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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

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Schuyler Brown

General Theological Seminary

Any hypothesis concerning the purpose that the author of Luke-Acts may have had in writing must, if it is to lay serious claim to acceptance, be based on the work as a whole. One of the weaknesses of the redaction-critical method, as it is sometimes employed, is its concentration on certain "key" texts from which the author's entire theological program is inferred. We may wonder whether the texts selected for this use were really as crucial to the author as they are to his modern interpreter. It may well be beyond the ingenuity of any New Testament exegete to suggest a purpose for Luke-Acts, or even for either part of the work, for which no "Achilles' heel" can be found in the form of some passage or saying which appears to contradict such a suggested purpose. Indeed, we may legitimately ask whether Luke must have had one and only one overriding purpose in writing. Furthermore, even if he did have such a purpose, it is hazardous to assume that he was entirely consistent in eliminating or editing all traditional material which could not be made to serve this purpose.

If the form-critics erred in viewing the evangelists as mere "collectors," it may be that the redaction-critics have gone too far in urging their independence and "creativity" in the use of tradition. "The 'process of redaction' can have taken place in several steps, over a rather long period of time and with the involvement of an entire circle of persons."² The contribution of the final author would, in this case, be considerably more modest than has sometimes been assumed, and the gospels, as well, perhaps, as other New Testament books, would have to be viewed as imperfect unities.

But whatever value such cautionary observations may have, the search for Luke's overall purpose will certainly continue, and in this search the textual starting point that the exegete selects is of very considerable importance. One obvious starting point is the two prologues,³ particularly the prologue to the gospel, in which the author explicitly states his purpose in writing (Lk 1:3-4). Unless we are to suppose a discrepancy between the author's declared purpose and his real purpose, it would seem reasonable to expect that all hypotheses concerning Luke's purpose be related somehow to what the author himself says. To be sure, the meaning of these verses is far from obvious, and one's interpretation of them will inevitably be influenced by the understanding of Luke's purpose obtained from the rest of the work. Nevertheless, the introduction of a "hermeneutical circle," in which we allow Luke's work to provide the commentary for his stated purpose and check our interpretation of the work against the author's statement in Lk 1:3-4 might bring a new element into a long-standing debate which seems, at times, to exclude a priori any possibility of its own resolution.

The former task, of allowing the individual exegesis of the gospel and Acts to cast light on Lk 1:3-4 and on any statement of purpose that may be implied in Acts 1:1-8, must be left to the authors of commentaries on these two works. Our concern in this article is restricted to the latter half of the circle. We will take the principal hypotheses which

have been proposed concerning Luke's purpose and see what basis they have in the two prologues.

Charles H. Talbert has given us a convenient summary of the alternative options from which we have to choose in determining the purpose of Luke.⁴ Today, nine years after the book's appearance, Talbert's categories continue to cover most suggestions as to Luke's purpose, even those which have been proposed in the interim. If we omit the last alternative,⁵ which has played no major role in recent discussion, the remaining options may be listed⁶ as follows:

1. The rehabilitation of Paul
2. An apology directed to the Roman state
3. The evangelization of the non-Christian world
4. The solution of a theological problem
5. A defence against heresy⁷

Obviously, options four and five are closely related, as long as they are proposed in this generic way.

One preliminary question which has a direct bearing on two of these options is whether the purpose stated in Lk 1:3-4 is to be taken as extending to both volumes of Luke's work or whether it simply gives his purpose in writing the gospel. In other words, is Lk 1:1-4 the prologue to the gospel alone or to the entire two-volume work?

The first option, that Luke's purpose is the rehabilitation of Paul, is possible only if the former alternative is true. For obviously Paul has no place in the gospel, and consequently, if Lk 1:1-4 expresses the theme of both volumes, option one is excluded as the purpose of either. Only if Acts was written as an afterthought, with a different purpose from the one expressed in the prologue to the gospel, does option one have any plausibility.

On the other hand, if Lk 1:1-4 is taken to be the prologue for both volumes of Luke's work, this would give considerable support to option four. For an intent to write the story of Jesus and the story of the church as two parts of one "historical"⁸ work suggests an originality of theological outlook which would set Luke apart from all the other evangelists, including John. "Thereby Christ's death and resurrection become one point in a series of fulfilled prophecies."⁹ The Christ-event no longer has the same climactic significance as in the other evangelists.

Unfortunately, this question about the literary function of Lk 1:1-4, which is so important for Luke's purpose, is probably not capable of being answered definitively. To be sure, it was the custom in antiquity to prefix to the first volume of a work a preface to the whole.¹⁰ But this really does not resolve the question. It shows that Lk 1:1-4 can be the preface for both the gospel and Acts but scarcely that it has to be. For if Acts were an afterthought, Luke might still have wished to refer back to the earlier work when he commenced the later one. The prologue to Acts is "secondary" in the sense that it recalls the content of the earlier volume, but this does not establish its function in the volume in which it stands.

For us the primary objection to regarding Lk 1:1-4 as the preface to both volumes lies in the introductory clause. If "the things which have been accomplished among us" are taken to include the contents of Acts, then Luke would be affirming that he had "many" predecessors not only in writing his gospel but also in composing his second volume, something that few contemporary critics would be prepared to admit.¹¹ However, we must admit that this consideration may not be absolutely decisive.¹²

Another general question concerning Lk 1:1-4 which has a bearing on Luke's purpose is the secularity or "Sachlichkeit"¹³ which it exhibits. The use of pragmata (v.1) and of the hapax legomenon autoptai (v.2) instead of martyres, and perhaps the absence of any reference to pistis in verse four may be taken as examples of this tendency. But the phenomenon can be interpreted in more than one way. The more obvious explanation would seem to favor option two or three: Luke prefers the language of Greek historiography to the language of faith because he is writing for non-Christians. However, Luke's secular style in the prologue has also been explained as the expression of a theological position,¹⁴ rather than as an accommodation to his readers.

There is no need for us to show how Lk 1:1-4 can be understood as an apology directed to the Roman state, since this task has long ago been done.¹⁵ Furthermore, as we have said already, the first option, the rehabilitation of Paul, has no relationship to the prologue to the gospel. Consequently, in considering the exegesis of Lk 1:1-4 we will be concerned with options three, four and five. In this connection it will not always be possible to distinguish clearly between options four and five, since the indications in the prologue that Luke is pursuing a theological purpose do not permit us to say definitively whether this was in response to the threat of false teaching.

Before Luke expresses his own purpose in writing, he states where he stands in relation to the previous tradition.¹⁶ To what extent Luke is to be understood as setting himself off against this tradition depends on how much force is given to epecheiresan (v.1). Obviously, Luke does not regard his own work as superfluous. But if he is claiming to undertake a task which his predecessors have attempted unsuccessfully, then this suggests an inner-Christian polemic which would give support to option four or five.

Those who consider Luke to be "the theologian of salvation history" will be inclined to see the theological notion of "fulfilment" behind the word peplērophorēmenōn.¹⁷ A glance at the concordance will show the interest Luke has in the theological concept expressed by (sym)plēroō. However, it can be questioned whether this interest is announced here in the prologue. First of all, as we have already noted, the prologue is very sparing in the use of specifically Christian conceptions.¹⁸ More important, it is difficult to see how events (pragmata) can be fulfilled in a theological sense. They can be the fulfilment of God's promises, but this is clearly not what Luke is saying here. A non-theological interpretation of the participle therefore seems preferable.¹⁹

The first person plural pronoun hēmin in verses one and two raises once again the relation of Lk 1:1-4 to Acts. If these verses form an introduction to both volumes of Luke's work, then these two pronouns may somehow be related to the "We" passages in Acts.²⁰ Initially we had intended to include a discussion of this matter in the present paper, but we subsequently decided that the topic deserved separate treatment.

We have already mentioned the principal argument in favor of restricting the pragmata to the events narrated in the gospel. If this argument is accepted, the question arises: why does the author use the first person plural pronoun in connection with events at which he was clearly not present in person? A certain analogy is found in the Johannine prologue (Jn 1:14.16), and it is of no great importance for our present concern whether the first occurrence of hēmin is called

"ecclesiastical" or "eschatological."²¹

In the hēmin in verse one Luke associates himself with the accomplishment of the pragmata. In the hēmin in verse two he associates himself with the polloī. Had he wished to suggest that his own task was radically different from that of his predecessors, we would expect to find autois as the indirect object of paredosan.²² This consideration must be balanced against any polemical intent which might be read out of epecheiresan. Positively, Luke's association of himself with his predecessors offers a basis for the view that diēgēsis is not simply Luke's designation for what the polloī have written but also expresses what Luke understood his own prōtos logos (Acts 1:1) to have been.²³

If the phrase hoi ap' archēs autoptai kai hypēretai genomenoi tou logou (v.2) refers to the apostles = the Twelve,²⁴ then we have here a Lucan theological leitmotiv: the traditio apostolica. Elsewhere²⁵ we have defended the thesis that in Luke's view the church rests on the fides apostolica, understood not merely as the continuity of the apostles' testimony but also as their unbroken faith during the Age of Jesus. Of course, the prologue does not tell us why Luke has recourse to the traditio apostolica. Is he concerned with the problem of tradition in itself (option four): how is the church connected with its origins?²⁶ Or is he appealing to the concept of the traditio apostolica to ward off some teaching that he considers to be dangerous (option five)?

If this theological conception is the presupposition for Luke's statement of purpose, then the hēmin in verse two takes on special force. The traditio apostolica was not simply the source for the work of the polloī and of Luke himself. It is the ultimate norm for the church (ecclesiological hēmin).

A "canonical" intent on Luke's part may be suggested by the phrase edoxe kamoi (v.3), particularly when we recall the similar phrase in Acts 15:28: edoxen gar tō pneumati tō hagio kai hēmin. Luke's omission of any reference to the holy spirit is in keeping with his secular style, but it offended some scribes who added the words "and to the holy spirit,"²⁷ thereby underlining the parallel with the text in Acts. For Luke the apostolic decree was the definitive document which consolidated the relationship between the Gentile Christians and the Jewish Christians.²⁸ Does his use of edoxe kamoi suggest that he attributed an analogously definitive significance to his own gospel? In any case, the kamoi underlines Luke's solidarity with his predecessors and, through them, with the traditio apostolica which they incorporated into their writings.²⁹

In what sense Luke's work may have gone beyond that of his predecessors could be suggested by the distinction between ap' archēs and anōthen. The two expressions occur together in Acts 26:4-5, and anōthen may designate an earlier point in time than ap' archēs.³⁰ According to Acts 1:22 (arxamenos apo tou baptisματος Iōannou), the archē in question would seem to be the beginning of the traditio apostolica, i.e. the baptism of John. It seems reasonable, therefore, to suppose that anōthen in Lk 1:3 includes the infancy narrative, which follows immediately upon the prologue.³¹

If this is the case, what is the reference of pasin? An explanation of the word as a solecism for pasais, referring to diegēseis (understood),³² would make Luke's task correspond precisely with that of his predecessors. On the other hand, an interpretation of the word to include what Luke narrates in Acts³³ seems to overlook the probable reference to

the pragmata in verse one.³⁴ Furthermore, the parallel use of panton in Acts 1:1 makes clear, through the phrase that follows, that Jesus' ascension (anelēmphthē) [v.2] is the terminus usque ad quem.³⁵ If Luke is claiming here to be more comprehensive than his predecessors a parte post as well as a parte ante, then perhaps the pasin is to be thought of as including Jesus' conversations with his apostles after the resurrection (Lk 24:13-49; Acts 1:3-8).

Luke's use of panta in both prologues may have a polemical thrust, a possibility which would favor option five. "Luke underlines the completeness of the apostolic witness in various ways at decisive points in Acts, evidently taking a position against growing pseudo-Christian secret tradition."³⁶ In other words, Luke is telling his readers all there is to tell, and he does so by going beyond the work of his predecessors, including an infancy narrative and post-resurrection conversations. Can we conclude from this that these two loci served as sources for the secret teaching which Luke opposed?

"It is not completely impossible that Luke may have known about the heretical danger of such logoi apokryphoi, and that his reaction against this danger ... was an influence in limiting the appearances to forty days."³⁷ It is possible that the Gospel of Thomas intends to give the reader the words of the risen Jesus,³⁸ and apocryphal infancy narratives were used to convey unorthodox teaching.³⁹ However, any assumption that the literary genres used to circulate heresy in the post-Biblical period were already being used for this purpose in Luke's day must remain extremely tentative.

Whatever the precise reference of pasin (Lk 1:3), it is not necessary to understand it in such a way as to exclude the diēgeseis of Luke's predecessors.⁴⁰ The normative character that the traditio apostolica has for Luke is suggested by hēmin (v.2), and this tradition is accessible to him only through the works of his predecessors, in which it is incorporated. Pasin can therefore be taken to refer both to diēgeseis and to pragmata, so that both senses of parakolouthēō are brought into play. By "following what is read" in the works of his predecessors Luke "keeps in touch with"⁴¹ "the things accomplished among us."

The adverb akribōs may sharpen the polemical tendency implied in pasin. It is not clear whether it is to be taken with parēkolouthēkoti or with grapsai, but its position may suggest that it goes with both.

The word kathexēs has been used as a basis for ascribing a theological purpose to Luke (option four). For a study of the gospel shows that "Luke does not give us an order which represents the historical sequence of events more accurately than Mark. Consequently, his program to write everything 'in the correct sequence' (kathexēs) cannot designate a strictly chronological order."⁴² If Luke's order is not chronological,⁴³ is it perhaps theological? Such a reference to theological order could be connected with Luke's "geographical theology,"⁴⁴ but it could also signify the joining together of two phases of salvation history, the Age of Jesus and the Age of the Church.⁴⁵ To be sure, this latter suggestion has force only if we presuppose that Lk 1:1-4 is the prologue for both books.⁴⁶

But it may be that the notion of "order" -- whether chronological or theological -- is not in kathexēs at all. If the correct translation is simply "as follows," then the purpose which Luke expresses in verse four would be achieved not by any sort of order but simply by the accuracy (akribōs) of what he writes.⁴⁷

More important than the insoluble question of the personal identity of Theophilus⁴⁸ is the question of whom he represents.⁴⁹ Considered in terms of options three through five, this question can be rephrased: was Theophilus a "person who had received ecclesiastical instruction"⁵⁰ or was he someone "on the brink of Christianity"?⁵¹ The question of Luke's purpose is closely related to the question of his addressees. Was Luke writing to Christians or to well-disposed non-Christians?

This question becomes crucial for the interpretation of the final verse of the prologue. Does *katēchēthēs* suggest a process of formal catechetical instruction or does the verb have the general meaning "to inform"?⁵² A possible connection between *logoi* in verse four and *logos* in verse two, suggesting that the plural form is the concretization of the singular,⁵³ might favor the former alternative, since *logos* is clearly the apostolic preaching (cf. Acts 6:2.4).

If *logoi* refers to catechetical instruction,⁵⁴ then *asphaleia* cannot refer to faith,⁵⁵ which Theophilus, as an instructed Christian, would already possess. It could signify objectively the security or protection provided by Luke's work itself for the church's catechesis.⁵⁶ This interpretation would support option five, since it suggests the presence of a threat to faith which Luke's work is intended to counter.⁵⁷ But *asphaleia* could also be taken subjectively to designate Theophilus' reflex certitude concerning what he had already come to believe.

On the other hand, if Theophilus is a well-disposed non-Christian, then his acknowledgment (*epignōs*) of the reliability (*asphaleian*) of the matters (*logōn*) about which he has been informed (*katēchēthēs*) would be the act of faith itself. This strange circumlocution would come from Luke's concern to avoid the use of Christian language in addressing readers who were not yet Christians.

From our limited perspective, which is confined to the prologue, it is not easy to choose between option three, on the one hand, and option four or five on the other. The style of Lk 1:1-4 does seem geared to win over the readers of the gospel to Christianity. On the other hand, the appeal to the *traditio apostolica* as the ultimate authority appears to presuppose that Luke's readers are already Christians. Can the theological (or anti-heretical) tendency be brought together with the evangelical tendency, so that both can be seen as expressions of one and the same purpose? An affirmative answer to this question has been given. "The same impetus which, with respect to the past, led to a new type of certitude concerning the facts of salvation history led, with respect to the present, to the characterization of Christianity as an intellectual movement capable of holding its own in competition."⁵⁸

But even if such a formulation could show how the two tendencies of the gospel stem from the same impetus on the part of the author, does it explain how Luke's work could have been addressed to a single audience? Why would Christians need to be shown that Christianity was an attractive intellectual option, and, conversely, why would those whom Luke was seeking to win over by such a demonstration require a new type of certitude? The double tendency in Luke does seem to presuppose two circles of readers,⁵⁹ and perhaps some thought should be given to the question: what plausible *Sitz im Leben* in early Christianity might have given rise to a book with such diverse potentials?

The prologue to Acts can be dealt with much more briefly, since its bearing on the purpose of the author is limited. Even if we understand the prologue to extend as far as Jesus' final words with his disciples, i.e. through Acts 1:8, there is nothing in it to correspond to Luke's explicit statement of purpose in Lk 1:3-4. This could be seen as an argument in favor of the view that Lk 1:1-4 was intended by the author to introduce both works. But Acts 1:1-8 may contain an implicit expression of Luke's purpose, which would deserve our consideration.

The prologue to Acts is at one with the prologue to the gospel in its utilization of contemporary literary forms. Luke's second prologue, then, provides additional evidence of the author's intention to represent Christianity as a world religion and not as a Palestinian sect.⁶⁰ As we have already noted, this tendency supports the view that the author's purpose was evangelization (option three).

In the first two verses the author resumes the content of his earlier work and then proceeds immediately to a summary description of the forty days (vv.3-5), which serves as a transition to a new scene, Jesus' last conversation with his apostles before his ascension (vv.6-8). If the prologue to Acts is taken narrowly, so as to exclude these last three verses, then the author gives us no preview of the contents of the book that he is beginning. However, this function is fulfilled by Jesus' prediction and implicit command in verse eight.

If Lk 1:1-4 is understood to be the prologue to both the gospel and Acts, the most that we might hope to find at the beginning of the second volume would be some confirmation of the author's purpose as already expressed at the beginning of the gospel. If Luke's purpose is to present a "geographical theology," then the reference in Acts 1:8 to the triumphant advance of the apostolic witness "in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth" could be seen as spelling out the implications of *kathexēs* in Lk 1:3. If, on the other hand, Luke hopes to bring Theophilus and the group of readers whom he represents to believe in the Christian preaching, then the fact that this preaching has reached "the end of the earth," i.e. Rome, the capital of the Greco-Roman world, could be taken as confirmatory evidence of its reliability (*asphaleia*).

If the author's purpose is to appeal to the *traditio apostolica*, this appeal is surely strengthened by Jesus' promise concerning the territorial expansion of the apostolic witness. If Luke invokes the *traditio apostolica* in order to combat dangerous doctrine, then the forty-day period of instruction by the risen Lord on the subject of "the things about the kingdom of God" (v.3), i.e. the content of Christian teaching, serves to exclude any appeal to secret teaching which might be in conflict with the *traditio apostolica*. If, on the other hand, the theme of tradition was introduced in the prologue to the gospel precisely as a theological problem, then Acts 1:6-7 may be raising a complementary theological problem. The problem of tradition is how to preserve the connection with the beginning. The problem of Acts 1:6-7 could be phrased: how to preserve the expectation of the end (*basileia*), despite the church's ignorance of the time of its coming (*ouch hymōn estin gnōnai chronous ē kairous*)? Acts 1:8 would then be seen as an answer to this problem: the church's ignorance as to when the end will come is rendered tolerable by its reception of the spirit and its engagement in its missionary task.⁶¹

If we assume that Luke-Acts represents a single work with a single purpose, then we must raise with respect to Acts the same question that presented itself for the gospel: do the evangelical and theological tendencies expressed in the work presuppose two groups of readers, and, if so, what may this suggest concerning the historical circumstances in which the work was written?

We have discussed the possibility of interpreting Acts 1:1-8 as a confirmation of the author's statement of purpose in Lk 1:3-4. But what if Acts was written as an afterthought, in response to a different problem and in order to achieve a different purpose?⁶² As we have noted, there is no explicit statement of purpose at the beginning of Acts. Nevertheless, the fact that the expansion of the apostolic witness (Acts 1:8) appears as a prediction and a command on the lips of the risen Lord could suggest an implicit purpose on the author's part.

If the outward movement from Jerusalem to Rome is understood quantitatively, so as to suggest the growth of the Christian mission, then the fact that this growth is the fulfillment of Jesus' promise and command might serve "to spur his [Luke's] community to missionary effort at a time when external pressures made such effort extraordinarily difficult."⁶³ If, on the other hand, the emphasis is qualitative, so as to suggest the transition from the Jewish-Christian community in Jerusalem to the center of the Gentile world, then Acts 1:8 could be intended to represent the Gentile mission "as being the result not of any human decision but of God's direct intervention."⁶⁴

Finally, if Acts was written as an afterthought, 1:8 could be taken as support for option one, the rehabilitation of Paul. The fact that the promise made by Jesus to the apostles (Acts 1:2) comes to fulfillment in the person of Paul (Acts 28:30-31) is a very forceful way of associating him with the traditio apostolica.⁶⁵

The purpose of this paper has been strictly limited. We have not attempted to propose all the exegetical alternatives for the interpretation of the two Lucan prologues, since only a limited number of these alternatives are related, directly or indirectly, to the question of the author's purpose. Nor have we tried to list all the hypotheses concerning Luke's purpose or purposes, since such hypotheses depend on the interpretation not only of the prologues but of the entire work.

Nevertheless, we hope that our exposition of the bearing of the two prologues on the question of Luke's purpose in writing may stimulate activity in the other direction of the hermeneutical circle. For only thus can light be shed on the fundamental question: to what extent was Luke a self-conscious author and to what extent was he the representative of a wider tradition which he only imperfectly succeeded in making his own?

NOTES

1. After completing the research for this paper, we decided to substitute the word "purpose" for the related but less specific term "tendency" which appeared in the original title.
2. A. Weiser, Die Knechtsgleichnisse der synoptischen Evangelien (Munich 1971), p. 241. See our review in Biblica 54 (1973) 578-581.
3. We are presuming the authenticity of the prologue to Acts, which some critics have assigned to a redactor. See E. Haenchen, Die Apostelgeschichte (Göttingen 1965), pp. 113-114.
4. Luke and the Gnostics (New York 1966), chapter 7, "The Alternatives."
5. That of J. Knox in Marcion and the New Testament (Chicago 1942), treated by Talbert on pp. 108-109.
6. We have reversed the sequence of Talbert's second and third options and described options one, four and five more generically than he does, in order to make them as comprehensive as possible.
7. Option five is the proposal of Talbert himself, who identifies the heresy in question as Gnosticism.
8. Whether or not Luke intended to write strict history depends, as far as the prologues are concerned, on how one interprets his use, particularly in Lk 1:3, of expressions found in contemporary Hellenistic historiographers. See D. J. Sneen, "An Exegesis of Luke 1:1-4 with Special Regard to Luke's Purpose as an Historian," ET 83 (1971-1972) 40-43. We believe that "Acts cannot be called an historical work in the proper sense, because what Luke intends to present is not human history but salvation history." (A. Wikenhauser - J. Schmid, Einleitung in das Neue Testament [Freiburg 1973], p. 351.) The same statement could be made about Luke's gospel.
9. E. Lohse, "Lukas als Theologe der Heilsgeschichte," Ev Theol 14 (1954) 265.
10. H. J. Cadbury, "Commentary on the Preface of Luke," in The Beginnings of Christianity (London 1922), I II 491.
11. Luke's pioneer role in the composition of Acts is independent of the question whether or not there were available traditions concerning the life of the early Christian communities. See J. Jervell, "The Problem of Traditions in Acts" in Luke and the People of God (Minneapolis 1972).
12. G. Klein ("Lukas 1, 1-4 als theologisches Programm," in Zeit und Geschichte [Tübingen 1964]) admits that the work of Luke's predecessors did not include the history of the early church (205), but he sees an allusion to Acts in pasin and kathexes in verse three (210-211).

13. H. Flender, Heil und Geschichte in der Theologie des Lukas (Munich 1965), p. 61.
14. Klein 214: "Luke waives the use of a lingua christiana in order to express the objective verifiability of the contents of faith."
15. H. J. Cadbury, "The Purpose Expressed in Luke's Preface," Exp 21 (1921) 431-441.
16. Klein 211 divides the prologue into a "Standortbestimmung" (vv.1-2) and a "Zweckbestimmung" (vv.3-4).
17. Lohse 261: "The full-sounding participle ... points to the fact that God has caused events to be fulfilled whose significance extends into the future and therefore has a fundamental character for the church."
18. About the only exception to the rule of secularity in the prologue is the use of logos in verse two.
19. Arndt & Gingrich (A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature [Chicago 1957]), ad verb., offer the translation "the things that have been accomplished among us." Cf. M.-J. Lagrange, "Le sens de Luc 1, 1 d'après les papyrus," Bull. d'ancienne litt. et d'arch. chrét. 2 (1912) 100: "Les faits accomplis parmi nous."
20. See H. J. Cadbury, "'We' and 'I' Passages in Luke-Acts," NTS 3 (1956-1957) 128-132, and E. Haenchen, "Das 'Wir' in der Apostelgeschichte und das Itinerar," ZThK 58 (1961) 329-366.
21. See H. Schürmann, Das Lukasevangelium: Erster Teil (Freiburg 1969), p. 8.
22. Ibid., p. 8, n. 44.
23. See W. Marxsen, Der Evangelist Markus (Göttingen 1959), p. 13.
24. For Klein this identification is suggested by the comparable formulation in Acts 13:31. There were "eye-witnesses from the beginning" who did not become (genomenoi) "servants of the word" (see Acts 1:21-22), and there were "servants of the word" who had not been "eye-witnesses from the beginning" (see Acts 26:16), but the two concepts coincide only in the Twelve. For the details of Klein's somewhat complex argument, see pp. 201-205.
25. Apostasy and Perseverance in the Theology of Luke (Rome 1969).
26. Klein 214: "The question of how the connection with the beginning is to be preserved."
27. B. M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (London 1971), p. 129.
28. Klein 215.

29. Cf. W. C. van Unnik, "Opmerkingen over het doel van Lucas' Geschiedwerk (Luc 1, 4)," *NedThT* 9 (1955) 330 n. 1: "From the kamoi it is clear that verse one levels no criticism against predecessors but rather that Luke lines himself up with them."
30. Klein 208-210.
31. See Schürmann 11: "Here Luke has us consider that his ... careful investigation went beyond the traditions derived from the legitimated apostolic eye-witnesses (vv.1-2), ap' archēs, i.e. that it brought to light the 'prehistories' of Lk 1-2." However, Cadbury (Commentary 502) cautions us: "There appears to be no warrant for assigning to the word [parēkolouthēkoti] the sense of deliberate investigation." Therefore, even if anōthen is taken to include the infancy narrative, the prologue does not oblige us to suppose that Luke had special sources or informants for his first two chapters. See R. E. Brown, "Luke's Method in the Annunciation Narratives of Chapter One" (unpublished article submitted for the John L. McKenzie Festschrift).
32. This possibility is mentioned but rejected by Schürmann 10.
33. Klein 210.
34. Grammatically speaking, pasin can be either masculine or neuter. If masculine, it would refer either to polloi (v.1) or to autoptai and hypēretai (v.2). This would yield two possible interpretations for parēkolouthēkoti ... pasin: 1. Luke has studied all the earlier writers. 2. Luke has accompanied all the "eye-witnesses" and "servants of the word." The former interpretation corresponds with Luke's dependence on Mark and Q, according to the Two-Source Theory. The latter is the apparent basis for the view in the early church that Luke was "a follower and disciple of the apostles" (Irenaeus, AH iii 10 1). If pasin is neuter, the reference is to pragmata (v.1), and this interpretation seems to be the simplest. This would make it possible for pasin to include the events treated in chapters one and two, since pragmata, which occurs before the comparative clause in verse two, is not, of itself, restricted to the events following the archē of the traditio apostolica. On the other hand, to understand this reference to pragmata as somehow by-passing the traditio apostolica and its incorporation in the literary efforts of the polloi seems unwarranted. For the opposing view see Klein 206-207: "For him [Luke] his own discovery of truth replaces recourse to the apostolic tradition."
35. However, in Acts 1:1 pantōn is limited by the phrase "that Jesus began to do and teach," so that here the archē of the traditio apostolica is the terminus a quo, i.e. the infancy narrative cannot be included. If pasin (Lk 1:3) and pantōn (Acts 1:1) do in fact have a different comprehension, this is not necessarily due to any deliberate intention on the author's part.

36. Schürmann 11.
37. J. M. Robinson, "Logoi Sophōn: Zur Gattung der Spruchquelle Q," in Zeit und Geschichte, p. 84, n. 27.
38. Loc. cit.
39. O. Cullmann, "Infancy Gospels," in E. Hennecke - W. Schneemelcher, New Testament Apocrypha (Philadelphia 1963) I 367: "It is the Gnostics who appear to have been especially interested in infancy stories and to have encouraged the collection of all this kind of material."
40. Pace Klein 206: "The predecessors were concerned with the traditional diēgēsis of events. Luke, on the contrary, wants to get back to the events themselves."
41. See Cadbury, Commentary 503-504.
42. J. Schmid, "Lukasevangelium," LThK VI 1208.
43. Schürmann 12 insists that kathexēs means a "chronologically correct sequence" but then adds: "To be sure, Luke is thinking more in terms of salvation history than 'historically.'" But an order that is governed by considerations of salvation history would seem to be more theological than chronological.
44. Lohse 260: Luke "points to the geographical way which was taken by the sequence of events that he describes."
45. Klein 211. It is this "follow-up" to the Age of Jesus which, in Klein's opinion, is what Luke missed in the works of his predecessors.
46. Klein seems to presuppose what his interpretation of kathexēs is intended to prove. If, when Luke announced his intention to Theophilus to write "one thing after the other" (see Klein 211 n. 99), he had already determined on a sequel to the gospel, then the notion of succession in kathexēs might be given the significance that Klein assigns to it.
47. J. Kürzinger, "Lk 1, 3: ... akribōs kathexēs soi grapsai," BZ 18 (1974) 249-255. See also M. Völkel, "Exegetische Erwägungen zum Verständnis des Begriffs kathexēs im Lukkanischen Prolog," NTS 20 (1973-1974) 289-299. Völkel translates kathexēs as "continua serie." Unlike Kürzinger, he believes that the word has a relation to Luke's purpose. Luke endeavors "to represent them [pragmata] in such a way that the connective sense of the event that he describes becomes clear and thus ... contributes to epignōsis in relation to the asphaleia of the teaching" (298).
48. The fact that "Theophilus" appears in Josephus (Ant 18 123) as the name of a Jew would have significance for those who think that Luke is addressing Jewish-Christians.
49. Klein 213: "Luke does not compose his work with a view to convincing an historical individual In Luke's

mind, the intended effect on Theophilus represents the effect of the work on each reader."

50. Schürmann 13.
51. W. C. van Unnik, "The 'Book of Acts' -- the Confirmation of the Gospel," NT 4 (1960) 59.
52. Arndt & Gingrich, ad verb., cite parallels for the general meaning as well as for the meaning "teach, instruct ... in our lit. only of instruction in religious matters." In Acts 21:21.24 the verb must have the generic meaning, since it is used of the misinformation that has been circulated about Paul. In Acts 18:25, however, the connotation is religious: Apollos has been "instructed (ka-techémenos) in the way of the Lord." The specific sense of catechetical instruction is found in 2 Cl 17:1.
53. The problem of the relationship between "the word" and "the words" is a familiar one in contemporary theological discussion.
54. Klein's suggestion (213) that the logoi are "the pre-Lucan literature" seems quite unfounded. It rests on the parallel between the plural forms polloi (v.1) and logoi (v.4). Robinson's article (see footnote 37) gives the history of the plural usage.
55. Flender 63: "Not one word suggests that ... [Luke's] presentation is supposed to call forth faith." Klein 216 comes close to suggesting that Luke intends that asphaleia should replace faith. One senses that systematic concerns are finding expression here.
56. From a Roman Catholic confessional standpoint, "motives of credibility" do not undermine the nature of faith, since they neither cause it (subjectively) nor prove it (objectively). A similar "motive of credibility" can be seen in 1 Cor 15:6. See my "Response to Professor Peter - II," CTSA Proceedings 29 (1974) 279.
57. To continue the parallel from the previous note, Paul's appeal to living witnesses of the risen Lord in 1 Cor 15:6 is made in response to a clear danger to the faith of his community (1 Cor 15:14.17).
58. Klein 212-213.
59. Pace Klein 212: "It is not that a message is being delivered here to two different groups of readers."
60. See Haenchen Apg 106.
61. Cf. H. Conzelmann, Die Apostelgeschichte (Tübingen 1963), p. 22: "The delay of the parousia is transformed into something positive, from the standpoint of salvation history." But there is really nothing in these verses to suggest that the problem is the delay of the parousia.
62. A shift in Luke's purpose between the gospel and Acts would seem more likely if he were addressing Christians in both works than if he were addressing well-disposed

non-Christians. The needs of Christians could shift between the composition of the two volumes, but if he were addressing non-Christian readers, Luke's purpose would remain basically the same, i.e. conversion to Christianity. Hence the adoption of option three seems more compatible with viewing Luke-Acts as a single work written with a single purpose than it does with the contrary hypothesis.

63. S. Brown, "Précis of Eckhard Plümacher, Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller," SBL Seminar Papers (1974) II 112.
64. Ibid., 110. Haenchen's suggestion (Apg 111) that the problem of the Gentile mission is already alluded to in Acts 1:6 depends on his restrictive interpretation of "Israel" in that verse. Jervell 60 argues, to the contrary, that "The addition of the Gentiles is part of the restoration of Israel." The point of Acts 1:8 could not be that "salvation is not restricted (emphasis ours) to Israel" (Haenchen Apg 112) if Luke considers the Gentiles to be associate members of Israel.
65. Cf. G. Klein, Die Zwölf Apostel (Göttingen 1961) 210. M. Bourke has gone so far as to suggest (The University Seminar for Studies in the New Testament, Minutes of the Meeting of Nov. 22nd, 1974, p. 11): "It has always seemed to me that Luke must consider Paul as an apostle because Paul is the only one who actually fulfills the commission in Acts 1:8 ('to the end of the earth')."

T. C. Smith

The importance of the role of Stephen in Acts is recognized by all, but whether Luke had more than a mere historical interest in this pioneer of world-missions is still a subject for debate. What is the significance of the Stephen episode for the author of Acts? Is there any way for us to detect the theological stance of Luke through his presentation of the first Christian martyr? Does the tendency of the author breathe through the story with sufficient regularity for us to see how he related to the character whom he described? Was he at one with Stephen over against the Apostle Paul? Does he at the time of his writing of the document comprehend fully that Stephen represented the genuine gospel sans Law, sans Temple, and sans Jewish nationalism while Paul deviated from the truth by compromising at various times for the sake of Jewish nationalistic interests?

To my knowledge no in-depth study has been made which aims at connecting Luke's viewpoint with the Stephen incident. The investigation of O'Neill¹ seems to be the only one that has considered the matter seriously. He takes as his starting point the speech of Stephen because it occurs at the first crisis in Acts and because it is so different in form and content from the other speeches in Acts. He maintains that Luke's theology can be discerned in his movement of history and argues that the most sure method of discovering his viewpoint is to see what he chooses to tell and what he omits, where he begins and where he ends. It is true that the most significant part of the Stephen tradition is found in the speech, but should not an examination include the whole episode of Stephen? In this investigation I shall follow essentially the methodology of O'Neill, but the study will be expanded to embrace the whole tradition about Stephen incorporated by Luke. It is hoped that no one will assume that this paper is a comprehensive examination of the materials. It only scratches the surface. Perhaps sufficient interest can be created to motivate others in this direction.

The Hellenistic age had no single concept of historiography.² Lucian who wrote in the second century A.D. began his tract *On Writing History* with a harsh attack on his contemporaries. He believed that the aim and goal of history were centered in its usefulness. In order to accomplish this task, the historian's work must be true. The usefulness of history resided in the openness of men to learn how to react to the circumstances of the present by the record of the past. He commended to the historians two causes to keep ever before them. The first was the national cause and the second was a moral cause. With respect to the moral reason he advocated the use of real examples from whom the reader might construct an ideal for himself and for the state. In addition these living examples might point out to a person what course of action he should avoid. If we could be certain that Luke followed principles similar to those outlined by Lucian, we would be in a much better position to discover the tendency of Acts. The sentiment of the author relative to his characters and his development of

materials is not easily discovered. We do not hear the voice of Luke in the midst of his work. Furthermore, if we could positively identify Theophilus, the man to whom Luke addresses himself, perhaps the whole design of Luke would be much clearer for us.

Before considering the story of Stephen let us briefly take a look at the primitive Church prior to Acts 6. In Acts Luke begins his narrative with a tradition about post-resurrection appearances of Jesus to the apostles during a period of forty days, a tradition apparently unknown to him when he wrote his Gospel. The content of his conversation with the apostles was focused on the kingdom of God. He also instructed them to remain in Jerusalem until they received the Holy Spirit. On one of these occasions when Jesus was in the company of the apostles, they asked him if he was going to restore the kingdom to Israel (Acts 1:6). The nature of the question clearly reveals an attempt on the part of the apostles to limit the purpose of the risen Lord to the glorification of the nation Israel. Luke has Jesus ignoring the question and substituting a command that implied a severance of their national ties with Judaism. After receiving the Holy Spirit they were to be his witnesses in Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria and to the ends of the earth.

Luke's division of the contents of Acts (2:14-8:1;8:2-11:18; 11:19-28:31) seems to suggest that he was far more interested and dedicated to the injunction of the risen Lord than the apostles. Their anxiety expressed in Acts 1:6 is further demonstrated by their close adhesion to the Temple and the acceptance of shelter under the roof of Jewish institutions. While the Galilean disciples had their private gatherings for instruction, prayer, breaking of bread and the rest (2:42,45, 46b;4:23f;5:42), their public activities centered in the Temple precincts where the crowds gathered (2:46a;3:1-3,11f;5:12,20-21, 25,42). Manson³ suggests that the primitive Church expected Jerusalem was to be the scene of the return of Christ. The apostles were influenced in part by Malachi 3:1-4, and this probably explains why they remained in Jerusalem and in the vicinity of the Temple rather than returning to Galilee. In addition to their attachment to the Temple the apostles and other Jewish converts felt honor bound to remain under the umbrage of the Law for their own protection nationally. If they discarded the Law, they were in danger of losing their national existence. Since the Law was the basis for the Jewish civil and religious forms, membership in the nation required the observance of the regulations and customs. They did not see how they could exist as a religious community in a Jewish land unless they followed the Law. To them confession of Jesus as Messiah did not carry with it any notion of the abrogation of the Law. On the contrary their Jewish devoutness was upheld by the Law. The Scriptures acquired a greater meaning, a new intensity, and a more inward spiritual force.

Up until chapter 6 the primitive community enjoyed unity, peace, and harmony. It was a closely knit fellowship that flourished and became extremely popular among Jewish people. There is no record of any internal troubles except the case of Ananias and Sapphira which lasted only for a moment. The only external attempt to curtail their efforts came from the Sadducees. Yet it does not appear that their reaction stemmed

from any suspicion of the apostles' adherence to Judaism. The Sadducees were afraid that a riot might ensue from the accusations leveled against them for their responsibility in connection with the death of Jesus. Any kind of stir in the city was always a threat to their peacemaking role for Rome. The first time that the apostles appeared before the Sadducees they received nothing more than a reprimand and threat (Acts 4:17,21). The second arrest brought a more severe form of punishment. They were flogged (Acts 5:40). However, there had been a desire to have them executed, but Gamaliel with his "wait and see" policy prevented this drastic action.

The kind of attitude registered by the apostles and the early Church in Jerusalem could never have made the break with Judaism and permit the new movement to become a world-wide religion. In their Jewishness the Hebrew Christians began to identify their salvation with historical and earthly fixtures. Luke seems to know this. If not, he certainly makes the reader aware of the inability of the apostles to transcend nationalism and follow the suprahistorical purpose which God had for his people.

Stephen the Administrator and Evangelist

The abrupt beginning of chapter 6 indicates that Luke has resorted to another source. The introductory formula ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἡμέραις reveals that the author was not aware of the exact time in relation to the other events which he had recorded. He does seem to know that sufficient time had elapsed for a further increase in the number of disciples. However, the author has not mentioned anything previously about two groups existing in the community of believers. He simply takes it for granted that the reader is familiar with this duality. The unity of the church which Luke had stressed so much previously (1:14; 2:1,46; 4:32; 5:12) has now been replaced with dissension. Luke intentionally draws our attention from the Palestinian Jewish Christians to let us get a glimpse of another group of Jewish Christians who were able to break across nationalistic barriers and proclaim the gospel to the Gentiles.

In Acts 6:1-8:2 there are two stories connected with Stephen plus a speech attributed to him. It is thought by some that Luke follows two sources to introduce Stephen. One presents him as one of the Seven selected to carry out the administrative function of seeing that the Hellenistic Jewish Christian widows were given their proper share of the alms. The other story portrays him as an aggressive evangelist. There seems to be no serious reason for attributing the two roles of Stephen to two sources. His function as an administrator along with that of the other six was due to an ad hoc commission. When the problem of discrimination was solved within the community, he continued his mission of preaching to those outside the community--the Hellenistic Jews.

What brought about the tension in the church that resulted in discrimination against the Hellenistic Jewish Christian widows? Was it caused by linguistic or cultural differences? It is true that the Jews who lived in the land of Palestine viewed with suspicion their kinsmen who lived outside the land.

A large number of Jews who lived outside the land adopted the Greek language as their own while Palestinian Jews for the most part spoke Aramaic. Many of the customs which were observed by the Palestinian Jews were not considered too important by Hellenistic Jews. Since Jews outside the land associated freely with Gentiles, there was a deep feeling of resentment against them because they suspected that the Hellenistic Jews compromised their religious principles for financial gain. Linguistic and cultural differences could account in part for the rift in the church, but there must have been a more radical difference in the community. Lurking behind the presentation of Luke is a significant disagreement between the two groups concerning ideologies and thought forms. There was a theological division.⁴ This variation in the theological viewpoint becomes clearer to us in the debate of Stephen with members of the Hellenistic synagogues. The cause of the rift is further clarified when the Hellenistic Jewish Christians bear the brunt of the persecution after the death of Stephen. Why did Luke decide to pass over the real issue in silence? Did he suppose that the reader would come to this conclusion from what followed in the persecution and martyrdom of Stephen along with the rest of Acts? Schmithals⁵ says that it is evident Luke knew more about the difference than he indicates in Acts 6:1-7 by the continuation of his account of Stephen.

Though the theological division in the church continued, Luke lets us know that discrimination against the impoverished widows ceased. The appointment of the Seven was an assurance against a repetition of this unkind act. All of them had Greek names, so we assume that they represented the Hellenists. It seems strange indeed that Hellenistic Jewish Christians would be appointed to control the social service function of the whole primitive Christian community in Jerusalem. Admittedly this was a sure way of protecting those who had been deliberately overlooked previously, but could the whole church agree to such a decision without fear of retaliatory discrimination? Could it be that Luke is telling us that the character of these men safeguarded against showing special favor toward their own? They were well equipped with faith and wisdom in addition to be filled with the Holy Spirit. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Seven were made leaders of the Hellenistic community while the Twelve continued to maintain their control of the primitive church.

The most prominent of the Seven was Stephen. His varied gifts made him an influential and convincing advocate of the faith. His endowments were accompanied by a manifestation of works that appear to be miraculous in character. Heretofore only the apostles displayed this power. In addition to the qualities of Stephen described by Luke he had in some degree an authority and official status by being selected as one of the Seven.

Stephen did not follow the pattern of the apostles and go to the Temple to bear his witness. His interests were directed toward the Hellenistic Jews. He was more at home in the Hellenistic synagogues. Perhaps Luke wants us to see that the kind of views concerning the Christian faith represented by Stephen might be more readily received in these circles. Under normal conditions the freer inward character of the message of Jesus would be more attractive to the Diaspora Jews. Their

broader contacts in the provinces made them less nationalistic than those who lived in Palestine all their lives. Their encounters with other religions and philosophy pressured them into a re-examination of their own faith. The type of reasoning which they employed was superior to the pedantic and superficial approach of the rabbis.

When Stephen expounded his views in the synagogue, the Hellenistic Jews engaged him in a debate. They probably forced him into an argument to get him to express opinions which they could use against him. Luke tells us that he overcame his opponents with irresistible wisdom and spirit (6:10). When they saw that they were no match for Stephen, their jealousy prompted them to stir up the people against him. Thus they secured men who would misrepresent what Stephen said. These men said that they heard Stephen speak blasphemous words against Moses and God. A charge of blasphemy was a capital offense and punishable by death. This brought the elders and scribes into the picture, and Stephen was brought before the Sanhedrin.

It is interesting to note that the original charge of blasphemy by the manipulated witnesses in verse 11 does not appear in the trial of Stephen. Unless testimony could be produced to verify Stephen's use of the sacred name of God, he was not liable according to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 7:5). In order to get the swift attention of the people, elders, and scribes the Hellenistic Jews persuaded the witnesses to accuse Stephen of blasphemy which could be interpreted later in the lesser meaning of abusive language.

Before the Sanhedrin the witnesses testified that Stephen incessantly spoke against the holy place (the Temple) and the Law. Luke says that they were false witnesses. In what sense was the testimony false? Surely there was some foundation for the allegations. According to Jewish law a witness who gave false testimony was answerable for the life of the sentenced person (Mishnah: Sanhedrin 4:5). The testimony of the witnesses was sustained by the court. What did Luke mean? Does he attempt to tone down the charges against Stephen for some ulterior motive? Yet the speech of Stephen indicates that there is an element of truth to the allegations. Furthermore those who shared the opinion of Stephen went to the Gentile world with a gospel free from legalistic tradition. Easton⁶ suggests that the falseness must lie in some secondary detail. It is also possible that the men who brought the charges against Stephen twisted his words in order to cause alarm. More probably Luke means that the witnesses falsified the specifications to the charges. In the specifications to the charges the witnesses said that they heard Stephen say that Jesus of Nazareth was going to destroy the Temple and change the customs of Moses (v. 14). The accusation is made by witnesses at the trial of Jesus and by the crowds at the crucifixion that he had made the statement about destroying the Temple and rebuilding it in three days. This is found in Matthew 26:61; 27:40; Mark 14:58:15:29 and John 2:19. Luke for some reason omitted this accusation in his Gospel. Apparently Stephen in his preaching and in the debate with the Hellenistic Jews placed more emphasis on the anti-ritual and anti-legalistic side of Jesus' teaching, and they understood him to say that Jesus would return and make fundamental changes in the Law and nullify the Temple.

The Speech of Stephen

The speeches in Acts make up approximately one-third of the book. In eight speeches of Paul Luke has given a total of 123 verses. The six speeches of Peter have 76 verses. The longest single speech is that of Stephen with 52 verses. It is longer than three of Paul's sermons combined. If the length of a speech is an indicator of the interest that it holds for an author, the reply of the first Christian martyr to the high priest must have some bearing on the theological stance of Luke. If the author of Acts invented the message, he compels us to affirm with little degree of uncertainty that he is on the side of Stephen. On the other hand if Luke followed a source he had the opportunity to shorten what Stephen said in the event that he did not attribute any great significance to it.

Two important questions arise from this speech. Did Stephen deliver the message? Is it really a rebuttal of the charges brought against him? Concerning the first question very few accept the speech incorporated by Luke as a verbatim report transmitted by those who heard Stephen. Some maintain that the speech is a free composition by Luke which expresses his own views. It appears that the majority of scholars hold a middle position. Luke relied on a source, whether from the followers of Stephen or a Hellenistic Christian sermon, and altered it to suit his purposes.

Dibelius⁷ has made the observation that the speech breaks the continuity between the transfiguration of Stephen's face (6:15) and his looking upward to heaven (7:55). On the basis of this he concludes that Luke contributed the sermon himself when he incorporated the martyrdom source into his narrative. Knox seems to have Dibelius in mind when he says, "It is not likely to be Luke's own compilation . . . he would hardly have been guilty of such barbarous Greek."⁸ O'Neill⁹ argues that Stephen's theology of the Temple did not arise until after A.D. 70 because there are no Christian parallels to this view before that time. However, he hastens to add that absence of parallels does not prove that the historic martyr was incapable of expounding such ideas. The strongest argument in favor of Stephen's originality stems from the omission of any reference to the destruction of the Temple in A. D. 70. O'Neill does not suggest that the speech is a free composition by Luke. Rather he admits that the author of Acts relied on a source or sources for his framework and reconstructed the speech patterned by what a Hellenistic Jew would have said. Haenchen in his commentary concludes that Luke took over a history-sermon and "tailored it for his purposes with additions and perhaps also abbreviations."¹⁰ Because its stylistic and linguistic features are somewhat different from the rest of Luke-Acts we must confess that some memory of Stephen's attitude was preserved in a written or oral source from which Luke reproduced the speech substantially with alterations.

We shall now examine the second question which has to do with the nature of the speech. Is it a rebuttal of the charges brought against Stephen? If by charges we mean his speaking against the holy place and the Law, the answer is no. Most of his reply is a continuation of his attack on the Temple and

the Law. Even if we have in mind the specifications to the charges, the answer is still no. Some will argue that Stephen was not given an opportunity to contradict the charges because his speech was interrupted. But what difference would that make? He had already confessed to the charges, so why should he deny them? If Stephen's reply is not a defense against the charges, what is it? Essentially it is an apologia though it possesses certain polemical elements. He does not admit that he is guilty nor does he regret what he has said but decides that this is the strategic moment to lay the issues before the Jewish leaders. According to the Mishnah the accused was allowed to make a speech for his acquittal (Sanhedrin 5:4). The court was bound to listen to him provided there was any substance to what he was saying. When the time came for that part in the court proceedings, Stephen knew that the chance for acquittal was impossible and his death was certain. Unless he denied the charges, there was no way out. Instead of making a plea for acquittal he used this privilege to clarify his theological position which brought about his arrest. The format and substance of what he said on this occasion had probably been used by him in the Hellenistic synagogues.

On the surface the reply of Stephen seems to be nothing more than a summary of Hebrew history from the time of Abraham to the time of the speaker. To some degree it reminds us of recitals found in the Old Testament and Apocrypha.¹¹ In the review of Jewish history certain variations between the Old Testament story and Acts are obvious. These discrepancies center around dates, places, ages, sequence of events, etc. Some of these, as Cadbury¹² points out, can be accounted for by a slip of memory, the use of the Septuagint text, or by changes which occur in Philo, Josephus and other Jewish writings. Others might be due to contradictions or confused views in the Old Testament. Yet one glaring inexplicable variation seems to express a polemic tendency by the speaker. This is the reference to the patriarchs being buried at Shechem (7:16). It appears to be an intentional assault on Jewish prejudice toward the heretical Samaritans.

The tenor of the whole speech is a devastating attack upon the so-called religious privileges of the Jews. Through their forefathers they laid claim to three distinct advantages. They had inherited the land and promise from Abraham. God had revealed himself in the Torah through Moses. The Temple was sacrosanct because God had placed his name there. Against all of these proud pretensions Stephen unmasked his batteries and assailed with withering denunciation his audience and their forefathers for their disobedience. They were disobedient to God, the patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets, but the culmination of their stubbornness manifested itself in the rejection of Jesus.

Stephen begins with the God of Majesty¹³ who revealed himself to Abraham in Mesopotamia and commanded him to go into a land which he would show him. While Abraham received the promise that this land was to be his possession, in his own lifetime he did not own walking room in it. Later Stephen refers to the purchase of a burial plot in Shechem, but one could hardly say that this was a gift. Stephen's crafty way of making Samaria the center of the patriarchs' real inheritance was a "biting form of anti-Jewish polemic."¹⁴ He shattered the

alleged religious superiority of the Jews by implying that the sacred site of Shechem with its nearby shrine had a higher claim than their own to Hebrew inheritance. It is interesting to note that two times in his Gospel Luke shows that a Samaritan proves himself to be far superior in religious commitment to the self-styled sons of Abraham (10:33; 17:16). The religious pride and prejudice of the Jews is attacked in a more direct manner in another scene in Luke's Gospel. When the worshipers in the synagogue at Nazareth reacted negatively to his sermon, Jesus countered with references to the aid which Elijah rendered to the widow of Phoenicia and the healing of the Syrian leper by Elisha (4:16-30). Thus it seems that Luke sees in the reference to Shechem found in Stephen's speech another example to add to his collection showing that the Jews were denied their inheritance because of their exclusiveness.

In his build up for an attack on the Law and the Temple by way of a review of Hebrew history, we tend to pick up from Stephen undertones of an apologia for Hellenistic Jews who lived outside the homeland. He was a member of that group and had probably been reminded time and again that Palestine was a holy land. Some of the Jews felt that only those who inhabited this territory had the privilege of the inheritance through Abraham. Stephen seems to be saying, "It is not true." God appeared to Abraham in a foreign land. When Joseph was sold as a slave in Egypt, God delivered him and elevated him to a high position in Pharaoh's court. God was with Moses in the land of Midian, and when Moses was called as a deliverer of the Israelites in the area near Mt. Sinai, God told him to take off his sandals because he was standing on holy ground. God was also with Moses and the Israelites in Egypt before they made their escape and continued to be with them in their nomadic existence in the desert.

Most will agree that Stephen's opposition to the Temple is absolute and without reservation, but few in number are those who are of the opinion that he was antagonistic toward the Law. Rather the majority repeatedly say that Stephen upheld the validity of the Law and only denounced the Jews and their forefathers for being disobedient to the Law. Concerning his attack on the Jews, who from the time of Moses disobeyed the Law, there is no problem. This is clear from the text (7:53), but can we be so certain that Stephen glorified the Law?

What was Stephen's attitude toward the Law? Was he guilty of speaking against it? If so, what sort of Law did he oppose? There is no doubt about his glorification of Moses. Of the 53 verses contained in the address 20 verses cluster around the lawgiver. Thus nearly half of the speech is dedicated to him. Moses becomes the center of interest for Stephen because God at Mt. Sinai gave to him the *λόγια τῶντα*. What does he mean by the "living oracles?" Is he trying to make a distinction between the authentic Law (living oracles) and an adulterated law which the Jews followed? Does Stephen condemn the Jews for being disobedient to the "living oracles" by following an inferior law?

What are some possible answers to the meaning of the "living oracles?" There are at least four. (1) Stephen is doing essentially what Paul did by making a distinction between *νόμος* and *πνεῦμα* of the Law in 2 Corinthians 3:4ff. The Apostle called for open-eyed obedience by the Spirit rather than obedience for

obedience sake. It was the dead letter of the Law that confined God to the past and blurred the vision of God's action in history in the present. (2) He considers the function of the Law not to provide regulations for daily conduct but to predict Christ. In this he would share the view of the primitive church with its emphasis on proof texts. (3) He follows the view of the Hellenistic Jewish apologists of Alexandria represented by Philo. For Philo the written law which Moses received from God was a type of an archetype (unwritten law). The Mosaic law was a copy and secondary. Abraham observed the original law of God which was unwritten. The unwritten law for Philo was not the rabbinical Torah she-b'al pe. (4) Finally, he interprets the living oracles as the Torah itself and claims that the Jews have been disobedient to this divine instruction by following the halachoth of the oral tradition. Of the four possibilities it seems to me that the third is more in line with the concept of Stephen. He seems to be saying that the "living oracles" were violated in the worship of the golden calf. When Moses came down from the mountain with the true law, he saw that the Israelites were committing the sin of idolatry and in anger broke the tablets. As a substitute the Israelites received through Moses another Law which was inferior to the first.¹⁵ The first was the pattern from the mount and revealed the intention and will of God for his people, but the second was an idolatrous distortion of the first. The invective delivered against the Jews and their forefathers at the end of the speech involves their disobedience to the "living oracles," the archetype, and not the Torah which they read daily. Through the prophets God repeatedly tried to disclose his purpose by the "living oracles," but the Jews rejected them and persecuted the prophets. The climax of their rebellion is reached when they betray and murder the Righteous One and the Prophet about whom Moses spoke. They threw away their last chance of recovering the "living oracles."

Clearly and unequivocally Stephen rejected the Temple and the whole cultic practice. God never intended for the Jews to be shackled by a fixed place for worship nor for the rituals to be performed in this institution. Just as the Jewish law was inferior to the "living oracles" so the Temple was inferior to the tabernacle. The tabernacle in the desert was the pattern from the mount. It was mobile and was moved from place to place as the Israelites made their way through the desert. The Temple was not constructed until after the inspired days of David. Stephen considers the construction of this edifice as an act of unfaithfulness to the nomadic character of earlier ideals. He seems to think that the Jews had made of this religious fixture some sort of idol. They had attempted to confine God to a handmade structure. As support for his position he quoted from a text from Trito-Isaiah which was one of the few denunciations of the Temple in the whole Old Testament (66:1-2). The Gospels record that Jesus called the Temple a house of prayer (Matt. 21:13; Luke 19:46; Mark 11:17 and adds "for all nations;" John 2:16--"My Father's house" instead of "house of prayer") and Luke shows us in Acts that the apostles were closely attached to it, but Stephen thinks that this institution was a misconception from its inception because it detained the

purpose of God for his people. In a succinct manner Cole has put the teaching of Stephen about the Temple thusly:

Stephen taught a supersession of the Temple made with hands in favour of some other form of worship, which is not directly particularized in his speech but is analogous to the Tabernacle worship and is connected with Jesus of Nazareth.¹⁶

Stephen does not use the name of Jesus in the entire speech. In an allusive way he mentions him in a quote from Deuteronomy 18:15 where there is a prediction by Moses concerning the coming prophet whom God will raise up. Again at the end of his speech he refers to Jesus as the righteous one anticipated by the prophets whom the Jews killed. Just before he was executed, he looked up toward heaven and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God. While he was being stoned he prayed and said, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."

By refuting the three religious privileges of the Jews Stephen exposed the weakness of the foundation of Judaism and its claims. He also challenged the complacency of the primitive church and brought about a division in the fellowship which hitherto had been rather harmonious. The apostles by their attachment to Jewish privilege were on the verge of pulling a sheet over the Christian movement and pronouncing it a corpse. Furthermore, Stephen antagonized the Pharisees who had previously defended the primitive community against the Sadducees. Finally, he enraged the members of the Sanhedrin to such a degree that they passed the death sentence.

The death of Stephen paved the way for the world-mission of Christianity. The Hellenistic Jewish Christians left Jerusalem and Judea to escape the severe persecution that was directed against all those who shared in the opinions of Stephen. Luke says that the apostles remained in the city. We are not to infer from this that only the apostles remained. He probably meant that those who followed the brand of Christianity upheld by the apostles stayed as well. All of them would be unmolested because their theological position was unlike that of Stephen. For Luke the death of Stephen marked an end to his interest in the mission centered in Jerusalem. The obstinacy of the Jews seems to be his validation in advance for the proclamation of the gospel to the Gentiles. The church finally came of age when it left Jerusalem and the apostles with an immature understanding of the purpose of God in history and went to Samaria and the rest of the world (8:4-11:18; 11:19-15:35).

Stephen and the Apostle Paul

There is no doubt that Luke admired Paul because he devoted half of Acts to him, but running through the document we find undertones of criticism against the Apostle. Does Luke indicate that Paul's attachment to Judaism by his Palestinian training in the rabbinical tradition restricts him from the liberal position of Stephen? In his portrayal of Paul does the author of Acts show us a nationalistic Jew who was unyielding in his battle for the freedom of the gospel for the Gentile world but reluctant to fight for the same liberty for Jews who became Christians? If

so, does Luke minimize the real gospel of Paul in his presentation?¹⁷

Though he was an apostle to the Gentiles, Paul in Acts, upon entering a city to bear his witness, constantly went to the synagogues of the Jews (13:5,14,44;14:1;17:1,10,17;18:4,19;19:8). Of course this action can be explained as a safeguard against accusations of proclaiming an illegal religion in the Roman Empire, or as a desire to use the understanding of Judaism by Gentiles who attended the synagogues as a foundation for his mission work, or as his interest in seeing that his own people the Jews had an opportunity to hear the good news. While all of these explanations are plausible, it appears that Luke, in light of Paul's rejection by the Jews in these places, questions the merit of this approach.

Luke also seems to suggest that Paul, possibly due to his Jewish heritage and nationalistic interests, compromised his convictions and pursued a casuistic principle. One such compromise is evident from the decision of James in the Jerusalem conference in Acts 15. It is obvious that the author of Acts has more than a passing interest in what James says about abstaining from four things in order to make it possible for Jewish Christians to associate with Gentile Christians without being dragged down to the level of pagan living. The repetition of the decision would seem to bear witness to this (15:20-21;29;21:25). According to Luke the only justification for Paul's circumcising Timothy was out of deference to Jews in the area of Derbe and Lystra (16:3). During his final visit to Jerusalem, according to the author of Acts, Paul yielded to the pressure from James and the elders, who out of desire to keep peace in the Jerusalem church, urged the Apostle to verify his attachment to the Law before the multitude of ultraconservative Jewish Christians by the performance of ritual acts in the Temple (21:20-24). They asked Paul to share the ritual acts and defray the monetary expenses of four Jewish Christians who had taken a vow. The requirements included fulfilment of the votive obligations, visits to the Temple, ceremonial discharge of the vows, and the offering of a sacrifice for each of the votaries. Finally, though not a compromise in the strict sense, Luke tells us that Paul brought alms and offerings to his nation (24:17). In his epistles Paul refers to a collection that he initiated in the various churches designed to foster peaceful relations between the Jewish and Gentile Christians (1 Cor. 16:1; 2 Cor. 8:1-9:15; Romans 15:26-28). The Apostle says that this money was for the poor saints in Jerusalem, yet in Acts, at his hearing before Felix, we learn that he brought the collection to his nation. Thus it appears that Luke interpreted the presentation of the gift as more than a charitable act for a few needy Jewish Christians in Jerusalem. Paul did it for the Jews because of his nationalistic interests.

In Acts Paul is presented as an apostle to the Gentiles proclaiming a gospel free of entanglements of Jewish heritage, Law and Temple, but at the same time he was reluctant to surrender these privileges totally as they related to himself. It was only after long and bitter conflicts with his compatriots that he finally arrived at the freer view of Stephen. Paul on three occasions in Acts rejected the Jews and said that he would go to the Gentiles (13:4ff.;18:6;28:25ff.), but it was only in his last rejection while in Rome that he summed up the verdict of God on all Jews. Previously he seems to have considered the church essentially a part of the Jewish nation, but finally he saw the mission of Christianity as Stephen viewed it. The

unhindered gospel first set forth by Luke in the rising action to the drama of world-mission through the speech of Stephen finds full acceptance by Paul in Rome where he preached it unhinderedly.¹⁸ "While the gospel spread from Jerusalem in ever-widening circles until it reached Rome, another process was at work. The gospel was breaking out of its entanglement with organized Judaism and becoming free to be a universal religion. Jerusalem is left behind and Rome is entered."¹⁹

With the liberalism of Stephen Luke took his stand. To him the theological position of the early Christian martyr was the watershed in the life of the church. If Stephen had not appeared on the scene, Christianity would have died as a Jewish sect. The church came of age when Jerusalem no longer became the religious center. Luke can see this more clearly in the light of the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in A.D. 70.

NOTES

1. J. C. O'Neill, The Theology of Acts in Its Historical Setting (London: S.P.C.K., 1961), pp. 71-93.
2. C. K. Barrett, Luke the Historian in Recent Study (London: Epworth Press, 1961), p. 9.
3. William Manson, Jesus and the Christian (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), p. 200.
4. Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament. Trans. K. Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 56. See also Leonhard Goppelt, Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Times. Trans. R. A. Guelich (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1970), p. 53.
5. Walther Schmithals, Paul and James. Trans. D. M. Barton (Naperville: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1965), p. 18.
6. Burton Scott Easton, Early Christianity (Greenwich: Seabury Press, 1954), p. 116.
7. Martin Dibelius, Studies in the Acts of the Apostles, Trans. Mary Ling (London: SCM Press, 1956), p. 168.
8. W. L. Knox, The Acts of the Apostles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 24.
9. J. C. O'Neill, op. cit., pp. 85-89.
10. Ernst Haenchen, The Acts of the Apostles. Trans. Noble and Shinn (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), p. 289.
11. Psalms 105:12-43 and 106:6-46; Joshua 24:1-13; Nehemiah 9:7-31; Judith 5:6-18.
12. Henry J. Cadbury, The Book of Acts in History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), p. 103.
13. Stephen's use of "God of majesty" might have been done deliberately to offset the accusation of blasphemy set forth by the suborned witnesses.
14. Henry J. Cadbury, op. cit., p. 105.
15. Philo, Abraham 3. See also W. L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), p. 55 Note 33. Also see for a further study of this Marcel Simon, St. Stephen and the Hellenists in the Primitive Church (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1958), pp. 39ff.
16. Alan Cole, The New Temple (London: SCM Press, 1950), p. 42.
17. Edwin R. Goodenough, "The Perspective of Acts" in Leander E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn, Studies in Luke-Acts (New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), p. 54. See also Ulrich Wilckens, "Interpreting Luke-Acts in a Period of Existentialist Theology," p. 62 and Philipp Vielhauer, "On the 'Paulinism' of Acts," pp. 40ff. in Keck and Martyn.
18. Frank Stagg, The Book of Acts, The Early Struggle for an Unhindered Gospel (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1955), p. 266.
19. J. C. O'Neill, op. cit., p. 70.

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The following paper is a critique of the New Testament text critical methodology used by Professor Kilpatrick and J. K. Elliott, his former student and the editor of this Festschrift. However, it is offered as an expression of sincere appreciation for Professor Kilpatrick's many contributions to scholarship and for his warm personal friendship.

I

There can be little question that the currently reigning method in NT textual criticism is eclecticism. It is the method openly espoused by the translators of the RSV¹ and the NEB,² and used, if not by that name, by the editors of the UBS Greek Testament (UGT).³ Not all scholars, to be sure, are pleased with this state of affairs. Some have even suggested that it is only a provisional method, belonging "to a day like ours in which we know only that the traditional theory of the text is faulty but cannot yet see clearly to correct the fault."⁴ Nonetheless, eclecticism is the currency of the realm and will undoubtedly be so for years to come.

The term "eclecticism," however, is an umbrella term, and not all who stand under it mean the same thing. On the one hand, it refers to a method such as that used by the translators of the NEB and the editors of the UGT, where the age, weight, and diversity of witnesses to a variant play a significant role in textual decisions. This method, called "rational" or "reasoned" eclecticism,⁵ has been defined by Vaganay as one where there is

no shutting up of the different branches of the science into watertight compartments; verbal criticism, external criticism, all have their parts to play, and they must give each other mutual support.⁶

*This paper is to appear soon in a Festschrift for G. D. Kilpatrick. It appears here with the kind permission of the editor, J. K. Elliott, and the publisher, E. J. Brill.

¹F. C. Grant, "The Greek Text of the New Testament," An Introduction to the Revised Standard Version of the New Testament (ed. L. A. Weigle; Chicago: International Council of Religious Education, American Standard Bible Committee, 1946) 37-43.

²R. V. G. Tasker, ed., The Greek New Testament, being the text translated in the New English Bible, 1961, (New York: Oxford and Cambridge, 1964) vii-x.

³B. M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (New York: United Bible Societies, 1971) xiii-xxxi.

⁴K. W. Clark, "The Effect of Recent Textual Criticism upon New Testament Studies," The Background of the New Testament and Its Eschatology (eds. W. D. Davies and D. Daube; Cambridge: University Press, 1964) 37-8.

⁵The term comes from M.-J. Lagrange, Critique textuelle, II, La critique rationnelle (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1935).

⁶An Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament (London, 1937) 91-2.

In contrast Professor Kilpatrick and Dr. Elliott have advocated a "rigorous" eclecticism (sometimes called "thorough-going" or "consistent"),⁷ in which intrinsic and transcriptional probabilities ideally are the sole criteria, irrespective of the date and nature of the external evidence which supports a given reading. Kilpatrick has repeatedly affirmed that "readings must be considered severally on their intrinsic character;"⁸ they must be "accepted or rejected, each and all, on their merits."⁹ This means further that since no MS or text-type has escaped corruption, textual decisions must not be made on the basis of which MSS support a reading, and further that the variant of any single MS has as much authority as does the combined witness of all the rest.

Elliott has spelled out this method in greater detail and has offered a Greek text of the Pastoral Epistles based on internal evidence alone. More strongly than Kilpatrick, he inveighs against "the cult of the best manuscript" and repeatedly

⁷See the following significant studies by Professor Kilpatrick: "Western Text and Original Text in the Gospels and Acts," JTS 44 (1943) 24-36 [= "Western Text"]; "Atticism and the Text of the New Testament," Neutestamentliche Aufsätze: Festschrift für Prof. Josef Schmid (ed. J. Blinzler, et al; Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1963) 125-37 [= Schmid Festschrift]; "An Eclectic Study of the Text of Acts," Biblical and Patristic Studies in Memory of Robert Pierce Casey (eds. J. N. Birdsall and R. W. Thomson; Freiburg: Herder, 1963) 64-77 [= Casey Festschrift]; "The Greek New Testament of Today and the Textus Receptus," The New Testament in Historical and Contemporary Perspective (eds. H. Anderson and W. Barclay; Oxford, 1965) 189-208 [= Macgregor Festschrift]; "Style and Text in the Greek New Testament," Studies in the History and Text of the New Testament in honor of Kenneth Willis Clark (Studies and Documents 29; eds. B. L. Daniels and M. J. Suggs; Salt Lake City, 1967) 153-60 [= Clark Festschrift]; "'Kurios' in the Gospels," L'Evangile hier et aujourd'hui. Mélanges offerts au Professeur Franz-J. Leenhardt (Geneva: Labor & Fides, 1968) 65-70 [= Leenhardt Festschrift]; "Some Problems in New Testament Text and Language," Neotestamentica et Semitica, Studies in Honour of Matthew Black (eds. E. E. Ellis and M. Wilcox; Edinburgh: Clark, 1969) 198-208 [= Black Festschrift]; "Language and Text in the Gospels and Acts," VC 24 (1970) 161-71 [= "Language and Text"].

By Elliott: The Greek Text of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus (Studies and Documents 36; Salt Lake City, 1968); "ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ in 2 Timothy," JTS 19 (1968) 621-3; "The Use of ἄριστος in the New Testament," ZNW 60 (1969) 140-1; "Nouns with Diminutive Endings in the New Testament," NovT 12 (1970) 391-8; "Κηρῶς; Σίμων Πέτρος : ὁ Πέτρος : An Examination of New Testament Usage," NovT 14 (1972) 241-56; "Phrynichus' Influence on the Textual Tradition of the New Testament," ZNW 63 (1972) 133-38.

Dr. Elliott has recently called the results of this method a "radically eclectic text" ("The United Bible Societies Greek New Testament: An Evaluation," NovT 15 [1973] 300). This is a useful article in that he has brought together the resultant text of a great many of the studies listed in this note.

⁸Macgregor Festschrift, 205-6.

⁹Casey Festschrift, 65.

condemns a methodology which uses "exclusively documentary criteria."¹⁰

At issue between "rigorous" and "reasoned" eclecticism is the weight, if at all, one gives the external evidence in making textual choices. The editors of the UGT, for example, often appeal to "the age and diversity of text-type of the Greek witnesses."¹¹ Kilpatrick and Elliott reject such appeals out of hand. But this is not the only difference. Also at issue are the internal criteria which Kilpatrick and Elliott tend to emphasize, sometimes to the exclusion of others.

Over the years Professor Kilpatrick has offered several studies in which two primary emphases have emerged: Atticism¹² and author's style.¹³ Elliott has put these propositionally: (1) "When faced with a straight choice between an Attic and a non-Attic expression, the latter is more likely to be what the original author wrote." (2) "A variant consistent with the author's style and usage elsewhere, is more likely to be original than a variant out of character with the general usage, other things being equal."¹⁴

This methodology has from time to time been called into question. E. J. Epp,¹⁵ E. C. Colwell,¹⁶ and B. M. Metzger¹⁷ have each cautioned against the short-sightedness of seeing Atticism as the basic kind of stylistic change occurring in the second century, and Metzger in particular has warned against decisions which place undue confidence in variants reflecting an author's style.¹⁸ Furthermore, E. C. Colwell has argued convincingly that to neglect the external evidence is to run the risk of default as an historian.

The purpose of this paper is to spell out in greater detail the inadequacy of rigorous eclecticism as a total method, an inadequacy which is essentially two-fold: (1) It assumes a faulty theory of textual corruption and transmission, and therefore an unrealistic--and unhistorical--attitude toward the various textual witnesses. (2) Having abandoned the evidence of the witnesses, it leaves textual judgments to the whims of the individual practitioner. This problem is especially acute whenever variation can be shown to have two equally plausible explanations. In such cases rigorous eclecticism will tend

¹⁰The Greek Text of Timothy and Titus, 1-14

¹¹Metzger, *A Textual Commentary*, 27 and passim.

¹²e.g. Schmid *Festschrift*; Casey *Festschrift*; Clark *Festschrift*; Macgregor *Festschrift*; "The Aorist of *gamein* in the New Testament," *JTS* 18 (1967) 139-40.

¹³e.g. "Western Text," 30-4; "Some Notes on Marcan Usage," *BT* 7 (1956) 2-9, 51-6, 146; "Some Notes on Johannine Usage," *BT* 11 (1960) 173-7; "διαλέγεσθαι and διαλογίζεσθαι in the New Testament," *JTS* 11 (1960) 338-40; Casey *Festschrift*; Black *Festschrift*.

¹⁴The Greek Text of Timothy and Titus, 9, 8.

¹⁵"Some Important Textual Studies," *JBL* 84 (1965) 172-3.

¹⁶"Hort Redivivus: A Plea and a Program," *Studies in Methodology in Textual Criticism of the New Testament* (Leiden: Brill, 1969) 154-5.

¹⁷The Text of the New Testament (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford, 1968) 177-9.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 178.

either to become monotone, i.e. to lock in on one possibility of error to the exclusion of others, or else it will simply be cast adrift amid a welter of options, wherein choices are made in a most random and arbitrary fashion.

II

Since Professor Kilpatrick has repeatedly expressed disapproval of Hort's methodology, he also of necessity has rejected Hort's theory of textual transmission. For it must be remembered that Hort did not use genealogy in order to discover the original NT text. Whether justified or not, Hort used genealogy solely to dispense with the Syrian (Byzantine) text. Once he had eliminated the Byzantines from serious consideration, his preference for the Neutral (Egyptian) MSS, was based strictly on intrinsic and transcriptional probability. That is, he applied the canons of internal criticism first to the documents, then to the "original" text. In his own words:

Where then one of the documents is found habitually to contain these morally certain or at least strongly preferred readings, and the other habitually to contain their rejected rivals, we can have no doubt, first, that the text of the first has been transmitted in comparative purity, and that the text of the second has suffered comparatively large corruption; and, next, that the superiority of the first must be as great in the variations in which Internal Evidence of Readings has furnished no decisive criterion as in those which have enabled us to form a comparative appreciation of the two texts.¹⁹

His judgment that Codex Vaticanus (B) best represents the text which has been "transmitted in comparative purity" is well-known:

It will be evident . . . that B must be regarded as having preserved not only a very ancient text, but a very pure line of very ancient text, and that with comparatively small depravation either by scattered ancient corruptions otherwise attested or by individualisms of the scribe himself.²⁰

Kilpatrick, on the other hand, not only rejects any MS or tradition as having a relatively pure transmission, but also almost altogether disregards questions of MS relationships. He thereby also discards one of Hort's basic principles: "All trustworthy restoration of corrupted texts is founded on the study of their history."²¹

In place of a careful study of documents and their history, Kilpatrick has tended to relegate that history to the period before the documents--the second century. He has frequently cited with approval the contention of Vogels that, "apart from

¹⁹The New Testament in the Original Greek, [vol. 2] Introduction Appendix (2nd ed.; London: MacMillan, 1896) 32.

²⁰Ibid., 250-1.

²¹Ibid., 40.

errors, the great majority of variants in the New Testament³¹ text have come into being before A.D. 200." He has further argued that "by the end of the second century A.D. Christian opinion had hardened against deliberate alteration of the text," a hardening which was "connected not with the canonical state of the New Testament but with the reaction against the re-handling of the text by the second century heretics."²²

The importance of this argument for Kilpatrick's methodology cannot be overestimated. The assumption that all textual corruption derives from the second century, plus the general disregard for knowledge of individual MSS, textual relationships, and the citing habits of individual Fathers allows him to posit that the original text may be found anywhere in the later witnesses. It is as if the original text were scattered during the second century as pieces of a puzzle, to reappear in the most random geographical or chronological fashion--even in a single MS from the medieval period, although all of that manuscript's hundreds of relatives do not have the reading. As Colwell has put it, "Such an editor relegates the manuscripts to the role of supplier of readings."²³

But there are some serious criticisms which may be leveled against this theory of textual corruption. In the first place, the relegation of textual corruption to the second century and a hardening against deliberate change thereafter does not seem to accord with the actual data. p⁶⁶, for example, which was copied at the end of the second century, underwent a considerable deliberate revision. But that revision, made chiefly by the original scribe, shows no reaction to heresy, nor does it manifest a concern for the original wording per se.²⁴ Furthermore, if Colwell is correct that singular readings are clues to the scribe's fingerprints upon the codex,²⁵ then the plethora of such readings in some MSS as over against others (e.g. p⁶⁶ & D W) indicates that more than mere carelessness is involved in the copying process. Finally, the complete disregard for the wording per se that one finds in such "orthodox" Fathers as Tertullian, Epiphanius, and Chrysostom suggests that hardening against deliberate change is scarcely a trademark of the third and fourth centuries.

The problems with this theory, however, lie deeper still. Rational eclecticism agrees in principle that no MS or group of MSS has a prima facie priority to the original text. Furthermore, it agrees in principle that every variant should be considered on its own merits. Hort's famous, and surely correct, dictum--"Knowledge of documents should precede final judgement upon readings"--may not be turned into "Knowledge of documents shall prejudice judgment upon readings."

Rational eclecticism, however, in the words of Duplacy, will plead "donc la cause de l'histoire et surtout, au nom de

²²Schmid Festschrift, 128-31; cf. Macgregor Festschrift, 190.

²³"Hort Redivivus," 154.

²⁴See my Papyrus Bodmer II (P66): Its Textual Relationships and Scribal Characteristics (Studies and Documents 34; Salt Lake City, 1968) 57-75.

²⁵"Scribal Habits in Early Papyri: A Study in the Corruption of the Text," The Bible in Modern Scholarship (ed. J. P. Hyatt; Nashville: Abingdon, 1965) 372-6.

l'histoire, la cause des documents."²⁶ For it is both illogical and unhistorical to imply, as both Kilpatrick and Elliott do, that because no MSS have escaped corruption, therefore all MSS are equally corrupt, and no MS(S) may be judged better than others. In fact the very internal considerations for which Kilpatrick and Elliott argue as a basis for the recovery of the original text, Hort used first for the evaluation of the existing witnesses. And if his evaluation of B as "neutral" was too high a regard for that MS, it does not alter his judgment that compared to all other MSS B is a superior witness.

This has been confirmed by recent studies which have applied the principles of intrinsic and transcriptional probability to several of the papyrus discoveries. For example, Günther Zuntz subjected p⁴⁶ to a most rigorous analysis as to its quality in preserving the original text of I Corinthians and Hebrews in various types of variation (word order, interpolations, LXX quotations, features of style and grammar). His conclusions:

The excellent quality of the text represented by our oldest manuscript, p⁴⁶, stands out again. As so often before, we must here be careful to distinguish between the very poor work of the scribe who penned it and the basic text which he so poorly rendered. P⁴⁶ abounds with scribal blunders, omissions, and also additions. In some of them the scribe anticipated the errors of later copyists; in some other instances he shares an older error; but the vast majority are his own uncontested property. Once they have been discarded, there remains a text of outstanding (though not absolute) purity.²⁷

I have subjected P⁶⁶ and P⁷⁵ to a similar investigation with similar results.²⁸ The singular and sub-singular readings of P⁶⁶ are all of secondary character precisely because they reflect the scribe's wildness in copying and his tendency to "smooth out" the text. With regard to certain clearly discernible features of Johannine style, P⁶⁶, in non-singular variants, more often preserves the Johannine original than the Western and Byzantine witnesses, but whenever it varies from its close relatives, P⁷⁵ and B, it picks up predominantly secondary readings. Such judgments will affect the value of its witness in variant after variant.

As to P⁷⁵, it can be shown to be precisely what Hort considered B to be: a very pure line of very ancient text. For example, when tested along with all other witnesses in Luke 10 and 11 for variants reflecting possible harmonization to Matt, Mark, or the LXX, P⁷⁵ and B stood alone in their "comparative

²⁶"Histoire des manuscrits et histoire du texte du Nouveau Testament," *NTS* 12 (1965/66) 125.

²⁷The Text of the Epistles (London: British Academy, 1953) 212-3.

²⁸For P⁶⁶ see Papyrus Bodmer II, 36-56; for P⁷⁵, "P⁷⁵, P⁶⁶, and Origen: The Myth of Early Textual Recension in Alexandria," *New Dimensions in New Testament Study* (eds. R. N. Longenecker and M. C. Tenney; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1974) 19-45.

purity." Codex D, for example, had 36 such harmonizing variants,³³ the Byzantine majority had 27, while P⁷⁵ and B had 6, and some of theirs were more likely the result of other factors than harmonization. The results were almost identical when the tests were made against certain features of Johannine style (asyndeton, anarthrous personal names, "vernacular possessives," and *ὁρί-recitativum*), which were chosen because there were both Johannine and generally unidiomatic Greek, thus bringing them also under the principle of lectio difficilior.

The point is that MSS may be evaluated as to their scribal characteristics and their general worth in preserving original readings. And such judgments must play their proper role in textual decisions. This verdict will be noted at several points, but it is nowhere more demonstrable than in the way that Hort, on the one hand, and Kilpatrick and Elliott, on the other, evaluate singular and sub-singular readings.

III

It is well known that Hort often adopted singular readings of B because of his evaluation of the general superior quality of this MS. But he was no blind follower of B; he opted for its singular readings only when internal considerations merited it. He therefore distinguished between those singular readings which he judged to be the "clerical errors" of B itself and those which "must be reasonably supposed to have belonged to the text of its exemplar."²⁹ The implication of this is clear: In the time of Hort some of B's singular readings were solecisms of the scribe (therefore, truly singular readings), while others really belonged to the "Neutral" text-type, and if earlier (or other) MSS of this text-type were ever found, the readings of B would no longer be singular. The subsequent discoveries of the Egyptian MSS P⁴⁵, P⁴⁶, P⁶⁶, P⁷², and P⁷⁵ have demonstrated the extraordinary skill with which Hort made his judgments. For example, in Luke and John, where both P⁷⁵ and B have extant text, B now has 47 singular readings. Only one of these (a word order variant at John 10:32) is found in the WH text. On the other hand, there are many instances in WH where B was singular in 1881, but now is supported by P⁷⁵, and sometimes also by other subsequent discoveries. In other words, Hort did not consider these as solecisms of B but as belonging to the "Neutral" (therefore for him, "original") text; and subsequent discoveries have proven him right.

This does not mean of course that Hort was correct in following B or that such readings are indeed original because they have additional support. What is suggested rather is that Hort was aware of the tenuous nature of the singular reading, and that he adopted such readings only when they occurred in a MS which, according to his theory of textual transmission, was found to be generally superior.

Kilpatrick and Elliott, on the other hand, on the basis of their theory of "random transmission," are prepared to opt for singular and sub-singular readings wherever their principles lead them. Elliott does indeed recognize the problems involved and briefly speaks to them in his presentation of the case for rigorous eclecticism.³⁰ He argues in principle that "a reading

²⁹The New Testament in the Original Greek, II, 230-46.

³⁰The Greek Text of Timothy and Titus, 10-11.

can be accepted with greater confidence, when it has stronger support." But he also argues, and cites Aland and Tasker in support,³¹ that in principle "there is no reason why an original reading should not have been preserved in only one ms." He does note here especially (or only) one needs to be aware of MS idiosyncrasies, and concludes (rightly): "When a weakly attested reading is accepted as the true reading, it must be shown why and how the variant came about, and why it was so widely accepted."

But surely the opposite is equally necessary. That is, when one opts for singular readings in such witnesses as P66, κ , D, 1241 or Eusebius (!) in the Gospels, as Kilpatrick does, or 88, 440, 1908, D, F or in the Pastorals, as Elliott does, must it not be shown that these MSS have a generally overall reliability that would cause one to side with them even when they depart from their own relatives, not to mention the entire textual tradition? In these instances such readings are not necessarily condemned because they are singular, but, as in the case with P66, κ , D, and 1241 in John, because they are singular in MSS whose texts abound in singular readings of patently secondary character.

Furthermore, in practice such choices not only reveal a faulty theory of text, but in almost every case there is a better explanation as to why the singular reading is the variant rather than vice versa. For example, in a discussion of diminutives in the NT, where it is argued that the elimination of diminutives is a feature of second century Atticizing, Elliott says:

More significant is the noun *veavíac* which occurs in the New Testament at Acts vii 58 and is the only firm example of the noun in the New Testament. The diminutive form *veavíoxoc* occurs as a variant for *veavíac* at Matthew xix 20; Mark xvi 5; Acts xx 9, xxii 17, 18, 22. The noun *veavíac* has been substituted for the diminutive form by scribes influenced by Atticism. In all these places the diminutive form should be read.³²

Both the strangeness and weaknesses of this argument can be seen once the variants and manuscript data are grouped as follows:

A) Acts 7:58	<i>veavíou</i>	no variation
B) Matt 19:20	<i>veavíac</i>	0 700
	<i>veavíoxoc</i>	Rell
Mark 16:5	<i>veavíac</i>	2145
	<i>veavíoxoc</i>	Rell
C) Acts 20:9	<i>veavíac</i>	P ⁷⁴ rell
	<i>veavíoxoc</i>	614 1108 1245 1518 2147
Acts 23:17	<i>veavíav</i>	P ⁷⁴ rell
	<i>veavíoxov</i>	2147
D) Acts 23:18	<i>veavíav</i>	B D Ψ Byz pler TR
	<i>veavíoxov</i>	P ⁷⁴ κ A C E 33 81 1175 pc
Acts 23:22	<i>veavíav</i>	D Ψ Byz pler TR
	<i>veavíoxov</i>	P ⁷⁴ κ A B C E 33 pc

³¹Ibid., 11.

³²NovT 12 (1970) 392.

Groups A and B alone fit within Elliott's appraisal of things. Group C, especially the singular reading of 2147 in Acts 23:17, seems to suggest just the opposite. To say here that "veavíaq̃ has been substituted for the diminutive form" is a most peculiar way of looking at textual variation. This seems to ask too much of a single eleventh century minuscule whose textual relatives all have veavíav. How is one to explain how this "original" reading is completely missing in all earlier stages in the transmission of the text?

Furthermore, the question I have asked elsewhere applies here as well. Should not "thoroughgoing eclecticism" lead to "thoroughgoing emendation"?³³ For if Elliott had written this article before von Soden had collated codex 2147, then he would have had two "firm examples" of veavíaq̃; and contrariwise, if a MS of any kind were ever found to have veavíoxov at Acts 7:58, then even this "firm example" would yield to the variant. With tongue in cheek one wonders what would happen if such a MS were "discovered" similar to that given Erasmus with the Comma Johanneum included.

Group D further demonstrates the weakness of this method. Here alone one has substantial support for both variants; and the cause of variation is not related to Atticism at all. As Nestle-Aland and von Soden both note, it is a simple case of assimilation to the text of Acts 23:17.³⁴

This of course does not necessarily condemn all singular readings in all MSS. The fact that P⁷⁵ (sometimes with P⁴⁵) and P⁴⁶ have eliminated what were once singular or nearly singular readings of B at some points where these MSS in combination seem to preserve the original text, and the fact that each (P⁴⁶ P⁷⁵ B) has been judged as a careful preservation of a very early type of text, should cause one to allow the possibility that any of them in a singular reading best represents this text-type. It does not necessarily follow of course that the "best representative of the text-type" also preserves the original text, but it does mean that the original reading may have survived only in the "best" representative of a type of text, not necessarily in the entire group of MSS.

However, all of this to say that if P⁴⁶, P⁷⁵ or B does preserve the original text in a singular reading, consideration given to such a reading (besides its best answering the questions of internal criticism) rests chiefly on the judgment as to the generally excellent quality of these MSS. And it must be granted even then that singular readings by their very nature are suspect, which means that there must be decisive internal evidence in favor of such a reading before it is considered as original.

³³Review of Elliott's The Greek Text of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, JBL 89 (1970) 505-6.

³⁴With this one might compare Kilpatrick's siding with a single citation from Eusebius (d.e. 10.8; Clark Festschrift, 156) in reading μνημεῖον at Mark 16:2, or Elliott's opting for μεταλαμβάνόμενον (cum 81 2005) at 1 Tim 4:4, and many others, all of which can be better explained as singular assimilations, rather than all other witnesses as having been corrupted by Atticism.

If one is going to take each reading "on its own merits," then the fullest range of intrinsic and transcriptional probabilities must always be kept in view. Professor Kilpatrick himself recognizes this principle and skillfully employs it in some of his arguments against Westcott-Hort (some alleged conflation may be due to omission by homoioteleuton).³⁵ However, both Kilpatrick and Elliott appear oblivious to other alternatives whenever Atticism is seen as a possible cause of textual corruption.

Atticism may indeed be a cause of some corruption in the second century, but it is hypothetically equally probable (to this writer, far more probable historically) that a Christian scribe in the second century altered a less common form (= the alleged Atticism) to a more common, if less literary, form. This is especially true when the more common form is also septuagintal. One may not assume scribes always to have gone in one direction; and in the second century one may suppose scribes just as often to have preferred a biblical to a non-biblical idiom. After all, these scribes were Christians, whose spiritual life--and therefore perhaps stylistic idioms--were thoroughly nurtured on the LXX. Kilpatrick, however, does not seem to consider this possibility. He has averred, without supporting evidence from the MSS themselves, that "the tendency of scribes was to eliminate or moderate Semitic features rather than introduce them."³⁶ But the evidence from the MSS and the Church Fathers points to the contrary. This can be demonstrated by a detailed examination of three of Kilpatrick's alleged Atticisms: the case of the object of προσκυνεῖν, ἡγήσω/ἡγήσομαι; ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν.

A. Kilpatrick has noted that with προσκυνεῖν "the grammarians condemned the dative construction and recommended the accusative;" and therefore he has argued that "we should expect it to be changed to the accusative and not the other way about."³⁷ That such may have happened seems very likely. In fact, Kilpatrick fails to note the variant in Mark 15:19 where this is the likely explanation of the reading of ¶ 4 213 273 440 472 579.

However, his discussion of the variation of this idiom in John and the Apocalypse seems to be crippled by his view of the alleged Atticizing tendencies of the second century scribes. For example, there are six (possibly seven)³⁸ occurrences of προσκυνεῖν with an object in John. In two instances the object is τῷ πατρὶ without textual variation (4:21, 23). In two others (4:22 bis) the object is a noun clause begun with the relative ὅ (which Kilpatrick suggests "may well be for τοῦτο ὅ"). The other two instances occur with some textual variation of the personal pronoun:

³⁵Macgregor *Festschrift*, 190-1.

³⁶Casey *Festschrift*, 69.

³⁷Clark *Festschrift*, 154.

³⁸I agree with C. L. Porter that John 7:38-9a is an interpolation by a later hand. See "John ix. 38, 39a: A Liturgical Addition to the Text," *NTS* 13 (1966/67) 387-94.

- 4:23 αὐτόν p66c p75 B NC rell
 αὐτῷ p66* N* 124c 238 (pc known to Tisch)
 4:24 αὐτόν p66 p75 B NC rell
 αὐτῷ 251 (pc known to Tisch)³⁹
 omit N* D* ff2 Herac Novat

Although Kilpatrick is properly hesitant, he favors αὐτῷ as the Johannine original in both cases. His conclusion: "Αὐτόν is probably an Atticising correction, but should we read αὐτῷ with so few witnesses or nothing? Opinions will differ, but in any case we have probably no example in John of προσκυνεῖν with the accusative."⁴⁰

I demur--on two grounds. (1) If the αὐτόν read by the preponderance of witnesses from every geographical and chronological stratum is an "Atticizing" correction, how does one explain how this form so thoroughly replaced the other at these two places while not a single "Atticistic" correction is known anywhere for the two occurrences of τῷ πατρί in the same passage? Surely the more likely explanation of the data is that the author, for some reason unknown to us, wrote αὐτόν and that a few scribes independently conformed it to the more common αὐτῷ, either because of the immediately preceding τῷ πατρί or especially because this is the thoroughgoing idiom of the LXX.

(2) An evaluation of the witnesses to αὐτῷ confirms this judgment. The singular reading of codex 251 is of the same kind noted in the preceding section. The αὐτῷ in 4:23 appears to have more support, but the appearance is illusory. Codex 238 is unknown to me, except to note that it is unrelated textually to P66 and N. Furthermore, P66 and N are textually unrelated in John 4; therefore the variant does not go back to a common early ancestor. Nor does it go back to the Johannine original. Rather these MSS are related as to their scribal characteristics--many wild, singular readings, often corrected, usually made in carelessness or conformation to more common expressions, and almost always secondary. In any case, a glance at the photograph of P66 suggests that the scribe made an immediate correction of a careless slip and his αὐτῷ is therefore not a copy of a MS with this reading at all. That is, his αὐτῷ begins and ends with him and is in no way related to N*, nor to the original text of John.

The problem of variants with this idiom in the Apocalypse is more complex; however Professor Kilpatrick's statement of the problem seems to be somewhat misleading. He indicates that προσκυνεῖν occurs with the dative in 18 instances (actually 19; he omits προσκύνῃσαν τῷ δράκοντι in 13:4) and that there is a variant with the accusative in 10 of the 18 (variation occurs in fact in 13 of 19), thus implying that the variation is always from the dative to the accusative. But such a presentation is prejudicial.

³⁹Tischendorf incorrectly includes Eus. Marcell., which reads αὐτόν with the majority; see GCS 4 (1906) 5.

⁴⁰Clark Festschrift, 155-6.

There are indeed six instances of the dative without variation (τῷ ζῶντι 4:10; τῷ θεῷ 7:11; 11:16; 19:4, 10; 22:9), as well as seven others where the dative is read by the majority, and one or a few MSS have the accusative (τὸν δακνόντι 13:4; τὸν θηρῖον 13:4; τὸν ποιῆσαντι 14:7; αὐτῷ 19:10; τῇ εἰκονί 13:15; 16:2; 19:20). But there are also five places where the accusative is found in all but a few late MSS (τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ ἔθνη 9:20, τὸ θηρῖον 13:12; 14:9, 11; 20:4), as well as one where the early evidence is fairly evenly divided (αὐτῷ/αὐτόν 13:8).

It would seem that factors other than Atticism should be taken into account. The evidence suggests that neither John nor scribes were consistent. If in some cases a few MSS reflect "Atticizing" tendencies where John had the dative (and one always wonders why such scribes were not consistent to change all such datives), there seem to be cases where John is the "Atticist" and scribes conformed to the more common dative. Rather than run roughshod over the data, perhaps the MSS can be used to determine the author's tendencies: e.g., τῷ θεῷ is always dative without variation; neuter nouns are usually accusative, especially τὸ θηρῖον (thus the τὸ θηρῖον of A 296 1876 2014 2043 2066 is perhaps original at 13:4, where it was conformed to the preceding δακνόντι). In any case, such possibilities seem far more probable to explain the MS evidence than Atticism alone.

B. Professor Kilpatrick says of the future of ζῆν that ζῆω is the Attic form, ζήσομαι the non-Attic. This being the case, "we would expect the New Testament writers to use ζήσομαι."⁴¹ He then illustrates his argument from the Gospel of John by setting out, with the MS evidence, the six occurrences of the future of ζῆν.

The heart of the Egyptian tradition (P⁷⁵ B L) reads the active four times (5:25; 6:57, 58; 14:19). In three of these they are joined variously by D, Θ, fam 1, fam 13, and members of the Byzantine tradition.

On the basis of the witness of P⁴⁵, P⁶⁶, and P⁷⁵ (the former two read the active once each), Kilpatrick notes that the active occurs in MSS which are older than A.D. 200. He therefore concludes:

As the variation came into being in the second century, the century of Atticism, it is more probable that the evangelist at the end of the first century used the non-Attic middle which was later corrected to the Attic active future. That the evangelist should go out of his way to introduce an Attic form into his Koine Greek which the second century scribes then changed to the Koine form seems most unlikely. We may accordingly regard the middle-future as what the evangelist wrote and the active as an Atticist correction of the second century.⁴²

Kilpatrick further notes four places in the Epistles where the future active occurs, in three of which he finds Atticism at work (Rom 6:2 ζήσομεν/ζήσωμεν; 2 Cor 13:4 ζήσομεν/ζήσμεθα; James 4:15 ζήσομεν/ζήσωμεν). Only at Heb 12:9 does he allow that the almost universally attested ζήσομεν is original.

⁴¹Schmid *Festschrift*, 132.

⁴²Ibid.

Of these last four readings, however, two things should be noted: (1) They all occur in the first person plural, and these are the only occurrences of the first plural of the future of ζῆν in the NT. (2) Only one of these readings (2 Cor 13:4) reflects a variation between the "Attic" active and the "koine" middle. The variation at Rom 6:4 is between a deliberative future indicative and deliberative subjunctive,⁴³ both of which are classical and koine forms;⁴⁴ likewise in Jas 4:15 the choice is between a future indicative and an aorist subjunctive. It would seem, therefore, that the future active of ζῆν in the first person plural is the fixed form, and it was this that was being resisted in favor of a koine form at 2 Cor 13:4, not vice versa as Kilpatrick suggests.⁴⁵

But the real weakness in Kilpatrick's argument is that he fails to note the other ten occurrences of the future of ζῆν in the NT (Matt 4:4; 9:18; Luke 4:4; 10:28; Rom 1:17; 8:13; 10:5; Gal 3:11, 12; Heb 10:38), all of which occur, as in John, in the second and third person. In every instance but one (Luke 10:28 where D and 28 read the active) ζῆν occurs in the future middle without textual variation.

Furthermore, the future middle is the septuagintal form. Of over 105 occurrences of the future of ζῆν in the LXX, the active occurs only in Ps 137:7; 142:11; and Prov 9:11, all three in the second person singular. One might well ask why the same Christian scribes, who allegedly introduced Atticisms into John, did not do so also in the LXX.

The fact that in John the future middle is universally attested (except for P⁴⁵) at 11:25, and the active attested by the majority of uncials at 6:58, plus the universal attestation of the future middle (apart from the first person plural) outside of John, seems to point to a conclusion directly opposite that of Kilpatrick. The question which Kilpatrick must answer is, why only in John do the Alexandrians, and others, reflect Atticist tendencies? For whether or not the evangelist "went out of his way" to do so, the future active of ζῆν is strictly a Johannine phenomenon in the entire Greek Bible. Furthermore, the combined evidence of 6:58 and 11:25 indicates that the Fourth Evangelist was not consistent. What we have then in John is not P⁶⁶ and later MSS resisting "corrections" toward Atticism, as Kilpatrick argues, but P⁶⁶ and later scribes resisting the "Atticism" of the Fourth Evangelist in favor of the more common biblical idiom.

⁴³Interestingly, von Soden cites two MSS (1245 104 [? von Soden has H⁰¹³, which is presumably a misprint for H¹⁰³]) as reading ζῆσθεθα. Yet this is not the original text for which Kilpatrick argues, but rather the aorist subjunctive (which is not necessarily non-Attic). Kilpatrick is therefore agreeing that in this instance at least the koine ζῆσθεθα is the secondary form toward which these scribes were correcting.

⁴⁴See H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (rev. ed.; Harvard, 1956) 428, 596; N. Turner, Syntax, Vol III of J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek (Edinburgh: Clark, 1963) 98.

⁴⁵In his evaluation of the UBS text (NovT 15 [1973] 299) Dr. Elliott has quite missed the point here. He has stated that "the middle form should be printed at Romans vi 2, II Corinthians xiii 4, James iv 15, where UBS follows κ AB which read the active form." Even Kilpatrick does not argue for the middle at Rom 6:2 (see note 43 above) and the middle at Jas 4:15 would be a case of thoroughgoing emendation!

C. Kilpatrick has also argued that the ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν idiom, where there are variations, is to be preferred to either of the verbs occurring by itself; for "no Greek of any period, left to himself, would say or write ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν."⁴⁶ He therefore concludes:

Hence we are not surprised when we find that often where ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν and the like occur in our Greek text there are variants designed to mitigate or remove this unGreek expression. We may even suspect that sometimes the attempt to improve the language has been successful and that the more Greek expression is in our text and the original unGreek wording in our apparatus.⁴⁷

However, an analysis of this idiom in John seems again to point to the opposite conclusion, namely, that the author himself had a basic unGreek idiom, ἀπεκρίθη [Ἰησοῦς] καὶ εἶπεν [αὐτῷ], which he himself altered occasionally toward the "more Greek" ἀπεκρίθη [Ἰησοῦς]; the scribes, on the other hand, tended not "to mitigate" the author's unGreek idiom, but tended rather to conform to that idiom where the author himself had used the "more Greek" form.

The following evidence substantiates this conclusion:

(1) The full idiom occurs without MS variation 19 times in John.⁴⁸ On 9 other occasions a single MS "mitigates" this unGreek form.⁴⁹

(2) The "more Greek" idiom (less καὶ εἶπεν) occurs 21 times without MS variation.⁵⁰

If one may trust the manuscript evidence at all, these two sets of readings clearly indicate that the author of the Gospel himself used both the "Attic" and the septuagintal forms. Moreover, the nine instances where a single MS reads the "more Greek" for the "unGreek" idiom indicates that there is very little tendency in the MS tradition to mitigate the unGreek form.

(3) On the other hand, on 17 other occasions, where the majority of MSS read without καὶ εἶπεν, one or a few MSS read the full idiom. The MS evidence for those which read the full idiom at these points is given below:

3:5 L K M Θ Π 053 69 124 174 213 320 579 1093 1241 pc

6:70 ⱼ (D) N 1187 a ff² sa

7:45 544 c bo

⁴⁶Schmid Festschrift, 126.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸1:48, 50; 2:18; 19; 3:9, 27; 4:10, 13; 7:16, 21, 52; 8:38, 48; 9:30, 34; 14:23; 18:25, 30; 20:28.

⁴⁹3:3 (ⱼ* om. καὶ εἶπεν); 3:10 (083 om. ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς); 4:17 (ⱼ* om. καὶ εἶπεν); 5:19 (ⱼ* ἔλεγεν. . . ὁ Ἰησοῦς); 6:43 (053 om. καὶ εἶπεν); 6:26 (N om. καὶ εἶπεν); 8:14 (ⱼ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς); 12:30 (ⱼ om. καὶ εἶπεν); 13:7 (33 om. καὶ εἶπεν).

⁵⁰5:7; 6:7, 68; 7:47; 8:34; 9:20, 27; 10:25, 33; 11:9; 12:34; 16:31; 18:8, 20, 23, 34, 35, 36; 19:7, 15; 21:5.

8:19 & D 27 78 543 700 713 1093 1188 1241
 8:33 D 1 7 291 565 658 660 1293 1354 1582 2193
 8:49 & G @ λ ϕ 291 440 565 1093 1170
 8:54 1093 1170 1242 1555 e bo
 9:3 053 λ 565 e b
 10:32 33
 10:34 p⁶⁶ (D)
 13:8 1071 r¹ eth sypal
 13:26 & D 13 346
 13:38 D aur c ff²
 18:5 X 213 f
 18:37 p⁶⁶
 19:11 ϕ a c ff² sypal
 19:22 1170 1242

(4) On only four occasions do the Egyptian MSS (always with several others) read the shorter form against the majority (1:49; 7:20; 9:11, 25).

From these sets of figures the conclusion is unmistakable that the MSS tend not to become "Atticist" against the author, but rather that they tend to conform to the more characteristically biblical idiom. The fact that the MSS which do have variations at this idiom are not necessarily "superior" witnesses seems to confirm this conclusion. Codex Sinaiticus, for example, whose tendencies to be "wild" in John make it suspect, "mitigates the unGreek idiom" five times, but it also reads the full idiom against most of the rest at four other places. The fact that P⁶⁶ (almost alone) conforms to the more characteristically Johannine idiom at two places indicates that even in the second century the tendency to "conform" is at least as great as any tendency to "Atticize", as far as this idiom is concerned.

Finally, while it may be true that "no Greek, of any period, left to himself, would say or write ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν," the point is that biblical scribes and Church Fathers were not "left to themselves." They were steeped in the biblical idiom, as even a Greek of unquestioned rhetorical and literary powers as St. John Chrysostom bears unexpected witness. For in two separate citations of John 5:7, where all known witnesses have ἀπεκρίθη (or λέγει) αὐτῷ ὁ ἄσθενῶν, he writes ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ ὁ ἄσθενής καὶ εἶπε (anom. 12.2 [MPG 48.804]) and ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ καὶ λέγει (hom. 36 in Jo. [MPG 59.204])!

All of this is not to exclude Atticism as a possible cause of corruption. But it is only one possible cause, and in all of these cases not the most probable one. Textual criticism simply cannot afford a "hardening of the categories."

But if rigorous eclecticism is likely to lock into one possibility of error to the exclusion of others, it also runs the risk of making choices in a most random and arbitrary fashion. Hort long ago warned of this possibility: "The uses of internal evidence are subordinate and accessory: if taken as the primary guide, it cannot but lead to extensive error."⁵¹ The following sampling (from scores of examples) from Dr. Elliott's study of the text of the Pastorals illustrates the soundness of Hort's judgment.

A. In 1 Tim 1:1 Elliott has argues that the τοῦ added before σωτήρος in D 81 104 is original because it gives balance to the opening sentence (κατ' ἐπιταγὴν θεοῦ τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἡμῶν) and conforms to the appositional use of σωτήρος elsewhere in the Pastorals (Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν Tit 1:4; 3:6).

But one may ask whether this is a correct use of "author's style." In the first place, the appositional use of the article with σωτήρος in Titus is probably irrelevant; for in each case it occurs with the compound name Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ which always has the article in the Pastorals when an appositive is added. On the other hand, the true stylistic equivalent of θεοῦ σωτήρος is the often repeated anarthrous θεοῦ πατρός (1 Tim 1:2; 2 Tim 1:2; Tit 1:4; and Paul *passim*). Furthermore, the similar phrases in the salutations of these epistles do not have the "balanced" construction (ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρός καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν).

B. In 1 Tim 1:2 Elliott says that the ἡμῶν after πατρός found in the Byzantine tradition is probably original. He argues: "The possessive was omitted here on stylistic grounds: ἡμῶν occurs 4 times in verses 1 and 2." Yet in identical variations in 2 Tim 1:2 and Tit 1:4 he argues that the ἡμῶν was added to conform to 1 Tim 1:2! But is not this the explanation for all three variants? The Pastor consistently wrote πατρός; scribes variously conformed it to the more Pauline πατρός ἡμῶν (Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:3; 2 Cor 1:2; Eph 1:2; Phil 1:2; Col 1:2; Phlm 1:2; cf. the TR on 1 and 2 Thes).

C. In an extensive--and helpful--discussion of all variants involving the nomina sacra, Dr. Elliott states, of word order, that "for the author of the Pastorals ΙΕ ΧΕ was the most natural order. He kept this order wherever possible, but when ΙΕ did not unambiguously show the case in the Genitive and dative, he inverted the words."⁵² This is a remarkable statement, given that even in Elliott's resultant text "the most natural order" occurs but five times (in the nominative at 1 Tim 1:15, 16; 2:5; accusative 2 Tim 2:8; genitive Tit 3:6) out of 29 occurrences of the double name, and that there is textual variation in 22 of these. Elliott's rule seems altogether arbitrary; for in fact, discussion of case aside, the most common order in the Pastorals is Χριστός Ἰησοῦς. There is only one instance (Tit 3:6) of the more "natural order" occurring without significant textual variation, and in that case it occurs in the genitive! And when this order occurs with scattered but insignificant support

⁵¹The New Testament in the Original Greek, I, 543.

⁵²The Greek Text of Timothy and Titus, 201.

in 1 Tim 1:15 and 2:5, one wonders again how such choices can be made without consulting the MS evidence, since there simply are no unambiguous internal grounds on which to establish the "rules."

D. In 1 Tim 2:9 Elliott adopts the reading of $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ before $\gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ with the Byzantine majority. In the discussion he notes that $\gamma\upsilon\nu\eta$ elsewhere as well as other general nouns are anarthrous in the Pastorals. "Nevertheless," Elliott argues, "we should be inclined to add $\tau\alpha\varsigma$ here, which parallels $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \text{ \textit{\textbf{ἀνδρας}}}$." Indeed, is this not precisely what the scribes were inclined to do? Far more so, one would think, than that as early grammarians they "omitted the article to conform to other and similar uses of the anarthrous generic noun."

E. At 1 Tim 4:6, 10; 5:5; and 6:17 there is a series of four variants where 5, 2, 1, and 3 witnesses respectively have another tense than the perfect of the majority. Elliott has opted for the variant in each case on the grounds of "the rarity of the strict perfect in the Pastorals" (although he acknowledges that it does occur in no less than seven instances without variation). That this is another case of an argument turned on its head may be seen from his choice of $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\pi\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ at 6:17 (cum F G John Damascus) for the $\acute{\eta}\lambda\pi\iota\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$ of the rest. Elliott grants that the perfect infinitive is rare in the NT (which makes it the *lectio difficilior*), although it is found without variation at 2 Tim 2:14 and Tit 1:16 (which makes it a known Pastoral usage). Yet in spite of this Elliott says: "[The immediately preceding] $\mu\alpha\rho\alpha\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\lambda\epsilon$ and $\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta\lambda\alpha \phi\rho\omicron\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ are present. So $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\pi\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ agrees naturally." But this is precisely what the ancestor of F G and John of Damascus both sensed and altered the text accordingly!

F. At 1 Tim 2:12 Elliott prefers the word order of the TR $\gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\acute{\iota} \delta\epsilon \delta\iota\delta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$ because a somewhat similar word order occurs at 1 Tim 5:1 and because it is unusual for an infinitive to stand first in a sentence in the Pastorals. Since $\gamma\upsilon\nu\eta$ stands first in the preceding sentence, Elliott argues that "the variant $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu \delta\epsilon \gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\acute{\iota}$ arose on stylistic grounds to prevent two consecutive sentences beginning with the same noun." But Elliott's "variant" is the more difficult reading on all counts, especially since the reading of the TR puts $\delta\iota\delta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omega$ in more logical juxtaposition.

G. At Tit 1:2 Elliott opts for the $\mu\upsilon\sigma\eta\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ of 1908 against the $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\eta\gamma\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha\tau\omicron$ of all others, despite the fact that $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega$ is a Pastoral word. Elliott says: "[$\mu\upsilon\sigma\eta\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$] was altered (a) because it was not Classical, (b) scribes objected to verbs compounded with and followed by the same preposition, (c) scribes preferred simple to compound forms." But all of this is arbitrary, for scribes can be shown to go either way in all three of these situations. (Cf., e.g., the singular readings of D and M in Mark 3:20 for $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma\acute{\epsilon}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma$ and [$\sigma\upsilon\nu$] $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\chi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$.)

All of these illustrate the tenuousness of choices made on internal grounds alone. If textual criticism is going to approximate a science--or at least be considered a discipline--it must avoid both the heavy-handedness of seeing only one cause of corruption and the whims of the individual critic. In each of the cases noted above, the alternative option also has the better support. Surely that factor tips the scales of probability:

The final dilemma of rigorous eclecticism is related to the preceding problem, namely that very often internal questions either are indecisive or sometimes collide.

This dilemma may be illustrated best by noting the three criteria of rigorous eclecticism offered by F. C. Grant for evaluating variants:

1. No one type of text is infallible, or to be preferred by virtue of its generally superior authority.
2. Each reading must be examined on its merits, and preference must be given to those readings which are demonstrably in the style of the author under consideration.
3. Readings which explain other variants, but are not contrariwise themselves to be explained by the others, merit our preference.⁵³

The problem for rigorous eclecticism here is, on what grounds does one choose when rules 2 and 3 point to directly opposite conclusions? It would seem that when such happens--and it often does--that rule 1 must be laid aside; for "the generally superior authority" of a given MS or type of text may be the deciding factor.

One may note, for example, the following set of variations in John 5:17. Without regard for the moment to the external evidence, there are these four variants:

1. ἀπεκριθη αυτοις
2. ο δε απεκριθη αυτοις
3. ο δε απεκρινατο αυτοις
4. ος δε απεκριθη αυτοις

The readings are here listed in the order of preference according to Grant's rule 2. Reading 1 is preferred because it is the only reading in accordance with Johannine style. The use of $\delta\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ for the continuation of narrative is so uncommon in the Gospel of John as to make the rigorous eclectic suspect it at any point; and $\delta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ at such a point is found in the NT only here and in a reading of $\aleph\ B\ N\ \Sigma\ 33\ 579\ pc$ in Mark 15:13.

On the other hand, according to Grant's rule 3, the exact opposite is the order of preference. The $\delta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ is the only reading which explains the other variants, and is not contrariwise itself to be explained by the others. The $\delta\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ is easily explained from $\delta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ as the preference for a more common form of expression; the omission of either reflects a preference for a more characteristically Johannine mode of expression. If the omission were original, one can scarcely explain the addition of either $\delta\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\delta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ --especially with a form of ἀποκρίνεσθαι in the Fourth Gospel. If $\delta\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ were original, one can explain the omission as a conformation to Johannine style, but the $\delta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ defies explanation except as an inadvertent scribal error.

⁵³"The Greek Text of the RSV," 41.

It would seem, therefore, that either Grant's rules must be transcended, or else a choice must be made between rules 2 and 3.

However, when external evidence is added, a decision in favor of $\delta\varsigma$ $\delta\epsilon$ seems well founded. The external evidence is as follows:

- | | | |
|----|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. | απεκριθη αυτοις | D E F H M S U V pler TR |
| 2. | ο δε απεκριθη αυτοις | P66 C L N K G Δ A pm |
| 3. | ο δε απεκρινατο αυτοις | κ* W |
| 4. | ος δε απεκριθη αυτοις | P75 A B |

The textual relationship between P75 and B means that theirs is a single witness. The reading of A is unexpected support, inasmuch as it more often reads with the Byzantine MSS than with P75 B, where these two types of text differ. Moreover, my recent study on the alleged recensional character of the Egyptian text-type demonstrated that the text of P75 B, although by no means pure, is indeed a witness to the faithful preservation of a given type of text.⁵⁴ On the other hand, P66 has been noted frequently to differ from P75 B in favor of an easier reading,⁵⁵ and thus it does here. Furthermore, D, the only early witness to the more "characteristically Johannine" reading, has been shown often to conform to a "later" text.⁵⁶

When, therefore, the earliest and "best" MSS have the reading which best explains the others, this combination would seem to overrule the choice dictated by rigorous eclecticism.

Similarly, the introductory formula at John 11:12 has the following variants:

- | | | |
|----|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. | ειπαν ουν αυτω οι μαθηται | κ D K W Π 579 b ff ² |
| 2. | ειπαν ουν αυτω οι μαθηται αυτου | 251 254 a c |
| 3. | ειπαν ουν οι μαθηται αυτω | P66 P75 B C X θ pc |
| 4. | ειπαν ουν αυτω | A 44 122 |
| 5. | ειπαν ουν οι μαθηται | 7 116 314 1200 1 |
| 6. | ειπαν ουν οι μαθηται αυτου | L Ψ Byz aur e f TR |

The most characteristically Johannine reading here is (1).⁵⁷ The combination of verb-object-subject (VOS) is far more common than the combination VS in (5) and (6) and VO in (4).

⁵⁴"P75, P66, and Origen."

⁵⁵Fee, *Papyrus Bodmer II*, 56.

⁵⁶Fee, "Codex Sinaiticus in the Gospel of John: A contribution to Methodology in Establishing Textual Relationships," *NTS* 15 (1968/69) 33.

⁵⁷See my "The Use of the Definite Article with Personal Names in the Gospel of John," *NTS* 17 (1970/71) 173-8.

But the only reading which explains all the others and is itself explained by none is (3). This is easily the lectio difficilior inasmuch as in the some 120 occurrences of this idiom in John the order VSO occurs without variation only where the object is a noun (e.g., 2:5; 6:67; 18:11) or where the prepositional phrase πρὸς . . . replaces the dative (e.g., 4:48; 8:57; 11:21). The order VSO where the pronoun is in the dative occurs only here and at 11:44 (P75 B C L W sa bo e vg) in the Gospel of John.⁵⁸

Therefore, reading (2) may be dismissed as a modification of (1), and readings (1), (4), (5), and (6) all represent various attempts to remove the difficulty of the word order of P66 P75 B et al. The fact that this reading is supported both by the earliest and "best" MSS, as well as by various others which do not necessarily have Egyptian proclivities, seems to indicate that the "more difficult" and "best supported" reading is to be preferred.

Such judgments are not expressions of a genealogical method, nor do they suggest a full scale return to Hort. The fact that external evidence serves as a final arbiter is precisely where rational eclecticism parts company with Westcott-Hort. They started with one text-type as superior and followed its readings except where it had clearly discernible clerical errors or, in a few cases, where internal principles dictated the superiority of the Western text (as in the so-called Western non-interpolations). Rational eclecticism starts with readings, noting first the various intrinsic and transcriptional possibilities, and where such questions are indecisive, then appeals to the relative value of the witnesses.

Rational eclecticism is indeed the currently reigning method, and it appears to be a valid one, for it takes seriously both internal questions and the manuscript evidence. Rather than search for a new method as some propose, or jettison historical study as rigorous eclecticism tends to, the present methodological task would seem to be the implementation and refinement of rational eclecticism. It is here that the labors of Professor Kilpatrick and Dr. Elliott should prove to be most useful. Their contributions as to various stylistic features of the NT authors as well as their isolation of the variants where Atticism might be a possible factor have not only increased our knowledge but also widened our perspective when asking the internal questions. For this we express unqualified appreciation.

⁵⁸This unusual order also occurs in three singular readings (6:32 [579]; 7:33 [1241]; 9:41 [D]).

THE ECLECTIC METHOD IN NEW TESTAMENT TEXTUAL CRITICISM:
S 29 SOLUTION OR SYMPTOM?

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- Outline: I. Problem and Purpose
II. Criteria for Originality of Readings
 A. Use of Critical Canons in Antiquity
 B. Use of Critical Canons in Modern Times
 C. Use of Critical Canons in Current Eclecticism
 1. By Eclectic Generalists
 2. By Eclectic Specialists
III. Conclusion

I. PROBLEM AND PURPOSE

The "eclectic method" in New Testament textual criticism is one of several disguises for the broad and basic problem of the "canons of criticism" or of the "criteria for originality" as applied to the various readings in the New Testament textual tradition, and in a real sense eclectic methodology—in its several forms as currently practised—is as much a symptom of basic problems in the discipline as it is a proposed and widely applied solution to those problems. By the same token, perhaps every methodological approach and even every discussion of methodology in New Testament textual criticism could be described as symptomatic of the problems; yet the eclectic method seems in a particularly pointed way to veil the problems of the discipline, for by its very nature it tries in one way or another to utilize all available approaches to textual problems, and in a single given case of seeking the original text it often wishes to apply to the problem several established text-critical criteria, even if these criteria have the appearance of being mutually exclusive or contradictory. If indeed basic problems are disguised by the eclectic approach, perhaps they also can be disclosed by a careful scrutiny of the eclectic method.

The eclectic approach to the recovery of the most likely original text of the New Testament is, in its broadest definition, a method (1) that treats each text-critical problem (normally a single "variation-unit") separately and largely in isolation from other problems, (2) that "chooses" or "selects" (ἐκλέγω) from among available and recognized text-critical criteria those that presumably are appropriate to that particular text-critical situation, and (3) that then applies the selected criteria in such a way as to "pick" or "choose" (ἐκλέγω) a reading from one or another manuscript and thereby arrive at a text-critical decision for that particular variation-unit. (Incidentally, it is not clear whether the term "eclectic" refers primarily to the selection of readings from here and there or to the choice of criteria from among the many and various ones available. It is clear, however, that both kinds of choices are prominent in the eclectic approach.)

In a real sense the eclectic method, taken in the broadest meaning, is as old as the formulation and application of the traditional "canons of criticism," such as those promulgated by J. A. Bengel in 1725, by J. J. Griesbach in 1796, by K. Lachmann in 1842, and others, for if it is axiomatic that "the harder reading is to be preferred," and also axiomatic that "the

"the shorter reading is to be preferred," and that "the ancient and weighty witnesses" are to be given priority, then one is forced to choose between or among conflicting criteria when the shorter reading is the easier reading, or the harder reading is the longer, or the shorter or harder reading is attested only by late manuscripts. It is at this point that the delicate and ingenious phrase, "the balance of relative probabilities," comes into play, for when two or more conflicting criteria seem applicable to a given variation-unit, then both the choice of the most appropriate criterion (or criteria) and the textual decision itself become increasingly complex and problematic. In precisely such a situation (logically at least) the eclectic method was born, for at this juncture factors on the external, historical, and documentary side of the transmission of the text are thrown into the balance with factors on the internal, contextual, and stylistic side, and an eclecticism that takes into consideration all conceivably applicable criteria—though always within a "balance of relative probabilities" context—is applied to each case to isolate the most "suitable" criteria or criterion, which then becomes the basis for the selection of the one variant reading that is to be accredited as the most likely original.

Difficulties, however, are multiplied when different values are placed upon different sets of criteria (for example, on the "external" criteria as opposed to the "internal") by different schools of thought; for instance, when the criterion of the "oldest and best manuscripts" is valued more highly than the criterion of "conformity to the author's style," then textual decisions will vary markedly from those made when these relative valuations are reversed. Such differing valuations represent, in fact, not only a general problem faced by contemporary textual critics, but also a very special crux in text-critical methodology, for among practitioners of an eclectic approach there is a distinction to be drawn between what might be called eclectic generalists (true eclectics), who in each case of textual variation try to employ the appropriate criteria without prejudice as to their relative weight or value [Do any such "true" eclectics exist?], and eclectic specialists (biased eclectics), who tend to fall into two distinct sub-groups, (1) those who quite obviously value external criteria above the internal and who utilize the latter mainly to clarify cases plagued by an ambiguous array of external evidence, and (2) those who forthrightly value internal criteria above the external and who rely almost exclusively on grammatical, stylistic, and contextual factors in their textual decisions. The issues underlying these distinctive eclectic approaches determine and constitute the subject matter of the discussion to follow.

Incidentally, these broad classifications (eclectic generalists and eclectic specialists) encompass all contemporary New Testament textual critics with the exception of the genealogical scholars; the latter construct stemmata for New Testament textual transmission and thereby affirm the feasibility either of reconstructing the archetype or of isolating the earliest "state" of the New Testament text (or, better, of each major segment or transmissional unit of the New Testament text). The older, simplistic genealogical approach (stemmata and archetypes) has been abandoned almost entirely by New Testament textual critics (except in connection with small "families" of manuscripts) because it is both inapplicable to the massive and disparate New Testament data and ineffectual in tracing sure developmental lines through manuscripts with such complex mixture as those of the New Testament textual tradition;¹ an approach known as "textual analysis," which (somewhat more modestly) determines the genealogical relationship between the various "states" of a text (though not the genealogy

of the documents containing them) with a view to identifying the "state" from which all the others have descended,² as yet has not been widely assessed—and certainly not definitively so—by New Testament textual critics in general. These subjects, however, extend beyond the scope of the present discussion.

The problem of eclectic methodology, then, has at least two aspects. First, integral to the eclectic method—in all its forms—are the criteria for originality of readings, and these need to be described with some care and assessed, for they are the stock in trade of eclecticism. In the second place, the various eclectic approaches need to be examined, not only to see whether what we have called the eclectic generalist method is viable, but particularly to scrutinize the relative merits and usefulness of the two competing eclectic specialist approaches. It has been said often before,³ but bears repetition, that all of us—except the genealogists—employ an eclectic method, for it is the contemporary procedure both for handling separate cases of textual variation and also for formulating critical texts of the New Testament. Yet, recent handbooks and other technical literature of the discipline all too seldom engage in serious self-criticism of this central and basic matter of the methodology employed in isolating the most likely original New Testament text. Above all, our aim in this present discussion is the clear definition and description of the eclectic method and of attendant issues, and beyond that our purpose is the critical evaluation of the eclectic approaches currently in use. In fulfilling these goals it will be instructive, as is so often the case, to employ a historical approach, attempting to show whence and why current eclectic methods developed; accordingly, a history of the criteria for originality of readings will form the first step in our analysis of the eclectic method.

II. CRITERIA FOR ORIGINALITY OF READINGS

The traditional "canons of criticism" are in reality, of course, criteria for determining the originality of variant readings in a textual tradition, that is, they are principles devised to counteravil the corrupting processes attendant to the manuscript transmission of ancient texts and are based both on knowledge of the documents transmitting the texts and on acquaintance with the scribal habits of those who copied them.

A. USE OF CRITICAL CANONS IN ANTIQUITY

Undoubtedly the first application—rudimentary and unsystematic as it was—of such canons of criticism to the New Testament text was made by Origen, who, for example, could characterize certain variant readings as found in "few," "many," or "most" manuscripts known to him,⁴ an adumbration of the much more modern canon underlying the 16th century phrase, textus receptus or "text received by all," a canon that in reality declares that the reading supported by the largest number of manuscripts is to be accounted original. Although Origen does not always follow the majority reading and at times even rejects a reading of the entire known manuscript tradition,⁵ yet the canon of the majority reading is latent in his comments. Moreover, at other times Origen employs etymological and theological canons,⁶ and he preferred readings that suited the immediate context (once he uses the phrase, "inner probability") and that were harmonious with parallel passages.⁷ A century and a half later, Jerome evidences the use of the canons of age (old manuscripts are given more weight), of scribal quality (the care in writing and in correcting a manuscript affects its reliability), of a

reading's suitability to its context, of a reading's grammatical appropriateness,⁸ and of harmonization from parallel passages.⁹

There is no need to pursue such early uses of critical canons down through the middle ages, for in the final analysis it is their formulation and utilization in modern New Testament textual criticism that will be most instructive for us.

B. USE OF CRITICAL CANONS IN MODERN TIMES

It was only in modern times that canons were drawn up in formal fashion, ranging from the first such attempt by Gerard von Maestricht in his 1711 edition of the Greek New Testament, who lists 43 canons and comments at length on most of them,¹⁰ to the terse *proclivi scriptiori praestat ardua* ("the harder reading is to be preferred") of Bengel, to Griesbach's 15 canons and Lachmann's 6, and to the various lists of critical principles found in manuals of New Testament textual criticism.¹¹

It is instructive to peruse these lists of critical canons, especially those given and employed by various editors of Greek New Testaments down through the years. John Mill of Oxford listed no canons of criticism for his edition in 1707, but he appears to have relied primarily on two canons, that smooth and easy readings are not necessarily genuine and that the united testimony of different kinds of authorities carries more weight than mere numerical preponderance of authorities, though at the same time he does regard as important the mere number of manuscripts attesting a reading. In addition, he considered patristic quotations decisive and highly valued the Latin versions, particularly the Old Latin, in textual decisions.¹²

The canons of Gerard von Maestricht, referred to earlier, were designed to disparage the value of those variant readings that he had taken from the 1710 edition of Mill and Kuster's Greek New Testament and had reprinted in his own 1711 edition. His 43 canons are no longer important in themselves, though extolled by some at the time; they take on significance, however, when it is observed that both Wettstein and Bengel, very soon after 1711, encountered these canons and the text that accompanied them and, apparently, were rather profoundly affected by them. Bengel became acquainted with the canons in Heidelberg about 1713, and he published three separate refutations, first in the *apparatus criticus* attached to his edition of 1734 and finally, with considerable detail, in his preface to *Gnomon Novi Testamenti* in 1742.¹³

Many of von Maestricht's canons are concerned with scribal habits and the causes of variant readings, such as the "negligence, listlessness, haste, and . . . malice" of scribes (Canon I), the repetition of words or sentences from the context (II, III), the substitution, addition, omission, or alteration of letters, syllables, words, and the like (V, VI, VII, XXVI, and XXVII), and the growth of variant readings from gospel parallels (XVI, XXIV); moreover, variations recognizable as due to the presumption or impudence of a copyist are not "variant readings" (XXVI, XXVII, cf. IX) and are to be rejected in favor of the "received readings" (cf. VIII), as also to be rejected are "absurd" readings (XXII). Also, copyists as well as manuscripts can be observed and described as prone, for example, to add or to omit (XV, XXX, XXXI). More specifically, especially in cases involving omission, one codex does not make for a variant reading (IX), nor do two codices in agreement against a received reading that makes sense (X), nor do three or four codices produce a viable variant against twenty manuscripts (XI), for "a

great number of manuscript codices, for instance twenty or more, establish and approve a received and common reading of good sense, above all in a case of a variant involving an omission" (XII), nor does a reading of three or four codices that does not alter the sense—whether consisting of addition, deletion, or change of construction—command attention, for "certainly no reason is compelling that will prefer a variant reading to a received reading" (VIII). Finally, Canon XXIV indicates that a variant reading commonly disappears when the origin of that variant reading is discovered.

Richard Bentley, in his 1720 pamphlet on Proposals for Printing a Greek and Latin New Testament (which task, as is well known, was never completed), made it clear that the criterion of the antiquity of manuscripts ("... the most ancient and venerable MSS. in Greek and Roman capital letters") was primary (Proposal I), with the corollary that readings chosen for the text must be confirmed by the use of "the old versions, Syriac, Coptic, Gothic, and Aethiopic, and of all the fathers, Greeks and Latins, within the first five centuries," adding that any reading intruding upon any copies since that time is "of no value or authority" (Proposal IV). Bentley's overriding concern appears to be with what are now called external criteria rather than with internal evidence.

J. A. Bengel, in a 1725 "Prodromus" to his proposed edition of the Greek New Testament (which appeared in 1734), stated his leading and classic canon, "the harder reading is to be preferred," a principle already utilized with some frequency by Mill in his lengthy prolegomenon. In this celebrated canon, Bengel was responding to his own urgent question as to which reading (in a given case) is likely to have arisen out of the others,¹⁴ and actually he was reducing all of von Maestricht's 43 canons "to one comprehensive rule of four words":¹⁵ proclivi scriptioni praestat ardua. Since Bengel's time, this canon often has been expressed as difficilior lectio potior. Akin to this canon are some others issued by Bengel and relating also to internal considerations: readings representing obvious scribal errors or scribal elaborations are inferior (cf. his numbers 13 and 14 below), as are readings showing alliteration, parallelism, or lectionary adjustments to the text (number 14):¹⁶

13. A reading which does not allure by too great facility, but shines by its native dignity, is always to be preferred to that which may fairly be supposed to owe its origin to either the carelessness or the injudicious care of copyists.

14. Thus, a corrupted text is often betrayed by alliteration, parallelism, a modification for the beginning or end of a church lesson. The recurrence of the same words suggests an omission; too great facility, a gloss. Where various readings are many, the middle reading is the best.

Though Bengel's "harder reading" canon is not in this list as such, it is presupposed (and contained) in both 13 and 14 where the word "facility" occurs.

For text-critical decisions, Bengel also valued highly, as did Mill and Bentley before him, the oldest Greek manuscripts and the Latin versions; this is clear from the preface to his Gnomon (1742), where he gives his list of 27 "canons" (he calls them monitis—"admonitions"),¹⁷ two of which we have quoted above and many of which range well beyond what normally would be designated as text-critical canons. Number 12 is by far the most telling of his rules:

... More witnesses are to be preferred to fewer; and, which is more important, witnesses which differ in country, age, and language, [are to be preferred] to those which are closely connected with each other; and, most important of all, ancient witnesses [are to be preferred] to modern ones. For, since the original autographs (which were in Greek) can alone claim to be the Fountain-head, the highest value belongs to those streams which are least removed from it; that is, to the most ancient codices, in Greek, Latin, &c.¹⁸

Two other canons are closely related to this one: number 9, which refers to versions and patristic quotations as carrying little weight when they differ from Greek manuscripts of the New Testament, but "where Greek manuscripts vary, those have the greatest authority, with which versions and fathers agree"; and number 10, which commends the Latin Vulgate, when supported by Latin fathers, because of its singular "high antiquity."¹⁹

Just at this point it is essential to emphasize that no discussion of critical canons dare overlook Bengel's greatest contribution to this aspect of New Testament text-critical methodology, namely, his pioneering division of the extant manuscripts into classes or groups (syzygies, he called them), for a fundamental and far-reaching "canon" or principle emerges from (or perhaps underlies) this methodological procedure. For Bengel, all New Testament manuscripts fall either into the African "family," consisting of the most ancient Greek manuscripts and the most ancient versions (Codex A, the Greco-Latin codices, and the Ethiopic, Coptic, and Latin versions), or the Asiatic family, made up of the more recent Greek manuscripts and versions. He then speaks of the readings of the African family as "always ancient" and states that those of the Asiatic family, "many as they are, have often but little weight. . . ."²⁰ Though there were adumbrations of these views, particularly in Mill—who recognized the greater importance of certain combinations of witnesses (such as A and the Latin versions) than of mere numbers of witnesses, and also in Bentley—who viewed the Greek manuscripts as transmitted from three areas (Egypt, Asia, and the West) and who gave preference to the more ancient readings, yet here in Bengel's classification of known sources for the New Testament text was enunciated for the first time in a systematic formulation the significant and fundamental principle that textual witnesses must be weighed and not merely counted. It is noteworthy, too, that in Bengel's text-critical system the internal and external criteria are counterparts, though it is sufficiently clear that for him the external considerations have both the first and the decisive voice. This is evident from his Admonition number 12 (quoted above), but also by implication from the very phrasing of his summary statement on text-critical principles (Admonition 15):²¹

There are, therefore, five principle means of judging the Text. The Antiquity of witnesses, the Diversity of their extraction, and their Multitude; in the next place, the Origin of the corrupt reading, and the Native appearance of the genuine.

Obviously, the first three items here involve external criteria, the other two internal, and Bengel separates the categories with a semi-colon and tum ("then," "in the next place"). The last two items refer to Bengel's 13th and 14th admonitions (see above), covering scribal errors, elaborations, and improvements. Since the first three items of Admonition 15 correspond to the three criteria in Admonition 12 (reversed in order of listing, though not in their order of importance), we know precisely how

Bengel valued these criteria: antiquity of witnesses was most important, then their geographical, language, and age distribution, and last—though still significant—their number. When Bengel in his summary statement then lists, both in a separate category and as "in the next place," matters involving internal considerations, we may be sure that these are subsidiary to the external criteria first listed, and this indication of the superiority of external criteria is supported also by the system of classification that he applied to the textual witnesses. Bengel, therefore, suggests that text-critical criteria are of two distinct and separable kinds, external and internal, and that the external are superior to and more decisive than the internal. Bengel implies, moreover, that an eclecticism becomes operative when the evidence or the canons are in conflict: he says of his five principles for judging the text, "Where these concur, none can doubt but a sceptic; when, however, it happens that some of these favor one reading, and some another, the critic may be drawn now in this, now in that direction; or, even should he decide, others may be slow to agree with him" (Admonitions 16 and 17).²²

To what extent did Bengel's canons of criticism shape his text of the New Testament? Actually, his text was hardly affected when measured against the effects that would naturally have been expected to flow from his theories, for he chose to retain the *textus receptus* except when readings judged by him to be original had appeared already in some printed edition of the New Testament. He did, however, impose his judgment on the text in a more direct way by rating variant readings (placed under the text, without supporting witnesses) according to their closeness to the original and according to their relative merits in comparison with the reading of his printed text; there were five categories, each indicated by a Greek letter: (α) the genuine reading, in Bengel's judgment; (β) a reading whose genuineness was not entirely certain, but which was preferable to the reading in the text; (γ) a reading equal in worth to that in the text, but the choice was unsure; (δ) a reading of less value than that in the text; and (ε) a spurious reading.²³

Despite his failure to carry through consistently on his principles, Bengel effectively set in motion two processes, each of which would have far-reaching effects upon the establishment of the New Testament text and upon New Testament textual criticism as a discipline. One of these processes would involve the increasing recognition that the oldest manuscripts, rather than the most numerous or smoothest, were the best manuscripts; the other process would involve the alternating cooperation and tension between external criteria and internal considerations in determining the most likely original New Testament text. These processes had only the dimmest beginnings in Mill and Bentley, but with Bengel came the basis for their swift development. The former process would lead, through Griesbach and then Lachmann, more than a hundred years later, to the decisive overthrow of the *textus receptus* in favor of a New Testament text based solely on ancient witnesses; the latter process would lead through many editors of the New Testament text—and their editions—to the problematic juxtaposition of external and internal criteria and to the current ambivalence and ambiguity in their application. It would seem not too far from the truth, then, to say that the origins of eclecticism can be traced with some assuredness to Bengel's formulary intermingling or conjoining of external and internal canons and that, in terms of our earlier definitions, Bengel appears to be an eclectic specialist and one on the side of those who consider external evidence decisive but who employ internal criteria to settle matters for which the external evi-

dence is conflicting or ambiguous.

J. J. Wettstein, whose two-volume Greek New Testament appeared in 1751-52, took an interest in variant readings before he was twenty years old (in 1713), following the appearance of G. von Maestricht's Greek Testament of 1711—published by Wettstein and Smith of Amsterdam, whose senior partner was Wettstein's relative. During the several years of direct preparation for his own Greek New Testament and during the nearly twenty years of delay (due largely to theological issues--his Arian views), Wettstein's critical principles were altered from a generally high view of the oldest manuscripts to quite the opposite, a change based on his acceptance of the Latinization theory--that all of the oldest Greek manuscripts had been corrupted by interpolation from Latin manuscripts; consequently, he said, the textual critic must move several centuries beyond the oldest Greek manuscripts to more recent ones if a pure text is to be found. Yet, in his 1751-52 edition, Wettstein enunciates many of the critical canons that he had published separately in 1730, before his views on the oldest Greek manuscripts had changed, and the result is curious: his approved readings (over against the Elzevir text printed in Wettstein's edition) often stand in opposition to his stated principles or canons of criticism. Among those principles are the following: The reading in clearer or better Greek is not necessarily preferable; more often the contrary (item 7); among readings equally suitable to the context, that which employs an unusual expression is preferable (8); the fuller, more ample reading is not preferable to the shorter (9); the reading found in the same words elsewhere is not preferable to one that is not (10); a reading conformable in every respect to the style of the author is preferable (11); the more orthodox reading is not necessarily preferable (12); the Greek reading more in accord with the ancient versions is preferable (13); patristic testimony has much weight in attesting the true reading, and silence in the fathers on readings of importance in the controversies of their times renders such readings suspect (14 & 15); the more ancient reading is preferable, other things being equal (17); and the reading of the majority of manuscripts, other things being equal, is preferable (18).²⁴

Obviously, many standard—if sometimes mutually exclusive—criteria are to be found in this list; it is equally obvious, however, that Wettstein abandoned many of them in establishing his final textual theories and in printing his own preferred readings for the New Testament text. Some of Wettstein's theories and canons and particularly the contradictions among them can be explained by his change of views between 1730 and 1751, especially his growing opposition to the views of Bengel, who (as noted earlier) held to a high view of the oldest Greek manuscripts and of the Latin versions, and whose views Wettstein combatted by pushing farther than anyone else the theory of the Latinization of the oldest Greek manuscripts of the New Testament. Wettstein's inconsistencies become obvious when, for his edition, he prefers later, presumably unlatinized, codices to the earlier ones--against his canon 17 that the more ancient reading normally is preferable,²⁵ and when he can state in the same work that any division of readings into groups with more or less weight is useless (canon 6) and also affirm that "codices are to be appraised by weight, not by number."²⁶

Our interest here, however, is not in Wettstein's consistency or his lack of it, but only in the formulation of criteria for the recovery of the most likely original readings, and his list of canons, whether he followed them or not, represents a thoughtful approach at a time judged by all to precede a genu-

inely scientific understanding of New Testament textual criticism; as such, they are as worthy of our attention as any other list of critical canons from this general period. Observe that the external and internal criteria are undifferentiated in Wettstein's canon list.

J. J. Griesbach published three editions of the Greek New Testament between 1775 and 1807, and the second edition of 1796-1806 contained his canons of criticism, fifteen in number. These fifteen canons are concerned with internal criteria for determining the originality of readings, and they include numerous points made earlier by Bengel and Wettstein. Griesbach's first canon,²⁷ judging both from its primary position in the list and from the detailed attention accorded it by Griesbach, must have been regarded by him both as first in importance and fundamental in nature. The canon states that "the shorter reading . . . is preferable to the more verbose"; this, says Griesbach—quite correctly, is based on the principle that scribes are far more prone to add to their texts than to omit. He qualifies the canon carefully and in several ways, noting, for example, (1) that the canon applies only when the reading in question has some support from "the old and weighty witnesses"; and (2) that the originality of a shorter reading is more certain still (a) if it is also a harsher, more obscure, ambiguous, elliptical, hebraizing, or ungrammatical reading, (b) if the same matter is expressed differently in various codices, (c) if the order of words is inconsistent and unstable, (d) if the reading stands first in a pericope (or church lesson), or (e) if the fuller reading shows evidence of a gloss or an interpretation, or is in accord with words in parallel passages, or appears to have been taken from a lectionary; but, he continues, the shorter reading would not have a strong claim to originality (unless supported by many notable witnesses) (1) if the missing portion of the longer reading (a) can be attributed to homoeoteleuton, (b) would have appeared to scribes as obscure, rough, superfluous, unusual, paradoxical, an offense to piety, an error, or inconsistent with parallels, or (c) does not, by its omission, destroy the sense or the word structure, or (2) if the shorter reading (a) is less suitable to the author's character, style, or goal, (b) makes no sense at all, or (c) probably represents an intrusion from a parallel passage or a lectionary. In these qualifications and elaborations of his first canon, Griesbach has anticipated many of his succeeding canons, thereby providing an instructive illustration of how the various critical canons overlap and intertwine in actual practice.

Griesbach's fourteen other canons specify that:

2. "The more difficult and more obscure reading is preferable to that in which everything is so intelligible and cleared of difficulties that every scribe is easily able to understand it."
3. "The harsher [or rougher] reading is preferable to that which flows pleasantly and smoothly." "Harsher" refers to readings that are elliptical, hebraizing, ungrammatical, contrary to normal Greek usage, or offensive to the ears.
4. "The more unusual reading is preferable to that which constitutes nothing unusual." "Unusual" means rare words, words with rarely used meanings, and uncommon phrases and constructions. Scribes seized on the more customary expressions rather than the more exquisite, and for the latter they substitute glosses and explanations (especially if these are provided in the margin or from parallel passages).
5. "Expressions less emphatic [rhetorically], provided that the context and goal of the author do not demand emphasis, are closer to the genuine text than readings possessing, or appearing

to possess, a greater vigour, for polished scribes, like commentators, love and seek out [rhetorical] emphases."

6. "The reading, compared with others, that produces a meaning suited to the support of piety (especially monastic piety) is suspect."

7. "Preferable to others is the reading that conveys [at first glance] an apparently false meaning, but which meaning, upon thorough examination, is found to be true."

8. "Among many readings in one place, that reading is rightly considered suspect that clearly suits the opinions of the orthodox better than the other readings," for it was impossible for a scribe who was a monk devoted to the church to overlook any reading that appeared strongly to confirm any catholic doctrine or to destroy a heresy.

9 and 10. These canons treat homoeoteleuton and related phenomena, and readings arising from this "symmetry" of language are of "no value" and are "rightly rejected."

11. "The reading is preferable, among many in the same place, that lies midway between the others, that is, the reading that, as it were, holds together the threads in such a way that, if this reading is admitted as original, it becomes obvious how or, better stated, by what origin in error all the other readings have arisen from it."

12. "Readings having the odor of a gloss or an interpretation may be rejected."

13. "Readings that have been introduced into the text from ancient commentaries or scholias of the fathers are to be spurned."

14. "We reject readings appearing originally in lectionaries."

15. Finally, "readings introduced from the Latin versions into the Greek books are disapproved."

These internal criteria supplemented Griesbach's theory of the history of the text that was evident already in his first edition of the Greek New Testament in 1775-77. He divided the extant manuscripts of the gospels into three groups (following J. S. Semler's 1764 expansion of Bengel's two-family scheme): two ancient "recensions" or families (the Western and Alexandrian, dating to the beginning of the third century) and one more recent (the Constantinopolitan, dating to the late fourth century and following). One of Griesbach's critical principles, arising out of this understanding of the early history of the text, was that a reading had high claim to originality when supported by two of these three "recensions"; more particularly, (1) a reading was accounted genuine when supported by all three of these old "recensions"; (2) a reading attested by the Western and Alexandrian against the Constantinopolitan was the most ancient reading; (3) a reading supported by the Constantinopolitan and by one only of the other two was suspect if it evidenced the "peculiar kinds of error" characteristic of its own group (i.e., Western or Alexandrian); and, finally, (4) when different readings were found in the three "recensions," they had to be judged, not according to the number of witnesses, but according to "the preponderance of internal grounds of evidence."²⁸

It becomes clear, then, that Griesbach's external criteria for establishing the original New Testament readings, as they arise out of his theory of the early history of the text, take precedence over the internal criteria in the entire text-critical task. That the internal criteria are subsidiary to the external appears already in the first dependent clause of his first canon, where he indicates that this most basic of the internal criteria does not even apply to a shorter reading should that reading lack

the support of all "old and weighty witnesses." Notice, furthermore, that the "preponderance of internal evidence" comes into play when there are differing readings in the two oldest groups of manuscripts or when different readings occur in all three of his groups; in other words, when the external evidence is inconclusive, then the internal canons become decisive, but normally external evidence alone should be sufficient for a confident decision. This is not essentially different from Bengel's understanding of the interrelationship between external and internal criteria, but this relationship—including (1) the differentiation of the two categories, (2) the precedence of the external criteria and their superiority, and (3) the decisive role of the internal criteria only when the external criteria are ambiguous or in conflict—becomes more explicit in Griesbach. It is self-evident, of course, that Griesbach, like Bengel, relied on a basic rationale of weighing rather than counting witnesses, and this principle becomes well established with Griesbach's work, though by no means does it yet become universal. Griesbach's contribution in this area was considerably greater than may appear from the present summary, for when Griesbach began to formulate his views, particularly those on the great worth of the oldest manuscripts, Wettstein's denigration of all the older manuscripts (and his Latinization theories) were highly influential and dominant. Griesbach's re-establishment of the principle put forward by Bengel was, therefore, neither a natural direction in which to move nor an easy task to accomplish.²⁹ This context of Griesbach's work also makes more understandable his failure to abandon the *textus receptus* to a greater extent than he does and to the extent that his text-critical theories would seem to require; the time for a decisive break with the *textus receptus* had arrived in theory, but the time for putting good theory into practice still lay in the future.

The foregoing discussions again should alert us to observe closely the pattern of interrelationship between the external criteria and the internal whenever text-critical methods and principles are under consideration, for the development of modern eclectic approaches is related to this interplay and to the incipient polarity between them, as pointed out earlier in connection with Bengel.

Karl Lachmann published a Greek New Testament in 1831, the fruit of five years of work and whose purpose was to present the text of the New Testament as it existed in the fourth century. The only statement in this edition giving Lachmann's principles for selecting the readings of his text was a paragraph of fewer than one hundred words,³⁰ indicating that he followed "nowhere his own judgment," but "the usage of the most ancient eastern churches" as a first principle of selection; when the evidence was not consistent, he preferred the reading established by the agreement of the "Italian and African" witnesses. When these principles did not lead to a resolution of a textual issue, Lachmann employed brackets in the text and alternate readings in the margin to indicate indecision and other possible readings. His entire work, however, gave no consideration to the "received readings" (i.e., the *textus receptus*), but sought, from the older manuscripts and by his stated principles, to establish the text of the fourth century.

Lachmann states his text-critical principles in a more systematic fashion, though still concisely, in the preface to his second edition of the Greek New Testament (1842-50) as follows:

1. Nothing is better attested than that on which all authorities agree.
2. If some of the authorities are silent or defective, the

weight of evidence is somewhat lessened.

3. When the witnesses are of different regions, their agreement is of more importance than when those of some particular locality differ from the rest, either from negligence or from set purpose.

4. When witnesses of different widely separated regions disagree, the testimony must be considered to be doubtfully balanced.

5. When readings are in one form in one region and in another form in another region, with great uniformity, they are quite uncertain.

6. Lastly, readings are of weak authority when not even the same region presents a uniform testimony.³¹

These are all external criteria, for it was Lachmann's aim to reconstruct the transmitted text of the fourth century, and for this purpose external criteria seemed sufficient. The transmitted text of a certain period is, after all, something recognizably different from the most likely original text, yet the transmitted text of the fourth century obviously was, for Lachmann, a step on the way toward the most likely original text (and a giant step—twelve hundred years—away from the "received text" of the sixteenth century, which was accorded no authority by Lachmann, the first scholar to make such a clean break with the *textus receptus*), and accordingly we may assume with some justification that external criteria would have held the same dominant—though perhaps not exclusive—position whether Lachmann were seeking the fourth century transmitted text or the original text itself. This assumption is, in fact, confirmed to some extent in Lachmann's second volume (1850), which contains notes with occasional conjectures as to the original text, and here he uses "the traditive readings of the oldest documents as his basis of argument."³² Clearly then, with Lachmann the weight in textual critical decisions shifts heavily to the side of external criteria.

There is no need for a detailed description of the criteria used by the many succeeding editors of the Greek New Testament text until the time of Westcott and Hort. Brief notice, however, should be given to the critical canons of notable figures such as Tischendorf and Tregelles.

Constantin von Tischendorf, in his second edition of the Greek New Testament in 1849, gave as his rationale for his text the basic principle, much like Lachmann's, that

the text should be sought solely from ancient witnesses, and chiefly from Greek codices, but by no means neglecting the testimonies of the versions and the fathers. Thus, the whole arrangement of the text is bound by necessity to arise from the witnesses themselves . . . , not from the edition of Elzevir, which is called "received"; however, to be placed first among disagreeing witnesses are those regarded as the oldest Greek codices, i.e., written from the fourth to about the ninth century. Again, among these, those that excel in antiquity prevail in authority, and this authority increases if testimonies of the versions or fathers are added, nor is this authority surmounted by the disagreement of most or even of all the recent codices, i.e., those written from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries.³³

This fundamental external criterion is supplemented by Tischendorf's further canons, some external, some internal:

1. Readings wholly peculiar to one or another [ancient] witness are suspect, as are readings, in a class of documents, that appear to have originated from critical, scholarly correction.

2. Excluded are readings, no matter what their attestation, that clearly or very probably have originated from a copyist's error.

3. Witnesses with passages parallel to the Old Testament, the New Testament, and especially the synoptic gospels, when they attest disagreements, are preferable to witnesses that show agreement, for the ancients paid particular attention to parallels.

4. More probable than others is the reading that appears to have occasioned the other readings or that still contains within itself elements of the other readings. Taken broadly, says Tischendorf, this is the foundation of all rules.

5. Readings should be studiously retained that are in accord with the Greek language and style of the individual authors of the New Testament.

Both the basic principle and the five canons of Tischendorf are repeated in C. R. Gregory's *Prolegomena to Tischendorf's* eighth major edition of the Greek New Testament (1869-94)³⁴ and may be taken as those governing all of Tischendorf's efforts to establish the text of the Greek New Testament.

The combination in Tischendorf of a dominant external criterion—the oldest Greek manuscripts are the most authoritative—and of further, intermingled external and internal criteria means that the basic reliance on the oldest witnesses cannot be carried through consistently, for the further internal criteria force the modification of the basic principle at point after point and thwart its comprehensive application; the result is that at numerous points the "balance of probabilities" formula must be invoked. This is evident from the illustrative passages discussed by Tischendorf, where, as examples, he prefers a reading in Mark 2:22, attested by only two ancient witnesses, to another reading, better attested, that shows evidence of harmonization to Matthew;³⁵ and in Matt 24:38 he prefers a shorter reading, rather sparsely attested, to longer forms that are better attested but that are due, according to Tischendorf, to scribal expansion and are explicable as occasioned by the shorter (original) reading.³⁶ Yet Tischendorf's basic approach to textual decisions is by way of an external criticism that in each case invokes any internal criteria appropriate to that particular situation.

S. P. Tregelles published his text-critical principles in 1854,³⁷ summarized them in his contribution to T. H. Horne's *Introduction* (10th ed.) in 1856,³⁸ and published his edition of the Greek New Testament between 1857 and 1872. Unaware of Lachmann's principles, Tregelles arrived at a similar view: "to form a text on the authority of ancient copies, without allowing the 'received text' any prescriptive rights."³⁹ This basic principle, consisting of an external criterion of reliance upon the oldest documents, was supplemented by a general statement on the decisive role of internal criteria whenever the old witnesses are in disagreement:

In confining the examination to the ancient documents, all care must be taken rightly to understand their testimony, and to weigh it in all its particulars.

Authorities cannot be followed mechanically; and thus, where there is a difference of reading amongst the more trustworthy witnesses, all that we know of the nature and origin of various readings, and of the kind

of errors to which copyists were liable, must be employed. But, let it be observed, that discrimination of this kind is only required when the witnesses differ; for otherwise, we should fall into the error of determining by conjecture what the text ought to be, instead of accepting it as it is.⁴⁰

When Tregelles is forced to move to internal considerations so that a decision may be made between or among readings with ancient attestation, factors such as the following determine which way his "balance of probabilities" turns: favor the reading that appears to have occasioned the others;⁴¹ reject readings that clearly involve scribal errors, such as homoeoteleuton;⁴² prefer the reading that at first glance is incongruous but that makes good sense upon further scrutiny;⁴³ reject harmonizations,⁴⁴ marginal intrusions into the text,⁴⁵ and dogmatic alterations;⁴⁶ prefer the reading that accords with the author's style;⁴⁷ and, more generally (since they encompass some of the above), prefer the harder reading,⁴⁸ and prefer the shorter reading.⁴⁹

Tregelles thought it impossible to classify manuscripts in any definite fashion, though he recognized that they fell into two large groups of documents, the Alexandrian or more ancient and the Constantinopolitan or more recent witnesses.⁵⁰ As in the case of Tischendorf, however, manuscript grouping does not affect Tregelles's text-critical principles in any material way, except, of course, to place together in a convenient category those early witnesses that form the basic materials for his recovery of the most likely original text.

Once again, like Bengel, Griesbach, Lachmann, and Tischendorf before him, Tregelles operates with a fundamental external criterion, supplemented when necessary by subsidiary criteria of an internal kind.

The twenty years of prodigious labor by B. F. Westcott and F. J. A. Hort in preparing their edition of The New Testament in the Original Greek of 1881-82 and the text-critical insight and theory that accompanied this influential critical text bring to a climax the entire development and interaction of external and internal "canons of criticism." Westcott and Hort do not give a list of canons in any traditional fashion, and they do not even like the term,⁵¹ yet their "canons of criticism" are easily enough compiled from their direct statements or by inference from them; however, any abstraction of "rules" from their carefully drawn contexts or the formulation of simple principles by summarizing Westcott and Hort's full discussions will invite both oversimplification and possible misrepresentation. Nevertheless, if Westcott and Hort's canons were to be formulated for such a list, they would include the following:

1. Older readings, manuscripts, or groups are to be preferred. ("The shorter the interval between the time of the autograph and the end of the period of transmission in question, the stronger the presumption that earlier date implies greater purity of text.")⁵²

2. Readings are approved or rejected by reason of the quality, and not the number, of their supporting witnesses. ("No available presumptions whatever as to text can be obtained from number alone, that is, from number not as yet interpreted by descent.")⁵³

3. A reading combining two simple, alternative readings is later than the two readings comprising the conflation, and manuscripts rarely or never supporting conflate readings are texts

antecedent to mixture and are of special value.⁵⁴

4. The reading is to be preferred that makes the best sense, that is, that best conforms to the grammar and is most congruous with the purport of the rest of the sentence and of the larger context.⁵⁵

5. The reading is to be preferred that best conforms to the usual style of the author and to his material in other passages.⁵⁶

6. The reading is to be preferred that most fitly explains the existence of the others.⁵⁷

7. The reading is less likely to be original that combines the appearance of an improvement in the sense with the absence of its reality; the scribal alteration will have an apparent excellence, while the original will have the highest real excellence.⁵⁸

8. The reading is less likely to be original that shows a disposition to smooth away difficulties (another way of stating that the harder reading is preferable).⁵⁹

9. Readings are to be preferred that are found in a manuscript that habitually contains superior readings as determined by intrinsic and transcriptional probability. Certainty is increased if such a better manuscript is found also to be an older manuscript⁶⁰ and if such a manuscript habitually contains readings that prove themselves antecedent to mixture and independent of external contamination by other, inferior texts.⁶¹ The same principles apply to groups of manuscripts.⁶²

The extraction and tabulation of such canons does not, however, enlighten us as to the real significance of Westcott and Hort's treatment of text-critical principles. Rather, their contribution (and our major interest) rests in the fact that they combined in a unique fashion the internal and external criteria as they had developed and had been used over the years and that they utilized the resulting combination in a new way--with far-reaching effects on New Testament text-critical theory and method.

Westcott and Hort had the highest regard for Griesbach—"a name we venerate above that of every other textual critic of the New Testament"—with respect to his historical reconstruction of the "genealogical relations of the whole extant documentary evidence,"⁶³ that is, Griesbach's scheme of two ancient and one more recent group of manuscripts. Westcott and Hort's own reconstruction followed this general pattern, though with well-known modifications. On the other hand, they complain that Griesbach's two great weaknesses were, first, his use of the *textus receptus* as a basis for correcting the New Testament text and, secondly and chiefly, his propensity "to give a dangerously disproportionate weight to internal evidence, and especially to transcriptional probability on which indeed for its own sake he placed excessive reliance."⁶⁴ This criticism of Griesbach by Westcott and Hort will be perplexing to anyone who knows Westcott and Hort's own text-critical theory; although they claim that genealogy is primary,⁶⁵ thereby leaving the impression that external evidence provides the solid foundation for their text-critical theory, yet a closer reading shows that Westcott and Hort employed genealogy only on a broad scale and in a generic and almost loose fashion to separate the pre-Syrian lines of text from the Syrian line and that they never worked out their genealogical method (at least as far as we know) in terms of specific stemmata of actual New Testament manuscripts;⁶⁶ moreover, when the crucial question of deciding between the two earliest text-types (Neutral and Western) is broached, they admit that genealogical method cannot lead to a decision.⁶⁷ At this point, the

whole range of internal considerations comes into play, as Westcott and Hort elaborated them:⁶⁸ (1) the Internal Evidence of Readings, that is, consideration of individual readings in terms of (a) Intrinsic Probability (what the author most likely wrote) and (b) Transcriptional Probability (what the scribe most likely wrote), yielding great certainty about the most probable reading when both methods certify the same reading, but with transcriptional probability decisive when the two methods are in conflict; (2) the Internal Evidence of Documents, that is, consideration of each single group of readings that constitutes a manuscript so as to acquire "knowledge of documents," that is, knowledge of that manuscript's general quality and reliability, so that the weight of its readings can be assessed when the Internal Evidence of (individual) Readings is unclear; and (3) the Internal Evidence of Groups, or consideration of a single group of manuscripts to determine its overall character in relation to other groups as a bearer of generally reliable documents.

Westcott and Hort's quantitative use of internal considerations adds up, in the final analysis, to a qualitative judgment on internal evidence as superior to and more decisive than external (genealogical) evidence; for all practical purposes, it is internal evidence alone that is determinative for them in virtually all text-critical decisions once the early text-types have been separated from the later, Syrian type, and, moreover, internal criteria are thereafter utilized to support this basic distinction between the early and the later types of text.

This qualitative judgment on the superiority of internal evidence is obvious from Westcott and Hort's descriptions of the basic text-types; though the Syrian and pre-Syrian texts ostensibly were isolated and differentiated in the first instance by objective, genealogical procedures,⁶⁹ it seems clear enough from Westcott and Hort's characterization, for example, of the Syrian type (a text that is smooth, eminently readable, complete, and conflated, filled out by harmonization, assimilation, and appropriate connecting tissue⁷⁰) that reliance on internal evidence alone would have yielded the same result—that the Syrian text is a relatively late derivative text, posterior to, built upon, and incorporating numerous elements of its antecedent texts (the Western, Neutral, and Alexandrian).

What actually develops for Westcott and Hort, then—to be more specific—is a theory that leads, first, to a division of manuscripts and groups of manuscripts into early and later text-types presumably by an external, genealogical method, and, secondly (though concurrently), an assessment of the relative quality or reliability of these various manuscripts and groups of manuscripts. The result is their well-known judgment (1) that the later Syrian (or Byzantine) manuscripts are conflated and therefore farthest removed both chronologically and qualitatively from the original text; (2) that manuscripts like C, L, and 33 (the Alexandrian text) are individually and as a group good but refined and polished texts and thereby removed somewhat from the original; (3) that manuscripts like D and δ^{Paul} (the Western text) and their group are ancient but corrupt texts and thereby removed in quality though not so much in date from the original text; and (4) that manuscripts B and $\aleph$ are the "best" manuscripts and that their group (the Neutral text) is the "best" group because they are at once close in time and closest in quality to the original New Testament text.

It will be obvious that this distinctive textual theory and these confident judgments of Westcott and Hort were produced by

a unique synergism of external and internal evidence. First, the two kinds of criteria coacted not only to isolate the earliest and least mixed (and thereby presumably the purest) readings, but also to identify the groups of manuscript witnesses supporting such early, unmixed readings; this process utilized external data (the date or relative antiquity of the manuscript, the age of the reading as determined by patristic support, etc.) and employed genealogic-like methods (locating pre-Syrian readings and texts by analysis—primarily—of conflate readings) to achieve its goal. Secondly, the synergism acted concurrently to isolate the anterior (in the sense of logical rather than temporal priority) and "best" readings and groups of witnesses (and thereby presumably the purest readings and groups); this was accomplished by utilizing the Internal Evidence of Readings (both Intrinsic and Transcriptional Probabilities) to assess variation-units that included, again, conflate readings, thereby permitting the "superior" readings and texts to be separated from the "inferior."⁷¹

The first result of these processes was that Westcott and Hort's synergism of external and internal evidence separated the later Syrian text and its readings from the earlier texts and readings of the three other groups, the Western, Neutral, and Alexandrian. Furthermore, the Alexandrian text was shown, by the same cooperation of external and internal evidence, to be posterior (both in terms of time and logical sequence) to the Western and Neutral groups because its readings were shown to have been derived from one of these two other pre-Syrian text-types (the Neutral) and could be externally dated to about the beginning of the third century.⁷² The further result of these processes was Westcott and Hort's characterization of these various groups or text-types: the Syrian text is a late, critically edited, and polished text, incorporating the bulk of available readings to form a full text; the Alexandrian is a somewhat earlier, inventively interpolated, and philologically refined text; and the two other, still earlier texts, the Western and the Neutral, are rather drastically different in character, for the Western is judged, on internal grounds, to have "a love of paraphrase" and "a disposition to enrich the text at the cost of its purity," and a "fondness for assimilation,"⁷³ while the Neutral text is "a relatively pure Non-Western text."⁷⁴ Hence, the Neutral text emerges as the "best" New Testament text.

From these conclusions, the synergism of external and internal evidence proceeds, in Westcott and Hort, to the identification, not only of the "best" (that is, the purest) text or group of witnesses (the Neutral), but of the "best" (that is, the purest) manuscripts. Their well-known assertion is that Codex Vaticanus (B) "holds a unique position" since "its text is not only Pre-Syrian but substantially free from Western and Alexandrian adulteration";⁷⁵ moreover, "B very far exceeds all other documents in neutrality of text . . . , being in fact always or nearly always neutral,"⁷⁶ and this conclusion is based both on genealogical or external evidence and on internal evidence.⁷⁷ The corollary to this assessment of B is that Codex Sinaiticus (X) is next in purity among all other manuscripts,⁷⁸ and Westcott and Hort can speak of "the preeminent excellence of the Vatican and Sinaitic MSS, which happen likewise to be the oldest extant Greek MSS of the New Testament."⁷⁹ Again, this judgment on X arises from the coaction of external and internal evidence.

As is common knowledge, Westcott and Hort go on from these settled points to make use of the Neutral text generally, but particularly of codices B and X, as the lodestar for locating and establishing the original New Testament text.

It is precisely at this point of determining the single best text, however, that the synergism of external and internal evidence in Westcott and Hort's scheme suddenly breaks down to reveal instead--and quite unexpectedly--a tension between the external and the internal criteria. This tension turns out, upon examination, to be a genuine polarity of external and internal evidence, and it comes to light as these two methodological procedures and their resultant data are employed by Westcott and Hort in building their text-critical theory. It is the so-called Western text and its leading representative, Codex Bezae (D), that bring this polarity to view, in the following way: The combination of external and internal evidence had led Westcott and Hort to the "best" readings (the pre-Syrian); thence to the "best" text or groups of manuscripts (the non-Western pre-Syrian Neutral text), since this "best" text consistently contained these "best" readings; thence, finally, to the "best" manuscripts (B, with $\aleph$), since they are the "constant element" of those groups that "are found to have habitually the best readings."⁸⁰

This line of argumentation established, in effect, a new "objective" standard for originality, namely, the criterion of the best manuscript or best manuscripts, and this canon then could be invoked for a decision between or among readings in cases where the evidence was otherwise ambiguous or where other criteria were inconclusive. (Critics have called this Westcott and Hort approach "the cult of the best manuscript."⁸¹) That this new criterion was established by the coaction of external and internal evidence is not to be disputed, but an inconsistency is soon disclosed in Westcott and Hort's scheme when their treatment of D and the Western text is investigated, for Westcott and Hort's external evidence isolated two "earliest" texts or groups, the Neutral and the Western, and suddenly it becomes apparent that the criterion of the best manuscript(s), which focuses on B (with $\aleph$), was not the exclusive fruit of Westcott and Hort's genealogical and external considerations; actually, external evidence shows, by their explicit admission, that the Western text, in fact, has the earliest documentation:

The earliest readings which can be fixed chronologically belong to it. As far as we can judge from extant evidence, it was the most widely spread text of Ante-Nicene times; and sooner or later every version directly or indirectly felt its influence.⁸²

And of Codex Bezae, they say:

... When every allowance has been made for possible individual license, the text of D presents a truer image of the form in which the Gospels and Acts were most widely read in the third and probably a great part of the second century than any other extant Greek MS.⁸³

On what grounds, then, do Westcott and Hort strain and apparently violate their presumably basic genealogical principle by an unequivocal preference for the Neutral text rather than the Western? On grounds of internal evidence, for "any prepossessions in [the Western text's] favour that might be created by this imposing early ascendancy are for the most part soon dissipated by continuous study of its internal character."⁸⁴ The harmonious synergism of external and internal evidence may have enthroned B as the best manuscript on both grounds (perhaps in isolation a reasonable conclusion), but the case made at the same time by Westcott and Hort for the dethronement of D cannot with consistency be based on the external evidence admitted by them for D and the Western text. In other words, to accept the readings of B in virtually all cases as practically identical with the

original text and to utilize B as the standard of excellence because it represents the purest and most ancient text, and at the same time to reject possibly even older readings (in terms of demonstrable evidence) simply because they are found in a manuscript like D, containing (according to Westcott and Hort) a "prodigious amount of error,"⁸⁵ or in a "licentious,"⁸⁶ "corrupt,"⁸⁷ and "aberrant" text like the Western (when judged by internal evidence), not only violates their genealogical principle, thereby placing a strain on logic, but also is a clear capitulation to the primacy of internal evidence, and it effects a shift from a cooperative role between external and internal evidence to a situation of polarity. Now the rather clear external evidence concerning D and the Western text is pushed aside and stands in opposition to internal considerations, forcing upon critics a choice between them; in fact, the two kinds of evidence have been separated to the extent that they assume a dualistic posture, breaking once and for all Westcott and Hort's harmonious synergism of external and internal evidence and highlighting the ambiguity of both the external testimony and the internal judgments. When there is conflict of evidence, as is so often the case, are basic text-critical decisions to be made (or able to be made) on the basis of historical-development and documentary (external) considerations or on the assessment of contextual, stylistic, and scribal (internal) factors? When the evidence fails to point to the same conclusion, one or the other—but never both—must assume the determinative role, and it will not immediately be clear to most textual critics whether it is the external evidence or the internal considerations that should play that decisive role. What is clear, however, is that the failure of Westcott and Hort's synergism of external-internal evidence precisely at the crucial point of the earliest demonstrable fork in the New Testament textual stream (the separation of the Western and Neutral traditions) has evoked, in large measure, the uncertainty, the bewilderment, and the virtual anarchy of recent and current New Testament textual criticism, and—to be more specific—has occasioned the entire eclectic movement as presently practiced in the textual criticism of the New Testament.⁸⁸

This inordinately lengthy "survey" of the "canons of criticism" and the accompanying assessment of their formative role in text-critical theory and practice hardly would be complete without a summary list of canons that have survived the test of time and that are recognized generally as viable principles. These canons fall, of course, into two major categories, (1) criteria appealing to external evidence, that is, to documentary and historical-development factors in the textual transmission process, and (2) criteria appealing to internal evidence, that is, to factors relating to scribal habits, the contexts of passages, and the author's style, language, and thought. In the following outline, which aims to be comprehensive but could never be exhaustive, each criterion is phrased in such a way that, if it accurately describes a textual variant, there would be a presumption (other things being equal) to regard that variant as the most likely original reading.

A. Criteria related to external evidence.

1. A variant's support by the earliest manuscripts, or by manuscripts assuredly preserving the earliest texts.
2. A variant's support by the "best quality" manuscripts.
3. A variant's support by manuscripts with the widest

- geographical distribution.
4. A variant's support by one or more established groups of manuscripts of recognized antiquity, character, and perhaps location, that is, of recognized "best quality."

B. Criteria related to internal evidence.

1. A variant's status as the shorter or shortest reading.
2. A variant's status as the harder or hardest reading.
3. A variant's fitness to account for the origin, development, or presence of all other readings.
4. A variant's conformity to the author's style and vocabulary.
5. A variant's conformity to the author's theology or ideology.
6. A variant's conformity to Koine (rather than Attic) Greek.
7. A variant's conformity to Semitic forms of expression.
8. A variant's lack of conformity to parallel passages or to its context generally.
9. A variant's lack of conformity to Old Testament passages.
10. A variant's lack of conformity to liturgical forms and usages.
11. A variant's lack of conformity to extrinsic doctrinal views.

This list does not include those further criteria for originality that must be applied to readings at an earlier stage in the text-critical process to determine whether readings are "significant" or "insignificant" for the establishment of the most likely original text. Hence, readings that obviously are (1) nonsense readings, (2) clear and demonstrable scribal errors, (3) mere orthographic variations, and (4) singular readings will be assumed to have been excluded from the process, for they are not "textual variants" in the proper, restricted sense of that term⁸⁹ and, therefore, do not constitute appropriate raw material for the actual determination of the most likely original New Testament text.

C. USE OF CRITICAL CANONS IN CURRENT ECLECTICISM

The categories earlier specified as including all contemporary New Testament textual critics (except the genealogical scholars), namely, eclectic generalists and eclectic specialists, will provide an appropriate framework for a brief assessment of text-critical methodology in the present, post-Westcott-Hort situation—a situation characterized by a polarity of external and internal evidence. That "all of us" employ an eclectic approach in New Testament textual criticism may stand as a fair generalization; it is also a fair generalization that eclecticism is of two distinct kinds, variously designated, on the one hand, as "moderate" or "reasoned" eclecticism and, on the other hand, as "thoroughgoing" or "rigorous" eclecticism, though the more descriptively accurate and less question-begging terms, eclectic generalists and eclectic specialists, perhaps are preferable. As will appear presently, eclectics in both groups attempt to break down or neutralize the polarity between the external criteria for originality and the internal, some by ignoring it, and others by emphasizing one pole to the diminution or even banishment of the other pole. All, however, stand within

the dualistic situation created by the conflict of text-critical criteria that has issued from Westcott and Hort's failure to hold the external and internal canons together.

1. Use of critical canons by eclectic generalists

An eclectic generalist is a textual critic who recognizes that no single criterion or constant combination of criteria will adjudicate all text-critical cases and who tries, within this acknowledged limitation, to apply with evenness and without prejudice any and all criteria appropriate to the given case and who attempts, further, to arrive at a reasonable solution based on the relative probabilities among those applicable criteria.

Eclectic generalists acknowledge the validity, for appropriate situations and with other things being equal, of the various canons of criticism or criteria for originality that have emerged in the history of textual criticism and have demonstrated their worth, such as those listed on the two preceding pages, including both those of an external and an internal kind. Accordingly, the eclectic generalist would overcome the polarity of these external and internal criteria by ignoring that polarity or by attempting to ignore it. This is easily possible when, for example, one variant reading among several is the hardest reading from the perspective of scribal habits, is also in accord with the author's ascertained vocabulary and style and with his theology as critically determined, and happens at the same time to be attested by "excellent" manuscripts and by ancient versions or early fathers of wide geographical distribution. In such cases, where textual decisions are easy, the eclectic generalist (and every other textual critic!) will be oblivious both to the dualistic framework of two classes of criteria for originality and also to the ambiguities so often attendant upon the application of those criteria. When, however, as is so frequently the case, several "strong" criteria do not favor a single reading but variously approve one or another reading, and when—also a frequent occurrence—there is a further bifurcation of evidence between the external and internal poles, then the critic finds himself in a dilemma as he faces the difficult "crisis of criteria." If the reading that better suits the author's style is found only in later manuscripts, while the rival reading is found in codices B and $\aleph$ (cf. Matt 6:33),⁹⁰ which does he choose? If one of five variant readings is attested by B and D, but two other similar readings most adequately account for the origin of all the others (cf. Matt 15:14),⁹¹ which is to be selected? If a wide variety of textual types attest a reading that is clearly "easier" than its alternative (cf. Matt 15:38),⁹² which should be preferred? If a variant that quite probably arose from a parallel passage is omitted by the "best" witnesses (cf. Matt 16:2-3),⁹³ should it be admitted into the text? If a longer reading that is almost certainly explicable as a scribal addition due to the influence of the immediate context is supported by B and $\aleph$ (cf. Matt 16:21),⁹⁴ should it be approved? If the vast majority of manuscripts, including the "best" manuscripts, attest a shorter reading that could easily be explained as a doctrinal modification of the original longer reading (cf. Matt 27:16,17),⁹⁵ which is to be chosen? If the majority of witnesses support a reading that appears to be original on grounds of transcriptional probability, but a few of the earliest and "best" manuscripts have a shorter reading (cf. Acts 3:6),⁹⁶ which reading is to be approved?

Examples of this kind could easily be multiplied, but it will be obvious that textual problems involving the conflict of external and internal criteria are common. Of course, many

textual problems are even more complex than these examples, for at the same time they may involve, on the one hand, evenly divided external evidence and, on the other hand, conflicting but balanced internal factors. These situations not only demand more refinement in all of the criteria and call for ways to weigh them against one another, but they also highlight the vexing ambiguities to be found in both the external and internal aspects of text-critical criteria.

Most contemporary New Testament textual critics, if asked to classify themselves, probably would affirm that they belong to this eclectic generalist class, for most textual critics today, recognizing the inconclusiveness of modern text-critical theory, would profess to have adopted this evenhanded approach to the available means of judging between and among textual variants, that is, a balanced and impartial application of the relevant external and internal criteria to each case of textual variation. To take an example, certainly this was the intention of the distinguished editors of the United Bible Societies' Greek New Testament,⁹⁷ as evidenced by the careful delineation of the criteria in the report of their textual deliberations and decisions.⁹⁸ This intention comes to the fore time and again as the editors, for example, go against a variant supported by Westcott and Hort's *Iodestar*, Codex B (with $\aleph$), when other evidence—external or (perhaps more often) internal—suggests the originality of an alternative variant; it appears also in the scrupulous and judicious evaluations of relevant criteria in those numerous cases where the evidence is very closely divided. Yet, a perusal of B. M. Metzger's *Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* strongly suggests that the steady repetition of such phrases as "the preponderant weight of external attestation," "the overwhelming weight of manuscript evidence," and "superior manuscript support," along with such expressions as "the earliest and best witnesses," "the oldest and best attested reading," and "attested by inferior authorities," all signal a predilection for an external principle along the lines of "the readings of the oldest and best manuscripts are to be preferred," and most often this means B with $\aleph$ and, where applicable, the early papyri, such as P75, P66, P45, P46, and P72.^{98a} This assessment, based as it is on impressions from extended interaction with the *Textual Commentary*, just possibly could be an unfair generalization; more likely, however, it is a reasonable and fair judgment, and, if so, it signifies that the editors of the United Bible Societies' Greek New Testament in the final analysis are not eclectic generalists after all, nor in fact are there many other contemporary New Testament textual critics who could be so classified, despite the good intentions of most of them to follow this balanced approach. Rather, contemporary textual critics for the most part are to be classed as eclectic specialists, whether on the right wing of that subdivision or on the left.

2. Use of critical canons by eclectic specialists

The eclectic specialist recognizes quite clearly the polarity between external and internal evidence, and he tries to overcome it by specializing in or by emphasizing one of the poles to the minimizing or even exclusion of the other. Whether he can escape the dualistic dilemma by this one-sidedness remains to be seen, but he is aware that a major choice between text-critical criteria (in addition to and quite different in character from the innumerable minor choices) must be made in order to solve the textual problems that he faces, and the choice—when the chips are down—is between final reliance either on evidence from the historical-development and documentary side of textual history

(external evidence) or from scribal, stylistic, contextual, and ideological factors in manuscript transmission (internal evidence).

At least two subgroups are to be found among eclectic specialists. On the right hand are those textual critics who permit external evidence to cast the decisive vote in cases where there is equiponderance of evidence, but the utilization of historical-documentary evidence in this way requires that the critic first shall have accepted as valid a particular historical-development scheme for the earliest transmission of the New Testament text; usually the scheme adopted will follow the general lines of Westcott and Hort's understanding of a two-fold Syrian (or, better, Byzantine or Koine) and pre-Syrian textual history, including their further demarcation of a "Neutral" (or, better, Alexandrian or Egyptian) text-type and a "Western" text-type as the earliest (and competing) texts, but also the recognition of a third early text, the Caesarean type.⁹⁹ For critics of this kind, normally a reading strongly attested by widely diversified witnesses from all of the early groups would be preferred, as would a reading very strongly attested by the Alexandrian (Westcott and Hort's Neutral) group. When the probabilities are more evenly balanced (such as divided support among the Alexandrian witnesses or among the early text-types), then other criteria will come into play, particularly internal considerations (hence, the designation, eclectic specialists), such as a search for the reading that best explains the origin of all the others, or any other applicable criteria. The complicating factors attending textual decisions can be severe and vexing, but the point is that in the final analysis an eclectic specialist, as one who emphasizes external criteria, characteristically will flee for refuge to any relevant historical-development and documentary considerations that will permit a resolution of the problem. This does not necessarily mean that he does so automatically or even consistently, but only characteristically, for there are times when the internal evidence will show unambiguously that a scribal error or some other transmissitional phenomenon—whether intentional or unintentional—lies at the root of the reading in his "best" manuscript or group; in that case, as an eclectic, he will choose another reading. Yet the textual critic of this type has a prevailing predilection—though hardly a whimsical or haphazard one—for the supremacy of external evidence and usually for external evidence of a particular brand. Obviously, not all such eclectic specialists will lean toward the Alexandrian text-type or its members as determinative; some few may prefer, for instance, the so-called Western witnesses.

The major difficulty with an eclectic approach that specializes in external evidence emerges precisely at this point, that is, with the uncertainty as to which historical-development scheme to adopt as normative. Is it to be the basic Westcott and Hort conception as modified by new developments and discoveries, or some other reconstruction of the earliest history of the New Testament textual transmission? This inconclusiveness is, of course, no fault of the eclectic method, but is rather a weakness—perhaps the weakness—of modern New Testament textual theory in general.¹⁰⁰ As a matter of fact, far from being at fault in this circumstance, the eclectic method is merely a reflection or a symptom of this fundamental problem. If there were any reasonable certainty about this very earliest history of the New Testament text and if reasonably confident assertions could be formulated as to precisely how our extant manuscripts are related to that history of transmission, these difficulties in the eclectic method would disappear—and perhaps also the eclectic method as we know it would itself disappear! Such basic solutions, how-

ever, appear not to be close at hand, though certainly some significant advances in methodology, coupled with the extraordinary discoveries of early papyri during the past generation or two, are a source of optimism.¹⁰¹ In the meantime, most New Testament textual critics doubtless will follow some form of this moderate or reasoned eclecticism that we have designated the eclectic specialist approach.

(Observe that genealogists, while they are "specialists" who emphasize external evidence, are not eclectic specialists, for internal considerations play virtually no role in their establishment of a text.)

On the left wing of the eclectic specialist class are those who rely largely, primarily, or even exclusively on internal criteria for resolving text-critical problems and for establishing the original New Testament text. Obviously, scholars of this persuasion overcome the external-internal polarity by granting to internal evidence the determinative role. This dominance of internal factors, notably the author's style and contextual considerations, was operative, for instance, in the work of B. Weiss, whose editions of the Greek New Testament appeared between 1894 and 1905,¹⁰² in C. H. Turner's "Notes" (consisting of 100 pages!) on Marcan usage (1923-28),¹⁰³ and in M.-J. Lagrange's "critique rationnelle" (1935).¹⁰⁴ Both Weiss and Lagrange in effect depart, however, from their proclaimed reliance on internal criticism and move instead to a practical dependence on a "best manuscript" criterion, and in both cases Codex B is employed as the touchstone of purity. Though customarily mentioned as the leading exponent of "rational criticism,"¹⁰⁵ it can be said of Lagrange that "in almost Hortian terms he pleads for following codex Vaticanus even where the evidence is not clear—on the grounds of its general excellence."¹⁰⁶

C. H. Turner opened his series of studies on Marcan usage by altering Westcott and Hort's famous dictum, "Knowledge of documents should precede final judgement upon readings,"¹⁰⁷ to "Knowledge of an author's usage should precede final judgement,"¹⁰⁸ thereby indicating in a striking fashion the need to take internal evidence most seriously, particularly stylistic and philological features, and that these are crucial if not conclusive in text-critical decisions.

Turner's description of grammatical usages in Mark bore fruit in the work of George D. Kilpatrick, whose views developed from their rather cautious beginnings in 1943 and 1944¹⁰⁹ until the present time when they represent what justly may be called the far left of the eclectic specialist emphasis on internal criteria. Kilpatrick's early views were expressed in statements such as, "We cannot accept or reject textual types or manuscripts as wholes," for each segment of text is only a collection of variants, "each of which is to be judged on its own merits"; and by calling for scholars to apply a "rigorous eclecticism" in the gospels and Acts and to "pursue an impartial eclecticism" also in the epistles, but to do so in a consistent way everywhere.¹¹⁰ By eclecticism he apparently meant, at this time, the serious application of text-critical criteria additional to those that tried to move "from the textual families and types to the original text"¹¹¹ (external evidence). In other words, for the establishment of the original text, he was urging that all mechanical application of "best manuscript" and "best text-type" criteria cease and that in addition to the normal criteria arising from knowledge of manuscripts and palaeographical principles the textual critic should employ also—and with great seriousness—those criteria concerned with harmonization, style, language, theology,

and a reading's fitness to account for all others (internal evidence), but with special emphasis on the assertion that in this eclectic method "the decision rests ultimately with the criteria as distinct from the manuscripts, and that our evaluation of the manuscripts must be determined by the criteria."¹¹² Kilpatrick claimed that his proposals entailed no disparagement of external evidence¹¹³ (of none, that is, except claims for a normative "best text" or "best manuscript"), yet in a real sense external criteria were seriously undermined. Whereas he seemed to be asking only that external evidence be removed from its seemingly exclusive position of supremacy in textual decisions, that critics lay aside their predispositions in its favor, and that all criteria be allowed to stand on an equal plane, in actuality external criteria were negatively affected to a much greater extent than these statements would imply, for how can external criteria play a role when "each reading has to be judged on its merits and not on its supports"?¹¹⁴ How, for example, can the date or geographical provenance of a reading be determined when "the decision rests ultimately with the criteria as distinct from the manuscripts" (italics added)? The effect of this presumed eclecticism of internal and external evidence is that the external evidence virtually is ruled out of court in advance, for this particular presiding judge will allow no evidence along the lines of "general opinions about the value of manuscripts or textual types,"¹¹⁵ nor any, presumably, about the date or provenance of a manuscript containing a given reading or its place in any reconstruction of the history of New Testament textual transmission; that leaves little if anything on the external side of the case.¹¹⁶

To be fair to Professor Kilpatrick, it must be added that his two earliest articles on this subject encompassed as possibly original only those readings from text-types and witnesses that were acknowledged to be early (notably the Alexandrian and Western texts and their witnesses);¹¹⁷ nevertheless, the principles established there by Kilpatrick for evaluating these early readings were thereafter applied by him to all readings. This becomes explicit when in 1963 he repeated his conclusion that "no manuscript or type of text is uniformly right or wrong" and then affirmed that "this conclusion applies as much to the Byzantine text . . . as to the Western text and the Old Uncials," adding that the "outright condemnation" of the Byzantine text was one of Westcott and Hort's greatest errors.¹¹⁸ In 1965, Kilpatrick supported and illustrated this conviction from scores of variation-units where he felt that the Byzantine witnesses preserved the original text, and he concluded by saying,

We have to pursue a consistent eclecticism. Readings must be considered severally on their intrinsic character. Further, contrary to what Hort maintained, decisions about readings must precede decisions about the value or weight of manuscripts.¹¹⁹

It is, then, this assessment and judgment of individual readings, inevitably on internal grounds and in complete detachment from any value or weight that may be assigned to the manuscripts or groups that contain them, that is the heart of this form of the eclectic specialist approach, though this characterization, as pointed out earlier, does not adequately convey the degree to which external evidence has been excluded by this method; in fact, for all practical purposes it has been eliminated from the text-critical decisions about the original text.

The accuracy of our estimation of the true character of this form of eclecticism is confirmed by the handling of the method in

the work of J. K. Elliott, who calls for a "thoroughgoing eclecticism," in which "the cult of the best manuscripts gives way to the cult of the best reading" and which "devotes its main attention to the individual variants themselves and very little attention to external evidence."¹²⁰ The phrase, "very little attention to external evidence," is actually, however, an understatement, for nowhere in either of his brief but recent expositions of "thoroughgoing eclecticism" does Elliott mention, much less approve, any external criterion among his extensive list of critical canons; rather, external criteria are excluded, for his approach "is concerned with finding plausible explanations based on internal considerations to justify the choice of one reading as original and the others as secondary,"¹²¹ or again, "... we are concerned with which reading is likely to represent what our original author wrote. We are not concerned with the age, prestige, or popularity of the manuscripts supporting the readings we would adopt as original."¹²² In an earlier exposition of the method, reference presumably to external evidence—phrased as palaeographical phenomena and manuscript characteristics—seems to refer only to aids in recovering scribal habits and peculiarities, in actuality internal evidence.¹²³ Elliott, furthermore, is quite explicit about the antithesis between external and internal criteria, for which he often uses the designations (respectively) of "documentary" and "eclectic" methods, and he is equally explicit about his clear preference for the latter:

... It is reasonable to depart from a documentary study and to examine the N. T. text from a purely eclectic standpoint.

and

The eclectic method, by using different criteria and by working from a different standpoint, tries to arrive at the true reading, untrammelled by discussion about the weight of ms. support.¹²⁴

One of the difficulties with the eclectic approach that specializes in internal criticism may be only a terminological inconsistency, but it should be obvious that those who insist most strongly on an "eclectic" approach actually are the least eclectic, for their partiality toward internal criteria virtually excludes the external. Moreover, since the critical principles of these eclectics are focused for the most part rather narrowly on the style of the author (including language and grammar, and how scribes are likely to have treated what the author wrote),¹²⁵ the term "eclectic" loses much of its appropriateness. It is not clear either what the adjectives "rigorous," "impartial," or "thoroughgoing" signify when they modify "eclecticism," for the method's self-imposed limitation to internal criteria surely makes it less "impartial" and less "thorough" than an eclectic generalist approach or than that of the specialist emphasizing external evidence, for these latter methods utilize both external and internal criteria. Moreover, the term "rigorous" is ambiguous here, for it is not evident whether it means "strict" or "severe" in the sense of narrow, restricted (an appropriate designation), or has the sense of inflexible, that is, rigidly conforming to the eclectic principle (which it seems not to do); since the latter is close to "thoroughgoing" and since Kilpatrick calls for a "consistent eclecticism,"¹²⁶ it would appear that "rigorous" refers to thoroughness and consistency in being eclectic (which the school seems not to be).

This semantic problem could more likely be solved, however, by taking "eclectic" to specify the open choice, not of criteria, but of readings from any extant manuscripts; if so, this kind of

eclecticism would be "impartial" in the sense that it shows no favoritism toward any particular manuscript and has no predilection for any specific text (which is true); it would be "thoroughgoing" in the sense that it considers all readings as candidates for the original reading until some internal test rules it out; and it would be "rigorous" and "consistent" in that it never swerves from this openness to every extant reading. The only difficulty here is that nearly all the contexts, in both Kilpatrick and Elliott, that characterize or describe "eclecticism" suggest that "eclectic" is concerned primarily with the open and wide choice of criteria and not of readings, though the latter also is certainly a prominent feature of this branch of eclecticism.

More substantive criticisms of this eclecticism of internal criteria arise from the side of the evolution and history of New Testament textual transmission—a tangled history, one must add. There was such a history and there is such a history to be reconstructed, even though exactly how it is to be done is by no means clear. Yet, the eclectic specialist on the side of internal evidence has pushed his partiality for internal criteria—and also his aversion to external evidence—to such an extent that it is doubtful whether even a definitive reconstruction of the history of early New Testament transmission (if by some miracle it should appear) would occasion any alteration in his procedures for determining the original New Testament text. Everyone, I think, will recognize that to utilize history judiciously is always difficult, and most will acknowledge that to ignore history is always perilous; in the case of the New Testament text, to ignore its history and the relevant historical factors of its transmission—with or without a definitive reconstruction—and to follow instead an exclusively internal eclecticism may be the surest path to what A. F. J. Klijn has already called the "complete chaos" attendant upon the application of the eclectic method to the recovery of the original New Testament text.¹²⁷ This is not to deny, of course, the very considerable and stimulating methodological contributions and the continuing new insights into textual criteria that flow from this eclecticism that is restricted to internal evidence, though the appropriateness of the particular limitation to one kind of criteria is called into question.

III. CONCLUSION

The extended, though not devious, path that has taken us all the way from the early "canons of criticism" to contemporary eclectic emphases on internal criteria alone, including the several broader forms of eclectic procedure along the way, provides an answer to the question posed at the outset in the title, "the eclectic method—solution or symptom?" Each exponent or practitioner of an eclectic method feels assured, naturally, that his method, given the present circumstances, is the best available solution to New Testament text-critical problems, though only a very few are willing to assert that eclecticism is anything like a final solution, and it is the finality precisely of these latter eclectic schemes that is the most questionable of all. This widespread caution, if not always humility, among at least the majority of eclectics should indicate that every eclectic method is at best a temporary "solution" to our basic problems in New Testament textual criticism, and if such a method really is a solution at all, it is of the most tentative kind; it would appear, rather, that the eclectic method—regardless of type—is more certainly a highly visible symptom of those basic problems. After all, the most fundamental and longest-standing problem of the entire dis-

cipline and one that encompasses virtually all others (as this study has attempted to show) is the problem of the criteria for originality of readings, and the eclectic method most clearly is symptomatic of this severe and crucial problem. Yet, it is not more than this, for it is unable to find a conclusive way to overcome the "crisis of criteria"; indeed, the very name "eclectic" (if—as seems likely—it refers to the choice of appropriate criteria from among many) discloses the fact that the method does not have the solution. Yet, symptoms are extremely useful and important; no disease should be without them, lest there be no warning of trouble and no efforts toward a remedy. Certainly the eclectic method provides us with detailed indications of the difficulties in New Testament textual theory and method, and it assists us greatly both in clarifying those problems and in exploring appropriate solutions. We must, however, beware of treating symptoms rather than the disorder itself.

NOTES

¹E. C. Colwell, Studies in Methodology in Textual Criticism of the New Testament (NTTS, 9; Leiden: Brill, 1969), pp. 63-83, especially 66-70, 82-83; F. G. Kenyon, The Text of the Greek Bible (3rd ed., revised and augmented by A. W. Adams; London: Duckworth, 1975), p. 254.

²Vinton A. Dearing, Principles and Practice of Textual Analysis (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California, 1974), pp. 1-2.

³For a recent statement, see JBL 93 (1974) 403-5.

⁴B. M. Metzger, "Explicit References in the Works of Origen to Variant Readings in New Testament Manuscripts," Biblical and Patristic Studies in Memory of Robert Pierce Casey (eds. J. N. Birdsall and R. W. Thomson; Freiburg: Herder, 1963), p. 81.

⁵Ibid., pp. 91-92.

⁶Ibid., pp. 82, 85, 87.

⁷F. Pack, "Origen's Evaluation of Textual Variants in the Greek Bible," Restoration Quarterly 4 (1960) 144-45.

⁸K. K. Hulley, "Principles of Textual Criticism Known to St. Jerome," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 55 (1944) 87-109.

⁹M.-J. Lagrange, Critique textuelle: II. La critique rationnelle (Paris: Gabalda, 1935), p. 37.

¹⁰Ἡ ΚΑΙΝῆ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ, Novum Testamentum . . . ac tandem Crisis Perpetua, qua singulas Variantes earumque valorem aut originem ad XLIII. Canones examinat G. D. T. M. D. [Gerardus de trajecto Mosae Doctor] (Amsterdam: ex officina Wetsteniana, 1711), pp. 11-16; 48-68.

¹¹See, as examples, J. D. Michaelis, Introduction to the New Testament (tr. by H. Marsh; 2nd ed.; London, 1802), I: 1. 328-39, who lists about 20 canons; J. L. Hug, Introduction to the New Testament, translated from the third German edition by D. Fosdick, Jr., with notes by M. Stuart (Andover, 1836), pp. 301-7; S. P. Tregelles in T. H. Horne, An Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures (4 vols.; 11th ed.; London, 1860), 4. 343-45; C. E. Hammond, Outlines of Textual Criticism Applied to the New Testament (3rd ed., rev.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1880), pp. 93-99; F. H. A. Scrivener, A Plain Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament (4th ed. by E. Miller; 2 vols.; London: G. Bell, 1894), 2. 247-56; Eb. Nestle, Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the Greek New Testament (London: Williams & Norgate, 1901), pp. 239-41; P. Schaff, A Companion to the Greek Testament and the English Version (New York/London: Harper, 1903), pp. 202-5; E. Jacquier, Le Nouveau Testament dans l'église chrétienne (2 vols.; Paris: Gabalda, 1911-13), 2. 328-35; B. M. Metzger, The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration (2nd ed.; New York/Oxford: Oxford University, 1968), pp. 209-10; idem, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (London/New York: United Bible Societies, 1971), pp. xxiv-xxviii. Cf. also Lagrange, Critique textuelle, pp. 17-40; several canon lists are reproduced in E. C. Colwell, What Is the Best New Testament? (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), pp. 32-33;

73-75; 111-15.

¹²See Tregelles, An Account of the Printed Text of the Greek New Testament (London, 1854), pp. 44-45; A. Fox, John Mill and Richard Bentley: A Study of the Textual Criticism of the New Testament 1675-1729 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954), pp. 70-71.

¹³I have used the 3rd ed., ed. by J. Steudel (Tübingen, 1855), pp. xiv-xxi. The detailed refutation has been omitted from the English edition of Gnomon (Philadelphia, 1864) and from its recent reprint, New Testament Word Studies (2 vols.; Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1971); cf. pp. xx-xxi, xxxiv (=vol.1, reprint).

¹⁴W. G. Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems (Nashville/New York: Abingdon, 1972), p. 48; cf. n. 45 on p. 414.

¹⁵E. Nestle, Introduction to the Textual Criticism, pp. 16-17, 239.

¹⁶Bengel, Gnomon Novi Testamenti (3rd ed., ed. by J. Steudel; Tübingen, 1855), p. xiii; Eng. ed.: Gnomon of the New Testament (Philadelphia, 1864), reissued as New Testament Word Studies (see note 13 above), p. xviii.

¹⁷Ibid., Latin ed., pp. xii-xiv; Eng. ed., l. xvi-xx.

¹⁸Ibid., Latin ed., p. xiii; Eng. ed., l. xviii. Italics in original.

¹⁹Ibid., Latin ed., p. xiii; Eng. ed., l. xvii.

²⁰See S. P. Tregelles in Horne, 4. 69-70; he also gives Bengel's Latin text of these statements.

²¹Gnomon, Latin ed., p. xiii; Eng. ed., l. xviii. We have added "in the next place" (tum) from Bengel's Latin text, quoting otherwise the Eng. ed.

²²Ibid., Latin ed., p. xiii; Eng. ed., l. xviii.

²³Cf. now the ratings in the United Bible Societies' Greek New Testament, which "indicate the relative degree of certainty . . . for the reading adopted as the text" (2nd ed., 1968), p. x.

²⁴Selected from 19 items in ch. 16 of Wettstein's (anonymous) Prolegomena of 1730, which appear as 18 items in the appendix to his 1751-52 edition, "Animadversiones et cautiones ad examen variarum lectionum N. T. necessariae," II. 851-74. Cf. Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, p. 80; C. L. Hulbert-Powell, John James Wettstein 1693-1754 (London: SPCK, 1938), pp. 114-21. If not otherwise available, the text of Wettstein's 1752 "Animadversiones" can be found in F. Wrangham, Briani Waltoni . . . in biblia ployglotta prolegomena . . . (Cambridge, 1828), l. 511-12.

²⁵Note, however, that in the 1752 appendix he has dropped the original 18th canon—that the reading of the majority of manuscripts normally is preferable.

²⁶Metzger, Text of the New Testament, p. 114.

²⁷The canon in its entirety may be seen conveniently in Metzger, Text of the New Testament, p. 120. The Latin text of all of Griesbach's canons—should the 2nd ed. of his Greek New Testament not be available—will be readily accessible to most in H. Alford, The Greek Testament. . . (4 vols.; new ed.; Boston, 1883), 1. 81-85.

²⁸Actually, this is De Wette's summary of how Griesbach employed his principles of external criticism; see Tregelles in Horne (11th ed.), 4. 76.

²⁹See Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, pp. 91-92; witness also the views of J. M. A. Scholz, whose Greek New Testament text (1830-36) followed the Constantinopolitan "recension," and who relied on numbers of manuscripts (*ibid.*, pp. 92-97).

³⁰The Latin text is given in C. R. Gregory, Textkritik des Neuen Testament (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 966-67, and in Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, p. 98n. Lachmann also refers the reader of his first edition to his article of the preceding year, "Rechenschaft über seine Ausgabe des Neuen Testaments," TSK 3 (1830) 817-45, for the rationale and plan of the edition. This article, however, contains neither a list nor a discussion of critical canons.

³¹Translation adapted from Tregelles in Horne (11th ed.), pp. 135-36, and in Account of the Printed Text, p. 103; the Latin text may be found in Gregory, Textkritik, p. 968, or in Gregory's Prolegomena to C. Tischendorf's Novum Testamentum Graece (ed. octava critica maior; vol. 3; Leipzig, 1894), p. 260.

³²Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, p. 111.

³³Tischendorf, Novum Testamentum Graece (Prolegomena), 3. 47-48.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 3. 53-54, 63; see pp. 47-68 for the entire discussion of Tischendorf's text-critical principles, with examples. Cf. Tregelles in Horne (11th ed.), pp. 138-39, and in Account of the Printed Text, pp. 119-29, for a full discussion of Tischendorf's rules. Tischendorf's view of two pairs of documentary groups, one pair comprised of the more ancient, the other of the more recent witnesses, does not affect his use of canons; see Tregelles, *ibid.*, pp. 126-28.

³⁵Tischendorf, Novum Testamentum Graece (Prolegomena), 3. 54-55.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 3. 63-64.

³⁷Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, pp. 174-226; cf. 151-74.

³⁸(11th ed., 1860), pp. 342-45.

³⁹Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, p. 152; cf. in Horne (11th ed.), pp. 140-41: "The ancient MSS. should be the authorities for every word"; "the ancient authorities should be allowed a primary place"; "the general principle in the formation of the text is that of following evidence."

⁴⁰Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, p. 186; cf. in Horne (11th ed.), p. 344 (item no. 6).

⁴¹Tregelles, Account of the Printed Text, pp. 191-92, 222, 230.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 194-96, 205-6, 220-21.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 196-200.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 206-7, 220-21, 224-25.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 221, 245-46.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 222-23. Tregelles allows these as "occasional" occurrences, such as alterations in the interest and support of asceticism, but he says that it would be "an entire mistake to suppose that there was any evidence of doctrinal corruption of the sacred records. . . ." Cf. pp. 224-25.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 256-57.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 201-2, 221-22.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 220-21.

⁵⁰Tregelles in Horne (11th ed.), pp. 104-7.

⁵¹B. F. Westcott and F. J. A. Hort, The New Testament in the Original Greek (Cambridge/London: Macmillan, 1881-82), 2. 23. All references are to vol. 2, "Introduction, Appendix," which, as is well known, was authored by Hort, though both are fully responsible for "the principles, arguments, and conclusions set forth" (p. 18).

⁵²Ibid., 2. 59; cf. 2.5-6, 31.

⁵³Ibid., 2. 44.

⁵⁴Ibid., 2. 49-50.

⁵⁵Ibid., 2. 20.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., 2. 22-23.

⁵⁸Ibid., 2. 27, 29.

⁵⁹Ibid., 2. 28.

⁶⁰Ibid., 2. 32-33.

⁶¹Ibid., 2. 150-51.

⁶²Ibid., 2. 260-61.

⁶³Ibid., 2. 185-86.

⁶⁴Ibid., 2. 184.

⁶⁵Ibid., 2. 63-64; cf. 2. 17.

⁶⁶Colwell, Studies in Methodology, p. 65; cf. the section on "Genealogical Evidence" in Westcott-Hort, 2. 39-62; also 90-119; 178-79.

⁶⁷Westcott-Hort, 2. 41-42.

⁶⁸Ibid., 2. 19-39; 60-66.

⁶⁹Ibid., 2. 90-117.

⁷⁰Ibid., 2. 134-35.

⁷¹Ibid., 2. 90-119.

⁷²Ibid., 2. 130-32.

⁷³Ibid., 2. 122-26.

⁷⁴Ibid., 2. 128; cf. 178.

⁷⁵Ibid., 2. 150-51.

⁷⁶Ibid., 2. 171.

⁷⁷Ibid., 2. 150-51; 170-71; 210-71, especially p. 210.

⁷⁸Ibid., 2. 171; 210-13; 222-23.

⁷⁹Ibid., 2. 212.

⁸⁰Ibid., 2. 212; cf. 210: "Every group containing both $\aleph$ and B is found, where Internal Evidence is tolerably unambiguous, to have an apparently more original text than every opposed group containing neither."

⁸¹J. K. Elliott, "Can We Recover the Original New Testament?" Theology 77 (1974) 345-46. A view similar to Westcott and Hort's—the championing of a "best manuscript" as an almost "external" criterion but one based essentially on internal judgments—can be seen in the work of M.-J. Lagrange and would be worth exploring as another step on the way to the current chaos in New Testament text-critical method; cf. Colwell, Studies in Methodology, pp. 6, 80-81.

⁸²Westcott-Hort, 2. 120.

⁸³Ibid., 2. 149.

⁸⁴Ibid., 2. 120.

⁸⁵Ibid., 2. 149.

⁸⁶Ibid., 2. 178.

⁸⁷Ibid., 2. 124, 127, 131.

⁸⁸These ideas, in compressed form, were first developed for a forthcoming article on "Textual Criticism, NT" in The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, Supplementary Volume (ed. K. Crim; Nashville: Abingdon, 1976).

⁸⁹These not uncontroversial matters have been treated by the present writer in a paper presented to the Society of Biblical Literature's Textual Criticism Seminar in 1974 entitled, "Toward the Clarification of the Term 'Textual Variant,'" to be published in the G. D. Kilpatrick Festschrift (Leiden: Brill, 1975).

⁹⁰See Metzger, Textual Commentary, pp. 18-18.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 39.

⁹²Ibid., pp. 40-41.

⁹³Ibid., p. 41.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 42-43.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 67-68.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 307.

⁹⁷K. Aland, M. Black, C. M. Martini, B. M. Metzger, and A. Wikgren (2nd ed.; New York/London/Edinburgh/Amsterdam/Stuttgart: United Bible Societies, 1968); 3rd ed. forthcoming.

⁹⁸Metzger, Textual Commentary, pp. xxiv-xxviii.

^{98a}That B played this decisive role in the UBSGNT is confirmed by the statement in Metzger, ibid., p. 295: "... The possibility must be left open that occasionally the text of B represents a secondary development." The fact that this comment occurs in connection with an Acts passage makes it all the more significant, for Metzger reports (pp. 272-73) that the editors recognized that in the text of Acts "neither the Alexandrian nor the Western group of witnesses always preserves the original text, but that in order to attain the earliest text one must compare the two divergent traditions point by point and in each case select the reading which commends itself in the light of transcriptional and intrinsic probabilities," and that, therefore, the editorial committee "proceeded in an eclectic fashion." The clear implication is that, for the UBSGNT committee, B was indeed the lodestar of the original text, for if in Acts—where there is the greatest uncertainty as to whether it and its group or its early rival, the Western text, represents the original—the possibility must be allowed that B occasionally represents the non-original text, then elsewhere B must surely stand as the most reliable guide. Incidentally, the statement from pp. 272-73 quoted above does not mean that in Acts the editors gave primacy to internal evidence, for what they sought, as explicitly stated, was "the earliest text"—an external criterion, but internal criteria were employed, in an overall eclectic process, to determine which of the two rival texts or which of the various alternative readings were in fact the earlier or earliest.

⁹⁹See JBL 93 (1974) 393-96 for a statement on the status of the Caesarean text in current criticism.

¹⁰⁰Cf. ibid., pp. 390-401.

¹⁰¹Cf. ibid., pp. 387; 406-414.

¹⁰²See Metzger, Text of the New Testament, pp. 137-38, for a succinct description of Weiss's procedures, and pp. 175-79 for a general summary of this kind of eclectic methodology.

¹⁰³C. H. Turner, "Marcan Usage: Notes, Critical and Exegetical, on the Second Gospel," JTS 25 (1923/24) 377-86; 26 (1924/25) 12-20; 145-56; 225-40; 337-46; 27 (1925/26) 58-62; 28 (1926/27) 9-30; 349-62; 29 (1927/28) 275-89; 346-61.

- ¹⁰⁴Lagrange, Critique textuelle, especially pp. 17-40.
- ¹⁰⁵E.g., A. F. J. Klijn, A Survey of the Researches into the Western Text of the Gospels and Acts (Utrecht: Kemink, 1949), p. 170.
- ¹⁰⁶Colwell, Studies in Methodology, p. 6; cf. note 81 above.
- ¹⁰⁷Westcott-Hort, 2. ix, 31.
- ¹⁰⁸Turner, JTS 25 (1923/24) 377.
- ¹⁰⁹Kilpatrick, "Western Text and Original Text in the Gospels and Acts," JTS 44 (1943) 24-36; idem, "Western Text and Original Text in the Epistles," ibid., 45 (1944) 60-65.
- ¹¹⁰JTS 44 (1943) 33-34, 36; 45 (1944) 65; see also Kilpatrick, "Atticism and the Text of the Greek New Testament," Neutestamentliche Aufsätze: Festschrift für Prof. Josef Schmid zum 70. Geburtstag (eds. J. Blinzler, O. Kuss, F. Mussner; Regensburg: Pustet, 1963), p. 136: "At each point the text must be decided impartially on the merits of the readings involved." Similar statements appear inevitably in his articles on the subject.
- ¹¹¹JTS 44 (1943) 36.
- ¹¹²Ibid., pp. 25-26.
- ¹¹³Ibid., p. 36.
- ¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 33.
- ¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 26.
- ¹¹⁶Kilpatrick does speak of assessing the "antiquity of the tradition in a certain manuscript" from its spelling, abbreviations, script, number of columns, and errors" (ibid.).
- ¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 36.
- ¹¹⁸Kilpatrick, "An Eclectic Study of the Text of Acts," Biblical and Patristic Studies in Memory of Robert Pierce Casey (eds. J. N. Birdsall and R. W. Thomson; Freiburg: Herder, 1963), p. 76.
- ¹¹⁹Kilpatrick, "The Greek New Testament Text of Today and the Textus Receptus," The New Testament in Historical and Contemporary Perspective: Essays in Memory of G. H. C. Macgregor (eds. H. Anderson and W. Barclay; Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), pp. 189-206; the quotation is from pp. 205-6.
- ¹²⁰J. K. Elliott, "Rational Criticism and the Text of the New Testament," Theology 75 (1972) 340-41.
- ¹²¹Ibid., pp. 340-43 (the quotation is from p. 341); idem, "Can We Recover the Original New Testament?" Theology 77 (1974) 349-53.
- ¹²²Ibid., p. 352.
- ¹²³Elliott, The Greek Text of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus (Studies and Documents, 36; Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1968), p. 10. There are some ambiguous references to "weak" and "strong" support (p. 11).

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 5-6, 11. Cf. also: "Often such a study serves as further ammunition against the documentary method" (*ibid.*, p. 12); ". . . internal rather than on documentary criteria" ("Rational Criticism," p. 341).

¹²⁵Cf. e.g., Kilpatrick, "Eclectic Study of the Text of Acts," p. 77; Elliott, Greek Text of . . . Timothy and Titus, p. 8, who calls conformity to the author's style and usage the eclectic method's "basic rule of thumb."

¹²⁶Kilpatrick, "The Greek New Testament Text of Today," p. 205; cf. JTS 44 (1943) 34.

¹²⁷A. F. J. Klijn, "In Search of the Original Text of Acts," Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays Presented in Honor of Paul Schubert (eds. L. E. Keck and J. L. Martyn; Nashville/New York: Abingdon, 1966), p. 104; cf. p. 108. Klijn makes this highly critical judgment while affirming at the same time that "the eclectic method seems to be the only adequate method to regain the original text" (p. 104). Observe, however, that while Klijn's attribution of chaos to the eclectic method explicitly encompasses Kilpatrick's work, Klijn's own views on external evidence are radically different from Kilpatrick's, for Klijn, while approving the "rational criticism" of readings (mainly on grounds of intrinsic probability), states that textual criticism must attempt to render this approach superfluous, mainly by the grouping of manuscripts into families and texts (external evidence) (Survey of the Researches into the Western Text, p. 170).

THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS
IN MARK'S GOSPEL

Donald Juel

With few exceptions, recent studies of the trial of Jesus in Mark 14 have relied heavily on an approach to literature developed by form critics, even if the focus has changed.¹ The biblical narrative is viewed as a collection of distinct individual units. The interpreter must first disentangle the strands of tradition before hazarding a guess as to the meaning of the narrative in its present form. The perspective of the final editor will be determined by examining the links he has forged between elements of tradition, the alterations and additions he has made, or the context into which a particular unit has been placed. However the approach may be supplemented, interpretation begins with the separation of tradition and redaction.

When the object of study is the final stage in this complex literary process, however, the approach has some serious liabilities. In Mark, precise delineation of tradition and redaction must remain hypothetical. It is not always clear what is implied by the identification of a phrase as "traditional." Does the author view the tradition as true, or must we assume that it is only in conscious alterations that his views surface? It is instructive that students of the Gospel employing similar methods can come to radically different interpretations of a particular text. Eta Linnemann, Eduard Schweizer, John Donahue, and Johannes Schreiber all consider themselves redaction critics.² All insist that interpretation of the temple charge in Mk 14:58 must begin with observations about the editing process. While all four agree that this portion of the trial has been extensively edited by Mark, they disagree about the interpretation of the charge itself. Schweizer and Linnemann argue that the author considers the charge to be false, Schreiber and Donahue that it is true in his eyes. How is the matter to be settled? Further precision in the separation of tradition and redaction is probably unattainable; the editorial process sketched by Linnemann is already impossibly complex. Interpretation of the temple charge will not be settled by appeal to the history of tradition.

There is another approach to the trial narrative that is considerably less complex and that promises a higher degree of certainty about interpretation. If the goal of study is to understand a text in its present form, we can bring to the biblical narrative questions of the sort that have traditionally been asked of other narratives. We can inquire about the function of a particular unit within the work, about themes that link the unit with its literary context, about the location of a particular episode in the plot or within the narrative structure. The chief advantage of this approach is simplicity. Such questions can be answered whatever view one holds with respect to the history of tradition--even if one believes the Gospel to have come from the hand of Peter's "interpreter." And such questions must be answered however one chooses to solve the historical questions about the development of the gospel tradition. Interest in the history of tradition is legitimate, but it cannot obviate the need to study the Gospel as one would study any

piece of literature. It must be demonstrated that there is some unity and purpose and coherence in Mark to merit such investigation. But we ought to begin with the assumption that the author was capable of telling a story, that he had a reason for including what he did. The assumption will be justified to the extent we are able to discover the function of features of the text that appear at first glance to be superfluous, out of place, or without sense.³

Problems

The trial of Jesus before the Jewish high court reported in Mk 14:55-65 is one of the basic texts for historians interested in reconstructing the events surrounding the death of Jesus, but it is no less central for students of Mark. The trial is one of the high points in the story. It represents the culmination of plots against Jesus initiated early in the story. Scribes hearing Jesus declare a paralytic's sins forgiven react with amazement:

"Why does this man speak thus? It is blasphemy!" (2:7)

In 14:64, a charge of blasphemy is sustained against Jesus. Throughout the story Jesus' identity has been a closely guarded secret. At the trial before the Sanhedrin, for the first and only time in Mark, Jesus openly acknowledges his identity:

Again the high priest asked him, "Are you the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" And Jesus said, "I am; and you will see the Son of man sitting..." (14:61-62)

The trial seems to represent a decisive stage in the unfolding of the plot.

Yet the trial is also problematic. It leads nowhere in the story. When Mark reports the meeting of the council on the morning following Jesus' trial, he gives no indication that a trial has even occurred--much less a trial at which someone has been found guilty of blasphemy, a capital offense punishable by stoning. Jesus is bound over for trial to the Roman court. No attempt to have the sentence of the Jewish court sustained by Pilate is reported; no explanation is offered for turning the prisoner over to the Roman authorities to be tried under Roman law, as in the Fourth Gospel (Jn 18:31). For all the prominence accorded the trial in Mark, it appears to have virtually no impact on the action. Why is it narrated at all? What difference does it make that Jesus has been accused of crimes before the Jewish high court and has been found guilty of blasphemy? What is the function of the trial narrative in Mark?

Before handling the major questions, minor problems within the trial need to be considered. One of the major obstacles to interpretation is the style of the author, in particular the unevenness of the narrative. The abrupt transitions, frequent lack of coherence, a striking absence of information essential for constructing a full picture of the events being described, and in some cases glaring inconsistencies--all these make it difficult to determine the point of the story. The following are some of the more obvious examples within Mark's version of Jesus' trial:

1) At Jesus' trial, a host of false witnesses testify against Jesus (14:56). Although the court "sought testimony against Jesus to put him to death," they were unable to find a suitable charge because the witnesses were unable to agree on their false testimony. It is unclear how the witnesses could fail to agree when the clear impression is given that they had

been sought out by judges committed in advance to a guilty verdict.

2) "Some" of these witnesses testified--falsely--that Jesus made a statement about the temple that presumably constituted a legal offence:

"We heard him say, 'I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another, not made with hands.'" (14:58)

Yet we are then told that they, too, were unable to agree (14:59). The charge is carefully worded and is reported, according to the narrator, by "some." How can the witnesses have failed to agree?

3) The precisely formulated statement Jesus is alleged to have made is reported nowhere in Mark. If the point of the charge is a threat against the temple, it is remarkable that no reference is made to the "cleansing" of the temple reported in 11:15-17 or even to the prediction of destruction Jesus does make in 13:2.

4) The question of the high priest in 14:61, following Jesus' poignant silence in the face of accusations, seems to presume that the issue of Jesus' alleged messianic claim has already been raised: "Again" he asks Jesus if he claims to be the Messiah, Son of God. Yet it is by no means obvious that the issue of Messiahship has been raised.

There are other puzzling details that need not detain us here. It is stylistic features like these--unevenness in the narrative, obvious gaps in the story--that have provided for recent interpreters keys for unlocking the mysteries of the text. Form critics pointed to such stylistic features as indications that the author of the Gospel used for his narrative individual story units or primitive cycles of stories. In most cases, they argued, the author followed the contours of these units and may even have preserved intact whole cycles of stories. The legacy of these pioneers in the study of the Gospels remains even among those who profess very different opinions about how cleverly these "editors" were able to arrange the blocks of tradition.

These same stylistic features tell us something quite different about Mark, however. In his epic study *Mimesis*, Eric Auerbach examined the manner in which authors from ancient times to the present have interpreted reality as they "imitated" it in literary form.⁴ He devoted a short portion of one chapter to the Gospel of Mark, specifically to the account of Peter's denial. What struck Auerbach is how little effort the author made to convey a thorough and consistent picture of the event he narrates on the level of the sensory. Large spaces in the portrait are simply left unfinished. Why was Peter not arrested? How did he escape? Was he ever forgiven for denying Jesus three times with an oath? How was he reunited with the rest of Jesus' scattered followers?

What Auerbach inferred from these strange literary features of Mark's Gospel is that the narrator had a view of reality different from that of his contemporaries in the field of literature and that his conception of the literary task was correspondingly distinctive. Reality, as Mark viewed it, had more than one level. The real meaning of an event may not be apparent on the level of the sensory, which may explain why the narrator did not feel constrained to achieve the coherence and flow within his narrative so conspicuously absent. It may be that his gaze was fixed at another level of his story.

Peter's Denial (Mk 14:54, 66-72)

What must strike anyone reading Mark for the first time is the remarkable lack of information about Peter, "the rock," whose collapse figures so prominently in the story. We are not told what motivates Peter alone to risk his life by following Jesus to the house of the high priest. The account ends with his remorse as he hears the cock crow and remembers Jesus' warning. We are not really told, in other words, how the event ended. This is all the more striking since the event bears telltale brushstrokes of the artist. The narrative is separated into two parts--a simple but effective way of portraying Jesus' trial and Peter's "trial" as simultaneous. Yet the author concludes without even telling us where Peter went, how--or if--he found his way to Galilee.

To complicate matters still further, the author seems to relish little details in the story. The woman who first questions Peter is not simply a "maid," as in Matthew and Luke, but "one of the maids of the high priest" (14:67). The scene opens with Peter "warming himself at the fire" (14:54)--a detail absent from Matthew, while in Luke the fire provides light by which Peter is recognized. What is the significance of the little detail in Mark? In 14:72, most of the major manuscripts include the reading "for the second time." The author takes pains to note that the cock crowed twice.⁵ Why would he be interested in such detail when there are such major gaps in the story? It is hardly sufficient to maintain that this was simply the form in which he received his material.

The small details are signals that more is taking place than meets the eye. While Jesus is arraigned before the high court, Peter is outside in the courtyard at a "trial" of his own. While Jesus is interrogated by the high priest, Peter is questioned by a female servant of the high priest. At the moment Jesus boldly confronts his judges with the truth about himself, even though it means death, Peter denies him three times, finally invoking a curse upon himself. What transpires outside in the courtyard is a parody--a tragic one--of Jesus' trial. Peter, the "rock," who only hours before had sworn that he would die before forsaking Jesus, collapses under the questions of a female slave. The pathetic figure, warming himself by the fire, fears for his miserable life. Perhaps he, too, is one of the "sinners" Jesus came to call, one of the "sick" who have need of a physician (Mk 2:17). It is for him, too, that Jesus' life must be given as a ransom (10:45).

Immediately after Peter denies Jesus for the third time, the cock crows a second time. It is just as Jesus said it would be, as Peter recalls:

And Peter remembered how Jesus had said to him, "Before the cock crows twice, you will deny me three times." (14:72)

The scene closes with Peter's remorse. But the author has reminded us that the whole terrible episode of Peter's denial is the fulfillment of something that Jesus prophesied earlier (14:30). His prediction is fulfilled to the letter. That is one point the reader is not to miss.

But then a little detail in the account of Jesus' trial assumes considerable significance. The report of the trial does not end until the author has recounted the mockery to which Jesus is subjected after a verdict has been reached. If the author were concerned simply to contrast Jesus' trial with Peter's, we might have expected the scene to shift to the courtyard immediately after a verdict had been reached. It is conceivable that Mark includes the mockery because it is part of

his tradition, perhaps because it fulfills Scripture.⁶ But there is good reason for the story to read as it does. Jesus is not mocked as Messiah, as might be expected from the proceedings, but as prophet:

And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and to strike him, saying to him, "Prophecy!" (14:65).⁷

The taunt must refer to something Jesus said at the trial. Most likely, the prediction about the Son of man in 14:62 is the object of their scorn. The pathetic figure whose followers have deserted him, whose movement has collapsed, who has dared to accept the designations of Messiah and Son of God, has made an outrageous prediction about sitting at God's right hand and coming with the clouds of heaven. Jesus' adversaries taunt the would-be prophet: "Let's hear more prophecies." At this point, the scene shifts to the courtyard--where one of Jesus' "prophecies" is being fulfilled to the letter. The reader is afforded a glimpse of what is really happening at a level of reality inaccessible to the participants in the drama. Incidental details about Peter are unimportant. His role is to serve as a foil for Jesus and to fulfill a prophecy of Jesus. When he has served his purpose, he leaves the stage.

Style and the Passion Story

What Auerbach's proposals mean for the interpreter of Mark is that a new question must be asked at each stage of the story: what is "really" happening. In many cases a second look at an incident reveals an interior dimension of meaning of considerable import. Consider the mockery to which Jesus is subjected by the Roman soldiers (15:16-20). The incident is accorded a prominent place in the narrative not because it is so significant in the course of events but because the event has a double meaning. On the one hand, it serves to express the contrast between the prisoner Jesus and the royal office to which he allegedly aspires in the eyes of the characters in the story. On the other hand, the mock investiture must strike the reader as ironic; he has known from 1:1 that this is the story of Jesus Christ--the King. The garrison provides unwitting testimony to the truth at a level of reality beyond their grasp. Many have observed the irony in the "confession" of the centurion at the moment of Jesus' death (15:39). But it is possible that the confession is more ironic than many have assumed. Should the Greek be translated "a son of God" or "the Son of God"? Perhaps both are intended. The ambiguity of the υἱὸς θεοῦ may be a superb vehicle of expression. According to the author, the centurion does not really understand what he is saying. Luke probably captures one meaning of the expression when he renders the confession, "Certainly this man was innocent [$\delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma$]." At another level, the soldier utters at a moment of seeming failure what the reader knows to be a true confession: Jesus is the Son of God.

Such an approach to the task of imitating reality in literary form would explain why the author narrates Jesus' death with language taken from the Old Testament without employing explicit formulas to introduce the allusions. The language is not independent of the story but part of it. The soldiers cast lots for Jesus' garments (Mk 15:24 = Ps 22:18); Jesus is mocked by people "wagging their heads" (Mk 15:29 = Ps 22:7); Jesus cries in desperation from the cross, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me" (15:34 = Ps 22:1). The language is appropriate to the story and is not an intrusion. Yet it points the reader to something obscured from all the participants in the

story: what is occurring is taking place according to plan. "The Son of man goes as it is written of him" (Mk 14:21). The author perceives a tension between appearance and reality that he seeks to capture in his description of the events.

The observation that Mark narrates a story at two levels is illuminating, but it does not solve all problems in the text. Certain features of the trial are problematic not because the author omits essential information, as in the case of Peter's denial, but because on the external level the details make no sense. How can "some" false witnesses have failed to agree in their reporting of a charge given in exact detail in Mk 14:58? Perhaps the author is in some sense bound by tradition. Yet must we not at least ask if these strange features of the text do not serve some purpose at another level of the story? It may be that the author is so preoccupied with the inner dimension of the story that he is willing to sacrifice coherence and even good sense on the sensory level to make a point. What is happening at the trial of Jesus in Mark, and what does each feature of the narrative contribute to the story?

The Rejected Stone

Three times in Mark, Jesus predicts that he will be arrested, tried, and executed. In these predictions the author provides clues to the meaning of the trial. Of particular interest is the first of the three:

And he began to teach them that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again. (Mk 8:31)

Twenty-seven verses in chapter fifteen are devoted to the role played by the Romans in Jesus' death; in the first passion prediction they are not even mentioned. Jesus simply states that he will be killed. More significant is the role to be played by the Jewish leaders. Yet for someone familiar with the story even what is said about these figures is a bit unexpected. No mention is made here of a trial or about their handing Jesus over to Pilate. It is stated simply that they will "reject" Jesus.

The term "reject" (ἀποδοκιμάζειν) is carefully chosen. The unusual term appears once more in Mark's Gospel, as part of a quotation from Psalm 118 in chapter 12. In 12:1-9, Jesus tells a parable against the heads of the temple establishment (the scribes, chief priests, and elders), the group that will soon serve as his judges. They are compared to wicked tenants of a vineyard who refuse to pay their rent. When the patient owner finally sends his son to collect his due, the tenants kill him, foolishly supposing that they will secure control of the vineyard. Their crime only seals their doom. The vineyard will be taken from them and given to others. At the conclusion of the parable, Jesus quotes a verse from a psalm:

The very stone which the builders rejected
has become the head of the corner;
this was the Lord's doing,
and it is marvelous in our eyes. (Ps 118:22)

In the thinly veiled allegory, Jesus is identified as the stone, the Jewish leaders as the builders. They will "reject" Jesus. But that will not be the end of the story. He will be vindicated; God will make him the "head of the corner." The verse is used with the same application in Acts 4:11, and in Acts the vindication of the rejected stone is associated with Jesus' resurrection (4:10).

In the first of his predictions Jesus foretells his "rejection" at the hands of the Jewish leaders. The perceptive reader will learn, if he does not already know, that this rejection has already been planned in advance by God; it has been "written." But Jesus also promises that he will be vindicated; after three days he will rise again. The reference to the Jewish leaders points the reader to Jesus' trial before the Sanhedrin. This is the scene of his "scriptural" rejection. But rejection is only the counterpart of vindication. Jesus will die, but God will raise him from the dead. In the first prediction, Jesus' resurrection, interpreted as God's vindication, is related in a special way to Jesus' trial before the Sanhedrin. God himself will set aside the verdict of Israel's supreme court--in accordance with the scriptures.

This may help explain why Mark seems so unconcerned about linking the trial before the Sanhedrin to the trial before Pilate. His interest in the story lies at a deeper level; what is important is that the leaders of the people "reject" Jesus--as foretold in the psalm. But this rejection/vindication motif is perhaps even more significant. Mark is not concerned simply to indicate that Jesus is rejected by the scribes, chief priests, and elders. The "rejection" is accorded the formal setting of a trial at which specific charges are introduced and at which a specific verdict is reached. If the author wants his readers to know that God will turn the tables on Jesus' enemies, is it perhaps important to ask on what basis Jesus is rejected at his trial? Do the specific charges also serve as the basis for Jesus' vindication by God? Is the reader expected to understand the charges at another level, as statements of something the truth of which has been or will be demonstrated when God vindicates his Son?

The Crucified Messiah

At his trial Jesus is found guilty of blasphemy. The verdict is related to the decisive interchange between Jesus and the high priest that forms the climax of the scene:

Again the high priest asked him, "Are you the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" And Jesus said, "I am; and you will see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming with the clouds of heaven." And the high priest tore his mantle, and said, "Why do we still need witnesses? You have heard his blasphemy." (14:61-64)

Throughout the story Jesus has kept his identity a secret. In response to the question of the high priest he provides the only unambiguous self-revelation in the Gospel. The result is not mass conversions, however, but a charge of blasphemy. It has long been observed that measured by Mishnaic standards nothing in Jesus' statement constitutes blasphemy in the legal sense.⁸ I have chosen not to invest much time on that problem in this paper. I assume that the term is employed with a wider application than simply use of the ineffable Name of God (Mk 2:7). It also provides perhaps the only convenient way to conclude the trial: it could hardly have been terminated without a charge being sustained, since Jesus is to be handed over to Pilate. It is also conceivable, as some have suggested, that the term is used with an eye to later Jewish/Christian disputes, reflecting what subsequently came to be viewed as "blasphemous."⁹

But to what does the charge refer? To Jesus' acceptance of the designations "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed"? Or to his prediction about the Son of man? Arguments have been offered in support of a variety of views. The matter deserves

some attention, for if the proposal I have made thus far is correct, the basis of Jesus' condemnation represents for the author a basic feature of Christian belief. It seems most probable to me that for the author, the decisive issue at Jesus' trial is the claim that Jesus is "the Christ, the Son of God." Space permits only a sketch of arguments presented in more detailed form elsewhere:¹⁰

1) The title "Son of the Blessed [One]" (Son of God) in the question of the high priest is a messianic designation, i.e. it is a title appropriate to the Messiah-King. It means more than "Messiah," but the title belongs to royal terminology derived from messianic oracles like Psalm 2 and II Sam 7, where the King is called "Son" by God himself. "Son of God" thus may not be viewed as a qualification of "Messiah" nor as designating an independent traditional figure. The argument depends upon the following evidence:

a) Messianic oracles such as Psalm 2 and II Sam 7 provided the possibility of calling the Messiah God's Son. In 4QFlor., II Sam 7:10-14 is read as a messianic oracle, and the interpreter makes no effort to avoid the implication from v. 14 that the Messiah, the "Branch of David," will be called God's Son. In an unpublished fragment presently in the possession of J. T. Milik, an otherwise unidentified figure is called both "Son of God" and "Son of the Most High."¹¹ If the titles are used of the Messiah--as John Strugnell believes--a decisive piece of evidence will have been unearthed. Lacking that, what exists is at least evidence that in messianic passages, the Messiah is called "Son" by God himself.

b) There is evidence that these messianic oracles, in particular Psalm 2:7 and II Sam 7:14, were influential in the development of New Testament christology.¹² Ps 2:7 is quoted in Acts 13:33 in the context of Jesus' resurrection; in Rom 1:3 a similar reference is likely. Both II Sam 7:14 and Ps 2:7 are quoted in Heb 1:5. And it is likely that Ps 2:7 played an important role in the development of baptismal narratives. Thus, a use of "Son of God" as a messianic designation can be established in pre-Markan Christian circles.

c) Mark is aware that the title "Son of God" is part of traditional messianic ideology. An allusion to Ps 2:7 is present in the baptismal narrative (1:11), possibly also in the transfiguration account (9:7). "Christ" and "Son of God" occur together twice in the Gospel (1:1, 14:61). Son of God may have other associations, but in the trial it is employed as part of messianic imagery.

2) The Son of man saying in 14:62 is not intended as a qualification of "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed"; like "Son of God," the title "Son of man" does not define Jesus by identifying him as a traditional figure distinct from the Messiah. After accepting the titles "Christ" and "Son of God," Jesus promises his judges that "you will see." The title "Son of man" is used as an enigmatic self-designation elsewhere in Mark in the context of vindication motifs. In the three passion predictions, Jesus predicts that the "Son of man" will rise after three days (8:31, 9:31, 10:34; see also 9:9). On this occasion the "rejected" stone will be vindicated. In 13:21-27, Jesus promises a public vindication of all those who refuse to follow false Christs and false prophets when he returns "in clouds with great power and glory" (13:26); then "they will see" who is the real Christ and the real prophet. Whether 14:62 is

to be interpreted as a reference to the resurrection (Ps 110:1) or to the parousia (Dan 7:13), or to both, the verse points the reader to an event or events that will establish that Jesus is "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed."

There is still some basis for the argument that the charge of blasphemy refers in Mark to Jesus' statement about the Son of man.¹³ The tearing of the high priest's robe does not follow the words "I am," but the promise of the heavenly session of the Son of man. Presuming the right to sit at God's right hand might well represent blasphemy in the broader sense of invasion of God's oneness. But there is not enough evidence in the trial narrative itself to determine precisely to what the charge of blasphemy is to be related. There is convincing evidence in the remainder of the passion narrative, however, that the decisive issue at Jesus' trial in Mark is the claim to Messiahship.

In Mark, Jesus dies as king. Three times Pilate refers to him as "King of the Jews" (15:2, 9, 12). Jesus is mocked by Roman soldiers as "King of the Jews" (15:16-20). When he is crucified, the inscription of the charge against him reads, "The King of the Jews" (15:26). As he hangs helplessly on the cross, he is ridiculed by chief priests and scribes as "the Christ, the King of Israel" (15:32). The difference in terminology employed by Romans and Jews suggests that they view kingship differently. In the eyes of the chief priests and scribes, those who were involved in Jesus' trial, Jesus claims to be the Messiah-King. The kingship at issue is for Jews a religious as well as a political reality. For Romans the issue is simply political; they could hardly be expected to concern themselves with distinctively Jewish religious matters. Jesus is alleged to be a king--the King of the Jews--and is consequently executed as a threat to the state. It is also appropriate that Romans call Jesus "King of the Jews," while Israelites call him "the King of Israel." "Jew" was a term used only by Gentiles in Palestine. The difference in terminology cannot obscure the essential consistency of imagery. Jesus is tried, mocked, and executed as king. The chief priests and scribes understand this to be the issue that emerges from Jesus' trial (15:32). There can be little question that in the eyes of the narrator, the trial narrative introduces the major theme in the passion story and that this theme is the messianic claim.

The confession of the centurion in 15:39 may seem to constitute an exception. The verse occurs at the climax of the passion story. At this climactic moment, however, Jesus is not called "King of the Jews" or "Messiah," but "Son of God." But how is the title to be interpreted here? The verse is in some respects a counterpoint to the question of the high priest at Jesus' trial: "Are you the Christ, the Son of God?" At the moment of death, the question is answered--perhaps without the confessor understanding what he is saying: "Truly this is the Son of God." If "Son of the Blessed [God]" in the question of the high priest is used as a messianic designation--as language appropriate for the Messiah-King, and if the centurion's confession occurs at the conclusion of the trial, mockery, and execution of "the King of the Jews," and "the Christ, the King of Israel," is it not possible that even in the confession of the centurion the title "Son of God" should be viewed as part of the constellation of messianic images? If so, the imagery throughout the narrative of Jesus' trial and crucifixion would be consistent.

The whole passion story in Mark is painted with somber colors; little light penetrates the gloom. We are not told, as

in Matthew, that Jesus could have twelve legions of angels at his disposal if he chose; Jesus pauses for no homily on the way to the place of the skull, as he does in Luke; he does not save one of the criminals crucified with him before his death. Yet there is another dimension to the story. Events proceed according to plan. And for anyone who knows that the story is about "Jesus Christ, the Son of God" (1:1), the events become highly ironic. The high priest himself introduces the titles "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed"; three times Pilate calls Jesus "King of the Jews"; soldiers salute Jesus as "King of the Jews," and it is as King that Jesus dies; scribes and chief priests mock him as "the Christ, the King of Israel"; and at the moment of his death a soldier identifies him as "a son of God" [the Son of God]. There is nothing about Jesus that would lead one to believe that he is the King, God's Son; the mockery serves to underline the contrast between the pathetic figure on the cross and the traditional image of the Messiah. And yet at another level the high priest, Pilate, the soldiers, the chief priests and scribes, even the centurion become servants of God's will in a way they could never have anticipated. Contrary to their intentions and at a level of reality beyond their comprehension, they witness to the truth: Jesus is King, the crucified Messiah. The rejected stone will become the head of the corner.

The Temple

At Jesus' trial before the scribes, chief priests, and elders, he accepts the designations "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed"; in 15:32, he is mocked by chief priests and scribes as "the Christ, the King of Israel"; in 15:39, at the moment of his death, he is "confessed" by the centurion as "Son of God." The repetition of the charge highlights what the author considers to be the decisive issue in the story, and it does so in ironic fashion. But there are two charges at the trial, and in the crucifixion narrative the first charge is also repeated, even if in slightly altered form:

"We heard him say, 'I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another, not made with hands.'" (14:58)

And those who passed by derided [ἐβλασφήμου] him, wagging their heads, and saying, "Aha! You who would destroy the temple and build it in three days, save yourself, and come down from the cross." (15:29)

And the curtain of the temple was torn in two, from top to bottom. (15:38)

The charge at the trial is characterized as false testimony; it cannot be entered as evidence because the court is unable to secure the consistent testimony of two witnesses. But why then is the charge reported at all? Why this one of all the false charges against Jesus (14:56)? Interpreted within the context of the whole passion story, the charge becomes an important matter. It is important enough to be restated in the mockery in a scene where mockery consistently has a double meaning. And at the moment of Jesus' death something happens to the temple. Why does the author note the tearing of the temple veil? It seems to have little to do with the centurion's confession, and it has no impact on the action. We must assume that the link between Jesus' death and the tearing of the veil is significant at another level, and if so it is likely that the author intends some relationship among the three statements about the temple (14:58, 15:29, 15:38). If the same pattern may

be assumed here as in the case of the second charge at the trial, the temple charge must be true at some level; the mockery in 15:29 would provide ironic restatement; and the tearing of the veil at the moment of Jesus' death would provide provisional confirmation of its truth--a preliminary vindication.

If this seems to be the function of the temple charge in the larger context of the passion story, we need to know why the author characterizes the charge as false testimony, why the witnesses cannot agree on the charge, and why the carefully formulated charge in 14:58 appears in altered form in 15:29. Are these features of the narrative accidental, merely "traditional," or do they serve some important function in the present context?

"Yet not even so did their testimony agree" (14:59)

In one sense it is difficult to understand how an author with any sense could make such a statement. How could planted witnesses have failed to reproduce rehearsed testimony? How could "some" who reported the charge still fail to get it straight? In another sense it is difficult to understand how else the author might have continued his narrative following the temple charge. The climax of the trial is the exchange between Jesus and the high priest. Had the witnesses been able to agree in their testimony about the temple, there would have been no need for the high priest to ask the decisive question. By making what appears to be a senseless remark about the failure of witnesses to agree, the author is able to introduce the temple charge while also carrying the trial through to its appointed conclusion. The author presumably lacks the ability or the interest to achieve coherence on both levels of the story, but the verse does serve an important purpose in the narrative.

False Testimony

If the author views the temple charge as true in some sense, why is it introduced as false testimony? Even if the double mention of false testimony derives ultimately from tradition or an apologetic use of the Old Testament, it is still necessary to ask if the reference has any function in the trial as narrated by Mark.¹⁴ There are at least three possibilities:

- 1) The "falseness" refers not to the charge but to the intention of the witnesses. This would represent one facet of the author's attempt to portray the trial as a miscarriage of justice.
- 2) The charge is "false" because Jesus never said anything of the sort. There is no such prediction attributed to Jesus elsewhere in Mark, and the carefully worded charge is not a direct allusion either to the cleansing of the temple in 11:15-17 or to Jesus' prophecy of the temple's destruction in 13:2. The irony would be that even a trumped up charge can serve a purpose quite contrary to the intentions of those seeking to incriminate Jesus.
- 3) The falseness of the charge and the differences in wording between the charge in 14:58 and the mockery in 15:29 are related. As in 15:32, the wording in 15:29 might indicate what Jesus' opponents have understood to be the issues at the trial, where the "full" confessional statements are made. According to the author, those testifying falsely against Jesus do not understand what they are saying. They interpret the statement about destruction and building as a threat against the temple and/or an impossible boast implying a claim of magical powers. For Jesus' enemies, the distinction between "this temple made with hands" and "another not made with hands" is meaningless. Asking how the witnesses could have understood so little of what

they said is like asking how those witnessing Jesus' exorcisms could have failed to be impressed by the repeated identification of Jesus by demons as "Son of God" or "Son of the Most High God" (3:11, 5:7). The inability of the participants in the drama to penetrate the aura of mystery surrounding Jesus is more than a simple lack of insight. The author seems more interested in underlining that mystery, while simultaneously allowing the reader to see beneath the veil, than in achieving a cohesive narrative on the level of the sensory. We might consider the approach flawed, but in its own way it is very effective.

Examination of the trial narrative itself produces a number of alternative interpretations of the various details. Decisions about the appropriateness of the proposals must be made by studying the trial within its literary context. The feature of the charge at the trial that stands out is the distinction between one temple that is to be destroyed and another temple that is to be built. Does the author provide any clues to the meaning of the charge elsewhere in the Gospel?

The Temple Cleansing (11:15-19; cf. also 11:12-14, 20-25)

Jesus' first act in Jerusalem is to drive merchants and money changers out of the temple. Once again the account is extraordinarily concise. We learn nothing about the reaction of the crowds to the provocative act, about the extent of Jesus' interruption of the temple routine, or about the reason Jesus is not arrested by the Romans for disturbing the peace. The event is interpreted in a brief statement made by Jesus:

And he taught, and said to them, "Is it not written, 'My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations'? But you have made it a den of robbers." (11:17)

The comment includes an explicit quotation of Isa 56:7 and an allusion to Jer 7:11. The quotation from Isaiah seems well-chosen. It is taken from an oracle in which God promises the "foreigner" and the "eunuch" who keep his covenant that they will have a place in his Temple:

"these I will bring to my holy mountain,
and make them joyful in my house of prayer;
their burnt offerings and their sacrifices
will be acceptable on my altar;
for my house shall be called a house of prayer
for all peoples."

The allusion to Jeremiah is not so obviously appropriate. The term *ἀποστής* does not mean "dishonest merchant," as its use elsewhere in Mark clearly indicates. The appropriateness of the image from Jeremiah only becomes apparent when it is observed that the phrase is taken from a famous sermon in which the prophet indicts the people of Jerusalem for their total disregard of the commandments of God. They have turned God's house into a refuge for lawbreakers. Jeremiah concludes with a promise:

"therefore I will do to the house which is called by my name, and in which you trust...as I did to Shiloh. And I will cast you out of my sight, as I cast out all your kinsmen, all the offspring of Ephraim." (Jer 7:14)

A verse quoted from the Old Testament need not have been chosen with a view to its context; atomistic exegesis is well-attested among Christian and Jewish interpreters. But the use of the phrase from Jeremiah's oracle predicting the destruction of the temple can hardly be accidental. The bracketing of the

cleansing narrative with the account of Jesus' cursing of the fig tree (Mk 11:12-14, 20-25) only brings out the point more clearly. Those in charge of the temple have borne no fruit; they have turned God's house that was intended to be a "house of prayer for all nations" into a "den of robbers." Like the barren fig tree, they will be cursed; like Jeremiah, Jesus predicts that the temple will be destroyed. The "cleansing" of the temple in Mark is a prophetic prefigurement of its impending destruction.

It is also interesting that the moral drawn from the cursing of the fig tree includes a discussion of prayer (11:25), immediately after the institution that God intended to be a "house of prayer for all nations" has been condemned. Do the instructions about prayer suggest that Jesus' disciples are being prepared to serve as a substitute for the old "house of prayer" whose fate has been sealed?

The Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen (12:1-12)

The parable is directed against the scribes, chief priests, and elders who will try Jesus for statements allegedly made against the temple. According to the parable, their vineyard will be taken from them and given to others (12:9). The parable begins with imagery taken from Isa 5, the well-known Song of the Vineyard. In the Isaiah Targum, each detail of the song is allegorized and applied to the temple, and the song becomes a prophecy of its destruction. Are such interpretations of Isa 5 traditional by the time of Mark? If so, the author has sought to make the application of the parable to the temple and its leaders even clearer. The temple and its leaders will be rejected; the leaders will be replaced by others.

The Great Commandment (12:28-34)

One of the series of disputes between Jesus and his opponents has to do with the greatest commandment. In answer to the question of a scribe, Jesus quotes familiar passages from Deuteronomy 6 and Lev 19. The scribe accepts Jesus' answer:

"You are right, Teacher; you have truly said that he is one, and there is no other but he; and to love him with all the heart, and with all understanding, and will all the strength, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, is much more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices. (12:33)

Jesus' response is instructive: "You are not far from the kingdom of God" (12:34). Temple worship is not merely corrupt; the sacrificial institution seems to represent an inferior type of worship.

"There will not be left here one stone upon another" (13:2)

At the beginning of his instruction to his disciples about what they could expect from the immediate future, Jesus predicts that the temple complex will be utterly destroyed. The polemic against the temple now issues in an explicit prediction of its doom.

In Mark, the temple serves as a focal point of the controversy between Jesus and the scribes, chief priests, and elders. He condemns these superintendents of the temple for corruption and predicts their rejection and demise. At his trial, one of the charges against him is that he has made a threat against the temple. The charge has something to do with the Sanhedrin's "rejection" of Jesus. The link between each of the events in chapters 11-13 and the charge is not made by characters in the story. The charge at the trial is not a direct reference by the false witnesses to anything Jesus has said or done as Mark tells the story. But for the reader the

charge clearly represents the outcome of a confrontation that has been building since the moment Jesus arrived in Jerusalem.

The repeated emphasis on the rejection of the temple officials and the impending destruction of the temple in chapters 11-13 provides a clue to the meaning of the three statements about the temple in the trial and passion narratives. Jesus is condemned in part for having made a threat against the temple that his opponents consider absurd. At the moment of his death, the temple veil is torn from top to bottom--a sign to the reader that its doom is certain.¹⁵ By rejecting Jesus, his judges have assured their rejection; their vineyard will be taken from them and given to others.

The New Temple

If the temple charge must be understood as true in some sense, and if the first half of the charge points to the impending destruction of the Jerusalem temple, the second half of the carefully formulated prediction must refer to the founding of the church. The hints that something will replace the destroyed temple are few, but there seems to be little other possibility for understanding the "other temple not made with hands" that Jesus will build within three days than as a reference to the community of believers established at Jesus' resurrection.

The prediction of the new temple is certainly elusive. What is a temple "not made with hands"? In Acts 7, Stephen quotes Isa 66:1-2 to prove that God does not live ἐν χειροποιήτοις. That means, however, that he does not need temples--not that he needs temples not made with hands. The term ἀχειροποίητος is an unusual one. It is not found in the LXX, and it occurs in the New Testament only in Mk 14:58, II Cor 5:1, and Col 2:11; the expression οὐ χειροποίητος in Heb 9:11 is closely related. The use of the term in Colossians to describe a "circumcision not made with hands" provides a useful comparison with the usage in Mark. The "temple not made with hands" is not simply a temple of a different order, as the usage in Hebrew indicates; it is a temple that is not really a temple. In both Colossians and Mark, the term seems to mean metaphorical; in both works it is used in the appropriation and redefinition of cultic images.

Once again the term seems well chosen in Mark. The author might have clarified matters by using a term like πνευματικός to describe the "new" temple, since that seems to be what is meant. But "spiritual" is unambiguous, and an ambiguous term is demanded in the passage. The elusive "not made with hands" serves a double function. It provides the author an opportunity to speak of the replacement for the old temple with cultic imagery employed in a metaphorical sense, but it also contributes to the sense of mystery and the confusion of the false witnesses. Given the character of the narrative, it is important that they not understand what they are saying. To them, the charge sounds perhaps like a threat and dangerously like a claim to magical powers. Only the reader knows better.

It is important, of course, that there be some control over our ingenuity as interpreters. It must be shown that the image of a "temple not made with hands" would have been understood as a reference to a community by Mark's readers. The subject cannot be discussed in detail here. There is evidence in the New Testament that the image was so used by others (II Cor 6:16, Eph 2:21, II Peter 2:5), and in a book published in 1971 entitled *Die Umdeutung des Kultus in der Qumrangemeinde und im Neuen Testament*, G. Klinzing has demonstrated that the

characterization of the community as a temple is well-attested in the Scrolls. The proposed interpretation of the "temple not made with hands" in Mark is thus quite conceivable in the context of the larger community of ideas within which the Gospel originated.

The Messiah and the Temple

The last feature of the charge that deserves some attention is the characterization of Jesus as builder of the new temple. What can that mean in Mark? The image from Psalm 118:22, already quoted in Mark 12, is far more common in Christian tradition: Jesus is the foundation stone or corner stone in the new temple. What does it mean that he is characterized as the builder? Does the author presume that the image has any particular significance for his readers? It seems clear to me that he does, and the task of the interpreter must be to determine both from the context in Mark and from the thought world from which Mark emerges who was expected to build the new temple.

The most plausible answer is the Messiah. In Mark, Jesus is tried before Jews and Romans, mocked, condemned, and executed as King. It is not immediately apparent what the temple charge is doing in an account of a trial at which Jesus is condemned as the Christ, the Son of the Blessed. But if it is the Messiah who was expected to build a new temple--the temple at the end of days--the imagery in the narrative would be consistent. Both charges at the trial would serve to identify Jesus as the promised Messiah. The relationship between the two charges that seems to be implied in the question of the high priest would be explained. There are major questions that such a proposal raises--questions about the development of christology, about messianic expectations in pre-Christian Judaism, about the history of the particular tradition as it appears in Mk 14:58; but if it can be shown that there are bases in pre-Christian Jewish messianic tradition for portraying the Messiah as the builder of the temple of the last days, the remaining pieces of the puzzle in Mark's trial narrative would fall into place.

What did people believe about the Messiah and the Temple? The matter is complex not because of any intrinsic obscurity but because we are outsiders in the biblical world, and the sources are scanty that must provide information an author and his audience shared as part of a common cultural and religious heritage. The few sources we do have have been examined repeatedly, without having generally accepted results. I am nevertheless convinced that there is enough evidence to support the proposal that the characterization of Jesus as builder of the new temple identifies him as the Davidic Messiah.

The possibility of assigning the Messiah the task of building the eschatological temple exists within biblical texts that have from pre-Christian times been interpreted as messianic oracles:

"I will raise up your offspring after you, who shall come forth from your body, and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build a house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever. I will be his father, and he shall be my son." (II Sam 7: 12-14)

"Behold, the man whose name is Branch: for he shall grow up in his place, and he shall build the temple of the LORD." (Zech 6:12)

This is not the only possibility available in tradition. There are other biblical texts that could be employed to prove that God will build the eschatological temple. One such text is in Moses' song in Exodus 15, in which the poet mentions a temple that God's hands establish (15:17). The text is actually used as a reference to this temple in 4QFlor--interestingly, as part of an interpretation of Nathan's Oracle in II Sam 7.¹⁶ According to the interpreter, the "house" God will establish for David's offspring in II Sam 7:11 is not a reference to "dynasty" but to the "temple," the same eschatological temple to which Exod 15:17 points. The line from II Sam 7:13 according to which the king will build a house for God is simply omitted. In the eyes of the sectarians, God, not the Messiah, was expected to build the temple at the end of days.

Yet the ascription of this task to the Messiah remained a possibility. Even the sectarians at Qumran viewed II Sam 7:10-14 as a messianic oracle. Assigning the task to God would have appealed to interpreters for a variety of reasons, particularly to those responsible for the well-being of the Jewish community after the disastrous Bar Kochba experience. But there is at least one case in Jewish tradition in which the task of building the temple is assigned to the Messiah. The paraphrase of Isa 53:5 in the Targum reads:

He will build the temple
which was profaned because of our transgressions
and delivered up because of our sins.¹⁷

The mechanics of the interpretation of Isa 53:5, the problems of dating targumic traditions, and the place of this messianic text within the targum as a whole have been discussed in detail elsewhere.¹⁸ Here it is important to note that the phrase about the building of the temple by the Messiah is interjected into the verse not because the text provides an opportunity but because for the targumist the image of the destroyed temple provides an opportunity to offer word of hope. A new temple will be built, and in the targumist's picture of the future it is the Messiah who will build it. The task that exists as a possibility within messianic oracles has been actualized by the interpreter. The dating of the targumic tradition is perhaps less important than the circumstances under which such a tradition developed. Under what circumstances would an interpreter assign the task of building the temple of the last days to the Messiah, and in what ways do those circumstances determine the larger context into which the building of the temple is integrated?

A survey of Jewish eschatological tradition yields some surprising results. It not only provides evidence that the ascription of the task of building the temple to the Messiah was conceivable within the complex of messianic ideology, but it also suggests that in traditions about the eschatological temple there were only two possible builders: the Messiah or God himself. There can be little doubt which of the identifications fits Jesus as he is portrayed in the Gospel of Mark.

I have deferred an obvious question with regard to the saying about the temple in Mk 14:58. Jesus is depicted not only as the builder of the new temple but as the destroyer of the old. How does this fit with traditional messianic expectations? Nowhere in Jewish tradition is the Messiah portrayed as the destroyer of the old temple and the builder of the new. The "Lord of the Sheep" in Enoch accomplishes something of this sort:

And I saw till the Lord of the sheep brought a new house greater and loftier than that first, and set it up in the place of the first which had been folded up. (Enoch 90:29)

But the "Lord of the Sheep" is God. The Messiah is expected to "purge Jerusalem" according to Ps Sol 17:25, but that is as close a parallel as can be found. How has the traditional role assigned the Messiah of building the temple become one of tearing down the old temple and building a new one? The answer must be sought in the origin of Christian tradition, in the manner in which christology developed. Few traditional ideas Christians appropriated from their Jewish heritage remained unaffected by the distinctive history of the movement and its founder. The long-awaited Messiah, according to Christians, was the crucified and risen Jesus, and in the light of the story of their Messiah, Christians profoundly reinterpreted traditional messianic conceptions. Many possibilities available in tradition--the Messiah as ruler, as judge, as warrior--were deemed inappropriate since they did not fit Jesus. On the other hand, other biblical texts and images that had not traditionally been associated with the Messiah became "messianic" by their application to Jesus the Christ. In some instances, roles traditionally assigned the Messiah were useful. I would argue that this is the case with regard to the building of the new temple. But even here, the biblical image has been integrated into a new setting and reapplied in light of Christian experience and beliefs.

It would seem probable that what came first in the origin of this tradition was a threat against the temple in which Jesus himself was identified as the destroyer. The presence of the threat alone in Acts 6:13-14 points in this direction. Where the saying originated is perhaps impossible to determine. What is striking is that although each of the Gospel writers seems to reveal some sensitivity about the charge, it cannot simply be dismissed. In Matthew, Jesus says not that he will destroy the temple, but "I am able..." (26:61). The charge is not reported in Luke's Gospel but is raised against Stephen (Acts 6:13-14). In John the statement about destruction and rebuilding is applied to Jesus' own death and resurrection (Jn 2:19-21). Only in Mark does the charge feature a distinction between one temple "made with hands" and another "not made with hands," and only in Mark are the destruction and building stated unequivocally as things Jesus himself will do. The original tradition has perhaps been reinterpreted by introducing messianic imagery and by characterizing the church born at Jesus' resurrection as the replacement of the Jewish temple.

Interpretation of the individual books of the New Testament is impossible without a broad understanding of the context out of which the works emerged, the community of ideas of which they were a part, and the process by which Christian tradition was formed. Awareness of the history of tradition helps to explain certain features of Mark. Although the author seeks to relate Jesus' death and the destruction of the temple, he does it indirectly. Jesus himself never predicts that he will destroy the temple. Yet in a sense he is the reason it will finally be destroyed. By rejecting him, his judges have merited God's punishment; in accusing him of blasphemy, they have become the blasphemers (15:29). It is difficult to imagine that the author would himself have composed the saying attributed to the false witnesses. It is easier to view him as an interpreter of tradition.

But the precise identification of Mark's contribution to

that history of tradition is unnecessary for interpreting the temple charge in its present context. It is sufficient to examine its function in the story, looking to Christian and Jewish tradition only to clarify language or conceptions that are unfamiliar to us, or to determine whether or not proposed interpretations of Mark are conceivable within the given historical and religious milieu. The primary clues for the interpreter will be found in the way the author tells the story and in the place of the charge in the thematic structure of the narrative.

The primary characteristic of the narrative is the tension between what appears to be happening and what is "really" occurring. Hostile but confused witnesses become unwitting prophets. The charge they report is highly ironic. Those who would condemn Jesus for the sake of the temple will find that his rejection will result in the end of the temple. The charge also becomes a prophecy of a new religious order that will be established at Jesus' resurrection. Interestingly, this new order is defined by its relation to the old order; it is conceived as a replacement of the temple. Finally, the charge provides some understanding of the Messiahship claimed for Jesus at every stage of the passion story: as Messiah he will build the "new temple not made with hands."

The Trial and the Passion Narrative

What is the function of the trial within the context of the passion narrative? The passion story in Mark represents the culmination of conflicts present throughout Jesus' career between Jesus and tradition, between Jesus and the institutional guardians of truth. For a variety of reasons Jesus is judged to be religiously and politically dangerous by the recognized religious and political leaders, and he is condemned to death. The reader knows, however, that the situation will be reversed: Jesus will be vindicated and his judges judged. There is a tension between appearance and reality inherent in the events as the author perceives them.

Mark chooses to highlight particular features of the contrast between Jesus and traditional expectations. The tension between his inability to help himself and the extravagant claims made about him is stressed at every stage of the story. But the issues are focused even more narrowly, and it is in the trial narrative that we learn what is really at issue. It is the claim that Jesus is the Messiah, Son of God. In the temple charge the struggle between Jesus and the temple leaders is broadened to include his followers as well, those who confess him as Messiah. What the reader is led to discover in the story is that contrary to all appearances, Jesus is who his followers believe him to be. He is the long awaited Messiah, Son of God. Those who rejected him will themselves be rejected, and a new religious order will be created to take the place of the old.

The Trial and the Jerusalem Phase

The trial represents the culmination of themes introduced with Jesus' cleansing of the temple in chapter 11. From the moment Jesus arrives in Jerusalem, the story is dominated by conflict with the temple authorities on the one hand and preparation of Jesus' followers for what is to come on the other. The temple charge promises both the rejection of the old order and the establishment of the new. What is significant about these chapters, however, is that the disputes with representatives of the old order--disputes that help define what the new order will be--focus on issues important within the Jewish community.

Jesus cleanses the temple, but he does so as a representative of prophetic tradition. His authority is compared in some respects with that of John the Baptist. Jesus does not condemn "the Jews" as a whole, but those in charge of the vineyard--the scribes, chief priests, and elders. He takes positions on issues of major concern to Jews: payment or non-payment of taxes to Caesar, belief in the resurrection, and the relation between observance of the commandments and the temple cult. His whole attack against the temple and its leaders is firmly anchored in Jewish tradition and scripture. The new religious community is characterized as a replacement for the old temple. The conflict that climaxes in the trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrin may demand reconsideration of the relationship between the community for which Mark writes and the Jewish community. The author invests a great deal in the interpretation of that relationship.

The Trial and the Gospel

Since Wrede it has been customary to refer to the "messianic secret" as a dominant motif in Mark, but "Christ mystery" is perhaps the more appropriate designation. The story is introduced as the "gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." It is no secret to the reader that Jesus is the Christ--though it seems to be for the characters in the story. The work begins with a religious assessment of the main character that will be confirmed--though in a strange way--in the story that follows. The main character is an enigma for everyone in the story. His identity remains hidden even from his own followers. But the reader is never in doubt about who Jesus is.

What is unclear is what it means to call Jesus "Christ" and "Son of God." The terms would certainly have made some impression on the reader, but what impression? What information do they really provide about Jesus? The narrator provides no clues by telling about a supernatural birth or about the adoration of the young king by Magi or even shepherds; he does not even include information about Jesus' ancestry. And the matter is not really clarified in the next few chapters. The voice at Jesus' baptism and transfiguration and the "confessions" of the demoniacs provide confirmation that Jesus is God's Son. But the title seems to have little to do with the story. None of the characters in the story suggest that Jesus is God's son. Many, in fact, are simply offended. Members of his family consider him insane; scribes view some of his activity as blasphemous; and some scribes from Jerusalem are convinced that he is possessed by the devil. But even those who respond positively to Jesus do not view him as Messiah or Son of God. They consider him to be a prophet (6:14-16; 8:27-28).

Peter's confession appears to represent a breakthrough. In contrast to what "others" think, Jesus' followers have come to believe that he is the Christ. It is unclear how one ought to view the evaluation of the "others." It is perhaps an overstatement to say that they are wrong, but they have at least not seen what Jesus' disciples have. But what have they really seen? Peter's response to Jesus' first prediction of his death indicates that the veil has not yet been torn away. If Jesus is the Messiah, Peter has not understood in what sense. The scene introduces a tension between Jesus and "Messiah," as it is understood by everyone, a tension that is one of the predominant features of the story of Jesus' trial and death.

It is only in the account of his trial and execution that Jesus is consistently called "Messiah" and "King." The characterization of Jesus with which the Gospel opens appears for the

first time in the question of the high priest. Strangely, the "confession" appears as an accusation, and Jesus' acceptance of the titles elicits only the scorn of the high court and a charge of blasphemy. In the eyes of the Sanhedrin, there is nothing about the pathetic figure on trial that would suggest to anyone that he is the Messiah, God's Son. The contrast is heightened still further as the passion unfolds. He is tried, mocked, and executed as king, and at the moment of his death he is called Son of God.

That is what the story seeks to show. The most revealing moment in the story is, paradoxically, the moment at which the darkness seems most impenetrable. The most "messianic" thing Jesus does in the story is to die--measured by tradition, the ultimate sign that he cannot be the Messiah. But appearance is not reality, according to the author. Jesus is the Messiah, Son of God. That has been demonstrated at his resurrection and will be confirmed at his return with the clouds. But there is something mysterious about that Messiahship, something that cannot be perceived on the level of reality at which most people live. Jesus is not Messiah in any traditional sense; to understand who he is, one must be given eyes to see beneath the obvious.

What I wish to stress, however, is that the author is concerned not simply to portray Jesus as the crucified one but as the crucified Messiah, Son of God. It is not simply his identity that is a mystery, but his identity as Christ, Son of God. The detail is perhaps not of great significance for the interpretation of Mark, for it is not so much the titles used of Jesus that reveal who he is but what he does and what happens to him. But an interpreter ought to be sensitive enough to the narrative to appreciate the place of designations like "Christ," "Son of God," and "Son of man." Mark's story is about the crucified Messiah, Son of God. The issue becomes more significant when we attempt to reconstruct the development of christology. If the designation "Messiah" is so inappropriate for Jesus, why is he called Messiah at all? Why does Mark feel constrained to redefine the title instead of rejecting it in favor of "Son of God," "Lord," or "suffering servant"? Why is the story of Jesus' death narrated as the death of the king instead of the suffering servant? The questions take us beyond the scope of this paper, but they do raise questions with which Nils A. Dahl has dealt in an important essay entitled "The Crucified Messiah" in the recently published collection of essays entitled *The Crucified Messiah*.

The way the author has chosen to tell his story is revealing. There is absolutely no doubt that for Mark the resurrection of Jesus is constitutive for the Christian movement. Explicit reference is made to the resurrection in five predictions (8:31, 9:9, 9:33, 10:34, 14:28). Yet the author concludes his story without an account of Jesus' appearances to his followers. Why? Why does the storyteller end his story without a conclusion, particularly when the reader knows that there is more? Why does he not conclude the story with a picture of the risen, vindicated Lord seated at God's right hand?

Part of the reason must be the emphasis the author seeks to achieve. From kerygmatic patterns like I Cor 15:3 or Rom 1:2-4, one might have expected Mark to tell the story of Jesus as the story of the one who was crucified in weakness but now lives by the power of God, who is now enthroned at God's right hand as Lord. In fact, the pattern of the story in Mark is reversed. The story of the risen Lord, the Messiah, Son of God who is now seated at God's right hand, is narrated as the story of one whose career concluded with total disintegration; of one who

was betrayed by one of his closest friends, denied by another, forsaken by the rest; who was tried and condemned by the religious and political authorities and died a most humiliating death, mocked even by those executed with him. Even his last cry of desperation is misunderstood. Why is the story told in this way? In what situation would such a story be appropriate? Is the author writing for people who are facing the prospect of persecution? For a rejected community that expects vindication too soon? Is the story aimed at Christians who have begun to make the measure of greatness the same patterns and standards by which Jesus was judged and found wanting (8:34-38; 9:33-37; 10:35-45)? Or is the author writing for people who must make sense out of opposition from Jews who view the new movement as blasphemous?

Such questions will continue to engage students of Mark's Gospel. As a crucial element in that Gospel, the trial narrative will perhaps provide some clues to the answers of the large questions. I hope that this study has shed light on the interpretation of the trial and, as a consequence, on the interpretation of the Gospel as a whole.

NOTES

¹E. Linnemann, Studien zur Passionsgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1970); J. Schreiber, "Die Christologie des Markusevangeliums," ZTK 58 (1961), 154-183; idem., Theologie des Vertrauens (Hamburg: Furche Verlag, 1967); J. Donahue, Are You the Christ? The Trial Narrative in the Gospel of Mark (SBLDS 10; Missoula: SBL, 1973).

²E. Schweizer, The Good News according to Mark (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1970), 324; Linnemann, Studien, 131; Donahue, Are You the Christ?, 72ff; Schreiber, Theologie des Vertrauens, 47, note 106.

³I have discussed the various approaches to the trial in Mark in my dissertation in some detail (The Messiah and the Temple [Yale, 1973]). To avoid duplication of effort and for purposes of brevity, I have chosen to avoid reference to the numerous valuable contributions of other scholars to the discussion except where absolutely necessary.

⁴E. Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (tr. by W. Trask; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

⁵The variant readings are complicated by the mention of a first cock crow in 14:68. It is possible that the phrase "for the second time" was added by a copiest to correspond with Jesus' prediction in 14:30 (14:72), though the manuscript evidence is reasonably strong in favor of the reading and it would suit the author's purpose admirably.

⁶Some have argued that the passage is to represent fulfillment of Isa 50:6, though I consider this somewhat unlikely. The parallels are not striking enough to demand that the biblical text be presumed to stand behind the narrative.

⁷For a discussion of the textual problems in 14:72, see B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels (London: Macmillan, 1964), 325-327.

⁸The Messiah and the Temple, 144-160.

⁹The proposal is made by T. A. Burkill, "The Trial of Jesus," VC 12 (1958), 9-10.

¹⁰The Messiah and the Temple, 110-176.

¹¹My information about the fragment derives from a letter I received from Prof. Joseph Fitzmyer.

¹²The influence of these oracles is developed in detail by Prof. Dahl in his lectures on New Testament Christology, delivered at Yale Divinity School in 1968-69. The lectures have been mimeographed but not yet published.

¹³The position is argued by O. Linton, "The Trial of Jesus and the Interpretation of Psalm 110," NTS 7 (1961), 258-262.

¹⁴Linnemann, Studien, 119; Donahue (Are You the Christ?, 72-84) moves in this direction, though he still seeks to determine the meaning of the reference to false witnesses by observing how Mark has reinterpreted prior tradition.

¹⁵If the veil referred to here is the curtain separating the sanctuary from the forecourt that served as a replacement for the doors during the day after they had been opened (Jos Ant 8:75), the tearing of the veil as a sign of impending doom may be related to stories about the miraculous opening of the temple gates (Jos JW 6:293-296; bYoma 39b). In both stories, those with foresight understand that the opening of the gates is a sign of coming destruction. It is impossible to trace any direct relationship between the stories and Mark, but the similarities are at least intriguing.

¹⁶Discoveries in the Judean Desert of Jordan V: Qumran Cave 4 (ed. J. Allegro; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 277-78.

¹⁷The text and translation can be found in J. Stenning, The Targum of Isaiah (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949).

¹⁸The Messiah and the Temple, 280-304.

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The purposes of this paper are twofold: (1) to ask whether or not the origin of some of the sayings of Jesus recorded in the gospels can be traced to the work of early Christian prophets active in the church from its inception, and, if that answer is an affirmative one, (2) to ask further, whether or not it is possible to suggest criteria by which such sayings can be recognized and isolated.

Introduction

First however, an introduction is in order to alert the reader to my personal bias and to inform him of my own understanding of the early Christian prophet--who he was and what he did.

1. I admit to voluntarily being within a creedal tradition that holds as one of its important beliefs, a high view of Scripture. I affirm at the outset, therefore, that Holy Scripture is God's special revelation to mankind, that it is the trustworthy authoritative message of God, essential for a correct understanding of God and his acts and of ourselves and the meaning of our existence and that it was inspired by the Spirit of God, given to be obeyed as the voice of the living God (2 Tim 3:15ff.).

Nevertheless, I also affirm that this sacred text was written down by human beings in human language at specific junctures in time and in particular geographical locations, with all the limitations that humanness, language, space and time, societies and their cultures impose upon it. I affirm therefore, that the Bible is a joint effort of both God and man in time and space--a product initiated by God and under his control, so that every part and form of it can be labeled "God breathed" (theopneustos, 2 Tim 3:16; 2 Pet 1:21), but also a product of different men, living at different times and in different places, having differing personalities and outlooks, fears, and aspirations, etc., so that every part and form also bears the stamp of humanness: omnia ex Deo; omnia ex hominibus. It is my belief, therefore, that the Bible is both a word from God to be heard and obeyed, which stands above me and is my critic and at the same time that it is a human word to be analyzed and subjected to the most thorough historical and literary criticism. My understanding of the Christian prophet's role in the formation of the Gospel Tradition, therefore, will of course be colored by this creed. To be forewarned is to be forearmed.

2. By Christian prophet I have in mind an unusually powerful figure in the early church, who spoke the Word of the Lord with authority, who was a receiver and proclaimer of divine revelations, as well as one who was a preacher of the Good News in the more traditional sense.

The Christian prophet was anticipated and announced by Jesus (Matt 5:11-12; 7:21-22; 10:40; cf. Mark 9:41; Matt 23:24-37; Luke 13:34). But the first Christian prophet to step out of the shadows and be named was Agabus. He was a person whose

sphere of activity and authority was not restricted to one place. From Jerusalem, he also travelled to and prophesied in Antioch, Syria and in Caesarea (Acts 11:27f.; 21:10f. His prophecies, however, seem to have been of local application). Judas and Silas are two others who are named as prophets in the NT (Acts 21:30-32). Several prophets had their home-base in Antioch, Syria (Acts 13:1-3), among whom may have been Barnabas, Simeon called Niger, Lucius of Cyrene, etc. The four virgin daughters of Philip the Evangelist were prophetesses (Acts 21:10). In all likelihood Paul himself was numbered among the prophets (cf. Acts 13:1 with 9:3-9; 2 Cor 12:1-3; Gal 1:11-12; 2:2).¹ John, the writer of the Apocalypse, was certainly a prophet (Rev 1:10; 17:3; 21:10), and the woman he calls "Jezebel" and "false," was a prophetess of prominence and authority in Ephesus (Rev 2:20-21). Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna, was termed "the apostolic and prophetic teacher" (Mart Pol 12.3; 16.2), and both Barnabas, Ignatius and Hermas appear to have been self-styled prophets (Barn 16:9; Ign Phil 7; Herm Vis 1.3). This exhausts the list of named prophets in the earliest period of the church's history. By early second century this movement of the Spirit was losing impetus in the church (with the possible exception of the church in Asia Minor) and the influence of the Christian prophet declined precipitously.

Although the names of early Christian prophets are few, there is, nevertheless, a good deal to be learned about their character, activity, message, destiny and importance by a study of the NT and the early fathers.

a. Apparently the presence and activity of Christian prophets were quite widespread. Paul hints at this when he tells the Ephesians that the Holy Spirit, in town after town, made it clear to him that imprisonment awaited him if he should go to Jerusalem (cf. Acts 20:23 with 21:10f.) The Didache, however, shows that it was possible for a Christian community to exist without a prophet in their midst (13.4).

b. Early Christian prophets worked within the framework of the Christian community, i.e. the church. Quite possibly they only became active when the church was at worship or when intercession was being made to God from this assembly of the godly who had the "faith of the Divine Spirit" (Herm Mand 11.9; Acts 13:1-2). Prophets were considered part of the Body of Christ (1 Cor 12:28-29; Did 10.7). Their place within the structure of the church was one of great importance, ranking second only to the Apostles (1 Cor 12:28-39; Eph 4:11; cf. Matt 10:40-41). They, with the apostles, were considered the foundation upon which the church was built (Eph 2:20).² Quite possibly on the Lord's day a congregation would be addressed by its prophets speaking in the Spirit and giving it both exhortation and revelation (1 Cor 14). "In any Christian gathering the words of a prophet. . . were sure to carry great weight, because they relayed a message from the God who was being worshipped. . . The listeners would realize that they were being addressed simultaneously by the prophet. . . by Christ, and by the Most High God who had disclosed his presence in Christ."³

c. Apparently early Christian prophets belonged to and worked together in bands or brotherhoods of prophets (Acts 11:27; 13:1; Rev 19:10; 22:9), which can be considered as elite or exclusive groups. For not every one was a prophet (1 Cor 12:29; contrast Barn 16.9).⁴ Hence, although Paul wrote to the Corinthian church, "You can all prophesy in turn" (1 Cor 14:31) he meant this in a restricted sense, i.e. "all prophets,"

not all Christians--"all (prophets) are to wait their turn to prophesy."⁵ This restriction is demanded by the context even though Paul could wish that all might prophesy (1 Cor 14:5), and urged all to seek the gift of prophecy (1 Cor 14:1).

d. The early Christian prophet was a man of the Scripture. His mind was saturated with the OT text, so that his own prophetic utterances were often couched in the language of the Bible. Stephen's famous prophetic review of Israel's history is a classic example of this phenomenon (Acts 7; cf. Josh 24 for a similar review of Israel's past history and a prophetic interpretation of it in terms of the purpose of God; cf. also the Apocalypse); he was a man known to be "full of faith and the Holy Spirit" (Acts 6:5). It appears also that such new prophetic insight was prompted by meditation upon the ancient texts, which, at times were quoted with less than exactness by the prophet, or to put it positively, were modified in such a way as to bring out more clearly the meaning of this new idea (compare Rom 11:27 with Isa 27:9; 1 Cor 15:51, 54-55 with Isa 25:8; Hos 13:14), and the ultimate meaning of the OT passage. But this new meaning was authoritative and powerful for, like Stephen's arguments which came through the Spirit, they could not be refuted (Acts 6:10).

e. The early Christian prophet was also a person of the Spirit⁶ whose words and actions on occasion were especially prompted by the Spirit (ὁ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος, Acts 11:27-28; 13:2; cf. Rev 1:10; 4:2). Apparently the Spirit, who lives within all believers (Rom 8:9), would seize, come upon, inspire the prophet (Rev 4:12; Herm Vis 1:3; cf. 1 Kgs 22:19ff.), so that at a particular moment he could then say, "The words which I am going to speak (τάδε) are the words of the Holy Spirit" (Acts 21:11; Herm Mand 11:8f.; Did 11.7; cf. Rev 1:8).⁷ He might also be "transported" from place to place by (in) the Spirit so as to see some new event that was to take place (Rev 17:3; cf. 2 Cor 12:1-4). It was this experience of inspiration that separated the "apocalyptic" role of the Christian prophet (1 Cor 14:31) from his role as preacher⁸ and made what he said under inspiration take precedence over what he said otherwise. This, it seems to me, is what Paul meant when he wrote the Corinthian church that two or three /of their prophets/ could speak while the rest of the prophets (οἱ ἄλλοι) exercised their judgment upon what was said. But if another (prophet) received a revelation, the first speaker must give way to him (1 Cor 14:29-30).

Prophecy, therefore, was of more than one kind. It included what could be called "ministry," prophetic words given for the improvement, encouragement, consolation (οἰκοδομήν, παράκλησιν, παραμυθίαν) and general benefit of the Christian community (1 Cor 14:3-4). This was closely tied with teaching (Acts 13:1; 1 Cor 14:31; Rev 2:20; Herm Sim 9.15.4) and with a lively interest in and a close proximity to the Gospel tradition and knowledge of the words of the earthly Jesus.⁹

But it also included another dimension, a "higher" dimension, related directly to a special work of the Spirit upon the prophet by which the Spirit revealed to him a word from the risen exalted Christ (cf. Rev 1:10 with 4:1, 2a)--a word that did not come whenever the prophet wished, but only when God wished, whenever the prophetic Spirit rested on him and filled him (2 Pet 1:20-21; Rev 22:6; cf. Herm Mand 11.8). Then, under these circumstances, when the prophet spoke, this word became the command of the Lord for either an individual Christian or

for the whole Christian community (1 Cor 14:29-30, 37).

In other words, this part of the prophet's ministry was the result of a direct revelation given to him of an aspect of the divine mind hitherto unknown (Eph 3:5; Rev 10:7; 22:6)--something that transcended a Christian's previous knowledge. The prophet was "let in," so to speak, on the secret counsel of God by the Holy Spirit, and commissioned to share this secret (μυστήριον) by prophesying it to the church, not only orally but possibly in written form as well (cf. Col 1:26-27 with Rom 16:26).¹⁰ Like OT prophecy this prophetic message was an immediate communication of God's (Christ's) word to his people through human lips. There are times in fact when the risen Christ speaks in the first person and the figure of the prophet fades into the background--"Behold," says Christ, "I am coming as a thief" (Rev 16:15; 22:7), so that it is clear that the words that are spoken are indeed the words of the heavenly Lord (Rev chaps. 2 and 3).

Perhaps it is this dual nature of the ministry of the early Christian prophet that is the key to understanding a very difficult passage in 1 Cor (14:22-25). How can Paul say on the one hand that prophecy is intended not for unbelieving people but for those who hold the faith (vs. 22), and then turn around immediately and say on the other hand, "But when all (i.e. all prophets) are speaking prophecies, the uninstructed person or unbeliever who enters the assembly of Christians, will hear something that searches his conscience and brings conviction, and lays bare the secrets of his heart"? (vs. 24).¹¹ This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we allow that the prophet participated in two events: (1) in an extraordinary one, one contrary to the usual course of nature--such as an inspired authoritative word from the risen Christ, a revelation given by the Spirit and meant as a "sign" (σημεῖον)¹² exclusively for the believing community, and also (2) in an ordinary event such as preaching the gospel in language intended to scrutinize, judge, lay bare the secret thoughts of unbelievers and bring about their conversion.

f. In the NT the ministry of the prophet was clearly distinguished from that of apostle, teacher, miracle worker, evangelist, etc. (1 Cor 12:28-29; Eph 4:11).¹³ Even though his functions may have, in actuality, overlapped those of other charismatic figures within the church,¹⁴ yet he was nonetheless considered in a class by himself, and his ministry pneumatic, "given by the Spirit," indeed, the chief of attainable pneumatic gifts (1 Cor 14:1, 3-5).

His ministry was distinct, too, from prayer (1 Cor 11:4) and from glossolalia (Acts 15:6; 1 Cor 14:1, 3-5), but closely associated with teaching (Acts 13:1; Rev 2:20; Herm Sim 9.15.4) and with witnessing (Rev 11:3, 6-7). ἡ μαρτυρία Ἰησοῦ, says the writer of the Revelation, ἐστὶν τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς προφητείας (Rev 19:10).¹⁵ It also involved prediction (Acts 11:27-28; 21:10), the ability to see hidden things and to know without being told (Acts 5:3-5; 1 Cor 13:9). The prophet, too, was able to point out specific people for specific Christian tasks (Acts 13:1-2; 1 Tim 1:18), and his word about these people was charged with energy--effective and creative--for apparently it was able also to equip them with the necessary gifts to carry out their tasks (1 Tim 4:14). Very likely the prophet also participated in the installation of the people so designated and equipped.¹⁶

The Christian prophet like the OT prophet made moral judgments on people's conduct, and by his words exposed the wrong inner motives of their hearts. For this the prophet was hated and persecuted (Rev 11:6-10). His message was also one of encouragement and edification (1 Cor 14:1, 3-5, 31) when directed to the church. According to 2 Pet 1:19 the basis of this encouragement was that the Christian prophet's word was more fully guaranteed than that of the OT prophet since it was backed up by the person of Jesus and the witness of God to his worth.

g. Because the early Christian prophet was such an important pneumatic and awesome figure within the early church, and because what he said was accepted by the community as the command of the Lord to be obeyed without question, abuses quickly set in. In certain areas prophets under inspiration may have become ecstasies, people beside themselves, behaving in an uncontrollable way characteristic of prophetism in the Hellenistic world.¹⁷ This perhaps was the reason for Paul's precise regulations governing the prophet's conduct within the church at Corinth. These regulations applied even to matters of the prophets' dress (1 Cor 11:4) and of orderliness in presenting their prophetic utterances (1 Cor 14:29). Critical evaluations (διακρίνειν) of all prophecies by persons qualified to judge became necessary (1 Cor 14:30), and prophets were reminded that they were always to be in control of themselves--"It is for prophets to control prophetic inspiration" (πνεύματα προφητῶν προφηταὶς ὑποτάσσεται, 1 Cor 14:32). Christian prophets, therefore, were not mere passive instruments of a superior power. They could have resisted the impulse of the spirit/Spirit if they chose.

It is in this context of the abuses of prophecy, perhaps, that Rom 12:6 is best understood--εἴτε προφητείαν κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως--"If your gift is prophecy, prophesy in agreement with the faith." This is to say, that prophetic utterances had to conform to a given body of truth, and those which contradicted this basic teaching of the church, preserved in its traditions, were false prophecies. Still other tests were applied to those who presumed to speak in the Spirit for the prophet's witness was not open-ended. It had to be fixed to the once-for-all historic act of God through the man Jesus (1 John 4:1-3). The true prophet could lead the church into no truth contradictory to the historic truth of Jesus Christ.

False prophets were also present. Their coming was not without warning, however. Jesus himself had anticipated it (Matt 7:15; 24:11, 24; Mark 13:22) and by the time 1 John was written "many false prophets had already gone out into the world" (4:1). The Shepherd of Hermas devoted a large section to giving his people criteria by which to judge between the true prophet and the false (Mand 11.1-21). The writer of the Didache did the same (11).

Such abuses had a tendency to lower the prophet and his ministry in the eyes of the people. This perhaps was why Paul had to warn the Thessalonians not to stifle inspiration nor to despise prophecies (1 Thes 5:20), and why, though establishing guidelines for distinguishing the true prophet from the false, the writer of the Didache strongly urges his readers to hold the true prophet in awe (11).¹⁸

Is there Evidence of the Christian Prophet's
Role in Creating Dominical Sayings?

That certain logia attributed to Jesus are in reality the result of the creative activity of early Christian prophets is considered by many today as one of the assured results of gospel criticism.¹⁹

How can this be, since in reality there seems to be no "hard" proof for a phenomenon like this occurring? Professor F. F. Bruce remarks that "the role of prophets in the formation of the tradition has been greatly exaggerated. We simply have no concrete evidence to indicate that prophets in church meetings uttered words in the name of the exalted Lord which were preserved in the tradition as sayings of Jesus 'in the days of his flesh'."²⁰

I am compelled to agree with Professor Bruce's assessment about the lack of "concrete evidence". At the same time, however, I wonder about the advisability of simply dismissing the Christian prophets' role, great or small, in the formation of the tradition because of this apparent lack of "hard" information. My questioning on this point arises from a consideration of the following observations that might be termed "cumulative" or "soft evidence". Some of them are old, some new, and not all of equal weight, but these observations do at least seem to point toward the possibility of a creative role for Christian prophets:

1. Although the early church may have been concerned to distinguish between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, to use modern terminology, it nevertheless, without question, believed firmly that these two titles belonged to the same person: "Let all Israel be assured of this," Peter proclaimed, "that God has made this Jesus whom you crucified both Lord and Christ (Acts 2:36). Hence, the risen Lord of the church was not a different person from that of the Jesus who lived and taught in Palestine during the days of his flesh, but one and the same.

2. Furthermore, the early church considered itself a community of the Spirit--people living in the ecstasy of the fulfilment of Joel's prophecy, living in those last days when God would pour out his Spirit on all mankind so that men and women would rise up and prophesy (Acts 2:16-21). This meant that the church expected people to prophesy, to speak the word of the Lord to them, and that therefore they not only looked back to a past time when Jesus was with them, but to the exciting present moment of Jesus' immediate presence as their living Lord--Christ-with-them-today. For the Holy Spirit in the church was none other than the Spirit of Christ in the church (cf. Acts 16:6-7--τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. . . τὸ πνεῦμα Ἰησοῦ--with John 14:15-18; Rom 8:9b-10; 2 Cor 3:17). It was the fulfilment of Jesus' own promise that where two or three would meet together in his name there he would be with them (ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν, Matt 18:20).

3. This implies, then, that the interest of the early Christians lay not only in what their Lord once had said to a basically Jewish audience, but also in what the living Lord of the church was saying to them (Palestinian and Hellenist) right now! It is a fact of Scripture that these Christians took for granted that the heavenly Christ would reveal to them further

truths about himself: "I have still many things to tell you," Jesus told his disciples, "but you cannot grasp them now. When he comes, the Spirit of Truth, he will guide you into all truth . . . what he hears (will hear) he will speak, and he will tell you what is yet to come. He will bring glory to me by taking from what is mine and making it known to you" (John 16: 12-15).²¹ A textual variant to John 14:26, though probably not original, at least indicates the kind of expectation that was abroad in the church: where the accepted text states that the Holy Spirit will remind the disciples of all things Jesus had said (ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν ἐνῶ), the variant indicates that the Spirit would bring to their minds whatever things he might say (ἃ ἂν εἴπω ὑμῖν ἐνῶ).

4. The place and practice of the prophet in the pneumatic-community is also an important consideration. It should be clear from the introduction to this paper, and be kept in mind, that from this writer's perspective the Christian prophet was no ordinary individual but one who spoke with authority. He was a person especially inspired by the Spirit, that all-important identifying power which made the prophets' words, one and the same with the words of Christ. He was the earthly voice, so to speak, by which the heavenly Lord expressed in propositional form those promised revelations of himself and of his will to individuals and/or groups in the early history of the Christian church.

Mark 13:11 (=Matt 10:19=Luke 21:15) is interesting in this connection. Mark (and Matthew) quote Jesus as saying to his disciples that the Holy Spirit (the Spirit of your Father) at some future time, no doubt after his own death-resurrection-ascension, would be the one to speak through (ἐν) them. But Luke has Jesus say, "I myself will give you the ability to speak," i.e. "I will be speaking through you." By this important change Luke makes clear, therefore, that the Spirit which was to inspire Jesus' disciples was none other than Jesus himself! What the disciples would say would in reality be what Jesus would say.

Now although it is clear from these texts (both from John [16:12-15] and from Mark 13:11 and par.) that the risen Christ would yet speak to his own (or to the world), it is not completely clear how or through whom he would do this. It might be argued, therefore, that these promises apply to all Christians, and hence all Christians are potentially or actually prophets, thus eliminating any need for positing a special group of pneumatics (prophets) to receive and transmit words from the risen Lord.

Using these same texts, however, the opposite idea can also be argued and with even greater force if they are considered in light of what has been said above (see introduction) about the Christian prophet's role, that unique role of receiving revelations from the risen Lord and proclaiming them to the church. Is it not true that John 16:12-15 was addressed to a select body (apostles) that had a certain succession and that, at least on one occasion, was identified with prophets (Did 11.4,5)? And was not Mark 13 also spoken to a special group of people who would be facing death as martyrs (witnesses), a term also used to describe the early Christian prophet (Rev 19:10 with 17:6)? In fact, prophets occupied such a place in the number of martyrs that James, in challenging his readers to hold on to the end, "cites not Jesus' sufferings, but that of the /Christian?/ prophets" (James 5:10)!²²

5. The words of the exalted Jesus spoken through his prophets are very like in form and content to the words of Jesus recorded by the evangelists in the gospels. This can be tested by comparing the latter with the former as found in the Apocalypse. Granting the fact that the apocalyptic genre²³ is quite different from the gospel genre, and granting, too, that at the end of the first century A.D., the "sayings" in Revelation are still acknowledged for what they are--sayings of the exalted Lord spoken through a prophet by the Spirit, yet the similarity between gospel-sayings and Revelation-sayings is striking nonetheless. Take the Lord's words in Rev 2:10, for example, "Do not be afraid of the suffering to come. The devil will throw some of you into prison to put you to the test . . . only be faithful till death, and I will give you the crown of life," and compare them with the pre-resurrection words of Jesus to his disciples, "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body. . . you will be hated by all for my sake. But the one who endures to the end will be saved" (Matt 10:28, 22). Compare also Rev 3:20 with John 14:23, and Rev 16:15 with Matt 24:43-44; Luke 12:39, and Rev 3:5 with Luke 17:8-9, etc. Remove the contexts and the character of the sayings of Jesus preserved in the tradition are not radically different from the sayings of the exalted Lord pronounced through his prophets. Surely it is not too much to say that all words of this Blessed One, whether spoken in Galilee by his own lips or from heaven through his prophet, would be heard by the church as instruction, encouragement, chastening or promise from the ever-living Lord. (Would the sayings of Jesus in Rev 1-3 be any less "authentic" than those in the gospels?) If this is so then is it impossible to imagine that some of the risen Lord's words could have been included perhaps unconsciously among the pre-resurrection sayings of Jesus?

6. Paul, however, seems to distinguish the words spoken by the earthly Jesus and preserved in the tradition of the church from those that were not, i.e. from those that might have been spoken by the risen Lord in heaven through a prophet, i.e. through Paul himself (1 Cor 7:10, 12, 25, 40). It is this distinction that has made some scholars cautious about claiming that words received from the heavenly Jesus found their way into the gospels and were regarded by the early church as having equal validity with the pre-resurrection sayings found there.²⁴

I do not want to throw caution to the winds but to consider some important additional factors in this connection:

a. Paul may have been familiar with the tradition and used it (cf. 1 Cor 15:3), but we should not forget that he also asserted his independence from it, claiming that the message he preached was no human invention, that he did not take it over from any man, that no man taught it to him, but that he received it through revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1:11-12; 2:6).²⁵ Therefore, when he says that he received something from the Lord (1 Cor 7:10; cf. 11:23ff.), he may have meant that he had received this directly from the risen Lord by revelation (cf. Gal 2:2. This could also apply to Paul's words in Rom 14:14: "I know and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ, by the Risen One, the Lord of the Church that nothing is common in and of itself") and when he says, "I say this, not the Lord" (1 Cor 7:12), he may have meant, "I have received no revelatory word not, "I have no traditional saying" about this, so I must give my own apostolic opinion."

b. If, however, we grant that he did distinguish words

spoken by Jesus on earth from those spoken by him from heaven, it does not follow that he considered the latter of less importance or any less authoritative. If Paul, because of a lack of traditional information, had to rely on his own opinion (γνώμη, 1 Cor 7:25, 40), it made no authoritative difference because he believed that as an apostle-prophet he had the mind/Spirit of God/Christ (1 Cor 7:40; cf. 1 Cor 2:11-15).²⁶

c. There are, on the other hand, instances of where Paul's general instructions to the churches contain elements of what has been thought of as traditional sayings of Jesus, or at least allusions to them, but where Paul felt no compulsion to point out this fact or to distinguish between them and his own demands as apostle-prophet for the conduct of the churches to which he wrote (cf. Rom 12:14 with Matt 5:24; Rom 13:9 with Mark 12:31; Rom 14:12 with Luke 16:2; Rom 14:3 with Matt 7:2; Rom 14:20 with Mark 7:19; Rom 16:19 with Matt 10:16; 1 Cor 13:2 with Mark 11:23; 1 Thes 5:2, 4 with Luke 12:39).²⁷ Could it by any chance be possible that instead of Paul drawing from traditional material as the source of his parenesis, the traditional material drew from Paul? That is to ask, did some of the words of Jesus now contained in the gospels come from the parenesis, i.e. from the words of admonition and encouragement originating with the risen Lord and channeled through his prophet Paul?⁷

Note, too, that Paul in referring to the Last Supper (1 Cor 11:24-25) quotes Jesus as saying, "This is my body, which is for you; do this as a memorial of me" (v. 24). Later he says that in the same way the Lord Jesus took the cup after supper and said "Do this, as often as you drink it as a memorial of me" (v. 25). Then, without a break or any indication that the Lord had stopped speaking, the text continues (v. 26): "For as often as you eat this bread and drink the cup you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes . . ." In fact the conjunction "for" (γάρ) ties the two statements so closely together that one has to take special note that v. 26 begins Paul's exposition of the Jesus-words, and is not a continuation of the Jesus-words. Here, then, in the liturgy of the eucharist, commingle traditional words of Jesus with prophetic words of the risen Lord. Little or no concern on Paul's part to distinguish between them is evident.

d. It was Paul who asked the Ephesians to remember "the words of the Lord Jesus who said, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive'" (Acts 20:35). But this is a statement not found in our four gospels. He also wrote to the Thessalonian Christians, "We can tell you this from the Lord's own teaching that any of us who are left alive until the Lord's coming will not have any advantage over those who died" (1 Thes 4:15, JE). Where does one find this "teaching of the Lord"? Certainly not in the canonical gospels,²⁸ although it is not unlike what Jesus could have said. It is possible, of course, that these sayings were drawn from that vast sea of oral tradition. But could they be words of Christ spoken through a prophet by revelation--in this case through Paul himself? Whether or not this could be true, it is true, and this is important, that these sayings in Acts and Thessalonians were regarded by the early church as dom-
inical as any of the sayings of Jesus in the gospels!

e. Finally, in this connection, there is one saying of Jesus in Luke (assuming that the text is correct) that is not found in the sources Mark or Q--the eucharistic word of Jesus, "Do this in remembrance of me" (Luke 22:20=Mark 14:22=Matt 26:26). The only other place it occurs is in Paul's teaching on the Last Supper (1 Cor 11:24), teaching he claims to have

received from the Lord (1 Cor 11:23). Is it possible that here is a concrete example of a word received from the risen Lord, transmitted to the Corinthian church through the prophet Paul, which found its way into the gospel narrative as a word of Jesus through Paul's close associate, Luke?

7. It is very possible that early Christian prophets functioned as interpreters of OT Scripture. Perhaps the OT was a key catalyst for their prophetic insight and utterances (cf. Acts chaps. 2 and 15) since many of their oracles were derived from interaction with the sacred text. But this interaction with the text was done in a manner characteristic of the prophetic mind: the OT was not always quoted verbatim. Often it was shortened or enlarged upon or modified in other ways,²⁹ but never was the OT treated as a past authority merely to be commented upon by the prophet; it was spoken fresh as the present word of the living Lord. Paul's own revelations apparently came in conjunction with his exegesis of the OT (cf. Rom 11:25-27; 1 Cor 15:51-52), and it is most instructive to see how he shaped the text to express the new inspired vision he received as a prophet.³⁰

Could this treatment of the OT by the Christian prophet have been a model for the prophet's working with the traditional sayings of Jesus in the period before they took written form in the gospels?³¹ Is it not possible that a peshered saying of Jesus (or even a saying de novo) from a Christian prophet would readily have had an authoritative status and as such been given a place within the gospel tradition? For example, while Matt 19:9 refers only to instances where the husband divorces his wife, this is expanded in Mark 10:11-12 to include dual divorce terminology, i.e. to include those instances where a woman could divorce her husband as well as where the husband could divorce his wife. Jewish law, however, only allowed the husband to initiate divorce proceedings, while Graeco-Roman law allowed the wife as well as the husband to initiate such proceedings. As Mark 10:11-12 stands, therefore, it seems to reflect the reformulation of the Jewish-oriented message of Jesus so as to apply it to a new historical-cultural situation of the Christian church and in the process the creation of a new saying of Jesus -- "And if a woman divorces her husband and marries another she commits adultery." This reformulation (or creation) is certainly in keeping with the spirit of Jesus' original teaching, but it may very well not have been an actual part of that teaching.

8. A further point, while considering the relation of the Christian prophet to the OT, is the following. If one should concede that not all the sayings of Jesus in the gospels were actually spoken by him between his birth and ascension but later by him through his prophets, it is possible that the book of Hebrews may give a hint of how this was done. The Christian prophet (here the writer To the Hebrews) takes words from the OT, quotes them exactly or freely, and places them in the mouth of Jesus so that they become his words. Note carefully the wording of 2:11-13 (NIV): "Both the one who makes men holy and those who are made holy are of the same family. So Jesus is not ashamed to call them brothers. He says, 'I will declare your name to my brothers . . . ' And again, 'I will put my trust in him.' [underlining mine] Of special interest is Heb 10:5-7. Do not the words here, put on Jesus' lips by the prophetic writer quoting Ps 40:7-9, ". . . 'I have come to do your will (θέλημα), O God'" (10:5-7) sound very like the Gethsemane words of Jesus in Luke's gospel, "Not my will (θέλημα) but yours be done," (Luke 22:42)?

9. It is a fact that sayings of Jesus which are today not considered part of the text of the traditional four gospels were, nevertheless, accepted as authentic sayings of Jesus, and therefore canonized, by certain segments of the early church. One of these is the variant to Luke 6:5 found in Codex D and used by Marcion. It quotes Jesus as saying to a man whom he saw working on the sabbath, "Sir, if you know what you are doing you are blessed; but if you do not know, you are accursed and a law-breaker." What of the words of Jesus in John 7:53-8:11? Of those in the longer ending of Mark? Certainly the words of Jesus here were accepted as part of the canon and they appear even today in many Bibles. Do these sections contain authentic words of Jesus? What of the Freer logion, a noteworthy insertion into Codex W near the close of the longer ending of Mark's gospel (after 16:14)? It too includes additional words of the resurrected Christ? And what of the shorter ending to Mark?

The sayings here could all have been drawn from oral tradition. But is it not also possible that they could have been oracles of Christian prophets which solved particular problems that the early church faced--concern over the abrupt ending of Mark's gospel on a note of fear, worry over why the message of Christ was making such slow progress in the world and why the chosen showed unbelief and hardness of heart³² (the Freer logion³³)? If so, then, it appears that there was indeed an openness, at least, on the part of early Christians to supplement the tradition by the prophetic word.

10. In the gospel of John there are places where it is difficult, if not impossible, to say where the words of Jesus end and the words of the evangelist begin. John 3:10-21 is the classic example.³⁴ Here there seems to be an imperceptible change from the words of Jesus addressed to Nicodemus to the words of the exalted Christ addressed to the world and spoken through John (just note the translations that make use of quotation marks and observe where they place the closed-quotes to indicate the end of Jesus' words). Why was there not greater care taken on the part of the writer of the fourth gospel to make the kind of sharp distinction between what Jesus actually said in the days of his flesh and what he said after his ascension through the evangelist (prophet) that we twentieth century people would like to see? Perhaps the answer is because in the thinking of this evangelist, a first century man, inspired by the Spirit of God, it made no significant difference. He viewed his gospel as a prophetic gospel,³⁵ himself as a prophet and his task, guided and validated by the Spirit of truth (the Spirit of Jesus, John 16:12-25), to work creatively with the tradition.³⁶ Only in this way could the facts be put in proper perspective and the whole truth of God about Jesus Christ be set forth. Hence, quite naturally there would be this blending of tradition and inspired (prophetic) interpretation. "And if John were asked to justify the freedom he has exercised in handling the tradition of Jesus' words and deeds, he could appropriately reply: 'Who but Jesus has the authority to interpret Jesus? The risen Lord is not another Jesus; he is the same one who lived among us in the flesh . . . [and] still teaches us through the Spirit.'" ³⁷

11. What seems strange to many of us--the possibility that the words of the risen Lord Jesus are equally authentic with those of the earthly Jesus, seems not to have been strange at all to Christians of the early centuries of the church's history. The Didache is a case in point. Not only does it teach about prophets (Did 11), but it itself may have been the work of a

prophet. Dating from about A.D. 110³⁸ it claims to be "The Teaching of the Lord Through the Twelve Apostles to the Gentiles," and was thus accepted as an authoritative document, at least by the Syrian church.³⁹ How did it gain this acceptance? If Professor Aland is correct, it was not because the author pretended that he had discovered it as a holy book of the past, or because he had it sent off to distant friends to make its way in a place where the author was unknown. "The only conceivable hypothesis is that the author of the writing introduced it first to his own congregation . . . in the service of worship. Indeed the congregation knew that this address was written by its elder. . . . But when he claimed his work to be the message of the Lord through the Apostles and when his own congregation . . . acknowledged this to be valid, they did this only because it was but the written version of what hitherto had been orally delivered in any congregational meeting: a prophet got up and preached the Word of the Lord. Everyone knew the prophet and his human affairs. But when he spoke with inspired utterance it was not he that was heard but the Lord or the Apostles or the Holy Spirit himself. The writer of the Didache knew himself to be a charismatic and was acknowledged as such, because the content of the message confirmed the claim. Accordingly the written word received the same credence as the charismatically spoken word and thus the Didache achieved recognition in the church of those days."⁴⁰ It became the word of the Lord for them, and traditional words of Jesus (Did 1 and passim) and the words of their own charismatic figure (their prophet-preacher) were mingled together without distinction and with equal weight.

Justin Martyr's (d. ca. A.D. 165) writings too, should be considered in this connection. The "prophetic Spirit" looms large in his thinking,⁴¹ and prophecies for him are more trustworthy than human reports. How naturally he takes the prophetic word of the OT--any part of the OT--and like the writer of Hebrews applies it to Jesus Christ (Dial 38.3, passim) or puts its words into his mouth (Dial 37.1ff., passim) to form new sayings of Jesus. Justin writes: "Therefore, our Lord Jesus Christ said: 'In whatsoever I overtake you, in that will I also judge (you)'" (Dial 47.5).⁴²

For Justin the gift of prophecy, found everywhere in the OT, came to rest at last in Christ. As a consequence no prophet now exists among the Jews, but they abound among believers in Christ (Dial 52.4; 82.1; 87.2f.; 88.1). It is possible that Justin even thought of himself as a prophet. In any case he feels free, when quoting Jesus' words from the gospels, to alter them, summarize them, combine them in new ways (see 1 Apol 16 for a surprising combination of Matt 4:10 and Mark 12:30) or even add to them. Of special interest is Dial 35.2-3. Here Justin is talking to Trypo about the Lord Jesus and writes: "For he [Jesus] said: Many shall come in my name clothed without in sheep skins, but within they are ravaging wolves [Matt 24:5 combined with 7:15]. And: there shall be divisions and heresies [1 Cor 11:18f.]. And: beware of false prophets, who will come to you . . . [Matt 7:15]." (Note the easy inclusion of words from Paul among the words of Jesus so that they too become *Verba Domini*.) Again Justin writes, "For Christ did not call the righteous . . . to repentance, but the ungodly . . . So he said, I have not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance [Luke 5:32=Matt 9:13=Mark 2:17]. For the heavenly Father wishes the repentance of a sinner rather than his punishment" (1 Apol 15.8). Where would Justin have placed the quotation marks in the text here cited--after "repentance" or after "punishment"? From what I can observe of his thought it was of

no consequence to him. Even though the latter sentence cannot be traced to a saying of Jesus in the gospels, it is for Justin, nevertheless at the very least, a correct "prophetic" interpretation of the former saying which can be traced to Jesus in the gospels. Therefore the latter has every right to rank equally with the former.

Melito of Sardis (d. ca. A.D. 190), though perhaps a bishop,⁴³ nevertheless belonged to this same pneumatic milieu. It is possible that his prophet-like characteristics were the very characteristics that projected him into a leadership role in the church. In any case, his recently discovered sermon, On the Passover, shows him to be a charismatic. Like the NT prophet described above in the introduction his ministry was played in two keys: (1) an ordinary key where his message was presented in language intended to scrutinize, judge, encourage, inform, etc., and (2) an extraordinary key, an "apocalyptic"/revelational key where the human instrument fades into the background and the risen Lord alone appears and is heard through the prophet to address the congregation in the first person: "I am the Christ. I am the one who destroyed death . . . and bound the strong one. . . . Therefore, come unto me all families of men . . . and receive forgiveness for your sins. I am your forgiveness . . ." ⁴⁴ How would Melito's audience have heard these words? Would they, could they, have been in a position to distinguish them from any sayings of Jesus they perhaps may have read in or heard from the gospels--assuming of course, that the gospels were regularly and universally read alongside the OT in the liturgy of the church? (I rather think this is a twentieth century question--one that never would have occurred to them.)

In conclusion, I ask again, did Christian prophets have any part in the creation of dominical sayings? The data marshalled above seems to require an affirmative answer.⁴⁵

Granting then even a possibility that this was so, it does not follow that the majority of Jesus-sayings, or even many of them (actually the number may be very small), were created by Christian prophets. Nor does it mean that the early church had no interest in the Jesus of history, in what he did and said during the days of his flesh--only in theologizing about him, nor does it mean that the early church was incapable (or disinterested) in distinguishing between the words of Jesus and the words of its exalted Lord.⁴⁶ But it seems that, if there was a situation in which the words of the earthly Jesus and the words of the risen Jesus existed side by side and circulated together, there was bound to be (at least there was the possibility of) a mingling of the two together--unconsciously if not consciously.

Neither does the possibility that some of the sayings originating with Christian prophets and later attributed to the earthly Jesus mean that these sayings are "inauthentic" and hence inferior to the "genuine" sayings of Jesus. "Granting the prophet's credentials, his saying is as genuine a word of the Lord as a verbatim saying from the pre-resurrection ministry. For 'authenticity' has to do with the authority by which a word of Jesus comes to us, not with the ability of scientific historians to give the word a certain ratio of historical probability."⁴⁷ These words may not actually have been spoken by Jesus during his earthly life, but then we cannot always be sure we have the ipsissima verba of Jesus in any case.⁴⁸ But the new saying--the saying through the prophet, granting its possibility--may actually have brought to light, under the guidance of the

Spirit, the full meaning of the old saying.⁴⁹ Therefore, just because a saying may have originated with a Christian prophet does not mean that it is of secondary importance, without authority or "inauthentic." Only the person who has no doctrine of inspiration can say this. (See my creedal position stated in the introduction.) If the Scripture is inspired by the Spirit of God, and if the Scripture includes the words of Christian prophets inspired by the Spirit of God, and if those prophets were led at times by the Spirit of God to transform some of Jesus' words into a new key (John 16:12-15), then it seems we cannot say that there is then a radical distinction to be made in the matter of dominical origin and authority "between sayings of the most unimpeachable authenticity . . . and sayings which were shaped by prophets in the years after the resurrection as the church was directed by the Spirit into new channels of activity and thought."⁵⁰

Can Criteria for Deciding the Prophetic Origin of Dominical Sayings be Established?

If there is, then, the possibility that dominical sayings placed in the pre-resurrection ministry of Jesus actually originated later than this period with the risen Jesus speaking through the Christian prophet, is it possible today to determine which ones they are?

In glancing over the "Index to Synoptic Pericopae Ostensibly Influenced by Early Christian Prophets," prepared for this seminar by David Aune and accompanying this paper, one gets the impression that the answer to this question is an easy "Yes." For over a hundred different pericopae from Matthew alone have been traced by NT scholars (not always the same scholar however) to the Christian prophet. But on examination one discovers that in most instances few if any reasons are given for assigning these pericopae to prophets other than that "they are like sayings in the Revelation or to those in the Odes of Solomon in which the exalted Lord speaks," or that "in many of these sayings it is particularly the risen Lord who speaks."⁵¹ Few, if any, criteria are provided by which one can intelligently assign a given saying in the gospels to a Christian prophet.

There are exceptions however. Ernst Käsemann is one of these. In his important article entitled "Sentences of Holy Law in the New Testament"⁵² he attempts to show that sayings of early Christian prophets lie imbedded in the Pauline letters. His basis for this conclusion is both the form and content of these sayings. They are chiastic in form (for Käsemann, a form familiar to OT prophets) and they promulgate the jus talionis motif which operates on the eschatological level where God's judgment is pronounced: $\epsilon\iota\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\nu\nu\ \nu\alpha\nu\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\ \phi\theta\epsilon\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota$, $\phi\theta\epsilon\rho\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\ \delta\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ --"If anyone destroys the temple of God, God will destroy him" (1 Cor 3:17; see also 14:38; 16:22). According to Käsemann the criterion of judgment set forth in 1 Cor 3:17, etc., and presented in this chiastic form with its lex talionis characteristic, could only be given by those who, because they were endowed with charisma, had knowledge of this criterion and were therefore enabled to proclaim it with prophetic authority.⁵³ As Rev 22:18f. shows, the original Sitz im Leben for sentences of this kind was the proclamation of the prophet.

Moving then from this conclusion--namely that this kind of sentence of holy law could be pronounced only by a prophet with

the insight, authority and power of Christ behind him, Käsemann proceeds to examine the gospels. Wherever he finds a saying that corresponds in form and content to these "sentences" he confidently assigns it, not to Jesus, but to the Christian prophet speaking for the risen Lord--Matt 10:32f., for example: "Everyone who will confess me before men, I will also confess him before my father in heaven . . ." (cf. also Matt 5:17-20, especially v. 19; 6:14f.; 10:41; Mark 4:24; 8:38). Seemingly then, Käsemann has uncovered two important criteria to determine which dominical sayings originated with the prophet: (1) Is the form of the saying chiastic and (2) is its content concerned with eschatological judgment? If so we can be confident of its prophet-origin! However, G.-C. Kahler, Klaus Berger, and more recently David Hill⁵⁴ have levelled severe criticisms against Käsemann's conclusions which make us somewhat sceptical, therefore, about using them as criteria to identify sayings of Christian prophets in the tradition.

In addition to Käsemann, Professor Jeremias has some interesting observations that might provide help in isolating sayings of Christian prophets. His observations are about the use of "Father" as a title designating God in the sayings of Jesus. Most striking is the fact that this use of "Father" is a growing phenomenon in the tradition (4 times in Mark; 15 times in Luke; 42 times in Matthew and 109 times in John). Jeremias accounts for this by saying that, in part, this increase in occurrence "involves a factor which can be traced to Revelation 2:28; 3:5, 21. Here the exalted Christ speaks of God as 'My Father'. In other words, Christian prophets, who spoke in the name of the exalted Lord and with his words, contributed to the increase in the use of the title 'Father' for God in the tradition of the words of Jesus."⁵⁵ Can this "Father-formula" in the gospels then, be a tool we can use to decide which dominical saying is to be attributed to the Christian prophet? Jeremias himself makes this conclusion doubtful, however, and shakes our hopes of using this formula as a criterion for decision when he adds that his remarks (above) are not meant to imply that every use of "Father" for God by Jesus was introduced into the tradition at a later period. Such scepticism, he cautions, does not do justice to the facts,⁵⁶ especially since, for Jeremias, "abba" in many instances is almost certain evidence for the ipsissima vox of Jesus.⁵⁷

What about the "I-sayings" which occur in the gospels? Can these be used as a criterion to determine the prophet's role in fashioning the tradition? Based on Rev 16:15: "Behold I come as a thief . . .," and Odes of Solomon 42.6: "For I have arisen and stand by them and speak through their mouth," it has been argued that the proper Sitz im Leben for the use of "I" when the speaker or singer means Christ, and hence, of the "I-sayings" in the gospels is the proclamation of the Christian prophet.⁵⁸ Melito's Paschal Homily also might be added as further support for such a contention.⁵⁹ But again, strong objections have been raised against this claim⁶⁰ of sufficient weight to make us at least hesitant to use the "I-sayings" as a distinguishing mark of the Christian prophet's work.

One is tempted too, to think of the sayings introduced by amen as being prophetic in origin. In the gospel tradition amen introduces and endorses Jesus' words. Thus the amen-formula could be seen as an authoritative prophetic formula equal to the expression "Thus saith the Lord."⁶¹ Amen is found twice in the Apocalypse as the prophet's response to the revelation he receives (1:7; 22:20). Many times it occurs in the fourth

gospel which seems strongly influenced by Christian prophecy and is considered a prophetic gospel (see introduction above). Victor Hasler's impressive redaction critical study of amen⁶² seems to put the finishing touches on the matter when he concludes that the "Truly I say to you" sayings of Jesus arose in the liturgy of the Hellenistic churches and was only secondarily placed on the lips of Jesus; it was a formula used to describe a word of the exalted Lord (see his discussion of the amen in 1 Cor 14:16).⁶³ But here again one becomes skeptical about using this formula as a criterion for deciding what sayings must be attributed to a later period and originating with the prophet. For Jeremias disagrees with Hasler,⁶⁴ and argues strongly and carefully that the amen-formula is but one more important key in discovering the exact words of Jesus--the Jesus who spoke in the days of his flesh.⁶⁵

The most serious attempt to formulate needed criteria by which to identify the contributions of Christian prophets to the synoptic tradition, and to my knowledge the only systematic attempt, has been made by the original chairman of this seminar, Eugene Boring.⁶⁶ He first gathered together the sources available for describing the Christian prophet--the Apocalypse, Paul, the Synoptics and Acts, the Johannine literature, and the Didache (Ephesians, Hebrews and the Pastorals were excluded). He did not go beyond these sources to any extent, a factor that some might consider a weakness in his overall thesis (see introduction above) resulting in a deficient picture of the early Christian prophet.

Second, Boring asks whether these sources can be utilized in such a way that they will yield a characterization of Christian prophets prior to any one of these sources. To answer this question he proposes the following methodology: (1) project the data about Christian prophetism in these sources carefully backward and Palestine-ward as far as this is possible; (2) critically construct a list as complete as possible of those characteristics of the prophet which are common to several of the sources or which, though unique, provide some early or typical trait of Christian prophetism and (3) compare this characterization with those synoptic sayings of Jesus which (a) have existed independently of a narrative-context, though now are contained in narratives, and (b) which on other grounds are considered as secondary, i.e. church products (at least in their present form) rather than words of the historical Jesus.

Boring then illustrates how his method might work by examining Mark 3:28-29: (1) this saying is an independent logion resting uncomfortably in all its present contexts; (2) there are in it formal indications of prophetic speech; (3) the saying is eschatological in nature--a characteristic of all early Christian prophecy; (4) the saying was spoken with the authority more fitted to the Christian prophet than the Christian scribe; (5) Mark 3:28-29 is considered as a peshet on Isa 63:3-11, and interpreting Scripture was an important function of Christian prophets; (6) the association of the Holy Spirit with the Spirit of prophecy, common to such Christian sources as Revelation, Acts, Didache, Hermas, is evident here.

Even before Eugene Boring's article was published, however, Earle Ellis made a careful study of still another pericope (Luke 11:49-51) in light of the possibility that its origin may have been among the early Christian prophets.⁶⁷ This brief but important article provides ideas that are useful in our search for criteria and hence should not be overlooked. (Boring makes

no reference to it in the footnotes to his paper.) It does not, however, provide us with the same sort of procedure that Boring's article does, a procedure which when further developed promises to provide a possible way for identifying the sayings of Christian prophets among the traditional sayings of Jesus. Therefore, it is difficult to do anything more than commend Professor Boring for his thorough thoughtful study,⁶⁸ and in light of it (and Ellis' paper) answer the question introducing the final part of this paper in the affirmative--it does seem that criteria for deciding the prophetic origin of dominical sayings can be established.

Nevertheless, in conclusion I wish to make a few remarks that bear on Boring's paper in particular and on the subject of Christian prophets and gospel tradition in general; perhaps these remarks will stimulate further questions and thought. Naturally though, they grow out of and will be colored by my theological perspective and understanding of prophetic activity in the early church.

1. Boring appears to limit his investigation to Christian prophets of the period which begins about A.D. 30 and ends around A.D. 70 (p. 503). Theoretically this would remove Revelation and the Didache (unless he follows Audet who dates it between A.D. 50-70) from his sources for making a composite picture of the prophet. He says "that after 70 Christian prophecy and that stream of tradition which found its literary deposit in the synoptics tended to move more and more in different channels" (p. 503). He cites the Apocalypse as proof of this divergence.

But all this seems too restrictive to me: (a) because how can we say for sure that prophecy on Hellenistic soil (a later period) was really that different from prophecy on Palestinian soil, since Palestine itself was largely Hellenized even in the period A.D. 30-70; (b) because there are in fact many points of contact between the synoptic sayings of Jesus and the words of the risen Christ spoken through the prophet (see above),⁶⁹ (c) because many ideas about prophecy and the prophet in some later literature (Justin, Melito) does not radically differ from what can be learned of prophecy and the prophet in the NT and (d) because Boring himself turns right around and uses the Apocalypse as one of his chief sources for drawing his composite picture of the Christian prophet. (He somewhat protects himself, however, by claiming that although Revelation is a product of Christian prophetism resident in Asia Minor in the last decade of the first century it was probably earlier at home in Palestine [p. 504].)

2. From what I can tell of early Christian prophecy there is no reason for saying (as Boring seems to say, pp. 515f.) that Christian prophecy was eschatological, and hence only those sayings in the gospels which have an eschatological tone can be considered as originating with a Christian prophet. This point is so important to Boring that he is compelled to say about Agabus' famine prediction (Acts 11:27-29) that Luke has de-eschatologized (historicized) an oracle that was originally eschatological (p. 508).

But note that in addition to prophecy having at times its eschatological tone (which I do not deny) Paul specifically describes prophecy not in eschatological terms, but in terms of it being God's means to build up and stimulate and encourage the church (1 Cor 14:3). Hence, I would not wish to rule out the

possibility of a saying having its origin with the risen Christ simply because it is not eschatological. What of those sayings that could be intended for admonition and encouragement-- answers to pressing problems the early church was facing and for which they may have known no answer that had been given by Jesus in the days of his flesh? I think of a saying like that contained in Matthew's account of Jesus' baptism which explains why this had to (or did) happen to Jesus. I think, too, of Matthew's account of Jesus' teaching on divorce where a concession-word of Jesus--"except for fornication" (5:31f.; 19:9)--appears for the first time in Jesus' otherwise rigid absolute pronouncement against divorce on any grounds (Mark 10:11; Luke 16:18). Or I think of the saying only in Mark that apparently extends Jesus' words about who could (but should not) divorce whom, to include the possibility that women could (but should not) divorce their husbands (Mark 10:12). Such sayings could be important because they may give us insight into how the first Christians solved pressing questions about faith and practice. They may have solved such problems through their Lord's authoritative spokesman, the prophet, who, in response to their earnest requests while at prayer, received answers from the Lord via revelation (1 Cor 14).

3. Based on what the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whom I assume to have been a Christian prophet,⁷⁰ did with the OT, namely, take selections from it and put them on the lips of Jesus (see the discussion above), does it not seem reasonable to suggest that some of the sayings of Jesus now preserved in the tradition originated in that same way? This is to ask, could a Christian prophet, believing that the OT was inspired, that it pointed to and was fulfilled in Jesus and that it was in fact spoken by the pre-existent Christ (1 Pet 1:11), have taken significant statements from the OT which could prove crucial points or answer important questions, and have placed them in the mouth of Jesus? In other words, is this a phenomenon we should be looking for as we cast about for criteria to decide what dominical sayings may have originated with the prophet? I think of such passages as Mark 14:62 which contains Jesus' reply to the chief priest's question, "Are you the Christ the Son of the Blessed?", cast in the phrases of Dan 7:13 and Ps 109 (110):1-- "I am," he said, "and you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven."⁷¹ Mark 4:12 is another such passage, more elaborately presented in Matthew (13:13-15) than in Mark and less so in Luke (8:10b), where the words of Isa 6:9 (10) freely quoted (in Mark) are employed by Jesus to explain his use of parables.⁷²

4. Finally, it seems clear from the introduction to this paper that NT prophets worked creatively with the OT. Sometimes their revelations came from pondering the ancient texts. Professor Boring makes this point in his article (p. 517f.),⁷³ but seems to confine this "peshering" of the text to texts of the OT. Again, at this point where we are searching for criteria to trace prophetic activity in dominical sayings, we must ask: If Christian prophets worked creatively with the OT text, may they not also have worked creatively with the "genuine" sayings of Jesus found in the tradition? Should we not also be looking for evidence of the Christian prophet's work in those places where it appears that a saying, which originated with Jesus in the days of his flesh, has been added to, modified, changed into a higher key, etc., so that its first meaning may be applied now to a different day and to a new audience? Mark 10:12 and Luke 11:49-51⁷⁴ have already been referred to above, but what of those "new" sayings of Jesus in the liturgy of the

eucharist, or the post-resurrection departing statement of Jesus as found in Matt 28:18-20--an expansion over similar sayings in [Mark 16:15], Luke 24:48f. and John 20:21 to include a trinitarian baptismal formula, the only such baptismal formula in the NT? Could these, and many other such expansions, modifications, etc., of the *ipsissima verba Jesu*, be but a prophetic "peshering" of the tradition to bring out its true meaning in terms of the prophet's own era and audience? If so, these changes in the tradition should not be thought of as distortions or falsifications of the earthly Jesus' message, but rather the correct interpretation of that message through insight into it provided by the risen Jesus through his prophet.

NOTES

¹For Paul as a prophet see W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, London, 1948, pp. 177-266; E. Fascher, *ΠΡΟΦΗΤΗΣ*, 1927, p.185; *TDNT*, 6, 828-61; cf. also pp. 812-28; J. M. Meyers and E. D. Freed, "Is Paul Also Among the Prophets?" *Interpretation*, 20 (1966), 40-53.

²The genitive here, τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ προφητῶν, modifying "foundation" is ambiguous. It may be translated as I have done here, following the *RSV*, or with a quite different sense as is shown by the translation of the *NEB*: "The foundation laid by the apostles and prophets."

³P. S. Minear, *I Saw a New Earth*, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 5.

⁴Swete states that "only a relatively small number of believers were 'established to be prophets', forming a charismatic order to which a recognized position was given in the church. Such persons were said ἔχειν προφητείαν (1 Cor 13:2) and known as οἱ προφῆται, (Eph 2:20; 3:5; Rev 18:20; 22:6) being thus distinguished from those who occasionally 'prophesied' (Acts 19:6; 1 Cor 11:4f.; 14:31)." See H. B. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, London, p. 377.

⁵Acts 19:6 seems to contradict this. Here Paul explains to the Ephesians about the Holy Spirit, who then came upon them so that they spoke with tongues and prophesied. Does this mean all spoke with tongues? all prophesied? or only that some spoke with tongues, etc.? See Swete's comment in note 4 above.

⁶Cf. the various translations of Rev 22:6: ὁ κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῶν πνευματικῶν τῶν προφητῶν. . . . The adjective, πνευματικός is never used to describe the prophet, however. But see E. E. Ellis, "'Spiritual' Gifts in the Pauline Community," *NTS*, 20 (1974), 128-44.

⁷Cf. the formula τάδε λέγει that is repeated several times over in Rev (2:1, 8, 12, 18; 3:1, 7, 14). This is "John's use of an old traditional formula. The OT prophets had established this formula as the appropriate introduction for God's address to his people." Minear, *I Saw a New Earth*, ad loc., Rev 2:1.

⁸Many scholars draw a sharp distinction between prophecy and apocalypse. It seems, however, that both are found at work in the same person. W. Schneemelcher says, "Early Christian prophets who were in fact above all charismatic leaders . . . , used apocalyptic terminology and ideas", in Hennecke, Schneemelcher, Wilson, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2.684. See also

P. Vielhauer in Hennecke, Schneemelcher, Wilson, New Testament Apocrypha, 2.605ff.

⁹G. B. Caird, The Revelation of St. John the Divine, New York, 1966, p. 296, counts at least 14 places in Rev where echoes of the gospel tradition may be detected: Rev 3:3, 5; 6:16; 8:13; 11:2; 14:4, 20; 16:13, 15; 18:21-23, 24; 19:17; 21:3-7.

¹⁰It is the combination of "now" and "prophetic writings" in Rom 16:26 along with the ideas set forth by Paul in Eph 3:5f. and elsewhere, that make some believe Paul had Christian prophetic writings in mind here--not OT prophetic writings: "The divine secret kept silence for long ages is now disclosed through the prophetic writings . . ." i.e. through the writings of Christian prophets. See E. E. Ellis, "Luke 11:49-51: An Oracle of a Christian Prophet?" ExpT, 74. no. 5 (1963), 157.

¹¹J. B. Phillips was sufficiently perplexed by this to feel justified in emending the words of Paul without any textual evidence. His translation reads: "Tongues are a sign of God's power not for those who are unbelievers, but to those who already believe. Preaching the word of God /propheying/, on the other hand, is a sign of God's power to those who do not believe rather than to believers."

¹²Cf. Arndt and Gingrich, Greek-English Lexicon, σμμεῖον.

¹³In the Didache apostles and prophets are equated (11.3-6), but the prophet is distinguished from teachers (13.1-6).

¹⁴See E. E. Ellis, "The Role of the Christian Prophet in Acts," in Apostolic History of the Gospel, ed. by W. W. Gasque and R. Martin, Grand Rapids, 1970, pp. 55-67; cf. also Did 10.7 where apostle is both identified with prophet and distinguished from him.

¹⁵This is a difficult expression as may be noted by the many ways it is translated. It can mean at least four different things: (1) that prophesying equals witnessing to men about Jesus, (2) that the witness Jesus gave before Pilate (1 Tim 6:13) which led to his death, was that which inspired Christian prophets to bear their witness and accept death too, (3) that the witness Jesus gave, i.e. the truth that he revealed to his church, was the spirit, the driving force, of prophecy which inspired the prophets to speak or write, or (4) that prophecy must conform to the traditional witness of the church to the historical Jesus.

¹⁶M. Dibelius and H. Conzelmann, The Pastoral Epistles, Philadelphia, 1972, p. 32.

¹⁷See Fascher, ΠΡΟΦΗΤΗΣ, for details.

¹⁸For an excellent essay on prophecy in the New Testament see the thorough work by E. Cothenet in Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible, VIII, col. 1222-1337.

¹⁹D. E. Aune, The Cultic Setting of Realized Eschatology in Early Christianity, Leiden, 1972, pp. 65-73. F. W. Beare, "Sayings of the Risen Jesus in the Synoptic Tradition," in Christian History and Interpretation: Studies presented to John Knox, ed. by W. R. Farmer, et al., London, 1967, pp. 161-81; R. Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. by

J. Marsh, Oxford, 1963, pp. 108-66; Ellis, "Luke 11:49-51," ExpT, 74 (1963), pp. 157f.; J. Jeremias, New Testament Theology, London, 1971, I, p. 2; E. Käsemann, New Testament Questions of Today, London, 1969, pp. 66-81; A. Loisy, Les evangiles synoptiques, Paris, 1907, I, p. 195; The Origins of the New Testament, London, 1950, pp. 47ff.; N. Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, New York, 1967, pp. 15f. and passim.

²⁰F. F. Bruce, Tradition Old and New, Grand Rapids, 1970, p. 64, underlining mine. Bruce also cites F. Neugebauer's article "Geistsprüche und Jesuslogien," ZNW, 53 (1963), 218ff. for a critical evaluation of Bultmann's arguments for the prophet.

²¹See also John 14:26; 15:26; 1 Cor 2:16; 7:40; 2 Cor 13:3.

²²Paul E. Davies, "Did Jesus Die as a Martyr-prophet?", Biblical Research, 19 (1974), 43.

²³It does not do justice to the Revelation, however, to assign it to the genre "Apocalyptic," and thereby to dismiss it from consideration in the discussion of Christian prophecy. Much if not all of the traditional features of Apocalyptic are absent from the Revelation, and the writer both calls himself a prophet (1:19f.) and his writing a prophetic message (1:3; 10:18f.; 22:7). See G. W. Barker, et al., The New Testament Speaks, New York, 1969, pp. 363-370; Vielhauer in Hennecke, Schneemelcher, Wilson, New Testament Apocrypha, 2.623f.; M. Eugene Boring, "The Apocalypse as Christian Prophecy," in SBL 1974 Seminar Papers, 2.43-57.

²⁴See G. N. Stanton who claims that the early church was more aware of the distinction between the "past" of Jesus and the "present" of the risen Christ than is allowed (Jesus of Nazareth in New Testament Preaching, New York, 1974). H.A. Guy, New Testament Prophecy, London, 1947; J. Lindblom, Gesichte und Offenbarung, Lund, 1968, pp. 141-43; V. Taylor, Formation of Gospel Tradition, London, 1957, p. 107; Bruce, Tradition, pp. 49, 65. But see also D. Dungan, The Sayings of Jesus in the Churches of Paul, Philadelphia, 1971.

²⁵R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, New York, 1951, I, pp. 187-89, takes the radical view that Paul was ignorant of and indifferent to the teachings of Jesus in the tradition. For more moderate or opposite views see O. Cullmann, "The Tradition," in A. J. B. Higgins, ed. The Early Church, 1966, pp. 55-99; D. M. Stanley, "Pauline Allusions to the Sayings of Jesus," CBQ, 23 (1961), 26-39; P. Fannon, "Paul and Tradition in the Primitive Church," Scrip, 16 (1964), p. 47-56.

²⁶A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, London, 1931, pp. 172ff., holds that Paul considered communications received directly from Christ through the Spirit to be of greater value than the teaching of Jesus as recorded by tradition.

²⁷Arnold Resch, Der Paulinismus und die Logia Jesu, in Texte und Untersuchungen, NF, 12 (1904), claimed to have discovered 925 allusions to Jesus' teachings in the nine Pauline letters (including Colossians), 133 more in Ephesians, 100 in the pastorals and 64 in the Pauline speeches in Acts. See Dungan, The Sayings of Jesus, p. xxii.

²⁸See H. Koester, "Die ausserkanonischen Herrenworte," ZNW, 48 (1957), 220-37, where he argues that Paul was not concerned to distinguish between the canonical and extracanonical

sayings of Jesus.

²⁹See F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews (NIC), Grand Rapids, 1964, p. xlix.

³⁰See M. Eugene Boring, "How may we Identify Oracles of Christian Prophets in the Synoptic Tradition?" JBL, 91 (1972), 505, n. 11. E. E. Ellis, Paul's Use of the Old Testament, Grand Rapids, 1957, pp. 107-12, argues convincingly that in this kind of interaction with the OT text we have some of the literary remains of early Christian prophets.

³¹We know from the Apocalypse that the prophet's mind was saturated not only with the OT, but with the traditions about Jesus (see n. 9 above).

³²Guy, New Testament Prophecy, p. 109.

³³"And they [the disciples] excused themselves saying, 'This age of lawlessness and unbelief is under Satan, who does not allow the truth and power of God to prevail over the unclean spirits. Therefore reveal thy righteousness now'--thus they spoke to Christ." Then Christ replies, "The term of years for Satan's power has been fulfilled, but other terrible things draw near. And for those who have sinned I was delivered over to death, that they may return to the truth and sin no more; that they may inherit the spiritual and incorruptible glory of righteousness which is in heaven."

³⁴See R. Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St. John, New York, I. p. 360. Cf. W. Nicol, The Semeia in the Fourth Gospel, Leiden, 1972, p. 149.

³⁵Whether or not the writer of the Fourth Gospel is the same as the writer of the Revelation, it does seem that both documents belong to the same "school." The paraclete of John's gospel is none other than the Spirit of Christian prophecy. "Recognition of this fact helps to establish a basic kinship between the Johannine Gospel and Epistles on the one hand, and the Book of Revelation on the other. In none of these works is prophecy confined to the matter of predicting the future; it refers more generally to inspired utterance in the task of making known the very words of the Son of God. In John's Gospel the prophetic function consists in introducing a particular divine perspective on a series of historical events. Prophecy becomes essentially interpretation, and the prophet an inspired interpreter of what Jesus has said and done." Barker, et al. The New Testament Speaks, p. 396.

³⁶This creative working with the tradition "involves selecting some events and sayings while omitting others (20:30), structuring these according to certain historical and theological considerations and in some instances perhaps even reformulating and rephrasing the words of Jesus handed down in the tradition." Ibid., p. 395.

³⁷Ibid., p. 396. See also Aune, Cultic Setting, pp. 65-73; J. Louis Martyn, History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel, New York, 1968.

³⁸The most complete study of the Didache is that by J. P. Audet, La Didaché: instruction des apôtres, Paris, 1961, but he dates it as early as A.D. 50-70.

³⁹Apparently Clement of Alexandria also quotes the Didache (3.5) as Scripture (cf. Misc 1.20.100). Eusebius, however, did not consider it so (HE 3.25.4).

⁴⁰See K. Aland, "The Problem of Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Christian Literature of the First Two Centuries," JTS, 12 (1961), 39-49, especially pp. 43-44.

⁴¹So much so that one must study Justin's doctrine of the Holy Spirit mainly in connection with prophetic inspiration. See E. R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 177.

⁴²This saying is quoted also by Clement of Alexandria (Quis dives salvus, xl, and elsewhere in some MSS, introducing it by "God saith through the prophet," with perhaps a reference to Ezek 33:16-20. Justin alone attributes it directly to Christ.

⁴³p. Nautin, Lettres et Ecrivains chrétiens des II^e et III^e Siècles, Paris, 1961, p. 71, questions the statement made by Eusebius (HE 4.26.1) that Melito was a bishop.

⁴⁴Melito, On the Passover, 101-103. See G. F. Hawthorne, "A New English Translation of Melito's Paschal Homily," in Current Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation, ed. by G. F. Hawthorne, Grand Rapids, 1975, pp. 173-74.

⁴⁵David Hill's important article, "On the Evidence for the Creative Role of Christian Prophets," NTS, 20 (1974), 262-74, which concludes with these words, "The evidence produced and repeated in support of the contention that Christian prophets played a creative role in respect of sayings later attributed to the earthly Jesus proves, on examination, to be lacking in substance and authority," came to my attention too late to alter this section of the paper or for me to attempt any serious refutation (even if I wished to do so). However, I have not in this section merely repeated the arguments Hill rejects, but I bring together a chain of thinking that goes beyond his objections and that in my judgment cannot be swept aside as wholly "lacking in substance and authority."

⁴⁶Against Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, p. 15. See B. Gerhardsson, Memory and Manuscript, Lund, 1964², and Tradition and Transmission in Early Christianity, Lund, 1964; and even Käsemann, New Testament Questions, pp. 46-47.

⁴⁷E. E. Ellis, The Gospel of Luke, London, 1966, p. 172.

⁴⁸The Aramaic words of Jesus contained in Mark, however, could be examples of exact expressions of Jesus. See J. Jeremias, The Prayers of Jesus, Naperville, Ill., 1967. But elsewhere the sayings of Jesus as found in the different traditional sources, are modified, interpreted, rewritten, etc., to reflect the particular theological outlook of those who compiled them. These changes did not conflict with their concept of what the Spirit of Christ was doing in the church, nor do they with mine.

⁴⁹Note P. Vielhauer's cautious remarks in Hennecke, Schneemelcher, Wilson, New Testament Apocrypha, 2.606.

⁵⁰Beare, "Sayings of the Risen Jesus," p. 181.

⁵¹Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, pp. 148-149,

see also pp. 127, 163.

⁵²in Käsemann, New Testament Questions of Today, (=NTS 1 /1954-55/, 248-60).

⁵³Ibid., p. 68.

⁵⁴See David Hill, "Creative Role of Christian Prophets," NTS, 20 (1974), 270-74. Hill challenges Käsemann's thesis on three grounds: first because Hill believes that Käsemann merely presupposes that sentences of Holy Law have their origin with Christian prophets but offers no proof for this; he merely reiterates what Bultmann had said, without sufficient evidence, thirty years earlier. Second, because in Hill's judgment charismatic endowment is not a prerequisite for recognizing the criterion of divine judgment or for proclaiming it. "Why," Hill asks, "has it to be proclaimed with prophetic authority? Were there not others in the church, besides prophets, to speak, instruct and warn?" And third, because for Hill G.-C. Kahler (see Hill, p. 271, n. 3) and Klaus Berger ("Zu den sogenannten Sätzen heiligen Rechts," NTS, 17 /1970-71/, 10-40) had already demolished Käsemann's thesis by showing that the form of the "sentences of holy law" "belongs to the genre of sapiential exhortation in which the sanction corresponds to the action according to a law of imminent justice. Such formulations could be transposed into the realm of eschatology, but by themselves they do not require us to assume the existence in a Christian community of prophets who promulgated the eschatological ius talionis."

⁵⁵Jeremias, Prayers of Jesus, p. 34.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 35ff.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 34.

⁵⁸Bultmann, History of Synoptic Tradition, pp. 128, 163.

⁵⁹See note 44 above.

⁶⁰Bruce, Tradition, p. 64, n. 2. See also Hill, "Creative Role of Christian Prophets," NTS, 20 (1974), 262-70.

⁶¹Jeremias, New Testament Theology, I. p. 36.

⁶²Victor Hasler, Amen. Redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung Zur Einföhrungsformel der Herrenworte 'Wahrlich, ich sage euch', Zörich, 1969.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 162-167.

⁶⁴Jeremias, New Testament Theology, I. p. 36, n. 2.

⁶⁵Jeremias, Prayers, pp. 112ff.

⁶⁶Boring, "How may we Identify Oracles of Christian Prophets in the Synoptic Tradition?" JBL, 91 (1972), 501-21.

⁶⁷Ellis, "Luke 11:49-51," ExpT, 74, no. 5 (1963), 157-58; The Gospel of Luke, pp. 170ff.

⁶⁸This article no doubt grew out of his more complete treatment of the subject, "Christian Prophets and the Gospel of Mark" (unpublished dissertation; Vanderbilt University, 1969).

⁶⁹Caird, Commentary on the Revelation, p. 296; L. A. Vos, The Synoptic Tradition in the Apocalypse, Kampen, 1965.

⁷⁰This is a theological reason based on my belief that functionally if not by occupation the writer of Hebrews was a prophet, for according to the NT, inspired books came into existence only through prophets who were moved by the Spirit (2 Pet 1:20-21).

⁷¹See the discussion about Mark 61b-62 in J. Wellhausen Das Evangelium Marci, Berlin, 1909² ad loc.; E. Meyer, Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums, I. p. 192; V. Taylor, The Gospel According to St. Mark, London, 1957, pp. 568-69.

⁷²See the treatment of Mark 4:12 in J. Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, New York, 1955, pp. 12-15; 61ff.

⁷³Even the Scofield Reference Bible concedes this point when it says that "the rule, applicable to all modifications of the forms of quotations in the New Testament from Old Testament writings, is that the divine author of both testaments is perfectly free, in using an earlier statement, to recast the mere literary form of it. The variant will be found invariably to give the deeper meaning of the earlier statement." (1909 edition, p. 1300. I am indebted to Merrill C. Tenney for calling this to my attention.)

⁷⁴Ellis, "Luke 11:49-51," ExpT, 74. no. 5 (1963), 157-58.

CHRISTIAN PROPHECY AND THE SAYINGS OF JESUS:
AN INDEX TO SYNOPTIC PERICOPAE OSTENSIBLY
INFLUENCED BY EARLY CHRISTIAN PROPHETS

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The following index is intended to serve, at least in part, as a bibliographical Forschungsbericht on the subject of the creation or reformulation of sayings of Jesus by early Christian prophets. The index is concerned only with indicating which Synoptic pericopae, or portions of pericopae, one or another modern scholar has judged influenced by early Christian prophets. While only forty-four separate bibliographical items have been listed (representing the work of twenty-nine scholars), these entries represent only a portion of the articles and books which the present author has examined for the purpose of compiling this index. The major shortcoming of the index is of course its incompleteness. Scholars who are interested in this subject and who may have suggestions for expanding either the scope or coverage of the index are encouraged to forward their contributions to the author at Saint Xavier College, Chicago, Ill. 60655.

The format of the index requires some explanation. The index is arranged in two major sections: first of all individual pericopae, or portions of pericopae, are referred to in the order in which they occur in the NT; secondly, a bibliography of scholarly writings provides complete bibliographical data for items referred to in the index itself by only the surnames of the various authors (in instances where individuals have contributed more than one entry to the bibliography, the entries are distinguished by the inclusion of a number following the author's name, e.g. Bultmann (1), 127. In order to facilitate the usefulness of the index, the arrangement of pericopae found in Huck-Lietzmann have been indicated in brackets at the far left margin; Synoptic parallels are listed only when they actually occur in the index. Immediately following the bracketed Huck-Lietzmann pericopae I have included sigla which indicate the probable source of the pericopae: Q, Mk, M (special Matthaean material), L (special Lukan material). When the author's name appears in brackets one of three things is indicated: (1) it may be unclear whether the author regards this particular pericope as a formulation of a Christian prophet, (2) the author may fail to make a firm decision on the question, or (3) the passage referred to may contain formal characteristics which closely parallel genuine prophetic utterances.

MATTHEW

[3:7-10] Q

3:7-10 Bultmann (1), 127

[5:3-12] Q Lk 6:20-23

5:3-12 Loisy (2), 120
5:10-12 Bultmann (2), 57
5:11 K  semann (1), 100
5:12 K  semann (1), 96

[5:17-20] M

5:17 Bultmann (1), 163; K  semann (1), 97
5:17-19 Bultmann (1), 149
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- 5:19 K#semann (1), 85f.; K#semann (3), 78f.; Schweizer (1), 226f., n. 3
 5:21-48 Q Bultmann (1), 149
- [5:21-26] Q Lk 12:57-59
 5:26 Hasler, 175
- [6:1-4] M
 6:2-18 Bultmann (1), 149
 6:4 K#semann (1), 95
- [6:5-8] M
 6:6 K#semann (1), 95
- [6:9-15] Q
 6:2-18 Bultmann (1), 149
 6:14f. Perrin (2), 22f.; K#semann (3), 77f.
- [6:16-18] M
 6:2-18 Bultmann (1), 149
 6:18 K#semann (1), 95
- [7:1-5] Q
 7:2 K#semann (1), 98
- [7:6] M and [7:7-11] Q
 7:6ff. [Westermann, 312]
- [7:21-23] Q Lk 6:43-46; Lk 13:22-30
 7:21 Beare (3), 175f.
 7:21-23 Loisy (2), 124
 7:22-23 Bultmann (1), 117; Hahn, 91; K#semann (1), 100
 7:23 K#semann (1), 96; Schweizer (1), 226
- [8:5-13] Q
 8:11-12 Bultmann (1), 128; K#semann (1), 100
- [9:9-13] Mk Mk 2:13-17
 9:13 K#semann (1), 97
- [9:35-10:16] Mk Mk 6:6b-13
 10:5 Beare (1), 9; Beare (3), 176f.; K#semann (1), 88;
 Luck, 500, cf. 503ff.
 10:5-16 Bultmann (1), 145, 149
 10:13-14 K#semann (1), 94f., 103
 10:15 K#semann (1), 95f.
 10:16 Bultmann (1), 158, 163; Bultmann (2), 57
 [Stählin, 141]
- [10:17-25] M Lk 12:2-12
 10:17 Ellis (1), 171
 10:21-22 K#semann (1), 105
 10:22 K#semann (1), 106
 10:23 K#semann (1), 106; Tödt, 61f.; Perrin (2), 202;
 Hasler, 84, 166, 175; [Ellis (1), 171]; Vielhauer (1), 58-61; Luck, 500, cf. 503ff.

- [10:26-33] Q Lk 12:2-12
 10:26 Käsemann (1), 99
 10:32 Käsemann (1), 104f.
 10:32-33 Käsemann (3), 77f.; Perrin (2), 185ff.
- [10:34-36] Q Lk 12:49-56, esp. vv. 51-53
 10:34 Käsemann (1), 97
 10:34-36 Bultmann (1), 163
- [10:37-39] Q
 10:39 Käsemann (1), 99
- [10:40-11:1] Mk Mk 9:33-37, esp. v. 37
 10:40 Bultmann (1), 163
 10:40-41 Hasler, 37
 10:41 Käsemann (1), 90
 10:41-42 Käsemann (1), 94; Ellis (1), 171
 10:42-45 Bultmann (1), 146
- [11:2-6] Q
 11:5-6 Bultmann (1), 128
- [11:7-19] Q Lk 7:24-35, esp. vv. 31-35
 11:10 Stählin, 141
 11:11 Berger, 123
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- [11:20-24] Q Lk 10:1-16, esp. vv. 13-15
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 11:24 Käsemann (1), 95
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 11:27 Bultmann (1), 159f.
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- [12:25-37] Mk Mk 3:23-30
 12:27 Bultmann (1), 163
 12:31 Hasler, 30; Windisch, 218-21
 12:32 Käsemann (1), 102f.; Hahn, 324, n. 88; Bornkamm (1), 34; Wilder, 89
- [12:38-42] Q
 12:38-42 Meyer, 407ff.
 12:40 Vielhauer (2), 150ff.
 12:41-42 Bultmann (1), 112f.; Käsemann (1), 95

- [12:43-45] Q
12:45c Meyer, 409
- [13:10-15] Mk & M
13:12 K#semann (1), 98
- [13:47-50] M
13:47-50 Haenchen (1), 174
- [15:21-28] Mk
15:24 Bultmann (1), 163
- [16:13-23] Mk & M
16:17-19 Bornkamm (1), 45
16:18 Loisy (1), II, 14f.; Loisy (2), 134
16:18-19 Bultmann (1), 146, 149, 157; Bultmann (2), 57;
[Windisch, 221]
16:19 [Hasler, 90]
- [16:24-28] Mk Mk 8:34-9:1
16:24 K#semann (1), 100
16:25 K#semann (1), 99
16:27 K#semann (3), 77f.
16:28 K#semann (1), 88; Gr#sser, 136
- [18:6-9] Mk
18:7 Loisy (2), 134
- [18:10-14] Q
18:11 K#semann (1), 97
- [18:15-20] v. 15: Q; vv. 16-20: M
18:15-17 Bultmann (1), 146
18:18 Bultmann (1), 146, 149; K#semann (1), 107;
Hasler, 90, 166, 175
18:18-20 Bultmann (1), 157
18:19-20 Bultmann (1), 149; Loisy (1), II, 91f.; Beare (2),
149f.
18:20 Bultmann (1), 158, 163; Bultmann (2), 57; Fuller,
89; Kretchmar, 61; Schmid, 273
- [19:16-30] Mk Mk 10:17-31
19:26 K#semann (1), 98
19:28 Bultmann (1), 158, 163; T#dt, 64; Bornkamm (2),
209, n. 13
19:28-29 K#semann (1), 93
- [20:17-19] Mk Mk 10:32-34
20:18 K#semann (1), 98
- [20:20-28] Mk Mk 10:35-45
20:28 K#semann (1), 97
- [23:1-36] M & Q
23:2-22 Loisy (2), 136f.

- 23:8-10 Bultmann (1), 146; Haenchen (2), 43f.
 23:12 Käsemann (1), 98
 23:34 Bultmann (1), 158
 23:34-36 Ellis (1), 170ff.; Ellis (2), 157f.
 23:36 Hasler, 69ff.
- [23:37-39] Q
 23:38 [Westermann, 310]
 23:39 Hasler, 71f., 175
- [24:9-14] Mk Mk 13:9-13
 24:10-12 Vielhauer (3), 619
 24:11 [Fascher, 183]
 24:13 Käsemann (1), 106
 24:14 [Schmid, 396]
- [24:15-22] Mk
 24:15ff. Kraft, 252, n. 7
- [24:23-25] Mk
 24:24 [Fascher, 183]
- [24:34-36] Mk Mk 13:30-32
 24:34 Käsemann (1), 96
- [24:37-41] Q
 24:37 Käsemann (1), 96
- [24:42-44] Q
 24:42 [Tödt, 289]
 24:43-44 [Bultmann (1), 128]
 24:44 [Tödt, 289]
- [24:45-51] Q
 24:45-51 [Bultmann (1), 128]
- [25:1-13] Q Lk 12:35-46
 25:1-13 Bultmann (1), 127
- [25:14-30] Q
 25:29 Käsemann (1), 98
- [25:31-46] M
 25:35-36 [Westermann, 312]
- [26:6-13] Mk
 26:13 [Schmid, 396]
- [28:16-20] M
 28:16-20 Luck, 500, cf. 503ff.
 28:18 [Tödt, 288]
 28:19 Kretschmar, 61
 28:19-20 Bultmann (1), 145; Bultmann (2), 57; Loisy (1), II, 749
 28:20 Fuller, 89, 92; Grant, 140

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[2:13-17] Mt 9:9-13

2:17b Bultmann (1), 163

[3:27-30] Mt 12:25-27

3:28 Hasler, 158, 166, 175, 179f.

3:28-29 Scroggs, 359-73; Boring, 501-21; Hasler, 30;
Windisch, 218-21; Bornkamm (1), 34

3:29 Hahn, 324, n. 88; Käsemann (1), 99

[3:31-35]

3:35 Bultmann (1), 163; Käsemann (1), 99

[4:21-25] Mt 13:10-15, esp. v. 12

4:24 Käsemann (3), 77f.

4:24-25 Schweizer (2), 61; Käsemann (1), 99

[6:6b-13] Mt 9:35-10:16; Lk 10:1-16

6:7-13 Haenchen (1), 225

6:8-11 Bultmann (1), 145, 149; Schniewind, 140

[8:11-13] Mt 12:38-42, esp. v. 39

8:12 [Berger, 59-62, 128]

[8:34-9:1] Mt 16:24-28; Lk 9:23-27

8:34-38 Loisy (2), 90

8:35 Käsemann (1), 99

8:38 Käsemann (3), 77f.; Käsemann (1), 99; Käsemann
(2), 111f.; Perrin (1), 117; Perrin (2), 22f., 185ff.,
Perrin (3), 62f.; Vielhauer (2), 143f., 147;
Haenchen (1), 299; Schweizer (1), 226f., n. 39:1 Bultmann (1), 127; Käsemann (1), 88; Hasler, 49,
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9:12-13 Bultmann (1), 127

[9:33-37] Mt 10:40-11:1, esp. v. 42

9:37 Bultmann (1) 163

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9:41 Bultmann (1), 163; Hasler, 37, 175

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10:15 Käsemann (1), 99; Hasler, 175

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10:29-31 [Berger, 127]

[10:32-34] Mt 20:17-19

10:32-33 Loisy (2), 90

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 10:42 Bultmann (1), 163
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 11:23 Hasler, 159, 175
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 12:1-11 Loisy (2), 95
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 13 Grant, 142
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 13 Grant, 142
 13:5-6 Berger, 119
 13:5-20 Colani, 202f.
- [13:9-13]
 13 Grant, 142
 13:5-20 Colani, 202f.
 13:8 Berger, 119; [Westermann, 311]
 13:10 [Schmid, 396]
 13:13b Käsemann (1), 99
- [13:14-20] Mt 24:15-22; Lk 21:20-24
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 13:30 Perrin (2), 200; Hasler, 49, 158, 175; [Berger, 68f.]
 13:31 Bultmann (1), 123, 127
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- [6:20-23] Q Mt 5:3-12
6:20-21 Bultmann (1), 128
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- [6:37-42] Q Mt 7:1-5
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- [9:28-36] Mk
9:29 Käsemann (1), 99
- [10:1-16] Q Mt 9:35-10:16; Mk 6:6b-13
10:2-12 Bultmann (1), 145, 149
10:3 Bultmann (1), 158
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10:15 [Westermann, 310]
10:16 Bultmann (1), 163
- [10:17-20] Q
10:18 [Bultmann (1), 163]
10:19-20 Bultmann (1), 158, 163; Bultmann (2), 57
10:20 Bultmann (1), 111
- [10:23-24] Q
10:23-24 Bultmann (1), 125
- [11:29-32] Q Mt 12:38-42
11:29-32 Meyer, 407ff.

- 11:30 Vielhauer (1), 150ff.
 11:31-32 Bultmann (1), 112f., 128
- [11:37-12:1] Q Mt 23:1-36, 37-39
 11:43-50 Loisy (2), 136f.
 11:49-50 Fascher, 183
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 11:51b Hasler, 69ff.
- [12:2-12] Q Mt 10:17-25
 12:8 Vielhauer (3), 606; Perrin (3) 62f.
 12:8-9 Ferrin (1), 117; Perrin (2), 185ff.; Vielhauer (1), 143f., 147
 12:8-10 K~~u~~semann (1), 99
 12:10 Hahn, 324, n. 88; Perrin (3), 71; Scroggs, 359-73; Bornkamm (1), 34
 12:11 [Ellis (1), 171]
- [12:13-21] L
 12:20 Bultmann (1), 158
- [12:22-34] Q
 12:32 Bultmann (1), 111, 127, 158; Scroggs, 359-73
- [12:35-46] L
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- [12:57-59] Q Mt 5:21-26
 12:59 Hasler, 175
- [13:22-30] Q Mt 7:21-23
 13:26-27 Bultmann (1), 117; Loisy (2), 124; Hahn, 90f.
 13:27 Schweizer (1), 226 (cf. 225, n. 6)
- [13:34-35] Q Mt 23:37-39
 13:34f. Ellis (1), 190f.
 13:35 Hasler, 71f., 175; [Westermann, 310]
- [14:15-24] Q
 14:15-24 Hasler, 104
- [17:22-37] Q Mt 24:37-41
 17:26-27 Vielhauer (1), 152
 17:30ff. Kraft, 252, n. 8

- [18:9-14] L
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- [19:39-44] L
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- [21:20-24] Mk Mt 24:15-22; Mk 13:14-20
21:20-24 Ellis (1), 244; Kraft, 252, n. 8
21:22 [Westermann, 311]
- [21:34-36] L
21:34-36 Bultmann (1), 127
21:35 [Westermann, 311]
- [22:24-30] Mk Mt 20:20-28; Mk 10:35-45
22:27 Bultmann (1), 163
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22:30 Bornkamm (2), 209, n. 13
- [23:26-32] L
23:27-31 Bultmann (1), 37
23:28-31 Bultmann (1), 127
- [24:1-11] Mk
24:6-7 [Berger, 122f.]
- [24:36-49] L
24:47ff. Bultmann (1), 145
24:49 Bultmann (1), 157f.

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THE MATTHEAN UNDERCURRENT:
PROCESS HERMENEUTIC
AND THE "PARABLE OF THE LAST JUDGMENT"

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One of the most interesting problems to have emerged within the debate on demythologizing the New Testament is expressed in the interchange between Herbert Braun and Ernst Kasemann on the relationship between Christology and anthropology. According to Braun, while the New Testament presents many variations on the Christological theme, its major components--the letters of Paul, the gospel of John, and the teachings of Jesus--share a common anthropology which portrays humanity as standing under a word in which a radical pronouncement of grace is united with a radical demand for obedience. Hence the ultimate reference of the proclamation of the New Testament is not to a once-for-all act of God for man's salvation but rather to a particular human self-understanding. Braun argues, in effect, that the Christology of the New Testament is finally a cipher for an anthropology which is ultimately independent of any historical incident. Kasemann,² on the other hand, professes that he finds in the New Testament no anthropology at all, that the Christological witness is the irreducible core around which all else is built.

The problem in dealing with this question is that it involves much more than an exegetical issue. What is at stake is hermeneutical method. Viewing the obvious phenomenon of the Christocentricity of the New Testament, Kasemann takes it at face value. Braun, however, believes he sees through it to a deeper signification. The question is whether the attempt to "see through" the apparent meaning of the text is legitimate. And this is a question that cannot be answered by "scientific exegesis" alone, since the outcome is so clearly the product of the starting point. The plain fact is that we cannot make an objective incision in the hermeneutical circle.

What we can do, however, is to approach the text with the hermeneutical problem clearly in view. We can examine the presuppositions upon which any given conclusion about the "meaning" or "reference" of a text is based and seek to establish whether different conclusions might be drawn upon alternative bases. One method, one set of presuppositions, may uncover aspects of the text that another misses. The test of method, then, is in a sense quantitative: how much of the text, how many "layers" of signification is it able to expose? If we cannot find an absolute starting-point for interpretation, we can at least make certain that we traverse the hermeneutical circle, moving continually from method to results and back to method and in this way try to avoid the arbitrary choice of presuppositions.

The present paper is conceived as an attempt to move beyond the Braun-Kasemann impasse by examining the problem of Christology and anthropology from a hermeneutical perspective informed by the insights of process philosophy with respect to the nature of religious language. I do not intend to claim that process thought can give a final answer to this or any other problem in New Testament studies but only that in this particular instance it can help the interpreter achieve a vantage point that uncovers aspects of the text that are obscured by other approaches.

It should be said at the outset that I have taken my cue from Braun and consider the present paper as a second stage in the investigation of the "sense" of New Testament Christology. My method, however, will differ from his not only in the use of process categories, but also in another important respect. I have chosen to approach the problem in terms of the internal structure of a single Christological formulation, rather than to imitate Braun's comparative studies. He has already made his point on that issue; what now needs to be asked, I believe, is just how individual New Testament writers relate their Christological confessions to their anthropological, or soteriological, perspectives. It is an article of faith in the Bultmann school of interpretation that Paul and John have achieved an effective union of Christology and soteriology, but that other New Testament writers have not. I have chosen to deal with the gospel of Matthew partly because I believe I see here an effective union of Braun's grace/demand polarities without an effective union of Christology and soteriology.

If this latter point can be established, we are faced with a curious situation, which offers a serious challenge to Bultmann's personal canon. We have an anthropology which accomplishes, on its own, what Christology is designed to do; it is, nevertheless, set side by side in Matthew's scheme with a full-blown Christological statement. It is in assessing this juxtaposition that I have found Whitehead's understanding of the nature of religious language to be helpful. But before turning to that level of discussion, I must review the exegetical evidence under two headings: "The Anthropological Undercurrent" and "The Christological Mainstream."

I

The Anthropological Undercurrent

That Matthew's gospel contains, at the redactional level, an "anthropological undercurrent" is nowhere more evident than in the so-called "Parable of the Last Judgment," Mtt. 25:31-46. What is interesting here, for our purposes, is the theme of "the great surprise." Those who are granted entrance into the Kingdom on the basis of their deeds of mercy are surprised to learn that in ministering to the needy they have, without knowing or intending it, rendered service to the Christ who now meets them as judge. If this theme is taken seriously, explicit confession of Christ cannot be seen as a requirement for salvation. Thus Georg Strecker argues that here Matthew envisions a means of salvation which transcends the bounds of the Christian confession:

The Matthean apocalypse concludes with the picture of the judgment of the peoples; all the nations of the world are gathered together and judged--without respect to Church membership, but solely according to the standard of good works... As with the Church, it is assumed that in the world of nations the good and the evil will remain together up until the ultimate separation at the final judgment.³

If Strecker's interpretation is correct, Matthew has developed a soteriology that clearly overextends his Christology by placing Christian salvation within the broader framework of a general statement about the life-style requisite for the Kingdom. He has, in other words, developed an anthropology

that appears, in some sense, more basic than his Christology.

The "universalistic" emphasis of the passage has, however, been challenged by numerous interpreters. A particularly weak objection is based upon a Paulinizing interpretation of Matthew's scheme of salvation. Schlatter⁴ and Schniewind,⁵ for example, readily admit that here salvation is available apart from confession of Jesus but insist that it is based upon a general forgiveness won by Jesus' death. But the fact of the matter is that all attempts to find an atonement-theology in Matthew are bound to fail, as Strecker and others have demonstrated. Whatever else may be said about Matthew's theology, the "righteousness" of which he speaks clearly refers to human deeds and not to the "righteousness of God" of Pauline theology. This is seen not only in the present passage but also in Matthew's construction of the Sermon on the Mount around the introduction to the antitheses (Mtt. 5:17-20), which makes salvation contingent upon adherence to the Torah interpreted in light of Jesus' summation of it in the love-commandments.

A more serious objection to the universalistic reading of the passage is based upon an identification of the "needy" with Christian missionaries. Allen,⁶ for example, reads the passage in light of 10:40-42, the conclusion of the commission to the twelve: "He who receives you receives me...." From this perspective, the Parable of the Last Judgment appears both as a word of comfort to Christian missionaries and as a statement regarding the status of non-Christians. This, in effect is what the evangelist says to missionaries in the face of their difficulties: "Do not despair, for the people whom you confront with the word will be judged according to their treatment of you." So while Christian confession may not be requisite for salvation, reception of Christ's missionaries is.

The connection with 10:40-42, however, is not borne out by the contextual placing of the judgment-passages. In Matthew's structure it concludes an eschatological discourse and follows immediately upon a series of parables which serve as hortatory complements to the apocalyptic warnings of chapter twenty-four. It is thus, quite clearly, another injunction to Church members in general, not just missionaries, commending preparation for Jesus' return through deeds of love. The problem in view is not opposition to the mission, as it is in 10:40-42, but rather the more general one of endurance to the end. Allen's view entails the identification of the ones who minister to the needy with the Gentiles. But the sense of the passage is just the opposite: it is Christians who are enjoined to humanitarian service.

If this much is accepted, the question that now arises is how the element of surprise is to be related to the hortatory purpose of the passage. Klostermann⁷ has argued that the universalistic theme has no real function in the redactional context, that Matthew merely uses the passage for ecclesiastical purposes. Stendahl,⁸ along the same lines, goes so far as to say that the surprise theme is nothing more than a rhetorical device.

It is clear that Matthew's primary purpose at this juncture is to enjoin Christians to deeds of love. And it is probable that he means this primarily in terms of the needs of fellow-Christians. But in light of Matthew's contrast between the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees and the "higher righteousness" enjoined by Jesus (5:20), and in light of his disparagement of deeds done for show (6:1ff.), there is good reason to see in the

judgment-pericope an emphasis upon the incalculability of genuine deeds of love. The just would seem to be commended precisely because they did their deeds without knowledge of the divine reference and without any hope of reward. The theme of the great surprise, on this reading, is the real point of the passage.

There can be no doubt that those who are "gathered" for the judgment (25:32) are "all the nations." Thus it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that while Matthew is interested primarily in the standard by which the Church is to be judged (Cf. the Parable of the Tares), he has actually formulated a general standard, which applies to all humanity, and has subsequently applied this standard to the Church.

This reading is given strong support by 13:36-43, the explanation of the Parable of the Tares. The context (Cf. the Parable of the Seine-Net) shows that Matthew is dealing, once again, with the question of the status of the Church at the eschaton; he is warning that Christians, too, stand under judgment. But notice the juxtaposition of terms in the explanation. The "field" into which the seed is sown, and out of which the righteous are chosen, is explicitly termed "the world." So the "Kingdom" which appears is temporarily coincident with the world at large, not simply the Church. And it is therefore here, in the world--which contains the Church--that both good and evil are found. As Vögtle⁹ has argued, then, despite Matthew's ecclesiastical interest he emphasizes here simply the fact of judgment--judgment upon the world at large. Church and world are sub-jected to a common standard, and there is no hint of any inherent distinction between them. Thus Strecker¹⁰ can say that "the world is not as such assessed negatively; rather there exists within it too the possibility of salvation."

Now when the incipient universalism of 25:31-46 and 13:36-43 is seen in light of Matthew's consistent approach to soteriology, it takes on even greater significance. Whatever else may be said about Matthew, it is clear that the salvation he envisions is inextricably bound to Torah--the Torah as definitively interpreted by Jesus through the criterion of the love-commandments. At 5:17-20, which is the cornerstone of the entire Sermon on the Mount,¹¹ Jesus asserts that he has come not to "destroy" but to "fulfill" the Law. The term "fulfill" (*pleroōn*) is notoriously ambiguous and has been interpreted in various ways.¹² I would agree with Gerhard Barth¹³ that it refers to Jesus' "upholding" the Law. I would add, however, that the antitheses that follow (vv. 21-48) show the precise sense in which Jesus "upholds" the Torah: by giving the final and definitive interpretation of it (although Matthew does assume that Jesus also obeyed it in definitive fashion). Then at 22:40 comes the programmatic statement of the principle at work in the Matthean Jesus' hermeneutic. The love-commandments are followed by Matthew's editorial statement: "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." Finally, at 28:16-20, the commission Jesus gives his disciples reinforces the point: "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations," he says, "teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you. . . ." Matthew's soteriology would thus appear to be grounded in Torah, and Jesus' function would seem to be primarily to interpret that Torah definitively.

It is important to establish, however, the extent to which the love-commandment, as the principle by which the Torah is to be understood,

represents a new criterion in Matthew's eyes. Does Matthew, in other words, envision Jesus as proclaiming a "new" Law? The fact that Jesus revises some portions of the Torah and intensifies others might seem to indicate just that. But we must be careful to view the matter from Matthew's perspective; what might logically, from our standpoint, constitute a radical departure from the past might mean something quite different for him. As Daube has shown, what the Matthean Jesus does by way of interpretation is, as radical as it might seem, not fundamentally different from what any rabbi does. The rabbinic "but thou must say," which stands behind Matthew's "but I say unto you," involves the substitution of "a new, freer meaning for a literal rendering." So the teachers of Jesus' time "were not unaware that exegesis might be tantamount to legislation."¹⁴ Moreover, Matthew himself makes the point rather explicitly by his editorial comment regarding the Mosaic provision for divorce at 19:8b: "...from the beginning it was not so!" Thus the true intention of the Torah is identified with the primordial will of God which stands behind it.

It would appear, then, that there is no reason to speak either of a new Law or of the abrogation of the Law: Jesus brings out the true intention of the old Law. And his "fulfillment" of the Law can hardly be said to have created a new situation with respect to man's position before God in terms of the possibility of genuine obedience. What Matthew's Jesus teaches is precisely that for which Israel has been responsible all along: God's primordial will. And if we ask whether Matthew would say that all men have been responsible for this also, we may point to the wisdom-sayings of the Sermon on the Mount (Cf., e.g., 6:25ff.)--which, taken in themselves, give no hint of a covenantal background--as well as to the incipient universalism already noted, as evidence that in some sense he indeed would.

This does not necessarily mean that Matthew explicitly envisions the salvation of non-Christians or that he consciously and intentionally qualifies his Christology with a universalistic soteriology. I rather doubt that such questions are within his purview. But the fact remains that in constructing his soteriology he develops a standard of salvation that overextends his Christology. Not only has he allowed the implication of extra-ecclesiastical salvation to stand but, more importantly, he has placed Christian deeds of charity within the broader framework of humanitarian deeds of a general nature. As Hendrikus Boers comments, then, he "lets non-Christian acts interpret what the Christian confession really means," allowing the confession "to be confronted and interpreted by worldly acts."¹⁵

Hopefully, the evidence presented thus far has established the presence of an anthropological--as opposed to Christological--emphasis in Matthew's soteriology. This theme appears to be a product of Matthew's own editorial activity; it is not an accidental element in his text. If it does not constitute an intentionally systematic or programmatic statement worked out with logical precision, it is nevertheless a genuine Matthean theme. Wherever else Matthew has traveled, he has been this way en route.

But we do not have to look far to find his destination. He does, of course, make a Christological witness--a witness to Jesus as God's uniquely commissioned agent who in some way is the bringer of human salvation. And the objectivism of his Christology shines through even in 25:31-46. For it is finally Jesus himself who appears, not only as judge,

but also as the referent of all the deeds of love done in the world.

At this point, the tension within Matthew's Christology begins to come into focus. On the one hand, Matthew works within the framework of a strong Christological confession in which Jesus appears as a unique and exclusive act of God on behalf of man's salvation. On the other hand he has, in the course of formulating the details of his Christological statement, appealed to criteria which clearly transcend such a union of Christology and soteriology. Our problem is how to weigh these conflicting tendencies. In order to do so we must have a fuller view of the dimensions of the Christological mainstream. We need to know precisely to what extent it stands in tension with the undercurrent.

II

The Christological Mainstream

The strong Christological thrust of the gospel needs no documentation; what is critical for the present study is a determination of the nature of this thrust. My basic contention at this point is that Jesus' role as the interpreter of the Law is determinative of his salvific function. For Matthew, the sole criterion for entering the Kingdom is "righteousness"--and that means nothing other than human obedience to the Torah as definitively stated by Jesus. Jesus is the Son of David, the Son of Abraham, the Messiah, the Son of the Living God. But he is all these precisely in that in him is brought to definitive expression that "righteousness" which God requires of men. To be sure, Matthew has taken over the atonement tradition from his predecessors (Cf. 20:28; 26:28). But it is significant that Matthew's editorial activity in relation to this tradition is directed solely toward drawing out the ethical implications he sees in it.¹⁶ And, what is more important, I do not believe it can be demonstrated that a theology of atonement actually functions in the gospel as a whole.

That Jesus is the Christ means for Matthew that he appears at the apex of a scheme of salvation-history revealed in the genealogy and at 21:43, where the evangelist acknowledges the shift of Israel's prerogative on the Kingdom to the Church. This view is ably attested by Georg Strecker. The attempts of Ljungman,¹⁷ Fuchs,¹⁸ and even Schlatter¹⁹ to read Matthew in a quasi-Pauline light are thus misguided: Matthew's soteriology is ethical, and his Christology is functional and Messianic, not incarnational.

If this general characterization is accepted, then certain limits may be drawn at the outset. Matthew's Christology is founded upon the categories of Torah and salvation-history, and any emphasis upon a vicarious atonement or general reparation between God and man, if present at all, is clearly of secondary importance.

The emphasis upon Torah, however, must not be interpreted in such a way as to obscure the centrality of Jesus' role in the gospel. Jack Suggs's²⁰ treatment of Matthew's redaction of the Wisdom-material in Q, perhaps more than any other study of Matthew's Christology, has made this apparent. What he argues, in brief, is that for Matthew Jesus assumes the function of Wisdom, which in Jewish tradition has already been identified with Torah. In Q, Jesus appears as spokesman for Wisdom--the last and greatest of her envoys--but in Matthew Jesus is Wisdom and hence is Torah.

The evidence is impressive. 1) At 11:19, Matthew changes the saying on Wisdom's "children" to read "Wisdom is justified by her deeds." This, Suggs argues, indicates that Matthew has in mind the "Messianic deeds" of Jesus which are central in 11:2-24.²¹ 2) In order to reenforce a sense of Jesus' uniqueness, Matthew has inserted 11:12-15 into the Q context, signifying that "with John the Baptist the 'new' has erupted into history."²² 3) At 23:34 Matthew actually puts Wisdom's saying (Lk. 11:49) into Jesus' mouth. He thus assigns to Jesus "a function which belongs to no figure in pre-Christian Judaism except Wisdom and God."²³ 4) When the material that now comprises 11:25-27 was placed in its present context it acquired a new meaning. "These things" that are "hidden from the wise and understanding" but "revealed to babes" must now be interpreted as Jesus' Messianic deeds.²⁴ Moreover, in the following verses (28-30) Jesus issues an invitation to "my yoke," although in Jewish Wisdom-speculation the yoke of obedience is always Wisdom's own. 5) Jewish thought also identified Wisdom with Torah, and rabbis could speak of the "yoke of the Torah." Thus when Jesus (11:28-30) invites his hearers to take his yoke upon them, he is inviting them to Torah. Suggs concludes: "Jesus speaks as Sophia, and in such a saying as 11:28-30 that means as Torah as well."²⁵

Without a doubt, Suggs has pointed to a consistent and intentional emphasis on Matthew's part. His study makes clear the central role of Jesus in the Matthean soteriology, and it also reemphasizes the connection between Torah and salvation. I remain unconvinced, however, that Matthew thinks of Jesus specifically as Torah. What Suggs has demonstrated is that, as over against Q, Matthew rejects the notion of Jesus as one of Wisdom's envoys and assigns to Jesus sayings that were attributed to Wisdom in Q. But does this mean that Jesus is Wisdom, or simply that Matthew does not choose to work with the (somewhat suspect) figure of Wisdom? Does Jesus speak as Wisdom, or has the category been supplanted? If Jesus is the Son of God (or Son of David, or Son of Abraham)--in the sense of his being the divinely commissioned eschatological agent who stands in moral unity with the Father and whose function is to issue a definitive statement of the Torah at the climax of history--is it not quite natural that he stand in God's stead? All this implies a great deal about Jesus' uniqueness and authority, about his climactic role in the history of salvation, but nothing about any sort of incarnation in his person. There is simply no need to resort to such a notion in interpreting this gospel which seems so clearly oriented in another direction. As Stendahl comments, the idea of sonship in 11:25-30 "has no clear implication of pre-existence or specific Christological speculation."²⁶ Jesus' status as the revealer is understood throughout Matthew's gospel in terms of authority and moral unity with God.

With regard to Torah, it is again unnecessary to speak of incarnation or identity on the basis of Suggs's evidence. That Jesus may speak of the yoke of the Torah as "my yoke" need mean only that Jesus represents God precisely in that he has been commissioned to interpret the Law. If some kind of incarnation of the Torah were intended, would it be too much to expect that at some point Matthew might say so explicitly? Matthew's Jesus does not say, "I am the Law," but "I have come to fulfill the Law."

Suggs's argument, then, in no way necessitates a revision of my general characterization of Matthew's soteriology; it actually strengthens the connection between Torah and salvation that I have stressed. But if the salvation offered in Jesus is Torah-salvation, this does not necessarily

mean that Matthew's soteriology is "legalistic." Granted the sharp differences between Matthew and Paul, there is some indication of a functioning grace in the first gospel, although it is not connected with a theology of atonement. The fact of the matter is that in Matthew we can see Law itself functioning as grace.

This is clear, above all, in 11:25-30. The "easiness" of the yoke that leads to "rest" is so manifestly an expression of grace that Gerhard Barth is led to read the passage as a reference to Jesus' "act" in behalf of sinners.²⁷ But there is nothing in the context of the passage to suggest such a reading, nothing remotely suggestive of a vicarious sacrifice. If the passage is read in light of the Torah-theology that dominates the gospel, Strecker's interpretation appears to have the greater merit:

Because the law of Christ, in contrast to the pharisaic precepts, leads to "rest," it can be called *chrestos* /"easy"/ even though it is more difficult in terms of its content; and, insofar as the "yoke" provides even now the *anapausis* /"rest"/, it is termed "light," even though its demands are heavier. Ethical demand and eschatological gift therefore accord with one another--but not in the sense that the latter assumes the former as a prerequisite or even less that, conversely, the "gift" precedes the "demand." To the contrary, the gift of salvation is present in Jesus' demand; the imperative itself has salvific significance.²⁸

Hans-Dieter Betz has offered an interpretation that challenges both Barth and Strecker, relating the present passage to 28:16-20 and 25:31-46. Betz sees the source of the "rest" not in the simple giving of the command itself, but in the risen Jesus' presence with his disciples at 28:20. And he finds this same indication of Jesus' presence in the Parable of the Last Judgment, where it is again combined with Matthew's ethical interest. In the latter passage, Betz argues,

the Risen Lord is present in a mysterious way in "the least of these my brothers," and it is in connection with this that the words /"learn from me, for I am gentle"/ have their validity.²⁹

Thus in 11:25-30 the command to receive Jesus' yoke is a command to imitate the action of the righteous in the parable. And the contrast between Jesus' attitude toward the Law and that of the Pharisees is to be seen in light of the theme of the great surprise in 25:31-46.

But Strecker would seem to be correct at two points. First, the "easiness" of the ethic is quite compatible with Jesus' intensification of the demands of the Law. The commandment is easier by virtue of its simplicity; it is harder because it claims the total person. Second, there is indeed a real unity of indicative and imperative here. But this point will be best appreciated in connection with a consideration of Betz's contention regarding Jesus' presence with the disciples.

The fundamental problem with Betz's view is that Jesus' presence at 28:16-20 is something quite different from his identification with the suffering ones at 25:31-46. In the former case Jesus promises his presence to the body of disciples to empower them to keep his commandments. But it cannot be maintained that the righteous who minister to the needy at 25:31-46 do so by the power of Jesus' presence, for in this case Jesus is present in the needy. And he is present in such a way that the revelation of his identification with these people is a surprise to the righteous. The problem of enabling power is simply not in view.

At 28:16-20 the life of the Church is expressly brought under the aegis of Jesus' empowering presence. There is indeed a parallel between this passage and 11:25-30, since 11:28 seems to be a promise that those who follow Jesus will be given the power to keep his commandments. But does this mean what Betz thinks it means? There is no hint of any mystical or quasi-mystical indwelling. The "coming" to Jesus in vs. 28 is defined in this way in vs. 29: "Take my yoke upon you and learn from me." Thus the ultimate reference is to Jesus' yoke, his command. It is precisely the taking up of the yoke that itself grants "rest." Jesus' presence and Jesus' command are one and the same; the indicative and the imperative are identical.

Further, the presence of Jesus at 28:16-20 need not be understood in quite the way Betz wishes. It is perfectly in line with the sense of this passage (along with 18:20) to understand Jesus' presence as a surrogate for his original presence as the authoritative interpreter of the Law. Jesus stands in the midst of his followers as the one who brings the easy yoke and thereby grants the grace sufficient for authentic obedience.

Here, then, is the problem of Matthew's Christology. He presents a soteriology grounded in a real theology of grace. He also constructs a Christological witness in which Jesus has unique authority and a unique status. But Jesus himself seems to be related to the grace that issues in man's salvation in a merely indirect way. It is Torah itself, finally, that contains the paradoxical statement of radical grace/radical demand. Thus when Matthew finally speaks of the eschatological judgment, it turns out to be the rightly-interpreted Torah--not confession of Christ, not membership in the Church, not dependence upon Jesus' atoning sacrifice--that actually functions salvifically.

If the "universalistic" element represented in the Parable of the Last Judgment, then, is an undercurrent in Matthew's gospel, it must nevertheless be seen as a significant one. If it is not an explicitly developed theme, it is nevertheless related in a significant way to a theme that is explicitly developed: the ethical character of salvation. Conversely, if the Christological thrust of the gospel is indeed the mainstream in Matthew's witness--and I do not doubt that in one sense it is--it is nevertheless a curiously inconsistent element in that in practical terms it is overextended by an ethical soteriology with universalistic overtones. The mainstream, in other words, turns out to be interpreted by the undercurrent.

A Process Perspective

That exegetical results are theologically ambiguous can hardly be challenged. What might need emphasis at this point is that they are often ambiguous on a more immediate level. We need not raise the question of the "theological implications" of the preceding exegetical venture to see the problem. It is there in full view as soon as we ask the question of the relative importance of mainstream and undercurrent. For the only possible answer will come in the form of another question: "What is meant by 'importance'?" And with this we enter the explicit domain of hermeneutical method.

It is possible, of course, to get one kind of answer without consciously raising the second question. We can limit ourselves to the type of response that a purely "scientific" exegesis can make. Clearly, Matthew's intention was to make some sort of Christological witness, not an anthropological statement. If there are discrepancies in this witness, we must look for evidence of a verifiable nature in order to explain these discrepancies. And there is an explanation close at hand: if, as seems apparent, Matthew is involved in a polemic against "antinomians" of some sort, then it is quite natural that he should tend to overstate his own special interest and assume, rather than explicate, the fundamentals of Christian faith.

I do not wish to dispute such reasoning; I can accept it as partially valid. But the fact remains that, for whatever reasons, Matthew has taken a detour on his Christological destination. If we choose to ignore that fact, we do so on the basis of hermeneutical presuppositions of a particular nature, not from a neutral perspective. Thus if we are to "assess" the phenomenon we have encountered, as opposed to merely "explaining" it, we must be willing at least to consider how it might appear from another point of view.

In observing essentially the same undercurrent that I have identified in this paper, Hendrikus Boers is led to say that "we must come to ask, not only what the author of a text intended, but what happened to him in the writing of the text."³¹ On the basis of this insight he goes on to contend that the incipient universalism in the New Testament, although an undercurrent, shows what happens to confessional theologians as they struggle with the problem of bringing their simple but potent message to bear upon the complexities of life in the world. They are led, unknowingly, to transcend the bounds of narrow confessionalism in the name of deeper insights they cannot name.

I concur fully with these sentiments, but it seems to me that Boers has left us with an insight in search of a hermeneutic. What needs clarification is on what grounds the universal is to be chosen over the particular. And it is at this point that I find process thought to be peculiarly relevant.

The fundamental question that any hermeneutic must answer is this: "What is the nature of the language employed in the text?" The school of interpretation that has addressed itself most explicitly to this question is the New Hermeneutic, and much that I have to say on the basis of process thought will actually parallel the approach represented by this perspective.

But in my estimation the New Hermeneutic is ill-equipped to deal with the total dimensions of the problem encountered in Matthew.³² For in stressing the poetic dimension of religious language, this approach tends to obscure its discursive aspect. Thus any thinker of Matthew's systematic or doctrinal character is bound to be distorted if viewed exclusively from this vantage point. On the other hand, I believe a process hermeneutic can give some perspective on the discursive level of Matthew's thought while at the same time doing justice to what might lie beneath it.

What, then, can process thought tell us about the language of this text that will help us assess the problem it presents? As I conceive it, a process hermeneutic will be based upon the perception of a basic duality in the nature of human speech. On the one hand, language is fragmentary, imprecise, and analogical; words point not to absolutely definite and discrete objects but to prior experiences of a complex and dynamic nature, to subjectively delineated elements in an ongoing process.³³ On the other hand, precisely because the referents of words are not discrete objects, all language depends upon a host of what Lyman Lundeen terms "non-linguistic factors"³⁴ for its meaning, factors that provide words with specific references and intentions. What the presence of these factors shows is that all language necessarily presupposes something: the totality of the process that comprises reality. Thus there is always, in any signification, an implicit metaphysical background.³⁵

The first point parallels an insight of the New Hermeneutic and involves an appreciation of the affective character of speech. For Whitehead, propositions must be understood primarily as "lures for feeling."³⁶ The formation or the choice of a word or concept is never a purely objective matter. It always involves the interest or perspective of the speaker. It always involves a value judgment, for the very act of discerning an aspect of experience for signification necessarily entails a measure of participation in the stance of the speaker. Therefore, as with the New Hermeneutic, we must reckon with a relativization of the subject-object character of speech. The major difference to be noted is that Whitehead sees all language--not just poetic or religious speech--functioning in some measure on this model. Thus even highly discursive speech presupposes some shared experience, on an existential level, between speaker and hearer.

On the second point, a process hermeneutic will go far beyond the New Hermeneutic. By exposing the common root of all language, Whitehead has not only called attention to the affective element in discursive speech but has also shown the signifiatory aspect of affective speech. The gap between variant modes is thus relativized.

The implications for religious speech are profound. Religious language is of necessity involved in a kind of tension. Properly understood, it is--in a higher degree than ordinary language--primarily a lure for feeling, an affective mode designed to draw the hearer into a world of experience, a circle of understanding. It addresses the hearer and invites him to share a value-perspective. On the other hand, however, it does seek to signify, and its specific drive is toward the transcendence of the fragmentary character of experience. It points to the embracing context, the metaphysical background that is the source of all intelligibility.

It is here that the problem arises. In pointing to the metaphysical background of experience, religious language takes on a discursive tone. It tends to sound as if it were meant to be taken univocally, and so its users are almost inevitably tempted to interpret their faith-symbols literally.³⁷ A particularly potent illustration of this tendency is the way in which the metaphors for salvation which the New Testament writers borrowed from Jewish tradition (redemptive suffering, ransom, blood sacrifice, etc.) are taken up by post-Biblical theologians and made the basis of descriptions of the actual mechanics of salvation--with, needless to say, grotesque results.³⁸

If the dual nature of language is appreciated, however, then two important points become clear. First, religious language is a vital and necessary form of human speech, for it tries to make explicit what is implicit in other modes of discourse. Second, however, religious language is problematic because of its tendency to misrepresent itself. A religion that takes its faith-statements as dogmas distorts the relationship between words and faith. Thus in order for religious language to function properly, it must be subjected to metaphysical criticism.³⁹ This means that religious statements must be lifted out of the context of the specific believing community and interpreted in light of the broadest range of human experience.

Now what may we say about the problematic of Matthew's Christology in light of Whitehead's understanding of language? The Matthean gospel presents a highly-structured theological conceptuality. Jesus' role is systematically developed in terms of a history of salvation which is itself bound up with a scheme of Torah-salvation. But Matthew's conceptuality is not worked out with full consistency. His Christological scheme and his soteriological witness ultimately go separate ways, and it is finally the latter that is pursued the more relentlessly. Taking a cue from Whitehead, then, do we not have reason to question whether the final reference of Matthew's presentation of the significance of Jesus is to be found in his doctrinal, or discursive, formulation at all?

The term "confession" is ambiguous. It can mean a pre-intellectual expression of ultimate commitment, but it can also mean the discursive formulation of that commitment. Matthew's "confession," like all such in the New Testament, embraces both aspects. The evangelist addresses the reader with the invitation to understand his life in a particular way; he also develops a "systematic" understanding of the truth upon which that invitation is based. The crucial question is how the two aspects of his confession are to be related. Must we accept Matthew's synthesis on Matthew's terms? From a Whiteheadian perspective, as I understand it, we must make a distinction between the author's surface intention and the deeper lure of the text. The doctrinal thrust is legitimate, for it is the correlate of the author's intention to say something true. The call to follow Jesus is logically accompanied by a declaration of who Jesus is, and the declaration necessarily takes on the character of assertion. But we miss the point if we identify this assertion with the ultimate reference of the text.

The reference is indeed to a truth. This truth, however, is to be found not in the author's assertions, but through the lure that he offers. The interpreter must move in two opposite directions. He must first look beneath the discursive level of the text and ask what feeling the author is

luring him toward. But then, because all language--and religious language most especially--always implies a metaphysical commitment, he must ask what this feeling implies about the structure of reality itself. He must look to the text for feeling, but he must look beyond the text--to the broadest range of human experience and to metaphysical thought--for conceptual clarification of that feeling.

When we look, then, at Matthew's Christological witness with Whiteheadian eyes, what do we see? At the basic level, the level of address, we see an invitation to understand human life on the basis of the agapic principle. And we see a promise that those who do so will find ultimate fulfillment of their human nature. On the discursive level, we see a claim to the ultimate truth of the image of existence that has been proclaimed in the form of the assertion that the one who has brought this understanding is an agent of a transcendent deity who ordains the course of human history. Through this agent the deity has acted in human history in a unique and unrepeatable way.

If we begin with the invitation to the agapic principle as the basic theme in the text, we must next ask whether and to what extent the discursive accompaniment to this theme will stand up, under a metaphysical critique, as a valid complement to it. The problem, of course, lies in the claim to uniqueness and unrepeatability. There is, to be sure, a sense in which any event is unique and unrepeatable. But something else is being asserted here. The text implies control over history; it connotes intervention from beyond; it suggests that some events in history are caused by God in a sense that others are not, thus problematically making God's promptings appear to be one among various other causal forces in history.

Now I am aware of recent attempts of process theologians to speak of salvation-history and special acts of God in a non-mythological way. I believe, however, that such an approach entails serious problems that can be avoided if we begin with Whitehead's view of language, rather than approaching the text directly with his metaphysical categories. The point is that if we recognize that the heart of the text is not to be found at the discursive level at all it becomes simply unnecessary to deal with the more problematic aspects of its conceptuality. The claim to a unique act of God is inherently problematic if taken on the discursive level. But if understood as confessional hyperbole, as a hybrid figure of speech involving an affective lure in the guise of an assertion, it becomes readily intelligible. It appears as an attempt to place the stamp of validity and ultimacy upon a basic insight about life-in-the-world. If we view it in this way we may agree with Herbert Braun that the anthropology, not the Christology, constitutes the more basic level of the New Testament text. And we may agree with Fritz Buri,⁴⁰ Schubert Ogden,⁴¹ and Hendrikus Boers, against Bultmann, that even the Christological witness must be subject to the demythologizing process.

This is one implication of Whitehead's claim that religious language must be subjected to metaphysical criticism. But there is another, equally important, implication. The interpreter's task is not complete when the feeling embodied in the text has been identified. For from Whitehead's perspective, feeling and signification are integrally bound up with one another. The rejection of the mythological form of Matthew's truth-claim gives us no right to ignore his intention to state something true about reality, to make

a claim about God's relationship to human beings. The mythological claim stands for something, a point that is obscured by the New Hermeneutic.

At this point, of course, we slide imperceptibly into the areas of philosophy and systematic theology, in which the Biblical interpreter may or may not have an interest. But it belongs clearly within the task of the interpreter at least to make this initial recognition: what Matthew feels about life cannot be reduced to his subjectivity; his witness implies, and in some sense intends, a metaphysical reference. If he calls his readers to the agapic principle, let us be clear that this principle is for him not merely the construction of the human intellect or the human heart. It is embedded in the structure of existence. The anthropology to which Matthew points is based upon his vision of the nature of the universe in which man lives: the human possibility is a gift of God.

NOTES

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19. See above, n. 4.
20. M. Jack Suggs, Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Matthew's Gospel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970).
21. Ibid., p. 57.
22. Ibid., pp. 57f.
23. Ibid., p. 59.
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25. Ibid., p. 106.
26. Stendahl, p. 784.
27. Barth, pp. 147f.
28. Strecker, pp. 174f. See also G. Lambert, "Mon joug est aisé et mon fardeau léger," NRT, LXXVII (1955), 963-69.
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30. Ibid.
31. Boers, p. 8.
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1. The first part of the report is devoted to a general description of the project and its objectives. It also includes a brief history of the project and a list of the people who have been involved in it.

2. The second part of the report describes the methods used in the project. This includes a description of the data collection methods, the statistical methods used, and the methods used to analyze the data.

3. The third part of the report presents the results of the project. This includes a description of the data, the results of the statistical analysis, and the conclusions drawn from the results.

4. The fourth part of the report discusses the implications of the results. This includes a discussion of the limitations of the study, the strengths of the study, and the implications of the results for future research.

5. The fifth part of the report is a conclusion. This includes a summary of the findings of the project and a statement of the author's conclusions.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of references. This includes a list of the books, articles, and other sources that were used in the project.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of appendices. This includes a list of the tables, figures, and other materials that are included in the report.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of acknowledgments. This includes a list of the people who have helped the author in the project.

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In Jacob Jervell's Luke and the People of God: A New Look at Luke-Acts (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publ. House, 1972) are collected seven essays, all but one of which directly concerns Lukan ecclesiology. This central theme encompasses "the question of the identity of a church which is heir to the promises given to Israel, a church which claims to be Israel and yet still includes uncircumcised Gentiles within its membership" (17). As far as a general Sitz im Leben stance is concerned, "Alienation of Jewish Christians after the influx of Gentiles into the church and rumors about Paul provide the problems Luke attempts to resolve for his readers" (17). This critical review of Jervell [hereafter referred to as "J."] will concentrate particular attention upon two foundational essays: "The Divided People of God" and "Paul: The Teacher of Israel." Summary remarks will be offered concerning the other essays.

I

In his seminal and most important essay, "The Divided People of God: The Restoration of Israel and Salvation for the Gentiles," J. proposes three main theses regarding the Acts which concern the question of: "Why does the church carry on the Gentile mission, and how has it come about?" (41). First of all, as a result of the preaching of the gospel Luke presents a picture of two groups in Israel: the repentant and the unrepentant. Therefore, and secondly, Luke shows that Israel has become "the divided people of God" because two groups emerge: the repentant Jews who believe in Jesus and constitute the purified, restored, true and "empirical" Israel, and the obdurate, unbelieving Jews who are no longer a part of the "empirical" Israel. Thirdly, the promises must be fulfilled to Israel [i.e., the restored, repentant Israel] before the Gentiles can share in salvation, for the salvation of the Gentiles must proceed by way of the restored Israel (42-43).

The first two theses are well documented (44-49). J. shows that the opening chapters of the Acts reveal that many Jews receive the gospel [and thereby constitute the restored Israel]. Moreover, he discovers a pattern of acceptance and rejection by Jews which is faithful to the view of Luke. Thereby J. begins to sketch an important contribution to Luke's understanding of the motive for the Gentile mission.

In Part Three (49-55) J. examines Acts 15,13-21 and 3,23 in order to formulate his view of the way in which Luke presents the bringing of salvation to the Gentiles. J. convincingly argues from these texts that after the promises have been fulfilled to Israel and so Israel has become restored and rebuilt (Acts 15,16), then the Gentiles receive a share in the promises, and so, salvation, as they become an associate people which belongs to the "empirical" Israel (Acts 15,17-18). [Acts 3,23 complements this interpretation in that this text reveals that the unrepentant Jews will be purged from Israel.] With his interpretation that the mission to the Gentiles occurs through the restored Israel, J. overturns the standard view of the Gentile mission that "Only after and because Israel rejected the gospel, and for that reason has itself been rejected, do the missionaries turn to the Gentiles" (41). Building upon his insights regarding Acts 15, J. makes two other important observations which correct previous

"... the main point is that salvation has come to the Gentiles through Israel, and has come in such a way that the Gentiles do not need circumcision in order to be justified" (67). We suggest that J. is carrying his thesis too far. The earlier statements in the Acts [e.g., 1,8; 2,39] should be taken as programmatic and Acts 10-11 as illustrating and bringing into actualization what was given as a program to be unfolded in time. Therefore, the Cornelius story is about the problem of Israel's acceptance of the mission to the Gentiles and their share in salvation [see esp. 10,34-35.45-48; 11,15-19]. Certainly the question of circumcision is intrinsic to the nature of the mission to the Gentiles, but it is not one of the two main questions in chs. 10-11 as J. proposes (on 66-67). Moreover, J. seems to be reading his thesis about salvation to the Gentiles through the restored Israel into chs. 10-11 and he doesn't adduce texts from these chs. to support his view.

In the main, J.'s essay of the divided people of God makes many contributions to the understanding of the Gentile mission in the Acts, and thereby, to Lukan ecclesiology. Yet, as our objections reveal, J. sometimes carries his theses too far, applies them where they do not fit, and neglects to seek an interplay among different traditions because he seeks a unified perspective. [We note here that S. Wilson, *The Gentiles and the Gentile Mission in Luke-Acts*, SNTS 23 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1973) takes the position that Luke does not have a unified theology regarding the Gentiles.]

II

J.'s thesis in "Paul: The Teacher of Israel" is that the primary thrust of chs. 21-28 of the Acts consists in a defense of Paul. This defense focuses primarily upon the facts that Paul is a loyal Pharisee, faithful to the law and to Scripture, and as such true to the hope of Israel, the resurrection. Luke portrays Paul in this way because charges and rumors have accused him of being a false teacher in Israel. Luke's defense of Paul in the last part of the Acts shows without a doubt that Paul is just the opposite: he is a faithful, law-abiding Jew who is first and foremost the teacher of (and not an apostate from) Israel (see esp. 164-171).

In many ways J. puts forth important insights concerning the last part of the Acts and his analyses do account for a considerable portion of chs. 21-28. Also, J. argues convincingly against the theories that (1) Acts 21-28 constitute in the main a political apologetic addressed to the Roman state, and (2) Acts 21-28 is concerned primarily with the mission to the Gentiles (154-58,167).

Our basic assessment of J.'s work in this essay is that he does isolate, explore and elaborate an important theme in Acts 21-28, but that this theme cannot account for all which goes on in these chapters. J. makes the mistake of taking the part for the whole. Our remarks below speak to this issue in a number of ways and suggest that in these last chapters of the Acts a number of concerns are interplayed and that J.'s thesis about Paul as the true teacher of Israel is one of these concerns, but does not constitute the whole story.

J. concentrates much of his attention upon, and finds the basic evidence for his position about Acts 21-28 in, the summary accusations against Paul and Paul's declarations of innocence [see esp. Acts 21,21.28; 28,17; 25,8; 24,5; 23,29; 25,19]. In the main the arguments which J. puts forth do show that Luke is defending Paul as a true teacher of Israel. In the course of his analyses J. does mention twice in passing that Paul is a missionary to both Jews and Gentiles (158,173), and yet one gets the impression that J. is so intent to show that Paul is an authentic teacher of Jews that he loses sight of the fact that it is

also a concern of Luke that Paul is a missionary to Gentiles. We would point out a number of texts within Acts 21-28 which show that Luke presents Paul as a missionary to both Jews and Gentiles: 22,15 [confer 9,15]; 26,17.20.22-23.26-29; 28,23-31 [and perhaps 21,28 if "all persons everywhere" could be interpreted by 22,15 rather than by 21,21 as J. suggests in n. 37]. In Acts 22,15 Paul is told that he will be a witness to all persons, and likewise in 26,17 he receives a commission to be sent to be a witness to "the people" of the Jews and to "the Gentiles." In 26,20 he notes that he has preached to both Jews and Gentiles, and in 26,22-23 he is witness to "both small and great." The interchanges in 26,26-29 show that Paul seeks the conversion of his audience who is composed of Gentiles and the half-Jew Agrippa (see 25,23). Lastly, in 28,23-31 we find an account of Paul preaching first to Jews and later to Gentiles. In light of these texts we propose that J. is correct when he says that Luke portrays Paul as an authentic teacher of Israel, but that in order to grasp the interplay of concerns in Acts 21-28, J. must integrate his insight with the fact that Luke presents Paul as a missionary to both Jews and Gentiles. Luke defends Paul not only as a teacher of Israel, but also as a teacher of Gentiles.

Paul as an apostle of the Gentiles comes into focus within Acts 21-28 particularly in 22,17-21; 26; and 28,23-31. We would like to propose some observations about the first two texts. J. does make a good point that 22,17-22 does not constitute sufficient evidence to justify the assertion that the Gentile mission forms the theme of chs. 22-26 as a whole (165-166). J. basically assesses 22,17-21 [which he admits can be cited as a counter-argument to his position of Paul as the true teacher of Israel, 165] as a tradition which contradicts 26,17f.19.23 but one which Luke did not want to suppress. While it is true that these texts are contradictory, we suggest that J. cannot account for the significance of Acts 22,17-21 because he wishes to understand them in accordance with his thesis that Paul is the true teacher of Israel. We suggest, on the other hand, that even the contradictions among the texts do not pose an insurmountable difficulty if one understands them within the framework that Luke is presenting Paul as a witness to both the Jews and Gentiles [see 22,15 and the other texts cited above] and that 22,17-21 gives one example of the divine command to Paul to go to the Gentiles. Moreover, the literary structure of 22,5b-21, with a number of repeated elements and correspondences, reveals that the primary thrust of 22,5b-21 is that of Paul's going to the Gentiles:

- α .5 εἰς Δαμασκὸν ἐπορευόμεν
 β .6 ἐγένετο δὲ μοι πορευομένῳ καὶ ἐγγίζοντι τῇ Δαμασκῷ
 γ .10 πορεύου εἰς Δαμασκόν
 α' .11 ἦλθον εἰς Δαμασκόν
 β' .17 ἐγένετο δὲ μοι ὑποστρέψαντι εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ
 γ' .18 σπεύσον καὶ ἔξελθε ἐν τάχει ἐξ Ἱερουσαλὴμ
 γ² .21 πορεύου, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἔθνη μακρὰν ἐξαποστελῶ σε

This structure shows how Luke is interplaying a number of traditions [i.e., the Damascus event, the interchange between Paul and Ananias, and the Temple Vision]. Moreover, in view of this structure, which is not found in chs. 9 and 26, we would have to disagree with J.'s statement (163) that "In Chapters 22 and 26 Luke clearly makes use of pre-formed material without making any alteration, while his commentary on the material is found in Chapters 23 and 24." The structure of 22,5b-21 shows precisely how Luke has interplayed and indeed "altered" the

interpretations of the Acts. Since salvation comes to the Gentiles through the restored (and repentant) Israel, then "the continuity of salvation history has also been insured; Luke is unaware of a break in salvation history" (53). Furthermore, "A Gentile Christianity that claims to be the true Israel in contrast to the 'empirical' Israel is not described at all by Luke" (54). Thus, J. overturns the application of the theory of the Gentiles as the "new" and "true" people of God who replace unbelieving and obdurate Israel [the "old" or "former" people of God].

J. has isolated an important tradition and viewpoint of Luke in these analyses of Acts 15. In Part Four (56-64) he applies his viewpoint that salvation comes to the Gentiles through the restored Israel to Peter's speeches in Acts 10 and 3 (i.e., 3,17-26), and to 13,40-47 and 28,23-31. While we do not wish to take issue with his interpretations of Peter's speeches in chs. 3 and 10, we do suggest the possibility that J. may be reading his thesis into somewhat ambiguous texts. It is with J.'s interpretations of 13,40ff. and 28,23ff. that we have a number of difficulties, for J. seems to be taking his insights in Part Three [concerning Acts 15, 13ff.] and forcing these texts to fit the perspective which he has found there regarding salvation to the Gentiles through the restored Israel. Classical understandings of 13,44-47 and 28,25-28 view these texts as showing that Israel's rejection of the gospel motivates the Gentile mission. But since J. has argued a very different theory, he must now reinterpret these texts. On p. 61 J. argues that 13,47 ought to be interpreted in this way: "Thus, even before the speech in this synagogue, the missionaries were under command to turn to Gentiles. The partial rejection on the part of the Jews does not provide the basis for preaching to Gentiles because the Gentile mission is already contained in the missionary command of God . . ." Provided that the missionaries represent Israel, it is through Israel that light=salvation comes to the Gentiles.

We would make the following objections to this interpretation. First of all, J. seems to overlook the force of οὐκ in vs. 47 which grammatically must refer to what precedes it, i.e., the rejection by some Jews as the motive to turn to the Gentiles in vs. 46. Therefore, J. can't argue his position [described above] on the basis of grammar, but only conceptually. Secondly, even though the missionaries were under the command of God to go to the Gentiles before their speech in the synagogue, nevertheless, in the scene described in 13,44-47 it is precisely the rejection by some Jews which at this point in time moves the missionaries to go to the Gentiles. What we would suggest in the place of J.'s interpretation is that in 13,40-47 there are two traditions given by Luke: 13,40-43, which speaks of the acceptance of the gospel by some Jews, and 13,44-47, which portrays the motive for going to the Gentiles to be the rejection of the gospel by some Jews. The first tradition is in accord with J.'s basic position, and the fact that in the second tradition one finds only part of the Jews rejecting the gospel [i.e., according to 13,40 some Jews present do believe] also coheres with J.'s thesis of the divided people of God. What we suggest is that 13,44-47 represents a tradition which does see the mission to the Gentiles as motivated by the rejection of the gospel by some Jews. This tradition is placed next to the one about acceptance of the gospel by some Jews (13,40) and Luke does not harmonize nor bring these two traditions into one perspective. J.'s exegesis of 13,40-47 tries to harmonize the two traditions. We propose that rather than harmonizing them, they should be understood as two traditions which Luke incorporates and interplays but does not harmonize.

In a similar way, we object to J.'s interpretation of 28,23-31. The conjunction, οὖν, in 28,28 grammatically refers to what precedes it, i.e., the rejection of the gospel by some Jews and this as the motivation to go to the Gentiles (28,24b-27). J. interprets vs. 28 in the following way: "The salvation of God does not come to Gentiles for the first time [see the aorist tense of προσέλθω in vs. 28], that is, as a consequence of the Jews'

rejection. It had already been given to them in the past [see Acts 1,8 for example]. Long ago, when the missionaries were addressing Israel, the place of Gentiles in God's plan of salvation was clear. When Paul says that the Gentiles will listen, this implies an 'in spite of'--in spite of the partial rejection on the part of the Jews, the gospel and thereby the sharing in the promises of Israel are to be offered to the Gentiles" (63). Again, we suggest that two traditions are placed side by side here: 28,24a (Jewish acceptance of the gospel) and 28,24b-28 (partial Jewish rejection of the gospel motivates the Gentile mission). And these are not harmonized into one perspective. It is true that long ago the mission to the world was pronounced--see, for example, Lk 24,47ff.; Acts 1,8 (2,39)--but these texts are to be interpreted programmatically, and not as actualized as yet. They are actualized and unfolded in various ways in the Acts.

We suggest, then, that 13,43-47 and 28,24b-28 do not support J.'s thesis that the mission to the Gentiles is motivated by the acceptance of the gospel by the repentant portion of Israel. Rather, they constitute another tradition which Luke has preserved and interplayed with the tradition which J. has isolated and well documented. Moreover, Acts 6, 8-8,3 and 11,19ff. also illustrate the theme of: due to the rejection of the gospel by some Jews, the gospel is spread to the Gentiles. This is a tradition in the Acts which cannot be denied, but must be interplayed with the one J. has isolated.

In order to be fair to the various traditions which Luke incorporates we suggest the following interplay of traditions. J. has isolated one tradition which states that through the repentant and restored portion of Israel salvation comes to the Gentiles. But other texts in Acts speak of a partial rejection of the Jews as motivating the turn to the Gentiles [e.g., 6,8-8,3 and 11,19ff.; 13,43-47; 28,24b-28]. Yet, the latter does not necessarily contradict the former because even though a partial rejection by Jews motivates some turning to the Gentiles, it is still through members of the repentant Israel [e.g., Paul in Acts 13 and 28] that salvation is preached to the Gentiles. In conclusion, then, we submit that J. has isolated a tradition regarding the motive for the Gentile mission in the Acts, and he has done a great service for the understanding of the Acts in so doing. But there is more than one tradition in the Acts regarding the Gentile mission, and J.'s work needs to be corrected because he seeks to harmonize different traditions into his one perspective rather than seeking an interplay among different traditions.

Since the above comments constitute our main objections to J.'s essay, "The Divided People of God," we only summarily note a few other ideas of J. to which we take objection. At the end of Part Four (64) J. maintains that "with the conclusion of Acts there is also the conclusion to the mission to the Jews" [see 68-69 also for this view]. We suggest that this is not necessarily born out by the text of 28,23-31 because (1) it is possible that, like the material after 13,40-47 [which has many affinities to 28,23-31 as is apparent above], Jews again will hear the gospel and some believe [see 14,1; 17,4,11, etc.]; and (2) *πάντας* in vs. 30 does not necessarily exclude Jews.

Our last objection concerns J.'s application of his thesis [that through the restored Israel salvation comes to the Gentiles] to the Cornelius story in Acts 10-11. J. states the problem: "If it was clear that from the beginning in the preaching to the Jews that the Gentiles should also share in the salvation of Israel, how then is the Cornelius event (10:11-11:18) to be understood? (64-65). J. takes the position that "Here the question is: In what way and at what time do the Gentiles receive a share in the promises to Israel?" (65). The answer is:

pre-formed material.

In relation to J.'s statement quoted in the preceding paragraph, we would also disagree with J. that Luke makes no alteration of the pre-formed material in ch. 26. On the contrary, we suggest that Luke makes important alterations which integrate this material with the fact that Paul as an authentic Jew teaches the general resurrection and the resurrection of the Christ (26,6-8,22-23) to both Jews and Gentiles. When one compares ch. 26 with chs. 9 and 22 one finds that 26,6-8 and .22-23 do not have parallel material, and so one would see Luke's hand in these additions to the traditional material. Acts 26,6-8,22-23 link ch. 26 with the statements about the resurrection in 23,6; 24,15,21. When these five texts are interrelated it becomes clear that Luke is presenting a certain development of ideas and an interplay of concerns. In chs. 23 and 24 Luke portrays Paul as an authentic and law-abiding Jew who is preaching the resurrection--at which fact Jews, of all people, can't take offense! [This accords with J.'s analyses on 162-171.] Then, in 26,6-8,22-23 Paul openly declares the Christ to be the first member of the resurrection of the dead (26,23) and it is important both (1) to whom he speaks and (2) the interplay of 26,6-8,22-23 with the rest of the speech of ch. 26. Clearly Paul is addressing an audience of Gentiles (see 25,23) and the half-Jew, Agrippa, and in 26,26-29 he seeks their conversion. [We must disagree with J.'s statements about 26,23 on p. 161, par. 1.] Therefore, a development has taken place between chs. 23 and 24 and ch. 26. In the former Paul is the authentic teacher of Israel, as J. would argue; but in ch. 26 Paul, the loyal Jew (26,4-5), now declares the message about the resurrection of the Christ (26,23) to the Gentiles. Moreover, this declaration to a Gentile audience should be understood within the framework of Paul as an apostle to both Jews and Gentiles, as 26,17-23 indicates. In this way Paul's witnessing to Gentiles (26,22-23,25-29) is interplayed with the concern in chs. 21-28 that Paul is an apostle to both Jews and Gentiles [see the texts cited above].

J. offers interesting *Sitz im Leben* reflections in accord with his view of Paul as the true teacher of Israel and with his thesis about the restored Israel and the Gentiles as an associate people (172-177). While we do not wish to argue against these proposals, we would like to suggest another tact. Building upon what we have indicated above concerning Paul as the apostle to both Jews and Gentiles we propose that as such Paul's figure and his defense constitute an excellent portrayal of the continuity between Judaism and Christianity. Moreover, the resurrection texts in chs. 23-26 [and see 28,20 also] show that belief in the resurrection of the Christ is in perfect continuity with authentic Jewish belief. This message about the resurrection of the Christ is proclaimed in turn to Jews (23,6; 24,15,21) and to Gentiles (26,6-8,22-23,26-29). Therefore, not only the figure of Paul, but also his message in chs. 22-26 argue for an unbroken continuity between Judaism and belief in the Christ as the first of the resurrection of the dead (26,22-23). Such a point of view of continuity between Judaism and Christianity would be quite understandable if Luke's community consisted of both Jewish and Gentile Christians. J.'s work has certainly showed such a community to be a realistic assessment of the case.

In summary then: in his essay on Paul as the teacher of Israel J. has made a number of significant contributions to the understanding of Acts 21-28. While Paul as the teacher of Israel is a definite concern of this last part of the Acts, it is not the whole story. We argued that this theme is interplayed with the theme of Paul as an apostle to both Jews and Gentiles; and we suggest that this theme is also interplayed with the concern to show the continuity between Judaism and Christianity.

III

J.'s thesis about Israel as the restored people of God through whom the Gentiles become an associate people provides the framework for his consideration of the twelve apostles in his essay, "The Twelve on Israel's Thrones: Luke's Understanding of the Apostolate" (75-112). Luke assigns the twelve a "prophetic role"--preaching to Israel the message of the resurrection of the Messiah which constitutes the fulfillment of God's promise to his people (90-94). Furthermore, "The mission among the Gentiles is not a break with Israel, but an affirmation of Israel. The guarantee for this is precisely the Twelve who are chosen to play a role within Israel, since the eschatological Israel is the people of twelve tribes who are to be joined to the Gentiles" (93). The twelve can disappear after Acts 15 because their task has been fulfilled in that the restored Israel has come into existence. A general point of criticism to be addressed to J. concerning this essay is that he seems to bring in a lot of extraneous material which doesn't directly concern his basic argumentation [which appears on 90-94]. Specifically, J. mistakenly states that Lk 24,46ff. is revealed only to the twelve (102). But, according to Luke 24,33 the eleven "and those who were with them" were present. Relatedly, this observation raises the probability that Acts 10,41 refers not only to the twelve as J. would interpret (88) but to those of Luke 24, 33 "who ate and drank with him after he rose from the dead" (Acts 10, 41b).

In "The Lost Sheep of the House of Israel: The Understanding of the Samaritans in Luke-Acts" (113-132), J. seeks to overturn the standard opinion that Luke regards the Samaritans as Gentiles. J. takes the position that the Samaritans constitute Jews who have gone astray, but through their conversion to belief in Jesus belong to the restored and repentant Israel. Much of J.'s argumentation must be by way of inference (see esp. 119-123) and he presents a good case for his position, but sometimes he seems to overstate his case (see 125, end of par. 2).

Again building upon his thesis of the church in Luke-Acts as consisting of the restored Israel and the Gentiles as an associate people, J. studies the question of "The Law in Luke-Acts" (133-151). Disagreeing with the general opinion that the law in Luke-Acts is a peripheral concern (133), J. maintains that to Luke the law is "not essentially the moral law, but the mark of distinction between Jews and non-Jews" (137). This mark is very important because Jewish Christians are the restored Israel and thereby "circumcision and law become the very marks of their identity" (143). Moreover, being the restored Israel, Jewish Christians constitute the foundation of the church and so they must uphold the law (143). J. corrects Haenchen's position that the Gentiles are "free from the law." Indeed, they are not totally free from the law--on the other hand, they must keep certain prescriptions in order to associate with the restored Israelites (144). On the whole J.'s presentation is quite convincing but he doesn't deal with Luke 16,16-18 in a sufficiently thorough way.

Within the context of the positions espoused in "The Divided People . . ." and "Paul . . ." J. proceeds to argue in "James: The Defender of Paul" (185-207) that "James' function in Acts is of primary importance in connection with Paul, whose conduct Luke must defend by writing Acts, and to a lesser degree in connection with Peter, whose conduct is also not completely above suspicion (11:11ff.)" (187). In response to J.'s arguments, which find their crucial evidence in chs. 15 and 21, we would suggest that while James is the defender of Paul [in chs. 21 especially] he is first and foremost the guarantee of the "church's claim to be the restored Israel" (188).

For James officiates in the two places where the relationship between Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians is resolved (chs. 15 and 21).

In "The Problem of Traditions in Acts" (19-39), J. attempts to argue that there exists sufficient evidence in the Paulines for the probability of the formation of a tradition about apostolic times with regard to the activity of the apostles, the Jerusalem congregation and mission. J. adduces convincing evidence (23-31) which shows that "reports of the work of the apostle [Paul], the growth and life of a congregation, and progress of mission had their place in the life of the congregation" (32). It is when J. tries to formulate arguments for the existence of traditions concerning preaching about the apostles [see, e.g., 1 Cor. 15,3ff.] and concerning the availability of a "remarkable amount of information" about the Jerusalem congregation [see Gal. 1 and 2] that he seems to be on less solid ground (32-36).

Regarding the general issue of Sitz im Leben, J. chooses to view Lukan problems and concerns in terms of Jewish Christians primarily. In the past these problems were formulated in terms of Gentile Christianity only. We would raise the question: does J. overcompensate? Perhaps a middle ground is needed: we suggest that the Lukan corpus could profitably be viewed in terms of a community of Jewish and Gentile Christians in which milieu Luke stresses in many ways the continuity between Judaism and Christianity. The figures of Paul, Peter and James, the relationship(s) between Jewish and Gentile Christians, the problem of the law and the Gentile mission, for instance, could be viewed in this light and the way(s) in which Luke interplays traditions concerning these could be pursued.

IV

We would conclude this critical review of Jervell with the following remarks. In certain respects J. has offered creative, insightful, instructive and often convincing theses about ecclesial concerns in Luke-Acts. On the other hand, at times J. lacks rigor and verifiability; he has a tendency to harmonize and force interpretations according to his particular perspective, and he needs to seek the interplay of different elements rather than levelling them according to a single hypothesis.

Susan Wittig

A vexed and vexing question in both literary criticism and in Biblical criticism these days has arisen like a shadow out of that murky bog that lies in the vicinity of the intersection of "structure" and "meaning." In the past few years we have heard a great deal about formal and structural approaches to the linguistic surface structure of the verbal text and to the deep structural patterns latent in the narrative itself. We have been assured that computer analysis, algebraic formula, and techniques borrowed from transformational grammar will shortly reveal to us heretofore hidden structural phenomena responsible for the creation of meaning: the basic binary oppositions by means of which meaning is generated. Our response to all of this esoteric activity is perhaps tinged with uneasiness, for (we may fear) once the deep structure of the text has been revealed, our freedom of interpretation will be threatened, our range of understanding of the verbal text will be greatly limited: structural study and its related semiotic activities will at last have shown us the meaning of the literary artifact.

Obviously, I am here exaggerating both the claims of structural and semiotic criticism and our distrust of it. Generally speaking, as we all know, most critics who have practiced structural analysis are modest, even tentative, in their claims for its interpretive powers, while the more conservative critics of non-structuralist persuasions are quite unlikely to be intimidated by techniques and methods as apparently radical as those proposed by some structuralists. But I would like to use the exaggerated positions I have just described as the basis for addressing a serious problem that does require our attention now, as structural and formal approaches proliferate and as readers experiment with new ways of understanding what and how Biblical texts mean. The problem I would like to pose here is the task of understanding how a text, generated by one single deep structural pattern, can have multiple, often apparently contradictory meanings--that is, how a text can be polyvalent or plurisignificant. Further, the question of the nature of plurisignification (also a problem in the analysis of secular texts) assumes an even more urgent importance when we confront scriptural texts, whose significance frequently is doctrinally determined and traditionally limited, and whose interpretation is related to belief systems more deeply embedded than those of secular texts. More specifically, the problem for us here is focussed on structure and meaning in the parables of Jesus: first, on the pluralities of meaning that the parable text can generate and has generated; and second, on the significative process out of which these multiple significations arise.


Contemporary interpretations of the parables have raised a number of critical questions concerning context, generic and mythic structure, rhetorical purpose and rhetorical effect, and signification. Through the work of the form critics, it has been shown that the parables as they appear in the gospels are the product of the ideological needs and rhetorical purposes of the writers of the gospels, who embedded a variety of traditional texts within the basically linear structure of their own narratives, refashioning them to suit the requirements of the narrative frame within which they are set and the doctrinal purposes for which these narrative frames are designed. Since, then, the parables can no longer comfortably be interpreted in

an historical situation, through the external structure of a Sitz im Leben, it has become apparent that the next area to be explored is the internal structures of the texts themselves.


Looking at the points of view on one single parable represented by participants in this seminar, we can see a variety of approaches--all with a common concern for the internal structures of the text, attempting to disregard its narrative or generic or social contexts. From one point of view the Prodigal Son is seen as a comic structure, representing the movement of a "picaresque saint" from irresponsibility to a "contextual freedom." From another it is seen as a wish-fulfillment dream expressing a human need for unity and completeness in a fragmented world; from yet another it is an "anti-myth," calling the possibility of mythic mediation, of unity and reconciliation, into question. Each of these points of view, of course, is firmly grounded in a particular philosophical and methodological matrix which justifies and reifies the critical conclusions that have been reached through its application: literary and esthetic criticism, Freudian psychoanalysis, structural criticism. And each of these points of view seems to find equally valid significance in the same text, even though these critical perspectives find opposing meanings. It is my task here to suggest how these different views of the same parable may arise, what in the semantic structure of the text makes such marked plurisignification possible, and what the function of multiple signification may be from the phenomenological perspective of the reader's encounter with the text.

To provide a foundation for this discussion of signification and plurisignification in the parables, I would like to briefly review a theoretical model for the understanding of communication proposed by Charles Sanders Pierce and Charles Morris.¹ I propose its use here not because it is currently fashionable (although it is), but because it is powerful enough to provide us not only with a view of the parables but with a meta-view that includes the primary texts and the variety of approaches to them. In other words, it can help to establish not only a way of understanding how meaning is achieved but a model for organizing ways of understanding meaning--a model for organizing various ways of deriving textual significance.

Semiotics is the study of the sign and the sign system, within the context of its production, its performance, and its reception. The diadic relations of the components of the communications event--the sender and receiver, the sign, and the referent--can be most clearly presented in what is commonly called the "communication theory triangle," a triadic representation of the speech act:²



According to Charles Morris, a complete semiotic study of a system of signs--a verbal text, say--would focus on the sign in its several dimensions: the relationship of signs to one another, along the syntactic axis; the relationship of sender and receiver, along the pragmatic (or rhetorical) axis, and the relationship of sign to referent, along the semantic axis.



It is immediately apparent, however, that an analysis of a single dimension of the speech event, isolated from the other dimensions, is impossible, for each aspect of the communications act involves the other in complex, almost unmeasurable ways. The whole process of signification is the total interaction of all three dimensions simultaneously: the syntactic, the pragmatic, the semantic. To limit our analysis and interpretation of any verbal text to one of these dimensions, then, is likely to distort our view by foregrounding or focussing attention on some particular properties of the text, so that the text essentially becomes a self-reflecting mirror in which our own critical techniques and philosophies are reflected. In order to understand this first source of polyvalence--viewing the text from different critical points of view--we must become aware of how thoroughly our critical perspectives and purposes--what we're looking for--determine what we find.

To clarify the views presented in this seminar in respect to the problem of plurisignificance, let me place them within the context of the semiotic model I have just described and look briefly at their assumptions and basic premises. First, we can see that structural criticism (or rather, the Greimassian model that is being currently applied in parable study) is a kind of syntactic analysis; it is concerned with the nature and structure of the message.³ Specifically, it is concerned with the latent under-structure of the message and (unlike Levi-Strauss' structural/cultural analysis, which sees the text and its socio-cultural context as sharing similar structural features and functions) completely disregards the context of the message--textual, cultural, and communicational contexts. As far as the Greimassian structuralist is concerned, the text alone is the sole source of meaning--and by "text" I mean the isolated parable text, taken out of its narrative context within the gospels. The significance that is generated by the text is local (it is confined to the parable itself, independent of its context); it is latent, residing within the infra-structures of the narrative; it is monadic, for if the structure is the sole source of meaning (and structuralist critics are inclined to assume that it is), then signification must be limited to the generational capabilities of that structure. It is possible to hypothesize, as Levi-Strauss has done, that there are multiple codes which generate meaning from the binary base structure: the geographical, cosmological, kinship, and economic codes.⁴ It is also possible to argue, as Barbara Babcock-Abrahams does, that certain texts are the product of a "junction of opposing forms


and values" in a given text.⁵ However, none of the structural approaches to the parable have proposed anything other than a single investment of the semiotic square, or anything other than a single structure at work in the parable. Structural criticism as we have it, then, disregards the problem of multiple significations, assuming, in fact, that there is a single meaning to the text.

Although the esthetic critic⁶ also works along the syntactic dimension, without special regard for other dimensions of the communication act, there are several important generic differences between esthetic criticism and structural criticism--differences that are not always acknowledged or even recognized by their practitioners. While the structural critic works at the intermediate and deep structural levels of the text, the esthetic critic is much more concerned with its surface structure. Similarly, the structuralist critic virtually ignores the individual creator of the work, arguing (or assuming without argument) that the meaning of the work is the product of pre-preceptual structures which operate in the creator's mind at an unconscious level, rather than at a consciously artistic level. (That is why, of course, structuralist criticism of poetry has been largely unsatisfactory so far.) He also assumes (often without recognizing the assumption) that the receiver of the message (in this case, the audience of the parables) is conditioned to receive and decode the message at this unconscious level, as Levi-Strauss suggests, to allow the myth to think him.⁷ For the structuralist critic, then, the perception of the text is very much a product of habitual responses, unconscious and conditioned. The esthetic/literary critic, however, begins from the assumption that the work is consciously and deliberately designed by the artist to be esthetically pleasing to the perceiver, to waken conscious responses to form and to evoke an awareness of esthetic qualities: balance, symmetry, rising and falling action, and so forth. For the esthetic critic, form is the vehicle for meaning, and the significance of the work is lost or partially lost if the perceiver fails to recognize the carefully designed intricacies planned by the artist. The question of multiple significations, as far as the esthetic critic is concerned, almost never arises, for the work has one coherent form, which communicates in a single voice.


Freudian psychoanalytic criticism presents us with yet another set of problems in our attempt to understand how the text evokes such varied responses, for it adapts for the purposes of literary analysis the terms and configurations of a model designed to describe human personality--that is, to describe the sender of messages through the particular characteristic of the messages he sends.⁸ The Freudian interpretation of a single message, however, simply seeks to apply the principles of Freudian analysis to one narrative or poem without regard for the author's motivations and compulsions. Like structural analysis, Freudian analysis is concerned with latent structures and (usually) the meaning of the text is seen to be a product of local forces at work in the text itself, rather than in the context of the work. Further, because of the terms of its explanatory model are limited to components of the human personality, it is limited to an understanding of the significance of the work in terms of personality--even more specifically, in the terms proposed by Freud. Because the model on which Freudian analysis is based is itself a monadic system, finding only one kind of significance in the text, there is no opportunity for a Freudian critic to explore multiple significations.

But the text of the parable obviously is polyvalent. It does admit of a variety of possible readings, as we can see from a quick glance over the contributions to the study of the parable in the last few years. Indeed, the polyvalence I have just described seems to derive directly from the critical tools and techniques used to decode significance. How does this phenomenon occur? What are the conditions of its occurrence? What features does the text possess which make it polyvalent?

Let me approach these questions by defining the semantic structure of the parabolic sign--as distinguished from the syntagmatic / paradigmatic structure of a parabolic narrative. From this point of view, the parable is a duplex connotative system⁹ in which the precise significance is left unstated. Schematically, the parabolic sign consists of a signifier (Sr) and its signified (Sd) which refer to an object or event that has (or could have) physical existence in extra-linguistic reality ("A certain man had two sons"). This semiotic relationship can be represented thus:




There is nothing unique about this signifying process, of course, for it is the normal denotative process described by Saussure and others.¹⁰ In parabolic signification, however, the signified does not retain its status as a mere signified; the sign is transformed into a second-order semiotic where the signified becomes a signifier--not a linguistic signifier (Sr₁) but a material signifier (Sr_m)--designating (not denoting) an unstated signified.^{11m} This signified, a conceptual entity which has only a moral and psychological existence, not directly perceivable in extra-linguistic reality, must be supplied by the perceiver of the sign:



In the parabolic sign, then, the relationship between the first-order signifier (the linguistic signifier) and its ultimate signified is mediated by a second-order signifier, the physical, formal properties of which have been endowed with an implied significance.¹² The second-order signified, then, is not directly connected to the original linguistic signifier; it is linked to it only through the mediation of a transformed signified.


The semantic structure of this duplex semiotic gains its energy and vital force from the nature of the semantic relationships that link its two orders. The first order signifier is linked conventionally and arbitrarily to its signified, as are nearly all linguistic signs; the second-order signifier, however, is linked iconically to its unstated, implicit signified: that is, the signifier exhibits its signifier in the same way that the structure of a diagram formally exemplifies and exhibits the structure of its object.¹³



The conjunction of the conventional and iconic relationships in the second-order parabolic sign generates much more energy than can be generated by the stable conventional relationships of denotation and designation which exist in the first-order system. This is true precisely because the final signified remains unstated, giving to the system a dynamic, unstable indeterminacy which invites, even compels the perceiver to complete the signification.¹⁴

Precisely because of this semantic indeterminacy, the parabolic text may acquire a large number of different signifieds; in other words, it may become polyvalent or plurisignificant. However, the nature of the relationship between the first- and second-order systems, the iconic relationship, imposes some important limitations on the signified and restricts it to particular configurations. Obviously, since the second-order signifier exhibits its signified iconically, the ideal dimensions of the signified are intrinsically controlled by it; they must be congruent to it. For instance, the parabolic statement "a certain man had two sons" could hardly be interpreted by the statement "God has three kinds of children." The two structures are not sufficiently congruent.

There is yet another constraining force intrinsic to the signifying system itself, and that is the framing structure within which a particular parabolic sign is embedded. Significance is developmental in that it shifts and changes as the perceiver encounters new signs that enter into relationships with already existing signs, altering the signifying configuration. Since narrative signs do not occur in isolation, the perceiver is obliged to take into account what comes before and what comes after a particular significant unit, for that framing structure has the capacity of measurably altering the sign embedded in it.



The process of signification is part of an on-going activity experienced by both the sender of the sign and by its receiver, and is constrained within the syntactical parameters of the whole sign system.

In addition to this intrinsic control that is exerted within the signifying process by the shape of the sign, and by the framing context in which the sign is embedded, there is an extrinsic control that may be even more powerful, even to the point of reshaping the signifier slightly to accommodate a rather "strained" signified. The second-order signified is supplied by the perceiver out of a rule-governed system of beliefs and conventions and experiences through which he finds significance in the world. The signified he attaches to the signifier, then, must be congruent not only with the signifier itself, but with his own beliefs and expectations--or, if not precisely congruent with already held values, at least within the bounds of his cognition, within the realm of "believability."


It is likely that the signified owes as much to the meaning system in the mind of the perceiver as it does to the signifier itself. It is possible, for instance, to attribute to our brief parabolic text the signified "the emperor (or ruler or king) had two kinds of citizens"--in fact, if the parable were taken out of its context, it might be read as an economic fable. However, the powerfully stable doctrinal system within which this narrative structure is embedded, and the doctrinal system which structures the perceiver's beliefs and values disallows this particular signified and orders the parameters within which the signified may be constructed.

At the same time, a powerful, well-organized, and stable analytic system may generate a particular kind of significance, even though the structure of the second-order signifier does not immediately suggest it--and even though the sender does not consciously intend the sign to be perceived as a parabolic. Let me illustrate by reminding you of the late-medieval concept of four-fold signification, outlined so clearly in Dante's letter to Can Grande:

. . .the meaning of this work is not simple, but rather it is polysemous. So that this method of exposition may be clearer, one may consider it in these lines: "When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from people of strange language, Judah was his sanctuary and Israel his dominion." If we look only at the letter, this signifies that the children

of Israel went out of Egypt in the time of Moses; if we look at the allegory, it signifies our redemption through Christ; if we look at the moral sense, it signifies the turning of the soul from the sorrow and misery of sin to a state of grace; if we look at the anagogical sense, it signifies the passage of the blessed soul from the slavery of this corruption to the freedom of eternal glory.¹⁵

The "literal" meaning is what we have been calling here the first-order signified; the other three signifieds--the allegorical, moral, and anagogical--are all derived from it by conventional, carefully systematic rules, and arranged in a hierarchically ordered system of conceptual relationships:



The analytic system to which this kind of complicated exegesis belongs calls for three different but related signifieds; perceivers acquainted with the regular conventions of four-fold signification (as well as with the conventions of the doctrinal system with which these signifieds must also be congruent) looked for signifieds to fill the empty slots in taxonomy of the model. And of course the signifieds, once looked for, were found.¹⁶

This indicates, too, how such analytic models as Freudian and Jungian psychology, Marxian economic theory, and structural and semiotic criticism can find various significations in a single work, supplying as they do stable explanatory systems with their own comprehensive philosophies and methodologies. When these models are used to describe a parabolic text, they provide meaning to the text out of the resources of the explanatory system itself, rather than discovering meaning in the text. This phenomenon does not invalidate these interpretations, of course; it only requires that we become aware of the model which has generated the significance and understand by what means that significance has been achieved. It may suggest, too, that the most adequate model is that which explain how these various significations are acquired, rather than that which supplies yet another significance.

These last statements concerning the rule-governed conventions which control signification can be fully explored only when we recognize the fact that we have arrived at the intersection of the semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic dimensions,

and that we can go no further without considering how these structures are related to the psychological dimensions of the communications act. Let me begin by examining the implications of the statement that the sender of the parabolic sign presumably has in mind a meaning-system in terms of which the signified should be constructed--and may even have a definite signified in mind. If the receiver of the sign does not also possess that meaning-system, he cannot discover the exact signified intended by the sender, although he may understand very well the nature of the signifier. Or if he possess another, different meaning system, with its own rule-governed structure, and if the sender does not make explicit what signified he intends to be derived from the sign, the receiver will arrive at a signified--an interpretation of the parable, in this case, different from that which the sender intended, although it may be fully consonant with the dimensions of the signifier and with his own conceptual system. Or, finally, under the exigencies of his own particular place and time, the receiver may invert or otherwise distort what he knows to be the intended signified, in order to make the sign fit into his own meaning-system. For instance, in *The Parables and Similes of the Rabbis*, Rabbi Feldman quotes Zech. 2:10: "For I have spread you abroad as the four winds of heaven, saith the Lord." Feldman comments:

The Rabbis in expounding this simile, declare: "Even as the world cannot exist without winds, so mankind cannot exist without Israel." Here the original meaning of most distant despersion and difficult reunion is entirely reversed in the process of elaboration; a new and favorable turn is given to this apparently untoward prophecy against Israel.

From the sender's point of view, the multiple signifieds arrived at by these receivers are wrong because they are not in agreement with his own. From another, more objective point of view, what is demonstrated here is the ability to semantically alter a parabolic sign by embedding it within another belief-system and validating the new significance by reference to those beliefs. What makes the sign polyvalent, of course, is its quality of "indeterminancy," the lack of direct, immediate connection between the second-order signifier and its signified--the dependence on the iconic relationship and the perception of certain similarities of form. When the sender gives no indication as to precisely what and how the sign is intended to mean, or when that indication is forgotten or otherwise disregarded, the receiver may achieve whatever significance suits his own immediate needs and purposes.

Because of their status as embedded texts, the parables of Jesus present an interesting, nearly unique problem in the rhetorical analysis--the analysis of the relationship between sender and receiver and of the ways in which that relationship structures the message and its perception. In their first context, the parables belonged to a concrete historical place and time: they are originally spoken by Jesus, to his disciples and to a crowd of listeners, and (it is argued) it is this historical context which imparts to them their form and meaning and is most crucial to their proper understanding. Further, C.H. Dodd

has suggested, recovering the historical moment in which Christ lived and spoke is critical, not just because this gives the parables greater authenticity, greater validity, but because the parables provide brief glimpses into the divine significance of human events--because in what he calls their "intense particularity as comments upon an historical situation," the parables declare the "eternal order. . . present in the actual situation."¹⁸ For Dodd, then, the recovery of the original rhetorical context is crucial because its understanding will lead to a reconstitution in our own lives of that intersection of the eternal in time.

Second, the parables are embedded in late first-century narratives of Jesus' ministry by writers who saw his teachings in the light of the needs and desires of a growing heterogeneous church community embattled against Jews, Gnostics, and Romans, and reinterpreted the parables of Christ to suit their own immediate and pressing purposes.¹⁹ Their reinterpretation is both explicitly and implicitly perceivable: explicit, because these editors and redactors have added commentary and explanation to the parabolic texts which give them specific point and particularity for the early Church; that is, they have created signifieds for their audiences--not necessarily those intended by Jesus. In addition, they have reshaped the narratives of the parables to fit their own meaning system and they have carefully embedded them into the larger narrative of the ministry in such a way as to contextually control their significance to the perceiver. As a result, the parables of Jesus have become very thoroughly the parables of the gospel writers, and attempts to reconstruct their original shape and context face serious difficulties.²⁰

Finally, the parables belong to a powerful exegetical tradition that has for centuries accumulated every possible interpretation of the texts and attached these signifieds to the signifiers, giving them the weight of theological authority. Essentially, then, readers of every century have come to the perception of the parables through the multiple perceptions of earlier readers; their own expectations and understanding are controlled to a greater or lesser extent by the understanding of other audiences. The fact of these imbricated communicative contexts is no doubt crucial to an historically accurate and sophisticated diachronic understanding of what the parables have meant to a variety of audiences, and it is certainly necessary to help us avoid the conflation of one audience, one rhetorical purpose, with another audience and another rhetorical purpose.

But I would like to argue that it is not what the parables have meant to these various audiences that is important, but how the parables have meaning to one reader or another and how two or more dissimilar meanings and interpretations of the same text can be at once valid. To do this, I would like to broaden our discussion of the rhetorical dimension of the parable text to include an understanding of what goes on in the reader's mind as he confronts the text, to what Wolfgang Iser has called the "phenomenology" of the reading act.²¹

In The Implied Reader, Iser suggests that the literary event does not occur on the page, but in the convergence of the text and the reader that calls the work into phenomenological existence. Following Roman Ingarden,²² Iser characterizes the reading activity as a "kaleidoscope of perspective, preintentions,

and recollections" in the reader's mind--expectations of what he is to see and recollections of what he has earlier seen--which make meaning out of the potential semantic structures of the text, potential because they can be actualized only by the reader's perception of them. Iser is particularly interested in those texts which display hiatus--the lack of syntactic or semantic connections--and "indeterminacy"--the omission of detail--and which invite the reader to establish his own connections between the lines of the text, so to speak, and to create his own significant detail, when the text does not offer it.²³ Indeterminate texts, he says, are "often so fragmentary that one's attention is almost exclusively occupied with the search for connections between fragments."²⁴ In these texts, he suggests, it is not the creator's intention to frustrate or confuse us

so much as to make us aware of the nature of our own capability for providing links; in such cases, the text refers back directly to our own preconceptions--which are revealed by the act of interpretation that is a basic element of the reading process.²⁵

Iser's statement has several rather important implications. If he is right, then we might suggest that the structure of the parable is significant because it is the product of a meaning-making interaction between the mind and imagination of the author and the historical and traditional materials out of which he fashioned his text. And if Iser is right, we might also suggest that the structure of the parable is not the place to look for a clue to its significance, for that exists in the mind and imagination of the perceiver, and is only partly affected by the structures which the author has invested with meaning. The "real meaning" of the parable, then, does not lie in the structure of the text, but in the structuring of the text--not in the created product but in the process of creation and perception. The purpose of the parables, from this point of view, is not to create one particular meaning, but to create the conditions under which the creation of meaning can be defined and examined by each individual perceiver, who can come to a clearer understanding of his own expectations and preconceptions--his own meaning system. In semiotic terms, such texts are self-reflexive in a metacommunicative dimension, calling to our attention not their syntactic or semantic structures, but the variety of ways in which those structures are actualized in our minds, are made to yield their potential meanings. When we read a text characterized by the quality of indeterminacy, as the parables are, we are reading ourselves as well as the text, and are being forced to an awareness of the creation of meaning in our own minds, as well as to an awareness of the meaning itself.

And that, I submit, is one of the meanings and purposes of the parables, in all of the rhetorical contexts we can define: for the audience in the physical presence of Jesus; for the early church community to whom the Evangelists wrote; for the readers and hearers of the parables in all centuries. The significance of the parable does not lie wholly in the context, nor wholly in the structure of the narrative; it lies in the reader's own act of structuration, in his efforts to find coherence and significance, to understand both the parable and his own system of values and beliefs which is called to his immediate attention by the puzzle of the parable's indeterminacy.

I am arguing, then, that efforts to find the "real meaning," the "single" significance in the parabolic sign--indeed in any text--are destined to end in frustration, for the semantic structure of these texts is capable of generating a multiplicity of meanings, of creating a variety of significations. To place the parables in the historical context of a single rhetorical act at a single moment in time and to find meaning there simply rewards us with one kind of meaning; to place the parables in the analytic context of a single critical perspective (whether that be Jungian, Freudian, structuralist, or what have you) rewards us with another kind of meaning. But a larger view allows us to see and understand clearly how these meanings are acquired, and to accept them for what they are--reflections of our own meaning-systems revealed to us in the mirror of the text.

It is in this context that the parables acquire their largest, most capacious meaning, for they ultimately require us to direct our attention away from the text and toward ourselves, as perceivers. Because of their semantic indeterminacy, they present the reader or hearer with a difficult problem in cognition and signification, requiring his total attention--and more, his attention to his attention. As Iser observes:

Herein lies the dialectical structure of reading. The need to decipher gives us the chance to formulate our own deciphering capacity--i.e. we bring to the fore an element of our being of which we are not directly conscious. The production of the meaning of literary texts does not merely entail the discovery of the unformulated, which can then be taken over by the active imagination of the reader; it also entails the possibility that we may formulate ourselves and so discover what had previously seemed to elude our consciousness.²⁶

From this point of view, the imposition of an interpretation--any interpretation--by one reader upon another reader is a perilous act, for to offer a "reading" of a parable to an audience is to circumvent this crucial aspect of the meaning of the parabolic text, and to invite the audience to participate in a ready-made signification, instead of creating their own and creating in themselves an examination of the act of signification.

If the parable has any single, dependable meaning, it is that the human mind creates significance, and can understand itself completely only when it can comprehend itself in the act of making meaning. The nature of the parabolic sign--its indeterminate semantic structure--makes polyvalency, multiple significations, inevitable. The only danger is that we will too easily accept our understandings as truly residing in and springing from the text itself, rather than deriving from our own vision.

Notes

1. See Charles Sanders Peirce, Selected Writings (ed. J. Buchlev, New York, 1940) and Charles Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior (New York, 1946).
2. For a full description of these three processes see Charles Morris, "Foundation of the Theory of Signs," in Foundations of the Unity of Science, ed. Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Charles W. Morris (Chicago, 1961).
3. Bernard Scott's paper "A Structuralist Interpretation," presented in this seminar, is an excellent example of applied structuralist theory. Daniel Patte's "Structural Network in Narrative: The Good Samaritan," Soundings, Vol LVIII, 2 (Summer, 1975), 221-242, provides another example of this kind of criticism.
4. "The Story of Asdiwal," Edmund Leach, ed., The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism (London, 1969), pp. 1-48.
5. "The Novel and the Carnival World: An Essay in Memory of Joe Doherty," Modern Language Notes, 89 (December, 1974), p. 913.
6. I am grateful to Dan Otto Via (The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension, Philadelphia, 1967) for providing such a thoughtful and well-worked example of esthetic criticism applied to Biblical texts. The Jungian model on which he is currently at work was not completed in time for its discussion here.
7. In the introduction to The Raw and The Cooked (New York, 1969), Levi-Strauss discusses the important question of how myths control the logical thought of their creators by providing models which are employed to create additional myths.
8. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Rivers (New York, 1960), and On Dreams, trans. James Strachey (New York, 1952). Mary Ann Tolbert's paper, "The Prodigal Son: An Essay in Psychoanalytic Criticism," demonstrates how this model may be applied to Biblical criticism.
9. For a description of connotative and denotative semiotic systems see Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, trans. Lavers and Smith, (Boston, 1970), pp. 89-90. Barthes has borrowed this distinction from Hjelmslev's Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, trans. Whitfield, (Madison, 1961); however, Barthes' diagram of the relationships between signifiers and signifieds in a connotative semiotic is oversimplified, I think.
10. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics ed. Bally and Schehaye (New York, 1959).
11. Charles Morris ("Foundation of the Theory of Signs," p.83) makes this distinction between signs which refer to things (denotation) and signs which refer to abstractions (designation):

A sign must have a designatum (that which the sign refers to); yet obviously every sign does not, in fact, refer to an actual existent object... Where what is referred to actually exists as referred to the object of reference is a denotatum.

A designatum is not a thing, but a ...class of objects.

Like other American semanticists (particularly Stephen Ullmann, The Principles of Semantics, Glasgow, 1951; and Semantics, An Introduction to the Science of Meaning, Blackwell, 1962), Morris concentrates on the nature of referent, as distinct from the signifier. Further, the Saussurian separation of signifier and signified and the avoidance of the extra-linguistic referent is rejected by some American linguists (see Kenneth Pike, Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior, The Hague, 1967, p. 83).

12. For a brief distinction between first and second-order sign systems, see Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, pp. 90-91.

13. Dan Via (The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension, pp. 4-6) provides a summary application of this notion to the parables. For a more detailed discussion see Eta Linnemann, Die Gleichnisse Jesu, p. 16.

14. Wolfgang Iser (The Implied Reader, Baltimore, 1974) discusses the problem of incompletely filled-out texts which invite the reader to participate in them. Both he and Roman Ingarden (The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, Evanston, 1973) are concerned with texts which are syntactically incomplete--where the reader must fill out the details of what happens or the details of description. Here, I have extended their concept to the semantic structure, arguing that when the second-order signified is not supplied, the perceiver is challenged to fill up that incomplete meaning by providing his own. The parable text, then, is semantically indeterminate.

15. Trans. Nancy Howe, in Essays on Dante, ed. Mark Musa, Bloomington 1964, p. 37. Since Dante deliberately and carefully constructed his allegory according to this four-point model, the reader who does not know the possible modes of signification will miss much of the meaning of the narrative. It is hardly necessary to add, I think, that no all parabolic systems are so constructed, not even those parables and allegories composed in Dante's day.

16. Good examples of the generative power of this system may be found in what is now called the "Robertson school" of medieval criticism, which reads almost every late medieval text as though it were a parabolic system constructed according to the rules of four-fold signification.

17. Cambridge, 1924, p. 10.

18. The Parables of the Kingdom (New York, 1961).

19. As an example of this view, see Luke and the Gnostics, by Charles H. Talbert (Nashville, 1966).

20. Form criticism and redaction criticism exemplify that critical method which intersects the syntactic and the pragmatic dimensions: it sees the Gospels as a collection of traditional materials generically ordered, reshaped by the requirements of the later users. From a rather different point of view, Dan Via comments:

...although from the standpoint of the situations in which Jesus told the parables the parables themselves were the focus, now that they have been included in a more comprehensive literary structure, that new structure has become the focus and the parables are subsidiary. To make the parables subsidiary to the larger story of Jesus and to the kerygmatic interpretation of that story was certainly the intention of the evangelists, and to the extent that their intention can be carried out the parables become vehicles for the expression of the whole kerygmatic meaning of the Gospels. (The Parables, pp. 178-179)

One of the problems implicit in the application of structural methodologies to the parables is the fact that the context (which, as Via is arguing here, gives meaning to the parables) is largely ignored.

21. Iser, The Implied Reader, p. 274.

22. The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, Evanston, 1973.

23. p. 280. He adds:

With all literary texts, then, we may say that the reading process is selective, and the potential text is infinitely richer than any of its individual realizations.

This "potentiality" (or, as he puts it, its "virtual dimension") is responsible for the polyvalence of the parable text. From this point of view, each reading actualizes a particular dimension of meaning that is latent in the text--but does not exhaust the meaning that is there.

24. p. 280. Some texts (notably novels which are chronologically disordered, like Ford Maddox Ford's The Good Soldier, or Faulkner's Absolom, Absolom!) are syntactically fragmented--that is, they exist in unrelated pieces, which the reader is required to reorder and organize. I'm arguing here that the parabolic text is semantically incomplete, and that the reader then becomes occupied with the search for meaning, for significance--even to the point of examining his own systems of signification.

25. p. 280.

26. p. 294.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637
U.S.A.
1962

TO THE EDITOR
OF THE JOURNAL OF
THE AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SIR,
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th of May, 1962, in which you inform me that you have received a copy of my paper, "On the Theory of the Quantum Theory of the Interaction of a System of Particles with a Field", published in the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY, Vol. 55, No. 5, May 1962, pp. 1585-1590.

I am glad to hear that you have received a copy of my paper, and I am sure that it will be of interest to you and your readers. I am sure that you will find it of interest to you and your readers.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours truly,
J. J. Sakurai

Enclosed for you are two copies of my paper, "On the Theory of the Quantum Theory of the Interaction of a System of Particles with a Field", published in the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY, Vol. 55, No. 5, May 1962, pp. 1585-1590.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours truly,
J. J. Sakurai

Bernard B. Scott

A review of the history of scholarship on this parable is important so that we may be aware of the gains that have been made and the problems that continue to exist. For the purposes of this discussion, I shall limit my remarks to J. Jeremias because of the importance and influence of his interpretation and because it exposes a decisive methodological error in the interpretation. The thesis of this first part is that the interpretation of the parable has been determined by the Lucan redaction.

Jeremias

Jeremias classifies this parable with those that show God's mercy for sinners. They contain the gospel itself, but are not orientated towards a proclamation of that gospel but a defense of it. This entire group of parables has as its audience (critics) the Pharisees. Jeremias points to Lk 15:2 as proof of this for the parables of the Lost Sheep, Lost Coin and the Prodigal Son (1962:124). Since for Jeremias the correct identification of the Sitz im Leben of the parable (21) is necessary for its interpretation, this location of conflict with the Pharisees is decisive for his interpretation. "The parables which have as their subject the gospel message in its narrower sense are, apparently without exception, addressed, not to the poor, but to opponents. That is their distinctive note, their Sitz im Leben: their main object is not the presentation of the gospel, but defense and vindication of the gospel" (124).

This identification of the conflict situation with the Pharisees has important implications for interpretation since that context is supplied by the Lucan redaction of 15:2. It further demands the younger son be favored and accepted, the elder son unfavored and rejected.

The legal situation of the parable is in accordance with practice in Palestine. The younger son demands both the right of possession and the right of disposal. According to Jeremias the younger can dispose of this portion of the inheritance although the father would continue to enjoy the usufruct during his life time. The elder brother would have only the right of possession. "This legal position is correctly depicted in the parable when the elder brother is presumably indicated as the sole heir (vs. 31), but nevertheless the father continues to enjoy the usufruct (vs. 22f., 29)" (129). This is the only place in his exegesis that Jeremias deals with verse 31.

After the disgrace of the younger son, the father's reception of him, especially the three orders given to the servants (vs. 22), indicate according to Jeremias "manifest tokens of forgiveness and reinstatement" (130). Thus the first part of the parable "describes with touching simplicity what God is like, his goodness, his grace, his boundless mercy, his abounding love" (131). This first part of the parable is complete in itself and therefore the second part seems superfluous. Why then is there

a second part? "Why did Jesus add it? There can be only one answer, because of the actual situation. The parable was addressed to men who were like the elder brother, men who were offended at the gospel" (131). Here we begin to see the significance of the identification of the Sitz'im Leben which as we have pointed out is provided by Lk 15:2. While the parable is a vindication of Jesus' ministry, the parable is open-ended for Jeremias since Jesus does not pronounce judgment on the Pharisees. "He still has hope of moving them to abandon their resistance to the gospel, he still hopes that they will recognize how their self-righteousness and lovelessness separate them from God" (132).

Now the problem becomes more acute. If this parable is a challenge to the Pharisees to accept the gospel, as Jeremias maintains, why should they respond if according to verse 31 they are the only inheritors (129). Furthermore if the parable describes what God is like (131) then one must conclude that the God who is apparently generous in forgiving the younger son is playing a cruel joke on him. The elder son inherits all, so he can come into the feast and rejoice at the return of the younger brother who is now effectively his slave.

The logic of this interpretation is forced by two assumptions on Jeremias' part. (1) The Pharisees are the opponents of the parable and are to be identified with the elder brother. This, of course, assumes the interpretation of the parable before the interpretation has even begun. Why would the Pharisees identify with the elder brother? They are accused by Christians as being self-righteous; they do not accuse themselves of this. Jeremias provides a goyim reading of the parable. Furthermore why should the Lucan context be accepted as the Sitz im Leben Jesu?

(2) While claiming that the parable is not an allegory, Jeremias has allegorized the characters of the parable so that the value attached to the characters of the parable is determined by their outside referents. This allegory prevents the impact of the elder son being the sole heir from coming through in the interpretation.

From this analysis of Jeremias we can draw the following conclusions. (1) The second part of the parable is seen to be superfluous because of the allegorical identifications. (2) Any interpretation that places a negative value on the elder son must explain how this can be if he is the sole heir.

Integrity

The parable of the Prodigal Son has for some time been under attack as regards its integrity. This has traditionally since Wellhausen taken the form of challenging the authenticity of the section dealing with the elder brother, Lk 15:25-32. Even more recently the whole parable has been challenged by Louise Schottroff (1971) who has claimed that it is a construction of Lucan theology. Both of these claims must be dealt with so that the interpreter will have some notion of the extent of the parable he is to exegete.

The arguments for the non-authenticity of vs. 25-32 have been summarized by Jack T. Sanders (1969). His arguments are divided into three parts: form, linguistic and content.

Form

Following Jeremias, (1962:131) Sanders classifies this parable as zweigipfelig, i.e., as having two parts. Jeremias has listed three other parables as having this same form: The Generous Lord of the Vineyard (Matt 20:1-15), the Royal Wedding Feast, with the Guest without a proper garment (Matt 22:1-14), and the Rich man and Lazarus (Lk 16:19-31). With Sanders we can agree that Jeremias is wrong in claiming that these three parables are zweigipfelig (1969:433-4). Sanders maintains though that Lk 15:11-32 does have two parts because there are two identical conclusions (vs. 24 and 32) and "the first part of the parable will stand without difficulty on its own" (434). This argument from form leads Sanders to conclude that "if the parable of the Prodigal Son is a zweigipfelig parable, then it is the only one of its kind in the New Testament. From the outset, then, even without further evidence, one should suspect that Luke vs. 25-32 represents a later addition to an original parable" (435).

Sanders' argument seems to presume his conclusion, for if there is no other example of this form of a parable in the New Testament then why should not one question the existence of the form? Sanders, of course, does this but then draws the conclusion that the section of the parable dealing with the elder son must be secondary. But this is clearly based upon an assumed interpretation of the parable, namely that the point of the parable involves the acceptance of the younger son by the father. Form cannot be determined by interpretation, but form leads to interpretation. Thus the logical conclusion to be drawn from the so-called zweigipfelig form of parables is that there is no such form. Since there is no such form, the question of integrity cannot be solved on the basis of the form of the parable.

Linguistic

Sanders' second set of arguments deal with the linguistic characteristics of the parable. He in effect summarizes the discussion between Schweizer and Jeremias./1/ Schweizer had argued that the first part of the parable was more heavily semitized than the first part. Sanders lists the following semitisms that may be considered confirmed as a result of this debate (435). (a) "Consecutive use of kai seven (or eight) times in vs. 12f. and 15f." There are also two consecutive uses of kai in verses 25 and 26. (b) gemisai tēn koilian which is corrected in the manuscript tradition with chortasthēnai ek. (c) the change of subject twice in vs 15f. A similar change takes place also in verses 28 and 29. (d) "Only the first part of the parable is understandable on semitic soil" But is the second part not understandable on semitic soil? (e) "The word order, verb-subject, throughout is semitic syntax; since, however, it is only the frequency of this pattern, not the word order itself, that makes one think of semitism, it is important to note that this word order occurs only twice after vs. 24."

Statistically in sentences where both the subject and the verb are expressed, in the first part six out of twelve have the inverted form, while two out of eight have the same form in the second part. (f) "The superfluous ērxato in vs. 14 is an Aramaism." (g) the reference to heaven in verses 18 and 21 are a circumlocution for God. (h) in vs. 19, hōs used in place of an adjective in the predicate represents semitic kē. (i) "Repetition of the personal pronoun in the statement eiden auton ho patēr autou in vs. 20 and again in vs. 22 is a semitism." This same construction also occurs in vs. 28b. (j) Sanders lists prōtos in the sense of "best" as probably representing semitic usage while dote and eis before cheir and pous as certainly representing a semiticism. (k) "pherete in the sense of 'fetch' reflects Aramaic 'abēl.'" Sanders concludes that there are only two semitisms in the second part: erchomenos before ēggisen (vs. 25) and idou in vs. 29.

This type of argument from the semitic character of the first part of the parable is difficult to evaluate. It cannot be conclusive for as I have pointed out some of the same characteristics also occur in the second part of the parable. Furthermore the admission of two semitisms in the second part is most damaging. Evidence of this type cannot simply be added up and the one with the most wins. The presence of two semitisms in the second part shows that the material being used is traditional. There are also other explanations for the presence of semitisms. Schottroff points to Luke's ability to imitate the style of the LXX (1971:36).²; Blass and Debrunner have maintained the general semitic character of koine Greek; (1961:3-4); and finally Robert Funk has argued that the parables (at least some) may have originally been composed in Greek.³ One must conclude that the linguistic evidence does not conclusively demonstrate the non-integrity of the story and at most indicates a somewhat more semitic favor to the first part than to the second part.

Besides pointing out semitisms, Sanders also argues that there are a significant number of Lucan constructions in the second part of the parable that find no correspondence in the first part (1969:436). Once again his arguments are not all of equal weight. In verse 25 he locates three Lucan traits. Sanders sees particular significance in the switch from the plural to the singular of agros from verse 15 to verse 25. He maintains that the singular is characteristic of Luke. Of the ten occurrences of agros in Luke-Acts six have parallels; four with Mark, two with Matt. Mark's usage is two plurals and two singulars; both parallels with Matt (Q) are singular. (Perhaps Q has a tendency towards singular.) In the non-parallel passages there are three singulars and one plural. At first sight this would seem to indicate a Lucan preference for the singular, but this cannot be sustained since it is difficult in two of the singular usages (Lk 17:7; Acts 4:37) to demonstrate that we are dealing with Lucan constructions rather than traditional material. There is simply no convincing pattern that would allow one to point any particular direction. It should also be pointed out that Bauer thinks that the plural usage in the first part of the parable refers to farms or hamlets rather than fields, so that

the change in number between the first part and the second part of the parable may not be as significant as Sanders maintains (1957:13).

Sanders' other two Lucan traits in verse 25 are hōs temporis and eggizo. This presents him with a problem in that he also maintains that erchomenos in this same verse represents a semitism. This would seem to indicate that the evidence could be read in either direction.

Also identified as Lucan traits are thuō in vs. 27, and 30; apolambanō in vs. 27 and parerchomai in vs. 29. These are all problematic. Thuō is also used in verse 23 and it is the stereo-typed phrase for the killing of the fattened calf. Paralambanō and parerchomai are too common with fairly even distribution throughout the New Testament to be conclusive.

Sanders' other Lucan traits are much more substantial. Ho de eipen is definitely Lucan and in sharp contrast with the use of eipen in the first part of the parable. The same is true of de kai in verse 28. Sanders' most telling argument is his identification of the phrase "he asked what this meant" as Lucan. His argument would have been even stronger if he had pointed to the parallel of this phrase in Lk 18:36 which is a clear Lucan insertion into the blind man at Jericho story. One would have to agree with Sanders that this phrase is clearly Lucan. But does that then show that the second part of the parable is a Lucan construction? If the blind man story can serve as a parallel, then we can maintain that while this phrase is a Lucan addition, it probably serves to smooth the transition from the entrance of the elder brother to the response of the servant.

In conclusion the linguistic evidence by Sanders does not necessarily lead one to the conclusion that the second part of the parable is a Lucan construction, although it must be admitted that it contains Lucan traits not found in the first part. Sanders' evidence does, however, raise a question mark against the second half of the story. Other collaborating evidence would be necessary to prove the point.

Content

Sanders believes he has found the confirming evidence by pointing to internal contradictions within the story and its place redactionally in chapter 15. "The Blanket statement of vs. 31, 'Everything mine is yours,' seems not to recall the situation laid out in vs. 12, 'He divided to them his living'" (436). D. Daube has shown that in fact this corresponds to the situation and the omission of the second part creates more problems for the first part (1955:334). Furthermore anyone who would eliminate the second part of the parable must also eliminate the introduction of the parable which pre-supposes the existence of the second part.^{4/} We are introduced to the younger brother (which surely implies the existence of the elder brother) and the property is divided "among them." Also verse 13 clearly denotes that only the younger son took possession of his share and converted it into cash. The parable clearly envisions the father as still in possession of the elder son's inheritance. Finally

the situation of the younger brother when he squanders his inheritance demands the elder brother as his opponent for he can only return to the father as a hired hand since he has no claim on the inheritance. Rather than vs. 12 standing in opposition to vs. 31, it rather seems that verse makes explicit what is implied in vs. 12.

The redactional argument mounted by Sanders deals with the anti-pharisaic argument of chapter 15 and more generally with the anti-pharisaic thrust of the Lucan redaction. Within the context of chapter 15 the parables of the Lost Sheep and the Lost Coin are related to defend Jesus' association with the outcast and against the righteousness of the Pharisees (cf. 15:1-2; 7). The first part of the prodigal son serves to defend Jesus' association with the outcast while the second part attacks the Pharisees. Sanders further buttresses this argument by pointing to the parable of the Good Samaritan, the Pharisee and the Publican and the Rich man and Lazarus while all in their Lucan context become parables against the Pharisees (437-8). Sanders is surely correct about the redactional functioning of the parable, but again does that point to Lucan creation of the second half? In fact it seems to point in the opposite direction. If Luke is, as Sanders says, levelling a "broadside" at the Pharisees (438), why would he have the father (read God) address them: "You are always with me; and all that is mine is yours." That is hardly a rejection.

The consideration of the internal consistency of the parable and its redactional use seem conclusively to point towards the integrity of the parable. (1) The legal situation of the first part is consistent with and demands the second part. (2) The introduction of the first part implies the existence of the second part. (3) The father's response to the elder son is at odds with the Lucan redactional usage.

Luise Schottroff has recently maintained that the parable is the creation of Luke himself on the basis of his soteriology. The claim that Luke is the author can be dismissed because it fails to take account of the undoubted semitic background of the parable. The overwhelming evidence of Sanders is simply convincing in this matter. Furthermore, Schottroff has viewed the redactional purpose of the parable too narrowly. The second part of the parable is definitely orientated against the Pharisees in its present context and therefore cannot be the product of Luke for the same reasons listed against Sanders above. But Schottroff's emphasis upon the soteriological concern of the redaction does present an important element needed to ascertain the original form of the parable.

Schottroff points out that a primary emphasis in chapter 15 concerns repentance, which theme she traces throughout Lucan theology e.g., Acts 5:31; 11:18; 20:21, (1971:29) Lk 5:32; 17:3f; 15:7, (1971:31ff). Within the context of chapter 15 both the parable of the Lost Sheep and the Lost Coin point out the rejoicing over one who repents (vs. 7, 10). This same theme emerges in the parable of the Prodigal Son. He acknowledges his sin twice (i.e. repents) and the joy in repentance is seen in the reception of the father afforded the younger son. The elder son's

refusal to repent places him outside of the kingdom. For Schottroff the emphasis of the parable falls on the first part as the example of 15:7 and 10.

This analysis has important conclusions because it explains why verse 24 is repeated at verse 32. Within the Lucan redaction the elder brother is a negative figure but the response of the father, "all that is mine is yours" creates problems for this redaction. Thus the conclusion of the first part is repeated to return attention to the first part. In this way the first part and second part of the parable stand in contrast.

Narrative Structural Analysis/5/

Lexie 1. "A certain man had two sons."

The parable begins with a qualification expressed at the level of manifestation by "to have." The qualification stops and summarizes a previous sequence that is not related. Two actants of this sequence are expressed: the SUBJECT, father; and the OBJECT, two sons. As the analysis of the narrative will show, this story will be complete when the final correlated sequence can express the implied contractual state: "a certain man had two sons."

Lexie 2. "And the younger of them said to his father, Father, give me the share of the property that falls to me."

This lexie introduces the first sequence whose purpose will be to break or provide the possibility to break the implied contract of the qualification. This is a contractual syntagm in which the utterance of the function mandate is semantized. The younger son as ADDRESSER designates the father as SUBJECT who communicates the OBJECT, the share of the property, to the RECIPIENT, the younger son.

Lexie 3. "And he divided his living among them."

The Father accepts the contract and the story semantizes the function attribution in this performancial syntagm PU 3. This means that the father's mandate has been successfully carried out in the initial correlated sequence. But if the contract is successfully carried out how can it be the initial correlated sequence which by definition is a contract that has failed? It would seem more logical that the next sequence in which the younger son loses his property would be the initial correlated sequence. This is not the case for two reasons. (1) Because this story begins with a qualification, which stops and summarizes a narrative, we know whose story is being narrated, the father, and the OBJECT, two sons. (2) While the father carries out his contract, the contract contains the seeds of destruction for the original contract./6/ Four actants are semantized in this syntagm: SUBJECT, father; OBJECT, property; ADDRESSES, younger and elder son ("them"). The father's complete contract implies two other contractual syntagms. By giving the OBJECT to the ADDRESSES he has effectively constituted two new SUBJECTS, so that the narrative structure demands that both of the new SUBJECTS' stories be told. These two possible stories represent a test of the father's contract.

Lexie 4. "Not many days later, gathering together everything, the younger son took his journey into a far away country."

At the level of manifestation this utterance is recognized by the function of departure and arrival, departure from his father's home, arrival in a far away country. Because this is a disjunctional syntagm, the SUBJECT, the younger son, has accepted a contract which is not specified at the level of manifestation. The implied contract most probably is that he will use the cash for his well-being. The cash ("gathering together everything") is semantized as the actant HELPER. This disjunctional syntagm is part of the initial correlated sequence of the sub-sequence of the younger son's narrative.

Lexie 5. "And he squandered his property in loose living, and when he had spent everything, a great famine arose in that country and he began to be in want."

Only one of the three utterances, PU2, is semantized in this performancial syntagm. The function of submission is manifested so that the subsequence of the younger son is now aborted. The purpose of the topical sequences that follow will be to establish the original contract, the son's well-being. Two OPPONENTS are semantized in this syntagm. On the one hand the younger son is his own OPPONENT for he squanders his HELPER in loose living, and the other OPPONENT is the famine. This converts the OBJECT from well-being to lack of well-being. This confirms that the initial contract of the younger son deals with the maintenance of his well-being (OBJECT) through the use of his property (HELPER). The syntagm concludes with a qualification that summarizes the state of the younger son: "He began to be in want."

Lexie 6. "So he went and joined himself to one of the citizens of that country."

A disjunctional syntagm concludes the initial correlated sub-sequence of the younger son, and since his contract has aborted, provides the clue as to possible HELPERS, here a citizen of that country. It may also be that the son is also a HELPER by going and joining. Since he is his own OPPONENT he must overcome himself in order to complete his contract.

Lexie 7. "Who sent him into his fields to feed swine."

The first topical syntagm is inaugurated by a disjunctional syntagm. The contract is semantized, "to feed swine." The story of the younger son and that of the citizen have intercepted, so we really have two actantial models. The model of the citizen's story has the following actants: ADDRESSER: citizen; SUBJECT: younger son; OBJECT: to feed swine. But this contract serves as a HELPER for the son. The other model implied is that of the topical sequence of the son: HELPER, the contract issued by the citizen: SUBJECT, son: OBJECT, the son's well-being. This lexie at the level of manifestation represents the semantization of the narrative of the citizen; but in the narrative structure it is a sub-sequence of the younger son's narrative.

In the son's narrative this is a disjunctional syntagm since his going into the field denotes his acceptance of the contract offered by the citizen of that country.

Lexie 8. "And he would gladly have fed on the pods that the swine ate; but no one gave him anything."

The syntagm returns directly to the story of the younger son. The functions are confrontation and domination. Once again the son's contract, his well-being, aborts at PU2.

Lexie 9. "But when he came to himself he said, 'How many of my father's hired servants have bread enough and to spare, but I perish here with hunger!' I will arise and go to my father, and I will say to him, 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before you; I am no longer worthy to be called your son; treat me as one of your hired servants.'"

If the story of the younger son is not to abort completely, he must find a HELPER capable of accomplishing his original contract. This lexie is the first utterance of a contractual syntagm, in which the younger son proposes a contract to his father, the purpose of which is the establishment of the son's original contract, his well-being. The proposed HELPER will then become SUBJECT of the proposed contract. The actantial model is as follows: ADDRESSER: son; OBJECT: contract to complete his original contract; SUBJECT: father. If the father accepts the son's contract, then in the narrative of the son the father will become his HELPER.

Lexie 10. "And he arose and came to his father."

This disjunctional syntagm reinforces the analysis of Lexie 9. In order to accomplish his original contract, the younger son must propose a contract to his proposed HELPER. But since he has been one of his own OPPONENTS he must accept a contract to propose a contract. That he has done this is manifested by his motion towards the father. We therefore expect a performancial syntagm in which the younger son must confront the father and dominate him if the father is to accept the contract.

Lexie 11. "But while he was yet at a distance, his father saw him and had compassion, and ran."

The function of departure, "ran," marks this as a disjunctional syntagm and thus denotes a new SUBJECT, the father. Because it is a disjunctional syntagm it means that the father has accepted a contract, which is not specified. We have returned to the father's story which has been abandoned after Lexie 3.

Lexie 12. "And embraced him and kissed him."

The father's narrative follows with a performancial syntagm in which the father as SUBJECT dominates the younger son. Since the son is dominated in this syntagm, he must hold the actant position OPPONENT. This allows us to confirm that the father's contract is the having of two sons.

Lexie 13. "And the son said to him, 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before you; I am no longer worthy to be called your son.'"

This too is a performancial syntagm only in the son's sequence. It entails the function confrontation. By the fact that the contract is not fully semantized it points to the failure of the confrontation so that the function submission is implied.

Lexie 14. "But the father said to his servants, 'Bring quickly the best robe, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet; and bring the fattened calf and kill it, and let us eat and make merry.'"

The father, having dominated the son in Lexie 12, now completes the syntagm with the function of attribution. It needs to be pointed out that the father's contract is still not semantized, but the father is here clearly SUBJECT who has fulfilled his contract and is in possession of the desired OBJECT, his son.

Lexie 15. "'For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found.' And they began to make merry."

As a qualification the stories of both the father and the younger son are summarized and stopped. "Was dead and is alive" summarizes the story of the younger son; "was lost and is found" summarizes the story of the father. This is important for here the contract of the father is semantized, the possession of his son. This qualification corresponds to the qualification with which the story originally began: "A certain man had two sons." Thus the sequence of the father is the final correlated sequence. But correlated sequence to which narrative? As we argued above there are two initial correlated sequences in this narrative structure. One in which the father divides the property and one in which the younger son loses his share. The father's sequence is the final correlated sequence of the younger son's story, in that the son's well-being is now ensured. At the same time it is a partial final correlated sequence to the father's initial correlated sequence. Since he had divided the property among them, he had set up two opponents to his initial contract; one has now been reconciled, the other remains to be dealt with.

To summarize: The SUBJECT of the parable is the father; the OBJECT, two sons. In the initial correlated sequence the father divides his property between his sons which establishes two new SUBJECTS who function as OPPONENTS to the father's contract. In the initial correlated sub-sequence the younger son squanders his property, thus destroying his well-being and threatens the father's contract. In the two topical sequences the son seeks to establish his well-being; both abort at PU2. In the final correlated sequence the father re-establishes the son's well-being, thereby restoring the son's contract and half of his own contract. The narrative analysis demonstrates, against the traditional interpretation of this parable, that not only is the first part not complete in itself but also that the second part is demanded by the initial correlated sequence.

Lexie 16. "Now the elder son was in the field."

A qualification serves to introduce the elder son, whose existence is implied in the first part of the story (cf. above). But more than simply introducing the elder son it locates his narrative to this point as being intertwined with that of the father. This is shown by the fact that he was in the field, i.e., he has remained within the father's network. Likewise since he was in the field he was not part of the reception of the younger son and therefore has not ratified the father's contract. The qualification sets up the situation in which the elder son must either continue his story with that of the father or withdraw from the father's network.

Lexie 17. "And as he came and drew near to the house, he heard music and dancing."

This utterance is characterized at the level of manifestation by the functions departure and arrival and therefore appears to be a disjunctional syntagm which implies the acceptance of a contract. But it should be noted that at the level of manifestation the function of arrival is not completed: "He drew near." Therefore this utterance points out that this sequence will deal with the acceptance or rejection of a contract. If the elder son completes the function of arrival, then the contract is accepted; if he does not, then the contract is rejected. The elder son has a contract to accept a contract. This disjunctional syntagm points to the problematic of this narrative as revolving around the completion or abortion of the implied CU2. The actants make this clear: SUBJECT, elder son; OBJECT, the acceptance of contract; OPPONENT, refusal to arrive.

Lexie 18. "And he called one of the servants and asked what this meant. And he said to him, 'Your brother has come, and your father has killed the fattened calf, because he has received him safe and sound.'"

The contract of the elder brother is the acceptance of a contract. In this Lexie the contract to be accepted is revealed, the father's acceptance of the younger son. This syntagm involves the function of confrontation; the elder brother is confronted with the contract he has a contract to accept.

Lexie 19. "But he was angry and refused to go in."

The elder brother rejects his father's contract and his narrative now aborts. His refusal to go in, to complete the function of arrival, shows that he has been dominated. The OPPONENT is his own refusal.

Lexie 20. "His father came out and entreated him."

Here we have two syntagms: a disjunctional and performancial. By coming out, the father has accepted a contract to entreat the elder son to come in, i.e., to accept the father's contract with the younger son. The father is the SUBJECT, the elder son is the OPPONENT; the OBJECT is the elder son's coming in. By entreating the father engages in the function of confrontation.

Lexie 21. "But he answered his father, 'Lo, these many years I have served you, and I never disobeyed your command; yet you never gave me a kid, that I might make merry with my friends. But when this son of yours came, who has devoured your living with harlots, you kill for him the fattened calf.'"

The sequence to this point has concerned the elder son's acceptance or rejection of the contract his father had made with the younger son. The subject has clearly remained the elder son. But implied within this sequence is the possibility that the elder son represents an opponent to the father's original contract, namely the having of two sons. Now that original contract comes directly to the surface. The elder son by addressing the father designates him SUBJECT and confronts him about the terms of the original contract. This can be seen at the level of manifestation by the clear division between the elder and younger brother, "this son of yours," and the accusation that he, the elder brother has not been treated as a son. We are no longer in a topical sequence seeking to provide the elder son as SUBJECT with a HELPER capable of enabling him to accept his contract. No, the elder son is now clearly an opponent to the original and total contract of the parable: "A certain man had two sons." We are in the final correlated sequence. The parable has suddenly turned deadly serious.

Lexie 22. "And he said to him, 'Son, you are always with me, and all that is mine is yours.'"

Instead of a dramatic PU3 we find ourselves with a qualification. The story has stopped, as though it were too dangerous to continue. But this qualification serves the same purpose as the qualification that ended the first sub-sequence. "You are always with me" summarizes and stops the elder son's sequence. As always with the father, the son has no real need to "arrive". "All that is mine is yours" summarizes the father's narrative. The elder son had complained that nothing had been given him; the father replies that he already has everything. There is implied in this qualification PU2 and PU3. By refusing to allow the elder son to reject, and thus dominate, the father ends with two sons.

SEQUENCE Qual.

CS1

(Father)

CUL CU2 DU1 PU1 PU2 PU3

SUB-SEQUENCE

cs1

cul cu2 dul pul pu2 du2//

ts1

(son)

cul cu2 dul pul pu2//

ts2

(citizen)

cul - - -

ts3

(son)

cul cu2 dul pul pu2//

cs2 (Father)	cul	cu2	dul	pul	pu2
SUB-SEQUENCE					
csl (Elder)	cul	cu2	dul	pul	pu2//
tsl (Father)	cul	cu2	dul	pul	
CS2			PUL	PU2	PU3

Mythical Structure/7/

The Mythical structure along with the narrative structure is part of the intermediate structures. To obtain the meaning effect of the parable one must attempt also an analysis of the mythical structure. At this point we face a certain methodological obscurity, particularly in regard to parables. In an exchange published in *Semeia* 2, Daniel Patte (1974b:118) has suggested that Dominic Crossan in his article "The Good Samaritan: towards a Generic Definition of Parable" (1974 a) was engaged in an analysis of the mythical structure of the Good Samaritan. Following Levi-Strauss' model for this structure, Patte identified the binary oppositions as between the Samaritan and the Priest/Levite. He further maintained that the mediating agent was absent. In reply Crossan faulted Patte for not identifying the mediator and suggested that he, Crossan, in fact had been working on the level of elementary structures whose model is the semiotic square. (1974b:125-6).

I agree with Crossan that Patte's failure to identify the mediating agent calls his suggestion into question. But even more confusing to my mind is that I fail to see what investment of the semiotic square Crossan has identified in the case of the Good Samaritan. If I understand Greimas and Rastier (1969) correctly, the intermediate structures must first be clearly defined and ascertained before the investment of the semiotic square can be determined. "But first, it would be as well to define the mode of existence of the contents at the level of superficial structure, and, once their logical status is described, to establish the calculation of their combinations" (1969:105). This means that the investment of the semiotic square can only be determined after the intermediate (superficial) structures are clearly defined. Since only one structure (narrative) was clearly worked out for the Good Samaritan, Crossan's move to the semiotic square was premature. (This probably explains his inability to determine its investment.) My own suspicion is that the investment of the semiotic square can only be determined after the investigation of the intermediate structures of a number of parables has been accomplished.

In order to move beyond this methodological obscurity, I would suggest that we are involved in two separate questions: from Patte's point of view the identification of what structural level and with what structure we are dealing; from Crossan's the attempt to define what a parable is. I will take each question separately.

The binary opposition in the parable of the Good Samaritan is not, as Patte suggests, that between Samaritan and Priest/Levite, but simply Samaritan and Jew. In the traditional form of this myth the opposition is resolved in favor of the Jew and the mediating agent is God. This parable calls into question whether or not God will mediate that opposition. Thus the parable is the mediating agent of a new binary opposition created between the parable hearer's myth and the parabolic rejection of that myth.

Crossan argues that the clash between speaker and hearer in parable involves "divergent investments of the Square of opposition" (1974b:126). If the meaning effect is made up of a variety of structures there is no reason to limit the clash only to the elementary level. The clash may well take place at a variety of levels, and in several different structures. For example, in the case of the Good Samaritan there is an obvious clash between the mythical structures. Likewise because the mythical structure is different, the narrative structure is different. Surely the hearer does not expect the Samaritan to accept the contract to assist the man in the ditch. My argument with Crossan is simply, (1) the clash is more extensive than he allows; (2) we are probably not yet in a position to determine the investment of the semiotic square as regards parables.

I have engaged in a review of this discussion so as to clarify what I am attempting. The level of manifestation should provide the clues as to what myth is being semantized in this parable. After the identification of the myth we should be able to determine how the mythical structure is invested. Finally we can determine whether the investment of the mythical structure is the same in parable as in the tradition. It should be noted that I am assuming that the investment of the mythical structure will be different in the parable and the hearer. I do this on the basis of my analysis of the discussion between Patte and Crossan. One should expect a different investment of the structures at different levels.

At the level of manifestation the myth constraining this parable can be identified by the characterization of the actants.

The parable begins with the simple statement that a certain man had two sons and specifies a younger and later an elder son. The identifications in the setting up of this parable are very specific. The man has two sons, duo hyious; one son in neōteros and the other presbuteros. A parable similar to ours occurs in Matt 21:28-30 where a man had two sons, tekna, and they are distinguished as prōtos and deuteros. In the case of the parable in Matt, the distinction between the relative ages of the sons plays no part.

The detail of an elder and a younger son is not simply local color, but is constrained by the myth which this parable partly semantizes.

A two sons mythodology is an important part of Jewish tradition. The younger son, the son of old age, is often pictured as the favorite son in the OT and Rabbinic writings. Roland de Vaux argues that the legislation of Deut. 21:15-17, governing the laws

of inheritance, give a double portion to the eldest son, not because **he was** the favorite, but to protect him against favoritism often shown the youngest son (1961:42). But even more important to our parable are the stories in which the younger son is the favorite son. One need only call to mind the stories of Cain and Abel, Ishmael and Isaac, Esau and Jacob (Israel), Jacob's favorite son Joseph and after his supposed death, Benjamin. Gen. 44:18ff gives a touching account of the attachment of Jacob to his younger sons. The cup has been found in Benjamin's bag and Judah begs of Joseph: "We have a father, an older man, and a younger brother, the child of his old age; and his brother is dead, and he alone is left of his mother's children; and his father loves him." Other favorite sons can be seen in the case of Aaron and Moses and especially David and Solomon, both of whom were the youngest sons. Furthermore this tradition was applied to the nation of Israel. Mal. 1:2-3 "Is not Esau Jacob's brother? says the Lord. Yet I have loved Jacob but I have hated Esau; I have laid waste his hill country and left his heritage to jackals of the desert." Finally it is the youngest son who asks at the Seder meal the questions of the mighty acts done by God for Israel.


This exegetical tradition remained alive in Jewish tradition. To quote only one example, that of Gals 4:21ff where the two sons of Abraham are given an allegorical interpretation. "For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by a slave and one by a free woman. But the son of the slave was born according to the flesh, the son of the free woman through promise. Now this is an allegory: these women are two covenants. One is Mount Sinai, bearing children for slavery; she is Hagar. Now Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia; she corresponds to the present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery with her children. But the Jerusalem above is free, and she is our mother...Now we, brethren, like Isaac, are children of promise."

Besides the exegetical tradition, the common folkloric tradition also persists past NT times. An interesting example is preserved in the Midrash on the Psalms, Ps. 9,1. "R. Berechiah said in the name of R. Jonathan...the verse means therefore that God has set love of little children in their fathers' hearts. For example, there was a king who had two sons, one grown-up, the other a little one. The grown-up one was scrubbed clean, and the little one was covered with dirt, but the king loved the little one more than he loved the grown-up one" (1959:131).

The myth we are dealing with is manifested in three different forms. The first can be designated the natural form, the traditional antagonism between elder and younger sons. This form of the myth is semantized in the protective legislation of Deut 21:15-17 and the rabbinic parable quoted above. (I would suggest that this phenomenon is cross-cultural). Secondly there is what might be called a "history of salvation" form of this myth. It can be recognized in the stories of the patriarchs. Finally there is an existential form in Israel versus the nations exemplified in the quote from Malachi. In the case of the first form (natural) the mediation is accomplished by the father, likewise in the story of the patriarchs although there is a sense

in which the action of patriarchal father in resolving the mediation towards the youngest is sanctioned by God. Finally in the existential form God himself mediates the opposition in favor of Israel.

Using Lévi-Strauss' model for mythical structure we arrive at the following investment of the model.




I have left A non-invested but am inclined to see the fundamental opposition that the myth attempts to resolve why what proceeds (children) from one (father) can be in opposition (elder and younger). I am inclined towards this definition of the fundamental opposition because of the consistency of the mythical investment. In each case the opposition is resolved by a hierarchical figure who is the source of the opposing principles.

Jesus' parable at the level of manifestation is concerned with the form of the myth as it appears in A⁴, although the parable probably reverberates up the mythical ladder. The relations between the father and younger son conform to the traditional investment of mythical structure. The clash between hearer and teller comes with the investment -A⁴ for the parable refuses to resolve the opposition in favor of the younger son, but the father accepts both sons. In the narrative structural analysis we argued that the elder son's complaint to the father (Lexie 21) belonged to the final correlated sequence of the father's narrative, that it was PU1 demanding PU2. This dramatic turn of the parable is due the mythical structure. In the mind of the audience the elder son's contract is to reject the elder son in PU2. But instead the father accepts him. But it should be noted that there is no implied rejection of the younger son. Thus we must conclude that the traditional investment of the mythical structure is rejected, but it is not reversed. The parable

mediates a binary opposition between the hearer's mythical investment and the rejection of that myth by the parable's narrative. This, of course, is exactly what happened in the case of the Good Samaritan.

On the basis of the analysis of two parables (an extremely narrow base, whereby all conclusions hereafter are made very tentative) I propose the following transformational law for Jesus' parables. B's mediation between +A and -A is replaced by the parable's mediation between the traditional myth and the parabolic non-myth.


Lévi-Strauss' model can be used to exemplify the working of this transformational law.



Semiotic Square/8/

In the immediate diagram I indicate that the mediating agent B¹ is the parabolic structure. I must now attempt to indicate what I consider the parabolic elementary structure to be. It must be remembered that I am working from the analysis of the intermediate structure of only two parables. If my analysis of the parable's mythical structure be correct then the fundamental opposition to be mediated is Wholeness and Separatedness. S is the semantic axis of meaning (the universe of meaning) which is manifested as Wholeness. Its opposite is Separatedness thus S¹ and S² are defined as the hyponymic relation between S¹ and S², and S. or to put it differently S is articulated as two contrary semes (Greimas and Rastier, 1969:87) Therefore S¹ can

be invested as parable and its contrary non-parable s^2 . The same process can be used to define the other end of the square. If S is separatedness the $\bar{S}^1$ is myth and its contrary $\bar{S}^2$ as non-myth. Thus the semiotic square would be invested as follows.




This investment of the semiotic square allows several gains. We can move towards a definition of parable and indicate how parabolic structure functions.

A parable is the opposite of a myth. This at first may not be very enlightening, until it is recalled how we reach the investment of the square. We began with a known, namely myth, and its structural model. Lévi-Strauss argued that "the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction" (1958:226, see also Crossan: 1974b:104). But myth overcomes the contradiction by means of the mediating agent that resolves the contradiction in favor of one of the competing poles. Thus the separatedness, although mediating, still remains.

Parable is the opposite of myth not by creating an anti-myth but by attacking myth at the point of mediation, i.e., the parable calls into the question the ability of the mediating agent to carry out the mediation in favor of one or the other poles. It resolves in favor of both poles. Non-myth is then not the absence of myth but the rejection of myth's ability to mandate. Similarly non-parable is not a denial of parable but rejection of parable's ability to resolve the completing poles in equal favor.


I am, then, essentially in agreement with Crossan's remarks on the relation between parable in myth (1974a 105). The only exception I would make is his reconstruction of the tree diagram of Kongas-Maranda. Crossan offers the following diagram.



In my analysis parable does not function to create contrast where there is no contrast (as Crossan's diagram suggests) but it does not allow the mediating agent to resolve in favor of the positive pole. Within Crossan's diagram parable functions to call into question the "gain by mediation" by pointing to wholeness verses separatedness and secondly by dissolving the mediation, thus re-creating the original binary opposition and resolving it through the parabolic structure.

Robert Funk has spoken often and eloquently about entering the world of the parable. The semiotic square can indicate what is meant and happens when this intuitive phrase is used. To enter the world of the parable is to allow its investment of the semiotic square to structure one's universe of meaning.

This allows us to move to our final question: How does parabolic structure function? The model would be the following?



In this diagram the arrows indicate the movements of constraints. The parabolic structure, constructed from its model the semiotic square and its investment, constraints both the myth-mythical structure and the narrative/narrative structure. Finally the myth-mythical structure and the narrative/narrative structure constraint the parable at the level of manifestation.

This theoretic construction can perhaps be made more evident by the example of the Prodigal Son.

The parabolic structure acts as a constraint upon the myth and its structure first by calling into question the contents of the myth. In the case of the parable of the prodigal, the parabolic structure does not allow the binary opposition to be resolved in favor of the younger son, but rather the mediating agent renders both of them equal. The mythical structure itself is similarly undermined by turning the mediating agent into a dissolving agent. Instead of the father of the myth mediating the poles of opposition he holds them together in himself.

In the case of the narrative and its structure the parabolic structure likewise acts as a constraint. This can be seen clearly in two places at the level of manifestation. First, the father is the SUBJECT of the parable, not the younger son with his OPPONENT, elder son and HELPER father. Thus the actantial model is greatly modified. Secondly, as we have already pointed out, the parabolic structure determines that at the end of the parable, the elder son will not be rejected but accepted by the father, thus creating the conflict between the parabolic structure and the mythical structure of the audience.

At the level of manifestation all these intermediate structures are operative. I have already engaged in a detailed analysis of how the narrative structure is operative at the level of manifestation, so I will restrict my remarks here to myth/mythical structure constraints upon the level of manifestation. It should be remembered that the myth/mythical structure is here no longer the model of Lévi-Strauss, but the myth/mythical structure under the constraint of the parabolic structure. The characterizations of the figures of the parable are heavily constrained by the myth. For example the younger son is pictured as a rogue, who regardless of what he does will be graciously accepted by the father. Likewise the almost burlesque reception of the father according to the younger son is determined by the myth's attempt to mediate the binary opposition. Finally the elder son is pictured as a villain because it is demanded by his mythical role. But the myth itself is broken by the father's refusal to mediate but rather to function parabolically.

NOTES

- /1/ Eduard Schweizer, "Zur Frage der Lukasquellen, Analyse von Luke 15, 11-32," ThZ 4 (1948) 469-471; Jeremias, "Zum Gleichnis vom verlorenen Sohn, Luke 15, 11-32," ThZ 5 (1949) 228-231; Schweizer, "Antwort," ThZ 5 (1949) 231-233.
- /2/ Ernst Haenchen, The Acts of the Apostles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), 72-73, gives the statistical information: 90% of Luke's vocabulary can be found in the LXX.
- /3/ In an unpublished paper read at the 1973 annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature.
- /4/ Dan Via, Jr., The Parables (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967) 163, makes this same point, but in later discussions of the parable ("Parable and Example Story," Semeia 1 (1974), 128-129; "Comments on Robert W. Funk's article, 'Structure in the Narrative Parables of Jesus,'" Semeia 2 (1974), 130) dismisses the elder son scene as secondary.
- /5/ I am following the arrangement of Daniel Patte (1974a). See this article for specific bibliography.
- /6/ Claude Bremond, "La logique des possibles narratifs," Communications 8 (1966) 60-62, has shown that a narrative can begin with the possibility of a process. In this parable the Father's division of the property sets up the possibility of action. The body of the parable deals with the process, while the goal is overcoming the possibility opened by the Father's action.
- /7/ Lévi-Strauss (1958: 202-28). I have accepted Patte's suggestion that one should distinguish the mythical and narrative superficial structures (1974a: 25, note 0.22). This distinction represents a definite gain in that it allows one to understand how the inherited mythical structure is constrained by the parabolic structure.
- /8/ Greimas and Rastier (1969). Cf. also Crossan (1974b: 126-128).

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by

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The parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32), the longest of the extant parables of Jesus, has probably had a greater influence on the life of Western Christendom than any of the other parables. It has been interpreted and discussed from the time of the early Church Fathers to the most recent scholarship of modern parable research.

Modern research on the Bible, which has developed in the last two centuries, with its emphasis on re-constructing the historical setting of the New Testament and attempting to reach behind the present gospel texts to the tradition that led to their production, has focused a great deal of attention on the parables. They have been purged of their settings in the gospels and stripped of the additional expansions and allegorizations of their earliest periods of transmission. Modern scholarship has pushed the parables back to, perhaps, the feet of Jesus himself. However successful one may judge the total endeavor, it has shown conclusively that the parables originally had nothing to do with their present settings in the gospels. The gospel writers used the parables, as they used much other traditional material, to present a particular message to their own time; they in no way were concerned to record the historical events in the life of Jesus but, rather, were attempting to present the Christ of faith speaking to a new situation and its problems. It is, therefore, justifiable that many modern interpreters of the parables have turned their attention to the individual parable texts, rather than interpreting them within the context of the total gospel or even gospel chapter in which they presently appear. Yet in order to understand the parables, modern scholars have found it necessary to supply some type of context, either a general view of the message of Jesus¹ or some particular philosophical orientation,² in order to help them relate the parables to this present age. The final question to be answered in Biblical scholarship, as in literary studies generally, is one of hermeneutics: how are these texts to be understood and made available for the modern reader/interpreter.

The problem for Biblical scholarship may be more pressing due to the fact that its texts are more ancient than are many, though not all, of the texts explored by general literary critics and the fact that its texts have been determined as perennially authoritative by canonization. One cannot drop a book or part of a book out of the Biblical canon on the grounds that it is irrelevant, unhelpful, or completely unintelligible to the modern age, as much as one might at moments want to do so. Hence, Biblical scholarship must always be profoundly involved with hermeneutics, bridging the gap from one era to another. For this reason, too, interpretations of Biblical texts made in the past may no longer be helpful to present day interpreters. Not only have the tools and methodologies been sharpened and improved, but the intelligibility requirements of the age also may have been radically altered. Biblical critics are inevitably caught in the mess and movement of history, and it is, in fact, from the very consciousness of their involvement in the flow of history that their distinct function as interpreters arises. This essay is one attempt at discussing a particular parable, the Prodigal Son, from the standpoint of a modern critical school of thought, depth psychology. To the degree that modern existence is psychological existence, psychology has shown itself to be a valuable tool in modern literary criticism. This essay will offer one possible interpretation of the parable of the Prodigal Son using the methods of literary criticism with a psychoanalytic orientation.

It is just as well to note at this point that the use of psychoanalytic models by literary critics is not in itself an issue devoid of controversy. Many literary critics are skeptical of the usefulness of psychoanalytic categories because of the plethora of "bad" psychoanalytic criticism, criticism that has obscured and all too often bludgeoned to death the literature it was intending to enlighten, all in the name of exemplifying psychoanalytic concepts.³ On the other hand, psychoanalysts and psychologists often fault literary critics who use psychoanalytic categories with discretion and care for not being rigorous enough in their application nor far reaching enough in their conclusions. For the literary critic, however, the literature itself must always retain the central focus of attention. Using psychoanalytic models in literary criticism requires the establishment of a delicate balance between faithfulness to the psychoanalytic concepts used and unrelenting concern for the integrity of the literature being discussed. That such a balance is difficult and, at times, perhaps even impossible to maintain is evident; that, however, it must always be the critic's goal in interpretation is mandatory. With this goal in mind let us turn to the parable of the Prodigal Son.

One of the problems which appears consistently in discussions of the Prodigal Son concerns what to do with the second section of the parable, the elder brother episode (Lk. 15:25-32). Some scholars have gone to the extreme position of supposing that the elder brother episode was a later textual interpolation, though no textual evidence exists to support this view, or that it was entirely a Lucan composition. The parable, as the very title suggests, has always been understood as presenting the theme of fatherly forgiveness and mercy toward the prodigal. In the light of this theme, the second episode does seem to possess a certain superfluity. The mainstream of recent research, though maintaining the linguistic and textual unity of the entire parable, still remains uncomfortable with the elder brother episode. Rudolph Bultmann expresses the feeling well:

On these grounds [the enlarging of parables by allegorical interpretations and expansions in the tradition] we may ask whether in the parable of the Prodigal Son the second part Lk. 15:25-32 is not a secondary expansion of the first vv. 11-24. Surely the narrator's purpose, to make plain the fatherly goodness of God, which unconditionally forgives self-condemning remorse, is already attained in v. 24? And is not the point of the parable shifted when God's forgiveness is defended against the charge of injustice? Yet vv. 25-32 are not an allegorical fabrication, but remain completely within the parable so far as formal features are concerned . . .⁴

Even in the work of Dan O. Via, Jr., whose recent discussion of the parables has opened a new era of parable research by introducing the procedures of literary criticism to Biblical interpretation, this same problem of what to do with the elder brother episode arises:

From the standpoint of the plot The Prodigal Son has a rounded and complete beginning, middle, and end without the elder brother episode; but . . . there are good reasons for considering the latter an original part of the parable . . . the elder brother episode--and hence the whole parable--is concluded by the father's repeating (15:32) the statement which he uttered at the end of the prodigal's story (15:24) and which expresses the movement and meaning of the latter. Thus the main interest of the story as a whole is seen to be the redemption of the prodigal.⁵

If one agrees that there are no compelling linguistic or textual grounds for dismissing the elder brother episode as a later addition to the text, then any critical understanding of the text must deal with the totality of the parable and not just with the first half--or admit that the parable was a botched production ill-conceived and ill-created. The strongest argument against the latter view of the parable is its amazing power and influence

throughout centuries of Western history. The parable, the entire parable, must speak convincingly to some deep layer of the human psyche in order for it to have had the prominence it has had in the Christian tradition.

From the standpoint of literary criticism the parable presents a particular problem: most of the work of modern literary criticism has been directed toward the novel or the poem, and the parable is neither. It is far more compressed than any novel; yet unlike a poem it is a narrative, and it does not have the high degree of formal control characteristic of poetry. The characters in the parables are not characters in the Aristotelian sense of character, having many stereotypical and developed attributes, but, rather, agents of action. In the Prodigal Son the only descriptive evidence we are given is that they are a father and two sons. We find out in the course of the story that the father has some property, servants, robes, a ring, shoes, and a fatted calf. We are not told whether there is a mother, other children, where they live, what the father does for a living, what any of them look like, etc.--all elements we might expect in a novelistic or dramatic development of character, and all elements we might need if we intended to discuss each of the parable's "characters" as if they were living individuals. It is on this very point, by the way, that some psychoanalytic interpretations of the parable have collapsed: one cannot discuss the Oedipal resolution of the two sons unless one assumes a great deal of material the story does not mention, not the least of which is a mother.⁶ In fact the parable appears to have a much closer relation to the simplest type of dream than it does to a novel or a poem. Freud states that, "Condensation, together with the transformation of thoughts into situations ("dramatization"), is the most important and peculiar characteristic of dream work."⁷ The characteristic narrative of a parable could easily be described as a condensed or compressed dramatization. Any work of art, of course, differs from a dream in that it demands a far greater amount of conscious control, thus allowing a greater amount of conscious complexity, than a dream does. Yet the simplest type of dream, the dream of undisguised wish-fulfillment characteristic of childhood, is fully available to consciousness without any need for distortion or displacement.⁸ The parable might be seen, then, as a conscious, more complex representation of a simple wish-fulfillment type of dream with its formal elements drawn from the processes of dream work.

In dream interpretation one often encounters the fact that various elements in the dream are all parts of a more complex unity. Another way of expressing this is to say that all the characters in the dream represent various aspects, characteristics, or desires of the dreamer. Especially when the elements in the dreamer are conflictual, the dream tends to split them into different characters or situations.⁹ If we view the parable of the Prodigal Son as a type of conscious representation of a wish-fulfillment dream, then we might also see the father and two sons as elements of a complex unity. In fact the text of the parable itself suggests this view to us, for the first sentence of the story establishes a complex unity, a man with two sons (v. 11), a family. The second sentence of the parable begins the splitting of this family into its elements. The rest of the parable is an attempt to return to the original unity of the family, to bridge the dividing of "his living" (v. 12).¹⁰ It is interesting to note here that the Greek word used for "his living" in v. 12b is *τὸν βίον*, rather than the more particular *οὐσίας* of vv. 12a and 13. The word *βίος* carries a further meaning than simply substance, property, or wealth. It connotes the whole course of one's life. The father was dividing the whole of his lifetime for his sons. The wish the parable presents is the wish to reconcile the conflicting elements and restore a type of unity. In terms of the story, the father achieves this in a limited way by the end of the parable: he has unified the two sons within himself. The sons are not joined directly with each other as they were at the beginning of the parable, but they are joined through the person of the father-figure. The younger son is unified with the father by the formulaic statement in v. 24:

"... for this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found." The elder son is joined to the father by the again formulaic "all that is mine is yours" of v. 31. The father's last speech¹¹ which closes the parable (vv. 31-32) states his connection with his elder son and then re-states his connection with the younger son. The two sons are joined indirectly by their individual relation to the father; a new unity has been established, though it is not the same simple unity present at the beginning of the story.

The unity of the parable as a whole and the parallelism of the father's attempt to reconcile each son separately with himself is borne out, not only by the thematic elements in the parable that we have been discussing, but also by an analysis of the structure of the surface narrative. Since we are concerned here with the particular message of this particular parable, we are more concerned with the surface structure, that over which the author has conscious control, manipulating it to express his special message, than we are with any deep or generative structure that might be uncovered. In the structural formulation that follows, the two basic criteria for analysis have come from Aristotle: action and manner of discourse. For Aristotle the central point in all imitation, or art, is the object of imitation, and the object is always agents involved in actions. So one aspect of the surface structural analysis will be to determine what actions are involved in the configurations of the narrative. The second basic criterion involves the manner of imitation. Aristotle identifies three types of manners: the narrative mode, the dramatic mode, and the mixed mode. What he is talking about here is essentially narrated discourse, direct discourse, or some combination of the two. Most stories are part of the mixed mode, that is, they contain some narrated discourse and some direct discourse. What is of value in this distinction is that the decision of which mode to use at what moment is essentially up to the author's discretion. As Aristotle says:

For, using the same means and imitating the same kinds of object, it is possible for the poet on different occasions to narrate the story (either speaking in the person of one of his characters as Homer does or in his own person without changing roles) or to have the imitators performing and acting out the entire story.¹²

The author, then, has a great deal of freedom in the choice of what manner of discourse to use at any moment. Regardless of how many or how few traditional elements are contained in the story, the individual author can manipulate the manner of his telling of the story to bring out his particular message. Changing the manner of discourse is a way the author can structurally signal to his readers or listeners some kind of distinction.

If one looks at the alternation of narrated discourse (ND) and direct discourse (DD) in the Prodigal Son, the story falls into the following divisions:

- ND: introduction, Luke 15:11
- DD: younger son's request, v. 12a
- ND: action of father and son, vv. 12b-16
- DD: younger son decides to return to father, vv. 17-19
- ND: action of son and father, v. 20
- DD: younger son's confession and father's response, vv. 21-24a
- ND: action in house and in fields, vv. 24b-26
- DD: servant's explanation to elder son, v. 27
- ND: action of elder son and father, v. 28
- DD: elder son's accusation and father's response, vv. 29-32

The introductory sentence and the younger son's request set the stage for the action of the story. After the younger son's request divides the family, the story falls into two main sections, the younger son's experience

with the father and the elder son's experience with the father. These two sections are paralleled to an amazing degree. An expansion of the above divisions made on the basis of the various actions occurring in each division might look like this:

I Narrated discourse: introduction, Lk. 15:11

II Direct discourse: younger son's request which divides the family,
v. 12a

III Younger Son & Father

1. action of father & son
vv. 12b-16 (ND)
 - a. father's action in complying
with request v. 12b
 - b. son's trip to foreign country
& difficult situation there
vv. 13-16
2. son talks to himself & evaluates
his situation vv. 17-19 (DD)
3. action of son & father v. 20 (ND)
 - a. son comes home v. 20a
 - b. father comes out to greet him
v. 20b
4. confession & response vv. 21-
24a (DD)
 - a. confession of son v. 21
 - b. father's response vv. 22-24a

III Elder Son & Father

1. action in house & in fields
vv. 24b-26 (ND)
 - a. household response to return
v. 24b
 - b. son's trip home from fields &
curiosity about situation there
vv. 25-26
2. servant tells son of situation at
home v. 27 (DD)
3. action of son & father v. 28 (ND)
 - a. son refuses to come home v. 28a
 - b. father comes out to entreat him
v. 28b
4. accusation & response vv. 29-
32 (DD)
 - a. accusation of son vv. 29-30
 - b. father's response (repeating
response to younger son)
vv. 31-32

The parallelism between the two major sections (III) of the story is striking. Both the younger son and the elder son travel to the house from a distance away; both are met outside by the father; both state their intentions to him outside; and with both the father has the final word. Verse 24a is repeated in v. 32, so that the final parallelism is not only one of action but also one of diction. The two sections of the parable are deeply intertwined, carefully paralleled, thematically and structurally, to bring the listener or reader to the father's proclamation of his intimate, though different, bonds with both of his sons which he expresses in his final speech in vv. 31-32. This kind of analysis clearly shows the authenticity of the elder brother episode: it is neither an interpolation nor a rather awkward addendum. It is a necessary and important part of the total configuration of the parable. We are not in this parable discussing only the forgiveness of the father for the younger son; we are also discussing the father's identification with ("all that is mine is yours," v. 31) and acceptance of the elder son. The parable as a whole, then, is pointing toward a far more complex understanding of existence than that of the forgiveness of "self-condemning remorse."¹³ It is expressing the longing of the human heart for wholeness, for a re-integration of the conflicting elements of life.

We can begin to see at this point some of the parable's appeal to people throughout the centuries. The wish to restore a unity, a harmony among the conflicting elements of one's life is an almost universal desire. The parable seen in this perspective seems to speak to our deepest desire for reconciliation. Though the unity or wholeness may not be as complete as the dimly perceived harmony of the past, it is still the goal toward which we work. But the Prodigal Son's appeal reaches even further than that. It specifies some of the conflicting elements that break the unity of life.

The parable presents us with three characters, an adult and two children. The adult must mediate between the two children; he goes out of the house to talk with them, to restore them to himself (vv. 20 and 28). One of the sons has wasted himself on a dissipated life, "devoured your living with harlots" (v. 30). The other son is rigid, judgmental and unforgiving. These three elements are present in the psyche of every individual. The voice inside us which demands the fulfilling of every desire, the breaking of every taboo is pitted against the often equally strong voice of harsh judgment on those desires. Both voices are infantile; they are the cries of children; the desires are often beyond what reality could possibly fulfill, and the judgment is often stronger and harsher than the present situation at all requires. Mediating between these two voices is the one who attempts to bring unity and harmony. The wish for unity that the parable embodies, then, repeats and represents the desire for wholeness, the resolution of conflicts within the psyche of every individual. The parable dramatizes some of the most basic conflicts and relations of the human psyche. It speaks to the wish of every individual for harmony and unity within themselves. Let us explore briefly the three characters in the parable and their possible relation to some of the internal conflicts of human life.

The younger son figure in the parable took his part of his father's possessions and journeyed into a distant land. There he wasted his money on "loose living" (v. 13). The elder brother later specifies this loose living as "devoured your living with harlots" (v. 31). The unrestrained seeking of pleasure was evidently his desire. When he ran out of money, he went to work feeding swine. Having anything to do with swine was a religious taboo for Jews of the first century. So the younger son is depicted as seeking sexual pleasure and breaking religious taboos without any great concern. It is only when his desires stop being fulfilled that, as the story puts it, "he came to himself." He decided to return to his father in a much more limited capacity than before in order to have "bread enough and to spare" as his father's servants did. The story presents his repentant attitude as springing from a not too noble source, his desire for food to sustain himself. The picture of the younger son presented in the parable is very close to the kind of picture Freud presents of the psychic element which he terms the id. It is dominated by the unrestrained pleasure principle, and it is for the most part living in a "far country," the unconscious. It exists out of sight of the conscious mind, though to find fulfillment it must appeal to consciousness.

The theme of forgiveness usually attributed to the parable as a whole and particularly to the younger son section is far more complex than often recognized. The son proclaims the error of his ways only after luck has turned against him. He represents the kind of conversion experience expressed by the cliché, "you will never find an atheist in a foxhole." When life turns sour for him, he returns to his father. The narrative's long and clear portrayal of the circumstances surrounding his decision to return (vv. 14-19) forces the reader to recognize the totally materialistic and utilitarian basis for his "repentance." His motivation for returning to his father is given in the story, but the father's motivation for receiving him back again before he has even spoken his words of repentance (v. 20b) is not given. The excessive way in which the father welcomes the son, moreover, emphasizes the importance for the father of the son's return. It is not necessarily his repentant son he wants back but simply his son. In the context of the parable as a whole, as we have seen, the father-figure's motivation is toward a re-establishment of unity, a reconciliation. What is important for the father is that the son has returned, repentant or not, changed or not, and the father's words in vv. 24a and 32 underline that point. He does not require, or perhaps even desire, the reformation of his prodigal son; he only desires his return to the family: "... for this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found."

The younger son in the parable is characterized by the elder son as having "devoured your living with harlots" (v. 30). The prodigal is clearly connected in the story with sexual excess. He satisfies all his desires in the most direct way possible without regard for religious or moral taboos. Yet he is welcomed back into the family with rejoicing and feasting. It is interesting that the elder son complains that this kind of celebration was never held for him (v. 29). It is as if only when the younger son returns to the family can real rejoicing take place. In Freudian terms the unrestrained, often destructive, and wasteful desires of the id also supply much of the energy for enjoyment and the love of life so crucial to human existence. Sexuality and the search for pleasure are at the heart of human existence; their acceptance and satisfaction by the individual are crucial for health and wholeness. The father welcomes his prodigal son with an embrace and a kiss; he requires no change in his son's status or attitude before he offers his wholehearted compassion. The parable does not deny sexuality or the desire for pleasure; rather it only desires the transposition of them from the wasteful excesses of the far country to the warmth and merry-making in the midst of the family. The younger son's desire for feasting and pleasure are still supplied in the unity of the family by the father's orders, but now the desire for pleasure is more restrained and controlled, still satisfied but not at the expense of life itself (" . . . my son was dead, and is alive again . . .").

Just as the younger son of the story embodies some of the aspects of Freud's conception of the id, the elder son exhibits some striking analogies with the ego ideal or "conscience." The super-ego, as Freud calls it, is the seat of morality, religion, law, and judgment. Its concepts, however, were formed during childhood and, like the id, do not always parallel the present reality of the adult. The elder son in the parable proclaims his righteousness to his father: "these many years I have served you, and I never disobeyed your command" (v. 29). He judges his brother harshly as one who has let his sexual desires run wild. He is angry and refuses to enter the house where the celebration is going on. He presents much the type of response we often encounter from our conscience when we celebrate and "make merry."

The elder son's anger comes from his feeling of being treated unfairly by his father: he is so righteous and his brother so lawless that he should be, of course, the more honored one; yet no feast has ever been given for him. His objection to his brother's celebration is essentially selfish, though it is couched in the terms of normative morality. He is angry, not because his wild-living brother has been returned to the family, but because he never got the kind of feast his brother is getting. To the degree that he represents the views of established religion and morality, as many commentators have observed, his presentation in the story and stated motivations show the underside of such a rigid morality: childish selfishness. Yet the father affirms the elder son even with his self-righteous declarations and, moreover, confirms the bond of identity between them: "Son, you are always with me, and all that is mine is yours" (v. 31). The father needs this son as well. As childish as the elder son's actions and statements may seem to be, he is a necessary and valued element of the family whom the father affirms and with whom he identifies. Neither sexuality nor morality are denied in the parable, but both are put under the control and judgment of the adult, the father-figure of the parable.

The parable does not tell us whether the elder son eventually comes into the house for the celebration or not. The parable ends with the elder son still outside, unreconciled to his brother, but his father has affirmed the bond of unity between this son and himself. At the end of the parable the full, original harmony of a man and two sons (v. 11) has not been re-established, but a partial unification of the sons within the person of

the father has been accomplished. Neither son has been presented in the parable as having fundamentally changed his nature: the elder son is still angry when we last hear from him, and the irony surrounding the younger son's "repentance" is carefully drawn in the longest, most detailed section of narration in the entire parable (vv. 13-17). The parable gives only the father the last word; we are not told how either of the sons respond to their father's statements to and about them. The unity that is established within the father is a precarious one at best. Either son could disrupt it again at any moment. The harmony at the end of the parable is indeed a moment of grace, a moment when acceptance for an instant holds the field. One is reminded of a quotation from a sermon by Paul Tillich delivered at Union Seminary in New York:

We experience moments in which we accept ourselves, because we feel that we have been accepted by that which is greater than we. If only more such moments were given to us! For it is such moments that make us love our life, that make us accept ourselves, not in our goodness and self-complacency, but in our certainty of the eternal meaning of our life. We cannot force ourselves to accept ourselves. We cannot compel anyone to accept himself. But sometimes it happens that we receive the power to say "yes" to ourselves, that peace enters into us and makes us whole, that self-hate and self-contempt disappear, and that our self is reunited with itself. Then we can say that grace has come upon us.¹⁴

The momentary grace of wholeness presented at the end of the parable is intimately connected with the actions of the father-figure. The father in the parable is the agent of reconciliation, the one who attempts to reunite his family. He accepts both of his sons; they are both part of his family. As was noted above, he does not rebuke his elder son's anger just as he did not rebuke his younger son's life style. He accepts them both and affirms with each of them their relation to himself. He is for a moment given the grace to say "yes" to both his sons, not because of their proclaimed righteousness nor their proclaimed repentance. Neither earns his acceptance by his father, but both receive it. The father has seen the failures of both of his sons, but he affirms their relationship anyway. It is striking to compare the actions of the father concerning the younger son with a quotation from Freud on the relation between the ego and the id:

(v. 20) And he arose and came to his father. But while he was yet at a distance, his father saw him and had compassion, and ran and embraced him and kissed him. . . . (v. 22) But the father said to his servants, 'Bring quickly the best robe, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand and shoes on his feet . . .'

. . . it [the ego] offers itself, with the attention it pays to the real world, as a libidinal object to the id, and aims at attaching the id's libido to itself . . . Whenever possible it tries to remain on good terms with the id; it clothes the id's Ucs. commands with its Pcs. rationalization; it pretends that the id is showing obedience to the admonitions of reality, even when in fact it is remaining obstinate and unyielding; it disguises the id's conflicts with reality and, if possible, its conflicts with the super-ego too.¹⁵

For Freud, the particular characteristic of the ego is "establishing the unity, or tendency to unity."¹⁶ Yet the ego's success at this project, much like that of the father-figure in the parable, is limited at best.

The ego, like the father in the parable, attempts to satisfy the demands of both the id and the superego as well as the demands of reality. It cannot ultimately change or destroy the conflicting elements within the psyche, but it can at moments modify them. So the ego's relation to the other two elements in Freud's mental typography is a complex one: on the one hand, it is the rudder of the psyche, setting the direction of life; while on the other hand it is a slave to two childish and demanding masters as well as to outward reality:

. . . in the matter of action the ego's position is like that of a constitutional monarch, without whose sanction no law can be passed but who hesitates long before imposing his veto on any measure put forward by Parliament . . . From the other point of view, however, we see this same ego as a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego.¹⁷

The father in the parable is both the unifying center of the parable and its most vacillating figure. He gives in to the request of the younger son and allows him to leave; he runs out to meet first one son and then the other; he does not order his elder son into the house or attempt to force either son to bend to his will; in fact, it is he who bends to the demands of his sons. It is interesting that in the history of the interpretation of this parable some scholars have suggested that it be called the parable of the Father's Love¹⁸ rather than the Prodigal Son. One perceives something centrally important to the parable in the action of the father, but at the same time there is something strangely weak in his depiction; the characters of the sons are far more strongly drawn. Yet in the course of interpreting the parable one begins to realize that in the father's weakness is his ultimate strength: because he bends to the demands of his sons, he can unite them in himself. For him to take a rigid position with either of his sons would be to destroy the possibility of wholeness forever. Yet in this strength is also his ultimate weakness: he can completely control neither of his sons, so the precarious harmony that he is momentarily able to establish can come crashing down in the next moment. The conflicts within the family, like those within the human psyche, have not been resolved but only abated in one delicate moment of wholeness when, through the father, grace becomes a reality—but it is only for a moment.

The parable of the Prodigal Son seen from this perspective expresses a basic human desire for unity and wholeness in life. Though the wholeness reached by and in the father at the close of the parable is limited and partial, it is still a kind of resolution, perhaps the only kind life allows. Every character in the parable is necessary, including the elder brother, and the conflicts and relations between them are basic to human existence. The comparison of the characters in the parable to Freud's analysis of the elements of the psyche is enlightening to the degree that Freud's analysis is an experiential reality in the lives of countless human beings. We can see that at least one reason the parable's influence has been so far reaching lies in the fact that its message has touched the heart of human desire. It depicts the continuing conflict and attempt at resolution that form the basic fabric of everyday psychic life. The wish fulfilled by the parable is the wish for harmony within, for unity no matter how partial nor how precarious.

NOTES:

¹For instance, C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961); Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962).

²For instance, Eta Linnemann, Parables of Jesus (London: S.P.C.K., 1966); and Dan O. Via, Jr., The Parables (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967).

³Simon O. Lesser, a literary critic who uses psychoanalytic concepts well, has expressed the fear of many critics opposed to such criticism in this way: "The cry of 'reduction' is immediately raised. Vigorous and sometimes angry voices are to be heard protesting that literature should not be assimilated to psychology, or economics or sociology The things that distinguish literature as literature seem peculiarly difficult to isolate and focus upon; it seems easier to discuss almost anything else. Thus there is a very real danger that a novel, for example, may be treated as though it were a kind of case history, as though only its meaning mattered, or that it will be used to document some economic development or cultural trend. It is probably safe to say that most discussion of literature assimilates it to something else. In extreme cases, a body of knowledge first introduced to explicate literature may end by claiming the center of the stage. Literature is relegated to a supporting role; it does not so much speak as stand by to be pointed to when it can be of service in illustrating a statement about something else." In Lesser, Fiction and the Unconscious (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 294.

⁴Rudolph Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 196.

⁵Via, p. 167.

⁶G. Crespy discusses the Oedipal nature of the parable in his "Psychanalyse et Foi" in Essais sur la situation actuelle de la foi (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1970), pp. 41-56.

⁷Sigmund Freud, On Dreams (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952), p. 50. Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams (New York: Avon, 1965), pp. 344-374.

⁸cf. Ibid., pp. 32-39.

⁹cf. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

¹⁰All English quotations from the Bible will be from the Revised Standard Version.

¹¹It is interesting to note here that some scholars have taken only the last part of this final speech, v. 32, to be its entirety (cf. Via, p. 167). Yet the text clearly shows that the father's final speech begins in v. 31 with, ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτῷ, τέκνον" and continues to the end of v. 32. The whole of the father's response, and not just half of it, receives the end stress of the narrative.

¹²Leon Golden, trans., Aristotle's Poetics, Commentary by O. B. Hardison (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 6.

¹³Bultmann, p. 196.

¹⁴Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 163.

¹⁵Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), p. 46.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 45-46.

¹⁸Jeremias, p. 128.

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I should like in this paper to give a very provisional Jungian interpretation of The Prodigal Son based only on an analysis of the narrative functions. Analyses of other levels and structures would give more scope, depth, and fineness, but these things will have to wait for another time.

One might offer a two-fold justification for such a psychological interpretation. (1) Any interpretation requires the choice of some vantage point for reading, and none is neutral. On a priori grounds a psychological approach is as good as any other. Whether it is legitimate in this case will depend on whether the narrative elements and psychological categories can really be shown to attract each other. (2) According to Jung, the archetypes, which are ultimately unknowable, project themselves in modified form in what we might call secondary images or symbols. And one medium into which these secondary images are projected is stories of various types.¹

Functional Analysis

Being ineluctably drawn to the dividing of stories into three parts, but feeling that one should be more modern, and hopefully more fashionable than to employ Aristotle's beginning, middle, and end, it seems to me that Bremond's three elementary narrative functions--(1) initial state=potentiality; (2) process; (3) result--provide a simple and useful way of grasping a narrative. The two most unembellished and general narrative movements are: (1) state of deficiency → process of improvement → improved state; (2) satisfactory state → process of degradation → state of deficiency. These patterns can be complicated in various ways, two being to introduce opposition into the process of improvement or helpful interventions into the process of degradation.²

In approaching The Prodigal Son we will deal first with the prodigal's story and then with the elder brother's. It would appear that the initial state is more one of deficiency than satisfaction, but we must ask to whom the deficiency or lack is primarily ascribed and what its nature and aspects are. Answering these questions will help us to determine where the initial state function ends and the process of improvement begins. Looking at the final--result--function, where deficiencies are supplied and alienation overcome, will cast light on the extent of the first function. The father is deprived of a son--temporarily as it turns out--and also of some money. But in the end he is still the one who is in a position to confer all of the benefits and the son is in need of them; therefore, it must be the son who is to be seen primarily as deficient. What is restored to the son: sonship itself, a home, food, the tokens of wealth and position--the robe, ring, and shoes.³ Therefore, the first function must include the loss of all of these things, which means that it runs through 15:14. The process of improvement begins with his joining himself to the citizen of the foreign country

(15:15). The theological import is grounded in the fact that he is graciously restored to sonship with all of its entailments without his moral deficiency, however, being filled. He has the position or relationship of son without the appropriate achievements of a son. We can not tell with certainty what the story intends to represent as his "sin" against his father and God. It may be that his request to receive the right of disposal to his share of the inheritance during the lifetime of his father was regarded as sinful. But the legal situation regarding that is uncertain.⁴ Or it could be that squandering his property was the sin. In any case the parable seems more interested in showing that he felt guilty in his alienation from his father than in specifying exactly how he acquired that guilt.

Yet in the result function the son is regarded as the lost who has been found and the dead one who has been restored to life. If that is what his return means, then the logic of the story suggests that the initial leave-taking itself, and not just his material destitution, was a loss to the son whether or not it was an offense against the father and in at least some Jewish circles the son's request for his share of the inheritance would have been an affront (Ecclus. 33:12-23) even if not unlawful. At the same time others could have seen the younger son's act of leaving home with his share of the estate as affirmatively enterprising. Perhaps the ambiguity of the act is an important part of its meaning: it hovers between presumption and courageous freedom.

Having considered the first and final functions, let us now look at the middle or process function. The process which the prodigal inaugurates in 15:15 must be considered a process of amelioration since his joining himself to a citizen of the foreign country (undoubtedly a conjunction, which means two figures coming closer together than they were before) is an effort to overcome the want in which we find him in 15:14. His willingness to eat the swine fodder--if he could have--might appear to be the depth of his degradation, and perhaps it is; but at the same time our psychological interpretation, not to mention theological considerations, will show this to be an important move toward redemption. The process of improvement is furthered by his coming to himself and his resolve to return home. His new self-awareness, however, is experienced in terms of law. He has forfeited the right to sonship and does not expect to receive it back. Merit is the principle of the world's working, hence he hopes only to be a servant. This law-oriented understanding of his possibilities opposes the process of improvement and would prevent its attaining its proper goal were there not a dimension beyond the conscious imagination. He is his own opponent. That law is not the ultimate principle of reality and that he might be a son again is a new possibility which comes to him in the final function, as we have seen, from beyond his own self-consciousness. The story comes to a quite satisfactory comic conclusion with the merrymaking and the enunciation of the comic theme of life through death, but it does not end here, at least not syntagmatically. There is the elder brother episode.

The latter picks up two aspects of the result function of the prodigal's story--the festal merrymaking and the articulation of the life through death theme--and encloses within

these two the reaction of the elder brother to the prodigal's return. Broadly speaking since the prodigal's story and the elder brother's story both end with the statement of the life through death motif, the two stories conclude with synonymous paradigmatic correlates. This has the effect of thrusting the elder brother's story back into the prodigal's story, or perhaps more accurately, of making the two stories variant transformations (see figure 1) within a conceivable set of stories. What seems to happen is that the elder brother's story retells the prodigal's story in reverse order and with transformations with the result that the life through death theme is extended, so to speak, beyond the temporal beginning of the prodigal's story and thus this archetypal motif is presented as the original possibility which generates the story. This is represented in a very non-specific way in figure 2, and I now turn to a more specific analysis of the elder brother's story (see figure 3 for a more detailed diagram of the relationship of the elder brother's story to the prodigal's).

The elder brother's story begins by taking up the festal celebration which symbolized the satisfactory result of the prodigal's story and turns this into an initial deficient situation. The older brother is angry at the prodigal's reception and refuses to join in the dancing and feasting which are going on at the house; therefore, he is lacking a home. A process of improvement is begun with the father's going out and entreating him to come to the feast. The elder brother opposes this offer by expressing his resentment at the fact that he has never been given the provisions for a celebration in spite of his consistent obedience and by condemning the past actions of his wayward brother. This is a second (implicit) refusal to go to the feast. He refuses because his sense of justice has been offended. Feasting--the parable's symbol for gracious acceptance as the turning of death into life--is offered to him, but he can not accept it because of the imprisonment of his self-understanding in self-justification.

The process of improvement with its opposition parallels the same kind of formal arrangement in the prodigal's story. The relationship between the two will be more fully considered in the psychological interpretation, but it might be noted here that while the prodigal himself seems to initiate the process of improvement in his story, it is the father who initiates it in the elder brother's story. We should also observe that the elder brother's charge that the prodigal had spent the father's living on harlots makes contact with the statement in the (first) deficient state function in the prodigal's story that the younger brother squandered the property. Thus the first function in the first story is also paralleled in the second story. That is, the process function in the elder brother's story parallels the process function in the prodigal's story but also makes allusion to the initial state function of the prodigal's story. That is why, then, it could be said that the result function of the elder brother's story extends out in front of the initial function of the prodigal's story.

We do not know whether the elder brother will go in, but the possibility is left open. In the result function the father tells him that all that he has is his and restates the theme of the finding of the lost and the restoring of the dead.

The three functions of the two stories in their reverse movements present three binary oppositions:

Prodigal:	(1) Leaving home actualized; destitution	(2) Process of improvement initiated by one character	(3) Celebration accepted
	vs.	vs.	vs.
Elder Brother:	(3) Being at home as possibility; celebration--life through death	(2) Process of improvement initiated by a different character	(1) Celebration rejected

All three are mediated by the interaction of father and son.

Some Jungian Concepts

At this point I should like to discuss briefly just those Jungian categories which will be pertinent for the intrapsychic interpretation of the parable.

I begin with Jung's complex concept of the Self. The Self is an archetype of wholeness or totality which embraces all of the components of the individual personality (conscious and unconscious) and which is ultimately indefinable and unknowable and exceeds the consciousness of the individual by an indeterminate extent. But not only is it the totality of the personality, it is also the center.⁵ As totality and center it is the source of life which is there from the beginning and which confronts the individual independently of his conscious will. It is in addition the process of becoming what one always was as well as the goal of the total man.⁶ Within the Self all of the opposites are contained, and the Self as an archetype of totality cannot be empirically distinguished from the image of God.⁷

Consciousness develops out of the unconscious and exists as the awareness of opposites, manifesting itself in the exercise of exclusion, selection, and discrimination.⁸ The center of consciousness is the ego, which is the subject of all personal acts and of all successful attempts at adaptation in so far as they are achieved by the will.⁹

The personal unconscious is comprised of lost memories, repressed ideas and other elements which could just as well be conscious. That from the personal unconscious which can be summoned up into consciousness should be kept there and assimilated into one's conscious outlook.¹⁰

"Beneath" the personal unconscious is the collective unconscious, which is the realm of the archetypes. The latter are the inherited deposits of the ever repeated experiences of the race and are universal and identical in all persons, the identity of mental functioning being based on the universal similarity of the brain.¹¹ The archetypes are the foundation stones of the psychic structure which make knowledge of objects possible. They are not inherited ideas or patterns of thought

but are inherited empty forms or possibilities of certain types of actions, perceptions, or ideas. Because the archetypes are the forms through which we think and therefore can not be fully got out of in order to be thought about, and because they are empty, they can never be fully known or described.¹² The concept of archetypes simply means that imagination, perception, and thinking, like the instincts, are influenced by inborn, formal elements.¹³

While the archetypes are ultimately unknowable, they can be circumscribed and something can be said about them on the basis of the multiplicity of images and parables which each of them generates and on the basis of the psychic contents which they attach to themselves through empirical experience.¹⁴ There are as many archetypes as there are typical life situations,¹⁵ and although an archetype is indescribable and expresses itself in many different images, it nevertheless must have a character because Jung states that an archetype is recognizable¹⁶ and is the possibility of a certain kind of action or perception. Thus each archetype must be the possibility of a particular kind of experience, however varied its manifestations, and its numerous images would have to have a recognizable relationship to each other. But when all is said and done, any interpretation of an archetype remains an "as if."¹⁷

While Jung recognizes that the unconscious possesses a certain inert tendency to remain unconscious, at the same time it wants to become conscious; and the latter seems to be the emphasis of Jungian psychology. The unconscious wants to communicate itself and break into consciousness.¹⁸ The proper response to this on the part of the ego is to accept and integrate the contents of the archetype into consciousness and to become conscious of the archetype itself as something which the ego is not and should not identify itself with.¹⁹

The most important archetype, other than the Self, for our purposes is the shadow. The shadow is the archetype which is the closest and most accessible to consciousness, and its contents can be largely deduced from the personal unconscious.²⁰ Therefore, Jung can say that the shadow represents primarily the personal unconscious,²¹ or he can even--somewhat inconsistently--identify it with the personal unconscious.²²

The shadow is the dark or inferior personality, composed of those elements which have been repressed because they would be too painful to be held in consciousness.²³ Yet it wants to become a part of the conscious personality, and admitting or integrating it is the essential condition for self-knowledge as well as the first step toward a knowledge of the broader collective unconscious.²⁴ The shadow is redeemed by being made conscious, but some aspects of it may need to be made conscious in order to be rejected as unassimilable and incompatible with a healthy personality.²⁵ Or highly negative elements may be assimilated in a paradoxical way.

Since the realization of the Self depends on a reintegration of consciousness and the unconscious, a knowledge of the shadow must lie at the beginning of the actualization of the Self.

I turn now to a brief discussion of the relationship of the ego to the Self, a relationship which is subject to two problematical distortions. The first of these is inflation. This is the identification of the ego (something small) with the Self (something large) so that the ego is blown up beyond its proper limits. This is the situation into which one is born, and it may occur also later in life, but always with some kind of suffering because the ego will have appropriated for itself energies that are too great for it.²⁶

In order for consciousness and proper psychological development to take place the ego must separate from the Self. But the consequence of separation is that disidentification becomes disconnection: the alienation of the ego from the Self is the second distortion of the relationship.²⁷ Paradoxically inflation (identification) and alienation (separation) are likely to be simultaneous, and perhaps always are to some degree. Because the ego is unconsciously identified with the Self, it acts as if it were the center and source of power and thereby alienates itself from the real center and totality. What is desired is neither inflation nor alienation but a relationship between ego and Self constituted by a conscious axis or line of communication between the two. Thus the ego will neither be filled beyond capacity nor separated from its origins and foundations.²⁸

Jungian Interpretation

My overall intention is to give an intra-psychic interpretation of the parable showing that the dynamics involved are the alienation of the ego from the Self and its reintegration through coming to terms with the shadow. It seems well at the outset to establish the psychological meaning of the father and the prodigal. The other psychological meanings can be developed as we proceed.

It is easiest, and most reliable, to begin with the father because the archetypal connections are most obvious. The archetype of the Self (wholeness) often expresses itself symbolically in a circle, because of its "perfect" form, and/or in quaternity because four is the minimum number of parts into which a circle can be naturally divided. Either the circle or quaternity can be expressed geometrically or as objects or as arrangements of persons or objects. From quaternity proceed such symbols as a city, castle, house, etc. A frequent symbol of the Self is a god or godlike figure--like a prince, priest, father or successful elder brother--inhabiting quadratic space.²⁹ Hence in our parable the father holding a feast at his house (15:25) and dispensing a ring is a rich symbol of the Self. For convenience I will refer simply to the father in the future as the symbol of the Self (The elder brother in this story turns out to be a shadow image). The prodigal is the ego if for no other reason than that he leaves the father (Self) in search of his own independent existence--consciousness.

At this point in order to provide a very limited context for the fuller interpretation of The Prodigal Son I should like to mention briefly two fairy-tales which have structural similarities with the former but are also different.³⁰ In "The Undutiful Son" a son (ego) rejects the needs of his Father

(Self) and as a result is bewitched and forced to wander around with no place to rest. The story ends with the alienation of the ego. In "The Gold Children" two brothers leave father and mother and meet with misadventure. One decides to return home while the other declares that he must and will go on. He marries but is later bewitched. When the brother at home found out about this, he rode out and redeemed his unfortunate brother. The two embrace joyfully but then part, the one to return to his wife and the other to his father. All live happily ever after. The brother who stays away from home would seem to be the ego and the father, the Self. The second brother, however, is not the shadow but another symbol of the Self or of the ego Self axis. He makes it possible for the first brother (ego) to live relatedly in the world but in conscious relation also to his own Self. And so we return to The Prodigal Son.

The younger son leaves home because the ego must separate from the Self in order to achieve consciousness. But dissociation leads to alienation as is reflected in the son's sense of having sinned against his father (Self). And inflation is seen in the son's lack of regard for the money which has been graciously given and which he perhaps has no right to. He acts as a center. This arbitrary squandering of the property shows that the ego has no goals or commitments, and that in turn reveals that energy has moved from consciousness to the unconscious.³¹ We can therefore expect that the unconscious will have power to influence the ego-consciousness; moreover, if the ego is going to recover the lost energy and be established in a conscious relationship with the Self, it will have to assimilate the unconscious--specifically the shadow--to which the energy has become attached.

We move into the process of improvement as the prodigal makes a hazy effort to alleviate his misery by accepting the position of swineherd. The first really significant note is that he would have eaten the swine's lowly carob pods if he could have. Here we must observe that the story has two shadow images, not just the elder brother but also the swine. For a Jew eating with another is the closest form of intimacy.³² Jesus ate with outcasts and sinners and thereby brought God's healing to them (Mt. 11:19; Mk. 2:15-17). The prodigal is willing to eat swine food. That means that the ego assimilates its shadow as symbolized by an animal. It says "yes" to its primitive, instinctual animal self.³³ And since the pig is such an overdetermined symbol in Jewish religious culture, for a Jewish ego to assimilate into itself its instinctive, animal aspect as pig is to accept the unacceptable indeed. The consequences of this need to be broadened and humanized,³⁴ and they are as the story progresses. Perhaps it is the ego's acceptance of the unacceptable shadow-pig that makes it possible for the alienated, guilty ego to accept its acceptance by the Self finally.

But the most immediate consequence of the assimilation of the shadow-pig is that the ego came to itself. The coming to himself of the prodigal recalls or is the manifestation of another archetype, the archetype of spirit. For Jung the spirit archetype occurs in a story when the hero is in a desperate and hopeless situation from which he can not extricate himself. It is the spontaneous concentration of his reflective, moral, and

physical powers suggesting an unexpected resolution of his plight. The most frequent image of the spirit is the helpful "wise old man," though other images also appear, or the spirit may manifest itself simply as an authoritative voice or thought.³⁵ In *The Prodigal Son* it occurs as a dialogue of the prodigal (ego) with himself. And as the wise old man often asks questions for the purpose of stimulating thought and mobilizing moral resources,³⁶ so the prodigal begins with a question to himself: "How many....?".

According to E. F. Edinger the spirit or wise old man is equivalent to the conscious ego-Self axis;³⁷ therefore, we can say that at this point in the story that line of communication has been set up, and it will ultimately lead to the reintegration of ego and Self. But as yet the channel is partially blocked. We have seen that the ego-prodigal has some awareness of the Self-father, but he can not imagine that full integration with the Self and the complete overcoming of alienation is possible. He hopes only to be received back as a servant, not as a son. Why is this so?

We have seen that on structural grounds the elder brother story is a transformation within the same set that the prodigal's story belongs to. What does this mean psychologically? The correlation of the prodigal's disbelief that he can be a son again (disbelief that ego and Self can be fully reintegrated), which is based on a legalistic self-understanding, with the assertive legalism of the elder brother and his condemnation of the prodigal shows that the elder brother is the ego's hostile shadow.³⁸ He is the shadow that wants to defeat the ego and prevent its salvation or psychic health, that double of the ego that wills alienation from the Self. The elder brother-shadow's alienation is seen in his refusal to go to the feast at the house, and his inflation is manifested in his arrogating to himself the power of self-justification. He is the shadow who needs to be made conscious in order to be rejected or neutralized.

The elder brother's story shows us the true nature of this shadow. The prodigal in the beginning wanders away from home somewhat aimlessly; the older brother, on the other hand, angrily refuses to go to the house. In the prodigal's hope of being only a servant in his father's household we see the operation of the shadow as refracted through the ego-consciousness, preventing a sense of sonship or hope for full reconciliation, but not manifesting its full hostility. The prodigal's feeling of deserving merely servanthood is a weak but not total self-condemnation, for he still wants to go home. The much sharper and more explicit condemnation and rejection of the prodigal by his brother (he calls him, not "my brother," but "your son") shows the latter to be the shadow projected. What the ego hates in itself is repressed into the unconscious and projected onto another figure who represents the environment as hostile to it. The self he hates hates him.³⁹ Why he does not experience this hostility in its full force will be seen below.

The elder brother's story also tells us something important about the action of the Self (father) which must cast light on the prodigal's story because of the paradigms or connections which we have seen to exist between the two stories (see figure

3 again). The prodigal's story shows us the action of the Self at the end, in the result function, completing the work of the ego and making life out of death, reintegration, real. But the elder brother's story demonstrates that already in the process function the Self is at work, seeking to reconcile the hostile shadow, unite consciousness and the unconscious. And the Self (father) is doing this prior to the elder brother's (shadow's) explicit condemnation of the prodigal (ego) which, we have seen, corresponds to the prodigal's condemnation of himself, which is a part of his coming to himself. As has been noted, the ego is different from the shadow in that it is willing to go home, even as a servant, while the shadow refuses to go in. The hostile shadow affects the ego-consciousness making it see itself as servant but does not dominate it completely because it can still resolve to return to the father. This lack of complete domination, this protection from seeing the world as totally hostile, is grounded in the fact that the Self is already at work, before the end, to moderate condemnation and effect reintegration. And even the guilt created by the shadow is influential in moving the ego to return; therefore, the shadow's effect is not wholly negative. The process function of the prodigal's story suggests that dealing with the two shadow figures, coming to himself (the manifestation of spirit or the wise old man), and resolving to return home were the works of the ego and were necessary for its reintegration with the Self. Considering this in the light of its paradigmatic correlate, the process function of the elder brother's story, disclosed that all of this was possible because the Self was already at work to bring it about. The parable, then, supports Jung's contention that the appearance of spirit or the wise old man is a spontaneous incursion of the collective unconscious into consciousness to offer a new possibility and future at a time when consciousness itself is not capable of such.⁴⁰

In the result function of the prodigal's story the father runs to greet his returning wayward son. It has often been remarked that it is unusual and undignified for an older oriental man to run.⁴¹ Perhaps this extravagant behavior is to be explained by its really being his mother dressed in his father's clothes who ran out. Or, more seriously, may this not be an instance of "the forgotten feminine in the Gospels," an occasion of eros, the principle of relatedness, expressed by a man?⁴² In any case the father welcomes the son at the house and has a ring put on his finger--clearly indicating that the ego is reintegrated with the Self, with that which transcends it. And as we have observed, the theme of the rebirth of the dead, the finding of the lost, is articulated. The prodigal is found as son, not as servant.

That the ego is found means that the ego-Self axis is now clearly established. No longer is the line of communication distorting or distorted. Clearly alienation has been overcome, and inflation as well has been dealt with. The ego has assimilated its pig-shadow, a humbling but healthy experience, and the hostile elder brother-shadow must also have been assimilated in some way. The earlier sense of servanthood has been replaced by actualized sonship. No longer can the accusing shadow prevent the ego from being given a new relationship with the Self. Now that the ego is conscious of having been given a new relationship with the Self, it can

be conscious of the accusing voice of the shadow rather than being unconsciously goaded by that voice into reducing itself to a servant. The self-giving power of the Self relativizes the condemning voice of the shadow and prevents it from keeping the ego away. But the shadow-brother is always a part of the Self (15:31) and therefore may condemn again. Is this, too, a protection against inflation? And may it suggest that the whole process could recommence?

This brings us finally to consider again briefly the fact that the end of the elder brother's story pushes the basic comic motif--the dead is alive, the lost is found, hence celebration--out ahead of the beginning of the prodigal's story. If life through death is the original archetypal possibility from which the narrative flows, then obviously one can be found only by being lost. The ego must seek the life which is death (independent consciousness which is inflation and alienation) in order to be given the death which is life (the renunciation of being the center of power for the sake of being grounded in the transcendent resources of the Self). But what generates the movement, the story, out of possibility? The condemning shadow-brother (15:28, 30) who is still there at the end (15:31) was already there at the beginning (15:11). Is it then that this most powerfully comic and redemptive of all of Jesus' parables contains a hint also of the tragic? Does the prodigal not only become guilty because he leaves but also leave because he is guilty, condemned? Does the ego not only become alienated because it separates from the Self but also separate because it is alienated?

If we are constituted in our humanness by our linguisticity, then the relationship of archetype or logos to story must have an inescapable bearing on the structure and process of our psycho-existential possibilities. If the archetype precedes the story, as I have suggested, then it would seem that we are guilty before we act, or must die (become lost) in order to live (be found). However, if the story is prior, and the logos is derived from it, then perhaps we must act in order to be guilty. Which is it, or is it both? Maybe we can not tell, but that is not ultimately grave, for the story is about a rescue, a being found, despite our fumbling efforts.

Figure 1



Figure 2





Figure 3



1. C. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. R. Hull (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 230; The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, trans. R. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959), pp. 5, 70.

2. Claude Bremond, "Morphology of the French Folktale," Semiotica 2(1970): 248, 249, 251, 252, 261, 267.

3. See Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, trans. S. Hooke (New York: Scribner's, 1963), p. 130.

4. See Dan O. Via, Jr., The Parables (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967), pp. 168-171.

5. Jung, Two Essays, pp. 234, 242-252; "Commentary," in The Secret of the Golden Flower, trans. R. Wilhelm (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962), p. 124; Psyche and Symbol, edit. V. de Laszlo (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958), p. 4; Aion, trans. R. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959), pp. 195-196; Marie Louise von Franz, Interpretation of Fairytales (Zurich: Spring Publications, 1973), p. 43.

6. Von Franz, Fairytales, p. 43; Edward F. Edinger, Ego and Archetype (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 4; Jung, Aion, p. 260; Archetypes, p. 40; Answer to Job, trans. R. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 97, 106.

7. Jung, Job, 54-55, 106, 107; Psyche, pp. 30-31.

8. Jung, Archetypes, pp. 276, 281, 288; Golden Flower, p. 88; Aion, p. 204.

9. Jung, Two Essays, p. 234; Psyche, pp. 1-2, 5; von Franz, Fairytales, p. 41.

10. Jung, Two Essays, pp. 76, 90, 137, 145.

11. Jung, Archetypes, p. 43; Two Essays, pp. 79, 157; Psyche, pp. 115, 117.

12. Jung, Psyche, pp. xvi, 19, 61, 118-119, 123; Archetypes, pp. 38, 48, 57, 66.

13. Jung, Archetypes, p. 44.

14. Jung, Two Essays, p. 200; Psyche, pp. 118-119, 123; Archetypes, p. 38.

15. Jung, Archetypes, p. 48.

16. Ibid., p. 38

17. Jung, Psyche, pp. 118-119, 123.

18. Jung, Job, p. 94; Two Essays, p. 194; von Franz, Fairytales, p. 1, 116, 123.

19. Jung, Psyche, pp. 19-20; Two Essays, pp. 83, 108, 159-162.

20. Jung, Archetypes, p. 37; Psyche, pp. 6-7, 9.

21. Jung, Psyche, p. 9.

22. Jung, Archetypes, p. 284; Psyche, p. 21; Two Essays, p. 76.
23. Jung, Aion, p. 233; Psyche, p. 7; Two Essays, p. 76.
24. Jung, Archetypes, p. 20-22; Psyche, pp. 7, 21; Two Essays, p. 64; see also von Franz, Fairytales, p. 104.
25. Von Franz, Fairytales, pp. 96, 121.
26. See Edinger, Ego, pp. 7, 35.
27. Ibid., pp. 12, 37, 42.
28. Ibid., pp. 6, 38, 41.
29. Jung, Aion, pp. 222-225.
30. Both can be found in Household Stories, collected by the Brothers Grimm (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1876).
31. See Von Franz, Fairytales, p. 104.
32. See Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, trans. I. and F. McLuskey, J. Robinson (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), p. 80.
33. Jung, Two Essays, p. 40; von Franz, Fairytales, pp. 95-96.
34. See von Franz, Fairytales, pp. 95-96.
35. See Jung, Psyche, pp. 67-70, 72-74; von Franz, Fairytales, p. 110.
36. Jung, Psyche, p. 75.
37. Edinger, Ego, p. 118.
38. See von Franz (Fairytales, pp. 91-92, 95-96) for a human image of the shadow as jealous, hostile and murderous..
39. For the projection of the shadow see Jung, Psyche, p. 8. The elder brother could also be seen as the Freudian super-ego. See Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. J. Riviere (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1962), pp. 38-39, 42; Civilization and its Discontents, trans. J. Strachey (New York: Norton, 1962), pp. 82-83; An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, trans. J. Strachey (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 63. One might also see the prodigal as the id. But to see the father as the ego, the closest analogy, would modify the Freudian personality theory so as to transcend it toward Jungianism.
40. Jung, Psyche, pp. 74-76.
41. See Jeremias, Parables, p. 130.
42. See Elizabeth B. Howes, Intersection and Beyond (San Francisco: Guild for Psychological Studies, 1971), pp. 107, 114.

J. Ramsey Michaels

An assumption underlying much of the critical study done on the Gospels in the past quarter century is that a great deal of vigorous and creative prophetic activity was going on in the early church, and that this activity played a decisive role in the shaping of the Gospel tradition. Günther Bornkamm's statement made in 1956 is typical of many, and what he said then has become almost commonplace:

"The history of the tradition shows that frequently not only the words of Jesus spoken while he was here on earth...soon took on a post-Easter form. For words spoken by the Risen Christ also became words of the earthly Jesus. In principle this is the same process. We have to reckon with it wherever circumstances and questions of the later Church are presupposed in a saying coming from the tradition....Such sayings will originally have been declared to the Church by her inspired prophets and preachers, as the Revelation of John shows in its Letters to the Churches (Rev. ii and iii)."¹

Whatever may be true of the synoptics, the applicability of such a statement to the Gospel of John in particular has been rather widely accepted. The reasons for this are not hard to see:

1. Even conservative scholars who are not prepared to recognize as much freedom in the synoptic tradition as Bornkamm does, must account for the differences both in form and substance between the synoptic sayings of Jesus and the discourses recorded in the Fourth Gospel. One method of doing this is to assign the "post-Easter" or "prophetic" factor of which Bornkamm speaks, to the Fourth Gospel in a much more sweeping way than to the synoptics. Thus in John, "what Jesus said" is more strongly colored by and integrated with "what he says" now in the church through his inspired messengers.

2. John's Gospel itself affords a foothold for the notion that the sayings and discourses of Jesus which it contains have been re-presented and perhaps re-shaped by the Holy Spirit in the post-Easter church. There is general agreement that the "Paraclete" passages in Jesus' Farewell Discourse in John (14:16f., 26, 15:26, 16:7-15) in some way reflect the literary and/or theological self-consciousness of the Gospel writer.² The Paraclete, or "Spirit of truth" (14:17, 15:26, 16:12), or "Holy Spirit" (14:26), will "remind" the disciples of all that Jesus has said (14:26), will "bear witness" about Jesus (15:26), and will "take from that which is mine and announce it to you" (16:14). Such promises suggest that the Paraclete is concerned especially with what Jesus has said and done, and thus with the Gospel tradition. Since this is what the author of the Fourth Gospel is concerned with as well, it is natural to infer

that he considers himself somehow allied with, or an instrument of, the Paraclete who guides the disciples "into all the truth" (16:13). The parallel between the Paraclete's witness and that of the original disciples (including the "beloved disciple" in whose name the Fourth Gospel is written) is clearly seen in 15:26f.: "He will bear witness about me, and you too must bear witness, for you have been with me from the beginning." Whether this self-consciousness is more properly designated as "apostolic" or "prophetic" or both, is a question which deserves close and careful attention.

3. Of the four Gospels, John is the one which in early Christian tradition (and to some extent in modern scholarship as well) has been assigned a place of kinship with the Book of Revelation, the only self-designated "prophecy" in the New Testament canon. Whether this kinship rests on common authorship or on a common "school" of thought in the ancient church, or simply on later tradition,³ it at least creates a presumption in favor of looking for "prophetic" elements in John's Gospel which may intertwine (as they do occasionally in the Book of Revelation)⁴ with traditions of the sayings of Jesus. This "presumption" is what now needs to be followed up and tested.

I. Prophets and Prophesying in Johannine Vocabulary

Apart from two references to "prophet" in a purely general way (4:44, 7:52), the term prophētēs in the Fourth Gospel is reserved for OT prophets (John 1:23, 45, 6:45, 8:52, 53, 12:38), for Jesus as "a prophet" (4:19, 9:17; implicitly in 4:44, 7:52), and for the messianic figure known as "the Prophet" (1:21, 25), who is on two occasions expressly identified with Jesus (6:14, 7:40).⁵ Thus John makes no mention of any order of NT "prophets" in the early church or among Jesus' disciples. The same is true of the Johannine epistles, although First John speaks of many pseudoprophētai who have "gone out into the world" (4:1). The Book of Revelation, on the other hand, speaks in several instances of "prophets" in the church and in the world (11:10, 18, 16:6, 18:20, 24, 22:6, 9, and possibly 10:7).⁶

Curiously enough, while "prophet" (except in reference to OT prophets) is characteristically singular in the Gospel and Epistles and "false prophet" (in its one occurrence) is plural, the reverse is true in the Book of Revelation: NT "prophets" are freely referred to in the plural, while "the false prophet" (Rev. 16:13, 19:20, 20:10) is a singular eschatological figure.⁷

The only example of the verb prophēteuein in the Johannine Gospel or Epistles comes in a rather surprising context. Not Jesus, and not an OT prophet, but Caiaphas the high priest is said in John 11:51 to have "prophesied (eprophēteusen) that Jesus was going to die for the nation, and not for the nation alone, but so that even the children of God who were scattered might be gathered into one."⁸ The fact that Caiaphas was high priest affords John the opportunity to ascribe to him prophetic powers,⁹ and the classification of his statement in 11:50 as a prophecy in turn allows John to find in his words a deeper meaning (i.e. a specifically Johannine one in v. 52; cf. John 10:16, 17:11, 21-23). The significance of this remarkable reinterpretation of a bit of political expediency as an inspired utterance is the possibility it opens that John may have done something analogous with sayings of Jesus on the grounds that he (in a much deeper sense than Caiaphas) spoke "not of his own

accord" but "prophesied" (v. 51). Whether such free interpretations of prophetic utterances should themselves be classified as prophecy is another question. In any case it is of some interest that the reason given for John's free handling of a rather straightforward comment by Caiaphas is not that John is a prophet and has therefore the right to reinterpret freely, but that Caiaphas is a prophet so that his words, almost like those of an oracle, are subject to extension and new application far beyond the immediate circumstances or his own conscious intent.

The only instances of prophēteuein in the Book of Revelation refer to a mission of proclamation carried on by prophets in the world (10:11, 11:3).

II. Jesus as ho prophētēs

There is fairly wide agreement that the references in John 1:21, 25 to a messianic figure called "the prophet" as well as the identifications of Jesus with this figure in 6:14 and 7:40, have to do with the prophet comparable to Moses mentioned in Deut. 18:15-22.¹⁰ When Philip tells Nathanael that "we have found him of whom Moses wrote in the law" (1:45, cf. 5:46), it is likely that this is the passage in view. The sign of the multiplying of the loaves leads to the confession that Jesus "is truly the prophet who is coming into the world," with an attempt to make him king (6:14f.) and later a request for a further sign along the lines of Moses' provision of manna in the desert (6:30f.). In 7:40, the conclusion that Jesus "is truly the prophet" is in somewhat parallel fashion based on a promise of living water (7:37f.) reminiscent (among other things) of the Mosaic provision of water in the desert according to Num. 20:7-11 (cf. Neh. 9:15, Ps. 78:15f., 20, 105:40f.).¹¹

The parallels between the Fourth Gospel and Deut. 18:15-22 go well beyond actual uses of the title "prophet" with reference to Jesus. At least five areas of common thought or language can be noted.

1. The prophet is introduced in the Deuteronomy passage as a kind of substitute for the Sinai theophany. The people had said, "Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, or see this great fire any more, lest I die" (Deut. 18:16), and the Lord had told Moses, "They have rightly said all that they have spoken. I will raise up for them a prophet like you from among their brethren" (18:17f.). Because it is easier to listen to the voice of a man than the voice of God, the prophet becomes God's spokesman (18:18b). This "non-Sinai" type of revelation seems to be precisely what is assumed to be in effect in John 5:37b-38: "You have neither heard his voice at any time nor seen his form, and you do not have his word dwelling in you, because you do not believe the one whom he sent."¹² Jesus is here the one who takes the place of the Sinai revelation, and if his word is rejected there is no revelation or knowledge of the truth. Similarly in John 6:46: "Not that anyone has seen the Father, except him who is from God; he has seen the Father." A better known passage at the end of the prologue reinforces the same idea: "For the law was given through Moses, but grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has seen God at any time; God the only Son, who is at the Father's side, he has made him known" (1:17-18). In that Jesus finally makes it possible to see God as well as to hear his voice (12:45, 14:9), his role far transcends that of the Deuteronomic prophet, and

indeed of the Sinai revelation itself (cf. Ex. 33:17-23, Deut. 4:12). But insofar as the focus is on hearing the voice or the words of God, the prophet like Moses functions as the most appropriate model for the Johannine Jesus.

2. The promise in Deut. 18:18b that "I will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I command him" seems to echo persistently through the discourses of John's Gospel (see, e.g. John 3:34f.; 7:16-18, 28; 8:26, 28; 12:49f., 14:10). Several terminological features reinforce the general similarity: the use of lalein in every one of the above passages, the use of ta rhēmata in 3:34 and 14:10 (cf. 12:47 and especially ta rhēmata with edōkas in 17:8), and perhaps most significantly the use of entolē in 12:49f.

The last phrase of Deut. 18:18 (kathoti an enteilōmai autōi) may have helped shape a formula which John uses once to conclude the first half of his Gospel and introduce the farewell discourses

kathōs eirēken moi ho patēr, houtōs lalō
(12:50b, following entolē in
vv. 49-50a)

and then again to conclude the farewell discourse (or a major stage of it) and introduce the passion:

kathōs eneteilato moi ho patēr, houtōs poiō
(14:31, cf. also 10:18b).

Jesus "speaks" as the prophet who has received a command from the Father, and "acts" in laying down his life (cf. 10:18) according to the same command. Though Jesus' role as Son (especially in the passion) goes immeasurably beyond that of prophet, the prophet concept from Deuteronomy seems to have been one of the major sources from which the Son, for John, derived his identity as the revealer of God.

This insight stands, even if it is not admitted that Deut. 18:15 ff. received a specifically messianic interpretation at the hands of John and his Jewish contemporaries. The characteristics of a prophet described in the passages belonged already to Moses himself and to those in Israel who exercised the prophetic office after him. The phrase "not of [my] own accord," so characteristic of the Johannine material,¹³ is used already of Moses in Num. 16:28, a verse rich in parallels to the Fourth Gospel: "Hereby you shall know that the Lord has sent me to do all these works, and that it has not been of my own accord" (LXX: ouk ap' emautou). Balaam tells Balak in Num. 24:13: "If Balak should give me his house full of silver and gold, I would not be able to go beyond the word of the Lord, to do either good or bad of my own will (par' emautou); what the Lord speaks, that will I speak." In prophesying for King Ahab, Micaiah insists, "As the Lord lives, what the Lord says to me, that I will speak" (I Kings 22:14). God tells Jeremiah, "Whatever I command you, you shall speak" and "Behold, I have put my words in your mouth" (Jer. 1:7, 9).

Such examples confirm the fact that the Son in the Fourth Gospel speaks after the pattern of Moses, or of a prophet, or of the (messianic) prophet. In that all of these speak only the words which God has given them, any of them can serve as an acceptable model for the Johannine Jesus. He comes into the

world as the final expression of the prophetic voice, but not as "the prophet" in any simplistic sense that coincides exactly with some particular set of Jewish expectations. The term "prophet" is therefore not one of the major Johannine titles for Jesus. As the Son, he transcends the Mosaic categories. One cannot help but think of Heb. 1:1-2: "In many and various ways God spoke of old to our fathers by the prophets; but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world."

3. The command in Deut. 18:15, "him you shall hear" (autou akousesthe) is widely believed to have influenced the synoptic tradition of the transfiguration (Mark 9:7, Matt. 17:5, Luke 9:35), in which a voice from heaven declares Jesus to be the "beloved" (Mk., Mt.) or "elect" (Lk.) Son. The situation is not unlike that of Deut. 18:15ff. in that a heavenly voice (comparable to that of Sinai) renders itself unnecessary by referring the hearers to the voice of a man, who from then on is the one they must "hear."

It is not necessary to press the idea, sometimes suggested, that the whole ministry of Jesus is one great transfiguration in which the disciples "beheld his glory" (John 1:14, cf. Luke 9:32) to be intrigued by the significance attached in John's Gospel to "hearing" Jesus. The first one who is said to hear Jesus' voice is John the Baptist, the "friend of the bridegroom" (3:29). The strong emphasis on "hearing" the bridegroom and rejoicing at his "voice," while not inappropriate to the parabolic situation, probably does not arise from it, but rather from the characteristically Johannine depiction of the Baptist as a (typical?) Christian confessor and disciple.¹⁴ This is confirmed by a survey of other relevant passages. The Samaritans hear the word of Jesus for themselves and conclude that he is "truly the Savior of the world" (4:42). Eternal life is promised to those who hear his word (5:24), or the dead who "hear the voice of the Son of God" (5:25, cf. v. 28). The sheep "hear the voice" of Jesus the shepherd (10:3, 16), but not of strangers or robbers (10:5, 8). Jesus is not the shepherd because the sheep hear him, but rather the sheep are the sheep because they hear the true shepherd. A genuine believer, in fact, is defined as one who hears Jesus: "Everyone who is of the truth hears my voice" (18:37).¹⁵

4. The hearers are judged if they reject the true prophet. Those who cannot or will not hear Jesus do not disqualify him as shepherd or prophet, but only themselves. When they exclaim, "This is a hard saying. Who can hear it?" (6:60) or "He has a demon and is mad. Why do you hear him?" (10:20), they prove that they do not belong to God, for Jesus' words are the very words of God. (8:43, 47; cf. 10:26f.). In Deut. 18:19, unspoken penalties are assigned to those who will not hear the words which the prophet speaks in the name of the Lord. Similarly in John the sanctions are not spelled out, but implicit in the promise of life for those who hear is the warning of death or judgment for those who do not (e.g. 5:24). This warning becomes explicit usually in contexts which speak of unbelief (with some form of pisteuein): e.g. 3:18, 36, 5:45, 8:24. Only in 12:47f., where John (untypically) distinguishes "hearing" and "keeping," is there any direct allusion to final judgment (v. 48).

In Deut. 18:20, Moses speaks of a "prophet who presumes to speak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to speak, or who speaks in the name of other gods" and warns that such a prophet shall die. Although John's Gospel has no specific reflections on false prophets, there is one statement in 5:43 which fits this situation. Jesus tells the Jews, "I have come in my Father's name and you do not receive me; if another comes in his own name, him you will receive." In speaking of false prophets, First John indicates in similar fashion that they will find acceptance in the *kosmos*: "They are of the world; therefore they speak from the world's viewpoint, and the world hears them" (I John 4:5, cf. John 15:19). Being heard and accepted is thus not in itself a proof that the one speaking is a true prophet, nor is rejection a proof that he is not, for the hearers as well as the speaker are being put to the test.

5. In many respects the Johannine claims of Jesus that he is sent from the Father are self-authenticating. Again and again he says that his words are the words of God and that those who reject him do so because the Father has not chosen them or given them the ability to believe (e.g. 6:44, 65; 8:21, 43, 47; 10:26). The words of the prophet mentioned in Deuteronomy, on the other hand, are subject to testing and verification, at least negatively. Moses concludes the section by explaining how the hearers may recognize "a word which the Lord has not spoken": "when a prophet speaks in the name of the Lord, if the word does not come to pass or come true, that is a word which the Lord has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it presumptuously, you need not be afraid of him." (Deut. 18:21f.). He does not say that words which do come to pass conclusively prove that the prophet is true (cf. Deut. 13:1-3), only that words which do not come to pass prove him false.

Though the Fourth Gospel does not rely on such an external principle of verification in any explicit way, the reader is carefully reminded at several points that the words of Jesus were in fact subsequently verified. After Jesus was raised from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up" and realized that he referred to his body (John 2:19, 22; see below III, #2). After alluding to his betrayal by Judas, Jesus says, "I tell you this now, before it takes place, that when it does take place you may believe that I am he" (13:19). Near the end of his farewell discourse on his departure to the Father, he concludes, "And now I have told you before it happens, so that when it happens you may believe" (14:29). Speaking to his disciples of impending persecutions, he states, "But I have told you these things so that when their hour comes, you may remember that I told you of them" (16:4). In two instances, specific sayings of Jesus (6:39, 12:32) receive their verification or "fulfillment" (like OT scriptures) in the light of subsequent events (18:9, 32).¹⁶

As a somewhat less concrete kind of verification (yet perhaps closer to John's central concern), Jesus prays that his followers may become one, "so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them just as you have loved me" (17:23). Ultimately the confirmation of Jesus' mission is to be found in the oneness of his disciples in their mission to the world (cf. 10:16, 13:35).

These parallels make it clear that although John has no interest in emphasizing or laboring the concept of Jesus as the prophet of Deut. 18, this figure has nevertheless informed his presentation of Jesus at a number of decisive points. This can be seen even in aspects of the Fourth Gospel which go well beyond what is stated or implied in the Deuteronomic passage. For example, the concept of "hearing" (#3 above) is extended in John's Gospel to include the fact that Jesus himself has first of all "heard" certain things from the Father before he came into the world as the prophet or sent one. He can do nothing of his own accord because his judgment is based on what he has heard, and for that reason is a just judgment (5:30). There is much that he could say by way of judgment out of his own wisdom, but, he maintains, "He who sent me is true, and what I have heard from him, these things I speak to the world" (8:26). Later he adds, "But now you seek to kill me, a man who spoke to you the truth, which I heard from God" (8:40). To his disciples he says, "All that I have heard from the Father I have made known to you" (15:15). These statements correspond to others which speak of things Jesus has "seen" in the Father's presence (5:19, 6:45, 8:38; cf. 3:11, and "seeing" and "hearing" together in 3:32).

The concept of a prophet as "seer" is well known, but Jesus as the prophet in John's Gospel is also characterized as a "hearer." Auditions as well as visions contribute to his exercise of the prophetic role, and it is precisely the experience of "hearing" which unites the prophet and his people. This is illustrated in John 6:45 which quotes an OT prophecy that "they shall all be taught of God" (cf. Isa. 54:13), and finds the fulfillment in the fact that "everyone who hears from the Father and learns comes to me." The use of akouein with para and "the Father" parallels what Jesus says of himself in 8:26, 40 and 15:15. The privilege of the Son in his pre-existent state is extended to all who come to him in faith. The invitation to "hear from the Father" remains open even well into the harshly polemical discourse in John 8. Jesus says to the Jews who have professed to believe in him, "The things I have seen with the Father I speak; you therefore must now do what you are hearing from the Father" (8:38).¹⁷ Jesus alone has seen the Father, but it is possible to hear the Father by hearing and accepting the word of Jesus. This is what Jesus' antagonists prove unwilling to do (8:43, 47), and it is what leads him to designate his disciples as "friends" in 15:15.

Such passages point to a community of people who are "taught of God" by virtue of their relationship to Jesus. Some elements in the immediate context of John 6:45 could suggest one must first be a hearer or disciple of the Father (i.e. be drawn by the Father) in order to come to Jesus. But elsewhere in John, Jesus is the way to the Father. It is therefore doubtful that any definite priority can be established either way. Jesus is explaining how it can be true that "all shall be taught of God," and concludes that such a relationship is evidenced by those who in fact come to him in faith. The "all" is qualified as "everyone who" is drawn by God's voice and learns the truth. In the larger context, Jesus is grappling with the problem of why some reject his message (6:36), and concludes that the response is ultimately determined by the Father who "gives" certain people to Jesus (6:37, 39) or "draws" them to him by word and teaching (6:44f.). In any case, to "come" to Jesus (cf. 6:35, 37) is to share with him in his experience of "hearing from the Father and learning" what God has to teach. The use of didaktoi and

mathōn in John 6:45 indicates that teaching is at least as much in view in this context as prophecy, and in fact raises the question of whether a valid distinction can be made between the two in the Johannine material.

In 7:14, Jesus appears at the temple midway through the Feast of Tabernacles and begins to teach. The Jews ask, "How is it that this man has learning when he has never studied?" (mē memathēkōs). Jesus answers as one who is "taught of God": "My teaching (didachē) is not mine, but it belongs to him who sent me" (7:16). The use of ap' emautou in v. 17 (cf. aph' heautou, v. 18) suggests that the categories of prophet and teacher may well be overlapping ones at this point. The occurrence of krazein in 7:28 and 7:37,¹⁸ the latter introducing an utterance which may plausibly be characterized as prophetic,¹⁹ and which leads to the confession that Jesus is ho prophētes (7:40) lends additional support to this possibility. What else, after all, is a teacher taught by God except a prophet?

If this equivalency stands, a natural inference is that all who hear and learn from the Father by coming to Jesus (6:45) are in some sense "prophets." The term didaktoi theou is open to this interpretation.²⁰ It is possible, moreover, to read John 6:45 in much the same way as I John 2:20ff. where the readers are said to have "an anointing (chrisma) from the Holy One" so that all of them have knowledge (kal oīdate pantes). The author urges them to "let the anointing which you have received from him remain in you, and you have no need that anyone teach you, but as his anointing teaches you about all things and is true and is no lie, and just as he [it?] taught you, remain in him [it?]" (2:27). Here as in John 6:45 we have a community of those who are taught of God so that they have no need of other teachers. If, as commonly supposed, the chrisma is an expression for the Holy Spirit conferred in baptism,²¹ we have an additional ground for speaking of this Johannine community as a prophetic community.

At this point definitions become important. Exactly what is a "prophetic community"? If the point of John 6:45 is that not some, but all, are taught of God, then it could as well be said that we have here a polemic against a certain kind of prophetic community, i.e. one in which authority rests with a special order of "prophets" within the larger group. The statement which immediately follows in 6:46 may be intended as a warning against the prophetic activities of a gifted few who profess to have received heavenly visions. John is careful to insist that only Jesus has seen the Father. (Cf. 1:18, 3:13, 5:37). "Hearing from the Father" is a privilege which can be conferred on others, but "seeing the Father" (at this point at least) remains the prerogative of Jesus alone. Thus whatever "prophetic" characteristics may be associated with Jesus' disciples in the Fourth Gospel are carefully limited and qualified. It appears to be no accident that the Johannine Gospel and Epistles know of no NT "prophets" in an explicit sense, only of "false prophets" (I John 4:1). On the analogy of Matt. 23: 8-10, one is almost tempted to summarize the Johannine view as "You must not be called prophets, for one is your prophet, Jesus." And yet even with regard to Jesus himself the title of prophet is virtually submerged amid other christological titles of more apparent significance. It appears that certain features of the prophetic experience -- being sent from God, hearing and being heard, speaking not one's own words but the words of God, having one's message confirmed by subsequent events, etc. -- were

more important to John than the actual terminology of prophets and prophecy. There are traces of a line from "the prophet who comes into the world" to a prophetic community capable of producing a creative, prophetic witness to the words of Jesus, but they are faint and blurred, almost as if someone had covered the tracks deliberately.

III. The Prophet and the Scriptures

The concept that Jesus as the prophet represents the continuation of, or substitute for, the voice of God in the Sinai revelation (II, #1 above) implies that his words stand on a par with the OT Scriptures. This is in fact the case in the Gospel of John.

1. The formula hina plērōthēi, which is used in connection with Scripture fulfillment not only in Matthew's Gospel but in John itself (12:38, 13:18, 15:25, 17:12, 19:24, 36) appears twice in John 18 in connection with sayings of Jesus (18:9, 32). At one level this phenomenon may be subsumed under the verification principle described above (II, #5). But in addition to this (or perhaps as an extension of it), the fulfillment theme suggests that Jesus' words, like OT Scripture, have a continuing validity; they cannot "pass away" or be of no effect, but must "be fulfilled" or come to realization. There are hints of this equivalency even in the synoptic tradition, where Jesus can say "Heaven and earth shall pass away but my words shall not pass away" (Mk 13:31, Mt 24:35, Lk 21:33) as easily as he can say, "Until heaven and earth pass away, not an iota or dot shall pass away from the law" (Mt 5:18, cf. Lk 16:17). John himself can speak in a similar way of the OT Scriptures (10:35), and when he applies the fulfillment principle to the sayings of Jesus, he is in effect classifying these sayings as "prophecy," and thus on a level with the writings of Moses (cf. "prophet" or "prophets" in 1:23, 45, 6:45, 12:38).

The two earlier sayings singled out for this special attention in 18:9 and 32 must have been firmly fixed in the pre-Johannine tradition. It is natural to cite the "fulfillment" of something familiar, not of something created ad hoc. The very awkwardness of 18:8 as a fulfillment of 6:39 makes it highly unlikely that the latter represents a Johannine formulation. In the case of 18:32, John alludes to 12:32 (cf. also 3:14, 8:28) without an actual quotation and merely notes the confirmation of an interpretation which he had given already in 12:33. The use of semainō indicates that John is again attaching to a traditional word of Jesus an interpretation which is not immediately obvious. He (or a redactor)²¹ does the same with Jesus' enigmatic prediction of the death of Peter in 21:19. In no case is it natural to suppose that the author has deliberately set out to make riddles. Instead he has taken it on himself to interpret certain traditional sayings of Jesus in the light of subsequent events in the Gospel story (specifically events of the passion) in much the same way as he might interpret passages from the OT.²² The situation is much the same in these two citations in John 18 as with the interpretation of Caiaphas' statement in 11:50-52. In each instance the assumption is that because the utterance is a genuine "prophecy" (explicitly so in the case of Caiaphas), it is legitimate to interpret it in a way which goes beyond its apparent literal meaning and relates it to the events of the passion in a distinctively Johannine manner.²³ The ground for this procedure seems to lie more in the nature of the material being interpreted than in the fact

that the interpreter himself assumes the role of prophet.

2. The parallel between words of Jesus and words of Scripture becomes more explicit in John 2:17-22. Here it is twice stated that Jesus' disciples "remembered" something: first the prediction in Ps. 69:10 that "The zeal of your house will consume me," and second the statement of Jesus, "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up." These are set forth in parallel fashion:

emnēsthēsan hoi mathētai autou hoti gegrammenon
estin (2:17)

emnēsthēsan hoi mathētai autou hoti touto elegen
(2:22)

with the concluding statement:

kai episteusan tēi graphēi
kai tōi logōi hon eipen ho Iēsous

The time reference of the remembering of the biblical passage is not entirely clear. The context suggests that it took place on the immediate occasion, but the parallel with v. 22 indicates that it may rather have come at the same time as the remembrance of Jesus' prediction, i.e. "after he had been raised from the dead." The remembrance formula in v. 17 has essentially the same function as ahina plerothēi formula: to alert the readers of the Gospel to the fact that this prophecy of Scripture was fulfilled. For John and his readers the meaning of Ps. 69:10 could scarcely have been exhausted in the "consuming zeal" at the cleansing of the temple, but must have extended to the passion itself. Ps 69 is characteristically a passion Psalm in the NT, so that the full meaning of kataphagetai cannot have been realized short of the crucifixion. But John has placed the citation where he has to suggest that even on the immediate occasion of the temple cleansing the disciples saw the applicability of the reference to "zeal for your house."

There is a time gap, however, between the "remembrance" of the Scripture (v. 17) and "belief" in it (v. 22).²⁴ It is the post-resurrection "remembrance" of the saying about destroying and raising the temple which produces understanding of, and faith in, both the Scripture passage and the word of Jesus. "Remembrance" for John implies understanding, partial though it may have been at first. It is on the basis of the fuller understanding mentioned in v. 22 that John is able to state confidently in v. 21 that Jesus "spoke about the temple of his body." The repetition of elegen in vv. 21 and 22 bears this out. Again, as in 18:9 and 32, it is a matter of an unexpected interpretive turn, and in this case one that is not distinctively Johannine.²⁵

The only other use of mimnēskesthai in John's Gospel is in 12:16, where the perspective is post-resurrection (or more exactly, post-glorification), much as it is in 2:22. After an account of the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, the author comments, "These things his disciples did not understand at first, but when Jesus was glorified, then they remembered (tote emnēsthēsan) that these things were written about him and

that they did these things to him" (12:16). There is no mention here of any words of Jesus; the purpose of the reference is rather to show how the meaning of OT prophecy falls into place in light of Jesus' glorification. The pronoun *tauta* occurs three times in this one verse: first with reference to the entire preceding context (or at least vv. 12-15), and then twice (*tauta...tauta*, v. 16b) with reference, in chiasmic fashion, to the Scripture (vv. 14b-15) and its fulfillment (vv. 12-14a).²⁶ What was "remembered" (or better, "realized") was the correspondence between what had taken place and what was written in Scripture. The idea that the bearing of Scripture on the events of Jesus' life becomes clear in light of his resurrection or glorification is not new to anyone who is familiar, e.g., with the Lukan tradition (Lk 24:27, 32, 44ff.). What is new is rather the idea found in 2:22 that sayings of Jesus may in parallel fashion be illuminated and clarified after the fact.

The experience of the beloved disciple himself at the tomb provides still another possible example of this phenomenon. His "belief" (20:8) is definitely said not to be based on any prophecies found in Scripture, "for they did not yet know the Scripture, that it was necessary for him to rise from the dead" (20:9). The "Scripture" in view is apparently a specific OT text which in the pre-Johannine tradition had been applied to the resurrection of Jesus. Again it is natural to look in the direction of Luke-Acts for analogies (cf. Lk 24:26f., 44-46) and think, e.g. of Ps 16:10 (cf. Acts 2:27, 13:35). The closest Johannine parallel to 20:9 is 2:22, where it also looks as if the pre-Johannine tradition had intended the graphē to refer (in Lukan fashion) to Ps 16:10 or something similar. But the present context of 2:22 connects the "Scripture" instead with Ps 69:10, the passion saying cited in 2:17, while in 20:9 the identification of the "Scripture" is unimportant precisely because the beloved disciples' faith is not based on it, but on something else. The comparison with 2:22 suggests that what it is based on is rather a word of Jesus, whether the veiled prediction of his resurrection in 2:19 or (more likely) the repeated statement of the farewell discourses that he is "going to the Father," which he says he has told them "before it happens, so that when it happens you may believe" (14:29, cf. 20:8). In any case, a point is made of the fact that an understanding of Scripture is not essential to Christian faith (presumably the reverse is true); what is essential is personal experience ("he saw") and perhaps implicitly the remembrance of what Jesus had said.

3. Finally, the words of Jesus are given a place alongside, or above, the writings of Moses in the discourse at the end of John 5. The statement in 5:46 that Moses wrote about Jesus refers in all likelihood to Deut. 18:15ff. To John the witness of the Scriptures is summed up in the words "him you shall hear" of Deut. 18:15, pointing to Jesus as the prophet, and his spoken words as the sequel to the Sinai revelation. To reject what Jesus says is to reject what Moses wrote. The grammata of Moses and the rhēmata of Jesus stand or fall together (5:47), for behind both is the voice of God who spoke at Sinai and continues to speak (5:37f.).

Of the two foci of revelation, it is clearly the words of Jesus which enjoy the pre-eminence. Moses is a witness to Jesus and not the other way around. John's point is not that those who would believe in Jesus must accept along with him the Hebrew

Scriptures,²⁷ but that the Scriptures cannot be taken seriously without accepting the words of the prophet to whom they bear witness.

The tendency to put the words of Jesus on the same level with Scripture and to interpret them accordingly in light of subsequent events is a tendency which can probably not be confined to the author of the Fourth Gospel, but is present already in the earlier traditions which came down to him. The interpretation of 3:14 and 12:32 in 12:33 and 18:32 undoubtedly reflects the special concern of the evangelist, who in 8:28 as well tacitly understands the "lifting up" of Jesus to refer to crucifixion (contrast Acts 2:33, 5:31). The fulfillment of 6:39 in 18:9 seems out of keeping with the evangelist's interest in relating the promise about none of the disciples being lost to the matter of eternal salvation (cf. 6:39b, 40, 10:28). But the careful placement of chapter 17, with its prayer for unity, between the prediction of scattering in 16:32 and the "triumphalized" version of the disciples' scattering in 18:8 (cf. 17:12) shows that the evangelist has nevertheless integrated this "fulfillment" rather carefully into his overall presentation.

On the other hand, the interpretation of the "temple" of 2:19 as the body of Jesus (2:21) is not discernibly a particular "Johannine" interest (see above, n. 25), while in the case of Caiaphas' prophecy both Johannine and pre-Johannine concerns seem to be at work (see above, n. 23).

If this tendency to re-interpret sayings of Jesus in an almost midrashic fashion is one which begins in the pre-Johannine material and is adopted and continued by the evangelist, we are left with a significant question. Has such a re-interpretation perhaps taken place on a much more ambitious scale than is indicated by the relatively few references to words being "remembered" or "fulfilled"? Is it possible that the reinterpretations which are "signalled" in this way are merely the ones which became standard relatively early in the growth of the tradition, while later stages, including the evangelist himself, have "contemporized" the words of Jesus the inspired prophet in a wholesale way and without "signals" (at least without the same signals)? This supposition, of course, merely expresses a little more concretely than usual what is said again and again about the Johannine tradition. To adopt it uncritically is almost to give up hope of distinguishing between original words of Jesus and "prophetic" re-formulations by the later community. It also leaves unanswered some major questions. Who in the community had the authority to make these re-formulations, especially if a "prophetic" community was one in which all were "taught of God" (cf. John 6:45, I John 2:20, 27)? What was the status of the apostles and/or the apostolic witness in such a community? If there are other "signals" of prophetic re-formulation or re-interpretation, how may these signals be discerned? Clearly, some checks are necessary, but they are difficult to come by. Before approaching these questions, it is necessary to consider one more crucial area of John's theological framework: the role of the Spirit.

IV. The Spirit as ho paraklētos

Jesus is never called paraklētos in John's Gospel, yet the designation of the "Spirit of truth" as allos paraklētos in 14:16 indicates that whatever the title means, it is applica-

ble first of all to Jesus himself.²⁸ Much study has been given to the term,²⁹ but in the last analysis its importance for Johannine theology depends less on its lexical and history-of-religious background than on the predicates attached to it in the Fourth Gospel. The Paraclete "comes" to the disciples (15:26, 16:7f., 13); he is "given" (14:16) or "sent" (14:26, 15:26, 16:7) to them by the Father (14:16, 26), or by Jesus from the Father (15:26, 16:7), to be with them forever (14:16f.).

In relation to the disciples, he will "teach" (didaxei) all things and "remind" them (hupomnēsei) of all things which Jesus had said to them (14:26). He will guide them (hodēgēsei) into all the truth; he will speak (lalēsei) what he hears, and proclaim to them (anaggeleī) things to come (16:13). He will glorify Jesus (doxasei) by taking the things of Jesus (i.e. of the Father, 16:15) and proclaiming them to the disciples. (16:14f.).

In relation to the world, he will "bear witness" (marturēsei) about Jesus (15:26), and will convict the world (elegxei) about sin, and righteousness, and judgment (16:8ff.).

The distinction between the Paraclete's activity in relation to the disciples and in relation to the world is not an absolute one. The direction of his ministry is explicitly to the world in 16:8-11, but this comes immediately after a promise that "I will send him to you" (16:7). Although the testimony mentioned in 15:26b is not explicitly said to be to the world, it parallels a testimony by the disciples in 15:27, and it is natural to infer that this testimony is directed to the world. This is supported by the whole context consisting of 15:18-25, with its emphasis on the disciples' mission to, and conflict with, the world. The alternative to this is the supposition that those who bear witness along with the Paraclete in 15:27 are not the disciples of Jesus generally (i.e. Christian believers) but the original apostles in particular. If this is the case, then their witness might be understood as being directed to the church rather than to the world (cf. I John 1:1-5). All through the farewell discourse the question persists whether those being addressed are the original disciples and eye-witnesses, or the Christian church at large. The distinction surfaces only rarely (cf. 17:20, 20:29), and it appears unlikely that the reader is intended to make a choice. What is said of the original disciples is said also of those who later believe through their word (cf. 17:20-23). Those who were with Jesus "from the beginning," appear to function as representatives of the larger community, and the argument from the context is strong enough to demand that in 15:27 they represent the church (and in another sense, the Paraclete) in an on-going witness to the world. If so, there can be little doubt that the same pattern (i.e. the Spirit speaking to the world through apostles, or the church regarded as an apostolic community) underlies 16:7-11 as well. This would explain the abrupt transition from pros humasin v. 7 to ton kosmon in v. 8. The question of whether the Christian community presupposed in the Fourth Gospel is best described as "apostolic" or "prophetic" is one that remains to be discussed in light of this insight (see below, IV, #3).

Several conclusions emerge from the preceding brief survey of the Johannine data pertaining to the Paraclete:

1. The term hupomnēsei, used in 14:26, stands out immediately because of its apparent connection with the emnēsthēsan of 2:17, 22, 12:16.³⁰ The Paraclete comes after the departure of Jesus to remind the disciples of what he said, even as they remembered certain things after he was raised from the dead or glorified. Again in 16:4, shortly before a series of Paraclete sayings, when the disciples are faced with persecutions after Jesus' departure, they are to "remember" (hina...mnēmoneuēte) that Jesus had foreseen what would happen. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that their later realization of the meaning of what he said and did was a work of the Spirit, and therefore to that extent "prophetic." As we have seen (III, #2), the emphasis in chapters 2 and 12 is not so much on an exact recall of what was said or done as on a new understanding of the significance of certain events, sayings, and Scripture passages.

The importance of this link between the "remembrance" passages and the Paraclete passages should be given its full due, but should not be exaggerated. The uses of hupomimnēskein in Second Peter (1:12; cf. 1:13, 3:1) and the Pastorals (II Tim. 2:14, Tit. 3:1) have more to do with ethical exhortation than with theological understanding, and the close association of this verb with didaskēin in John 14:26 may suggest that this element plays a part there as well. At least the use of hupomimnēskein by itself is not conclusive proof that the Paraclete is the author of wholesale re-interpretations or reformulations of the Jesus tradition.

2. The fact that Jesus' mission in the Fourth Gospel reflects to a considerable degree the background of the prophet like Moses, coupled with the fact that the Paraclete continues the work of Jesus, makes it appropriate to look for definite prophetic features in John's image of the Paraclete.³¹ Like Jesus he is "sent" from the Father. Like Jesus and like Caiaphas he speaks "not of his own accord" (ou...aph' heautou), but speaks "what he hears" from God (16:13). Like Jesus he "teaches" (14:26), and (as in the case of Jesus) his identity as teacher does not exclude but rather reinforces his role as "prophet," or dispenser of prophecy (cf. 6:45, 7:15-17; see above, section II). This teaching role corresponds to that of the chrisma according to I John 2:27 (cf. also Luke 12:12).

Like the Messiah of Samaritan expectation (with whom Jesus is quick to identify himself, 4:25f.), the Paraclete "proclaims" certain things (anaggelei, 16:13f.), indeed by implication "all things" (panta, 16:15; cf. apanta, 4:25). The parallels between 4:25 and the last three Paraclete passages are in fact so close as to suggest reliance on a common tradition (cf. hotan elthēi keinos with the same phrase in 16:13, and see also 15:26, 16:7f.).

Finally, the Paraclete will "bear witness" (marturēsei) about Jesus (15:2) just as Jesus did about himself (5:31, 8:14, 18) and about the truth of God (18:37; cf. 3:11, 32). This word has no obvious connection with prophecy in John's Gospel, but in the Book of Revelation the "witness of Jesus" is specifically defined as the "spirit of prophecy" (Rev. 19:10), while "witnesses" and "prophets" have become virtually interchangeable terms (Rev. 11:3, 10, 16:6, 17:6). The context of John 15:26f. is that of conflict and opposition, as it is in the Book of Revelation. When the synoptic tradition which links prophetic activity with occasions of persecution (Mk 13:11, Mt 10:19f., Lk 12:11f.) is taken into account, it appears likely that

marturein belongs with the data which help define the Paraclete's activity as distinctively prophetic.

It is illuminating to compare John 15:26 with 5:31:

ho paraklētōs....ekeinos marturēsei peri emou (15:26)

allos estin ho marturōn peri emou (5:31)

The enumeration of several witnesses in 5:31ff. makes it difficult to define exactly who this allos is. The tendency of most commentators is to relate it specifically to the Father (5:37), but the parallel set forth above raises the intriguing possibility (no more than that) that the allos is none other than the allos paraklētōs of 14:16. The present tense of the participle in 5:31 is not a conclusive objection to this idea in view of the present tenses used in relation to the Paraclete in 14:17. Quite possibly the interpretation of the "other" as the Father, and the interpretation of it as the Paraclete are not two alternatives to be set over against each other in a mutually exclusive way, since in any case the Paraclete is sent from the Father (cf. 15:26). But the understanding of 5:31 as a rather enigmatic reference to the Paraclete's witness lends to the discourse in 5:31-47 a prophetic cast which might otherwise go unnoticed but which becomes particularly appropriate in view of the allusions to Jesus' own prophetic role in 5:37-39, 45-47.

A further point of interest in this discourse is the recurrence of allos in 5:43 in a quite different connection: "I have come in my Father's name and you do not receive me. If another comes in his own name, him you will receive." Clearly this allos is not the same as the one mentioned in v. 31, and just as clearly he is not the Paraclete. But the contrast between one who "comes in his own name" and one whom the Father sends in the name of Jesus (14:26) suggests that what may be in view here is the Paraclete's opposite number, the spirit of false prophecy (cf. I John 4:6, "the spirit of truth and the spirit of error"). Just as the world does not "receive" Jesus (5:43a), so it cannot "receive" the Paraclete (14:17, and cf. its attitude toward Jesus' disciples in 15:18-25),³² but it shows itself to be the world by accepting false prophets who come in their own name (5:43b; cf. I John 4:5).

These features make it clear that the Paraclete passages in the Fourth Gospel may be legitimately regarded as a provision for the prophetic words of Jesus to continue among his disciples. Sandwiched between the last two references to the Paraclete is Jesus' statement, "I have many things to say to you, but you are not able to hear them now; when he comes, however, the spirit of truth..." (16:12f.). The implication is that the Paraclete continues the speech of Jesus by proclaiming to the disciples "all the truth" which they were not ready to receive during his earthly ministry. Again in 16:25 Jesus promises, "These things I have spoken to you in parables; the hour is coming when I will no longer speak to you in parables but I will tell you (apaggelo)³³ about the Father openly." For John, this more open announcement which is to come corresponds to the ministry of the Paraclete.

In 16:29 the disciples conclude, rightly or wrongly,³⁴ that Jesus is already speaking "openly" and not in parables,

adding, "Now we know that you know all things" (oidas panta) and have no need that anyone question you (ou chreian echéis hina tis se erōtāi); by this we believe that you have come from God" (16:30). H.N. Bream has shown that the disclaimer of a need to be questioned belongs to the terminology of prophecy and oracles.³⁵ The false prophet has to be plied with questions so that by his ingenuity he can deceive the questioner with plausible-sounding answers, but the true prophet has no such need. As stated in Hermas, Mandates 11:5, "no spirit which is given from God is asked questions, but has the power of the Godhead and speaks all things of itself (aph' heautou), because it is from above (anōthen), from the power of the divine spirit."³⁶ Thus John 16:30 is a further piece of evidence identifying Jesus as prophet, but what is important at this stage of the discussion is that this verse essentially anticipates the situation that will prevail after Jesus' departure (cf. v. 25). As such it may fairly be taken as descriptive of the Paraclete's ministry. The language parallels to some extent that of I John 2:27 (ou chreian echete hina tis didaskēi humas), used in relation to Christian believers as a corollary of the fact that they "all have knowledge" (v. 20), or "know the truth" (v. 21). The fact that they "have no need" to be instructed corresponds in a way to the fact that Jesus, or the Paraclete "has no need" to be questioned. Here again the prophetic community can be seen as the collective recipients of truth from the prophetic Revealer. But there is no sharp distinction between prophecy and tradition; they know because the anointing teaches them (2:20, 27) or they know because they have "heard" the message which is "from the beginning" (2:18, 24; cf. 1:1-3, 5, 2:7, 3:5, 3:11, 4:3). To the writer of First John it makes little difference. This is no new situation but is reflected already in one of the earliest NT letters, First Thessalonians. Paul can say "you have no need (ou chreian echete) that I write to you" about brotherly love (I Thess 4:9a) or the "times and seasons" (5:1) because his readers are "taught of God" (4:9b) to love one another, or because they already "know" certain things from the tradition which he has handed down to them, either about Paul's own conduct (1:5, 2:1, 2, 5, 11, 3:3, 4) or about Christian truth and practice (4:2, 5:2; cf. II Thess 2:6, 3:7). Here the emphasis is on the tradition, but the theodidaktos of I Thess 4:9, following shortly upon the sanctions against disobedience to "God who also gives his Holy Spirit to us" (4:8) suggests that prophetic revelation is also within the scope of the apostle's concern (cf. 5:19f.).

The concept of the Spirit as Paraclete in John can thus be seen as a prophetic concept with rather wide ramifications. One might in fact almost have expected allos prophētēs in John 14:16 were it not that prophētēs never became a significant christological title for the Johannine Jesus. Since allos huios would never do in a Gospel which laid so much stress on the Son's uniqueness, the only recourse was to a functional designation which focused on the revelatory role which the two figures had in common.

3. A question remains which has been skirted again and again in this discussion. Who are the custodians of the truth about Jesus which the Paraclete makes known to the Christian community? Are they the apostles, or the community as a whole, or a distinct order of prophets within the community? If the Paraclete's activity is seen as laying the basis for extensive reinterpretation of the Jesus tradition, it is important to know precisely who is doing the reinterpreting. As we have seen, the emphasis on the prophetic nature of the community as a whole

appears in John 6:45 and I John 2:20, 27, while John 15:27 stresses the apostolic witness as the chief vehicle of the Paraclete's revelation. What is missing is any explicit connection between the Paraclete's witness and a special order of prophets within the Johannine community. Whether such a sub-group is presupposed even in the Book of Revelation is debatable,³⁷ but in the Gospel and Epistles of John there is no real evidence in its favor. In fact, traces of polemic against claims to special visions (6:46), and the consulting of oracles (16:30), whether inside or outside the church,³⁸ may well be discerned as part of the evangelist's intention.

It is possible to find in the Pastoral epistles a remarkable collection of imperative verbs applied to the Christian minister (specifically Timothy and Titus) which in John have to do with the Paraclete: e.g. parakalei (I Tim. 5:1, 6:2, Tit. 2:6, 15), lalei (Tit. 2:1, 15), elegche (I Tim. 5:20, Tit. 1:13, 2:15; cf. II Tim. 4:2), hupomimeske (II Tim. 2:14, Tit. 3:1), and didaske (I Tim. 4:11, 6:2). Paul attributes to the Christian prophet speech which produces "edification, encouragement (paraklēsēsin), and consolation" (I Cor. 14:3). But there is no more reason to think that the Paraclete speaks only to or through designated "prophets" in the Johannine community than to limit ministry in the NT to the distinct orders described in some of the later NT writings.

Three references in the Fourth Gospel to the Spirit, in which the term Paraclete is not used (7:37ff., 3:8, 20:22), lend additional support to these conclusions.

The setting of John 7:37-39 resembles that of the Paraclete passages in that the coming of the Spirit is contingent on the glorification of Jesus. The utterance of Jesus in 7:37f. leads some to the conclusion that he is "the prophet" (7:40) and may fairly be taken as a prophetic utterance (even granting the presence of a wisdom background as well).³⁹ The invitation to come and drink of the water of life is set in a prophetic context in Rev. 22:17, where the words of the "Spirit and the bride" are echoed by "the one who hears,"⁴⁰ to invite the thirsty outsider to come and drink. It has long been disputed whether the "living water" in John 7:38 comes from within Jesus, or (derivatively) from the believer. If the believer (i.e. any believer) is seen as a source or channel of the Spirit to others, the passage bears rather strong testimony to the prophetic nature of the entire Johannine community. If, as is more probable, Jesus alone is the source,⁴¹ the emphasis falls rather on "receiving" the Spirit (7:39), and the prophetic function of those who "receive" is not directly in view. But the connection made in 6:45 between "coming" to Jesus and being "taught of God" suggests at any rate that in 7:37ff., "drinking" of the Spirit which Jesus supplies forms the basis of a pneumatic community of some kind. It becomes a matter of definition as to whether a Spirit-directed community which shows no evidence of needing prophets is properly designated as prophetic.

The second passage which deserves attention is John 3:8. The first occurrence of pneuma in this verse is commonly translated as "wind" and the second as "Spirit" on the grounds that John is making a play on words.⁴² There is no doubt that the imagery of wind does underlie the statement, but the logic of the sentence demands that pneuma in 3:8a must also yield some sense when understood as "Spirit." Jesus is arguing from the principle that like produces like (just as in v. 6). What

is true of the Spirit (v. 8a) must necessarily also be true of "everyone who is born of the Spirit" (v. 8b). It is hard not to connect the reference to "hearing the voice" of the Spirit (v. 8a) with prophecy.

Such a connection is made in what is possibly the earliest interpretation of this passage, Ignatius, *Philad.* 7:1f.: "For even if some desired to deceive me after the flesh, the Spirit is not deceived, for it is from God. For it knows where it comes from and where it is going, and tests (*elegchei*) secret things. I cried out while I was with you, I spoke with a great voice, with God's own voice: 'Give heed to the bishop'...I had no knowledge of this from any human being, but the Spirit was preaching and saying..." In part, Ignatius' statement may represent an extension of what Jesus says about himself in John 8:14b, but there can be little doubt that John 3:8, or a tradition behind it, has also contributed to the formulation. The main difference is that Ignatius focuses on what the Spirit does know, while John 3:8 focuses on what Nicodemus does not know.

The prophetic voice, wherever it is heard, is a mystery to human perception. No less a mystery is the origin and destiny of "everyone who is born of the Spirit" (i.e. all believers and not just prophets in a technical sense). Their collective "voice" is heard, yet no one knows (except by the Spirit) that they, like Jesus, are from God and are going to God again.

In John 20:22 those on whom Jesus breathes and to whom he says, "Receive the Holy Spirit" are not designated as prophets. They are Jesus' immediate disciples, who have just become eye-witnesses of the Risen Lord, and been commissioned by him as he was by the Father (20:19-21). As in the farewell discourses, the question is whether they are seen here in their historical uniqueness or whether they function as representatives of the community. The answer is the same here as it was there: their historical uniqueness in no way rules out their representative function, and what they represent is not a contemporary Johannine order of prophets within the church but the whole church.

John's view of prophecy and prophetic authority could be summed up by saying that to him prophecy is too important to be left to the prophets. Authority to preserve and interpret the Jesus tradition rests at one level with the entire community, and at another with the apostles, their appointed representatives and the authoritative eye- and ear-witnesses of Jesus' ministry. The function of the Paraclete figure in all of this is to lay claim to Christian prophecy in the name of the apostles and the apostolic tradition, possibly (though extensive evidence is lacking) to counter a prophet-centered movement within the church. True prophecy rests not in visions or oracles but in hearing the voice of Jesus in what was regarded as the apostolic tradition. (i.e. probably the particular aspect of it which had come to be associated with the beloved disciple).

Such a conclusion obviously puts the Gospel of John in very close proximity with First John, not only because of the apostolic "we" of I John 1:1-5, but because of the insistence in 4:1-6 that prophets must be tested in light of the apostolic tradition. This includes not only the historical emphasis on "Jesus Christ come in the flesh" (4:2f.), but also the parallel

between "you are from God, little children" (referring to all believers, v. 4; cf. John 3:8), and "we are from God" (referring to the apostles, v. 6a). John then adds significantly, "He who knows God hears us; he who is not from God does not hear us. This is how we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error" (v. 6b). The test of prophecy is whether or not it hears the apostolic voice, which in the last analysis is really no different from hearing Jesus the prophet and Son of God.

Obviously, none of these conclusions rule out the kind of extensive reinterpretation of the tradition which is commonly assumed to have taken place. But they do suggest that whatever freedom was exercised in the Spirit had its limits.

V. The "Other Voice" in the Johannine Discourses

No investigation of the Paraclete or of "prophetic" phenomena in the Fourth Gospel can lay claim to being able to distinguish between what is "original" and what is "secondary." All that can be expected is that at points certain formal characteristics of the text may betray a different voice from that of the one who is supposed to be speaking, a voice which represents the understanding of the "apostolic-prophetic" author of the Gospel, or of his community. Three passages (possibly interrelated) will be used as test cases: the monolog which concludes Jesus' interview with Nicodemus (3:11-21), the reflection appended to the 'farewell speech' of John the Baptist (3:31-36), and the discourse on the bread of life (6:32-59). These examples are especially appropriate because they not only furnish possible glimpses of the Johannine prophetic consciousness at work, but also within the scope of their subject matter can be discerned possible reflections of this prophetic consciousness on itself and on its own christological foundations.

1. The question of where Jesus' dialog with Nicodemus ends and the evangelist's theological reflections begin is a long-disputed one. There is general agreement that another voice can be heard in 3:16-21, which looks back on the Christ event as past, but what is the status of vv. 11-15? The plurals in v. 11 suggest that already here the witness of an apostolic-prophetic community is at work. As in its first occurrence in 1:51, the amēn, amēn formula marks a transition from a singular to a plural and from a particular situation to a more generalized one.

In light of the prophetic overtones of amēn⁴³ it is natural to pinpoint the amēn, amēn formula as the beginning of a prophetic discourse. But the uses of this formula in John's Gospel are very diverse, and it is difficult to place 3:11 within any of the categories which emerge. Amēn, amēn usually appears as an introduction to sayings which show some evidence of being traditional. Some are virtually identical with sayings known from the synoptic tradition (13:16, 20, 21, 38, 16:23); some have to do with the Son of Man (1:51, 6:26f., 53), or with the Son of God in a context of eschatological promise (5:25, cf. v. 24); others appear to be based on parabolic forms involving a son (5:19, 8:34) or servants (8:34, 13:16) in a household, or on parables of other kinds (10:1, 16:20). In three instances egō eimi forms are involved (6:47f.; 8:58, 10:7), and in five others amēn, amēn introduces stipulations about salvation which begin with ean mē (3:3, 5, 6:53, 12:24) or ean (8:51). Several cases involve promises to those who "believe"

(5:24, 6:47, 14:12), or promises of something "given" by God (6:32, 16:23) or the Son of Man (6:27). Occasionally the formula can even be used in connection with strictly ad hoc statements about known events (13:21, 38, 21:18).

No clear reason can be given why twenty-five sayings in particular are introduced by this formula and a multitude of others are not. Why, for example, is it used with 3:11 instead of with 3:13 or 14? John 3:11 stands by itself among the amēn, amēn utterances; it reads less like an isolated traditional saying than like a solemn assurance of the truth either of what precedes or what follows. In its present context it functions much like an extension or elaboration of the amēn, amēn formula proper, introducing and affirming the truthfulness not of a single statement but of the whole sequence that follows.

Such a usage has no exact parallel in the Fourth Gospel. In most cases amēn, amēn introduces a single utterance, though on occasion the saying to which it applies may be preceded by additional introductory material (6:26b-27). In a few instances it may lead into an extended parable (10:1-5; cf. 8:34-36) or even possibly a segment of a discourse (6:53-58, 10:7-18, 14:12-24; cf. 12:24-26).

In 3:11, however, the words "we speak what we know and testify to what we have seen, and you do not receive our witness," reinforce the amēn, amēn and serve as a transition from dialog to monolog. The plural subject is not totally unexpected, being prepared for by the humas of v. 7, by Nicodemus' use of the plural "we know" already in v. 2, and perhaps by the reference in v. 8 to "everyone who is born of the Spirit." Even as Nicodemus represents a community (i.e. either Judaism or a Jewish Christianity which is unwilling to break with the synagog),⁴⁴ so too (for all his uniqueness) does Jesus. Essentially what is said of this Christian community in 3:11 is said of Jesus alone in 3:32: "What he has seen and heard, this he testifies, and no one receives his witness." The testimony of Jesus is identified in v. 11 with that of a group associated with him, so that in the section which begins at this point we may expect to hear the voice of this community in and with the words attributed to Jesus himself.

This expectation helps to explain what in fact we find in vv. 12-21. In v. 12 Jesus switches back to the first person singular to refer to his own speech while retaining the second personal plural with reference to those whom Nicodemus represents. The distinction between what Jesus has said (eipōn), i.e. "earthly things," and what he will, or may, say (eipō), i.e. "heavenly things," is reminiscent of the distinction in 16:25 between what he "has spoken" in parables and what he "will speak" openly to his disciples about the Father (cf. 16:12, where he has "much more to say," for which the disciples are not ready until the Paraclete comes). It is tempting to suppose that in 3:12 the "earthly things" are the familiar and well-established traditions of the words and deeds of Jesus, while the "heavenly things" are the Johannine reinterpretations of the tradition, made available to John's "apostolic-prophetic" community through the Paraclete.⁴⁵ The flow of thought from v. 11 to v. 12 suggests that the "we" of v. 11, like that of First John, is an apostolic "we" of Jesus and the eye-witnesses. The ho heōrakamen of v. 11 closely parallels I John 1:1, and suggests eye-witness testimony. The "if" clause at the beginning of v. 12 seems to pick up the last part of v. 11, as ou pisteuete

reiterates the rebuke of ou lambanete. This suggests that the eye-witness testimony of v. 11 has to do first with the epigeia, the firmly-established apostolic traditions about Jesus, but secondly also with the epourania, which then represent an interpretive superstructure found primarily (though perhaps not exclusively) in the verses that follow. The important thing to remember is that the emphasis falls on continuity, not discontinuity, between the earthly and heavenly things. Both meet with the same response (v. 12); the witness to both is singular (explicitly in v. 12), and yet plural as well, for at both levels Jesus speaks with or through his disciples (v. 11).

The mention of "heavenly things in v. 12 triggers the reference to "heaven" in v. 13. Only the Son of Man is qualified to speak of heavenly things because only he has "ascended into heaven." As in 6:46 there may be a trace of a polemic here against prophets (even within the church) who claimed heavenly visions. To John the only way to experience these realities is to listen to the Son of Man's witness (i.e. "hear his voice") and this the apostolic community has done.⁴⁶ Those who despise the "earthly things" of the apostolic traditions have no reason to expect to be able even to recognize "heavenly things when they hear them.

The perspective of John 3:13 is post-resurrectional. The assumption is that the Son of man has already ascended into heaven, an event which must be regarded as future from the standpoint of the dialog with Nicodemus (cf. 6:62, 20:17). In relation to 3:12, v. 13 has the tone of a confessional echo or chorus. The first and second persons of the verb, whether singular or plural, which have dominated the interview to this point, now give way for good (i.e. through v. 21) to an almost detached-sounding third person reminiscent of the prolog (where, however, the confessional "we" breaks through at 1:14, 16). Though there is no corresponding "we" in 3:13-21, it is a fair assumption that these verses similarly represent the witness of a believing community. If 3:13 is confessional, of course, it breaks the rule that "Son of Man" appears only on the lips of Jesus,⁴⁷ and indicates that under certain circumstances the community felt free to imitate the form of Jesus' speech. In this case the purpose seems to have been precisely to reinforce the unique authority of Jesus and to guard against the proliferation of prophetic claims.

The complexity of the situation is underlined by the fact that v. 13 is immediately followed by a "Son of Man" statement which betrays no formal signs of a post-ascension perspective and which bears all the marks of a traditional (almost synoptic-like) utterance. As we have seen (III, #1), the reference in 18:32 to a saying about the mode of Jesus' execution, with a fulfillment formula, strongly argues for such a saying having been already firmly established in the pre-Johannine tradition. Besides this, the form of John 3:14 closely parallels that of at least one synoptic Q-saying about the Son of man: "As Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the fish, so will the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth" (Mt 12:40; cf. Lk 11:30). The two passages have in common the "as...so" formulation⁴⁸ and the comparison of a specific OT figure and incident with the Son of Man, specifically in relation to some aspect of the passion.

Thus the perspective in John 3:11 ff. moves quickly from pre- to post-resurrection and back again. The continuity is maintained by the repetition of "Son of Man" in vv. 13, 14 and probably too by the use of hupsothēnai, picking up the anabebēken of the previous verse. The crucifixion, familiar to John from traditional passion predictions known to him, is the first stage of the ascension (cf. 12:32, "I will draw all to myself"), so that the traditional saying in v. 14 affords him a further basis for introducing the ascension where he does.

Once introduced, however, the ascension motif as such is dropped. Its sole function appears to be to guarantee the validity of the revelation (i.e. the special Johannine meditation) that follows, by basing it on the unique knowledge and authority of the ascended Jesus. The focus shifts to the traditional saying introduced at v. 14; vv. 16-21 are best regarded as an exposition of this saying. No longer is revelation simply gazing at itself, as in vv. 11-13. Instead it unfolds in very broad perspective the total outcome of the Christ event and the alternatives which this event poses for mankind.

The saying about Moses and the serpent concludes with a hina clause (v. 15) which looks very Johannine but which contains a very un-Johannine use of pisteuein with en.⁴⁹ It is likely that this clause belongs with the Moses reference which precedes it, and arises not out of Johannine theology (at least not directly) but out of midrashic reflection on the incident in the desert. The reference to "eternal life" corresponds well to the verb "live" in Num. 21:8f., while the necessity of "believing" may represent a NT equivalent to the necessity of "looking" at the bronze serpent in the same OT verses. Such "midrashic reflection" is probably to be identified as "Johannine" in the sense of having taken place in a Johannine "school" (i.e. in a distinctly pre-Johannine rather than pre-synoptic setting). The conjoining of the hina clause with "believing" and "having eternal life" is too close to support any other conclusion (cf. e.g. 20:31, and especially 6:40, which affords a possible additional glimpse of a stage of the midrash in which "seeing" and "believing" stood side by side).

This does not necessarily mean, however, that vv. 14, 15 represent the work of the evangelist or of his community,⁵⁰ for he finds it necessary to make his own reflection and re-formulation in vv. 16ff. He re-phrases the pisteuein en construction as the typically Johannine pisteuein eis (vv. 16, 18a) or eis to onoma (v. 18b). The houtos...hoste of v. 16 picks up the houtos of v. 14 so as to ground the necessity (dei) of the passion in the love of God for the world. Even here we are not dealing with a pure Johannine "creation," prophetic or otherwise. It is debatable whether the idea of God loving the kosmos is characteristic of the Fourth Gospel, and it is likely that the use of edōken to refer to the redemptive death of Jesus is traditional.⁵¹ But clearly the verse contemplates both the love and the gift as past; the viewpoint of v. 16, like that of v. 13, is post-resurrectional. 'Son of Man' (v.14) is re-interpreted as Son of God, in the distinctly Johannine form, ho huios ho monogenēs (vv. 16, 18).⁵² The reference to having eternal life is elaborated

with the addition of its negative corollary (mē apolētai),⁵³ which sets the stage for John's reflection on the alternatives of krinein and sozein in v. 17 and on krinein in particular in vv. 18f. In v. 17 the traditional edōken, gives way to the more Johannine apesteilen. The setting of the dialog with Nicodemus is forgotten as several details of language call to mind the prolog: i.e. the use of di' autou with kosmos (cf. 1:3,10), and the references to "believing in the name" (cf. 1:12) and to "light coming into the world" (cf. 1:9).

The perspective of 3:16-21, like that of the prolog, is cosmic as well as post-resurrectional. The issues raised by the coming of Christ are universal ones, and they have already been decided, at least in principle. The statement in v. 19b, "Men loved darkness rather than light" looks back on the results of Jesus' ministry in much the same way as the prolog ("The world knew him not," 1:10; "His own received him not," 1:11), or as the verdict on the public ministry laid down in 12:43 ("They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God").

In vv.20 and 21 the evangelist makes one of his rare efforts to get behind the mystery of unbelief which the coming of Jesus calls forth. He adds in v. 19b a reason why men preferred darkness to light ("because their deeds were evil," cf. 7:7), and then elaborates by means of a pair of generalizing statements in vv. 20 and 21 which reiterate the alternatives of v. 18 in ethical rather than simply confessional terms. The effect, however, is not so much to ethicize the demand to believe in terms of "doing the truth" as it is simply to repeat the demand to believe by saying to the reader in effect, "Come to the light" (thus giving evidence of your good works - a curious reversal of the Protestant principle of works as an evidence of faith!). Thus the step-by-step development of thought in v. 16 concludes by reinforcing the call to faith implicit already in vv. 11, 12, and 15. It is plausible to see in this whole passage a creative theological mind at work, reflecting on and interacting with a tradition so as to drive home to his readers some implications of Jesus' words which reach far beyond their "original" setting.

2. Another such reflection is appended to the farewell speech of John the Baptist (3:27-30). The "trigger" for this postscript in 3:31-36 appears to be the phrase ek tou ouranou in v. 27. The use of ou dunatai in the same verse recalls Jesus' interview with Nicodemus at the beginning of the chapter (vv.3, 4, 5, 9), and the emphasis there on the two spheres ('flesh and spirit,' 'above and below' or 'earth and heaven') and on the impossibility (without rebirth) of getting from the one to the other.

This same dichotomy is developed in vv. 31-36. But if Jesus is the one who comes from heaven, who is the one that is of the earth? If v. 27 is the true setting of vv. 31-36,⁵⁴ it can only be John the Baptist himself.⁵⁵ Like Nicodemus he is anthropos (3:27; cf. 2:25, 3:1), yet it seems unlikely that the evangelist would reflect on his words if he were not also in some sense a "prophet" (analogous to Caiaphas?). If John the Baptist becomes in the Fourth Gospel a confessing Christian, is it possible to

consider him a Christian prophet as well? Are the two the same? His acknowledgement in v. 28, "I am not the Christ" (cf. 1:20) places him in sharp contrast with the false prophets mentioned in Matt. 24:5 (cf. v. 11). The emphasis on his limitations may have had as one of its chief functions the setting of limits on Christian prophecy.

Like Christian believers generally, John the Baptist "receives" something (v. 27 and probably v. 33; cf. 1:12 and 7:39, the latter in a prophetic context). Like them too he "hears" the bridegroom; he is a "friend" of Jesus (cf. 15:15), and his joy is fulfilled" (cf. 15:11, 16:24, 17:13, 1 John 1:4). But he also is "sent" (v. 28) and therefore "speaks" (v. 31). As we have seen, the Christian community as a whole can be depicted in the Fourth Gospel as a prophetic community, and so too in a similar way can John the Baptist be described as a prophetic figure. In one sense he is a true prophet, even though he speaks ek tēs gēs. But the prime quality of a "true" prophet in the Fourth Gospel is that he acknowledges his own earth-bound character. He points the would-be hearer to Jesus the unique prophet. This is the thrust of vv. 27-30 and this is what is reinforced in vv. 31-36. Unlike the false "earthly" prophets of Hermas, Mandates 11 (e.g. 11:11, 12, 14, 18-21), the Baptist makes no boastful claims for himself, but recognizes the dichotomy between earth and heaven which dominates John 3. The Johannine view may be summed up by saying that in one sense all Christians are prophets, but that in another sense there is only one prophet, Jesus Christ. There is nothing in between (cf. the NT concept of priesthood?). In John 3:27-36, John the Baptist becomes the spokesman for this viewpoint, and it is precisely because he is seen as prophet that his witness in vv. 27-30 can be expanded to v. 36.⁵⁶

After contrasting himself with the unique one from heaven, the Baptist (i.e. the evangelist on his behalf) summarizes in v. 32 the outcome of Jesus' ministry in much the same manner as in v. 11, except that the ou lambanete has been generalized to oudeis lambanei (perhaps in light of v. 19). The abrupt shift from oudeis lambanei (v. 32) to ho labōn autou tēn marturian (v. 33) is reminiscent of the shift from 1:11 to 1:12. The negative statement sets the stage for the positive. The singular aorist ho labōn is perhaps best explained as referring not to believers generally but to John the Baptist in particular (cf. lambanein, v. 27),⁵⁷ and v. 34 may then be seen as an explanation of v. 33b: God is true in that the one he sent (i.e. Jesus) speaks his words.

The farewell of the Baptist thus leads to an exaltation of Jesus as the unique prophet sent from God. The prophetic character of Jesus' mission is not explicit in v. 34a, but becomes so in v. 34b with the words "for he does not give the Spirit by measure." The subject and object of the verb are clarified by v. 35: "The Father loves the Son and has given all things in his hand." As he has given (dedōken) all things, so we may infer that he gives (didōsin) the Spirit to Jesus the Son. Jesus is thus the prophet in that he possesses the Spirit without measure,⁵⁸ but the title he bears, as almost everywhere in John, is not prophet but Son. The promise of life and warning of wrath in v. 36 represents a further expression of the invitation to believe which emerged so strongly in vv. 16-21.

Thus again "another voice" is heard in the text of the Fourth Gospel. Even though it cannot be said with certainty that in vv. 27-30 we have something close to the original words of John the Baptist, it is clear at any rate that traditional materials are being employed (e.g. the image of the bridegroom, cf. Mark 2:19; probably also v. 28), and that a definite shift in perspective takes place at v. 31 (more clear-cut, in fact, than the shift which occurs between vv. 11 and 21).

3. A third example of another (prophetic ?) voice in the Fourth Gospel is to be found in the bread of life discourse in chapter 6. The task of disentangling traditional and/or "authentic" elements in this discourse from the theological contribution of the evangelist and his "school" is obviously far beyond the scope of this investigation. All that will be attempted is the isolating of certain "echoes" which may represent the same voice or voices heard in chapter 3. Eduard Norden has pointed out in Jewish, Gnostic, and Christian (but not Oriental, purely Hellenistic) texts the use of the formulas su ei, egō eimi, and houtos estin in revelatory or soteriological contexts.⁵⁹ The "echoes" in John 6 take the form of confessional houtos or houtos estin expressions, sometimes in response to egō eimi statements of Jesus. As in the prolog and in chapter 3 it is not difficult to hear in these sentences the assent of the believing community to the revelatory words of Jesus.

The first of these echoes is in 6:27b, not in response to an egō-saying, but in response to a Son-of-Man saying (v. 27a). This saying, introduced by amēn, amēn (v. 26; see above #1), appears to be traditional. The shift from what Jesus has done to what the Son of Man will do is not unlike certain synoptic Son-of-Man utterances which have gained rather wide acceptance as authentic (e.g. Luke 12:8). But the statement in v. 27b sounds more like a confessional echo from the Christian community. Although toutos agrees with the third person 'Son of Man,' it appears to function in much the same way as if it had followed an egō-saying. This will become clear from the examples which follow. Moreover, by its mention of "God the Father" as the one who "sealed" the Son of Man, v. 27b presupposes an interpretation of the Son of Man as the Son, an interpretation which was seen operating also in 3:16ff. (cf. 3:35f.).⁶⁰ Whether the "sealing" refers to Jesus' baptism or not, and to what extent it implies the giving of the Spirit without measure (3:34) can be left open at this point (the only other occurrence of esphragisen in John is in 3:33, possibly used of the Baptist in connection with the baptism of Jesus).

The second "echo" in John 6 is found in v. 33. Jesus has just made an exegetical comment (introduced by amēn, amēn) on the Scripture passage about bread from heaven, to the effect that God, not Moses, is the giver of the true bread from heaven, and that the gift that really counts is not past (dedōken) but present (didōsin). So far there is nothing overtly christological except the designation of God as his Father, and the response of the Jews in v. 34 presupposes no christological claims. These appear for the first time in an egō eimi formula in v. 35. The translation of v. 33 is debated: if ho katabainōn is adjectival modifying artos, then v. 33 could be understood as a further explanation (on the lips

of Jesus) of the "true bread from heaven" of which he has just spoken. But if ho katabainōn is substantival, then it refers to Jesus himself: "The bread of God is he who comes down from heaven and gives life to the world." In this case the whole verse is best understood as a confessional echo which really "gets ahead of the story" by anticipating the egō eimi claim of v. 35 and the claim in v. 38 that "I have come down from heaven." Quite possibly the ambiguity in ho katabainōn is intentional. There is no evidence that John intends the reader to distinguish in any way between the voice of Jesus and the voice of a prophetic-apostolic community. There was no such evidence in chapter 3 and there is none here. The precedent of 3:13 suggests that the descent of Jesus from heaven is indeed one of the major concerns of the "other voice," for it is this descent and the access to heavenly truth which it implies that validates the community's self-consciousness of authority. Moreover, John 6:33 in its present context reads almost like an interpolation, for it would make perfect sense to move directly from v. 32 to v. 34. This does not mean that it should be treated as an interpolation, in the usual sense of the word, and excised. It is part of a larger pattern and should therefore be regarded as an "interpolation" by the evangelist himself (and his community?) into an earlier form of the dialog which had come down to him. This is the only example in the chapter which lacks houtos, but in this case the noun ("bread of God") is used with estin instead of houtos (cf. v. 50). Clearly, 6:33 contemplates the whole scope of the incarnation and the redemptive work of the Son in much the same way as the prolog and chapter 3.

In 6:41f. there is a clear formal example of the interplay between egō eimi and houtos estin. Here, however, it is not a case of a confessional echo by a believing community, but of a skeptical question by the participants in the unfolding drama of the chapter. Jesus is quoted as having said "I am (egō eimi) the bread that came down from heaven" (v. 41, drawing together statements made in vv. 35 and 38), and the Jews reply, "Isn't this (ouch houtos estin) Jesus the son of Joseph....How then does he say 'I have come down from heaven'?" This "negative confession" functions in much the same way as a positive one, for the reader is expected to know who Jesus really is and where he comes from. This exchange illustrates again that to the evangelist there is no real distinction between words purportedly spoken on the particular historical occasion and words reflecting the community's meditation on the implications of what is being said for the contemporary reader.

In 6:46 the "other voice" is heard again, this time clarifying what Jesus has just said about hearing the Father. Hearing means hearing only, for no one has "seen the Father except he who is from God, this one (houtos) has seen the Father." As we have seen, the voice speaks precisely on the subject of prophecy. Those who claim to be seers or visionaries are liars, for the only prophet in this sense is Jesus. The only way to be a prophet in the limited sense that is possible for the Christian community is to come to Jesus and hear what the Father is saying through him. The houtos looks at Jesus from the standpoint of faith and humble confession. As in 6:33 the echo follows not an egō eimi saying but an exegetical remark on a passage of Scripture (vv. 32,

45).

The confessional 'interpolation' in v. 33, which anticipated the egō eimi revelation in v. 35 and throughout the chapter from that point on, turns out to be programmatic for what John does in vv. 48-58. The announcement that "I am the bread of life" (v. 35) is repeated verbally in v. 48, except that now the emphasis falls particularly on the qualifying genitive, "of life." The egō eimi of v. 48 is answered by the houtos estin of v. 50. The first part of this statement agrees almost verbally with v. 33 except that the pronoun houtos replaces the noun; the last part differs in that it focuses on the negative corollary of life: "that a person may eat of it and not die." This transition from "life" or "eternal life" to its negative corollary, death or perishing, was also a feature of the appended meditation in 3:16-21, and seems to be one of the interests of the apostolic-prophetic 'interpolator.' Here in chapter 6 the reference to dying occurs already in v. 49 in words assigned explicitly to Jesus. It is not as if vv. 48-49 are 'text' and v. 50 is 'homily' or 'interpretation.' Instead, text and interpretation are woven inextricably together and assigned partly to egō constructions spoken by Jesus and partly to houtos constructions which seem to belong to the community. It is not unlikely that such apparent shifts in the identity of the speaker are part of the prophetic phenomenon. One may compare Rev. 1:7-8 where the perspective shifts quickly from that of the expectant community to that of the coming Lord, and also the pattern of a prophetic utterance followed by a response in Rev. 14:13, 20:17 and 20:20.

The houtos saying in John 6:50 is followed closely by another egō eimi saying in v. 51a: "I am the living bread who came down from heaven." This gives way in turn by another houtos saying in v. 51b: "if anyone eat of this bread (ek toutou tou artou) he will live forever," but in v. 51c the egō form reappears: "And the bread which I will give is my flesh for the life of the world." The entire section, vv. 48-51, can thus be regarded as an exposition of the programmatic v. 33 in light of the egō eimi revelation which had followed it. It takes the form of a rapid alternation between sayings introduced by egō (vv. 48f., 51a, 51c) and houtos (vv. 50, 51b) and culminates in a statement (v. 51c) which explains (or at least introduces the explanation of) the terse reference in v. 33b to "giving life to the world." Jesus "gives life to the world" by means of his 'flesh' which is somehow huper the "life of the world" (v. 51c), a phrase which is spelled out in its eucharistic significance in vv. 53-58.

The alternation in vv. 48-51 between egō and houtos sayings (unlike v. 33 itself and the other examples in this chapter) is one in which the first and third person viewpoints are so closely interwoven that neither can be set apart as anything like an 'interpolation.' One cannot bracket vv. 50 and 51b and still leave a coherent line of thought, for v. 50 is needed to complete the meaning of v. 49 and in v. 51c Jesus speaks of the bread in the same third-person way that the preceding "echo" does in v. 51b. The houtos sayings are thus needed to smooth the transitions, and the evangelist has no problem in letting them do so because for him the 'now' of his own experience merges with the 'then' of the historical situation.

The final "echo" in the bread of life discourse is the houtos estin saying in 6:58. This statement follows the Son-of-Man saying in v. 53 and the ego language of vv. 54-57 and serves as a summary of the entire discourse. It combines and draws together in a remarkable way the preceding houtos sayings in vv. 33, 50, and 51b: "This is the bread which [or who] came down from heaven, not as the Fathers ate and died; whoever feeds on this bread will live forever" (v. 58). The use of this formula to conclude the whole discourse points to some fairly consistent redaction by a Johannine community, with the purpose of spelling out the implications of Jesus' words for a later time by providing an almost liturgical counterpoint to certain traditional sayings of Jesus about OT Scripture passages and about himself as Son of Man. Whether the ego eimi sayings belong with these older traditions or whether they arose alongside the houtos estin sayings must remain an open question for now, but the former seems (to me at least) the more likely possibility.

As a postscript to the discussion of chapter 6, it is worthwhile to notice v. 63a, where a possibility exists that to pneuma estin functions in much the same way that houtos estin does elsewhere. This could be justified on the ground that for John the Spirit is a necessary corollary of the ascension. The statement in v. 62, with its reference to the Son of Man as anabainonta, serves as the explanation for the repeated emphasis on katabainein in the preceding discourse (vv. 33, 38, 42, 50, 51, 58). The ascent verifies the descent, and therefore the ability to bring a revelation from God, just as it does in 3:13. The Spirit in the community is the immediate evidence of this for the readers of the Gospel, and so the "echo" in v. 63a (if it is that) focuses on the Spirit. A connection with prophecy would be easier to demonstrate if v. 63a read to pneuma estin to marturoun, as in I John 5:6. The interest centers instead on the impartation of life (to pneuma estin to zōopoion, cf. vv. 48-51, 53, 57-58), but the shift to the ego form in v. 63b and the emphasis there on the spoken words (rhēmata) of Jesus as "spirit and life" suggests that some of the same themes we have noticed elsewhere are operative here as well. This much-discussed crux requires considerable further investigation before its relationship to the prophetic phenomena in John can be determined.

NOTES

¹Jesus of Nazareth (1960), p. 19.

²See, e.g., H. Sasse, "Der Paraklet im Johannesevangelium," ZNW 24 (1925), pp. 273f., O. Cullmann, Early Christian Worship (1953), pp. 47ff., F. Mussner, The Historical Jesus in the Gospel of John (1967), pp. 59-67.

³See É. Cothenet, "Prophétisme," in Dict Bib Suppl, cols. 1317ff.

⁴E.g. 2:7, etc., 3:3, 5, 21, 16:15.

⁵If the reading of P⁶⁶ is adopted in 7:52, this verse must be added to the list.

⁶It is likely that OT prophets are primarily in view in 10:7, while in 11:18, 16:6, 18:20, 24 it is possible that they are at least included.

⁷But cf. Jezebel, an individual false "prophetess," in Rev. 2:20.

⁸See C.H. Dodd, "The Prophecy of Caiaphas," Neotestamentica et Patristica (1962), pp. 134-143; S. Pancaro, "People of God" in John's Gospel," NTS 16, 2 (1969/70), pp. 114-129.

⁹Cf. Josephus, Ant. 11, 327 and 13, 299. See also the paper of J. Blenkinsopp, "Prophecy in Josephus," pp. 12-16.

¹⁰Cf. T. F. Glasson, Moses in the Fourth Gospel (1963), pp. 27ff, W. A. Meeks, The Prophet-King (1967), pp. 21ff.

¹¹Note the linking of the manna and the water from the rock in these passages. Cf. Glasson, op. cit., p. 48.

¹²Cf. also 10:34f., where the mention of "those to whom the word of God came" may similarly refer to the Sinai experience, placed in contrast with the mission of "him whom the Father consecrated and sent into the world." See R. E. Brown, Anchor Bible (1966), p. 410.

¹³Cf. not only Caiaphas in John 11:51, but Jesus himself frequently, both in his words (7:17f., 12:49, 14:10) and in his works (5:19, 30, 8:28).

¹⁴On the Christianization of the Baptist, see W. Wink, John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition (1968), pp. 105f. For the two verbs, "standing and hearing" (3:29), cf. 12:29 and perhaps also the experience of the disciples at the transfiguration (Mark 9:1, 7b). In the Johannine allusions to the baptism of Jesus, however, the emphasis is on seeing rather than hearing (1:33f.).

¹⁵It is not always the case, however, that hearing implies belief (cf. 12:47 and probably 18:21; 3:8 may be still another case in point).

¹⁶See below (III, #1), and cf. also the confirmation of 6:44 in 6:65.

¹⁷The translation of this verse is disputed. There are no possessive pronouns to indicate that the father mentioned in v. 38b is different from the father mentioned in v. 38a. The argument of vv. 41 and 44 that the father of Jesus' opponents is the devil should not be read back into v. 38. The oun also indicates that v. 38b is an inference from v. 38a: "You then (must) do what you have heard from the Father (i.e. through Jesus)." Cf. Brown, op. cit. p. 356.

¹⁸See W. Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon (ed. Arndt-Gingrich, 1957), p. 449, and W. Grundmann in TDNT III, p. 900.

¹⁹Cf. Rev. 21:6, 22:17.

²⁰Cf. Theophilus, Ad Autolyicum II, 9; perhaps also Athenagoras, Legatio 11.

²¹R. Bultmann also ascribes 18:9, 32 to the redactor. The Gospel of John (1971), pp. 640, 653.

²²All of the Johannine uses of pleroun in connection with OT Scripture, except 12:38, are also to be found in the passion context.

²³In 11:50-52 the distinctively Johannine element is the gathering of the scattered children of God (cf. 10:16, 16:32, 17:11, 22f.); the application of the saying to the atoning death of Jesus is pre-Johannine. Cf. Dodd, op. cit., pp. 140f.

²⁴This is on the assumption that "the Scripture" in mind in v.22 is Ps. 69:10 (see below, in connection with the discussion of 20:8f.).

²⁵The idea of the body (of Christ or the believer) as a temple is more characteristic of Paul than John, while the phrase "raised from the dead" in v. 22 is less Johannine than the "glorified" of 12:16.

²⁶There are several exact parallels between the Scripture and the language used to describe its fulfillment. Thus basileus in 12:15 corresponds to the same word in v. 13; erchetai (v. 15) parallels ho erchomenos (v. 13); kathēmenos (v. 15) is fulfilled in the ekathisen of v. 14a; and pōlon onou (v. 15) parallels onarion (v. 14a).

²⁷Although the concern to retain the OT and to lay claim to the past for Jesus Christ is present in the NT and at least a subsidiary concern in John, it is more characteristic of the second century than of the first.

²⁸I John 2:1, however, is not a true parallel.

²⁹See e.g. H. Sasse, op. cit., H. Windisch, The Spirit-Paraclete in the Fourth Gospel (repr. 1968), O. Betz, Der Paraklet (1963), G. Johnston, The Spirit-Paraclete in the Fourth Gospel (1970), Brown, op. cit., pp. 1135-1143 and NTS 13(1966/67), pp. 113-132.

³⁰Mussner, op. cit., pp. 40ff.

³¹Cf. Sasse, op. cit., and A. Kragerud, Der Lieblingsjünger im Johannesevangelium (1959).

³²Is there still a further allusion to false prophets in the oudeis allos of 15:24?

³³Cf. the use of the same verb with reference to the apostolic witness in I John 1:2, 3.

³⁴It is not necessary for our purposes to settle the question of whether the disciples' confession is premature or soundly motivated. In either case, there is no doubt that it represents for John a valid description of Jesus as revealer.

³⁵"No Need to be Asked Questions: A Study of Jn. 16:30," in Search the Scriptures - New Testament Studies in Honor of Raymond T. Stamm (Leiden: Brill, 1969), pp. 49-74.

³⁶See the whole discussion of false and true prophets in Mand. 11. The use of aph' heautou here stands in formal contradiction to the Johannine emphasis because the contrast is with human initiative rather than with divine direction. Contrast 11:8, where the true prophet "gives no answers to anyone when he is questioned, nor does he speak by himself (katamonas), for the Holy Spirit does not speak when a man wishes to speak, but he speaks when God wishes him to speak." On anóthen, cf. Jn 3:3 31 and see below, section V.

³⁷Although "prophets" are frequently mentioned as a group, all Christians are seen in Rev. 12:17 as having the "witness of Jesus," which in 19:10 is identified as the "spirit of prophecy." In Rev. 11 there is wide agreement that the two prophets represent the church in its mission. Cf. J. L. Trafton, "The Prophethood of All Believers," Unpublished Th.M. dissertation, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 1974.

³⁸Bream, op. cit., p. 74.

³⁹See above, n. 19, and on the wisdom background of the material, cf. Brown, op. cit., pp. 327f.

⁴⁰A case can be made that hearing itself is a prophetic phenomenon in Revelation (like the seeing of visions). Again and again it is John the prophet who "hears" a voice from heaven. If this is the case, it is an additional factor which unites the prophet with the whole community and characterizes the whole community as prophetic (cf. 1:3, 2:7, etc.). In 22:17 the community "hears" and echoes the Spirit's invitation to the thirsty unbeliever to "come."

⁴¹Brown, op. cit., pp. 320ff.

⁴²A notable exception is J. H. Bernard, who takes pneuma as Spirit in both parts of the verse. St. John (ICC, 1928), pp. 106ff.

⁴³K. Berger, Die Amen-Worte Jesu (1970), pp. 95-117; V. Hasler, Amen (1969), pp. 146-156.

⁴⁴Cf. W. A. Meeks, "The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism," JBL 91 (1972), pp. 54f.

⁴⁵For a somewhat similar view (though not identical), cf. W. Thüsing, Die Erhöhung und Verherrlichung Jesu im Johannesevangelium (z. Aufl., 1970), pp. 255ff.

⁴⁶In Matthew, cf. the way in which the statement about revelation in 11:25-30 (especially v. 27) anticipates the establishment of apostolic authority in 28:18-20.

⁴⁷Cf. also John 9:35ff., where Son of Man becomes virtually a confessional term.

⁴⁸The Jonah saying uses hōsper...houtōs in Matthew, but kathōs...houtōs in Luke. Although John's dei differs from the estai of the synoptic passage, dei in connection with the passion is not distinctively Johannine (cf. Mark 8:31, Luke 17:25, 22:37, 24:7, 26, 44).

⁴⁹On pisteuein with en, see Bauer, op. cit., p. 667. Because of the strangeness of the construction, many commentators connect en autōi with "have eternal life."

⁵⁰A similar kind of midrashic development appears to be at work in Barn. 12:5-7.

⁵¹Cf. paredōken in Rom. 8:32, and the use of paradidonai in a variety of ways elsewhere to point to the passion (with Isa. 53:12 as a possible background), and the use of didonai in Gal. 1:4, I Tim. 2:6.

⁵²Cf. 1:14, 18, I John 4:9 and the frequent use of "Son" in the Fourth Gospel.

⁵³Cf. 6:39, 10:28, 17:12, 18:9; 6:12, 27, 11:50.

⁵⁴Rearrangements have been suggested, notably by Bultmann (op. cit., pp. 160ff.) who places vv. 31-36 after vv. 16-21, but whatever may have been true in early stages of redaction, justice must be done to the Gospel in its present form, and the present arrangement satisfactorily explained. Cf. Brown, op. cit., p. 160, and C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (1953), pp. 308ff.

⁵⁵Is it possible that the ho anōthen erchomenos of 3:31 echoes (and qualifies) the ho erchomenos of John the Baptist's question from prison in Matt. 11:3, Luke 7:20?


⁵⁶Cf. 1:15, where the witness of the Baptist is set free from its historical context (cf. 1:27, 30) to become a present (prophetic?) testimony to the reader. It can be argued, in fact, that his testimony extends through 1:18 as he is allowed to become the spokesman for the old covenant. If this is the case, a situation not unlike 3:31-36 is to be found already in the prolog.

⁵⁷Cf. R. H. Lightfoot, St. John's Gospel (1960), p. 133. That the Baptist should be speaking in vv. 27-30 and presumably in vv. 31ff., but then be spoken of in the third person seems strange unless we keep in mind the impersonal (i.e. third person) stance of 3:16-21 as well as vv. 31-36.

⁵⁸Was it of interest in Johannine circles that the one who had the "bride" (v. 29) had the "Spirit" as well (v. 34; cf. Rev. 22:17)?

⁵⁹AGNOSTOS THEOS (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 177-201.

⁶⁰This connection can occur, however, even in the synoptic tradition. Cf. Mark 8:38, where the Son of Man comes "in the glory of his Father."



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