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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The papers included in the two volumes of *Seminar Papers, 1978*, are to be discussed in the appropriate program units of the One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, New Orleans, Louisiana, 18-21 November 1978. The volumes have been produced by photographically copying the manuscripts submitted by the authors. In the large majority of cases, therefore, both format and content are the responsibility of the respective authors. The Editor is responsible for assembling the volumes and preparing them for publication; copy editing is limited to paper titles.

These papers are intended to stimulate discussion within the various program units of the Annual Meeting for which they have been prepared. Only rarely do they represent the final product of scholarly reflection; rather, they are intended to be one step within the process of scholarly debate and refinement. Their publication in these volumes is for purposes of convenience of distribution, and does not represent any claim as to the final form they may one day achieve.

The order in which the papers appear is dictated by their place within the Annual Program. The identifying number preceding each title refers to the program, and the Book of Abstracts. The letter *S* indicates that they are presentations of the Society of Biblical Literature.

The editor is happy to take this opportunity to thank those authors and chairmen and chairwomen of the various Groups and Seminars, and to the Convenors of the various consultations whose efforts have resulted in the papers brought together in these volumes.

S 6

APOCALYPTIC PATTERNS IN THE SIMILITUDES OF ENOCH

David W. Suter
Wichita State University

This paper is the result of an invitation to explore the usefulness of the definition of apocalypse as a literary genre presented by John J. Collins in "Apocalypse: Towards the Morphology of a Genre"[1] by examining it in light of a specific writing. It consequently has two parts, (a) an analysis of the structure of the Similitudes of Enoch (1 En. 37-71; hereafter Sim. En.) based largely on the author's dissertation,[2] and (b) a discussion of Collins' approach to the definition and typology of apocalypse in light of the analysis of Sim En. It should be noted that, while this paper responds directly to Collins, his work is based on that of the workgroup on Apocalypse for the SBL Genres project which included H. W. Attridge, J. J. Collins, A. Yarbro Collins, F. T. Fallon, and A. J. Saldarini.

The Structure of Sim. En.

Thematic patterning in Sim. En.

The key to the structure of Sim. En. is to be found in a comparison of the list of things revealed to Enoch in a heavenly journey in 1 En. 41:1-2 with 1 En. 60-63.

(41:1) And afterward, I saw all the secrets of the heavens,	1 En. 60:7-24
and the kingdom, how it will be divided,	1 En. 61:1-5; cf. Ezek. 40-48, where the temple and land are measured; Is. 34:17; and Zech. 1:14-17 and 2:1-5(MT, 2:5-9)
and the deeds of mankind, how they will be weighed with a balance.	1 En. 61:6-11; cf. especially 61:8
(2) And there I saw the dwellings of the elect, and the dwellings of the holy,	1 En. 61:12-13; cf. also 61:4 and 62:13-16 (see especially 61:12c)
and my eyes saw all the sinners, who deny the name of the Lord of Spirits, being driven from there, and they will be dragged [away], and they will have no persistence [wa-qawima 'albomu], on account of the punishment which will come forth from the Lord of Spirits.[3]	1 En. 62:1-63:12

An additional element of the pattern appears when the heavenly ascent and the vision of the heavenly court in 1 En. 39:3-40:10 is compared to 60:1-6,25. The common elements of 1 En. 39:3-41:2 and 60-63 suggest the following pattern:

1. the vision of the heavenly court
2. the secrets of the heavens
3. the division of the kingdom
4. the judgment of mankind (or the host of heaven)
5. the reward of the righteous
6. the punishment of the wicked[4]

The heavenly ascent itself appears only in 1 En. 39. It seems to be essential to the pattern but does not require repetition in the recapitulation.

Pesharim and other traditional units

In Sim. En., the elements of the above pattern seem to be related to a number of midrashic[5] fragments or pesharim, and an analysis of these relationships provides a further key to the structure of the work. The Similitudes are clearly divided into three major sections (similitudes or "parables"), 1 En. 38-44, 45-57, and 58-69, each of which is clearly distinguished by an introduction.[6] The heavenly ascent, vision of the heavenly court, and list of things seen by Enoch in his cosmic journey are to be found in the first of these sections, and the recapitulation of the themes from the vision and journey are to be found in the third. The second section contains various traditional materials including a number of pesharim in which scenes are built up through the association of allusions to subsidiary passages of scripture with a central passage. These pesharim are then combined with each other in the third section as the thematic pattern from the first section is repeated in 1 En. 60-63, and it is possible, therefore, to associate them with individual themes and to examine the process of composition of Sim. En.

An example of the way in which pesharim from the second section are combined in the third is to be found in 1 En. 46:4-8; 48:8-10; and 62-63. Behind the first two of these passages lie pesharim on Is. 14 and Ex. 14-15 respectively.

(1 En. 46:4) And this Son of Man whom you saw will raise up the kings and mighty from their couches and the strong from their thrones, and he will loosen the reins of the strong and break the teeth of sinners. (5) And he will remove the kings from their thrones and their kingdoms because they do not exalt him and glorify him and humbly confess whence kingship was given to them. (6) And he will cast down the faces of the strong and will fill them with shame, and darkness will be their dwelling place, and worms will be their bed, and they will not hope to raise from their beds, because they do not exalt the name of the Lord of Spirits. (7) And these are the ones who judge the stars of heaven, and lift up their hands against the Most High, and trample down the earth and dwell upon it. And all their deeds show forth iniquity, and their	Is. 14:9; 49:7(?) Job 17:13 Job 30:11 Ps. 3:7(MT, 8); 58:6! Is. 14:9 Ps. 107:10; Lam. 3:6 Is. 14:11; Job 17:14; 21:26 Is. 14:13-14 Is. 14:14

power [depends] upon their wealth and their trust is in gods which they have made with their hands, and they deny the name of the Lord of Spirits. (8) And they are persecuting the houses of his congregation and the faithful who depend upon the name of the Lord of Spirits.[7]	Ezek. 28:4-5! Ps. 74:8
(1 En. 48:8) In those days the kings of the earth and the strong who occupy the land through the deeds of their hands will be downcast of face, because on the day of their distress and their trouble they will not [be able to] deliver themselves. (9) And I [God] shall deliver them into the hands of my elect ones; like straw in a fire thus will they burn	(cf. Ex. 15:14-16; Is. 13:6-9) Is. 46:2; 47:14 Ex. 14:26-27 Ex. 15:7; Is. 47:14; Mal. 4:1 (MT, 3:19)
before the face of the holy ones; like lead in water [thus] will they be swallowed up before the face of the righteous ones, and no trace of them will be found. (10) And on the day of their distress there will be rest upon the earth, and before them [the righteous] they will prostrate [themselves] and not rise, and there will be no one who will grasp them with his hands and raise them up, because they have denied the Lord of Spirits and his Messiah, and blessed be the name of the Lord of Spirits.[8]	Ex. 14:30; Is. 66:24 Ex. 15:10 Ex. 14:30; Is. 66:24 Ex. 14:13,28; Is. 26:14 Is. 14:7!; 2 Sam. 7:11 Ps. 36:12; 140:10; Is. 26:14; 49:7,23; Ex. 14:30 Ps. 2:2

It can be seen that, like the Qumran pesharim, these passages are built around a central passage of scripture which is supplemented through reference to a number of secondary passages. Unlike the Qumran examples, they are narrative or descriptive rather than expository in style.

George Nickelsburg has observed that there is a special relationship between 1 En. 46 and 62-63 that suggests that these two passages represent "variants of a common tradition"[9] which is related to Is. 14 and 49; however, the exegetical background of chapters 62-63 as well as their relationship to material in the second section of Sim. En. is even more complex. 1 En. 62-63 includes the following elements:

(1) the enthronement of the Elect one as judge based on Is. 42:1-4 and found in 1 En. 45:3; 49:4; and 55:4
(2) the revelation of the Son of Man based on Dan. 7:9-14 and found in 1 En. 46:1-3
(3) the judgment of the kings and mighty based on Is. 14 and found in 1 En. 46:4-8
(4) the naming of the Son of Man based on Is. 49 and found in 1 En. 48:2-7
(5) the punishment of the kings and mighty based on Ex. 14-15 and found in 1 En. 48:8-10[10]

In addition, 1 En. 63 is centered around the motif of repentance which is found in the second section in 1 En. 50:1-5 and 53:1-5. In chapter 50 the Gentiles repent, and in chapters 53 and 63 the repentance of the kings and mighty is unavailing. In the latter two chapters the motif seems to be related to Joel 3:1-8 (MT, 4:1-8): cf. 1 En. 53:1-2 and possibly 63:10. This analysis suggests that 1 En. 62-63 is not itself a traditional unit but rather is composed of several traditional units which have previously been introduced in the second section.

Other parts of the third section pull together material from the second section. An examination of the theme, "division of the kingdom," in 1 En. 61:1-5 indicates that it combines two motifs, the return of the exiles and the resurrection of the elect. The former is implicit in the passages of scripture which deal with measuring (division) as an eschatological motif--cf. Ezek. 40-48 and Zech. 1:14-17 and 2:1-5 (MT, 2:5-9)--and it appears in the second section in 1 En. 57:1-3. The latter appears as an eschatological motif independently of the return of the exiles in Is. 26:19 and Dan. 12:2, and in the second section of Sim. En. at 1 En. 51:1-2 it is likewise an independent motif.

The "Elect one" material in Sim. En. represents another traditional strand which is developed extensively in the second section and reappears in the third section at 1 En. 61:8-9. When compared to the sections of Sim. En. that use "Son of Man" to refer to the messianic figure, the passages using "Elect one" can be seen to reflect a distinct tradition based, probably, on Is. 42:1-4 where the servant of Yahweh or "my elect one" is commissioned to "bring forth justice to the nations" and to establish "justice in the earth" (cf. also 1 En. 49:3 with Is. 42:1). In 1 En. 45:3; 49:1-4; 55:4; and 61:8-9 the Elect one is given a judicial function which corresponds with the theme of judgment appropriate for 61:6-11 (see above). On the other hand, with the exception of the Gospel of Matthew, "Son of Man" is not associated with a judicial function but merely serves as the eschatological warrior or the ruler of the new age. In Dan. 7, judgment has already taken place before the messianic figure appears (cf. 1 En. 47:3). In Sim. En., the "Son of Man" passages give the messianic figure the responsibility of punishment of the kings and mighty rather than of judgment, and the use of "Son of Man" coincides with the theme of punishment (see above) in chapters 62-63.

An additional feature of interest is the "throne of his [God's] glory," here apparently a throne of judgment rather than the object of the mystical ascent as in Merkabah mysticism, which is first associated with the Elect one (cf. 1 En. 45:3; 51:3; 55:4; and 61:8) and then in the course of chapter 62 is transferred from "the Elect one" to "that Son of Man" (cf. 62:1-2 where the Lord of Spirits seats the Elect one on the throne of his glory with 62:5 where the kings and mighty see "that Son of Man" seated on the throne of his glory). Chapter 62 seems to be designed to integrate the features of the two strands of messianic traditions represented by "the Elect one" and "Son of Man," and in the conclusion to the three sections of Sim. En., 1 En. 69:26-29, "that Son of Man" is again associated with the throne of his glory and is given the responsibility for both judgment and punishment.

The above analysis indicates that the two strands of

messianic traditions are developed separately in the second section of Sim. En. and then brought together in the third section where they are related to two themes of the pattern discussed above. The alternation of the messianic terms in the second section and their combination in the third suggests that a second major structural principle of Sim. En., in addition to the thematic pattern common to the first and third sections, is the counterpoint between these two strands of messianic traditions to which this paper will return later.

This survey of the relationship between the second and third sections of Sim.En. demonstrates the importance of observing the role of scripture in the composition of the work.[11] Most of the passages or traditional strands have a central passage of scripture (or group of passages) behind them, although the closeness of the relationship to scripture may vary. Observation of the exegetical background is important to the distinction between "Elect one" and "Son of Man" strands of tradition and to the study of the role of these two strands in Sim. En. Such observation is also important to a study of the development of the division of the kingdom theme. The exegetical background to 1 En. 62-63 is of most importance, however, since it points to a complex set of relationships to passages in the second section of the work. In the last case (and perhaps also in the case of the "Son of Man" strand), eschatological speculation is based on an exegetical process which involves the interrelation of traditional pesharim. Other passages reflect traditional units which, while they have a scriptural basis, have achieved a greater degree of independence as eschatological traditions. It is even possible to suggest that the intensity of the exegetical process points toward the themes of judgment and punishment with their associated messianic strands ("Elect one" and "Son of Man" respectively) as the areas in which the author of Sim. En. sets out to solve what he considers to be important problems. The use of more traditional material in the other themes suggests that they do not present burning questions in Sim. En.

Theme and embellishment

1 En. 54:1-56:4 and 64:1-68:1 represent narrative midrashim of Is. 24:17-23. What the three passages have in common is a concave structure (A:B:A_1) with a reference to or account of the world flood in the center and passages dealing with judgment and punishment at the beginning and end:

A:	Is. 24:17-18b	1 En. 54:1-6	1 En. 64:1-2
B:	Is. 24:18c-20	1 En. 54:7-55:2	1 En. 65:1-67:3
A_1:	Is. 24:21-23	1 En. 55:3-56:4	1 En. 67:4-68:1

In Is. 24:21-23; 1 En. 55:3-56:4; and 67:4-68:1 the punishment of human beings and heavenly beings is paralleled.

In Sim. En., the myth of the fallen angels is confined to 1 En. 54:1-56:4 and 64:1-68:1 (with the addition of 1 En. 68:2-69:12). The work as a whole seems to be concerned with the human causes of evil, the kings and mighty of the earth. The fallen angel material appears toward the end of the second and third sections of Sim. En., and in each case it follows material dealing with the punishment of the kings and mighty (see 1 En. 53 and 62-63). In the third section, it appears after the apparent completion of the thematic pattern discussed above. In addition, in both chapters 53 and 63 the

kings and mighty attempt to repent to no avail, and in each section the place of punishment of the angels is related to that of the kings, in 1 En. 53:1 and 54:1 through the coordination of the two valleys and in 64:1-2 through direct reference:

> (64:1) And I saw other forms hiding in this place.
> (2) I heard the voice of the angel saying, "These are the angels who descended upon the earth and who revealed secrets to the children of men and led the children of men into error so that they sinned."

In Is. 24:21-23, the punishment of the host of heaven and the kings of the earth is paralleled, leading to the embellishment[12] of the punishment of the kings and mighty of the earth in Sim. En. through the introduction of a version of the myth of the fallen angels based on Is. 24:17-23. This embellishment occurs twice, each time at the appropriate point in the section in which it is found. In each case a motif from a different pattern has been introduced to ornament a similar motif central to the thematic structure of Sim. En.

Recapitulation in the composition of Sim. En.

The above discussion has outlined a structural analysis of Sim. En. which uncovers several types of recurrence or recapitulation which take place from section to section of the work. These include (a) the thematic pattern in the first and third sections, (b) the midrashic and traditional material in the second section which is integrated into the thematic pattern in the third section, and (c) the Is. 24:17-23 midrash dealing with the myth of the fallen angels which is used to embellish or ornament the theme of punishment in the second and third sections. The importance of this analysis for the discussion of the composition of apocalypses becomes apparent when it is compared to the work of Adela Yarbro Collins on Revelation. She finds there a pattern of recurrence from section to section based on the mythic pattern of the divine warrior.[13]

The purpose of recurrence, judging from its use in Sim. En., is the integration of various traditional materials (including pesharim based on various passages of scripture) by fitting them into the appropriate points of a pattern which is in all probability traditional itself. In some cases, the themes of the pattern already have traditional material associated with them, as is the case with the theme "division of the kingdom" which has clear associations with Ezek. 40-48 and Zech. 1-2. In other cases, the theme permits the creation of a new idea through its ability to attract and associate similar motifs. The use of recurrence as a compositional principle suggests a writing which has strong traditional roots but which at the same time is capable of dealing with the demands of the present by producing new associations of traditional materials.

At the same time, it should be noted that Sim. En. has a linear thread which runs through the three sections.[14] The development of messianic concepts runs throughout the work. Both the "Son of Man" and "Elect one" strands are elaborated through the introduction of various materials (some of which may represent traditional associations), and finally, in chapters 62-63 the two strands are pulled together. In 1 En. 39:6-7, the seer sees the Elect one and his dwelling place. In 49:1-4, the Elect one stands before the Lord of Spirits. In

51:3, the Elect one sits on the throne from where in 55:4 he judges Azazel and his hosts. Finally in 61:8-9 he is placed on the throne to judge the host of heaven. Throughout all this runs the theme of the dwelling of the elect ones with the Elect one in the new age (cf. 1 En. 39:7; 40:5; 45:4; 51:5; 53:6; and 61:5). On the other hand, the "Head of Days" and "that Son of Man" (cf. Dan. 7) are introduced in 1 En. 46:1-3. In 46:4-8, the Son of Man is to cast kings down from their thrones (cf. Is. 14). In 47:3-4, the Head of Days seats himself on his throne and opens the books of the living (cf. Dan. 7:9-12). In 48:1-7, the Son of Man is named before creation (cf. Is. 49). In 1 En. 62, the Son of Man is seated on the throne, pulling together the Elect one/throne/judgment strand with the various materials associated with "that Son of Man." The linear thread culminates in 1 En. 69:26-29, the conclusion to the three sections of Sim. En., with the Son of Man named before the righteous and seated on the throne judging sinners.

The linear thread related to the messianic elements of Sim. En. can not be viewed in isolation from the recurrent patterns in the work. It has been noted that the "Elect one" and "Son of Man" strands have their thematic associations, and, in addition, the materials used to elaborate the messianic concepts likewise are of importance in the patterns of recurrence in the work. In the second section of Sim. En., the interplay between the messianic passages and those dealing with judgment, punishment, the division of the kingdom, and the dwelling place of the righteous suggests coherent associations rather than a random collection of material. In the final analysis, the linear thread stands out from the recurrent patterns in much the same way that a skillful musician can make a melody stand out from a running passage in Baroque music by emphasizing the proper notes.

The shape of Sim. En. as a whole

So far the discussion has concentrated on the division of Sim. En. into three sections and the structures present in these sections. The three sections are themselves set in a framework which seems to reflect a distinct stage in the composition of the work. Sim. En. begins with an introduction in chapter 37 which ascribes the vision to Enoch, relates the speaking of wisdom to the ancients to its communication to "moderns" through this writing, and indicates that the work is to be divided into three "parables" or mesālē. Material at the division of the three sections (which may also be distinguished through internal features) continues these divisions,[15] and the work is finally closed with two accounts of the translation of Enoch to heaven in chapters 70 and 71. It is interesting to note that with the exception of the Is. 24:17-23 midrash in 1 En. 64:1-68:1 the name of Enoch is confined to the introductory or editorial material (see 1 En. 37:1; 39:1-2a, which is almost certainly an interpolation; 60:1, which is editorial in that it refers to the three "parable" structure; and 69:29). 1 En. 64:1-68:1 is odd in that it makes Noah the speaker and relates him to his "grandfather" Enoch, although the purpose of this feature becomes obvious in 1 En. 68:1 which recounts how Enoch gave Noah the book of the parables (mashaf za-mesālē). 1 En. 68:1 (along with some of the narrative elements of 65-67 which make Noah the speaker) is thus intended to explain how the work was transmitted from Enoch to the "present"[16] and is therefore editorial in intent and should be related to the material which introduces the whole work and makes explicit the division into three "parables."

The distinction between the three "parables" and the editorial material should not be used to disassemble the writing. What is being distinguished, rather, is two stages in the composition of Sim. En. In his dissertation,[17] the author has argued that the three "parables" represent an oral composition delivered by a visionary speaker in the first person as a sermon or lecture and that the editorial material was necessary to transform an oral composition into a pseudepigraphon so that the written work would carry the same authority that the spoken one had.[18] The editorial material is therefore not extraneous. It is an important part of the final written work.

Implications of Sim. En. for the Study of the Genre "Apocalypse"

In "Apocalypse: Towards the Morphology of a Genre," Collins derives a definition of apocalypse as a genre by classifying the features of a widely inclusive group of writings commonly regarded as apocalypses to determine what characteristics they have in common. He distills the following definition:

> "Apocalypse" is a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, in so far as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial, in so far as it involves another, supernatural world.[19]

He then uses the variant features of the group of writings to develop a typology of apocalypses:

- Ia: "historical" apocalypses with no otherworldly journey
- Ib: apocalypses of cosmic and/or political eschatology (which have neither historical review nor otherworldly journey)
- Ic: apocalypses with only personal eschatology (and no otherworldly journey)
- IIa: "historical" apocalypses with an otherworldly journey
- IIb: otherworldly journeys with cosmic and/or political eschatology
- IIc: otherworldly journeys with only personal eschatology[20]

He places Sim. En. in IIb, "otherworldly journeys with cosmic and/or political eschatology."

Does the definition fit Sim. En.?

It can be readily seen that the definition does fit Sim. En. The work has a narrative framework--albeit a complex one--which explains the manner of revelation. The above discussion distinguishes between a central body of material, in which an apparently anonymous sage is caught up into heaven in a whirlwind (1 En. 39:3) and given a vision of the heavens and of the eschatological judgment, and an editorial body of material which identifies the sage as Enoch and recounts how the Book of the Parables (Sim. En.) was passed on from Enoch through Noah. The latter stage of composition is awkward in that it at one point treats Noah rather than Enoch as the first person.[21] It should be noted that in Sim. En. the emphasis is on the vision rather than the mediator. The latter has been reduced to an occasional reference to "the angel who accompanied me."[22] In the awkward passage (1 En. 65:1-68:1), Enoch becomes, in effect, the other-

worldly mediator and Noah the human recipient. The work verges on direct vision rather than mediated vision.

The list of the six themes from the first and third sections of Sim. En. makes it clear that the content of the revelation deals with a transcendent reality which has both temporal and spatial dimensions. The first two themes, the vision of the heavenly court and the secrets of the heavens, reflect a spatially transcendent reality while the last four, the division of the kingdom, the judgment of mankind, the reward of the righteous, and the punishment of the wicked, reflect a temporally transcendent or eschatological reality. Salvation lies in the future when the current rulers of this world, the kings and mighty of the earth, have been brought to judgment and the righteous come to dwell with the messiah, the Elect one or that Son of Man, who is currently a heavenly reality.

The usefulness of the definition

One might ask two questions in attempting to evaluate the usefulness of a definition of a genre. First, does the definition focus attention on the important issues of the work? Second, does it permit relevant comparative judgments to be made?

It is possible for a definition of a genre to be applicable to a writing and yet to focus attention on side issues rather than the central thrust of the work. The above discussion of Sim. En. has suggested that, judging from the intensity of the exegetical process, the central interest of the work is the eschatological judgment of the kings and mighty of the earth and the character of the messianic figure who will carry out that judgment. The work is concerned with the negative aspects of salvation while the positive aspects, the division of the kingdom and the dwelling places of the righteous, seem to involve more traditional materials and less intense speculation. Taken with the clear concern for the fate of the <u>community</u> of the righteous,[23] to which the salvation or resurrection of the individual is clearly secondary, it becomes obvious that the major thrust of the work is as much political as it is religious. The definition undoubtedly means to include the <u>possibility</u> of the negative aspects of salvation in the term "eschatological salvation"; however, the negative or political eschatology is not one of the common features which produced the definition but rather one of the variables which characterizes group IIb of the typology, "otherworldly journeys with cosmic and/or political eschatology." The typology is thus more useful than the definition itself in getting at the central thrust of Sim. En. This consideration does not represent an argument against the validity of the definition, but it does suggest that the divisions of the typology represent important literary classifications in and of themselves. As Collins observes:

> This definition marks the boundries of the genre and enables us to identify it. It is not intended as a complete or adequate description of the constituent works. No individual apocalypse can be adequately understood without reference to some other elements of the paradigm. The fuller paradigm permits us to see the variety within the genre and distinguish different types of apocalypses.[24]

The above argument does suggest that, if the variants which distinguish the various classes of the typology are as

central to their respective works as political eschatology is to Sim. En., the definition does permit relevant comparative judgments to be made. A distinction between the types of salvation offered by the various works included in the survey does seem to be relevant.

The typology uncovers a distinction between otherworldly journeys and ex eventu prophecies of history in pre-Christian apocalypses that seems to be of importance for a discussion of the history of the genre. Collins uses that point to raise "the question whether we should speak of two genres, or of two strains in a single genre."[25] Since the discussion of genre has been divorced from historical and sociological considerations, he is correct in treating the choice between the two options as a matter of terminological clarity.

The discussion of the usefulness of the definition suggests that its usefulness depends upon its association with the typology. Its utility does indeed seem to be that it defines the outer limits of the genre, while the distinctions within the genre uncovered by the typology are of more importance in the discussion of apocalypses.

Approaches to the study of the genre

Apocalypse and the study of religion. As they stand, the definition of the genre "apocalypse" and the typology reflect as much as a type of religion as they do a literary genre. Transcendence or belief in a transcendent reality of some sort is one possibility as a defining characteristic of religion. Transcendence does not necessarily imply alienation between present reality and ultimate reality.[26] Established religions develop various institutions to deal with the relation between the two. The large majority of examples of apocalypses come from two types of religious movements, apocalypticism (Jewish or Christian) and gnosticism, which express a profound alienation between present reality (history or the cosmos respectively) and ultimate reality. In Sim. En., history, represented by the kings and mighty of the earth, is out of the control of the divine realm[27] and must be brought under that control by a reassertion of divine authority at the eschatological judgment. Alienation thus seems to be as important a key word as transcendence.

Given the split between ultimate and present reality characteristic of apocalypticism and gnosticism, some form of special revelation is necessary in order to relate the heavenly and earthly realms, and in literature that function is filled by the genre "apocalypse." From the standpoint of the study of religion, an apocalypse would have two important characteristics, (a) a literary form requiring a revelation mediated from the divine to the human realm (as Collins puts it, "a revelation [which] is mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient"),[28] and (b) a religious content dealing with some sort of "eschatological" salvation (since salvation is not possible in present time and space). This consideration suggests that there is a religious basis for the coherence of the genre across the boundries of apocalypticism and gnosticism and that the existence of the genre can be dependent on existential situation as well as on historical relationship. At the same time, the typology which Collins has developed reflects in part the different understandings of reality and salvation characteristic of the various movements which have produced apocalypses.

It is possible that the split or alienation between ultimate and present reality explains, at least in part, the distinction between heavenly journeys and ex eventu prophecies of history found in pre-Christian apocalypses. Such a writing seems to deal with one of the two (but not with both) alienated poles of reality. It is thus possible that heavenly journeys and prophecies of history in some way fulfill the same function in an apocalypse. From different perspectives both reflect the contrast between the discord of human society or history and the divine order of things that is an important element of apocalyptic literature and thought (cf. 1 En. 2-5). This consideration suggests that form is of more importance than content in distinguishing the genre "apocalypse." It is the relation of the parts to the total purpose of the writing more so than the specific character of the contents which makes an apocalypse.

Form versus content. The examination of Sim. En. in the first part of this paper has attempted to deal with the relation of form and content by showing how a thematic pattern has been used to organize a number of traditional units and pesharim. In some cases traditional associations seem to exist between themes and traditional units or passages of scripture; in other cases the work seems to be creating new associations of thought through the combination of traditional units or passages of scripture. The success of this approach in Sim. En. suggests that the study of the genre "apocalypse" needs to look beyond the specific content of the writings with which it deals to the role that the contents play in the form of the whole. The definition of a genre should depend upon form as well as content.

Collins has so far concentrated on the common elements of content in developing his definition of apocalypse as a genre, although the manner of revelation is in essence a matter of form. The procedure was to list and classify the contents of a number of writings traditionally considered to be apocalyptic and to look for common elements in that list. The typology does depend on formal considerations in that it classifies apocalypses according to the presence or absence and the interrelation of significant features of content. The next step in the study should look beyond the content to the formal characteristics of apocalypses. Attention needs to be paid to the way in which various apocalypses organize materials and to the possibility that different materials play similar roles in different apocalypses as well as to traditional units which seem to have constant roles from writing to writing. One possible approach to this study would be to examine the use of scripture and pesharim in various apocalypses in order to look for constants and variables in the way that material is handled. The results of such an approach to the genre would probably leave the definition basically intact but could produce a different typology.

Conclusions

1. Sim. En. fits the definition of the genre "apocalypse offered by Collins, although it is necessary to turn to the typology to deal with the central thrust of the work

2. The typology of apocalypses offered by Collins is a useful starting point for the comparative study of such writings

3. The definition of the genre "apocalypse" might be revised somewhat to reflect more specifically the idea of alienation

between present and ultimate reality as a consistent feature of apocalypses

4. Considerations from the study of religion support the inclusive approach to the study of apocalypse as a genre

5. Further study of the genre should concentrate on formal characteristics of the writings

Notes

[1]Society of Biblical Literature 1977 Seminar Papers, ed. Paul J. Achtemeier (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 359-70.

[2]David W. Suter, "Tradition and Composition in the Parables of Enoch" (University of Chicago, 1977).

[3]Ibid., p. 216.

[4]Ibid., p. 217.

[5]The terms "midrash" and "midrashic" are here used quite loosely to refer to any hermeneutic process which requires reference to or manipulation of a passage or passages of scripture. The view that a midrash deals with "the intrinsic meaning of the text" (Paul D. Hanson, "Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6-11," Journal of Biblical Literature 96 [1977]: 195) is problematic since the concept of the intrinsic meaning of a passage of scripture is itself problematic.

[6]1 En. 38:1-6 and 39:2:b; 45; and 58. The conclusion of the three sections is found in 69:26-29.

[7]Suter, "Tradition and Composition," p. 167.

[8]Ibid., p. 175.

[9]Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 75.

[10]Cf. 1 En. 62:4-5 with Is. 13:7-8; Ps. 48:5-6; and Ex. 15:14-16. Cf. 1 En. 62:5c with 1 En. 48:8a and Ex. 15:15(?). Cf. 1 En. 62:8a with Ex. 15:17. Cf. 1 En. 62:12a with Ex. 14:30-31. Cf. 1 En. 62:12b with Ex. 15:1-18. Cf. 1 En. 62:13 with Ex. 14:13 (both places associate the salvation of the righteous with never again seeing their enemies). See Suter, "Tradition and Composition," pp. 184-85.

[11]Lars Hartman, Prophecy Interpreted: The Formation of Some Jewish Apocalyptic Texts and of the Eschatological Discourse Mark 13 Par. (Lund, Sweden: CWK Gleerup, 1966), pioneered the study of the way in which apocalyptic texts use scripture.

[12]The concept of the embellishment or ornamentation of one motif by the introduction of a similar motif from a different pattern is derived from Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (New York: Atheneum, 1974). It is interesting to note that with the theme "judgment" in the thematic pattern,

in 1 En. 41:1 it is the deeds of men which are weighed in a balance while in 61:8-9 it is the deeds of the holy ones in heaven.

[13]The Combat Myth in the Book of Revelation (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1976), pp. 36-44.

[14]George Nickelsburg made a similar point in discussion at the annual meeting of the Catholic Biblical Association in August, 1975.

[15]See 1 En. 38:1; 45:1; 57:3; 58:1; 60:1; and 69:29.

[16]1 En. 68:1, like 37:2-3, is concerned with the ancient/modern relationship.

[17]"Tradition and Composition," pp. 192-242. The provisional identification of the material as oral is based on traces of formulaic language and the presupposition of the editorial material that the three "parables" were spoken (see 1 En. 37:2-3,5; and 58:1). In addition, the three "parables" appear to be related to an earlier type of mashal found in Ps. 49; Is. 14; and Num. 23-24 that represents an oral type which envisages the punishment of the wicked and the reward of the righteous.

[18]Walter Scott argues for a similar process of composition for the Hermetica, see Walter Scott and A. S. Ferguson, Hermetica: The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings Which Contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings Ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924-36), 1:1-6.

[19]J. J. Collins, "Apocalypse," p. 364.

[20]Ibid., pp. 366-67.

[21]1 En. 65:1-68:1.

[22]See 1 En. 40:2,8; 43:3; 46:2; 52:3,5; 54:4; 56:2; 60:9,11,24; 61:2; and 64:2. The archangel Michael does get involved in the process of revelation in 60:4-5 and 71:3-5.

[23]The intent of the theme "division of the kingdom" is obviously communal in that it involves reassembling the Jews of the diaspora and those who have died with the community of the righteous in Jerusalem.

[24]"Apocalypse," p. 364.

[25]Ibid., p. 368.

[26]Collins discusses the concept of alienation, ibid., p. 365; however, he appears to assume that it is implied in the idea of transcendence.

[27]The sin of the kings and mighty is that they do not acknowledge the true source of their authority, cf. 1 En. 46:5 and 63:4,7.

[28]"Apocalypse," p. 364.

S 7 THE REBELLION MYTH IN GNOSTIC APOCALYPSES

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The working group on apocalypses in antiquity has proposed a master paradigm to embrace as many types of ancient apocalypse as possible. That paradigm requires some rather substantial modifications for the gnostic writings. They are said to be unusual in that: (1) the visual element is slight; (2) they emphasize salvation through knowledge (present eschatology) leading to a personal afterlife; (3) their content has shifted from the temporal to the spatial axis--or rather to the inner concern with knowledge.[1] How far should boundaries be stretched? Should the gnostic apocalypse be described as an allied genre?

Defining the paradigm by listing the characteristics of various apocalypses avoids such questions as well as the issue of genetic relationships. But overly wide genre definitions have limited usefulness. E. Hirsch has pointed out that we use hypotheses about the genre of texts whenever we interpret their particular linguistic utterances. For the interpreter, then, genre serves a heuristic function. For the author it may have a normative one. He casts his text in a certain form because he anticipates a particular response by the hearer.[2] One must arrive at a sufficiently narrow definition of the genre of a work to determine the implication of the various traits observed in the text. No single text will exhibit all the traits associated with a given genre, but a correct hypothesis will not only account for those observed but also any that are implied. It should also provide some index as to the relative importance of the various implications that may be drawn from the work.[3] Thus it will provide not only positive but also inverse insight: some implications of particular utterances in the text are to be rejected because they cannot belong to the[4] type of meaning implied in an author's choice of genre.[5] Thus an hypothesis as to genre involves understanding the purpose of an utterance.

The metaphoric character of language makes the creation of new genres possible. Older genres may be amalgamated or an existing type may be extended. The interpreter must also decide, then, whether a text represents a new or a well-developed genre. Repitition and tautology may be necessary to establish meaning in a new genre while in a well-known one allusion to only a few traits will be sufficient to invoke the whole. Therefore, Hirsch considers it preferable to define genre by describing the common traits in a narrow group[8] of texts with established historical relationships.

Collins has proposed two criteria for breaking down the master paradigm into sub-types: the presence or absence of a heavenly journey and the type of eschatology displayed--political or cosmic eschatology with or without historical survey or only personal.[7] As his chart is set up, the first cut, journey or not, would seem most important. Yet the various analyses imply that eschatology is the primary issue. Should there have been three eschatology categories with two sub-divisions

each? The criteria given for distinguishing an apocalypse--manner of revelation described; revelation mediated by a heavenly figure; eschatological salvation present in some form[8]--suggest that the function of an apocalypse is to provide information about eschatology. If one accepts that view, the latter would be a better classification. P. Hanson has also suggested that the root of jewish apocalyptic lies in the shift from prophetic, this worldly eschatology to an otherworldly eschatology in which images from primordial myth are no longer applied to historical events but are projected as the future culmination of history.[9] He argues that the divine warrior myth was the major carrier of this transformation. Israel's cult had historicized the myth by seeing Yahweh the divine warrior active in Israel's history. Apocalyptic visionaries used its scenario of conflict, destruction, renewal of cosmic order and creativity to describe a final destruction of evil powers which would establish Yahweh's kingship forever.[10] Though a particular eschatology is characteristic of the genre, its function is to assert Yahweh's divine kingship--a particular form of cosmic order. Personal eschatology may figure in the description in situations where the destiny of the righteous seems to conflict with that vision of order. But it is not the central motif. It is only part of the necessary establishment of divine justice in the renewed order. Thus the function of statements about personal eschatology in jewish apocalypses is quite different from that in pagan ones. In the former, God may be called to account for justice in the world; in the latter, the divine is untouched by the fate of individuals or nations--the issue in a given discussion of world order is how an individual is to attain virtue. We must ask at what point the function of the various subgenres becomes so different as to require a separate genre designation.[11]

We will approach these issues by focusing on the rebellion myth pattern which Hanson[12] and Nickelsburg[13] have isolated in 1 Enoch 6-11. We have previously argued that the account of Noah and his sons and the concluding judgment scene in the Apocalypse of Adam (ApocAd) are related to traditions preserved in 1 En and Jubilees.[14] The eschatological conclusion to On the Origin of the World (OrigWld) has several parallels to Enoch material.[15] After examining the use of the rebellion myth in 1 En and related jewish, apocalyptic materials, we will turn to its use in gnostic revelations. The varied associateons between the myth and knowledge introduced by one of the versions used in 1 En 6-11 are particularly interesting, since in gnosticism knowledge will eventually replace the divine warrior as destroyer of the power of evil.[16]

The Rebellion Myth in Jewish Apocalyptic

Hanson and Nickelsburg follow older commentators in isolating two stories behind 1 En 6-11--one about the fall of Semihazah; the other about that of Azazel. Hanson holds that the association of rebellion and knowledge was introduced into the Azazel story secondarily[17] while Nickelsburg holds that the original was formed on the model of the Prometheus myth.[18] We would agree that Nickelsburg's critique of Hanson's account of the first stage of the Azazel tradition indicates that there was only one version of the story but still find Hanson's account on the basis of ancient near eastern myth more compelling than the derivation from the Prometheus tale.[19] The Azazel story is less

complete, since it has been incorporated into a story with the same structure. The following outline combines the work of Hanson and Nickelsburg:

	Semihazah	Azazel
INTRODUCTION	6,1-2a	
REBELLION	2b-8	
RESULT (devastation)		
giants born	7,1abc-2	
earth desolate	3-5	
teaching		8,1,3
seduction, fornication		8,1-2
PLEA		
of earth	7,6	
of men	8,4	
ANGELIC RESPONSE		
hear	9,1-3	
intercede	9,4f,7-11	9,6,8c(?)
GOD'S RESPONSE		
Sariel sent to Noah to preserve his seed	10,1-4	
Michael/Raphael sent to bind, cast down rebel leaders; fire, final judgment	10,11-14	10,4-7
Michael/Gabriel sent against giants	15	9-10
cleansing earth	16,20	7
ESCHATON	10,17-11,2	

Jubilees 4,16-5,12 seems to have drawn upon the final form of 1 En 6-11:

INTRODUCTION	4,16
(rebellion is implied since the introduction states that the angels were to instruct men)	
RESULT	
3 classes of giant	5,1 (7,23?)[20]
earth corrupted	2
GOD SEES	3
GOD'S RESPONSE	
save Noah	6
bind punish angels	6
vs. giants	7, 10 (?)
vs. the unrighteous shorten life; loss spirit; war	8-10
final judgment	12
cleansing earth	12

Jub is closer to Gen 6 than 1 En 6-11 in that God does not require pleas to call his attention to the situation. Men are included along with the evil angels in the punishment. Other texts see the primordial rebellion as repeated in historical war, bloodshed and persecution which lead up to the final judgment.

Jub. 23,12-31 applies the pattern to Israel's experience after the flood. The introduction points to the shortness and misery of life after the flood (cp the penultimate punishments in the previous account).

INTRODUCTION	23,12
REBELLION (breaking covenant)	23,16,19
RESULT	
earth defiled, war	vv.13-22
GOD'S RESPONSE	
gentile oppression	23
PLEA, of men	vv. 23,24
GOD'S RESPONSE	
shorten life	
oppression	v. 25
MEN REPENT	26
GOD'S RESPONSE	
heal life span, peace	27f
destroy enemies	30
judgment	31

By altering the traditional pattern, this section of Jub. makes the point that pleas are not enough. God only acts when Israel repents. Perhaps the author intended to counter the implication of the traditional pattern that God was about to intervene to save his people.

Testament of Moses 5-10 applies the pattern to the persecution under Antiochus. The martyr's death of Taxo and his sons falls in the place of the plea.

REBELLION (apostasy)	ch. 5
RESULT	
devastation by kings	
persecution	chs. 6-8
PLEA (martyrs' death)	ch. 9
GOD'S RESPONSE	
angel vs. Satan	10,2
divine warrior vs.	
gentiles	3-7
judgment	10ab[21]
ESCHATON	8,9,10c

1 En 85-90 is dependent upon the earlier section chs. 6-11. The first star (86,1) is to be identified with Azazel (88,1 summarizes 10,4 cf. 90,21). Therefore this section may be dependent on a version in which the fall of Azazel preceeded the deeds of Semihazah.[22] That version also contained the tradition that there were three types of giant.

INTRODUCTION (vision)	ch. 85
REBELLION	86,1-3
RESULTS	
giants born	86,4 (88,2; 89,6)
earth devastated	4-6
PLEA, of earth	87,2
ANGELS RESPOND	
bind Azazel	88,1
cast giants in abyss	2f.
rescue Noah	89,1-9
RESULTS	
new procreation on earth,	
Israel's history	89,10-67

PLEA, of men ending with Judas	89,68-71,76f; 90,13
of angels	90,14
GOD'S RESPONSE	
destroy enemies	90,15,18
judgment, fire	vv. 21-27
cleanse earth, temple	20,28f.
ESCHATON	30-42

This section has expanded the pattern to take in the history of Israel.

The Apocalypse of Weeks begins with the history of Israel as motivation for the events of the eschaton. A primordial rebellion may be presupposed, but it is not described.

RESULTS	
history culminating in apostates/elect	93,1-10
GOD'S RESPONSE	
righteous avenged	91,12
new temple	13
judge humanity	14
judge angels	15
ESCHATON	16-17

Each account has varied the pattern to describe its period of crisis and persecution. Both Hanson and Nickelsburg associate the first version of the Semihazah story with the wars of the Diadochoi (3rd. cent. B.C.) The myth of angelic revolt explains the devastation caused by the "mighty of the earth."[23] The Azazel cycle traces the devastation of war to metallurgy taught by the fallen angels.[24] Its view of such knowledge fits in with the tradition of pessimistic evaluation of culture heros known from both semitic and greek myth.[25] This story may have been aimed at the Greek conquerors--their knowledge only pollutes and destroys God' creation. It should not be envied or sought.[26] The other examples of the pattern use it to describe a wide variety of situations from the Antiochean persecution to the division within Israel between righteous and sinner. If we assume that an author's emphasis falls where he varies the pattern, then eschatology is not its main interest. The variations show different responses to living in the present, pre-eschatological time. Sometimes angels must transmit the plea of the righteous--implying that all they can do is pray and hold out against hellenism and its wars? AssMos glorifies a very particular response, martyrdom. Jub. 23, on the other hand, suggests that a sustained effort to win others to repent and study the law is required before God will act. The Apocalypse of Weeks and the Animal Apocalypse, on the other hand, hint that Israel will be aided in pursuing an agressive military policy. The rebellion myth pattern does legitimate the cosmic order so that the believer may be sure that Yahweh is sovereign lord of the cosmos. But it goes beyond affirming that basic theological conviction. It sustains a particular way of life in that crisis. The eschatological descriptions in each case are largely traditional, part of the legitimating rhetoric rather than sources of information for the reader.

The Rebellion Myth in Gnostic Tests: Noah Traditions

The rebellion myth in jewish apocalyptic is associated with the exegesis of Gen. 6. Gnostic revelations frequently

use the flood as part of their own schematization of gnostic history.[27] Texts which employ that motif usually display cosmic as well as personal eschatology.[28] Their scenes of cosmic eschatological devastation continue to employ imagery from the divine warrior traditions or the jewish apocalyptic judgment scenes. Many show acquaintance with the larger pattern of the rebellion myth though its interpretation, reuse and eventual demise suggest that it did not become an important religious explanation for the gnostic cosmos. One may even surmise that the gnostic apocalypse represents the demise of the last stages of the genre. The Apocalypse of Adam (ApocAd), the Nature of the Archons (NatArc) and the Concept of Our Great Power (GrPow) employ the myth in revelations whose only (ApocAd, GrPow) or main (NatArc) content is a schematized gnostic salvation history which culminates in eschatological judgment and the definitive revelation of gnosis. ApocAd and NatArc depend upon jewish exegetical traditions while GrPow has incorporated them--by way of earlier gnostic speculation?--into an account of christian gnostic salvation history. Two other treatises, On the Origin of the World (OrigWld) and the Second Treatise of the Great Seth show that such traditions were well-known in gnostic circles.

ApocAd is closest to Jewish models in its overall literary form, a testament of Adam,[29] and in its content. There is no gnostic theogony and the term "god" is used for both the lower and higher deities.[30] After explaining how he and Eve fell into ignorance, Adam predicts the future of Seth's seed. This history centers around the rebellion against the creator god by his sons and some of the sons of Noah. (Noah, himself, is the faith ful servant of the creator god, who has made a covenant with him and his sons. Note the similarity of wording between ApocAd and 1 En 65,12)[31] The history is divided into three acts of rebellion and their consequences. It is climaxed by an eschatological judgment scene in which the non-gnostics acknowledge their condemnation and the blessedness of the gnostics. Special twists have been built in by the gnostic author. A hostile act by the creator prefaces each rebellion scene. Rebellion still takes the form of angels descending to earth, but they do so to rescue the men to whom god is hostile--more as angels were sent by God to rescue the righteous in some of the jewish versions of the story. Thus the gnostics are preserved from foul deeds and defilement. By dwelling with the angels, they are preserved in knowledge of God.

GOD'S ACT, flood	69,2-18
REBELLION	69,19-70,6
RESULTS	
covenant with Noah	70,7-72,1
gnostics in their own land	72,1-14
covenant with sons of Noah	72,15-73,11
some sons join gnostics	73,13-29
PLEA, by archons vs. gnostics	73,30-74,25
GOD'S ACT, Sodom incident	74,28-75,11
REBELLION	75,12-28
RESULTS	
gnostics with angels	75,29-76,6
REBELLION	
phoster (=Jesus?)[32] comes	76,8-18
more sons Noah converted	

RESULTS	
gnostics free from day of death	76,18-77,3
PLEA, archons vs. phoster	77,4-7
GOD'S ACT	
flesh phoster punished (=crucifixion?, glory withdraws)	77,8-18
heresy ("use name in vain")	77,18-27
false explanations phoster[33]	77,28-83,4
judgment[34]	
gnostics to angelic glory	83,8-23
non-gnostic self-condemnation	83,23-84,3
divine condemnation angelic guardians	84,4-9
ESCHATON (implied in exaltation of gnostics to angelic glory)	

We previously suggested that ApocAd uses the testament genre ironically to justify gnostic covenant breaking. This study would expand that suggestion. Purity, lack of defilement, heavenly exaltation and dwelling with the angels are all part of the ideology of jewish sects that preserved the rebellion myth traditions--some of them even advocated sectarian withdrawal from the unrighteous among Israel. Here, those goals are attained by reading the traditional salvation history as vindicating rebellion against the god of the Bible. Heavenly exaltation is only gained by those who dwell apart from judaism (or possibly christianity?).[35] The point of angelic rebellion here is not knowledge but separation. Therefore, we conclude that the rebellion myth is being used to justify gnostic sectarianism. The text is not interested in personal eschatology. Rather, it is a symbolic salvation history to teach sectarian withdrawal--in response to persecution from orthodox jews or christians?

Like ApocAd, NatArc places a revelation by an angelic figure in association with the flood. But the content of the revelation is more directly gnostic. The gnostic story of the creation is summarized. The final editor, who conceives the whole as a treatise on the meaning of powers in Col 1:13 and Eph 6:12, has added philosophical comments.[36] All the punishments suffered by humanity are attempts to keep mankind from realizing its true destiny. The flood is the lower god's response to mankind's improvement (92,4). Like ApocAd, Noah is servant of that god, who rescues him while Seth's sister, Norea, the prototype of the gnostics, is excluded from the ark.[37] When the powers try to defile her as they had tried to defile Eve she asserts her heavenly origin (92,23f). The story of the defilement of the daughters of men is reversed--Norea is of heavenly origin and cannot be defiled. Her plea for help brings and angelic revealer (cp. ApocAd) But she is not merely spirited away; she must be taught about her root. The motif of a special gnostic abode is still preserved (93,27-32).

Unlike ApocAd, there is no gnostic salvation history. The primordial rebellion of the lower god and his powers is described. He sins by claiming to be God (94,21f; 95,4f; cp. 86,30). Each boast brings a heavenly voice to rebuke him and the descent of one of the pleromatic beings. After he creates his own heavens, a firey angel comes to cast him into the Abyss. The threat, voice, descent of the divine warrior, defeat and binding of the opposing god (and offspring) follow the pattern of divine warrior stories.[38] Enthronement and renewed creation would normally follow as

they do here. But enthronement requires a further act of rebellion. Sabaoth rejects his father and praises the heavenly Sophia and life. They enthrone the repentant archon in the seventh heaven. Life becomes his consort and teacher. Note the shift to knowledge that we saw earlier with Norea. Jealousy leads the other powers to produce androgynous offspring, Envy and Death, to fill chaos. Thus renewed fertility turns out to be that of the chaos monster. The redactor explains that all this happened to fulfil the will of God, 96,11-14 cp. 88,11f., 33f.

Norea's question about her origins moves the dialogue from Urzeit to Endzeit. The appearance of the immortal gnostics, her offspring, will not take place for three generations (96,28f). When the True Man comes, he and the gnostics will defeat the powers; the gnostics will be anointed, given eternal life and ascend to heaven praising Father and Son. There is no intervening salvation history between the flood and the end-time. Gnosis comes as an eschatological event with the revealer who will destroy chaos and its powers. NatArc does not clarify the function of Sabaoth's repentance. Perhaps it guarentees some true, gnostic information in the earlier, pre-gnostic biblical traditions.[39] NatArc is more typical of gnostic revelations in moving from Urzeit to Endzeit--or in explicitly christian gnostic works to the coming of Christ--without intervening salvation history, than ApocAd's symbolic history of the revolts of the sons of Noah is. It also shows the more characteristic emphasis on teaching as part of the revelation. (The tractate framework of the redactor's introduction typifies that concern.)

The work which follows NatArc in codex II, OrigWld, has abandoned the revelation framework for that of the tractate altogether. Middle platonic interpretations of a variety of mythic traditions are given in what is introduced as a philosophical treatise on cosmology.[40] The myth represented in NatArc seems to have been one of the author's sources. The philosophic editing of the tractate has obscured some of its structure. The lower god, thinking that "he alsone existed", creates seven sons and their heavens as part of his boasting (100,29-101,25). Then the lower heavens are shaken and Pistis sends her breath to bind the archons and send them to Tartaros (102,27-34). NatArc shows that the incident belongs to the rebellion myth where the boast is a threat against the heavens. The pattern threat--manifestation of a heavenly being--shaking of the lower heavens is repeated in proper sequence before the creation of Adam (112,25-35). Another boast preceeds the rebellion of Sabaoth. The divine voice which condemns the Archon also announces the final judgment to be brought by the heavenly man (103,10-32). Sabaoth's repentance leads to war among the lower aeons (missing in NatArc). Like the gnostics in ApocAd, Sabaoth is rescued by angels of light (104,13-25). The androgynous offspring of the lower archons that follow are balanced in OrigWld by androgynous good powers (106,19-107,4).

The author picks up after these elaborations with another statement of the threat/boast--heavenly retaliation theme. The appearance of the angel of light leads to the creation of the world (107,18-108,14). An elaborate collection of jewish and pagan mythology describes the process.[41]

Part of that material may derive from Enoch traditions. The section on the trees in paradise which lie outside the circuit of the sun and moon (110,2-111,8) suggests the journies of Enoch (e.g. 1 En 25,3-6; 32,3).[42] In the N.E.

he finds the paradise of righteousness containing the tree of knowledge (4QEn^{c} I xxvi 18-21; 1 En 32,2f).[43] In this text Righteousness creates a paradise in the East which has the tree of life in its north side.[44] Like the parallel section of Enoch, the paradise of the lower world may be described as a tripartite double paradise of Ocean/Abyss--Darkness--Fire. The offspring of the archons whom Sophia has cast down to earth proceed to teach men error: magic, potions, bloodshed, altars, temples, sacrifices and libations to the demons of the earth so that men will be in ignorance until the end of the age and the coming of the gnostic revealer (123,4-24). We have seen that such a list belonged to the Azazel story. It may have been part of the Enoch tradition used by OrigWld.

At this point, the treatise breaks off the account of the Urzeit and shifts to the Endzeit when the gnostics appear as the fourth race.[45] It concludes with a scene of cosmic eschatology.[46] War, bloodshed, earthquake, thunder, falling stars, split heavens, casting the demons into the abyss (125,32-126,35) are typical of such scenes. The author probably derived them from the source(s) from which he got the other elements of the rebellion myth. After this judgment, the glory of God appears throughout creation and the various races of men ascend to the aeons from which they derive (127,5-14). Though OrigWld has used parts of the rebellion myth, the myth itself does not provide a structural pattern in the text. Rather it is part of the general esoteric lore to be included in a treatise on cosmology. The rebellion of Sabaoth has also changed its function. It now legitimates the gnostic vocation to expose the false claims of the powers (125,14-32). When Sabaoth and later Adam and Eve rebel in response to gnosis, the powers learn that the true God is above them (cf. 120, 11-15).[47] Gnostic preaching and wisdom will finally show up the impiety of the rulers of the lower world. The author has stressed that theme by repeating the boast/retaliation motif of the myth.[48] His elaboration of the teaching of the fallen angels points in a similar direction. He is not rejecting culture as such but portraying them as teachers of false religious practices which enslave people. His collection of jewish, pagan, and christian materials as well as his introductory rejection of other philosophies, suggests that the main function of the rebellion myth in this tract is to argue that all other forms of human wisdom--religious and philosophical--are put to shame by gnosis.

Once the boasting of the Archon, the appearance of a heavenly being in response and the rebellion of lower aeons become set pieces no longer tied together by the narrative logic of the myth, they can be used in any order in a text. GrSeth, a discourse in which the gnostic Christ reveals the true story of his ministry and crucifixion, uses several elements of the myth. Christ's descent causes destruction in the lower world (51,24-30; 52,8-30). When Adam appears to the archons, they take precautions lest their angels rebel (53,13-23). The boast follows this event (53,20f). GrSeth has reinterpreted the rebellion myth--probably derived from the Sabaoth version since a revolt among the angels is reported[49]--as a story about the plot to kill Jesus. The eschatology of this tractate is completely individualized. The soul ascends into the pleroma (57,27-58, 17). The point of this revelation seems to be to get the gnostics to laugh--as the Savior did at the archons, 53,32f--at the doctrines of the orthodox, who apparently are perse-

cuting the gnostics for their christology (59,19-60,12). A patterned section of the work mocks all the heros of the OT from Adam to Moses and finally the archon's boast--all are inferior to the gnostic (62,27-65,1).

The first person discourse, GrPow, surveys salvation history. The first age, the earthly one, culminates in the flood (37,29-39,15). In the next age, the psychic, the defilement of earth increases. This age, that of the earthly ministry of Jesus, culminates in the attempt to kill him (39,15-33). The final section describes the end-time in great detail. An anti-christ figure will teach men wickedness (44,6-29). An "imitator" will follow to rule the cosmos and lead men astray (44,30-45,30). The end comes when the savior descends to lead the gnostics to their heavenly home (45,25-46,21). GrPow concludes with an apocalyptic judgment scene in which the souls of the wicked are shown the glory of the gnostics and cry out for mercy (47,9-34). This account of salvation history does not make explicit use of the rebellion myth. The revealer brings the eschaton by simply withdrawing those who belong to him to their heavenly glory. The rest of the destruction follows as the natural consequence of depriving the world of its light; not as the action of a heavenly divine warrior. Perhaps the polemic in which the author is engaged had not engendered the kind of persecution and hostility that seems to underlie the use of divine warrior material in many apocalypses. GrPow condemns the sect of the Anomeans (40,1-9), a left-wing Arian group that flourished in Alexandria in the mid-4th cent. A.D.[50] Traditional pieces of eschatology have been redacted so that the reader will "know the concept of our great power" and avoid this heresy. The author also accuses his opponents of judaizing (45,17-19). He may have perceived the heavenly nature of the gnostics and their victorious ascent with the revealer as threatened by the Anomean doctrine that Jesus had only a moral likeness to the Father. The cosmic victory expected by the gnostics requires a divine, not a human, savior.

The Revelation/Destruction Pattern

We have seen that the revelation of a divine figure in the heavens and destruction in the lower world is part of the larger pattern of the rebellion myth. Some gnostic revelations build on that element of the pattern and omit either the earlier rebellion or the final eschatology.

The Paraphrase of Shem (ParaShem) is a complex account of a revelation by the angelic savior/revealer, Derdekeas to Shem.[51] Parts of the myth are repeated several times. A "paraphrase" similar to the angelic interpretation of a vision follows the main revelation (32,27-41,30). The seer awakens, testifies to the evils to come after his death and ascends into the heavens (41,21-48,8). A concluding section has the revealer pronounce a blessing on Shem and his seed (48,8-49,9). In its present form, the work polemicizes against water baptism as does ApocAd. The last age is characterized by an imperfect baptism which leaves those who use it in bondage to the Water (=evil nature, 30,23-27). Christianity is also pronounced impoerfect in that it followed the baptismal practices of John the Baptist (30,27-31,4,14-21).[52] The gnostics are to avoid the impure practice of baptism (34,16-24; 35,1-6; 38,5-8). Baptism is a futile remedy because it deals with the body which belongs to the realm of the demons, a realm which the mind must rise above (36,25-35). The author seems to have used earlier ascetic paraenesis to formulate his anti-baptismal polemic.[53]

The cosmogonic myth is repeated several times in the beginning of the text as the various regions of heaven and finally earth are differentiated out of the primordial chaos. Watery chaos holds spirit and fire imprisoned. It is portrayas a womb-like creature. This cosmogony combines archaic myth with stoic and middle platonic cosmogony.[54] Since the elements are differentiated as part of the natural cosmogonic process, rebellion as such is unnecessary. Nevertheless we find allusion to it: the "crookedness of darkness" is associated with the traditional boast (2,15-17).[55] The author has used the plea motif to structure sections of the account:

PLEA		
elements/angels	6,25-30	13,23
revealer/1st light	7,31-8,15	16,29ff.
GOD HEARS	8,18-25	16,34f.
REVEALER APPEARS	6,36ff.	16,36ff.
	8,29ff.	18,1ff.
	12,19ff.	
RESULTS		
spirit,light rescued	9,14ff.	17,20ff.
	11,8ff.	
nature retaliates	10,1ff.	18,18ff.
	15,5ff.	

The revealer then appears in animal form (20,1ff.), which leads to the creation of earth and of man, a being of mixed nature (24,2-29).[56] Nature makes three attempts to destroy the gnostics: flood--fire at Sodom--turmoil at the end of the age (25,11-32,18; 43,28-45,31). A demonic figure leads people astray prior to the end. The judgment oracle by the revealer appended to ParaShem belongs to the eschatological pattern, since it proclaims the final blessedness of the gnostics and condemns the non-gnostics (48,8-30). Rebellion as such never emerges as a motif in this text. In fact, the lower world is never said to be ruled by a person-like power--the bizzare mythic figure, nature, is bearly able to heave herself up out of the primordial waters before she falls back again. The non-gnostic who trusts in water baptism faces such a fate unless he repents.

The Apocryphon of John (ApocryJn) uses a more usual form of the gnostic myth but also focuses on the plea/revelation/destruction pattern. The lower god boasts of his own divinity (13,8-13) and takes power from his mother (13,26-30). The result is not the repentance of one of the lower angels as in the Sabaoth story but of Sophia herself (13,13-17,20-25,32-36):

PLEA	
of Sophia	13,36-14,1
of angels in pleroma	14,2-5
GOD ACTS	
consort to rescue Sophia	14,6-13
theophany	
divine voice	14,3-18
1st man appears	14,18-24
lower world shaken	14,24-30
RESULT	
creation of man	15,1-13
PLEA	
Sophia for offspring	19,15-18

GOD ACTS
angels to trick Ialdabaoth
to giving man light 19,18-33

RESULT
jealous archons cast man from
paradise to earth 19,34-20,9
man entombed in body 20,35-21,13

These hostile acts are countered by the revelatory activity of the epinoia of light. Unlike ApocAd and NatArc, Noah is portrayed as the ancestor of the gnostics. As in that tradition, however, the truth about the flood is that the gnostics go with a luminous cloud to a place (28,34-29,15). The tradition of fallen angels bringing knowledge harmful to man is then used to explain how humanity came to be in bondage to the powers after the flood (29,16-30,11; cp. OrigWld 123, 4-24 where the knowledge of the archons is also enslaving humanity until the coming of gnosis). That bondage is not broken until the descent of the gnostic revealer (BG 75,10-20). Codex II introduces a hymnic section describing the threefold descent of the true pronoia (30,11-31,25). The first two descents, which must be associated with the gnostic Urgeschichte,[57] cause shaking and destruction in the lower world. The third, in human form (in ApocryJn a reference to Jesus) does not. ApocryJn does not describe a cosmic destruction, though presumably withdrawal of all the light from the lower world will lead to its collapse (25,9-15). Its eschatology is statedin individual terms. The fate of a given soul after death is determined by the extent to which it has/has not been enslaved by the imitation spirit (26,1-27,30).

The triple descent hymn suggests another work, the Trimorphic Protennoia (TriProt) in which the revealer describes his/her three descents as Father, Mother, Son. The author clearly expects the reader to be familiar with the kind of traditions represented in ApocryJn. The Father's descent occured in response to Ialdabaoth's creation of aeons and of man. It brings revelation to gnostics and destroys the gates and bonds of the underworld so that the gnostics can enter their true home (40,4-20). The Mother announces that destruction is coming to the present aeon and that an unchanging one is coming (42,18-22). The destruction in the lower world is even greater the second time (43,5-26). The divine voice disturbs the heavens so that the lower powers too realize that the Archigenetor was wrong to boast and that he too is ignorant.[58] The powers confess their own downfall as in a traditional judgment scene (44,8-29), and the Mother predicts the blessings of the gnostics who will receive the new aeon and be exalted into the light (44,29-45,20). As in ApocryJn, the final revelation is associated with the incarnation, a ruse which deceives the powers. The gnostics receive revelation and the true destruction of the cosmic powers occurs: destruction of their hold over individual souls--a process which is to continue until all are liberated (49,18-50,20). Both ApocryJn and TriProt assume that the reader knows the gnostic myth--which usually ends with cosmic eschatology. But they have retained only its prototype in the Urgeschichte--or in TriProt in the second descent--and tied an individualized eschatology to the coming of Jesus as revealer. Perhaps that decision represents polemic between gnostic and christian at the end of the second century.[59] Jesus is merely a temporary form of the tri-morphic gnostic revealer. (The presentation of the

risen Jesus in ApocryJn (2,1-14) explains that he is trimorphic, father, mother, son as is the revealer in TriProt.) TriProt may stress the fact that the archons realize Ialdabaoth is not the highest god as a way of assuring the reader that orthodox christology and eschatology are not the true interpretation of christianity. Individual knowledge of the highest God is the key to salvation; not the cosmic victory of a heavenly divine warrior. Not surprisingly, then, gnostic revelations show a shift away from the apocalypse with its visionary and mythic forms toward the revelation discourse, dialogue and quasi-doctrinal tractate.[60]

Conclusion

Our study of the rebellion myth suggests that insofar as gnostics adopt the apocalypse as a genre they do so in dependence upon jewish forms of the rebellion myth that were embodied in apocalyptic traditions. Their interest in those traditions lay in the possibility of using and inverting them to explain the gnostic dissociation from the traditional and earlier forms of religious expression--jewish, pagan and christian, depending upon the polemic context of a particular tractate--rather than in any eschatological information they may have contained. For most of these texts the gap between Urzeit and Endzeit represents a clear awareness that the appearance of gnosis is a new phenomenon. Since all previous manifestations of the divine are rejected as at best imperfect or at worst demonic snares, the gnostics were not able to appropriate the history of Israel as a salvation history in the way that orthodox christianity was to do. Its questions of righteousness, theodicy, divine kingship and cosmic order cannot emerge for the gnostic whose only prehistory is to be found in primordial myth. The gnostic's true place has no connection with creation at all, not even with its heavens. Not surprisingly then a gnostic revelation is quite different from its jewish or christian counterpart. Its relationships with the latter are the result of direct borrowing of traditions rather than of affinity for the genre--one which the gnostics preferred to assimilate to other forms such as the dialogue, the discourse or the tractate.

NOTES

[1]J.J. Collins, "Apocalypse:Towards the Morphology of a Genre," Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers: 1977 ed. P.J. Achtemeier, Missoula: Scholar's Press, 366. Also see the unpublished paper by Francis T. Fallon on Gnostic Revelations. Some of the research for this paper was made possible by a 1978/79 sabbatical research grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities for which I am grateful.

[2]E.D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 70-82.

[3]Hirsch,90-98.

[4]Hirsch, 124. On the significance of inverse insight see B.F. Lonergan, Insight, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, 19-32.

[5]Hirsch, 99.

[6]Hirsch, 105-10.

[7]Collins, 366f. [8]Collins, 363f.

[9]P. Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975, 1-31.

[10]Hanson, Dawn, 302-13; 359-69.

[11]Thus Frank Fallon has suggested that one should not even apply the term "apocalypse" to gnostic texts but should use the term "revelation."

[12]P.D. Hanson, "Rebellion in Heaven: Azazel and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 En 6-11," JBL 96(1977) 195-233.

[13]G. Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic and Myth in 1 En 6-11," JBL 96(1977) 383-405.

[14]P. Perkins, "The Apocalypse of Adam: The Genre and Function of a Gnostic Apocalypse," CBQ 39(1977) 390-93.

[15]A. Bohlig & P. Labib, Die koptisch-gnostische Schrift ohne Titel aus Codex II von Nag Hammadi, (Berlin,1962) 102-07. The reader may find English translations of all the works referred to in this article in J.M. Robinson ed. The Nag Hammadi Library in English, (San Francisco: Harper & Row/ Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977).

[16]Hanson,"Rebellion," 226f.; Nickelsburg,"Apocalyptic,"397f.

[17]Hanson, "Rebellion,"228-30. [18]Nickelsburg, "Apoc." 399-401.

[19]Hanson, "Rebellion," 197.

[20]Cp. 1 En 86,6; 88,2. On the relationship between these passages see J.T. Milik, The Books of Enoch: Aramaic Fragments, London/New York: Oxford, 1976, 43.

[21]The motif of exaltation and looking down belongs to the apocalyptic judment scene. See G. W. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism, Cambridge: Harvard, 1972, 48-121.

[22]Cf. Nickelsburg, "Apoc." 393; 398 n. 65; Milik, 43.

[23]Nickelsburg, "Apoc." 397, suggests that the author is parodying claims to divine parentage. If so, he may also be parodying their intermarriages.

[24]Nickelsburg, op. cit.,398. [25]Hanson,"Rebellion," 226-29.

[26]Nickelsburg,op.cit.,405. [27]Perkins, op. cit.,387-89.

[28]Collins should not classify ApocAd under Ic, since it has cosmic eschatology as do many other gnostic revelations. See the discussion of gnostic eschatology in M. Peel, Gnostic Eschatology and the NT," NovTest 12(1970) 141-65.

[29]Perkins, op.cit.,384-86. See the opposing view of C. Hedrick, "The Apocalypse of Adam: A Literary and Source Analysis," unpub. PhD. diss. Claremont, 1977, 69-72, who attributes these elements to one of the sources used by the final redactor. H.'s source analysis ha s the disadvantage of splitting apart elements of apocalyptic patterns that belong together literarily.

[30]See the discussion of the non-christian character of ApocAd in G.W. MacRae,"The Apocalypse of Adam Reconsidered," Society of Biblical Literature Proceedings 1972, vol. 2 , 573-77.

[31]Perkins, op. cit., 392f.

[32]MacRae, op. cit., 574f. denies that a suffering phoster implies a reference to Jesus, since there are texts about a suffering figure in jewish literature. For an opposing view see R.McL. Wilson, Gnosis and the New Testament, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968, 138f. MacRae also argues that gnostics are explicit in their references to Christ. The close parallel between the conclusion of this work and others in which the final appearance of the revealer is Christ leads us to wonder if that is not the case in ApocAd--perhaps the polemic situation made such allusive references desireable.

[33]The catalogue of thirteen false explanations is widely recognized as an independent piece added to the work. See the extensive discussion of this catalogue in Hedrick,op. cit., 161-199.

[34]See the detailed outline of this section in Perkins, op. cit., 390f.

[35]Valentinian exegetes regularly use "the Jews" to refer to psychic/orthodox christians, see E.H. Pagels, The Johannine Gospel in Gnostic Exegesis, Nashville:Abingdon, 1973, 66-68; 100-104; ibid., The Gnostic Paul, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975, 18-45.

[36]Introduction: II 86,20-26; philosophical comments: 87, 5(?),10f,20-23;88,1-3,10f; 88,32-89,3.

[37]II 91,35-92,2.

[38]Cf. F.M. Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic, Cambridge: Harvard, 1973, 91-194; Hanson, Dawn, 302f.

[39]So Fallon, "The Repentance of Sabaoth in CG II,5," unpub. Th.D. thesis, Harvard Divinity School, 1974, ch.1, p. 25; cp. Adv. Haer. I,vi,2; I,30.

[40]See P. Perkins, "On the Origin of the World (CG II,5) A Gnostic Physics," Vigiliae Christianae, forthcoming.

[41]See M. Tardieu, Trois Mythes Gnostiques, Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1974.

[42]Tardieu, op. cit.,313. [43]Milik, op. cit., 37.

[44]Milik, ibid.,39-41. [45]CG II 124,34-125,10.

[46]See the discussion of the eschatology of this work by R. Haardt, "Das universaleschatologische Vorstellungsgut in der Gnosis," in K. Schubert ed. Vom Messias zum Christus, Wein, 1964, 326f.

[47]I disagree with Fallon's view, loc. cit., that this passage of OrigWld intends--like NatArc--to assert the presence of gnosis in the OT.

[48]II 100,30-34; 101,12f.; 103,8-13;107,30f.;112,28f;117,8ff.

[49]So Fallon, "Sabaoth,"ch. 3.

[50]Robinson, N.H. Library, 15.

[51]See F. Wisse, "The Redeemer Figure in the Paraphrase of Shem," NovTest 12(1970) 133; K.M. Fischer, "Die Paraphrase des Seem," M. Krause ed. Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts (NHS VI), Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, 257-61.

[52]On the anti-baptismal polemic of ParaShem and its relationship to ApocAd see Hedrick,op. cit., 240f.; D.A. Bertrand, "Paraphrase de Sem et Paraphrase de Seth," J.-E. Menard ed, Les Textes de Nag Hammadi, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, 156f.; F. Morard, "L'Apocalypse d'Adam de Nag Hammadi," M. Krause ed. Gnosis and Gnosticism (NHS VIII) Leiden:E.J. Brill, 1977, 39.

[53]See the condemnation of lust and impurity in the paraenetic sections of CG II,7, Thomas the Contender, for an example of the type of sermonizing on which the author seems to be drawing.

[54]See the discussion of the cosmological imagery in OrigWld in Perkins, "OrigWld."

[55]See the discussion of the boast of the archon from the OT perspective in G.W. MacRae, "The Ego-Proclamation in Gnostic Sources," E. Bammel ed. The Trial of Jesus (SBT sec ser. 13) London:SCM,1970, 123-29.

[56]Note that the condemnation of the soul here is a condemnation of baptism.

[57]G.W. MacRae, "Sleep and Awakening in Gnostic Texts," U. Bianchi ed. Le origini dello gnosticismo, Leiden:E.J. Brill, 1967, 499,502, suggests the Adam and Eve and the flood stories as the reference for these earlier descents.

[58]Cp. OrigWld II 120,14f where Adam's breaking the commandment teaches the authorities that there is another greater than they.

[59]As in II Peter?

[60]An extreme example of this tendency would be the use of the rebellion myth by the author of I,5, The Tripartite Tractate, to account for the diversity of erroneous philosophical opinions (109,5-113,1).

S 9

STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE RHETORIC IN GENESIS 2-3

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The structure of Biblical narratives may be clarified by combining the methods of structuralist narrative analysis with the methods of analysis of narrative rhetoric which have been developed primarily in English and American criticism of fiction.[1] This methodological experiment will explore three aspects of the Yahwist's creation narrative: 1) the rhetorical structure of the major narrative appeals implicit in the narrative;[2] 2) a sketch of the narrative and semantic structures of the narrative with particular attention to the actantial shifts in the narrative function of the characters;[3] 3)the connections between the structures which emerge from these two analyses. An underlying purpose is to determine whether the various emerging approaches to rhetorical criticism can be integrated with and make a contribution to structuralist interests.[4]

The possibility that the analysis of narrative rhetoric may shed light on the structures which shaped the formation of Biblical narratives such as Gen. 2-3 can be introduced by remembering the story of "The Three Little Pigs." This will also facilitate a quick introduction to the basic categories for the analysis of narrative rhetoric which will be used in this study.

As you recall, the three little pigs go off to seek their fortune. The first two little pigs build houses of straw and sticks. But a big bad wolf comes and blows their houses down. Implicit in these first two episodes of the story are two major appeals by the narrator: 1) to be sympathetic towards the two little pigs because of their vulnerability as well as somewhat critical because of their laziness and stupidity, and 2) to be alienated from the wolf for his actions. The third little pig builds a house of bricks, develops a plan, torments the wolf into coming down the chimney, and cooks the wolf in a boiling pot. The three little pigs sing a song and do a dance. The narrator's invitation is to share their joy at the wolf's defeat. But, when I once read this story to a three year old boy, he looked up at me with tears in his eyes and said, "Was the wolf really dead?" For some reason, he had sympathetically identified with the wolf in his death. And, as a result, the story had a reverse effect of sorrow rather than joy on him. The other effect was a further reversal of my expectations of the story: I had a hard time getting him to bed.

Four basic factors of narrative technique which shape the rhetoric of the narrative are among those which can be identified in this story: variations in narrative point of view, norms of judgment, dynamics of distance in the characterizations, and plot. These categories of narrative analysis can be defined briefly.

Point of view is the vantage point or perspective from which the narrator presents the actions of the story. Biblical narrators primarily report their stories from the perspective of a third person observor who is omniscient, that is, who has no limitations of knowledge such as would be imposed on a first person narrator.

He is free to move at will from one place and perspective to another. One major variation in narrative point of view is the inside view in which the narrator reports what a particular character says internally, feels, or perceives.[5] In this variation he reports the action from the perspective of one of the characters in the story. Thus, the narrator's description of the third little pig's development of a plan to kill the wolf is an inside view. The narrative comment will be considered here as the other major variation in point of view in Biblical narrative. Biblical narrators often interrupt the narration of the action to make comments directly to the audience. The narrative comments generally give additional information, clarify possible confusions, or directly inject the narrator's judgment about the action.[6]

Norms of judgment are the criteria of right and wrong which are the implied basis for the narrator's attitudes toward the characters and actions of the narrative.[7] They are also the basis for his implicit appeals to his audience to make similar judgments. In the case of my three year old, the narrator wrongly assumed that his norms in relation to the wolf and his death would be shared. As a result, the narrator's appeal for rejoicing was rejected.

Distance is the degree of sympathy or alienation, involvement or detachment which occurs in the various relationships in the narrative between the narrator and his audience and between the audience and the characters of the story.[8] Many factors influence distance: the point of view from which a character is seen, norms, patterns of behavior, and the connotations of his/her words. Distance relationship in the experience of a narrative is in constant flux but any successful story provides basic limits for the relationship. In my case, the child's sympathy for the wolf crossed the limits of the story's rhetorical structure and the over-all effect was reversed.

The plot is the interrelationship of the actions of the narrative. It progresses from a beginning through a series of connected incidents to a believable though often surprising outcome. Conflict is at the heart of a plot. The establishment and reversal of expectations is one of the basic resulting dynamics in plot structure. And, once again, my listener did not expect anyone to get killed in the story and the shock of that reversal of expectation was too much for him.

My experience in reading "The Three Little Pigs" made me aware of a structure of narrative rhetoric. These structures are like water pumps and spark plugs: one way of learning that they have been operating is when they do not work. The narrator's appeals had a simple structure of asking for increasing sympathy for the good characters and of alienation from the bad one which led up to the climactic reversal. The appeal at that point was for joy at the victory. The intended effect was a combination of relief and assurance, a feeling of security. The fact that the structure did not work as intended only means that a narrator's rhetoric is in fact a series of appeals or invitations which can either be accepted or rejected by the audience. Thus, in any narrative, the dynamics in the relationship between the narrator, his story, and the audience influence the over-all effect.

I have found these categories of narrative analysis helpful in diachronic analysis of Biblical narratives. The possibility which this essay seeks to explore is that synchronic investigations of narrative rhetoric in a wide range of Biblical narratives will reveal structures of relational dynamics that will shed light on another aspect of the deep structures which underlie Biblical narrative.

I. Analysis of the Narrative's Rhetorical Structure

The rhetorical analysis will follow the narrative's surface structure. The analysis of the narrative's literary units in its final form will only be presented. This analysis is based on the hypothesis that the narrative's basic unit of composition is a unit of two or three sentences, the episode.[9] The fundamental technique of composition is the marking of the limits of the episodes by various forms of parallelism. When analyzed in this framework, the narrative can be read as having five sections with from three to five episodes:[10]

A. The creation of man and the garden (2:4b-17)

1. The creation of the man (2:4b-7)
2. The creation of the garden (2:8-9)
3. The river Pishon and the land of Havilah (2:10-12)
4. The other three rivers (2:13-14)
5. The prohibition (2:15-17)

B. The creation of woman (2:18-25)

1. The search (2:18-20)
2. The creation of woman (2:21-23)
3. The union of man and woman (2:24-25)

C. The transgression (3:1-7)

1. The serpent's interrogation of the woman (3:1-3)
2. The serpent's interpretation of the prohibition (3:4-5)
3. The transgression (3:6-7)

D. God's discovery of the transgression (3:8-13)

1. God's search for the man (3:8-9)
2. The interrogation of the man (3:10-11)
3. The confession (3:12-13)

E. The punishment and expulsion (3:14-25)

1. The curse of the serpent and the woman (3:14-16)
2. The curse of the man (3:17-19)
3. Notes of reconciliation (3:20-21)
4. The expulsion (3:22-24)

A.1. (2:4b-7) The description of the earth and the watering of the earth is a scenic narration which moves to a detailed close up description of the man's creation, all from the perspective of an observor. The analogy of a panorama scene in a movie which moves to a close up is appropriate. God is the only active character.

His characterization is positive. The climax of the episode is a narrative appeal for appreciation of God's kindness in the giving of his breath to the man, the breath of life.

A.2. (2:8-9) The primary dynamic in this episode occurs in relationship to God. The moving of the man from the desert to the garden and its trees is a further gracious action. The effect of the images is similar to finding an oasis in the middle of the desert. The narration of this good gift further heightens the narrator's invitation to approve of God's acts.

A.3. (2:10-12) The description of the rivers is an extended narrative comment in which the narrator interrupts his description of the action and directly addresses his audience. His comment explains the connection between the garden and the rivers which are assumed to be familiar to his audience. Von Rad's comment is germane: "Here we find what we missed above (see at v. 8): a connection between the earth and the garden on the one hand and the historical world of man on the other."[11] The description of the land of Havilah assumes norms that would make it extremely attractive. The climax of the episode describes not just gold but "good gold" (zahab ṭôb) and precious jewels. Though God is in the background, he is still the primary character. The narrator's appeal is to recognize that God was the source of the water and, therefore, of the fertility of that rich land.

A.4. (2:13-14) The geographical associations with the rivers and the garden are more definitively associated with Mesopotamia in the naming of the Tigris and the Euphrates.[12] This was a foreign country for the Yahwist's audience. In the context of the positive norms of the preceding episode, the narrator's request may be to share with him a degree of envy of the abundant water in that land. The celebration of God's gift of the rivers is the primary atmosphere of these two episodes.

A.5. (2:15-17) The opening parallelism to the first sentence of the garden episode (2:8) recalls the positive associations of the man's being moved from the desert to the garden. The prohibition of eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is the first potentially alienating element in the characterization of God. The prohibition and the threat of death on the same day are reported objectively without narrative comment.

B.1. (2:18-20) The search for a helpmate is introduced in the narrative's first inside view. Inside views generally reduce distance to the character because of their effect of presenting the character's point of view on the action. This insight into the mind of God, as he identifies the man's central problem and searches for a solution, is an unusually powerful inside view. Its effect is to set the prohibition of the tree in a sympathetic context. God's delegation to the man of the power to name the animals is the first development of the man's characterization. It is also positive and creates a degree of identification with the man.

B.2. (2:21-23) The description of the creation of the woman is an intimate and detailed narrative close up. The parallelism with the earlier description of God bringing the animals to the man (2:19) heightens the delight of God bringing the woman. The

man's first words are also the narrative's first poetry. His poem of ecstasy expresses his response to the woman. The norms of judgment in relation to the woman are overwhelmingly positive. She is a glorious and totally attractive character. She is worthy of adoration and unambiguous approval. Her arrival in the narrative is the culmination of the search. Thus, the narrator's petitions for approval and identification with all three characters reach a high point in this episode.

B.3. (2:24-25) This is the shortest episode in the narrative to this point and it thereby receives the greatest emphasis. The narrator once again interrupts the action to comment on the story to his audience. These comments directly connect his audience's experience with the events of the narrative. The first comment relates the story to his audience's experience of the culmination of marriage in sexual union. It is an invitation either to anticipate or to remember the honeymoon. The comment is also the narrator's implicit expression of his approval of God's gift of sexual union. Regardless of whether or not the narrative comment describes the physical union of the man and the woman,[13] its impact on the audience is to evoke thoughts of becoming "one flesh." The second comment ends with an inside view of the couple's feelings about being naked. An implicit request in this comment is to compare the difference between feelings about nakedness then and now. It is the culmination of the implicit contrasts between life before and after the expulsion from the garden.

These narrative comments are also the narrator's invitation to his audience to have a warm and spontaneous relationship with him. The shared delight of remembering the garden is, to use the language of transactional analysis, all "warm fuzzies."

C.1. (3:1-3) An inclusio parallelism between the first and last lines of the episode (*'āmar 'ĕlohîm lō tōkᵉlû*) marks its boundaries. The narrator continues his commentary on the narrative in his introduction to the serpent. He warns his audience to beware of the serpent. The norm of judgment, *'ārûm*, is somewhat playful because of its verbal connection with *ʿărûmîm* in the previous sentence. It is, however, the first note of potential narrative disapproval in relation to any character. The comment thereby asks for a degree of suspicion in relation to the serpent. The woman's distortion of God's prohibition also enlists a slight degree of distance. But this is only a slight modification of the complete identification with the woman which has been established at the end of the previous section.

C.2. (3:4-5) The serpent's statement once again picks up the key word from the last sentence of the previous episode and changes it. In this case, he directly contradicts the woman and God. His statement is a major accusation in relation to God's motive. With this confrontation, the narrative's central conflict has been joined.

C.3. (3:6-7) This episode is almost totally an inside view. The narrator's description of the woman's perceptions of the tree and the couple's realization of their nakedness is the most intensive treatment of the internal perceptions and feelings of the characters in the entire narrative. The function of this shift in narrative point of view is to give the audience an experience of the actions of the episode from the perspective of the man and woman. The inside view tends to reduce the distance to the characters.

The implicit norms of judgment, on the other hand, are negative. The eating of the fruit is associated with the prohibition of the fruit by God. The negative judgment which is thereby solicited tends to create condemnation and increased distance. Therefore, the dynamics of distance in relation to the woman pull in contradictory directions.

In the phrase "her man with her" (l^{e}ʾîšāh ʿimmāh) which reverses the earlier term, "his wife" (ʾištô), the characterization of the man also has negative connotations for the first time. The norm of judgment implicit in this phrase is that no man should become subject to his wife. The implicit request is to disapprove of the man and to disassociate from him to some degree. And, of course, the major appeal for disapproval is in relation to his eating the fruit of the tree.

The reversal of expectations in relation to the knowledge gained from eating the fruit is also reported in an inside view: "they knew they were naked." The final sentence of the episode has a major parallelism to the final sentence of the preceding episode. Their eyes were indeed opened but they knew only that they were naked. This major reversal of expectations is also created by the antithesis between this inside view and the climactic inside view, "they were not ashamed" (yitbbōšāšû), at the end of the second section.

These inside views are a major factor in the rhetorical dynamic of the episode. They engage the audience with the characters and their internal perceptions during the narration of actions that are unambiguously wrong and that would create a high degree of alienation if reported from a purely objective point of view. The inside views induce the audience to maintain a close identification with the man and the woman during this critical turning point in the narrative.

D.1. (3:8-9) God's reentry into the narrative is reported from the point of view of the man and the woman: they hear Yahweh walking in the garden. The possibility that the audience might share the fear of Yahweh implicit in their hiding from him is balanced by the extremely anthropomorphic and "down to earth" portrayal of Yahweh. The narrator's description encourages his audience to remember their earlier positive associations with the character. Yahweh's search for the man also involves the narrator and his audience in an unusual relationship with the character of Israel's God. Yahweh's knowledge is here restricted since he does not yet know what has happened. This is one the few occasions, if any, in which the narrator and his audience know something that Yahweh does not know. As a result, the relationship to God is to one who is for the moment ignorant and, therefore, to some degree, inferior. But this is in no way a negative element in the characterization because his search for the man is wholly innocent and, therefore, sympathetic. Nevertheless, this relational dynamic is in tension with the fear of him implicit in the couple's hiding fro him. The dynamics of distance in relation to Yahweh are also in tension.

D.2. (3:10-11) The synonymous parallelism between the first sentences of these contiguous episodes ("I heard your voice in the garden...") sets the interrogation in the context of the man's fear

The possibility of immediate death is evoked by Yahweh's question in regard to his earlier command (2:17). The dynamics of distance implicit in the narrative's rhetoric reach their highest level of contradiction in these episodes.

D.3. (3:12-13) The episode is short and, therefore, emphatic. The confessions are signs of the rupture in the previous quality of the relationships between the male and female. The irony of their confessions is created by the disjuncture between the efforts of the man and the woman to blame others for their actions and the implicit assumption by the narrator that they are fully responsible. The man's effort to blame God and his wife for his action is a continuation of the same pattern of weakness that was present in his implicit acceptance of subordination to his wife. The woman's explanation of her offense is equally ironic because of the audience's memory of her meditation on the tree and her decision to eat it.

E.1. (3:14-16) The curses are rhetorically simple. The implicit norms are that God's judgments are just. The high degree of identification with the woman creates an equally high degree of sympathy with her sentence.

E.2. (3:17-19) The reversal of expectations in the curse of the man is that God condemns him only to death in the future rather than on the same day (2:17). The comparison between the curse of the woman and the curse of the man conveys an implicit invitation to recognize that the man was the one who was finally responsible for the transgression. An almost inevitable result of the curses is an increase in alienation in relation to God. While just and even compassionate, God's judgments are associated with pain and death for the audience.

E.3. (3:20-21) Once again, a short episode creates emphasis as in the final episodes of the second and fourth sections (2:24-5; 3:12-13). The episode sounds two notes of reconciliation and is an implicit appeal for the reduction of tensions. The effect of the episode is to interrupt the action. As a result, it has the impact of a narrative comment in which the narrator gives supplemental information to his audience. The man's giving the woman a second name evokes the memory of the first name at the climax of the search for a helpmate. It is a sympathetic and affirmative action which, in the context of the man's earlier accusation of the woman, reestablishes a positive relationship between them. Thus, the function of the naming of Eve is to solicit a higher degree of approval in relation to both the man and the woman. God's clothing of the couple is related to the motif of their shame. The gesture creates an atmosphere of reconciliation between God and the couple. It thereby invites an increased degree of positive response to God.

E.4. (3:22-24) God's statement, while apparently addressed to other gods, is similar in its narrative function to his statement to himself about the man's loneliness and it has the effect of an inside view. The tone of the statement is loss. There is a need to prevent further dislocations. The narrator's implicit manner makes it likely that the rest of the episode was also intended to be experienced in the same mood. God's replacement of the man with the cherubim to guard the garden (2:18) is the final

note of grief. This implicit insight into God's feelings about the expulsion from the garden has the same appeal as the inside view following the prohibition of the fruit. The narrator invites his audience to be reconciled with God.

In the light of this analysis, a summary of the narrative's rhetorical structure is now possible. Reduced to its most basic components, the underlying rhetorical structure of the narrative is as follows:

Section A - Strong appeals for positive relationship with God are established prior to the imposition of the interdiction.

Section B - A high degree of identification with the man and the woman is invited in the context of the quest for a helpmate.

Section C - The violation of the interdiction creates major tensions in distance relationships; a high degree of identification with the man and the woman is maintained.

Section D - Extreme tensions are invoked in all the narrative relationships as the transgression is identified and confessed.

Section E - The enforcement of punishment is accompanied by appeals for reconciliation and grief. The restoration of sympathetic relationships is invited with the man and the woman. The final appeal is for reconciliation with God.

Thus, the dynamics of the narrative's rhetoric move from appeals for a high degree of sympathetic identification through high levels of tension to a restoration of positive identification in an atmosphere of loss.

II. Analysis of the Narrative and Semantic Structure

The purpose of this analysis is to identify some major aspects of the narrative and semantic structures of Gen. 2-3 as those categories of analysis have been identified by Greimas and used in Biblical analysis by Calloud and Patte. Wherever possible, the results of the rhetorical analysis will be used. The analysis will follow the literary units of the five sections rather than the individual episodes.

Narrative Structure

The analysis of the narrative structure will focus primary attention on the actantial functions of the characters.

A. (2:4b-17) An initial impression of the actantial framework of the first section would be that the function of the section is to establish communication between God as a sender and the man as a receiver. The object of God's action is to give life. Thus, the following diagram in Greimas' scheme of the actantial relationships:

God ——→ Life ——→ Man

Two factors in the narrative, however, require a modification of this model. First, the extended description of the earth at the beginning of the narrative is a classic description of a situation

of lack.[14] It describes a desert and a series of things that are absent, the most important of which is the man. But, since the man is absent during this description, the implied receiver is mankind or the people. The description of the rivers is the second factor which requires actantial interpretation. As the rhetorical analysis has revealed, these episodes are narrative comments addressed to the Yahwist's audience. The man is not even mentioned in the description. God is the assumed sender and the only possible receiver is the people which includes the narrator's audience. Thus, the actantial structure is as follows: the man is the means or subject by which, with the help of the garden and the water, God gives life to the people.



The major antinomy in this section is the contrast between the fertility of the garden and the surrounding region watered by its rivers and the implied barreness of the desert in which the man was created. The rhetorical analysis has also revealed the possibility that the narrator and his audience understood the area to be in a foreign country, Mesopotamia. In addition, the garden and the region in which it is located are presented as highly desirable. Therefore, a further aspect of the actantial relationship may be that the Yahwist is affirming that Yahweh, the god of the nation of Israel, was the one who created the garden and the fertility of its region rather than the gods of that region. The tension between the garden and its region as a good land and as a foreign land will need to be discussed more fully in the semantic analysis.

The narrative function of the prohibition of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is to mandate a condition which is implicitly accepted by the man. The tree is thereby associated with evil. Because of the actantial framework which has been established, this contract is, by implication, mandated to and accepted by the people. The issue is what shall and shall not be eaten. The punishment for violation of the contract is clearly stated. With the interdiction, the first correlated sequence of the narrative is completed. A social order has been established between God, the garden with its waters and trees, the man, and the people.

B. (2:18-25) The new section begins with the definition of another lack, a helpmate. The narrative function of this section is the establishment of a search. The goal of the search is to move from the disjunction of the man's loneliness to conjunction with a helpmate. Actantial analysis reveals a further aspect of the positive characterization of the man. In naming the animals and the woman, the man becomes a sender of names to them on the axis of communication:



This momentary assumption of the actantial position which God occupies in the main program of the narrative is a sign of the growth in the stature of the man as a character which takes place in this episode.

The over-all program of this section is the successful culmi-

nation of the search for a helpmate. The actantial model is a classic instance of the introduction of a helper:



The actantial model also makes clear the structure of communication in the narrator's final comments at the end of this section (2:24-25 With the use of diachronic methods, the meaning of the narrative is ambiguous in relation to the culmination of sexual relationship between the man and the woman. A synchronic investigation shows, however, that the over-all effect of the comment is precisely to describe the joining of man and woman in one flesh. The narrator's comment reports God's gift to his people of sexual joy without shame. The narrator's claim is, therefore, that Yahweh is also the giver of sex. Once again, this claim is important data for the semantic analysis.

C. (3.1-7) The serpent is introduced with a warning and is immediately cast in the role of opponent. The narrative function of this section is a test which occurs on the axis of power. The serpent establishes a counter program: eat the fruit and become like gods. In his implicit recommendation of this program as well as in his interpretation of God's motive for the prohibition, the serpent becomes a sender in relation to the woman. He,in effect, places himself in the role of God in his claim to know the meaning of God's command. In relation to the woman, therefore, the serpent takes the actantial role of sender:



The history of religions research on the symbol of the serpent in the ancient Near East has established that one of the primary connotations of the serpent was as a phallic symbol in the fertility cult.[15] The actantial analysis reveals the possibility that the serpent is a predominantly male symbol who takes the role of a god in relation to the woman.

The serpent's counter program is accepted by the woman. Her central motivation is to be made wise. As the rhetorical analysis has revealed, the narrator maintains a high degree of identification with the woman during this action by a long and intensive inside view. In the woman's giving of the fruit to the man, another major shift in actantial roles occurs. The woman becomes the sender of the fruit to the man. She takes the same role in relation to the man as the serpent took in relation to her:



Thus, the causal structure which leads to the eating of the fruit is in both instances the substitution of a male/female program in place of the program of God. The serpent's counter program is, therefore, associated with a reversal of the characters' actantial roles.[16]

The climax of the section is a further reversal in which the realization of nakedness results in shame. The immediate associa-

tion of the violation of the contract, therefore, is a disruption of the sexual relationship between the man and the woman. This is a major reversal of expectations in the narrative. An operating assumption of the audience is thereby challenged. The structural analysis reveals the possibility that the introduction of shame and the disruption of the couple's sexual relationship is the reversal of an implicit assumption by the Yahwist's audience that the eating of the fruit would improve or heighten the couple's sexual relationship. If that is the operative expectation, Crossan's diagram is a helpful scheme for specifying the impact of this reversal:[17]



(Read: the audience expects the eating of the fruit will lead to a better sexual relationship between the man and the woman; but in the story the opposite happens.)

As the diagram reveals, the implied reverse correlation is that not eating the fruit and being obedient to Yahweh is associated by the audience with sexual shame. But in the story the opposite is what the man and the woman have just lost, namely, sex without shame.

D. (3.8-13) With God's reentry into the narrative, the program for the rest of the narrative is God's counter-counterprogram.[18] The narrative function of this section is to describe God's search for the man and then for information about the disjunction in relationship that has taken place. This once again involves a shift in actantial relationship in which Yahweh is the subject of a search in which, as the rhetorical analysis has shown, the narrator, the audience, and the couple all know what has taken place. The interrogation of the man and then the woman is a direct confrontation which leads to their confessions.

E. (3.14-24) The curses reestablish the actantial relationships that existed before the violation of the mandate. In effect, the results of the violation in the rupture of the relationships are incorporated into the curses. The reversal of roles between the serpent and the woman is turned around and the serpent is cast in the role of eternal opponent. The woman's reversal of roles in relation to the man is countered by the imposition of the helper role upon her. The man's acceptance of the woman's reversal of roles is changed into his being made subject to the earth. The major reversal of expectations is that the man's punishment is eventual rather than immediate death. The curses end, therefore, with a limitation of the punishment.

The naming of the woman and the clothing of the couple are set in the context of the disruptions in the couple's sexual relationship after the eating of the fruit. The woman's sexual role is honored by the new name which she is given. The name is also an affirmation of her status as a woman rather than as a goddess.[19] The clothing of the couple by Yahweh takes away the shame of nakedness and gives them a measure of dignity. It also reestablishes God in the role of giver of good gifts to people. Thus, in the context of the restoration of the relationship with Yahweh, the

implied correlation between obedience to Yahweh and sex with honor and dignity is confirmed.

The expulsion from the garden takes place in the context of the successful restoration of the previous framework of actantial roles though with significant losses. The expulsion from the garden to serve the earth is associated with a return to the desert from which the man was taken into the garden at the beginning. The antinomy between the garden/region of Eden and the desert is thus reestablished. The replacement of the man with the cherubim as the guard is the final confirmation of the change in the man's relationship to the trees of the garden and the earth.

Semantic Structure

A thorough analysis of the semantic structure is beyond the scope of this essay and of my mastery of the methodological tools. But an attempt at an introductory sketch is required.[20]

A. Alimentary code. The narrative's one law is a dietary law about what is and is not to be eaten and, therefore, about the opposition of pure and impure foods. The law is associated with the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This tree is the only forbidden tree prior to the ending. This establishes an antinomy between this tree and all other trees. The tree is associated with knowledge of all things and the desire to be like the gods. There are also associations of the knowledge of good and evil with sexuality (II Sam. 19:36). As the analysis of the narrative structure has shown, an assumed correlation between the eating of the fruit and better sex may be operative in the narrative. The tree is also associated with water and thereby with the opposition between wet and dry.[21] The consequences of eating the fruit are sexual shame in the man/woman relationship and fear in relation to Yahweh because of the threat of immediate death.

B. The code of the animals. The opposition between all of the animals and the serpent is related to the actantial roles. All of the other animals are subject to the man's authority in his naming them. The opposition is then between animals who are subject to human authority and those who are not. The serpent is not subject to the man's authority and effectively becomes a competitive male figure in relation to the woman. The serpent also takes the place of God in relation to the woman. His "cleverness" (ʿārûm) is contrasted with the couple's "nakedness" (ʿărûmîm). The oppositions in the narrative, therefore, assume a primary association of the serpent with the fertility cult in which the serpent was an animistic god and a phallic symbol. The serpent is also associated with the recommendation of the fruit of the tree and, therefore, with the promise of wisdom and eternal life in becoming like the gods.[22] The opposition between the serpent as a competitive deity and God is decisively resolved in the curse of the serpent as the lowest and most hated of the animals. The semantic code of the animals, therefore, is an antinomy between animal worship and the worship of Yahweh.

C. The sexual code. The basic opposition in the sexual code is related to the antithetical programs of Yahweh and the serpent. The antinomy is between the male/female as creations of God and as a competitive god/goddess. Thus, the eating of the fruit is associ-

ated with the possibility of the man and the woman becoming like gods. The realization of this possibility functionally takes place in the narrative by the acceptance of male/female symbols in the actantial role of God. God's acknowledgement that the man and the woman have become "like one of us, knowing good and evil" (3:22) is another instance of this antinomy.

The opposition is also correlated with underlying assumptions about the relationship between the competitive programs and the quality of sex. Sex in God's program is first associated with primordial innocence and absence of shame and later with the granting of sexual honor and dignity. The underlying code of which this is a reversal is an association between Yahwism and sexual repressiveness and shame. Likewise, the results of the serpent's program, shame and pain, are a reversal of an assumed association between the fertility cult and freedom from sexual repressiveness and shame. Thus, the narrative's sexual associations move from primitive innocence in Yahweh's program through shame and pain in the serpent's program to honor and dignity in the restoration of Yahweh's program.

D. Geographical code. The basic geographical opposition is between the garden and the earth (*adamah). The garden is associated with the region of Eden which, in turn, is associated with Mesopotamia in the description of the rivers. The earth is associated with the desert and with land that is cursed (3:17-18) where the growing of food is difficult. Thus, the code of wet land/dry land is correlated with blessed land/cursed land. The man is created on and from dry land, placed in the easy service of wet land, and is finally expelled to serve and, in death, to return to the dry land. Thus, an antinomy of easy work/hard work is also correlated with the geographical code.

An essential element of the geographical code is that Yahweh created both the wet and the dry land. He is present with the man on both kinds of land. The dry land is, therefore, also the gift of God and in man's service to the dry land he can remain in a right relationship with God. Also the wet land, while unambiguously associated with God's blessing, is also associated with the fertile crescent and the fertility cult. It is also, therefore, the place of testing in which the man and woman were deceived.[23]

E. Life and death. Life is associated with the creation of the man in the desert by the breath of God, the garden, and water. The most consistent association is between life and a right relationship with God. Death is connected with eating the fruit of the tree and the disobedience of God's law. It is also thereby associated with the program of the serpent and the fertility cult. As a result of the transgression, the man's access to the possibility of eternal life is cut off, an option which remains open until the end of the narrative. Thus, exclusion from the possibility of eternal life is also associated with the violation of God's interdiction. God's reduction of the punishment from immediate death to eventual death is also a further granting of life in spite of the implied contract. Thus, while removing the possibility of eternal life, God also grants the continuation of life.

Semantic Configurations

The conclusion to which this analysis leads is, therefore,

that the underlying semantic code falls roughly into the antinomies between Yahwism and the Caananite fertility cults. The correlations are not precise and areas of major ambiguity remain. The purpose of this summary is only to indicate some aspects of the basic semantic field in order to provide a context for the correlations with the analysis of the rhetorical structure.

Code	Yahwism	Fertility cult
Alimentary code	Prohibition of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil	Eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil
Animal code	Acceptance of the serpent as an animal and as a creation of Yahweh	Acceptance of the serpent as a male god symbol in place of Yahweh
Sexual code	Woman as helpmate	Woman as female goddess in place of Yahweh
	Sex without shame and with honor and dignity	Sex with shame and mutual recrimination
Geographical code	Reconciliation with life in dry land	Banishment from the wet land
	Garden/desert as creations of Yahweh	Garden and rivers as creations of the gods of the nations
Life/death	The promise of continuing life	The threat of immediate death

III. The Dynamic Structure of Gen. 2-3

The synthesis of the results of these two methodological analyses can now be attempted in a summary form. As the works of Propp and Levi-Strauss have shown, synchronic analysis of the correlations between the results of these two analytic procedures will be more productive in the light of analyses of a much wider range of Biblical narratives. Therefore, this proposal is advanced both as a possible framework for the interpretation of Gen. 2-3 and as a hypothesis for future synchronic investigations of the structure of Biblical narratives.

The results of the two analyses directly supplement and enrich the uncovering of the narrative's structure. A skeletal outline of the structure is as follows:

A. Sender gives gifts. A sender, God, gives gifts to a receiver, the people, through a subject, the man. Intensive sympathetic appeals are made in relation to the sender prior to an initial mandate.

B. Sender gives more gifts. The sender gives gifts to the receiver through the man and a helper. Intensive sympathetic appeals are made in relation to the subject and the helper. The initial social contract is completed in a highly positive atmosphere.

C. Test by an opponent. Appeals for alienation from the opponent are made along with intensification of involvement with the internal perspective and experience of the helper/subject.

D. Discovery by the sender. Extreme tension is developed in the narrator's appeals in relation to the norms, distance relationships, and control of narrative perspectives on the process of the discovery.

E. Punishment by the sender and restoration of the original framework of relationship. Appeals for affirmation of the punishment are made along with requests for sympathy in relation to the subject/helper. Modification of the punishment is accompanied with appeals for reconciliation with the sender and the subject/helper.

A further suggestion is that the over-all effect of this narrative structure is an appeal to the audience for repentance in relation to the symbolic area of action indicated by the interdiction.[24] In the Yahwist's creation narrative, the appeal is for repentance in relation to eating the fruit of the tree which is associated with some form of participation in the fertility cult. An associated dynamic is an appeal for repentance in relation to the tendency to transform either the male or the female into a god or goddess who takes the place of God.

The other major effect of the narrative structure is to create an appeal for reconciliation with God as the primary sender in the story particularly in relation to the areas of possible alienation resulting from the punishments which are presently experienced by the audience. In this narrative the appeal is for reconciliation with God in relation to the experiences of living and working in a dry land, pain and humiliation in sexual relationship, and the prospect of death. An appeal for reconciliation implicit in the narrative structure is also directed toward the affirmation of a helpmate relationship between man and woman in which honor and dignity in their sexual relationship is given and received.

A concluding hypothesis is that some form of this narrative structure was an underlying framework of narrative thought within the religion of Israel. If this structure did exist in the deep structure of Israel's religious experience, one would predict that some form of this structure will also be found in other Biblical narratives.

NOTES

1. For the most comprehensive treatment and bibliography of the analysis of narrative technique, see Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago, 1961). Also see Edward P.J. Corbett, ed., Rhetorical Analyses of Literary Works (New York, 1969).

2. Rhetorical criticism as a distinctive methodology in Biblical studies has primarily been an outgrowth of James Muilenburg's proposal in his SBL presidential address of 1969 and the work it represented. Muilenburg suggested going beyond form criticism's preoccupation with literary types and genres to a systematic consid-

eration of the techniques of narrative and poetic composition. He proposed comprehensive investigations of: 1)the form and character of the basic literary units of Biblical narrative and poetry and 2) the ways in which those literary units are "ordered into a unified whole" [in "Form Criticism and Beyond," JBL 88 (1969) 1-18]. As the yearly meetings of the rhetorical criticism section have shown, rhetorical criticism in Biblical studies has developed in a variety of ways but the concern with the techniques of poetic and narrative composition has remained constant. See, for example, Rhetorical Criticism: Essays in Honor of James Muilenburg (eds. Jared J. Jackson and Martin Kessler, Pittsburgh, 1974). The proposal here is that the adaptation of the methods for the analysis of the rhetoric of narrative which have been developed in the study of fiction may also be useful in the study of Biblical narrative. My methodological interests have centered on the exploration of this possibility; see Thomas E. Boomershine, Mark the Storyteller: A Rhetorical Critical Investigation of Mark's Passion and Resurrection Narrative (unpublished Union Theological Seminary dissertation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, microfilm, 1974). For examples of the way in which methods of narrative analysis can reveal major aspects of the meaning of Biblical texts, see Robert C. Tannehill, The Sword of His Mouth (Philadelphia, 1975); also see "The Disciples in Mark: The Function of a Narrative Role," JR 57 (1977) 386-405.

3. My knowledge and mastery of structuralism in general and of structuralist methods of narrative analysis in particular is not comprehensive. My interest in structuralism has grown out of acquaintance with two strands of structuralist study. The first is the work of Greimas and his disciples, most notably, for us in America, Daniel Patte. In its adaptation and development of Propp's pioneering work, Greimas' methodology awakens the hope of a comprehensive framework within which the forms of Biblical literature could be studied as an integral rather than instrumental element in its meaning. For an excellent discussion of this problem in the history of Biblical criticism, see William A. Beardslee, Literary Criticism of the New Testament (Philadelphia, 1970), 4 ff. This connection is not coincidental since, as Robert Scholes has noted, major elements of the concerns that have motivated the development of methods for the analysis of narrative technique, such as the difficulties surrounding point of view, were also primary concerns of the Russian formalists [in Structuralism In Literature (New Haven, 1974) 77-9]. As I have studied the work of Greimas, Calloud, and Patte and used their methods to the degree that I understand them, there has been a growing realization that the often confusing language and diagrams of structuralism may be helpful in clarifying the underlying connections between the forms and techniques of the various stages of Biblical narrative.

The second strand of my interest has grown out of acquaintance with the anthropological research of Claude Levi-Strauss and, in Biblical research, the work of Robert Culley on oral tradition. Theie investigations of oral literature and the exposure of the underlying structures of widely divergent stories has raised the possibility that there are aspects of rhetorical or dynamic structure in oral literature as well as the elements which Culley has identified. See, for example, Robert C. Culley, Studies in the Structure of Hebrew Narrative (Philadelphia, 1976).

4. When this paper was in its final stage, I noticed for the first time Robert Scholes' discussion of the works of a French

structuralist literary critic, Gerard Genette, who has published three major works in which methods of narrative rhetoric analysis are integrated into an overall structuralist approach. I have been unable to gain access to these works and know only the summary in Scholes, Structuralism, 157-67. But this discovery has only confirmed the conviction which the research for this paper formed that the integration of these methodologies has promise.

5. For a comprehensive discussion of inside views, see Booth, Rhetoric 163-69; also 245-58.

6. Booth devotes an entire section of his book to a discussion of the various types of narrative commentary; see "The Author's Voice in Fiction" in Rhetoric, 169-270.

7. Ibid., 177-95; 249-64.

8. For an excellent discussion of the control of distance in characterization, see Booth, "Control of Distance in Jane Austen's Emma, in Rhetoric , 243-270. For a discussion of possible problems in the control of distance, see 311-338.

9. In pursuit of Muilenburg's concern to discover and define the marks of the literary units of Biblical narrative as the first step in rhetorical criticism, my research on Mark led to the conclusion that the basic unit of composition was what I have called the episode. The analysis of this literary unit and its features in Mark's passion and resurrection narrative has many points of connection with the Yahwist's creation narrative. The possibility that both the Yahwist and Mark used a similar literary unit of composition at such widely divergent stages of the Biblical narrative tradition has fascinating implications. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the episode's characteristics and use in Mark 14-16, see Boomershine, Mark, 1-49. The issues and data related to the literary analysis are, however, far too complex for treatment in this essay.

10. This analysis is similar at many points to the analysis of Jerome T. Walsh ["Gen. 2:4b-3:24: A Synchronic Approach," JBL 96 (1977) 161-77]. One puzzling feature of his analysis is, however, that he twice leaves out verses. In the initial outline, 3.20-21 are simply omitted between scenes 6 and 7. And, in the analysis of section 1, v. 9 is omitted without either explanation or literary critical justification (162) which in turn makes 7-8 a more conceivable literary unit. It is unclear, therefore, whether his literary analysis is of the junctures between the literary units of the final narrative or of the seams between the various levels of the tradition which have been joined together in the final narrative.

11. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis (London, 1972) 80.

12. For further discussion of the geographical significance of the rivers, see E. A. Speiser, Genesis (Garden City, N.Y., 1964).

13. John McKenzie argues that the divergence between the glorification of the woman in 2 and the criticism of the woman in 3 added with the absence of the implied climax of sexual union between the couple are discontinuities between a creation narrative which

the Yahwist joined with a separate narrative of the fall [in "The Literary Characteristics of Genesis 2-3," TS 15 (1954) 559-60]. The decisive sign of this literary seam for McKenzie is the suppression of the description of the couple's sexual union. This is a classic instance of the misreading of basic elements of plot construction and narrative commentary as signs of literary conflation. John Bailey, on the other hand, maintains that the man's poem and his giving of a name which describes sexually mature females means that the Yahwist understood the couple as having been created sexually mature and assumed sexual intercourse from the beginning [in "Initiation and the Primal Woman in Gilgamesh and Genesis 2-3," JBL 1970 (89) 145]. The rhetorical analysis provides further support for Bailey's view.

14. V. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (Austin, 1968) 35, 92.

15. For a comprehensive survey of the ancient evidence connecting the serpent with the fertility cult, see J. Coppens, La connaissance du bien et du mal et le peche du Paradis (Louvain, 1948) 92-134. See also Karen R. Joines, "The Serpent in Gen. 3," ZAW 87 (1975) 1-11.

16. It should be noted here that actantial analysis may throw additional light on the persistent problem of the significance of the knowledge of good and evil in the narrative. Bailey has given an excellent summary of the major options which have emerged from critical work on this problem (in "Initiation and the Primal Woman," 144-47). The two major options and the scholars who have argued for them are: 1) the eating of the fruit symbolized knowledge that is primarily or exclusively sexual in character thus being associated with sexual initiation (Coppens, McKenzie, Gunkel, Boehmer, Gordis and others); 2) the fruit was associated with inclusive knowledge meaning "everything possible" (Humbert, Eissfeldt, Gordon, Cassuto, von Rad, Renckens, and Buchanan). Most scholars agree that the phrase, "the knowledge of good and evil," as well as the figure of the serpent had at least some major connections with wisdom. And I find the linguistic arguments of the advocates of the inclusive knowledge option persuasive. However, against the aspects of this position which exclude a primary sexual connotation, the eating of the fruit is shown by actantial analysis to be associated with the acceptance of male/female symbols in the place of God. The worship of gods and goddesses whose primary function was sexual was the basic pattern of ancient Near Eastern religion. In this context, therefore, the Genesis account would have been associated with sexuality and sexual roles. But, in contrast to the sexual interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil, there is no association between sex as such and sin since sexual symbolism and the evocation of sexual life is established immediately after the creation of the woman. Nor does the eating of the fruit associate sexual initiation with the fall. The possibility emerges that the connection between wisdom and sexuality is the connection between desire for inclusive knowledge in order to be like the gods and the transformation of male/female roles as creations of God into the roles of gods and goddesses. Thus, in the light of a structuralist analysis, that most desired possibility is present that both might be right.

17. Crossan's diagrammatic model has proven to be effective not only as a way of representing the reversal of audience expecta-

tions that are implicit in the narrative itself but also as a means of discovering the undefined implicit expectations that lie beneath the surface reversal; see John Dominic Crossan, The Dark Interval (Niles, Ill., 1975) 72,76 etc.

18. The degree of my indebtedness to David Jobling's study ["A Structural Analysis of Numbers 11 and 12," SBLSP (1977) 171-203] cannot be indicated by citations because of the degree to which his work enabled me to see how structuralist methods and terminology such as counter-counterprograms might be used. However, as will become evident, a number of important correlations have emerged between his conclusions about both the narrative and semantic structures of Numbers 11-12 and the conclusions here.

19. In this context, the evidence cited by Isaac Kikawada in his comparison of the naming of Mami in the Atra-ḫasīs epic with the naming of Eve is worthy of note. In both stories the women are given three element names in the context of the birth of mankind at the same position in the narrative's development. But, as Kikawada notes, "whereas the great lady in Atra-ḫasīs who receives the honorific name is the creatress, the honored lady in the Bible is the created, the first woman." [in "Two Notes on Eve," JBL 91 (1972) 35] A structuralist analysis reveals that the tensions of the process of demythologization may be visible in Gen. 2-3.

20. David Jobling's more thorough treatment of the Yahwist's semantic codes (in "Numbers 11-12," 189-99) is assumed as background for this discussion.

21. Ibid., 191.

22. A summarizing statement by Karen Joines (in "The Serpent in Gen. 3," 9) further clarifies the serpent's symbolic associations: "An authority on life, it knows that wisdom will demand immortality. Immortality attained, man will be a God. This is the ancient Near Eastern pattern."

23. This tension may be similar to the ambiguities which Jobling has pointed out in the geographical codes of Numbers 11-12 in the dual significance of the desert which he calls the "deceitful" and the "secret" desert (in "Numbers 11-12," 189-90, 198-99).

24. Taking a very different route, Jerome Walsh (in "A Synchronic Approach," 177) has arrived at a similar conclusion about the over-all effect of Gen. 2-3:

> Narratively, the story deals with origins; but on a deeper level, every hearer identifies with this "man and his woman" not filially but personally. The sin depicted is not simply the first sin, it is all human sin; it is my sin. And I who hear the tale am forced to acknowledge that my sin too has cosmic dimensions; my sin too is an attack on creation and an establishment of moral chaos.

S 10

ACTION SEQUENCES IN GEN 2-3*

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Gen 2-3 has been read, studied, and analyzed for centuries. Can anything really new and startling be discovered? Not likely. Still, each new age brings new perspectives and new ways of asking questions. This at least allows for fresh discussion of old problems. A new perspective which has begun to interest a number of biblical scholars recently is that of language. Texts are seen primarily as items of language which ought to be analyzed from the point of view of the structures of language, and these may run from grammatical to literary. One of the important ingredients in this approach is the work and discussion carried on in the field of modern linguistics, that is, from Saussure on.

Attention, then, is directed toward how texts are put together as products of language. One might say that texts are analyzed not so much in order to understand them, a careful reading alone will likely yield this, but to understand how and why a careful reader has understood what he has read. How does the shape of language, a very complex and multi-levelled system, as it appears in texts produce meaningful statements? A whole range of questions suggest themselves. For example, one may endeavour to determine how syntax and semantics are arranged to produce coherence in texts; or, in another direction, one may ask how language talks about reality, reflects reality, creates reality. As an instrument of communication used by a group, a language is conventional; yet it is flexible enough to be exploited by the most gifted and creative individual.

A theory which could explain or a model which would describe language as a total system would be an ambitious undertaking indeed. Most are content to work with aspects of language like the grammar of texts or the nature of narrative. In what follows, the scope will be limited to the investigation of one feature of narrative in Old Testament texts, that is narrative action, and one way of describing this aspect of narrative is explored.

Gen 2-3 is, perhaps, not an ideal text for what I want to do. If one is working with a fairly developed theory of narrative, such as the theory of Greimas or one related to it, then it is reasonable to apply the theory to any text in order to test the ability of the theory to account for the structure of the text. However, since I am still trying to identify some of the basic features of narrative in Old Testament texts, it might be wiser to begin with less complex texts.

It may be well to keep in mind that at the present time a very wide range of approaches is available when it comes to analyzing texts. For example, in their survey of recent scholarship, Gülich and Raible discuss seven general text models and four narrative text models, and this does not include all the theories and approaches in use. Among the wide range of possible approaches, one finds "discourse analysis", as described by Longacre and Levinsohn, in which the shape of discourse is

set out in terms of how paragraphs are marked by formal features in the text and how the arrangement of these paragraphs reflects a deeper pattern of notional features. Then, there are also the approaches of Bremond and Jason which are developments and adaptations of the work of Propp. While Greimas also developed some of his thinking about narrative from Propp, he seeks to locate basic narrative structure in a deep level which is not linguistic but semiotic. It is here that he postulates a fundamental morphology and syntax which govern the lower and more specific levels of narrative.

With regard to Old Testament narrative, only a limited number of studies have referred to, made use of, or tried to develop narrative analysis along the lines just mentioned. Two examples may be mentioned briefly since they represent rather full-scale applications of methods developed elsewhere. The first is an article by Longacre in which he applies his theories of narrative analysis to the Genesis flood story (1976). The other is work based on the theory of Greimas. Samples of this sort of approach can be found in the journal, Sémiotique et Bible, put out by CADIR (Centre pour l'analyse du discours religieux) in Lyon (CADIR, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c). There is also the analysis of Gen 4 in Cahiers Evangile 16. The article by David Jobling on Numbers 11 and 12 should be mentioned here as well.

In connection with the work of Longacre, it should be noted that Wolfgang Richter developed some time ago a way of analyzing the syntax and semantics of texts in order to determine paragraphing. In this regard, he and his students have paid attention to some of the same features important to Longacre (see for example, Gross, Schweizer, and the works appearing in the Münchener Universitätsschriften: Fachbereich Kath. Theologie edited by Richter).

It is in this broad context of the study of narrative that I am trying to locate and develop my own study of narrative. I became interested in the patterns in some Old Testament narratives which seemed to control what happened in the stories, that is to say, the main actions performed by the main actors (Culley 1975, 1976). The shortest possible stories were selected in order to get the simplest possible patterns. And these patterns seemed to be shared by other stories. For example, a pattern shared by a number of miracle stories runs as follows: (1) a party in a difficult situation brings this to the attention of a party with the power to provide miraculous help; (2) the helper party responds by taking action on the problem; (3) the miraculous result removing the problem is indicated. Example: Elisha makes the bad water good (2 Kgs 2:19-22). Similar patterns were found for deception and punishment stories. The attempt was made to work as much as possible through comparison of biblical narratives rather than attempting to apply theories or models developed elsewhere. It is clear, however, that types of actions and roles of characters are widely discussed in many kinds of text analysis. Instead of trying to apply Propp's thirty-one functions to biblical narratives, I tried to follow Propp's general method of looking for common actions and roles in groups of stories.

The results of this work were encouraging enough to move on further. However, since the number of very short stories in the Old Testament is very limited, the next step must be to move

on to more complex texts. If groups of small stories have turned up some common or shared patterns of action, then what happens in longer texts? One of the ways of producing longer and more complex stories appears to be by building in and adding on a number of action patterns of the sort found in very short stories. And this is what will be investigated in Gen 2-3.

But before moving on to the Genesis story some further comments are needed to clarify what is meant by pattern of action. I will use the term "action sequence" to refer to a basic unit of action in a story. Here, I am merely simplifying what I have done earlier in discussing miracle, punishment, and deception stories. Instead of the three steps mentioned above, all action sequences will be considered to have two primary phases. For example, a miracle story has a problem phase in which some difficulty is introduced and a solution phase in which an intervention occurs which solves the difficulty already introduced in the first phase. In this way an action sequence is seen as an action which moves from complication to resolution, from a beginning to an end, such that an action sequence could serve as the main action in a story. The term "action sequence" and the definition of it just given are tentative and proposed largely for the purposes of discussion. Similarly, reference to participants, characters, or roles has been set aside for pragmatic reasons. By concentrating only on some basic patterns of action, a simpler analysis will result which may provide a good basis for a discussion of participants.

With regard to action sequences, these will be identified in terms of patterns of action already discovered in Old Testament narratives. Here, too, the terms proposed will be tentative and may need revision later on. Three action sequences can be proposed here. The first one is "difficulty/difficulty removed". This is rather broad and covers a family of similar sequences of action (for examples see Culley, 1975). In some cases, the "difficulty" is a problem which is removed by a miraculous intervention. In other cases, the "difficulty" is a problem that is removed by means of a deception instead of a miraculous intervention. The second action sequence is "wrong/wrong punished". Here, the punishment could be a miraculous intervention or simply retaliation by a wronged party (for examples, see Culley, 1975). The third action sequence to be proposed here is "desired/taken". In the first phase, a person is confronted with something worth having but not easily accessible while in the second phase, the desired thing is gained. Two examples come to mind. Jacob gains Esau's blessing by using a deception. Ahab wants Naboth's vineyard, and it is gotten by a deception.

The last action sequence just mentioned, "desired/taken", can be used to illustrate why I have said that identification of action sequences is tentative. Precise description of action sequences is not easy at this stage because they can be viewed differently. One could argue that instead of "desired/taken", one could say "lack/lack liquidated", since to desire something is to express a lack of something. Thus, the emphasis would be on overcoming the lack. Since the lack of something is a difficulty, it might be argued that this "lack/lack liquidated" is essentially a "difficulty/difficulty removed" pattern, in other words, part of the family of the first action sequence mentioned above. I have chosen to make a start with tentative, and perhaps even arbitrary, proposals and allow for the fact that further investigation and discussion will be required to resolve problems

and ambiguities in this area.

One further comment needs to be made regarding action sequences. The identification of the three action sequences mentioned above is based in each case on the existence of a group of examples which share the same pattern of action. But the examples in any one group are not identical, so that the group really represents a cluster reflection different degrees of similarity. Here again, clear decisions can not always be made as to membership in groups.

Finally, a word may be said about how action sequences are joined together to form more complex stories. First, one sequence may be added to another so that one follows directly after the other. The story about Naaman in 2 Kgs 5 has two sequences: a miracle story in which the prophet heals a sick man (difficulty /difficulty removed) followed by a punishment story in which Gehazi does wrong and is punished (wrong/wrong punished). Second, an action sequence may be embedded in another such that one action sequence stands for one of the phases in another action sequence. For example, in the story about Naboth and his vineyard, Ahab does wrong and is punished, or at least the punishment is announced. But the act of wrongdoing is itself an action sequence (desired/taken) in which Ahab desires something which is acquired by a deception. Third, action sequences may run parallel to each other and be interwoven as will be seen in Gen 2-3. It should be added that stories can be expanded without adding action sequences. The two stories about the dead boy show this (1 Kgs 17:17-24 and 2 Kgs 4:18-37). The second of these is much longer than the first, although the action sequence is the same in both stories. Expansion is accomplished by fuller and more detailed description of what took place.

Gen 2:4b-3:24 will be taken as a single text. There are, to be sure, a number of tensions and marks of unevenness. Some of those may reflect stages in the growth of the text. However, the aim here is to concentrate on what holds the text together and on what produces coherence in spite of whatever signs of past development may exist. It is just as valid to ask about how a text hangs together as it is to ask about the stages in its growth.

In the story of Gen 2-3, one action sequence stands out as central. It may be identified as a "wrong/wrong punished" sequence and is spread out through the following verses: Gen 2:16-17; 3:1-6, 9-13, 16-19. A wrong is done when the man and the woman eat the fruit and this wrong is punished. Some elaborations of these phases are also present. The "wrong" has two primary elements: a prohibition and a violation of the prohibition. A specific instruction is given not to eat the fruit of a particular tree (2:17). This prohibition is violated when the woman takes some fruit from the tree, eats it, and gives some to the man to eat as well (3:6). It is probably best to consider the incitement of the serpent as a component of this sequence since the intervention of the serpent is essential from the point of view of the action. If eating the fruit meant certain death, as Yahweh God had said, then to do so would make little sense. However, when the serpent introduces an alternative view of what eating the fruit would do, then this act becomes possible. Similarly, in 1 Kgs 13, the prophet's word of Yahweh permitting the man of God to eat opens up an alternative to the earlier prohibition given to him. The second phase of the

action sequence, the "wrong punished" phase (3:16-19), consists of a pronouncement of punishment on the woman and the man. Further, it may be that 3:9-13 should be considered part of this action sequence because it deals with the discovery and investigation of the violation by Yahweh God. This kind of questioning and confrontation also occurs in the punishment story of Gen 4.

It might be helpful to refer briefly to two other examples of a "wrong/wrong punished" sequence. The first features Lot's wife (Gen 19:17 and 26). In Gen 19:17, there are four imperative verbs. Three of the four have to do with escaping from the plain but the fourth prohibits looking back. There is no explanation of this prohibition and no further reference to it until verse 26 where it is reported that Lot's wife looked back and became a pillar of salt. This version of the "wrong/wrong punished" sequence is extremely condensed, taking up less than two verses. Yet there is a wrong done and it is punished. Further, the "wrong" phase has two elements, a prohibition and a violation. This sequence is a very minor element in the story of Gen 18-19 and has been woven into another more important sequence. The second example is I Kgs 13. While this story is very different in content from Gen 2-3, the main action sequence can be identified as "wrong/wrong punished". The Man of God reports that he has been forbidden to eat or drink before arriving home (vs 9). Because of another word of Yahweh through a prophet, the Man of God eats and drinks. Since this violates the original prohibition, he is punished. Here the punishment phase has two elements. First the punishment is announced: he will not be buried in the grave of his fathers. The rest of the story relates how, having been killed by a lion, he is buried away from home. As already mentioned, the prophet plays a role similar to the serpent in the Genesis story by inciting the violation. However, he is not punished for this but later becomes instrumental in the fulfillment of the punishment announcement by burying the Man of God.

A second action sequence can be identified in Gen 2-3 and it is also "wrong/wrong punished". The serpent does wrong (3:1-5) and is punished (3:14-15). This sequence is woven into the previous one. It is worth noting that the action of the serpent functions differently in the two sequences. In the first, the serpent's action causes the violation. Yet, this action is at the same time a wrong which Yahweh God punishes and thus forms another "wrong/wrong punished" sequence. Here, as in many punishment stories, no particular prohibition is stated. Most readers would recognize actions which might constitute a wrongdoing. However, from the point of view of analysis into action sequences, it is best to recognize as wrongdoings only those actions which are punished and in this way let the structure of the story define wrongdoings. Here, then, the serpent's action is identified as a wrong because Yahweh God pronounces a punishment for it. In I Kgs 13, as already mentioned, the incitement of the Man of God by the prophet functions like the action of the serpent in that it enables the violation to take place but it is apparently not viewed as a wrongdoing in the story because no punishment is announced.

The next two action sequences to be mentioned are both short and have the form "difficulty/difficulty removed". The first of these is Gen 3:22-24 where Yahweh God expels the man from the garden. This segment only mentions the man but its

present context in the larger story suggests that the expulsion must be taken to include the woman as well. This is one of the tensions mentioned earlier. The new characteristic acquired by man through eating the fruit poses a difficulty or problem for Yahweh God. Man might take fruit from the other special tree of the garden and gain the ability to live forever. In the face of this difficulty, Yahweh God acts to avert the problem by expelling the man from the garden and setting a guard to prevent access to the special tree. That the man might try to eat the fruit can be taken as a difficulty primarily because Yahweh God takes action to avert the possibility. There is no notion of punishment here since the man has not had a chance to do anything. However, since this sequence is added on to and clearly depends on the main "wrong/wrong punished"sequence, it does narrate a further consequence of eating the fruit which must likely be understood as a negative result for the man. Furthermore, the punishment pronounced on the man (3:17-19) seems to anticipate the expulsion since the difficult conditions described seem to be what would apply outside the garden rather than inside it. The story about building a tower in Gen 11 can be set beside this action sequence. The building of a tower by human beings is a problem or difficulty facing Yahweh. Since Yahweh is concerned about what people will do next, he decides to put a stop to the whole business. By mixing up their language and scattering them, Yahweh averts the possibility of a repetition of this incident. It might be possible to understand Gen 11 as a punishment story in which the human race is punished for transgressing its proper bounds but, as indicated, the language of the story does not point in this direction.

The second "difficulty/difficulty removed" sequence is Gen 2:18-25 which relates the creation of the woman. The difficulty or problem is clearly stated by Yahweh God: it is not good that the man be alone. Yahweh God proposes to make a partner for him. After a first try which fails, the making of the animals and birds, a second attempt succeeds and the difficulty is solved with the creation of the woman who proves to be an ideal partner. It would be difficult to find close Old Testament parallels to this sequence. In the normal miracle story, Yahweh intervenes, usually through an intermediary like a prophet, to help someone with a problem. Here, it is Yahweh God who has the problem and he uses his special powers to solve his own problem. The movement from difficulty to solution of difficulty by miraculous means is there but the roles of the participants are divided differently. Nevertheless, in deception stories, it is the person in trouble who often helps himself or herself out of a difficulty by performing a deception. The sequence about the creation of the woman is very closely related to the preceding section about the creation of man (2:4b-17) and would appear to be embedded in and thus part of this larger story.

This brings us to Gen 2:4b-25. The embedded sequence just discussed is included. This segment is not easily defined as an action sequence. One cannot readily see other Old Testament stories with which it can be grouped. Still, it appears to be an action sequence in the sense that there is a clear beginning and ending, with a definite movement from one to the other. At the start, the world is relatively empty but at the finish, there is a man and a woman along with all the animals and birds living happily together in a wonderful garden. But where is the tension created by a complication and resolution here, usually clearly identifiable in other action seuqences? Perhaps any

task of making or creating poses a problem implicitly as a starting point. The task is a difficulty to be overcome, and this would make this sequence similar to those labelled "difficulty/difficulty removed". For the time being, I am prepared to leave the matter open for further discussion. I will simply argue that there appears to be justification for identifying an action sequence here and that it has something to do with a task and the completion of the task. In any case, the section Gen 2:4b-25 is subordinated to the main "wrong/wrong punished" action sequence in that it sets the stage for the wrong. A man and a woman are put in a garden with special trees. Now it is true that much more than the essential background information for the main punishment sequence is presented. Gen 2:4b-25 could stand alone as a creation story apart from the presence of the prohibition which suggests that there is more to come. In fact, some critics have suggested that the creation story was originally separate. The fact that a creation story has been subordinated to a punishment story creates a certain tension because the creation story demands more attention than background information normally does.

The last segment which must be discussed is Gen 3:1-8. Some of these verses have already been discussed in connection with the first two action sequences discussed above. The action of the serpent was in the first case an incitement which made it possible for the woman to do wrong. In the second case, the action of the serpent was also a wrong which was punished. But there is something else in these verses which may be an action sequence but can only be proposed at this stage as a possibility. The serpent tells the woman that eating the fruit of the tree will open their eyes and they will become like God with respect to knowing good and evil. The story relates how she looks at the tree and sees how attractive it is. It is especially desirable with regard to becoming wise. When the woman and the man do eat the fruit, it becomes evident that the serpent was right, although the story does not indicate this immediately. Verse 7 only says that their eyes were opened and that they knew that they were naked. There is nothing about their being like God with respect to knowing good and evil, but it is clear that a basic change has taken place. The next verse (8) turns to the problem of trying to keep what they have done from Yahweh God. It is only later (3:22) that it is explicitly stated that the change the serpent promised had in fact occurred. I suggest that it might be possible to see an action sequence here something like "desired/taken", a sequence mentioned earlier. The woman sees that there is a distinct advantage to be gained by eating the fruit, so she eats the fruit and gains the advantage. The expected change takes place, but because taking and eating the fruit is at the same time a violation of Yahweh God's prohibition, the couple are severely punished. However, they do not die as Yahweh God had said and what is more they retain the characteristic which they gained by eating the fruit. Nevertheless, their new state produces a situation which Yahweh God perceives as a problem and leads to their expulsion from the garden.

What we have, then, in Gen 2-3 is a punishment sequence (wrong/wrong punished) which seems to dominate, yet alongside it is another sequence (desired/taken) which, moving in the opposite direction, thickens and adds another dimension to the narrative. A certain degree of ambiguity is created with regard to the act of eating the fruit. It is a wrong which brings an advantage and a gain which brings a disadvantage.

In the discussion so far, only two verses have not been accounted for. Gen 3:20 relates how the man gives his wife a name. This action is not an action sequence in itself nor does it seem to be integrally related to any of the other sequences just discussed. In terms of subject matter, it is perhaps related most closely to Gen 2:4b-25.

The other verse raises an interesting problem about action sequences. Gen 3:21 says that Yahweh made skin garments for the man and his wife. This verse is related to earlier verses (3:7, 10, and 11) where the subject of the recognition of nakedness is mentioned. Perhaps one could suggest an action sequence to be classified with those labelled "difficulty/difficulty removed". A problem can be identified. In their new state the man and the woman realize that they are naked and are uncomfortable about it. They try to meet this problem by making garments of leaves. Yahweh meets the problem, apparently in a better and more permanent way, by making clothes of skin and dressing the couple in these. However, narratives are chains of actions with many of the actions being a response to a previous situation or action. In other words, what happens in narrative is usually logically related to the story which the narrative relates. For example, in Gen 2:8, it is said that Yahweh God planted a garden. It might be argued that planting the garden is a response to a need or problem: where is the newly created man to be placed? Thus, one might argue for an action sequence like "difficulty/difficulty removed" or "lack/lack liquidated". In this present paper, a pragmatic solution has been applied to defining action sequences. Only the more obvious cases, and it is assumed that there will not be a great deal of dispute about identifying these, have been selected and labelled as action sequences. The problem of the whole series of actions making up the narrative has been set aside.

The purpose of this paper has been to see if a narrative like Gen 2-3 can be described in terms of action sequences. With the use of tentative definitions, four fairly clear cases were established and two further possibilities were proposed. In summary, the action sequences run as follows: (1) Gen 2:16-17 and 3:1-6, 9-13,16-19 (wrong/wrong punished); (2) Gen 3:1-5, 14-15 (wrong/wrong punished); (3) Gen 3:22-24 (difficulty/difficulty removed); (4) Gen 2:18-25 (difficulty/difficulty removed); (5) Gen 2:4b-25 (task/task achieved?); and (6) Gen 3:1-8 (desired/taken?). It was suggested that the main action sequence is number (1). Number (2), another punishment story, is woven into number (1). Number (3) comes at the end as the final stage of the narrative. Number (5) functions as background information setting the stage for the main sequence, number (1). Number (4) is an embedded sequence in number (5). Number(6) is parallel to and woven into number (1). Sequences (2) to (6) can be seen as elaborations of number (1) in terms of their function in the narrative.

If this analysis of narratives into action sequences proves useful, it will, of course, be necessary to develop a more precise description of action sequences. In this paper, action sequences have been identified and described in the light of other stories in the Old Testament which share similar patterns of action. The labelling of action sequences is thus relative to the group of stories being considered. This fluidity which produces different degrees of specificity in describing action sequences will not be an advantage if one is working toward a

general theory of narrative. However, if the aim is an exploration of Old Testament narratives, then it may be useful to trace similarities in narrower and wider groupings of stories. What is done here is similar in some respects to the work of Jason and Bremond. They, too, are concerned with segments of action, although they have chosen other ways of defining these. Furthermore, they are concerned with developing a wider theory of narrative.

Identifying action sequences and noting their arrangement in complex narratives may provide a sound basis for another important stage in narrative analysis, the discussion of characters and roles. Characters perform within action sequences, and their roles should be defined in terms of how they function in the actions sequences in which they participate.

One of the things that makes individual stories interesting beyond the network of actions and roles which they produce is the specific actions and characters which fill this network as well as the setting and props used. This is especially true for Gen 2-3 where there is so much that invites exploration of other levels of the text, but this goes beyond the structure of action sequences which was the subject of this paper.

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S 11 A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF GENESIS 2:4b-3:24

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1. Narrative analysis

1.1 The achievement of the text is the provision of a "man to till the ground" (2:5). This is the lack set forth at the outset, and liquidated at the end: ". . . to till the ground from which he was taken" (3:23).

1.11 2:4b-7. The earth has been created, but there are no plants on it. This lack has two causes; no rain, and no man to till the ground. But the first cause seems unreal--and the text nowhere clarifies this point--in as much as sufficient moisture is available, though from below, rather than from above. The second cause is dealt with at once by Yahweh's creation of the man /1/, so that the preconditions for plant growth now exist.

1.12 2:8-17. Yahweh sets aside a Garden; for his own enjoyment, to judge by 3:8. And it is only in this Garden that the expectations raised by vss. 4b-7 are fulfilled. Yahweh makes plants grow in it, introduces the man to tend it, and even provides a special water supply. In relation to the achievement of the text, Yahweh here appears as the villain, who steals the skilled workman to make selfish use of his services. However, there is a flaw in this scheme, a weakness in Yahweh's hold on the man. Should the man eat the fruit of a certain tree in the Garden, it will cease to be possible--for reasons which will appear--for Yahweh to keep him there and enjoy his services. Yahweh therefore forbids to the man the fruit of this tree, on pain of death.

1.13 2:18-3:19. Heroic counteraction against the villain will therefore consist in getting the man to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree. The new characters who will participate in this counteraction, the serpent and the woman, are brought into the narrative (2:18-23), and there ensues the combat. The serpent reveals (to the woman) the true reason for the interdict on the fruit of the tree, and pronounces the death sentence to be a deception. The man is brought to eat the fruit, and this is discovered by the villain. As a result of the combat there occurs the marking (the curse section, 3:14-19), which affects the serpent and the woman, as well as the man.

1.14 3:22-24. But these curses are the most the villain can do, a Parthian shot. The man is lost to Yahweh's selfish purposes. He must be released "to till the ground from which he was taken" at the beginning of the text--the whole earth, not just Yahweh's Garden. Only thus, at the end, are the conditions for plant growth effectuated, and the original lack liquidated.

1.2 This Proppian analysis is formally appropriate and valuable, but raises serious questions as soon as we look at the specific content of the text. I begin with an investigation of the narrative roles played by the characters.

1.21 Yahweh's villainy is in tension with the fact that he was the initial sender of the action--he created the man to supply the earth's deficiency. Sender and opponent are incompatible roles. Of the two, it is clearly that of villain which comes across the more forcefully. At the end, it is only with reluctance that Yahweh sends the man out to fulfill the original purpose. But Yahweh is a villain who acts against himself; that is, on the side of the sender. The tree whose fruit endangers his hold on the man is a tree which he himself created. Along the same line, but more importantly, he is responsible for the very existence of those characters, the woman and the serpent, who set in motion the counteraction against him. Nothing could be clearer than Yahweh's sole initiative in 2:18-23. The man does not contribute even to the extent of complaining about his situation! Yahweh simply announces that "it is not good that the man should be alone." Why is it "not good?" Precisely here lies the deepest mystery in the text. The arrangement seems acceptable to the man, and just right for Yahweh the villain! Yahweh does play incompatible roles, and if the one appears the more vividly, the other quietly undermines it, and in the end precipitates the villain's failure.

1.22 The man is primarily the object of the action. Although he is very largely a passive figure, he does, however, participate to some extent in the heroic counteraction, and is to that extent the author of his own "escape," the hero. He chooses, ultimately, to eat the fruit. He is active also in the entry into the narrative of the woman and the serpent (2:18-23), since his response to them seems to be a necessary aspect of their creation.

1.23 The serpent and the woman are to be seen primarily as the helpers of the action (and 2:18-23 is perhaps the all-time classic "getting a helper" sequence!) That this is positively true is obvious. But it is true also in a negative sense, that the narrative drops them when it has done with them. It is only the man who is said in 3:22-24 to be expelled from the Garden (contrast the iconographic tradition which has quite naturally included the woman.) The curse on the man does not cover his relationships with the woman or the animals. And it is the man whom Yahweh addresses in the combat scene (3:9), turning to the woman and the serpent only as his attention is drawn to them. Thus the narrative cleaves firmly to its main line, getting a man to till the earth, even where this leads to an unexpected neglect of other characters. On the other hand, the woman and the serpent share in the marking, and to this extent share with the man the role of hero.

1.3 The narrative as I have considered it evokes two contrasting situations of the man, those inside and outside the Garden. This basic contrast is of great importance for our breaking down the logic of the text, but in making it we meet some narrative problems, to which I must next turn.

1.31 The issue is most clearly seen in the tension which exists between 3:17-19 and vss. 22-24. Ostensibly, the man is condemned to hard labor in the Garden (vss. 17-19); there has been no question yet of expulsion. But then he is expelled. These "punishments" seem incompatible. Further, the curse culminates in a reference to the man's death, while the later verses still contend with the possibility of his living for ever. Sense can be made only if we read vss. 17-19 as describing the man's fate outside the Garden.

1.32 The narrative, then, for reasons I shall consider later (3), puts the expulsion at the very end, though it is logically necessary to read some part of the preceding story as belonging to the "outside the Garden" situation. I propose the following. Once the interdict on eating the fruit has been broken (3:6) we are logically outside the Garden, since the eating, on my reading, entails the expulsion. In 2:8-15 we are unambiguously inside the Garden. The verses between, 2:16 (or perhaps 18)-3:6, evoke an ambiguous situation--the "inside" situation trying to contain, ultimately unsuccessfully, the seeds of the "outside" situation which have been sown within it (in the creation of the "helpers", 2:18-23, and even in the very introduction of the negative possibility, vss. 16-17.)

1.33 This three-stage logical reduction of the narrative moves us into the semantic analysis. In this analysis, I shall be aiming to define what characterizes respectively the "inside" and "outside" situations, and what special features, if any, belong to the ambiguous situation in between. The strictly narrative issues, to be sure, are far from having been exhausted in the foregoing paragraphs. The following sub-stories, at least, more or less directly connected with the main story of getting a man to till the earth, are present; the bringing together of the sexes, the man's naming of the animals and the woman, and the provision of clothing (it will have been noted that 3:20-21, which have to do with the latter two sub-stories, were not even included in the preliminary narrative sketch, 1.1.) I have also left hanging the narrative issue of the death sentence (2:17) which is not obviously carried out. But all of these narrative elements are so closely intertwined with the semantic analysis that it is better to deal with them there.

2. Semantic analysis

2.1 Agriculture--the vocation of the man

The situation here is particularly clear, and suggests the correctness of my approach. The man's essential relationship is with the soil, and his function is agriculture. Nowhere in the text is an alternative put forward (contrast the immediately following story of Cain and Abel!) The etymology ʾdm-ʾdmh obviously confirms this. The man comes from the ground, lives off it, and is responsible for it. Divergent possibilities exist only as to the conditions of the man's agricultural existence, ease or hardship. He may be the slave of the earth's needs, living on the little that it grudgingly gives back to him; or the

recipient of its bounty, with little expenditure of work (in 2:9 it is Yahweh who makes the plants grow!) These two possibilities characterize respectively "outside" and "inside" the Garden. And there is no third possibility--the ambiguous middle of the text contains little that can be construed as an ambiguous attitude towards agriculture (indeed 2:18-23 is the one substantial part of the text which makes no reference to plants.) One might develop the notion that it is the man's "overreaching himself" agriculturally that turns ease to hardship, but the issues of 2:16-3:6 seem to lie elsewhere/2/.

2.2 Life and death

2.21 A contradiction has often been suggested between the death penalty in 2:17 and its not being carried out in the subsequent narrative. But the contradiction is illusory, and the suggestion misconceives the issues. It is clear from 3:22 (and 2:9) that, while in the Garden, the man had <u>everlasting</u> life in his grasp. But the curse on him includes his <u>ultimate</u> death (3:19). We need only read 2:17 as "in the day that you eat of it you shall become mortal" for the text to be seen as quite consistent. "Life" is, in fact, ambiguous--it may mean deathless life, or life which culminates in death.

2.22 Everlasting life characterizes the "inside", and death the "outside", of the Garden. In the ambiguous situation, our attention is first turned to the serpent's claim, "You will not die." We have seen that this is true in a trivial sense, but falsified by the subsequent narrative in a deeper sense. But may not the serpent be intimating the possibility of the man's (and now also the woman's) enjoying <u>both</u> knowledge <u>and</u> everlasting life--just the possibility which 3:22-23 rules out? To comprehend the "outside" in the "inside", to have one's cake and eat it!

2.23 This isotopy makes one other appearance in 2:16-3:6. <u>Hyh</u>, "<u>living</u> creature," is the word used for the animals in 2:19-20 (and the serpent is one of these, 3:1.) This gains in importance from 3:20, where the woman's new name, Eve, has the same etymology, "living." "Life" in the first case is ambiguous--it may be mortal or immortal--but in the second it is necessarily mortal. The same movement may be recapitulated in the story of the serpent, whose connections with infinitely renewable life are well known, but whose life becomes definitely mortal ("all the days of your life," 3:14.) The narrative is under pressure, I suggest, to show the woman and the animals as belonging to "outside," though the matter is ambiguous when they first enter the story/3/.

2.3 Knowledge

There is no isotopy in biblical literature which is so consistently complex and revealing as this one. Here, we shall have three levels to consider. First, what is overtly said about knowledge, for it is an item in the narrative transactions. Second, the knowledge which the characters possess of what is going on in the story, and how they come to this awareness. Third, knowledge in the trans-

action between "author" and "reader," the knowledge the story imparts.

2.31 The tree forbidden to the man is "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," and by eating the fruit the man gets this knowledge. On this point the text is consistent (3:5, 22). Such knowledge is a divine attribute, and, as such, is exchangeable for everlasting life. Divinity, it appears, has two essentials, of which the man may possess only one--if "knowledge of good and evil" then not "everlasting life." What the qualification "of good and evil" means will appear gradually in what follows, but one has the initial inclination to expect that, of the two basic situations, "inside" and "outside," one will correspond to "good," and the other to "evil." Of the two exchangeable items, everlasting life obviously corresponds to "inside," and knowledge to "outside." But it is important in this connection that the two trees coexist in the Garden. Here again we have the ambiguous middle situation, the "inside" containing the "outside." It appears, in fact, that the "inside" situation is inherently unstable--the "outside" is already part of the initial definition of "inside" (2:9).

2.321 Knowledge being a divine attribute, Yahweh knows the conditions under which he keeps the man in the Garden, what the stakes are. He knows the limits of his power. But he is not omniscient; 2:18-23 is the passage which demands our attention. Yahweh abrogates to the man a whole sphere of knowledge, that which has to do with the animals and the woman. He does not know what relationships the man will assume with them, and he brings them to the man for him to decide. And Yahweh seems, in his aspect of "villain," to make a serious misjudgment in offering the man these helpers at all (1.21). Conversely, the man has no awareness of the conditions of his life inside the Garden; he comes to knowledge spontaneously when the "outside" confronts him in the form of the helpers. To sum up, Yahweh is responsible for the man's life inside the Garden, and knows the conditions of it; but the man is responsible for his own life outside, and has the knowledge necessary for it.

2.322 The Gnostics often made the serpent the hero of the story, and rightly from their point of view, for he typifies what Jonas understands as the characteristically gnostic knowledge--knowledge that is its own object. To know is not to know this and that, but to know that life consists in knowledge. The serpent knows "naturally" exactly what is going on, sees the villain's scheme to keep knowledge from the man. But he does not know what knowledge entails. He assumes that knowledge is compatible with the existing situation, life inside the Garden. The woman, though she is not much involved in this isotopy, seems to share some of the serpent's kind of knowledge (cf. the spontaneity of her answers in 3:2-6, and especially "the tree was to be desired to make one wise.")

2.323 One aspect of knowledge in this text is, of course, "carnal knowledge," to be discussed under 2.4. Under this isotopy falls also the issue of nakedness and clothing; before eating the fruit the human pair are naked but not ashamed (2:25), but the first thing they "know" afterwards

is that they must have covering. Nakedness characterizes lack of knowledge and "inside;" clothing, knowledge and "outside." In 2:25 we see for the first time an "idealistic" view of the relationship between the sexes in the unstable middle situation; this will be discussed in 2:4.

2.33 Lastly, the knowledge that the myth itself conveys. There was a Garden. This life is set over against something from which it represents our exclusion. And there is regret over this. In the text, regret is not clearly present, though the words of the man in 3:12, and of the woman in vs. 13, transferring the blame, suggest it. The myth implies that the man acquired the fatal knowledge without having sought it; that his self-precipitation into the "outside" was the work of a moment, not based on false expectations about the "inside," and the possibility of becoming "wise" there. The serpent's activity is based precisely on such expectations; and the woman seems to be placed by the myth somewhere in between. It is the man's myth, enabling the men who participate in it to transfer some of their regret into resentment against the woman, who is more responsible for the regretted situation. The movement of the myth is, of course, acknowledged as irreversible; knowledge cannot be re-exchanged for life.

2.4 The man and the "helpers"

2.40 The characters introduced into the main story of the man's relationship to the ground, the animals and the woman, have their own relationships with him; and, in the case of the man and the woman, the working out of this new relationship tends to take over center stage from the main story.

2.41 "Inside" there is no woman, "outside" there is. At one level, this matter is perfectly simple. Each situation contains the means of its own continuance. "Inside," the earth-born man has everlasting life; "outside," he is mortal, but can reproduce himself. The woman, who helped precipitate him from "inside" to "outside" becomes, logically and justly, the means whereby life "outside" becomes possible/4/. She is placed by the myth at a remove from the man, by her close association with the animals (cf. 2.23 on the etymology of 3:20, and also the direct access which the serpent has to her.)

2.421 But there are many signs that, even in the man's myth, this will not do as an account of the woman! Something suggests that this whole story ought to be reversible, or ought to have an initially hermaphroditic character as its protagonist. But the logic of "inside" and "outside" does not permit this, so the myth develops the ambiguous middle for its purpose. This cannot, of course, work; but the effort demonstrates the "bad conscience" which is in operation.

2.422 A good starting-point is the curse on the woman. Narratively, it "puts something over" on the reader. One would assume, from 3:16, that sexual desire and childbearing were well-established facts in the preceding narrative. But in fact, if we except 2:24, childbearing is

here first mentioned, and sexual desire has been at the most hinted at (on the part of the man, 2:23.) We are invited to see the "facts of life," which, in their "reduced" state, are the woman's accursed fate, as having existed in an "unreduced" state inside the Garden. 2:24, which is non-narrative commentary, encourages this by its "innocent" introduction, thus early in the text, of the "facts" of father and mother, and of sexual "cleaving"/5/. But these "facts" are the result of the myth, not the presupposition of it. The man was without father, mother, and genealogy, as he tilled Yahweh's Garden, and without wife too! The myth is trying to turn aside its own logic, whereby the woman entered her "punished" state without ever having enjoyed an "unpunished" one.

2.423 Along the same line is to be understood the insistence of 2:18-23 that the woman "corresponds" to the man in a unique way. She is somehow another man, or another part of the same man, despite the logic of the myth that "inside" the man is alone. It is of course precisely this correspondence that she loses in the curse.

2.43 Aside from the serpent, the animals have a small role in the text. The man's coexistence with them, and dominance over them, are intimated in 2:19-20. The serpent does not come in direct contact with the man at all. From being the "most subtle" of animals (3:1, with the well-known wordplay between "subtle" and "naked," which are opposed signs in the logic of the myth), he becomes the lowest of all; in fact his life becomes a reversal of being taken "out of the ground" (2:19), an intimation of death. Aside from the special role of the serpent, the main function of the animals in the text is to provide the other pole for the understanding of the woman, the pole opposite to that of sharer with the man. Like the animals, she is introduced as a "helper," but she is a helper entirely unlike them. The serpent has easy access to her, but the deepest enmity is established between them (3:15). This text scarcely begins the working out of the relationship between humans and animals (contrast the role of Abel in the passage immediately following)/6/.

2.44 The man's naming of the animals has been touched on (2.321) in connection with the isotopy of knowledge, but it is important also here. In 2:23, the man does not name the woman in the same sense in which he has named the animals. Not only is a different formula used but, much more importantly, the man must name himself in order to name her! In fact, the name he gives her, ʾšh, is the one by which she has already been referred to (vs. 22), and he renames himself in conformity with it (ʾyš for ʾdm.) In one breath he expresses dominance, in taking on the function of naming, and the sense of his own origin from the woman (and one is irresistably reminded of 1 Cor 11:11-12, another feminist turn within an anti-feminist passage!) However, in 3:20, and definitely in the "outside" situation, the man renames the woman; this time as he named the animals, as well as with a name which associates her with the animals (2.23).

2.45 Finally, I return to a question raised in 2.31. Of the situations "inside" and "outside" the Garden, which

is "good," and which "evil?" The only use of either of the two words outside the formula "knowledge of good and evil" is in 2:18, immediately after one of the occurrences of the formula (vs. 17). Yahweh announces that it is not good for the man to be alone, and I have shown this to be the point in the text at which the roles of Yahweh are most deeply in conflict (1.21). The man's aloneness characterizes "inside" the Garden. This is the myth's strongest affirmation that "the Fall" is good, that human society in the real world is better than solitary bliss in Yahweh's Garden. Of course, the myth does not want to give up the possibility of human society inside the Garden; but since the choice must finally be made, is it not made here?

3. Conclusions

3.1 The myth takes the form of a story "about" man and the earth. But this theme, though it provides narrative structure, has been overtaken by the content; and especially in two ways: it functions as an account of the sexual relationship, and hence of humanity as society; and as a theological account of disobedience to Yahweh and of the Fall. To an extent it is true to say that the agricultural framework provides an indirect approach to two issues too dangerous to be taken on directly. But, conversely, the relationship of ʾdm to ʾdmh as basic to all other relationships is to an extent to be taken seriously.

3.2 The Garden of Yahweh provides an object of regretful renunciation. I have suggested that the myth finally affirms earthly society over the delights of the Garden. Yet that Garden still provides a focus for the expression of dissatisfaction over the imperfections of earthly society. Though the imperfections are known to be intrinsic to human social life, and though the Garden is known to be the negation of human social life, yet there is the wistful attempt to conceive society perfected in the Garden. The myth is a way of sorting out experience and dream, and living with both, but opting for experience.

3.3 Theologically, the surface of the text is a clear self-condemnation for disobedience to Yahweh, and an acceptance of the punishment. Yet the myth counteracts the consequent guilt and despair by the very way it presents Yahweh. Several levels deep, it pursues the ambiguity of his activity in the story, and concludes, as it seems to me, with Yahweh as the "sender" of "fallen" human society. And it further marks this reversal of the surface theological reading by dressing Yahweh in the clothes of a folktale villain.

3.4 F. Lämmli has written on Greek culture myths under the title, Homo Faber: Triumph, Schuld, Verhängnis. It is not a bad summary of Gen 2:4b-3:24 to say that it mediates men's understanding (for the text does not escape being a male production) of their experience in the world as their triumph, their guilt, and their fate.

FOOTNOTES

/1/ I shall refer throughout to "the man," rather than "Adam," despite the absence of the article in 2:20, 3:17, 21. In fact, since there is a preposition in each of these cases, the distinction exists only in the pointed text.

/2/ The man's bondage to the earth is suggested not merely in the clear terms of the curse in 3:17-19, but also by the terms in which he is introduced at the beginning (2:4b-7), as simply a predicate of the earth's needs. I may here mention some coding in the text, associated with the isotopy of agriculture, which I shall not pursue. Inside/outside the Garden seem to correspond to wet/dry--the Garden is apparently better watered than the earth as a whole, and the man's close relationship outside is to the dust (dry earth; cf. the etymological connection of <u>'dm-'dmh</u> with red, i.e. parched, soil.) The topographical coding is a confusing mixture of concentric (the Garden in the middle of the earth, with a special tree in <u>its</u> middle,) and vertical (heaven and earth; the man made from, and returning to, the earth; the serpent going on its belly.)

/3/ There is a parallelism between 3:17-19 and vss. 22-24 which confirms this same movement of the text towards <u>mortal</u> life. In the curse, the man will ultimately be "sent back" to the ground (vs. 19), just as in vs. 23 he is sent back to "the ground from which he was taken."

/4/ The issue of autochthony/sexual generation, à la Lévi-Strauss, is, of course in play, but I shall not pursue it here.

/5/ 2:24 also stands in an interesting relationship to 3:20, for the two verses intimate views of the life-cycle respectively of men and of women. The man's movement is "upward," from parents (subordination) to wife. The woman's seems to be "downward," from wife to mother.

/6/ I have not been able to see the significance in the change in material between the covering of vegetable material which the human pair make for themselves (3:7), and the clothing of skins which Yahweh makes for them (vs. 21).

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I AND THOU IN THE COVENANT CODE

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The title of my paper purposely echoes that of Martin Buber's popular book, I and Thou. His book and the whole thrust of his religious philosophy evoked a dimension of biblical religion that has too often been neglected in dogmatics, metaphysics and biblical studies alike. More than a system of thought, religious faith is dialogic, being addressed and hearing, speaking and being heard.

Within biblical scholarship form criticism has to some degree overcome the scholarly insensitivity to the mode of communication. It is not surprising that Gunkel was developing form-critical method at about the same time as Buber was writing. This method categorizes language according to whether it is addressed speech or not, and if it is according to who speaks and who is addressed. The distinction between personally addressed and impersonally formulated statements of law plays a role in the analysis of Alt, Gerstenberger, Liedke, Gilmer, Gemser, Uitti, and numerous others.[1] There has also been some investigation of the identity of the parties involved in personally addressed material. The scholar who has explored this question most fully is G. von Rad. Following the lead of Klostermann,[2] he approached the book of Deuteronomy as paranesis on law rather than law proper. In Gottesvolk im Deuteronomium he made some keen observations regarding the identity of the "thou," viz., that this "thou" was the people of God regarded as a collective whole.[3] In Studies in Deuteronomy he examined the "I" who speaks in Deuteronomy and contrasted this work to the rest of the tradition.[4]

The study we are about to undertake in the following pages is closer to von Rad's than to the others' mentioned. It is my intention to establish the identity of the speaker and addressee and draw the implications warranted by this identification regarding the formation of the Covenant Code, its Sitz-im-Leben, the authority-structure assumed by it, and the social structure of the community to which it is addressed. We shall treat the Covenant Code in its extant form, the collection of laws beginning in Exodus 20:23 and ending in 23:19. This means that we shall not speculate about component parts and original formulations. Perhaps a phenomenology of speaker and addressee will offer new avenues of approach to the evolution and formative principles of the Covenant Code.

The table provides a synoptic view of the evidence. Several portions of the Code are formulated in their entirety as personal address, viz., the "altar law" that begins the Code and the complex of commandments, primary law and religious duties running from 22:20 through 23:19. The block of material beginning with a commission to Moses (21:1) and continuing through 22:19 is predominately impersonal, but contains a scattering of personally addressed sentences. This basic division has been noticed by most commentators of recent times and has

Distribution of Personal and Impersonal Statements in the Covenant Code:

Section of Code	I	Thou	Impers.
Law of the Altar (20:23-26)			
Prohibition of Idols	x	x	
Altar and Approach	x	x	
Commission of Mediator (21:1)		x	
Slave Law (21:2-11)			
Initial Description of Relation		x	
Rights and Duties			x
Murder (21:12-14)			x
Initial Mot Yumat Sentence	x	x	
Administration			
Abuse of Parents and Abduction (21:15-17)			x
Injury and Damages (21:18-36)			x
Lex Talionis (vv. 23-25)		x	
Theft and Related Cases (21:37-22:14)			x
Seduction (22:15-16)			x
Some Capital Crimes (22:17-19)		x	
Sorcery			x
Beastiality and Apostasy			
Commandments re Sojourner, Widow, Orphan (22:20-23)	x	x	
Primary Law re Loans to Poor (22:24-26)	x	x	
Dishonoring God or Nasi' (22:27)		x	
Duties to God (22:28-30)	x	x	
Commandments re Court Process (23:1-3)		x	
Duties to Person in Distress (23:4-5)		x	
Commandments re Court Process (23:6-9)	x	x	
Sacred Times (23:10-17)		x	
Fallow Year	x	x	
Sabbath	x	x	
Three Festivals		x	
Commandments re Sacrifices (23:18-19)			

formed the basis of many theories of the evolution of the Code.[5] For our purposes it is just as important to note the unity to the Code provided by the sporadic address in the impersonal sections.

I

The first observation to be made regarding the address pattern of the Code is: "I" and "thou" belong together and stand over against third person formulations. This rule applies with some qualification to other biblical codes and series, but we are restricting ourselves to the Covenant Code here.

There is no vacilation between personally addressed and impersonally formulated law within statements. The personally formulated sections do not contain statements or part statements referring to the persons governed by the law in third person. The consistency is complete and striking. Within the predominately impersonal section the personally addressed sentences are internally consistent and grammatically independent of the impersonal statements surrounding them.

The personally addressed statements attract the "I" who speaks. "I" and "me" occur only in sentences with a "thou" or "thee," never in the impersonal sections.[6] Within the personally addressed laws we encounter "I" or "me" with striking frequency. Indeed, nearly every "paragraph" (i.e., group of sentences treating the same subject) contains a first person reference.

It is not stretching the evidence to assume that wherever a "thou" is addressed the "I" of the law-giver is implied. The pattern indicates the ease with which the "I" enters into the addressed statements. Moreover, the very nature of address language personalizes the speaker as well as the hearer: When I address "thee," "I" enter into a personal relationship with "thee." Finally, the Code as a whole tends to bring personally addressed passages without an "I" into conformity with those that contain a first person reference.

To summarize, the personally formulated law of the Covenant Code is consistent and implies an "I" who speaks as well as a "thou" who is addressed.

II

The identification given the "I" who speaks and the "thou" who is addressed establishes the all-Israelite, "covenant" context of the Covenant Code. It might seem that demonstrating this thesis is superfluous were it not for the recurring removal of the Code from the covenant setting by scholars.[7] I will, therefore, show that the formulation of the Code corresponds to the narrative setting. In particular, I will show that the "I" of the Code is Yahweh, the God of Israel, and the "thou" is Israel, the people of Yahweh.

Every reference to "I" or "me" within the Code is to Yahweh. In the cultic law this fact is patently obvious, e.g., "An altar of earth you shall make for me..." (20:24); "Three times in the year you shall keep a feast to me" (23:14). The same can be said for the right of sanctuary in the law governing murder, "I will appoint for you a place...you shall take him from my altar..." (21:13-14). Passages like 22:23, 26, 23:7 clearly warn of divine sanctions, echoing the language of the confession describing Yahweh's nature (Exod 34:6-7).

There are some addressed laws without first person that refer to God/Yahweh in third person, viz., 22:27 ("revile God"), 23:17, 19a ("before Lord Yahweh"/"Yahweh your God"). If these sentences were not within the Covenant Code, we would not assume God to be the speaker.[8] However, within the Code the one

and only "I" is God and this speaker imposes himself even on passages that refer to him in third person. This fact is dramatically evidenced in one statement that refers to God both in third and first person: "...but God let him fall into his hand, then I will appoint for you a place..." (21:13). It is simply the case that Yahweh refers to himself in third person occasionally in the Covenant Code.[9]

When Yahweh speaks, he does not simply speak as God, but more specifically as the God of Israel. Nowhere is he actually named as such, but there are a large number of passages that indicate it indirectly. In the altar law, the statement "in every place where I cause my name to be remembered I will come to you and bless you" (20:24) brings the entire extent of his sway into view. The promise of places of sanctuary (in 21:13) also envisages a national policy. The institution of the three pilgrimage feasts (23:14-17) extends to all Israelites: "Three times in the year shall all your males appear before Lord Yahweh" (23:17). The homiletical statement, "You shall be men consecrated to me" (22:30), evokes the theological conception belonging to the entire people. 22:24 designates the scope of application as extending to "any of my people," clearly the entire Israelite nation. Though non-theological, the reference to the "nasi' of your people" (22:27) also indicates the national scope of this law. The references to the sojourn in Egypt (22:20, 23:9) appeals to national history.

The content of the Code also suggests that Yahweh speaks as the God of Israel. In particular, the version of the second commandment that begins the Code (20:22) belongs to the definition of the relationship between Yahweh and Israel. The same is true of the warning against uttering the name of any God but Yahweh (23:13). The prescription, formulated impersonally, of "destruction" for anyone sacrificing to another god (Exod 22:19) defines the relation of Yahweh and his people. In these three cases, we have principles of Yahwism that are unique to it and co-extensive with it.

The "thou" addressed in the Covenant Code is Israel. In some statements the second person pronoun refers to the collective entity, Israel, e.g., "I will come to you and bless you" (20:24b), "I will appoint for you a place"(21:13), "your poor" (23:6), "all your males (shall) appear before Lord Yahweh" (23:17). Where plural second person pronouns are used (20:23, 22:21, 23, 30, 23:13), the body of Israelites is designated. In most of the other cases, the "thou" is an individual, as one would expect in law, but an individual who comes under the authority of the law by virtue of belonging to Israel.

There are a number of laws that govern the acts of individuals acting in an official capacity as representatives of the people at law. I have in mind in particular 21:13-14 and 23:1-3, 6-8. The first of these is clearly an address of the members of the court as representatives of the nation, for it is a national arrangement that is being described. The prohibitions governing court process (23:1-3, 6-8) do not in themselves require that the "thou" represent all Israel, but when the Code addresses judges and disputants within the context of

the law valid for Israel, the persons take on this status.

The one exception to the equation "thou" = Israel/Israelite is the commission to Moses in 21:1. This statement actually reinforces the "I" = Yahweh, "thou" = Israel structure of the Code by linking them through a mediator.

The portions of the Covenant Code formulated in impersonal language do not identify God nearly so strongly with Yahweh nor identify the community governed by this law nearly so strongly with Israel. "God" (Elohim) is named in cc. 21:6, 22:7, 8. Nothing requires the identification God = Yahweh in these cases.[10] Nevertheless, "Yahweh" is named in 22:10, 19, enforcing the identification of God as Yahweh even within these impersonal sections. There is no reference to "Israel" in these portions. The word "Hebrew" in 21:2 may not have originally been a national or ethnic designation,[11] though it becomes so in the course of time (so Deut 15:12).

III

The study of the "I" and "thou" of the Covenant Code can yield important information respecting the social structure of Israel. By examining the action commanded or prohibited in personally addressed statements, we can identify the "social location" of the addressee. That is, we can identify the audience envisaged by the author of the Code. In particular, we shall find that the "thou" is a layman in the cult, a judge in the court, and a man of substance within the economy.

Those portions of the Covenant Code imposing duties and regulating practices within the cult govern actions of the laity. It is a lay Israelite with crops and herds that is commanded to offer a portion to God (22:28-29), to refrain from eating carcasses (22:30), to celebrate the three annual feasts (23:14-17), to keep the Sabbath and to fallow fields (23:10-12). Perhaps priests would also on occasion come under these rules, but not in their special capacity as priests but simply as Israelites.

The altar law (20:23-26) and the sacrificial regulations (23:18-19) might be considered to be exceptions. Ultimately the priesthood (and the kings in the case of royal sanctuaries) took responsibility for the arrangement of the altar and the proper performance of sacrifice. However, there is no necessity to single out the priests as the "thou" governed in these portions of the Covenant Code.[12] We have ample evidence that the laity exercised authority over the construction and maintenance of sanctuaries and performed sacrifices in their own behalf in the early period (i.e., during the period of Judges and into the monarchy).[13] Our law, I believe, reflects this early situation, for there is no verbal indication of a distinctive class of priests with special responsibility in this area and the principle of simplicity and unity argues for the address of laymen here. Other Biblical codes make a clear distinction between rules for priests and laity, reinforcing the thesis that the Covenant Code addresses only the general populace.[14]

The "thou" of the Covenant Code is an official in the court, i.e., a judge. The court process commandments in 23:1-3, 6-8 are addressed mostly to judges: "You shall not be partial to a poor man" (23:3), "You shall not pervert the justice due to your poor"(23:6), "You shall keep far from a false charge and you shall not slay the innocent and righteous" (23:7), and "You shall not take a bribe..." (23:8). A few of these commandments do govern the behavior of witnesses: "You shall not utter a false report...join hands with a wicked man...follow a multitude to do evil...(23:1-2). Even in these cases where a non-official is involved, it is a matter of a person of standing in the community who might be enlisted by a disputant.

Within the predominately impersonal portions of the Code, the members of the court are personally addressed twice: 21:13-14, 23-25. It is certainly as a member of a court that the "thou" is to take a murderer "from my altar, that he may die" (21:14). The lex talionis (21:23-25) is formulated as a rule for assessing retaliation and the "thou" who makes such an assessment is certainly a member of a court.

One other case should be discussed: 22:17. Presumably a sorceress would be executed as a result of a trial. Hence, the "thou" in this commandment would be a member of the court. However, I believe that תְּחַיֶּה should be repointed תְּחָיֶה, conforming the formulation more to the impersonal pattern of the two following statements.[15]

In the society at large the "thou" of the Code is a man of substance and power. He is a man who has the wealth to make loans to the poor (22:24-26), he owns slaves (21:2), and land (23:10-11). There are less direct allusions elsewhere to the fact that the addressee owns land, flocks and slaves (e.g., 21:20f, 26f, 23:19). The prohibitions protecting sojourners, orphans and widows (23:20-23, 23:9) assume the addressee to be a powerful member of society.

Of course, not all the personally addressed laws envisage the addressee to be a person of substance. The duties of assistance (23:4-5) apply to anyone who finds another, particularly his enemy, in distress. The connection of this address to the other laws is: The one capable of rendering assistance to others is personally summoned to act. Most often this will be a person of substance, but not always.

Finally, we should record the fact that the addressee is a male, presumably the head of a family unit. The pronouns of the laws are masculine and many of the actions governed would be the province of the male head of a family. The warning in 22:23 and the command in 23:17 apply only to males.[16]

From the identification of the envisaged social location of the addressee we can discern the component of the Israelite population expected to bear Yahwistic tradition, maintain peace and justice in society, and to subsidize the poor at the time of the Covenant Code. The backbone of Israelite society was clearly the landed peasantry, the ancient equivalent of the "middle class." This class provided the continuity and staying

power that assured the survival of Yahwism from the earliest times onwards.

IV

Up to this point I have simply been developing the evidence and there should be few demurrers from the propositions. From this point on the argument will become more speculative. I want to offer some theses regarding the formation of the Covenant Code, its Sitz-im-Leben, the structure of Israel assumed by the Code, and the Code's purpose for being.

Scholars are nearly unanimous in their assessment of the impersonal mishpatim as old, but the assessments of the personally addressed portions of the Code vary a great deal. One can find characterizations of the latter, particularly the paranetic sentences, as Deuteronomistic.[17] However, other scholars maintain that the addressed portions are also of great antiquity.[18] It would be advantageous if our evidence and inferences from it could contribute to the resolution of this disagreement.

A second, related question is the relationship between the impersonal and addressed portions of the Code. There seems to be general agreement that the matter to be explained is how the two independent blocks came together.[19] One position is that the impersonally formulated mishpatim constitute the original core, while the personally formulated portions were added to it at a later date.[20] Another is that the two existed independently and were joined at a literary stage of tradition.[21] The third possibility, viz., that the personally formulated portion formed the foundation and the impersonal mishpatim were incorporated into it, has to my knowledge no partisans.[22]

The argument of the following paragraphs begins with the problem of the relation of the two parts of the Code, considers the social setting for composition, and concludes with the postulation of historical setting.

The Covenant Code as it now stands is an address. The personality of the addressed sections is stronger than that of the impersonal section, so the whole emerges as an address. The impersonal section is literally sandwiched between addressed sections. Moreover, the impersonal section contains scattered intrusions of personal address, reinforcing the characterization of the whole as address. Finally, the identity of the speaker and addressee established in the addressed sections is imposed upon the impersonal part.

The formation of the Covenant Code in its extant form must therefore have the addressed sections as its foundation. Whatever the origin of the impersonal mishpatim, they cannot be understood to be the nucleus or foundational document of the Code.[23] They have, rather, been incorporated into a document dominated by an "alien" style and made to conform to the address format.

One might raise questions about the integrity of the ad-

dressed portions of the Code. Even if it were conceded that the address format formed the foundation of the Code, it would not follow that all the extant address belongs to the foundational document. Portions could just as well have been added relatively late in the formation of the extant work. This is a real possibility and nothing that we have said refutes it.[24] However, the consistency of the personally addressed material supports the common authorship of the great bulk of it.[25]

Another aspect of integrity would be the cluster of material in the addressed portions. The altar law, oppression of the weak, loans to the poor, court process, assistance, sacred calendar are clearly distinguishable groupings. Do these constitute independent units of tradition that have been stitched together or simply divisions in a unified creation? Either answer is possible and makes no difference to our thesis, as long as one keeps in view the consistency of the Code as it stands. Our thesis has to do with the format and formation of the extant Code, not the derivation of possible components.

V

Now we are in a position to determine the social setting for the composition: The address format implies an oral setting. One would hardly write literature in which an "I" addresses a "thou" if the literature were not intended to be spoken to the "thou" by someone representing the "I."[26] The address format is hardly a "fiction," a literary style that was invented by authors for written communication.

The oral setting is further supported by the almost ad hoc intrusions of personal address into the impersonal section. One would hardly expect such stylistic "slips" if the Code were being composed as a written communication, but such slips would be quite natural if the law were being promulgated orally and written down by a recorder.[27]

The oral setting would be one in which the "people of Israel" were addressed by their God, Yahweh. These are the parties identified throughout the Code as addressee and speaker. Since the publication of Alt's "Origins of Israelite Law" (1934) and von Rad's "The Form Critical Problem of the Hexateuch" (1938),[28] it has been common to postulate the celebration - either annually or every seven years - of a "covenant renewal ceremony." This thesis has been somewhat undermined by the challenge to Alt's thesis regarding the uniqueness of apodictic law.[29] However, the covenant renewal thesis is not logically dependent on any particular thesis about the origin or uniqueness of apodictic law. We have before us an addressed collection of laws, and the plausible inference is that it originated in an oral setting in which Yahweh addressed Israel, and that is what is meant by "covenant renewal ceremony."

The oral proclamation of law cannot be separated from covenant-making. The narrative setting of the Code in a covenant-making event expresses the theological and liturgical connection between them. Theologically, the covenant establishes the authority of Yahweh within Israel and the duty of

Israel to recognize his authority and obey the law bearing his authority. The Covenant Code assumes these parties bound together in this sort of arrangement. Liturgically, the covenant-making ceremony puts this arrangement in force, and law-giving is a part of the action (so Exod 24:3-8).[30]

Connecting the Covenant Code with covenant renewal does not date it. We can, of course, date the Covenant Code as pre-Deuteronomic, for Deuteronomy depends upon it. This, however, only pushes the probable date back to the period of the divided monarchy, viz., before 721 BC. The question is whether the Code came into existence during the monarchical or pre-monarchical era. I believe that we can arrive at a pre-monarchical date by a process of eliminating the monarchical period.

Nothing actually stated in the Code demands a pre-monarchical dating. It is the silence of the Code regarding the monarchy that suggests that the monarchy did not exist at the time of its formation. It is occasionally suggested that not only did the monarchy exist during the time of the Code's composition, but that it was created as a royal Code.[31] Against this position is the following: It is doubtful that a monarch would have missed the opportunity to legitimize his rule if he had drawn up the Code. The silence of the Code regarding the monarchy makes it improbable that a monarch had a hand in its formation.[32]

One might retreat from the suggestion that the Code was created under royal auspices to the position that the Code was promulgated during the monarchical period by non-royal circles. Against this position is the following: It is doubtful that a monarch would have allowed the promulgation of a law code without his authority and without benefit to his claims to rule.

The independence of Biblical codes and collections of law from royal ideology and authority is occasionally offered to answer the above objections. However, the independence of this literary tradition is not an explanation, but a matter needing explanation. In view of the fact that ancient Near Eastern codes were royal apologia,[33] the Biblical deviation is all the more significant. The most plausible explanation is that the tradition of the codes and collections and the covenantal constitution of the people pre-dates the monarchy. Without the existence of institutions, rituals and documents the monarchy would surely have become the patron of the law and the law would have become the legitimation of the royal constitution.

One could, of course, take recourse to the concept of an oral legal tradition deriving from a pre-monarchical period which was put to writing during the monarchical era. Such a thesis would not affect our argument a great deal, for it would entail the claim of radical stability, for without such stability the monarchy would have been able to insert itself into the picture. The inference of an oral setting for the Code probably implies an oral tradition preceding the writing of the document. Whether the writing took place at a pre-monarchical or monarchical date is hard to decide, but a pre-mon-

archical date is preferable on the grounds that the imperviousness of that tradition to royal encroachment is more explicable in terms of a fixed written tradition than an oral one.

The pre-monarchical origin of the Covenant Code implies an institutional structure to Israel at this time. In other words, we are driven back to Noth's hypothesis of a "twelve tribe league" presided over by a "judge of Israel."[34] This hypothesis has come under heavy fire in recent literature.[35] It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider and refute the objections. But it is relevant to show why the Covenant Code implies such an institutional structure.

Law requires authority. One does not promulgate law unless he is authorized to do so by a community which is duty-bound to obey it. The Covenant Code presupposes that Yahweh possesses the authority to give law and Israel is duty-bound to obey it. The human official who mediates the Code (Exod 21:1) must have had the authority to speak for Yahweh. This authority could not be charismatic, i.e., the personal conviction that he speaks for Yahweh. Rather, it had to be an authority recognized by the community for which the law is binding. Within the Code, this community is Israel, the people who recognizes Yahweh as God and as the source of the law valid for it.

Finally, it should be clear from what I have said that I do not consider the oral presentation of law to be a non-political "cultic event." Far from limiting the law to the "sacred sphere," attributing the law to Yahweh enhanced its authoritativeness for the entire society in all of its life. Ancient law generally was considered divine in origin, hence not the weak and capricious invention of human beings.[36] Biblical law takes the common feeling about the law to an extreme.

VI

When I suggest that the Covenant Code is authoritative for all Israel, I do not mean that its commandments and judgments had the force of statutory law or prescriptions for individual behavior or court decisions. Rather, we should understand this document as an apologia for Yahweh and Israel and as a model for society and judicial practice.

In his paper delivered to the Consultation on Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Law in 1976, Rifat Sonsino reported and explained a consensus among scholars in ancient Near Eastern law to the effect that the royal "codes" were not intended as legislation or even codification of tradition, but rather as apologia for the rulers under whose names they were published.[37] That is, they were intended to demonstrate both to the gods and to subjects that the king in question was a "king of justice" (ʿar meʿarim). It is my thought that the Covenant Code - and other Biblical codes and collections - likewise had an apologetic function.

The address format of the Code suggests its purpose was to persuade the addressee to obey Yahweh in the fulfillment of

his religious, social, economic and judicial roles. This means first of all enlisting the addressee's identification with Israel as the people of Yahweh. There were various religious and political options open to the components of "Israel." Israel had to compete for the loyalty of these people.[38] The Code seeks to define the addressee as an Israelite. It encourages recognition of Yahweh's authority simply by the form of the address and by the commandments and other material protecting his status within Israel. It also seeks to evoke recognition by cultivating the sense of right embodied in the law.

The Covenant Code can actually be interpreted as an apologia for Yahweh. It establishes him as a righteous and just God. All that is good and right is associated with him: This is what he wills for his people. By establishing this connection between Yahweh and the law and sense of right at the basis of law, the Covenant Code defines for the addressee the authority-structure of his world.

The apologetic purpose of Biblical law becomes explicit in Deuteronomic literature:

> For what great nation is there that has a god so near to it as Yahweh our God is to us, whenever we call upon him? And what great nation is there, that has statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law which I set before you this day? (Deut 4:7-8)

This "boasting" encourages identification with the Israel which has such a God and such a law. To use Peter Berger's term, the "nomos" that shapes Israelite consciousness recruits its constituancy as well.[39]

We identified the social location of the addressee envisaged by the Covenant Code as one of economic security, social power and judicial authority within Israelite society. In the present connection, we might say that the law-giver seeks to enlist the support of the free land-owning class. It would be this class that could lead a mass movement and provide it with stability and hierarchy. If this class could be enlisted to take responsibility for the care of the poor and powerless, for the justice of the judicial process, and for the maintenance of the cult, the success of Yahwism would be assured.

By characterizing the Covenant Code as an apologia for Yahweh and Israel, I do not intend to deny that it was formulated to be followed. Here, however, we must be careful. Research into the ancient Near Eastern codes suggests that they were not binding on judicial practice and not consulted to determine the law valid in the realm.[40] This may also be true for the Covenant Code, though this is not certain. I do believe that it can be shown that the portions of the Covenant Code formulated impersonally were not intended to prescribe remedies and court procedures, but to function more as a "model" of justice. It is doubtful that judges consulted this

or any other written law to decide cases, but rather they decided cases upon their knowledge of the concepts and principles of justice that they believed to be operative in their society. The mishpatim of the Covenant Code would have functioned to inculcate these concepts and principles.[41]

The addressed portions of the Covenant Code have the purpose of instructing and encouraging. Many of the prohibitions are primarily motivational. For example, prohibtions against oppressing sojourners, orphans and widows are hardly instrutional, for everyone would know that it was immoral to do so. The prohibitions are meant to encourage compliance with moral principles. The same thing seems to be true of the commandment of cultic duties like "You shall not delay to offer from the fulness of your harvest and from the overflow of your presses" (22:28). No information is communicated, but the addressee is encouraged to comply with duties already known to be in force. Even the feast calendar (23:14-17) assumes the practices and describes and encourages participation. In these addressed portions of the Covenant Code, the law-giver sharpens the conscience of his community to obey the moral norms and social practices that were common knowledge.[42] Only occasionally do we encounter a commandment or prohibition that instructs the addressee in practices that he would not otherwise know.[43]

The purposes of the two parts of the Code, thus, complement each other. The addressed portions seek to persuade the members of the community, particularly the lay leadership class, to live according to a model of moral, social, legal and religious behavior assumed and yet inculcated by the Code, and the impersonal portion constructs a model of a just and righteous legal order. The Code both enlists identification with Israel, the people of Yahweh, and seeks realization in the common life.

NOTES

1. A. Alt, "The Origins of Israelite Law," Essays on Old Testament History and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), pp. 81-132, particularly pp. 104, 107, 116-119; E. Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft des "apodiktischen Rechts" WMANT 20 (Neukirchen: N. Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1965), pp. 43ff, 70ff, et passim; E. Liedke, Gestalt und Bezeichnung alttestamentlicher Rechtssatze WMANT 39 (Neukirchen: N. Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1971), pp. 59-61, 161-180, 187-95; H. Gilmer, The If-You Form in Israelite Law SBL Diss. Ser 115 (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1975); B. Gemser, "The Importance of the Motive Clause in O.T. Law," Sup. VT, I (Leiden: Brill, 1953), pp. 50-66; R. Uitti, The Motive Clause in O.T. Law (Diss., Lutheran School of Theology in Chicago, 1973); D. Patrick, "Casuistic Law Governing Primary Rights and Duties," JBL 92 (1973), pp. 180-184.

2. A. Klostermann, Der Pentateuch: Beiträge zu seinem Verständnis und seiner Entstehungsgeschichte (Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlag., 1907).

3. Das Gottesvolk im Deuteronomium BWANT III/11 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1929), particularly pp. 17-19.

4. Studies in Deuteronomy SBT 9 (London: SCM, 1953), particularly pp. 15ff, 25ff.

5. See the introductions: e.g., O. Eissfeldt, The Old Testament: An Introduction (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 213-16; E.Sellin-G. Fohrer, Introduction to the Old Testament (Nashville: Abingdon, 1965), pp. 133-36.

6. It hardly needs to be said that the pronouns for "I", "thou," etc., are affixes of the verb, not independent pronouns.

7. Fohrer, op. cit., pp. 136-7; cp. Eissfeldt, op. cit., pp. 218-19; Gerstenberger, op. cit., pp. 89-109 re apodictic "form"; p. 143 re apodictic sentences in law books. I do not suggest, by the way, that the Covenant Code derives from Sinai, but that it derives from covenant tradition that has Sinai as its cult legend. On the narrative framework of the Covenant Code, see my "The Covenant Code Source," VT 27 (1977), pp. 145-57.

8. Cp. Gerstenberger, ibid., pp. 55-57.

9. Anyone familiar with prophetic oracles will not be startled by this phenomenon. It is also found in the decalog.

10. Cp. Alt, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

11. So Alt, ibid., pp. 95-96, 98.

12. On the antiquity of this law, see J.J. Stamm,"Zum Altargesetz im Bundesbuch, (Ex. 20, 24)," Theologische Zeitschrift I (1945), pp. 304-306.

13. For example, Judges 6:25-26, 8:27, 13:16-23, 17:5ff, 18:14-20, 30, 1 Sam 1:3f, 21, 2:12-17, 9:13f, 19ff; see R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1961), pp. 346-55.

14. In the Holiness Code, the sections formulated for the benefit of the priests (Lev. 17:2, 21:1, 17, 22:2) are distinguished from those for the laity (Lev. 18:2, 19:2, 20:2, 23:2, 9, 23, 33, 24:2, 25:2 (27:2)) by headings. Deuteronomy, like the Covenant Code, addresses only the laity, and the priests are referred to in third person (e.g., Deut 24:8).

15. D. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (New York: KTAV, 1969), p. 307, n. 43.

16. However, women are included implicitly in the second person pronoun. There is no direct indication of this implicit inclusion in the Covenant Code, but there is in the decalog: In the commandment to honor the Sabbath (Exod 20:8-11), the addressee's children, slaves and animals are mentioned, but not the wife. By implication, both husbands and wives are being addressed.

17. So Gerstenberger, op. cit., pp. 55-57; see Beyerlin's brief survey, "Die Paränese im Bundesbuch und ihre Herkunft," Gottes Wort und Gottes Land (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), pp. 11-12.

18. For example, W. Beyerlin, op. cit., pp. 9-28; B. Childs, The Book of Exodus OTLib (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), p. 456.

19. Childs, ibid., pp. 457-458.

20. Alt, op. cit., p. 106: "From the literary point of view, it seems that the Canaanite law (i.e., impersonal "casuistic" law) is the older text, and the Israelite a more recent addition..."

21. Childs, op. cit., pp. 458-459.

22. However, scholars like H. Cazelles, Etudes sur le code d'alliance (Paris, 1946), p. 109, take a position that is in substance quite close to this.

23. The mishpatim could have existed as a complete document on its own, or have been excerpted from a larger document, or have been drawn together from various smaller documents, or have been composed in situ. I know of no way to decide between these possibilities. I would tend toward the last one, but my position is no more than a hunch.

24. Cp. my "The Covenant Code Source," op. cit., p. 146, 146n. 4

25. Cp. Beyerlin, op. cit., pp. 9-28.

26. To argue that we do have a literary creation without any oral setting is essentially to abandon the method of form criticism, whose premise is that language reflects function and Sitz-im-Leben.

27. A view of how orally composed "literature" entered into writing suggested by A.B. Lord, Singer of Tales Harvard Studies in Comparative Lit. 24 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1960).

28. Translated and collected in: The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays (Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966).

29. Gerstenberger, op. cit.

30. See my "The Covenant Code Source," op. cit., p. 150.

31. Caspari, followed by Fohrer: see Sellin-Fohrer, op. cit., p. 137.

32. Cp. M. Noth, "The Laws in the Pentateuch: Their Assumptions and Meaning," in The Laws in the Pentateuch and Other Essays (Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), particularly pp. 12ff; on the function of codes as royal legitimation, see next note.

33. See Finkelstein, "Ammisaduqa's Edict and the Babylonian 'Law Codes,'" Journal of Cuneiform Studies 15 (1961), pp. 91-104; R. Sonsino, "Ancient Near Eastern Law Collections - Legislation or Literature?" delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, 1976, in St. Louis.

34. First adumbrated by Noth in Das System der zwölf Stämme Israels, BWANT IV/1 (1930); summarized in idem., The History of Israel, 2nd ed. (London: A & C Black, 1960), pp. 85-109; see also R. Smend's modified version, Yahweh War and Tribal Confederation (Nashville and New York: Abingdon, 1970); on the judge, see Noth, "Das Amt des 'Richters Israels'" in Festschrift für A. Bertholet (1950), pp. 404-417.

35. E.g., S. Hermann, "Das Werden Israels," TLZ 87 (1962), cll. 561-74; G. Fohrer, "Altes Testament - 'Amphictyonie' und 'Bund'?" TLZ 91 (1966), cll. 801-816, 893-904; R. de Vaux, "La These de l'Amphictyonie Israelite," in Studies in Memory of Paul Lapp, HTR 64 (1971), pp. 415-436.

36. A truism among legal historians: e.g., H.S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (Boston: Beacon, 1963), pp. 5f, 16, et passim. Although one might think that Hammurabi's boasting demonstrates the opposite, he assumes that the power and wisdom to make law is a gift of the gods, who know the true law: "I, Hammurabi, am the king of justice, to whom Shamash committed law..." (reverse XXV), Ancient Near Eastern Texts, 2nd Ed., Pritchard, ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1955), p. 178.

37. See note 33.

38. I believe that "Israel" was the result of a re-alignment of loyalties within Canaan, not an association of either warlike or peaceful "invaders." To this extent I accept Mendenhall's model of the conquest, first adumbrated in "The Hebrew Conquest of Palestine," BA 25/3 (1962), pp. 66-87 and expanded in The Tenth Generation (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1973). If this model is correct, the apologetic element would not be a struggle for the continuing self-identification of "barbarians" against the temptations of an alien culture, but a struggle for the redefinition of Canaanites against their earlier tradition.

39. The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), pp. 19-32, 54-61.

40. Finkelstein, op. cit., p. 103; Sonsino, op. cit., (no official pagination).

41. This is how common law operates, but with the additional factor of a tradition of cases that must be consulted to reconstruct what the concepts and principles are: see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard, 1977), pp. 22ff, 110ff. I hope to support and develop this thesis in the near future.

42. This is not to say that the legal statements and continual encouragement do not create as well as depend upon the "common knowledge."

43. Perhaps: 20:24-26; 22:24-26, 29b, 30; 23:10-11, 18, 19b.

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THOUGHTS ON A REDACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE BOOK OF MICAH

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Redaktionsgeschichte or Redaction Criticism is still in its infancy. Attempts at a programmatic presentation of this methodology[1] have raised many questions as to definitions, scope of the task, and the applicability of Redaction Criticism to the biblical text. These efforts point to the need for painstaking work on specific biblical books or works. A major issue which surfaces repeatedly is the role the redactors of a particular biblical book played in the growth, arrangement, and theological tendency of that book. After sketching four major recent means of dealing with the redaction of prophetic books, March appropriately concluded his essay with this challenge: "It is our task now to begin to test the various assumptions and conceptions against the text to discover whether and how we may better define, describe, and understand the work of redaction and the formation of prophetic books."[2] The present paper represents a modest attempt to probe certain problems related to redactional activity in the book of Micah.[3]

I. The Starting Point

A widely practiced scholarly approach to the prophetic books is (1) to attempt to determine the extent of each oracle or literary unit and to fix its setting and date so as to decide what is authentic and what is secondary; (2) to reconstruct the historical setting, life, and theology of the prophet from the authentic texts; and (3) to seek to understand the purposes of or reasons for the later additions so as to rediscover the theological emphases of the redactors.[4] It is typical of those who adopt this approach to affirm that hope oracles were inserted at strategic places in the text at later times to neutralize or soften or offset oracles of doom which were offensive to or inadequate for a generation living in suffering and poverty.[5] This approach inevitably leads to the conclusion that the prophetic books are disconnected or at best very loosely arranged. At the end of the nineteenth century and during the early decades of the twentieth, when this point of view was particularly prevalent in scholarly circles, "the task of the critic was seen primarily as one of separating the genuine words of the prophet form the handiwork of later annotators and editors. Since material was often excised with a high hand

because it fitted poorly in its context, or because of allegedly inferior style, or because its ideas were conceived to be unworthy of, or too advanced for, the prophet in question, the result was not infrequently a shredding of the prophetic books."[6]

In recent years, however, scholars have become increasingly aware that by the very nature of the situation and the task one is forced (1) to begin with the final form of a biblical book or work, analyze its present arrangement, theological emphases, and intentions (or lack thereof); (2) proceed deliberately but cautiously to earlier redactional or traditio-historical stages which may be discernible; and (3) reconstruct, where possible, the original setting and event or oracle reflected in the present text.[7] While such an approach is destined to make the work of the biblical and ancient Near Eastern historian very difficult, the nature of the biblical books demands it.

II. The Nature of the Book of Micah

The works of modern critical scholars demonstrate that there is a high degree of subjectivity in the assessment of the nature of biblical books in their final form. The appraisal of the book of Micah is no exception. A great deal depends on the mind frame the evaluator brings to the text. There are four major views as to how the present final form of the book of Micah is to be explained.

First, the most widely held view is that the book of Micah (like other prophetic books) is an anthology of authentic and spurious oracles (or pieces of literature) of varying length from different periods of Old Testament history, which have been collected out of a desire to preserve material that the tradents or redactors deemed valuable or divinely motivated, and not according to any discernible scheme. Marti states emphatically that "einen einheitlichen Zusammenhang innerhalb der Heilsweissagungen oder auch der Mahnworte aufzuweisen gelingt nicht."[8] Wade concurs: "The book as a whole lacks any systematic structure; . . . its contents comprise a number of sections of which many stand in no logical or orderly relation to one another; . . . various oracles included within it must have been delivered on distinct occasions."[9] Gautier compares the discontinuity of the book of Micah with that of Amos and Hosea: "Comme les livres d'Osée et d'Amos celui de Michée est une collection, non pas de discours à proprement parler, mais

de morceaux oratoires très brefs, souvent sans lien les uns avec les autres, et ce caractère fragmentaire est encore plus accentué ici."[10] Budde argues that Micah 4-7 and Zechariah 9-14 served as "catch-alls" for late eschatological oracles and thus consist of "fliegenden Blätter" which postexilic editors wanted to incorporate into the prophetic corpus.[11]

Second, several scholars interpret the book of Micah as a compilation of previously existing collections of oracles, either 1-5 and 6-7[12] or 1-5; 6:1-7:6; and 7:7-20[13] or 1-3; 4-5; 6:1-7:6; and 7:7-20.[14] There may be some sort of coherence within the collections themselves, but not between the disparate collections. The adoption of either of these views is tantamount to a general skepticism about the possibility of discovering a meaningful creative contribution on the part of the redactors, and indeed about the possibility of discerning a coherent theological thrust in the whole of the book in its final form.

Third, some critics, convinced that the book of Micah as it now stands is incoherent, rearrange the whole so as to restore the original coherence. Haupt, Hanon, and Scharbert[15] attempt this on chronological grounds, while Elhorst, Halévy, Schmidt,[16] and others follow what seems to them a logical scheme. Even if one adopted this solution, which actually has to do with scribal activity rather than redactional activity, when the alleged original order is restored he is still faced with the problem of explaining the process by which the book of Micah reached that form.

Over against these appraisals, at least to some extent, stands the fundamental redaktionsgeschichtliche concept that the book of Micah (like most other prophetic and biblical books) is the end product of a rather long history of handing on, selecting, revising, updating, arranging, and expanding earlier traditional material. Generally speaking, four theories of the redactional growth of this book have emerged.

(1) Stade, Cornill, and Cheyne[17] find the hands of two or three epigones or redactors. Stade argues that the original book was composed of one prophecy, namely, 1:1-2:11; 3. This material survived only because Jeremiah 26:17ff gave it high commendation. After the time of Jeremiah one epigone added 4:1-4; 4:11-5:3; 5:6-8, 9-14. "Der Grund, aus welchem jener Epigone seine Ausführungen hinter 3,12 einschaltete, war ohne Zweifel

dieser, dass er an der Einseitigkeit des Inhalts von c. 1-3 einen nicht unberechtigten Anstoss nahm."[18] Later a second epigone, assuming that this whole corpus was genuine, added 4:5-10 and 5:4-5 to incorporate the idea of an assault on Jerusalem by the nations and their defeat. This gave the work a balance of doom and hope which enabled it to be accepted into the canon.[19] Stade does not deal with 2:12-13 and chapters 6-7 in this discussion.

(2) Marti contends that the materials in the book of Micah were attracted to two poles or nuclei which were expanded gradually over a period of approximately five centuries. The original corpus was 1:5b, 6, 8, 9, 16; 2:1-3, 4(?), 6-11; 3:1, 2a, 3a, 4, 5a, 2b, 5b-8, 9-12. About 500 B. C., a redactor added 4:1-4 to modify the negative thrust of 3:9-12. Shortly thereafter another redactor added 6:6-8 to 4:1-4, joining them by 4:5. 4:1-4 and 6:6-8 functioned as two nuclei around which the rest of the book was added by different redactors at different times from the fifth to the second centuries B. C. 5:1, 3 were among the earliest passages to be added, and 5:4-14 and 7:7-20 were some of the latest.[20]

(3) The most widely accepted view of the growth of this prophetic book is that it occurred, generally speaking, in three stages. (a) Genuine oracles were preserved, collected, and written down by the prophet or his disciples at some indeterminable period. (b) Over a rather long time span, additions, deletions, explanations, updatings, and changes of various kinds were made as the earlier collection was reapplied and reinterpreted in light of new circumstances and needs. (c) At the end of this long transmission period, a redactor or redactors put the book in its present, final form. G. B. Gray seems to have been the first to champion this view. He thought that the original material consisted of 1:2-2:11; 3; 4:14; 5:9-13; 6:1-7:6 and may have been written by Micah himself as a kind of summary of his teaching. Jeremiah 26:17ff shows that the book was known in this form at the end of the seventh century B. C. Between the time of Jeremiah and the end of the third century B. C. this material was gradually enlarged by the addition of preexilic and postexilic pieces, re-edited, and given an expanded title. Then, at the end of the third century B. C. it reached its final form and was incorporated into the Book of the Twelve.[21]

Similarly, Wolfe finds three stages in the development of the book. The original oracles are 1:5-2:11; 3; 6:1-7:4. Between 700 and 200 B. C. many additions were made, and about 200 B. C. the book reached its final form.[22]

Wolfe remarks: "It is gradually coming to be realized that in those days commentators did not make separate books of their productions but that a manuscript, such as the present text of Micah, consisted of the basic document plus the comments which accrued to it during the time it circulated as a living growing book. In the case of Micah this period of growth lasted almost five centuries, from the time some collector edited what was available of the addresses into a manuscript shortly after 700 B. C. until the collection became regarded as sacred scripture at approximately 200 B. C. . . . Micah is a source book for observing the development of Hebrew thought from 714 B. C. to approximately 200 B. C."[23]

Marsh holds the same general view but is a bit more specific at certain points. For him, the original book consisted of 1:6, 8-16; 2:1-11; 3. Other oracles were added gradually over a period of time, but primarily during the Babylonian exile as the Jews were anxiously hoping to be able to return to Palestine (7:7-20) and after the return from exile when the Jews were expecting Yahweh to overthrow their enemies (4:9-13). The book reached its final form some time during the postexilic period.[24] Jeremias (with cautious reservations in some cases) thinks the original oracles were 1:2-4, 6, 8-12, 14-16; 2:1-2, 5-9, 11; 3:1-3, 5-12; 4:9-10bα, 14; 5:1, 3, 4a; 6:9-13, 15; 7:1-7. These were updated in the early exilic period by the addition of 1:5, 7, 13; 2:4-5, 10; 3:4; 5:9-13; 6:14, 16, all of which were inserted by the same redactors, as is clear from their method of exposition, bias, and language. Other additions were made until the book reached its present form.[25]

(4) Other scholars have thought it possible to identify much more precisely the stages through which the Mican materials passed until the final form of the book was attained. Hylmö argues that Micah himself edited chapters 1-3 with the exception of 2:12-13, and that in the time of Jeremiah the book ended with 3:12, as Jeremiah 26:17ff shows. Micah's friends and followers preserved additional genuine Mican oracles, namely, 4:9-10a; 4:14-5:1; 5:9-12a, 13b, which they inserted after the time of Jeremiah along with the spurious 2:12-13. Next, a later redactor inserted 4:1-4, 5, 8. Near the Greek Period, still another redactor inserted 4:6-7, 11-13; 5:2-3, 4-5, 6-7, and retouched 4:6-7, 10a to make them correspond to 4:1-4 and 2:12-13. A later redactor had certain early detached pericopes in his possession, namely, 6:1-4, 6-8, 9-15; 7:1-4 (all of which originated in the seventh century B. C. except 6:6-8), which he appended to 5:9-13. When these were inserted into the book, probably they had already been linked together by 6:5, 16; 7:5-6. Later, another redactor added 7:7-10, 11-13, 14-20; and either he or another redactor added 5:3, 14 to complete the

book.[26] Accordingly, the present book of Micah is "a conglomerate of oracles which come from different authors and from widely different times."[27] And yet, when each redactor completed his alterations, he left the book in a form which he felt suitable for the community for which it was intended.[28]

Lescow also detects several stages in the growth of the book. The original material composed (with minor glosses here and there) 1:2-5a, 8-13a, 14-15; 2:1-11; 3. In the exilic period interpolations were made including 1:5bc, 13bc, 16; 2:12, songs concerning Zion were written and added to lament the fall of the temple, as 4:6-8, 9-10, 11-13, 14, and other passages were added including 5:1-3, 4-5, 6-8, 9-14. After the temple was rebuilt in 516 B. C., 4:1-2 was written as a part of the feast of the dedication of the temple, and by the beginning of the fourth century B. C., 4:3-5 and other minor additions were made including 1:1, which originally had no reference to Samaria and so was inserted before the Samaritan Schism. The Samaritan Schism was the Sitz im Leben of the last redactional stage in the development of the book, for at that time 6:1-8, 9-16; 7:1-6, 7-20 were compiled and added to the work, and 1:6-7 was inserted as an anti-Samaritan polemic.[29]

This survey points out (among other things) the wide divergence of opinion as to whether the book of Micah has a structure and whether its final redactor (or redactors) compiled and/or composed this book as a theological work designed to meet the needs of a certain audience or kind of audience.

Scholars are divided on the question whether the book of Micah has little or no structure at all, or some structure within the smaller individual collections, or a structure of the whole. Those who find a structure for the entire book usually follow one of these divisional patterns: (a) 1-5; 6-7; (b) 1-3; 4-5; 6-7; (c) 1-3; 4:1-5:8; 5:9-7:20; (d) 1-3; 4-5; 6:1-7:6; 7:7-20; (e) 1-2; 3-5; 6-7.[30]

The modern critic should not expect to find a structure in biblical (or other kinds of ancient) literature corresponding to modern literary canons. But at the very outset it seems only fair to give ancient literary works the benefit of the doubt and to allow them the possibility of containing coherent principles of organization. Koch affirms that "chiefly they (redactors) give the whole structure which close analysis reveals to consist of clearly defined parts."[31] Danell writes: "Even for a convinced literary critic, it is interesting to try to interpret the content and tendency of an Old Testament book in its present form, for a redactor or

reviser has of course had his motives for publication. . . . In my opinion, the definite and essential aim of Old Testament study ought . . . to be to try to interpret the Old Testament texts in their present form. . . . When one approaches the texts with this attitude of confidence, prepared to listen to what they have to say in their present form, one has of course a better chance of understanding and interpreting difficult passages than if one approaches them with distrust on principle. One's scholarly ideal is then not to find mistakes, contradictions, and inconsistencies in a book, in order to get back to the 'original text' on this basis, but by intuition to live oneself into the author's world of thought and into the texts in the form they now have. . . . Books like Amos or Hosea, for instance, prove if investigated on these lines, to be on the whole a unit. . . ."[32] Weiser says concerning the book of Micah: "In der heutigen Form der Sammlung ist ein gewisses Ordnungsprincip nicht zu verkennen."[33] And even Lindblom cautions that in breaking up the material into its original components "muss man natürlich zusehen, dass man nicht der wesentlichen Einheitlichkeit verlustig geht."[34] But the recent remarks of Mays deserve serious attention: "When the book (of Micah) is studied carefully with an interest, not in what makes it come apart, but in what holds it together, then a variety of integrating features begin to appear. Catchwords and repeated motifs connect units which lie in sequence, and sometimes those set in different parts of the book. Units are arranged by style and subject in some segments. Passages are juxtaposed so that their contrasting or complimentary content is illuminated. Introductory rubrics are repeated to link units into larger complexes, and transitions lead from one to another. These features are the expressions of an understanding of the material which employs them in a movement of proclamation that flows through the entire book. The form of the book does not, of course, have the clarity and coherence of an original composition where movement of thought creates the material itself. But there does seem to be a continuity present which is the result of an accumulative and sustained purpose to say something which incorporates all the parts into a larger message."[35]

Now while it cannot be expected that there will be any sort of general agreement on this point, March's remarks on Hessler's assessment of Isaiah 40-55 are worthy of careful consideration in approaching the book of Micah and indeed the entire prophetic corpus: "Unity may be present on the basis of a genre well-known in antiquity but not immediately recognized by later interpreters. . . . An initial assumption of unity should be advanced rather than the opposite notion of random growth so frequently assumed."[36]

III. The Redactors' Functions

If it can be assumed that redactors used earlier material with specific audiences or kinds of audiences in mind who had certain needs, and that these redactors attempted to deal with those needs by means of relevant theological concepts, then it is important to determine the functions or roles those redactors played in their own contemporary Sitz im Leben. Such an undertaking demands that one envision the kinds of situations to which redactors may have addressed themselves. These seem to fall naturally into at least four broad categories.

Personal. In certain instances redactors may have simply written words, lines, verses, and the like into the traditional material for their own benefit to clarify obscurities, for personal edification, and/or to update archaic terminology.

Hortatory. Frequently an earlier oracle, song, or record of a historical event was used in and (re)applied to a new situation because the circumstances surrounding the past and the present were so similar that the redactors felt the message from the earlier period was appropriate to the new setting. For example, it may be that Micah 1:2-5b, 6-7 was originally delivered against Samaria before 721 B. C. and later reapplied to Jerusalem shortly before Sennacherib's invasion in 701 B. C.[37] Further, 7:7-20 in its original form could have been delivered in North Israel some time after the invasion of Tiglath-pileser III in 732 B. C. or after Sargon II's overthrow of Samaria in 721 B. C., and later adapted to the situation following Sennacherib's invasion of Jerusalem in 701 B. C., then finally reapplied to the circumstances in which the Jews found themselves after the Babylonian destruction of Jerusalem in 587 B. C.[38]

Cultic. The preservation of the material now constituting the book of Micah may have involved a process connected with a cultic setting. Redactors arranged and edited the material so as to make it suitable for use in a liturgical setting with the laity in mind. Weiser reasons: "Das Interesse an der Erhaltung der Worte des Propheten ursprünglich nicht ein 'historisch-biographisches,' sondern ein praktisches gewesen ist, was wohl in der Verlesung der Prophetenschriften im Kultus seine Ursache hat."[39] L. P. Smith suggests: "The completed book was intended for the edification of the laity. The compilers (like the preachers of today) were not concerned with historical reconstruction but with the needs of the people of their own times." They "doubted the ability of untrained readers to understand

without help the figurative and sometimes fragmentary sayings of the prophets, and they added explanation and amplification for increased clarity or emphasis."[40]

Didactic. The growing interest in the Wise Men or Sages of Israel in recent years is well known. Since much work is yet to be done in this area, one must at least explore the possibility the prophetic materials were preserved in circles or schools of the Wise for the purpose of teaching their pupils. A text like 6:9 might indicate wisdom influence in the book of Micah. Some sort of orderly arrangement of traditional material would facilitate both the teaching and the learning process.

Keeping in mind these hypothetical kinds of situations, some of the functions of redactors in any given context may be surmised. They may have grouped oracles together because these contained material dealing with the same chronological period or similar subject matter. They may have arranged the material in such a way as to give a specific effect or exhibit a certain theology: attention has often been called to the woe-weal pattern in the book of Micah and to the key-word or catchword arrangement principle. Redactors may have retouched traditional material to clarify obscure terms or ideas or information, to provide the hearer or reader with chronological or other types of information needed to understand what was handed down, or to emphasize a particular item in the text. They may have inserted hope oracles at strategic places to soften or neutralize the harsh negative impact of oracles of doom for a later audience living in destitute circumstances, aware of their sins, and penitently desiring to return to Yahweh. Nowack suggests that Micah 4:1-4 was probably inserted "um ein Gegengewicht gegen v. 3 13 mit seiner düsteren Perspektive zu bilden."[41] Similarly Bloomhardt proposes that 2:12-13 "was inserted here so that later readers might not be left depressed by Micah's lament."[42] Further, redactors may have inserted their own reflections on a certain passage. They may have added brief statements to make the transition from one traditional piece to another smoother.[43] They may have summarized portions of the traditional material either in anticipation of what was to follow (Judg. 2:6-3:6)[44] or in summation of what preceded (I Sam. 14:47-48) or in place of material at their disposal (cf. II Sam. 8:1-14, and compare vss. 3-8 with II Sam. 10).

Two other matters pertaining to the functions of redactors deserve studious attention. First, two explanations of apparent incompatible pericopes standing side by side or of rough or abrupt transitions from one line or oracle to the next have come to be accepted. One is that the lack of smoothness is due to redactorial deletions of traditional material because it was offensive or did not suit the redactors'

purposes. The other is that the incoherence is due to the lofty reverence in which redactors held their material. Now while each of these suggestions seems reasonable in itself, the two together, especially in dealing with the same book or work, tend toward convenient means of escaping difficult problems. To say the least, a new look at this issue would seem to be in order.

Second, if redactors (especially final redactors) intended to convey a theological message to a specific audience or kind of audience to meet their spiritual needs, it is important to seek to determine the source of their theology. It is often assumed that redactors brought their own theology to the traditions, a theology they had attained from sources other than the traditions they were passing on, and intermingled their viewpoint with the inherited material in such a way as to cause that position to prevail. For example, Wolfe finds thirteen editors (or editorial schools) who worked through the Book of the Twelve, each leaving his (or its) own theological biases at strategic places in the text.[45] Their work ranged from approximately 621 to 175 B. C. and "can be traced almost as accurately as the various geological strata on a hillside slope."[46] The insertions of seven of these are discernible in the book of Micah: (a) 1:2-4; 2:12-13; 4:1-4; 5:6 by the Late Exilic Editor (540-500 B. C.); (b) 5:1, 2b-3; 7:11-12 by the Messianist (520-445 B. C.); (c) 4:9-14; 5:4-5, 7-8, 14 by the Nationalistic School of Editors (360-301 B. C.); (d) 2:3e-5; 4:6-8; 5:9-11 by the Eschatologists (310-300 B. C.); (e) 1:5ab, 6-7; 5:12-13 by the Anti-Idol Polemist (300-275 B. C.); (f) 6:6-8; 7:1-10, 13-14, 16-20 by the Psalm Editor (275-250 B. C.); and (g) 1:1; 4:5; 5:2a; 6:3-5, 16a-c; 7:15 by the Early Scribes who edited the Pentateuch. Of course, this view goes hand in hand with the idea that the prophetic books have no literary or logical pattern.

In contrast to this kind of approach, it seems justifiable to suggest the possibility that redactors of biblical materials had a great respect for the traditions they inherited, that their theology was shaped by those traditions, and that a major reason they passed those traditions on to their audiences was that they were convinced this material spoke meaningfully to the new situations in which they and their audiences found themselves. In the final analysis, the modern critic must, at some point, wrestle with the problem of relating the theology of the redactor to that of the traditions he edited.

IV. Interpreting the Text

While it is valuable and necessary to deal generally with hypothetical explanations of the functions of redactors in the shaping of biblical books and works, the interpretation of the text is crucial to one's evaluation of the redactional process. This is true of one's appraisal of the book as a whole. For example, one evaluator sees the repetition of šim'û in Micah 1:2; 3:1; and 6:1 along with the key words rō'š in 2:13 and 3:1 and šm' in 5:14 and 6:1 as indications of a threefold division of the book into chapters 1-2, 3-5, 6-7.[47] Another contends that the repetition of šm' in 1:2 and 5:14 in conjunction with the ʿammîm and gôyîm shows that chapters 1-5 are to be taken together as "einer prophetischen Gerichtsliturgie."[48] The same problem exists with regard to the interpretation of specific texts within the completed corpus. Some of the most crucial relevant passages in the book of Micah include at least 1:1, 2-4, 5e-f, 6-7, 9c-d, 13c-f; 2:5, 12-13; 3:2b-3b; 4:1-5, 10e-h; 5:4a, d-e, 14; 6:6-7, 9, 16; 7:7, 11, 14, 20.

It is impossible to deal with each of these passages in this paper. The purpose here is to mention types of problems the critic faces as he attempts to reconstruct the development of the material that lies before him and the role of the redactors in that development and in the arrangement of the final form of the book.

Scope of the Superscription. The tendency is to assume that the superscription in 1:1 belongs to the final stage of the redactional process and was intended to cover the whole book. Some argue that all but the last line covers the entire book, and that the final redactor added that line to make the superscription apply only to what immediately followed.[49] Apart from the question of redactional stages within 1:1 itself, one must question the validity of an assumption that it was intended to cover the whole book.[50] The superscription of the book of Jeremiah (Jer. 1:1-3) purports to cover a period from the thirteenth year of Josiah to the fall of Jerusalem in the eleventh year and fifth month of Zedekiah (627-587 B. C.), yet there are several sections in that book dated after this time (e. g., chapters 40-44; 52:31-34).[51] This superscription, then, does not cover the whole book in its present final form. The same could be true of the superscription of the book of Micah.

Nature of the Terminology. Micah 5:4d-e speaks of God's people raising up against Assyrian invaders "seven shepherds and eight princes of men." Some interpret these as demonic or angelic powers to be used by the Messiah. Others think they are Israel's vassals who fight side by side with

them in times of war. Others regard them as (inadequate or adequate) Jewish rulers. Among those who hold the view, some take the numbers literally (either eight or fifteen) and apply this text to the Maccabean leaders Mattathias, his five sons, and the two sons of Simon, or to an alliance of Jewish rulers summoned to stop the advance of Antiochus III (218-198 B. C.), or to the Davidic dynasty; while some take them as indefinite and apply the passage to the messiah's subordinates or to a group of leaders sufficient or insufficient to the task. Still others interpret this phraseology as an idiomatic way of speaking of sufficiency.[52]

One's interpretation of these two lines has a direct bearing on his understanding of the redaction of the book. If the passage is taken literally, it clashes with the promise of the coming of one ruler in verses 1-4a, indicating that 4b-5b comes from a different hand than 1-4a, 5c-e; and if the reference is to the Maccabean rulers, this might date the time of the final redaction of the book. However, if the expression is an idiom for adequate leadership, the perieope might include 4:14-5:5 and conceivably date from the period just after Sennacherib's invasion of Jerusalem. Then it would not be helpful in dating the final redaction of the book.

Identification of the Speaker. Some consider Micah 6:6-7 to be rhetorical questions of the prophet used as a teaching device perhaps in a cultic setting (like Ps. 15:1). Others think this text preserves a dialogue between one or two speakers in the audience and the prophet. The determination of this issue is related to one's understanding of the extent of the pericope including these verses, which is variously thought to range all the way from 6:6-8 to 6:1-16.[53] The conclusion pertains to the view of the structure of the entire book and to the date assigned to its final redaction depending on the perception of the period to which a Torah Liturgy of the type represented in verses 6-8 belongs.

Micah 2:12-13 is often interpreted as a late postexilic hope oracle directed to destitute Jewish exiles. However, van der Woude has offered a logical and intriguing proposal that this little passage contains the words of pseudo-prophets who opposed Micah, and that 2:6ff. contains a Disputationswort or dialogue between Micah and these prophets (cf. 2:7; 3:11; and the dialogue between Amaziah and Amos in Amos 7:10-17).[54] If one follows van der Woude, these verses belong to the time of Micah and have no direct bearing on the redaction of the final form of the book. On the other hand, if they are a late postexilic hope oracle inserted into the text at this point for some theological purpose, they might contain important clues concerning the final redaction.

Identification of the Audience. The hope oracles in the book of Micah have long been a source of scholarly discussion. Many assume that these oracles were directed to the whole body of Jewish exiles in Babylon or their descendants and thus are exilic or postexilic. Micah 4:1-3 (=Isa. 2:2-4) is a case in point. The majority of scholars think later editors inserted the same oracle in two different places in the prophetic literature. Others contend that Micah borrowed from Isaiah; others, that Isaiah borrowed from Micah.[55] Kapelrud, however, contends that this is a cultic text originating very early probably in connection with the great Autumn New Year Festival, and that Micah (and Isaiah) borrowed it from this setting.[56] It is striking that there are at least five links between 3:9-12 and 4:1-5: (1) both are concerned with the role of Zion and Jerusalem (3:10, 12; 4:2); (2) 3:12 announces the diminution of the "mountain of the house" of the Lord, whereas 4:1 declares its exaltation; (3) there is a contrast between the wickedness of the "heads" of the house of Jacob (3:9, 11) and the divine determination to establish the temple mountain as the "head" (in both instances the Hebrew word is rō'š) of the mountains; (4) 3:10 speaks of building Zion with blood and wrong, whereas 4:1-2 speaks of establishing it as the center from which Yahweh's teaching or word can emanate; (5) 3:11 condemns the religious leaders of Jerusalem for "judging" and "teaching" for selfish purposes, while 4:2-3 proclaims that Yahweh will "teach" the nations his ways and "judge" between them justly (in both instances, the verb for "judge" is šaphat and for "teach" yarah). One cannot help but wonder how many links like this are necessary to support the view that the passages involved come from the same speaker or writer.[57] Assuming, for argument's sake, that 4:1-3 originated in the cult, it is conceivable that 4:1-5 is from Micah himself. His audience might have been his own disciples, and he might have delivered this oracle on a different occasion from that presupposed in 3:9-12. In fact, it might have been his response to questions or thoughts from his disciples arising from their having heard him deliver 3:9-12 to a larger Judean audience. On the other hand, it is not absolutely certain that 4:1-3 in its present context is a hope oracle. Verse 5 might reflect a situation in which Micah was addressing himself to a Judean audience that was trusting in foreign idols, and he used a familiar cultic song as a means of trying to persuade them to walk in the light of Yahweh.

Numerous other pertinent observations could be made on this much debated text. But enough has been said to emphasize that one's understanding of the audience addressed by an oracle colors his view of the redactional development of the book in which that oracle appears.

Circumstance. The situation to which Micah 1:6-7 (or portions thereof) has been assigned is much debated. At least five explanations have been proposed. (a) Jepsen contended, on the basis of linguistic considerations, that these verses originally belonged in Hosea 13; as the LXX testifies, in an early stage of the prophetic corpus the book of Hosea stood just before the book of Micah, and it is easy to see how a passage at the end of Hosea could have been transferred to the beginning of Micah.[58] (b) Haupt assigned it to the period after John Hyrcanus sacked the city of Samaria and sold the votive offerings (107 B. C.).[59] (c) Lescow interprets it as an anti-Samaritan polemic perhaps connected with the Samaritan erection of a sanctuary when they received permission from Alexander the Great in the latter half of the fourth century B. C.[60] (d) Since this text predicts the destruction of Samaria and Samaria was not destroyed but only captured by Sargon II in 721 B. C., many scholars date this oracle after 721 and often connect it with Sennacherib's invasion of Jerusalem in 701 B. C.[61] (e) Many scholars think 1:5a-d, 6-7 were originally delivered in North Israel before the overthrow of Samaria in 721 B. C., and then later reapplied to Judah by Micah or some other Judean prophet perhaps in connection with Sennacherib's invasion in 701 B. C.[62]

The circumstance lying behind this passage had little significance for determining the period and setting if the more widely held scholarly position is correct (that is, either d or e). But Lescow insists that these verses were among the last inserted into the book and place the final redaction during the Samaritan Schism in the fourth century B. C.

Concluding Remarks

It is time for scholars to take a new look at Old Testament books in their present form in an attempt to discover clues as to the nature of their structure, the functions of redactors in their formation, and the theological emphases which they communicated to their intended audiences. While comprehensive statements are helpful, a major task now seems to be that of reexamining the text verse by verse and pericope by pericope with a redaktionsgeschichtliche assessment in mind.

FOOTNOTES

1. See e. g., K. Budde, "Eine folgenschwere Redaktion des Zwölfprophetenbuchs, "Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 39 (1921), 218-229; R. E. Wolfe, "The Editing of the Book of Twelve," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 53 (1935), 90-129; O. Eissfeldt, "Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der Prophetenbücher des Alten Testaments," Theologische Literaturzeitung, 73 (1948), cols. 529-534; H.-J. Kraus, "Zur Geschichte des Überlieferungsbegriffs in der alttestamentlichen Wissenschaft," Evangelische Theologie, 16 (1956), 371-387; K. Koch, Was ist Formgeschichte? (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964)=The Growth of the Biblical Tradition, translated by S. M. Cupitt (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969); H. Ringgren, "Litterärkritik, formhistoria, traditionshistoria--eller vad?" Religion och Bibel, 25 (1966), 45-56; R. Rendtorff, "Litterarkritik und Traditionsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, 27 (1967), 138-153; Norman Perrin, What is Redaction Criticism? (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969); R. H. Stein, "What is Redaktionsgeschichte?" Journal of Biblical Literature, 88 (1969), 45-56; W. E. Rast, Tradition History and the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972); D. A. Knight, Rediscovering The Traditions of Israel, SBL Dissertation Series 9 (Missoula, Montana: Society of Biblical Literature, 1973); J. A. Wharton, "Redaction Criticism, OT," The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, Supplementary Volume (1976), 729-732; R. T. Fortna, "Redaction Criticism, NT," The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, Supplementary Volume (1976), 733-735; G. W. Coats and B. O. Long, editors, Canon and Authority (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977); D. A. Knight, editor, Tradition and Theology in the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977); and W. E. March, "Redaction Criticism and the Formation of Prophetic Book," Society of Biblical Literature 1977 Seminar Papers (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977), 87-101.

2. March, 98.

3. A number of articles and books appeared in recent years dealing with the redaction of the book of Micah, among which may be mentioned J. T. Willis, "The Structure of the Book of Micah," Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok, 34 (1969), 5-42; A. S. van der Woude, "Micah in Dispute with the Pseudo-Prophets," Vetus Testamentum, 19 (1969), 244-260); J. Jeremias, "Die Deutung der Gerichtsworte Michas in der Exilszeit," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 83 (1971), 330-354; Th. Lescow, "Redaktionsgeschichtliche Analyse von Micha 1-5," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 84 (1972), 46-85; "Redaktionsgeschichtliche Analyse von Micha 6-7," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 84 (1972), 182-212; J. T. Willis, "A Reapplied

Prophetic Hope Oracle," Studies on Prophecy, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, 26 (1974), 64-76; J. L. Mays, Micah, A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976); A. S. van der Woude, Micha, De Prediking van het Oude Testament (Nijkerk: G. F. Callenbach, 1976); J. L. Mays, "The Theological Purpose of the Book of Micah," Beiträge zur alttestamentlichen Theologie, Festschrift für Walther Zimmerli zum 70. Geburtstag (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977) 276-287; B. Renaud, La Formation du Livre de Michée (Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie, 1978).

4. Speaking of Micah 4-7, J. Lindblom (Micha literarisch untersucht [Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1929] , 82, writes: "Sie sind aus sehr disparaten Elementen zusammengesetzt, von denen ein jedes mit Hinsicht auf den Inhalt und die Entstehungszeit eine selbständige Behandlung verdient." He takes a consistent position on this point throughout his work. Similarly, S. Mowinckel (Prophecy and Tradition [Oslo: Jacob Dybwad, 1946] , 40) states that one of the exegete's tasks is to separate out the individual units within the larger traditional complex. "Only when he has succeeded in this can he attempt to make a satisfactory reply to the question why these originally independent units have been placed together in the tradition, and what the transmitters may have meant by it--if they have meant anything at all, apart from collecting in groups the sayings they felt had a certain affinity to each other."

5. "Wo nur immer eine scharfe Drohung in den alten Texten vorlag, fügten die Späteren gern sofort einzelne Worte oder Sätze hinzu, welche die Aufhebung der Drohung aussprechen sollten." G. Hölscher, Die Profeten. Untersuchungen zur Religionsgeschichte Israels (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1914), 457. W. Nomack ("Micha," Göttingen Handkommentar zum Alten Testament, Dritte Auflage, 4 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1922] , 197) suggests that the redactor of the book of Micah probably inserted 4:1-4 "um ein Gegengewicht gegen v. 3 12 mit seiner düsteren Perspektive zu bilden." With regard to 2:12-13, Lindblom (67-68) writes: "Entweder wird eine Heilsweissagung an ein Gerichtswort angeknüpft, um in liturgischem Interesse das dunkle Zukunftsbild mit einem helleren zu ergänzen, oder werden die Vorstellungen von einer glücklichen, Zukunft, die auch bein den ältesten Propheten bisweilen hervorbrechen, vervollständigt und weiter ausgeführt."

6. J. Bright, "Modern Study of Old Testament Literature," The Bible and the Ancient Near East. Essays in honor of William Foxwell Albright, edited by G. E. Wright (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), 19.

7. Koch (Growth, 57) states succinctly: "The history of the transmission of traditions . . . takes the final form of a unit and investigates the various stages it has been through . . ., in order to get back to the oldest ascertainable versions of it." Fortna (733) affirms that

methodologically "we must go backward from his (the author's) finished work, using as far as possible the insights of form criticism." Very recently B. W. Anderson ("From Analysis to Synthesis: The Interpretation of Genesis 1-11," Journal of Biblical Literature, 97 [1978] , 25) wrote: "one is compelled to agree that the proper starting-point methodologically is with the text as given, not with the reconstruction of the prehistory of the text."

8. K. Marti, "Micha," Das Dodekapropheton (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] , 1904), 262.

9. G. W. Wade, The Books of the Prophets Micah, Obadiah, Joel, and Jonah (London: Methuen & Co., Lts., 1925), xx.

10. L. Gautier, Introduction à l'Ancien Testament, 3rd ed., I (Lausanne: Librairie Payot & Cie. (1939), 502.

11. K. Budde, "Verfasser und Stelle von Micha iv 1-4 (Jes. ii 2-4)," Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 81 (1927), 157.

12. This was the view of G. H. A. von Ewald, Commentary on the Prophets of the Old Testament, translated by J. F. Smith, II (London: Williams and Norgate, 1876), 325-326; and has been espoused most recently by Mays, Micah, A Commentary; "Theological Purpose."

13. W. R. Smith, The Prophets of Israel and Their Place in History to the Close of the Eighth Century B. C. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1882), 427 note 3; 428 note 5.

14. W. W. G. Baudissin, Einleitung in die Bücher des Alten Testaments (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1901), 525-526, 529, 532-533.

15. P. Haupt, "The Book of Micah," The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, 26 (1910), 201-252; 27 (1910), 1-62; A. Hanon, Connaître la Bible (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), 12-14; J. Scharbert, Die Propheten Israels bis 700 v. Chr. (Köln: J. P. Bachem, 1965), 310-335.

16. H. J. Elhorst, De Prophetie van Micha (Arnhem: K. van der Zande, 1891); J. Halévy, "Le Livre de Michée," Revue Sémitique, 12 (1904), 97-117, 193-216, 289-312; 13 (1905), 1-22; H. Schmidt, "Micha," Die Schriften des Alten Testaments, II/2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1915), 130-153.

17. B. Stade, "Bemerkungen über das Buch Micha," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 1 (1881), 161-172; C. H. Cornill, Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament, translated by G. H. Box (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 343-347; T. K. Cheyne, "Micah" and

"Micah (Book)," Encyclopedia Biblica, 3 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902), cols. 3072-3073.

18. Stade, 170.

19. Stade, 169, 171.

20. K. Marti, Das Dodekapropheton. Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament, XIII (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1904), 262-264. Marti (263) states emphatically: "Man wird versuchen müssen, die Entstehung des jetzigen Buches aus einem allmählichen Anwachsen verschiedener fremder Bestandteile zu erklären."

21. G. B. Gray, "Micah, Book of," Dictionary of the Bible, edited by J. Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), 614-615. Commenting on the growth of the book, Gray (615) writes: "It is impossible to determine through how many stages of editorial treatment the book passed, but some of these stages certainly fell within the post-exilic period." In his later work, A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 219, Gray denies the authenticity of 4:14; 5:9-13; 6:1-7:6.

22. R. E. Wolfe, "The Book of Micah," The Interpreter's Bible, VI (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1956), 899-900.

23. Wolfe, 900.

24. J. Marsh, Amos and Micah. Torch Bible Commentaries (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959), 87ff, 106, 110.

25. Jeremias, "Deutung," 330-354, especially 352-354.

26. G. Hylmö, Kompositionen av Mikas Bok (Lund: Gleerupska Universitets Bokhandeln, 1919), 286-288.

27. Hylmö, 286.

28. Hylmö, 142.

29. Lescow, "Redaktionsgeschichtliche Analyse," 46-85, 182-212.

30. For a detailed discussion of these views, see J. T. Willis, "The Structure of Micah 3-5 and the Function of Micah 5:9-14 in the Book," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 81 (1969), 191-214.

31. Koch, Growth, 59.

32. G. A. Danell, Studies in the Name Israel in the Old Testament (Uppsala: Appelbergs Boktryckeri--A.-B., 1944), 13-14. Cf. similarly H. F. Hahn, The Old Testament in Modern

Research (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1954), 155-156.

33. A. Weiser, Das Buch der zwölf kleinen Propheten. Das Alte Testament Deutsch, 24 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 231.

34. Lindblom, 142.

35. Mays, "The Theological Purpose," 277.

36. March, 95.

37. So Lindblom, A. George, "Michée (Le Livre de)," Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément, V (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1952), col. 1259; Weiser, 237; and W. Beyerlin, Die Kulttraditionen Israels in der Verkündigung des Propheten Micha (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959), 13.

38. J. T. Willis, "A Reapplied Prophetic Hope Oracle," Studies on Prophecy. Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, 26 (1974), 64-76.

39. Weiser, 254.

40. L. P. Smith, "The Book of Micah," Interpretation, 6 (1952), 210. Cf. Similarly R. F. von Ungern-Sternberg, Der Rechtsstreit Gottes mit seiner Gemeinde: Der Prophet Micha. Die Botschaft des Alten Testaments, 23/III (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1958), 11. O. Schilling, "Michäas," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 7 (Freiburg: Herder, 1962), col. 391; and K. J. Grimm, Euphemistic Liturgical Appendixes in the Old Testament (Leipzig: August Pries, 1901), especially 1-8.

41. W. Nowack, "Micha," Die Kleinen Propheten. Göttingen Handkommentar zum Alten Testament, 3. Auflage, 4 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1922), 197. Cf. also Grimm, 82.

42. P. F. Bloomhardt, "The Book of Micah," Old Testament Commentary, edited by H. C. Alleman and E. E. Flack (Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1948), 845.

43. For rather extensive treatments of the work of redactors, see A. Condamin, "Interpolations ou Transpositions Accidentalles?" Revue Biblique, 11 (1902), 379: and particularly in the book of Micah, Lindblom, 160.

44. Cf. J. T. Willis, "The Function of Comprehensive Anticipatory Redactional Joints in I Samuel 16-18," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 85 (1973), 194-214.

45. R. E. Wolfe, "The Editing of the Book of the Twelve," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 53 (1935), 90-125.

46. Wolfe, 125.

47. Willis, "Structure," 12, 39-40.

48. Lescow, "Redaktionsgeschichtliche Analyse," 58.

49. Cf. Schmidt, 131 note 1; T. H. Robinson, "Micha," Die zwölf kleinen Propheten. Handbuch zum Alten Testament, 3. Auflage, XIV/1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1964), 130.

50. Initially S. Mowinkel ("Mikaboken, Oversettelse med noter og tekstkritisk kommentar," Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift, 29 [1928], 3, 20) argued that chapters 1-5 and 6-7 were two originally independent collections and that 1:1 was the superscription only for 1-5. Later, however (Det Gamle Testamente. III. De Senere Profeter [Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1944], 667, 670), he proposed that 1-3 perhaps should be separated from 4-5 and that 1:1 is the heading only of 1-3 since these are the only chapters in the book containing oracles against Samaria and Jerusalem.

51. G. M. Tucker ("Prophetic Superscriptions and the Growth of a Canon," Canon and Authority, edited by G. W. Coats and B. O. Long [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977], 65) recognizes the problem with Jeremiah 1:1-3, but does not discuss possible inplications of this for other prophetic superscriptions.

52. For a full discussion of these positions with bibliography, see J. T. Willis, "Micah IV 14-V 5--A Unit," Vetus Testamentum, 18 (1968), 539-542. See also the more recent studies of J. Coppens ("Le Cadre Littéraire de Michée V:1-5," Near Eastern Studies in Honor of William Foxwell Albright [Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1971], 57-62) and K. J. Cathcart ("Micah 5, 4-5 and Semitic Incantations," Biblica, 59 [1978], 38-48).

53. On this problem, see J. T. Willis, "Review of Micha 6, 6-8. Studien zu Sprache Form und Auslegung, by Th. Lescow," Vetus Testamentum, 18 (1968), 273-278.

54. Van der Woude, "Micah in Dispute," 256-257; Micha, 94-98.

55. On these three options, cf. E. Cannawurf, "The Authenticity of Micah IV 1-4," Vetus Testamentum, 13 (1963), 26-33, who takes the view that Isaiah 2:2-4 and Micah 4:1-4 were postexilic insertions into these two prophetic works.

56. A. S. Kapelrud, "Eschatology in the Book of Micah," Vetus Testamentum, 11 (1961), 395-396.

57. E. Nielsen (Oral Tradition [Chicago: Alec R. Allenson Inc., 1954] , 92) goes so far as to say: "The thought forces itself upon us that these passages (i. e., 3 9-12 and 4 1-5) cannot even have originated independently of each other."

58. A. Jepsen, "Kleine Beiträge zum Zwölfprophetenbuch," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 66 (1938), 96-99.

59. Haupt, "The Book of Micah," 26, 239; 27, 60; "Micah's Capucinade," Journal of Biblical Literature, 29 (1910), 95.

60. Lescow, "Redaktionsgeschichtliche Analyse," 82-83.

61. See Baudissin, 519; A. Clamer, "Michée," Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, X (1929), col. 1653; J. Marty, "Michée," L'Ancien Testament, II. Les Prophétes (Paris: Société Biblique de Paris, 1947), 769; et al.

62. See G. B. Gray, A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 218; Hylmö, 31-34; Scharbert, 315; et al.

S 110

THE FORMATION OF ISAIAH CH. 1: ITS CONTEXT IN CHS. 1-4

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Isaiah has received more than its share of attention through the centuries. Time precludes more than a summary glance at the most recent studies, as they apply to chapter 1.

Georg Fohrer with characteristic thoroughness has summarized the view of literary-historical criticism.[1] He notes general agreement for an outline like this (p. 149):

1:2-3 the sin
1:4-9 the judgment because of the sin
1:10-17 the possibility of being saved
1:18-20 the decision for judgment or salvation
1:21-26 a possible realization of salvation.

He then goes on to suggest, in agreement with Weiser, Kaiser, and others, that ch. 1 is a summary of the main themes of Isaiah's ministry.

L.G. Rignell examines the relation between the text of Isaiah 1 and the Book of Deuteronomy, particularly chs. 28-32.[2] He finds in Isaiah 1 a "coherent text ... not only an assemblage of oracles." His study of similar style and vocabulary establishes a "close relation between Isaiah chapter 1 and some texts of Deuteronomy, specially passages in chapters 28-32" (p. 157). He finds a striking resemblance between the messages of Isaiah 1 and Deuteronomy.

Fohrer's coldly analytical approach reminds one of a lecturer on physiology picking up human bones to identify them by name to a class. Rignell, on the other hand, flits lightly over the material with erudite observations on similar phrasaeology and ideas. His argument for coherence of Isaiah ch. 1 is suggestive, but hardly solves the problems in the structure of the chapter.

Neither of these approaches has satisfactorily met the issues raised by the chapter. The Book of Isaiah is not a collection of fossils to be neatly collected and classified. Nor is it simply a data file to help us piece together the life and sayings of a certain prophet named Isaiah. Rignell's comparison with Deuteronomy is very helpful in some ways, but leaves many other questions about that comparison unanswered.

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1 G. Fohrer, "Jesaja 1 als Zusammenfassung der Verkündigung Jesajas," ZAW 74 (1962) 251-268. Reprinted Studien zur alttestamentlichen Prophetie (1949-1965). (BZAW 99; Berlin: Topelman, 1967) 148-167.

2 L.G. Rignell, "Isaiah Chapter 1," ST 2 (1957)140-158.

It would be presumptuous to suppose that another effort would resolve the mystery of meaning and formation of this chapter (or this book).[3] But a few suggestions may open some new doors. This paper will be concerned with the Book of Isaiah as literature. It will ask about its purpose, its message, its style and structure. It will seek to allow the literature itself to dictate the method and the approach. It will attempt to let the text elicit the questions and provide the answers in the quest.

There are many unanswered questions concerning prophetic literature.[4] One of these is particularly pertinent here. What is the difference between prophetic narrative, as found in Kings and in ch. 7 and 36-39 of Isaiah, and the oracular literature which dominates the Latter Prophets? Is the vision of the prophet and the word of Yahweh the same in both? It is important to note that there is no narrative in Isaiah chs. 1-5. Even specific historical identification of the prophet or the chronological period is limited to the superscriptions (or are they superscriptions?) in 1:1 and 2:1.

A second important question concerns Isaiah's relation to the Latter Prophets. This is of much too great an import to begin to discuss here. But one must note that Isaiah ch. 1 not only introduces the Book of Isaiah, but in almost all collections of the Canon introduces the books of literary prophecy known as the Latter Prophets.

But here the question concerns chapter one. A beginning can be made with a direct inductive analysis. Perhaps this approach should be placed under rhetorical criticism.[5]

A RHETORICAL APPROACH

A number of passages in the chapter are in the 2nd person. Who speaks in this chapter? Who is addressed?

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[3]Roy F. Melugin's conclusions are suggestive here: The Formation of Isaiah 40-55. BZAW 141. Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, (1976) 175-178.

[4]Cf. the excellent survey by Gene Tucker, "Prophetic Speech," Int xxxii (1978) 31-45.

[5]Cf. James Muilenburg, "Form Criticism and Beyond," JBL 88 (1969) 1-18; J.J. Jackson and Martin Kessler, ed., Rhetorical Criticism, Essays in Honor of James Muilenburg. Pittsburg, Pa.: The Pickwick Press (1974).

Passage	Speaker	One(s) Addressed	Subject
1:1	Editor	Readers	The Vision (the Book) Participants: Isaiah, Judah and Jerusalem. The Setting: Jerusalem, last half of the 8th century.
1:2a	Prophet	Witnesses: Heavens and Earth (H & E)	JHWH's suit against Israel.
1:2b-3	JHWH	H & E	" " " "
1:4	Prophet	H & E	" " " "
1:5-7	Prophet	People of Israel (Ye)	" " " "
1:8	Prophet	H & E	JHWH's suit against Zion.
1:9	People of Jerusalem(we)	H & E	" " " "
1:10	"	Rulers of Jerusalem	" " " "
1:11-17	JHWH	" " "	" " " "
1:18-20	JHWH	(Ye) People of Jerusalem or the rulers or people of Jerusalem & Israel	Invitation to obedience.
1:21	Prophet	H & E	JHWH's suit against Zion.
1:22-23	Prophet	(Thee) Jerusalem	" " " "
1:24	JHWH	H & E	JHWH's decision.
1:25-26	JHWH	(Thee) Jerusalem	" " : Purge.
1:27-28	Prophet	H & E	Expected results.
1:29-30	Prophet	(Ye) People of Jerusalem	" "
1:31	Prophet	H & E	" "

This analysis should be enough to show that the structure of the chapter has much more movement and life, than one would guess from Fohrer's outline. Each topic is presented by more than one "speaker" and addressed to more than one group.

The first verse is clearly important and a part of the structure of the chapter.[6] It designates the nature of the literature to follow: A Vision.[7] It names the person who has the major role: Isaiah, son of Amoz.[8] It also lists the groups involved: Judah and Jerusalem.[9] It would be difficult to understand Deut. 32 in its position in the book without 31:30. It would be similarly impossible to understand Isaiah chapter 1ff. without 1:1. We should therefore not think of this as a superscription which is only loosely placed here at a late date. At whatever time the chapter stood in this form it needed this first verse to introduce the speakers and those spoken to.

What modern model is there for this art form? It is a kind of literary drama. Perhaps like an oratorio or an opera. If the "vision" can be understood like a stage with persons who speak, and are spoken to, the chapter (and perhaps the book or a part of the book to follow) may effectively be read or heard as an opening scene.

In the chapter JHWH is identified as speaker on several occasions. Where no other speaker is identified, the prophet may be understood to speak.[10] Where the speech is in the first person plural, the people speak.[11]

The prophet's speech in 1:2a introduces two very important witnesses, the heavens and the earth.[12] They will hear JHWH's complaint and witness his judgment. It is assumed that they are addressed whenever there is no direct 2nd person (singular or plural) address. During the proceedings, both JHWH and the prophet address Judah and Jerusalem. They also speak to Israel, apparently the people of the Northern Kingdom.[13] Sometimes they are addressed in the singular (as

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[6]Cf. the relation of Deut. 31:30 to the Song of Moses.

[7]Note that Deut. 32 is called a Song.

[8]Deut. 31:30 names Moses.

[9]Deut. 31:30 cites the assembly of Israel. The preposition עַל means "upon." It could mean "concerning" or "against." But it can also mean "in front of" (cf. Jer. 6:10; Gen. 18:8).

[10]An even greater role than that of the "Evangelist" in a Bach Passion oratorio.

[11]Except for vs. 18.

[12]Cf. Deut. 32:1.

[13]In spite of the appearance of only Judah and Jerusalem in 1:1.

Jerusalem or Israel). At other times there is an appeal directly to the people or to some group of the people in the second person plural.

The issue is a family problem that has gotten out of hand. Outsiders are called in to witness the proceedings to testify to the fairness with which they are conducted.

FORM CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS[14]

Summoning Heavens and Earth as witnesses is a reminder of Deut. 32 which in turn has been compared with the Covenant Law Suit genre.[15] A number of similar motifs, beginning with God's reference to Israel as God's children (vs. 5), can be seen as links between the two passages. These will be dealt with below.

What is the proper unit in Isaiah to be compared with Deut. 32? The common beginning has been noted. Does the end of chapter 1 correspond to the end of Deut. 32? A look at both chapters will be necessary to answer that.[16] Here is a parallel rhetorical analysis done for Isaiah 1 and Deut. 32.

Passage	Speaker	One(s) Addressed	Subject	Isa. 1
31:30	Editor	Readers	Introduction: participants	1
32:1-2	Moses	Heavens & Earth	Witnesses summoned	2
32:3-4	Moses	" " "	Proclamation of Name: JHWH	-
32:5	Moses	" " "	Summary of Complaint against Israel	3
32:6-7	Moses	Israel	Why do you rebel?	4-7
32:8-14	Moses	Heavens & Earth	Summary of Heilsgeschichte	-
32:15-19	Moses	H & E - Israel	Expanded complaint(2:6-8) idolatry	
32:20-25	JHWH	Heavens & Earth	Decision against Israel	(9:1-21)

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[14]Cf. W. Eugene March, "Prophecy," Old Testament Form Criticism, edited by John H. Hayes. San Antonio: Trinity University Press (1974) 141-177.

[15]G. Ernest Wright, "The Lawsuit of God: A Form Critical Study of Deuteronomy 32," Israel's Prophetic Heritage (J. Muilenburg F.S.) edited by B.W. Anderson and W. Harrelson. New York: Harper and Brothers (1962) 26-67.

[16]Rignell, op. cit.

Passage	Speaker	One(s) Addressed	Subject	Isa. 1
32:20-25	JHWH	Heavens & Earth	JHWH's Suit against Zion	8-17
			Invitation to Obedience	18-20
			Decision against Zion	21-31
32:26-27	JHWH	Heavens & Earth	Explanation of mitigation	
32:28-33	Apparently H & E speak		Lament lack of understanding	3b +
32:34-35	JHWH	Heavens & Earth	JHWH's right to vengeance	(2:12ff)
32:36	Moses	" " "	Beyond punishment	26-27
32:37-42	JHWH	Remnant - Israel	Where are your gods?	(2:18-20) (Cf. 41ff.)
32:43	Moses	The nations	Witness JHWH's redemption	(Cf. 34ff.)

Wright identified the genre of Deut. 32 as a "broken riv". Based on the old riv pattern, it has been adapted and expanded to reach its present form.

The same judgment may be given for Isaiah. The book has drawn on the old riv pattern in a very similar way to that in Deut. 32. Chapter one shows some significant divergences.

In vss. 1-7 there is a remarkable parallel to Deut. 31:30-32:7. Deuteronomy includes the proclamation of the Name (vss. 3-4) and the summary of the Heilsgeschichte (vss. 8-14). But the other parts are virtually identical. In the interpretation of Isaiah this is a strong indication that references to Israel or Jacob should be taken to refer to confederacy of tribes, the broader reality of God's election represented in Ephraim and the Northern Kingdom.

In vs. 8 Isaiah brings in a theme that does not exist in Deuteronomy and which could not be related to Moses' time: Zion. There follows a development parallel to that with Israel. But the judgment proposed is decisively different. Whereas Israel/Jacob are being chastized and will be devoted to destruction when they do not repent, Zion's guilt is placed on its rulers and other identified classes. Judgment will purge out these unwanted elements to preserve a pure city for JHWH. Deut. 32:36 looked beyond judgment to redemption for Israel. In Isaiah with the declared 8th century setting, no such hope is entertained at that time for Israel, while the future purposes of God turn to Zion. Other parts of Isaiah will reopen the question of Israel's future.

This comparison of Isaiah 1 with Deut. 32 also raises the question of the propriety of ending the Isaiah unit with the end of the chapter. It was noted that Deuteronomy's complaint about Israel's idolatry finds its Isaiah counterpart in 2:6-8. The record of JHWH's decision against Israel may also be reflected in ch. 2 but is strongly emphasized in 9:1-21.

Is it correct to think of Isaiah 1 as a primary unit in the book? The appearance of an apparent superscription in 2:1 has been taken to suggest that chapter 1 should stand alone as an introduction to the book. But Rignell has recently suggested that 2:1 is intended only for the prophecy which immediately follows it, and therefore does not introduce a new section.[17] It has always been difficult to explain the presence of a second superscription at this point.

The most effective way to test Rignell's thesis is to chart the continued development of the prophecy to determine whether it proves to be a direct continuation of ch. 1 or begins a new segment. So the next task is simply to continue the analysis begun on ch. 1.

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF ISAIAH 2-4

Passage	Speaker	One(s) Addressed	Subject
2:1	Editor	Readers	Announces the word of Isaiah before (or concerning) Judah and Jerusalem.
2:2-4	Prophet	Heavens & Earth	Jerusalem's latter state.
2:5	Prophet	Jacob - people of Israel	Invitation to join the nations in seeking JHWH.
2:6-8	Prophet	JHWH	Israel is forsaken because of idolatry.
2:9-10	Prophet	Israel	Advice to hide.
2:11-21	Prophet (or H&E)	Heavens & Earth (to all)	The day of JHWH: the high presumptions of man humbled.
2:22	H & E	JHWH	Advice to give up on man.
3:1-3	Prophet	Heavens & Earth	JHWH's decision to remove the leadership from Jerusalem.

[17] Rignell, op. cit., 140.

Passage	Speaker	One(s) Addressed	Subject
3:4	JHWH	Heavens & Earth	Inexperienced children will lead.
3:5-11	Prophet	Heavens & Earth	The chaos which follows
3:12a	JHWH	Heavens & Earth	Children and women rule.
3:12b	JHWH	People of Jerusalem	Your leaders mislead you.
3:13-14b	Prophet	Heavens & Earth	Yahweh stands to judge the elders.
3:14b-15	JHWH	Leaders of Jerusalem	Indictment for oppression.
3:16-24	Prophet	Heavens & Earth	Indictment of women of Zion.
3:25-4:1	Prophet	Heavens & Earth	Zion's plight in judgment.
4:2-5	Prophet	Heavens & Earth	Zion after judgment - purged, clean, glorified.

At the beginning of chapter 5 there is a break, marked by the abrupt beginning of vs. 1 without a conjunction and by a change of style. The song of the vineyard followed by a series of "woes." Chapter 6 is the vision of the prophet's call while chapter 7 turns to narrative style. So one may be justified in assuming a natural break and change after chapter 4.

The section 2:5-4:6 develops in a pattern of speeches not unlike that in ch. 1, first speaking of Jacob's sin and decreed judgment (like 1:1-2:7). A new element appears in the description of man (adam) and his pride which must be brought low on JHWH's day (2:11-21). But then the section follows the pattern of ch. 1 by dealing with Zion's sins and the decree for purging corrupt leaders (3:1-4:1 like 1:8-31). Then the section closes with a vision of the purged and renewed city (4:2-6) like 2:2-4.

The essential outline in three parts is repeated a second time. 2:2-4 is, therefore, a necessary third part of the outline. 2:1 applies only to the verses which immediately follow it and serves to emphasize the importance of that passage: this is Isaiah's lasting contribution, "the word" which he, different from all other prophets, brought to and concerning Judah and Jerusalem.

The right pericope, then, is 1:1 through 4:6. All of it displays the vivid interchange of speeches in dramatic

"oratorio" fashion. It is consistent in its announcement of Yahweh's decisions concerning Israel/Jacob on the one side and concerning Judah/Jerusalem/Zion on the other. There are no direct historical references apart from the list of kings in 1:1. Isaiah is not mentioned explicitly aside from the superscription and emphatic note (1:1 and 2:1). In contrast to the sections beginning in ch. 7, historical relevance is not a major feature. In contrast to chs. 5 and following the mention of social injustice is very general. The messages of 1:1-4:6 have considerable relevance in every decade from 740 B.C. through (and even after) 400 B.C.

(It is not possible here to continue the study to the entire book. But one must note a clear similarity in style and application in chs. 28-33.)

MOTIF ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER ONE
with a sketch of appearances in the rest of Isaiah

This portion of the study begins with recognition of the interesting group of words in vs. 3b: "know" and "understand." The people are accused of lacking these and the verses imply an amazement that this is so. Vss. 18-19 use different but related words: reasoning together, being willing, and hearing (being obedient). In vss. 25-27, the word "turn" is used three times.

Isaiah 6:9-10 adds the word "see" but omits the words "be willing" and "reason together." The appearance of the other words together (know, understand, hear, see, and turn) seemed reason enough to wonder at their appearance in chapter one. So the concordance was used to determine appearance in other parts of Isaiah. The result is interesting. Groups of at least three of these words together appear in the following locations:

5:20-21	28:9 +	37:3-9,	40:13-14, 21, 28
6:9-10	29:11-18,	17-20 +	41:20-23, 26, 28-29
	21-24	38:5-8	42:16-18, 22-25
	30:9-10,	39:1-5	43:9-13
	15, 19-20,		44:1-2, 8-9
	30		45:2-6, 20-23
	32:3-4		47:10-11
	33:13-20		48:5-8, 12-20
			49:5-7, 18-26
			50:4, 7, 10
			51:7
			52:6-8, 14-15
			53:1-3, 10-11
			55:2-3, 5, 7, 10
			56:10-11
			57:17-18
			58:2-4
			60:2-5, 16-18
			61:9; 63:15-17
			64:3; 66:4-5, 8,
			14-15, 19.

Even this very rough list is startling, suggesting (on this point at least) a closer relation of ch. 1 and ch. 6 with chapters after 28 than to chapters before that.

A second motif relates to Israel/Jacob and punishment on her which appears in 1:3-7; 2:6-8; 5:25; 7:7-9; 9:8-21; 17: 4-11; 22:3-4; 28:1-8,9-18; 40:27; 41:8-24; 42:24-25; 43:1-7, 22-24, 27-28; 45:9; 46:3; 47:6; 48:1; 49:1-4; 58:1+; 59:1+; 63:10-13; 65:1-7. The continuation of this motif through the entire book is noteworthy.

A third major motif relates to the purging of Jerusalem's sin: 1:8-17, 21ff. This appears again in 3:1; 4:4; 5:13ff; 22:8-14; 29:1+; 30:20+; 31:1+; 32:9+; 33:14+; 48:9; 49:8+, 14+; 50:1+; 52:3-6, 7-10, 11-12; 54:6-8, 17; 62:1+; 64:11; 65:8; 66:8. The way in which the Jacob/Israel and purging of Jerusalem motifs alternate in the book of Isaiah just as they do in ch. 1 is worthy of note in any analysis of the book's structure.

A fourth major motif is the picture of exalted Jerusalem found in 2:2-4. The motif owes much to royal Zion traditions. It occurs in 4:5-6; 8:3-7; 10:12+, 24-27; 12:6; 14:32; 18:7; 22:22; 25:6-7; 26:1+; 28:16; 30:19; 31:4-9; 33:5, 20-22; 34:8; 35:10; 37:33-35; 38:6; 40:9-11; 51:11-16, 17+; 52:1+; 59:20; 60:1+, 10-14, 22+; 61:1-11; 62:1-5; 65:18-19; 66:10-14, 20+.

A picture of ideal conditions often accompanies these promises of the exalted Zion. There are also a number of secondary motifs that are important.

The unique invitation of 1:18-20 has counterparts in 2:5; 24:15; 31:6; a cluster in chapters 41-44; and strong elements in 55:1-3 and 6-7.

The announcements of Yahweh's exclusive exaltation and of "man's" humiliation (linked with references to idolatry) occur at intervals throughout the book.

Citing these instances is enough to demonstrate how threads of meaning, apparent in these first chapters, are a distinctive part of the book's tapestry.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

1. The proper textual unit is Isaiah 1-4.

2. The basic outline is formed by a treatment of Israel's apostasy and judgment, then Judah's need to be purged of its contamination, and finally confirmation of Zion's ultimate exaltation. This occurs twice in these four chapters. These three elements are combined with wonder at the lack of knowledge in a people so favored, recognition of humanity's besetting sins of pride and oppression, and invitations to repent.

3. These elements are seen to continue in varying measure throughout the book of Isaiah.

4. The kerygma of these chapters (and perhaps of the book) is the announcement in 2:2-4 that Zion's destiny to be exalted as the dwelling and throne of Yahweh is secure. This is supported by reminders of man's inevitable humiliation before Yahweh and of Yahweh's insistence on justice.

5. The problematic of the chapters deals with the continued apostasy of both Israel and Judah/Jerusalem. The unbelievable ignorance and stubbornness of the chosen people is a basic problem for the book. Judgment is inevitable. But it is applied differently. For Israel the punishment applies to all. It is a kind of chastisement intended to bring repentance. When unsuccessful it becomes devotion to banishment. For Jerusalem punishment is a purge of those leaders and social elements that have polluted the holy city, with the firm assurance that Yahweh will dwell in her afterward.

6. The chapters lack historical reference (aside from 1:1 and 2:1) and any personal involvement with the prophet.

7. The literary style is dramatic and rhetorical with speeches and responses. The larger topics are presented by various speakers and ones addressed. It, therefore, seems unlikely that a satisfactory explanation of the structure and formation of the book can be given until we have a better understanding of this kind of literature and its setting.

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DIRECT AND THIRD PERSON DISCOURSE IN THE NARRATIVE OF THE "FALL"

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This article is presented as a contribution to the general search for paradignatic models which may be useful in determining the narrative process which guided the production of the Biblical narrative.

The major portion of the paper will be necessarily devoted to an attempt to lay out the critical theoretical issues which have arisen in particularly the French research on narratives structures. The last portion will bring this discussion into relation to the major features of the Pentateuchal narrative, and culminate with an analysis of the central structural feature of the story of the "fall" in Gen. 2:4b-3.

There are a number of assumptions and qualifications that the reader should bear in mind regarding this article. The first is that the basic understanding of the structure of the traditional or "classical" narrative developed by A. J. Greimas is being assumed as normative, and his terminology is being used without definition or explanation in most cases. The second is that, in order to bring into focus the distinctive character of the structure of the Biblical narrative in a single article a number of large problems are being treated lightly or circumvented entirely. Among those circumvented are the problems of historical criticism of the text and the theological implications of this mode of analysis. These problems are not being circumvented because of their lack of importance to the writer, but only because of the impossibility of doing all things within the scope of a single article.

Many apparent qualifications and exceptions to the general structural model will also doubtless occur to the reader, but it was again not possible to put the cart before the horse and deal with all of the particular qualifications and exceptions before the central theory was in place. Part of the purpose of the discussion and research to follow will be to investigate the general applicability of this theory to a wide variety of texts. Likewise the reader should know that the paper has been concluded somewhat arbitrarily in order to keep within certain space limitations, and only the initial stage of the text analysis has been given. These comments thus underscore the strictly "working" nature of this paper.

Jean Calloud, in concluding his introductory discussion of the method of narrative analysis developed by A. J. Greimas, indicates that this method aims at the elucidation of narrative structure by divesting it of its anthropomorphic outer form and explicating narrative meaning in terms of "strictly logical

laws and operations." (1976: 44). He goes ahead to point out that this has led him "to dismiss by economy almost entirely the dimension of enunciation," i.e., the act of speaking (1976: 45). This could lead, in Calloud's judgment, to the unfortunate separation of form and content in which the narrative process could be viewed in terms of "a primary meaning" preexisting in an ideal universe, without form and groping for a means of expression." He thus concludes that the Greimasian type of analysis "must be complemented by research on the problem of enunciation, that is, of the production of the text," and he points to the work of Emil Benveniste (1966) among others, as a starting point for such an investigation.

This article is offered as a contribution to the illumination of the system of constraints which stem from act of speech and serve to shape the surface of narrative, i.e., the final external form which the narrative takes in the text. While these two modes of analysis might be viewed as complementary, one dealing with the so-called "deep" semantic structure, and the other with the "surface" texture, the nature of the complementarity is fraught with troublesome complexities caused at least partially by incompatible semantic systems. The semanticist F. R. Palmer pointed to this difficulty when he wrote: "Indeed it is, or should be clear that the study of semantics is not advanced by being 'reduced' to logic. Logical relations are not relations that in some mysterious way 'underlie' human language. They are merely a convenient way of restating in a precise formulaic way some of the semantic features of language. But their precision is not, as often assumed, always a virtue, since it disguises the complexities and difficulties." (1976: 113). In his view "A great deal of our meaning is not 'ideational' at all, but is 'inter-personal' or 'social,' relating ourselves to others." (1976: 35). In this regard he refers to what the philosopher J. L. Austin (1976) has called "performative utterances," i.e., language which does not primarily serve to transmit information or ideas, but which is a form of action which alters in some way the behaviour of the speaker or hearer or both such as a promise, command or warning. It is clear that the meaning of a promise cannot be reduced to its logical content, but involves more fundamentally the subjective reality of both the giver and receiver.

We are thus confronted with the possibility of two spheres of meaning - one logical and expressed the most perfectly in the form of propositional statements the meaning of which ultimately stems from the truth tables of formal logic, and the other personal, the meaning of which stems from purely subjective factors operating in the relation of the speaker and hearer to the words they speak and hear. This distinction is potentially very significant for narrative analysis because it corresponds to the two fundamental types of discourse found in every narrative, i.e., third person description (which stands in continuity with propositional statements which are always also in the third person), and direct discourse (which corresponds to performative utterances which are the most typically expressed in the form of direct discourse). If performative utterances found in the direct discourse of narratives operate on the basis of their own form of meaning, then to rewrite the narrative so as to reduce them to propositional statements

which are logically analyzable would immediately exclude that form of meaning from the results of the analysis. It also would involve that form of analysis in a circular procedure which would predetermine the results from the outset. It may be assumed that if the discourse of a narrative is "suppressed" (Greimas, 1966: 139) at the outset and reduced to propositional statements, the semantic content of the narrative will be totally explainable in purely logical terms. It is thus of crucial importance that narrative be examined from the viewpoint of the semantic constraints which may be operative in direct discourse to determine importance which these constraints may have in the formation of the structure of the narrative as well as in the generation of its meaning.

* * *

If the problem of the approach of Greimas lies in the division between the statement (enoncé) and enunciation, as Calloud has said, then the starting point for the exploration of this problem must be those utterances which cannot be reduced to propositional statements but maintain their connection with that which is heterogeneous to logic. According to Palmer, the "Most important are the deictics (what philosophers have called 'indexical expressions,') the pronouns, I, you, etc., the demonstratives this and that and time markers such as now and tomorrow. For these cannot be paraphrased by any other forms that do not themselves indicate the real world, the present time or the relevant speakers and hearers. A theory of meaning in terms solely of sense, of intra-linguistic relations, cannot even in principle handle these terms." (1976: 34).

Significantly, the French linguist, Emil Benveniste, has singled out the deictics for special analysis because he too perceived their unique character. Benveniste argues persuasively that the pronouns I and you have, as their only reference, the instance of discourse in which they are uttered. In answer to the question "What is. . . the 'reality' to which I or you refers?" he says, "I is able to be defined only in terms of 'locution,' not in terms of objects, as is a nominal sign. I signifies 'the person who states the present instance of discourse containing I. . . .I is the 'individual who states the present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance I'" (1966: 252).

Corresponding to this the you is simultaneously established "as the 'individual allocuted in the present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance you." (1966:253).

This means that the I and you cannot be reduced to a propositional statement capable of logical analysis because they do not have any substantial semantic content. It is in fact their semantic emptiness that enables them to perform their function in language of moving continually from one speaker or object to another. As Benveniste says, they constitute a "collection of 'empty' signs, non-referential with relation to 'reality,' always available, . . . which become 'full' as soon as a speaker assumes them in each instance of his discourse." (1966:254). This means that the pronouns have no individual and no concept as their reference, and thus constitute a "class of words . . .

which escape the status of all the other signs of the language." (1966: 261).

The same holds true for the third person pronouns as for I and you, although the third person is not on the same level as the first and second persons. To begin with the third person presupposes a discourse occurring between an unexpressed I and you. As Benveniste says: "The form he. . . derives its value from the fact that it necessarily takes part in a discourse expressed by 'I.'" (1966: 265). But the use of the third person totally displaces reference to its own instance of discourse, and instead serves as a substitute and abbreviation for other elements of the statement: "As one has seen for a long time, the forms such as he, the, that, etc. serve only in the capacity of abbreviative substitutes ('Pierre is sick; he has fever'); they replace or relate the one or the other of the material elements of the statement." (Benveniste: 1976: 256).

Because the actual instance of discourse is concealed behind the he, and the reference of the third person is to an objective entity apart from the enunciator, Benveniste can speak of the third person as a "non-person" (1966: 255). In third person discourse, the speaker is forced to become a non-person in order to articulate that which exists apart from himself.

This distinction between the I/you and third person constitutes one of the primary constraints which operates in the structuration in the surface of the narrative. The exact nature of this constraint will become clear when the connection of the pronouns to illocutory acts is discussed below.

The lack of semantic content of the pronouns enables them to play a unique role in language. They are not empty forms which can be filled with the content of each enunciation, but rather they constitute the linguistic possibility for man to become a subject, i.e., for man to become man. Benveniste says that it is "pure fiction" to imagine that man ever existed apart from language, and thus might be in a position to use language as a mere instrument: "We never attain man separate from language, and we never see him inventing it. . .It is a speaking man that we find in the world, a man speaking to another man, and language teaches the definition itself of man." (1966: 259). Thus he can conclude that, "It is in and by language that man constitutes himself as subject; because language alone founds in reality, in its reality which is that of being, the concept of 'ego'" (1966:259). And more succinctly, "'Ego' is who says 'ego'" (1966: 260). Thus apart from pronouns, man himself does not exist as subject. This would account for the striking fact that "among the signs of a language, of whatever type, epoque or region that it might be, 'personal pronouns' are never missing." (Benveniste, 1966: 261).

But on the other hand, without pronouns, language itself cannot exist. To see this Benveniste says that one must keep in mind the crucial problem which pronouns are able to resolve: "If each speaker, in order to express the sentiment which he has of his irreducible subjectivity, disposed of a distinctive 'indicative' (in the sense that each broadcasting radio station possesses its own 'indicative'), there would be practically as

many languages as individuals and communication would become strictly impossible. Language guards against this danger, by instituting a unique but mobile sign, I, which is able to be assumed by each speaker under the condition that he refer each time only to the instance of his own discourse." (1966:254). He thus can conclude that "Language is only possible because each speaker poses himself as subject in referring to himself as I in his discourse." (1966: 260).

The pronouns thus constitute an irreducible center to language, which, precisely because of their semantic emptiness, serves as the vital linkage betwen language and that which is heterogenous to language. Since they are semantically empty, pronouns can also constitute a system of formal constraints which not only establish the formal possibilities for the speaker to exist as a subject, but also form the horizons of the semantic content which is predicated of the subject. Since the surface of the narrative consists of the interplay between direct discourse and third person discourse, the meaning of the narrative at the surface level could be profoundly affected by the interplay of these pronominal constraints. The remainder of this article now will be devoted to an attempt to lay out the basic outlines of such a system of constraints and to analyze the surface texture of Gen. 2:4b-3 to determine the extent to which these constraints help to explain the surface structure of the narrative and its meaning.

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The first significant constraint built into the structure of pronouns has already emerged in the distinction between the first and second persons, on the one hand, and the third person on the other. To speak in the third person requires the negation of the act of enunciation. A narrative which utilizes only the third person thus cannot contain its own act of enunciation. The full implications of this must be examined below, but they can be seen more clearly by first looking at the constraints that are operative in first and second person direct discourse.

At the purely abstract level, Benveniste points to the fundamental constraints which are inherent in the I/you dyad: "This polarity does not signify equality or symmetry: 'ego' always has a position of transcendence with regard to the you." (1966: 260). The I/you form thus brings with it a hierarchy of positions, the creating, giving I assuming the superior transcendent position, and the you the inferior, receptive position. This does not imply, however, that the I is in any sense independent of the you. On the contrary, the two are bound together in what he calls a relation of complementarity which is governed by the opposition "Interior/exterior" (1966: 260). But this hierarchy does not lead to rigid monological form because the lack of semantic content of the pronouns permits the positions to be reversed easily thereby setting in motion the process of dialogue which is, in principle, endless.

The I and you relation does not occur in the abstract, however, but is always mediated by other verbal constructions which add further constraints to the relation. The most signi-

ficant of these constraints are found in utterances which the philosopher J. L. Austin has termed "performatives" (1975: 4). Performatives not only characteristically occur in the first person indicative, present tense of direct discourse, but share with pronouns the quality of irreducibility. Just as the significance of first and second person pronouns is found, according to Benveniste, in the act of discourse which they signal rather than in a referential semantic content, so also performatives constitute verbal actions the significance of which stems from their simply being uniquely uttered rather than from the truth or falsity of their logical or referential content. Austin thinks in the first instance of examples of performative utterances such as an assumption of a marriage vow with the words "I do," or the naming of a ship with the words, "I name this ship xxx," or the willing of an inheritance with the words, "I give and bequeath my xxx to xxxx," or the making of a bet with the words, "I bet you xxx that xxx." (1975:5). In contrast to statements whose contents can be proven true or false, these utterances, in the instant of their utterance, bring into existence a relationship between the speaker and receiver by virtue of the act of their utterance. As Austin says, "In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing, or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it." (1975: 6).

Austin contrasts the performatives with other utterances whose content is capable of verification, and terms these "constatives." (1975: 3). It is not without importance for this investigation that constatives the most characteristically occur in the form of third person descriptive statements. Thus the performative/constative distinction of Austin corresponds stylistically (in its most representative examples) to the distinction between direct discourse and third person discourse.

To combine then the insights of Austin and Benveniste, one could say that the most characteristic performative statements constitute the utterances which qualify the acts of discourse which occur in the first and second person pronouns by delineating the relationship between the I and you which is established in those instances of discourse.

Before looking at the precise way in which the I and you are typically related in performative utterances it is necessary to see clearly the understanding of meaning which has replaced the traditional basis of meaning in the truth/falsity distinction. It is of course obvious that many performatives contain some degree of propositional or referential content which could be analyzed in terms of its truth or falsity (see esp. Searle, 1970: 22, 23). But the truth or falsity of the propositional content of a performative statement such as a promise or bet is not pertinent to the fundamental meaning of the utterance. Austin thus replaces the terms true and false with the terms "happy/unhappy." These terms refer to the circumstances which are mostly heterogeneous to language itself, that finally determine the "meaning" of performative statements, i.e., whether the words are effective in performing an action or not. As Austin says: "Besides the uttering of the words of

the so-called performative, a good many other things have as a general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to have happily brought off our action." (1975: 14).

One of the most fundamental of these extra-linguistic circumstances is a correspondence between the words uttered and the inner disposition of the person speaking, i.e., if a person promises to do something, he must "mean" to do it. Austin formally expresses it in this way: ". . . a person participating in and so invoking the procedure (i.e., the performative utterance in its conventional form) must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to onduct themselves. . ." (1975: 15). Thus, just as the I necessarily coincides with an instance of discourse which connects language with the heterogeneous reality of the speaker, so the performative utterance defines the subjective reality of the speaker. And if it does not, the statement becomes ineffective, and consequently meaningless.

On the other side are infelicities arising out of the circumstances of the utterance which cause it, in Austin's terms, to "misfire." In one example he imagines himself walking up to a newly constructed ship on the stocks, smashing the bottle hanging from the stem against its side, and proclaiming the name of the ship as the Mr. Stalin while kicking out the chocks to launch it. Austin points out that this would not in effect result in the naming of the ship because, though he went through the form of naming a ship, "my 'action' was 'void' or 'without effect,' because I was not a proper person, had not the 'capacity,' to perform it.

Thus there are factors heterogeneous to language stemming from both the subjectivity of the speaker, the concrete situation of the act of speech and the position of a speaker in a societal hierarchy which determine whether a performative statement is or is not meaningful, i.e., is effective as a signifying action. Austin isolates this meaning producing factor in performative utterances and terms it "illocutionary force." The performative can thus be called an illocutionary act, i.e., "performance of an act in saying something; I call the act performed an 'illocution' and shall refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language here in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces.'" (1975: 99, 100). A constative statement which is only an act of saying something is termed a "locutionary act." (1975: 98) and does not require this heterogeneous element of force in order for it to be significant.

Corresponding to these factors that provide the illocutionary force to the act of utterance, the performative also must lead to a response or sequel of some sort on the part of its recipient or even its giver (as in the fulfillment of a promise). This response can vary from the general bringing about of "the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution," as would be the effect of a successful warning, to the more specific response of obedience which would be a fixed, conventional response to a command, as would the act of fulfillment to a promise. (1975: 117). Questions likewise are performative utterances which invite a response by the receiver

in a certain conventional form. Thus, just as the performative is ineffective when the factors imbuing it with illocutionary force are missing or deranged, so too it cannot be regarded as "happy" if there is no corresponding act of response succeeding the utterance which indicates that the force was effective (e.g., at the very least a warning must be physically heard, and "taken" to be a warning).

For the purposes of this study, it is significant that the performative orients the receiver regarding the proper response which he must make to it just as the speaker is constrained by the conditions which produce illocutionary force. Thus the I/you relation as it occurs concretely in performative utterances is subject to a system of constraints which give shape to the subjectivity of both subjective poles of the dyad. Narrative action which flows from performative utterances would thus already be oriented by the structure of the subjectivity inherent in the particular character of the performative utterance.

Austin concludes his study by making an inventory of all the verbs in the dictionary which, when placed in the first person present indicative, would produce utterances with illocutionary force. He then classifies these verbs into five categories: (1) Verdictives - or verbs which pronounce a verdict by the speaker; (2) Exercitives - or verbs whose utterance constitutes the exercise of powers, rights or influence such as appointing, ordering, warning; (3) Commissives - or verbs which commit the speaker to a course of action such as in promising; (4) Behavitives - or verbs which define social relations and attitudes such as apologizing, congratulating, condoling, cursing, thanking; (5) Expositives - or verbs which articulate the way in which words are used in an argument or conversation such as reply, concede, illustrate, postulate. (1975: 151-164). Austin concedes that many verbs overlap several categories, though each can be assigned fundamentally to one of the five.

It is obvious that the I/you relationship which would be defined by verbs in each of these five categories would be quite different. Austin's five categories thus provide a good starting point for the illumination of the systems of constraints in performative utterances which may influence the course of narrative development, inasmuch as that development is governed by illocutionary acts.

Now that the general character of the restraints which operate in the first and second person discourse have been discussed, we must return to examine the constraints which are peculiarly associated with the third person. The chief distinction which has already emerged between these two modes of discourse is what we may now call the presence or absence of illocutionary force. As Benveniste says: "One sees the difference in replacing "I judge with he judges. While I judge is an engagement, he judges is only a description on the same level as he runs, he smokes." (1966: 265). The third person cannot constitute an action but acquires significance through reference to other actions or objects.

To delineate the constraints operating in the third person

statement more closely, it is necessary to probe briefly into the much debated problem of the possible illocutionary aspect of even these statements which both Austin and Searle have noted. Austin contended that to say "'I state that he did not do it,' is exactly on a level with 'I argue that he did not do it'. . . (and) 'I bet that he did not do it'" (1975: 134). He thus can conclude that, "Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act." (1975: 139). Here, however, it is obvious that the third person statements have been incorporated in first person utterances from which stems the connection between these statements and the "speech situation" producing the illocutionary force.

It is Searle who has been the most precise regarding this problem. He has proposed that all sentences be analyzed in terms of three constituent acts: " (a) the uttering of words (morphemes, sentences); (b) referring and predicating; (c) stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc." (1970: 23). Of these, the latter two are of semantic importance. Referring is the characteristic function of nouns and pronouns and predicating the characteristic function of verbs. The last category contains illocutionary acts which characteristically require an entire sentence to accomplish. From this viewpoint all sentences are illocutionary acts including third person statements such as, "Sam smokes habitually." He considers this an "assertion," of a proposition, and, following Austin's view of the illocutionary nature of statements, views an assertion as a speech act as much as a promise or command. The same reference and prediction (propositional content) can be found in sentences with a different illocutionary form such as, "Sam, smoke habitually." The propositional content can thus be abstracted from its illocutionary context in the sentence. This leads him to the canonical notation which is applicable to all sentences.

F (R P)

The parentheses contain the propositional content in the form of a predicating verb (P), and a referential noun (R); but the whole is qualified by the F which he terms an "illocutionary force indicator" (1970: 31).

The R term has the exclusive role of identifying objects of reference and has no bearing upon the illocutionary aspect of the sentence: "reference always comes neutrally as to its illocutionary force" (1970: 123). The predication, however, "always occurs in one illocutionary mode or another." (1970: 123). In its own right the predicate is "that portion of the total illocutionary act which determines the content applied to the object referred to by the subject expression, leaving aside the illocutionary mode in which that content is applied" (1970: 123). But the predicate is always acted upon by the F term "so as to determine the mode in which it relates to the object referred to by the referring term" (1970: 122).

The inclusion of third person assertions in the category of illocutionary acts had led, however, to at least an incongruity if not an inconsistency in his system. He has accurately de-

scribed the role of predication as determining the content applied to the object of the subject expression (R), and noted the neutrality of the referential role with regard to the illocutionary process. In a third person sentence in which there is no illocutionary verb, or other signifying mark, the only "mode" by which the predicate term connects a given content to the object of the subject expression is also that of identity or complement, and these are as neutral with regard to illocutionary force as reference. Unless the proposition "Sam smokes habitually" is prefaced by the illocutionary phrase, "I assert that. . . ," there is nothing in the sentence itself which would identify the illocutionary mode of the verb, leaving the verb to fall into the illocutionary neutrality characteristic of the noun. Searle seems not to have sufficiently considered the importance of the first person form in endowing statements with illocutionary force.

On the other hand, Searle is doubtless correct in recognizing the need to articulate the relationship between illocutionary force and propositional statements, but has been mistaken in seeing it as a positive one. Rather, it seems that the neutrality of propositional statements has been attained only by the negation of the roots of the statement in an act of speech and its consequent illocutionary force, just as the he is possible only at the price of the displacement of the I of the speaker. The need for this fundamental distinction arises from Searle's illuminating description of the function of predication. In a first person illocutory utterance the verb applies the content of the predicate not to the object of the subject expression, but to the speaking subject itself which exists in form of that very instance of discourse. This creates a direct bond between the content of the predication and the speaking subject which is not created by predication in third person statements where the speaking subject is not verbally present.

This same issue of the relation of the act of the speaker to the process of predication arose in a different form in the grammatical theories of Port-Royal, and later in the logic of Hegel. As Julia Kristeva points out, for the grammarians of Port-Royal, all verbs have an "est" at their center and this verb reflects an act of judgement by which the content of the predicate is "affirmed" of the subject on the basis of logic: "The logical sphere - universal - determines the linguistic expression and confers upon it, its movement. The judgement is then the "deep structure" of all assemblage, apparently arbitrary, of discursive forms. A model is established at two levels thus, of which the determining level is the logical level for it is this which replaces the arbitrary ("the fantasy of man") by the fixed and ordinating point of the judging subject (. . .). . . . 'To judge is to affirm that a thing that we conceive is such or is not such: as when, having conceived that this is the earth and that this is roundness, I affirm of the earth, that it is round' (Grammaire générale)" (1977: 249, 250).

It was Hegel, however, who perceived that the logic operating in the judging subject was a dialectical one in which the subject attained identity with the predicate only through a negation: "But the predicate that one applies to the subject

must still agree, in other words, must be identicle with it." Due to this application, the subjective sense of judgment and the exterior and indifferent existence of the subject and of the predicate find themselves suppressed "(. . .)" (from the Science of Logic, quoted by Kristeva, 1977:251). The possibility of affirming meaning solely in terms of sense relations, i.e., of the oppositions of identity and contradiction, truth and falsehood, depends upon a division between the material and verbal spheres and a suppression of the material sphere as well as the subjective act of judgment: ". . . the foreclosure of the subject of the enunciation represents the foreclosure of the material." (Kristeva, 1977: 252). Though the grammarians of Port-Royal perceived the subjective act which is hidden beneath the is in the statement, "the earth is round," it is precisely this subjective affirmation that is displaced and suppressed by the is so as to establish a purely logical relation of identity between the subject and predicate.

The conclusion must then be that third person statements are not illocutionary acts, dependent upon illocutionary force for their meaning, but rather attain significance through purely logical, sense relations made possible precisely by the suppression of the factor of illocutionary force which binds language to a heterogeneous dimension.

This examination of the third person statement has now disclosed a system of constraints which, together with the system of constraints in performative statements, may be useful in narrative analysis.

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Beginning on the side of the performative statements, it is clear that the first significant constraints that arise from these statements are the constraints which shape the subjectivity of the speaker and hearer, the I and you. As Benveniste has shown, the human subject exists in the instances of speech which coincide with the first and second person pronouns. It is thus the performative utterances whose primary role is that of establishing inter-subjective relations that give rise, in the first instance, to narrative subjects. Those performative statements that are peculiarly suited to creation of the type of dynamic subjective roles required by a narrative thus occupy important places in almost all narratives. Greimas in his study of the semantic structure of narratives concluded that narratives characteristically were set in motion by the violation of an explicit or implicit prohibition and establishment of a contract by means of the giving of a mandate and its acceptance (1966: 195). From these "functions" are derived the basic roles or actantial positions to be filled by the individual personages (or at times objects or qualities). But the way in which e.g. the role of subject of the mandate is established in his position is explained by Calloud as resulting from a "relation. . . linking the sender to the subject for the communication of volition." (1976: 33). To arrive at this accounting of the establishment of the subject, Calloud must transform the

acceptance of the mandate from direct discourse ("I accept" into a third person statement such as X accepted the mandate. According to the predication process of third person statements then, one can abstract the semic quality of volition from the verb accept and describe the essentially empty subject as having been invested with the quality of volition, or having received the communication of the quality of volition. In this way the factor of illocutionary force in a performative statement such as "I accept" is excised so that the meaning of the narrative can be articulated wholly in terms of functions, or as Searle would say, the propositional content of the performative statement (e.g., He has the volition to do it).

While it is obvious that the roles in narratives can be explained in this fashion, it is also clear that they can be explained more economically, following the arguments of Benveniste and Austin, as being created directly by the performative statement, i.e., that the linguistic form of e.g. a mandate, in its concrete utterance, establishes a speaking subject who does not receive the action of the verb (and thus by implication could be called a "sender"), and a receiving subject who is also the object of the action of the verb. Furthermore the conventional form of the mandate requires a response from the receiving subject to complete it as an illocutionary act. The negative subject or opponent role is created by illocutionary actualization of negative response to another performative, the prohibition. The types of actantial roles would thus appear to be generated in the first instance by the linguistic forms of the various performative statements.

In most narratives, however, the direct discourse is embedded in a third person narrative framework where the meaning of the propositional content is also articulated through logical processes. To understand the complex interaction between the illocutionary force and predicate logic in the narrative, the relation of the narrator to the narrative must now be examined. This likewise will provide the starting point for a consideration of the narrative in Gen. 2:4b-3.

The classical narrator speaks in the form of third person discourse. His own subjectivity is thereby displaced by the subjects of his sentences, which are, in turn, transformed into recipients of the semantic content of predication. The meaning which comes to expression in the narrative framework can be directly transferred into propositional statements whose semantic content can be shown to arise from strictly logical processes (such as are revealed in the logical square).

A narrative thus consists of fundamentally non-homogeneous elements; the direct discourse which is characteristically in the form of performative statements whose meaning is determined by their illocutionary force, and the third person narrative framework the meaning of which stems from the logical criteria of truth and falsehood. This produces an invisible barrier between the narrative framework and the direct discourse of the characters which is one of the most central constraints operating on the surface of the narrative. The way in which this line is drawn not only determines basic generic lines between drama, epic or fiction, and biography or history, it also

accounts for important distinctions in narrative modes within the category of fiction (Warren and Wellek, 1956: 222, 223).

One might even contend that without this barrier the figured narrative would not be a possibility, or at least the artifice which supports the narrative would be disclosed to the extent that the very nature of the narrative would be fundamentally changed. The barrier makes the narrative possible, because as Greimas has shown, narratives characteristically require not only a subject but also an anti-subject or opponent. The possibility of the opponent is generally actualized at the syntagmatic level by the violation of an explicit or implicit prohibition. But the violation of a prohibition is an alienating act that severs the relationship between the I of the prohibitor and the you of the prohibited so absolutely that the inner world of each party becomes inaccessible and incomprehensible to the other. The act of violation and the reasons for it cannot be uttered in the presence of the prohibitor without leading to the immediate punishment of the violator. This is the level of the discourse in courts of law where the law requires that information about the guilty party must be disclosed immediately to facilitate his arrest and conviction. Narrative only becomes possible when the narrator succeeds in displacing his own subjective position completely with the third person thereby enabling him to divorce himself from dynamics of direct discourse internal to the narrative. This makes it possible for him to possess information about each of the narrative subjects which they do not possess about each other. He can thus bring to expression fully the contradictory actions and perspectives of the subjects which could not be expressed in their direct discourse to each other. But the result is the creation of a multi-leveled surface to the narrative.

The narrator is thus in the position of mediating between the contradictory subjective positions of the protagonist and antagonist for the benefit of the reader. But this mediation is accomplished by attenuating the subjectivity of the characters, since the third person form transforms them into empty containers of the semantic content of the predicates. That which acquired meaning in the performative statements of direct discourse in terms of the subjective illocutionary force of the speaker, in the narrative framework is significant because of its position in relation to the semic oppositions of the narrator's semantic universe.

If this barrier separating the narrative framework and the relational network of direct discourse is breached and the narrator comes forth to address his characters directly, then the illusory nature of the narrative enterprise is revealed. The modern dramatist, Pirandello, however, took the inverse of this possibility as the motif of his play, "Six Characters in Search of an Author," making use of the often attested experience of the insistent independence of fictional characters in the mind of an author as the subject matter of the play. But by transgressing this barrier between the narrator and his characters, Pirandello took dangerous liberties with the generic constraints of drama, and few have followed him. A similar effect is achieved in the visual medium if a film director has his

dialogue with his characters over how the part should be played included in the film, or a cartoonist draws his own hand drawing his characters.

But since the writer cannot address his characters directly, their action cannot ultimately stem from the constraints of direct discourse, but rather will appear to stem from the logical operations present in the propositional content of their utterances and of the statements in the narrative framework.

The proper resolution of the tension between these non-homogeneous semantic factors in the narrative is still hotly debated, however, and cannot easily be resolved because it goes to the heart of the mental processes of the writer. It is the fundamental issue which the contemporary novelist, John Gardner raises in his recent book of criticism, On Moral Fiction. In criticizing a number of modern novelists he says, "None of the three (Mailer, Vonnegut and Heller) cares enough about his characters to use them as anything but examples in a forced proof. The novelist's 'message,' in each case, is only loosely related to the characters: they exist for the sake of the predetermined message. . ." (1978: 85). In his own view, ". . . plot exists only to give characters means of finding and revealing themselves, and setting only to give them a place to stand." (1978: 84). But for the writer to so subordinate himself to the existence of his characters is not simply a matter of adjusting the scope of his quotation marks. Rather direct discourse requires the writer to place himself in the speaking position of another person, and give himself over thus to the forces which arise from the performative utterances of that person. Gardner notices that speech from the position of another is also characteristic of schizophrenic speech, the difference being that, "The writer is fully conscious of what he's up to when he claims to be not James Joyce but Stephen Dedalus, writes the seeming gibberish of Finnegans Wake, pretends to be in Ireland when he's sitting in France, and solemnly, cunningly maintains that the book is for no one." (1978: 186, 87). But when a writer or actor "thinks he is the character . . . he has turned madman." (1978: 187).

Nevertheless, Gardner believes that "The writer and a psychotic make use of the same faculty and similar energy, the same ability to escape external time and space." (1978: 203). And the very point where the two the most closely approximate each other is in the creative process where the writer becomes the addressee of the direct discourse of his characters. Gardner describes such an experience which he had. After a long day of writing when he was alone he reports that, ". . . it came to me that the room was full of a mumble of voices much like the mumble one hears as one slips into dreams, except much louder, as loud as the voices at an ordinary, crowded party; . . . All this surprised me but did not at all stir fear or anxiety, because what was happening seemed clear - in fact I seemed to recognize the experience. While I was writing, earlier, I had been daydreaming similar creatures and voices: a light touch of the intellect made the creatures into people who

showed me how an imaginary line of action must go if it was to be true to the real process of life. . . That, I think, is about as mad as art gets." (1978: 202, 03). And this is not at all an uncommon experience for writers. It is thus chiefly through the "voices" of direct discourse that what we today call the unconscious finds the most immediate access to language. This invisible barrier between the third person narrative framework and direct discourse in a narrative is thus not merely the interface between two semantic systems, but it is also homologous with the barrier between the conscious and unconscious mind. With roots extending so deeply into the mental processes of the writer and effects determining the genre and mode of the literary work, this barrier constitutes one of the most powerful, significant constraints operative in the narrative art.

In turning to consider the Biblical narrative it is immediately obvious that the problematic tension between the I of the narrator and the I of his characters is of absolutely central importance. This is because of the central role played by the direct discourse of God.

This problematic is more visible in the prophetic literature, but no less present in the Pentateuchal narrative. H. W. Wolff was one of the first O.T. scholars to clearly bring this problem into focus in his pioneering article, "Das Zitat im Prophetenspruch" (1964). Wolff turns away from the attempts of the day to analyze Biblical prophecy in psychological terms and argues that the central features of the prophetic mentality are to be found in the structure of the prophetic speech. The central feature of this speech is the use of the citation of the words of both God and man. But he notes that the word citation does not adequately express the force of the divine utterance in the mouth of the prophet: "The prophet does not make use of the words, but rather Jahweh's word takes the prophet into his service." (1964: 98) In fact, Wolff notes, "Jeremiah is called 'My mouth' by Jahweh. The I of God in the style of the messenger speech is the rightful subject of the speech." (1964: 38). Only if this total displacement of the prophetic I by the I of God takes place can the message have meaning (in the sense of illocutionary force) for the hearers.

Wolff noticed also that it was characteristic of the prophetic message to include citation of human speech as well so as to bring the direct speech of men into dialogical relation to the speech of God. The "message" of the prophet was thus not communicated by means of moral teachings formulated in the third person, but grew out of the dynamics of direct discourse between the Divine I and the human subjects. (1964: 98).

An analysis of the so-called narrative of the "Fall" in Gen. 2:4b-3 reveals that this primacy of direct discourse is no less true of the narrative form than the prophetic speech. But since the narrator, unlike the prophet, must provide some kind of context within which the divine I can speak, a special problem is raised regarding the relation of the divine discourse to the third person narrative framework, the solution of which gives the Genesis narrative its unusual structural character.

The divine voice occupies a mediating position between the third person narrative framework and the direct discourse of the characters. On the one hand the divine is a character in the narrative by virtue of engaging human characters in direct discourse. But on the other hand, the divine voice has no given position within the physical topography or social hierarchy. In this respect his position resembles that of the non-person of the narrator whose position is concealed behind the third person discourse. Thus, with respect to the world of the personages internal to the narrative, the place of the divine, like the place of the narrator, is external, transcendent; but unlike the narrator, the divine voice transgresses the barrier separating the world of the personages from its heterogeneous origin, and engages the personages in direct discourse. On the other hand, the divine voice does not displace the role of the narrator, but is referred to by the narrator in the third person as he would refer to any other character in the narrative. The divine voice is thus posed midway between the external position of the characters, and can thereby mediate the opposition between the impersonal logic of the narrative framework, and the illocutionary dynamics of the direct discourse of the characters. Like the narrator, the divine voice has access to knowledge which the normal personages do not have. This usually takes the form of knowledge of the future. But unlike the narrator the divine voice delivers this knowledge in the form of direct discourse (performative utterances) to the characters, and in so doing, makes the future subject to the response of the personages. The characters thus, in a very fundamental sense, are able to take form in accordance with the dynamics of direct discourse, and are thus prevented from being mere anthropomorphic figurations of the propositional content of the third person statements of the narrator. By making the characters the subjects of a discourse about their own future, the illusion of the narrative world as a separate, self-contained reality is broken. The outcome of the narrative becomes in principle undetermined.

What is occurring here is highly unusual in the narrative art. The actual origin of the characters in the inner dynamics of the narrator is always covered over and the character appears as a given subject of his own discourse from the beginning. Occasionally a novelist will reveal something of this process as John Gardner did in the comments cited above where he alluded to the "light touch of intellect" which he applied to the fantasms of his dream world thereby enabling characters to take real human form. But the transgressive character of the divine voice enables the actual origin of the characters to be depicted. The character first emerges as a subject, as the addressee of a Voice uttering a performative expression which comes from a position outside of the narrative world and thus comes to exist first within the possibilities and limitations of response to this utterance. The mediating position of the divine voice thus enables the origin of the personage as subject in an act of direct discourse to be depicted and thus to become a part of the narrative.

By transgressing the barrier between the outside and inside of the narrative, the divine voice injects the heterogeneous dimension into the foundation of the narrative structure. This

alters the terms in which the meaning of the narrative can be articulated. In a typical narrative it is the suppression of the heterogeneous which makes possible the articulation of meaning in terms of logical oppositions. The heterogeneous element, though present in the direct discourse of the personages, is finally subordinate to the logical content of the third person framework. So the transgressing of that framework brings into focus a new set of oppositions, i.e., the opposition between the heterogeneous aspect of direct discourse and the logical content of third person statements.

The polarities are thus shifted from the logical polarities of opposing semes to polarities of opposing modes in which meaning can be articulated. This directly affects the surface of the narrative. In the classical narrative the logical oppositions are translated into opposing functions at the level of action, and opposing actants at the level of roles, i.e., finally personages embody the opposing poles of the semic system, and logical contradiction is translated into conflict between characters. The opposition between two modes of meaning, however, can only be articulated in terms of two modes of subjective existence, i.e. two modes of existing as a subject. This opposition is necessarily one that is internal to the subject, and cannot be embodied in a conflict between actants. The surface of the Biblical narrative thus cannot contain traditional heroes and villains.

Three highly significant constraints can now be identified which stem from the mediating position of the divine Voice.

1. The surface of the Biblical narrative cannot contain traditional heroes and villains since the fundamental conflict from which the meaning arises is one that is necessarily internal to the subjects.

2. There is almost nothing which the narrator can say in his third person discourse about the divine Voice for to make the divine object of descriptive or qualificative statements would pull the divine into the closure of the narrative framework, and thereby make the divine Voice simply another personage in the plot.

3. But there is correspondingly little that the narrator can say about the human personages as well, since he is constrained by the preeminent role in the creation of characters played by the divine voice in its direct discourse with the characters. There is a fundamental conflict between the mediating role played in the traditional narrative by the narrative framework between the alienated worlds of the characters after the violation, and the mediating role in the Biblical narrative played by the divine Voice between, what might be termed in abbreviated fashion, the illocutionary and logical modes of meaning. This polarity is in principle mediated in the direct discourse of the Voice with the character thereby depriving the narrator of his traditional function. His narrative cannot thus be characterized by extensive third person explanations or descriptions of his characters, nor can he even seem to be in possession of significant information which the characters themselves do not have, since the narrative action flows out of

their conscious dialogue. The narrator is thus reduced to the role of providing the barest sketch of the physical topography upon which the characters move, and recording primarily their dialogues and the deeds which stem from them. (The precise grammatical form of these statements should be determined through an inventory and classification).

With this brief list of constraints (it is by no means complete) in mind, it is now possible to turn to the particulars of Gen. 2:4b-3. What follows will only constitute the first stage of the text analysis, however, since a complete analysis would extend beyond the scope of this article. Since the theoretical considerations above led to the conclusion that the narrative matrix is the divine speech, the analysis will focus first on the initial divine utterance in this passage, the mandate and prohibition in 2:16, 17. The analysis will proceed by disclosing the structure of the prohibition as an illocutionary act which generates the structure of the subjectivity of the characters, and proceed by delineating the additional constraints which flow from the particular nature of the prohibition upon the structuration of the third person framework.

It is significant that the dramatic action of the Biblical narrative begins with prohibition in the fashion of narratives generally, but here the prohibition is stated explicitly in the direct discourse of the divine Voice and coupled with a positive mandate. This establishes man first as the you in the dual mode of addressee of a positive mandate (אכל תאכל is a permissive introduced by an imperative which establishes an antithesis with the prohibition) and a negative prohibition. The prohibition, as has been noted, serves as an effective starting point for narratives because its propositional content expresses clearly two opposing semic systems which can be actualized in actantial roles and given figuration as personages engaged in conflict.

In the standard narrative, however, the prohibition is not coupled with a mandate because each opposing personage must receive his own mandate (as hero or opponent) from different mandators. Since, however, the structure of this narrative does not permit an absolute division between heroes and villains, but focuses rather upon a conflict internal to the subject, both positive and negative performatives are given to the subject thereby setting up the conflict as an inner conflict within himself.

The terms of this conflict are likewise specified by the content of the mandate and prohibition and their interrelation. The mandate coupled with the prohibition offers the possibility of subjective actualization in the mode of obedience, and limited freedom. In this mode meaning is realized in terms of the illocutionary force actualized and shaped in the response of obedience by the subject to the joint mandate and prohibition.

On the other hand, violation of this prohibition through eating of the fruit of the tree, establishes man in the contrasting mode of subjectivity described as the "knowledge of good and evil." Here meaning is articulated in terms of logical, polar oppositions at the semantic level. To violate the

prohibition is not to become evil, but to enter into a mode of subjectivity called "knowledge" that is not homogeneous with the mode of subjectivity that was generated by the illocutionary force of the prohibition. In the latter he exists as a subject in terms of the illocutionary force that is articulated in the action of responding to the divine performative, whereas in the former, he would, through his violating act, become a subject defined by a predicate, i.e., "knowing good and evil." (3:4).

The result is that the barrier that, in the typical narrative, separates the third person discourse of the narrator from the direct discourse of the characters, is internalized and becomes a barrier separating two conflicting modes of existence within the subject. These are the two modes which Julia Kristeva characterizes as the "subject of the enunciation," as compared with the "subject of the statement (enoncé)" (1977: 252, 253).

This internal barrier is symbolically articulated by the donning of fig leaves after the violation, and then by the "hiding" from "sound" of God, the primal subject of the enunciation, "walking" in the garden. Man the violator does not become the embodiment of evil, but rather the embodiment of inner and outer alienation.

The analysis must be brought to a close at this point, due to the limitations of this article, but remaining to be done are the constraints which arise out of the impossible position of the narrator, required to relate what is essentially an inner state of alienation in terms of external actions and actors without violating the primary restraints concerning the use of third person descriptive statements. It is here that the need for the talking serpent and the almost physical presence of the divine Voice in the garden arises. Such deviations are not found after the narrative is recast upon the basis of the promise in Gen. 12:1-3.

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STRUCTURAL EXEGESIS OF GENESIS 2 and 3

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0.1 - Our exegesis follows a well defined method based upon a theoretical model of the structural network operating in narrative texts. Within the limited scope of this exegetical essay this model cannot and need not be justified nor presented in detail for two reasons. First, this justification and presentation will be in print by the time of the Annual meeting of the SBL (cf. Daniel Patte and Aline Patte, Structural Exegesis From Theory to Practice. Exegesis of Mark 15 and 16. Hermeneutical Implications, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978 and Pour une exégèse structurale, Paris: Le Seuil, 1978). Second, such a theoretical argument would take us into the realm of fundamental semiotic research, and thus preclude us from applying this specific structuralist method to the exegesis of Genesis 2 and 3. Moreover, we trust that the exegetical procedures we shall follow and their results can be understood and evaluated despite the fact that some of the methodological process might seem arbitrary without its theoretical justification. Nevertheless a few remarks are in order.

0.2 - The specific goal of our exegesis.

0.21 - Our ultimate goal is to elucidate the system of deep values, a semantic universe presupposed by the text in its present form. These deep values (or symbolic values, or again convictions as self-evident truths) are elements of the vision of life and of the world held as self-evident or revealed by the author or redactor (whether collective or individual). They constitute the semantic framework in which this text unfolds as a meaningful text. To use M. Foucault's vocabulary, they are the conditions of possibility of this meaningful discourse as well as of other meaningful discourses (such as any hermeneutical discourses which might "prolong" this text). Thus, we assume that a text presupposes a specific system of deep values--that is, a coherent vision of life and the world.

0.22 - These deep values are also termed symbolic values because they are manifested by the symbolic dimensions of the text--by the connotations of the textual elements, by the metaphorical relations; in brief, by the text's symbolic system. Both the system of values and the symbolic system are organized paradigmatically, that is in such a way as to constitute a set of interrelated codes or, more precisely, of interrelated isotopies. The quasi-logical relations of the semiotic square are the fundamental principles governing this paradigmatic organization. Thus we assume that a given text has a specific symbolic system.

0.23 - The problem plaguing a structural exegesis with such a goal is that the symbols of a given text can be organized in many different ways according to which connotations are chosen by the exegete as pertinent for each symbol. Each symbol has indeed a quasi-infinite number of possible connotations and can therefore be set in different relations with the other symbols. Furthermore, given the many textual elements it is difficult to determine which ones should be considered as symbols. In brief, how can one establish what is the symbolic system which characterizes a given text?

0.24 - Our research has demonstrated that there is, in any narrative, a correspondence between its symbolic organization and its narrative organization despite the fact that these are governed by quite different principles (the former is paradigmatic, the latter syntagmatic). By virtue of this correspondence, the study of the narrative organization (usually the easier task) provides criteria for the establishment of the symbolic system of a text, and, conversely, the study of the symbolic system helps to verify the validity of the narrative organization as previously sketched. A set of rigorous criteria can therefore be used as a control upon an exegesis with the goal stated in 0.21 and 0.22. Some of these procedures will be explained in the presentation of the results of our exegesis of Genesis 2 and 3.

1.0 - The narrative organization of Genesis 2 and 3

1.11 - Establishment of the narrative levels

The fundamental principle which governs the narrative organization is that of the relations among narrative programs viewed as a hierarchy. Each verb of action (of the category of "doing" and not of the category "being/having") whatever might be its verbal form (whether its tense is present or future; whether it is active or passive, . . .) manifests a narrative program which can be summarized as a Subject (S) transmitting an Object (O) to a Receiver (R). The Receiver in turn can become the Subject of another program because the reception of this Object (or of several Objects) has equipped this Subject to perform this other program. In an elementary narrative all narrative programs are linked in this manner producing an uninterrupted hierarchy.

By identifying all the narrative programs and studying their relations, one can then isolate in a formal way the elementary narratives designated by the breaks in the formal hierarchical relation among the programs. Then by studying the respective nature of these breaks one can show the specific relationships among these elementary narratives. Some elementary narratives are "converging" into another. An example might be the story of what happened to a character before becoming involved in the main narrative. Such is the case of the few lines concerning the serpent (3:1a,b) preceding its involvement in the story about Yahweh, the man and the woman. Other elementary narratives are "parallel" to another narrative. Such is the case of the river(s) (2:10-14). In fact an elementary narrative belongs together with its "converging" and "parallel" narratives and form together with them a single narrative level. The narrative level is a textual unit which needs to be identified as rigorously as possible since it will be an important basis for further interpretation.

Some elementary narratives are "diverging" from another. Even though their beginning is marked as in the other cases by a break in the formal hierarchical relations among programs, they do not interrupt the narrative development. A Subject does something not because he has received an Object from one of the preceding Subjects (thus there is a hierarchical break) but because of the value he himself attributes to what happened earlier (thus there is continuity). The elementary narrative introduced in this way, together with its own converging and parallel narratives, forms what can be termed an interpretative level, i.e., a narrative development built upon one (or several) interpretation(s) of another narrative development. A similar interpretative break seems to mark its end (this point needs further verification): an interpretation of an interpretative level may have the effect of bringing back the narrative to its

primary level by drawing the consequences that this episode has for the primary narrative development.

1.12 - The narrative levels of Genesis 2 and 3

In Genesis 2 and 3 we have isolated the following levels:
- Primary narrative level: 2:4-15 and 3:22-24
- Interpretative level: 2:16 - 3:21

After the narrative development recounting the first creating acts and its parallel narrative about the rivers (primary narrative level), Yahweh Elohim gives a command to the man (2:16) which presupposes a specific interpretation by Yahweh of the value of the first creative acts and therefore introduces an interpretative level. These values attributed respectively to the man and the Garden together with its content demand that the two be in a specific relationship expressed in the command. In 2:18 we find a second interpretation by Yahweh of the same situation focused this time on the loneliness of man. The serpent's intervention will presuppose another and conflicting interpretation of the relationship between man and Garden. Then the narrative unfolds on the basis of these interpretations and this without changing level up through 3:21. (The status of 3:20-21 as belonging to this interpretative level becomes clear for us only at the next stage of the analysis.)

With 3:22 an interpretation of what happened at the interpretative level is presupposed: Yahweh Elohim's statement draws the consequences from what happened. We can tentatively note that it is possible that at this point the narrative returns to the primary level: the next stage of the analysis will confirm that this is indeed the case.

So far the narrative levels have been identified with the help of a single (and at time, difficult to use) criterion. Other criteria will allow us to verify the validity of these first results.

For the sake of concreteness we can summarize the overall narrative organization of the text using the Proppian categories as follows.

Primary level	Interpretative level
2:5-6. Situation of lack. Twofold lack. First lack: no man to work the Adamah; Second lack: no rain and vegetation.	
2:4b; 7-15. Second lack is overcome. Yet first lack is not: there is now a garden but the man is working it rather than the Adamah.	
	2:16-18. A twofold interpretation recognizes (1) the order of the creation so far (16-17); (2) the lack of helper for the man, Third lack, (18).
	2:19-25. Third lack is overcome.
	3:1-7. Conflicting interpretation of the order of the creation; villainy disrupting the order as expressed in 2:16-18.

3:8-21. Converging narrative of Yahweh Elohim with that of serpent, woman and man; re-establishment of a proper order.

3:22-24. First lack is at last overcome: there is a man working the Adamah.

This schematization makes it clear that the main lack can be overcome only by means of the interpretative level. Thus we can already say that our text presupposes from its very beginning an order of the creation which is in some sense infralapsarian.

1.21 - Establishment of the systems of pertinent transformations

Each narrative level constitutes a complete and coherent narrative unit in the sense that it includes two interrelated sets of programs: one set of principal programs, and another of polemical programs. By definition we term principal programs those which conclude a narrative level and those which contribute constructively toward this end; we term polemical programs those which hinder the development of the principal programs. (Note that we term the programs "principal" and "polemical" rather than "positive" and "negative": the narrative axes do not necessarily correspond directly to the semantic axes although they do in the text studied.) Thus the programs manifesting what Propp would term the lack, the actions of the villain and the actions of the hero's various opponents belong to the polemical axis.

A level is a self-contained narrative unit insofar as it is the narrative space in which a series of polemical programs are overcome or neutralized by a corresponding series of principal programs. A number of programs are therefore opposed by pairs in that they manifest opposite "functions" (Propp's and Levi-Strauss's term) or "transformations" (Greimas's term). Since a transformation can be defined in terms of the actantial model as the relation between an Object and a Receiver, $(O \longrightarrow R)$, the opposition of two transformations can take three forms as follows:

$(O \longrightarrow R)$ vs $(\bar{O} \longrightarrow R)$
$(O \longrightarrow R)$ vs $(O \longrightarrow \bar{R})$
$(O \longrightarrow R)$ vs $(O \not\longrightarrow R)$

($\bar{O}$ and $\bar{R}$ should be read respectively "contradictory Object" and "contradictory Receiver").

By making use of this threefold formula (rather than Propp's categories which are difficult to use with the necessary rigor) one can isolate the programs that the text emphasizes by opposing their transformations two by two (one of these transformations can be hypothetical, or non-actualized, but at least one of two must be actualized). The transformations which have a counterpart within a given narrative level are "pertinent" in the sense that they are marked as participating in a distinctive way to the narrative organization of the text. The series of pairs of pertinent transformations--the system of pertinent transformations--is nothing else than the hierarchy reduced to its most characteristic elements.

The fact that each narrative level is characterized by a complete system of transformations provides a new criterion for verifying the validity of the previous identification of the levels. If two programs have clearly opposed transformations they belong to the same narrative level. It was this test which decided for us that 3:21 belongs to the interpretative level. Its program in which Yahweh makes skin-garments for the man and the woman (a principal program) is opposed to 3:7 in which the

man and the woman make for themselves leaf aprons (a polemical program belonging clearly to the interpretative level).

1.22 - The system of pertinent transformations of Genesis 2 and 3

1.221 - Primary narrative level: Genesis 2:4-15; 3:22-24

In this level of the text we find only a few polemical programs. Let us consider them first.

2:5-6 expresses what could be termed in Propp's vocabulary the situation of lack. It includes the following polemical programs that we represent by means of a terminology as close to the Hebrew as possible

2:5b, Eretz (springing up $\not\rightarrow$ herbs)
2:5c, YHWH Elohim (not rain $\longrightarrow$ Eretz)
2:5d, Adam (cultivation $\not\rightarrow$ Adamah)
2:6b, 'ed (moistness $\longrightarrow$ Adamah)

3:22 involves three additional polemical programs:

3:22d, Adam (hand of Adam $\longrightarrow$ tree of life)
3:22e,f Adam (fruit of tree of life $\longrightarrow$ Adam)
3:22g, fruit of tree of life (eternal life $\longrightarrow$ Adam)

By studying all the principal programs of this narrative level, we find that six of these seven polemical programs are pertinent because the text manifests programs with opposed transformations.

- Not causing to rain upon Eretz (2:5b) is opposed to the communication of the "state of creation" to Eretz (2:4b) since rain is here associated with the state of creation (cf. 2:5a,b).

- The possibility of the attribution of "eternal life" to Adam (3:22g) is opposed to the attribution of another type of life, "the breath of life" to same Adam (2:7d).

- The fact that edible plants (herbs of the field) did not spring up (2:5b) is opposed to the springing up of edible plants (trees) (2:9a).

- The fact that the "mist" ('ed) watered (attributed "moistness" to) the Adamah (2:6b) is opposed to the river watering the Garden (attribution of the same Object, "moistness" to two different Receivers) (2:10b).

- The possibility of Adam putting forth his hand upon the tree of life (3:22d) is opposed to the cherubim's guarding function aimed at preventing it (3:24b).

- The fact that "no cultivation" is provided for the Adamah (2:5d) is opposed to the expectation that Adam should cultivate the Adamah (3:23b).

The narrative development of this level is governed all along by the principal axis (the principal programs make the action progress). Consequently we need to organize these pairs of pertinent transformations according to the narrative logic found on the principal axis. In the present case this organization of the principal axis follows the order of the text, except in the case of the two last programs. The guarding action of the cherubim insures that Adam cultivate the Adamah (and not the other way around).

Since the system of pertinent transformations is a summarized hierarchy, we write it (see Table I) so that it might be read from bottom to top (this is a mere convention).

3:23b	Adam (cultivation ⟶ Adamah)	2:5d	Adam (cultivation ⟶/ Adamah)
3:24b	Cherubim (guarding ⟶ tree of life)	3:22d	Adam (hand of Adam ⟶ tree of life)
2:10b	river(s) (moistness ⟶ garden)	2:6b	'ed (moistness ⟶ Adamah)
2:9a	Y.E. (springing up ⟶ edible trees)	2:5b	Eretz (springing up ⟶/ herbs)
2:7d	Y.E. (breath of life ⟶ Adam)	3:22g	fruit (eternal life ⟶ Adam)
2:4b	Y.E. (state of creation ⟶ Eretz)	2:5c	Y.E. (not rain ⟶ Eretz)

Table I: Pertinent Transformations of Level I

The identification of some of these pairs of pertinent transformations has required that we evaluate the semantic relation of certain symbolic manifestations (e.g., the judgment that "edible trees" and "herbs of the field" are two representations of the same category "edible plants", while, by contrast, "Garden" and "Adamah" are representations of two opposed categories). The next stage of the analysis provides additional criteria allowing the exegete to verify the validity of such judgments because of the correspondence between the narrative and the symbolic textual organizations (the above system of pertinent transformations has, of course, been established with the help of these criteria).

1.222 - Interpretative Narrative Level: 2:16-3:21

Following the same procedure, we have identified the system of pertinent transformations of the interpretative narrative level. For the sake of space we omit all discussion of the process through which we identified these transformations as pertinent. We list them in Table II and proceed to make a few remarks clarifying their organization into a system (cf. next page).

Remarks

2:22d vs 2:20b. The failure to find a "matching helper" (O) for Adam (R) (2:20b, a polemical program) is opposed to the attribution of a woman (O) to Adam (R) (2:22d, a principal program).
3:3b vs 3:1d. The hypothetical polemical program of Elohim giving the "command about not eating from any tree" (O) to "man and woman" (R) (3:1d) is opposed to the principal program of Elohim giving the "command about eating from all trees except the tree in the middle of the Garden" ($\bar{O}$) to "man and woman" (R) (3:3b rather than 2:16a which has a slightly different Receiver, i.e., "man" by himself, and is less directly pertinent).
Beginning with this second pair and continuing through 3:7 the logic of the narrative development is governed by the polemical axis. Accordingly we order the four pairs involved according to the logic manifested by the polemical axis.

3:21b Y.E. (skin garments ⟶ Ish & woman)	3:7e Ish & woman (leaf aprons ⟶ Ish & woman)
3:19e Adam (dust ⟶ Adam)	3:4b tree in middle of garden (not death ⟶ man & woman)
3:19a Adam (bread in sweat ⟶ Adam)	3:6h Ish (fruit of tree in middle of garden ⟶ Ish)
3:18a Adamah (thorns & thistles ⟶ Adam)	
2:25b Adam & his woman (not shame ⟶ Adam & his woman)	3:7b,c Ish & his woman (cognition of nakedness ⟶ Ish & his woman)
3:3e tree in middle of garden (death ⟶ man & woman)	3:5c, 7a fruit of tree in middle of garden (opened eyes ⟶ man & woman)
2:17a Adam (not fruit of tree of knowing good & evil ⟶ Adam)	3:6g woman (fruit of tree in middle of garden ⟶ her Ish)
3:3b=2:16a Elohim (command about eating & death ⟶ man & woman)	3:1d Elohim (command about eating from any tree ⟶ man & woman)
2:22d Y.E. (woman ⟶ man)	2:20b Y.E. (not matching helper ⟶ man)
2:10b river(s) (moistness ⟶ garden)	2:6b ed (moistness ⟶ Adamah)

(a) Programs for Man

3:16e her Ish (domination ⟶ woman)	3:17b Adam (listening ⟶ woman)
3:16b Y.E. (labor pain ⟶ woman)	3:6e woman (pleasing fruit ⟶ woman)

(b) Programs of the Woman Parallel

3:15a Y.E. (enmity for serpent ⟶ woman)	3:13d serpent (fascination for serpent ⟶ woman)
3:14c Y.E. (greater curse than every beast ⟶ serpent)	3:1b Y.E. (greater craft than every beast ⟶ serpent)

(c) Programs of the Serpent Parallel

Table II: Pertinent Transformations of Level II

2:17a vs 3:6g. This pair represents the opposition between not eating the fruit (the program proposed by Y.E.) and eating it.
3:3e vs 3:5c, 7a. This pair represents the immediate consequences of eating the fruit: according to Elohim "death" (O) for man and woman (R); according to the serpent "open eyes" ($\bar{O}$) for them (R). This pair has its place here because of the actualization of the polemical program in 3:7a. This polemical program is also manifested in the serpent's promise: "You shall not die." Yet this program cannot be used here because it is not actualized (since it is merely a promise and indeed a questionable one). If 3:4b were opposed to 3:3e, neither of the two programs in that pair would be actualized at that point. However, 3:4b as a second manifestation of the polemical program is not without significance. It is pertinent as the hypothetical transformation opposed to a transformation which will have to be considered as actualized, namely one of the curses (i.e., religious words of authority which establish a reality and not mere promises).
2:25b vs 3:7b, c. This pair represents the opposition between the shameless attitude of man and woman and the shameful cognition of their nakedness.

From then on the logic of the narrative development is again governed by the principal axis (Y.E. cursing). The three curses form three parallel narrative developments, each involving two pairs of pertinent transformations corresponding to the twofold curse of serpent, woman and man.

The serpent parallel

3:14c vs 3:1a, b. This pair opposes the attribution to the serpent on the one hand of a "curse above all animals" and on the other of a "crafty nature above all animals" (the study of the complete hierarchy shows that the creation of the serpent as well as that of the other animals belongs to the polemical axis as failure to provide a fitting helper for man).
3:15a vs 3:13d. This pair opposes the attribution to the woman on the one hand of "enmity for the serpent" and on the other of "fascination for the serpent".

The woman parallel

3:16b vs 3:6e. This pair opposes the attribution to the woman on the one hand of "labor pain" (O) and on the other of "pleasing fruit" ($\bar{O}$).
3:16e vs 3:17b. It opposes the attribution to the woman on the one hand of "man's domination" (O) and on the other of "Man's listening"--a form of submission--($\bar{O}$).

The man parallel

3:19a and 3:18a vs 3:6h. This pair concerning the man is quite similar to 3:16b vs 3:6e concerning the woman.
3:19e vs 3:4b. This pair opposes the return of Adam to dust to the promise of not dying.

These three sets of parallel transformations do not correspond to each other narratively (that is through their narrative transformations) but symbolically as we shall see below. Those concerning the man and the woman are prolonged narratively by Y.E.'s attribution of skin-garment (O) to them (3:21b) opposed to their self-attribution of leaf aprons ($\bar{O}$) (3:7d,e).

2.00 - From the narrative system to the symbolic system

The identification of the system of pertinent transformations on both narrative levels completes our formal description of the narrative organization of Genesis 2 and 3. It already provides interesting insights into the text by showing what are the characteristic elements that form the narrative framework around which our text is organized syntagmatically. But, more importantly, this narrative organization gives us an entry into the symbolic and semantic organization of the text. A symbolic and semantic field (what Lévi-Strauss would term a "state") is associated with each pertinent transformation (what Lévi-Strauss would term a "function"). By using Greimas's actantial categories, we can say that this symbolic and semantic field (the state) is manifested symbolically by the subject and its various qualifications, i.e., the investments of the actantial positions of Helper, Opponent and Sender. Among the numerous semantic connotations (or semantic features) that each bundle of these qualifications has, the text selects a few pertinent semantic features by setting each bundle of qualifications in relation with others.

Following a suggestion by Greimas, it was shown in Structural Exegesis From Theory to Practice that the fundamental principle governing the relations between the narrative system and the semantic system of a given text is that to a narrative opposition (an opposition of narrative transformations) corresponds a semantic opposition (an opposition of semantic features manifested symbolically by the qualifications) of contradiction (the "diagonal" of a semiotic square, such as A and non-A).

For various theoretical reasons based on this principle, it appeared that the bundles of qualifications associated with the transformations are in the proper position as terms of semiotic squares when they are organized as the system of pertinent transformations, although with an important difference: the polemical axis must be slided upward so that the opposition corresponding to a narrative opposition be a contradictory opposition. Once more, it is not the place to justify nor to present this theory. The preceding remarks are simply intended to suggest that by considering the relations of contrariety, contradiction and implication among the bundles of qualifications (manifesting the investments of the actantial positions of Subject, Helper, Opponent and Sender corresponding to each pertinent transformation), the exegete can identify the semantic features (the value) that these various symbols connote in the text.

In practice one needs first to go back to the text and make a list of the qualifications of each Subject at the specific stage of the narrative development where the corresponding pertinent transformation is found. This list should include whatever according to the text the Subject uses or has when performing the program: will (vouloir), i.e., what motivates the Subject (thus also the purpose of the action); cognition (savoir), i.e., what knowledge the Subject has; and power (pouvoir), i.e., what enables the Subject. Note that the Helpers include eventually the proper time and location and often the possession of the Object which will be communicated. It is important at this point to include in this list only what is expressed in the text (we are not called to rewrite the text by adding qualifications that the text did not care to mention!). Studying this mass of symbols, one needs to use the cultural "dictionary" (i.e., the mass of knowledge accumulated by historical research devoted to the text's cultural milieu) in

order to be aware of the potential connotations of these qualifications. Then by studying the relations of the semiotic squares one can identify the semantic features which have been selected by the text for each bundle of qualifications so that the symbolic system of the text might be coherent. In this way the system of deep values presupposed by the text can be disclosed. Simultaneously the symbolic value (connotations) of each symbol (individual qualification) in the text can be defined. This opens the way to a detailed exegesis of the symbolism of the text. Obviously, as New Testament scholars we do not pretend to have the necessary background in Old Testament research to perform fully such an analysis. Despite this limitation we hope to be able to identify the main categories presupposed by our text. We leave it up to the Old Testament scholars to refine our formulation of these categories.

A full description of this twofold process would be too long in the limited scope of the present essay. We simply provide tables showing the symbolic system of each level, that is the network of relations among the bundles of qualifications corresponding to the pertinent transformations (the qualifications are suggested as concisely as possible). Without discussing the numerous relations which need to be considered so as to identify the pertinent semantic features, we shall merely present a second set of tables showing the semantic features which account for the three types of relation in the semiotic squares. The phrases we use in order to express these semantic features form a metalanguage which is at best an approximation. In fact it is the attempt to express in a referential way, i.e., as ideas, what belongs to the connotative realm, which is necessarily much less specific. On this basis we will draw some conclusions concerning what characterizes the semantic universe presupposed by the text and make a few suggestions concerning how the symbolism of the text could be studied in detail.

2.11 - The Symbolic System of Level I



Table III A

3:23b Adam

H: out of Garden,
Adamah,
from Adamah

Ser: Y.E.

3:24b Cherubim

H: east of the Garden of Eden
flaming sword turning
every way

2:10b River(s)

H: from Eden,
divided in four rivers,
related to different parts
of Eretz (cf. 2:11-14)
and various minerals

2:9a Y.E.

H: Adamah, Adam,
Garden in Eden,
in the East

2:7b Y.E.

H: man, dust,
(moistened) Adamah
(Y.E.'s) breath

2:4b Y.E.

H: בְּרִיאָה

2:5d Adam
no existence

3:22d Adam

H: knowing good and evil,
"like one of us"
access to the tree of life,
will to live for ever

Ser: Adam

2:6b ʾed

H: from Eretz,
whole Adamah

2:5b Eretz

without plant of the field
שִׂיחַ הַשָּׂדֶה

3:22g Adam

H: in the Garden of Eden,
access to the tree of life,
knowing good and evil
"like one of us"

2:5c Y.E.

H: Eretz without plant of
the field,
without sprung up herb
שִׂיחַ הַשָּׂדֶה

Table III B (H: Helper; Ser: Sender)

2.12 - The System of Values of Level I

The symbolic system forms a series of interrelated semiotic squares (four complete squares and two half squares). The only semantic features which appeared to be pertinent (that is to account for all the relations which exist among the bundles of qualifications) can be represented as in Table IV.

	2:5d' Adam no existence
3:23b Adam existence in own realm power to make Adamah fertile	3:22d Adam in divine realm power to disrupt order of cosmos
3:24b cherubim power to order the cosmos divine power belong to the divine realm	2:6b 'ed no power to make Adamah fertile chaotic power no power to give order
2:10b river(s) power to give order to Eretz from Eden = from the divine going out of Eden	2:5b Eretz does not belong to divine realm without specified origin no power to produce vegetable life
2:9a Y.E. power to produce vegetable life for others will to produce vegetable life	3:22g Adam not going out of Eden for oneself power to appropriate life
2:7b Y.E. power to give human life will to give of oneself	2:5c Y.E. no will to produce vegetable life no will to give of oneself no will to create Eretz and heavens
2:4b Y.E. will to create Eretz and heavens	

Table IV

The isotopy (i.e., the limited and coherent set of values) presupposed by level I is characterized by specific modal values concerning primarily what could be termed the /power to create/ (we use / / to make clear that our formulation of the semantic features is approximate; other formulations are certainly possible). In this phrase, "power" must be read as a technical term designating a modality, i.e., a value which modifies the value of an action; "to create" must be read in the broad sense of "causing to be".

In 2:7b, Y.E. manifests a /power to give human life/; in 2:9a, Y.E. manifests a /power to produce vegetal life/; in 2:10b the river(s) manifest(s) a /power to give order to Eretz/; in 3:24b the cherubim manifest a /power to order the cosmos/; in 3:23b Adam manifests a /power to make Adamah fertile/. The text unfolds on the presupposition that these values are positive. Each of these values is further defined by their relations of contrariety and of contradiction with negative values and by the relations of implication which exist among them.

The /power to give human life/ (2:7b) is contradictory with Adam's /power to appropriate life for oneself/ (3:22g): /appropriating for oneself/ is /not giving/, or more specifically /not giving of oneself/. This is to say that /giving human life/ involves /giving of oneself/, a feature that the text selects among the potential connotations of the symbol, "(Y.E.) breathed into his nostrils the breath of life". The fact that this feature is part of the deep values which form the semantic framework (the condition of possibility) of our text plays a significant role in the production of the text's meaning effect. This already suggests that the /power to give human life/ is associated with the /will to give of oneself/ (giving of oneself is a matter of "will" rather than of "power"). It is through this latter feature that this value appears to be in a contrary relation with the qualifications of Y.E. in 2:5c: the absence of creation does not result from a lack of power, nor from an opposed power (nothing in this part of the text can be construed as having such connotations). The only limiting qualification is the temporal notation, טֶרֶם , a time "before" the (proper) day, i.e., a time which is not appropriate, a time when Y.E. has /no will to create/, /no will to give of oneself/, by contrast with "the (appropriate) day" when Y.E. has the /will to create/ (2:4b).

The /power to produce vegetal life/ (2:9a) which involves the /will/ to do so (as contradictory to 2:5c) is further characterized as being /for others/: this feature which sets 2:9a as contrary to 3:22g (/for oneself/) is symbolically manifested by the description of the vegetal life as "pleasant to the sight and good to eat" which makes it clear that is is not created by Y.E. for his own sake but for others.

Considering the relation of implications between 2:7d and 2:9a, it appears that the /power to give human life/ involves the conjunction of the /divine/ (Y.E. self) and /adamah/ (thus human life is by nature both /divine/ and /earthly/) while the /power to produce vegetal life/ merely involves a use of /adamah/, /for others/, this second feature implying (i.e., manifesting in another way) the /divine/. By contrast the Eretz by itself which symbolizes something without the divine in either of its forms (this lack being symbolically represented as a lack of rain) is sterile (2:5c and also 2:5b). Similarly, "in the garden of Eden" which qualifies the negative power of Adam in 3:22g (the /power to appropriate life for oneself/) must be read as symbolizing a /power exclusively based on the divine/. We shall see below that the connotation /divine/ or /divine realm/ appears as a pertinent feature of the "garden of Eden" (and of "Eden") throughout our text.

The river(s) (2:10b) manifest(s) a /power to give order to Eretz/: its function is not only to water the garden but also to divide Eretz into various regions (cf. 2:10-14, not the repeated designation "Eretz"). By contradiction with Adam's power (3:22g) this ordering power is defined as going out of Eden (as well as out of the garden): it has a divine origin (from Eden) but is "outgoing". Through its contrary relation

with 2:10b, the powerlessness of Eretz (2:5b) is simultaneously defined once more as /not from the divine/, /not belonging to the divine realm/ or more specifically /without specified origin/.

The contradictory relation of river(s) (2:10b) and 'ed (2:6b) shows that the latter symbolizes (among other things to be discussed below) a /lack of power to give order/. The connotations /undivided watery mass/ and thus /chaotic waters/ are therefore without any doubt pertinent. 'Ed has here connotations similar to the corresponding Accadian term: "flood water" and not "mist" (cf. R.S.V.).

Since the cherubim (3:24b) manifest the values /power to give order to the cosmos/ (i.e., power to separate the human realm from the divine realm) which is derived from the fact that they /belong to the divine realm/ (a connotation which is shown to be pertinent because of the contradictory opposition to Eretz, 2:5b), cherubim and 'ed are in opposition of contrariety as /divine power/ vs /chaotic power/. Yet this chaotic power is not defined as an active (evil) power but rather as a twofold absence of power: as a /lack of power to give order to Eretz/ (cf. the relation to 2:10b) and as a /lack of power to make Adamah fertile/, by contrast to Adam's /power to make Adamah fertile/ (3:23b)--our way of formulating the power to cultivate Adamah.

Adam's /power to make Adamah fertile/ (3:23b) is defined as associated with the fact that /man is in his own realm/ (no longer in the garden but with Adamah) by contrast with its contrary /man in the divine realm/ (in the garden), the situation of Adam (3:22d). Both through the relation of contradiction with the "non-existent" Adam (2:5d) and the relation of implication with the cherubim (3:24b), Adam's power is further defined as /having existence/ as a result of Y.E.'s creative act, and thus as being the conjunction of a divine element and of adamah. As such he is in relation with the divine realm but does not belong to it. In fact for man to be in the divine realm is to be a /power disrupting the order of the cosmos/ (by disrupting the distinction between the human realm and the divine realm, by being "like gods") (3:22d).

These values, the main characteristics of which we briefly described (many details being left out for the sake of space), appear to be what form the semantic framework in which the text of the first narrative level unfolds its symbolism.

2.21 - The Symbolic System of Level II

	3:7e Ish and woman H: hiding among trees, fear, ashamed of nakedness
3:21b Y.E. H: man with power to name, view that woman is mother of all living (animal) skin	3:4b tree/3:17b Adam 3:13d serpent H: view of middle tree as for man, man as listening to woman, woman as fascinated by serpent
3:19e Adam/3:16e Ish/3:15a Y.E. H: from dust, from Adamah, desire for one's Ish relation to dust (14), to suffering and child bearing (16a,b), to Adamah (17-18)	3:6h Ish/3:6e woman/3:1b Y.E. H: deciding what is good and pleasing, more subtle than other animals S^{er}: themselves

3:19a Adam/3:18a Adamah
3:16b Y.E./3:14c Y.E.

H: manifestation of Y.E.'s authority (curse) over against serpent's, woman's and man's actions and attitudes

2:25 Adam and his woman

H: in Garden, naked, in relation with each other as described in 2:23-24

3:3e tree

H: tree of middle of Garden as viewed by Elohim, i.e., as not for man and deadly

2:17a Adam

H: in Garden has use of good to eat and pleasing tree (9a) except for tree of knowledge

ser: Y.E.

3:3b (2:16a) Elohim

H: view that Elohim (Y.E.) is man's sender; that Garden is for man, except for tree in middle of Garden

2:22d Y.E.

H: man (made with Adamah and divine breath) woman (made with man's rib) view that not good for man to be alone, animals not fitting helpers

2:10b River(s)

H: from Eden, divided in four rivers, related to different parts of Eretz (cf. 2:11-14) and various minerals

3:7b,c Ish and his woman

H: like gods, cognition of good and evil, opened eyes, shame

3:5c, 7a fruit

H: serpent's view about fruit of middle tree as having positive value, not deadly; woman's view that it is good and pleasing

3:6g woman

H: view of that middle tree is good to eat and pleasing to the eyes, knowledge of serpent's message (3:4, 5)

ser: serpent

3:1d Elohim

H: serpent's view that Garden is not for man, that no tree is for man

2:20b Y.E.

H: view that not good for man to be alone; animals from Adamah as living nepheshim, as would be helper for man (i.e., as would be human being)

2:6b 'Ed

H: from Eretz, whole Adamah

Table V

2.22 - The System of Values of Level II (Table VI)

3:7e Ish and woman
belonging to the vegetal world
hiding in fear
rejecting sexuality as shameful

3:21b Y.E.

sexuality is the source of life
belonging to the animal world

3:4b tree/3:17b Adam/ 3:13d serpent

like gods
transcending one's nature

3:19e Adam/3:16e Ish/3:15a Y.E.
each dominated according to own nature
dominated by that from which originated
not like gods

3:6h Ish/3:6e woman/3:1b Y.E.
having excessive freedom of choice
transcending one's origin

3:19a Adam/3:18a Adamah/ 3:16b Y.E./3:14c Y.E.
no choice regarding nature
Y.E. has authority to establish nature

3:7b,c Ish and his woman
acting as gods
not according to human nature
separation by shame

2:25b Adam and his woman
man's full union with woman
man's separation from parents
according to human nature
choice of an order for the world of living creatures

3:7a=3:5c fruit
man has choice of an order for the cosmic and/or vegetal world and of
good and pleasing

3:3e tree
not good and pleasing
man does not belong together with center of garden
center produces death for man

3:6g woman
like gods
totally identified with the divine
integrally part of garden

2:17a Adam
not integrally part of garden but related to it
earthly but not totally

3:1d Elohim
man and woman do not at all belong to the garden
totally unrelated to the divine

3:3b=2:16a Elohim
man and woman belong together with the garden (with the divine)
man and woman not integral with the divine

2:20b Y.E.
related exclusively to Adamah
totally earthly living Nephesh
made with Adamah alone*

2:22d Y.E.
woman made with rib of man
man made with Adamah and the divine breath
relational power

2:6b Ed
undifferentiated power with total claim
monolithic, chaotic power
no power to order Eretz

2:10b river
power to order Eretz
differentiated power
from Eden

The bundles of qualifications of this interpretative level involve cognitive manifestations of values which could be phrased "the view concerning" this or that aspect of the world or existence. In this way a Subject through its cognitive qualifications often manifests values concerning the nature of other personages.

The isotopy of the second level is interrelated to that of the first level through the values manifested by the contradictory terms 2:10b river(s) vs 2:6b 'ed which we can summarize as the opposition /differentiated and from Eden power to order the Eretz/ vs /undifferentiated and from Eretz chaotic power, i.e., lack of power to order the Eretz/. In addition to the emphasis on /power/, the theme of the first isotopy disclosed by this pair of contradictory terms in a specific way, this pair also involves specific features expressing the importance of proper relationships within the creation, the theme of the second isotopy.

The "power" (or "lack of power") has as its predicate "ordering", i.e., /setting in specific relations certain elements/. Furthermore this "power" is defined in terms of relations: the river has the power to order Eretz because it is "from Eden" and "divided" (into "four heads"), while the 'ed lacks such a power because it is "from Eretz" and an "undifferentiated mass". The second isotopy, i.e., the values which give unity and coherence to the symbolic system of the second level, endorses the relational character of the proper view of human existence and denounces as wrong the monolithic character of various views of human existence.

Thus if the animals and birds are not fitting helpers for Adam (2:20b) it is because each is a /totally earthly living nephesh/, i.e., /made with adamah alone/, a value contradictory to the value manifested by the woman (a qualification of Y.E. in 2:22d) who is /made with the rib of man/ and thus shares with Adam his twofold nature as /made with adamah and the divine breath/. This first observation, which by itself would be quite tenuous, is confirmed by the other relations in which 2:20b and 2:22d are involved. The woman's twofold nature (conjonction of the /divine/ and the /earthly/) is associated with a similar semantic feature manifested by the nature of Y.E.'s power in 2:22d: a power that Y.E. shares with man (who, through his naming, participates in the creation of the animals and of the woman), that is, a /relational power/ which is contrary to the /monolithic chaotic power/ of the flood, an /undifferentiated power with total claim/ (covering the whole adamah, 2:6). Thus 2:22d serves as a hinge between the two isotopies by linking the relational nature of human existence with the relational nature of Y.E.'s power. This link being established, the new isotopy can unfold the network of values which will define the proper human existence.

In 3:3b (2:16a) the pertinent qualification of Elohim (Y.E.) is his view of man (and woman) presupposed and expressed by his command. Man has his place in the garden; he can eat of every tree, yet he is not an integral part of it, he should not eat from the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil" (2:17a) that is from the tree "in the middle of the garden" (3:3b). The positive injunction manifests that man and woman /belong together with the garden (with the divine)/ while the negative injunction denying them access to its center emphasizes that they are not an integral part of it: human beings are related to the divine but not an integral of it. This positive relation to the divine which is the main emphasis of 3:3b (2:16a) is contrary to the /exclusive relation to adamah/ found in 2:20b.

2:17a manifests semantic features similar to those of 3:3b (2:16a) but with the opposite emphasis: the view of /man as not integrally part of the garden (as earthly) although he is related to it/. Such an emphasis sets 2:17a in contradictory relation to 2:20b: man as /earthly although not totally/ vs /totally earthly/ animal. To be /totally earthly/ is not to be a man (2:17a) as well as not to be a woman (2:22d).

On the negative axis we find two new expressions of the monolithic view of human existence as contradictory to 3:3b (2:16a) and 2:17a respectively: the view according to which human beings do /not at all belong to the garden/ (they cannot eat of any tree) found in 3:1d manifests that they are /totally unrelated to the divine/; the view according to which human beings are /integrally part of the garden/ (they can eat of any tree) found in 3:6g manifests that they are /totally identified with the divine/, they are /like gods/. In 3:3e (2:17b) the conjunction of the tree of the middle of the garden with the human beings as deadly manifests quite emphatically that such a total identification with the divine is a wrong view of the human nature: /human beings do not belong together with the center of the garden/. "The day" they would pretend to appropriate the divine for themselves they would be /annihilated/, /dead/, instead of /like gods/ (contrary relation to 3:6g) although this does not mean that they do not belong together with other parts of the garden (contradictory relation with 3:1d). The total integration in the garden, in the divine, is also deadly and /not good and pleasing/ (contradictory relation with 3:5c, 7a).

Considering the relation of implication between 3:3e (2:17b) and 2:25b (a bundle of qualifications which includes the textual elements found in 2:23-24), we note first that the /separation from the center of the garden/ and thus /from the divine/ (3:3e) is correlated with /man's separation from his parents/ (in which "separation" must be understood as "non-identification" according to the relations previously considered) and also with /man's full union with his woman/, a union which is the /fulfillment of the human nature/, by contrast with /not being according to the human nature/ i.e., /like gods/ (cf. the contradictory relation with both 3:6g and 3:7b,c). In 3:7b,c this /not being according to the human nature/ involves for /man and woman to be separated from each other/ (by shame), i.e., /not to be in full union/ (cp. 2:25b).

When considering the contrary relation between 2:25b and 3:5c, 7a, we identify another set of pertinent semantic features related to the category of /choice/ (for lack of a better term). In verses 2:19-23 (part of the bundle of qualifications of 2:25b) man's role as choosing a name for each living nephesh and further as choosing among them a fitting helper has been strongly emphasized (indeed to the point that this choice is a limitation to Y.E.'s power, cf. 2:22d). Thus the /choice to select a helper among living creatures/ or more generally the /choice of an order for the world of the living creatures/ is marked as a positive value. By contrast the "fruit" (which opens the eyes, 3:5e, 7a) is qualified as having been recognized as "good for food and pleasing to the eyes" by the woman, who in this way has chosen among the trees, i.e., among the elements of the garden, what is "good and pleasing" over and beyond the order established by Y.E. (cf. 2:9). This involves the /choice of an order for the cosmic (and/or vegetal) world/ which is marked as a negative value and is contrary to the freedom of /choice of an order for the world of the living creatures/ and contradictory with the values manifested by Y.E.'s curses (3:14c; 3:16; 3:18a and 3:19a). These curses manifest with utmost emphasis that any

living creature including man and woman has /no choice regarding one's nature/ even if it is not "pleasing": serpents have to go on their own belly but they eat dust (and thus have food); women have to suffer, and they bear children; men have to suffer hard work because of the hostile nature of adamah and they will have food from it. In other words the /authority of establishing the nature of each belongs to Y.E./ (3:14c; 3:16; 3:18a and 19a) and implies /man's role of establishing the relation of each living creature to himself/ (2:25). However it is illegitimate for /human beings to choose their relation to the world/, that is, /to establish their own nature/ (3:5c,7a) and thus /to be like gods rather than according to their own nature/ (3:7b,c).

The pertinence of these values (which could certainly be better formulated) is confirmed by the bundle of qualifications found in 3:1b, 3:6h and 3:6e where we find once more the man and woman choosing their relation to the world and, in addition, the serpent qualified as עָרוּם, term usually translated by "shrewd", "subtle" or "crafty", which must be understood as /having an excessive freedom of choice/ which is contrary to /being dominated according to one's nature/ manifested in 3:15a (for the serpent), in 3:16e (for the woman), and in 3:19e (for the man). In the two latter cases it is more specifically /to be dominated by that from which one originates/. The woman is dominated by the man from whom she has been taken; the man is dominated by adamah from which he has been taken (logically the serpent should then be viewed as dominated by the woman . . . "from whom he has been taken" . . . could it be in the sense that it is through the quest for the woman that it was created ??!?). At any rate, for the serpent, the woman and the man it is to be /not like gods/ by contradiction to 3:4b, 3:17b and 3:13d where man and woman are once more qualified as /like gods/ and where the serpent acts /like gods/ as the sender of the woman. It is /transcending one's origin/, /transcending one's nature as living creature, as animals/ which is contrary to /belonging to the animal world/, one of the features of 3:21b (the view of man and woman presupposed by Y.E. who gives them "skin-garments"). The contradiction to 3:7d,e is marked not only through the fact that man and woman who have the pretention to be like gods end up /belonging to the vegetal world/ (hiding in the "middle of the trees of the garden", identifying themselves with the trees, and not "in the middle of the garden"), /in fear/, /hiding from Y.E./ and /rejecting sexuality as shameful/. By contrast in 3:21b (a bundle of qualifications which includes 3:20) /sexuality/ receives a positive connotation /as the source of life/ (Adam is /not ashames/ of his woman but sees in her /the mother of all living/). Similarly the separation from God (hiding, fear) is overcome by Y.E.'s gift of clothing.

3.0 - The preceding application of this structural exegetical method shows that from a consideration of the narrative organization of a text one can indeed proceed to identify not only the symbolic organization but also the specific system of values it presupposes. This analysis calls for additional work in two different directions. First, we are now in a position to study in greater detail the symbolism of the text by applying the insights of traditional exegesis within the sketchy symbolic framework thus far uncovered: it already appears that the results of our analysis confirm many of these insights and provide criteria to show why other insights are not valid. In addition the systems of values on both levels provide a sound criterion for determining what are legitimate hermeneutic prolongations of the text.

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WAS PHILO A MYSTIC?

David Winston

Introduction

Although it is notoriously difficult to define mysticism, most students of the subject agree that it involves a timeless apprehension of the transcendent through a unifying vision that gives bliss or serenity and normally accrues upon a course of self-mastery and contemplation.[1] This minimal description may serve as an adequate criterion for our analysis of Philo's mystical passages, if in addition to the distinction between complete or undifferentiated identity with the transcendent as opposed to mere union with it, we further distinguish between a union with the ultimate itself and one that is limited to only an aspect of it, for we shall soon see that man's highest union with God, according to Philo, is limited to the Deity's manifestation as Logos, and is thus in a sense similar to the later mystical notion of the contact or conjunction (ittisāl) of man's "acquired" intellect with the transcendent "active" intellect associated with philosophers such as Ibn Bājjah (d.1138) and Ibn Rushd (1126-98), and derived from Aristotle's famous commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. early 3rd cen. CE).[2] This is obviously quite different from the Plotinian absorption into the Ineffable One, which is beyond Intellect, and is described in terms of a "touching" (ἀφή, ἐπαφή, θίξις) or "blending" (συγκρῦναι) or the converging centers of circles.[3] Since Philo's barring of the way to God's essence is rooted in his concept of the utter divine transcendence, we shall begin our discussion with an analysis of that concept and its sources.

The Divine Transcendence

It has already been noted that the notion of the absolute transcendence of the supreme First Principle may go back to Speusippus, the successor of Plato as head of the Old Academy, according to whom the primary principle of all things is not identical with any of them, but is prior to them and their attendant qualities (fr.34, Lang). It would appear that this principle was already operative to some extent in early Greek philosophy. Simplicius, for example, explains Anaximander's choice of the apeiron as the archē in the following manner: "It is clear that, having observed the change of the four elements into one another, he did not think fit to make any one of these the material substratum (ὑποκείμενον), but something else beside these" (DK A.9).[4] A similar doctrine to that of Speusippus was propounded by some of the Neopythagoreans, and by the Middle Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria (fl. 25 BCE), with their postulation of a supranoetic First

Principle above a pair of opposites: the Monad, representing Form, and the Dyad, representing Matter (Simplic. In Phy. 181, 10 ff., Diels).[5] In the light of this evidence it should be apparent that Philo's prophetic inheritance which emphasized the incomparability and unnamability of God had converged in this instance with his philosophical inheritance to lead him to an emphatic doctrine of divine transcendence. It should be equally clear, however, that (pace Wolfson) it was his philosophic commitment which was the decisive element in his sharp distinction between God's existence and his essence, and his insistence on man's total inability to cognize the latter, for the use of such categories of thought was completely alien to both biblical and rabbinic tradition. Many scholars, however, have found Philo's utterances on this subject contradictory, and we must therefore examine his doctrine of transcendence in further detail.

Philo explicitly states on numerous occasions that God is absolutely ἄποιος (LA 3.36; 1.36, 51; 3.206; Deus 55-6; Cher. 67), and Drummond and Wolfson have shown that not only does this mean that God is without accidental quality, but that it may be taken to imply also indirectly that in God there is no distinction of genus and species, i.e., He is τὸ γενικώτατον, "the most generic" (Gig.52), and since He belongs to no class, we do not know what He is.[6] Moreover, all the predicates which are predicated of God are strictly speaking "properties" (ἰδιότητες), i.e., they are derivative of His essence, but unlike definitions, do not indicate the essence itself, and unlike qualities are not shared by Him with others. Furthermore, since the essence of God is one and single, whatever belongs to it as a property must be one and single, and Philo therefore reduces all the divine properties to one single property, that of acting (Cher.77).[7] In Philo's hierarchical construction of reality the essence of God, though utterly concealed in its primary being, is nevertheless made manifest on two secondary levels: the intelligible universe or Logos, which is God's image (Somn.1.239; Conf.147-8), and the sensible universe, which in turn is an image of that Logos (Op.25). Thus, though the essence of God as it is in itself remains forever undisclosed, its effects, images, or shadows (or, to use the Plotinian term, traces: 6.7.17) may be perceived. Philo further attempts to delineate the dynamics of the Logos' activity by defining and describing its two constitutive polar principles: Goodness or the Creative Power (ποιητικὴ δύναμις), and Sovereignty (ἐξουσία) or the Regent Power (βασιλικὴ δύναμις)(Cher.27-8; Sacr.59; Her.166; Abr. 124-5; QE 2.68; Fug.95). It is not difficult to recognize in these two powers the ἄπειρον and πέρας or the Unlimited and Limit of Plato's Philebus (23C-31A), which reappear in Plotinus' two moments in the emergence of Nous, where we find undefined or unlimited Intelligible Matter proceeding from the One and then turning back to its source for definition (2.4.5; 5.4.2; 6.7.17. cf. Proclus, Elements, props.89-92, 159). Now, the various positive properties attributed to God by Philo may all be subsumed under either of these two polar forces, and are therefore all expressions of the one Logos which constitutes the manifestation of God as thinking-acting (De Prov. 1.7; Sacr.65; Mos.1.283). However, since God's essence as it is in itself is beyond any possibility of human experience or

cognition, including the experience of mystic vision, the only attributes which may be applied to God in his supreme state of concealment are those of the via negativa (e.g., ἀγένητος, ἀδέκαστος, ἀκατάληπτος, ἀκατονόμαστος, ἄόρατος, ἀπερίγραφος, ἄρρητος, ἀσύγκριτος), or of the via eminentiae.[9] A good example of the latter is found at Praem.39-40:[10]

> The Father and Savior, perceiving the sincerity of his [Jacob's] yearning in pity gave power to the penetration of his eyesight and did not grudge to grant him the vision of Himself in so far as it was possible for mortal and created nature to contain it. Yet the vision only showed that He is, not what He is. For this which is better than the good, more venerable than the monad, purer than the unit, cannot be discerned by anyone else; to God alone is it permitted to apprehend God. [Cf. Cont.2; QE 2.68; Leg.5; Op.8; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, 3:97.]

Although at the summit, the powers of the Logos may be grasped as constituting an indivisible unity, at lower levels, there are those who cognize the Logos exclusively as the Creative Power, and those beneath them who cognize it as the Regent Power (Fug.94 ff.; Abr.124-5). Lower still are those who, sunk in the mire of sensible being, are unable to perceive the intelligible realities with any degree of continuity (Gig. 20). At each successively lower level of divine knowledge the image of God's essence is increasingly dimmed or veiled.

Rational Mysticism: Faith, Reason, and Intuition

If we are to determine the function of mystic vision in the philosophy of Philo, we must first clarify his views concerning the relationship between faith, reason, and intuition. Wolfson has claimed that Philo sought to diminish Philosophy's stature by reducing it to the status of a bondwoman in contrast to the Torah, which is seen as the mistress, and has argued that when Philo represents philosophy as the bondwoman of wisdom, he thereby indicates that she is the bondwoman of the Torah:

> Philo compares the relation of philosophy, in the sense of Greek philosophy, to "wisdom" in the sense of the revealed Law, to the relation of the "encyclical studies" to philosophy, for he says, "just as the encyclical culture is the bondwoman of philosophy, so also is philosophy the bondwoman of wisdom" (Congr.79). . . . This subservience of philosophy to wisdom or the Law is explained by him in a passage in which he says that "philosophy teaches the control of the belly and the control of the parts below the belly," but while all these qualities are desirable in themselves, still they "will assume a grander and loftier aspect if practised for the honor and service of God"; for the service and worship of God, as we have seen, constitutes wisdom, and wisdom is the revealed Law embodied in Scripture. When, therefore, Philo speaks of philosophy as being the bondwoman or handmaid of

> wisdom, he means thereby that it is the bondwoman or handmaid of Scripture. [Philo (Cambridge, 1948), 1:149-50.]

The fact is, however, that a distinction between philosophy and wisdom was quite common among many Stoic thinkers according to Seneca's testimony (Ep.89.4-9), and this distinction probably goes back to the Middle Stoa.[11] It is therefore quite evident that when Philo, following in the footsteps of the Stoa, defines philosophy as "devotion to wisdom" (ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας) and wisdom as "the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes" (Congr.79),[12] and then concludes that just as the ἐγκύκλια are subservient to philosophy, so philosophy is subservient to wisdom, that by wisdom he means philosophy consummated, which in turn is identical in his scheme of things with the Torah, whose laws are in agreement with the eternal principles of nature.[13] Far from subordinating philosophy to Scripture, Philo is rather identifying the Mosaic Law with the summit of philosophical achievement. Thus, for example, Philo can equate Moses "who had attained philosophy's summit" with Moses "who had been divinely instructed in the greater and most essential part of nature's lore" (Op.8).[14] Wolfson continues his argument by insisting that "the subordination of philosophy to Scripture means to Philo the subordination of reason to faith. This is clearly expressed by him in his comment on the verses "Abraham believed God and it was counted to him for justice," and "not so my servant Moses; he is faithful in all my house." Commenting on these verses, he says that "it is best to have faith in the immediate knowledge given by God through revelation rather than in the result of our reason" (Philo,1:151-2). The Philonic passage under discussion (LA 3.228-9), however, is not contrasting reason and faith, but faulty reason with firm, secure knowledge. Philo employs four emphatic adjectives to draw his sharp distinction between "trust in God" on the one hand, and the use of obscure (ἀσαφέσι), empty (κενοῖς), plausible (πιθανοῖς) arguments, or unreliable conjectures (ἀβεβαίοις εἰκασίαις), on the other. Abraham's faith in God is paradigmatic for Philo of the "unswerving and firm assumption" that is attained when the mind has a vision of the First Cause, the truly Existent.[15] The exuberant variety of physical speculations is frequently the butt of Philo's biting critique,[16] when he wishes to contrast the utter uncertainty of man's knowledge of reality with the infinite splendor of the divine wisdom which alone is perfect and self-secure. It is not the denigration of philosophic reason and the attempt to escape into the bosom of divine revelation that motivates Philo's skeptical flights (Cher.65, 113; Her.246; Somn.1.21; Ebr.166-205; Jos.125-43; Mig.134-38) but rather his unshakable conviction that our knowledge of the modal or finite aspect of reality belongs to the contingent and unabiding, whereas our unmediated intuition of infinite divinity, limited though it be by the inherent finitude of the human mind, is vastly more effective than discursive reason in affording us a glimpse of the eternally and truly real (Praem. 28-30). It is only as a consequence of such an intuitive vision that one begins to read Scripture correctly and in accord with its deeper meaning. Wolfson's attempt, therefore, to foist on Philo "the ancillary conception of philosophy which prevailed for many centuries in European philosophy," is

essentially misguided.[17]

We must now determine the exact nature of this unmediated intuitive vision in whose praise Philo's efforts are so unflagging. In Philo's philosophy, the Logos is the Divine Mind, the Idea of Ideas, the first-begotten Son of the Uncreated Father, eldest and chief of the angels, the man or shadow of God, or even the second God, the pattern of all creation and archetype of human reason.[18] The Logos is God immanent, holding together and administering the entire chain of creation (Mos.2.134; Her.188), and man's mind is but a tiny fragment of this all-pervading Logos:

> How, then, was it likely that the mind of man being so small [cf. Arist.EN 10.88], contained in such small bulks as a brain or a heart, should have room for all the vastness of sky and universe, had it not been an inseparable portion of that divine and blessed soul? For no part of that which is divine cuts itself off and becomes separate, but does extend itself. The mind, then, having obtained a share of the perfection which is in the whole, when it conceives of the universe, reaches out as widely as the bounds of the whole, and undergoes no severance; for its force is expansive (ὁλικός). [Det.90; cf. Gig.27; LA 1.37; Ps-Plat. Axioch.370B.]

To the mind as yet uninitiated into the highest mysteries and still unable to apprehend the Existent alone by itself, but only through its actions, God appears as a triad constituted by himself and his two potencies, the Creative and the Regent. To the purified mind, on the other hand, God appears as One (Abr.119-23). Philo thus distinguishes between the mind which apprehends God through his creation, and the mind which elevates itself beyond the physical universe and perceives the Uncreated One through a clear vision. Following in the footsteps of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa,[19] he vividly expounds the teleological proof for God's existence:[20]

> Anyone entering this world, as it were some vast house or city, and beholding the sky circling round and embracing within it all things, and planets and fixed stars without any variation moving in rhythmical harmony and with advantage to the whole . . . will surely argue that these have not been wrought without consummate art, but that the Maker of this whole universe was and is God. Those, who thus base their reasoning on what is before their eyes, apprehend God by means of a shadow cast, discerning the Artificer by means of his works. There is, however, a mind more perfect and more thoroughly cleansed [cf. Somn.1.148; QG4.8], which has undergone initiation into the great mysteries, a mind which gains its knowledge of the First Cause not from created things . . . but lifting its eyes above and beyond creation obtains a clear vision (ἔμφασιν ἐναργῆ) of the uncreated One [cf. Post.167] so as from him to apprehend both himself and his shadow. . . . The mind of which I speak is Moses who says, "Manifest Thyself to

> me, let me see Thee that I may know Thee (Exod 33:13), for I would not that Thou shouldst be manifested to me by means of heaven or earth or water or air or any created thing at all . . . for the reflections in created things are dissolved, but those in the uncreated will continue abiding and sure and eternal. . . . Bezalel also has God expressly called, but not in like manner. One receives the clear vision of God directly from the First Cause Himself. The other discerns the Artificer, as it were from a shadow (cf. BT Ber.55a), from created things by virtue of inferential reasoning (ἐπιλογισμοῦ). [LA 3.97-103; cf. Praem.41; Spec.1.33 ff.; 3.187; QG 2.34; Plant.26.]

Elsewhere he speaks of those who have apprehended God through his works as advancing from down to up (κάτωθεν ἄνω) by a sort of heavenly ladder[21] and conjecturing (στοχασάμενοι) his existence through plausible inference (εἰκότι λογισμῷ):

> But those who have had the power to apprehend Him through Himself without the cooperation of reasoned inference (λογισμῷ) to lead them to the sight, must be recorded as holy and genuine worshippers and friends of God in very truth. In their company is he who in the Hebrew is called Israel, but in Greek the God-seer who sees not his real nature, for that, as I said, is impossible--but that He is . . . . Is not light seen by light? In the same way God too is His own brightness and is discerned through Himself alone without anything cooperating . . . . They then do but make a happy guess, who are at pains to discern the Uncreated and Creator of All from His creation, and are on the same footing as those who try to trace the nature of the monad from the dyad, whereas the observation of the dyad should begin with the monad which is the starting point. The seekers for truth are those who envisaged God through God, light through light. [Praem.40-6; cf. Post.167; Spec.1.42; Plot. 5.3.17; 5.5.10; Apoc Abr 7: "Yet may God reveal himself to us through himself."]

From all this it is quite clear that according to Philo, there is in addition to inferential reason, which provides an indirect mode for the apprehension of God, a direct approach requiring no mediation whatsoever. Wolfson believed that Philo is here referring to a direct divine revelation which bypasses the powers of human reason and is utterly dependent upon God's grace, whose illumination flashes into the human psyche from without. Such an interpretation is, in my opinion, very unlikely. Philo does indeed speak elsewhere of prophetic revelation mediated through ecstatic possession or the divine voice, a theory couched by him in the standard language of Greek theories of divination, but there is no mention of ecstasy or the eviction of the mind at the arrival of the Divine Spirit (Her.265), or any form of prophecy at all, in the passages dealing with the direct vision of God. Instead, Philo speaks of a "purified mind" capable of seeing God through Himself (cf. Deus 2). Moreover, as I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, the passage in De Prov.1.6-9,

contrary to earlier views, does not constitute a medley of contradictions, but can be understood as a coherent whole. It is Philo's view there that

> God is continuously ordering matter by his thought. His thinking is simultaneous with his acting and there never was a time when he did not act, the ideas themselves existing with him from the beginning. For God's will is not posterior to him, but is always with him, for natural motions never give out. Thus ever thinking he creates, and furnishes to sensible things the principle of their existence, so that one always finds these two processes in conjunction. [1.7]

What Philo means to say is that in so far as God is always thinking the intelligible "Forms," he is eternally creating the intelligible world or Logos, and thereby also indirectly causing its shadow reflection, the sensible world, which he is constantly making to conform as closely as possible to its intelligible counterpart. God's revelation must therefore be seen as continuous, and as encompassing the ideas taking shape within the human mind which, as we have seen, is nothing but an inseparable portion of the Divine Mind (cf. Op.146; Mut.223; Spec.4.123).

Having thus eliminated a revelation which bypasses human reason, we have yet to specify the precise nature of Philo's theory concerning the direct approach to God. The latter can be elucidated, however, by the examination of a well-known tradition in the history of philosophy which distinguishes between the cosmological and the ontological proofs for the existence of God. Whereas the former is based upon inferential or deductive reasoning, the latter constitutes an analytical truth and its function is to clarify those propositions which are implied by our definitions. It would appear then that, according to Philo, the concept of God's existence is contained within certain definitions of human reason and needs but an inner illumination to reveal it. It is this inner intuitive illumination, constituting a rational process of an analytical type, that is to be identified with the divine revelation taking shape in the human mind and enabling it to have a direct vision of God. In Philo's figurative language, this experience is expressed as follows: "He is his love for mankind, when the soul came into his presence, did not turn away his face, but came forward to meet him and revealed his nature, so far as the beholder's power of sight allowed" (Abr.79-80). Elsewhere he puts it that "the invisible Deity stamped on the invisible soul the impression of itself, to the end that not even the terrestrial region should be without a share in the image of God. . . . Having been struck in accord with the Pattern, it entertained ideas not now mortal but immortal" (Det.86 ff.).[22]

Although Philo does not specify the definitions which in his view contained the concept of God's existence, we may surmise that he is undoubtedly thinking of the various definitions of the archē out of which all things arise. Diogenes of Apollonia, for example, explained why the various elements of the cosmos could not be really different from one another in

their own nature, so that they must all be modifications of one archē "This is obvious," he writes, "for if the things now existing in this cosmos--earth, water, air, fire and all the other things which manifestly exist in this cosmos--if one of these was different from another, different, that is, in its own proper nature, and not the same thing changed and altered in many ways, they could in no way mix with one another, nor affect one another for good or ill" (DK, B.2; cf. QE 2.88). One can easily transpose this into Spinozistic terms: The various elements cannot be archai or substances, for substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another (Eth.1.2), whereas the elements interchange and therefore must have something in common. They therefore constitute but one substance modified in different ways. The immediate origin, however, of Philo's second way of knowing God, is undoubtedly to be found in Plato's well-known remarks at the end of Rep.6 to the effect that dialectical reasoning (νόησις) can arrive at the intuition of a First Principle by "treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas" (511BC; cf. 532AB: "When anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible"). The exact nature of this upward-downward dialectical path has been much debated, but the most likely interpretation is that it involves a sudden intuition of the First Principle (cf. Symp. 210E; Ep.7.341CD) at the end of a series of analyses of various hypotheses, which then permits a downward series of deductions from that Principle.[23] It may be recalled that Spinoza's third kind of knowledge, scientia intuitiva, by means of which man knows God, is similarly independent of sense perception and deductive reasoning. Finally, according to the testimony of Cicero (ND 2.12), the Stoics taught that God's existence is imprinted in man. Among the many proofs which they adduced there are some which appear to have constituted analytical truths. One series of arguments, for example, revolves around the central notion of the world's perfection, which necessarily includes the highest form of reason. "There is nothing else beside the world that has nothing wanting, but is fully equipped and complete and perfect in all its details and parts" (ibid.2.37). Since "it embraces all things and since nothing exists which is not within it, it is entirely perfect; how then can it fail to possess that which is best?" (2.38). Although the Stoic arguments cited by Cicero are not quite identical with the ontological argument as classically formulated by thinkers such as St. Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza, we do have at one point a locution which appears to be an incipient form of St. Anselm's famous "aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit" (Proslogion, chaps. 2 and 3). The Stoics point out that not only does nothing exist that is superior to the world, but nothing superior can even be

conceived (ne cogitari quidem quicquam melius potest) (2.18). The ontological proof is essentially constituted by the argument that man possesses the notion of that "than which nothing greater can be conceived," or that which necessarily exists, or that "whose essence involves existence," or a being who exists through his own power, or a being of the highest power or perfection. The Stoic arguments referred to above all assume that man possesses the conception of an absolutely perfect universal nature, but are deployed against those who would deny that that nature is endowed with reason. Still, in the light of Cicero's statement that according to the Stoics "all men have engraved in their minds an innate belief that the gods exist" (2.12), it would appear incredible that this series of proofs did not already include an early form of the ontological argument.

It is now clear that the direct vision of God is attributed by Philo to the workings of intuitive reason, and in no way serves as a bypass of man's rational faculties. Following Plato's lead, however (Phaedr.249CD), Philo repeatedly asserts that this unmediated vision may at times culminate in an experience of mystical union accompanied by a Bacchic frenzy, an ecstatic condition which shakes the soul to its very foundations. As with most mystics, however, he is convinced that this longed-for experience can only come after long and arduous preparations. We must therefore now turn our attention to a description of that psychic state which in Philo's view is a prerequisite for the mystic experience and the ascetic path leading to it.

Apatheia and Asceticism

Imitating God, who is completely apathēs,[24] the wise man must achieve a state of apatheia, i.e., he must convert all his pathē, "diseased or irrational emotions," into eupatheiai, "rational emotions."[25] Thus, for example, the wise man would never experience the morbid emotion of fear, but only the completely rational feeling of caution or wariness, which requires no further moderation or modification. Grief, on the other hand, he would not be subject to in any form, experiencing at most a mental sting or minor soul contractions, which are morally neutral and betray not the slightest trace of irrationality. In his state of apatheia/eupatheia the sophos, symbolized for Philo by Isaac, acts out of a fixity of disposition, no longer having to struggle to make rational decisions.[26]

In Philo's view, the body is by no means to be neglected, nor is its well-being deliberately to be compromised in any way. Those who needlessly fast or refuse the bath and oil, or are careless about their clothing and lodging, thinking that they are thereby practicing self-control, are to be pitied for their error. They are similar to those counterfeits who never cease making sacrificial and costly votive offerings in their mistaken belief that piety consists in ritual rather than holiness, and thus attempt to flatter One who cannot be flattered and who abhors all counterfeit approaches (Det.19-21). Moreover, it is a false strategy to oppose irrational desires by taking off in the opposite

direction and practicing austerities, "for in this way you will rouse your adversary's spirit and stimulate a more dangerous foe to the contest against you" (Fug.25). Better to indulge in the various pursuits for external goods, but to do so with skillful moderation and self-control. "Begin, then," advises Philo, "by getting some exercise and practice in the business of life both private and public; and when by means of the sister virtues, household-management and statesmanship, you have become masters in each domain, enter now, as more than qualified to do so, on your migration to a different and more excellent way of life" (Fug.36-8). As a matter of fact, even the wise man will indulge in heavy drinking, though in the more moderate manner of the ancients rather than in the style of the moderns who drink "till body and soul are unstrung." For "the countenance of wisdom is not scowling and severe, contracted by deep thought and depression of spirit, but on the contrary cheerful and tranquil, full of joy and gladness" (Plant 167-8).[27]

If the body is thus not to be neglected in any way, neither is it to be allowed to become the central focus of human concern or to usurp the higher dignity reserved for the rational element. Pleasure plays an important role in the life of ensouled creatures, but it must be accepted for what it really is and not elevated into a self-validating principle motivating human behavior. Following the teaching of Aristotle and the Stoics, Philo insists that joy, as well as pleasure, has no intrinsic importance, but is purely adventitious, a supervening aftermath or by-product of virtue (Det.124; LA 3.80).[28] Moreover, although hēdonē in the sense of agreeable physical feelings is permitted even to the wise man, this is not the case when it denotes that type of mental pleasure which is accounted a pathos by the Stoics, and is the result of a faulty judgment:[29]

> The serpent pleasure is bad of itself; and therefore it is not found at all in a good man, the bad man getting all the harm of it by himself. Quite appropriately therefore does God pronounce the curse without giving pleasure an opportunity of defending herself, since she has in her no seed from which virtue might spring, but is always and everywhere guilty and foul. [LA 3.68.][30]

The body is for Philo, at best, a necessary evil (LA 3.72-3), for it is a corpse, a shell-like growth, "the dwelling place of endless calamities" (Conf.177), wicked by nature and a plotter against the soul (LA 3.69). It is the source both of agnoia and amathia (cf. Pl.Rep.585 B; Tim.86B; Soph. 228ff.).

> For souls that are free from flesh and body spend their days in the theatre of the universe and with a joy that none can hinder see and hear things divine, which they have desired with love insatiable. But those which bear the burden of the flesh, oppressed by the grievous load, cannot look up to the heavens as they revolve, but with necks bowed downwards are constrained

> to stand rooted to the ground like four-footed beasts. [Gig.29-31; cf. Pl.Phaed.66B, 81C; Tim. 90A; Plant.16-27; QG 4.46.]

Philo quotes with approval Heraclitus' saying "we live their death, and are dead to their life" (LA 1.108). The soul that loves God will therefore disrobe itself of the body and its senses (Ebr.69-70), and, devoting itself to genuine philosophy, will "from first to last study to die to the life in the body" (Gig.14).[31]

In sum, like any good Platonist, Philo would much prefer to dispense with material reality and the human body which constitutes an inseparable part of it. As a philosophical realist, however, he must accept it and, on occasion, justify its existence within the divine scheme of things. He consequently never loses track of the body's legitimate needs and functions, though he is keenly aware of its capacity to entrap and entice the higher self. He believes that most men must wean themselves away from the physical aspect of things only very gradually and with the expenditure of much effort and toil, though he is aware of the psychological contamination which may result from too extended an exposure to bodily concerns. He is convinced, however, that some, though not many, may ultimately succeed in focusing their minds much of the time on the eternal realities, while yet going through the motions of somatic activity which will have finally faded away into insignificance.

The Mystical Experience

We are now prepared to evaluate the mystical passages in Philo. Like most mystics, he is convinced that man's goal and ultimate bliss lie in the knowledge or vision of God (Decal.81; Det.86; Abr.58; Praem.14; QE 2.51). Indeed, the mere quest is sufficient of itself to give a foretaste of gladness (Post.20).

> The limit of happiness is the presence of God, which completely fills the whole soul with His whole incorporeal and eternal light. And the limit of misery is His passing on the way . . . . for the soul to be separated from the contemplation of the Existent One is the most complete of evils. [QG 4.4]

The soul has a natural longing and love for God and is drawn to him by a surpassing beauty:

> When the mind is mastered by the love of the divine, when it strains its powers to reach the inmost shrine [cf. Plot.6.9.11.18], when it puts forth every effort and ardor on its forward march, under the divine impelling force it forgets all else, forgets itself, and fixes its thoughts and memories on him alone whose attendant and servant it is. [Somn.2.232; cf. Abr. 170; Op.71; Somn.1.71, 165; LA 3.84; QG 4.140; Deus 138; Her.68; Post.92]

The first step leading to God is man's recognition of his own

nothingness, which induces him to depart from himself:

> For when Abraham most knew himself, then most did he despair of himself, in order that he might attain to an exact knowledge of him who in reality is. And this is nature's law; he who has thoroughly comprehended himself, thoroughly despairs of himself, having as a step to this ascertained the nothingness in all respects of created being. [Somn.1.160; cf. ib.212; Sacr.55; Mig.134: "the final aim of knowledge is to hold that we know nothing."]

At Her.69, Philo writes:

> Therefore, my soul, if thou feelest any yearning to inherit the good things of God, leave not only thy land, that is the body, thy kinsfolk, that is the senses, thy father's house, that is speech, but be a fugitive from thyself also and issue forth from thyself. [Cf. LA 1.82; 3.41-2, 47; Somn.2.232.]

Having gone out of himself, the devotee is now asked to attach himself completely to God:

> The mind which has been perfectly cleansed and purified, and which renounces all things pertaining to creation, is acquainted with One alone, and knows but One, even the Uncreate, to whom it has drawn nigh, by whom also it has been taken to Himself. For who is at liberty to say, "God Himself is alone to me," save one who has no welcome for aught that comes after Him? And this is the Levite attitude of mind. [Plant.64; cf. LA3.126; Post.12; Somn.1.243, 252; Gig.44.]

This attachment to God involves the realization that it is God alone who acts, and as long as the mind "supposes itself to be the author of anything it is far away from making room for God" (LA 1.82). In the fragment from the lost fourth book of his Legum Allegoria, Philo writes:

> "But when [Moses] affirms the first and better principle, namely, that God acts not as man, he ascribes the powers and causes of all things to God, leaving no work for a created being but showing it to be inactive and passive." Those uninitiated, however, "in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness of the created," do not as yet recognize this truth. [Harris, Fragments:8; cf. Cher.77, 128.]

Moreover, in abandoning body and sense perception, the mind is now absorbed in a form of intellectual prayer which is wordless and unencumbered by petition:

> [The reasoning faculty must sever and banish from itself the word of utterance] to the end that the word or thought within the mind may be left behind by itself alone, destitute of utterance in audible speech;

> for when it has been thus left, it will live a life in harmony with such solitude, and will render, with nothing to mar or disturb it, its glad homage to the Sole Existent. [Fug.92; cf. Gig.52; Plant.126; Mig. 12; Spec.1.272; Ebr.94.][32]

At Her.71, Philo writes:

> Great indeed was [speech's] audacity, that it should attempt the impossible task to use shadows to point me to substances, words to point me to facts. And, amid all its blunders it chattered and gushed about, unable to present with clear expression those distinctions in things which baffled its vague and general vocabulary.

The mystic vision of God is a timeless experience which carries the soul to the uttermost bounds of the universe and enables it to gaze upon the Divine Logos:

> Those who serve the Existent ascend in their thoughts to the heavenly height, setting before them Moses, the nature beloved of God, to lead them on the way. For then they shall behold the place (Exod 24:10:εἶδον τὸν τόπον οὗ εἱστήκει ὁ θεός) which in fact is the Logos, where stands God the never changing, never swerving, and also what lies under his feet like "the word of a brick of sapphire, like the form of the firmament of the heaven," even the world of our senses, which he indicates in this mystery. [Conf.95-7; cf. Mos.1.158; Post.14.]

At Ebr.152 we read:

> What else was meant by the words, "I will pour out my soul" (I Sam 1:15) but "I will consecrate it all to Him, I will loosen all the chains that bound it tight, which the empty aims and desires of mortal life had fastened upon it; I will send it abroad, extend and diffuse it, so that it shall touch the bounds of the All, and hasten to that most glorious and loveliest of visions--the Vision of the Uncreated"? [Cf. Det.89, where we are told that the cont with the All is ἀχρόνως; Fug.169; cf. Plot.5.1.4.]

Still, the notion of actual union with God appears in only one passage: "He bids them 'cleave to Him' (Deut.30:20), bringing out by the use of this word how constant and continuous and unbroken is the concord and union (ἑνώσεως) that comes through making God our own" (Post.12; cf. Mig.13). In the exceptional case of Moses, however, Philo's language occasionally oversteps its usual restraints and not only describes him as having been resolved into the nature of unity (QE 2.29), but also as having been "divinized" by ascending to God (ib.2.40; cf. however, Det.161).

The mystic state is further described by Philo as producing tranquility and stability (Gig.49; Deus 12; LA 1.16; Abr.58; Post.27-8), and it is sometimes indicated that it

supervenes suddenly (Sacr.79-9; Somn.1.71; Mig.35; cf. Plato, Symp.210E; Ep.7.341CD). It is also frequently described as a condition of sober intoxication,[33] which is invariably depicted in a highly spirited and enthusiastic manner. The best known passage is at Op.70:

> When on soaring wing it has contemplated the atmosphere and all its phases, it is borne yet higher to the ether and the circuit of heaven, and is whirled round with the dances of planets and fixed stars . . . . And so, carrying its gaze beyond the confines of all substance discernible by sense, it comes to a point at which it reaches out after the intelligible world, and on descrying in that world sights of surpassing loveliness . . . it is seized by a sober intoxication, like those filled with Corybantic frenzy . . . . Wafted by this to the topmost arch of the things perceptible to mind, it seems to be on its way to the Great King himself; but, amid its longing to see him, pure and untempered rays of concentrated light stream forth like a torrent, so that by its gleams the eye of the understanding is dazzled. [Cf. Ebr.145; Fug.166; LA 1.82; 3.82; Prob.13; Fug.32; Mos.1.187; Cont.89.][34]

Philo occasionally exhibits a tendency to compare the mystic experience to that of prophetic ecstasy. Addressing his own soul, which yearns to inherit the goods things of God, he says:

> Like persons possessed and corybants, be filled with inspired frenzy, even as the prophets are inspired. For it is the mind which is under the divine afflatus, and no longer in its own keeping, but is stirred to its depths and maddened by heavenward yearning, drawn by the truly existent and pulled upward thereto, with truth to lead the way and remove all obstacles before its feet . . . --such is the mind, which has this inheritance. [Her.69-70; cf. Spec.3.1; Plant.38-9.]

Finally, like most mystics, Philo is keenly aware of the inability of man to maintain a steady vision of the divine and the consequent ebb and flow which characterizes that type of experience:

> But when the inspiration is stayed, and the strong yearning abates, it hastens back from the divine and becomes a man and meets the human interests which lay waiting in the vestibule ready to seize upon it, should it but show its face for a moment from within. [Somn.2.233; cf. ib.1.115-16, 150; QG 4.29.]

In an autobiographical vein, Philo sometimes describes his own personal experiences, and speaks of an inner voice within his soul which is God-possessed and divines where it does not know (Cher.27). At Mig.34-5, he describes such an experience more spaciously:

> I feel no shame in recording my own experience, a thing I know from its having happened to me a thousand times. On some occasions, after making up my mind to

> follow the usual course of writing on philosophical tracts, and knowing definitely the substance of what I was to set down, I have found my understanding incapable of giving birth to a single idea, and have given it up without accomplishing anything . . . . On other occasions, I have approached my work empty and suddenly became full, the ideas falling like snow from above and being sown invisibly, so that under the influence of the Divine possession, I have been filled with Corybantic frenzy and been unconscious of anything, place, persons present, myself, words spoken, lines written. For I obtained language, ideas, an enjoyment of light, keenest vision, pellucid distinction of object, such as might be received through the eyes as the result of clearest showing. [Cf. LA 2.85.]

It is significant that Philo has in this passage assimilated the mind's sudden attainment of clear insight to instances of divine possession and corybantic frenzy, thus providing a further indication that the latter terminology was freely applied by him to all extraordinary experiences of intuitive clarity.[35]

It has been pointed out that one possible motive behind Philo's lyrical descriptions of the mystic condition of the soul is his desire to vindicate prophetic inspiration and thereby authenticate Scripture as inspired writing. Some interpreters of Philo have consequently played down the mystical passages and have regarded them not as a reflection of true mystical experience but rather as a combination of poetic flourishes and clever apologetic. An analogy to this would be to the well-known use of "mystery" terminology by many Greek philosophers in order to indicate the more esoteric levels of their teachings.[36] Our detailed examination of Philo's mystical passages, however, has clearly revealed that they contain most of the characteristic earmarks of mystical experience. These may now be briefly summarized as follows: Knowledge of God is man's supreme bliss (with the corollary that separation from God is the greatest of evils); the soul's intense yearning for the divine; recognition of man's nothingness and the need to go out of oneself; attachment to God; the realization that it is God alone who acts; a preference for contemplative prayer; a timeless union with the All; the serenity that results from the mystic experience; the suddenness with which the vision appears; the notion of sober intoxication; the ecstatic condition of the soul in the mystic state; and finally the ebb and flow of mystical experience. If this evidence is added to the autobiographical remarks quoted above, it becomes abundantly clear that Philo was at least a "mystical theorist" (if not a "practicing mystic")[37] in the very core of his being and that his philosophical writings cannot be adequately understood if this signal fact is in any way obscured.

Notes

[1]See N. Smart, "Mysticism, History of," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards.

[2]See P. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1963):14 ff.

[3]See Plotinus 5.3.17; 6.9.11. Cf. J. Rist, Plotinus, The Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967):213-30.

[4]See P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1960):97, 105; H. Krämer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik (Amsterdam, 1967):207-18; 351-8; H. Happ, Hyle (Berlin, 1971): 208-41; J. Dillon, "The Transcendence of God in Philo," Colloquy 16, Center for Hermeneutical Studies (Berkeley, 1975).

[5]It is possible that Eudorus was influenced by the first Hypothesis of Plato's Parmenides. See Dodds, Class Quart (1928):135 ff. Moreover, Philo himself may be referring to the aforementioned philosophers in Somn.1.184: "Others maintain that the Uncreated resembles nothing among created things, but so completely transcends them that even the swiftest understanding falls far short of apprehending Him."

[6]Although Philo generally affirms that God is ἀσώματος and ἄποιος, at LA 3.206 he asserts that we cannot even make negative statements of God. Cf. Albin.Did.10.4, Louis.

[7]See J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus (rep., Amsterdam, 1969), II:17-34; H. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, 1948), II:94-164.

[8]A similar triadic configuration reappears in the mysticism of the Zohar. The sefirot of Wisdom and Intelligence represent the Logos, while those of Love and Stern Judgment are its dynamic polar principles, the Unlimited and Limit, which in this case are balanced and anchored in the sefirah of Compassion. Cf. Philo, Her.166.

[9]Wolfson has correctly pointed out that though Philo used many negative descriptions of God, he does not say outright that, as a result of the unknowability and ineffability of God, He is to be described by negations. Nor does he apply the principle of negation as an interpretation of those predicates in Scripture which are couched in positive form." (Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge, 1973]:117). Philo also hints at another way of predicating of God, i.e. the process of κατ' ἀφαίρεσιν, which consists of depriving the object of knowledge of any sensible attribute (Deus 55-6; cf. Albinus, Did.165.14). See also J. Whittaker, "Neopythagoreanism and Negative Theology," Symbdae Osloenses 44 (1969): 109-25; S. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria (Oxford, 1971):221.

[10]Although Philo's via eminentiae put God beyond the good, the beautiful, the One, the archē, knowledge, blessedness, and happiness, we are nowhere told that He is beyond being (like Plato's Good, which is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας: Rep.6.509B). It may be inferred, however, from the fact that God alone is ὄντως ὄν that his being is of an altogether different order

than that of all else. This is made explicit by Philo at Det.160: "For among the virtues, that of God really is, actually existing, inasmuch as God alone has veritable being. That is why Moses will say of Him as best he may in human speech, 'I am He that is' (Exod 3:14), implying that others lesser than He have not being, as being indeed is, but exist in semblance only, and are conventionally said to exist." The same might perhaps be inferred from the fact that God alone may be said to act, whereas all created beings "suffer" (Cher. 77).

[11]Seneca writes: "One thing is practically settled, that there is some difference between philosophy and wisdom. Nor indeed is it possible that that which is sought and that which seeks are identical." Other Stoics, he continues, "have maintained the two cannot be sundered." Cf. Cic.Leg.1.22: "And what is more godlike . . . than reason, which, once it is full grown and brought to perfection, is rightly called wisdom?"

[12]Cf. Sen.Ep.89.4; Cic.Off.2.25; Tusc.4.25.57; SVF II.36; Diels, Dox.Graec.273a13; IV Macc 1:16.

[13]See Mos.2.48, 181; Abr.16, 60; Op.143; Spec.1.31,155; 2.13; 3.46-7, 112, 137; 4.204; Decal.132; Mig.128; Virt.132, 18; Plant.49; Ebr.34, 142 (cf. SVF III.613); Prob.160; Det. 52; Agr.66; QG4.90; PT Kil'ayim 1.7; BT Kid.39a. Cf. I. Heinemann, "Die Lehre vom ungeschriebenen Gesetz im jüdischen Schrifttum," HUCA 4 (1927):149-71.

[14]See I. Heinemann, Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung (rep., Hildesheim, 1962):475-78.

[15]For πίστις in Greek philosophy, see Lilla, Clement (cited n.9), chap.4; Rist, Plotinus (cited n.3):231-46; T. Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus (Chicago, 1919):72-5. The opposite of πίστις is called by Philo οἴησις,τῦφος , κενὴ δόξα, ἀφροσύνη, φιλαυτία (Mut.176; Spec.1.10; Somn.248-66, 162, 192; Her.106). It consists in giving to the senses or to the thought based on them that trust which should be bestowed on God alone. Cf. Plato's denunciations of φιλαυτία in Laws 731D-732.

[16]Cf. Epict.fr.1 (Stob.Eclog.2.1.31).

[17]Cf. I. Heinemann, "Philo als Vater der mittelalterlichen Philosophie?" Theolog.Zeits. 6 (1950):99-116.

[18]See QE 2.124; Conf.41; Mig.103; Conf.63, 146; Deus 31; Her.205; Fug.112; Mos.2.134; Euseb.PE.7.13.1; LA 3.96.

[19]See Plato, Laws 886A; Phileb.28E; Arist.fr.12a, Ross; Cic. ND.2.31-9; 15-19; Epict.1.6; Ps.Arist.De Mundo 6; Xen. Mem.1.4.2-19; Albin.Did. chap.10; Wis.Sol.13.1-9; Rom.2:20.

[20]For Philo's employment of the cosmological proof, see Post.167; Fug.12; Mut.54; Post.28.

[21]Cf. Plato, Symp.211C: ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενα. For the history of this image in medieval Arabic and Jewish

philosophy, see A. Altmann, Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism (London, 1969):41-72; also B. Zak, "R. Solomon Alkabetz' Attitude Towards Philosophic Studies," Eshel Beer-Sheva (Beer-Sheva, 1976):288-306 (Heb).

[22]Chroust interprets Philo's direct way of knowing God in the light of Sextus Empiricus' statement (Adv.Phys.I.20-22) that Aristotle used to say (On Philosophy, fr.12a, Ross) that men's thoughts of the gods originated from two sources: the personal experience of the soul and the phenomena of the heavens. "It arose from events which concern the soul because of the inspired states of the soul which occur in sleep and because of prophecies." As we have already indicated, however, Philo says nothing of prophetic inspiration when he discusses the direct approach to God. See A.-H. Chroust, "'Mystical Revelation' and 'Rational Theology' in Aristotle's 'On Philosophy,'" Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34 (1972):500-12. Cf. E. Vanderlinden, "Les divers modes de conaissance de Dieu selon Philon d'Alexandrie," Mélanges de Sciences Religieuse 4 (1947): 285-304; H. Jonas, "The Problem of the Knowledge of God in the teaching of Philo of Alexandria," in Commentationes Judaico-Hellenisticae in Memoriam Johannes Lewy (Jerusalem, 1949): 75-84 (Heb). According to Bréhier (:197 ff.) and Vanderlinden, Philo is referring to a direct mystical contact with the Deity, resulting from a deep longing for Him.

[23]See R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953):156-79.

[24]See Op.8; LA 3.2, 81, 203; Cher.44, 46, 86; Sacr.101; Det.54-6; Post.4, 28; Deus 7, 22, 52, 56; Plant.35.

[25]There were four generic kinds of pathē: fear (phobos), lust (epithymia), mental pain (lypē), mental pleasure (hēdonē). The three eupatheiai (Lat. constantiae) were: wish or well-reasoned appetite (boulēsis), caution or well-reasoned avoidance (eulabeia), joy or well-reasoned elation (chara). (Cf. Cic.Tusc.4.14; D.L.7.116; Verg.Aen.6.733). See especially F. H. Sandbach's excellent analysis in his The Stoics (London, 1975):59-68; also, J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969):24-7; A. Bonhöffer, Epictet und die Stoa (Stuttgart, 1890):284ff.

[26]Abr.201-04; Fug.166-7; Somn.1.160; Sobr.8; Congr.36; Det.46; Mut.1. For Moses, see LA 3.128-34, 140-47; QG 4.177; QE 1.15; Mig.67.

[27]For the Stoic debate on whether the wise man will get drunk, see Rist, Stoic Philosophy (cited n.25):18-19. In Contemp.73 and QG 2.67, however, Philo suggests that the use of wine is superfluous, and in Agr.35; Mos.2.211; and Legat. 42, he warns against effeminate music and the frantic excitement brought on by dancers and the scandalous scenes of mimes.

[28]Cf. Arist.EN.1147b31-33; D.L.7.94, 86; Arius Didymus, ap. Stob.2.53.18; Albin.Did.32.7, Louis; Plat.Phileb.53C.

[29]See Sandbach, The Stoics (cited n.25):62: "If the pleasantness of experience of touch, sight, taste, smell and

hearing was thought to be good and important, a pleasure arose that was passionate and to be censured (Cic.Tusc.4.20), but the agreeable feelings themselves were not condemned by any Stoic, although there was no agreement on their exact status. Cleanthes denied that they were 'in accord with nature' or had any value in life, Archedemus thought that they were natural but without value, like the hairs in the armpit, while Panaetius believed some to be natural and others not." Cf. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (rep., N.Y., 1962):237-8.

[30]Cf. LA 3.107, where ἡδονή is considered the passion par excellence.

[31]Cf. Plato, Phaed.67E, 64A; Her.292; Contemp.34; Conf. 106; Mig.9, 16, 204; Deus 2; Her.239-40; Fug.91; LA 1.103.

[32]For the contemplative mode of prayer in Hasidism, see R. Shatz-Uffenheimer, Quietistic Elements in Hasidic Thought (Jerusalem, 1968):22-31, 95-110 (Heb).

[33]See H. Lewy, Sobria Ebrietas (Giessen, 1929). Cf. the expressions al-sahw al-thani, "the second sobriety," and sahwu'l-jam', "sobriety of union" of the Sufi mystic Ibn 'al-Farid of Cairo (1182-1235). See R. A. Nicholson, The Idea of Personality in Islam (Cambridge, 1923):19.

[34]In QG 3.3, Philo writes that "the heavenly singing does not extend or reach as far as the Creator's earth, as do the rays of the sun, because of his providential care for the human race. For it rouses to madness those who hear it, and produces in the soul an indescribable and unrestrained pleasure. It causes them to despise food and drink and to die an untimely death through hunger in their desire for the song. For did not the singing of the Sirens, as Homer says (Od.12.39-45), so violently summon listeners that they forgot their country, their home, their friends and necessary foods?" (Cf. Plato, Phaedr.259BC; Contemp.35; Prob.8; Hesiod, Shield 395; Plut. Quaest.Conviv.9.14.6). With this we may compare the statement of R. Isaac Napha that the angel of the Lord opened the ears of Sennacharib's troops who were besieging Jerusalem (II K 19: 35) and they heard the song of the Hayyoth, or Heavenly Living Creatures, and died (BT Sanh.95b). See G. Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism (N.Y., 1965):27. Nicholson, Mystics of Islam (1914) 63-4, writes: "Hujwiri gives anecdotes of persons who were thrown into ecstasy on hearing a verse of the Koran or a heavenly voice or poetry or music. Many are said to have died from the emotion thus aroused . . . . Pythagoras and Plato are responsible for another theory, to which the Sufi poets frequently allude, that music awakens in the soul a memory of celestial harmonies heard in states of preexistence."

[35]Cf. R. T. Wallis, "Nous as Experience," in The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed. R. B. Harris (Norfolk, Va., 1976):133 ff.

[36]See H. Chadwick, "Philo," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967):150-54.

[37]See E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge, 1968):70. ("Persons who are of the opinion that [mystical] union is possible I shall call 'mystical theorists'; persons who believe that they have themselves experienced it I shall call 'practising mystics': the first class of persons of course includes the second, but not vice versa.")

S 148 THE IMPLICATIONS OF PHILO'S DIALOGUES

ON HIS EXEGETICAL WORKS

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Philo's two dialogues with his renegade nephew, Alexander, better known as Tiberius Julius Alexander,[1] are among the least studied works of our best representative of Hellenistic Judaism. This state of Philo scholarship is due to several factors, not the least of which is the fact that there are no reliable translations of these works.[2] De Providentia (Provid) I-II and De Animalibus (Anim), like the Quaestiones, are extant only in a "classical" Armenian translation dating from the 6th century C.E. The syntactical difficulties of this translation, which maintains the word order of the Greek, are not fully resolved by its Latin translator, J.B. Aucher.[3] Consequently, his version has at times misled the few, more cautious translators of certain of these works.[4]

E.R. Goodenough rightly declares, "We shall know Philo only when we accept him as a whole, and on his own terms," and goes on to add, "To do any special study of Philo without at least a sense of his writings as a whole is extremely dangerous."[5] The lack of such an approach in Philo studies must have added to the neglect of the dialogues. It is regrettable that not all of Philo's works are extant. It is even more regrettable, because remediable, that the corpus of his extant works is not currently available in any modern language; indeed, not treated even in the two well-known indices to his works,[6] which exclude the works that survive only in Armenian.

Philo's dialogues were further neglected because of the unwarranted verdicts of those who declared them, along with Aet and Quod Omn, "youthful works," "belonging to his early life." Philo, they said, must have graduated from these "purely philosophical" "school exercises" into a theological maturity demonstrated in his exegetical works.[7] Thus, proponents of these long-held views attempted to construct a chronological order of the works, dividing them into three groups: philosophical, exegetical, and historical or apologetic. While this is not the place to discuss the chronological order of the works, especially those of the second and largest division, which in turn is subdivided into three groups or major works on the Pentateuch,[8] suffice it to say that the divisions are acceptable, but their sequence and possibly the "philosophical" designation are not.

We shall endeavor to show that Philo's dialogues belong to the closing years of his life, and that they are more closely related to his exegetical works than is generally supposed. Admittedly, the implications of our findings may prove to be broader than a paper of this length can probe.

Before pointing out the internal evidence for a late date for the composition of Philo's dialogues, we shall consider

their authorship. We shall also consider the misinterpretations influencing the traditionally held view that Philo wrote these treatises at an early date.

P. Wendland[9] gives overwhelming evidence of the genuineness of Provid I-II by showing philosophical, linguistic, and stylistic affinities between these books and the rest of the works of Philo. Likewise, the numerous parallels between Anim and the Philonic passages cited in a recent, as yet unpublished commentary by the author,[10] suggest more than just a common literary heritage or use of sources. The affinities between the dialogues, however, are stronger, so much so that the authorship of one can hardly be considered apart from that of the other.

Philo's opponent throughout these dialogues is his apostate nephew, Alexander. There is also a thematic relationship between Provid I-II and Anim: the latter deals with a certain aspect of providence and thus complements the theme of the former (providence and the question of animal intelligence are linked in Provid I 51-53). In a broad sense, the workings of providence range throughout the universe: from the majestic cycles of heavenly bodies to the minutest anatomical details of insects.[11] Moreover, both treatises are developed with a wealth of stock illustrations commonplace in Academic-Stoic controversies regarding divine providence and the rationality of animals.[12] In both works Philo systematically supports the Stoic position against the Academic criticism which he attributes to Alexander.[13] The Alexandrian origin of both treatises is certain (Provid II 55 and Anim 13 and 28 refer to Alexandria in Egypt, and Anim 7 alludes to a mixed assembly of Romans and Alexandrians). Besides, both titles have the testimony of Eusebius who cites them conjointly in his list of Philo's works.[14]

The parody of an opponent's imagined speech is a common literary device. Interestingly enough, a selection of Alexander's arguments (Provid II 3) is introduced by Eusebius as a statement by Philo himself of the objections which opponents might adduce.[15] There can be little doubt about Alexander's cherishing the Academic questions attributed to him in Provid I-II and Anim. In answering him Philo, like the Stoics before him, finds himself in a predicament and, in search for answers, sometimes contradicts himself (cf. Provid II 32 and 102; 105 and 110). Some of the questions purportedly raised by Alexander in these dialogues are not even dealt with in Philo's replies.[16] The composition of the treatises, however, may be taken with fair certainty to be Philo's. Colson makes this observation on Provid, "Philo was able to manipulate, even if he did not entirely invent, the part which Alexander plays, and he does not seem to have treated his opponent fairly" (LCL IX, 449). The single authorship of Anim is to be seen in its structure, patterned after the first part of the Platonic Phaedrus (227A - 237A).

With regard to the speakers in the dialogues, there can be no doubt about the identity of Philo and his apostate nephew; however, the identity of Philo's interlocutor in Anim, Lysimachus, has been confused. The confusion arises from certain parts of the introductory and transitory dialogues between Philo (1, 75) and Lysimachus (72), where both of them refer to Alexander as "our nephew." This common reference to Alexander by Philo and Lysimachus led to an erroneous iden-

tification of Lysimachus as a brother of Philo, taking him to be either Alexander the Alabarch, Philo's notoriously wealthy brother and father of Tiberius Julius Alexander, [17] or another younger brother. [18]

Such an identification of Lysimachus distorts his true identity clearly stated in § 2, where, speaking of Alexander, he says: "He is my uncle (lit., mother's brother) and my father-in-law as well. As you are not unaware, his daughter is engaged (lit., promised by an betrothal agreement) to be my wife." Aucher translates these lines correctly: "Avunculus enim est, ac simul socer: quoniam non es nescius, quod filia ejus mihi juxta suam etiam promissionem desponsata uxor est." However, being puzzled by Philo's and Lysimachus' calling Alexander "our nephew", he leaves the question of relation unresolved. [19] G. Tappe, who insists that Lysimachus is a brother of Philo and of the Alabarch, on the authority of a certain Andreas declares the text of this passage to be corrupt and goes on to provide the following translation: "Avunculus enim sum ac simul socer: quoniam non es nescius quod filia mea ei iuxta meam etiam promissionem desponsata uxor est." [20] There is no basis for these forced emendations. Moreover, if Lysimachus is a brother of Philo and of the Alabarch (Alexander's father) and at the same time Alexander's "mother's brother," then the Alabarch would have married his own sister.

The absolutely clear relationship indicated in § 2 must stand and the references to Alexander as "our nephew" by Philo (1, 75) and Lysimachus (72) must be explained--especially the latter. Two possible solutions are proposed: (1) Just as Philo in §§ 1 and 75 refers to Alexander as "our nephew," using a plural of modesty, likewise Lysimachus in § 72 refers to Alexander as "our nephew" out of respect to his interlocutor, Philo. Note that Lysimachus' reference to "Alexander, our nephew" comes immediately after addressing Philo as "honorable" (ὦ τίμιε φίλωνε), an address used earlier in § 2. (2) A possible corruption of "your nephew" to "our nephew," either in the Greek ὁ ἀδελφιδοῦς ὑμῶν to ὁ ἀδελφιδοῦς ἡμῶν or in the Armenian եղբաւրորդին ձեր to եղբաւրորդին մեր , may be suspected in § 72 (the possibly confused letters are underlined).

Adding to the confusion that led to the traditional view of ascribing the dialogues to Philo's early life are the references to Alexander as "the young man" (ὁ νήπιος, Anim 8, 75). These are not to be taken literally as denoting age but rather metaphorically or derogatorily, denoting inexperience or ignorance. [21] After all, time must be allowed for Alexander's maturity and familiarity with the authorities and the arguments he is made to cite in Provid I-II and Anim. Note that in Provid II he is referred to as ὁ ἀνήρ (1) and addressed as ὦ γενναῖε (31, 62), ὦ θαυμάσιε (55), ὦ φίλε (56), etc.

There are two datable events recorded in Anim (27, 54). The celebrations spoken of in 27 were given by Germanicus Julius Caesar probably in 12 C.E., when he entered on his first term of consulship. The account, however, is taken from a literary source used also by Pliny (NH viii. 4) and Aelian (NA ii. 11). Some time, therefore, must be allowed for the period between the event and its literary description on the one hand and for the period between that literary composition and its use by Philo on the other hand. The embassy to Rome spoken of in 54 is presumably the Alexandrian Jewish embassy to Gaius Caligula in 39/40 C.E. This delegation of five

was headed by Philo himself and probably included his brother, Alexander the Alabarch.[22] It now seems that Tiberius Julius Alexander accompanied his uncle and, perhaps, his father on this delicate mission described in Philo's Gaium and Josephus' AJ (xviii. 257-260). The second of these two datable events is to be taken as determining the terminus post quem and not the first as is generally supposed. Thus, the terminus post quem of Anim has to be advanced by about thirty years.

Two other accounts in Anim (13, 58) can be dated by way of their datable parallels in Pliny. J. Schwartz[23] sees certain similarities between Anim 13 and NH x. 120-121, where Pliny tells of a raven taught to salute by name first Tiberius, then Germanicus and Drusus, the sons of Tiberius--the first adopted--and that a talking thrush, a starling, and nightingales were owned by Agrippina, Claudius' fourth wife and niece, and the young princess: Brittanicus, his son from previous marriage, and Nero, her son from previous marriage. Schwartz goes on to suggest "un nouveau terminus post quem, de toute façons encore fort étoigné de la vraie date." His observation suggests a post 48 C.E. date for the composition of Anim--after Claudius took Agrippina as his fourth wife. The horse-race account in Anim 58 is found also in Pliny NH viii. 160-161, where the event is said to have occurred during the secular games of Claudius Caesar, i.e. in 47 C.E.[24]

Several other internal evidences indicate a late date for Anim. The introductory and transitory dialogues (1-9, 72-76) portray an old man conversing with a young relative, Lysimachus, who twice addresses Philo as "honorable" (ὦ τίμιε Φίλωνε, 2, 72). Alexander had a daughter, probably in her teens, betrothed to her cousin, Lysimachus (2). Granting that Alexander was born early in the reign of Tiberius (ca. 15 C.E.), whose nomen and praenomen he bears, was married in ca. 35 C.E. at the age of twenty, he would by ca. 50 C.E. have been in his mid-thirties, with a teenage daughter. Moreover, Alexander seems to have held some public office (3-4) and, probably, was beyond Philo's reach.[25] His apostasy, spoken of by Josephus in AJ xx. 100, that "he did not persevere in his ancestral practices" (τοῖς πατρίοις οὐ διέμεινεν ἔθεσιν), is clearly reflected in the citation of oysters as fit for food--contrary to Jewish dietary laws (31; cf. Provid II 92).

In Provid II we find three indications suggestive of a late date for the dialogues: an allusion to Philo's failing eyesight (1); another clear indication of Alexander's apostasy (92), where, contrary to Jewish dietary laws, he is made to cite the hare with animals fit for food (cf. Anim 31); and a reference to one of Philo's pilgrimages to Jerusalem (107).

The often quoted passage seemingly favoring the traditional view of Philo's growing out of philosophical writings into theological maturity and exegetical writings, Congr 73-80, has been misconstrued. The passage, rightly understood, shows Philo's concurrent interest in philosophy and theology/anthropology. Note that in the introductory and transitory dialogues in Anim, thought to be a purely philosophical work, he calls himself an "interpreter" (ἑρμηνεύς, 7, 74)--if by that he is to be understood as an interpreter of Scripture. Moreover, in a passage never before considered, Provid II 115, Philo speaks of philosophy as his life interest (in response to Alexander's asking for time to hear more from Philo): "I

always have time to philosophize, to which field of knowledge I have devoted my life; however, many and diverse yet delightful duties that would not be fair to neglect summon me." This conflict between political duties and personal endeavors expressed at the end of a philosophical treatise is reminiscent of that expressed at the beginning of an exegetical treatise, Spec Leg III 1-6.[26]

We must note that no use is made of Scripture in either of the two dialogues; instead, the arguments appear within the context of Academic-Stoic polemics. This, however, does not rule out the existence of a possible biblical background. H. Leisegang[27] observes that by arguing for the rationality of animals Alexander is opposing not only the Stoic but also the Judaeo-biblical doctrine that only man is endowed with the rational spirit. We may add that by emphasizing the irrationality of animals and thereby sanctioning their unilateral use by humans, Philo is perhaps defending the anthropocentric view of the cosmos reflected in Gen 1:26-28; 2:19-20; 9:2--man's dominion over the irrational creation. We may likewise observe that in Provid I-II, Philo is perhaps defending the biblical view of teleology, including the necessity of evil for the ultimate good--as found in numerous accounts in Genesis and Exodus.[28] In view of these observations, the dialogues with Alexander may be treated as apologetic literature; indeed, the apologetic thrust of Provid II seems to have been recognized by Eusebius.[29] Philo's dialogues thus seem to fall in line with the rest of his works which are more or less colored by an apologetic overtone; moreover, they may have influenced Christian apologists in the manner of responding to pagan opponents, as seen in the appeal to Stoic philosophy rather than to Scripture.[30]

To add to the validity of the foregoing observations, we shall revive a meritorious thesis put forward by M. Adler,[31] who observes in Philo's works comprising the allegorical commentary a gradual departure from the biblical text: whereas the earlier works (Leg All I-III, Cher, Sacr, Quod Det, Post Gig, Quod Deus, Agr. Plant, Ebr) show close attachment to the text, gradually breaking into free composition, the later works (Sobr, Conf, Migr, Heres, Congr, Fuga, Mut, Somn I-II) are almost altogether free from such attachment and more philosophical. Following his thesis on Philo's method, Adler suggests that the philosophical writings are of later development. These concluding rexarks can in turn be substantiated by our demonstration of the late date of Anim and strengthened by our elaborations on Leisegang's observations.

Having demonstrated that the dialogues with Alexander belong to the closing years of Philo's life and that his philosophical interest concurs with his theological interest,[32] we are led to conclude that perhaps most of Philo's literary career belongs to the closing years of his life, to the period following the political turmoils described in Flacc and Gaium. Moreover, his works, written over a comparatively short period of time, seem to be carefully structured compositions that progress not from philosophical into more theological writing but rather from a midrashic type exposition into a more apologetic approach conceivably climaxed in his dialogues.

Synopses of Philo's Dialogues

The interlocutory setting is destroyed in Provid I. The book opens with a statement on the subject under consideration and an introduction to the syllogistic method employed in the reasoning (1-5). There follow three main discussions, each ending with a recapitulation of the workings of Providence. The first of these discussions is on the eternity of the world: its creation, governance, and destruction (6-36); the second on the problems of natural catastrophies, protection, and retribution (37-76); and the last on the absurdities of astrological fatalism (77-88). A summary of the arguments is given in conclusion (89-92).

The dialogue form is far better preserved in Provid II. It begins with Alexander's early visit to Philo to resume the discussions of yesterday (1-2). Parts of the first two discussions of Book I receive further consideration: the problem of retribution (3-44) and that of the cosmos--its creation (45-58), governance (59-84), and natural phenomena (85-112). In the epilogue Philo thinks he has given satisfactory answers to Alexander's difficulties and goes on to invite further questions, but Alexander politely declines (113-116).

Anim falls into two parts, each preceded by a short dialogue between Philo and his interlocutor, Lysimachus (1-9, 72-76), a nephew of Alexander. Alexander's discourse on the rationality of animals, purportedly read in his presence, comprises the first part (10-71) and Philo's refutation of Alexander's premise, the second (77-100). Alexander begins his polemical discourse with sweeping denouncements of man's appropriation of reason to himself (10-11). He attempts to show among the brutes instances of the προφορικὸς λόγος, the reason which finds utterance and expression (12-15). Then follows a lengthy argument for their possession of the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος, the inner reason or thought (16-71). Some talking and singing birds constitute the examples for the first kind of reason; but the examples for the second kind of reason are far more numerous, including not only such stock examples as spiders, bees, and swallows (22), but also several performing animals (23-29) and a large number of others in whom demonstrations of virtues and vices are believed to exist (30-71). Philo, haphazardly and with some lack of kindness to his opponent, argues that animals do not possess reason. He ascribes the seemingly rational acts of animals to the reasoning of nature (77-100). By emphasizing the rationality of animals, Alexander argues for a moral and juridical relationship between man and animals (10, his opening remarks). This Philo rejects by insisting that there can be no equality between man, who is privileged with reason, and animals devoid of it (100, his concluding remarks).

NOTES

[1] He was born probably early in the reign of Tiberius (ca. 15 C.E.), after whom he was named. He seems to have taken part in the Alexandrian Jewish embassy to Gaius in 39/40 C.E. (§ 54). Upon the accession of Claudius in 41 C.E., and possibly due to the mediation of Agrippa I, he entered Roman service and was known as Epistrategos of the Thebaid by 42 C.E. He became Procurator of Judaea under Claudius (ca. 46-48 C.E.) and Prefect of Egypt under Nero (66-70 C.E.). He secured Alexandria for Vespasian and became Chief of Staff and, possibly, Praetorian Prefect with/under Titus (70-81 C.E.). There are a number of good studies on Alexander that deal with the passages in Josephus, the Egyptian inscriptions and papyri, and the Roman authorities. See A. Stein, "Julius, 59," PRE, 19 (1918), cols. 153-157 and Die Präfekten von Ägypten in der römischen Kaiserzeit (Bern, 1950), pp. 37-38; A. Lepape, "Tiberius Iulius Alexander, Préfet d'Alexandrie et d'Egypte," Bulletin de la Société Royale d'Archeologie d' Alexandrie, 8 (1934), 331-341; E.R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus: Practice and Theory (New Haven, 1938), pp. 64-66; E.G. Turner, "Tiberius Iulius Alexander," The Journal of Roman Studies, 44 (1954), 54-64 (excellent discussion); V. Burr, Tiberius Iulius Alexander, Antiquitas: Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte, I (Bonn, 1955) (excellent documentation); J. Schwartz, "Note sur la famille de Philon d'Alexandrie," Mélanges Isidore Lévy, Annuaire de l'institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves, XIII (Bruxelles, 1955), 591-602; and J. Daniélou, Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1958), pp. 11-39.

[2] Philonis Judaei sermones tres hactenus inediti: I et II de providentia et III de animalibus (Venice, 1822). No English translation of the Armenian text of Provide I-II was ever attempted. Translations of the Greek fragments of Provid II are readily available in translations of Eus. PE vii. 21. 336b-337a (§§ 50-51); vii. 14. 386-399 (=§§ 3, 15-33a, 99-112). A translation of these fragments by F.H. Colson is part of Vol. IX of the LCL edition of Philo; a German version of Aucher's Latin translation of Provid I-II is found in Philo von Alexandria, Die Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung, VII, ed. W. Theiler (Berlin, 1964); and a French translation of Aucher's Latin by M. Hadas-Lebel, De Providentia I et II, constitutes vol. 35 of Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1973). A recently completed study by the author, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Diss., Basel), will soon be published by the Philo Institute.

[3] See the preceding note; also Philonis Judaei paralipomena Armena: libri videlicet quatuor in Genesin, libri duo in Exodum, sermo unus de Sampsone, alter de Jona, tertius de tribus angelis Abraamo apparentibus (Venice, 1826).

[4] In addition to the translations cited in n. 2, the Quaestiones were translated into English with some reliance on Aucher's Latin translation by R. Marcus, and were publish-

ed as 2 supplementary vols. to the LCL edition of Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

[5] An Introduction to Philo Judaeus (2d ed.; Oxford, 1962), p. 19.

[6] H. Leisegang, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, Indices, I-II (Berlin, 1926-1930) and G. Meyer, Index Philoneus (Berlin, 1974).

[7] See, e.g., P. Wendland, "Philos Schrift περὶ τοῦ πάντα σπουδαῖον . . . (Quod Omn)," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 1 (1888), 509-517; L. Cohn, "Einteilung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos," Philologus Supplementband, 7 (1899), 389-391, 426; W. von Christ, Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur II, Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft, VII (6th ed.; Münich, 1920), 627-631. With the publication of G. Tappe's De Philonis libro qui inscribitur Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχειν τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα: Quaestiones selectae (Diss., Göttingen, 1912), especially pp. 3-6, the placing of Anim at the very beginning of Philo's works tends to become customary. W. Bousset, Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom. Literarische Untersuchungen zu Philo und Clemens von Alexandria, Justin und Irenäus, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, Neue Folge VI (Göttingen, 1915), 137-148, ascribes the dialogues with Alexander to the days of Philo's philosophical training. H. Leisegang, "Philon," PRE, 39 (1941), cols. 6-8, likewise lists Anim first as does also A. Lesky, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur (Bern, 1957-1958), p. 729; etc.

[8] This was correctly perceived by H. Ewald, Geschichte des Volkes Israel, VI (3d ed.; Göttingen, 1868), 257-312.

[9] Philos Schrift über die Vorsehung, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nacharistotelischen Philosophie (Berlin, 1892), written primarily in response to Massebieau, who doubted the Philonic authorship of Provid I, "Le classement des oeuvres de Philon," Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études, Sciences religieuse, I (Paris, 1889), 87-90. See also Hadas-Lebel, De Providentia I et II, pp. 26-28, 357-361.

[10] See above, n. 2.

[11] Epict. Diss. i. 16. 1-8; Origenes Cels. iv. 54; etc. See also Hadas-Lebel, De Providentia I et II, p. 52.

[12] Note that Chrysippus wrote On Providence (Περὶ Προνοίας, SVF III, App. II, p. 203) and Antipater of Tarsus wrote On Animals (Περὶ ζῴου, SVF III Ant. 48). Among later Stoics and others, note Cicero, in Book III of Fin., which derives from traditional Stoic sources, and Book II of ND, which provides the closest parallels to Provid II and which may be traced to Posidonius, its likely source; Seneca, in Book I of Dial., in the various Ep., and in the preface to Nat.; Epictetus in his Diss.; etc.

[13] Numerous examples of his supporting the Stoa against the Academy can be cited. In defending divine providence the distinction was made between God's primary works and the secondary or consequential effects (Provid II 100); e.g., eclipses are consequential effects, not God's primary intentions (79). Moreover, Philo is at one with the Stoics in the fundamental position that the irrational creation exists for the sake of the rational.

[14] HE ii. 18. 6; cf. Jerome De viris illustribus 11.

[15] PE viii. 14. 386, "After stating these and a host of others on the negative side he [Philo] next proceeds to refute the objections as follows."

[16] See Colson's note to the Eusebian line between Provid II 3 and 15 (LCL IX, 458). In Anim, several of Alexander's arguments are not answered in specific terms but in sweeping generalities.

[17] It is to be suspected that from a mistaken interpretation of these passages, the name Lysimachus has been added to the name of Alexander the Alabarch in the 11th century Ambrosian MS of Josephus (AJ xix. 276; cf. xviii. 159-160, 259-260; xx. 100-103; BJ v. 205); see M. Pohlenz, "Philon von Alexandreia," Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Neue Folge I, 5 (1942), 413. A. Schalit notes: "Der zweite Name Λυσίμαχος in A 19 276 ist zweifelhaft." "7 Ἀλέξανδρος [Λυσίμαχος] Alabarch von Alexandrien," Namenwörterbuch zu Flavius Josephus, A Complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus, ed. K.H. Rengstorf, Supplement I (Leiden, 1968), p. 8. This erroneous association of the names is quite common.

[18] Tappe, Ἀλέξανδρος, pp. 4-5. This equally misleading identification has influenced a host of scholars (including Wendland, Tappe's major professor, and his associates) down to the present.

[19] Sermones tres, p. xi, n. 1.

[20] Ἀλέξανδρος, pp. 4-5.

[21] Numerous examples of the metaphorical use of the term can be cited from classical and biblical literature.

[22] He was imprisoned on Gaius' orders and later released by Claudius. Jos. AJ xix. 276 suggests, though it does not positively require, the arrest to have taken place in Rome.

[23] "Note sur la famille de Philon d'Alexandrie," Mélanges Isidore Lévy, Annuaire de l'institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves, XIII (Bruxelles, 1955), 595, n. 1.

[24] C.H. Rackham's note, LCL III, 112.

[25] Cf. Y. Amir, "Philo Judaeus," Encyclopaedia Judaica, 13 (1971), cols. 410-411.

[26] Goodenough in his brilliant interpretation of Spec Leg III 1-6 shows that "Philo's literary career as an interpreter of the Bible was a function of his life after he had gone into political affairs, carried on as a hobby or escape from politics," The Politics of Philo Judaeus, pp. 66-68; cf. Colson's comment in LCL VII, 631-632. The bulk of Philo's writings does not make this supposition impossible. Hadas-Lebel cites the example of Cicero (De Providentia I et II, p. 39).

[27] "Philon," col. 7

[28] Cf. A.A. Long, "The Stoic Concept of Evil," Philosophical Quarterly, 18 (1968), 329-343.

[29] PE viii. 14. 386, quoted above, n. 15 (see its context).

[30] See Hadas-Lebel, De Providentia I et II, p. 75.

[31] Studien zu Philon von Alexandreia (Breslau, 1929), pp. 66-67.

[32] Among others who have challenged the arguments for the traditionally held view that Philo wrote the philosophical works Aet (if that is indeed Philonic), Quod Omn, Provid I-II and Anim before he undertook the expository works on the Pentateuch, see E. Schürer, who observes that Anim belongs to Philo's later works, the embassy to Rome being already contemplated, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi, III (4th ed.; Leipzig, 1909), 685; H. Leisegang, "Philons Schrift uber die Ewigkeit der Welt," Philologus, 92 (1937), 156-176, argues against Wendland that Aet belongs to the later years of Philo's life, to the time when he defended the Stoics on the notion of divine providence. Although the Philonic authorship of Aet is doubtful, most of Leisegang's arguments could be claimed for Provid I-II and Anim, which he elsewhere (see above, n. 7) places at the beginning of Philo's works. After establishing the identity of the speakers and the right date of Anim , Pohlenz argues that both the philosophical and the exegetical works belong to the same period, to the closing years of Philo's life, "Philon von Alexandreia," pp. 412-415; Turner, in due consideration of the events of Alexander's life, observes, "Philo cannot have written these dialogues before A.D. 40-50." "Tiberius Iulius Alexander," p. 56.

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ARITHMOLOGY AS AN EXEGETICAL TOOL IN THE WRITINGS OF PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

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INTRODUCTION -- This paper represents a stage in the development of a study of arithmology in Philo, which has been undertaken as part of the effort of the Philo project research team under the leadership of Burton Mack at the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity at Claremont, California.[1] To keep this paper within appropriate limits and yet show the range of functions which arithmology as an exegetical tool performs in the works of Philo, the discussion will concentrate on only one number within the decade, namely seven. This is not the most significant number within the Pythagorean system of arithmology, but for obvious reasons it has a special appeal for Philo. The paper will attempt to demonstrate the arithmological use of the number seven as an integral part of the exegetical arsenal employed by Philo, and it will try to indicate the type of world view Philo seeks to develop, among many other methods, with the help of arithmology. Such an agenda will require a brief summary of the character and development of arithmology in antiquity.

RECENT STUDY OF ARITHMOLOGY -- The study of the use of numbers in the exegetical writings of Philo, on the whole, has been rather accidental. Many authors speak of a Pythagorean influence on Philo, e.g., Henry Chadwick:

> Pythagoreanism was probably liked by Philo for its cryptic symbolism, its allegorical interpretation of poetic myth, its gnomic morality, and above all its speculations about the mysterious significance of numbers, notably the number seven, which played so important a role in sabbatarian Judaism.[2]

Richard A. Baer speaks of the "extremely complex issue of the philosophical (especially Neo-Pythagorean) background of Philo's use of numbers to describe reality."[3] Frank E. Robbins thinks that Philo's lost work, Περὶ ἀριθμῶν, "was not an elements of arithmetic, but an arithmology, in which were collected Pythagorean topics that appear in the extant works, and more."[4]

Erwin R. Goodenough, on the other hand, doubts that we have sufficient information to assign specific passages in Philo to the influence of either Pythagoras or Plato:

> The difficulty is that when we compare Philo with

> the neo-Pythagorean fragments we are without any criterion to determine how much of what resembles Platonism in them has been brought into Pythagorean tradition from Plato's teaching, and how much of it is early genuine Pythagoreanism which Plato knew.[5]

John Dillon devotes a chapter to Philo in his work on the Middle Platonists, and in his list of characteristics of Middle Platonism, he mentions as the fifth and last item, "vivid interest particularly in mystical numerology."[6]

Although he does not specifically refer to Philo, Martin P. Nilsson has some interesting comments on the symbolic use of numbers:

> Besonders bezeichnend für den Pythagoreismus ist die Zahlensymbolik. . . Die Zahlensymbolik hat an sich keine große religiöse Bedeutung, besitzt aber, wie sich noch in unserer Zeit zeigt, eine eigentümliche Anziehungskraft auf gewisse Gemüter. Auch die Arithmetik hat ihre Mystik.[7]

The only monograph ever written on our topic developed out of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the philosophische Fakultät of the University of Tübingen by Karl Staehle: Die Zahlenmystik bei Philon von Alexandreia.[8]

DEFINITION OF TERMS -- The quotations adduced from the authors just named not only illustrate the fact that modern scholars are encountering difficulties in classifying so complex an ancient author as Philo (a rather common phenomenon in the study of figures from late antiquity), but also that there exists a pronounced and confusing lack of agreement in the use of terminology connected with the study of Philo's use of numbers.[9] While Philo was certainly no mathematician and can hardly be accused of consistency in his voluminous writings, the lack of a generally accepted terminology among modern scholars will only make any comprehensive study of Philo even more difficult than it already is.

The expression "number mysticism" ("Zahlenmystik") suffers from the lack of any clear definition of "mysticism" in connection with number. Until the question has finally been solved whether the writings of Philo actually reflect a mystic form of Judaism,[10] it would appear advisable not to confuse the issue through the use of an ambiguous and probably misleading term. Philo's main purpose in his use of numbers as an exegetical tool is to demonstrate that God's creation is orderly and in harmony with certain numbers and numerical relations. But at the same time he repeatedly insists that the orderliness and harmony of the cosmos must not mislead the observer into confusing the creation with the creator: that is the serious mistake made by the "Chaldaeans":

> The Chaldaeans were especially active in the elaboration of astrology and ascribed everything to the movement of the stars, guided by influences contained in numbers and numerical pro-

> portions. Thus they glorified visible existence, leaving out of consideration the intelligible and invisible. But while exploring numerical order as applied to the revolution of the sun, moon, and other planets, and fixed stars, and the changes of the yearly seasons and the interdependence of phenomena in heaven and on earth, they concluded that the world itself was God, thus profanely likening the created to the Creator.[11]

In a similar vein: "These men [i.e., the Chaldaeans] imagined that the visible universe was the only thing in existence, either itself being God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole."[12]

In the light of such passages it would probably be easier to argue that Philo used numbers to stress the impossibility of reaching God even through the purest and most abstract thought processes than to demonstrate some form of number mysticism in any meaningful sense of this term.

The expression "number symbolism" is less misleading than number mysticism. It quite correctly describes the fact that many numbers, in addition to their purely numerical value, possess a symbolic meaning or, very frequently, several symbolic meanings. Greek mythology, Greek philosophical writings and poetry, the biblical text used by Philo, not to mention popular lore, all abound with references to the symbolic meanings of various numbers. Philo was aware of that and made use of many such statements. He incorporated them into his own system of using numbers as an exegetical tool. And for this very reason the term "number symbolism" is inadequate to describe the phenomenon in Philo: it is too restrictive and describes only one of the bases on which Philo developed his own method. The symbolic value assigned by Philo to various numbers is invariably part of an ancient tradition that he found at hand and put to his own particular use.

Whereas "number symbolism," within its strict limitations, correctly describes one part of Philo's exegetical use of numbers, the term "numerology" is definitely misleading. Numerology is usually understood as "the study of the occult significance of numbers," with the stress clearly on "occult."[13] This is almost the exact opposite of Philo's concern. Philo uses numbers in order to demonstrate what is accessible to any one who cares to look; he does not use them to reveal anything that is not accessible to the unaided human intelligence. In this connection it is important to note that the entire corpus of Philonic writings does not contain a single instance of gematria. There is nothing esoteric about Philo's use of numbers.

The term "arithmology" stresses the fact that the procedure involves a systematic attempt to demonstrate the λόγος-character of the use of numbers. The term was adopted by Frank E. Robbins, who quotes the following definition of it by A. Delatte:

> Arithmology is "ce genre de remarques sur la formation, la valeur et l'importance des dix premiers nombres, où se mêle la saine recherche scientifique et les fantaisies de la religion et de philosophie."[14]

Arithmology deals not only with individual and specific numbers, but also, and at least as importantly, with the various relationships existing among numbers. These relationships, on the whole, are expressed in a mathematically correct manner. The numbers themselves and their interrelationships are taken seriously and allowed to stand on their own. There may be a symbolic meaning behind the primary sense, but the mathematical value of a number is hardly ever ignored or shunted aside, as so frequently happens to the literal meaning of a text at the hands of the more extravagant exegetes.[15]

All this does not mean that arithmology would give unalloyed pleasure to a specialist in pure mathematics. Aristotle was biting in some of his criticism of some of the Pythagorean procedures and doctrines, especially on the nature of the exact relationship between numbers and reality, including geometric reality.[16] But it does mean that what we have in Philo is a serious attempt to relate the cosmic order to a rational system --expressed in numbers--and thereby to reach an understanding of the universe within thought categories that are available to any and all. It was exactly the mathematically universal character of arithmology which Philo found so attractive for his exegetical work: it could help him to explain the sacred texts of the books of the law in terms that were universally understood, even though not universally accepted. Philo's concern for the mathematical soundness of his procedure can be recognized in the fact that he hardly ever tires of repeating the basic arithmetical definitions of the various numbers he adduces.[17]

For these reasons the term "arithmology," among the many designations in use, would appear to be the most appropriate one to describe the phenomenon of Philo's use of numbers. It shall be used in this paper, except, of course, in quotations from authors who use a different term.

ARITHMOLOGY BEFORE PHILO -- We can distinguish at least three stages in the development of the use of numbers before the period of late antiquity. The history of this development is extremely complex and, to a high degree, remains obscure. Our main key, and perhaps the only one, seems to be the structure of the numerical system within a given language or family of languages. We can recognize various stages of development from such things as the number that is equated with "many (e.g., forty) or "innumerable" (e.g., ten thousand). Numbers which form the basis for the development of larger systems, like the decimal or the duodecimal, usually achieve a position of special prominence within a language (e.g., the common use of "a dozen" in modern English).

It is the acquisition of special prominence by a given number which constitutes the decisive step to the belief that such a number possesses some extraordinary significance. Thus,

if "three" is used, not merely to describe that quantity which is larger than that represented by two and smaller than that signified by four, but also to express the concept of "many" or "innumerable," and thus also of "complete," the word "three" will have acquired--and retain--a position of prominence within the numerical system of that language even long after a larger and more complex system is developed. The residual use of the word "three" (and the number designated by it) is then frequently given a symbolic meaning.

Such use of numbers is ancient and seems to be universal. Any given number may thus acquire a symbolic meaning or several. Sometimes these symbolic meanings might be contradictory in character, at least to some other, occasionally logical, way of thinking. The symbolic meaning of numbers may then lead to their association with supernatural beings, and thus with myths, sacred places, liturgical instruments, sacred days or periods, persons, animals, plants, or the cosmos as a whole and in its constituent parts.

The extent and complexity of such number symbolism was carefully studied by scholars of previous generations. In 1903 Hermann Usener published a major article on the number three.[18] He not only collected an amazing amount of detailed information from every conceivable ancient source, he also followed the history of "three" and "Dreiheit," paying close attention to their many ramifications. For Usener, "three" represented an important and long stage in the history of the Indo-European languages and the attempt of the Indo-European speaking peoples to come to terms with numbers, whereas "five" did not achieve such prominence, at least among the Greeks:

> Unsere Völkergruppen [i.e., the Indo-Europeans] müssen sehr lange auf der Stufe verharrt haben, die alle ihre Zahlen noch an den Gliedern eines Fingers abzählen konnte, wo drei und viel einerlei war. Der Fortschritt zur 4 und 5 und zum dekadischen System muss dann sich rasch und unaufhaltsam vollzogen haben. Die zwei und drei hatten sich zur Vorstellungsform gestalten können: die Periode in der man bis 5 gelangt war und noch nicht die Finger der beiden Hände arithmetisch überschaute war zu kurz um sich dem Volksgeist einzuprägen.[19]

We need not accept Usener's theory about the history of numbers among speakers of Indo-European languages in order to appreciate his documentation of the widespread use of the number three in all areas of life, and particularly in the religious sphere. This use antedates by many centuries later attempts to organize the various symbolic meanings into some kind of pattern.

Of particular interest to the student of Philo is the investigation of the number seven, which played an important role in sabbatarian Judaism and, consequently, was of special importance to our author.[20] Even the most cursory survey reveals that the number seven played an important role in the lives, not only of the Hebrews or the Semites generally, but of many

nations of different backgrounds, including the Greeks.

W. H. Roscher published several articles on the importance of the numbers seven and nine.[21] He clearly demonstrated that the number seven was sacred in the oldest forms of the Greek cults and myths. In the index to his 1903 article he listed over a hundred different functions of the number seven (or its multiples), and these functions reach all the way from the cult of Apollo to the use of seven black beans for magic purposes and in connection with the cult of the dead.

If numbers are important and influential, we must not be surprised that at an early stage some of them were not only sacred to certain divinities, but actually divine in their own right or, at least, identified with certain gods. Thus "seven" was given divine characteristics: Ἐστι γὰρ ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἁπάντων, θεός, ἀεί ὤν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων.[22] This possibility of deifying numbers was to be exploited later by the members of the Pythagorean school. For Philolaos, "seven" is identical with Athena, and in Nicomachus of Gerasa we shall find a whole system of identifications: numbers are identified with those gods whose characteristics appeared similar to those ascribed to the numbers, thus:

Monas	--Styx, Apollo
Dyas	--Rhea, Artemis, Aphrodite, Dione
Trias	--Lato, Thetis, Harmonia, Hecate, etc.[23]

All of this, we must not forget, is deliberate creation and has nothing to do with the earlier stages in the development, when numbers had been part of the unconscious thought pattern of the people. Hermann Usener expressed this difference pointedly:

> Niemand wird leugnen, dass die Pythagoreer, als sie Maass und Form der Dinge in der Zahl erkannt hatten, wie von einem Rausch ergriffen b e w u s s t w i l l k ü r l i c h e Z a h l e n s y m b o l i k ü b t e n; . . . Aber was verwirrte Wissenschaft und was Afterweisheit ersinnen, liegt weit abseits von den e i n f a c h e n u n d u n w i l l k ü r l i c h e n G e d a n k e n g ä n g e n d e s V o l k e s. Es ist ein offerbarer Missgriff, in den massenhaften Zahlenanwendungen, die sich in Sage und Brauch des Volkes finden, Symbolik zu suchen.[24]

With arithmology we enter into a different world. Here numbers are used neither for their traditional symbolic value, nor in the ancient unconscious and spontaneous manner of which Usener speaks. Now numbers are manipulated because of their arithmetical properties and proportions. All these are explored and used as clues for the investigation of the universe: number has become a heuristic principle. The men who worked in this field were not mythographers or obscurantists; they were people with a scientific bend of mind. A man like Pythagoras grew up in a world full of symbolic numbers. In his native Ionia the number seven was held in particular awe, and this

number was important also to the Orphics and the Delphic cult of Apollo. An intelligent and alert mind simply could not escape the influence of numbers upon every sphere of life. We do not know exactly what Pythagoras adopted from Babylonia, what he himself discovered and what was attributed to him by his immediate and later disciples. He was the founder of a school that combined scientific inquiry with a common way of life based upon strict and ascetic rules. The school acquired great political influence, especially after Pythagoras' emigration to Magna Graecia. Among the characteristics of the Pythagorean school in its later forms is one of special interest to us: the production of a number of pseudonymous writings attributed to the founder. There can be no doubt that the combination of intellectual activity and communal life, all, of course, within the context of cultic practices, was to be one of the main reasons for the reawakening of interest in the Pythagorean tradition and its teachings during the Graeco-Roman period.

The foundation of the mathematical work done by the Pythagoreans was the exploration of the numbers of the decade and their interrelationships. Smaller and higher numbers were put into a relationship to ten, before they were analyzed any further. Thus, four is important, because it is potentially what ten is in actuality. Thirty, to give another arbitrary example, will be analyzed as 3 x 10. In reading about these ancient Greek studies of arithmetic, the important thing to keep in mind is that the Pythagoreans did all this work visually: numbers were represented by pebbles, and the structure of numbers was made visible through the arrangement of these pebbles in certain patterns, so that the Pythagoreans were able to speak of triangular, square, or pentagonal numbers--and this was meant in a literal sense. A basic illustration of this principle is the representation of the τετρακτύς, the arrangement of the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4:



The sum of 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 is 10, and, as is obvious from the illustration, ten is a triangular number.

We must further keep in mind that what the Pythagoreans did was not computation (which was left to slaves), but the development of a theory of numbers. When they worked on problems of geometry, they used such terms as point, line, or surface as neutral concepts which have no dimension beyond the purely mathematical one. The pebbles on the ground, in their precise arrangement, merely served as aids for the abstract mental operation. This method has one great and important advantage, namely the gain of generality.

The philosophically most important discovery associated with the name of Pythagoras was the recognition that the musical consonants of octave, quint, and quart can be expressed through the numerical proportions of 1:2, 2:3, and 3:4. The conclusion drawn from this observation was that n u m b e r i s t h e f o r c e t h a t o r d e r e d t h e w o r l d,

both the macrocosmos and the microcosmos. This principle can be extended to the point where it means that t h e c o s m o s i s n u m b e r s.

> These thinkers [i.e., the Pythagoreans] also consider that a number is the principle both as matter for things and as forming both their modifications and their permanent states, and hold that the elements of number are the even and the odd, and that of these the latter is limited, and the former unlimited; and that the One proceeds from both of these (for it is both even and odd) and number from the One, and that the whole heaven is numbers.[25]

It is not clear what made possible the claim that "heaven is numbers." It could have been the Babylonian recognition of seven planets which then led to the doctrine of the harmony of the spheres. It could also have been the result of a dynamic reinterpretation of the static cosmology developed by Anaximander.[26] Such sweeping claims for the all-pervading importance of numbers evoked the scorn of an empiricist like Aristotle, but they had great influence upon Plato, whose Timaeus (but not only this dialogue) is heavily indebted to Pythagorean thought.

For the study of cosmogony and cosmology from the fourth century B.C. on, the Timaeus proves to be the starting point, whether for assent or dissent. A scholar like A. Schmekel even argued that the main source from which the Pythagorean and Pythagorizing authors of the Roman period drew their knowledge of Pythagorean arithmology was the (lost) commentary on the Timaeus by Poseidonius.[27]

Plato formulated two concepts in the Timaeus which turned out to be important for Philo's interpretation of the account of creation in Genesis: the existence of a world of being above our world of becoming, and number as the basic component of, and the key to, the universe:

> What is that which is existent always and has no becoming? And what is that which is becoming always and never is existent?[28]

> Before that time, . . . , all those things were in a state devoid of reason, but when the work of setting in order this universe was undertaken, fire and water and earth and air, although possessing some traces of their own nature, were yet so disposed as everything is likely to be in the absence of God; and inasmuch as this was their natural condition, God began by first making them out into shapes b y m e a n s o f f o r m s a n d n u m b e r s.[29]

With Plato, then, the decisive step had been taken. Philosophers were to continue to argue whether Plato ever came to identify the numbers with the ideas,[30] or debate the question of how mathematical abstracts can influence the material cosmos --nevertheless, a model for the understanding of the universe had been established that was to exercise profound influence

far beyond the confines of the Academy and its derivative philosophical movements and schools.

The history of Pythagoreanism and its development into--or according to Eduard Zeller, its new start as--Neopythagoreanism, is a highly complex problem. Walter Burkert has analyzed the modern study of this question and distinguishes three basic positions.[31]

(a) Eduard Zeller argued that the old school of Pythagoreanism died out soon after the middle of the fourth century B.C.[32] A Pythagorean school of philosophy did not come into existence again until the end of the second century B.C.[33] This means that between the Pythagoreanism of the old school and Neopythagoreanism there existed a gap of over two centuries.

(b) Zeller was criticized for failing to take into account the fact that, according to an ancient source preserved in Iamblichus,[34] the Pythagoreans were divided into two groups: the "mathematicians" and the "acusmatics." The "mathematicians" were the scientists, representatives of a rational nuchtern wing,[35] whereas the "acusmatics" represented the mystisch-magische wing of the movement, who were mainly interested in maintaining the old taboos and religious doctrines of the school.[36] Zeller also ignored the existence of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha. Some scholars, particularly Carcopino,[37] argued that the mystical wing of the Pythagoreans never ceased to exist and became the nucleus of the Neopythagorean movement. By playing down the distinctions between the "mathematicians" and the "acusmatics," one could finally argue, in complete contrast to Zeller, that the Pythagorean school enjoyed an uninterrupted existence from the days of its founder till the end of Neopythagoreanism.

(c) Burkert, finally, tried to do justice to both the existence of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha and the statements in ancient authors that after an interval of several centuries, Pythagoreanism had a fresh start during the Roman period.[38] He argues that the kind of non-rational thinking found in some forms of Pythagoreanism continued to exist "underground" even after the demise of the Pythagorean school.[39] The "surface" of intellectual life was dominated by "rational" thinkers, but below the surface, interest in everything mysterious, Oriental, and ancient continued unabated. Figures of the distant past were credited with arcane knowledge, one of these figures being Pythagoras. Only during the last century B.C. did this type of thinking once again become respectable and thus enabled to surface: "Darin also liegt der nicht zu leugnende Neubeginn des Pythagoreismus im 1. Jh. v. Chr.: was zuvor literarisch war, wird ins Leben zurückgerufen, an Stelle der Pseudopythagorica treten wieder die Pythagoreer."[40] At the same time, Burkert passes judgment on the intellectual value of Neopythagoreanism: Greek science in the first century was in a state of decay, and the return to the name of Pythagoras was not a return to science. The new cosmology was more religious than scientific in character, and it pretended to offer more than science is ever able to give.

The interest in Pythagorean thought and arithmology, how-

ever, was by no means restricted to Greek and Roman thinkers. Philo is the obvious and most important evidence that this type of thinking also appealed to Jews, but he is neither the only nor even the first Jewish author who can be cited in evidence for this.

Nilolaus Walter, in his monograph on Aristobulus, has a chapter on "Aristobulus und die Angänge eines jüdischen Pythagoreismus."[41] Walter assumes the existence of a Pythagorean (or Pythagoreanizing) florilegium in which had been collected from various poets many passages that lent themselves to number speculations. This collection would have contained references to all the numbers within the decade. An Alexandrian Jew then extracted all those passages which dealt with the number seven. Walter speculates that the motivation may have been a desire to collect evidence for the universal character of the commandment to observe the seventh day as a holy day. This unknown Jewish excerptor spared no pains to prove his point, "wobei er sich nicht gescheut hätte, auch in jenem echten Homervers die Vier in eine Sieben zu ändern (um so eine wirklich überraschende Prallele zum jüdischen Schöpfungsglauben zu erhalten) und weitere Verse dazuzuerfinden, bzw. zu bearbeiten."[42] Although, Walter argues, the Neopythagoreans quite generally tended to establish a connection between numbers and the cosmos, a Jewish writer, and especially one of the diaspora, would have concentrated on the link between the number seven and creation. It is important to note that Walter thinks that this development of a Jewish Pythagoreanism had its beginnings before Aristobulus, who merely is our oldest extant source. The main contribution made by Aristobulus would have been his claim that the Greek poets whose verses he quotes stood in a relationship of literary dependence upon Moses.

When we finally come to Philo, then, Pythagorean arithmology would not have been anything strange and unknown to him. It had begun to "resurface" among the Greeks and had even made its first impressions on Jewish exegetes of the Torah.

THE NUMBER SEVEN IN THE WRITINGS OF PHILO

Whenever Philo introduces a topic with a preliminary statement about its richness, importance, and difficulties, the reader is warned to expect a large amount of diverse materials collected from different sources. The Opificio Mundi contains one hundred and seventy-two sections, of which forty, or 23.26%, are devoted to a discussion of the many aspects of the number seven.[43] Philo supplies the reader with the following introductory remarks:

> I doubt whether anyone could adequately celebrate the properties of the number seven, for they are beyond all words. Yet the fact that it is more wondrous than all that is said about it is no reason for maintaining silence regarding it. Nay, we must make a brave attempt to bring out all that is within the compass of our understanding, even if it be impossible to bring out all or even the most essential points.[44]

These forty sections on the number seven give most of the arithmological interpretations possible, with much of the material being repeated in All. Leg. 1:8-16. A few points about this section are worth noting:

It contains only three short passages of unmistakably Jewish content:

a. 89: creation of the world in accordance with the properties of the number six, a perfect number;

b. 116: the law enjoins the keeping of the greatest national festivals at the time of the equinoxes, both of which fall into a seventh month;[45]

c. 128: Moses exceeded the scientists among the Greeks and other peoples in according honor to the number seven by incorporating it into the Law and by ordaining the observance of the seventh day as holy.[46]

In contrast to these sparse references to the Jewish tradition, which could be excised without any effect on the section as a whole, Philo brings, in addition to the straightforward arithmological statements, a number of interesting quotations from Greek authors and allusions to Greek institutions. These form an integral part of the section and cannot be deleted without violating the structure of the whole. The most obvious of these passages are the following:

a. 100: Some philosophers liken seven to the motherless and virgin Nike,[47] who is said to have appeared out of the head of Zeus; the Pythagoreans, on the other hand, liken seven to Zeus, on which Philo quotes the Pythagorean Philolaus:[48] "There is a supreme ruler of all things, ever one, abiding, without motion, himself (alone) like unto himself, different from the others.

b. 104: Long quotation from Solon's poem on the seven ages of man.

c. 105: Quotation from Hippocrates on the seven ages of man.

d. 119: Reference to Plato's Timaeus 75D: through the mouth mortal things have their entrance, immortal things their exit.[49]

e. 124: Reference to Hippocrates for the time needed for the solidification of the seed and the formation of the embryo.

f. 126: Reference to the seven vowels of language (appropriate for Ionian).

g. 127: Etymologies for both the Greek and Latin words for seven, which prove that seven is a holy number.

h. 128: The most approved mathematicians and astronomers among the Greeks and other peoples pay honor to the number seven.

A similar, detailed summary of the properties of the number seven is to be found in the Allegorical Interpretation 1:5-18. In the paragraph preceding this section, Philo states the purpose of his arithmological speculations, which, of course, he ascribes to Moses himself: "Moses' wish is to exhibit alike the things created of mortal kind and those that are incorruptible as having been formed in a way corresponding to their proper numbers."[50]

This discussion of seven includes a quotation from Euripides,[51] in which the author stresses the integral link between birth and death, an idea Philo will put to use in his discussion of the relationship between the numbers one and seven.

The section closes with a reference to Gen. 2:2, so that the predominantly Greek main part of the section is, as it were, framed by two specific references to things Jewish.

A quick summary of the purely arithmological statements on the number seven, without any specific application to biblical texts, would have to include the following items. They constitute the basic material which Philo uses in his exegetical application of arithmology.[52]

Op. 91

1. There are two types of "seven:"
   a. within the decade--consists of seven units and is determined by the sevenfold repetition of the unit;

Op. 92-94

   b. outside the decade: starting from one, it is obtained by seven fold doubling, tripling, etc.; e.g.,
   64 = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64
   729 = 1, 3, 9, 27, 81, 243, 729

Op. 92

Type (b) is superior: the seventh term of any regular procession, starting from unity and with a ratio of 2, 3, or any number, is both a cube and a square, combining both the corporeal and the incorporeal substance.[53]

Op. 99-100
L.A. 1:15
V. Mos. 2: 210
QG 2:12
Spec. Leg. 2:56
Heres 170 216
V. Cont. 65
Praem. 153
Decal. 102

2. The hebdomad within the decade is neither product nor factor. For this reason some people have likened it to the motherless, ever virgin Athena.

Op. 100
QG 2:12

3. Other writers liken it to Zeus.[54]

L.A. 1:15
Deus Imm. 11, 13
Op. 95, 96

4. For this reason the hebdomad is related to the monad.

5. All partitions of the hebdomad produce musical harmony:

7 = 1 + 6 (6:1 = greatest distance from highest to lowest note)
= 2 + 5 (5:2 = fullest power in harmonies, almost like diapason)
= 3 + 4 (4:3 = first harmony, the sesquitertian or diates saron).

Op. 107-110

6. The hebdomad is absolutely harmonious, the source of the most beautiful scale, which contains all the harmonies:

that yielded by the interval of 4
" " " " " " 5
" " " " octave.

Op. 97

7. In the right-angled triangle, 3 and 4 (components of 7) produce the right angle.

Op. 98, 106, 102

8. The hebdomad is the starting point of all plane and solid geometry, or: the hebdomad is the starting point of all things corporeal and incorporeal.

Op. 101

9. The hebdomad serves as a symbol in both the intelligible and the sensible world:

a. in the intelligible world it is a symbol for "that which is exempt from movement and passion;"

b. in the sensible world, the hebdomad is a most essential force [in the movement of the planets], from which all earthly things derive advantage.

Op. 112

10. Heaven is girdled by seven zones.

Op. 113
L.A. 108
Spec. Leg. 2:57
Decal. 102
QE 2:78

11. There are seven planets.[56]

Op. 114

12. Ursa maior consists of seven stars.

Op. 115

13. The Pleiades consist of seven stars.

Op. 116

14. The two equinoxes are seven months apart.[57]

Op. 101
L.A. 1:8
Spec. Leg. 1:178

15. The phases of the moon last seven days.

Spec. Leg. 2:56f.	16. Because of its influence upon the stars the hebdomad is called καιρός.
Op. 124	17. Semen solidifies in seven days.[58]
-"-	18. Menstruation lasts at most seven days.
-"- L.A. 1:9	19. Seven months' children survive.
Op. 104	20. There are seven stages of ten years each in a man's life.
Op. 105	21. There are seven ages in a man's life.
L.A. 1:10	22. Man's life can be divided into stages of seven years each.
Op. 117 L.A. 1:11 QG 2:12	23. The irrational part of the soul has seven components.
Op. 118 L.A. 1:12	24. The body consists of seven inner and seven outer parts.
Op. 119 L.A. 1:12	25. The head has seven essential parts.
Op. 120	26. There are seven things that can be seen.
Op. 121 L.A. 1:14	27. There are seven different intonations of the voice.
Op. 122 L.A. 1:12	28. There are seven types of motion.
Op. 128 L.A. 1:13	29. There are seven bodily excretions.
Op. 125 L.A. 1:13	30. Illnesses reach their κρίσις on the seventh day.
Op. 126 L.A. 1:14	31. The lyre has seven strings.
Op. 126 L.A. 1:14	32. There are seven vowels.

A number of observations can be made about this list.

1. Philo almost certainly took it over from some Neopythagorean work either on arithmology in general, or on the number seven. The Greek origin of the list is obvious from the references to Greek mythology and the quotations from Greek authors.

2. Although Philo has collected in the list a veritable armory of data, a glance at the list of the passages in which any of the items re-occurs outside the lists themselves in Op.

and L.A., indicates that he actually made very little use of this material in his own exegetical work. Only items nos. 2, 3, 4, 11, 15, 16, and 23 occur in any of the other treatises of the Philonic corpus. Among these, the most frequently used statement is one of Greek provenance: the number seven can be likened to the goddess Athena. The rest of the repeated items all refer to the seven planets in general or to the moon in particular.

3. These observations seem to justify the conclusion that Philo occasionally introduced arithmological statements for their own sake, without putting them to work as exegetical tools in connection with specific biblical passages.[59]

4. The shorter list of statements on the hebdomad in the Allegorical Interpretation is based upon the longer one in the Opificio. Not only do many of the items occur in the same sequence, but even the transitional clauses are strictly parallel:

Op. 101	par.	L.A. 1:8	transition to sensible world	
117	"	1:9	"	" man
126	"	1:14	"	" sciences

The only exception to this pattern is the transitional clause introducing the hebdomad within the decade, which is found only at Op. 95.[60]

A very important aspect of Philo's understanding of the number seven appears only as a subsidiary consideration in the list of arithmological statements given above: because seven has been likened to Zeus, it is related to the monad. And yet it is this peculiar relationship between one and seven that gives Philo an opportunity to interpret a number of biblical passages according to his own allegorical method.

In The Posterity and Exile of Cain Philo discusses the superiority of soul over body[61] and the precedence of Israel, though by birth the younger son, over the others, so that he even can be called "firstborn."[62] He who sees God is truly "the earliest offspring of the Uncreated one"; he is the true firstborn, and the law of Dt. 21:7 applies to him, that he should be given a double portion. From this allegorical interpretation of the law of inheritance, Philo moves on to a discussion of the superior position of the number seven, which "takes precedence of every number, in nothing differing from one."[63] Philo invokes Moses himself to supply proof for this seeming paradox. By looking at the seam between the Yahwist and the Priestly accounts of creation and by reading Gen. 2:4, not as an introduction to what follows, but rather as a summary of the preceding account, he reaches the interpretation he wants:

a. Philo quotes Gen. 2:2f.: "And God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he had made; and God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because in it God rested from all his works which God had begun to make."

b. He then continues his quotation with Gen. 2:4: "This

is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when it was created, in the day in which God made the heaven and the earth."

c. Philo now harmonizes Gen. 1:1 and 2:4: "Now these things were created on the first day [τῇ πρώτῃ], so that the seventh day is referred back to one, the first and starting point of all."

d. With this equation of one and seven, Philo has accomplished what he had set out to do; he closes this section by expressing satisfaction that the discussion of an opinion held by Cain has been fully treated. Thus the elaborate working-out of the equation, in this context, performs no more than a subsidiary function. In the process of it, Philo casually ignores fine points of exegesis upon which he had laid great stress in the Opificio, such as the fact that Gen. 1:5 speaks of "one day," and not "first,"[64] or his insistence that the chronological references in the account of the creation must under no circumstances be understood in the sense of empirical time.[65]

Philo performs a similar exegetical feat in his comments on 1 Sam. 2:5, where in the Song of Hannah he finds the following line: στεῖρα ἔτεκεν ἑπτά, ἡ δὲ πολλὴ ἐν τέκνοις ἠσθένητε. He now takes the Sitz im Leben of the song literally and places it after the birth of Samuel, but before the birth of his three brothers and two sisters mentioned in 1 Sam. 2:21. This leads him to ask how Hannah, at that time the mother of one, can boast of having borne seven children. Surely, this would not be possible, unless she μονάδα ἑβδομάδι τὴν αὐτὴν φυσικώτατα νομίζει, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀριθμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς ἐναρέτου λόγοις ψυχῆς.[66] Hannah, therefore, understands the cosmic truth of the unity of one and seven. The seemingly nonsensical text [seven children after the report of only one birth], taken literally, not only allows Philo to make his arithmological statement about the special relationship existing between the monad and the hebdomad, he is now also able to add a statement about the unique ("monadic") position of Samuel: "For Samuel who is appointed to God alone and holds no company with any other has his being ordered in accordance with the One and the Monad, the truly existent [κατὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν μονάδα, τὸ ὄντως ὄν].[67]

But the monad implies the hebdomad, and thus Samuel's involvement with the One implies the Seven, here expressed in language reminiscent of that applied to God in L.A. 1:2:16: ". . . a soul which rests in God and toils no more at any mortal task, and has thus left behind the Six, which God has assigned to those who could not win the first place. . ."

Philo then uses etymology in order to clear up another difficulty in the biblical text: how can a "barren" woman give birth? He (probably correctly) relates στεῖρα, "barren," with στερρά, "firm" or "solid," and actually equates the two. Thus he can read 1 Sam. 2:5 as saying that the "firm" or "solid" woman, "who still abounds in power, bore ἑβδομάδι τὴν ἰσότιμον μονάδα."

In this discussion of 1 Sam. 2:5, in itself no more than

an illustration of the nature of the soul, Philo uses:

1. a literal reading of the context of the biblical narrative,

2. the arithmological equation of one and seven,

3. an allegorical interpretation of the hebdomad as referring to "things divine,"

4. etymology,

in order to produce the type of allegorical interpretation of one biblical passage that would make it useful for the discussion of the topic at hand.

Not all cases, however, in which Philo combines one and seven are quite so elaborately constructed. In Ex. 25:36 we find a description of the menorah which Philo uses in order to interpret a passage in Genesis; the connecting link is provided by the number seven:

1. Abram, at God's behest, takes a heifer, a she-goat, and a ram, cuts them into two and lays each half over against the other.[67]

2. This makes six pieces of carcass, plus the severer, "the Logos, who separates the two sets of three and stations himself in the midst" and thus becomes the seventh.

3. Philo now introduces another illustration of the relationship of three plus three plus one. The menorah has three branches on either side with the central stem dividing the two sets of threes. In itself, it is made "of one piece of pure gold."[68]

4. Philo is now ready to explain the meaning of the form of the menorah, one of the most important symbols of the Jewish cult: "The One, alone and absolutely pure, has begotten the Seven, whom no other bore, begotten her by himself alone, and employing no other medium whatsoever."[69] Thus the menorah finds its explanation through the Greek myth of the birth of Athena by Zeus alone, without the interference of any mother.

Philo applies the identification of one and seven also to the Jewish liturgical year, which, in his view, reflects cosmic patterns. In Spec. Leg. 2:156f. he discusses the celebration of Passover, a festival lasting seven days. Here the number seven is viewed as the source of good things. The number seven and its character are primary; the festival is observed to celebrate the sacred character of the hebdomad: the feast lasts seven days

> to mark the precedence and honour which the number holds in the universe, indicating that nothing which tends to cheerfulness and public mirth and thankfulness to God should fail to be accompanied with memories of the sacred seven which he intended to be the source and fountain to men of all good things.

Although the festival lasts for seven days, the first and seventh days are declared holy, thus giving a natural precedence to the beginning and end. This allows Philo once again to illustrate the special relationship between one and seven, both of them understood as standing at the same time for beginning and end. The past adjoins the first day of the festival, and the future adjoins its last day. As a result, "the first and the last have each the other's properties in addition to their own." The first is the "beginning of the feast and the end of the preceding past"; and the seventh is the "end of the feast and beginning of the coming future."[70]

The same connection between one and the beginning, and seven and the end, is made in Spec. Leg. 1:187, where Philo is xxcommenting on Nu. 29:7-11. The following burnt offering is xxprescribed: one young bull, one ram, seven male lambs a year xxold. The total number of sacrificial animals is nine, but that is of no concern to Philo. He concentrates on the presence of both "one" and "seven" and comments:

> Treating it as a festival day, he made the sacrifices of the same number as those of the sacred-month days, namely a calf and a ram and seven lambs, thus blending the one with the seven and putting the completion in lone with the beginning. For to seven belongs the completion of actions, to one their beginning.

This blending of one and seven, or even their identification, represents an interesting example of Philo's use of numbers and their relationships. Since only a fraction of the Hellenistic Pythagorean literature has survived,[71] it is impossible to make any firm claims for originality in this field. We do not know whether the equation of one and seven is original with Philo or not. We are able to state, however, that the use of biblical prooftexts to buttress an arithmological relationship is probably the work of Philo. He may have been forced into this equation by the need to harmonize seemingly contradictory, or at least conflicting, accounts in the biblical text. One of the most obvious problems of this type would be seen in the juxtaposition of Gen. 1:1 and 2:4. Since Philo could not admit the use of multiple sources in the Pentateuch which, to him, was the work of Moses, and since, for this same reason, he could not allow any inconsistencies in the text, he found the solution to the problem in the identification of the numbers one and seven, so that the seventh day is the same as day one--and that, indeed, is the day on which God created heaven and earth.

But such exegetical sleights-of-hand were not the only means by which Philo could establish the identity of one and seven. We observe the application of a different method when we read that each of the equinoxes occurs in a seventh month, "and during them there is enjoined by law the keeping of the greatest national festivals."[72] Such a statement is possible only because the Jewish calendar system had two different dates for the beginning of the new year and because Philo chose to ignore the historical development of the system. In the pre-exilic agricultural calendar the beginning of the new year

occurred in the spring, in the post-exilic ecclesiastical calendar it fell into the autumn. As a result we get the following pattern:

spring	equinox	is	in	the	first	month
"	"	"	"	"	seventh	"
autumn	"	"	"	"	first	"
"	"	"	"	"	seventh	"

(old style)
(new ")
(" ")
(old ")

Thus it is possible to say that both equinoxes occur in the seventh month, but also to state that both occur in the first month.

Philo was aided in the development of this pattern by another habit of his. On many occasions he equates the "seventh day" with the number "seven," thus transferring characteristics of the one to the other.

In Heres 169-173 Philo gives a brief summary of the ten commandments, without quoting any of them verbatim. In 170 he makes the startling statement that the fourth commandment is ὁ περὶ τῆς ἀειπαρθένου καὶ ἀμήτορος ἑβδομάδος. The peculiarly Jewish character of the sabbath is replaced by an allusion to a Greek myth: the fourth commandment has as its subject the motherless birth of the virgin Athena by Zeus. When discussing the fourth commandment in Decal. 158-164, Philo again says that it deals περὶ τῆς ἑβδομάδος.

SABBATH--The close connection that Philo establishes between the sabbath and the number seven which, as we have seen, can go as far as complete identification, is merely a part of his consistent interpretation of the sabbath in a universalistic sense, thus depriving it of any specifically Jewish features. The sabbath [a term rarely used by Philo] is a universal holiday, not merely the festival of a single city or country; it is the birthday of the world.[74] As a result, the purpose of the sabbath is universal in character: those who would be citizens in ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ, in the cosmos created by God, should follow God in this as in other matters:

> rest on the seventh day,
> turn to the study of wisdom,
> while they had leisure for the contemplation of the truths of nature, they should also consider whether any offence against purity had been committed [εἴ τι μὴ καθαρῶς ἐπράχθη] in the preceding days.[75]

A different reason for the keeping of the sabbath is given in De Abrah. 28:f. The reason is not, as a literal interpretation would have it, that after six days the multitude abstained from their usual tasks, but rather that, both in the world and in ourselves, "the number seven is always free from factions and war and quarrelling and is of all numbers the most peaceful." Such a sweeping claim requires proof, and Philo promptly supplies it with the help of his arithmological psychology: our six senses[76] are always at war against each other, but the seventh [ἡ ἑβδόμη δύναμις ἡ περὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν] overcomes the six "and welcomes solitude and its own society, feeling that it needs no other and is completely sufficient for itself."

Here the number seven, because it is the number of things divine, and because of its lordship over the six and its self-sufficiency, allows the universalistic explanation of the sabbath (a term avoided by Philo also in this passage).[77]

The character of seven as a leader is brought out in another discussion of the seventh day, in Spec. Leg. 2:56. Note the shift from "day" to "number": "The second [feast] to be observed is the sacred seventh day . . . Some have given to it the name of virgin, having before their eyes its surpassing chastity." Seven is then explained as:

> motherless, begotten by the father of the universe alone,
> the ideal form of the male sex with nothing of the female,
> the manliest and doughtiest of all numbers,
> well gifted by nature [εὐ πεφυκώς] for sovereignty and leadership.

But the most sweeping interpretatio Graeca of the sabbath is probably the one found in Vit. Mos. 2:209f. Again we notice the shift from day to number and, in this case, back to day.

1. Moses magnified τὴν ἱερὰν ἑβδόμην [the holy seventh day],

2. because its marvellous beauty is found in heaven, the entire cosmos, and in nature itself:

   a. it is motherless, exempt from female parentage, begotten by the father alone, without begetting, brought to birth, yet not carried in the womb;

   b. ever virgin,[78] neither born of a mother nor a mother herself, neither bred from corruption, nor doomed to corruption;

   c. the birthday of the world
      a feast celebrated by heaven
      a feast celebrated by earth and on earth--
      as they exult in the full harmony of the sacred number.

The account of the people of Israel wandering in the wilderness for forty years contains the report of the miraculous provision of food for the people. Since on the seventh day they were not allowed to do any work, special provisions were made on the previous day to spare them any severe hardships. But the supply of a double ration of manna on the preceding day and its failure to appear on the sabbath had an unexpected side effect. The people, for many generations, had longed to know "what was the birthday of the world on which the universe was completed," and now they found the answer in the miracle of the double provision of food for the sabbath.[79] Philo here interprets what he sees as an historical event as a revelation of a cosmic fact.

THE HEBDOMAD AS A COSMIC FACTOR -- Philo's often repeated statement that the seventh day is the birthday of the cosmos is based upon one of his interpretations of Gen. 2:2f. The only passage in which he actually gives a reason for calling the seventh day "birthday of the cosmos" is Spec. Leg. 2:58f., where he interprets Gen. 2:2f. in a progressive manner: six is the number under which the parts of the universe were brought into being, seven that under which they were perfected, so that "from a higher point of view" Moses could call seven συντέλεια and παντέλεια. "Seven reveals as completed what six has produced,[80] and therefore it may be quite rightly entitled the birthday of the cosmos, on which the Father's perfect work, compounded of perfect parts, was revealed as what it was."[81] Seven thus is not only the number of perfection, it is also the means through which this perfection is revealed.[82]

The most common symbol used by Philo to express the cosmic significance of the hebdomad, and at the same time to demonstrate the harmony existing between the cosmos and the Jewish cult as ordained by God and instituted by Moses, is the menorah. In QE 2:78 Philo refers to Ex. 25:37a and asks: "Why are there seven lamps on the lampstand?" The answer: the seven lamps are symbols of the planets, because the hebdomad "belongs to those things reckoned as divine." At this point Philo comes close to an astrological interpretation of the significance of the movement of the planets:

> And the movement and revolution of these through the zodiacal signs, are the causes, for sublunary beings, of all those things which are wont to take place in the embrace of concord, in the air, in the water, on the earth, and in all mixtures from animals to plants.

Without any specific biblical reference, Philo in Vit. Mos. 2:102f. describes the arrangement of the sacred furniture in the tabernacle.[83] He has Moses place the menorah at the south, "for the sun and the moon and the others run their courses in the south far away from the north." After a description of the arrangement of the branches of the menorah (three-one-three), Philo draws the analogy between the lampstand and the planetary system. Although he is aware that the exact sequence of the planets is a matter of dispute among astronomers, Philo accepts that theory which places the sun in the middle position, with three planets each above the sun and below.[84] The reason adduced by Philo indicates that he has some knowledge of astronomical theory: the sun is in the middle position because "it gives light to the three above and the three below it." In Heres 221-225, Philo offers the same explanation, without indicating the biblical passage in which the menorah is described. In this treatise he makes explicit the reason for the shape of the lampstand: "The τεχνίτης, wishing that we should possess a copy of the archetypal celestial sphere with its seven lights, commanded this splendid work, the lampstand, to be wrought." The menorah is a copy of the planetary system.[85]

But not only liturgical instruments like the menorah reflect the harmony that exists between the cosmos and the Jewish

cult; this is done also by the Jewish liturgical calendar. In Spec. Leg. 1:181f. Philo, without quoting the biblical reference at Nu. 28:16, refers to the law concerning the festival of unleavened bread. During the first month, in this case at the time of the spring equinox, the festival shall be kept for seven days: "because the seven days of the feast bore the same relation to the equinox which falls in the seventh month as the new moon does to the month . . . The seven days of the feast, which being of the same number as the new moons represented them collectively."

Even the number of sacrificial animals prescribed for the burnt offering at the new moons reflects the harmony existing between the cosmos and the ritual. In Spec. Leg. 1:177f. Philo, without specific reference to Nu. 28:11-14, states that the burnt offering calls for ten victims: two calves, one ram, and seven lambs. The offering is presented at the time of the new moon at the beginning of every month. The month, in turn, is a "complete or perfect whole," and for this reason the number of sacrificial animals should be perfect: ten is a perfect number.[85] This perfect number is divided according to a perfect pattern:

the two calves represent the waning and waxing [two motions]
the one ram represents the one law that governs the changes of the moon
the seven lambs represent the complete cycle of the changes in the forms of the moon, which is measured in units of seven days each:

1.	waxing crescent	- 7 days
2.	full moon	- 7 days
3.	waning crescent	- 7 days
4.	new moon	- 7 days
		28 days of the month

But the most dramatic and elaborate structure to indicate the cosmic importance of the hebdomad Philo develops in QE 2:68. The passage is instructive also as an illustration of the arbitrary manner in which Philo is willing to proceed whenever he wants to establish a specific point.

In the pattern usual for Quaestiones et Solutiones, Philo starts with a biblical quotation and a question relating to it. He abbreviates Ex. 25:21b [Heb. 22b] and asks: "What is the meaning of the words, 'I will speak to thee above from the mercy-seat, between the two cherubim'?" The reader would now expect an allegorical interpretation of the cherubim, but that Philo had already offered in the preceding chapters of this treatise. What we get now is a picture of the structure of the world above the intelligible world. We find the following pattern:

1. He who is elder than the one and the monad and the beginning.
2. the Logos of the Existent One, the truly seminal substance of existing things;
3/4. two powers: creative ("God") royal ("Lord")

5/6. two powers: propitious ("beneficial")
legislative ("punitive")
7. the ark (symbol of the intelligible world--symbolically contains all things established in the innermost sanctuary).

Philo considers this pattern so important that he repeats it twice in reverse sequence. First he states that "the number of things here enumerated amounts to seven." Then he gives the list in ascending order:

1. the intelligible world;
2/3. the two related powers: punitive beneficent
4/5. the two preceding powers: creative royal
6. the Logos
7. the Speaker

And finally the descending order:

1. the Speaker
2. the Logos
3. the creative power
4. the ruling power
5. the beneficent power
6. the punitive power
7. the world of ideas

The lowest of the seven is the world of ideas. There is no room in this system for any form of "number mysticism" through which man would be enabled to have a vision of God, much less to enter into union with the One. At the same time it is worth noting that Philo in this passage remains faithful to one of the basic principles of the Hebrew understanding of God and his people: God speaks and the people hear. God is the Speaker, and it is important to see that Philo has chosen a biblical text in which God appears as the Speaker to develop his elaborate system of the divine court--which, once again, reflects the importance and sanctity of the number seven.

MICROCOSMOS -- One of the underlying assumptions of Philo's understanding of the universe and all its parts, is the affinity, perhaps even identity, between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos represented by man. The concept itself is Stoic, but Philo can accept it without difficulty, provided he disregards the type of pantheism implied in the Stoic notion. Philo can see the unity of all creation because behind it all he recognizes one creator. Thus we should not be surprised if Philo recognizes parallels between the make-up of the world and that of man.

Heres 232f. can serve as a good example of Philo's procedure and exegetical method in this connection. The entire treatise is a detailed commentary on Gen. 15:2-18, but as usual Philo feels free to draw illustrative materials from other passages. The starting point for this pericope is Gen. 15:10: "He did not divide the birds" (230). The allegorical interpretation of the birds understands them as "two words or forms of reason." One is the archetypal reason above us, the other

the copy which we possess.

Our psychic make-up represents an exact parallel to the structure of the heavens:

1. a. Our νοῦς is indivisible by nature.
   b. The sphere of the fixed stars is kept unsevered.

2. a. The irrational part of our souls, through a sixfold division, has been formed into seven parts.[87]
   b. The inner sphere of the heavens, by a sixfold division, produces the seven circles of the planets.[88]

This allows Philo to state: "I regard the soul as being in man what the heaven is in the universe." More than that: the two reasoning and intellectual natures, the cosmic and the human one, "are integral and undivided." And this, lest we forget, is the reason for the scriptural text: "The birds he did not divide."

The analogy between the starry heavens and the psychic make-up of man was made possible for Philo because he recognized the number seven as an element common to both. But he was also able to use his theories concerning the relationships between the monad and the hebdomad, the one corresponding to the fixed stars and the "reasoning and intellectual power," the other to the planets and the "irrational" part of our soul. The connection between this elaborate scheme and the biblical text supposedly under discussion is tenuous.

In Heres 225 Philo offers a different explanation of the structure of the human soul; unfortunately this passage is far from clear. Without any reference to a biblical passage, Philo states that the soul is tripartite, and each of the parts, "as has been shown," is divided into two, resulting in six parts, to which the ἱερὸς καὶ θεῖος λόγος, the "All-severer," makes a fitting seventh. Philo is alluding in this passage to Heres 132:[89] the soul consists of ψυχή, λόγος (understood as speech) and αἴσθησις, with the following subdivisions:

1. ψυχή	a. rational b. irrational
2. λόγος	a. true b. false
3. αἴσθησις	a. presentations where the object is real and apprehended. b. presentations where it is not.

The whole section in which this passage occurs speaks of various forms of division being performed by the "Severer of all things," that is his word [τῷ τομεῖ τῶν συμπάντων ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ] and in Heres 225 Philo finds himself able to add up the six parts and now, by adding the τομεὺς ἁπάντων ὁ ἱερὸς καὶ θεῖος λόγος, comes up with the hebdomad, as is "fitting" [εἰκότως].

The fact that Philo can divide an entity like the human

soul into different numbers of components indicates what his priority really is: he wants to make a specific point; he wants to illustrate that point through the arithmological significance of a number, and he will then find (or produce) an appropriate number which will provide the example wanted. Any concrete connection with a scriptural text is practically nonexistent or, at best, strictly secondary.

HISTORICAL USE OF THE HEBDOMAD -- Philo even insists that historical events reveal some of their significance by falling on certain dates or occurring after a specific interval of time. Again, a few examples involving the hebdomad may serve to illustrate this point.

In QG 1:77 Philo discusses Gen. 4:23, and in the process we can observe how he takes liberties with the literal meaning of the text.

Philo asks the kind of question usually found in this part of the corpus: "If sevenfold punishment shall be enacted for Cain, then for Lamech seventy times seven?" The question still follows the line of thought found in Genesis: the sevenfold punishment is threatened against anyone who would kill Cain; it is not the punishment inflicted upon the first fratricide.

Philo now proceeds in two steps: first he discusses the arithmological values of seven and seventy times seven, respectively, and then he demonstrates the moral justification for this kind of arrangement.

1. Philo follows the basic Pythagorean understanding of numbers when he states that "the ones are prior to the tens both in order and in power."[90] The Pythagoreans based their speculations on the numbers within the decade. Thus "seven is more archetypal and elder than seventy," while seventy is younger and derivative. These are the arithmological facts, the basis which determines the course of events.[91] Then Philo shifts in his interpretation: instead of following the text of Genesis, where the punishment is threatened as a revenge which is meant to protect the life of Cain, he now speaks of punishment exacted from Cain for his murder of Abel.[92] Cain, because he did not really know what he was doing, received the lesser punishment. But Lamech, having Cain as a warning example before him, had no excuse, was guilty of voluntary sin, and received punishment, both in the units and in the tens.

2. But what is the function of seven in this process? "According to the law," a sevenfold judgment is given.[93] The pattern adduced by Philo reads like a late version of the lex talionis: the judgment is inflicted upon each part of the irrational part of the soul--

> the eyes, because they saw what was not fitting;
> the ears, because they heard what was not proper;
> the nose, because it was deceived by smoke and steam;
> the [organ of] taste, which was a servant of the belly's pleasure;
> the [organ of] touch, to which by the collaboration of the

former senses in overcoming the soul are also brought in addition other separate acts, such as conquest and destruction of cities;
the tongue and the organs of speech for being silent about things that should be said and for saying things that should be kept silent;
the lower belly, which with lawlessness sets the senses on fire.

This, then, is the reason why "a sevenfold vengeance is taken on Cain."

This passage has hardly anything to do with the biblical text. Philo gives the story of Cain and Lamech a moralistic interpretation and starts, not from the text, but from his prior conviction that sin results from letting the components of the irrational part of the soul remain unchecked. In order to get this point across, Philo does not hesitate to alter the meaning of what to him was an historical narrative. Once again the number seven is the trigger which sets Philo's interpretation into motion.

In QG 2:13 Philo presents a long arithmological interpretation of the various time elements involved in the great flood. Here, too, the hebdomad plays an important role. The delay of the flood for seven days after Noah entered the ark is a representative example of the allegorical type of interpretation Philo can apply. The number seven itself is mentioned in the biblical text, and Philo merely adds his exegetical comments:

1. The seven days are a reminder of the genesis of the world, of which the birthday is celebrated on the seventh day.[94]

2. Whereas the creation was an expression of God's goodness, the destruction by flood was caused by "the ingratitude and impiety of those who have experienced good."

3. The delay presents an opportunity for repentance.

Philo recognizes the working of the hebdomad not only at the beginning of the flood, but also at its end. The situation is difficult to analyze, since the narrative in Genesis distinguishes two different stages (first the end of the increase in water and the beginning of its recession, and then, in chapter 8, the time when the earth was once again dry). Both of these stages are mentioned in the two different strands of the narrative, the Priestly and the Yahwist.[95] In addition, there are differences between the Hebrew and the Greek texts.[96] But for Philo's purposes, this is not sufficient: in order to be able to impose his scheme upon the narrative, he has to read Gen. 8:14 as "in the seventh month," not, with the Hebrew text and most manuscripts of the LXX, "in the second month."

Philo then develops the following pattern:

1. The beginning of the flood and its diminution[97] both fell in the seventh month on the twenty-seventh day. But: in reality these events were separated by seven months: the be-

ginning of the flood occurred on Noah's birthday at the vernal equinox, the diminution began began at the autumnal equinox.

2. This kind of schematization is possible because of the identity existing between one and seven: the seventh month of the equinox is potentially also the first, since the creation of the world took place in this month because all things were full at this time. Similarly (the month of) the autumnal equinox, (which) is the seventh in time, is the first in honor, the seventh having its beginning from the air."[98]

Philo, once again, takes advantage of the two different dates for the beginning of the year in Jewish tradition. He further postulates that both equinoxes occur on the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month, the source of this idea being unknown.

Philo is disturbed by the different dates he finds in Gen. 8:13 and 14. In QG 2:47 he asks: "Why was the earth dried up in the seventh month, on the twenty-seventh day?" Neither the Hebrew text, nor most manuscripts of the LXX mention a "seventh" month in this context at all. The standard reading in v. 13 is τοῦ πρώτου μηνός, in v. 14 τῷ μηνὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ. Philo, instead, keeps "first" in v. 13 and reads "seventh" in v. 14. This allows him to apply an arithmological interpretation to the passage. Instead of seeing in v. 13 the beginning of a process [ἐξέλιπεν τὸ ὑδωρ] in the first month, and in the second month the end result of this process [ἐξηράνθη], he replaces the developmental interpretation with a static identification of the numbers one and seven, repeating in this process many of the things he had said on this topic in the earlier sections.

Here we have one of the clearest examples of forced exegesis in the writings of Philo. His preconceived notions about the harmony in the cosmos and the orderly development of historical events, based upon Neopythagorean arithmological speculations, take priority over any straightforward reading of the text.

If it is possible to observe arithmological patterns in the account of the creation and in the primeval history of man, we should expect Philo to apply the same system to the life of the man who composed the record which contains all these marvelous observations. And, indeed, Moses is associated with the number seven in its character as the number of "things divine."[99] In Post. 173 Philo states that the seven generations from Abraham to Moses are more perfect than the preceding twice ten generations. But it is also worth noting how Philo applies the language of the Greek mysteries to the Hebrew legislator. Moses is not only πάντα σοφός, he represents the seventh generation from Abraham, and that means that he does not, like those before him, "haunt the outer court of the Holy Place as one seeking initiation [ὅία μύστης], but as a sacred guide [ὥσπερ ἱεροφάντης][100] he has his abode in the sanctuary." Once again, the hebdomad is employed as a means to indicate Moses' superiority over the patriarchs and his closeness to things divine, all this expressed in Greek sacred terms.

CONCLUSION -- This partial yet, it is hoped, representative survey of the arithmological use of the number seven by Philo has concentrated on trying to demonstrate the connection which he attempts to establish between the text of the Torah and the cosmos, the process of creation, the furniture and calendar of the Jewish liturgical life, and certain historical events. In many instances, the biblical text presents Philo with all the data required by him, but in many others, the link between the biblical text and Philo's arithmological interpretation is, at best, tenuous. In some instances, he simply alters the reading in order to be able to develop his arithmological pattern.

Firm conclusions about the function of Philo's arithmology within the whole pattern of his exegesis can be drawn only when all the evidence has been collected and analyzed.[101] But it is possible, even now, to make a few preliminary observations:

1. Arithmology is a frequently used exegetical tool of Philo's, but it is only one among several and must be judged as an integral part of his entire exegetical approach.

2. In his arithmology, Philo makes heavy use of Greek myths and symbols, which he applies to purely Jewish concepts.

3. Arithmology allows Philo to stress two points:

   a. the cosmic and human order described by Moses is of universal validity, as is made most obvious in Philo's universalistic interpretation of the sabbath;

   b. this order is represented most clearly and purely in Jewish law, liturgy, and tradition; the Jewish religion is, therefore, the most "natural" religion.

4. The superiority of the Jewish tradition is not esoteric in character: as can be shown through arithmology, it is reasonable and demonstrably so.

Arithmology, then, is a tool valuable for Philo's intentions. It is an exegetical method alien to us, but certainly no more forced than most other aspects of allegorical interpretation. It deserves more careful study.

NOTES

1. I wish to thank Burton Mack and the other members of the team for their valuable critique of my preliminary report and the instructive discussions in general.

2. Henry Chadwick: "Philo," in A.H. Armstrong (ed.): The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge U.P., 1970, p. 141. Chadwick also stresses Philo's dependence upon Plato. In an author of the first century, it is not easy to separate all strands of tradition that may have influenced him.

3. Richard A. Baer, Jr.: Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female [Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums III], Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970, p. 16, n. 3.

4. Frank E. Robbins: "Arithmetic in Philo Judaeus," Classical Philology XVI (1921), 345-361, p. 360.

5. Erwin R. Goodenough: An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, New Haven: Yale U.P., 1940; repr. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. 111.

6. John Dillon: The Middle Platonists, Ithaca, New York: Cornell U.P., 1977, p. 114.

7. Martin P. Nilsson: Geschichte der griechischen Religion [Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft V.2.1-2], München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2nd ed., 1961, II, 417. Nilsson also has a low opinion of what he calls Zahlensymbolik: "[Sie] imponierte der großen Menge durch ihre Schwerverständlichkeit und Spitzfindigkeit, sie verschaffte den Pythagoreern den Ruf, geheimes Wissen zu besitzen" [ibid.]

8. Leptzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1931. Staehle tries to reconstruct Philo's lost work περὶ ἀριφμῶν. He gives a brief survey of arithmology before Philo and reaches this verdict on Philo's accomplishment: "Philon ist in allen Dingen so sehr Pythagoreer und weicht in der Methode der vorgelegten Zeugnisse so wenig von ihnen ab, daß man seine Schrift περὶ ἀριφμῶν beinahe als ein pythagoreisches Lehrbuch bezeichnen könnte, und zwar als eines der umfangreichsten und ältesten, die wir kennen Denn alle die Werke, aus denen ich Parallelen gegeben habe, sind später und stammen aus dem 2. bis 6. nachchristlichen Jahrhundert. Philons Werk aber geht hinauf bis in die frühe Kaiserzeit" (p. 11). Staehle's comments on the importance of Philo's arithmological passages are essentially correct. This means that, quite apart from their value as a source for the study of Philo's exegetical methods, they possess an intrinsic value of their own and should be of interest to any student of late antiquity.

9. E.G., H. Chadwick: "speculations about the mysterious significance of numbers;" F.E.Robbins: "arithmology;" John Dillon: "mystical numerology;" M.P. Nilsson: "Zahlensymbolik," "Mystik der Arithmetik;" K. Staehle: "Zahlenmystik."

10. See especially Erwin R. Goodenough: By Light, Light, New Haven, 1935, repr. Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1969; and Jewish Symbols in the Graeco-Roman Period, New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1953-68. In X, 72 Goodenough refers to Scholem's work on Jewish mysticism and adduces some instances in which numbers form part of the mystical speculations and then states that this shows "definitely the influence of late hellenistic or Neoplatonic number mysticism, but all integrated quite securely with Jewish conceptions and the Hebrew alphabet. In this mysticism one does not ascend to the throne, . . . , but one performs a symbolic act by putting on a special garment in which the name of God had been woven." It is possible that the use of numbers in the Jewish mystical work Sefer Yetsirah (a

hundred years ago dated around the eighth century, now placed by Scholem somewhere between the third and sixth centuries, Kabbalah, Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974, p. 27) may have influenced Goodenough to assign numbers a similar function in earlier sources. As will be shown below, only one or two passages in Philo can be regarded as showing numbers with a mystical significance; Philo also states explicitly that the numbers do not permit man to achieve anything like a union with God.

11. Abr. 69. English translations of Philonic passages are taken from the Loeb Classical Library translations provided by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker, and, in the case of the Quaestiones et Solutiones, Ralph Marcus.

12. Migr. 179.

13. See Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged, Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam, 1969, s.v.

14. Frank E. Robbins: "Posidonius and the Sources of Pythagorean Arithmology," Classical Philology XV (1920), p. 309, n. 1, quoting from Bibl. de l'École des Hautes Études, fasc. 217, Paris, 1915, p. 139.

15. In the specific case of Philo, then, one could say that in his arithmology, as in his exegetical methods generally, he follows a middle course between literalism and total disregard for the literal meaning of the text.

16. Metaphysics XIV.6 (1093a): "If all things must share in number, it must follow that many things are the same, and the same number must belong to one thing and another. Is number the cause, then, and does the thing exist because of its number, or is this not certain?"

17. Although he occasionally simply omits such definitions, only once does he explicitly refuse to repeat one. The reason given should amuse any reader of Philo: "Many a time has much been said about the number ten in other places, which for those who wish to prolong the discussion it would be easy to transfer here. B u t b r e v i t y o f s p e e c h i s l i k e d b y u s, and it is timely and sufficient that whatever has been said be remembered" (QE 2:84). Note the incidental remark about his working habits.

18. Hermann Usener: "Dreiheit," Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, N. F. XXVIII, 1-47, 161-208, 321-362.

19. Ibid., p. 361.

20. See note 2.

21. "Die enneadischen und hebdomadischen Fristen und Wochen," Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der Kgl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Band XXI, Nr. IV, Leipzig, 1903; "Die Sieben- und Neunzahl im Kultus und Mythus der Griechen," ibid. XXIV/I, 1904; "Die Hebdomadenlehre

der griechischen Philosophen und Arzte," ibid. XXIV.2/VI, 1906; "Planeten," in his Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, n.d.

22. Hermann Diels: Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 4th ed., Berlin: Weidmann, 1922, p. 257.

23. Quoted by Photius: Bibliotheka, cod. 187.

24. Hermann Usener, op. cit., p. 348.

25. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 986a 15-21.

26. On Anaximander's cosmology, see G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven: The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge U.P., 1957, repr. 1971, pp. 131-142; W. K. C. Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. I: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans, Cambridge U.P., 1962, pp. 89-115; W. L. West: Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, pp. 83-97.

27. A. Schmekel: Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange dargestellt, Berlin, 1892, pp. 403ff. The view developed by Schmekel became very influential and led Roscher to attempt a reconstruction of portions of Poseidonius' commentary from Philo's De Opificio Mundi ["Die Hebdomadenlehre . . . ," pp. 112-127]. For an alternate view (accepted by Staehle), see F. E. Robbins: "Posidonius and the Sources of Pythagorean Arithmology." On completely different grounds, classical scholars like Wilamowitz had denied the existence of such a commentary by Poseidonius.

28. Plato: Timaeus 27D [Bury's translation in the LCL].

29. Ibid. 53B.

30. Cf. the instructive work by Julius Stenzel: Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles, Leipzig: Teubner, 1924. This work is probably more faithful to Plato's thought than Eva Sachs: Die fünf platonishchen Körper. Zur Geschichte der Mathematik und der Elementenlehre Platons und der Pythagoreer [Philosophische Untersuchungen, 24. Haft], Berlin: Weidmann, 1917.

31. Walter Burkert: "Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica," Philologus 105 (1961), 16-43, 226-246; cf. the debate between Burkert and Thesleff in Pseudepigrapha I [Entretiens Fondation Hardt XVIII], Geneva, 1972; Burkert: Weisheit und Wissenschaft Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon [Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft 10], Nürnberg: Carl, 1962; Kurt von Fritz: "Mathematiker und Akusmatiker bei den alten Pythagoreern," SB München, philologische historische Klasse, 1960, Heft XI.

32. Eduard Zeller: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 6th ed., Leipzig, 1919, repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963, I, 426. Zeller, however, makes two important qualifications: "Die bakshisch-pythagoreischen Orgien" continued, and the Pythagorean

school survived in Italy.

33. Ibid. III/2, 103: ". . . fehlt es bis zum Ende des zweiten Jahrhunderts an jedem Beweis für das Fortleben einer pythagoreischen Philosophenschule, und von den Schriftstellern der folgenden Jahrhunderte können auch solche, denen jede Spur ihrer Fortdauer willkommen gewesen wäre, von derselben noch nichts gewußt haben, da sie ihr zeitweiliges Erlöschen unbedenklich berichten."

34. Vita Pythag. 81, 87-89.

35. Kurt v. Fritz, in the "Discussion of 'Doric Pseudopythagorica'" in Pseudepigrapha I, 88.

36. v. Fritz, loc. cit.; "Generally, the latter group claims to have preserved without change the original teaching of the master, whereas the former do fresh research and publish it under their own names."

37. Carcopino: Le mystère d'un symbol chrétien, Paris, 1955, esp. pp. 40ff.

38. Cf. Cicero's statement on Publius Nigidius Figulus (98-45 B.C.) in the introduction to his translation of Plato's Timaeus: "He was not only versed in all the other arts which are proper to a gentleman, but was also a keen and diligent investigator of those things that lie hid in nature. Last, but not least, it was he, in my judgment, who, following on those noble Pythagoreans, whose system of philosophy, after flourishing for a number of centuries in Italy and Sicilly, was somehow extinguished, arose to revive it." Quoted by John Dillon: The Middle Platonists, p. 117.

39. Burkert borrows his analogy from Erwin Rohde: Psyche, 9th-10th eds., Tübingen, 1925, II, 296.

40. Burkert, op. cit., p. 235.

41. Nikolaus Walter: Der Thoraausleger Aristobulus [Texte und Untersuchungen 86], Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964, pp. 166-171.

42. Ibid., p. 167.

43. Op. 89-128.

44. Op. 90.

45. On this seeming paradox see below.

46. Even in this perfunctory bow to Moses, Philo describes the purpose of the sabbath observance in purely universalistic and philosophical terms: "giving their time to the one sole object of philosophy with a view to the improvement of character and submission to the scrutiny of conscience."

47. Athena.

48. Fifth century B.C. But see below on All. Leg. 1:15.

49. Plato actually establishes a contrast between ἀναγκαῖα and ἄριστα

50. All. Leg. 1:4. The passage is important for the understanding of the entire system of arithmology in Philo.

51. Fragment 839: Naught that is born does ever die,
Its severed parts together fly,
And yield another shape.

52. For a schematic presentation of the Greek text and brief references to similar passages in ancient authors, see K. Staehle: Die Zahlenmystik . . ., pp. 34-50. Since Staehle is interested in reconstructing Philo's lost work on numbers and the history of Neopythagoreanism, he omits from his work all specifically Jewish data (p. III).

53. In other places (e.g. QG 1:77), Philo will argue that the ones are prior to the tens both in order and in power, so that seven is more archetypal and elder than seventy.

54. Note that seven is likened to Athena or Zeus no fewer than eleven times. The use of motifs from Greek religion is obviously not a problem for Philo.

55. The affinity between one and seven plays an important role in Philo. He proves it on the basis of the biblical text. For detailed discussion, see below.

56. In Spec. Leg. 1:16, Philo comes close to the basic principle of astrology, when he speaks of the sun, the moon, and the other stars "in accordance with their sympathetic affinity to things on earth acting and working in a thousand ways for the preservation of the All." At the same time he warns against "supposing that they alone are gods."

57. As indicated above, this is one of the three passages in Op. 89-128 in which Philo introduces a clearly Jewish element. He actually says that "each of the equinoxes occurs in a seventh month." This allows him to adduce the sacred character of the hebdomad as a reason for the dates of the highest Jewish festivals.

58. Points 17, 18, 19, and 21 are attributed by Philo to Hippocrates.

59. It should be noted, however, that this is more obvious in the case of the hebdomad than with any other number, if for no other reason than that for no other number does he introduce so long and detailed a list of statements as he does in connection with the number seven.

60. The introductory statement on the hebdomad quoted above also has no parallel anywhere in Philo.

61. Post. 62.

62. Ibid., 63; cf. Ex. 4:22.

63. Post. 64.

64. Op. 15, 35.

65. Op. 26-28. In the Allegorical Interpretation Philo presents a completely different interpretation of Gen. 2:2f. In L.A. 1:5 he denies that God would ever stop creating, because it is ἴδιον for God to create. On the seventh day God, having brought to an end the formation of mortal things, begins the shaping of others more divine. Seven as the number of "things divine" plays an important role in Philo.

66. Deus 10-13, esp. 11.

67. Gen. 15:10; the birds listed there are irrelevant in the present context.

68. Quoted from Ex. 25:36. If in this passage Abram is identified with the Logos, in Heres 218 it is the center arm of the menorah which divided the other six. It is one of the few instances where Philo quotes at length from the biblical text [Ex. 38:15-17] and then slips in his interpretation in an almost off-handed fashion: "Thus by many proofs it is now established that the six is divided into two threes ὑπὸ μέσου τοῦ ἑβδόμου λόγου. Within the present context, Philo is mainly concerned with the question of division, and yet the identification of seven and logos is significant.

69. Heres 216.

70. Spec. Leg. 157.

71. See Helger Thesleff: An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period [Acta Academiae Aboensis. Humanoria XXIV], Abo: Abo Akademi, 1961; and The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period [XXX.1], 1965; also Walter Burkert: "Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica," and the other references given in note 31.

72. Op. 116.

73. Colson translates, "of the seventh day." He discusses similar instances in Philo and also gives one reference to Josephus [C. Ap. 2:282]. He chides the editors of the revised edition of Liddell & Scott for having expunged the entry of older editions, "The seventh day, Eccl." Colson also points out that Philo sometimes has ἑβδόμη in the sense of ἑβδομάς [e.g., Op. 116; Post. 64], but he does not venture an explanation of the phenomenon. [LCL Philo VII, p. 613, note on § 158.]

74. Op. 89: ἑορτὴ οὐ μιᾶς πόλεως ἡ χώρας ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντός . . .τοῦ κόσμου γενέθλιον. See also Vit. Mos. 1:207; 2:210; Spec. Leg. 1:170 [the seventh day is not only the birthday of the whole world (τοῦ κόσμου παντός), but it is of equal value to eternity (ἰσότιμον ἡγούμενος αἰῶνι τὴν ἑβδομήν)]; 2: 59, 70.

75. Decal. 98; in the following paragraph rest on the seventh day is prescribed as useful for man who has to labor for his living on six days every week.

76. The line of argument at this point requires Philo to omit the organ of reproduction, usually counted as the seventh component of the irrational part of the soul.

77. Philo's desire to avoid the use of the term sabbath is clearly demonstrated, e.g., by his changing the biblical text. Lev. 24:8 reads τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῶν σαββάτων, and Philo changes this to ταῖς ἑβδόμαις.

78. "Ever virgin"--in Op. 100 this epithet is ascribed to philosophers other than Pythagorean; in L.A. 1:15 to the Pythagoreans themselves. The second view is supported by the statement in Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.1.10, that Pythagoras, likening the numbers to the God, called seven Athena. Cf. Philo LCL VI, p. 609, note on § 210.

79. Vit. Mos. 1:205-207.

80. See E. A. Speiser: Genesis [The Anchor Bible 1], Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1964, p. 7 ad loc., and his translation, "God brought to a close the work that he had been doing," or A. Heidel: The Babylonian Genesis, Chicago U.P., 2nd ed., 1951, p. 127, who renders the verse as "and on the seventh day God declared his work finished." In view of the statement in the two preceding verses that God had completed his work on the sixth day, Heidel sees in the verb form "a declarative pi^{c}el."

81. For a different line of interpretation of Gen. 2:3f., see L.A. 1:5f., where God on the seventh day starts with the creation of things "happy and blessed." There it is flatly denied that God ever ceases making: οὐ παύεται δε ποιῶν αὐτός.

82. For another statement on seven as a means of revelation, see Decal. 105: "Nothing so much assures its (seven's) predominance as that through it is best given the revelation of the father and maker of all, for in it, as in a mirror, the mind has a vision of God as acting and creating the world and controlling all that is." It would be hasty to adduce this passage as a prooftext for number "mysticism" in Philo.

83. The implied reference is to Ex. 25:31-40, where it is not stated, however, that the lampstand is placed in the south part of the tabernacle. Josephus, Antt. 3:146, says that the seven lamps faced southeast.

84. On the scientific uncertainty, see Heres 224. In the system adopted by Philo, the three planets above the sun are Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, and those below are Mercury, Venus, and the moon [ibid.].

85. The same explanation for the menorah is given by Josephus, Antt. 3:146.

86. This is not true in a strictly mathematical sense, but reflects the extremely high esteem in which the decad was held

by the Pythagoreans.

87. The division of the irrational part of the soul into seven parts is the more common one in Philo; if occasion requires, he can also ignore one part (the organ of reproduction) and speak of only six components.

88. Philo's astronomy is based upon Plato's Timaeus 35D.

89. The soul is also given a tripartite division at Conf. 21 [νοῦς, θῦμος, ἐπιθυμία], but there we find no further subdivision.

90. Ralph Marcus, ad loc. in LCL XI, gives τάξει καὶ δυνάμει as the Greek equivalent.

91. Philo actually says: "These things being determined, . . ."

92. According to Philo, Cain is "more simply punished in accordance with the first and doubtful number, I mean one." The "one" instead of "units" may be based upon an error in the Armenian translation or in the transmission of the Armenian text. But why a number within the decade should be called "doubtful" remains unclear.

93. Lev. 24:17: "He who kills a man shall be put to death." Similarly Gen. 9:6; Nu. 35:30; the penalty inflicted upon Cain: "when you till the ground, it shall no longer yield to you its strength; you shall be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth" (Gen. 4:12). "Law" here may simply refer to the book of Genesis as part of Torah.

94. The relationship between the destructive element of the flood and the birthday, either of the cosmos or of Noah, the righteous man, forms an important secondary motif in Philo's interpretation of the flood narrative. In QG 2:31, he flatly states that "the beginning of the flood fell in the seventh month on the birthday of the righteous man at the vernal equinox."

95. Stage I, J: "the fountains of the deep were closed, and the waters receded from the earth continually" (Gen. 8:2a, 3); P: "at the end of a hundred and fifty days the waters had abated, and in the seventh month, the seventeenth day of the month, the ark came to rest on the mountains of Ararat" (Gen. 8:3b-4).

Stage II, J: "At the end of forty days Noah opened the window of the ark . . . and the dove did not return to him any more . . . and Noah . . . looked, . . . and the face of the ground was dry" (Gen. 8:6-12, 13b); P: "in the six hundred and first year, in the first month, the first day of the month, the waters were dried from off the earth; . . . in the second month, on the twenty-seventh day of the month, the earth was dry" (Gen. 8:13a, 14).

96. In Gen. 8:3, LXX, "on the twenty-seventh day."

97. "When the ark rested on the summits of the mountains"

(QG 2:31).

98. Ibid. No reasonable explanation for the last clause seems to be possible (see R. Marcus in his note ad loc.).

99. Gen. 2:3.

100. Cf. L.A. 3:219; Cher. 48, 49; Sacr. 60; Gig. 54; Fug. 85; Somn. 78; Spec. Leg. 1:319; Praem. 121.

101. This project will be completed as a contribution to the comprehensive work being done by the Philo research team under the direction of Burton Mack.

S 165

ENOCH TRADITIONS IN JUBILEES AND OTHER SECOND-CENTURY SOURCES

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Textual discoveries made over the last century in Mesopotamia have overwhelmingly demonstrated the many lines of influence from its traditions to Israelite literature. The similarities between Gen 1:1-2:3 and Enuma Elish, between the biblical flood story and Gilgamesh XI, and between much of Gen 1-9 and Atrahasis are common knowledge, but interesting connections have also been discerned between the Sethite genealogy of Genesis 5 and the Sumerian King List. Even before sufficient cuneiform evidence was forthcoming, scholars had noticed the remarkable similarities between the seventh and tenth members of the biblical line and the seventh and tenth kings in Berossus' list: Enoch and Euedorachos; Noah and Xisouthros, the heroes of the flood.[1] The seventh heads of humanity show several parallels, once the identity of Euedorachos is known. The Sumerian King List says about him

> I drop (the topic) Larak;
> its kingship to Sippar was carried.
> (In) Sippar En-men-dur-Anna(k)
> became king and reigned 21,000 years.
> 1 king reigned its 21,000 years. (i.24-29)[2]

Sippar, the city of Enmenduranna(=Berossus' Euedorachos), was a center for the cult of Shamash, the sun-god; naturally, this fact makes Enoch's solar associations(cf. the 365 years of Gen 5:23) intriguing. Other texts speak of him as the founder of a guild of priestly diviners and as an intimate of the deities who disclosed mysteries to him.[3] These data leave little doubt that the biblical Enoch is a Hebrew form of Enmenduranna, now baptized, as it were, to fit the exigencies of Israelite religion. The extreme antiquity of the Sumerian King List compels one to see in Genesis' cryptic pericope on Enoch(5:21-24) a Hebrew adaptation of Mesopotamian traditions.

The Genesis passage is the oldest extant Jewish treatment of Enoch,[4] and it lodges somewhat uncomfortably in its present context. 5:21-24 is part of a cliché-ridden genealogy, but the Enochic section offers three striking contrasts to the surrounding items: Enoch lived for 365 years(5:23), a total far below all others; after the birth of his first son he "walked with God" for 300 years(5:22);[5] and, in place of the genealogical refrain "and he died," one reads that "Enoch walked with God; and he was not, for God took him."(5:24 RSV) With this tantalizing overview Enoch disappears from biblical literature with the single exception of 1 Chr 1:3, part of another genealogy.

In the centuries that followed completion of the pentateuch and Chronicles there appears to have been continued interest in Enoch and other sources from which writers could draw information about him. The Astronomical Book(=AB) of

1 Enoch has, if Milik's dating is correct, elements which come from the Persian period, particularly its 364-day calendar.[6] If these calendrical teachings were associated with Enoch then as they now are in the AB, an author at that time used extra-biblical sources that credited him with astronomical wisdom, since it is difficult to imagine that one could extract all of this from Gen 5:21-24. The process of augmenting and re-interpreting biblical Enochic traditions continued apace in the third century as well[7] when, according to Milik, the Book of Watchers(=BW)--1 Enoch 1-36-- was written,[8] and when the LXX of Genesis originated. The former assuredly marks a huge expansion of biblical data from other sources, including a Book of Noah,[9] as it presents a detailed account of the watchers' descent and its consequences(6-11), Enoch's testimony to them(12-16), and his celestial and terrestrial journeys(17-36). The material that now appears in the BW is the earliest preserved instance in which Gen 5:21-24 and 6:1-13 are combined or closely related to one another. And, though the LXX of Gen 5:21-24(and of 6:1-13) is much more closely tied to the biblical text, it, too, engages in some reinterpretation.[10]

The second century shows a great increase in the amount of Enochic literature or at least in the amount that has survived. At the very beginning of the century or even in the late third century an anonymous Samaritan, Pseudo-Eupolemus, wrote in passing about Enoch as the discoverer of sciences.[11] A short time later Ben Sira included Enoch among famous biblical men and spoke of him in glowing terms.[12] Milik has maintained that the Book of Dreams(=BD), now the fourth component of 1 Enoch(83-90), was composed in 164 by an author who labored under the immediate impress of Judas Maccabeus' stunning victory at Bethsur.[13] The Book of Jubilees, which was written toward the middle of the second century,[14] devotes several passages to Enoch and Enochic traditions(4:15-26; 5:1-10; 7:20-39; 10:1-17; 21:10). Several other texts from the latter part of the century but of less certain date also relate to Enoch. Milik assigns the Book of Giants and the Epistle of Enoch(91-107) to the late second century.[15] The Genesis Apocryphon, which continues to defy attempts at precise dating,[16] strongly resembles Jubilees in many respects and may be a product of the later second century. The first five columns of the scroll appear to have dealt with Enoch and Enochic traditions, but only the second column has been preserved to any great extent. The Damascus Document, perhaps from the last quarter of the second century,[17] mentions the watchers' descent and related topics; and 4Q227, whose date Milik has not specified but which resembles Jubilees' treatment of Enoch in several particulars, may also belong to this period.[18] Finally, some references to Enochic material in some of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs may ultimately stem from the second century, though, of course, the dating of this composite work is still hotly debated.[19]

These second-century works carried on the process of re-interpreting, altering, and augmenting Enochic traditions--each in the manner that its author deemed appropriate to his purpose. The diverse character and social position of the various writers demonstrate that fascination with this ante-

diluvian sage surfaced in different strata of the Jewish community. An examination of the second-century sources shows that some statements in them derive from earlier texts that are now incorporated into 1 Enoch, some from biblical material, but others from sources that are no longer extant. In the present essay I propose to study one second-century adaptation of Enochic traditions--that found in Jubilees--in order to answer several questions: 1) From which sources did the author draw his information? The answer to this question will supply a reasonable indication of which Enochic works existed by the mid-second century. 2) What is the image of Enoch himself that emerges from Jubilees? And 3) has the writer made significant alterations in his sources insofar as this can be checked? In the course of this investigation numerous references will be made to the more recent portions of 1 Enoch and to the other second-century texts that were listed above.

I. Enochic Material In Jubilees

Jubilees devotes four extended pericopes to Enochic traditions(4:15-26; 5:1-10; 7:20-39; 10:1-17), but the first two provide virtually all the clues regarding the sources from which the author borrowed. Thus these passages will receive more detailed treatment and the others a more cursory examination. I think that the first section offers the greatest number of difficulties in identifying sources, for which reason the longest discussion is accorded to it. I have defined the limits of the first unit as vv 15 and 26, since Enochic references begin and end with them, though others have delimited the section as vv 17-23.[20]

R. H. Charles concluded on the basis of the indications in Jubilees 4 that the author used 1 Enoch 6-16; 23-36; and 72-90.[21] He also maintained that the writer of 1 Enoch 91-104 used Jubilees and that 1 Enoch 1-5 was likewise later than Jubilees, although he found the evidence for the latter point less than conclusive.[22] Milik and P. Grelot have recently reopened the question and have reached largely the same conclusions as Charles. Milik holds that Jubilees employed three segments of 1 Enoch: the AB, the BW(in its entirety), and the BD;[23] and he rejects the contention that Jub 4:18-19 refers to the Epistle.[24] As will become apparent below, Milik also thinks that Jubilees' author had access to additional Enochic literature apart from 1 Enoch.[25] Grelot generally follows Milik, but he does not think that 1 Enoch 1-5 is mirrored in Jubilees.[26]

There is, then, agreement that of the books now in Enoch Jubilees draws upon the AB, the BW, and the BD, with some reservation about 1 Enoch 1-5.[27] I think that Jubilees not only reflects these sections but probably the Epistle as well, in addition to a number of other Enochic sources. The evidence for that conclusion should now be examined.

A. Jub 4:15-26

Chapter 4 reproduces genealogical data from Genesis 4-5 and supplements the biblical base with characteristic items:

dates expressed in jubilees and year-weeks, names of wives and other relatives, an injunction engraved on the heavenly tablets, and a section on the deaths of Adam and Cain. Another significant expansion is the Enochic passage where the writer betrays knowledge of Enochic compositions. Part of this section is from Genesis but most of it comes from elsewhere.

4:15: This verse must be included in the unit because it relates the birth of Jared, Enoch's father, and gives as the etymology of his name the familiar Hebrew word-play yered-yārad: 'esma ba-mawāᶜelihu waradu malā'ekta 'Egzi'abḥēr westa medr 'ella tasamyu teguhāna("... for in his days the angels of the Lord descended on the earth, those who are named the Watchers, ...").[28] The writer's debt to 1 Enoch 6-11 at the minimum is here evident; in those chapters the same connection between Gen 5:15 and 6:1-4 is drawn, and the bĕnê hā'ĕlōhîm of 6:2,4 are termed the watchers or angels(e.g. 6:2; 10:7). 1 En 6:6 offers the nearest parallel: "And they were in all two hundred; who descended in the days of Jared...."[29] The reason for which the angels left heaven should be noted in passing here(it will be treated in greater detail below): in Jubilees the descent was for the good purposes of teaching and doing justice. Only later did problems develop. As will be seen below, this constitutes a major alteration of the BW's teachings in this regard.

4:16 reproduces Gen 5:18 with only minor changes and makes no reference to other Enochic literature.

4:17 and 4:18 belong to a poem about Enoch that the author either cited or composed himself. Charles did not print the passage as poetry, but it seems to me that the unusual word-order in 17a and 18b especially and the short phrases(note the parallel lines in 18b) suggest that this is verse. Perhaps the original text ran something as follows:

17 zeh ri'šôn[30] 'ăšer lāmad
sēper ûmaddāᶜ wĕḥokmâ
mibbĕnê hā'ādām
'ăšer nôlĕdû bā'āreṣ.

wa'ăšer kātab 'ôtôt haššāmayim
bĕsēder yarḥêhem bassēper
lādaᶜat bĕnê hā'ādām
zĕman haššānîm lĕsidrêhem lĕyarḥām.

18 zeh ri'šôn 'ăšer kātab ᶜēdût
wayyāᶜad bibnê hā'ādām
bĕtōlĕdôt hā'ădāmâ.

ûšĕbûaᶜ hayyôbĕlîm 'āmar
wîmê haššānîm higgîd
wĕhayrāḥîm siddēr
wĕšabbĕtôt haššānîm 'āmar
ka'ăšer higgadnuhû.

4:17: Here two claims are made for Enoch: 1) he was the first to learn writing,knowledge, and wisdom(maṣḥafa, te'merta,

tebaba); and 2) he recorded astronomical information in a book for the benefit of mankind. The first claim is hardly surprising for a man of whom Gen 5:22 said that he communed intimately with God for 300 years; indeed, one would expect him to be the primal wise man.[31] In several passages from 1 Enoch the patriarch either possesses extraordinary knowledge(e.g. 82:1-3; 92:1) or transmits revealed wisdom to his children(81; 82:1-3; 83:1; 94:1; cf. 1:1-3). While it is noteworthy that the term tebab occurs three times in 82:2-3, 92:1, especially as it reads in 4QEn^{g} 1 ii.22-25, may be the immediate inspiration for parts of 17a: "[That which](Enoch)wrote and gave to Methuselah [his son and to all his brothers,--Enoch the scribe of distinction and] the wisest of men[32] and chosen of [earth to judge their deeds,--he wrote(it also) to his sons] of sons [and] to the future generations, to all who dwell [on the dry land, in order to do good and peace]:..."[33] The Ethiopic text offers two of the three terms that figure in Jub 4:17a: te'merta tebab, though they are joined in construct relation. Nevertheless, the salient point is that no passage in 1 Enoch says that he was the first to learn knowledge and wisdom. The author of the poetic source, who seems particularly interested in Enoch's "firsts," may have drawn part of his information for the first claim from 92:1(or 82:1-3), but he also had access to other data.[34]

Enoch's remarkable knowledge is amply attested in other second-century texts. Pseudo-Eupolemus wrote: "And Abraham lived with the Egyptian priests in Heliopolis, teaching them many things. And he introduced astrology and other sciences to them, saying that the Babylonians and he himself discovered them, but he traced the discovery to Enoch."[35] Ben Sira spoke of him as 'wt dᶜt ldwr wdwr--a phrase that probably includes the sciences.[36] And, if J. Fitzmyer's reading of 1QapGen 19: 23-25 is correct, then Abram, when kindness, wisdom, and truth are under discussion, reads to the pharaoh's representatives: "... the [book] of the words of [En]och(?)."[37] The connection between Enoch and knowledge or wisdom was, then, more widespread in the early second century and could have been derived by Jubilees' author from several sources.

I am also unable to find a precise parallel for the poetic claim that Enoch was the first writer; certainly no part of the present 1 Enoch is the basis for the assertion. Charles could appeal only to passages such as 12:3 where the phrase "Enoch the scribe" occurs and realized the inadequacy of the parallel for explaining Jubilees' statement.[38] There are allusions to his books(e. g. 82:1-3) and in 83:2 he speaks of learning to write, but in no passage is it said that he was the first to do so. Thus, the poetic source must have drawn this Enochic "first" from another place.[39]

Jub 4:17b is a delightfully clear reference to the AB.[40] There one finds the requisite discussions of the heavenly signs (sun, moon, stars) and of correct calculation of months(cf. especially 82:4-9). In this context one should recall Pseudo-Eupolemus' report that Enoch was the first astrologer: "And he(Enoch) was the first to discover astrology, not the Egyptians," and his syncretistic remark that "The Greeks say that Atlas discovered astrology, Atlas being the same as Enoch."[41]

The reference in Sir 44:16 to Enoch as 'wt dᶜt alludes to such knowledge as well as the other sciences.[42]

Jub 4:18: It is not absolutely clear whether the testimony mentioned in 18a is explicated in the remainder of the verse as an astronomical document, or whether the references to this testimony and Enoch's testifying in the first part of the verse are a unit separate from what follows. I opt for the second alternative because of the obvious syntactical break, but Milik takes 18a as an allusion to 1 Enoch 80-82,[43] and Grelot likewise finds the AB intended here.[44] A close parallel occurs at 81:6 where Enoch's recording his teachings and testifying about them to his children are mentioned(cf. also 82:1 and 82:4-9). Though it is tempting to agree with Milik and Grelot, there are some problems. If the entire verse is an entity that deals with calendrical matters, one wonders whether the AB could be the referent because the plural verb('aydāᶜnāhu[45], we informed him) is inappropriate to it. There, although seven angels do appear(81:5), Uriel alone and not these serves as the revealer (72:1; 74:2; 75:3-4; 79:2, 6; 80:1; 81:1; 82:7; cf. 33:2-4). Moreover the contents of the latter part of the verse, which may derive partially from the AB, do not correspond in all details to that book.[46] Milik is probably correct in saying that 18b points to "... various astronomical and calendrical texts, calculated on the cycles of three, six, seven, and forty-nine years, copies of which exist among the manuscripts of Cave 4 ...."[47] Part of the Epistle appears again to offer the nearest parallel to 18a--93:1-2(=4QEnᵍ 1 iii.18-22)--if it is a unit apart from 18b. There one reads of Enoch's recounting information from his books to his children; this material he received from the holy angels(malā'ekt, ᶜyryn wqdšyn in 4QEnᵍ 1 iii.21[48]). This passage serves as an introduction to the Apocalypse of Weeks, a survey of human past and future which may be the referent of the words "among the generations of the earth."

Jub 4:19: This verse says that Enoch saw in a night vision what had happened and would transpire until judgment day, that he understood all of this, and that he wrote a testimony which he deposited upon the earth for mankind's generations. Charles, Milik, and Grelot[49] understand by this description the BD. Chapters 83-90, which contain two dream-visions, depict the past(85:3-88:3) and the future(83:3-5; 89:1-90:39). Nevertheless, Jub 4:19 does not harmonize with some of its details: 1) the BD proceeds beyond the judgment to the messianic reign (90:28-39); and 2) it consists of two visions. It is possible that Jubilees intends only the second vision, but in that case the first problem would remain. Other referents are at least possible. One is the early parts of the Epistle, including the Apocalypse of Weeks. 92:1 refers to Enoch's writing, the contents of which are also for future generations; 91:1 mentions that he showed to his children "... everything/that shall befall you forever;" and 93:2 states that the Apocalypse came to him in "the heavenly vision." Furthermore, the ten-weeks of the Apocalypse cover the past(93:3) and the future until the judgment(91:15) with only a vague allusion to subsequent events(91:17). Another possibility is 1 Enoch 81-82(especially note 81:2) where Enoch says that he observed the heavenly tablets, understood their contents, and read about the deeds of

all future generations. 81:6 deals with Enoch's recording this material and transmitting it to his children, and 82:1-3 describes his provisions for handing along what had been shown to him. However, neither 81 nor 82 talks of past events; for that reason the initial sections of the Epistle remain the most likely referent of Jub 4:19.

Jub 4:20: Here Enoch marries 'Edni (variants: 'Adni in A, C; 'Ednā in D; 'dny in Syriac)[50] who bears Methuselah. Gen 5:21 names Methuselah as Enoch's eldest son, and his wife's name appears in 1 En 85:3 as 'Ednā. It may be that this verse in BD was the authority for Jubilees' slightly different spelling.

Jub 4:21 refers to Enoch's stay of ca. 300 years (six jubilees) with God's angels who showed him all earthly and heavenly phenomena including the rule of the sun--all of which he recorded. The 300 years[51] stem from Gen 5:22 where Enoch walks with God for the 300 years between the birth of Methuselah and his assumption. The stay with the angels occurred, therefore, during his 365 years, not after it. Milik is correct in perceiving in this verse a reference primarily to the cosmological section of the BW (17-36), where Enoch in angelic company (12:1-2; 17:1; 19:1; 20:2, 3, etc.) views celestial and terrestrial things as he journeys to the extremities of the earth and beyond (cf. 23:1; 28:1; 30:1; 31:2; 32:1, 2; 33:1; 34:1; 35; 36:2). Reference is also made to his writing about heavenly phenomena (33:3) and to Uriel's doing the same (33:4=4QEn^{e} 1 xxvii.19-20; the verb appeared in a lost part of the column).[52] The single item in Jub 4:21 that cannot be gleaned from 1 Enoch 12 and 17-36 is the phrase šeltāno la-dahay (the rule of the sun) which, if it is original, refers to chapter 72.[53] Grelot's suggestion that 4:21 summarizes the AB fails to account for the facts that it has no stay of Enoch with the angels (though he hypothesizes that there may have been one in the longer original) and in it only one angel, Uriel, shows things to Enoch.[54]

Jub 4:22: Enoch's testifying to/against the watchers who had sinned by cohabiting with women is certainly taken from the angelological part of the BW (6-16).[55] Verbal similarities between 4:22 and sections of 1 En 7:1; 10:11 are especially close. 4Q227 parallels the Jubilees text twice for this verse: 1. 4: wgm ʿl hʿyrym (the verb appears to be the wyʿd of 1.3); and 1. 3: wyʿd ʿl kwlm.

Jub 4:23-26 form a unit that deals with Enoch's translation from earth and its aftermath, and they show virtually no affinities with 1 Enoch, which, apart from 106-7, does not picture this new stage in the patriarch's existence. Of course, the Book of Parables speaks about Enoch after his translation (e.g. 60:8; 65; cf. 70-71), but there is almost no chance that it existed in the mid-second century. I include these verses here because they augment Jubilees' portrait of Enoch himself.

Jub 4:23 speaks about Enoch's removal (by angels) to the Garden of Eden (cf. 1 En 60:8) where he continues to record the judgment and evil of all. This derives partially from Gen 5:24, and 1 En 81:6 anticipates his removal from mortal society (cf. 87:3-4). Grelot thinks that 4:23 "... concerne la section cosmographique du Livre des Vigilants (I Hén., xvii-xxxvi),--qui...

mentionne explicitement deux séjours au Paradis de justice (xxxii, 3-6; cf. xxiv, 3-xxv, 7)."[56] But this is surely wrong because even if these passages do refer to the Garden of Eden they do not say that Enoch remained there. Furthermore, the journey there described occurred during Enoch's 365 years, not after as in Jub 4:23. Enoch's post-ascension labors do, however, figure in 1 Enoch 106-7(4QEn^{c} 5 ii preserves 106:13-107:2), a noachic section that shows marked similarities with the tattered first columns of the Genesis Apocryphon.[57] There the translated Enoch assures Methuselah, who in turn comforts Lamech, that Noah was indeed Lamech's son despite his extraordinary features and not the offspring of his wife and the watchers(plural). That is, Enoch, like Utnapishtim, though he was removed from the society of mankind, could be consulted if one journeyed far to find him. Jub 4:23-26 may draw some of its inspiration from this passage but hardly all. For example, 4:23 mentions Enoch's role as scribe of judgment. From 1 Enoch his role as scribe is familiar, and he is called "[... Enoch the scribe of distinction and] the wisest of men and chosen of the sons of [earth to judge their deeds...]."[58] Yet, such verses have as their context some point during his 365 years; Jubilees thus moves well beyond the contents of the original 1 Enoch here.

Jub 4:24 continues the description of Enoch in Eden. As the verse reads in all published manuscripts it makes no sense because it has God(subject supplied by Charles) bring the flood waters upon the garden where Enoch is. The obvious problem is that they would drown him, thus ending his career as recorder of misdeeds prematurely. I think that a simple Ethiopic error accounts for the difficulty: 'amse'a(he brought) is a corruption of 'i-mas'a(did not come--note the same consonants). This change restores meaning to the text: due to Enoch's presence in Eden(ba'enti'ahu) the flood did not cover it. This reading is confirmed by EMML 3, the oldest extant manuscript of Jubilees.

Jub 4:25-26 describe Enoch as a priest in a mountain sanctuary (the mountain of the East?), one of the four places especially dear to God.[59] There is no similar list of places in 1 Enoch, nor is the sage there depicted as a priest.

Jub 4:15-26 betrays, then, both the writer's knowledge of some portions of 1 Enoch and his acquaintance with a broader range of Enochic traditions. These impressions are confirmed by the other Enochic sections of the book.

B. Jub 5:1-10

After completing the Genesis 5 genealogy with the birth of Noah's sons(Gen 5:32), the author takes up Genesis 6 and expands it with information from 1 Enoch 6-16 and 86-88. This section leads into an account of the final judgment(5:10b-16)[60] with a note on the day of atonement preceding the narrative about Noah's ark which begins at 5:19. 5:1-10 thus introduces a section on the last judgment--a connection familiar from e.g. 1 Enoch 6-10--and on the flood as in Genesis 6; 1 En 86:1-89:9; and 6:1-10:3.[61] Jub 5:1-10 adheres more strictly to the biblical text than 4:15-26 or 1 Enoch 6-10.

Jub 5:1 reproduces Gen 6:1,2 and part of 4 verbatim, understanding sons of God as angels of God and the gibbōrîm as giants. To these verses Jubilees adds only a date(on the giants, see on 7:22 below).

Jub 5:2 draws upon Gen 6:5, 12, and 7(with similar lists of creatures, e.g. 6:19-20; 7:2-3; etc.) and supplements the report about human evil(cf. 1 En 8:2) with the remark that they (all creatures?) began to devour one another. 1 En 7:3-5 describes how the watchers' offspring(the giants), after devouring all of mankind's possessions, began to eat people, to sin against various kinds of animals, to eat one another, and to drink blood. The motif of mutual eating recurs in 86:5-6 and 87:1. 86:5 seems to mean that people ate the giants, while v 6 has the giants devouring people, and 87:1 the giants eating one another.

Jub 5:3 cites from Gen 6:12; it may also borrow general themes from Gen 6:11 and 1 En 9:1, 8. Jub 5:4 uses Gen 6:7 in slightly altered and abbreviated form(cf. 1 En 10:2); and Jub 5:5 quotes Gen 6:8(adding just bāḥtitu=only after Noah).

Jub 5:6 is the first verse in this pericope without parallel in Genesis 6. It pictures God's anger against the angels whom he had sent and his punishment of them: they were to be removed from their dominion and enchained in the earth's depths. Parts of 1 Enoch furnish all of these ingredients. In chapter 10 God responds to the evil engendered by the watchers by ordering that Asa'el be bound and thrown into a hole in the earth(10:4= 88:1), that Šemihaza and his associates be tied and also be cast into the earth's valleys(10:11-12; cf. 88:3; 14:5; 19:1-2; 21; 67:4-7). Thus the watchers who had departed from heaven with good intentions but later violated their commission were denied opportunity to return to their former places(12:4; 13:5; 14:5); through lust they had betrayed their spiritual natures (15:2-12; cf. Jub 7:21; TNaph 3:5).

Jub 5:7 also departs from Genesis 6 and derives information from 1 Enoch. The verse refers to the divine command that the giants, the watchers' children, die by the sword, and this theme finds expression in the BW. In 1 En 10:9(cf. 4QEn^{b} 1 iv.5-7) Gabriel is ordered to destroy the watchers' progeny by sending them against one another in battle(also 10:12,15; 12:6; 16:1). 14:6 supplies the specific detail that they would fall by the sword before their fathers' eyes, and 88:2 also mentions the weapon.

Jub 5:8 reproduces Gen 6:3 verbatim; note that the surrounding verses were quoted already in 5:1.

Jub 5:9 narrates the execution of the command given in 5:7. Though similar orders are given in 1 Enoch 10, the only passage in which the battle and death by sword are actually described is 88:2.

Jub 5:10 notes that the fathers of the giants were to witness their children's mutual slaughter after which they were to be bound in the depths of the earth until the final judgment(cf. 5:6). 1 En 10:12 predicts that the fathers will view the car-

nage and that they will then be enchained in nether places till the judgment. Once again 88:3 alone describes the acts rather than merely predicting them.

C. Jub 7:20-39

The setting for this unit, which Charles called "... a fragment of the lost book of Noah,"[62] is a speech of Noah in which he enjoins upon his children "the ordinances and commandments, and all the judgments that he knew...."(v 20) He warns them about three principal vices--fornication, uncleanness, and iniquity--since they caused the flood(20-21). Mention of the terms fornication and uncleanness led Noah to expound upon the story of the watchers(21b-25), and he recapitulated the main themes of 5:1-10 with some interesting modifications. Not all of the verses that follow can be called Enochic in any sense (e.g. 26, 28-33, 34-37), but in 38-39 Noah has recourse to the authority of Enoch regarding some halakhic matters.

Jub 7:21 links the flood directly to the lustful sin of the watchers who opposed the law of their nature and thus produced uncleanness. Gen 6:1-4 in its present location certainly connects its contents to the flood, but the connection becomes explicit in 1 Enoch. The watchers' departure from the ways of their spiritual nature was suggested in Jub 5:2-3, and this matter comes from passages such as 1 En 12:4; 15:2-12(cf. 86:2; 106:14). As 10:1-3 show, the immediate consequence was the flood. TNaph 3:5 reads in similar fashion: "In like manner the Watchers also changed the order of their nature, whom the Lord cursed at the flood, on whose account He made the earth without inhabitants and fruitless." As the material is presented in the BW, the watchers can be called the initiators of uncleanness(1 En 8:2; 9:8; 10:8).[63]

Jub 7:22 expands upon the statement of 5:1 that the children of the watchers were giants by naming three kinds of them: nāfidim appear to be the giants in general and this category consists of three types: yerbāh(giants), nāfil, and 'ēleyo(B has 'iliyo). Nāfidim is, I think, a corrupt form of nĕpilîm(Gen 6:4; the corruption probably occurred in Greek when majuscule lambda was misread as a delta), and they seem to be the progeny of the angels and women in Gen 6:1-4(gigantes in the LXX). The other three names derive from the BD and ultimately from Gen 6:4 where nĕpilîm, gibbōrîm, and 'anšê haššēm appear. 1 En 86:4 calls the watchers' descendants elephants, camels, and asses(also 87:4; 88:2; 89:6).[64] These three names were selected for the Animal Apocalypse because they involve word-plays on the underlying names that appear in Jubilees: ʿrdy'--'ēleyo; gmly'--gbry'; pyly'--npyly'.[65] Syncellus introduced the very names of Jub 7:22 into his rendition of 1 En 7:2: gigantes, naphēleim, elioud.[66] His spelling of the last name corresponds somewhat more closely to the Aramaic ʿărôd than does Jubilees' spelling which appears to have dropped the final consonant. In this instance Jubilees' author almost certainly took this information from the BD. The motif of the giants' devouring one another may be expressed in 1 En 7:5 and is clearly stated in 87:1(cf. Jub 5:2). The theme of their mutual slaughter has been examined above(on 5:2,7,9); 1 En 7:4 notes that the giants ate people.

Jub 7:23 describes in a general way the evil and violence that prevailed upon the earth, and with it may be compared passages such as Gen 6:5,11; 1 En 8:2; 9:1,9; 10:8. Jub 7:24 cites material from 1 En 7:5 and draws its comment on bloodshed from 9:1,9. The statement about man's evil imagination is from Gen 6:6. Jub 7:25 is an announcement that the flood, which destroyed everything on the earth, came as punishment for wickedness and murder. It could be based simply on Genesis 6-7, but some passages in 1 Enoch 6-10(e.g. 10:1-2,8) and the order of the narrative could have informed it as well.

Jub 7:27 shows the next parallel. It pictures Noah bemoaning the fact that demons are seducing his children and grand-children--something that he fears will lead to the same punishment for his offspring as for the generation of the flood. These demons are, according to 1 En 15:8-16:1, the children of the giants; to them freedom has been granted to mislead people and thus advance the work begun by their ancestors, the watchers and the giants, until the final judgment(cf. Jub 10:1-11 where their activities and influences on Noah's progeny are developed in more detail).[67]

From this point on connections with known Enochic literature become very few. Mention of bloodshed in 7:27 introduces a section on the topic of blood(28-33) in which only 7:29 and 1 En 103:7-8 show close affinities. Charles thought that the latter cited from the former,[68] but the relations between Jubilees and the Epistle that have been noted suggest the reverse (cf. also 98:11). The notion of his sons' being planted in righteousness in 7:34[69](an image that recurs at Jub 1:16; 1 En 10:16; 93:10) oddly develops into several injunctions about planting trees, etc. in his sons' cities and the appropriate way for offering the first fruits(7:34-37).

Jub 7:38-39 stand now in what appears to be a disturbed context. Noah had instructed his sons about offering the first fruits in the fifth year after planting, but this is immediately followed by a comment about the release, which normally refers to the seventh year.[70] Whatever the state of the text may be here, in 7:38-39 Noah traces the halakhic statement to no other authority than Enoch himself. Enoch is said to have transmitted it to Methuselah who instructed Lamech who told Noah. He adds that Enoch taught this law during his earthly stay and that he thus testified to the day of his death, though Jubilees' writer did not think that Enoch had died. The context to which Noah alludes could be 1 Enoch 81-82 where the sage is permitted one year for instructing his children before the angels remove him (81:6). There he is to pass on to them commands and testify until his translation. In the same context there is talk of righteousness(81:7,9; 82:4), and, while most of the following verses deal with calendrical matters, 82:18-19 ascribe to the period of Hēl'emmēlēk(91 days) "... glowing heat and dryness, and the trees ripen their fruits and produce all their fruits ripe and ready... and all the fruits of the earth are gathered in...." A context such as 1 Enoch 91 in which he addresses his descendants and speaks of righteousness does not offer as many similarities as 81-82; and the BD is an unlikely referent because its disclosures were for Methuselah alone(83:1). But the really intriguing feature in 7:38-39 is the ascription of spe-

cific halakhic material to Enoch. For this I find no previous evidence. In the AB he is certainly an authority on the calendar, a halakhic matter, and he is also a teacher of proper conduct(cf. 91; 94:1-5; 104:11-13; 5), but in no passage is a specific law credited to him. Jub 21:10 has Abraham refer to the words of Enoch and Noah as authorities either for the law that sacrificed meat was not to be left to the third day(v 10) or for this law and the other sacrificial stipulations in vv 6-10 (the latter alternative seems less likely). Thus twice in Jubilees Enoch is listed as a source for such legislation, and 7:38-39 figures in a citation from the Book of Noah, while the passage in 21:10 mentions Noah alongside Enoch(note also their appearance together in the present text of Sir 44:16-17). The two men who walked with God have, it seems, assumed in some traditions the function of instructing others exactly how to do the same. If more of the Book of Noah surfaces some day, perhaps more will be learned about Enoch and halakhot.[71]

D. Jub 10:1-17

The final pericope that has direct relevance for Enoch and Enochic traditions is another part of the Book or Apocalypse of Noah.[72] Again, a number of verses do not belong directly to Enochic material, but the passage develops some topics that were treated in 1 Enoch. The general problem here is that the demons or evil spirits, whose malevolent doings Noah had earlier feared(7:22), had now succeeded in their scheme to such an extent that Noah's sons approached him for relief from their injuries(1-2). 1 Enoch 15-16 are again the background for this section(cf. also 19:1), but the theme receives historical development in Jubilees that would have been inappropriate in the generally antediluvian perspective of 1 Enoch. There are, however, new motifs in Jubilees: at the prayer of Noah God agreed to bind all of the evil spirits(3-7), but at Mastema's request he agreed to release a tenth of them(8-9, 11), thus insuring a robust amount of evil in succeeding generations. Also, in order to counteract the physical abuse that the demons would cause, the Lord commanded that Noah be taught medicines(10,12), and the latter recorded the information and passed it along to Shem(13-14). After this Noah died(15-16), a man whose righteousness was exceeded only by Enoch.[73]

Jub 10:17 spells out the nature of Enoch's work(gebru)as a testimony(sem^{c}) for all generations "... so that he should recount(yenger) all the deeds of generation unto generation, till the day of judgment."(cf. Sir 44:16 LXX) As this verse is worded almost exactly like 4:24, it probably refers to Enoch's post-ascension labors, though it could, I suppose, have reference to his earlier predictions. His testimony is a frequent theme in 1 Enoch(81:6 for example), and he recounts('enagger) to Methuselah what had been revealed to him so that he could transmit it to following generations(82:1). Other passages which speak in similar terms are 92:1 and 91:1. If this passage refers to Enoch's pre-translation activity, it may intend his admonition to his offspring in 91 because there, unlike 81-82, he specifically discloses what is to happen forever(91:1). Also, 93:3 has Enoch recounting(yetnāgar) all history until the judgment. Thus, it is not impossible that 10:17 makes reference to the Epistle.

This concludes the analysis of the major Enochic sections in Jubilees. On the basis of the observations made above, a number of conclusions can be drawn regarding the questions that were posed at the beginning. First, the Enochic sources that the author of Jubilees used appear to be these:

A. From 1 Enoch
   1. The BW: 4:15,21,22; 5:2,6,7,(9,10); 7:21,(22),23,24, 27; 10:1-2
   2. The AB: 4:17,18(?); 7:38-39(?)
   3. The BD: 4:20; 5:(2,6,7),9,10; 7:(21),22
   4. The Epistle: 4:17(?),18,19; 7:29; 10:17(?).

The only surprising entry is the Epistle, and its inclusion is advanced with some hesitation. But it seems to me that several passages in Jubilees which refer to Enochic writings presuppose some of its contents. Milik has no specific reasons for dating it to a later period, though he does assert that "the work was certainly not known to the author of the book of Jubilees."[74] Charles interpreted its major theme of conflict between righteous poor and wicked rich in terms of the Pharisees and Sadducees,[75] but why an earlier conflict--say between the conservatives and Hellenizers--could not be meant is not clear to me.

B. Enochic Sources Other Than 1 Enoch
   1. A poetic source about Enoch's "firsts": 4:17-18
   2. Calendrical texts: 4:18
   3. Description(s) of Enoch's post-translation work as scribe, judge, and priest: 4:23-26
   4. Noachic source(s):
      a. regarding the influence of demons on Noah's children: 7:27; 10:1-11
      b. regarding Enoch as a dispenser of halakhot: 7:38-39; 21:10.

Naturally, not all of the sources mentioned in section B. need be separate; several of them may belong to the same work.

Second, a rather full picture of the man Enoch emerges from the pages of Jubilees. The traits that appear there can be outline thus:

A. During His 365 Years
   1. The first wise man: 4:17
   2. The first author; he wrote by revelation:
      a. astronomical/calendrical works: 4:17,18(cf. 4:21)
      b. a cosmological work: 4:21
      c. a testimony: 4:18,19
      d. halakhot: 7:38-39; 21:10
   3. A visionary: 4:18,19,21
   4. A husband and father: 4:20
   5. An associate of the angels for 300 years: 4:21
   6. One who testified to the watchers: 4:22

B. After His Translation
   1. Resident of the Garden of Eden: 4:23-24
   2. Recorder and judge of human actions until the judgment: 4:24; cf. 10:17
   3. A priest in the mountain temple: 4:25-26.

II. Jubilees' Reinterpretation of the Watcher Story

Enochic traditions were frequently altered as they passed from century to century and source to source. Jubilees' reuse of the material is no exception. It may have treated all of its sources in this way, but in the case of the material that it has borrowed from 1 Enoch, its deviations can be documented. It changes its Enochic base at a number of points or uses traditions for new purposes (an example is Jubilees' borrowing of calendrical information), but I will discuss only its major revisions in the story of the watchers. The evidence will be adduced first, and then an attempt will be made to explain why the changes were made. The descent of the watchers and its effects, a tale that held such fascination for a number of Jewish writers in this period and later, appear in 1 Enoch 6-16 and 86:1-89:6 in extended form, and are mentioned or discussed in many other places (e.g. 106:13-15). The preceding section demonstrated that Jubilees' author knew both the BW and the BD and that he was familiar with the version of the watcher story in each; but he transformed this earlier material in line with his theology and the requirements of his book. The nuances that he gives to the story are found in no earlier work though they do re-emerge in a number of later sources. The major differences between the two Enochic versions of the watcher story and Jubilees' form of it can be seen from the following outline.

1 Enoch 6-16	1 En 86:1-89:6	Jub 5:1-10;7:20-25; 10:1-11
A. Angels lust in heaven (6:2)	A.	A.
B. Descent in Jared's days (6:6)	B. A star falls (86:1)	B. Descent in Jared's days to teach and do justice (4:15)
C. Marriage to women and illicit teaching (7:1; 8:1,3)	C. Fall of many stars and marriage (86:3)	C. Marriage to women (5:1; 4:22)
D. Women bear giants (7:2)	D. Birth of elephants, camels, asses (86:4)	D. Women bear giants (5:1; 7:22)
E. Violence and evil result (7:3-6; 8:2,4)	E. Violence and evil result (86:5-87:1)	E. Violence and evil result (5:2)
F. Angels see and inform God (9:1-11)	F.	F. God sees (5:3)
G. Punishment announced by God (10) and to be executed by angels	G. Punishment by angels (88:1-3)	G. God punishes (5:4, 6,7-10)
1. Bind watchers in nether places (10:4-6,11-14)	1. Bind first star (88:1)	1. Bind watchers in nether places (5:6)

1 Enoch 6-16	1 En 86:1-89:6	Jub 5:1-10;7:20-25; 10:1-11
2. Giants to kill one another as their fathers watch (10:9;14:6)	2. Elephants, camels, and asses kill one another (88:2)	2. Giants kill one another as their fathers watch (5:7,9,10)
3. Bind the watchers (10:12)	3. Stars bound (88:3)	3. Imprisoning of the watchers (5:10)
H. Evil spirits of giants deceive till the judgment (15:8-16:1)	H. Elephants, camels, and asses drown in the flood (89:6)	H. Evil spirits of giants 1. Mislead the sons of Noah (7:27;10:1-2) 2. 9/10 of them are bound (10:11) 3. 1/10 of them continue to mislead (10:11

In addition to some smaller differences, there are three major variants in the versions: 1) 1 Enoch 6 places the initial sin of the watchers in heaven, 1 En 86:1 mentions only a falling star without naming a reason for its fall, and Jub 4:15 and 5:6 teach that God himself had sent the watchers to earth for good purposes. 2) 1 Enoch 6-16 in its present form interweaves the motifs of violence and illicit teaching as the consequences of the watchers' lustful descent,[76] but the other two versions mention only violence and evil as the results of the mating. Teaching figures in Jubilees as the good purpose for the descent and is ignored in the remainder of the story. 3) All of the versions differ at the end where in 89:6 the offspring of the watchers drown in the flood, while 1 Enoch 6-16 and Jubilees know of a third generation--the evil spirits. In these latter sources, nevertheless, there is a considerable difference in the way in which the nefarious work of these demons is presented: in Jubilees only a tenth of them continue to afflict mankind, whereas in 1 Enoch all of them do.

These discrepancies, especially the one regarding the reason for the watchers' descent, are well known, and both versions of why the angels left heaven continued to exert influence in Judaism and Christianity.[77] But the difficulty lies not so much in discerning these differences as in explaining their existence. Jubilees' writer may not have been the first to present the story as in appears in his book, but if he is not the originator of that version he is at least an advocate of it. It seems to me that theological differences unlie the first and third differences that were listed above, while the disagreement or at least difference of detail regarding the watchers' illicit teaching is capable of another explanation. I think that the author of Jubilees' was familiar with the motif that the watchers taught mankind what they ought not know not only because he obviously used the BW but also because he mentions it at a later passage. In 8:1-4 one reads that Kainam, a de-

scendant of Noah, discovered an inscription that the watchers had left. It told about their teachings regarding omens of the sun, moon, and stars, and through knowledge of this information Kainam sinned. Of course, correct knowledge about the heavenly bodies and their functions was available from the writings of Enoch; thus there was no need for Kainam's recourse to the watchers' misleading literature. Since the author does know about the sinful teaching of the angels but does not mention that fact in his actual account of the story, I suspect that he simply omitted it as he did other details.[78]

The facts that 1 En 6:2 attributes the watchers' departure from heaven to sexual desire and that Jub 4:15 and 5:6 explain it as due to divine commission to teach and encourage justice reveal variant views on the origin of the sinfulness that produced the flood. The writer of 1 Enoch 6-16 completely avoids reference to the story of the fall in Genesis 3, though the final editor of the BW certainly knew of it(32:6). For him the extraordinary level of violence and all kinds of evil upon the earth in the generations just before the great flood could be explained only by a superhuman cause.[79] Humans alone were incapable of bringing about such complete perversity and disobedience to the divine will. As it appears in the BW, the fall of the watchers from grace to lust and violence is a complete and supernatural explanation for wickedness so immense that God had to respond with the flood. It also explains the continued power of the demonic in the world through the motif of the evil spirits who are given unbridled license until the final judgment.

The version in Jubilees makes a more nuanced point about the evil in the world at the time of the deluge. The book is far more intimately bound to the order and contents of Genesis than is the BW, and for this reason it presents the case differently. Jubilees includes the story of Adam and Eve and their fall into sin(3:17-29), and with Genesis it assigns the role of instigator to a serpent. Consequently, sin is of earthly origin, and it prevailed long before the descent of the watchers. The tale of the watchers performs, therefore, the function, not of accounting for the origin of evil, but of explaining its escalation just before the flood. But even in the watcher pericope, sin remains a fact of human, earthly existence, and heaven remains inviolate. The angels did not sin in heaven; only after they reached the earth at God's bidding did they see the daughters of men and begin their downfall. The vast moral separation between heaven and earth, between the particular realm of God and the abode of mankind is thus staunchly maintained, whereas the version in 1 Enoch 6-16 compromises that rigid distinction. It appears, too, that the Enochic version had the disadvantage of appearing to excuse people for their sins by attributing them to the powerful and malignant influence of supernatural forces. Precisely this excuse is the point of the polemic in 1 En 98:4-5 where the writer insists against the sinners

> ... as a mountain has not become a slave,
> And a hill does not become the handmaid of
> a woman
> Even so sin has not been sent upon the earth,

But man of himself has created it,
And under a great curse shall they fall
who commit it.
And barrenness has not been given to the
woman,
But on account of the deeds of her own hands
she dies without children.

Thus, within Enochic literature the view of Jubilees also finds voice. In fact, if the Epistle antedates Jubilees as suggested above, it may be the source of this difference with the BW. The version found in Jubilees retains the essential concepts that sin is serious and that its power has been increased by superhuman forces, but it avoids the weakness from which the story in the BW suffers.[80]

1 Enoch 6-16 and Jubilees also show variation in their accounts of the third-generation demons or evil spirits and here too Jubilees appears to represent a later theological corrective on the older and less adequate version in the BW. The position expressed in 1 Enoch 6-16 more than sufficiently explains the heavy hand of sin that characterizes human history. Demons in untold numbers, the offspring of superhuman ancestors, are permitted by God to wreak havoc until the final judgment. The earth and its inhabitants are their domain and they control them. But Jubilees' version nuances this position into a safer theological conception. By reporting that the Lord had ordered the imprisonment of 90% of the demons and freedom for only 10%, the writer impresses upon the reader God's control over the forces of evil, his care for his people, and his lordship over human history. He agrees, to be sure, that sin continues to be a major factor on the earth and that supernatural powers are behind it including the prince of mastēmâ himself; yet, despite all that, the one who remains in control is God.

Summary

The Enochic traditions and picture of Enoch himself as they appear in Jubilees show that the author had access to a number of sources including the BW, the AB, the BD, and the Epistle. His portrait of the man Enoch displays some features that are lacking in 1 Enoch's older portions: in his lifetime he was the first wise man and writer and he taught halakhot; after his translation to the Garden of Eden he performs the functions of a priest in the mountain sanctuary and records all the deeds of men. Finally, the author of Jubilees nuances the version of the watchers' descent and of the demons' work in the BW in order to make it theologically more acceptable.

Footnotes

[1] See, e.g., J. Skinner, Genesis (ICC; Edinburgh: Clark, first ed. 1910; second ed. 1930) 137-38. The second edition appears to have involved only a new introduction and bibliography (cf. p. x); the Sumerian King List, which was available by 1930, is not mentioned in the exposition of Genesis 5.

[2]Translation of T. Jacobsen, The Sumerian King List(Assyriological Studies 11; Chicago: UC, 1939) 75. A variant form En-me-dur-an-ki, which appears to underlie Berossus' spelling, occurs in K 2486. On the various spellings, see Jacobsen, n. 28(74-75).

[3]Skinner, Genesis, 132; and P. Grelot, "La légende d'Hénoch dans les apocryphes et dans la Bible: origine et signification," RSR 46(1958) 7-9.

[4]J. T. Milik has argued that parts of the Astronomical Book(1 Enoch 72-82) and of the Book of Watchers(especially 6-19) antedate the definitive form of the pentateuch("Problèmes de la littérature hénochique à la lumière des fragments araméens de Qumrân," HTR 64[1971] 339-40; 349-50; The Books of Enoch[Oxford: Clarendon, 1976] 8;30-32). To mention just one bit of evidence that opposes his position: is it likely that a later writer would change the clear references in 1 Enoch to angels/watchers into Genesis' more ambiguous bĕnê hā'ĕlōhîm?

[5]Later in the book(6:9c) Noah, too, walks with God during his lifetime.

[6]The Books, 8.

[7]Milik(The Books, 23-24) mentions an allusion in 4QTest Levi[a] 8 iii.6-7 to Enoch's accusing someone, presumably the watchers. He dates this text toward the end of the third century, though he suspects it may be older.

[8]The Books, 25-28.

[9]Enoch does not figure in 6-11, though the "son of Lamech" does(=Noah, 10:1-3). Milik sees in 6-19 an old source--The Visions of Enoch--that the author of the BW cited with little change("Problèmes," 346; 349-50; The Books, 25; 30-32). However, Grelot("Hénoch et ses écritures," RB 82[1975] 486) has correctly observed that 12:1 appears to be the beginning of a book whose title may be given in 14:1. It would more likely therefore commence at 12:1.

[10]A. Schmitt("Die Angaben über Henoch Gen 5,21-24 in der LXX," in Wort, Lied und Gottesspruch[Festschrift für J. Ziegler; ed. J. Schreiner; Würzburg: Echter, 1972] 161-69) sees Tendenzen particularly in the translator's choice of forms of euarestein for hithallēk("ein spiritualisierende Tendenz"), euriskein for nimsā', and metatithenai for lāqaḥ(the latter two representing "eine Transposition der hebräischen Entrückungsaussagen in die griechische Gedankenwelt"[168]). As is well known, some manuscripts of the LXX read hoi aggeloi tou theou for bĕnê hā'ĕlōhîm in 6:2,4, though it is an inferior reading (cf. J. W. Wevers, ed. Genesis[Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Gottingensis Editum 1; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974]). Of course, the process of interpretation continued in the targumim; Targum Onkelos says that God killed Enoch.

[11]Two fragments of Pseudo-Eupolemus' work have been preserved in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica IX.17;18,2. Eusebius drew this material from Alexander Polyhistor. For a discussion of Pseudo-Eupolemus' date and of the two fragments, see B.Z. Wacholder, "Pseudo-Eupolemus' Two Greek Fragments on the Life of Abraham," in Essays on Jewish Chronology and Chronog-

raphy(New York: KTAV, 1976) 75-105. He places it in ca. 200 and sees in it "... a conscious effort to integrate the traditions of Genesis with those of the Mediterranean culture."(104) Cf. also Milik, The Books, 8-10.

[12]44:16;49:14. All textual evidence can be consulted in F. Vattioni, Ecclesiastico(Naples: Instituto orientale di Napoli, 1968). On the problem of whether Enoch was originally mentioned in 49:14 alone and whether material has been secondarily transposed from there to 44:16, see Y. Yadin, The Ben Sira Scroll From Masada(Jerusalem: IES, Shrine of the Book, 1965) 38. The book is normally assigned to a date in the first third or quarter of the second century(cf. O. Eissfeldt, The Old Testament: An Introduction[New York, Evanston: Harper and Row, 1965] 597).

[13]The Books, 43-45. The key passage for this date is 90: 13-15.

[14]The reasons why I date the book thus are given in Textual and Historical Studies in the Book of Jubilees(HSM 14; Missoula: Scholars, 1977) 207-85.

[15]The Books, 57-58(Book of Giants); 48-49(Epistle).

[16]See J. Fitzmyer, The Genesis Apocryphon of Qumrân Cave 1 (BibOr 18A; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1971) 14-19. Fitzmyer prefers a date in the first century(19).

[17]F. M. Cross(The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies[2nd ed.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1961] 81-82) suggests the end of the second or beginning of the first century. Milik(The Books, 58) opts for ca. 110-100.

[18]The Books, 12.

[19]For a report on a very recent discussion, see J. Charlesworth, "Reflections on the SNTS Pseudepigrapha Seminar at Duke on the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," NTS 23(1977) 296-304.

[20]E.g. R. H. Charles, The Book of Jubilees or the Little Genesis(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1902) lxix; 36-39(all quotations from Jubilees will be from this source). Grelot ("Hénoch et ses écritures," 481-88) discusses 16-26, though he finds 18-23 the key section for determining which Enochic books the writer knew.

[21]The Book of Jubilees, xliv; lxviii-lxix. He adds that 5:1-2 presuppose 1 En 7:1,2,5; 9:1,9.

[22]The Book of Jubilees, lxix-lxxi.

[23]"Problèmes," 340-41; 345; 355(cf. The Books, 11; 24-25; 45). Since Milik holds that the BW possessed substantially its present shape in the first half of the second century(The Books, 25), Jubilees' use of part of it means for him that the author had the entire work at hand(1-36).

[24]"Problèmes," 360-61; The Books, 48.

[25]He finds an allusion to calendrical texts, some of which have surfaced at Qumrân, in Jub 4:18("Problèmes," 361; The Books, 11; 61-69).

[26]"Hénoch et ses écritures," 484-88. He thinks it peculiar that there is no reference to the Apocalypse of Weeks in Jubilees(487). Grelot's position here represents a departure from his earlier view that Jubilees reflects all components of 1 Enoch except the Book of Parables(37-71; see "La géographie mythique d'Hénoch," RB 65[1958] 45 n. 2). An interesting feature of Grelot's essay "Hénoch et ses écritures" is that he thinks the three Enochic works that Jubilees knows are the tltt spry' of 4QMess ar 1.5(488-500). A problem with this view is that Jubilees' author knew not only these books but a number of other Enochic sources(see below).

[27]S. Zeitlin and W. F. Albright are exceptions. The former apparently ignores the fact that Jubilees refers to writings of Enoch that already exist and asserts flatly that 1 Enoch presupposes Jubilees("The Book of Jubilees: Its Character and Its Significance," JQR 30[1939-40] 12). Albright(From the Stone Age to Christianity[2nd ed.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1957] 346-47) also placed Jubilees before 1 Enoch and thought that the book of Enoch to which it referred must be another of the same name. Later, he lowered his fourth-third century date for Jubilees to ca. 175 but did not mention its relation to the early parts of 1 Enoch(p. 20).

[28]All citations from the Ethiopic text of Jubilees come from R. H. Charles, Mashafa Kufālē or the Ethiopic Version of the Hebrew Book of Jubilees(Anecdota oxoniensia; Oxford: Clarendon, 1895).

[29]All quotations from 1 Enoch are from R. H. Charles, The Book of Enoch or 1 Enoch(Oxford: Clarendon, 1912). His rendering here follows Syncellus' Greek text because the Ethiopic is manifestly corrupt: wa-waradu westa 'ardis(see Charles, The Ethiopic Version of the Book of Enoch[Anecdota oxoniensia; Oxford: Clarendon, 1906] 13-14). 4QEn^{a} 1 iii.4 supplies the correct bywmy yrd here(Milik, The Books, 150,152). Cf. also the words in 1QapGen 3:3: 'ry bywmy yrd 'by, the only surviving fragment from the column. Its context can be surmised, however, from the highly similar 1 En 106:13 where the same phrase occurs(4QEn^{c} 5 ii.18 reads bywmy yrd '[by], Milik, The Books, 209).

[30]The letters zh ry'š[wn] appear on a tiny fragment of Jubilees published by Milik, "A propos de 11QJub?" Bib 54(1973) 78. It contains four letters from 4:16 as well. For a comparison of the fragment with the Ethiopic, Syriac, and Greek texts see VanderKam, Textual and Historical Studies, 29-31.

[31]On this topic see M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism(2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974) 1.204. One should also recall in this context the traits of Enmenduranna.

[32]Grelot has shown that Enoch accumulated traits of both Enmenduranna and of the flood hero("La légende d'Hénoch," 17-24). The phrase "wisest of men"([h]kym 'nws'--Milik, The Books, 260) is of extreme interest in this regard because Utnapishtim is called atra-ḫasis, "exceeding wise," in Gilgamesh XI.187(ANET^{3}, 95, and n. 218).

[33]Milik, The Books, 260.

[34]Both Milik(The Books, 8-9)and Grelot("Hénoch et ses é-

critures," 483-84) see here a reference to the AB

[35]Translation of Wacholder, Eupolemus: A Study of Judaeo-Greek Literature (Monographs of the Hebrew Union College 3; Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College--Jewish Institute of Religion, 1974) 313. Cf. also his "Pseudo-Eupolemus' Two Greek Fragments on Abraham," 88.

[36]Text from Vattioni, Ecclesiastico, 238-39; see Yadin, The Ben Sira Scroll, 38; and Milik, The Books, 10-11.

[37]The Genesis Apocryphon, 61.

[38]The Book of Jubilees, 36; also cf. 92:1 and Milik's note (The Books, 262).

[39]The Jewish writer Eupolemus appears to have claimed that Moses invented writing in addition to his being the first wise man. On this passage and related literature, see Wacholder, Eupolemus, 71-83. 1 En 69:8 says that a fallen angel first taught writing.

[40]So Charles, The Book of Jubilees, 36; Milik, "Problèmes," 340; The Books, 11; and Grelot, "Hénoch et ses écritures," 484, though he sees only 72-76 reflected here.

[41]Translations of Wacholder, Eupolemus, 313-14. Wacholder assigns this Samaritan writer to a stage in the development of Hellenistic world chronicles that he calls "fusion of Biblical and Greek Myth" ("Biblical Chronology in Hellenistic World Chronicles," in Essays on Jewish Chronology and Chronography, 113-17). He thinks that Pseudo-Eupolemus derived his information about Enoch's astrology from a part of 1 Enoch or another work which took this material from 1 Enoch ("Pseudo-Eupolemus' Two Greek Fragments on Abraham," 89).

[42]Cf. Milik, The Books, 11.

[43]The Books, 11; he rejects the theory that part of the Epistle underlies it (48).

[44]"Hénoch et ses écritures," 484-85.

[45]The same expression figures in 4Q227 in the identical context--lmdnwhw (Milik [The Books, 12] reports that the n which makes the verb first person rather than third, was added by another hand).

[46]Charles (The Book of Jubilees, 37) found no reference in the AB to "weeks of jubilees."

[47]The Books, 11; cf. 61-69. Milik writes (61) that Charles was wrong in translating "weeks of jubilees," since the text reads a singular. He is correct for most manuscripts, but C and D do have a plural. Apparently a cycle of seven jubilees is found in the 4Q texts (61).

[48]Milik, The Books, 263-64.

[49]Charles, The Book of Jubilees, 38; Milik, "Problèmes," lacks this statement, but it appears in The Books, 45; Grelot, "Hénoch et ses écritures," 485. If Milik's date for the BD (164) is correct, then it provides a firm terminus a quo for Jubilees, since the latter clearly used it.

[50]See Charles, Mashafa Kufālē, 16 n. 29. The oldest known manuscript (EMML 3) reads 'Adni. According to Jub 11:14 Terah's

wife was named 'Ēdnā, and 4:27 names Methuselah's spouse 'Ednā. See Milik, The Books, 42.

[51]Jubilees' phrase(six jubilees of years) recurs in 4Q227. 2:]šš̌h ywbly šnym(Milik, The Books, 12).

[52]The Ethiopic verb may be the product of a failure by the Greek translator to distinguish simple stem and causative form of ktb(a fairly frequent phenomenon in the LXX for Hebrew qal and hip^{c}il forms). If this is the case, then the original would have read "he dictated to me" rather than "he wrote for me."

[53]The phrase is asyndetic and thus appears very abruptly. Milik(The Books, 25) suspects it is an addition from Jubilees' Greek or Ethiopic stage.

[54]"Hénoch et ses écritures," 485. Note 1 Enoch 2-5 where heavenly and earthly phenomena are used as examples in a hortatory context.

[55]So Charles, The Book of Enoch, lxxii; Milik, "Problèmes," 345; The Books, 25; Grelot, "Hénoch et ses écritures," 485-86.

[56]"Hénoch et ses écritures," 486.

[57]See Fitzmyer, The Genesis Apocryphon, 187-92, for 1Q19 and 6Q8 which relate to the same context(the word prds' occurs in 6Q8 2.3). The Vulgate of Sir 44:16 reads: Enoch placuit Deo et translatus est in paradiso ut det gentibus paenitentiam (Vattioni, Ecclesiastico, 238).

[58]Milik, The Books, 260, translating 92:1(4QEn^{g} 1 ii.22-23). He notes(263; 103-7) that Enoch as heavenly scribe and judge became a popular motif in Coptic and Byzantine literature. See also 104:7 where the angels are said to record the sins of men.

[59]Cf. Jub 8:16; in 8:19 only three places are mentioned, the mountain of the East being omitted. Grelot thinks("La géographie mythique d'Hénoch," 45-47) that the geographical notes in Jub 4:23-26 and 8:16-19 are derived from data in 1 Enoch, where two Edens are distinguished: one in the northwest where God dwells and one in the East which is an earthly replica of the other(43-44). Jubilees has attempted to reduce the two to one on the basis of Gen 2:8-14.

[60]On the problem of tenses here, see Charles, The Book of Jubilees, 44-45.

[61]The typology of this section is discussed by P. Hanson, "Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6-11," JBL 96(1977) 197, 200.

[62]The Book of Jubilees, 61. As in 1 Enoch, sections of this lost book are included elsewhere in Jubilees(e.g. 10:1-17).

[63]CD 2:14-21 makes similar connections: through a guilty inclination and fornication the watchers fell and the flood followed because of God's anger.

[64]89:6 appears in 4QEn^{e} 4 i.20-21. Milik(The Books, 238) reads the section that mentions these three kinds of animals thus: [w^{c}rdy' wgmly'] wpyly' yrw my[n]("[... and wild asses and camels] and elephants sank in the waters...."[239]). The order of the three differs in the Aramaic text from the order in the Ethiopic manuscripts.

[65]The Books, 240.

[66]Text in Charles, The Ethiopic Version of the Book of Enoch, 17. Syncellus' reading is not original to 7:2, since the names are lacking there in all other texts, including 4QEn^{a} 1 iii.16-17 and 4QEn^{b} 1 ii.20-21(The Books, 150, 166).

[67]CD 3:1 does not mention demons but credits the cutting off of Noah's descendants to the very evils that produced the watchers' sin and the flood. 4Q180.7-10 ascribes sinful influences on Israel to Azazel and fallen angels(The Books, 249-52).

[68]The Book of Jubilees, lxix.

[69]On the textual problem here, see Charles, Mashafa Kufālē, 29 n. 35.

[70]See Charles, The Book of Jubilees, 65.

[71]A variant in TZeb 3:4 credits a "law" to Enoch.

[72]Charles, The Book of Jubilees, 78.

[73]Enoch's advantage over Noah was the final walk with God; Noah simply died(cf. Sir 49:14).

[74]The Books, 48.

[75]The Book of Enoch, 221-22.

[76]As many have recognized, 1 Enoch 6-11 is composite. Jubilees was, however, written well after the strands were interwoven. 1 En 86:1-89:6 presupposes a version in which Asa'el alone descended at first and was later joined by others. Jubilees has many unnamed angels descend and thus probably mirrors the present composite account in 1 Enoch 6-11 primarily.

[77]See Charles, The Book of Enoch, 14-16, for references. To these the QL's occasional references should be added as well as the Semihaza and Asa'el Midrash(Milik, The Books, 321-31) in which the descent was for testing the angels and Semihaza repented of his sins while Asa'el remained recalcitrant.

[78]E.g. the names of the watchers, etymologies except Jared.

[79]On the mythic antecedents of this rebellion-in-heaven motif, see Hanson, "Rebellion in Heaven," 202-18.

[80]1 En 100:4 appears, however, to revert to the position of 6-16(cf. Milik, The Books, 52-54).

S 166 PHILO (JOSEPHUS, SIRACH and WISDOM OF SOLOMON) on ENOCH

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The Question:

How much did Philo (or Josephus, etc.) know about Jewish traditions which centered on the figure of ENOCH as an important revealer and righteous person?

The Primary Data:

Josephus Antiq 1.85 "When he [Anoch] had lived 365 years he went up [or, returned, ἀνεχώρησε] to the deity, whence there is no record of his end."

Josephus Antiq 9.28 "About that time Elias was no longer seen [or, became invisible] among men and no one knows to the present time his end . . . . And concerning Elias and Enoch, who lived prior to the flood, it is recorded in the sacred books that they became invisible and no one saw their death."

compare Antiq 4.326 ". . . As he [Moses] was still speaking with Eleazar and Joshua/Jesus, when a cloud suddenly stood over him he disappeared into a certain cleft [or, ravine; see Gen 34.6 MT]. But he recorded in the sacred books that he died, fearing lest they should dare to say that on account of the superiority of his virtue he went up [or, returned, ἀναχωρῆσαι] to the deity." (Elsewhere in this context Josephus uses death terminology of Moses.)

Sirach 44.16 (49.14) and Wisdom of Solomon 4.10-15, see below, "observation" no. 5.

Philo Posterity of Cain 33-74: Three descendants of Cain are contrasted with those of Seth who have identical names -- Enoch ("your gift"), Methusaleh ("sending forth death") and Lamech ("humiliation"). The Sethian Enoch symbolizes those with whom God is well pleased and thus translocate from perishable to imperishable existence so that they are no longer found among the multitudes (43).

Philo Change of Names 27-42: The designation "God" identifies the creative aspect of deity, who has created especially the wise and the good persons who strive to destroy the earthly aspects of existence and foster the powers of mind and soul. Such persons are well pleasing to God but are hard to find -- as was Enoch

(34; see Gen 5.24). Some philosophers say that wisdom and the wise person do not exist. But wisdom and the wise do exist, although they cannot be seen by the wicked. So Enoch symbolizes the person who is well pleasing to God, who is hidden from sinful mortals and shuns their company. This person is translocated from the mortal to the immortal life (38) -- he typifies the wild ecstatic, but wisdom also has tamer children like Abraham, who practice piety without disdaining the human sphere (39).

Philo Abraham 7-59: A comparison between respective symbolic triads of Enos-Enoch-Noah (hope, repentance/reorientation, uprightness/perfection) and Abraham-Isaac-Jacob (instruction, character/integrity, disciplined practice). Enoch represents reorientation and betterment with respect to sins -- changes from worse to better, from ignorance to learning, from impropriety to propriety, resulting in a life of solitude and isolation from corrupting (society based) influences (17-26). "Enoch's" characteristic is change which causes God to be pleased; "he was not found" means either that the old life disappears, or that the virtuous person withdraws from the multitudes to a solitary life (20-23). Thus "Enos" hopes but does not attain, "Enoch" partly attains (in the last part of life) and "Noah" is from the start perfect uprightness relative to "his generation" (47). But Abraham-Isaac-Jacob represent absolute virtue in the stable context of law and nationhood (48-59). (For a parallel treatment of μετάνοια, without specific reference to "Enoch," see Virtues 175-186.)

Philo Rewards and Punishments 10-27: Treatment similar to Abr 7-59 on the two triads. "Enoch" fled the bodily context to that of the soul, gained a different home and virtuous solitude (μόνωσις, 15-21). (for similar praise of relative solitude see Every Good Man is Free 62-75.)

Philo Questions on Genesis 1.79-87

Gen 4.26 and 5.1: "Enos" = "man" = human reasoning/mind which is capable of hope leading to joy leading to good.

[comments on the genealogical lists in Gen 5.4-21 are lacking.]

Gen 5.22, 21-23: As "Cain" symbolized reception of mercy/forgiveness, "Enoch" symbolizes the repentance that forgiveness tends to produce. Thus even though "Enoch" was not completely perfect, his turning towards piety/virtue/God makes him "pleasing to God." (Various numerological interpretations follow.) Enoch sinned prior to his repentance/reorientation, went through a period of purification from ἀδικία, and became perfected in virtue.

Gen 5.23-24: At the end Enoch is again described as "pleasing to God: because he is an immortal/ incorporeal soul and because he persevered in uprightness after penitence.

Gen 5.24: As with worthy and righteous men, Enoch does not die but changes position from a sensed/visible plane to incorporeal/intelligent form. He became invisible and could not be found, just as later with Moses (whose burial place was not known) and Elijah (who ascended).

Gen 5.29: "Noah" symbolizes justice which gives rest from the problems of the earthly nature.

Observations:

1. To a large extent the pre-diluvian generations are symbolic lessons (not literal "historical" persons) to Philo. That is their almost exclusive function. Whether he ever seriously considered them as actually historical is problematic. From Noah onward, and especially from Abraham onward, Philo deals with what he considers to be historical figures concerning whom he also often draws symbolic lessons.

2. Philo's attitude to "Enoch" is entirely positive, even when "Enoch" symbolizes transition from corporeality/ shortcoming (sin) to incorporeality (pleasing God).

3. When Philo compares and contrasts Enos-Enoch-Noah with Abraham-Isaac-Jacob, an underlying contrast between individual/isolated activity and social/political/ corporate activity seems evident. Thus "Enoch" becomes an ecstatic solitary in pursuit of virtue and Noah's perfection/righteousness is only relative to his (evil) generation, but Abraham exhibits absolute virtue as a whole/social person in a commonwealth structured by constitution/law. "Enoch" escapes from the multitudes, Abraham lives righteously in society.

4. Almost in passing, Philo sometimes identifies Enoch with special knowledge/understanding (even with "ecstatic" insight), but it is not clear whether Philo derived this spontaneously from his treatment of the scriptural text or relied on older, more developed traditions about Enoch's "wisdom" (etc.).

5. The origin of Philo's identification of "Enoch" with repentance is obscure. Unlike with the parallel identifications Enos-hope and Noah-righteousness, preserved texts of Genesis make no overt reference to Enoch "repenting," although the wording in Gen 5.22 (Enoch walked with or was pleasing to God after he sired Methusaleh) might suggest such an interpretation. Since Philo is not alone among Greek-Jewish sources in associating Enoch with repentance (see Sirach 44.16 "an example of repentance" in the maj-

ority of Greek witnesses, although the Hebrew and a few Greek witnesses have "a sign of knowledge" and Syriac lacks the entire reference to Enoch; perhaps Wisdom 4.10-15, where God removed the one who pleased him from among the wicked, consciously reflects a similar Enoch tradition although his "repentance" is not part of the picture in Wisdom), it is possible that Philo derived this feature from an extant exegetical or hagiographical tradition about Enoch and the (wicked) generation in which he supposedly lived. The conjecture that a less-than-perfect, once-sinful Enoch was created to counter exorbitant apocalyptic glorification of Enoch (so e.g. Box and Oesterly in the Charles ed. of Sirach; compare Ginzburg in Legends of the Jews 5, 156f. and 163) finds little direct support from these texts. Philo seems to have no objection to glorifying "Enoch" and his elevated understanding, but in the larger picture, Abraham and Moses provide Philo with even better models of virtue/righteousness/perfection.

6. The summary treatment accorded Anoch/Enoch by Josephus is somewhat startling and may reflect Josephus' hesitancy, obvious also elsewhere, about commenting on eschatological/apocalyptic themes. It is difficult to imagine that Josephus did not know various extra-biblical legends and traditions regarding Enoch, considering Josephus' awareness of such materials in connection with other biblical personages (e.g. Cain, Seth, Noah, Abraham). Perhaps Josephus is pursuing a consciously low-key approach to Enoch in opposition to other claims made for Enoch (see also Antiq 1.106 on how long life of the antediluvians helped them make discoveries in astronomy and geometry, especially those who lived 600 years or more; Enoch lived only 365!) -- notice how the passage about Moses' death/end lends itself to a similar interpretation -- but this cannot be demonstrated for Enoch from Josephus' own words.

Summary:

For Josephus, Anoch/Enoch is neither a revealer nor a holy person, and is distinguished only for his unusual end (death?). Josephus does not even mention that Enoch was "pleasing to God" (contrast Antiq 1.75 on Noah, whom "God loved").

For Philo, Enoch does symbolize virtue (in solitude) and understanding (with ecstasy) which characterize a person "well pleasing to God", but Enoch's total situation is sometimes viewed as secondary to that of Abraham (or Moses) as a life-paradigm, probably largely because of Philo's conception of the socio-political models associated with these respective names.

For Wisdom of Solomon, Enoch (?) represents a righteous person with correct insight, pleasing to God, whom God removes early from life to guard him from the corrupting influence of surrounding wickedness.

For Ben-Sira and his grandson, Enoch is pleasing to God and an example of knowledge (Hebrew text) or of repentance (Greek).

S 167 A REPORT ON ENOCH IN RABBINIC LITERATURE

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The rabbinic references to Enoch offer striking differences of opinion about the patriarch. Some texts list him as one of those who entered paradise alive, while one text tries to prove that the ambiguous language of Gen 5:24 means simply that Enoch died. One text says that he was wicked, while another exalts him with Moses and Elijah.

Almost all of the rabbinic references to Enoch have been assembled by L. Ginzberg in the notes of The Legends of the Jews.[1] Ginzberg's presentation of the material is influenced by his belief in an "'official' depreciation of Enoch"[2] which leads him to play down sources favorable to Enoch. Thus it seems worthwhile to attempt a more neutral exposition of the sources. Ginzberg's reconstruction of the development of rabbinic attitudes toward Enoch will be discussed below.

Dating rabbinic sources is notoriously slippery work. I have nevertheless grouped the texts by the time period, for my arguments require only approximate, not exact, dating.[3]

TALMUDIC PERIOD (70-600)

Silence. Ginzberg argues that the almost complete silence of the tannaitic and Talmudic sources on Enoch is evidence of a negative attitude toward him.[4] (Ginzberg claims that the silence is complete, but to do so he must assume that the source quoted in Midrash haGadol is not genuine.[5] See below.) In the light of the polemic in Genesis Rabbah (see below), the silence sounds significant. Rather than implying a negative judgment of Enoch, however, the silence might suggest reticence because of Enoch's wonderful nature. We shall return to this question when we have finished looking at the sources.

Serving on High. An apparently tannaitic source in Midrash haGadol, a thirteenth-century Yemenite compilation, names three men who ascended and served on high: Enoch, Moses and Elijah.[6] The passage is introduced by the formula תאנא , which indicates a tannaitic source. M. Margolioth in his edition of Midrash haGadol accepts the passage as genuinely tannaitic, noting only that its source has disappeared.[7] Ginzberg calls this passage "a supposedly tannaitic source," and argues that the last part of the passage, which includes "all the righteous" in such ascent, is a later addition.[8] He does not explain why that should affect the part of the passage about Enoch, Moses and Elijah, nor does he offer any other argument against the authenticity of the passage.

It is interesting that Philo in Quest. Gen. I.86 also groups Enoch, Moses and Elijah together as three who ascended to heaven. Philo does not mention service on high.

Anti-Enoch Polemic. Because of its importance, I offer a translation in full of Genesis Rabbah 25.1.

> "And Enoch walked with God, etc." (Gen 5.24). R. Ḥama son of R. Hoshaya said, he was not written in the ledgers of the righteous, but rather in the ledgers of the wicked. R. Aibo: Enoch was changeable, sometimes righteous, sometimes wicked. The Holy One Blessed Be He said, while he is still righteous, I will take him away. R. Aibo said, he judged him on the new year when he judges the whole world.
>
> The heretics questioned R. Abbahu. They said to him, we do not find death mentioned for Enoch. He said to them, why do you say this? They said to him, it says here that he was "taken," and it says that Elijah was "taken." He said to them, if you are interpreting instances of "taking," it says "taking" here, and it says in Ezekiel (24.16), "Behold I take the desire of your eyes, etc." R. Tanḥuma said, he answered them well.
>
> A lady said to R. Yosi, we don't find death mentioned for Enoch. He said to her, if it said, "Enoch walked with God," and was silent, I would agree with you. But when it says, "...and was not, for God took him, etc." -- he wasn't in the world, because God took him.

The rabbis of this passage lived in the late third and early fourth century. (Genesis Rabbah as a whole was edited in the early fifth century.) They offer several opinions. R. Ḥama says that Enoch was wicked. R. Aibo modifies this position. Enoch vacillated between good and evil. His disappearance from earth is a result of his lack of moral resolution, for God decides to take him away while he is still behaving righteously.

Does R. Aibo accept the proposition that Enoch is taken away without dying? In view of the claims that R. Abbahu and R. Yosi must refute, it is certain that this was a subject on which one chose one's words carefully. If R. Aibo had meant that Enoch died, he could surely have said so more clearly. In his notes to Genesis Rabbah 25.1, however, J. Theodor refers to Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7.15, where the same words, "While he is still righteous, I will take him away," explain "There is a righteous men who perishes in his righteousness" (Eccl 7.15).

R. Abbahu and R. Yosi contend that Enoch died. The "heretics" are on the offensive, and the rabbis are faced with the necessity of providing scriptural refutations for a position with a certain basis in Scripture.

Targum Onqelos also comes out squarely against interpreting Gen 5.24 to mean that Enoch was translated, although it grants Enoch's piety. "Enoch walked in the fear of the Lord and was not, for God made him die."[10]

Beloved Sevenths. Enoch's name appears in a list which begins, "All the sevenths are beloved." It mentions, for example, the seventh heaven, the seventh land, the seventh patriarch (Moses). Enoch figures as the seventh generation from Adam. The proof of Enoch's belovedness is found in Gen 5.24, which may imply reading the verse as meaning that Enoch was translated.

The list appears in Pesiqta deRav Kahana 23.10 and in Wayiqra Rabbah 29.11, both fifth century works, and in Midrash haGadol to Gen 5.24 in a shorter form. Ginzberg's comment dismissing the passage is strained. "...All the Midrash wants to say is that Enoch was better than the six previous patriarchs and this is no particular merit..."[11] He offers no grounds for this pronouncement other than a reference to another of his notes, in which he points out that the generations before Noah are sometimes considered sinful in rabbinic literature.[12]

Metatron. According to Targum Yerushalmi I, Gen 5.24, after his ascension Enoch became "Metatron, the great scribe." The angel Metatron is prominent in the heavenly hierarchy of the hekhalot texts and is mentioned in three passages in the Babylonian Talmud. Among the published texts, however, the identification with Enoch is made only in Targum Yerushalmi I and H. Odeberg's 3 Enoch (and parallels),[13] which G. Scholem dates to the fifth or sixth century.[14]

Scholem argues that there are several layers of Metatron tradition. The traditions reflected in the Talmud and most of the hekhalot literature view Metatron as an angel with the functions of Jahoel, the lesser YHWH, or Michael, the prince of the world, or both. 3 Enoch contains these traditions alongside another tradition which associates the translated Enoch with the angel Metatron.[15]

Almost every chapter of 3 Enoch begins, "R. Ishmael said: Metatron, the Prince of the Presence, said to me..." Most of the work, however, has little else to do with Metatron. The sections concerned with him are chs. 3-16 and 48 B-D in Odeberg's edition. Within these sections, the identification with Enoch is clear only in chs. 3-8, perhaps 15, and 48 B-D.[16] Chs. 9-16 seem to derive from the other Metatron traditions.

In chs. 3-8, Metatron tells R. Ishmael that he was originally Enoch son of Jared, but that God took him up to heaven as a witness against the evil generation of Enosh, turned his flesh to fire, made him serve by his throne, revealed secrets, granted him wisdom and honored him above all angels.

In ch. 48 B-D, the tradition of Enoch/Metatron is united with other Metatron traditions. Enoch/Metatron's biography is essentially the same as in chs.3-8, although other duties are ennumerated. It is interesting that in neither place is Metatron called a scribe. This is the office given the translated Enoch in Targum Yerushalmi I and also in several pseudepigraphic texts.[17]

POST-TALMUDIC PERIOD

Did Not Die. A list of those who entered paradise alive appears in many places in rabbinic literature in varying forms. Enoch is one of nine on the list in Derekh Eretz Zuta, ch. 1, end. Yalqut Shimoni, Ezekiel, 367 offers two lists, one of thirteen who entered alive,[18] and one of nine.[19] Both include Enoch. Enoch also appears in the untotaled list in 2 Alphabet of Ben Sira.[20] Ginzberg mentions two occurrences of the list with Enoch's name that I have not been able to see,[21] Pirqe Rabbenu haQadosh 83, presumably the same as Yalqut Shimoni, Ezekiel, 367, list 1 (see n. 18), and Aggudat Aggudot (Carmoly) 12.[22] Qimhi to 2 Kings 2.1 refers to a list of ten who entered alive, but he does not say where he found the list.

The list of seven who entered paradise alive which appears in Kallah Rabbati 53a does not include Enoch. Kallah Rabbati and Derekh Eretz Zuta date to the Talmudic period, making them the earliest of the texts containing these lists. Ginzberg argues on the basis of a reference in Maḥzor Vitry which I have not been able to see that the mention of Enoch is not original in Derekh Eretz Zuta.[23] These lists, then, show that the belief that Enoch entered paradise alive is widespread later, but do not provide firm evidence of its existence in the Talmudic period.

The view that Enoch did not die is also to be found in the Palestinian targumim. Targum Yerushalmi I and II and Neofiti are unanimous in asserting that Enoch was translated. We have seen that Targum Yerushalmi I goes so far as to claim that after his ascension Enoch was called Metatron, the great scribe. The dates of the targumim are the subject of great controversy, and I list them here not because they are obviously post-Talmudic, but because they contain an idea close to that of the lists.

Astronomical Knowledge. In Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer 8.1-10 we learn that God taught Adam how to intercalate the year and that Adam handed down this knowledge, "the secret of intercalation" to Enoch, who handed it on to Noah, and so on. Enoch is not singled out over other members of this chain. Enoch receives more attention in Midrash Aggadah to Gen 5.24, which says that he spent three hundred years in the Garden of Eden learning intercalation and other astronomical wisdom from the angels.

Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer is clearly post-Muslim and may date to the eighth century. More is known about the origins of Midrash Aggadah. It comes from the school of Moshe haDarshan in eleventh-century Narbonne.

It is commonly claimed that the author of Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer and the school of Moshe haDarshan had access to the pseudepigrapha.[24] Ch. Albeck argues, for example, that Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer's statement that Enoch handed on secrets to Noah violates Biblical chronology, in which Enoch was not on earth to do so, but follows Jubilees 4.16-28 and I Enoch 65 and 68.[25] (See below, Passing on the Staff.) Ginzberg understands the passage in Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer to mean that the translated Enoch passed on the secrets.[26]

Albeck adduces a number of other parallels between Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer on the one hand and Jubilees and Enoch on the other, none of which suggest literary dependence to me.[27] He does not discuss the question of how those pseudepigrapha became available to the author of Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer.

The various works of Moshe haDarshan's school show points of contact with the pseudepigrapha including the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and again Albeck makes the claim that here is direct dependence on the pseudepigrapha.[28] He points to one parallel between Midrash Aggadah and Jubilees that is quite striking. The three hundred years that Enoch spent with the angels in Midrash Aggadah is exactly equivalent to the six jubilees he spends with them in Jubilees 4.21.[29]

How these ancient materials come to re-enter the mainstream of Jewish literary activity is a question which demands serious attention.[30] The claim that actual texts of Jubilees and Enoch

were available seems to be based on no evidence other than certain points of contact between the midrashim and the pseudepigrapha. These claims must be discounted until better grounds are found for arguing them.

Several approaches to the search for avenues of transmission suggest themselves. One is to compare what these midrashim seem to have received from the pseudepigrapha with what the Byzantine chronographers know. Another is to search for a possible Muslim connection. Southern France is not an unlikely place for such contact, and the Arabic literature has yet to be explored for what it can tell us about the survival of traditions known to us from the pseudepigrapha in Islam. The presence of Hebrew and Aramaic fragments of a form of the Testaments in the Cairo Genizah has not yet been adequately explained.

Passing on the Staff. Enoch appears in another chain in Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer, ch. 40. Here he receives from Adam the staff created at twilight on the sixth day and hands it on to Noah. This is the staff with which Moses is to do his wonders in Egypt. For Albeck, this passage makes it certain that Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer believes that Enoch was still on earth in Noah's time.[31] Enoch's presence in this chain makes it questionable whether his presence in the astronomical chain indicates any special association with astronomical wisdom.

Good in an Evil Generation. In Tanḥuma, Bereshit, 26 and Bemidbar Rabbah 5.3, we read that God is not like a human king. When his subjects rebel, a human king does not differentiate, but punishes the good with the wicked. But when the generation of Enosh sinned, God punished the wicked and saved Enoch, the righteous man. Other examples of this kind of goodness follow. This passage teaches both that Enoch was righteous and that he was somehow saved from the punishment that overtook the idolatrous generation of Enosh.[32] This seems to imply Enoch's translation. This is explicit in 3 Enoch, where Enoch is to serve as a witness against the generation of Enosh. (See above, Metatron.) Tanḥuma is certainly no earlier than the end of the eighth century, and Bemidbar Rabbah comes from the school of Moshe haDarshan in the eleventh century.

Enoch as Teacher and King. Sefer haYashar tells us that Enoch was a God-fearing man who separated himself from other men to devote himself to serving God.[33] (It is worth noting that one of Philo's interpretations of "Enoch walked with God and was not" is that Enoch's piety led him to withdraw from human affairs.[34]) Then an angel appeared to Enoch and told him to teach God's ways to men. Enoch did so and was soon made king over all the people of the earth, who then enjoyed great peace. During the 243d year of his reign, Adam died, and Enoch helped bury him.[35]

In the year of Adam's death, Enoch decided once again to absent himself from men. At first he would hide himself for three days and appear for one day to teach the people, but his periods of solitude increased until he would absent himself for a year at a time. His face had become so radiant that the people were afraid to look at him.

Again an angel appeared to Enoch to tell him that he would soon be taken up to heaven to rule over the angels as he had

ruled over men on earth. This passage implies the equation of Enoch with Metatron and rationalizes the metamorphosis as the promotion of a good administrator. A horse descended from heaven and carried Enoch off. Many men followed, but gradually they returned home. On the seventh day, Enoch ascended in a whirlwind, on a fiery chariot drawn by fiery horses. The men who had remained with him could not be found under the snow that covered the place of his ascension.

Sefer haYashar is an expansion of the narrative portions of the Torah, Joshua and the beginning of Judges. Little is known about its origins. Eleventh-century Spain is the guess of the Encyclopedia Judaica. Its author seems to have felt free to add his own details to traditional legends about Biblical heroes.[36] Enoch is the only antediluvian whose life receives so much attention. Despite certain parallels to other sources, this account of Enoch stands alone.

Enoch the Least of the Righteous. A passage in Leqaḥ Tov to Gen 5.24 collects several texts in which people are said to walk in relation to God. It argues that Abraham and Isaac, who walked before God (Gen 48.15), that is, on their own, are greater than the people Israel, who needed to follow after God (Deut 13.5). Israel in turn is greater than Enoch or Noah, who walked with God (Gen 5.24, 6.9), that is, needed his support to be righteous.

Leqaḥ Tov is an eleventh-century compilation. Ginzberg believes that this passage draws on an early source, but he does not explain why.[37] He reads this passage as anti-Enoch. In Genesis Rabbah 30.10 and Buber's edition of Tanḥuma, Lekh Lekha, 81, the same point is made about Abraham and Noah, but Enoch is not mentioned.

One could argue that Enoch appears in the latest of these three texts in order to counter the belief in his greatness. On the other hand, it is also possible to view all three texts as stating a hierarchy that is perfectly natural in classical Judaism. The forefathers of the Jewish people are greater than the antediluvian fathers, and the people of Israel, in the text in which it is mentioned, is in the middle. Certainly this attitude excludes the equation of Enoch with Metatron, but it is not necessarily an anti-Enoch attitude.

Born Circumcised. Enoch appears in a list of thirteen who were born circumcised in Midrash Tehillim 9.7. The list does not appear in all the manuscripts, and Buber in his edition considers the passage secondary. Thus the date of Midrash Tehillim, even if it were well established, would not solve the problem of the date of the list. A different list of thirteen which does not mention Enoch is found in Avot deRabbi Natan ch. 2. Buber's edition of Tanḥuma, Noah, 6 says that ten were born circumcised, but does not list them, while the list of seven in the older edition of Tanḥuma does not include Enoch.

This list, then, proves to be a dead end. Given that Enoch does not appear in two out of three occurrences, it seems unlikely that he is original to the list.

GINZBERG'S VIEW

Perhaps because his main interest is presenting the sources, Ginzberg's theories take the form of ad hoc comments. In

his discussion of the passage in Genesis Rabbah, Ginzberg argues first that the "authoritative rabbinic sources" do not glorify Enoch. Then he claims that the anti-Enoch attitudes expressed in Genesis Rabbah did not develop in confrontation with the heretics, but have roots in pre-Christian sources like Philo and Wisdom of Solomon. The only reference favorable to Enoch that Ginzberg admits to the discussion is the "beloved sevenths" list, which he discounts.[38]

In his discussion of the hekhalot texts, Ginzberg admits that here "the older esteem of Enoch was not only retained in popular circles, but was even enlarged...." He understands the lists of those who entered paradise alive as a middle ground between glorification and downplaying, based on a literal interpretation of Gen 5.24.[39]

The theory that can be extracted from these comments runs like this: In the pre-Christian period, the pseudepigrapha glorified Enoch, but sources like Wisdom of Solomon and Philo did not. Later the rabbis maintain the attitude of Wisdom of Solomon and Philo, while the popular literature, without literary dependence,[40] holds views close to those of the pseudepigrapha. Some rabbinic sources maintain a middle ground.

There are several problems with this theory. First, since Scholem's work, the hekhalot texts cannot be considered either popular or opposed to the rabbis. Thus, the variant views about Enoch discernable in the Talmudic period cannot be attributed to the rabbis on the one hand, and the people on the other.

Second, Ginzberg is at pains to deny that the anti-Enoch attitude grows up in the conflict with Christianity.[41] Thus the view that Enoch died predates the challenge of the heretics (whom he identifies as Christians or Jewish Christians[42]). To support this claim he relies on Philo and Wisdom of Solomon. His interpretation of these texts, however, is extremely doubtful, although he is certainly right in pointing out that they differ from the pseudepigrapha.

Before Ginzberg, Theodor argued for the similarity of Philo's repentant Enoch to the Enoch of R. Aibo, who was sometimes good and sometimes bad.[43] Both Theodor and Ginzberg seem to me to be missing the point. According to Philo, Enoch's great virtue is that he repented. According to R. Aibo, God had to make sure that Enoch would leave the world good by snatching him up while he was still behaving, implying that soon he would not be behaving. As Theodor saw, Wis Sol 4.10-15 is like R. Aibo in understanding Enoch's translation/death as God's pre-emptive action. Unlike R. Aibo it views Enoch as having been outstandingly righteous. Ginzberg is wrong in claiming that Wisdom of Solomon and Philo deny Enoch's translation.

Ginzberg claims that the weight of the evidence is for a negative view of Enoch in the Talmudic period. We have seen that Genesis Rabbah 25.1, Targum Onqelos, and silence are the sum total of that evidence. In addition to eliminating 3 Enoch from consideration by labelling it popular, a perfectly acceptable point of view at his time, Ginzberg claims that the tannaitic reference in Midrash haGadol is not tannaitic and that the

undeniably fifth-century "beloved sevenths" list is not really praising Enoch. It is true that many of the references favorable to Enoch are quite late, but it is not true that none is to be found in the Talmudic period.

MAPPING THE SOURCES

The references to Enoch is rabbinic literature preserved today cannot provide us with a complete picture of the various rabbinic attitudes toward Enoch, their relation to each other and to the views of outsiders. Using these references as markers, however, we can attempt to arrive at a tentative mapping.

The Talmudic period is characterized by relatively little mention of Enoch. The Talmuds do not mention him at all, and only one reference is to be found in tannaitic literature. The comments of the late third and early fourth century rabbis in Genesis Rabbah suggest that Enoch had become an extremely controversial figure.

Not everyone, however, had washed his hands of Enoch. There seems to be no compelling reason to think that the source in Midrash haGadol is not tannaitic, and it mentions Enoch as serving on high like Moses and Elijah. Toward the end of the Talmudic period, the equation of Enoch with the angel Metatron emerges in 3 Enoch. At about the same time the "beloved sevenths" list makes its appearance. Its stance is not clear. Does it indicate reverence for Enoch of a different, less intense kind? Or is it too alluding to Enoch's angelization?

The tannaitic source shows that early in the Talmudic period some rabbis honored Enoch. Genesis Rabbah shows that in the middle of the Talmudic period some rabbis opposed such views. Are the views expressed in 3 Enoch and the "beloved seventh" part of an on-going tradition of which the tannaitic source is an early witness, a tradition that existed alongside the anti-Enoch views expressed in Genesis Rabbah? Or is the glorification of Enoch rejected completely by the rabbis in the middle Talmudic period, only to re-enter later, unconsciously borrowed from the "heretics" or spontaneously rediscovered?

We have evidence, then,of at least two trends in the Talmudic period. One speculated about the metamorphosis of Enoch into an angel. The other argued that Enoch was simply a man. The silence of so many of the sources is difficult to construe. Does it imply a negative attitude toward Enoch? Or does it mean that the figure of Enoch was considered a dangerous subject for public discussion,although not necessarily unsuitable for the speculation of a select circle?

The parallels between the pseudepigrapha and 3 Enoch seem to indicate development of certain ideas rather than borrowing. Thus the emergence of motifs associated with Enoch in the pseudepigrapha in a form close to that of the pseudepigrapha in texts like Midrash Aggadah is all the more puzzling. The attempt to solve the puzzle may lead to greater understanding of development of rabbinic authority in the early rabbinic period and of the contacts between Jews and non-Jews in the Middle Ages.

The post-Talmudic references to Enoch are positive, with the possible exception of Leqah Tov. The idea that Enoch did not die becomes widespread. Whatever had made Enoch a problematic figure in the Talmudic period seems no longer to be at

issue. The views of Genesis Rabbah, however, are not ignored. Yet they do not seem to trouble anyone. An interesting indication of how varying views about Enoch were maintained side by side is Yalqut Shimoni, Bereshit, 42. The compiler quotes first from Genesis Rabbah's assertion that Enoch died and then from Derekh Eretz Zuta's list in which Enoch is sa d to have entered paradise alive.

NOTES

1. L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1909-28), v. 5, 156-58, 162-64. The following corrections should be noted: p. 156, n. 58 -- WR 29.11, Wisdom 4.11; p. 162, n. 61 -- BHM V, 41-43; p. 163, n. 61 -- Derek Erez Zuta, ch. 1 (end).

A. Hyman, HaTorah haKetuvah v'haMesorah (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1936) on Gen 5.24 lists several passages that Ginzberg does not note: Midrash Tehillim 9.7; Bemidbar Rabbah 5.3 and Tanḥuma, Bemidbar, 26.

M. Kasher, Torah Shlemah (New York: American Biblical Encyclopedia Society, 1949) on Gen 5.24 quotes two readings from manuscripts that I have not seen mentioned elsewhere. One comes from an unpublished fifteenth-century Yemenite work, Midrash haBeur, the other from a manuscript of Aggadat Bereshit containing material to the early chs. of Genesis not treated in the printed editions. I have not included these readings in my discussion.

2. Ginzberg, v. 5, 163.

3. I have followed the various articles on particular texts in Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1972) for dating unless otherwise indicated.

4. That the silence about Enoch is not a general silence about the antediluvian fathers can be seen by checking Hyman, HaTorah haKetuvah, to Gen 5.29 and 6.9 where several Talmudic discussions of Noah are indicated. (Only the first two volumes of proper names in Kasovsky's concordance to the Talmud were available to me. Thus Enoch could be checked there, but Noah could not.)

5. Ginzberg, v. 5, n. 58.

6. Midrash haGadol to Gen 5.24.

7. M. Margolioth, ed., Midrash haGadol (Jerusalem: Mosad haRav Kook, 1946-47), 132.

8. Ginzberg, v.5, 157, n.58.

9. J. Theodor-Ch. Albeck, eds., Midrash Bereshit Rabba (Jerusalem: Wahrmann, 1965), v. 1, 238.

10. According to A. Sperber's The Bible in Aramaic (v. 1) (Leiden: Brill, 1959), Gen. 5.24, four printed editions and a second hand in one of the British Museum manuscripts read "for God did not make him die."

11. Ginzberg, v. 5, 157, n. 58.

12. Ginzberg, v. 5, 132, n. 1.

13. H. Odeberg, ed. and trs., 3 Enoch (Cambridge University Press, 1928; reprint ed., prolegomenon by J. Greenfield, New York: KTAV, 1972). The Alphabet of R. Akiba duplicates (or is duplicated by) ch. 48 B-D of Odeberg's text of 3 Enoch. A. Jellinek in his Bet ha-Midrasch (Jerusalem: Wahrmann, 1967; first ed. 1853-57) publishes the Enoch/Metatron section of the Alphabet in v. 2, 114-17, and the rest of the text, in two recensions, in v. 3, 12-64. G. Scholem says in Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, paperback ed., 1961), 68, that an unpublished magical text, the Havdalah of R. Akiba, contains some of the oldest elements of the mystical treatment of Enoch.

14. G. Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1965), 7, n. 19.

15. Scholem's thought on this subject has undergone some development. I rely here primarily on Gnosticism, 50-51. See also Major Trends, 67-70, "Metatron" in Encyclopedia Judaica, and J. Greenfield's prolegomenon to Odeberg, xxxii.

16. Greenfield, xxxii, says that of chs. 3-16, identified by Odeberg as an Enoch/Metatron section, chs. 9-13 refer not to Enoch/Metatron, but to the primordial Metatron. He does not explain his grounds for making this particular division.

17. Odeberg claims in his introduction, 80, that Enoch/Metatron is regarded as a scribe in 3 Enoch because he is called a witness against the generation of Enosh. Odeberg does not explain why witness implies scribe.

18. Yalqut Shimoni is the most extensive compilation of midrashim. It seems to date to about the thirteenth century. D. Hyman, Meqorot Yalqut Shimoni (Jerusalem, Mosad haRav Kook, 1965), v. 2, 189, thinks that this list is quoted from Pirqe Rabbenu haQadosh.

19. Yalqut Shimoni attribures the list to Avot deRabbi Natan. I could not find it in Goldin's index to the A text or in Saldarini's index to the B text. D. Hyman, 189, could not find it in Avot deRabbi Natan either and suggests that its true source is Derekh Eretz Zuta.

20. Alphabet of ben Sira in J.D. Eisenstein, Otzar Midrashim (Israel, 1968), v. 1, 50, col. 1.

21. Ginzberg, v. 5, 163, n. 61.

22. M. Higger, Masekhtot Zeirot (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1929), 129-30, provides extensive references to parallel rabbinic and medieval texts, most of which are not immediately relevant.

23. Ginzberg, v. 5, 164, n. 61. There Ginzberg claims support for his opinion from Tawrogi in his commentary on Derekh Eretz Zuta, which I have not been able to see.

24. See, for example, M.D. Herr, "Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer," and I. Ta-Shma, "Moses ha-Darshan," Encyclopedia Judaica. These claims go back to the nineteenth century. On Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer, see I. Lévi, "Elements Chrétiens dans le Pirké R. Eliezer," REJ 1889, 83-89. On Moshe haDarshan's school, see A.

Epstein, "Le Livre des Jubilés, Philon et le Midrash Tadshé," REJ 1890, 80-97; 1891, 1-25; and "Moshe haDarshan miNarbonah," in Kitvei R. Avraham Epstein, ed. A.M. Habermann (Jerusalem: Mosad haRav Kook, 1949-50), v. 1, 213-44.

25. L. Zunz-Ch. Albeck, HaDerashot B'Yisrael (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1954), 139.

26. Ginzberg, v. 5, 158, n. 59.

27. Zunz-Albeck, 136-40.

28. Ch. Albeck, Midrash Bereshit Rabbati (Jerusalem: Meqitze Nirdamim, 1940), 16-18.

29. Albeck, Bereshit Rabbati, 17.

30. I. Lévi, "Elements," does wrestle with this question.

31. Albeck, Bereshit Rabbati, 17.

32. For the sin and punishment of the generation of Enosh, see Ginzberg, v. 1, 122-24.

33. This part of Sefer haYashar is published in Jellinek, v. 4, 129-32, as Ḥayye Ḥanokh.

34. Mut. 38, Abr. 23-24, Praem. 15-21.

35. See Seder Olam Rabbah, beginning.

36. M.D. Herr, "Midrashim, Smaller," Encyclopedia Judaica.

37. Ginzberg, v. 5, 157, n. 58.

38. Ginzberg, v. 5, 156-7, n. 58.

39. Ginzberg, v. 5, 163, n. 61.

40. Ginzberg, v. 5, 163, n. 61.

41. Ginzberg, v. 5, 163, n. 61.

42. Ginzberg, v. 5, 156, n. 58.

43. Theodor-Albeck, 238.

S 168 ENOCH IN EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

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The following report is intended to provide a brief summary of references to Enoch in early Christian literature. These references may be divided into two general categories - 1) references to writings or sayings of Enoch, and 2) references to the figure of Enoch himself.

1) References to writings or sayings of Enoch:

For our purposes, it is sufficient to list two types of references to writings of Enoch in early Christian literature - a) explicit allusions to writings or sayings of Enoch, along with a direct quotation ascribed to him; this quotation may or may not be found in the preserved Books of Enoch; and b) allusions to writings of Enoch without a direct quotation.

We are not including here so-called verbal "resonances" with passages in the extant Books of Enoch if the latter is not cited explicitly as a source. Such a collection of parallels, some less compelling than others, can be found in Charles' introduction to the First Book of Enoch (in Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament 2 180-184). Similarly, the numerous references in early Christian literature to the legend of the fall of the angels (cf. IEnoch 6.1ff.) are also excluded unless Enoch is expressly cited as a source; a writer's knowledge of this legend, which seems to have circulated widely, does not necessarily prove that he was drawing directly on the version of the legend as it is recounted in IEnoch. (For references to the story of the descent of the angels in early Christian literature, see Charles, op. cit. 181-184.)

a) Explicit references to writings or sayings of Enoch, along with a direct quotation (Jude 14, 15; Barnabas 4.3; Clement, Eclog. Proph. 2; Origen, De Principiis 4.35; Tertullian, De Idol. 4.15) :

Only two of the passages cited above have unambiguous parallels in the preserved Books of Enoch - Jude 14,15 (cf. IEnoch 1.9) and Origen's quotation in De Principiis ("ambulavi usque ad imperfectum"- cf. IEnoch 21.1). Pseudo-Cyprian (in Hartel's Cyprian, 3 p.67) also contains a lengthy quotation originally found in IEnoch. However, here the author does not cite as his source the Book of Enoch, rather introducing the citation with the words, "sicut scriptum est." And since this citation is the same as that furnished in Jude 14,15, it is at least possible that the author took it from Jude and not directly from IEnoch.

A passage in the Epistle of Barnabas (4.3), prefaced with the words,"as Enoch says," does not appear to have a parallel anywhere in the preserved Books of Enoch. Barnabas 16.4 might plausibly be traced to IEnoch 89.53ff., but it is by no means identical with it, and the citation is introduced only with the words "scripture says." Both Clement and Origen (loc. cit.) assign to Enoch the words,"I have seen the whole of matter"(Lat. "Universas materias perspexi"), but no close parallels to this in the extant Books of Enoch are forthcoming. Finally, Clement's (Eclog. Proph. 53) and Tertullian's (loc.cit.) attributions to Enoch appear to be not direct quotations, but paraphrases of material in Enoch.

b) References to writings or sayings of Enoch without a quotation ascribed to him (Origen, Comm. on John 6.25; De Principiis 1.3.3; In Num. Homil. 27.2; Contra Cels. 5.52-55; Tertullian, De Cultu Fem. 3; De Idol. 4; Apost. Const. 6.16; Eusebius, EH 7.32.19; Augustine, De Civ. Dei 15.23.4; Jerome, Homily 45 (on Psalm 132) alludes only to a "certain apocryphon" but it is clear that the Book(s) of Enoch is intended); De Viris Illust. 4; Pistis Sophia, chs. 99 and 134 (pp. 158 and 228 in Schmidt's German translation, in Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften, GCS, 13, pt.1):

A great number of these references have to do either with the story of the fall of the angels (IEnoch 6.1ff.) or the question of the canonical status of the Book(s) of Enoch. Origen's opinion on the latter question is somewhat ambiguous. In Contra Celsum (loc. cit.), he refutes Celsus' claim that Jesus was not the only "angel to visit mankind";Origen argues that the source of Celsus' information, the Books of Enoch, in which the story of the fallen angels is elaborated,"do not at all circulate in the churches as divine." Elsewhere, he is more hesitant about rejecting the writings of Enoch. In his Commentary on John (loc. cit.), he alludes to the descent of the angels in the time of Jared, adding the following:"if anyone cares to accept the books (of Enoch) as sacred." In De Principiis (loc. cit.), he adduces the Books of Enoch and the Shepherd of Hermas in order to show that God is creator of all things, but his position on the authority of Enoch is not stated clearly here.

Tertullian is far less reserved about the authority and genuineness of Enoch. In De Cultu Feminarum (loc.cit), after discussing at great lengths the evil teachings of the fallen angels and their seduction of women (chs. 1 and 2), he goes on to acknowledge that the "scripture of Enoch" is not received by some people because it is not "admitted into the Jewish canon." He surmises that the reason for this rejection was doubt that these writings could have survived the flood. To this Tertullian replies that Enoch's "preachings" were handed down into the trusteeship of Noah, who preserved them. Or if this explanation is not found to be satisfactory, he says, it may have been that Noah had restored, by inspiration, the books of Enoch lost in the flood. At all events, the citation from Enoch in Jude attests to the genuineness of the former work (for a similar argument, see Priscillian, De Fide et de Apocryphis, 44ff. in Schepss ed.).

On the same question-that of the authority of the Books of Enoch-Augustine suggests (loc.cit.) that some things contained in these writings were written by Enoch himself. This is so, he says, by virtue of the fact that Jude quotes from Enoch. But Augustine rejects the writings of Enoch as a whole, arguing that they were not transmitted properly through successive generations. Specifically, he rejects the idea of the angelic origin of the giants of Gen 6.4, and proposes that the "sons of God" of Gen 6 were Sethites, not angels. In like fashion, Jerome (De Viris Illust. loc. cit.) asserts that the citation from Enoch in Jude attests only to the authority of the passage quoted, not to the entire corpus of Enoch literature, which,he says elsewhere (Hom. on Ps. 132), the Manichees use to promote their own beliefs. (For Manichaean use of the Books of Enoch, and especially the Book of the Giants, see J.T. Milik, The Books of Enoch, 209-338; W. Henning,"The Book of the Giants," BSOAS 11 (1943-46), 52-74.)

A few other references to books of Enoch deserve attention. The Coptic treatise Pistis Sophia alludes to books of Enoch in two places. First, there is mention of"lesser mysteries" in the "two books of Jeu, which Enoch has written while I(Jesus) spoke with him out of the tree of knowledge and from the tree of life in the Paradise of Adam"(ch.99). Later, in the same work, Jesus speaks of "mysteries which are in the books of Jeu, which I have made Enoch write in Paradise, discoursing with him out of the tree of knowledge and out of the tree of life." Although Pistis Sophia is aware of the legend of the fallen angels, it is unlikely that the books of Jeu described

therein refer to the preserved Books of Enoch. The Books of Jeu, which Schmidt identified and published from a Bodleian papyrus, and which correspond in contents to the Books of Jeu mentioned in Pistis Sophia, have little to do with the extant Books of Enoch.

A second, much later work, entitled the Book of John the Evangelist, also mentions writings of Enoch. According to James, in its present form this work is no earlier than the 12th century, although the original may have been much earlier (see James' Apocryphal New Testament, 187). This work speaks of "3 score and seven books" which Enoch wrote; Satan, after his fall, raised up Enoch on the firmament, and showed him his godhead. Subsequently, he commanded Enoch to write books, which Enoch delivered to his sons, and which, we may assume, contained "unrighteous mysteries and the custom of sacrifice "(James,190).

2) The Figure of Enoch:

The figure of Enoch in early Christian literature has at least seven different functions or characteristics- a)Enoch's translation;b)Enoch's repentance;c)Enoch's uncircumcision; d)Enoch the priest;e)Enoch the discoverer of astrology;f)Enoch the scribe of righteousness;g)Enoch, the opponent of Antichrist.

a)Enoch's translation (Hebrews 11.5; IClement 9; Justin,Dial. 19; Irenaeus,Adv. Haer. 5.5; Ascension of Isaiah 9.6; Tertullian, De Resurrectione Carnis 58; De Anima 50; Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 7.7; Gospel of Nicodemus 9(25); Ps.Clementine Recognitions 4.12; Augustine, De Civ. Dei 15.19):

Typically, Enoch's translation is ascribed to his faith (cf. Hebrews,loc. cit.), righteousness and obedience (cf. IClement, loc. cit.) and his having pleased God (Gen. 5.24;cf. Irenaeus, loc. cit.). According to Irenaeus, Enoch's translation points out by anticipation the translation of the just. The Ascension of Isaiah (loc. cit.) asserts that Enoch's translation is not fully consummated until Christ's coming; Enoch and "those with him" are clad in higher garments, but have not yet received the crown and thrones of glory, which are reserved until Christ's descent in the last days. From the words "and those with him (Enoch)," we may assume that the author did not regard Enoch's translation as a singular event.

Eusebius (loc.cit.) understands Enoch's translation as his "withdrawal from the converse of the multitude." Enoch is the type of a man who is "taken by God, and translated from this world to that, though he cannot be seen or found by men, has become the friend of God, and is found by God "(trans.Gifford). A similar understanding of Enoch's translation is found earlier in Philo (Change of Names 27-42; Rewards and Punishments 10-27). Tertullian adduces the translation of Enoch and Elijah as evidence for his own views on the resurrection of the flesh (see also Irenaeus, loc. cit.) In the Recognitions (loc. cit.), Enoch is translated because he "hoped to call upon the name of the Lord," an interpretation presumably based on a confusion of the name Enoch with Enos, the son of Seth (cf. Gen 4.26).

b) Enoch's repentance (Clement, Strom. 2.15):

According to Clement, God,"after pardoning Cain, not long after introduced (εἰσάγει) Enoch, who had repented(μετανοήσαντα)." The theme of Enoch's repentance is found earlier in Philo(Abra-

ham, 17-26), most Greek witnesses to Sirach 44.16 (Enoch as ὑπόδειγμα μετανοίας), and implicitly in Wisdom of Solomon 4.7-5.14 (for discussion, see D. Lührmann,"Henoch und die Metanoia," ZNW 66 (1975), 103-116, and accompanying paper by Robert Kraft, "Philo ...on Enoch."

Enoch is also sometimes pictured as "preacher of repentance," either to his own sinful generation or in the last days. A five book treatise against Marcion, falsely attributed to Tertullian, recounts how Enoch tried to "recall (revocabat)" his contemporaries, who had "strayed from God and followed misdeed."(PL 2 1070; Engl. trans. in ANF 4 151). In Hippolytus' De Antichristo (ch. 46), Enoch and Elijah proclaim repentance in the last days to the people and all the nations (see below, f).

c) Enoch's uncircumcision (Justin, Dial. 19.92; Aphrahat, Demonstrations 11.3):

The fact that Enoch was uncircumcised and did not observe the Sabbath, but was still pleasing to God, is offered as proof that God's covenant with the Jews was transitory (so Aphrahat) or required of them as a sign of their hardness of heart (so Justin). It is of some note that in some Rabbinic traditions, Enoch was said to have been born circumcised (Midrash Tehillim 9.7. Buber ed.).

d) Enoch the priest (Apost. Const. 8.5.3-reference to a succession of high priests-Abel, Seth, Enos, Enoch, Noah, Melchizedek and Job).

e) Enoch the discoverer of astrology (Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 9.18, citing (Ps.) Eupolemus in Alexander Polyhistor; cf. also Jub. 4.17):

Enoch is identified here with Atlas as founder of the science of astrology.

f) Enoch, the scribe of righteousness (Apoc. of Paul 20; Gospel of Bartholomew 17; Epistle of Ps.-Titus (in Hennecke- Schneemelcher 2 153); see also Test. of Abraham (Greek of shorter recension) ch. 11; Jub 4.23; IEnoch 12.3; 2Enoch 23.4ff.; 53.2; 64.5):

Enoch, sometimes together with Elijah, is the "scribe of righteousness," entrusted with recording the deeds of all humanity. In the Epistle of Ps. Titus, for example, Enoch, "who was carried away in the first age," was commissioned to commit to writing the history of the first men, and Elijah was given the task of recording the deeds of the "later people." In connection with this Enoch's role as "scribe of righteousness" is to record for the day of judgment the sins of each person. In Test. of Abraham (loc.cit.) , Michael tells Abraham that Enoch, "the teacher of heaven and earth and scribe of righteousness," was sent by God to"record the sins and righteousness of all humanity". In response to Abraham's complaint that it is not fitting for a man who has not seen death to pronounce sentence on mortals, Michael explains that Enoch does not sentence mortals, but only records their sins.

Enoch's function as eschatological scribe who has authority not only to record the deeds and misdeed of humanity, but to erase sins as well, is well attested in Coptic literature (see the Enoch apocryphon published by M. Munier,"Melanges de litterature copte. 3-Manuscrits coptes sa'idiques d'Assouan," Annales

du Service des Antiquities de l'Egypte 23 (1923), 215; see also B. Pearson,"The Pierpont Morgan Fragments of a Coptic Enoch Apocryphon," In Studies on the Testament of Abraham, ed. G. Nicklesburg, 238(and n. 29); 243-246; 275. Pearson suggests that a corollary to Enoch's role in Coptic literature as scribe who records the sins of men is the understanding of Enoch as an avenger; as such, he can be represented in some Coptic magical texts as fear inspiring and punitive, see Pearson, op. cit. 245f.)

g) Enoch, the opponent of Antichrist (Gospel of Nicodemus 9(25); Apoc. of Elijah, in G. Steindorff, Die Apokalypse des Elias, Texte und Untersuchungen, n.f. 2 (1897), 124-128; Tertullian, De Anima 50; Ethiopic Apoc. of Peter 2; Hippolytus, De Antichristo 43; The History of Joseph the Carpenter, 31-2 transl. F. Robinson in Texts and Studies, 4/2 (1896), 146-147; for other references, see W. Bousset, The Antichrist Legend, 203-211, and more recently, R. Bauckham,"The Martyrdom of Enoch and Elijah: Jewish or Christian?" JBL, 95 no.3 1976, 447-458):

Rev 11.3-13 speaks of two witnesses who will appear in the last days to prophesy and be slain by Antichrist. In subsequent developments of this legend, these two figures are sometimes identified as Enoch and Elijah. Thus, in Hippolytus' De Antichristo (loc.cit.), it is said that Enoch and Elijah will preach 1260 days, proclaiming repentance (cf. Rev. 11.3), and will be slain by Antichrist. It should be noted that in some Christian sources which allude to Enoch's and Elijah's confrontation with Antichrist in the last days, there is no mention of their martyrdom by him. In the Ethiopic Apocalypse of Peter(loc. cit.), for example, Enoch and Elijah are sent forth to identify the "deceiver who performs signs and wonders," but they do not appear to be slain by him (for other references, see Bauckham, op. cit. 454-457). Bauckham suggests that there had been a legend, of Jewish origin, which described the conquest of Antichrist by Enoch and Elijah, and that the marytrdom of Enoch and Elijah was a Christian innovation,"deriving via Revelation 11. 3-13 from the Christian innovation of the martyrdom of the Messiah"(op. cit. 458).

We should note finally the existence of a tradition which knows of four witnesses against Antichrist in the last days-Enoch, Elijah, Tabitha and Sibyl. In the Arabic version of the History of Joseph (loc.cit.), Jesus identifies four people who will be slain by Antichrist "because of their reproachings"-Henoch, Elias,"Schila," and Tabitha. This Tabitha is probably the Tabitha whom Peter heals in Acts 9.36-41. Crum has identified the name "Schila" with Sibyl, a supposition which is strengthened by the fact that Sibyl was often understood as Enoch's sister (see W. Crum,"Schila und Tabitha," ZNW 12 (1911), 352; also Pearson, op. cit. 239f.)

h) The Significance of the name "Enoch":

1)Enoch= "grace of God"(see Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 7.8; cf. the significance attached to the name Enoch (Cain's son) in Philo's Posterity of Cain 35-χάρις σου; and Enoch as recipient of grace (κεχαρισμένος) in Abraham 17.

2) Enoch= "dedicatio" (cf. Augustine, De Civ. Dei 15.19).

S 199a TOWNS TO FORTRESSES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN LIFE IN JUDAH FROM 8TH TO 7TH CENTURY B.C.

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Within the past two years two different archaeological chronologies for Iron Age Palestine have been published: a traditional "low" chronology by Holladay (1976) followed the lines developed by Albright and was accepted virtually unanimously for years, and a revised "high" chronology by Aharoni (Aharoni and Aharoni 1976) expanded Tufnell's original analysis of Lachish and added new data from his own excavations and research. In essence the "low" chronology posits a date of approximately 600 B.C. for the destruction of Tell Beit Mirsim A_2 and Lachish level III, whereas the "high" chronology dates their destruction to around 700 B.C. Quiescent for many years, Iron Age chronology has now become a bone of contention among Palestinian archaeologists and led to a spate of articles related to the problem.

About the time Palestinian archaeologists became reabsorbed in chronologies, other archaeologists have looked with increasing displeasure upon those who spend so much time building typologies and constructing chronologies. In their history of New World archaeology Willey and Sabloff (1974) describe how a phase of classification and chronology gave way around 1960 to a new period of archaeology devoted to explanation of social organization and the processes of social change. The so-called "new" archaeologists of the sixties left no doubt that they considered their pursuit of explanation far superior to the older concern for constructing more elaborate chronologies and finer typologies which, in their view, had become a sterile pursuit. The point is well taken: chronologies are not ends in themselves, even though the satisfactory completion of a complex system may be a major achievement. Sir Mortimer Wheeler put it this way: "We have . . . been preparing time-tables; let us now have some trains" (1954: 215).

Why, then, worry about a misunderstanding of one hundred years? In defense of ceramicists and chronology builders, sound chronological schemata are absolutely essential for the reconstruction of history and of cultural processes. Slight modifications in a chronology can significantly alter our understanding of a society's development; the problem of chronology cannot be ignored. A case in point is the debate over the archaeological chronology of Iron Age Palestine; the differing "high" and "low" chronologies result in markedly divergent views of Judah's history.

I have developed a chronology (fig. 1) based on the quantification of ceramics and the seriation of assemblages (McClellan 1975). In essence it is in agreement with Aharoni's "high" chronology, but I suggest that Tell Beit Mirsim A_2 and Beth Shemesh IIC are earlier than Beer-sheba and Lachish III, that Tell en-Nasbeh suffered its major destruction at the end of the 8th century, and that Megiddo IVA was destroyed no earlier than 700 B.C. However, rather than discussing the detailed problems of archaeological chronology, I wish to focus attention on the implications of the "high" chronology for our understanding of historical events and cultural processes of Judaean society from the late 8th century to the early 6th century B.C. An archaeological history of the late Iron Age using a "low" chronology has been described by Stern (1975); his study conveys the impression of a homogenized history in which diagnostic types in ceramics may have changed enough for the archaeologist to recognize, but the social organization and the pattern of the material culture remained essentially the same.



Fig. 1 Chronology of Palestine in the Late Iron Age

In contrast, following my chronology, I suggest that there was a major transformation in the social organization of Judaean society which manifests itself in the archaeological record. Prior to the calamities at the end of the 8th century B.C. the nation-state of Judah was organized into a prosperous and complex network of regional towns. After their destruction the regional towns were not rebuilt. Instead a transformed society emerged in the 7th century in which fortresses and other small settlements were built in sparsely populated rural areas. They were under the control of Jerusalem which had increased rapidly in size and population. The nation-state was replaced by a city-state system.

In the 8th century Jerusalem stood apart from and above the regional towns of Judah by virtue of its position as seat of the Davidic dynasty and the site of the Temple. But similarities among the regional towns are apparent in their urban plans. They are strongly fortified with city walls which circumvallate the towns in oval patterns, rather than the rectangular plans of Assyrian settlements and the administrative capital at Samaria. Inside the towns, domestic dwellings often abut the city walls; on the interior side of those houses a major street usually runs in an oval pattern, following the lines of the city walls. Domestic houses display a striking similarity in plan throughout Judah; the most common types are the three-room pillar house, the four-room pillar house, and an intermediate-type pillar house. Although the central areas of towns are relatively unknown because they remain unexcavated as at Tell Beit Mirsim, or are poorly preserved due to erosion or later construction, as at Tell en-Nasbeh, Beer-sheba and Lachish, recent excavations at Lachish (Aharoni 1975) and Beer-sheba (Herzog, Rainey, and Moshkovitz 1977: Fig. 1) have produced more domestic architecture in the centers of the towns. Thus, the towns of Judah are notable for what they do not have: palaces or villas of wealthy aristocrats or princes, temples, market places, inner citadels. In sum, the layouts of the towns in Judah distinguish them from city-planning in most other areas of the Near East during the same time, and from urban design of the earlier and later periods of Palestine.

Differences among the regional towns of Judah are observable, however. In terms of architectural characteristics, the three storehouses of Beer-sheba distinguish it from other towns in Judah. Beer-sheba also had a public water system within its walls, which probably accounts for the rarity of cisterns associated with individual houses. A number of industrial buildings, thought to be dye factories, were found at Tell Beit Mirsim and Tell en-Nasbeh, but they are rare elsewhere. In addition to architectural differences, the distribution of artifacts among the various sites reveals interesting differences in the functions of the towns. The lmlk seals were common at Lachish, Tell en-Nasbeh and el-Jib, but rare at Tell Beit Mirsim and Beer-sheba (Welten 1969). Loomweights were found in profusion at Tell Beit Mirsim (and Tell es-Sa'idiyeh), but few have been noted at Tell en-Nasbeh or Beer-sheba.

The variations in architectural form (archaeological features) and in the distribution of artifacts among the regional towns of Judah are indicative of different economic activities taking place in them. In fact, in spite of their similarities, the towns served quite different functions within an economic network operating in the kingdom of Judah. Tell Beit Mirsim was a major textile center, and must have produced quantities of textiles far greater than the needs of the town's inhabitants. The surplus had to be exchanged, perhaps through trade on an open market or through a redistribution system controlled by the monarchy. By the same token, the high incidence of lmlk stamp seals at Lachish, Tell en-Nasbeh and el-Jib suggests that those

towns were centers of wine production (or olive oil, depending on the identification of the items being produced and stored in the jars to which the seals belonged). Beer-sheba's storehouses were definitely not recipients of the lmlk jars, contrary to what one might expect. Nor did the storehouses contain products all of one kind.

The regional towns were not carbon copies, according to the archaeological evidence, but actually served different economic functions within Judah. Although cottage industries thrived in some towns, the economy was agricultural. The land produced the goods on which the town economies were based: wool for the textile industry, olives for the different grades of oil used in cooking, perfuming, and lighting, and vineyards for wine production. Obviously certain regions of Judah were better suited for the production of different crops. In this regard the Chronicler's recollection of Uzziah's reign is of special interest: he had large herds in the lowlands and on the tablelands; in the hills and on fertile lands he had farmers and vinedressers. He was fond of agriculture (2 Chr 26:10).

Putting this archaeological evidence together, it is possible to begin describing social and economic organization within Judah even though there are still many unresolved questions. Turning to the inhabitants of the towns, it is difficult to say precisely who they were, to describe their social and economic status, and to determine what their occupations were. In a popular lecture this past year a prominent Palestinian archaeologist suggested that the three-room pillar houses at Beer-sheba were quarters for soldiers and their families. We know that military contingents were stationed in towns during the reign of Jehoshaphat (2 Chr 17:12,13), but I doubt that the majority of the inhabitants in any of the towns were professional soldiers, and there is as yet no archaeological evidence to reveal where and how soldiers lived in the towns. Nor were the inhabitants of towns likely to have been peasants. In fact I have seen little evidence to suggest that there were ghettos of poor living in the towns. It appears more likely to me that the peasants dwelt in farming villages surrounding these fortified towns. Preliminary analysis of occupational patterns at Tell Beit Mirsim (McClellan n.d.) indicate that inhabitants in certain quarters of the town were engaged in specialized economic activities such as dyeing and weaving. Furthermore there is tentative evidence that the different quarters were organized into social groups, perhaps craft guilds or clans, real or fictive. By analogy it is possible that inhabitants of certain quarters at Lachish were engaged in production of wine, and in other quarters and other towns olive oil was a major occupation. But these activities would not take all their time, nor in themselves support the town's inhabitants. Perhaps they were also the owners of the land producing the olives and grapes, or of the herds supplying the wool, even though most farming and herding would have been done by peasants in the outlying villages.

Assuming that the towns were engaged in specialized economic activities, it is doubtful that they were self-sufficient in providing for the economic needs of their inhabitants, and that the surplus products of textile industries and wineries could have been consumed by the local inhabitants alone. The towns must have been integrated into a regional economic system which allowed for the redistribution of goods among the other towns of Judah and to foreign markets. Economic integration of a region might have been achieved in several ways; an urban network could have arisen by spontaneous and unplanned growth in response to a self-regulating marketing system largely unrelated to political considerations. Location, size, and market activities of towns would be the result of geographical and economic factors, as described in central-place theory.

Alternatively, economic integration of the network of urban centers might have been achieved in a highly centralized state-controlled economic system in which the political authorities of the state decided where and when to build towns, what agricultural products were to be grown in lands surrounding them, what products would be manufactured in the towns, and how the surpluses would be redistributed inside the kingdom or exchanged with foreign powers. Of the two types of regional networks, I suggest that the monarchy in Jerusalem carefully controlled the economy of Judah in the 8th century B.C. The urban plans of the towns were very well organized; for example, domestic buildings of nearly the same size and shape were constructed flush to the city walls at Tell Beit Mirsim and Beer-sheba, possibly at the same time the defensive walls themselves were built. The economic status of the inhabitants appears to be rather uniform; there is an absence of villas and ghettos. The public works involved in the construction of the city defenses, water systems, and storehouses, and the distribution of the storage jars with lmlk stamp seals, however they were used, seem to be too highly organized to be other than centralized enterprises of the king.

Thus, the urban settlements of 8th century B.C. Judah reveal that there was a high degree of economic specialization by various towns and groups within towns; they were integrated into a regional network in which their surpluses were redistributed. The economic system was organized by the state, under the leadership of the king in his administrative center, Jerusalem.

However, by the end of the 8th century much of Judah lay in ruins; its urban centers destroyed, and its agricultural system in shambles. The causes for these disasters cannot be precisely identified archaeologically. Historically, the campaign of Sennacherib in 701 B.C. must be looked to as the primary instrument of God's wrath. Sennacherib claimed to have destroyed forty-six towns, most notably Lachish. But it is possible the destruction of some was due to a combination of factors, including the Syro-Ephraimite war of ca. 735 B.C., and other events unknown or unsuspected by us, perhaps best described as Acts of God. Whatever the causes, the results were devastating; only Jerusalem stood amidst the desolation of Judah and its once thriving system of urban settlements.

The long-range consequences of the destruction of regional towns in Judah by 700 B.C. must have been felt in every aspect of life. Four areas in which the cultural transformations may be charted are in the demography, economy, politics, and religion of Judah. In some areas I believe the shifts are clearly observable in the archaeological and biblical record; in others, the changes I describe are hypotheses about what would have happened if our chronological revisions are correct.

The archaeological evidence indicates a demographic shift occurred in Judah in terms of the size and composition of the population. The destruction of three or four major towns in Judah according to archaeology, and over two-score towns according to Sennacherib, and the failure to rebuild those towns or new ones of comparable size means that there was a considerable decline in the number of inhabitants in Judah during the 7th century (contra Stern 1975: 35). The evidence for the decline is to be seen in the transition from a network of towns that characterized the kingdom of Judah in the 8th century B.C. to one of much smaller settlements and fortresses in the 7th century. It is not clear how many of the fortresses were already in existence in the 8th century, and how many new ones were built between 700 and 600 B.C. Archaeological surface surveys of Iron Age settlement patterns might help strengthen or weaken my argument, but until the dispute over the dating of 8th and 7th century potsherds is settled, such

surveys will be ambiguous (Kochavi, ed. 1972).

In the course of a century in which the regional towns of Judah lay in ruins and its population reduced in size, a rural wilderness was created which gradually transformed the reduced population outside Jerusalem from something like a "petite bourgeoisie" to a peasantry. In the 7th century B.C. that group of prosperous town dwellers was gone: dead, fled, deported, or reduced to a new and humbler role. The status of the peasants was probably markedly reduced due to changes in the agricultural system. Previously they may have worked their own farms or those of their kinsmen in the regional towns, but in the 7th century they may have worked on vast properties owned by a few wealthy and remote landowners who resided in Jerusalem. The other element in the rural population consisted of soldiers who manned the fortresses throughout Judah.

The demography of Jerusalem was also transformed. As Broshi (1974; 1978) has shown, the size of Jerusalem expanded rapidly at the end of the 8th century B.C. when refugees, rich and poor, gravitated to the capital city which had victoriously withstood siege. In modern times fighting in the Levant has led to the burgeoning of Amman and Beirut in a similar way. It has been suggested that the increase of Jerusalem's population was primarily due to the influx of Israelites from the north after the fall of Samaria, but I suggest that the bulk of the new refugees came from Judah itself, from the regional towns which were destroyed before and at the time of the Assyrian invasion of 701 B.C. Probably many of the craft industries of the regional towns could not be reestablished on the same scale in Jerusalem, and many refugees of Judah and Samaria in effect were disenfranchised due to the loss of their crafts, land, and homes. The reorganization of the social groups in a swollen Jerusalem may have been on the basis of kinship, town or region, and occupational lines, but new kinds of social groups must have developed in Jerusalem as they did in Judah. The 'am ha'ares may have emerged as part of the new demographic patterns of the 7th century. It may have taken most of the century for social relations to sort themselves out.

The economy of Judah was transformed for the worse in the 7th century. The textile industry at Tell Beit Mirsim was no longer producing for local consumption or foreign export, and in turn the demand for raw wool probably dipped sharply. Agricultural production of "cash crops" such as olives and grapes probably also dropped dramatically due to the destruction of groves and vineyards by the besieging army of Sennacherib, but just as importantly, due to the decline of domestic and foreign markets. In regard to foreign markets, the Assyrians probably favored their own newly acquired province of Samaria as the principal producer of wine and oil for Phoenician trade, and Transjordan as the conduit for trade in spices from Arabia, effectively isolating Judah economically.

The evidence for the decline of agriculture is varied. Regional towns, with their facilities for collection and production of textiles, wine and oil, were not rebuilt. The statements of Sennacherib and the siege scene of Lachish make it clear that the Assyrians laid waste Judah, probably destroying trees and vines which were hard to replace and which were important to the economic life of the area. A change in the ratios of pottery types is also noticeable. A variety of small juglets which probably contained olive oil declined in use during the 7th century, as did large storage jars which may have been used for transporting and exporting bulk quantities of oil and wine. The discussion of the lmlk stamp seals on storage jars has a direct bearing on the issue of agricultural production. The seals were stratified at Lachish in levels III and II, suggesting that they were used

in the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. But, as I noted, storage jars (with the exception of wholemouth jars) were not particularly common in 7th century Judah, while to the north at Megiddo, Hazor, Tyre, and Sarepta storage jars, especially the sausage jar, underwent a great increase in popularity. I suggest that their increased presence outside Judah may be an indication of higher production in the "cash crops" of oil and wine, and possibly a sign of a more highly organized and standardized system of production and distribution of agricultural products within the Assyrian empire.

In the 7th century there were fairly close stylistic similarities of the pottery of northern Palestine with Phoenicia, and Transjordan with areas to the north and east. In contrast Judah's ceramics appear to be isolated stylistically, which may suggest a general decline in contact and commerce. The trade network of the late Assyrian empire may have been designed to bypass Judah and favor other areas for production and distribution.

Overall, there are indications that the economy of Judah suffered a major collapse at the end of the 8th century and was transformed in the 7th century B.C. How did it operate? It is possible that the king continued to control the economy of Judah in its impoverished condition, but widespread disruptions might have allowed a few wealthy aristocrats to grab vast tracts of land (Mic 2:12) and eventually cause a shift of the economy from royal control to the private sector of powerful landlords. However, if the land were in the hands of wealthy landowners, I doubt the agricultural estates should be described as latifundia because that term implies mass production of "cash crops" for trade and profit, and I have indicated there is little evidence for the processing and trade of agricultural surpluses in the 7th century. Surely Jerusalem now became a major market place and its inhabitants the principal consumers of the agricultural products of Judah, but the economic system probably led the farmers to achieve little more than self-sufficiency agriculturally. However, these aspects of economic change remain largely conjectural.

The transformation of urban life within Judah must have also changed the political system within the kingdom and affected her foreign relations. The destruction of regional towns, although weakening the kingdom of Judah on the whole, in turn strengthened the position of Jerusalem within the kingdom and transformed her into a city-state. The population and size of Jerusalem increased and, in terms of power, she no longer had any real or imagined competitors in Judah such as Lachish or Beer-sheba, let alone Samaria to the north.

In place of regional towns a series of fortresses grew up, for example, Ramat Rahel, Tell el-Ful, and Arad, either by reconstruction on destroyed sites, or by totally new construction (Aharoni 1967; Lapp 1976). The fortresses were garrisoned by a soldiery which was presumably under the strict disciplinary control of the higher command in Jerusalem. There was little chance for a single fortress to establish its own power base by which to challenge Jerusalem. On the other hand, the absence of a thriving urban class outside of Jerusalem, engaged in industry and agriculture, would mean there was loss of an effective counterbalance to the military authorities. The 7th century B.C. in Judah witnessed a militarization of Judaean politics and society, both by default due to the loss of other segments of society and as a result of the active strengthening of the defenses of Judah by construction of new fortresses.

The organization of life within the fortresses has yet to be established by archaeological analysis, but a body of literary evidence is provided by the ostraca from Lachish, Arad, and Mesad

Hashavyahu. Apparently some soldiers were mercenaries supplied by Jerusalem, as was the case at Arad where Greeks or Cypriotes are mentioned in a letter, and at Mesad Hashavyahu where Greek pottery was found and interpreted to be evidence of foreign mercenaries in the king's hire. The size of the garrisons was small and the number of soldiers stationed in one would have been insufficient to support any major nonmilitary activities involving agriculture or industry, although the perfume-making installation at Tel Goren may belie the statement.

All significant political activity must have occurred in Jerusalem now. There were probably no longer any regional interests outside of Jerusalem competing with her. But within the city itself there was likely to have been a greater diversity of social and cultural groups, from various regions of Judah and Samaria, than had ever been seen in a Palestinian city since the Late Bronze Age. It would be interesting to know how the king coped with all the new groups and the pressures they placed upon him and upon the fabric of society itself. Jerusalem was probably the home of powerful absentee landlords who previously would have been dispersed among the regional towns of Judah during the 8th century. They might not only have usurped economic control from him, but tested his political power too.

The transformations in the demography, economy, and polity of Judah, due to the destruction of the regional towns, doubtless also resulted in shifts in religious ideas and practices. I submit that a number of religious concepts of the 7th and late 8th centuries B.C. are more intelligible in light of the revised "high" archaeological chronology, which postulates the destruction by 700 B.C. of Tell Beit Mirsim A_2, Lachish level III, Beer-sheba stratum II, Beth Shemesh IIC, and Tell en-Nasbeh, than the traditional "low" chronology, which presumes that they were thriving urban centers until the late 7th and early 6th centuries B.C.

Changes occurred in the religious concepts of the Day of Yahweh, the Remnant, and the valuation of Zion. It is difficult to understand their development in the archaeological context of the "low" chronology, but considered in light of a "high" chronology the message of the prophets would have been more intense for the people of Judah. Isaiah described a situation in which destroyed towns remained deserted ruins, agricultural production had diminished, and the population of the countryside was drastically reduced (Isa 5:8-10, 6:11-13). The prophets of Judah became increasingly outspoken about the social ills of the countryside where the rich took the fields and homes of the poor (Mic 2:2; Isa 5:8), and of Jerusalem where social order had become chaotic (Isa 1:21-28, 3:1-9). Later Zephaniah described the Day of Yahweh in a context in which Judah's enemies mocked her reduced state (Zeph 2:8) and the remnant was identified as the humble and lowly of Judah (Zeph 3:12). One day the Philistines would find themselves reduced to the same state, their land empty of inhabitants and turned into pasturage for the shepherds of Judah (Zeph 2:4-7). The transformed socioeconomic situation also provided a context in which changes in theological concepts and cultic practices were expressed through the Deuteronomic reforms of Josiah's day.

The foregoing model is presented as an attempt to understand cultural processes in which various socioeconomic subsystems of the culture interact; changes in one aspect of the culture affect others which in turn provide positive or negative feedback affecting the first. I have avoided the explicit terminology of systems theory, but some of its concepts underlie the model. In using systems theory it is possible to assume that changes in the material culture, reflected in the archaeological record, are connected to changes in social organization and ideologies of a

society without the necessity of presuming that material and economic factors are the underlying causes for those changes.

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CAN THIS MARRIAGE BE SAVED?

A Critique of Lewis Ford's The Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism (Fortress Press 1978)

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In The Lure of God, Lewis Ford seeks to make a contribution to Christian theology by bringing together Process theism and biblical studies. He writes, "Philosophy and biblical studies are the two extremes which need to be fruitfully married in the theological enterprise. Whether this marriage is successful or not must be left to the reader to decide." (Preface, 5) [1] The need for this marriage lies on both sides of the proposed union: Since the demise of neo-orthodoxy, biblical studies are left with an uncertain entry into the contemporary theological arena, an entry which requires a congenial and adequate conceptuality into which the biblical vision can be translated. On the other hand, up to the present time "much of what has been written as 'process theology' is really simply philosophy written within the context of a Christian perspective" (Preface, 2) and, in Ford's view, the distinctively theological task has been comparatively neglected (a judgment which Meland and Pittenger, with the volume of their output, would be intrigued to learn). Ford makes his essay in Christian theology as primarily a philosopher, with a secondary background in biblical studies. I approach Ford's results primarily from the field of biblical studies, with a purely amateur interest in philosophy and a hermeneutical perspective which is taking shape as the 'natural' fruit of a common-law co-habitation in my mind of the two disciplines which Ford hopes to marry. My critique will be as sharp as I can make it. I trust that Lewis Ford, who is a good friend of mine, will accept this as a compliment to his own work. For one thing, such a critique will help to open up a wide room for discussion during the seminar meeting. But more importantly, I happen in fact to diverge decidedly from Ford (and, I suspect, from a number of other current process thinkers and scholars) on a number of basic issues pertaining to biblical hermeneutics and theology; and I believe it is important that the wider community of non-process people who are attempting to reflect theologically from biblical bases should be disabused of any notion that current process hermeneutics is monolithic in practice or narrowly limited in its potential. I will attempt to confine my critique to matters of hermeneutical method in general, and to the liaison between philosophy and biblical studies in particular, with discussion of theological outcomes included by way of example. Also, I will keep exposition of Ford's general argument to a bare minimum, for reasons of space, and on the assumption that participants in the seminar will have read the book carefully.[5] Therefore, at the risk of a brevity and bluntness which may properly incur a charge of ungracefulness and ungraciousness, I will plunge directly into critique.

1. I find problematic the language in which Ford writes his essay. Granted, this is a 'process essay,' and the writer is entitled to make some use of the categories and special coinages associated with the Masters of Process thought. Yet it is, after all, Ford's hope that

> those unfamiliar with Whitehead or Hartshorne's philosophy can feel at home with this book. While it delves into some of the intricacies involved in applying Whitehead's thought to basic Christian doctrines,

> it addresses the general reader, explaining these Whiteheadian categories as they are needed for this task. (Preface, 5)

Ford's hope is laudable; but I am not convinced that it has been realized. It is not that the whole armory of Whiteheadian terms, or even most of them, is employed. Nevertheless, enough technical terms are used (in key ways), and used constantly, to give the texture of the discussion an esoteric feel. In a technical philosophical discussion, this sort of language is less of a problem. In a book which attempts a marriage between philosophy and another discipline or area of reflection, it is unfortunate. My concern here is twofold: (1) There are a number of persons in the general area of Bible and theology who are searching for fresh perspectives and conceptual tools, who have a general interest in what Process theism may have to offer them. But the history of the interaction between philosophy and biblical studies is ambiguous enough, that many such persons are wary of being drawn into a dialogue which is not a dialogue, where the very terms of discussion in effect force them, so to speak, to play all their games "away from home" and in the Process ballpark. I know from personal experience how suspicious some biblical theologians are of exegetical notions presented in too technical a process terminology. Surely, if Process metaphysics does indeed illuminate, not only the more abstruse and arcane reaches of reality, but also the texture of common lived experience, then the general resources of our common language, freshly and imaginatively employed, allow for the possibility of doing Process theology in what the Anglican Twenty-Fourth Article calls "a tongue . . . understanded of the people." (2) My other concern here is not for the readers of this book, but for the writers of this kind of book. What happens in, and to, the mind of a thinker who persistently uses language this way? I take with deadly seriousness Whitehead's assertion that, in the formulation of metaphysical first principles,

> Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap. [2]

They remain metaphors. The crucial word here is remain. I suppose one difference between a metaphor and a literalism is that literalisms clamorously order a pre-determined leap while metaphors mutely appeal for an imaginative leap. Now, technical language is language on the way to literalism, and one way to follow that way is to use the technical expressions over and over again. From Process and Reality, one could get the impression that Whitehead himself was guilty of such a tendency. Yet we should rather view the sustained use of technical expressions in that book as part of Whitehead's attempt to present his fundamental metaphors in the form of a "sustained conceit." Certainly, one is impressed by the way in which, as Whitehead moved from book to book in his last, philosophical period, he kept changing whole sets of terms, as if to achieve fresh perspective on his central vision through fresh language. Robert Frost somewhere has said that the difference between philosophers and poets is that philosophers get up one metaphor, and then spend the rest of their life detailing and extending it, while poets toss off metaphors at the rate of one a day. I would see Whitehead's shifts in key words and images, from book to book, as evidence for a basically poetic mind at work, searching for freshness, and seeking to escape the snares of language become literal. So then, I take it that a process theology which is most faithful to the central vision and spirit of Whitehead's philosophical vision and system should attempt to move forward toward the Bible with a language whose flexibility evidences the operations of the metaphoric imagination at least

as vividly as the operations of discursive reason and strict logic. Whereas, when I read Process theology which uses too heavy a dosage of Process terminology as the common coin of most of its key sentences, I find myself being drawn into a narrowing and hardening of my own mind and vision. I confess myself to have sinned in this way, in a number of my own first attempts at Process hermeneutics and theology. But increasingly, now, I am tending to fight shy of the peculiar language, in the search for ways of writing (and thinking) which stay as close as possible to ordinary language. Needless to say, I do not intend here to place myself within another theoretical strait-jacket, that of the ordinary-language philosophers! What I have in mind is the sort of thing Owen Barfield writes about in, for example, Speaker's Meaning, or what Philip Wheelwright means by tensive, as contrasted with ordinary and stipulative, language; or what Wordsworth was trying to do in the Lyrical Ballads in contrast with the special diction of eighteenth-century poetry. In my view, it is when we enter deeply into the heart of Whitehead's philosophical vision, but operate as much as possible without the technical language, that we will find that vision most fruitful and generative of fresh insight in other fields; whereas, the more we work within the once-original vocabulary the sooner we will find ourselves repeating the same insights over and over again, with diminishing returns. It is not just a matter of communicating with the non-Whiteheadian community that is at issue here: the deeper issue is the question of what is going on in the thinker's mind, in the act of doing Process theology. Is such an act merely an exercise in conceptual re-enactment, however diversely applied to different special fields? Or does it display any imaginative novelty? Such novelty must be evident, not just in what is said, but in how it is said. In this context, we do well to ponder David Hall's recent comment on the achievement of Bernard Meland:

> One of the first things to appreciate about Meland's works is that he is undoubtedly more successful than anyone writing today -- theologian or philosopher -- in distilling the essence of process thinking from the dross of its technical vocabulary without sacrificing the uniqueness and power of that sensibility. That is not to say that he has simplified or trivialized in any way the insights to be found in process philosophy. On the contrary, there is a profundity and conceptual density in some of Meland's formulations worthy of Master Whitehead himself. [3]

2. While we are in the general vicinity of Ford's passage quoted at the beginning of the previous point, I want to make a comment that is primarily merely an observation, though, as will be seen, obliquely it is also a criticism. Ford tells us that he was "introduced to process theology through /Hartshorne's/ wise tutelage. Nevertheless, there are subtle but important differences between them, and where they differ I find myself siding with Whitehead." (Preface, 5) On re-reading this statement I find myself thinking "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." For the question of Ford's philosophical allegiance, like the question of the "subtle but important differences" between these two philosophers, goes deeper than is indicated by correspondences on matters of specific detail (e.g., concerning God's entitative or societal status, the primordial nature as the realm of eternal objects, and so on). As it happens, on most of the differences to which Ford refers, I find myself agreeing with Hartshorne against Whitehead. Yet, in respect to what I would consider the subtle but important issue in the difference, I side with Whitehead over against Ford and Hartshorne. Hartshorne tells us, in the Preface to The Logic of Perfection, that since the age of seventeen his mind has been made up "to trust reason to the end." His rationalism is such that, in Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, he twice confesses

bewilderment at how certain other people have come upon insight by other modes: "Strange that Longfellow saw /a certain point/ so long before the philosophers did!" (p. 117); and, a few pages later, "James, with his strange flair for (often) reaching the right conclusion though 'only God knows how he got there' (C. I. Lewis), decided that experience comes in finite 'drops'." For all Hartshorne's emphasis, theoretically, on the aesthetic matrix, and his own undoubted actual appreciation for bird song, his commitment to rationalism seems to render him bewildered in the face of others' arrival at insight into the nature of things through modes of consciousness not presided over by reason strictly so called. Whereas, Whitehead called himself a rational empiricist, where the second term no doubt is the more fundamental. In accordance with this, Whitehead held insights arrived at in non-rational modes in high (though of course not uncritical) regard. In the terms of my comparison here of Whitehead with Hartshorne, I find myself agreeing often with Hartshorne's specific conclusions against Whitehead, but in the spirit of Whitehead and for different "reasons"; whereas, in my view, Ford brings to his agreement with Whitehead a temper of mind more characteristic of Hartshorne. This observation is not out of place in a general critique of Ford's hermeneutical method, since it suggests in part the nature of Ford's philosophical and hermeneutical self-understanding. At any rate, this difference between Ford and myself is, I think, of a piece with the differences which run throughout this critique.

3. I come now to Ford's description of that part of his "Marriage Contract" which stipulates the respective duties and spheres of competence of the two partners, philosophy and the Bible or biblical studies. His proposal may conveniently be set forth by several quotations:

> . . . it is the business of philosophy to ascertain that which is purely necessary and universal. . . . It is no accident that the leading exponents of process theism have shied away from revelatory or kerygmatic theology. . . . Process theism recognizes that God possesses both necessary and contingent features, while philosophy can only satisfactorily examine the necessary ones. Regarding these contingent features, we must resort to other methods, and here respect the evidence of historical testimony. . . . God's generic attributes are necessary, and his steadfast purpose is everlasting, but his experience and activity are dependent upon the contingencies of the world. . . . If philosophical inquiry thus discovers contingent aspects in God's full actuality, it also discovers the intrinsic limits of its own inquiry into the mystery of God, for no amount of ingenious argument can deduce the concrete, historical character of that which happens to be, but which could have been otherwise. (Chapter 2, 30,32,33)

> Process is the abstract, necessary matrix whose contingent actualization is history. . . . /The Old Testament's/ medium of expression is historical recital, which concentrates not on what God necessarily is but on what he has contingently done. Process philosophy can complement this biblical recital by providing a description of the necessary conditions whereby such contingent divine activity is possible, just as the biblical recital can complement this abstract philosophical outline by giving it specific, concrete historical contours. (Chapter 2, 34,35)

> The radical contingency of /God's/ involvement /_in history/, known to us through the Scriptures, thus precisely complements the abstract conceptuality process theism offers, while this conceptuality in turn illumines the way in which we today can appropriate this rich heritage. (Epilogue, 1)

In these and similar passages, Ford clearly sets forth his proposal for the relationship between philosophy and the Bible or other historical testimony significant for theological reflection. Since such a relationship as he proposes is not conceivable within the framework of classical theism (for which the categories of contingency and historicity are not applicable to God), but presupposes a view of God such as Process theism presents, Ford's proposal has the freshness and the interest of novelty, and gives an initial impression of consistency and a sense of 'fit.' It may be that the proposal here made is Ford's central hermeneutical proposal in the book under discussion. As such, it would merit a much fuller consideration than can be attempted here. I will content myself with just three brief comments: (1) While Ford undoubtedly does not intend it, and while perhaps he does not even perpetrate it, there is something about the statements which open and close the second group of quotations above (about Process as the abstract, necessary matrix to which the biblical recital gives specific, concrete contours) which seems to hint at a reification of the abstraction. I used to think of space and time in a naive version of the Newtonian view, as an empty matrix gradually filling up with the occurrence of events. Whitehead helped me to understand that space and time are abstractions, or general features of events which are actual. It seems to me that Ford's way of putting the above relationship runs the danger of lapsing back into a Newtonian view of reality; whereas, if Whitehead is right, what is concrete gives contours to nothing but itself. Parenthetically, this is an example of what I consider one of the fatal seductions of too close an observance of Whiteheadian terminology: After a while, all the talk about the actualization of possibilities begins to seduce one into the notion that the dynamism of history is (merely) a matter of actualization, that the characters in the drama of history are, somehow, all just waiting in the wings, ready to walk onto the stage on cue. By the Ontological Principle, surely it is actual entities (and not even 'actuality' generically) that are the 'matrix' out of which other contingent actualities are born; and abstract terms such as 'process' and 'necessity' are ways of describing aspects of these entities in themselves and in their inter-relationships. (2) I cannot agree, and I doubt that Ford will get many biblical theologians to agree, that philosophy has sole jurisdiction over discussions of God's necessary and universal nature, and that the Biblical story concentrates "not on what God necessarily is but on what he has contingently done." If my beloved teacher, G. Ernest Wright, would have agreed with Ford, it would have been because (unlike Ford -- and unlike myself) he vigorously disputed the intelligibility and appropriateness of <u>any</u> talk of God's own being, and thought all talk should have to do with, or at least proceed from, what God has done. I would like to ask -- where do we get our notions of what is necessary and universal, but by generalization from what is contingent and particular? Is this not why, repeatedly, Whitehead urged the inclusion of poetry, law, moral and sociological habits, art, historical judgments, and so on, as the evidence upon which philosophical thought should be built and to which it must answer? To be a rational empiricist is to attempt to make sense out of experience -- but experience is irreducibly historical; and the necessary and universal, though it may be distinguishable from the contingent and historical, is never 'had' apart from them. If this be so, may we not derive our notions of God's necessary and universal being from the contingencies and particularities of the Biblical story? I would suppose that the Bible tells a story which serves as a <u>vehicle</u> whose <u>tenor</u> (to use the terms proposed by I. A. Richards) is, not just the shape of the human story under God, and not even just the story of God (though, I would emphatically agree, Process theism helps us to see that it is that), but also the nature and the character of the God who is its central character. (3) Ford's proposal contains another problem: <u>if</u> history is such, in its particularity, that we cannot move from it

to God's necessary being, and is limited to disclosing God's contingent existence, then how is the Bible adequate to this aspect of theology's task? Surely there is more to the consequent nature of God than is presented in the Bible. Indeed, given the well-known fact that the Bible contains, not a record of actual history, but a story which offers typical events which have a variable relation to actual events, it could be argued that the Bible is more fitted for the first type of reflection than the second. Yet, we may perhaps generalize from what is presented in the Bible and deduce that what the Bible says in principle about the consequent nature of God gives us the hermeneutical key to how the whole of cosmic history enters into God "unto whom are all things." But if we can generalize from the biblical particulars in respect to the contingent divine nature, it is not clear to me why we may not do so in respect to God as necessary.

4. I will introduce my next two points of criticism by means of two series of comments by Stanley R. Hopper in his essay "Whitehead: Redivivus? or Absconditus?"[4] The first set of his comments will bear upon the issue I will raise in the following point, and the second set will bear upon the issue I wish to raise in this point. This somewhat awkward form of presentation will preserve the sequence, and the sense, of Hopper's own argument.

(1) In the first place, Hopper spends some time insisting upon the primacy of the aesthetic vision in Whitehead:

> We should note . . . that Whitehead's is a cosmological philosophy based upon an aesthetic picture of relations. . . . Cosmology as aesthetic vision is . . . the feature of Whitehead's work that must be stressed, for this is the clue to the most direct comprehension of Whitehead's philosophy. (p. 114)

> Aesthetics is wider in scope than logic, and so contains it. 'Indeed,' wrote Whitehead, 'when the topic of aesthetics has been sufficiently explored, it is doubtful whether there will be anything left for discussion.'
> But more than this, the mode of the process itself is aesthetic. (p. 116)

> I have spoken of the primacy of the aesthetic vision in Whitehead at length because it is, curiously, the dimension of Whitehead's speculative philosophy that is either subordinated or ignored by so many Whiteheadian enthusiasts today, and especially by those who seek his philosophic offices for the doing of theology; . . . (p. 117)

> This is . . . Whitehead's view: that both metaphysics and theology have an aesthetic base, not a logical one. (p. 118)

> Whitehead puts it bluntly: 'Logicians are not called in to advise artists.' (p. 119)

(2) The bearing of the preceding quotations upon Ford's way of doing theology will occupy us shortly. Meanwhile, with reference to the point I wish now to raise, I will continue the series of quotations:

> What is true of the relation between aesthetics and logic is true to even a higher degree of the relation between "metaphysics" and theology. To re-apply a happy simile of Whitehead's, there is Aaron's rod, and there are the magicians' serpents: the only question for theology

> is which swallows which? If the metaphysical system is given formal primacy, then the theologian quite properly objects that something has been left out . . . . If "metaphysics" is used in its traditional manner, theology is swallowed, which is what contemporary theology has been resisting in all its existentialist forms. But it would appear that Whitehead is resisting it too if he is permitted to come forward on his own terms: that is to say, in terms of the aesthetic. For the aesthetic requires the factuality of feeling as indispensable to actual entities, and it requires the metaphorical language of appetition, feeling, satisfaction, life. (pp. 119-120).

The point I wish to make now is simply this: At a number of places in the book, we observe the magician's serpent swallowing Aaron's rod. That is to say, given the formal primacy of Ford's metaphysical system, the data of the Bible are either fitted into this system, or left out. Item: The biblical witness to God's power includes portrayals of that power as both coercive and persuasive. Since process theism defines God's power primarily or strictly in terms of persuasion, those elements of the Biblical portrayal which have to do with divine efficient causation or coercion are eliminated as data. Item: Since Apocalypticism presents the historical process in images which stress divine coercive power and divine control of the outcomes of history, Apocalyptic is found seriously wanting, if not an outright mis-representation, as a portrayal of the dynamics of the historical process. Item: The formal requirements of Process metaphysics make it problematic to conceive of the Christ as revealing to us the character of God, therefore his significance must lie in his being God's specific address to man. Item: The requirements of Process metaphysics, together with our current sense for the vastness of the cosmos, make it difficult to conceive of the Christ as having cosmic significance. therefore it is concluded that the Christ is significant for us human beings. Item: It was, in the first instance, the polarities in Christological New Testament texts, and the shape of Christian life and devotion, which led to two-nature doctrines of the Christ. Classical theism presented certain ways of formulating an understanding of these polarities. What governs Ford's discussion is, not the polarities inherent in the texts and in Christian devotion and life, but the requirements and the possibilities defined by his system of Process theism. Item: Process theism, at least in the formulations of Whitehead and Hartshorne, is probably neutral on the question of individual subjective immortality (though Hartshorne does seem to give some necessary "grounds" for the denial of it to finite creatures). For Ford also the question is to be settled on general philosophical and existential grounds, and the conviction which lies on the surface of the New Testament writers may be disregarded. (Yet why? Supposing Ford were correct in his proposal concerning the distribution of competencies between philosophy and Bible: is there any topic which is more germane to God's contingent nature than the question of the continuation of a living relation between him and his subjects? This seems to be the implication of Jesus' response to the Sadducees, on the basis of the historically defined self-description "I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob.") In all these instances, Aaron's rod is swallowed (though hardly digested and assimilated); and I can recall not one instance in Ford's book where the scenario ends to Aaron's advantage. This is odd. What is the explanation? What status does Whitehead's completed metaphysical scheme have for Ford? Is it unrevisable? Or unimpeachable? In Chapter 8, entitled "The Sources of Christian Hope," Ford writes, "here metaphysics fails us. . . . In this chapter we must leave metaphysical certainties and venture forth tentatively . . ." (Chapter 8.4,5). Metaphysical certainties indeed! This is a far cry from Whitehead's

prefatory comment in Process and Reality that

> There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosophic discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly.

Has Ford not learned the lesson which he says Whitehead learned with the shattering of Newtonian physics, a lesson which, Ford tells us, gave Whitehead's thinking ever afterwards "an element of tentativeness"? (Chapter 1, 5)

The other side of this issue is the question of the status of the Bible as Canon, as Scripture, in and for the Church. (Of course, we may decide that we need to abandon the notion and the specification of a Canon; but Ford does not raise this possibility.) I confess to having no very good way to understand or to articulate a case for the Bible as the Church's Canon of Scripture. But I find myself acting and thinking within a frame of reference which includes a confession and a use of the Bible as Scripture. I look to Process thought for a way to understand what I experience, and to enhance that experience. Not only do I not find it, but I sense in Ford's procedure an at least implicit (though no doubt inadvertent) invitation to change the locus of my Canon. Now such a move would be theologically more novel and momentous than any other which Ford proposes; and I would like to hear Ford disclaim this implication of his way of doing theology. In raising the question of Canon, and in suggesting that Ford's method implies a relocation of Canon from the Bible to Whitehead, I may be speaking too sharply. Yet, what is the import of the words in Chapter 2,4, where Ford claims that "The history of God's dealings with Israel can no longer serve as the all-embracing horizon for our understanding of God. . . . It would appear that only a philosophical structure can provide a sufficiently inclusive context suitable to our needs"? With the Bible, as with the Christ, Ford seems to be laboring under a problem of size, or scale: The history of God's dealings with Israel is not adequate to our expanded cosmic and economic and ethical situations; and the doctrine of the universal Christ cannot hope to be adequate to our realization that there are, almost certainly, intelligent beings on other planets. Indeed, with respect to the scope of the significance of the Christ, Ford in one place refers to the "naive assumption /of our forefathers/ of the uniqueness and exalted status of man." (Chapter 4,46) Our forefathers may have been wrong; but I do not think they were naive or parochial in their vision. If we have to deal with the possibility of intelligent and possibly superior orders of life elsewhere in outer space, they had to deal with a rather widespread and considerably less tenuous belief in the reality of hierarchies of beings in the heavens which placed man rather low on the totem pole of the great chain of being. Yet they gave expression to a vision of the Christ as Lord over all these hierarchies -- bold, sweeping, breathtaking, perhaps completely wrong-headed, but hardly naive. Teilhard's vision of the cosmic Christ may be problematic in its details; but in its scope and daring, and in the sense it conveys for man's open-endedness, at least it is homologous with the Biblical vision. In comparison, Ford's is reductionistic, not to say parochial. Is it a matter of the reach of one's hermeneutical imagination?

5. My final point of critique recurs to the question of Ford's relationship to Hartshorne and Whitehead, in the distribution of his emphasis upon reason and experience, upon logic and aesthetics. Early in the book Ford echoes Whitehead's requirements for a system of general ideas, when he writes that a given philosophical theory "must be both

consistent and coherent in itself, and adequate and applicable to human experience." (Preface, 2). (Whitehead's terms are : coherent, logical, applicable and adequate.) Throughout the body of his essay, however, there is a distinct bias in favor of consistency. The word crops up again and again, in a usage which indicates that by consistency Ford means primarily logical consistency. By this emphasis, and from a study of how it works in various hermeneutical applications, I would assert that Ford locks himself into a system which cannot help but fall short of the ideal of adequacy. To come back again to Whitehead's phrase, "rational empiricism" is "experience seeking understanding" and not "understanding seeking exemplification in experience." The desire for consistency is a faith which seeks vindication within the particularities (and, as often, in the face of the particularities) of experience. It is a faith which often must live by hope and not by sight. So, what does one do, when one has in one hand the requirement of logical consistency and in the other hand the dissonant insistencies of discordant experience, immediately had or as reported in concrete, expressive and presentational modes of language? Does one resolve the tension theoretically? And if so, in what direction? Or is the tension handled in some other way? In his poem "The Armful," Robert Frost describes the shopper walking home with an armful of parcels --

> And the whole pile is slipping, bottles, buns,
> Extremes too hard to comprehend at once,
> Yet nothing I should care to leave behind.

There is the dilemma, in an armful or a cosmos-ful. Frost goes on:

> With all I have to hold with, hand and mind
> And heart, if need be, I will do my best
> To keep their building balanced at my breast.

The order of what we have to hold with is significant: hand, mind, and heart if need be. The desire for logical consistency in our grasp of things is a desire to hold our world together with our minds because our practical might is not equal to the world's discordant efficacies. Were our hands sufficient, we would not need to think. But the temptation is to try to make our thinking sufficient -- for we would rather not have to hold the world together by feeling, by that creative agony which might draw the discords into reconciliation through our own growth and, thereby, the world's growth. The stubborn fact seems to be, however, that there is a mystery and a dissonance in the universe which resists being held with the hand and with the mind -- and whether or not it may be held with the heart, that is all that we have left, and indeed is the most capacious mode of com-prehension we have. On that page in Process and Reality where he refers to H. M. Sheffer's emphasis on the fundamental logical importance of the notion of 'incompatibility,' Whitehead also writes "But 'feelings' are the entities which are primarily 'compatible' or 'incompatible.' All other usages of these terms are derivative." (This statement, again, confirms Hopper's argument concerning the primacy of aesthetic over logic for Whitehead.) The lesson here for hermeneutics, it seems to me, is this: In our attempt to translate the biblical poetics into a philosophical conceptuality, we are to take care to leave nothing behind. And sometimes such taking care must move on, beyond the sufficiency of the mind's grasp at consistency.

II.

I would like to continue, now, with an autobiographical statement (theology as story), which may shed some light on my critical perspective on Lewis Ford's hermeneutical method, and after which I will try to draw attention to what I consider to be one essential element in adequate method. This statement is unabashedly personal; but I make no claim of diplomatic immunity for it.

My earliest years up to about the age of thirteen were spent in a personal and -- as I thought -- family climate of naive and unreflective agnosticism. Between my thirteenth year (when my father died) and my graduation from high school, I came gradually but increasingly to a deep sense of the absurdity, the meaninglessness and pointlessness, of the triviality of existence in the face of the apparent finality of perishing and death. This despair was succeeded, eventually, by a renewed sense of the worthwhileness of things, in the context of a personal appropriation of the Christian faith and entry into the community of the Church. My new-found outlook, naively Christian, no doubt included many superficial, conflicting, and simply wrong-headed notions. Six years of study in Liberal Arts and Theology -- years which witnessed more than one crisis of belief and of doubt -- gave me some experience of the need and the practice of critical reflection upon my experience and upon the tradition within which I now stood. Thereafter, further study in the Bible, and the general climate of post-neo-orthodox theologizing, in a wider cultural climate of increasing secularity, led to a gradual erosion of the intellectual dimensions of my faith and, concomitantly, of the vital energy of my life. Momentum (or inertia -- I suppose they are the same thing) kept me going, until I came to my present institutional situation. Here, I found myself frequently conversing and arguing with a colleague in theology who periodically would needle me with the comment "you ought to read Whitehead -- you're a process thinker and you don't know it." In self-defence I began to read Whitehead. The revolution that ensued in all aspects and modes of my life was of the sort that I do not expect to experience again in this life (though I cannot be sure). For one thing, for the first time philosophy became for me a possible mode of reflection, and sometimes even a mode of vision and of existence, rather than just a bad memory of a curriculum requirement that I had messed up (in the major term paper on The Rationalism of Descartes, I was told, I had completely neglected to expound his epistemology and his axiology and a few other points on the compass, in my passionate preoccupation and attempt to prove, or rather to show, that Descartes' proof for the existence of God didn't (dammit) work). No matter how badly I might comport or disport myself in it, I could now function in a new way. But alongside of this discovery came a re-discovery -- of the reality of existence, the density, the efficacy, the worthwhileness, the willingness to live with energy though energy might bring pain. Someone has written somewhere in an issue of Process Studies that Whitehead once summed up his philosophy in the words (approximately): Reality matters -- and it has consequences. Exactly! This became my experience on reading Whitehead. The whole thing began to matter, and everything in it began to matter, even me as a part. Now, on the one hand, this experience was strikingly analogous to that earlier experience when I consciously and intentionally had appropriated the Christian faith and made it my own, and understood myself to have been appropriated and made part of a universal and inclusive reality called the Kingdom of God. But the analogy did not have the character of "B" replacing, or even of translating, its earlier analog "b". At the time of the discovery of Whitehead, I believe I would have been willing to set aside the biblical corpus like an old pair of

outgrown shoes (coated perhaps in bronze, and mounted on a plastic base in front of an old picture of myself in seminary), and to become a purely philosophical natural theist, taking the Bible positively as far as it legitimately went but largely as a historical phenomenon now increasingly obsolete. For, at that time, many aspects of the Bible were a distinct burden and embarrassment to me, of the sort that Whitehead might have been expected to offer me a way beyond. But that did not prove to be my experience. As economic necessity kept me working in and teaching the Bible, my experience was that the more deeply I read into Whitehead, the more lively and meaningful and cogent and applicable and efficaciously real became the biblical materials. At first, I spent my enthusiasm matching up philosophical category with Biblical metaphor, and Whiteheadian notion with Scriptural theme. Gradually this has given way to a situation in which Whitehead's thought forms an increasingly un-selfconscious background to my study of the Bible. (My sub-title for a book like Lewis Ford's would have to be just the reverse of his.) Increasingly, what I find myself doing is trying to explore the particular images and metaphors in their biblical constellations, together with the themes which they announce and the narrative sequences to which they contribute, in a way that seeks out their meaning from within, freed from two thousand years of a certain metaphysical perspective, free to entertain another perspective, and gradually trying to adjust the results of one such hermeneutical exploration with the results of another, using Whitehead's ideas where they are helpful and leaving them alone where they are not, and holding conflicting results under suspended sentence, seeking to resolve them or reconcile them not so much formally and logically but aesthetically, and not just on paper but within myself, by seeking to grow existentially to a place in which the conflicts may be reconciled dynamically. The bearing of all this upon my critique of Lewis Ford's book is this: dearly as I hold Lewis in bonds of personal esteem, and highly as I esteem his Whiteheadian scholarship and general reflective abilities -- when I read his book I find that, rather than being led more deeply into wider reaches of Scripture, I am held at a certain abstractive distance from the text, and the Scriptural resources for reflection and action are narrowed and diminished under the requirement of a notion of consistency that strikes me as a version of what Meland calls 'closure' -- a concern for coherence at the expense of disregard for dissonance. And I must confess that all this works to lessen the interest that Ford's book holds for me.

Which leads me to a concluding hermeneutical suggestion concerning the place of interest. Readers of Science and the Modern World will remember Whitehead's statement, in his chapter on God, to the effect that after Aristotle's great, entirely dispassionate metaphysical consideration of God, "ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions." In this passage, dispassionateness clearly seems to be given a higher place among the investigative or hermeneutical virtues than interest. Yet there is the section in the first chapter of Modes of Thought where Whitehead discusses interest in much more positive terms vis-a-vis the concern for truth: "The zeal for truth presupposes interest." But, I would add, authentic results of such zeal also contribute to an intensification of interest. I would add this on the authority of the overall argument of Modes of Thought, in which the rise and fall of the sense of importance (or interest) and the fall and rise of a sense of triviality are a function of a true grasp of the nature of things. (I am reminded here of Northrop Frye's distinction, in The Critical Path, between myths of concern and myths of freedom -- the point being that myths of freedom are a special form of myths of concern.) In chapter six of Modes of Thought Whitehead speaks of primal awareness as taking the form "have a care, here is something that matters!" In Adventures of Ideas he

speaks in his first philosophical chapter (XI) of this fundamental awareness, or structure of existence, in terms of the awareness of concern, and it is not until the next chapter (XII) that he discusses freedom as the dimension of disconnectedness from the wider universe. But what I would like to suggest, in the context of this reflection on hermeneutical method, is that, just as concern and freedom both are inherently important dimensions of existence, so interest and dispassionateness are likewise important ingredients in exploration into the nature of things. The importance of dispassionateness is in its service of the enhancement of the inherent importance of things, attested in our various modes of interest. But since it has been exalted for some time now as a hermeneutical virtue (the objectivity of research, and so on), it is perhaps time to give interest its due. Indeed, within the frame of reference of an aesthetic philosophy, it may be suggested that freedom and dispassionateness can lead to disregard for the wider community of actuality, out of a deadening or atrophy of sensitive regard for the structure of experience which is a community of concern. And on the other hand, interest, while it begins with the self, by the nature of the subject-object (or rather, the subject-subject) structure of things, leads the interested subject through sympathy or fellow-feeling, outward to the widest reaches of existence. For is not interest the energy inherent in prehensive outreach? And it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true. There is of course the immediately following cautionary remark that truth adds to interest. And yet even this caution is instructive; for the full statement is that the importance of truth is, that it adds to interest. Moreover, I suggest that sometimes interest uncovers truth where nothing else can. Hermeneutically speaking, then, I would hazard as a general principle, that that system is more likely to be useful as a working tool of investigation, which tends to intensify one's sense of the intrinsic interest and the inclusive importance of all things and the fatefulness of one's own active and passional participation in it. I would suggest that all other hermeneutical considerations operate within this "hermeneutical field of interest," and have the function of specifying the causes of greater or lesser interest -- or of providing a smoke-screen for one's primal judgments. It is within such a "hermeneutical field" that I personally find Lewis Ford's book less interesting than I had hoped, and certainly much less interesting than I find Lewis Ford.

NOTES

1. This essay was prepared on the basis of access to galley proofs of The Lure of God. In the absence of pagination, references are by chapter and to paragraphs numbered consecutively in each chapter.

2. Process and Reality, I.I.II.

3. In a review of Meland's Fallible Forms and Symbols, in Process Studies-7/2 (Summer 1977), p. 112.

4. In William A. Beardslee, ed., America and the Future of Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967).

5. For an expository account of The Lure of God, see Process Studies 7/4 (Winter 1977).

S 221 WHAT IS THE TASK OF HERMENEUTICS?

A Response to Lewis Ford's
The Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978)

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Lewis S. Ford teaches philosophy at Old Dominion University and is the literary editor of the journal Process Studies, co-edited by John B. Cobb, Jr. He is well known for his contributions to the technical discussion of process thought in a variety of philosophical and theological journals. An example of this work is a volume of essays comparing Hartshorne and Whitehead, Two Philosophers: Hartshorne's Encounter with Whitehead, AAR Studies in Religion, No. 5 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1973), which he edited.

In The Lure of God Ford brings together his skills of philosophy and, to a lesser extent (he says so of himself), biblical studies. This book consists of eight essays, a Preface and an Epilogue. With the exception of two of the essays ("Reconciliation through the Cross," and "The Sources of Hope"), parts of individual essays draw from materials presented either in lectures or in journal articles: "Whitehead's Pilgrimage to Process Theism" and "Divine Sovereignty" were presented as lectures in 1974 (the latter to a conference on process philosophy and biblical studies held at Christian Theological Seminary in Indianapolis). "Divine Persuasion and the Old Testament" has appeared in an earlier version in Interpretation 26 (1972):198-209. "Recent Process Christology" draws on materials that originally appeared in The Raymond Review 2 (1968): 1-14; Religious Studies 8 (1972): 169-73; Anglican Theological Review 55 (1973): 479-83; and Encounter 35 (1974): 281-94. Most of "The Resurrection of Jesus as the Emergence of the Body of Christ" appeared in Religion and Life 42 (1973): 466-78. And a simplified and abridged version of "A Process Trinitarianism" appeared in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 43 (1975) 199-213 /1/.

Ford seeks to show in these essays that process thought can illumine the understanding of biblical traditions and enable their creative appropriation. The essays are arranged so that each unfolds logically and systematically the notion "the lure of God," which refers to Whitehead's ontology of events and what Ford regards as the fundamental feature of biblical tradition: namely, the belief that God acts in history. His thesis is that this belief is intelligible within process theism and that the process concept "the lure of God" illumines certain aspects of the biblical tradition. Briefly, to say that God's action in history is in the mode of a "lure" means that God's action in history is never simply identical with any historical event, for divine power is persuasive rather than coercive and, therefore, requires creaturely response.

This process ontology of events is applied to the concept "kingdom of God" and the apocalyptic vision of the final triumph of God over evil in the world; to the claim of christology that in Jesus we encounter the creative word or address of God to the human situation; to the image of the body of Christ as the emergence, through the resurrection of Jesus, of a new corporate reality enlivened and directed by the Spirit of Christ, which is the creative power of God for humanity; to the event of Jesus' crucifixion as evidence of the passion of God, through which God's purpose for humanity was intensified by enabling the emergence of the body of Christ in Jesus' resurrection; to the doctrine of the Trinity as an elaboration of the inner complexity of God, which explains both how God is transcendent of and immanent in the world and how the world is immanent in and transcendent of God; and to the theme of Christian hope, whose sources are identified as the body of Christ, which is evidence that God is able to triumph over evil, and the God who gathers all things and transforms them for the good of all.

However much light is shed on these features of biblical tradition, the sub-title of this book is misleading. For the book does not demonstrate the implied claim that process theism has "a biblical background." The most it can do is show that process theism, whose claims can be and have been established on other grounds, does "fit" and can "illumine" certain parts of biblical tradition. To be sure, biblical tradition was not without any influence on process theism. Process theism did not evolve deductively from a set of first principles. Rather, the first principles of process theism were derived from an analysis of the truths implicit in concrete experience, including the experiences of the adherents of the world's religions, particularly Christianity. Therefore, when Ford, selecting from all the symbols and images of the biblical tradition, chose to apply process theism to the concept "the kingdom of God" and the event of Jesus' cross, for example, that selection was not arbitrary. It reflects one of the sources from which process theism derives its understanding of the relation between God and the world. And yet, by applying the conceptuality of process theism to biblical traditions, Ford shows how this conceptuality "illumines" and "translates" (even "replaces") certain features of the Bible without displaying how they might have informed process theism as it developed.

Perhaps much that is good in this book will be lost on some readers because of the claim made by Ford that the hermeneutical task calls for "replacing" biblical categories with philosophical concepts (Epilogue: 134-35). Remembering that the book began by proposing "a biblical background for process theism," one wonders how that promise could become so transmuted by the end. The statements that follow seem to qualify and explain Ford's conclusion:

> But it is important that there be no premature abandonment of history's nurturing role . . . .
>
> History provides the proper way into theology, but philosophy is the critic of the consistency of its perspectives. Theology today must be articulated by means of philosophical concepts, and these should be evaluated according to purely philosophical criteria of consistency, coherence, adequacy, and applicability. Yet if these concepts are to be adequate and applicable to all experience, this experience must also include the experience of biblical man. While philosophy may judge the consistency of his interpretive standpoints, it cannot gainsay his witness [i.e., "biblical man's"] to the contingencies of divine action.
>
> Process theism is the natural ally of biblical history, for process is history abstractly conceived. Process theism can provide the contemporary conceptuality by which we can appropriate this ancient literature, while the biblical tradition can provide those concrete particularities whereby our lives are given final meaning. [Epilogue: 135.]

These statements, cryptic as they may seem following the claim that "the universality of the Christian proclamation of salvation for all requires that the particularity of historical categories be replaced by the universality of philosophical concepts," refer to the normative rather than to the descriptive side of the hermeneutical task. Because the descriptivist approach to biblical theology dominates today, these comments require more elaboration and defense than Ford provides.

Of course a good descriptivist knows that each historical community provides its own symbols, images and concepts for expressing its identity and experience. The OT scholar, for example, knows the variety of diverse expressions that arose in Israel to express the self-same conviction that the history of Israel embodies "the lure of God" for the people of Israel. Each expression is meant to proclaim God's creative word for a particular people in a concrete historical situation using idioms and forms of expression understandable and effective in that time and place. Each case represents a normative judgment concerning the appropriate form of expression, just as in theology today. The same is true of the NT: each christological title, for example, seeks to express the conviction that in Jesus is encountered God's address to the predicament of human existence; and each does so in terms of a different conceptuality, which is considered to be normative in the community that uses it. So the biblical tradition itself sets the precedent for the normative side of the hermeneutical task, to which Ford refers in the closing words of his book.

So the question is not whether he should have made

any normative judgment at all, but whether in making the judgment to replace biblical categories with the conceptuality of process theism he will be able to achieve an appropriate and understandable expression of the faith of which the biblical traditions in their own ways are also expressions. The success of the book on this level is uneven. Ford's interpretation of the image "kingdom of God" fails to explain adequately how this image of divine sovereignty can coherently balance concepts of divine persuasion and coercion; but it does elucidate the coherence of the belief in the present immediacy and the futurity of the reign of God in this world. His interpretation of the body of Christ as a new corporate reality, enlivened and directed by the Spirit of Christ, which emerged in the resurrection of Jesus, is a faithful rendering of a NT image; although one wonders what to make of Ford's identification of it as a "biological" phenomenon (Chapters 3:42 and 5:74). And his explanation of how a process conceptuality says better for us what the apocalyptic vision of God's final triumph over evil in the world meant to say in antiquity is likewise appropriate to early Chrstian witnesses to God as the End of all things.

The most serious weakness of this book, however, is not in the interpretation of individual biblical themes, concepts or images, but rather its failure to maintain the distinction between "empirical-historical" and "existential-historical" assertions /2/. This failure leads to confusion in Ford's discussion of christology, although it is not limited to Chapter 4; on the contrary, it is found throughout Chapters 5-7, which deal with Jesus' resurrection, salvation through the cross, and the Trinity. On one level, Ford correctly, both from the standpoint of philosophy and from that of the NT, treats assertions about Jesus' life, death and resurrection as properly "existential-historical" assertions, insofar as Ford maintains that they fundamentally seek to express the belief that in the historical life of Jesus "the lure of God" for the human predicament is encountered. But, on another level, he makes the assertion, in various ways, that Jesus "fully actualized" God's address to humanity in his life and death (despite his other claim that Jesus became the Christ in the resurrection). That we are here dealing with "empirical-historical" assertions is established by Ford's references to the faithfulness, patience, care, love and peace which Jesus is alleged to have enjoyed in his life and death (Chapters 3:38; 5:75, 79; 6:81, 90-91, 93; and 7:104). Only statements of fact can warrant such assertions, although in the nature of the case such warrants are neither possible nor legitimate /3/. Ford himself wants to relativize these assertions of Jesus' "saintliness" to the extent that he argues that they are necessary but insufficient to warrant the claim that Jesus is the Christ (Chapter 4:51-52). What is sufficient is the "existential-historical" assertion that Jesus is the Christ because in Jesus God's address to the predicament of human existence is encountered. The necessity of "empirical-historical" assertions of Jesus' "full actualization" of this divine address in

his own life and death for the "existential-historical" assertion that Jesus is the Christ is merely assumed rather than argued. The result is that the emphasis, which the NT maintains, upon the present reality of Jesus as the Christ (i.e. what he is for us) is shifted to what Jesus was in the past and in himself /4/.

Ford's denial that we can know anything about Jesus' allegedly unique inner psychic structure, and his observation, that

> if we cannot know but only believe, then the question becomes whether we can have any confidence that our belief in such a unique psychic structure is even meaningful [Chapter 4:67],

are vitiated by his other assertions about the full actualization of the "christological aim" in Jesus' life and death. How can such assertions even be legitimate, let alone necessary, if their factual warrants are in principle unknowable?

This confusion reflects a misunderstanding of the hermeneutical task. Evidently Ford considers the hermeneutical task of theology to be one of speaking about the past in its pastness rather than one of speaking about the past in its present meaning for us. The former is the "empirical-historical" task of the historian, understood in the narrower sense of the reconstruction and description of events; and it would be fruitful to explore the contribution of process theism to that historical task /5/. But the hermeneutical task of theology is the "existential-historical" one of enabling a contemporary understanding of the address of God for the predicament of human existence as it is contained in the Hebrew and Christian Testaments. This task requires a careful exegetical-historical analysis of the understanding(s) of the human situation and its solution(s) in the biblical traditions, as well as a philosophical analysis of human existence; the two cannot be separated, but each should inform the other.

The contribution of process philosophy to this hermeneutical task has yet to be fully explored, despite the work of Schubert Ogden, who makes the most persuasive argument for understanding the hermeneutical task of theology as "existential-historical" /6/. A Bultmannian as well as a Hartshornian, Ogden follows the existentialist philosophical analysis of human existence developed by Heidegger, an analysis which presupposes a single pattern of the human predicament and its solution for humanity of all times. But it is becoming increasingly clear, largely through the essays of Krister Stendahl /7/ and E. P. Sanders /8/, that more than one pattern of the human predicament and its solution is found in biblical traditions. Just within the NT, for example, it can be shown that Paul and his "opponents," and even Paul and the second-generation Paulinists, have different understandings of human existence and of

Christ as the solution to its problem; and the same can be shown to exist between the earliest Jesus-traditions and the gospels that contain them. What is needed, therefore, is a new philosophical analysis of the patterns of human existence, which would inform and be informed by a fresh analysis of the patterns of human existence and its solutions in biblical traditions. One such analysis is provided in John B. Cobb, Jr., The Structure of Christian Existence (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), which has not yet exerted any influence in the field of biblical studies (perhaps because of its weaknesses, which by his own admission require its revision).

The conclusion that the hermeneutical task is misconstrued by Ford in his book The Lure of God is not meant, however, to dismiss what he has done there. The reader will find much that is stimulating and provocative in it. And even if the reader disagrees with the way Ford attempts to consummate a marriage of process theism and biblical studies, one will at least agree that the effort itself is worthwhile. Those who share his interest in the future of process theology will also hope that the marriage can be a good one, for no theology that does not bear witness to the faith that we encounter "the lure of God" for our human situation in the biblical witnesses of faith can long survive.

NOTES

/1/ Hereafter references to The Lure of God will be by chapter number and page; however, since at this writing the book has not yet been published, the pages cited will be from a copy of the page proofs kindly supplied by Fortress Press.

/2/ This distinction has been persuasively argued for by Schubert M. Ogden in "The Point of Christology," The Journal of Religion 55 (1975): 379, n. 4:

> empirical-historical assertions function to make claims about the historical past, whose warrants, if any, must be empirically given or inferred, while existential-historical assertions are used to make or imply claims about our present existence as itself historical and, therefore, must be warranted, if at all, by an existentialist analysis of human existence.

Cf. also his "Falsification and Belief," Religious Studies 10 (1974): 21-43.

/3/ Cf. Ogden, JR 55 (1975): 382, n. 7, where he also refers to Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief (London: SCM Press, 1966), pp. 246-91. Cf. also Ogden and Harvey, "How New is the 'New Quest of the Historical Jesus'?" pp. 197-242 in The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ: Essays on the New Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. by Carl E. Braaten

and Roy A. Harrisville (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1964).

/4/ Cf. Ogden's criticism of the christology of John B. Cobb, Jr., in "Christology Reconsidered: John Cobb's Christ in a Pluralistic Age [Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1975]," Process Studies 6 (1976): 116-22 (Cobb's reply follows on 123-29).

/5/ John B. Cobb, Jr. has done this in "History, Ontology, and Christian Faith," Religion in Life 34 (1965):270-87; and in an unpublished paper presented in the SBL/Process Hermeneutic and Biblical Exegesis Group meeting in Chicago (1975), "Trajectories and Historical Routes."

/6/ Cf. JR 55 (1975): 375-95; "What is Theology?" JR 52 (1972): 22-40; and "The Task of Philosophical Theology," pp. 55-84 in The Future of Philosophical Theology, ed. by Robert A. Evans (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1971).

/7/ Paul Among Jews and Gentiles, and Other Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), which includes "The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West" (originally in Harvard Theological Review 56 [1963]: 199-215), which first drew attention to the lack in Paul's letters of language about guilt and forgiveness as key words in his understanding of the problem of human existence and its solution.

/8/ Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), which expands on Stendahl's work, and which carries out the thesis of Sanders' earlier article, "Patterns of Religion in Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: A Holistic Method of Comparison," Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973): 455-78.

S 246 A RESPONSE TO JOHN COLLINS'
"METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF I ENOCH"

Paul D. Hanson

I Enoch 6-11 bristles with literary and historical problems. They are problems of the type which demand that the scholar first of all ask the right questions, secondly use an appropriate method of investigation, thirdly, carefully sift through all pertinent data, and, fourthly, use imagination restrained by constant reference back to the data in deriving conclusions. By virtue of the complex nature of the material, however, these conclusions will usually remain tentative.

What does this have to say to the topic of the Pseudepigrapha Group? First, it explains why I wrote my article. As a member of the editorial board of Hermeneia who was interested in the pseudepigrapha, I wanted to participate in George Nickelsburg's task of writing an Enoch commentary in more than a casual manner. So I decided to study chapters 1-36, with special attention to 6-11. It seemed like a good passage from which to raise important methodological issues, since such issues are better addressed concretely than in an abstract discussion which never plunges into actual texts. Secondly, it explains why Nickelsburg and I wrote separate articles. We could have emphasized a joint approach, and emerged with one statement. We felt that this would have failed to emphasize sufficiently the complexity of the material under study. We also recognized the validity of input from scholars coming at the material from different directions. Thirdly, it offers suggestions concerning our objectives in this discussion, for as difficult as I Enoch 6-11 is, it is typical of a vast corpus of material, material of extreme importance for the so-called intertestamental period, and material largely untouched by study applying up-to-date tools and discoveries. To have two articles on I Enoch 6-11 followed by a third followed by two more replies and another major paper at first blush may seem not only confusing, but like an inordinate amount of attention paid to a relatively small section of the book. On further reflection, however, it presents itself as a golden opportunity to discuss matters pertinent to the study of a vast, largely misunderstood and understudied literature.

John Collins has captured the intended spirit of these articles by identifying four methodological issues which surface in them. Here there is room for brief comment on each issue.

First, in regard to the use of source criticism, one must always ask whether different sources have been brought together in the final recension of a composition, and this applies to the type of literature contained in I Enoch. I find evidence throughout the pseudepigrapha of a "studied" approach to writing, which not only makes lavish use of ancient texts, but tends to supplement and combine more recent materials as historical and social changes require adaptation. Collins offers "perspective" as a criterion for division into sources. This is not a reliable criterion, since the growth of a narrative can

occur within one group which over a period of time remains true to the same basic perspective, but applies it to changing conditions. This is what I believe occurred in the development of I Enoch 1-36 as a whole, and certainly of chapters 6-16.

In seeking to discern the whole history of transmission of a section like the chapters under discussion, therefore, we are after the process according to which the narrative grew. The study of ancient textual versions in the Bible and elsewhere indicates that the tendency for these living literatures to grow was tremendous. Witness the difference between the Old Greek and the Massoretic texts of Jeremiah, or closer to our subject, the broad diversity found when comparing the Aramaic, Ethiopic, Gizeh Greek and Syncellus Greek versions of Enoch. Certainty is not to be expected in this research (cf. Collins' critique, "precisely in that form"),but neither should certainty be a precondition for source division. Plausibility will do.

Regarding genre, I do not want perspective to become a part of the definition of genre. The perspective of apocalyptic eschatology uses a host of genres. Prophets and kings and priests can all use the same genre (e.g., collective hymn), but in the service of widely divergent perspectives. As for the genre designation "expository narrative," it is meant to imply that the rather precisely defined structural characteristics which become associated with midrash are not yet in evidence here. Neither does it fit the genre of apocalypse, targun or enthnographic history. Rather it comes from a milieu where a mixture of features which were later to develop into these genres are yet undifferentiated. If someone can think of a more satisfactory term, I should be pleased.

The question of the perspective of the work is too complicated to discuss in the one paragraph limit set by the editor. We have a rich issue to discuss here, and I am grateful to John Collins for raising it. At stake is the extent to which the sectarian group with which we are dealing has reverted to an *Endzeit wird Urzeit* mentality.

On the question of the historical derivation of the mythic traditions in I Enoch 6-11, I remain convinced that the ancient Near Eastern lineage I traced explains the overall pattern underlying the Šemihazah myth (i.e., the rebellion in heaven myth). As for the Azazel story, I shall offer several observations regarding the possible Leviticus 16 or Prometheus connections: 1) All of Nickelsburg's difficulties (p. 403) are ones we should expect of a sectarian group which, critical of a temple cult which has not dealt effectively with corruption in the community and the world, offers its own mythologized remedy on the basis of the day of atonement traditions. 2) The language parallels between I Enoch 10:4-5 and Promethean tradition must be examined carefully, because the general motif of the punishment of a rebellious god in a rocky desolate region is so common as to be inadequate evidence for dependence. I do not find the parallel compelling. First, Enoch uses the odd

phrase *anoixon* ("open the desert"), unparalled in Promethean material, and better explained in connection with Lev.16. As for the terminology in Aeschylus (and similarly in Hesiod) it is quite distinct from Enoch: Hephaestus *shackles* Prometheus, *rivits* him to the rocks, and *drives a wedge through his chest*; in addition there is the whole matter of the raven eating away at his liver. 3) More attention must be given also to the overall mythic theme of the divine teachers. The theme is oriental through and through, and traces back to the *apkallu* of the third and second millennia. To such antiquity in the East is also to be traced the resolve of the gods to destroy humankind, and the heroic efforts of a god kindly disposed toward the human race to thwart the plot. Thus the motifs of the Promethean legend came from the East, and are associated with the *apkallu* and Ea. As so frequently, the stemma is this:



What we shall be discussing is possible influence from the one side to the other in the specific case of I Enoch 10, which theoretically is very possible within the ecclectic milieu of the Hellenistic period, but which should be argued in each specific case only on the basis of an order of evidence which makes this line of derivation more plausible than another.

I am in complete agreement with Collins' comments regarding the historical matrix, and thus end my comments with a word of thanks to the participants in this discussion, and in anticipation of a lively continuation in the Pseudographic Group.

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REFLECTIONS UPON REFLECTIONS: A RESPONSE TO JOHN COLLINS' "METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF 1 ENOCH"

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Here, briefly, are my responses to John Collins' perceptive analysis of issues relating to Paul Hanson's and my articles on *1 Enoch* 6-11.

1. The Use of Source Criticism

Certainly there is a unity in *1 Enoch* 6-36. Chaps 12-16 function as a kind of commentary on the story of the Watchers. Chaps 17-19 reinforce the certainty of the Watchers' judgment by describing Enoch's journey to the place of their punishment. Chaps 20-32 are in considerable part a repetition of materials in chaps 17-19. Nonetheless, there are indications that chaps 6-11 are a literary unit of distinct origin. Thus 12:1-2 serves as a link between the anonymous tradition in chaps 6-11 and the Enochic tradition in chaps 12-16. A notable difference in viewpoint or emphasis is evident in the two units' descriptions of the giants' fate. According to 10:9-10,12, the giants are simply annihilated, in contrast to *ʿAśaʾel* and *Šemiḥazah* and his angels, who are imprisoned until the final day of their judgment and destruction. According to 15:7-16:1, the death of the giants, far from being their destruction, releases their spirits, which wreak havoc until the day of final judgment and their annihilation.

My argument about inconsistencies (p. 385) is much broader than Collins suggests. First, I do not speak of the revelatory element in the *Šemiḥazah* story as "inappropriate" or "unromantic." My argument hinges, first of all, on an understanding of the *Šemiḥazah* material as story. Not only does reference to the instruction of the wives interrupt a logical sequence, it is neither prepared for in chap 6, nor is it mentioned in the indictment of *Šemiḥazah* and his angels in 10:11. Moreover, it has no function in the *action* that follows. Different from the Watchers' intercourse with the women, which results in the birth of the giants and the devastation of the earth (chap 7, the next stage in the plot), the *Watchers'* instruction *of the sons* is said to have a result only in the indictment of *ʿAśaʾel* (10:7). I should sharpen my distinction between the understanding of sin in the two traditions (p. 385). In the *Šemiḥazah* story, the Watchers and the giants are the perpetrators of evil and *the human race as a whole is victimized.* In the *ʿAśaʾel* material, the human race is co-opted into the process of evil. Yet another distinction between the two traditions is that in chaps 6 and 7, *Šemiḥazah* is clearly the angelic chieftain, who suggests and leads the conspiracy and the perpetration of the deed. In chap 8, *ʿAśaʾel* suddenly heads the list,[1] and in 10:8, it is to him that *all sin* is ascribed (so p. 385). It is this combination of literary disjunctions and theological tensions that suggest to me the combination of originally distinct traditions. Contra Collins, I nowhere speak of "distinct literary documents," but of "separate cycles of tradition" (p. 383) and of a "story" that

has been "interpolated" with other "material" (p. 386).

2. The Genre of the Text

Collins raises some questions about the eschatological interpretation of chap 10, proposed by both Hanson and myself. He correctly notes that 10:4-6,12-13 indicate an extensive time interval between the imprisonment of the principals and their judgment and punishment (so also my article, p. 388). Nonetheless, there remains a problem in interpreting the primary events in chap 10 simply with reference to the immediate post-diluvian period. In the commission to Michael, the author combines elements from the Gen 8-9 description of the post-deluvian world with mythic elements that are inappropriate in a simple description of that period (10:16-22). What is described is the total eradication of all evil and its consequences (the adjective "all" is frequently repeated), the fabulous fertility of the earth and the human race, and the universal recognition of God's sovereignty, i.e., the conversion of the gentiles (v 21). Now all of this might make sense from the fictional point of view of the narrative, or in the context of Trito-Isaiah, from which some of this language may have been drawn. However, it seems highly improbable to me that an author of the Hellenistic period would have created a story in which he described the long past post-diluvian period as, in effect, the *eschaton*.

Collins touches an important and difficult question when he raises the issue of genre. Chaps 6-11 are several things, unfortunately for the purists among us. First, they are narrative, a story with a beginning, middle, and end. As such a story, they represent an important reformulation of the scriptural material of which they are an interpretation. Collins makes an important distinction between exegetical intent and the use of scriptural material as building blocks, among others, in a new story. But which is the case here? We do have a new story, with its own beginning, middle, and end. At the same time, the author appears to be moving off a scriptural base, and he fleshes out that Genesis material with other scriptural material in a method that is not totally different from later midrashic methods.[2]

If our tradition is narrative in form and interpretive in technique, it is also mythic in content. In that sense, it explains the world as the author sees it in terms of events that have taken place in the heavenly realm, out of the reach and ken of man. Moreover, it describes the future in terms that vastly exceed the human experience. In both of these respects, in its typology of *Urzeit* and *Endzeit*, and in its message of an imminent judgment, the story also has much in common with what is often called apocalyptic thought, though it is not an apocalypse, generically speaking.

In a negative sense, the story differs from the targumim, not only in its highly expansive character, but also in its omission of many elements of the Genesis text. The term, midrash, is difficult, I propose. We cannot extrapolate that

term from the rabbinic (or Qumran) commentaries and apply it here to a document that is not formally commentary (text plus comment) without making some important distinctions. If we are going to speak of genre, we must look at our story in light of its similarities to, and differences from this array of genres and thought types.

4. The Historical Matrix

I readily admit that the extrapolation of historical information from documents that do not intend to convey such information, but rather presume it, is a hazardous and problematic enterprise.

While I have *presumed*, and not attempted to prove, a Palestinian provenance, this still seems to me the most likely alternative. Negatively, I am not convinced of all of Grelot's Babylonian parallels; but even if he is correct, as Collins admits, this does not prove Babylonian origin. Moreover, even if one grants that fact, the wars of the Diadochi ranged into Mesopotamia with some fury. On the other hand, I am quite convinced of the Galilean provenance of chaps 12-16. That author's accurate knowledge of Galilean geography is impressive, and the placing of Enoch's vision of heaven in the immediate vicinity of the ancient shrine of the North is not to be taken for granted. Thus, I would argue that the first context for our story is in conjunction with a commentary on that story which has close Galilean connections.

In the final analysis, my attempt to extrapolate historical information from this story is the result of my attempt to make sense of some important differences between the story and its biblical prototype. Most important of these is the prominent place played by the giants--who are scarcely mentioned in Genesis, but who here become the devastators of humanity and the whole creation. It is around their actions that the whole story turns. It is to these actions that the initial sin of the Watchers leads, it is as a direct result of these actions that the judgment process is triggered. It is, in part, with reference to the giants and their activities that the Watchers are punished (hence this punishment includes their witnessing the slaughter of the giants).[3] Moreover, it is in the giants' devastation of the creation, that the story, begun in the realm of heaven, touches the world as the author knows it. That the author of this story should move from Gen 6 to 9 and make his story turn on an element scarcely mentioned in that text, and that he should explicitly connect the tradition in Gen 6:1-4 with the Flood tradition by identifying the violence that brought on the flood with the activities of the giants is, in my opinion, ample evidence that something in his worldview or experience had led him to a considerable interest in giants. I doubt that that something was Greek myths about *Titanomachia* or *Gigantomachia*, for again there would have to be some reason to import such material and make it central. The imagery in which an author expresses himself is significant. Why does our author speak of giants and the devastation of the earth? As I have argued (p. 389), and as could be expanded, the imagery of warfare is close at hand, when we hear of giants, their combat, their rape of the earth, and their destruction

of the human race. We must take this imagery seriously, if we are to be fair to our author's creation. With all of this in mind, I have tried to find a historical setting that fits the general time limits probable for this story.

Notes

[1] See also the discussion of D. Dimant, in the paper that follows, § A.

[2] See Lars Hartman, "Comfort of the Scriptures--and Early Jewish Interpretation of Noah's Salvation, I En. 10:16-11:2," *SEÅ* 41-42 (1976-77) 87-96.

[3] So Dimant, § Ba.

S 248 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF I ENOCH:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ARTICLES OF P. D. HANSON AND G. W. NICKELSBURG

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The publication of the Aramaic fragments of 1 Enoch from Qumran by J. T. Milik has aroused a scholarly interest in this pseudepigraphon which has been long overdue.[1] The palaeography of the fragments suggests that the "Book of the Watchers" (1 Enoch 1-36) and the "Book of the Heavenly Luminaries" (1 Enoch 72-82) originated in the third century BCE and so are especially important for the light they throw on an obscure period of Jewish religious history. The recent detailed studies of one segment of 1 Enoch 1 - 36 by P. D. Hanson[2] and G. W. Nickelsburg[3] are therefore especially timely and welcome. The following reflections are not intended as a critique of their detailed arguments and do not attempt to resolve the differences between them but seek to further the discussion of some of the broader issues raised by these stimulating articles. Specifically, I wish to focus on four issues : 1) the use of source criticism in this kind of literature 2) the question of genre 3) the significance of identifying underlying traditions and 4) the historical matrix.

1. The use of source criticism

Perhaps the first question prompted by the two articles is whether 1 Enoch 6-11 should be treated as a separate unit. It is true that these chapters make up a self-contained narrative which could have circulated independently, but I am not aware of any evidence that they actually did so. The evidence from Qumran shows that these chapters were integrated with the rest of the Book of the Watchers in the early second century BCE - the earliest stage for which we actually have documentary evidence.[4] Further, we should note that chaps. 12-16 are still concerned with the judgment of the Watchers, while chaps. 17-36 continue the heavenly journey of Enoch begun in chap. 14. It is at least arguable that the heavenly cosmology viewed by Enoch, especially the habitations of the dead in chap. 22, is directly related to the problem of theodicy in chaps. 6-11. So, while these chapters could be viewed as an independent unit, they could also be viewed as part of the larger whole of 1 Enoch 1-36. The significance of this point varies with the particular question at issue. If we are concerned with the sources from which the myth of the Watchers is derived, then chaps. 6-11 can legitimately be treated as a unit. If we are concerned with the patterns in the story, it may be possible to stop at chap. 11 but we must at least check whether the references to the Watchers in chaps. 12-16 add to or alter the pattern. If we are concerned with the perspective of the work it is of fundamental importance to decide whether chaps. 6-11 should be read in isolation or interpreted in the context of the entire Book of the Watchers.

A second consideration involving the use of source criticism is also of basic importance. This concerns the internal unity of chaps. 6-11. Both Hanson and Nickelsburg regard the Asael material as interpolation. The arguments are clearly spelled out by Nickelsburg (384-85) and they conform to the methodological presuppositions of the older "literary" critics such as R. H. Charles - breaks in continuity, inconsistency in the explanation of evil and duplications of angelic functions. I am reminded, however, of F. C. Burkitt's comments in his obituary of Charles:

"If he came to have any respect for an ancient author he was unwilling to believe that such a person could have entertained conceptions which to Charles's trained and logical western mind were "mutually exclusive," and his favourite explanation was to posit interpolations and a multiplicity of

sources, each of which may be supposed to have been written from a single and consistent point of view."[5]

Burkitt was already aware that this procedure imposed a modern ideal of clarity and consistency and impeded a sympathetic appreciation of the texts themselves. So, we may consider it inappropriate (and unromantic besides) that the angels should be said to impart knowledge about charms and roots to their wives in the same sentence that they "began to go in to them" and before the wives are said to conceive (7:1-2). However, it is not apparent that the instruction has no function in the chain of events[6] since it provides for the transmission of this angelic knowledge to the giants. It is not apparent either that the duplications in the instructions to the angels argues for distinct sources, unless we assume that the destruction of the sinners or the healing of the earth could not be assigned to more than one angel. Apocalyptic literature is replete with apparent redundancies such as these. Most fundamentally, we must question whether there is any incompatibility between the views that "angels and their half-breed descendants are the perpetrators of evil" and that "human beings are held responsible."[7] Even apart from the obvious consideration that the humans are said to have been corrupted by the angels, the views would only be incompatible if a single work must be thought to posit a single source of evil.[8] Can we not allow that a single author might regard the phenomenon of evil as a sufficiently complex phenomenon to warrant a number of sources which might then be thought complementary ? This must at least have been the case with the redactor, but it is not apparent that an original author could not also have thought in this way.

In short, the source critical arguments for the separation of the Šemihazah and Asael materials seem to presuppose that original authors were guided by doctrinal clarity and economy of expression. I suggest that there is no evidence that the authors of the literature which is usually called apocalyptic were so guided and much to suggest that they were not. This is not to deny the possibility of ever distinguishing distinct documents within a text, but to warn that duplications, alleged breaks in continuity etc. do not provide reliable criteria for doing so.

These considerations do not question the basic contention of Hanson and Nickelsburg that the cluster of motifs associated with Šemihazah is distinct from that associated with Asael, and that the two can be ascribed to distinct traditions. My point is that the presence of distinct traditions within a text does not necessarily presuppose distinct literary documents. The difference is significant. A document exists in its own right and has its own meaning and function. A tradition, however, only exists in particular formulations and its meaning and function may differ from one formulation to another. So we cannot assume that the myth of the fallen angels has the same meaning and function in Genesis 6 and in 1 Enoch. While there may have been earlier versions of the Šemihazah story, the only version we have is combined with the Asael material, and I see no compelling evidence that the story isolated by the excision of the Asael material ever circulated in precisely that form. So I would argue that we cannot purposefully discuss the meaning and function of the Šemihazah story apart from the Asael material.

The implications of the foregoing argument for the articles of Hanson and Nickelsburg are not as great as they might at first appear. Both scholars use the distinction between Šemihazah material and Asael material primarily to trace the underlying traditions, and the distinction is quite valid for that purpose. Also, neither posits a significant difference in the setting of the two stories. However, the methodological issue raised in the use of source critical criteria has far wider implications for 1 Enoch 1-36 and indeed for inter-testamental literature in general.

2. The genre of the text

The question of genre may be pursued at two levels, which may be illustrated from Hanson's article. On what we may call the surface level Hanson categorizes 1 Enoch 6-11 as "expository narrative."[9] On the deeper level, which Hanson calls the perspective of the work, it is categorized by the adjective apocalyptic.[10]

On the surface level we may readily agree with Hanson that 1 Enoch 6-11 is neither an apocalypse nor an ethnographic history nor a midrash. The difficulty with the category "expository narrative" is that its precise connotation is unclear: it does not have an established meaning from common usage and Hanson himself does not define it adequately. In particular we should like to know how it differs from midrash. In rejecting the category midrash Hanson (196) correctly notes that 1 Enoch "strains the usual exegetical function of midrash." Yet the adjective "expository" suggests just such an exegetical function and Hanson himself speaks of the Šemiḥazah story as an exposition of Genesis 6 and of the light it sheds on one way in which scripture was being interpreted (232). I do not have a ready category to substitute for Hanson's (perhaps the very broad designation "mythic narrative" would suffice). However, I think there is an important distinction between a text which is exegetical in intent and one which uses scripture (among other traditions) as one of its building materials in fashioning an essentially new story.

On the deeper level Hanson argues that 1 Enoch 6-11 is informed by the perspective of apocalyptic eschatology and Nickelsburg more broadly regards it as apocalyptic. While 1 Enoch is universally regarded as part of the apocalyptic corpus, it does not, of course, follow that every section of the work is apocalyptic in any sense of the word. It is well-known that apocalyptic writings include prayers, stories etc. which would not be considered apocalyptic if considered in isolation. We may agree with Nickelsburg that "the mythical dimension in the "intertestamental" writings appears to be <u>one</u> element that may set these writings apart from other contemporary expressions" but that element would not, of course, distinguish them from the mythic parallels which have been adduced, or suffice to designate them as apocalyptic. The use of the adjective apocalyptic with reference to this section of 1 Enoch depends on Hanson's contention that it is informed by apocalyptic eschatology. I do not wish to re-open here the question of the distinction between prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology[11] but to focus on the more basic question whether 1 Enoch 6-11, taken in isolation, is eschatological at all, or if so how that eschatology is conceived.

The crucial question here concerns Hanson's argument that "the period from the time of the deluge to the Noatic covenant which in Gen 9:8-17 involves the briefest possible interval is sprung open so as to encompass all of history from the diluvian age to the eschaton. All of history is, therefore, placed under the ominous chaos of the deluge..."[12] In short, the healing of the earth in 1 Enoch 10 is not the restoration after the flood, but rather an eschatological restoration which is still in the future, not only relative to Enoch but also relative to the actual author in the third century. However, there are some indications that a distinction is maintained between the resolution of the story in the time of the flood and the future eschaton. In 10:4-6 Asael is bound and imprisoned in the desert "to abide there for ever" until "the day of the great judgment" when "he shall be cast into the fire." In 10:12-13 the giants too will be bound "for 70 generations till the day of their judgment and of their consummation, till the judgment which is for ever and ever is consummated." These passages clearly imply a two-stage judgment, with a long intervening period. It is especially noteworthy that the intervening period can be described as "for ever" (<u>eis tous aiōnas</u>, 10:5). "Forever" in 1 Enoch does not mean forever in our sense of the word, just as "an eternal life" (<u>zōēn aiōnion</u>) in 10:10

does not last forever but is equivalent to 500 years. Now the healing of the earth evidently takes place after the imprisonment of Asael and the giants rather than after the final judgment. The question then is whether the period of the imprisonment of the giants and healing of the earth is still in the eschatological future, or whether it corresponds to the restoration after the flood.

Some parallels, none of them precise, can be adduced in favor of each interpretation. For the eschatological interpretation we might point to the millenium in Revelation 20 or the 400 year reign of the messiah in 4 Ezra 7:28. In Revelation 20 we are told that the dragon, who is the Devil and Satan,will be bound and imprisoned in the pit for the duration of the millenium. We might also compare Isa 24:21-22 where the host of heaven and the kings of the earth are imprisoned in a pit "and after many days they will be punished." Both the imprisonment and the final punishment are clearly eschatological in both Isa 24 and Rev 20, but neither passage identifies the prisoners as the Watchers or Giants, or relates the imprisonment to primeval history. On the other hand we must notethat the flood and its aftermath are often placed in parallelism with the eschatological destruction and restoration while being clearly distinguished from it.[13] Two examples are especially noteworthy. 2 Pet 3:6-7 notes the well-known parallelism between the destruction by water, which is past, and the destruction by fire which is to come. However, in 2 Pet 2 we find the flood listed as one of a series of exemplary judgments from the past. That series includes the reminder that "God did not spare the angels when they sinned, but cast them into hell and committed them to pits of nether gloom to be kept until the judgment" (2 Pet 2:4). The judgment here is evidently the eschatological judgment which is to come. The stories of the Watchers and the flood serve as examples from the past and models for the future. The second noteworthy parallel is found in the restoration after the flood in Sib Or 1:283-308. Sib Or 1 and 2 originally formed a unified composition which was disrupted by Christian insertions. The account of the flood and its aftermath belong to the Jewish original, which was most probably composed in Asia Minor about the turn of the era.[14] The oracle was structured by a division of history into ten generations punctuated by the flood in the fifth. The restoration after the flood in the sixth generation is described in mythical language which we more readily associate with the eschaton. The sixth generation corresponds to Hesiod's golden age, and those who live in it will enjoy an earth that wondrously bears fruit of itself and will be "ageless all the days" (299). Yet it is eventually followed by another, inferior generation and so cannot be called eschatological. This parallel is especially interesting for 1 Enoch because of its direct reference to the flood and its reliance on Hesiod.[15] It should warn us against too hasty an assumption that blessings which correspond to the blessings of the covenant or surpass those of the post-exilic restoration must be eschatological.[16] The divine promise not to send defilement or punishment upon the earth again has its basis in the promise not to repeat the flood in Gen 9. The promises in Enoch go far beyond those in Genesis (is there anything in Enoch which does not ?) but are not necessarily eschatological for that reason. While the assurance that these blessings will be forever could be understood in an eschatological sense, we should bear in mind the ambiguity of "forever" and "eternal life" elsewhere in this chapter.

My argument here is that if 1 Enoch 6-11 is considered in isolation, then the events described in chap. 10 are ambiguous. The restoration of the earth could be eschatological in the sense of the millenium in Rev or might refer to the restoration after the flood like Sib Or 1. (The final judgment, which terminates the imprisonment of the giants, is, of course, eschatological in any case). At this point the question whether 1 Enoch 6-11 should in fact be considered in isolation acquires crucial importance. In 1 Enoch 16:1, in a passage which still deals with the giants we are told that the spirits of the giants go forth from their flesh in order to destroy

until "the day when the great consummation of the great world will be consummated" - a tradition paralleled in Jubilees 10. We should not too hastily assume that such an idea of continued demonic activity after the imprisonment of Asael and the giants is incompatible with the purification of the earth in chap. 10. (Witness the initial perfection after the flood, followed by gradual deterioration in Sib Or 1). The incompatibility only arises if we assume that the restoration of the earth in chap. 10 is eschatological. The alternatives, then, are not that all history is subsumed under the activity of the Watchers, on the one hand, or that all history is subsumed under the healing of the earth on the other. The second alternative is that the author did not attempt to describe all history. The healing of the earth only describes the outcome of the phase of the giants, and need not be taken to preclude all further manifestations of evil. If the analogy of Sib Or 1 is relevant we should expect that the whole sequence from the revolt of the Watchers to the healing of the earth exhibits a pattern which anticipates a similar (not necessarily identical) sequence in the eschatological period. 1 Enoch 10 merely indicates that there will also be a final judgment after "70 generations". It does not undertake to describe directly that judgment or the events which immediately precede it. We may make some inferences from the account of the Watchers about the general atmosphere in which the author wrote, but these chapters cannot be taken as a direct account of his times.

In 1 Enoch 22 we find reference to the final judgment which affects not only the Watchers and giants but also the souls of the dead. This chapter and those which follow it elaborate the second stage of the judgment in chap. 10. It does not preclude a millenial interpretation of the healing of the earth, but it provides a different picture of the final eschatological state.

In summary, then:

1) we must at least distinguish clearly between the 2 stages in chap. 10. If any inferences about apocalyptic eschatology are based on this chapter they cannot be based solely on the healing of the earth.
2) The healing of the earth is not necessarily eschatological, although it could be understood in this way if 1 Enoch 6-11 were considered alone. An eschatological interpretation becomes much less likely if these chapters are placed in the context of 1 Enoch 1-36 or even if chaps. 12-16 are included.
3) If we read chaps. 1-36 as a unit the eschatology of the second stage of chap. 10 must be elaborated by the data of chap. 22 and the following chaps. This is significant for our understanding of apocalyptic eschatology.

Even if the healing of the earth in chap. 10 refers to the restoration after the flood it still has implications for apocalyptic eschatology, since the destruction and restoration at the time of the flood provides a prototype for the eschatological destruction. Hanson's claim that these chapters are informed by the perspective of apocalyptic eschatology can be maintained, in so far as they point forward to an eschatological judgment.[17] It is doubtful however whether the healing of the earth can be treated as a specimen of apocalyptic eschatology in itself, and whether the story of the giants can be taken as a direct allegory for the author's own time.

3. The significance of identifying underlying traditions.

A good part of both articles is concerned with establishing the historical derivation of the mythic elements in 1 Enoch 6-11. These studies are important since they bear on the idiom and associations of the language. My question here concerns the degree to which one can hope to specify the sources and the importance of doing so. In view of the admitted relationships and affinities between the Hurrian myths adduced by Hanson and

the material in Hesiod, we must question whether it is possible to decide the question of sources by an either-or decision. There is no doubt that Hesiod's works were readily available in the Hellenistic Near East. It is by now apparent that there was also a widespread interest in the revival of ancient myths in this period.[18] Since the apocalyptic writers did not follow their sources slavishly we must reckon with the possibility of an eclectic use of traditional material, which may combine motifs from different traditions or may use motifs (or patterns) which could be understood simultaneously against a number of different traditions.[19]

I do not wish here to enter the debate as to which traditions actually provide the closest parallels to 1 Enoch, but to draw attention to someimplications which may be latent in the discussion. Hanson (p.225 n.58) dismisses the parallels with the Promethean myth by stating that he "finds it possible to derive all aspects of the Azazel episode from Semitic sources, without recourse to Greek or Hellenistic materials." This statement could be read to imply that a Semitic derivation should take precedence over a Hellenistic one and that if a Semitic source can be found one need look no further. Whether this implication is intended by Hanson, I leave for him to say. Since it reflects an assumption which is not uncommon, I think it requires discussion and critique even if it is not intended by Hanson since our purpose is not to criticize Hanson but to clarify the methodological issues.

First, it should be clear that the existence of Semitic parallels does not preclude the possibility that even better parallels can be found in Hellenistic sources, or that partial Hellenistic parallels may still be illuminating. As we have noted there is no reason to assume that an author relied on only one source. However, the study of apocalyptic literature has been plagued by the tendency of scholars who are specialists in other areas to reduce the apocalyptic works to the area of their speciality. Commonly scholars of the OT have looked to the Babylonian and Canaanite traditions which figure prominently in the discussion of other areas of the OT, while NT scholars refer to the Hellenistic-oriental syncretism which plays an important part in the study of NT backgrounds. Progress in this area surely requires that all areas of influence be taken into consideration irrespective of the specialization of the scholar. This point is obvious enough, and few scholars, I think, would explicitly reject it. Another factor is more deeply rooted. Scholars have often used the question of sources as a way of establishing or repudiating the theological validity of apocalypticism. The assumption that apocalypticism derives from Persian dualism has often been used as grounds for regarding it as "unbiblical" and theologically suspect.[20] Conversely, scholars like Charles and Rowley who emphasized the prophetic roots of apocalypticism were concerned to legitimate it theologically. This tendency to confuse historical derivation with theological evaluation was encouraged by the emphasis on a distinctive Hebrew mentality in the so-called Biblical Theology Movement. More recently, the "authentic" Hebrew tradition has been expanded to include elements from the Semitic matrix in which Israel emerged - e.g. the Hittite treaty form. However, the question of sources is really quite irrelevant to theological evaluation. The biblical tradition was influenced by neighboring cultures at all stages. The theological value of a particular document does not depend on the sources of its imagery, but on the way in which that imagery is used.

I repeat that these criticisms may be quite irrelevant to Hanson's article, since he has not, to my knowledge professed any of the views criticized. However, I would appreciate some clarification of the reasons for which he seems to accord precedence to Semitic derivations.

4. The historical matrix

My final question concerns the possibility of inferring the historical situation in which 1 Enoch 6-11 originated. It is apparent from the dating

of the Qumran fragments that the date must be earlier than 200 BCE. Nickelsburg (391) has suggested that it was composed during the wars of the Diadochi on the grounds that this period provides a situation in Palestine which might be reflected in the story of the giants. This proposal is an interesting one and (like most hypotheses where there is no clear evidence) cannot be definitely disproved. However, there are some considerations which underline the extremely tentative character of such a hypothesis. First, it does not seem to me self-evident that the work was composed in Palestine. Milik's argument that the author "was certainly a Judean since he looks upon Jerusalem as the centre of the earth, and the hill of the temple of Jerusalem as 'the sacred mountain' par excellence (26:1-2)"[21] is not convincing - it proves no more than that the author was a Jew. A more specific indication of local origin may be found in the references to Mt. Hermon (1 Enoch 6:6) and the waters of Dan (13:7), although it is doubtful whether these references demand that the work have been composed in that area. On the other hand, P. Grelot has argued at length that 1 Enoch 1-36 shows extensive familiarity with Babylonian traditions.[22] Such familiarity would not prove Babylonian origin, but it raises the question whether a Diaspora origin is any less likely than a Palestinian. Ultimately we must admit that 1 Enoch 1-36 gives very little indication of its provenance, and this is even more obviously true if chaps. 6-11 are considered in isolation.

The hypothesis of a reference to the Diadochi suffers from the lack of any explicit reference to these particular rulers, or indeed to any political events at all. We have warned already against the assumption that the story of the giants must be read as an allegory for current political events. Just as the author fails to give a clear indication of place, he also avoids clear historical references. We must consider the possibility that this elusiveness is a deliberate device which broadens the range of situations to which the work may be relevant.

Further we might ask whether the traditional materials which have been proposed as backgrounds to these chapters always permit the identification of specific historical situations - could we assume, for instance, that the passage from Hesiod cited by Nickelsburg (395) about the strife of the gods must have been composed in a time of human warfare ? Might it not be that the impurity, strife and oppression described in 1 Enoch 6-11 found adequate analogies in the typical conditions of life in the Hellenistic Near East and that we err if we try to restrict its application to one specific event or period.

Since several apocalypses give specific indication of the situation in which they were composed, and since those situations are typically political crises, we tend to assume that all apocalyptic literature must have been inspired by such specific situations. This assumption may be too hasty. In sharp contrast to a work like Daniel, 1 Enoch 1-36 simply does not give explicit references to historical events. In fact the review of history in the form of ex eventu prophecy, and the attendant sense of imminent expectation, are not nearly such constant features of apocalypses as is generally supposed.[23] Undoubtedly 1 Enoch 1-36 reflects a world in distress, where a transcendent eschatological judgment is necessary and desirable. It is not apparent however that the problems reflected in this apocalypse should be identified with one specific political crisis.

These reflections have concentrated on those assumptions in the articles of Hanson and Nickelsburg which seem to me questionable. I would be remiss, however, if I did not express my appreciation for the positive contribution of these articles, and my general agreement with the quest for the mythological backgrounds and social matrix of this literature. The assumptions which I question are, in virtually all cases, widely held and not peculiar to Hanson and Nickelsburg. I do not envisage these questions as antithetical to their line of approach, but as a continuation of the probing they have begun.

Notes

1. J. T. Milik, The Books of Enoch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976).
2. P. D. Hanson, "Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6-11," JBL 96(1977) 195-233.
3. G. W. Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic and Myth in 1 Enoch 6-11," ibid., 383-405.
4. Milik, The Books of Enoch, 25.
5. Cited by J. Barr, "Jewish Apocalyptic in Recent Scholarly Study," BJRL 58(1975) 31.
6. Contra Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic and Myth," 385.
7. Ibid.
8. The explanation of evil is further complicated by the introduction of the spirits of the giants in chap. 16.
9. Hanson, "Rebellion," 197.
10. More precisely, Hanson says that Gen 6:1-4 "is interpreted from the perspective of apocalyptic eschatology." (Ibid.)
11. See J. J. Collins, "Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death," CBQ 36(1974) 21-30.
12. Hanson, "Rebellion," 202.
13. See J. J. Collins, The Sibylline Oracles of Egyptian Judaism (SBLDS 13; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1974) 101-103 and 206-208. See Josephus, Ant. 1.2.3 (70-71),Adam and Eve 49, 2 Pet 3. The parallelism of the flood and final conflagration dominates the periodization of history in Sib Or 1, 4 and 7. The idea of periodic destructions by fire and flood is is also found in Plato and the Stoics.
14. See A. Kurfess, "Oracula Sibyllina I/II," ZNW 40(1941) 151-65 and the forthcoming discussions by J. J. Collins, "The Sibylline Oracles" in the Doubleday edition of the Pseudepigrapha edited by J. H. Charlesworth and "The Development of the Sibylline Tradition," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, edited by W. Haase.
15. See A. Kurfess, "Homer und Hesiod im 1 Buch der Oracula Sibyllina," Philologus 100 (1956) 147-53.
16. Hanson rightly notes that "the plant of righteousness and truth" (10:16) is related to sectarian self-consciousness. However, in the Apocalypse of Weeks, where "the elect of righteousness of the eternal plant of righteousness" are elected at the close of the seventh week, and seem to be a sectarian group, we had already been told that in the third week "a man will be chosen as the plant of righteous judgment and after him will come for evermore the plant of righteousness." (1 Enoch 93:5). Here the reference is to Abraham and his descendants. In 10:16 the same reference could be intended.
17. Nickelsburg (388) also regards chaps. 10-11 as "a prototype of the final judgment and new age." I am not sure, however, in what sense he thinks it "must be considered a description of the eschaton."
18. See J. J. Collins, "Jewish Apocalyptic Against Its Hellenistic Near Eastern Environment," BASOR 220(1975) 30.
19. See A. Y. Collins, "The History -of-Religions Approach to Apocalypticism and the "Angel of the Waters" (Rev 16:4-7)" CBQ 39(1977) 367-381.
20. E.g. W. R. Murdock, "History and Revelation in Jewish Apocalypticism," Int 21(1967) 167-187.
21. Milik, The Books of Enoch, 25.
22. P. Grelot, "La géographie mythique d'Hénoch et ses sources orientales," RB 65(1958) 33-69; "La Légende d'Hénoch dans les Apocryphes et dans la Bible," RSR 46(1958) 5-26, 181-210. See also the older work of H. Ludin-Jansen, Die Henochgestalt (Oslo: Dybwad, 1939) and the remarks of M. E. Stone, "The Book of Enoch and the Third Century," CBQ (forthcoming).
23. For clarification of this point see J. J. Collins, "The Jewish Apocalypses" in a forthcoming issue of Semeia on Apocalypse: The Morphology of a Genre.

S 249 1 ENOCH 6-11: A METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Aggadic elements are part and parcel of the apocalyptic literature. They are found, to various degrees, in all the apocalyptic writings. Usually these elements are connected with the pseudepigraphic figure to whom the book is ascribed.[1] Chaps 6-11 of *1 Enoch*[2] also belong to this category, but at the same time they present a special case. They are located in the Book of the Watchers (chaps 1-36), which consists of several units: chaps 1-5, an introduction about the Day of Judgment and reprimand of the wicked; chaps 6-11, the sin of the Watchers; chaps 12-16, the Watchers' petition; chaps 17-36, Enoch's voyages with the angels. Unlike the other units, chaps 6-11 are not explicitly connected with Enoch. In my opinion these chapters were extracted from an independent midrashic source[3] and were inserted before chaps 12-16 in order to give the background information necessary to understand the course of events.

The unit consisting of chaps 6-11 is also unusual in its length, form, and detailed description and is the most ancient witness to the legend of the Fallen Angels.[4] This unique character makes it both a good illustration of the problems involved in this type of material and an interesting case in its own right.

A. Literary Analysis of Chapters 6-11

The story in this section runs as follows: The Angels in heaven lusted after the women and wanted to choose wives and beget children. They descended onto Mount Hermon and took an oath to commit this sin. They went to the women after having chosen them, they were defiled by them, and they taught the women charms. The women bore giants who devoured men and their possessions and finally devoured one other. The four archangels now bring men's complaint to God, and they are commissioned to punish the Angels and the giants.

Notwithstanding its short compass, the story betrays several strata, some of which constitute independent literary sources. This is evident from the inconsistancies, abrupt changes in subject, lack of literary sequence, and diversity of motifs.[5]

Chaps 6-7 present a smooth and logical story, but chap 8 interrupts the sequence with a list of the Angels and their teachings to men. The list stands isolated in the context and is not connected to the preceding or following sections. The end of chap 7 finds its natural sequence in the beginning of chap 9. Further irregularity is evident in the list itself: the verses about Asael, which open the list (8:1-2), stand out in form and contents. The rest of the Angels are mentioned briefly by name and their teaching--usually one, three at the

most. The teachings are kinds of sorcery and mantic techniques. Most of the Angels' names are tied to the teachings. No mention is made of the effect which these arts had on humanity, apart from a general statement at the end of the list.[6] In contrast, the information on Asael takes two verses. Eight kinds of his teachings are enumerated,[7] none of them attached to Asael's name. A whole verse depicts how the teachings corrupt men (cf. below).

There is also a difference in Asael's place in the list. In a partly identical list at the end of chap 6, Asael stands as the tenth. Here, in chap 8, he is the first, before Shemihaza, who heads the list of chap 6. If we remove the Asael material from chap 8, we have another version of the list with Shemihaza as the first.

Some irregularities are also apparent in the account of the archangels and their missions in chaps 8-10. First, this section also makes a distinction between Asael, on the one hand, and Shemihaza and the Angels, on the other. Secondly, there is duplication in the commissions of Raphael and Michael. Each one is instructed to cleanse the earth from evil (9:7 and 10:16,20).[8] The commission of the first archangel Sariel[9] to Noah stands isolated.

The indicated difficulties point to several strata. We might assign the material in the following manner.

a. A story about two hundred Angels with their leader Shemihaza, who took women, begot giants and taught charms (*Chaps 6-7; 8:3-11; 9: 7-10; 10:7,9-10*).

b. A story of one angel, Asael, who taught men various arts which led them to sin (*8:1-2; 9:6; 10:4-5,8 [10:1-3 ? cf. below]*).

Material which may be assigned to both (*9:1-5,11*).[10]

B. Analysis of the Contents of Chapters 6-11

The fundamental difference between the traditions about Shemihaza and Asael is apparent also in the distinct motifs and their structure.

a. The Story of Shemihaza

The story is clearly based on the biblical account of Gen 6:1-4, as is evident from the biblical citations in the beginning of chaps 6 and 7.[11] The citations are interwoven into the story in a manner known to us from other contemporary Jewish literature.[11a]

The Angels' sins are the following:

1. Lusting after the women and wishing to choose wives.
2. Wishing to beget children.
3. Taking an oath to commit the crime, being aware of the gravity of the offense.

4. Descending onto Mount Hermon in the days of Yared[12] to take this oath.

5. Choosing women for each of them and defiling themselves with the women.

6. Teaching the women charms.

7. Begetting giants who devoured men and their possessions, sinning against the animals, drinking blood and devouring one other.

8. In addition Shemihaza, their leader, is guilty of inciting them to take the oath.[13]

The significance of the Angels' sin is hinted at in the names given to giants: "bastards" and "sons of fornication" (10:9). This means that they are the offspring of an adulterous union.[14] Actually in early rabbinic sources the biblical expression, וַיִּקְחוּ לָהֶם נָשִׁים מִכֹּל אֲשֶׁר בָּחָרוּ,[15] was interpreted to mean that they chose married women,[16] thus committing adultery.[17] The same interpretation might be implied in our chapters.[18] Accordingly, the defilement of the Angels in our story is the defilement caused by adultery.[19] It may have a more particular sense, namely the defilement of menstrual blood[20] (15:4). This would mean that the Angels not only took the women unlawfully, but also cohibited with them during their menstrual period.

An offense not less serious is the wish to beget children and the act of doing so. That this was an offense of equal gravity with the forbidden sexual intercourse, is indicated by numerous details. The wish to beget offspring is stressed in the conspiracy to sin (6:2) and is repeated in the account of the sin itself (7:2).[21] The strong emphasis on the crimes of the giants also implies it. Surprisingly enough, this emphasis appears also in the LXX version of Gen 6:4. There, instead of the MT vocalization, וַיֹּלֶד, which would mean in the context "they bore (unto them)", the translators of the LXX must have read וַיִּלָּדוּ,[22] which means "they begot (unto themselves)." According to such an understanding, the biblical text stresses the fact that the Sons of God came to the women and begot for themselves offspring. Such an interpretation probably lies behind our text of Enoch 6:2. This emphasis on the sin of begetting recurs when the author depicts the crimes of the giants as part of the Angels' sins (9:8-9). Consequently, the Angels are punished also for their sons' iniquity.

Such an understanding offers a meaningful context for a repeated detail in the Angels' punishment, namely, they will witness the destruction of their beloved sons, and no request for mercy will be granted to them.[23] This part of the punishment makes sense only when we see the punishment as an eradication of the Angels, their wishes and the outcome of their deeds (10:16).

Another aspect of the offense is expressed by the episode on the Mount Hermon,[24] when the Angels take an oath to commit the crime.[25] This stresses that they were aware of the seriousness of their intended deed, they did it intentionally, and were thus fully responsible for it.[26] Because of his role as

their leader, who incites them to sin, Shemihaza bears special responsibility.[27]

The punishment of the Angels and the giants involves their eradication and the eradication of the effects of their deeds. The Angels and Shemihaza are to be bound in the depths of the earth for seventy generations,[28] and in the Day of Judgement they will be thrown into eternal fire.[29]

Significantly, humanity plays a passive role in this story. Their sins are not mentioned. On the contrary, men are described as perishing because of the giants. Their complaint about the giants is justified and the Archangels intercede on their behalf (7:6; 8:4; 9:2-3,10). In such a framework there is no place for the Flood as a punishment of a sinful humanity. The sinners are punished by other methods.[30] How do we reconcile this with the explicit citations of Gen 6:1-4? May we assume that Enoch is reflecting the ancient biblical legend which originally was not connected with the Flood? On the face of it, it seems the only logical conclusion, but see further discussion below.

The element of the Angels' instruction escapes all these complications, and it fits very well with the Flood.[31] It stands out in the story of the Angels also on other grounds: It is introduced abruptly (7:2), without being prepared for in chap 6. It also has no real place in the events narrated afterwards[32] (except for 9:7; 10:7, which may be a result of the contamination of the elements). The element of instruction also does not fit well with the suffering humanity. It involves a humanity who sinned, and for whom the Flood may be a suitable punishment.

Thus we conclude that the element of instruction is of independent origin; however, in its present form, it is already completely interwoven into the framework of the Angels' story. So we cannot apply here source criticism[33] as was done with the Asael pericope. A different question is posed by the similarity between the instruction element and the Asael tradition. It seems to me that to postulate a common origin[34] is to go much too far. The two traditions differ in major figure, general character and orientation. In my judgment they originated in different cycles. In an earlier stage, the Shemihaza tradition was contaminated by the instruction element. Only later was the Asael tradition attached to the whole complex, perhaps because the teachings were already included.

b. The Legend of Asael

It was already pointed out that from the literary point of view the Asael material has a distinct character. The distinction between Asael and Shemihaza and the Angels is maintained not only in chaps 6-11, but also in other sections of Enoch.[35] They differ also in general tendency and approach. Asael's teachings have nothing to do with sorcery and mantics. They involve human arts such as making arms, metals and cosmetics. These teachings cause corruption among men similar to that described in Gen 6:11-12 (cf. below). If we assume that Asael

is a character in his own right, we have no mention of his crime apart from the teachings themselves. Different from the Angels who committed definite offenses other than the teachings, his crime is the revelation of these arts. Clearly Asael is here playing the typical role of one leading others to sin, i.e., a similar role to that of Satan. No wonder that one who may have been an independent angel named עשאל / עסאל[36], was soon identified with the enigmatic biblical figure (a demon?) of Azazel[37]. In my judgment such an identification is already assumed in the adaption of the material in chap 10, where the punishments are commanded.[38] Asael is to be bound hand and foot and thrown into a pit in the desert of *Dudael*, covered with darkness and jagged rocks. Here we have reminiscence of the ritual of dispatching the scapegoat to Azazel, as it was practiced in the time of the Second Temple. The "Desert of *Dudael*" probably reflects the name "the Desert of *Beith Hidudo*", mentioned in the Mishna and Targum Ps-J[39] as the place where the goat was pushed down from a rock as part of the ritual of the Day of Atonement. That this was a region of cliffs and rocks is evident from the name[40] and from the description of the large rock from which the goat was pushed.[41] The commission to Raphael to ascribe Asael all sins (10:8) may be an allusion to Lev 16:22.

In opposition to the main body of the Angels' legend, the story about Asael almost asks for a punishment like the Flood. In the present form of the material, only the punishment of Asael is mentioned, but one would expect some punishment for men as well. Perhaps the pericope about Noah (10:1-2) is properly placed before Asael, hinting at the original connection of this story to the Flood.

c. Shemihaza, Asael and the Noachide Commandments

The question of how the two traditions are related to the Flood is of major importance for understanding their significance and provenance and their relationship to the biblical account. Although the foregoing literary analysis led to the conclusion that the version of the legend about the Angels is independent of the Flood, another line of investigation shows that such connection does exist in the present adaptation of the legend. The connection is apparent through a well known concept of the Noachide Commandments. In the rabbinic sources these commandments designate the laws binding upon both Jews and Gentiles from the time of Adam and Noah. The list accepted later prohibits: idolatry; blasphemy; murder; adultery; robbery; eating a limb from a living animal, and it commands the establishment of courts.[42] But in Tannaitic sources there is still fluctuation in some components of the list. R. Hanania B. Gamliel included blood drawn from a living animal; R. Hidka, emasculation; R. Simeon, sorcery; R. Eleazar, hybridization of animals and trees. A Tanna of the School of Manasseh gave the following list: idolatry; murder; adultery; robbery; flesh cut from a living animal; emasculation; forbidden mixtures.[43] Surprisingly enough, the sins of the Angels and the giants correspond to components of several of the above mentioned lists.

Angels & giants	*Noachide commandments*
Angels:	
Lusting after the women, being defiled, begetting bastards	fornication[44]
Taking oath	blasphemy[45]
Teaching sorcery	sorcery (R. Simeon & R. Jose)
Giants:	
Devouring men's possessions	robbery
Devouring men and one other	murder
Sinning against animals	Eating a limb from a living animal
Drinking blood[46]	Blood drawn from a living animal (R. Hanania)

The Noachide Commandments have their origin in the biblical tradition.[47] After the Flood Noah and his sons were prohibited from murder and eating blood. The rabbinic sources elaborated the list further to include the above mentioned prohibitions.[48] Now both rabbinic and other early Jewish writings connected some of the prohibitions in the list with the sins of the generation of the Flood. From the fluctuation of the list it is clear that a fixed formulation was not accepted before the third century,[49] but a list of three basic crimes binding Jews appears in rabbinic sources as well as other early writings. Thus, e.g., the enumeration of CD 4:17 fornication, property[50] and defiling of the Temple (זנות, הון, טמא המקדש) is close to the basic three prohibitions of the rabbis:[51] idolatry, murder and fornication, which bind a Jew even in face of death.[52] These basic three are part of most of the lists of Noachide Commandments. Clearly they bind gentiles and Jews alike.[53] Now the rabbinic sources frequently stated that the Generation of the Flood committed these three offenses.[54] *Jub.* 7:20 makes explicit mention of three crimes which brought the Flood: fornication; uncleanness; iniquity. Obviously this is another version of the basic list of three. Under the disguise of Asael's teachings, we find another witness to a list of three:

Asael	*prohibitions*
Making arms	murder
Working gold and silver	idolatry[55]
Cosmetics, dying cloths,[56] working precious stones (ornamentation)	fornication

In the brief outline of the effects which these teachings had upon humanity, three phenomena are also mentioned: ". . . and they committed fornication and went astray and became corrupted in all their ways."[57] Perhaps we have here another allusion to fornication, idolatry and robbery.

The similarity between the sins of the Angels and Giants and the teachings of Asael, on one hand, and components of the Noachide Commandments, on the other hand, is too striking to be coincidental. One must conclude that it is intentional. Would this mean that all the various legends were originally connected with the Flood? How does one relate this to the results of our literary analysis?

I do not pretend to have a magic formula which will resolve all contradictions. Such a situation warns us of too easy solutions. But I shall offer a few suggestions:

a. We may still assume a story of Angels' sin, originally unconnected with the Flood. Only a later adaptation made the connection.

b. There might have existed an allomorph of the legend, in which: the giants were punished by the Flood and not by sword;[58] or the Flood punished both men and giants; or the giants were punished by both the Flood and the sword.[59] The last possibility may have resulted from an effort to resolve those contradictions created by the contamination of the legend which are still evident in chaps 6-11.

In conclusion, here again are the strata which our analysis has revealed:

a. A story of the Angels and Shemihaza, based on Gen 6:1-4. It may originally not have been connected with the Flood, but in the present adaptation it is closely linked with the Noachide Commandments.

b. A story of the Angels teaching sorcery, secondary to and different from the first story. Originally it might have been independent and connected with the Flood. It early contaminated the first tradition.

c. The Asael tradition differs both from a. and b. but is closer to b. It has an implicit connection with Gen 6:12 and Lev 16 and may originally have been independent and connected with the Flood. In an early stage it was identified with the biblical Azazel. It was contaminated with story a. because of the presence of the instruction element or because of the dependence of both on lists of major offenses. It is clear that the editor of chap 8 saw Asael either as the leader of the Angels[60] or as the first who descended to men.[61]

In my judgment, from the present state of the sources it is obvious that the tradition of Asael was the last to be added to the 6-11 complex because the various literary sources are still apparent.[62] At the same time some mutual contamination must be allowed to explain the similarity of the punishments of the Angels and Asael.

A word must be said of the relationship to the biblical account. On the whole, the Enochic section can be defined as a midrash on Gen 6:1-4, but in interpreting the Bible, it uses such ancient material that one is justified in asking if original elements of the biblical tradition were included here. Could our stories point to the possibility that the Gen 6:1-4 account was actually independent, as biblical critics long ago postulated? This may be the case, but at the same time the data also point to the overwhelming number of elements which are connected with the Flood. This means that the tie between Gen 6:1-4 and the Flood must be very ancient indeed.

D. The Significance of the Asael and Shemihaza Traditions

The legend of the Angels and Shemihaza emerges as a story of Sin and Punishment *par excellence*. Here is a group of primordial sinners, whose sins were so grave that they had to be disposed of. The seriousness of their offense and their exemplary punishment explain why they will be the first to be judged in the Day of Judgment[63] and why wicked humans in the future will be punished with them (10:14).[64] No wonder that in various old lists of exemplary sinners, the Angels or the giants, or both, appear.[65] Accordingly, it seems to me that the widely accepted view that the myth of the Fallen Angels explains the origins of Evil,[66] is unfounded. This view is based on a misconception of the story itself and on overstressing a secondary element, namely, the account of the demons issuing from the dead bodies of the giants.[67]

In contrast, the legend of Asael is a characteristic legend of the figure of the Temptor, the one who leads astray. If there are elements that explain the origins of Evil in the world, they are here. Significantly, this Evil is not attributed to "Rebellion in heaven," but to very human occupations. Even here, one might ask whether we actually have a one-time Temptor from the time before the Flood, or the Eternal Incitor. This belongs to a much later development in later Jewish sources[68] and the Church Fathers.

What is the place of such legends in the Enochic literature? Why the recurring references to these two in particular? The answer is evident from all the sections of Enoch. Enoch has an important role to play with regard to the Angels, Shemihaza and Asael. He reprimands them, brings their petition to heaven and finally announces their judgment.[69] We may say that the interest in the life of Enoch is tied up with the interest in the Flood and the events which led to it. Why did Enoch and the Flood hold such a fascination for apocalyptic writers in the late Persian and early Hellenistic period?[70] Undoubtedly they were struck by this combination of factors: a wise and just man (Enoch) living in a generation of iniquity, or before it, knowing of the approaching terrible end of the wicked. The Flood as the first End (קץ) was of extreme interest to apocalyptic writers because it was interpreted typologically of the approaching final End. Enoch played a role similar to the one assigned by these writers to the Just who will remain in the generation before the End, an idea well-known from the writings of Qumran.[71]

We cannot here specify a particular historical setting for the Aggadic material that we have discussed. We are dealing with traditional material, and every adaptor must have been limited by the traditional details which he received.[72]

The last question to be discussed is the accepted view that these legends were influenced by foreign mythologies. Much has been made of the so-called "re-mythologization" found in post-biblical literature, and our legends have been taken as a typical example. As for the legend of the Angels, Greek as well as Near Eastern myths have been adduced.[73] Most of these comparisons are ill-founded for the following reasons:

a. As the above analysis has shown, the stress is on Sin and Punishment. The examples of "Rebellion in heaven" miss the point and lack specific details of correspondence.

b. Sources from the second millennium B.C. such as these cannot have influenced a third or fourth century B.C. text. An intermediate period must be assumed.

c. In such an intermediate period, an independent development must be allowed, connected with the interpretation of the Pentateuch, already a sacred text.

d. If Persian period is assumed for origins, Greek influence might be excluded. A similarity between Asael story and Prometheus myth[74] can be explained by the dependence of the Enochic material on the episode of Tubal-Cain, or perhaps the Greek myth itself was influenced by Semitic elements, as in other cases.

In any case, one must exercise the utmost caution in comparing myths from different contexts and cultural milieux. A detailed analysis must precede all such attempts. Only a real evaluation of the significance of the material can guide us safely in the sea of comparisons. Such an analysis must take into account the special character of the material, including its interpretative nature vis-à-vis the Bible and its eclectic and composite character.

NOTES

Abbreviations:

G - The Greek version of *1 Enoch*: Chaps 1-32:6, the Gizeh Fragment, edition by M. Black, *Apocalypsis Henochi Graece* (Leiden: Brill, 1970) 19-44; chapters 97:6-107, the Chester Beatty Papyrus, edition by C. Bonner, *The Last Chapters of Enoch in Greek* (SD 8; London, 1937).

S - The fragments of the Greek Enoch preserved in the works of Georgius Syncellus, edition by M. Black, *Apocalypsis*, 21-26, 29-30, 32-33.

E - The Ethiopic version of Enoch, edition by R. H. Charles, *The Ethiopic Version of the Book of Enoch* (Anecdota Oxoniensia, Sem. Ser. 10:1; Oxford, 1906).

For the Aramaic fragments cf.

Milik, *Books* - J. T. Milik, *The Books of Enoch: Aramaic Fragments of Qumran Cave 4*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976). The references are usually to Milik's texts and collection of sources. (As for his evaluations and theories, the reader is well advised to exercise caution.)

Hanson, "Rebellion" - P.D. Hanson, "Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6-11," *JBL* 96 (1977) 195-233.

Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic" - G. W. E. Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic and Myth in 1 Enoch 6-11," *JBL* 96 (1977) 383-405.

D. Dimant, Thesis - *The Fallen Angels in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphic books related to them* (Hebrew, Unpublished dissertation, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1974).

CD - The Covenant of Damascus

DJD - Discoveries in the Judaean Desert, Oxford.

Tg. Ps.-J. - Targum Pseudo-Jonathan to the Pentateuch

[1] I am convinced that investigation into the nature of the aggadic material and its relationship to the pseudepigraphic figure will do much to clarify the phenomenon of pseudonymity. A few suggestions in this direction were made by me in a paper read at the Seventh World Congress of Jewish Studies in Jerusaem, August 1977.

[2] I follow here Milik's designation of the Ethiopic Enoch as the "Books of Enoch" to emphasize its being a collection of independent writings. This fact was known to literary critics long ago and has been confirmed by the discoveries in Qumran.

[3] Such an assumption may explain the existence of Hebrew (and not Aramaic, as the rest of the Enochic writings) fragments in Qumran of this particular text. Cf. 1Q19:19bis "Le Livre de Noe," *DJD* 1. 84-86, 152.

[4] Apart from the Enochic writings, the legend is attested

in the following early sources: *Sir* 16:7; *Jub.* 4:15,22; 5:1-10; 7:21-25; 8:3; 10:5; CD 2:17-21; 4Q180-181; 1Q19; 6Q8; 1QapGen 2:1-5,16. For the Book of Giants and other unpublished Qumranic material, cf. Milik, *Books*, 59ff., 298ff. *Wis* 14:6-7; *T.Reuben* 5:6-7; *T.Naphtali* 3:5; 2 *Apoc. Bar.* 86:10-16; *2 Enoch* 4;7. For rabbinic sources, cf. notes 35, 56. For a detailed analysis for these sources cf. my Thesis.

[5] The following is a short resumée of a slightly modified version of a chapter in my thesis. Recently Nickelsburg ("Apocalyptic") has published an independent inquiry along similar lines, but with some important divergencies.

[6] This note is preserved only in S: πάντες οὗτοι ἤρξαντο ἀναακαλύπτειν τὰ μυστήρια ταῖς γυναιξὶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτῶν. It seems to be original, in comparison with the 4Q fragments: לגלי]ה רזין לנשיהן ; (4QEn[a] 1 4:5); ...]ושרין לחר]שתא ולכש[פתא (4QEn[b] 1 2:18-19).

[7] If we interpret all the arms as belonging to one teaching. Part of the list is preserved in 4QEn[b] 1 2:26-27. Cf. Milik, *Books*, 345.

[8] Nickelsburg ("Apocalyptic," 385) sees duplication also in the commissions of Gabriel and Michael. The first is to destroy the giants, the second is to destroy the spirits of the giants. But these two belong to different categories. The spirits are the demons issued from the dead bodies of the giants according to 16:8-12; so there is no duplication.

[9] שריאל as the first archangel appears in 4QEn[b] 1 3:7; G has Uriel. Cf. Milik, *Books*, 345 and nn. 172-4.

[10] Note that in my analysis I include the teachings of the Angels with the Shemihaza material, contra Nickelsburg ("Apocalyptic," 384), who attaches it to Asael material. Cf. my discussion above.

[11] Gen 6:1-2a //*1 Enoch* 6:1-2a; Gen 6:2b,4b//*1 Enoch* 7:1ab; Gen 6:4c//*1 Enoch* 7:2a; Gen 6:12b//*1 Enoch* 8:2c. Significantly, no mention is made of Gen 6:3. The description of *Jub.* 5:2-3 might allude to an interpretation of the biblical בשר as applying to the giants. In passing it should be noted that G and S do not use the LXX in rendering the citations in Enoch.

[11a] Such as the 1QapGen, *Jub.*, and Pseudo-Philo.

[12] Chaps 6-11 are characterized by a tendency to use paranomasia meaningful only in Hebrew. Thus the Angels descended on Mount Hermon in the time of Yared (ירד / ירדו) and took the oath on Hermon (חרם / חרמון). Raphael is to heal the earth (רפא/רפאל), and Gabriel is to give a sword to the giants (גבורה/גברים / גבריאל). (To me Hanson's suggestion ["Rebellion," 199, 221] that שמיחזה is a paranomasia on the biblical אנשי השם is unconvincing.) Some of these etymologies appear in different texts (on Yared, cf. *1 Enoch* 106:13; 4QEn[c] 5 2:17: בימי ירד א]בי; *Jub.* 4:15). Others occur in different contexts (e.g. *1 Enoch* 40:9: רפא / רפאל גבורה / גבריאל. For the first etymology see also the version of *Jub.* 10, which was

preserved in Hebrew in the Introduction to *The Book of Asaf the Physician* (Hebrew edition by Z. Muntner; Jerusalem, 1958, 147, 149). There Raphael gives Noah the Book of Medicines. The data suggest that some of the etymologies belong generally to the tradition of the Angels' story, others are common property of the tradition about the four archangels. Consequently, these etymologies are not a particular trait of 6-11, (contra Hanson "Rebellion") 221, nor can we draw from them any conclusion about the original language of Enoch (as an argument in favour of a Hebrew original this was used as early as Halevi in *JA* 9 [1867] 356-7).

[13] Cf. also 8:7

[14] Cf. *m. Yebam.* 4:13; *m. Qidd.* 3:12; *m. Ḥag.* 1:7.

[15] The New English Bible translates: "So they took for themselves such women as they chose."

[16] *Gen. Rab.* 26:5. Additional sources are cited by Theodor-Albeck in their commentary *ad. loc.*

[17] Lev 18:20.

[18] Cf. also in other sections of *1 Enoch* 12:4; 15:2,4; 86:1; 106:14; and *Jub.* 7:21; *T. Reuben* 5:6.

[19] Lev 18:24; Num 5:13,20,27. Cf. *Jub.* 33:9.

[20] Lev 15:24; 18:19; *m. Mak.* 3:1; *m. Kelim* 1:3. The G uses ἀκαθαρσία('defilement', 10:11,12). In the LXX it usually translates טומאה, but on three occasions it stands for נדה in the sense of 'defilement' (Lev 20:2; Ezek 7:20; 2 Chr 29:5). The suggestion that menstrual defilement was meant here was already made by L. Jung, *Fallen Angels in Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan Literature,* (Philadelphia, 1926) 95, n. 152.

[21] Cf. also 12:5-6; 15:3-7.

[22] The LXX reads καὶ ἐγεννῶσαν ἑαυτοῖς . The verb γεννᾶν is used of the father in the sense of 'begetting'. Cf. *LSJ*, 344. The LXX uses it to translate the Hebrew ילד / הולד applied to men, in opposition to τικτεῖν, which translates ילד referring to women. Cf. E. C. Dos Santos, *An Expanded Hebrew Index for the Hatch-Redpath Concordance to the Septuagint* (Jerusalem: Dugith Publishers) 81. The LXX vocalization is attested also by the Samaritan Pentateuch (וירולידו) and is reflected in *Jub.* 7:22. The understanding and וילדו as referring to the women is attested by *1 Enoch* 7:2; *Jub.* 5:1; the targums and rabbinic exegesis.

[23] Cf. also 12:5-6; *Jub.* 5:10, which should be translated "and their fathers will see," as E. Littmann did ("*Das Buch der Jubiläen,*" in Kautsch, *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments* [Tubingen, 1900]) and not as Charles translated "and they will testify." The Ethiopic *yenēseru* can be translated in both ways, but only the first makes sense.

[24] Cf. the additional section about Mount Hermon cited by S (Black, *Apocalypsis*, 37) but not found in the known text of *1 Enoch*.

[25] The oath is perhaps attested also in 4QGiants[a] 8:14: ועכן שרוא אסורכון מח]בל . Cf. Milik, *Books*, 315. Milik understands it as referring to actual bonds and translates: "And now loosen your bonds which tie (you) up." אסור might be understood also as a vow and thus might be construed as a reference to the oath taken on Mount Hermon. Cf. Levi, *Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midrashim* (Berlin und Wien, 1924), l. 134; M. Jastrow, *A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi and the Midrashic Literature* (New York, 1950), l. 57; cf. also Jean-Hoftijzer, *Dictionnaire des Inscriptions Semitiques de l'Ouest* (Leiden, 1965) 20. Compare S. Lieberman, *Greek and Hellenism in Palestine* (Hebrew edition; Jerusalem, 1962), 91.

[26] In the halachic terminology, the terms בזדון and בשוגג designate intentional as opposed to accidental commission of an offense. Cf. e.g. Exod 21:13,14; Num 35:11, 15; 35:16,20; *m. Šabb.* 11:6; *m. 'Abot* 4:13; *m. Ker* 2:1.

[27] *M. 'Abot* 5:18: "The one who leads the many to sin, to him shall not be given the means to repentance." The example given *ad. loc.* is Jeroboam. Cf. *1 Enoch* 8:7.

[28] Preserved in 4QEn[b] 1 4:10: שבעין ד]רין . Milik (*Books*, 248ff.) relates it to 4Q181. He sees here an allusion to a division of the Sacred History into seventy generations and adduces unpublished Qumran material to support this thesis.

[29] Compare the similar Qumranic terms: כלת עולמים (1QS 2:15; 1QM 1:5; 9:5); כלמת כלה באש מחשכים (1QS 4:13 *et al.* Cf. *1 Enoch* 55:4; 90:24-25; 91:15.

[30] *Jub.* 7:22-23 tries to solve the contradiction by explaining that the giants caused men to transgress, thus bringing on the Flood which destroyed both. Similarly *1 Enoch* 89:6.

[31] Cf. 9:7. The teachings of the Angels are mentioned in *Jub.* 8:3 but not in connection with their sin with the women.

[32] Cf. Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic," 365.

[33] Thus, ibid., 384 ff.; 399ff.

[34] Ibid. Cf. Hanson, "Rebellion," 226-27.

[35] 13:1-2 against 13:3; 86:1 against 86:3. It is interesting to note that as late as the Middle Ages, the later midrashic version preserved the distinct character of Shamhazai and Azael. The first is a sinner who wants to repent, the second is the Temptor. Cf. *Yalkut Shim'oni*, Genesis § 44; *Bereshith Rabati* on Gen 6:2, *et al.* Cf. Dimant, Thesis, 175ff. Cf. also the collection of sources in Milik, *Books*, 320-333. At the same time, the tendency to combine the Angels with Asael is attested quite early: the editor of *1 Enoch* 8:1-4; 4Q180

1 7 and *1 Enoch* 55:4.

36 Thus 4QEn[a] 1 3:9: עסאל ; 4QEn[b] 1 2:1: עשא[ל; 4QEn[c] 1 2:27: עשא[ל . Cf. Milik, *Books*, 152-6.

37 Two spellings of the name are attested: עזזאל in 4Q180:7 and the Temple Scroll 26:13. Cf. also the spelling עזזל in the margin of *Tg. Neof.* Lev 16:8. The spelling עזאזל is attested by the MT. The first form is reflected in the midrashic interpretation as 'a place of strength' (עזז-אל). Cf. *b. Yoma* 67b; *Sifra, Aḥarei Moth* §12; *Tg. Ps.-J.* Lev 16:10. The second form of spelling is reflected in the LXX and Symmachus' translation of Lev 16:8 as עז-אזל. Cf. *JQR* 53 (1962/3) 249, n. 34; Sh. Aḥituv, "Azazel," *EncJud* 3 (1971) 999-1002.

38 For the following reasons I cannot agree with Hanson's reconstruction of the Asael tradition as an elaboration of the Shemihaza tradition together with interpretation of Lev 16.

a. Hanson did not take into account the independent details in 8:1-2. They differ both from Shemihaza tradition and from Lev 16.
b. The similarity between Asael's punishment and Lev 16 is better explained as stemming from the contamination of Asael and Shemihaza traditions, rather than causing it.
c. The presumed exegetical connection between *1 Enoch* and *Tg.Ps.-J* is unconvincing, especially since *Tg.Ps.-J.* is known to have been collected and edited as late as the seventh or eighth century. *Tg.Ps.-J.* Gen 6:4 betrays a relatively late stage of the aggada.
d. In my judgment the Shemihaza story is not "a myth explaining the origin of Evil." Therefore it differs from the Asael story in contents and tendency and cannot be seen as a mere interpretation of it.

39 Cf. Lev 16:10,21-22; *Tg. Neof.* Lev 16:8 margin; *Tg.Ps.-J.* Lev 16:10,21-22; *m. Yoma* 6:6-8. The *Tg.Ps.-J.* reading, *'Beit Harorei,'* is an obvious confusion of *resh* and *daleth*, as the correct name appears in the Mishna. For other variants in the Targum, cf. D. Reider, *Targum Jonathan Ben Uziel*, (Jerusalem, 1974).

40 *'Beith Hadudo'* (Yalon's vocalization) means 'a place jagged and pointed." For this meaning, cf. Job 41:22. Cf. 1Q19 35 : חדודי שמש (*DJD* 1. 85, and Milik, *Biblica* 32 (1951) 343ff. The relevant linguistic material was collected by E. Kimron in *Lesonenu* 3 (1973) 96-98.

41 A place called צוק , mentioned in *m. Yoma* 6:4-6 and *Tg.Ps.-J.* Lev 16:10. On the location, cf. S. Lieberman, *Tosefta ki-fshuta, Moʿed*, 794-5.

42 Cf. *b. Sanh.* 56ab-57a; Tosefta *Aboda Zara* 8,4-8; *Gen.Rab.* 34:8; *Pesikta de Rav Kahana, Baḥodesh* §12; Cf. also Maimonides, *The Book of Judges*, 5.9.1.

43 Cf. *b. Sanh.* 56b. For discussions see *Encyclopedia Talmudith* (Hebrew), 3. 384-352; J. P. Lewis, *A Study of the*

Interpretation of Noah and the Flood (Leiden, 1968) 186-9.

[44] cf. above.

[45] *Jub.* 7:20 mentions six commandments of Noah to his sons. Finkelstein ("Some examples of the Maccabean Halaka" *JBL* 49 [1930] 22-23) believes that 'blessing God' is a euphemism for blasphemy. According to *1 Enoch* 19:1; 65:6, the Angels also taught the women idolatry.

[46] Cf. also *1 Enoch* 98:11; *Jub.* 7:28-29. Cf. what Albeck wrote in *Das Buch der Jubiläen und die Halacha* (Bericht der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin 47; 1930) 24-25, 52-53.

[47] Gen 9:4-6.

[48] Cf. *b. Sanh.* 56b, 59a; *Gen. Rab.* 16:6; *Exod. Rab.* 30:9, *et al.*

[49] Lewis, *Noah,* 186; according to S. Safrai and D. Flusser, not before the time of Usha (private communication of D. Flusser. cf. Dimant, Thesis, 50).

[50] 1QS 1:12-13; 5:2 CD 6:15; 8:15 *et al.*

[51] Cf. L. Ginzberg, *An Unknown Jewish Sect* (New York, 1976, [1922]) 18.

[52] *b. Sanh.* 74[a], et al.; Cf. E. Urbach, *The Sages* (Hebrew Jerusalem, 1969) 308ff.

[53] The three are mentioned in many other contexts. Cf. e.g. the sources cited by Ginzberg, *Sect, 8.*

[54] E.g. *Gen. Rab.* 31:6; *b. Sanh.* 57a. Cf. L. Ginzberg, *Legends of the Jews* (1953), 5. 173-74.

[55] Working gold and silver is connected with idolatry already in biblical parlance. Cf. Isa 2:20; 31:7; Jer 10:4; Ezek. 7:19; Hos 8:4. Cf. also *Ep Jer* and Wis 13:10. *1 Enoch* 19:1; 65:6 state that the Angels taught the women idolatry.

[56] For colourful clothes of women which tempt men, cf. *m. Zab* 2:2; *b. Yebam.* 76b; *b. Abod. Zar.* 20 ab. S. Lieberman connects these sources with the later Jewish aggada of Azael who taught women how to make coloured clothes. Cf. his note in S. Spiegel, *Noah, Danel and Job,* L. Ginzberg Jubilee volume (New York, 1942) 352 n. 55. Milik connects the later Jewish legends also with a Qumranic fragment (4QAmram[b] 1:13). Cf. his article in *RB* 79 (1972) 79; Milik, *Books,* 322-26. Cf. note 35 above.

[57] G: καὶ ἐπόρνευσαν καὶ ἀπεπλανήθησαν καὶ ἠφανίσθησαν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν. Note 4QEn[b] 1 3:1:]ד׳ך פֹּ, which means 'reckless, haughty;' cf. Jastrow, *Dictionary,* 2. 1152.

[58] Sir 16:7; CD 2:17-21; and perhaps *1 Enoch* 106:17 (G 106:14); Wis 14:6-7. Cf. also rabbinic stories that the people

of the Generation of the Flood were giants: *Gen.Rab.* 26:7; *Tanhuma Buber*, Genesis 40; *Pirkei de-Rabi Eliezer* chap 22. Compare also *Sib. Or.* 1: 123-124; 2:229-233. Perhaps in this context belong the peculiar legends about Sihon and Og as the giants who survived the Flood. Cf. *b. Zebaḥ* 113b; *Deut.Rab.* end of *ve-zoth Habbracha; Tg.Ps.-J.* Deut. 2:2; 3:11. Og as a grandson of Shemihaza appears already in *b. Nid.* 61a. Milik, (*Books*, 320) connects it with the Book of the Giants. Cf. also his index under Og.

[59] Thus *1 Enoch* 88:2; 89:6. The section of *1 Enoch* is probably dependent on chaps 6-11. Cf. Dimant, Thesis, 81ff. See also *Jub* 5:9; 7:25.

[60] Compare the position of Asael in *1 Enoch* 8:14; 13:1; 55:4; 1Q180.

[61] 8:1-2; 13:1 can be understood also in this way. Cf. 86:1

[62] Cf. note 38.

[63] 91:15; 90:24. Cf. 12:12; 15:1; 19:1; 65:4; *Jub.* 5:10.

[64] 10:14; 91:14-15; 90:25-27.

[65] Sir 16:7; CD 2:17-21. 4Q180 is probably also based on a list. In my Thesis, 153ff., I have suggested that this fragment originally included *pesharim* on all the Ends (קצין) in an order similar to that of the Apocalypse of the Weeks. Compare Milik, *Books*, 248ff.

[66] This opinion is shared by most of the surveys in the field, e.g. Bousset-Gressmann, *Die Religion des Judentums* (1966 [1925]) 332ff. D. S. Russell, *The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic* (London, 1964) 249ff; M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism*, (1974), 1. 190; Hanson, "Rebellion," 201; M. Delcor, "Le Myth de la chute des anges et de l'origine des géants comme explication du mal dans le monde dans l'apocalyptique juive," *RHR* 190 (1976) 3-53.

[67] 16:8-12; *Jub.* 10:1-14. Cf. note 8. Cf. 19:2.

[68] E.g. *Apoc. Abr.* 14;23. Cf. *b. Yoma* 67b; *Tg.Ps.-J.* Gen 6:4 and the sources cited in note 35.

[69] *1 Enoch* 12-16; 106-107; cf. *Jub.* 4:22. Compare 4Q227 in Milik, *Books*, 12.

[70] The long literary history behind chaps 6-11 permit us to push the date of this unit to an earlier period. In my opinion some of the sources could have originated in the late Persian period.

[71] Note the comparison between the Days of Noah and the Days of Jesus, Matt 24:37-39; Luke 17:25-26.

[72] On this ground I find it difficult to accept Nickelsburg's ("Apocalyptic," 389-91) arguments for a particular

historical setting.

[73] For Greek material see T.F. Glasson, *Greek influence in Jewish Eschatology* (London 1961) 62ff.; M. Hengel, *Judaism*, 1. 140. For Near Eastern Material see Hanson, "Rebellion," 202ff.

[74] Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic," 399ff. The case for the influence of the Greek gigantomachia or titanomachia on the story of the giants is not substantiated by real evidence. The use of Greek terms in the G might have been forced on the translator because no other Greek words were available for giants.

S 290 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS AS BASIS FOR FURTHER EXEGETICAL PROCEDURES

Bernard C Lategan

Introduction

The chairman of our group has asked me to look into some of the latest developments in the field of discourse analysis. I would not even attempt to give an overall view of this phase of linguistic research, but I would like to raise some of the issues encountered in projects I have been involved in more closely, to share with the group some of its results and its frustrations.

After a few preliminary remarks on developments during the last six years and the emergence of a plurality of exegetical methods (section 1), the lack of a basic unit for textual analysis will be discussed in section 2 and a possible solution proposed. This proposal is illustrated in the following section by means of an analysis of Gal. 1-2. The results are summarized in section 4.

1. A plurality of methods

1.1 Since the 1972 SBL meeting in Los Angeles, when linguistics and structuralist methods first became prominent in herme= neutical discussions, a wide variety of structural techniques for the interpretation of biblical texts has been advocated. Evidence of this development is not hard to find. Increasing attention is being given to linguistics. We have seen the establishment of Semeia as an experimental journal for biblical criticism. Influences from the Continent led to the Vanderbilt conference in 1975 and the forming of a SBL seminar group on structuralism and exegesis. A lot of work has been done on parables, again along structuralist lines, and the output of literary studies of this nature is growing.

1.2 Because of these developments, we are at the moment faced with an often bewildering variety of methods within the structuralist framework itself. Exegetes have come to realize that one and the same text may be open to a variety of "readings". But the increase in methods has brought with it a sharper awareness of the limitations of each approach. At this stage of the discussion it is of growing importance that exponents of a particular method should make it as clear as possible on what level the proposed method operates and at what stage of the exegetical process it is applied. To do this convincingly, a broader theory of interpretation is needed and the models proposed so far are of a tentative nature (cf. Patte, 1976b, vi).

1.3 The plurality of methods within a structuralist framework is compounded by the continuing debate with "historical" methods of interpretation. Patte (1976a, 1) has aptly called this

a contrast between methods based on a historical paradigm and those assuming a linguistic paradigm. It is easy to become one-sided in this debate and to opt for one set of methods with the exclusion of the other. The resilience of the historical approach is not merely the result of stubborness to accept new methods, but because it is focussed on a vital aspect of biblical texts, viz. their historical or diachronic dimensions. Whether a historical enquiry can uncover the "real" meaning of a text or whether the intention of the author should be taken as norm for its interpretation, is of course the disputed issue. However, a negative ver= dict of the exegete on this point does not mean that he has dispensed with the historical dimension. We should do well therefore to remind ourselves again that the biblical text contains three basic aspects - a historical, a structural and a theological dimension. The historical dimension be= comes apparent not only in the text as historical phenomenon in itself, but also in its reference to events in history. The structural dimension is contained in the text as lin= guistic structure, subject to syntactic and semantic rules, functioning as a code or sign as part of much wider process of communication. The theological dimension is to be found in the text's explicit understanding of itself as God's decisive communication to man. Patte might call the latter the "mythical structure" of the text (1976a, 63. Cf. also Schicklberger 1978, 68). A successful theory of interpre= tation should be able to account for all three aspects satisfactorily. At the same time, one should be wary of a too hasty and easy synthesis of methods. At this stage of the discussion, it might be wise to keep the various aspects and their respective methods separated and even in a "dia= lectic tension" (Patte, 1976a, 19; cf. Schicklberger 1978, 68), provided this tension reflects the structure of the text or man's existence as such. Tension could also be the result of incompatable methods, based on conflicting presuppositions. Part of the exegete's critical task is to be sensitive with regard to possible contradictions in the methods he employs. Here the need for an encompassing theory of interpretation already referred to in 1.2, again becomes apparent. It is only against an existing framework, be it only tentatively formulated, that the suitability of a specific method can be judged. Refinement of methods on various levels may necessi= tate adjustments of the general theory - the theory for its part must supply the coherent framework within which the various methods can be applied. This circular movement between general theory and specific method must be accepted as the normal situation in a developing and experimental phase of the research. However, of exponents of the various methods can be expected to indicate how their method links up with other exegetical procedures and where it fits into a general theory of interpretation.

2. Wanted: a basic unit for the analysis of texts

2.1 Bearing these preliminary remarks in mind, various arguments

can be advanced for taking the structural aspect of a text as starting point for the investigation of its historical and theological dimensions and for its interpretation as a whole. By means of a structural analysis a reliable indi= cation can be found of the semantic highlights and of the historical issues important for the interpretation of the text. Historical inquiry then no longer serves as a second epistomological source, independent of the text itself. Rather, it is the text which brings the various theological and historical issues into play. In the analysis of Gal 1-2 following below (section 3), the implications of this metho= dological approach will be illustrated more clearly.

2.2 Once structural analysis is chosen as method, the criteria for subdividing the text and especially the basic unit of analysis becomes crucial. In the linguistics section of the NT Society of South Africa (NTSSA), extensive discourse analyses were undertaken under direction of Johannes Louw (cf. Louw 1973; Du Toit 1974). It soon became clear that the subdividing of texts will remain arbitrary as long as it has no clearly defined and linguistically motivated basis. The case for moving "beyond the sentence" (Hendricks 1967), the importance of discourse (Grimes 1975) and proposals for a text-grammar in contrast to a sentence-grammar (Van Dijk 1972a) have been well and extensively argued. Kummer (1972) has even outlined a model for a grammar of discourse. In Germany the project of Güttgemanns is well known and in the field of Textlinguistik and Literaturwissenschaft a lot of work is being done (cf. Van Dijk 1972b, 117-122; Schickl= berger 1978, 66 n 9-17 for some references). One can speak of a new awareness of the text as integrated whole - it is no longer seen merely as a collection of sentences, but as a coherent structure, where the "syntax" of the text often has decisive influence on the syntax of the sentence.

2.3 The surprising aspect of these developments is that very scant attention is being given to criteria for analyzing texts as integrated structures. Genot (1973, 56) rightly states that any analysis starts with a "preliminary quarter= ing of the text's surface.... which aims at cutting the text in 'zones'", but remains very vague about the units (lexemes, patterns, generators of various types - p.58) used in this dissecting operation. According to Nida (1975, 55), an adequate description of the structure of a text requires an analysis on at least three different levels: (1) the underlying level of kernels or near-kernels; (2) the surface level of the clause or clause-like constituents and (3) the level of major thematic units. For good reasons, he opts to begin his analysis on the second level, but is unconvincing when he groups together clauses like "By accident or design", "But this spring" and sentences containing finite verbs like "Man seems determined to upset the delicate balance of nature in Florida" as being units of the same class, without moti= vating this classification on linguistic grounds. Kummer (1972, 32) is not more helpful when he describes the sentence

in his proposed grammar of discourse as a "possible part of an utterance having the form of a well-formed formula" or "utterance-type having the form of a well-formed formula". Petöfi (1972, 73) rightly recognizes the need for identifying composition-units when subdividing a text on its surface level. His description of these "first order composition-units" as "the parts of text falling between two sentence-closing punctuation-marks" is a rather careless one and again lacks a linguistic basis. Many of his subdivisions do co=incide with the limits of sentences in a syntactic sense, but his first example ("One morning the tiger woke up in the jungle and told his mate that he was king of the beasts") combines two sentences with two finite verbs.

2.4 From these few examples the need for and the difficulties of finding a suitable unit of analysis become clear. The choice of such a unit is an arbitrary matter: more than one model may serve the purpose. There are really only two require=ments to be met:

1) The unit must be clearly defined and verifiable on linguistic grounds.

2) It must be neither too big nor too small, but suitable as a basis for further macro- and micro-textual analysis.

In the light of these prerequisites, the linguistic section of the NTSSA decided on the κῶλον as unit of analysis - using a concept first introduced by the ancient grammarians (Louw 1973, 104; 1976, 91 ff; cf. also Schütz 1923). The colon is defined in linguistic terms as S ⟶ NP VP. It is a syntactic unit, consisting of an independent sentence, dominating zero or more embedded sentences. Point of de=parture is the independent "verbum finitum", which implies a self-contained syntactical construction. In the sentence S ⟶ NP VP the NP can be expanded almost indefinitely by adding embedded sentences or phrases. In the same way, the VP as VP ⟶ V NP can be expanded by sentences or phrases which further modify or qualify the V or NP, while remaining subordinate to the VP. In other words: a colon represents a single, independent matrix-sentence, which can be expanded on various points. We find a good example in the first five verses of Gal 1, which represent one colon, with as its matrix-sentence:

Paul [says] to the churches: grace and peace!

All further expansions are dominated by the (deleted) princi=pal verb λέγει (or λέγουσι). This can be clearly seen when the sentential relations are mapped out - cf. appendix A. On the same appendix an exploded view is also given of the structure of colon 28 (Gal 2:3-4). A last example: colon 30 (Gal 2:7-10) can, despite the sentence inserted in parenthesis (" - for by God's power I was made an apostle to the Gentiles, just as Peter was made an apostle to the Jews - ") be reduced to the kernel sentence: "James, Peter and John shook hands with Barnabas and me as partners".

2.5 The subdividing of a text into cola is therefore performed on the level of the surface structure. From this starting point, a structural analysis can be executed in two directions: upwards and downwards. Moving upwards, the cola can be grouped together into colon clusters to form even bigger units. This process can be continued until the macro-structure of the whole text (in the case of the NT, that of a whole gospel or epistle) is revealed. Cf. Combrink's (1975) analysis of 1 Peter - in Neotestamentica 11 (1977) which is due to appear shortly, an analysis of the first 13 chapters of Matthew is attempted by members of the NTSSA linguistics section. (For further examples, see Louw 1978; Combrink 1973; Lategan 1974; Maartens 1977). This movement upwards in fact coincides with the notion of an analysis "beyond the sentence". It can be argued that the transition from the sentence to larger units in the text represents the transition from linguistics to literary criticism (cf. Maartens 1977). The use of the colon as unit is not an attempt to analyze textual structures in terms of sentential concepts, but to provide a controlled and "objective" passage from the sentence to what lies beyond its borders. (Cf. Hendricks' (1974) and Ihwe's (1972) discussion of this problem - also Berger 1977, 11-32).

2.6 The NP- and VP-expansions of the colon invite further analysis in a "downward" direction into smaller units - first in the form of sub-cola following on verbs like εἶπεν and λέγει (cf. colon 35.1-35.3 in appendix B), then on the level of embedded sentences (containing a conjugated verb) and finally on the level of expansion-phrases. By doing so the nuclear structure of the text is exposed. According to Louw (1973, 106), this structure consists of an event nucleus which may either be a state, an action, an experience or a change. These nuclear structures represent the smallest units of the discourse and can be given a semantic interpretation. In this way it becomes possible to describe how the formal structure was organized and built on these nuclear events.

2.7 Although the colon is primarily based on surface criteria, it can provide an entrance to underlying deep structures. Patte (1976a, 25), who understands "deep structures" in a specific sense, sees them as the primary objects of structural studies. At the same time he realizes that in biblical texts the deep structure imposes its constraints upon the epistolary-theological argument at the textual surface (74). Starting from the latter, a process of deconstructing the text into elements of a mythical system is called for in order to identify the broad mythemes of the text (68). How a syntagmatic and a paradigmatic reading of the text can be assisted by a structural analysis on the basis of a division into cola will hopefully become clearer when Gal 1-2 is analyzed along these lines in the following section.

3. Analysis of Gal 1-2

3.1 When these two chapters are divided into cola (cf.

appendix B), it appears that they contain four main sections:

1. Cola 1-11 : The gospel not of human origin
2. Cola 12-30 : Paul and the Leaders
3. Cola 31-35 : Paul and Peter
4. Cola 36-45 : The conflict resolved

We therefore have the following chiastic construction:

1. Argumentative section
2. Narrative section
3. Narrative section
4. Argumentative section

(It is interesting to compare the structural remarks of Bligh (1969: 37 ff) on this point. However, his consequent chiastic interpretation of Galatians is forced and executed without a clearly defined criterium of analysis).

3.2 On a first syntagmatic reading, a whole series of contrasts becomes apparent. To name a few of the most prominent:

man - God/Christ (colon 1, 5-11, 29 et passim)
another gospel - the gospel of Christ (2)
Paul - the church (12)
Jesus - Gentiles (13-14, 35)
Jerusalem - Arabia (15-16)
Judaea - Syria (22-23)
once - now (23)
destroy - preach (23)
slavery - freedom (28)
Peter - Paul (31)
law - faith (35)
sinners - put right with God (36)
death - life (39)
for the law - for God (39)
law - justification (45)

These oppositions are operative not only on the topical level, but are reflected in the attitudes of the principal actors and even affect the temporal and topographical indicators.

3.3 What we have here is a very typical Pauline structure, which can best be described as one of binary opposition. This is a structure to be found in various Pauline epistles. A well-known example is 2 Cor 3:1-18, with its oppositions of ink/Spirit; stone tablets/human hearts; our work/God's work; letter/Spirit; life/death; condemnation/salvation; lasting for a while/ lasting for ever. We are concerned here with an expression of a dominating theme in Paul's theology, viz. the contrast between life without Christ and life in Christ. Ridderbos (1966, 62) speaks of two modes of existence and this correlates with Bultmann's division of Paul's theology

into two main sections: man before the revelation of faith and man under faith (1965, 192).

3.4 This binary structure in Gal 1-2 is furthermore of a hierarchical nature. The primary opposition is that of God-man or Christ-man, which dominates the whole argument and introduces an element of tension. The line of tension steadily moves upward, until it is broken off shortly before the end of chapter 2 when the conflict between God and man is resolved. One might speak of this contrast between God and man as the backbone of the passage, that has a secondary effect on the actantial, temporal and topographical level. This phenomenon calls for some further observations.

3.5 We claimed that a structural analysis of Gal 1-2 could serve as the basis for further exegetical procedures. To illustrate what is meant by this, we would like to give some indication of how an analysis of actantial functions can be executed as a further step in the interpretation of the text. According to the actantial model of Greimas (1966), there exists only a limited number of roles that can be acted out by the principal figures in a narrative text. Güttgemanns (1973, 38ff; 1978, 95-113) has expanded and refined this model as part of a more complex theory of interpretation. Without going into any detail, the following actants can be identified in Gal 1-2.

Addresser : God (Satan can be assumed as anti-addresser, although he does not play a part in this text)

Addressee : the Galatians/the present reader of the text

Protagonist : Christ

Antiprotagonist : man

Helper : Paul

Opponent : the apostles

3.6 The striking aspect of our text is that an exchange of roles can take place on the level of helper and opponent: a one-time opponent of the gospel becomes a helper (Paul - c. 23); helpers of an earlier stage (Peter, Barnabas - c. 30) are revealed in a moment of crisis to be opponents (c. 34). So we find the paradoxical situation that Gentiles at a given moment find themselves to be part of the church while envoys from James act as enemies of the gospel (c. 32). However, no exchange of roles take place on the level of protagonist or anti-protagonist. This fact is underlined by the impossible possibility of Christ being an assistant to sin (c. 37-38) or that an angel from heaven should proclaim "another" gospel (c. 3-4). Two conclusions may be drawn from this exchange of roles: 1. Man's resistance to God does not represent a permanent state of affairs, but can be broken down. 2. The gospel is not dependent on the capriciousness of man, but linked to the unchanging God. The possibility of change therefore rests with God, is brought about by a

divine initiative. Paul describes this divine initiative with the term "revelation" and this phrase is to be found in key cola (c. 11, 14, 16).

3.7 This contrast and interchange of actantial roles corresponds with contrasts on the temporal and topographical level: ποτε/ὅτε (c. 12, 14), ποτε/νῦν (c.23.1) and the converse προ/ὅτε (c.32-33) indicate the two modes of existence in their chronological context, which is stressed by οὐκετι/νῦν in c. 41-43. As far as the topographical directions are con= cerned, similar paradoxical relations occur, with the result that Jerusalem and Judaea receive a negative connotation in contrast to Arabia and Syria (c. 15-16, 22-23). The binary structure is thus worked out in all detail.

3.8 But still - this fundamental opposition between God and man is not the last word. Gradually another strand becomes visible in the tapestry, hinting of a solution to the con= flict. We have already noticed how the exchange of roles implies the possibility of change. This idea is prepared in the structure of the text by a threefold synthesis:

3.8.1 Paul's own life is a living example of a persecutor of the church turned into a proclaimer of the faith. His opposition to God is being replaced by service to his Lord (c. 23,7). He therefore no longer seeks to please men (c. 5-7).

3.8.2 This synthesis on a personal level is reflected in the form of broader concensus - the tension between Paul and the leaders is dissolved when an agreement is reached that includes not only Paul and Barnabas, but even Titus the Greek (c. 28-30). This agreement proves to be of a fragile nature (c. 31-34).

3.8.3 The previous two is only preparatory for the real synthesis that follows in colon 40: Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι. This is the dénouement of the whole passage. In the συν- the tension between God and man comes to an end. No longer do they face each other as opponents, but an identification takes place, which opens the door to life. Cola 41-45 are dominated by the theme: life and death, with a threefold repetition of "life" in c. 41-43. Colon 40 forms the climax of Paul's argument in Gal 1-2 and occupies a key position in the structure.

3.9 A further remarkable feature is the close link between Paul's "existential" death to the law (c. 39) and the beginning of a new life on the one hand and Christ's death on the cross on the other hand. This close association of Paul with the cross brings us back to an aspect already encountered in 3.6 - the end of the conflict between God and man goes back to a divine initiative. For Paul the cross represents this initiative. But more: his new life which is the result of this initiative, apparently is of a special ethical "quality" - it is a life "for God" (c. 39), a life "by faith in the Son of God" (c. 43). So strong is this identification with Christ that the apostle does not shrink from declaring that

his own life has come to an end and that it is Christ who lives in him (c. 41-42). When one looks for the cause of this exclusive orientation towards Christ, colon 43 gives the answer: his love and self-surrender for the benefit of man.

3.10 This brings us to one of the most important themes in Gal 1.2: Christ as servant. Not only does it provide the motivation for the solution of the conflict and for colon 43, but the διάκονος-theme is already present in c. 1. The only description given of Christ in these opening verses is a reference to his willingness to give himself for our sins in order that we may be liberated from this evil age. Exactly the same expression is used in c. 43 to qualify the Son of God.

c. 1 : ....τοῦ δόντος ἑαυτον ὑπερ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν

c.43 : ....παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπερ ἐμοῦ

The theme of Christ's service thus provides the setting for Paul's whole argument in Gal 1-2. It includes both the binary structure with its primary contrast between God and man, and its termination. The διάκονος-theme is seldom explicitly stated - apart from an antithetical reference in c. 7 (Paul as δοῦλος Χριστοῦ) and in c. 36 (Christ dismissed as ἁμαρτίας διάκονος) - but it remains the implied framework within which Pauls's argument is developed. Christ's selfless giving of himself for the sake of man forms not only the basis of the new life of his followers, but is also decisive for its ethical content.

3.11 The twofold implication of the διάκονος-theme (as basis and content of the new life) apparently also serves as a material and structural link between Gal 1-2 and the rest of the epistle. Both aspects are explicitly stated towards the end of chapters 1-2, and is taken up again in 3-4 and 5-6 respectively. Christ's service as basis for the new life, culminating in the cross, representing the divine initiative which overwhelms man's resistance, is extensively discussed in chapters 3-4 in terms of the great contrast: justification through the works of the law/by faith. This theme is already announced in c. 35.2:

οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

Also the second aspect of the διάκονος- theme (its ethical implications) is treated in a similar way: in c. 39-43 the apostle describes his new existence as a life dedicated to God and Christ and in chapters 5-6 its implications are worked out in terms of a life led by the Spirit in contrast to one under the law.

3.12 This structural and material anticipation in 1-2 of themes still to be developed in 3-6 may have important implications

for the concept of the epistle as a whole. However, this calls for an investigation of a more intensive nature and executed on a wider scale than the one attempted here.

4. Conclusion

4.1 We break off our observations on Gal 1-2 at this rather premature stage in the hope that enough has been said to give some idea how a structural analysis can serve as a springboard to further aspects of the text. Once this linguistic and surface operation is completed as initial step in the process of interpretation, it can easily fall away, enabling the exegete to move on to deeper structures and other dimensions of the text. It does, however, serve an important function: it places the interpreter under the discipline of the text and compels him to take his cue as far as other dimensions are concerned from the text itself. In our analysis in section 3, we have not touched on the historical issues involved. A full interpretation will have to take these diachronical aspects into account - but, once again, not as a second source of information or as norm for the interpretation of the text, but because they are raised by the text and because they should be treated along lines indicated by the text. Our analysis has shown how a theological interpretation is prepared by a structural reading and how textual indicators provide the clues for placing the theological issues in their right perspective. In this way a structural analysis can serve as the basis for further exegetical procedures. It is really a matter of taking the text and its intentions seriously.

4.2 After the completionof the above analysis, Patte's treatment of the mythical structures of Gal 1:1-10 came to my notice (1976a, 59-76). Despite the difference in approach and technique, I was struck by the large measure of similarity in the conclusions reached. The most important of these can be summarized as follows:

4.2.1 According to Patte (68), Gal 1:1-10 is characterized by the fundamental opposition "God/man" - the same conclusion we reached in 3.4.

4.2.2 This basic opposition is complemented by a whole series of oppositions on a secondary level (64, 69-70), which can be seen as part of a binary structure with a positive and a negative side. Cf. 3.2-3.4.

4.2.3 The Galatians feature on both sides of the dividing line: they can either belong to the positive side of the gospel structure (the Galatians as Christians) or to its negative side (the Galatians as pagans)(65-66). This correlates with our conclusion that an exchange of roles can take place on the level of helper and opponent and that the Gentiles at a given moment find themselves to be part of the church (3.6).

4.2.4 Patte stresses (64, 68) that the fundamental opposition can only be resolved by a mediator, who appears to be either God or Christ. Starting from the resurrection, a whole series of mediations take place, involving God, Christ and Paul as apostel (69-70). We reached a somewhat different conclusion, but we did find that the conflict between God and man can only be resolved by a divine initiative and that Christ's gift of him= self opened the possibility of a new existence (3.8.3, 3,9).

4.2.5 To mention one further point of agreement: the hypo= thetical oppositions (e.g. an angel proclaiming "another" gospel; Christ being an assistant to sin) is a dramatic way of presenting an impossible possibility (67, 71; 3.6).

4.3 There are, of course, also points of disagreement:

4.3.1 I am not convinced that our text does presuppose a Hellenistic mythical system as distinct from a Pharisaic mythical system (63). Rather, the structure stresses the similarity of Jew and Gentile both outside the faith and under the faith. Patte himself observes (75) that Paul uses a mixture of Jewish and cosmological terminology when speaking about the "other gospel" and no definite conclusions can be drawn from these state= ments with regard to the specific doctrines of Paul's apponents.

4.3.2 Patte does not point out the importance of the διάκονος- theme as setting of Paul's argument in Gal 1-2. This is perhaps an unfair criticism, as he is only concerned with the first ten verses of chapter 1 and acknowledges the need for further analysis (72). But it could help in deciding whether Christ or God is the actual mediator of the opposition Paul/apostle (64, 72). The structure gives decided prominence to Paul's identifi= cation with the cross and the mediating role of Christ.

4.3.3 A last point: as we have already seen (2.7), Patte is well aware that there exists a direct correlation be= tween the textual surface and the deep structures he would like to uncover. However, he gives no clear description of the way in which he moves from the one to the other, nor of the criteria on which his analysis is based. A breaking down of the text into cola and the identifying of clusters of cola, can in fact assist him in his search for mythemes and in the discovery of bundles of mythemes.

4.4 Patte makes a very important point when he writes that an understanding of the mythical systems to which the early Christians belonged prior to their conversion can have im= portant hermeneutical implications for the interpretation of our modern mythical systems (75). He is also to be com=

mended for his view that structural methods could furnish an additional tool to deal with questions both of authorship and of redaction. The supporting role of various and often diverse methods in our common task of interpreting biblical texts should indeed be more appreciated.

A note on Appendix B

For reasons of space, the syntactic relations in each colon between the matrix-sentence and its various expansions have not been mapped out - for an example of this, see Appendix A and further Louw 1978. Formalization has been kept to a minimum: the sets of binary opposition are indicated by ⟶ ⟵ , while some of the more prominent semantic units have been underlined. The relations between various cola are shown schematically on the left hand margin.

Colon 1



Colon 28



Appendix B

I. The gospel not of human origin

(*Cola* 1-11 : Gal 1:1-12)

	Colon
Παῦλος ἀπόστολος, οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν, 2 καὶ οἱ σὺν ἐμοὶ πάντες ἀδελφοί, ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Γαλατίας· 3 χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 4 τοῦ δόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν ὅπως ἐξέληται ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος πονηροῦ κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν, 5 ᾧ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων· ἀμήν.	1
6 θαυμάζω ὅτι οὕτως ταχέως μετατίθεσθε ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, 7 ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο· εἰ μή τινές εἰσιν οἳ ταράσσοντες ὑμᾶς καὶ θέλοντες μεταστρέψαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.	2
8 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἡμεῖς ἢ ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ εὐαγγελίζηται ὑμῖν παρ' ὃ εὐηγγελισάμεθα ὑμῖν, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.	3
9 ὡς προειρήκαμεν, καὶ ἄρτι πάλιν λέγω, εἴ τις ὑμᾶς εὐαγγελίζεται παρ' ὃ παρελάβετε, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.	4 4.1
10 Ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνθρώπους πείθω ἢ τὸν θεόν;	5
ἢ ζητῶ ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκειν;	6
εἰ ἔτι ἀνθρώποις ἤρεσκον, Χριστοῦ δοῦλος οὐκ ἂν ἤμην.	7
11 Γνωρίζω γὰρ ὑμῖν, ἀδελφοί, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον·	8

12 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτό, 9

οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην, 10

ἀλλὰ δι' ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ παρέλαβον 11

II. Paul and the leaders

(*Cola* 12-30 : Gal 1:13 - 2:10)

13 Ἠκούσατε γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀναστροφήν ποτε ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, 12

ὅτι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐδίωκον τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπόρθουν αὐτήν,

14 καὶ προέκοπτον ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας ἐν τῷ γένει 13

μου, περισσοτέρως ζηλωτὴς ὑπάρχων τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων.

15 ὅτε δὲ εὐδόκησεν [ὁ θεὸς] ὁ ἀφορίσας με ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου 14

καὶ καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ 16 ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ

ἵνα εὐαγγελίζωμαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, εὐθέως οὐ προσανεθέμην σαρκὶ

καὶ αἵματι,

17 οὐδὲ ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀποστόλους, 15

ἀλλὰ ἀπῆλθον εἰς Ἀραβίαν, 16

καὶ πάλιν ὑπέστρεψα εἰς Δαμασκόν. 17

18 Ἔπειτα μετὰ ἔτη τρία ἀνῆλθον εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα ἱστορῆσαι Κηφᾶν, 18

καὶ ἐπέμεινα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡμέρας δεκαπέντε· 19

19 ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων οὐκ εἶδον, εἰ μὴ Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ κυρίου. 20

20 ἃ δὲ γράφω ὑμῖν, ἰδοὺ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ ὅτι οὐ ψεύδομαι. 21

21 ἔπειτα ἦλθον εἰς τὰ κλίματα τῆς Συρίας καὶ τῆς Κιλικίας. 22

22 ἤμην δὲ ἀγνοούμενος τῷ προσώπῳ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Ἰουδαίας ταῖς ἐν 23
Χριστῷ, 23 μόνον δὲ ἀκούοντες ἦσαν ὅτι 23.1

'Ο διώκων ἡμᾶς ποτε νῦν εὐαγγελίζεται τὴν πίστιν ἣν ποτε
ἐπόρθει,

24 καὶ ἐδόξαζον ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν θεόν. 24

"Επειτα διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν πάλιν ἀνέβην εἰς 'Ιεροσόλυμα μετὰ 25
Βαρναβᾶ, συμπαραλαβὼν καὶ Τίτον·

2 ἀνέβην δὲ κατὰ [ἀποκάλυψιν·] 26

καὶ ἀνεθέμην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, κατ' ἰδίαν 27
δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν, μή πως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον.

3 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Τίτος ὁ σὺν ἐμοί, "Ελλην ὤν, ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι· 28
4 διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισάκτους ψευδαδέλφους, οἵτινες παρεισῆλθον κατασκοπῆσαι
τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἡμῶν ἣν ἔχομεν ἐν Χριστῷ 'Ιησοῦ, ἵνα ἡμᾶς καταδουλώσουσιν·
5 οἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαμεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ, ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου
διαμείνῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

6 ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι — 29
ὁποῖοί ποτε ἦσαν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει·
πρόσωπον ὁ θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει
— ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱ δοκοῦντες οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο,

30

7 ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἰδόντες ὅτι πεπίστευμαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας
καθὼς Πέτρος τῆς περιτομῆς,

8 ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας Πέτρῳ εἰς ἀποστολὴν τῆς περιτομῆς
ἐνήργησεν καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη,

9 καὶ γνόντες τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι, Ἰάκωβος καὶ Κηφᾶς καὶ Ἰωάννης,
οἱ δοκοῦντες στῦλοι εἶναι, δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν ἐμοὶ καὶ Βαρναβᾷ κοινωνίας,
ἵνα ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, αὐτοὶ δε εἰς τὴν περιτομήν·
10 μόνον τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα μνημονεύωμεν, ὅ καὶ ἐσπούδασα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.

III. Paul and Peter

(*Cola* 31-35 : Gal 2:11-16)

31

11 Ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν Κηφᾶς εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν, κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ ἀντέστην,
ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν.

32

12 πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἐλθεῖν τινας ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν·

33

ὅτε δὲ ἦλθον, ὑπέστελλεν καὶ ἀφώριζεν ἑαυτόν, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς.

34

13 καὶ συνυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ [καὶ] οἱ λοιποὶ Ἰουδαῖοι, ὥστε καὶ Βαρναβᾶς
συναπήχθη αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποκρίσει.

35

14 ἀλλ' ὅτε εἶδον ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοποδοῦσιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου,
εἶπον τῷ Κηφᾷ ἔμπροσθεν πάντων,

Εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων ἐθνικῶς καὶ οὐχὶ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς, 35.1
πῶς τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις Ἰουδαΐζειν;

15 Ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί, 35.2
16 εἰδότες δὲ ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου
ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,

καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν, 35.3
ἵνα δικαιωθῶμεν ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου,
ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ.

IV. The conflict resolved

(*Cola* 36-45 : Gal 2:17-21)

36
17 εἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ εὑρέθημεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτωλοί,
ἆρα Χριστὸς ἁμαρτίας διάκονος;

37
μὴ γένοιτο.

38
18 εἰ γὰρ ἃ κατέλυσα ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ, παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνιστάνω.

39
19 ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω.

40
Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι·

41
20 ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ,

42
ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός·

43
ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με
καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.

44
21 οὐκ ἀθετῶ τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ·

45
εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν.

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S 307 **AMOS 2:13-16: ITS STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN THE BOOK**

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INTRODUCTION

In the numerous discussions of the oracles against the nations in the first two chapters of the Book of Amos little attention has been paid to the closing strophe in 2:13-16 other than to deal with some problems of textual criticism and raise questions regarding the authenticity or order of certain phrases or stichs. It shall be the purpose of this paper to examine this strophe in some detail with reference to structure and rhetorical devices. This in turn may clarify questions of authenticity or at least suggest a new way of looking at that issue. Finally, we shall take occasion to note briefly how this passage functions in the book as we know it.

The Hebrew text is as follows[1]:

10[2]	הנה אנכי מעיק תחתיכם	13a
	כאשר תעיק העגלה המלאה לה עמיר	13b
7	ואבד מנוס מקל	14a
9	וחזק לא יאמץ כחו	14b
9	וגבור לא ימלט נפשו	14c
9	ותפש הקשת לא יעמד	15a
9	וקל ברגליו לא ימלט	15b
11	ורכב הסוס לא ימלט נפשו	15c
17	ואמיץ לבו בגבורים ערום ינוס ביום ההוא נאם יהוה	16

That this is a self-contained unit is clear on the basis of הנה, vs. 13, and נאם יהוה, vs. 16.[3]

FORM

The form of this pericope is an announcement of judgment introduced by the particle הנה. The LXX reads διὰ τοῦτο ἰδοὺ as though the Hebrew had read לכן הנה. This collocation occurs several times in the form לכן הנני (1 Kings 14:10; 2 Kings 22:20; Isaiah 29:14; Ezekiel 13:37 and *passim*; Hosea 2:8). The exact form לכן הנה occurs in Jeremiah 7:32; 16:14; 19:6; 23:7; 48:12; 49:2; 51:52, always however in the phrase לכן הנה ימים באים נאם יהוה. In Hosea 2:16 we find an exact repetition: לכן הנה אנכי, followed by a participle. It is tempting, therefore, to emend the text at this point. Since, however, הנה alone (i.e. without לכן) is employed to introduce an announcement of judgment (2 Samuel 12:11 - הנני מקים; 1 Kings 2:31 - הנני קרע; Jeremiah 20:4 - הנני נתנך; Jeremiah 29:21 - הנני נתן)[4] it seems likely that the original reading was simply הנה. It is possible that לכן was introduced into the Egyptian text under the influence of the frequently appearing לכן הנני, thus accounting for the LXX's διὰ τοῦτο.

Like the preceding long poem (1:3-2:12) Amos 2:13-16 should be viewed as poetry throughout except for line 13b which I shall discuss presently.

TEXTUAL CRITICISM

From antiquity the word מעיק (13a) has been a *crux interpretum*. The Greek texts are at variance: κυλίω or κωλύω, to cite just two.[5] It is my contention, however, that even earlier than the LXX someone had found the word difficult. This view is based upon the appearance of כאשר which is best understood as introducing an explanatory gloss. The particle כאשר/אשר, whether as a relative pronoun or a conjunction, is not appropriate to poetry.[6] It is characteristic of prose and here introduces a gloss intended to explain the difficult word מעיק. Thus I see 13b as a prose sentence added at a later time, but earlier than *ca.* 200 B. C., as an attempt to explain the *hapex legomenon*, מעיק.

Let me then suggest what I believe was the original sense of מעיק. It is a Hiphil participle of the root עוק. Two derived noun forms appear in the Psalms: עקתּ<עקה (55:4) and מועקה (66:11). The clue to the meaning of מעיק comes from the Targum of the Book of Amos where we read: האנא מיתי עליכון - "I am bringing distress upon you." The meaning "distress" for Aramaic עקא is well attested.[7] This is certainly the sense also of Hebrew עקה in Psalm 55:4 where it is translated "oppression" in RSV. In Psalm 66:11 מועקה clearly means "distress" (RSV - "affliction"). Thus מ/העיק meant "to cause distress."

The עוק also means "to press down"[8] and this apparently was the only meaning that some ancient student of the Book of Amos knew. Since the original sense of מעיק was not obvious this reader glossed it with a reference to a cart heavy with sheaves pressing down. This made the sense of 13a conform to the meaning of עוק current at that time and in that place, whatever it was. This meaning was further suggested by the presence of תחתיכם which the glossator (and modern translators as well) understood to mean "under you." However תחת has another meaning such as that found in the following passages: Exodus 16:19 (תחתיו - "in his place"); 2 Samuel 2:23 (תחתו/תחתיו - "where he was"); Isaiah 25:10 (תחתיו - "in his place"); Jeremiah 38:9 (תחתיו - "there"); Job 36:20 (תחתם - "in their place"[9]); Job 40:12 (תחתם - "where they stand"[10]). Consequently I would translate line 13a somewhat as follows: "Lo, I am bringing distress right where you are." The prophet meant to say that calamity would come with such swiftness that the people would suffer before they had a chance to move from their places. Thus I would argue that early in the transmission of the text, and hence in the formation of the book, line 13b was added, giving a different meaning to the text than that which it had had originally.

LENGTH OF STICHS

The strophe then consists of eight lines of which 13a and 16 constitute an introduction and conclusion respectively and enclose three bistichs. These eight lines have the following

syllable count: 10 : 7 : 9 : 9 : 9 : 9 : 11 : 17. The introductory and closing lines are relatively long. The first line of the body of the poem (14a) is shorter than any other and is balanced by the last line (15c) which is longer than any excepting the concluding line (16).

Thus we see that the entire poem is very well balanced, especially when we note the heavy weight of meaning that line 16 carries. However metrical consistency is avoided, illustrating well the contention of James Muilenburg.[11]

PARALLELISM

Let us turn next to parallelism. Lines 14b, c constitute a bistich, חזק (14b) here being in the same semantic field as גבור (14c). Lines 14a and 15b constitute another bistich. In addition we find an example of chiasmus. Line 14a begins with a verb and ends in the noun קל. Line 15b begins with קל and ends with a verb. This may be shown graphically as follows:



This bistich probably refers either to messengers in the army who must report promptly the progress of the battle or to the spearmen who are commonly depicted in Assyrian reliefs as running at great speed.[12] The third bistich consists of lines 15a, c with reference to two major units of an ancient army: archers and cavalry.

The structure of the three bistichs may be charted as follows:



This reflects a very skillful interlocking of the stichs which holds the three bistichs together in a compact unit. One might be tempted to suggest a displacement of line 15b from an original position following line 14c. If that had been the original order it would look like this:



This would be a more common type, i.e. ABB´A´. But as it stands the order is more striking, very skillful and quite unusual. Given the recognized high literary quality of the Book of Amos we should no doubt resist any suggestion to alter the

order or to delete any stichs.[13] In addition one would be hard pressed to find an explanation as to how the change came about.

REPETITION OF WORDS

The strophe under consideration is marked by a striking and effective repetition of words, like the peal of a bell of doom. We have already had occasion to note the repetition of קל in lines 14a and 15b. The root נוס appears in lines 14a and 16. The verb אמץ appears in line 14b (יאמץ) and in line 16 (אמיץ). The word גבור appears in 14c and in 16. The word ימלט stands in three lines--14c, 15b and 15c. The word נפשו appears in line 14c and is repeated in 15c.

Note also that the negative לא is found in five successive lines: 14b, c, 15a, b, c, as though the prophet not only wanted to negate certain verbs in the poem but wished to emphasize the Yahweh's "NO!" to all that had been mentioned previously. One should also note the placement of לא in relation to the other words in each of the five lines in which it appears. In the first two lines (14b, c) it is preceded by one word and followed by two; in the next two lines (15a, b) it is preceded by two words and followed by one; in the fifth line it is both preceded and followed by two words.

Finally it should be noted that every word of line 14c, in the middle of the strophe, appears elsewhere in the strophe! This striking repetion of words may be displayed more clearly by presenting the passage in a transliteration of the consonantal text with the repeated words in large capital letters.[14]

13 hnh ʾnky mᶜyq tḥtykm

14a wʾbd nNWS mQL

14b wḥzq Lʾ yʾMṢ kḥw

14c wGBWR Lʾ yMLṬ NPŠW

15a wtpś́ hqšt Lʾ yᶜmd

15b wQL brglyw Lʾ yMLṬ

15c wrkb hsws Lʾ yMLṬ NPŠW

16 wʾMYṢ lbw bGBWRym ᶜrwm yNWS bywm hhwʾ

Some have seen in this repetition of words grounds for deleting certain lines. For example, H. W. Wolff views 14c and 15b as additions, stating, "their vocabulary has been derived almost entirely from the context" and "the threefold repetition of לא ימלט (נפשו) would be unusual for Amos."[15] In contrast to this view Sh. Paul has shown the importance of the repetition of words for a correct understanding of the oracles against the nations in 1:3-2:3.[16] To be sure the repetition is not identical in nature in both sections. In the oracles against the nations the repetition regularly appears in succeeding lines while in 2:13-16 such repetition occurs only

once (lines 15b, c) except for the appearance of לא in five succeeding lines. Nevertheless, Paul's study is adequate caution against assuming that the repetition of words is a sufficient basis for emendation.

Another kind of repetition--what might be called semantic repetition--should be noted in line 14b. Here the prophet has put together three different words with the sense of strength (חזק, מלט and כח), a technique which must have been particularly striking to the listener's ears and have elicited their admiration!

FUNCTION

Let me now comment briefly on what I feel to be the function of this strophe in the Book of Amos. That the oracles against the nations may be characterized as war oracles need not be argued here beyond calling attention to the phrase ושלחתי אש . . . ואכלה. Anyone who has excavated a Palestinian city or read excavation reports knows that the most common mode employed by armies to destroy a city was by fire. Thus these oracles may properly be called war oracles.[17] The passage under consideration, Amos 2:13-16, announces the final judgment of Yahweh upon the nation. "On that day" Yahweh "unleashes his awesome terror upon the hosts of Israel."[18] The army of Israel is crushed never again to rise to defend the nation. With this the war oracles come to an end. Never again in the Book of Amos does the war oracle have a significant place.

War imagery does appear briefly at two points: 3:11 and 4:10, 11. Of the former it may safely be said, I think, that it is hardly more than an allusion to war made in passing, so to speak. Of the latter it is of no little import to note that H. W. Wolff has argued at some length that the section 4:6-11 is the work of a redactor having close affinities with the Holiness Code.[19] His argument appears to me to be rather formidable. This in turn adds credence to the position here being put forward, namely that the strophe 2:13-16 not only serves as a conclusion to the oracles against the nations (war oracles) which precede it but effectively functions to separate that part of the book in which war imagery prevails from that part in which war imagery has been abandoned. Thus it may be said that the strophe serves a dual purpose: (1) theologically, to emphasize the judgment of Yahweh upon Israel; (2) literarily, to effect a separation between war language and speech that makes no reference to war.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to show that the strophe of Amos 2:13-16 is skillfully constructed through (1) balancing the length of lines by means of a provisional syllable count; (2) an effective though limited use of chiasmus; (3) a striking parallelism in which an interlocking of stichs provides remarkable coherence; (4) the notable repetition of words/roots/sounds which also serves to provide coherence. On the basis of these observations it has been argued that deletion or alteration of the order of any of the stichs is a procedure open to serious question. Finally it has been suggested that this strophe serves

effectively to bring the language of war to an end in the Book of Amos.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The numerals to the left of the lines indicate the number of syllables in that line. See my article, "The Last Words of David: Some Notes on II Samuel 23:1-7," *JBL* 90 (1971) 257-266 and bibliography there for the method of syllable counting. Note also D. N. Freedman, "Pottery, Poetry, and Prophecy: An Essay on Biblical Poetry," *JBL* 96 (1977) 5-26 and M. D. Coogan, "A Structural and Literary Analysis of the Song of Deborah," *CBQ* 40 (1978) 143-166.

[2] For a different syllable count throughout see D. L. Christensen, *Transformations of the War Oracle in Old Testament Prophecy* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975) 61f. The differences are the result of his having omitted *waw*-conjunctive and the article. The latter is a moot question (cf. M. D. Coogan, *CBQ* 40 [1978] 149 n. 44). As to the former, the difference would only be relative. Christensen's emendations account for other variations.

[3] This is true whether נאם יהוה concludes this particular pericope or the whole of 1:3-2:16.

[4] Cf. J. Muilenburg, "Form Criticism and Beyond," *JBL* 88 (1969) 15; C. Westermann, *Basic Forms of Prophetic Speech* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967) 149.

[5] See W. R. Harper, *Amos and Hosea* (*ICC*; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905) 60.

[6] See D. N. Freedman, *JBL* 96 (1977) 6.

[7] See M. Jastrow, *A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Jerushalmi and the Midrashic Literature* (New York: Pardes Publishing House, Inc. 1950) II, 1104.

[8] I shall not debate the contention of H. W. Wolff (*Joel and Amos* [*Hermeneia* 1977] 71) that the verb is cognate with Arabic *ᶜqqa* and Ugaritic *ᶜqq* except to say that the meaning of *ᶜqq* is not at all clear. (In fact, Aistleitner, whom Wolff quotes, was probably wrong.) Moreover, מעיק would not be the expected form of a geminate verb; we would expect מעק but the question of internal *matres lectiones* in the eighth century B. C. would need to be taken into account. At any rate, as the text stands we are hardly justified in arguing for a geminate root.

[9] M. Pope, *Job* (*AB* 15; 3rd ed.; New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973) 267.

[10] Ibid., 316.

[11] J. Muilenburg, *JBL* 88 (1969) 12.

[12] See Y. Yadin, *The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands* (New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963) II, 293ff.

[13] Note Wolff, *Joel and Amos*, 134f.

[14] Since the presence of conjunctive *waw* in poetic texts is debated, I have not stressed this point.

[15] Wolff, *Joel and Amos*, 134f.

[16] Sh. M. Paul, "Amos 1:3-2:3: A Concatenous Literary Pattern," *JBL* 90 (1971) 397-403.

[17] Note the title of D. Christensen's work: *Transformations of the War Oracle* . . . . Cf. also the work of I. A. Seeligman who refers to the "OAN tradition" as "basically 'war prophecy'" (D. Christensen, 5 and n. 21).

[18] Wolff, 172.

[19] Ibid., 212-215, 217f., 220-222.

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THE FORMATION OF AMOS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXEGETICAL METHOD

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In recent years a trend has emerged in biblical studies toward recapturing the whole. Redaction criticism, rhetorical criticism, and canonical criticism reverse the tendency in biblical studies to atomize the text into its smallest units and aim instead to interpret larger blocks of material.

Prophetic literature has not been overlooked in the emerging interest in the formation of larger units of tradition. Figures such as Muilenburg, Fohrer, Wolff, Westermann, Zimmerli, and Koch come immediately to mind. In the United States a group of scholars have recently begun discussions on the formation of prophetic books through a paper by W. Eugene March which explored several types of redaction criticism in the study of prophetic books.[1]

The Book of Amos is an especially suitable place to undertake a study in exegetical method, for that prophetic corpus has been the subject of several inquiries into its formation. Of particular significance are the quite different approaches of Hans Walter Wolff and Klaus Koch.[2] The former argues that the Book of Amos is the result of several layers of collection of tradition, whereas the latter thinks of the book more as a composition which has not only used and reshaped earlier oral tradition but also has produced new material at the literary stage of the developing tradition. It is my aim to analyze these two approaches in the hope that such an examination will enable us to penetrate beyond what they have done.

HANS WALTER WOLFF

Hans Walter Wolff sees the formation of the Book of Amos, as W. Eugene March has expressed it, "more as the overlaying of one stage of redaction upon another than the gradual enlargement of a collection."[3] The Book of Amos, according to Wolff, is the result of six layers of redaction, each of which has been laid upon what had emerged thus far in the process of growth. Wolff's main interest is in reconstructing these layers, along with the historical situation in which each layer developed.

Wolff postulates the following levels of redaction: 1) "the Words of Amos from Tekoa," 2) "the Literary Fixation of the Cycles," 3) "the Old School of Amos," 4) "the Bethel-Exposition of the Josianic Age," 5) "the Deuteronomistic Redaction," and 6) "the Postexilic Eschatology of Salvation."[4] In his judgment the superscription in 1:1 shows growth, suggesting the possibility of a corresponding growth of layers of redaction in the book as a whole. The oldest layer of tradition read, he argues, "the words of Amos from Tekoa." Subsequently the clause, "which he saw two years

before the earthquake," was added, and then "who was among the sheperds" and the dating notice in the time of the kings of Israel and Judah.[5]

A. The Words of Amos from Tekoa. The earliest form of the superscription suggests that it was the heading for a collection of utterances preserved in chs. 3-6. Since the speeches in 1:3-2:16 are divine words introduced by the messenger formula and chs. 7-9 must be seen also as primarily divine speech, we are left with chs. 3-6. Many utterances in chs. 3-6 display prophetic speech, while others begin with a word of Amos and contain a speech of Yahweh only in the second part. This collection in its earliest form in all probability goes back to Amos himself.

B. The Literary Fixation of the Cycles. Also from Amos himself are two groups - the vision reports (7:1-8; 8:1-2; 9:1-4) and the oracles in 1:3-2:16. Both groups have five parts with climax on the last of the five (2:6-16; 9:1-4).[6] Both groups rely on repetition in the framework and in important sentences. In both groups the last of the five parts portray an earthquake (2:13-16; 9:1-4). Both groups employ the concluding formula 'āmar yhwh (1:5, 8, 15; 2:3; 7:3,6), a formula rarely used elsewhere.[7]

C. The Old School of Amos. 1. The redaction level emanating from a school growing out of Amos' early disciples can be seen first of all in 7:10-17. This third-person report reflects the style and themes of Amos quite accurately, leaving the impression that the composer had heard and seen Amos. Yet Amos never says "Hear Yahweh's word." (7:16) but rather "Hear this word" (3:1; 4:1; 5:1). Moreover, this school, unlike Amos himself, uses the term "Isaac" (7:9, 16).

2. The speeches in 8:4-14 show the disciple's closeness to the master while exhibiting significant differences as well. 8:4-7, 8 shows that the school handed down genuine words of Amos. Nevertheless, the disciple says "Hear this" instead of "Hear this word." Moreover, he introduces the citation with lē'mōr instead of Amos' typical participles (4:2; 6:13). The announcement of judgment in v 7b is not concrete like those of the master but rather a generalized sentence derived from the language of the lament psalms.[8] Moreover, we find an unusual chain of infinitives in vv 5-6 instead of Amos' characteristic participles. 8:8 is an announcement of punishment in rhetorical-question style, a phenomenon which is not found in Amos' messenger speech, but understandable as a result of disciples' discussion of the master's words.

The structure of the utterances in 8:9-14 is not typical of Amos. The Begründung for the announcement of punishment is either lacking (vv 9-10, 11-12) or surrounded by the announcement (14a in vv 13-15). The introductory formulae are not found in the older speeches in the Book of Amos.[9] Moreover, the language of ch. 5 is reformulated here: 5:2 in 8:13, 14b and 5:1 in 8:10.

3. In 9:7-10 we find reminders of the speech of Amos in the question style (v 7a), the threat of deportation (v 8a), the threat of death (v 10a), and the introduction of the citation by a participle (v 10b). But the speech of a disciple is apparent in the mixing of disputation style with that of messenger speech (v 7ab) and in the use of the cultically-related root bṭ' (vv 8a, 10a). The word mamlākāh, too, occurs only in this layer of tradition (6:2; 7:13; 9:8).[10]

9:7-10 is best understood as the reflection of disciples upon 9:1-4.[11] The repetition of death by the sword (vv 4, 10), śwh (vv 4, 9) rā'āh (vv 4, 10), and the mention of Yahweh's "eyes" (vv 3, 4, 8) indicate a relationship between the two units of speech.

4. 5:14-15 is an insertion from the "Old School of Amos" into the "Words of Amos from Tekoa."[12] In vv 14-15 the exhortation style of 5:4f. can be seen, but the exhortations are not substantiated with an announcement of punishment as in 5:5b. Moreover, the concrete reproaches of 5:4f. are transformed into generalities, and wihyû (v 4b) becomes lema'an tihyû (v 14a). The term "remnant of Joseph" fits best in the time of the casualties suffered under Tiglath-Pileser in 733.[13] 5:14-15 presupposes not only 5:4f. but also vv 7+10-12, an indication that 5:14-15 came into being in response to the material of the "Words of Amos from Tekoa" (5:1-3, 4-5, 7+10-12, 16, etc.). In addition, vv 14-15, along with v 13, interrupt the continuity of accusation and announcement of punishment in vv. 12+16f.[14]

Several other supplements may be attributed to the "Old School of Amos."[15] 6:2 interrupts the row of participles in the woe-speech by means of the question style which we saw in 8:8 and 9:7b. 6:6b, since it has no poetic parallel, is not originally part of the woe-speech. Moreover, it uses the term "Joseph," which is uncharacteristic of Amos. 5aγ, too, is a later expansion, resulting from the encounter of pilgrims to Beersheba from the north by Amos' disciples.[16]

5. The "Old School of Amos" is apparently responsible for binding together the two earlier collections, placing the "Fixation of the Cycles" before and after chs. 3-6.[17] This school of disciples also added to the superscription the phrase, "which he saw concerning Israel two years before the earthquake," and inserted its own material into the visions (7:9-17; 8:3-14; 9:7-10) and chs. 3-6 (5:5aγ, 13, 14f.; 6:2, 6b). The reworking of the older tradition by the disciples gave those words new significance for a later generation. 7:9 reinterprets 7:11 to take account of the fact that it was not Jeroboam but rather his son who died by the sword.

C. The Bethel-Exposition of the Josianic Age. 1. In 3:14bα we find an insertion which reinterprets the oracle as an announcement of the destruction of the altar at Bethel. Vv 13-15 appear to be one of a trio of oracles

which were directed originally to Samaria (vv 9-11, 12, 13-15). 3:14bα takes pqd and mizbēaḥ from the original oracle and uses them as catchwords upon which to build the insertion.[18]

2. 5:6 is later than the context into which it has been placed. The messenger style of 5:4f. is transformed into disputation style, and in the place of the antithetical vetitives and the Begründung of 5:4f. we find in 5:6 a conditional clause. The style of v 6 is prosaic and awkward, and at the end the entire speech is related to Bethel by means of the preposition 1e in the typical fashion of interpretive glosses. In both 3:14bα and 5:6 Bethel is singled out in a way unusual to Amos.[19]

3. Three hymn fragments (4:13; 5:8f.; 9:5f.), which Wolff has reconstructed into a three-strophe hymn,[20] were placed in the text as responses to speeches concerning Bethel.[21] This is obvious in the case of 5:8f. (cf. v 6). The hymn fragment in 4:13 concludes the "liturgy" in vv 6-12, which is in turn attached to a pericope concerning Bethel (vv 4-5). The "liturgy" is quite unlike Amos in style, and in v 12 we encounter language which, unlike Amos, is prosaic and awkward - and in this regard much like 5:6. Wolff thinks that 4:6-12, 13 is a later reinterpretation of 4:4-5 just as 5:6, 8f. is a reinterpretation of 5:4f. Both share a common interest in Bethel. The hymn fragment in 9:5f. follows language concerning the destruction of an unnamed altar (9:1-4). Wolff thinks that the redactor who placed 4:13 (4:6-12, 13) and 5:8 as responses to language against Bethel understood the altar in 9:1-4 as Bethel. The occasion for this level of redaction is Josiah's destruction of the altar at Bethel.

4. 1:2 probably belongs to this pre-Deuteronomistic layer of redaction. The Deuteronomistic redactor, says Wolff, cannot speak so positively of Jerusalem.[22]

E. The Deuteronomistic Redaction. This layer is to be found first of all in the Tyre, Edom, and Judah oracles in the Oracles against the Nations. 2:10-12, too, is later than its context and reflects the characteristics of the Deuteronomistic tradition. The third person address of v 9 is transformed into the direct address of paranetic style. To the mention of the land in v 10 is added the Exodus and wilderness tradition, leading again to the gift of the land (v 10bβ); thus vv 9-10 are quite awkward, both in style and progression of thought. If we assume that vv 10-12 are an insertion, the difficulties are removed. The mention of the forty years suggests that we have to do with the Deuteronomistic school. Vv 11-12 reflect the interest in prophetism which we find in the Deuteronomistic 3:7.[23]

The Deuteronomistic redactor also created 5:25f., identifiable in the mention of forty years in the wilderness and in the direct-address, rhetorical-question style found in 2:10-12. 3:1b is also Deuteronomistic, as is 8:11f. The

phrase, "who was among the shepherds," in the superscription, along with the names of the kings, belongs also to the Deuteronomistic redaction.[24]

F. The Postexilic Eschatology of Salvation. 9:11-15, 5:22aβ, and the phrase "like David" in 6:5 belong to this layer of redaction.[25]

CRITIQUE OF WOLFF

Even if Wolff is right that the Book of Amos is the result of several stages of growth throughout decades and even centuries, can we reconstruct those levels with the accuracy which Wolff claims? Because of the limitation of space we shall critically examine Wolff's hypothesis at only two points, namely the "Old School of Amos" and the "Bethel-Exposition of the Josianic Age."

A. The Old School of Amos. Much of Wolff's argument for a redactional layer of Amos' early disciples rests on finding enough similarity with the master's style of speaking to suggest direct ties with him on the one hand, yet recognizing sufficient differences to warrant a distinction between disciple and master on the other (cf. C.1. above). Such criteria, though not unsound in principle, are difficult to apply in practice, particularly when there are only nine chapters from which to derive the criteria. For example, the criteria for assigning 8:4-7, 8 to someone other than Amos suffer from this difficulty (cf. C.2 above). Wolff's contention that "hear this" instead of "hear this word" is a sign of the speech of someone else takes advantage of the fact that the latter predominates in Amos. But what rules out the possibility that Amos may have varied the phrase? I am not arguing that he did; it is rather my contention that we have too few utterances in the Book of Amos to have a basis for such a fine distinction. The same is true for the chain of infinitives and lĕʾmōr.

The problem of finding adequate controls for distinguishing between master and disciple can be illustrated also in the problems connected with 9:7-10 (cf. C.3 above). How can we be sure that the mixing of disputation style with messenger speech is the disciple rather than a stylistic variant of the prophet's own?

Wolff's arguments that a particular passage is a reinterpretation of earlier material are easier to establish. For instance, the combining of the imperatives with language about justice in the gate in 5:14-15 suggests that these verses originated from the hand of someone who was trying to bring vv 4-5 (also v 6?) into relationship with vv 10-12, perhaps interrupting an original continuity of vv 10-12+16-17.[26] Whether this reinterpretation may be securely tied to other reinterpretations which Wolff calls the Old School of Amos is still another question.

The problems associated with Wolff's attempts to

classify obvious reinterpretations of earlier tradition into clearly identifiable levels of redaction may be seen when one scrutinizes his analysis of 9:7-10 (cf. C.3 above). Though it is generally recognized that recasting of earlier material is evident in this passage, it is not so clear whether Wolff's arguments about the precise nature and level of redaction are convincing. Vv 7-8a show no signs of originating as a reinterpretation of vv 1-4, as Wolff contends. The repetition of ʿênay/ʿênê appears to be the only connection between vv 1-4 and vv 7-8a. V 8a, in the form of an announcement of judgment, is a response to the disputational questions in v 7. The disputation does not concern itself with the totality of judgment proclaimed in vv 1-4 but rather with the claim that Yahweh would not punish the people whom he delivered from Egypt. The reinterpretation of the totality of judgment of vv 1-4 comes only in the prose, literary v 8b and the following vv 9-10. Now Wolff's "Old School of Amos" is generally characterized by vibrant poetry (5:14f.; 8:4-7, 9-10, 13-14) and lively rhetorical question (6:2). But in 9:7-10 the reinterpretation of 9:1-4 which Wolff attributes to that school takes place in the segment of the speech which appears to be a literary postscript. Thus it is questionable whether 5:14-15 and 9:7-10 (especially vv 8b-10) belong to the same level of redaction.

Space prevents a more thorough analysis of Wolff's reconstruction of an "Old School of Amos." It is possible here only to raise questions of methodology. The cumulative character of Wolff's reconstruction indeed lends to the whole a degree of credibility which the individual parts, taken separately, could not evoke. Nevertheless, the difficulty of adequate controls remains.

B. The Bethel-Exposition of the Josianic Age. Wolff's hypothesis concerning this level of redaction suffers from some of the difficulties which we have encountered above. To be sure, the language of the hymnic material (4:13; 5:8-9; 9:5-6) is so different from the rest of the utterances in Amos that there is good reason to suspect that it comes from a special layer of tradition. Moreover, the similarities among these three hymnic passages suggest the likelihood that all three came from the same circle of tradition.[27] It is more difficult to demonstrate, however, that the hymnic passages belong to the same level of redaction as 3:14bα, 4:6-12, and 5:5-6. Even if one assumes with Wolff that 3:14bα was inserted into vv 13-15 by a redactor, only 3:14bα and 5:5-6 manifest an exclusive interest in Bethel and Bethel alone (cf. 4:4-5; 5:4-5).[28] On what basis can we assume that the altar in 9:1-4, a passage to which 9:5-6 is a hymnic response, was understood as Bethel by the redactor of the hymnic passage? Or what warrants the conclusion that 4:13 betrays a polemic against Bethel? Even if 4:6-12 should happen to belong to the same layer of tradition as 4:13 (Wolff), it is not clear that 4:6-13 in its expansion upon vv 4-5 focuses on Bethel more than Gilgal.

To conclude: It has not been my intention to argue that Wolff is wrong in his contention that the Book of Amos

is the product of several layers of redaction but rather to show the difficulty of reconstructing those layers. Indeed, anyone who studies the problem of the formation of the Book of Amos must ask to what extent such a reconstruction is even possible.

Another important limitation of Wolff's study in the formation of the Book of Amos is his lack of attention to the structure and meaning of the book in its final form. Does the entire book have kerygmatic significance? Or is that kind of significance to be found only in particular layers of redaction?

KLAUS KOCH

The analysis of Klaus Koch pays more attention than Wolff to the significance of the structure of the Book of Amos as a whole. This is partly the result of his belief that synchronic analysis should generally precede diachronic[29] and partly attributable to his contention that the present structure of the book is more a composition than a collection.

Koch begins his analysis of structure by noting that the oracles against the nations (1:3-2:16) and the vision reports (7:1-9; 8:1-3) have certain features in common. Both employ the formula *'āmar yhwh* (1:5, 8, 15; 2:3; 7:3, 6), and each closes with *bayyôm hahu' ne'um* (*'ădōnāi*) *yhwh* (2:16; 8:3).[30]

The material between the oracles against the nations and the vision reports is divided at certain points by the formula, "Hear this word" (3:1; 4:1; 5:1). If one observes more closely, however, it becomes apparent that 3:1 and 5:1 differ from 4:1. In addition to the expression, "Hear this word," Amos 3:1 and 5:1 both have *'ăšer* and a relative clause immediately following "hear this word," while 4:1 does not have so fully developed an introduction. Thus 3:1 and 5:1 serve as introductory formulae for major blocks of collected material, whereas 4:1 introduces only a segment within a major block.[31]

The hymnic passages (1:2; 4:13; 5:8; 9:5-6) are also major structural markers. The first one (1:2) introduces the oracles against the nations (1:3-2:16) and chs 3-4. The hymn in 4:13 closes the section beginning in 3:1, and 9:5-6 concludes the block of collected material which opens in 5:1. The hymn in 5:8 comes within the section 5:1-9:6; it anticipates 9:5-6 rather than serving as the opening or closing of a major section of the collection. The repetition of 5:8b in 9:6b suggests that the shorter hymn (5:8) merely anticipates the longer and weightier 9:5-6.[32] Additional evidence suggests that 3:1-4:13 and 5:1-9:6 each has its own identity as a block within the larger book: the former addresses the people as "sons of Israel" (3:1, 12; 4:5), while the latter uses "house of Israel" (5:1, 3, 4, 25; 6:2, 14; 7:10).[33] The book closes with the postscript 9:7-15.

The Book of Amos is constituted, then, by

Kompositionsbogen: (a) 1:2-2:16; (b) 3:1-4:13; (c) 5:1-9:6, plus the later 9:7-15. The Kompositionsbogen display sufficient unity of structure that they reflect a composition and not merely a collection. The Book of Amos is not the product of the addition of layers of redaction upon one another (Wolff) but its basic form is the result of a single person or school (apart from the obviously later 9:7-15). The composition is not the work of Amos himself but instead a later Judean "composer" who gave literary shape to the Amos-tradition which had been preserved in oral form.[34]

Although the Book of Amos can be called a composition, we can recognize behind it certain earlier collections of speeches which were probably associated with one another at the oral stage: 3:9-4:3; 4:6-12bα; 5:9-17; 5:18-27; 6:1-14; 8:4-14a (9:4?).[35] The composer took these collections, added to them other material from the Amos-tradition, and formed a prophetic book. Amos 3:9-4:3 was originally a collection of speeches directed to the inhabitants of Samaria. The composer put that tradition into a new context, however. He placed before 3:9ff. two units of tradition, 3:1-2 and 3:3-8, which are joined together by dibber yhwh/yhwh dibber (vv 1,8). With the addition of 3:1-8 speeches originally addressed to the inhabitants of Samaria are addressed to the entirety of the "sons of Israel" and related to Yahweh's act of deliverance from Egypt. Moreover, 3:1ff. is connected to chs 1-2: Israel and the nations are compared in both 1:3-2:16 and 3:1-2; Yahweh's "roaring" in 1:2 is picked up in 3:8; the destruction of the "strongholds" of the foreign nations (1:4ff.) reaches also Israel's "strongholds" in 3:9-11. 4:1-3, which originally belonged to the collection of speeches directed against Samaria (3:9-4:3), was separated from that collection and placed by the composer into a new context (4:1-13), in which the subject is the cultic sites: Samaria (4:1-3), Bethel and Gilgal (4:4-5), the various m^{e}qomot (4:6), and the "high places of the earth" (4:13).[36]

Koch's understanding of the structure of Amos has much to commend it; indeed, I find its broad outlines generally persuasive. Nevertheless, I would pose two major questions: (1) Is Koch's treatment of the hymnic passages adequate? Although I quite agree that 4:13 and 9:5-6 close major sections of the book, I find his arguments for 5:8[37] unpersuasive. If 4:13 and 9:5-6 are categorized as major dividers, why should 5:8 be considered as merely anticipatory? Is its structure sufficiently different from 4:13 and 9:5-6 to assign to it a different function? (2) Is the structure of the Book of Amos primarily the work of one level of shaping (a Judean composer), or should we think of multiple levels of redaction? Koch offers little evidence for his theory; thus it needs further analysis.

A FRESH ANALYSIS

Is the Book of Amos more a product of the process of collection (Wolff), or should we think more in terms of a composer (Koch)? These two alternatives are of course not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible that col-

lector(s), like a composer, may have had definite kerygmatic aims, with the result that the shape of the collection reflects an author-like intentionality. It is possible also that a composer might have made use of earlier material, so that his creativity was limited by his feeling bound to some degree to earlier tradition.

We begin, like Koch, with the structure of the book as we now have it: (1) A superscription opens the book (1:1). (2) A Zion-hymn follows (1:2). (3) A series of oracles against foreign nations culminating in an oracle against Israel (1:3-2:16) and a segment of text dominated by vision reports (7:1-9:4) bracket a group of utterances in chs. 3-6. Chs. 3-4, addressed to the "sons of Israel," may be divided into two parts (3:1-15; 4:1-13), each of which begins with "Hear this word. . ." Chs. 5-6, composed of speeches directed to the "house of Israel," begin with "Hear this word" (5:1). Dominant features in chs. 5-6 are imperatives ("seek," "hate," "love"), woe-announcements (5:18; 6:1), and a repeated address to the "house of Israel" (5:1, 3, 4, 25; 6:2, 14). A theme of "death and life" pervades ch. 5. A theme of exile is recurrent in chs. 5-6 (5:5, 27; 6:7). (4) Amos 9:7-10, with its qualification of the totality of judgment (vv 8b-10), leads to the proclamation of salvation in vv 11-15, so that 9:7-15 is a segment of material in which the various parts work together to turn the judgment into hope and close the book on a note of expectation. (5) The hymns 4:13 and 9:5-6 seem to fit well as closing utterances in their respective sections of the collection, but 5:8-9 does not appear to exhibit such a function.

This broad analysis of structure reveals certain patterns in the shape of the book, yet it does not adequately account for how and why the book has taken this particular shape. Such an account is of course impossible in a short essay; thus we shall concentrate on the formation of chs. 3 and 4, recognizing that even there a detailed structural, form critical, and redactional analysis cannot be done.

A. A Structural Analysis of Chs. 3-4 (similar to Koch).

I. Call to hear (3:1)

A. Yahweh has "spoken" (3:1-8): dibber yhwh/ yhwh dibber (vv 1, 8)

1. Oracle against Yahweh's elect (3:2)
2. Disputation (3:3-8)

B. Destruction of strongholds and houses (3:9-11, 12, 13-15)

1. Oracle of doom against "strongholds" (3:9-11)
2. Proclamation of total disaster (3:12)
3. Proclamation of disaster for Bethel's altar and for the fine houses (3:13-15).

II. Call to hear (4:1)

A. Oracle against women of Samaria (4:1-3)

B. Ironic summons to sacrifice (4:4-5)
C. Refrain text (4:6-12)
D. Hymnic response (4:13)

Koch argues that the structure is the work of a composer rather than a collector. The composer created 3:1-2 and bound it tightly with a previously-existent vv 3-8 by means of the inclusio, "Yahweh has spoken" (vv 1, 8). Then he took an already-formed small collection of utterances about Samaria (3:9-11, 13-15; 4:1-3), moved 4:1-3 into a new context (ch. 4), and attached 3:9-11, 13-15 to 3:1-8. He also added 3:12, so that 3:9-15 manifest a unity of buildings and their furniture. Ch. 4, according to Koch, was structured around a cultic theme. Vv 1-3, originally joined to 3:9-11, 13-15, was given an expanded introduction (v 1aα) and connected with 4:4-5, 6ff. because the composer understood "mountain of Samaria" as a reference to a cultic center, "cows of Bashan" as residents of a cult center, and "bring that we may drink" as a language associated with cultic activity. Vv 6ff., a body of already-existing tradition which the composer adapted, was joined to vv 1-3, 4-5 because of its cultic emphasis, visible in the reference to "places" (cult centers) and in the refrain about the refusal to repent.[38] Koch envisions the composer as sovereign over the earlier material which he uses, structuring 3:1-4:13 into a compositional unity, whereas Wolff sees it as a collection involving three stages of redaction: the "Words of Amos from Tekoa" (3:1-2, 3-8, 9-11, 12, 13, 14a, bβ, 15; 4:1-3, 4-5), the "Bethel-Exposition of the Josianic Age" (3:14bα; 4:6-13), and the "Deuteromistic Redaction" (3:1b, 7).[39]

B. Analysis of Genre. In order to ascertain how the various parts of chs. 3-4 are related, an analysis of genre - necessarily abbreviated - is needed. Chs. 3-4 may be divided into the following units: 3:1-2, 3-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15; 4:1-3, 4-5, 6-12 (13).

At first glance 3:1-2 looks like a prophetic oracle of judgment with a call to hear (v 1), Proclamation of Disaster (v 2b) and Reason for Punishment (v 2a). Yet the Reason does not contain the enumeration of misdeeds which is characteristic of this particular genre. Nevertheless, the genre of the oracle of doom is the framework from which this utterance has taken its shape.

Another genre is reflected in 3:3-8. No longer is Yahweh the speaker; he is instead spoken about (vv 6, 7, 8). Vv 3-8 are a disputation concerning the prophet's grounds for uttering his oracles. The ha-'im style of rhetorical questions (vv 3-5) is found elsewhere in disputation language (Job 6:5-6; 8:3; cf. also 8:10, 11).[40] Vv 1-2 and vv 3-8 can stand alone in terms of both form and content.

The genre of the oracle of doom reappears in 3:9-11. The Reason and Proclamation of Disaster are visible in vv 10-11, along with the messenger formula. The imperatives in v 9, though not connected primarily with the genre of the oracle of doom, have strong rootage in prophetic tradition

(Jer 4:5; 5:20; 31:7; 46:14; 50:2; Isa 48:20).[41] Messengers, who are commonly sent to warn concerning military invasion (Jer 4:5; 46:14), are sent here to summon witnesses among foreign nations to observe Samaria's misdeeds. The entire utterance is dominated by the word "strongholds" (4 times).[42] Indeed, vv 9-11 stand apart from their context as a complete oracle of doom with a dominating catchword not shared by the immediate context.

3:12 is a proclamation of the future, apparently in terms of disaster,[43] without a Reason. Its structure is similar to Isa 31:4 and 55:10-11.[44] Thus it is independent of its context by form, and its imagery is not found in either its immediately preceding or immediately following genre units (vv 9-11, 13-15).

3:13-15 is a Proclamation of Disaster, without Reason, but with the imperatives, "hear and testify." Whether those to whom the imperatives are directed are to "warn" (Ex 19:21) or to testify as witnesses (Jer 32:25) is not clear. However that may be, the utterance is capable of standing alone. Its catchword bêt also gives it inner integrity and separates it from its context.

Another prophetic oracle of judgment is apparent in 4:1-3. It has a call to hear (v 1a), Reason (v 1b), and Proclamation of Disaster (v 2). Unlike the context in which it is presently embedded, it is directed toward the wealthy women of Samaria.

4:4-5 is a parody of priestly instruction, as has been generally recognized. This kind of language ends with v 5, as indicated by the direct address, "sons of Israel," and the oracle formula. Vv 6ff. begin a new type of speech.

4:6-12 has proved particularly difficult for interpreters; thus we cannot expect to resolve the problems, particularly in the space available here. We must instead limit ourselves to a few observations: (1) The passage consists of five strophes, each of which end with the refrain, "you did not return to me." (vv 6-11), plus a proclamation of the future and command to prepare to meet Yahweh (v 12). The first five strophes contain a first-person verb in the perfect tense (vv 6, 7, 9, 10, 11). The strophes, however, are not regular in length.[45] Strophe 1 (v 6) is short and exhibits poetic parallelism; strophe 3 (v 9) also has parallelism. Strophes 1, 3, and 5 show a fairly regular pattern of stress: 4 (or 3) x 3[46] and 4 x 3 (not including nᵉ'um yhwh).[47] Strophe 4 (v 10) also has the stress pattern of strophes 1, 3, and 5,[48] as long as the phrase ʿim sēbî sûsēkem is seen as an expansion of the basic pattern of stress. Strophe 2 is much longer and more prosaic than the others. One is tempted to argue that the "expansion" in strophe 4 and the length and prosaic nature of strophe 2 are signs of additions to an earlier poem. We may not be certain that such is the case, however, so that caution is warranted.

(2) If we ask what kind of text this is, we find it difficult to be precise. Its similarities with Lev 26 have

long been noticed: nātattî (Am 4:6) and wᵉnātattî (Lev 26:4, 6, 11, 17, 19, 30-31), wᵉlō' yisbā'û/tisbā'ū (Am 4:8; Lev 26:26), šillaḥtî deber (Am 4:10; Lev 26:25), hikkêtî 'etkem (Am 4:9; Lev 26:24), and other similarities.[49] zō't 'ᵉśeh lāk (Am 4:12) is reminiscent of 'ap 'anî 'ᵉśeh zō't lākem (Lev 26:16).

(3) Although Am 4:6-12 is clearly rooted in the kind of language which we find also in Lev 26, the form of the Amos-text differs from that of Lev 26.[50] It is not stated in conditional form, as is the case in Lev 26; moreover, the verbs in the prophetic text are in the perfect. Indeed, Am 4:6-11 has to do with acts of chastisement in the past which did not lead to repentance. The form of the text seems to be shaped by the prophetic oracle of doom: vv 6-11 take the place of the Reason, and v 12, introduced by lākēn, is reminiscent of the Proclamation of Disaster. The more characteristic forms of the genre are considerably restructured here, but the rootage of vv 6-12 in that genre is clear.

(4) Vv 6-12 are explicitly connected with vv 4-5 by wᵉgam. We have already argued, however, that vv 4-5 are quite capable of standing alone, so that the connection between vv 4-5 and vv 6-12 is somewhat loose.

4:13 reflects a particular kind of hymnic passage known elsewhere in Amos (5:8-9; 9:5-6) and outside Amos.[51] Its structure is sufficiently stereotyped to separate it form critically from its context.

To conclude: Chs. 4-5 are composed of genre-units which can be relatively easily isolated. In all probability this indicates that we have to do with a process of collection of material. A composer, in the strictest sense of the term, would probably have blurred the distinctions between units somewhat more.

C. Arrangement of Genre-Units. Having established the probability that chs. 4-5 are basically a collection rather than a composition, we must now consider the basis upon which these units are juxtaposed. Can we determine where redactors are at work as opposed to the tradition which they used? Can we determine whether we have more than one level of redaction?

We shall begin with 3:1-2: is this passage an old oral tradition or the creation of a redactional school? V 1 is without doubt redactional, for it opens chs. 3-4 just as 5:1 introduces chs. 5-6 (or 5:1-9:6).[52] Moreover, as we saw, v 2 differs somewhat from the patterns which we characteristically find in the prophetic oracle of judgment. V 2a occupies the place in which the Reason for Punishment normally appears, but it is scarcely a typical description of the misdeeds of the prophet's hearers. V 2b lacks the concreteness and specificity of a typical Proclamation of Disaster. In addition, it is questionable whether the oracle is expressed in poetry, as is characteristic of most of the utterances in the Book of Amos. V 2, though possibly read as two lines of 3 x 3 and 3 x 2 respectively, lacks parallelism. In my

judgment, vv 1-2 are rhythmic prose.

In all likelihood vv 1-2 were composed by a redactor to introduce what follows in the collection. Not only does the prose character of vv 1-2 suggest the hand of a redactor, but also the language of v 2 suggests a rootage outside the Amos tradition. The verb yd' is not used elsewhere in Amos to indicate election. It is found in J (Gen 18:19), along with several other passages.[53] The phrase, "all the families of the earth," is found outside Amos only in Gen 12:3 and 28:14 (J).[54] Indeed, the writer uses a language more at home in J than in the traditions in the Book of Amos. It is probable that a redactor who was steeped in the traditions of the Yahwist created vv 1-2 in order to set the following utterances into a context of the relationship between Israel and the nations.

Another indication that vv 1-2 were created by a redactor is found in the relationships between the language of vv 1-2 and elsewhere in ch. 3. The verb root pqd is found again in 3:14 and nowhere else in Amos; רק אתכם ידעתי מכל משפחות האדמה (v 2) appears again in v 5, and the verb yd' is repeated in v 10. It looks as if a redactor has composed vv 1-2 as an introduction to the utterances which follow by using the language of the material which he has collected. By means of vv 1-2 the redactor has given new significance to Yahweh's activity of "visitation" (pqd). When he "visits" upon them their transgressions (v 14), he does so because he has known them and known them alone. Thus it is ironically inappropriate for those who have been "known" by Yahweh (v 2) not to "know" how to do what it right (v 10). Furthermore, the redactor who created vv 1-2 sees all the material of chs. 3-4 as an address which Yahweh has spoken to the "sons of Israel" (3:1, 12; 4:5).

The redactor connected 3:1-2 with vv 3-8 by the inclusio dibber yhwh/yhwh dibber (vv 1, 8).[55] The fact that "Yahweh has spoken" serves as the basis of all that follows in 3:9ff. Moreover, both vv 1-2 and 3-8 presuppose a criticism of the prophet's message which has occasioned a disputation on the one hand and an "oracle" with disputational overtones on the other. Vv 3-8 reflect the genre of disputation and it is clear that the utterance was formulated to counter attempts to undermine the authority of the prophet's word. Vv 1-2, though not a disputation in form, appear to reflect a gap between the prophet's word and the perception of the people to whom his word is addressed. They cannot comprehend a proclamation of disaster; after all, are they not the special people whom Yahweh has known? Yes indeed, responds the redactor, but that does not mean what his hearers have taken their election to signify; it means instead that they are held especially accountable.

Wolff argues that vv 1b, 7 are Deuteronomistic insertions.[56] (1) V 7 is a piece of didactic prose which interrupts a poetically-formed disputation. It reflects the theology of the Deuteronomistic school concerning the relationship of prophetic word and historical event.[57] More-

over, the terminology shows affinity with the Deuteronomistic traditions: the prophets as servants of Yahweh (2 Kgs 17:13, 23; 21:10; 24:2; Jer 7:25; 25:4), *'sh dābār* (2 Kgs 20:9; cf. 17:12), and Yahweh's "council" (Jer 23:18, 22).[58] (2) V 1b shows itself to be an insertion by the shift from speech about Yahweh (v 1a) to divine speech (1b) prior to the quotation of Yahweh's words in v 2. Indeed, v 1b manifests the Deuteronomistic redactor's interest in the Exodus (1:10; see under D. 3 below). The redactor has borrowed the terms "against you" (v 1a) and "all the families" (v 2) as catchwords for his insertion.[59] I find Wolff's arguments convincing.

3:9-11 and 3:13-15 are associated on the basis of the similarity in the opening imperatives (vv 9, 13) and by the imagery of buildings ("strongholds" in 3:9-11, "houses" in 3:13-15).[60] The connections between 3:9-11, 13-15 and vv 1-2, 3-8 have been discussed above. 3:12 relates to its context in a different way from 3:9-11, 13-15. Whereas the relatively loose associations between vv 9-11 and vv 13-15 suggest the possibility that these two texts may have originally existed independently of each other, v 12 seems to presuppose the context of ch. 3 as a whole. Its use of the messenger formula, as well as the language about household furnishings and the verb *yšb* relates to both vv 9-11 and vv 13-15. The mention of the "lion" in v 12 is reminiscent of vv 3-8 (4, 8). It looks as if v 12 was created by a redactor who already had the material in ch. 3 before him. His purpose was to show that the destruction proclaimed in vv 9-11 (also 13-15) would be so thorough that nothing of consequence would be left.

Wolff has argued that 3:14bα is a later insertion into 3:13-15.[61] Without doubt the pericope is mainly about the destruction of the "houses" (v 15), so that the reference to the altar at Bethel seems out of place. Nevertheless, his arguments are not without problems. If v 14bα were to be considered original, a certain parallelism in structure emerges: the clauses with the first person of Yahweh (14bα, 15a) are expanded by clauses with third-person verbs which express the result of Yahweh's intervention (14bβ, 15b). Moreover, v 14bα provides a context without which the altar in 14bβ would remain unidentified. I incline toward regarding the whole of 14b as a later reinterpretation. If that were the case, the entire utterance would be directed toward the "houses" which are to be destroyed. After the imperatives (v 13) and announcement concerning Yahweh's day of "visitation" (v 14a), Yahweh's intervention is announced in first person (v 15a). V 14b would be a later redactional expansion which, like the reinterpretation in 5:6, focuses on Bethel.

The redaction of ch. 4 (vv 1-3, 4-5, 6-12, 13) is apparent first of all in the call to hear (v 1aα), which divides ch. 4 from ch. 3. Upon what basis are the units in ch. 4 juxtaposed? Koch's contention that the units were placed side by side by means of cultic language cannot be shown for the entire chapter.[62] The term "mountain of Samaria" is not clearly a cultic term. Nor is the phrase

"cows of Bashan" a clear cultic reference. To be sure, Hos 8:5-6 refers to a calf of Samaria (undoubtedly a cult object), and Ps 68:16f. seems to speak of Bashan as a cult center, but the references to Bashan in the Hebrew scriptures do not all reflect cultic significance. In Ps 22:13 "bulls of Bashan," which, along with dogs and lions, are images of the supplicant's enemies rather than cultic figures, reminds us of the phrase "cows of Bashan" in Am 4:1. Perhaps the women of Samaria are being portrayed as enemies of the poor who could well utter psalms of lamentation. I do not claim that this assertion is true; I make it simply to show that Koch's contention that "cows of Bashan" is a cultic referent is open to serious question. Even Hos 4:11 is not a sufficiently strong parallel to persuade us that the reference to "drink" in v 1 is a reference to cultic activity.

How, then, is ch. 4 organized? Word repetition may be a factor, e.g., hābî'āh/wᵉhābî'û (vv 1, 4), yāmîm (vv 2, 4), the verb bô' (vv 2, 4), lišlōšet/šᵉlōšāh (vv 4, 7). Vv 4-5 and 6-12 are connected because they both employ language related to the cult: wᵉlō' šabtem ʿādai in vv 6-12 has to do with the cultic act of repentance (Hos 14:2; Isa 9:12; Deut 4:30; 30:2); vv 4-5 contain a variety of cultic terms. But there is no such obvious relationship between vv 1-3 and vv 4-5, 6-12. The most striking similarity in language is the parallel between "bring that we may drink" (v 1) and "two or three cities wandered to one city to drink water and were not satisfied" (v 8). Whatever the words, "bring that we may drink," may have meant in the original context for which vv 1-3 were designed, the redactor who joined vv 1-3 with vv 4-5 and vv 6-12 seems to have intended a contrast between the wealthy women who, before the destruction announced in vv 2-3, were able to say, "Bring that we may drink!" and the situation in which cities could not find water to drink.

D. The Relationship between Chs. 1-2 and Chs. 3-4. 1. I consider the Oracles against the Nations (1:3-2:16) as the work of a composer who designed the passage to introduce 3:1ff. rather than a body of already-existing oracles against the nations.[63] The oracles against the nations are stereotyped to a higher degree than we normally expect of independent speech-units of the same genre. Though various independent oracles of doom characteristically resemble one another in many respects, it is abnormal to have the uniformity which we find in Amos' oracles against the nations.[64] It seems more likely that a composer has created a series of short, almost-uniform oracles of doom which are deliberately designed to lead up to the longer and differently-structured oracle against Israel (see also a similar structuring process in 7:1-9; 8:1-3; 9:1-4).[65]

The composer of 1:3-2:16 has created this passage as an introduction to 3:1ff. by using language which is employed elsewhere in his collected material. Again and again he says that the "strongholds" will be punished (1:4, 7, 10, 12, 14; 2:2, 5). The only other places in the Book of Amos in which this term occurs are 3:9-11 and 6:8. peša' (1:3, 6, 9, 11,

13; 2:1, 4, 6) and its accompanying verbal form appear elsewhere in Amos only in 3:14, 4:14, and 5:12. The composer of 1:3-2:16 used these two terms to express a particular theology which shaped his compositional and redactional activity: if Yahweh punishes the "strongholds" of the foreign nations because of their "transgressions," how much more the "strongholds" of Samaria (3:9-11) because of the "transgressions" of Israel (3:14), whom of all the families of the earth Yahweh alone had known (3:1-2)!

2. Amos 1:2 betrays another level of redaction. Precisely how it is related to Joel 4:16 (cf. also Jer 25:30) may be debated,[66] but it seems to be a level of redaction which presupposes that much of the Book of Amos had already been organized, i.e., the Oracles against the Nations plus the Vision Reports (7:1-9:4), as well as the basic shape of chs. 3-6: Yahweh's "roaring" and "giving his voice" in 1:2 seems to be related to the vocabulary of 3:4, 8; "Carmel" appears also in 9:3, and the verb root *'bl* is found also in 8:8, 10 and 9:5. It looks as if a redactor has used language from selected points in previously-redacted material, and in so doing has given the material new shape. It is now Yahweh who "roars" and "gives his voice" (contrast 3:4, 8), and he roars from Zion. Thus we have a level of redaction which, unlike earlier levels of redaction, understands Amos' words from the perspective of Jerusalem. Nothing in 1:3-2:16, the Vision Reports, and the material in chs. 3-6 suggests a hint of Zionistic orientation; therefore it is almost certain that 1:2 represents a level of redaction which is later than the Oracles against the Nations, the Vision Reports, and the material in chs. 3-6 which accompanied that earlier level of redaction.

3. Wolff has argued that 1:3-2:16 as it now stands includes material which was not present in the original form of the composition.[67] The Tyre, Edom, and Judah oracles are form critically somewhat different from the other oracles against foreign nations. In these oracles (1:9-10, 11-12; 2:4-5) only the messenger formula and the proclamation, "For three transgressions of X and for four I will not turn it back," appear in precisely the same form as the other oracles against the nations. The Reason for Punishment is expanded in the Tyre, Edom, and Judah oracles, and the Proclamation of Disaster is considerably shorter. These oracles, according to Wolff, are surely later and may be attributed to a Deuteronomistic layer of redaction.

Wolff contends also that 2:10-12 is a Deuteronomistic insertion into the composition 1:3-2:16.[68] The movement from the conquest of the Amorites (v 9) backward to the Exodus would be a somewhat unexpected movement in the text; moreover, there is a shift from third-person speech (vv 6-9) to second-person (vv 10-12). Indeed, v 10bα is almost identical with Deut 29:4a, and the forty-year sojourn in the desert is characteristically Deuteronomistic (Deut 1:3; 2:7; 8:4; Jos 5:6). The Deuteronomistic tradition also uses the Hiph'il of *qûm* for the raising up of prophets (Deut 18:15, 18).[69]

Wolff argues also that 3:1b and 3:7 are Deuteronomistic additions, along with 5:25f.[70]

Wolff is right, in my judgment, about these passages. They seem to be additions, and they have a definite Deuteronomistic flavor. Thus the Exodus-theology in the Book of Amos and the indictment for refusing to allow the prophets to prophesy (2:12) are largely the result of the Deuteronomistic layer of redaction.

4. Is 4:6-12 from the same layer of redaction as 1:3-2:16 (also the Vision Reports)? The Oracles against the Nations (1:3-2:16) and the Vision Reports (7:1-9:4) each have five members[71] with climax on the last member (2:6-16; 9:1-4). 4:6-12 also has five members which end with the refrain, "you did not return to me". If we were to consider 4:6-12 a part of the level of redaction which created the Oracles against the Nations and the Vision Reports, that level of redaction would consist of a five-member introduction (1:3-2:16) plus a five-member text at the end of each of the two main section of the collection (3:1-4:13 and 5:1-9:4).

There are difficulties, however, with connecting 4:6-12 to the level of redaction which produced the Oracles against the Nations and the Vision Reports.[72] The strophes of 4:6-12 are not regular in length, as is the case with the first four members of the Oracles against the Nations and the Vision Reports. Moreover, 4:6-12 really has six members, and the sixth (v 12) is climactic rather than the fifth. In addition, 4:6-12 uses the formula n^{e}'um yhwh, whereas the Oracles against the Nations and the Vision Reports employ 'āmar yhwh. Perhaps 4:6-12 comes from another level of redaction, but to claim that it belongs to the same layer as the Bethel texts (3:14b; 5:5-6) can hardly be proven. The attempt to connect it with the destruction of the altar at Bethel in Josiah's time (Wolff) is even more problematic, for the lack of specificity of the references in 4:6-12 is a major obstacle for the reconstruction of the situation which engendered the passage.

E. Conclusions. From what we have discovered thus far it seems apparent that we should speak of independent genre-units as a major element in the formation of the Book of Amos. Yet redactors sometimes composed new material to introduce the older material which they were using (e.g., 1:2; 1:3-2:16; 3:1-2; 3:12).

We have also been able to distinguish between layers of redaction at certain points. To be sure, many problems and uncertainities remain, and it is by no means clear whether we can adequately reconstruct the various levels of redaction. Still, we have made some progress. The following are a series of statements of where our research has led us thus far.

1. Foundation-Level of Redaction. We have argued that 3:1-2 was created by a redactor to introduce material in ch. 3. We have seen also how the Oracles against the Nations

(1:3-2:16) seem to have been composed with chs. 3-4 in mind. Thus this material originated with a redactor rather than with Amos himself (against Wolff).

Is the redactor who composed 3:1-2 the same as the one who created 1:3-2:16? Probably so, for they both share an interest in Israel in relation to the nations. If not, the latter was a second stage which added to the work of the former. In any event, the foundational redaction of what came to be the Book of Amos was done by the creator(s) of the cycle-texts (1:3-2:16 and 7:1-9; 8:1-2; 9:1-4). It is this level of redaction which is probably responsible for the initial shaping of chs. 3-6. Other material was inserted later, but a basic pattern had already been formed.

2. Another level of redaction may be seen in those passages which focus singularly on Bethel (3:14b; 5:6). We argued above that 3:14b seems to be a later insertion into 3:13-15. 5:6, too, appears to be reinterpretation which was added after an earlier redactor had already shaped vv 1-5. This earlier redactor connected 5:1-3 and 5:4-5 as utterances concerning the "house of Israel" (lᵉbêt yiśrāʾēl, vv 3,4). lᵉbêt yiśrāʾēl in v 3 stands outside the meter and fits rather awkwardly, which is surely a sign of redactional activity. Even in v 4 the phrase might well be the work of a redactor, though that is not certain. The particle kî is also prominent in the structuring of 5:1-3, 4-5 (3a, 4a, 5b), particularly in the messenger formula: kî kōh ʾāmar (ʾadōnai) yhwh. In addition, the contrast of life and death seems to have been a major factor in the juxtaposition of vv 1-3 and vv 4-5. 5:1-5, then, displays a structural and thematic integrity which suggests a definite focus of a particular level of redaction. V 6 has neither lᵉbêt yiśrāʾēl nor kî. Moreover, its interest is in Bethel alone; thus it reflects a later redactional stage.

Whether the "Bethel-level" of redaction of 3:14b and 5:6 (7 also?)[73] also includes other passages (Wolff) cannot yet be determined. Nor can we be certain what occasioned this layer of redaction.

3. We have argued that the Tyre, Edom, and Judah oracles (1:9-10, 11-12; 2:4-5) belong to a Deuteronomistic layer of redaction, along with 2:10-12, 3:1b, and 5:25f. I think it is probable also (contrary to Wolff) that the two major insertions into the Vision Reports (7:10-17 and 8:4-14) are the result of a Deuteronomistic stratum of redaction.[74] Each of these insertions is connected to the Vision Reports by means of a clause which is an expansion of the Vision Report to which it is joined (7:9; 8:3).[75] The second and third visions end with "I will never again pass him by," to which is appended a clause introduced by waw plus perfect. The language of each of these clauses is so different from the Vision Report to which it is attached that we may be relatively certain that 7:9 and 8:3 are later expansions which build a bridge to the material which was inserted.

The expansion of the third vision in 7:9 is related to the narrative in 7:10-17. Jeroboam and death by the sword are common to both 7:9 and 7:10-17 (7:9, 11). Moreover, the destruction of the "sanctuaries" (7:9) appears to be related to Amaziah's claim that Bethel is the royal "sanctuary" (7:13). Yet there is tension between 7:9 and vv 10-17 in that the latter says that Jeroboan will die by the sword, whereas 7:9 indicates that it will be Jeroboam's house. Indeed, the tension between 7:9 and 7:10-17 is sufficiently great that I have difficulty in assigning both to the same layer of redaction (Wolff).[76] Whereas the main point of vv 10-17 is a legitimation of Amos' right to prophesy in Bethel, v 9 is a polemic against the "high places" and "sanctuaries" of Israel. V 9 is Deuteronomistic, I would suggest; thus it seems probable that a Deuteronomistic redactor has taken older material (vv10-17) and joined it to the Vision Reports by means of v 9. Just as the Deuteronomistic redactor inserted his own material into the Oracles against the Nations (1:9-10, 11-12; 2:4-5, 10-12), here also he inserted material into the already-existing structure of the Vision Reports and added the typical Deuteronomistic polemic against the "high places" to the kerygma of the emerging Book of Amos.

Amos 8:3 also reflects a sanctuary polemic. Because of its structural similarity with 7:9, we conclude that it also is the creation of the Deuteronomistic redactor. Thus 8:4-14 is a collection of speeches which was inserted into the Vision Reports by Deuteronomistic circles rather than by a school of the prophet's early disciples (Wolff). Although vv 4-14 may have existed in collected form prior to the activity of the Deuteronomistic redactor, it was he who inserted vv 4-14 into its present context in the Book of Amos.

4. Although we believe we may have resolved certain problems, a number of uncertainities in chs. 1-4 remain. (a) To what level of redaction should we assign 3:12? We argued above that a redactor created this verse. Was it the same redactor who composed 3:1-2 (Foundation-Level of Redaction)? We have not yet progressed far enough to decide, yet a comparison with 6:9-10 may be a fruitful beginning. Both 3:12 and 6:9-10 deal with the notion of a remnant in negative terms. Like 3:12, 6:9-10 seems to be a later commentary on its context: wᵉhāyāh is the sign of redactional activity;[77] furthermore, the language about the "ten" probably presupposes 5:3 and therefore the organization of chs. 5-6 in a rudimentary form at a minimum. Even the emphasis on the term "house" may be dependent upon its usage elsewhere in 5:1ff. (5:11, 19; 6:11, plus the several references to the "house of Israel") If, as I am inclined to argue, 6:8 is the work of a redactor at a foundational level,[78] vv 9-10 probably reflect an even later stage of redaction, since 9-10 appear to be a reinterpretation of v 8. If that is true, and if it is also true that 6:9-10 and 3:12 reflect the same level of redaction, then it would appear that 3:12 is later than the foundation-level for ch. 3. Such an hypothesis must be held quite tentatively, however, until more extensive analysis is performed. (b) The appropriate level for 4:6-12 and for the hymn is v 13 is by no apparent.

CONCLUSION

Many problems in the redaction of the Book of Amos remain to be examined. Hopefully this essay has illumined the discussion in three areas: (1) the structure of the book, especially chs. 1-4, (2) the debate over the nature of the structure (collection or composition?), and (3) the possibility of the reconstruction of levels of redaction. Additional study is needed, particularly in chs. 5-9, in order to understand these matters more fully. Two further questions which have scarecly been touched on here need to be addressed as well: Does the structure of the book in its final form (and also at each level of redaction) reveal kerygmatic intent in its arrangement of material, or do other principles of arrangement seem to be at work? Can we discover the circumstances behind the transmission and growth of the tradition? Both of these questions are fundamental and should be pursued with vigor.

FOOTNOTES

1. W. Eugene March, "Redaction Criticism and the Formation of Prophetic Books," Society of Biblical Literature 1977 Seminar Papers, 91.

2. Wolff, Joel and Amos (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977); Koch, Amos: untersucht mit den Methoden einer strukturalen Formgeschichte (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1976).

3. March, "Redaction Criticism," 91.

4. Joel and Amos, 106-113.

5. Ibid.,117-118.

6. Both groups have later insertions coming from "The Old School of Amos" (7:9-17; 8:3-14) and from "the Deuteronomistic Redaction" (1:9-10, 11-12; 2:4-5, 10-12).

7. Cf. 5:17, 27; 9:15.

8. Ps 74:19. Cf. also Ps 13:2; 44:24f.; 77:9f.

9. (wᵉhāyāh) bayyôm hahû' (vv 9, 13) appears nowhere else, hinnēh yāmîm ba'îm is found elsewhere only in the secondary 9:13. Cf. Joel and Amos, 324-325.

10. Joel and Amos, 346.

11. Ibid., 345-346.

12. Ibid., 109.

13. Ibid., 251.

14. Ibid., 109.

15. Ibid., 109.

16. Cf. also 8:14.

17. Joel and Amos, 108.

18. Ibid., 111, 199.

19. Ibid., 111.

20. Ibid., 215-217.

21. Ibid., 111-112.

22. Ibid., 112.

23. Ibid., 112-113, 135-142, 151-152, 169-171.

24. Ibid., 112, 113, 176.

25. Ibid., 113.

26. Ibid., 233.

27. Whether the three hymnic passages were originally separate or whether they were originally only one or two pieces of tradition remains unsettled. Cf. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 215-217; also W. Brueggemann, VT 15 (1965), 1-15; J. L. Crenshaw, ZAW 80 (1968), 203-215, and Hymnic Affirmation of Divine Justice (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975); F. Crüsemann Studien zur Formgeschichte von Hymnus und Danklied in Israel, WMANT 12 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neulkirchener Verlag, 1963), 88-96; F. Horst, ZAW 47 (1929), 45-54; H. Graf Reventlow, Das Amt des Propheten bei Amos, FRLANT 80 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962, 75-90; J. D. W. Watts, Vision and Prophecy in Amos (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), 51-67.

28. 7:10-17 also refers to Bethel alone, but Wolff assigns this passage to the "Old School of Amos."

29. Koch, Amos, Teil 1, 9.

30. Ibid., Teil 2, 104.

31. Ibid., Teil2, 107-108.

32. Ibid., Teil 2, 111.

33. Ibid., Teil 2, 112.

34. Ibid., Teil 2, 105.

35. Ibid., Teil 2, 124.

36. See Koch's discussion of the Kompositionsbogen.

37. Koch considers only v 8 as hymnic.

38. Koch, Amos, Teil 2, 76-80.

39. Joel and Amos, 106-113.

40. Wolff, Amos the Prophet: the Man and His Background (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1973), 13. Note that Wolff considers v 7 to be a Deuteronomistic addition (p. 7).

41. Cf. Koch, Amos, Teil 1, 132.

42. Ibid., Teil 2, 76.

43. Cf. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 198, for a discussion of the rootage of the language of v 12. See also A. Weiser, Das Buch der zwölf kleinen Propheten, ATD 24 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1949), 127.

44. Koch, Amos, Teil 2, 20.

45. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 212.

46. But cf. v 11a4.

47. Or 4 x 2, if one takes $w^{e}l\bar{o}^{\flat}$ šabtem as one stress.

48. If $b^{e}derek$ miṣrayim is read as one stress.

49. See Wolff, Joel and Amos, 213, for an extensive comparison with Lev 26, Deut 28, and 1 Kgs 8.

50. Ibid., 212ff. Cf. also Brueggemann, VT 15 (1965), 1-15, Reventlow, Das Amt des Propheten bei Amos, 75-90.

51. Crüsemann, Studien zur Formgeschichte von Hymnus und Danklied in Israel, 88-96.

52. Koch, Amos, Teil 2, 107-109.

53. Ibid., Teil 1, 126.

54. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 177.

55. Koch, Amos, Teil 2, 16.

56. Joel and Amos, 112-113.

57. Ibid., 187. Cf. also G. von Rad, The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 208-211; W. H. Schmidt, ZAW 77 (1965), 168-193.

58. Cf. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 181.

59. Ibid., 174.

60. Koch, Amos, Teil 2, 20, 22.

61. Joel and Amos, 199.

62. Amos, Teil 2, 23.

63. I disagree with Koch's contention that 1:3-2:16 was not originally a unified text. Wolff, on the contrary, sees it as a single composition, but he does not assign it to a redactor.

64. The Tyre, Edom, and Judah oracles will be discussed later.

65. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 107.

66. Ibid., 121; J. Jeremias, Theophanie: Die Geschichte einer alttestamentlichen Gattung, WMANT 10 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965), 12-17, 130-138, 154.

67. Joel and Amos, 139-140, 151.

68. Ibid., 141-142.

69. Ibid., 170.

70. Ibid., 112-113. Wolff also considers 8:11-12 Deuteronomistic.

71. There are five members only when one deletes the Tyre, Edom and Judah oracles from 1:3-2:16 as well as 7:10-17 and 8:4-14 from 7:1-9:4.

72. Cf. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 212.

73. It is common to transfer v 7 behind v 9, but sufficient evidence for such an emendation is lacking.

74. Wolff assigns 7:9-17 and 8:3-14 to the "Old School of Amos," Joel and Amos, 108-110.

75. Ibid., 108.

76. Ibid., 108.

77. Cf. Am 8:9.

78. 6:8 seems to gather vocabulary from the collection at large: ʾarmᵉnōtâw (chs. 1-2; 3:9-11), snʾ (5:11, 15, 21), hisgîr (cf. 1:6), ʿîr (5:3). The images are unusually bland also. It is probably the work of a redactor who is drawing upon a wide range of already-organized material.

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND "THE CONFESSIONS OF JEREMIAH"

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In as much as it is the function of seminars to proffer theses which are exploratory both in content and in method, a two-fold venture takes place. On the one hand, new knowledge is sought, and, on the other, new ways of learning are tried. They broaden a person's outlook, even where particular applications are found to need improvement. Indeed, one assumes from the very nature of "seminar" that the seed planted grows through critique, response and discussion.

The new knowledge sought in this essay is a more adequate understanding of the kind of Biblical text represented in the so-called "Confessions of Jeremiah," specifically: to test the hypothesis that the Confessions originated as public prophetic speeches. I say kind of Biblical text because I believe their uniqueness has been exaggerated, and "so-called" because I believe the analogy with the Confessions of St. Augustine has been a bit misleading. The term is retained simply as the proper name traditionally applied to six given pericopes, without regard for whatever sense one may or may not regard them as "confessional." By consensus, the texts are: Jer. 11:18-23; 12:1-6; 15:10-21; 17:12-18; 18:18-23; 20:7-18. They comprise an early originally separate collection (Eissfeldt:357, Fohrer:395). Individual exegetes occasionally add to or subtract from these.

I. Sociology of Religion

The new ways of learning pursued here are derived from sociology, particularly sociology of religion and socilogy of knowledge, the latter being our chief concern. Sociology of knowledge goes back from Stark, Berger, Luckmann, Merton and others, to Mannheim and Max Scheler who coined the expression, and ultimately to Karl Marx. Its basic presupposition is: Man's consciousness is determined by his social being. Sociologists of knowledge differ among themselves in the determination of the precise social causes of knowledge: human activity (labor), ideas, or "common sense" knowledge, etc. The central question with which it has been willing to deal is: How is it possible that subjective meanings become objective facticities (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:17)? We feel their methods and results are helpful. Review of recent Sociological Abstracts confirms an earlier statement of Peter Berger that few sociologists are concerned with both branches of sociology. Because the perspectives of Berger and T. Luckmann embrace both areas, they, along with W. Stark, relate best to ourinquiry. According to Berger and Luckmann, sociology of religion (proper-defined--it is usually defined too narrowly) is integral and

even central to the sociology of knowledge. We look first to it, especially to the role of the prophet in the social world of ancient Israel viewed by a sociologist.

Throughout human history religion has played a decisive part in the construction and maintenance of worldviews. It embraces the totality of reality in its ultimacy. The whole world is known in the light of it. The task of sociology of religion is to analyse the cognitive and normative apparatus by which a socially constituted universe(that is, 'knowledge' about it) is legitimated. Quite naturally, this task will include the analysis of both the institutionalized and the non-institutionalized aspects of this apparatus"(Berger/Luckmann, 1963:69).

Religion plays a fundamental role in the Confessions. The Confessions gradually progress to take hold of the total world of Jeremiah, in terms equated with his prophetic role, and he must make fundamental decisions with regard to it.

Developing sociology of religion as a new tool of investigation, Max Weber, the father of religious sociology, discovered many new perspectives of ancient Israel. In delineating a complete typology of religious figures, he included the prophetic type along with the mystic type, the founder, the priest, etc. When he described the prophetic type, it was Jeremiah whom he held up as exemplar. Even more interesting is the fact that it was from the Confessions particularly that Weber drew illustrative texts.

Weber viewed the prophet as a socially detached individual, standing essentially in opposition to the official institutional structures of Israel (1952:179). The prophetic charisma made the man a brave individual defying religious authorities and institutions. Weber's prophet, Gerth and Martindale tell us, was "typically a lone man heroically swimming agains the stream, boldly shocking his hostile audiences (Weber, 1952:xxii).

> The prophet is unconfined by priestly or status conventions and quite untempered by any self-control. The prophet discharges his glowing passions and experiences all the abysses of the human heart. Despite his frailties characteristic of these titans of the holy curse, it is not their private motives but the cause of Yahweh that reigns supreme over the uproar (Weber, 1952:273, emphasis mine).

> When Yahweh left unfulfilled the threats against his own people which he had put into the prophet's mouth, Jeremiah fell into a rage and, in view of the dicision of his enemies, demanded that God let fall the day of prophesied doom (Jer. 17:18), that he avenge him on his persecutors (Jer. 15:15), that he let stand his opponents' sin against him (Jer. 18:23) without expiation, in order that Yahweh deal with them the more terribly in the time of his anger" (ibid:271).

In placing the prophet at the fringes of society, Weber was basically following the Biblical scholarship of his day. Since then, of course, the Biblical scholars have re-habilitated the prophets. In sociology, Berger dealt with the social (re-)location of Israelite prophecy in sociological terms. Still, Weber's Jeremiah is one to throw into the cistern, lock in the stocks, a "magor missabib" to ridicule and mock. This is a Jeremiah who is

better off having Baruch read his scroll for him. His is a scroll the king would enjoy slashing off column by column and tossing into the fire piece by piece. To dramatize the point one could go so far as to suggest that it was the Confessions themselves which gave the Urrolle its poignancy and odium.

But, more modestly, how can such an uncommon view which sees the Confessions as public speeches be stabilized enough to warrant serious consideration within the confines of contemporary scholarship, especially when the Confessions are regarded either as autobiographically irrelevant or as private laments of a discouraged individual torn between his prophetic role and human nature? By pursuing the social dimensions of Jeremiah's knowledge of self and others, drawing insights drawn from the sociology of knowledge.

II. Sociology of Knowledge

Sociology of knowledge looks to the social matrices out of which knowledge arises. It seeks the kind of knowledge that informs a total worldview as well as the immediate framework for knowing how life is lived. Its knowledge is experiental, "common-sense as opposed to abstract ideas," say the sociologists. It admits that the world of modern man is different from that of traditional societies. In determining the conceptual framework of knowledge, it would differentiate the "world" of the prophets from that of the patriarchs where there are significant differences.

The principles directing the way in which a prophet knows his world are no different from those of anyone else. Differences in the various social frameworks create different "worlds." The family, the local community, the economic communities are not the same as they were long ago. They are "worlds" apart. The feudal world and the industrial world developed different types of knowledge as did the nomadic patriarchal world over against the sedentary monarchic/prophetic world.

Different worlds produce different phenomena. In providing a preliminary orientation to sociology of knowledge, Stark begins by illustrating how a Haydn or a Mozart could happen only in their own times. Classical prophecy dies with the expiration of the monarchical/prophetic world. What returned from the different world of the exile was a "book religion."

"People believe," Stark observes, "that there is some connection between the specific configuration of human relationships in a given society on the one hand, and the characteristic forms of thinking and feeling prevalent in that same society on the other; but exactly what this connection is, they do not know and they do not even seem interested enough to ask" (1958: 10-11). The individual himself cannot be understood unless he be seen in his social setting, in the living interplay of his self with other selves. If we want to comprehend the full meaning of any cultural phenomenon, the Confessions for example, we must go beyond to the social circumstances with which it is genetically connected. I believe exegetes generally do this except when it comes to prophetic activity in the Confessions. Instead, most exegetes would have the Confessions hidden away somewhere until after the death of the prophet (Fohrer, Leslie).

Wildeberger examined the utterances and found the line between the utterances of Yahweh and the words of the individual is blurred. On the Confessions he concluded: "Es ist eine indirekte Verkündigung der Gewalt und des Herrschaftsanspruches des göttlichen Wortes und so sind diese Klagelieder prophetische Rede und nicht private Dichtung (119)."

Sociology of knowledge claims to provide "a method or mode of procedure which will enable us to uncover the social--the 'existential--roots of any concrete mental structure or artistic achievement and thereby to gain more insight into its making and meaning, its essence and existence, than we should have or could have otherwise" (Stark:12).

Sociology of knowledge is concerned with the way in which systems of thought, whether cognitive or evaluative or both, are conditioned by other social facts (Sprout). The aim is to distinguish and isolate diverse styles of thinking and to relate them to the groups from which they spring (Mannheim). This means that sometimes the individual is moved into the centre of the picture, and at other times the ideas expressed by the subject are to be regarded as functions of his social existence. This would mean that the Confessions were ideas and feelings in fulfillment of a social function. In other words the social dimensions of the Confessions are with the social frameworks, the "cognitive system" which produced them in the world of Jeremiah.

Thought-processes out of which man's world-building activity emerges depend on life-processes, on processes of social living, for their color and content. World-building is always a collective enterprise. It engages past and present. Jeremiah built on existing traditions, as we depend on ours. The collective process is also a dialectical one in two ways: mediating a (one-sided) conversation with the past, and socializing the (present) subjective world of the individual with the objective world of society.

Jeremiah uses past (established) language forms (the lament) to express his difficult relations with society. Interpretaters of the Confessions have been satisfied with only that language form. They "dialogue" with only one constituency of Jeremiah's traditions. The result is, predictably, emphasis on the subjective side of Jeremiah. There was no reason to go further and stipulate that the Confessions were composed for society at large. But if other forms of speech are found in the Confessions, the objective social nature of them may become evident. The Confessions could than have originated as public speeches. The speech-form we examine below probably fits best under the general category of the once-fashionable rîb-Gattung, though no attempt will be made to fit the Confessions into patterns found elsewhere.

The fundamental dialectical processes observed in by the sociologist of knowledge has three moments or steps: externalization, objectivation and internalization. "Externalization" is the ongoing outpouring of the human being in the world, both in physical and mental activity. "Objectivation" happens when this activity produces a reality that gains an independent existence and confronts its original producer as a distinct and separate reality. The basic form of social objectivation is language (Berger/Luckmann, 1963 :66). The structure of a language imposes itself on those who use it. "Internalization"

is the reappropriation of the same reality, transforming it once again from structures of the objective world into structures of the subjective consciousness (Berger 1969:4 and passin).

We place the Confessions at the first moment. A literary genre belongs in the second. When an author uses a literary genre he or she has internalized an objectivated externalization. When Jeremiah internalized the objectivated lament and rîb forms in a struggle to externalize the anguish of his prophetic experiences, he did not need to express himself in a fixed (objectivated) form of speech.

Exegetical demands to have too many pericopes in fixed forms has led to misunderstanding and confusion for which Rolf Knierim's "Old Testament Form Criticism Reconsidered" is a corrective. Not recognizing that genres are restricted to "second moment" phenomena can also lead to confusion. The discussion of "Setting" can serve as a good example. When Richter (cited by Knierim:446) programmatically assumes that setting "provides or produces" the matrix to which typical linguistic units owe their existence" he could be referring only to objectivated data according to which "typical linguistic units" qua "typical linguistic units" owe their existence. This is to say nothing about the externalizing or the internalizing moments of an existential human situation. There is something within a specific human situation which exists in dialectical confrontation with language itself. Language is an autonomous matrix of typical linguistic expressions. It is the way in which the reality of the world is known socially and individually. It is the "given." Internalizing and externalizing show what is done with what is given. Thus, the discovery of any one objectivation, e.g., a genre, or function, or typical intention, does not allow us to generalize without taking the other two moments into consideration.

A criticism for avoiding shipwreck on the shoals of objectivation is rhetorical criticism. If one asks why the Confessions were (and still are) supposedly not intended for a public audience the answer lies in their strong rhetoric. God seduced Jeremiah (20:7): Near blasphemy, some say. An alternative is to water down the Confessions. To describe them simply as rhetorical overstatement (Leslie:154) is in effect to deprive them of their power.

James Muilenberg (1970:42-63) dealt amply with the rhetoric of adversity in Jeremiah. He draws as many citations from the poetry outside the Confessions as from within them (adversity rhetoric is absent from the Baruch and deuteronomistic narratives-Mowinchel's sources "B" and "C"). Further studies of inclusio and chiasmus in Jeremiah by Jack R. Lundbom confirm the suspicion that rhetorical critical grounds may be sufficient for including the Confessions from the public speeches. A value of rhetorical criticism is that it looks as much to the first and third moments as it does to the second.

Sociology of knowledge is dialectical in that the "interpreter" as well as the "interpretee" lives in a world whose reality is socially constructed. Perhaps the rhetoric supposedly too strong for the social world of ancient Israel was rather just too strong for modern exegetes.

It may be that we have come full circle:

1) Cornill (1895) Duhm (1901) Erbt (1902), for example, relegated the bitterest segments of the Confessions to scribes of later traditions. Duhm and Cornill simply rejected them as "unworthy" of a shy and timid Jeremiah. (Erbt had metrical grounds for his conclusion.)

2) Skinner on the other hand projected a strong Jeremiah. He refused to delete explicit figures from the Jeremiac repertoire. Nevertheless he assigned to them a social framework which nearly precluded them from public speeches. To him they were devotional literature. "They (the Confessions) form no part of his (Jeremiah) public message to his contemporaries, and were probably never published in his lifetime" (201). Skinner, whose Prophecy and Religion has been reprinted several times each decade since 1922, left his imprint on Leslie (1954, 137) who simply states: "they (the Confessions) were not written for the public"--despite the fact that he includes them among Jeremiah's prophecies and affirms that they contain the most profound and enduring elements in Jeremiah's teaching. In a moment of Christian chauvinism he, as many others do, notes "how far the noblest piety of the Old Testament still is from the heights reached in the New Testament" (151)--as if keeping the words of the Covenant of Old is inferior to wreaking vengeance on one's enemies! It is the world of modern piety which refuses to internalize (or allow Jeremiah's public to internalize) the Confessions, properly understood.

3) John Bright is much more modest in his assertion that "It is quite possible that most pieces of this sort were never spoken publicly (lxvi). Thus 15:19-21 becomes a "private oracle" (111).

4) It is Bright's own remark on the Confession in Jer. 18 which, I think, gives the key to the prophet's use of the Confession as a vehicle for public prophetic speech: They show that Jeremiah is a human being. "And it is only as we accept him as a human being that we can rightly hear the prophetic word that he spoke" (126). Our horizins of piety are too narrow.

It was stated above that few sociologists of knowledge are concerned with sociology of religion. The reason according to Berger and Luckmann (1963:64) is partly found in the fact that sociologists of religion too often operate with an ecclesiastically oriented definition of religion, a church-affiliated religiosity which is too narrow to make sense from the standpoint of sociological theory since sociology must be concerned with everything which is taken as social reality. Its concept of religion must also be open. Exegetes also have clung closely to a too formally institutionalized definition of religion. We know from the sociology of knowledge that there is a wide range of human phenomena that are socially objectivated but not institutionalized in the narrow sense of the word" (ibid p. 65). This should enable broader concepts to function in our studies.

The Confessions fall into the category of the non-institutionalized, i.e., not formalized literary structures. This makes it difficult to recognize their full prophetic value. One always tends to look for easily recognizable "objectivations," not mere externalizations. Jeremiah for his part was too bound up with the traditional "objectivations" of the prophet. The struggle commonly identified as one between "the man" and "the

prophet" is one of identity and role. But Jeremiah's identity and role are that of a prophet. The tension is between the kind of prophet he is supposed to be and the kind of prophet he expects and wants to be. The final resolution is in his accepting the identity and role of the prophet he was to become.

In pursuing less formally objectivated notions of institution, religion, and prophecy we find ourselves a long way down our path. The sociology of religion gave us the prophetic type. The prophetic type was best illustrated in Jeremiah, and, even better, in the Confessions. It would be particularly pleasing to be able to link Confessions with a series of events. Other than the possibility that priests disenfranchized by the Josian reform plotted to kill Jeremiah, there are no reliable connections with historical events or movements. We turn, then, to the language, form and setting for the Confessions themselves.

The quest for the "life-setting" of a literary genre is a search for sociologically determinable features. "Form critical work is (therefore) closely associated with both the study of literature and sociology" (Koch, 27).

III. The Confessions

Without going so far as to call the Confessions a mixed-genre (Mischgattung), one can find in them an internalizing syntheses of two kinds of speech: the lament, and the rîb. The lament does not concern us, except to observe that in the Old Testament, the lament is a very natural part of human life (Westermann:25). We precede comment on individual Confessions with a sketch of the rîb as it is structured the Confessions, with this reminder: "Not only must the structural analysis of the individuality of texts be included into the form-critical method, it must, in fact, precede the analysis of the typical structure if the claim that such a typicality inherently determines an individual text is to be substantiated" (Knierim: 461, emphasis his).

The rîb structure tells us more than the lament-of-the-individual about how Jeremiah expressed prophetic knowledge. From this we can learn that what he expressed was prophetic speech. The "form" is proposed for heuristic purposes, not as a mold to reshape the text.

We may then consider Knierim's concluding remarks to guide the invesitgation:

> Within the concept of such a historical sociology of language, the role of form criticism would be to employ its tools heuristically. It would have to ask what, in a given text, constituted the communication event between writer and readers, between speaker and listener in a typical way. It would have to ask how the typical factors were related to one another and how the typical and the unique interact. This certainly means that answers will be found which confirm many results found in the traditional sense. But it means also that we are no longer stuck with the expectation of a distact typicality in a text when such a typicality may never have been constituted for its existence. The communication event in a text may be constituted by the typicality of a genre understood

> in a certain way or it may function through some other typicality or it may be governed by none whatsoever. We can leave such determinations to subsequent findings. Such findings may occasionally show that a text is governed by factors beyond those asked for by the form-critical method, for example, by a thematic concern or a motif. Even so, the form-critical tools will be indispensable for the understanding of the texts are predisposed to their application. By being subservient to those factors that dominate texts rather than by dominating the texts through its own methodological system, form criticism will, probably with some kind of new face, continue to have its unique role in the concert of the exegetical disciplines (468).

A. The Rîb

"ריב," "dispute," "case," "lawsuit" appears in every Confession save one. According to Gemser (1955:122-3) the juricical contents, or at least connotation of the rîb is proven, although none of the legal texts of the Old Testament give a clear picture of the course of judicial proceedings. Rîb "patterns" are used metaphorically in Deutero-Isaiah and in at least twenty-five of lament psalms of the individual. It is "not used as a purely literary style-motif, but rather as a form of thinking and feeling, a category, a frame of mind (128, emphasis mine). This is important because it tells a great deal about the social framework of knowledge which shaped the thoughts people had who would hear the rîb. The lack of uniformity of the many instances of the rîb indicates that the metaphor was already objectivated. It had an existence of its own which was free from fixed formulas. The "sense" of the rîb was well within people's experience from the public preaching of the prophets. This has been noticed since Gunkel, who called it a Gerichtsrede (H. Schmidt, 1915: LXV).

Blank (1948, 331) also located the origins of the rîb in the law court. In agreement, Reventlow (217) saw it transferred quickly into cult, but Fohrer (1965, 266) follows Eissfeldt in eschewing the cultic setting for at least some of them. Recalling the comment above about defining religion too narrowly, one is prompted to say that ideas about cult also tend to be formalized to rigidly and subsequently rejected.

Gerichtsrede was not as far as I could tell a technical legal term in Gunkel's day. As a metaphor it became part of everyday experience. It needs no fixed formula. The metaphor is linked to the international covenant treaty (Mendenhall, Huffmon, Harvey). The covenant rîb is also a "fixed knowledge." Gemser (129) pointed out, the rîb, which in profane usage is normally a breach in international relations, in its religious usage is between the Lord and his people. Yahweh can lament that he has been aggrieved. The prophet can carry out Yahweh's lawsuit against the people. The prophet is the covenant mediator.

Jeremiah, at the time he was called to utter the words of Yahweh was given guarantees that Yahweh will see him through times of trouble. The gates of hell would not prevail over the pillar of iron and a wall of brass. For Yahweh will be "with

him to deliver him." The Confession represent nothing more and nothing less than Jeremiah's claim to this insurance, the repeated promises of it, repeated failures to realize it and a final rejection of it. The prophet as ambassador was entitled to the diplomatic immunity he never received. Diplomatic immunity was neither unheard of in the ancient Near East nor was it likely a rarity. Consider the Hittite treaty between Mursilis and Duppi-Tessub of Amurru (ANET, 1955:204, #11) in which fair treatment of delegetes is required:

> If anyone should press you hard, Duppi-Tessub, or (if) anyone should revolt against you, (if) you then write to the king of the Hatti land, and the king of the Hatti land dispatches foot soldiers and charioteers to your aid—if you treat them in an unfair manner you act in disregard of the gods of the oath.

Consider the Third Aramaic Inscription from Sefîre-Sûjîn in which the kings messenger is guaranteed immunity under penalty of breach of treaty:

> When I send my messenger to anyone of the kings around me or to anyone who is a friend of mine, to (exchange) greetings or for any of my business, or he sends messengers to me, the road shall be open to me. You must not (try to) exercise control over me in this respect and you must not contest its use with me. If you do so, you will have betrayed this treaty (Rosenthal, 1960:29).

A violation of the ambassador is a violation of the treaty. Yahweh has violated the covenant (Jeremiah almost says this in 12:1). To be consistent in the metaphor it must be said Jeremiah has a legal case, and every bit of juridical language should be mustered to show the urgency. What Yahweh fails to do is to decide to change things for Jeremiah. The modus operandi of a judge is to act, to decide.

After considering the many variations proposed for the rîb pattern in relation to numerous pericopes, we find unacceptable the recommendation to restrict the term rîb to refer only to the questioning part of the pattern. True, we may be naming the whole after a part. In a lament psalm the lament proper is only one of six structural features. The rîb component is the distinctive characteristic in the whole literary unit. To isolate the rîb component is like draining the blood from the body. Moreover, the part itself looses its special meaning if it is separated from the whole.

The entire rîb, as we reconstruct it as a beginning hypothesis can have as many as the following components: direct address, indictment or accusation, testimony, appeal to (the qualifications of) the judge, demand for a verdict, the verdict, the sentence, closing. The judicial rîb is more than a simple lament, a wishful/vengeful prayer. It is a call for decisive action, the type prophets are accustomed to demanding.

In the progression of Confessions some components gradually dissappear. From beginning to end the prophetic commitment and invocation to divine knowledge are constant: Yahweh knows. He is implored to act decisively on this knowledge. The knowledge Jeremiah has is God's knowledge which Jeremiah shares. This is

the community of thought or framework of knowledge from which Jeremiah speaks. He who has upset so many so often suffers too much to worry about scandalizing the public when he calls on divine wrath to deal with those who are plotting against his life. The prophetic word is his last line of defense. Jeremiah needs to pronounce it over them, but the result as we see it is the opposite.

B. Individual Confessions

11:18-23 and 12:1-6

Scholars have found alternatives for dealing with these Confessions: 1) Re-arranging verses to make better (more convenient) sense; i.e., reconciling facts with grammar and story, or, 2) Preserving the data as given and attempt to reconcile the story with fact. Many exegetes choose to re-arrange the order, unfortunately, placing 12:1-6 before 11:18-23, or 12:6 after 11:18.

The difficulties solved are superficial; meaning changes may be radical. For one thing, putting 11.21-23 at the end gives two Confessions one grand Hollywood ending.

Since the Confessions originally formed a separate collection, the abrupt beginning in 11:18 is accounted for by the fact that the scribe simply extracted the Confession from its introduction. If Jeremiah and/or the collectors thought the "who" and the "when" were not trivial and distracting they would have tied all the confessions more clearly and explicitly to historical circumstances. The effect would have been dulled. God's word was to punish the culprits, other people were not. The prophet is not a demagogue trying to generate a following.

In structure the two Confessions parallel each other:

	Jer. 11	Jer. 12	
18	revelation event, initiated by God.	1a	judicial review, initiated by the prophet
19	allegation treachery deceit	1b,2	allegation treachery deceit
20a	description of the judge: basis for action	3a	description of the judged: basis for action
20b	call for sentence	3b	call for implementation of sentence already given.
21	verdict of guilt	4	lament on delayed implementation
22	sentence pronounced, on the opponents	5	challenge to Jeremiah
23a	decisive and final		to continue indefinitely
23b	concluding word in a kî clause	6	concluding word in a kî clause

The major difference is found in 12:5: the denial of revenge and the challenge to Jeremiah to endure.

11:18-23

The rîb is formally directed to God, a soliloquy meant to be heard by others. Jeremiah announced that at first he did not know what Yahweh made known to him. When Yahweh did communicate this knowledge Jeremiah made a (threefold) accusation (12:19). He invoked the Lord of the people, i.e., of the Hosts of Israel, the hosts being the army drawn from the general population (McKenzie 1965, 375 Tracing the warrior theme in the Confessions --which space does not allow-would benefit our hypothesis). Yahweh would decide because he is just and because he is a judge. He is qualified because of what he knows: not the superficial circumstances but fundamental orientations. With Yahweh is the framework for the knowledge according to which justice shall prevail. This has always been the basis for prophetic proclamations. Jeremiah speech is for Yahweh's justice to prevail. Then Jeremiah calls for a judicial sentence; neqāmā (LXX:ʾekdikēsis) is a legal term. The usual translation "vengeance" is weighted too heavily on the emotional side whereas both Hebrew and Greek mean "to procure justice," (cf Schrenk TDNT II:180). The criminals are identified and charged (11:21). They are sentenced with a threefold punishment (11:22-23a) parelleling the threefold accusation (11:19b). The closing statement brings the suit to a promising and satisfactory solution. The verdict (11:21) and the sentence (11:21) were given with the customary prophetic messenger formula: "Therefore, thus says the Lord. . ."

12:1-6. The last three verses have traditionally given problems, 12:4 most of all. Land is a metaphor for totality, referring chiefly to the people in it. The rest of the verse merely extends the figure.

As shown above, the second Confession reflects the first and makes its point in contrast to it. As soon as the point is made, the direction of the Confessions becomes evident. In 11:18 God takes the initiative, in 12:1 Jeremiah does. He seeks judicial review, a reversal of the word of judgment, although the ambiguity of ʾak mišpāṭîm ʾadabēr ʾôṯāk has given rise to various renditions. Then follows a question with its answer. Together they lay the ground for the sentence sought. Since it is justice Jeremiah seeks rather than revenge, he puts the question in general terms: Why do the wicked prosper? The answer: it is not evil which begets good. Prosperity is brought about by God. He "plants them," an obvious reference to the commission given at the time of Jeremiah's call. As in 11:20, in 12:3 he invokes the knowledge God has of Jeremiah, because Jeremiah is appealing his own predicament especially. In demanding sentence he wants his situation reversed. The play on lamb (11:18) and sheep (12:3) serves to illustrate this well. They, not he, should be dealt with severly. This theme recurs in every Confession.

12:4 is the rîb question proper, the last clause of which draws attention to the "endurance test" between Jeremiah and his enemies. In 12:5 the first of the response verses, Jeremiah expects the sentence. He receives just the opposite: 1) no termination of trial; and, 2) matters will become only more of a challenge. In 12:6, the response is meant for both Jeremiah and his treacherous household. It tells Jeremiah where the challenge is to be met. It lets the household know that the deceit is revealed. The key to the last comment is in "full cry" which Driver (1954:177) found is a rallying (military) cry

to everyone around. The enemy is in open battle with him.

15:10-21

15:12-14 are cryptic and textually uncertain. In 15:11a the speaker is not clear. MT has Yahweh, and LXX has Jeremiah. Jeremiah is a man of the rîb who is well known as such and not for profane reason (15:10). In this phase of his life, at least, Jeremiah's style of externalizing his prophetic experiences is contentious. He includes even his own rîb. The textually uncertain vv.13 and 14 could have contained the accusation of Jeremiah. In any case, 15:15, Jeremiah again recalls the knowledge of the Lord, invoking divine pathos in participation of which a prophet speaks. He asks for an official visit (pkd, cf. Brown, Driver, Briggs:833), a sentence (neqāmā) against his persecutors, and strength for endurance as he did in 12:3 and 4. After the rîb questioning (15:18) comes the sentence (15:19) in the prophetic word formula, although the content is as it was in 12:5 and 6: completely expected.

Exegetes commonly infer from the call to return (15:19), that Jeremiah had at one time or another abandoned his role. That may be. It may also be that Jeremiah never thought he did. Everything else in the Book points to a very constant and faithful prophet. It could be that in this Confession such new vistas are opened to him as to what it means to be a prophet that the transition is like a re-conversion. The function of this second call narrative is to announce this. Without having failed his role according to commonly accepted standards, Jeremiah becomes a "born again" prophet. The key to this interpretation is the call toward responsible prophesying. It is Jeremiah's responsibility to make value judgements as a prophet. Heretofore, the word of the Lord was spoken as it came to the prophet. Henceforth Jeremiah has to sort out the wheat from the chaff. From here on, no Confession gives any more "official" prophetic words "Lākēn kô ʾāmar Yahweh . . . Everything is put into Jeremiah's own words.

Skinner held up the Confessions as the signal for the end of prophecy and the beginning of "true piety." Rather, it is the end of solely conventionally externalized prophecy. The experience of the word of God, now not so simply processed, is still what gives the social framework to Jeremiah's knowledge, how he sees his world. A reaffirmation of diplomatic immunity closes the Confession (15:20-21).

17:12-18

Damage, not diplomatic immunity, however, is the real result. After introductory cola which set the stage (17:12-13), the plea (17:14), the accusation (17:15) are based upon divine knowledge and pathos (17:16). 17:15 and 16 testify to the fact that Jeremiah, did exercise the prudentral judgement required by the prevesious Confessions. He tried not to be an îš rîb, but to no avail. Divine punishment intimidates him (17:17), so he pronounces the "evaluated" prophetic word.

20:7-18

The climax. Sometimes divided into two and even three poems. Rudolf (1968, 129) upholds the unity of the whole on the grounds that the emotional and intellectual depths of the struggle must leave its marks in the structure and on the surface of the poetry. Sudden shifts are to be expected.

An inverted order placing 14-18 before 7-13 was recommended by Ewald, Cornill, Schmidt and others. The prophet experienced a catharsis before arriving at a happy ending. This arrangement is an emotional reduction of the Confession to create a model for modern subjective piety in moments of depression. The righteous sufferer would be indicted. Just the opposite is the obvious conclusion.

The structure is the same formal address, accusation, (deception) testimony appeal to divine knowledge and pathos. Called to decision-making in 15:19 he tried to stop altogether (17:15, 20:9). In the light of "enlightened" prophetic responsibilities, Jeremiah himself formulated the punishment which Yahweh the warrior will carry out. Jeremiah does not make the decisions on his knowledge alone. He has spoken on behalf of the assaying knowledge of God.

The sentence is Yahweh's for Jeremiah has revealed his case (rîb) totally, including the penalties. Then in 20:13-18 Jeremiah makes a definitive stand. At this point psalmic 20:13 is almost whistling in the dark. God has delivered the needy in the past. He will do so again. It is all in his hands now, because in what follows Jeremiah releases all his self-concerns.

Lament psalms have accustomed the hearers to sudden shifts in emotion, like that from 20:13 to 14-18. Jeremiah had strong and mixed emotions, they can be expressed only one at a time. The most forceful and unheard of is given last, and not without the rhetorical power of his other prophetic speeches. Probably the audience is stunned, not so much because of the figures of speech as the total renunciation of the prophetic role as he was supposed to have known it (but did not). His enemies know he accepts living with them and with a God who promises protection but does not deliver. The world Jeremiah thought he knew and strove to take hold of was dead. In true Schleiermachian fashion, Jeremiah experienced das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl des Anderes.

One of the merits of Lundbom's (1975, 29) dissertation is the elucidation of the greater inclusio of Jer. 1-20 which tells us the answer to "why did I come forth from the womb (20:18)? Answer (should read): "(Because) before I formed you in the womb, I knew you, before you were born I dedicated you (1:5) That means Jeremiah was born to no purpose acquired after his birth. In other words to the lámmâ of 20:18 the answer is: "none, except to see toil and grief and end my days in shame" i.e., "to take what comes and take it as it is."

A new world was born to Jeremiah. If one assumed total rejection of prophetism, this Confession would end the book. It does not. It occurs probably before the new covenant was in sight. Therefore, we conclude that the Confession represents a change in prophetism, not towards a passive other-wordly piety, but into a prophetism of responsibilities and prudential judge-

judgments. It is one which is religious without deriving the comforts of religion.

In conclusion, the word of Yahweh is the chief agent in the cognitive system whereby Jeremiah knew his world. The final confession shows a metamorphosis takes place not from prophecy to pious individualism, but from immature, self-oriented and superficial role-playing prophetism to a mature, decisive and profound prophetic consciousness. The social location of this charismatic phenomenon is not with some vested interest, a particular class, for example, or even with religion. The prophet represents nobody but Yahweh (Weber). "Even though he emerges from a traditionally defined office, exercises his charismatic activity in terms of this office, he carried it far beyond its traditional definition by his religious message"(Berger, 1963:950). The prophetic experience climaxing in 20:7-18 expresses the word, a public manifestation of the totally pervasive and totally persuasive power of the dabar of Yahweh.

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S 319a

ISRAEL AND THE SEA

A Test Case in Hellenosemitic Studies

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It is one thing to make statements of cosmic significance about the interaction between Yahweh and primeval marine chaos, as scholars from Hermann Gunkel to Otto Kaiser have done.[1] It is quite another to inquire what the average Israelite knew or thought about the sea, and how it affected his day-to-day living. The concern of this paper is, first, the manner in which the sea influenced Israel's concept and experience of the human realm. Its second concern is the manner whereby Israel may have utilized the cultural bridge represented by the Mediterranean Sea, linking Aegean and Palestinian cultures.

Although this paper is presented for consideration by a group whose methodological concern lies primarily within the social sciences, the paper itself employs literary analysis to open for discussion the larger issue of hellenosemitica, an issue which has, potentially, tremendous impact on the understanding of the social and cultural milieu of ancient Israel in particular and the Mediterranean community in general.

A disclaimer must be added here. This is not the sort of paper that presents a solidly supported, airtight case. There is no line of hellenosemitic inquiry which at present offers such rational security. Rather, this paper is suggestive of two new ways to think about ancient Hebrew culture: as possessing a genuine, indigenous sea consciousness; and as being in contact with Aegean civilization long before the period of Alexander the Great. It cites some evidence--most of it literary--that seems to point in these directions, and (as its title suggests) represents a preliminary line of inquiry, not a final conclusion.

Before proceeding further, some general observations about the Mediterranean community are in order. Ferdnand Braudel, in his book, *The Mediterranean*, focuses on this community much later in its history than is under discussion here; but at the same time he develops background which is pertinent to present concerns. Braudel writes compellingly about the Mediterranean as a physical unit:

> It is a matter of some importance to the historian to find almost everywhere within his field of study the same climate, the same seasonal rhythm, the same vegetation, the same colours and, when geological architecture recurs, the same landscapes, identical to the point of obsession; in short, the same way of life.[2]

Braudel himself warns against overgeneralization along this line of reasoning, but at the same time his observations suggest that the world views of Aegean and Palestinian peoples are not so distinct as is often believed. Both coastlands contain only small amounts of land suitable for farming.[3] Both civilizations grew up in proximity to mountainous areas, which served at once as shelter from the tempestuous winds of the area, and as a source of lumber for shipbuilding.[4] Both lands were part of

the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, and easy sailing between Cyprus and Crete was made possible by favorable currents and atmospheric conditions.[5] Finally, both areas were subject to seasonable variations: the winter storms which made navigation difficult if not impossible, and the spring and summer periods of heavy maritime activity.[6]

The literature of Israel is far from eloquent on marine topics; the passages which depict the Israelite fishing in, sailing on, or even watching the sea, are so rare as to be virtually non-existent.[7] This statement would seem to point to the conclusion that Israelites knew little or nothing about the sea and had no dealings with it. The majority of scholars have accepted this proposition and have cited impressive evidence to support their position. Martin Noth, for example, declared:

> The fact that the land was shut off from the neighbouring sea explains why seafaring and seatrading played no part at all in Israel and why, in spite of its proximity, the sea plays a purely marginal part in Israel's outlook on life . . . . Where the sea is mentioned in the Old Testament it hardly ever appears as a means of communication between different countries but rather as a menace on the edge of the inhabited earth, whose uncanny and dangerous power is broken only when it meets dry land.[8]

It is true that Israel is recorded to have had a navy for only a short time. I Kings 9:26ff. and 10:22 describe Solomon as having assembled a fleet of merchant ships for expeditions to Ophir (India?) with the assistance of his allies from Tyre. Jehoshaphat's naval efforts described in I Kings 22:48 were far less successful, his ships being destroyed at Ezion-geber before completing their maiden voyage. It is also true, as Noth pointed out, that from before the eleventh century B.C. the Philistines controlled the coastal plain of Palestine, a long expanse of straight, sandy shoreline lacking any good natural harbor. Israel's trade was carried on almost exclusively by caravan, enhanced by her strategic position on the land bridge connecting Egypt and the "super powers" of Mesopotamia. Her fishing industry centered around the Sea of Galilee, a large freshwater lake.[9] This information generally supports the traditional conclusion that Israel existed in a state of marine ignorance, and drew virtually everything she thought or wrote about the sea from maritime neighbors.

The author of the present study is unwilling to dismiss so summarily the possibility of discerning a concept of the sea which was indigenous to Israel. Granted that from patriarchal times, Hebrews traveled and settled in an area not forty miles distant from the Mediterranean Sea, outright ignorance of that natural phenomenon is all but unthinkable. While they may not habitually have set forth upon the sea in commercial and military undertakings, Israelites observed the sea and its currents, heard its roar, and smelled its breezes. This much their literary reminiscences make clear, especially in poetic contexts.[10] The following verse, full of figurative sea imagery, is illustrative of numerous Old Testament passages that support this conclusion:

> Alas! the tumult of many peoples;
> they sound like the raging seas,
> and the roar of nations like the roar of endless
> waters.
>
> Isaiah 17:12[11]

Unquestionably, as Noth has maintained, the sea appears frequently in canon as an image of terror and alienation. According to ancient theories of cosmology, oceans like the Mediterranean were formed by streams which issued from beneath the underworld, from the very depths of the inferior ocean. It is particularly this fact, this origin far removed from the life arena of mankind, which in the analysis of Reymond rendered the sea a *monde négatif*, a non-world, to the Israelite.[12] Moreover, like her neighbors, Israel regarded the sea as part of the domain of the dead, and as such, a realm of special terror. While Stadelmann warns against an outright equation of Sheol and *thwm*,[13] Pedersen describes the relationship between them:

> He who is in Sheol is also in the ocean, because they both denote the subterraneous, negative power, the world of death and chaos. He is surrounded by its waters, which close over him; he wades in slime and seaweed (Ps. 40,3; Jon. 2,6); he is swallowed up by the ocean; the great deep, *mᵉsôlâ*, attracts him to it (Ps. 69,3.16; 88,7). He is overwhelmed by the surges of death (2 Sam. 22,5) and desires to be pulled up from the *tᵉhômôth* of the earth, its ocean-deep (Ps. 71,20). Sheol and the ocean are fused in a unity as the source of all that is evil.[14]

The themes of shipwreck or death at sea, well known to every mariner, provide a framework within which the connection between the sea and the underworld becomes both theoretically and practically comprehensible, and serves to shift the focus of discussion to specifically naturalistic concerns as regards the Hebrew concept of the sea.

Precisely how much sea exploration was done by ancient Israelites themselves can be but an object of speculation. Archaeology provides no enlightenment, and literature but little. The word *tarshish* appears in historical writings, prophetic literature, and also in one psalm (48:7) as a generic term for a merchant vessel, a name probably derived from the Phoenician port of Tarshish, thought by many to have been located in Spain. Foreshadowing the hellonosemitic theme which will be dealt with later in this paper, one must also note that the attention of Hebrew writers, even before the fifth century B.C., was broad enough to encompass maritime areas, as indicated in references to "islands" (Isa. 41:1, e.g.), coastal settlements bordering on the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the poets of Israel generally regarded their seafaring neighbors with a distrust bordering upon scorn. Reymond suggests that maritime activities appeared to the Israelites as the epitome of *hybris*, since it is Yahweh, and not the human race, who rules the sea.[15] This concept is graphically illustrated in Ezekiel's oracles against Tyre which, significantly, display a fairly sophisticated nautical vocabulary in describing Tyre's fleet

(Ezek. 27). A particularly pertinent passage as regards Reymond's notion of *hybris* is 28:2ff., a portion of which reads:

> Son of man, say to the prince of Tyre:
> Thus says Yahweh.
> Because your heart is haughty, and you have said,
> "I am a god, I dwell in a divine place
> in the heart of the seas."
> Yet you are human, and not a god,
> though you represent your heart as the heart of gods.

It is dangerous, however, to push the *hybris* notion too far. One of the three "reformer" kings of Judah, Jehoshaphat, undertook what turned out to be an abortive effort at maritime commerce, yet he is described by Hebrew historians as having done "that which was right in the eyes of the Lord." Interesting to note, but difficult to analyze, is the statement in I Kings (22:49) that the prince of Israel, Ahaziah, was willing to help staff Jehoshaphat's navy, but his offer was refused. Perhaps such an ostensibly "neighborly" gesture was in fact motivated by desire for the gold of Ophir!

Reymond's observations about *hybris* are on target, nevertheless, relative to the two poetic chronicles of sea voyage by Israelites, Psalm 107 and the Book of Jonah. Both reflect Yahweh's control over the waves and tempest, stirring them to violence and making them tranquil at his sovereign command. The humans involved had no more control over their situation than seaweed or a piece of driftwood tossed about in a storm. They could but pray for deliverance, as Jonah 2:7(8) suggests:

> When my soul felt faint inside me,
> I remembered Yahweh,
> and my prayer obtained audience with you
> in your holy temple.

The vividness of the passages in question bespeaks eyewitness testimony, while their inclusion in canon underscores some significant degree of responsiveness by Israelites to tales of the sea. Such responsiveness could be a function of simple curiousity; it could as easily be generated by collective observation and even a measure of common experience.

For all that much naturalistic discussion of the sea in Hebrew canon proceeds from a negative standpoint, this does not tell the whole story. As a phenomenon of nature, the sea was also considered a creation of God, its vital, churning force at all times subordinate to divine decree, as the citation from Jonah shown above makes clear. Illustrative also is this verse from Psalm 89:

> You govern the sea's raging;
> when its waves arise, you pacify them.
> 9(10)

The sea, moreover, could be used by Israel's poets to symbolize harmony and control, as in this passage from Isaiah:

> Surely give ear to my commands, and your
> wellbeing will be as a river, and your piety
> as the waves of the sea.
> 48:18

It is also true that in a semiarid land like Israel, the sea, like all water, had life-giving and sustaining properties. The psalmist writes;

> Here is the sea, great and broad;
> there is no counting the reptiles there.
> 104:25

Indeed, H.G. May observes that ancient Hebrews conceptualized a subterranean source of fecundity which sprang forth from the sea.[16]

Up to this point, discussion of Hebrew sea imagery has focused on the experiential realms of nature and history, and has sought to determine how the sea appeared to the Israelites and how they interacted with it. A more mythological approach has claimed the attention of many scholars, some of whom have been quick to cite passages with marine symbolism (for example, Isaiah 27:1) as evidence of cross-cultural borrowing, following the line of reasoning pointed out by Noth in denying, for all intents and purposes, the existence of any sea-consciousness that was indigenous to Israel.

These theories leave one question unanswered: if Hebrews were in fact almost totally ignorant of the sea, why would they presume to borrow sea imagery? What meaning could it possibly have had for them? As is well known, the Isaiah 27 passage mentioned earlier exhibits very close correlation with Ugaritic text 5(67) which is part of the Anath-Baʿal cycle. In this case, evidence of cross-cultural influence--whether borrowing or mutual indebtedness to a third source--is clear. But the fact remains that some felt need must have influenced the Hebrew poet to draw upon ancient Near Eastern tradition that was at least five hundred years old at the time, and to select marine imagery to emphasize his point as to the victory and prevailing sovereignty of Yahweh.

In whatever frame of reference the relationship between the sea and Israel may be explored, the author of this study consistently contends in favor of approaching the elements within that relationship as authentic creations of Israelitic culture rather than thinly disguised adaptations from surrounding civilizations. This does not deny the fluidity of cultural exchange in the ancient Near East; nor does it ignore the clear historical fact that as a nation, Israel was never a maritime power. What this position does, however, is ascribe to Israel that fascination with the sea which has been characteristic of humanity in all times and places. Moreover, it allows for the possibility that such fascination was practically exemplified in direct encounter between Israel and the sea. While Israel's sea mastery as a nation was tenuous to the point of being largely untried in economic and political activities, so far as literature and archaeology presently indicate, such mastery was nevertheless asserted in a manner basic and central to the nation. Yahweh himself had given Israel victory over the sea and all its symbolic insurgency in the experience of the Exodus. In that single act, the nation was created and the chaos of slavery and rootlessness was defeated. This statement of faith set Israel apart from all other nations, shaped decisively her every perception--including that of the sea, whether viewed naturalistically or mythologically--and is the basis of Israel's unique and characteristic genius.

It seems reasonable to argue that a percentage of Israelites in each generation--small, perhaps, but influential--had occasion themselves to go to sea, rather than just to hear about the sea secondhand or borrow traditions about it from other cultures. Hebrew scriptures cite the tribes of Asher (Judges 5:17), Zebulun (Gen. 49:13 and Judges 5:18), and Dan (Judges 5:17) as navigating in the Mediterranean. It is known, of course, that Israelites sailed for their country during the reigns of Solomon and Jehoshaphat. At other periods in Israel's history, they may have served aboard foreign vessels, or they may have undertaken a voyage to the offshore island of Cyprus or beyond. While little evidence can be marshaled to support this contention, it seems quite reasonable in light of the cultural and political fluidity of the ancient Near East, particularly from the Assyrian period. This conclusion points to a sea-consciousness in Israel which was both authentic and indigenous, but certainly not isolated, in origin or in development, from her ancient neighbors.

Of the several studies which present the notion that the Hebrews learned of the sea from other cultures, virtually all suggest the source of data was east of Israel, thus ignoring an obvious link to the west and the world of the Mediterranean represented by their neighbors the Philistines and the Phoenicians. Both cultures were associated with Greek civilization. According to Scripture, the Philistines came from Caphtor, a site now clearly identifiable as Crete on the basis of Egyptian records of about 1400 B.C. (To be sure, no archaeological evidence directly links the Philistines with Crete.) The Phoenicians established trade with Greece at an early date and maintained the contact. Barrois observes:

> Phoenician sailors had been instrumental in making possible the lively exchange of ideas, arts, and crafts, which took place between the Asian mainland, Cyprus, the Aegean isles, and Greece during the latter half of the second millennium.[17]

Thus the potential for interaction between Greek and Hebrew cultures clearly existed, and from a detailed study of sea imagery in the poetic literature of Israel and Greece, an interesting fact emerges. In basic and important respects, the marine perspectives revealed in the literature of these cultures display strong affinities, too marked and too vivid to be coincidental. The results of the study[18] may be summarized as follows.

While several Greek sea images are entirely unknown in Semitic poetry, and from the Homeric period Greeks drew upon a marine vocabulary which was far more vivid and diversified than any the Israelites conceived, both cultures described the earth as surrounded by a sea from which all earth's waterways flow. Indeed, both cultures remarked upon the expanse and depth of the sea, suggested the sea was the anchor of mountains and continents, and located the abode of the dead nearby. Concepts of the sea as a means of purification,[19] a route of travel,[20] a barrier of separation,[21] and an arena for storms,[22] were common to Greek and Hebrew poetry. Also shared were images of mist above the sea,[23] seaweed floating on its surface,[24] and the craggy, chambered terrain of the ocean floor.[25] Figurative use

of sea language expressed tumult, conflict, and despair.[26] Both Greeks and Hebrews expressed a fear of the sea which in fact seems more like respect, born of experience.[27]

The poetry of each culture is distinct--yet each holds in common with the other qualities of perception and attitude so creative and so sharply drawn as most likely to be understood as the result of intercultural contact and communication which ancients took very much for granted.

One would expect that the literature of Ugarit, early a Phoenician port of call, might reveal evidence linking Hebrew and Greek sea imagery. Such, however, does not seem to be the case. The same study which compared Hebrew and Greek sea poetry also included a consideration of Ugaritic sea imagery, and discovered few if any hellenosemitic parallels therein. Moreover, the canonical authors far exceeded their Canaanitic counterparts in subtlety, vividness, and sheer quantity of sea images.

Thus, on the basis of an analysis of comparative literature, it becomes possible to conclude that Greek and Hebrew cultures in many respects shared a perspective on at least one natural phenomenon which was at once part of each culture's environment and a link between them. While no solid evidence supports the contention, it is not unreasonable to surmise that actual contact between Greeks and Hebrews took place in pre-Alexandrean times, judging from the parallel images appearing in the literature of each culture and from what is known about the trade routes in the eastern Mediterranean.

Certain problems always arise when drawing broad cultural conclusions from literary evidence alone. These problems are epitomized by the fact that, despite what one would expect from archaeological evidence of contact between Ugarit and both Minoan and Mycenean civilizations, literary evidence of cultural indebtedness as regards sea imagery simply does not follow. There is, so far as this author is aware, no archaeological data with regard to Hebrew maritime activity to serve as a balance for literary analysis. One reason, of course, may be simply that there was no such activity. Noth's sweeping generality about Israelitic ignorance of the sea may be right after all. Yet the hellenosemitic parallels remain.

Was the Mediterranean a bridge that for the Hebrews operated one way only, from the world of the Aegean to the coastal regions of Israel? Or was it a bridge traversed in both directions? Did the presumably Aegean "Sea Peoples" who were the ancestors of the Philistines import a sea awareness that was applied somewhat superficially to the Hebrew consciousness? Or did these people draw out, serve as catalysts for, a native curiosity about the sea which certain Hebrews satisfied by themselves undertaking ocean travel? At the present time, these questions cannot be answered with assurance based on certifiable data. But they are suggestive of a perspective on the world of the ancient Hebrew which is much wider than has previously been believed.

If, by whatever means, the Hebrews were in contact with the Greeks, and were in rapport with them as regards the sea, to what other concerns may they have directed mutual attention?

This is the broader question of which the present "test case" is but preliminary exploration.

NOTES

[1]The most significant studies on the subject of the sea in ancient Hebrew tradition are the following:

Hermann Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos*. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1895).

Philippe Reymond, *L'Eau, Sa Vie, et Sa Signification dans L'Ancien Testament*. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1958).

Otto Kaiser, *Die Mythische Bedeutung des Meeres in Agypten, Ugarit und Israel*. (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1959).

Because of the hellenosemitic orientation of this study, I would also cite a significant resource for Greek texts:

Albin Lesky, *Thalatta*. (Wien: Rudolf M. Rohrer Verlag, 1947).

[2]Translated by S. Reynolds. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 235.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 243.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 143.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 137.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 259.

[7]Jonah and Psalm 107 are major exceptions.

[8]Martin Noth, *The History of Israel*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 13.

[9]Braudel, *op. cit.*, discusses what may be a good reason for this. He writes, p. 138:

> The water of the Mediterranean, which is geologically too old, is apparently, according to oceanographers, biologically exhausted.

[10]A detailed analysis of Hebrew sea poetry, providing many more specific illustrations than can be cited in this context, appears in *Songs of the Sea: The Sea in the Poetry of Israel, Ugarit, Greece, and Rome*, a dissertation by Elaine R. Follis, unpublished, (Boston University Graduate School, 1976).

[11]Compare here a parallel image used by Homer in Book II of the *Iliad*:

> . . . into the assembly again they swept back, from their ships and shelters, with a roar, as when a wave of the loud-roaring sea crashes to the great coast, and the beach resounds.
> 207ff.

[12]Reymond, *op. cit.*, pp. 183ff.

[13]Luis J. Stadelmann, *The Hebrew Conception of the World*. (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1970), pp. 166ff.

[14]Johannes Pedersen, *Israel*, II. (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 463.

[15]Reymond, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

[16]H. G. May, "Some Cosmic Connotations of *Mayim Rabbim*, 'Many Waters,'" in *Journal of Biblical Literature* 74 (1955):20.

[17]G. A. Barrois, "Trade and Commerce," in the *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, IV. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 680.

[18]The study mentioned is referred to in note 10.

[19]Micah 7:19; *Iliad* I:312ff.; *Odyssey* II:260ff.

[20]Compare the Exodus motif in Israel, e.g., Isa. 43:16, 51:10, and Book XIII of *Iliad*, 21ff., where waves part before Poseidon's chariot. Other comparisons include Ps. 8:8; *Iliad* XV:472; Aeschylus' *The Persians*, 68; Sophokles' *Antigone*, 31; Pindar's *Nemea* VI:112; and Apollonios' *Argonautica* I:107.

[21]Amos 9:3; *Argonautica* III:1063ff.

[22]Examples abound in Jonah, *Argonautica*, *Odyssey*.

[23]Job 38:9; *Iliad* I:357ff.; *Argonautica* II:1102ff.

[24]Jonah 2:6; *Argonautica* IV:1237ff.

[25]Ps. 18:15(16); *Odyssey* XII:234ff.

[26]Particularly striking is the image of the sea "boiling," found in *Odyssey* XII:234ff.; Job 40:23; Ps. 46:3; Hab. 3:15. For similar motifs, see also Jer. 49:23 and Aeschylus' *The Libation Bearers* 201ff.

[27]Note that it is Laodamas, a seafaring prince, who says (*Odyssey* VIII:138f.): "For I truly declare there is nothing worse than the sea for confounding a man, though he be mighty indeed."