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Paul J. Achtemeier

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Paul J. Achtemeier

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The papers included in this volume were prepared for use in various program units of the Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, which met Nov. 5-9, 1980, in Dallas, Texas. They were intended primarily to foster discussion in their respective program units, and are therefore not to be considered finished works of scholarship in the sense that articles published in the Journal of Biblical Literature are. In many cases, these papers represent first attempts to present a thesis, or are deliberately experimental in approach. Rarely do they represent the final word an author intends to say on a given subject.

Because that is the purpose of the papers, they have been printed in this volume as they were submitted. In every case, the author is solely responsible for the content, and in most cases, for the format as well. Editing has been limited to placing them in their present order and numbering the pages, along with providing a table of contents. Occasionally, the form of the title will also have been provided by the editor, but in no case has the editor caused any changes whatsoever to be made in the content. Authors are therefore solely responsible for the material which appears under their names in this volume.

Experience has shown that discussion of scholarly theses early in their development fosters mature and responsible scholarship. If the past is any guide, much of the material published here for the first time will be published at a later time in more developed form. The rationale for this volume is precisely that process of scholarly refinement and precision, to which the Society of Biblical Literature is also dedicated.

The order in which the papers appear in this volume is dictated by the order in which they will be discussed at the Annual Meeting. The identifying number preceding each title also refers to the program of the Annual Meeting, and to the Book of Abstracts. The letter *S* indicates they are presentations of the Society of Biblical Literature.

The editor is happy to take this opportunity to thank those authors and program unit chairmen and chairwomen whose efforts have resulted in the papers assembled in this volume.

S 16 DESIGN AND STRUCTURE IN HEBREW POETRY

John S. Kselman
St. Patrick's Seminary

The literary study of the Hebrew Bible is not a new enterprise, but one whose modern beginnings stretch back to the eighteenth century and the work of Lowth and Herder. The heir of this tradition was Hermann Gunkel, who, as Muilenburg reminds us, was deeply affected by his reading of Herder's Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie.

However, it was Gunkel's pioneering form-critical work and his consequent interest in the rediscovered literatures of the ANE that shaped much of twentieth-century OT scholarship. To be sure, there were occasional forays into the stylistics of Hebrew literature: the work of Moulton, Gray, and Lund come immediately to mind.[1] But it was Muilenburg's 1968 presidential address to the SBL that focused attention on this less prominent part of Gunkel's heritage. His description of what he termed "rhetorical criticism" is worth quoting:

> What I am interested in, above all, is in understanding the nature of Hebrew literary composition, in exhibiting the structural patterns that are employed for the fashioning of a literary unit, whether in poetry or in prose, and in discerning the many and various devices by which the predications are formulated and ordered into a unified whole. Such an enterprise I should describe as rhetoric and the methodology as rhetorical criticism.[2]

Since Muilenburg's appeal for a renewed interest in stylistics, there has been a spate of studies that may be subsumed under the rubric of rhetorical criticism. Of the most recent, the following deserve mention:

1. J. P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis: Specimens of Stylistic and Structural Analysis,[3] presented his analysis of two small literary units (Gen 11:1-9) and the larger Jacob cycle (Gen 25-35).

2. Michael Fishbane has also devoted an important article to the Jacob cycle, available now with a number of other literary studies in his Text and Texture: Close Readings of Selected Biblical Texts.[4]

3. Jeremiah has been the object of stylistic analysis in two important works: W. L. Holladay, The Architecture of Jeremiah 1-20,[5] and J. Lundbom, Jeremiah: A Study in Ancient Hebrew Rhetoric.[6]

4. A number of D. N. Freedman's articles to be published by Eisenbrauns will make his important contributions to the study of Hebrew poetry more readily available.

5. J. J. Jackson and M. Kessler, eds., Rhetorical Criticism: Essays in Honor of James Muilenburg (Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series 1; Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1974) contains a number of instructive studies.[7]

As a contribution to the rhetorical and stylistic study of Hebrew poetry, I shall in this paper examine a series of

poetic texts from the Hebrew Bible; attention will be given especially to "the structural patterns that are employed for the fashioning of a literary unit", i.e. to the way the poet has built the microstructure of parallelismus membrorum into larger complexes. I shall restrict my efforts to what structuralists term the "surface structure" of this series of texts.[8] And consideration will be given as well to what contribution the discernment of the design of a literary unit can make to the discovery of its meaning. We will begin with a brief example from the poem in Isa 38, and move from that text to more complex structures in Hosea, Zephaniah, Micah, Isaiah, Lamentations, and Psalms.

1. Isa 38:10-20

The stylistic device of inclusion has been described by Liebreich as "the phenomenon of employing the same word both at, or toward, the beginning, as well as at, or toward, the end of a unit or thought."[9] Moulton had earlier designated this device as "the Envelope Figure, by which a series of parallel lines running to any length are enclosed between an identical (or equivalent) beginning and end."[10] An obvious example is that found in Ps 21, in which yhwh and bᶜzk occur in vv 2 and 14.

A more complex form of this device is what Dahood described as "distant parallelism",[11] in which a poetic unit is framed not by repetition, but by synonymous elements in parallelism. The frequent chiastic structure of this form of inclusion has led Talmon to refine the description of the technique as "inclusio by distant inverted parallelism".[12] An example will make this clear. The poet of Isa 38 says toward the beginning of the lament: "To the gates of the nether world I shall be consigned, for the rest of my years" (v 10b). This verse is linked to its context by the parallelism of šnwty with ymy in v 10a, and by the contrast of bšᶜry š'wl with b'rs hyym in v 11a. But in addition to this parallelism with contiguous elements (what can be called the "microstructure"), the poet has also balanced v 10b with an inclusion at the end of the poem: "we shall sing to stringed instruments in the house of the Lord all the days of our life" (v 20). As with v 10b, the connection of v 20 with its immediate context at the end of the poem is clear from the repetition of hy hy in v 19 and hyyk in v 20, as well as from the contrast of both with several terms for death and the underworld in vv 17-18 (šht, š'wl // mwt, ywrdy bwr). But v 20 is also linked to v 10b through the technique of parallel word pairs (šᶜr // byt; ymym // šnwt)[13] arranged in chiastic order:

:10 bšᶜry š'wl ytr šnwty

:20 kl ymy hyy ᶜl byt yhwh

This elegant linking of the beginning and the end of the poem demonstrates the poet's ability to bring line-to-line parallelism (microstructure) and distant parallelism (macrostructure) into an esthetically pleasing literary whole.

The two passages to be considered now from Hos 8-9 illustrate how the recognition of their concentric structure can determine the limits of a poem and thus speak for its integrity.[14]

2. Hos 8:8-14

The structure of this passage was first illuminated by D. N. Freedman; its meaning was further clarified by A. Ceresko and J. Lundbom.[15] Freedman noted that vv 9 and 13 formed an "envelope construction", an inclusion formed by separating two cola of poetry that would ordinarily form a bicolon:

ky hmh ᶜlw 'šwr	For behold they will go up to Assyria
hmh mṣrym yšwbw	Behold they will return to Egypt

Working from Freedman's observation, Lundbom understands these lines in a slightly different way: the first colon (v 9), reflecting the world of eighth-century international politics, concerns Israel's political alliance with Assyria, and the annual journey of the vassal's ambassadors with tribute money, described bitterly by the prophet as payment to a prostitute. V 13, in Lundbom's view, does not simply balance or complement v 9; rather, they are related causally: "Because they have gone to Assyria, and not to Yhwh, with their prostitute's wages, they will return to the kind of slavery they knew in Egypt." Building upon the work of these scholars, I would like to suggest that the envelope extends beyond vv 9 and 13, and that the whole poem in vv 8-14 forms a chiasmus:[16]

A nblᶜ ysr'l ᶜth hyw bgwym kkly 'yn ḥpṣ bw

B ky hmh ᶜlw 'šwr pr' bwdd lw

C 'prym htnw 'hbym
gm ky ytnw bgwym
ᶜth 'qbṣm. . .

C' ky hrbh 'prym mzbḥt lḥṭ'
hyw lw mzbḥt lḥṭ'
'ktwb lw rbw twrty kmw zr nḥšbw. . .

B' hmh mṣrym yšwbw

A' wyškḥ ysr'l ᶜšhw wybn hyklwt
wyhwdh hrbh ᶜrym bṣrwt
wšlḥty 'š bᶜryw
w'klh 'rmntyh

The A-line is paired with A' through the shared ysr'l; in A' it is expanded through the addition of parallel wyhwdh on the level of microstructure, and the formulaic wšlḥty 's bᶜryw // w'klh 'rmntyh. A further less obvious link between A and A' is the synonymous blᶜ and 'kl, which form a parallel pair in Ps 21:10 and Jer 51:34 (and cf. Lam 2:2-3 below). CC' have a common structure: (1) both have a repeated element (htnw/ytnw; mzbḥt lḥṭ'[17]); (2) both concern 'prym; (3) both end with a first-person verb ('qbṣm; 'ktwb) where the speaker is Yhwh.[18] And note how in each section of the chiasmus, the name of a nation appears, with Israel/Ephraim at the beginning, middle, and end: ysr'l:'šwr:'prym::'prym:mṣrym:ysr'l + yhwdh. Like Assyria and Egypt in Hos 7:11, 9:3, 11:5,11, 12:2, Ephraim and Israel are paired in Hos 5:3,5,9, 6:10, 11:8, 12:1.

In C', the approximate center of the whole, Ceresko has identified an ABBA chiasmus: hrbh:mzbḥt lḥṭ'::mzbḥt lḥṭ':rbw. Similarly, concluding A' is also structured chiastically: hyklwt:ᶜryw::bᶜryw:'rmntyh.[19]

3. Hos 9:3-4

The context of the concentric pattern in 8:8-14 deserves some comment. In 7:14-15 there is an ABCCBA chiasmus of

prepositions.[20] And in 9:3-4, we find another passage cast in concentric form:

A l' yšbw b'rṣ yhwh
wšb[21] 'prym mṣrym

B wb'šwr ṭm' y'klw

C l' yskw lyhwh yyn

D wl' y^{c}rbw lw zbḥym

C' klḥmm 'wnym lhm

B' kl 'klyw yṭm'w

A' ky lḥmm lnpšm
l' ybw' byt yhwh

Again it is Freedman who supplies the structural key to this passage: the parallelism of AA' (l' yšbw b'rṣ yhwh // l' ybw' byt yhwh) where "the house of Yhwh" is a poetic description of the land (cf. Hos 8:1, 9:15). The repetition in BB' produces an internal chiasmus: tm':y'klw::'klyw:ytm'w. The CC' parallelism is formed by the pair yyn // lḥm.[22] The statement against the cult is central in the thought of the unit, and central in the structure. There is also a sonant element: in ABC the repeated šb (of yšbw, wšb, and reversed in wb'šwr) and in C'B'A' the kl that begins each line (klḥmm, kl 'klyw, ky lḥmm).

These structural considerations have a bearing on the integrity of both passages. Hos 8:14 and the last sentence of 9:4 (l' ybw' byt yhwh) have both been considered by some commentators to be secondary glosses.[23] Their participation in complex concentric structures makes this less likely, in my view. Or if secondary, we must assign with Talmon a part in the creative process to the editors:

> . . . in ancient Hebrew literature no hard and fast lines can be drawn between authors' conventions of style and tradents' and copyists' rules of reproduction and transmission. It may be said that in ancient Israel, and probably in other ancient Near Eastern cultures, especially in Mesopotamia, the professional scribe seldom if ever was merely a slavish copyist of the material which he handled. He rather should be considered a minor partner in the creative literary process.[24]

4. Zeph 3:14-18a

Zeph 3:14-18a forms a unit with a clear concentric structure:

A rny . . . hry^{c}w . . . śmḥy w^{c}lzy

B mlk yśr'l

C yhwh bqrbk

D l' tyr'y r^{c} ^{c}wd

D' 'l tyr'y ṣywn

C' yhwh 'lhyk bqrbk

B' gbwr ywšy^{c}

A' yśyś . . . bśmḥ . . . ygyl . . . brnh

In AA' there are four synonyms for joy, with the verbs rny and śmḥy reversed in order and transformed into their cognate nouns. The complementarity of BB' is built upon the parallelism of

mlk // gbwr (cf. Ps 33:16: 'yn hmlk nwšᶜ brb ḥyl // gbwr l' ynṣl brb kḥ) and of mlk and ywšyᶜ in Isa 33:22 (yhwh mlknw hw' ywšyᶜnw; and cf. Hos 13:10). The repetitions in CC' and DD' require no comment, beyond the fact that the assertion in CC' -- yhwh ('lhyk) bqrbk -- is near the middle of the chiastic pattern, so that structure echoes meaning.

Zeph 3:19-20 are also carefully patterned, not chiastically but in a kind of step parallelism:

A whwšᶜty 't hṣlᶜh
whndḥh 'qbṣ

B wśmtym lthlh wlšm

C bkl h'rṣ bštm

A' 'by' 'tkm
wbᶜt qbṣy 'tkm

B' ky 'tn 'tkm lšm wlthlh

C' bkl ᶜmy h'rṣ bšwby 't šbwtykm

In AA' qbṣ is repeated, as are lthlh wlšm in B and inverted in B'. BB' are also linked by the parallel pair śym // ntn.[25] CC' are connected by the repetition of bkl (ᶜmy) h'rṣ, and by the wordplay of bštm and bšwby 't šbwtykm.

5. Isa 2:2-4 // Mic 4:1-4

The most notable feature of the Isaiah/Micah poem is the unity achieved by the single motif of transformation. There are five transformations in this short poem, developed from the elements of the Zion tradition:[26]

1. Mount Zion becomes the highest mountain.

2. The river flowing from Zion (Ezek 47:12, Joel 4:18, Zech 13:1, 14:8, Ps 46:4) becomes a river of people streaming into (nhrw) Zion.[27]

3. Nations massed for attack on Jerusalem (the Völkerkampf motif) become peaceful pilgrims (Wallfahrt).

4. Mount Zion replaces Mount Sinai as the source of torah and the word of Yhwh.[28]

5. The weapons of war become agricultural implements. This departs from the classical Zion-tradition motif of the breaking of the weapons (Ps 46:10; Ps 76:4). Here they are transformed from death-dealing arms to life-supporting tools.

The poem's structure could be represented thus:

b'ḥryt hymym

A nkwn yhyh hr byt yhwh
br'š hhrym ⟨rm⟩[29]
wnś' mgbᶜwt

B wnhrw 'lyw kl hgwym
whlkw ᶜmym rbym
w'mrw lkw wnᶜlh 'l hr yhwh
'l byt 'lhy yᶜqb
wyrnw mdrkyw
wnlkh b'rḥtyw

A Nature transformed
(Mount Zion elevated)

B The nations streaming
to Zion as pilgrims
(centripetal motion)

B'	ky msywn ts' twrh wdbr yhwh myrwšlm wšpṭ byn hgwym whwkyḥ lᶜmym rbym	B'	Torah, the word of Yhwh, and justice come from Zion (centrifugal motion)
A'	wkttw ḥrbwtm l'tym whnytwtyhm lmzmrwt l' yś' gwy 'l gwy ḥrb wl' ylmdw ᶜwd mlḥmh	A'	Culture transformed (weapons become tools for the cultivation of the soil)

Other poetic devices in this poem include the breakup of hr byt yhwh in A into hr yhwh // byt 'lhy yᶜqb in B; the assonance of ky msywn ts' twrh in B' and wkttw hrbwtm l'tym whnytwtyhm in A'; the wordplay on tōrāh in wᵉnēlᵉkāh 'bᵉ'ōrᵉḥōtāyw (and wᵉnēlᵉkāh bᵉ'ôr in Isa 2:5), recalling the common idiom hālak bᵉtôrat yhwh (Exod 16:4, 2 Kgs 10:31, Jer 26:4,32:27, Pss 78:10, 119:1, Neh 20:37, Dan 9:10); and the consonant inversion in ylmdw ᶜwd mlḥmh: lmd > dml.

Finally, note how the poem in Micah 4:1-4 forms a chiastic structure with 3:10-12:[30]

Mic 3:10-12	Mic 4:1-4
(v 10) Zion-Jerusalem built on wickedness and bloodshed (A)	(v 1) temple mount (hr byt yhwh) exalted (E')
(v 11) the leaders judge (yšptw) for bribe(B)	(v 2) nations quoted (w'mrw): go to Jerusalem for instruction (yrnw) of Yhwh (D')
(v 11) priests: ywrw prophets: yqsmw for profit (C)	(v 2) twrh wdbr yhwh from Zion-Jerusalem (C')
(v 11) people quoted (l'mr): Jerusalem is safe, Yhwh is in our midst (D)	(v 2) Yhwh judges (yšpṭ) the nations (B')
(v 12) Zion-Jerusalem, the temple mount (hr hbyt) reduced to ruins (E)	(v 3) weapons of war transformed; no more war (v 4) agriculture in peace (A')

The kind of close literary interdependence this concentric structure demonstrates indicates either that Mic 3:9-12 was written as an explicit contrast to the quotation of Isa 2 by Micah's prophetic opponents,[31] or that Mic 3:10-12 + 4:1-4 was a literary unity produced by Micah (thus returning to the earlier views of the originality of the poem in Micah).

6. Ps 21

Ps 21 is framed by a frequently noted inclusion in vv 2 and 14: bᶜzk. Also in the first and last cola of the poem the divine name yhwh occurs. It appears only twice more in Ps 21, and, as we shall see, one of these other two occurrences (v 8) is structurally significant. A third possible inclusion linking first and last cola has been pointed out by Dahood,[32] who notes that śmḥ and gyl in v 2, and rwm in v 14, are found in parallelism in Ps 89:12 (bšmk ygylwn kl hywm // bṣdqtk yrwmw) and 89:43 (hrymwt ymym ṣryw // hśmht kl 'wybyw). A fourth possible link between the first and last verse of Ps 21 is found in the parallelism of forms from the roots yšᶜ and gbr, as in v 2 (wbyšwᶜtk) and v 14 (gbwrtk).[33]

The inclusions that link vv 2 and 14 (bᶜzk; yhwh; yśmḥ + gyl // rwmh; wbyšwᶜtk // gbwrtk) suggest that these two verses frame the poem, acting as a kind of refrain.

Dahood further divides the poem into two sections: vv 3-8 (the blessings Yhwh bestows on the king) and vv 9-13 (the battle and victory). Ridderbos modifies this division by suggesting that v 8 is a transitional verse between the first and second stanzas. Auffret and Quintens also consider v 8 as transitional.[34] That this identification is correct is demonstrated by the fact that the two stanzas of the poem both end with a similar phrase (v 7: ky tšythw . . . pnym; v 13: ky tšytmw . . . pnyk). The structure that emerges then is as follows:

Ps 21:2,14 refrain/inclusion

:3-7 stanza 1 (how God blesses the King)

:8 midpoint and transition

:9-13 stanza 2 (how God destroys the king's enemies)

The transitional v 8 is related to the refrain in vv 2 and 14, first of all by the recurrence of yhwh, and by mlk. There is also a less obvious link between vv 2, 8, and 14: the pair ḥsd // ᶜz. They are in parallelism in Exod 15:13 (nḥyt bḥsdk ᶜm zw g'lt // nhlt bᶜzk 'l nwh qdšk) and in Pss 59:17 and 62:12-13. What Freedman observes of the pair in Exod 15:13 is apposite of the distant parallelism bᶜzk // bḥsd // bᶜzk here: ". . . strictly speaking, ḥsd and ᶜz complement rather than duplicate each other. A form of hendiadys is indicated here: 'your mighty hesed' or 'your merciful strength'."[35]

There are a number of parallels to Ps 21:2 that may be noted here: Ps 9:5 ('gylh byšwᶜtk), Ps 20:6 (nrnnh byšwᶜtk), and Isa 25:9 (ngylh wnśmḥh byšwᶜtk). In Ps 31:7-8, motifs of vv 2 and 8 occur together (w'ny 'l yhwh bṭḥty // 'gylh w'śmḥh bḥsdk). But the highest density of parallels to Ps 21:2, 8, and 14 occurs in Ps 13:3, 5-6:

ᶜd 'nh yrwm 'wyby ᶜly

ṣry ygylw ky 'mwṭ

w'ny bḥsdk bṭḥty

ygyl lby byšwᶜtk

'šyrh lyhwh ky gml ᶜly

Compare this to Ps 21:2, 8, 14:

yhwh bᶜzk yśmḥ mlk wbyšwᶜtk mh tgyl m'd

ky hmlk bṭḥ byhwh wbḥsd ᶜlywn bl ymwṭ

rwmh yhwh bᶜzk nšyrh wnzmrh gbwrtk

The similarity of language is striking, in that it appears in two different types: a royal hymn and a lament. Given the royal character of Ps 21, the formulaic language it shares with Ps 13 might suggest that Ps 13 is a royal lament, in which the speaker is the king. If this is so, the examination of the structure of Ps 21 has cast new light on the meaning of the related Ps 13.

7. Isa 35

Another poem that reveals to analysis a high degree of artistry is Isa 35. The poem begins with a chiasmus of verbs:

A ysśwm

B wtgl

C wtprḥ

C prḥ tprḥ

B wtgl 'p gylt

A' wrnn

The various words for joy in A and B reoccur in v 10, with the replacement of gyl with its synonym, śmḥ,[36] to form an inclusion; and the verbs in v 10 are arranged in the ABCB pattern found elsewhere in Hebrew poetry: brnh / wśmḥt / śśwn / wśmḥt.[37]

Another chiasmus employing wordplay and assonance occurs in vv 2-4a:

A hmh yr'w kbwd yhwh hdr 'lhynw

B ḥzqw ydym rpwt

C wbrkym kšlwt 'mṣw

C' 'mrw lmhry lb

B ḥzqw

A' 'l tyr'w hnh 'lhykm

In addition to 'lhynw / 'lhykm, AA' are linked by the wordplay r'h / yr'. the verbs ḥazzeqû and ḥizqû form the B lines; and the CC' center, with internal chiasmus of object: verb::verb:object, is built on the alliterative assonance of 'ammēṣû and 'imrû.

Vv 5-6 is the central affirmation of the poem: a humanity healed of its ills (blind, deaf, lame, mute) lives in a healed land, a desert transformed into a garden. The artistry of the poet is evident in the manner in which he has reinforced this central theme by the structure of the poem.

35:5 'z tpqḥnh cyny cwrym
w'zny ḥryšym tptḥnh

This verse employs both internal chiasmus (verb:subject::subject verb) and assonance ('āz, we'oznê; tippāqaḥnah, tippātaḥnah). But more importantly, it points backward to yr'w and 'mrw at the beginning of the poem. The hēmmāh of v 2 who will see the glory of Yhwh are those once blind whose eyes have been opened; and those once deaf can now hear the word of assurance pronounced ('mrw) in the heavenly council: "Fear not! Your God comes!"

And just as 35:5 points backward to yr'w and 'mrw, so 35:6 points forward to vv 9-10:

35:6 ydlg k'yl psḥ
wtrn lšwn 'lm

The redeemed who travel (hlkw, yšbwn, wb'w) to Zion are those who were once lame, and now are healed; and those formerly mute now enter Zion singing for joy (trn . . . brnh).

This complex pattern of (1) initial statement (Isa 35:2, 4); (2) its resumption and development in the center (35:5); and (3) the anticipation in the center (35:6) of the conclusion (35:9-10) can be represented thus:

35:2 they will see the glory of God
:4 say to those . . . fear not

35:5 'z tpqḥnh ᶜyny ᶜwrym (-- resumes yr'w of v 2)
w'zny ḥršym tpthnh (-- resumes 'mrw of v 4)

:6 'z ydlg k'yl psḥ (anticipates whlkw g'wlym of 9)
wtrn lšwn 'lm (anticipates wb'w brnh of 10)

35:9 (healed of lameness) they will walk
:10 (healed of muteness) they will sing

9. Patterning in acrostics

Finally we turn our attention to several examples of patterning in sections of acrostic poems. In considering acrostics, we are following the lead of L. Liebreich, who showed that the composers of Pss 34 and 145 were capable, even within the constraints of an acrostic poem, of subtle and elegant design.[38] What comes to mind as a modern analogy is the variety and flexibility which a modern poet can employ within the limits of the sonnet form.

Ps 119:69-70, 77-78, 79-80

Our first example is a rather straightforward instance of distant parallelism in inverted form:

A (69) ṭplw ᶜly šqr zdym / 'ny bkl lb 'ṣr pqwdyk
B (70) . . . 'ny twrtk šᶜšᶜty
B (77) . . . ky twrtk šᶜšᶜy
A (78) ybšw zdym ky šqr ᶜwtwny / 'ny 'śyḥ bpqwdyk

Note the inversion in AA of šqr zdym / zdym ky šqr. Vv 79-80 of the same psalm contain a complex chiasmus of sound, in the words yšwbw . . . wydᶜw . . . ᶜdtyk . . . 'bwš:

A šb
B dᶜ
B ᶜd
A bš

Ps 25:7-14

The second example is more complex; it is a form of step parallelism, comparable to that discussed above in Zeph 3:19-20:

:7-10 A lmᶜn ṭwbk yhwh
B ywrh ḥṭ'ym bdrk
C ᶜnwym . . . ᶜnwym
D lnṣry brytw wᶜdtyw

:11-14 A lmᶜn šmk yhwh
B ywrnw bdrk ybḥr
C wzrᶜw yyrš 'rṣ
D wbrytw lhwdyᶜm

The repetitions that mark AA, BB, and DD are not found in CC. However, in another acrostic psalm (37:11) we find wᶜnwym yyršw 'rṣ. This clue indicates that the ᶜănāwîm in v 9 to whom God teaches his way (wylmd ᶜnwym drkw) are the God-fearers in v 12 to whom God shows his way (ywrnw bdrk ybḥr) and whose descendants (zrᶜw) shall possess the land. Finally, note the wordplay in DD of wᶜdtyw and lhwdyᶜm, as in Ps 119:79-80.

Lam 2:1-4

In Lam 2:1-4 the poet has employed a concentric pattern that extends from the 'alep to the dalet verse:

A (2:1) b'pw . . . bt ṣywn

B (2:2) blᶜ . . . yᶜqb

C (2:2) hrs bᶜbrtw mbṣry bt yhwdh

C' (2:3) gdᶜ bḥry 'p kl qrn yśr'l

B' (2:3) byᶜqb . . . 'klh

A' (2:4) bt ṣywn . . . ḥmtw

The repetition of bt ṣywn in the chiasmus b'pw:bt ṣywn::bt ṣywn:ḥmtw links the AA' elements. Similarly there is internal chiasmus in BB': blᶜ:yᶜqb::yᶜqb:'klh. The pair blᶜ // 'kl occurred also in distant parallelism in Hos 8:8-14, considered above. The CC' elements are linked by the merism bt yhwdh // yśr'l and by the synonymous phrases bᶜbrtw // bḥry 'p (cf. ḥrwn 'pw // ᶜbrh wzᶜm in Ps 78:49; kl ᶜbrtk // mḥrwn 'pk in Ps 85:4).

Ps 34:5-11

In this final example, we will demonstrate how a structural insight in Ps 34 can confirm an exegetical conclusion reached on other grounds.

In his article on Pss 34 and 145, Liebreich pointed out that the repetitions of key words in Ps 34 divide it into four sections: vv 2-4, 5-11, 12-15, and 16-23.[39] The second of these divisions (vv 5-11), extending from the dalet verse to kap, is dominated, as Liebreich points out, by four key words (drš, yr', ḥsd, twb), of which the first forms an inclusion that identifies vv 5-11 as a unit: dršty 't yhwh in 5a, and wdwršy yhwh in 11b. What Liebreich did not notice, however, is that the limits of this second unit contain a subtle chiasmus and wordplay:

A dršty 't yhwh wᶜnny

B wmkl mgwrwty ḥṣylny (v 5)

B' kpyrym ršᶜ wrᶜbw

A wdwršy yhwh l' ḥsrw kl ṭwb (v 11)

The parallelism pointed out by Liebreich in AA is clear; but what is the reason for finding a link between B and B'? The basis is a wordplay involving mgwrwty in v 5 ("fears, terrors") and kpyrym ("young lions") in v 11, a wordplay in which mgwrwty in this context recalls the root gwr, "lion cub", which is found in parallelism with kpyr in several places:

Jer 51:38 yḥdw kkpyrym yšᶜgw / nᶜrw kgwry 'rywt

Ezek 19:2-3 rbṣh btwk kpyrym / rbth gwryh
wtᶜl 'ḥd mgryh / kpyr hyh[40]

Ezek 19:5 wṭqh 'ḥd mgwryh / kpyr śmthw

This chiastic wordplay that is part of the inclusion linking vv 5 and 11 confirms the reading of kpyrym against emendation to kbydym or kbyrym on the basis of LXX plousioi. The discovery of this wordplay adds a structural argument to the comparative evidence from Akkadian that J. J. M. Roberts adduced for the retention of kpyrym in v 11.[41]

To sum up: in this paper the writer has attempted to make a contribution to the study of some of the techniques used by the poets of the Hebrew Bible. Several specimens of Hebrew poetry have been considered from the point of view of their design: their use on the macrostructural level of concentric patterns, chiasmus, inclusion, assonance, and other poetic devices.

In directing attention to the macrostructural level of a poem, several questions immediately arise. First of all, is it there? That is, is there really a discernable structure in the poem, or is this a kind of esthetic eisegesis, the imposition of a pattern upon the material being studied? Evaluations will vary of course, since the answer to this question is to some extent a matter of esthetic judgment and appreciation. But as rhetorical studies of Hebrew literary art continue to appear and combine methodological rigor with sensitivity to the poet's skill, I believe that the Hebrew poet's ability to work both on the micro- and macrostructural level in the same piece will be demonstrated, though there may be questions about such patterning in a particular literary work.

Another question that should be addressed is the question of intention. That is, did the poet actually intend such subtlety (as, for instance, the wordplay in Ps 34 that begins in v 5 and is not completed until v 11); and did the poet expect the audience or reader to be aware of and delight in such subtlety? The question can be answered in two ways. C. H. Whitman, in his study of the Iliad, would answer positively:

> The human mind is a strange organ, and one which perceives many things without conscious or articulate knowledge of them, and responds to them with emotions necessarily and appropriately vague. An audience hence might feel more symmetry than it could possibly analyze or describe. The second point is that poets sometimes perform feats of virtuosity for their own sakes and without much hope of understanding from their audiences, for one of the minor joys of artistic creation is the secret which the artist buries in his work, the beauty (if such indeed it be) which he has deliberately concealed amid the beauties which he has tried to reveal and express.[42]

Cleanth Brooks takes another tack, questioning whether intentionality is a proper or primary question:

> The truth of the matter is that we know very little of the various poets' methods of composition, and that what may seem to us the product of deliberate choice may well have been as "spontaneous" as anything else in the poem. . . . We shall probably speculate to better advantage -- if speculate we must -- on the possible significant interrelations of image with image rather than on the possible amount of pen-biting which the interrelations may have cost the author.[43]

And with specific relation to Hebrew poetry, Holladay writes:

> Finally, many who have been patient enough to work through the details of the analysis given here respond with the judgment that it is too subtle; that one cannot expect ancient man to have paid so much attention to key words, to the balance of phonemes, or whatever;

> that no ancient collector could have been conscious of anything so intricate. But surely it is evident that there can be a great gap between structure that is sensed by a poet or artist, or by one who enjoys a work of art, on the one hand, and the systematic analysis of the structure by a critic, on the other.[44]

Finally, it is no accident that the rhetorical concern for the text in its final literary form coincides with the renewed theological concern for the final canonical form of the OT. This teleological approach, with its concern for the final form of the text as literature or as canon, should not mean to supplant or replace the genetic approach of historical criticism; rather it provides another perspective by which to consider the text, balancing a study of the process by which the text came to be with an interest in its final crystalization.

> Perhaps the primary concern should be that we confront two basic problematics: on the one hand, the genetic fallacy, which believes that truth lies in origins; and on the other hand, the teleological fallacy, which identifies truth with the final product. Attention to both beginnings (as in historical criticism) and endings (as in literary criticism) is surely important. . . . Attention must be paid to the process from genesis to telos, avoiding both the genetic and teleological fallacies.[45]

NOTES

1. R. G. Moulton, The Literary Study of the Bible (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1896); N. W. Lund, Chiasmus in the New Testament (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1942); G. B. Gray, The Forms of Hebrew Poetry (first published 1915; reprinted NY: Ktav, 1972).

2. J. Muilenburg, "Form Criticism and Beyond," JBL 88 (1969) 8.

3. Studia Semitica Neerlandica 17: Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1975.

4. NY: Schocken, 1979.

5. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press/London: Associated University Presses, 1976.

6. SBLDS 18; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975.

7. Articles on various features of Hebrew rhetoric are too numerous to list with any attempt at comprehensiveness, but some recent articles that I have found instructive in the preparation of this paper include the following. For a general orientation, cf. M. Kessler, "A Methodological Setting for Rhetorical Criticism," Semitics 4 (1974) 22-36. S. Talmon has contributed a very important study of stylistics in "The Textual Study of the Bible -- A New Outlook," in F. M. Cross and S. Talmon, eds., Qumran and the History of the Biblical Text (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1975) 321-400. Auffret has produced an important series of articles on the psalms: "Essai sur la structure littéraire du Psaume 1," BZ

22 (1978) 26-45; The Literary Structure of Psalm 2 (JSOT Supplement Series 3; Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 1977); "Note sur la structure littéraire du Psaume xxi," VT 30 (1980) 91-93; "Note sur la structure littéraire du Ps LI 1-19," VT 26 (1976) 142-147; "Note sur la structure littéraire du Psaume LVII," Semitica 27 (1977) 59-73; "Essai sur la structure littéraire du Psaume LXXXVI," VT 29 (1979) 385-402; "Note sur la structure littéraire du Psaume CXXXVI," VT 27 (1977) 1-12. Other helpful contributions are the following: N. Sarna, "Psalm 89: A Study in Inner Biblical Exegesis," in A. Altmann, ed., Biblical and Other Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963) 29-46; M. Weiss, "Die Methode der 'Total-Interpretation'," in P. A. H. de Boer, ed., Congress Volume: Uppsala 1971 (VTSupp 22; Leiden: Brill, 1972) 88-112; P. Trible, "The Gift of a Poem: A Rhetorical Study of Jeremiah 31:15-22," ANQ 17 (1977) 271-280 (now available in her God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978]); J. Cheryl Exum, "Isaiah 28-32: A Literary Approach," in P. Achtemeier, ed., SBL 1979 Seminar Papers II (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979) 123-151; W. H. Irwin, "Style and Syntax in Isaiah 26," CBQ 41 (1979) 240-261; R. J. Clifford, "Style and Purpose in Psalm 105," Bib 60 (1979) 420-427; M. Greenberg, "The Vision of Jerusalem in Ezekiel 8-11: A Holistic Approach," in J. L. Crenshaw and S. Sandmel, eds., The Divine Helmsman: Studies in God's Control of Human Events Presented to Lou H. Silberman (NY: Ktav. 1980) 143-164. A noteworthy contribution to the study of prose rhetoric is S. Bar-Efrat, "Some observations on the analysis of rhetoric in biblical narrative," VT 30 (1980) 154-173; also J. L. Crenshaw, Samson: A Secret Betrayed, A Vow Ignored (Atlanta: John Knox, 1978).

8. W. Vogels, "A Structural Analysis of Psalm 1," Bib 60 (1979) 410-416.

9. L. J. Liebreich, "Psalms 34 and 145 in the Light of Their Key Words," HUCA 27 (1956) 183.

10. Quoted in Liebreich, 190.

11. M. Dahood and T. Penar, "Ugaritic-Hebrew Parallel Pairs" (II Intro 6 c-f), in L. R. Fisher, ed., Ras Shamra Parallels I (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1972).

12. Talmon, "Textual Study of the Bible," 358-368.

13. Dahood and Penar, "Ugaritic-Hebrew Parallel Pairs," II 137 (byt // šᶜr), II 238, 241 (ymym // šnwt), RSP I.

14. P. Auffret, VT 26 (1976) 142-147, has demonstrated by his analysis of the structure of Psalm 51 the seconday character of vv 20-21 as an addition to the original composition in vv 3-19.

15. D. N. Freedman, "Prolegomenon" to G. B. Gray, The Forms of Hebrew Poetry, xxxvi-xxxvii; A. R. Ceresko, "The Function of Chiasmus in Hebrew Poetry," CBQ 40 (1978) 3-4; J. R. Lundbom, "Poetic Structure and Poetic Rhetoric in Hosea," VT 29 (1979) 300-308.

16. On chiasmus in Hosea cf. W. L. Holladay, "Chiasmus, the Key to Hosea XII 3-6," VT 16 (1966) 53-64; B. Renaud, "Genèse et unité redactionelle de Os 2," RSR 54 (1980) 1-20. Also

helpful are J. de Waard, "The Chiastic Structure of Amos V 1-17," VT 27 (1977) 170-177; F. Holmgren, "Chiastic Structure in Isaiah LI 1-11," VT 19 (1969) 196-201.

17. Ceresko understands the first lht' as privative piel (lᵉhattē'), rendering the phrase as "altars to expiate sin".

18. C and C' have been abbreviated by the omission of some material to make the basic concentric pattern clearer.

19. Cf. Isa 13:22 (b'lmnwtyw // bhykly); on 'lmnh/'rmnh, cf. A. Fitzgerald, "The Interchange of L, N, and R in Biblical Hebrew," JBL 97 (1978) 481-482. For 'rmnh // ᶜyr cf. Isa 25:2, 32:14, Jer 30:18, Amos 6:8; and cf. 'lmnwtyw // ᶜryhm in Ezek 19:7. Other poetic devices in Hos 8 include the breakup of a construct chain (D. N. Freedman, Bib 53 [1972] 534-536) in 8:2; double-duty subject ('py) in 8:5 (J. R. Lundbom, VT 25 [1975] 228-230; and a semantic-sonant chiasmus in 8:7: qmh:'yn:: bly:qmh.

20. W. Kuhnigk, Nordwestsemitische Studien zum Hoseabuch (BibOr 27; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1974) 96.

21. Traditionally the first two lines are understood to mean "They shall not dwell in the land of Yhwh; Ephraim shall return to Egypt." However, šb may be a biliteral by-form of yšb, as in Ps 23:6; the meaning of the second line would then be: "Ephraim will dwell in Egypt." Cf. F. I. Andersen, "Biconsonantal Byforms of Weak Hebrew Roots," ZAW 82 (1970) 273; "Orthography in Repetitive Parallelism," JBL 89 (1970) 343-344; the preposition with b'rs would in this case be double-duty. On the repetition of the same word in parallel cola in Hebrew literary style, cf. M. Dahood, "Ugaritic-Hebrew Syntax and Style," UF 1 (1969) 30-32.

22. Dahood and Penar, "Ugaritic-Hebrew Parallel Pairs," II 332, RSP I.

23. Cf. J. L. Mays, Hosea (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969) 123-124 (on 8:14) and 127 (on 9:4); H. W. Wolff, Hosea (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974) 146 (on 8:14) and 155 (on 9:4).

24. Talmon, "Textual Study of the Bible," 381. The observation of M. Greenberg, "The Vision of Jerusalem in Ezekiel 8-11," 158, is apposite: "The working assumption underlying our attempt to interpret the text of Ezek 8-11 without eliminating the tensions is thatthe present composition is an intentional product. That assumption has been justified by the evidences of design and interconnection of parts that have been found. Enough tensions remain to render plausible the guess that not all the elements . . . were from the first united. . . . But they have been put together with some art. . . ."

25. Josh 7:9, 1 Kgs 12:29, Isa 41:19, 61:3, Ezek 15:7, 30:21; on the synonymity and interchangeability of ntn and śym, cf. Talmon, "Textual Study of the Bible," 340-343.

26. J. J. M. Roberts, "The Davidic Origin of the Zion Tradition," JBL 92 (1973) 329-344.

27. L. Neve, "Psalm 46 and Isaiah," ExpT 86 (1975) 243-246.

28. S. Talmon, "The Biblical Concept of Jerusalem," JES 8 (1971) 308-312.

29. J. S. Kselman, "A Note on Isaiah II 2," VT 25 (1975) 225-227.

30. B. Renaud, Structure et Attaches Littéraires de Michée IV-V (Cahiers de Revue Biblique; Paris: Gabalda, 1964) 13, has proposed a highly elaborate chiastic arrangement of thesis-antithesis for Mic 4:1-4 // 5:8-14:

(a) 4:1 (trip to Zion, nations blessed) = (a') 5:14 (nations cursed)
(b) 4:2a (pilgrimage to temple) = (b') 5:12-13 (suppression of idolatry/pagan cults)
(c) 4:2b (to find there law/word of Y.) = (c') 5:11 (destruction of soothsayers/sorcerers--false oracles)
(d) 4:3 (transformation of arms of war) = (d') 5:9-10 (destruction of arms of war)
(e) 4:4 (nations blessed) = (e') 5:8 (nations cursed)

31. For the view that in the book of Micah we find a series of disputations between Micah and the prophets of weal, and that in Micah 4:1-4 we have part of a debate between Micah and these pseudoprophets, who quote Isa 2:1-3 and are answered by the prophet, cf. A. S. van der Woude, "Micah in Dispute with the Pseudo-Prophets," VT 19 (1969) 244-260; "Micah IV 1-5: An Instance of the Pseudo-Prophets Quoting Isaiah," in M. A. Beek, A. A. Kampman, C. J. Nijland, and J. Ryckmans, eds., Symbolae Biblicae et Mesopotamicae Francisco Mario de Liagre Bohl Dedicatae (Leiden: Brill, 1973) 396-402; J. A. Sanders, "The Hermeneutics of True and False Prophecy," in G. Coats and B. Long, eds., Canon and Authority (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977) 21-41.

32. M. Dahood, Psalms I (AB 16; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966) 34-35.

33. Isa 30:15, Ps 106:8; the roots are in construct relationship in Ps 20:8 (bgbwrt yšᶜ). This pair reveals a concentric pattern in Ps 71:15-16:

A py yspr ṣdqtk
  B kl hywm tšwᶜtk
    C ky l' ydᶜty sprwt
  B 'bw' bgbwrt 'dny
A yhwh 'zkr ṣdqtk lbdk

34. N. H. Ridderbos, Die Psalmen (BZAW 117: Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972) 183: v 8 "kann jedenfalls als eine Überleitung vom ersten zum zweiten Teil gelten." And cf. P. Auffret, "Note sur la structure littéraire du Psaume xxi," VT 30 (1980) 91-93; W. Quintens, "La vie du roi dans le Psaume 21," Bib 59 (1978) 516-541 (esp. 534-540 on structure).

35. D. N. Freedman, "Strophe and Meter in Exodus 15," in H. N. Bream, R. D. Heim, and C. A. Moore, eds., A Light unto My Path: Old Testament Studies in Honor of Jacob M. Myers Philadelphia: Temple University, 1974) 187. Cf. also K. D. Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed in the Hebrew Bible (HSM 17; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978) 218-226 for the nuance of ḥsd as "deliverance".

36. The g'wlym of 35:9 may be a play on tgl gylt, as are r'h and yr' in vv 2 and 4.

37. B. Porten and U. Rappaport, "Poetic Structure in Genesis IX 7," VT 21 (1971) 363-369.

38. L. Liebreich, "Psalms 34 and 145," HUCA 27 (1956) 181-192.

39. Liebreich, 183.

40. Note the ABBA chiasmus of kpyrym:gwryh::mgryh:kpyr; and cf. Nah 2:12.

41. J. J. M. Roberts, "The Young Lions of Psalm 34,11," Bib 54 (1973) 265-267.

42. C. H. Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition (NY: Norton, 1965) 256.

43. C. Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn, quoted in J. Cheryl Exum, Isaiah 28-32," 123.

44. W. L. Holladay, The Architecture of Jeremiah 1-20, 23-24.

45. W. Brueggemann and D. Knight, "Why Study the Bible?" CSR Bulletin 11 (1980) 80.

S 17

RHETORICAL CRITICISM IN THE EXEGESIS OF HEBREW POETRY

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This paper proposes two items for discussion: a statement on the function of rhetorical criticism in exegesis and a collection of some rhetorical structuring devices used in Hebrew poetry. Its starting point is the presidential address of James Muilenburg to the Society of Biblical Literature in 1968.[1] Though Muilenburg did not of course invent rhetorical criticism he did stimulate contemporary interest in the approach and left behind careful formulations and intriguing examples. Muilenburg's theory can be related more precisely to form criticism and integrated into a scheme of exegesis. To the list of rhetorical devices he compiled additional examples can be added, specifically instances of parallelism of scenes and of actors as structuring elements.

In his address Muilenburg defined rhetorical criticism.

> What I am interested in, above all, is in understanding the nature of Hebrew literary composition, in exhibiting the structural patterns that are employed for the fashioning of a literary unit, whether in poetry or in prose, and in discerning the many and various devices by which the predications are formulated and ordered into a unified whole. Such an enterprise I should describe as rhetoric and the methodology as rhetorical criticism.[2]

Few scholars would dispute Muilenburg's statement of principles, particularly in the nuanced and example-filled way he argued it. A number of prominent scholars have taken exception, however, to the exegetical practice which flows from his principles. Much of the criticism has been directed against his major commentary on Second Isaiah which appeared in 1956.[3] Though published some 12 years earlier than his presidential address, the commentary already exemplified many of the principles contained in the later address. Most troublesome to many users of his Isaian commentary has been his alleged neglect of form criticism. Criticism on this score was almost inevitable for a commentary which deliberately departed from the form critical methodology dominating Second Isaian scholarship for the last half century.[4] Yet insufficient attention is given to form criticism, a fault evidently due to a failure to clarify his exegetical method. A careful reading of the address shows that Muilenburg leaves somewhat unresolved the relation between his literary approach and that of form criticism. He did not of course intend to do away with form criticism. "Finally, it has not been our intent to offer an alternative to form criticism or a substitute for it but rather to call attention to an approach of eminent lineage which may supplement our form critical studies."[5] Unfortunately he does not make precise what "supplement our form critical studies"

means either in theory or in practice. The continued irresolution tempts the exegete wishing to following Muilenburg's promising approach to choose between two methodologies which should rather be complementary. It is to the practical relationship between form and rhetorical criticism to which we now turn.

Perhaps the most concise and concrete way of specifying the relationship between the two criticisms is to borrow the expository scheme used in the ongoing series Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament (BK). BK differs from other major OT series by its use of a standardized exegetical exposition and its emphasis on the intention (Ziel) of each literary unit. Each unit is analysed according to the scheme below. The English equivalents are those used in the Hermeneia translations.

Text	Text
Form	Form
Ort	Setting
Wort	Interpretation
Ziel	Aim

Using the scheme as a grid for my argument - hence necessarily going beyond the assumptions of the BK contributors - I should like to argue that "form" ought to be restricted to the biblical and ancient Near Eastern genre or genres most closely resembling those of the text being investigated. It deals with the conventions of language and structure of those comparative texts. "Interpretation" and "aim" ought to be reserved for the study of how this text uniquely shapes the conventions of the genre and adds its own novum. In other words "form" should deal with the typical and "interpretation" and "aim" with the unique.[6] "Setting" in biblical scholarship has been used to refer both to the setting of the genre and to the setting of the individual text. Used in the former sense, it belongs under "form"; in the latter, under "Interpretation.

The proposed division restricts "form" and hence form criticism to what has come to be called "genre." Gene Tucker has recognized the distinction, though he would not agree with the restriction of form criticism.

> What is form, and what constitutes it? Ambiguity concerning such fundamental concepts has been implicit in the discipline from the beginning. But clarification and some redefinition have begun to emerge in recent years concerning two points. First, it has been recognized that the term "form" has been applied far too loosely in two senses which must be distinguished from one another. On the one hand, it refers to the structure or pattern or framework of an individual text or a genre. On the other hand, it has been used in reference to genre or type or Gattung itself. For the single word "form" most OT form critics now have substituted the terms "structure" and "genre." The former refers to the (often typical) outline or framework of a text. The latter refers to the types of literature or oral expression, such as the hymn, the speech, the wisdom saying, and the like. The two are

> by no means identical, since genre is constituted not only by structure but also by setting, content, mood, intention, and other factors.[7]

Tucker's distinction is valid and important. Unlike Tucker, however, I should argue that the methodologies appropriate to analysis of the form (in the sense of genre) and of the form (in the sense of the structure of the individual unit) are so different that the one discipline of form criticism ought not to embrace them both. A proper understanding of the genre is arrived at only by careful examination of its instances, its varied structures, settings, vocabulary, traditions and functions throughout the history of its use. The scholar deduces the common elements or conventions from several occurences in order to describe the ideal type. Form in an idealist sense does not exist. The best that can be arrived at is the typical configuration of structure, the varied conventions, observations about its possible uses, its history.

The methodology required for analysis of the structure of the particular text is of a different kind from that required for the description of the genre. The structure of a text is imposed by the unique author, and is by no means necessarily dependent on the typical features of the genre. The conventions of the genre are induced from comparison of many texts. The structure of the individual text is learned from studying the rhetorical devices used in its composition - strophic construction, word play, figura etymoligica, chiasm - in short the whole range of poetic devices that the Hebrew poetic tradition provided to its poets. Rhetorical criticism cannot of course merely be a simple minded recording of the rhetorical techniques used in a composition. It has to allow for the originality of the author - the free recasting of old devices and genres. The sensitivities and tools required for the appreciation of the structuring of a text seem to me to be so different from those of form criticism as to require a separate criticism - rhetorical criticism.

Not to distinguish rhetorical from form criticism in this way runs the risk of allowing form criticism with its interest in the typical form to dominate the analysis of the singular occurence. The unique and the singular is underrated. An overly genetic emphasis can be introduced. A particularly unhappy consequence of the dominance of form is the determination of the poetic unit primarily by considerations of form. The unit length becomes coequal with the extent of the form that is used. The poet thereby loses his license to write long poems or to recast old conventions to new uses. Oversensitivity to the conventions of the genre the poet is judged to be employing can easily set up expectations in the critic's mind about the length and purpose of a unit and the presence of secondary material. Too many form critics have overrefined form critical and underdeveloped rhetorical awareness.

In the determination of the aim or intention of a passage, the same distinction between the general type and the specific text is important. Tucker has again recognized the need of the distinction.

> In the determination of such issues [intention] many factors in addition to those mentioned above must be considered, including the mood, tone, and literary subtleties of the material. For instance, in Amos 4:4-5 the prophet issues a call to worship, but the irony of the expression reveals that the text does not intend to initiate worship, but rather to criticize it. Thus it is necessary to distinguish between the intention of genres in general and of the particular examples or uses of them.[8]

Genres have a general purpose, e.g. hymns praise God or the gods, laments plead for divine rescue of the miserable. But every hymn and lament that occurs has a specific purpose. Only a full examination of the text, done with a thorough knowledge of poetic technique and a full allowance of originality to the poet can bring out the particular intention of a specific text. To entrust diverse functions to the single discipline of form criticism blurs an important distinction.

To argue for a distinction between the study of the general and the singular - and to assign each to different criticisms - is not to champion rhetorical criticism at the expense of form criticism. There is need for both. Indeed form criticism is foundational. The individual text is fully understood only as an instance of the typical, and especially so in ancient Near Eastern literature where the poet tried to stand in the traditions of the ancestors. "Form" appropriately comes before "interpretation" and "aim" in the exegetical scheme. Actual exegetical practice tends to be circular, with constant cross reference until the full individuality of the text is revealed. To take a modern example, any longtime reader of newspapers intuits the conventions of an editorial and a sports column. In the former, one expects to see restrained and cautious use of metaphor, passive verbs and circumlocutions, mediating political positions. In the latter, one expects effusive metaphors and similes, colorful active verbs, and generally strong opinions. One even senses the settings behind the writings - the discussions of editorial boards whose sobriety (ideally) is reflected in the moderation of the editorial, the partisan excitement of the athletic arena distilled into a sports column. Only with sensitivities to these conventions and settings can one pick up the subtle parodies of them that characterize the columns of a Russell Baker or an Art Buchwald. Knowledge of these conventions, the typical, enables one to appreciate the variations, the unique expression of the writer.

In summary, then, I propose to locate form and rhetorical criticism in the following grid so.

	Text	
typical	Form Setting	Form Criticism
unique	Interpretation Aim	Rhetorical Criticism (and other criticisms that deal with author's particular use)

When "setting" is taken as the setting of the genre, it belongs with form criticism. When it is taken as the setting of the particular text, it belongs with "interpretation" and "aim."

* * *

In the second half of the paper we move from theoretical considerations to the practical step of collecting some structuring devices used in Hebrew rhetoric - in this case instances of parallelism of scenes and of actors in a drama. It is important to compile examples of Hebrew rhetorical technique if one is to avoid subjectivism in the practice of rhetorical criticism. Muilenburg devoted a large part of his presidential address to examples. Rhetorical criticism should be no less rigorously empirical than any other criticism and should be eager to increase its repertory of examples. It is not gushy literary appreciation but critical analysis of rhetorical technique.

Parallelism of cola has long been seen as a characteristic of Hebrew poetry.[9] Not so clearly recognized has been parallelism of scenes (synonymous or antithetic) and of chief actors in a drama. I propose three examples of each kind of parallelism in the conviction that these are authentic Hebrew structuring devices. What holds true of parallelism of cola holds true mutatis mutandis of these more extended uses. Hebrew poets often expressed themselves in two or three statements, balanced both in form and content. The intent evidently was to play one statement off against the other, to let the two expressions "reverberate." The single colon was not adequate. The final statement of the poet is contained fully in no single colon but in the mutual coloration of the two (or three) cola. This poetry assumes the reader or hearer has a lively memory: he waits for the second (or third) colon after hearing the first. The final statement appears in the interplay. This dynamism is in sharp contrast to much English poetry in which the poet will aim for a single sharp statement. One thinks of W. H. Auden and T. S. Eliot. Two scenes can be in parallel in a way analogous to cola in parallelism. A single scene is not enough for the final statement. It is assumed that the reader or hearer will instinctively bring the two scenes together in his mind. Examples are Ps 89:2-18; Psalm 78 and Isa 41:1-42:9.

Psalm 89 gives us two scenes of acclamation of Yahweh as king by reason of his victory: a celebration in heaven among the divine beings (vv. 6-15) and a celebration on earth among his people (vv. 16-19).[10] The introductory vv. 2-5 anticipate the heavenly-earthly celebration of the cosmic victory by linking together the establishment of the cosmos and the appointment of the davidic regent of the cosmos. The parallelism of scenes can be made clear by juxtaposing vv. 2, 6, and 16-17.

v. 2 Thy merciful deeds, Yahweh, forever will I sing,[11]
Unto all generations my mouth will make known your fidelity,
ki . . . .

v. 6 The heavens confessed your wondrous act, Yahweh,[12]
Your fidelity, in the assembly of the holy ones,
ki . . . . .

vv. 16-17 The people acknowledging Yahweh marched,[13]
In the effulgence of your face they walked.
At your name they cried joyfully all day long,
At your victory they raised a shout,
ki . . . . . .

One has to assume that the triumphant earthly army/people (ʿam) accompanies the victorious deity on his way to possession of his shrine. It is the same movement as that of Exodus 15 where after the battle at the sea (vv. 4-10), Yahweh is acclaimed king by the other gods (vv. 11-12), and the people march to his shrine protected by the divine presence. The heavenly acclamation does not precede in time the shouts of the marching people in vv. 16-19. The scenes are parallel. The holy ones declare that no other deity can rank with Yahweh for he has defeated Rahab and her allies and has securely established the earth. The earthly declaration is that Yahweh is the king and glory of his people and can confer upon his anointed agent the authority to maintain the cosmic order.[14] The juxtaposition of heavenly and earthly voices gives an experiential reality to the heavenly cries. The heavenly acclaim adds depth and universal scope to the earthly activity and to the appointment of the Davidide.

Psalm 78 witnesses to the Hebrew poet's freedom to select and freely recast narrative traditions from the national story of the Exodus and Conquest. The venerable story exercised an undoubted fascination on generations of authors. Deuteronomy 1-11 is probably the most extended example of creative rewriting of the national story - in the first speech of Moses in chaps. 1-3 and in chaps. 5-11.[15] Several psalms similarly retell the account of the Exodus and Conquest - Psalms 105, 106, 135, 136 and preeminently Psalm 78. Psalm 78 not only recasts old traditions with considerable freedom, e.g. the combining of the crossing of the sea with the giving of the water in the wilderness (separate in the Pentateuch) into a unified miracle of grace (vv. 13-16), but also contrasts two recitals of the national story. Each recital is intended to illuminate the other.[16]

First Recital: Wilderness Events	Second Recital: From Egypt to Canaan
vv. 12-32 (47 cola)	vv. 40-64 (55 cola)
Gracious act (vv. 12-16)	Gracious Act (vv. 40-55)
Rebellion (vv. 17-20)	Rebellion (vv. 56-58)
Divine anger & punishment (manna & quail vv. 21-32)	Divine anger & punishment (destruction of Shiloh vv. 59-64)
Sequel (vv. 33-39, 16 cola)	Sequel (vv. 65-72, 17 cola)
total cola: 63	total cola: 72

The psalm obviously presumes the reader is familiar with the old traditions and also is able to intuit the pattern of

gracious act, rebellion, divine anger and punishment, and ultimate gracious response of God. The emphasis seems to rest on the second and longer recital. The poem most probably wants to establish by the first recital (the wilderness traditions) a pattern of divine-human relationship that will illuminate the second recital. No matter how heinous the infidelity and severe the punishment, God is ready to begin again. The paralleling of the pattern in the second recital leads the reader to expect that the destruction of the northern shrine is not the end of divine favor just as the slaughter in the wilderness camp was not the end. The choice of Zion and David is the gracious response to infidelity.

A third extended poem for which a case can be made that parallel scenes play an important role is Isa 41:1-42:9.[17] Few commentators beside Muilenburg consider the passage to be a poetic unit and many do not concede that 41:5-7 are in their proper place. That 41: -7 belong to their context is shown by the repetition of its vocabulary in a reversed sense in the immediately following vv. 8-10 (*yrʾ, qĕṣôt hāʾāreṣ, *ʿzr, *ʾmr, *ḥzq). The idol makers address their mute idols in vv. 5-7 while Yahweh speaks to mute Israel in vv. 8-10. The demonstration of unity of the whole passage is best shown by its parallel structure.

	A	(cola)	B	(cola)
Summons of all nations to trial	41:1	(4)	21-22b	(5)
Legal questioning and gods'/nations' inability to respond	2-7	(21)	22c-29	(27)
Turn to Israel	8-20	(52)	42:1-9	(30)
Total cola		(77)		(62)

Vv. 1-10 are part of a single scene. Yahweh has summoned the nations of the world (including Israel) to a trial. Whatever its origin,[18] the trial scene is used by Second Isaiah here and elsewhere as a device for Yahweh's addressing all the nations of the world. In our passage the nations are asked who is the deity behind Cyrus' military success. There seems to be parallelism of scenes here - the summoning and movement of the nations toward the place of trial (41:1; 21-22b), the legal questioning (41:2-7; 22-29), the reassurance to Israel (41:8-20; 42:1-9). The contrasts could not be more vivid: between Yahweh's easy control of Cyrus' overturning of the world and the frenetic and useless activity of the nations, between the fearful nations who encourage each other and address their silent idols and Israel who is silent while Yahweh speaks a multitude of consoling words. Repetition of vocabulary serving to contrast vv. 5-7 and 8-10 has been noted. The nations say to their statues, "It is good (ṭôb hû')," while Yahweh says to his people, "You are my servant (ʿabdî ʾattā)." It is significant that after the legal questioning in the second part of the poem, vv. 22c-29, when the gods do not respond to the question of who is the deity supporting Cyrus, there is another turn to Israel, hēn ʿabdî (42:1). Israel and the worshippers of idols are again contrasted.

The powerless deities and the idols who image them on earth are vividly contrasted with the powerful Yahweh and his servant on earth, Israel. The lifeless idols on earth mirror perfectly the powerless deities in heaven. Servant Israel, coming to life by the words and presence of Yahweh, effectively images the power of its deity Yahweh. The second speech of Yahweh to Israel (42:1-9) makes clear the representative character of Israel - Yahweh's spirit is upon Israel and makes his justice visible to the nations.

What is the purpose of the parallel scenes? I suggest that they support the central contrasts between statues/deities-nations and Yahweh-Israel. The second scene relates Israel directly to the nations. Israel and not the images is the showplace of divine glory for the nations (42:9).

Another aspect of the Hebrew fascination with parallelism as a structuring device is the use of two actors deliberately contrasted in a drama. The contrast is clearest perhaps in Proverbs 1-9 between Dame Wisdom and Dame Folly, but also appears in Exodus 1-15 between Yahweh and Pharoah and in Daniel 11 between Yahweh and Antiochus IV. The particular function of each contrast differs according to the aim of the passage. Each must be studies separately.

The diptych in Proverbs 9 is the clearest but by no means the only instance of the contrast in Proverbs 1-9 between Dame Wisdom and Dame Folly.

1 Wisdom has built her temple,
She has erected her seven pillars.
2 She has slaughtered her meat,
She has mixed her wine.
Yes, she has set her table.
3 She has sent out her messengers,
She calls out at the high point of the city.
4 "Whoever is untaught, let him turn aside here,
the one lacking understanding, she will teach him.
5 Come, eat of my food,
And drink the wine I have mixed.
6 Abandon folly and live,
And walk in the path of insight.
11 For with me your days will be made many,
And the years of your life will be increased."

13 The foolish woman shouts,
Untaught, she knows nothing.
14 And she sits at the door of her temple,
Upon a throne at the high place of the city.
15 She calls to the passers-by,
Those who walk straight ahead.
16 "Whoever is simple, let him turn aside here,
And the one lacking understanding, she will teach him.
17 Water stolen is sweet,
Food (gotten) in secret is pleasant."
18 But he does not know that the rephaim are there,
In the depths of Sheol are the ones she has invited.[19]

The section does not consist of two static portraits but rather of two dramatizations. The two women are shown in action, in this case inviting inexperienced youth to their feasts. Dame Wisdom, a woman of obvious wealth and refinement, invites youth to her mansion. They will find true life at her table. Dame Folly, on the other hand, behaves in a brazen and coarse manner. She calls to passers by directly and not through servants. Her invitation to youth is the same as Dame Wisdom's but death lurks in her house.

Each sketch makes its statement only when paired with the other in the manner of parallel cola. Proverbs 1-9 portrays the world of inexperienced youth as consisting of two parties-those who seek wisdom and those who adhere to folly. Both parties make their appeal and oftentimes the appeal of each is voiced by women. The choices offered to youth - to follow wisdom or to adhere to folly - are so fundamentally opposed that the choice of one excludes the other. To depict the women as resembling each other makes it clear to the reader the competing character of the basic options. The dramatizations of the two women thus support the main point of the chapter.

The literary problems of Exodus 1-15 are far too complex to discuss in a section devoted to singling out the parallel of actors in the P source. P seems deliberately to have contrasted God/Moses and Aaron with Pharoah and his magicians.

> See, I make you as God to Pharoah; and Aaron your brother shall be your prophet. You shall speak all that I command you; and Aaron your brother shall tell Pharoah to let the people of Israel go out of his land. But I will harden Pharoah's heart, and though I multiply my signs and wonders in the land of Egypt, Pharoah will not listen to you; then I will lay my hand upon Egypt and bring forth my hosts, my people the sons of Israel, out of the land of Egypt by great acts of judgment. And the Egyptians shall know that I am the Lord, when I stretch forth my hand upon Egypt and bring out the people of Israel from among them. Exod 7:1-5, RSV

In subsequent encounters, Moses delivers the Lord's word to Aaron who then performs a sign which the Egyptian magicians duplicate or not as the case may be. The Lord hardens the heart of Pharoah or Pharoah's heart is hardened. As R. R. Wilson has seen, Yahweh's hardening of Pharoah's heart in the P account constitutes provocation to holy war.[20] The war is between Yahweh and Pharoah for possession of the people. In P's view Pharoah had attempted to make himself lord of the Hebrews. He had attempted to interfere with the blessing to increase (chap. 1) and had demanded the people's total allegiance. He had tried to prevent Yahweh's spokesman, Moses, from addressing the Hebrews. Having elevated himself to the level of deity by his actions, he must face the true deity directly. Thus Yahweh/Moses with Aaron confront Pharoah with his magicians. P has made use of paralleled actors in order to underline his theological aim.

A similar parallel between Yahweh and an earthly ruler who attempts to set himself up as god appears in Dan 11:21-12:3.[21] In 11:21-35 Antiochus IV imitates his predecessor in his waging two campaigns against Egypt (Antiochus III, 11:10-12 and 11:13-19; Antiochus IV, 11:25-28 and 11:29-35). The introduction to his reign (11:21-24) has already warned that this king is different from his predecessors - doing things which no previous king had done. In 11:36-12:3 the reader learns what novelty Antiochus has dared to do. "He shall exalt himself and magnify himself above every god, and shall speak astonishing things against the God of gods." (11:36) The verbs "exalt oneself" and "magnify oneself" are used in the OT elsewhere only of God. Antiochus IV, raising himself to the level of divinity must in consequence encounter directly the only God, Yahweh. That direct encounter in battle is narrated in 11:40-12:3. The author uses the parallel figures of Antiochus IV and Yahweh to make his point - impiety, blasphemy, alloting the holy land to his own followers are acts proper to a god. For a man to do these things means that Yahweh himself will come directly into the picture.

In the second part of the paper examples of structuring by parallelism have been provided. To these examples I am sure others could be added. It is hoped that when judgments are made about the composition of a Hebrew poem, commentators will consult evidence drawn from the study of Hebrew poetry and not make judgments simply on logik.

NOTES

1. "Form Criticism and Beyond," JBL 88 (1969) 1-18.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. In IB (New York: Abingdon, 1956) 5.381-773.

4. C. Westermann, "Sprache and Struktur der Prophetie Deutero-jesajas," Forschung am Alten Testament (TBu 23; Munich: Kaiser, 1964) 106-110 and R. A. Melugin, The Formation of Isaiah 40-55 (BZAW 141; New York: DeGruyter, 1976) 10.

5. Muilenburg, "Form Criticism," p. 18.

6. I prescind for the moment from "text" which is established through textual laws and versional evidence. Sense and comparative passages play their roles but are subordinate.

7. "Form Criticism, OT," IDBSup, p. 342.

8. Ibid., p. 344.

9. A recent study of parallelism is that by A. Schokel, "Poésie Hébraïque," DBSup 8 (1972) 65-72. S. Talmon has begun the study of parallelism in prose, "The Presentation of Synchroneity and Simultaneity in Biblical Narrative," Studies in Hebrew Narrative Art throughout the

Ages (Scripta Hierosolymitana 27; ed. J. Heinemann and S. Werses; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1978) 9-26.

10. For an extended discussion, see R. Clifford, "Psalm 89: A Lament over the Davidic Ruler's Continued Failure," HTR 72 (July-October, 1980).

11. ḫsdyk with G on the basis of parallelism with v. 2b.

12. G apparently read Hebrew yôdû (contrast MT wĕyôdû) which it interpreted as future. I adopt yôdû, witnessed by G, Vulg and Syr but interpret it as preterite.

13. MT ʾašrê hāʿām, "happy the people," though attested elsewhere in Ps 144:15, is not parallel to the second colon of 16b, "they walked." The root *ʾaṯr appears in Ugaritic in parallel with *hlk, employed for an army's march: hlk lʾalpm ḫdd // wrbbt kmyr // ʾaṯr ṯn ṯn hlk // ʾaṯr ṯlṯ klhm, "The [type of soldier] walked by thousands, // and by ten thousands the [type of soldier] // two marched, two walked, // three marched all of them." (CTA 14.2.92-95; 4.180-183). In Isa 3:12 and 9:16 *ʾšr in the D stem means "lead the people, cause them to march." In the same verse we have adopted W. L. Moran's suggestion in Bib 42 (1961) 238-39, to remove tĕrûʿâ, "shout," from v. 16 and place it after yārîmû (MT yārûmû) in v. 17b in accord with the Hebrew idiom lĕhārîm qôl bitĕrûʿâ in Ezek 21:27; bitĕrûʿâ bĕśimḥâ lĕhārîm qôl in Ezra 3:12; gîlî // hārîʿî in Zech 9:9. One is left with the phrase in v. 16 yôdĕʿê YHWH to which may be compared yôdĕʿay of Ps 87:4; yôdĕʿe(y)kā in Ps 36:11; ʿam yôdĕʿê ʾĕlōhayw in Dan 11:32; yôdĕʿê šĕmekā in Ps 9:11. Displacement could have come about through supralinear correction in the scroll. The verb yĕgîlûn can mean "raise a jubilant shout," TDOT 2 (1977) 471.

14. J.-B. Dumortier has convincingly demonstrated that two sections of the poem commonly held to be diverse, the "royal poem" of vv. 2-5 + 20-38 and the "cosmic hymn" of vv. 6-19 were in fact originally unified. The dominion achieved by Yahweh through his creation victory (vv. 6-19) is shared point by point with the Davidide and his descendents (vv. 20-38). "Un rituel d'intronisation: Le Ps LXXXIX: 2-38," VT 22 (1972) 176-96.

15. A model for careful literary analysis of these chapters has been provided by N. Lohfink, Das Hauptgebot: eine Untersuchung literarischer Einleitungsfragen zu Dtn 5-11 (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963) more popularly in Höre, Israel! Auslegung von Texten aus dem Buch Deuteronomium (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1965).

16. See my detailed study, "In Zion and David a New Beginning: An Interpretation of Psalm 78," in a collection of articles to be published by Eisenbraun in 1981.

17. See the detailed treatment in my "The Function of Idols Passages in Second Isaiah," CBQ 42 (Oct., 1980)

18. The question of the origin of the trial scene in Second Isaiah is controverted. Is its origin secular court custom or cultic usage or international legal procedures? For a recent summary, see A. Schoors, I am God Your Savior: A Form-Critical Study of the Main Genres in Is. XL-LV (SupVT 24; Leiden: Brill, 1973), chap. 3. In my judgment, the prior question should be the rhetorical function of the trial in the particular passage. Investigation of the history of a form or motif remains of course highly important.

19. Vv. 7-10 and v. 12 are intrusive. Proverbs has attracted many single proverbs into its poetry, a process discernible in the additional proverbs in the LXX of this chapter. See further my "Proverbs IX: A Suggested Ugaritic Parallel," VT 25 (1975) 298-306.

20. "The Hardening of Pharoah's Heart," CBQ 41 (1979) 18-36.

21. See further my "History and Myth in Daniel 10-12," BASOR 220 (1975) 23-26.

S 22 SOME USES AND LIMITATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY

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Human beings are born into societies, a kind of second nature. Although ultimately we are all part and parcel of our physical environment, as we live in society we are surrounded by the structures produced by humans for humans. Those structures, which constitute our world, are physical, emotional, mental and spiritual. They are patterns that we learn to cope with and internalize to different degrees. We learn our way around our physical living space, where our nourishment comes from. We learn to deal with the emotional environment surrounding us, to interact with it, modify and be modified by it. We learn the language, the symbol systems, even though we are largely unaware how we learn them. That is, we learn to negotiate the mental environment. And we learn, more or less explicitly, the unifying concepts of our social group, the overall understanding of how and perhaps why things are as they are. That is the spiritual environment. Every society functions on all four levels. As we accumulate experience we acquire personal structures through which we perceive and evaluate our experience and by which we act at all these levels.[1] The extent to which we accept the inevitability or even the rightness of the various levels of our environment is the extent of our integration into that system. But members of a society are more <u>or</u> less integrated, and the completeness of their integration may vary within the course of their lives.[2]

This possibility of variation in acceptance of concepts and roles, an experience probably shared by all of us who have gone through adolescent rebelliousness, mid-life crises, etc., goes to the heart of a long standing controversy in the social sciences which we need be aware of as we attempt to apply the tools of social and behavioral sciences to ancient history. The controversy manifests in the study of history, in sociology, in psychology, as well as in the study of literature. A general description of the poles of the conflict is "holism vs. individualism."[3] The problem concerns assumptions about the nature of human consciousness from the perspective of any line of inquiry trying to qualify as "scientific". One way to put the question is, do individuals create society or does society create individuals? Another form of the question is in terms of free will and social determinism. As we look at the literature of antiquity, do we consider a given work to be expressive of a society, of a collective consciousness, or a product of individual creativity?[4] The biases of the social scientist and particularly of the methodologist, the social scientific toolmaker, on this issue will have a powerful effect on the questions asked and the data considered. My own view is that such controversies present us with false polarities.

A major focus of this paper is the relationship of Paul, as he reveals himself in his letters to, not society in general, but the variety of social worlds in which he functioned. Given his activities, I cannot readily comprehend him as a totally autonomous individual for he was determined by too many social facts. What we have of Paul is basically his communications. A language user, he intended through his letters to <u>shape</u> others to his concepts, to convince. He perceived himself to be bound to the interests of the community (or communities) that constituted for him the "body of Christ." He would conform his behavior on all levels to its needs. A leader, as he was and wanted to be, is inherently dependent on the community and must share the same world with them to some extent. Insofar as Paul identified with his <u>role</u>, he was created by the community. Further, Paul did not perceive his attachment to the social world of early

Christianity as a matter of an autonomous choice, but more as an inevitable result of a category-shattering experience which he did not seek.[5] But by no means is it helpful to attempt to understand Paul wholly as a product of social forces, for in fact he functions as a social world creator in early Christianity. What we require, then, is a methodology, a set of tools, that will allow us to examine and evaluate Paul insofar as his consciousness is socially constructed and insofar as it is not.

First, let us consider the social construction of reality, of social worlds, which manifests in the individual as the socialized part of consciousness. When socialized into our family units (or into other social institutions), we are confronted with restrictions on our behavior. Learning the rules about what we can and cannot do, of what we should and should not do -- and with or without whom, we also learn rules about what to say and how to say, to whom to say or not to say -- and ultimately what to think or not to think. We are taught the justifications, the reasons for this structuring. We are given understandings, interpretations of our experiences which are building blocks for our own conceptions of reality, our own perspective. (Developmental psychologists tell us that awareness of having a perspective, or an identity, normally does not arise until we are six or seven years old!) We are socialized into reality structures constructed and maintained by others. And insofar as we internalize the interpretations and evaluations of phenomena as well as the rules and their supporting cosmology, we are also created as persons in the process:

> . . .man not only produces a world, but he also produces himself. More precisely, he produces himself in a world (Berger, 5).

More generally we are socialized into categories of truth and falsity, good and evil, beauty and ugliness -- and ultimately, reality and illusion.[6] A major effect of the social structuring of consciousness is the incessant internal verbalization or chatter that fills our waking moments. The most effective social restraints are precisely those which enter into our stream of consciousness and with which we identify. The stream of consciousness is where the structures of the consensus reality manifest internally. Dissents from consensus reality often take the form of internal dialogues, which we experience as arguing with our selves. So, on the one hand we encounter social restraints when, say, a policeman commands us to obey a stop signal, and on the other hand we encounter social restraints in the absence of a policeman when our own internal voice repeats the same warning. It is sometimes called conscience, but it is social control, what Freud named "super-ego." Of course, in my description, I am vaguely indicating the tip of the iceberg.[7]

When Paul became attracted to the early Christian communities that he had earlier tried to destroy, the movement was still new, still largely unformed and by no means uniform in its structures on any level. Membership was gained mostly by conversion which meant that most left social worlds that they had grown up with and joined in a social world-in-the-making. To become part of a new movement, to be creating a new way of living, is to be creating a new reality:

> All new religions, then, are directed toward the creation of new worlds: old symbols are given new meaning and new symbols come to life; new communities define themselves in opposition to previous traditions; a new order of the sacred is brought into being and perceived by the community as the source of all power and meaning; new rituals emerge to remind the community of this sacred order by creating it anew in the act of ritual celebration, mechanisms are established for preserving this new world and for adapting it to changing circumstances; and eventually an integrated world view may emerge, including systems of theology, sacred scriptures, and ecclesiastical offices whose

> task is to give meaning not just to the community itself but to all other worlds as well (Gager, 11).[8]

But in joining the Christians, Paul left another community, the Jews. Leaving one social world for another implies that one reality had to dissolve for him into another. And in his case we know that an intense religious experience was the solvent. How do we understand the experience of moving from the role of reality maintainer to reality creator? For instance, was it merely a matter of moving from one social system to another with the major change for Paul being in his role and function? Or do we also need to consider the differences between the social system on all levels? What I am trying to understand about Paul is the experience of making that move and its consequences in his own consciousness. We know little of the details of his pre-Christian life in Judaism, and in fact our knowledge of the Judaism in that period is scarcely secure. But we do know that Paul was sufficiently attached to some part of that community to serve as a prosecutor or persecuter (perhaps even an unofficial vigilante) in relation to perceived enemies. We also know that he considered himself to be a Torah-abiding citizen rather than a malcontent who might easily disengage and slide off into another community to seek his fortune. He seemed to be an authority-accepting member of his group, willing to support its structures to the extent of killing its enemies, perhaps risking his own life to do so (Phil. 3:5-6). His identification with the social reality of his group seems to have been exceptionally strong. He did not live out his life comfortably as a tent-maker with little involvement in public affairs.

As a Christian Paul showed a similar intensity in attachment to his new social world, again willing to accept personal discomforts, bodily and psychic stress, the possibilities of arrest, imprisonment and death in its service. But his structures about the nature of social worlds seem to have changed, perhaps as a consequence of his visionary experiences:

> For although I am free of all men, I have made myself the slave of all, in order to win the majority. And to the Jews I became (like) a Jew in order to win Jews; to those under the Law I became like (one) under the Law, although I am not myself under the Law, in order to win those under the Law; to those outside the Law I became like one outside the Law of God but within the law of Christ, in order to win those outside the Law. To the weak I became weak, in order to win the weak. I have become all things to all men, in order to save at least some (1 Cor. 9: 19-27).

We can imagine that prior to his transition he believed that a Jew was a Jew, a Greek was a Greek. One lived as a Jew or a Greek, each social world with its own boundary. Jew and Greek were categories at the same level of social experience. But after his transition, he added another level, relativizing the reality of the social worlds of Jew and Greek. Now it was possible to be neither, but to behave as one or the other. The social world represented by "body of Christ" could comprehend both. To become a part of that body was to be able to live in a more comprehensive reality, to add, as it were, a vertical dimension. But not every Jew or Greek who joined was automatically capable of living in that added dimension or of leaving his or her prior social world. Baptism had its limitations as long as human beings remained embodied. Much of 1 Corinthians is devoted to such problems.

In his discussion of <u>eleutheros</u> in 1 Cor. 9, Conzelmann points out that Paul "does not speak about the freedom of Christians in general, but about his own particular freedom; nor yet about apostleship in general, but about his own particular apostleship (152)." Throughout his letters Paul justified his actions and defended the uniqueness of his apostleship with a variety of arguments, each deemed by him to be suitable to the particular challenge. It is no wonder that readers at times conclude that he had more

than a touch of cynicism and opportunism. But it is a mistake, I believe, to assume that these various post facto defenses determined Paul's apostolic behavior, that the arguments convinced him of his freedom. Rather, we need to look at his transition and what we can understand to constitute the experience of transition, his rite of passage, as it were.

What was it in his experience that led Paul to open the convenantal promises which he had always understood to apply solely to the Jews to everyone else? We may search through the various universalistically oriented passages in the literature with which Paul may have been familiar. We may look at movements in that direction already present in early Christianity. We may look for parallels in Jewish law to Paul's "end of the Torah" eschatology. But the questions still remains: how did Paul arrive at this conviction? I suggest that it was not by dialectic, not by the arguments he marshaled to convince others. No person convinced him; he acknowledged no human teachers. What in his experience could lead to such a dissolution in boundary concepts? Moreover, as Paul left his former social world, he entered the world of those who were the enemy. In doing so, he assumed the responsibility of convincing others to join, that is, he joined in the missionary effort well under way. He understood himself to have a special focus in his missionary activity, the gentiles. He also affirmed that gentiles need not join the Jews in order to be eligible for the promises made to them, strongly rejecting the boundary concepts of his former social world. In the variety of positions on Christian mission, less extreme options were open to him.[9]

In his own letters Paul tells us little about the experience or experiences that propelled him from his prior life. His sense of personal uniqueness may assure us that in no way does he conceive of his transition experience as typical, although virtually all in that first generation had to make transitions of their own. Did Paul enter the new system at the same level at which he left the old, or did he change in some fundamental way so that he could never again relate to a society in the automatic believing way he learned as a child? Did Paul leave his Jewish community equally at all levels? What were the changes in his reality constructs, in his social identity?

The methodology being developed by Mary Douglas seems particularly appropriate for dealing with such questions systematically. She is interested in developing ways to compare types of social systems, particularly those that exist in adjacent spaces at the same time. Moreover she has designed her methodology to focus on the differences in socially constructed realities in different types of societies:

> If the reasoning is sound, we can go a great deal further than the phenomenologists who have been saying for some time that the perceived universe is socially constructed. We should be able to say what kinds of universe are likely to be constructed when social relations take this or that form (NS,9).[10]

Another great advantage, especially for students of early Christianity where so much of the data is literary, is Douglas's focus on the individual and society at the level of the individual's experience of society:

> The first source of our troubles as cultural anthropologists is that we have no adequate conception of the individual. Necessarily somewhat parasitic upon sociology, we share its strengths and weaknesses; and this particular failing is one we all have in common (CB,5).[11]

Douglas is fully aware that human beings create their own environment, that is, create the structures across which their experiences flow. But she is also aware that the degree of individual identification with that socially constructed reality may differ, not only from individual to individual, but also within the experience of a given individual. This fact sets the level

of her methodology and determines the nature of her categories:

> Culture is no passive object of negotiation; it is not a solid deep-storage system, nor a fixed set of logical pigeon holes for retrieving embedded memories. With some pliability and some toughness of its own, there are yet limits to the negotiability of culture. To discover these limits is the problem I discern as common now to sociology and anthropology (CB,6).

To set the question in terms of my concern with Paul, it seems that Paul did perceive himself to be at or beyond the limits of the negotiability of the culture with which he identified prior to his experiences. There is no evidence that he was ejected from his own community, but rather he excluded himself, or, by his experiences, was driven to exclude himself.

What Douglas is trying to do is to link two types of experience: first the individual's experience of social constraints on all levels of his activity. Physical movement, emotional attachments, the symbols available to the mind, concepts are all subject to the constraints of his/her fellows, society, and its institutions. This is the social context, which consists of all the structures, the behavior expectations at all levels with which one is confronted. The second type of experience has to do with the individual's participation or lack of participation in the social construction and maintenance of reality. Given certain kinds of social contexts, particular types of universes are likely to be constructed with different degrees of coherence. The individual is left with the possibilities of accepting, rejecting or modifying <u>these</u> socially presented cosmologies. We understand our own actions and the actions of others according to the cosmology. It provides not only the categories through which we perceive particulars, but also the possible interconnections between phenomena, for instance, all our beliefs about casual connections.[12]

> The reason for focusing upon the social context defined in this way is that each pattern of rewards and punishment moulds the individual's behavior. He will fail to make any sense of his surroundings unless he can find some principles to guide him to behave in the sanctioned ways and be used for judging others and justifying himself to others. This is a social-accounting approach to culture; it selects out of the total cultural field those beliefs and values which are derivable as justifications for action and which I regard as constituting an implicit cosmology (CB,6).

Douglas separates out patterns of social experience and the possible patterns of beliefs to make sense and meaning of those experiences. Our activity in the world is not a process of individual responses to present stimuli, but rather a process of response to stimulis perceived through the structures of accumulated and <u>classified</u> experience. F.A. Hayek is an essay entitled "The Primacy of the Abstract" makes the point this way:

> The primacy with which I am mainly concerned is a casual one, that is, it refers to what, in the explanation of mental phenomena, must come first and can be used to explain the other. I do not wish to deny that in our conscious experience, or introspectively, concrete particulars occupy the central place and the abstractions appear to be derived from them. But this subjective experience appears to me to be the source of the error with which I am concerned, the appearance which prevents us from recognizing that these concrete particulars are the product of abstractions which the mind must possess in order that it should be able to experience particular sensations, perceptions, or images (Hayek,44).

A cosmology involves a more or less sufficiently coherent set of such abstractions. The understanding of the cosmology for Douglas's purposes, must be expressible by the individual in some symbolic fashion while its sufficiency is determined by the satisfaction it gives to the individual doing the justifying and explaining. That sufficiency to the individual may or may not include the cosmology's acceptability to the public. In psychosis, for instance, one may construct a totally coherent, paranoid cosmology so unacceptable to others that the result is forcible incarceration!

Douglas connects social contexts to cosmologies by establishing two coordinates or dimensions by which she can plot the spectrum of possible social structures. These dimensions, or better, meta-dimensions, she calls "group" and "grid". Both are defined in a variety of ways since they are experienced at different levels. Group Douglas defines as "a dimension of social incorporation" (CB,7). It is the experience of pressure from other members of the group to conform at all levels of behavior. The stronger the group, the more members' activities are focused in the group. Members live together, work together, control each others sexual arrangements, etc. Group also defines the external boundaries, the defining of who is in and who is out.[13] The experience of strong group is the experience of being strongly constrained. The other end of the pole is to be so removed from group control to be able to exert control over others. Another way to put it is that the line connecting the two poles "separates the area of conformity from innovation (NS,85)." The difference in the latter positions has to do with Douglas's other dimension. In a social system with a strong hierarchical (rather than egalitarian) structure, the higher one is in the hierarchy the fewer the restraints and the more the possibilities or exercising control over those below. If the power differentiation, on the contrary, is low, the result of being outside of group control would be quite different. There might be no structures for exerting power over others.

Grid, the other dimension, is, in Durkheimian terms, the classification system. At one level it is the cosmology that will be called upon to justify behavior when a member feels the group pressure for such explanations. At the level of power relationships, it is the presence or absence, the elaboration or simplicity, of hierarchies. Grid is the structures, implicit and explicit. From the perspective of individual consciousness, grid is the map of roles and routes to be negotiated in the social context. To experience strong grid is to experience clear categories which differentiate people. So a strong caste system is a manifestation of strong grid, or an army where the behavior expectations of the interaction of people from different ranks is clear. As grid weakens, the rules for interaction become less explicit and ambiguity in social relations increases. Grid also contains the rules about which category of persons can control other categories of persons. So grid is constituted by the social structures and in a sense is the major information inculcated in the institutions for socialization.



Diagram 1

It is important to keep clear the distinction between the public classification system and the private. The "public" classification system might be understood as what everyone believes everyone else believes -- almost a consensus of grids. But Douglas insists on allowing for the experience of moving "down-grid", and in extreme situations even "off-grid". To move downgrid is to widen the gap between personal grid and the consensus reality. The dissent could be so strong that one might even move off into the private fantasies of psychosis. Or one might move into another group. Or one might remain within the same group but at a different level of grid awareness, consciously role-playing. The zero point on grid and group is a crucial possibility in any system:

> The tension in the possibility of zero and the maximum possible order and pressure which a society provides is the measure of possible joy and sorrow. Zero is the inexpressible, timeless, weightless unembodied experience. There is only a flash-point at zero-zero; it can never be fixed. The thought of zero, of love which has no rule but itself, nothingness instituted, is the magnet which pulls the sociological imagination off course. Its vision haunts us with false cosmologies whose social conditions can never be met. That is the first freedom to be gained from this demystifying exercise: to recognize impossibility. Another is to appreciate clowns. . . .[T]he clown gyrates around zero, where meanings are destructible and interchangeable. The clown can lift the weight of the categories and show its provisional, makeshift character. He can teach us to respect the person who moves out alone to the far left-hand bottom of the diagram. Here the solitary mystic, without legislating for others, tries to live with his own heart set to zero, where no boundaries pull God and the self apart (IM,228).

Movement, even momentarily, into the zero position may reveal the "provisional, makeshift character" of the categories. Did Paul ever experience such a moment? The experience he describes in 2 Cor. 12 provokes such speculation:

> I knew a man in Christ fourteen years ago -- whether in the body, I don't know, or out of the body, I don't know -- God knows -- such a man as that was caught up into the third heaven. And I know wush a man -- whether in the body or out of the body, God knows -- who was caught up into paradise and heard unspeakable words, which a man is not permitted to speak (2-4).

This is not to say that Paul was a mystic. Experiences free from pressures of classification or group are sought by mystics in their grid and group dissolving disciplines. But such experiences come to others. All of us have them as we sleep. When we awake we call their residue "dreams," denying them the reality that our culture reserves for intersubjective phenomena. The ordeals of shamans, perhaps the visions of prophets, psychedelic experiences induced by psychotropic drugs -- all such experiences strain toward that zero-zero point. All trance experiences have that potential. Hence the control that higher grid cultures attempt to exert over trance states (NS, 104-110). And for Paul such a state "of love which has no rule but itself" may have been what he expected after leaving the body for the life of the spirit at the end of it all. At least it was his dream for all "in Christ." Such a dream of undifferentiated unity seems to be the fantasy of many millenarian movements, a fantasy translated into the political realm of ruleless interpersonal love. But it is also the mystics' dream where such unity is understood or even experienced as the essential eternal being which lies beyond and even constitutes our erring grid structures.

Before delving further into Paul's personal grid-group history, let us look first at Douglas's typology of social contexts and their correlated cosmologies. Grid as a dimension of the public realm is experienced as categories, as insulation separating phenomena. In an army, for instance, ranks are insulated from one another in a variety of ways, including uniform differentiation, differences in expected behavior in each rank, etc. The hierarchy may be many-layered and supported by an elaborate cosmology which justifies and reinforces the differences. On the other hand, grid may only involve one significant criterion of insulation, say between the "big man" and everyone else in that type of culture, or between the rich factory owner and the workers in a pre-union factory town.

The power of group-grid analysis is in what it correlates, for grid includes the whole symbolic system, the whole world of structures, of forms:

> I am not merely saying that people's behaviour to their god corresponds to their behaviour to each other, though the truism could well be underlined. I am saying that religious forms as well as social forms are generated by experiences in the same dimensions (NS,34).

The strong grid-strong group type of society is the system Durkheim takes as prototypical. Society is divinized and all deviations from social structures are considered not only crimes but impieties. It is the type of society which indeed exploits to the fullest the legitimizing functions of religion. Ritual is prevalent, institutions are sacralized:

> Strong grid and strong group will tend to a routinized piety toward authority and its symbols; beliefs in a punishing, moral universe (NS,87).

Categories of pure and impure are clear and the rejects of the society are easily identifiable. Formal behavior, social and religious rituals insulate individuals in roles. Rituals are believed to be efficacious; magic reinforces institution. Bodily control is taught and valued. Power distribution is likely to be hallowed by tradition as well as divinely instituted. Role structures are strongly defined; one's life script is clearly written. Individualism, i.e., independence in behavior, in thought, innovation in relations and culture are all discouraged:

> With strong grid and group there is the tendency to take the intellectual categories which the fixed social categories require as if they were god-given, eternal truths. The mind is tied hard and fast, so to speak, bound by the socially generated categories of culture. No other alternative view of reality seems possible. . . . Anomaly is abhorred . . . . Rituals have the function of celebrating the transcendence of the whole over the part (NS, 174).

It is this society type which tends, in its socialization, to have the strongest hold over the individual's consciousness, that molds the body and psyche as totally as possible and co-ordinates all symbol systems to uphold the legitimacy of its constructions. It must be said that this type of society tends to be inwardly stable and to last. People will die for it.

After presenting the idealized type of a high classification society, we need to recall that individuals within that society are found at different places on the grid, and within their lifetimes may have a history of moving up and down on grid and back and forth on group dimensions. That is to say that one's individual experience may be such that the public grid becomes implausible, or one's place in the hierarchy may render a member free of control by others. For different reasons someone in such a social context may experience the development of a personal grid that loosens the bonds of convention.

Low group, low grid social setting will tend to correlate with a secular rather than sacramental universe, with ritual being far less valued than it would be in a high group, high grid setting:

> Pygmies move freely in an uncharted, unsystematized, unbounded social world. I maintain that it would be impossible for them to develop a sacramental religion. . . .(NS,34).

Low grid is a world of greater social mobility along with the anxiety of competition.. Religion is not sacramental, magic is personal and pragmatic:

> As a cultural type, low grid goes with eclecticism, fashion-ridden openness to any new gimmick; then pragmatism, secularity, the privateness of access to spiritual powers; each man claiming his own secret resources. . .; then the contractual nature of the relations between individuals, and their possibility of breach; the absence of a gory criminal law . . . (CB, 53).

The basic value is the sanctity of the individual, even in the face of group need when group is also low. There is no drive to uniform thought forms, therefore, little interest in metaphysics. Low grid, low group can also be a long-lived social type, for it can accommodate cycles of change without the fractures in categories that change brings to high-classification settings. Another way of saying it is that low grid, low group contexts do not impel their members to construct elaborate, architectonic metaphysical or theological systems to support the plausibility of institutions, rituals, or customs.

In diagram 2 I have plotted one way to understand Paul's transition from Jew to Christian.



The chart itself is, of course, limited. Paul moves out from his position in Judaism where, we shall assume, he was a faithful follower of the Pharisees. Submitting himself to their traditions and institutions, he would have experienced strong grid, that is, an articulated classification system which distinguished sharply between Jew and gentile, male and female, pure and impure. From the perspective of the Pharisees, once he removed himself from their group, he was effectively off the chart, subject to pressure by neither group nor grid. However Paul experienced a transition from follower to leader, from culture maintainer to creator. His letter writing, as well as his preaching, were effective, and the extent to which they were effective is the extent of his control over others. He was challenged, however, by other apostles who claimed his rank or higher but on the basis of a different grid. The extent to which their challenges were effective is the extent to which he moved toward a position of being controlled.

Paul left his former group. Rejecting the necessity of their rituals, he declared void their central symbol--the Torah. But he did not leave them completely. They did not become the enemy for him as they did for other Christians. On the mental level, i.e., the symbolic level, he partially retained the Jewish grid. Torah was truth to Paul, for its creator, God, could not lie. But God could embody a new symbol which subsumes the old. The prefiguration of the new in the old was crucial to Paul. It was his hope that nothing need be lost. On the spiritual level, the level of overarching concept that organizes the whole grid, Paul appropriated, yet transformed, his former classification system as we can see in his utilization of creedal formulas:

> Paul, a slave of Christ Jesus, called an apostle, separated out for the gospel of God which he promised previously through his prophets in the holy writings about his son who came into being from the seed of David on the level of flesh, who was designated son of God on the level of the spirit of holiness by resurrection of the dead, through whom we received grace and apostleship, for obedience of faith among all the nations . . . (Rom. 1.1 ff.).

As elsewhere, Paul derived his authority as apostle from the realm of divine power, the same level which had informed the prophets of the Bible. Krister Stendahl correctly emphasizes that Paul understood himself to be called to the vocation of prophecy rather than to have been converted to another religion (Stendahl, 7-23). He connected his experience with that of Jeremiah: "Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you, I appointed you a prophet to the nations (1.5)". In Galatians Paul explicitly repeats the pattern of Jeremiah's call and ties it to a rejection of any human authority over him:

> When it pleased the one who separated me out from my mother's womb and called me through his grace to reveal his son in me so that I might preach him among the nations, I did not confer with flesh and blood . . . (1.15-16).

Paul took seriously the image of relating to God <u>before</u> he was independently embodied. Perhaps the issue is not so much his pre-destination to be a prophet beyond the confines of Judaism, but that his boundary-breaking, which entailed his leaving the group of his birth, was authorized even before the birth that brought him into the group. As Jesus Christ existed on the levels of flesh and spirit, so did Paul. On the level of spirit Paul's removal from the Jews could not be apostasy.

The question still remains whether Paul is to be categorized as a "convert" or not. Stendahl argues convincingly that what Paul describes in Galatians is a prophetic call, that Paul had no intention of abandoning his former group for a new group. In fact the argument in Romans 9-11 attempts to retain the efficacy of the old covenant, the means by which God established the Jews as a group. Yet Paul, in affirming the new covenant and its social embodiment, found it necessary to declare voided the power of the symbols of the Jews, Torah, the Sacrificial System, food rules, etc. To appreciate the immensity of Paul's grid change, we must recall that he himself claims that up to the point of experiencing his call his attitude toward Torah was that of the Pharisees (Phil. 3.5 f.) for whom Torah in its written and oral forms was <u>the</u> symbol, in which all grid and group considerations was centered, in which all knowledge was preserved all power relationships, all social relations were legitimated, and by which all ritual was established (Isenberg, 36 ff.).

In grid-group terms conversion involves a change in cosmology, a change in social relations, as well as a "revolt against ritual (NS, 179):

> Anyone who finds himself living in a new social condition must . . . find that the cosmology he used in his old habitat no longer works. We should try to think of

> cosmology as a set of categories that are in use. It is like lenses which bring into focus and make bearable the manifold challenge of experience . . . . Occasionally a major overhaul is necessary to bring the obsolete set of views into focus with new times and new company. This is conversion (NS, 181).

Unquestionably Paul's "lenses" were radically altered. Of course such alterations do not involve forgetting prior structures. Paul did not reject the significance of his former life, of his previsionary group-grid history. What he did reject, with some ambiguity, were the present value of those categories. And so he could to argue for the significance of the Jews in the scheme of salvation and their present lack of significance. Paul's experience was not that of the gnostic or the mystic who awakes to an experience of the "real" structures of the cosmos as they have always been and must evaluate former structures as ignorance or illusion. Paul awakens to structures that he realizes have just changed. Insofar as those of his former group retain the old prescriptions for their own lenses and he moves away into new perceptions, his grid-group structural changes do seem to quality as "conversion" -- at least in Douglas's terms. Of course he did not consider himself to have "left", to have become an apostate, which seems to me to be Stendahl's point. He experienced a call, and the result of that call was a conversion, rather than gnostic awakening or mystical enlightenment.

With such a conversion comes rejection of ritual:

> Inevitably this recognition of a new viewpoint produces a revulsion against dead ritual . . . . [T]here is a burden of old, irrelevant rituals to be laid aside. They no longer have meaning because the social action in which they inhered no longer attracts (NS, 180).

For Paul there was indeed the rejection of old ritual, even without the revulsion. The Temple sacrifices were no longer necessary, for the body is a temple. Circumcision, food rules, all that makes up Torah -- all those rituals are a law on the side of sin and death:

> For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus freed you from the law of sin and of death (Rom. 8.2).

Paul polarized flesh and spirit in a way uncharacteristic of Pharisaism (for all we can tell), but familiar to millenarian cosmologies (e.g., Qumran). He opposed the outward manifestations of works to the inwardness of faith, without, perhaps, arriving at Luther's extremity. This movement away from ritualism which characterizes the results of a conversion was also reinforced by Paul's tendencies toward low grid. Insofar as he influenced his audience, he helped create conditions for low grid.

Paul's low grid leanings are evident in his own rejection of hierarchies, i.e., human hierarchies. As we have seen, he insisted that his authority derived from no human institution, not even from the apostles. In his dealings with behavioral problems within the community he invoked, not rules, but love and "upbuilding of the community", both of which are group values, not grid values. He would permit neither his own sense of freedom, nor that of anyone else to serve as an excuse for mistreating or scandalizing a community member less secure in faith. Thus, in the case of food sacrificed to idols, Paul was clear that the food rituals are meaningless. But if a weaker brother might be shaken, then the rules, e.g., the formality with regard to food, was to be observed. The ritual is viewed with pragmatism, although with reverence for its divine origins.

Paul's preference for low grid is accompanied by a strong sense of group. In no way did he perceive himself as a creature of the group, but he was willing self-consciously to sacrifice his freedom for its good. The "one body" image is explicit:

> . . . in the body should be no schism, but the members should care equally for one another. Whether one member suffers, all

members suffer, or whether one member is glorified, all members rejoice (1 Cor. 12.25 f.).

Paul's principle of action was the upbuilding (oikodomen) of the group. All competition for glory, all power conflicts, all appeal to classification, were to submerge to that principle. That principle could even be applied critically on "spiritual gifts." The community which he addresses in 1 Cor. had experienced trancelike phenomena, glossolalia, spontaneous prophecy, etc. Members of the community had engaged in behavior which they insisted was "pneumatic", i.e., originating in the spiritual realm. In that same community, apparently, bodies had been misused sexually, the feelings and concepts of members of the community had been confused by the actions of others. Individual ego-oriented values had been satisfied at the cost of group values, presumably with the justification that the saved were no longer subject to rules at the fleshly level. Paul intervened, then, in a community experiencing problems of low grid type. The denial of resurrection implied in 1 Cor. 15 reinforces that estimation, for the denial of resurrection, in Paul's understanding -- in Paul's grid -- was tantamount to denying significance to Jesus's death. As James Robinson points out the emphasis in Corinth was placed on the efficacy of baptism. The Corinthians took Paul's formulation of baptism in terms of "rising with Christ" very seriously. Their own bodily death lost redemptive significance and that was expressed in their denial of resurrection, for they did not need to wait until then to acquire all the fruits of the spirit (Robinson, 32 ff.) There was nothing redemptive left in group values for them. So Paul who insisted upon group values over spiritual values re-emphasized the cross and resurrection of Christ as THE gospel, thereby affirming the significance of embodied existence for all.[14]

The schism-ridden, unruly nature of the Corinthian community is, as I said, characteristic of a low grid situation and Paul rightly emphasized group values to bring them together. But he was not attracted to create a comprehensive group living situation in the style of Qumran. On the physical level Christians lived in the general population even in the midst of non-Christian families. Undoubtedly the ritual meal was the main focus for gathering. So Paul sought unity at the emotional, mental and spiritual levels, promising that the differentiation at the level of flesh would soon end -- indeed the level of flesh itself would end. It is unlikely, given the social experience of low grid and the lack of shared group experience at the level of family life that letters and arguments could create unity, especially without grid. In terms of Douglas's analysis the later orthodox move to unity through an empowered hierarchy was the obvious route to survival in society. Of course, for Paul long range survival was not even an issue. Rather he tried to create a situation which, as we know comparatively, breeds millenarianism, a low grid, high group social context (NS, 184).

Of course, low grid is not the same as no grid at all. We see Paul suggesting rules for living both with the authority of "a word of the Lord" and, failing that, on his own authority. Rules create grid and the promulgation of rules presumes grid, i.e., the capacity for one part of a social system to restrain the behavior of another. And so we find Paul also supporting ritual. The proto-gnostic perspective of some Corinthians might have been that baptism's effectiveness was complete and that flesh was already magically transcended. The result would have been a collection of self-styled perfected individuals for whom no further ritual was needed. For Paul, baptism began a process -- begain it decisively, but the process's completion depended on events to come. So the ritual and its relative nature was affirmed. The performer of the ritual was irrelevant; it did not matter who did the baptizing. Again, the rejection of human hierarchy kept grid values low.[15]

I recognize that I am now scattering observations based on grid-group considerations rather than systematically working through a specific problem or set of problems. I am deliberately trying to indicate the range of provocativeness and usefulness of Douglas's system. Let me offer one further area in recent scholarship that seems to invite this kind of analysis. Recent formulations of the "trajectories" type of documentary analysis have gained much from the recognition of the necessity to deal with issues of social context, correlating, for instance, creedal conflicts and conflicts in the understanding of ritual with differing social values, whether they relate to actual social experience or to models for (or against) social control. The various trajectories described by Robinson and Koester, for instance, all have relevant social locations. In distinguishing the trajectories of the symbolic structures of early Christian communities, one could continue with inquiry into and speculation about the grid-group situation in the various communities to which the different literary strata appealed. In short, the analysis of religious and other symbolic forms in relation to social forms the original task of form-criticism.

Helmut Koester, in his thoughtful essay "The Structure and Criteria of Early Christian Beliefs" sets forth the following program of inquiry:

> . . . the structure of faith as it occurred within the earliest history of Christianity must serve as a primary model for understanding the relationship being considered here: the relationship between the historical event [of Jesus of Nazareth] on the one hand, providing the criteria of understanding, and the culturally conditioned expression of faith in creed, symbol, dogma on the other hand, which is always a human attempt -- inspired or not -- to relate human existence to a historical event in order to establish a symbol that transcends man's own limitations and predicaments (207).

This program, in and of itself, appears to lack the social dimension. But Koester is well aware of the need to consider the social context:

> . . . Jesus did not found a church or start a social or political movement -- much less a revolution. He did not envisage the kingdom of God in any institutionalized form. Yet typical responses to Jesus, and the expressions of faith, the Christologies, which they produced, have very distinct ecclesiological as well as sociological and cultural implications (209).

This, of course is precisely to the point of Douglas's statement cited above that "religious forms as well as social forms are generated in the same dimension (NS, 34)." Koester presents four different types of faith structures, or cosmologies in Douglas's terms, which he relates to the probable social context of each. It is at the level of working out what Koester calls the "sociological implications" that Douglas's schema should help in several ways.

The first structure that Koester deals with is "Jesus as the Lord of the Future". He draws a parallel with Qumran as a similar type of community which might hold similarly structured beliefs:

> The Qumran texts also demonstrate that such eschatological hopes generated a particular type of community life: sectarian seclusion in a monastic-type congregation. . . (212).

At this point I am tempted to construct a typical social structure of a millenarian community, but that would take us far afield. What I want to point to for now is the assumption underlying the verb "generated." It seems to me to be a real question in the case of Qumran whether millenarian beliefs generated a particular social structure, or whether the social experience of the founders generated the cosmology, or whether

such temporal-causal links are so complex and so hidden in our sources that they are for all practical purposes lost to us. We must be aware of our own tendencies toward either social determinism or ideological determinism. So we would do well, when considering any evidence of Christian millenarism, to direct our attention to the whole range of elements involved. Were the external political circumstances such that a closed community (strong group) with few internal social differentiations (low grid) developed? In that case we should expect that it would be attracted to millenarian traditions. In another instance it may have happened in the way that Koester portrays the formation of the Jerusalem community, i.e., a group with similar expectations banding together and constructing social forms consonant with their cosmology. In analyzing the relationships between faith structures and social structures we might do well to adopt a more dynamically neutral term than "social consequences".

Another structure that Koester analyzes is "Jesus as the Divine Man." The emphasis on Jesus as miracle worker is associated with those contexts in which the "super-apostles" operate, the miracle workers whose preaching of Christianity takes the form of demonstration of possession of similar powers:

> These successful missionaries, boasting of impressive records of their great works ("letters of recommendation"; see 2 Cor. 3:1; 5:12) and of outdoing Paul by impressive preaching and inspired interpretation of Scripture, did not preach "another gospel." Rather, they were preaching themselves, as it were (2 Cor. 4:5), for only in this fashion were they able to document the power of God . . . (218).

Koester has difficulty describing the sociological consequences of the divine man symbol:

> In general, the Hellenistic parallels show that it does not lend itself easily to the development of communal concepts . . . . In the development of Christianity we have evidence of the way in which superapostles of the divine man type abused existing communities for their own purposes (cf. Paul's battle with his opponents in 2 Cor.) (218).

With the help of group-grid analysis it might be possible to say something more about the social context in which "super-apostles" operate. In fact, it is probably the confused, unstable social context that permitted these itinerant wonderworkers to operate.

Paul found himself in a strong competitive situation whose rules he did not like. Thus while the "superapostles" appealed to their strength, to their success as attested by written testimonies from other communities, he appealed to his "weakness", to an authority which was <u>not</u> internal to him. Moreover he refused to participate in the "spoils" of the competition, i.e., he refused to partake of the material benefits although, he averred, he had every right to do so (2 Cor. 11). Douglas points out that a low grid situation breeds competition, while a highly structured social grid with fixed clear hierarchies makes competition irrelevant. Her test case for the low grid situation is the Big Man system, found especially in New Guinea, but also among Northwestern American Indian tribes and elsewhere. Characteristic of such low grid contexts is ambiguity in criteria, with success understood in terms of individual initiative. The ability of one person to accumulate whatever it is that the culture values essentially defines success. The religion associated with the system she describes as "pragmatic." (NS, 154). The personal magical effectiveness of the competitors counts for much. The "winners" in the competitions shift and group loyalty shifts too. Thus group may also tend toward the weak side of the chart. If group is strong enough, the "big men" may stabilize their own positions and maintain themselves in power by strengthening grid so that the "big men" control their own followers.

This description seems to me to have much in common with the "super-apostles" situation. The strong grid that develops between them and those they try to impress Koester describes well:

> . . . emphasis upon the supernatural elements denigrates the normal human experiences, because divine presence is not found in the common, everyday occurrences, events, actions, and tribulations of men (218).

They presented themselves as proofs of the reality of the workings of the Spirit, but that same reality was not available to their audiences. Thus, as Koester comments, "there is no continuity of faith and life with the earthly, human Jesus."[16] Although the grid is strong between the super-apostles and everyone else, the classification system of grid is low. In a sense that's all there was: the superapostles and everyone else. Only the manifestation of such powers could distinguish anyone from the rest, could give authority. Recall that a low grid context with a small, strong group structure breeds millenialism. Often concerns for group unity take the form of mechanisms to expell any pollution internal to the group, i.e., witch-hunting (see 2 Cor. 11.13 ff.). Paul treats all indulgence in personal manifestations of extraordinary power, not as unreal, but as ultimately insignificant. In Paul's understanding of the present situation, such ego-centered activities were destructive of the group solidarity to which he, as a millenarian prophet, was attracted. If the superapostles, pointing to their own power, raised themselves above the group, then Paul, boasting of his weakness, placed himself at the level of the group -- in terms of power, even lower than the group he desired to serve.

So Paul fights back with a <u>different</u> grid, a <u>different</u> classification system, a different perception of what the manifestation of power is and means. He does this, naturally, by reversing the categories of judgment utilized by his opponents.

It is important to see the over-all picture of Christianity at this point beyond the particular communal structures. The picture that we have from Bauer and those, such as Koester and Robinson, who have refined and deepened the scope and methods of his work, is of a highly diverse set of Christian communities whose inter-communal relations are indeterminate and intermittent. For apostles and superapostles, perhaps, <u>all</u> the communities are potentially their social world as they travel. That social experience is to be distinguished from that of a Christian, say an evangelist, who is located only in one given community. No matter how much Paul invokes the "body of Christ" as an image of group identification we need to recognize that the boundaries of that body are indefinite. For Paul this is especially so in that his understanding of group had changed radically as he moved out of Judaism.

At this point let me attempt an assessment of the potential uses of as sensitive a methodology as that advanced by Mary Douglas. A particular value of the work of social scientists who have learned from Marx and Durkheim is their constant reminders that symbolic systems are related to social systems. Douglas's attempt to correlate particular types of symbolic systems with corresponding types of social contexts is helpful in several ways. First, we can appreciate the balance in a human being's life process between experiences shared with others and unique experiences. We can talk about Paul as a person whose experiences are <u>comparable</u>. They may or may not be comparable to our own. That is not merely an issue of his living in a different time and space. It is also a matter of his living in social context which may be more or less similar to ours. Similarities and distinctions may be developed on the dimensions of group and grid. But we can also appreciate the <u>singularity</u> of Paul's experience in his interaction with his social context. Douglas seems to recognize that there are limitations in the net which social sciences can cast with respect to the individual. Douglas's schema, moreover, must be adapted to deal with

compleses of grids and groups. Paul interacted with Jews, Romans, different Christian communities, as we today find ourselves in a variety of group contexts with perhaps a subtle accompanying capacity to unconsciously shift our private grids.

Second, the distinctions between types of social contexts and cosmologies permits comparison between different Christian groups, e.g., Paul and his opponents, Gnostics and "orthodox" at a later point, etc. Further study along these lines may develop an understanding of the dynamics of interaction of different types of groups calling themselves "Christians". How do the interactions on the social level relate to interactions on the ideological level? Of course, in the study of the history of Christianity, these are not novel questions. It may be that the social sciences can give us tools, developed and tested in other than Christian situations. If the tools work, then we know more about the nature of Christian humanity. Its history is part of human history and the history of its spirituality is also part of the story of humanity's spirituality. For instance, under what conditions are the needs for a comprehensive ideological formulation strongly experienced? Under what conditions are such needs considered arid intellectualizing? This is a question not so much about content as about styles of communication. Moving in another direction, what do controversies about the nature of Jesus tell us about social context (NS, 17 f.)? How can we evaluate ritualism and anti-ritualism?

Finally, grid-group analysis encourages us to turn instruments on ourselves. We too have our cosmologies; our own experiences with their symbolic components are part of the structures of our scholarship. Biblical scholarship has long been aware of the "observor-effect" propounded by Heisenberg in theoretical physics. In a way the analysis of literature is the analysis of the interaction of subjectives. Grid-group analysis gives us a bit more control with its four-fold typology. In examining Paul's "cosmology", his sense of the structures that underlie all phenomena, we look at what matters to Paul, what he considers significant. But the questions we ask actually reflect our own cosmologies, what matters to us. In a way our capacity to imagine is the issue. My limits to understanding Paul involve my capacity to imagine, to identify with, an apocalyptic subjectivity. There are no methodological tools which can create in me such creative use of my consciousness. But a methodology as richly elaborated as Douglas's can help me give texture to my attempts by working at a very high level of abstraction which catches connections among the levels of experience which might not otherwise be obvious. As her own work has demonstrated, the more creative the application, the less mechanically used the tool, the richer the results.

But the remainder must be dealt with. What is the nature of those parts of consciousness that are not "socially structured"? What remains when the social ego is separated out? What needs to be fought is the tendency to reduce all consciousness not attached to the public grid to "private", or "selfish" or "insane" or "alienated". In fact such epithets are often to the point. But is that all there is? We who study the documents of the religions are in a position to be sensitive to this issue. The danger is that we swallow the cosmology and, therefore, the anthropology of the toolmaker as we use the tool. Various mystics and some philosophers tell us of a structured yet unsocialized portion of our consciousness as yet unawakened in most of us. The paths of mystical schooling often involve a de-socializing experience, an antidote to our enculturation. Does our search for tools lie in that direction too?

Let me finish with a somewhat less obscure warning. And that has to do with the tendency toward social determinism in every theorist I have come across. Even Douglas, with her awareness of the tendency and her disclaimers, is not immune.

FOOTNOTES

[1]By stressing the multilevel nature of our experience, it is my intention not to prejudge any particular level to be always determinative of any of the others. Marx's structuralism which presumes that mental and spiritual structures are reflexes (superstructures) of economic relationships within a society, and Weber's counter-demonstrations that change in religious ideological structures may bring change in economic relationships may both be accepted as partial paradigms. The point is that significant experience at any level will affect the other levels. Each case must be analyzed for its own dynamics.

[2]Integration, too, may vary with the levels. One hypothesis to be dealt with below suggests that the shaking of structures at one level will call into question structures at other levels. In society as a whole, a change in economic relations or in technology may produce changes in family structures which will generally affect the emotional climate of its members, changing the quality of human relationships over a wide range of population. On the other hand, an individual as a result of a religious experience may change his religious group, altering his whole pattern of social relations and economic relations, with all the necessary adjustments to be made at the various levels of his/her experience. This is what happened in Paul's case.

[3]One crucial problem being debated in current methodologist's battles is the conflict between those who see society as a collection of individuals who constitute it and those who see society as a whole greater than its parts, something "real" that impinges on the individual. One commentator says of Talcott Parson's The Structure of Social Action that it "views society as a voluntaristic community in which men proudly congratulate the righteousness of their sovereign decision to choose one normative order rather than another..." (Greelen, 184). The opposing view, of course, is most powerfully expressed in the holism of Emil Durkheim who comes close to positing a Jungian collective consciousness. This opposition manifests in other ways, say, in the historian's conundrum, Do heroes make history or does history make heroes? Durkheim's structures about human nature partially derive from the Marxist tradition which sees individual consciousness as a reflex of socio-economic location. On Durkheim and holism see Phillips, 37-40.

[4]Of course the alternatives are limiting as they are usually expressed in literature, for the only entities contained in the universe posited by social and/or behavioral scientists I am considering are society and individuals. The experience of an author who claims inspiration from some supra-human source and that of the prophet who disclaims any personal control over his words and actions cannot be dealt with without reduction to individual or social production. Peter Berger takes a hard line on this issue:

> If one grants the fundamental religious assumption that another reality somehow impinges or borders upon the empirical world, then these features of the sacred will be dignifies with the status of genuine "experience." Needless to say, this assumption cannot be made within a sociological or any other scientific frame of reference. In other words, the ultimate epistemological status of these reports of religious men will have to be rigorously bracketed. . . . [T]hey must be analyzed as are all other human meanings, that is, as elements of the socially constructed world (88-9).

I take Berger's position, shared alike by individualists and holists, to be a serious methodological limitation, i.e., an arbitrary limitation passed on by the toolmakers to the toolusers. To "bracket" one's personal

judgment of the epistemological status of religious experience does not necessarily entail the reductionism demanded by Berger. Some "socially constructed worlds" include structures for dealing with religious experiences attributed to supra-human powers. Without apology Berger imposes the judgment of his own cosmology on "religious" cosmologies.

[5]This raises another old issue in the voluntarism-determinism debate. Does the self-perception of free choice mean that the perceiver's choices are free? Or, as Skinner claims, are our feelings of freedom illusory? The question needs to be formulated in the other direction too. Does the self-perception that one's choices are determined mean that they are indeed determined, or is that too either an illusion or an excuse? Under what circumstances do we tend to believe our choices are free or are not free? There is another possibility to consider, and that is that we do in fact act mechanically, choose mechanically, but we have the potential for free choices. This is the position taken by some mystically based psychologies. This is hardly an all-or-nothing question, but it is usually treated as such. Lurking behind every description of, and theory about, relationships between members of a social group, is a prior set of assumptions, beliefs, biases about what a human being is. And those beliefs arise from social scientists' own histories of socialization.

[6]Although Berger suggests that all cultures categorize phenomena as "real" according to their intersubjective "objectivity", we should not ignore those cosmologies which validate the reality of dreams, of visions and other phenomena which need not and perhaps cannot be experienced intersubjectively, although they may be communally symbolized. The reality of Paul's visionary experience(s), as far as we know was not called into question, while in our own culture Paul might have been committed to an insane asylum. It is not the case that only what is, in Berger's terminology, "objectivated" is categorized as real:

> The representations of solitary fantasy offer relatively little resistance to the individual's volition. The representations of society are immensely more resistant. The individual can dream of different societies and imagine himself in various contexts. Unless he exists in solipsitic madness, he will know the difference between these fantasies and the reality of his actual life in society, which prescribes a commonly recognized context for him and imposes it upon him regardless of his wishes (Berger, 11).

Berger's image of "society" allows for too little variation, and his tools for understanding social experience lack subtledty and capacity for differentiation:

> Above all, society manifests itself by its coercive power. The final test of its objective reality is its capacity to impose itself upon the reluctance of individuals (11).

[7]Naturally the social world does not appear to us as largely a human construct. Rather it seems as "given" as the earth and sky. We are not normally aware, either, of our functions in maintaining our social worlds which we do in virtually every act of communication internally and with others as we strive to make sense of our experience and to make sense of the experiences of others. Myth and social sciences share the function of explaining where, when, how, and why social institutions develop. See Berger, especially chs. 1 and 2. See Pearce, 121 ff.

[8]In Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity, Gager has applied a variety of insights from cultural anthropology and sociology with discrimination and creativity.

[9]Cognitive dissonance theory is helpful in understanding the emphasis on missionizing in this millenarian cult awaiting the end-time. See Gager, 37-43.

[10]As in this citation, Douglas sometimes reads like a social determinist suggesting that the structures of interpersonal relationships are determinative of ideological and religious structures, a kind of sociological Marxist. She is sensitive to this issue, so that while she generally describes social environments and in her own reasoning derives cosmologies from the different types of social environments, she does not claim that she understands the precise causal connections:

> In any social context, it may be assumed that the chains of cause and effect between the structures of social interaction and cosmological and cultural systems which are supporting them are indefinitely interwoven and interdependent (CB, 53).

As Berger she does tend to see the function of cosmology, religion and other cultural products as the "supports" of patterns of social relations, which provide for the "plausibility" of any particular system. I wonder, though, whether there are times when social structures may be designed to support mental and spiritual structures, i.e., ideologies, cosmologies and belief patterns. I suspect that Paul in his dealings with social and political problems moves in that direction. Contemporary communes may also be designed initially to realize some ideological stance. The early Kibbutz movement in Israel surely worked that way.

[11]In commenting on the polemic of Aaron Cicourel against sociologists "for setting in the middle of role theory a mindless robot in place of an intelligent being" (CB, 5), Douglas comments:

> A formidable list of textbook quotations shows that our students are given a stereotype of society consisting of well-trained sheepdogs picking their way through institutional mazes. Whereas we know that many social situations are fraught with ambiguity: each individual has latitude to misroute, redirect and even reconstrue (CB, 5).

Of course, it is easy to understand a sociologist's desire to smooth out theory by standardizing the elements he or she is trying to describe in law-like ways. At this point the sociologist's paradigm of "scientific" is derived from Newtonian mechanics where an atom is an atom is an atom and where interest can focus on the various circumstances to which it is subject. But contemporary particle physics has been discovering during this century that not only are atoms different, but that the particles that constitute them are utterly mysterious and may, on principle, be beyond human understanding.

Douglas describes the structures of her understanding of the range of individual interactions with social context in this way:

> . . . the individual, not seen here as being passively acted upon by the forces of his social context, is himself part of that social environment, and he will be actively maintaining and constituting it. Any individual can interact at any level and choose to accept or reject the social pressure and prevailing cosmology in which he finds himself (CB, 53).

Again, Douglas argues against social determinism almost to the point of a thoroughgoing voluntarism. But in fact she sees as <u>part</u> of her inquiry the discovery of the line where social control and individual will meet. In many ways her major meta-categories, grid and group, arise precisely out of that question.

[12]Paul undoubtedly came from a strong group situation, given that group membership among the Jews was defined by birth or conversion, and that his own statements suggest that he willingly accepted the group constraints on his behavior, the Torah as understood by his community. As we shall see below, in his newly evolving community he tried to create a

strong group situation. He himself, however, as itinerant and an apostle who did not permanently attach himself to any particular community usually did not experience strong group control. In the Corinthian correspondence, he responded to attempts to exert such control in the form of criticism of his behavior. At the same time he tried to reinforce loyalty to the group.

[13]See below, p. 10.

[14]But the affirmation of flesh, with its appropriate set of controls located in the "body of Christ", i.e., the community of the baptized, meant that Paul had to deal with his change of group in a way that did not deny the meaningfulness of his original Jewishness. It is not surprising then that the clarity of his discussion of the place of Judaism in God's redemptive plan is less than crystalline and that the imagery of Romans 9-11 has been applied in a variety of ways. Can one be saved as a Torah-abiding Jew without being a member of the body of Christ? New Testament scholarship today is still working for understanding of Paul's thinking.

[15]Contrast that position with that of Ignatius of Antioch:

> It is not legitimate either to baptize or to hold an agape without the bishop . . . . To join with the bishop is to join the church; to separate oneself from the bishop is to separate oneself not only from the church, but from God himself (Smyrneans 8.2).

Cited by Pagels, 105. A direct comparison of Ignatius's politics with Paul's would not be useful methodologically. But to compare the later gnostic-orthodox controversy with the conflict in which Paul was embroiled in terms of grid-group analysis should be useful, especially if done in detail. Let me briefly indicate some elements of such a comparison.

Elaine Pagels contrasts the gnostic and orthodox positions on the passion, a key element in the creedal formula, and related their understanding of Jesus' fleshly and spiritual nature to their position on perhaps the most significant Christian social action in that period of persecution -- martyrdom. Douglas points out that it is a social context with a high group rating that values death for the community. The martyrs death may be the highest validation of a community under attack, reinforcing both group and grid. What Pagels found was that the devaluation of Jesus' human nature and the proportionally higher valuation of his spiritual nature corresponded to a disapproval of martyrdom. On the other hand, emphasis on the bodily resurrection reinforces the significance of the member's bodily life and makes its sacrifice to the group a supreme value, one that guarantees salvation after death. This is the position of orthodoxy which tries to create a high group situation and clarify its hierarchy, i.e., its grid or classification system.

When the experience of group is low, Douglas suggests, death loses in social significance and its sacrifice for the group is not valued. This is the Gnostic position that Pagels describes, and the corresponding understanding of the passion emphasizes the spiritual, indestructible part of the main figure. Jesus' death is devalued and the value of the martyr's death is denied. It is apparent that gnostics did tend to resist attempts of others to impose political hierarchies which clearly served as temporal powers, as agents of political control. Indeed the gnostic rejection of strong group values is consonant with its anthropology, i.e., how the gnostic interprets is personhood. Someone who has acquired or achieved gnosis is redeemed -- the group holds no power for or against the gnostic's salvation. From the growing orthodox strong group perspective the claim that the martyr has guaranteed his or her own redemption can only reinforce group values by reinforcing the public grid. It can be of no threat to the group since the successful martyr ceased to exist in a social context. But the member of the group who claims to be redeemed at a level beyond group existence and by a power not mediated by the group structures will be seen as a threat to existing power structures.

[16]See Douglas, NS, 156:

> Here is . . . the social situation. A relation of reciprocity and independence, a premise of initial equality and an actual pattern of gross inequality.

This pattern is obviously destructive of group values, values which Paul strongly supports.

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S 38a SYNOPTIC PRONOUNCEMENT STORIES: FORM AND FUNCTION

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In this short address I will be drawing a line of development fixed by two surveyor's points: the work of Rudolf Bultmann in the past and my own work in the present. I will be suggesting that this line of development may continue into the future. You will recognize that this is a considerable reduction of reality. Past, present, and future are all more complicated than this allows, and there will be some who will see the main line of progress going in quite a different direction. But the time allotted does not permit more. The time limit also requires me to limit the scope of the Gospel material to be covered: I will concentrate on the pronouncement stories or, in Bultmann's terminology, the apophthegms.

When I compare my own approach to the apophthegms with that of Bultmann, I note the following changes:

1) There is a shift from textual archaeology to a focus on the text as a form of influence in communication between persons. Bultmann wrote a History of the Synoptic Tradition. In much of his discussion of the apophthegms he was digging into the individual units of tradition, looking for an earlier substratum, or he was discussing developmental tendencies in the apophthegms as a whole or in types of apophthegms. Scholars will probably continue to discuss these questions, for on many points the evidence is not so overwhelming as to bring discussion to a close. While considering these issues, Bultmann was also pointing out formal patterns in Gospel material and suggesting the function of formal types of material in the life of the early church. His remarks about form and function were all too brief, and it would seem obvious that more work needed to be done on these matters. But the challenge of form criticism to assumptions about the historical reliability of the Gospel tradition dominated subsequent discussion, and further investigation of the form and function of apophthegms was largely neglected. It is time to press forward with this investigation of form and function.

Much depends on the context within which the question of function is raised. In the past certain assumptions about the main functions of Biblical texts have narrowed our vision. Arguing that the material goes back to the historical Jesus, we may assume that its chief function is to convey historical information about Jesus, since that is our interest. After arguing that the material is redactional, we may assume that its function is to express the Evangelist's systematic theological ideas, since we are interested in such theological ideas. Bultmann went beyond this by suggesting certain

functions relating to the church as a social group. These suggestions should be developed and corrected in the light of recent social theory. It is also helpful to think of the text's role in a communication event which is broadly defined. Someone who tells a story about Jesus is not only talking about Jesus but also to some audience for some purpose. The story may serve not only to convey instruction but also to challenge the will and awaken the imagination. It may appeal to the audience not as abstract intellects but as feeling, imagining, willing, and acting persons. The rhetoric of the synoptic unit is often important testimony to this concern to influence feelings, decisions, and actions.

Bultmann, however, had only a limited interest in the rhetoric or the literary art of synoptic tradition. He distinguished his interest in form history from an aesthetic concern with form,[1] and dismissed some formal features of texts as "ornamental."[2] He pointed to parallels to synoptic forms in non-Christian literature, but, as so often happens, could substitute parallels for explanation. The fact that a literary pattern is found in a number of places does not tell us why it is meaningful and useful. My own inclination is to press this "why?" question. Why is it said in just this way? What purposes are served and what view of the audience is implied? The fact that parallels can be found does not answer these questions, though it does suggest that our explanation needs to take account of more than one text.

My concern to understand how a text speaks not only to the mind but also to the will and the imagination does make contact with a concern of Bultmann: his emphasis on the Word of God as Anrede, personal address and challenge. However, to my knowledge, Bultmann made no attempt to relate this emphasis on personal address to the forms of the synoptic tradition. Indeed, he might resist any suggestion that God's Word is subject to literary description by human beings. The result, however, was that Bultmann discussed the function of synoptic forms apart from the theological context which was so important to him elsewhere, making it easy for subsequent scholarship to ignore any theological or religious context in discussing the function of synoptic forms. Therefore, it was an important development when Amos Wilder asked, "What modes of discourse are specially congenial to the Gospel?"[3] The insight that there is a congeniality between the Gospel and certain modes of human utterance provides a new impetus for the study of the language modes of the New Testament and points to the importance of studying the function of these language modes in a theological as well as in a sociological and literary context.

2) I am working with a different typology of apophthegms than Bultmann used. Bultmann divided the apophthegms into controversy dialogues, scholastic dialogues, and biographical apophthegms. The controversy dialogues are a clear formal type, although Bultmann included some stories that do not, in fact, follow this form. On the other hand, biographical apophthegms are a catchall class and do not consist of a single formal type. A different typology can call attention

to features of the stories neglected by Bultmann, helping us to understand the functions of the different types. I have developed this typology by considering the relationship between the two necessary parts of a pronouncement story: the stimulus and the response, that is, the situation which provokes Jesus' response and the response to that provoking situation. Pronouncement stories portray Jesus interacting with other persons, indeed, reacting to things observed or things said to him. This interaction provides the principal narrative tension and movement in the story. When we attend to this interaction, we are able to view the story as a whole and understand the relation of the parts, rather than defining types on the basis of features viewed in isolation, and we can observe common patterns of narrative tension in these stories. By this approach I am trying to take seriously the fact that a pronouncement story is a story, however brief, while Bultmann grouped the apophthegms with the tradition of the words of Jesus, rather than the narrative material, indicating that he regarded the narrative as incidental.

Approaching the stories in this way, I arrive at five main types of pronouncement stories: 1) correction stories, 2) commendation stories, 3) objection stories, 4) quest stories, and 5) inquiry stories. The objection stories correspond closely with Bultmann's controversy dialogues. There might seem to be some relation between inquiry stories and Bultmann's scholastic dialogues, but most of his examples do not belong with my inquiries. And correction, commendation, and quest stories are entirely new.[4]

3) This typology points to patterns in the stories which were overlooked by Bultmann, and these patterns suggest the rhetorical functions of these stories in communication between persons. The utterance of Jesus is placed in climactic position in the pronouncement story and is often expressed in a forceful and striking way. It is clear that Jesus' utterance is intended to make the dominant impression on the hearer or reader. But there is tension in many of these stories. Jesus speaks against resistance; he intends to bring about a change in attitude. If the readers share the challenged attitude, they, too, are challenged to change. Values and assumptions common in the world of the early church are directly or indirectly indicated in the stories so that they can be attacked by Jesus. Readers who follow the movement of the story are being asked if they can adopt or reaffirm a similar shift in attitude.[5]

In correction stories the response of Jesus corrects something observed, something stated, or an assumption behind a statement or question. Those encountered by Jesus represent certain understandings of what is right or acceptable, and Jesus corrects those understandings. The story contrasts two sets of values and opens up a choice for the reader. It contains a hidden recommendation that we adopt Jesus' view, for his word is presented as final and victorious. The story dramatizes a value conflict and encourages a shift in values on the part of the readers. Correction stories are very common in Greek literature of the Roman period, being the dominant type of pronouncement story in Diogenes Laertius' Lives

and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Lucian's Demonax, Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana, and (pseudo?)-Plutarch's Sayings of Kings and Commanders. In commendation stories Jesus commends someone or what they represent. In most cases this means that the commended person becomes a model for others to follow. It may not be so obvious that commendation involves tension and can change attitudes and value commitments. However, most synoptic commendation stories are actually hybrid stories, combining commendation and correction or commendation and an answer to an objection. These stories usually contain three parties and emphasize the contrast between two of the parties. The contrasting parties represent contrasting values and attitudes, and Jesus affirms the one while opposing the other. Here also tension may arise with values and attitudes of readers, and the movement of the story can encourage movement on the part of the readers. Objection stories contain obvious tension, for Jesus or the disciples are being attacked for something said or done, and Jesus must reply to the attack. The reply is often a forceful appeal to see the matter from a new perspective. Although many objections come from opponents of Jesus, Jesus' replies are often sufficiently radical to challenge followers as well as opponents. In quest stories the limits and movement of the story are defined by the quest of someone who encounters Jesus. The story begins by disclosing the nature of the quest and ends by telling us whether the quest is successful. Thus the quester is really the central figure of the story, though Jesus remains the figure of authority whose decisive word will determine the success of the quest. These stories also function to change attitudes on the part of hearers and readers. The stories end in a way that challenges common social values. A man who is rich, seemingly a desirable situation, fails in his quest. On the other hand, there is a surprisingly large group of quest stories which feature religious outcasts, and they are all successful. These stories present us with a gentile woman, a gentile man, a Samaritan leper, a sinful paralytic, a sinful woman, a tax collector, a condemned criminal. The negative qualities of these people are often highlighted in the story as a major obstacle to the quest, but at the end Jesus declares that they will receive what they seek. Exclusive attitudes toward such people are called in question when readers discover that these offensive people are not excluded. While the other types of pronouncement story are well represented in Greek literature of the Roman world, good examples of quest stories have been hard to find outside the Gospels.[6]

Study of the rhetoric of the climactic pronouncement is an important part of the study of pronouncement stories. The sayings of Jesus in pronouncement stories show some of the same literary patterns and tendencies as sayings outside pronouncement stories. However, we can also observe that saying and story setting are often shaped to fit each other, and sayings of a certain pattern are especially common in certain types of pronouncement stories. Bultmann noted that in controversy dialogues (my objection stories) Jesus frequently responds with a rhetorical question, a simile, or both together. Bultmann argued that this shows the similarity of the synoptic controversy dialogues with rabbinic stories. Bultmann's appeal

to rabbinic literature as the best witness to the historical setting of synoptic apophthegms is becoming questionable in the light of the findings of the pronouncement story work group, for when we restrict ourselves to tannaitic documents, the amount of comparable rabbinic material is considerably less than Bultmann supposed.[7] However, even if Bultmann's judgment were right on that score, it would not answer another question: Why are rhetorical questions and similes (or analogies) used so commonly in objection stories? What is the advantage of this type of speech? In these stories Jesus is appealing for agreement in spite of conflict. Jesus and the other party are judging the matter from different perspectives; different values and commitments are decisive in each case. We react to situations on the basis of our judgments that they are like other situations which we understand and evaluate in particular ways. Pointing out a likeness to another kind of situation which we approach differently can change our perspective on the matter. Furthermore, the rhetorical question calls for an answer; it expects an admission from the objector that a particular judgment is required in the analogous case and so may also be required in the situation causing the objection. Thus the question seeks personal involvement and decision from the objector, while a striking analogy promotes imaginative freedom from the old perspective so that the objector can adopt the new. This language appeals across a gulf by striving to awaken the imagination and provoke decision, thereby causing an important shift in perspective.

The work of Bultmann should have stimulated further explorations of the form and function of synoptic apophthegms, but this has been slow in coming. I hope that the time for such exploration is now ripe and that the new approach which I have been sketching will contribute to this exploration.

[1]Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition (4. Aufl.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958) 4. E.T. The History of the Synoptic Tradition (Rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1968) 3-4.

[2]Geschichte 73. E.T. 69-70.

[3]Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1971) 3.

[4]Fuller discussion of these types and of the synoptic texts that belong to each type may be found in my articles in a forthcoming volume of Semeia on pronouncement story and in Robert C. Tannehill, "Types and Functions of Apophthegms in the Synoptic Gospels," forthcoming in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, ed. Hildegard Temporini & Wolfgang Haase, Band II. 25.1.

[5]See Robert C. Tannehill, "Attitudinal Shift in Synoptic Pronouncement Stories," in Orientation by Disorientation: Studies in Literary Criticism and Biblical Literary Criticism

in Honor of William A. Beardslee, ed. Richard A. Spencer (Pittsburgh:Pickwick, 1980).

[6]Some possible examples are found in the articles by John Alsup and Paula Nassen Poulos in the forthcoming volume of Semeia on pronouncement story.

[7]See the article by Gary Porton in the forthcoming volume of Semeia on pronouncement story.

S 49 POLYVALENCE AND PARABLES: ANYONE CAN PLAY
A Response to J. D. Crossan's Cliffs of Fall

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A word is dead
When it is said
Some say.
I say it just
Begins to live
That day.

Emily Dickinson

John Dominic Crossan's Cliffs of Fall extends the repertoire of lively, imaginative, provocative essays he has offered to colleagues and students in the literary-critical corner of the field of biblical studies. His basic point about the power of the word--especially in parable, and more especially in the paradoxical aspects of Jesus' parables--to elicit a variety of creative responses merits affirmation. The earliest stages of that process are to be seen in the interpretation of Jesus' parables within the gospel text, or perhaps even in the editorial modification of the parables in their seemingly uninterpreted form, as in Mark 4:3-8. In the present century, biblical scholars such as Jülicher, Dodd, and Jeremias have offered influential studies of the parables. That none of these interpretations has been accepted as the last word on the subject is not a negative criticism of these scholars, but a recognition that the text of a parable stands there both to elicit interpretation and to function as a potential corrective to any proposed exegesis. At the same time--and this is a point neglected by Crossan, but to which we shall return--full, careful account must be taken of the respective cultural contexts of both the parable and its interpreter.

Crossan rightly deplores an approach to biblical texts which seeks only brute facts, with the interpreter suffering under the delusion of objectivity, assuming that the process is purely inductive. That is an important observation in an era like ours which is seeing a resurgence of literalism and of apologetic conservatism in academic high places. The author is also correct in asserting the importance of the history of the exegesis of a text for gaining perspective on its interpretation. Even more important is his insistence on the central role of human imagination in understanding and appropriating meaning from a text. Here again, Emily Dickinson's insight is apposite, though it hovers on the brink of subjectivism:

To make a prairie it takes a clover and one bee,
One clover, and a bee,
And revery.
The revery alone will do,
If bees are few.

The analysis of the Parable of the Sower which Crossan has undertaken in the second of his essays is quite thorough, and presents a plausible case. Both the refinements of his redactional assignments to editorial stages and the criteria by which those decisions are made are highly subjective, however. More

important for the argument of the book as a whole is Crossan's point of departure for the definition of parable taken from Paul Ricoeur, who discerns three ingredients in parable: narrative form, metaphorical process, and an appropriate qualifier "which insures its convergence with other forms of discourse which all point toward the meaning, Kingdom of God" (1). The third factor is, in my view, essential to interpreting a concrete parable, such as the Parable of the Sower. Yet Crossan is driven, not only to abandon the qualifier as an interpretive factor, but also to dissolve the definitional boundaries of metaphor and narrative. The consequence is to pose for this reader a quaternion of doubt and dissent, the components of which may be designated as logical, methodological, theological, and existential.

The logical difficulties emerge when Crossan's definition of metaphor builds on the notion of Jacques Derrida's philosophy of absence, which is signaled by "the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present" and by "the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience" (9). On this basis, Crossan describes metaphor as having a "void of meaning at its core" (10), and affirms that "metaphor implies lack." He sees this as leading to "a theology articulating itself by a philosophy of absence." Narrative is described as referring, not to a real or imagined world outside itself, but to "a world and reality that it itself has created."

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that analogia mentis is given priority over analogia entis. Although Descartes is not quoted, Crossan seems to be suggesting that cogito, ergo sum, which might seem to many more than adequately subjectivist, be replaced by cogito, ergo summa est. There is a consistent denial of a reference point outside of the metaphorical--or as Crossan prefers, allegorical--language. In the allegorical work of the Alexandrine tradition as represented admirably by Philo and Origen, there was a conscious and consistent acknowledgement of a dialectical movement from the scriptural narratives to the philosophically synthetic structure, with its admixture of Platonic ontology and Stoic ethics. But in Crossan's allegorical program there are no fixed reference points in history, culture, or in any other realm of human social experience. The only "rule" in hermeneutics is "aleatory," and thus wholly unpredictable, dependent on chance alone. At the heart of Crossan's semiotic enterprise there is "an ontological chasm." One may speak of world, but only as of something within language. What goes on in that world is play, Crossan's metamodel and mega-metaphor. The labyrinth in which play occurs is created by us, has no center, yet we cannot escape it. Where is it? In A. A. Milne's familiar lines, "It isn't really anywhere; it's somewhere else instead," this unconvinced reader might respond.

The methodological failure of Crossan's undertaking is the more poignant since his speaking of creating a world brings him close to a constructive solution to some of the problems he quite properly raises. It has been the great contribution of sociology of knowledge, as represented by Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckman, Peter Berger and others, to observe that personal identity is always found in a group which shares a common life-world: a network of assumptions and beliefs about reality, about values,

about the human situation and the solutions to human problems which provide a social and noetic structure within which the individuals can find meaning and identity. Luckman has called it "The Invisible Religion," although he uses religion in a broad sense to include what persons consider to be of ultimate value. Peter Berger employed the phrase, "The Sacred Canopy," under which human beings find a semblance of order in what would otherwise be a chaotic world. Hans Mol, in Identity and the Sacred, has developed this approach into a comprehensive identity theory of religion. The sociologists-of-knowledge assert that the process of ordering takes place in human minds, but they do not assume that what is ordered is self-contained within the human mind, lacking any significant reference to the world beyond the mind. The particular brand of structuralism toward which Crossan is moving or has moved, however, regards all analyzable structures as intra-cranial. Is it mere chance that Crossan, like Levi-Strauss, acknowledges his disillusionment with romanticism and his subsequent shift to structuralism? Is it the case, as Clifford Geertz has asked concerning Levi-Strauss, that a real solution to perennial problems is now being offered, or is this (in Geertz' words) "an elaborately disguised evasion necessitated by a failure" to solve them? Is this "a vain attempt to revivify a primitive faith whose moral beauty is still apparent but from which relevance and credibility have long since departed?"

In passing, Crossan refers to the work of Gerd Theissen, whose work raises scholarly consciousness about the social function of literature and the changing social context of such phenomena as miracles. Surely this approach to parables and to the wider task of New Testament interpretation has the potential for clarifying and specifying the variety of ways in which the Jesus tradition was heard and understood. But Crossan limits his analysis of the parables to form and content, ignoring the whole dimension of social function. Responsible analysis of the history of tradition must ask not merely what and how did the writers pass on the tradition, but why? Closely linked with this untapped possibility of the social function of literature is the work of Jean Piaget on structuralism, in which he concerns himself with structures as they can be observed and analyzed--literary, conceptual, social structures--with the aim of discerning how in the course of social and cultural changes the structures are transformed. Here is a vast new potential for fresh study of familiar data, which has no need of limiting its investigation to the dark recesses of the human mind under a cloud of unknowing.

The theological difficulties in Crossan's proposals are, of course, of interest only to those who do not share Derrida's longing for a retrieval of negative theology. But for one who feels responsible to seek meaning in the theological perspectives of the biblical writers, there are apparent inadequacies or outright repudiation of central biblical motifs in Crossan's essays. First, there is no doctrine of creation. Rather, there is only flight from the space-time continuum, and a retreat into the mind of the interpreter. The only world that matters is created by the mind. Corresponding to this is the absence of a doctrine of incarnation. Indeed, central to Crossan's interpretation of the Parable of the Sower is that the sower forthwith disappears after initial mention of him. That is not a chance feature, since it proves for Crossan that the text has priority over the author.

It is the more ironic that an extended part of the second essay is devoted to an aspect of the historical Jesus question, even though Crossan soon beats a hasty retreat to the "metaparable." The familiar Johannine pronouncement, ho logos sarx egeneto, has been transmuted by Crossan into ho nous logon egennesen. A corollary of the absence of creation and incarnation in anything like the traditionaal sense is the lack of a doctrine of redemption. Since reality is play, there is only the endlessly repeated game. You win some; you lose some. After all, it's only a game.

From the standpoint of the New Testament in all its diversity, a central pervasive theme is the definition of the covenant community, the people of God. Whether the imagery and tradition is political (as in David/son of David language) or strictly covenantal (as in Abraham, Israel, Last Adam language), Christian existence is always corporate. The answers given by the various writers differ, but the questions are uniform: How does one qualify for admission to the covenant people? The role of the people of God is also variously conceived; but whether it is to be the agents of reconciliation (Paul), the messengers to all the world (Matthew), or to the ends of the earth (Luke), the faithful pilgrim people awaiting access to the heavenly sanctuary (Hebrews), they are responsible as witnesses to humanity at large. Yet what we have instead in Crossan's work is an invitation to private retreat, analogous to the flight of the anchorites into the Egyptian desert, of the Byzantine monks to the caves and crevasses of Mt. Athos, of St. Simeon shinnying up his stone pillar, of the mix of flower children and anti-war radicals heading for Tibet and Nepal. Crossan warns of the perils of nihilism and narcissism, but he has fallen victim to both.

The final set of difficulties has to do with the failure to address the perennial existential questions. We have already noted that there is no provision for the question of identity, certainly not in the social dimensions which are essential to full humanity as it is understood in the biblical tradition. Neither is there any addressing the question of the meaning or purpose of human existence, individually or corporately. The nearest approach to this is the preference expressed by Crossan for texts of bliss--which involve disquieting, challenging factors--over texts of mere pleasure. The reader is not the consumer but the producer of the literary work. And the goal of the supreme form of literary art, comedy, is not to eradicate error but to glorify irrational freedom. True comedy is farce, not satire, nor is it ever in the service of a logical ideal. In Crossan's view, the Parable of the Sower, and the parables of the Kingdom of God in general, have nothing to do with cosmic purpose, or of a person's place in the fulfillment of that central strand of biblical aspiration. Parable, yes; kingdom, no.

Missing from the growth to be expected from the parabolic seed as Crossan would have us understand it are the traditional themes of alienation and reconciliation, of love and death. A moving story has been told of Emily Dickinson, the sensitive, lonely recluse of Amherst. When a beloved eight-year-old nephew died, she wrote:

> "Open the Door, open the Door, they are coming for me," was Gilbert's sweet command in delirium. Who were waiting for Him, all we possess we would give to know--Anguish at last opened it, and he ran to the little Grave at his Grandparents' feet--All this and more, though is there more? More than Love and Death? Then tell me its name!

How shall we answer Emily's--or millions of other Emilys'--question? On Crossan's assumption that "the exquisite apex of self-manifestation, the metaparable, the megametaphor, the allegory that allegorizes allegory," should we answer, "Fun and games"?

S 50 POLYVALENCE AND THE PARABLES: A CONSIDERATION OF J. D. CROSSAN'S CLIFFS OF FALL

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Those of us not asleep subdued to mark
How the cold creeps as the fire dies at length, —
How drifts are piled,
Dooryard and road ungraded,
Till even the comforting barn grows far away,
And my heart owns a doubt
Whether 'tis in us to arise with day
And save ourselves unaided.

Robert Frost, "Storm Fear"

It seems appropriate to begin a consideration of John Dominic Crossan's Cliffs of Fall: Paradox and Polyvalence in the Parables of Jesus, a book filled with reflections on metaphor, narrative, art, poetry, play, and hermeneutics, by citing Robert Frost's poem "Storm Fear". The poem's image of being caught in a blizzard, where all the familiar demarcations and distinctions of yard and field and road disappear beneath a blanket of snow and even the comforting landmarks of home territory grow distant, can stand as an apt description of the experience of reading the three essays collected in this book. While some discomfort may inevitably result when scholars trained in more traditional historical disciplines start to explore the new realms of structuralism and literary criticism, the "storm fear" that this book may induce is neither inevitable nor necessary. The direction in which Crossan is moving is probably correct and his development of parabolic paradox and the aniconicity of God are certainly insightful interpretations, but the blizzard of quotations, generalizations, and expansions of concepts that accompany his journey obscures the landscape and obliterates the path. Or, to put it less metaphorically, while Crossan's goal may be laudatory, his method is often open to question. This essay will explore two broad areas of doubt raised by Crossan's work: 1. the tendency to collapse distinctions and expand concepts into universals, and 2. the implications of connecting modern hermeneutical speculations with the historical Jesus.

Using two characteristics drawn from the writings of Paul Ricoeur and adding one of his own, Crossan attempts in the opening chapter to develop a general definition of a parable. The three elements that establish the literary genre are metaphoricity (Ricoeur's metaphorical process), narrativity (Ricoeur's narrative form), and brevity. Although the "arguments" supporting brevity consist simply of quoting two modern parable-writers who say parables ought to be brief (pp. 3-4) and one might as easily discover another parable-writer (for instance, Kafka) who thought parables need not be brief, Crossan's initial definition appears to be useful and acceptable. He then proceeds to explore metaphoricity and narrativity at greater length. Following and intensifying Ricoeur, he concludes that all language is metaphorical, for there is no possibility of language without metaphor. Metaphor

is universal and ubiquitous (p. 8). Indeed, so also is narrativity, for Crossan argues that all human existence is narrative existence (p. 13). If all language and all human existence are metaphorical and narratival, how, then, can these terms possibly define a specific literary genre? Is <u>any</u> brief human language a parable? Clearly not. What began as a possibly functional definition of a literary genre has been expanded to the point of meaninglessness. While Crossan quotes approvingly Ricoeur's point that literal language cannot be established except in contrast to metaphorical language, what Crossan does not suggest is that the same argument could be reversed: metaphor can only be recognized in contrast to the literal or non-metaphorical. If metaphor is ubiquitous, if everything is metaphor, then it is totally unrecognizable and meaningless. While it is certainly important to point out that language by its very nature resists univalence, it is also important to make distinctions between more and less metaphorical language. Crossan jumps from one extreme to the other, from literal language as the norm to all language as metaphor. Surely it is possible to affirm the basic polyvalence of language and at the same time preserve some contrasts between more and less metaphorical statements. In fact, such a median position must be worked out if metaphor is to remain a useful term. Moreover, the same arguments could be made about narrative. In losing its specificity, the ubiquitous narrative loses its functional value. The final definition of a parable that Crossan develops is not a definition at all.

Departing a bit from Ricoeur's stance, Crossan then distinguishes between parables in general and Jesus' parables in particular. In addition to metaphoricity, narrativity, and brevity, Jesus' parables are paradoxical. Paradox is Crossan's term for what Ricoeur calls the extravagant, strange, or radical elements in the parables (p. 14). However, in what sense is the term paradox identical to Ricoeur's idea of the extravagant limit-expressions of the parables? Is hyperbole always paradox? A certain arbitrariness seems to pervade Crossan's choice of the word paradox to refer to the phenomena Ricoeur is underlining. It is not at all clear that Crossan's understanding of the pervasive paradoxicality of Jesus' parables is what Ricoeur means by the extravagance of the parables. Yet again Crossan collapses distinctions between terms, and by doing so he claims to be only intensifying Ricoeur when he may, in fact, be saying something rather different.

These problems of arbitrariness, collapsing of distinctions, and expansion to universals appear in even clearer form in the final chapter of the book where Crossan is searching for a metamodel for polyvalency, that is, a model to explain the many models. The metamodel he decides upon is play. If play seems at first to be a rather arbitrary choice, Crossan justifies it by the expansion of the idea of play to include all culture and, indeed, all reality. He affirms, "Reality <u>is</u> play" (p. 76). Again, what does play expanded to include <u>all</u> culture and all reality mean? Is play an absolute beyond which there is nothing? While it may well be possible for play to be serious, from Crossan's avowedly structuralist viewpoint, would it not be necessary for play to have a binary

opposite? What, then, would not-play be? Non-reality or non-being? Play becomes in this universal sense an extremely obscure, almost meaningless term. Whatever distinction might have been present in the contrast between being playful and not being playful has been lost. Linguistic inflation, much like economic inflation, impoverishes the value of the object. In fact, milder forms of such inflation are evident throughout the book in the use of "meta-" and "mega-" terms: metamodel, metaparable, megametaphor. Linguistic inflation can be just as devastating and just as uncontrollable as economic inflation, and it needs to be watched just as carefully. In these inflated times, the best advice might be: buy only what you need and use inflated language only when absolutely necessary.

The presence of the metamodel play behind the various sign systems of reality is most clearly seen in art and comedy, where the greatest degrees of self-consciousness and self-awareness are present (pp. 87-90). Hence, language at its most playful is language at its most self-conscious, and this in turn marks the difference between "literary" language and so-called "ordinary" language. Any sharp distinction between literature and "ordinary" language is false, Crossan argues, because all language is playful; the only difference is in the degree of self-consciousness the language exhibits. While Crossan is surely right in denying any absolute distinction between "literary" and "ordinary" language, his selection of the "self-manifestation of its ludic reality" (p. 94) as the basis for the relative difference in language leads him into trouble. Since the most self-consciously playful language is the apex of literary art, Crossan determines that the most profound level of "ludic allegories" (the "paradoxical parables" of Jesus) occurs when they are "perfect mirrors of themselves" (p. 102). This most profound story, this allegory allegorizing allegory (p. 103), he terms a metaparable. Yet, is this metaparable, this parable captivated by "parabling" or allegory engrossed in allegorizing, the most profound level of language, or is it rather the most narcissistic and, perhaps, most decadent level of language? Is it language in decay, language turned in upon itself in endless self-admiration? Ironically, Crossan demonstrates this very point by appending a brief example of the kind of metaparabolic interpretation he believes is most profound:

> How well does any allegory work as an allegory for allegory itself? In The Prodigal Son, for instance, what would happen if the father is reality, the elder or dutiful son is mimesis, and the younger or prodigal son is play? Would we not have in this story an allegory of allegory and, indeed, an allegory of Western consciousness' path from mimetic to ludic realism. (p. 103)

While such an interpretation may indeed be an allegory of allegory (although why play went into a far country and had to feed swine seems a bit obscure), it is certainly closer to the banal and decadent than to the profound. Based upon this example, at least, metaparable is clearly not the "most profound and disturbing form of story" (p. 102) as Crossan claims it to be. From the human perspective one might suppose

that ludic allegory is most profound when it is mirroring, not itself, but rather the playful mind of the perceiver/ interpreter. Hence, it is not language focusing on language that disturbs but language revealing the character of its perceiver.

In just such a revelation of character the final chapter records Crossan's own steadfast commitment to following play wherever it leads him: "if once we leave the safe havens of mimesis for the dangerous seas of play, we can never escape the paradox of the perceived perceiver and the played player. So be it" (p. 86). Play, it seems, fundamentally relativizes existence. Since there is no reality apart from played reality, each player creates his/her own world and in the process is created herself/himself. The player creates the play; the play creates the player. In hermeneutics this paradoxical situation generates polyvalency and undermines any attempt to establish one "canonical" interpretation (p.102). At the end of chapter two and again in chapter three, Crossan quotes Jacques Derrida on the contrasting approaches to interpretation found in the older classical tradition and the newer structuralist view:

> The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin which is free from freeplay and from the order of the sign, and lives like an exile the necessity of interpretation. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay and tries to pass beyond man and humanism... (p. 63 and 82)

Crossan embraces the structuralist position and commits himself to the "dangerous seas of play." But does he? Does he not also succomb to "storm fear," that dread of erasing distinctions and losing comforting harbors in the seas of relativity? Does he not attempt to establish an anchor, an origin, even in the name of freeplay: the historical Jesus?

Of the 39 pages of chapter two, about 25 of them (64 percent) are involved in the detailed attempt to establish a text for the Parable of the Sower that could reasonably derive from the historical Jesus. Crossan, though not seeking the <u>ipsissima verba</u>, wants to find the <u>ipsissima structura</u> (p. 27) of Jesus' original parable. <u>But why? Certainly</u> in an essay on the history of Christianity, one would not need to justify exploring gospel material for traces of the historical Jesus. However, in the context of freeplay, the perceived perceiver, ludic allegory, and structural relativity, the quest for the historical Jesus seems incongruous at best. What is implicit in this constant reference to Jesus is a search for an origin "free from freeplay," the very opposite of Crossan's avowed intention. Is Crossan himself not convinced by his own arguments for polyvalence and therefore wants the historical Jesus to supply some normative authority for multiple interpretations? Or must all of the positive and creative values Crossan finds in modern hermeneutical theory have also been in the mind of Jesus? Crossan's attempt to show that paradox and metaparable originate with Jesus, the Paradoxical Parable of God, implicitly establishes a normative authority for them, a normative anchor in the "dangerous seas of play." Yet, in

doing so Crossan not only violates his own principles, but he also opens himself to the same injunction he quotes Kafka and Henry James directing at those who would seek authorial intention: "Give it up, give it up!" (p. 55)

In addition, the very interpretation of the parables that Crossan proposes does precisely what he says interpretations must not do: it ends the game and stops interpretation. If Jesus intended the Parable of the Sower to be a parable about "parabling" (p. 49-50), as Crossan argues, then Crossan, too, has presented a final interpretation of the parable just as other interpreters have done. Moreover, because Crossan's interpretation is plurality, the polyvalence of the parable itself cannot relativize it, and that effectively stops any further interpretation. The paradoxical nature of Jesus' parables "both generate and undermine all applications and interpretations that can be suggested" (p. 21), Crossan asserts. Thus, the paradox that the first shall be last and last, first may encourage the oppressed revolutionary to overthrow the ruling power, but once the revolutionary is in power that same paradox declares his/her inevitable fall. Yet, how can the paradoxical nature of the parables undermine Crossan's interpretation of them as paradox. Paradox cannot undermine itself and, hence, Crossan's interpretation of the parables as paradoxes stops further interpretation and ends the game. In the name of paradox and freeplay he actually presents a normative and "canonical" interpretation. If one is really willing to follow ludic semiotics and freeplay wherever they lead, one must be willing to follow them away from the attempt to create an origin, away from a reconstruction of the historical Jesus.

Moreover, the image of Jesus that Crossan paints ironically confirms his own discussion of the perceived perceiver and the played player. Jesus, for Crossan, is the ultimate parabler, the consummate literary artist whose words, acts, and deeds vividly and playfully reflect the paradoxical truth of an aniconic God and an anti-apocalyptic kingdom. And such a Jesus remarkably, but not surprisingly, mirrors Crossan's own views of reality, language, paradox, and hermeneutics. The perceiver and the perceived are one, or as Albert Schweitzer observed about seventy-five years ago: "Thus each successive epoch of theology found its own thoughts in Jesus; that was, indeed, the only way in which it could make Him live" (Quest of the Historical Jesus, p. 4).

Cliffs of Fall: Paradox and Polyvalence in the Parables of Jesus explores an exciting and fruitful new realm for biblical studies. The book is important both for its success and its failure. The goal Crossan is trying to reach is praiseworthy and the difficulties he has in reaching it are instructive to those who would follow. The new conceptual tools provided by semiotics and literary criticism can, like a new snowfall, make the old landscape of the parables appear fresh and clean and open to discovery, but the blizzard of material Crossan sometimes unleashes can transform that exciting situation into a frightening one and can cause one momentarily to doubt "whether 'tis in us to arise with day/ And save ourselves unaided." Indeed, it is, and we can.

S 51 REFLECTIONS ON JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN'S CLIFFS OF FALL: PARADOX AND POLYVALENCE IN THE PARABLES OF JESUS

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Those who have followed Dominic Crossan's remarkable surge of creativity since his In Parables in 1973 to the present will not be surprised by the three essays collected under the title Cliffs of Fall. All the now familiar Crossan characteristics are there: scriptural scholarship of the highest rank combined with charm and provocativeness; a high-risk hermeneutics united to sheer readability. Exegetes and theologians are supposed to be serious (Crossan is) but often expected to be a bit solemn (Crossan isn't). Indeed Crossan's ability to be serious about the parables of Jesus without ever becoming solemn, his ability to remain always scholarly without becoming pedantic marks his work as both rare and welcome in contemporary scholarship.

Moreover, Crossan's instructive love of literature seems to come more and more into prominence as his own work moves forward. His earlier work seemed to show a preference for the Romantics while now the great modernists (Joyce, Stevens, Kafka) and even post-modernists (Borges) hold sway. This literary shift of allegiance may prove a central clue to the hermeneutical shift that has also occurred in Crossan's work since 1973. In this volume, Crossan himself describes the shift (p. 67) as one from a "romanticist" to a "structuralist" viewpoint. I wonder, however, whether "structuralist" is really the best description for the major position of this work. In spite of the appeals to semiotics and structuralism, Crossan's basic allies, in my judgment, are, for practical literary criticism, to Stanley Fish and the later work of Roland Barthes and, for hermeneutical (or anti-hermeneutical?) theory, to Jacques Derrida's post-structuralist, indeed explicitly deconstructionist position.

I do not raise this issue of the "proper" description ("structuralist" or "deconstructionist") for Crossan's enterprise in the hope that if only we could have a clearer "label" we could discuss the several claims of these essays more deliberately. Rather I raise the issue because I believe that a major difficulty with Crossan's position at several key points in these provocative and important essays is this: It is genuinely difficult to know what the exact claim is which Crossan wants his reader to consider. A first example: Is Crossan's claim solely that the particular parable (or meta-parable?) of Sower and Seed shows "paradox and polyvalence"? Or is the claim that all the parables of Jesus do? Or is the claim that "religious" parables (like those of Jesus) show paradox and polyvalence, whereas "theological" parables (like those of the rabbinic masters) do not?

A second example of a lack of clarity on claims: In spite of Crossan's frequent usage of the terms, exactly what is the distinction between "religious" and "theological" for Crossan? He seems to hold, for example, that his concept "paradox" is identical to Ricoeur's expression for the religious-as-religious (viz., as limit-expressions) (p. 14). Yet clearly this is not the case: Paradox for both Crossan and Ricoeur (and everyone else) covers far more linguistic territory than simply the "re-

ligious," whereas "limit-expressions" for Ricoeur at least (here in the Kantian tradition) usually have a much narrower range, relating explicitly to a religious dimension to existence. My point is not, of course, to state that Ricoeur, because clearer, is correct. Rather the point is the far more modest but crucial one of noting that a reader can know exactly what counts as "religious" for Ricoeur and what counts as "theological" for him and how the two are related. I am not sure that, on the basis of this text of Crossan's at least, any reader could do the same for the crucial distinctions between "religious" and "non-religious" and the distinction between "religious" and "theological." To pose some obvious questions: Are not the rabbinical parables also "religious" in some sense? Or is the "theological," by definition for Crossan, "non-religious" (see pp. 18-19)? Are Borges and other "poets" "religious" while rabbis and theologians are not? Before a reader could accept these provocative but (for me) implausible categories, one would want to know a good deal more. One would especially want to know what exactly are Crossan's claims here on the meaning and the relationships of the religious, the non-religious, and the theological.

Allow me to give a third and final example of a difficulty in clarifying some of Crossan's claims: Is the major claim of this book this--the "polyvalence and paradox" shown to be intrinsic to the parable of Sower and Seed forces a recognition of the need for a pluralism of readings for these particular parabolic texts (as a text which becomes a parable for the process of making parables)? If that is the claim (and, on the basis of pages 25-47, this is a very defensible claim), then the discussion of the book should be on whether Crossan's interpretation of these parabolic texts of Sower and Seed succeeds--a discussion I must leave to his fellow professional exegetes who are responding at this symposium.

Or is the claim as it often seems (e.g., pp. 51-64 and especially 65-104) a much wider one: namely, that all "live" texts are in fact "polyvalent" and therefore demand a radical pluralism of readings. This wider claim is far more in keeping with Jacques Derrida's similar position of a radical indeterminacy of meaning in every "live" text and the need for a radical pluralism of readings for every such text. The fact that Derrida is the thinker most often referred to for the major warrants for the theoretical side of Crossan's hermeneutical claims (e.g., pp. 9-11, 57-58, 63-64, 68-71, 81-82) here leads me to assume that Crossan is also making the second, wider, and more theoretical claim. Indeed, even the exegesis of the parable of Sower and Seed seems more a major illustration of a more general thesis (note especially pp. 51-64) than it does as the major theoretical point of even the second (and most exegetical) essay. Surely all the extra-exegetical comments (even in the second essay, especially pp. 51-64) and overwhelmingly in the first and third essays) lead a reader to believe that the hermeneutical claims that Crossan makes do not rise or fall merely in accordance with his exegesis of the parable of the Sower and the Seed. Rather, that parable seems for him to illustrate clearly the wider case of polyvalence and paradox in language. But then, the question recurs, just how wide? in all parables? in all paradox? in all religious language? in all live language? in the "ground" of all language?

At any rate, in terms of my own limited competence, I will not presume to discuss the details of Crossan's ingenious and, for me, typically brilliant exegesis of the parable of Sower and Seed. Rather I will assume that my interpretation of Crossan's more general and more ambitious hermeneutical claim of polyvalence of meaning and the radical pluralism of readings is plausible. I will, therefore, use the limited space available to provide a brief outline of some relevant aspects of my own position on hermeneutical theory on the central question of a "pluralism" of readings. I will contrast that position, where appropriate, with what I understand to be Crossan's. This method of "clarification-through-contrast" should, I trust, allow for a more helpful conversation at the symposium itself. An initial heuristic guide to the hermeneutical differences between Crossan and myself may be stated here in terms of more familiar differences: I believe Crossan to be more in harmony with Derrida on general hermeneutical theory and with Roland Barthes (pp. 61-62) and Stanley Fish (pp. 59-60) on practical criticism. My own position is more in harmony with the Gadamer-Ricoeur (more exactly Gadamer as partly corrected by Ricoeur) position on hermeneutical theory and with Wayne Booth on practical criticism.[1]

I assume that both Crossan and I want some form of a real pluralism of readings. I assume further that we both desire some criteria of relative adequacy for eliminating "wrong" interpretations (Cliffs, pp. 49-51) and adjudicating the relative adequacies of alternative interpretations. I assume, finally, that we both agree that the larger dialogue with the entire community of competent readers is a major need for any claim to relative adequacy in interpreting the polyvalent meaning in any text in a genuinely pluralistic way. In fact, there also exists a pluralism of reading traditions whose major point of difference, as is well known, may be located on what major focus (the reader, the work, the world, or the artist) is chosen to concentrate the interpreter's attention.[2] There is also, of course, a pluralism within each "tradition" of reading.

For example, the emphasis of Gadamer's theory of interpretation based on the models of dialogue and play is analogous to but not identical with the emphasis upon the reader in the "free-play" (not the play as dialogue) model of Roland Barthes, much less the "bottomless chessboard," radically deconstructionist "free-play" model of Jacques Derrida and J. Hillis Miller and the "ludic realism" (p. 103) of Crossan. And neither their free-play model nor Gadamer's model of the "play" of dialogue is identical to the emphasis upon the response of the reader in the tradition of Horace or Philip Sidney and the classical pragmatic debates on instruction or pleasure, much less to any search for the response of the original audience. Yet every reader will recognize that all these diverse models with their common focus upon the reader's response do bear real family resemblances within the "pragmatic" (as praxis) tradition of criticism. And yet a question must be raised here. Can any theory of interpretation really do justice to the readings disclosed by alternative traditions of reading with their different foci?

The choice of the ethical word "justice" here is not inap-

propriate. As Wayne Booth has argued at length and persuasively in his development of criteria of "relative adequacy" to defend a critical pluralism of readings,[3] "justice" to alternative readings and alternative traditions of reading is incumbent upon all readers in any genuine community of inquiry (especially those, like Barthes, Derrida and Crossan, who claim polyvalence of meaning in the text.) This demand for justice is aligned by Booth to two other criteria: first, a defense of the kind of vitality that practices new and fresh readings (hence he defends some productive "violations" of the text); and second, a demand, above all, for articulated critical understandings of the text.[4] Together these three criteria seem to provide criteria of relative adequacy for a responsibly pluralistic community of readers. Booth's criteria, note, do not remove inevitable, indeed necessary conflicts. They do provide empirical tests for the presence or absence of the ideal of dialogue. They also challenge any form of critical monism--including those which monistically and paradoxically demand pluralism![5]

The question, therefore, recurs: Can the familiar dialogue-play model of hermeneutics (Gadamer) with its focus upon the reception of the text by the reader do justice to alternative traditions of readings and their distinct foci? Insofar as one accepts the expansion of the original dialogue-play model from one of Verstehen or understanding (Gadamer) to the dialectical model of understanding-explanation-understanding (Ricoeur) "justice" can, I believe, occur. For there an originary and enveloping "understanding" is internally open to every development, challenge, confirmation or transformation of that originary understanding by every legitimate method of explanation (e.g., formalist, structuralist, semiotic, and deconstructionist, etc.) as the interpreter heads through a pluralism of explanatory readings to some informed understanding of the text.[6]

This same general response provides a second line of defense against the charges of injustice, partiality or provinciality to this dialogical focus (e.g., from the "free-play" model of Barthes or Crossan). Insofar as the dialogue model expanded as the model of "understanding-explanation-understanding" functions justly, that model of play is open to learning from formalist, structuralist, semiotic, and deconstructionist explanations of how the text produces its "sense."

The debate may focus, for example, upon whether the sense of the text in the structures and signs (or even in the endless abyss of indeterminacy) does or does not also disclose a referent, a world (Cliffs, especially pp. 65-73; 101-04). On the Gadamer-Ricoeur hermeneutical model of play (and creative mimesis), it is important to recall, the referent of the text will be a referent in front of the text, not behind it (as in many forms of "psychological" or "sociological" criticism). Insofar as that latter claim holds, it follows that the "world" of the text (alternatively the vision of reality, the form of life disclosed by the text) is also countenanced, indeed demanded, by this model of reading. If that general hermeneutical principle is sound, then the referent will exist in front of the text even for those self-referential texts whose very referent is to the sense: texts like Finnegans Wake and possibly (i.e., on Crossan's reading) the parable of Sower and Seed.

Such are some of the issues at stake in the choice of a hermeneutical model based on the "play of dialogue" (Gadamer-Ricoeur) as distinct from one based on "free play" (Derrida, Barthes, and possibly Crossan). The issues are, as Crossan makes clear at several points, ontological, historical, hermeneutical and practical--and often all at once. I make no claim in these brief comments to having resolved any of them. I do claim, however, that Dominic Crossan's creative and intriguing work-in-progress would be greatly aided by further clarification and defense by him of his exact claims on these issues. So far his claims, I have suggested, seem at crucial points unclear and sometimes unsteady: in sum, badly in need of a lengthy spelling out of their character and warrants before the wider community of readers can enter more fully into the conversation they provoke. I have risked an interpretation of Crossan's "ludic model" as in fact a "free-play" hermeneutical model. I would be happy to be proven wrong here and to find that Crossan's real hermeneutical "meta-model" is in fact a "play-as-dialogue" model. The latter, in my judgment, would be more faithful to the brilliant exegetical practice of Crossan himself but not to the Derrida-like theories and the shifting hermeneutical sands both enhancing and encumbering Crossan's ongoing project of interpretation.

Notes

[1]The references are: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975); Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976). Idem., "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation" in Philosophy Today, 17, especially pp. 128-29. For myself, the major advance Ricoeur makes in Gadamer's position is to shift Gadamer's almost exclusive concentration on Verstehen to a dialectic of "understanding-explanation-understanding"--thus allow explanatory moments (structuralist, semiotic, etc.) in the general hermeneutical enterprise without abandoning the hermeneutical tradition's emphasis on understanding. For Wayne Booth's contribution to the debate sparked by such critics as Barthes, Fish, J. Hillis Miller, et al., see his valuable criteriological study, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1979), especially pp. 219-35 (for criteria). I have defended my own choice and use of Ricoeur-Gadamer (and Booth) in the forthcoming The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Seabury, 1981), chapter three.

[2]For analyses, see here M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 3-26; Giles Gunn, The Interpretation of Otherness: Literature, Religion and the American Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 58-91. It should be noted that since I interpret Crossan as in fact more "deconstructionist" than "structuralist," I have emphasized his relationship to the so-called pragmatic (or reader response) tradition. I do not thereby question, of course, the genuinely structuralist elements in Crossan's actual exegesis, but do question their dominance for his general hermeneutical position.

[3]Critical Understanding, pp. 219-35.

[4]On the basis of these criteria, Crossan's interpretation of the parable of Sower and Seed (indeed Crossan's brilliant series of works on parables) could be recognized as productive "violations" of the text even by more traditional historico-critical exegetes. Part of the fascination of Crossan's work for me (and, I suspect, for others as well) has been his move from an earlier historico-critical exegesis through a kind of romanticism hermeneutic to his present more radically pluralistic "structuralist" (in his words) or "deconstructionist" (in mind) position. On this account, Crossan clearly employs all three of the kind of criteria Booth suggests.

[5]A paradox which many "pluralists" rarely face--as Crossan does not in his monistic-pluralistic attacks on the "totalitarian univalence" (see Cliffs, p. 56).

[6]Readers of Ricoeur (n. 1) will note that I have shifted his "envelop-develop" language into the more expansive (and pluralistic) "develop, challenge, confirm or transform." Thus do I hope to show an openness from the "hermeneutical side" to the "challenge" of deconstructionism, etc., rather than an assumption that it represents merely a "development" of an enveloping hermeneutical understanding. Whether a particular interpretation represents a development of an originary understanding or a radical challenge to it depends, of course, always on the particular case, never simply on the general theory alone.

S 102 SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE CITY OF THE EARLY PRINCIPATE: STATE OF RESEARCH

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If we are to understand what life was like for a Jew or a Christian in the first two centuries, we need to know what it was like to live in a city of the early Roman Empire. Recent work has illuminated Roman urban life by studying population, social mobility, the conflict of native and Roman traditions, housing conditions and the like. Quantitative studies have clarified prices, ethnic composition of populations, and life expectancy. But "what life was like" is a matter of an individual living within a physical and social environment, reacting to family, neighbors, acquaintances, strangers, and forming opinions and attitudes about himself and his world. The most historically suggestive picture is likely to rely less on statistics than on a thorough sense of the source materials, which will often be anecdotal, and on a general interpretation of the social world as it is refracted in the individual within that world.

As it happens, in a Roman city one of the most important determinants of an individual's social world was his juridical standing: citizen or non-citizen, senator or equestrian or plebeian, freeborn or freedman or slave. Such categories had a real formative influence on a Roman's life, and status was a major factor in how a person was identified and perceived by himself and others (Hopkins 1965e:15). Status consciousness was constantly reinforced by legislation (Garnsey 1970), by economic reality (Finley 1973; Gager 1975:96-106), and by overt symbols such as distinctive dress (Reinhold 1971; Kolb 1977). Thus the senatorial and equestrian aristocracy was very rich, and influential in the administration of city and empire; the urban poor, whether freeborn or manumitted, existed on a subsistence level, dependent on the dole or on the more prosperous men who were their patrons, living in simple or squalid surroundings, and expressing political power only in demonstrations or riots; slaves generally had no power, were subject to and dependent on their masters, and may have had some growing savings with the intention of sometime obtaining their freedom.

There is, however, a difference between (juridical) rank and social status (Weaver 1967:121); there are many ways to measure social status, and an individual could be low on one or more measures of status, but high on others. A member of the senatorial aristocracy might choose to behave in a way appropriate to a slave, giving up his status for a career in the theater or the gladiatorial arena. A freedman could gain great wealth and imitate the prerogatives of the upper ranks. A slave in the imperial household might enjoy considerable administrative responsibility and hence political power.

A woman might enjoy the prestige or at least the financial resources usually reserved to a paterfamilias (Reekmans 1971). This is a phenomenon which has been called "status discrepancy" or "status dissonance," a convenient concept used for instance by Hopkins (1965e) as a basic explanation of Roman social mobility both upward and downward.

To help in understanding the individual, whether socially mobile or stationary, in relation to the social grouping(s) in which he found himself, this paper is organized as a series of profiles of the main social/juridical categories in the cities of the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries. Each category's profile includes (a) who was in it, racially and economically; (b) the relative size of the group; (c) its status symbols; (d) main sources of income; (e) what the category contributed to society, and what honors it expected; (f) the main features of daily life and life-style; (g) composition and size of families; (h) role of women; (i) characteristic values, moral standards, attitudes; (j) characteristic religious activities; and (k) two or three examples which are well documented in the source materials. Each profile is sketched in broad strokes, of course, but it may serve to bring out those parameters of social life which (like honors, expectations, attitudes) seem directly related to juridical categories, and which (like life-style and religion) do not. Also, it brings out the verities on which each category could depend, and the hopes and insecurities by which each was cheered and beset.

THE RULING CLASS

The highest class in the city of Rome and hence in the Empire as a whole was made up of two juridical "orders," the senatorial aristocracy and the "knights" or equestrian order.

Membership in the Senate was limited to freeborn men with land holdings worth at least 1,000,000 sesterces. The group was basically hereditary, although the emperors could "adlect" new members as necessary. During the first two centuries, there was a great deal of change in the membership of the senatorial order. Many of the older families died out or were executed. The new members, promoted from the ranks of wealthy equestrians, were often from outside Rome: Italy, Spain and Narbonese Gaul in the first century; Greeks, Syrians and Africans in the second (Gagé 1964; Hopkins 1965e; Earl 1967: 85-89; Barnes 1974). The class numbered only about 600 senators, along with their families, and as status symbols they wore special togas with the "wide stripe," wore special shoes, and were entitled to front seats at theater and circus. They also continued the tradition of the Republican nobility, in patronizing a special kind of art, characterized by portrait sculpture in a Hellenizing style (Bianchi Bandinelli 1970:71-105).

The equestrians were also free-born citizens, with a property requirement of 400,000 sesterces. Apparently all free men with the necessary fortune were popularly considered equestrians, although a smaller elite was particularly chosen

by the emperor to hold the special insignia of the "public horse (deLaet 1941; Crook 1967:64-65; Reinhold 1971): in the reign of Augustus there were over 1000 knights with public horse in Rome. Throughout the Empire, each city had its own group of rich men who qualified for equestrian rank: 500 are mentioned, as an unusually high number, at Gades in Spain and Patavium in Italy (Strabo III.5.3, V.1.7; MacMullen 1974:89). Insignia of equestrian rank included the right to wear a gold ring, to wear the "narrow stripe" on the toga and the purple trabea (a ceremonial parade uniform), and to sit in special seats in the rows immediately behind the senators (Kolb 1977).

Most scholars agree that the rich, of whatever formal rank, gained their fortunes through inheritance, dowry and government service (Hopkins 1965e:118) and invested chiefly in agriculture (Finley 1973:46-57; Duncan-Jones 1976) -- Duncan-Jones has even (1974:33-59) calculated the return that could be expected from viticultural investments. On the other hand, investment in urban properties (Garnsey 1976u) and in maritime trade were more important than is often thought (LeGall 1974), and aristocratic landowners had little sentimental or political attachment to a given piece of real estate, and thus sold and bought without much restraint (Rawson 1976).

These aristocrats were the men who served as the chief administrators of the Empire, as governors, procurators, military commanders. They contributed generously to the common life of the Empire, donating buildings, festivals, games and educational and alimentary endowments to provinces and cities (Harmand 1957:345-420; Duncan-Jones 1973). Their lives were full of political, judicial and ceremonial duties, with much travel on personal and official business. They owned country villas, but they lived in the cities, their great houses characterized by an atrium, a formal reception room in which the wealthy patron could be formally greeted by his retinue of clients each morning (McKay 1975:66-73). An enclosed garden often expressed the typical Roman yearning for the countryside (Grimal 1969). The household was staffed by a large familia of slaves -- Lucius Pedanius Secundus is known to have had a staff of 400 (Tacitus, Annals XIV. 43). Though exceptions are known, the immediate family tended to be rather small, with three children a seldom attained maximum (Hopkins 1965e:117-119; Balsdon 1969:82-87), and legacy hunters cultivating the wealthy childless are frequently met in the literary sources. Marriage among the upper classes tended to have political overtones, and in uncertain and shifting political conditions like those of the late Republic, many divorces and remarriages are documented. Under Augustus, laws were passed to tighten certain marriage regulations, and though marriage and divorce were still regarded as matter-of-fact arrangements, "one gets the impression that marriages were 'steadier' amongst the upper class during the Principate" (Crook 1967:98-106). Women often were married quite early, usually to considerably older men (Hopkins 1965a; Brunt 1971:136-138; den Boer 1973), a situation which produced a large number of widows. As in the late Republic, the early Empire saw an ever greater independence of women in their behavior. The gossip recorded in Tacitus, Suetonius and the satirists certainly implies a high degree of sexual freedom among upper-class ladies, and we find

them also accumulating considerable fortunes, playing at politics, and patronizing literary circles, even though the traditional skills of spinning and weaving seem still to have been part of a wife's expected image (Pomeroy 1975:149-189).

Such traditional moral values were still part of the spiritual world of many members of the traditional aristocratic families, though in many ways these values conflicted with the new order established by Augustus (Earl 1967:66-74). Many simply accommodated themselves to the new order (Syme 1958:570-580), but others resisted (MacMullen 1966:1-94). Emperors like Caligula and Nero and Domitian systematically humiliated the traditional upper classes, and threatened their very existence (Earl 1967:89; Yavetz 1969:113-118). As a result the old families inhabited a world in which their familial traditions had little place, and only the more flexible survived, along with the new families adlected to the order by the emperors. One member of such a new family, Pliny the Younger, exhibits a real pride in senatorial status and its responsibilities under the "good emperors" starting with Nerva and Trajan. Later in the second century, when the life of an aristocrat was as routine as much else in the Empire, we notice a great deal of hypochondria among the upper classes (Bowersock 1969:71-75; Dodds 1965:37-68). Other attitudes which have recently been studied are a continuing disdain for trade and commerce (Mossé 1966:25-30; Finley 1973: 41-61; Burford 1972:25-30), snobbish scorn for lower classes generally (MacMullen 1974:116-119, 138-141), a general suspicion of non-Romanized foreigners, especially Greeks (Sherwin-White 1967:83-86), and an ambivalent attitude to slaves ranging from loving kindness to suspicious and fearful cruelty (Vogt 1974; Hopkins 1978:164-171).

These values and attitudes are reflected in the religious activities of the aristocracy. Its members were prominent in the formal rites of the state religion, and were given important seats at their celebration. The traditional cult of the family lares must also have been maintained within aristocratic homes. But though we find the upper classes generally resisting such oriental innovations as the cult of Isis, there was interest in the quasi-oriental cult of the Great Mother (Vermaseren 1977:124-125) and in the healing god Asclepius (Bowersock 1969:69-71), and they shared with the emperors and the lower classes a great predilection for astrology (Hopkins 1978:231-240).

In assessing the motivating values and perceptions of the aristocracy, Pliny provides a particularly rich starting point, for he has left us a detailed record of his activities as a senator and thoughts as a gentleman: Duncan-Jones (1974: 17-32) has studied the sources and uses of his wealth, Sherwin-White (1966:69-82) his family background and political career, Bütler (1970) the social world in which he moved. Other examples are Pliny's friend the historian Tacitus, who illustrates the accommodation of a tradition-minded aristocrat to the needs of the new order (Syme 1958:521-584), or his father-in-law Cn. Julius Agricola, a provincial equestrian who rose through the ranks to be governor of Britain, and introduced Roman urbanism to that province (Earl 1967:91-93).

A somewhat more raffiné example is L. Mestrius Florus, a novus homo with pronounced antiquarian and philhellenic taste, of whom we know most from allusions in the writings of his friend Plutarch (Jones 1971:48-49).

In the other cities of Italy and the provinces, the ruling class consisted of a local aristocracy, the order of "decurions," members of the curia, the municipal equivalent of the Senate in Rome. Membership in the decurial order was also limited to the wealthy, although the specific property qualification varied with the individual community: at Comum in Cisalpine Gaul, for example, the requirement was 100,000 sesterces (Pliny, Epistles I. 19). Furthermore, certain groups were excluded by reason of moral character or undesirable occupation (Jones 1974:41). Normally the Romans made no changes in local administration in provincial cities, except that they took care to put the chief administrative power in the hands of the local wealthy aristocrats. In cities which were officially "colonies" of Rome and thus had been officially settled by a group of Roman citizens from Italy, on the other hand, the decurial order included the descendants of those Romans and also rich natives who would normally be granted Roman citizenship and (in the case of the richest) equestrian status. At Pompeii for example, which had been colonized in 80 B.C., the ruling class in the early Empire consisted of (1) local landowners whose families had been influential before the Romans arrived; (2) descendants of the original Roman colonists of 80 B.C.; and (3) a coalition of Roman citizens sent out by Augustus to assure Pompeii's loyalty. Under the later Julio-Claudians there is some evidence to suggest that magistrates were adlected from new families, which facilitated social mobility (Castrén 1975:82-111). Social mobility is also shown by the relatively high proportion of decurions in Italy who can be shown to be sons of freedmen: the percentage ranges from 33% in the commercial city of Ostia down to around 12% in Cisalpine Gaul (Gordon 1931). In Mediolanum (in Cisalpine Gaul), the aristocracy included both traditional landowners and city-dwellers of low birth who had made money in commerce (Garnsey 1976e). Farther afield in the provinces, prosopographical studies in Noricum (Zając 1973) and Galatia (Dabrowa 1975) have shown a traditional aristocracy based on agriculture which was broadened, under the influence of Romanization, to include commerce. In the African cities, analyses of the inscriptions show how the native aristocracies assumed Roman citizenship, names and values (Leglay 1960; Thompson 1968, 1969; Thébert 1973; Torelli 1973). In the Greek cities of the east, the wealthy native aristocracy held power through a hereditary council, such as the Areopagus at Athens (Jones 1974:11-19; Oliver 1970). Our most thorough study of a local decurial class in sociological perspective is that of Antioch (Liebeschuetz 1972:41-51, 101-104, 167-197), though its focus is on the later Empire.

Within a provincial city, the number of people rich enough to qualify for decurial rank was relatively small, ranging from around 30 to as many as 500, with 100 suggested as a kind of average. In the east generally, the local governing body tended to be somewhat larger than in the west

(Jones 1940:176; MacMullen 1974:90-91). Like the Senate, membership was strictly dependent on holding certain elective administrative offices, though as time went on the decurial class tended to become hereditary and little fresh blood was infused until the crisis of the third century (Jones 1940:180-181).

Members of the decurial order wore the toga praetexta and enjoyed honored seats at games and festivals, a larger share at distributions of grain and money, and exemption from certain types of punishment (Dill 1904:215; Garnsey 1970).

The sources of wealth of this class are a matter of some dispute. Rostovtzeff (1926) tended to see it as a commercial class, grown rich on trade; Finley, however, stressed (1973: 46-57) the traditional connection of the aristocracy with landholding (cf. also Jones 1974:40-41). Recent work concentrating on inscriptions from northern Italy, on the other hand (Garnsey 1976; D'Arms 1977), indicates that commercial activity was in fact a major source of the wealth of many of these decurions (cf. also Clavel/Lévêque 1971:218-219; Gordon 1931; Skydsgaard 1976). One particularly upwardly mobile group was composed of rhetoricians and sophists, who made enough money from their students to become important members of the moneyed class in the larger cities of both east and west (Bowersock 1969).

The decurions served their communities by holding municipal office and attending to day-to-day administration. They served as priests and priestesses of the city's cults, and as patrons for the official and private collegia. When a new bath had to be built, or gladiatorial games given, or a temple repaired, those expenses too normally fell to the wealthy decurions. (This was not always easy: Jones 1978:104-114 reports on the political opposition to Dio and his family in the city of Prusa when they were trying to build a stoa.) During the early principate, a sense of social responsibility, the prestige of being important, and the honors voted by a grateful community (Robert 1960) provided sufficient incentive for the wealthy to continue such contributions, called munera in the west and "liturgies" in the east. During the second century the local history of the towns begins to reveal problems; the expenses of duty eroded the wealth of the traditional families, the liturgies were made obligatory, fewer new families were able or willing to become decurions and the well-to-do began to seek ways to avoid the duty (Jones 1940:183-191; Bowersock 1969:31-42; Garnsey 1974).

Like the senators and equestrians, though on a more modest scale, the decurions lived in town, attended by a familia of slaves in large, elaborately decorated houses (Etienne 1960; McKay 1975; LaRocca/deVos 1976:28-29). Their lives, too, were full of ceremonial and administrative duties, but one assumes they needed to take relatively more time for the demands of business (Andreau 1973, 1974; Skydsgaard 1976).

A declining birth rate probably affected this group as well as the senatorial and equestrian aristocracy. This at least seems a reasonable conclusion from the relatively large

number of freedmen's sons who are documented as decurions in northern Italy (Gordon 1931) and in Athens (Oliver 1970). We do not have a specific study of the women of the decurial order: it seems likely that they enjoyed many of the same freedoms of senatorial and equestrian women, though local customs in Greek and Celtic cities may have restricted them somewhat. One very prominent decurial woman is Eumachia of Pompeii, descended from one old local family and married to a member of another, wealthy in her own right, patronness of the fullers' collegium in which capacity she donated a great meeting hall adjacent to the forum, and priestess of an important official cult of Venus (LaRocca/deVos 1976:114-115; Castrén 1975:165-166).

The moral values of the decurial order were formed mainly by their devotion to Rome (Brunt 1976). The rhetorical culture of Greece also exercised a strong influence, both in the west and in the east (Clavel/Lévêque 1971:220-222). The decurions also placed a high value on loyalty to their hometown, and they were leaders in the not always friendly rivalries between cities (Jones 1940:248-250).

These loyalties are also reflected in the religious activities of the decurions. They served as priests in the official cults, and they paid for the religious festivals (Castrén 1975:68-72).

Members of this class have left enough memorials of themselves, in elaborate tombstones, in inscriptions commemorating their generosity, and also in literature, so that we can get a rounded sense of the achievements and attitudes of individuals and families. The most detailed studies are in the late empire, such as Etienne's study (1964) of the family of Ausonius in Gaul and Liebeschuetz's (1972:1-39) of the environment of Libanius -- both present parallel impressions of the class at different ends of the Empire in the fourth century. From the early third century, the "Harvester of Mactar" has left a lengthy biographical inscription describing his patient temperament and generous attitudes in the midst of marked upward mobility (CIL VIII. 11824; MacMullen 1974:43). In the second century, there is a notable and rare example of self-consciously confessional literature in the testament of Diogenes of Oenoanda, a decurion from Asia Minor who, suffering from heart disease, was moved to erect a monument preaching the virtues of philosophical Epicureanism to his fellow townsmen. This has been examined as literature, philosophy, epigraphy and archaeology (Chilton 1971), but has not yet been analyzed with respect to his social class and his place in the social world of Oenoanda.

THE FREE-BORN PLEBS (HUMILIORES)

The ruling classes came during the principate to be known as the honestiores, the "more honorable" ones; the free-born citizens who did not qualify as honestiores were often referred to as humiliores, and this category included a wide variety of economic situations, from the relatively prosperous to the relatively poor to the truly destitute. The more

prosperous formed a kind of middle class, though we have been warned not to interpret "middle class" as a bourgeois entrepreneurial class: Finley (1973:49-50) for example maintains that the well-off merchants at Lyons, Arles and Noricum were all freedmen and foreigners. Still, freeborn merchants are known in considerable numbers from Ostia, Palmyra and Arretium, and the freeborn sons and heirs of freedmen may well have formed a group of intermediate prosperity, as did the tax collectors ("publicans" in the first century, conductores in the second) and some of the physicians, rhetoricians and teachers attested in the legal documents (Crook 1967:203-205). Among "the poor" were those like Martial and Juvenal whose families had lost their previous status and wealth and who were forced to live on the sufferance of richer patrons; this group also included such small independent businessmen as barbers, haulers, shoemakers, bakers, fullers, construction workers, and owners of small bathing establishments (Maxey 1938:10-11); such too would be the free workers in the potteries of Lezoux in Gaul (Finley 1973:74, 82). In contrast to the honestiores, who tend to identify themselves by the municipal and military offices they have held and the honors they enjoy, members of this group tend to identify themselves by occupation (e.g. CIL VI.8734-10043, 33840-33936; Bianchi Bandinelli 1970:51-71). As for the truly destitute, they were citizens lacking any particular skills, unable to compete with slave labor for most of the dirty work, unable to compete with foreign talent for most of the skilled jobs. They form the Roman mob, which has been studied by Yavetz (1958) and Brunt (1966) for the late Republic, Yavetz (1969) for the early Empire, and Mazza (1974) for the Empire in the east. All these tend to focus on the ways in which the plebs, in spite of an apparent lack of political power, was able to express itself in demonstrations, in riots and sometimes in strikes, to exercise a political influence (cf. also MacMullen 1963 and Baldwin 1964 on the strike as a form of social protest). Yavetz (1969:19-20, 33-37) analyzes the psychology of the Roman crowd, but the nature of the evidence makes it more difficult to encounter individual members of this class than individual members of the higher classes. The crowd appears in the sources as faceless and anonymous, but sometimes individuals take on names and generalized personalities as they pass through the pages of Petronius, Martial or Juvenal, to whom we owe the standard description of their preoccupations, "bread and circuses". Members of this category survived by attaching themselves to patrons, if they were lucky, from whom they might expect an occasional meal; they collected a ration of the grain dole, to which they were entitled as Roman citizens, at least to a ration sufficient for a grown man (Hands 1968:62-115); they could sometimes look to the fellow members of their collegium for help in special emergencies; and sometimes, from compulsion or habit, they had recourse to crime in the streets. They might occasionally find work as laborers in ships, shops laundries and workshops, where their temporary employment had the advantage of being cheaper than maintaining slaves (Crook 1967:192-202).

The upper classes had many ways of blocking the humiliores from upper movement (Jones 1940:172-181), and there were distinct legal discriminations against them (Garnsey 1970).

Their status was symbolized negatively, by the absence of the insignia of their superiors. Yet they provided sweat, and the potential of political support. In exchange they claimed their bread and their circuses, enjoyed the status which urban dwellers felt was an advantage over the rustics of the country, and as neighborhood groups and members of collegia they often could claim special sections at the amphitheater and some other special if exiguous honors.

Their life-style varied with their resources. The better off lived in their own houses or in relatively spacious apartments, less grand than the palazzi of the rich, but often quite comfortable (LaRocca/deVos 1976:29; Hermansen 1970; Frier 1977, 1980). The poor lived in the crowded conditions known from Juvenal's third satire and from the excavations at Ostia, in tenement-like inns and sublet rooms (Yavetz 1958; Packer 1971; Frier 1977, 1980), or else in small lofts inserted as mezzanines in the house-front shops (Etienne 1960: 92-99; McKay 1975:80-99; Skydsgaard 1976). The poorer among them had very little privacy, and tended to spend most of their time in the streets and the public spaces of the city, which were noisy but which might engender a sense of community (MacMullen 1974:62-66, 119-120). Those who had jobs no doubt spent most of the day at them, with perhaps a brief visit to the baths. Those who did not have jobs spent the day loitering around, though some (such as Martial and Juvenal's typical client) filled the morning in what they perceived as degrading attendance on patrons (Balsdon 1969:17-55). Socializing took place at the monthly meeting of a collegium, or at the baths, or at the neighborhood wine and food shops (MacMullen 1974:77-80, 86-87; Kleberg 1957; Sperber 1970; Hermansen 1974).

Within this category, child mortality must have been very high, and too many children would have been a problem to support. Various endowments, the alimenta, were directed toward helping this group raise its children (Hands 1968:108-115; Balsdon 1969:88-90). The records seem to indicate that the alimentary schemes favored boys rather than girls, and the lot of women in this group must have been at least very hard. Perhaps, because political alliances were not a factor, this class married at a somewhat later age than the upper classes (Hopkins 1965a:321-322; Brunt 1971:136-140), but in any event women will have had to do considerable work to help support themselves and their families: there are references to female shopkeepers, barbers, barmaids and prostitutes (Pomeroy 1975: 198-204).

The great gulf fixed between the rich and the poor was the significant influence shaping the values and perceptions of the plebs. MacMullen (1974:66-73, 119-120) stresses the sense of community which often developed among them, and cites passages documenting how the poor perceived the upper classes; he concludes, however, that the chance for improving one's condition was so remote that passivity, silence and deference were characteristic, while organized hostility was not (cf. also Lee 1971). As for religion, this group probably furnished enthusiastic attendants at the formal sacrifices of the state, where distributions of meat could be expected, and

they participated in the occasional devotions of the collegium to which they belonged. It is often said that they were the chief component in the membership of the mystery cults, but a real sociological analysis of such membership has not been made.

Martial is a good if atypically articulate representative of this category, dependent on the generosity of his patrons and friends, and a careful observer of the city scene all around him. Both he and Juvenal exhibit dissatisfaction with their particular status, but share, at least rhetorically, a deep respect for traditional Roman values, which they see their fellow Romans neglecting and the great numbers of oriental immigrants subverting (Sherwin-White 1967:71-76; Reekmans 1971). It is harder to find first-hand evidence of the perceptions and attitudes of those lower on the economic scale, who live below the surface of historical documentation in what White (1962:vii) called "subhistory". Some clues might be available from grave inscriptions (Lattimore 1962), but the very poor could only afford to be buried in a simple unmarked grave or in one of the grim paupers' graves on the outskirts of the city.

SLAVES

The extent to which Roman society was permeated, and its values and life-style molded, by slavery has been widely discussed (Vogt 1971; Finley 1973:62-94; Hopkins 1978). A freeborn Roman might under exceptional stress sell himself or his children into slavery, but for the most part the slaves were aliens forcibly transplanted to work in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, domestic service, management or education. Though the legal category of slave was at the bottom of the juridical order, a wide variety of status was present: from the slaves of the emperor who often had important administrative duties to the lowest chattel slave in a remote mine. Slaves came from the fringes of the empire, were sold at great emporia like Delos, and enjoyed very limited rights. Most of the slaves' names which are preserved are Greek, but this may reflect the popularity of Greek names among slave dealers and masters rather than authentic ethnic heritage (LaPiana 1927:190; Duff 1928:3-5).

The relative number of slaves within, say, Italy is difficult to demonstrate. Hopkins (1978:7, 101) guesses that at the beginning of the Empire 2,000,000 slaves lived in Roman Italy out of a total population of 5-6,000,000; this would of course include the gangs of slaves working in agriculture. Even in the cities, though, the texts seem to assume that even a relatively poor man could own a slave or two (Finley 1974: 79), and this certainly suggests a very large number of slaves.

Since the racial composition of the slaves was no different from that of the free, and since slaves were not required to wear special dress, there were no obvious badges of slavery, although troublesome individuals might have to wear iron collars identifying them as potential runaways (Hopkins

1978:121).

A slave depended on his master for his livelihood, and in turn he worked for his master or was rented out to someone else for the master's profit. Yet it was a widespread custom for masters to entrust a certain sum, the peculium, to the slave for his own business use (cf. Plutarch, Cato 21). An astute slave could increase the peculium into enough money to buy his freedom (Hopkins 1978:125-129).

Slaves, though considered "things" in Roman law, were also endowed with certain rights, and as thinking human beings were often entrusted with considerable responsibility (Crook 1967:55-60). Slaves furnished the chief management personnel on the great farms of the nobility, and they also managed industrial enterprises and small shops in the cities. Imperial slaves assigned to the palace often had important posts. Public slaves were assigned to duty cleaning sewers and aqueducts, stoking the fires in the baths and the like. Such slaves presumably lived in barracks, supervised by other slaves; there is no way to tell if they enjoyed any approximation of family life at all. Domestic slaves, on the other hand, worked as personal attendants, entertainers, seamstresses (Treggiari 1975j, 1976); they were not only part of the familia to which they belonged, but were also often given permission to form permanent couples as contubernales (Treggiari 1975f; Flory 1978; cf. Pliny, Epistles VIII. 16). Such marriages gave some stability to lives subject to the whims of others, and grave inscriptions seem to reflect a high degree of affection in such unions (Pomeroy 1975:193-204). A given urban familia might well have three times as many male slaves as female (Treggiari 1975f).

Being subject to the whim of their owner made the slaves' lives precarious, and the potential for misery was great (Hopkins 1978:118-123). Vogt (1972:103-121) has examined the personal relations between masters and those slaves who served in such nurturing capacities as nurses, tutors and physicians, a situation which presented considerable potential for conflicting perceptions of status. In fact slaves never demonstrated any class solidarity in the face of their masters; there was instead apparently a tendency to adopt many of the values of their masters, and this tendency was encouraged by the hope of manumission. The slave of a wealthy owner might well identify more completely with his master's values than with those of the destitute freeborn, who probably actually had less influence and freedom of action than a well-favored slave. In some circumstances they even enjoyed full equality with colleagues of other orders, as in the collegia where slaves could participate as full members (Gager 1975:105; Levi 1976:11). It seems, thus, that the reactions to slavery by slaves were varied. In the nature of things we have almost no first-hand evidence of the opinions of the most miserable among the class, but Štaerman (1975e, 1975s) has made an interesting attempt to analyze the Stoicism of Epictetus in terms of the humble, self-effacing values assumed during a lengthy servitude.

Štaerman has also tried to delineate a slave ideology in

the cult practices of the "oppressed classes" of Rome, arguing (1961, 1975s) that in the Empire, the slaves expressed their resistence to their status by deliberately joining cults which were as directly opposed as possible to the cults of their masters. Most research, however, seems to indicate that slaves joined their masters in family worship, were active in collegia along with the free, and served with freedmen in some official neighborhood priesthoods, albeit in inferior capacities (Bömer 1957:9-31, 98-109; Castrén 1975:72-78).

FREEDMEN

The goal of any slave's life was manumission, a kind of ultimate participation in social mobility. Manumission brought personal freedom and the special rights and duties of Roman citizenship, although the freed slave remained under certain specific obligations to his master, who now became his patron (Crook 1967:50-55), and although access to certain municipal offices and the orders of honestiores was normally prohibited. Many freedmen, especially freedmen of the imperial household, did find the way to become rich, even very rich, and to be influential in the Empire, city and municipalities (Hopkins 1978; Weaver 1972).

The Romans liberated their slaves in remarkably large numbers (Hopkins 1978:115-132 tries to explain why), and one often quoted estimate holds that 90% of the population of Rome was of servile origin (Brunt 1971:376-388); so high a figure has been doubted (Taylor 1961), but there were certainly a lot of freedmen about. Tombstones and other evidence have been used for onomastic studies of the freedman category. Thylander (1952:134-185) showed that most of the freedmen in Rome were from the east (cf. Taylor 1961). Kajanto (1968) addressed the methodological question of whether Roman citizens of foreign origin can be identified by their names, since there might be a tendency to cover a foreign origin with a genuine-sounding Roman name. The conclusion, however, was that the etymology of the cognomen can be a reasonably reliable guide in determining foreign origin, and thus of identifying its bearer's native country. He found that 80% of free-born Romans have Latin cognomina, while only about 20% of freedmen have Latin cognomina: these data are true for the cosmopolitan city of Rome; elsewhere the freed population shows about equal proportions of Latin and foreign names.

The freedman enjoyed Roman citizenship, and sometimes tried to imitate or usurp the insignia of the unattainable equestrian order (Reinhold 1971). The name of a freedman functioned as a constant symbol and reminder of his status: as a Roman citizen, he had the "three names," but instead of "son of Marcus," he was formally known as "freedman of Marcus". His praenomen and nomen gentilicum were taken from his patron, and the cognomen was usually his slave name; this will normally have been foreign, and therefore it is often possible, if the cognomen is not Roman, to assume freedman status even in the absence of the word libertus. To mute or disguise their servile background, freedmen commonly gave

their sons Roman-sounding cognomina, but this is not an infallible index: the family of the Lucilii Gamalae of Ostia for instance retained its Syrian cognomen for generations of prominent civic service (Meiggs 1960:193-194, 493-502), and others must surely have done the same.

A liberated slave's financial start came from the money earned from his peculium. Inheritances might also contribute to his wealth, and investments in business often produced enough money to buy land and begin to assume the values of the traditional aristocracy.

The chief honors that might come to a prosperous and successful freedman were service in the Augustales, an organization set up by the state and devoted to the cult of the emperor. It provided a way for a freedman to perform civic service and receive social recognition and status (Alföldy 1958; Duthoy 1974). As Augustales or seviri, rich freedmen contributed to the expenses of the cult, and they were often liable for liturgies in the municipalities. They also served as businessmen and craftsmen, and as such were important elements in the elusive Roman middle class.

The life-style of an individual freedman was of course directly related to his wealth, and his values tended to be molded by the status appropriate to his wealth or lack of it. That he was a freedman was always, however, a fact of life, and as such he had always to face a certain amount of scorn from the freeborn. At the same time, this group tends to exhibit a considerable degree of the pride of the self-made man. The typical freedman moved out of the master's house, and those of modest means must have competed with the freeborn plebs for scarce tenement housing (Yavetz 1958:511).

No studies have been made on the size of freedmen's families, and the reason is probably that the data do not really allow a specific study (cf. Flory 1978). Any children born to a slave man or woman remained in servitude to the parents' master, unless the children were specifically manumitted, and there is no evidence that this happened very regularly. But children born after manumission were free, freeborn Roman citizens with no juridical restrictions to their mobility (except in cases such as second-century Athens where councillors were expected to have three generations of free birth, Oliver 1970). The most socially mobile were the imperial freedmen, whose high status is indicated by the evidence that from the time of Claudius 66-75% of imperial freedmen married free-born women (Weaver 1972:115-136).

Masters sometimes freed a favorite slave woman in order to marry her legally, and many freedwomen may have married free men. Most freedwomen were part of the great Roman working class -- shopkeepers, artisans, domestic servants, textile workers. Some, presumably among the most destitute, were prostitutes. Some were successful in commerce and became very wealthy (Treggiari 1971; Pomeroy 1975:198-204).

The values and attitudes of the freedman category must have been as varied as the specific circumstances of

individual freed men and women. But a few generalizations may be possible, for all liberated slaves had in common the fact that to some degree the system had worked for them. They had risen from the legal status of a "thing" to that of a Roman citizen, entitled to nearly all the privileges of that citizenship, and entitled to have children who could enjoy all of them. The juridical bars to their full enjoyment of citizen rights were real ones, but their relative status as freedmen was largely dictated by the influence they could exert through their wealth. The imperial freedman, or the freedman who had invested his peculium luckily or wisely was able to become fabulously rich, and as such subject to various and contradictory attitudes: he could look down from the high status of his wealth on senators and equestrians with less land and money; but his own relatively low juridical status also demanded that he look up to these same senators and equestrians. This is a classic situation of status dissonance and is clearly sketched in the works of Petronius (Veyne 1971) and Juvenal (Reekmans 1971).

The most conspicuous religious activities of wealthy freedmen were service as Augustales and priesthoods of the neighborhood gods, the Lares Compitales (Castrén 1975:72-78). A large number of wealthy freedmen participated in the mystic rite of the taurobolium (Duthoy 1969), and freedwomen are commonly attested as priestesses in the cult of Cybele (Vermaseren 1977:106, 109).

In general, we find attitudes among the freedmen which are typical of the economic and social group to which they belong, without any particular correlation with their freed status. The nouveau riche are the best known, and the constantly cited classic example is Trimalchio in the Satyricon of Petronius who, though seen from an upper-class perspective and a character in a work of fiction, is nevertheless a plausible if exaggerated representative of a wealthy freedman's psychology. The kind of pride in individual attainment which Trimalchio embodies can perhaps best be appreciated as a phenomenon of real life if we look at the aggrandizing funeral and commercial art commissioned by this prosperous, upwardly mobile group of freedmen (Bianchi Bandinelli 1970: 51-71). An equally classic case, this time of an imperial freedman, is the father of Claudius Etruscus, manumitted by Tiberius, who quietly worked in the administration of ten emperors, controlled vast revenues and enjoyed vast power, yet is repeatedly praised in his poetic biography (Statius, Silvae III. 3) for his modesty and quiet industriousness (Weaver 1972:284-294). The moral values of less prosperous freedmen can also be sensed by a study of their epitaphs: M. Canuleius Zosimus, for instance, is praised by his patron as loyal, good-hearted, honest and skilled, and Q. Candidus Benignus is commemorated for his skill, intelligence, modesty, gentleness and kindness (Burford 1972:181-183). The very poor among the freedmen have not left any more trace than the very poor among the freeborn, except that their patrons must have continued to look after them and may have been more inclined to give them a burial place in the family tomb, and so we may have a relatively better chance to know their names.

FOREIGNERS

The texture of urban life in early imperial Rome was to a large extent determined by its cosmopolitan nature, which it owed to the presence of many non-Romanized foreigners from the Orient and other fringes of the Empire. Many of the oriental foreigners whom Juvenal despised (III. 62-65) were liberated slaves or, sometimes, their freeborn offspring. But there were also a detectable number of freeborn foreigners who migrated to Rome in search of opportunities of all sorts, summarized in Seneca's Consolatio ad Helviam 6: Greeks, Asians, Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Palestinian Jews, Africans, Gauls, Spaniards; the poor and the prosperous; beggars and commercial entrepreneurs and intellectuals (LaPiana 1927:192-198). Some individuals among them, such as St. Paul, held Roman citizenship, although it seems likely that his life-style and social environment were more influenced by the fact that he was a Jewish businessman than that he was a Roman citizen. In the suburbs of Ostia and slightly farther afield at Puteoli, the foreign traders enjoyed relatively high status among the local aristocracy. In the other cities of Italy and the provinces, there was a rich and complicated tension between the local native inhabitants and the Roman settlers or administrators; we have already discussed how the local aristocracies adopted Roman citizenship and Roman values, and were a major source for the Romanization of the provincial towns. It is not so clear that this Romanization permeated all the classes of provincial society. In Africa, for instance, the cities are enclaves of Romanization, but the native Libyan traditions persisted in the interior (Pflaum 1973). Deman contends, on the other hand, that in Gaul the countryside was as thoroughly Romanized as the cities, and that Romanization affected all classes of society (Deman 1968 and his comments on the paper by Pflaum 1973:68-69). In the eastern part of the Empire, studies by Jones (1940), Cassikan (1971), Stark (1971), Rendić-Miočević (1972), Pippidi (1976) and Tresceva (1977) provide the material for an analysis and speculation about the role of any individual, native or foreign, confronted by a society varying in its proportion of Roman and indigeneous elements. (Clavel-Lévêque 1973 provides a general methodological study.) But apart from the confrontations of Romans and natives in the provincial cities, we can also find in those cities non-Roman foreigners which made them as cosmopolitan, at least superficially, as Rome itself. In several Spanish cities, for example, Greeks and orientals predominated among soldiers, slaves and freedmen (Garcia y Bellida 1959); in African cities, Greeks, Syrians, Syrophoenicians, Jews, Cappadocians and Thracians, some of them at least freeborn immigrants, have left traces (Euzennat 1971). Absolute numbers of such immigrants are beyond our reach, though clearly to someone like Juvenal there seemed to be an awful lot of them.

They were characterized, according to Juvenal, by colorful native dress, and by their foreign languages, though not all would have been conspicuous on the streets.

The foreign merchants resident in Rome and its port towns were prosperous, although some of the strain of doing

business in Italy comes through in the case of the Tyrian merchants of Puteoli, whose community had trouble paying for the maintenance of its statio, or meeting place (CIG XIV. 830). In general, such merchants were well organized, with their stationes in which to gather for business and social purposes (LaPiana 1927:249-265; Rostovtzeff 1926:158-159; Meiggs 1960:283-285; MacMullen 1974:84-85). The Greek intellectuals earned money from lecture fees and tuition charges, and were also (if we are to believe Juvenal) constantly honored guests in wealthy households. Of the poor we hear rather less, although the satirists do mention the Jewish beggars at the city gates. These foreigners contributed to society by providing the luxury goods to which Rome had become accustomed (Meiggs 1960:214-216) and by setting the intellectual standards (Bowersock 1969:26-29). In the Greek cities of the east, resident non-citizens were expected to perform liturgies even though they could not serve as magistrates (Jones 1940:175).

As to the life-style of such immigrants, we can imagine the merchants spending long hours in their stationes and socializing with each other, worshipping at one of the small shrines of their native gods. There is no information about whether or not they brought wives and families along. The Greek rhetoricians hob-nobbed with the influential and they enjoyed the most luxurious life style Rome had to offer. The poor immigrants lived in the same squalor as the freeborn poor, or perhaps in even greater squalor, in shanty-towns at the edge of the city.

It seems unlikely that many found everything they were looking for when they came to Rome; many, certainly, found misery. What effect this had on their attitudes can only be guessed, though LaPiana makes an interesting observation that aliens tended to come to Rome in ever increasing numbers during the first century B.C. and the first two centuries of the Principate; this is exactly the time when the Roman race was declining in numbers, and was thus losing the power to absorb the newcomers (LaPiana 1927:201). Thus, the foreigners comprised a conspicuous and not entirely integrated element in the life of the city, living on the Aventine (LaPiana 1927: 204-221) and in the Transtiber region (Savage 1940:26). On the other hand, the topography of the city and the power of its physical presence must have exercised a symbolic Romanizing force even on the alien elements of its population.

Literature presents some first-hand evidence of foreign immigrants' views of the city and its society. Lucian, especially in Nigrinus and De Mercede Conductis, illustrates a Greek intellectual's perceptions of life in the house of a Roman gentleman, hitting especially at the vulgarity and tastelessness of wealthy Romans (Sherwin-White 1967:62-71). A different type of example is M. Antonius Gaionas, a Syrian resident in Rome. He was apparently successful in business and directed most of his social energies toward his fellow members of the Syrian cult which met on the Janiculum (Savage 1940:37, 45-46).

THE ARMY

The army is included as one of our social categories because membership in it dictated a life-style and demeanor which were peculiar to it, even though the army was composed of members of most of our other categories. The top commands were reserved for the senatorial and equestrian aristocracy, and were simply one more kind of public service, though often a profitable one. For the lower ranks of officers and enlisted men, service in the army (which Hopkins 1978:75, 89-96 discusses briefly as one of the "structurally differentiated" institutions which developed new, particular social norms distinct from those of society as a whole) held out a realistic promise for upward mobility. It was this promise which encouraged soldiers to stay on: the centurions, for example, formed the bulk of the officer corps. When a young man of the upper orders entered the army as part of his career of public service he would be commissioned directly as a centurion. Most centurions, however, were regular legionary soldiers who had been promoted. The centurions in turn could hope for promotion to the rank of primipilaris, a select group of about 600, which carried elevation to the equestrian order and opened the way for their sons to be adlected into the Senate (Dobson 1974). Within the army, status naturally counted for nearly everything, not only in the successive ranks through which a soldier might hope to be promoted, but also between the three main divisions of the armed forces. The elite force, paid almost twice as much as the others, was the praetorian guard, stationed in Rome and nearby towns as the emperor's personal guard. Its members were recruited from Italy and the Romanized provinces near it. The praetorians, along with the urban cohorts and the vigiles, were highly visible in Rome itself. The legions were stationed throughout the empire, ready to fight, to patrol the frontiers and to maintain order in potential trouble spots. The legions were recruited from freeborn citizens, originally from Italy and the more Romanized provinces, though by the second century only 1% of the legionaries were from Italy, and local recruitment was fairly common (Forni 1974). Third were the auxiliaries, who served along with the legions. In theory they were foreigners who upon honorable discharge were granted citizenship, although there is evidence that citizens were also recruited into the auxilia on occasion (Watson 1969:11-25).

Soldiers will have been conspicuous in the cities of the Empire. Their uniforms were instant symbols of rank and status and enough soldiers were assigned to urban duty, especially in the provincial capitals, to make their presence obvious. In Rome there were perhaps 1500 praetorians, 500-1000 praetorian cavalry, 1000 or so members of the urban cohorts and 7000 vigiles assigned to police and fire-fighting duties (Watson 1969:16-20).

A soldier's regular pay apparently kept him in some comfort: Watson (1969:89-92, 97-108) gives the pay scales, from which Duncan-Jones (1974:11-12) calculates that the average legionary would need to spend only 10-20% of his salary on food. (There were in addition, however, other required expenses, for instance the need to provide one's own uniform --

Watson 1969:102-104.) In addition, special donatives, occasional opportunities for plunder and, in peacetime, extortion could supplement this. A legionary could also, after twenty years' service, expect praemia militiae as mustering-out pay. Watson (1969:147-153) calculates that in the more prosperous areas, this would probably have necessitated a more modest life-style than an individual had enjoyed as a soldier, although on the less expensive fringes of empire, a veteran could probably live very well, enjoying the produce of a small farm bought with the praemia.

The daily round of a soldier's life has been studied by Davies (1974). In order to maintain optimal devotion to soldiering, official policy prohibited marriage during active service, though individuals often took mistresses who were probably non-Romans and who were not normally eligible for citizenship when their common-law husbands were discharged. Any children born were technically illegitimate, but they received the citizenship on their father's discharge, and often entered the army too, as a family tradition (Watson 1969:133-138; Forni 1974:390).

Watson's book (1969) reconstructs in considerable detail the career of a hypothetical, typical soldier; yet except for a reporting of some complaints about boredom and high costs of living, and an account of marriage regulations, there is little to suggest the values and attitudes of the average legionary or centurion. Such a study might well be attempted, for many dedications and funerary inscriptions survive which could tell of the hopes, fears, loves and hates of individual soldiers.

Religion provides one set of clues. Officially, the legionaries followed a typical Roman religious calendar, with a straightforward cycle of festivals. In addition, there was a cult of the legionary standards, and dedications to Victory and Bravery are common (Watson 1969:128-132; Webster 1969:266-272). As individuals, the officers were especially devoted to the cult of Mithras, with its endurance trials and elaborate hierarchy. The lower ranks were apparently more devoted to the cult of the Commagenean warrior-god Dolichenus (Watson 1969: 132-133).

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CONTACTS

In each of these categories we have been able to notice some opportunity for social mobility. Upward mobility was available to an equestrian or a provincial decurion who was adlected by the emperor to the senatorial order; to slaves who were manumitted and had luck and good entrepreneurial instincts, especially members of the emperor's familia (Weaver 1967, 1972); and to those with access to a "structurally differentiated" institution such as the army, education or the law (Hopkins 1978:74-95). There is also a corresponding downward mobility, caused by the consumption of aristocratic wealth through dissipation or an excessive burden of liturgies, and by the low aristocratic birth rate which created plenty of room at the top (Hopkins 1965e).

There were, besides, other types of social relations in the cities of the early principate, and these final paragraphs will list the main institutions that provided a chance for individuals of different categories to come together in various types of social exchanges.

The familia of a wealthy man, for instance, included his wife, his freeborn children and their wives and children, and a large number of slaves. All shared in the religious activities of the family and in the common family burial place. On the fringes of the familia, but owing specific allegiance to it, were the manumitted freedmen and any other clients of the paterfamilias.

Outside the household, the streets and public spaces of the city provided plenty of opportunity for the categories to mix, although the honestiores managed even there to pull rank conspicuously, attended as they were by personal slaves and by clients, and often carried over the heads of the crowd in litters. Such distinctions were also emphasized in the seating arrangements at theater and circus, where the senators and knights had special seats reserved for them. Rank was slightly less important at the baths, the great public structures which must have contributed considerably to a perception of social leveling -- although even here the influential person would be distinguished by his retinue of slaves and clients (Petronius, Satyricon 27).

Taverns and inns also provided companionship, food and drink. The potential for regular companionship, in fact, called forth repeated attempts in the first century at legislation to discourage people from gathering for what might turn out to be subversive purposes (Sperber 1970; Hermansen 1974).

The collegia offered a context for small-group interaction which answered various social needs and which also occasionally invited legislation to restrain their activities and limit membership (Sherwin-White 1966:608-609); DeRobertis 1972; MacMullen 1974). On the other hand, the conviviality provided by the collegia could be seen as a channel for the social energies of the poor which might otherwise have made trouble for the authorities (Mazza 1974), and the municipalities do seem to have called on the collegial bodies to render certain civic services (Schulz-Falkenthal 1972, 1973; Cracco Ruggini 1973). Many collegia had a socially diverse composition (Jones 1974:43-46). Within the collegium, freedmen were able to hold major office and ordinary members were able to express their opinions with some hope of effectuality, one of the few places in this society where this was possible (Meiggs 1960:311-336). Some artisan collegia attracted rich patrons who wanted to benefit, perhaps, from certain exemptions from tax and liturgy enjoyed by the group (Schulz-Frankenthal 1973). The funerary associations made their chief appeal to the very poor, who could assure themselves of a decent burial only by subscribing a small amount each month to the common treasury, to which more prosperous patrons also contributed proportionately more generously. In Gaul and in Ostia the patrons tended to be members of the collegium, and to be seeking prestige through a very nearly exclusive attention to that group; in the rest of

Italy, in Africa and the Danube provinces, on the other hand, to act as a patron to a collegium was something done by important municipal personalities as just another social duty (Clemente 1972); in the Greek east and in Britain, for their part, there is little evidence of patronage in the collegia, owing to specific local conditions (Cracco Ruggini 1976).

Similar social functions were served by the religious groups -- cults of the Egyptian gods, of Mithras, of the Syrian gods and the like, which met behind closed doors for exotic rituals or formal meals, with a regular membership and an internal hierarchy. The inscriptions show that in most of these a wide range of social categories was represented. The philosophical sects were also similar, and provided group support for the individual in his convictions and commitments (DeWitt 1956).

CONCLUSION

We need to have a sense of the individual's world, shaped by his social standing, his juridical category, his hopes of advancement, his fears of disaster, his physical environment, his support groups. The sources are, of course, tantalizingly sparse, but exemplary models are available in the literature and in the other documents. These models, and a sense of the statistical data which make them plausible as representative examples, seem to provide at present our best chance for approaching that desirable but elusive goal of historical imagination, understanding what life in a city of the early principate was really like.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANRW -- Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt.
CIL -- Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
CJ -- Classical Journal.
IG -- Inscriptiones Graecae.
JRS -- Journal of Roman Studies.
VDI -- Вестник древней истории [Vestnik Drevnei Istorii].
WZH -- Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle-Wittenberg, Gesellschaftliche-Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe.

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S 103

JUDAISM IN THE GRECO-ROMAN CITY:

THE CASE OF THIRD CENTURY TIBERIAS

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In order to profitably discuss Judaism's adaption to the Greco-Roman city in the third century of the common era with a minimum of unexamined assumptions it is important to scrutinize the working assumptions about the relationship between Judaism and Hellenism. It will no longer do to take one's cue from Acts 6:1 and to assume that Hebrew and Hellenist are contrasting terms. This assumption, unfortunately, has been reinforced by the Second Book of Maccabees which described the Maccabean war as a defense of Judaism against the onslaught of Hellenism. Subsequent reinforcement for this assumed antithesis derived from the Pauline and patristic contrast between "Jew" and "Greek."

A significant corrective to this approach has been suggested by M. Hengel. Although the title of the work is Judaism and Hellenism, the author's assumption is that "From about the middle of the third century BC all Judaism must really be designated 'Hellenistic Judaism' in the strict sense." (1) Even Hengel, however, goes on to discuss the relationship between Palestinian Judaism and Hellenism under the chapter heading, "The Encounter and Conflict between Palestinian Judaism and the Spirit of the Hellenistic Age," (2) as if it were an either/or proposition

Another way of illustrating the problem of discussing Judaism and Hellenism is through J. Charlesworth's critique of D. Flusser's recent essay on "Paganism in Palestine." (3) Flusser wisely discussed paganism rather than Hellenism since receptivity to some aspects of Hellenism could go hand in hand with opposition to paganism. Flusser showed convincingly that "paganism and Judaism co-existed in the Land of Israel in the Hellenistic and Roman periods." Flusser then goes on to argue that "the Jewish People in Palestine ...(were)... immune to the attractions of ... paganism" and that Judaism did not feel "the impact of paganism as a living religion." Charlesworth, on the other hand, believes that his study has shown the opposite, namely, that "Paganism, at least via astrology, had become attractive to , and made an impression upon, numerous Jews during the Hellenistic and Roman periods." (4)

Charlesworth demonstrated in his study how pervasive astrology was in Jewish circles. That in itself, however, does not prove that "paganism ... had become attractive to ... numerous Jews" anymore than going to a psychiatrist proves the attractiveness of Freud's metaphysical assumptions.

The question is whether astrology at the time of its spread in Jewish circles was considered pagan. That is, did the appeal to astrology provoke any religious dissonance? Charlesworth himself wrote, "From earliest times the Jews have demonstrated a brilliance for borrowing symbols and reminting them in line with older intrinsic traditions." He also noted

that "most probably would have thought there was no inconsistency or problem with being at the the same time both a devout Jew and a confirmed believer in astrology." (6) As is known from both rabbinic literature and Medieval Judaism, there were Jews who sensed no conflict between monotheism and astrology. The presence of astrological beliefs among some Jews, once the blatant idolatrous elements are extracted, may just signify Jewish participation in the credible intellectual currents of the day. It no more attests to the incursions of paganism in any self-conscious religious sense than acceptance of the principles of physics or psychiatry need express any specific religious position today.(7)

A case in point is the rabbinic treatment of magical practices which worked as medical remedies. Both in Palestine and Babylonia, rabbis declared that what served as a remedy is not forbidden on account of the ways of the Amorite. (8) In other words, a common medical remedy was permissible notwithstanding its origins in magical practice. (9)

All this only underscores the need for proper models in grasping the relationship between Hellenism and Palestinian Judaism. To avoid some of the above misunderstandings, I would suggest two alternative models to the antithesis thesis. The first, which has been alluded to above, is to understand the encounter between Hellenism and Palestinian Judaism as that between modernism and traditional cultures. (10) The question then becomes how do traditional cultures appropriate modernity? Asking the question in this manner can help avoid postulating nonexisting antitheses.

In adopting this model we must avoid the dichotomies which have prevailed in sociological thought up until recently It used to be that the bias for modernity and against tradition allowed sociologists to postulate antitheses which echo, indeed may have been the origin of, some of the traditional distinctions between Hellenism and Judaism which inform much of Hengel's analysis. (11)

S. N. Eisenstadt wrote about these false antitheses in his article, "Intellectuals and Tradition." (12) He says that traditional sociology held the following picture:

> ... traditional society was generally depicted as a static one with little differentiation of specialization with a low level of urbanization and of literacy. Modern society was seen as having very high levels of differentiation, or urbanization, with literacy and exposure to the mass media being commonplace. In the political realm, traditional society was represented as being based on a traditional elite ruling by virtue of some Mandate of Heaven, while modern society was seen as being based on wide participation of broader strata of the population who did not accept the traditional legitimation of the rulers and who held those rulers accountable in terms of secular values and efficiency. Above all traditional society was conceived as society bound by the cultural horizons set by its tradition, while

modern society was seen as culturally dynamic, oriented to change and innovation. (13)

These dichotomies have partially broken down by the recognition that traditional societies and change are not mutually exclusive. Eisenstadt went on to explain how great variety and changeability have been rediscovered in traditional societies. More and more tradition has been seen, he says, "not simply as an obstacle to change, but as an essential framework for creativity," indeed, "a framework without which cultural creativity is impossible." (14) "And paradoxically," wrote Eisenstadt elsewhere, (15) "in many countries modernization has been successfully undertaken under the aegis of traditional symbols and by traditional elites."

Another model for grasping the relationship between Hellenism and Palestinian Judaism is that of one between an imperialistic colonial power and a conquered but proud traditional culture. An illuminating example is the relationship between England and India; (16) the parallels being Rome/England, Palestine/India, and Hellenism/European culture. Careful use of such a model can avert several misunderstandings. Knowledge of the Indian situation will avoid drawing automatic connections between political opposition to imperial rule and cultural opposition. It will also illustrate the degrees to which a conquered religious culture can accomodate to the culture of the ruling religion without feeling it has compromised its integrity. Moreover, the Indian situation illustrates different crystallizations of accomodation over a span of several hundred years. What may be considered dissonant at the inception of the accomodation process may not be considered so two centuries later. Finally, it evinces how contemporaries can disagree in their evaluation of the presence of the imperial power without having aspersions cast on their religio-cultural loyalty. Two examples will illustrate this for our case. In the second century several rabbis are portrayed as disagreeing on the value of Roman construction of markets, bridges, and bathhouses. (17) In another case of the third century, one rabbi charged Rome with robbing and extorting under the facade of legality while his contemporary praised Rome for taking up the causes of men. (18) Neither of these disagreements can be used to measure degrees of hellenization. They only illustrate various responses of a conquered people to an imperial power.

An example of accomodation can be taken from the stadium of Tiberias. (19) The tannaitic Sifra, which probably is preserving an earlier than second century CE interpretation, explained the meaning of Nor shall you follow their customs, to prohibit the adoption of theaters, circuses and stadiums. (20) On the other hand, the Palestinian Talmud records two, apparently, third century rabbis strolling in the environs of the stadium of Tiberias. (21) Apparently, by the third century the stadium of Tiberias had been "domesticated" and was no longer considered a religious threat. This situation is to be constrasted with the attitude toward objects of idolatry which in Tiberias were ordered destroyed by the major rabbinic figure of the city. (22)

The art-work discovered in the synagogue of Hammat-Tiberias is an excellent example of this process of accomodation. A debate rages among scholars whether the depiction of Helios, the sun-god, on his horse-drawn chariot in the inner circle of the zodiac of the mosaic is an idolatrous symbol or naught but a representation of contemporary artistic convention. In my opinion, it is more important to ask how did the rabbis understand a symbol which elsewhere bore such a pagan valence. In this case, it seems that the rabbis "domesticated" the motif once it became a staple of synagogue art. In a source, cited in the name of a third century Tiberean, the symbol is apparently understood as reflecting the Shekhinah surrounded by all the symbols of the zodiac as the ancient Tent of Meeting was surrounded by the twelve tribes. (23)

It is also important to ascertain how the sun and the zodiac became symbols in synagogue art. Possibly, the commissioned artist just drew upon the artistic conventions of the day. It is more likely that synagogues, as evidenced by the dedicatory inscriptions, were built by people of means who followed their aesthetic taste which itself was informed by the aesthetic standards of those of means throughout the empire who were in a position to commission works of art. As mentioned above, there is good reason to believe that the zodiac was no longer considered religiously offensive by many Jews. And the sun had a long and rich tradition in hellenistic literature of being compared with God. (24) Moreover, the influence of philosophical monotheism symbolised by the worship of the sun symbol reached a new high in the third century in the worship of Sol Invictus under the aegis of the emperor Aurelian. It can therefore be argued that the Shekhinah-Helios symbol is part of a Greco-Roman cultural trend which included an Apollo-Helios motif in Greek pagan literature and a Christ-Helios one in Christian literature.

The assumption behind such as explanation is that just as third century wealthy Tibereans took part in "international" trade they became subject to "international" culture in so far as it was not blatantly idolatrous, that is, religiously dissonant. (25)

The presumption that Tiberias was a Greco-Roman city derives from the fact of it being founded by Herod Antipas and named after an emperor. Also the tetrarch Herod had his palace erected there along with decorated animal representations. The city was for a period in the first century under direct Roman rule. Apparently, under Hadrian its government was entrusted to pagans. The period of Gentile control probably occasions the appearance of pagan emblems on its coinage and the construction of the Hadrianeum. In addition, the internal political institutions include a βουλε, ἄρχον and ἀγορανομος.

By mentioning the above, there is no intimation of any diminution of the Jewishness of this almost exclusively Jewish city. My point is to underscore that much of what is considered "hellenism" by modern scholars was by the first century of the common era not considered an alien threatening culture, but rather the cultural matrix of contemporary life in which

all urban dwellers more or less participated. Nonetheless, we must be careful of making unwarranted inferences from this involvement in contemporary culture. The same city which so equivocated about joining Jerusalem in the revolt against Rome was some thirty years earlier unequivocal in its readiness to accept martyrdom at the hands of the Roman legate Petronius rather than countenance the erection of a statue in Jerusalem.

The complexity of the situation is further illustrated by Justus of Tiberias. Justus came from a respected Tiberean family. His father bore the Greek name Pistus. Josephus tells us that Justus' knowledge of Greek exceeded his own, yet Josephus charged him with being a sworn enemy of the Romans and an associate of the Zealots trying to draw Tiberias into the revolt against Roman rule. Thus Justus illustrates well the lack of correlation between participation in hellenistic culture and opposition to Roman rule.

Although some concede considerable cultural interaction prior to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 CE, they argue for a subsequent cultural withdrawal. It is not clear what is meant by this judgment. Does it suggest that signs of participation in Greco-Roman culture decreased drastically, or that the rise of rabbinic Judaism entailed a withdrawal from the political sphere into the academic one?

Neither of these two contentions can be supported by the evidence.

From the inscriptions found in the environs of Tiberias, Greek, apparently, was a significant medium of communication into the third and fourth centuries. It has been suggested that Greek influence was flowing from the north as evidenced by its effect on Galilean Aramaic. This coheres with the findings of material culture such as coins and pottery which indicate a northern economic orientation. Apparently, cultural influences went hand in hand with commercial links, both of which traveled the road system, the main branch of which leads from Damascus to Tiberias intersecting the heart of the lower Galilee.

In addition, the Patriarchate which moved into Tiberias about the mid-third century was known for its pro-Greek bias as opposed to Aramaic, which, based on the recovered inscriptions, was the other major medium of communication in Tiberias. But it was not only the Patriarchate which reflected knowledge of Greek. In the recorded statements of R. Yohanan, the head of the Tiberean academy, there have been found over two hundred and fifty Greek and Latin borrowings including signs of technical Roman legal terms. Even his colleague-disciple, R. Eleazar, who was raised in Babylonia, was capable of using the Greek expression παρὰ βασιλέως ὁ νόμος ἄγραφος to underscore that God in contrast to the emperor does obey His laws. Of course, scholars have noted the extensive use of Greek borrowings in rabbinic literature. The point here is the extent of its use in Tiberias by the rabbinic head and even a Babylonian emigre.

A host of Greco-Roman terms are used in rabbinic literature to refer to many of the sites of Tiberias. The city was protected by a three-sided wall. On the west side in the direction of Bet Maon, there stood a glassworks (ὕαλος) or a grove of trees (ἄλσος). Next to it was a pottery works, a large stadium (στάδιον) adjacent to which protruded a platform called a πῆγμα which may have functioned as a spectator's bleachers, and lastly there was the Mausoleum of Sirikios. Within the walls lay the palatial castra, columnae or stoa, a castellum, and a boule fronted by a statue possibly of Herod. Even the crooked way into the city was called by its Greek equivalent πρόσοδος as the entrance was referred to as πύλῶν.

The most telling evidence that a denizen of the Greco-Roman world would feel at home in Tiberias was the centrality of the bathhouses and springs of Tiberias. The springs merited mention by the Mishnah, by Josephus, by Pliny, and by Solinus. This widespread notice probably attests to their wide-spread clientele. Indeed, some coins of Tiberias bear the emblem of Hygeia, goddess of health. Such emblems undoubtedly served to advertise the medicinal value of the springs.

It is not without significance that rabbinic literature dicusses this typical Roman institution mainly in Greek terms. The bathing places are called by their Greek terms (ἐμβατεια, δημόσιον, βαλανεῖον). The term for bathing attendant is βαλανευς ; bathing garments are called βανιάρια or βαλνιαρτα . The cashier is θερμοσάριος and the cloakroom attendant is ὀλεάριος . The towel for drying is λέντιον and the water pipe was called σωλήν while μιλιᾶριον and possibly ὀντράχιον are used for water heating instruments. Finally, the furnace room was called κάμινος . One of the bathhouses was even named after the Three Graces τρεῖς χάριτες . Indeed, apparently, the demon of the bathhouse was called by his Greek name ἀρωγοναύτης

None of this seemed to have fazed the rabbis. Rabbinic literature records every generation of rabbis, from that of Yavneh through the fourth century, frequenting these spots. Indeed, R. Simeon b. Yoḥai was said to have purified the city on their account. A century later, R. Yohanan held that one graced a city by constructing for it a bathhouse.

The second contention mentioned above that rabbinic Judaism withdrew from politics into the academy sealing themselves off from contemporary currents is just as open to question. Can one speak of a rabbinic withdrawal without speaking of a Jewish withdrawal in general? The rabbis were not a caste cut off from Jewish society. On the contrary, they were recruited from every station and region of society. Among the rabbis could be found priest and layman, rich and poor, artisan and farmer, laborer and proprietor. Study in the academy did not isolate them either: they are found teaching in the streets, preaching in the synagogues, examining the educational situation throughout the country, taking positions in distant towns, encouraging the submission of cases to their courts, and inviting all to partake of the life of the academy.

Rabbinic religion was unique in its effort to raise the religious endowment of the average person to its own level of virtuosity thereby making a significant impact on social reality.

The misleading impression of rabbinic withdrawal may be a result of the destruction of their power base with the destruction of Jerusalem. What ensued was not a withdrawal from politics as such, but a diminution of their impact politically. The mere fact that following the destruction of the Temple, the rabbis immediately tried to legitimate their court at Yavneh as the religio-political equivalent of the venerable court of Jerusalem reflects a desire to maintain political status, that is, to maintain institutions which control, or at least influence social reality. The problem was the absence of a significant geo-political base from which to launch operations. After the destruction of Jerusalem and even more after the failure of the Bar Cochba revolt, one could not affect the centers of Jewish population, wealth, and status such as the urban centers of the Galilee without extensive organization, influence, and power. In the absence of modern media, geographical proximity can be decisive, especially in the absence of coercive power. There was no hope of imposing demands in Tiberias and Sepphoris from a small insignificant coastal town in the south such as Yavneh. If Josephus representing the revolutionary council of Jerusalem and R. Yohanan b. Zakkai possibly representing the Pharisees encountered difficulty persuading Galilee to heed them before the war, how much more so would the rabbis of Yavneh, bereft of a political base, at a time, with Jerusalem in ruins, the urban centers of Galilee were growing in prominence, have difficulty.

It is not coincidental that the Nasi, R. Judah, who solidified Roman backing and represented the Patriarchate's political apogee, is the one who moved the Patriarchate from Bet Shearim to Sepphoris. Heretofore, the Nasi and his court had been located in relatively insignificant towns starting with Yavneh and Usha and then Shefaram and Bet Shearim. Under the prescient leadership of R. Judah, the rabbinic hierarchy moved into the wealthy, large, and politically significant Sepphoris. R. Judah realized that if the Patriarchate was to extend its influence throughout Palestine it needed the semblance of power which provincials derived from association with the Roman authorities. Moreover, chances for co-opting the Jewish municipal aristocracy and land-owning class were best in Sepphoris. By so co-opting the alternative power centers, R. Judah turned the Patriarchate into the recognized judicial institution of third century Palestine.

But patriarchal power does not automatically entail rabbinic power. The mere fact that the rabbis reprimanded the Nasi for appointing unqualified wealthy men to judicial positions shows that the rabbis were not getting these positions and that the judges were not all adjudicating by rabbinic law.

By the middle of the third century, after the Patriarchate had moved from Sepphoris to Tiberias, rabbinic power apparently was solidified in an alliance with the Patriarchate

and the urban aristocracy. This occurred under the new Nasi, R. Judah Neseah, his namesake's grandson, and the head of the Tiberean rabbinic academy R. Yohanan who seems to have played a role in the Nasi's administration.

The political benefits that accrued to the rabbis through such an alliance were the appointment to municipal positions - some as part of the patriarchal administrative bureaucracy - financial or allimentary support from the Nasi, and access to the Nasi's guards to enforce their decisions.

The alliance served the interests of all parties. R. Yohanan succeeded in keeping the scholarly class under the patronage of the Nasi, and the Nasi, in turn, allowed him latitude in using the authority of the Patriarchate to promote the concerns of the rabbis. This entente sheds light on many of the dicta of R. Yohanan which, on the one hand, reflect the interests of the wealthy and, on the other hand, the concerns of the scholarly class.

For the rabbis to co-opt the wealthy, as the Nasi had done, they had to show that they understood their problems and were willing to consider their perspective in their deliberations.

R. Yohanan was clearly sensitive to all these issues. He is recorded as testifying to the trustworthiness of one of the prominent landownders of Tiberias. He took into consideration the desires of their womenfolk when he issued lenient rulings with regard to wearing of jewelry and the study of Greek. He talked about how to prevent the dissipation of inherited wealth, how to enhance wealth through small cattle breeding and proper use of land investments, and how to marry into wealth.

More significant is the connection between R. Yohanan's advice to the wealthy and subsequent legal interpretations in their favor. The tendency to help the wealthy maintain their holdings is illustrated by his rulings on interest and on the purchase of futures.

R. Yohanan hoped that this alliance of business and scholarship would lead to financial support of the scholarly class including business partnerships and marriages between budding scholars and daughters of the wealthy.

In addition to these social and economic issues, R. Yohanan sided with the municipal aristocracy against Roman political directives which had deleterious economic ramifications. For example, he allowed one to petition to be released from the decurionate and its concomitant onerous tax responsibilities. If that failed, he was willing to offer advice on how to escape such burdens and even went so far as to try to guarantee the safe-keeping of their landholdings in their absence.

R. Yohanan's position may have also helped him see the minimal threat posed by pagan idolatry. He argued that much of contemporary paganism was not idolatry, but cultural conservatism. He was thus able to distinguish between cult-image

and deity. Also by arguing that the impulse toward idolatry had long disappeared among the Jews, he did not have to consider pagan motifs a serious religious threat.

It is also necessary to realize that the business community which was engaged in the making and marketing of crafts would feel compelled to match contemporary aesthetic standards. This segment of the community would be clamoring for leniency with regard to decorations with pagan motifs. It is noteworthy that one such lenient ruling of R. Yohanan was transmitted by, apparently, an artisan. Easing the restrictions of Jewish economic life in general would be a boon to the commercial class.

This convergence of factors not only sheds light on why R. Yohanan did not upbraid his contemporaries for decorating synagogue walls with paintings as well as on his moderate permissiveness with regard to nullification of idolatry, but also why R. Yohanan became a leading exponent of excluding the realm of public services and the like from the stigma of idolatry, and why he allowed Jews to transact business with Gentiles on their festivals if the latter do not observe them.

Along with his program of integrating scholars into the economic structure, R. Yohanan put forth a program to produce scholars worthy of communal position. It was insufficient to inveigh against the Nasi for appointing men of means to judicial positions who were academically and morally unfit. In order to acquire "clergy" exemptions and appointments in communal administration for scholars, R. Yohanan had to upgrade the scholarly class from within. Such upgrading demanded high standards of academic achievement and of personal deportment. This effort at professionalization induced him to formulate the qualifications for judicial appointment and the proper considerations for judicial rulings. To qualify for a magistracy demonstrated competence over the full range of rabbinic law was required. As his Roman counterpart, the jurist Celsus explained, "It is improper either to give a decision or venture an opinion without taking into consideration the entire law."

Many of R. Yohanan's statements parallel Greco-Roman rhetorical and legal material. This is not surprising since the educated classes in both cultures were propounding programs for the integration of an elite-scholar bureaucracy into the administrative structure.

To accomplish this goal, R. Yohanan had to transform rabbinic academic discussion into functional law. Thus it was R. Yohanan more than anyone else who articulated the rules by which the law may be distilled from the Mishnah and its contradictions harmonized. This set in motion the process that made the Mishnah the source of binding law. Thus R. Yohanan's generation played the role that the Law of Citations played in the development of Roman Law, namely, improving the chances for uniformity and predictability of judicial sentences. Of course, the more workable the system the more cogent is its claim to normativeness.

In the light of the above developments, it is not surprising to find an upsurge of rabbinic appointments among those who studied in R. Yohanan's academy.

The alliance of the rabbinic leadership, the Patriarchate, and the urban aristocracy of Tiberias served the interests of all three. It enhanced both the status and the authority of the rabbis and conferred upon them positions through which the they promulgated their ideal of a Torah-centered existence. It facilitated the balancing act of the Patriarchate which tried to co-opt the wealth and power of the upper classes without losing the loyalty of the rabbis who provided its internal ideological legitimation. And finally, the upper classes gained from rabbinical rulings which took into consideration their specific concerns.

Such alliances were not unique to Tiberias. On the contrary, they characterized the Greco-Roman city of Late Antiquity. As P. Brown wrote in his The Making of Late Antiquity:

> Faced by tensions that were clearly pulling the local community out of shape, urban elites all over the Empire appear to have strenuously mobilized all the resources of their traditional culture, their traditional religious life, and for those who had good reason to afford it, their traditional standards of generousity in order to maintain some sense of communal solidarity.

Notes

1. Philadelphia, 1974, I, 104, see 311f.

2. Ibid., chapter three.

3. The Jewish People in the First Century, eds. S. Safrai and M. Stern, I:2, 1665-699.

4. "Jewish Astrology in the Talmud, Pseudipigrapha, the Dead Sea Scrolls and Early Palestinian Synagogues," HTR 70 (1977) 183-200, 200, n. 59.

5. Ibid., 195.

6. Ibid., 198, cf., however, S. Lieberman, Greek in Jewish Palestine (New York, 1965) 99f.

7. This agrees with the thrust of Charlesworth's own remarks and conclusion. It is only his note which elicits this comment.

8. B. Shabbat 67a; J. Shabbat 6 8c.

9. See Lieberman (n. 6) chapter four, 91-114.

10. See S. Isenberg, "Millenarism in Greco-Roman Palestine," Religion 4(1974) 26-46, 28.

11. Hengel (n. 1) 55-7.

12. Daedalus 101 (1972) 1-19.

13. Ibid., 2.

14. Ibid., 3.

15. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition," Daedalus 102 (1973) 1-27,2. See also his "Some Observations on the Dynamics of Traditions," Comparative Studies in Society and History 11,4 (1969) 451-75.

16. This example is taken from J. Goldstein, "Jewish Acceptance and Rejection of Hellenism," to be published in the series Jewish and Christian Self-Definition II, Judaism From the Maccabees to the Mid-Third Century, ed. E. P. Sanders, SCM Press, London, and Fortress Press, Philadelphia. This essay has influenced significantly my understanding of the issues involved.

17. B. Shabbat 33b

18. See S. Lieberman, "Palestine in the Third and Fourth Centuries," JQR 36 (1946) 353.

19. Mentioned by Josephus, Life 92 and 331; Wars 2.21.6 (618); and 3.10.10 (539).

20. Sifra, ed. Weiss, 86a. For "stadium" I follow the reading in Midrash HaGadol Leviticus, ed. Steinzalts, 507. E. E. (L.) Finkelstein, "Midrash, Halakhot VeHagadot," Y. Baer Jubilee Volume 28-47, 41,,recorded a reading that I could not find in his edition of the Rome MS of the Sifra.

21. J. Kilayim 9,4 32d and parallels, following S. Lieberman, "Tiqune Yerushalmi," Tarbiz 3(1932) 208.

22. J. Abodah Zarah 4,4 43d, see Lieberman (n. 18) 365f.

23. Deuteronomy Rabbah, ed. Lieberman, 16. See Numbers Rabbah 12,4; and Pirqe DeRabbi Eliezer 6

24. See G. W. Clarke's note in his annotated translation of The Octavius of Marcus Minucius Felix, ACW 39, 345, nn. 540f.

25. The rest of this study is a summary of the conclusions of my "Third Century Tiberias: The Alliance Between the Rabbinate, the Patriarchate, and the Urban Aristocracy," to appear in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, eds. H. Temporini, and W. Haase, Supplement to II.9. Full documentation will be found there.

S 104 THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT OF PAULINE CHRISTIANITY[1]

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The variety of early Christianity about which we have the most first-hand information, that associated with Paul and his "fellow-workers," was entirely an urban movement. That fact is commonly recognized, but no one, not even Sir William Ramsay, has systematically investigated its implications, which are enormous. Within a decade of the crucifixion of Jesus the Christian movement had gone beyond the village culture of Palestine; the Greco-Roman city had become its dominant environment. The movement had thus crossed the most fundamental division in the society of the Roman Empire, that between rural people and city dwellers.

The cities of the Mediterranean world were at the leading edge of the great political and social changes that occurred during the six and a half centuries from Alexander to Constantine. Augustus, learning from Alexander and the Successors and from Caesar's and Antony's veterans' colonies, began a policy of urbanization of the provinces that continued well into the second century. By adroit use of the system of patronage, he built up a network of personal dependency connecting the upper classes of the eastern cities to himself. The alliance between the Roman principate and the Greek cities brought subtle and complex changes in the relationships among persons and classes. New opportunities were created for social and economic mobility, but at the same time new tensions.

For a long time groups of foreigners had gathered in each city: merchants and artisans following the armies or in search of better markets, persons enslaved and displaced by war or piracy and then freed, political exiles, soldiers of fortune. These non-citizen residents (metoikoi) often retained some sense of ethnic identity by establishing local cults of their native gods or by forming a voluntary association, which also had at least the trappings of religion, like the "Association of the Poseidoniasts of Berytus," who put up an elegant clubhouse on Delos in the second century B.C. Of course the Roman settlers soon came to have a privileged position among these groups, but their precise relationship to the others varied. One of the foreign groups which retained the strongest cohesion and identity was the Jews. Like other immigrant groups, they were organized as a club or guild, but one that was unique in several respects. The association took on an important political role as the Jews struggled on the one hand to maintain the

boundaries upon which their identity depended, between themselves and paganism, and on the other to secure as many as possible of the rights and sources of prestige that belonged to citizens. The Jews in those cities where their numbers constituted a large segment of the population formed a virtual city within the city, for which one Greek term was politeuma.

The conservatism of the villages preserved their local diversity; changes in the city were in the direction of a common Greco-Roman culture. This was most obvious in language. Today a tourist may manage comfortably with English or German throughout most of the Pauline mission area, so long as he stays in the cities, but if he wants to communicate in the villages, he must know several languages and even then may find his best efforts stymied by local pronunciation or idiom. Just so, Greek was the universal urban language of the eastern Roman provinces, but not far beyond the city walls. Beside common language, city folk used common forms in many areas of life. City councils announce decrees, clubs honor their patrons, the bereaved commemorate their dead in like fashion from Alexandria to Thessalonica. Students learned rhetorical style from the same handbooks. Styles too of pottery and glassware, of furniture, of floor and wall decoration, of sculpture and painting spread from city to city. Even today a visitor to the excavated remains can hardly fail to see that throughout the Mediterranean basin there was a common conception of the way a city should be laid out and what sorts of construction would enhance its elegance. To be sure, the similarities should not be exaggerated to the point of forgetting important local differences.

The city was the place where, if anywhere, change could be met and even sought out. It was the place where the empire's power was felt, and where the future began. To throw in one's lot with the city meant to be caught up in movement--not just the "brownian movement" as MacMullen calls it, of the farmer from his hamlet to the next or to the city to buy and sell or complain to the governor and then back again--but the tides of migration, the risky travel of the merchant, and even the irregular movement of manners, attitudes, and status.

From the schematic itineraries of the book of Acts alone, Ronald Hock has calculated that Paul traveled nearly 10,000 miles during the course of his reported career.[2] Beside Paul himself and the companions who traveled with him, we hear often of his associates sent on special missions in Paul's stead, of delegates from the churches to Paul, of travelers who on the way bring greetings and news. The final chapter of the letter to Romans is replete with evidence of impressive physical mobility. Some of this travel was undertaken specifically for the Christian mission, but much of the mission was carried out by people who were traveling for other reasons. Both were possible, and not even surprising to the writers of the New Testament, because the people of the Roman Empire were traveling more extensively and more easily than anyone had done before them--

or would do after them until the nineteenth century. Roman power made possible this flourishing travel in two very practical ways: the Roman army undertook to keep brigandage on land and piracy on the sea at a minimum, and the imperial government took responsibility for a road system throughout its regions.

Very much of the travel on the land and sea routes, apart from the military and administrative operations of the empire, was undertaken by individuals for purposes of trade or professional advancement. It is not surprising that the spread of foreign cults closely followed the movements of trade, or that Christianity also exhibited this already established pattern. The ways in which the movement of artisans and tradespersons could facilitate movements of religious cults were manifold. The way most familiar in the Hellenistic world has already been mentioned: foreign settlers in a city found neighbors from the same country and set up a shrine of their native gods. As their numbers and solidarity grew to the point that they could demand some civic recognition, their cult, by now usually housed in a proper Greek temple and assimilated in many other ways as well to their Greek urban environment, became part of the municipal religious establishment. The splendid sanctuaries of the Syrian and Egyptian gods that overlook the theater and harbor of the sacred island of Delos well illustrate the process, as do the somewhat less imposing sanctuaries that are similarly situated above the forum of the Roman colony of Philippi. There were also quieter, less public ways in which new cults moved with migrants: peddled along with their wares or gossiped in their workrooms. The best known instance is the account Josephus gives of the conversion of the royal house of the little kingdom of Adiabene, in Mesopotamia, at the time of Claudius.[3]

It is more problematic to speak of social mobility in the Roman Empire, and more difficult to assess its importance for religious change. The sorts of perceptions and attitudes about changing status that we take for granted in modern industrial societies are in almost every case inappropriate to the conditions of Greco-Roman society. Once we look below the minuscule number of the elite at the apex of what Ramsay MacMullen calls "the steep pyramid" of Greco-Roman society, we see hardly any movement at all nor, perhaps more important, do we find much expectation of movement. Where mobility of the non-elite did occur and has left traces in the stones and records of the ancient city, it appears in ways that are strange to us. Most germane to the social history of early Christianity, for reasons which cannot be elaborated here, are questions about the status and opportunities of artisans and tradespeople, of slaves and freedpersons, and of women.

The freedperson occupied a peculiar niche in the society, a transitional category between slave and free. The libertus or liberta was clearly superior to the slave, but still obligated to the former owner, now patron, in numerous ways both legal and informal, and bearing to the grave the more general stigma of servile origin. Yet they

also had special opportunities. While slaves they had often learned specific skills which enabled them to pursue a business or profession on their own after emancipation. It was common for wealthy householders to use slaves and freedmen as agents in all sorts of transactions, particularly those in which it was considered unseemly for a person of high standing to engage himself directly. A freedman might thus accumulate both considerable capital and skill in using it to make more money. It is understandable, then, that MacMullen finds among those few people who by means of a craft or commercial activity managed to gain relative affluence, "freedmen stood out."[4] In the inscriptions found in the Roman colony of Corinth, there are names of several prominent persons who probably had followed this path to wealth and then used their wealth to buy political and social honors as well. Among them was an aedile named Erastus, who may very well be the same as the oikonomos tēs poleōs known to Paul (Rom 16:23).

Some Christians of the Pauline circle belonged to one particular group of slaves and freedmen that constituted probably the most mobile category that can be identified in Roman society: the familia caesaris (Phil 4:22). Several intensive studies of the inscriptional evidence in recent years have succeeded in documenting with considerable clarity the restless upward movement of the imperial slaves. The clearest indicator of their enhanced social power is the tendency of slaveborn members of the imperial household to marry freeborn wives--a kind of union rare in the rest of society.

The rise of the freedmen aroused deep resentment among many people who thought themselves their betters. Witness the venom that the mere sight of a statue of Pallas, freedman-financial secretary of Claudius, could provoke in Pliny the younger, half a century after Pallas' death.[5] What the critics found so outrageous in the parvenus was their crossing of social boundaries. They dared to claim the status to which their education, intelligence, skill, power, and wealth accord, but which was forbidden by their birth, origin, and legal rank.

The upwardly-mobile freedmen are an example of the more general phenomenon that sociologists call "status inconsistency." It is a phenomenon that may prove important for understanding some aspects of Pauline Christianity. In every society the status of a person, or of a family or other group, is determined by the composite of many different clues, "status indicators." For example, Tony Reekmans has extracted from Juvenal's satires seven social categories, in each of which there was a traditional hierarchy of ranks: extraction (Roman, European Greek, Eastern Greek, Barbarian), nobility (the formal ordines), personal liberty, fortune, occupation, age, and sex.[6] Now if one were a libertus, an Eastern Greek living in Rome, a young man, but nevertheless a philosopher who had studied with Musonius Rufus, then one would be in a situation of status inconsistency or low "status crystallization." Depending on the number of categories in conflict, the relative importance of those categories in

widely held attitudes, the distance traversed in each category from one level to the next, and so on, such "criss-crossing of categories" (M. I. Finley's apt phrase) produces feelings and reactions of varying power, both within the mobile person or group and in others, especially actual or potential competitors. We may plausibly suppose that such feelings would often find some form of religious expression or--contrariwise--that some kinds of religious symbols, beliefs, and attitudes would enhance, inhibit, or channel social mobility differently from others. All of the individuals in the Pauline circle about whom we have enough information to make any judgment about social stratification show signs of status inconsistency.

Among the persons who crossed categories in order to better their lives, even at the cost of enduring some obloquy from the neighborhood gossips and, presumably, some internal tensions within their families and within themselves, there were a great many women. The hierarchical pattern of the family, in which the male was always superior to the female as surely as parents to children and masters to slaves, was deeply entrenched in law and custom and its erosion constantly deplored by the rhetorical moralists and the satirists. Nevertheless, there were more and more opportunities for some women to break through this pattern. The most conspicuous examples, not surprisingly, come from the upper classes, but opportunities were not altogether wanting for women of lower standing. Inscriptions show that women were active in commerce and manufacture and, like their male counterparts, used some of the money they made in ways that would win them recognition in their cities. In Pompeii a woman named Eumachia, who made her money in a brick-manufacturing concern, paid for one of the major buildings and donated it to a workman's association. She held the title of sacerdos publica. Another Pompeian woman, Mamia, built the temple of the Genius of Augustus. Throughout Italy and in the Greek-speaking provinces, a small but significant number of women are mentioned on coins and inscriptions as benefactors and officials of cities and recipients in return of municipal honors.[7]

Like men, but not nearly so frequently, women joined clubs--usually the same clubs as men, for apart from associations of priestesses there is little evidence for all-women's clubs. Perhaps more significant, fairly often in imperial times women were asked to serve as founders or patrons of men's clubs. Women were also active in religious matters, both in cults that were exclusively or primarily practiced by women and in state or municipal and private cults that appealed to men and women alike. In the hellenistic and Roman periods, women seem to have been especially attracted to the syncretic cults that were produced by the diasporas of eastern and Egyptian religions in the Mediterranean cities. However, the invective of the satirists and other conservative critics exaggerated the extent to which women were the primary devotees of the new cults. It is also difficult to tell whether the participation of women in the new cults represented any significant change in their ordinary social roles.

I have sketched a few of the aspects of urban life that need to be understood at greater depth and on a more intimate scale than the grand generalizations that occupy the introductory pages of most New Testament commentaries. After that, the task becomes the discovery of ways the earliest Christian congregations adapted to the city. Let us begin with as simple a question as possible: When Paul and Silas, Timothy, Titus, and the others arrived in a city in order to "preach the Gospel," where and how did they begin? How did they make connection with those who would listen?

The cities where Pauline Christianity took shape were physically quite small, compared with modern cities. And while the public facilities were handsome and spacious, the living conditions for all but the elite were terribly crowded. It follows that privacy was rare. Much of life was lived on the streets and sidewalks, squares and porticoes. News or rumor would travel rapidly; riots could flare up in a moment. A peddler of copper pans or magic amulets, of horoscopes or a new savior god, could count on the word getting around--once he had made his initial contacts.

Acts gives a tiny glimpse of one way Paul and Silas found an audience--whether it comes from a source close to the event or the author's imagination makes little difference for our immediate purposes. In Philippi the missionaries went on a Sabbath "outside the gate to the riverside, where we supposed there was a place of prayer" (Acts 16:13, RSV). Later the same author tells us that in Corinth Paul "found a Jew named Aquila," who with his wife Priscilla ran a tent-making shop (18:2f.). When a stranger arrived in a city, then, it is taken for granted that he knew, or could easily learn, where to find immigrants and temporary residents from his own country or *ethnos* and practitioners of his own trade. Nothing could be more natural, for these were the two most important factors in the formation and identification of neighborhoods.

Below the level of the ethnic quarter and the neighborhood of similar trades came the individual household. Our sources give us good reason for thinking that it was the basic unit in the establishment of Christianity in a city, as it was indeed the basic unit of the city itself. We must remember that the *oikos* we hear about when the New Testament tells us of the conversion of someone "with all his/her house" is broader than our concept of the nuclear family. The household is defined not in the first instance by kinship but by the relationship of dependence and subordination. The head of the household was responsible for--and expected a degree of obedience from--not only his immediate family but also his slaves, his former slaves who were now his clients, his hired laborers, and sometimes business associates and tenants. To be part of a household was thus to be part of a larger network of relations, of two sorts. Within the household, a vertical but not quite unilinear chain connected unequal roles, from slave to *pater familias* in the most intimate strand, but also including client-to-patron and a number of analogous but less formal relations. Between this

household and others there were links of kinship and friendship, which of course also often entailed obligations and expectations.

There is one further form of social relationship that was very important in the Greek and Roman cities: the voluntary association. Clubs, under a great variety of names, had been known in Greek cities since the fifth century B.C., in Rome from somewhat later. In imperial times they proliferated in both East and West, despite periodic efforts of the government to suppress them. Normally quite small, from a dozen to thirty or forty members, the constituency of a club was usually drawn from one of the aggregations already mentioned: families, trades, neighborhoods, or immigrants of common origin. Trade and professional associations were especially important in Rome, and spread widely also in the Greek cities in the period we are concerned with. These groups are often called "guilds," but their purpose is not to be confused with medieval guilds, much less modern trade unions. The Builders and Carpenters, the Patchwork-Rug-Makers, the Porters, the Purple-dyers of 18th Street met as did their counterparts of many other names, to eat a meal perhaps a bit better than usual, drink some pretty good wine supplied by the member whose turn it was, celebrate the birthday of the founder or patron or the feast of Poseidon or Hermes or Isis or Silvanus, and to draw up rules to make sure that the members would all have a decent burial when their times came. The ekklēsia that gathered with the tent-makers Prisca, Aquila, and Paul in Corinth or Ephesus might well have seemed to the neighbors a club of the same sort.

Finally, we need to pay attention to the particular characteristics of each city and each region in which the Pauline mission was carried on. The places where we have some evidence from our first line of sources, the letters of Paul and his school, for persistence of Christian communities some time after the initial evangelization, are irregularly distributed along a rough arc from the middle of Asia Minor across Macedonia and down to the Peloponnesus. In size they range from rather small towns, like Philippi, to sprawling cities like Ephesus and Corinth, but they are all "cities" in government, culture, and the feelings of their inhabitants. Two are Roman colonies, Philippi and Corinth, but of very different types, the one primarily an agricultural center, the other a center of crafts and commerce. If we were to be convinced that the Pisidian cities Antioch, Iconium, and Lystra were the places Paul meant by "Galatia," these would be added to our list of colonies, but it is more likely that his Galatians were in Ancyra and perhaps Tavium and Pessinus. The dominant language is Greek in all except the two colonies in Greece, Philippi and Corinth, and even in those two cities there was a substantial population for whom Greek was the normal language. All except Philippi are centers of trade, and even in Philippi there are reasons to think that alongside the Italian farmers were a good many foreigners who made their living by trade. Every one of the cities is well located for access by sea or land or both; even the towns of northern Galatia are connected by good Roman roads with the rest of Asia Minor. Such were "the cities of St. Paul."

The more we learn about them, the better our position will be to make inferences and judgments from the New Testament sources about the nature of everyday Christianity in the first century.

NOTES

[1]This paper summarizes some of the main points in one chapter of a book in progress, which will treat the social context and formation of the Pauline circle of early Christianity. I am grateful to the John Solomon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for a fellowship that has made possible a period of concentrated research this year. In order to save space in this brief survey, I have eschewed reference to sources and secondary literature, except in the case of quotations or paraphrases. Instead, I append a small bibliography.

[2]The Social Context of Paul's Ministry 27.

[3]Ant. 20.17-53.

[4]Roman Social Relations 100.

[5]Ep. 7.29 and 8.6.

[6]"Juvenal's Views on Social Change," Ancient Society 2 (1971) 117-61.

[7]Ramsay MacMullen, "Women in Public in the Roman Empire," forthcoming in Historia. (I am grateful to Prof. MacMullen for letting me see this article in galley proofs, as well as for much other advice and help.)

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S 157 A BIBLICAL CRITICISM FOR AMERICAN BIBLICAL SCHOLARSHIP

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This paper deals with the problem of method in contemporary American biblical studies and argues that the situation of American biblical scholarship no longer allows us simply to place the text in a historical context but supports a comprehensive approach to the biblical text which focuses upon the literary nature of the text and the process by which the reader makes sense of the text which is satisfying to him.

I. PROBLEM OF METHOD

An assumption with which I begin is that the basic activity in making sense of the biblical text is putting the text in proper context. Jonathan Culler says:

> To make sense of something is to bring it within a discursive order, to naturalize it or reduce its strangeness so that is speaks to us in an idiom we can understand. We would even say that everything makes sense from a certain perspective and that the process of making sense is that of finding this perspective and lodging the material within it, so that it no longer passes as strange but seems natural, recognizable for what we take it to be, intelligible.[1]

Culler's description of how we make sense of something suggests that the context in which we are situated determines the context into which we place the text for the purpose of interpretation. The text can speak to us only "in an idiom we can understand." The context which is natural and intelligible, and therefore, satisfying, depends upon our own situation.

The Historical Context and Theological Meaning.

The history of biblical criticism in general can be seen as the attempt to make history the context for understanding the biblical text. This attempt has been made in the face of several significant challenges: the challenge of correlating the results of a historical study of the Bible as a coherent structure of historical events with theological values; the challenge of relating particular historical phenomena to more universal transhistorical realities; and the challenge of the contemporary questioning of Cartesian thought, the doubt that for the subject everything can become an object, with the objectivity guaranteed by the method of study. American biblical scholarship shares these challenges and the history of attempts to overcome problems inherent in the critical approach in general and the historical approach in particular.

Prior to the critical approach, of course, the context was the church and its dogma. Texts were suited to a churchly context or system of knowledge. This was satisfying for the "truth" of "knowledge" of the ancient and medieval world supported this method of biblical exposition. The critical method developed when accepted "knowledge" would no longer support the ancient and medieval system. The Reformation and post-Reformation world had to justify theological as well as other ideas on some sort of rational grounds and this meant that scholars had to allow

biblical texts their own historical weight as well as (or in place of) suiting the text to the churchly system of knowledge.

A historical criticism which operates with the view of history set forth by Ernst Troeltsch as an entire course of coherent and reciprocally related historical events seems to compel the critic to arrange and evaluate his findings within the entire structure of historical events. This was not impossible for scholars in earlier eras concerned with theological meaning. History could be seen as the movement of the divine Spirit itself. Events could be viewed in terms of universal historical progress. Historical criticism, then, enabled the critic to note the witness of the divine Spirit in the historical witness of the Scriptures or to see historical criticism as the method allowing theology to share in and give shape to universal historical progress.[2]

When revelation and reason cannot be united in the notion of a rational religion and history cannot be viewed as the upward moral development of mankind, how can we relate historical criticism and theological inquiry? History and criticism can be forsaken and retreat made to a precritical approach to Scripture. A popular choice is the strictly functional approach to historical criticism, disavowing historicism and using historical criticism for purposes not implicit in the historical approach itself. But attempts continue to be made to form a synthesis of historical criticism and theology in which both are given their full rights.

The functional approach assumes that biblical data can be examined as historical phenomena in an objective scientific way and that once this is done application may be made.[3] This conceptualization has been satisfying, but the assumption that the descriptive historical task can be distinguished from the hermeneutical task is challenged today. Historical study, for example, is inevitably influenced by the interpreter's sense of the relation of history and reality. As Peter Stuhlmacher points out, "If we proceed from a rationalistic notion of history and reality, the phenomena of historical tradition conformable or applicable to this concept are made to appear in markedly positive light, while conversely, all historical experiences and utterances which resist rationalism are subject to criticism or skepticism."[4] The same thing is true of idealism, existentialism, materialism, biblicism, structuralism and other ideologies.

Rudolf Bultmann attempted a genuine synthesis of historical criticism and theology. For a synthesis to take place, however, liberalism's concern with the meaning of all history had to be replaced with a less problematic view of history. And at least one branch of the "knowledge" of the twentieth century has allowed the question of the meaning of all history to be replaced with the question of the individual's encounter with historical events. But theology also had to be reduced to manageable proportions, and when the Bible's speaking as Word of God is limited to its speaking in terms of human existence, then necessary reduction has taken place. Mediation of history and theology, then, is by means of the individual in whom historically demonstrable reality and religiously experienced reality encounter each other. Bultmann's synthesis was satisfying to the extent that one shared the conviction that God and his activity is to be grasped not directly as an item of objectifying research but indirectly in the mirror of believing existence. Historical criticism, then, with the assumptions and reduction of Bultmann,

inquires behind the biblical text to ask of its existential content. This approach is not universally satisfying today for the assumptions and reductions which require or allow the approach are unacceptable.

Contemporary attempts to deal with the problem of method often begin with history and relate theology to history. Eberhard Jüngel relates the two by speaking of the task of biblical exegesis as the tracing of the "word event which takes its origin under the historical conditions of the world."[5] Wolfhart Pannenberg would make the object of theology historical reality as a whole. In this reality God indirectly manifests himself as the reality which destines everything for his future. The historical method, then, is broadened to allow room for the question of God and his activity and has an eye for comprehensive historical processes which are still open in respect of their future.[6]

I wonder if our attempts to rehabilitate and redefine historical method are not doomed to failure because the historical model of criticism as such is no longer the prevailing model, no longer satisfying. Peter Stuhlmacher speaks for a growing number of scholars in the church when he says: "For colleagues in the discipline, for pastors performing their office, and for students, historical criticism is the agent of a repeated and growing rupture of vital contact between biblical tradition and our own time . . . . this problem is inherent in the structure of historical criticism."[7]

The American Context.

The history of American biblical scholarship has paralleled that of biblical scholarship in general. Until two decades ago, the great majority of American scholars worked in the context of the church and theological schools. They assumed the necessity and validity of the historical approach for critical and theological study. One difference between American and Continental scholarship may be American scholars' continued confidence in the historical method and the resultant lack of need to be concerned with Bultmann's existential hermeneutics and the continuing hermeneutical discussion. Today, however, the American context is more complex. One aspect of this complexity is the questioning by biblical scholars of the assumptions behind the historical approach and the placing of biblical study more consciously into philosophical and theological contexts. A study of the past philosophical and theological traditions is becoming necessary for satisfying biblical study.

The major factor in the increased complexity of the present day, however, may be that the context of American biblical scholarship is no longer simply the church and its theological schools. The context of biblical scholarship--and the context into which the text must be placed for satisfying interpretation--has become much more complex than that of its counterpart in Europe because of the rapid growth of the field of religious studies in secular colleges and institutions. Patrick Henry speaks of the shift from seminary-oriented biblical study to academically-oriented religious studies as a change in "the center of gravity of New Testament studies."[8]

The most important result of this shift is the interaction of New Testament scholars with scholars in other disciplines. Henry lists some of the "revolutionary developments" in psychology, sociology, literary criticism, and history of religions

which, until now, have had little impact on exegesis and interpretation, but which inevitably will have an impact because they help form the context of contemporary American biblical scholarship: "Psychology has uncovered the irreducible, finally untranslatable function of myth and symbol . . . . Sociology has demonstrated that consciousness and society are inseparable. . . . Literary criticism clarifies the positive uses of ambiguity. . . . History of religions points to liturgy and sacraments as chief bearers of religious meaning. . . ."[9]

The American biblical scholar continues to have the responsibility of relating critical study to theology, even if it is a theology which is worked out in an anti-ontological conceptuality. But the American scholar can no longer be satisfied with limiting his critical method to the historical and his meaning to descriptive historical and/or theological statements. Strangeness is no longer reduced simply by placing the text in a historical context--that of the events described in the text _or_ of the author _or_ _even_ that of the canonization of the testaments.

II. A NEW APPROACH

I suggest that a focus upon the literary nature of the biblical text and the way that the reader makes sense of the text which is satisfying in light of his context may be a way appropriately to mediate the conventional historical and theological factors and to coordinate the new factors in the context of American biblical scholarship. By "make sense," I intend something like what is meant when we ask of some event or some object: "What sense do you make of that?" I am suggesting that satisfying interpretation of the biblical text today cannot be subordinated to a theoretical original meaning toward which interpretation grasps. Interpretation, then, is not simply the consequence of a lost original meaning, a process which would be unnecessary save for the problem of distance. In making sense, however, we are not really doing anything different in a formal way from the first readers of the biblical text. They had to make sense of the text too, even though they were more closely related chronologically to the origins of the text.

This view of interpretation as a creative process changes the focus of biblical interpretation. We do not think first about the properties which biblical texts have, meanings as something deposited in or behind the text by an original intention or cause. We think rather about operations which may be applied to a text to produce meaning. We think about or own interpretive activities which are able to create meaning in conjunction with the text.

The inclusive literary approach within which history and theology play their proper roles is not the view of linguistic and literary study advocated by some current writers in biblical studies. Erhardt Güttgemanns attempts to treat the text from the perspective of a text-grammar based on generative grammar and in so doing _reduces_ the text to linguistics, a linguistics which subsumes semantics within syntax.[10] Norman Petersen and David Robertson have recently written books on literary criticism for New Testament and Old Testament critics. Petersen remains basically a historian in his approach to biblical studies. He wishes to argue against the fixation of historicism on the culture that "caused" the text, but he subordinates literary criticism to the historical task of "establishing and interpreting the written word as evidence" of the time and writing and of the

events to which a text refers.[11] Robertson, on the other hand, would read the Bible as "pure" literature. For him this means that the context for studying a particular work is the work itself. What matters is the "fit" of an idea or an event in the work of literature within the world created by the work.[12]

The approach I envision will begin with the literary text in the foreground with the information gained from historical investigation forming the background. The final focus may be history--but it may be any other focus the reader finds significant. The inclusive literary criticism I envision, then, is not the older literary history or the New Criticism with its emphasis upon the autonomy of the literary work. It is a newer criticism which has crossed over the line into philosophy, sociology, psychology, linguistics, and even theology. Geoffrey Hartman, one of the men always cited as among the "revisionist" or "hermeneutic" critics finds questionable the "mystique of originality," and the "historical simplifications that see literature as a one-way system, moving along chronological rails."[13] Hartman and other critics are not content to conclude so quickly with the humanistic values of literature, viewing literature as a means of finding what will make our lives meaningful and valuable.[14] Hartman indicates that through the critical secularizing scrutiny of literature, "evidence of archaic or sacred residues come to light." Although we may not value them, he says, they are too prevalent to be undone. As a result, Hartman declares, the newer critics "are critical of humanistic cant and of easy uses of the concept of secularization."[15]

A Literary Framework for Biblical Criticism.

How can biblical criticism be related to a newer, more open, literary criticism? In Meaning in Texts, I began from a point within philosophical and theological hermeneutics and related to this hermeneutics the studies in contemporary structural semiotics.[16] I attempted to show that the hermeneutical concern for meaning can be related to the linguistic processes and structures of concern in the structural tradition. There is hermeneutical core at every structural level. A way of conceptualizing this relationship which opens the way for construction of a comprehensive approach to biblical study is to observe first of all that hermeneutics is a part of the rhetorical system of communication. The system of communication between author and reader includes the modern reader with the history of interpretation and effects of the text impinging upon him. The next important step is to see that the system of communication involving hermeneutics needs the system of representation in which we find language and the forms, signs, and structures which are necessary for sharing information and world views.

Here I will suggest that the kind of historical study we presently do is an incipient literary criticism and that an expansion of our historical approach can result in a full-blown comprehensive approach to the biblical text as a literary phenomenon. First of all, let me sketch more completely a framework for literary criticism to which biblical study can be related. Literary criticism has seen four elements in the comprehensive situation of a work of art: the artist, his audience, the work, and the universe imitated in the work. These four elements form a dynamic system in which each of the elements is a variable coordinate differing in meaning and function according to the particular critical theory which is operating. The various components can be organized into two systems which impinge upon one

another.[17] There is the rhetorical system of communication which involves the artist and his audience or the author and his readers. The text is emphasized as a factor in communication between an author and his readers. We are very familiar with this system, for the historical approach has equated what a text means with what a text meant in its original situation of communication and has taken what it meant as a product of its immediate historical and cultural context.[18]

The other system is the system of representation which relates the work to the "world" represented. It is the system of representation that uses verbal means to convey information. Our historical orientation has caused us to emphasize the work as representative of the real world of persons and events in the text or the real world of the original author and readers.

As biblical scholars we have found it necessary to correlate the two systems, to relate the text as representation to the text as communication. The easiest way to do this is to take data in one system as fixed and then adjust data in the other system. For example, in the system of representation assume that the gospels realistically portray the life of Jesus. Then, on the level of communication reconstruct historical situations involving authors and readers which would allow or even demand such a portrayal of Jesus.

Redaction criticism has become a very interesting study because of the complexity of correlating the system of representation and the system of communication when neither system is definitely established. But redaction criticism did not originate with such a demanding task. Hans Conzelmann, for example, began with the assumptions that eschatology is the key to Luke's reflection on the Kerygma and that salvation-history is the result of Luke's reflection. His work consisted basically of showing how the data of Luke-Acts could be coordinated with the historical and theological situation set forth by such scholars as Baer, Bultmann, and Vielhauer.[19]

Biblical critics, then, have been making sense of the text by finding the perspective from which the material makes sense and lodging the text in that perspective from which it no longer seems strange. The rhetorical system of communication involving author and reader has been stretched in the definition of author and the nature of the communication. We have seen the evangelists become genuine authors, not mere collectors. We have seen that communication involves not only locutionary acts which have meaning but also illocutionary acts which have a certain force _in_ saying something and perlocutionary acts which achieve certain effects _by_ saying something. The system of representation has been stretched by emphasizing that the represented world is not simply that of the events described in the text. The world of the evangelist and his church is there. Can we extend further the system of communication and the system of representation to form a comprehensive literary approach which includes historical and theological factors and the other elements which are important in the new context of American biblical scholarship? The following suggestion of specific ways that the systems of communication and representation can be expanded does not constitute a comprehensive catalogue. The suggestions were chosen because of their relevance for a biblical study which is designed not only to enable contemporary readers to make sense of the text which is satisfying aesthetically, intellectually, and religiously but also concerned to conserve values of conventional historical

criticism.

The Extended System of Communication.

An extension of the system of communication could result in the inclusion of modern readers in a way which would help solve the problem of distance or the problem of objectifying the text. Hans-Georg Gadamer treats this problem when he speaks of the fusion of the horizons of text and the interpreter.[20] He says that when we come to interpret a text, we do not merely repeat the text with other words. That a text is the object of interpretation means that it presents a question to the interpreter. To understand the text is to understand the question of the text. But the interpreter does not come as an empty vessel; he comes with a horizon of meaning which is broadened so as to become fused with that of the text. Between the original situation of communication and the contemporary interpreter is a history of effects and interpretation of the text which impinge upon the interpreter. Paul Hernadi places both the history of interpretation and effects and the modern reader on the axis of communication. On this axis, he says, "every text can . . . be seen as responding to 'worldly' challenges--some of them literary--and in turn challenging the reader to respond--sometimes by creating another text--in his day and age, under his particular circumstances."[21]

When the focus is the contemporary reader and his process of making sense, the original author and the history of the reception of the text are not irrelevant. They will be considered as vital background, but as background. Maybe the historical critic will be helped by distinguishing between the "meaning" of a text--the idea of some hypothetical original referent--and the "sense" of the text--the idea of a redirected referent or the significance which the reader finds in the text. Literary critics would see the original meaning as the background against which contemporary significance is discovered or created.

Is there some intermediate point in the system of communication which can help provide guidance? Do we simply jump somewhat intuitively from the original situation of communication to either the history of interpretation or to the modern reader? I think that the concepts of an "implied author" and an "implied reader" may be helpful, particularly in gospel study when we really have no original authors or readers we can name and situate in history. The "implied author" is the name given by Wayne C. Booth to the "core of norms and choices" in a work which let the reader know where the author wants the reader to stand. "This implied author is always distinct from the 'real man' . . . who creates a superior version of himself, a 'second self', as he creates his work."[22] Booth indicates that:

> our sense of the implied author includes not only the extractable meanings but also the moral and emotional content of each bit of action and suffering of all of the characters. It includes, in short, the intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic whole; the chief value to which <u>this</u> implied author is committed, regardless of what party his creator belongs to in real life, is that which is expressed by the total form.[23]

The postulated or implied reader is related to the implied author. Although there may be intellectual, moral, and aesthetic distance between the two, "from the author's viewpoint a successful reading of his book must eliminate all distance between the

essential norms of his implied author and the norms of the postulated reader."[24]

Wolfgang Iser has taken the notion of the implied reader and the process of reading beyond Booth. He emphasizes not only the artistic work of the author but the aesthetic realization accomplished by the reader. He distinguishes, then, between the text created by the author and the literary work.

> . . . the literary work cannot be completely identical with the text, or with the realization of the text, but in fact must lie halfway between the two. The work is more than the text, for the text only takes on life when it is realized, and furthermore the realization is by no means independent of the individual disposition of the reader--though this in turn is acted upon by the different patterns of the text. The convergence of text and reader brings the literary work into existence, and thus convergence can never be precisely pinpointed . . . it is not to be identified either with the reality of the text or with the individual disposition of the reader.[25]

The Extended System of Representation.

We come then to the system of representation. From the viewpoint of the creative process of reading, we might need to call this the system of suggestion. The text is to be understood not only as representation but "as a combination of forms and signs designed to guide the imagination of the reader."[26] No matter what we call it, at every point in the system of communication, there is the impingement of the system involving forms and signs. Human communication involves representation. Signs capable of containing information are necessary for one man to inform and to motivate another man. In the system of representation, then, we are concerned about verbal means of representation and the referents of the totality of forms and signs in the text. A concern with verbal means causes us to consider language and semiotics, extending from the phoneme to larger linguistic and literary forms. The forms themselves may be seen as the vehicles of meaning of a sort, but in biblical study we usually try to equate the verbal means with some theme, some teaching which makes sense in the original situation of communication. We attempt to develop a causal or explanatory relationship between the historical context and the text. In fact, we generally reduce the referent to the immediate historical and cultural context out of which the text comes. (When serious attention is given to linguistic and literary form--such as the "forms" of form criticism--other possible contexts or Sitze-im-Leben may be considered worthy of consideration. These include the activity of the human mind, the spirit of an age, specific occasions of creation and/or performance, literary concerns, and tradition.)

How can we expand the system of representation in terms of the "information" conveyed by the totality of forms and signs in the text? Maybe a way of expanding the system of representation is to note the distinction we make between what a text is saying and what the text is saying this about. At one point of gospel study we were concerned about what the texts are saying with the idea that they are saying something about Jesus. Now we are convinced that although the subject matter is Jesus, the gospels are making statements about the early church. The worlds of Jesus created by the authors are really fictive worlds in which the actions are imitations of real actions, and the extra-linguistic reference for understanding the gospels is the evange-

lists and their churches.[27] Gospel study today, then, does not begin by relating the materials of the text to a real world of the persons and events described. The total world of the text is taken as a construction which can be directed outwardly only after it has been understood correctly as a world created by the author. The traditions about Jesus and his disciples have been used to make a statement about the early church.

An expanded system of representation could include the world of Jesus in some sense as well as the world of the evangelists, but such an expanded system could also include what the reader does with the text as a part of the system. To what areas does the reader direct the quest for meaning? Rudolf Bultmann introduced us to the importance of directing the text. Bultmann was convinced that existential interpretation is true to the nature of the biblical writings, that myth, for example, does not intend to give an objective world view or tell of divine powers but expresses the way that man understands himself in his world. But Bultmann's interpretation whereby the Word speaks to contemporary man as it speaks in terms of human existence is not governed by the ostensible purpose of the text in every case. Bultmann, indeed emphasized that the ostensible purpose of a text does not always have to govern the direction of investigation. Interest in the reconstruction of the context of past history, psychological interests, and aesthetic interests are cited as possible directions of investigation as well as interest in history as the sphere of life in which human existence moves.[28]

Murray Krieger has given a suggestive allegory which allows us to conceive of the interpreter's involvement in the creation of meaning. He pictures the process of reading literature as a wanderer who comes upon a glass house filled with interesting objects. Initially, the wanderer looks into the house from without. Then he enters to examine the attractive objects he has seen. As he examines the objects, he first compares them with objects in the "real" world by glancing out through the glass walls, but then he becomes totally absorbed with the objects themselves in a variety of ways. The objects no longer appear as replicas of things outside but take on an independent meaning in their relationships with one another. Eventually, the mirrors become windows again, and the wanderer now compares the objects outside with the vision of the objects in the glass house.[29]

Study of the biblical text may be directed inwardly. The reader may be drawn into the work by its literary symbols, and, through his efforts to organize the symbols into some total realization of the work, the reader may surrender himself in some fashion to this new creation and achieve a heightened integration of body and mind, self and world. In the comprehensive approach to the text as literature, however, historical factors play a part as the background of study. Such factors will be given very serious attention by biblical critics, and whatever total realization or reinterpretations are made of the text will be controlled by historical investigation. The potential of the metaphorical language of the text for creation of meaning will be constrained and directed by historical investigation of the meaning of the text in its original context of communication. Moreover, the interest of the interpreter may cause the final focus of the study to be historical. This historical study may be directed to the events recounted in the text, directed to the situation at the time of writing, or used for other historical reconstruction. The nature of the text as literature, or the treatment of the text as literature by the reader, will allow the

reader to direct the text to other areas--psychology, sociology, ethics, politics, economics. Reading the Bible as literature expands the context from the original context (it does not exclude the original context) into a larger context as broad as life itself.

Is theological use of the Bible possible with a literary approach informed by contemporary literary criticism? The reader who is not dissuaded by an anti-ontological bias may direct the text to religious and theological areas of concern even though the language of the Bible will be approached as poetic not philosophical, and the statements as metaphorical rather than objective and descriptive. A theological reading of the text will benefit from the historical background and an aesthetic appreciation of the text. It may attempt to coordinate its theological understanding with understandings gained from historical, existential, psychoanalytic, Marxist, mythic and other interpretations of the text. Nevertheless, it will attempt to confront the text so as to exploit the possibility of reinterpreting its metaphorical statements into direct conceptual statements.[30] A literary approach to the biblical text from a theological perspective may uncover riches which are left behind when concern is limited to direct conceptual philosophical and theological statements and/or when the approach is severely historical.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that my paper is an attempt to discover a satisfying approach to the Bible for our day, an approach as satisfying as the historical-critical approach was to its early practitioners and as Bultmann's existential hermeneutics was to his disciples. I see the danger of contemporary biblical criticism attempting to maintain a method of study which is no longer viable because it is no longer sustained by our contemporary world-view. (In such a case, we will be found converting our students to an outmoded historicism so that they can find our method of study satisfying.) There is just as great a danger of rushing to a fragmented literary criticism which refuses to cross over the line into the human sciences not to speak of philosophy and theology. I have suggested that contemporary literary criticism authenticates a comprehensive approach to the biblical text in which the reader makes sense that is satisfying in light of his world view, interests, and linguistic and literary capacity. Such an approach integrates conventional historical and theological approaches with contemporary development in psychology, sociology, literary criticism and other disciplines in the context of American biblical scholarship. I have even suggested that contemporary historical criticism is really an incipient literary criticism which can be expanded to a full-blown system of study without any real compromise of the hard-won victories of historical criticism. Indeed, the literary criticism suggested will help us answer some of the questions historical criticism is asking but unable to answer with conventional approaches.

NOTES

1. Jonathan Culler, "Making Sense," Twentieth Century Studies (December, 1974), 30.

2. See Peter Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Toward a Hermeneutics of Consent (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), pp. 41-8 for a description of the views of D. F. Baur (who saw history as the movement of the Spirit) and E. Troeltsch (whose framework for historical criticism was a concept of universal history influenced by German idealism and culture-optimism).

3. See Otto Kaiser and Werner G. Kümmel, Exegetical Method: A Student's Handbook (New York: Seabury, 1967) for an able statement of the functional approach.

4. Stuhlmacher, p. 62.

5. Eberhard Jüngel, "Das Verhältnis der theologischen Disziplinen untereinander," Unterwegs zur Sache, Gesammelte Aufsätze (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972) 54, as quoted in Stuhlmacher, p. 77.

6. Stuhlmacher, pp. 81-3.

7. Stuhlmacher, p. 62.

8. Patrick Henry, "The Plate Tectonics of New Testament Study," Theology Today 37 (1980), 52.

9. Henry, p. 53.

10. Erhardt Güttgemanns, "Generative Poetik'--Was Ist Das?" Glauben und Grammatik (Bonn: Linguistica Biblica, 1973), 152-68.

11. Norman R. Petersen, Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978) 25-33.

12. David Robertson, The Old Testament and the Literary Critic (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977) 3-5, 10-11.

13. Geoffrey Hartman, "Literary Criticism and Its Discontents," Critical Inquiry 3 (1976-77) 216.

14. Robertson, p. 15.

15. Hartman, p. 219. For a recent critique of some "radical" exponents of the "age of reading" see M. H. Abrams, "How to Do Things with Texts," Partisan Review 4 (1979) 566-88. Although the question of the reader's involvement in the "realization" of a literary work is currently debated in literary criticism, it appears to this observer that the questions is not whether the reader is involved in making sense of the text but the extent to which there is some meaning to be posited behind the text, to what extend the reader unfolds meanings in front of the text, and how these meanings are related. See also, Wayne C. Booth, "The Limits of Pluralism: 'Preserving the Exemplar'" or "How Not to Dig Our Own Graves," Critical Inquiry 3 (1977) 407-23.

16. Edgar V. McKnight, Meaning in Texts: The Historical Shaping of a Narrative Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978).

17. The two systems are often conceived of as a field with a horizontal axis and a vertical axis. See Karl Bühler, Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1934) 28; M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York W. W. Norton, 1958) 6; Roman Jakobsen, "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics," Style in Language, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960) 353, 357; Paul Hernadi, "Literary Theory: A Compass for Critics," Critical Inquiry 3 (1976) 370, 74, 81, 82; and John Dominic Crossan, "Perspectives and Method in Contemporary Biblical Criticism," Biblical Research 22 (1977) 45.

18. Petersen, p. 25.

19. Hans Conzelmann, "Zur Lukas-Analyse," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 49 (1952) 16-33; The Theology of Luke (New York: Harper, 1960).

20. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975) 305-41. See McKnight, Meaning in Texts, 53-60.

21. Hernadi, 371.

22. Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 74, 151.

23. Booth, pp. 73-4.

24. Booth, p. 157.

25. Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Becket (Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 274-75.

26. Iser, p. 58.

27. See McKnight, "Form and Redaction Criticism," in New Testament and Its Modern Interpreters (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980).

28. Rudolf Bultmann, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," Essays Philosophical and Theological (London: SCM Press, 1955), 252-53. See McKnight, Meaning in Texts, 65-73.

29. Murray Krieger, A Window to Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) 67-69.

30. Paul Riceur stresses that "the dynamics of meaning, which turns the figurative toward the conceptual, must remain under the control of the hermeneutical potential of the metaphor, "Biblical Hermeneutics," Semeia 4 (1975) 135.

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HERMENEUTICS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY: GERMANY AND AMERICA

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> Because it is now deeply entrenched in our thoughts, it is easy to forget that the tendency to view all matters in terms of their histories may itself have had a history.[1]

Introduction

Few will want to dispute the statements that an essentially historical interpretive framework has dominated the past two centuries of biblical study and that this interpretive framework long appeared as unquestionably correct and as the only appropriate response to the allegedly historical character of the biblical documents themselves. Indeed, a standard designation of modern biblical study is "the historical-critical method." However, this thoroughly historical hermeneutics itself has had a history; and, more significantly, this hermeneutics, like all others, rests upon a foundation of highly theoretical presuppositions. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss one aspect of the history of the kind of historical analysis which long ruled biblical study. This aspect is that of the shared assumptions of method which lie beneath the hermeneutics of both the German historiographic tradition and the mainstream of biblical criticism since the late eighteenth century. Though this topic will be my greatest concern here, briefer attention will also be paid to the significantly different assessments of the great German historians, chiefly Ranke, reached by German critics on the one hand and by American historians on the other, assessments clearly articulated in the very years which witnessed also the founding of the Society of Biblical Literature.

Since a full treatment of this subject is impossible in a limited discussion, some initial limits have to be placed upon the material to be covered. With regard to the historiographic tradition, the focus will be upon the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Leopold von Ranke, and Johann Gustav Droysen. With regard to biblical scholarship, it is chiefly the History-of-Religions School, associated above all with the name of Hermann Gunkel, which will be my concern. Neither of these two choices is arbitrary. Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen, whose works very nearly span the entire nineteenth century, are the acknowledged leaders of German historical thought in the past century. Their students commanded almost all of the academic posts in history in Germany, and many posts in other lands. Joachim Wach's Das Verstehen[2] devotes three of its lengthiest chapters to considerations of "the hermeneutical teachings" of Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen. Wach's volume is hardly atypical in this regard. The methods of inquiry and understanding advocated by Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen were powerfully influential upon a number of disciplines -- biblical scholarship, of course, but also literary criticism, classical philology (itself one of the important sources of the historiographic tradition), linguistics, and so forth.

The influence of Gunkel and others of the History-of-Religions School is equally profound. Writing in 1967, James Muilenberg argued that Gunkel's name would head any list of those who dominated further research: "His approach to the biblical materials and his methodology in delineating their character and purpose have been appropriated, in one fashion or another, by all who move in the mainstream of contemporary biblical study."[3] One has only to think of the near hegemony of form criticism in the present century to realize the truth of this statement. Of course, Gunkel was not

alone in founding "die religionsgeschichtliche Bewegung," which movement included Wrede, Bousset, Troeltsch, Heitmüller, and, later, Gressmann, and whose acknowledged spokesman was Albert Eichhorn.[4] For convenience, however, the present discussion will focus chiefly upon Gunkel and, to a lesser extent, upon Gressmann. This is partly because of the number, range, and accessibility of their works, and partly because both openly acknowledged their debt to the German historians of their own and the previous generation. Gunkel, for example, thanked Ranke and Mommsen for awakening his sense for history, which he never allowed to sleep again;[5] and his affection and respect for Herder, who in many ways stands at the beginning of the German tradition of historical understanding, were life-long.

Additional reasons also suggest the concentration here upon the History-of-Religions School. The era in which this school was born was precisely that which witnessed what has come to be called "the crisis of historicism." The years from 1890 until 1920 were those of a number of dramatic developments in the German intellectual scene. These include the founding of sociology as an independent discipline, the rise of the Marburg and Baden schools of Neo-Kantianism, and, of greatest importance for us, an intense scrutiny of the bases of historical thought. Though many, most especially Mandelbaum, have wisely warned of the artificiality in much of the periodization of history,[6] it remains true that the period in which the History-of-Religions School originated is one that is singularly noteworthy for the extent of its intellectual ferment. In addition, the members of this school spoke openly and often of the hermeneutical problems confronted in the study of the Bible. This is so much the case that in his important volume called simply Hermeneutics, Richard Palmer assigns a place to the History-of-Religions School in his schematic portrait of the half dozen or so most important stages in the development of modern hermeneutics.[7] Finally, the period of the flourishing of this school is also that of the founding of the Society of Biblical Literature and of the initial American reception to the German historiographic tradition.

Concentrating as I am upon Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen on the one hand, and upon Gunkel on the other, does not mean that I discount the great importance to the formulation of biblical hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, all of whom stand directly in the line of the modern hermeneutical debate. Others -- Wach for the period through the 1920's, Gadamer, Palmer, and McKnight more recently[8]-- have traced this tradition from Schleiermacher forward and have demonstrated its undeniable bearing upon biblical hermeneutics. However, the particular tradition of German historical understanding is at least as significant for an appreciation of the directions taken by biblical study, and is much less widely known. It is this historiographic tradition which biblical scholars themselves in the nineteenth century most often cited as the basis for their own hermeneutics, as we saw above in the case of Gunkel. As early as 1817, de Wette could assert, "'der Gegenstand der biblischen Einleitung die Geschichte der Bibel ist.'"[9] The hermeneutical discussion was mediated to biblical scholarship by the form that discussion took within the German tradition of historical understanding. One could argue that Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen defined the hermeneutical issues for biblical scholars more so than did, for example, Schleiermacher or Dilthey. Of course, one has to admit, in the end, that the theoretical discussion of hermeneutics and the issues as raised by the historians considered here are identical. As de Wette, again, said, "'Die allgemeinen Gesetzte der Hermeneutik sind auch die der historischen Interpretation.'"[10] Similarly, in his essay "Hermeneutik und Historismus," Gadamer has correctly shown how the development of the hermeneutical issue was ruled by "die Fragestellung des Historismus."[11]

Finally in these lengthy introductory comments, it is worth mentioning that the methodological model of this undertaking has been most directly provided by the work of two classical historians, Arnaldo Momigliano and M. I. Finley. Their work merits the attention of biblical scholars for several reasons, among them because the disciplines of ancient history and biblical study have much in common and have often worked closely together -- one thinks, for example, of the long association of Wellhausen and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.[12] Both Momigliano and Finley have viewed the discipline of ancient history as including not only the study of ancient historians but also inquiry into the historical and sociological context of modern students of ancient history. Each, too, has found a much larger theoretical component in the investigation of ancient history than many others have been willing to allow. Thus, Momigliano was among the first to criticize the widespread cliche that the ancient Hebrews had a totally different view of time from the Greeks.[13] And it was Momigliano who observed that "the Jews whom Wilamowitz, Wellhausen and Meyer were prepared to admit into their own picture of civilization had all been dead before Cyrus king of Persia allowed their descendants to go back to Jerusalem."[14] Finley's contributions are similar methodologically, and similarly stimulating. For example, Finley as much as anyone has countered the mistaken view that historians can get along without worrying much about theory:

> Historians, one hears all the time, should get on with their proper business, the investigation of the concrete experiences of the past, and leave the 'philosophy of history' (which is a barren, abstract and pretty useless activity anyway) to the philosophers. Unfortunately the historian is no mere chronicler, and he cannot do his work at all without assumptions and judgments.[15]

The German Historiographical Tradition

Since a number of scholars have devoted many years and volumes to accounts of the German tradition of historical understanding, I can pretend to do no more here than to sketch some of the chief emphases of this tradition and then to exemplify these in the works of Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen. We are well served by several recent studies of this tradition,[16] all of which have demonstrated that German historians shared "basic theoretical convictions in regard to the nature of history."[17]

One of the keys to the German tradition of historical understanding, a tradition which in fact began in the Aufklärung and received great stimulus from Herder,[18] is this: the changing and unrepeating nature of the human world means that only through historical study can this world be comprehended. Hans Frei correctly notes that this tradition involved "an apprehension of the specificity and irreducibly historical particularity of cultural change."[19] To describe this emphasis slightly differently, the investigation of human phenomena was distinguished sharply from the methods used in the natural sciences. The natural sciences could rely upon abstractions and could work with broad classifications. Neither was appropriate for historical study. Of course, this claim, like many of those voiced by the German historians we are looking at, hardly ceased to receive support in the last century. When Gadamer contrasts "a method which studies an object" with "an experience of participation,"[20] his distinction is precisely that made by nineteenth-century German historians. The same is true of Palmer, who asks us to "desert the abstractness of the scientific model of our knowing of the world and ask what happens in experience."[21] Georg Iggers has happily described this particular characteristic of the German tradition of historical understanding as its "Anti-Begrifflichkeit" nature.[22] Rather than utilizing abstractions or general laws of the sort employed in Naturwissenschaft, the historian is to confront directly the stuff of history,

to immerse himself totally in concrete events and experiences, to allow texts and monuments to speak for themselves, unmediated by any apriori considerations. This accent upon confrontation and immersion leads to an emphasis upon the notion of empathy. One thus hears repeatedly of the historian's task as one of personal involvement with the material investigated. Only such involvement properly stimulates one's imaginative or intuitive faculties in order to allow one to reconstruct properly the flow of history. There is, to be sure, some tension perceptible already between the notion of the historian's empathetic confrontation with concrete data which results, it is claimed, in truly objective comprehension, and the notion of the intuitive or imaginative reconstruction of history which total immersion in the data facilitates. But both notions are present in the German tradition of historical understanding.

A second fundamental presupposition of this tradition was the belief that nations, and separate epochs within the total "life" of a nation, were to be understood as living organisms, as true individuals. The origin of this application of an organic analogy to historical nations and epochs is a most interesting issue, which we cannot pursue here.[23] Certainly, the belief was partly a product both of the Lutheran tradition, with its positive evaluation of the state, and of the incipient Idealist tradition, which saw in the development of historical states the completion of a vast and positive process;[24] but the more direct source for the historiographic tradition of this belief is probably to be seen in Herder's insistence that nations were persons.[25] The result was that one could speak, for example, of the birth, growth, maturity, and death of Hellenism, as if the concept Hellenism were a living organism. If it seems to us entirely natural and unproblematic to speak in this way, it is well to be reminded that this analogy rests upon some highly theoretical assumptions. More importantly here, this assumption carried with it the hermeneutical implication that different nations and different epochs, and the products of both, demand different categories of understanding. If most of those who stood within the tradition of historical understanding believed that children thought differently than did adults, so too they believed that various nations, and various epochs within a nation's overall growth, thought differently -- more or less logically, for example.

Finally in this greatly abbreviated portrait, within the tradition we are surveying the study of history was seen above all as the study of origins and developments. This is true even if the Enlightenment belief in progress was rejected. The words Entstehung and Entwicklung are among those one encounters most frequently in reading the works of the nineteenth-century German historians, especially their presentations of the historical method. Such a concentration upon development cannot be separated from the use of the organic analogy discussed above, since the belief that development is meaningful rests upon the assumption that this development is a manifestation of some idea which is organic to a nation. So central to the German historiographic tradition is this particular notion that it is usually incorporated into definitions of historicism. Thus Mandelbaum defines historicism as "the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of any phenomenon and an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained through considering it in terms of the place which it occupied and the role which it played within a process of development."[26] This emphasis upon Entwicklung obtains already in the works of B. G. Niebuhr, the historian whose discussion of source analysis was held to be of particular value for biblical criticism.[27]

I want now, as promised above, to exemplify these key theoretical positions in the works of Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen. In a well chosen phrase, Lord Acton labeled Wilhelm von Humboldt "'the most central figure in Germany.'" [28] The label is accurate because Humboldt is remembered for his role in founding the University of Berlin, for his pioneering work in

linguistics, as well as for his fundamental role in shaping German historical understanding. Unlike Droysen, Humboldt never composed a systematic presentation of his hermeneutics.[29] However, his 1822 essay "Über die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers" approximates such a compendium.[30] That empirical aspect of the historiographic tradition which was noted above is clear in the first sentence of this essay: "Die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers ist die Darstellung des Geschehenen."[31] Though Humboldt will subsequently make much of the role of imagination, he begins by arguing that the historian must subordinate his imagination to "der Erfahrung und der Ergründung der Wirklichkeit."[32] "Philosophical history" Humboldt sees as a great threat, because it imports ideas from without rather than discovering ideas "aus der Fülle der Begebenheiten selbst."[33] "Der Geschichtschreiber," Humboldt concludes, "muss vor allen Dingen sich hüten, der Wirklichkeit eigenmächtig geschaffen Ideen anzubilden."[34]

Despite such arguments, and in a manner most typical of the entire German tradition of historical understanding, Humboldt then goes on to devote a major part of his essay to a comparison between the historian and the artist. The chief point of this comparison is that the historian, like the poet, must use intuition and imagination to reconstruct the connections between events, the greater whole which is the historical process. "Auf verschiedene Weise," he writes, "aber ebensowohl, als der Dichter, muss er (der Geschichtschreiber) zerstreut Gesammelte in sich zu einem Ganzen verarbeiten."[35] With such statements, Humboldt establishes for himself an important place in the development of hermeneutics. As Wach argues, "Humboldt ist der erste -- wenn wir einmal von Herder absehen --, der die Bedeutung der Phantasie für die hermeneutische Tätigkeit erkennt und betont."[36]

Recalling another of the emphases cataloged above, Humboldt speaks of "die Geistesfähigkeit" of each nation and of "die Individualität der Nationen."[37] He thus advised as a task for his generation the composition of "biographies" of the various nations of the earth.[38] Each nation has its own "Eigentümlichkeit" which it must strive to develop;[39] and it is just in search of each nation's individual character that the historian exercises his imagination.[40] Moreover, it is not just nations but also epochs which display this personal quality, for "jede Epoche des Menschengeschlechts trage einen eigentümlichen Charakter."[41] Each nation and epoch thus demands of the historian the exercise of different categories of understanding, categories derived from an appreciation of the nation or epoch's individual character.

As early as the 1790's Humboldt rejected the belief that the methods of the natural sciences were to be imitated by the historian.[42] His essay "Über der Gesetze der Entwicklung der menschlichen Kräfte" (1791)[43] argued that human phenomena cannot be approached as can the inert phenomena of the scientist. The comprehension of "real living forces" requires the exercise of the artist/historian's imagination. The abstractions of the natural sciences only impede this comprehension.[44] With these last statements, Humboldt's importance for the developing historical hermeneutics is perhaps clear, for he touches upon every one of the key theoretical issues which were to become central to the German historiographic tradition.

"Ranke -- das ist die Inkarnation des historischen Sinnes."[45] Thus begins Wach's discussion of the hermeneutics of Leopold von Ranke; and the judgment is one that most at the end of the nineteenth century would share. The phrase by which Ranke is most often remembered, especially in this country (that the historian is to show history "wie es eigentlich gewesen"),[46] clearly indicates that Ranke, like Humboldt, begins with the mandate that the historian immerse himself in concrete events. However, and this is an important point to which we will have to return below, Ranke, no less than Humboldt, sought to go beyond such data to the real processes in his-

tory, to the "hand of God" as he said, and in striving to reach this goal he advocated the use of "divining" or intuitive comprehension.[47] For example, in his Dialogue on Politics (1836), Ranke writes, "Only by comprehensive historical investigation and combination can we aspire to a divining perception of the deeply hidden, all-embracing spiritual laws."[48] A better statement of the twin foundation of the German historiographic tradition in empiricism and Idealism is difficult to imagine. Even while arguing that historians, unlike philosophers, begin with concrete phenomena and not abstractions, Ranke would also maintain that there was a deep historical process,access to which was not obtained by the investigation of concrete phenomena.[49]

In the same work, Ranke also repeatedly voices the view that nations are living organisms. Thus he writes that "all states that count in the world and make themselves felt are motivated by special tendencies of their own," which tendencies are "of a spiritual nature."[50] Similarly, "the state is a living being, which by its nature incessantly grows and irresistibly progresses."[51] This deep acceptance of the organic analogy is combined with a clear statement of the historian's search for the great process in history in a memorable statement from Ranke's Weltgeschichte (1881):

> Eine Sammlung der Völkergeschichten in engerem oder weiterem Rahmen würde doch keine Weltgeschichte ausmachen: sie würde den Zusammenhang der Dinge aus den Augen verlieren. Eben darin aber besteht die Aufgabe der welthistorischen Wissenschaft, diesen Zusammenhang zu urkennen, den Gang der grossen Begebenheiten, welcher alle Völker verbindet und beherrscht, nachzuweifen.[52]

Therefore, even if individual nations and epochs are best understood as separate, living beings, the whole of history still represents a single, interconnected process behind which is to be seen "the hand of God." Given these views, it is hardly surprising that Ranke would also subscribe to the distinction between an approach appropriate to the life of history and a method suited to the mechanistic world of Naturwissenschaft.[53]

We come finally, in this section, to J. G. Droysen, a historian who, if he is less widely known and read today than are Humboldt and Ranke, was if anything even more powerfully influential upon the hermeneutical tradition we are tracing. Both Jacob Burckhardt and Troeltsch spoke clearly of the force of Droysen's teaching,[54] as has Gadamer more recently.[55] In addition, Droysen merits special attention because his Geschichte des Hellenismus (completed in 1843) defined the very concept of "Hellenism" in a way which still dominates our thought.[56] The attention given by Droysen to this concept already demonstrates his participation in that tradition which thought in terms of world epochs, each with its own life. For Droysen, Hellenism represented the birth of world history, and thus played a divinely ordained role in the overall historical development of mankind.

Unlike Humboldt or Ranke, Droysen did write a systematic presentation of his hermeneutics. This is his Grundriss der Historik, a work initially written in 1858, though the history of its publication is as complex as is the history of Schleiermacher's Hermeneutik.[57] Nor is this volume easy to follow, for it is written in an extremely terse style which demands several readings before some sense begins to emerge. Droysen's Grundriss opens with an expression of gratitude to Humboldt, called here "ein Bacon für die Geschichtswissenschaften."[58] No less than do Humboldt and Ranke, Droysen insists that historical research begins with immersion in concrete data: "Die Wissenschaft der Geschichte ist das Ergebnis empirischen Wahrnehmens, Erfahrens und Forschens;" and "Alle empirische Forschung regelt sich nach den Gegebenheiten, auf die sie gerichtet ist."[59] Still, in a fashion by now familiar to us, Droysen then goes on to define the goal of history as the apprehension of "die sittliche Welt;" and this world can be apprehended only by appeal to an understanding which goes far beyond empiricism.[60]

Rather, Droysen writes, employing an extraordinarily graphic metaphor, such apprehension arrives "als unmittelbare Intuition, als tauche sich Seele in Seele, schöpferische wie das Empfängnis in der Begattung."[61] Historical comprehension represents an act of understanding, not a logical mechanism; it is an art, working partly through "divinatory seeking."[62]

More explicitly and often than either Humboldt or Ranke, Droysen distinguishes sharply between the methods appropriate for the natural sciences and the understanding of historical hermeneutics. This is the subject of his essays "Erhebung der Geschichte zum Rang einer Wissenschaft,"[63] "Natur und Geschichte,"[64] and "Kunst und Methode."[65] In each of these Droysen argues that since the subject of history is "die sittliche Welt," the historian must deal with "vitale Erscheinungen" which are not open to the mechanistic methods of the natural sciences. The three evils to be avoided in historical understanding are "'Positivismus,'" "'Materialismus,'" and "'die polytechnische Methode.'"[66] None of these methods allows one to see the connections between apparently isolated events, connections which for Droysen, as for Ranke, reveal the true process of historical development. "Über den Geschichten," Droysen said in a memorable aphorism, "ist die Geschichte."[67]

That which is initially surprising to one who reads through the lengthy works of Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen is not their empiricism. This aspect of their work is well known. What is surprising is the extent to which real metaphysical Idealism informs their concept of understanding.[68] Though Ranke's methodological statements in his Weltgeschichte argue that the historian, unlike the philosopher, begins with concrete facts and not with apriori abstractions, the same work reveals throughout the thesis that all of human history represents a single, interconnected process. To put this in terms of intellectual history, Ranke is plainly a product both of Niebuhr and of Hegel.[69] The same could be said, with perhaps even more emphasis upon Hegel, of Droysen. He too insisted "'Ich glaube überall nicht mehr an die Philosophie.'"[70] Yet his essay "Theologie der Geschichte," printed as the preface to the final volume of his Geschichte des Hellenismus, argues that there is an unbroken stream, an overall process revealing a divine purpose, which runs through the ages and which it is the historian's task intuitively to understand.[71] As Rüsen has it, Droysen's hermeneutical statements reveal a combination of "kritische Geschichtswissenschaft" and "idealistische Geschichtsphilosophie."[72]

The "Crisis in Historical Understanding"

As is well known,[73] to the years following about 1890, the same period in which the History-of-Religions School in biblical criticism first began to make its positions well known, there has come to be fixed some such label as the "crisis in historical understanding." In this era Dilthey, speaking for many others, could reflect that "the present age was more helpless in the face of the basic questions of life than any previous period."[74] Though many scholars reflected this crisis in their personal lives, of none is this more true than it is of Max Weber.[75]

I noted above that we are doubtless confronted here with the danger of an exaggerated periodization of history. Still, it is difficult to think of another period, unless it is the present, when questions of method loomed so large, when historians on all sides began consciously to evaluate the foundations of historical understanding. I have to schematize greatly my discussion here. However, one can fairly argue that this era witnessed on behalf of many a return to the classic formulations of the German historiographic tradition, a turn to a Neo-Idealist and more "spiritual" understanding of history, and, with this, a sharp criticism of the works of the

immediately preceding decades. These decades' historical works came to be stigmatized as too "positivistic," "mechanical," "fragmented," and "specialized."[76] Scholars claimed to have perceived a loss of "cultural vitality" in the quarter century following 1850, a situation which only began to be reversed in the late 1880's and beyond.[77]

The enemy against which this latter era rebelled is not entirely real. That is, to find much true positivism in the German historical works of the period 1850-1880 is difficult. One might, I suppose, argue that Wellhausen's scheme for the history of Israel, with its stages of vigor and then decadence, does correspond to aspects of Comte's thought. In any case, in so far as positivism insists that the methods of inquiry in the natural sciences are the same methods which all other sciences must follow, the entire German tradition of historical understanding entailed a sharp anti-positivistic bias, which was made the stronger in the decades near the turn of the century. This became the central issue of the Geisteswissenschaft debate, a debate associated above all with Dilthey.[78] For Dilthey, the key terms in this discussion became erleben and, especially, verstehen.[79] Though there is no doubt, as Ermarth has proved brilliantly, that Dilthey's concept of verstehen has been grossly misunderstood,[80] Dilthey did intend through his use of this term to combine realism and Idealism into a proper science for the comprehension of human phenomena.

Others in these years took these thoughts further in a Neo-Romantic direction and began to demand, in terms strikingly reminiscent of Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen, a renewed stress upon the necessity within the humanistic disciplines for the investigator to establish a personal relationship with the material investigated. This demand is certainly related to the profound distaste for any approach which might be called mechanistic; but it went behond this to include a longing for a simpler, rural life, and a loathing of the technological and impersonal aspects of contemporary society. Ringer attributes this in part to the fact that these years witnessed changes in the structure of German universities, changes which meant that scholars "were actually experiencing that process of dehumanization which many German professors associated with the advent of the machine age."[81] The generally pessimistic assessment of the present and the future is, again, to be found reflected most poignantly in Weber's comments on the inescapability of bureaucratic rule.[82]

Finally, this period also saw an attempt to deepen historical understanding by including an analysis of the social contexts of events and of texts. To relate this attempt to the above observations, I think one can say that the addition of sociological analysis was seen as step toward the goal of combining Idealism with realism. That is, if one brought a consideration of the social into his historical thinking, then one was obeying the dictum to investigate concrete reality while simultaneously discovering an experiential background for the formulation and transmission of ideas. Once again, there is nothing fundamentally new here, since the twin concentration upon ideas and their concrete realizations was precisely that of the entire German historiographic tradition. In all these ways, then, the years following 1890 represent not so much a radical break as they do a vigorous return to the formulation of historical understanding of Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen.

The History-of-Religions Movement

Let me now turn to an account of the History-of-Religions movement (or, school, or circle).[83] This account has as its aim not the establishment of various "influences," which is a characteristic of the least helpful sort of intellectual history. Rather, I want to sharpen the theoretical back-

ground of this movement in biblical study, a background which rests upon assumptions shared with the German historiographic tradition, especially as these assumptions were repeated and deepened in the years following 1890. Despite its deep roots in the German tradition of historical understanding, the History-of-Religions movement, like other movements in this era, did see itself inaugurating a new epoch. Thus, Gressmann wrote at about the turn of the century, "wir am Anfang einer neuen Epoche in der Auffassung der alttestamentlichen Religions- und Literaturgeschichte stehen."[84] However, and this gives some explicit justification to the present study, the members of this movement also placed themselves within a specific tradition: "'In Wirklichkeit ist sie,'" Gunkel said of the History-of-Religions movement in 1914, "'nichts anderes als eine neue Welle des gewaltigen geschichtlichen Stromes, der sich von unseren grossen idealistischen Denkern und Dichtern her über unser gesamtes Geistesleben und auch seit lange in unsere Theologie ergossen hat.'"[85] Further, with regard to the History-of-Religion School's participation in the renewal of historical thought which obtained in the 1890's, Gressmann stated clearly that of the several forces responsible for the School's existence, the most powerful was his era's "developing refinement of the historical sense": "Das Aufkommen der religionsgeschichtlichen Schule auf theologischen Gebiet ist demnach nur die Teilerscheinung einer grösseren Gesamtbewegung, die sich überall in der Wissenschaft bemerkbar macht."[86] So clearly are the theoretical foundations of the History-of-Religions School the same as those of the German historiographic tradition in its several phases that I have not always found it necessary, in what follows, to do more than note the chief characteristics of this School, leaving the reader free to compare these characteristics with the account of the historiographic tradition given above.

First, the movement's own "Schlagwort" and the interpretation given it indicate immediately the tradition in which the movement stands. Gunkel first used the word "Religionsgeschichte" in 1889.[87] By it he, along with others who followed, meant to assert than any understanding of religious phenomena which was not historical was unthinkable. Reflecting in 1926 on the movement's origins, Gunkel wrote, "we had come to see that such a phenomenon can be understood only when it is understood in his history, in its growth and becoming."[88] An historical investigation alone, it was maintained, would reveal the trueforces at work in the human realm: "Die geschichtliche Exegese geht von der Grundüberzeugung aus, dass das Leben der Menschheit nicht nach Willkür und Zufall verläuft, sondern dass darin ewige Ordnungen walten."[89] Only such an investigation could arrive at "das geheimnisvolle Innenleben" of Israelite religion, which was, Gunkel makes clear, the real goal of exegesis.[90] Moreover, just as the tradition founded by Herder and Humboldt claimed to be free of ideology, so too Gressmann proclaimed that alone an investigation which pursues "nur die geschichtlichen Tatsachen als solche" can be free of dogma.[91]

In this connection, great importance should be attached to Gunkel and Gressmann's insistence that it was upon the word Geschichte that the emphasis of the movement lay. Here the initial influence of Albert Eichhorn is clear, for Gunkel said that he and others had learned from Eichhorn to pay heed to realities and not theories, to history and not philosophy.[92] Humboldt and Droysen, we have seen, said precisely the same. To be sure, the members of the History-of-Religions School did speak of the connections between the Isrealite or Christian religions and other religions. However, when this aspect of the School came to be accented by others, and when the movement came to be seen chiefly for its comparative work, Gunkel and Gressmann both protested that this was only a subsidiary aspect of the movement, one subordinated to its centrally historical emphasis. Hence, the School's negative reaction to the work of Friedrich Delitzsch and others of the pan-Babylonian group should occasion no surprise. The true "Kern der Bewegung," Gressmann wrote, was not the use of other religions as an aid

to understand Judaism and Christianity; it was rather the word Geschichte.[93] Gunkel's forward to his Reden und Aufsätze is especially instructive in this regard. If others, Gunkel writes, have taken Religionsgeschichte to mean chiefly the explanation of biblical religion in the light of extra-biblical religions, they are mistaken. Instead, Gunkel protests -- and here one cannot help but recall Droysen's aphorism "Über den Geschichten ist die Geschichte"-- "wir haben von Anfang an unter 'Religionsgeschichte' nicht die Geschichte der Religionen, sondern die Geschichte der Religion verstanden."[94]

A common and useful means of characterizing the movement begun by Eichhorn, Gunkel, and others is to place it in opposition to Wellhausen and Literarkritik. The movement's reaction to Wellhausen is surely a part of the general tendency, apparent in many different disciplines in the 1890's, to criticize the previous generation as too mechanistic, too concerned with empirical data alone and not enough with the deeper origins of the data or with the overall historical process the data reflect. The conflict between the History-of-Religions School and Wellhausen ought not to be exaggerated. Gunkel praised Wellhausen repeatedly and never ceased to insist that Literarkritik was an aspect of his own program too. Wellhausen, Gunkel said, was his greatest teacher.[95] Gunkel also said that Wellhausen had in fact laid the true foundations for the History-of-Religions movement, even if he had not gone far enough in his historical research.[96] And Gunkel expressed the hope, in a letter to K. Budde, that he would be remembered as "'ein echter Wellhausianer.'"[97] Nor did such respect flow in one direction alone, for it was Wellhausen who recommended Gunkel to Hinneberg to write the Israelite literature section of the latter's Die Kultur der Gegenwart.[98]

Still, "der Streit mit Wellhausen," as Klatt labels it,[99] did mark a real division of opinion. The birth of the History-of-Religions School, Gressmann claimed, was marked by its disagreement with Wellhausen.[100] What, then, was the basis for this disagreement? In a sentence, and admitting that no one formulated it quite this explicitly, the basis of the disagreement was the feeling of Gunkel, Eichhorn, and others that Wellhausen had not been sufficiently historical. To say this seems highly paradoxical, since Wellhausen merits, by ordinary criteria, the title of historian as clearly as anyone. But in the eyes of the members of the History-of-Religions School Wellhausen was not sufficiently historical because he was too mechanical in his emphasis on source analysis, too little concerned with connections between the religion of Israel and the religions of the surrounding nations, and too little aware of the deeper origins which define the truest spirit of Israelite religion. All of these charges, I need hardly add, have about them a most familiar ring to anyone acquainted with the intellectual climate of Germany at the turn of the century.

Further, the charges against Wellhausen were nearly inevitable given the spirit in which the History-of-Religions School was founded. Though several members of this school denied that any one scholar could be said to have founded their movement, that scholar who comes closest to earning the designation of founder was Albert Eichhorn, to whom Gunkel dedicated his Schöpfung und Chaos (1895), a volume which officially inaugurated this school.[101] Among the theses Eichhorn had defended in 1888 as a part of his Habilitation at Halle were the following: "'Jede Deutung eines Mythus ist falsch, welche nicht die Entstehung und Ausbildung des Mythus berücksichtigt;'" "'Die Geschichtschreibung ist eine Kunst;'" and "'Historiker ist nur, wer die Gegenwert versteht.'"[102] Each one of these theses, and especially the first, is best seen as a polemical statement against a "merely" literary-critical approach. Each, in addition, recalls vividly the main lines of the German tradition of historical understanding. When Wellhausen criticized Schöpfung und Chaos on the ground that the origin of the material now in Genesis 1-3, for example, was a matter of indifference,

Gunkel answered in this way:

> In such declarations Wellhausen falls into conflict with fundamental principles which are everywhere recognized in historical science. . . . The cardinal principle of historical study is this: That we are unable to comprehend a person, a period, or a thought dissociated from its antecedents, but that we can speak of a real living understanding only when we have the antecedent history.[103]

Already in Schöpfung und Chaos, "'das letzte Ziel der Forschung'" is for Gunkel "'den ursprünglichen Zusammenhang zu reconstruieren und die Gründe seiner Veränderung unzugeben, dh die Geschichte der Tradition zu schreiben.'"[104] The literary-critical method, then, was not truly historical, in the eyes of those who wanted to go beyond it, because it did not go deeply enough into the sources which truly are responsible for the historical process. To fail to probe the Urgeschichte of a text was to fail to approach that text historically. Wellhausen and his school, Gunkel said, "were disposed to pay too little heed to what has not come down to us in the literature."[105] "Wie oft," Gressmann argued, "ist das Ungeschriebene wichtiger als die Geschriebene!"[106] Thus, as the historical hermeneutics shaped by Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen criticized any approach which did not deal sufficiently with origins, with developments, and with the connections between events, so the same charges were repeated and made more particular by the History-of-Religions School against the literary-critical approach.

Among those characteristics of the German historiographical tradition which were emphasized with renewed enthusiasm in the years around the turn of the century was that which insisted upon the distinctiveness of the humanistic disciplines. In opposition to the alleged positivism which had obtained in preceding decades, scholars began in about 1890 to argue again that historical understanding was an art, and an art which demanded of the historian a personal relationship with the material investigated. This theme too shows up in the work of the History-of-Religions School. Gunkel railed against what he perceived as the reigning materialism of the preceding generation.[107] He proposed to counter a coldly analytic approach through calling attention to the beauty of the Old Testament and to the joy which it evoked in a sensitive exegete.[108] An awareness of the artistry of the Old Testament carried with it for Gunkel and others an important hermeneutical implication, for it meant that the exegete must himself participate in the feelings the text evokes. Thus Gressmann argued that the student of the Bible must bring to the religion of Israel an "ehrfurchtsvolle Liebe," and must establish with this religion a "persönliche Anteilnahme."[109] The conclusion of such arguments is, in Gunkel's well known formulation, that "Exegese im höchsten Sinne ist mehr eine Kunst als eine Wissenschaft."[110] There is nothing here which would not have been endorsed heartily by any of the founders of historical hermeneutics in Germany or by their defenders at the turn of the century period. What is of especial interest to us is the theoretical background for this argument: behind the call for the historian to approach his material reverentially and to establish with it a living, devotional relationship is the Idealist presupposition that all in history is a reflection of the greater historical process -- or, more simply, a reflection of the divine.

The years following about 1890 also saw, it will be remembered, a return to the demand, first voiced by the German historians we surveyed above, that the historian discover the concrete, social contexts in which ideas were realized. That is, many scholars looked again, as Herder, Humboldt, Ranke, and Droysen had bid them, to the social realm as a reflection of the vital, creative impulses in human life. The result in biblical study was that many parts of the Bible were investigated not alone for their religious ideas but also for the religious experiences in which these ideas realized themselves. It is this turn which helps to explain the enormous

significance granted the study of Gattungen in this era. This phenomenon is also a product of another aspect of the hermeneutics of the German historians, namely, that different categories of literature demand different categories of understanding. These issues, I would argue, are more important than an issue which has received much attention, that of whether or not Gunkel acquired his emphasis upon Gattungen directly from Germanists and classicists.[111] When Gunkel claims that literary types are the key data because they lie deeper than the individual artistic level,[112] this claim implies that types give one access to the general process of history which also, of course, lies deeper than the individual level. Therefore, for Gunkel the origin of any type was to be sought in the overall social life of the people. The research program of Gunkel's era, with this renewed stress upon the concrete, social realizations of the historical process, almost demanded that he would seek to anchor religion in the realm of real Leben. That he should then have moved on to formulate the notion of Sitz im Leben is anything but surprising. "Wer also eine antike Gattung verstehen will," Gunkel wrote in 1906, "hat zunächst zu fragen, wo sie ihren Sitz im Volksleben habe."[113] The desire to explain where and how individual forms had actually functioned accounts for Gunkel's willingness to discuss the cult, a willingness which is otherwise puzzling since, as Klatt has shown, cultic phenomena were not a part of Gunkel's own experience.[114] Gunkel did not go as far in this direction as would his pupil Mowinckel. Still, the first sentence of Gunkel's article on the Psalms in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart asserts, as if self-evident, that "wissenschaftliche Betrachtung eine Betrachtung im Zusammenhange ist."[115] And the context, as this and other of Gunkel's studies make plain, is preeminently the social context, for it was here, following the mandate of the hermeneutical tradition established by nineteenth-century German historians, that one reached the true and living origin of Israelite religion. It is also worth noting that in addition to the fact of an accent upon Gattungen, the way in which Gunkel discusses literary types -- types develop and grow, from small units to greater wholes, and they have a full maturity followed by an increasingly rigidified old age -- is a fine example of the almost universal application of that organic analogy which was an essential part of the German historiographic tradition. In one fashion or another, these bases for form critical work have been followed throughout the present century, with little awareness, at least explicitly, of either the theoretical nature of the bases or of the criticisms leveled against them in other disciplines.

One last emphasis of the German tradition of historical understanding which was wholly shared by the members of the History-of-Religions School was that concerning the proper assessment of nations. Nations, and epochs too, were seen as unique organisms. This hermeneutical aspect of the historiographic tradition manifests itself most clearly in the discussion by Gunkel and Gressmann of the proper role to be accorded to comparative investigation. Both left no doubt that their comparative work was only preparatory labor which concluded with a proper appreciation of the unique status and value of Israel.[116] For example, in "Die Grundprobleme der israelitischen Literaturgeschichte," Gunkel argues that while a bountiful harvest awaits the scholar who will compare the legends of Genesis with other narratives, such a comparison will reveal in the end "das Eigentümliche des israelitischen Geistes."[117] Similarly, on a more specific level, a comparison of the Babylonian Flood tales with Genesis 6-9 will show "wie stark hier der eigentümliche Geist Israels gearbeitet."[118] Gunkel's program of moving from the comparative to the appreciation of the unique value of Israel and of Israelite religion is precisely that of the German tradition of historical understanding generally. Meaning in history for this tradition was to be found above all in the existence of individual nations and of their separately unique achievements. It was here that the goal of the historical process was clearest.

America and the German Historiographic Tradition

One of the themes which has run consistently through the above discussion is this: despite the talk of the difference between the historian and the philosopher, despite the claim that the former works up from the data while the latter works down from abstractions, there is a great deal in the German tradition of historical understanding which is dependent upon something other than empirical inquiry. To say that theoretical presuppositions lay beneath this tradition is hardly to distinguish it from any other hermeneutical tradition. Still, it is important to note the kind of Idealist thought which informs this particular tradition, and the way in which this stream of thought is combined with an equal dose of empiricism. Something of particular interest in this regard is the American reception of the historical hermeneutics founded by Herder, Humboldt, and others.[119] Here I can just touch upon this issue, and leave a proper study of it for another occasion. With this warning in mind, one can fairly summarize the American reception of the tradition we have been following by saying that American historians came to see the German historiographic tradition as thoroughly empiricist and anti-philosophical. They exhibited little apparent awareness of its deep roots in a particular philosophical tradition. Their discussion focused, quite naturally, upon Ranke. American historians during the last two decades of the nineteenth century regarded Ranke as "the prototype of the nontheoretical and, for many, the politically neutral historian."[120] "They believed," Iggers notes with absolute correctness, "that a Rankean or scientific approach to history consisted in a search for facts with little or no attempts at generalization and a rigorous renunciation of all philosophy."[121] Similarly, Cushing Strout has demonstrated that "American historians saw in Ranke the high priest of a 'scientific' history which would be devoted to the pursuit of isolated fact."[122] The fact that the American historians who reached and publicized this judgment (for example, Herbert B. Adams of Johns Hopkins, Edward G. Bourne of Yale, or Ephraim Emerton of Harvard)[123] held chairs in some of the institutions in which biblical scholarship made its initial impact in this country is intriguing. It suggests the thesis that American scholars were strangely unable to appreciate the theoretical presuppositions in a tradition whose roots were largely Idealist.

If one turns from this altogether too brief summary to a consideration of the German assessment of Ranke and of the tradition in which he stands, one's initial reaction is that the Americans and the Germans, surely, cannot have been assessing the same tradition.[124] For us, the most critically important assessments are those reached by Meinecke and Wach, since they stand so centrally in the German hermeneutical tradition. Meinecke's _Die Entstehung des Historismus_ concludes with an appendix devoted to Ranke.[125] It is true, Meinecke begins, that Ranke refined the source-critical method which he learned from Niebuhr, and that this is a memorable contribution from him. However, when Ranke speaks of understanding, Meinecke continues, he speaks of it in terms of "'_ahnende Erkenntnis_,'" a kind of divination which goes well beyond an intimate acquaintance with the facts.[126] Meinecke concludes that Ranke's infrequent but significant references to the hand of God in history and his continual habit of referring to states as living beings means that there is a deep foundation of Idealism in Ranke's thought.[127] Wach's summary of Ranke's hermeneutics is remarkably similar.[128] So too is Heinrich von Sybel's "_Gedächtnisrede auf Leopold v. Ranke_,"[129] a fact of special significance since von Sybel's address was published in 1886, the same period in which American historians were reaching very different conclusions about Ranke. Von Sybel argues that Ranke's initial years in Berlin, where he encountered Hegel, Humboldt, and Schleiermacher, were formative of his hermeneutics, for it was just after this that Ranke began

to seek the invisible connections between events which would reveal the true unity of all history.[130] Whether or not von Sybel is correct in his suggestions for the origin of Ranke's Idealism, he is undeniably justified in pointing out the great role played by Ranke's philosophical convictions in his historical inquiries. From the perspective of the present, then, the assessment reached by von Sybel, Wach, and Meinecke seems as sound and well-balanced as the American assessment seems curiously one-sided. German students of their own land's historical hermeneutics took far less seriously this hermeneutics' claim to be without theoretical foundations than did American historians.

Conclusion

These brief remarks on the reception accorded the German tradition of historical understanding by some powerfully influential American historians leads me directly to some final remarks. The justification of the present study lies in its claim that an appreciation of the intellectual context of a particular movement within biblical study (the History-of-Religions School) can bring with it a renewed awareness of the theoretical bases both of this movement and of all subsequent work within biblical scholarship (form criticism, tradition history, etc.) which has defined its goals after the manner of Gunkel and others. That it is possible to be quite blind to these bases is proved beyond question by a glance at an important stream of American historical thought.

More importantly, this lack of awareness of the importance of theory to the study of ancient texts obtains not just among a few American historians. For example, it became customary in this century, very clearly in the American phase of the Biblical Theology movement, to assert that the Bible is studied historically because the texts demand historical treatment. That is, the claim has been that an historically oriented study is a result of a scholar's own, relatively unmediated encounter with the text itself. There is more to it than this. The question of what biblical texts mean was answered in thoroughly historical terms throughout the nineteenth century, and especially in the generation of Gunkel, not in the first instance because the texts themselves cry out for historical treatment. Instead, the question of meaning was answered in this way because such historical orientation was the accepted and approved method of understanding when dealing with human phenomena. In addition, though those German historians whose works we have examined here insisted that their mandate that the historian avoid normative concepts meant that the resulting historical portraits would be free of ideology, recent students of the German historical tradition have maintained that this tradition's refusal to acknowledge its great theoretical component looks highly ideological.[131]

Whatever one's assessment of this particular conclusion, it is undeniable that the role of theory in the methods of the German historiographic tradition, and hence in that tradition's manifestations in biblical study, is great, and probably greater than many have been willing to allow. Barry Barnes has recently reminded us that "those general beliefs which we are most convinced deserve the status of objective knowledge -- scientific beliefs -- are readily shown to be overwhelmingly theoretical in character."[132] If this is true of scientific beliefs, it is true as well of the concepts with which biblical scholarship has operated for most of this century. The occasional reminder of how thoroughly theory dependent is biblical criticism can only aid us in our attempt to direct further research.[133]

I can perhaps make this more concrete by mentioning briefly two adjectives which have played no small role in recent discussions of method in biblical study. The adjectives, both of which have nearly acquired the

status of talismans, are diachronic and synchronic. Despite their heavy use of late, these terms are of value in describing the primary directions of various programs of research. The nineteenth-century inheritance was so powerful that for a long time biblical study was directed by diachronic concerns -- concerns for correctly dating various stages in a tradition's development, concerns for separating early traditions from redactional elements, and so forth. This approach came to be seen as self-evidently correct and as particularly appropriate to the alleged character of the biblical texts. So much was this the case that an initial response to some methods of understanding which accent rather a synchronic analysis was that these latter methods looked suspiciously apriori and theoretical. Such methods were therefore to be rejected. This response is fundamentally mistaken. The clash of the traditional, historical approach with newer methods of analysis is not, as the partisans of the former might wish to assert, a clash between an objective, scientific approach on the one hand, and a subjective, theoretical approach on the other. The conflict is rather a conflict between two equally theoretical methods of understanding, neither of which can claim to be working in the first instance from a direct confrontation with the text itself. The pressing question for us is therefore that of which theory is the more coherent.

NOTES

1. Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, & Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1971), p. 51.

2. Das Verstehen: Grundzüge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Theorie im 19. Jahrhundert (3 vols.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1926-1933). Humboldt's hermeneutical teachings are treated in vol. 1, pp. 227-266, Ranke's in vol. 3, pp. 89-133, and Droysen's in vol. 3, pp. 134-188.

3. "Introduction" to Hermann Gunkel, The Psalms: A Form-Critical Introduction (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967), p. iii.

4. Two volumes of particular value for one interested in the origins and development of the History-of-Religions School are Hugo Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn und die religionsgeschichtliche Schule (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1914), and Werner Klatt, Hermann Gunkel: Zu seiner Theologie der Religionsgeschichte und zur Entstehung der formgeschichtlichen Methode (FRLANT 100; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969). See also Hans-Joachim Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments (2d ed.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969), pp. 327-367, and J. W. Rogerson, Myth in Old Testament Interpretation (BZAW 134; Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), pp. 57-65. Recent discussions of Gunkel's theoretical foundations include Martin J. Buss, "The Idea of Sitz im Leben -- History and Critizue," ZAW, 90 (1978), 157-170, and S. M. Warner, "Primitive saga men," VT, 29 (1979), 325-335.

5. Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 17.

6. Maurice Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1977), pp. 22-23, and pp. 134-136.

7. Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1969), p. 36.

8. Wach, Das Verstehen; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode:

Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (2d ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965) = Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975); Palmer, Hermeneutiks; and Edgar V. McKnight, Meaning in Texts: The Historical Shaping of a Narrative Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978).

9. W. M. L. de Wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel, p. 3, cited by Kraus, Geschichte, pp. 176-177.

10. Cited by Kraus, Geschichte, p. 185.

11. Gadamer, "Hermeneutik und Historismus," in Wahrheit und Methode, p. 479 (English, p. 462).

12. Kraus refers to Wellhausen's assertion that he had found "the friend of his life" in Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Geschichte, p. 255). On the association of the two, plus the many links between classical philology and biblical criticism, see also the very suggestive observations of C. F. Evans, Explorations in Theology 2 (London: SCM, 1977), pp. 86-100.

13. Arnaldo Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography," Quarto Contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1969), pp. 13-41. Others, most persuasively James Barr, have argued a similar point.

14. Arnaldo Momigliano, Quinto Contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1975), vol. 1, p. 152.

15. M. I. Finley, The Use and Abuse of History (New York: Viking, 1975), p. 61.

16. See Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Middletown: Wesleyan University, 1968), and "Historicism," in The Dictionary of the History of Ideas (New York, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 457-464 (the article concludes with an extensive bibliography); Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1969) and Education and Society in Modern Europe (Bloomington and London: Indiana University, 1979); G. P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (2d ed.; London: Longmans, Green and Co.: 1952); Friedrich Engel-Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series 62, no. 2; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1944); and Mandelbaum, History, Man, & Reason and The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge.

17. Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 4.

18. One of the topics of contemporary research into the development of historicism has been the roots of this tradition in eighteenth century thought, despite the nineteenth century's rebellion against many Enlightenment ideas. See Mandelbaum, History, Man, & Reason, pp. 51-61; and Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism (Berkeley -- Los Angeles -- London: University of California, 1975). The classic study of historicism remains Friedrich Meinecke's Die Entstehung des Historismus (ed. Carl Hinrichs; München: R. Oldenbourg, 1959).

19. Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: a Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1974), p. 213. Somewhat paradoxically, this led, as Frei goes on to say, "to a vast universalization in defining the content of historical change" (p. 213). We will meet this same apparent paradox in slightly dif-

ferent forms below.

20. So McKnight, Meaning in Texts, p. 54.

21. Hermeneutics, p. 232; cf. p. 10, p. 19, and p. 252.

22. The German Conception of History, p. 10.

23. See Reill, The German Enlightenment, p. 67.

24. Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 14.

25. See Lothar Perlitt, Vatke und Wellhausen (BZAW 94; Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1965), p. 23; and cf. Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 35, and Mandelbaum, History, Man, & Reason, p. 58.

26. History, Man, & Reason, p. 42 (italicized in the original). For further definitions of historicism, see the sources cited in n. 16 above, plus Dwight E. Lee and Robert N. Beck, "The Meaning of 'Historicism,'" American Historical Review, 59 (1954), 568-577, and Reinhard Wittram, Das Interesse an der Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), p. 58 (historicism is concerned "alle Erscheinungen des menschlichen Lebens wesentlich als Geschichte und damit als zeitbedingt und veränderlich darstellen").

27. Perlitt, Vatke und Wellhausen, p. 59.

28. Cited by Paul R. Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt: A Biography, Volume One: 1767-1808 (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1978), p. ix. Sweet's study is most instructive for the formation of Humboldt's thought. For a specific account of Humboldt's hermeneutics, see Wach, Das Verstehen, vol. 1, pp. 227-266.

29. Cf. Wach, Das Verstehen, vol. 1, p. 227.

30. This treatise is most conveniently available in Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Albert Leitzmann (Berlin: B. Behr's, 1905), vol. 4 (1820-1822), pp. 35-56. The essay was first published in Abhandlungen der historisch-philologischen Klasse der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1822, 305-322; and there is an excellent translation in History and Theory, 6 (1967), 57-71. References here are to the essay as published in the Gesammelte Schriften edition (abbreviated GS).

31. "Über die Aufgabe," GS, vol. 4, p. 35.

32. "Über die Aufgabe," GS, vol. 4, p. 37.

33. "Über die Aufgabe," GS, vol. 4, p. 46.

34. "Über die Aufgabe," GS, vol. 4, p. 56.

35. "Über die Aufgabe," GS, vol. 4, p. 36.

36. Das Verstehen, vol. 1, p. 250. As is well known, similar sentiments were expressed by Schleiermacher; see Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 178-179 (English, pp. 167-168), and Palmer, Hermeneutics, pp. 86-91.

37. "Über die Aufgabe," GS, vol. 4, pp. 51-54.

38. Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt, p. 126; cf. p. 283.

39. Cf. Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp. 184-185.

40. Again, see Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp, 185-186.

41. Wach, Das Verstehen, vol. 1, p. 239 (summarizing Humboldt).

42. Cf. Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt, p. 183.

43. Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (1785-1795), pp. 86-96.

44. Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 51.

45. Wach, Das Verstehen, vol. 3, p. 89. On Ranke, see Wach, Das Verstehen, vol. 3, pp. 89-133; Gooch, History and Historians, pp. 72-97; Meinecke, "Leopold von Ranke: Gedächtnisrede," pp. 585-602 in Die Entstehung des Historismus; Theodore Von Laue, Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (Princeton Studies in History 4; Princeton: Princeton University, 1950); Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 191-199 (English, pp, 179-187); and Leonard Krieger, Ranke: The Meaning of History (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1977).

46. The phrase was used by Ranke in the preface to his Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514 (1824), p. vii.

47. See Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, p. 43.

48. Ranke's Politisches Gespräch is most accessible in the translation of Von Laue (Leopold Ranke, pp. 152-180); the citation here is from p. 164.

49. Cf. Iggers, The German Conception of History, pp. 76-77, and Perlitt, Vatke und Wellhausen, p. 62.

50. "Dialogue on Politics," in Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, pp. 168-169.

51. "Dialogue on Politics," in Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, p. 168.

52. Leopold von Ranke, Weltgeschichte: Erster Theil, Die älteste historische Völkergruppe und die Griechen (2d ed.; Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1881), p. v; cf. p. viii. Already in his History of the Popes (1834-1836), Ranke had said, "'There is no national history in which universal history does not play a great role'" (cited by Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, p. 85).

53. Cf. Reill, The German Enlightenment, p. 101.

54. See Jörn Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte: Genesis und Begründung der Geschichtstheorie J.G. Droysens (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1969), p. 13, n. 16, and p. 89, n. 1. In addition to Rüsen's very important monograph, see on Droysen, Wach, Das Verstehen, vol. 3, pp. 134-188; Gooch, History and Historians, pp. 125-131; Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 199-205 (English, pp. 187-192); Iggers, The German Conception of History, pp. 104-115; and Robert Southard, "Theology in Droysen's Early Political Historiography: Free Will, Necessity, and the Historian," History and Theory, 18 (1979), 378-396 (see 378, n. 1 in Southard's article for a more complete bibliography).

55. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 477 (English, p. 460).

56. For Droysen's views on Hellenism, see Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, pp. 23-49, and Momigliano's important essay "J.G. Droysen Between Greeks and Jews," Quinto Contributo, vol. 1, pp. 109-126.

57. Droysen's Grundriss der Historik is now available in Rudolf Hübner's ed., Historik: Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte (5th ed.; München: R. Oldenbourg, 1967), pp. 317-366. For Schleiermacher, see now F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, ed. Heinz Kimmerle, trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (AAR Texts & Translations 1; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977).

58. Historik, p. 324. See Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, pp. 117-122 for the many similarities between the hermeneutics of Humboldt and Droysen.

59. Historik, pp. 326-327.

60. On Droysen's use of the concept of "die sittliche Welt" and the similarities here with Hegel, see Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, pp. 103-104, and pp. 122-133, and Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 201 (English, p. 188).

61. Historik, p. 329.

62. Historik, p. 329 and p. 335.

63. Historik, pp. 386-405 (originally, a review of Buckle's History of England).

64. Historik, pp. 406-415.

65. Historik, pp. 416-424.

66. In a letter by Droysen, cited by Wach, Das Verstehen, vol. 3, p. 154.

67. Historik, p. 354.

68. As is the case with the term "historicism," definitions of Idealism abound. That upon which I am relying is Mandelbaum's: "metaphysical idealism holds that within natural human experience one can find the clue to an understanding of the ultimate nature of reality, and this clue is revealed through those traits which distinguish man as a spiritual being" (History, Man, & Reason, p. 6).

69. Cf. Von Laue, Leopold Ranke, p. 123; Iggers, The German Conception of History, pp. 65-66; and Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 192-199 (English, pp. 180-186).

70. In a letter of Droysen from 1842, cited by Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, p. 20.

71. Pp. 369-385 in Historik; cf. Southard, "Theology in Droysen's Early Political Historiography," 383-385.

72. Begriffene Geschichte, p. 11.

73. See H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930 (rev. ed.; New York: Vintage, 1977), and Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins.

74. Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1978), p. 16.

75. See, e.g., Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 127.

Iggers himself argues that the crisis atmosphere of this era has probably been exaggerated (pp. 124-126) but that the era's significance remains great for the problems of historical understanding.

76. See Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, p. 265.

77. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, p. 260.

78. In addition to Ermarth's volume (n. 74 above), for Dilthey's hermeneutics see Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 205-228 (English, pp. 192-214); Palmer, Hermeneutics, pp. 98-123; and McKnight, Meaning in Texts, pp. 26-30.

79. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 316-317.

80. Ermarth caricatures the misunderstanding of verstehen as "some neo-idealist gnosis best left to telepathists and clairvoyants" (Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 241); see pp. 241-321 for Ermarth's demonstration of the misapprehension by a great many scholars of what Dilthey meant by his use of the term verstehen.

81. The Decline of the German Mandarins, p. 57; cf. pp. 78-80.

82. See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City: Anchor, 1962), pp. 460-463.

83. Gressmann prefers the term "Kreise" on the grounds that "Schule" implies a kind of institutional framework which did not exist for this movement (Albert Eichhorn und die religionsgeschichtliche Schule, p. 25). I will use the term school, in addition to movement (Bewegung), because this is the term generally applied to this group, despite Gressmann's cautions.

84. The statement is from unpublished material of Gressmann, cited by Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 74.

85. Cited by Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 26; the article which contained this sentence originally appeared in Deutsch-Evangelist, 5 (1914).

86. Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, p. 28.

87. Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 25, n. 39.

88. Hermann Gunkel, "The 'Historical Movement' in the Study of Religion," Expository Times, 38 (1926-27), 533.

89. Hermann Gunkel, "Ziele und Methoden der Erklärung des Alten Testament," pp. 11-29 in Reden und Aufsätze (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913); citation from p. 26. This article is especially valuable for its explicit statements of the History-of-Religion School's aims.

90. Gunkel, "Ziele und Methoden," p. 12.

91. Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, p. 14.

92. See Gunkel's letter of 1913 to Gressmann, cited in Kraus, Geschichte, p. 330.

93. Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, pp. 29-30.

94. Gunkel, Reden und Aufsätze, p. v.

95. Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, pp. 46-47.

96. Gunkel, "The 'Historical Movement,'" 533.

97. Cited in Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 179.

98. Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 107, n. 4.

99. Hermann Gunkel, pp. 70-74.

100. Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, p. 30.

101. So Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, p. 26; cf. Klatt (Hermann Gunkel, p. 80) on the significance of Schöpfung und Chaos.

102. Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, p. 8. Several of Eichhorn's theses are also cited in Kraus, Geschichte, p. 328. Douglas A. Knight (Rediscovering the Traditions of Israel (rev. ed.; SBL Diss. Series 9; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975), p. 71) also emphasizes the importance of the first of these theses.

103. Hermann Gunkel, "The Religio-Historical Interpretation of the New Testament," The Monist, 13 (1902-03), 404.

104. Schöpfung und Chaos, p. 256 (cited in Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 66).

105. Gunkel, "The 'Historical Movement,'" 534.

106. Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, p. 31; cf. p. 35.

107. Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, p. 86, citing Gunkel's "Die Popularisierung der theologischen Forschung," Festschrift Ferienkurse Jena, p. 75: "'Eine tiefe Sehnsucht nach Religion geht durch unsere Zeit. Die Zeit des Materialismus ist vorüber.'"

108. See especially Gunkel's essay "What is Left of the Old Testament?," pp. 13-56 in What Remains of the Old Testament and Other Essays (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), an essay whose defense of the Old Testament opens, "To begin with, we have in the Old Testament an almost illimitable wealth of artistic stimulation" (p. 19).

109. Gressmann, Albert Eichhorn, p. 47.

110. Gunkel, "Ziele und Methoden," p. 14.

111. This issue has dominated many discussions of Gunkel's emphasis on Gattungen; see, e.g., Klatt, Hermann Gunkel, pp. 106-116.

112. Hermann Gunkel, "Die Grundprobleme der israelititschen Literaturgeschichte," pp. 29-38 in Reden und Aufsätze (citation from p. 31). Cf. "Die israelitische Literatur," in Die Kultur der Gegenwart: Die orientalischen Literaturen, ed. Paul Hinneberg (Berlin and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1906), p. 52.

113. "Die israelitische Literatur," p. 53.

114. Hermann Gunkel, p. 182.

115. Hermann Gunkel, "Die Psalmen," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (2d ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1930), vol. 4, col. 1609.

116. Another motive present here was the desire (noted above) to distance the History-of-Religions movement as clearly as possible from the Babel und Bibel controversy. Gressmann (Albert Eichhorn, p. 40) argues that only out of "ignorance or ill-will" (Urkenntnis oder Überwollen) could one confuse the work of Gunkel, Eichhorn, and himself with that of the pan-Babylonian school.

117. Gunkel, "Die Grundprobleme," p. 37. Recall again Humboldt's repeated use of the adjective "eigentümlich."

118. Gunkel, "Die israelitische Literatur," p. 67.

119. This entire section of the present discussion is heavily indebted to Georg C. Iggers' article "The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought," History and Theory, 2 (1962), 17-40. See also W. Stull Holt, "The Idea of Scientific History in America," Journal of the History of Ideas, 1 (1940), 352-362, and Cushing Strout, The Pragmatic Revolt in American History (New Haven: Yale University, 1958), pp. 14-21 and p. 73.

120. Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 63.

121. "The Image of Ranke," 21; cf. 23.

122. The Pragmatic Revolt, p. 19.

123. See Herbert B. Adams, "Special Methods of Historical Study as Pursued at the Johns Hopkins University and at Smith College," and "New Methods of Study in History," Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 2 (1884), 5-138, and Edward Gaylord Bourne, "Leopold von Ranke," pp. 245-261 in Essays in Historical Criticism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901).

124. Again, of decisive importance here is Iggers' "The Image of Ranke," 27-40.

125. Die Entstehung des Historismus, pp. 585-602.

126. Die Entstehung des Historismus, p. 589.

127. Die Entstehung des Historismus, p. 590.

128. Das Verstehen, vol. 3, pp. 89-133.

129. Historische Zeitschrift, NF 20 (1886), 463-481.

130. Von Sybel, "Gedächtnisrede," 470-471.

131. Iggers, The German Conception of History, p. 17; cf. Iggers' further observation that "historicism undoubtedly greatly impoverished historical scholarship when it dismissed the great theoretical questions facing man as legitimate problems of scholarly study" (p. 285).

132. Barry Barnes, Scientific knowledge and sociological theory (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 10. I owe my awareness of Barnes' work, as well as much of the stimulus for several aspects of the present study, to Professor Ivan Strenski of Connecticut College.

133. I have attempted in several recent studies to argue the same point with regard to the general analysis of ancient myths. See Robert A. Oden, Jr., "'The Contendings of Horus and Seth' (Chester Beatty Papyrus No. 1): A Structural Interpretation," History of Religions, 18 (1979), 352-

369; "Method in the Study of Near Eastern Myths," Religion, 9 (1979), 182-196; and "Theoretical Assumptions in the Study of Ugaritic Myths," MAARAV, 2 (1979), 1-20.

S 199 DISCOURSE STRUCTURE AND MACRO-STRUCTURE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF TEXTS: JOHN 4:1-42 AS AN EXAMPLE[1]

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1. Introduction. a) The following study is an attempt to clarify what appears to be a rather complex text by trying to discern all the factors which together contributed to its production and are still discernable in it. John 4:1-42 was chosen because of its complexity, and of the difficulty of seeing how its various parts cohere. Because of the incoherence in its discourse structure it appeared extremely probable that quotations of existing texts were used in its production without adequate editorial smoothing. If that were to have been the case a major part of the task would have been to clarify the function of the quoted materials in the text, but also to uncover meanings in the quoted materials not intended by the author/redactor of the gospel, not however, an attempt to reconstruct the quoted materials as they appeared in the source(s) from which they were quoted.[2] Contrary to expectations, the study revealed the text to be a much more unified production, except for two probable interpolations, vv. 22 and 31f.

b) Three principles of interpretation were determinative for the inquiry, (i) that the meaning of a text is constituted by its macro-structure or semantic deep structure of which the discourse structure is only one (surface level) aspect; (ii) that three macro-functions can be distinguished in the macro-

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1. The absence of reference in this paper to other scholarship on John, and specifically John 4, does not mean that such scholarship is ignored in the inquiry. Scholarship on John is the general background against which it was conducted, but at this stage it was not possible to engage in detailed discussion with other theories of interpreting the gospel. The procedure is not even sufficiently close to that other text-linguistic analysis of the chapter to engage with it in detailed discussion. I mean Birger Olsson's Structure and Meaning in the Fourth Gospel. A Text-Linguistic Analysis of John 2:1-11 and 4:1-42, Coniectanea Biblica. New Testament Series 6, Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1974. Indeed, the present inquiry will have to be extended in at least a preliminary way to the entire gospel before an engagement with other theories of interpretation can meaningfully take place. The issue at the present stage is not of details, but of the theory itself. Only when the merits of the theory have been established will fruitful discussion of details with other theories of interpretation be possible.

2. Cf. my "Language Usage and the Production of Matthew 1:18-2:23," in Richard A. Spencer (ed.), Orientation by Disorientation: Studies in Literary Criticism and Biblical Literary Criticism Presented in Honor of William A. Beardslee, Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, forthcoming.

structure of a text, and (iii) that the meanings of larger segments of a discourse, phrases, clauses and even paragraphs, are determined by the functions which they fulfill in a discourse, in the same way as the specific meanings of words in a sentence are determined by the functions which they fulfill in a sentence. Syntax reveals which of a paradigm of possible meanings of a word, phrase, clause, etc. is meant. Something more needs to be said about each of these.

(i) I derive the conception of a macro-structure from Teun van Dijk who formulates its function as follows: "...semantic macro-structures are necessary to explain in sufficiently simple terms how it is possible that throughout a text the selection of lexical items and underlying formation of semantic representations is heavily restricted by some global restraint."[3] In order to understand a text, thus, it is necessary to uncover the complex of interrelated factors that went into its production. This complex of interrelated factors is what I understand to be the macro-structure of a text, i.e., the global constraint which determines the choice of the words and syntactic structures with which a text is constituted, with the understanding that the words and syntactic structures are themselves also factors which co-determine their choice.

(ii) The following three macro-functions distinguished by M.A.K. Halliday[4] may serve to clarify further the macro-structure of a text: ideational, the communication of information in a text; interactional, the text as a means of interrelating between author and reader/hearer; and textual, the way in which the restraints of a particular language determine the formulation of a text, oral or written.

(iii) What happens when words, sentences and even larger syntactic units are selected/formulated in the production of a text is that their meanings become restricted, i.e., out of a number of possible meanings particular ones are defined to function in a text. In a sentence such as "The table is large" the syntax of the sentence will reveal that e.g., "table" is a noun and not a verb, but not only will it not be clear what type of

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3. Teun A. van Dijk, Some Aspects of Text Grammars. A Study in Theoretical Linguistics and Poetics, Janua Linguarum, Series Maior 63, The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1972, p. 160.

Cf. also the discussion of the relationship between semantic deep structure and surface structure by Wallace L. Chafe, in Meaning and the Structure of Language, Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. A major problem with this very insightful study is that Chafe seems to assume that the semantic deep structure can exist independent of a surface manifestation, and thus does not provide for reciprocal relationship between deep and surface structural features.

4. Cf. M.A.K. Halliday, Explorations in the Functions of Language, London: Edward Arnold, 1973, pp. 22-45. For a thorough critical review of the discussion of this aspect of a text--without reference to Halliday--see David Hellholm, Das Visionenbuch des Hermas als Apokalypse, Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1980, specifically Section II 1.2, "Textsemiatik als metatheoretische Basis," pp. 27-52.

table, and which one of the type, is meant; it will also not be clear what the sentence means, unless it is part of a discourse, or is pronounced in a particular setting, in which it functions to express a specific meaning.

And what applies to words in a sentence, and sentences in a discourse, applies equally well to larger syntactic units constituted by more than one sentence in a paragraph. Even though we may know the meanings of all the words that are used, and may be familiar with the syntactic structures by means of which the words are formed into sentences, and even recognize that the sentences are interrelated in the expression of a single, even if complex, idea, we may still not understand what the discourse means, as little as we would understand what a person means when she/he comes into the room saying, "The table is large," unless the context of the statement or discourse is known or its function in a discourse is understood. This is a problem which hardly surfaces in the typical Biblical commentary, concerned as it is with individual verses, if not with single words, as if meanings are tied up in words or sentences, or maximally in short segments of the text.

c) John 4:1-42 is an excellent text by means of which this problem can be investigated. Up to a certain level the syntactical relationships between the sentences cause no problem. It is easy to discern 19 such higher level syntactic units, not counting 2 parentheses, vv. 2 and 9c., i.e., units that are not integrated syntactically. (See the accompanying chart.) In terms of the discourse structure, i.e., the surface structure, it is also not difficult to determine how these larger units are interrelated, even though the transitions are sometimes sharp, as if there is a change of subject, e.g., between verses 15 and 16, the woman saying that she would be glad not to have to come again to draw water followed by Jesus commanding her to fetch her husband.

At the macro-structural level, however, it appears evident that the text lacks cohesion. It is not clear what function many of these higher level syntactic units fulfill in the discourse, i.e., what is meant by them. As in the case of "The table is large" we can clarify the meanings of terms and recognize grammatical structures and still not understand what is meant. Our task is precisely to try and determine what functions these higher level syntactic units fulfill in the discourse, i.e., what is meant by them.

2. The Higher Level Syntactic Units in John 4:1-42.

The next step in our investigation of the macro-structure of John 4:1-42, after identifying the higher level syntactic units, is to try to determine the possible ways in which the text as a whole coheres. This would necessarily mean that certain higher level syntactic units come to the fore more than others. Depending on which units come to the fore the meaning and coherence of the text would vary.

The following surface level structural featues can be noted.

a) Easily recognizable is a main story line (Jesus and the Samaritans--vv. 4-7, 9-26, 28-30, 39-42) into which a subservient line is woven rather loosely (Jesus and the disciples--vv. 8, 27,

Higher Level Syntactic Units

	Main Story Line			
(i) 1 - 3 Transition				
	(ii) 4 - 6 Introduction (iii) 7 Request for water,			
	(v) 9 and woman's reply			
		(vi) 10 - 15 Two level discourse on water		
	(vii) 16 - 19 Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ- prophet			
			(viii) 20 - 21 Not this mountain nor Jerusalem,	
			(x) 23 - 24 but in spirit and in truth (xi) 25 - 26 Jesus, Messiah	
	(xiii) 28 - 30 The woman returns to her village			
				(xvii) 39 Faith in the θεῖος ἀνήρ
	(xviii) 40 Jesus stays in village			
				(xix 41 - 42 Jesus, savior of the world

in John 4:1 - 42

Superimposed Story Line		Commentary
(iv) 8 Disciples had left to buy food		
		(ix) 22 Reaffirmation of the Jews
(xii) 27 Return of the disciples		
(xiv) 31 - 34 Two level discourse on food		
	(xv) 35 - 36 The harvest is ready	
		(xvi) 37 - 38 Scriptural proof

between Messiah who will announce ἅπαντα (v. 25) and the woman's statement that Jesus told her πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα which prompts her to wonder if he is not the Christ (v. 29), whereas she had earlier recognized him only as a (θεῖος ἀνήρ-) prophet on the basis of the same evidence (v. 19).

3. Towards the Semantic Deep Structure of the Text.

a) At a deeper, i.e., purely semantic, level the following features can be noted. The crucial question in vv. 35f. is who the sower is, who the reaper. Circumstantially it appears rather evident that the harvest is the Samaritan villagers. Could Jesus then be the sower by what transpired between him and the woman? But who then is the reaper, as distinct from him? A better possibility would be that God is the sower (cf. 3:37, "Everyone given to me by the Father will come to me"), and obviously Jesus would then be the reaper. If that is the case, the relationship not only between vv. 31-34 and 35f., but also in turn between this entire supplemental story line and the main line, becomes clear. The speech about his nourishment serves to clarify that the purpose of his coming is to reap the harvest which God prepares for him, and the placement of it at this point in the story serves to show that this is about to take place in what is to transpire with the Samaritan villagers. At a crucial point in the story the author provides Jesus with the opportunity prepared by vv. 8 and 27, to act as his own "chorus" by explaining the action.

The supplemental story line of Jesus and the disciples thus functions meta-linguistically to interpret the main story line. But it is not merely meta-linguistic. The disciples themselves are drawn into the main story line on the side of the woman who does not recognize Jesus. Interpretive as the story line of Jesus and the disciples is, it does not merely interpret meta-linguistically, but repeats the contrast of the two double-level discourses on water and on nourishment, but there is also no indication in the rest of the story (except in the later addition of vv. 37f.) that the disciples are not left as ignorant as the woman of the true identity of Jesus when the villagers are united with Jesus in the knowledge that he is truly the savior of the world.

b) With that a very complex set of inter-relationships has already become clear. This in turn clarifies a number of other relationships.

(i) The invitation of the Samaritans that Jesus remain with them because of what the woman told them, namely that Jesus told her πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα (v. 39, cf. 29) at the material, earthly level (vv. 28-30, 39f.) is coordinated at the spiritual level by their recognizing that he is the savior of the world; and so her understanding of him as θεῖος ἀνήρ - messiah (v. 29) stands in contrast with their recognition of him as savior of the world (v. 42) and similarly her λαλία (v. 42) with his λόγος (v. 41).

(ii) Furthermore, Jesus revealing himself as a θεῖος ἀνήρ prophet-messiah (cf. vv. 19, 29, 39) by telling the woman πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα (vv. 29, 39) at the concrete, earthly level (vv. 16-18) is coordinated at the spiritual level by his revealing himself as Messiah (vv. 25f.). by announcing to her ἅπαντα concerning true worship (vv. 23f.). It now appears that πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα/ἅπαντα

may also be a single term with a double meaning similar to water and food, although it functions differently in the discourse, and can only function differently.

(iii) So also the θεῖος ἀνήρ - miracle worker Jacob, who did not need an ἄντλημα because the water rose to the surface when he lifted the stone from the mouth of the well, overflowing for twenty years (v. 12, cf. the Palestinian Targum of Gen. 28: 10), at the earthly level is coordinated at the spiritual level by Jesus who provides the water of life for eternity (vv. 13f.). The meaning of the water springing up in v. 14 should thus not be sought in an investigation of the signified "water of life" as a metaphor for the spirit, but in the significant, the "spring water" which the miracle worker Jacob had provided when he lifted the stone from the mouth of the well.

It is a remarkable conflation when the woman asks Jesus if he is greater than Jacob, when at that stage of the narrative from her vantage point Jesus was merely daring to compare himself with the miracle worker Jacob who did not need an ἄντλημα to draw water (vv. 11f.). Her question challenging whether he is μείζων τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἰακώβ already anticipates that more is involved than a mere comparison with Jacob. Thus the miracle worker Jacob stands to Jesus, the savior of the world, as the spring water provided by Jacob stands to the water of life provided by Jesus.

(iv) In a similar way the question whether to worship on "this" mountain or in Jerusalem (v. 20) stands in contrast with the worship of the father in spirit and in truth (vv. 21, 23f.).

c) It appears thus that John 4:4-42 consists of a series of inter-related contrasts.

1a)	The spring water from the well	: The water of life provided by Jesus
:: 1b)	The θεῖος ἀνήρ - miracle worker-Jacob	: μείζων τοῦ Ἰακώβ
:: 2.	Worshipping on this mountain or in Jerusalem	: Worship in spirit and truth
:: 3a)	Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet-messiah telling the woman	: Jesus, Messiah announcing
:: 3b)	πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα	: ἅπαντα concerning worship
:: 4.	The food of the disciples	: The nourishment of Jesus
:: 5a)	The woman's λαλία	: The λόγος of Jesus
:: 5b)	The woman's understanding of Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ - messiah	: The villagers' recognition of Jesus as the savior of the world

The key to the inter-relationships is provided by the supplemental story line which interprets the contrasts by rejecting all those that appear on the one side, represented by the food offered by the disciples, and choosing those that appear on the other side in the obvious connection of the nourishment of Jesus with the faith of the Samaritan villagers by means of the metaphor of the harvest.

31-38). The disciples never play a part in the story of Jesus and the Samaritans; even after they had returned they remain unmentioned in the subsequent scenes when the Samaritans ask Jesus to stay with them, etc. On the other hand, reference to the Samaritan woman (v. 27) and evidently to the Samaritans (vv. 35-38) are factors in the story line about the disciples.

Furthermore, there is an obvious formal parallel between the double level conversation between Jesus and the woman about water (vv. 10-15), and between Jesus and the disciples about food (vv. 31-34).

b) In the story line of Jesus and the Samaritans it is easy to distinguish between the main line, and supplementary features. After an introduction, presenting the circumstances (vv. 4-6), Jesus asks the woman for a drink of water (v. 7), to which she counters with the question about his asking her, a Samaritan woman, for water (v. 9). Jesus reveals himself to her as a θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet in a way similar to the Nathanael story in 1:45-49 by revealing his extraordinary knowledge about her (vv. 16-19), which she then discloses to her village, but using the designation messiah, in the sense of a θεῖος ἀνηρ, (vv. 28-30) resulting in the villagers asking him to stay with them, which he does for two days (v. 40). Note a similar feature in 1:39, "and they stayed with him that day." The two level discourses on water (vv. 10-15) and the question of the right place of worship (vv. 20-26) are not carried further in this story line--at least not at the surface level.

The recognition of Jesus as a θεῖος ἀνήρ - messiah (v. 28) is reinterpreted in a deeper sense in the recognition that he is the savior of the world in vv. 39, 41f., similar to the reinterpretation of the confession of Nathanel (1:49) with the μείζω τούτων in 1:50f.

The transition from the two level discourse on water (vv. 10-15) to the discourse in which Jesus reveals that he knows all about the woman (vv. 16-19) is abrupt; similarly the transition from the latter to the discourse on the right place to worship (vv. 20ff.). In both cases it appears to be a change of topic.

In the discourse on the right place of worship (vv. 20-26) the two levels of discourse in the sense of the conversation concerning water in vv. 10-15 are no longer present. There is nothing which suggests that the woman is <u>incapable</u> of recognizing what Jesus is saying. Similarly she did <u>recognize</u> him as a θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet when he revealed that he knew all about her in vv. 16-19. The discussion takes place in two steps, first the rejection of either the mountain or Jerusalem as the right place to worship (vv. 20f.), and then a discourse on worship which is in the spirit and truth (vv. 23f.). It is concluded with the exchange concerning Messiah (vv. 25f.) in which reference is made back to the subject-matter of the discourse on true worship when the woman says (Μεσσίας) ἀναγγελεῖ ἡμῖν ἅπαντα.

The statement of v. 22 breaks in between the two steps of the discourse, introducing a completely alien idea that stands over against both the rejection of the mountain and Jerusalem as the right place of worship, and the conception of worship in the spirit and truth.

c) The story line of the disciples consists of two discours-

es that are, at the surface level at least, unrelated, respectively, on food (vv. 31-34) and on the symbolic harvest (35-38). The reference to the disciples in v. 8 and the mention of their return in v. 27 have no material significance; they only function text-grammatically to integrate the two story lines, or more precisely, the story line of the disciples into the main story line.

The discussion of the harvest, in turn, appears to feature two distinctive points, in meaning and in temporal perspective. In vv. 35f. the meaning appears to be the harvest that is ready for reaping and evidently refers to the Samaritans that are already on their way to Jesus. In point of time it looks forward to the immediate future. Note also that it refers to a single unidentified sower and a single reaper. As will be seen later, in the answer who the sower and reaper are, respectively, lies the key to the structure of John 4:1-42. In v. 38 the reapers are the persons addressed (in the plural) in the story, and the sowers are others who had worked earlier, apparently among the Samaritans. In point of time it looks back on a history of Samaritan mission.

At the surface level the relationship between the symbol of the harvest and those symbolized remains very loose. There is nothing in these verses which clearly identifies the Samaritans as, symbolically, the harvest. Neither is it very clear anywhere who the reaper(s) is(are), and who the sower(s). Everything remains circumstantial, with nothing at the surface level to relieve ambiguity. It is also not clear what this supplemental story line has to do with the main line.

Whereas it is possible to distinguish the main theme and supplementary features in the story line of Jesus and the Samaritans, such a distinction does not seem possible here in the story line of Jesus and the disciples. It is evident that vv. 37f. interpret vv. 35f., revealing the latter as primary, but what is the relationship between 31-34 and 35f?

d) The following cross relationships between the two story lines are evident.

(i) The discourses concerning water (vv. 10-15) and food (vv. 31-34) both proceed at two levels, like in the Nicodemus discourse concerning being born ἄνωθεν (3:3-6), with Jesus talking at one, a spiritual level, and the woman and the disciples at another, a material, earthly level, without any communication between the two levels. Does this parallelism explain the function of the supplemental story line in relationship to the main line? Text grammatically, i.e., structurally, this does indeed appear to be the case, but what is the meaning of repeating the same discourse structure, merely with different conversation partners and subject-matter? That it does not fulfill a merely dramatic function, namely, to fill in the time between the woman's departure and the arrival of the villagers is shown by v. 30 in which it is stated that they had left the village and already proceeded to him. Verse 39 reaches back, which makes it clear that vv. 31-38 do not function to fill in the time. Rather, it appears that the scene is introduced to provide Jesus with the opportunity to make the speech of vv. 34ff. But what is the purpose of the speech?

(ii) The following connections exist between the various higher level syntactic units in the main story line. The fact that it is Jacob's well (v. 5), is taken up in the two level discourses on water in v. 12. A connection also seems to exist

It should be noted that as this segment of the story rejects the one side of the contrast and affirms the other, it also unifies another set of contrasts, i.e., between the sower and the reaper as metaphors for God and Jesus who rejoice together in the harvest that is about to be reaped, the coming faith of the Samaritan villagers.

4. The Role of the Woman in the Narrative.

A remarkable feature of the woman is that she always says more than she actually understands. In v. 12 she suggests that Jesus must be claiming to be more than Jacob, which is of course true because the water Jesus offers is more than what Jacob provided, but she does not know that. When Jesus reveals that he knows everything about her (vv. 16-18) she recognizes him as a θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet (v. 19), but then as if she senses that more is involved, she moves the conversation beyond the level of a θεῖος ἀνήρ with the question concerning the true place of worship (vv. 19f.), and when Jesus takes her up on that and leads her on further by explaining to her what true worship is (vv. 21, 23f.), which is clearly ἀναγγελεῖν ἅπαντα (v. 25), she is on the verge of recognizing that he is Messiah. However, when Jesus confirms that indeed that is who he is (v. 26), she drops her jar and merely wonders whether he is not possibly the messiah, not because he told her ἅπαντα concerning true worship, but πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα (v. 29) with which she is back at the level of a θεῖος ἀνήρ, even if she has moved from the designation of prophet to messiah.

In this woman the struggle between matter and the spirit, between earth and heaven is rather tragically narrated. But it is an inversion of the hero of Greek tragedy when she remains innocent of the truth notwithstanding her constant probing. The truth, in contrast with Greek tragedy, is of course in this case not damning, but liberating. As in Greek drama the tragedy is constituted by the discovery of truth about oneself, so the tragedy here is constituted by the woman's inability to discover the truth about Jesus. The failure to discover the truth about him leaves her in ignorance when the villagers become united with Jesus in their knowledge of who he is. On the other hand, not only does the woman play an important role in the story by leading the villagers to Jesus, which makes their final attitude towards her reproachable; she is the one through whom the reader is led from misunderstanding who Jesus is to the recognition of his true identity.

It should be noted that the failure of the woman to recognize the true identity of Jesus is not because there is no connection between her level of discourse and that of Jesus, as one might be led to believe by the two level discourse on water (vv. 10-15). In the present discourse the meaning of that higher level syntactic unit is not that there is no access to the spiritual level of Jesus from the woman's material level. The contrast between the two kinds of water merely serves to highlight the difference between the θεῖος ἀνήρ Jacob and Jesus. The woman indeed does not understand what Jesus is talking about (cf. v. 15), but she is not in principle incapable of moving up to the level of Jesus. She fails to move up to the level of Jesus because she is more drawn to earthly matters (v. 15), or falls back to that level (compare v. 29 with vv. 20f., 23-25). Even if she did not realize it, she more than once moved from her level of discourse to that of Jesus, when she recognized him

as a prophet (v. 19), and sensed that what he had told her about worship was what Messiah was to have done (vv. 25f.).

What is more important is that unwittingly she had become a witness to Jesus for the Samaritans who finally recognize the true identity of Jesus, in a way similar to John the Baptist who had directed Andreas and another disciple to Jesus (1:35-39), and Andreas who in turn had led Peter to Jesus (vv. 41f.), and Philip who had done the same for Nathanael (vv. 45-49). It should be remembered that, at least at that stage, not even Nathanael had moved beyond the recognition of Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ (1:50f., cf. 4:39, 41f.).

5. The Restraints under which the Narrative was produced.

The progression of the story takes place in terms of the series of contrasts. The contrast between the θεῖος ἀνήρ Jacob and Jesus (vv. 10-12), highlighted in the contrast between spring water and the water of life (vv. 13f.), is taken up at a higher level in the contrast between Jesus himself as θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet who reveals that he knows all about the woman (vv. 16-18) and as Messiah who explains everything about the true worship (vv. 19-21, 23-25), which comes to focus in the contrast between πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα and ἅπαντα concerning true worship. This is then taken up more directly in relationship to Jesus in the contrast between the food offered by the disciples (vv. 31-33) and the food provided by God (vv. 34f.), which also prepares for the final contrast between the woman who was not able to move beyond the understanding of Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ (v. 39, cf. 29), and the Samaritans who recognize in him the savior of the world (v. 42) expressed in abbreviated form in the contrast between the λαλία of the woman (v. 42) and the λόγος of Jesus (v. 41). In the first part of the story, the discussions between Jesus and the woman, the contrasts are merely stated (1a, b, 2 and 3); in the supplemental story line, the discussion between Jesus and the disciples, the turning point is reached when yet another contrast is stated (4) but which then in verse 35 turns to a clarification of the resolution when it points to the purpose of the story which is effected in the final two contrasts (5a and b).

The macro-structure, the global restraint, thus, which determines the choice of "lexical items (including the higher level syntactic units) and underlying formation of semantic representations" in the text in its final form is not the narrative of Jesus and the woman, but the development in terms of the series of contrasts. This explains certain surface level shifts in the progression of the story that are unwarranted from a purely narrative point of view, e.g., from the response of the woman that she could really appreciate the water offered by Jesus because it would relieve her of having to come to the well to draw water (v. 15) to Jesus' abrupt statement that she should go and fetch her husband (v. 16), or the woman's turning from her recognition that Jesus is a θεῖος ἀνήρ-prophet because he had revealed that he knew everything about her (vv. 16-19) to the question of the right place to worship (v. 20), although the idea of a prophet may provide some motivation for the question. From a narrative point of view, it was in each case a change of subject, but the macro-structure proposed above, the deeper level semantic structure, reveals that in the first case it is a return to the original story (vv. 16-19) after the introduction of the contrast between Jacob and Jesus in terms of the contrast between spring

water and the water of life (vv. 10-15), and in the second case the introduction of Jesus as Messiah who announces ἅπαντα in contrast with the preceding presentation of him as θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet who told the woman πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα. In terms of the contrast of the deep structure the various parts of the story are closely related.

Similarly the woman questioning whether Jesus can claim to be greater than Jacob in verse 12 is unmotivated at that point of the narrative, but it is highly effective as a move beyond a mere comparison of Jacob and Jesus, expressing the contrast between them.

There are other points where it becomes clear that restraints were provided by the fact that the author made use of a source, e.g., when in verse 39 he has to reach back earlier to what happened before verse 30 (cf. 40) in order to bring out the contrast of verses 41f. The same is indicated by the request of Jesus for a drink of water from the woman in verse 7 which serves none of the contrasts in the macro-structure of the present story. Indeed, with the request for a drink of water, Jesus is placed in a position directly antithetical to the one he maintains against the woman in verses 10-14. Also the woman's response, questioning why he, a Jew, should ask a drink from her, a Samaritan woman (v. 9) was probably provided by the existing story of which the author made use, even though the response has a degree of relevance in the larger context of the present story, especially in connection with the question concerning the right place to worship (v. 20), which was probably partly motivated by it. In these cases certain aspects of the original story which have no meaning in the new version, and certain text-grammatical features that resulted from the usage of it as the narrative base, were left unedited by the author in the production of the present text. The fact that the author made use of an existing story to provide his main story line should thus also be recognized as a factor in the macro-structure of the present story, co-contributing to its global constraint.

It is futile, and serves no useful purpose, to try to reconstruct the original story. In broad outline it was probably a type of miracle story in which Jesus asks a Samaritan woman for a drink of water to which she responds with her question about the appropriateness of his asking her for a drink of water, which reminds of a similar incident in which Ananda, a favorite pupil of the Buddha, had been involved. In what follows he reveals himself as a θεῖος ἀνήρ by showing her that he knows "everything" about her, as a result of which she leads the inhabitants of her village to him, and they ask him to stay with them, which he does for two days. It appears to have been the same type of story as we have in 1:35-49. In the original story, i.e., without the higher level interpretation of 4:39, 41f. (cf. 1:50f.), the woman's role was probably a positive one, i.e., of leading the villagers to Jesus. That may be why in the present form of the story her role is so ambiguous, progressing and regressing in her understanding of who Jesus was. The final judgment of her is negative when the villagers spurn her with their οὐκέτι διὰ τὴν σὴν λαλίαν πιστεύομεν (v. 42), which, at the surface level of the narrative, one cannot but consider highly unfair. From the point of view of the surface level development of the story their harsh rejection of her is unwarranted, thankless, and should reflect negatively on them. It is an indication of success in the development of the story when the reader, who shares in the deeper level

of understanding who Jesus is, becomes easily drawn in to share the villagers' distancing of themselves from the woman. The reader should thus share in the negative reflection on them. Note the difference in attitude in the case of Nathanael who was expected to see μείζω τούτων (1:50).

It seems obvious that the harsh and unfair treatment to which the woman is subjected in the story may not have been specifically intended, but resulted, at least partly, from the movement of the story from its original level (Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ) to the present one (Jesus as savior of the world). The ambiguity of her situation thus may not have been intended, but to have resulted from the way in which the story came into its present form. This should be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the text.

It would be possible to clarify this ambiguity with greater certainty and accuracy if one had access to the original story, by differentiating the given features from the restructuring by the author of the story in its present form. This cannot, however, be done on the basis of a reconstruction of the supposed original which would merely be a feedback of the clarification of the ambiguity by means of the attempted reconstruction into the clarification based on it. Furthermore, it should be noted that clarification of ambiguity resulting from the usage of a source (by uncovering the process through which the text came into being) should not lead to an elimination of the ambiguity in the interpretation of the text. Such ambiguity is part of the text and the task of interpretation should be to clarify it as such, not to eliminate it. In this regard ambiguity which is the result of the use of a source and ambiguity that can be clarified by a "sach"-critical interpretation should be distinguished. The latter type of ambiguity I understand to be present when the author's intention is not altogether congruent with his/her text, but can nevertheless be discerned through it. These two types of ambiguity converge when the reading of a quoted source intended by the author who made use of it is not unambiguously established in the text produced by him/her.

From the point of view of the narrative, i.e., of the surface level of the text, the greatest ambiguity is to be found in the higher syntactic unit concerning worship (vv. 20-26). This may not appear to be the case if one asks what its meaning is taken by itself, in the same way as it would not be difficult to determine what possible meanings a sentence such as "The table is large" taken by itself can have. However, if someone were to come in the door and say "The table is large" it would immediately become clear that more is involved than a clarification of the meaning of the sentence by itself if one wants to understand what a person who makes use of it means by it. Similarly, it may be relatively easy to find a meaning for 4:20-26 taken by itself, but that still leaves unclarified the meaning it has in the text, or what the author means by it. The question is what function it has in the discourse.

On the one hand, as a result of the incident the woman does seem to have progressed from recognizing Jesus as a prophet (v. 19) to at least considering whether he might not after all be the messiah (v. 29, cf. 25f.). However, this appears to be based, not on the discourse on worship, but on the fact that he revealed to her that he knew everything about her, indicating that in both cases she thought of him as a θεῖος ἀνήρ. On the

basis of our analysis it is possible to recognize that at a deeper level the function of the discourse on worship, apart from introducing the contrast between the question of the right place to worship and worship in spirit and truth, is precisely to contrast the understanding of Jesus as a θεῖος ἀνήρ with the recognition of him as Messiah, as is clearly expressed in the contrast between πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα and ἅπαντα concerning worship, which is very closely related to the general meaning of the text. The transition from the one meaning to the other is made by means of the ambiguous designation "prophet," which could mean a θεῖος ἀνήρ but also a proclaimer of religious truth. An important feature of the text is to remove the ambiguity of the designation as applied to Jesus in favor of the second meaning.

6. The Macro-Features of the Text.

a) Ideationally the author obviously wanted to make a Christological point in the present story, by posing the recognition of Jesus as savior of the world against the understanding of him as a θεῖος ἀνήρ (vv. 39, 41f.) irrespective of whether it is expressed in terms of a prophet (v. 19) or of the messiah (v. 29). Similar to the counterposition of μείζω τούτων (cf. the hint of what was to come with μείζων τοῦ πατρος ἡμῶν Ἰακώβ in 4:12) against the confession of Nathanael that Jesus is ὁ υἱος τοῦ θεοῦ, the βασιλεὺς τοῦ Ἰσραήλ in 1:49-51, which is obviously also taken by the author of vv. 50f. in the sense of a θεῖος ἀνήρ (cf. ὅτι εἶπόν σοι ὅτι εἶδον σε ὑποκάτω τῆς συκῆς, πιστεύεις). With that, however, the meaning of the present story is not nearly exhausted. Why did the author do so, in contrast with 1:50f., by means of the elaborate restructuring of the original story through the series of inter-related contrasts?

John 4:4-42 is a step beyond 1:50f. insofar as the earlier text merely states that Nathanael will see μείζω τούτων, whereas ours not only tells how the Samaritans already recognized what had merely been promised to Nathanael, but, more importantly, how the move can be made from the recognition of Jesus as a θεῖος ἀνήρ to the knowledge of him as savior of the world. This is achieved by a complete restructuring of the original story on the basis of the network of inter-related contrasts, a very important part of which is the ideational deep structure of the text. The full meaning of the text can be determined only when all aspects of its surface structure have been clarified satisfactorily, i.e., when we have given a satisfactory account of the transformation of the semantic deep structure into the surface structure of our text.

b) Textually the contrasts are inter-related in the surface structure, i.e., syntactically, by superimposing them on the existing story of Jesus and the Samaritan woman who led the inhabitants of her village to him. In some cases the syntactic inter-relationships are easily recognizable, in others they are obscure. So, for example, someone who knows the story of Jacob's miracle and who Jesus is from the earlier chapters of the gospel would not find it difficult to recognize the contrast expressed in μείζων τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἰακώβ and also the relationship of that contrast to the contrast between spring water miraculously provided by Jacob and the water of life promised by Jesus. However, the relationship between these contrasts on the one hand, and the contrast between Jesus himself as θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet in vv. 16-19, and as Messiah in vv. 20f.,

23-26, on the other, remains difficult to recognize at a purely textual level. And not only that, but even the very fact that the latter are contrasts. Jesus revealing himself as a θεῖος ἀνήρ to the woman (vv. 16-19) and explaining everything about worship (vv. 20f., 23f.) appear to be merely two more incidents which carry the story forward, linked by the dual meaning of prophet (v. 19) as θεῖος ἀνήρ (vv. 16-18) and as proclaimer of religious truth (vv. 20f., 23f.). The contrast between the question of worship on the mountain or in Jerusalem and worship in spirit and truth is very explicit, and possibly even the relationship of this contrast to the subsequent recognition of Jesus as savior of the world by the Samaritans; not however its very important relationship to what precedes in vv. 16-19, so that it becomes clear that worship on the mountain or in Jerusalem: worship in spirit and truth::πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα:ἅπαντα concerning worship, and::Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ:Jesus the Messiah. At the surface level the discussion on worship appears to be a diversion, especially since the woman subsequently (v. 29) only remembers that Jesus told her everything about herself.

The contrast between the food offered by the disciples and the nourishment of Jesus is clearly superimposed on the main story line, but it is easily recognizable that it is a structural parallel to the two types of water. Textually, however, it is merely a repetition; its meaning remains unclear. On the other hand it is linked circumstantially by means of the metaphor of the harvest to the coming recognition by the villagers that Jesus is the savior of the world. The contrast between the woman's understanding of Jesus as a θεῖος ἀνήρ because he told her everything about herself (vv. 16-19, 29) and the recognition of him as savior of the world by the villagers (v. 42) is explicitly established by the reference back to what the woman had said in verse 39, and by means of the contrast between her λαλία and the λόγος of Jesus (vv. 41f.). In this latter case we have a reversal of the <u>diachronic</u> forward movement of time in a narrative, by referring back from one event to an earlier one to establish a <u>synchronic</u> relationship of contrast between them. On the whole much remains unclear at the narrative, i.e., the textual level. We already know that more is involved, based on our analysis of the semantic deep structure of the text, but everything remains unsatisfactory unless we can show how this deep structure was transformed into the actual surface level of the text. There may of course always remain many deeper level meanings of a text that are not effectively transformed into its surface level--and it is possible to uncover them--but there is one remaining feature of the text which needs to be considered, what Halliday calls the <u>interactive</u> feature.

c) Textually we have a narrative of a woman who meets Jesus at the well, engages in conversation of such a nature with him that she leaves for her village with the news that he is a θεῖος ἀνήρ, as a result of which the Samaritan villagers go out to Jesus and ask him to stay with them. The story takes a turn when the villagers reject the witness of the woman by proceeding to a deeper level in their understanding of who Jesus is. Superimposed on this story is a conversation of Jesus with the disciples which clarifies the events meta-linguistically. At this, surface, level a number of the deeper level contrasts stand out clearly, e.g., between the understanding of Jesus as a θεῖος ἀνήρ and as savior of the world (vv. 39, 41f.), but others remain obscure, e.g., between Jesus as θεῖος ἀνήρ in verses 16-18, and as Messiah in 20f., 23f. Especially the interrelationships

between the contrasts remain obscure at the textual or purely narrative level, e.g., the relationship between the two contrasts just mentioned.

The situation changes completely when the reader becomes engaged in the text, i.e., at the interactional level. That would mean taking the text, not as a story about Jesus, but as a myth, a narrative symbol, which engages the reader. The question is whether such an interactional reading of the text can serve to unlock its meaning, revealing how the deep structural network of contrasts are symbolized in the text.

To begin with, the reader obviously is not required to identify with the woman because she/he knows from the earlier chapters of the gospel what the woman does not know, that Jesus is not a mere casual stranger but the λόγος of God. The reader's interest in the story is thus not in what is going to happen to the woman, but how, in what may happen to her, Jesus is going to be revealed as the λόγος, not so much to the woman, the disciples or the Samaritan villagers as to the reader her/himself. In this sense the real counterpart of Jesus in the story is the reader. And, although the reader is not expected to identify with the woman, it is through what happens to her that she/he is led along in the story.

In interpreting the story as a narrative myth which engages the reader as participant the question arises whether this should be done without consideration of what we already know of its deep structure, or whether we should proceed on the basis of that knowledge. What an ordinary reader may understand of the text at a first reading, or even repeated readings, is not without interest, but it is a limitation we can no longer put on ourselves--we can no longer return to that stage--nor is it desirable. It would be equivalent to saying that the only way a symphony, concerto or sonata should be heard is without an analysis of the musical score. Once the text has been read, and certain features have been noted, the reader inevitably will read, not only diachronically as the story proceeds, but also synchronically, noting meanings because of what is already known about what is to come. What is necessary, however, is that we interpret the actual text, not a surrogate of our own making, nor should we create a new text by suggesting what the author should have written, so to speak, producing our own revised transformation of the deep structure in a surface level text. Such a procedure could also have validity, but then it should become clear that one has taken a step beyond the interpretation of the actual surface level text. Our task now is to see if, with all the information we have, we can read the text and understand it.

7. The Engagement of the Reader in the Narrative.

Even with all of this information, and reading the text as a narrative myth which engages the reader--or probably because it is read like that--the request by Jesus for a drink of water from the woman remains without meaning, except as a way of getting the conversation started. However, what already catches one's attention in this earliest part of the text is mention of the fact that it is Jacob's well, and that it was given by Jacob to his son Joseph. We know that it presupposes knowledge of Jacob's miracle, and so prepares for the subsequent contrast between him and Jesus. Furthermore, mention of the fact that the disciples

went into the village to buy food is known to prepare for their subsequent return and specifically for Jesus' conversation with them about food. The fact that the location is in Samaria, that the woman is a Samaritan, and her emphasis of the opposition between Jews and Samaritans, provides the context for the subsequent dissolution of those differences by Jesus when he rejects the question of the right place of worship, substituting in its place the conception of the true worshipper who worships in spirit and truth.

Up to this point everything is preparatory. The reader knows that the story really starts when Jesus reverses the request for a drink of water. The process of self-revelation has started, even though the reader already knows who Jesus is. The prologue has already made that clear, and in that regard the self-revelation in this story would be a repetition. The difference is that the self-revelation here has the purpose of leading the reader from where she/he is to where Jesus is. The reader needs to be guided to be with Jesus, to "stay" with him (v. 40, cf. 1:39). It is through the woman that this is done.

The preposterous suggestion of Jesus that she should rather ask him for water becomes clear to the reader when the woman compares Jesus with Jacob, and by implication Jacob's spring water with Jesus' water of life. The reader can also recognize very easily that what is at issue is Jacob's miracle and that Jesus is greater than Jacob, that what Jesus offers is on a different level compared with the miracle which identifies Jacob as a θεῖος ἀνήρ. The water of life which Jesus offers does not rise up in a well as when Jacob performed his miracle, but in contrast with that, it rises up like a fountain in the recipient, and not only for twenty years, but in eternity.

In the next stage of the story a further clarification takes place. Whereas in the previous scene Jesus by implication claims to be greater than the θεῖος ἀνήρ Jacob, what that claim means is now clarified in terms of Jesus alone. He himself is now first presented as a θεῖος ἀνήρ, thus revealing that he is capable of taking the place of Jacob. But it is not merely a case of being equal to Jacob. Jesus is "greater than" Jacob. This stage clarifies in what way he is greater. In one sense he is merely like Jacob, i.e., by performing an act which proves that he too is a θεῖος ἀνήρ; he reveals that he miraculously knows things about the woman which a normal stranger cannot know. The woman recognizes him as a θεῖος ἀνήρ - prophet. The ambiguity of the term "prophet" functions as a transition to the otner pole of the contrast; a prophet is also the appropriate one with whom to discuss the crucial religious issue between Jews and Samaritans, the question of the right place to worship. The reply of Jesus introduces the most complex feature of the story because with it he does a number of things at the same time. At the most simple level he answers the woman's question, but in so doing he dissolves it; neither on the mountain nor in Jerusalem. The earthly question which concerns the contradiction between the mountain in Samaria and Jerusalem is dissolved by placing over and against them a new contrast, worship in spirit and truth, which dissolves the prior contrast. The woman is as close to heaven as she will ever be in the narrative; it is on the tip of her tongue to reveal the true identity of Jesus: οἶδα ὅτι Μεσσίας ἔρχεται· ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος, ἀναγγελεῖ ἡμῖν ἅπαντα. Jesus almost says to her: Woman, you have guessed it! but he is less subtle, declaring outright: It is I!

Never mind, she has understood nothing. For her the crucial question concerning worship has lost its significance. All she can think of is that she has met a man ὅς εἶπάν μοι, not ἅπαντα περὶ προσκυνησέως, but πάντα ἃ ἐποίησα. For the reader, however, it is clear that the meaning of Jesus is not in the fact that he is, like Jacob, a θεῖος ἀνήρ who knows πάντα ἃ ἐποίησε ἡ γύνη, but μείζων τοῦ πατρος ἡμῶν Ἰακώβ, Messiah himself who declares ἅπαντα περὶ προσκυνηοέως. The reader also knows that it is not possible to hold onto earth if one is to proceed to heaven. The reader recognizes that it is at this very moment that heaven opens up, when Jesus says ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν, ὅτε οἱ ἀληθινοὶ προσκυνηταὶ προσκυνήσουσιν τῷ πατρὶ ἐν πνευματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ (v. 23). If she/he reads on in the gospel they will find confirmation for this when Jesus says ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὅτε οἱ νεκροι ἀκούσουσιν τῆς φωνῆς τοῦ υἱου τοῦ θεοῦ και οἱ ἀκούσαντες ζήσουσιν (5:25). The bitterest irony is that the woman does take the step to the recognition of Jesus as the messiah, but then she reverses the contrast by interpreting heaven in terms of earth; she wonders if the man who told her everything about herself, the θεῖος ἀνήρ is not the messiah, and forgets that he told her everything about worship.

The narrative is not complete. The woman has brought understanding back to the level of the earth. The reader knows that this is a mistake, but the narrative nevertheless leads her/him back to that level. A new scene is superimposed at this point, at the same earthly level to which the text has led the reader. The disciples are at the same level as that at which the woman started and where she ended; they offer Jesus food and when he refuses they can only surmise that someone else had given him something to eat. Once more Jesus explains the difference between heaven and earth by distinguishing between the food about which the disciples are talking and the nourishment which is his. With the rejection of the food offered by the disciples Jesus once more rejects the earth and everything it represents in this narrative, including the understanding of him as θεῖος ἀνήρ. His task is to do the will of his father who sent him και τελειώσω αὐτοῦ το ἔργον (v. 34). And one does not have long to wait to find out what that task is. God is the sower, and Jesus is about to reap the harvest which is already ripe in the fields, and the oneness of Father and Son is confirmed in their common joy in the harvest (v. 36). The reader knows that the harvest is the Samaritan villagers who are already on their way to Jesus.

On their invitation Jesus stays with them two days. Staying where Jesus is, is obviously of decisive importance, because that is what leads the Samaritan villagers to the recognition of him as the savior of the world. We should thus ask whether that is not the meaning of the enigmatic exchange between Jesus and Andreas and the other disciple, when they ask him ῥαββι, ποῦ μένεις; λέγει αὐτοις· ἔρχεσθε καὶ ὄψεσθε. ἦλθαν οὖν καὶ εἶδαν ποῦ μένει, καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ ἔμειναν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην (1:38f.). In the gospel of John to be with Jesus (μενεῖν παρ' αὐτῷ) appears to be the equivalent of the synoptics' eating bread in the Kingdom of God. (Cf. 14:3, ἵνα ὅπου εἰμι ἐγω καὶ ὑμεῖς ἦτε.) Thus it may be incorrect to say that the Samaritan villagers were the first who fully recognized who Jesus was. The only difference between our present text and 1:38f. may be that in the earlier text the reader is not yet provided with the opportunity to share in that recognition.

All that is needed now is the resolution of everything that has been provided up to that point. Jesus stays with the villagers and so they come to the recognition of his true identity. With their statement in verse 42 they make explicit what has been obvious all through the narrative, by contrasting the woman's λαλία with the λόγος of Jesus, and her understanding of him as a θεῖος ἀνήρ with their recognition of him as savior of the world. The reader too has been led to the end point of the narrative. She/he has been initiated into the mystery of Jesus as the savior of the world. Not any more the mere promise to Nathanael that μείζω τούτων ὄψῃ, and "you will see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending on the Son of Man" (1:50f.). With the villagers the reader can say to the woman, "We no longer believe through your λαλίαν, for we have listened and we know that he is truly the savior of the world" (4:42).

8. Once More the Role of the Woman in the Story

With this confession the woman is left behind--or is she? Does she not appear again symbolically in the person of Martha, who also does not understand Jesus when she says about her deceased brother, Lazarus,"Lord, he already smells, for it is already four days"(11:39, cf. 21-34). Jesus responds with, "did I not say to you that if you believe you will see the glory of God" (v. 40), evidently referring back to his earlier statement, "I am the resurrection and life. Whoever believes in me will live even if she/he died, and everyone who lives and believes in me will never die" (vv. 25f.), to which she had responded with insight, "Yes, Lord, I believe that you are the Christ, the Son of God who comes into the world," (v. 27). When Jesus now commands, "Lift up the stone" (v. 40) one is left with almost no doubt that this is the counterpart to the stone which Jacob had lifted from the mouth of the well to let the spring water rise to the top.

But the not unengaging Samaritan woman who is so almost brutally rejected by the villagers whom she had directed to Jesus is in some respects recalled even more strongly by Martha's sister Mary. It is Martha who, like the Samaritan woman the villagers, directs Mary to Jesus, waiting outside the village (11:28). She arrives ὅπου ἦν Ἰησοῦς (v. 32, cf. 14:3; 1:39; 4:40), and falling at his feet says to him, "Lord, if you had been here, my brother would not have died" (v. 32). It is she who anointed him and wiped his feet with her hair (v. 2, cf. 12:1-8), but here she still thinks in a very earthly fashion that his presence could have prevented the death of her brother. And instead of correcting her as he did her sister and the woman at the well, Jesus is moved by her grief (v. 33). Unlike to his mother whom he brushed aside so harshly with τι ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί, γύναι; (2:4) he now responds "Where have you placed him?" (11:34), ready to come to her aid in her need. For at least the moment it is heaven that is turned earthward. Has the woman at the well not been vindicated in Mary against the Samaritans who knew so much better?

And is the Samaritan woman not back again in Mary Magdalene at the gravesite mourning and mistaking the risen Lord for the gardener until he calls her by her name (20:14-16)? All of this is very uncertain. An answer will be found only when the entire gospel has been investigated, and the function of 4:1-42 within

its structure has been clarified. It is enough here to draw attention to the fact that the last word may not yet have been said with the confession of the Samaritans and their rejection of the woman who had directed them to Jesus.

9. The Work of an Editor?

Two brief sections of our text have not yet been clarified, verses 22 and 37f. They have apparently been added later by a subsequent editor (or subsequent editors) who evidently read the text with his (their) own understanding(s) of its meaning. The statements have not been integrated structurally into the text, but stand almost meta-linguistically as comments on it. Nevertheless, they have a significant effect on its macro-structure. Interactionally, the reader is no longer engaged in the text, but is informed (ideationally) that a) the difference between the worship of the Samaritans and of the Jews is that salvation is from the Jews, apparently meaning that Jesus is after all the Jewish, and not the Samaritan, messiah (v. 22), and b) that the reference to the distinction between the sower and the reaper refers to more than one group of workers in the Samaritan mission (vv. 37f.). It is conceivable that both additions are from a single editor. An investigation of the entire gospel may reveal whether or not this is the case, and possibly lead to a better understanding of his (their) editorial activity.

10. A Framework of Meaning Extending beyond the Gospel.

It has already been argued above in connection with the role of the woman in the story that its meaning cannot be determined finally before the function of the story itself as a higher level syntactic unit within the structure of the gospel as a whole has been clarified. Even that would still not be sufficient for a conclusive interpretation of our text. There is a sense in which no text can be interpreted exhaustively except within the framework of all other texts, written and oral, existing texts and texts to come, even though such an extension of the framework of interpretation, apart from being impossible to achieve, would proceed with a very rapid diminution of results that are meaningful for a particular text. However, we can extend the framework of our present interpretation quite meaningfully beyond the limits of the gospel to other relatively more closely related texts. I would like to make reference to another familiar text, Mt. 22:1-14, for two reasons: First, by contrast it will highlight the involvement of the reader in John 4:4-42, making clear that the suggestion of such an involvement is not arbitrary, and, second, once more by contrast, it will shed light on an even deeper level of meaning in our text than we have been able to bring out thus far. We will not engage in a complete interpretation of Mt. 22:1-14. For our purpose it will be sufficient to recall certain general features.

a) As the parallels in Luke (14:15-24) and the Gospel of Thomas (saying 64) reveal, the first part is based on an existing tradition which each author produced in a different version. A rabbinic parallel quoted by Joachim Jeremias (Parables, pp. 179f.) shows that the story also existed outside the Christian tradition. Matthew allegorized the story as a messianic banquet representing the history of Israel and the church. This story alone, however, was not sufficient for his purposes so he attached to it another

story (parable?) of a man who was thrown out of the banquet hall because he did not have on a wedding garment. For this story too there is a rabbinic parallel (cf. Jeremias, Parables, p. 188) which suggests that the wedding garment refers to the appropriate behavior for being found worthy, (cf. 22:8 in connection with the originally invited guests, οἱ κεκλημένοι οὐκ ἦσαν ἄξιοι), an understanding which appears to be confirmed by the statement that the guests who did come to the feast included πονηρούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς (v. 10).

Matthew's version of the story thus presents the church as the outcome of an open invitation without regard to the moral qualities of those who are invited to join, but with the understanding that that is not the last word. Incomprehensible from the point of view of the story line is how the guests who were picked up indiscriminately from the streets could have been expected to have been appropriately clothed. From the point of view of Matthew, however, it is quite understandable, signifying that presence in the church does not guarantee acceptance into the kingdom of God. What he intends with the story is made very clear by means of the proverb with which he concludes the story, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐστιν κλητοί, ὀλίγοι δε ἐκλεκτοί (22:14), notwithstanding the fact that only one guest was thrown out.

b) With regard to the interactional feature, the engagement of the reader, the difference from John 4 is evident. In Matthew's story the reader is informed of the events and also of the meaning, but she/he is not engaged in the story. The tensions which exist in this story, e.g., the unreasonable expectation that guests who had been picked up from the streets should be appropriately dressed for a banquet, also cannot be resolved by reader participation in the story, but are evidently products of insufficient editorial attention in combining the two original stories. In contrast with John 4:4-52 engagement of the reader in the story is neither called for in Mt. 22:1-14, nor would such an engagement serve to clarify whatever tensions exist in the story. A comparison of the two narratives with regard to the interactional macro-feature reveals that the suggestion is not arbitrary that the reader is engaged as a decisive component of the story in John 4:4-42. Mt. 22:1-14 is an informative story which discloses to the reader important facts about the church, and directs an urgent warning to be constantly prepared with the appropriate behavior. John 4:4-42 functions like a cultic myth, it is a narrative symbol which is intended to engender in the reader a certain experience of reality when she/he is led to the recognition of Jesus as the savior of the world.

c) More important still is the contrast in meaning between these texts. First of all it is necessary to establish the contact point(s) between the two stories. As has already been suggested above, μενεῖν παρὰ Ἰησοῦ (cf. 1:39), to stay where Jesus is, is an equivalent symbol in John to "eating bread in the kingdom of God" in the synoptics (cf. Lk. 14:15; John 14:1-3). The Lucan parallel to our Matthaean text can serve as a point of contact between our two stories. There is also the following agreement between Luke and John: Both can obviously say that the hour which is coming now is. Cf. the Johannine ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν (4:23, cf. 5:25). In John the hour does not arrive only when the Samaritan villagers come to the realization that Jesus is the savior of the world (4:42), but is also already at hand for the reader in her/his engagement in the text. So also in 5:25, ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν when the dead will hear the

voice of the Son of God, and those who hear shall live."

Luke insists on something very similar! When someone in the crowd says, "Blessed is whoever eats bread in the kingdom of God" (14:15) he has Jesus counter with the parable of the feast which has the clear implication that the hour has already come. It is not necessary to dispute that Luke has already realized that the parousia has been delayed into a distant future, but here it is clear that he does not consider that a serious problem, because it is not necessary to sigh about "eating bread in the kingdom of God" when even now "the poor and the maimed and the blind and the lame (v. 21) and the gentiles (v. 23) are invited to take a seat at the festive table. Thus it is understandable that Luke has no difficulty in having Jesus say "Blessed are the poor, because the kingdom of God belongs to you" (6:20).

Luke expects less than John for participation in the kingdom of God. For him mere acceptance of the invitation is sufficient. What an appalling chaos it must have been when his indiscriminately assembled guests gathered at the festive table. In John participation in Jesus is not quite as indiscriminate; at least recognition of Jesus' true identity is required, in contrast with mistaken identifications of him. Salvation for John is given with the recognition of Jesus, but at least that recognition must be contributed by the believer. In Luke, salvation, participation in the kingdom of God, is offered indiscriminately. From John's point of view that would have appeared an odd kind of salvation, because he does not have Luke's deep concern for the underprivileged, the dispossessed, the powerless, for whom John's requirement of recognition could only have appeared an unnecessary condition for salvation. It should not come as a surprise if Luke were to have said that it is the woman in her simplicity, and not the arrogant villagers, to whom the kingdom of God belonged.

Matthew too was unable to think of salvation as indiscriminately as Luke with his rabble, but his condition for salvation was a certain moral disposition, symbolized by the wedding garment. He was less concerned about the social conditions of the guests, but what did matter for him was that they were composed of "the bad and the good" (v. 10). However, he does not leave the indiscriminacy of the invitation in the happy disorder of Luke. When the king enters the festive hall all that is discordant is removed. It is not a case of Matthew's necessarily having a disdain for Luke's poor and dispossessed and powerless. They simply do not enter into his picture. For him what is at issue is that "the bad and the good" are invited to come indiscriminately. Therefore a moral distinction needs to be made. Matthew's attitude to the indiscriminacy of the invitation is in accord with his version of the beatitudes compared with Luke: "Blessed are the poor in spirit; blessed the humble, those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, the poor of heart, for the kingdom of God belongs to them" (4:3-9). In Matthew's view no indiscriminate rabble will inherit the kingdom of God. Have no illusions, "many are invited, but few will be chosen to stay" (22:14).

d) The comparison with Matthew--and with Luke--reveals at a deeper level the problematic nature of John's understanding of salvation. The view presented in Luke's version of the story of the great feast presents the simplest conception of salvation.

Mere acceptance of the invitation is all that is required, and Luke has no doubt that "the poor and the maimed and the blind and the lame" are ready to accept because their conditions leave them with little compunction in contrast with the sophisticated pious Jew.

In John's view more is required; not only recognition of Jesus, but correct recognition, in contrast with mistaking the fact that he is a θεῖος ἀνήρ, is of inherent significance. In the case of Luke one cannot speak of justification by faith, but of childlike confidence. For John salvation is obtained in an act of faith which is the recognition of Jesus, not by intellectual assent--whether by reasoning or by believing the story that is told--but by an initiation into the mystery of who Jesus is when Jesus stays with the Samaritan villagers, or when the reader is engaged in the story of Jesus and the Samaritan woman. John can affirm the understanding of salvation as presented in Luke's story of the banquet, i.e., that it is offered as a free gift from God, only by giving it a deeper meaning in the recognition of Jesus as the savior of the world.

Matthew also moves beyond the simplicity of an understanding of salvation such as that of Luke, but in the opposite direction, not by deepening the meaning of the acceptance of God's invitation in Jesus, but by introducing a new factor, the necessity of being found worthy. One should not be misled by the fact that he also has an open invitation to think that anything has really changed. The necessity of being found worthy completely relativizes the openness of the invitation.

e) Our concern here is less with the contrast between John and Luke and Matthew as such, than with the contrast as a means of uncovering the meaning of our Johannine text at an even deeper level than has been achieved by our interpretation up to this point. That level is reached when we recognize the irreconcilable polarity in the positions of John and of Matthew; in the contradiction between the conception of salvation as a free gift which occurs in the very act in which the believer recognizes Jesus as the savior of the world, and as something bestowed on whomever is found morally worthy; between recognition of Jesus as a condition which qualifies the nature of salvation, and moral worthiness as a precondition for its bestowal; between surrender to the divine by initiation into the mystery of who Jesus is, and affirmation of human worthiness as constitutive to the achievement of salvation. Over and against John's affirmation of heaven against earth--unless someone is born ἄνωθεν, she/he cannot see the kingdom of God (3:3)--Matthew reaffirms earth in the face of heaven--"not everyone who calls me, Lord, Lord, will enter into the kingdom of the heavens, but whoever does the will of my father who is in the heavens" (7:21).

The issue here is not of choosing between the views of John and Matthew. We understand the situation only when we recognize that we have to accept both views as uncompromisingly true, irreconcilable as they are. Logically salvation cannot be something that is unconditionally given with the recognition of the savior, <u>and</u> as the divine recognition of human worthiness. It cannot be at the same time human surrender to the divine and divine recognition of human worthiness, and yet we are called upon to accept both views. The situation is similar to when Plato in his old age found it necessary to embrace two contradictory principles also representing, respectively, heaven and

earth. He proposes that we have to accept that both the theory of the friends of ideas (his own, in agreement with Parmenides) that only what is unchanging, the ideas, are real, as well as the contrary theory of the Heraclitians who assert that what is real is the visible world of constantly changing things. "...in the way of children (we should) call real and the whole (τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν) both what is unmoved and what moves" (Soph. 249 d 2-4).

Even with that the macro-structure of John 4:1-42 has by no means been described completely, but the wider context out of which the text was formulated has at least been indicated. It is that context which ultimately determines the meaning of the text, revealing that the recognition of Jesus is less a matter of his personal identity which has meaning in itself, than of the nature of salvation expressed in the understanding of who he is.

Conclusion. In this study we have done the equivalent on a larger scale of clarifying the words and the syntactic structure of a sentence such as "The table is large." We also have a glimpse at what the passage means, because being more than a single sentence, John 4:1-42 is less equivocal than "The table is large." However, until the entire gospel has been clarified, we will not know what the author is saying with the passage. Hopefully this study has provided an indication of how the rest of the gospel can be interpreted so that it can finally be read as a single macro-sentence.

"THE JORDAN A BOUNDARY":

A READING OF NUMBERS 32 AND JOSHUA 22

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> By these limited and partial analyses, we have hoped to suggest a certain manner of reading, a methodological model which seems to us, at present, the best adapted to the strategy of semiotic research: it consists, whenever one is confronted by a phenomenon which has not been analyzed, of constructing a representation of it in such a way that the model is more general than the case under examination requires, so that the observed phenomenon registers itself (s'y inscrive) as one of (the model's) variables.
>
> Greimas (1976: 263)

> In short, the historico-symbolic appropriation of history characteristic of early Israel leaves us with the task of analyzing the processes involved in such historicizing symbolism, on the one hand, and the task of trying to uncover, insofar as we can, the underlying structure and detail of the lived experiences in a framework of documented history, on the other hand.
>
> Gottwald (85)

1. Theoretical setting

1.0 This paper has two theoretical concerns. The first is my long preoccupation with finding a mode of structural exegesis adequate to the Old Testament, and in the first instance to its narrative parts. The second, more recent, is the need for models of Old Testament research capable of giving to adherents of the established historical-critical methods and to explorers of newer literary and social-scientific approaches some sense of a common enterprise. These concerns have interacted with the relatively random particularity of "what I happen to be working on at the moment" to produce what is very much a report on work in progress.

1.1 Towards an adequate narratology

1.11 Though there have been many varieties of biblical structuralism, its mainstream has been fed from two sources (cf. especially Patte), A. J. Greimas's literary analyses of the structures of narrativity, and Claude Lévi-Strauss's work on the semantic structure of myth. In this mainstream I choose, now perhaps unfashionably, to continue, though not without some dissatisfaction with the results achieved so far. My sense is that there have been too many, often "one-shot", applications of Greimas and/or Lévi-Strauss, often (and I do not exempt some of my own work from this judgment) looking like elegant parlour games. I do not wish to depreciate the sense of discovery which marks such exegeses, and there is intrinsically a mathematical elegance to a good structural analysis. But we cannot live for ever on the sense of discovery and on elegant demonstrations. Where are we going?

1.12 Leaving judgments about New Testament to others, I feel that we have been insufficiently insistent, from the Old Testament side, on the specific objective qualities of our material, and that as a result we have failed to get the best guidance we could precisely from the two poles of our inspiration, Greimas and Lévi-Strauss. The "implied Greimas" and "implied

Lévi-Strauss", as it were, of current biblical structuralist praxis have been too narrowly defined. They are most often thought of as the authors of a few deductive models of great precision and immense (claimed) breadth of application; that is, as "reductionists" par excellence. I think this is wrong, or at least much too simple, and that at their best they show us ways to avoid the reductionism to which structuralism is indeed always prone.

1.131 In the case of Greimas the fault has not all been on the side of his readers, for he did not, either in Sémantique structurale or in Du sens, guard himself against the reductionist charge. But such a charge cannot be properly levelled against his later book, Maupassant, which is a superb example of the interplay of the deductive and the inductive, of letting the text direct the methods applied to it, as well as of the variety of methods in the literary structuralist's repertoire (cf. my first superscript). His earlier, theoretical works are of great importance still, and I believe that even the price that was paid, of giving an unfortunate and wrong impression of the scope of the structuralist enterprise, was not too high for the gains he made. But, faced with a real live text, it is Maupassant that I want to have in my hand.

1.132 In the case of Lévi-Strauss most of the trouble has stemmed from the absurd over-emphasis of one single article out of his immense output, "The Structural Study of Myth" (1963: 206-31). Important methodological principles are no doubt stated there, but the practical examples consist of a brief bagatelle with the Oedipus myth which, despite his disclaimers, remains by far his most influential analysis, and of a few odds and ends from Amerindian mythology. From these examples a few deductive models, including a celebrated and baffling formula, are deduced. But these certainly do not dominate his serious analyses of myths, particularly his magnum opus, the four-volume Mythologiques (1970, 1973, 1978, 1971), where he allows his models to become as complicated as they need to be in the face of the massiveness of his chosen object, the entire extant mythology of Indians from one end of the Americas to the other /1/.

1.14 The Old Testament is not all narrative; this year, in fact, the SBL seminar on structural exegesis is turning its attention, not before time, to non-narrative texts. But about half of it does consist of one sequential narrative, which, following Freedman (226) I shall call the Primary Narrative (Genesis to 2 Kings). Clearly much material not originally narrative has gone into its making, but this material has been "narratized" by its very incorporation. The Primary Narrative is my long-term concern as a structural analyst, but in the face of its immensity the existing rather atomistic efforts at structural analysis of it, including my own, seem painfully inadequate.

1.15 Part of the value of Lévi-Strauss for me lies, accordingly, in the very scope of the Mythologiques. To launch oneself into the semantics of the Primary Narrative is an act almost of comparable madness to launching oneself into those of Indian mythology. But it is by no means only in this sense of an adequate scope that his value lies. The innumerable pieces of which the Primary Narrative is made are often loosely connected, and their susceptibility to fruitful treatment in detachment from their narrative context is clear from historical-critical research (especially form-criticism). So there is wide scope for the paradigmatic analysis of the narrative elements, looking at them "side by side" as if they were separate entities like Lévi-Strauss's myths. For this part of the work he provides innumerable tactical and strategic insights. However, the pericopes of the Primary Narrative do not reach us as separate entities, but in a syntagmatic arrangement, and the constraints of narratization, even on such an enormous scale, must be accounted for in any adequate structural approach. The traditions of Israel reach us not merely as texts, but as a text, in the quasi-technical sense in which Barthes or Kristeva, as well as Greimas (1976) use the word.

To approach a text with regard for its textuality is to approach it as a system of (intrinsic) meanings, before considering it as a collection of references (to society, history, etc. — realities outside the text). This is not to propose the absurdity that the "pure" text is devoid of reference; rather to say that all referential meaning must be looked at first as having become part of the intrinsic meaning-system of the text. (On paradigmatic vs. syntagmatic cf. further in 1.33).

1.2 Structuralism, historical criticism, and social science

1.21 Gottwald (e.g. 622-24) endeavours to work out the relationship between synchronic and diachronic models drawn from sociology, with a view to using them as tools for a historiography more attuned to the social sciences than that which has usually been employed in writing the history of Israel. While pure synchrony is ultimately an impossible abstraction, history should be looked at as the diachrony of systems first grasped, so far as it is possible, synchronically. Biblical texts he sees (e.g. 83-87) as "sociohistorical symbolization" of the historical reality thus defined. The texts which are relevant for him, as being sufficiently early to reflect his period (1250-1050 B.C.E.), Gottwald lists precisely (47-59). This list of texts is arrived at by the traditional methods of historical criticism. He further attempts an ambitious model, synchronic and diachronic in the above sense, of the relation of these texts, organized into narrative themes, to sociohistorical reality (100-114; it is the social institution of cult which mediates the relation).

1.22 This approach already makes a structuralist feel at home; and Gottwald tentatively takes a further step:

> There appears to be a measure of conjunction, as yet largely unexplored, between the linguistic context isolated by structuralism and the sociohistorical context, in the sense that each points to a larger structure of regularities that finds expression in particular texts. For the moment, social psychology may be the sphere in which the structural linguistic and the sociological approaches initially intersect. (720)

The obvious line of justification for these remarks is that structuralism has grown up as, and has usually if not consistently seen itself as, interdisciplinary at least among the human sciences. What is very much lacking, however, is theory about how social or psychological reality becomes "inscribed" in literary texts — the need being particularly urgent, of course, when almost all that we have from a given society is texts. In this situation we cannot give enough attention to the reading of texts against models of all kinds drawn from the social sciences, and to the building of theories of such reading. To this theory-building a structuralism which conceives itself in an interdisciplinary way should be able to make great contributions. Gottwald's own great merit is to have read the texts against such sophisticated sociological models. On a very modest scale, I shall offer some such readings (cf. 2.6, 3.42).

1.23 Gottwald gives promise, then, of an approach to biblical historiography to which a semiological approach to texts can attach itself. For his part, he seems to be looking for a literary method more in keeping with the sophistication of his sociological method than the very traditional one which he employs. But some serious problems stand in the way of this marriage.

1.24 Gottwald has no "text" in the sense defined in 1.15. He has texts, determined by historical-critical methods from the text which Israel has left us. There is no reason why these texts could not be subjected to

literary structural analysis, as any well-defined text can, nor why significant gains should not be expected from such a procedure. But what of the final form of the text, and of regard for its textuality? I think it fair to say that structuralist insistence on the final form as the proper object of analysis has been more polemical than illuminating (e.g. Polzin on Job, 57-61). Certainly the final form demands our attention; but why not also the important hypothetical earlier forms of the text? Is it not in just this way that the text might be studied as "the diachrony of systems first grasped synchronically" (cf. 1.21)? No doubt the sharp distinction of structural methods, as intrinsically synchronic, from diachronic methods (especially Patte: 17-20) has hindered such a collaborative approach (though Patte actually calls for collaboration, without defining how it might look).

1.25 I shall, nonetheless, argue for the final form as the necessary starting-point, and thus explain why I have not taken the attractive option of beginning with Gottwald's sources, but in such a way as to specifically not rule out diachronic possibilities. When a given discourse becomes part of another discourse (sc. "source" and "redaction") it is not likely to go unaltered in the process; and it is even less likely that we can achieve certainty on the matter. Our approach to the "source" discourse must therefore always be via the "redaction" discourse, with the possibility that the source-critical question itself may change during the analysis. This much, I suppose, would be widely agreed, but there is much more to it. Going directly to the "source", even when its existence is widely agreed, means giving up potential gain in information. The "redaction" discourse necessarily takes up some position vis-à-vis the position of the "source" discourse, and in particular the unconscious assumptions of the two will stand in some relation to each other. Another way of saying this is: the diachrony of a text will be inscribed in the text structurally, and a structuralism true to itself will make this the presupposition of any dialogue with historical method. Perhaps I am not far away from Polzin, when he interprets historical-critical classics like Wellhausen's Prolegomena as structural analyses (126-49, cf. 150-202). Certainly I can invoke Güttgemanns (49), whose point is clear enough through jargon and polemic: "In principle, a 'redaction' can only 'insert' materials into a structural framework where the syntagmatics of motifemic sequence 'grammatically' permits this from the start, since otherwise 'nonsense' would occur". In psychoanalysis, so often the readiest analogy to literary analysis, a diachrony (case-history) is taken to be inscribed in the "text" of the patient's discourse. Even if the literati who may be responsible for the P redaction should have attempted to reverse the JE point of view, their having done so will not be unrecorded in their text, any more than a person's change of mind on a matter will be unrecorded in his/her further utterances on the matter.

1.26 All this in principle; but what does it mean at the level of practical method? We need to set our structural analysis of a text (final form) against existing models of the text's historical development; not with a view simply to taking these models for granted and doing structural analysis of the text at important stages (1.24), but to entering into increasingly critical dialogue with the models as our understanding of the parameters of structural transformation in texts becomes more refined. Since this is a project which needs first to be tried out on much less complicated texts than I shall be dealing with here, I shall note only briefly (4) the application of such a procedure to my analysis. And indeed it cannot be properly carried through in the absence of a Gottwaldian sociohistory of the entire period of the development of the Primary Narrative. The task is enormous. Let me add, however, and in homage, that it takes on some sense of feasibility, enormous as it is, from the work Gottwald has done already.

1.3 A question and a starting-point

1.31 In relation to the preceding discussion, my modest analysis needs some further introduction. Upon reading Gottwald, I pondered the possibility

of an analysis which would impinge on his central question of immigration vs. revolt models of Israel's origins, in the mode of social psychology which he saw as a potential point of intersection between his work and literary structuralism. The question I formulated, and which underlies the whole analysis is: What viewpoint does the Primary Narrative reveal towards the idea of Israelites living east of the Jordan? Since immigration is mainly conceived of as from the east, ingrained attitudes towards the east, I thought, ought to be related to a deep sense of whether the east did have such a special significance for Israel's beginning. Starting-points are always to some extent random, but in this case the starting-point seemed relatively determined. Of many passages relevant to the question, only two seem to have as their textual function the "answering" of it. I begin, then, with Num 32 and Jos 22.

1.32 Looking at the analysis in its present form, I find its relationship to Gottwald more problematic than I had hoped. The implications for his central question are obscure, though I believe there are some if they can be adequately interpreted; and I have not yet come to close grips with his sociological models. With the exception of a few verses in Num 32, my two chapters are not, of course, among Gottwald's sources. I do not see this as a drawback, for the reasons expounded in 1.2; but since my programme for working back from the final form of the text is at such a rudimentary stage (4), it will obviously be some time before I meet up with Gottwald by pursuing this line. To complete all my disclaimers at once, the following will be a very stripped-down analysis, since the scope even of this limited analysis is too broad for a seminar paper. The analysis of Num 32 and Jos 22 will be relatively full (2), but of other passages schematic and no doubt speculative. But I hope there will be enough to make clear what I am after, and to provide a basis for discussion of whether my project "makes sense".

1.33 Finally, Part 3 will be so arranged as to highlight a theoretical issue of such prevalence that a few remarks are in order here. On every scale, from the microscopic to the macroscopic, the relation between paradigmatic and syntagmatic analysis (cf. 1.15) becomes a practical issue. Num 32 and Jos 22 raise the issue unavoidably in several ways. They stand in the clearest syntagmatic relation to each other, yet as two stories with essentially the same actors, they demand paradigmatic comparison. Syntagmatically again, they are related in principle to the entire Primary Narrative, and especially significantly to what lies between them. But they also include (Num 32:8-13, Jos 22:17, 20) references back to particular parts of this containing and contained narrative (cf. Jobling, 1978a:63-88) with which they thus put themselves into a paradigmatic relationship. A common case is where two parallel accounts are joined sequentially (cf. e.g. 2.114). Here the appropriate analytic movement is paradigmatic → syntagmatic; first the messages are compared, then the effect on the total message of their sequentiality is assessed. But sometimes (e.g. 3.3) it requires a considerable syntagmatic reading to get a sense of the semantic load, so that the movement tends to be syntagmatic → paradigmatic. I hope the paper may be a contribution to the theory of this central issue.

> But in order to go from east to west, they will first of all have to cross the river. The latter has both a dividing and a unifying function . . .
>
> Lévi-Strauss (1978: 440-41)

> Does the construction of these traditions around the Jordan . . . not suggest that the conquest theme was recast in accord with the prejudices of the people of Canaan?
>
> Coats (188)

2. Analysis of Numbers 32 and Joshua 22

2.01 The group seeking a home to the east of the Jordan will be referred to in Part 2 simply as the Transjordanians; it is convenient to leave for Part 3 issues related to the constitution of this group. Those settling in the west will correspondingly be called the Cisjordanians.

2.02 Considering the amount of material between these two chapters, it is striking how nearly seamlessly they join together. All that is needed to link them is something like: "The Transjordanians were as good as their word. After the settlement in the west was successfully completed . . ." In fact, there are two included passages, Jos 1:12-18 and 4:12-13, which belong to the story-line of Num 32 and Jos 22. Neither passage as it stands offers much to the analysis. I will invoke 1:12-18 to some extent, but in the case of 4:12-13 I am conscious of the need to study it as part of the whole account of the Crossing of the Jordan, a deep consideration of which, in fact, seems to me the most serious lack in the present form of this paper. For the present, the object of analysis is Num 32 + Jos (1:12-18, 4:12-13), 22. But this object falls into two separate stories, each well-formed in the sense of moving from a conflict to its resolution:

Story I: Num 32 + Jos (1:12-18, 4:12-13), 22:1-8
Story II: Jos 22:9-34

Story I tells of the Transjordanians' desire to be settled in the east, of the conflict thus created, of an agreement made, and of the carrying out of its terms by both parties; the Transjordanians get their wish, but conflict is averted. Story II tells of a unilateral act by the Transjordanians, the building of an altar, of the conflict thus created, and of the provision by the Transjordanians of a satisfactory explanation; they achieve, apparently, what they set out to, and conflict is averted. The point of division, between Jos 22:8 and 9, is less than perfectly obvious (cf. the analysis), but can be justified in a preliminary way by the following observations: Joshua, a significant character in Story I, especially at the end of it, last appears in v. 8; "the people of Israel" first appear as an actor in v. 9, as also does the setting in Shiloh (cf. v. 12).

2.03 The two stories will first be analyzed individually (2.1, 2.2); then their relationship will be analyzed, paradigmatically and syntagmatically (2.3, 2.4). In 2.5 I shall attempt a summary of the semantic message in the form of an isotopic analysis (cf. Jobling, 1978a: 27-28, 40-46), and in 2.6 try out a recent sociological model of conflict as a tool for interpreting the stories.

2.1 Story I

2.11 The main story line. I shall at this stage bracket the reference in Num 32:8-13 to the story told in Num 13-14 (including certain features of 32:14-15 necessary for the inclusion of this story). I shall return to the enclosed story in 2.12.

2:111 The story is readily segmented, mainly by the speeches:

Num 32:1-5	Request by Transjordanians
6-7, 14-15	Angry response by Moses
16-19	Compromise proposed by Transjordanians
20-24	Guarded agreement by Moses
25-27	Reaffirmation of good faith by Transjordanians
28-30	Moses instructs Joshua, etc. to implement the agreement after the event if the Transjordanians prove their good faith
31-32	Reaffirmation of good faith by Transjordanians

33-42 Moses gives land to Transjordanians
(Jos 1:12-18, 4:12-13 Carrying out of agreement)
Jos 22:1-8 Joshua confirms the gift of land to the Transjordanians, and dismisses them

The biggest problem brought out by this segmentation is the degree of repetition in the story. It is clearest in the double reaffirmation of good faith by the Transjordanians, but even before this Moses' speech in v. 20-24 is repetitive of v. 16-19. The following analysis of the story must give some account of the repetition.

2.112 In Num 32:1-5, the Transjordanians make a logical suggestion. It is reasonable, in the circumstances, for them to make their home in the east. Their request has two parts, (a) to be settled in the east, (b) not to be made to cross the Jordan now.

2.113 V. 6-24

2.1131 Moses responds with great anger, seeing the request as a threat to all of Israel, and suggests no possibility of compromise. It is noticeable, however, that it is only to part (b) of the request that he objects; no one in the story, in fact, ever objects to (a) or impugns its logic. The Transjordanians offer a compromise — (a) but not (b). They will cross the Jordan, even (though this is not quite clear) assume a role of leadership, provided only that they can first make provision for their dependents and property for the interim. Moses accepts this, but in the conditional form, with reference to a divine sanction if the Transjordanians renege. It is worth noting how the Transjordanians put provision for themselves before helping the rest of Israel (v. 16-17), while Moses does the opposite (v. 20-24).

2.1132 It is frequently a powerful tool of narrative analysis to posit a countertext, to tell another, usually more "natural" story, and to ask why the given text is not this way. In the present case, the compromise put forward by the Transjordanians is so obvious as to make one ask why Moses did not think of it. The countertext, then, would have Moses responding to the request in v. 1-5 with something like the conditional of v. 20-24 (with a Transjordanian response like v. 25-27 following). The countertext would, of course, lack the jarring repetition of the text. I suggest two pressures in the formation of the text as it is; that Moses have occasion for an angry speech, and (with less confidence) that the initiative for a compromise solution come from the Transjordanians.

2.114 V. 25-42

2.1141 V. 25-30 and v. 31-42 can be read as alternatives, either of which could at this point be the text. Each consists of a reaffirmation of good faith by the Transjordanians (25-27, 31-32), followed by an act related to giving them land (28-30, 33-42). Not only does this provide us with an approach to the repetition, it also highlights an important semantic opposition. In fact, the very awkwardness of 25-27 and 31-32 encourages us to see them as markers of something significant in semantic organization. The procedure of course will be a paradigmatic followed by a syntagmatic analysis.

2.1142 In v. 28-30, Moses makes provision for the fulfilment of the bargain a posteriori; the obscure v. 30 at least means that the Transjordanians must lose their original request if they do not keep the bargain. In v. 33-42, Moses gives the land a priori. It may be argued that prior distribution of the land was implied in the bargain, in that the Transjordanians were allowed to build cities, and that this distribution was implicitly provisional. But in fact the earlier sanction (v. 23) did not include the loss of the land, and it cannot be denied that v. 28-30 and 33-42 give different impressions of the timing of the gift and of the givers. We may formulate

this as the prior vs. the posterior gift.

2.1143 A comparison of v. 25–27 and 31–32 is also interesting. In the first case the Transjordanians are still putting their own interests ahead of those of the others (26–27), and, we may perhaps add, simply going along with Moses; while in the second they perceive the agreement as having Yahweh's sanction, and put the others' interests ahead of their own. At some risk of overinterpretation, the following syntagmatic understanding may be suggested: 25–27, Transjordanians as still somewhat reluctant bargainers; 28–30, Moses as still a reluctant giver, with a "wait and see" attitude, and stressing the negative; 31–32, Transjordanians as enthusiastic and pious helpers; 33–42, Moses as a ready giver, stressing the positive (though the gift is still necessarily provisional).

2.115 In Jos 1:12–18, the prior and the posterior gift are kept in nice tension; also noteworthy is the self-sanction implied by the Transjordanians (v. 18). In Jos 22:1–6, Joshua carries out the instruction of Num 32:28–30, to give the Transjordanians their inheritance a posteriori, but does so completely in the terms of the prior gift by Moses. As a final narrative touch, giving a sense of roundedness to the whole of Story I, note the fairness of Jos 22:8, answering precisely to Moses' appeal to fairness in Num 32:6 (just as the Transjordanians could be challenged to share their compatriots' wars, as the latter had shared theirs, so the Transjordanians must share their compatriots' booty, as the latter had shared theirs). The point is somewhat obscured, though, by the odd reference to Manasseh in Jos 22:7a (on this, cf. below, 3.222).

2.12 The enclosed story in Num 32:8–13. In these verses Moses invokes the story told in Num 13–14, of the failure to enter the land from the south. The behaviour of the Transjordanians, he claims, is like that of the spies in the earlier story who discouraged the people. Thus one story is put into a hermeneutical relationship with the other, and a paradigmatic analysis becomes imperative. There are theoretical issues involved in deciding what form of the spies' story to use — what, in particular, of Deut 1:20–46? For reasons to be considered later (3.20) I shall base this analysis on Num 13–14.

2.121 That the spies' story should be retold in Num 32 briefly and tendentiously is to be expected, but significance may still be found in the particular ways in which it is deformed. The following is a segmentation of Num 13–14, with indications of what becomes of each segment in the retelling.

13:1–16	Choosing of spies by tribe	
17–25	Commissioning and journey	32:8–9
26–33	Report of the spies	9 (cf. 12)
14:1–10a	The people are discouraged	
10b–35	Yahweh's angry response; punishment on Israel	10–13
36–38	Exemplary punishment of spies	
39–45	Abortive attempt to enter land without Yahweh's blessing	

Remarks on this table: The retelling in 32:8–13 omits any reference to the tribes. Whereas the report of the spies in 13:26–33 was a mixed one (cf. v. 27), it is wholly negative in the retelling (knowledge of the minority report by Caleb and Joshua, and their consequent blessing, is implied in 32:12, but this is not significantly developed; the presence of Joshua as an actor in Story I may, however, make the reference to him here important at some other level). By far the most tendentious omission is of the people's allowing themselves to be discouraged by the discouraging report — Moses' argument seems to founder on this point. The Transjordanians are threatened with no such exemplary punishment as that of 14:36–38, though they presumably would

share the general fate. The final episode, the abortive attempt, appears to have no relevance to the new situation.

2.122 One is not superficially impressed with the appositeness of Moses' allusion. The Transjordanians have not seen the land of Canaan, let alone given a negative report of it — they have made no recommendations at all to anyone. The tertium quid is simply the discouragement the others will draw from the Transjordanian initiative; but this is merely an imputation by Moses, as indeed is Yahweh's anger and punishment. There is, however, more to be said. If we extend our view to the whole of Story I, we find that it has a number of structural elements in common with Num 13-14:

(a) The spies saw the land, and called it bad. The Transjordanians have seen what is not the land, and called it good. This point depends upon Transjordan's not being part of the land, an issue to which we must frequently return.

(b) Closely related to (a) is the opposition: recommendation not to enter the land vs. desire not to enter the land.

(c) Both stories include an agreement to enter the land and return, on behalf of the whole people's entering (in the case of the spies before, in the case of the Transjordanians after, the "discouragement").

(d) The premature taking of land. More speculatively, the failure of the attempt in Num 14:39-45, which has become premature in relation to the revised divine plan, may be compared with the sense of prematurity in 32:33-42 (cf. 2.1142), at least in the "taking" of land in v. 39-42.

(e) The most compelling common element, however, is of a quite different kind, namely the prevalence of the security of children, i.e. of the next generation. But this is better taken up in the isotopic analysis (cf. 2.53).

(f) Both stories, finally, look to a positive conclusion long deferred.

2.123 Syntagmatically, the enclosed story is so placed as to give occasion for Moses' angry speech, for which it provides, albeit unconvincingly, the substance. Also, though again unconvincingly, it provides a way of bringing Yahweh into Story I as a quasi-actor.

2.2 Story II

2.21 If we put aside v. 9 (transitional, cf. 2.4), and perhaps the awkward and redundant v. 11, whose concern seems to be to make it unmistakably clear which side of the river the altar was on, Story II is in the form of a grand chiasmus:

(a) 10 Transjordanians build the altar
  (b) 12 Cisjordanians threaten war
    (c) 13-15a Cisjordanians send an embassy
      (d) 15b-20 Accusatory speech by the embassy
        (e) 21-29 Transjordanians' reply
      (d') 30-31 Accepting speech by the embassy
    (c') 32 Return of the embassy to Cisjordan
  (b') 33 Withdrawal of the Cisjordanian threat of war
(a') 34 Transjordanians name the altar

Even the central element (e) has itself a convincing ABBA form: A, invocations and oaths expressing innocence (22-23, 29); B, explanation of the altar, in two closely parallel sections (24-27a, 27b-28).

2.22 My response to such impressive structure is literary admiration, and also the question, what is being put over on me that needs all this trouble (on structuralism and the hermeneutic of suspicion, Jobling, 1979). The main problem is that v. 34 looks lost, and the reason is that it wants to be with v. 10 — the naming of the altar should immediately follow its building. Is it too much to suggest that the admirable structure exists to "naturalize" the separation of these two verses, whereby alone the altar is left open to misunderstanding? At any rate, a countertext is suggested (cf. the very similar observations and suggestions of Soggin: 213-14). On the occasion of the happy parting of Cisjordanians and Transjordanians, the latter party, or even both parties, thought of a problem. The Transjordanians would have conceived it in the terms of v. 24-28, "in time to come your children might . . ."; whereas the Cisjordanians would rather have conceived it as "living so far away, indeed outside 'Yahweh's land' (v. 19), your Yahwism, or at any rate that of your children, may become dubious". So an agreement was made: the Cisjordanians to respect the Yahwism of the Transjordanians, and to give them access to Yahweh's sanctuary, the Transjordanians to perform Yahweh's service in the prescribed way at the Cisjordanian sanctuary (cf. v. 27); and this agreement was ratified by the building of an altar as a witness to future generations. The altar was close to the west bank of the Jordan, and perhaps was considered as belonging to Transjordan, as "a portion in Yahweh" (v. 25), and in "Yahweh's land" (v. 19).

2.23 The existence of such an agreement appears to be the upshot of the given story, but the result is achieved through a narrative of gross implausibility. A detailed reading may be dispensed with, for reasons of space (but cf., for example, the curious logic whereby the Transjordanians are assumed to have founded an illegitimate Yahweh-cult on the <u>west</u> of the Jordan). The achievement of the present form of the story seems to me to be simply the assimilation of these events to those of Story I, so that it is appropriate to move directly to a paradigmatic comparison.

2.3 Paradigmatic reading of Stories I and II

2.31 In the following analysis, it is to be noted how many of the features of Story II are not features of the countertext proposed in 2.22.

(a) A Transjordanian initiative sets the story in motion (Num 32: 1-5, Jos 22:10)

(b) Moses/the Cisjordanian embassy express anger at the initiative. Each (particularly in the second case) goes to some lengths of implausibility to put the worst possible construction upon it. And each makes use of allusions to the past to establish the case (and to help introduce Yahweh).

(Note: A fuller form of 2.2 would include a treatment of the stories alluded to in Jos 22:16-20, namely Peor (Num 25) in v. 17 and Achan (Jos 7) in v. 20, similar to the treatment of the spies' story (Num 13-14) above, 2.12. The allusions are actually so brief as to raise problems about such a procedure. Salient features of the Peor and Achan stories will, however, be considered in the isotopic analysis of 2.5).

(c) The Transjordanians make a suggestion/response which is satisfactory, and in fact provides the substance of a bargain (Num 32:16-19, Jos 22:22-29).

(d) Acceptance by Moses/the Cisjordanian embassy (Num 32:20-24, Jos 22:30-31.

Certain differences are, of course, not to be overlooked. The situations are different; in Story I the agreement includes a promise to be made good later, while in Story II the element of future ratification is much less specific. This may be related to the most striking contrast between the stories, namely that between Moses' hesitant acceptance of the Transjordanian programme and the precipitate readiness of the Cisjordanian embassy to be convinced. The element of the threat of war in Story II has no true parallel in Story I.

2.320 Various narrative programmes (Jobling, 1978a: 33) of the two parties (assimilating Moses for the moment to the Cisjordanians, cf. 2.41) are in play — explicit, implicit, and imputed — and it is a significant part of the analysis to unravel them. I shall not here go as far as I might into the "logic" or narrative plausibility of the programmes.

2.321 The Transjordanians' first aim, in Story I, is to receive their inheritance in the east. They wish to be a geographically separate part of Israel (nothing being said about any special mode of long-term relationship with Cisjordan). As a concession, they make their own the Cisjordanian programme, to get the Cisjordanians settled, which necessitates a Transjordanian sub-programme, to make temporary provision for their property and dependents. In Story II, matters are less clear, but the aspects of the Transjordanian programme seem to be:

To maintain their eastern residence permanently (through forthcoming generations),
To maintain their identity as Yahwists, and as a part of Israel,
To perform as Yahwists, by duly attending the service of the sanctuary,
To have a permanent guarantee of this state of affairs (through forthcoming generations).

They impute to the Cisjordanians' children a (potential) programme, to deny their children's Yahwist identity, and to prohibit their access to Yahweh's cult.

2.322 The Cisjordanians are largely in a reactive situation, so that their programmes are to be deduced in part from their reactions to the Transjordanian ones. Obviously, they wish to be and to remain settled in the west. But they see this as depending on their religious status before Yahweh, and this status as threatened by the Transjordanian programmes as they perceive them. They impute to the Transjordanians some rather incomprehensible programmes; to prevent the western settlement, to make Yahweh angry, to destroy the whole people. Their main programme, essentially reactive, is to offset the wrath of Yahweh against themselves which they think the Transjordanians are causing. Although they finally fall in with the Tranjordanian programmes, in both stories there are hints of another Cisjordanian programme of extreme interest — the eventual settlement of the Transjordanians in the west, and the consequent removal of the problem (whatever the problem may be). This programme is seen most clearly in Jos 22:19, but also of interest is v. 33, where the war is seen as to destroy the Transjordanians' land (as opposed, presumably, to exterminating the Transjordanians themselves), and especially Num 32:30, the peculiar sanction against the Transjordanians should they renege on their promise (on this, cogently, Coats: 187). Thus one may surmise that the Cisjordanians see the basic Transjordanian programme as the disunifying of Israel, and that they themselves include in their basic programme the reunification of Israel west of the Jordan.

2.33 This paradigmatic analysis may be concluded with a note on the views the stories take of the two parties. Moses and the Cisjordanians are quick to anger and ungenerous in their interpretations; though, as we have noted, the Cisjordanians of Story II are more readily appeased than is Moses in Story I. The views taken of the Transjordanians in the two stories are in much sharper contrast. In Story I they are so accommodating that they win the reader's sympathy from Moses. That this is not the case with Story II is due to their extraordinary deviousness. If their intentions in building the altar were so honourable, why did they not make them known (again, of course, the countertext is relevant)? In this light, their pious invocation of Yahweh in Jos 22:22 definitely looks like "protesting too much". (The narrator, indeed, seems to have caught this secretiveness, in withholding until v. 28 the information, presumably vital, that the altar was a copy

of the one in Yahweh' tabernacle).

2.4 Syntagmatic reading of Stories I and II

2.41 The forming of the two stories into one tends to make one read each in the light of the other, and in this case the effect of Story II on Story I seems to be the greater. The Moses of Story I is claimed, as it were, as representative of the Cisjordanian position, a claim which conceals extraordinarily complex issues in the Moses tradition (Coats). The Transjordanian deviousness in Story II can perhaps be read back into Story I — for all their accommodation there, were they not ready to leave their fellows in the lurch? On the other hand, the Cisjordanians can grasp at Mosaic authority by adopting the Mosaic style of argumentation.

2.42 To these no doubt random remarks must be added a further point of much greater theoretical importance. Story II effects a redoubling of Story I, by means of a reopening. The technique of the reopening is worth comment. Story I is complete at Jos 22:6; "and they went to their homes" is grammatically, as well as thematically, a closure. Still leaving aside v. 7a (cf.3.222), 7b appears as a very studied reopening (note the repetition of the verbs of 6, "bless", "send away"), rendered "innocent" by the content of 8, which certainly belongs to Story I ("by the way, I forgot to say . . .") But the reopening, once achieved, is confirmed by the "open" language of 9, "(they) left . . . in order to go to . . . their own land", by which Story II is opened. In other words, 22:6 so completes Story I, with the Transjordanians back in the land of their inheritance, as really to leave no room for anything else that happened before they got there. Nonetheless, something did happen. What is the effect of this? A story of a conflict fully and happily resolved becomes a story of a conflict which led to another conflict. Is there not profound significance in this? Despite the resolution of the conflict in Story II, conflict between Cisjordanians and Transjordanians has acquired a quality of recurrence, which makes the narrative redoubling much more than a matter of a factor of two.

2.5 Isotopic analysis of Stories I and II

2.50 I have sought elsewhere to demonstrate the great power of isotopic analysis in organizing meaning in texts (Jobling, 1978a: 26-62, especially 27-28; 1978b). An isotopy is a semantic category defined broadly enough to "catch" a large number of meaning-elements in the text (the language of "semes" and "sememes" is often used in this connection), but precisely enough for useful organization of the meaning-elements. A large number of isotopies are typically relevant to a text, and the order of their introduction is to some degree arbitrary, though certain isotopies can be perceived as more central than others to the message of the text. Going beyond my earlier works, I hope to develop the theory (beginning very modestly in this paper) that isotopic analysis will provide the most direct means for reading texts against significant social-scientific models (cf. 1.22). In the following analysis I shall include not only the spies' story enclosed in Story I, but also some points from the stories of Peor and Achan, enclosed in Story II, which were previously passed over.

2.51 The unity of Israel

2.511 By their initial request in Num 32:1-5, the Transjordanians break the integrity of Israel. One people about to enter one land becomes two groups with different territorial intentions. The Cisjordanians interpret non-integrity as division, which means danger from Yahweh (presumably because it may or must become religious division). The Transjordanians are quick to negate all thoughts of such division, and an uneasy equilibrium is attained at this point. But the Cisjordanians are prone to ask, if Israel is indeed undivided, why not demonstrate this by geographical integrity. This summary

of the preceding discussion (cf. especially 2.32) can be plotted on the semiotic square (cf. Aristotle's logical square, discussed by Güttgemanns: 64-68):

On each side, the upper state implies the lower, but not vice versa (i.e. integrity can exist only if there is no division, but there can be a state of non-division even in the absence of integrity, etc.) The upper two states are contraries — they cannot both obtain simultaneously; the lower two are sub-contraries — they cannot both not obtain simultaneously. All this lies in the theory of the square itself, not in our particular case. To interpret: The Cisjordanians are in the "either-or" situation of the top line; if not integrity, then division. They read the vertical implications upwards as well as downwards, which simply means that they equate integrity with non-division, etc. (making integrity and division into contradictories instead of contraries). The Transjordanians are in the "both-and" situation of the bottom line, insiting upon both non-integrity and non-division. (Narrative movement follows the sequence integrity → non-integrity → division → non-division (→ integrity); for the theory, Greimas, 1970: 175-78, and note how Story II recapitulates the proper movement, beginning with the integrity of Cisjordanians and Transjordanians before their parting). Cisjordanian and Transjordanian concepts of the nature of Israel's unity are profoundly different.

2.512 It is instructive to consider certain features of the terminology for the two parties (here briefly summarized) used by the parties themselves, and by the narrator. There are two basic options:

(a) $\frac{\text{Transjordanians}}{\text{Cisjordanians}} = \frac{\text{"you"}}{\text{"your brethren"}}$

(b) $\frac{\text{Transjordanians}}{\text{Cisjordanians}} = \frac{\text{?}}{\text{"the people of Israel"}}$

Option (a), which occurs in Num 32:6 (Moses' first remark), and exclusively in Joshua's speech (Jos 22:1-8), tends to include the Transjordanians as part of Israel. Option (b), which occurs in one form or another almost everywhere else, excludes the Transjordanians (the ? ought to be "non-Israelites", though this conclusion is not drawn). The occurences of (a) frame Story I, giving to it an inclusive cast, and the occurences of (b) in Story I do not give the impression of being deliberately "loaded". The occurences of (b) in Story II do give this impression; even at the point of conciliation (Jos 22:31) the "we" and the "people of Israel" in Phinehas's speech are hard to interpret inclusively, since the narrative reverts to option (b) in v. 32-33. The two stories give different impressions; Story I varies its rhetoric to give a movement of unity lost and regained, while Story II subsumes this movement under a rhetoric which implies non-unity throughout.

2.513 The enclosed stories have a contribution to make. If Israel's unity, on which its position before Yahweh depends, is so fragile, even a single individual, let alone two tribes and a half, can threaten it. This is the message of both the Peor (cf. Num 25:6-18) and the Achan stories; the latter being indeed locus classicus for this affirmation, a point not missed in the retelling — "wrath fell upon all the congregation of Israel though he (Achan) was but one man" (Jos 22:20). An a fortiori argument is implied — the Transjordanians' offense is worse than the earlier ones. Rather different is the point implied by the exemplary punishment of the offenders as individuals (as opposed to the general punishment on Israel), which occurs not only in Num 14:36-38, but also in both the Peor and the Achan stories. Though you Transjordanians will bring trouble on all Israel, this seems to

say, be sure that you will bring special trouble on yourselves. These are good examples of oblique but real contributions to the constellation of meanings being created.

2.52 Israel's land

2.521 It is story II which casts doubt on the status of Transjordan as Israelite territory, in contrast to Story I, where the words "the land which Yahweh smote before the congregation of Israel" (Num 32:4) have the effect of conforming the occupation of the east to that of the west (cf. 3.21). Jos 22:19 explicitly contrasts Transjordan with Yahweh's land, and raises the possibility of its being "unclean"; v. 33 suggests that the Cisjordanians intended to destroy the Transjordanian land rather than its people; and v. 25, though put forward as a negative possibility by the Transjordanians, evokes the idea of the Jordan as the boundary of Israel's authentic land. Geographical bipartition is not merely non-integrity, but a basis for value-judgment. It is significant in this connection that, in both stories, the Transjordanians undertake to cross the Jordan for the service of Yahweh. Since this obligation means that they are on Cisjordanian soil only temporarily, it is a renewable obligation, as the redoubling of Story I by Story II underlines. Is it the point that those whose status as Israelites is rendered dubious by their Transjordanian residence acquire sanctity by crossing the Jordan for the service of Yahweh? This question will be of special importance for the next section (2.53).

2.522 Of the enclosed stories the following may be said. Num 13-14, though concerned with a different boundary, has the element of entering the land and returning for the service of Yahweh. But only those of the spies acquire grace thereby who make the proper response to the land. Num 25 shows Israel, or some element of it, tempted to remain in Transjordan for the service of another god. And the Achan story, in the form in which we have it in Jos 7, shows remarkable similarity in its structural elements to Num 13-14 (cf. 2.121):

Sending of spies (Jos 7:2)
Their favourable report (v. 3)
Premature, unsuccessful attack (v. 4-5)
Complaint (by Joshua) (v. 6-9)
Revelation of sin (v. 10-21)
Exemplary punishment (v. 22-26)

All the implications cannot be pursued, but the point of major interest is the wish expressed by Joshua in v. 7, "Would that we had been content to dwell beyond the Jordan!", a wish for which he is not rebuked. If not crossing the Jordan is sin, then sin is in a sense equivalent to not crossing the Jordan. The presence of uncleanness makes the attempt upon the land premature, and its removal will allow a successful occupation (8:1-29).

2.53 Children and women; the generations

2.531 In Story I, in its enclosed story (Num 13-14), and in Story II, there is a concern for the coming generation which amounts to an idée fixe. In Story I, the Transjordanians reiterate the need to provide for their "little ones" (Num 32:16, 17, 26, cf. 24), while showing almost no comparable concern for their wives (in v. 26 they do appear, after the little ones; note, however, that this is reversed in Jos 1:14). Adult males are to risk themselves, children are to be safeguarded, and women are scarcely an issue. In Story II, the great concern of the Transjordanians is that their children may be disinherited, and it is to safeguard the interests of coming generations that they take, at least as the story stands, the risk of internecine warfare. In this light, the dynamic of Num 13-14 stands out very clear, and it is in this connection that Moses' allusion has its appositeness (2.122). The wilderness generation which refused to enter the land did so on the grounds that they would be risking their wives and little ones (Num 14:3).

But in Yahweh's response, it is the little ones who become significant (v. 31). It is they, for whom such false concern has been shown, who will be the object of Yahweh's concern. Yahweh will uphold their interest in the land, while the present generation will not see it.

2.532 In one sense, the message is everywhere the same. Authentic provision for coming generations consists in faithfully entering the land for the service of Yahweh, even at risk to the present generation. This accounts at one level for the greater prominence of children than of women, where the safety of both is at issue (women being in any case, no doubt, semantically akin to the coming generation). Nor is the syntagmatic point to be overlooked that the "little ones" of Num 13-14 become the adult generation of Num 32 and Jos 22, again underlining the element of recurrence generation by generation.

2.533 But none of this says anything specific about the Transjordanians. They are (at best) Israelites outside the land, or at least in a dubious part of it. Their situation is regularized by crossing the Jordan for the service of Yahweh. This logically means that each new generation is born in irregularity, and must renew its connection with Yahweh's land. But, whether it be for war or for the service of the sanctuary, it is only the males who are under obligation. Thus while each new (male) generation of Transjordanians create a problem which can be solved, Transjordanian women are a potentially dangerous anomaly, dealt with, in these texts at least, largely by silence. But we note that one of the enclosed stories, that of Peor, raises the issue of Transjordanian women to paramount importance. The awkwardly juxtaposed parts of Num 25 (v. 1-5 and 6-18) have this clearly in common, that it was women who tempted Israel to remain on the wrong side of the Jordan.

2.54 Theology. A brief consideration of the function of Yahweh in our two chapters is useful, largely by way of a summary of points already made. With the notion of Cisjordan as Yahweh's land (Jos 22:19) is to be compared the point made by Hulst (186) about the impressive unanimity with which our texts and others make Moses, not Yahweh, the "giver" of Transjordan. In Story I, Moses (except in Num 32:33-42) and Joshua consistently make reference to Yahweh, while the Transjordanians only gradually begin to do so. In Story II, by contrast, both sides do so consistently, so that the story becomes a contest over Yahweh. The significant point about these data is, however, that Yahweh is not in fact an actor in the narrative in either story; Yahweh simply neither does things nor says things. How does the narrative handle this absence? It makes Yahweh into a quasi-actor by the specific means of the included stories. Num 13-14, Num 25, and Jos 7, are all narratives in which Yahweh does things and says things, and their use makes plausible the claim that he will have things to do and say in the given situation. By this technique, the narrative underlines more than by any other means the imbalance between the parties. It is the Cisjordanians (including Moses) who can claim Yahweh in this way. That the narrative is working hard to achieve this result is clear from the fact that all the allusions are in the "angry" speeches, which I have shown, both in Story I and in Story II, to be narratively awkward (2.113, 2.22). We may suggest here that narrative form is more powerful than narrative content in carrying the "message" of a partisan Cisjordanian claim upon Yahweh.

2.55 Two other significant isotopies will not be dealt with here. The more important is that of leadership, which I omit because I do not yet know how to handle it. Three levels coexist; that of Moses and Joshua (on the semantics of these cf. Jobling, 1978a: 49), that of the priests, Eleazar and Phinehas, and that of the (tribal?) leaders/representatives. But the Transjordanians have no leaders. While a great many useful observations might be made, semantic organization of this isotopy would need to be based on analysis of large parts of the Primary Narrative (cf. Coats, whose numerous works on the Moses tradition would be basic). The other isotopy omitted is that of (Transjordanian) wealth, particularly cattle, for reasons of space.

2.6 Num 32, Jos 22, and a theory of conflict-resolution

2.60 I argued earlier (1.22) for the reading of texts against social-scientific models, as a potential bridge between structuralist and socio-historical approaches; models in particular which are capable of ready application to texts, since texts form most of our data. Purely as an example, and without any claim of its definitive importance, I shall make use in this way of the last chapter of Kenneth E. Boulding's Conflict and Defense. Our text "symbolizes" the relations between Cisjordanians and Transjordanians by a double story of conflict and its resolution, and the terms of Boulding's theory seem applicable. To what extent we can read off from such analysis the real attitudes symbolized remains an open question.

2.61 Boulding (308-310) posits three ways in which conflict is brought to an end; avoidance, conquest, and procedural resolution. Avoidance itself takes three forms; one party removing itself from the controverted field, both parties doing so (rare), and one party forcibly removing the other (which at its extreme tends towards "conquest"). Our stories are obviously cases of procedural resolution, but both avoidance and conquest are raised as possibilities. The controverted field is control over the Transjordanian group, and particularly over its Yahwist practice. The possibility exists of unilateral or even mutual "avoidance", the Transjordanians setting up a Yahweh-cult in the east (cf. those scholars who hold that the altar in Story II must logically have been in Transjordan, e.g. Ottosson: 134), while the Cisjordanians close the boundary (which is the Transjordanian fear in Story II). Interestingly, Boulding (308) includes among his own examples of avoidance "A quarrelsome faction within a church splits from it and forms another sect". But this precisely is not an option; neither can the Cisjordanians tolerate a Yahweh sect, nor can the Transjordanians themselves conceive of their Yahwism as separate. More of an option is conquest, the forcible reintegration of the Yahwist community from the west.

2.62 Again, procedural resolution takes three forms, each with its characteristic means (Boulding: 309-11). They are reconciliation (through processes which, according to Boulding, are inadequately understood), compromise (by bargaining, relatively well understood), and award (by arbitration, with some higher authority, a "referee"). It is rare to find any of the three in pure form. In Story I, it is compromise which stands out — neither is the issue between Moses and the Transjordanians put to a higher authority, nor is reconciliation particularly stressed. The theory of compromise (Boulding: 313-16) includes the idea of the "positive-sum game", in which the parties pursue mutual advantage but still try to maximize each its own advantage within the solution reached. This dynamic can be perceived in Story I, as also can another striking feature of compromise theory, "that the weakest bargainer is frequently in the strongest bargaining position" (315) — Moses, as we have seen, has an uninviting set of options if he declines to compromise. In Story II the situation is different. The upshot seems to be a bargained compromise (cf. 2.23), but the compromise process is obfuscated in the story as it stands. On the one hand, there is a rather overdone reconciliation (Jos 22:30-31) — reconciliation, as Boulding (311) notes, requires some "flexibility in the images" which the parties have of each other, but the alteration in the Cisjordanian image of the Transjordanians between v. 16-20 and 30-31 is too violent. On the other hand, we see a clear element of the award situation, in the Transjordanian appeal to Yahweh as higher authority in v. 22-23.

2.63 Yet there is nothing like an agreement by the parties to submit the case to Yahweh; the Transjordanian appeal to Yahweh's authority is to be read as a reaction to the implicit claim by the Cisjordanians in v. 16-20 to have Yahweh on their side (cf. 2.54). That Yahweh fails to function as a real referee we may put down to this basic imbalance in the authority situation, due to the fact that it is a Cisjordanian point of view that we are getting. Both stories invoke authority figures, whom one would expect to be

neutral vis-à-vis the tribes (Moses, Phinehas), on the Cisjordanian side. A further indication of the Cisjordanian viewpoint is the contrast in the stakes which the two sides are presented as having in a solution (cf. Boulding: 312-13, on how much the parties value reconciliation) — the Transjordanians indeed have a stake in Yahweh, but what stake do they really have in remaining in the east, with all the danger this causes?

2.64 Thus the assessment of the two sides as conflict-producers/avoiders/enders is rendered more difficult by a bias in the text. Deutsch (6-7) mentions the importance in conflict-theory of the openness of communication, the credibility of mutual perceptions, etc., between the parties. At the level of text-interpretation, we must add the openness of communication and the credibility between narrator and reader! Nonetheless, an assessment may be attempted. Boulding (313) distinguishes between "the authoritarian and the reconciling personality" in conflicts. In these terms, it is clear enough that, although the Transjordanians are seen as the source of the conflict, it is they also who are the reconcilers, while the Cisjordanians are the authoritarians, the ones who raise the conflict to a high pitch. One's impression in Story I is that Moses' heavy-handed authority covers anxiety, even panic, while the Transjordanians have confidence in their own powers of compromise. The result of stressing so strongly that legitimate authority lies with the Cisjordanians is that Story I redounds to the credit of the Transjordanians. Is this, perhaps, part of the reason for reopening the matter by means of Story II? Here again, the Cisjordanians are heavy-handed enough, but the narrative succeeds in making the Transjordanians devious, even manipulative, in their management of conflict, to the extent that one may go back and ask whether, even in Story I, they were not merely saying what was necessary to keep the peace, while pursuing their own ends. Is there a message, underlying these accounts of conflict happily resolved, that the hard imposition of authority is the way to deal with those tricky easterners? In connection with the earlier remarks on the recurrence of the conflict (2.42, 2.532), I cannot refrain from a final quote from Boulding (325): "conflict-producing personalities tend to reproduce themselves in their children".

3. Text and context; examples and problems

3.0 Here, much more than in Part 2, the analysis will be extremely incomplete. Every reader will think of passages, even very basic ones, which I have omitted. It is therefore a matter of examples, in which I have particularly in mind the issue of paradigmatic vs. syntagmatic analysis (1.33) 3.1 inquires paradigmatically into the significance of the particular tribes who make up the Transjordanians; 3.2 considers the syntagmatic relationship of Num 32 to ch. 20-36 as a whole; and 3.3 deals, in "the daughters of Zelophehad" with a case where the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions are particularly hard to separate. In 3.4, I shall briefly renew the isotopic analysis of 2.5 in the light of the new findings, and shall speculate about the "deep structure".

3.1 Paradigmatic relations among Reuben, Gad, and Manasseh

3.11 In the tradition of Gen 29:31-30:24, Reuben is Jacob's firstborn. He almost always heads lists of the tribes. The cases in Num 2, 7, 10, where Judah leads, are not really lists, and in the genealogies of 1 Chr 2-8 the demotion of Reuben is explained, though oddly (cf. below). From lists of Cisjordanian tribes, Reuben is, of course, absent; and in a case like Jos 21 his apparent demotion is accountable by geography. Particularly interesting are Deut 27:12-13 and Judg 5:14-18, where Reuben heads, not the whole list, but the subset of tribes judged negatively/put into a negative situation. But Reuben lost his precedence by sleeping with his father's concubine, Bilhah; Gen 35:22 records the act, 49:3-4 the consequence (though Reuben is still at the head of the list). 1 Chr 5:1-2 rehearses the case, and states that the precedence passed to Joseph, though actually it is Judah which heads these genealogies.

Reuben is mentioned quite frequently in Genesis, and would be susceptible of an extended analysis (particularly of his persistent relationship with Joseph); but for present purposes he is one who loses precedence on account of a concubine.

3.12 Loss of precedence is no less clear in the case of Manasseh, who in Gen 48:8-20 is Joseph's elder son, but whom Jacob puts below Ephraim, the younger. In the lists which include them, Ephraim is generally placed above Manasseh, though exceptions are found (Num 26, 34, 1 Chr genealogies). Jos 17:1 is curious — it logically suggests that Manasseh, as the elder, is receiving its allotment first (cf. 16:4, "Manasseh and Ephraim"). But in fact Ephraim has already received (16:5-10). It is of special significance for our inquiry that in this verse (only) Machir is Manasseh's firstborn, and is specified as being the Transjordanian half of the tribe (further on this, cf. 3.31). A question of precedence between Cisjordanian and Transjordanian Manasseh is thus evoked, but in a tantalizing way; Machir's status as firstborn puts Transjordan before Cisjordan, but Manasseh's loss of precedence to Ephraim raises the possibility of a similar reversal in the case of Machir. The Manasseh tradition also knows of a concubine connection. In the genealogy of (ostensibly) Cisjordanian Manasseh (1 Chr 7:14-19), Machir is made into Manasseh's son by "his Aramean concubine" (this genealogy is in bad shape; "Asriel" seems to be a mistake based on Num 26:31, etc., and the tradition is out of kilter with Gen 50:23; but the reference to the concubine is not in doubt). No judgment is attached to this, but it gives to Machir the status of a concubine-son like those of Jacob. Machir thus combines "loss of precedence" (in his father) with "concubine" (in his mother).

3.13 The tradition concerning Gad is scant and featureless compared with Reuben or even Manasseh. He usually appears low in the tribal lists (the only reason for a higher place seems to be to create a link with Reuben, with the Transjordanian situation in mind, e.g. Num 1:24-25). Gad is, indeed, a first-born, of Jacob's concubine Zilpah (and it may be of significance that he holds the important seventh place in the birth traditions). But one would have no real thought of precedence in the case of Gad were it not for the extraordinary passage Deut 33:20-21, in the Blessing of Moses. I am aware of the great critical problems here, but it can hardly be denied that some sort of precedence is here ascribed to Gad. "He sought out the precedence (? r'syt; RSV, "best of the land") for himself"; "the portion of a mhqq" (the word is used in similar connections in relation to Judah, Gen 49:10, and Machir (!), Judg 5:14); even "couches like a lion" (so of Judah, Gen 49:9). The blessing of Gad in this chapter exceeds that of Judah; at most that of Joseph equals it.

3.14 Thus a link is forged between Reuben, Gad, and Manasseh (especially Machir, which, despite some critical opinion, is never demonstrably other than Transjordanian) under the headings "lost precedence" and "concubine". If the concubine connection seem weak in the case of Gad, since Jacob had several concubine-sons, it is worth noting that his other first-born concubine-son, Dan (which lost its first, Cisjordanian, home), stands in some ambiguity regarding Cis- and Transjordan (Deut 34:1, 33:22).

3.15 The occurences of Reuben, Gad, and Manasseh in Num 32 and Jos 22 are not, of course, symmetrical. To begin with, Manasseh is only half Transjordanian, which puts it in a special position; and even the half-tribe finds no settled position in either chapter. In Num 32, it does not appear until v. 33, and in v. 34-42 its occupation of land is differently recounted, in style and in substance, from that of Gad and Reuben; in Story II, it disappears in Jos 22:25 and 32-34. A basic difference between Reuben and Gad, on the one hand, and Transjordanian Manasseh, on the other, will recur below (3.22). Even Reuben and Gad, though they always appear as a pair, present a problem in Num 32, for though they are first introduced in this order (v. 1), which is the usual one (Jos 22 and almost everywhere else), they are reversed, Gad-

Reuben, throughout the rest of Num 32.

3.16 The element "concubine" links up with the "problematic" Transjordanian women (2.533). The element "loss of precedence" seems so prevalent that even at the most "microscopic" level normal orders are, as it were, routinely reversed, as in Num 32, where the initial enumeration in the "right" order (v. 1) merely strengthens the point. But "loss of precedence" has a much profounder reflection in Num 32 and Jos 22. Reuben and Gad grasp for precedence in the gift of land. In as sense they get it, but in another sense they go to the bottom of the list. They may receive first only if they are willing to enjoy last (cf. the prior vs. the posterior gift, 2.1142).

3.2 Num 32 as part of its narrative context (20:14 to ch. 36)

3.20 For the terminus a quo, cf. especially Coats (177-79). Much of the material has a parallel in Deut 2-4, but I shall use these chapters reticently, since proper consideration of them would have to be preceded by a full-scale paradigmatic analysis of the two sections. Though the analysis will be arranged in isotopic categories, issues of narrative sequence will be kept in the foreground.

3.21 Transjordan as ambiguous land

3.211 In Num 32:4, Gad and Reuben refer to the land they want as "the land which Yahweh smote before the congregation of Israel", and therefore, presumably, as fair game for settlement. But is this conclusion well drawn, in relation to the logic of the preceding narrative? The direct reference is to 21:21-32, for it is Sihon's land which Gad and Reuben claim (Ottosson: 90; for 21:33-35, cf. below, 3.221). But the claim to Sihon's land is an odd one. First, in 21:21-23 Israel merely wants to cross Sihon's land peaceably, and it is only as a result of his recalcitrance that they conquer it. This gives Israel's occupation an "accidental" quality. Second, the negotiations with Sihon entirely parallel those with Edom (20:14-21) — a peaceable approach met with refusal and a show of strength — except that in one case Israel makes a detour, in the other, war. What is the difference? In the light of this parallel (and indeed of the whole tradition here and elsewhere) on may conclude that Israel approaches Sihon as it approaches those affine peoples (Edom, Moab, Ammon) whose land is forbidden to it.

3.212 After an avoidance of Moab, even of negotiations with it, which is remarkable (in the light of parallel traditions), one is surprised to find that Israel arrives in Moabite territory in 21:20. Indeed, v. 26 explains that it is ex-Moabite territory now in Amorite hands by conquest, but this merely confirms the sense that it is really Moabite (and therefore not part of the inheritance of Israel). The Moabite location of the following chapters is repeatedly stressed (22:1; 26:3, 63; 31:12; 33:48, 49; 35:1; 36:13). More significantly, conflict with Moab, and with Midian (which here stands in a specially close relation to Moab, 22:4, 7; 25) becomes a major theme (22:2- 25:18; 31) and its conclusion even becomes the last act of Moses (31:2) and hence the immediate condition for Israel's crossing the Jordan. The entire impression of these chapters is of Israel in foreign territory, subject to the attendant dangers, in the period immediately before the entry into Cisjordan.

3.213 In Num 26, a census is taken, at the end of which (v. 64-65) it is noted that by this time the wilderness generation was all dead. Though the time of their dying out is not more precisely specified (and note the difference of this tradition from Deut 2:14-15), the note in 26:1 that the census was "after the plague" invites the conclusion that the last of the wilderness generation died precisely in the plague of Peor (25:9). But this would imply that Israel was not yet in the promised land. In any case, Moses' own survival has the same implication; he has indeed survived the wilderness generation, but only, perhaps, as its last member. Moses' death

before the entry into Canaan is mentioned in 27:12-14, but it is supportive of my reading that it cannot take place until the last chapter of the Peor affair is written (31:2, 15-16).

3.214 In the course of the census (26:52-56), Yahweh instructs Moses in the division of the land. The extent of the land is not defined, but the division is obviously to be to all twelve tribes. The principles of division are that it be by tribal size and by lot. The passage is repeated, largely verbatim, in 33:54. Two points are to be made about this repetition. First, it follows ch. 32, and belongs, in fact, to a large section, 33:50-34:29, whose aim seems to be the smooth incorporation of ch. 32. The new instructions have to do with the division of Cisjordan among the nine tribes and a half only. But this fails to conceal the irregularity of the procedure by which the Transjordanians had their inheritance determined; it certainly was not by lot. Secondly (and, though speculatively, of great potential importance), the repetition in 33:54 of the instructions for dividing the land is injected into a section (v. 51-56) about the issue of non-Israelites in the west. They are to be exterminated along with all trace of their influence, for any who remain will cause great trouble. Is there an undercurrent here that the continued existence of non-Israelites in the west has something to do with the existence of Israelites in the east? This would be extremely simple at the level of mythic logic, and would "explain" the Cisjordanians' programme (Num 32:30, Jos 22:19) to get the Transjordanians to come west after all. It is room which the Transjordanians ought to be filling which is filled with Canaanite troublers of Cisjordanian Israel.

3.215 For all this, the tradition does affirm that Yahweh smote Sihon's land before Israel. What all the above points achieve is not the negation of this, for it is there in the narrative. What they rather achieve is the creation of Transjordan as ambiguous land. It belongs, at some level, to Israel; yet there is the suspicion of another level at which it belongs rather to someone else, so that Israel's occupation of it is not Yahweh's intention (this "someone else" is Israel's affines, Moab and Ammon, and two passages among others demanding to be drawn into a fuller discussion are Gen 13:2-13 and Judg 11:12-28). And, if our speculation in 3.213 about the generations be accepted, there is a corresponding sense of the time that all Israel spent in Transjordan as ambiguous time, caught between well-defined times.

3.22 The Jabbok a boundary; Transjordan as two entities

3.221 If the approach to Sihon in 21:21-32 parallels that to Edom in 20:14-21, it certainly does not parallel that to Og in 21:33-35, though this passage, like the whole rest of the tradition, is at great pains to affirm just this parallel. For there can be no question of Israel's needing to or negotiating to cross Og's territory. If Israel approaches Sihon as it approaches its affine peoples, it approaches Og as it approaches the kings of Canaan (extremely relevant here is the point of Coats: 184 that the Og section, but not the Sihon one, includes the divine assurance of victory characteristic of conquest traditions). Sihon's land is here (and usually) defined as that between the Arnon and the Jabbok, and Og's as lying north of the Jabbok. The further point, of great importance for our investigation, is that, in Num 32, it appears clear (Ottosson: 90) that Gad and Reuben get Sihon's territory, and half-Manasseh gets Og's (which seems also overwhelmingly the point of view of the larger tradition). Hence:

$$\frac{\text{Sihon}}{\text{Og}} = \frac{\text{Gad and Reuben}}{\text{Half Manasseh}} = \frac{\text{South of Jabbok}}{\text{North of Jabbok}}$$

3.222 This means that, though the text does not quite "come clean" about it, the logical status of Transjordanian Manasseh is different from that of Reuben and Gad, less "problematic". This fits in with the unease with which half-Manasseh is included in both Num 32 and Jos 22 (3.15), and

invites the further speculation that the tribe of Manasseh, in its bipartition, recapitulates and mediates the bipartition of Israel; Israel's being split in two is softened if there is a point at which these two are still one. Worth mentioning is Jos 17:1-6, where, by a tour de force (cf. 3.33), it is shown that Manasseh consists of ten Cisjordanian and two Transjordanian parts; and an interpretation of the odd interpolation of Jos 22:7a is possible along these lines, that it stands as a marker that it is one entity, "brethren", which is separating. In the south, Israel is divided, but in the north it is joined (cf. E. Nielsen's suggestion, in Hulst: 172, that Judah, but not northern Israel, regarded the Jordan as a boundary).

3.23 Transjordanian women. Num 27:1-11 and ch. 36 are deferred to the next section on the daughters of Zelophehad, but some comments are called for on the issue of women in ch. 31. This chapter, as we have seen, is a continuation of the Peor story in ch. 25, where Moabite/Midianite women seduced Israel, both sexually and religiously, and thereby, as I speculated, tempted Israel not to cross the Jordan. After defeating the Midianites, the Israelite force takes booty including "the women of Midian and their little ones" (31:9)— notable is the agreement of this with the instructions for taking a city outside Israel's territory (Deut 20:14-15). Moses, however, points out that it was precisely the non-virgin among these women who seduced Israel (v. 15-16). The male children and the non-virgin women are thereupon killed, while the virgin women are kept alive (v. 17-18). The logical problem of Transjordanian women was considered earlier (2.533), and the present passage ties in with it. Is it the case that non-virgin Transjordanian women have, as it were, taken the contagion irredeemably, so that they are a source of danger, but so that conversely it is meritorious to bring a Transjordanian virgin into Yahweh' land? A full investigation would include a great deal of material about wife-getting from Transjordan, not to mention at least one memorable Transjordanian virgin (Judg 11:34-40).

3.3 The daughters of Zelophehad

3.31 The relevant texts are Num 26:29-33 (the Manasseh genealogy in the census), 27:1-11 and ch. 36 (the "case"), Jos 17:1-6 (the settlement of Manasseh), and 1 Chr 7:14-19 (the genealogy of Cisjordanian Manasseh). The genealogy of Num 26 is as follows:



This genealogy is assumed in ch. 27 and 36. Certain of the names are clearly Cisjordanian (Abiezer, Shechem, Hepher, Tirzah), but the "top" of the genealogy is equally clearly Transjordanian. And it is no different with 1 Chr 7, though it purports to be the genealogy of Cisjordanian Manasseh (it is not stylized like that of Num 26, and is much more complex, but it contains many of the same names). This all suggests, in whatever way one interprets genealogies (cf. 3.42), some sort of precedence of Transjordanian over Cisjordanian Manasseh. But the failure to find an indigenous genealogy for Cisjordanian Manasseh is striking, and it seems to be this problem which makes Jos 17, in recording the settlement of Cisjordanian Manasseh, try a kind of compromise, in which Hepher and his five brothers are put at the same hierarchical level as Machir (who, uniquely here, is called Manasseh's firstborn.) Machir-Gilead becomes the Transjordanian line (still with the precedence of the firstborn), while the other "brothers" become the Cisjordanian, not tracing "descent" from Machir-Gilead.

3.32 Syntagmatically, the opening of the "case" in Num 27:1-11 depends not only on the genealogy of 26:29-33, but also on 26:52-56, the principle of inheritances, and on 26:64-65, the death of the wilderness generation. The placement is in this sense a happy one. The daughters of Zelophehad come to Moses with the request that, since their father died without sons (as one of the wilderness generation), his name should be preserved by them, the daughters, through their receiving a possession along with their male relatives. This is granted. The entire issue of land-inheritance seems premature at this point. But the next part of the "case", ch. 36, stands in a quite different light because of the intervention of ch. 32. Not merely is settlement now a reality, but the parties to the case belong to the stock of Machir, who has already received land, and hence, one must suppose, to Transjordanian Manasseh. In this new situation, the male members of the tribe raise a problem about the earlier ruling. Should the daughters of Zelophehad marry out of their tribe, it will lose the inheritances which they have been granted (making a mockery of the principle of fixed tribal divisions). The force of this is allowed, and propertied women are bound by law to marry within their tribe, which Zelophehad's daughters in fact do.

3.33 This completes the "case", but the application of it in Jos 17:1-6 is remarkable. In a word, the inheritances of the five daughters, along with those of their five "great uncles" (cf. 3.31), make up the totality of Cisjordanian Manasseh (ten portions, against two in the east, cf. 3.222). All of this can no doubt be made to fit the concept of the precedence of Transjordanian Manasseh, perhaps colonization from east to west. But this could have been presented much more easily! The case of the daughters of Zelophehad has to do with women and Israel's inheritance of land. By setting their case in Transjordan, and by relating it to Num 32 via Machir, the narrative has invited us to see them as Transjordanian women. Though the message is hard to pin down, this whole case puts out feelers towards parts of our earlier analysis. Did they "marry west" — a proper thing to do? The mediating position of Manasseh means that they could do so even though they were propertied. If title to land can pass across the Jordan, then Israel's title to (at least some) Transjordanian territory is put in a different light.

3.4 Concluding summary and a deep-structural hypothesis

3.41 It is time to bring the analysis, however incomplete, to a close. Our attempt to answer the initial question about Cisjordanian attitudes to Transjordan has led us into a constellation of narrative meanings which to some extent has taken convincing form and which may be considered with some confidence as a symbolization of real attitudes. Transjordan is ambiguous Israelite territory; along with the claim to it goes a sense of danger from it, along with the desire for a formalized relationship, the wish that it would just go away. The unity of Israel is felt to be deeply called in question by Transjordan. There is a sense that Transjordan possesses some sort of precedence, in face of which Cisjordanian precedence needs to be the more strongly affirmed; reversal of precedence relationships is everywhere. The issues have something to do with women and children. Transjordanian women present a logical problem and a danger, but marrying them is a means of overcoming this. Definitions of the relationship with Transjordan lack continuity from generation to generation. In all, there is the sense of a heavy-handed maintenance of authority, which cloaks anxiety and the lack of real power. There is, however, a difference between south and north Transjordan, which cuts across the other set of attitudes without negating them. There are different compromises (I have not covered this) between a deep sense of the Jordan as boundary and a sense of "unproblematic" relations towards the north-east.

3.42 Malamat (132) puts forward a literary-sociological model for the reading of biblical genealogies, including particular reference to female

terms. "Daughters . . . generally represent either clans or, rather, settlements — dependent on and subject to the principal tribal group or urban center". "The merging of a tribe, settling in a new area, with an earlier or indigenous population may be formulated as the marriage of the tribal eponym with one of the local women. Union with a concubine may personify a fusion with a foreign or inferior ethnic element". ". . . in attributing lineage through a concubine or maidservant, the Bible intends to convey the idea of migration . . . from (the) ancestral home to peripheral regions". The anthropological status of such a model would need to be established, but, taking it at face value, it relates "females", particularly "concubines", to the meaning-elements of (socio-political) dependency, peripherality, foreignness, inferiority, and indigeneity. These are elements which could be traced, with considerable precision, in the foregoing analysis of the views taken of Transjordan. Such metaphors as these female ones, however much they turn into technical terms, do not become innocent of their basic semantic content, and I suggest that, at a deep level, Cisjordan and Transjordan are coded simply as male and female. Nothing so bald as this ever appears on the surface, for many other semantic organizations overlay it; nonetheless, the hypothesis is worth framing that this is the semantic force most deeply charging the manifest texts. As examples of its potential — the fighting styles analyzed in 2.6, authoritarian vs. conciliatory/manipulative, could be looked at in terms of male-female stereotypes, while the whole issue of precedence takes on new dimensions.

4. Structural analysis and the diachrony of the text; a modest example

4.0 This section, intended simply as an exercise, will ask how the foregoing analysis would be different if we had taken as object the JE stage, rather than the final form, of the text. Disregarding numerous methodological problems, I shall accept the source-division by Ellis (57-72), which I have found to be a good "average" representation of the views of the major analysts.

4.1 No part of Jos 22 is held to belong to JE. Certain difficulties attend the attempt to read it as a deuteronomic or priestly creation, and there are those who think that some form of the story may have existed very early indeed. But even if it did, it would stand at most in some undiscoverable paradigmatic relation to Num 32, and none of the important issues related to the redoubling of the message (2.42) would apply. Jos 22 will not be considered any further here.

4.20 The texts are:

Story I: Num 32:1-17, 20-27, 34-42
Spies' story (enclosed in Story I): Num 13:17b-20, 22-24, 26b-31, 32b-33; 14:3-4, 8-9, 11-25, 31-33, 39-45
Context in Numbers: Num 20:14-21; 21:(1-3, 4b-9), 12-35; 22:2-25:5
32 as above (the bracketed sections are those which, while ascribed to JE, were not considered in the earlier analysis)

4.21 Story I and its enclosed story (cf. 2.1). The story lacks an ending like that in Jos 22:1-8. This is, of course, related to the general problem of where the older sources end, and one might surmise some follow-up, now lost. On the other hand, the story becomes, by the loss of Num 32:28-30, less future-oriented, and it may be thought of as complete in itself. The "alternatives" of v. 25-30 and 31-42 collapse into one account, and only the prior gift remains. The enclosed story of the spies is little altered; in particular, the stress on "wives and little ones" remains (note, however, that Num 32:11-12 can scarcely be entirely JE if 14:26-30 are not!) But two parts of the story absent from the retelling in Num 32 (cf. 2.121) are, we see, absent from the JE form of the original story; namely, the choosing of the spies and their exemplary punishment.

4.22 The semantics of Story I (cf. 2.3, 2.5, 2.6). By the loss of Story II and of Num 32:30, the mysterious Cisjordanian programme (2.322) to reunify Israel in the west disappears. This means that the logic of unity (2.51) is less tight, but it is not basically altered. The impressions we get of the two sides (i.e. now of Moses and the Transjordanians) are rather mixed (so that we see how much Story II cast its stamp on Story I in our analysis). The sympathy is with the Transjordanians (2.33), though Moses does not move quite as grudgingly. In the terms of 2.512, the exclusion of Transjordan from Israel by terminology is more consistent (though, as we saw, this usage does not seem "loaded" in Story I); but there is no "exemplary punishment" (2.513). Theologically, the authority of Yahweh is consistently on Moses' side (2.54), and the contrast of "authoritarian" vs. "reconciling" personalities is stronger (2.6). The element of crossing the Jordan for the service of Yahweh remains (2.52), but, importantly, there is no questioning of the status of Transjordan as Israelite territory. The special role of children and women is unaltered, and Transjordanian women are still a logical problem (though, in the absence at this stage of the analysis of reference to Num 25, this issue does not break the surface).

4.23 The narrative context (cf. 3.2). Though much of the material on the ambiguous status of Transjordan disappears, the point is not lost (as it was in 4.22); 3.211, on Num 20, 21, is intact, and so, in substance, is 3.212 on Moab, though the references to a Moabite location (22:1, etc.) are gone. Much of the development of the theme of women is gone (25:6-18, ch. 31), but the basis remains in 25:1-5 (of interest here is the fuller form of the JE tradition which Wellhausen: 111-12 hypothesizes by invoking 31:8, 16, as well as 25:1-5).

4.24 The general conclusion of this hopelessly brief analysis is clear. The later redactors have tightened the semantic organization, and have made the status of Transjordan more deeply questionable. But at every point, the structures they reveal are detectable also in the JE redaction as I have defined it.

FOOTNOTE

/1/ From reductionism in another sense Lévi-Strauss can, indeed, hardly be exculpated. Cf. Geertz: 449: "The idea . . . that cultural forms can be treated as texts, as imaginative works built out of social materials, has yet to be systematically exploited. Lévi-Strauss' 'structuralism' might seem an exception. But it is only an apparent one, for, rather than taking myths, totem rites, marriage rules, or whatever as texts to interpret, Lévi-Strauss takes them as ciphers to solve, which is very much not the same thing". But I find that, by sitting light to what Lévi-Strauss hopes, or claims, to achieve philosophically, one can find in his analyses abundant materials for doing just what Geertz has in mind.

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A LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO PAUL'S EXHORTATION IN 1 THESS 4:13--5:11

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From the broader standpoint of an apocalyptic approach, William Baird has provided a succinct summary of the eschatology of Paul in his hermeneutical article in NTS. He shows that "Paul does not have a clear and simple apocalyptic picture of the end."[1] His review of opinions about what Paul teaches in First Thessalonians reveals that commentators have reached an impass concerning the apocalyptic teaching of this letter. From the narrower standpoint of the text under consideration (1 Thess 4:13--5:11), B. Rigaux has given an updated version of his own masterful study in his presidential address to the Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas. He too sees the need for further research and appeals for more careful scientific study "independent of all prejudice."[2]

Amos Wilder indicated the direction that such scientific study must take when he described his own goal as gathering "up older pursuits and achievements and carrying them further." He does not reject achievements of earlier scholars but sets out "to deal directly with the original texts and in the light both of contemporary New Testament scholarship and of contemporary 'secular' literary method." To these he adds insights "afforded by a contemporary literary criticism and our newer exploration of language and hermeneutics."[3]

Why it is not sufficient to rely upon established methods for dealing with the genres of hellenistic literature was shown by Helmut Koester in the paper he discussed with the SBL Seminar on the Thessalonian Correspondence in 1979. He pointed out that Paul undertook a new experiment in writing in his communication to the Thessalonians. Commentators cannot rely upon later developments in Pauline letters; rather they must investigate "the creative process itself" as it unfolded in the life of Paul.[4] What was happening in his composing of First Thessalonians was more than a new literary genre coming into existence. It is Paul grappling with his growing sense of responsibility as prophet, father, nurse, adviser and apostle in a dynamism that was transforming his very personality. Through his active involvement with this young group Paul grew into a fuller understanding of God's plan for the new communities he had helped to establish.

Since First Thessalonians mirrors Paul at the beginning of his writing career, it will not witness the same skill and maturity he displays later. Modern writers have difficulty in keeping aware of this truth since they know all his letters as well as Acts of the Apostles. In addition, modern commentators are influenced by the long tradition of those who commented on the New Testament as the church's liturgical library.

In this theological tradition, William Beardslee suggests that the influence of Aristotle's Rhetoric has meant that form "becomes simply a means for effectively (persuasively) communicating the content, which in turn is thought of as an idea."[5] This long-standing intellectual approach narrows appreciation of these writings becuase it shuts off dimensions intended by the original authors. Thus, in the passage under consideration Paul states that he is not writing to convey information to his readers (1 Thess 4:13). His purpose is rather "to prepare them for the coming of Christ, and to calm their fears about this great event."[6]

With that intention in mind Paul obviously composed this passage in a way that would appeal to the will and affections of his readers. Hence the large amount of expressive and evocative material. Today's readers hear this passage as Paul intended only when they are sensitive to these elusive elements that are operative in the total communication event. Among linguists who have analyzed the speech act to explain the operation of such factors, Roman Jakobson has perhaps been most successful.[7] He has developed a schema of the constitutive elements or factors of the communication act and traced the functions involved. In this paper I intend (1) to describe the six elements and the six functions he proposes (not necessarily exactly in his terms but expanding in the light of comments by other linguists), and (2) to apply this system to 1 Thess 4:13--5:11, Paul's earliest apocalyptic passage and one of his longest ones.

Jakobson's Analysis

Jakobson identifies the six elements or factors of verbal communication as addresser, message, addressee, context, contact and code. These elements are constitutive whether the message is delivered orally or communicated in a written text. The addresser, speaker or writer, encodes a message for those able and willing to decode it, the addressees. Such a process demands both physical and psychological contact between the participants. That contact is effected by means of a language code that operates on three levels: phonic, grammatical and lexical. This code must be at least partially common to both parties in the process. Finally, the message is always communicated in a context that makes it capable of being grasped and vocalized by the interacting parties.

Jakobson does not end his analysis of the communication act here. He continues, "Each of these factors determines a different function of language."[8] Then he goes on to describe these functions, which are to be understood in the sense of roles or tasks in a means-end model of language use. They are also six in number but are not tied rigidly to the individual elements. Some functions are closely linked to one element, but others may blend into more than one factor. As Jakobson says, diversity in a speech act lies "in a different hierarchical order of functions."[9]

The first is the emotive or expressive function, which "aims at direct expression of the speaker's attitude toward what he is speaking about."[10] Emotive language is usually

associated with the first person and is "language used for the direct expression of feelings and attitudes."[11] Yet, too rigid a tie with speaker must be avoided because the first person may be either exclusive or inclusive of hearers. Emotive language can become extremely complex because it can cover the whole range of personal involvement with a message, including all the emotions as well as belief, disbelief, doubt, intraspection and every degree of personal feeling. The emotive function's role is to focus the message for receivers so that they are put into contact with the speaker's behavioral reactions.

Second, the poetic function is closely tied to the form of the message. It focuses "on the message for its own sake.... The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination."[12] Wolfgang Iser elaborates upon this characteristic:

> Selection brings about the background-foreground relation, and this allows access to the world of the text. Combination organizes the chosen elements in such a way as to allow comprehension of the text. Selection establishes the outer link, combination the inner.[13]

The poetic function includes the aesthetic function of language, the artistic role played by a text as a verbal artifact produced by the creative and imaginative use of words, which are complex tools. When speakers or writers want to draw attention to the beauty of the discourse or text itself, or upon any formal aspect of their message, they combine words artistically to produce pleasing sounds and cadences. This function is called poetic in the radical sense of the Greek poiein (to make) rather than in the limited meaning of making verses. It plays the dominant role in so-called literary texts, without, however, eclipsing the other functions of language. "The supremacy of poetic function over referential function does not obliterate reference but makes it ambiguous."[14] In other words, even forms of communication in which the artistry is primary say something about someone or something. A speech event differs from music.

The third function of a speech act is the referential--also called the denotative, cognitive, ideational or representational. It is "an orientation toward the context."[15] This function has traditionally been linked to third-person discourse. However, since all functions of language operate simultaneously and in relation to all its elements, the referential function is not limited to narratives. It predominates when transfer of factual or conceptual information is the chief concern of the process. Yet, emotive language also communicates information about the speaker's emotions, attitudes, openness, etc., and so shares in the referential function.

The conative function is speech's "orientation toward the addressee" with the intention of having an impact on that person or group.[16] Since this function appears most clearly in vocative and imperative sentences, in the traditional model of language it was associated with the second person. But again, the correlation is not that simple. In certain performative speech acts the conative role appears in first-person speech:

I promise, I bet, I regret. William Smalley prefers to call this the "evocative" function; he locates it in the creative capacity of language to stimulate the addressees by being either ambiguous ("if it has multiple, specified interpretations") or vague ("if it has multiple specifiable interpretations"), using the definitions of C. Lachenmeyer.[17] An example is the joke, which is designed to evoke laughter.

The fifth constitutive function of verbal communication is the phatic, which establishes, prolongs or discontinues communication, shares feelings, greets and checks to see whether the contact is continuing. This role is similar to communication between animals. It is the first verbal function of infants; "they are prone to communicate before being able to send or receive information."[18] Phatic communication is often carried out by ritual formulas, but it also appears in such important acts as expressing sympathy and striving for intimacy.

The metalingual function of verbal communication is the final one in Jakobson's analysis. It designates the power of language to reflect back upon itself, to test the code. It comes into play "whenever the addresser and/or the addressee need to check up whether they use the same code."[19] Its most common usage occurs in language learning.

As a linguist Jakobson was most interested in exploring the poetic function of language. But that function should not be exaggerated or made equivalent to the art of poetics, which deals with "the underlying properties of literary discourse."[20] These analyses are widely accepted in substance and have validity for studying speech acts independent of Jakobson's structuralism. They have proved helpful in dealing with all levels of verbal communication, and I suggest that they can be of service in an effort to understand Paul's letters, which are complicated creations with complex sets of inner relationships.

Contemporary believers may not be called upon to make the same kind of decisions Paul wished to evoke when he wrote his apocalyptic passage to the Thessalonians, but they want to identify the situation and the tensions it involved. "Reading causes the literary work to unfold its inherently dynamic character," but only if it is read correctly.[21] The interaction of the elements and functions of language distinguished by Jakobson will help "uncover the unformulated part of the text, and this very indeterminacy is the force that drives us to work out a configurative meaning while at the same time giving us the necessary degree of freedom to do so."[22] Linguistic competency protects readers from what Wilder called the "claustrophobic error" of the 'new hermeneutic,' namely, "of treating a writing as an autonomous aesthetic object."[23]

Application to 1 Thess 4:13--5:11

Paul Ellingworth and Eugene Nida warn translators about the first part of this passage when they write:

> These verses raise two general problems for the translator. First, he needs to recognize that Paul's main purpose, as he has stated in verse 13 and will repeat in

> verse 18, is not to give his readers further information, but to prepare them for the coming of Christ, and to calm their fears about this great event....
>
> The second problem is closely related to the first. In this passage, Paul is speaking of events which are outside direct human experience. He therefore uses a high proportion of figurative language....[24]

Helpful also in approaching this passage is the direction of T. Todorov that every text is to be read as a palimpsest because "the text is always the transformation of another transformation."[25] Since Rigaux recently analyzed 1 Thess 5:1-11 carefully, I shall focus primarily upon it to show how Jakobson's approach calls attention to some of the transformations easily ignored in a conceptual approach. Rigaux broke this paragraph down into three speech acts (although he does not use that term) plus a concluding summary.[26] In the first speech act Paul speaks as a prophet and continues the instruction begun in 4:13 on the condition of deceased believers (5:1-3). Here his aim is to place his disturbed audience before the traumatic "times and moments " of Christ's return. Paul warns community members that they cannot stand there in "peace and security," because that apocalyptic event will occur suddenly with all the inescapable force of birth pangs.

Having defined their situation, Paul moves on to a second speech act of a different nature. He starts to exhort them (5:4-8a). He urges them to adopt a positive attitude toward what has happened in contrast to nonbelievers who have "no hope" (4:13). Finally, Paul reconciles these conflicting reactions in regard to the return of Christ by appealing to them to respond to the mystery of Christ as basis for hope of joining him in eternal life (5:8b-11). This appeal builds upon his earlier instruction about the certainty of Christ's return (4:13-18) and ends with the conclusion to the entire apocalyptic passage. They are to draw mutual support from this event.

How can an approach based on Jakobson's analysis enrich this essentially ideational analysis and make for a more fruitful reading of the passage? Attention to the individual elements and functions of these speech acts reveals that they are more complex and have more overtones than Rigaux' analysis indicates. Above all, the text is more dynamic; it becomes more urgent as it unfolds. It communicates progression in Paul's sense of concern for the implications of Christ's return on the lives of believers. This concern bursts forth when the reader starts to make explicit the complexity of feeling motivating the stylistic features that Rigaux often notes (such as the change of mood in verses 4-8) but does not pursue.[27]

Change in literary expression signal a change in the nature of the communication. At the start of this paragraph, when he acts as prophetic instructor, Paul employs phatic factors that deepen contact: direct address; flattery by his disclaimer of their need for further information from him; his contrasting them with outsiders to open them to his view of reality; praise of their original decision to believe by calling them "sons of light" (5:4). Paul skillfully wins their complete attention and

takes their minds off conceptualizations of the parousia that have disturbed them. He puts them at ease so he can lead them to a different approach to the situation. Jakobson's analysis explains rather than downplays changes in literary expression as J. Plevnik does in his recent study of this paragraph: "The change in subject in 5, 3 may be due to Paul's drawing on a tradition and should not be unduly emphasized."[28]

Paul's vision shines through his exhortation. After first stating their advantage as a fact in a statement addressed directly to them, "You are not in darkness" (5:4), Paul suddenly shifts to the inclusive first-person plural. His expressive outburst shows his own involvement, "We are not of night nor of darkness" (5:5). By this switch in person Paul places himself in their situation. He thus exploits the conative function of language to make an impact upon his audience. Plevnik explains the shift from "you" to "we" in verses 5, 8 and 9 in terms of content: "Paul considers all the faithful united with him in the hope of salvation."[29] But his explanation in terms of the referential function of language fails to convey Paul's intense involvement with the struggle of this young community.

The seven verbs in verses 6-10 that are in the subjunctive are all in the inclusive first-person hortative. Paul decides to urge rather than command in order to lessen tension. This paragraph helps the community respond to the demands of their perilous apocalyptic situation. Paul encourages their efforts to overcome the paralysis of fear by using the conative capacity of language in soft focus. Once his assurances free them from the fears of those unbelieving outsiders who have no hope, he can share with them his own confidence in the saving power of the risen Jesus. Paul conveys the crucial element of information, the saving mystery, not in a third-person statement but in the midst of an expressive outpouring of personal faith.

In concluding Paul communicates the aim of this section by an explicit use of the mood that ordinarily serves the conative function, the imperative: keep encouraging and keep upbuilding one another (5:11). The emphatic present imperative not only conveys great urgency but includes the referential function of recalling his comment that the manner of Christ's return is not clear to believers. These two imperatives define believers' responsibility. It is not a once-for-all affirmation of faith but their whole life of loyally sustaining one another for this transformation they await.

Paul adds a brilliant coda to these comments, "just as you are doing." It fulfills both emotive and conative functions because it embodies his desires for them and stimulates their way of acting. It helps them feel at peace in their waiting for the apocalyptic day of the Lord.

The above analysis of this paragraph with attention to the elements and functions of a speech act opens up to readers the complexity of its message. Related linguistic features need to be pointed out also. The repetition of the demonstrative <u>loipoi</u> (5:6) that singles out unbelievers, identified in 4:13 as "the rest who have no faith," shows a significant shift in function

with the two paragraphs. The repetition does not simply recall the earlier usage, which was purely referential, but casts this group into an unfavorable light by designating them as lazy and as drunkards (5:7). These parallel phrases serve the emotive function of communicating Paul's attitude toward them.

Paul affirms that God accomplished salvation for us through Jesus in order that we might live with him (5:10). Many manuscripts put the verb of this purpose clause in the future indicative, a reading favored by Nigel Turner.[30] A switch to the indicative at this point conveys Paul's conviction that believers are in firm possession of salvation. Note that Paul stated at the beginning of the passage that he was going to speak peri "about the dead" (4:13). At the end he states that Jesus is the one who died peri "for us" (5:10). Perhaps a lingering remembrance prompted Paul to choose this less common way of designating the death of Jesus as redemptive for the deseased.

A tendency to carry over a word in consecutive phrases to refer to different actions appears in the four uses of the verb katheudein. It first appears in a mildly negative expressive function: "let us not sleep" like those who are unaware of the seriousness of these times (5:6). In the next sentence Paul is more specific about the faults of unbelievers: "those who sleep, sleep at night" (5:7), evidently meaning to pass judgment on the sexual faults he warned against earlier (4:3-7). Finally, the verb appears in the neutral sense of the state contrasted to watchfulness (5:10). Paul's gliding from one meaning to another reveals his emotional involvement and adds to the urgency with which he exhorts this young community.

Rigaux concludes his study of 1 Thess 5:1-10 by affirming the need of more research, part of which should concentrate on separating the study of themes from a study of the redaction of the passage.[31] Another method of widening this research is to apply the findings of contemporary linguistics to Paul's speech acts. Nida has encouraged translators to pay more attention to the functions of language by reminding them that "functions of language are more complex than is generally assumed."[32] In his experimental translations of poetic biblical texts Smalley has made efforts to incorporate the complexity of discourse patterms "which are essential to a sensitive reading" of poems.[33]

Brief comments will suffice for 1 Thess 4:13-18. This paragraph cannot be understood correctly apart from its relation to Paul's summary of Timothy's report (3:6-13). It is necessary to read 3:9 as a question, with verse 10 as Paul's answer: he is anxious to supply what is lacking in their faith.[34] He then starts to give various kinds of advice and eventually comes to these defects in their faith (4:13--5:11).

In 4:13 Paul states the problem that is challenging their faith, namely, that some members have "fallen asleep," a common euphemism for death. The community cannot reconcile the deaths with their belief that the gift of faith in Jesus is a promise of enjoying risen glory. And so they are overwhelmed with grief like "the rest," pagans who live without hope (4:13). Paul's manner of dealing with this problem exploits the emotive factors

of the speech act. He uses litotes both to deemphasize the referential function and to convey his involvement in their disturbed state. What they are going through touches him and he wants to fill them with his own confidence. He reassures them further by using the title "brothers," an exercise of the phatic function of the communication act (4:13).

After beginning in this encouraging way Paul goes on to explain how their response springs from a lack of faith. He does not give a lecture or undertake a theological explanation. Rather he communicates to them as believers who are at a loss about how to appropriate for themselves the power of faith. His caution not to alienate them in any way manifests itself in three ways in 4:14: (1) the shift to the inclusive first-person "we." which associates them with his faith; (2) putting the truth of their faith in the death-resurrection of Jesus in the form of a condition, "if you believe." This "if" does not point to a doubt but is a use of the expressive function of language to convey Paul's "point of view" that he wants them to adopt.[35] (3) the anacoluthon. Paul is so anxious to convince them of the power of faith that he cites the raising of Jesus as proof that God is also going to raise all believers who have died. But his thoughts rush ahead and he truncates verse 14 by compressing the two steps into one statement. The referential function is clear: the resurrection of Jesus provides solid ground for believing in the resurrection of their deceased members. But Paul is more anxious to share his own confidence about this hope and so disturbs the surface grammar to focus on faith response.

As he continues, he maintains the first-person form to keep up their spirits. Here the first "we" (4:15) is disjunctive--a teaching that Paul is communicating "by the word of the Lord." But then he shifts into the inclusive "we the living" to draw the Thessalonians into the sphere of those who will benefit from the power of Christ's resurrection, namely, all believers living and dead.

Throughout this paragraph Paul obscures the referential function by not elaborating on what this "word of the Lord" is (v. 15) and by adopting apocalyptic imagery (v. 16). He does not try to demonstrate how God will raise the dead. Rather he employs imagery from apocalyptic traditions to express his firm trust in the reality of the event. This imagery modifies the ordinary referential function of third-person narration. Attempts of commentators to deal with these verses in conceptual terms presuppose that Paul was writing purely historical prose. In reality, he exploits language's power to be ambiguous. When he returns to events surrounding Christ's return again (1 Cor 15), it is to insist that they must be awaited in faith. Paul brings this paragraph to an end by exhorting and encouraging the community to stir up a trustful attitude (v. 18). He shows them how to do so in the companion paragraph (5:1-11).

Conclusion

In an effort to explain how to hear the message of this passage in its entirely I have drawn upon Jakobson's analysis of the communication act. The application shows that readers

can overlook or misjudge many linguistic factors of a text. It will be more fruitful in some passages than in others. If applied systematically to all the Pauline letters, it promises to open up insights into his mentality in general and into the "point of view" he displays in individual situations. By taking advantage of this and similar methods of research being pursued by contemporary linguists, exegetes can help headers understand Paul's Christian experience more fully.

Notes

[1] Willaim Baird, "Pauline Eschatology in Hermeneutical Perspective," NTS 17 (April 1971) 314-327, on p. 325.

[2] B. Rigaux, "Tradition et rédaction dans I Th. v. 1-10," NTS 21 (April 1975) 318-340, on p. 339.

[3] Amos N. Wilder, Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. xi.

[4] Helmut Koester, "1 Thessalonians--Experiment in Christian Writing," in Continuity and Discontinuity in Church History: Essays Presented to G. H. Williams, (Leiden: Brill, 1979) 33-44, on p. 34.

[5] William A. Beardslee, Literary Criticism of the New Testament, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), p. 98.

[6] Paul Ellingworth and Eugene A. Nida, A Translator's Handbook on Paul's Letters to the Thessalonians, (Stuttgart: United Bible Societies, 1975), p. 98.

[7] Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in T. A. Sebeok, ed., Style in Language, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960), pp. 350-377. Robert Scholes, "Toward a Semiotics of Literature," Critical Inquiry 4 (Autumn 1977) 105-120, is critical of Jakobson's division as "too neat," and proposes to double the six elements of communication acts.

[8] Ibid., 353.

[9] Ibid., 353.

[10] Ibid., 354.

[11] M. A. K. Halliday, Explorations in the Functions of Language, (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 14.

[12] Jakobson, "Linguistics," 371.

[13] Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p.96.

[14] Jakobson, "Linguistics," 353.

[15] Ibid., 353.

[16] Ibid., 355.

[17] William A. Smalley, "Restructuring Translattions of the Psalms as Poetry," in Matthew Black and W. A. Smalley, eds., On Language, Culture and Religion: In Honor of Eugene A. Nida. (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 337-371, on pp. 349-350.

[18] Jakobson, "Linguistics," 356.

[19] Ibid., 356.

[20] Tzvetan Todorov, "Poetics and Criticism," The Poetics of Prose, (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1977), pp. 29-41, on p. 34.

[21] Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), p. 275.

[22] Ibid., 287

[23] Wilder, Early Christian Rhetoric, xxix.

[24] Ellingworth and Nida, Handbook, 98-99.

[25] T. Todorov, "How to Read," The Poetics of Prose, 244.

[26] See Rigaux, "Tradition," 318-340.

[27] Ibid., 331

[28] Joseph Plevnik, "1 Thess 5, 1-11: Its Authenticity, Intention and Message," Biblica 60 (1979) 71-90, on p. 73.

[29] Ibid., 79

[30] J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Vol. III: Syntax by N. Turner, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1963), p. 100.

[31] Rigaux, "Tradition," 339-340.

[32] Eugene A. Nida, "Translating Means Communicating: A Socio-Linguistic Theory of Translation I," Bible Translator 30 (Jan. 1979) 101-107, on p. 104. Note that his naming and division of the functions of language differ from Jakobson's.

[33] W. A. Smalley, "Recursion Patterns and the Sectioning of Amos," Bible Translator 30 (Jan. 1979) 118-127, on p. 125.

[34] See James M. Reese, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1979), pp. 37-38.

[35] See Norman R. Petersen, Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics (Phila.: Fortress, 1978), p. 36. He discusses Jakobson's communication model at length but with the aim of "isolating textual information that the historian can use as empirical evidence," (p. 33)-- a more limited aim than that of this paper.

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ESCHATOLOGY IN 1 THESSALONIANS: THE THEOLOGICAL FACTOR IN 1:9-10; 2:4-5; 3:11-13; 4:6 and 4:13-18

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Previous discussions of the eschatology of I Thessalonians have tended to focus on 4:13-18 and 5:1-11. This is not surprising, given past interest in the history of synoptic traditions; Paul is surely echoing in chs 4 and 5 apocalyptic matetials comparable to those found in the synoptic gospels (see MK 13).[1] But this comparability has strongly effected the way commentators view the pattern of Pauline eschatology; since the focus of the synoptic materials is on the parousia of the Son of Man, eschatology in Paul likewise tends to be seen primarily as Christ centered. After all, the NT already contains the later creedal statement that Christ will come to judge the living and the dead; and if 2 Tim could be shown to be genuinely Pauline, Paul himself would be the first to proclaim this formulaic confession (2 Tim 4:1). Using 1 Thess 4:13-18 and 5:1-11 as normative indicators of Pauline eschatology, commentators have been concerned with its apocalyptic character and its Christological focus.

This emphasis, unfortunately, is unbalanced for a proper assessment of all of the eschatological materials in 1 Thess. For there are numerous other passages in the letter besides chs 4 and 5 which do not necessarily belong to an apocalyptic stream (i.e. 1:9-10; 2:4-5; 3:11-13 and 4:6). As I hope to show, these passages reflect a tradition about divine judgment typically found in Jewish-Christian missionary preaching; there is a strong, even dominant, theological focus in them, insisting that God, not Christ, judges. This theological focus, long neglected,[2] becomes important also in consideration of more apocalyptic passages such as 4:13-18.

The hypothesis of this paper may be summarily stated:
[1] there are several streams of eschatological material reflected in 1 Thess: a) a synoptic-like apocalyptic stream reflected primarily in 4:13-18 and 5:1-11; b) a Jewish-Christian missionary-preaching tradition found in 1:9-10, and 4:6, reflected also in 2:4-5 and 3:11-13.
[2] the missionary-preaching tradition has a strong theological component: God, not Christ, sees, hears, judges and requites.
[3] in fact, the missionary-preaching tradition, with its strong theological component, is the typical expression of eschatological materials in Pauline letters.

This paper, then, will examine and bring back into focus a number of eschatological passages in 1 Thessalonians such as 1:9-10; 2:4-5; 3:11-13; and 4:6 which both contain a strong theological component and stem from traditions of early missionary preaching.

Missionary Preaching: A Brief Sketch

To facilitate subsequent discussion of the eschatological passages of 1 Thess, it will be helpful to summarize briefly the consensus position on the general contents of early Jewish-Christian missionary preaching, with an obvious concentration on

the theological focus of that preaching.[3] The following elements are commonly judged to belong to the schema of missionary preaching: 1) monotheism (anti-idol polemic), 2) God as creator, 3) God as Judge, 4) conversion from immorality, and 5) Jesus' death, resurrection, and return.

Like comparable Jewish missionaries,[4] Christian preachers heralded the one and true God, urging their hearers to turn from idols to serve the living God (1 Thess 4:5; 1 Cor 12:2; Gal 4:8). The one God is also the world's creator and rules providently over the world (1 Cor 8:4-6; Acts 4:24; 14:15-17). And this same provident God is the Judge of the world, who rewards the world in the afterlife according to its deeds (Acts 17:31; Heb 6:2). Hence, hearers of the preaching are urged to convert to the true God, to forego their dead works, and to live a life worthy of God's calling.

Evidently at a given point in the preaching the Jesus material was introduced: Jesus died to save us from our sins (1 Thess 5:9; 1 Cor 15:3); Jesus was raised up for our justification (Rom 4:25); and Jesus will come again as savior at the day of judgment.[5] By treating the Jesus component so summarily, I do not want to downgrade its importance, but only to distinguish it from the prior and even dominant theological components of missionary preaching.

What is important for this study is that we recognize that eschatology in the schema of missionary preaching was basically theological. God is judge of the world; God raises the dead to judgment on the Day of the Lord and judges them, requiting them according to their deeds. It belongs to the one God, who created the world, to exercise comparable providence in dispensing justice, which justice, since it is not always apparent in this world, will be rendered in the next world. Judgment, therefore, belongs to God.

1:9-10

This first eschatological passage in 1 Thessalonians contains a clear summary of the place of God in Christian faith: God is the only God, the living and true diety, the rescuer of Jesus Christ, and judge of the church--all traditional theologoumena. While it is not a hymn, the passage has a careful formal structure:

1. καὶ πῶς ἐπεστρέψατε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπο τῶν εἰδώλων
2. δουλεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ
3. καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν
4. ὃν ἤγειρεν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν
5. Ἰησοῦν τὸν ῥυόμενον ἡμᾶς
6. ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης

As Rigaux noted,[6] (a) 1 and 2 are parallel in thought, centering on θεός; 2 completes 1; (b) 3 and 4 tell us the essential kerygma about Jesus: he died, was raised, is in heaven; ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν balances ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν ; (c) 5 and 6 integrate the work of Jesus and God: Jesus saves us from God's coming judgment.

It is generally recognized that Paul is depending on earlier eschatological materials in 1:9-10; for as the argument goes, the phraseology is untypical of Paul.[7] For example, in

the phrase ἐπεστρέψατε προς τον θεον, ἐπεστρέψατε is found in Paul only in 2 Cor 3:16 and Gal 4:9, while it is a technical term for missionary preaching and conversion elsewhere (see Acts 3:19; 9:35; 11:21; 14:15; 15:19 and 26:18,20). δουλεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ : Paul nowhere else calls God ἀληθινός and God is ζῶν only in 2 Cor 3:3; 6:16 and Rom 9:26 (cf. Hos 2:1); this is surely echoing typical God language.[8] ἀναμένειν τον υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν : only here do we find ἀναμένειν in regard to Jesus' return, whereas Paul elsewhere tends to use ἐκδέχομαι (1 Cor 11:33; 16:11) or ἀπεκδέχομαι (Rom 8:19, 23,25; 1 Cor 1:7; Gal 5:5 and Phil 3:20). Ἰησοῦν ῥυόμενον: it is generally God who rescues (ῥυόμενος) in Paul; cf. Rom 7:24; 11:26; 15:31; 2 Cor 1:9-10. Ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης : while Paul speaks of God's wrath elsewhere (Rom and 1 Thess), the coming wrath is found only here in Paul.

Although the phraseology may be unique in Paul, the statements about God in 1:9-10 are found extensively throughout the rest of 1 Thess. God, of course, is the only God (cf. Deut 6:4-5) and He is "living and true," which phrase not only contrasts God with lifeless pagan idols but alludes to more positive elements in 1 Thess. As θεὸς ζῶν , God is God of the living and giver of life to the dead; He raised His son Jesus to life (1:10) and He will raise and lead those who have fallen asleep (4:14). As θεὸς ἀληθινός, God has called the pagans to a covenant (1:4; 2:12; 4:7; 5:9 and 24); He destined them to salvation (5:9), and He is faithful to his promises (see πιστὸς ὁ καλῶν ὑμᾶς, 5:24). Yet He is also Judge; His is the "wrath to come" (1:10). The traditional character of these statements about God can be readily recognized by comparing 1:9-10 with the doctrine about God in missionary preaching: God is one, true (1:9) and God judges (1:10).

The eschatological perspective of 1:9-10 is sharply different from that of 4:13-18 in that it focuses on God, sovereign and judge. Jesus' role is somewhat secondary in that he is the prime recipient of God's saving action. He died for us (5:10), saving us from our sins; and he will apparently function in the same capacity as savior at God's judgment (1:10). The apocalyptic trappings and Christological focus of 4:13-18 are not in evidence here; what we find rather is a summary statement of God's place in Christian faith, even his sovereign judgment. 1:9-10, then, should best be described as reflecting a general theological summary such as is found in missionary preaching, one key element of which was divine eschatological judgment.

2:4-5

The immediate task in dealing with 2:4-5 is to clarify the nature of the statements about divine knowledge: God "tests hearts" and is "witness" of our deeds. The background of θεῷ δοκιμάζοντι τὰς καρδίας is certainly a traditional reference to God's knowledge vis-à-vis judgment and it may well be a citation of Scripture.

Δοκιμάζων primarily means "to put to the test, examine," although it derivatively means "to prove by testing," as in the case of gold or silver tried in the fire (see Prov 8:10; Sir 2:5; Wis 3:6 and 1 Pet 1:7). In the Pss it occurs in contexts where the person praying begs for God's vindication or for divine investigation of an unjust situation (see Pss 17:3; 26:2). In Jeremiah, the link with God's "testing hearts" and his judgment

is explicitly made; for example, as the prophet experiences hostility from his audience, he appeals to God's knowledge of him and hence to God's vindicating judgment:

> But, O Lord of Hosts, who judgest righteously,
> who triest the heart and the mind (δοκιμάζων καρδίας)
> let me see thy vengeance upon them,
> for to thee have I committed my cause (11:20).

More clearly, the "testing of hearts" occurs in another prophetic judgment oracle against Jerusalem (17:5-13). After curses and blessings are pronounced (vv 5-8), reference is made to the deceitfulness and inscrutability of the human heart (v 9); then mention is made of God's scrutiny of the heart and His judgment in requiting the people according to their deeds:

> I, the Lord, search the mind (ἐτάζων καρδίας)
> and try the heart (δοκιμάζων νεφροὺς)
> to give to every man according to his ways
> according to the fruit of his doing (17:10).

And the oracle is concluded with reference to God's throne of judgment being set up (v 12) and a severe judgment pronounced against the wicked (vv 11,13). In general, it can be said that God's knowledge, sight, and scrutiny of our secret deeds is a traditional attribute of God in biblical theology, Christian talk about God, and later rabbinic writings.[9] And this omniscience is invariably linked to God's role as supreme Judge.[10]

Whether Paul is expressly citing Jeremiah (11:20; 17:10) or merely alluding to a traditional theologoumenon, he never uses the expression δοκιμάζων τὰς καρδίας anywhere else. The same concept, however, is found in other words throughout his letters. In Rom 2:16, it is God who judges the secrets of men on the day of judgment; in 1 Cor 4:5, the Lord will bring to light at the judgment things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart.[11] And this concept is found beyond Paul in other NT writings which treat of heavenly judgment. Surely the Son of Man at the Great Assize in Mt 25:31-46 knows the secrets of human hearts and judges accordingly. The Son of Man in the seven letters of Revelation begins each letter with the proclamation "I know" and it is he who in addressing Thyatira tells the church there: "I am he who searches mind and heart, and I will give to each of you as your works deserve" (Rev 2:23).[12]

The background of θεῷ δοκιμάζοντι τὰς καρδίας is certainly general biblical doctrine of divine judgment. The expression of God's knowledge and judgment, moreover, belongs not so much to synoptic-like apocalyptic traditions, but is compatible with the emphasis on divine judgment in traditions such as missionary preaching.

3:11-13

In many ways this passage is typical of other Pauline prayers, be they part of thanksgiving periods or discrete prayers.[13] The eschatological aspect of the prayer is our concern and it too contains traditional phrases and thought patterns, including a strong theological component. Paul prays for the continuation of the Thessalonian church in love, which has a clear eschatological dimension. For, continuation in love will have the

effect of confirming them: εἰς τὸ στηρίξαι ὑμῶν τὰς καρδίας ἀμέμπτους ἐν ἁγιωσύνῃ (3:13).

Being "blameless" before God is central to the religious response to God in the OT. Abraham was commanded "to walk before me and be blameless" (Gen 17:1); and Job was described as the ideal practitioner of traditional wisdom, for he was "blameless and upright" before God (Job 1:1, 8; 2:3). In the same vein, Wisdom recognizes the righteous and preserves them blameless before God (10:5). Being "blameless" was the goal of Paul's Pharisee period (Phil 3:6), and it is his command to the church (Phil 2:15).

In Paul's letters, moreover, being "blameless" has specific eschatological significance. Although it belongs to sinners to experience the mercy of God through the death of Jesus (Rom 5:6-8), it is not permitted to be sinful still on the day of judgment. Hence we find in 1 Cor 1:8 a prayer that God establish even the perfect Corinthians ἀνεγκλήτους on the day of the Lord Jesus (this may be an ironic warning against presumption).[14] And in Phil 1:10, a prayer is again offered that the Philippians abound in love, knowledge, and discernment, so that they may be εἰλικρίνεις καὶ ἀπρόσκοποι on the day of Jesus. So in 1 Thessalonians, Paul celebrates their conversion (1:9; 5:9-10), but he also concerns himself with the perseverance of the convert church in holiness so that it may stand on the day of divine judgment.[15]

Indeed the Thessalonians must be blameless since they must one day stand before God, ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρός ἡμῶν. It has been suggested that this phrase is to be considered as a reference to the βῆμα τοῦ θεοῦ .[16] It is axiomatic in Pauline eschatology that all people will stand before the heavenly judgment seat, even the βῆμα τοῦ θεοῦ (Rom 14:10).

The eschatological perspective so cryptically expressed in the prayer in 3:11-13 presupposes a fuller scenario which constitutes the traditional background of the letter's eschatology. In that traditional scenario the theological component is quite clear: God judges deeds and scrutinizes hearts (see 1:10; 2:4; 4:6). Jesus does not judge; rather he is the Savior who rescues us from the wrath of God (1:10), which he does by establishing the church blameless in holiness (3:13), even as he died to save it from its sins (5:9-10).

4:6

Does ἔκδικος κύριος in 4:6 refer to Jesus or God? The answer will come from an evaluation of 4:6 both in terms of its background and its position in the context of 4:1-12. This passage contains recognizable blocks of traditional paraenetic materials. First, the material is introduced by the formal tag which tends to begin paraenetic sections in Pauline letters (ἐρωτῶμεν ὑμᾶς καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν, 4:1).[17] And the second block of material is headed by περὶ δὲ τῆς φιλαδελφίας (4:9), suggesting both a topic heading and possibly even a <u>topos</u> on this topic.[18]

As is characteristic of paraenesis, the exhortation contains familiar and traditional materials. Thus Paul remarks that his exhortation is not new, for it belongs to his former missionary teachings: καθὼς καὶ προείπαμεν ὑμῖν καὶ διεμαρτυ-

ράμεθα (4:6; see καθὼς παρελάβετε παρ' ἡμῶν, 4:1).

Concerning the traditional content of the exhortation, the focus of Paul's statements on Christian morality centers on God's holiness and the subsequent demand that the convert likewise be holy. This is expressed apropos of the exhortation to correct sexual behavior in marriage. Since the will of God is our holiness (4:3) taking a spouse must be done in that holiness, and not in lust καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ εἰδότα τὸν θεόν (4:5). On the surface this expression resembles Jer 10:25 and Ps 79:6, even as it echoes comparable statements in Gal 4:8; 1 Cor 15:34 and Rom 1:21-24 & 28.[20] In substance it reflects a traditional theme in Jewish missionary preaching and propaganda that the pagans succumb to vices, especially sexual immorality, precisely because of their bad theology (see Wis 14:22-30 and 2 Enoch 10:4-6).[21] The Thessalonians have turned to the living and true God (1:9) and this acknowledgement of the right God must lead them to holiness, not back to moral degeneration. Their God, moreover, is the one who διδόντα τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἅγιον εἰς ὑμᾶς (4;8). This phrase echoes Ezek 36:27 and 37:14, but is probably also a traditional description of Christian baptism (see Gal 4:6-7; Rom 8:14-15). Thus the true God who is holy calls to holiness and gives the believer a holy spirit as the right impulse toward it. In substance the material closely resembles the traditional theologoumenon in 1 Peter: "Be ye holy as I am holy" (1:15; Lev 19:2).

The statement in 4:6, ἔκδικος κύριος περὶ πάντων τούτων , surely belongs to traditional paraenesis as well. It is commonly written that sexual immorality brings divine judgment (see Jub 30:15 and Heb 13:4); and Paul states again and again that "those who do these things shall not inherit the kingdom of God" (1 Cor 6:10; Gal 5:21; cf. Eph 5:5 and Col 3:5). Ἔκδικος κύριος belongs as well to Paul's traditional eschatological preaching; 4:6b indicates that Paul has time and again preached the future judgment by God, proof of which is found in 1:9-10.

It can be shown, moreover, that κύριος must mean God in 4:6. As regards the background of ἔκδικος κύριος, while it is not a formal citation of Scripture, it is, nevertheless, evocative of the traditional Jewish description of God in the LXX. God executes judgment (σὺν ἐκδικήσει μεγάλῃ) on Egypt in Ex 7:4 and 12:12; God avenges Israel's enemies (κύριος ἐκδικήσεις) in Judges 11:36; but ἐκδικέω and its cognates begin to take on a general connotation that God judges and punishes ordinary sinners as well as national enemies.[22] In the prophetic traditional especially, we hear that God remembers and punishes (κύριος...ἐκδικήσει, Hos 8:13; 9:7, 9); God will indict Judah, punish Jacob (κυρίῳ...τοῦ ἐκδικήσαι) and requite him according to his deeds (Hos 12:3); God's punishment of sinners is linked in Amos with the "day of the Lord" (3:14). In the Psalms, it is not only God who punishes, but it is His exclusive and necessary activity (Pss 17:47; 78:10; 149:7 LXX). And should the wicked say "the Lord does not see; the God of Jacob does not perceive" (Ps 93:7), the faithful believer knows that God is a judging God, and so he prays:

ὁ θεὸς ἐκδικήσεως κύριος
ὁ θεὸς ἐκδικήσεως ἐπαρρησιάσατο
ὑψώθητι ὁ κρίνων τὴν γῆν
ἀπόδος ἀνταπόδοσιν τοῖς ὑπερηφάνοις (Ps 93:1-2 LXX).

Ἔκδικος κύριος, then, echoes the traditional appeal to God's judgment in Jewish scriptures.

Proof that κύριος in 4:6 refers to God, not Christ, comes from several sources other than the OT background. For example, the letter as a whole indicates that God judges, tests hearts and shows wrath. The precise passage (4:1-8) is itself thoroughly theological in focus. In 4:1, Paul reminds the Thessalonians that he has taught them πῶς δεῖ ὑμᾶς περιπατεῖν καὶ ἀρέσκειν θεῷ. Pleasing God and doing his will are common concerns in Pauline thought but in 1 Thessalonians these have an eschatological aspect as well. In 2:4, Paul insists that he is faithful to God's will, i.e. his divine commission, and so his good behavior is pleasing to God (ἀρέσκοντες θεῷ), the God who tests hearts. Alternately, in 2:14-16 the Jews who reject Jesus and the later missionaries do not please God (καὶ θεῷ μὴ ἀρεσκόντων) and so experience divine wrath (2:16). "Pleasing God," therefore, is ultimately related to future scrutiny and judgment by God.

Christian sexual behavior in marriage is to be different from that of the pagans because of the Christian's acknowledgement of the true and holy God, whereas the pagans do not know God and are correspondingly immoral. The divine election of a Christian is both a call from God to salvation in Christ (5:9-10) as well as a call to holiness οὐ γὰρ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν ἁγιασμῷ, 4:7. Paul considers it his divinely appointed mission to exhort, encourage and charge the Thessalonians τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ καλοῦντος ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βασιλείαν καὶ δόξαν (2:12).

And God remains the final arbiter and judge of the believer's fidelity to the call to holiness. This is formally expressed in two ways. The exhortation which Paul delivers is not his private advice but is a formal word of God: ὁ ἀθετῶν οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀθετεῖ ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν (4:8). And God will surely back up His word with judgment and power. Secondly, after the advice in 4:4-5, Paul solemnly states that this material is a matter of life and death by appealing to heavenly judgment. Now Paul never states that Christ/κύριος punishes, whereas in Rom 12:19 it is clear that according to Deut 32:35, judgment belongs to God/κύριος. The strong theological element in the paraenesis in 4:1-8 as well as the clear statements elsewhere in 1 Thessalonians about God's judgment make it certain that God is the one who requites in 4:6.

4:13-18

In 4:13 Paul signals that he is beginning a discussion of a fresh topic (περὶ τῶν κοιμωμένων; cf. περὶ δὲ τῆς φιλαδελφίας, 4:9). As far as this paper is concerned we can bracket the debate over whether Paul in 4:13-18 is reporting material which he did not previously tell them or whether he is supplementing his preaching. It suffices to note that 4:13-18 is thoroughly constructed of traditional materials.

Appeal is made in 4:14 to a creedal formula. Presupposing that the Thessalonians have heard and believed ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη, Paul applies this to their future, οὕτως... (14b). Inasmuch as Paul names the resurrection with ἐγείρω[23] rather than with ἀνίστημι, we may consider v 14a as a traditional formula. The apocalyptic details of the scenario in vv 15-17

are likewise judged to be traditional.[24] Jesus' parousia, alluded to in 1:10, is described in 4:15-17, even to the formal appeal to its traditional character, τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμῖν λέγομεν ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου (v 15).

Our interest, however, is not in this traditional material but in the God component of the eschatology discussed in 4:13-18. 4:14 explicitly indicates that as God raised Jesus (ἀνέστη), even so ὁ θεὸς τοὺς κοιμηθέντας ἄξει σὺν αὐτῷ. God, therefore, is He who raises the dead, even the Christian dead. The passive verbs in the parousia scenario probably should be seen as explaining the reference to God in 4:14. Ὁι νεκροὶ ἀναστήσονται parallels the creedal formula about Jesus, Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ; inasmuch as Paul regularly uses ἐγείρω to talk about God's raising of Jesus, he would seem to be drawing explicitly upon the tradition formula when he speaks in 4:16 about the dead being raised. This implies that the dead are raised by God.[25] Thus ἁρπαγησόμεθα in 4:17 should likewise be understood as God's action. Just as Paul said earlier ὁ θεὸς ἄξει κοιμηθέντας (4:14), so God will snatch and lead the dead with Christ in 4:17. Thus the parousia scenario of Jesus' return contains a strong theological element: God raises the dead; God leads them.

The statement that God raises the dead is itself a traditional element in Jewish and early Christian preaching, a fact that can be quickly verified. The second of the Eighteen Blessings acclaims that God quickens the dead[26]; late Jewish literature likewise attests to this theologoumenon[27]; and in Josephus' description of Jewish sects, God's action on the dead is one of the primary categories used in distinguishing the Sadducees from the Pharisees.[28] In early Christian circles, there is a story in Mark that Jesus argued explicitly for God's power and determination to raise the dead (Mk 12:18-27). In discoursing on Abraham's faith, Paul called attention to the fact that Abraham explicitly believed that God raises the dead (Rom 4:17). Of course it is part of the early preaching that God raised Jesus from the dead, and Paul explicitly proclaims that God likewise raises the Christian dead. For example, even in conflict Paul's consolation is his faith in the comforting God, that is, ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ τῷ ἐγείροντι τοὺς νεκροὺς (2 Cor 1:9). He explicitly says again:

> ὁ ἐγείρας τον κύριον Ἰησοῦν
> και ἡμᾶς συν Ἰησοῦ ἐγερεῖ (2 Cor 4:14; see Rom 8:11).

Thus the statement in 1 Thess 4:13-18, that God raises the dead, is a traditional confession of faith.

But "resurrection" should be understood in its proper context as resurrection-unto-judgment. As Dan 12:2 indicates, the dead shall awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting contempt. This same fundamental understanding of resurrection as resurrection-unto-judgment is found in late Jewish writings (see 1 Enoch 102:4-104:7),[29] and in Josephus' description of the major Jewish sects in the first century (see Note 28). Indeed belief in afterlife is never an isolated element in Jewish or Christian thought but is always linked with the doctrine of rewards and punishments which will finally be meted out in the afterlife.[30] As such, this same complex idea enters the NT as well (see Jn 5:28-29).

The consoling scenario of the dead being raised and caught up to Christ (1 Thess 4:15-17) should then be seen in the light of the full eschatological understanding of 1 Thessalonians, which is quite clear and insistent on a final judgment by God (1:10; 2:4-5; 3:13 and 4:6). Surely the consoling element is stressed in 4:13-18, for Paul would seem to be addressing people in need of hearing a gospel about the dead, lest they be like "those who have no hope" (4:13). The formal purpose of the material in 4:13-18 is consolation: ὥστε παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις, 4:18). Nevertheless, the proper context of God's raising the dead in 4:13-18 includes the element that the dead are raised unto judgment, albeit a saving judgment (see 1:10; 5:9), a judgment nonetheless from God.

To be sure, the background of the eschatological passage in 4:15-17 is Jewish apocalyptic as well as Christian traditions about the parousia such as are found in the synoptic gospels. But the notion of divine judgment in the afterlife is not exclusive to Jewish traditions, for it is found extensively in Greek discussions of providence.[31] Although the background of 4:15-17 is not missionary preaching, the passage nevertheless contains a pronounced theological component. And in 4:15-17 Paul supplies a necessary element to his eschatological preaching, viz., that the dead are likewise the objects of God's eschatological activity, including his judgment.

The Pattern of Pauline Eschatology

We have pointed to a recurring theological component in the major eschatological passages in 1 Thessalonians. In summary, one might gather together the phrases containing the theological aspects of that eschatology:

1. God's wrath (1:10)
2. God tests hearts (2:4)
3. God's knowledge (2:5)
4. God's judgment seat (3:13)
5. God requites (4:6)
6. God raises the dead [unto judgment] (4:14-17)

We have indicated all along that such phrases are not unusual but belong to traditional Jewish and Christian theology, and in fact to the missionary preaching of the early church. The question before us now is whether such materials constitute Paul's standard preaching on eschatological matters. How typical is the God component in the eschatology of 1 Thessalonians?

1. God's Wrath This concept is found only in Romans and 1 Thessalonians. It is constitutive of the presentation of God in Romans, as Paul first shows how all are sinners (3:9-12), how all fall short of the glory of God (3:23), and how all are subject to God's just judgment, ὀργὴ θεοῦ. Even with redemption in Christ, Paul still speaks of a future day of wrath (2:5) and of a future action of Christ to save us from the coming wrath of God (5:9). 1 Thessalonians accords with the general discussion of God's wrath in the more reflective, systematic discussion of God's judgment in Romans.

2. God Tests Hearts Although Paul never again uses the explicit phrase θεῷ δοκιμάζοντι τὰς καρδίας , there are numerous analogous statements in his letters. In Rom 2:16, we are

told that it belongs to Paul's gospel to confess that God judges the secrets of men on the day of judgment; 1 Cor 4:5 proclaims that God will bring to light things hidden in darkness and disclose the purpose of the heart, when He comes to judge. It belongs to God, therefore, to bring the deeds of men and women to light in judgment (see 1 Cor 3:13).

3. God's Knowledge As God is Paul's judge, He witnesses Paul's deeds (1 Thess 2:5; Phil 1:8), oaths (Gal 1:20), mission (Rom 1:9), and his confusing travel plans (2 Cor 1:23).

4. God's Judgment Seat It is not surprising that in Romans, where Paul discourses on God's wrath, knowledge of the human heart, and His judgment, that we should find a formal statement that "all will stand before the judgment seat of God" (τῷ βήματι τοῦ θεοῦ , 14:10) to render an account of our deeds (14:12). But on this very point, 2 Corinthians suggests a different perspective. Paul is confident that after death God will give him a "new building" (5:1,5); he is also conscious that he, like all people, will face judgment after death (5:9-10), but here he speaks of standing before the judgment seat of Christ (ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βήματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ , 5:10), and receiving good or evil, according to what was done in the body.

5. God Judges and Requites Paul stresses again and again in 1 Corinthians that God judges and that his judgment lies in the future. In 3:17 a "sentence of holy law" is cited apropos of preachers who would pervert the church: εἴ τις τὸν ναὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φθείρει, φθερεῖ τοῦτον ὁ θεός. And in view of the Corinthian criticism of Paul, he affirms that judgment belongs, not with the congregation (chs 5-6 notwithstanding) but with God: ὁ δὲ ἀνακρίνων με κύριος ἐστιν; at that future judgment "everyone will receive his commendation from God" (4:6). And in an effort to persuade the Corinthians to exercise judgment on the incestuous man (ch 5), Paul maintains that the church will judge the church (5:13), even the world (6:2); but God will judge outsiders (5:13). And as a warning to overconfident Corinthians, the divine judgment of the exodus people is recalled, how God overthrew them (10:5), judged and requited them in the desert (vv 9-10).

In Romans, Paul characteristically maintains that "God will judge the world" (3:6). This accords with the central presentation of God in the letter: Paul argues that all people were liable to God's condemning judgment before the death of Jesus brought them under the justifying judgment of the same God. In 2:4-11 Paul is evidently citing traditional material about the fact of God's judgment, the delay of judgment as kindness (2:4), the judgment according to one's deeds (2:6-11), and the impartiality of God's judgment (2:11).[32] And God's judgment can be condemnation (3:5,8; 5:16). In short, except for 2 Cor 5:10, it is clear that in all of Paul's letters eschatological judgment is always ascribed to God.

6. God Raises the Dead (unto Judgment) God raised Jesus from the dead and this act is paradigmatic of God's action on the church. Abraham believed in God who raises the dead; so did Paul (see 2 Cor 1:9; 4:14); and so he describes πίστις in Romans as "belief in God who raises the dead" (Rom 10:9; cf. 4:23-24). But in Phil 3:20-21 Paul explicitly attributes to the descending Savior the power to "change our lowly body to be like his glorious body."

Thus the God factor in the eschatology of 1 Thessalonians is found typically in the other letters of Paul. One can detect in this, however, tendency to translate certain elements of this material from God to Jesus. God's βήμα becomes the βήμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ (2 Cor 5:10); and God's raising of the dead is subsequently attributed to Jesus (Phil 3:20; cf Jn 5:21,28-29).

Conclusions and Further Questions

1. As I have shown, the eschatology of 1 Thess and indeed of all of Paul's letters, contains a strong, even a dominant theological component: God knows, tests hearts, raises the dead, and judges. 2. This material comes not so much from synoptic traditions about the parousia but from pre-Pauline missionary preaching, which is the proper background for a study of the eschatology of Paul. 3. There are indications of a development in Paul's thought in that raising the dead and judgment are not exclusively predicated of God, but on occasion of Jesus also.[33] 4. This raises the question of whether Paul knows of the formula which eventually becomes the dominant creedal statement of the church about the parousia: "Christ will come to judge the living and the dead" (2 Tim 4:1; Acts 10:42; 1 Peter 4:5). 5. The repeated phrases in Paul that God judges/Jesus saves (1 Thess 1:10; Rom 5:9) would seem to warrant further investigation into just what Paul thought Jesus would do to save us at the parousia. And this purely soteriological function would seem to be subsequently modified when Christ begins to be proclaimed as judge (2 Cor 5:10). Whence this development? 6. If Pauline eschatology in 1 Thess and Romans is reflective of early missionary preaching, then this invites a re-examination of Paul's relationship to synoptic parousia traditions, for there is clearly an alternate trajectory of eschatological material which is not dependent on gospel traditions. 7. Concern over the imminence of the parousia may be a misplaced preoccupation in discussions of Pauline eschatology, since what was preached was a general accountability to God as judge which stems from general preaching about God rather than the so-called imminent return of the Son of Man. 8. The adaptation of eschatological materials by Paul to specific problems and churches remains a further topic for discussion. Why does Christ raise the dead in Philippians? Why does Christ become judge in 2 Corinthians?

Notes

[1]For example, J. B. Orchard, "Thessalonians and the Synoptic Gospels," Bib 19 (1938) 19-42.

[2]Dahl, Nils A., "The Neglected Factor in New Testament Theology," Reflection 73 (1975) 4-7.

[3]See R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951) I. 66-79; A. Oepke, Die Missionspredigt des Apostels Paulus (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1920) 76-106; Claus Bussmann, Themen der paulinischen Missionspredigt auf dem Hintergrund der spätjudisch-hellenistischen Missionsliteratur (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1971) 144-165; and Ulrich Wilckens, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte (WMANT 5; Neukirchen: Moers, 1961) 80-86.

[4]A. Seeberg, Die Didache des Judentums Und der Urchristenheit (Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1908) 11-23 and H. Lietzmann, "Symbolstudien," ZNW 21 (1922) 6-9.

[5]Bussmann, Themen der paulinischen Missionspredigt 82-108.

[6]B. Rigaux, Saint Paul Les Épitres Aux Thessaloniciens (Paris: Gabalda, 1956), 392.

[7]Bussmann, Themen der paulinischen Missionspredigt, 38-56. J. Munck, "I Thess i.9-10 and the Missionary Preaching of Paul," NTS 9 (1962-63) 95-110; U. Wilckens, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte 81-86. Paul-Émile Langevin, "Le Seigneur Jésus selon un texte prépaulinien, 1 Th 1,9-10,"SciEccl 17 (1965) 263-282.

[8]Bussmann, Themen der paulinischen Missionspredigt, 44-45; Langevin, "Le Seigneur Jésus," 478-480.

[9]A. Marmorstein, The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God (New York: KTAV, 1968) 153-176.

[10]For discussion of the debate in Jewish literature over whether God sees human hearts and the relationship of this to divine judgment, see J. Neyrey, The Form and Background of the Polemic in 2 Peter (Yale Dissertation, 1977, unpublished) 34-38.

[11]Hans Conzelmann, I Corinthians (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 84.

[12]See 1 Clem 21:9.

[13]Peter Thomas O'Brien, Introductory Thanksgivings in the Letters of Paul (Supp to NT XLIX; Leiden: Brill, 1977) 123-130, 162-164; Gordon P. Wiles, Paul's Intercessory Prayers (Cambridge: University Press, 1974) 52-63.

[14]On the problems at Corinth over realized eschatology and spiritual perfectionism, see Richard A. Horsley, "'How can some of You Say That There is No Resurrection of the Dead?' Spiritual Elitism in Corinth," NT 20 (1978) 203-231 and Anthony C. Thistelton, "Realized Eschatology at Corinth," NTS 23 (1978) 510-526.

[15]On the relationship of first justification and final judgment, see Karl Paul Donfried, "Justification and Last Judgment in Paul," ZNW 67 (1976) 90-110, esp. 102 and 104.

[16]James E. Frame, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912) 139; B. Rigaux, Les Épitres aux Thessaloniciens, 490.

[17]C.J. Bjerklund, PARAKALÔ (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967) 125-135, and O. Schmitz, "παρακαλέω, παράκλησις," TDNT V. 793-799.

[18]Boers, H. "The Form-Critical Study of Paul's Letters: 1 Thess as a Case Study," NTS 22 (1976) 140-158; and Chalmers E. Faw, "On the Writing of First Thessalonians," JBL 71 (1952) 217-225; cf. J. Hurd, The Origin of 1 Corinthians (London: SPCK, 1965) 65-74.

[19]For a fuller discussion of the paraenetic character of 1 Thess, see A.J. Malherbe, "I Thessalonians as a Paraenetic Letter," unpublished SBL seminar paper.

[20]A. Oepke, Die Missionspredigt des Apostels Paulus, 100-106.

[21]See G. Bornbamm, "The Revelation of God's Wrath," Early Christian Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) 53, esp. note 33.

[22]Schrenk, "ἐκδικέω," TDNT II. 442-446.

[23]Rigaux, Les Épitres aux Thessaloniciens, 534-535; Langevin, "Le Seigneur Jésus," 271-275.

[24]See G.H. Waterman, "The Sources of Paul's Teaching on the 2nd Coming of Christ in 1 & 2 Thessalonians," JETS 18 (1975) 107-112; T.J. Scott, "Paul and Late-Jewish Eschatology - A Case Study, 1 Thess 4:13-18 and 2 Thess 2:1-12," JETS 15 (1972) 136-141; and William Baird, "Pauline Eschatology in Hermeneutical Perspective," NTS 17 (1971) 324.

[25]Ernest Best, The First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972) 188, 196; Best further suggests that the "command" mentioned in 4:16 is probably to be interpreted as God's command (196); see also H. Schlier, "Auslegung des 1 Thessalonischerbriefes (4,13-5,11)," BibLeb 4 (1963) 20-21.

[26]See C.W. Dugmore, The Influence of the Synagogue upon the Divine Office (Westminster: The Faith Press, 1964) 115.

[27]See George F. Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era (New York: Schocken Books, 1958) II, 377-395; see m. Aboth 4:22.

[28]Josephus, B.J. II. 162-165; ANT. XVIII. 16-18.

[29]See George W. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism (HTS XXVI; Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1972) 112-130.

[30]Ulrich Wilckens, "The Tradition History of the Resurrection of Jesus," in The Significance of the Message of the Resurrection for Faith in Jesus Christ (ed. C.F.D. Moule; SBT 8, second series; London: SCM, 1968), 65-66.

[31]See J. Neyrey, The Form and Background of the Polemic in 2 Peter, chs 4 and 5 for Greek and Jewish discussions of judgment in the afterlife.

[32]An excellent treatment of these judgment themes in Romans may be found in a recent work of Jouette Bassler, The Impartiality of God: Paul's Use of a Theological Axiom (unpublished Yale dissertation, 1979).

[33]For other attempts to show development in Paul's thought, see E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977) 432, note 9.

II THESSALONIANS 2:3-12

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From ancient times II Thess. 2 has been noted for its problems of interpretation. IN the early fifth century Augustine, when faced with vss. 6-7, let slip his well-known admission: "Ego prorsus quid dixerit me fateor ignorare" (De Civ. Dei. XX, 19). Therefore, it is not surprising that the chapter is a focus of controversy today. Aside from full discussion in various commentaries,[1] exegetical articles appear with some regularity.[2] In addition the chapter has been the subject of a rather long doctoral dissertation by C. H. Giblin, who is a member of this seminar.[3]

It would be impossible within the confines of this paper to treat all the exegetical problems of the chapter with a sophistication even approaching that of Giblin. Therefore I have chosen to discuss only the following four:

1. the meaning of the temple in vs. 4,
2. the villainous figure depicted in vss. 3f., etc.
3. problems of grammar in vss. 6-7
4. possible identifications of the katechon (-ōn) in these same verses.

To these exegetical problems two more general problems affect the exegesis of the passage. The first is the problem of authorship. The evidence against Pauline authorship, while hardly conclusive, is significant enough that one should no longer assume his authorship as a tool for exegesis.[4] Up to now most exegetes have proceeded on exactly this assumption.[5] However, while the Pauline epistles, like the rest of the New Testament, may provide a general background for interpreting II Thessalonians, we should no longer casually assume that the genuine Pauline epistles provide a facile insight into the author's mind.

The second general problem concerns backgrounds. One should normally expect a small piece of apocalyptic to use dramatis personae recognizable to one versed in Jewish and/or Christian apocalyptic. Apocalyptic literature has provided no plausible parallels to the katechon (-on) as commonly interpreted in vss. 6-7.[6] The usual explanation for this lack is to affirm the author's originality, but any author introducing a new idea would normally explain the idea to his readers and not simply refer to it in passing. Of course a ready solution to this lack of explanation lies in vs. 5, according to which Paul had already explained to the Thessalonians about the katechon. However, the solution assumes Pauline authorship. If the epistle is deutero-Pauline, then the historicity of this particular Pauline catechesis becomes doubtful. Moreover, if, as will be shown below, it is likely that the whole passage depends upon a non-Pauline source, the katechon is preferable which does not assume the introduction of some unheard-of, unexplained apocalyptic figure.

I. THE QUESTION OF A SOURCE IN II THESS. 2

In Rom. 1:4 the words pneuma hagiōsunēs appear. They probably represent the Hebrew ruaḥ qodesh.[7] Elsewhere in the Pauline Corpus the Hebrew expression is rendered more freely as pneuma hagion, with or without the article. However, such a literal,

un-Pauline rendering of the Hebrew construct causes little concern to exegetes because the rendering is simply further evidence that the passage comes from a non-Pauline source. In fact, whenever there appear stylistic features out of keeping with the rest of a work or a corpus by one author, one suspects that the passage in question is either an interpolation or a source used by the author. In the case of II Thess. 2:3-12 there are several such unusual stylistic features, most of them capable of being understood as Semiticisms.[8]

In the first place, there are three epithets which, like "Spirit of Holiness" in Romans 1, appear to be literal renderings of Semitic constructs. The first is "the man of lawlessness"[9] ("the man of sin" in Mss. A, D, G, Vulg., and TR) in vs. 3. One might expect this figure to be called ho anomos, as in vs. 8. Of course not all Greek genitives hide Semitic constructs, and determining which ones do must necessarily involve a subjective judgment; nevertheless, "the man of lawlessness" does appear more Semitic than the Pauline Corpus generally and II Thess. in particular.[10] There are various possible Semitic phrases that "man of lawlessness" might render. One possibility is ish Beliyya'al since in II Sam. 22:5 // Ps. 18:5 beliyya'al becomes anomia in the LXX. Although in this context beliyya'al was not yet a proper name, the use of this word at Qumran demonstrates that it could be a proper name in first-century Palestine.[11] For other possible Semitic equivalents, see 1Q27 (Appendix I), I, 27.

The other two possible renderings of Semitic constructs are "the son of perdition" (vs. 3) and "the mystery . . . of lawlessness" (vs. 7). In the case of "the son of perdition," "son of" is a particularly common Semitic usage as in "son of man."[12] "The mystery . . . of lawlessness," while not written as a unit, is logically understood as such. In the LXX mysterion always translates raz,[13] and anomia translates pesha' nineteen times. The whole construct appears in the plural in 1Q27 (Appendix I), I, 2: raze pesha', "mysteries of lawlessness."[14]

Another unexpected usage in II Thess. 2:3-12 is heōs (not heōs an) with the subjunctive in vs. 7. The construction appears only here and is a further indication that the passage is not Pauline.[15] While the usage is not particularly Semitic, other aspects of vs. 7b may well be so. The use of monon, as interpreted below, exactly matches the Rabbinic word alla. In addition ek mesou might be a rendering of mittokh[16] although the expression does appear in the normal Greek of the period.[17]

In a recent article[18] R. D. Aus argues that II Thess. 2:3-12 contained indications that its author was aware of the Hebrew Bible as well as the LXX. The allusion to Dan. 11:36 in vs. 4 follows neither the LXX nor Theodotian (which for Daniel predates the New Testament). Rather the II Thess. 2:4 seems to be following the Hebrew text in rendering weyitgaddel with kai huperairomenos instead of kai hupsōthēsetai (LXX) or kai megalunthēsetai (Theod.). Moreover in the same verse, in what seems to be an allusion to Ezek. 28:2, the Hebrew yashavti is translated by "sit" rather than by "dwell" as in the LXX.[19]

All these stylistic notes suggest various possibilities. They certainly would tend to suggest that II Thess. 2:2-12 is

not an original composition of Paul. Since some of the usages in the passage seem alien to the rest of II Thess., the passage may be either a source or an interpolation; but the latter possibility is unlikely because the passage fits too well into the epistle.[20] Therefore, the author of II Thessalonians, when he wrote the apocalypse on chapter two, probably was using a source that he knew either in a Semitic language or in a highly Semitic Greek style. However, whether such a source was Jewish or Christian is unclear. There is little about the passage that is specifically Christian. As will be shown below, it follows familiar Jewish patterns. In fact, the only word that makes the passage specifically Christian is the word "Jesus" in vs. 8, and this word is missing from several manuscripts including B and W. If "Jesus" is an interpretative addition by some scribe or by the author of II Thessalonians, then there is no reason to assume that the source being used was not Jewish. In that case "the Lord" in vs. 8 would originally have been a reference to God.

Another question concerns the extent of such a source. It was obviously not copied as a whole without change. Vs. 5 with its personal reminder would certainly not have been part of the source. There is also the possibility that the source may have extended beyond vss. 3-12. What may be Semitic constructs in vs. 13b (see n. 10) suggests that the author of II Thessalonians may have been using language from the source in this half verse.

Related to the question of the extent of the source is the question of how the author used it. Did he copy it largely verbatim? Did he only borrow some phrases? The answer probably lies somewhere between these two views. In any case, the fact that "the man of lawlessness" becomes a less obviously Semitic _ho anomos_ in vs. 8 suggests that the author felt free to change the title.[21]

The use of a source in a writing also raises exegetical problems. The passage may have two meanings, that found in the original apocalypse and the meaning intended by the author of II Thessalonians. To determine the first meaning we must disregard the context in II Thessalonians. To determine the second meaning the position of the apocalypse in the epistle becomes important. However, the relation of the apocalypse to Pauline thought as a whole only assumes major importance if the Pauline authorship of II Thessalonians is reasonably assured.

II. THE TEMPLE IN VERSE 4

With the question of who wrote II Thessalonians still open and with the possibility of a source being incorporated within chapter 2, the interpretation of "the temple" (_naos_) in vs. 4 takes on added importance. If this temple was the one in Jerusalem (Irenaeus, V, 25, 4; 30, 4; Hippolytus, _Daniel_, IV, 44; etc.), then the apocalypse, or at least its source, must stem from before the destruction of tht temple in C.E. 50.[22] If, however, the temple in vs. 4 is understood as representing another entity such as the Church (Jerome, _Epist._, 121; Chrysostom, Hom. 3 on II Thess.; etc.), then the apocalypse might well represent a situation later than C.E. 70.

There are three indications that this temple is indeed the

one at Jerusalem. First the verse contains an allusion to Dan. 11:31-36 (cf. 9:27; 12:11) where the temple in question could only be the one at Jerusalem. Moreover, as shown above, in the allusion in the verse to Ezek. 28:2, yashavti is translated, not by "dwell" as in the LXX, but deliberately by "sit," an action which is more fitting in the context of a physical temple than a community.

Secondly, the interpretation of ho naos as the Jerusalem temple fits the context of both the source and the epistle. The source is simply describing the last events. The author of the epistle is assuring his readers that certain of these events must precede the return of the Lord Jesus. Both source and epistle are following a common apocalyptic concept of history according to which the forces of evil must become ever more powerful. There is apostasy and the appearance of "the man of lawlessness," whose work reaches a climax when "he takes his seat in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God" (vs. 4).

The third and most important indication that this temple is the one at Jerusalem is the fact that naos in vs. 4 has an article. It is common for various sources to speak of temple and sacrifice in depicting various aspects of Jewish or Christian life, but nowhere do Christians or Jews speak of some non-building replacing the temple, at least while that temple was still standing.[23] Nevertheless, it has become almost commonplace to assume that community had replaced temple at Qumran and in the writings of Paul.[24]

In regard to the scrolls from Qumran, the texts cited are 1QS, V, 6; VIII, 5, 8f.; IX, 5f.; CD, III, 19; 4QFlorilegium. Except for the last, none speaks of the community as the sanctuary (with the article) but as a sanctuary (without the article).[25] In regard to 4QFlorilegium, the fragment concerns the eschatological replacement for the present sanctuary that the Jerusalem priesthood has defiled.[26] That this temple was viewed as a real physical entity like the present one is quite clear from its detailed description in the recently published Temple Scroll.

As at Qumran, the Pauline Corpus never uses "the temple" (with the article in a symbolic sense). To this pattern I Cor. 3:17 is no exception because the words "the temple" can easily refer to the Jerusalem temple if vss. 16f. are translated as follows: "Do you not know that you are a temple of God? If anyone destroys the temple of God [at Jerusalem], God will destroy him. For the temple of God [at Jerusalem] is holy as you are [holy]." So interpreted the relative hoitines modifies the adjacent "holy" instead of the more remote "temple."

In view of the above arguments, it seems likely that ho naos in II Thess. 2:4 is the Jerusalem temple and that, therefore, the apocalypse must stem from before C.E. 70. However, three caveats are necessary. First, although the temple was destroyed in C.E. 70, it is possible that the sanctuary continued to be used on greatly limited scale.[27] However, naos (unlike hieron) would refer to the temple building, which was destroyed, rather than to the whole sanctuary. Secondly, it is possible that the author of this apocalypse was looking forward to a rebuilt eschatological

temple like the one in the Temple Scroll from Qumran, although it seems unlikely that "the man of lawlessness" would take his seat in such a temple. Thirdly, it is possible that the author of II Thess. reinterpreted his source. Thus, while the source meant the Jerusalem temple by ho naos, the author of the epistle understood it to be the Church. A similar case of reinterpretation is found in Rev. 11:1-2, where a prophecy clearly states that ho naos will not be destroyed. This prophecy the author of Revelation, writing after the destruction of that temple, has reinterpreted, probably as the Church. Therefore, the temple of II Thess. 2:2-4 implies either that II Thessalonians was written before the destruction of the Jerusalem temple or that a source which he was using came from this period.

III. THE MAN OF LAWLESSNESS

In most apocalyptic there is some kind of villain who opposes God and God's people. Here in II Thess. 2 the villain is called "the man of lawlessness" (vs. 3, = "the lawless one" in vs. 8), "the son of perdition" (vs. 3), and ho antikeimenos (vs. 4). In addition, "the man of lawlessness" is apparently related to "the mystery . . . of lawlessness" (vs. 7). As shown above, most of these titles have Semitic originals, but the nature of the villain is revealed mostly in his works. He is engaging in a cosmic struggle against God, his Christ, and his people. Action seems centered about the Jerusalem Temple (vs. 4). The theme is that of the Holy War as found, for example, in the New Testament (I Cor. 15:24-28; Rev. 12f.; 19:11-21; etc.), at Qumran (notably in 1QM),[28] and in late Jewish apocalyptic (see Appendix II for a relatively early sample).[29]

The apocalyptic villain in the Holy War is either Satan or someone close to him, perhaps so close as to bear his name. At Qumran the leader of the evil forces was Belial;[30] and, as suggested above, "the man of lawlessness" might be a rendering of ish Beliyya'al. The relation of the villain in II Thess. 2 to Satan is also suggested by the title ho antikeimenos. This participle is generally understood descriptively to indicate the villain's opposition to God, but in such a case it would normally be followed by a dative (as in 2 Kgdms. 8:10; III Kgdms. 11:25, ms. A; I Macc 14:7; and III Macc. 7:9). In II Thess. 2, however, (as in the plural usages in I Cor. 19:9 and Phil. 1:28), the word appears alone without an object and is more suggestive of a title. Now an obvious Hebrew equivalent of antikeimenos would be Satan, and in III Kgdms. 11:25, ms. A antikeimenos does in fact translate satan, although not as a proper name.[31] But Satan had become a proper name as in Zech. 3:1, where Satan's aim is described as being lesiteno, the verbal form of satan translated antikeisthai in the LXX.

Since antikeimenos seems like a Greek equivalent for Satan, it might be tempting to identify Satan as the villain in II Thess. 2. Unfortunately other considerations make the identification unlikely. In vs. 9 the villain's coming is described as "according to the working of Satan," a description which appears to distinguish between the two, although one might ask who should do the work of Satan better than Satan himself. Also in vs. 3, if "the man of lawlessness" does mean man of Belial, one should probably distinguish between the man and Belial; but again

there is a slight caveat. Semitic constructs do not always indicate exactly what their English translations imply. For example, "son of man" means a human being. Similarly in certain contexts "angel of God" can mean God. Could "man of Belial" mean Belial? Probably not, although the identification cannot entirely be ruled out. More likely antikeimenos simply indicates the close relation of the villain to the devil.

"The mystery . . . of lawlessness" in vs. 7 is related verbally to the man of lawlessness in vs. 3 and to the lawless one in vs. 8. The phrase probably is simply indicating that at present the man of lawlessness is working in secret. Only later he will be revealed (vs. 6). There may also be a deliberate contrast between the lawless one who works in secret and the Lord who works openly (vs. 8).[32]

In the context of II Thess. 2 the villain stands bigger than life, big enough to wage war against God. There is no need to identify this villain with any particular historical figure. He may be completely mythical like Satan or one of his chief angels. Nevertheless, the line between mythical and historical should not be drawn too sharply. The lawless one in II Thess. 2 may well have been depicted with historical villains in mind. Jewish midrash tells of various kings who like the man of lawlessness claimed to be God. Their number includes Pharoah, Hiram, Joash, Sennacherib, and Nebuchadnezzar.[33] Perhaps a more likely model for the man of lawlessness would have been Antiochus Epiphanes IV, a king remembered for defiling the temple and the object of Dan. 11:36, alluded to in II Thess. 2:4. Another influence on the passage may have been Caligula's attempt to erect his statue in the Jerusalem temple in C.E. 40/41.[34] However, apocalyptic figures are notoriously reuseable; and, even though Antiochus Epiphanes or someone like him may have helped shape the man-of-lawlessness figure, the thought of such a king lies far in the background for both II Thessalonians and its apocalyptic source.

Further description of the villainous figure is difficult, partly because he may have been quite vague in the minds of those who shaped the chapter. It was suggested above that he may have been Satan or one of his angels. Another possibility has been suggested by Giblin.[35] He contrasts the man of lawlessness, whom he calls the man of rebellion, with a man of God, an expression that generally designates a prophet. He therefore believes that the man of lawlessness is a kind of antiprophet, the false prophet par excellence. However, in a world where the mythological and the historical are not clearly distinguished might not such a false prophet par excellence have been an angel of Satan or even Satan himself (cf. Gal. 1:8).

IV. GRAMMATICAL CONSTRUCTION OF VSS. 6-7

Before trying to identify the katechon in these verses, it is necessary to clarify certain grammatical problems. The most detailed discussions of these problems in recent years have been those of Giblin and M. Barnouin.[36] The two differ surprisingly. In vs. 6 Giblin understands oidate in the sense of what in Hebrew would be hikkartem, not yeda'tem,[37] and plays down any verbal aspect of katechon (p. 211). Therefore, the articular

infinitive (eis to apokalypsthēnai) must depend, not on the participle katechon but on oidate, which also happens to be nearer than katechon to the infinitive. So understood the infinitive cannot indicate purpose or intended result. Instead eis to apokalypsthēnai must introduce a clause indicating a simple future consequence in the order of knowledge. It is unlikely that one would be acquainted with the katechon (which is neuter) "for the purpose of him being revealed in his own time." Rather the infinitive clause tells of the logical working out of what is being experienced now. The weakness of this position is twofold. First there is a tendency to relate the masculine auton that follows the infinitive to the neuter katechon. Giblin recognizes that the mismatched genders prohibit a strictly grammatical relationship; still he argues that "these two distinct entities can nevertheless be related in terms of a common dynamism and common connotations" (p. 210; cf. pp. 217-224.) The other difficulty is that, while eis with the articular infinitive is possibly meant as Giblin interprets it, the construction is rare. Within the New Testament the articular infinitive after eis occurs in Heb., I Pet., and James, but mainly in the Pauline Corpus, where it nearly always expresses purpose.[38] More significant is the fact that all the other examples of this construction in II Thessalonians, including two from chap. 2:3-12, clearly express purpose (1:5; 2:2, 10, 11; 3:9).

Barnouin begins by noting the difficulty of making the articular infinitive depend on oidate since it is not a verb of action. Therefore the infinitive must go with the participle katechon even though oidate comes between katechon and the infinitive. He explains the unusual word order as a means of emphasizing katechon. He finds this construction not unlike vs. 4 where hōste with the infinitive depends on the anarthrous participle huperairemenos in apposition with antikeimenos, which is arthrous. The same verse contains another example of a hoti claus depending upon a participle. Another example of eis with an articular infinitive that depends upon a participle occurs in I Thess. 3:10 although unlike II Thess. 2:6 there is no verb intervening. Unfortunately there are no New Testament examples which parallel Barnouin's interpretation in all respects; nevertheless, his interpretation of the infinitive clause as expressing purpose and depending upon katechon appears plausible, but not necessarily more so than the interpretation of Giblin.

Most commentators agree that vs. 7b is elliptical,[39] but they agree about little else concerning the half verse. The passage contains one nominative (katechōn in the masculine) and one verb (genētai); so it would seem natural to interpret the one as the subject of the other. Unfortunately this interpretation faces other difficulties such as the conjunction "until" in the middle of the passage. Another possible interpretation would be to supply the verb genētai with a subject such as the unexpressed object of katechōn. Giblin opts for the first solution; Barnouin, for the second.

Giblin begins with monon, which usually follows the word it modifies and may precede it only if the word has a verbal force. Therefore monon cannot modify either ho katechōn, which is substantized, or the adverb arti. Rather we should interpret monon as a conjunction, and understand an unwritten imperative

(katechetō) after the participle. Moreover this interpretation has a precedent in that it follows the Old Latin and the Vulgate versions, both of which add teneat after qui tenet (= ho katechōn). Giblin would tentatively translate the half verse as follows: "But let the katechōn exercise his function as katechōn for the present--until he is ousted" (p. 212). This use of monon to introduce a proviso has several parallels in the Pauline Corpus. Particularly significant is I Cor. 7:39 where the reader must supply the imperative "let her marry" after monon: "But (or only) let her marry in the Lord." Moreover, as mentioned above, this use of monon also matches the Rabbinic use of ella.

Barnouin notes that katechein normally requires an object. If one supplies the object auton, it would naturally refer to the villain of vss. 3f. Turning to genētai, one might regard ho katechōn as its subject and treat the whole as a single clause except for the conjunction heōs lying between the two words. It might be possible to regard the heōs as a postpositive conjunction, except that none of the ten examples of a postpositive conjunction in the Pauline Corpus involves heōs. Also it would be difficult to translate vs. 7b, which contains the word "now," and retain the force of the conjunction "until" throughout. Barnouin recognizes that the alternative of taking heōs . . . genētai as a separate clause has the difficulty of providing a subject for genētai, but there is a solution. Greek generally tends to an economy of words. The subject of a verb in a subordinate clause is not expressed whenever that subject is the same as the object of the verb on which the subordinate clause depends. However, the subject of the subordinate clause is expressed (usually by autos) whenever it is the subject of the verb on which the clause depends, provided that the latter is in the active voice. Thus the subject of genētai is the implied object of ho katechōn, the villain of vss. 3-4. Barnouin also argues that "from the midst" means from where the lawless one was being kept. He translates vs. 7b as follows: "Quelqu'un le tenant seulement gardé actuellement jusqu'à de que, sortant de là, il vienne."

These two grammatical interpretations have been given because there is much to be said for them; yet neither is entirely convincing. In vs. 6 Giblin is more convincing on word order while Barnouin's understanding of the articular infinitive with eis is more in accord with the usage of II Thessalonians and the Pauline Corpus as a whole. In vs. 7b Barnouin's interpretation seems somewhat more obvious, but that of Giblin is backed by the Latin tradition. Grammar alone cannot solve the problems of these verses. Their interpretation depends on the general thrust of the message, and that message ought to have made sense to a reader who was somewhat versed in the apocalyptic of the first century. The key figure in that message is the katechon (-ōn), to which we now turn.

V. THE KATECHON (-ŌN)

In the first section of this paper we noted that Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic know of no special restraining figure which is holding back the final onslaught of evil.[40] It was also shown that to argue convincingly that such a figure originated with the author of II Thessalonians, one must assume

that Paul wrote the epistle and that he had made no extensive use of a source for chap. 2:6f. Since both assumptions are questionable, it seems unlikely that the katechon (-ōn) was a separate apocalyptic figure.[41] Rather he was probably a figure already well known, such as the man of lawlessness or God.

The verb katechein is capable of a variety of meanings. In the LXX it translates seventeen Hebrew and Aramaic roots. Several of these roots have to do with possessing cities, land, kingdom (the last only in Daniel); but the root which most commonly lies behind katechein is ʾḤZ. Another frequent root behind katechein is ḤZQ in the hif'il. Both Hebrew words convey the idea of "seizing" or "grasping" with either a favorable or unfavorable connotation.[42] This idea of "seizing" or "grasping" would easily fit the man of lawlessness, who according to vs. 4 seizes God's place and occupies God's temple. In other words, the masculine katechōn could easily be the man of lawlessness who is seizing power; and the neuter katechon, his workings, i.e., the mystery of lawlessness. This interpretation is essentially that of Giblin, who in accord with his grammatical exegesis suggests the following translation for vss. 6-8a:

> And now you know by experience the Seizing power for his being manifested at his own [proper] time. For the Mystery of Rebellion is already at work. But the Seizer [is to be, is to seize] for the present until he is ousted. And then will the Rebel be "manifested." (pp. 37, 319. Note that Giblin translates anomia and anomos as "Rebellion" and "Rebel" respectively.)

However, this interpretation of katechon (-ōn) would also fit the essential elements of Barnouin's grammatical exegesis. In such a case an adapted translation might run thus:

> And you know what is usurping (power) in order that he (the man of lawlessness) may be revealed in his own time. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work. But now there is the one seizing power until his power comes into the open. Then the lawless one will be revealed (for what he is.)

Katechein need not have an unfavorable connotation. It can mean "to possess" what rightfully belongs to one (cf. Exod. 32:13; Josh. 1:11; Ps. 69 (LXX: 68):37; Ezek. 33:24; Dan. 7:18, 22). In this sense the masculine katechōn could refer to God, the only person besides the man of lawlessness mentioned in this apocalypse up to this point (vss. 6f.)[43] It is God who "possesses" creation and is Lord of history. With this understanding of the masculine katechōn, the neuter katechon would be the rule of God over creation and over history. To this understanding of the katechon (ōn) one could adapt Barnouin's grammatical exegesis as follows:

> And now you know what is ruling (or is in control) in order that he (probably the man of lawlessness but possibly God) may be revealed in his own time. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work. But now

> there is the one who rules (or is in control) until the object of his control comes into the open. Then the lawless one will be revealed (for what he is).

This interpretation of katechon (-ōn) obviously would not make sense in a translation that followed Giblin's grammatical exegesis because Giblin's interpretation of heōs . . . genētai at the end of vs. 7 would call for the ouster of God. However, if these words are understood as Barnouin understood them, then katechon (-ōn) in the sense of God and his rule would fit very well most of the other points in Giblin's grammatical exegesis. A translation would then run as follows:

> And now you know by experience what is ruling (or in control) for his (the lawless one's or God's) being manifested at his own [proper] time. For the Mystery of Rebellion is already at work. But the one who now rules [may he continue to rule] until he comes into the open. And then will the Rebel be "manifested."

VI. CONCLUSION

In papers such as this it is customary to take one position on each point and defend it, but there are times when to do so would be dishonest. In biblical scholarship we must always be ready to say, "I don't know." In regard to the apocalypse of II Thessalonians, I believe that certain conclusions are probable but that there are other important issues which cannot at present be resolved. Among the former the probable conclusions are that the apocalypse draws upon Holy-War imagery, that the author of II Thessalonians seems to be drawing upon some kind of source in chap. 2, and that the katechon (-ōn) is probably not an otherwise unknown restraining figure. The masculine katechōn is probably to be identified with either the man of lawlessness or God simply because these are the only two persons mentioned in the apocalypse before the introduction of katechon (-ōn). Among the questions yet to be resolved are various points of grammar in vss. 6-7 and a specific identification of the katechon (-ōn). I have suggested four possible combination solutions to both problems. There are other combinations of grammar with the two renderings of katechon (-ōn), but these four indicate the range of possibilities. Among the four renderings the fourth seems least likely, but all are possible.

NOTES

[1]B. Rigaux, Saint Paul: Les épitres aux Thessaloniciens ("Études bibliques"; Paris: Gabalda, 1956) is by far the fullest commentary on II Thess.

[2]E.g., R. D. Aus, "God's Plan and God's Power: Isaiah 66 and the Restraining Factors of 2 Thess 2:6-7," JBL 96 (1977), pp. 537-553; M. Barnouin, "Les Problemes de traduction concernant II Thess. ii. 6-7," NTS 23 (1976/77), pp. 482-498.

[3]The Threat to Faith: An Exegetical and Theological Reexamination of 2 Thessalonians 2 ("Analecta Biblica," 31; Rome: Pontifical Bibl. Inst., 1967). For other works on the subject, see the excellent surveys of Giblin, pp. 11-34, and of Rigaux, pp. 247-280.

[4]For a recent treatment of authorship, see J. A. Bailey, "Who Wrote II Thessalonians?" NTS 25 (1978/79), pp. 35-47, but the article has no detailed exegesis of II Thess. 2.

[6]For attempts to find suitable parallels, see O. Betz, "Der Katechon," NTS 9 (1963), pp. 276-291; Barnouin, pp. 495f.

[7]The exact expression is not biblical although Is. 63:11 has a near equivalent. The expression does appear at Qumran (1QS IV, 21; 1QSb 2:24), and with the addition of the article it is common in Tannaitic and later Hebrew.

[8]On attempts to define Semitisms, see F. L. Horton, "Reflections on the Semitisms of Luke-Acts," in Perspectives on Luke-Acts, ed. C. H. Talbert (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1978), pp. 5-7. My own definition follows that of C. C. Torrey.

[9]Giblin, pp. 63-66, argues for the translation "man of rebellion." This interpretation is semantically possible and certainly fits the context, but anomia has a considerably broader meaning than just "rebellion." Therefore, I have chosen to translate anomia with "lawlessness," which has an equally broad range of meanings and can include the idea of rebellion.

[10]Other possible renderings of Semitic constructs appear in II Thess. 2:13 (twice) and 3:16. 2:13 may well belong with vss. 3-12 (so Giblin, pp. 41-49); and, as a benediction, 2:16 may also reflect Semitic usage.

[11]But note that in the LXX anomia translates 25 roots including 'awon, which it translates 62 times. For further evidence that the title may mean "man of Belial" or "man of Beliar," see Rigaux, pp. 656f.

[12]"Sons of perdition" appears in Charles' translation of Jubilees 10:3, but unfortunately no Greek fragment for this verse is extant. for a Hebrew mixing of both titles, see E. von Dobschütz, Die Thessalonischer-Briefe ("Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das NT"; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1909), p. 273, who suggests that ben 'awlah (LXX: huius anomias) from Ps. 89:23 (LXX: 88:22) may lie in the background. See also 1QS, III, 21: bene 'awel; R. Brown, The Semitic Background of the Term "Mystery" in the New Testament("Facet Books," Bibl. Ser., 21; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), pp. 38-40.

Giblin, pp. 62f., also recognizes the Semitic character of these titles in vs. 3, but he rejects the idea of a source because it "has left absolutely no further trace." For further traces, see below.

[13]But only in the Aramaic sections of Daniel. See also Betz, pp. 279-282.

[14]See Brown, pp. 28f.; Betz, pp. 279-282. Cf. Appendix II, waw.

[15]See Barnouin, p. 487; Rigaux, p. 671.

[16]In Mishnaic Hebrew the absolute and construct of TWK have identical pointing.

[17]The most commonly cited example is Plutarch, Timoleon 5:4 (519d). For other examples, see Giblin, p. 179, n. 2; Aus, p. 543, n. 29.

[18]Op. cit., pp. 541f.

[19]Aus, pp. 542-544, gives two other examples, but they seem less convincing.

[20]See Giblin, pp. 44-49, who disputes the usual limits of the passage.

[21]However, this usage is hardly un-Semitic. Still it is less likely that a Semitic writer would have changed a Semitic epithet than that the author of II Thess., writing in Greek, was a little uncomfortable with "man of lawlessness" and changed it.

[22]Bailey, p. 143, recognizes that the temple is vs. 4 would normally be the one in Jerusalem, but rejects the interpretation because he believes II Thess. was written after C.E. 70.

[23]The basic evidence for this statement is found in my doctoral dissertation, The Jerusalem Temple in New Testament Thought (Harvard Divinity School, 1958). What follows are a few of the main lines of argument.

[24]The first person who popularized the idea that the Jerusalem Temple was relatively unimportant in the time of Jesus was W. Bousset in the first edition of Religion des Judentums in neotestamentlichen Zeitalter (Berlin, 1903), pp. 91-102. He was followed by most Protestant and many Jewish scholars. Typical of this view for the post-Qumran era are B. Gärtner, The Temple and the Community in Qumran and the New Testament (SNTS Monograph, 1; Cambridge Univ., 1965); H. W. Kuhn, Ender-wärtung und gegenwärtiges Heil ("Studien zur Umwelt des NT," 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965); R. J. McKelvey, The New Temple (London, 1969); G. Klinzing, Die Umdeutung des Kultus in der Qumrangemeinde und im Neuen Testament ("Studien zur Umwelt des NT," 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965). Among those who would question some of the easy assertions being made about community and temple in Qumran and the NT are E. Fiorenza, "Cultic Language in Qumran and in the New Testament," CBQ 38 (1976), pp. 159-177; and A. J. McNicol, "The Eschatological Temple in the Qumran Pesher 4QFlorilegium 1:1-7," Ohio Journ. of Rel. Stud. 5 (1977), pp. 133-141.

[25]In a few cases (e.g., 1QS, V, 6) the absence of an article depends upon how one points the text.

[26]So McNicol, pp. 133-141.

[27]K. Clark, "Worship in the Jerusalem Temple after A.D. 70," NTS 6 (1960), pp. 269-280; J. R. Brown, Temple and Sacrifice in Rabbinic Judaism (Evanston, IL, 1963), pp. 20-24.

[28]See H. G. May, "Cosmological Reference in the Qumran Doctrine of the Two Spirits and in Old Testament Imagery," JBL 82 (1963), pp. 1-14.

[29]The best collection of late Jewish apocalyptic is J. Even-Shemu'el, Midrashe Ge'ullah (2nd ed. enlarged: Jerusalem: Bialik Inst., 1953/54). In English see R. Patai, The Messiah Texts (New York: Avon, 1979), and G. W. Buchanan, Revelation and Redemption (Dillsboro, N.C.: Western NC Press, 1978). See also M. Buttenwieser, Outline of the Neo-Hebraic Apocalyptic Literature (Cincinnati: by the author, 1901).

More generally on the Holy War and Antichrist, see Giblin, pp. 89-109; Rigaux, pp. 247-280; idem, L'Antéchrist et l'Opposition au royaume messianique dans l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1932); Bousset, The Antichrist Legend (London: Hutchinson, 1896).

[30]Y. Yadin, The Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness (Oxford: Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 232-234; May, p. 5.

[31]Here the satan was Rezon ben Eliadah. Cf. also I Cor. 16:9; Phil. 1:28.

[32]Rigaux, Comm. Thess., p. 272.

[33]Mekhilta on Exod. 15:11. Shirata, 8; Gen. R. 9:5; Tanh. (Buber), Way'era, 16; Exod. R. 8:2.

[34]For a recent study, see P. Bilde, "The Roman Emperor Gaius (Caligula)'s Attempt to Erect his Statue in the Temple of Jerusalem," Stud. Theol. 32 (1978), pp. 67-93.

[35]Op. cit., pp. 61-70.

[36]Giblin, pp. 159-166, 204-224; Barnouin, pp. 484-498.

[37]Barnouin would agree in translating the verb vous connaissez.

[38]So N. Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Vol III (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. 143.

[39]So J. B. Lightfoot, Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1957), p. 114; Rigaux, p. 670; Giblin, p. 211; etc.

[40]Perhaps the closest parallel is Rev. 20:1-9; see also the fourth-century Acts of Pilate, part 2, vi-viii (xxii-xxiv), according to which Jesus set angels to hold (katechein) Satan in Hades. See also above, n. 6.

[41]The usual interpretation is that the neuter restrainer is the Roman Empire; and the masculine restrainer, the emperor. So also Betz, pp. 285f. Another view being put forward is that the neuter restrainer is the apostolic preaching; and the masculine restrainer, Paul himself. This view was first proposed by O. Cullmann, "La charactere eschatologique du devoir messionnaire et la conscience apostolique de S. Paul," RHPR 16 (1936), pp. 210-245. So also J. Munch, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind (London: SCM, 1959), pp. 36-42. See above, n. 3.

[42]This interpretation is supported by the Syriac version of

II Thess. 2:6f. The Syriac word translating katechon (-on) is 'ahid which also means "seizing" or "grasping." On this passive form being used in the active, see R. P. Smith and J. P. Smith, A Compendicus Syriac Dictionary (Oxford at Clarendon, 1903), s.v.

[43]This interpretation was held in ancient times by Theodore of Mopsuestia (Migne, PG, vol. 66, cols. 933-936) and by Theodoret of Cyrrhus (PG, vol. 82, cols. 663-666). It has been revived by Aus, op. cit., who bases his argument on a supposed allusion to Is. 66:9. Unfortunately, Is. 66:9 does not contain the verb katechein. Moreover, his theory that II Thess. 2 relies generally on Is. 66 assumes that this chapter is closely tied to chap. 1; however, if the author used a source for chap. 2, its wording would hardly depend on chap. 1.

APPENDIX I--1Q27: Book of Mysteries

Text from Discoveries in the Judaean Desert, by D. Barthelemy and J. T. Milik (Oxford at Clarendon, 1955), pp. pp. 102-107.

I 1. . . . all . . .
2. . . . truth . . . mysteries of sin (raze pesha': Pesha' = anomia 19x in LXX & raz always = mysterion in LXX)
3. . . . And they have not known a mystery (raz) being brought about. And things of old they have not understood. And they have not known what will come upon
4. them. And they have not delivered their soul (nefesh) from a mystery (raz) being brought about.
5. Now this is the sign for you that it shall come to pass: When the descendents of (mulede) of iniquity ('aviah) = anomia 7 x in LXX) are shut up and the wicked one (rasha' = anomos 30 x in LXX, or "wickedness" = resha', but which also = anomos 5 x in LXX) will depart from (or "on account of") the righteous one (taaddiq, or "righteousness" = tsedeq) like the departing of [darkness from (or "on account of")
6. light. And like vanishing smoke which is no more, so shall the wicked one (rasha' come to an end forever. And the righteous one (tsaddiq) shall be revealed like the sun, the standard of
7. the world. And all who hold (or "grasp" = tomekh, a root never rendered katechein in the LXX) the mysteries of (raze) wonder are no more. And knowledge (da'ah) shall fill the world. And folly shall be no mor[e].
8. The saying shall certainly come to pass, and the oracle is truth. From this be it known to you that it (the evil one?) shall never come back. Do not all
9. the peoples hate injustice ('awel = anomia only 3 x in LXX)? Yet all of the[m] walk in its power. Does not respect for the truth come from the mouth of all peoples?
10. Is there a lip and tongue clinging to it (truth)? What nation takes pleasure when one stronger than itself shall oppress it? Which one
11. shall take pleasure when its wealth is plundered by a (or "the") wicked (rasha') one? Which is the nation that has not plundered its neighbor? Where is a people that has not
12. plundered weal[th] belonging to [another]? . . . and results . . .

II 1. . . .
2. and . . . for him plan[s] were suitable
3. . . . What advantage is there for [him] . . .
4. except the good doer and the evil doer. If . . .
5. he shall not succeed in anything. Thus anything good is his mammon . . .
6. with no wealth, and it was bought at no cost because . . .
7. What . . . except all . . .
8. My value (dani), and n[o co]st is worth . . .
9.
10. God has known all . . .

APPENDIX II--A hymn by Eleazer (ben) Qalir, who flourished at the end of the seventh century in Palestine

Text from Midrashe Ge'ullah, by J. Even-Shemu'el, formerly J. Kaufman. (2nd edition enlarged; Jerusalem/Tel Aviv: Bialik Institute, 1953/54), pp. 113-116. This translation differs at several points from the translation by G. W. Buchanan, Revelation and Redemption (Dillsboro, NC: Western North Carolina Press, 1978), pp. 288-290, who used a text from the Roman Maḥzor. I made the present translation without reference to Buchanan's translation. However, I did make full use of Even-Shemu'el's introduction, vowel points, and notes to interpret many obscure lines.

I

In those days and at that time,
In the first month, the month of Nisan:
alef Verily on its fourtenth day,
Menaḥem ben Ammiel (=Messiah ben David) shall suddenly come.
bet In the valley of Arvel (in Galilee) shall his goodness bloom,
And colorful garments of vengeance shall he don.

II

In those days and at that time,
In the second month, the month of Iyyar:
gimel Those hidden away in Sabbatical-year observance (i.e., dead) shall be revealed,
And the community of Qorah shall rise in the sight of all the tribes.
dalet The banners of Asaf shall be adorned
From the steppes of Moab to the Wadi Shittim (opposite Jericho).

III

In those days and at that time,
In the third month, the month of Sivan:
be Those who died in the wilderness shall rise,
And a great earthquake shall overcome the walls,
waw And on the mountain tops there shall be a strip of grain,
And the earth shall tremble, and the secret mystery (sod raz) shall be spoken.

IV

In those days and at that time,
In the fourth month, the month of Tammuz:
zayin Wrath and fury shall everywhere be found,
And there shall go forth a king apart from [the will of] Heaven.
ḥet Power and Satan shall bid him, "Go forth";
But relief and deliverance shall be found for the little ones (me'utim)

V

In those days and at that time,
In the fifth month, the month of Av:

tet — The Pure One (God) shall put on his garments of vengeance,
And at his rebuke (or shout) shall Mount Olivet be cleft.

yod — In his greatness there shall go forth Messiah (against Satan's king),
In his might like the rising sun.

VI

In those days and at that time,
In the sixth month, the month of Elul:

kaf — As his prince shall (Zerubbabel) ben Sheatiel play the herald,
And (from heaven) shall descend Michael and Gabriel

lamed — To wage the war of God's vengeance,
and not one of God's enemies shall they spare.

VII

In those days and at that time,
In the seventh month, the month of Tishre:

mem — Tumults and conflicts shall there be in every nation;
And they shall say, "Come and let us destroy their nationhood."

nun — --He is feared as one who has taken for himself a nation from a nation's midst (cf. DT. 4:34).--
(They are) an entity (nefesh) of scorn, an abhorrence to (every) nation.

VIII

In those days and at that time,
In the eighth month, the month of MarHeshvan:

samekh — There shall be a tempest in the first exile (of the three),
And in it (that month) a lily (Israel, cf. Cant. 2:1) shall go forth into the wilderness.

'ayin — Ten thousand (from the diaspora) in support shall be revealed,
And the last (exile) shall not be like the first (without sacrifices)

IX

In those days and at that time,
In the ninth month, the month of Kislev:

pe — Suddenly shall there fall a sword from heaven,
And uncircumcised blood shall run like rivers of water,
From the third to the ninth (hour) shall the White One (God, cf. Cant. 5:10) confound them (cf. II Sam. 22:15) (so that they are) rushing like waters (cf. Isaiah 17:12),
And after two days shall the dead arise and live (cf. Hos. 6:2)

X

In those days and at that time,
In the tenth month, the month of Tevet:
qof The daily watchmen shall set forth a cry:
"Woe (oy) be unto us for the day has slipped away" (cf. Jer. 6:4)!
Forty-five days shall hunger prevail,
But there shall he be praised: "Blessed be the LORD every day."

XI

In those days and at that time,
In the eleventh month, the month of Shevat
shin Paralysis shall there be among ninety thousand
And among a hundred thousand wearing armor
shin When there shall be a fourth war against a [foe with] a thousand on each wing;
And there (in Jos. 23:10; cf. Dt. 32:30): "One of you shall pursue a thousand."

XII

In those days and at that time,
In the twelfth month, the month of Adar:
tav Three shall be blameless when it (Jerusalem) is rebuilt:
The Tishbite (= Elijah), Menahem (= Messiah ben David), and also Nehemiah (= Zerubbabel and perhaps Messiah ben Joseph).
tav With them is numbered the splendor of the ministering priests;
And there (in Ps. 150:6): "Let everything that has breath praise the LORD."

LAW AND JUDAISM IN ACTS

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My original intention was to include a discussion of the relevant material in Luke's gospel, but in attempting to do this it soon became evident that none of the material would receive anything more than a cursory glance. It is mainly for this reason that I have chosen to concentrate upon Acts, but there are also other good reasons for doing so. First, with respect to law, most of the significant themes in the gospel reappear in Acts and in conjunction with important new themes. Secondly, I am more confident of understanding the theme of law in Luke's gospel than in Acts. The evidence in Acts is more complex and intriguing, and raises more questions than it provides solutions. This particular setting, however, seems ideal for raising the questions, suggesting some tentative solutions, and reflecting upon some of the broader implications. I shall return briefly to the evidence in the gospel when concluding.

I. Legal Terminology

The use and distribution of three terms is particularly significant for Luke's understanding of law: 'law' (nomos), and the associated terms 'custom' (ethos) and 'Moses'. The term commandment (entole) is infrequent and less significant (Lk.1:6, 18:20, 23:56). The term nomos is absent from Mark, but occurs eight times in Matthew and nine in Luke of which only two overlap (Lk. 16:16-17 = Matt. 11:13, 5:18; otherwise see Lk. 2:22,23,24,27,39, 10:26, 24:44). In Acts the term is used fifteen times and of these two are connected with Stephen (Ac. 6:13, 7:53) and thirteen with Paul (Ac. 13:15, 39, 15:5, 18:13,15, 21:20,24,28, 22:3,12, 23:3,29, 24:14, 25:8, 28:23). This distribution is suggestive and may indicate where, for Luke, the problem of the law primarily lay. In general Luke's use of vomos reflects normal Jewish or Christian usage and of the twenty-four occurrences in the two volumes the majority refer to the 'prescriptive', and a few to the 'predictive', function of the law.[1]

The connection of Moses with the law - in phrases such as 'the law of Moses', 'the customs of Moses', 'Moses and the prophets', or simply 'Moses' - is typical of, but not unique to, Luke.[2] The occurrences divide fairly equally into the 'prescriptive' and 'predictive' and this accords with the dual function of Moses in Acts as both prophet (Ac. 3:22, 7:37) and lawgiver (Ac. 7:38).[3] The law of Moses is described as 'living oracles' and as having been 'delivered by angels' (Ac. 7:38,52), though the latter is not used to denigrate the law as in Gal. 3:19 and Heb. 2:2f.

Unique to Luke in the New Testament are the curious uses of the concept 'custom' in connection with the law. The noun ethos can be used to mean 'habit' (Lk. 22:39, cf. eiotha Lk. 4:16, Ac. 17:2) or to refer to Roman customs (Ac. 25:16), but usually Jewish customs are in mind.[4] On three occasions the custom is specified: priestly customs (Lk. 1:9), circumcision (Ac. 15:1) and passover (Lk. 2:42). The others refer in general to the Jewish way of life, described variously as 'customs' (Ac. 16:21, 21:21, 26:3), 'the customs of our fathers' (Ac. 28:17) and 'the customs of Moses' (Ac. 6:14, 15:1, cf. 21:21). Two observations

can be made. First, the association of the concepts custom and law with reference to Judaism is without parallel in early Christian literature. Secondly, the association of the two concepts amounts to an identification in the parallel versions of the charges against Stephen (Ac. 6:11-14), the demands of the circumcision party (Ac. 15:1,5), the charges against Paul in Ac. 21:21, the reference to specific legal requirements in Lk. 1:9, 2:42, and in the verbal phrase in Lk. 2:27 (kata to eithismenon tou nomou).[5]

It would appear that for Luke, on some occasions at least, the terms ethos and nomos are interchangeable and that he moves naturally from the one to the other in describing essentially the same phenomenon. Is this of any significance and to what may we liken it? Heb. 10:25 uses ethos to mean 'habit' (cf. Lk. 22:39; I Macc. 10:89; II Macc. 13:4; Mart. Polyc. 9:2), while Jn. 19:40 refers to 'the burial customs of the Jews' (cf. II Macc. 11:25; IV Macc. 18:5, v.l.). Occurrences of the term in the LXX are limited to those just mentioned. Rabbinic literature offers no useful parallels for although the rabbis respected custom and recognized its force they did not confuse it with law. In general the force of local custom was respected when it did not infringe specific commands (cf. Pes. 50b-57b), but although custom could be seen as sacred and binding it is always clearly distinguished from legislation (Yeb. 13b, Nidd. 66a, Ta'an 26b, Sof. 18.18). It would appear that neither the LXX, early Christian literature, nor Rabbinic usage can shed light on the peculiarites of Luke's use of ethos.

Philo uses ethos of the habits of other peoples (Ebr. 193) as well as the Jews. In many passages custom and law are mentioned together but clearly distinguished (eg. Leg. All. III.30,43) and in one case custom is compared unfavourably with law (Mut. Nom. 104). He can make disparaging comments about custom in general (Ebr. 55), but often recognizes the usefulness of custom, defined as 'unwritten law', as an adjunct to the demands of the torah (Spec. Leg. IV.149). As a rule custom and law are clearly distinguished, though even this distinction can break down, especially in apologetic contexts (eg. Leg. ad Gaium 210). Josephus provides a more interesting parallel to Luke. He uses the term ethos frequently and occasionally mentions a planned treatise called 'Customs and Causes' which he failed to complete (eg. Bell. V.237). He uses the term ethos of a wide variety of specific legal prescriptions (eg. Ant. II.313, XIV.245-6) as well as to the Jewish way of life as a whole (Bell VII.50). On several occasions he uses ethos and nomos interchangeably (eg. Ant. XII.281, XIV.194-5), a tendency which is to be explained not by his 'orientation to Pharisaim'[6] but rather by his apologetic design. As part of his plea for tolerance towards Jewish customs and beliefs, he presents them in the context of the customs peculiar to all national groups (Ant. XVI.35f) which should be encouraged if they aid the pursuit of goodness (Ant. XVI.176f). Jewish customs are, he claims, ancient, widely respected and emulated (Ant. XVI.43-7, Ap. II.282). Indeed all religious customs should be tolerated and one should not blaspheme the gods of other nations or abuse the gifts offered to them (Ant. IV.207). Josephus' use of the term ethos in connection with Judaism is, I would argue, essentially apologetic, one of the ways in which he attempts to present Judaism in terms comprehensible

to non-Jews. He is well aware that within Judaism the 'customs' are, unlike the customs of many others (Ap. II.155f), reinforced by the written law, that what to an outsider looks like a peculiar national habit to an insider has the force of divinely sanctioned law. But in order to make them intelligible and to plead for tolerance Josephus frequently presents them as customs different in detail, but not in kind, from those of other peoples.

I wonder if it is against the background of Josephus, and to a lesser extent Philo, that we are to understand Luke's use of ethos and nomos. There is no exact parallel to the Lucan phrases 'customs of the law' or 'customs of Moses', but it may be that he can be understood by analogy with these two hellenistic Jewish writers. There is, of course, no explicit apologetic on behalf of Jewish customs/laws in Luke of the sort that is especially evident in Josephus, but it may well be that he shares the cosmopolitan tone and cultural magnaminity common to both these writers. Like Josephus, Luke can use ethos to describe practices which are covered by legislation in the torah as well as some which are not. In neither case does it imply any disrespect for the law, nor does it appear to reflect the equation of written and oral tradition in rabbinism. Rather it is an attempt to set the customs/laws of the Jews in a broader cultural context. Does Luke's usage contain an implicit (as Josephus' contains an explicit) invitation to the reader to view Jewish practices in the same way as those of other peoples and accord them the same respect?

Of course, describing the ways of the Jews as customs is not confined to Jewish writers. Dio refers to those who were converted to Jewish customs (Hist. LVII.14.2,18.5a) and to the observance of Jewish customs after 70 C.E. (Hist.LXV. 9.2), and Diodorus contains a reference to the 'customs and laws' of the Jews (XL.3.1-8) as well as a few more hostile references to their practices (eg.I.55.5). It is perhaps worth noting that one use of ethos in the LXX is ostensibly part of a letter by a non-Jew (Antiochus V), to which we might add the use of the same term in the imperial edicts quoted by Josephus which defend Jewish rights (eg. Ant.XIV. 213-6, 245-6, XVI.171-6) even though their authenticity is a matter of dispute. This evidence shows that non-Jews quite naturally described Jewish practices as 'customs', often with magnanimous intent, and it makes sense of Josephus' attempt to reinforce this attitude for apologetic reasons.

Whichever analogy is thought to be most appropriate for Luke, hellenistic Jewish or non-Jewish (and I am inclined to favour the former), a similar impression is conveyed. To describe the law as ethos is to view it as a cultural as much as a religious phenomenon and indicates an ability to view it either from something of a distance or in a broad perspective. Can we go further and suggest that Luke's language implies an attitude towards Jewish law which is both tolerant, in that it upholds the right of the Jews to follow the practices most natural to them, and yet also restrictive, in that it would view as unnatural the imposition of this law where it does not belong (on the Gentiles)? Have we here at least one key to Luke's view of the law?

II. Law in Acts

In order to clarify and sharpen the issues I shall divide the material under a series of sub-headings. I assume that everyone will bear in mind that this kind of systematising, especially with a writer like Luke, can all too easily lead to a false impression.

A. Critique of the Law

On two occasions we are provided with casual, muted echoes of the intense debate surrounding the law in the Pauline era. In Ac. 13:38-9 the following words are placed on the lips of Paul:

> Let it be known to you therefore brethren that through this man forgiveness of sins is proclaimed to you, and by him everyone that believes is freed (dikaioutai) from everything from which you could not be freed by the law of Moses.

It has long been recognized that while these words echo Pauline language they do not express Pauline thought with any precision.[7] Justification and forgiveness of sins are closely associated and seen as supplements to the law of Moses. Precisely in what sense the law cannot provide 'justification' is not clear, but there is no doubt that the law is in some way seen to be inadequate and that whatever the law cannot provide Christ can. This does not mean that the law has been done away with, but simply that it is, on its own, an inadequate vehicle of salvation.

In his address to the council in Jerusalem, Peter argues against the imposition of the law on Gentile believers in part with the words (Ac. 15:10-11):

> Now therefore why do you make trial of God by putting a yoke upon the neck of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? But we believe that we shall be saved through the grace of the Lord Jesus, just as they will.

It is not clear whether v.10 is to be understood in terms of v.11. If so, then the peculiarly Lucan notion of the law as an unbearable burden, which is neither Pauline nor rabbinic, may refer to obedience to the law as a means of salvation. Since the Jews had been unable to keep the demands of the law, Jewish Christians, like Gentile Christians, were dependent on the grace of Christ for their salvation. If so, then Luke becomes one of the first in a long line of Christian writers to misunderstand the purpose of Jewish nomism and the role which repentance and forgiveness play in it. It may be, however, that the two verses offer two separate arguments in favour of Peter's view: the pragmatic observation that not even Jews can keep up with the demands of their own law, and the theological assertion that at any rate the salvation of both Jewish and Gentile Christians depends upon the grace of Christ. As in 13:38-9, the law is not thereby discarded but is seen to be inadequate as a basis for salvation.

These two criticisms of the law in toto, from the point of view of the Christian message of salvation, find no parallel elsewhere in Acts and arguably, if we do not read Acts through Pauline eyes, they are unemphatic. One explanation of this is that Luke held an essentially conservative view of the law and muffles any serious criticism because he believed that the church as the renewed Israel was committed to keeping it.[8] A quite different explanation would be to suppose that on a theological level the issue of the law was relatively unimportant for Luke and his readers.[9]

B. Keeping the Law

One thing is unambiguously clear from the narrative of Acts, namely that Luke, despite his reservations about the law as an instrument of salvation, is nowhere critical of Jews or Jewish-Christians who choose to keep the law, with the possible exception of Peter in ch. 10-11. This is true not only from occasional allusions in Acts but most emphatically in the narratives about Stephen and Paul. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it is difficult to find much of significance with regard to the question of Jewish Christians and the law outside of the material relating to Stephen and Paul.

It is assumed by Luke that the Christians in Jerusalem worshipped in the Temple (2:46, 3:1, 5:42) and those in the diaspora in the synagogues (13:14, 14:1, 17:2). Ananias is described as a man 'devout according to the law' (21:12), unlike his Jewish contemporaries who fail to keep the law delivered to them by angels (7:53). These few references concur with material in Luke's gospel (especially Lk. 1-2, 10:25f), but they are a meagre handful and many of them are incidental to more important themes (eg. the lealing in 3:1f and missionary preaching in 13:14f). While we should not overlook the implication of these casual allusions it can scarcely be said that they indicate Luke's interest in the early church as a law-abiding group.[10]

When we turn to the account of Stephen and Paul, especially the latter, the law suddenly becomes a major issue. The charges against Stephen are given in three different forms, but they say essentially the same thing:

v11 blasphemy against Moses and God
v13 blasphemy against the law and this holy place
v14 Jesus will change the customs of Moses and destroy this place

It is made clear that these charges are unfounded since his accusers were primed for their task and are described as 'false witnesses' (vv11,13). The notorious problem of the relationship between the charges and the speech of Stephen cannot be reviewed here. The speech directly addresses the issue of law only twice: in 7:38 Moses is described as the recipient of the 'living oracles' and in 7:53 the Jews are accused of failing to keep the law, thus throwing back at them the charge they made against Stephen. Moses is an important figure in other parts of the speech but more, it seems, in his role as prophet and leader than as lawgiver. The connection between this and the charges against Stephen is somewhat oblique, but it can at least be said that the relevant parts of the speech confirm what Luke has already made clear in the preceding narrative: Stephen is not an

antinomian. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that in Luke's view Stephen represents the whole church or at least a respectable part of it.

Of the three versions of the charge v14 is certainly the most curious. It is related, as is often noted, to the charges against Jesus at his trial which are absent from Luke's Gospel. Here, however, he speaks of what Jesus will do in the future (katalusai, allaxai). Is the apocalyptic reference deliberate and, if so, is it in any way related to Lk. 16:17? And whether or not we take the future tense strictly, is Luke implying, as seems most likely, that what it is said Jesus will not do in the future he did not do in the past? If so, how does this relate to material in the gospel where Jesus appears to be critical of the law (eg. the sabbath controversies Lk. 6:1f and the saying on divorce Lk. 16:18)? Is there an inconsistency here or are we to assume, with Jervell,[11] that in view of Ac. 6:14 none of the material in the Gospel can be interpreted as being critical of the law? Since when Acts was written the temple had been destroyed but the law had become an increasingly central issue within Judaism, is it significant that the theme of the temple is addressed in Stephen's speech whereas the law is ignored apart from two brief and positive references?

In connection with Paul the law becomes a central theme. He is repeatedly accused by hostile Jews of attacking the law (21:28, 23:29, 24:5-6, 25:7). The charges are repetitive and Lucan and fall into three categories: that he has abandoned the laws and customs, profaned the temple, and generally stirred up trouble. The reply to these charges is complex and goes beyond the narratives in which they are raised. First, the accusations are flatly denied and perhaps no more clearly than in 25:8 (cf. 24:14-15, 28:17):

> Neither against the law of the Jews, nor against the temple, nor against Caesar have I offended at all.

When the Jews attempt to interest Roman authorities in Paul's case he is always found to be innocent of political charges and whatever disputes he has with the Jews are declared to be an internal matter of no concern to them. A second form of reply is found in those narratives in which Paul is portrayed as a faithful and law-abiding Jew (16:1-3, 18:18, 22:3-4, 12-16, 22:17-21, 23:1-5, 26:4-5). This pattern is consistent and remains unbroken throughout Acts, even when it strains the reader's credulity (23:1-5) - not to mention that of the historian who knows Paul's letters. A third ploy used by Luke is to deflect criticism about the law by insisting that Paul's real dispute with the Jews was over the resurrection, and even so some of them should have found his views congenial (23:6, 24:21, 25:18-19). The approximate identification of Paul's views with those of the Pharisees is perhaps significant in that when Luke wrote the Sadducees were a spent force (and therefore an easy target) while the successors of the Pharisees were extending their control over Judaism with increasing success.

The crucial incident in Paul's dealings with Jewish-Christians is recounted in Ac. 21:18-26. Paul agrees, at the suggestion of James and the elders, to foot the bill for four men undertaking a vow and to participate in the ritual with them. The aim is to dispel the rumour that he encour-

ages diaspora Jews to abandon the law and to put at ease the thousands of Jewish-Christians who are 'zealous for the law' (v20). It is clearly implied that for Luke it is legitimate for Jewish-Christians to retain their zeal for the law and it is one more incident which proves that Paul's observation of the law is impeccable.

We might conclude, therefore, that the dispute over the law is virtually identical with the dispute over Paul. Does this imply that Paul rather than the law *per se* was the problem?

C. The Gentiles and the Law

Perhaps the one exception to the conclusion above is the relationship of the Gentiles to the law, though here of course Paul is also an important figure. I shall concentrate on a few issues which appear to be crucial and yet are obscure and puzzling.

In the story of Cornelius' conversion three significant points arise in connection with the law. First, while Peter interprets his vision as a sign of the dissolution of the distinction between clean and unclean people (10:28) it clearly also involves the dissolution of the similar, but not identical, distinction between foods (10:14, 11:8, cf. 11:3). Peter, presented here as a scrupulously law-abiding Jew, is required by God to act 'illegally' (*athemitos* 10:28). The force of *athemitos* is not clear. It refers basically to an action which defies the divine ordering of the universe (*themis*) rather than the law (*nomos*). Thus it can refer generally to anything which is 'godless' or 'abominable' (I Pet. 4:3, Did. 16:4, I Clem. 63:2, II Macc. 10:34, Jos. *Bell*. I.84,659, VI.209) but is also frequently used to describe an act contradictory to Jewish law (II Macc. 7:1, Jos. *Bell*. I.650, II.131, IV.99,205, *Vit*.26, *Ap*.II.119. The clearest example is in II Macc. 6:4, *tois apodiestalmenois apo ton nomon athemitois*). If Luke means the latter then presumably he thought that at least one part of the law had been overturned, namely the distinction between clean and unclean which caused the social segregation of Jews and Gentiles. That there are no such commands in the Torah which apply to all Jews everywhere and that there is no evidence that this was thought to be the case within all Jewish groups before 70 C.E., would mean that Luke was mistaken at least insofar as 10:28 is presented quite generally as a statement about all Jews. This may be because the form of Judaism familiar to him had been affected by the increasingly successful rabbinic program to extend the rules on purity and tithing during the Jamnia period. However, this would not reduce the importance of the observation that Luke thought that God had intervened to abrogate part of the law - though whether it applies to Peter alone, all Jewish Christians, or only those engaged in missionary work among the Gentiles is not clear. If we give the more general meaning to *athemitos* and suppose that the distinction between clean and unclean is presented as something which was believed to be part of the order of things rather than a legal prescription, Luke may be conveying a more subtle message. The vision of Peter is then designed not to contravene the law but to correct what Luke saw to be a common Jewish misunderstanding that certain regulations about clean

and unclean were part of the divine ordering of the universe. It contradicts what was probably the view of pre-70 Pharisaim as well as their successors at Jamnia, but the law as such is not at stake. If this is what Luke means it removes what is otherwise the only incident in Acts where Jews or Jewish Christians are discouraged from keeping their law.

Secondly, Peter states his conclusion in the following words (10:35):

> In every nation he that fears him and works righteousness is acceptable to him.

It is a conclusion which is obviously appropriate to the pious and godfearing Cornelius (10:1-2,4,22. Cf. the reference to 'alms' with Lk. 11:41), but it is at the same time close both to hellenistic Jewish summaries of the law, what we might call a 'liberal' Jewish position,[12] and to the summaries of the central demands of the law in Lk. 10:25f, 11:42. Is this intentional? Does it imply that Peter represents a conservative (Palestinian?) position which is overthrown by a liberal (diaspora Jewish and Christian) position?

The third and most perplexing issue is the relation between Ac. 10-11 and 15, which Luke draws to the reader's attention in 15:7-9. Why does the problem of the Gentiles and the law arise again in ch.15? Are we to suppose that there was a new influx of extremists (15:1,5), that ch.11 records only a temporary silencing of the opposition (and who are 'those from the circumcision' in 11:2?), or that the conversion of the pious Cornelius and his family failed to provide adequate arrangements for a mass of new Gentile converts? Yet 11:18 looks remarkably like a unanimous and final approval of the position of the Gentiles and this, together with Peter's vision and his summary of its meaning, leads us to expect neither the debate in ch.15 nor, above all, the terms of the apostolic decree.

For our purposes it is the decree which is the nub of the problem in Ac.15. It resolves the previous debate in which those who wish to impose circumcision on the Gentiles are shown to be a fringe minority (15:1,5,24). It is published as an apostolic edict which is warmly welcomed by the Gentile churches (15:30-1) and applicable to them all (16:4). Luke presumably saw it as relevant to his own day and in no sense a troublesome burden.(15:10,19). Luke's apparent enthusiasm for the decree has been interpreted in two quite different ways. For some the decree amounts to an insistence that the Gentiles observe those parts of the law applicable to them, so that to speak of a 'law-free Gentile mission' is misleading. The Church, as the renewed Israel, must remain faithful to the law - Jewish Christians to all of it and Gentile Christians to those parts applicable to them.[13] For others the decree amounts to a release from the law and does not introduce part of it, in lieu of the whole, into Gentile Christian practice.[14] The requirements of the decree were thus seen not as the imposition of law but as the confirmation of existing Gentile Christian practice. The key issue is whether Luke saw the decree as the application of Torah legislation to Gentile Christians. Four obscure clues are all we have:

1. Most important is the connection with Lev. 17-18. The terms of the decree can be seen as a summary of the rules for 'strangers in the land' and this might well have been their original purpose. But did Luke wish to convey this? Certainly the order of the requirements in 15:29, 21:25 (not 15:20) is identical to, and the substance approximately the same as, Lev. 17-18. On the other hand, in the LXX the rules are applied to 'proselytes' (Lev. 17:3,10,15) and it is not clear that eidolothutos is a precise summary of Lev. 17:1f or porneia of Lev. 18:6f. That the Gentiles should not be troubled (15:19, cf. v10) and their warm reception of the decree (15:30-1) perhaps most naturally suggest freedom from the law, and this is certainly what ch. 10-11 have prepared us for. Moreover the decree, inspired by the spirit (15:28), is presented as apostolic rather than Mosaic in origin (15:19,28-9, 16:4), and we might have expected Luke, with his penchant for quoting the O.T. to prove a point, to have referred clearly to Lev. 17-18 if that was the connection he wished to convey.

2. The strongest hint at the Mosaic origin of the decree is in the notoriously obscure verse in 15:21. It seems likely that it should be connected somehow with vv.19-20 (and not 16-18) but, as with the similar problem in 15:10-11, it is not clear if v21 is an explanation of what precedes it or an independent but relevant observation (the connecting gar is too vague to be of much help). Some think that v21 justifies the decree on the grounds that the requirements of Lev. 17-18 were widely known and accepted as a result of synagogue exposition of the law at which Gentiles could be present (Jos. Bell. II.560, VII.45). Is this what Luke means by the 'preaching' of Moses? Or, the verse might equally well be seen as an observation to the effect that the decision not to impose the law on Gentiles in no way disturbs the regular and legitimate inculcation of the law among Jews and Jewish Christians - a view which accords with the primary purpose of the synagogue as a place for the reading and exposition (preaching?) of the law to Jews.

3. In 15:28 Luke describes the terms of the decree as 'necessary things' (epanagkes). It is a rare term, usually an adverb, and the unique use with the article here has led to emendations.[15] More important is the sense conveyed since, whatever the syntax, it is applied to the terms of the decree by those promulgating it. The basic meaning is 'obligation', frequently of a financial kind. Sometimes the obligation seems to be legal or semi-legal (Demosthemes Orat.34.7), but more frequently refers to the demands of custom (Jos.Ant.16.36, Herodotus 1.82, Aeschines Epist.I.24). The papyrological evidence is often ambiguous but appears to show a similar range of meaning with the emphasis on local rule or custom.[16] The evidence thus supports either interpretation of the decree mentioned above, though it perhaps favours the sense of 'custom' rather than 'law'.

4. Jervell claims that phulassein (16:4, 21:25) and diaterein (15:29) are technical terms in the LXX and N.T. for keeping the law.[17] This is perhaps more true of the former than the latter,[18] though both are used in a more general sense. It should be noted that two of these (15:29, 21:25) are cast in the form 'keep yourselves/themselves from' while the third is related specifically to the 'dogmata of the apostles and elders in Jerusalem' (16:4). Indeed, the term dogma itself can be used of the law (III Macc. 1:3, Jos. Ap. 1:42). This does not mean, however, that the use of

phulassein/diaterein or of dogma means that the decree is seen as an expression of Torah. The dogma of 16:4 is more like the imperial dogma of Lk. 2:1 (cf. Ac.17:7) and even if we accept that phulassein/diaterein are technical terms, which is not certain, it could be argued that the result is to elevate apostolic judgement to the level of Torah rather than to present it as an expression of Torah.

None of the above can offer us certainty. At least we can say that Luke does not emphasize the connection between Lev. 17-18 and the decree. Perhaps he did not know about, or even wilfully obscured, it. But if he did not see the decree as the application of the law to the Gentiles, how did he view it?

If Luke understood the regulations of the decree as chiefly concerned with food regulations (except porneia?) it may be that in his day they were so well established and widely accepted among Gentile Christians (because they do go back to the apostolic period?) that they were no longer seen as a troublesome imposition. Perhaps they were part of the accepted social mores whose legal basis (if they had one) was forgotten. We have no independent evidence that such demands were made of god-fearers in the first century, but they might have been.[19] Perhaps too, even allowing for some exaggeration, the claim by Philo (Vit.Mos.II.202f) and Josephus (Ap.II.282) that Jewish practices were widely emulated by non-Jews has some bearing here. It is also pertinent to observe, as many have done, that some of the prohibitions of the decree were observed at a later date for reasons other than the regulation of Jewish-Gentile relations: eating idol-meat was banned because it signified participation in pagan worship (Did.6:3, Just.Dial.34) and the prohibition of blood was used to counter charges of cannibalism (Tert.Apol.9). Can we conclude that the regulations of the decree were seen by Luke as apostolic confirmation of accepted Gentile Christian mores which knew nothing of a Mosaic connection and observed some of them for reasons other than those which originally inspired them? Does apanagkes in 15:28 support this?

The regulations of the decree can all be connected with a prohibition of pagan worship and the possibility that Luke interpreted them so should not be ruled out altogether. Haima and pniktos may refer to meat polluted by connection with a pagan cult and porneia could be a metaphor for idolatry or a reference to the immorality associated with pagan worship. The most significant parallel occurs in Rev. 2:14, 20,24, which recalls the decree and shows that eidolothuta and porneia could be understood in this way in Asia Minor around the end of the first century (the same tima and place as Acts?). This interpretation is, however, somewhat strained[20] and raises an issue which nowhere else appears to concern Luke.

An attractive alternative is to suppose that Luke understood the terms of the decree (especially if we omit pniktos with D) in an ethical sense, as a summary of the minimal demands for all Christians. That the decree could be so interpreted is shown by the Western text, and there is also the interesting parallel with the rabbinic reduction of the law to three essential prohibitions for Jews under duress - idolatry, immorality and murder (Seb.7b, Sanh.24a). Such

an interpretation would reduce considerably the tension with ch. 10-11 and accord with Luke's interest in the central commands of the law in Lk. 10:25f, 11:41 (cf. Ac. 10:35). It would explain both the warm reception of the decree, to which no Christian, Jew or Gentile, could take exception, and the absence of any reference to Lev. 17-18. To enjoin such obvious moral demands with a decree might seem redundant, but might reflect the hellenistic Jewish penchant for summarizing the demands of the law in ethical terms, for which the preaching of Moses in the synagogues (15:21) provides a natural setting.

On the whole I am disinclined to think that Luke saw the decree as the application of the law, albeit in minimum form, to the Gentiles. It would appear that he did think in terms of a 'law-free' Gentile mission and that the decree was seen either as the confirmation of long-standing practices, of apostolic rather than Mosaic origin, or as the enjoining of certain fundamental ethical principles which, while they might be seen as a summary of the law in the hellenistic Jewish sense, would not have been seen as a legal obligation in the stricter sense.

III. Conclusions

1. An important motif in Luke's presentation of the law is that it is seen as the ethos of a particular ethnos. As such it is akin to the views of hellenistic Jews and cultured pagans. It is an irenic and enlightened (and in Josephus apologetic) approach to cultural pluralism, in which the law of the Jews is seen as the legitimate expression of their nationhood. I take this to be Luke's fundamental attitude towards the law and not, as Jervell contends, the notion that the Church was the renewed Israel and thus committed to the law - a view for which I find little or no evidence in Acts. The connection with hellenistic Judaism is reinforced by Luke's interest in summaries of the law into a few central ethical commands which, it appears, he considered to be incumbent upon all Christians regardless of their origin. A similar view of Gentile piety is given in Ac. 14:15-17, 17:22f and it is not insignificant that the Areopagus speech has frequently been connected with hellenistic Jewish apologetics.[21] O'Neill has attempted to show further links with this world of thought in terms of the way Luke describes his heroes, the appeal to the State, and the theology of conversion.[22] It is interesting to note in passing that despite this connection Luke does not attempt to blend the concept of law with popular philosophical thought in the manner of some hellenistic Jewish writers - a procedure which Paul, for example, echoes in Rom. 2.

2. It follows from this that Luke would view the imposition of the law upon the Gentiles as inappropriate since they have their own cultural and religious roots. The terms of the decree might be thought to contradict this view but I suspect that Luke, however he understood it, did not see it as the application of Torah to the Gentiles. In general the impression conveyed by Acts is that the problem of the Gentiles and the law was no longer an issue at the time of writing.[23] Those who would impose the law on the Gentiles are presented as a fringe minority whose views are firmly

and unanimously rejected by all the important apostolic figures.

3. It is unambiguously clear that Luke believed there was no contradiction between being a Christian and being zealous for the law. This can be seen in many passing references in Luke-Acts, the dispute over Stephen and, above all, in the career of Paul. It is equally clear that zeal for the law, however laudable, cannot bring salvation. Jewish piety, like Gentile piety, may have been approved of by Luke, but the approval is always qualified by the conviction that they both need to be supplemented and fulfilled by the gospel of Christ. The possible exception to Luke's approval of the law is in ch.10-11, but it is not clear that Luke did see this as a legal matter. It is also one of the places where we may catch an echo of conflict with Judaism of the Jamnian era.

4. When the law becomes a critical issue it is almost exclusively in connection with Paul. This might suggest that it was the reputation of Paul and, by implication the standing of Pauline communities (for whom Luke wrote?), and not the law as such which was at stake. Paul's view of the law and his own practices when among Gentiles could as easily and as understandably have been misunderstood in the rumour and legend of Luke's day as it was during Paul's lifetime - and by friend and foe alike. It was as natural for the accusations to cluster around this theme as it was for Luke to defend him. Who were the defamers of Paul - Jews (Jervell) or Jewish Christians (Pseudo-Clementines)?

5. It is interesting to note that the evidence in the gospel is more ambivalent on the question of law. 'Doing the law' is approved (Lk. 10:25f, 11:41), illustrated (Lk. 1-2), and the law can even be declared to be eternally valid (Lk. 16:17); yet Jesus is critical of the law (Lk. 6:1f) and can overturn it (Lk. 16:18). The ambivalence is most apparent in Lk. 16:16-18, and one explanation of this is that when Luke wrote the Gospel the question of 'Jesus and the law' was not an issue in the sense that 'Paul and the law' was when he wrote Acts. Is this because Luke wrote for Pauline communities whose opponents attacked their founder because he was the figure they knew best? Or does it signify a lapse between the writing of the Gospel and Acts during which circumstances changed? Is this why the issue of Jesus and the law is raised in Ac. 6 and not in the trial of Jesus?

6. I have deliberately left aside the prophetic function of the law, whose importance as a theme for Luke is sufficiently well known that it need not be rehearsed. In this respect there clearly was a conflict with Judaism over the law. The conflict, however, was not over matters of practice (on which Jews and Jewish Christians could agree) but of belief. If it is true that Judaism in the first century was more concerned with right practice than right belief (though this may have been less so in Luke's day), is Luke deliberately shifting the Jewish - Christian debate to the less controversial of these?

7. At some point Luke's positive view of the law must be considered in the light of the negative presentation of 'the Jews' elsewhere in Acts. Clearly the mission to the

Jews met with some success and Jewish spokesmen occasionally show some favour towards Christians (Ac. 5:43). At the same time 'the Jews' are consistently presented as the instigators of the harrassment and persecution of Christians. As in the Fourth Gospel, the only other N.T. text in which the phrase 'the Jews' is used with similar regularity and pejorative force, the Jews in Acts appear as the natural enemies of the Church. Does this suggest a similar locale for Acts and John, perhaps Asia Minor? And does Luke write, as John probably did, after the drawing of the boundaries at Jamnia and the introduction of the Birkath ha minim into the synagogue liturgy? Is it this which explains the attacks on Paul and Pauline churches (and it could still be either Jews or Jewish Christians under pressure) against which Luke defends them - and partly in accord with the views of a more liberal diaspora Judaism?

NOTES

1. For the former see Lk. 2:22,23-4,27,39, 10:26, 16:17; Ac. 7:53, 13:15,39, 15:5, 18:13,15, 21:20,24,28, 22:3,12, 23:3,29, 25:8; and for the latter Lk. 24:44; Ac. 24:14, 28:23, possibly Lk. 16:16.

2. Luke has five of the eight N.T. uses of the phrase 'law of Moses' (Lk. 2:22, 24:44; Ac. 13:38, 15:5, 28:23; Jn. 7:23; I Cor. 9:9; Heb. 10:28) and nine of the uses of 'Moses' to refer to the law (Lk. 5:14, 16:29,31, 24:27,44; Ac. 6:11, 15:1,21, 21:21; Jn. 5:45, 7:22; Heb. 7:14; II Cor. 3:15)

3. For the former see Lk. 2:22, 5:14, 16:29,31, 20:28; Ac. 6:11,14, 13:38, 15:1,5, 21:21; and the latter Lk. 24:27,46; Ac. 3:22, 7:37, 26:22, 28:23 and cf. Ac. 7:52. J.Jervell, Luke and the People of God (Minneapolis,1972), p137, thinks that for Luke Moses is primarily a lawgiver. This is not true of Ac.7 at least.

4. Lk. 1:9, 2:42; Ac. 6:14, 15:1, 16:21, 21:21, 26:3, 28:17, and the verbal use in Lk. 2:27.

5. E.Richard, Acts 6:1-8:4. The Author's Method of Composition (Missoula, 1978), p291, prefers the general sense of 'ancestral custom' rather than 'torah legislation' in Ac. 15:1, 21:21, but recognizes the latter sense in Ac. 6:14.

6. W.Gutbrod, art. nomos, TDNT IV, pp1050-1.

7. P.Vielhauer's discussion is probably the best known - 'On the "Paulinism" of Acts' in Studies in Luke-Acts, ed. L.Keck, J.L.Martyn (London, 1968) pp51f, here p44.

8. Jervell, Luke, p144. On p141 he claims that 'Luke has the most conservative outlook within the New Testament.'

9. Vielhauer, Paulinism, p42.

10. Jervell, Luke, p138 inflates this aspect of Acts 1-8.

11. Jervell, Luke, pp138-40.

12. K.Berger, Die Gesetzauslegung Jesu (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1972), pp362-95. See also F.Siegert, 'Gottesfürchtige und Sympathisanten' JSJ 4(1973), 109-64, here 131-2.

13. Jervell, Luke, pp143-4; similarly E.Haenchen, The Acts of the Apostles (Oxford, 1971), p449.

14. For example H. von Campenhausen, The Formation of the Christian Bible (Philadelphia, 1972), pp37f.

15. K.Lake, H.J.Cadbury, The Beginnings of Christianity, Vol. IV, pp180-1.

16. J.H.Moulton and G.Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament (London, 1930), p228-9.

17. Jervell, Luke, p144.

18. On phulassein see G. Bertram TDNT IX, 236f, and in relation to law Lk. 18:11 pars., Ac. 7:53, 21:24. The only other use of diaterein in the N.T. is Lk. 2:51, which has nothing to do with law.

19. See the discussion by Siegart, 'Gottesfürchtige', and W. Schmithals, Der Römerbriefe als historitche Problem (Gutersloh, 1975), pp69-82.

20. F.J.Jackson and K.Lake, The Beginnings of Christianity, V. p206f; M.Simon, 'The Apostolic Decree and its Setting in the Ancient Church', BJRL, 52 (1969-70), 445f.

21. W.Nauck, 'Die Tradition und Komposition der Areopagrede', ZTK, 53 (1956), 11f; H.Conzelmann, 'The Address of Paul on the Areopagus', Studies, ed. Keck and Martyn, 225-7.

22. J.C.O'Neill, The Theology of Acts in its Historical Setting, (London, 1970), 2nd ed., pp139f.

23. Jervell, Luke, pp145-7, rightly emphasizes this and the fact that Paul is Luke's real problem.

S 254

THE DIVINE PURPOSE: THE JEWS AND THE GENTILE MISSION (ACTS 15)

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The Jerusalem meeting of the apostles, elders, and community has figured prominently over the years in discussions of ecclesial structures, the Gentile mission, the church and Judaism, and a host of other topics.[1] The interest of recent scholars has been equally intense, especially in view of the alleged Pauline account of this meeting.[2] Every aspect of this chapter, so it seems, has received considerable scrutiny, except its OT citation and its function within the chapter. It is my intention, therefore, after a brief review of some of the major opinions of contemporary scholarship, to submit Acts 15 to a structural analysis in view of examining the divine purpose as it relates to the role which the Jews/Judaism play in the Gentile mission.[3] Particular attention will be paid to James' speech and the use which the author makes of the OT as a vehicule of the divine will.

1) Contemporary Scholarship: Major Views

a) The Jews and the Gentile Mission. It is the generally accepted position of scholars that "Luke saw the reception of the Gentiles and the Gentile mission as being the result of the Jews' rejection of the gospel."[4] This interpretation is rarely questioned, although scholars often point to elements within Acts which conflict with this view. J. Jervell insists, on the contrary, that the acceptance of the good news by the Jews rather than its rejection forms the basis for the Gentile mission.[5] In reality, the two views operate with similar presuppositions based upon a chronological/geographical perspective. First the Jews in a Palestinian and then in a Diaspora setting are the object of the Christian mission; only then the Gentiles in a Syro-Palestinian and finally in a thoroughly pagan context receive the attention of the Christian missionaries. The difference lies not in substance but in emphasis; the former see the rejection by the Jews as the presupposition of the Gentile mission, while the latter underscore the (partial) acceptance of the gospel by the Jews as the path which leads to the Gentiles.

b) The Mission to the Jews in Acts and to the Gentiles in Luke. Another opinion often advanced is the cessation of the mission to Israel. Relying primarily upon Acts 13:46; 18:6; and especially 28:28, it is maintained that by the end of Acts the rejection of Israel is irrevocable.[6] It is also observed that there is a relative absence of the concept of a Gentile mission in Luke, a theme which appears particularly in Acts.[7]

c) The Historical Character of the Jerusalem Episode. On the one hand, it is proposed that in Acts 15 "the problem of the Gentiles and the Gentile mission is once and for all decided at a meeting in Jerusalem of all the main figures in the early Church."[8] On the other, many insist that the principal theme of Acts 15 is a "law-free" mission to the Gentiles.[9]

The views here described have important methodological ramifications for the study not only of the Jews and their role in the Gentile mission but for a proper understanding of the overall structure and purpose of Luke and Acts.

2) Structural Analysis of Acts 15:1-35

The chapter is clearly defined spatially and temporally: the action begins in Antioch with the arrival of men from Judaea (1) and ends there with the departure of the new Judaean envoys (33). While this passage is usually characterized as a Jerusalem

episode (the Jerusalem council) both for geographical and theological reasons, the structural components of the introduction and conclusion require more careful analysis. First, however, we must consider the overall framework:

INTRODUCTION		the problem/dissension	--rhetorical structure	
1-5		from Antioch to Jerusalem	--spatial	"
JERUSALEM MEETING				
6-21	debate	--narrative		6-7a
		--speech (Peter)		7b-11
		--narrative		12
		--speech (James)		13-21
22-29	resolution	--decision		22-23a
		--communique		23b-29
CONCLUSION		conciliation	--rhetorical structure	
30-35		from Jerusalem to Antioch	--spatial	"

The structural indicators are fairly clear.[10] The rhetorical elements are as follows: the problem (zētēma--2) which cause dissension (stasis--2) will be resolved in the finale of the episode (paraklēsis--31); the debate (zētēsis), anticipated in v. 2, is reintroduced in v. 7; and the resolution is both indicated by the approval (dokeō + dat.--22) of James' proposal (krinō--19) and communicated in writing (graphō--23). Further, the debate structure consists of alternating narratives and speeches. The spatial elements are equally distinct. While the starting and ending point of the episode is Antioch, thereby underscoring its spatial nature, it should not be overlooked that the impetus for the incident originated in Judaea or, one should say, in Jerusalem.[11] On a strictly linear basis, the structure can be described as follows. The issue emanates from Judaea, is inserted into the non-Palestinian setting of the Gentile mission, and is referred back to its source for a solution. There, after being reformulated by appropriate spokesmen, the issue is debated and resolved. Finally, from Jerusalem comes the remedy for the original disruption. In Acts as in the gospel, Jerusalem bears spatial and rhetorical significance. Not only do all post-crucifixion events occur in or around the holy city, but every impetus, embassy, or ideational thrust, regardless how reluctant or questionable, arises from or is related to Jerusalem. Offically and unoffically, theologically and spatially, Jerusalem is critical for an understanding of Acts 15.[12]

Of added interest are the dynamics operating within the structure outlined above. The term "debate" occurs twice and provides the necessary clue to comprehend the dynamics involved.

a statement (1)	→ a'	statement (5)			
b debate (2a)	→ b'	debate (7a)			
c report: conversion of Gentiles (2b-3)	→ c'	speech: conversion of Gentiles (7b-11)	→ c"	speech & sequel (13f)	
d "what God has done" (4)	→ d'	"what God has done" (12)	→ d"	preaching: God's work (34)	

Each statement introduces a Jewish group making fundamental demands of Gentile converts (a), each of which provokes serious opposition (b). In the first case unauthorized Palestinian teachers meet fierce resistance. There is considerable dissension and debate and so an official resolution of the issue is sought from Jerusalem. In the second case members of the Jerusalem community attempt to formulate missionary policy. There follows considerable debate (note that nothing is said about dissension). In effect, vv. 6-12 address the issue raised by the unauthorized teachers of v. 1 (and to a lesser extent to that voiced by the Pharisees), while James' speech (vv. 13-21) directs its attention to the more fundamental concern of the divine purpose (dei) as it is

revealed in sacred scripture (5). The parallel elements described above, therefore, underscore the problem of this chapter, i.e., the Gentile mission and its relation to Judaism. Further, the two statements function both spatially (v. 1 introduces the issue within Antiochene and v. 5 within Jerusalem contexts) and thematically (first pastoral concerns are addressed and then more theological issues are interjected). V. 1 not only acquaints the reader with the basic issue, but also sets in motion the dialectical process whereby Judaism is revealed both as source and solution of the controversy. V. 5 reiterates the concerns of v. 1 and by its added elements carries the narrative forward and addresses a more fundamental problem. Further, the author underscores the functional significance of the debate. By merely speaking of discussion, rather than providing the contents of the exchange,[13] he chooses instead to direct attention to the speeches of Peter and James which are more closely allied to the resolution than to the discussion of the issue. The speeches, then, are structurally central and their analysis crucial for an understanding of the chapter.

Peter's discourse tackles in fundamental terms the issue of the Gentile mission by restating the import of the Cornelius episode. On a very practical level, Peter insists: there have been Gentile converts; this phenomenon owes to divine initiative (himself as agent); and finally, in the realm of faith, Jew and Gentile are equal. The speech states and justifies anew the conversion and admission of Gentiles into the Christian assembly. Of further significance is the correlation of v. 10 to v. 5 (on the Mosaic law) and of v. 11 to v. 1 (on salvation), i.e., Peter makes a partial response to the two Judaizing statements of the introduction. After Peter's discourse there follows a transitional narrative (12), part (d) of the above schema. While its parallel (4) qualifies "what God has done" by the expression "through them," v. 12 adds "among the Gentiles through them." The latter prepares for the dual character of James' speech: Judaism and the Gentile mission.

The second speech, vv. 13-21, is the centerpoint of the entire chapter. Structurally, it is carefully related to the various parts of the episode. The two statements of vv. 1 and 5 (a) are of special concern to James' speech, especially the latter concerning the Mosaic law.[14] A decisive feature of the dynamics involved is the relationship of the two speeches to the Pharisees' demands; Peter (10) responds in a negative way by countering the false aspect of the statement and James (20-21) in a positive manner by correctly interpreting Moses. The two speeches are intentionally linked by an explicit reference to Peter/Simeon's role in the Cornelius episode (7, 14). Following the pivotal citation from Amos, James makes a proposal which is then approved (22) and expressed in writing (23f), even to the extent of verbatim repetition (29). Finally, as v. 2 emphasizes the nature of the problem (dissension, debate, issue), as the lengthy debate underscores the unanimity of the community, so the concluding sections of the episode stress the resolution (threefold use of dokeō, rejoicing, conciliation, peace).

3) <u>The Divine Purpose</u>

In reading Luke and particularly in following the events of Acts, one becomes increasingly aware of the pervasive theme of the divine purpose.[15] This author, more than any other in the NT, is consumed by this concept which he introduces in a variety of ways: by employing terms expressing necessity, through some type of supernatural intervention (voice from heaven, activity of the Spirit, angels, demons, appearances of the risen Christ, dreams or visions, etc.), by using various temporal expressions or ap-

pealing to the OT and its interpretation. Of particular concern for the present study are the elements in ch. 15 which either introduce or further elaborate the divine purpose as it relates to the Jews and the Gentile mission.

It is universally recognized that dei is Luke's favorite term to express necessity.[16] Its use in 15:5 along with the expressions: "unless you...you cannot..." (1) and "these necessary things" (28--epanagkes) leads one to expect further elaboration of God's purpose as it relates to the issue at hand. The first statement as presented by the unofficial teachers (see 24 for the official disclaimer) is expressly rejected by Peter who insists that salvation for Jew and Gentile comes through faith, not circumcision (11). The statement of the Pharisee believers (5), however, is not so easily dismissed nor its function in ch. 15 very simply stated. They declare: "it is necessary to circumcise them and to command them to keep the law of Moses." Were we to conclude that the Jerusalem church decides upon a "law-free" Gentile mission, then the use of dei in this case would be the only negative one in all of Luke-Acts, i.e., the only occasion on which the author disavows the implications of the expression.[17] Instead, since this statement expands the initial requirements of v. 1 and since the Pharisees are official members of the Jerusalem community and reputed interpreters of the law of Moses, it must be concluded that the author takes seriously the proposal of these Jewish believers and addresses the reader's attention to the resolution of the issue at hand. Moreover, it should be noted that the proposal of James, as approved and communicated by letter to the Antiochene community, is said to consist of "necessary things" (29), ostensibly things required by divine revelation.

Supernatural intervention as a means of expressing the divine purpose permeates Luke and Acts.[18] In Acts 15 the action of God (4, 12) is readily invoked to justify the mission and its Gentile character. Equally significant is the role assigned to the Cornelius episode in the speeches of Peter and James where both speakers underscore the divine initiative (7, 14).[19] Further, Peter recalls the activity of the Holy Spirit as a witness of God's action (8) and lastly, the authoritative letter unambiguously links the "necessary" character of the stipulations and the approval by the church and the Holy Spirit (28).[20]

The use of temporal expressions in relation to the unfolding of the divine will is well known particularly as regards OT citations,[21] in the present case vv. 16 and 18 ("after these things" and "known from the ages"). Other such phrases which will require attention are: "from the early days" (7), "now" (10), "first" (14), and "from early generations" (21). These expressions will receive further elaboration in relation to the Amos citation and the role played by Peter and James in Acts 15.

The last area of concern is Luke's use and interpretation of the OT.[22] First, we must consider the Pharisees and their appeal to the law of Moses in relation to Gentile converts. Whatever may be said regarding their role in the gospel of Luke, the situation is relatively clear in Acts. They are tolerant of, sympathetic to, or members of the Christian community.[23] In the first occurrence of the term "Pharisee" in Acts, Gamaliel is called "a teacher of the law" (5:34). In 15:5, in accordance with this Lukan perspective, even as members of the Christian assembly, they are presented as interpreters of the law. The teachers in Antioch had demanded circumcision; now the Pharisees express the logical conclusion of this requirement: not only circumcision, but also full compliance with the law of Moses. Employing a literary technique similar to that used in Acts 17 where Paul and Athens typify the mission to and the world of the Gentiles,[24] here in Acts 15 Luke

presents the Pharisees and Jerusalem as embodying the law and its Jewish setting.

The part played by Peter is crucial to the dialectical framework of the chapter and fundamental to Luke's point of view.[25] His speech is delineated by two temporal indicators: "from the early/beginning days" (7b) and "now" (10). On a pastoral level Peter counters the demands of the Judaizers by recalling that from the very beginning of the Christian era God had brought about the conversion of the Gentiles, saving them without circumcision and giving them the Holy Spirit as sign of his approval. In the second part of the speech Peter warns against modifying the divine plan by "now" introducing new demands. If God did not require such,[26] how could the assembly "place an added[27] yoke[28] upon the neck of the (Gentile) disciples?" Peter's reasoning is twofold. On the one hand, Israel (past and present) has never been very successful in its observance of the law (10);[29] and on the other, salvation is achieved not by the law (13:39) but "through the grace of the Lord Jesus" (11).

4) The Role of James and the Old Testament

The appearance of the enigmatic James upon the scene is problematic and has occasioned considerable discussion and harmonization of available data.[30] The identity of this individual seems intentionally omitted. That he might be a brother of Jesus, James son of Alphaeus, or some other personnage named James seems of little concern to Luke. Therefore, to relie too readily upon non-Lukan sources in discussing James in Acts is methodologically questionable. Presumably, he appears three times in Acts (12:17; 15:13; 21:18) and it is from these that we must understand his role therein. In all three instances he is located in Jerusalem and linked with its Christian community: the brothers (12), the Jerusalem community (15), and all the elders (21). It seems, therefore, that his role here must be viewed as that of member and perhaps leader of the Jerusalem church. His discourse represents, for Luke, the thinking of that central community, a point of view which is subsequently given official status.

The entire speech would merit detailed analysis; however, it is necessary to focus upon the role played by the OT. After a typical address and call for attention, James presents the theme/context of the discourse (14), an OT citation, and finally, a proposal with a Mosaic justification (19-21).[31] V. 14 establishes the context of the speech by referring to Peter's discourse and the paradigmatic Cornelius episode and formulates the basic twofold theme of the chapter: how God has brought about the salvation of the Gentiles. Both James' statement in v. 14 and the two parts of the Amos citation (16, 17) address themselves to this twofold motif. God's visitation has repeatedly been actualized through Jewish missionaries (3-4, 7, 12), i.e., "rebuilt" Israel (16) and the synagogue (21). As he visited his people Israel through the Jesus event (see Luke 1:68; 7:16), so now through reconstructed Israel he "visits the Gentiles that from among them he might form a people[32] for his name."[33] Amos 9:11-12 is cited because it agrees (symphōneō) with the theme just stated. The prophetic passage is taken from the LXX,[34] but has undergone several modifications.[35] Introductory and concluding temporal formulae are either altered or added;[36] the theologically "loaded" verb anistēmi is eliminated twice and twice substituted by "rebuild;"[37] the expression "I will return" is appended to the citation;[38] and "I will raise up again" (anorthōsō) replaces "I will rebuild."[39] As confirmation of his initial statement James cites Amos to the effect that "from the ages" God had promised that through Israel (hopōs an--17) he would call all men to his name.

The citation functions as the centerpiece of the speech and of the Judaizing controversy. Its relation to other parts of the episode and surrounding chapters is instructive and will be further examined in the concluding part of the paper. Since, however, it is a well-known tendency of this author to write in a cumulative way so that later speeches and narratives amplify earlier themes, it is no surprise that this second Amos quotation should be closely related to the first one (7:42-43) and its context. In 7:39 the people thrust Moses aside and turn in their hearts to Egypt and to idolatry, so that in v. 42 God turns away (strephō: 39, 42) and gives them over to the worship of the host of heaven (there follows the first Amos citation). In 15:16, the author adds to the quotation the statement that God returns (anastrephō) to his people. The occurrence in 14:15 and 15:19 of the related term epistrephō, used of conversion but without losing its spatial imagery (turn to God, from vain things) is noteworthy. The term anoikodomeō of 15:16 reintroduces the earlier theme of house-tabernacle-place, so prominent in ch. 7. The accumulation of detail (rebuild twice, fallen, destroyed parts, setting up straight again) as Cadbury notes,[40] alerts us to the significance of this theme. It is through "rebuilt" Israel (David not Solomon, as in ch. 7) that the Gentiles become a chosen people for his name. The Jews described as builders, in having rejected Jesus the cornerstone (Luke 20:17; Acts 4:11), are here in Acts 15:16 replaced by God himself as rebuilder. No longer does man build a house for God (Acts 7:47, 49), but God rebuilds Israel (under the image of tabernacle of David),[41] that all nations may enter.[42]

The second part of the citation also presents numerous contacts with the surrounding speeches and narratives. The themes of "seeking the Lord" and "calling/the name" will be treated later. The occurrence of the term anthrōpos ("the rest of men") is interesting in light of its double use in 14:11, 15 (Jews state: we are men like you), its use in 15:26, and especially in relation to 17:26 (God has made from one every nation of men).[43] Related to this motif is the use of the term ethnē whose distribution in each part of the episode underscores the import of this theme.

The verses following the citation require particular attention. Inspite of the controversy which obtains regarding the relation of v. 21 to what preceeds, the following parallel provides a key to the problem:

Acts 15	Luke 7 (Centurion's servant)
16f [citation]	6b [opening statement]
19 dio egō krinō	7 dio oude emauton ēxiōsa
mē porenochlein tois...	pros se elthein
20 alla episteilai autois...	alla eipe logō
tou apechesthai...	kai iathētō...
21 Moysēs gar ek....	8 kai gar egō....

Since in the healing episode v. 8 (the centurion as a man of discipline) is the justification of the alla-statement, a similar interpretation would seem required for ch. 15, whereby the stipulations of v. 20 are elucidated by reference to Moses in v. 21. The dynamics of the overall structure, however, suggest a more intricate series of relationships. In light of the opening statement or citation the author, by means of the inferential conjunction dio,[44] introduces double conclusions: the first negative and the second positive. He then validates the crucial alla-statement by a final gar-clause. The last mentioned, therefore, serves as a pointed justification (causal conjunction) for the statement immediately preceeding and, being the final element of both speeches, assumes a special relation to the entire discourse.[45]

James, on the basis of the Amos citation, submits two pro-

posals as solutions for the problem raised by the Judaizers. The first recommends non-interference with the divine plan; Gentiles are turning to God and he is forming a people from their ranks. In effect, v. 19, along with vv. 10, 24, and 28, constitutes a formal rejection of the Judaizing demand that Gentiles become proselytes. The second proposal reveals a deeper and more radical understanding of Moses than that displayed by the believing Pharisees. Since the issue concerns Gentiles, the Mosaic law itself provides the solution; the regulations for resident aliens (Lev 17-18)[46] are invoked by James and approved as necessary by the assembly and the Holy Spirit. The law is not abolished but rather more correctly interpreted.

V. 21, described by Dibelius in terms of context and meaning as "among the most difficult in the New Testament,"[47] requires close attention in light of the structure described earlier. The verse is certainly enigmatic, but coming at the end of James' speech it is intentionally so.[48] It confirms the Mosaic origin of the stipulations, but, owing to its structural cast, relates to the dual theme of James' speech:

For Moses	
-from early generations-in every city has had those who preach him,	(universal mission--17) (by Jewish preachers)
-in the synagogues-on every sabbath being read.	(via Judaism--16) (divine purpose)

This verse then presents some of Luke's most basic concerns: role of Moses, of the Jewish Christian preachers in relation to the Gentile mission, of the synagogues and Jewish assemblies, and of the scriptures. The law of Moses continues to be valid for Jews as Jews and for Gentiles as Gentiles. More important, Moses, as the symbol of divine revelation, "does not pass away" (Luke 16:17); instead, interpreted under the guidance of the Spirit (Acts 15:28), he remains the ultimate revelation of the divine purpose (Luke 24: 44-47; Acts 26:17-18, 20, 23).

5) General Consoderations

In view of the foregoing discussion a reinvestigation of the opinions stated at the beginning is in order. a) The Jews and the Gentile Mission. The schema which sees the rejection of the gospel by the Jews as providing the impetus for the Gentile mission is not supported by a reading of Luke-Acts as a whole. Such a view attempts to impose upon Acts a very doubtful pattern of "rejection/Gentile-mission" by relying on surprisingly few data: the rejections at Antioch, Corinth, and Rome. To do this one must of necessity isolate the three verses (13:46; 18:6; 28:28) from their contexts. Methodologically this is suspect since none of these occur at the conclusion of their respective episodes. A careful reading of the context reveals a more complex situation. It is always stated that some believe and some do not (even the Gentiles of Athens are so divided, 17:32). Further, the rejection scene at Rome must be examined separately since it is different in structure and function from the other passages in question. To understand the theme of rejection in Acts one must examine the synagogue scenes from 13:1 through 19:8 (13 out of 19 occurrences of the term "synagogue" in Acts). In practically every synagogue episode the outcome is negative: expulsion, persecution, or withdrawal. Equally constant are the references to successful missionary activity among Jews and Gentiles. The following pattern emerges: after the rejection at Antioch (13), Paul and Barnabas go directly to the synagogue in Iconium (14); the pattern is interrupted by a scene among Gentiles. Immediately after the "rejection" at Thessalonica (17), Paul and Silas go to the synagogue in Berea and from there (same pattern) to Athens, where the sequence is once again interrupted by a Gentile scene. Finally, after the

rebuff at Corinth (18--and 18 months of teaching) Paul enters the synagogue at Ephesus. There is indeed a pattern of rejection in Acts, but it is not that of "rejection/Gentile-mission." Among these various scenes those of Antioch and Corinth mention specifically a turning or going to the Gentiles. A third episode should be noted, that at Ephesus (19:8-10), where owing to the disbelief and abuse of some, Paul withdraws from the synagogue and teaches two years at the hall of Tyrannus with great sucess among Jews and Greeks. Not accidentally, these three scenes of rejection (chs 13, 18, 19) occur in each of the three journeys of Paul. One should probably relate these passages to persecution scenes throughout Acts whereby a dynamics of expansion and growth is compositionally established.[49] Preaching in the synagogues, in mysterious ways, invariably leads to the Gentiles, as Acts 15 has led us to expect (through Israel salvation for the world).

Jervell's contrary proposal, that the reception of the gospel by repentant Israel preceeds and forms the basis of the Gentile mission, encounters similar objections. While he is correct in emphasizing the significance of mass Jewish conversions throughout Acts, his insistence upon the prior nature of the mission to the Jews and upon the incorporation of Gentiles as an associate people within repentant Israel is questionable at best. The theme "Israel first" is only partly temporal. The gospel is announced first to the Jews and of course early Christians were principally Jewish; however, this theme must be related to that of <u>how</u> salvation comes to the Nations. It is the Jewish character and medium of salvation which is of fundamental importance here (also Acts 3:25-26). Further, his concept of the church as a "new" Israel consisting of repentant Jews and believing Gentiles rests upon very debatable and selective evidence[50] and too great a desire for continuity in salvation history. His thesis of an Israel split by Christian preaching into repentant and irrevocably unrepentant groups represents an oversimplification of the evidence. Missionary scenes among the Jews (and Gentiles) invariably speak of believers and unbelievers, also in Rome, but without establishing these into distinct groups. Jewish opinion in Acts regarding Christianity is divided; nonetheless, the institutionalization of this disagreement is unwarranted. Besides, even in the rejection of the gospel, Israel continues to be called <u>laos</u> (Acts 28:26-27), while converted Gentiles also constitute a <u>laos</u> (15:14). The relationship of Judaism to Christianity is considerably more complex and less defined than Jervell would have it. Neither rejection nor acceptance of the gospel is a negligible factor in Luke's scheme of things, but instead of viewing these as major agents of salvation, it is preferable to see them as facets of the gradual unfolding of the divine plan, unmistakably revealed in the sacred scriptures.

b) The Mission to the Jews in Acts and to the Gentiles in Luke. In view of Acts 15:21 regarding Moses as preached and read and of Luke 16:31 concerning the role played by Moses and the prophets in the understanding of the resurrection, it is hard to reconcile the often repeated conclusion that Israel as a group has been rejected for all times and the mission to it terminated. Such a thesis robs Acts 5:31 of its meaning since "God exalted [Jesus] at his right hand...to give repentance to Israel." Even Paul arrives in Rome in chains "because of the hope of Israel" (28:20) and there "tries to convince them about Jesus both from Moses and from the prophets" (23). Just as sight is a divine gift (Luke 8:10; 24:16, 30) especially related to an understanding of the scriptures (Luke 24:45; often in Acts--under the inspiration of the Spirit),[51] so is blindness the result of divine intervention (Luke 9:45; 18:34; 24:16) and foretold by the same scriptures. Acts 28:26-28 dwells upon this motif: the reaction of the

Jews (blindness) was foreannounced in Isa 6:9-10, while that of the Gentiles (listening) was foretold in Ezek 3:6: "If to such [people of foreign speech] I were to send you, they would listen to you."[52] Luke reflects the situation of his time. He knows that the mission to the Jews was a mixed success (see Simeon's prophecy: "this child is set for the fall and rising of many in Israel," Luke 2:34) and is at a stalemate; however, in his composition he is careful to note that the mission to Israel is open-ended.[53] This is demonstrated by the inclusio of Acts 28:23 (testifying to the kingdom of God, about Jesus, from Moses and the prophets) and 28:30-31 (welcoming all, preaching the kingdom of God, teaching about Jesus Christ). The ears of God's people are closed and their eyes are blind, but as long as they have Moses and the prophets the mission remains possible. Besides, it is the obligation of the Christian missionary (Paul) to preach Moses (Acts 15:21--note particularly the term kerysso, also used in 28:31) and thereby to open the eyes of both Jew and Gentile (Acts 26:17-18, 22-23).

While it is true that Luke avoids undisguised treatment of the Gentile mission in the gospel for historical reasons,[54] it would be misleading to overemphasize this point since this would constitute a misunderstanding of Hellenistic historiography[55] and Luke's view of mission. From the beginning of the gospel, as early as the prophetic speech of Simeon, the missions to Israel and to the Nations are interrelated as the divine purpose is revealed, particularly by appealing to the OT, and actualized through the life and mission of Jesus and that of the early church.[56] The salvation, which has brought forth the visitation of God to Israel (Luke 1:68-69) and was promised to all flesh (3:6), has also brought about a visitation to the Gentiles (Acts 15:14). While this same salvation finds a ready acceptance among the Nations (Acts 28:28), it remains the hope of Israel (28:20).

c) The historical Character of the Jerusalem Episode. To view Acts 15 as Gentile freedom from the law is to misunderstand the purpose of the episode or, in quest of the historical event, to "second guess" the author and his traditions. If the analysis of the present study is correct then the opposite obtains; the law, according to Luke, remains valid both for Jewish and Gentile Christians.[57] Moses, properly interpreted, prepares for and has his part to play within the community as Christian revelation.

A "once and for all" view of Acts 15 misrepresents the fundamental nature of Acts. The author's view of early Christianity is intimately related to the medium he chose for the presentation of his vision. Acts is episodic in character and must be read as a dynamic, dramatic whole, allowing its various parts, characters, and themes to speak as the occasion requires.[58] The Gentile mission is presented in a series of incomplete, sequential events. The Cornelius episode already points to the world mission (10-11), as do the sequel to the Antioch speech (13), and the encounter with the Lycaonians (14). After the Jerusalem meeting the author pursues this theme in a more formal way in the Athenian speech (17), and concludes the entire book on the same theme (28). Beyond this, the Stephen and Philip episodes (6-8) as well as the conversion of Paul (9) set in motion the mission, by Jewish missionaries, announced in 1:8, and so often foreshadowed in Luke.[59] Finally, Acts 15, with its Jerusalem-Antioch setting, lends particular attention to the Jewish character of that mission and the ramifications of this for Jewish-Gentile relations.[60]

The citation of Amos 9:11-12 is pivotal in this regard. It allows the author to reintroduce his earlier statements on the role of Israel in relation to the Christian reality (chs 5, 7, 13). The citation also allows him to interconnect several themes

involving the Gentiles. The phrase "seeking the Lord" fits well into the pattern established within the principal Gentile episodes: the Ethiopian eunuch who desires understanding (18), Cornelius' openness to God (10), the Lycaonians who are anxious to see gods (14), and the Athenians who see, feel for, and find God (17). The saying of Luke 11:9, therefore, applies also to the Gentiles: "seek and you will find, knock and it will be opened" (even the gift of the Holy Spirit is forthcoming, v. 13). Also, the expression "all the nations upon whom my name has been called" relates to v. 14 and to the interesting passage of 14:12 where the Lycaonians call Barnabas and Paul by the names of Zeus and Hermes. Like the Jews of Acts 2:21 (citation of Joel), the Lycaonians call upon the name of God (gods) but in reality they are called by him. The theme of divine election leads the author to stress further the divine purpose by the expansion: "made known from the ages." Further, by the addition within the quotation of "I will return" not only does he express God's presence among the Jews but highlights the numerous contacts of God with the Nations: God did not leave himself without witness (14:17); the Gentiles expect or imagine that the gods visit them (14:11); God visits the Gentiles to acquire a people (15:14); and finally, he is not far from the nations of men (17:27).

This chapter of Acts, therefore, by its carefully chosen list of characters, geographical considerations, constant interaction of speech and narrative, the interweaving of motifs, the foreshadowing and recalling of episodes and themes, and the conscious use and interpretation of the OT, should warn us that at no single point does the author speak either definitively or in his own name. While Acts 15 plays an important part in establishing the author's view of Israel's role in the world-wide mission, it must be remembered that it is but a part and that only the whole represents his vision.[61]

As the mission to Israel has been but a partial success so the heritage from Judaism has been but a mixed blessing.[62] While other chapters of Luke-Acts dwell upon various aspects of this heritage (e.g., Luke 11; Acts 7, 13, 26), Acts 15 makes its own special contribution to our understanding of the author's point of view. In a skillfully presented episode Luke attempts to clarify the relationship between the Jewish "mother" church and the Gentile community. What begins as an effort to assimilate Gentile Christianity within Judaism, through a dialectical process, not only arrives at a modus vivendi between the two groups (the stipulations), but succeeds in examining the fundamental role which Judaism plays within the world-wide mission.[63]

NOTES

1 L. Cerfaux, "Le chapitre XVe du Livre des Actes à la lumière de la littérature ancienne," Recueil Lucien Cerfaux: études d'exégèse et d'histoire religieuse (Gembloux: Duculot, 1954) 2: 104-24.

2 Among others, see: M. Dibelius, Studies in the Acts of the Apostles (London: SCM, 1956) 93-101; W. Schmithals, Paul and James (London: SCM, 1965) 38-62, 97-102; J.C. O'Neill, The Theology of Acts in Its Historical Setting (London: SPCK, 1970) 100-33; E. Haenchen, The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 440-72; S.G. Wilson, The Gentiles and the Gentile Mission in Luke-Acts (Cambridge: UP, 1973) 171-95; T. Holtz, "Die Bedeutung des Apostelkonzils für Paulus," NovT 16 (1974) 110-48; A. Strobel, "Das Aposteldekret in Galatien: Zur Situation von Gal I und II," NTS 20 (1974) 177-90; M. Hengel, Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979)

111-26.

3 In his excellent article, "Le salut des Gentils et la signification théologique du Livre des Actes," NTS 6 (1959-60) 155, Dupont states: "en composant les Actes, Luc a voulu montrer comment...la prédication apostolique s'est tournée vers le monde païens." In effect, his analysis has shown that the gospel reached the Gentile world; the present study will attempt to demonstrate how, according to Luke, this occurred.

4 Wilson, Gentiles, 227. Confer: F. Hahn, Mission in the New Testament (London: SCM, 1965) 134; Schmithals, Paul and James, 57; G. Bornkamm, "The Missionary Stance of Paul in 1 Corinthians 9 and in Acts," ed. L.E. Keck & J.L. Martyn, Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays in Honor of Paul Schubert (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966) 200-1; Haenchen, Acts, 100-1; H. Conzelmann, Die Apostelgeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972) 78; U. Wilckens, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte (Neukirchen: GMBH, 1974) 50, 70.

5 Luke and the People of God: A New Look at Luke-Acts (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972) 43. Cf. O'Neill, Theology, 76 and L. Gaston, No Stone on Another: Studies in the Significance of the Fall of Jerusalem in the Synoptic Gospels (Leiden: Brill, 1970) 310, 368.

6 Most scholars listed in n 4. See also I.H. Marshall, Luke Historian and Theologian (Grand Rapids: Zandervan, 1970) 186-87 and Jervell, Luke, 64.

7 N.Q. King, "The 'Universalism' of the Third Gospel," Studia Evangelica (TU 73; Berlin: Akademie, 1959) 199-205; H. Conzelmann, The Theology of St. Luke (New York: Harper & Row, 1961) 207-34.

8 Wilson, Gentiles, 178.

9 Haenchen, Acts, 100, 440-72; H. Flender, St Luke: Theologian of Redemptive History (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967) 15; J. J. Kilgallen, "Acts: Literary and Theological Turning Points," BTB 7 (1977) 178.

10 See S.A. Panimolle, Il discorso di Pietro all' assemblea apostolica (Bologna: Dehoniane, 1976) 175-98, especially 176-77.

11 In Acts one can "go down" (katerchomai) from Jerusalem (8:5; 9:32?; 11:27; 15:30; 18:22?) as well as from Judaea (12:9; 15:1; 21:10) with no apparent difference in meaning. Besides, from Acts 15:24 we must conclude that Jerusalem is meant; see the interesting interchange of Jerusalem and Judaea in 11:1-2.

12 On the importance of Jerusalem: Conzelmann, Theology, 73-94; H.H. Oliver, "The Lucan Birth Stories and the Purpose of Luke-Acts," NTS 10 (1963-64) 220-21; E. Lohse, TDNT 7:331-36.

13 Dibelius, Studies, 95-96, expresses surprise at the minor role played by Paul (and Barnabas) in this episode. One expects this only in light of Gal 2.

14 The name of Moses appears three times in ch. 15: vv. 1, 5, 21. Note too that v. 3 speaks of the conversion/turning (epistrophē) of the Gentiles and v. 19 of the Gentiles who are turning to God (epistrephō).

15 Conzelmann, Theology, 149-69; Jervell, Luke, 202. Note that C.H. Talbert does not list the divine purpose among his alternative purposes of Luke-Acts, Luke and the Gnostics: An Examination of the Lucan Purpose (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966) 98-110, not even P. Schubert's "proof from prophecy"; see "The Structure and Significance of Luke 24," Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1954). But confer F. O'Toole,

"Why Did Luke Write Acts (Lk-Acts)?" BTB 7 (1977) 73.

16 With H.J. Cadbury, The Making of Luke-Acts (New York: Macmillan, 1927) 303-6, it is preferable to speak of "must" rather than "shall" when discussing Luke's use of scripture and other devices to express the divine purpose. Prophecy/fulfillment terminology is avoided, therefore, as misleading; cf. Schubert, "Luke," 172, n 18. On dei confer W. Grundmann, TDNT 2:22-24.

17 Luke 13:14 ("there are six days on which one ought to work") presents a situation similar to Acts 15:5. Jewish interpreters of Moses cite the law in protest. Jesus does not deny the truth of the statement; instead he justifies a certain kind of work on the seventh day. So too in Acts 15, the law of Moses is not denigrated but interpreted correctly by James.

18 On visions, voices, and angels in divine manifestations, confer T.Y. Mullins, "New Testament Commission Forms, Especially in Luke-Acts," JBL 95 (1976) 603-14 and B.J. Hubbard, "The Role of Commissioning Accounts in Acts," ed. C. H. Talbert, Perspectives on Luke-Acts (Danville: ABPR, 1978) 187-98.

19 With these references to the Cornelius episode the audience and reader are subtly reminded of the various elements of supernatural intervention that occurred on that occasion: visions, angel, heavenly conversation, and the coming of the Spirit; cf. J. Dupont, "Les discours de Pierre dans les Actes et le chapitre XXIV de l'évangile de Luc," ed. F. Neirynck, L'évangile de Luc: problèmes littéraires et théologiques: mémorial Lucien Cerfaux (Gembloux: Duculot, 1973) 366.

20 E. Schweizer, TDNT 6:407-9, rightly emphasizes the importance for Luke of visible manifestations.

21 This phenomenon is aptly described by Cadbury, Making of Luke-Acts, 305, as the "divine schedule."

22 Whether appeal should be made to "die lukanische LXX-Mimesis" of E. Plümacher, Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller: Studien zur Apostelgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972) 67, remains to be seen. For an excellent survey of recent scholarship on Luke's use and interpretation of the OT, see F. Bovon, Luc le théologien: vingt-cinq ans de recherches (1950-1975) (Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1978) 89-117.

23 O'Toole, "Why Did Luke Write," 67, concludes: "...Luke holds that Christians are the true Pharisees;" confer also his study, Acts 26: The Christological Climax of Paul's Defense (Ac 22:1-26:32) (Rome: BIP, 1978) 41-44, 159-60.

24 Dupont, "Salut des Gentils," 152-54; Haenchen, Acts, 517; H. Conzelmann, "The Address of Paul on the Areopagus," Keck-Martyn, Studies, 218; Wilson, Gentiles, 196.

25 Panimolle, Discorso, 237-65; Dupont, "Salut des Gentils," 146-49; id., "Discours de Pierre," 365-71.

26 The expression "put God on trial" is taken from the OT (Exod 17:2; Deut 6:16) and "seems to mean acting against the declared will of God;" see K. Lake & H.J. Cadbury, The Acts of the Apostles, vol. 4 of The Beginnings of Christianity, ed. F. Foakes Jackson & K. Lake (London: Macmillan & Co., 1920-33) 173 (future references = Beg.); Arndt-Gingrich-Danker, Greek-English Lexicon, 640. Besides, it should be interpreted in light of Peter's statement at the end of the Cornelius episode: "who was I that I could forbid/hinder God?" Acts 11:17.

27 Epitithēmi epi should not be translated "put or place upon" but "add or place an added (burden) upon" (Arndt-Gingrich-

Danker, Greek-English Lexicon, 302-3.1b--example given: Rev 22: 18). See also J.H. Moulton & G. Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament Illustrated from the Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1930/74) 248 and more particularly the parallel of Acts 15:28: "to lay no further burden upon" (mēden pleon epitithesthai hymin baros) where epi disappears and the meaning made clearer by the addition of pleon (note that the Greek idiom for "placing a yoke upon" is epitithēmi tini zyga). F.F. Bruce, The Acts of the Apostles (London: Tyndale, 1962) 293, is correct when he states: "to impose conditions in addition to the one that satisfied God would be 'tempting' Him." The emphasis then is on added not on burden.

28 The law as a "yoke" clearly is a positive concept in Judaism of the NT period (Lake-Cadbury, Beq. 4:173-74) and its description here as a "burden" (see parallel in v. 28 = baros) probably represents "lexical slippage" from the figurative back to the literal meaning; for another example, see Acts 13:11 where "not to see the sun" is equated with blindness; confer E. Richard, "'The Old Testament in Acts': Wilcox's Semitisms in Retrospect," CBQ 42, 3 (1980) #2.

29 Haenchen, Acts, 446, states of this passage: "the law is in any case impossible of fulfillment." This is hard to believe since there is no other such statement in Luke-Acts. "To carry/bear a yoke" seems natural enough, but does ouk ischyō mean "to not be able" in the sense of "to be impossible?" Commenting on the papyri, Moulton-Milligan, Vocabulary, 308, state: "The ordinary sense 'to be able,' without the connotation of strength, may be seen early in..."--examples from the third centuries B.C. through the third A.D. are given. Further, one should relate this passage to Acts 7:53: "you received the law...and did not keep it." Thus, in the present case, we should read: "which neither our fathers nor we succeeded in bearing."

30 See J. Munck's severe critique of the Tübingen legacy, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind (Richmond: Knox, 1959) 69-86.

31 The above divisions correspond to E. Schweizer's following categories: a) address, b) appeal for attention, c) misunderstanding > theme/context, d) quotation from scripture, g) reply to misunderstanding > proposal, h) call to repentance = Gentiles turning to God (v. 19b), and i) message focused upon the particular audience = decree and its Mosaic justification; see "Concerning the Speeches in Acts," Keck-Martyn, Studies, 208-10 and E. Richard, Acts 6:1-8:4: The Author's Method of Composition (Missoula: Scholars, 1978) 254-60.

32 Usually laos in Luke-Acts designates the Jewish populace, although it frequently has the meaning "chosen people or people of God." In the first instance it always refers to Jews, while in the second its range is extended to include Christians or people destined to become such (Acts 18:10) and by further extension to include those among the Gentiles who will become Christian (Acts 15:14). It would also seem that the plural laoi of Luke 2:31-32, referring to both Gentiles and Jews, should be thus explained. See the discussions of N.A. Dahl, "A People for His Name (Acts XV.14)," NTS 4 (1957-58) 324-25; Haenchen, Acts, 535; and H. Strathmann, TDNT 4:29-35, 50-57.

33 That Acts 15:14 is a creation of the author of Acts with a certain "couleur biblique," as Dupont suggests, is correct, "LAOS EX ETHNŌN (Acts XV.14)" NTS 3 (1956-57) 48-49, but that it is a citation of a LXX text (Deut 7:6 or 14:2) is too conjectural to be convincing. At the same time, Dahl's contention, "A People for His Name," 327, that the phrase is a targumic expression de-

riving from Zech 2:15 and therefore "must have roots which go back to early Jewish Christianity," is based on inadmissible linguistic evidence. His targumic data are now supplemented by abundant evidence from Neofiti I. My conclusion, after examination of the expression "for my/the Lord's name," is that it is in fact a mark of late Aramaic (post-200 A.D.), whereby lšm regularly replaces l- with God as object (see, e.g., Tg. Neof. Lev. where lyhwh is normally rendered lsmh dyyy). Luke employs the expression "the name" so often that appeal to such late sources is unwarranted.

34 The theory of dependence upon the Hebrew text or upon some type of testimonium has often been proposed; most recently, M. Wilcox, The Semitisms of Acts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965) 49; Gaston, No Stone on Another, 200-4; R. Hodgson, "The Testimony Hypothesis," JBL 98 (1979) 368-69; R.F. Zehnle, Peter's Pentecost Discourse: Tradition and Lukan Reinterpretation in Peter's Speeches of Acts 2 and 3 (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971) 29-31. See Richard, "The Old Testament in Acts," #23 and Dupont, "LAOS EX ETHNON," 47.

35 Contra T. Holtz's theory that the first half of the citation, owing to its differences from the LXX, derives from Judaizing Christians, while the second half was later added by the author to support his concept of the Gentile mission, Untersuchungen über die alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Lukas (Berlin: Akademie, 1968) 21-27. Equally unacceptable is O'Neill's proposal concerning Acts 15:16 that it is "a free and independent translation from the Hebrew" which was later partly "corrected" by reference to the LXX, Theology, 122-23.

36 Meta tauta, a favorite expression of this author and one which he omitted in his citation of Joel 3:1 (= Acts 2:17), is here considered more appropriate. At the same time, the ending of the Amos quotation leads him to a similar passage in Isa 45:21. Since both formulae are standard prophetic phrases, the observation of Lake-Cadbury, Beg. 4:176, is apropos: the author "rounds out his Biblical quotations in Biblical style."

37 The transitive use of anistēmi (9 occurrences in Acts--14 in entire NT) is reserved by Luke for the resurrection of Jesus (6 times). On three occasions this construction involves the citation of Deut 18:15 (raising up a prophet like Moses).

38 As there is a visitation of the Gentiles (15:14--contrast 14:11-18), so God returns to his people Israel, so that the Gentiles may turn to him (anastrephō and epistrephō).

39 Anorthoō, only here in Acts, is employed to underscore the raising up once more (ana-) of fallen Israel, as a contrast to the raising up (orthos--only there in Acts) of a Gentile cripple from birth, 14:8, 10.

40 Making of Luke-Acts, 35-36. See further: Dupont, "Salut des Gentils," 151-52; H.J. Cadbury, "Four Features of Lucan Style," Keck-Martyn, Studies, 88-102.

41 The skēnē of Acts 15:16 (= Amos 9:11) recalls the skēnōma of 7:46 (= Ps 131:5)--both favorably associated with David. On the role of David, see Richard, Acts 6:1-8:4, 337-38 and E. Lohse, TDNT 8:482-87.

42 See the intriguing image of 14:27: "they declared...how [God] had opened a door of faith to the Gentiles."

43 Note also Acts 10:26. On the theme of the two Adams, see M. Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason in Paul's Epistles," NTS 4 (1957-58) 95 and Dupont, "Salut des Gentils," 154.

44 Note that the underlined passage is peculiar to Luke (not in Matthew) and therefore owes to Lukan editing.

45 The author has a penchant for concluding speeches with pithy statements or citations with carefully chosen endings (so Dupont, "Salut des Gentils," 136, who calls Luke's introductions and conclusions "endroits privilégiés"). Note that for the healing episode (Luke 7:1-10) the centurion's statement in v. 8 provides the rationale for the entire story (the opening declaration, the alla-statement, and also Jesus' reaction in v. 9). Other examples of this construction are found in Luke 1:35f; Acts 25:26f; 27:25f, 34f.

46 So Haenchen, Acts, 450-51 and most recent commentaries.

47 Studies, 97.

48 In a structure comparable to the one under discussion, note Gabriel's final statement which seeks to justify all that preceeds: "For with God nothing will be impossible," Luke 1:37.

49 The persecution resulting from the Stephen episode is a good example of this process (a fact referred to several times in Acts). The rejection episodes seem to serve different functions in the narrative of Acts. 13:51 (shaking off the dust from the feet and departure) must be viewed as an enactment of Luke 9:5. This episode also signals an increased concern for the Gentile mission (ch. 14) with no change in missionary proceedure. Acts 18:6-11, which should be studied with an eye on Luke 10:10-12, points to a new type of missionary approach (see the ending of the episode). 19:8-10, in presenting Paul as separating from the synagogue and moving to a public forum, also breaks new ground (note especially the following "civic" episodes). One can only infer that the complexity of Luke's traditions and vision required a multiplicity of compositional devices. For interesting attempts to balance these rejection texts with equally important acceptance passages, see L.T. Johnson, The Literary Function of Possessions in Luke-Acts (Missoula: Scholars, 1977) 54-58 and E. Franklin, Christ the Lord: A Study in the Purpose and Theology of Luke-Acts (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975) 113-15.

50 Jervell, Luke, 44-49, 53-55, 62-64, 147. See Wilson, Gentiles, 227-33 and M. Moscato, "A Critique of Jervell's Luke and the People of God," SBL Seminar Papers 1975 (Missoula: Scholars, 1975) 2:161-68, for extended criticism of Jervell's proposals.

51 On the concept of sight, particularly "to open the eyes" (Acts 26:18), confer O'Toole, Acts 26, 70-81.

52 Both reactions were foreshadowed in Luke 4:14-30; see D. R. Miesner, "The Circumferential Speeches of Luke-Acts: Patterns and Purpose," SBL Seminar Papers 1978 (Missoula: Scholars, 1978) 2:223-37; the parallels between Luke 4 and Acts 28 are compelling but the conclusion less so.

53 So also Franklin, Christ the Lord, 78.

54 Wilson, Gentiles, 229 and Franklin, Christ the Lord, 122.

55 Cadbury, Making of Luke-Acts, 184-209; id., "The Speeches in Acts," Beg. 5:402-27; id. & Editors, "The Greek and Jewish Traditions of Writing History," Beg. 2:7-29; M. Dibelius, "The Speeches in Acts and Ancient Historiography," Studies, 138-85; Schweizer, "Concerning the Speeches," 186-93; C.K. Barrett, Luke the Historian in Recent Study (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970); C.H. Talbert, Literary Patterns, Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts (Missoula: Scholars, 1974); V.K. Robbins, "By Land and by Sea: The We-Passages and Ancient Sea Voyages," Talbert, Perspectives, 215-42; W.S. Kurz, "Hellenistic Rhetoric in the Chris-

tological Proof in Luke-Acts," CBQ 42 (1980) 171-95.

56 Hahn, Mission, 128-32, 136; Oliver, "Lucan Birth Stories," 215-26; Jervell, Luke, 56; Franklin, Christ the Lord, 119-24; Dupont, "Salut des Gentils," 139, 141 (critique of King, 138, n 2); and P.S. Minear, "Luke's Use of the Birth Stories," Keck-Martyn, Studies, 111-30 (contra Conzelmann).

57 So also Jervell, Luke, 144 and Franklin, Christ the Lord, 125; contra: Conzelmann, Theology, 145-49, 211-13 and S.G. Wilson, Luke and the Pastoral Epistles (London: SPCK, 1979) 96-97. Others allow that the law remains valid for Jewish Christians, e.g., P. Vielhauer, "On the 'Paulinism' of Acts," Keck-Martyn, Studies, 41.

58 Cadbury, Making of Luke-Acts, 302 and C.K. Barrett, Paul's Speech on the Areopagus," ed. M.E. Glasswell & F.W. Fashole-Luke, New Testament Christianity for Africa and the World: Essays in Honour of Harry Sawyerr (London: SPCK, 1974) 69-77.

59 Hahn, Mission, 128-36. On Luke's "forward and backward" technique as literary and theological device, see Schubert, "Luke 24," 185.

60 Mention should be made of the interesting proposal of L. C. Crockett, "Luke 4:25-26 and Jewish-Gentile Relations in Luke-Acts," JBL 88 (1969) 183, that as early as the Nazareth episode "Luke's use of the OT was dominated by the Jewish-gentile question."

61 On reading Luke-Acts as a whole, see the observations of W.C. van Unnik, "The 'Book of Acts' the Confirmation of the Gospel," NovT 4 (1960) 34-38; Barrett, "Paul's Speech on the Areopagus," 69-71; Cadbury, Making of Luke-Acts, 299-316.

62 E.Richard, "The Polemical Character of the Joseph Episode in Acts 7," JBL 98 (1979) 262-67; id., Acts 6:1-8:4, 319-52.

63 For a convenient analysis of major views on "Israël et l'Eglise: Mission et Extension," consult Bovon, Luc le théologien, 342-61.

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LUKE-ACTS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE GREEK BIBLE

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I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars commonly recognize that the author to Theophilus (henceforth Luke) locates his Gospel narrative within the context of contemporary world history (Luke 1:5, 2:1-2, esp. 3:1-2). Less universally noticed is how Luke also locates his narrative within the biblically described history of the world from Adam to the judgment Day of the Lord. The focus of his first LOGOS (Acts 1:1) is of course the story of Jesus, of the second that of the spread of the Word through Jesus' witnesses till its rejection by many of the Jews at Rome in Acts 28. But just as one of Luke's concerns was to relate these accounts to contemporary history and to show that they did not take place "in a corner" (Acts 26:26), another was to ground them in God's past work in history and his promised future consummation on the Day of the Lord.

Some of the methods of so situating his story within the sweep from ancient to future history were available to Luke in profane Hellenistic narrative and historiography. But the "time line" on which Luke placed his two-fold LOGOS was conceived in a specifically religious way, that in the Bible. This line began with Adam and ended with the biblical Day of the Lord. In addition, the Greek Bible which Luke so extensively quoted and used already contained a variety of genres of narrative, almost all of them focussed on God's action for his people through chosen individuals, in ways very similar to those found throughout Luke-Acts. It also contained most of the historiographical conventions and motifs found in Luke-Acts. It therefore seems reasonable to investigate the Greek Bible as a probable source for many of the narrative techniques in Luke-Acts.

This article will select from narrative forms and approaches found in the Greek Bible some that were used by Luke to situate his account within the broader scope of religious history, specifically the history of God's dealings with his chosen people. It is submitted as a part of the dialogue on the "Jewish connections of Luke-Acts" and as a contribution to the on-going discussion on the genre of Luke-Acts.[1] Page limitations prevent it from attempting a full answer to the genre question. It is meant rather to describe evidence that needs to be considered in genre discussions.

Three important narrative forms and approaches for locating Luke's account on a "biblical time line" are genealogies, summaries of OT history in speeches, and the use of the Testament or farewell address to describe "future history" that extends beyond the last narrated event in the main story (Acts 28).

Thus the genealogy of Jesus in Luke 3 shows Jesus' roots in, and continuity with, the fathers of the people back to "Adam son of God." In the Acts speeches, the summaries of OT history are commonly understood as a way to show the connection between the events in Luke-Acts, and God's past promises and prophecies to his people. Similarly, the testaments and prophecies about the future, found in the mouths of Jesus and

Paul, enable Luke to include a description of events which take place after the activity of Paul which he describes in his last chapter. These include Paul's death, the destruction of Jerusalem, the rise of false teachers and persecution, cosmic cataclysms, and Jesus' return as Son of Man. These three devices enable Luke to mention the whole history of God's dealings with his people from Adam to the final day.

Space does not permit more than a mere mention of the contents of the whole time line here. This article will concentrate on that part of the time line covered by the genealogy. OT surveys of the past, and testament-like prophecies of the future, are being developed in other articles. But for some sense of the entire time line, here is a brief introductory sketch.

Luke begins his time line at the very beginning - Adam's origin from God. He grounds the whole genealogy, a synopsis of all of human history, in God's action. The genealogy from Adam to Abraham is based on biblical genealogies and has no surprises. The list of names provides a quick review of whatever is known from biblical tradition about the pre-patriarchial "history" of humanity. In a similar way the names from Abraham to David come from the Bible, but for this period he supplements the bare list of names with his OT surveys in Acts speeches.

After David the situation changes drastically. Except for David's son Nathan and for Zerubabel son of Salathiel none of Luke's names are obviously biblical.[2] Whether or not Luke is averting to a later Jewish identification of Nathan son of David with Nathan the prophet to David,[3] he is clearly avoiding the Davidic lineage through the reigning kings of Judah. He has deliberately chosen other "sons of David" for Jesus' Davidic ancestry, sons who never became king, and consequently were never the subject of the curses against the unfaithful kings found in the Deuteronomic history, Jeremiah, (esp. Jer 22:24-30 and 36:30-31), and later biblical books. Therefore, as far as the biblical story goes, there is a gap between Nathan son of David to Joseph Mary's husband. Two strange exceptions are Zerubabel and Salathiel, who are listed as descendants of someone other than the king Jehoiakim, who was cursed by Jeremiah from ever having a descendant on the throne.

Similar gaps from David to Jesus and the Baptist occur in the OT surveys in Acts 7 and 13, which when seen in light of Luke's theme of exalting the lowly and humbling the exalted, seems to imply a statement by Luke that God was preparing a Messiah more through unknown little people than through most of the public figures of the post-Davidic era, such as the unfaithful royal line and Hasmonean-Herodian leadership.

The Acts surveys of the OT relate Jesus not only to his Davidic ancestor but to others who played saving roles in God's people, and delineate epochs in the history of God's dealings with his people. The epochs are demarcated in terms of promise and fulfillment. Thus Acts 7 highlights Abraham, Joseph and Moses so as to portray Joseph and Moses as fulfilling promises to Abraham.[4] The promise that Abraham's descendants would worship in the promised land (Acts 7:7) is not fulfilled in (either) Temple but with Jesus (Luke 1:73-75). The prophecy of the twice-rejected Moses, that God would raise up a prophet like himself, is fulfilled in the twice-rejected Jesus (Acts 7:37 citing Deut 18:15).[5]

Acts 13 also emphasizes fulfillment of God's promises to the fathers (Acts 13:23 & 32), ultimately with Jesus' resurrection and the consequent forgiveness of sins (13:32-39). The survey divides history into epochs (450 years in 13:20) of the rescue from Egypt and gift of the land, the time of the judges till Samuel the prophet, Saul's 40 years and replacement by the obedient David. "From this man's seed according to promise he (God) brought for Israel a savior Jesus (13:23).

Together, the OT surveys in Acts 7 and 13 complement each other and divide the history of God's dealings with his people into epochs marked by promise/prophecies and fulfillment, with even rejections of his plan subsumed by God to fulfill it. This is obviously a very helpful interpretive framework for Luke's account of the rejection, death, resurrection and followers of Jesus the Savior.

Since Luke's account ends with Paul in Rome in the early 60's, there remained the task of filling out the "biblical time line" from the early 60's to the final Day of the Lord, the ultimate consummation of God's saving plan and public vindication of Jesus as Son of Man and eschatological judge. For this "future history" (future in terms of the limits of Acts) Luke found in his Greek Bible frequent examples of the testament or farewell address and similar kinds of prophecies of the (eschatological) future. Three important instances in Luke-Acts are Luke 21, Luke 22, and Acts 20.

Luke 21 divides the coming time into at least three stages: a time of persecution of Christians (partially fulfilled in Acts), the destruction of Jerusalem (fulfilled between the 60's of Acts and Luke's writing)[6] and "times of the Gentiles" (21:24, the time in which Luke is living), and the final stage of the cosmic signs and return of the Son of Man in power (the only stage still to come at the time of Luke's writing). That Luke did not expect this to be centuries away is indicated by the urgency in Luke 17 and especially 18:1-8, where his readers are told in a parable to pray to hasten "the vengeance for his elect." They are assured that if they pray day and night for this, God will vindicate them EN TACHEI (18:7-8, cf. Acts 3:20).[7]

More clearly portrayed by Luke as Jesus' last testament is Luke 22:15-38. In addition to the important Eucharistic material, Luke has gathered here sayings which Mark and Matthew had placed earlier in their Gospels (Who is the greatest? Be as servant), and some material peculiar to him. The last is most clearly testamental. As Jesus' last words, he notes his disciples' fidelity to him, "and I DIATITHEMAI to you a kingdom, as my Father DIETHETO to me" (22:28-29, cf. the covenant language in the Eucharistic words, 22:20). Promises follow that the Twelve will sit on thrones judging the twelve eschatological tribes of Israel (the ten tribes considered lost in Luke's day would have to be eschatologically restored to make up the promised "twelve tribes").

The next of Jesus' final promises are for Simon: though Satan will sift him like wheat (his three-fold denial), Jesus has prayed for him that his faith not fail, so that after his fall and repentance he will strengthen his brethren (fulfilled in the rest of the Gospel and Acts 1-2).

Finally come changed instructions for the coming new stress (22:35-38), ending with the ironic, "it is enough."

The testament of Paul in Acts 20:17-38 provides one last set of "future" events to be put on Luke's time line after Paul's imprisonment in Acts 28. In a form clearly modelled after a dying patriarch's testament, Paul sends for the Ephesian elders and speaks his final words to them (Acts 20:17-18). After the usual declarations of "mission fulfilled" among them, Paul predicts his imprisonment and trials (fulfilled in the rest of Acts) and the finish of his race and task as witness (20:18-24; Paul's death is fulfilled before Luke writes).

None of them would see Paul again (20:25-27). After his death they are to be alert against wolves who will attack the flock. Even fellow elders will distort the truth and seduce disciples into error (20:28-30). It is likely that the warnings of false teachers both without and within refer to the time of Luke's community. Thus Luke would be living not only in the "times of the Gentiles" (Luke 21:24) but in what are also times of laxity and false teaching. Living during these hard times, his community have only the cosmic signs and final day to await.

Thus "the things that have been accomplished among us" (Luke 1:1) mostly fall toward the end of the "biblical time line" from Adam to the final day. The activities in Acts are part of "the final days" of Joel 3:1-5LXX (Acts 2:17) when the eschatological Spirit is poured out. From the time after the last event of Acts to the time of Luke's writing, prophecies which had remained unfulfilled in Acts come true, such as Paul's death, continued persecutions, the fall of Jerusalem, and the current "times of the Gentiles" and of false teachers. All that remains for fervent prayer and repentance (Luke 18:7-8, Acts 3:19-21) to hasten is Jesus' return from heaven amid cosmic signs.

II. MAIN INVESTIGATION: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL FUNCTIONS OF GENEALOGIES

The Introduction tried to cull from Luke and Acts a setting within the history or "time line" of all God's deeds among his people for Luke's double account of Jesus and his followers. It isolated three forms utilized for this purpose: the genealogy, the speech survey of biblical history, and the testament or farewell address. For lack of space, the rest of this article will focus on the functions of the genealogy, probably the least discussed of the three forms.

Despite the lack of popular interest in biblical genealogies, recent scholarly studies have increased our understanding of biblical and comparative genealogies and their functions.[8] The following comparison of the functions of genealogies in Luke's Gospel and the Greek Bible will have four points: A) the placement of the genealogy in relationship to the entire work as it now stands; B) the extension of the genealogy back to Adam; C) the meaning of mentioning God at the head of the genealogy; and D) genealogies as providing a context for the main narrative within the history of God's people.

A. PLACEMENT OF THE GENEALOGY WITHIN THE ENTIRE WORK.

Scholars have frequently discussed the differences between where Matthew and Luke place their respective genealogies, and why Luke's appears after the infancy-youth section. That the genealogy in Luke 3:23-38 is fitted into its immediate context to explain the title Son of God in Luke 3:22, and to provide

an immediate backdrop for his testing as Son of God in Luke 4:1-13, is commonly known. Not quite so widely recognized are the similarities in placement between Jesus' genealogy in Luke 3:23-38 and that of Moses in Exodus 6:14-17.[9]

Luke precedes his genealogy with a substantial amount of introductory material. After his preface, a form lacking in earlier biblical books but present in later Greek books like the Sirach translation and 2 Maccabees epitome, Luke begins in Greek biblical style, EGENETO EN TAIS HEMERAIS HERODOU... (Luke 1:5)[10]. The story of Zachary, Elizabeth and the conception of John the Baptist precede the parallel account of Mary and the conception of Jesus (Luke 1:5-25 and 26-38). That is, Luke sets the stage in expectations of pious Jews before introducing his main figure, Jesus.

Similarly, Exodus 1 gives a transition from the Joseph account at the end of Genesis to the new king "who did not know Joseph" (Exod 1:8 G, cited in Acts 7:18). His order to kill all male Israelite babies sets the stage for introducing the (unnamed) parents of Moses, both of the tribe of Levi. (Compare the levitical priest Zachary from the division of Abijah, which is identified in 1 Chr 24:10 and Neh 12:4 & 17, and Elizabeth a daughter of Aaron.)

Both Luke 1-2 and Exodus 2 proceed to describe the births of their heroes, followed by their naming, their being brought up, and their growth. Both relate an event in the youth of their heroes which foreshadowed their later work but preceded it by many years - Moses' attempt to rescue fellow Israelites, leading to his 40-year exile, and Jesus in the Temple at 12, but subject to his parents until about 30.

Only after this do the respective missions of Jesus and Moses begin, both with mention of the desert. When Moses is leading a flock across the desert, God reveals himself to him and commissions him at the burning bush (Exod 3). The word of God comes to the Baptist in the desert, which begins his ministry of preaching and baptizing. When Jesus is baptized, God addresses and commissions him (Luke 3:1-22).

Because of the multiplicity of sources, of which Luke may well have been unaware, there are repetitions in the commissioning of Moses to go to Pharaoh in Exodus 3-6. In Exod 6:13 God again orders Moses and Aaron to Pharaoh. The genealogy of Aaron and Moses is inserted here in Exod 6:14-27. In 6:28-7:5, after the two of them have been "properly introduced," Moses is again told to take God's message to Pharaoh, balks, is given Aaron as "prophet," and is further instructed in his mission. For Moses this is equivalent to one last temptation to resist his mission and clarification of what it will involve. Moses and Aaron's obedience is then stated in 7:6, and in 7:7 their respective ages when they spoke to Pharaoh to begin their mission. Only then follows the extended narration of their rescue mission of the ten plagues, which culminated in the death of first-born sons (Exod 7:8-ch. 11, followed by the Passover in ch. 12).

In a similar placement, after Jesus is named Son of God and filled with the Spirit (Luke 3:22), his genealogy as Son of God is given (3:23-38), then the testing and clarification of his mission as Son of God and his obedience (4:1-13), and finally the beginning in 4:14 of the extended account of Jesus' saving mission beginning in Galilee, culminating in his own death as God's Son (23:34 & 46) at Passover time. One slight

difference is that Jesus' age is mentioned at the beginning of the genealogy, Moses' and Aaron's only after the statement of their obedience and immediately before the plague accounts.

In other words, in relationship to the overall story of God's saving work through Moses and Jesus in Exodus and Luke respectively, the genealogies occur in almost the same relative positions. They are preceded by preliminary accounts of their birth, youth and commissioning, and followed by detailed narratives about their main mission.

Though such parallels can at first glance seem arbitrary, Acts 7:18-37 gives solid evidence that Luke had in mind precisely this parallelism between the structures of Jesus' and Moses' careers, and that he elaborated his parallelism on the basis of the Greek version of Exodus. In a way quite reminiscent of Luke's use of Mark, Acts 7 retells the story of Moses with frequent quotations from the Greek text of Exodus and constant use of its language, combined with Lukan introductions, summaries, transitions, substitute favorite expressions, and interpretative comments.

The heavy use of verses, phrases and language from Greek Exodus is quite obvious even from the printing of Nestle's 25th edition, which uses bold print for allusions as well as for full verse quotations, and still clear in the 26th edition which only italicizes full quotations. For lack of space we will cite only some of these, inviting readers who so desire to compare the Greek texts of Acts and Exodus more fully.

Acts 7:18 quotes Exod 1:7 about the new king who did not know Joseph, and uses the same combination of words for the oppression by the Egyptians (Acts 7:19 KATASOPHISAMENOS, Exod 1:10 KATASOPHISŌMETHA; Acts 7:19 EKAKŌSEN, Exod 1:11 KAKŌSŌSIN; Acts 7:19 MĒ ZŌOGONEISTHAI, 3 forms of same verb in Exod 1:17, 18, 22). The same unusual expression is used for the baby Moses in Acts 7:20, ĒN ASTEIOS, and Exod 2:2, IDONTES AUTO ASTEION (the Hebrew has the very ordinary expression KI TOV).[11] For Moses' adoption by Pharaoh's daughter, Acts 7:20 has HĒ THUGATĒR PHARAŌ... HEAUTĒ EIS HUION, Exod 2:10 TĒN THUGATERA PHARAŌ ... AUTĒ EIS HUION. The account goes on like this, with many coincidences of otherwise unusual words or word combinations which clearly show a deliberate use of Exodus by Acts. 7.

But the parallels are not just in language - more importantly for our question is the deliberate parallelism in structure between the careers of Moses in Acts 7, closely based on Exodus, and of Jesus in the Gospel of Luke, which has been convincingly shown by scholars.[12] Both are in times of fulfillment of promises to Abraham (Acts 7:17), both grow in wisdom (Acts 7:22 as in Luke 2:40 & 52, not in Exodus), both were "powerful in words and deeds" (Acts 7:22 = Luke 24:19). It could be said of both that "he thought the brothers would understand that God was giving salvation to them at his hand, but they did not understand" (Acts 7:25 and passim for Jesus in the Gospel and speeches of Acts). Both are rejected not just once by their people but twice, and the Acts speeches use similar expressions for Moses and Jesus to describe this rejection of a savior vindicated by God: TOUTON TON MŌUSEN, HON ĒRNĒSANTO ... TOUTON HO THEOS KAI ARCHONTA KAI LUTRŌTĒN APESTALKEN (Acts 7:35 and Luke's frequent use of parallelism between the relation HON and demonstrative TOUTON, as in Acts 5:30-31, HON HYMEIS DIECHEIRISASTHE... TOUTON HO THEOS ARCHĒGON KAI SŌTĒRA HYPSŌSEN).

Finally and conclusively, the parallelism between Moses and Jesus is obviously alluded to in Acts 7:37. "This" Moses (who worked signs and wonders, 7:36, and was sent as the people's savior, 7:35) prophesied (citing Deut 18:15) the God would ANASTĒSEI ("raise up," with a pun on "resurrect") "a prophet for you ... like me."

Luke's care in the Acts speeches to show parallel structures for the careers of Jesus and Moses, while respecting the differences in the details of their lives, is confirming evidence that Luke imitated Exodus' structure in the placement of his genealogy. Luke's Acts 7 speech gives evidence that he was conscious of comparative structure in the lives of Moses and Jesus, and that the analogy between the placing of Moses' genealogy in Exodus 6 and Jesus' genealogy in Luke 3 is therefore probably conscious imitation of the Exodus structure.

From this parallel placing of the genealogies of Moses and Jesus just before the beginnings of their saving careers, what can be learned about the narrative functions of each in their respective accounts? Coming after the introductory section on Moses' youth and call, the genealogy in Exodus 6:14-27 functions to situate Moses and Aaron within the priestly line of Levi, and ultimately in their place within God's people, before the narrative of how God actually saved the people through them by the plagues.

Unlike Luke's linear genealogy tracing just a single line of descent, the genealogy in Exodus 6:14-27 is segmented to give the descendants of several sons of one father. An added function resulting from this is that Moses and Aaron are related not only to their direct ancestors and descendants, but also to collateral priestly lines of Levi (as well as from Reuben and Simeon) to which other protagonists of the desert stories like Korah (Numbers 16) belong. In fact, the genealogy is geared more to Aaron than to Moses, and traces Aaron's line through Eleazar to the priestly line of Phineas. It therefore has the additional function of legitimating Phineas' line by grounding it in the saving figures of the exodus.[13]

In summary, the genealogy of Moses and Aaron in Exod 6:14-27 situate them in the priestly line from Levi, and relate Aaron to the priestly lines of his descendants, especially that of Phineas. It also relates Moses and Aaron to collateral levitical lines before relating their roles in the people's salvation.

The similar placing of the genealogy in Luke 3:23-38 suggests a similar function in his Gospel. It supplements the dating from contemporary rulers in Luke 3:1-2, with Jesus' position within the ancestral subdivisions of God's people, and his temporal relationship to the people's history. Thus the genealogy places Jesus in an obscure (vs. the royal) branch of David's line, as Moses and Aaron were placed in Levi's. It puts Jesus as the end of the long saving history of God with his people, traced back to its very beginning in Adam (vs. the Exodus genealogy which also names Aaron's descendants after him, and which began only with the sons of Jacob). This difference in the content of Jesus' and Moses' respective temporal relationships to the history of God's people is very important. Though Luke was one or two generations after Jesus, Jesus still is the end of the genealogical line, unlike Aaron who was in the middle of his. The whole line has led up to its exclusive and definitive fulfillment in Jesus, and now the people of God is in the eschatological age of the Spirit's

outpouring, which has relativized the importance of blood relationships in God's people (Acts 10-11 and 15). Nevertheless, in terms of function, both genealogies show the temporal relationship of the saviors to their people's history.

Let us now turn to the functions implied by Luke's extension of Jesus' genealogy back to Adam.

B. DEPTH OF LUKE'S GENEALOGY BACK TO ADAM

1 Chronicles 1-9 has in common with Luke 3:23-38 genealogical links from the contemporary generation or hero all the way back to Adam. Though the genealogies in Genesis also go back to Adam, they do not extend forward nearly as far as those in Chronicles, which cover the generations from Adam to his main hero David. It does not seem an unreasonable question to ask whether Luke might have imitated Greek Chronicles in the functions to which he put his genealogy.[14]

Comparison between the genealogies in 1 Chronicles 1 and Genesis 5 and 11 indicates probable dependance of Chronicles on Genesis, and therefore mostly similarities. Both are similarly subdivided: from Adam to the three sons of Noe (1 Chr 1:1-4, Gen 5:3-32), and Sem to Abram/Abraam (1 Chr 1:17-27, Gen 11:10-26). But there are small differences, so it can be asked whether Luke 3:23-38 is in general closer to Chronicles or to Genesis. Luke 3:36 has KAINAM between ARPHAXAD his father and SALA his son. Neither the Hebrew Genesis 11 nor 1 Chronicles 1 have KAINAM, but both identify Shelah as son of Arpachshad. In the Greek texts, however, Gen 11:12-13 says ARPHAXAD begot KAINAN, and KAINAN begot SALA (Cambridge text), the same as Luke except for the spelling of KAINAN (and for textual criticism, spelling of names in genealogies is notoriously difficult.) The manuscript tradition behind Greek 1 Chr 1:17-24 is confused, and only the Alexandrian text agrees with Luke 3:36 in listing ARPHAXAD, KAINAN, SALA (Rahlfs). The evidence strongly indicates Luke's dependance, at least ultimately, on a reading from the Greek rather than Hebrew Bible. The evidence is confused about whether Luke more probably used Greek Genesis or Greek Chronicles for his KAINAM, but tips slightly in favor of Genesis unless his text was like the Alexandrian.

Other arguments slightly favor Luke's use of Greek Chronicles over Greek Genesis. Luke agrees with Chronicles in the spelling ABRAAM, instead of ABRAM in Genesis. Also, the names in Chronicles are in simple list form as in Luke, whereas Genesis includes much extraneous information about ages and other children. Luke could have himself done what apparently the Chronicler before him did, namely cull his names from Genesis and simply list the results in genealogical order. But it would have been easier simply to use the prominently displayed genealogies at the beginning of Chronicles. If his Greek version of Chronicles was like the Alexandrian text in including the KAINAN discussed above, he would not have had to consult the Genesis lists at all. A definitive conclusion does not seem possible, but it seems reasonable to suggest that Luke (or his source) used the Chronicles list, with possible reference to Genesis, to extend the genealogy back beyond Abraham to Adam.[15]

Even at first sight, the function of gathering in one place all genealogical material from the time of the narrative back to Adam seems to be to situate the narrative within the overall history of God's dealings with humans from the beginning. Closely related to this is the function of spanning

gaps in the traditions narrated, as between creation and the patriarchal stories by the genealogies of Genesis 5 and 11, between Adam and Saul/David in 1 Chronicles, and between especially Adam and Abraham, David and Jesus in Luke 3.[16]

Another related function of the genealogical connection to Adam is to show continuity of God's people through periods of national disruption, as when the genealogies in Genesis 46 and Numbers 26 connect the sons of Judah with the exodus clans.[17] This function is less obvious for linking David with Adam in 1 Chronicles, but perhaps implied. It does seem to fit the link between Jesus and David through a Davidic line which avoided the curses that destroyed Judah's royal line.

Genealogies can also be used to help show epochs in history according to a pre-arranged plan by God,[18] as in the arrangements of names in multiples of seven or the epochs marked by the flood, Abraham, exodus, etc. The Chronicler seems to have preserved this from his Genesis source, as in the separate Adam-Noah's sons and Shem-Abraham lists. It is probably clearer in Luke's source, with its arrangements of seven from Adam to Jesus which highlight major intermediate figures, than when God has become the first name of the list. With Adam at the head of the list, the seventh figures include Enoch, Abraham, David, Salathiel, and Jesus, which is what one would expect. With God at the head of the list, none of these names are in seventh position, but rather Jared, Terah, Jesse, Neri and Joseph. Nevertheless, the key names would continue to stand out and thus naturally divide the list into epochs marked by Noah, Abraham, David, etc.

Another obvious function of genealogies is simply to identify the individual through his ancestry, and link him to well-known personages from the past, as in 1 Sam 1:1 (Elkanah son of Jeroham son of Elihu son of Tohu son of Suph, an Ephraimite), 1 Sam 9:1 (for Saul), 2 Sam 20:1 (for Sheba), Zeph 1:1, and Zech 1:1. When the genealogy proceeds through sons who were not the first-born (e.g., Jacob, Judah, David, Nathan in Luke 3), the importance of being chosen by God is implied. Thus 1 Chr 5:1-2, explains why Joseph not Reuben got the birthright, and that though Judah became dominant and had a prince descendant (David), the birthright was Joseph's. 1 Chr 17:7 emphasizes the free choice of David, that "I took you from the pasture from following the sheep to be leader over my people Israel." 1 Chr 2:13-15 had earlier listed David not as first-born of Jesse but as "the seventh." The notion of God's free choice may be part of the what is implied in Luke 3 by listing Jesus' descent from David through a non-royal line.[19]

For readers familiar with the biblical narratives, genealogies also function as "encapsulated history" and a memnonic device for quick recall of a whole sweep of history in the briefest possible way. This is true of the genealogies in 1 Chronicles 1-9 and in Luke 3. Also, by the contrast between the brevity of the list of names with the full narratives of both Chronicles and Luke, the complete narratives are automatically emphasized in relation to the genealogical overview of preceding history.

C. WHY LUKE MENTIONS GOD AT THE HEAD OF HIS GENEALOGY

Like the Chronicler before him, Luke extends his genealogy back to the first man. Unlike the Chronicler, or as far as I know any other Jewish writer, Luke goes even beyond Adam to God.[20] Hellenistic and Roman sources do trace people back to

an origin in some god, and popular Hellenistic philosophy contains the view that the whole human race is descended from the gods or the divine principle. The Areopagus speech, especially Acts 17:26 & 28-29, shows that Luke is aware of such thinking. The verses mentioned argue that all humans are descended from one man (Adam is not named) and "we" (humans) are all the descendants (GENOS) of God.[21]

In its argument and wording, the Areopagus speech exhibits a combination of Stoic, rhetorical, poetic and biblical expressions, concepts and allusions. The "unknown god" is identified with the God who created and is Lord over the cosmos and everything in it. God therefore does not dwell in man-made temples nor need anything from humans, since "he himself gives to all men life and breath and everything" (Acts 17:25 RSV). These are important themes in popular Hellenistic philosophy and Jewish propaganda.

This God made from one human (Adam) the whole race to inhabit the earth, and he set the times and boundaries so humans would seek God (cf. Luke 3:38, Acts 1:7, Gen 1-5 & 10, Deut 32:8 and Ps 74:17).

Verses 27b-29a are especially important for understanding Luke 3:38. They argue that God "is not far from each of us. For in him we live and move and are, as even some of your poets have said: 'for we are his (God's) GENOS.' Being therefore the GENOS of God..." The word GENOS refers to descendants of a common ancestor, and the expression of humanity as God's GENOS is found in writers like Cleanthes and Dio Chrysostom, as well as in Luke's quotation from Aratus.[22]

The background for understanding the combination of Luke 3:38 and Acts 17:28-29 in the context of Luke-Acts seems to be Gen 1:26-27 and 5:1-3. In Gen 1:26-27 God says, "Let us make man according to our EIKONA and HOMOIŌSIN." They (ANTHROPOS is collective) were to rule all other creatures. "And God made man, KAT' EIKONA THEOU he made him, male and female he made them."

The link between EIKŌN and descendants becomes clear in Gen. 5:1-3. The chapter begins, "This is the BIBLOS GENESEŌS ANTHRŌPŌN: on the day God EPOIĒSEN ... TON ADAM, KAT' EIKONA THEOU EPOIĒSEN AUTON." Gen 5:3 then uses similar expressions to describe Adam's begetting of Seth: "KAI EGENNĒSEN KATA TĒN IDEAN AUTOU KAI KATA TĒN EIKONA AUTOU." Just as Adam is KAT' EIKONA THEOU, so is Seth KATA TĒN EIKONA of Adam. Implied in Genesis is a careful distinction between how God is related to Adam from how gods in Greek mythology are related to heroes they beget from human partners. The distinction appears in the choice of verbs used in Greek Genesis. God made (EPOIĒSEN) Adam, whereas Adam begot (EGENNĒSEN) Seth. God's transcendence is preserved, yet a filial relationship is implied by saying Adam was KAT' EIKONA THEOU as Seth was KATA TĒN EIKONA of Adam. The care with which the Greek translators proceeded was not lost on Luke.

For on the one hand, Acts 17:28-29 uses terminology from Greek literature and philosophy to say that humans are all the GENOS of God, which would ordinarily imply some kind of ancestry by God of the human race. But Acts 17:26 had said that God EPOIĒSEN TE EX HENOS PAN ETHNOS ANTHRŌPŌN KATOIKEIN... Although here EPOIĒSEN may well be a helping verb, for Luke's Christian readers it is nevertheless allusive to the language of Genesis. We are obviously all the GENOS of God through the

one man, who remains unnamed according to rhetorical style for a speech ostensibly addressed to Athenian philosophers. Especially in view of Luke 3:38, however, the allusion to Adam is obvious for Luke's readers.

In this light, the explanation of Luke's affixing of God to the head of Jesus' genealogy can be attempted. Like the discussion in Acts 17, the designation of Adam as son of God seems to interpret the biblical information in terms understandable to the Hellenistic thought world. Listing a god at the head of human genealogies is a Greco-Roman pagan practice rather than a biblical one. Luke's genealogy itself, however, already contains hints that Adam's origin from God was not by sexual generation, hints which would be obvious to readers familiar with the Bible.

Two clues to look for something unusual in Luke's genealogy are his insertion of the phrases HOS ENOMIZETO in the beginning and "of God" at the end of it: "Jesus... being the son, as was supposed, of Joseph of Eli... of Adam of God" (Luke 3:23 & 38). Not only does the first phrase "harmonize" the genealogy with the virginal conception in Luke 1:26-38, but it points to an analogy between Jesus' filial relationship to Joseph and the special kind of filial relationship of Adam to God, which anyone familiar with the Genesis story would know. Neither Jesus nor Adam were sexually begotten by their respective "fathers" in the genealogy, Joseph and God. Rather God <u>made</u> Adam and gave him the divine prerogatives of ruling and naming the rest of creation. In Luke 1:26-38 also, there are echoes of the creation story. Jesus is not sexually conceived in Mary's womb but is created in the womb by the Holy Spirit (Luke 1:34-35). For the creative and life-giving functions of the Holy Spirit are widely attested in the OT and well-known among first-century Jews and Christians.[23] Nor are either of the verbs in Luke 1:35 for the Spirit's action (EPELEUSETAI AND EPISKIASEI) used with sexual meanings in the Greek Bible or ordinary secular usage.[24] And because it is through the Holy Spirit and power of God that Jesus is created in the womb, "therefore the one to be born shall be called holy, the Son of God" (1:35).

The pericope following Luke's genealogy provides some confirming evidence for the analogy here described between Jesus and Adam as made by God's creative power, and in that non-sexual sense being sons of God. Many have noticed an implied parallel between Adam and Jesus in the temptation of Jesus (Luke 4:1-13). There Jesus is tempted as Son of God by the devil, and contrary to the disobedient Adam in Genesis 3, he acts as an obedient Son. The comparison between Jesus and Adam in the adjacent pericope helps confirm the analogy for which we are arguing in this section on the genealogy.[25]

On the basis of this evidence, some functions of Luke's affixing God to his genealogy can now be suggested. In the light of Acts 17, adding God to the genealogy and implying that all humanity are children of God through "one man" Adam function as relating the biblical account to Hellenistic concerns, especially the unity of the human race and its kinship with God.

Adding the phrase, "as was supposed," at the beginning and "of God" at the end of the genealogy calls attention to more than one kind of sonship-paternity relationship in the genealogy. Besides ordinary generation there is also a creative fatherhood of God for Adam and Jesus, and a legal fatherhood (in terms of inheritance) of Joseph for Jesus and God for Adam.

The addition of "Adam of God" also functions to highlight the implied Adam-Jesus comparisons as disobedient-obedient sons of God in the following temptation story. All these functions, even those most influenced by secular Hellenistic interests, take place within the biblical perspective of God as transcendant creator of the human race, and of the Genesis story of Adam.

D. SITUATING THE MAIN ACCOUNT WITHIN THE HISTORY OF GOD'S PEOPLE

This function has already been implied in the earlier comparisons between Luke 3:23-38 and Exod 6:14-27 and 1 Chronicles 1-9. But each of those juxtapositions was made from a different main point of comparison, namely the literary placing of the genealogy within the overall work, and the extension of the list back to Adam. A further brief comparison to Ruth 4:18-20 G can help clarify the function of showing where the story fits in the overall history of God's people. The likelihood that Luke consulted Ruth for his own genealogy from Phares to David gives an added reason to compare Luke 3:23-38 and Ruth 4:18-20 G.[26]

A notable similarity between Luke and Ruth is the relative independence of their main narrative from their genealogy. Both genealogies read like later insertions into a narrative which could otherwise stand on its own. As in Matthew and Mark, the temptation story in Luke would be a natural immediate sequel to the heavenly proclamation of Jesus as God's Son. Luke has had to insert the genealogy into his sources' arrangement at this point. Similarly, the story in the Book of Ruth is completely finished by the point at which the genealogy is added, and most scholars hold that it was added by a later hand.[27]

The story in Ruth reaches its climax when Ruth and Boaz preserve the name and line of Naomi's dead husband and sons through the birth of Obed. The climactic line is, "A son has been born to Naomi" (Ruth 4:17). With that, the story's internal plot line is resolved. But the text as it now stands goes on to show the wider significance of the story: "and they called his name Obed; this is the father of Jesse the father of David." This simple addition would have been sufficient to insert the story into the larger history of Israel. The still further addition of the final genealogy links the story not only with later generations up to David but with earlier ones back to Phares the son of Judah the patriarch. In so doing, the genealogy shows where the story of Ruth stands on the "biblical time line" from the patriarchs through the exodus generation through the judges to its "fulfillment" in David.

If this is the case, why does the genealogy begin with Phares and not with the better-known Judah? The seventh-generation emphasis seems to be the answer. Boaz, the male hero of the story, is seventh in the genealogy from Phares, but would have been eighth from Judah.[28] The link between the Ruth story and Judah the patriarch had already been made earlier in the narrative, which is evidence that it was the person responsible for the canonical version of the story and not some later glossarist who put the genealogy at the end of the book. Ruth 4:12 has the prayer of the elders: "and may your house be as the house of Phares, whom Tamar bore to Judah..." This verse ties the genealogy to the narrative in two ways. First, there is an analogy between the roles of Judah and Boaz, and between those of Tamar and Ruth. In both situations a kinsman of a dead husband provides a childless widow with a child on behalf of her dead spouse (with obvious differences!). Second,

it explicitly identifies Phares as a son of Judah the patriarch, who would be a more obvious first name in a genealogy. The explicitation of the link between Phares and Judah in Ruth 4:12 freed the redactor from having to begin the genealogy in 4:18 with Judah, and thereby enabled him to reserve the climactic seventh place in the genealogy for Boaz. Therefore, the genealogy in 4:18 can begin, "And these are the GENESEIS of Phares."

If this explanation is valid, it follows that Luke and the canonical redactor of Ruth have made similar adjustments in adding a genealogy to their main accounts. Both begin with a story which stood alone without a genealogy (as in Luke's source Mark). Both add the genealogy to the basic story as an obvious insertion or addition. Both stories had previously been furnished with time indicators before the genealogies were added. Thus the story of Ruth is set in the time of the judges: KAI EGENETO EN TŌI KRINEIN TOUS KRITAS... (Ruth 1:1).[29] In accordance with Hellenistic taste, Luke's temporal setting in Luke 3:1-2 is more detailed. But in both cases, the genealogy provides not the contemporary time indicator but rather the relationship of the story to earlier biblical accounts of God's dealings with his people.

Another similar procedure is the forging of links between genealogy and story. Luke put his links into the genealogy itself, using the phrase "as was supposed" to correlate Jesus' sonship to Joseph with the story of Jesus' virginal conception, and adding "of God" to relate the genealogy to its context between Jesus' being named and being tempted as Son of God. The redactor of Ruth put his links both in the genealogy and in the story. Instead of beginning the genealogy more obviously with Judah the father of Phares, he gives the "GENESEIS of Phares" so that Boaz can have the privileged seventh position. Then, in Ruth 4:12, the link to Judah is expressed in a way that shows the analogy between the birth of Obed from Boaz-Ruth and that of Phares from Judah-Tamar. Thus it makes sense at the end of the story to append the genealogy of Phares.

Lastly, both genealogies culminate in the person who was for each author the climactic figure in the history of God's people - David for the redactor of Ruth, and Jesus the Son of God, who will receive "the throne of David his father and will rule over the house of Jacob forever..." (Luke 1:32-33).

CONCLUSION:

The genealogy of Jesus in Luke 3:23-38 has provided one of several possible examples of how Luke used material and methods found in the Greek Bible, in adapted imitation of the Bible. Lack of space precluded similar comparisons of how OT surveys and the "future history" of testaments or farewell addresses were used by Luke to provide a temporal backdrop from Adam to the final day of judgment for his "narrative about the things that have been accomplished among us" (Luke 1:1). Nor was there room to present further stylistic arguments for Luke's imitation of the Greek Bible, such as his unapologetic use of barbaric names in his genealogy, and of many phrases that are far more common in the Greek Bible than in ordinary Koine, like the extraordinarily frequent EGENETO constructions in Luke-Acts.[30]

Many names in Luke's genealogy are taken from the Bible and left in their non-Greek biblical forms. Similar methods of placing the genealogy between the call and actual mission of the hero, of extending the genealogy back to the biblical first

man Adam, and of using it to set one's own account within the whole history of God's dealings with his people, are found both in Luke-Acts and in several places in the Greek Bible. Even the one apparent difference from biblical procedure, that of grounding the genealogy in God, has to be understood according to the Genesis account of Adam's relationship to God.

The various functions of Luke's genealogy within his account are found for genealogies in the Greek Bible as well. The main function seems to be to situate Luke's narrative in the history of God's dealings with his people. In this, it functions the same way many biblical genealogies do.

By themselves, these conclusions do not solve the genre question for Luke-Acts, if for no other reason than that the Greek Bible contains several narrative genres. E.g., Tobit is a romance, 1-4 Kingdoms are meant as history in the special sense of the history of God's interactions with his people, yet both use many of the same narrative devices. But our findings do demonstrate a very fruitful source of comparative material for studying Luke-Acts: the Greek Bible, a hellenized part of the "Jewish connections of Luke-Acts."

FOOTNOTES:

[1]See, e.g., the work of Charles Talbert, Horst Moehring, James Sanders, Vernon Robbins in the U.S., Eckhard Plümacher, W. C. van Unnik, and Martin Hengel abroad, and the classic theses of Henry Cadbury. The focus is on the Greek Bible because it is almost universally considered to be the Bible Luke used, and can perhaps provide a mediating alternative between the Hebrew Bible and Hellenistic pagan environment as comparative material to illuminate the genre of Luke-Acts. In both the Greek translation and in the later books found only in the Greek Bible can already be found an integration between biblical faith and Hellenistic culture not unlike that in the NT. Nor should the rich store of common language, themes, stories, types, and theologies which the Greek Bible shares with the NT be overlooked. Even Walter Bauer, in the introduction to his lexicon where he discusses the many cultural influences on NT Greek, remarks, "As for the influence of the LXX, every page of this lexicon shows that it outweighs all other influences on our literature" (p. xxi in the 1979 Gingrich-Danker revision, henceforth cited as BGD).

[2]Some commentators have noticed possible allusions to the Hasmonean Mattathias in the repetitions of that name in the genealogy between Zerubabel and Joseph, but none of Mattathias' sons correspond to those named in the books of Maccabees.

[3]Cf. pro: M. D. Johnson, The Purpose of the Biblical Genealogies (SNTSMS 8; Cambridge: University, 1969) 240-242, and E. L. Abel, "The Genealogies of Jesus Ho Christos," NTS 20 (1973-74) 203-10. Contra: R. E. Brown, The Birth of the Messiah (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977) 92, n. 75; H. Schürmann, Das Lukasevangelium (HTKNT 3/1; Freiburg: Herder, 1969) I, 201, n. 96; and J. Ernst, Das Evangelium nach Lukas (RNT; Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1977) 156. Regarding the rejected and cursed royal line (Solomon-Jehoiakim), cf. A. Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to S. Luke (ICC 28; 5th ed; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1922) 104, Schürmann, Lukasev. I, 201, and Ernst Lukas 156.

[4]Still one of the most enlightening brief treatments of this speech and of Abraham in Luke-Acts is Nils A. Dahl, "The

Story of Abraham in Luke-Acts," in his Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976) 66-86, and also in L. Keck and J. L. Martyn, Studies in Luke-Acts (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966) 139-158, now reprinted as a Fortress paperback. See also Earl Richard, Acts 6:1-8:4: The Author's Method of Composition (SBLDS 41; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978), J. Bihler, Die Stephanusgeschichte im Zusammenhang der Apostelgeschichte (Münchener Theologische Studien 30; München: Max Hueber, 1963), E. Haenchen, The Acts of the Apostles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 275-90, and H. Conzelmann, Die Apostelgeschichte (HNT 7; 2nd ed; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul] Siebeck], 1972) 50-58, and their references.

[5]Cf. esp. Luke T. Johnson, The Literary Function of Possessions in Luke-Acts (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977) 70-76.

[6]Cf. David L. Tiede, "Luke 19:41-44 as Vaticinium Post Eventum," privately distributed for the 1977 SBL Luke-Acts Seminar.

[7]Cf. William S. Kurz, "Acts 3:19-26 as a Test of the Role of Eschatology in Lukan Christology," Society of Biblical Literature 1977 Seminar Papers (ed. P. J. Achtemeier; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977) 309-323; E. Franklin, Christ the Lord (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975) 9-47, 162. I do not see two irreconcilable strands in Lukan eschatology, contra S. G. Wilson, "Lukan Eschatology," NTS 15 (1969-70) 330-47. Now also cf. A. J. Mattill, Luke and the Last Things (Dillsboro, NC: Western North Carolina Press, 1979).

[8]See esp. R. R. Wilson, "The Old Testament Genealogies in Recent Research," JBL 94 (1975) 169-189, and his Genealogy and History in the Biblical World (Yale Near Eastern Researches 7; New Haven: Yale, 1977), and M. D. Johnson, Purpose (note 3).

[9]Cf. Plummer, Luke, 101-102, and R. E. Brown, "Genealogy (Christ)," IDBSup, 354.

[10]For biblicistic stylistics, see e.g., standard sources like Hawkins' Horae Synopticae, Moulton, Grammar of NT Greek: Vol. 4 on style by N. Turner, both Cadbury's Making and Style, J. de Zwaan, "The Use of the Greek Language in Acts," and W. K. L. Clarke, "The Use of the Septuagint in Acts," in Beginnings II. Compare the judicious recent review of the question and the suggestion of "synagogue Greek" by Fred L. Horton, Jr., "Reflections on the Semitisms of Luke-Acts," in Charles H. Talbert, ed., Perspectives on Luke-Acts (Special Studies Series No. 5; Association of Baptist Professors of Religion, 1978) 1-23. Massive evidence of Lukan use of the Greek Bible is now marshalled in the careful study of Earl Richard, Acts 6:1-8:4: The Author's Method of Composition (SBLDS 41; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978).

[11]Compare the similar citing of ASTEIOS from Exodus 2 G in Heb 11:23, the only other NT occurrence of the word. In the Greek OT, it appears only here in Exod 2:2, Num 22:32 (in the sense of a way acceptable to God), Judg 3:17 for Eglon, Jdt 11:23 for Judith, LXX Susanna 7, and 2 Macc 6:23 (with LOGISMON). By the Stoics it seems to be almost equivalent to SPOUDAIOS (Moulton-Milligan, Vocabulary of the Gk Testament, p. 86). For extensive further evidence of Acts 7's use of the Greek Pentateuch, cf. E. Richard, Acts 6:1-8:4 (note 10), pp. 38-140, on Moses esp. 76-102. Our two analyses were done independently of one another and confirm each other.

[12]E.g., L. T. Johnson, Literary Function, pp. 70-76 (note 5). For extensive evidence of Luke's parallel structuring in general, cf. C. H. Talbert, Literary Patterns, Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts (SBLMS 20; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1974) with references.

[13]An interesting peculiarity of the Lukan genealogy is the large number of names from the priestly tribe of Levi rather than from Judah. This is related to the peculiarity that Elizabeth, wife of the priest Zachary and "daughter of Aaron" is called the kinswoman (SYNGENIS) of Mary Jesus' mother (Luke 1:36). All other uses of SYNGENIS and cognates in Luke and Acts denote actual blood relationship (Luke 1:58, 61; 2:44; 14:12; 21:16; Acts 7:3, 14; 10:24). Therefore, besides Luke's emphasis on Jesus' Davidic ancestry, he may also be hinting at levitical connections. The same phenomenon of emphasizing one important blood line while referring to a second occurs in the genealogy in Exod 6:14-27, only with the emphasis reversed. Whereas Luke gives a Davidic genealogy with levitical allusions, Exodus provides the levitical/Aaronic genealogy with Davidic connections. Exod 6:23 identifies Aaron's wife as Elizabeth (!) daughter of Aminadab and sister of Naasson, who are identified in Num 1:7; 7:12 & 17: Naasson is the head of the house of Judah when Moses and Aaron take the census. The same two also appear in the Davidic genealogy in Ruth 4:20, 1 Chr 2:10, Luke 3:32-33 (and Matt 1:4). Of the four sons of Aaron and his wife from the tribe of Judah (Exod 6:23), two died without heirs and Eleazar and Ithamar were heads of the two major priestly lines. Phineas was son of Eleazar. Thus the priestly line of Phineas is shown to have connections through the wife of Aaron himself to Judah, David's tribe. Providing such Davidical connections for the priestly lines may have been a secondary function of the Exod 6:14-27 genealogy.

[14]Lest such imitation be rejected as too sophisticated for Luke, the widespread role of imitation as a procedure in Hellenistic rhetoric should be recalled, as well as the likelihood that Luke himself had some rhetorical training. For imitation, see E. Plümacher, Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller (SUNT 9; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), esp. 51-69, and Talbert, Literary Patterns (note 12), pp. 1 and 11. For an extensive treatment of the role of rhetoric in Luke-Acts, see William S. Kurz, "Hellenistic Rhetoric in the Christological Proof of Luke-Acts," CBQ 42 (1980) 171-195.

[15]With several contemporary commentators, I think that Luke had a genealogy among his sources which extended from Adam to Jesus and contained 77 names in 11 groups of seven. To it he himself added the TOU THEOU at the head of the genealogy and also the phrase HOS ENOMIZETO, which qualifies Joseph's paternity of Jesus and harmonizes the genealogy with Jesus' virginal conception in Luke 1:26-38. In adding God at the head of his genealogy, Luke has fitted it into its context between "You are my son" in Luke 3:22 and the temptations as son of God in chap. 4, but he has damaged the clear arrangements of the climactic seventh names like Enoch (cf. Jude 14, "the seventh from Adam"), Abraham and David. Cf. Schürmann, Lukasev., I,199-204; I. H. Marshall, The Gospel of Luke (New International Greek Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978) 157-165, esp. 160-61; Ernst, Lukas, 154-57; M.D. Johnson, Purpose, 229-39.

[16]Wilson, JBL 94, p. 172, and M. D. Johnson, Purpose, 78.

[17]M. Johnson, Purpose, 80.

[18]Ibid., 80-81.

[19]Ibid., 79-80.

[20]Cf. Schürmann, Lukasev. I, 201-02, "ganz ungewohnlich!" M. Johnson, Purpose, 237 says there is no known parallel in the OT or in rabbinic texts. Compare pp. 239 and 112-14 on Hellenistic and Roman practices of tracing a genealogy back to a god.

[21]For thorough discussion of these notions with their counterparts in Greco-Roman and Jewish writings, see M. Dibelius, "Paul on the Areopagus," in his Studies in the Acts of the Apostles (ed. H. Greeven; London: SCM, 1956) 26-77, esp. 47-58; Haenchen, Acts, 524-25; Conzelmann, Apg[2], 104-11 and the literature they cite.

[22]BGD, p. 156, GENOS, and works cited in note 21.

[23]See the extensive arguments and many texts cited by Schürmann, Lukasev. I, 52-54, Sjöberg & Schweizer, "PNEUMA," TDNT 6:386-87 and 402, Schulz, "SKIA/EPISKIAZŌ," TDNT 7:399-400. (Luke does not mention pre-existence: this treatment of Jesus being created in the womb obviously refers to the human Jesus.) Compare also Justin Martyr's explicit arguments in the mid-second century against the pagan myths and any sexual interpretation of the Spirit's role in the virginal conception, 1 Apology 33:3-6. The Spirit and power (which Justin identified with the Logos) ELTHON EPI TĒN PARTHENON KAI EPISKIASAN OU DIA SYNOUSIAS ALLA DIA DYNAMEŌS ENKYMONA KATESTĒSE (33:6, Goodspeed, p. 49).

[24]Liddell-Scott-Jones 618 & 657, Moulton-Milligan 231-244, Schneider, "ERCHOMAI/EPERCHOMAI," TDNT 2:680-81, Schulz, "SKIA/EPISKIAZŌ," TDNT 7:399-400, Schürmann, Lukasev., I,52-54. Cf. Isa 32:15 G: HEŌS AN EPELTHĒ$_{I}$ EPH' HYMAS PNEUMA APH' HYPSĒLOU.

[25]In addition to the commonly made comparison between Luke 4:1-13par and the stories of Adam and of Israel, God's disobedient sons, in the desert, the further parallel to Jesus' prayer before his passion can be mentioned. In Luke 22:39-46, Jesus prays as Son to "Father," saying, "yet not my will, but yours be done." Jerome Neyrey shared with me a pre-publication draft of his study on Luke 22:39-46 which mentioned Adam comparisons in Luke.

[26]The two most likely genealogical sources Luke could have used for the names between Judah and David are LXX 1 Chr 2:3-15 and Ruth 4:18-20. If Luke used Chronicles here, he would have had to cull the names from among many collateral lines. Ruth 4:18-20, on the other hand, is a ready-made list with no extraneous material. Secondly, Luke's spellings and idiosyncrasies seem more easily explained by the Ruth list than by 1 Chr 2:3-15. For Luke's ESRŌM, Ruth has ESRŌN (Alexandrian text ESRŌM in v 18 only), 1 Chr. 2:5 has ARSŌN, 2:9 ESERŌN (Rahlfs). To Luke's ARNI, Ruth's ARRAN is closer than Chronicles' ARAM. Luke's ADMIN seems a mistaken duplicate for the following AMINADAB, which could with equal probability be traced to either source. Luke's SALA is closer to Ruth's SALMAN than to Chronicles' SALMŌN. Both sources have ŌBĒD for Luke's JŌBĒD. In general, Schürmann, Lukasev. I, 201, Ernst, Lukas, 156-57, and Marshall, Luke, 164-65 prefer Ruth to Chronicles. Some raise the possibility of Luke's use of a Hebrew source. But since most agree that Luke relied exclusively on the Greek and not Hebrew elsewhere, and because of the notorious textual difficulties with names, the explanation

here seems good enough. Note the despairing comment in B. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (United Bible Societies, 1971) 136. Richard, Acts 6:1-8:4, 150-54, has some helpful observations on textual questions in Lukan quotations from the Greek Bible. E.g., he notes that the Alexandrian text, which is the one most in agreement with NT quotations, is also the one most susceptible to Christian editing (p. 154).

[27]Cf. O. Eissfeldt, The Old Testament (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965) 479-80, and G. E. Wood, "Ruth, Lamentations," JBC I,609. A. S. Herbert, "Ruth," PCB 316, disagrees: "There is no necessity to suppose that the genealogy is a later addition to the book.... What the writer has done is to use this well-known and often repeated story and give it a point." My own conclusion is that the genealogy was inserted at the level of the canonical redaction of the story, so that although it is not an original part of the story, it is an original part of the book of Ruth, just as Luke's genealogy is an original part of his book.

[28]Cf. J. M. Sasson, "Generation, Seventh," IDBSup, 354-56.

[29]Note also this typical OT introduction to a story or part of a story (as in Ezek 1:1, Lam tit., Josh 1:1, Judg 1:1, Ruth 1:1, 2 Kgdms 1:1) is an obvious mark of Luke's style: KAI EGENETO EN TŌI plus the infinitive. It occurs in Luke 1:8; 2:6; 3:21 EGENETO DE EN TŌI BAPTISTHĒNAI...; 5:1, 12; 8:40; 9:18, 29, 33, 51 EGENETO DE EN TŌI SYMPLĒROUSTHAI TAS HĒMERAS TĒS ANALĒMPSEŌS AUTOU...EIS JEROUSALĒM; 10:38; 11:1, 27; 14:1; 17:11, 14; 18:35, etc.

[30]Regarding the use of barbarian names, compare Luke's genealogy with that in Josephus' Antiquities I, 79 (LCL 4:36), which according to Hellenistic historiography tries to put Greek endings on all the names and introduce some stylistic variety instead of a mere listing of names: "NŌCHOS...APO ADAMOU DEKATOS: LAMECHOU GAR ESTIN HUIOS, HOU PATĒR ĒN MATHOUSALAS, HOUTOS DE ĒN TOU ANŌCHOU TOU JAREDOU, MALAĒLOU DE JAREDOS EGEGONEI, HOS EK KAINA TEKNOUTAI TOU ANŌSOU SYN ADELPHAIS PLEIOSIN, ANŌSOS DE SĒTHOU HUIOS ĒN TOU ADAMOU." See H. Cadbury, The Style and Literary Method of Luke (HTS 6; Cambridge: Harvard, 1920, reprint 1969), esp. pp. 154-58.

For similarities between Lukan and biblical style, see note 10. For the rare formula and ascending order of Luke's genealogy, cf. Tob 1:1: BIBLOS LOGŌN TŌBIT TOU TŌBIĒL TOU ANANIĒL TOU ADOUĒL TOU GABAĒL EK TOU SPERMATOS ASIĒL EK TĒS PHYLĒS NEPHTHALIM (Rahlfs). These are the closest parallels to Luke in that they preserve the non-Greek endings of names. Contrast the Greek endings in a bilingual inscription: AAILAMEIN HAIRANOU TOU MOKIMOU TOU HAIRANOU TOU MATHTHA and Herodotus IV, 147: THĒRAS HO AUTESIŌNOS TOU TEISAMENOU TOU THERSANDROU TOU POLYNEIKEOS, which are cited in E. Klostermann, Das Lukasevangelium (HNT 5; 3rd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1975) 56-57.

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"NO NEED TO HAVE ANY ONE WRITE"?: A STRUCTURAL EXEGESIS OF 1 THESSALONIANS

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The problems of interpreting 1 Thessalonians are often approached historically. Commentators generally consider the date, place, and occasion of the writing of the letter and its situation in the context of Paul's ministry and travels, along with the authenticity, integrity, and unity of the letter.[1] Theological concerns are often, in effect, concerns for historical theology, e.g., Paul's understanding of the parousia. A more literary approach is taken by those interested in the epistolary "form" of 1 Thessalonians or of Paul's letters more generally.[2] However, historical interest may dominate studies of the epistolary "form" as well, e.g., Paul's adaptation of first-century letter-writing conventions. Both historical studies and literary studies may seek to illustrate something identified as the "structure" of 1 Thessalonians; historical/theological studies may present an "outline of the contents" while literary (epistolary) studies may present an "outline of the form." The following two outlines represent these two possibilities.
(1) From The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, an "outline of contents" of 1 Thessalonians:[3]

I. The Salutation, 1:1
II. Personal, chs. 1-3
  A. Thanksgiving, 1:2-10
  B. Retrospect on the mission, 2:1-16
    1. Pastoral labors of the apostles, 2:1-12
    2. Response of the believers, 2:13-16
  C. The Mission of Timothy, 2:17-3:10
    1. Concern of the apostles, 2:17-20
    2. Motives for sending Timothy, 3:1-5
    3. Timothy's report, 3:6-10
    4. Prayer, 3:11-13
III. Ethical and doctrinal, chs. 4-5
  A. Moral requirements of the Gospel, 4:1-12
    1. General (previous instruction), 4:1-2
    2. Chastity, 4:3-8
    3. Love of the brethren, 4:9-10
    4. Sobriety and diligence, 4:11-12
  B. The coming of the Lord, 4:13-18
  C. The day of the Lord, 5:1-11
    1. Warning, 5:1-3
    2. Encouragement and exhortation, 5:4-11
  D. Brief precepts and prayers, 5:12-27
IV. The benediction, 5:28

(2) From Robert Funk's Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God, a "working hypothesis concerning the substructure of the Pauline letter form" and its exemplification in 1 Thessalonians:[4]

(1) salutation [1:1]
  (sender, addressee, greeting)

(2) thanksgiving [1:2-10]
(3) body [2:1-3:13]
(with its formal opening, connective and transitional formulas, concluding "eschatological climax" [2:13-16] and travelogue [2:17-3:8])
(4) paraenesis [4:1-5:22]
(5) closing elements [5:23-28]
(greetings, doxology, benediction)

Structural exegesis is literary rather than historical in orientation. Yet the present structural exegesis of 1 Thessalonians is not focused upon the text's "form" as a letter. It may perhaps be said that Funk's study is concerned with the "surface structure" of the text (as long as it is clear that a concern for "surface" structure is not a "superficial" concern!), while the present study seeks to investigate the "deep structure" or "depth structure" of the text.[5] Keys to this investigation are the structuralist distinction between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic dimensions of texts (or cultural phenomenon) and Claude Lévi-Strauss' suggestion that repetition serves to make the structure of the text (or cultural phenomenon) apparent.[6] Thus our procedure is to look for repeating elements in 1 Thessalonians as these make apparent the syntagmatic (or chronological) and paradigmatic (or "logical," theoretical) structure of the text. The search for such a "structure" is not dependent upon presuppositions about "the historical Paul" or first-century letter-writing conventions; it does, however, presuppose the potential meaningfulness of the text in the context of human communication.

Our presentation will consider the mythic repetitions, epistolary interjections, and overall outline of the syntagmatic structure and the interrelated actions, familial metaphors, and temporal framework of the paradigmatic structure of 1 Thessalonians. In conclusion, a structural theory of goals and foci will suggest an epistemological framework for structural exegesis.

Syntagmatic Structure

A text may be delineated as an intricate web of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. Isolation of these two dimensions is possible only in the abstract. Simply stated, the syntagm is the chronological order of events, ideas, emotions, etc. presented in the text. The text of 1 Thessalonians as a whole, from 1:1 through 5:28, may be considered a single syntagm; however, repetitions within the text may suggest smaller syntagmatic units which clarify the structure of the text.

Mythic Repetitions

Even a quick reading of 1 Thessalonians, and especially 1:2-2:16, brings to light the repetition of the phrase "you know":[7] 1:5, "You know" (kathōs oidate); 2:1, "For you yourselves know" (Autoi gar oidate); 2:2, "as you know" (kathōs oidate); 2:5, "as you know" (kathōs oidate); 2:11, "for you know" (kathaper oidate). To these five statements that "you know" is added one statement that "we know" (eidotes), 1:4. Comparable to assertions of "knowing" are assertions of "remembering": 1:3, "remembering" (mnēmoneuontes); 2:9, "For you remember" (mnēmoneuete). Variations on the simple expression of

knowing or remembering are seen in 2:10, "You are witnesses" (humeis martures), and in 1:8, "we need not say anything" (mē chreian echein hēmas lalein ti). However, the observation that "we need not say anything" does not preclude the letter-writer's speech; the admission that the readers ("you") already "know" does not prevent the writer's recapitulation.

Statements which follow (or occasionally precede) an assertion of knowing (or remembering) often appear to be demonstrations or explanations of the fact of knowing; they are the evidence which supports the assertion. That Paul "give[s] thanks to God always" for the Thessalonians (1:2) demonstrates that Paul is "remembering" before God their "work of faith and labor of love and steadfastness of hope" (1:3). The coming of the gospel to the Thessalonians "not only in word, but also in power and in the Holy Spirit and with full conviction" (1:5) is explanatory of Paul's "knowledge" that God has chosen the Thessalonians (1:4).[8] That the Thessalonians "know what kind of men" Paul and his colleagues "proved to be" (1:5) is demonstrated by the fact that the Thessalonians became "imitators of [them] and of the Lord" (1:6) and "an example to the believers in Macedonia and Achaia" (1:7). The fact that "the word of the Lord [has] sounded forth" from the Thessalonians and that their "faith in God has gone forth everywhere" (1:8a, b) explains why Paul feels no need to say anything (1:8c). The report that others make concerning the Thessalonians (1:9-10) demonstrates the aptness of Paul's perception. The Thessalonians' perceptions of Paul (2:1; 2:2a; 2:5a; 2:9a; 2:10; 2:11-12) are confirmed by Paul's recapitulation of his actions among them (2:2b; 2:5b; 2:6; 2:7a, b; 2:9b) and their response (2:13; 2:14-16). 2:13 portrays the Thessalonians' response as a positive demonstration that they "know" how Paul himself behaved (2:10) and how he "exhorted" them to behave (2:11-12); 2:14 offers a positive comparison between the response of the Thessalonians and that of the churches in Judea; 2:15-16 presents a negative comparison between the response of (the Judean Christians and) the Thessalonians and that of "the Jews."

At first glance, 2:3, 2:4, and 2:7c-8[9] might seem additional demonstrations or explanations of the Thessalonians' "knowledge" of Paul's ministry among them. However, these verses do differ from Paul's descriptions of his behavior and actions in 2:2b, 2:5b, 2:6, 2:7a, b, and 2:9b, which, although not narrowly specified, do indicate particular past actions in particular circumstances. 2:3-4a, on the other hand, reads more like the axiom underlying all such actions; it is an explanation asserted by Paul rather than a demonstration or explanation of something previously given as "known." Paul's conviction is that--negatively--"our appeal does not spring from error or uncleanness, nor is it made with guile;" (2:3) and that--positively--"we have been approved by God to be entrusted with the gospel" (2:4a).

The implications of this conviction, implications for Paul's relationship with God and his relationship with the Thessalonians, are drawn out in 2:4b and 2:7c-8. This is our conviction (2:3-4a), Paul writes, "so we speak, not to please men, but to please God who tests our hearts" (2:4b). This is our situation, Paul explains, "so, having a strong affection for you, we take pleasure to share with you not only the gospel of God but also our own selves, because you have become beloved to us" (2:8, my own translation).

The above observations concerning 1:2-2:16 may be presented

in the form of a chart of the type employed by Lévi-Strauss in "The Structural Study of Myth."[10] Repeated elements are listed below one another in vertical columns. Further attention to the relations between the columns is given below in considering the paradigmatic dimension of the text. The syntagmatic order of the text is followed by reading the chart from left to right and from top to bottom. Figure 1 illustrates our initial hypothesis: 1 Thessalonians 1:2-2:16 manifests a "structure" of four elements, which is made apparent by repetition in whole or in part.

FIGURE 1

1	2	3	4
	1:2		
1:3			
1:4	1:5a		
1:5b	1:6		
	1:7		
	1:8a, b		
1:8c	1:9-10		
2:1			
2:2a	2:2b	2:3	
		2:4a	2:4b
2:5a	2:5b		
	2:6		
	2:7a, b		2:7c-8
2:9a	2:9b		
2:10			
2:11-12	2:13		
	2:14-16		

The clearest expression of the fourfold pattern is given in 2:1-4 (which, according to Funk, is "formally" the opening of the body of the letter).

We must now consider whether such a "structure" is found elsewhere in 1 Thessalonians. 4:1-12 will provide the first test. The now familiar phrase "you know" does occur at 4:2 (oidate gar). (The reference to "know" in 4:4 [eidenai] appears to serve as a demonstration/explanation of that which "you know" in 4:2, more than as an additional assertion of something known. The reference to the "heathen" or "Gentiles" [ta ethnē] "who do not know God" at 4:5 is a negative transformation of a subjective, personal sense of "know" and will be discussed below.) More complex expressions indicating "knowing" are found at 4:1b, "as you learned from us" (kathōs parelabete par' hēmōn), and at 4:9a, "you have no need to have any one write to you" (ou chreian echete graphien humin).

The demonstration that the Thessalonians learned from Paul (4:1b) is offered in 4:1a and c, which, in terms of the logic of the argument, follow 4:1b: you learned from us (4:1b); you are demonstrating that (4:1c); we "exhort you" (4:1a) to keep on doing so "more and more" (4:1c). 4:2 asserts that "you know what instructions we gave you through the Lord Jesus," and the instructions are reiterated (and thus this knowledge demonstrated and/or explained) in 4:3-6 under the heading "For this is the will of God, your sanctification" (4:3). That the Thessalonians were "forewarned" (4:6) by Paul explains, of course,

how these various instructions (4:3-6) came to be "known" (4:2) by them. 4:7 is less a continuation of this list of particular injunctions and more a general principle underlying all such injunctions: "For God has not called us for uncleanness, but in holiness." This assertion justifies the instructions which have been explained (4:3-6) and are being demonstrated by the Thessalonians (4:1c). The implication of the assertion in 4:7 is made clear in 4:8, "Therefore whoever disregards this, disregards not man but God, who gives his Holy Spirit to you." The movement from 4:7 (note akatharsia and cf. akatharsias at 2:3, the only two occurrences of the term in 1 Thessalonians) to 4:8 parallels the movement from 2:3 to 2:4 (note disregarding, or rejecting, not humanity but God at 4:8 and cf. pleasing not humanity but God at 2:4).

The fourfold pattern begins anew at 4:9a with the observation that "But concerning love of the brethren you have no need to have any one write to you, ..." The basis for the Thessalonians' "knowledge" on this point is explained by the comment that they "have been taught by God (theodidaktoi) to love one another" (4:9b). The demonstration that this lesson is known is given in 4:10-11, "and indeed you do love all the brethren . . .," although, as in 4:1 above, "you" are "exhorted" to "do so more and more" (4:10). 4:12 brings out the implications of this love for the community, especially for its relationship to outsiders: "so that you may walk honorably among those outside and be dependent on no one" (my own translation). Thus the fourfold pattern uncovered in 1:2-2:16 also appears in 4:1-12 and may be charted as follows.

FIGURE 2

1	2	3	4
	4:1a		
4:1b	4:1c		
4:2	4:3		
(4:4)	4:4-5		
	4:6	4:7	4:8
4:9a	4:9b		
	4:10		
	4:11		4:12

When we continue our reading of 1 Thessalonians against the background of this fourfold pattern, 4:13 comes as somewhat a surprise. Rather than an assertion of the Thessalonians' "knowing," 4:13 is an assertion of their "not knowing": "But we would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning those who are asleep, that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope." Such a statement is a negative transformation, or an inversion, of the first element of the anticipated fourfold pattern. The second element, the demonstration/explanation of the asserted knowledge, is not to be expected if no knowledge has been asserted! Transformation of the situation of "ignorance" of the Thessalonians (4:13) demands some new word from Paul, and it is this which is introduced by 4:14 and elaborated in 4:15-17a. 4:14 is Paul's succinct statement of belief: "For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have fallen asleep." This belief statement is an assertion on the order of those in 2:3-4a and 4:7; it is more an initial postulate than a resultant

proof. 4:15, 16, and 17a elaborate this belief in picturesque detail. The implications of this belief, which is offered (4:14-17a) as a counterpoint to the "ignorance" of the Thessalonians (4:13), are drawn out in 4:17b and 18. The first implication concerns the relationship of Paul and the Thessalonian Christians to "the Lord": "and so we shall always be with the Lord" (4:17b). The second implication concerns the internal relationships of the Thessalonian Christian community: "Therefore comfort (parakaleite) one another with these words" (4:18). Thus, although 4:13 inverts the expected opening, the fourfold pattern manifest in 1:2-2:16 and in 4:1-12 also appears in 4:13-18.

5:1-11 may be conceived, perhaps, as a doublet of 4:13-18. A double assertion of "knowing" is presented in 5:1 and 2--"you have no need to have anything written to you" (ou chreian echete humin graphesthai, 5:1) and "For you yourselves know well" (autoi gar akribōs oidate, 5:2). The "knowledge" which is asserted is the manner in which "the day of the Lord" will come, and it is this "knowledge" which is demonstrated/explained in 5:3. The entire section, 5:2-8, moves forward by a play on the eschatological term "day of the Lord"--day vs. night, light vs. darkness. "But you are not in darkness, brethren" (humeis de, adelphoi, ouk este en skotei, 5:4) is yet another assertion of "knowing," and 5:5 and 5:7 an additional (and metaphorical) demonstration/explanation of what is presented as "known." (A shift in pronominal reference at this point will be discussed below.) 5:6 (note ara oun) and 5:8 present implications, again metaphorically expressed, of such "knowledge" and should be compared with 2:4b, 2:7c-8, 4:8, and 4:12. The axiom underlying this knowledge (5:1, 2, 4) as demonstrated/explained (5:3, 5, 7) is boldly stated in 5:9-10a: "For God has not destined us for wrath, but to obtain salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, (5:9) who died for us (5:10a) . . . ." As in 4:17b-18 above, the implications of the asserted belief (4:14-17a; 5:9-10a) are twofold, involving the relationship of Christians to the Lord (5:10b, "so that whether we wake or sleep we might live with him") and the relationships of Christians among themselves (5:11a, "Therefore encourage [parakaleite] one another and build one another up, . . .").

Both 4:13-18 and 5:1-11 direct the Thessalonians toward an assured and constant relationship with the Lord and a supportive relationship with each other. 4:13 opens this section with an assertion of "ignorance" on the part of the Thessalonians, but 5:11b closes this section with a demonstration of their "knowledge": "just as you are doing" (kathōs kai poieite); compare kathōs kai peripateite at 4:1, the opening of the larger section, chapters 4-5. These observations on 4:13-5:11 may be charted as were those on 1:2-2:16 and 4:1-12. (See figure 3 below.)

We turn now to 2:17-3:10, the section of 1 Thessalonians generally labeled "the travelogue." But our procedure calls for considering this section without this prior label and in the same manner as we have evaluated the other portions of the text. We wish to determine whether or not the fourfold pattern discovered elsewhere in 1 Thessalonians appears at 2:17-3:10 as well. The section is indeed complex, but our analysis of 4:13-5:11 offers several clues for understanding 2:17-3:10. Near the close of the section, 3:7, with its use of paraklēthēmen, seems to parallel 4:18 and 5:11a. At the opening of the section, 2:17a seems to parallel 4:13 as an assertion not of

"knowledge" but of "ignorance."

FIGURE 3

1	2	3	4
4:13 (-)		4:14	
		4:15	
		4:16	
		4:17a	4:17b
			4:18
5:1			
5:2	5:3		
5:4	5:5		5:6
	5:7		5:8
		5:9-10a	5:10b
			5:11a
	5:11b		

Paul's experience of the spatial and temporal distance between himself and the Thessalonian Christian community seems to be felt as a situation of "not knowing," as 2:17a suggests and 3:5b, c makes plain: "that I might know your faith, for fear that somehow the tempter had tempted you and that our labor would be in vain." 2:17b-18 demonstrates/explains why Paul has "no knowledge": he has been "hindered" from visiting the Thessalonians, even though he has desired to visit them "again and again." The rhetorical question at 2:19 and the strong statement at 2:20 function as the underlying motivation for Paul's desire to visit (2:17b-18), the axiom behind the action: "For what is our hope or joy or crown of boasting before our Lord Jesus at his coming? Is it not you? (2:19) For you are our glory and joy (2:20)." The action resulting from this assertion (2:19-20) is, not surprisingly, a renewed attempt on Paul's part to make contact with the Thessalonians. The failure of a proposed personal visit (2:17b-18) has left the status of "no knowledge" unchanged (2:17a); thus a visit by an intermediary is proposed (3:1-3a; 3:5a) to transform Paul's "not knowing" to "knowing" (3:5b, c): "Therefore when we could bear it no longer (3:1; cf. 3:5a), . . . we sent Timothy, our brother . . ., (3:2) . . . that I might know your faith (3:5b)." The thrust of Paul's argument at this point is, perhaps, more clear than the order and manner of its presentation, which manifests not only intellectual reasoning but also emotional response.

1	2	3	4
Paul does not know how the Thessalonians are faring,	for he has been hindered in his desire to visit them.	But the Thessalonians are Paul's glory and joy,	so he sends Timothy to them on his behalf, to inquire and exhort.

The transforming result of Timothy's visit to the Thessalonians and return to Paul (Paul's lack of "knowledge" of the Thessalonians' faith ⟶ Paul's "knowledge" of the Thessalonians' faith) is reported at 3:6, but it is foreshadowed at 3:3b, 3:4a, 3:4b by the statement of the Thessalonians' "knowledge" of Paul's ministry. It is <u>as if</u> Paul, who had worried that the Thessalonians might "be moved by these afflictions" (3:3a), is so excited by Timothy's "good news" of their faith and love

(3:6a) that he cannot restrain himself to recount his response in the proper chronological order; at the mention of "these afflictions," Paul's tribute to the Thessalonians' "knowledge" of himself and his ministry spills out. A double assertion of "knowledge" (3:3b, "You yourselves know," autoi gar oidate; 3:4b, "just as it has come to pass, and as you know," kathōs kai egeneto kai oidate) frames a demonstration/explanation of this "knowledge" (3:4a). The "good news" of Timothy reestablishes Paul's "knowledge" of the Thessalonians (3:6a) as Paul learns that the Thessalonians have not failed in their "knowledge" of him: "that you always remember us kindly and long to see us, as we long to see you-- (3:6b)."

The implication of this renewed "knowledge" for Paul's relationship with the Thessalonian Christian community is drawn out in 3:7, "for this reason, brethren, in all our distress and affliction we have been comforted (paraklēthēmen) about you through your faith; . . . ." Like 4:13-18, 2:17-3:10 opens with an inversion, or negative transformation, of the first element of the anticipated fourfold pattern, yet manifests the pattern in a recognizable and basically positive way, moving toward paraklēsis (consolation, exhortation) as the implied action. 3:8 and 9, paralleling 2:19 and 20 in reverse order, present a strong statement (3:8) and a rhetorical question (3:9) which assert that the Thessalonians are Paul's joy. This assertion motivates the movement from absence and "not knowing" to Timothy's visit and report and "knowing." 3:10, Paul's constant prayer for the Thessalonians, demonstrates that his "knowledge" of the Thessalonians has indeed been renewed. While 3:8-9 parallels 2:19-20, 3:9-10 parallels 1:2-3. Prayer (1:2, proseuchōn; 3:10, deomenoi) and thanksgiving (1:2, eucharistoumen; 3:9, eucharistian) frame the first half of Paul's letter to the Thessalonians. These observations on 2:17-3:10 may be charted in the previously established manner. Additional markings indicate certain internal relations of 2:17-3:10, as discussed above.

FIGURE 4



Thus we have illustrated the presence of a fourfold pattern in 1 Thessalonians 1:2-2:16, 2:17-3:10, 4:1-12, and 4:13-5:11. This "structure," presented above basically in its syntagmatic dimension, was discovered by following Lévi-Strauss' suggestion that "repetition has as its function to make the structure of the myth apparent."[11] Divisions suggested by the historical or theological "content" of the letter or by the epistolary "form"

of the text have been overlooked in this search for what may be termed the mythic structure. This mythic structure will be considered in its paradigmatic dimension below, but first we must consider several groups of verses of 1 Thessalonians which remain to be evaluated: 1:1, 3:11-13, 5:12-22, 5:23-24, 5:25-28.

Epistolary Interjections

The fourfold pattern which was found to be repeated throughout 1:2-2:16, 2:17-3:10, 4:1-12, and 4:13-5:11 does not appear to extend to 1:1, 3:11-13, 5:12-22, 5:23-24, and 5:25-28. In the former passages a mythic structure appears to leave a heavy impress on the letter, while in the latter passages the marks of an epistolary structure appear dominant.

1:1 is the salutation of the letter, consisting of sender (1:1a), addressee (1:1b), and greetings (1:1c). Traditional commentators are not in strict agreement concerning the extent of the formal closing of 1 Thessalonians. At the very least, 5:28 is listed; 5:28 parallels 1:1c, the initial greeting. However, it is difficult to categorize 5:25, 26, and 27 other than as greetings as well, in which case 5:25-28 parallels 1:1. 3:11-13 is a prayer, a blessing, which closes the first half of the letter; 3:11-13 is paralleled by 5:23-24, a blessing which closes the second half of the letter. As the first half of the letter is dominated by thanksgiving (note the framing references to "giving thanks" in 1:2-3 and 3:9-10, as well as the additional reference in 2:13 and the overall tone), a blessing forms an appropriate conclusion. The second half of the letter is dominated, however, by exhortation (note the framing references to "exhorting" in 4:1 and 5:11, additional references in 4:10 and 4:18, and the overall tone, but also the exhortation [5:14] to "give thanks in all circumstances" [5:18]),[12] and, it would appear, an exhortation (5:12-22) and a blessing (5:23-24) together form the conclusion. Thus:

1:1	greeting
1:2-3:10	(thanksgiving)
3:11-13	blessing
4:1-5:11	(exhortation)
5:12-22, 23-24	exhortation, blessing
5:25-28	greeting

Although 1:1 and 5:25-28 and 3:11-13 and 5:12-22, 23-24 do not manifest the same "structure" uncovered in the larger intervening passages (1:2-3:10; 4:1-5:11), certain emphases are common to both groups. Everywhere a system of relationships among "persons" is of importance: Paul relates to the Thessalonians (see especially 1:1; 3:11-12; 5:25-28; cf. especially 2:8; 2:19-20; 3:8-9), God and/or the Lord and/or the Holy Spirit relate/s to the Thessalonians or all Christians (see especially 1:1b; 3:13; 5:16-18; 5:19-20; 5:23-24; 5:28; cf. especially 4:7-8; 4:14; 4:17b; 5:9-10), God relates to Paul (see especially 3:11; cf. especially 2:3-4), the Thessalonians relate to each other (see especially 3:12; 5:12-15; 5:26; cf. especially 4:12; 4:18; 5:11a).

1 Thessalonians is often cut lengthwise, as it were, into two halves: chapters 1-3 and chapters 4-5. 1 Thessalonians may also be cut crosswise, again as it were, into two groups: portions in which an epistolary structure is dominant (1:1 // 5:25-28; 3:11-13 // 5:12-22, 23-24) and portions in which a

mythic structure is dominant (1:2-2:16 // 4:1-12; 2:17-3:10 // 4:13-5:11), although both an epistolary and a mythic structure may be assumed to be operative at some level throughout.

Overall Outline

A graphic outline which reflects the observations made of 1 Thessalonians to this point is presented below.

FIGURE 5



The various parts and sections of the text are interwoven in a number of ways. 1:1 and 5:25-28 frame the text as a letter; 3:11-13 and 5:12-22, 23-24 close its two halves. The major portions of the text may be divided into four groups based on the way each group manifests the mythic structure (the fourfold pattern): in groups B and D the initial manifestation of the first element of the fourfold pattern is an inversion (-), although the pattern later appears with the first element as anticipated (+). 1:2-3 and 3:9-10 (note "give thanks," "thanksgiving") enclose 1:2-3:10 (A and B), as 4:1 and 5:11 (note "exhort") enclose 4:1-5:11 (C and D). References to holiness and pleasing God (2:3-4; 4:7-8) interrelate group A (1:2-2:16) and group C (4:1-12), while references to exhorting one another (3:7; 4:18; 5:11a) interrelate group B (2:17-3:10) and group D (4:13-5:11). Holiness and exhortation (and comfort--both *paraklēsis* in Greek) appear to epitomize divine-human and human-human relationships respectively; the blessing at 3:11-13 and the exhortation/blessing at 5:12-22/23-24 crystallize this view. Paul's personal relationship to the Thessalonians is critical throughout, as signaled by the beginning (1:1) and the end (5:25-28).

Figure 5 reflects both epistolary and mythic structures, both syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions. The mythic structure is of greater concern in the present analysis, but in those passages enclosed by rectangles the epistolary structure is

considered dominant. Following the arrows and the consecutive numbers of the passages themselves illustrates the syntagmatic dimension. However, the division of the passages into groups (columns) A, B, C, and D is made in consideration of the paradigmatic dimension as well.

Figures 1 through 4 may be read syntagmatically by reading the horizontal rows from left to right and from top to bottom. Figures 1 through 4 may be read paradigmatically by ignoring the horizontal rows and reading the vertical columns from left to right, each column being considered as a unit.[13] Our attention now turns to this paradigmatic reading.

Paradigmatic Structure

According to Lévi-Strauss, the syntagmatic dimension of a myth presents only its "apparent content," whereas the paradigmatic dimension reveals its "latent content." However, an actual text is formed of interwoven syntagmatic and paradigmatic strands, and the two are fully unraveled only at the risk of destroying the fabric of the text. Analytically, though, the paradigm may be isolated as the "logical," theoretical structure of the text, and, in Lévi-Strauss' view, the mediation of opposites is key to the mythic paradigm.

Interrelated Actions

The verses indicated in figures 1-4 are arranged in columns on the basis of repeating elements, and these elements may be considered basically as actions. Central to the verses listed in column 1 is an assertion of knowing or an assertion of knowledge. The focus of the verses in column 2 is the enactment of a demonstration or explanation (of the knowledge or "non-knowledge" asserted in column 1). Column 3 is comprised of passages which make an assertion which itself may be an underlying explanation. The passages in column 4 suggest action or actions which follow from previous assertions (generally of column 3), that is, implications. In analyzing the Oepipus myth and certain Zuni myths, Lévi-Strauss found that the four columns which emerged could be related as follows:

1 : 2 :: 3 : 4

that is, 1 is to 2 as 3 is to 4. My analysis of 1 Thessalonians 1:2-3:10 and 4:1-5:11 may also be depicted in this form.

This pattern of relations is expressed in a more complex form in Lévi-Strauss' formula for the structure of myth:

$$f_x(a) : f_y(b) :: f_x(b) : f_{a-1}(y)$$

where "x" is opposed by "y," and "a" is opposed in one way by "b" and in another way by its own inverse, "a-1." In addition, in the fourth and final element of the formula, function and term values are reversed: "y," which had appeared as a function, now appears as a term; "a" had appeared as a term and now the "inverse of a" appears as a function. This final element of the formula indicates the mediating and transforming power of myth, the power of myth to move beyond its starting point in the manner of a spiral.[14] The formula may be applied to 1 Thessalonians as follows.

FIGURE 6

terms: a = (Objective) Knowledge
b = Demonstration/Explanation
a-1 = (Subjective) Knowledge
y = Action

functions: f_x = asserted
f_y = enacted
f_{a-1} = (subjective) knowing

$f_x(a)$	:	$f_y(b)$	::	$f_x(b)$	:	$f_{a-1}(y)$
asserted (Objective) Knowledge	:	enacted Demonstration/ Explanation	::	asserted Explanation/ Demonstration	:	(subjective) knowing Action

At this level of abstraction, the formula may seem but a play with words, but a return to the text (using figures 1-4 as guides) embodies the abstract terms with narrative significance. For example:

The Thessalonians know Paul's exemplary ministry and the instructions of the Lord,	as demonstrated in their exemplary behavior.	For holiness before God and mutual exhortation are required of Christians,	and these lead to holistic relationships with both God and other people.

Lévi-Strauss' formula for the structure of myth is concerned with the relationship between relationships. In terms of 1 Thessalonians this means that the relationship of asserted (Objective) Knowledge to enacted Demonstration/Explanation is comparable to the relationship of asserted Explanation/Demonstration to (subjective) knowing Action. As enacted Demonstration/Explanation completes or fulfills asserted (Objective) Knowledge, so (subjective) knowing Action completes or fulfills asserted Explanation/Demonstration. Furthermore, as the second element fulfills or extends the first, and the fourth fulfills or extends the third, so the third and the fourth move beyond the first and the second, giving to the whole movement a helicoidal shape. 1 Thessalonians aims toward the reestablishment of relationships: human-human (especially Paul-Thessalonians) and human-divine (especially Thessalonians [living or dead]-the Lord). Such reestablishment of relationships is a (subjective) knowing Action.

The difference between objective knowledge, i.e., knowing a fact, and subjective knowledge, i.e., knowing a person, is the difference between knowing instructions and knowing God and fellow Christians. Of the thirteen occurrences of *oida* in 1 Thessalonians, all but two are statements of knowing *that* (or knowing *how*, 4:4), even though *knowing that Paul* acted in such-and-such a way (1:5b; 2:1, 5, 11-12; 3:3b, 4; 4:2) or *knowing that God* acts in such a way (1:4; 3:4?; 5:2) is usually signified.[15] However, at 4:5 the people (*ta ethnē*) "who do not know God" are contrasted with the Thessalonians who, thus, must "know God"--personally, subjectively, that is, as subject to subject. At 5:12, part of the final exhortation, Paul encourages the Thessalonians "to know [*eidenai*, perfect infinitive of

oida, translated 'to respect' by RSV] those who labor among you and are over you in the Lord and admonish you, ..." This too signifies a subject to subject knowing. Both God and fellow Christians are to be known in this personal, subjective way --not just known about. Knowing about or knowing that is not detrimental--indeed, it is essential; but it is partial. Paul's statements that the Thessalonians have no need to have any one write to them "concerning love of the brethren" (4:9) or "as to the times and the seasons" of the day of the Lord (5:1) are assertions that more (Objective) Knowledge is not needed. However, the very writing of Paul's letter to the Thessalonians suggests another need: the need for (subjective) knowing Action, i.e., the need to express and strengthen the personal knowing of one another and of God (and the Lord) in action, including the action of letter-writing!

It is this need which Robert Funk has considered from another angle in examining the "apostolic parousia" in the Pauline letters. Funk's thesis is as follows:

> Owing to Paul's understanding of the significance of his apostolic presence to his congregations, Paul gathers the items which may be scattered about in the common letter or appended as additional information, into one more or less discrete section, in which he (a) implies that the letter is an anticipatory surrogate for his presence, with which, however, the letter is entirely congruent (2 Cor. 10:11); (b) commends the emissary who is to represent him in the meantime; and (c) speaks of an impending visit or a visit for which he prays. Through these media his apostolic authority and power are made effective.[16]

However, as Funk suggests in two footnotes, in 1 Thessalonians the real focus of the relevant section (2:17-3:13) is "the Pauline notion of the reciprocal presence of apostle and congregation to each other" (see 1 Thessalonians 3:6-8; cf. 2:19f.).[17] I judge that in 1 Thessalonians greater weight is given to the significance of the "presence" of the congregation to the apostle. The Thessalonians may have "no need to have any one write," but Paul has a great need to write!

In this sense, the act of Paul in writing to the Thessalonians (after hearing from them via Timothy) is more important than the "facts" the letter contains; the letter is more something done than something said. A letter as letter presupposes a relationship between sender and receiver;[18] to the extent that expressing and solidifying this relationship is more important than whatever "news" may be conveyed, a letter is a "performative" text. In 1 Thessalonians, this assumption of the letter as letter is also manifest in the mythic structure of the letter: one form of (subjective) knowing Action is the writing of letters.

Funk's concern is the "form and significance" of the Pauline letter, especially the "apostolic parousia" (of which the so-called "travelogue" is one aspect); 1 Thessalonians 2:17-3:13 serves as one example. My main concern is the mythic structure of 1 Thessalonians as a whole, and in this approach 2:17-3:10 is to be understood in its context within 1 Thessalonians. Within this context, a parallel between 2:17-3:10 and 4:13-5:11 is suggested. It is as if Paul answers the questions and comforts the anxieties of the Thessalonians concerning the absence of those who have died on the basis of his own

experience of questions and anxieties brought about by his absence from the Thessalonians. As Timothy's "good news" of the Thessalonians' faith and love comforts Paul (3:6-7), so Paul's "word of the Lord" concerning the resurrection of the dead is intended for the comfort of the Thessalonians (4:14-18). As Paul's relationship with the Thessalonians proves to be secure despite his absence from them, so the relationship of living and dead Thessalonian Christians is secure despite their absence from one another. Both the "apostolic parousia" and the parousia tou kuriou aim to reestablish relationships; both intend to fill an absence with a "presence." The structure of the letter as letter (Funk's analysis) does not suggest this parallel; it is suggested by the mythic structure of the text.

The mythic structure of 1 Thessalonians 1:2-3:10 and 4:1-5:11 has been analyzed syntagmatically as a repeating series of actions of four types: 1, 2, 3, 4. The mythic structure of 1 Thessalonians 1:2-3:10 and 4:1-5:11 has been analyzed paradigmatically as the interrelation of the four types of actions: 1 : 2 :: 3 : 4. Basically, these analyses have followed the procedure of Lévi-Strauss in "The Structural Study of Myth." We now turn to a brief look, and one less structured by Lévi-Strauss' example, at (1) the familial metaphors applied to the "actors" involved in these actions and (2) the temporal framework in which these actions are embedded.

Familial Metaphors

A letter does not involve "actors" in the sense that a drama or a narrative does, but Paul's letter to the Thessalonians does assign actions to, among others, the sender, the addressees, God, and the Lord Jesus Christ. Furthermore, 1 Thessalonians links these four "actors" (Paul, the Thessalonians, God, the Lord) by a network of familial metaphors.

Of the thirty-three occurrences of theos in 1 Thessalonians (including the compound theodidaktoi, "God-taught," at 4:9), four combine "God (theos) and "Father" (patēr): "(our) God and Father" (1:1, 3; 3:11, 13). The distinctiveness of this designation is made apparent by the relative absence of modifiers in conjunction with theos in 1 Thessalonians.[19] In relation to "(our) God and Father," the Lord Jesus Christ is "his Son [huios] from heaven" (1:10).[20] Christians, including the Thessalonians and Paul, are "sons (huioi) of light" and "sons (huioi) of the day" (5:5).

In addition to providing a model for the relation of God to believers, the father image provides a model for the relation of Paul to the Thessalonians: 2:11, "for you know how, like a father (patēr) with his children (tekna), we exhorted each one of you and encouraged you and charged you . . . ." It would seem that this father image is supplemented by a mother image at 2:7; however, not mētēr but trophos, "nurse," appears as the vehicle of the metaphor. The implications of this usage suggest an answer to the confusion regarding verse division in 2:6-7, punctuation in 2:7, and the variants nēpioi, "infants," and ēpioi, "gentle," in 2:7b.[21] Following the text and punctuation of the United Bible Societies' third edition, I translate 2:7-8 rather literally as follows:

> (7a) being able to be in authority [or, able to claim authority] as Christ's apostles, (7b) we became, however,

> infants in your midst. (7c) As if a nurse were caring for [or, Like a nurse caring for] her own children, (8) so, we, having a strong affection for you, take pleasure to share [or, in sharing] with you not only the gospel of God but also our own selves, because you have become beloved to us.

The tenor of the "nurse" metaphor is not 2:7b requiring the variant "gentle" as in RSV 2:7a, but 2:8. Sharing her own self is the literal role of one nursing a child; such sharing is the figurative role of Paul among the Thessalonians. Thus the import of the metaphor is not "gentle, like a nurse" but "like a nurse, self-giving." As God is "Father" to all, so Paul is like a parent, both nourishing and disciplining, to the Thessalonians.

Yet Paul is also like a child, even an infant, to the Thessalonians. 2:7b (nēpioi , not ēpioi) is a familial metaphor paralleling 2:7a. The antithetical images (like 2:3-4, negative first, positive second) might be rephrased: "we could command authority over you as apostles, but we came instead as infants in your midst." The juxtaposition of the metaphors (Paul as infant, Paul as nurse) is dramatic and serves to dramatize the "family" ties which bind Paul and the Thessalonians.[22]

The most frequently employed familial metaphor of 1 Thessalonians is "brother" (adelphos) or "brothers" (adelphoi). The singular form occurs but twice: 3:2, "and we sent Timothy, our brother (adelphon) and God's servant in the gospel of Christ"; 4:6, "that no man transgress, and wrong his brother (adelphon) in this matter . . . ." It is clear that "brother" is a familial metaphor for "fellow Christian." That Christians are "brothers" to each other ("sisters" does not appear in 1 Thessalonians) follows from the assertion that God is "Father." Timothy is a "brother" to Paul (3:2) and the Thessalonians are "brothers" to Paul (1:4; 2:1, 9, 14, 17; 3:7; 4:1, 10b, 13; 5:1, 4, 12, 14, 25). The Thessalonians are also "brothers" to each other (4:6; 5:26, 27) and to Christians beyond their own community (4:9, 10b).

On four occasions, "brothers" is used objectively," that is, something is said about "brothers": 4:9, "concerning love of the brethren (philadelphias); 4:10a, "and indeed you do love all the brethren (adelphous)"; 5:26, "Greet all the brethren (adelphous)"; 5:27, "that this letter be read to all the brethren (adelphois)." (The two singular uses mentioned above are also "objective" in this sense.) However, on fourteen occasions, "brothers" is used subjectively (in the sense of subject-to-subject), in direct address. The vocative adelphoi occurs throughout the entire letter (from 1:4 to 5:25) and is a mark of the enunciation, a signal of the sender's relation with the addressees. In terms of the foregoing discussion of interrelated actions, the contexts of the fourteen vocative uses of adelphoi may be categorized as follows: Paul is not in need of "knowledge" (1:4); Paul is in need of "knowledge" (2:17; 3:7); the Thessalonians are not in need of "knowledge" (2:1, 9, 14; 5:1, 4); the Thessalonians are in need of "knowledge" (4:13); Paul exhorts the Thessalonians for their own sakes (4:1, 10b; 5:12, 14); Paul exhorts the Thessalonians for his sake--and for the sake of his co-workers? (5:25). From beginning to end, from "not knowing" to "knowing," from exhortation to prayer, Paul addresses the Thessalonians as "brothers."

The presence of the familial metaphor "brothers" in

1 Thessalonians is congruent with a basic presupposition and/or function of the Greek letter--the maintaining of a personal relationship.[23] The presence of the two familial metaphors "Father" and "brothers" is congruent with the mythic structure of 1 Thessalonians, with its focus upon personal relationships--both human-human ("brothers") and human-divine ("Father").

Temporal Framework

The actions of God ("Father") and Paul and the Thessalonians ("brothers") are presented within the temporal framework of past, present, and future. The divisions of the basic temporal framework of 1 Thessalonians, determined both syntagmatically and paradigmatically, mirror those of the overall outline presented above (figure 5).

FIGURE 7

1:1	present greeting [salutation]
1:2-2:16	present memory of [thanksgiving for] the relatively distant past [Paul's original ministry among the Thessalonians]
2:17-3:10	present memory of [thanksgiving for] the recent and immediate past [Paul's absence and Timothy's visit and report]
3:11-13	present prayer for the future [blessing]
4:1-12	present instruction [exhortation] concerning the present and the continuing future [ethical exhortations]
4:13-5:11	present instruction [exhortation] concerning the present and the unscheduled future [teaching on the resurrection of the dead and the day of the Lord, with implications for the present]
5:12-22	present instruction [exhortation] concerning the present and the continuing future [general ethical exhortations]
5:23-24	present prayer for the future [blessing]
5:25-28	present greeting [closing]

When the text is examined in detail, verb tense by verb tense, the situation presents itself in greater complexity. As a rule, the "as you know" statements (the assertions of column 1) are in the present tense, while the substance of what is known (the demonstration/explanation of column 2-- especially in chapters 1-3) is in the past tense, and exhortations to continue acting in the manner known (column 2--especially in chapters 4-5) are in the present tense. As a rule, the passages which serve somewhat as axioms (column 3) and those which stand as implications (column 4) are presented in the present tense, often with a certain "then, now, and always," or timeless, sense.[24] Of course, present assertions and implications with regard to

the future (4:14-18) involve both present and future tenses.

The "future" carries weight in the syntagmatic structure of 1 Thessalonians because of its position of end stress. The "future" also carries weight in the paradigmatic structure because reference to it binds the letter together, as is especially the case with the four explicit references to the "coming" (parousia) of the Lord Jesus Christ.[25] The first such reference is 2:19, "For what is our hope or joy or crown of boasting before our Lord Jesus at his coming? Is it not you?," which is the assertion underlying Paul's desire and efforts to renew contact with the Thessalonians and leading to Paul's being comforted by the Thessalonians' faith (2:17-3:10). The third reference to the parousia is 4:15, "For this we declare to you by the word of the Lord, that we who are alive, who are left until the coming (parousia) of the Lord, shall not precede those who have fallen asleep," which is Paul's assertion leading to comforting the Thessalonians (4:13-18; cf. 5:1-11). The second reference to the "coming" of the Lord is the prayer at 3:11-13, "so that he may establish your hearts unblamable in holiness before our God and Father, at the coming (parousia) of our Lord Jesus with all his saints" (3:13). As the third reference to the Lord's "coming" parallels the first, so the fourth parallels the second, for the fourth reference to the parousia is the prayer at 5:23, ". . . and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming (parousia) of our Lord Jesus Christ." Holiness before God is demanded because of the Lord's "coming" (3:13; 5:23); joy and comfort in one another will continue through the Lord's "coming" (2:19; 4:15). The parousia is a future "presence" as culmination of past and present.

The brotherly relationship, past and present, of Paul and the Thessalonians will be strengthened at the future "coming." Throughout most of the letter, the writer's self-reference is "we," while the pronominal reference to the Thessalonians is "you." However, at 1:10, the reference to "us" (hēmas), who are to be delivered from "the wrath to come," surely includes both Paul and the Thessalonians. Similarly, the reference to "we who are alive, who are left until the coming of the Lord," at 4:15 (and also at 4:17, without the repetition of parousia) must include both the sender and the receivers of the letter. Certainly the distinction between "we" (Paul or Paul and his co-workers[26]) and "you" (the Thessalonian Christians) is broken down by "us" at 5:4-10. Since "you are all sons of light and sons of the day" and "we are not of the night or of darkness" (5:5), "you" and "we" are the same type of "sons"; "you" and "we" are "brothers" (5:4). "So then let us [both "you" and "we"] not sleep, as others [neither "you" nor "we"] do, but let us keep awake and be sober" (5:6). This inclusiveness carries over to the "we" at 5:8 (hēmeis) and the "us" at 5:8 (nēphōmen, first person plural pres. subjunctive), 5:9 (hēmas), and 5:10a (hēmoñ). The "we" who "might live with him (zēsōmen)" at 5:10b is most inclusive of all: both Paul (the original "we") and the Thessalonians (the original "you"), both "we" who are awake and "we" who are asleep.

As the paradigmatic structure of the major "actions" of 1 Thessalonians (figure 6) illustrates, the text moves toward the renewal of relationships among its "actors"--between those present and those absent, between the living and the dead, between human beings and other human beings, between human beings and God and the Lord Jesus Christ. This process of the renewal

of relationships has roots in the past, continues into the present, and moves toward fulfillment in the future. Through their actions (remembered, continued, projected), the actors of 1 Thessalonians move toward each other as they move toward the future. In Lévi-Straussian terms we might say that the opposition presence vs. absence is mediated by communication; the opposition life vs. death is mediated by resurrection; the opposition "we" (or "I") vs. "you" is mediated by "us" as "brothers"; the opposition present vs. past is mediated by the future. These structures of mediation are parallel, for each level of a myth is "a transformation of an underlying logical structure common to all of them,"[27] just as each variation within a musical composition is a transformation of the major motif. Thus, communication and "brotherhood" and the future are resurrection experiences; or, the other way round, the meaning of "resurrection" and "parousia" is made apparent in the experience of communication among "brothers."[28]

Structural Theory

The conclusions of the present structural exegesis of 1 Thessalonians repeat neither the outline of the "contents" nor the outline of the "form" presented in the opening of this study, although, in certain aspects, the "structure" proposed herein may be compared with both "outlines." Traditional criticism is historically oriented in outlining the "contents" of biblical texts; e.g., 1 Thessalonians is viewed as a source of information about Paul's ministry. Structural criticism is literary in orientation and often focuses not on the "surface" of a text (e.g., the "form" of a narrative [story] as a narrative [story] or the "form" of a letter as a letter) but on the "depth" dimension of a text (in Lévi-Straussian terminology, the mythic dimension) or on the relationship between "surface" and "depth." Thus it is perhaps over-simplified and yet helpful to characterize traditional criticism as historical and structural criticism as literary,[29] traditional criticism as diachronic and structural criticism as synchronic,[30] traditional criticism as focused on the "Author" and structural criticism as focused on the "Text."[31]

Yet "structural criticism" (like "traditional criticism"), while singular grammatically, is plural in manifestation! It is not our purpose here to define "structuralism," nor to describe "structural criticism" in all its varied manifestations. Our aim is, rather, to consider briefly what is common to a variety of endeavors identified as "structural" or "structuralist"[32] and what distinguishes them, and to set within this framework the present study of 1 Thessalonians. This approach to "structuralism" and "structural criticism" concentrates on end points and beginning points, goals and foci. The following theoretical construct was originally developed in relation to narrative texts and is here expanded to include letters ("epistolary texts") and to illustrate certain commonalities between the two.

Goals

Because of divergent intentions, methods, and results of thought and works labeled by their authors or by others as structural or structuralist, it is not easy, perhaps not possible, to complete the statement, "structuralism is . . . ." I should like, instead, to present several alternatives to the

statement, "structuralism as . . . ." In other words, while agreeing in principle with those who find structuralism impossible, or nearly so, to define, in practice I have found it helpful to systematize several important goals of structuralism's "adherents" or "practitioners."

I employ the two terms "adherents" and "practitioners" advisedly, for structuralism in its broadest sense may aim toward either ideology or methodology. These two basic directions are not unique to structuralism, but common to intellectual movements generally; they represent the two categories of "the means that men employ to order their universe."[33] By ideology--or philosophy if its connotations are less abrasive[34]--is meant "any more or less consistent system of beliefs and values which describes and accounts for the relations of men to one another, and to the material, and not infrequently the immaterial, universe."[35] Structuralism as an ideology is "a way of looking for reality not in individual things but in the relationships among them."[36] Lévi-Strauss' desire to understand the structure of the human mind from an examination of its cultural products, his discovery of "vast homologies,"[37] represents an ideological (or philosophical) goal of structuralism. By methodology is meant "any set of rules or regulations which describes and prescribes the operations to be performed upon any matter . . . with the purpose of ordering it and understanding its working."[38] Most structuralists view structuralism as a methodology, although they may recognize that its basic presuppositions are philosophical. I offer this distinction between ideology and methodology as a descriptive one, not as an evaluative one, although "ideology," or its equivalent, generally serves as the negatively valued pole among commentators on structuralism. In fact, neither ideology nor methodology is manifest concretely in total isolation--in structuralism or in any intellectual movement.[39]

But, speaking abstractly, structuralism as a methodology may focus upon either theory or analysis.[40] Structuralism as theory may be directed to various issues: a theory of Russian fairy tales (Propp), a theory of kinship or myth (Lévi-Strauss), a theory of narrativity (Greimas). In the field of literature, theoretical structuralism approaches not so much the meaning of individual works of literature as the meaning of meaning, that is, the presuppositions which enable literature to be written and to be read; theoretical structuralism seeks not so much to tell the meaning as to recreate the process of meaning. From this description, the reverberations between theory and ideology should be loud and clear; in somewhat simplistic terms, ideology may be understood as theory (or theories) further abstracted and further generalized.

In the other direction, theory is resonant with analysis, for analysis is applied theory. In the field of literature, structuralism as analysis focuses upon the meaning of individual works, although this meaning must be considered (theoretically) as a subset of the meaning of meaning. Structuralism as analysis is concerned not just with the what of individual meaning, but with the how of individual meaning. Observers have often noted that structuralism as theory appears dominant over structuralism as analysis; some commentators have even identified structuralism as theory with "structuralism" per se. Since theoretical hypotheses offer starting points for analysis, theoretical dominance may be a mark of structuralism's youth; if so, signs of maturation (or aging, depending upon the point of view!) may be discerned in an increasing number of analytical

studies. However, theory and analysis, like ideology and methodology, are separable only in the abstract.[41]

Just as structuralism as methodology bifurcates into theory and analysis, so structuralism as analysis subdivides into structural exegesis and narrative hermeneutics.

FIGURE 8



In relationship to ideology, both theory and analysis are forms of methodology. In relationship to theory, both structural exegesis and narrative hermeneutics are forms of analysis. As theory is, in a sense, applied ideology, so structural exegesis is theory applied to an "object" (a text) and narrative hermeneutics is structural exegesis applied to a "subject" (a reader). Edgar McKnight's Meaning in Texts: The Historical Shaping of a Narrative Hermeneutics, from which I have borrowed the term "narrative hermeneutics," well represents this goal of structuralism.[42] Structural exegesis as a goal of structuralism has been the aim of the present study of 1 Thessalonians.

These four--ideology, theory, structural exegesis, narrative hermeneutics--may be considered terminal goals of structuralism;[43] a structuralist may choose any one of them as her or his ultimate goal, though she or he may reach it via another goal (or goals) as penultimate.[44] Thus, in the Mythologiques, Lévi-Strauss moves from an analysis of individual myths (structural exegesis) to a theory of myth to an ideological understanding of what makes humanity human. In Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice, Daniel Patte and Aline Patte move from a semiotic theory to a structural exegesis of Mark 15 and 16, toward a narrative hermeneutic. In the present study, I have presupposed Lévi-Strauss' theory of myth as the basis for a structural exegesis of 1 Thessalonians.

In actuality, both Lévi-Strauss and Patte and Patte move back and forth between goals, or forms of structuralism, in the process of discovering meaning. However, their respective directions and ultimate goals are clear: Lévi-Strauss moves toward ideology, the Pattes toward hermeneutics. Yet ideology and narrative hermentutics are not as unrelated as they might appear from figure 8 above. The desire to philosophize on the basis of ethnography is not unlike the desire to theologize on the basis of narratology. Ideology, in its philosophical aspects, and narrative hermeneutics, in its theological aspects, share a concern for the breadth of humanity and the depth of

human beings.[45] It is possible that the continuum which might be represented as:



should be represented as:

FIGURE 9



For while movement from structural exegesis to theory to ideology (Lévi-Strauss) is movement from the concrete to the increasingly abstract--through the pole of the objective, movement from theory to structural exegesis to narrative hermeneutics (Patte and Patte) is movement from the objective to the increasingly subjective--through the pole of the concrete. Although I began my study with a theory developed by Lévi-Strauss, I moved in a direction more similar to that of the Pattes: from a theory of myth to a structural exegesis of 1 Thessalonians.

Foci

As structuralism as a whole may be approached, though not defined, by interrelating its diverse goals, so the various manifestations of structural criticism may be characterized by noting their distinctive foci. Based on the model of communication as the interrelation of Sender, Sign, and Receiver, a work of literature (in the broadest sense of the term) may be considered as the interrelation of Author, Text, and Reader. If the communication model is expanded to include Referent[46]--someone (Sender) says something (Sign) to someone (Receiver) about something (Referent)--the model of a literary work may be expanded to include World.[47]

FIGURE 10



When figure 10 in inscribed within figure 9, an intriguing set of affinities is manifest.

FIGURE 11



NARRATIVE HERMENEUTICS is shaped by its concern for the Reader, STRUCTURAL EXEGESIS by its concern for the Text. THEORY, while apparently applicable to any of the four elements, generally focuses on the constraints upon the Author. IDEOLOGY is most concerned with views of (the) World. Thus each of the four structuralist goals appears to focus primarily upon one of the four elements of the model of a literary work. However, just as the four structuralist GOALS were seen to be non-exclusive, the four structuralist Foci are interrelated in structural criticism. While one of the four elements (Author, Text, Reader, World) or one relation may be of focal importance for a particular structuralist endeavor, all the elements and relations are of subsidiary importance, for the literary work is a whole. Thus the diagram (figure 11) might be conceived as a spider's web; touching one point or one strand causes the whole to vibrate. In addition, each of the four major foci may be further subdivided, for example:

Author--historical writer/incarnate narrator
Reader--particular reader/implied reader
World--historical world/literary world

We shall concentrate below on further distinctions of the Text.

The Text is the shared focus of various methods of structural criticism; to distinguish among these approaches we must first distinguish foci <u>within</u> the Text as focus. The text as sign has two levels: surface (narrative or epistolary) and depth (mythic).[48] In traditional literary terms, the narrative level has to do with the characters and the plot; it is what

makes the story recognizable as a story. In traditional form-critical terms, the epistolary level concerns the formulae of and divisions between salutation, body, and closing; it is what makes the letter recognizable as a letter. The mythic level has to do with the broader cultural, philosophical, religious significance of the text. The text as language (Saussure's langue), or a system of signs, has two dimensions: syntagmatic and paradigmatic. In the synchronic dimension of a text, elements are ordered chronologically; in the paradigmatic dimension of a text, elements are ordered abstractly, theoretically. Interrelating these two levels and two dimensions yields four textual foci:

(1) the syntagmatic dimension of the surface level
(2) the paradigmatic dimension of the surface level
(3) the syntagmatic dimension of the depth level
(4) the paradigmatic dimension of the depth level

which may be represented:[49]

FIGURE 12

TEXTUAL FOCI		dimensions	
		syntagmatic	paradigmatic
levels	surface	1	2
	depth	3	4

To concretize this abstract description of textual foci we may attempt to identify the foci of Propp, Lévi-Strauss, and Greimas as they analyze narrative texts and of Doty, White, and Funk as they analyze epistolary texts.[50] Propp's focus on the order of invariant "functions" (types of actions) within the plot is a focus on the syntagmatic dimension of the narrative (surface) level (1). Lévi-Strauss' insistence that to "understand" a mythic text we must examine its bundles of relations arranged not chronologically but abstractly, in terms of opposition and mediation, is a focus on the paradigmatic dimension of the mythic (depth) level (4). The complex and ongoing work of Greimas is less easy to plot; however, Greimas' chief interests seem to lie with the actantial model and the constitutional model (or elementary structure of signification); that is, his foci are chiefly the paradigmatic dimension of both the narrative (surface) level (2) and the mythic (depth) level (4). Both Doty and White are concerned with establishing a theoretical model of the Pauline letter from beginning to end; thus their focus is the syntagmatic dimension of the epistolary (surface) level (1). While Funk shares this concern with Doty and White, he concentrates on one aspect of the letter form, the so-called "travelogue," in terms of its "logical," theoretical order and significance as "the apostolic parousia." Thus Funk's major focus is the paradigmatic dimension of the epistolary (surface) level (2).

The present study of 1 Thessalonians, while focusing on the mythic (depth) level in both its syntagmatic (3) and

paradigmatic (4) dimensions, has aimed for an awareness of the interrelation of all four aspects. To observe that at the beginning (1:1), middle (3:11-13), and end (5:12-22, 23-24; 5:25-28) of 1 Thessalonians the epistolary level is dominant is to examine the syntagmatic dimension of the epistolary (surface) level (1). To call attention to the functional parallelism between 1:1 and 5:25-28 as marks of the relationship between Paul and the Thessalonians and between 3:11-13 and 5:12-22, 23-24 as marks of the interrelation of thanksgiving and exhortation is to note the paradigmatic dimension of the epistolary (surface) level (2), although in 1 Thessalonians, as in all texts, the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions are intricately interwoven. Isolation of the repeating pattern--[1] asserted (Objective) Knowledge, [2] enacted Demonstration/Explanation, [3] asserted Explanation/Demonstration, and [4] (subjective) knowing Action--develops from a study of the syntagmatic dimension of the mythic (depth) level (3). Analysis of the interrelation of the above four elements [1 : 2 :: 3 : 4] rests on an examination of the paradigmatic dimension of the mythic (depth) level (4).

Epistemological Framework

Foci are the what of structural criticism, the aspects and relations for careful investigation. Goals are the why of structuralism, the purposes and reasons for careful investigation. Together goals and foci suggest the framework within which structural criticism operates and strives to "know."

We noted above that Propp, Lévi-Strauss, and Greimas all share a common goal in their structural research--theory, although they theorize on various topics (Russian fairy tales, kinship and myth, narrativity). Thus my differentiation of the goals of structuralism functions to link these three key figures, although it also differentiates Lévi-Strauss on the basis of his ideological aims. However, we have just noted that the three scholars focus on different aspects of the structural analysis of texts. Thus my differentiation of the foci of structural analysis functions to differentiate these key figures, although it does not illustrate their commonality as theorists. Likewise, Doty, White, and Funk share "theory" as a goal and "the syntagmatic dimension of the epistolary level" as a focus, but Funk is distinguished by a further concern for "the paradigmatic dimension of the epistolary level." Thus, by a system of goals and foci, it is possible to register both commonalities and distinctions among major structuralist critics of narrative on the one hand and among critics of letters on the other. (See figure 13[31] and figure 14 below.)

As parallel figures, figures 13 and 14 illustrate the basic similarities between narrative texts and epistolary texts as texts: (1) they are two-leveled (surface/depth), and (2) each level is organized in two ways (syntagmatically/paradigmatically). The remaining questions are substantial ones: Given these similarities, what differences exist between narrative texts and epistolary texts? How are narrative texts and epistolary texts to be related? It would appear that brief narratives are easily incorporated into letters (e.g., 1 Thessalonians 3:1-5) and that brief letters are easily incorporated into narratives (e.g., Acts 23:26-30). However, may a letter as a whole be conceived as a "narrative" (a story) of the relationship of a sender and a receiver? May a narrative as a whole be conceived as

FIGURE 13

STUDY OF NARRATIVE TEXTS		foci			
		narrative/ syntagmatic	narrative/ paradigmatic	mythic/ syntagmatic	mythic/ paradigmatic
goals	ideology				Lévi-Struass
	theory	Propp	Greimas		Lévi-Strauss Greimas
	structural exegesis				
	narrative hermeneutics				

FIGURE 14

STUDY OF EPISTOLARY TEXTS		foci			
		epistolary/ syntagmatic	epistolary/ paradigmatic	mythic/ syntagmatic	mythic/ paradigmatic
goals	ideology				
	theory	Doty White Funk	Funk		
	structural exegesis			(Malbon)	(Malbon)
	narrative hermeneutics				

a "letter" (a message) from a writer/teller to a reader/hearer? How is the relationship between surface and depth to be understood? Is the "surface" level of a text (either a narrative or an epistolary level in the texts examined to this point) a "generic" level? Is the "depth" level of a text (a mythic level in the texts examined to this point) a "universal" level of communication?

The present study has focused on both the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic dimensions of the mythic level of Paul's letter to the Thessalonians and has had as its goal a structural exegesis of 1 Thessalonians. Structural exegesis, like any exegesis which seeks to avoid eisegesis, must finally be evaluated in terms of the text whose meaning it seeks to "draw out." 1 Thessalonians suggests that communication is an ongoing action, not a static state; the present structural exegesis of 1 Thessalonians is certainly an open-ended project, not a *fait accompli*.

June-July 1980

NOTES

[1]Such a pattern is followed, for example, in Ernest Best, A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972) and in the following biblical or New Testament commentaries: The Interpreter's Bible, 12 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1952-57): volume 11, pp. 245-53 (by John W. Bailey); The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, 4 vols. (Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1962): volume 4, pp. 621-25 (by F. W. Beare); The Jerome Bible Commentary, 2 vols. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968): volume 2, pp. 227-28 (by J. Terence Forestell, C. S. B.); Werner Georg Kümmel, Introduction to the New Testament, trans Howard Clark Kee (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), pp. 255-62.

[2]For example, Robert W. Funk, Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God: The Problem of Language in the New Testament and Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), part three (pp. 224-305); Robert W. Funk, "The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance," in Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox, ed. W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, R. R. Niebuhr (Cambridge: The University Press, 1967), pp. 249-68; John L. White, "The Structural Analysis of Philemon: A Point of Departure in the Formal Analysis of the Pauline Letter," The Society of Biblical Literature 107th Annual Meeting Seminar Papers, vol. 1 (1971), pp. 1-47; Willaim G. Doty, Letters in Primitive Christianity, Guides to Biblical Scholarship, New Testament Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973).

[3]IDB 4:623-24. That such an outline is generally agreed upon is clear from comparable--but generally less detailed--outlines in IB 11:251; JBC 2:228; Kümmel, pp. 255-56; The Oxford Annotated Bible; Revised Standard Version, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Claus Westermann, Handbook of the New Testament, trans. and ed. Robert H. Boyd (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969), pp. 120-21.

[4]Funk's summary appears on p. 270. Funk is most concerned at this point with the body of the Pauline letter, and this is the only division he specifically delineates for 1 Thessalonians; however, Funk does state "that I Thessalonians matches the proposed structure point for point and in the proper order. As a matter of fact, it stands alone in this regard" (p. 271). Doty (p. 43) lists the "formal parts" of 1 Thessalonians as follows:

(1) opening (1:1)
    sender, addressee, greeting
(2) thanksgiving/blessing (1:2-16) [Presumably 1:2-10 is meant, although 1:2-2:16 is conceivable.]
    (a) intercession (cf. 3:10)
    (b) eschatological climax (1:10; 3:11-13)
(3) body (2:1-3:13)
    (a) formal opening (2:1-4, -12?)
    (b) eschatological conclusion (2:13-16)
    (c) travelogue (2:17-3:13)

(4) paraenesis (4:1-12; 5:1-22) [What of 4:13-18?]
(5) closing
    (a) greetings (5:26)
    (b) doxology (5:23)
    (c) benediction (5:28)
    [What of 5:24, 25?]

[5]In the sense in which Dan O. Via, Jr. employs "surface structure" and "deep structure" in the editor's foreward to What Is Structural Exegesis?, by Daniel Patte, Guides to Biblical Scholarship, New Testament Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), pp. iii-iv. For further discussion of the problems and possibilities of this distinction, see the section on Structural Theory below.

[6]The distinction between "syntagmatic" and "paradigmatic," of course, grows out of the work of Saussure, although "paradigmatic" is actually Hjelmslev's term, Saussure's term "associative" being more problematic and less widely employed. One explicit statement on the function of repetition in myth appears in Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," Journal of American Folklore 68 (1955): 443 [reprinted in Structural Anthropology].

[7]The text employed for this study is that of The Greek New Testament, ed. Kurt Aland et al., 3rd ed. (N.p.: United Bible Societies, 1975). Unless otherwise noted, quotations presented in English are from the Revised Standard Version of the New Testament, second edition, copyrighted 1971 by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Chruches of Christ in the United States of America.

[8]With Best (p. 73), I take the hoti in 1:5 to be epexegetical rather than causal and verse 5 to be explanatory of verse 4.

[9]For a translation and discussion of 2:7a, b, c, and 8, see the section on Familial Metaphors below.

[10]See especially pp. 432-34.

[11]"Structural Study," p. 443.

[12]This is not to say that the occurrences of parakaleō (2:12; 3:2; 3:7) and paraklēsis (2:3) in the first half of the letter are unimportant. Paraklēsis at 2:3 seems especially important as a key term for Paul's overall ministry. That chapters 1-3 center on "thanksgiving" and chapters 4-5 center on "exhortation" is a common observation of 1 Thessalonians, and it is not made simply on the basis of the occurrence of the terms eucharistia and paraklēsis.

[13]Cf. Lévi-Strauss, "Structural Study," p. 433.

[14]I do not propose to explicate Lévi-Strauss' formula in detail in this paper. For further discussion and applications the reader is referred to Daniel Patte, "Structural Network in Narrative: The Good Samaritan," Soundings 58 (1975):221-42; Robert M. Polzin, Biblical Structuralism: Method and Subjectivity in the Study of Ancient Texts, Semeia Supplements (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977; Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977); Elizabeth Struthers Malbon, "Mythic Structure and Meaning in Mark: Elements of a Lévi-Straussian Analysis," Semeia

16 (1979):97-132. Both Polzin's book and my article take into consideration the adaptation of Lévi-Strauss' formula by Elli Köngäs Maranda and Pierre Maranda, Structural Models in Folklore and Transformational Essays (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1971). Maranda and Maranda develop the image of mythic structure as helicoidal. Questions remain concerning the extent to which Lévi-Strauss' intent is modified by Maranda and Maranda's adaptation.

[15]Cf. the references to mnēmoneuō (1:3; 2:9), ginōskō (3:5), and agnoein (4:13): 1:3, Paul remembers how the Thessalonians acted; 2:9, the Thessalonians remember how Paul acted; 3:5, Paul seeks to move from not knowing how the Thessalonians are faring to knowing how they are faring; 4:13, Paul seeks to move the Thessalonians from not knowing what will happen to those who have died to knowing what will happen to them.

[16]Funk, "Apostolic Parousia," p. 266.

[17]Ibid., p. 251, n. 1; cf. p. 266, n. 1.

[18]Funk ("Apostolic Parousia," pp. 263-64), White (pp. 10-11), and Doty (pp. 11-12) each present a brief review of Heikki Koskenniemi, Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr. (Helsinki: Suomalaien Tiedeakatemie, 1956). Koskenniemi argues that three basic motifs or functions of the Greek letter are (1) philophronesis, (2) parousia, and (3) homilia. As Doty explains, philophronesis refers to the purpose of the letter to express "the friendly relationship" between persons; parousia refers to the intention of the letter "to revive the existence of a friendship when the correspondents were physically separated"; homilia designates "the main function of the letter, the continuance of a dialogic conversation in writing."

[19]Exceptions are the adjectives "living and true" at 1:9b; the relative clause, "who gives his Holy Spirit to you," at 4:8; and the genitive phrase, "of peace," at 5:23. In addition, parallel statements in certain passages manifest an opposition or distinction between God and idols (1:9), or between God and humanity (2:4b; 2:15?; 4:8), or between God and Satan, or "the tempter" (2:18; 3:5--both of which also portray the opposition Satan vs. humanity). These relations might be indicated by a "logical square," or Greimas' "elementary structure of signification":



where God and Satan are contraries, and God and idols, on the one hand, and Satan and humanity, on the other, are contradictories. According to the rules of the "logical square," humanity and idols are sub-contraries, and God and humanity, on the one hand, and Satan and idols, on the other, are in a relation of implication.

[20]More typical of 1 Thessalonians than the designation "Son" for Jesus (only at 1:10) is the designation "Lord" (kurios). Of the thirty-three references to Jesus in seven

different forms (Son, Jesus, Christ, Christ Jesus, Lord Jesus, Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord), the three numerically dominant forms are "the Lord" (13 occurrences, 39%), "Lord Jesus" (6 occurrences, 18%), and "Lord Jesus Christ" (5 occurrences, 15%) --all including kurios (24 occurrences, 73%).

[21]For the issues and arguments see Best, pp. 98-102, and Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (N.p.: United Bible Societies, 1971), pp. 629-30.

[22]The references at 5:3 and 4:4 do not enter into the discussion at this point. At 5:3, the "travail [which] comes upon a woman with child," literally "the (female) one having--in womb" (tē en gastri echousē), or "the one who is pregnant," is offered as a simile of the coming of the day of the Lord. The term skeuos, "vessel," at 4:4 may signify "wife" (so RSV and Best, pp. 161-63), but if so, wife is meant literally not metaphorically (although skeuos is a metaphor). However, it may be that skeuos signifies "body" (so JBC 2:231).

[23]See note 18 above.

[24]RSV and Best (p. 102) to the contrary, eudokoumen at 2:8 is in the present tense. However, ekalesen at 4:7 and etheto at 5:9, both actions of God, are aorist. At 5:10b, zēsōmen is aorist subjunctive but has the sense of the future. Because 3:1-2, 5a, 7 is a "flashback," the verbs there are aorist.

[25]On the significance and early Christian context of the term parousia, see Best, pp. 349-54. With the references to parousia in 1 Thessalonians, compare 1:10, ". . . Jesus who delivers us from the wrath to come (tēs orgēs tēs erchomenēs)," in which the Thessalonians are portrayed positively (see 1:9-10), and 2:16, ". . . But God's wrath has come upon them at last! (ephthasen de ep' autous hē orgē eis telos)," in which the Jews are portrayed negatively (see 2:14-16).

[26]On whether the "we" in 1 Thessalonians is generally an "epistolary plural" meaning Paul or an inclusive plural meaning Paul and his co-workers or something in between, see Best, pp. 26-29, and the bibliography given there.

[27]Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Story of Asdiwal," trans. Nicholas Mann, in The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism, ed. Edmund Leach, A. S. A. Monographs, no. 5 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967), p. 1.

[28]With this conclusion, compare Dan O. Via's analysis of "Paul and the Comic [death-and-resurrection] Structure," chapter II of Kerygma and Comedy in the New Testament: A Structuralist Approach to Hermeneutic (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).

[29]Ibid., p. 72.

[30]Patte, What Is Structural Exegesis?, pp. 9-20; Via, Kerygma and Comedy, pp. 1-7; Edgar V. McKnight, Meaning in Texts: The Historical Shaping of a Narrative Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), pp. 239-48; Polzin, pp. 9, 17-18, 201.

[31]Robert C. Culley, "Structural Analysis: Is It Done With Mirrors?," Interpretation 28 (1974): 166-71.

[32]I am using these terms interchangeably, although some writers do make a distinction between the two.

[33]Michael Lane, ed. Introduction to Structuralism, (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 13. Lane expresses these two categories not as ideology and methodology but as "theories" and "methods." Because Lane is making only a gross distinction, one involving only two categories, his terms are workable, if, in the case of "theories," unfortunate. But note that on one occasion Lane uses the terms "philosophies and methods" (p. 17) in place of "theories" and "methods," and on another he comments that structuralism "has been accused of modulating from a method into a full-fledged theory, or ideology even" (p. 18).

[34]I do not mean by this to ignore the possible distinctions between ideology and philosophy, but rather to refer, in general and with neutrality, to what Robert Scholes identifies and Robert Polzin affirms as "structuralism as a movement of mind" (Scholes, Structuralism in Literature: An Introduction [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974], p. 1; Polzin, pp. iv, 1).

[35]Lane, p. 13, describing what he terms a "theory" as opposed to a "method."

[36]Scholes, p. 4.

[37]Francis Bovon, "French Structuralism and Biblical Exegesis," in Structural Analysis and Biblical Exegesis: Interpretational Essays, trans. Alfred M. Johnson, Jr., Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, no. 3 (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1974), p. 11.

[38]Lane, p. 13.

[39]Ibid.

[40]This distinction between theory and analysis is paralleled by Daniel Patte and Aline Patte's distinction between "theory" and "practice" or "fundamental research" and "applied research" (Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978], p. 10) and by Daniel Patte's distinction between the search for "universal structures" and the search for "structures which characterize each specific narrative" ("One Text: Several Structures," introduction to Semeia 17, forthcoming).

[41]Daniel Patte's discussion of "Two Types of Structures, Five Types of Structuralist Research" (§2.2 of "One Text: Several Structures") may be understood as a development of the various relationships between theory and analysis. The two types of structures, (1) "universal structures" and (2) "structures which characterize each particular narrative," are the respective objects of study of structuralism as (1) theory and (2) analysis. The five types of structuralist research may be grouped as theory in isolation from analysis (Patte's "almost pure research" or semiotic theory, type 2); analysis in disregard of theory (Patte's "studies [which] aim at elucidating the structures which characterize a given text . . . by examining the text . . . in and of itself," type 1); analysis for the sake of theory, whether inductive of deductive (Patte's types 3 and 4); and analysis in the light of theory (Patte's "structural

exegesis," type 5). The two of these five types of structuralist research which Patte develops further are semiotic theory and structural exegesis.

[42]In McKnight's words, Meaning in Texts "accomplishes two tasks at the same time. First, it applies studies in narrative from a structural perspective to hermeneutical studies. It also traces hermeneutical and structural developments in the twentieth century to their source in Dilthey, and in his mediation of the two traditions finds a new and fruitful approach to hermeneutics and structuralism--narrative hermeneutics" (p. xi).

[43]My diagram of goals, although developed independently of Philip Pettit's "tree of options on which the structuralist analyst of narrative must decide his position," may be fruitfully compared and contrasted with it. See Philip Pettit, The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 54ff.

[44]Compare and contrast the five levels of the "problematic," or conceptual framework, of structuralsim--or of any theoretical system--suggested by Miriam Glucksmann, Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought: A Comparison of the Theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Louis Althusser, International Library of Science (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974). Listed according to "descending levels of abstraction rather than a hierarchy of determinacy" (p. 10), they are: (1) epistemology, (2) philosophy, (3) theory, (4) methodology, (5) description.

[45]See Patte and Patte's diagram of "the path taken by Lévi-Strauss" and the path they follow to the "semantic universe" (Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice, pp. 15-16).

[46]Suggestive to me at this point have been conversations with, and an unpublished paper by, Gary Phillips, now of the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts. In "Ideology of the Sign" (Nashville, 1977), Phillips places an adaptation of Stephen Ullmann's model of the sign within Eugene Nida's schema of communication in order to account for both the linguistic reality and the extra-linguistic reality of communication.

[47]It is possible that the four points of figure 10 correspond to Daniel Patte's enumeration of three types of "constraints" upon a work of literature, (1) structures of the enunciation (Author), (2) cultural structures or cultural codes (World), and (3) deep structures (Text), and Patte's category of hermeneutics (Reader). What Is Structural Exegesis?, pp. 22-23, 3-6. It would probably be more accurate to say that Patte's three types of constraints and his category of hermeneutics correspond to four relations as follows:

(1) structures of the enunciation/Author-Text relation
(2) cultural codes/World-Text relation
(3) deep structures/Text-Texts relation
(4) hermeneutics/Text-Reader relation

It would also appear that the two axes of figure 10 (broken lines) correspond to Patte's twofold categorization of the interests of structuralist research: signification systems (Text-World axis) and the communication process (Author-Reader axis). Patte, "One Text: Several Structures." As the two axes of figure 10 intersect, so Patte's two categories are interrelated.

[48]Greimas and others make a distinction between the "narrative" and the "discursive" dimensions of a text. Although, for purposes of comparing the work of Propp, Lévi-Strauss, and Greimas (see below), I have employed the term "mythic" rather than "discursive," the most significant difference between Greimas' distinction and my own is not merely terminological. For Greimas the narrative dimension is organized syntagmatically, and the discursive dimension is organized paradigmatically. Patte follows Greimas on this point. In What Is Structural Exegesis?, Patte discusses "the narrative and the mythical system" as "two semiological systems which have been sufficiently identified so that we can now begin to study them systematically at the levels of their structures of content" (p. 34), although he does not assert that they are the only or the most basic semiological systems. In Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice, Patte and Patte elaborate systems on eight levels (pp. 1-38; see especially the figure on p. 15), the first four of which I would classify as sub-levels on the narrative level, the second four as sub-levels of the mythic level. In "One Text: Several Structures," Patte orders the various levels into two categories: syntagmatic systems (basically the first four levels) and paradigmatic systems (basically the second four levels). (Lévi-Strauss may be in line with this way of thinking as well, for he identifies the syntagmatic dimension with the "apparent" content and the paradigmatic dimension with the "latent" content.) Thus both Greimas and Patte collapse into a single distinction (variously labeled) aspects and relationships which I am suggesting may only be seen clearly in terms of two intersecting distinctions (narrative/mythic and syntagmatic/paradigmatic); see below.

The terms "narrative"/"epistolary" and "mythic" are not at the level of abstraction or generalization of "syntagmatic" and "paradigmatic"; they would not necessarily serve for all texts. "Surface" and "depth" serve as terms at the appropriate level of abstraction and generalization. However, in addition to their ambiguity, these metaphorical terms are laden with evaluative connotations. On the problems of the terms "surface" and "depth," see Polzin, pp. 158-60. On the problems of studying "surface structure" and "deep structure," see Robert C. Tannehill, The Sword of His Mouth, Semeia Supplements, no. 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975; Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975), pp. 31-36. On the possibilities of the terms "surface" (perceptual order) and "depth" (imaginative order) in analyzing aesthetic experience, see Eugene Francis Kaelin, Art and Existence: A Phenomenological Aesthetics (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1970).

[49]A more complete figure, from which figure 12 might be said to be "abstracted," is as follows.

TEXT		elements of the substance	formal relations	
			syntagmatic	paradigmatic
levels	surface	A	1	2
	depth	B	3	4

However, because structural criticism focuses on relations rather than on elements, this "expansion" is not necessary for our present purpose of systematizing the foci of structural criticism.

With the above chart, compare and contrast the chart on page 62 of Joseph Courtés, Introduction à la sémiotique narrative et discursive (Paris: Classiques Hachette, 1976), which is provided to accompany some introductory remarks on the actantial model of Greimas. Courtés' chart also isolates a "surface level" and a "deep level"; but while his chart distinguishes between elements of the substance ("morphology": A = sememes, B = semes) and formal relations ("syntax": 1 + 2 = actantial model, 3 + 4 = constitutional model), it does not distinguish between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations of the text.

A text is like a language, a system of signs, in being characterized by two dimensions, two types of relations (syntagmatic/paradigmatic). A text is like a sign in possessing two levels (surface/depth), or two types of elements (signifier/signified). In suggesting that the surface and depth levels of the text are analogous to the signifier and signified, the expression and the content, of the sign, I am dealing with the text at the supra-sentential or transphrastic level. It may also be said, analogously, that both the narrative/epistolary and mythic levels are levels of the content of the text (see Courtés, p. 43; cf. Patte, What Is Structural Exegesis?, p. 34), of which the expression is the textual manifestation, or actual words (or even phonemes or letters) at the sentential or subsentential level.

[50]The works taken as representative of Doty, White, and Funk for the present purpose are cited in note 2 above.

[51]Although developed independently (yet out of some shared contexts), Daniel Patte's table of "the broad categories of structuralist research" (§2.35 of "One Text: Several Structures") and my figure 13 are comparable. Patte's "structural exegesis" and my "structural exegesis" are identical, and his "semiotic research" and my "theory" are equivalent. My chart includes two additional categories along this dimension: "ideology" and "narrative hermeneutics," equivalents of which are spoken of by Patte in other contexts. Patte's categorization of the objects of study, "signification systems"/"communication process," corresponds with the two axes of my model of a literary work, Text-World/Author-Reader, as suggested above. Patte's table does not illustrate, but his discussion explicates, the distinction between "two types of signification systems: the syntagmatic and paradigmatic systems"; the distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions is illustrated in my chart.

Neither Patte's table nor his accompanying explanation considers the distinction between the narrative and mythic (surface and depth) levels of the text, which my chart does illustrate. Patte has elsewhere (What Is Structural Exegesis?, p. 34; see note 48 above) stated his view that the narrative and the mythic are but two of the "semiological systems" of a text, so, perhaps, narrative and mythic structures could be considered as examples of the "universal structures" of Patte's table. However, it is my impression (see note 48 above) that Patte collapses into one distinction relationships which I am suggesting may only be seen clearly in terms of two intersecting distinctions (narrative/mythic and syntagmatic/paradigmatic).

S 265

JUDGMENT, IMMORALITY, AND SEXUAL ETHICS IN 1 CORINTHIANS 6

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I. Introduction

1 Corinthians 5 and 6 have been regarded as a *locus classicus* for an understanding of Paul's sexual ethic, and rightly so. Not only do they include the most dramatic single account of sexual impropriety (5:1-8), they also include three vice-catalogues in which sexual sins are dominant (5:10; 5:11; 6:9b-10), and an impressive discussion of the body in the context of problems of immorality (6:12-20). But 6:1-11 (or 1-8) is almost universally excepted from the discussion of Paul's sexual ethic,[1] being viewed as an intrusion of some kind or other. It is the thesis of this paper that all of chapters 5 and 6, including 6:1-11, has to do with sexual questions.

To my knowledge J.H. Bernard[2] is the only person in this century who has presented a case for chapter 6 being connected to chapter 5 in subject matter. John C. Hurd, jr., in his thorough treatment of *The Origin of I Corinthians* says: "No commentator seems to have accepted Bernard's suggestion."[3] In general his suggestion has been given short shrift by those who knew of it, and the majority give no evidence of knowing it.[4] I will reject the least defensible parts of his hypothesis, but argue in much the same direction, using variant forms of somewhat the same evidence. Bernard's evidence may be summarized as follows:

- the structure of I Corinthians suggests that chapters 5 and 6 ought *prima facie* to be connected with each other;

- the *argument* of 6:1-11 deals not with the impropriety of Christians ever appearing before heathen tribunds but with the impropriety of sins of adultery and infidelity being judged by anything other than Christian standards;

- the *linguistic* occurrences of ἐξουσιάζειν in 6:12 and 7:4; of ἀποστερεῖσθαι in 6:8 and 7:5; of ἄδικος κτλ. in 5:10,11; 6:9-10; and of πλεονεξία in the lists and in 1 Thessalonians 4:6.

From this evidence he concludes that the πράγματα of 6:1 are "cases of adultery or the like; and that the ἀδικία of which he speaks throughout chapter 6 is the wrong which is done when domestic honour is hurt..." He goes on from this to claim that "...the whole discussion [is] strictly relevant to the scandal that had recently occurred in the Christian community at Corinth (5:1)",[5] and he claims further that the offender "is the same as the offender of 2 Corinthians 2:5f. and 7:12f."[6] Though I will not bother to refute his latter arguments, I am persuaded by the weight of scholarship on these questions that

it is possible to maintain neither the exact identity of the persons presupposed in 2 Corinthians with those of 1 Corinthians 5:1, nor the exact overlap of 1 Corinthians 5 with 6:1-11. I shall attempt to maintain, however, his insistence that chapters 5-6 are a unity, and that the juridical question at issue in 6:1-11 is a sexual matter, one that is elucidated by, and in turn elucidates, the first of the response topics in 7:1-24, especially 7:1-7.

The usual view is, of course, that 6:1-8 has nothing at all to do with sexual morality and little to do with the rest of chapters 5 and 6.[7] It has sometimes been noted that chapter 5 raised matters of one kind of church judgment, and 6:1-8 (which considers another quite different kind of judicial function) has been suggested by a natural association.[8] The subject matter of 6:1-8 then, as commonly interpreted, does not have any necessary connection with the preceding or following sections. Generally it is held that the issue has something to do with fraudulent business practices or with monetary ethics.[9] It should be noted, however, that modern commentators seem less inclined to make strong assertions that the passages have no connection than was once the case,[10] indeed if there is a tendency, it is towards a greater degree of integrity.[11]

II. Problems

(a) Background

Against what background is the interpreter to read Paul's concern in 6:1-11 that the Corinthian Christians not take their disputes outside the congregation?[12] It is obvious and undisputed that those outside are heathen (Roman? or Greek?) officials, who are designated unrighteous (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων , 6:1) and unbelievers (ἐπὶ ἀπίστων ,6:5). But what model is in Paul's mind as he urges that the church deal with its own behavioural or ethical problems? There are a number of possibilities.

A relatively recent suggestion[13] is that the most nearly similar situation is to be found in the Dead Sea Scrolls, in which one can find a distinction between cases for the whole community to decide and cases for judges to decide (similar to the distinction between 1 Corinthians 5 and 1 Corinthians 6). Though there is no precise prohibition against recourse to pagan courts, the attitudes of Paul and Qumran are probably similar. The eschatological context is similar, including the non-LXX emphasis on judging the world.

A longer standing proposal, the significance of which has never been fully developed for the social situation of the church in Corinth,[14] is that which looks for the background in the special disciplinary privileges held by the synagogues of the diaspora.[15] It is quite certain, as Paul's autobiographical statement in 2 Cor 11:24 also shows, that the synagogues exercised a range of punishments;[16] it is not so certain whether in the synagogue in Corinth, for

example, the members either were forbidden or felt they were forbidden from going before heathen judges. Nor has an adequate study appeared which distinguishes clearly between what may be said of a synagogue's juridical authority and Palestinian Rabbinic authority.[17]

The Rabbinic model is the third possible model.[18] There is sufficient data to show that the issue of using non-Jewish law-courts was a problem requiring Halakic decisions, but the evidence is not crystal clear, nor is its dating certain. There is then a double problem: is the evidence relevant (I think it is) and if it is is chronologically relevant is it the likeliest way of interpreting Paul's advice. Certainly it seems clear that there is a prohibition against recourse to pagan courts.[19]

The Greco-Roman setting offers a fourth possible background.[20] Roman law provides one important basis, in particular, for the situation presupposed in 6:1-11: the court of arbitration. It may well be that the σοφός in 6:5 who is to decide (διακρίνειν) between the parties is just such an arbitrator. If so, it is interesting that Paul use a Jewish title (דיין) for a greek-based notion.[21]

The fifth possible model emerges from the Greco-Roman setting. It is arguable, though I do not know the evidence at first hand, that there is in the mystery religions or cults of Asia Minor, Macedonia and Achaia a pattern of settling internal differences. Commentators on this point vary.[22]

(b) Structure

Recent Pauline scholarship has made major advances on the question of letter-writing forms and structure. Here, too, there are a number of points to be raised.

First, does 1 Corinthians exist in more or less its original form, and is it tolerably certain that its macro-structure includes a letter body (chapters 1-4), responses to oral reports (chapters 5-6), and responses to written questions (chapters 7-16)?[23] If this is not assumed, and if one hypothesizes instead that parts of several letters have been put together by a later hand, the problem of 6:1-11 is radically altered. I am persuaded that nothing in 1 Corinthians demands that latter hypothesis and I interpret the letter as a whole.

Second, then, the structure of chapters 5-6. The following parts may be identified at the outset: report of a case of incest (5:1-5); reflections on the community's purity generally (5:6-8); clarification of a previous letter (5:9-13); legal disputes before pagan courts (6:1-8); reflections on immorality and purity (6:9-11);[24] freedom, immorality and the body (6:12-20). There is no disagreement that all of chapter 5 properly belongs together, since there is a sensible development of thought throughout the three discernible sections. The transition between 5:13b, with its quotation from Deuteronomy 17:7 and 6:1 will be dealt with below. It seems abrupt, however; especially so if the subject matter of 6:1ff

is financial. But 6:1-8 and 6:9-11 do properly belong together, so that 6:1-11 and 5:1-13 show much the same basic elements: a specific case or cases, a demand for community action set in a strongly eschatological context, a general discussion of the purity question, and one or more Lasterkataloge .[25] The paragraph 6:12-20 has been shown by Hurd[26] to be a transitional paragraph, looking both back to chapters 5 and 6 and forward to chapters 7-16. In that 6:12-20 deals with similar sexual issues to those which animate chapter 5, and is also connected closely with the sexual emphasis of 6:9-11, the material in all of 5-6 is closely intertwined. Structurally one would expect 6:1-8 also to deal with sexual matters.

Finally, the structure of chapters 7ff. It is well recognized that all (or most) of chapters 7-16 is woven around responses to written questions, indicated by the repetitive περὶ δέ . We do not know, of course, the exact content of the Corinthians' letter,[27] nor do we know why Paul deals with the topics in the particular order in which he does. It is relevant to this paper to ask why the first response topic has to do with marriage, and especially within that general topic with conjugal rights.[28] If the letter is a unity Paul deals first with party groupings, then with further oral reports which have focussed on sexual problems (chapters 5-6) which were not included in the letter. Paul then uses his angry discussion of those matters to lead in to a calmer appraisal of the Corinthians' own questions. That is to say, while chapter 7 is properly recognized as beginning a new section of the letter, that fact ought not to obscure the close connection in thought between chapters 5-6 and 7.

(c) Connections of thought and language

If we think of the two chapters as comprising three basic sections (i.e. 5:1-13; 6:1-11; 6:12-20), it is clear that there are innumerable overlaps and intertwinings between the sections, connections that can only be sketchily suggested. There is first, the dominant motif of πορνεία/πόρνος/πόρνη/πορνεύω , absent from 6:1-8 but controlling the remainder (5:1,8,9,10,11,13; 6:9,13,15,18; cf. 7:2).[29] Second there is the strong emphasis on judgment, coupled with a sense of eschatological urgency (5:3-5, 5:6-8,12-13; 6:1-5, 6:9-10, 11,13-14). Connected with this is the way in which the body is treated together with the activity of the Spirit (5:3(?), 4-5; 6:11,13,15-20; cf. 7:4). There is an obvious concern running throughout for the community as a collective entity (5:2,4,9,11,12-13; 6:1-5,12,19) beside which is placed the community's totally inadequate reaction to it's corporate well-being (5:2,6; 6:5,8,15). The Lasterkataloge constitute another obvious connection between the several parts (5:10; 5:11; 6:9-10).[30]

Finally, the glimmerings of a diatribe form in these chapters, particularly the οὐκ οἴδατε form (5:6; 6:2,3,9,15,16,19)[31] is a sufficient indication that Paul is working in a quite different mood and mode from that which he adapts in the rest of the letter.

(d) Content of 6:1-11

The passage may be loosely translated as follows. "Does someone with a legal case against another dare to be judged before unrighteous men, and not by the Christians in Corinth? Don't you understand that the saints will judge the world, and if so you are worthy to establish lesser tribunals.[32] Don't you understand we will judge angels, not to mention human affairs? If you have such human tribunals do you set [on them] those who are least esteemed in the church? I say this to shame you. Is there not even one wise man among you to decide between brother and brother? But brother takes brother to law even before unbelievers! It is already nothing but a defeat for you to have lawsuits against each other. Why not prefer to be wronged? Why not prefer to be defrauded? But you wrong and defraud even the brethren. Don't you understand that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God? Don't be deceived: no fornicators, no idolaters, no adulterers, no catamites, no pederasts, no thieves, no greedy men, no drunks, no abusive persons, no robbers will inherit the kingdom of God. And that is what some of you were. But you were washed! But you were sanctified! But you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God!"

There is in this statement nothing which states the nature of the lawsuits. For that we are forced to infer from hints that lurk below the surface. Those elements of the passage which might offer some help are the following. First, and most important, are the words ἀδικέω and ἀποστερέω (6:7-8). Neither word in itself carries specific meaning, and so a consideration will need to be given to their use in Paul. Second, none of the legal language gives an idea of the nature of the case, but the fact that it is a legal matter narrows the range somewhat. It is a case which is properly brought before judges -- at least it would be if the litigants were not Christians -- and it is a matter of sufficient concern that it ought to be dealt with by the Christian community (6:1-6). Third, presuming that 6:1-11 is a whole (cf. the repetition of ἄδικοι in 6:1 and 9), the order of the Lasterkatalog in 6:9-10 may offer some hint of a sexual background in 6:1-8. Fourth, it is possible that some hint may lie behind either the use of βιωτικά (6:3-4) or ἥττημα (6:7), though it does not seem likely. Finally, if one leaves behind the specific hypothesis of Bernard that 5 and 6 involve the same persons, but accepts the notion that they are related, one would be looking for a problem of the same sort but less severe. This would satisfy the demands of the text that a much less severe punishment (indeed, if any!) is expected in chapter 6.[33]

III. Arguments for a sexual reference in 6:1-11

I now wish to develop six arguments on which to support the claim that 6:1-11 presupposes a sexual problem.[34] Though not of equal weight, all do, I think, contribute something to the case. None is absolutely decisive, but the cumulative force is more persuasive than the collective neglect of scholars suggests. I know of no countervailing argument to suggest that the issue is the one generally assumed. There is, to my knowledge, nothing in the passage itself to drive one to the conclusion that the problem involves money, apart from the meaning of ἀποστερέω, which includes as one of its meanings "to rob." The issues dealt with in turn are:

(a) the chiastic pattern of the passage;
(b) the connection with 7:1-7;
(c) the bracketing of the passage by 5:1-13 and 6:12-20;
(d) the connection of the passage with OT passages, especially in 5:13;
(e) the similar problem in 1 Thessalonians 4:1-6;
(f) a possibly similar situation in James.

(a) Chiasmus

It has been noted by Hurd and others that Paul frequently uses a chiastic structure in large blocks of material. Such an observation has been pressed into service, correctly in my opinion, to argue that abrupt -- or seemingly abrupt -- changes in thought do not require the hypothesis of letter fragments but instead are a part of Paul's argumentative pattern and should be understood as a part of the same letter. Thus in chapters 12-14 there is an ABA pattern, as also in 8-10 and, it can be argued, here in 5:1-13; 6:1-11; 6:12-20. Such a view seems to me correct, though I hasten to point out that this need not require the deduction that 6:1-11 is on a substantially different topic. In the same way that there are important connections between chapter 13 and chapters 12 and 14, and between chapter 9 and chapters 8 and 10:1-22, so there are connections within 5 and 6. Whereas 5:1-13 and 6:12-20 are especially concerned with πορνή/πόρνος/πορνεία/πορνεύω, it is remarkable that 6:1-11 is not. As is now often recognized, 6:1-11 deals with a second form of judgment, the first example of which is dealt with in 5:1-5.[35] In both there is a deep concern for the proper approach to internal questions, with the outside being left to fend for itself.[36] In other words, though I do not attribute much to this point, the correct observation that chapters 5-6 are another example of Pauline chiasmus need not lead to the conclusion that 6:1-11 deals with something other than sexual problems. The chiasmus may be located in the fact that the actors are different: 5:1-13 and 6:12-20 involve persons outside the fellowship, and 6:1-11 deals with persons inside the Christian community.

(b) 1 Corinthians 7:1-7

The connections between 7:1-7 and our passage are striking

and not always noted, but the most important one is the use of ἀποστερεῖτε in 6:7-8 and 7:5, which is almost always overlooked. According to Liddell-Scott its range of meaning includes "rob, despoil, bereave, defraud; passively to be robbed or deprived of; with acc. pers. to deprive or rob."[37] The word is used only in these three instances in Paul (cf. also 1 Tim. 6:5). In 7:5 its meaning is unmistakable and undisputed: "Do not refuse one another (i.e. deprive your spouse of normal sexual intercourse) except for an agreed upon period of time so that you can devote yourself to prayer... lest Satan tempt you through your lack of self-control."

While the meaning is universally recognized, the only other instances of the word ἀποστερέω in Paul (6:7-8) have not attracted the same meaning. One paragraph earlier, it seems to me, Paul is using the words in exactly the same way: "...why not prefer to be deprived sexually? But you... deprive, and that even the brothers" (6:7-8). Ἀδικέω, with which ἀποστερέω is linked here, is also a general word "to do wrong, or to be wronged", and adds no degree of specificity to the charge, it merely heightens the rebuke.[38] On the basis of the known meaning of 7:5, then, I propose to establish a probable meaning for 6:7-8.

This is reinforced by the following additional considerations. First, there is the fact to which Bernard pointed[39] that ἐξουσιάζω is found in Paul's letters only at 6:12 and 7:4 (bis).[40] While the meaning is not exactly the same, the content ,which has given rise to the use of the word ,is.[41] When coupled with the evidence for ἀποστερέω, the coincidence is remarkable. Second, there is the concern for the way πορνεία (7:2; 6:13; 5:1 and references to related roots throughout)affects the well being of the Christian community. Third, the use of Gen 2:24 in 6:16 stands out as somewhat inappropriate in its immediate context, but significant as the OT basis for the discussion of marriage which begins in 7:1. Fourth, the references to Satan in 5:5 and 7:5 help to draw 7:1-7 firmly into the context of chapters 5-6. In both instances the action of Satan is described by Paul as a destructive force within the area of sexual relationship, in the one case as punisher, in the other as tempter.[42]

These connections point towards a closer connection between chapters 5-6 and 7:1-7 than would be expected if there were a sharp break between Paul's reaction to the oral reports and to the written questions. Thus, the context of 6:1-11 and 7:1-7 is very similar. Specifically, the use of ἀποστερέω in 6:7f, 7:5, creates the strongest presumption that the word bears the same meaning in the two places, since the contexts are similar. Prima facie, it is likely that the problem of 6:1-11 has to do with sexual defrauding -- not financial fraud -- on the basis that the word is a general one and that its meaning at 7:5 is known.

(c) 1 Corinthians 5:1-13 and 6:12-20 as a sexual "bracket"

Perhaps enough has already been said on this point earlier. Let me merely repeat that the ABA pattern of chapters 5-6

the surrounding uses of πορν-vocabulary, the Lasterkataloge of 5:10, 11; 6:9-10, the striking concern for the body and Spirit, the awesome eschatology, all emphasise that the basic thrust of chapters 5-6 is sexual, specifically the right way of dealing with sexual challenges in the face of the near end when judgment will be given and the kingdom of God is to be attained -- or not.

It is in this context that one should interpret, then, the judgment theme of 6:1-11, and the role of the community in exercising judgment. The problem is less going to law before unbelievers than brother engaging in litigation with brother (6:6,8). That is what is defeat for the community (6:7, ὅτι κρίματα ἔχετε μεθ' ἑαυτῶ).

(d) 1 Corinthians 5:13

The transition between 5:13 and 6:1 seems abrupt and awkward. If it is the case that chapters 5 and 6 belong together, as I have been arguing, this abruptness needs careful consideration. Were it not for the OT quotation, of course, the transition would be smoother, for 6:12-13a is concerned with the distinction between insiders judging insiders, while God will judge outsiders. And then 6:1 picks up a variation of this: insiders must judge insiders, insiders are not to go outside for legal decisions.

The quotation in 5:13 is from Deuteronomy 17:7:

καὶ ἐξαρεῖς τὸν πονηρὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν (LXX)

ἐξάρατε τὸν πονηρὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν (1 Cor.5:13).

But with this should be compared exactly the same clause in the very same context (Deut. 19.19; 22:21; 22:24; 24:7). This section of Deuteronomy lays out the statutes and ordinances (e.g. Deut. 12:1) to be maintained in the land of Israel. One of these (Deut. 16:18) is to appoint "judges and officers"[43] who shall "judge" (κρινοῦσιν τὸν λαὸν κρίσιν δικαίαν , Deut. 16:18 LXX). The very next instruction, after the establishing of a method of judgment, is a sexual sin -- planting trees as Asheroth (Deut 16:21-22). Then, immediately after a brief reference to sacrifice (17:1), there comes a description of the first sin to require absolute purging, serving other gods. The person who does this, man or woman, does evil: ποιήσει τὸ πονηρόν. Deuteronomy 17:8-13 (which in V.12 has a comparable "purging"-statement) makes more precise kinds of rules for legal judgments in language reminiscent of chapters 5-6.[44] After instructions dealing with kingship, Levitical priests, human sacrifice, prophets, manslaughter and murder, none of which gives rise to the formulaic conclusion of 17:7 (but cf. 19:13), Deuteronomy returns to methods of judging (specifically the matter of witnesses) in 19:15-21, in the midst of which is the second instance of the purging formula.[45] When Deuteronomy repeats the purging formula four more times in rapid succession (2:21; 22:21,22,24), all are found in the context of family and sexual law: children's inheritance (21:15-17), disobedient children (21:18-21); divorce and virginity (22:13-21); adultery (22:22); rape (22:23-29); and incest (22:30= LXX 23:1: τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ, cf. 1 Cor. 5:1).

The collection of relevant data not only for the background of the quotation of the purging formula in 1 Corinthians 5:13, and for the subject matter of chapters 5-6 (both method of judging and content), but also for the subject matter of chapter 7, is very striking and, so far as I have found, never noticed. It seems that Paul, having developed a method of "purging" for the Corinthian church in chapter 5, recalls the fundamental texts in Deuteronomy 17-22, and then strings out the relevant Corinthian problems in the next two chapters (6-7). There is, then, a large degree of overlap between the sexual focus of the relevant Deuteronomy passages and the sexual issues of 1 Corinthians; there are provisions for judging in both Deuteronmy and 1 Corinthians; and all of this is drawn together by the "purging" formula.

In parentheses it might be added that Leviticus 18 contains still more explicit incest laws (18:6-18)[46] and other sexual laws (menstruation in 18:19; adultery in 18:20; human sacrifice in 18:21; homosexuality in 18:22; bestiality in 18:23), together with general statements (18:1-5 and 24-30).[47] In all of this the emphasis is on "not doing as the nations do" (e.g. 18:3,21,24,26,27,30). While this is all marginally relevant, there are not enough resemblances to 1 Corinthians to allow for much influence (though compare, of course, 1 Cor. 5:1).[48]

Note should also be taken of Genesis 2:24, which is quoted directly in 1 Corinthians 5:16.[49] What is odd about the quotation is that only half is quoted; the half which is left off is that having to do with marriage. The reason for this seems obvious, yet still perplexing: only the second half is used because only that portion applied to the case of sexual intercourse with prostitutes, and yet the portion which is not quoted -- even in chapter 7 -- is the fundamental text having to do with marriage, which is the subject of chapter 7. It is this that makes so clear the role of 6:12-20 as a transitional passage.[50]

The formulaic text from Deuteronomy, then, quoted in 1 Corinthians 5:13, bears a close relationship not only to the preceding case dealt with in 5:1-5, but also to the ongoing development of chapters 6-7. Specifically 5:13 serves as an introduction to the method for making judgments in the church, described in 6:1-6 (cf. Deuteronomy 17:8-13, which follows the first instance of the purging formula in exactly the same way that 1 Corinthians 6:1-11 follows 5:13, except that recourse to the Levitical priests is replaced by judgment of the Saints, or a wise man).[51] In the same way the LXX has interpreted the MT, so also Paul has interpreted and applied the provision for local judgment to his situation. In particular he has extended the kinds of cases to include ἀδικέω and ἀποστερέω , as the LXX added ἀντιλογία.

(e) <u>1 Thessalonians 4:1-6</u>

The connection between 1 Thessalonians 4:1-6 and 1 Corinthians 6:1-11, as well as 7:1-7, has occasionally been noted. While it would be incorrect to attempt to establish the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 6:1-11 from 1 Thessalonians,

it is legitimate to turn to it for confirmation of the proposed interpretation. In both there is an eschatological urgency; both contain a concern for holiness;[52] and both refer to the work of the Holy Spirit (1 Thess. 4:8; 1 Cor. 6:11). But more important, both presuppose a problem within the brotherhood. The comparison is illuminating:

1 Thess. 4:6- τὸ μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ

1 Cor. 6:1- τις ὑμῶν πρᾶγμα ἔχων πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον...
6:8- ἀλλὰ ὑμεῖς ἀδικεῖτε καὶ ἀποστερεῖτε, καὶ τοῦτο ἀδελφούς.

The situation in 1 Thessalonians 4 would seem to involve a sexual problem[53] (cf. 4:3: ἀπέχεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας, εἰδέναι ἕκαστον ὑμῶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος κτᾶσθαι ἐν ἁγιασμῷ καὶ τιμῇ, μὴ ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἔθνη). While the interpretation of σκεῦος is still debated, it seems best to interpret verses 1-8 as a whole, in which case Maurer's conclusion is likely correct: "Here, then, πρᾶγμα is a euphemism for sex... Thus one might freely translate the saying: Do not allow yourself any presumptuous infringement upon your brother in this matter, i.e. fornication."[54]

If it be correct to connect the kind of case arising in 1 Thessalonians 4 with the one described in 1 Corinthians 6, it becomes doubly interesting through the comparison with 1 Corinthians 7 and 5. With 1 Corinthians 5:1 (...πορνεία καὶ τοιαύτη πορνεία ἥτις οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν) we may compare 1 Thessalonians 4:3,5 (ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας... ἐπιθυμίας καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἔθνη). With 1 Corinthians 7:2 (διὰ δὲ τὰς πορνείας, ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα ἐχέτω) we may compare 1 Thessalonians 4:3, again (ἀπέχεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας εἰδέναι ἕκαστον ὑμῶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος κτᾶσαι). It is also worth noting that πλεονέκτης does appear in all three Lasterkataloge (though not always in the same place). It is, I believe, reasonable to suppose that the kind of sexual problem being addressed in 1 Corinthians 5,6, and 7 has also arisen in the Thessalonian church. For our purposes we need only claim that 1 Corinthians 6 is a part of the linkages, and is the middle term between the resemblances of 1 Corinthians 5 and 7 with 1 Thessalonians 4.[55]

(f) The Epistle of James

With great diffidence I suggest one other NT piece of evidence for a similar situation to the one being developed for 1 Corinthians 6:1-11. It has been argued that James 2:1-7, with its concern that no distinction should be made between rich and poor, actually is a reference to a judicial assembly of the church.[56] While it is quite speculative, it is possible that James 2:10-11 (which seems a slightly forced example in the context) actually gives the content of the judicial case being heard in the Christian assembly, a case of adultery involving two of the brothers. To make this rather wild suggestion stick would involve much more investigation, including a full study of James, especially 4:1-12, and possibly 5:6.[57] It is noteworthy that in 4:1-10 there is a still more exaggerated view of internal problems than in 2:1-7. It may not be accidental that the only other instance of κριτήριον

in the NT, besides 1 Corinthians 6:2,4, is James 2:6. The word διακρίνειν is, prominent both in James 2:4 and 1 Corinthians 6:5. But having raised this no doubt improbable speculation, I hasten to say that the Epistle of James can hardly be evidence for what may or may not have been Paul's view. It may provide evidence for judicial assemblies within the church, if Ward is correct, and for problems with adultery in the church.[58]

IV. The situation presupposed in 1 Corinthians 6:1-11

I have argued at what many will think tiresome length that there is a sexual case (πρᾶγμα) behind the lawsuit discussion of 6:1-11. I have hesitated to identify it exactly with the case of 5:1ff., and have tended to associate it with 7:1ff. But what kind of case was it?[59] First, it involves two males; second, both are within the church; third, the case involves some kind of sexual defrauding; and fourth, it is a case which properly can be brought before local authorities, whether Roman or Corinthian.[60] The following cases seem possible:

(i) A brother committing adultery[61] with another brother's wife is possible, though it seems surprising that Paul would not make such a matter explicit, especially when he has done so with the case of incest in 5:1ff. It could be argued that he was not as sure of his facts, and knew only that a case of this sort before local judges was pending or had been heard.[62]

(ii) A brother was "alienating the affections" of a brother's wife, and causing her to withhold herself from marital sexual relations. Such a possibility sounds almost too modern. More likely is the variant, that someone within the brotherhood is counselling a general withdrawal of sexual relations within marriage (the situation presupposed in 7:1-7) and one brother, who feels himself particularly wronged, has gone to law over it.[63]

(iii) Under Roman law the paterfamilias can end the marriage of a member of his familia by divorce.[64] Several situations could be conjectured, by which a Christian father-in-law might require his daughter (is she a Christian or is she a non-Christian?) to divorce her Christian husband, or vice versa, resulting in a legal case between two "brothers." The difficulty with this view is that we have no direct evidence of Christians who are Roman citizens, which would be required by the hypothesis.

(iv) It is also possible, avoiding the specifically "Roman" connotations of (iii), that a Christian husband has put aside his unbelieving wife, and that her father, who is also a Christian, has taken his son-in-law to court. Such a hypothesis is closely related to the advice Paul gives in 7:12-16.

(v) A still simpler possibility involves dowry practices, whether from a Roman, Greek or Jewish background. If a husband were to divorce his wife, her father might well be involved in litigation to have the dowry, or a major portion of it, returned.

(vi) The "liberationist" theology, which seems to underlie several of the Corinthian problems, is prompting them to behave as if they were not married. In matters of dress during worship (when Paul requires "authority" on the head: 11:10) there is a male/female problem, perhaps a marital problem. In 7:3-5 these same women may be turning against their husbands sexually (the verbal form, ἐξουσιάζω, is used). It is possible that the same issues have created sexual misunderstandings between two brothers (cf. ἐξουσιάζω in 6:12?) so that the problem behind the case of 6:1-11 is another form of the questions about believers' marriages (cf. 7:10-11; 7:27-30).

(vii) Difficult as the issue of the virgins (7:36-38) is, it is also possible that an hypothesis could lurk there. For example, Corinthian Christians might be attempting to cohabit spiritually <u>beyond</u> marriage or bethrothal ties, giving rise to Paul's concern in 7:1-2 with its emphasis on temptation to πορνεία and the need to have <u>one's</u> <u>own</u> wife or husband.

(viii) Finally, it is tempting to suppose that the words of the <u>Lasterkatalog</u> in 6:9-10 suggest a cause. The re-ordering of the place of idol-worshippers, together with the inclusion of adulterers, might suggest some connection with adultery associated with cultic prostitution. In the same <u>Lasterkatalog</u> the words μαλακοί and ἀρσενοκοῖται are included (only here in Paul's letters). Though it is difficult to construct a viable hypothesis, the starting point may be right.

Others might think of more clever, or more straightforward, solutions to the puzzle. These are proposed only to suggest the range of possibilities, and to show that the kinds of problems afflicting the Corinthian church are such that a case involving two brothers could arise. I have suggested several cases, most of which fall into the following categories:

- a father and son-in-law over the status of the younger man's wife;
- two men involved sexually or a-sexually with the same woman;
- a man charging an influential "leader" in a congregation with "tampering."

To this tissue of speculation I need only add that if several commentators are right in pointing to the notion of "arbitration" rather than "judging," the range of possibilities is extended even further.

V. Conclusion

This paper has dealt only with the subject matter and the background of the situation motivating Paul's discussion of the shame which accrues when Christians take their affairs before non-Christian judges. Beyond that simple question are the theological questions at stake, those questions which are relevant to a study of Pauline ethics.

Three issues are crucial, and were intended to be discussed in greater detail: immorality, judgment, and eschatological urgency.[65]

The Corinthian church, and other churches as well (e.g. Thessalonian), faced directly the difficulty of sexual ethics. The ethical dimensions pressed in upon the community not merely from the side of what constituted proper behaviour in circumstances arising within normal and legitimate marriages. Much more dramatic questions afflicted Corinth, at least. Incest, continuing to consort with prostitutes (perhaps temple prostitutes), and legal actions arising out of some form of marital breakdown are dealt with in chapters 5-6. To this must be added the evidence of chapter 7: refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, breakdown of Christian marriages, breakdown of mixed marriages, remarriage, new marriage, or the refusal to enter marriage, and -- as I am inclined to believe -- so called spiritual marriages.

To all these sexually charged issues which give rise to problems of morality and ethics should also be added the questions hinted at in the Lasterkataloge, though we need not imagine that every kind of vice is necessarily present. But the lists include a bewildering variety of vices, some of which had been practiced by the Corinthians. It is not too farfetched to imagine that the effects of the prior "life-style" continued in some Corinthian Christians. And so we note, still on the sexual side: immorality, idol worship, adultery, catamites, pederasts.

The range of issues is rather staggering, and the fact that the problems -- or rather some of them -- were present and still increasing suggests that ethically something was going haywire. I see no reason to reject, and many good reasons to accept, the common view that some of these moral difficulties were being prompted by tendencies towards a hyper-spiritual or enthusiast position. Indeed, with respect to the range of hypotheses offered in the previous section, there is some extra attraction to a theory associated with this tendency.

In such a situation Paul calls for action. Specifically he wants to see judgment exercised, but a form of judgment predicated on both the old understanding of judgment and justice (5:13 and the Deuteronomy formula) and on the new understanding of the saints as the effective form of the people of God. The warrant then is found in scripture, in the standard Rabbinic rejection of judgment before outsiders (which also applies to the Synagogues), and in the positive interpretation

of an apocalytic expectation of the world's judgment by the saints.

Paul's firm conviction that judgment is not merely a privilege but a necessity causes him to be harsh and even sarcastic. He demands, in the one case, that the congregation assemble and mete out judgment -- the same judgment he himself has already reached. He tries to shame the congregation in the other case to deal with its own affairs. If in the synagogue one would not settle a civil suit before a _iudex_, why should the Christian congregation? In both cases, as it seems to me, the cases are sexual in nature. The only other case of which we have reasonably sure evidence (1 Thessalonians 4) is also sexual. (The James case is too hypothetical.)

It needs, however, to be added quickly that the evidence we have does not allow very sure inferences about the nature of the judging process. And further, we ought not to leap to the conclusion that there were set persons or set procedures. In chapter 5, the judgment seems to be by the whole community, and it is goaded into action by Paul, who also says what the decision should be. In chapter 6 it appears that either a tribunal or a "wise man" is recommended, and no specific conclusion is even hinted at (evidence, I suppose, for Paul's lack of information).

The motivation for all this is important: the heightened sense of urgency created by the expectation of the end. As is now quite commonly recognized, judgment and eschatology go hand in hand. Indeed, one could extend this to say that sexual ethics, judgment and eschatology are all bound up together in chapters 5-7. The points are so obvious as to require no elucidation. We allude to the following features: (a) the Spirit and the Lord's power are present, and the man is handed over to Satan for both destruction and salvation; (b) the saints will judge the world and so -- _a maiori ad minori_ -- are competent to try internal cases; (c) the inheritance of the Kingdom of God is for those who, having been washed and sanctified and justified, are righteous; (d) the body -- the site of immorality -- is also the locus of the resurrection; (e) the present interim period, while the saints wait for the end, should prompt everyone to remain in one's present state so one can devote oneself to the Lord's affairs.

One last point: though the congregation is expected to do something about the legal dispute of 6:1-11, the real answer, according to Paul, is a quality of Christian behaviour which accepts being wronged and defrauded. To do so is preferable to the "defeat" of legal actions which alienate one from the other.

FOOTNOTES

[1] On the exegesis of 6:1-11 see Lukas Vischer, Die Auslegungsgeschichte von I Kor. 6:1-11: Rechtsverzicht und Schlichtung (Beiträge zur Geschichte der neutestamentlichen Exegese I), Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1955.

[2] J.H. Bernard, "The Connexion Between the Fifth and Sixth Chapters of 1 Corinthians," The Expositor, Series 7, Volume 3, 1907, 433-443. It is noteworthy that Vischer completely overlooks him.

[3] John C. Hurd, jr., The Origin of I Corinthians, London: SPCK, 1965, p. 84.

[4] Hurd, Origin, p. 84, n. 3, notes that Goudge on 1 Corinthians, 1911, allows a possible connection. It might also be noted that K. Lake, The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul, London: Rivingtons, 1911, p. 133, and C.K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, p. 139, are tolerant of the connection, though neither refers to Bernard.

[5] Bernard, "Connexion," p. 437.

[6] Bernard, "Connexion," p. 439. G.W.H. Lampe, "Church Discipline and the Interpretation of the Epistles to the Corinthians," in Christian History and Interpretation, edd. Farmer, Moule and Nie buhr, Cambridge: University Press, 1967, pp. 337-361, maintains the correspondence between 1 Cor. 5:1ff and 2 Cor. 2:5-11 (pp. 353-355).

[7] H.A.W. Meyer (tr. D.B. Bannerman), Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1877, p. 162, says (on 6:1): "A new section, not connected with what has gone before... The connections of thought, which some have traced out, are arbitrary inventions." See also J. Weiss, Der erste Korinther brief, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910, pp. xl-xliii, 145-6.

[8] J.B. Lightfoot, Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul, London: McMillan, 1895, p. 210; E. Lohmeyer, An die Korinther I-II (HNT 9[5]), Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1949, p. 25, p. 175 (W.G. Kümmel); Ernst Synofzik, Die Gerichts- und Vergeltungsaussagen bei Paulus, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977, pp. 56-58.

[9] A. Deissmann, Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912, p. 71, is especially forthright: "The poor folk who made up his churches and who lived on obols and denarii, envious persons who even, as St. Paul once says, 'bite and devour one another,' and who by trooping before pagan judges in their miserable disputes over some mere bagatelle exposed the brotherhood to mockery... "

10 So, for example: Conzelmann; Barrett; E. Fascher, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, erster Teil, Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1975; E. Dinkler, "Zum Problem der Ethik bei Paulus: Rechtsnahme und Rechtsverzicht (1 Kor. 6.1-11)," ZTK 49 (1952), 167-200; C.J. Roetzel, Judgment in the Community, Leiden: Brill, 1972, pp. 125-133;

11 See Nils Dahl, "Paul and the Church at Corinth," in Studies in Paul, Minneapolis: Augsburg, pp. 40-61, esp. pp. 55-56.

12 See Siegfried Meurer, Das Recht im Dienst der Versöhnung und des Friedens (AbHTANT 63), Zürich: Theologisches Verlag, 1972, pp. 23-29; he shows "dass im wesentlichen drei Rechtsbereiche für die christlichen Gemeinden von Bedeutung gewesen sein müssen, von denen wir im NT hören: der jüdische, der griechische, und der römische" (p. 25).

13 For the following points see Mathias Delcor, "The Courts of the Church of Corinth and the Courts of Qumran" in Paul and Qumran: Studies in NT Exegesis, ed. J. Murphy-O'Connor, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968, pp. 69-84; cf. Roetzel, Judgement, pp. 121-22.

14 W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, 1927 (reprinted New York: Meridian, 1961) pp. 220-223 makes some useful distinctions.

15 See Strack-Billerbeck, Kommentar, ad loc.; Albert Stein, "Wo trugen die korinthischen Christen ihre Rechtshändel aus?", ZNW 59 (1968) 86-90; E. Hatch, The Organization of the Early Christian Churches, London: Rivingtons, 1882, pp. 58-62.

16 See, among others, Vincent M. Scramuzza, "The Policy of the Early Roman Emperors towards Judaism," in The Beginnings of Christianity, Part I, Vol. V, edd. K. Lake and H.J. Cadbury, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966 (r.p. of 1932), pp. 277-297, and H.J. Cadbury "Roman Law and the Trial of Paul", ibid, pp. 297-338, esp. p. 301.

17 That there were substantial differences among the synagogues of various diaspora cities is also quite likely; the situations of Rome and Alexandria were clearly different, and one should not imagine that conditions in one city would apply to another, even though the Imperial basis for the exercise of disciplinary rights might have been the same. This basis is to be found at least in part in Philo's Legatio ad Gaium, see also Philo In Flaccum, and Claudius' decrees (see H.I. Bell, Jews and Christians in Egypt, London:British Museum,1924; Josephus, Antiquities, 19.5.2. and 19.5.3.). It is important to observe that these decrees restrict the right to make proselytes.

18 See especially Strack-Billerbeck, Kommentar, ad loc.;

19 See J.D.M. Derrett, Studies in the NT, vol I, Leiden: Brill, 1977, pp. 38-39. C.K. Barrett, "Cephas and Corinth," in Abraham Unser Vater, Leiden: Brill, 1963, p. 7, connects the problem with the Cephas-party.

20 It may be arguable that no special background other than the general milieu is needed to explain Paul's thought. His use of technical vocabulary (πρᾶγμα, κρίνω, κριτήρια, καθίζω, and διακρῖνω) and his reference to Βιωτικά point to a Greek cultural setting.

21 See Meurer, Recht, pp. 147-149: "Paulus rät hier eindeutig, formal juristisch gesehen, zum privaten Schiedsgerichtsverfahren- aber innerhalb der Gemeinde" (p. 149). See also reference to J. Davillier in Delcor, Paul and Qumran, pp. 77-78

22 E.g. K. Lake, Earlier Epistles, p. 132, states that the greek Θίασοι would never assume they were competent to try disputes, whereas the synagogues would. Others, however, point to the mystery religions as a parallel.

23 Weiss, Jewett, Schenk, and Schmithals, among others, subdivide 1 Corinthians rather mercilessly. Most recent scholarship finds some logic to the present form, a logic to be located in Paul's letter writing practices. See R. Jewett, "The Redaction of 1 Corinthians and the Trajectory of the Pauline School," JAAR 44/4 (1978), 389-444.

24 But see Meurer, Recht, p. 141: it is best to divide into two sections, 6:1-6 and 6:7-11.

25 Anton Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im NT (Nt AbH 16/4-6) Münster: Aschendorff, 1936, analyses the vice-lists in 1 Cor. 5-6; see pp. 9-46.

26 Origin, pp. 86-89.

27 See Hurd, Origin, for an impressive attempt to reconstruct it, especially pp. 114-209.

28 On the Pauline approach in chapter 7 see my forthcoming "'I say, not the Lord:' Personal Opinion, Apostolic Authority, and the Development of Early Christian Halakah", Tyndale Bulletin, 1979

29 These words appear nowhere else in 1 Corinthians, except for πορνεύω at 1 Cor. 10:8. Only πορνεία appears in other certainly Pauline letters (2 Cor. 12:21; Gal. 5:19;

Col. 3:5; 1 Thess. 4:3; and cf. Eph 5:3); πόρνος appears at Eph 5:5 and 1 Tim. 1:10.

30 See Vögtle, Lasterkatalogen, pp. 58-62.

31 Elsewhere in Paul only at Rom. 6:16; 1 Cor. 3:16, 9:13, 24. See Hurd, Origin, pp. 85f.

32 Κριτηρία is frequently translated "law-suits" or "cases", though parallels cannot be found. I have attempted to retain the common translation both here and later.

33 It is frequently suggested that in 6:1-11 what is in view are arbitrators. But it is not clear that it is civil suit of that order. It may still be an important civil dispute but one to which the horror of 5:1 does not attach.

34 In some of what follows I am indebted to two research assistants, Mr. Martin B. Shukster and Mr. Peter Gooch.

35 Some have pointed out that chapters 5 and 6 are held together on the Stichwort κρίνω.

36 Note the pattern:

	outside	inside
1 Cor 5:12	What is it to me to judge those outside?	Do not judge those inside?
1 Cor 5:13	Those outside God judges.	Put out from among you the fornicator.
1 Cor 6:1	Do you go to be judged by unrighteous persons	and not before saints?
[1 Cor 6:18?	Sins outside the body	sins against his own body]

37 See also Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich: steal, rob. This is too specific for the evidence.

38 The ἀδικ- words are more frequent, especially ἄδικος, (found here in 6:1, 9 to refer to pagan judges in the one case and the unrighteous generally in the other). The related word αδικία appears in 1 Cor. only at 13:6 (cf. 6X in Rom., 1X in 2 Cor., 2X in 2 Thess.). The more important word, for our purposes, is ἀδικέω which is found only at 1 Cor. 6:7, 8; 2 Cor. 7:2, 12; Gal. 4:12; Col. 3:25; Phm. 18, in every case, it would seem, of wrongs done within the Christian community.

39 Bernard, "Connexion," p. 437.

40 6:12: πάντα μοι ἐξεστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐγὼ ἐξουσιασθήσομαι ὑπό τινος, and 7:4: ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει... ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει. In fact 7:4 is an unusual use of the word since it is a very close reflection of Gen. 3:16, but uses ἐξουσιάζω rather than κυριεύω (LXX) because of other Jewish traditions (Targumim and Aquila).

41 cf. also the use of ἐξουσία in 11:10, see below.

42 Σατανᾶς appears nowhere else in 1 Corinthians; elsewhere in Paul only at Rom. 16:20; 2 Cor. 2:11; 11:14; 12:7; 1 Thess. 2:18; 2 Thess. 2:9. See Forester, art."Σατανᾶς" TDNT 7, 151-163, esp. p. 161.

43 MT, שֹׁפֵט וְסוֹפֵר (LXX, κριτὰς καὶ γραμματοεισαγωγεῖς)

44 E.g. κρίσει ἀνὰ μέσον in Deut. 17:8, cf. 1 Cor. 6:5; καὶ ποιήσεις κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα in Deut 17:10, cf. 1 Cor. 6:1; ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ σου in Deut. 17:12, cf. 1 Cor. 6:11.

45 In 19:13; the paragraph, 19:15-21 contains several resonances with 1 Cor. 6:1-11: ἀδικία, ἀδελφός, ἐπονηρεύσατο.

46 It is surprising that Paul does not cite this passage in his consideration of incest in Corinth.

47 See also Leviticus 20, and the comments of David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, Cambridge: University Press, 1947, pp. 78-82.

48 1 Cor. 5:21: καὶ τοιαύτη πορνεία ἥτις οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. In the LXX a variety of expression are used: τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα γῆς Αἰγύπτου... Χαναάν, τὰ ἔθνη, ἡ γῆ, οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῆς γῆς.

49 1 Cor. 6:16: Ἔσονται γάρ, φησίν, οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν. Gen. 2:24, LXX: καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν.

50 See Hurd, Origin, pp. 88-89, esp. footnote 1 on p. 89 where he describes a number of transitional passages.

51 In Leviticus 17:8 the cases which have recourse to Levitical priests are those "requiring decisions between one kind of homicide and another, one kind of legal right and another, or one kind of assualt and another..." In LXX this is translated: ἐὰν δὲ ἀδυνατήσῃ ἀπὸ σοῦ ῥῆμα εἰ κρίσει ἀνὰ μέσον αἷμα αἵματος καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον κρίσις κρίσεως καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον ἁφὴ ἁφῆς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀντιλογία ἀντιλογίας... With this compare 1 Cor. 6:5: οὕτως οὐκ ἔνι ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδεὶς σοφὸς δυνήσεται διακρῖναι ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ.

52 1 Thess. 4:3 (ὁ ἁγιασμὸς ὑμῶν), 4:4 (ἐν ἁγιασμῷ καὶ τιμῇ),4:7 (ἀλλ' ἐν ἁγιασμῷ), 1 Cor. 6:11 (ἀλλὰ ἡγιάσθητε).

53 Though neither ὑπερβαινεῖν nor πλεονεκτεῖν require such an interpretation. See Schneider, TDNT 5, 743f. and Delling, TDNT 6, 266ff., and literature cited there.

54 TDNT 6, pp. 639 f. in article πρᾶγμα, cf. Maurer, TDNT 7, pp. 365ff., art. σκεῦος.

55 For a careful presentation of many of the sexual dimensions of 1 Thess. 4:1-8, see William Klassen, "Foundations for Pauline Sexual Ethics," a paper presented to Seminar in 1978. He agrees with Maurer's view of σκεῦος but holds to the view that 4:6 refers to business. While he notes the resemblances with 1 Cor. 7, he does not mention resemblances to 6:1,8.

56 See R.B. Ward, "Partiality in the Assembly: James 2:2-4," HTR 62 (1969) 87-97. I owe this reference and the point generally to a doctoral student, Raymond C. van Leeuwen.

57 On 5:6, van Leeuwen refers to R.P. Martin, "The Life-Setting of the Epistle of James in the Light of Jewish History", in Biblical and Near Eastern Studies (W.S. La Sor Festschrift), ed. G.A. Tuttle, Grand Rapids: Eerdmens, 1978, pp. 97-103.

58 Ward does not notice the resemblances to 1 Cor. 6, and barely mentions one overlap with 1 Cor. 5. The evidence he cites for the lawcourt background from Rabbinic sources is impressive.

59 In spinning the following hypothesis I have tried to inform myself, albeit imperfectly, of the legal and marital situation of members of a Jewish synagogue or a Christian congregation in a provincial city. The following have been helpful: D.M. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law: Marital Relations, Contraception, and Abortion as set forth in the classic texts of Jewish Law, New York: NY University Press, 1968; Ludwig Blau, Die jüdische Ehescheidung und der jüdische Scheidebrief, Budapest, 1911 (r.p. Farnborough: Gregg, 1970); Jacob Freid, Jews and Divorce, New York: KTAV, 1968; J.A. Crook, Law and Life in Rome London: Thames & Hudson, 1967; J.V.P. Balsdon, Roman Women, London: Bodley Head, 1962; Ramsey MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, New Haven: Yale, 1974; Ludovic Beauchet, Histoire du Droit Privé de la République Athénienne, Paris: Marescq, 1837, vols. 1 & 2.

60 These points all arise from 6:1-8. The first seems required by the use of ἀδελφός ; the second is demanded by the stress on insiders within the church; the third by

the evidence of section III above; and the fourth by the fact that they are already going outside.

61 The word group μοιχεύω is used surprisingly seldom by Paul: μοιχαλίς in Rom. 7:3, μοιχεύω in Rom. 2:22; 13:9; and μοιχός only in 1 Cor. 6:9.

62 Some such supposition about the limits of Paul's knowledge of the facts would probably be necessary, given the strictures against adultery, both in Judaism and in the Lex Julia de Adulteriis (see Hauck, article Μοιχεύω TDNT 4, 729-35).

63 I am not yet able to establish whether this would be a legitimate case under Corinthian legal conditions.

64 See W.W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, Cambridge: University Press, 1939, p. 69.

65 There is a striking difference between these questions and those discussed by Musonius Rufus when he discusses the question: "Will the Philosopher prosecute anyone for Personal Injury?" Text and translation in Cora Lutz, Musonius Rufus, Yale Classical Studies X, New Haven: Yale University, 1947, pp. 76-81.

S 266 SEXUALITY: ITS SOCIAL REALITY AND THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING IN 1 CORINTHIANS 7

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The problem of sexuality is discussed most thoroughly by Paul in 1 Cor. 7. 1 Cor. 7 has the added benefit of being sociologically as well as theologically accute. Paul obviously has a particular problem with which he must deal yet at the same time he shows that he wishes to solve this sociological problem from a theological perspective. Consequently there is perhaps a no better place in the entire Pauline Letters to examine the relationship between Paul's theology and his ethical or sociological expectations than in 1 Cor. 7.

Any interpretation of 1 Cor. 7, or 1 Cor. itself, depends upon an analysis of the sociological and theological situation which called forth the letter. Although it is highly probable that 1 Cor. 5-16 was written before 1 Cor. 1-4 we assume that the situation found in 1 Cor. 1:11-13 actually would define for us the theological and sociological problem if we could agree on a meaning of that passage. Ferdinand Christian Baur set the theological and sociological problem for us by maintaining that the problem of 1 Cor. was conflict between the Petrine party and the Pauline party, that is, the Judaizers and the Gentile Christians.[1] Baur's thesis was not simply an observation but a total picture of the early church based upon a Hegelian understanding of historical development. Johannes Munck sufficiently altered this understanding of the conflict at Corinth to allow the possibility that the real situation was a conflict between gnosticism and the more institutional church founded by Paul.[2]

It is our opinion that the Christ party at Corinth was a gnostic group.[3] The church at Corinth, like all other churches in the Gentile world, consisted of people with two or perhaps even three sociological backgrounds: Jewish, Hellenistic, and perhaps Roman. The impact of Paul's preaching for all three heritages was to call for a suspension of the sociological reification that had occurred in these cultures. Paul did this by preaching an eschatological message which called them to place in suspension their normal activities.[4]

It would appear that the Christ party, the gnostics, caught the intention of Paul but assumed the suspension of sociological values meant a suspension of history or sociology itself. That disdain of historical or carnate existence marks gnosticism as we know it. Paul was not aware of this problem until gnosticism itself began to reify itself in a world denying structure. This gnostic reification produced parties or conflicts in the Corinthian church. Up to this time there had been conflicts among the three traditions. These conflicts surely regarded dress codes and eating habits. They had been solved by eschatological suspension. But now that a new Christian ethos was

being formed by the gnostics, a sociological form had come into being which stood in conflict with the previously more flexible Christian tradition.

For Paul the exchange of one reification for another would not be conversion. However true that might have been for the ancient world, it was not true for Paul. For Paul conversion would mean the suspension of sociological values while at the same time living in current sociological patterns. Being in Christ or in the Lord for Paul is not a sociological alternative to Judaism or Hellenistic religions. Rather, the body of Christ is a community of persons from various walks of life and various strati who stand in theological tension with their own particular concrete life situations.

This is no more apparent than in 1 Cor. 7 where, as noted before, Paul deals not only with the sociological issue involving the new Christ party but also chooses to work at some specific ethical matter from a theological perspective. Consequently, we are able to see the interplay between Paul's theological convictions and his sociological advice for possibly the only time in Pauline Epistles.

Analyses of the Text

Chapter 7 is divided into two sections by the *peri de* formula. Verses 1-24 deal with the shift from one sociological state to another. This centers primarily on shifts from one marital status to another marital status. However verses 17-24 summarize Paul's operative principles in terms of other sociological commitments or conditions: circumcision and slavery. The second part of the chapter, verses 25-38, extends Paul's theological conviction into the realm of the shift from a single person in one's own family to the creation of a new family unit.[5] In verses 39-40, Paul sharpens that argument by contrasting the freedom of the married women with the freedom of the unmarried women.

Once it is seen that the entire chapter deals with the issue of seeking sociological change, the material falls into place fairly easily.

In verse 1 we find a fractured *tobspruch*[6] which must have been used by Paul to encourage demarried persons to remain as they were. While we have lost the direct implication of this Pauline *tobspruch*, we must conclude that the Christ party reinterpreted the saying, perhaps even deliberately fracturing the *tobspruch*, to decry any kind of sexual relationship. Paul counters the Christ party with three separate ascertions. First, in verse 2 he tempers his own argument and that of the New Testament in general by conceding that a second marriage would often times be appropriate. The strong sense of the formation of one covenant and its implication for each partner in the covenant, as seen in verse 4, convinced persons like Paul that only one marriage was possible. A second marriage would be adulterated by the first relationship. However, Paul is not willing to make this observation a law. As a result, in verse 2 he allows that persons in the community who have

been married but are no longer might do well to remarry.

Secondly, in verses 3 and 4 he stresses the importance of sexual relationship in marriage. His argument is that the identity of the partner depends upon the intimate relationship with the person of the opposite sex. Consequently sexuality is not only an activity that is due a partner but it is the very means by which the covenant is celebrated, formed, and made functional. So he directly denys the gnostic antisexual teaching. As has long been noticed,[7] it would appear that the Christ party at Corinth had advocated sexless marriage. Paul strongly attacks this position, which may have been derived from his own sayings, in his stress of the importance of the sexual relationship. He does allow that a couple could agree for a short time to do without sexual intimacy. The concession clause of verse 6 is confusing. According to the present analysis the concession could be the important modification of the teaching regarding a second marriage otherwise so prevalent in the early church.[8] If this is true then verse 6 refers back to verse 2. On the other hand it is also quite possible that Paul was so adamant about sexual intimacy in marriage that the "short time for prayer" in verse 5 would be his concession.

Thirdly, verse 7 states his own conviction regarding the marriage state. Considering the events of the time and the urgency of the Christian mission, he wishes all people were as he is, that is, having been married and therefore having participated in the closest form of covenant relationship, but not married and free to serve the Lord in world mission. This exegesis assumes the fact that Paul was married.[9] The text itself would indicate that he had been. In verse 8 he addresses the demarried men and the widows and wishes that they were as he himself was. The obvious implication of that is that he classified himself among the demarried men. The linguistic insistance on this fact derives from verse 11 where the agamos must refer to people who are demarried rather than single persons. In verse 9 he repeats verse 2. It would be better if demarried persons would not marry. But if this discipline is too difficult, then it would be better if they did.[10]

In verse 10 he shifts then to people who are married and apparently do not have the gnostic concern regarding sexuality. He repeats what he had received from the Lord: that a married couple should not be divorced or separated. It is difficult to determine what exact sociological need is met by this except perhaps the insistent clarity that changing one's sociology will not in itself contribute to one's life as a Christian. Some might be seeking divorce as a route to greater purity (as seen by the gnostics) by conflict avoidance with a non-believer or other tension-issues related to a partner. Or, it could well be that Paul simply is using here the "Word of the Lord" in his own particular form to lead to his arguments in the rest of the section. In the next verses it becomes apparent that a strong issue at Corinth is whether a man or a woman married to a non-believer would stay with the non-believer (vss. 12-16).

In verses 17-24, Paul states his thesis very clearly. The fact that it has nothing to do with marriage or sexuality indicates that he is reflecting on those explicit covenantal matters in the context of a theological affirmation he has already presented and that he intends to employ in the rest of the letter. He argues quite clearly that the sociological unit in which one finds oneself does not in itself constitute an opposition to the Christian faith, nor does changing one's sociological position for another sociological position enable one to exist better in the Christian community. As conversion then does not require, so it does not imply a shift from one sociological unit to another nor from one class of society to another.[11] Rather conversion is a creative state of being in which one is joined with others in a new relationship where sociological problems or values are suspended but not negated. It is difficult to derive normative ethical directives from the letters of Paul because he refuses to equate the Christian community as the body of Christ with any sociological unit. Paul carefully validates several sociological expressions on a given issue. He points out the real need or value met by each, be those themselves rooted in sexual, social, or religious experience. Verse 23 perhaps states it as poignantly as possible: "You were bought with a price by God so don't become slaves to a human condition." Do not suppose freedom in Christ lies in any racial or social place Christians can achieve through common behavior.

When, then, Paul shifts to the subject of single persons (vss. 25-38), he is faced with a new situation. For in speaking of marriage, Christians are speaking of creating new sociological relationships. He must now extend his previous basic observations to an area which was not touched by "any saying of the Lord" (vs. 25) or by his own previous teaching. Thus his position is quite simple. He allows that covenantal formation and sociological formations are quite appropriate. Still he urges that not even marriage, which he has otherwise so highly revered (vs. 4), is to be sought as a sociological change which in itself assures Christians of doing good.

In order to support his thesis he equates, as we would have supected, the things of the Lord with the threat of an imminent end. In verse 26 he speaks of the present distress and in verse 29 he speaks of the foreshortened time. Paul uses eschatological statements, as did other Jewish writers, in order to develop either a sense of immediacy, as in this case, or a sense of preparedness, as for example in the Thessalonians correspondence.[12] The sense of immediacy accompanies a sense of and wish for the disillusion or freedom from present (desirable or undesirable) sociological conditions. In this line Paul stands with the prophets who proclaim the day of the Lord and with Jesus who attached his eschatology to the parables which tended to reverse societal perceptions.

Paul argues that one can be wedded to a societal ethos in such a way that allegiance to the Kingdom of God becomes most difficult. Yet Paul does not oppose the formation of new social units such as the family although he does oppose the perception that such formation <u>in itself</u> better serves the Lord or <u>necessarily</u> prohibits the service of the Lord. Paul

calls for proper discernment between sociological expressions and their eschatological end so that a proper perspective on the role of societal forms can be maintained.

In whatever sociological form that one finds oneself, Paul calls people to an existence that takes seriously the things of the Lord rather than the things of society. This is the famous hōs mē section (vss. 29-31). Here, Paul indicates that people who are married, celebrating various life events, doing their business or involved in the world's wealth should do such without attaching ultimate secular (and surely not moral) value to them. The "teleological suspension of sociological value" could hardly be any better expressed than in these verses. Paul then restates his principle rather clearly in verse 35. He is not trying to establish normative sociological values nor does he want what he has said to be reified into ethical directives. He would like for people to live faithfully and without sociological distraction in relationship to the things of the Lord.

In the difficult verses of 36-38, it seems reasonable that we have the actual sociological situation raised by the Corinthian correspondence. There are two possible interpretations of this situation. Paul could be responding to fathers giving daughters in marriage or to betrothed men taking their betrothed. There is no clear textual evidence to help us decide. It is clear that men are being advised about marriage matters regarding unmarried women. These verses give us evidence that the Corinthian social context gave men the decision-power in marriage (be it fathers or young men) most likely excluding the women in that choice. Verse 39 views the implications of that choice: women are bound to their husband as long as he lives. Paul ends this section by judging that a woman in his opinion, would be happier as she is--unmarried or demarried.

In preliminary summary then, we conclude that the parties of Corinth consisted of persons of Jewish, Hellenistic, and Roman origin. Paul called them forth from their own sociological units into the body of Christ. This body of Christ had sociological configurations, but Paul attempted to keep them from being reified. His very nonreification was concretized by the so-called Christ party or gnostics. This group attempted to make a social structure out of their new freedom. Paul was forced to affirm his original preaching and his original eschatological immediacy without affirming their gnostic sociology. In the case of marriage, which must have been one of the more difficult problems,[13] he reaffirmed the importance of marriage and the importance of sexual relationship while at the same time reaffirming that sociological change was not conversion. He did this by theological reference to freedom in Christ, being bought with a price, the immediate disillusion of society, and the importance of anxiety for the things of the Lord. But the question of establishing new marriages required Paul to face just how Christians, for whom sociological change and reification do not constitute things of the Lord, shall establish and interpret the sociological and theological significance of their new creation.

Exegetical-Theological Issues in verses 25-40

The key section of this chapter is 25-40. For here one sees the confluence of sociological and theological determinations in making a choice which constitutes the formation of a new social structure--a family. Because a new social unit is being established by Christians, the ethical decision is not merely how to live in faithful suspension of the sociological. It involves the most basic issues of intentional Christian formation.[14]

Fundamentally, Paul acknowledges all people as equal in the Lord. Christian freedom consists both in being free from social-structural concerns and in being free to devote oneself to the Lord in both social form and theological fact. Nevertheless, whatever the social structures of which one is a part, Paul regularly insists they are not to be cast off or disparaged. Despite the teleological suspension of the sociological--what it is to be in Christ--one is to honor the social strictures in which one lives whether those be circumcision, slavery, or marriage.[15] For that is part of our being incarnate in the world. Temporal and social relations constitute conditions in the human social fabric under which all persons, Christians as well, live and express themselves and in which they raise up young into the formation community. Christians "put on the Lord Jesus Christ" (Rom. 13:14) with the assurance that social conditions neither save nor damn. God's gospel of salvation may be received and borne witness to in whatever the social conditions to which believers are subject.[16]

Paul grants anticipated marriages more particular attention than circumcision, slavery or even the existing marriage covenant. In choosing the social structure of marriage, Christians simultaneously acknowledge and subject themselves to several orders: 1) that society which Christians share in common with all other people--a social context which directs women to be subordinate to men; 2) the mutual covenant of marriage which includes the enrolling of one's sexuality into covenant relation such that even one's body is not any more only one's own (vss. 3-4); 3) the combination of the first two orders (societal hierarchy and covenantal mutuality) which means that neither member may be fully free to give herself or himself exclusively to the things of the Lord.

We argue that Paul's point in verses 36-38 is this: if the man (father/betrothed) feels that he is acting unfairly toward the unmarried woman/daughter, then let him do as he thinks about marriage.[17] But if he can withstand the societal pressure and is sure in his own heart, then he will do better to let the woman remain unmarried. This is important because in marriage Christians subject themselves to both the social expectations placed on the marriage contract and to the Christian covenant of interdependent mutuality (with the subsequent result that one is less free to serve the Lord). And only men had the decision-making power in those days to determine whether they would enroll both themselves and another into these orders. Thus an already delicate matter, the creation of a new social unit, is complicated further. Women are socially disallowed from deciding the structures to which they

will submit. Publically and socially that was not the way it was done. While equal in Christ, they are unequal in the social hierarchy.[18]

Verses 39-40 make this plain. Unmarried and demarried men may choose regarding their singleness. Women have such freedom only 1) after their husbands die or 2) if they are not given or taken in marriage apart from or against their will. Unmarried women who become wives will remain bound both in covenantal mutuality and in sociological hierarchy to their husbands for the durations of their husbands' lives (vs. 39).[19] Thus Paul writes to the church so as to raise the question of women's will and welfare, knowing the present sociology disallows their choosing the marriage issue for themselves. And Paul believes those women would be happier as they are: unmarried (vs. 40). Happier that is, than by being made subject through another's choice to the social hierarchy of masculine domination, as well as enrolling that social hierarchy into Christian covenant obliging both parties to be more fundamentally concerned with pleasing another person than with pleasing the Lord.

Ethics and theology in 1 Cor. 7

We can now see that Pauline theology addresses two sorts of ethical postures in Chapter 7. The first is clearly outlined in verses 1-24. Even after the transition to the matter of unmarried women (vs. 25) he first summarizes the entire foregoing argument, "I think that in view of the present distress, it is well for a person to remain as she/he is" (vss. 26-28). Then Paul's marvelous *hōs mē* verses make plain his theological and ethical context. Following that his second posture is pursued, "I want to promote good order and to secure your undivided attention to the Lord" (vss. 32-40).

The first posture reflects on a Christian's response to social conditions which simply are given: conditions in which the believer is not granted sociological choice. We need not like those conditions, indeed, we may agree they are sometimes ignoble or demeaning. But for our part as believers we know that in Jesus Christ they already are overcome. In such situations an ethic of obedient response is called for. Thus in matters like slavery, circumcision, and marriage, Christians are to fulfill their social and covenantal obligations. But, *hōs mē*; Christians are never to mistake social good or burden for the fulfillment of or as a threat to the gospel.

The second posture reflects a Christian's intentional creation of social conditions. It seems apparent that awareness of this issue arose rather late ("I have no command of the Lord," vs. 25). We believe the Christ party's efforts to suspend the sociological, carnate, and historical, called Paul's attention to the fact that whatever one's theological affirmations, they will be reified in the lives and choices Christians make. Furthermore, intentional choices which create new sociologies affect *others*' lives in a manner quite unlike the obligation issues characteristic of the first ethical posture. The first posture may appropriately only

ask how to be obedient or remain pure within a context and structure for which it must accept no responsibility. The second Christian ethical posture entails intentional choice: it actually creates new social forms. Still, Christian formation ethics has no different limits than does secular sociology in the face of the apocalyptic effect God's eschaton in Jesus Christ has on all human creations. Secular and Christian forms alike are temporary, and are to be lived in the hōs mē.

If that is hard for Christians to hear it is even harder to do. We become attached to and identified with our own creations. But for Paul there is no Christian ethos if by that we mean either a code of behavior that marks off Christians from all other people; or that by doing and/or believing in a given manner persons could be assured of the eschatological fullness in Jesus Christ. Being Christians does not assure us of or allow us to create an ethos which suspends the apocalyptic affect of God's inbreaking eschatology in Jesus Christ.

The theological problem that Paul finds in responding to the ethical issues of 1 Cor. 7 is how to speak to matters that have powerful significance in Christian community while yet helping Christians sense how highly conditioned is that importance. The Corinthian parties are losing sight of the fact that useful ethical teachings are but tutors. Some are arguing about which tutor (ethos) is best--Paul, Cephas, or Apollos. And the people of the Christ party who do understand the limitations of a particular ethos tend to go for a false hope: that of denying the validity of all social forms (thus removing the need of tutors). But none of this will do. When intentionally creating a new reified social structure, Paul had to decide whether or not to build in those qualities which would eventually explode it. And his answer was, yes: do it. But even here, hōs mē: not for the sake of exploding it, but knowing that no human creation can be or deliver God's new creation.

Christian behavior, in Pauline theology, is fundamentally an incarnate, sociologically expressed response to faith. As behavior is never the starting point for faith, ethical matters are not an appropriate source for Christian reflection on the directives for faith and practice. Thus Paul granted that diverse social formations might express faithful responses to the same Lord, since the ultimate significance of sociology is suspended by God's eschatological act in Jesus Christ. But the diverse expression of faithful response was not to be confused with or taken as the source of salvation lest believers mistake sociology for ontology, and ethics for theology either by claiming particular Christian formation or by an attempted suspension of all historical claims upon their lives as the way to inherit God's promise.

In summary, in Pauline thought sociological considerations properly outweigh theological reflections in local communities, while remaining dependent on theology for direction, vision, and depth. In translocal community,[20] theological considerations outweigh the sociological, while remaining dependent on varying community's social formations for its expression,

actuality, and signification. Thus translocal theology responds to local crisis and dilemma not so as to resolve the problem, but rather to nurture responsible choice exercised in the tension of being formed by and subject to communal sociology while one is informed by and freed in Christ.

NOTES

[1]F. C. Baur, "Die Christuspartei in der Korinthischen Gemeinde, der Gegensatz des petrinischen und paulinischen Christenthums in der ältesten Kirche, der Apostel Petrus in Rom," Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie 5 (1831):61-206; or in his Ausgewählte Werke in Einzelausgaben (Stuttgart: Froman, 1963), 1:1-146.

[2]It was Wilhelm Lütgert who first identified the Christ party as spiritualists or gnostics. See his Freiheitspredigt und Schwärmgeister in Korinth (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie 12, 3, 1908). Nevertheless it was Johannes Munck in his Paul and the Salvation of Mankind (London: SCM, 1959) who showed that the opponents could not be Judaizers as the Tübingen school supposed. Though Munck himself did not hold to the thesis that the opponents were gnostics, one can see his awareness of what had been done in his article, "Jødedom, Kristendom, Gnosis," Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift 21 (1958), 219-230.

[3]We consider the Christ party to be gnostics in the non-social pneumatic sense, not a movement as maintained by Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971). Gnosticism would always be an attitude or a method of perception, which, of course, becomes reified. Bo Reicke speaks of the Christ party as one with an "überirdische Art von Erkenntnis," in Diakonie, Festfreude und Zelos (Uppsala Universitet Årsskrift, 1951:5), pp. 275-77.

[4]Graydon F. Snyder, "The Sociological Function of 1 Cor. 7:29a," (Pauline Ethics Consultation, New Orleans, 1978).

[5]This new creation entails Christian intentionality, to which we return in the final section.

[6]Graydon F. Snyder, "The Tobspruch in the New Testament" New Testament Studies, 23 (1976):117-120.

[7]Although the term uxor spiritualis appears first in Tertullian (de exhortatione castitatis, 12), as early as Tatian (in Clement, stromata, 3:12) and perhaps the Shepherd of Hermas (2:4; 6:3) 1 Cor. 7:5 was taken to be a call for spiritual marriage. See D. Plooij, "Eine enkratitische Glosse im Diatessaron," ZNW 22 (1923):1-16.

[8]See the useful article on Matthew 19:12 by Quentin Quesnell, "'Made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven,' (Matthew 19, 12)," CBQ 30 (1968):335-358. It could be that the saying of 19:10, οὐ συμφέρει γαμῆσαι, matches the saying in 1 Cor. 7:1, or even 7:26.

[9]Among many others, Joachim Jeremias, "War Paulus Witwer?" ZNW 25 (1926):310-12 and 28 (1929), 321.

[10]We have again a fractured tobspruch in 7:26. Its formally absent apodosis is replaced by Paul's explicit statement of various behavior acceptable morally. But eschatologically, the issue is not social structure or behavior; it is how one indwells one's social condition.

[11]Presumably Paul's experience is mirrored in this judgment. We assume that Paul's conversion involved the overpowering recognition that the real significance of his life was not given him through his Roman citizenship, Hellenistic wisdom, or Pharisaic Judaism. All had been his social tutors. But God's inbreaking into his life in Jesus Christ utterly transformed their significance for him. We have no evidence that Paul ever rejected or otherwise dissociated himself from any of his previous sociologies. We are clear that Paul used in and for his ministry all the social inheritances he continued to possess after conversion. Cf. especially Robin Scroggs' "Paul as Rhetorician: Two Homilies in Romans 1-11," in Jews, Greeks, and Christians, ed. by Robert Hamerton-Kelly and Robin Scroggs (Leiden: Brill, 1976):271-298; and Boyd Reese's "The Apostle Paul's exercise of his rights as a Roman Citizen as recorded in the Book of Acts," The Evangelical Quarterly, 57 (1975):138-145.

[12]Graydon F. Snyder, "A Summary of Faith in an Epistolary Context: 1 Thess. 1:9-10," SBL 1972 Proceedings, 2, 355-365.

[13]Our next section suggests why, unlike circumcision (which is not so obviously public if one changes) and slavery (where the slave can rarely influence affectual change), in marriage relations each partner has enormous power, and the marriage itself is a highly public fact. These facts may also suggest the sociological weight of marriage issues. For where personal volition is greater than social constraints, ethical judgments look more to publically acceptable reasons rather than privately tendered prudence when assessing what action shall be taken.

[14]The context of this formation is religious education as that intentional effort of a community to form itself so as to be the living embodiment of its affirmations. Clearly every society has social structures with which it tutors its members. In this, Christians do not differ from other societies. As we saw, Christian conversion was for Paul the eschatological end of the hold upon persons not only of the law, but of all social forms or tutors: cultural, political, or religious.

As an ontological expression of Paul's theology, that understanding drew little resistance from adult believers.

But the Corinthians evidently all hoped to pass on their inheritance in Jesus Christ to others. So the Paul, Apollos, and Cephas parties argued against the Christ party as to how to properly reify, tutor, and create their society. They seemed not to realize that Christian ethics and education can no more deliver God's promise than could Greek wisdom, Roman citizenship, or Jewish law.

Paul's call to live hōs mē is, then, not only mandated for the present social structures in which one lives. It applies equally to God's eschatological end limiting Christian formative behavior. Any community's ethical directives are reifications of its faith affirmations. As confessional embodiments of its faith, the Christian ethos is in fact its witness to God's salvation. But it is dangerous to draw theological principles from (re-reify) concrete ethical reifications of faith. Indeed, that is idolatry: mistaking God's eschatological inheritance for obedience to a local societal tutor. The result of such mistaken judgment is infighting which debates not which reification may be most useful and appropriate for this community and/or persons, but rather which form is the true embodiment of God's will.

The establishment of a new social unit is an especially explosive platform for this debate, since all the persons involved are adults. Christian formation is not just a matter of teaching the community's young. Far more passionate are those debates attending adult decisions in which a community corporately and publically reifies its faith. Thus the creation of a new social unit in Corinth surfaces the question whether in those new units all ethical behavior must be homogenous if the faith is one.

Paul addresses none of the theory. Rather, using the fractured tobspruch, the hōs mē, and reminders of the apocalytic end-time, Paul offers options simultaneously compassionate and in touch with very diverse human experience, and keeping in focus the penultimate significance of all present ethos.

[15]Paul's Christological understanding of Jesus Christ applies in this directly to believers. Jesus was fully human while indeed God's Christ. Just so Christians who are now members of Christ's body are yet subject to radically diverse human conditions.

[16]See Robin Scroggs, "Paul and the Eschatological Woman," JAAR 40 (1972):291-93.

[17]Against the Christ-party, Paul insists that bodily expressions and drives are not evil. Indeed, fulfillment of physical drives is not itself the real source of competition to pleasing the Lord in marriage (vss. 32-35). To marry and not consumate the relationship implies that the sociological phenomenon of sex is problematic. Paul does not belief that. Indeed, if sex seems that significant, then by all means, marry and enjoy it (vss. 3-5). Inasmuch as Christians give themselves into covenant, that bonding is to be also sexually fulfilled. It is neither to be broken nor unfulfilled.

Therefore, when covenant is intentionally made, Christians nurture it and insist that it is binding before God: even to the point of acknowledging that it competes with full dedication to things of the Lord.

[18]Which led Dena Pence Frantz, a student at The University of Chicago, to wonder if the Christ party gnostics were heavily female. That would appear to allow married and unmarried women an alternative to both the covenantal and sociological subordination. Convents provided an alternative structure to marriage acceptable to society for women in the Middle Ages. Perhaps gnosticism earlier appeared to offer such an option to women of the first century.

[19]It is tempting to believe that if covenant mutuality is achieved, social subordination must cease. And indeed that is the claim leveled not only by Paul's Christ party, but by every reified understanding of justice, equality, or liberation movements. Paul's strong Christology takes seriously the tension that members of Christ's body, the church, experience as they live in but not of their given social structures. Christian equality in Christ is as certain as a believer's faith that Jesus is Lord. But subjection of Christians to powers not in their control is also as serious as Jesus' human limitations, suffering and death. Covenantal mutuality does not overcome or eliminate--though indeed it transforms at a price and with an outcome it does not control--the form and significance of social hierarchies.

[20]Adapted from Robert Redfield's great and small tradition terminology and corresponding with the observations arising from the sociology of knowledge as these studies have been related to Paul, local/translocal are less geographical than perspectival terms. Local perspectives attend to the concrete and immediate needs for community unity and order. Translocal perspectives inquire after that source or end in which otherwise conflicting charismata receive both direction and signification. Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: University Press, 1956).

MARK AS GENRE

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Perhaps I may be excused, perhaps I will not be, if I reflect just a moment on the day, 100 years ago, when the Society of Biblical Literature began. On that day in 1880 it would have been possible to invite Heinrich Julius Holtzmann, just 48 years of age as of May 18, to discuss the Gospel of Mark theologically, literarily, and generically. It would have been a long trip for him by ship, but if asked to discuss these matters he may have said something like this:

> With humility and gratitude, I stand before you today to discuss the theological, literary, and generic dimensions of the Gospel of Mark. I begin this statement with trepidation since even in my own country my investigations "impress many a theological reader as a project remote from all religious interests, indeed, at more than one point even inimical to them . . ." (p. 152). Perhaps for this reason I must indicate the essential presuppositions and goals that lie within my investigations of the synoptic gospels and the Gospel of Mark in particular. As I said in my book entitled Die synoptischen Evangelien, ihr Ursprung und ihr geschichtlicher Charakter, published seventeen years ago, I am concerned primarily "with the question, whether it is now possible to recover the historical figure of him to whom Christianity not only traces its name and state, but whose person it has also made central to its special religious outlook, in a way that will satisfy all proper demands of the advanced historico-critical sciences; whether it will be possible, by the use of a conscientious historical criticism which is the only legitimate methodology to recapture what the founder of our religion really was--the genuine and untouched image of his essential being--or whether we have to abandon once and for all the hope of attaining such a goal" (p. 152).
>
> On the basis of my investigations, I have been able to demonstrate that we are in an advantageous position with the Gospel of Mark. In brief, my investigations demonstrate that the Gospel of Mark is a reliable report. The baptism account "rests perhaps on a report given of it by Jesus himself" (p. 154) and in

Mark, but "only in Mark, . . . most of the sections" after this decisive event bear the "clear impression of originality" (p. 155). Generically, therefore, the Gospel of Mark is a reliable account of Jesus' life something like accounts based on diaries and journals in the Mediterranean world. There is one major difference, however. The primary source of the accounts in the Gospel of Mark is an oral source. Indeed, "it is at least inherently possible . . . that the whole Second Gospel . . . [may] rest in the first instance on oral tradition." Nevertheless, if this turns out to be the case, it is based on "a source that still flowed fresh, even after its main content had already been fixed in literary form" (p. 153).

In terms of a more general literary approach, the Gospel of Mark "shows itself to be a thoroughly coherent whole, with no interpolation spoiling the arrangement" (p. 153). "In the Second Gospel we know almost always at what point we are, for the circles the Lord describes in his journeys are enlarged very gradually and deliberately. The same progress prevails in this external part of the account as in that of the inner development and the gradual emergence of the messianic idea. . . . The public activity, however, . . . is presented in terms of seven ever-expanding circles that can be drawn quite definitely, although the author need not always have been aware of the transition" (p. 154). In other words, in contrast to Matthew and Luke, the Gospel of Mark stands out as a literary unity containing narrative progression in terms of both internal plot and external composition.

With regard to the theological ramifications of my investigations, the results are highly satisfying. "Without having to resort to the blunted weapons of an apologetic that rests on dogmatic presuppositions, we leave behind us, once and for all, the results of the Tübingen School" (p. 153). In Mark "a harmoniously constructed spiritual picture is unfolded, whose basic feature consists in the robustness of the divine consciousness that manifests itself at all times and at all places; a manifold and progressive development of a life whose driving principle is shaped by the religio-moral factor that operates with a power that completely divests itself of all the theological disputations and scholastic opinions of his day; that, avoiding all attempt to achieve knowledge that can be

> formulated scientifically produces instead eternal moral truth, free from and devoid of historical limitation, to such an extent that no one any more will wish to seek for a second example in history of the progressive consciousness of the divine" (p. 153).
>
> Thank you for your patience and respectful decorum /1/.

With this statement on the Gospel of Mark, the Society of Biblical Literature could have begun its prestigious history of exegesis of Mark with a programmatic overview that sought to be rigorously scientific, literarily sensitive, and theologically sound. In fact, I present this statement with no intention to parody, for the issues lie remarkably close to issues that are alive in 1980.

But if the issues are much the same, the games we play around those issues look amazingly different. Especially the last twenty-five years of biblical exegesis has seen an infiltration of new methodologies, new terminology and new publication formats. I feel quite sure H. J. Holtzmann would never have consented to write a paper entitled "Mark as Genre," and he would have avoided all use of diagrams and arrows as they appear in many of the discussions of genre.

Where does this bring us, then, in a discussion of the genre of Mark? First of all, it surely reminds us that though the issue of genre was implicit in many investigations of Mark during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the issue was not investigated in a detailed comprehensive manner like it is in some circles today. Secondly, though some of our methods for studying Mark have changed, and many of our conclusions have changed, still a majority who read this paper or hear parts of it may feel more at home with the way Holtzmann approached the issues than the way the issues will be approached in this paper. Thirdly, a majority of interpreters feel that much less is gained by the discussion of the genre of a work than a specific analysis of aspects of that work. And I, for the most part, agree with this sentiment. But there are times when it is important to enter into genre discussions with one another, and I think this transitional period in the field of biblical studies may be just such a time.

PRE-1920 DISCUSSIONS OF THE GENRE OF MARK

A person faces at least two difficulties when attempting to discuss the genre of the Gospel of Mark. First, many wish to emphasize the uniqueness of the Gospels, the lack of parallels. The Gospels are, they assert, a new literary creation--one of the creative results of a new phenomenon in the Mediterranean world, i.e., Christianity. Second, the term genre may refer to a literary work in different ways. While "genre" is indisputably:

> a term used in literary criticism to designate the distinct types or categories into which literary works are grouped according to form or technique or, sometimes, subject matter, . . . it is used loosely, since the principles on which they are made are numerous. . . . The difficulty resulting from the loose use of the term is easily illustrated: novel designates a genre, but so does picaresque novel; lyric designates a genre, but so does sonnet, as do both elegy and pastoral elegy. . . . /2/.

Perhaps especially since the term may be used in so many different ways, "today critics frequently regard genre distinctions as useful descriptive devices but rather arbitrary ones" /3/.

Nevertheless, most interpreters introduce either implicit or explicit genre statements in the midst of their investigations. These statements call forth from time to time specific generic investigations. These genre investigations sort through various classifications of literary types in an attempt to specify the literary class to which certain texts belong. The procedure of genre investigation may be misleading to some readers, however, since the goal of genre analysis is less to attain an indisputable classification of a literary work than to call forth aspects of the work that have been ignored in previous investigations. In other words:

> the purpose of criticism by genres is not so much to classify as to clarify . . . traditions and affinities, thereby bringing out a large number of literary relationships that would not be noticed as long as there were no context established for them /4/.

This procedure often reveals that a consensus has arisen around a piece of literature that not only hinders but essentially excludes an awareness of many dimensions of that document.

Classification of the Gospel of Mark in relation to other literature has occurred regularly during the past one hundred years. In 1903, for example, Johannes Weiss discussed the similarities and differences between Mark and Graeco-Roman biographical literature in the first chapter of his book on Mark. Observing that Justin Martyr used the term ἀπομνημονεύματα with reference to the Gospels twice in his Apology and frequently in his Dialogue with Trypho, he compares the Gospel of Mark with Xenophon's Ἀπομνημονεύματα (Memorabilia) about Socrates /5/. On the basis of the loose interconnection between stories, anecdotes, conversational scenes and individual words, Weiss remarks concerning the appropriateness of comparing the form of the Memorabilia with the Gospels. Concerning Mark in particular he asserts:

> Also here the large number of entirely disconnected individual units of anecdotal character, also here the alteration between

> narration, description, and conversational scenes. Above all the amazingly similar manner in which the little narratives only have the purpose of framing and motivating an utterance of Jesus. Especially, however, is the agreement in the negative to be observed. It [Mark] lacks throughout the pragmatism of a biography in the modern sense /6/.

Weiss is therefore led to Xenophon's Memorabilia by means of Justin Martyr's second century use of the generic term and concludes that Justin's use of the term to refer to the Gospels was appropriate especially in relation to the Gospel of Mark.

Weiss' next step, however, helped to set the stage for later developments in the comparisons of Mark with Graeco-Roman literary works. He asserts that the essence of the memorabilia form is that the reader continually be convinced that he is reading reliable remembrances about the person who is featured in the work. For this reason, it is necessary for the author to remind the reader regularly that the data is coming either from his own accurate memory or the report of someone else who saw it or himself received the account from a reliable source. Citing such editorial comments by Xenophon, asserting that such comments are indispensible to the memorabilia form, and observing the lack of such comments in Mark, Weiss concludes that the Gospel of Mark and Xenophon's Memorabilia are significantly different. He seals his argument with a discussion of the Papias tradition in which he claims that Papias presents the opinion that the Gospel of Mark has only a limited relationship to the classical genre of memorabilia since the author is only an indirect witness of the life of Jesus. With this conclusion, Weiss moves on to a discussion of peripatetic biography as defined by F. Leo and shows how the major interests in the person from birth to death are absent from Mark /7/.

Finally, inquiring if the Gospel of Mark is literature and if the one who wrote it is an author, Weiss notices the absence of a first person statement of purpose in the second Gospel. He concludes that the writer of Mark is no author but a recorder of materials who has no consciousness of writing a book designed for independent status and attention. Rather, the writer is a mediator who is simply recording the contents of the gospel that are well-known to both him and the people with whom he associates. The document may serve the direct cause of propaganda, however, because the proclamation of the gospel is the central dimension of Christian mission /8/. The content of Mark as gospel for Christian mission, therefore, takes Weiss away from any further comparison between Mark and other literature. At this point, in other words, content (object) criticism halts the enterprise of genre criticism.

In 1915, Clyde W. Votaw attempted to inaugurate an era of detailed comparison between the Gospels and Graeco-Roman biographical literature. Distinguishing between historical biography and popular biography, he argues that the Gospels are examples of Graeco-Roman popular biography which present:

> only memorabilia of a man's life, disconnected incidents and sayings, without adequate chronology and connection, without showing his genetic relation to and his influence upon his times. . . . the data of the man's life are inadequately furnished by the writing, so that uncertainty exists as to the deeds, the teaching, the personality, the relationships of the man, . . . because the didactic aim has operated to the neglect or the obscuration of the historical facts /9/.

Taking this approach, he concludes that "the nearest parallels to the Gospels are the books which report the lives of Epictetus, Apollonius, and Socrates" /10/. The rest of his article, therefore, is a discussion of Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus, Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana, Plato's Dialogues, and Xenophon's Memorabilia /11/. Votaw's discussion points to various analogies concerning the time that transpired between the activity of the teacher and the writing of the documents, the lack of written documents from the hand of the teacher himself, and the group of interested people who kept the memory of the teacher alive within Mediterranean culture. To demonstrate further similarities, he quotes extensive portions of the works which reveal dynamics, actions, and themes that compare favorably with the Gospels.

Prior to 1920, therefore, it was not unusual for interpreters to discuss the relation of the Gospel of Mark to other literature for the purpose of classifying the Gospel of Mark in the domain of the literature being produced in Mediterranean culture. In this context, Graeco-Roman biographical literature concerning Socrates, Apollonius of Tyana, and Epictetus was considered to offer the greatest potential for comparison.

FORM-CRITICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE GENRE OF MARK

In the year 1919, Karl Ludwig Schmidt published Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu and Martin Dibelius published Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums /12/. These two works together exhibit the mindset that weighed against any serious attempts to discover wholistic analogies for the Gospels from the 1920's to the 1960's. Schmidt analyzed the framework of the Gospels and concluded that each evangelist had taken small units of tradition and joined them together loosely according to his own purposes. By itself, Schmidt's study would not have turned scholarship away from genre analysis, since it was widely known that the framework of Xenophon's Memorabilia, for example, also joined units of tradition together in a loosely connected manner. In fact, Schmidt himself mentioned at one point a similarity between the participial constructions used by Xenophon and by the Gospel writers to establish the contexts for the sayings, conversations, and actions that were contained in the small units of tradition /13/. But the climate of interest in New Testament interpretation had shifted to the transmission of the small units of tradition the Gospel writers

had collected together in their composition of the documents. For this reason, when Dibelius sought analogies within Rabbinic, Greek, and Patristic literature, he did not look for extended composition that would compare with an entire Gospel narrative but for striking and witty sayings, scenes containing brief conversations, stories that end with a poignant saying or action, and miracle stories /14/. The interest had turned toward the forms that were alive in oral transmission prior to the composition of the Gospels, and along with this mindset came the assertion that the framework of the Gospels arose simply as an extension of the impulses at work during the stage of oral transmission.

In 1921, Rudolf Bultmann included some remarks about the wholistic comparison of the Gospels with other literature in the conclusion to Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition. He approaches the comparison, however, through his interest in the small units of tradition he analyzes in the book. First, therefore, he argues that the forms the early Christians used to tell and hand down the traditions about Jesus were not new:

> With all this the Church did not itself create new literary genres but took over traditional forms that had long been used in Judaism, and which--so far as dominical sayings are concerned--Jesus himself had also used. . . . Yet with all this the type of the Gospel was not yet formed. . . . (S)ections were finally collected and fixed in written form and in this way underwent naturally enough some process of editing--as we must suppose took place for the speech material in Q, and for the shorter collections of apophthegms and miracle stories which Mark used . . . The idea of a unified, connected presentation of the life of Jesus was obviously far removed from the Palestinian community. . . .
>
> It is in Mark that the Gospel type is first met /15/.

In other words, Bultmann participated in the shift of interest from wholistic analogies for the Gospels to analogies for the small units and collections of units. The radicality of Bultmann's thesis lay not in his interest in the small units. This interest had been nurtured steadily since the 1880's and 1890's. It was, however, a radical thesis to claim that most of the forms operative during the stage of oral transmission had been taken over from Jewish and Hellenistic tradition.

Along with the shift in interest to the small units of traditions and the growth of the Gospel framework out of Christian concerns came a stronger assertion that there were no significant analogies for the Gospel form within Mediterranean literature. Bultmann put it thus:

> . . . must we look around for analogies to explain the form of the Gospel? What analogies can be suggested? There are none in the Greek Tradition; for there is no point in considering either the Memoirs about which Justin (Apol., I, 66) might have been thinking with his reference to ἀπομνημονεύματα, or the Hellenistic biography, or even a collection of anecdotes like the Lives of Aesop. Even if there are many individual points of comparison, there is lacking in the Gospels, apart from all other things, the proper biographical interest and technique of execution, and, on the other hand, the genres of Greek literature lack the connection with myth and cult.
>
> Also the analogy with popular oriental books is of no use for an explanation. . . . While the analogy of Ahikar may well explain the small collections that preceded Mark, it cannot explain the Gospel type; for this presupposes a Christ myth and cult and is a creation of Hellenistic Christianity. . . .
>
> It seems to me that while we need analogies for understanding the individual components of the Synoptic Tradition we do not need them for the Gospel as a whole. It has grown out of the imminent propensity for development which lay in the tradition fashioned out of various motives, and out of the Christ-myth and the Christ-cult of Hellenistic Christianity. It is thus an original creation of Christianity /16/.

The first edition of Bultmann's analysis of the synoptic tradition, therefore, presented an absolute stance against the possibility of finding significant analogies for the overall Gospel narratives. Analogies, if they were to be found, would at best explain the forms that emerged during the stage of oral transmission and the small collections that were made prior to the writing of the Gospels.

The next strike against genre analysis of the Gospels came in 1923 with the publication of Karl Ludwig Schmidt's "Die Stellung der Evangelien in der allgemeinen Literaturgeschichte" /17/. This essay launches a direct vendetta against any interpreter who attempts a detailed comparison of the Gospel of Mark with Graeco-Roman biographical literature written prior to the second century A.D. The opening page attacks Votaw's articles and concludes that there is no influence whatsoever from Socratic tradition upon Gospel tradition until the second century A.D. Citing the work of Johannes Weiss, Martin Dibelius, Rudolf Bultmann and others, he concludes that "the comparison of the Gospels with Xenophon's Memorabilia is really nothing different than the comparison of Jesus with Socrates" /18/. In agreement with Hugo Gressmann,

however, he argues that there are some analogies with the Ahikar story from the Elephantine Papyri, and following the lead of Dibelius and others he suggests that some Jewish, and Rabbinic works furnish analogies for the formation and collection of sayings, apophthegms, anecdotes, miracle stories, and tales /19/. Then, taking his lead from Franz Overbeck and those who had developed Overbeck's thought, Schmidt returns to a discussion of Greek literature to allow for influence on the Gospels from Kleinliteratur but not Hochliteratur /20/. Immediately after this discussion, he writes the sentence that was to be cited again and again:

> Das Evangelium ist von Haus aus nicht Hochliteratur sondern Kleinliteratur, nicht individuelle Schriftstellerleistung, sondern Volksbuch, nicht Biographie, sondern Kultlegende /21/.

Moving out from this thesis, Schmidt develops an argument that the study of the Gospel form is, in the final analysis, a theological matter rather than a literary matter. As Kleinliteratur, the Gospels are products of Christian thought and action rather than literary influence. In the name of scientific procedure, therefore, interpreters must resist the temptation to pursue literary analogies to the Gospels. This pursuit presupposes a literary dimension within the Gospels which simply is not there:

> Thus, the form-critical concern is a theological matter. The general philosophical question concerning content and form is transformed into the theological question concerning God and world, Christianity and culture /22/.

When Julius Schniewind followed Schmidt's study with a full-scale study of the concept euangelion (1927, 1931) /23/ and Bultmann expanded his statements in the second edition of Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition (1931) /24/, the death knell occurred for genre analysis of Mark. Schniewind presented an intrinsic study of the concept gospel from its earliest usage in Christianity until the time it was used to refer to the Christian documents that presented the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The implication of the entire study was that intrinsic theological dynamics rather than literary impulses caused the Gospels to become as they now are. Ironically, Bultmann actually made his statements more moderate in the second edition of his work. Under the influence of Schmidt and Dibelius, he presented a milder negation of the use of memorabilia for comparison and he admitted that a collection of anecdotes like the Lives of Aesop could be of assistance in understanding the Gospels. Instead of an absolute rejection of any generic relation, he wrote this:

> The literature of memoirs and lives of the philosophers are related to the Gospels at most in that they, like the Gospels, gather together in somewhat looser form dialogues

> and episodes from the lives of important men; but as they lack any link with myth and cult, so the Gospels lack any interest of a scientific-historical kind.
>
> The Gospels bear some analogy to many books of lesser literature (Kleinliteratur), where we find collections of episodes and dialogues of a popular hero like Aesop or of a miracle worker like Apollonius of Tyana, a literature which was later continued in certain lives of Christian monks and saints. There is apparently a still closer analogy with popular oriental books, of which admittedly one example has been preserved for us: the Ahikar Story . . . /25/.

Still Bultmann left his most dramatic statements intact:

> What analogies can be suggested? There are none in the Greek tradition . . . /26/.
>
> It seems to me that while we need analogies for understanding the individual components of the Synoptic Tradition we do not need them for the Gospel as a whole /27/.
>
> It (the Gospel type) is thus an original creation of Christianity /28/.

Bultmann's second edition could actually function more powerfully in stopping genre criticism than the first edition. If anyone felt the need to assert that the Gospels had some relation to other kinds of literature in the Mediterranean world, statements in Bultmann's study supported the claim. Also, if a person wanted to assert that the Gospels were a unique Christian creation, statements in Bultmann's study supported the claim. In the ensuing years of energetic form critical analysis, genre criticism lay at rest as an unimportant issue.

REDACTIONAL AND COMPOSITIONAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE GENRE OF MARK

The first stirrings that signalled an awakening of genre analysis of Mark began in the 1950's as a result of redaction criticism. Willi Marxsen set the stage for current genre analysis with his redaction-critical analysis of the term εὐαγγέλιον in the Gospel of Mark /29/. Johannes Weiss had set the principles in motion for stopping genre analysis by arguing against Theodor Zahn's position that the term εὐαγγέλιον in the first verse of the Gospel of Mark was part of the book title /30/. Against Zahn, Weiss had argued that at the beginning of his Gospel:

> . . . Mark speaks not about "his book," since he is not even conscious of writing a book

> with any pretensions to independent significance /31/.

In contrast to Weiss, Marxsen argues:

> As to the relation between the generic term "Gospel" and its application to the individual writings, the two must be kept distinct. If, according to Mark 1:14-15, Jesus proclaims the gospel, this gospel is not to be equated off-hand with the "book" itself. But the same term appears in 1:1. Are we dealing with a title here? Does it characterize the writing as a whole? A comparison with Matthew, who describes his work as a βίβλος suggests this /32/.

Still, Marxsen does not argue that the author of Mark meant for the term Gospel to designate a book. This took place only when Mark, which contained the term in its opening verse, was used alongside Matthew and Luke /33/. In fact, Marxsen considers it problematic whether we may speak of Gospel "genre" at all /34/. Marxsen does, however, argue that "Mark introduced the term εὐαγγέλιον into the synoptic tradition," and this term refers to the confluence of two traditions: the "conceptual-theological" (related to Paul's usage) and the "kerygmatic-visual" (the material of the synoptic tradition /35/. With this convergence of two traditions, Jesus becomes both the subject and the object of the gospel in the context of redaction and authorship. Therefore, Marxsen suggests:

> Christ himself is the gospel. At the same time the gospel makes contemporary the one who has come and the one who will come. In this way the term "gospel" becomes a connective device which Mark presses into the service of his consolidation and by which he summarizes his entire work /36/.

This investigation by Marxsen gave rise to current genre analysis since it raised the specific issues connected with genre study. Genre study is concerned with the interrelation between concepts and literary practices. Marxsen's analysis approximated a form of "intrinsic" genre analysis. At the same time, Marxsen could not resist a comment that had "extrinsic" generic significance. In his conclusion to the essay, he states:

> . . . the term [εὐαγγέλιον] has a special nuance in Mark. He offers a kind of commentary on Paul's understanding of the term /37/.

This statement is essentially an intrinsic/extrinsic genre statement. Intrinsically, the Gospel of Mark contains narration, stories, and sayings that present "gospel" (a conventional concept that has a definite meaning in its cultural context). Extrinsically, the Gospel of Mark is "a kind of commentary" (an extrinsic literary notion that cries out for comparison with all other kinds of commentaries). Precisely

the interrelation of cultural concept and literary classification gave rise to discussions that helped to set the stage for current genre analysis of Mark.

Norman Perrin was highly interested in Marxsen's work for the purpose of discussing the Gospel genre. As a result of this interest, he concluded his book What Is Redaction Criticism? with a section entitled "The Nature of a 'Gospel'." In this section he asserts:

> The literary form "Gospel" is the unique product of early Christianity and as such must be held to be characteristic of a distinctive element in early Christian faith /38/.

In other words, while Marxsen showed uncertainty whether the term "genre" could be used in relation to the Gospels, Perrin felt certain that it could. Moreover, Perrin went on to describe the Gospel genre on the basis of the Gospel of Mark:

> The Gospel of Mark is the prototype which the others follow and it is a mixture of historical reminiscence, interpreted tradition, and the free creativity of prophets and the evangelist. It is, in other words, a strange mixture of history, legend, and myth. It is this fact which redaction criticism makes unmistakably clear; and it is this fact to which we have to do justice in our thinking about the significance of the "Gospel" as the characteristic and distinctive literary product of early Christianity /39/.

As Perrin presented redaction criticism to the field of New Testament interpretation in the United States, therefore, he took the discipline a step closer to genre criticism. Despite Marxsen's moves toward genre criticism, his definition of Mark was still essentially a form-critical definition. The term "gospel" was investigated form-critically in an attempt to discern its meaning at the historical stage of development where it entered the Gospel tradition. In the Gospel of Mark, the term refers to the convergence of the concept "gospel" as reflected in Paul with the traditions about Jesus as reflected in the synoptic Gospels. Only in this context does Marxsen call the Gospel of Mark a commentary on Paul's understanding of the term. In contrast, Perrin gives a more literary description of the Gospel genre: a strange mixture of history, legend, and myth.

Within the milieu of redaction-critical study of the Gospels, Helmut Koester and James M. Robinson began to discuss the genre of the Gospels on the basis of collections of materials that had been incorporated into them. Recalling that Dibelius, Bultmann, and Schmidt had encouraged the idea that collections of sayings, apophthegms, parables, and miracle stories were made by early Christians under the influence of traditional collection genres within the domain of Kleinliteratur in Mediterranean culture, they began to investigate

these collections for the purpose of discovering the generic conceptions at work in the composition of the Gospels. Robinson began with analysis of collections of sayings for the purpose of understanding the generic conceptions within the "Q" material and the Gospel of Thomas /40/. Koester followed Robinson's article with a more extensive analysis of different kinds of sayings in collections and of collections of miracles and revelation discourses /41/. Then, in 1970 Robinson used these analyses to discuss the genre of Mark (and John). For Robinson, the discussion of the genre of the Gospels by means of the collection genres incorporated into them represented a move from redaction criticism (Redaktionsgeschichte) to composition criticism (Kompositionsgeschichte). As he put it, composition criticism:

> would consist in making use of form criticism's identification of the individual units of tradition as the building blocks available to the Evangelist to detect the Evangelist's tendency or theology by observing the way he employs his contruction materials to compose a whole, to produce a structure, a Gospel. That is to say, the shift from the designation Redaktionsgeschichte to the term Kompositionsgeschichte actually points toward a shift in method from deriving an Evangelist's theology primarily from the observation of the consistent tendentious way in which he edits a written source available to us for control, to the observation of the way he assembles discernible building blocks into a meaningful structure whose form reflects his tendency or theology. That is to say, Redaktionsgeschichte has tended to modulate via Kompositionsgeschichte into Gattungsgeschichte [genre criticism] /42/.

Within this context, Robinson proposed that Mark and John had composed their Gospels with the aid of a prior collection which he called an "aretalogy," i.e., "a narrative of the miraculous deeds of a god or a hero" /43/. Presupposing that each Gospel writer also had a connected passion narrative available to him, Robinson suggests that the challenge for understanding Mark is to discover Mark's correlation of passion narrative with aretalogy. From this vantage point, Robinson concludes that the Gospel genre arose at the conceptual intersection of traditions about the earthly activity of Jesus and revelations that Jesus was resurrected. In other words, at the point where early Christians presented a unified treatise about the earthly life of Jesus that contained a conceptual solution to the discontinuity between earthly traditions and post-Easter revelations, the Gospel genre was born. Using Gnostic treatises to develop a history of religions background, Robinson argues that Mark 8 and John 16 are the chapters that reveal the conceptual solution:

> In the case of Mark and John, where the basic turning point is from an aretalogical public ministry to a kerygmatic crucifixion, the beginning of the period of higher revelation can be transplanted back from the resurrection appearances to the point at which the passion narrative is thematically initiated: Mark 8 and John 16 /44/.

For Robinson, therefore, the major challenge is to discover the conceptual framework that explains the incorporation of both aretalogy and passion narrative in the Gospel of Mark (and John). In contrast to Martin Kähler's description of Mark as a passion narrative with extended introduction, Robinson, in essence, describes Mark (and John) as an aretalogy and passion narrative interrelated by means of revelation of the meaning of death and resurrection.

Following insights from the work of Koester, Robinson, Perrin and others, Theodore J. Weeden produced a redaction-critical analysis of Mark that introduced a significantly new understanding of the genre to which it belongs. On the basis of redaction-critical analysis of pericopes featuring interaction between Jesus and the disciples, Weeden argued that the author of Mark was attacking people in his community who espoused a divine man christology. Mark carried out this polemic, Weeden argued, by placing a divine man christology on the lips of the disciples and a christology of suffering on the lips of Jesus. When the disciples misunderstand Jesus and even reject him so that they flee to leave Jesus to die on the cross, the disciples' divine man christology is shown to be false in the light of Jesus' enactment of a suffering christology. Through the narrative role of the disciples, therefore, the author of Mark uses the christology of the passion narrative to attack the christology of the aretalogy.

From the standpoint of genre considerations, Weeden's redaction-critical analysis had an amazing influence on the interpretation of Mark. E. D. Hirsch, a modern literary critic, has said:

> an interpreter's preliminary generic conception of a text is constitutive of everything that he subsequently understands, and . . . this remains the case unless and until that generic conception is altered /45/.

With Weeden's analysis, the generic conception of Mark was altered for many interpreters /46/. If the misunderstanding of the disciples was linked with a polemic against a group within Mark's community, then the Gospel of Mark was as much a defense treatise as a direct propaganda treatise for mission. Moreover, the Gospel of Mark had to be much more of a self-conscious literary product than had been assumed. The result of Weeden's study was a sharpening of literary sensitivities about the Gospel of Mark. Whether Weeden was right or wrong, it now seemed mandatory to discover more wholistic literary ways of analyzing the contents of the Gospel of Mark /47/.

While the investigations of aretalogy and divine man christology by Dieter Georgi, Morton Smith, and Hans Dieter Betz /48/ appeared to support the work of Koester, Robinson, and Weeden, the investigation of aretalogy by Howard C. Kee disconfirmed it /49/. Arguing that no aretalogy genre exists and that no concept of divine man is associated with collections that have been called aretalogies /50/, Kee turned away from Graeco-Roman literature to Jewish apocalyptic literature to understand the genre of Mark:

> the model for the tradition that Mark utilized and for the literary and conceptual framework in which he placed that tradition was not a hypothetical form in which the career of a divinized man is traced, a form that can be documented only in the second century of our era, but the figure of the eschatological deliverer as portrayed in Jewish apocalyptic literature /51/.

On the basis of this point of view, Kee wrote a book on Mark in which he proposed that the interrelation of miracle stories, eschatological sayings and apocalyptic discourse demonstrate that it belongs to apocalyptic literature. The role of the wise, prophetic seer, a central figure in apocalyptic literature, produces the biographical style of the Gospel. Also, the literary device of historical backdating provides the means by which the author can communicate to his readers the divine purpose that governs their lives /52/.

Kee's thesis is similar to a point of view presented by Hans von Soden in 1919 /53/. Von Soden observed that the future style of the narration concerning the coming Messiah in the context of a narrative that presents the life of the earthly Jesus in fulfilled time reflects an orientation of apocalyptic literature. Despite the quick dismissal of von Soden's work by Bultmann and Schmidt, the thesis presented by Kee is important for genre analysis of Mark /54/.

Redactional and compositional investigations have been important for the study of the genre of Mark. Especially the analyses of Marxsen, Perrin, Koester, Robinson, and Kee have contributed directly to genre analysis. Nevertheless, these studies do not qualify as bona fide genre investigations. The studies are guided by a historical mindset that turns away from full-scale genre analysis. Influence from form criticism requires the authors to think in terms of direct historical influences. For them, the absence of some stream of historical influence prevents two pieces of literature from belonging to the same genre. For this reason, the emphasis remains on the uniqueness of the Gospel of Mark, and this emphasis continues to hinder a real commitment to detailed generic comparisons of Mark with other literature. New Testament interpreters talk about analogies, yet class after class of literature is disqualified because no direct historical influence from that class is detectable in Mark.

INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC GENRE ANALYSIS OF MARK

Most interpreters are aware that a document containing literary dimensions is unique to itself. For this reason, interpretation must finally turn to that document itself to explore its intricacies of style, content, and organization. Excitement over the uniqueness of a document may be so dominant that interpreters are unwilling to talk about that document in relation to other pieces of literature. This orientation toward the Gospel of Mark has been obvious during the past 100 years and still exercizes a stronghold on Marcan interpretation. It is quite possible, however, to become fascinated with genre analysis in such a form that it drives the interpreter into large numbers of outside documents at the same time that it drives the interpreter into more detailed study of the document at hand. If this kind of pursuit is informed by genre analysis, both the conventional and the unique dimensions of a document become visible in a manner quite foreign to our traditional literary-historical methods of analysis.

Full-scale genre analysis begins with an awareness that it is impossible for any piece of literature to escape the cultural setting in which it was produced. In order for any document to communicate, it must contain a relationship to conventions within communication systems that exist within its own milieu. However, no piece of literature will simply repeat all the dimensions of another example of literature of its type. If the document has any significant literary qualities, it will juxtapose items in a manner unlike any other document.

Linquistic-Structural Beginnings of Genre Analysis of Mark

The first real indications of the birth of genre analysis in New Testament study emerged in Ehrhardt Güttgemanns' Offene Fragen zur Formgeschichte des Evangeliums /55/. Especially parts III and IV, entitled "The Gospel as Literary 'Gestalt'," and "The Gospel Form: Extension of the Kerygma, or Auto-Semantic Language Form?" indicated an interest in pursuing a method of analysis truly designed to test comparable structures within a wide range of literature. For the most part, the essay raises questions and opens doors. Three aspects in particular seem apposite in this context. First, when Güttgemanns talks about literary genres, he is influenced significantly by the work of René Wellek and Austin Warren /56/. In other words, Güttgemanns has been influenced by secular literary critics who have been potentially available to American New Testament critics for many years. Güttgemanns' work explains the split between secular literary criticism and biblical criticism that has impeded New Testament critics from moving into the kinds of questions that have occupied secular literary critics since the 1920's and 1930's. Second, Güttgemanns is interested in a linguistic and structural form of analysis that relates genre questions to sociological institutions with historical dialectics. In other words, to

move into genre analysis does not mean that one has to discuss genre-type as a pure type or abstraction /57/. Genre analysis may guide the interpreter in detailed study of many documents in relation to the sociological milieu of an entire cultural setting. Third, Güttgemanns suggests how the study of framework genre can help us to move with some continuity from form and redaction investigations into genre analysis /58/. In this context, he presents an analysis of Mark 8:27-10:45 that is informative for genre analysis of Mark /59/.

The first genre study of Mark from a structural-linguistic approach was Dan O. Via's Kerygma and Comedy in the New Testament: A Structuralist Approach to Hermeneutic, published in 1975 /60/. In this book, Via pursues the "structure" that represents the common ground between early Christianity and Graeco-Roman culture. By means of binary analysis influenced especially by Claude Levi-Strauss, he establishes syntagmatic/paradigmatic figures for eleven texts or segments of texts from the Mediterranean world: Aristophanes' The Frogs, The Clouds, The Birds, and Plutus; Paul's 1 Corinthians 1:17-2:5; 11:23-26, Philippians 2:8-11, and Romans 5:12-18; the Gospel of Mark; Deuteronomy; and Hosea. He concludes that all of these texts are performances of the tragi-comic structure (which he also calls tragi-comic genre or Gattung). On the basis of this analysis he proceeds to detailed analyses of Mark for the purpose of understanding the nuances within its performance of the tragi-comic (or comic) genre. For him, the genre of Mark should be understood from the perspective of its generation as a text:

> Mark came to be written because the . . . death and resurrection of Jesus reverberated in the mind of Mark and activated the comic genre whose nucleus is also death and resurrection. . . . The story took the shape it did because the comic genre--a deep, generative structure of human mind--generated the Gospel of Mark as a performance text, a transformation of itself /61/.

This book has its place within the growing interest in structuralist analysis in the field of biblical studies, and it represents an interesting combination of structuralist method, genre criticism, and hermeneutical theology /62/.

Mythic Structure as the Key to the Genre of Mark

In 1977 the field of New Testament study saw the first truly systematic attempt to discuss the Gospel genre since K. L. Schmidt's article in 1923: Charles H. Talbert's What Is A Gospel? /63/. Talbert's book is a direct response to Bultmann's assertion:

> The literature of memoirs and lives of the philosophers are related to the Gospels at the most in that they, like the Gospels,

> gather together in somewhat looser form dialogues and episodes from the lives of important men; but as they lack any link with myth and cult, so the Gospels lack any interest of a scientific-historical kind /64/.

Talbert wants to show, first and foremost, that a widespread myth, the myth of the immortals, governs both the synoptic Gospels and Graeco-Roman memoirs and lives. Second, he wishes to show that similar communities of interested people (essentially cultic-groups) kept the traditions of both philosophers and Jesus alive in Mediterranean culture and furnished the impulses for writing memoirs and lives of those people. Third, he asserts that the attitude of inclusive interpretation informs both Graeco-Roman biographical composition and Gospel composition. In this context, Talbert develops a typology for classifying the Gospels among Graeco-Roman biographical writings. The Gospel of Mark, he suggests, is a biography:

> written to defend against a misunderstanding of the church's savior and to portray a true image of him for the disciples to follow. This gives the story of Jesus its overall structure and indicates that the gospel functioned as a myth of origins for an early Christian community /65/.

The Gospel of Mark, therefore, belongs to the type of Life that is designed to dispel a false image of a teacher and to provide a true model to follow. Other members of this genre are Xenophon's Memorabilia, Philodemus' Life of Epicurus, Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana, and Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras /66/. In direct opposition to Schmidt and Bultmann, therefore, Talbert argues that the synoptic Gospels must be classified among Graeco-Roman Lives on the basis of their mythical structure, cultic function and attitude. Within this overall classification, the Gospel of Mark belongs to the type of Life whose function is to dispel a false image and provide a true model to follow.

Perhaps future investigations will determine that Talbert's study was too highly influenced by a desire to turn back the assertions of Bultmann. It is likely that genre analysis must take a more detailed intrinsic/extrinsic approach to a large number of documents to establish a classification system that wins the day. Nevertheless, Talbert's analysis has given new breath to the study of the Gospels in the context of Graeco-Roman literature. Also, his classification system stands as an hypothesis to be tested in the arena of genre analysis. In other words, while Bultmann and Schmidt de-activated all hypotheses that might nurture genre analysis, Talbert's study provides a straightforward hypothesis that can function as a beginning point for investigation in a field that badly needs to be studied.

Graeco-Roman Literary Matrix as the Key to the Genre of Mark

In addition to Talbert's work, David L. Barr has written a systematic essay attempting to define the Gospel genre in relation to the Socratic dialogues by means of Aristotle's theory of tragedy /67/. A number of interpreters during this century have suggested that the plot of the Gospel of Mark approximates tragic drama /68/, and James Moffatt argued that the dialogue represented one of the closest analogies to portions of the Gospels /69/. Barr discusses in a very suggestive way the relation of the Gospels and Plato's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo to tragedy, relying on some of the most recent work in literary criticism on Aristotle's theory of tragedy. One of the clear results of the investigation is to suggest that genre analysis of the Gospels has barely begun. Barr introduces a modern literary approach quite different from Talbert's that leads to fruitful insights concerning the relation of the Gospels to Graeco-Roman literature. One of the characteristics of genre analysis has been the variety of ways to approach it. It would appear that the study of the Gospel of Mark could be richer if interpreters learned "a way of living with variety rather than subduing it" /70/.

Gilbert G. Bilezikian has narrowed the comparison of the Gospels with Greek tragedy down to the Gospel of Mark in his recent book The Liberated Gospel /71/. He presents a persuasive case for the existence of "closet dramas" and "narrative tragedies" in the first century A.D., and analyzes the plot of Mark on the basis of complication-crisis-denouement. He argues that Mark has been exposed to Greek tragedy through the Hellenistic school curriculum and the large number of theaters distributed throughout the Mediterranean world. Bilezikian's study, alongside those by Talbert and Barr, suggest that Graeco-Roman literary culture contains much material that needs yet to be tapped to understand the genre and function of Mark /72/.

Biblical and Jewish Matrix as the Key to the Genre of Mark

Wolfgang Roth, in a recent study yet unpublished, has produced a genre analysis that has similarities with Kee's view of Mark as apocalyptic literature /73/. In basic ways, Roth's analysis harks back to earlier studies that probed cycles of biblical materials for precedents to the Gospels /74/. The difference between Roth's approach and the previous studies lies in the mode of analysis. Adopting a structural approach, he proposes that 1 Kings 16-2 Kings 13, 4 Ezra, 1 Enoch 3-71, Daniel, Matthew, Mark, Luke-Acts, John, and Revelation contain a similar generic structure that was alive in biblical and Jewish culture and manifested itself in the perpetuation of the Gospel traditions. He divides his analysis into four constitutive structural elements: cast, plot, staging and timing. The cast contains four main actors, the plot has five successive acts climaxed in the fourth act, the staging moves in the spatial, and the timing moves in the temporal

dimension. The most complete manifestation of this structure lies in the Elijah/Elisha cycle in 1-2 Kings and the synoptic Gospels.

While Graeco-Roman literature is a fruitful hunting-ground for genre analysis of Mark, therefore, it is obvious that biblical and Jewish literature must also be tapped to explore the dynamics that produced the generic traits of the Gospels. The Gospel of Mark is a product of two streams of culture, Jewish and Graeco-Roman, and neither must be allowed to fall out of sight in genre analysis of Mark.

A Literary Paradigm for Genre Analysis of Mark

Some of the most direct reflection on the genre of Mark has been performed by Norman R. Petersen /75/. Applying Roman Jakobson's communications model to the theory of genre espoused by Warren and Wellek, he has analyzed the Gospel of Mark with the avowed purpose of relating genre criticism to historical criticism /76/. Petersen approaches the genre of Mark by means of the intrinsic poetics of the narrative. Locating the referential function of Mark in the narrative world created by the text, Petersen presents an initial intrinsic analysis of the Marcan narrative to establish a beginning point for generic study of the text. The key to his approach lies in his merger of the work of Vladimir I. Propp with the work of Roman Jakobson. Following the model of Vladimir I. Propp, Petersen perceives generic traits to be located "in the common infrastructure of narratives that on their surface seem to look alive" /77/. The common infrastructure is discovered in the relatively fixed sequence of certain kinds of actions in the text that are called functions. "The number of functions and the kinds of functions, and their sequential relationships, define narrative genres in structural terms" /78/. Petersen sees the functions of the text (as understood by Propp) to be the intrinsic poetics of the text (as understood by Jakobson). Therefore, the conventions surrounding the selection and combination of functional units that concern the morphology of genre (in Propp's work) are found within the realm of the metalingual function of genres (in Jakobson's work). In other words, Propp's work was concerned first and foremost with the discovery of genre (or the generic code) extrinsic to texts while Jakobson was concerned first and foremost with analysis of the poetics (or communication system) intrinsic to the text. In the process of analysis, however, Propp analyzed the functions intrinsic to the text and Jakobson became interested in the metalingual (or extrinsic generic dimensions) of the text. Petersen proposes an intrinsic/generic approach to genre using the strengths of both systems of analysis.

As a beginning point for genre analysis of Mark, Petersen investigates the text to see if it contains plotted time--a coherent sequential arrangement of incidents that create a narrative world. His analysis shows that the Marcan text contains plotted time (sequential narrative incidents) within the boundaries of story time (an overarching time from the promise of Isaiah to the return of the Son of man). The plotted time

looks like a biographical sequence of events beginning with Jesus' preaching in Galilee and ending with his resurrection from the dead. The plotted time and the story time are interrelated by means of plot devices that control the reader's movement of thought. These plot devices--predictions that create suspense, anticipatory references, references to past events in plotted time, recollection of events in story time, and repetition--exhibit the intrinsic poetics of the Marcan narrative essential for discovering the generic code of Mark. These devices, among other things, show that the Marcan text is a narrative with plotted time, that it presents plotted time within a context of story time, and that all of the things yet to be fulfilled by the end of plotted time will be fulfilled in story time /79/.

The analysis of the intrinsic poetics of Mark by Petersen, and his merger of the systems of Propp and Jakobson, represent a most promising development in genre analysis of the Gospel of Mark. The completed work is only a beginning point, since it is limited to an initial analysis of the intrinsic poetics of the text. Using this intrinsic/extrinsic model for genre analysis, however, an entire discipline of genre criticism could develop which would utilize, test, revise and specify the work begun by Güttgemanns, Via, Talbert, Barr, Roth and others.

Within the last year, George W. E. Nickelsburg has completed a paper on the passion in Mark that extends Petersen's work. The questions that motivate the study are:

> Does the Markan passion narrative have a generic identity? Is it a component of a genre of which the whole of Mark is an example? Or is the Markan passion narrative itself, as a whole, an example of a genre which occurs elsewhere independently of such material as we find in Mark 1-13? /80/.

Three aspects of the study will be mentioned here to indicate the nature of this work. First, Nickelsburg's investigation employs categories from Propp to analyze the functions in the Markan passion narrative that reveal the generic code within it. His work, therefore, bears the potential for being interrelated with the analysis by Petersen, whom he has consulted during the process of analysis and whose work he cites. Second, Nickelsburg's work shows some affinities with the interests of Kee and Roth. He seeks the generic model for the passion narrative within the domain of the persecuted wise man in biblical and Jewish narrative--the Joseph narratives in Genesis 37ff., the story of Ahikar, the book of Esther, Daniel 3 and 6, Susanna and Wisdom of Solomon 2-5. Third, Nickelsburg wrestles with the possibility that the passion genre he analyzes may have existed in narrative form prior to its incorporation into the Gospel of Mark. In this way, his work harks back to the investigations by Robinson and Koester, and indicates the possibility of interrelating that kind of previous work with the intrinsic/extrinsic genre approach proposed by Petersen.

Within the last decade, therefore, genre analysis of the Gospel of Mark appears to have been reborn in a form that may give it a viable place within Markan scholarship during the next decades. In fact, it is surely fair to assert that no actual intrinsic/extrinsic genre analysis of Mark has ever been made in the past. Rather, a partial comparison of the Gospel of Mark with various texts produced statements for and against any possibility that it should be understood in relation to them. Obviously, the work of the past century came out of generic perceptions held by the interpreters, and much of it must be described at least as implicit genre analysis. Nevertheless, the work of Güttgemanns, Via, Robinson, Koester, Talbert, Petersen, and others has for the first time created the real possibility of a systematic genre analysis of the Gospel of Mark.

A Proposal for the Genre of Mark: Eschatological Memorabilia

My own work on the genre of Mark has led more and more to the conviction that the conceptual and generic worlds of both Jewish and Graeco-Roman culture must be merged to perform a satisfactory genre analysis of the Gospel of Mark. Exploration of texts simply within a biblical-Jewish matrix or a Graeco-Roman matrix will not produce a comprehensive picture of the generic traits within the text. Intrinsic/extrinsic genre analysis must explore the intersection of Jewish and Graeco-Roman generic traits within a Gospel created by an author with a sectarian Jewish background living within Graeco-Roman culture.

Investigations of the text of Mark within the domain of both Jewish and Graeco-Roman literature leads me to describe the genre of Mark as eschatological memorabilia. The terminology of the classification is not nearly as important, however, as the explication of the results of intrinsic/extrinsic analysis of the text itself. The term "eschatological" indicates that the particular dynamics of plot time within story time are likely to be most prominent in prophetic, eschatological and apocalyptic texts. The generic code that governs the selection and arrangement of references to past and future events so that plotted time occurs within a suspenseful, unfulfilled story time is likely to be deeply imbedded in eschatological literature. The term "memorabilia" is important within the classification, since the reader's time intersects with plot time and story time by means of the rehearsal of individual episodes plotted on a line that is persistently disrupted by interludes of manifestation-interaction-summons. An initial presentation of the intrinsic Markan evidence for this will appear in Novum Testamentum later this year /81/.

A major dimension of Mark not signified by the term eschatological memorabilia is the tragic action within the narrative. A full description of the genre of Mark is "eschatological memorabilia within a tragic mode." The emotive/expressive function (point of view and plot) reflects

the generic dynamics of tragedy. These dynamics interrelate plot time and story time by means of the suspense that hovers over the tragic action and the unfulfilled predictions. In other words, the action which leads the protagonist through complication-crisis-denouement takes the reader into the complication-crisis-denouement of the eschatological story time which conditions his own existence.

Within the context of plot time, story time, and reader time, the conative function (imperatives to the reader) of the text interrelates the dynamics of memorabilia, eschatology, and tragedy. Memorabilia literature creates an obligation upon the reader to respond to the value system of the person about whom the incidents are recounted. The manifestation-interaction-summons interludes that continually appear in the midst of plot time challenge the reader to imitate the thought and action of the protagonist. This mimetic mode interrelates the dynamics of the value system with the urgency of eschatological story time and the catharsis that results from tragic action.

Time and space do not allow elaboration of this thesis or presentation of the intrinsic/extrinsic evidence /82/. Perhaps this much discussion of the matter, however, will introduce the reader to my conviction that it is mandatory to interrelate generic conceptions and conventions in both Jewish and Graeco-Roman culture as we labor on the text of Mark. Also, it seems to me necessary to establish continuity with previous analyses and conclusions wherever possible, since the implicit genre analyses of previous years are likely to be generally informative for explicit genre analysis from this point on.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

As we look back one hundred years, it seems ironic that recent work has concluded that the Gospel of Mark contains a coherent plot within a systematic, overarching framework of thought. H. J. Holtzmann believed this about the Gospel of Mark in 1880, though the form in which he held the belief is significantly different from the form in which it is held today.

As we look back to the time between Holtzmann and the present, we can see the manner in which detailed genre analysis of Mark was systematically discouraged, even though a number of interpreters attempted to open the door in one way or another.

As we look at the last decade of analysis and probe the future we can see the possibility of a fruitful era for genre analysis of Mark. Interest in wholistic approaches is being nurtured in many ways in our culture, and it is likely that genre criticism will attract increasing attention during the next few decades. Within this context, this study suggests

that the following may also be characteristic of analysis within the next decades:

First, it would appear that genre criticism may provide a means to integrate the study of Jewish and Graeco-Roman literature more successfully than it has been integrated during the past century. The point of view either that biblical and Jewish literature alone or that Graeco-Roman literature alone furnishes the data for understanding the genre of Mark should be less dominant in the field. The Gospel of Mark is a participant both in Jewish culture and in first century Graeco-Roman culture. It would appear possible that scholarship in the future could interrelate the influences from Jewish traditions and Graeco-Roman traditions in a more even-handed manner than has been considered possible during the past century of scholarship.

Second, detailed comparison of Mark with biblical and Jewish cycles of traditions and with Graeco-Roman traditions has only recently begun to nurture a full-scale genre analysis of the Gospel of Mark. One of the stimuli for the new interest has been intrinsic literary criticism. By applying insights from secular literary criticism and modern linguistics, investigations of the Gospel of Mark could become a part of the disciplines of the humanities and the social sciences in a manner unprecedented during the past one hundred years.

Third, it appears obvious that various forms of structural analysis influenced by linguistics, sociology, and rhetorical criticism will play something of the role during the next one hundred years that form criticism did during the last. In and around this activity, interpreters will employ all kinds of philological, historical, social, anthropological and literary analyses of the Gospel of Mark. From our vantage point, genre criticism of the Gospel of Mark will be part of the activity by which people, in the midst of a pluralistic society, seek overarching syntheses that interrelate phenomena and experiences that seem at first to be entirely disparate.

FOOTNOTES

/1/ The direct quotations in this statement are taken from Werner G. Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems (trans. S. M. Gilmour and H. C. Kee; New York: Abingdon, 1972) 152-55. I have modified Holtzmann's statements only by leaving out his inclusion of source "A" in each of his statements about Mark. I have thought this to be defensible, at least for the most part, since Holtzmann had discarded the hypothesis about this source by the time of the publication of the third edition of his Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in das Neue Testament (Freiburg: Mohr, 1892) 351-53, 537.

/2/ C. H. Holman, W. F. Thrall, and A. Hibbard, A Handbook to Literature (3rd ed.; New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972) 239.

/3/ Ibid., p. 240.

/4/ Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (New York: Atheneum, 1966) 247-48.

/5/ Johannes Weiss, Das älteste Evangelium (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1903) 6-7.

/6/ Ibid., p. 8; author's translation.

/7/ Ibid., pp. 8-22.

/8/ Ibid., pp. 23-42.

/9/ Clyde W. Votaw, "The Gospels and Contemporary Biographies," American Journal of Theology 19 (1915) 51, in the reprint, The Gospels and Contemporary Biographies in the Greco-Roman World (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), p. 7. Hereafter the pages of the reprint will be cited.

/10/ Ibid., p. 10.

/11/ Ibid., pp. 12-62.

/12/ Karl Ludwig Schmidt, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu (Berlin: Trowitzsch, 1919); Martin Dibelius, Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums (Tübingen: Mohr, 1919).

/13/ Karl Ludwig Schmidt, "Die Stellung der Evangelien in der allgemeinen Literaturgeschichte," ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ: Studien zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments Hermann Gunkel zum 60. Geburtstag . . . dargebracht (ed. Hans Schmidt; FRLANT, N.F. 19.2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1923) 54.

/14/ See Martin Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel, trans. B. L. Woolf (New York: Scribners, n.d.) 133-77.

/15/ Rudolf Bultmann, Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition (FRLANT, N.F. 12; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck,

1921) 226. The translation is the author's using the English translation in The History of the Synoptic Tradition (trans. J. Marsh; New York: Harper, 1963) where the text between the first and second editions coincide.

/16/ Bultmann, Die Geschichte, pp. 227-28.

/17/ Schmidt, ibid., pp. 50-134; see note 13 above for bibliographical details.

/18/ Ibid., p. 55.

/19/ Ibid., pp. 62-68.

/20/ Ibid., pp. 68-75.

/21/ Ibid., p. 76.

/22/ Ibid., p. 134.

/23/ Julius Schniewind, Euangelion (BFCHTH, ser. 2, vols. 13 and 25, 1927 and 1931).

/24/ FRLANT, N.F. 12; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1931.

/25/ Ibid., pp. 397-98 (ET: p. 372).

/26/ Ibid., p. 397 (ET: p. 371).

/27/ Ibid., p. 399 (ET: p. 373).

/28/ Ibid., p. 399-400 (ET: p. 374).

/29/ The analysis was originally published as the third essay in Der Evangelist Markus: Studien zur Redaktionsgeschichte des Evangeliums (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1956). Hereafter we will cite the ET: Willi Marxsen, Mark the Evangelist (trans. J. Boyce, D. Juel, W. Poehlmann with R. A. Harrisville; New York: Abingdon, 1969).

/30/ Weiss, ibid., pp. 24-42, arguing against ideas presented in Theodor Zahn, Introduction to the New Testament (vol. 2; New York: Scribners, 1909) 367-400.

/31/ Weiss, ibid., p. 25; author's translation.

/32/ Marxsen, ibid., p. 118.

/33/ Ibid., p. 150.

/34/ Ibid., n. 109.

/35/ Ibid., pp. 146-47.

/36/ Ibid., p. 148.

/37/ Ibid., p. 147.

/38/ Norman Perrin, What Is Redaction Criticism? (GBS; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969) 75.

/39/ Ibid.; see also his discussion in "The Literary Gattung 'Gospel'--Some Observations," ExpTim 82 (1970) 4-7.

/40/ James M. Robinson, "LOGOI SOPHON: On the Gattung of Q," in Trajectories through Early Christianity (ed. J. M. Robinson and H. Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971) 71-113; originally published in 1964.

/41/ Helmut Koester, "One Jesus and Four Primitive Gospels," in ibid., pp. 158-204; originally published in 1965.

/42/ James M. Robinson, "On the Gattung of Mark (and John)," in Jesus and Man's Hope (vol. I; Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1970) 101.

/43/ Ibid., p. 103; the definition of aretalogy in this quotation is from Webster's Third New International Dictionary.

/44/ Ibid., p. 113.

/45/ E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University, 1967) 74.

/46/ See the author's review of Weeden's book in JBL 91 (1972) 417-19.

/47/ For an example of an interpretation of Mark after Weeden's investigation, see Werner H. Kelber, Mark's Story of Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979).

/48/ Dieter Georgi, Die Gegner des Paulus im 2 Korintherbrief (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1964); Moses Hadas and Morton Smith, Heroes and Gods (New York: Harper, 1965); Morton Smith, "Prolegomena to a Discussion of Aretalogies, Divine Men, the Gospels and Jesus," JBL 90 (1971) 174-99; Hans Dieter Betz, "Jesus as Divine Man," in Jesus and the Historian (ed. F. T. Trotter; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968) 114-33.

/49/ Howard C. Kee, "Aretalogy and Gospel," JBL 92 (1973) 402-22.

/50/ Ibid., p. 411.

/51/ Ibid., p. 422.

/52/ Howard C. Kee, Community of the New Age: Studies in Mark's Gospel (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977); see the author's review of the book in JBL 98 (1979) 147-49.

/53/ Hans von Soden, Die Enstehung der christlichen Kirche (Geschichte der christlichen Kirche I; Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1919) 66.

/54/ Schmidt, ibid., pp. 75-76; Bultmann, History, p. 373.

/55/ Ehrhardt Güttgemanns, Candid Questions Concerning Gospel Form Criticism (trans. William G. Doty; Pittsburgh Theological Monograph 26; Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1979); originally published in 1970.

/56/ René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1956); see Güttgemanns, ibid., pp. 279-80 (German: pp. 180-81).

/57/ Ibid.

/58/ Ibid., pp. 119, 262-63 (German: pp. 86, 170).

/59/ Ibid., pp. 321-33 (German: pp. 211-23).

/60/ Dan O. Via, Jr., Kerygma and Comedy in the New Testament: A Structuralist Approach to Hermeneutic (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975).

/61/ Ibid., p. 93.

/62/ See the author's discussion of Via's book in "Structuralism in Biblical Interpretation and Theology," The Thomist 42 (1978) 365-68.

/63/ Charles H. Talbert, What Is A Gospel? (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977). On p. 13 Talbert gives a brief summary of the conclusions in Philip Shuler, The Synoptic Gospels and the Problem of Genre (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation; McMaster University, 1975).

/64/ Bultmann, History, p. 372.

/65/ Talbert, Gospel, p. 134.

/66/ Ibid., pp. 94-95; for an expanded discussion of the classification see Charles H. Talbert, "Biographies of Philosophers and Rulers as Instruments of Religious Propaganda in Mediterranean Antiquity," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 16.2 (ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1978) 1619-51.

/67/ David L. Barr, Toward a Definition of Gospel Genre: A Generic Analysis and Comparison of the Synoptic Gospels and the Socratic Dialogues by means of Aristotle's Theory of Tragedy (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation; Florida State University, 1974).

/68/ Henry B. Carre, "The Literary Structure of the Gospel of Mark," in Studies in Early Christianity (ed. S. J. Case; New York: Century, 1928) 105-26; Ernest W. Burch, "Tragic Action in the Second Gospel: A Study in the Narrative of Mark," Journal of Religion 11 (1931) 346-58; Donald W. Riddle, The Gospels: Their Origin and Growth (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1939) 141-45; Curtis Beach, The Gospel of Mark: Its

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/69/ James Moffatt, An Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament (New York: Scribners, 1915) 45-46.

/70/ Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979) 3.

/71/ Gilbert G. Bilezikian, The Liberated Gospel: A Comparison of the Gospel of Mark and Greek Tragedy (Baker Biblical Monograph; Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1977).

/72/ See the author's review of Bilezikian's book, CBQ 41 (1979) 480-81.

/73/ Wolfgang Roth, "The Biblical Matrix of Literary Structure and Narrative Execution of the Synoptic Gospel," read and distributed privately at the Chicago Society for Biblical Research; April, 1980.

/74/ E.g., Raymond E. Brown, "Jesus and Elisha," Perspective 12 (1971) 85-104; Dom A. Baker, "Form and the Gospels," Downside Review 88 (1970) 14-26; E. C. Hobbs, "Norman Perrin on Methodology in the Interpretation of Mark," in Christology and a Modern Pilgrimage (ed. Hans Dieter Betz; SBL, 1971) 85; Meredith G. Kline, "The Old Testament Origins of the Gospel Genre," Westminster Theological Journal 38 (1975) 1-27.

/75/ Norman R. Petersen, "The So-Called Gnostic Type Gospels and the Question of the Genre 'Gospel'" (working paper for the Task Force on Gospel Genre; Society of Biblical Literature, 1970) 1-117; "On the Notion of Genre in Via's 'Parable and Example Story: A Literary-Structuralist Approach'," Semeia 1 (1974) 134-81; Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics (GBS; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978).

/76/ Petersen, Literary Criticism, pp. 29-48.

/77/ Ibid., p. 43.

/78/ Ibid.

/79/ Ibid., pp. 49-80.

/80/ George W. E. Nickelsburg, "The Genre and Function of the Markan Passion Narrative," to appear in Harvard Theological Review, 1980. Quotation from first page of the unprinted MS.

/81/ Vernon K. Robbins, "Summons and Outline in Mark: The Three-Step Progression," NovT forthcoming.

/82/ These items have been pursued further in a monograph MS tentatively entitled The Genre of Mark: Expectation and Adaptation, forthcoming.