


SEMINAR PAPERS



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SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE 1981



SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE
1981 Seminar Papers

**SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE
SEMINAR PAPERS SERIES**

Editor, Kent Harold Richards

Number 20

**Society of Biblical Literature
1981 Seminar Papers**

Editor, Kent Harold Richards

SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE

1981 SEMINAR PAPERS

Editor, Kent Harold Richards

One Hundred Seventeenth Annual Meeting
December 19-22, 1981
San Francisco, Hilton & Tower
San Francisco, California

SCHOLARS PRESS

Distributed by
Scholars Press
P.O. Box 2268
101 Salem St.
Chico, CA 95927

SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE
1981 SEMINAR PAPERS

Editor, Kent Harold Richards

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by
The Society of Biblical Literature

ISBN: 0-89130-548-3

ISSN: 0145-2711

Printed in the United States of America

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The papers in this volume were prepared for discussion at the One Hundred Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature convened at the San Francisco Hilton Hotel and Tower, 19-22 December 1981. They represent, in most cases, experimental and initial work on a subject. Therefore, they should not be considered finished works but works in progress. The Society encourages this type of publication to stimulate discussion which may lead to the refinement and precision necessary in a journal article or monograph.

The papers in this volume are solely the responsibility of the individual authors and have been printed only with minor editing as they were submitted. They appear in alphabetical order with a program number following the title. The number corresponds to the presentation order found in the Annual Meeting Program and also relates to the Book of Abstracts.

The Editor takes this opportunity to thank those who have contributed their papers, the Chairpersons of all program units and the staff of Scholars Press.

Kent Harold Richards
Editor

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF KING CHARLES THE FIRST

IN THE YEAR 1649

BY JOHN BURNET

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

IN TWO VOLUMES

THE SECOND VOLUME

CONTAINING THE

REIGN OF KING CHARLES THE FIRST

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INSCRIPTIONAL EVIDENCE FOR WOMEN AS LEADERS
IN THE ANCIENT SYNAGOGUE

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Institute for Antiquity and Christianity

The thesis of this paper is that women served as leaders in a number of synagogues during the Roman and Byzantine periods. The evidence for this consists of Greek and Latin inscriptions in which women bear the titles "president of the synagogue," "leader," "elder," "mother of the synagogue" and "priestess." These inscriptions range in date from 27 B.C.E. to perhaps the sixth century C.E. and in provenance from Italy to Asia Minor, Egypt and Palestine. While new discoveries make this a growing corpus of material, a number of the inscriptions have been known to scholars for some time. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is not to present a hitherto unknown body of evidence, but rather to suggest a new interpretation of known material.

According to previous scholarly consensus, Jewish women did not assume positions of leadership in the ancient synagogue. Scholars have therefore interpreted the titles borne by women in these inscriptions as honorific. Samuel Krauss, for example, made the gender of the office holder a criterion for the functionality of the title: "The office of archôn does not occur for women, and this is the best proof that we must regard archôns as genuine, practicing officials of the gerusia or synagogue, in a way that one certainly could not have taken them from the ranks of the women."¹ This tradition of interpreting the titles borne by Jewish women as honorific has continued until the present day,² although in recent years several scholars have begun to question it, among them A. Thomas Kraabel, Dorothy Irvin and Shaye Cohen.⁴ Jeanne and Louis Robert also seem to view the titles as functional.³ In order to decide if the titles were functional or honorific it is necessary to examine each title and each inscription.

I. LEADERSHIP TITLES BORNE BY JEWISH WOMEN DURING THE
ROMAN AND BYZANTINE PERIODS

A. President of the Synagogue

CII 741 (=IG IV 1452; Greek; probably 2nd C.), from Smyrna in Ionia, reads:

Rufina, a Jewess, president of the synagogue, built this tomb for her freed slaves and the slaves raised in her house. No one else has the right to bury anyone (here). If someone should dare to do, he or she will pay 1500 denars to the sacred treasury and 1000 denars to the Jewish people. A copy of this inscription has been placed in the (public) archives.

The history of the interpretation of the title archisynagōgos in this inscription can serve as an exemplification of the way in which scholars have dealt with all of the following inscriptions. Salomon Reinach, who first published the inscription, solves the dilemma of a woman archisynagōgos in a novel way.⁵ He first reviews how Emil Schurer deals with the problem of mothers of the synagogue, namely by declaring both mothers and fathers of the synagogue to be honorary office holders.⁶ What can be done now that a woman president of the synagogue has been discovered, he asks, for this goes against Schurer's establishment of the title archisynagōgos as functional. Reinach solves the crass contradiction between genuine function and woman by positing two stages in the development

of the title. Since we know that at the early stage presidents of the synagogue had a genuine function, we cannot, he reasons, depart from the accepted understanding. Later, however, archisynagōgos became a purely honorific title, one which passed from father to son. It took on a sense which was "more vague and more general," analogous to the title father or mother of the synagogue. Thus it is in the category of president of the synagogue honoris causa that Rufina is to be seen.

M. Weinberg's solution to the dilemma is that Rufina was the wife of an archisynagōgos, "for women have never held an office in a Jewish community, and certainly not a synagogue office."⁹ Emil Schürer's is simple: "Rufina herself bears the title archisynagōgos, which in the case of a woman is, of course, just a title." Jean Juster, after describing how difficult it was to fill the office of archisynagōgos, what authority and knowledge were required, notes in closing that "the title of archisynagōgos could also be accorded honorifically, even to women and children."¹⁰ Samuel Krauss adopts the wife solution: "Concerning the women, it can certainly not mean that they were bestowed with the dignity of a president of the synagogue, for the synagogue did not allow women such honors; it is rather the wives of presidents of the synagogue who are meant."¹¹ Salo Wittmayer Baron writes, "The aforementioned woman archisynagōgos of Smyrna, if not merely the wife of an official, was very likely a lady whom the congregation wished to honor, but to whom it could hardly have entrusted the actual charge of an office."¹² Jean-Baptiste Frey, querying whether the title could be honorific or whether Rufina was simply the wife of a president of the synagogue, notes, "It seems difficult to admit that she actually exercised the functions of a president of the synagogue."¹³

It does seem difficult for these scholars to admit that a woman could have exercised an official function in the ancient synagogue. Are there any who can imagine it? The epigraphist Louis Robert is a notable exception in the history of the interpretation of this inscription. In the context of discussing a Jewish woman who bears the title archēgissa, which will be discussed below, Robert notes, "In Jewish communities women bore titles," and lists the Rufina inscription and others.¹⁴ Robert does not make any further attempts to define the titles or to discuss the functions associated with them, but he does see all of these examples as part of the same phenomenon and not as something exceptional. More recently, A. Thomas Kraabel, Dorothy Irvin and Shaye Cohen have also suggested that the title archisynagōgos in this inscription denotes an actual function.¹⁵

Are the arguments of those who consider the title honorary convincing? As to the view that Rufina was merely the wife of an archisynagōgos, it is striking that in the legal matter at hand, namely that of guaranteeing a burial place for her freed slaves and the exposed infants raised in her household, she acts in her own name. Thus we do not even know whether she was married. The suggestion that the title archisynagōgos was honorific in the later period flies in the face of fourth century references to archisynagogi in the Theodosian Code (16.8.4 [331]; 18.8.13 [397]; 16.8. 14 [399]), where they are listed among the synagogue functionaries, and it is also difficult to reconcile with an inscription such as CII 803 from Apamea in Syria, which is dated to 391 and mentions several presidents of the synagogue. No one has ever suggested that these men were merely honorary presidents of the synagogue. The primary argument is that a woman, qua woman, could not have held such a post. This will be discussed below after all of the evidence has been surveyed.

The following Greek inscription (CII 731c;¹⁶ 4th/5th C.) comes from Kisamos in Crete:

Sophia of Gortyn, elder and president of the synagogue of Kisamos (lies) here. The memory of the righteous one forever. Amen.

Note that she bears two titles and that no husband is mentioned. For this and the following inscriptions, the history of interpretation will not be outlined. In each case, the arguments are similar and the result the same: Most scholars believe that each title borne by a woman was honorific because a woman bore it.

CII 756¹⁷ (Greek; 4th/5th C.), a donative inscription carved into the top of a chancel screen post, comes from Myndos in Caria and reads:

[From Th]eopempte, [pres]ident of the synagogue, and
her son Eusebios.

The presence of the son indicates that Theopempte was or had been married, but his lack of title shows that if his father bore a title, it did not automatically pass on to the son.

If the titles of these women were functional, what might their work in the synagogue have entailed?¹⁸ From Jewish and Christian literary sources and Jewish inscriptions a rough outline of the office of president of the synagogue can be obtained. Presidents of the synagogues seem to have had responsibility for inviting members of the congregation to read from scripture (t. Meg. 4:21) and to preach (Acts 13:15). Exhorting and teaching (Lk 13:10-17; possibly Acts 18:12-17; Justin Martyr Dial. Tryph. 137; Epiphanius Haeres. 30.18.2; cf. b. Pesah 49b), as well as collecting money, together with the presbyters, to be sent to the patriarch (Cod. Theod. 16.8.14, 17) occur in the ancient sources as activities of the archisynagōgos. The archisynagōgos seems to have been the leading synagogue functionary, judging by the fact that the title occurs at the head of ancient lists of synagogue officials (CII 766, 803, 1404), as well as by the etymology of the word itself (<archos, chief, ruler). The evidence suggests that more than one archisynagōgos could serve in a synagogue at a time (Mark 5:22; Acts 13:15; CII 766, 803; possibly Acts 18:8, 17). The method of selection is not clear. The existence of archisynagōgoi who were sons of archisynagōgoi (CII 584, 1404) and of one infant archisynagōgos (CII 587) raise the possibility that the office was hereditary, but inscriptions mentioning an achisynagōgos-for-life (CII 744, 766) suggest that others did not hold the office for life and that the latter were therefore selected in a way other than by inheritance. The Patriarch may possibly have had a role in the selection (Palladius Dial. on the Life of St. John Chrys. 15; cf. Cod. Theod. 16.8.15).

B. Leader

CII 696¹⁹ (Greek; date uncertain), a columella (also called kioniskos: a small column, flat on top and without a capital, used as a gravestone) embellished with a seven-branched menorah, from Thebes in Phthiotis in Thessaly, reads:

Tomb of Peristeria, leader.

Louis Robert considers the title archēgissa to be the female equivalent of archēgos, which occurs only once in the Jewish inscriptions (CII 731g), but which seems to have its Latin equivalent in principalis (CII 681).²⁰ In the LXX archēgos translates a number of Hebrew words meaning "leader," "chief" or "official," among them ro's (Exod 6:14; Num 13:3; 14:4; etc.), qasin (Judg 11:6, 11[B]; etc.) and šar (Judg 5:15[B]; 1 Chr 26:26; etc.). In light of the lack of further sources, one cannot be more precise in defining the exact meaning of Peristeria's title.

C. Elder

In five Greek inscriptions women bear the title presbytera and in one a woman most likely bears the title presbytis. CII 731c (Greek; 4th/5th C.) from Kisamos in Crete was quoted above under "President of the Synagogue;" the woman of the inscription bears both titles.

CII 692²¹ (Greek; 4th/5th C.) from Bizye in Thrace bears an ethrog and a seven-branched menorah and reads:

Tomb of Rebeka, the elder, who has fallen asleep.

Three inscriptions found in a Jewish catacomb in Venosa in Apulia in southern Italy mention Jewish women elders.²² They probably date from the third to the sixth centuries. CII 581 (= CIL IX 6226; Greek) reads:

Tomb of Beronikene, elder and daughter of Ioses.

CII 590 (= CIL IX 6230; Greek) reads:

Tomb of Mannine, elder, daughter of Longinus, father, granddaughter of Faustinus, father, (aged) thirty-eight years.

CII 597 (= CIL IX 6209; Greek) reads:

Tomb of Faustina, elder. Peace! (Hebrew)

It is striking that three of the five extant presbytera inscriptions are from Venosa. Given that in two further inscriptions from Venosa (CII 606: Alexsanra, pateressa; 619d: Faustina, mēter) women bear titles, it is legitimate to ask whether the Venosan Jewish community had a tradition of granting women official functions.

Although not unambiguous in its title, CII 400²³ (Greek), which bears a seven-branched menorah and comes from the Monteverde catacomb in Rome (1st C. B.C.E.-3rd C. C.E.²⁴), should also be added to our list. It reads:

Here lies Sara Ura, elder [or aged woman].

PRESBYTNS should probably be read as presbytis or presbytēs. The male presbys can be used much like presbyteros, and possibly the female form used here also means more than simply "aged woman."

Notice that no husbands are mentioned in these inscriptions and that the only age given is that of Mannine (CII 590), who died at the age of thirty-eight, which is hardly old enough for us to postulate that presbytera was a title granted to older, venerated women of the congregation. The parallelization with archisynagōgissa (CII 731c) is further support for the official character of the title presbytera.

The literary and epigraphical sources for the title presbyteros²⁵ yield an outline, albeit shadowy, of what the possible range of functions of an elder might have been. The Roman lawgiver appears to have viewed Jewish elders as primarily religious functionaries, parallel to Christian clerics (Cod. Theod. 16.8.13). Functions included collecting money in the synagogue²⁶ to be sent to the patriarch (Cod. Theod. 16.8.14,17), activities related to the worship service (Corp. Iur. Civ., Nov. 146.1), as well as judicial activities (Cod. Theod. 16.8.2; Cod. Iust. 1.9.15). According to rabbinic definition (b. Qidd. 32b), an elder is a scholar. The evidence points to councils of elders, both in Judaism and in Jewish-Christianity, rather than to single elders (CII 663, 731f, 803, 1404; Luke 7:3-5; Acts 11:30; 15:2, 4, 6, 22-25; 16:4; 21:18; Jas 5:14, etc.). The evidence for a special seating place for elders (t. Meg. 4:21; 1 QS 6:8-9; possibly CII

633; cf. the benches in the Sardis synagogue) also points to a council of elders.

D. Mother of the Synagogue

In five inscriptions a woman bears the title "mother of the synagogue," and one inscription speaks of a pateressa. They are all from Italy. CII 523²⁷ (= CIL VI 29756; Latin; date unknown), known since the sixteenth century, was carved into a sarcophagus which is now lost. A shofar, a lulav and a seven-branched menorah decorated the epitaph. The provenance within Rome is uncertain. It reads:

Veturia Paulla F (?), consigned to her eternal home,
who lived eighty-six years, six months, a proselyte of
sixteen years, named Sara, mother of the synagogues of
Campus and Volumnius. In peace her sleep.

The last sentence is Greek written in Latin characters. "Campus" here most likely means Campus Martius, a plain of around 600 acres on the left bank of the Tiber (see CII 88, 319), and "Volumnius" refers to the Synagogue of the Volumnesians (see CII 343, 402, 417, 523). Veturia Paulla, who converted to Judaism at the age of seventy, was thus actively involved in the life of two synagogues. Here again, no husband is mentioned. If she had had one, it is quite likely that she outlived him.

CII 496²⁸ (Greek; probably 2nd/3rd C. C.E.), a sarcophagus fragment, should most likely be reconstructed to mention a mother of a synagogue. The fragment, which is from Rome, probably from the Monteverde catacomb (1st C. B.C.E.-3rd C. C.E.), reads (as reconstructed):

[Her]e lies [Jul-, Jun-, Mar- ?]ia Marcella, [mo]ther
of the syna[gogue of the] Auguste[s]ians. May] she be
remembered. [I]n peace he[r] sleep.]

That Markella was a woman is indicated by the fragmentary -ia before Markel and by the final sigma for au[tē]s. "Mother of the synagogue" is also partially reconstructed: [me]t[er] syna[gōgēs]. (On the Synagogue of the Augustesians, see CII 284, 301, 368, 416).

A third inscription from Rome should probably also be reconstructed to mention a mother of the synagogue. The marble fragment (CII 166:²⁹ Greek; 2nd/3rd C.), which is more mutilated today than when it was found in the Appia catacomb (1st-3rd C. C.E.), bears a seven-branched menorah and reads (as reconstructed);

Here lies Simp[licia. . . mother of the syn]agogue,
who loved her husband. [Husband's name and office] of
the synagogue [set up (this stone)] to his own
w[ife.]

The basis for "Simplicia, mother of the synagogue" is: Simp[likia. . . mēter synagōgēs], admittedly conjectural, but the gender of the deceased is established by the philandros and by the τῆς ἰδίας σλῦμβι. Further, the title mēter synagōgēs, known from elsewhere, is a plausible reconstruction for the lacuna preceding -nagōgēs, especially since synagōgēs occurs in the following line. Note that this is the first inscription in which a husband is mentioned. Further, he seems to bear a title of synagogue leadership himself.

CII 639³⁰ (= CIL V 4411; Latin; date unknown), from Venetia in Brescia, which is in northern Italy, has been known since at least the fifteenth century and reads:

To Coelia Paterna, mother of the synagogue of the Brescians.

CII 619d³¹ (Greek; 3rd-6th C.), from Venosa, attests to a mother, whether of a synagogue, of the Jewish community or of the city, is unclear. It reads:

Here lies Faustina, mother, wife of Auxanios, father and patron of the city.

This is the second time a husband is mentioned. He bears two titles and one, pater, is the masculine counterpart to her title, meter. Of further note is that of the ten "fathers" mentioned among the Venosan Jewish inscriptions, seven are named Faustinus. Perhaps Faustina's family ties helped her to attain the title. (See especially CII 611 and 613 for the passing down of names.) Compare also Faustina, the Venosan presbytera (CII 597), and Mannine, the Venosan presbytera whose father and grandfather (named Faustinus) both bore the title pater (CII 590). There are thus at least three ways in which Faustina could have acquired her title: (1) through her own family ties; (2) as the wife of her husband; (3) through her own contributions and work in the Jewish community.

A final inscription from Venosa with a rather unusual title should also be considered in this context. CII 606³¹ (= CIL IX 6231; Latin; date unknown) reads:

Here lies Alexsanra, "fatheress" (pateressa), who lived approximately [. . .] Peace! (Hebrew)

The title pateressa is simply the feminine of pater.

In addition to the epigraphical evidence, there is one literary reference to Jewish mothers of the synagogue. It is found in De altercatione ecclesiae et synagogae, which is meant to be a dialogue between two matrons, Synagoga and Ecclesia, on a number of controversial points. During the debate Church argues that circumcision cannot be the sign of salvation or how would women be saved? She says, ". . . what will your virgins do, what your widows, what even your mothers of the synagogue, if you bear witness that the sign of circumcision has helped the people to eternal life?" (. . . quid facient virgines tuae, quid facient viduae, quid matres etiam synagogae. . .).³² This document attests that the title mater synagogae was known well beyond the Jewish community. From the rhetorical standpoint, the title had to be vested with some authority or the sarcasm implicit in the build-up to "what even your mothers of the synagogue" would not have carried. The date and provenance of the work are uncertain. Jean Juster dates it from 438 to 476.³³ A fifth century date would fit in well with the inscriptions cited.

The scholarly consensus is that both "mother of the synagogue" and "father of the synagogue" were honorific titles.³⁴ It is my belief that this view arose because "mother of the synagogue" inscriptions have been known since the fifteenth (CII 639) and sixteenth (CII 523) centuries. That is, scholars have been faced for some centuries with the dilemma of women bearing this title. Rather than admit that the title signified a function, thereby allowing women into the ranks of synagogue leadership, they proposed that both fathers and mothers of the synagogue were honored members, but nothing more. Samuel Krauss's argumentation is quite specific in this respect: "A genuine office could not have been associated with the distinction of father/mother of the synagogue for the simple reason that it was also bestowed upon women."³⁵

If one does not use gender as the primary criterion for distinguishing

between honorific and functional titles, there are good reasons to take mother/father of the synagogue as a title of genuine leadership. A law promulgated in the year 331 frees a number of Jewish functionaries from the corporal duties of the empire: "priests (hiereis), presidents of the synagogue (archisynagogi), fathers of the synagogues (patres synagogarum), and all others who serve the synagogues (ceteri, qui synagogis deserviunt)" (Cod. Theod. 16.8.4).³⁶ If the title pater synagogae was purely honorific, it is puzzling to find it in this list. In Roman law certain groups of society were freed from the corporal duties; these included, to a certain extent, pagan priests and, in the course of time, Christian clergy. Thus the context of this law implies that those listed were seen as having a functional role in the synagogue.

A further piece of evidence for the functionality of the title is CII 533, a Latin inscription from Castel Porziano in southern Italy, in which Livius Dionisius, pater, a gerusiarch, and an Antonius whose title is broken off seem to be the three main leaders of the community, at least regarding the grant of a small plot of land to the gerusiarch Gaius Julius Justus for a family tomb. Pater (without synagogae) could, of course, be a civic, rather than a synagogue title.

While there is no reason from within either the inscriptions mentioning mothers of the synagogue or those mentioning fathers of the synagogue (CII 88, 319, 509, 510, 537, etc.) to take the titles as honorific, it is quite difficult to ascertain precisely which functions they might have implied. The cult of Mithras, in which pater was the highest of seven grades a man could pass through, might be a useful analogy. It seems that the lower orders, such as Lions, could have a pater at their head, and that the patres could have a pater over them, pater patrum/pater pateron.³⁷ (See CII 607, 610, 614, 619b, in which this phrase occurs in the full or abbreviated form.) This analogy is of only limited value, because we do not hear of a system of seven grades in ancient Judaism, but the coincidence of terminology is striking, and the inter-religious use of the term may have implied a transference of nuance. In sum, we will have to be content with counting the mothers and fathers of the synagogue among the top officials without knowing their exact duties.

E. Priestess

In three inscriptions women bear the title hiereia or hierissa. The oldest (CII 1514:³⁸ Greek; 27 B.C.E.) is from Tell el-Yahudiyyeh in Lower Egypt and reads:

O Marin, priestess (hierisa), good and a friend to all, causing pain to no one and loving of your relatives, farewell! (She died at the age of) approximately fifty years, in the third year of Caesar (Augustus), on the thirteenth day of Payni (= June 7, 27 B.C.E.).

The site of the Marin inscription, Tell el-Yahudiyyeh, is the ancient Leontopolis in the nome of Heliopolis, which is where Onias IV founded a Jewish temple during the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometor and Cleopatra (181-146 B.C.E.). The temple existed until or shortly before 73 C.E., when the Romans destroyed it.³⁹ The rabbinic authorities are also familiar with the temple of Onias, the sacrificial service of which they view with some ambivalence, but which they are willing to recognize under certain limited circumstances. (See m. Men. 13:10; t. Men. 13:12-14; b. Meg. 10a; b. Men. 109a, 109b; y. Yoma 43c.64-43d.6; y. Sanh. 19a.9.)

CII 315⁴⁰ (Greek; 3rd/4th C.) comes from the Monteverde catacomb in

Rome and reads:

Here lies Gaudentia, priestess (hierisa), aged twenty-four years. In peace be her sleep.

A menorah and a torah shrine embellish the marble plaque.

CII 1007⁴¹ (Greek; 2nd-4th C.), painted in red letters above and to the right of arcosolium 2 of Hall K in Catacomb 1 at Beth She'arim, reads:

Sara, daughter of Naimia, mother of the priestess (hierieia), the lady Mar[i]a, [lies here].

Since Sara's father is not called a priest, it is unlikely that Sara was the daughter of a priest, and therefore a priestess herself. Her daughter must have acquired her title in a way other than by birth.

There exist several possibilities for interpreting hierieia/hierissa⁴² in our inscriptions:

1. The term is simply the Greek equivalent of the rabbinic term kōhenet (Aramaic: kahanta').⁴³ A man becomes a kōhen in one way, by birth, so that a priest can be defined as the son of a priest, while a woman becomes a kōhenet in two ways, by birth and by marriage. A kōhenet is therefore either the daughter of a priest or the wife of a priest. A kōhenet had certain priestly rights, such as the right to eat from the priestly dues (Lev 22:12-13), although not during her menstrual period (m. Nid. 1:7). A kōhenet could lose her priestly rights in various ways (m. Yev. 7:4-6), while a kōhen could not permanently lose his (b. Soṭa 23b; b. Mak. 2a; m. Bek. 7:7). There is in fact a sharp distinction between the kōhenet and the kōhen (m. Soṭa 3:7). Thus, the rabbinic authorities recognized that a kōhenet had certain rights and duties, but they viewed her priestliness as both derivative and fragile. There is, however, a further strand of tradition according to which a daughter of a priest who married a common Israelite was still allowed to eat the priestly dues (i.e. because of her own priestliness), and in some cases her husband was even allowed to eat on account of her (b. Hul. 131b-132a). The interpretation of hierieia/hierissa as kōhenet would cause no difficulties of orthodoxy. It would also mean that the title had nothing to do with synagogue leadership. The difficulty lies in establishing why a woman in Rome (Gaudentia) or in Leontopolis (Marin) should in any way fall under rabbinic categories.

2. Hierieia/hierissa means "priestess" in the full, cultic sense of the term. Some may find this very hard to believe, but scholars have suggested in the past that such texts as Exod 38:8 and 1 Sam 2:22, which speak of women ministering at the tent of meeting, may indicate the existence of female cultic functionaries at a certain point in Israelite history, or that Zipporah, Jael or Miriam may have had cultic functions.⁴⁴ Whatever the situation in the earlier period may have been, it should not a priori be excluded that a woman like Marin bore the title hieris(s)a due to cultic functions which she carried out at the Jewish temple of Leontopolis. If female cultic functionaries did serve at Leontopolis, this could be a continuation of an earlier tradition, now lost to us, or it could have been a specifically Egyptian Jewish development.

3. The term could denote a synagogue function. To some, synagogue function may seem as incredible an interpretation as cultic priestess, if only because hierieus is not usually taken as having anything to do with the synagogue. There are, however, two functions which the priest has in the synagogue service: (1) the priestly blessing (based on Num 6:22-27); (2) preference in reading from the Torah (m. Git. 5:8; Philo Hypoth. 7:13). Further, the reference in the Theodosian Code to hierieis (16.8.4--discussed above in the

context of fathers/mothers of the synagogue), who are listed among synagogue functionaries, is a further reason for taking seriously the possibility that priests could have been seen as part of the synagogue leadership. Even given this, however, is it not absurd to imagine that women could have fulfilled such functions? For example, could priestly women have been preferred readers of the Torah? Could they read the Torah at all? T. Meg. 4:11 states that women are counted in the minyan of the seven who read the Torah in the worship service, but that women do not read. Could it be that women were at one time allowed to read and then later forbidden to do so?⁴⁵ Or could it have been allowed in geographical areas not under rabbinic influence (such as Rome or Leontopolis)? There is in any case evidence for Jewish women studying scripture in antiquity (e.g. m. Suk. 3:10; Philo De vita contempl.⁴⁶); see also the traditions concerning the well educated woman Beruriah⁴⁷). The recitation of the priestly blessing by women is probably unlikely due to the exclusive language used in Num 6:23 ("say to Aaron and his sons"), for the rabbinic interpretation usually takes exclusive language quite seriously, i.e. to mean that women are excluded (e.g. b. Qidd. 29b, in which Deut 11:19 is taken to mean that one must teach one's sons the Torah, but not one's daughters). However, even within the rabbinic tradition androcentric language is occasionally interpreted inclusively (e.g. Num 27:8 in b. B. Bat. 109a), and it is therefore possible that "sons" could have been taken to include daughters. And again, non-rabbinic traditions of interpretation may have been more inclusive with respect to androcentric language.

In sum, it is impossible to decide definitively which of the three interpretive possibilities to prefer, and it is even possible that each of the women bore her title for a different reason.

II. WERE THESE TITLES HONORIFIC OR FUNCTIONAL?

A. Honorific Titles in Antiquity

With all the talk of honorific titles in the discussion of the above inscriptions, there has been very little reflection on the meaning of that term. One normally means something rather different with the term "honorific title." For example, Friedrich Preisigke devotes a section to Ehrentitel in his dictionary of the papyri.⁴⁷ The honorific titles listed fall into two categories: adjectives, often in the superlative (e.g. clarissimus, lamprotatos), and nouns, often corresponding to a titular adjective (e.g. spectabilitas, lamprotēs). A man of senatorial rank, for example, could bear the title vir clarissimus, his wife being clarissima femina. The senatorial rank certainly implied duties and functions, but these were not expressed with this title. Quite unlike the title archisynagogos, clarissimus/a never denoted an official function; it was *per se* honorific. Note also that while a wife did receive the title of her husband, his was not functional while hers was honorific.

What of the wife of a religious functionary receiving his title? Were not such titles honorific? For example, the wife of a flamen dialis was called flaminica, but this was not simply a title, for a flaminica had certain cultic functions and appeared at her husbands' side wearing cultic garb. The wife of the flamen of the emperor cult seems to have been a similar case.⁴⁸ Thus, this kind of example actually speaks against the honorific nature of the functionary's wife's title, for in these two cases the titles of both husband and wife were functional.

Before speaking of the honorific nature of these women's titles, one must first establish that honorific titles even existed in the ancient synagogue. The assumption is that titles normally functional were honorific when bestowed upon women, which is similar to suggesting the existence of a church with functioning male bishops and honorary female bishops. There is

no internal reason to assume that any of the titles of synagogue organization were honorific.

One often cites the child office holders as a parallel to the women⁴⁹ (e.g. CII 120: archōn nēpios; 402: mellarchōn), thereby overlooking that a grown woman has little in common with a two year old boy. Rather than attesting to the existence of honorific titles, such inscriptions can be seen either as evidence for the hereditary nature of some offices in certain synagogues or for the role of family ties in the selection process. Judging by the word, a mellarchon became a functioning archōn upon reaching adulthood. Such a case in no way parallels adult women bearing titles.

Is it nevertheless possible, and even probable, that the women title bearers received the titles on account of their husbands? A major difficulty with this hypothesis is that in all of the above inscriptions, husbands are mentioned only twice (CII 166, 619d). Even if it were to have been the case that the women in these two inscriptions acquired their titles on account of their husbands, which is not a necessary consequence (why should two Jewish leaders not be married to each other?), it does not follow that no functions were attached to the title. Nor does it follow that all of the other women acquired their titles in this way. The Jewish women's titles have been compared to German women being addressed as "Frau Dr." when their husbands hold a doctorate, but even this custom does not prove the honorific nature of the titles. Many German women are called "Frau Dr." because they have written a doctoral dissertation. Further, if it had been a common custom for Jewish women to assume the titles of their husbands, why does this not find expression in the inscriptions? Numerous inscriptions mention male title bearers and their wives, but with the two exceptions noted above, the wives are not honored with titles (CII 22, 216, 247, 265, 333, 391, 416, 457, 511, 532, 553, 681, 733b, 739, 770, 788, 949, 1145, 1531, etc.) and the situation is the same with the daughters of male title bearers (CII 102, 106, 147, 172, 291, 510, 535, 537, 568, 610, 611, 645, 1202, etc.).

In sum, we do not have evidence that the custom of wives taking on their husbands' titles even existed in ancient Judaism, but even if it did exist, and even if one or two of our inscriptions were to reflect that custom, this would not prove that the wives in question had no functions attached to their titles, nor would it prove that all Jewish women acquired their titles in this way. Further, there is no indication in the ancient sources that any of the titles of synagogue leadership were honorific at any period.

B. Women's Participation in Ancient Synagogue Life

The lack of an adequate understanding of women's participation in the life of the ancient synagogue has hindered research on the Jewish inscriptions in which women bear titles. Even the following, very cursory survey of several salient points should shed light on the context from which they arose. The basis for all other participation is attendance at the synagogue services. Women's attendance at synagogue worship services is taken for granted in the ancient sources (Luke 13:10-17; Acts 16:13-14; 18:26; y. Sota 16d.38-52; b. Abod. Zar. 38a-38b; y. Ber. 9d.5-8; cf. b. Sota 38a). Further, according to Tannaitic Halakah, women are obliged to pray (m. Ber. 3:3);⁵⁰ prayer in the synagogue is one of the ways of fulfilling that obligation.

Where did women sit during the service? The prevailing scholarly view, that the women sat in a gallery or side room, is not supported by the literary or archaeological evidence. No ancient source speaks of a women's gallery or section in the synagogue. The Second Temple did have a Women's Forecourt, but it was not reserved for women; rather the sexes mingled

together freely in this large outer court. It was only once a year, at the Water Drawing Celebration of the Feast of Tabernacles that the sexes were separated (b. Sukk. 51b). Y. Sukk. 55a.72-55b.27 has been cited as evidence for a gallery,⁵¹ but is not convincing because the parallel texts (Lam. Rab. 1.45 [on 1:16]; 4.22 [on 4:19]) have the women not above, but below. Nor is Philo's description of the Therapeutrides and Therapeutai (De vita contempl. 32-33; cf. 69) convincing as evidence that Jews other than this celibate sect had a separation of the sexes during the service. Further, the fourth century custom referred to in b. Qidd. 81a, "Abaye placed jugs around (them); Rava placed reed around (them)," actually speaks against a permanent architectural divider and in any case is not stated in the context of synagogue worship (see Rashi).

As for the archaeological evidence, the earliest synagogue ruins from Israel clearly had no gallery or separate section for women (Masada, Herodion, Gamla), while the reconstruction of a gallery at most sites (e.g. Bar'am, Capharnaum, Meiron) is questionable. In the Diaspora synagogues, the assignment of one of the side rooms to women (e.g. Dura Europos, Hammam Lif, Delos) is not based on any evidence from the sites themselves.⁵² Therefore, we should simply admit that we do not know where the women sat in the synagogue.⁵³ There is insufficient evidence to posit a strict separation of the sexes.

Women were active as donors in the synagogue, as numerous inscriptions attest (Lifshitz nos. 5, 7, 13, 29, 30, 33, 41, 42-46, 51, 54, 55, 70, 81b, 100; Hüttenmeister, pp. 157-158, 183-184, 324, 325; Goodenough 3, fig. 894; etc.). This points to at least some women having had greater economic power than we usually imagine, and economic power is, of course, often accompanied by influence in the community, as well as by special honor. For example, a Jewish congregation in Phocaea in Ionia honored a woman named Tatian who had donated the money for the building of a synagogue by giving her a golden crown and the privilege of sitting in the seat of honor (Lifshitz no. 13 = CII 738). This is not to imply that all women who donated were also synagogue leaders, nor that the women who bore titles had come to them by way of donation, but simply that women's possessing and controlling their own money would seem to be an important prerequisite for carrying out any administrative tasks which a title such as archisynagōgos, mater synagogae, presbytera, etc. might imply.

A final point deserving mention is the relative frequency of women converting to Judaism. (See Josephus J.W. 2.20.2 §560-561; 5.20.2 §55; 5.3.3 §119; 5.4.2 §147; Ant. 18.3.5 §81-84; 20.2.3. §35; 20.2.4. §38; 20.2.5 §49-53; 20.4.3 §94-95; 20.5.2 §101; CII 21, 202, 222, 285, 462, 523, 524, 529, 642, 731e; m. Ketub. 4:3; b. Ber. 8b; b. Roš. Haš. 17b; b. B. Qam. 109b; b. Hor. 13a; b. Yebam. 46a, 78a, 84b; b. Ketub. 37a; Ger. 2.1, 4; Cod. Theod. 16.8.6.; etc.) The large number of women converts to Judaism sheds light, not only on ancient Judaism in general, but also on the question of the make-up of Diaspora communities. Could it have been that women formed the majority in some congregations? Further, women's attraction to Judaism may have had something to do with the nature of the Judaism to which they were attracted. Is it possible that these forms of Judaism were less restrictive regarding women than some of the forms of Judaism known to us through history? The one clear point of connection between proselytes and women title bearers is CII 523, in which Veturia Paulla, who had converted to Judaism sixteen years before her death, is called the mother of two synagogues.

CONCLUSIONS

The view that the titles in question were honorific is based less on evidence from the inscriptions themselves or from other ancient sources than on current presuppositions concerning the nature of ancient Judaism. Seen in the larger context of women's participation in the life of the ancient

synagogue, there is no reason not to take the titles as functional, nor to assume that women presidents or elders of synagogues had radically different functions than men presidents or elders of synagogues. Of the functions outlined for each title, there are none which women could not have carried out. If women donated money, and even large sums of it, surely they were capable of collecting and administering synagogue funds. Nor is it impossible to imagine Jewish women sitting on councils of elders or teaching or arranging for the religious service. Even women carrying out judicial functions is not impossible in a tradition which reveres one of its prophetesses (Deborah) as a judge. This is not to say that the women of these inscriptions might not have been exceptions. Indeed, they probably were. It is an exception today for women to hold positions of religious leadership. The point is not whether these women were exceptions or not, nor even whether they faced opposition or not -- by analogy to today's women rabbis, ministers and priests, they probably did -- but whether their titles were merely titles or whether they implied actual functions, just as for the men. It is my view that they were functional, and that if the women bearing these titles had been members of another Greco-Roman religion, scholars would not have doubted that the women were actual functionaries. This collection of inscriptions should challenge historians of religion to question the prevailing view of Judaism in the Greco-Roman period as a religion all forms of which a priori excluded women from leadership roles.

FOOTNOTES

1. Samuel Krauss, Synagogale Altertümer (Berlin: Benjamin Harz, 1922) 166 (hereafter cited as Krauss, Altertümer).
2. A recent example would be Emil Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (2 vols., rev. ed., rev. and ed. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, Matthew Black and Pamela Vermes; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1973-1979), 2.435-436 (hereafter referred to as Schürer, History). The editors simply add to the footnotes the newly discovered inscriptions in which women bear titles, without calling into question Schürer's view that they were honorific.
3. A(lf) Thomas Kraabel, Judaism in Western Asia Minor under the Roman Empire, with a Preliminary Study of the Jewish Community at Sardis, Lydia (Th.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1968) 43-50; Dorothy Irvin, "The Ministry of Women in the Early Church: The Archaeological Evidence," The Duke Divinity School Review 45 (1980) 76-86, esp. 76-79; Shaye Cohen, "Women in the Synagogues of Antiquity," Conservative Judaism 34 (1980) no. 2, 23-29.
4. Louis Robert, Hellenica 1 (1940) 26-27; Jeanne Robert and Louis Robert, Bulletin epigraphique, Revue des études grecques 77 (1964), no. 413.
5. Salomon Reinach, "Inscription grecque de Smyrne. La Juive Rufina," REJ 7 (1883) no. 14, 161-166 (facsimile).
6. Emil Schürer, Die Gemeindeverfassung der Juden in Rom (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1879) 29, cited and discussed by Reinach, 163.
7. See CII 584, 587.
8. M. Weinberg, "Die Organisation der jüdischen Ortsgemeinden in der talmudischen Zeit," Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 41, n.s. 5 (1897) 658-659.
9. Schürer, History 2.435.
10. Jean Juster, Les Juifs dans l'empire romain (2 vols.; Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1914), 1.453 (hereafter referred to as Juster, Juifs).
11. Krauss, Altertümer 118.
12. Salo Wittmayer Baron, The Jewish Community (3 vols.; Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1942; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1972), 1.97.
13. Jean-Baptiste Frey, CII 2.11.
14. Louis Robert, Hellenica 1 (1940) 26-27.
15. See above, n. 3.
16. First published by A. C. Bandy, Hesperia 32 (1963) 227-229, pl. 64, no. 1 (photograph).
17. First published by Théodore Reinach, "La pierre de Myndos," REJ 42 (1901) 1-6 (photograph).
18. Space does not permit citing all of the relevant literature for the

meaning of this and the other titles borne by women. In addition to the literature cited thus far, see the survey discussion of archisynagogos in Schürer, History 2.433-436. The reconstruction of each of the offices presented here draws upon a wide variety of sources from a broad chronological span, but should not be misunderstood as an attempt at harmonization. The purpose is to suggest a possible range of functions and not to exclude regional difference or chronological development.

19. First published by G. Sotirou, Archaeologischer Anzeiger 52 (1937) 148.

20. Louis Robert, Hellenica 1 (1940) 26-27.

21. First published by R. M. Dawkins and F. W. Hasluck, "Inscriptions from Bizye," The Annual of the British School at Athens XII, session 1905-1906, 179-180, no. 5 (facsimile).

22. On the Venosan Jewish inscriptions, see François Lenormant, "La catacombe juive de Venosa," REJ 6 (1883) 200-207; Harry J. Leon, "The Jews of Venusia," JQR n.s. 44 (1953-1954) 267-284; Baruch Lifshitz, "Les Juifs à Venosa," Rivista di filologia 90, n.s. 40 (1962) 367-371; Leo Levi, "Le iscrizioni della 'Catacomba nuova' di Venosa," Rassegna mensile di Israel 31 (1965) 358-364.

23. First published by Giorgio Schneider Graziosi, "La nuovo sala giudaica nel Museo Cristiano Lateranense," Nuovo bulletino di archeologia cristiana 21 (1915) 31, no. 51; see also Nikolaus Müller, Die Inschriften der jüdischen Katakomben am Monte Verde zu Rom (ed. Nikos A. Bees, Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1919) 55, no. 48 (photograph in CII).

24. For the dating and description of this and the other Roman Jewish catacombs, see Harry J. Leon, The Jews of Ancient Rome (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960) 54-66 (hereafter referred to as Leon, Jews). This work is the most comprehensive study of the Roman Jewish inscriptions and should be consulted for all of the Roman inscriptions cited in this paper.

25. On "elder," see esp. Juster, Juifs 1.440-447; Hans Lietzmann, "Zur altchristlichen Verfassungsgeschichte," ZNW 50, n. s. 20 (1914) 97-153, esp. 113-132; Krauss, Altertümer 116-117, 147-148, 167, 246, 307, 393; H. Zucker, Studien zur jüdischen Selbstverwaltung im Altertum (Berlin: Schocken, 1936) 173-190; A. E. Harvey, "Elder," JTS n. s. 25 (1974) 318-332, esp. 320-326; C. H. Roberts, "Elders: A Note," JTS n. s. 26 (1975) 403-405; Günther Bornkamm, "Presbys, presbyteros, etc." TWNT 6 (1959) 651-683; or TDNT 6 (1968) 651-680; Shimon Applebaum, "The Organization of the Jewish Communities in the Diaspora," Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum (2 vols., ed. Shmuel Safrai and Menachem Stern; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974-1976), 1, 1.491-495; Schürer, History 2.427-433.

26. See Alf Thomas Kraabel, "The Diaspora Synagogue," Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (ed. Hildegard Temporini and Wolfgang Haase; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972ff.), 19,1 (1979) 477-510, esp. 486-487 (hereafter referred to as Kraabel, "Synagogue").

27. For references to the earliest attestations of this inscription, see Frey, CII 523 (ad loc.).

28. First published by Giuseppe Gatti, "Nuove scoperte nella città e nel suburbio," Notizie degli scavi (1900) 88 (photograph in CII).

29. First published by Raffaello Garrucci, Cimitero degli antichi Ebrei scoperto recentemente in Vigna Randanini (Rome: Coi tipi della Civiltà

cattolica, 1862) 52 (photograph in CII).

30. For references to the earliest attestations of this inscription, see Frey, CII 639 (ad loc.). Note that the name is Coelia and not Caelia. Frey seems to have made a simple error. Lifshitz corrects it in the Prolegomenon, 49.

31. For literature on the Venosan inscriptions, see above, n. 22.

32. PL 42.1134.

33. Juster, Juifs 1.74, n.l. See also Bernhard Blumenkranz, Altercatio aecclesie contra synagoga (Strasbourg: Palais de l'Université, 1954) 27. (Blumenkranz's book is not about our document.)

34. E.g. Emil Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi (4th ed.; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1909; reprint ed., Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1970) 3.88-89 (hereafter referred to as Schürer, Geschichte); Juster, Juifs 1.448-449; Leon, Jews 194; cf. Frey, CII, p. XCVI, who is forced (by the evidence I have cited) to conclude that the title must imply an active role in administration, but the existence of mothers of the synagogue sways his interpretation in the direction of charity administration.

35. Krauss, Altertümer 166.

36. Ed. Theodor Mommsen (Berlin: Weidmann, 1905) 887; tr. Clyde Pharr (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952) 467 (with minor changes).

37. M. J. Vermaseren, Corpus inscriptionum et monumentorum religionis Mithraicae (2 vols.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 1. nos. 688, 803; see indices to vols. 1 and 2.

38. First published by C. C. Edgar, "More Tombstones from Tell el Yahoudieh," Annales du Service des Antiquités de l'Égypte 22 (1922) 13; see also Jeanne Robert and Louis Robert, Bulletin épigraphique, Revue des études grecques 61 (1948) no. 259.

39. On the temple of Onias, see Schürer, Geschichte 3. 144-148; PW 12,2 (1925) 2055-2056; M. Delcor, "Le temple d'Onias en Égypte," RB 75 (1968) 188-203 ("Post-Scriptum" by Roland de Vaux, 204-205).

40. First published by Giorgio Schneider Graziosi, "La nuova sala gindaca nel Museo Cristiano Lateranense," Nuovo bullettione di archeologia cristiana 21 (1915) 31, no. 49; see also Nikolaus Müller, Die Inschriften der jüdischen Katakomben am Monte Verde zu Rom (ed. Nikos A. Bees; Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1919) 43-44, no. 35 (photograph in CII).

41. First published by Moshe Schwabe, Yediot 5 (1937-1938) 91; see also Moshe Schwabe, Baruch Lifshitz and Nahman Avigad, Beth She'arim, vol. 1: Benjamin Mazar, Catacombs 1-4; vol. 2, Moshe Schwabe and Baruch Lifshitz, The Greek Inscriptions; vol. 3: Nahman Avigad, Catacombs 12-23 (Jerusalem: Masada, 1973-1976; Hebrew original, Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1957-1971), 2.42-43, no. 66.

42. On the priesthood in ancient Israel, see esp. Wolf Wilhelm Baudissin, Die Geschichte des alttestamentlichen Priestertums (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1889); Juster, Juifs 1.453-454; Gottlob Schrenk, "Hiereus," TWNT 3 (1938) 257-265; or TDNT 3 (1965) 257-265; EncJud, s.v. "Priests and Priesthood;" Schürer, History 2.237-308. On the Greco-Jewish inscriptions in which the title "priest" or "priestess" occurs, see esp. Louis Robert, Hellenica 11-12 (1960) 382-383.

43. On the rights and duties of the kōhenet, see Talmudic Encyclopedia (ed. Meyer Berlin and Shlomo Josef Zevin; Jerusalem: Talmudic Encyclopedia, 1951ff.), 4 (1952) s. v. bat kōhēn (Hebrew); Encyclopedia Talmudica (ed. Meyer Berlin and Shlomo Josef Zevin, tr. David B. Klein), Jerusalem: Talmudic Encyclopedia, 1969ff.) 3 (1978) s.v. ḥēšet kōhēn.
44. Ismar J. Peritz, "Women in the Ancient Hebrew Cult," JBL 17 (1898) 111-148; Ditlef Nielson, Die altarabische Mondreligion und die mosaische Überlieferung (Strasbourg: Karl J. Trübner, 1904) 192; Alfred Jeremias, Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients (4th ed., rev. and enl.; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1930) 425 (cf. 1st ed. [1904] 271); Theod. Engert, Ehe- und Familienrecht der Hebräer (Munich: J. J. Lentner, 1905) 11; Max Löhr, Die Stellung des Weibes zu Jahwe-Religion und -Kult (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1908) 49-54; Frank Moore Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973) 200-1; Benjamin Mazar, "The Sanctuary of Arad and the Family of Hobab the Kenite," JNES 24 (1965) 301-2. For the position that there were no priestesses in ancient Israel, see esp. A. Eberharder, "Gab es im Jahwekult Priesterinnen?" (Tübingen) Theologische Quartalschrift 94 (1912) 183-190.
45. Ismar Elilbogen, Der jüdische Gottesdienst (2nd ed.; Frankfurt: J. Kauffmann, 1924) 170, suggests this.
46. See David Goodblatt, "The Beruriah Traditions," JJS 26 (1975) 68-85.
47. Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden mit Einschluss der griechischen Inschriften (4 vols., ed. E. Kiesling; Berlin: By the Heirs, 1925-1944), 3 (1931) 183-203; see also Otto Hirschfeld, "Die Rangtitel der römischen Kaiserzeit," Kleine Schriften (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913) 646-681; Paul Koch, Die byzantinischen Beamtentitel (Jena: University Press, 1903); Arthur Stein, "Griechische Rangtitel in der römischen Kaiserzeit," Weiner Studien 34 (1912) 160-170.
48. See PW 12 (1909) 2484-2492; Otto Hirschfeld, "Zur Geschichte des römischen Kaiserkultes," Kleine Schriften (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913) 491-492. Hirschfeld believes that the flaminica was responsible for the cult of the empress, her husband being responsible for that of the emperor.
49. E.g. Schürer, History 2. 435-436.
50. See Shmuel Safrai, "The Synagogue," Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum (2 vols., ed. Shmuel Safrai and Menachem Stern; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974-1976), 1, 2.919.
51. Eliezer Sukenik, Ancient Synagogues in Palestine and Greece (London: Oxford University Press, 1934) 47-48.
52. For literature on each of these sites, see Huttenmeister, s.v. Bar'ām. "Herodium," Kōfar Naḥum, "Maṣāda," "Meron," "Gamla;" Marilyn J. S. Chiat, A Corpus of Synagogue Art and Architecture in Roman and Byzantine Palestine (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1979) 86-93, 111-113, 200-212, 467-471, 561-567, 640-643, 904-5, 923-930, 937-939, 942, 951-959, 1009, 1021-1022, 1030-1033; Kraabel, "Synagogue," 480-483, 491-494. Marilyn Chiat disputes that Masada, Herodion and Gamla were actually synagogues.
53. Shmuel Safrai, "Was There a Women's Gallery in the Synagogue of Antiquity?" Tarbiz 32 (1963-1964) 329-338 (Hebrew); English Summary, p. II, also disputes, primarily on literary grounds, that there was a women's gallery in the ancient synagogue.

ABBREVIATIONS

Goodenough, Erwin Goodenough, Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period (13 vols.; New York: Pantheon, 1953-1968)

Hüttenmeister, Frowald Hüttenmeister and Gottfried Reeg, Die antiken Synagogen in Israel, pt. 1, Frowald Hüttenmeister, Die jüdischen Synagogen, Lehrhäuser und Gerichtshöfe (Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des vorderen Orients. Series B [Humanities] no. 12/1; Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert, 1977)

Lifshitz, B(aruch) Lifshitz, Donateurs et fondateurs dans les synagogues juives (Cahiers de la Revue biblique 7; Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie., 1967)

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LOVE, FREEDOM, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONTRIBUTION
OF I COR. 8--10 TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF
PAUL'S ETHICAL THINKING

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The discussion of food offered to idols in I Cor. 8:1--11:1 is one of Paul's longest treatments of an ethical issue, but because this issue is no longer a live issue in Western culture, and perhaps also because of questions about the literary integrity of the passage, this discussion has not received the attention it deserves in studies on Paul's ethic.¹ The present study attempts to explore the value of this passage for an understanding of Paul's ethical thinking.² The study is divided into four parts which will treat in turn introductory matters (literary integrity and historical background), the overall argument of the passage, Paul's approach to the topic, and the significance for an understanding of Paul's ethical thinking.

Introductory Matters

Before attempting to understand the overall intent of this passage one must decide whether or not it is a unity. Since the time of J. Weiss the literary integrity of the passage has been questioned.³ The two bases for dividing the passage into material from two different letters are (1) supposed contradictions between the standpoint of 10:1-22 as compared with 8:1-13 and 10:23--11:1, and (2) supposed literary breaks between 8:13 and 9:1; 9:23 and 24; 9:27 and 10:1; and/or 10:22 and 23. Neither of these reasons for dividing the passage is convincing, however, for definite links can be seen between the various sections of the passage.

First, there are links between 8:1-13 and 9:1-23. In the former Paul argues that "this ἐξουσία of yours" (8:9) must not be used to put a stumbling block in the way of the weak. He concludes with an example (probably hypothetical) about his willingness to never eat meat lest he cause his brother to fall (8:13). In 9:1-23 Paul turns to an actual example of his willingness to give up his ἐξουσία (the term is used in vss. 4, 5, 6, 12, and 18) rather than put an obstacle in the way of others. A further link is seen in the words of 9:4, μὴ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐξουσίαν φαγεῖν καὶ πίνειν. As Barrett⁴ has suggested these words refer back to the discussion of food and forward to that of receiving pay for the Gospel. Thus they provide a link of subtle transition between the two chapters.

Second, 9:24-27 is tied with both 9:1-23 and 10:1-22. As for the link with the former, Paul's first person reference continues and vs. 27 seems to follow from vss. 16-17. The link with the latter is pointed out by Schmithals:

Now 9:24-27, however, is also connected with 10:1-22. The metaphorical assertion that, of those who contend for the prize, only one is awarded the prize is illustrated by Paul in 10:1ff by means of a historical example.⁵

Finally, there are connections between 10:1-22 and 8:1-13. In the Old Testament examples presented in 10:1-13 people are destroyed by sins associated with eating, drinking, and idolatry, just as in Corinth there are people who are in danger of being destroyed (8:11) by a kind of eating associated with idolatry. In addition, as Hurd⁶ has shown, the questions in 10:19 look like a conscious attempt to avoid contradicting 8:6.

The apparent contradiction between chapters 8 and 10 is resolved when one realizes that in 10 Paul is qualifying the discussion of idol meat with a warning concerning idolatry per se.⁷ While in chapter 8 eating itself is insignificant, but the act of eating which destroys the weaker brother is opposed, in 10 eating itself is insignificant, but the act of eating which destroys the relationship with God through contact with demons is opposed.⁸ Thus there is no necessity for dividing these chapters, and they are best taken as a unity.

Another preliminary question has to do with the situation in Corinth that prompted Paul's response. It is obvious from the *repl. de* in 8:1 that Paul is answering a question put to him by the Corinthians, and as Hurd⁹ has shown the Corinthians probably not only asked Paul about the eating of idol meat but also defended their right to eat such meat.

Often attempts to further characterize the situation move outside the data of the text itself into the realm of speculation. In order to avoid this temptation several facts about the text should be remembered. First, there is no conclusive evidence in the text that there was a dispute going on over the issue of food offered to idols. The idea of dispute is often imported from Rom. 14:1--15:13, where weak and strong seem to be making counter-accusations against each other,¹⁰ or from other passages in I Corinthians (1--4; 11:18; 12:25) where it is apparent that the Corinthian church was divided. Paul does not say, however, that the weak openly objected to the practice of eating idol meat, only that this association of idol meat with idolatry made them vulnerable. Had they openly objected to the practice it is not likely that Paul would have been so concerned that they might follow the example of the strong. This does, of course, leave one problem unexplained. Why would the Corinthians have found it necessary to defend their practice if there was no dispute? While it is impossible to answer with certainty perhaps the issue had been raised without necessarily causing an open dispute, and those who asked Paul wanted to insure that his answer would be to their liking.

Second, those with "knowledge" are never addressed as the "strong" nor does Paul explicitly identify with them as he does with the strong in Rom. 15:1. In fact, throughout the letter Paul seems to play down the idea that anyone should be called "strong," perhaps in response to claims made by those with knowledge.¹¹

Third, Paul never explicitly addresses the weak (unless 10:25 is understood as instruction for them);¹² rather Paul expresses concern that they will be led astray. This is in marked contrast to Rom. 14--15 where Paul gives pointed admonitions to the weak about how they are to relate to the strong. The "weak" take on more the role of third parties here.

It is in part because the Corinthian situation is understood in terms of a dispute where the weak objected to the practice of food offered to idols that certain scholars¹³ (such as Dupont, Coune, and Sawyer) have identified the weak as Jewish Christians, who would be expected to object to idol meat. Rauer¹⁴ has shown, however, that 8:7 strongly supports a Gentile Christian identification for the weak, for the $\epsilon\omega\varsigma \alpha\pi\tau\epsilon$ clearly indicates that the weak had previously been in the habit of eating sacrificial meat as if it were really offered to an idol. In fact, according to Rauer, this is the only characteristic of the weak--they ate sacrificial meat not as common meat, but as meat really offered to an idol because of their previous practice. This could hardly characterize Jewish Christians.¹⁵

It is probably best not to try to carry the identification of the weak further by making them into some distinguishable group or party that was in opposition to some other group or party. Conzelmann¹⁶ is no doubt correct in maintaining that they were not a closed group at all, but were simply "some." Even Theissen's¹⁷ attempt to identify the weak with the lower socio-economic class, while suggestive, fails to be totally convincing because the links between I Cor. 1:26f and 8--10 are not as clear as he contends. The weak were simply "some" who still associated idol meat with idolatry and whose relationship with God could be jeopardized by following the example of fellow Christians who were more secure in their "knowledge" that an idol has no real existence.¹⁸

There is much more consensus on the identification of the "strong" who apparently defended their right to eat idol meat. Throughout I Corinthians Paul treats a number of problems that all seem to fit with a gnostic or pre-gnostic type of thinking. There are people in Corinth who claim knowledge, wisdom, and freedom with claims such as "All things are lawful" (6:12). According to Paul their claims are arrogant (4:18ff). They appear to have tolerated (or perhaps even have been proud of) a case of flagrant immorality (5:1ff) and were probably involved in ecstatic worship (12--14). All of this suggests at least a pre-gnostic type of thought with which the claims of the Corinthian $\epsilon\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ relating to food offered to idols would correspond.¹⁹

Thus we conclude that at Corinth there was a group of gnostic-type individuals who made claims to knowledge and freedom and were enthusiastically oriented. Their freedom included a certain license with regard to sexual immorality and the right to eat food offered to idols. These individuals wrote to Paul and asked him about the practice of eating idol meat, probably (for reasons that are not evident from the text) defending their practice.

Paul knew, however, that there were some who might be led astray if they partook of idol meat because of the previous associations between idolatry and idol meat that were still part of their thinking, at least at the emotive level. These were Gentile Christians who were former idolaters, but they cannot be identified as any specific party or group.

With this reconstruction of the Corinthian situation in view we move to Paul's argument.

Overview of Paul's Argument²⁰

Paul begins his discussion of idol meat in 8:1-6 by agreeing with the Corinthian slogans that affirm the existence of one God and the non-reality of idols. These slogans form the theoretical framework for the Corinthian acceptance of idol meat. But while Paul accepts their validity he already begins to qualify them, not by denying the validity of either the Corinthian claim to knowledge or the content of that knowledge, but by warning that knowledge "puffs up" in contrast to love which "builds up."²¹ Thus from the outset Paul begins to recast the discussion and bring in the element of one's attitude toward other people and the community as a whole. He is more interested in the attitudes that result from the knowledge than in the knowledge itself. He is concerned that knowledge produce the kind of love for others that will build up the community.

In 8:7-13 Paul moves on to make the reason for the qualification of the Corinthian knowledge more explicit. There are some who do not share this knowledge, and all claims to knowledge and freedom must be qualified by responsibility for these people. The weak are in danger of having their consciences defiled because their previous practice of eating idol meat in association with the worship of idols makes it impossible for them to fully assimilate the Corinthians' monotheistic knowledge and view idol meat outside the context of idolatry.

Space does not permit a detailed study of the term "conscience" at this point,²² but it seems clear that Paul sees this defilement as the possibility that the weak may actually fall away from their relationship with God and be destroyed. Thus Stählin is right when he argues that the "wounding of conscience" is more than resultant pangs of guilt or uneasiness after eating; it is actual damage to a person's existence before God. The "wounding of conscience" is:

...tantamount to "wounding the sense of faith, i.e., the fellowship of love which unites with God." It is an offending in such a way that the brother's relation to God suffers serious harm.²³

This defiling, wounding, or falling takes place if the weak are led to follow the example of those with "knowledge." Thus the freedom and "rights" of the latter must be governed by consideration and love for the former. This leads Paul to the conclusion that he would rather give up meat altogether than cause a brother to fall. Clearly the specific question of idol meat has been subordinated to the more important issue of love.

In chapter 9 Paul presents himself as an example of this necessity to be willing to give up one's own rights for the sake of others. Paul has a right to earn his living from the Gospel, but he gives up that for the sake of people to whom he ministers. This chapter is complicated by the fact that Paul's apostleship is probably under attack at Corinth, and Paul takes advantage of this opportunity in the discussion to defend it. But the central point that one must be willing to sacrifice even legitimate rights for the sake of others remains clear.

This discussion of Paul's willingness to give up his rights leads to a very significant statement concerning his personal procedure. In vss. 19-23 Paul shows that his Christian existence transcends his former Judaism, yet he is willing to become a Jew for the sake of Jews just as he is willing to become a Gentile for the sake of Gentiles. He becomes all things to all people. Yet this procedure is also qualified. There are limits. Paul does not actually live "under law," nor does he live a life that is "lawless" before God, for he is *ἐν νόμῳ Χριστοῦ*. But Paul will go as far as he can, without violating the limits that *ἐν νόμῳ Χριστοῦ* implies, for the sake of his missionary work and the building up of his churches.²⁴

The basic function of 10:1-13 is to provide Scriptural examples that prepare the way for the warning against idolatry in vss. 14ff. Apparently a part of the arrogant "knowledge" which the Corinthians claimed was the belief that their status as Christians and particularly their participation in the sacraments made them immune from "falling." And yet Paul sees that they are in danger. He has already discussed the problem of sexual immorality, and now he is in the course of discussing the danger of the Corinthians leading the weak to destruction through their lack of concern for them expressed in eating. Thus subtle connections regarding food, idolatry, and immorality all make this Exodus midrash appropriate to the Corinthian situation.²⁵

In 10:14-22 Paul turns specifically to the subject of idolatry and issues the direct command, "Flee from idolatry." Paul wishes to make it clear that although neither food offered to idols nor an idol in itself is anything, he is not condoning idolatry or the worship of idols. Paul simply could not let a discussion of idol meat go past without making it certain that by indifference to idol meat he was not giving excuse for idolatry. Neither indifference to idol meat nor the knowledge of the non-reality of idols in any way implies that direct participation in the pagan cult is nothing. Although an idol is nothing, there are demons onto whose ground one enters by participating in idolatry. To become a partner of demons cuts one off from Christ. It is the strength of Paul's feelings on this matter that accounts for the presence of this passage in the discussion.

Finally, in 10:23--11:1 Paul comes to specific advice about the eating of idol meat, but he does it only after the necessary groundwork has been laid. While certain aspects of these verses will be discussed in more detail below this section may be summarized as follows.

The Corinthian affirmation that all things are lawful must be qualified by the recognition that not all things build up the community. There is no inherent evil in idol meat itself; therefore in a private situation such as the meat market one may eat whatever is sold. For the same reason when invited to an unbeliever's home one may eat whatever is served, but here it is not wholly a private matter and thus one must be sensitive to the other person. If informed that the meat is idol meat one should refrain for the sake of the other person.²⁶

Thus the eating of idol meat becomes ethically significant whenever consideration for another person enters the picture. That this is the bottom line of Paul's argument is

confirmed by the final summary which emphasizes that all action must be done for the glory of God and that one must always seek the advantage of the other person rather than his or her own. It is in this sense that the Corinthians are to imitate Paul.

Paul's Approach to the Topic

In order to understand Paul's approach to this topic as he argues it in 8:1--11:1 one must distinguish between three aspects of this approach: first, Paul's personal attitude toward idol meat; second, his treatment of the question for the Corinthians; and finally, his own personal practice.

Attitude. Paul's attitude is in basic agreement with the position of the "strong" in Corinth who defend the practice of eating idol meat. Paul agrees with both the theoretical foundation of their position and with their practical conclusion.

The theoretical foundation is the knowledge that there is only one God and that an idol is nothing. Paul fully agrees with this in the early verses of chapter 8 and reaffirms it in his warning against idolatry (10:19). The Corinthian practical conclusion is that idol meat cannot harm a person, and Paul fully agrees that as far as idol meat in itself is concerned this is true. He accepts the Corinthian slogan in 8:8 and affirms that idol meat is nothing in 10:19. In fact, it is quite possible that Paul's strong qualification of the Corinthian slogan "All things are lawful" in 6:12 as it pertains to sexual immorality, coupled with his acceptance of it as it applies to food, reflects Paul's indifference to the whole question of food.²⁷

Thus Paul's attitude is that the eating of food offered to idols in itself cannot harm the believer. Were Paul simply writing to convince the believers in Corinth of his opinion this could be the bottom line of the discussion. But for Paul the focus of the ethical issue is elsewhere. Therefore his attitude must be distinguished from his treatment of the problem.

Treatment. Paul does not treat the question of idol meat by attempting to get everyone to adopt his attitude. Rather he subordinates the question of the rightness or wrongness of idol meat to that which, in his mind, transcends the question of food. His concern is for the effect that the act of eating has on the fellow believer and on the church as a whole. The real ethical question is not "to eat or not to eat" but to act responsibly in love toward the other person. All claims to knowledge, freedom, and one's "rights" must be governed by love. Even legitimate rights must be set aside to avoid hurting another person. Interpersonal relationships and the unity of the church are more important than the "right answer" to the specific question at hand.²⁸

Thus Paul treats the question by refusing to simply give a "right answer." His specific advice differs depending on the context of the action and the effect it will have on others. Where it is a private situation, such as buying meat at the meat market, the freedom to eat idol meat is decisive. But once the conscience of another person is involved the freedom to eat idol meat must be subordinated to more important ethical considerations.

There is disagreement about the precise shape that Paul's specific advice takes. Sawyer²⁹ argues that Paul addresses three possible situations concerning the eating of idol meat: the meat market, where it is permitted (10:25); the private home of an unbeliever (10:27), where it is permitted unless it will cause a problem for someone else's conscience; and the pagan temple, where it is condemned for two different reasons. It is condemned in 8:10 because it might cause a weaker Christian to fall and in 10:20f because it puts one on demons' ground. In a similar manner Fee³⁰ argues that the real issue between Paul and the Corinthians is where one may eat. In 8:1-13 and 10:14-22 Paul is forbidding εἰδωλόθυτα (a term which for Fee means eating sacrificial food in the temple--see note 7). Paul sees what one eats as a matter of indifference, but he is very concerned about where one eats.

But Conzelmann³¹ is correct when he says that Paul is not concerned about place but about the character of the meal. Paul does not necessarily rule out a meal in the temple restaurant that is of a social nature, but he does rule out a meal that takes on the character of actual cultic participation or that endangers a weak Christian.

It is also important to understand the precise nature of Paul's concern for the weak Christian. The accommodation that is to be granted them is not because they object to the practice of eating idol meat, but because they are in danger of being injured by it.³² As Paul shows in 10:29b³³ freedom should not be limited simply by the scruples of another. But Paul is concerned that the weak will actually be destroyed--their relationship with God will be injured--if they follow the example of the strong in light of the associations that they make between idol meat and idolatry as a carry-over from their previous practice.

Thus Paul's treatment of this problem reveals at least two and perhaps three ways that a person might "sin" or "fall." First, one may sin by failing to show concern for another person. To injure a brother or sister is to sin against Christ (8:12). This is the crux of the ethical issue for Paul. An act may be perfectly legitimate in itself, but if it injures another it is sin. There are ethical considerations that transcend the rightness or wrongness of such specific acts.

There is a second way that one may sin, however. For Paul there are certain acts that are wrong in themselves. To participate in idolatry (10:7) or sexual immorality (10:8) causes one to fall. Even though there are ethical considerations that transcend the rightness and wrongness of acts in themselves, Paul cannot conceive of one being part of the body of Christ and ignoring the wrongness of acts such as idolatry and sexual immorality.

The third way one may sin in relationship to this issue is closely related to the second but is somewhat different from it. One may suffer genuine spiritual injury by participation in acts which are not wrong in themselves but which violate one's convictions and create associations with acts that are wrong. This is the particular danger that confronts the weak.

Paul treats the issue of food offered to idols at Corinth not by imposing his attitude on the congregation but rather by

attempting to insure that the issue of idol meat will not lead any of the Corinthians into sin in any of the above three ways. Thus Paul's treatment of the problem must be distinguished from his own attitude. There is yet a third element, however, that must be distinguished from both of these.

Personal Practice. Did Paul himself eat idol meat? Pierce³⁴ answers in the negative and goes so far as to argue that Paul would have felt pangs of conscience were he to discover that he had eaten it, while Hurd³⁵ argues that Paul had actually eaten it publicly on his first visit to Corinth. Both these positions move beyond the evidence of the text itself. But although it is not possible to prove with certainty what Paul actually did in practice there are certain points to be kept in mind.

First, in light of Paul's specific advice in 10:25, 27 it is difficult to imagine him standing in the meat market inquiring as to which meats had been offered to idols or asking about the origin of the meat in someone's home.

Second, Paul's outline of his procedure in 9:19-23 may hold some clues to his practice. He is obviously willing in at least some areas to shift his practice in order to increase his ministry for others. The fact that Paul's attitude toward sacrificial meat is one of indifference, coupled with his willingness to qualify the freedom to eat it for the sake of others, would seem to make the eating of idol meat a prime candidate for the kind of practice that Paul varied in different circumstances. A definite conclusion is impossible, however.

It should be noted, however, that even this principle of being all things to all people is qualified by Paul. Even though Paul becomes as one under the law he is not himself under law, and as Gal. 2:11-14 clearly reveals there were limits to Paul's accommodations.³⁶ And although Paul becomes as one outside of law he never forgets that he is *ἐν νόμῳ Χριστοῦ*, and that too sets limits.³⁷ For Paul there is a moral responsibility that is implicit in faith in Christ, and not even Paul's attempt to be all things to all people will lead him to forget that fact. It would be a mistake to consider these limits that responsibility sets as limits to freedom, however, for Paul includes them within true freedom.

The Significance for Paul's Ethical Thinking

An understanding of Paul's approach to food offered to idols yields the conclusion that Paul here presents an example of principled ethical thinking characterized by a freedom that finds the occasion for its expression in love and moral responsibility. The final section of this paper will briefly analyze the major elements of this statement.

Principled Ethical Thinking. The word "principle" here is not intended to convey the idea that Paul has an explicit set of general principles from which he systematically derives moral guidance. Rather it is used in a much looser sense to point out that Paul's specific decisions and admonitions are based on considerations that transcend the question of the rightness or wrongness of the act itself. Paul does not appeal to laws, rules, or conventions but to the effect of the action on other individuals and the community as a whole and

on the action's consistency with Christian faith. For this reason many of his specific admonitions carry an "it depends on..." with them. There are higher values that must be considered, and these values do provide moral guidance. In this sense it is legitimate to call Paul's approach a principled one.

Freedom. Because Christ has liberated them from the bondage of sin and death, because they are not under law, and because of the different ways that a given specific act might impact on different people, Christians must be free. Paul's affirmation of freedom is seen not only in his theological statements about it but also in his very willingness to allow for diversity of practice on this issue from one person to another and from one situation to another. This is seen even more explicitly in Paul's similar discussion of a different aspect of dietary practice in Rom. 14 where Paul can say, "Let each one be fully convinced in his own mind" (vs. 5). Paul's ethical thinking is characterized by freedom.

But for Paul freedom is never the unchecked authority simply to do as one pleases. Faith in Christ gives a definite shape to freedom. But while it is tempting to see this "shape" as a qualification or limitation of freedom this would be a mistake; it is rather the occasion for freedom to find expression. This is where one sees the irony of Pauline freedom. Leander Keck puts it well when he says:

The scruples of fellow Christians are not an obstacle to the exercise of freedom but the opportunity for it, because not until one is free also to forgo the exercise of one's own freedom for the sake of a fellow-Christian is one really free.³⁸

Love. Genuine freedom includes liberation from the compulsion to exercise one's rights. It is the freedom to love. True freedom finds concrete expression in love.

This love is first of all a radical concern for the well-being of each individual. It involves judging one's actions carefully lest they should in some way injure another--even the most weak and vulnerable other.

There is also a broader focus to this love. To love is to have concern for the community of believers and its "building up." *Oikodome* is one of Paul's most important values. There is a communal context in all of Paul's ethical thinking. Furnish³⁹ is certainly right when he says that Paul never sees the believer standing alone choosing among various abstract ideals based on their inherent "goodness," but rather sees him choosing what is good for the brother or sister and will build up the community. Freedom finds its fulfillment in community.

Moral Responsibility. Freedom also finds concrete expression in moral responsibility. Paul finds it unthinkable that genuine freedom could find expression in sexual immorality or idolatry, to point to the two examples that are included in these chapters. Certain acts are inconsistent with faith in Christ.

Paul does not spell out the criteria for determining which acts fit in this category. For him they seem self-evident. But while Merk⁴⁰ is correct in observing that even

in such matters Paul does not specifically appeal to the law as a motive for action, the content of the law does seem to play a role in these matters. As Keck says:

Paul...never indicts the content of the law but rather insists that it is holy, just, and good (Rom. 7:12). What was right in the law of Moses cannot be contrary to what life in Christ should produce.⁴¹

Freedom acts in a way that is consistent with this insight.

Thus we see in Paul's approach to the question of food offered to idols an example of principled ethical thinking which is characterized by a freedom that finds occasion for its expression in love and moral responsibility.

NOTES

¹For example, Jack T. Sanders, Ethics in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) hardly mentions this passage when discussing Paul's ethic (although he does treat the somewhat parallel discussion in Rom. 14--15. See pp. 62f.) Refreshing exceptions are seen in Peter Richardson, Paul's Ethic of Freedom (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1979), who refers to the passage throughout, and Leander E. Keck, Paul and his Letters, Proclamation Commentaries (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), who uses this passage as an example of Paul's ethic (pp. 88-94).

²The terminology "ethical thinking" is used rather than "ethic" to avoid the implication that Paul is somehow presenting a systematic ethical treatment. He is rather, of course, treating a concrete problem in the Corinthian church from which we draw inferences about his ethical approach.

³In 1910 J. Weiss, Der Erste Korintherbrief (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1910), pp. xi-xliii, divided I Corinthians into three letters and assigned 10:1-22 to letter A and the remainder of our passage to letter B. W. Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971), pp. 95-96, modifies this to include 9:24-27 in letter A. On the other hand, J. Hering, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians (London: Epworth, 1962), pp. xii-xiv, places 8:1-13 and 10:23--11:1 in letter A and 9:1--10:22 in letter B.

⁴Charles K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 202.

⁵Schmithals, p. 93. While Schmithals sees this link he does not recognize the link with 9:1-23 and does not consider the passage a unity.

⁶John C. Hurd, The Origin of I Corinthians (New York: Seabury Press, 1965), pp. 134f.

⁷Gordon D. Fee, "Εὐδαίμονα Once Again: An Interpretation of I Corinthians 8--10," Biblica 61(1980): 172-197, believes that I Cor. 10:14-22 is the main point of Paul's discussion to which 8:1--10:13 has been leading. He holds that the term εὐδαίμονα does not refer to sacrificial meat sold in the meat

market at all but only to food eaten in the temple in the presence of the idol-demon, and bases this conclusion on three facts. First, sacrificial food sold in the marketplace would not have been a problem to Gentile converts; second, both Jewish and pagan worship often involved eating in the presence of the deity; and third, in I Cor. 10:19 εἰδωλῶτον obviously refers to worship in the pagan temple. But this position ignores several important considerations. First, it does not take the terminological evidence that Fee himself mentions but subsequently dismisses (see p. 182) with sufficient seriousness. Second, it does not adequately explain why Paul would not simply oppose idol meat from the beginning instead of making its acceptability dependent on its effect on others in chapter 8. Finally, and most important, it does not take seriously the distinction Paul appears to be making between εἰδωλῶτα and εἰδωλολατρίας in 10:14-22. Paul definitely rules out the latter, but he does not rule out the former or equate it with idolatry. Instead he says in 10:19 that he does not mean to imply that εἰδωλῶτον is anything. Were Fee's position correct we would expect Paul to begin the paragraph by saying φεύγετε ἀπὸ τὰ εἰδωλῶτα, which, of course, he does not. Thus it is much better to take εἰδωλῶτον as the eating of sacrificial food in a general sense rather than limiting it to the eating of sacrificial food in a temple.

⁸ See Hans von Soden, "Sakrament und Ethik," in *Urchristentum und Geschichte* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1951), vol. 1, pp. 239-276, first pub. in 1931, pp. 262ff; and Hurd, p. 135.

⁹ Hurd, pp. 240-270, see especially p. 246. Both Hurd (pp. 237-239) and Fee (pp. 179-181), however, move beyond the evidence when they venture to reconstruct the letter that the Corinthians wrote in detail.

¹⁰ Note, for example, Paul's reference to "disputes over opinions" in 14:1 and his specific admonition that they no longer pass judgment on each other in 14:13.

¹¹ In 1:25-27 he says that the weakness of God is stronger than men, and that God chose what is weak to shame the strong. In 4:10 he specifically contrasts himself to the strong and says, "We are weak but you are strong." This sounds very much like a criticism of their claim to strength. The motif is also found in the discussion of idol meat. When speaking of the danger of idolatry Paul ironically asks, "Are we stronger than he (God)?" When these ironic statements are coupled with the fact that Paul never calls those with knowledge "the strong" in 8--10 it seems quite possible that Paul is sarcastically challenging a claim on the part of some to be strong.

¹² Robert Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), pp. 426ff claims that 10:25 is directed specifically to the weak, but this is not necessarily the case from the text. Paul may simply be telling those with knowledge that they do not need to worry or ask questions in the meat market context.

¹³ Jacques Dupont, *Gnosis: La Connaissance Religieuse dans les Epîtres de S. Paul* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1949), pp 285ff; Michel Coune, "Le Probleme des Idolothytes et l' education de Syneidesis," *RSR* 51 (1963): 497-534, pp. 504ff; and William

Thomas Sawyer, The Problem of Meat Sacrificed to Idols in the Corinthian Church, Southern Baptist University Th.D dissertation (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1968), pp. 126ff.

¹⁴Max Rauer, Die "Schwachen" in Korinth und Rom nach den Paulusbriefen, Biblische Studien (Freiburg: Herder, 1923), pp. 27-29.

¹⁵Coune (pp. 515-517) attempts to counter this by arguing that one should read $\sigmaυνελθ\sigma\epsilon\iota$ with the Koine text, D, G, etc., rather than $\sigmaυνηθε\iota\alpha$ in this verse. It is the most difficult reading, the singular $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\omicron\nu$ would fit better with it, and it is supported by the analogy with I Pet. 2:19. However, the analogy with I Peter is not that close and the other arguments are not convincing. On the other hand, if $\sigmaυνηθε\iota\alpha$ is original, the change to $\sigmaυνελθ\sigma\epsilon\iota$ can be accounted for quite easily as accidental assimilation to the other occurrences of $\sigmaυνελθ\omicron\nu\varsigma$ in the same verse. See Bruce Metzger, et. al., A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (United Bible Societies, 1971), p. 557.

¹⁶Hans Conzelmann, I Corinthians: A Commentary, trans. James W. Leitch, ed. George W. MacRae, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), p. 147.

¹⁷Gerd Theissen, "Die Starken und Schwachen in Korinth: Soziologische Analyse eines theologische Streites," Evang. Theologie 35(1975): 155-172.

¹⁸Hurd (pp. 123-125) concludes that there are no "weak" in Corinth. The weak person is merely a hypothetical construct of Paul's solely for the purpose of dissuading the Corinthians from eating idol meat. But Rauer (pp. 40f) was correct when he argued (much earlier than Hurd) that the weak could not have been a Pauline construct because of Paul's expressions of genuine concern for them and for the real dangers that they faced.

¹⁹Hurd (pp. 119-123) presents valid criteria for determining what portions of the text are Corinthian slogans. Not only do they fit with the "strong" position, but, in addition, Paul finds it necessary to qualify them. In the case of "We all have knowledge" there is also the awkward repetition of "we" (the first person plural ending on $\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha$ and $\epsilon\gamma\omega$) which is difficult to explain unless $\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu$ is the introduction to the slogan Paul is quoting. Other slogans include vs. 4 ("An idol has no real existence" and "There is no God but one") and 10:23 ("All things are lawful"). For a summary of the statements which are considered to be Corinthian slogans by various scholars see Hurd, p. 68.

²⁰Detailed exegetical treatment is impossible within the scope of this paper. For a more detailed, although by no means exhaustive, exegesis of the passage see the present author's dissertation, Paul's Attitude Toward and Treatment of Problems Involving Dietary Practice: A Case Study in Pauline Ethics, Emory University Ph.D. dissertation (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1978), pp. 78-116.

²¹Hering (p. 67) holds that this statement is an interpolation added either by Sosthenes or by a reader who remembered the phrase about "puffed up" gnostics in 5:2, but the only evidence he adduces is his judgment that the remark is

unfitting and that the phrase would be expected to begin with $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ or $\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$. On the contrary, the phrase fits well as the beginning of Paul's qualification which carries through vs. 2, and the use of the term fits well with its other occurrences in this letter. Both the terms "puff up" ($\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\sigma\omega$) and "build up" ($\sigma\iota\kappa\omicron\delta\omicron\mu\epsilon\omega$) are favorites of Paul in this letter, and both probably stem from Paul rather than the Corinthians. $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\sigma\omega$ is used at 4:6, 18, 19; 5:2; 8:1; and 13:4, and elsewhere in Pauline material only at Col. 2:18. Since the term is used exclusively as a criticism of the Corinthians and is not found in any of their slogans, it must originate with Paul. The term $\sigma\iota\kappa\omicron\delta\omicron\mu\epsilon\omega$ or its noun form $\sigma\iota\kappa\omicron\delta\omicron\mu\eta$ occurs at 3:9; 8:1, 10; 10:23; 14:3, 4 (twice), 5, 12, 17, and 26. Although the majority of occurrences are in the Corinthian correspondence, Paul had already used the term in I Thess. 5:11, and as Michel ("Ὀικοδομῶ," TDNT V: 140-142) points out it is basic to Paul and is not merely suggested by the polemical situation. Both Michel and Dupont (pp. 267ff) believe it was suggested to Paul by Jer. 1:10 and 24:6.

²² Among the more important recent studies on Paul's usage of the term are the following: Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), Vol. 1, pp. 216-220, who sees conscience as man's knowledge of his conduct as his own, through which he knows that he has an obligation to a transcendent source of authority; Charles Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, Studies in Biblical Theology (Chicago: Alec Allenson, 1955), who shows that the term derives from popular usage rather than Stoicism and refers primarily to the pain one feels after he has committed an act which is believed (either rightly or wrongly) to be wrong; Bo Reicke, "Synesis in Rom. 2:15," Theologische Zeitschrift 12(1956): 157-161, who shows that in Rom. 2:15 conscience is not a natural guide to right but the feeling of guilt; Johannes Steltzenberger, Syneidesis im Neuen Testament (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1961), who emphasizes the newness and uniqueness of the N. T. usage, which is without antecedents, and does not limit the term to one meaning, but gives a number of different meanings for various N. T. passages; Coune, op. cit., for whom conscience is "religious conviction" based on the O. T. concept of the daath Yahweh; Christian Mauer, "ἔννοια and συνέσις," TDNT VII: 898-919, who holds that for Paul conscience is the central self-consciousness of the knowing and acting man; Margaret E. Thrall, "The Pauline Use of συνέσις," NTS 14(1967): 118-125, who argues against Pierce and maintains that Paul moves beyond Greek usage to include in the term a sense of moral guidance for the future so that it served the same function in the Gentile world as the Law in the Jewish world; Roy B. Zuck, "The Doctrine of Conscience," Bibliotheca Sacra 126 (1969): 329-340, who offers a very general and weak rebuttal to Pierce in which he holds that the weak conscience is an oversensitive conscience which Paul hopes to educate with more knowledge of the Word of God; and Jewett, op. cit., pp. 402-446, who is in basic agreement with Pierce and emphasizes that Paul insists on the autonomy of conscience. Jewett also presents the best and most recent history of research on the use of the term in this passage and I am indebted to him.

²³ Stählin, "ῥῆμα," TDNT VIII: 268-269.

²⁴ David Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology (London: Athlone

Press, 1956), pp. 336ff, 346ff, holds that Paul's principle of accomodation has to do specifically with Paul's missionary strategy, but Peter Richardson, "Pauline Inconsistency: I Corinthians 9:19-23 and Galatians 2:11-14," NTS 26(1980): 347-362, is right when he includes church related problems in its purview (see p. 351). See also Günther Bornkamm, "The Missionary Stance of Paul in I Corinthians 9 and Acts," in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, ed. Leander E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966), p. 194-208.

²⁵C. K. Barrett, "Things Sacrificed to Idols," NTS 11 (1964-1965): 138-153, p. 139, points out the interesting fact that the incident in vs. 8 comes from a part of the Balaam stories, and in Revelation Balaam is connected with idolatry, immorality, and eating food sacrificed to idols. Although we have not been able to find any Jewish polemic against sacrificial meat which makes use of Balaam, his association with Israel's idolatry would make him an appropriate example when idolatry or idol meat is discussed.

²⁶Opinion is divided over whether the informant is the unbeliever or another (presumably weak) Christian guest. Whichever is the case Paul's principle that eating idol meat becomes ethically significant when another person's conscience comes into view is clear. For various arguments that the informant is a Christian see Barrett, I Cor., p. 242; Pierce, pp. 78f; Weiss, p. 205; Jewett, p. 426; and Hering, p. 98. For the view that the informant is the unbeliever see Theissen, p. 164, and Hans Lietzmann, *An Die Korinther 1-11*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, 3rd. ed. (Tübingen: J. C. Mohr, 1931), p. 51.

²⁷For a good summary of Paul's use and qualification of Corinthian slogans relating to food and sexuality in I Cor. 6 see Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, "Corinthian Slogans in I Cor. 6: 12-20," CBQ 40(1978): 391-396.

²⁸Paul's subordination of the question of the rightness or wrongness of the specific act is especially interesting in the light of the history of the discussion of food offered to idols in early Christianity, where the discussion inevitably focuses on whether the act is right or wrong. For a survey of Paul's uniqueness in this respect see the present author's article in a forthcoming issue of NTS, "Rejected, Ignored or Misunderstood? The Fate of Paul's Approach to the Problem of Food Offered to Idols in Early Christianity."

²⁹Sawyer, pp. 116-121.

³⁰Fee, p. 191.

³¹Conzelmann, p. 177.

³²For a discussion of how the weak can be injured see Gene Outka, "On Harming Others," *Interpretation* 34(1980): 381-393.

³³I Cor. 10:29b should probably follow directly from vs. 27 with vss. 28-29a serving as a parenthesis. See Richardson, "Pauline Inconsistency," p. 129.

³⁴Pierce, p. 78.

³⁵Hurd, pp. 280-290.

³⁶Richardson, "Pauline Inconsistency," believes that there is inconsistency between Paul's actions in Gal. 2:11-14 and his statement of procedure in I Cor. 9:19-23. Paul fails to allow Peter the privilege of accomodating himself in the way that Paul does. He sees Peter's action as an implied affront to himself in his own territory. While this may be true there is more to Paul's displeasure with Peter. Paul's emphasis on the unity of the church is seen throughout I Cor. 8--10. For Paul the Gospel means that God has accepted all people without distinction. Eating together is a symbol of that unity, and thus for one Christian to refuse to eat with another violates the basic truth of the Gospel. In such matters no accomodation is possible.

³⁷Thus Richardson, Paul's Ethic, pp. 86ff, is right when he says that Paul's procedure is not unprincipled, but the reason is not only seen in the goal; there are also limits inherent in the qualification Paul places in the text itself.

³⁸Keck, p. 93.

³⁹Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul (Nashville: Abingdon, 1968), p. 233.

⁴⁰Otto Merk, Handeln aus Glauben: Die Motivierungen der Paulinischen Ethik, Marburger Theologische Studien (Marburg: N. E. Elwert, 1968), p. 235.

⁴¹Keck, p. 90.

The Law of the Forgotten Sheaf

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"When thou cuttest down thine harvest in the field, and hast forgot a sheaf in the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it: it shall be for the sojourner, for the fatherless, and for the widow: that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine hands. When thou beatest thine olive tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again: it shall be for the sojourner, for the fatherless, and for the widow. When thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean it afterward: it shall be for the sojourner, for the fatherless, and for the widow. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt: therefore I command thee to do this thing" (Deut. 24:19-22).

The initial injunction about the harvesting of a field of grain is different from the two about the harvesting of olives and grapes. Whereas in gathering them a regular practice of leaving some olives and grapes for the needy is enjoined, this is not so with the grain. Only if a sheaf has been left forgotten in the field and the harvester then becomes aware that it is still there, is he counselled to leave it for the poor. The likelihood of this occurring on a regular basis is not very high. The Talmud informs us that the poor depended on such charity.¹ If this were the position back in the Deuteronomist's time, they might well have gone without benefit many a year, at least so far as grain was concerned. It is noteworthy that the corresponding requirement in Lev. 19:9 and 23:22 lacks the peculiarity of the Deuteronomic statute. There is nothing haphazard about requiring the harvester to leave the corners of his field unreaped.

Some commentators seem to be aware of the oddity in the Deuteronomic formulation. They imagine that in some remote, early period of Israelite history a sheaf might have been left in the field as a propitiatory offering to a god.² This view, for which no evidence is presented, appears to underlie their further point that the rule in question is ancient, and that the lawgiver has incorporated it into his material without awareness of its original, and almost certainly now unacceptable, religious significance. Their entire position is untenable. Not least is their attribution of an unthinking intelligence to the lawgiver, a failure on his part to see the peculiarity of his counsel.

The law is readily explained in the light of two perspectives. First is the well recognised link between certain laws relating to food and agriculture and the Israelite's historical experience in Egypt. The Passover lamb, the unleavened bread, the first-fruits of the year's harvest are all given didactic, historical significance. The same is true for the forgotten sheaf. An indication of this possibility is that the final exhortation in the law is for the Israelite to remember that he was a slave in Egypt. Moreover, in all four instances, the lamb, the bread, the first-fruits, and the sheaf, sensitivity to an oppressed state is expressed.

The second perspective is the link between law and wisdom. This particular injunction provides an excellent illustration of how certain biblical laws are like many a proverb in that they are condensed stories.³ They encapsulate the essential significance of the story in question, or at least some aspect of it. Proverbs often embody a clever, superficially concealing element that engages the hearer's attention and enables him

to switch his focus from one setting to another. The lawgiver's concentration on the sheaf that has been forgotten constitutes the proverbial element in this law. It is the link to a fundamental feature of the story about Joseph and his brothers, and Joseph in Egypt. For it was he, in a dream, whose future significance in Egypt was revealed in his role as a sheaf that was bowed down to by the others at harvest time (Gen 37:7, 8).

What happens at the beginning of the Joseph story is indeed pertinent to its final outcome. The unfolding of the dream in reality occurs when Joseph's brothers come to Egypt in order to obtain grain to keep them alive. In doing so, they have to acknowledge Joseph's supremacy over them. The relief of their distress is dependent upon this subordination. But their bowing down to him now was the consequence of their tyrannical act of selling him into slavery and his being taken to Egypt.⁴ His success there centered on his capacity to interpret dreams. First he successfully interpreted those of the butler and the baker. Then he accomplished the interpretation of the Pharaoh's, both of which were about the coming grain harvests.

His contact with the Pharaoh and his consequent elevation as overseer of the Egyptian granaries would never have come about, however, if the butler had continued to forget Joseph's existence in prison. On interpreting his dream Joseph had requested the butler to cause him to be remembered to Pharaoh (Gen 40:14, *zakar* occurring twice). "Yet did not the chief butler remember Joseph, but forgot him" (Gen 40:23). Only when no one could decipher Pharaoh's dreams, did the butler recall his time in prison and what Joseph had been able to do.

It is accurate to say that Joseph as the dominant sheaf in his dream came into his own when he was remembered on the occasion of the Pharaoh's dreams about the forthcoming harvests. Moreover, all of these events were to the end that Joseph might be the means of saving his own family from starvation. The role of providence is emphasised throughout the story. Even the sale of Joseph by his brothers is attributed to God's will. "God did send me before you to preserve life. Ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive" (Gen 45:5, 50:20).

For anyone reflecting upon the story, as the Deuteronomic lawgiver did, and probably for the storyteller himself, Joseph can be characterised as the sheaf of grain whose significance was forgotten until he was called upon to predict the problem about the future harvests. He then became the deity's agent in saving the hungry from starvation. In particular, Joseph as the sheaf in the dream, who was eventually remembered in the context of the Pharaoh's dream, provided the first example in Israelite tradition of someone who had set aside grain for the relief of the needy. Among those were his fellow Israelites who became sojourners in Egypt. In a sense they also became slaves there too. They addressed the disguised Joseph as their lord and this disposition was appropriate because they were being requited for their previously treating Joseph as a slave. Moreover, like all the Egyptians, these Israelites would have thought of themselves as servants of Pharaoh. When the lawgiver appeals to the Israelite harvester to remember that he was once a slave in Egypt, he is recalling this period of time in Israelite experience. Providence had looked after the Israelites then in the person and position of Joseph. Moses, so we are to understand, reflects upon this providential activity and imitates its intent in terms of what is humanly possible. He focuses on the agricultural conditions that will prevail in Israel's new land. There the Israelite harvester is to remember the role of Joseph

and realise how, in the words of the law, God will bless all the work of his hands, just as he had done for Joseph when the latter had provided food for the needy.

The unsatisfactory aspect of the injunction about leaving a forgotten sheaf in the field should not be viewed as a failure in practical wisdom. The directions about not going over the olive boughs a final time, or gleaning the vines again, indicate that the lawgiver knows what constitutes sensible procedure. He surely would have changed, as presumably the levitical lawgiver did, the nature of his counsel if the practicable were the foremost of his concerns. Rather, it is the link to a historical precedent for his law which is the important consideration. This the lawgiver finds in his reflection upon the Joseph story.

The term for a sheaf as applied figuratively to Joseph is ʿalummah; in the law it is ʿomer. What other linguistic considerations might apply, it was sensible of the lawgiver to use a different term from the figurative one in the story. The metaphor of Joseph as the sheaf forgotten and then remembered primarily conveys his position of supremacy over his brothers and his overlordship of Egypt. His sphere of power was his execution of the agricultural policy that he devised for distributing grain. It is the connection between his position in the dream and the way in which it manifested itself that has caught the lawgiver's attention. For him to have used ʿalummah in his law would have been over-clever and artificial, even misleading.

¹R. Johanan ben Nuri, at the beginning of the second century A.D., actually lived on the gleanings. See Pal. Peah 20d.

²See G. von Rad, Deuteronomium, ATD 8 (Göttingen, 1964) 109; A. Phillips, Deuteronomy CBC (Cambridge, Eng., 1973) 166.

³A possible biblical example is 2 Sam. 5:8, "The blind and the lame shall not come into the house," which, according to G. Fohrer, must be derived from a specific historical situation. See Introduction to the Old Testament (E.T. New York, 1968) 311. R. B. Y. Scott, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, AB (New York, 1965) xxvii, disagrees. He in turn cites 1 Sam. 10:11, 12 ("Is Saul also among the prophets?"); 1 Sam. 24:14 (13) ("Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked"); 1 Kings 20:11 ("Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off."); Jer. 13:23 ("Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?") as "examples of adages connected with particular persons or episodes, historical or legendary, famous for some particular thing, like Caesar's wife who must be above suspicion, or the disastrous victory of Pyrrhus."

⁴On the intimate link, involving a symmetry of plot, between the scene in Genesis 45 and Genesis 37, see Donald B. Redford, A Study of the Biblical Story of Joseph (Genesis 37-50), (Leiden, 1970) 71-74. His remark (249-50) about the virtually complete silence of the rest of scripture on the subject of the Joseph story is simply wrong. His view becomes an important prop for his late dating of the story: "One can only conclude that the reason why the historical books and the Prophets say nothing of the Joseph Romance is because the narrative was not yet in existence when they were written."

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THE ENDANGERED BENEFactor IN LUKE-ACTS

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One of Luke's major contributions to the history of early Christian thought is his use of the model of the Graeco-Roman benefactor in conjunction with the Isaianic servant-figure to project the significance of Jesus' person and performance.

Since the publication of Jesus and the New Age: A Commentary on the Third Gospel (St. Louis, fifth printing, 1980) and Luke (Philadelphia, 1976), in which I discussed this noetic junction, I have become increasingly impressed with the importance that Luke attaches to the concept of benefactor in Luke-Acts, and this impression has been justified by further investigation of epigraphic documents as media for understanding the diction and mode of presentation in Luke's work, not to speak of other documents in the New Testament that bear a clear Hellenistic stamp, including especially the Pauline letters and 2 Peter.

The results of these investigations as well as those from earlier inquiry in connection with the preparation of the revision of the English version (BAGD) of Walter Bauer's Lexicon, are incorporated in Benefactor (St. Louis, 1981). I am grateful to Clayton Publishing House, Inc. for permission to include translations and other data from this publication, which offers a detailed typology of the characteristics of Graeco-Roman benefactors at the hand of numerous inscriptions, an investigation of the principal themes that are formulated in laudatory documents, and a probe into the structure of response to generous performance.

Since involvement in the public interest - the technical term is leitourgia - could be extremely costly, Graeco-Roman documents, both literary and non-literary, are replete with terminology relating either to material or personal sacrifice or to both. In this study I aim to confine myself to the aspect of hazard, with special reference to Luke's awareness of a deeply rooted cultural phenomenon known as the Endangered Benefactor.

Abbreviations of standard corpora of inscriptions follow the style in Liddell-Scott-Jones-McKenzie, Greek-English Lexicon. Unless otherwise specified, all dates are B.C.E. Translations are my own. The transliteration follows the spelling of the published texts.

I. GRAECO-ROMAN DOCUMENTS

Since the focus in this study is on description of laudable performance in perilous circumstances, it is convenient to classify such description as peristatic narration. Such narrative may describe perilous circumstances that require the generous services of a deity or of an influential citizen. Or it may explicitly alert the public to the fact that a benefactor has personally undergone risk or danger in performing his or her service.

The neologism derives from the noun peristasis, which in a number of ancient texts refers to a difficult position or crisis in which the recipients of benefits find themselves. The word peristasis need not, however, itself be present in order for a narrative to qualify as peristatic.

DANGER INCURRED BY BENEFICIARIES

In the first century B.C.E. the people of Tomi on the western coast of the Black Sea commended forty citizens and their leaders who volunteered to serve as a security force for their city. The preamble of the city's monument expresses her pathetic plight: "Whereas the people, in profound perplexity and hard-pressed because of the critical circumstances (dia tas tōn kairōn per[is]taseis) had almost lost hope and above all else were filled with anxiety about the city walls, for some of the discouraged citizenry had abandoned the city and others who were unable to protect their own homeland because of the pestilential condition that prevailed along with the attendant illnesses (dia tēn genomenē[n]loi[m]kēn peristasin kai tas arrōstias mē dynamenōn|phy|lassein tēn patrida), ..." (SIG 731. 2-9).

About the year 42/41, an administrator named Kallimachos received awards from the city of Thebes for bringing it through a most perilous period. The inscription in his honor states that he "brought aid and comfort to the city when it was on the verge of collapse in a variety of adverse circumstances" ([hypo chalepōn] kai poikilōn peristaseōn kat-ephtharmenēn tēn polin ethalpe, OGI 194. 5).

Menas, son of Menes, a citizen of Sestos (second century), was similarly helpful in times of hostilities that threatened his city (en te tais polemikais peristase[sin anēr agathos ōn diateteleken peri ton dēmon, OGI 339. 25-26; see also line 17. As is frequently the case in laudatory documents, the term anēr agathos here functions as a synonym of euergetēs and is appropriately rendered "benefactor." The document explicitly indicates that one who rescues others from danger qualifies for recognition as a philanthropist. The next group of inscriptions deals with the dangers or hazards encountered personally by benefactors.

DANGER INCURRED BY BENEFACTORS

In praise of Demetrios the Great, 336-283, who bore the surname Poliorketes, the Athenians declared that he "endured danger and hardship" (kindynon kai pon[on hypomeinas], Kyparissis-Peek, Ath. Mitt. 66, 1941, 226, line 7) in his efforts to secure freedom for Greece.

Antiochos I of Kommagene moved thousands of tons of rock in the first century to ensure that the world would never forget how his piety and holiness had helped him "to survive in marvelous ways the great dangers (kindynous) that befell" him "and to achieve remarkable mastery in matters of State that appeared to be hopeless" (OGI 383. 20-21). Since temples were in constant need of repair, donors who contributed generously to their maintenance and helped to defray the expenses of the rites connected with them were given special recognition as benefactors. Antiochos does not wait for the recognition of others. He provides for a mausoleum-shrine dedicated primarily to himself, but judiciously in association with other deities. His benefactions included distributions of land, with resultant produce for "luxurious offerings," and provision for "unfailing service" at the sacrifices. He boasts: "I arranged for the festive order and all the liturgy in manner befitting my fortune and the dignity of the Divinities; and I made appropriate provision for the everlasting sacral duties so that everyone in my kingdom might, in reverence for the Gods and in our honor, celebrate with the sacrifices that have been ordained by ancient and common customs" (lines 70-83).

In his letter of acceptance to the Ionians, who voted him a gold crown of valor and a statue (167-166), Eumenes II repeats their references to the "many great struggles" (pollous men kai megalous agōnas) that he had undertaken in their behalf against non-Greeks, struggles that were in keeping with his policy of indifference "against approaching danger"

([pros]t[on] ep[akolouth]ounta kindynon), OGI 763. 8-14.

About the year 48, the people of Dionsysopolis, a city near the Black Sea, praise a philanthropist named Akornion, who "risked life and limb in any crisis that developed" (*katholou de kata pāsan peristasin k[ai]r[on] psychēi kai s[ō]mati paraballomenos*, SIG 762. 38-39).

Of Menas, who was mentioned above, it is said that he "spares no expense in rendering public service nor gives thought to any hazard (*kindynon*) that imperils his own interests when he leaves on embassies in behalf of the city" (OGI 339. 4-6). The inscription goes on to state that he "bore (*hypomeinas*) his public service out of love for the good (*philagathōs*)," lines 27-28.

At Olbia a distinguished citizen named Kallisthenes receives the gratitude of his city for "braving danger in behalf of his home city" (*pro-kindyneuōn aei tēs patridos*, IPE I. 43. 13).

According to a decree passed (about 158-150) by an auxiliary force allied with Ptolemy VI, a man from Kos named Aglaos, son of Theokles, distinguished himself "in the most critical times" (*en tois anagkaiotatois kairois*, Durrbach Choix d' inscrr. de Delos 92. 6-7) and avoided "neither danger nor personal distress (*oute kindynon oute kakopathian oudemian*), lines 11-12).

In related vein a naval commander named Seleukos, of Rhosos, Syria, receives commendation from Octavian for "the many and great hardships he endured in the face of danger, and for his perseverance in adversity." (*polla kai megala peri hemōn ekakopa [thesen ekin] dyneusen te oudenos pheisamenos tōn pros hypomonēn deinōn*, P. Roussel, *Syria* 15 1934, p. 34, lines 13-14).

Instead of an individual, a group of people, such as a political entity, may qualify as endangered benefactors. Of special interest is the series of resolutions of loyalty adopted during the reign of Seleukos II Kallinikos (247-226) by the people of Smyrna (OGI 229). In the preamble of the first resolution the people of Smyrna explain the difficult circumstances under which they have maintained their loyalty to Seleukos (lines 1-5). This is no small benefit that they have conferred on Seleukos. Then they go on to say that Seleukos is a benefactor who knows how to requite those who are his "benefactors" (lines 5-7).

The preamble to the third part of the document again rehearses the many hazards undertaken by the people of Smyrna to maintain the stability of Seleukos' reign (lines 89-91).

ULTIMATE HAZARD - DEATH

From the inscriptions cited above it is apparent that the theme of the endangered benefactor is public property in the Hellenistic world and not the occasional expression of romanticizing poets or philosophers. It is only natural, however, that a benefactor's endurance of death as the ultimate hazard should have become the subject of poetic and oratorical exposition.

No tale in antiquity expressed the theme more poignantly than did the story of Alkestis, daughter of Pelias and Anaxibia and wife of Admetos. As reported by Hyginus (51, edited by H. Rose) Apollo had agreed that "another could volunteer to die in Admetos' place" (*et illud ab Apolline accepit, ut pro se alius voluntarie moreretur*). When neither his father nor mother was willing to die for him, Alkestis offered herself. Herakles then came and brought her back from the nether regions.

Euripides gave the myth classic treatment in his *Alkestis*, in which Admetos upbraids his aged father Pheres for lacking the will and the courage to die in his behalf (ouk êthelêsas oud' etolmêsas thanein|tou sou pro paidos, 644-645).

Also popular was the recital about the fidelity of Phintias, a Pythagorean philosopher, to his friend Damon. According to Iamblichos, one of the kings of Syracuse named Dionysios related the story. In a manner reminiscent of the testing of Job's integrity by the Satan, the probity and loyalty of the Pythagoreans was to be put to the test. Phintias was accused of plotting the death of Dionysios. When Dionysios confronted him and pronounced a sentence of death, Phintias asked that he be given the remainder of the day to settle his affairs and offered to supply a hostage. Dionysios asked in astonishment whether such a person existed, one who would risk his life in pledge for another (ei estin ho anthropos hostis hypomenêi thanatou genesthai eggýtês). Phintias assured him that there was such a person and had Damon summoned. The latter agreed to the arrangement, and Dionysios, in his own words, was astounded. The detractors of the Pythagoreans scoffed and said that Damon would be left holding the bag. But just as the sun was about to sink Phintias made his appearance, prepared to accept his execution. The opposition were discomfited and Dionysios embraced both of the young men, asking to be admitted into their friendship pact. Despite his entreaties, they refused. (Iamblichos *Pythagoras* 33. 234-236.)

Polyainos, a Macedonian rhetorician (second century C.E.) relates a variation of the story of Phintias and Damon. A Pythagorean named Euphenos declared to his comrades that a tyrant could not be trusted. Condemned to death, he asked for a stay of execution on the grounds that he had a sister in Parium who had not yet been given in marriage. After taking care of her future he would return for his execution. Everyone laughed, and Dionysios asked who would serve as hostage for him. Euphenos summoned one named Eukritos, who readily agreed to offer himself as hostage on penalty of death if Euphenos did not return within six months (ho de mala asmenôs epepneuse tou thanatou tèn eggýên syntaxas ton men exienai hôs en mēsin hex epanēxonta). At the appointed time Euphenos appeared in Syracuse and Dionysios was overwhelmed at their arete nobility (*aretê*) and asked to become a third party in their relationship. They refused, but requested of Dionysios, were he to grant them the right to live, the right to continue their association with the young men in their fellowship. Dionysios agreed and won the confidence of many people in Italy (Polyainos 5.2.22)

In his essay on friendship, entitled *Toxaris*, the satirist Lucian (second century C.E.) alludes to the story of Damon and Phintias when he has Toxaris addressed in these words: "What firmer display of goodwill (*eunoia*) could one make to a friend who has fallen overboard into a raging sea at night than to share his death? Let your eyes take in for a moment the awful cresting of the waves, the crashing roar of waters, the roiling boiling spume, the darkness, the despair. Then behold the one man, his lungs filling with water, scarcely holding up his head, hands reaching out for his friend; now see the other frantically plunging toward him and swimming with him, fearful lest this Damon should perish first," (*Toxaris* 20.)

Orators echo the judgment of the poets. In a fragment attributed without justification to the brilliant orator Demades, who was active from about 350-319, the pseudonymous author incorporates the topic of the ultimate hazard and uses diction appropriate to description of a benefactor's performance: "If by my death I am in a position to contribute something to the common welfare (pros tèn koinên sotērian), I am prepared to die. For the winning of public goodwill through one's own

death is a noble enterprise, if the sacrifice of life redounds to the interests of the city and not to the rhetorical prestige of my opponents." (Demades 4[179])

Demosthenes, in his *Oration on the Crown*, gives full-throated utterance to the theme of endured danger when he praises Athens for the "naval battles, infantry involvement, campaigns undertaken in days that are past as well as in our own time - all of which our city undertook in behalf of the liberty and security of the rest of the Greeks." (*On the Crown* 100.)

Woe to the one who is unwilling to run the risk. With withering scorn Lysias asks his audience why Andokides should receive any consideration: "For the conferment of what benefit (*euergesia*)? Because he incurred danger (*ekindyneusen*) on account of you many times in behalf of (*hyper*) the city?" (Lysias 6. 40.)

Willingness to accept exposure to danger in the course of conferring benefits is beyond question an indication of extraordinary nobility, but the willingness to pay the ultimate price in such enterprise is the supreme mark of *aretē*, the term with which Greeks of every age endeavored to express nobility and excellence of the highest order. The fact that poets and orators rang changes on the theme again indicates how deeply entrenched it was in the Graeco-Roman mind.

BENEFACTORS BENEFITED

Benefactors may themselves be the recipients of bounties, especially from deities.

In a letter to Pergamon (5 October 135), Attalos III lauds Zeus Sabazios, "our companion and helper in many dangers, whom we decided to enshrine in the temple of Athene Nikephoros because of his manifestations of power" (*em pollois kindynois parastateg kai boethon hemig genomenon ekrinamen dia tas ex autou genomenas epiphaneias sugkathierōsai tēi Nikephorōi Athēnai*, OGI 331. 50-52).

In his *Res Gestae*, Caesar Augustus points out that the Senate ordered the immortal gods to be thanked for his successful campaigns on land and on sea (1. 4. 24-26).

Along the same lines Nero expressed his gratitude to the deities of Greece for granting him safe passage on land and sea (*hōn kai dialgēs kai dia thalattēs aiēi mou pronomēnōn pelpeiramai*, SIG 814. 22-24).

II. LUKE - ACTS

Even a cursory perusal of the documents cited above, not to mention thousands of others that incorporate philanthropic themes, will reveal that the Graeco-Roman world had no technical generic expression for the civic-minded benefactor. Instead, literary writers and formulators of official documents drew on a vast stock of terms and phrases that functioned within a semantic field to denote and connote a person or group deserving of recognition. Thus, out of many that might be mentioned, the phrase *Deinos legei kai prassei ta panta sympheronta tōi dēmōi* (N. says and does whatever is helpful to the people) may, depending on the context, be translated by one or more nominal statements: "N. is a benefactor, patron, backer, philanthropist, champion, humanitarian, ... of, to, or for the people."

Once it is understood that concept and term are not co-extensive one

need not fall into the trap of assuming that Jesus discourages either for himself or for others the role of benefactor when he warns his disciples about "rulers who like to have themselves called humanitarians" (*hoi exousiazontes auton euergetai kalountai*, Luke 22:25). As in the case of the warning in Matthew 23:9 about calling anyone "father," the point of the passage relates not to the use of a term but to the attitude that underlies its use. Jokes were in fact made in antiquity about tyrants who masqueraded as *euergetai*: Ptolemy VIII (about 182-116) was nicknamed *Kakergetes* (*Athenaios* 4. 184c). Luke says in effect that Rome's client kings may be inclined to lay fraudulent claim to the term *euergetes*. The disciples, on the other hand, are to keep in mind the value of service that qualifies for non-inflated adulation as a true benefactor.

That this is Luke's perspective is apparent from the fact that out of four uses in the New Testament of terms from the *euerge-* family, Luke has three (Luke 22:25; Acts 4:9; 10:38; the fourth occurrence is in 1 Timothy 6:2), and two of these three instances are expressed affirmatively: In Acts 4:9 the noun *euergesia* is used to qualify an act of healing performed by John and Peter, and in Acts 10:38 the healing activity of Jesus is qualified with the verb *euergeteo*.

In view of the ample resources available to Graeco-Roman writers for expression of ideas relating to benefactions it is not surprising that the *euerge-* family is not represented more often in Luke's documents, which are among the more Graeco-Roman oriented in the New Testament. Even in a specialized corpus of inscriptions like that of C. Bradford Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period: A Study in Greek Epigraphy* (London, 1934), which includes seventy-five documents, the term *euergetes* is cited in the Index only 4 times; the cognate verb 3 times; and the noun *euergesia* 4 times. And this statistical observation receives endorsement from numerous other corpora. In any event, apart from the numerous other ways in which Luke alerts his public to the role of Jesus as benefactor (see *Benefactor*, passim), the usage of the verb *euergeteo* in Acts 10:38 - which is located within a passage (vss. 34-43) that summarizes Luke's Christology and soteriology through rhetoric assigned to Peter - is Luke's way of impressing on his Graeco-Roman auditors that his hero fits into the framework of their cultural conceptions even while transcending them. At the same time the role of Jesus as benefactor is specifically qualified by the ultimate hazard that befalls him: "whom they finally killed and hung up on the cross" (vs. 39). Jesus Christ is from Luke's perspective the supreme example of the endangered benefactor who gives himself entirely in behalf of the endangered.

ENDANGERED BENEFICIARIES

Much of Luke-Acts consists of stories relating to perils in which the beneficiaries of Jesus find themselves. The long list of healings and rescue from various types of confinement is too well known to be rehearsed. Of special interest, however, is the programmatic note sounded in 4:18-19: Jesus appears as the benefactor of those who are in dire straits. This passage in turn is echoed at 7:22, which rehearses the type of restorative activity in which Jesus engages. In both these passages one of the characteristic marks of a Graeco-Roman benefactor is stressed by Luke: words matched by deeds. Kleopas and his companion repeat the thematic note when they say that Jesus of Nazareth had been "mighty in work and word" (*dynatos en ergoi kai logoi*, Luke 24:19). But one benefit, they fear, he has failed to confer: the deliverance of Israel (vs. 21). From their perspective the prospective beneficiaries remain endangered. How is their quandary to be resolved? Part of the answer is to be found in the structure of the relationship between the Father and the Son as reciprocating benefactors.

FATHER AND SON: BENEFACTORS

Viewed apart from the function of the Father in his narrative, Luke's story of Jesus' life and death would be but another variation of the Damon-Phintias legend. However, in Luke-Acts it is the Father's interpretation of the death of Jesus as an opportunity for display of unparalleled generosity that gives to the life and work of Jesus a unique position in the history of beneficence.

In the Gospel, Luke is at pains to show how the Father and the Son are associated in the restoration of humanity. His usage of *sōter* in description of God (1:47) and of Jesus (2:11) is thematically consistent. Together with the Infancy Narrative, the recital of Jesus' words and deeds provides a substantive basis for understanding that the crucifixion is the ultimate hazard that Jesus encounters as humanity's Great Benefactor, who is under assignment from the Father. But it will take Pentecost, with its affirmation of the Father as the Supreme Benefactor, to answer Kleopas' question.

Salvation (*sotēria*)-variously understood as restoration, peace, security, stability-is the most celebrated boon ascribed to benefactors in the Graeco-Roman world. Luke 1:46-56, 68-79; 2:14, 29-32 project but one message to Graeco-Roman ears: Jesus fits into the category of a Caesar Augustus, whose own role as benefactor is celebrated in the famous calendaric inscription at Priene (*Inscr. Prien.* 105=OGI 458). But immediately after the pronouncement by Simeon, Luke lets his public know that this newly born benefactor is to run extreme risks in discharging his assignment (Luke 2:34-35).

Herod Antipas is dramatically described as an anti-benefactor in 3:19. Luke states that he was rebuked "for all the wicked things that he had done." Graeco-Roman auditors would be accustomed to having monuments record the praises of officials "for all the good things that they had done" (see, e.g., *Inscr. Prien.*, Index, s.v. *poieō* and *prassō*). Coming after the solemn announcement of Jesus' arrival on the public scene as one who determines the ultimate welfare of people (3:1-17), Luke's public hears in the fate of John the Baptist a forecast of hazards to be faced by the Great Benefactor.

In the recitation of the Temptation, this perspective is sharpened through climactic placement of the suggested leap from the temple (4:9-12). The auditors know how the story ends, and they understand that Jesus is to be measured at a minimum in terms of a Eumenes II, a Demetrius, a Caesar Augustus, a Herakles - and many others whose monuments decorated the market places, the temples, and the major crossroads of the Mediterranean world. The philosophers would be heard and read by the few. The stones were chiseled for the many.

After hearing the inaugural address imbedded in the recital of Jesus' visit to Nazareth (4:18-19), Luke's auditors anticipate a denouement like that of the attempted lynching described in verse 29. Again, familiar with the main outlines of the plot, Luke's public understands that the endangered benefactor will ultimately survive the climactic hazard that awaits him in Jerusalem and will be raised from the dead by the Father. His auditors are now prepared for all that lies between the inaugural presentation and the story of the crucifixion: it will embrace the message and performance records of Jesus the Great Benefactor, with reminders here and there of the ultimate hazard.

THE VERB DEI

The most dramatic among these reminders are the passages in which Jesus is presented as one who recognizes that the ultimate hazard is experienced under divine jurisdiction. In Luke's vocabulary the term *dei* replaces *pronoia* and cognates, which appear occasionally in Graeco-Roman documents (see, e.g., the calendaric inscription cited above, OGI 458. 32). In Graeco-Roman ears the prestige of a person is enhanced when it is suggested or explicitly stated that a deity or deities have had a hand in human destiny. Alexander the Great, to cite but one example, derived much influence from the circulation of the story that he had been recognized as a son of Ammon (Zeus).

Luke's first use of the term *dei* is made at Luke 2:49 and proclaims that already at the age of twelve Jesus recognizes his relationship to his true Father and accepts the obligation that is laid on his life. The evangelist's auditors would understand that the point here is not the precociousness of Jesus. Rather, in accordance with a stock theme in Graeco-Roman inscriptions - in which the customary formulation is: *Deinos* proved himself such and such from earliest youth (*apo* or *ek tēs protēs hēlikias*; see, e.g., Inscr. Prien. 110. 11-12; SIG 717. 33) - Jesus is born and reared as a person of *arete* and destined for exceptional work. (See C. H. Talbert, in *The Divine Helmsman* [N.Y., 1980] 129-41.)

The price of such dedication comes to repeated expression in the use of the term *dei* in 9:22 (the first prediction by Jesus of the ultimate hazard that awaits him in Jerusalem); in 13:33 (in explicit response to the warning that Herod was plotting to kill him); and in 17:25 (after an apocalyptic anticipation of his ultimate glory). Other explicit anticipation of the crucifixion comes to expression in 9:43-45; 12:49-53; 18:31-34. Of these, the last passage is especially important, for it serves as a prelude to the climactic story of Jesus' reception of Zacchaeus (19: 1-10), in which salvation, the most welcome contribution that a benefactor can make, finds expression (vs. 9) in an echo of the programmatic description given in 1:69, 71, 77 (*sōteria*) and 1:47; 2:11 (*sōtēr*).

The textual problem associated with 22:19-20 need not be rehearsed here. Joachim Jeremias has done this in detail (*The Eucharistic Words of Jesus*, translated by N. Perrin from the third German ed. [Philadelphia, 1977], pp. 138-159), and I agree with his conclusion that the longer text is not the result of later interpolation. Of immediate interest is the probable impact that 22:19-20 would have made on Luke's Graeco-Roman public. They would be sensitive to the non-Hellenistic sound of the two-fold liturgical formulation, taken as a whole, but strangeness was to be expected from a cult of somewhat foreign origin, and far from disturbing them it would have evoked appreciation for the hallowed moment. At the same time they would not have felt that the semantic circuit carried an esoteric overload. The term *hyper* with the genitive, in the sense of beneficial conferment, appears time and again in official documents in association with various verbs (see, e.g., Inscr. Prien. 115. 3; 117. 62; OGI 339. 6; SIG 762. 41-42). The verb *didōmi* and its compounds are frequently linked in such documents with the reflexive *heauton* to emphasize personal commitment (see, e.g., OGI 339. 19-20; SIG 762. 15; see also Theodor Nägeli, *Der Wortschatz des Apostels Paulus* [Göttingen, 1905], p. 56, for additional references); but I have not found the formulation *didonai heauton hyper* in any Graeco-Roman inscription. The phrase to *sōma mou didomenon* would, however, readily be generated in the mind of the auditor as *emauton didōmi*, I give myself. Similarly, the parallel clause in vs. 20. The preposition *hyper* would immediately suggest a benefactor engaged in making the supreme sacrifice. Luke's blending of Hellenistic idioms is here the product of his conservative tendency to transmit dominical words with less editorial liberty than he permits himself in the case of other traditional material.

As indicated earlier, details about the manner in which the death of Jesus is a meaningful boon to the world are reserved by Luke for presentation in the Book of Acts. From what he sets forth in the Gospel, however, it is clear that Luke does not think in terms of transactional atonement, as though God's sense of justice demanded the death of Jesus as surrogate for humanity.

Just as Phintias and Damon were true to one another, so Jesus is loyal to his friends and refuses to save his own skin in the presence of intimidating authority. Unlike the offer of Damon and of Alkestis, the beneficial value of Jesus' existence is not concentrated in a dramatic moment of sacrifice on the outskirts of Jerusalem, even though that moment is the supreme hazard of his life. Rather, his entire life is the gift of a beneficent Father, and all his words and deeds are part of his own beneficent identity. What gives Jesus' death unique significance is the fact that the Father uses it as an opportunity to display his beneficence in a spectacular demonstration of clemency, such as no Caesar could ever claim. Augustus boasted that after the battle of Actium he showed clemency to all citizens who pleaded for pardon; he also stated that he preferred to save (*conservare*) the people of foreign nations whom he could pardon without risk to the State (*Res Gestae* 1:3). Through the resurrection of Jesus the Father dramatically affirms his Son as Christ and Lord (Acts 2:36), that is, as the Great Benefactor, who is qualified in the same sentence as the Endangered One ("this Jesus whom you crucified"). The central message of Pentecost is then pronounced: The Supreme Benefactor grants clemency to all humanity. Anyone who recognizes the Great Benefactor as Lord can be assured of pardon (vss. 38-39).

To highlight the exceptional character of the divine benefaction, Luke makes use of a thematic commonplace concerning a special act of beneficence that admits no hope of ever being surpassed. The people of Priene, for example, proclaimed in praise of Augustus that he "not only surpassed those who were benefactors before him, but he left no hope for those who will come hereafter that they will ever be able to surpass him" (*Inscr. Prien.* 105. 38-39). Nero accepted the challenge that history left in connection with another Roman, names Quintilius Flaminus, who in the year 196 had declared liberty for Greeks. At Corinth, on 28 November 67C.E., after winning over 1800 first prizes in the national contests of Hellas, Nero proclaimed to a national assembly of Greeks: "Others have liberated cities, but Nero an entire province" (*SIG* 814. 25-26). Luke's version of the theme of unsurpassable beneficence is the sentence in Acts 4:12: "Salvation is available through no other person." To a Graeco-Roman auditor this meant, first of all, that the acme of beneficence had now been reached.

ENDANGERED APOSTOLIC BENEFACTORS

Those who are entrusted with the proclamation of God's beneficence as manifested in the beneficent Jesus are also to be classified as benefactors, but with emphasis on divine instrumentality. Shortly after Pentecost, John and Peter, for example, run the risk of jeopardizing their relation with the religious leadership in Jerusalem when they heal the lame man and proclaim Jesus as the chief instrument of the benefaction conferred on him (4:9-10).

Most of Luke's benefactor rhetoric is conserved, however, for the climactic description of Paul as endangered benefactor. In one episode after another Paul faces hostile forces. After bringing the boon of salvation to the people of Pisidian Antioch, he and his friend Barnabas are driven out of the district (13:44-51). At Lystra they could scarcely restrain the populace from treating them as deities after they had healed

a cripple (14:8-18), but opponents from Antioch and Iconium ended their stay in that area (vss. 19-20). After exorcizing a slave girl at Philippi, Paul and Silas were arrested and imprisoned (16:16-24), but an earthquake helped stimulate their release (vss. 25-40). Conditions were not much better at Thessalonica (17:1-15) or Corinth (18:1-17). At Ephesos Paul incurred the wrath of the silversmiths (19:21-41). Finally, after being taken into custody in Jerusalem, he made his appeal to Caesar (25:11-12) and the stage is set for the dramatic account of his journey to Rome (chapters 27-28).

The chief function of the story of the shipwreck is to confirm Paul's piety - a dominant feature in Graeco-Roman depiction of benefactors - and to celebrate the divine intention in using him as the Supreme Benefactor's instrument in proclaiming the goodness of the Creator to the world. That goodness was given homiletical treatment earlier in Acts 14:15-17 and 17:22-31. Like an Antiochos of Kommagene, a Caesar Augustus, or a Nero, Paul is brought safely through great dangers in order that he might carry out his assignment, and in Rome at that! (28:30-31.)

Lesser figures appear in the story as philanthropists: a man named Julius (27:3); the centurion who rescued Paul from the hands of anxious sailors (vs. 47); people on the island of Malta, who showed Paul and his company unusual hospitality (28:1-2); and Publius, a man of some prominence, who hosted them three days (vs. 7). Through their presence in the narrative, Luke's public is permitted to conclude for themselves that what can be said of these lesser personages is far more true of Paul, and even more so of Jesus and of his Father.

In his *Symposium* (208d), Plato points to the longing for immortal glory as the underlying motive for vicarious dying. Socrates is asked: "Do you really think that Alkestis would have died on behalf of Admetos, or that Achilles would have followed Patroklos in death, or that your own Kodros would have suffered death to ensure the kingdom for his sons, had they not thought that there would be a lasting memorial to their own arete?"

Among his last words to the disciples, Jesus included a request that they celebrate his memory (*touto poieite eis tēn emēn anamnēsin* (Luke 22:19). He himself recognized the Supreme Benefactor when he gave thanks (*eucharistēsas*, vss. 17, 19). They are to recognize his function as Benefactor in their behalf. The Graeco-Roman auditor hears correctly: The reward outweighs the hazard.

CHRONOGRAPHY IN 4 EZRA AND 2 BARUCH

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"The end is nigh" is an easy prediction, but the real test of a prognosticator is whether he will set a date for the end he is prophesying. Both believers and sceptics down through history have inquired of the prophet, "So the end of the world is near, but how near? When is it coming?" And there have always been those willing to put their reputations and even their lives at stake by being specific. The nearness of the endtime is a major theme in the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, and any study of the chronography of the two books must focus on this.

In an earlier seminar paper, I examined some of the major aspects of Jewish chronography and laid the foundation for a continuing study on the subject.¹ Although calculation of the endtime is a major aspect of chronography, it is not the only one. Some of the chief functions are as follows:

¹See under "Grabbe" in the list below. Several standard works are presupposed throughout this paper and are cited by author only. I regret that I did not have access to Michael Stone's oft-cited dissertation, *Features of the Eschatology of IV Ezra* (Harvard, 1965).

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|---------|--|
| Bogaert | P. Bogaert, <i>L'Apocalypse syriaque de Baruch</i> (2 vols.; SC 144, 145; Paris: Cerf, 1969). |
| Box | G. H. Box, <i>The Ezra-Apocalypse</i> (London: Pitman, 1912). |
| Charles | R. H. Charles, <i>The Apocalypse of Baruch</i> (London: Black, 1896). |
| Grabbe | L. L. Grabbe, "Chronography in Hellenistic Jewish Historiography," <i>Society of Biblical Literature 1979 Seminar Papers</i> (SBLASP 17; Chico: Scholars, 1979) 2.43-68. |
| Violet | B. Violet, <i>Die Apokalypsen des Esra und des Baruch</i> (2 vols.; GCS 32; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1924). |

For the Latin text of 4 Ezra, I used B. Fischer (ed.), *Biblia Sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem* (Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1969) 1934-67; for the Syriac text of 4 Ezra and

1. *External apologetic.* It became necessary to counter pagan anti-Jewish attacks. This was done directly in some cases, but often a more effective method was the indirect method of pro-Jewish propaganda. One useful device was to demonstrate the antiquity and priority of the Jews in culture and civilization.

2. *Internal apologetic and instruction.* Preaching to the converted is not always redundant; it may be needed just to keep the converted in that blissful state. Reassurance of the believing community as to the validity of their faith is most important. One effective way is to demonstrate that the community--its leaders, at least--has inside knowledge of the mysterious workings of God. Another need, important for external apologetic but probably more important to the community itself, has been that of reconciling difficulties in their scripture. If a school boy counting on his fingers could not make biblical figures add up properly, something had to be done to resolve the problem.

3. *Demonstration of God's control of history.* Although a feature of apologetic to the community, this aspect of chronography deserves a separate listing. Since God is in control of the world and history, various important events must have taken place according to a specific divine timetable. One has only to search out the chronographic pattern behind the seemingly random happenings.

4. *Calculating when the end would come.* Since this is one of the more spectacular functions of chronography, it is hardly surprising that it dominates in certain apocalyptic literature.

Even though Point # 4 is not the only intent of the chronographic passages in 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch, it is clearly the overriding one. There seems no doubt that the question of the endtime is a major preoccupation of these books, even though their specific theology is still a debated subject.² Many passages detail the endtime events and even discuss specific patterns of happenings which lead step by step to the end.³ However, it is not my purpose to discuss all these but

2 Baruch, *The Old Testament in Syriac According to the Peshitta Version* (4/3; Leiden: Brill, 1973). Wherever the Syriac text is quoted, it is transcribed in the Hebrew alphabet. The recently identified Greek text of 4 Ezra 11-12 has, unfortunately, turned out to be only a 17th-century retranslation from the Latin text; see R. Rubinkiewicz, "Un fragment grec du IVE Livre d'Esdras (Chapitres XI et XII)," *Muséon* 89 (1976) 75-87.

²For a recent discussion with a review of earlier works, see A. L. Thompson, *Responsibility for Evil in the Theodicy of IV Ezra* (SBLDS 29; Chico: Scholars, 1977).

³Primarily 4 Ezra 4:33-5:13; 6:1-28; 7; 11-12; and 2 Baruch 25:1-30:5; 36-40; 48-51; 53-74.

rather to limit my exploration only to those passages which fall under the subject of chronography, specifically, 4 Ezra 10:45; 11-12 (Eagle Vision); 14:48; 2 Baruch 27-28; 53-74 (Vision of Waters).

4 Ezra 11-12 (Eagle Vision)

The Eagle Vision and its interpretation have received perhaps as much attention as any part of 4 Ezra. I have no new interpretations as such to add to the discussion but feel certain features are likely to command a consensus among scholars:

1. The date of 4 Ezra as a whole is about 100 C.E. (3:1), which is the basis for interpreting the Eagle Vision in its present context.
2. Earlier sources may have been used by the writer, with a greater or less adaptation to his own purposes. If the Eagle Vision existed in an earlier form and was taken over by the author of 4 Ezra (with some changes), this might explain some of the difficulties in interpreting certain features (e.g., the 12 wings and 8 sub-wings which are said to be kings).
3. The eagle is the Roman Empire (12:10-13).
4. The three heads are the Flavians. The middle head is Vespasian who restored stability to the government and who died a natural death.⁴ The left wing is Titus who according to rumor was brought to an early death by Domitian (the right wing).⁵
5. The two sub-wings which rule just before the destruction of the eagle are Nerva (who had a brief, weak rule) and Trajan (who had only come to Rome in 99 C.E.).⁶

4 Ezra has been heavily influenced by Daniel, specifically Dan 7 and 8 for the Eagle Vision. The first

⁴4 Ezra 12:26 also states that the middle head would die "in great pain" (*tamen cum tormentis*). Perhaps this was a Jewish rumor about the attacker of Jerusalem or simply wishful thinking. The Roman sources present Vespasian's death as a courageous one, in which he struggled out of his death bed in order to die on his feet (Suetonius, *Vesp.* 24; Dio Cassius 66.17.2-3).

⁵Dio Cassius 66.26.1-2.

⁶2 Bar 36-40 has a vision of a forest which represents the four kingdoms, including the fourth kingdom (Rome) and the final ruler (the cedar) who would be brought before the Messiah. Since there are no specific indications of chronology, it is not clear which Roman ruler the cedar represents--likely just the unspecified final ruler of Rome.

clearly datable author to identify the 4th kingdom with Rome is Josephus (*Ant.* 10.11.7 §§ 276), but 4 Ezra is about the same time as Josephus. Yet it seems likely that the 4th kingdom had been equated with Rome long before, probably in the 1st or possibly even in the 2nd century B.C.E. The Habakkuk and Nahum commentaries from Qumran seem to refer to the Romans under the figure of the "Kittim" (1QpHab 2:12; 3:19; etc.; 4QpNah 1:3) in the 1st century B.C.E. The enormity of Pompey's act in taking Jerusalem and entering the Holy of Holies was the theme of the Psalms of Solomon 2, 7, 8, and 17. Even within the native Roman tradition there was a good deal of speculation which would make Rome the 4th or 5th of the great world empires.⁷ So it would hardly be surprising if Daniel was reinterpreted to equate Rome with the 4th empire long before the time of Josephus and 4 Ezra. Yet the earlier interpretation that made the Greeks the 4th empire seems to be known to the author of 4 Ezra (cf. 12:10-12).

Just as the author of Dan 7-12 expected the end in his own time in the middle of the 2nd century B.C.E., so the writer of 4 Ezra expected God to turn his wrath on Rome in his time about 100 C.E.⁸ No exact date is given but the last emperor was already ruling and would have only a short reign. There seems little doubt that the imminent destruction of the Roman Empire and restoration of Israel were expected.

4 Ezra 14:48⁹

One of the problematic passages of 4 Ezra is 14:48. The Syriac text reads, "And this I did in the 7th year of the 6th week after 5000 years of creation . . ."¹⁰ The question is whether the figure is a part of the original or is only a

⁷See especially C. Trieber, "Die Idee der vier Weltreiche," *Hermes* 27 (1892) 321-44; D. Flusser, "The Four Empires in the Fourth Sibyl and in the Book of Daniel," *IOS* 2 (1972) 148-75.

⁸On the function of historical reviews to show the reader that he lived on the edge of the endtime, see the recent discussion in J. J. Collins, "Pseudonymity, Historical Reviews and the Genre of the Revelation of John," *CBQ* 39 (1977) 329-43, esp. 333-40.

⁹For a detailed discussion and references for many of the data in this section, see Grabbe 51-55.

¹⁰The Syriac probably means a total of 5042 years, but it may only total 5000 years with the "7th year of the 6th week" a separate reference. The other Oriental versions are not the same as the Syriac but all give approximately 5000 years. This verse is absent in the Latin text; it is often thought that the verse was omitted from this translation when the additional chapters (15-16 = 6 Ezra) were added.

later Christian interpolation. Commentators have considered it the latter, but it seems to me there is nothing against the approximately 5000 years being Jewish in origin and a part of the original writing.

The first thing to be determined is whether the figure represents the time of Ezra in the 5th century B.C.E. or is really the author's own time about 100 C.E. In other words, does the author see his own time as about 5000 A.M.? One indication is 10:45 which states the temple of Solomon was built about 3000 A.M. It might seem an easy matter to calculate from the known fact that Solomon's temple was built about 1000 B.C.E. The problem is that this date was by no means the consensus of ancient interpreters. The time of the post-Exilic period was given widely varying values among different writers.¹¹ Before considering the subject further, another passage needs to be taken into account.

4 Ezra 14:11-12 states that the world was growing old, with $9\frac{1}{2}$ of its 12 parts already gone by. In this instance only the time of the original Ezra can be in mind, an obvious deduction from the fact that the author of 4 Ezra sees himself at the end of the 12 parts of history. Exactly when Ezra was dated by the author of 4 Ezra is uncertain, but a rough estimate of 500 years before his own time is a workable figure. This makes a "part" (Latin *pars*) equal about 200 years, which would put the age of the world in the time of 4 Ezra (= time of the end) about 2400 A.M.

This figure for the age of the world is extremely low and does not correspond with anything elsewhere in Jewish chronography. So it seems likely the figure--unless only a symbolic one meant to be taken in a non-literal fashion--was not calculated from creation but from some other period.¹² Possibilities (with the resultant age of the world in 100 C.E.) are as follows:

Flood (4000-4500 A.M.).

Exodus (5000 A.M.).

Solomon's Temple (5500 A.M.).

These numbers all correspond to known figures for the age of the world in other writers. The preferred text of Pseudo-Philo 28:8 states the world would last 4000 years. The Testament of Moses 10:12 says the end would come 250 "times" (Latin *tempora*) after the death of Moses (= 2500 A.M.; see 1:2). If "times" means weeks of years here, the end was expected about 4250 A.M. Yet "250 times" may mean 2500 years, to yield 5000 A.M. Josephus also put the age of the world at 5000 years for his own time (*Ant. Proem. 3 § 13; Ag. Apion 1.1*

¹¹See Grabbe 55-58 for further information.

¹²Cf. the ten-generation scheme of the 4 Sibylline Oracle which begins with the Noachian deluge (vv 49-53).

§ 1). Many Christian writers, and probably some Jewish, put the birth of Jesus about 5500 A.M. According to Eupolemus' system, Jesus would have been born about 5300 A.M.

One might consider one other intriguing possibility. Although the year 5500 A.M. for the birth of Jesus is definitely a Christian item, certain Jewish systems of chronography may have put the year 5500 A.M. about the same time (e.g., Justus of Tiberias). This would make the time of composition of 4 Ezra about 5600 A.M. The figure of 400 years for the length of the Messianic age (4 Ezra 7:28) can be explained as an adaptation from Gen 15:13; nevertheless, this period of time is unusual in Messianic speculation.¹³ On the other hand, if this figure is added to 5600 A.M., one obtains the date 6000 A.M. for the time of divine judgment, a rather striking schema. This is only speculation and may be pure coincidence. But it is another possibility which needs further exploration in the light of chronographic schemes in other Jewish writers.

Therefore, the figure of about 5000 could be either a date which the author of 4 Ezra considered for his own time or one meant to refer to the historical Ezra. If the original Ezra is in the mind of the writer, he could have calculated about 5500 A.M. for his own time, depending on how much time he gave to the post-Exilic period. One cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that this number is a Christian interpolation. Yet the number is quite compatible with other known Jewish calculations and likely to be an original part of the text.

2 Baruch 53-74 (Vision of Waters)

Periodization is one aspect of chronography and several examples are found in 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch. Most periodization schemes--especially those which review history--have at least two functions in Jewish writings: one is to emphasize God's control of history; the other is to make clear that the reader's own time is the endtime.¹⁴ The vision of bright and dark waters is the only complete review of history in the two apocalypses in question, but on the surface it seems to have both the purposes just mentioned.

History is stated to be divided into 12 alternating periods of good and evil. One thing to note is that the figure 12 in the text (53:6; 68:1; 69:1) is not the actual total of the waters. The 12 periods only lead up to the endtime, but the endtime itself consists of another period of dark waters

¹³According to *b. Sanh.* 99a, R. Dosa appealed to Gen 15:13 as evidence that the Messianic age would last 400 years. A variety of lengths for the Messianic age are given in this passage, but further analysis is needed to demonstrate validity of the attributions to 2nd century rabbis.

¹⁴See Collins, "Pseudonymity" (note 8 above) 333-40.

and then one of lightning, making 14 in all.¹⁵ This can be compared with the Apocalypse of Weeks (1 *Enoch* 93; 91:11-17) which divides history into seven weeks but gives three more weeks to the endtime. The Aramaic fragments have supported the common scholarly reconstruction of the text.¹⁶ Yet the separation of the final three weeks from the initial seven in the Ethiopic text is not without logic¹⁷ and draws attention to the two significant numbers of seven and ten as the basis of the scheme. In the same way the Vision of Waters is constructed on the highly symbolic numbers of 12 and 14.

It is not beyond possibility that the final pair of waters/lightning was added by the author of 2 Baruch to re-interpret and update a pre-existent scheme taken over by him, but this assumption is not necessary. The author of the vision could have originally composed it with the full seven pairs, six pairs of which form history to the actual time of 2 Baruch and the final pair of which was about to take place or was already in progress.

One remarkable feature of this historical review is that there are no allusions to specific events after the rebuilding of the temple in the late 6th century B.C.E. (the 12th bright waters). The Maccabean wars, the fall of the temple in 70, and other important events between 500 B.C.E. and 100 C.E. are apparently ignored. The only part of the vision actually subsequent to the historical Baruch is the 12th bright water and the final pair of black water and lightning. This is strange since most *ex eventu* prophecies usually give some clearer indication of events about the time of the actual author and certainly after the time of the alleged author. One could argue that the author was maintaining the fiction of authorship by the historical Baruch to a remarkable degree, but that seems doubtful. In any event, from internal considerations alone, the vision could have been written anytime after 500 B.C.E. While I am not suggesting that the vision may turn up in a MS find from that period, it appears that the vision could be much older than the final form of 2 Baruch. We also have an exception to the general rule that historical reviews were meant to show the reader that he was living in the endtime. This may have been its purpose, but this is not immediately clear from the vision alone.

¹⁵2 Baruch 72:1 and 74:4 in the Syriac text speak of this final period as one of "bright waters" (כִּיָּא נְטִיָּא) rather than of lightning. While this could be only a copyist error, it may be a conscious or unconscious attempt by the author to indicate a connection between the final pair and the foregoing ones. That is, he may be showing that the final pair may either be counted separately or be totaled with the others (assuming the reading is original).

¹⁶J. T. Milik, *The Books of Enoch* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) 256-69.

¹⁷Cf. M. E. Stone, "Lists of Revealed Things in the Apocalyptic Literature," *Magnalia Dei* (ed. F. M. Cross, et al.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1976) 414-52, esp. 424-25.

2 Baruch 27:1-28:2

Perhaps one of the most puzzling chronographic passages is 2 Baruch 28:2: "But the measure and computation of this time are two parts weeks of seven weeks." The reference is to the period of endtime events which 2 Baruch 27 has divided into 12 parts. The stylized division into the symbolic number of 12 is quite usual. The list of events is also nothing particularly out of the ordinary (sword, famine, earthquakes, etc.). Until one comes to the end of the passage it looks like a more or less stylized listing of events leading up to the consummation of tribulation. But then 28:1 makes the point that the "one who understands will be wise," followed by 28:2 which gives the enigmatic number. The writer seems to be making a point of his computation.

The question is how to interpret 28:2. Box confessed his inability to make sense of it. Violet took it to mean $2 \times 7 \times 7$ years, i.e., 2 jubilee periods or 98 years in all, which basically covered the period of the Caesars and ended sometime in the late 1st century. More recently Bogaert (1.291-93) has outlined an ingenious theory (partly based on that of L. Gry). He accepts 28:2 as a reference to 14 seven-year periods but goes on to equate them with the 12 periods of chapter 27. He begins with the year 26-27 C.E. which was a sabbatical year.¹⁸ Each of the 12 periods corresponds to a sabbatical cycle. The seventh period is missing because it encompasses the events surrounding the fall of Jerusalem; it also ends the first "week of years." The writer's own time (95 C.E.) falls in the eleventh period, or the fourth "day" of the second "week of years." Bogaert's theory is clever and several things might be said in its favor. The explanation of the "two parts weeks of seven weeks" as 98 years is reasonable; the use of 49-year jubilees to structure history is common among certain groups at this time.¹⁹ One might even see the word "parts" (מִנִּי) as ultimately a mistranslation of an

¹⁸Bogaert gives an alternative scheme beginning with 22 C.E. which he actually favors, but it is not clear how he chooses that date. The sabbatical-year cycle is now firmly established with the finding of Mur 18. See *Les grottes de Murabba'at* (DJD 2; Oxford: Clarendon, 1961) 100-4; one should note that Milik's dating at this point is incorrect, as pointed out by M. R. Lehmann, "Studies in the Murabba'at and Nahal Hever Documents," *RQum* 4 (1963) 56-57.

¹⁹See most recently the extended discussion of R. T. Beckwith, "The Significance of the Calendar for Interpreting Essene Chronology and Eschatology," *RQum* 10 (1980) 167-202.

original Hebrew פְּעָמִים which can also mean "times" (in the multiplication sense, as French *fois* and German *Mal*), making the two-jubilee explanation even more likely.

More difficult is the problem of when the 98-year period began. If we date 2 Baruch about 100 C.E. as is not uncommon, certain suggested dates are excluded. 31 B.C.E. is much too early (though this seems to have been Violet's beginning date). The year 26-27 C.E. as suggested by Bogaert, however, seems to me unlikely. The fact that it is a sabbatical year has some merit, but would the beginning of Herod's procuratorship be considered that significant by a Jew writing in the 90's C.E.? Possibly, but one would like to see other uses made of the same date. 70 C.E. would be an obvious date, but it would put the culmination far in the future; the writer of 2 Baruch likely saw the end much closer to his own time. If we use the death of Herod in 4 B.C.E., however, we come out with the year 95 C.E. Since some recent scholars have put 2 Baruch in the 90's--and Bogaert himself uses 95--this date becomes rather significant. Bogaert also suggested that each of the 12 parts of the endtime equaled a specific number of years (7, to be precise). The difficulty with this is that 98 is not easily divisible by 12. Bogaert himself recognizes this when he makes the 12 parts equal only the first 12 of the 14 weeks of years. Elsewhere such lists of endtime evils do not presuppose a specific chronographic frame (e.g., Rev 6, 8, 9, 11, 16; Mark 13 and parallels; 3 *Sib. Or.* 796-809; 4 Ezra 5:1-12). Thus despite its ingenuity, I find this aspect of Bogaert's explanation unconvincing.

As already noted, I see several arguments in favor of taking 28:2 as a reference to 98 years, especially if one assumes a mistranslation. Nevertheless, the most natural reading of 28:2 as *it stands* is two parts of a week of seven weeks, i.e., two "days" of a jubilee "week" or 14 years. Otherwise, the word "parts" does not make sense; it is a word generally used to indicate the division of a period of time, not the multiplication of it. Unfortunately, this interpretation takes away some of the chronographic significance of 28:2. A period of 98 years would seem to be a definite period calculated from some important date, but a 14-year period is too short to acquire the same significance. For example, the author might be thinking that the period was just beginning in his own time and would come to an end 14 years later. Otherwise, there are no significant events in the late 1st century which occurred 14 years before 90-110 C.E. The destruction of Jerusalem was too long before. The eruption of Vesuvius might be a possibility, except that the sequence of events does not begin with fire--fire is only the ninth part.

The 98-year interpretation is certainly the most appealing but seems to me the less likely at the present. If I am correct that 14 years is more probable but also more difficult to relate to anything historically, we come up with an interesting observation about 2 Baruch: unlike 4 Ezra there are no specific chronographic indications of the endtime (= the writer's own time). As already noted, the Vision of Waters gives no specific indications of its time of fulfillment. This

appears rather unusual in a work which saw the end as near. It may very well indicate that something obvious has been overlooked by all students of the work up to the present.

The Place of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch in Judaism

Both the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch are generally classified as "Pharisaic." This brings up the question of the place of apocalypticism in Pharisaic and developing rabbinic Judaism. There were a variety of responses to the destruction of the temple in 70.²⁰ None of the major responses originated as a direct result of the destruction of Jerusalem; rather, pre-70 movements provided a means of responding to an event of drastic proportions. Two responses to be considered here are the Pharisaic and the apocalyptic.

Jacob Neusner has thoroughly analyzed the Pharisaic, and especially the rabbinic, worldviews.²¹ As is becoming more widely known, the Pharisees were primarily a table-cult group which attempted to apply the temple laws of purity in their own individual homes and hearths. Thus, their homes were each a microcosm of the temple and their tables, of the altar. The temple was not rejected but, on the contrary, assumed. Yet the Pharisaic outlook was well suited to a situation in which the temple cultus could no longer be performed in its proper context. The Pharisaic praxis became one of the major components of rabbinic Judaism which developed between 70 and 132 (Yavnean period). The other was the scribal contribution of Torah study. The synthesis created a usable substitute for the temple cult and made possible a continuation of Judaism without Jerusalem or the temple.

Another major response was the apocalyptic: the imminent expectation of God's intervention to restore Jerusalem and the temple. This was only a continued survival of a strong pre-70 movement. In the century and more preceding 70 a pervasive wind of apocalyptic eschatology blew over Palestine. This was manifest in the variety of groups expecting the end (e.g., Qumran), pseudo-Messiah's, and calculators of the end. Not only the expectations but many of the groups themselves were cruelly dashed by the 66-70 war with Rome. Nevertheless, such expectations still survived in the 70-135 period. 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch are examples of this. Regardless of the ultimate

²⁰See J. Neusner, "Emergent Rabbinic Judaism in a Time of Crisis," *Judaism* 21 (1972) 313-27 = *Early Rabbinic Judaism* (SJLA 13; Leiden: Brill, 1975) 34-49; "Torah und Messias--Versuch einer Interpretation der Geschichte des Judentums," *Judaica* 33 (1977) 30-35, 117-26.

²¹A useful summary of Neusner's views on the development of rabbinic Judaism is his "The Formation of Rabbinic Judaism: Yavneh (Jamnia) from A.D. 70 to 100," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1979) *Principat* (II) 19.3-42.

message of these two books, a message is that the religious crisis of the destruction of Jerusalem will be resolved by God's direct intervention in the world's affairs.

It should be clear that these two responses--the rabbinic and the apocalyptic--are fundamentally opposed. The first settles down for a long period of history without a temple and even without national independence. The other simply counsels to wait patiently for God to act because the time is short. Does this mean the common assumption that 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch are Pharisaic-rabbinic is wrong? It may be, but it is not my purpose to examine the theological system of the two works and compare it with the rabbinic system. Rather, I intend to propose several possibilities and to explore the broad implications of each. The specific testing would take much more detailed study than is possible here.

1. 4 Ezra/2 Baruch are not Pharisaic-rabbinic but belong to another stream of Judaism.

As just noted, only a careful comparison of theological systems could really make headway toward an answer here. But a great deal of new light has been thrown on both Pharisaism and the development of rabbinic Judaism in recent years. Old assumptions and conclusions about Pharisaism are now often known to be invalid or at least in need of modification. I am unaware of any study of 4 Ezra/2 Baruch in the light of the recent findings of Neusner and others.

2. Eschatological expectations were an important aspect of Pharisaism before 70.

Neusner has not found this to be the case in the rabbinic traditions about the Pharisees.²² Josephus also says nothing in this area in his descriptions of the Pharisees (*War* 2.8.14 §§ 160-63; *Ant.* 18.1.3 §§ 12-15). The Gospels, however, several times presuppose Messianic expectations on the part of Pharisees. This brings up the question of what may have been excluded from the rabbinic sources, a point to be considered below.

3. Apocalyptic speculation was an important factor in rabbinic Judaism in the period 70-132.

This possibility is independent of Point # 2 above but can be combined with it. It is a common assumption that Agiva proclaimed Bar Kokhba the Messiah. This assumption has now been shown to rest on a very fragile basis.²³ Yet it seems certain that several prominent rabbinic figures were directly involved in the Bar Kokhba revolt. Even Agiva may

²²*The Rabbinic Traditions About the Pharisees Before 70* (Leiden: Brill, 1971) 3.244-48.

²³See the translated article of G. S. Aleksandrov, "The Role of 'Agiba in the Bar Kokhba Rebellion" in Neusner, *Eliezer ben Hyrcanus* (SJLA 4; Leiden: Brill, 1973) 2.422-36.

have been a "calculator of times."²⁴ It is true that statements against calculating times can be found in rabbinic literature.²⁵ Such statements are readily explainable in the aftermath of the devastating 132-35 war. Another tendency seems to have been to retroactively make important figures such as Aqiva supporters of the revolt, regardless of their actual position.²⁶ The reason was to help spread the blame for the revolt, as it were. This all suggests that certain rabbis, at least, expected some sort of intervention by God on behalf of the Jews. If so, the apocalyptic expectations of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch would not be inconsistent with the developing rabbinic Judaism of about 100 C.E. But then how does one explain the lack of reference to imminent eschatology in Tannaitic literature? If the foregoing premises are correct, the only possibility seems to be a deliberate and comprehensive deletion of such references in the tradition.

Naturally, there are difficulties with this proposition, primarily the idea that such thorough censorship was even possible.²⁷ But there are some hints of apocalyptic ideas even in rabbinic literature, so it is not necessary to assume no trace has been left.²⁸ We also see a parallel in Christian literature. Within the first century or so, there were many expecting the imminent return of Christ. With time, this ardor cooled though some circles maintained it longer than others. By the early 3rd century we find that Julius Africanus and others had turned calculations to the purpose of opposing the idea that the time was at hand. In the same way we find calculations of times in later rabbinic writings (e.g., *b. Sanh.* 97a-b), but they serve to put the end of history in the distant rather than the immediate future. Messianic expectations in later rabbinic literature are of the same character. Neither Messianism nor an end to "this age" were considered contrary to developed rabbinic Judaism; they were simply downplayed by being relegated to a distant, indefinite future.

It is no doubt clear by now that I personally lean to this possibility # 3, but I see the difficulties and the need to do much more detailed study of rabbinic literature

²⁴Ibid., 434-36.

²⁵E.g., R. Jonathan and R. Samuel ben Nahmani (3rd century Palestinian Amoraim) in *b. Sanh.* 97b.

²⁶Cf. Neusner, *Eliezer* 2.347-50.

²⁷Cf. Neusner, *Rabbinic Traditions About the Pharisees* 3.239-40: "It serves no good purpose to allege that early Yavneans suppressed what we do not now find. We simply do not know what they did not hand on, only what they did. Nonetheless, it will give an illuminating perspective on what we do have to reflect on what is missing."

²⁸See A. J. Saldarini, "Apocalyptic and Rabbinic Literature," *CBQ* 37 (1975) 348-58; "The Uses of Apocalyptic in the Mishna and Tosepta," *CBQ* 39 (1977) 396-409.

with this thesis in mind. To accept it, one has to accept certain premises, as already noted; these premises may turn out to be invalid. It may turn out with further study that the views of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch differ more from rabbinic Judaism than has been assumed. But even at this early stage, one can conclude that apocalyptic eschatology may have played a much larger role in the rabbinic Judaism of 70-132 than is immediately apparent in the tradition.

If so, this would emphasize the amount of consolidation that went on during the Yavnean period. The pluralism of the pre-70 period continued in part after 70. Many groups were wiped out or made impotent by the 66-70 war, yet some of the diversity survived. It has already been noted that two major strains of pre-70 Judaism went into the rabbinic synthesis. Undoubtedly, other elements were also absorbed, and one should not forget that there were various groups of Pharisees. Some may have been more eschatologically inclined than others. All this diversity was likely not reflected in the tradition preserved.²⁹

Another possibility is that only the legal traditions were considered of concern to Yavneh or to Usha. That is, views in other areas were important but were not taken up in the redaction process. This would not be surprising in the light of the general situation. The Pharisees as a table-cult sect would naturally have the bulk of their traditions in the area of purity/agriculture. After the fall of the temple, they suddenly found themselves in a position to impose their opinions whereas before, the priestly circle was the authority. As they began to fill the vacuum left by the cessation of the temple cult, it is natural they would have concentrated on the matters specifically of Pharisaic concern. It was important to synthesize and edit the antecedent tradition and to begin to develop it for the new circumstances.

The post-70 situation was probably also sharply divided in matters of eschatology. Some were undoubtedly disillusioned by the 66-70 war and wanted to abandon eschatological speculation altogether. Others, even as they took advantage of the new Pharisaic and scribal ascendancy, still maintained the position that the end was near. For a Yavnean figure to participate in developing the timeless view of rabbinic traditions while personally looking for the imminent end of the age is far from unthinkable. Such an apparently contradictory position can be exemplified from other eschatological groups, both in antiquity and in the present. In fact, it has

²⁹ It is interesting to note that the Hillel/Shammai opposition was preserved because these two schools exerted considerable influence at Yavneh. But other figures, who probably belonged to Shammai or to neither school, were anachronistically attached to Hillel. Examples are Simeon ben Gamliel I and Gamliel II (who may have been Shammaites) and Yohanan ben Zakkai (who was evidently not connected with either house). See Neusner, *Rabbinic Traditions* 3.272-80.

been the exception for a group to leave their homes and normal lives and flee to a mountain top to await the coming of the Lord. The more common approach was to see oneself as living in the endtime while still maintaining a routine of life with some approach to normalcy. So one cannot rule out, *ab initio*, that a Yavnean rabbi could also look for the imminent rise of the Messiah and demise of the Roman Empire.

Matters were different in the Ushan period. Whereas the Yavneans evidently expected the temple to be rebuilt in the not-too-distant future, the Bar Kokhba war and its consequences ended such assumptions. It was clear to the Ushans that the temple and its service were at an end for the foreseeable future. Jews were even excluded from the area of Jerusalem, now the pagan city of Aelia Capitolina. They were a subject people with no possibility of national independence. The post-70 situation was confirmed; the Ushans now recognized that the *de facto* situation of 70-132 was a permanent reality. As they developed, edited, and put their stamp on the antecedent tradition, they were responding to their miserable situation. It would not be surprising if any aspects of the tradition with the earmarks of apocalyptic eschatology were abandoned or downplayed.

To conclude, it was *possible* for the authors of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch to be representative of the rabbinic Judaism of the Yavnean period even when their eschatological views are taken into account. Let me emphasize that I have not demonstrated that such was the case, nor have I even tried to. Much of my discussion in this section has been only an exploration of possibilities. Nevertheless, this hypothetical superstructure has been built on the firmer foundation of a developing consensus in rabbinic and intertestamental studies.

Summary

This paper has explored several passages of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch which relate to chronography (4 Ezra 11-12; 14:48 and 10:45; 2 Baruch 53-74; 27-28). Some of the principal points arising from this study are the following:

1. The end of the Roman Empire and the restoration of Israel through God's intervention were expected in the near future.
2. 4 Ezra 14:48 is probably a part of the original Jewish writing and indicates (along with 10:45) that the author of 4 Ezra saw his own time as about 5500 or 5600 years of human history. This might explain the unusual figure of 400 years for the Messianic age (5600 A.M. + 400 = 6000 A.M. for the time of God's judgment).
3. Two chronographic passages of 2 Baruch are in the category of periodization: 53-74 and 27:1-28:2. It is possible that 28:2 refers to a period of 98 years (2 jubilee cycles). If so, it probably covered the years 4 B.C.E. (death

of Herod) to 95 C.E. If not, there are no precise calculations of the endtime in 2 Baruch--at least, as yet identified. The Vision of Waters is strangely vague and contains no identifiable historical allusions for the period 500 B.C.E. to 100 C.E.

The fact that the authors of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch expected the imminent intervention of God on behalf of Israel brought up another important consideration in the light of recent scholarship on early rabbinic literature:

4. Were 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch Pharisaic (rabbinic) as is normally assumed? No attempt was made to address the matter systematically; rather, several possibilities were explored with emphasis on the question of whether the apocalyptic expectations of 4 Ezra/2 Baruch were antithetical to post-70 rabbinic Judaism. The conclusion was that 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch *could* have been written by a rabbi of the Yavnean period. Demonstration of the matter one way or the other remains to be done.

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Implied Christological Claims in the Core Sayings of Jesus:
An Application of Wittgenstein's Phenomenology
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Since the phenomenology of Heidegger has gained such wide influence in New Testament hermeneutics, principally through the influence of the word-event school (Bultmann and his followers), there has been a noticeable loss of interest in the intention and horizon of Jesus as person. The focus of Gospel studies seems to have shifted away from the creative words and acts of Jesus (except for studies in the parables) to language which is claimed to have independent and anonymous status within the early Church. Redactional research has shifted its interest to the intention of the Gospel writers, but even they seem to be shrouded in relative ambiguity in view of their traditions, sociological settings, and audiences.

In this study we will offer a promising methodology which may help us to recover Jesus' intention to generate a new tradition. This analysis examines the ordinary discourse of spoken and acted language and describes how persons do in fact stand in back of their words and acts, and how these words and acts disclose the intention of the persons who indwell them. The implications of a phenomenology of persons to Jesus' self-concept are considerable for Gospel research, and especially for determining the extent of pre-Easter Christology.

I. The Method

This largely unexplored hermeneutical approach to Jesus as person is available to New Testament scholarship in Wittgenstein's gnomic descriptions of our use of language. For him, personal words and acts are not ostensive references to some inaccessible third-person fact or thing which lies hidden behind them, but disclosures of the person himself who is speaking and acting with the backing of his own first-person personal pronoun "I." Against a third-person paradigm which encourages the assimilation of a person to thing-language, Wittgenstein explores the persistence of the first-person personal pronoun I as an important clue to the intentionality and uniqueness of the person who indwells his linguistic "form of life." Our application of this hermeneutic to Jesus' "form of life" will focus upon his use of the first-person personal pronoun I and its verbal equivalents as a significant clue to his unique intentionality, as he gives personal backing and signature to his spoken and acted language.

Wittgenstein's primary concern in his later stage of thought in the *Philosophical Investigations* is to investigate ordinary discourse where persons as subjects preside. He wants to guard against the modern tendency to treat the knower either as a thing or as a passive recipient, or as both, which brackets out the function of the knower himself. A modern fascination with speech has mesmerized scholarship to such an extent that it tends to apotheosize language by focusing on speech apart from persons speaking. Hence the personal dimension of language disappears and things begin to be separated from their names. Wittgenstein is concerned about this reductionism and the skepticism with which the modern specialist tends to reduce everything to impersonal abstractions, forsaking the word for the sign and the person for the notation.

As my former colleague Dallas High has remarked of the later Wittgenstein, all the form-making activity of language is a

reality in which persons define and extend themselves. Language is inseparable from the person who uses it. It is not a closed system independent of selves as speakers and hearers:

When, for example, I use a form of words, I am dwelling in that form of words, and giving my personal signature to them. Insofar as you hear what I am saying and understand what I mean, you may be said to be dwelling in that form of words, too. Without personal, human indwelling, language is no longer living and concrete speech. . . . ¹

The later Wittgenstein has reminded us that language, like all form-making activity, is grounded in its civil status, in personal subscription, because it is as human beings that we participate in the activity of speaking and hearing. It is a simple and obvious truth that persons indwell their language, but the fact is often overlooked:

What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings: we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes. ²

Wittgenstein reminds us with penetrating perception that the meaning of language is closely tied together with the use a person makes of that language. Without assuming that everything is exhausted by the formula that meaning equals use, we may allow that Wittgenstein has hold of an important truth which can lend considerable help in our search to understand Jesus' intention and meaning through his use of language:

Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?--In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?--Or is the use its life? ³

How, then, does Jesus use language? This question will be uppermost as we explore Wittgenstein's descriptive phenomenology of a person speaking and acting out his language-game and form of life. First, he says, we must rid ourselves of the misleading notion that meanings are things, that words refer to objects, that language is an object in that it asserts or denies impersonal facts. This referential theory of meaning is lifeless. It is rather a person's act of intending meaning by speaking in words and gestures which lies at the center of the forms of life. A person indwells his words when he speaks and acts, and without that indwelling no meaning or understanding is possible. Wittgenstein gives a homely example:

"There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be filled by the act of understanding."

"Only in the act of understanding is it meant that we are to do THIS. The order -- why, that is nothing but sounds, inkmarks.--" ⁴

That is to say, language is not simply a matter of learning to name things, as though there were a one to one correspondence between words and things without reference to persons who give them meaning. Rather, language is learning and indicating how

I as a person disclose my form of life to other persons when I speak and act, and how another person's form of life is revealed when he speaks and acts before me. Hence,

"To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."⁵

All of this assumes the inadequacy of a referential word-object theory of language, though widely employed in current New Testament studies, for the theory pretends that proper historical research consists in lining up historical data which corresponds to certain impersonal "facts"--for example, the language of Jesus, with little concern for Jesus as author of that language. The verifiability theory of language also comes under the scrutiny of Wittgenstein's critical eye, since it makes scientific discourse normative and assumes that language functions primarily objectively and can be tested without reference to personal intentionality. In fact, Wittgenstein is saying, no single theory suffices to account for the forms of personal language in all their complexity. But what is always present is the person, thinking and speaking and acting in discourse with other persons within the richly variegated forms of life:

. . . the lesson to be borne in mind is that no one form of speech is fundamental or primary and that no one form in itself has any priority over another.⁶

This falls hard against the modern penchant for abstract analysis which prejudices us against the personal components in our language-games. Wittgenstein illustrates this by referring to a pointing arrow, observing that "The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it."⁷ Accordingly, he is saying, words have significant meaning only as they are used and appropriated by persons. This is not to identify meaning exhaustively with use, but to underscore the fact that meaning inevitably points to the bearer of meaning, to the first-person personal pronoun "I," to the one who is intending, saying, doing something. Language is personally accredited action:

One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.⁸

Yes: meaning something is like going up to someone.⁹

It is the user of language who is primary, for he indwells his words with personal intentionality and meaning.

The following excerpts from the Philosophical Investigations provide additional insight into Wittgenstein's description of the phenomenon "I" which is disclosed in personal speech and behavior. There is need, he says, for a proto-phenomenology of the language-game:

Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a "proto-phenomenon". That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.¹⁰

Personal intentionality is revealed in saying and doing:

Why do I want to tell him about an intention too, as well as telling him what I did?--Not because the intention was also something which was going on at that time. But because I want to tell him something about myself, which goes beyond what happened at that time.

I reveal to him something of myself when I tell him what I was going to do.--Not, however, on grounds of self-observation, but by way of a response (it might also be called an intuition).¹²

Revealing oneself and observing another occurs in the context of story or language-game; when entered, the story discloses the meaning of what a person is saying and doing:

If I say "I meant him" very likely a picture comes to my mind, perhaps of how I looked at him, etc.; but the picture is only like an illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture.¹³

In the telling of a story Wittgenstein distinguishes between the surface grammar of syntax and the depth grammar of meaning:

In the use of words one might distinguish "surface grammar" from "depth grammar". What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use--one might say--that can be taken in by the ear.--And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about.¹⁴

If too much of our scholarly activity seems to take place on the level of surface grammar, the role of teaching by example of master with disciple becomes the key to the meaning of depth grammar:

Is it correct for someone to say: "When I gave you this rule, I meant you to. . . . in this case"? Even if he did not think of this case at all as he gave the rule? Of course it is correct. For "to mean it" did not mean: to think of it. But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?--The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion.¹⁵

This leads Wittgenstein to comment that what is presupposed in tacit commitment, namely personal intention, is what makes sense of our language-game.

"But then they make a tacit presupposition." Then what we do in our language-game always rests on a tacit presupposition.¹⁶

Moreover, for the language-game to work and personal discourse to be possible, it is important that persons speak and act consistently "in character." This is a very important point to remember when we seek to establish the underlying characteristics of Jesus' form of life and compare the continuity of his tacit and explicit christological utterances:

Closely associated things, things which we have associated, seem to fit one another. But what is this seeming to fit? How is their seeming to fit manifested? Perhaps like this: We cannot imagine the man who had this name, this face, this handwriting, not to have produced these works, but perhaps quite different ones instead (those of another great man).

We cannot imagine it? Do we try?--

Here is a possibility: I hear that someone is painting a picture "Beethoven writing the ninth symphony". I could easily imagine the kind of thing such a picture would shew us. But suppose someone wanted to represent what Goethe would have looked like writing the ninth symphony? Here I could imagine nothing,¹⁷ that would not be embarrassing and ridiculous.

Accordingly, if we can establish a characteristic self-understanding of Jesus through his form of life or language-game, as disclosed in undisputed sayings and acts, we should be able to test disputed material against the undisputed. This is what we will attempt to do presently.

Wittgenstein also parallels Polanyi's phenomenology of persons in yet another sense: To say "I. . ." is to say "I believe, I am committed to this. . .," thus revealing my own intentionality, myself:

One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own belief.

If there were a verb meaning "to believe falsely", it would not have any significant first person present indicative.

The language of reporting can be given such a turn that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter but about the person making the report.¹⁸

"I believe. . . ." throws light on my state. Conclusions about my conduct can be drawn from this expression. So there is a similarity here to expressions of emotion, of mood, etc.¹⁹

To say "I believe" is to say "I intend this statement to be true":

If, however, "I believe it is so" throws light on my state, then so does the assertion "It is so". For the sign "I believe" can't do it, can at the most hint at it.²⁰

I don't say of myself "I seem to believe"; I use the word "seem" only of someone else. I do not infer my own conviction; I feel conviction within myself:

This is how I think of it: Believing is a state of mind. . . . So it is a kind of disposition of the believing person.²¹

To say "I believe falsely" would be as nonsensical as to say "It may be raining, but it isn't." Thus Wittgenstein and Polanyi agree that the intentional, personal subject is at heart fiduciary and stands in a situation of tacit commitment when he or she uses the personal pronoun "I" in speech and behavior.

When Wittgenstein next asks how language conveys our inner intentionality and becomes an actual likeness of our meaning, he answers, "By the way we choose and value words. . . .; it is the field of force of a word that is decisive."²² It is we as persons who invest our public speech and acts with intention, so that to look and see what we are saying and doing is to look and see what we are intending:

The close relationship between "saying to oneself" and "saying" is manifested in the possibility of telling out loud what one said to oneself, and of an outward action's accompanying inward speech.

Let the use of words teach you their meaning.²³

The observation that one's inner intention indwells his behavior and is discerned in that behavior is succinctly expressed in the following statement:

Ask not: "What goes on in us, when we are certain that. . . .?" -- but: How is "the certainty that this is the case" manifested in human action?²⁴

To sum up. Wittgenstein asks us to look and see if we want to know who a person is, because our language-games or forms of life are revelatory of personal intention: "What has to be accepted, the given, is--so one could say--forms of life."²⁵ This very ordinary description of how we commonly convey personal intention to others through the forms of words and acts is especially helpful in establishing Jesus' claims about himself.

II. The Application

We will now attempt to apply Wittgenstein's phenomenology of persons to Jesus' "form of life," particularly his use of the personal pronoun "I" and its verbal equivalents, and try to discern what he is intending through what he is saying and doing. It is widely agreed, even among more extreme critics such as

Norman Perrin, that Jesus made claims about himself and his mission which appeared outlandish in the eyes of formal contemporary Judaism. We will examine several of these authentic sayings which are backed up by Jesus' implicit claims to radical, even divine authority. Perrin's remarks on the sayings are often very informative and will indirectly serve to make my point that Jesus' intention to make christological claims is expressed in his use of language. A characteristic pattern of authority emerges when we apply Wittgenstein's analysis of the forms of life, language-games, and fields of force.

1. Lk. 11:20 // Matt. 12:28

"But if it is by the finger of God [Matt.: Spirit of God] that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you."

Of this pivotal text Perrin remarks that (1) it is unparalleled in Judaism to find the presence of the kingdom related to the experience of one individual human being; (2) there is a consensus of critical opinion that Jesus was an exorcist; (3) Qumran studies lead us to assume a background of holy war theology with its eschatological conflict between good and evil. In sum, the emphasis of the pericope on the restoration of a single disordered individual rather than the whole land of Israel is a striking feature of Jesus' claim that he is authoritatively invading the demonic realm.²⁶

If Wittgenstein's analysis is applied to this widely accepted authentic saying of Jesus, it becomes clear that to "look and see" what Jesus is doing and saying is to intuit his intention to proclaim with astounding authority the presence of the kingdom of God in his own personal speech and behavior. We can only conclude that his form of life discloses his intention to proclaim the presence of the kingdom in terms of his personal pronoun "I". His "field of force" is a claim of correlative with God's reign and Spirit.

2. Mark 2:20

"Can the wedding guests fast while the bridegroom is with them?"

Jesus' personal claim is implied in this and other eschatological similes, since it is in the nature of simile, metaphor, analogy and parable to imply "I say to you. . . ." Perrin observes that the eschatological pronouncements in Mark 2:18-22 "proclaim the presence of God manifesting himself as king in aspects of the ministry of Jesus. Jesus understood the kingdom of God as being manifest in his ministry; all else in his teaching takes its point of departure from this central, awe-inspiring--or ridicule-inspiring, according to one's perspective--conviction."²⁷

Perrin's summary catches the sense of the saying well. Jesus' announcement that the bridegroom is present and that the promised eschatological wedding is underway could invite awe or ridicule, and did. He was ridiculed as blasphemous by some, by others considered mad, by the receptive welcomed with awe and gratitude. It is important to note that in every case the intentional claim of Jesus was clearly understood. He announced himself as the eschatological bridegroom with more

than messianic--with divine--pretensions. Perrin remarks: "It is here that the clear vision of one mind, the depth comprehension of one individual's vision and understanding is most apparent."²⁸

Yet having acknowledged what amounts to Jesus' messianic self-consciousness, Perrin takes a strange turn away from the evidence and refuses to ascribe a definite christological intentionality to Jesus:

Nowhere else is the change from Jesus to the early Church more apparent. Having the tradition of similes and analogies of Jesus, but lacking the vision to maintain or understand them, she transformed them into allegories expressive of a post-Easter faith and reflecting a post-Easter reflection.²⁹

This uncertainty as to what to do with Jesus' radical claims is enlightened by Wittgenstein's common-sensical analysis of language use. If Jesus evinces an understanding and conviction that is intrinsically messianic, if he speaks in an awe-inspiring and authoritative manner about the arrival of the redeeming reign of God in terms of his own person, and himself as the bridegroom, is it then so easy to say that "the pedestrian nature of the allegorizing, and the clear reflections of the post-Easter faith or situation, are easy to recognize and to remove"?³⁰ That is, that it is easy to remove explicit christological claims from implicit claims and ascribe the former to the Church?

Surely the author's confidence is greater than mine at this point. Far better to allow that Jesus generates a tradition, as Ben Meyer cogently argues in his recent study of Jesus' intentionality.³¹ For once we allow, in accord with Wittgenstein's analysis of words, acts, and intention, that Jesus' intention resides in his speech and behavior, and that his language is implicitly christological, we are hard pressed to make many facile distinctions between Jesus' christology and what is assumed to be the christology of the early Church. Surely the latter is not "easy to remove" from the tradition, not when it has already been tacitly admitted that Jesus' images of the finger of God and bridegroom are radical and messianic in character. Once we establish this genre as characteristic of Jesus' tacit language-game, it is altogether coherent to accord him the creativity to play an explicit language-game. Generally speaking, both reflect an identical christological intentionality.

Similarly, the new/old wine, patch/cloth similes may be described as "something quite startling about Jesus' understanding of his ministry: they tell us that Jesus regarded his ministry as marking a new point of departure quite incompatible with the existing categories of Judaism. . . : something new and different in the ministry of Jesus marks that ministry as bursting the bounds of late Judaism. . . : the Kingdom of God is here!"³² Jesus dramatically declares the inauguration of the eschatological age in terms of himself, and in so doing makes extraordinary claims which suggest a tacit christological self-understanding.

3. Lk. 15:11-32. The Parable of the Prodigal Son

The intention of Jesus is strongly in evidence in this parable. It is as though he were saying with authority, "I say to you. . . ." As Perrin attests:

The parable clearly reflects the situation of the ministry of Jesus and is equally clearly designed to open men's eyes to the reality of that situation, as Jesus himself saw it. It expresses Jesus' understanding and reflects his vision.³³

This parable, with others, captures the most dramatic of all the words and acts of Jesus, namely, his radical invitation to outcasts and sinners to join with him in open table-fellowship. Wittgenstein's phenomenology of persons helps us focus on the radical form of life which Jesus presents to a mixed audience, including a recalcitrant Judaism. Perrin writes:

There must have been a factor in the situation which drove both the authorities themselves to desperate measures and also gave them a defence against popular accusation. We suggest that a regular table-fellowship, in the name of the Kingdom of God, between Jesus and his followers, when those followers included "Jews who had made themselves as Gentiles", would have been just such a factor.³⁴

Our author continues with a powerful description of the discontinuity between Jesus' words and acts and the cherished doctrines of contemporary Judaism. The criterion of dissimilarity provides weighty evidence that the creative intention of Jesus assumes unheard of prerogatives. His behavior is simply outrageous:

Then came Jesus, claiming that they were wrong in their understanding of God and his attitude to these outcasts and so striking a blow at the fundamental convictions which upheld the Jewish people. But more than that, Jesus welcomes these outcasts into table-fellowship with himself in the name of the Kingdom of God, in the name of the Jews' ultimate hope, and so both prostituted that hope and also shattered the closed ranks of the community against their enemy. It is hard to imagine anything more offensive to Jewish sensibilities. To have become such an outcast himself would have been much less of an outrage than to welcome those people back into the community in the name of the ultimate hope of that community. Intense conviction, indeed, is necessary to explain such an act on the part of Jesus, and such an act on the part of Jesus is necessary, we would claim, to make sense of the fact of the cross.³⁵

Reading such a statement in light of Wittgenstein we can only conclude that Jesus is consciously assuming a divinely authoritative form of life; hence there must be no reluctance to assign Jesus a christological self-understanding. A simply descriptive phenomenology, quite apart from the christological preferences of the New Testament interpreter, provides compelling evidence that Jesus thought of himself in christological terms; indeed, in divine terms as correlative with God and as standing in the place of God. Following Wittgenstein we "look and see", and what we see when we look is one who is making outlandish claims for himself. Of course an initial analysis of this kind cannot offer any judgment as to whether that claim to divine authority is true or false, whether it arises from madness, blasphemy, or genuine credentials. That must be left to the response of belief or doubt on a deeper level as one is personally confronted by the intentional claims of Jesus. My deeper commitment is to the genuineness of Jesus' personal claims. But I want to make the point that an initial description of the data in phenomenological terms does not rest upon a particular position theologically. The data speak for themselves: Jesus does intend his form of life to be divinely oracular. He seems clearly to be playing the language-game of God. The field of force of his language is simply astounding.

4. Matt. 11:16-19. The Children in the Marketplace

"But to what shall I compare this generation?"

Jesus' use of the personal pronoun "I" in this offensive saying is enlightened by the foregoing exposition. What offended Jesus' opponents was his joyous conviviality in table-fellowship with sinners, thus announcing in his own acted and spoken parable the inauguration of the saving reign of God.³⁶ This language-game is being played, Wittgenstein would say. "That is the primary thing, the proto-phenomenon."

5. Lk. 18:1-14. The Pharisee and the Tax Collector

The amount of material which can be added to the few sample citations we have presented is quite impressive, even limiting ourselves to the core of sayings arrived at by the criterion of dissimilarity.³⁷ The overall effect is quite convincing that Jesus was conscious of a divine authority in claiming the power to forgive sins and inviting sinners and outcasts to the messianic banquet table. In the conclusion to the parable of the Pharisee and the Tax Collector Jesus says with authority tantamount to God's authority, "I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other."

The clue to Jesus' intention lies accordingly in his language-game or form of life which characterizes the style of his ministry. His personal vision, horizon and intention can be understood in terms of his use of language. Perrin is on the verge of saying something truly impressive about the intention of Jesus when he observes, "We should note that 'I tell you. . . ' with its direct challenge to dearly held preconceptions of the period is an indirect personal claim of great magnitude."³⁸ Precisely here, at the critical hinge where radical redaction cannot quite make the turn with the evidence to concede the christological consciousness of Jesus, Wittgenstein's phenomenology of persons helps us confront the

intentional Jesus, and forces us to ask the question, "What kind of person would speak and act like that?"


Accordingly, I would go further than Perrin and the critical school he represents and say that, quite apart from any theological axes we might have to grind, his authentic core of sayings provides impressive data for an objective phenomenological analysis of Jesus' christological intention. Using Wittgenstein's ordinary yet profound insights into the disclosure of personal intention through language-games and forms of life, we conclude that the form of Jesus' language evinces a unified pattern of remarkable authority.

Once we move with the turning of the hinge, however, we discover that the door has now opened to a wider christological horizon. Once we have stepped through the open door by acknowledging that Jesus' intentionality is at least implicitly christological, the language-games of Gospel criticism by which the post-Easter theology of the early Church is facilely separated from the language of Jesus will have to be rethought. How can we be certain that Jesus himself did not utter the explicit christological sayings which are assigned to his lips by the Evangelists? Implicit and explicit christological sayings in the Gospels exhibit a form of life and language-game that is coherent and generally appropriate. In light of David Hill's recent discovery that there is no substantial evidence for the theory that early Christian prophets uttered sayings of the risen Lord and placed them on the lips of the historical Jesus,³⁹ it is far more likely that sayings ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels actually originated from him, and that variations in wording are due to the paraphrastic and adaptive activity of the Evangelists, not to their creation of sayings *de novo*. In a longer study (New Approaches to Jesus and the Gospels, soon to be published) I have worked through the Gospel materials exegetically and hermeneutically and conclude that the evidence, examined through a phenomenology of persons, points to Jesus himself as the originative source of high Christology. The implications of this for defining the uses and limits of redaction criticism are, of course, substantial. The implications as to the validity and value of an evolutionary model for New Testament Christology, such as James Dunn's Christology in the Making (1980), are, it goes without saying, equally substantial.

NOTES

1. Dallas High, Language, Persons, and Belief: Studies in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Religious Uses of Language (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), p. 22.
2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), para. 415. Hereafter PI.
3. PI, para. 432. His italics.
4. PI, para. 431. His italics.
5. PI, para. 19.
6. High, op. cit., p. 54.
7. PI, para. 454.
8. PI, para. 340. His italics.
9. PI, para. 457.
10. PI, para. 654. His italics.
11. PI, para. 656. His italics.
12. PI, para. 659. His italics.
13. PI, para. 663. His italics.
14. PI, para. 664.
15. PI, para. 692.
16. PI, IIv (p. 179). This is similar to Michael Polanyi's description of the tacit component in Personal Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 69-245; The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 1-25.
17. PI, IIvi (p. 183). His italics.
18. PI, IIx (p. 190).
19. PI, IIx (p. 191). His italics.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. See Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, esp. pp. 264-68.
22. PI, IIxi (pp. 218-19). My italics.
23. PI, IIxi (p. 220). His italics.
24. PI, IIxi (p. 225).
25. PI, IIxi (p. 226). His italics.
26. Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (London: SCM Press, and New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 64-67.

27. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
28. Ibid., p. 78.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ben F. Meyer, The Aims of Jesus (London: SCM Press, 1979), pp. 252-53.
32. Perrin, *op cit.*, p. 81.
33. Ibid., p. 98. His italics. Cf. p. 102.
34. Ibid., p. 103.
35. Ibid; cf. pp. 105-06.
36. Ibid., pp. 105-06.
37. For a representative list with exegetical notes, see Perrin, *ibid.*, pp. 54-164.
38. Ibid., p. 122.
39. David Hill, New Testament Prophecy (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979), esp. chap. 2, "Jesus: 'A Prophet Mighty in Deed and Word', " and chap. 7, "Christian Prophets and the Sayings of Jesus."



Die Ironie der Offenbarung;
Exegetische Erwägungen zur Zionvision im 4. Buch Esra

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Aut numquid sensus meus fallitur,
aut anima mea somniat?
(4Esra 10,36)

I. Vorbemerkungen

Der Zionvision (4Esr 9,26-10,59) kommt im Rahmen des literarischen Entwurfs von 4.Esra eine Sonderrolle zu: Sie bildet den Zielpunkt der drei ersten Gesprächsgänge und stellt zugleich eine Art Peripetie im Geschick Esras dar. Diese Doppelfunktion erhellt aus folgenden Beobachtungen:

(1) Unverkennbar laufen die Maßregeln des Engels, die sich jeweils am Ende der drei ersten Dialogeinheiten finden, auf die spezielle Anweisung vor Beginn der Zionvision zu (vgl. 5,13; 6,30f mit 9,23-25). Denn das Formular des Engelauftrags, dem die Exposition der jeweils folgenden Offenbarungsepisode korrespondiert (vgl. 5,20; 6,35 mit 9,26), erfährt beim Übergang zur Zionvision eine derart auffällige Abwandlung, daß sich beim Leser unwillkürlich der Eindruck eines Höhepunktes einstellt: Esra soll sich (aus Babel) (vgl. 3,1) hinaus ins freie Feld begeben, 'wo kein Haus gebaut ist' (!), nicht mehr fasten, sondern vegetarische Speise zu sich nehmen (!) und unaufhörlich (!) zum Höchsten beten. Nimmt man hinzu, daß die Chronologie der Folge von Offenbarungen nach 6,35 (vgl. Dan 10,2f) auf die Erfüllung eines Drei-Wochen-Schemas angelegt ist, gewinnt die Zionvision erst recht an Bedeutung: Sie bildet den vorläufigen Abschluß einer sich steigernden Offenbarungsbewegung¹.

(2) Zum anderen gilt zu bedenken, daß sich Esra bis zum Ende des kontroversen Dialogs in den Episoden I-III der ihm vom Engel zugemuteten Erkenntnis widersetzt und seine Oppositionsrolle selbst noch zu Beginn von Episode IV aufrechterhält (vgl. 9,29-37). Um so überraschender wirkt sein Verhalten gegenüber dem Volk im Dialog 12,40b-49 und besonders in der Vermächtnisrede 14,27-36. In der Rolle eines eschatologischen Propheten sucht Esra nun seinerseits die ihm anvertrauten Glieder des Gottesvolkes für jene Einstellung zu gewinnen, die der Engel ihm gegenüber geltend gemacht hatte. Fragt man nach der Ursache für diese merkwürdige Metamorphose Esras², ist man an die Zionvision gewiesen. Sie erscheint nämlich nicht nur als eine Klimax der Offenbarungsbewegung, sondern zugleich als der Dreh- und Wendepunkt im Geschick Esras, als Ereignis einer Kehre, die aus einem Widerpart der Offenbarung deren Zeugen werden läßt³.

Unser Interesse konzentriert sich im folgenden somit darauf zu untersuchen, wie die Peripetie innerhalb der Zionvision selbst literarisch in Szene gesetzt wird. Daß wir es bei dieser Passage mit einer außerordentlich kunstvoll arrangierten Komposition zu tun haben, wird sich im Verlauf der Erörterung des Textes zeigen. Der literarische Rang der Dichtung beruht insonder-

heit darauf, daß sie in der Sphäre der Doppelsinnigen angesiedelt ist. Vieldeutigkeit macht das ausgezeichnete Element ihres Stils aus. Das Erzählte bleibt doppelbödig. Die inszenierte Handlung ist auf einen Hintergrund hin transparent, der sich erst allmählich entschleiern. Vom Moment einer Schweben bestimmt, das nicht nur das Verhältnis der Partizipanten im Text, sondern auch die Beziehung des Lesers zum Text betrifft, bewegt sich die Darstellung auf der Schneide zwischen Wirklichkeit und Überwirklichkeit, zwischen Täuschung und Wahrheit, und zwar derart, daß sich das Wirkliche als unreal und das Überwirkliche als real erweisen. Hinsichtlich dieser äußerst raffiniert gestalteten Verschränkung der Aussageebenen erscheint die Zionsvision von 4.Esra als ein literarisches Kunstwerk, das im Schrifttum der jüdischen Apokalypthik seinesgleichen sucht.

II. Analyse der Textstruktur

Es empfiehlt sich, zunächst bei der Frage nach der inneren Disposition des Textes einzusetzen. Auf diese Weise dürfte es am ehesten gelingen, das Strukturprinzip des Ganzen zu eruieren. An Hand formkritischer Erwägungen zur Gattung des Visionsberichts soll das Ergebnis dieser Voruntersuchung dann präzisiert werden.

1. Versuch einer Segmentierung des Textes

Überblickt man das Stück 4Esra 9,26-10,59 als ganzes, so zeigt sich, daß wie in den vorausliegenden Offenbarungsepisoden die Form der direkten Rede dominiert. Nach dem Anrufgeschehen der einleitenden Klage (9,29-37) geht die Texthandlung in einen Dialog über, der zugleich als die beherrschende Aussageform der Passage anzusehen ist. In dieser Hinsicht besteht also zum Charakter der drei ersten Episoden auf den ersten Blick keine auffällige Differenz. Wie bisher beschränken sich die narrativen Zwischenstücke auf knapp gefaßte Redeeinführungsfloskeln, die den Sprecherwechsel signalisieren (vgl. die sich stereotyp wiederholenden Wendungen *et dixi (ei); et dixit ad me*).

Fragen wir nun nach Zäsuren im Text, die eine Segmentierung der Texthandlung erlauben, so sind zunächst diejenigen Stellen von Belang, bei denen die Redeeinführung erzählerisch ausgestaltet ist: 9,27f (Situationsschilderung vor Beginn der Klage); 9,39 und 10,5 (Umkehrnotiz); 10,27b (Epiphanieaktion); 10,29f (Auftauchen und Aktion des Engels). Ohne Zweifel tragen diese narrativen Varianten des Sprecherwechsels sachliches Gewicht, zumal sie abgesehen vom Sonderfall der Klageeinführung 9,27f (vgl. 3,3; 5,21f; 6,36f) in den Episoden I-III lediglich eine einzige Sachparallele besitzen (vgl. 4,11b Syr). Sie verdienen also exegetische Beachtung. Indessen dürfte nur die Aussage von 9,27f eine für die Makrosyntax des Textes relevante Zäsur anzeigen. Dafür spricht die Wendung *et factum est*. Durch diesen Szenenweiser der hebräischen Erzählung (וַיֵּשְׁבֶה) wird die um eine Situationsschilderung erweiterte Redeeinführung markant vom Vorhergehenden abgesetzt. Sie fungiert also an dieser Stelle wie in 5,21f und 6,36f als die eigentliche Eröffnung der folgenden Offenbarungsepisode. Demgegenüber besitzt die einleitende narrative Notiz über den Vollzug der Engelweisung 9,26, die den entsprechenden Selbstaussagen Esras in 5,20 und 6,35 korrespondiert, den Charakter einer Exposition im strengen Sinn

des Wortes.

Nun finden sich neben der quasi-externen Notiz von 9,26 innerhalb der Texthandlung selbst noch zwei weitere Aussagereihen in Berichtsform, die nicht zugleich die Funktion einer Redeeinführung übernehmen. Es handelt sich um die Beschreibung einer unvermittelt auftauchenden Frau in 9,38 sowie um die Schilderung ihrer wunderbaren Verwandlung in 10,25-27a. Beide Stücke sind schon deshalb besonders auffällig, weil sie in die reine Erzählform des Ich-Berichts gekleidet sind und somit die Partien mit direkter Rede wirkungsvoll unterbrechen. Da sie nicht darauf abzielen, die dialogische Kontinuität aufrechtzuerhalten, heben sie sich auch von den sonstigen narrativen Übergangswendungen ab. Stellt man ferner in Rechnung, daß vergleichbare erzählende Partien im vorausliegenden Kontext der drei ersten Offenbarungsepisoden nur in 4,48f (Vision) und 6,17.29 (Audition) auszumachen sind, wird der exzeptionelle Charakter der beiden Aussagereihen noch augenfälliger. Was beide Stücke nun in besonderer Weise kennzeichnet, ist die häufige Verwendung von Verben des Sehens und des Präsentativs *ecce* (הֵן). Darauf wird später ausführlich einzugehen sein. Hier genügt die Feststellung, daß beide Partien auch insofern aus dem Rahmen fallen, als sie auf eine ganz ungewohnte Art die Aufmerksamkeit des Lesers beanspruchen. Diese Beobachtungen nähren den Verdacht, daß die genannten Abschnitte zugleich diejenigen Schwerpunkte der Texthandlung darstellen, die sie strukturieren. So ist mit Sicherheit zwischen 10,24 und 10,25 eine Zäsur vorzusetzen. Durch den Szenenweiser *et factum est cum ...* sowie durch die Form des Berichts wird das in 10,25-27a Gesagte vom vorangehenden dialogischen Kontext abgehoben. Die Schilderung fungiert als Auftakt eines neuen Gesprächsganges mit einem anderen Dialogpartner. In abgeschwächter Form gilt dasselbe nun aber auch für Stellung und Funktion von 9,38. Der Bericht vom Erscheinen der Frau eröffnet eine sehr umfangreiche Dialogsequenz, welche die Partie 9,39-10,24 umfaßt. Zwar fehlt eine dem Szenenweiser *et factum est* von 10,25 adäquate Wendung, und insofern scheint Esras Gespräch mit der Frau stärker mit dem Vorspann (9,26-37) verbunden. Andererseits dürfte aber aus der Korrespondenz der Formulierungen zwischen 9,38 und 10,25-27a wohl doch die Annahme eines Einschnitts abzuleiten sein. Hier wie dort findet sich eine analog gebaute Reihe von Aufmerksamkeit heischenden Wendungen (9,38: *Et cum loquar haec in corde meo, et respexi ..., et vidi ..., et ecce ...*; 10,25-27a: [*Et factum est,*] *cum loquebar ad eam, et ecce ... Et ecce ... Et vidi, et ecce ...*).

Damit tritt die Makrosyntax der Zionvision klar zutage. Auf einen Vorspann mit Exposition, Redeeinführung und Klage Esras (9,26-37) folgen zwei Interaktionseinheiten (9,39-10,24; 10,27b-59), die jeweils durch Aussagereihen in der Form des Berichts eröffnet werden (9,38; 10,25-27a). Innerhalb der beiden in sich geschlossenen Dialogsequenzen wechseln sowohl die Partner als auch die Sprecherrollen Esras. Im ersten Fall handelt es sich um ein Zwiegespräch zwischen Esra und der Frau, wobei der Seher den Part der zweiten Redefigur übernimmt, die Auskünfte erteilt, Anweisungen gibt und das letzte Wort behält. Der Dialog läuft auf zwei längere Ausführungen Esras zu, und zwar auf eine im Stil der Belehrung sowie eine im Stil der Klage gehaltene Rede, die jeweils in einer Mahnung gipfelt

(10,6-17.19-24). In der zweiten Interaktionseinheit fungiert wieder der Engel als der Gesprächspartner Esras. Wie auch sonst übernimmt er die ihm zustehende Rolle der zweiten Redefigur, die sich auf Esras Problemstellungen einläßt, während der Seher selbst wieder als der (aus den früheren Begegnungen bekannte) klagende und fragende Partizipant in Erscheinung tritt. Höhepunkt dieser Einheit bildet die das Ganze abschließende Deuterede Uriels, die in die Form eines umfassenden Lehrvortrags gekleidet ist (10,38-59).

Es hat den Anschein, als ließe sich der erste Gesprächskomplex in eine drei- (bei Einbeziehung des Vorspanns: vier-)gliedrige sowie zwei doppelgliedrige Dialogstücke segmentieren: 9, (27-37)39-42 (Sprecherfolge: [Esra-] Esra-Frau-Esra); 9,43-10,17 und 10,18-24 (Frau-Esra). Analog dazu läßt sich die zweite Interaktionseinheit vielleicht in ein vier- und ein doppelgliedriges Dialogstück aufteilen: 10,27b-33 (Esra-Uriel-Esra-Uriel); 10,34-59 (Esra-Uriel). Derartige Überlegungen zur Segmentierung der großen Gesprächskomplexe innerhalb der Zionvision sind insofern durchaus naheliegend, als sich auch die Dialoge der drei ersten Episoden auf kleinste Einheiten zurückführen lassen, die entweder nach dem Muster viergliedriger⁵ Lehr- oder zweigliedriger Disputationsstücke generiert sind.

Nach diesen Vorwägungen zur Makrostruktur des Textes sind wir nun in der Lage, eine detaillierte Gliederung der Zionvision in Form einer tabellarisch geordneten Übersicht vorzustellen:

1	Vorspann	9,26-37
1.1	Exposition (Vollzugsbericht)	9,26
1.2.1	Redeeinführung	9,27f
1.2.2	E: Volksklage	9,29-37
2	Bericht und Interaktion I	9,38-10,24
2.1	Schilderung I (Erscheinen d.Frau)	9,38
2.2.1	Umkehrnotiz I	9,39
2.2.2	E: Erkundigungsfrage	9,40
2.3	F: Antwort	9,41
2.4	E: Aufforderung	9,42
2.5	F: Selbstvorstellung	9,43-10,4
2.6.1	Umkehrnotiz II	10,5
2.6.2	E: Belehrung und Mahnung	10,6-17
2.7	F: Weigerung	10,18
2.8	E: Klage und Mahnung	10,19-24
3	Bericht und Interaktion II	10,25-59
3.1	Schilderung II (Verwandlung d.Frau)	10,25-27a
3.2.1	Epiphaniereaktion	10,27b
3.2.2	E: Frage (nach Uriel)	10,28
3.3.1	Auftauchen u.Aktion d.Engels	10,29f
3.3.2	U: Erkundigungsfrage	10,31
3.4	E: Auskunft	10,32
3.5	U: Ankündigung d.Unterweisung	10,33
3.6	E:Lehranforderung	10,34-37
3.7	U:Lehrvortrag	10,38-59

2. Das Verhältnis von Vision und Interaktion

In der exegetischen Literatur wird der Gegenstand unserer Untersuchung gemeinhin unter dem Teil der 'Zionvision' verhandelt. Sind dieser Charakteristik zugleich Anhaltspunkte für die Zuweisung des Stückes in eine literarische Gattung zu entnehmen? Läßt sich der Text 4Esr 9,26-10,59 der Gattung des Visionsberichts zuordnen?

Wir suchen diese Frage zu klären, indem wir uns zunächst Erwägungen formkritischer Art zuwenden. In seinem sehr aufschlußreichen Beitrag zum Apokalyptik-Kongreß in Uppsala (1979) mit dem Titel 'Vom prophetischen zum apokalyptischen Visionsbericht'⁶ hat K.Koch an Hand einer exemplarischen Analyse von Am 7,1-3; Dan 8 und Apk 6,7f die typischen Elemente der prophetischen sowie der apokalyptischen Visionsschilderung profiliert und die Divergenzen sowie die Konvergenzen beider Gattungsstrukturen herausgestellt. Nach Kochs Ausführungen zum apokalyptischen Visionsbericht gliedert sich diese Gattung in drei Hauptteile: Vorspann, Schauung, Deutung. Die Merkmale des Vorspanns können hier vernachlässigt werden. Für die Zielsetzung unserer Untersuchung sind primär die Elemente der Schauung und Deutung von Interesse. Stark vereinfacht stellt sich die Disposition des Teils der Schauung wie folgt dar⁷: Nach einer Eröffnungsnotiz, die stereotyp durch ein Verb des Sehens und ein damit verklammertes Präsentativ ausgefüllt wird, gilt die Schilderung zunächst der Vorstellung des Hauptgegenstandes A der Vision sowie seiner Teile in Ruhestellung. Eine Aussage über die Bewegung des Visionsgegenstandes A leitet zur Präsentation des Hauptgegenstandes B über, die wiederum durch eine der ersten analoge Eröffnungsnotiz eingeführt wird. Der Deuteteil gliedert sich in eine szenische Exposition (Reaktion des Sehers auf die Vision, Umstände des Deutungsempfangs, Auftauchen des Deuters, Bitte des Sehers um Deutung, (Sprech-) Bewegung des Deuters, Reaktion des Sehers) sowie die eigentliche Deuterrede, in deren Zentrum Nennung sowie Identifizierung der Visionsgegenstände A und B stehen.

Ein Paradigma dieses Gattungsmusters (reduziert auf den Teil der Schauung) findet sich im 4. Buch Esra selbst, nämlich⁸ in der Miniatur eines Visionsberichts, wie sie 4,48 begegnet:

1	Präsentation des Visionsgegenstandes A
1.1	Et steti
1.2	et vidi et ecce
1.3	fornax ardens transiit coram me,
2	Bewegungsansage
2.1	et factum est,
2.2	cum transiret flamma,
3	Präsentation des Visionsgegenstandes B
3.1	et vidi et ecce
3.2	superavit fumus.

Die übliche Deutepartie ist im Zusammenhang dieser Stelle durch eine Konklusion in der Form des Vergleichs nach Art einer Gleichnisapplikation ersetzt (vgl. 4,50).

Vergleicht man nun die Zionvision mit dem von Koch aufgewiesenen Muster des apokalyptischen Visionsberichts, so zeigt sich, daß das Korpus des vorliegenden Textes mit der konventionellen Gattungsstruktur nicht in Deckung zu bringen ist. Die Zionvision enthält nämlich neben dem Deuteteil eine weitere Interaktionseinheit, in welcher der Seher ausführlich mit dem Visionsgegenstand A kommuniziert. Zum anderen bezieht sich die dem apokalyptischen Muster noch am ehesten entsprechende Deuterede nicht nur auf Geschautes, sondern auch auf Gesagtes. Sie konzentriert sich wesentlich auf die Erläuterung von Selbstausagen der klagenden Frau, der Esra begegnet ist, und versteht sich de facto weitgehend als Allegorese einer Rede (vgl. 10, 45-48 mit 9,43-10,4). Schon auf Grund dieser gravierenden Differenzpunkte wird ersichtlich, daß die Zionvision eine literarische Struktur eigener Art besitzt, die sich mit dem Gattungsmuster des apokalyptischen Visionsberichts nicht ohne weiteres verrechnen läßt.

Trotz dieses Vorbehalts bleibt nun aber festzustellen, daß sich die Form des Textes mit der von Koch aufgewiesenen Gattungsstruktur durchaus berührt. Nur erstrecken sich die strukturalen Konvergenzen streng genommen nicht auf den Text in seiner Ganzheit, sondern lediglich auf bestimmte Teilaussagen. Dabei handelt es sich zunächst um eben jene Textpartien, die sich durch das Merkmal des Berichts aus dem dialogisch geprägten Umfeld abheben und denen daher eine die Struktur des ganzen bestimmende Schlüsselrolle zufällt: 9,38 und 10,25-27a. So entspricht die Beschreibung der Frau in 9,38 bis ins Detail dem ersten Element der Schauung der apokalyptischen Visionsschilderung. Das Stück enthält alle Bestandteile einer Präsentation des Visionsgegenstandes A, nämlich (nach einer Angabe über die abgeschlossene Redesituation): a) die typische Eröffnungsnotiz mit *Lexemen des Sehens* (et respexi oculis meis et vidi⁹); b) die Vorstellung des Hauptgegenstandes A (*mulier*) an belangreichem Ort (in *dextera parte*); c) eine durch das Präsentativ *ecce* eingeleitete Beschreibung der Befindlichkeit des Visionsgegenstandes in Ruhestellung (*lugebat, plorabat*) sowie d) die Einführung von Teilgegenständen von A (*vestimenta, caput*). In 10,25f findet sich nun das Element der Bewegung, das innerhalb der Episode der Schauung die Präsentation des zweiten Visionsgegenstandes B vorbereitet und zwischen A und B somit die Funktion eines Gelenks übernimmt. Auf eine an dieser Stelle durch den Szenenweiser *et factum est cum...* indizierte Eröffnungsnotiz folgt eine Doppelaussage über die wunderbare Verwandlung der nämlichen Frau, wobei die erste Aussage ein sichtbares, die zweite ein hörbares Phänomen anspricht: a) Das Antlitz der Frau beginnt zu glänzen und nimmt die Züge einer Lichtgestalt an¹⁰; b) die Frau stößt einen lauten Schrei aus. Beide Aussagen werden mit einem (jeweils durch das Adverb *subito* verstärkten) Präsentativ (*ecce*) eingeleitet und mit Finalsätzen abgeschlossen, welche die Wirkung des jeweiligen Phänomens (auf den Seher bzw. die Erde) beschreiben. Stilgemäß läuft das Ganze in 10,27a auf die Einführung des Hauptgegenstandes B zu, die das dritte Element der Schauung darstellt. Eine Doppel-

aussage, die mit der üblichen Eröffnungsnotiz einsetzt (Lexem videre in Verbindung mit dem Präsentativ ecce) stellt diesen Visionsgegenstand in zwei Teilaspekten vor (civitas, locus de fundamentis magnis). Bewußt ist das erste Glied der Offenbarungsaussage in die Form einer Antithese (correctio) gekleidet, denn diese erlaubt es, den Wechsel vom einen zum anderen Phänomen in der Bewegung von der Negation zur Position auch sprachlich zu artikulieren (amplius mulier non ... sed civitas).

Verknüpft man die textlich getrennten Schilderungen von 9,38 und 10,25-27a miteinander, ergibt sich eine geschlossene und konzinnere Aussagereihe, die aufs genaueste den Einzelelementen der Schauung im Rahmen der Gattungsstruktur des apokalyptischen Visionsberichts entspricht. Störend wirkt dann nur die Wendung cum loquebar ad eam in der Eröffnungsnotiz 10,25a, die im vorliegenden Zusammenhang durch die vorangehende Unterredung zwischen der Frau und Esra erzwungen ist. An dieser Stelle wäre eigentlich eine Bezugnahme auf den Vorgang des Sehens und nicht den des Redens zu erwarten. Als Visionsbericht im idelaltypischen Sinn der Gattung kann somit folgende Aussagesequenz angesehen werden:

- | | |
|-------|---|
| 1.1 | Et cum loquor haec in corde meo, |
| 1.2.1 | et respexi oculis meis et vidi |
| 1.2.2 | mulierem in dextera parte; |
| 1.3.1 | et ecce |
| 1.3.2 | haec lugebat et plorabat cum voce magna |
| 1.3.3 | et animo dolebat valde, |
| 1.4.1 | et vestimenta eius discisa |
| 1.4.2 | et cinis super caput eius. |
| 2.1.1 | Et factum est, |
| 2.1.2 | cum (videbam), |
| 2.2.1 | et ecce |
| 2.2.2 | facies eius fulgebat valde subito, |
| 2.2.3 | et species coruscus fiebat vultus eius, |
| 2.3.1 | ut etiam paverem valde ad eam |
| 2.3.2 | ... ¶ |
| 2.3.3 | et cogitarem, quid esset hoc. |
| 2.4.1 | Et ecce |
| 2.4.2 | subito emisit sonum vocis magnum timore plenum, |
| 2.5 | ut commoveretur terra a sono. |
| 3.1 | Et vidi, et ecce |
| 3.2.1 | amplius mulier non comparebat mihi, |
| 3.2.2 | sed civitas aedificabatur |
| 3.3 | et locus demonstrabatur de fundamentis magnis. |

Als gattungskonform erweisen sich nun aber auch bestimmte Passagen des Deuteteils 10,27b-59. Dies gilt zunächst für die szenische Exposition 10,27b-37 mit den Elementen: Epiphanie-reaktion und fragende Suche des Sehers nach dem Deuter (v.27b.28); Auftauchen, Stärkungshandlung¹² und Erkundigungsfrage des Deuters (v.29-31); Antwort des Sehers (v.32 - ohne den Rückverweis auf 9,23-25); Ankündigung der Deutung (v.33) und Bitte des Sehers um Deutung (v.34-37). Innerhalb der Deuterede selbst (10,38-59) sind indessen nur diejenigen Passagen als Gattungselemente zu beurteilen, die auf das Ereignis einer Schauung

Bezug nehmen. Dies trifft auf die Lehreröffnungsformel (v.38), die Nennung und Identifizierung des Visionsgegenstandes (v.40b-44) sowie die Schlußmahnung (v.55) zu. Für einen Lehrvortrag, der sich dem oben rekonstruierten Visionsbericht zwanglos anfügen läßt und zugleich dem Maß der Gattungsstruktur genügt, könnten somit folgende Elemente reklamiert werden:

- 1.1 Audi me
- 1.2 et doceam te
- 1.3 et dicam tibi, de quibus times.
- 2.1.1 Mulier,
- 2.1.2 quae tibi apparuit ante paululum,
- 2.1.3 quam vidisti lugentem,
- 2.1.4 nunc autem iam non speciem mulieris vides,
- 2.1.5 sed apparuit tibi civitas aedificari;
- 2.2.1 (haec absolutio est:)¹³
- 2.2.2 Haec mulier, quam vidisti,
- 2.2.3 haec est Sion,
- 2.2.4 quam nunc conspicis ut civitatem aedificatam.
- 3.1.1 Tu ergo noli timere
- 3.1.2 neque expavescat cor tuum,
- 3.2.1 sed ingredere
- 3.2.2 et vide splendorem vel magnitudinem aedificiij,
- 3.2.3 quantum capax est tibi visu oculorum videre.

An dieser Stelle der Untersuchung könnte man versucht sein, die synchronische Ebene der Analyse zu verlassen und zu einer diachronischen Betrachtungsweise überzugehen. Es liegt nämlich nahe zu fragen, ob die ausgegrenzten Teilaussagen der Zionvision, die sich als gattungsspezifisch erweisen, nicht den Kernbestand eines überlieferten Visionsberichts darstellen, den der Verfasser von 4Esr rezipiert und eigenständig bearbeitet hat. Der vorliegende Text erschiene dann als das Ergebnis eines Überlieferungsprozesses, und in der Relation von gattungskonformen und gattungsdisparaten Elementen spiegelte sich das Verhältnis von Tradition und Redaktion wider.

Nun kann die Annahme verwendeter Überlieferung sicher nicht eo ipso ausgeschlossen werden, zumal die extrapolierte Abfolge von Schauung und Deutung sowohl den Regeln der Gattungsstruktur genügt als auch einen plausiblen Aussagezusammenhang zu erkennen gibt. Das explizit auf Zion gemünzte Gesicht von der Transfiguration einer Klagenden in eine herrliche Stadt läßt sich ohne weiteres als Zumutung von Hoffnung begreifen, als die Vergewisserung einer eschatologischen Zukunft, in der für Israel die widrigen Umstände der Gegenwart wunderbar aufgehoben sind. Das ausgegrenzte Stück ist also nicht nur gattungskonform, sondern auch in sich selbst aussagekräftig. Gerade weil es des jetzigen Kontextes nicht bedarf, könnte sich der Gedanke an überkommene Überlieferung nahelegen. Allein, traditionsgeschichtliche Erwägungen bleiben so lange fragwürdig, als sie primär ästhetisch begründet sind und sich nicht zugleich durch eindeutige Indizien anderer (z.B. literarkritischer) Art stützen lassen. Sie sollten erst dann in Rechnung gestellt werden, wenn die Möglichkeiten eines alternativen, der Ebene der Synchronie verpflichteten Erklärungsmodells ausgeschöpft sind. Um der gespannten Beziehung zwischen gattungsgerechten und gattungswi-

drigen Elementen in der Komposition der Zionvision auf die Spur zu kommen, verfolgen wir daher den einmal eingeschlagenen Weg weiter.

Orientiert man sich an den Prinzipien der strukturalen Textanalyse, versteht sich das Repertoire der Gattung des apokalyptischen Visionsberichts als Inbegriff einer Sprachkompetenz, an der sowohl der Verfasser von 4Esr als auch die hypothetischen Adressaten seiner Schrift teilhaben. An der Art, wie von der sprachlichen Kompetenz literarisch Gebrauch gemacht, wie also die virtuell verfügbare Struktur konkret realisiert wird, ist das Sachanliegen der individuellen Sprachform von 4Esr 9,26-10,59 ablesbar¹⁴. Vergleichen wir nun die vorliegende Komposition der Zionvision mit dem Gefüge des Gattungsmusters, wird deutlich, daß die konventionelle Vorstellung des Visionsgegenstandes A hier aus ihrer strukturblichen Verankerung im Bericht der Schauung (vgl. 4,48) abgezogen und als Exposition einer vorgeschalteten selbständigen Interaktionseinheit verwendet ist. Die ihrer Strukturheimat entfremdete Präsentation wird zur Keimzelle eines breit entfalteten Eröffnungsdialogs. Damit gerät nun aber das Gattungsmuster mit der strukturgewohnten Episodensequenz von Vision und Deutung aus den Fugen. Die genannte Transponierung hat weitreichende Folgen für Eigenart und Gefälle der gesamten Textbewegung. Denn nun verliert die Präsentation selbst infolge ihrer Ablösung von den beiden anderen Akten der Schauung (Bewegung und Transformation) die Züge der visionären Extravaganz. Ohne sich der Sphäre des Gewohnten und Erwartbaren ganz einzupassen, gewinnt die Begegnung mit der Frau den Charakter eines real vorstellbaren Ereignisses, so daß sich auch die ganze folgende Unterredung zwischen Esra und der Frau als ein auf der Ebene alltäglicher Kommunikation angesiedelter Vorgang ausnimmt. Der eigentliche Akt der Schauung beginnt erst mit 10,25ff. Erst an dieser Stelle treffen wir auf die gattungstypische Realitätsverzerrung, die eine Deutung notwendig macht. Entscheidend ist nun aber zu sehen, daß die phasenverschobene Vision im vorliegenden Zusammenhang als eine Funktion der vorausgehenden Interaktion begegnet. Das Wunder der Verwandlung erscheint als ein Ereignis, das offenbar durch Esras Gesprächsverhalten gegenüber der Frau allererst ausgelöst wird. Andererseits ist der auf die Deuterrede des Engels abzielende zweite Dialog keineswegs durch die Unterredung zwischen Esra und der Frau veranlaßt. Was die Frage nach dem Deuter provoziert, ist wie üblich allein das Mirakel der Transfiguration. Gleichwohl nimmt Uriels Lehrvortrag nicht nur auf dieses Ereignis, sondern auch und gerade auf das Gesprächsverhalten der Frau in der ersten Episode Bezug. Die Deutung transzendiert also ihre gattungsgemäße Funktion, indem sie auf den Akt einer Schauung und den einer Rede rekurriert. Eben auf diese Weise macht sie die hintergründige Entsprechung von Vision und erster Interaktion namhaft.

Die formale Eigenart der Zionvision beruht somit offensichtlich darauf, daß sich die eigentliche Vision am Schnittpunkt von zwei Interaktionen befindet¹⁶. Sie stellt den Zweck des ersten und den Ausgangspunkt des zweiten Gesprächs dar. Zugleich bildet sie damit die Schwelle zwischen der Welt des Wirklichen und der Welt des Überwirklichen. Folgt man nämlich dem Ablauf der

dialogischen Bewegung, so scheint die erste Interaktionseinheit im Zeichen einer realen, die zweite indessen unter dem Vorzeichen einer irrealen Begegnung zu stehen. Im nachhinein erweist sich diese Beurteilung des Zusammenhangs freilich als vordergründig und irreführend. Die abschließende Deuterede verkehrt die Bezüge, indem sie die interne Relation zwischen Vision und erster Interaktion aufdeckt und den mit Esras Kommunikationspartner identischen Gegenstand der Transfiguration auf Zion auslegt. Die gegenläufige Entsprechung von Vorder- und Hintergrund nachzuzeichnen und das innere Verhältnis von Gespräch und Schauung noch präziser zu klären, wird Aufgabe der weiteren Untersuchung sein.

III. Die Kehre im Geschick Esras

Nach der ersten Klärung des Strukturzusammenhangs ist nun auf die Sache selbst einzugehen, die in den beiden Interaktionseinheiten zur Debatte steht. Eine Detailanalyse ist im folgenden nicht beabsichtigt. Wir beschränken uns auf die Erörterung derjenigen Aussagen, die für das Gesprächsverhalten der jeweiligen Kommunikationspartner charakteristisch sind.

1. Esras Dialog mit der Frau

Auf die Wahrnehmung der Frau, die unvermittelt in der typischen Gebärde einer Trauernden in Erscheinung tritt (9,38), reagiert der Seher mit einer Erkundigungsfrage (9,40). Die damit eröffnete dialogische Begegnung gliedert sich in das Vorspiel einer knapp gefaßten Exposition (9,40-42) sowie eine im doppelten Wechsel von Rede und Gegenrede entfaltete Kontroverse (9,43-10,24). Ist schon der Sachverhalt bedeutsam genug, daß das gewohnte Gegenüber Esras nun durch einen zwar nicht spektakulär, aber doch auffällig ins Spiel gebrachten neuen Partner abgelöst wird, so erst recht die Tatsache, daß der Seher unwillkürlich in die Rolle jener Redefigur einrückt, die bisher der Engel gepachtet hatte. Die bereits daran ablesbare Wende bekundet sich explizit in der narrativen Variante der Redeeinführung von 9,39 und 10,5. Jeweils an exponierter Stelle, nämlich im Anschluß an Vorstellung und Selbstdarstellung der Frau, findet sich eine analog gebaute Konversionsformel, mit der Esra die Abkehr von den früheren Gedanken¹⁷ und Worten (des Zweifels) zum Ausdruck bringt. Seine Zuwendung zu der ihm unbekannten Frau gründet im Verzicht auf die Belange seines Selbst. Sie ist mit einem Akt der Selbstpreisgabe verbunden. Andererseits vollzieht sich die Zuwendung gerade in der Form des Widerspruchs. Dieser bestreitet das Recht der Trauer, das die Frau für sich beansprucht¹⁸.

Worauf zielen die Einreden des Sehers ab? Ausgangspunkt der Kontroverse ist die Selbstvorstellung der Frau (9,43-10,4), die den Grund der Trauer namhaft macht: Erst nach dreißigjähriger Ehe empfieng sie einen Sohn, doch dieser stirbt am Tag seiner Hochzeit. Wie am Szenenweiser *et factum est* (cum) klar ersichtlich (vgl. 9,45.47; 10.1.3), gliedert sich die autobiographische Erzählung in fünf Episoden: (1) Not der Unfruchtbarkeit (9,43f), (2) Gebetserhörung (9,45f), (3) Brautschau und Bestimmung des Hochzeitstages (9,47), (4) Tod des Sohnes und Trostversuche der Mitbürger (10,1f), (5) Flucht (10,3f). Das fünfteilige Erzählgerüst besitzt eine bis zur dritten Episode ansteigende und dann jäh abfallende Handlungsentwicklung. Die Zäsur zwischen

der 'komischen' und der 'tragischen' Bewegung bezeichnet zugleich den Übergang von der autobiographischen Vergangenheit zur Gegenwart. Die Not dieser Gegenwart trägt deshalb das Gepräge einer verzweifelten Lebenslage, weil sie aus dem Verlust einer unter erschwerten Bedingungen empfangenen Gabe resultiert. Am Ende ist die Situation der Frau trostloser als zur Anfangszeit des lang versagten Kinderwunsches. Das Erzählte klingt realistisch und wirkt plausibel. Zwar finden sich auffällige Momente, die ans Märchenhafte grenzen. Dies gilt für die runde Zahl der Jahre der Unfruchtbarkeit und zumal für Ort und Zeitpunkt des Todes. Daß der Sohn ausgerechnet am Tag der Hochzeit stirbt, entspricht eher den Interessen einer auf Überzeichnungen angewiesenen novellistischen Dramaturgie. Doch erfährt die Ebene narrativer Isomorphie dadurch keine Störung. Es fehlen jedenfalls alle Züge einer bizarren Realitätsverfremdung, die den Transfer des Gesagten auf ein hintergründig Gemeintes veranlassen könnten. Vielmehr ist die Glaubwürdigkeit des autobiographischen Berichts noch dadurch gesteigert, daß die Erzählung in der Schlußepisode sowohl mit dem szenischen Rahmen des Vorspanns (*in hoc campo*) als auch mit der Dialogsituation selbst (*sicut vides*) verschränkt ist.

Eras erste Antwort (10,6-17) besitzt den Charakter eines argumentativen Lehrstücks. Daß sie auf einen Einspruch hinausläuft, signalisiert schon die Redeeinführung in 10,5: Im Zorn (*cum iracundia*) ergreift der Seher das Wort. Das Ganze zerfällt in drei Teile: eine auf Zions Lage bezogene Eröffnung, einen in die Rede eingelagerten fiktiven Lehrdialog sowie ein von Mahnungen gerahmtes Heilsorakel. Die Aussagen des ersten Abschnitts (v.6-8ab) suchen die Trauer der Frau dadurch zu desavouieren, daß sie ihr die Trauer Zions entgegenhalten, an der die Gesamtheit einer Gemeinschaft partizipiert. Die individuelle Not erweist sich als belanglos. Sie kommt gegen das sich kollektiv auswirkende Geschick Zions nicht auf, ja sie ist in diesem Geschick, von dem bezeichnenderweise nur im Stil des Bekenntnisses (1.Pers. Pl.) die Rede sein kann, aufgehoben. Das Argument stützt sich auf die Analogie zwischen der Mutterrolle der Frau und derjenigen Zions (*mater nostra omnium*). Belastet wird diese klare Entsprechung nun dadurch, daß im zweiten Stück (v.8c-14) eine dritte weibliche Figur eingeführt wird. Als Gegenüber der Frau fungiert nicht mehr Zion, sondern die Erde. Wieder basiert die Argumentation auf einem Vergleich. Gemessen am Verlust der Erde erscheint derjenige der Frau als minimal. Während nämlich die Frau nur den Tod eines einzigen Sohnes zu beklagen hat, trauert die Erde, die hier als Gebärende vorgestellt ist, um den Verlust einer großen Menge. Wahrscheinlich schwebt folgender Gedanke vor: Wie am Geschick Zions ablesbar, wurde dem Gottesvolk die ihm zugesagte Bleibe entzogen. Es scheint dem eschatologischen Verderben geweiht¹⁹. Damit hat nun aber auch die Erde ihren vornehmsten Sproß, nämlich Israel, verloren. Der Gedankenfortschritt gegenüber v.6-8ab liegt jedenfalls darin, daß nicht mehr der Radius der Trauer, sondern deren Anlaß verglichen wird. Intendiert ist der Gegensatz zwischen dem Verlust des einen und der vielen²⁰:

Et quis ergo debet lugere magis nisi haec,
 quae tam magnam multitudinem perdidit,
 quam tu,
 quae pro uno doles? (v.11)

Die komplizierte Doppelung von Zion (v.6-8ab) und Erde (v.8c-14) berührt merkwürdig. Ist trotz Jes 66,8 eine Hemmung im Spiel, Zion als Gebärende vorzustellen, weil die unter diesem Aspekt noch eindeutige Entsprechung Frau - Zion vorerst verschleierte bleiben muß? Oder erklärt sich die Einführung der Figur der Erde einfach aus der Absicht, den Stil der Argumentation Esras an dieser Stelle dem der weisheitlich gefärbten Beweisführung des Engels anzugleichen (vgl. 5,48; 7,54ff)²¹?

Die eigentliche Absicht der Gegenrede Esras erschließt sich aus dem Schlußwort (v.15-17). Einerseits will sie die Frau von dem subjektiven Anlaß ihrer verzweifelten Trauer ablenken. Dies geschieht durch den Verweis auf den umfassenden Schmerz Zions, der alle Glieder des Gottesvolkes betrifft. So münden die beiden Argumentationsgänge folgerichtig in die Mahnung, den Schmerz im Inneren zurückzuhalten und standhaft zu tragen (v.15). Andererseits zielt die Rede darauf ab, die Frau zu einer Gerichtsdoxologie zu veranlassen (v.16a: *sie enim iustificaveris terminum dei*). Es gilt, das eigene Ergehen als Tatfolge und damit als Implikation eines (umgreifenden) Schuldzusammenhangs (vgl. 1Kön 17,18) zu verstehen (vgl. Klgl 1,18; Hi 40,3; PsSal 2,15; 3,3,5; 4,8; 8,7). Dann bleibt die Hoffnung auf das Wunder einer Kehre, in der sich das Leiden in Freude²² verwandelt (vgl. Jes 66,7-11). So gipfelt Esras Widerspruch in der befreienden Zusage des Heilsorakels von v.16bc, das freilich an die Bedingung der Exhomologese geknüpft ist:

et filium tuum recipies in tempore
et in mulieribus conlaudaberis.

Nach H.Gunkels Vermutung erfüllt sich dieses Wort darin, daß Gott der Frau "einen neuen Sohn" schenkt, "durch den sie (als Mutter eines Sohns) wieder zu Ehren kommt"²³. Aber ist eine Erwägung dieser Art nicht zu rationalistisch? Kann die Referenz des Orakels wirklich etwas anderes meinen als das Wunder einer Erweckung? - Die abschließende Weisung (v.17: 'Geh also in die Stadt zu deinem Manne!') soll den Widerspruch von v.18 auslösen. Sie ist also rein literarisch motiviert²⁴. Daß ausdrücklich an den Mann erinnert wird (vgl. 9,45), verstärkt den Realitätsbezug der Interaktion.

Die zweite Gegenrede Esras (10,20-24) besitzt wie die erste eine dreiteilige Disposition. Im Zentrum steht ein breit entfaltetes Klagelied (v.21-23), das von Mahnungen gerahmt wird (v.20,24). Die persuasive Absicht des Ganzen bekundet sich in der Redeeröffnung (v.20): Die Frau soll sich dazu überreden lassen, das Unglück Zions wahrzunehmen, um aus diesem Blick auf eine umfassende Notlage Trost im eigenen Leid zu gewinnen²⁵. Wie aus der Abfolge von v.20,21-23 ersichtlich, übernehmen die einleitenden Imperative zugleich die Funktion einer Aufforderung zur Mittrauer. Die Frau wird angehalten, in die Wir-Klage um Zions Geschick einzustimmen. Das folgende Klagelied (v.21-23), dessen Diktion eine unverkennbare Verwandtschaft mit gewissen Aussagen der Threni aufweist²⁶, entstammt wohl einem gängigen Kultformular. Es besingt die Schändung des Tempelkults (v.21. 22.a-g) sowie das leidvolle Geschick der Glieder der Kultgemeinschaft (v.22h-p) und gipfelt in einer Feststellung über die Entehrung Zions (v.23; vgl. Klgl 1,6). Vergleicht man den Text mit dem Gattungsmuster der alttestamentlichen Kultklage, so

zeigt sich, daß dieses im vorliegenden Fall auf ein Struktur-element, nämlich die Schilderung der Not, reduziert ist. Neben der Bitte fehlt auch der Rückverweis auf das frühere Heilshandeln Gottes²⁷. Diese Beobachtung ist aufschlußreich. Denn durch das genannte Defizit hebt sich das Stück in auffälliger Weise von den Volksklagen der drei ersten Offenbarungsepisoden ab. Hatte Esra dort wiederholt aus dem krassen Widerspruch zwischen einst und jetzt das Argument einer radikalen Anklage Gottes abgeleitet²⁸, so begnügt er sich nun mit der im Wir-Stil gehaltenen Schilderung der Not. Er weist die angesprochene Frau also in eine Klage ein, die, weil sie für das Bekenntnis der Schuld Raum läßt, von der Hoffnung auf eine Wende getragen bleibt. Unter dieser Prämisse erschließt sich auch der Sinn der Schlußmahnung (v.24), die der gattungstypischen Vertrauensäußerung gleichkommen könnte: Die Abkehr vom individuellen Leiden hat dann heilvolles Ergehen zur Folge, wenn sie sich als Einkehr in die kollektive Klage um den Schmerz Zions vollzieht. Zu beachten ist, daß die Tatfolge hier als Zugabe von Versöhnung und Ruhe beschrieben wird. Damit deutet sich ein Zusammenhang an, der eschatologische Dimension besitzt²⁹. Es hat den Anschein, als gewänne das Gespräch am Ende Konturen, die sich dem dialogischen Referenzrahmen nur gezwungen einpassen. Dies gilt wohl auch schon im Blick auf die Dominanz kultischer Sprache in der zweiten Gegenrede Esras.

2. Die Deuterrede Uriels

Ausgelöst durch das wunderbare Ereignis der Transfiguration, entspinnt sich in 10,27b-59 eine weitere Unterredung, in der wieder Uriel als Gesprächspartner Esras auftritt, und zwar in der Rolle der gewichtigen zweiten Redefigur. Wir übergehen das dialogische Zwischenspiel, das den Akt der Schauung mit dem der Deutung vermittelt, und konzentrieren uns auf den Lehrvortrag des Engels 10,38-59. Nach dem Stilgesetz vom Achtergewicht bildet er den eigentlichen Schwerpunkt dieser Interaktionseinheit. Die Disposition der Rede läßt sich der folgenden Übersicht entnehmen:

1	Lehreröffnungsformel	10,38f
2	Deutung	10,40-50
2.1	Eröffnungsnotiz ³⁰	10,40a
2.2	Nennung und Identifikation der Frau	10,40b-44
2.3	Nennung und Identifikation von Teilaussagen der Selbstvorstellung d.Fr.	10,45-48
2.4	Zusammenfassung	10,49f
3.	Rückblick auf die Engelweisung von Episode III	10,51-54
3.1	domus	10,51f
3.2	fundamentum	10,53f
4	Schlußrede	10,55-59
4.1	Heilsorakel	10,55f
4.2	Seligpreisung Esras	10,57
4.3	Weisung betr. weiterer Offenbarung	10,58f

Für das Interesse unserer Untersuchung sind folgende Beobachtungen von Belang:

a) Die eigentliche Deutepartie zerfällt in drei Teile. Der erste (2.2) stellt eine Art proleptischer Gesamterklärung des Gesichts dar. Die Figur der Frau wird genannt und ohne Umschweife mit Zion identifiziert. Mit der Nennung ist eine Beschreibung verbunden, die rückblickend auf das Sichtbarwerden der Frau am Anfang und am Ende der Begegnung Bezug nimmt (v.40b.41a.42). Dabei scheint im Blick auf Esra zwischen dem Akt sinnlicher Wahrnehmung (Präsentation) und dem furchterregenden Widerfahrnis einer Epiphanie (Transfiguration) bewußt differenziert. Jedenfalls in der lat. Version dürfte für das erste das Verb *videre* und für das andere das Verb *apparere* reserviert sein: Die Frau wird von Esra als Trauernde gesehen (*quam vidisti lugentem*) und dann nicht länger als weibliche Person wahrgenommen (*nunc autem iam non speciem mulieris vides*); sie tritt (in veränderter Gestalt) in Erscheinung (*quae tibi apparuit ante paululum*) und zeigt sich schließlich als Stadt (*sed apparuit tibi civitas aedificari*). Ob die übrigen Glieder der Beschreibung (v.41b: *et inchoasti consolare eam*; v.43a: *et quoniam ennarabat tibi de casu filii sui*) dem ursprünglichen Text angehörten, erscheint zweifelhaft. Der Hinweis auf Esras Trostversuch konkurriert mit der sachgerecht plazierten Parallelaussage von v.49. Die Erinnerung an die Erzählung der Frau wirkt nach der Erwähnung der Stadt anachronistisch. Beide Wendungen stören zudem den ausgewogenen Chiasmus der Beschreibung (*apparuit-vidisti-vides-apparuit*). Wie dem auch sei, in erster Linie bezieht sich die Erläuterung gattungsgemäß auf die Frau als den Gegenstand einer Schauung. Sie trägt aber der unterschiedlichen Interaktionsebene von zurückliegender Erst- und Zweitbegegnung dadurch Rechnung, daß sie innerhalb der Schauung selbst zwischen aktiver und passiver Wahrnehmung, zwischen Anschauung und Epiphanie oder 'Vision' und Offenbarung differenziert.

b) Ist damit die Identität der in der Bewegung eines Wandels geschauten Frau erwiesen (*haec est Sion*)³¹, so bemüht sich der zweite Teil der Deutepartie (2.3) darum, diese Gleichsetzung schon an der sinnlich wahrgenommenen Figur, und zwar an der ihre Trauer aussprechenden Frau, zu verifizieren. Dies geschieht in Form einer Allegorese, die Teilaussagen der Rede von 9,43-10,4 unter Verwendung einer Zitationsformel jeweils wörtlich wiederholt und dann analog zur alttestamentlichen Traumdeutung und der ihr darin folgenden Pescherexegeese mit Hilfe "von identifizierenden Pronomina und Kopulae"³² (*haec erat*) auf die Zionsgeschichte bezieht. Dabei finden nur die Episoden (1), (2) und (4) der Erzählung Berücksichtigung: Sie figurieren als Symbole für die Erbauung der Stadt durch Salomon und das erstmalige Darbringen der Tempelopfer (Ende der Unfruchtbarkeit), für das Bewohntsein (Betreuung des Heranwachsenden) und den Untergang Jerusalems (Tod des Sohnes). Mag der gezwungene Charakter dieser gewaltsamen und reichlich eklektisch verfahrenen Allegorese (wie H. Gunkel³³ vermutet) zT. darauf beruhen, daß 9,43-10,4 in Auszügen eine überkommene novellistische Erzählung verwendet ist, die sich gegen den hier verfolgten literarischen Zweck im Grunde sperrt, deutlich ist das Sachinteresse der allegorischen Auslegung: Sie will die Identität derjenigen Figur erweisen, die im Rahmen der ersten Interaktionseinheit als Esras Kommunikationspartner fungiert. Nicht erst die sich verwandelnde, sondern

schon die trauernde Frau, die mit Esra redet, entspricht Zion. Ebenso steht bereits das von ihr artikuliert Anliegen, auf das der Seher im Dialog eingeht, in analoger Beziehung zum Geschick Zions.

c) Der Schlußteil der Deutepartie (2.4) präzisiert die Erläuterung hinsichtlich der Funktion der Schauung. Daß die vv.49 und 50 als zusammengehörig zu betrachten sind, ergibt sich aus der pointierten Korrespondenz der Aussagereihen (Et ecce vidisti ... et tu inchoasti - Et nunc videns Altissimus ... ostendit)³⁴. Sie bilden eine selbständige Einheit, die vom rückläufigen Kontext durch das Präsentativ ecce abgehoben ist. Zwei Gesichtspunkte verdienen Beachtung. Einerseits wiederholt sich in auffälliger Entsprechung zum ersten Teil der Deutepartie die Differenz zwischen aktiver und passiver Wahrnehmung. Dies erhellt aus dem Wechsel der Subjekte (du - der Höchste) sowie der Verben (vidisti - ostendit): Esra sieht die trauernde Frau und versucht sie zu trösten (Bezugnahme auf die erste Interaktionseinheit), doch der Glanz ihrer Doxa wird ihm gezeigt (Bezugnahme auf die Transfiguration als den Beginn der zweiten Interaktionseinheit). Damit verbindet sich nun aber ein zweiter Aspekt. Dem Sehen Esras korrespondiert ein Sehen des Höchsten, in dem das Zeigen der Offenbarung allererst begründet ist: Weil der Höchste Esras Eifer um die Trauer Zions wahrnimmt (Et nunc videns Altissimus, quoniam ex animo contristatus es et quoniam ex toto corde pateris pro ea), läßt er ihn die Frau im Glanz ihrer Herrlichkeit und in der Zierde ihrer Schönheit schauen. Damit wird explizit gemacht, was auf Grund strukturanalytischer Beobachtungen bereits zu vermuten war: Das Ereignis der Epiphanie versteht sich im vorliegenden Zusammenhang als eine Art Auszeichnung, die das Werben Esras für den Schmerz Zions belohnt. Wie sehr der Deuterede daran gelegen ist, das Verhältnis von Interaktion und Schauung auf einen Kausalnexus von Tun und Ergehen festzulegen, zeigt sich bereits in der Lehreröffnung (v.38f). Denn schon an dieser Stelle wird das Ereignis der Offenbarung (revelavit) als Tatfolge, nämlich als Gratifikation für die von Gott wahrgenommenen Verdienste Esras ausgelegt: Vidit enim rectam viam tuam, quoniam sine intermissione contristabaris pro populo tuo et valde lugebas propter Sion (vgl. 6,32). Dieselbe Tendenz verfolgt die Schlußrede, indem sie das Heilsorakel, das Esra zur Schau von Glanz und Größe der eschatologischen Gottesstadt einlädt (v.55), mit einem Makarismus verbindet, der dem Seher die Würde eines von Gott anerkannten Gerechten beilegt (v.57)³⁵.

d) Als Bindeglied zwischen Deutepartie und Schlußrede fungiert der Abschnitt v.51-54, der sehr kunstvoll die Schauung von Stadt und Fundament (vgl. 10,27a) mit den besonderen Maßregeln des Engels vor Beginn der Zionvision (9,23-25) verschränkt. Im nachhinein erweist sich die spezielle Ortsanweisung (ibis autem in campum) als genau überlegtes Kalkül der Offenbarungsregie: Esra kann nur dann der von Gott selbst errichteten Stadt der Endzeit ansichtig werden, wenn er sich an einem Ort befindet, der frei ist von Bauwerk menschlicher Herkunft. Die Doppelung des Rückverweises (propterea [enim] dixi tibi) sowie der Ortsangabe (campus, ager) in v.51 und 53 erklärt sich aus der Absicht, beiden Teilgegenständen der Schauung (civitas, locus de fundamentis magnis) Rechnung zu tragen. Bemerkenswert ist die Konse-

quenz, mit der die Erscheinung der Stadt im Rückblick als ein Offenbarungsereignis (ostendere, v.52.54) ausgegeben wird. Vergleicht man das Stück mit ähnlichen Partien der vorausliegenden Episoden I-III, so zeigt sich, daß es genau die Stelle ausfüllt, die sonst den Ankündigungen weiterer Offenbarungen vorbehalten blieb. Erstmals ist die nach vorn ausgerichtete Engelweisung durch eine Rückblende ersetzt. Dieser Sachverhalt dürfte als ein weiteres Indiz dafür anzusehen sein, daß die Zionvision den vorläufigen Endpunkt einer sich ständig steigenden Offenbarungsbewegung darstellt³⁶.

3. Die Verdrehung der Bezüge

Die exegetische Musterung der beiden Interaktionseinheiten setzt uns instand, die Textur der Zionvision noch präziser zu erfassen. Denn nun zeigt sich, daß der Identifikationsakt der Deuterede die von der dialogischen Bewegung selbst insinuierte Verhältnisbestimmung von real und irreal grundlegend verschiebt. Zunächst wirkt Esras Begegnung mit der Frau als ein Vorgang alltäglicher Kommunikation. Wenn aber die Figur der Frau in Wahrheit Zion repräsentiert, erweist sich der Wirklichkeitscharakter der Szene als Schein. Die konkrete Einzelperson, die Esra augenscheinlich gesehen hat, gewinnt rückwirkend die Züge eines Fabelwesens, das auf etwas anderes verweisen sollte. An der Frau konnte analogisch Zion sichtbar werden, wie es bezeichnenderweise in einer bislang ausgesparten Wendung der Deuterede heißt: Et ecce vidisti similitudinem eius (v.49). Gemäß dieser Doppelung, wie sie erst durch die Deutung erschlossen wird, nimmt die Kommunikation als ganze im Rückblick fiktionalen Charakter an. Was der Seher aktiv wahrnimmt, ist so etwas wie ein 'visionäres Gleichnis' (vgl. 4,47ff), und als Gesprächspartner der Frau wird er selbst zum Akteur in einem gleichnishaften Zusammenhang. Seine Rolle ist doppelsinnig wie die der Frau. Dies besagt: Die Unterredung spielt sich auf einer parabolischen Ebene ab, die sowohl den Charakter der Figuren als auch deren Gesprächsverhalten qualifiziert. Sie stellt somit eine Form symbolischer Interaktion dar. Der Vordergrund präsentiert sich als irrealer Traumwelt, die freilich auf den verborgenen Hintergrund einer möglichen realen zweiten Welt bezogen ist.

Das literarische Raffinement der Darstellung liegt nun zweifellos darin, daß die von Anfang an intendierte analogische Beziehung von Erst- und Zweitsinn bis zum Identifikationsakt der Deutung verschleiert bleibt. Die Signale einer symbolischen Referenz sind innerhalb der ersten Interaktionseinheit derart minimal³⁷, daß der Leser förmlich beim ersten Sinn behaftet wird und den unterstellten Realitätscharakter der Begegnung für bare Münze nimmt. Esra scheint sich tatsächlich durch die konkrete Not eines Einzelschicksals von seinem Eifer für die Frevler ablenken und zugleich unwillkürlich zu einer Parteinahme für das Gottesrecht bewegen zu lassen. So provoziert er das Interesse an der umfassenden Not Israels, wirbt für die Teilnahme an der kollektiven Klage um Zion, veranlaßt eine Gerichtsdoxologie und macht sich zum Sprecher eines Heilsorakels, das sowohl die Wiederkehr eines Toten als auch die Gewährung von Versöhnung und Ruhe verspricht. Daß dieser Einsatz für die Be-

lange Zions, der eine radikale Wende im Verhalten Esras zu erkennen gibt, mit einer Offenbarung der eschatologischen Gottesstadt honoriert wird, erscheint nur angemessen.

Aber nun begegnet die Epiphanie der Stadt als Effekt einer wunderbaren Verwandlung eben jener Frau, die Esra zu trösten unternahm, und diese Frau wird anschließend mit Zion identifiziert. Damit erweist sich die ganze Interaktion retrospektiv als Spiel einer ironischen Verstellung³⁸. Im augenscheinlichen Erstsinn der dialogischen Bewegung kommt ein Hintersinn zum Vorschein, der die Funktion der Dialogpartner verändert. Auf dieser Ebene agiert Esra de facto in der Rolle eines eschatologischen Propheten (vgl. 12,42), und in der Figur der Frau ist die Heilsgemeinde des Zion versammelt. Die Zumutung der Gerichtsdoxologie gilt dem Kollektiv des klagenden Gottesvolkes, und das Orakel (10,24) meint jene Heilssphäre des kommenden Äon, an der die Gesetzestreuern partizipieren. Der zugesagte Widergewinn des Sohnes (10,16) versteht sich dann ebenso hintergründig als Hinweis auf den Beginn der Heilszeit, der mit dem Akt einer Neuschöpfung verbunden ist. Dies wäre noch deutlicher, wenn der Sohn hier als Abbild Isaaks (vgl. 3,15) figurierte, dessen Freilassung beim Moria-Opfer in jüdischer Exegese als Rückkehr aus dem Tod ins Leben und deshalb als Typus einer eschatologischen Totenerweckung ausgelegt werden konnte (vgl. Hebr 11,19)³⁹.

Darin also liegt die ironische Verstellung, daß Esra vermeintlich einer Frau, in Wahrheit aber Zion gegenüber für das Geschick Zions Partei ergreift. Darin besteht die Ironie der Offenbarung, daß er im Verlauf der Begegnung aufgrund einer von der Offenbarung selbst inszenierten Täuschung zur Wahrnehmung des ihm zugeordneten Parakletenamtes (vgl. 5,17f) veranlaßt wird. Ohne sich dessen bewußt zu sein, erfüllt er bereits an dieser Stelle die Funktion eines prophetischen Gesetzeszeugen, die er später (12,40b-49; 14,27-36) ausdrücklich übernimmt.

So ist die Offenbarung der eschatologischen Gottesstadt, die dem Seher zuteil wird, durch eine noch radikaler gefaßte Kehre im Verhalten Esras motiviert, als dies der Erstsinn der Interaktion sichtbar macht. Esra hat sich weitaus mehr zugemutet, als im Vordergrund der Begegnung mit der Frau erkennbar wird. Deshalb widerfährt ihm der Einblick in das Mysterium des Eschaton (10,38). Was ihm gezeigt wird, besiegelt das Recht seiner Parteinahme für den Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang des Gesetzes⁴⁰ und legitimiert die von ihm geltend gemachte Hoffnung. Und wieder verkehren sich die Bezüge. Was sich anfangs als die ir-reale Welt des Überwirklichen ausnahm (vgl. 10,36), erweist sich nun als die reale Welt des Möglichen. Denn Gegenstand der passiven Wahrnehmung ist die Welt einer von Gott möglich gemachten Zukunft. An dieser Wende von aktiver Tröstung zu passivem Trostgewinn bekundet sich zugleich die Paradoxie eines Rollentauschs, von dem Zion und Esra betroffen sind. Während nämlich Zion als getröstete Trösterin in Erscheinung tritt, begegnet der Seher als tröstender Trostempfänger, der gerade dadurch befähigt wird, beim Höchsten für Israels Geschick einzustehen und das Trostamt an Israel wahrzunehmen:

Ego enim non dereli(n)qui vos
neque excessi a vobis,
sed veni in hunc locum,
ut deprecarer pro desolatione Sion
et ut quererem misericordiam pro humilitate sancti-
ficationis vestrae (12,48).

IV. Das Zionmotiv in den vorausliegenden Offenbarungsepisoden

Der Verfasser von 4Esr hat die Zionthematik, auf die sich das Ganze in 9,26-10,59 zuspitzt, in den drei ersten Gesprächsgängen durch eine Reihe zT. auffällig platzierter Hinweise von langer Hand vorbereitet. Auf die daran ablesbare innere Kohärenz der Komposition soll abschließend aufmerksam gemacht werden.

Besonders deutlich sind die Beziehungen zwischen der Zionvision und dem Auftakt der ersten Offenbarungsepisode (3,1ff). Dies zeigt sich, wenn man die Aussagen der Volksklage 9,29-37, mit der die Zionvision eröffnet wird, in die Überlegungen einbezieht. Dort beschreibt Esra zunächst die Sinaioffenbarung und deren Effekt auf Israel: Wegen der fehlenden Gesetzesobservanz gingen die Väter zugrunde (9,29-33), ein Verhängnis, das sich bis in die Gegenwart erstreckt (9,36). Die metaphorische Vorstellung vom Gesetz als Saat, von Israel als Mutterboden sowie von der Heilssphäre als Frucht der Saat⁴¹ bildet den Hintergrund für die damit verbundene Ausgangsthese, die besagt, daß Israel verdirbt, während das im Gesetz verankerte Heil bleibt: Der Boden vergeht, doch Saat und Frucht sind davon unbetroffen. Gegen die Plausibilität dieses Zusammenhangs verwahrt sich die folgende Kritik (9,34-37). Die Metaphorik von Boden und Saat wird nun um die von Gefäß und Inhalt erweitert. Esra macht geltend, daß die Erfahrung genau gegenläufig ist: In aller Regel bleibt der Boden erhalten, doch Saat und Frucht verderben; ein Gefäß erweist sich als beständig, doch der Inhalt kann verschüttet werden. Darauf basiert die Vorhaltung (9,36f), die in Form einer Anwendung e contrario zur Sprache kommt:

Nos quidem, qui legem accepimus,
peccantes peribimus
et cor nostrum, quod sudecepit eam;
nam lex non perit,
sed permanet in suo honore.

Im Kontext der Zionvision wird diese Argumentation implizit aufgegriffen und zugleich transformiert. Nicht ohne bewußt intendierten Hintersinn wiederholen sich die metaphorischen Motive der Eingangsklage in der Selbstvorstellung der Frau, einer Unfruchtbar-Fruchtbaren, die ihre Leibesfrucht verliert. Und im angesagten Wiederempfang des Sohnes klingt das Bild vom Rückgewinn einer verlorenen Frucht an. Worauf die sich daran bereits abzeichnende Verschiebung der Bezüge angelegt ist, zeigt die Offenbarung der eschatologischen Gottesstadt. Nun erscheint Zion selbst als Bleibe, in der sich der Same Jakobs (vgl. 9,30) bergen kann. Ohne daß dies auch terminologisch seinen Niederschlag gefunden hätte, bleiben die Motive der Eingangsklage textbestimmend, freilich in augenfälliger Verzerrung. Israel wird zum Gegenstand einer verlager-

ten Boden-Saat- oder Gefäß-Inhalt-Relation: Als Same Jakobs ist es dazu ausersehen, den Raum der eschatologischen Gottesstadt zu füllen⁴². Damit wird der von Esra unterstellte Gedanke einer Beständigkeit der Heilssphäre bekräftigt, aber so, daß Israel dieser Sphäre als dem Ort seiner Bleibe zugesprochen wird. Es wandelt sich aus einem Objekt des Verderbens in das Subjekt des Lebens. Daß für diese Ortsanweisung der Zionvision, die sich in hintergründiger Entsprechung zur Sinaioffenbarung ereignet (vgl. das Motiv der Einöde 10,51ff mit 9,29), die Zwischenbestimmung des Gesetzes konstitutiv bleibt, macht Esras Abschiedsrede explizit. Dort wird Israel weiterhin als Stätte des Gesetzessamens beansprucht (vgl. 14,34⁴³).

Überblickt man diesen Zusammenhang, wird die angedeutete Korrespondenz zwischen der Zionvision und der Eingangsklage der ersten Offenbarungsepisode offenkundig. Die bildliche Rede von der Frucht, die sich auf die durch das Gesetz erschlossene Heilssphäre bezieht, ist durch 3,20.33 vorbereitet, und in 3,21f dürfte bereits die Metaphorik der Saat vorausgesetzt sein (vgl. 4,30): Das Herz Israels versteht sich als Stätte des Gesetzessamens, dessen Entfaltung freilich wie bei Adam durch die am selben Ort angesiedelte Wurzel des Bösen verhindert wird⁴⁴. Auch wenn die unterschiedliche Tendenz der Aussagen zu beachten bleibt, findet der Rekurs auf die Sinaioffenbarung von 9,29ff seine Entsprechung in 3,17ff. Dort ist auch die Rede vom Samen Jakobs präfiguriert (vgl. 9,30 mit 3,17.19). Bezeichnenderweise kulminiert der Geschichtsabriß von 3,4-27 in einem Bericht über den Bau der Davidstadt sowie den Frevel ihrer Bewohner (3,23ff), und die anschließend entfaltete Problemstellung (3,28-36) gilt pointiert der Frage nach dem Grund für die desolate Lage Zions⁴⁵. Daran wird sichtbar, daß schon die Eingangsklage der ersten Episode in grundlegender Weise von der Zionthematik bestimmt ist (vgl. auch 3,2). Bewußt wird gleich zu Beginn einer sich über drei Gesprächsgänge erstreckenden Kontroverse das Motiv angeschlagen, das nach Abschluß dieser Partie alle Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zieht. Das Gefälle der Offenbarungsbewegung ist mit Bedacht darauf abgestellt, daß die vierte Episode der ersten respondiert.

An ähnlich exponierter Stelle wiederholt sich die Bezugnahme auf Zion im Eingangsgedicht der zweiten Episode (5,23-30). Der Israels Erwählung besingende hymnische Teil der Klage (5,23-27) entfaltet sich in zwei metaphorisch geprägten Reihen, die sich dadurch unterscheiden, daß im einen Fall Bilder aus der unbelebten, im anderen Bilder aus der belebten Natur Verwendung finden. Beide Sequenzen münden in Aussagen, die ohne Bild den jeweils intendierten Akt der Erwählung eines unbelebten bzw. belebten Phänomens zur Sprache bringen: *et ex omnibus aedificatis civitatibus sanctificasti tibimetipsi Sion* (v.25); *et ex omnibus multiplicatis populis adquisisti tibi populum unum* (v.27)⁴⁶. Damit ist der tragende Gesichtspunkt einer Doppelung in der Einheit der Erwählung namhaft gemacht, wie sie innerhalb der Zionvision durch die Figur der Frau repräsentiert wird: Die erwählte Stadt fungiert zugleich als Bleibe für das erwählte Gottesvolk.

Die übrigen Bezugnahmen auf Zion finden sich ausnahmslos in Äußerungen des Engels, und zwar in einer Lehrauskunft über das konkurrenzlose Wirken des Schöpfers (6,4: *et antequam aestima-*

retur scabellum Sion), in einer Beschreibung der präexistenten Eschata (8,52: aedificata est civitas mit der Parallelzeile: probata est requies!) und schließlich in einem Wort über die Verbindung von Zeichen und Endzeit (7,26). Die beiden ersten Belege sind Bestandteile längerer Reden und insofern weniger augenfällig. Der dritte, der sich auf die eschatologische Offenbarung von Stadt und Land (terra) bezieht, scheint mit der Erwähnung der Epiphanie einer Frau (als Braut) verbunden. Wenn dieses Detail nicht, wie vermutet⁴⁷, aus einem Übersetzungsfehler resultiert, könnte man fast versucht sein, die Aussage als geheimnisvolle Vorankündigung der Zionvision zu verstehen. Was die Hinweise auf Zion innerhalb der Dikta des Engels angeht, scheint die Ausbeute an Belegen somit außerordentlich gering. Dies könnte sich daraus erklären, daß der Verfasser bemüht ist, das Motiv auf seiten der Offenbarung für den Akt der Zionvision selbst zu reservieren. Dem entspricht, daß die einzige Bezugnahme auf Zion in Engelmund, die sich wirklich an exponierter Stelle findet, in Form einer versteckten Anspielung zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Gemeint ist die erste Erwidernung des Engels auf die Eingangsklage der dritten Offenbarungsepisode. Sie beantwortet die Frage, warum Israel die Fülle des Heils im Lauf der Geschichte vorenthalten blieb, obwohl es sich doch als das berufene Volk und damit als Geschöpf der Geschöpfe betrachten darf (6,59), mit zwei Gleichnissen (7,3b-9). Das eine berichtet von einem weiten Meer, das nur über eine enge Zufahrt zu erreichen ist. Das andere kündigt von einer herrlichen Stadt, die dem Erbfolger nur auf einem schmalen, gefährvollen Pfad zugänglich ist. Die demonstrative Absicht beider Stücke kommt in den jeweils angehängten Schlußfragen zum Ausdruck: Die Weite (des Meeres) und die Erbschaft (der Stadt) entziehen sich jeder Annäherung, sofern der davor liegende Engpaß nicht durchmessen ist (vgl. vv. 5.9). Berücksichtigt man den literarischen Zusammenhang, in den beide Gleichnisse integriert sind, so ist deutlich, daß sie für eine Sicht werben, nach der Israels Lage als ebenso unumgänglich beurteilt werden muß, wie dies in den geschilderten Situationen der Fall ist. Auch der geschichtliche Weg des Gottesvolkes soll als das Durchqueren einer Enge verstanden werden, die dem Heilsgut der Verheißung im Sinne einer unerläßlichen Zugangsbedingung vorgeschaltet wurde⁴⁸. Nun weisen beide Stücke aber gewisse Einzelzüge auf, die nicht unbedingt im Dienst der argumentativen Funktion stehen. Dies gilt für die Beschreibung der Enge in der zweiten Erzählung, die im Vergleich mit der ersten als überschüssig zu betrachten ist. Der Hinweis auf die Abgründe von Feuer und Wasser könnte, wie U. Gleßner vermutet⁴⁹, auf Sir 15, 14-17 anspielen und damit implizit die Alternative von 7,19ff vorbereiten. Als überquellendes Detail, das metaphorischen Beiklang hat, erweist sich dann aber auch das Motiv der 'gebauten Stadt, die alles Gutes voll ist' (plena omnium bonorum). Zu allem Überfluß wird die Lage der Stadt auf das offene Gelände einer Ebene bezogen (et posita in loco campestri). Nimmt man hinzu, daß die Rede von der Erbschaft eschatologische Dimension besitzt⁵⁰, wird ein anderer Referenzrahmen des Gesagten erkennbar. Das Ganze erweist sich zugleich als Anspielung auf die Fülle der neuen Gottesstadt, an der Anteil zu gewinnen Israel versprochen ist. Auf verhaltene Art und bewußt verschleiert deutet sich bereits an dieser Stelle die Thematik der Zionvision an. Dies gilt um so mehr, als auch die Metapher der Weite, die sich

im ersten Gleichnis findet, ein stehendes Epitheton des himmlischen Jerusalem darstellt (vgl. 1QH 6,3)⁵¹.

Anmerkungen

- 1) Zur Begründung und zum Einzelnachweis vgl. Harnisch: 1981 (Abschnitt II: Analyse der Makrostruktur des Werkes).
- 2) Vgl. Haymann, 47 f.
- 3) Zur Peripetiefunktion der Zionvision vgl. Breech, 272; Thompson, 218ff; Brandenburger: 1977; Harnisch: 1981 (Abschnitt IV.1: Der wunderbare Rollenwechsel Esras). Nach der sehr aufschlußreichen Untersuchung U. Gleßmers, die leider nur als Computerdruck zugänglich ist, soll sich der Umschwung der dialogischen Bewegung bereits innerhalb der dritten Offenbarungsepisode abzeichnen, und zwar in der auf die Oratio Esrae abzielenden Partie 7,70ff (vgl. bei Gleßmer bes. 59ff; ähnlich Westermann: 1954, 78). Dabei scheint indessen zu wenig berücksichtigt, daß die Unterredung trotz der veränderten Diktion Esras den Charakter einer Kontroverse beibehält (vgl. nur das Schlussvotum 9,15f sowie die Eingangsklage der vierten Episode 9,29-37). Sosehr Gleßmers Arbeit in dieser Hinsicht zu kritischen Rückfragen Anlaß gibt, stellt sie insgesamt einen außerordentlich materialreichen und sachlich gewichtigen Beitrag zur Auslegung von 4Esr dar (zur Zionvision vgl. den sehr anregenden Exkurs 13ff).
- 4) Vgl. Koch: 1974, 146.168f; 1981 (Absatz 1.1).
- 5) Vgl. Koch: 1978, 49ff; Harnisch: 1981 (Abschnitt III: Lehrgespräch und Kontroverse zwischen Esra und Uriel).
- 6) Erscheint 1981 in der Sammelpublikation der Kongreßbeiträge: Die Apokalyptik im Mittelmeerraum und im Vorderen Orient (Hg. D. Hellmholm), Tübingen.
- 7) Vgl. den Überblick 3: "Strukturaufriß von 44 Visionen" im Anhang von Koch: 1981
- 8) Die Vision von Wolke und Tropfen (4,49) bleibt hier ausgeklammert, da sie das Strukturmuster weniger klar zu erkennen gibt.
- 9) Vgl. zB. Dan 8,3a; Sach 2,1; weitere Belege bei Hasslberger, 87 Anm. 20; zum Formelcharakter der Wendung vgl. ebd., 88f.
- 10) Daß es sich dabei um ein eschatologisch qualifiziertes Phänomen handelt, belegen Aussagen wie 7,97 und 7,125 (vgl. den Gebrauch des Verbs fulgere).
- 11) Mit den Seitenreferenten ist wohl eine weitere Zeile zu ergänzen: 'und mein Herz war sehr erschrocken' (vgl. Syr, Aeth, ArabEw).
- 12) Zur Wendung et statuit me super pedes meos vgl. zB. Ez 2,1.
- 13) Nach Violet: 1924, 144 Anm. z.St. vielleicht als Zusatz (der griech. Überlieferungsschicht) zu beurteilen.

- 14) Zur Sache vgl. zB. Theißen, 13ff.28ff; Ricœur, 70: "... it is the task of hermeneutics to identify the individual discourse (the 'message') through the modes of discourse. In other words, it is the task of hermeneutics to use the dialectics of discourse and work, or performance and competence, as a mediation at the service not of the code, but of the message".
- 15) In 4Esr scheint ein analoger Fall 6,17ff vorzuliegen. Dort wird die Struktureinheit des Berichts einer Audition mit wunderbaren Folgen (6,17.29) aufgesprengt. Das aus dem Zusammenhang abgelöste Element der Auditionseröffnung (6,17) fungiert jetzt als Exposition einer Rede über die Zeichen der Endzeit (6,18-28).
- 16) Damit ist zugleich der Divergenzpunkt markiert, durch den sich die Zionvision sowohl von der Adler- als auch von der Menschensohnvision in 4Esr abhebt.
- 17) Zur Wendung Et dimisi cogitatus in quibus eram cogitans (9,39) vgl. 3,1; 5,21 (cogitationes); 6,34 (cogitare vana) sowie den Zusammenhang 4,13-21.
- 18) Das Gesprächsverhalten Esras ähnelt also dem des Engels, und die Frau gerät unversehens in die Rolle Esras. Anspielungen auf das Verhaltensmuster des Sehers bestärken diesen Eindruck: Die Frau begibt sich auf das Feld, um zu fasten (vgl. Harnisch: 1981, Abschnitt IV.1).
- 19) Dabei dürfte ein umfassendes Unheilsverhängnis im Blick sein. Die Einschränkung *pene omnes in perditionem ambulans* (10,10) stellt eine Sonderlesart der lat. Übersetzungsversion dar.
- 20) Daher ist mit Violet: 1924, 136 (und ebd. Anm. z.St.) eine Textzäsur zwischen v.8ab und v.8c anzunehmen.
- 21) Zur Diskussion des Problems vgl. Thompson, 218ff, dessen Lösungsversuch allerdings nicht zu überzeugen vermag (zur Kritik des problematischen Interpretationsansatzes dieser Untersuchung vgl. meine Rezension in ThLZ).
- 22) Vgl. 7,38 und die 'komische' Kehre im Geschick der Frau: Et *iocundata sum super eum valde, ego et vir meus et omnes cives mei* (9,45); vgl. 7,36.38.47.
- 23) Gunkel, 387 Anm.k. Allerdings konzidiert Gunkel (ebd.), das Wort bleibe doppeldeutig; in der (von Gunkel supponierten) novellistischen Vorlage sei der Schluß wohl so zu denken, "daß der Prophet den Sohn der unglücklichen Mutter wieder erweckt habe" (344).
- 24) Hintergründig dürfte zugleich eine Korrespondenz zwischen 10,17 und 10,55 beabsichtigt sein: Esras Aufforderung an die Frau wird von der ihm selbst geltenden Engelweisung, die Stadt zu betreten und deren Glanz zu schauen, abgelöst und überboten.
- 25) Zum topischen Charakter des Trostmotivs vgl. Schmitz/Stählin, 789 Anm. 144.
- 26) Vgl. bes. Klgl 1,4-6.18f; 5,11.
- 27) Vgl. Westermann: 1954, 48; 1968: 39ff.

- 28) Vgl. Westermann: 1954, 77f; Harnisch: 1969, 22f.
- 29) Vgl. 7,38 und die Wendung *probata est requies* 8,52 (dort bezeichnenderweise im synonymen Parallelismus mit der Aussage *aedificata est civitas*). Wie Hofius (vgl. 44ff; zu 4Esr: 60ff, auch 91ff) nachgewiesen hat, versteht sich die eschatologisch gedeutete *nnnn* von Ps 95,11 (vgl. Dtn 12,9; Ps 132,14) als lokale Größe und bezeichnet die endzeitliche Ruhestätte Jahwes und Israels, nämlich sowohl den Tempel als auch die heilige Stadt und das heilige Land.
- 30) Der ursprüngliche Wortlaut dürfte in Syr ('Hiervon also ist die Rede'; vgl. Aeth, Armen) eher bewahrt sein als in der reflektierter wirkenden Wendung der lat. Version: 'Hic ergo intellectus visionis'.
- 31) Zum Hintergrund dieser traditionellen Gleichsetzung vgl. neben Klgl besonders Jes 66,77ff, ein Aussagezusammenhang, auf den innerhalb von 4Esr auch 4,40 angespielt wird (vgl. Harnisch: 1973, 66f. 69f); zur Sache vgl. Gleßmer, 13f; Zimmer.
- 32) Klauck, 355; vgl. 67ff.
- 33) Gunkel, 344; vgl. Klauck, 80.
- 34) In der lat. Version ist die Deutung bereits mit v.49 abgeschlossen. Dies zeigt die Wendung: *Haec erant tibi aperienda* (v.49fin.; vgl. ArabGild). Indessen kann kein Zweifel bestehen, daß diese Abgrenzung der eigentlichen Deutepartie auf einer Fehlinterpretation des (der) Übersetzer beruht. Bei den Seitenreferenten Syr, Aeth, ArabEw und Armen findet sich keine vergleichbare Schlußfloskel. Die Zäsur ist daher erst zwischen v.50 und v.51 voranzusetzen (gegen Violet: 1924, 146).
- 35) Vgl. 7,76b.77; 8,47b-49; 9,13 und die Rede von Esra und 'seinesgleichen' 8,51.62.
- 36) In anderem Zusammenhang habe ich nachzuweisen versucht, daß es sich beim Adler- und Menschensohngedicht von 4Esr um sekundäre Ankrystallisationen an die Zionvision handelt (vgl. Harnisch: 1981, Abschnitt II). Dieser sekundären Schicht ist dann auch die Ankündigung 10,58f zuzurechnen. Für den ursprünglichen Zusammenhang ist folgende Textfolge zu beanspruchen: 9,26-10,57 (+13,54f?); 12,40b-49; 13,57f+14,1-47. Die Aussage 10,56 weist auf die mit der Theophanie 14,1ff verbundene Audition voraus.
- 37) Vgl. die kultisch verwurzelte Sprache von 10,21-23 sowie die Rede von 'Versöhnung' und 'Ruhe' in 10,24 (auch die Formulierung der Gerichtsdoxologie 10,16a). Dagegen erweist sich die Rede von den Mitbürgern (*omnes cives mei* [9,45; 10,2]), vom Löschen der Lampen (10,2; vgl. 10,22d) und von der Erniedrigung der Frau (9,41.45; vgl. 10,7.22a) erst im Rückblick als doppelsinnig.
- 38) Vgl. Allemanns Definition der Ironie (18) sowie seine Feststellung: "Literarische Ironie ist um so ironischer, je vollständiger sie auf Ironiesignale zu verzichten weiß - ohne Preisgabe ihrer Transparenz." (20).

- 39) Vgl. Bill III, 746; Michel, 173f; G.Vermes, 193ff. Bemerkenswert ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch die eschatologische Deutung der Abrahamverheißung auf die endzeitliche Gottesstadt Hebr 11,8-10. Angesichts der von Hofius (91ff) herausgestellten Korrespondenz zwischen den *ward nauotc*-Aussagen in Hebr 3,7-4,13 und einer Reihe von Sachparallelen in 4Esr dürfte der Verweis auf den Hebräerbrief nicht ganz abwegig sein.
- 40) Vgl. 13,54f.
- 41) Vgl. die Korrespondenz von *fructum facere* und *glorificari* (Gunkel, 385: "Herrlichkeit erwerben") in 9,31 sowie von *fructum fieri* und *vivere (posse)* in 8,6.
- 42) Die Vorstellung von Zion als einem Gefäß scheint 10,23 im Blick, wo der Effekt von Zions Entsiegelung nach Art einer (Doxa-)Entleerung gedacht sein dürfte (vgl. Klgl 1,6); so ausdrücklich die armen. Version: *Contumelia affecta est Sion, sicut vas inutile, et soluta est de gloria sua, et nos traditi sumus in manus hostium nostrorum.*
- 43) Damit macht sich Esra die Argumentation des Engels zu eigen (vgl. 7,92.127ff).
- 44) Vgl. Brandenburger: 1962, 32ff; Harnisch: 1969, 45ff.165ff.
- 45) Vgl. Harnisch: 1969, 33ff.
- 46) Damit revidiere ich meine Überlegung zum Aufbau des Textes in Harnisch: 1969, 28 und ebd. Anm. 3.
- 47) Vgl. Violet: 1910, 140 Anm. zur lat. Version.
- 48) Vgl. Harnisch: 1969, 302ff; zur Analyse des Stückes vgl. jetzt die sehr aufschlußreichen Beobachtungen von Gleßmer, 6f.
- 49) Vgl. Gleßmer, 7.
- 50) Vgl. Hofius, 92f.
- 51) Vgl. G. Jeremias, 246. Der Parallelismus der Metaphern (Weite, Erbschaft) legt die Vermutung nahe, daß beide Gleichnisse hintergründig auf ein und dasselbe Phänomen, nämlich die endzeitliche Gottesstadt, bezogen sein wollen (vgl. TestHi 18,6, wo freilich die Verbindung von Meer und Stadt als die von Weg und Ziel erscheint).

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THE PRE-PAULINE CHRISTOLOGICAL CREDAL
FORMULAE OF 1 THESSALONIANS

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Three times in 1 Thessalonians Paul quotes Christological credal formulae that have been taken over from those who were Christians either before or alongside him. As such, these formulae represent some of the earliest formulations of Christian belief. This study will examine the formulaic character of these formulae, what they say in themselves, how they are used in their immediate contexts and what significance they have for the theology of 1 Thessalonians.

A. Jesus' Resurrection by God--1 Th 1:10

The first pre-Pauline credal formula to appear in Pauline literature and, therefore, the first credal formula to appear in Christian literature altogether is, as we might expect, a resurrection statement. This formula is found within the context of 1 Th 1:9-10, and the text of these verses reads:

9a	αὐτοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν	
	ὅποιαν εἰσοδὸν ἐσχόμεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς,	
b	καὶ πῶς ἐπεστρέψατε	πρὸς θεὸν
		ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδῶλων
c	δουλεῦειν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ,	
10a	καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ	ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν,
b	ὃν ἡγείρεν	ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, Ἰη- σοῦν,
c	τὸν ρυθμιζόμενον ἡμᾶς	ἐκ τῆς ὁργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης.

The formula itself appears in v. 10b, "whom he raised from the dead," and is a variant of the most frequently cited credal formula in the New Testament. Originally the formula probably had the wording, ὁ θεὸς ἡγείρεν Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν,¹ and it has been adapted to its present context in vv. 9-10 in the following ways: The subject θεός was removed from the formula, since it is clear from v. 9c that God is the implied subject of ἡγείρεν. The ὃν replaces the original name of the object, probably Ἰησοῦν, in order to fit the formula into the sentence as a relative clause. That the name of Jesus occurs immediately following the formula proper is a sign that its original place was within the formula.² We find the same phenomenon in Acts 17:3:

3a	διανοίγων καὶ παρατιθέμενος
b	ὅτι τὸν Χριστὸν ἔδει παθεῖν καὶ ἀναστῆναι ἐκ νεκρῶν,
c	καὶ ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός, ὃς Ἰησοῦς,
d	ὃν ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν.

In this identity formula of v. 3c, the οὗτος has replaced the name of Jesus, but for clarity and for emphasis the name is stated following the formula. While emphasis on the name may also be intended in 1 Th 1:10b, the name is probably given simply due to the fact that the antecedent of the ὃν is τὸν υἱόν, and the full impact of the original formula would be lost if the name of Jesus were omitted. Therefore, the name of Jesus belongs to v. 10b and not at the beginning of v. 10c,

a point which will take on greater importance when we look at the overall structure of vv. 9-10.

One other peculiarity of v. 10b needs to be noted at this point, namely, the presence of the definite article τῶν, which is otherwise missing from this formula when Paul quotes it elsewhere.³ While the reading is textually uncertain,⁴ we do find the phrase ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν appearing in deuterio-Pauline writings in formulaic contexts (Eph 5:14; Col 1:18); we may also account for the τῶν in 1 Th 10b in light of a conscious parallelism to the preceding phrase ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν in v. 10a.

Theologically, the resurrection formula of v. 10b is significant in that it makes a clear distinction between God and Jesus, naming God as the agent of Jesus' resurrection from among the dead. We learn little more about Jesus, except that he must have died and was, therefore, a real person, but we learn nothing about the significance of his resurrection (or implied death) from the formula itself.⁵ How the formula is used in its immediate context in vv. 9-10 may provide more clues to the formula's significance, so we turn now to those verses.

It has long been noted that vv. 9-10 are unusual in many regards, both as far as terminology and content are concerned.⁶ The verb ἀναμένειν, for instance, is a hapax legomenon in the New Testament, while the adjective ἀληθινός is found only here in Paul. The phrase ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν is unusual on two counts, for Paul prefers the singular οὐρανός and normally leaves out the definite article. We have already noted the peculiarity of the definite article in the phrase ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν. Even though the words ῥεσθαι and υἱός are known to Paul elsewhere, nonetheless, he uses them here in an uncommon manner. ῥεσθαι is employed here in regard to the eschatological function of the Coming One, Jesus, rather than in reference to the present deliverance on God's part, as Paul more frequently uses the word. Also, Paul seldom uses the word υἱός in connection with the parousia. Even the absolute use of the name "Jesus" is unusual for Paul, unless the context is formulaic.⁷ Given the large number of departures from Pauline terminology and the differences in these verses from the way Paul normally expresses himself, it seems likely that he is drawing upon or even quoting pre-Pauline material, especially in vv. 9c-10.⁸

Less convincing, however, are the arguments that the ἐπιστρέφειν clause of v. 9b is also pre-Pauline and, as such, belongs to the material in vv. 9c-10. Basically four arguments have been set forth to show that v. 9b is pre-Pauline: 1) In Acts similar terminology is found which involves a "turning toward the Lord" (Acts 9:35; 11:21) or a "turning to God" (Acts 14:15; 15:19; 26:18, 20) and a "turning from" darkness or the past (Acts 26:18; 14:15). 2) Besides 1 Th 1:9b, Paul uses the verb ἐπιστρέφειν only in Gal 4:9 and 2 Cor 3:16, but these last two passages are to be distinguished from Paul's mission terminology. Gal 4:9 is not a matter of turning to Christ but to the opposite, an apostasy from Christ--the Galatians are in danger of turning to the ἀσθενή καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα--and 2 Cor 3:16 falls out of consideration, because it is a quotation from Ex 34:34 via an early Christian tradition which is different from the LXX text. 3) Instead of ἐπιστρέφειν, Paul prefers to use other terms to express becom-

ing a Christian which are theologically fuller and clearer, e.g. πιστεύειν (Rom 10:14-17; δέχεσθαι (τὸν) λόγον ὁπαραλαμβάνω λόγον ἀκοῆς (1 Th 1:6; 2:13), ὑπακούειν and ὑπακοή (Rom 6:17; 10:16). 4) Since the material which follows 1 Th 1:9b is pre-Pauline, this lends support to the supposition that v. 9b also is pre-Pauline.⁹

It can readily be conceded that ἐπιστρέφειν is not a common word in Paul and that Acts uses it in a similar way, but the appearances of the verb in Gal 4:9 and 2 Cor 3:16 cannot be so easily dismissed as irrelevant, and the form of 1 Th 1:9-10 needs to be more adequately taken into consideration. In v. 9b Paul is directly addressing the Thessalonians, so that even if he is drawing upon pre-Pauline material, he is hardly quoting directly at this point but is, at least, adapting the material to his audience. That Paul may have played an even greater role in the composition of v. 9b may be indicated by his manner of expression in Gal 4:9: ...πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε...ἐπὶ ...στοιχεῖα, οἷς...δουλεῦσιν θέλετε. The similarities with 1 Th 1:9b are striking: πῶς + ἐπιστρέφειν + prepositional phrase (but ἐπὶ instead of πρὸς) and the infinitive δουλεῦσιν, though under the governance of a different verb. No one claims that Paul is quoting pre-Pauline material in Gal 4:9; Paul is simply being Paul. But if this is Pauline language in Gal 4:9, why is the same not said for 1 Th 1:9b? A closer look at the so-called stereotyped language surrounding the verb ἐπιστρέφειν reveals that there is no fixed wording either in Paul or in Acts:

1 Th 1:9b	πῶς ἐπιστρέψατε	πρὸς	τὸν θεόν
		ἀπὸ	τῶν εἰδώλων
Gal 4:9	πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε...ἐπὶ	τὰ	στοιχεῖα
2 Cor 3:16	ἐπιστρέψῃ	πρὸς	κύριον
Acts 9:35	ἐπέστρεψαν	ἐπὶ	τὸν κύριον
9:40	ἐπιστρέψας	πρὸς	τὸ σῶμα
11:21	ἐπέστρεψεν	ἐπὶ	τὸν κύριον
14:15	ἐπιστρέφειν	ἐπὶ	θεὸν ζῶντα
15:19	ἐπιστρέφουσιν	ἐπὶ	τὸν θεόν
26:18	ἐπιστρέψαι	ἀπὸ	σκότους
		εἰς	φῶς
26:20	ἐπιστρέφειν	ἐπὶ	τὸν θεόν

Since Paul formulates Gal 4:9 ad hoc with its πῶς + ἐπιστρέφειν + prepositional phrase and since the two prepositional phrases of 1 Th 1:9b appear in none of the numerous ἐπιστρέφειν passages in Acts or elsewhere in Paul, it seems that a case can be made for the view that Paul is formulating v. 9b ad hoc as well.¹⁰

Formal considerations also suggest that care should be taken before lumping v. 9b together with the pre-Pauline material of vv. 9c-10. In the present context of vv. 9-10, the verb ἐπιστρέφω governs the two infinitive clauses of vv. 9c-10a, and it is in these infinitive clauses that we find the basic structural parallelism:

....δουλεῦσιν θεῷ κτλ.
καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ κτλ.

Since the verb ἐπιστρέφω governs both of these infinitives, it would be incorrect to see v. 9b as a parallel construction to v. 9c and focus attention solely on the θεός clauses while ignoring the verb elements in these two clauses, for these

elements are clearly not parallel.

The irregularity and unevenness between v. 9b and c is best accounted for by Pauline redaction. Paul introduces the pre-Pauline formulation of vv. 9c-10 with an ad hoc expression similar to the one he uses in Gal 4:9. In the process, he draws upon and interprets 1 Th 1:9c. It is possible, of course, that the verb ἐπιστρέφω originally introduced the infinitive clauses, perhaps, in an imperative or hortatory form, but this remains conjecture.

If v. 9b is to be largely attributed to Paul, then a severe blow has been dealt to Gerhard Friedrich's suggestion that vv. 9b-10 are a hymn consisting of two strophes of three lines apiece:¹¹

Strophe One

ἐπεστρέψατε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων
δουλεῦν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ,
καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν

Strophe Two

ὃν ἡγείρεν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν
Ἰησοῦν τὸν ρυθμιζόμενον ἡμᾶς
ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης.

Both of these strophes, according to Friedrich, follow the same time schema--the first line of each referring to the past, the second line of each speaking of the present situation, and the third line of each directed to the future. While the first strophe is directed toward Gentile-Christians, the second strophe deals with Christ alone.

Though there is a hymn fragment in Eph 5:14 that is a summons to action in which the audience (second person singular) is directly addressed, we have nothing comparable elsewhere to a strophe directed to new converts concerning what they have done. But quite apart from the weakness of including v. 9b in this reconstruction is the problematic time schema proposed by Friedrich, since it is highly questionable whether the ἀναμένειν is any less present tense than δουλεῦν and whether ρυθμιζόμενον has less of a future connotation than ἐρχομένης. Since the basic grammatical structural considerations have been largely ignored, there are anomalies like the final line of the reconstruction consisting only of a prepositional phrase. Why this prepositional phrase should be singled out and considered a separate line is unclear, especially when there are so many other prepositional phrases in vv. 9b-10.

It is not necessary, however, to pursue this matter further, for it is already clear that there is no hymn here, only prose¹² which is conducive to memory. The formulation which results, minus v. 9b, reads in its sense lines as follows:

9c ...	δουλεῦν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ	
10a καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ	ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν	
b	ὃν ἡγείρεν	ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, Ἰησοῦν,
c	τὸν ρυθμιζόμενον ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς	
		τῆς ἐρχομένης.

Since it is not possible to add the verbs, which often introduce credal formulae, to these infinitive clauses, this formulation is probably not a credal formula, but a formula which

was used for catechesis. As such, it may have been introduced with a hortatory or imperative verb, like "Let us turn to serve..." or "Let us desire to serve..." or "Turn to serve..." The verbs ἐπιστρέφειν and θέλειν suggest themselves by their presence in v. 9b and Gal 4:9.

We have already noted how the resurrection formula was modified to fit into this context, but the further observation is now in order, that this insertion of the resurrection formula disturbs the flow from v. 10a to v. 10c, so that the resurrection formula appears to be a later addition to the text.¹³ The ὅν clause, for example, is not structurally parallel to the τὸν ρυόμενον clause; if it were, we would find τὸν ἐγερ-θέντον. This would also fit better with the τὸν υἱόν. On the other hand, the τὸν ρυόμενον corresponds well to the τὸν υἱόν. Thus there is some justification for removing v. 10b to arrive at an earlier level of the tradition history of this formula and a theology which approximates that of the Q community:¹⁴

... δουλεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ
καὶ ἀναμένειν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν
τὸν ρυόμενον ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς
τῆς ἐρχομένης.

In this simple, two-part formula, we have the monotheistic emphasis of Jewish-Christianity clearly set before our eyes with its implied contrast to dead and false gods. The living and true God is the object of the first infinitive clause, even as the one God is mentioned first in the two-part formula of 1 Cor 8:6 and in the later and more highly developed Christian creeds, like the Apostolicum and the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol.¹⁵ While it is true that nothing is explicitly said about the Torah and that in the second part of the formula, the way of deliverance is through the Son, it is premature to conclude that we already have in this formula the implicit abrogation of the Torah and, therefore, the beginning of Paul's Torah-free gospel.¹⁶ The reason for caution is that the δουλεύειν of the first part of the formula may very well include the keeping of the Torah, for "to serve God" is also to keep his Torah. Certainly Jewish-Christians saw no conflict between keeping the Torah and proclaiming God's Son as deliverer.

The second part of the formula has "his Son from heaven," as its object. As we noted earlier, it is unusual in Paul to find mention of God's Son in a parousia context,¹⁷ and it is not clear how "his Son" is to be understood. It has been suggested, for instance, that the "Son from heaven" indicates a fusion of the Son of man tradition with that of Son of God.¹⁸ If our formula comes out of a context similar to that of the Q community, such a fusion is entirely possible, since Q identifies Jesus as both Son of God, though probably not as a divine figure¹⁹ (Lk 4:1-13 = Mt 4:1-11 and the baptism narrative, if the latter belongs to Q), and Son of man (Lk 9:57-58 = Mt 8:19-20 and Lk 12:8-9 = Mt 10:32-33), who does possess divine characteristics, especially in his key role during final judgment. Also, v. 10a may originally have spoken of the Son of man, but because this concept was unknown to Gentiles, the term was replaced, at the instigation of early Jewish-Christian missionaries, with the Son of God title which would have been a more meaningful term to Gentiles.²⁰ Whatever the origin of the Son concept may have been, it is clear that his function is deliverance from the wrath to come. The saving

event takes place at the end time, and it seems unlikely in view of the infinitive ἀναμένειν that the οὐόμενον is meant to bear the weight of a present saving activity; rather, the present tense has a completely future orientation here.²¹

If the original formula spoke of salvation in terms of deliverance at the end time and had no particular need to speak of the resurrection because the resurrection was not perceived as the saving event, why was the resurrection formula of v. 10⁵ eventually added to it? It is easier to account for the fact that it happened in this way than to explain why it happened, but v. 10, taken as a unit, now identifies the Son as the specific person "Jesus" and grounds the expectation of future deliverance by him in God's activity on behalf of him. Confidence rests in Jesus' ability to deliver, because God has singled him out by raising him from among the dead.²² Therefore, identification of the Son and ratification of his ability to deliver may have been the primary motivating forces for the addition of the resurrection formula. Even though the resurrection is not seen here as the core of salvation, it is, nonetheless, a salvific event in the sense that it contributes to the final saving event, namely, deliverance from wrath at the end time.

In suggesting that the form of vv. 9c-10 be called a catechetical formula, this in no way rules out the possibility that it also contains a summary of the *topoi* of the Hellenistic Jewish-Christian mission to the Gentiles, as it was known to Paul.²³ It is, after all, the "gospel" which Paul says he preached to the Thessalonians (1 Th 1:5; 2:4, 9), but it is doubtful if we can speak of a "schema of preaching" which shows a temporal progression, beginning with a call to conversion and concluding with the proclamation of deliverance at the end time.²⁴ Even if the introductory verb is some form of ἐπιστρέφω, the call to conversion involves the simultaneous actions of serving God and awaiting his Son,²⁵ and the mention of the resurrection is sandwiched between the two parts of the statement about the awaiting of the Son, so that it is difficult to speak of the resurrection as a separate topic apart from the awaiting. Therefore, while it is valid to compare the speeches of Acts and this formula with regard to common subject matter, it is not valid to compare the temporal progression of the preaching topics of Acts with the material of 1 Th 1:9c-10.²⁶

Finally, although Paul speaks of vv. 9c-10 as the "gospel," it is clear from other parts of 1 Thessalonians that his understanding of the meaning of Jesus is broader than what is presented in these two verses. As we will now see, he quotes other credal formulae which perceive Jesus in different ways and which show that the Thessalonians probably knew more than what is repeated in vv. 9c-10. We still miss, however, some of the key theological issues normally associated with Paul, such as we find in Galatians and Romans. This is not to say that between the composition of 1 Thessalonians and Galatians, probably a short time, Paul developed a whole new way of thinking theologically. The ideas used and materials employed by Paul in 1 Thessalonians may well have been selected in view of the specific issue of the *parousia* looming so large in the minds of the Thessalonians.²⁷ The issues in Galatia were simply different and, therefore, deserved a different response.

B. Jesus' Death and Resurrection--1 Th 4:14

In 1 Th 4:14 we find another Christological statement which betrays pre-Pauline influence. The text of this verse reads as follows:

14a εἰ γὰρ πιστεύομεν ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη,
b οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς κοιμηθέντας διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἄξει
σὺν αὐτοῖς.

Although there is general agreement that Paul is drawing upon a credal formula in v. 14a, there is a reluctance on the part of some to see a direct quotation of the formula.²⁸ Since the relation of v. 14b, which is certainly Pauline, to v. 14a depends, in part, on the resolution of the problem and since we can hardly speak of pre-Pauline Christology here till we know what exactly is pre-Pauline, it is necessary to look once again at the arguments for and against the notion of a direct quotation by Paul of a credal formula.

Often both inside and outside of the New Testament, the verb πιστεύειν introduces credal formulae,²⁹ especially when a ὅτι clause follows. While it is true that the πιστεύειν ὅτι combination does not always indicate the citation of a formula, it should be noted that this combination appears only three times in Paul: 1 Th 4:14a; Rom 6:8; 10:9b.³⁰ This last named passage is a clear quotation of a credal formula having content similar to that of 1 Th 4:14a: πιστεύσας...ὅτι ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν.³¹

Also unusual in Pauline literature is the use of the verb ἀνίστημι. It appears in two LXX quotations -- Rom 15:12 (=Is 11:10), 1 Cor 10:7 (=Ex 32:6)-and in a hymnic fragment in Eph 5:14. Only the καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται πρῶτον of 1 Th 4:16 can be directly attributed to Paul, though possibly even here he is repeating a portion of a pre-Pauline prophetic saying.³² If 1 Th 4:16 is not a pre-Pauline prophetic saying, it can be argued that Paul uses the verb ἀναστήσονται in v. 16 in the light of its appearance in a formula in v. 14a,³³ or, he may have chosen this pre-Pauline prophetic statement precisely because it uses the same word for the resurrection as in v. 14a. The exact opposite suggestion has also been made, that if v. 16 is a pre-Pauline prophetic statement, Paul has drawn the verb ἀνίστημι from v. 16 and either replaced the more usual ἐγείρω in v. 14a with it, or Paul has created his own credal formula altogether in v. 14a.³⁴ This last argument is unsatisfactory, however, since we would have also expected ἀνίστημι to appear in v. 14b for consistency and appropriate emphasis. Such a transposition from v. 16 to v. 14 would have required Paul to carefully plot his thought and wording in advance of its written expression.³⁵ Yet such mental gymnastics hardly need to be attributed to Paul in the light of the formulaic passion summaries in the Synoptics and Acts, where ἀνίστημι is frequently used to designate the resurrection.³⁶

The use of the name Ἰησοῦς in v. 14a is indeed striking, for only in this verse is "Jesus" the subject of a credal statement about his death. But this observation hardly shows that Paul is himself responsible for its employment.³⁷ As Klaus Wengst has shown and as we have noted in regard to 1 Th 1:10b, it is likely that the name "Jesus" was used in the earliest form of the Auferweckungsformel (i.e. "that God raised Jesus from the dead"), before Christological titles were ap-

plied to Jesus and finally used interchangeably with his name. Therefore, the use of the name "Jesus" in v. 14a is a sign of its primitive status, rather than a sign of Pauline redaction or invention.³⁸

The fact that there is no ὑπὲρ/περὶ ἡμῶν phrase associated with the statement about Jesus' death in v. 14a is interpreted by Wolfgang Harnisch as an indication that Paul is freely formulating his thoughts, for the complete formula must have contained a "for us" as in 1 Th 5:10a.³⁹ This argument loses weight, however, if the death statement in v. 14a was originally constructed parallel to that of the resurrection statement, i.e. with no other stereotyped phrases added to either part. The omission of any "for us" phrase may indicate that the death statement in v. 14a has a different significance altogether from that of 1 Th 5:10a and is, in effect, not the same credal formula at all.

Two other observations lend support to the view that a "for us" is not always required when Jesus' death is spoken of in formulaic expressions: 1) In the passion summaries of Mk and Lk-Acts, where the death of Jesus/Son of man is referred to, though not with the verb ἀποθνήσκω, there is never an accompanying "for us."⁴⁰ This is significant because the resurrection is also mentioned in these summaries with the ἀνέστη-μι. 2) In Rom 14:9 the same basic formula as in 1 Th 4:14a is present, though in a somewhat modified form; yet the phrase "for us" is missing within the formula itself (Rom 14:9b):

- a εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ
- b Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἔζησεν
- c ἵνα καὶ νεκρῶν καὶ ζώντων κυριεύσῃ.

While the textual evidence is in disarray for the reading ἔζησεν (many witnesses adding ἀνέστη to it or replacing it with ἀνέστη), the ἀνέστη is almost certainly secondary to the text of Rom 14:9,⁴¹ though it may, in fact, reflect the original form of the formula, as we find it now in 1 Th 4:14a.⁴² Rom 14:9 is also important because its Pauline explanatory ἵνα clause in v. 9c parallels Paul's explanatory οὕτως καὶ clause in 1 Th 4:14b. Both of these explanatory clauses stand in stark contrast to the simplicity of expression in the credal formulae immediately preceding them.

If Rom 14:9b is a somewhat altered version of the formula in 1 Th 4:14a, as we have suggested, then the uniqueness of the latter has been diminished, and its unusualness cannot rightly be used as an argument against its pre-Pauline character.⁴³ Such an argument is weak in any case, since a large number of New Testament credal formulae and hymnic fragments of one sort or another are unique: e.g. 1 Cor 8:6; Phil 2:6-11; etc.

On the basis of these arguments, it seems that 1 Th 4:14a is not merely an allusion to a pre-Pauline credal formula but is probably a word-for-word, direct quotation. It is not clear, however, that the πιστεύομεν ὅτι is an integral part of the formula,⁴⁴ since almost any verb of believing, knowing or confessing could, in other instances, be used interchangeably.⁴⁵ In the Patristic period, however, there is clear evidence that the introductory verbs sometimes are considered part of the credal formula itself, as this example from Theodore of Mopsuestia shows: διδάσκεισθαι ὀφείλει καὶ ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι πιστεύ-

ομεν εἰς ἕνα θεόν, κτλ.,⁴⁶ but there is no such evidence in the New Testament. Likewise, the *ὅτι* may or may not be part of the formula. In the case of 1 Cor 15:3-5, for instance, with its *ὅτι...καὶ ὅτι...καὶ ὅτι...καὶ ὅτι...* structure, the initial *ὅτι* is almost certainly a part of the original formula.⁴⁷

Having established the probability that the pre-Pauline formula reads: (πιστεύομεν ὅτι) Ἰησοῦς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη, we see that this formula is a complete statement in itself, and at this point, we have no reason to suspect that something has been left out.⁴⁸ Our task now is to seek out the meaning of this credal formula.

Wengst classifies v. 14a among the "Auferstehungsformeln" which employ the verb ἀνίστημι (aorist middle tense) in contrast to the "Auferweckungsformeln" which also speak of the resurrection but with the verb ἐγείρω in either an active or passive form (aorist or perfect tense).⁴⁹ In the latter case, God is sometimes explicitly the agent of the resurrection, as in Rom 10:9b, "God raised (ἤγειρεν) him from the dead," and this same fact is generally assumed when the passive is used, as in 1 Cor 15:4, "and that he was raised (ἐγήγερται) on the third day in accord with the scriptures." But in 1 Th 4:14a, which is an Auferstehungsformel, the aorist middle ἀνέστη can possibly be taken in the sense of Jesus raising himself.⁵⁰

In view of this, Wengst finds a different Sitz im Leben for this formula than for what he considers to be the more clearly Jewish-Christian Auferweckungsformel, which has its setting in the Aramaic-speaking primitive community and which maintains a clear distinction between God and Jesus.⁵¹ In 1 Th 4:14a, however, this distinction is now lost; God is not mentioned at all nor is he implied in the action; rather, Jesus himself takes over the divine agency of his own resurrection. This, says Wengst, reflects a Gentile-Christian community setting, which is more strongly influenced by mystery religion concepts.⁵² Thus, analogously to the mystery gods, Jesus rises (by himself), after he has died. The impact of the formula is that the experience of Jesus will be repeated by those who believe. In the future, what has happened to Jesus will also happen to believers. Wengst concludes that this Auferstehungsformel has its Sitz im Leben in the baptismal celebration of the Gentile-Christian communities.⁵³

There is a small problem in this interpretation, however, which may vitiate the whole. If the salient point in the formula is Jesus' self resurrection, then are we to assume that believers also will raise themselves, like Jesus did? Is there no agency of resurrection on the part of Jesus for those who believe? It is really a false problem, for the fact is that ἀνέστη does not necessarily say anything about the agency of resurrection, nor does it automatically exclude God's action, even if he is not specifically mentioned in the formula itself. Especially instructive in this regard is Mk 9:27, which speaks of Jesus healing a boy with an unclean spirit: ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς...ἤγειρεν αὐτόν, καὶ ἀνέστη. Here Jesus has raised the boy, and the boy has gotten up, but certainly the point is not that the boy has raised himself up, for it is clearly through the agency of Jesus that he has done so. The verb ἀνέστη is not commenting on agency but on phenomenological fact.⁵⁴ So also in 1 Th 4:14a the ἀνέστη can simply refer to the phenomenological process of rising up, without making any sort of

comment on the agent of resurrection. Therefore, those who find here only an emphasis on Jesus (and that apart from God) may be drawing a conclusion which is not at all implied by the formula, and this, in turn, may have led the search for a Sitz im Leben into a completely wrong direction.

If our analysis is correct, we can more easily account for Paul's commentary on the formula in v. 14b. There is no reason to be surprised that he speaks about God's activity, for the formula in v. 14a does not mean to exclude God's action, though its point is merely to stress the reality of resurrection rather than who was responsible for it. Therefore, while it cannot be said that Paul misinterprets the formula, it is clear that he is interpreting it in a way which goes beyond the formula's statement.

More important for understanding the formula than the issue of agency of resurrection is the function which the formula provides. It is one of analogy. Like Jesus, who died, arose, so will believers, who have died, arise. Paul, of course, explains this analogy with greater precision than we find implied within the formula itself: 1) God will "take up" the dead; 2) this will be done through Jesus, who thus serves as a mediator; 3) and the result is that the dead will be "with him" (God or Jesus?). If the formula was originally intended to be used analogously, i.e. what happened to Christ will happen to believers, then the meaning of Jesus' death is far from a notion of vicarious atonement, and it will not do to interpret it in the light of 1 Th 5:10a, where, as we shall later see, a salvific meaning is explicitly stated.⁵⁵ In 1 Th 4:14a, however, Jesus provides a pattern or model, much like we find in Mark's Gospel: even as Jesus suffered, died, and arose (The verb ἀνίστημι is used in the Marcan passion predictions.), so will the Christians of Mark's community undergo suffering and, perhaps, death, and they will be saved at the parousia. What happened to Jesus is a foretaste of what will happen to believers through Jesus, when he comes as Son of man at the parousia.⁵⁶ While the eschatological context of the formula in 1 Th 4:14a is similar to that of Mark's Gospel, in that the death and resurrection of Jesus provide the basis for the believers' hope of future salvation, the identification of the Resurrected One with the deliverer "from the wrath to come" at the parousia of the Son is not stated in the formula itself. But as we have seen with regard to the Auferweckungsformel in 1 Th 1:9c-10, this idea was early associated with the resurrection. This identification may even lie behind the origin of the formula in 4:14a, with the result that Jesus' death and resurrection are confessed precisely because he is the Resurrected One through whom God effects salvation, and Jesus' own experience is the way to salvation for believers.

It is possible, though probably incorrect, to interpret the formula of 1 Th 4:14a in itself and quite apart from the immediate Pauline context, as an apologetic or polemic to counteract a Gnosticizing docetism, in which the historical person of Jesus played no significant role. From this perspective, the name "Jesus" and the mention of his death would be points of emphasis in establishing the Resurrected One as a true human being. He has a human name (There are no titles given to him in the formula.) and he has died. The statement concerning his death allows for no understanding of ἀνέστη which could sidestep a rising from the dead;⁵⁷ it rules out

any interpretation of "rising up" as a "return" to God, in such a way as to separate Jesus the person from Christ the spiritual being, as we find done later in the Gnosticism of Cerinthus.⁵⁸ The difficulty with this interpretation is not only reading back later developments into this early period but also the fact that Paul does not seem to be concerned with this sort of problem in 1 Thessalonians, though something similar to this may be found in Corinth, when Paul says that "no one speaking by the Spirit of God ever says, Ἀνθέμα Ἰησοῦς!" (1 Cor 12:3).

Walter Schmithals argues that Paul is in conflict with Gnostics who deny the resurrection and the parousia, and that in 1 Th 4:14 the formula is quoted as the reason why there should be no mourning on the part of the Thessalonians, since the dead will arise. The doubts of the Thessalonians are laid to rest concerning the reality of the resurrection (not a delayed resurrection) of the dead, doubts which had arisen under the influence of some who denied the resurrection and replaced it with a spiritualistic hope of the hereafter.⁵⁹ If Schmithals is correct, then it is peculiar that Paul would quote the formula of v. 14a instead of the Auferweckungsformel of 1:10b, because v. 14a gives equal weight to the death of Jesus, whereas the sole focus of the Auferweckungsformel is on his resurrection. On the other hand, Paul could also have had the analogous understanding of v. 14a in mind as well, so that by using this formula he has "killed two birds with one stone"--proclaiming specifically the reality of the resurrection and setting forth the death and resurrection of Jesus as the pattern for all who believe.

Finally, the view that v. 14a represents a formula which arose in a Gentile-Christian setting needs to be challenged. Despite some similarity with mystery religion ideas, v. 14a does not teach a self resurrection of Jesus, it does not necessarily imply a heightening of the person of Jesus over against God, and the name "Jesus" instead of a Christological title leads us, instead, to a Jewish-Christian context. Whether this can be more specifically defined is difficult to say, in the light of the complexity of early Jewish-Christianity which does not allow for neat distinctions between Hellenistic Jewish-Christianity, Palestinian Jewish-Christianity, etc.⁶⁰ If there is an anti-Gnosticizing tendency within the formula, then Gnosticizing ideas appear very early in Christianity and in a Jewish-Christian milieu.

C. The Salvific Death of Christ--1 Th 5:9-10

A third pre-Pauline Christological formula is embedded in a long Greek period in Chapter 5, where vv. 9-10 are of special concern. The present text of these verses reads as follows:

- | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 9a | ὅτι οὐκ ἔθετο ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ὀργήν |
| b | ἀλλὰ εἰς περιποίησιν σωτηρίας |
| c | διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, |
| 10a | τοῦ ἀποθανόντος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν |
| b | ἵνα εἴτε γρηγορώμεν |
| | εἴτε καθεύδωμεν |
| | ἅμα σὺν αὐτῷ ζήσωμεν. |

The credal formula itself appears in v. 10a, "who died for us," and is similar to a formula attested frequently elsewhere in Paul, most clearly in these passages:

- Rom 5:6 ... Χριστὸς...ὕπὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀπέθανεν
 Rom 8:3 ... Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανεν
 Rom 14:15 ... ὑπὲρ οὗ Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν
 1 Cor 15:3 ὅτι Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν...

On the basis of these and some other similar passages, Klaus Wengst has shown the likelihood that Paul knew a credal formula with the wording: Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανεν.⁶¹ Significantly "Christ" is the subject, the verb ἀπέθανεν is found in the aorist, and the death is designated as a death "for" someone or something.⁶² The numerous occurrences of this "dying formula" (Sterbensformel) by itself show that this is a complete formula in its own right and not necessarily a fragment from some larger "pistis formula," such as in 1 Cor 15: 3-5.⁶³

In 1 Th 5:9-10 this dying formula has been added to a stereotyped phrase often found in Paul, "through our Lord Jesus Christ."⁶⁴ As such, the formula has an appositional function in a participial clause, this being the only time that the formula appears in this form.⁶⁵ There are three possibilities to account for this form: 1) it may simply be a variant form of the formula, much like participial forms of the Auferweckungsformel, as in Rom 4:24; 8:11; Gal 1:1; 2 Cor 4:14; 2) it may have been reformulated by Paul to fit his own context, or, as we shall see later, 3) it may have been reformulated as part of a larger pre-Pauline formulation in vv. 9-10. In any case, the aorist tense and the prepositional phrase have been maintained, and even though the subject is not named, the formula's connection with the preceding εἰς phrase provides the subject, and "Christ" is one of the predicates. All of the essential elements of this dying formula are present.

In contrast to the absolute statement of death in the formula of 1 Th 4:14a, which contains no modifying prepositional phrases, the formula of 5:10a expressly provides an interpretation of the death through the prepositional phrase ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.⁶⁶ This "for us" is the first time in Christian literature that Christ's death is explicitly interpreted as a soteriological event;⁶⁷ yet, in what way this death is salvific is not clear from the formula itself, since the "for us" is ambiguous. Does it mean that Christ died in our place? or that he died as our example? or that he died for our sake in general, i.e. to benefit us in some way, so that either or both of the first two possibilities are also included or that either or both of them are not included?

The preposition ὑπὲρ tends to be fairly general in meaning, having the sense of "on behalf of" or "for the sake of" rather than "instead of" or "in place of,"⁶⁸ but a more certain answer to the question is usually sought by looking at Paul's use of the formula here and elsewhere in his writings. While it certainly cannot be ruled out that Paul's interpretation of the formula reflects its original intention, there is yet another possibility for seeking out an interpretation of the formula, if it is indeed embedded here in another, larger pre-Pauline formulation. In this case, it is necessary to see how the formula is used within this pre-Pauline formulation.

First, however, it must be shown that vv. 9-10 contain pre-Pauline material in addition to the dying formula and

whether or not that material can be reconstructed into the form which it had when Paul took it up.

While it has often been suggested that vv. 9-10 contain pre-Pauline tradition,⁶⁹ Wolfgang Harnisch has provided the most detailed reasons for this suggestion, together with a reconstruction of that tradition. According to him, the signs of a stereotyped confession or confessional fragment include: 1) the prepositional phrases "through our Lord Jesus Christ" and "for us," 2) participial style in v. 10a, 3) the introductory $\delta\tau\iota$ in v. 9a, 4) the word $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\pi\omicron\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ which is a *hapax legomenon* for Paul, 5) the use of the verb $\xi\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron$ in the aorist tense, the tense most frequently used in confessional formulae.⁷⁰ To these we may add 6) the use of $\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, since credal formulae frequently employ the first person plural of the personal pronoun.

In Harnisch's view, the pre-Pauline material indicated by these signs does not stand in its original state in the present text of vv. 9-10; rather, the current text includes some Pauline additions and modifications. Harnisch understands the $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$ and $\epsilon\lambda\varsigma$ $\omicron\rho\gamma\eta\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ of v. 9 as Pauline additions, as well as the two $\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon$ clauses and the $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha$ of v. 10b. In the case of the term $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, Harnisch suggests that Paul has substituted this word for an original $\delta\acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, as it is still preserved in 2 Th 2:14. The reason for replacing the original term with another is to be seen in the contrast with $\omicron\rho\gamma\eta\nu$ and in the light of v. 8, where $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is encountered in a quotation from Is 59:17.⁷¹

On the basis of these observations, Harnisch reconstructs "ein geprägtes Bekenntnis (bzw. Bekenntnisformel)," in which the dying formula has a part:

... $\delta\tau\iota$
 $\xi\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron$ $\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ δ $\theta\epsilon\delta\varsigma$ $\epsilon\lambda\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\pi\omicron\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ $\langle\delta\acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\rangle$
 $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$ $\eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\text{I}\eta\sigma\omicron\upsilon$ $\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$,
 $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\theta\alpha\nu\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$ ($\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho$) $\eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$,
 $\epsilon\lambda\alpha$ $\sigma\upsilon\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$ $\zeta\eta\sigma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$.⁷²

If this is an accurate reconstruction of a pre-Pauline credal formula, God is given the major activity, that of destining us for attainment of glory. The means of accomplishing this activity is "through our Lord Jesus Christ who died for us." Like the acclamatory doxology of 1 Cor 8:6, we have here a God—Lord distinction, where the latter proves to be the mediator. Finally the purpose of this mediation through a death "for us" is "so that we might live with him," a rather general meaning which does not answer the specific questions we have raised about the interpretation of the $\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho$ $\eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$.

Harnisch sees in this reconstruction a baptismal background, indicated especially by the use of $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ and $\upsilon\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\upsilon\iota\omicron\iota$ $\phi\omega\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ in 1 Th 5:5 and by parallels to Rom 8:28-30, which he holds is based on a fragment of a pre-Pauline baptismal hymn and which speaks of election, call and justification, the glorification of the baptized already accomplished in the act of baptism ($\acute{\epsilon}\delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha\sigma\epsilon\nu$ in v. 30). He feels that this same certainty that the baptized have already been brought to glory lies behind the understanding of 1 Th 5:5-10. It is an expression of present eschatology, so that the $\zeta\eta\sigma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$ must be understood as a present reality to be in accord with the in-

tention of the pre-Pauline tradition. The destiny of the baptized is the reception of the $\zeta\omega\eta$ of the $\kappa\acute{o}\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma$, namely, the attainment of that $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ which corresponds to the glory of the Exalted One; whoever, as a result of baptism already possesses participation in this $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$, receives the new name of a $\upsilon\iota\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\phi\omega\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$.⁷³

Certain reservations concerning Harnisch's conclusions both in regard to his reconstruction of a pre-Pauline credal formula and to his baptismal interpretation are in order.

It can readily be conceded that the participial style of 1 Th 5:10a and the "for us" as well as the aorist participle are signs of credal material, since they are, in fact, all parts of the dying formula. The remainder of vv. 9-10, however, is much less clearly pre-Pauline. Certainly the phrase "through our Lord Jesus Christ" is a stereotyped expression in Paul, since it appears so frequently in exactly the same form,⁷⁴ but in no other case does it appear within a credal formula.⁷⁵ It simply does not require in itself a wider pre-Pauline context. As Joseph Plevnik justifiably suggests, this phrase "has been thoroughly appropriated by Paul and need not always refer to a pre-Pauline tradition."⁷⁶

What Harnisch acknowledges, but perhaps does not take seriously enough, is the fact that the $\delta\tau\iota$ which begins v. 9 now has a causal meaning and is not a *recitativum*. He assumes that the $\delta\tau\iota$ is so much a part of the confession that it remains in the present text as a vestigial *recitativum*,⁷⁷ but given the large number of credal formulae in Paul's writings, this would be the only formula quoted where the $\delta\tau\iota$ has clearly taken on a new meaning and function, thus reducing the likelihood that Harnisch's assumption in this regard is correct.⁷⁸

While the verb $\xi\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron$ is in the aorist tense, so are some other verbs in 5:1-11⁷⁹ which do not point to pre-Pauline material; also, $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$ is not an unusual word in Paul.⁸⁰ Likewise, the first person plurals in vv. 9-10, with the exception of the $\eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$ in v. 10a, do not stand out of this context in such a way as to suspect the use of pre-Pauline material.⁸¹ Only the $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ both in its immediate form and the contexts in which it is used here and elsewhere may point to pre-Pauline tradition but not necessarily to a credal formula.

The word $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ always appears in connection with the preposition $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, either directly as four times in the prepositional phrase $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ ⁸² or indirectly as in Eph 1:14, $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\tau\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, where the genitive is probably to be understood appositively,⁸³ thus preserving the sense of $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ with $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$. This prepositional phrase may very well be, then, a stereotyped expression. Equally important is the context of election or calling with which this phrase is associated and also the words which modify $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$:

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 2 Th 2:14 | $\epsilon\lambda\lambda\alpha\tau\omicron$... $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho\iota\alpha\upsilon$... |
| | $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\upsilon$... $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ $\delta\acute{o}\xi\eta\varsigma$... |
| 1 Th 5:9 | $\xi\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron$... $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho\iota\alpha\varsigma$ (present text) |
| 1 Pet 2:9 | $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$... $\lambda\alpha\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$... |
| | $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{o}$ $\theta\alpha\upsilon\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\phi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$. |
| Heb 10:39 | $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$... $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$. |

Eph 1:11-14 ἐκκληρώθημεν...εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς εἰς ἔπαινον
 δόξης αὐτοῦ...
 ἐσφραγίσθητε...εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῆς περιποιήσεως,
 εἰς ἔπαινον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ.

It is clear from these parallels that there was no fixed word, like δόξης, which modified the περιποίησιν, even though δόξης is associated with the word not only in 2 Th 2:14 but also indirectly in the hymnic material of Eph 1:14. Furthermore, while election or calling are part of the context in which εἰς περιποίησιν appears, there is no terminological consistency in that regard.

On the basis of these observations, it appears that a pre-Pauline tradition, based perhaps on Is 43:20-21, is present in 1 Th 5:9. This tradition includes a reference to election or calling and the use of the stereotyped εἰς περιποίησιν, but there is still no clear sign of a credal formula whose content consists of this tradition, and, except for v. 10a, there is a complete absence of the dying formula elsewhere in this "election tradition,"⁸⁴ which suggests, in turn, the possibility that Paul himself has added the dying formula to it.

Finally, Harnisch's proposed reconstruction of a pre-Pauline formula in vv. 9-10 fails on structural grounds. A minor point is the word order, for normally, as in the credal formulae of 1 Cor 15:3 or Rom 10:9b, we find this sequence: ὅτι + subject + verb + prepositional phrase(s). Harnisch's word order, however, has not adequately removed the residue of the οὐκ...ἀλλὰ antithesis, which follows a regular pattern, as these examples from 1 Thessalonians show:

4:7	οὐ γὰρ ἐκάλεσεν	ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς	ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ
	ἀλλ'		ἐν ἁγιασμῷ
5:9	ὅτι οὐκ	ἔθετο	ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς
	ἀλλὰ		εἰς ὀργὴν
			εἰς περιποίησιν σω-
			τηρίας
1:5	ὅτι		
	... οὐκ	ἐγενήθη	εἰς ὑμᾶς
	ἀλλὰ καὶ		ἐν λόγῳ μόνον
			ἐν δυνάμει

Nor is this pattern peculiar to Paul, as we see in Heb 10:39, a passage which bears some similarity to 1 Th 5:9 in other ways as well:

ἡμεῖς			
δὲ οὐκ	ἐσμέν	ὑποστολῆς	εἰς ἀπώλειαν
ἀλλὰ		πίστεως	εἰς περιποίησιν ψυ-
			χῆς

But more problematic than the word order of Harnisch's reconstruction is the inclusion of a ἵνα clause. Credal formulae generally, if not always, avoid this and similar constructions,⁸⁵ and quite apart from this line of argumentation, it is noteworthy that after the οὐκ...ἀλλὰ statements of 1 Th 1:5 and 5:9, explanatory clauses follow--a καθώς clause in the former, a ἵνα clause in the latter. This is typical Pauline style and is not to be attributed to some pre-Pauline tradition, even as he has used another ἵνα clause in 5:4.

Having reviewed the evidence for pre-Pauline tradition in 1 Th 5:9-10, it seems that we cannot hold to the view that Paul is quoting a larger formula in these verses, in which the dying formula of v. 10a has a part. Instead, Paul is drawing upon a pre-Pauline tradition concerning election or calling which uses the stereotyped phrase εἰς περιποίησιν, but it is Paul himself who introduces the dying formula into this context.

Since Harnisch speaks of a baptismal background for all this material, we need to look at the evidence for this claim more carefully.

Harnisch builds upon Ernst Fuch's observation that in 1 Th 5:4-10 traditional baptismal language is echoed, with terminology like that in Gal 3:26-27 and a confessional formula like that in Rom 6:3ff, even as the formula "in Christ" in 1 Th 4:16 is an allusion to the baptism of those who had died and as the formula in 4:14a is an anticipation of the formula in 5:10.⁸⁶ Harnisch seeks to define more precisely what that baptismal terminology in 5:4-10 is and notes in particular two aspects of v. 5: υἱοὶ φωτός and πάντες. The light-darkness motif found in vv. 4-5 appears in other (non-Pauline) texts, such as Acts 26:18; 1 Pet 2:9; Eph 5:8 and Col 1:12-14 (cf. also 1 Clem 59:2; 2 Clem 1:2, 8). He believes these refer to that conversion which is accomplished for believers in baptism, a new creation: the believer through baptism moves from the realm of darkness into that of light. Other references to light-darkness in Paul also seem to reflect quoted or traditional material.⁸⁷

Certainly the phrase "sons of light" is a traditional expression, found only here in Paul but elsewhere also in Lk 16:8 and Jn 12:36 (cf. τέκνα φωτός in Eph 5:8). It has the sense of Christian existence "in Christ" as opposed to a former existence or to outsiders, much as the Qumran community used the expression for their present existence as opposed to outsiders who are the "sons of darkness."⁸⁸ Since baptism introduces one into this realm of light, it may be reasonable to assume a baptismal connection for Christians with the term "sons of light," but it remains only an assumption, since baptism is nowhere here directly referred to. Calling other pre-Pauline materials "baptismal formulae" or "baptismal hymns" does not really strengthen the evidence unless they can be proven to have been used in that context--the claim is usually more easily made than the evidence often warrants.⁸⁹

Harnisch's argument that the πάντες of v. 5 is a sign of pre-Pauline baptismal usage is based on a parallelism which he, following Ernst Fuchs, finds in Gal 3:26-28, a passage where baptism is specifically mentioned. Twice πάντες is used in that context referring to υἱοὶ θεοῦ. In order for this passage to apply to 1 Th 5:5, υἱοὶ θεοῦ must be equated with υἱοὶ φωτός.⁹⁰ That, of course, is more problematic than Harnisch allows. More likely is the suggestion of Plevnik, that the πάντες occurs in v. 5 because of "Paul's concern to assure the community, in view of the menacing noted in vv. 2-3, that he did not threaten any one among them with the eschatological disaster."⁹¹ In this case, the πάντες has nothing at all to do with a pre-Pauline baptismal tradition.

On the other hand, it seems that a connection does, in fact, exist between "light" terminology and the pre-Pauline

election/calling--εἰς περιποίησιν tradition. Of the five passages in which the εἰς περιποίησιν appears in the New Testament, four of them occur in contexts in which "light" terminology is found: 1 Th 5:5, 9; 1 Pet 2:9; Heb 10:32, 39 and Eph 1:13-14, 18. This last named passage may be especially significant if the "were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit" refers to baptism,⁹² for, then, we would have a specific instance of this material within a baptismal context, rather than merely assuming it. It has also long been held that 1 Pet 2:9 appears in a baptismal setting.⁹³

Now we are prepared to ask why Paul has added the dying formula to this pre-Pauline "election tradition." He supplies what, from his perspective, is missing or only assumed in the election tradition, namely, the means by which God has destined us to attainment of salvation. It is only by adding the stereotyped διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ that this tradition becomes specifically Christian, and the dying formula serves to show why Jesus Christ is significant grounding the beginning of salvation in his person and his death. Salvation is "not yet," as is clear from the εἰς ὄργην...εἰς περιποίησιν σωτηρίας contrast--not εἰς ὄργην...εἰς σωτηρίαν⁹⁴--but it has already begun with the person of Christ and his death. Thus while Paul is still speaking primarily in terms of future salvation, there is also the present reality grounded in the past, which serves as a consolation and a source of confidence as the day of the Lord approaches.

If we are also dealing with a baptismal tradition, Paul does not add the Christological statements to protect against a "magical" understanding of baptism, since there are indications that he shares such an understanding himself;⁹⁵ rather, he seeks to show why baptism has the effect of making Christians υἱοὶ φωτός. It is because of Christ's death "for us" that baptism has the effect it does. Thus Paul uses the dying formula here primarily as a catechetical device. This does not rule out the possibility of an apologetic intention as well, especially if the claim to be υἱοὶ φωτός on the part of the Thessalonians is coupled with a reluctance to acknowledge the significance of the earthly Jesus. It seems more likely, however, that Paul is merely reenforcing what it means to be υἱοὶ φωτός in the light of the impending day of the Lord.

Conclusion

The three pre-Pauline Christological credal formulae in 1 Thessalonians show that Christ could be perceived in different ways already in this earliest extant Christian writing. The three formulae represent three different portrayals of Christ but not necessarily views that are contradictory. At least Paul seems to accept these different portrayals without getting upset at the differences. He uses each formula for his own particular purpose and does not try to harmonize them. As a result, 1 Thessalonians becomes, unbeknown to itself, the first document of an ecumenical movement which culminates in the formation of the New Testament, where unity admits a broad variety and where no one formula expresses all that there is to know about Christ.

Notes

¹Klaus Wengst, Christologische Formeln und Lieder des Urchristentums, in: SNT, 7 (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1972), pp. 32-33.

²Ibid., pp. 30, 32.

³Gerhard Friedrich, "Ein Tauflied hellenistischer Judenchristen: 1. Thess. 1,9f.," Theologische Zeitschrift, 21 (1965), 505-506.

⁴See The Greek New Testament, ed. Kurt Aland et al. 3 ed. (New York: United Bible Societies, 1976), loc. cit., which places the τὸν in brackets.

⁵Raymond F. Collins, "The Growth of Resurrection Faith," Emmanuel, 86 (1980), 279, notes that the spatial imagery underlying the formula is that of Sheol. By God's power Jesus has been taken from among those dwelling in Sheol.

⁶See especially Friedrich, 503-507; Ulrich Wilckens, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte, in: WMANT, 5. 3 ed. (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1974), p. 82; Franz Laub, Eschatologische Verkündigung und Lebensgestaltung nach Paulus, in: BU, 10 (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1973), pp. 29-31, and Traugott Holtz, "'Euer Glaube an Gott.' Zu Form und Inhalt von 1 Thess 1,9f.," in: Die Kirche des Anfangs: Festschrift für Heinz Schürmann zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. R. Schnackenburg, Josef Ernst and Joachim Wanke, in: Erfurter Theologische Studien, 38 (Leipzig: St. Benno, 1977), pp. 472-482.

⁷Cf. the formulaic passages: Rom 3:26; 6:11; 1 Cor 12:3; Phil 2:10; 1 Th 4:14a; in 1 Th 2:15 we may have a non-Pauline interpolation and in 1 Th 4:14b, we find the influence of the formula in v. 14a. Only Gal 6:17 and 2 Cor 4:5, 10-11; 11:4 can be attributed to Paul without clear formulaic influence.

⁸Since Holtz does not believe that Paul is directly quoting a pre-Pauline formulation that includes most of vv. 9-10, he more readily attributes certain words and clauses to Paul himself; see especially his closing remarks, pp. 483-486.

⁹So Friedrich, 503-504.

¹⁰Holtz, pp. 472-476, cites an example from JosAs 54:5-10 in which these expressions similar to 1 Th 1:9 appear: θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ θεὸς ζῶν...καὶ ἐπιστρέψω πρὸς αὐτόν. He concludes from this that the latter phrase is "der 'traditionelle' Sprachgebrauch" which is to be considered behind 1 Th 1:9. It should be noted, however, that this "traditional usage" is not a fixed wording and that Holtz does not make that claim either.

¹¹Friedrich, 508-510. This is also taken up by Ernest Best, A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians, in: Black's New Testament Commentaries. 3 ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1979), p. 86. Beda Rigaux, Les Épitres aux Thessaloniens, in: Études Bibliques (Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie, 1956), p. 393, proposes almost the same structure but has not divided the material into strophes and

does not call it directly a hymn. See the critique of the views of Friedrich and Rigaux by Holtz, pp. 464-465.

¹²So Peter Stuhlmacher, Das paulinische Evangelium. I. Vorgeschichte, in: FRLANT, 95 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), p. 264 n. 3 and also Wilckens, p. 228.

¹³Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament, tr. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1969), p. 87, suggests that v. 10b and c were added at a later time, but this fails to explain why the later redactor did not make them grammatically parallel, especially when pains were taken to make the prepositional phrases of v. 10a and b parallel. V. 10c belongs to the original formula, v. 10b does not.

¹⁴Friedrich, 514-516, has drawn attention to numerous similarities between vv. 9-10 and Q theology, and the matter deserves greater attention despite some serious objections of Holtz, pp. 465-467. Holtz's arguments are convincing, however, only if one accepts his view of the composition of vv. 9-10 as basically a Pauline formulation which draws upon traditional language here and there.

¹⁵Texts are given in August Hahn and G. Ludwig Hahn, Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche. 3 ed. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1962 = Breslau, 1897), pp. 22-23, 162-165.

¹⁶This suggestion is made by Stuhlmacher, p. 262, and discussed by Laub, pp. 44-49, but neither discuss the implications of $\delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$. Holtz, pp. 478-479, also takes up this suggestion but he interprets the $\delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$ of 1 Th 1:9 in the light of Rom 7:6. He is able to do this, because he feels that $\delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$ is a Pauline term and not necessarily a part of pre-Pauline tradition.

¹⁷So James D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980), p. 37, who points also to 1 Cor 15:24-28.

¹⁸So Ferdinand Hahn, The Titles of Jesus in Christology, tr. Harold Knight and George Ogg (New York and Cleveland: World, 1969), p. 286.

¹⁹Dunn, p. 36.

²⁰This suggestion of Friedrich, 514, has been taken up also by Norman Perrin, The New Testament: An Introduction (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), pp. 49-50.

²¹Versus Friedrich, 510, and Paul Ellingworth and Eugene A. Nida, A Translator's Handbook on Paul's Letters to the Thessalonians, in: Helps for Translators, 17 (Stuttgart: United Bible Societies, 1975), p. 16.

²²Wilckens, p. 86.

²³Ibid., pp. 81-82.

²⁴With Holtz, p. 460, against Wilckens, pp. 81-82.

²⁵So also Holtz, p. 460: "In der Hinwendung zu Gott ist also zugleich der gegenwärtige Dienst dieses Gottes und die

Erwartung des zukünftigen Retters beschlossen."

²⁶Wilckens, pp. 81-88 and Laub, pp. 36-40 make such a comparison, but Holtz, pp. 459-463, demonstrates why such a comparison ultimately fails to show that 1 Th 1:9-10 represents a similarly constructed schema of a primitive mission form of preaching.

²⁷So R. E. H. Uprichard, "Person and Work of Christ in 1 Thessalonians," Irish Biblical Studies, 1 (1979), 19-22, 27.

²⁸So Ulrich Luz, Das Geschichtsverständnis des Paulus, in: BET, 49 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1968), pp. 325-326; Peter Siber, Mit Christus leben, in: ATANT, 61 (Zürich: TVZ, 1971), pp. 24-25; Wolfgang Harnisch, Eschatologische Existenz, in: FRLANT, 110 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), pp. 32-33; Jörg Baumgarten, Paulus und die Apokalyptik, in: WMANT, 44 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1975), p. 93 n. 180.

²⁹This is the first criterion of discovering credal formulae, according to Ethelbert Stauffer, New Testament Theology, tr. John Marsh (London: SCM, 1955), p. 338. For a detailed analysis of πιστεύειν as an introductory word to credal formulae, see Ivan Havener, The Credal Formulae of the New Testament, Diss. (Munich, 1976), pp. 309-341.

³⁰In 2 Th 1:10 the ὅτι is causal, giving the reason for belief rather than stating the content of belief

³¹Wengst, pp. 32-33, suggests that the αὐτόν was originally Ἰησοῦν; other than this, the formula here is a direct quotation.

³²Luz, p. 325.

³³Rigaux, p. 534.

³⁴Luz, pp. 325-326.

³⁵Luz, p. 325 n. 30, cites Rom 14:9, where the stereotyped usage νεκροὶ καὶ ζῶντες has influenced the wording of the "pistis formula" immediately preceding it: Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἐζήσεν. The problem in applying this example to 1 Th 4:14a is that there is significant material between v. 14a and the end of v. 16, which makes such a direct borrowing by v. 14a from v. 16 unlikely.

³⁶Cf. Mk 8:31; 9:31; 10:33-34; Lk 18:33; 24:7; Acts 2:24, 32; 10:41; 13:33-34; 17:3, 31.

³⁷Versus Harnisch, p. 33.

³⁸Wengst, pp. 32-33, and Best, p. 187. Care should be taken not to judge the use of the name in v. 14a on the basis of Werner Kramer's hypothetical "pistis formula" of a later stage. Even he suggests that the name "Jesus" was originally linked with the statement about the resurrection. See Werner Kramer, Christ, Lord, Son of God, tr. Brian Hardy, in: SBT, 50 (London: SCM, 1966), pp. 199-200, 42.

³⁹Harnisch, pp. 32-33.

⁴⁰Cf. Mk 8:31; 9:31; 10:34; Lk 18:33; 24:7; Acts 10:39; 17:3.

⁴¹See Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (London and New York: United Bible Societies, 1971), p. 531.

⁴²Wengst, pp. 45-46. According to him, Χριστός probably belongs to the formula here, since up to this point Paul has been speaking of κύριος.

⁴³Versus Siber, p. 25.

⁴⁴Wengst, p. 45, makes this suggestion.

⁴⁵The common distinction between "homology" (=acclamation) and "credal formula" (=pistis formula or faith formula), suggested by Hans Conzelmann, "Was glaubte die frühe Christenheit?" Schweizerische Theologische Umschau, 25 (1955), 64 and reprinted in his Theologie als Schriftauslegung (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1974), p. 109, cannot be based on the introductory verb, as he, in part, suggests, but it must be based solely on the contents and form of the formula itself, usually in a ὅτι clause; see the study of these introductory verbs and their relation to credal formulae in Havener, pp. 306-450.

⁴⁶The complete text is given in August Hahn and G. Ludwig Hahn, Bibliothek, pp. 302-304.

⁴⁷The most thorough defense of this point of view is made by John Pierre Charlot, The Construction of the Formula in 1 Corinthians 15,3-5, Diss. (Munich, 1968), especially pp. III, 100-143; IV, 51-81.

⁴⁸So Wengst, p. 45.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 45-47, 32-33.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 45-46; so also Laub, p. 35.

⁵¹Wengst, p. 42.

⁵²This is suggested also by Martin Dibelius, An die Thesalonicher I, II, in: HNT, 11. 2 ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr--Paul Siebeck, 1923), p. 21.

⁵³Wengst, pp. 45-47.

⁵⁴Jacob Kremer, "Auferstanden--auferweckt," Biblische Zeitschrift, 23 (1979), 97-98.

⁵⁵Versus Harnisch, p. 32, who rejects the view that 4:14a is a directly quoted formula and, therefore, interprets v. 14a in the same way as 5:10a.

⁵⁶I am not persuaded by Martin Hengel's argument that the reason for only two passages in Mk (10:45; 14:24) which speak of "the vicarious death of Jesus 'for us'" is that such statements do not play a central role in the proclamation of Jesus and that Mark did not intend to present a "community theology" but primarily the message and work of Jesus; see Martin Hengel, The Atonement, tr. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981),

pp. 34-35. The reason why the vicarious death of Jesus plays such a minor role in Mk is because he simply has no need of this idea for his Christology.

⁵⁷ See the various meanings in H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek--English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940), sub ἀνίστημι. If ἀνέστη is understood by everyone as a resurrection from the dead, why is it necessary to mention the death?

⁵⁸ Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 26, 1.

⁵⁹ Walter Schmithals, "The Historical Situation of the Thessalonian Epistles," in his Paul and the Gnostics, tr. John E. Steely (Nashville and New York: Abingdon, 1972), pp. 212, 160-164.

⁶⁰ Hengel, p. 39, and Philipp Vielhauer, "Ein Weg zur neutestamentlichen Christologie?" in his Aufsätze zum Neuen Testament, in: Theologische Bücherei, 31 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1965), p. 144.

⁶¹ Wengst, pp. 78-79; cf. also Rom 5:8; 1 Cor 1:13; 8:11; 2 Cor 5:14-15; Gal 2:21b.

⁶² Kramer, pp. 26-27.

⁶³ Wengst, p. 79.

⁶⁴ Rom 5:1, 11; 15:30; 1 Cor 15:57; 1 Th 5:9; cf. also Rom 5:21; 7:25.

⁶⁵ Wengst, p. 79.

⁶⁶ In some mss. περί is used instead of ὑπέρ, but this frequent variant only indicates the flexibility of the use of these two prepositions. The original formula may have been cited with either preposition; so Wengst, pp. 79, 56 n. 6.

⁶⁷ James M. Reese, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, in: New Testament Message, 16 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1979), p. 60.

⁶⁸ Ellingworth and Nida, p. 113.

⁶⁹ Joseph Plevnik, "1 Thess 5,1-11: Its Authenticity, Intention and Message," Biblica, 60 (1979), 85-87, names especially E. Fuchs, N. Schneider, G. Braumann and W. Harnisch. He believes himself that Paul has depended somewhat on pre-Pauline tradition in 1 Th 5:1-11 and that the best case can be made for vv. 9-10, though he is critical of certain arguments used by Harnisch.

⁷⁰ Harnisch, pp. 122-123.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 123.

⁷² Ibid., p. 124.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 121-125.

⁷⁴ See n. 64 above for references.

⁷⁵1 Cor 15:57 may be a liturgical statement, but it is not in any case a credal formula.

⁷⁶Plevnik, 87.

⁷⁷Harnisch, pp. 122, 143.

⁷⁸This is not to deny, however, that $\delta\tau\iota$ is sometimes clearly a part of a formula. This is especially true for 1 Cor 15:3-5, as noted above in Section B.

⁷⁹V. 3 ἐκφύγωσιν, v. 4 καταλάβῃ, v. 8 ἐνδυσάμενοι.

⁸⁰It occurs 13 times in Paul.

⁸¹First person plural words occur also in vv. 5b, 6, 8 besides vv. 9-10.

⁸²1 Th 5:9; 2 Th 2:14; Heb 10:39.

⁸³So James Leslie Houlden, Paul's Letters from Prison, in: Westminster Pelican Commentaries (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977), p. 271.

⁸⁴The ἀπολύτρωσιν of Eph 1:14 is associated with the sealing of the Holy Spirit in v. 13, not with blood as in v. 7.

⁸⁵Stauffer, p. 339, correctly states that credal formulae avoid complicated constructions and proceed by thesis rather than by argument. Harnisch, p. 122 n. 28, cites Rom 6:4 as an example of a $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ clause within a credal formula but offers no proof for the assertion that v. 4a is, in fact, a formula which incorporates the Auferweckungsformel in v. 4b. In Jn 3:16 we do find an instance of the "surrender formula" (Dahingabeformel) using a $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ clause, but Wengst, p. 76, points out that this is a freely formulated, late rendition of the formula, where the original $\overline{\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho}$ usage has been replaced by the $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ clause. While Kramer, pp. 112-113, suggests that $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ clauses belong to some versions of a "sending formula" (Sendungsformel), as in Gal 4:4-5; Jn 3:17; 1 Jn 4:9, this is disputed by Wengst, pp. 58-60, who doubts the existence of any such formula. In any case 1 Th 5:9-10 is neither a Dahingabeformel nor a Sendungsformel. See also Wengst, pp. 84-85 for a reconstruction of traditional material from 1 Peter which includes a $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ clause. We do know with certainty, however, that $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ clauses occur in hymnic materials, e.g. Phil 2:10; Col 1:18.

⁸⁶Harnisch, p. 117.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 117-121.

⁸⁸Plevnik, 79-80.

⁸⁹Best, pp. 215-216, remains sceptical.

⁹⁰Harnisch, p. 121.

⁹¹Plevnik, 85.

⁹²Houlden, p. 270.

⁹³This has been especially true since the influential commentary by Edward Gordon Selwyn, The First Epistle of St. Peter, 2 ed. (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 379-382.

⁹⁴This important distinction has been noted by Norbert Schneider, Die rhetorische Eigenart der paulinischen Antithese, in: Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 11 (Tübingen: J. B. C. Mohr--Paul Siebeck, 1970), p. 92.

⁹⁵See the comments on Paul's understanding of baptism in Wilhelm Heitmüller, Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903), especially pp. 14-21 and also the views of Otto Kuss, "Zu paulinischen und nachpaulinischen Tauflehre im Neuen Testament," in his Auslegung und Verkündigung, I (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1963), pp. 121-150, especially pp. 132-134.

SCRIPTURE AND COMMENTARY IN PHILO

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In an earlier contribution to the Philo Project at Claremont, I arrived at a number of tentative conclusions concerning the nature of Philo's exegesis of the text of Leviticus. First, the presence of the formal exegetical principle of διαίρεσις (division of a specific subject into its component parts) in both the allegorical and expository treatises of the corpus suggests that the genus-species relationship is not only the structure of the *nomos*, but also the structure of the cosmos itself. Philo, of course, states that the Law and the cosmos are in perfect harmony at many points in the corpus. In *De Opificio Mundi*, this perception is vital to the entire argument and Philo supports his understanding of the harmony between cosmos and *nomos* through philosophical analysis. The very same argument is made again in *De Decalogo* and *De Specialibus Legibus*, but here the proof or support is generated from both the arrangement and exegesis of the biblical text. Second, analysis of Philo's interpretation of Leviticus across the corpus indicates that the often repeated division of the corpus into allegorical treatises, expository treatises, and political-polemical treatises, so important to our understanding of Philo, may not have occupied an equal importance in Philo himself. The dislocation between what is important for us and what was important for Philo begins to aid us in detecting, albeit only in faint outline, something other than audience as the critical determinant in Philo's agenda. Here, I argued that the critical factors in determining Philo's exegesis are both internal concerns and external issues, regardless of whether the specific treatise is allegorical, expository or political-polemical. Third, the presence of ἀναστροφή (interpretation through rearrangement) allows Philo to understand and interpret the biblical text either backward or forward. This gives him maximum flexibility in deducing the meaning of the text, but more importantly raises another question. Where does Scripture end and commentary begin for Philo? My suspicion was that clear distinction between Scripture and commentary is not as clear-cut for Philo as we might suppose and that one way in which we might begin to understand the continuity between Scripture and commentary is, through what Geza Vermes has described as the "rewritten Bible."¹ The present discussion is intended as an extension of this third tentative conclusion and perhaps a small refinement of the method I have employed to the present in attempting to understand the nature of Philo's exegesis of the biblical text.

The place of the biblical text in Philo has long occupied a prominent position in Philonic studies. The prominence of this issue might be illustrated by reminding ourselves of the Jewish recovery of Philo in the sixteenth century. Despite Poznanski's early attempt to demonstrate the influence of Philonic thought upon eighth through tenth century Jewish philosophical reflection,² the first real critique of Philo appears in Azariah de Rossi's *Me'or Einayim* (Mantua, 1573-1575).³ Azariah was critical of Philo on four counts: 1) that Philo preferred the LXX to the Hebrew text of the Bible; 2) that Philo perhaps believed in the pre-existence

of matter; 3) that in Philo's interpretation of the biblical text there is a tendency to ignore the literal, historical meaning of Scripture in favor of the allegorical meaning; 4) that he ignores the Masorah of the written text of the Hebrew Bible.⁴ It is the last error, which Azariah believed, plunged Philo "like lead into bottomless waters" (כעורפר במים שאין להם סוף) and which created a number of unorthodox views in his thought. Azariah brings a number of passages from *De Specialibus Legibus* (e.g., 3.181-182) which illustrate his unorthodox thinking and which Azariah accounts for by linking Philo's views to those of the "Boethusians." However, Azariah also attempted an apology for Philo and concluded that despite of "all these things I have considered his case carefully and have come to the conclusion, as I have written in this chapter that it is also possible to judge him favorably in some respects and to judge him innocent of all charges of sinfulness, the more so that I know that there are found in our generation discerning and genuinely upright men who drink in his words thirstily and crown him with a wreath of gold like those who walk in the right path among our people...I will not pass judgment upon him or acquit him or condemn him absolutely. He will not be called by me 'master' or 'sage', neither will he be called a heretic or unbeliever. One should call him only 'Yedidiyah the Alexandrian.'⁵ This observation is of interest on two counts. First, Azariah indicates, at the moment of Philo's recovery by Jews, that Philo's interpretations could not easily be brought into accord with Rabbinic Judaism, a position exactly opposite of contemporary, traditionalist interpretations of Philo. Second, the issue of the biblical text is critical in Azariah's critique of Philo and points to the very beginning of the issue in Philonic studies.

Carl Siegfried and H.E. Ryle were among the first scholars of the last century who took the citation of Scripture as a crucial problem in the interpretation of Philo. Siegfried developed twelve separate categories of scriptural citation in the corpus: paraphrases of Scripture; citations of the LXX which reflect Philo's interpretation; citations which partially agree and partly differ with the LXX; variations attested in MSS. of the LXX; variations explained by the Hebrew text; miscellaneous variations; variations explained by a different Hebrew text; citations reflecting Greek literary style; citations which are the synthesis of one or more scriptural verses; passages in which Philo's interpretation is dependent upon a reading which does not appear in the received version of the LXX or MSS; citations corrected so as to agree with the received version; variations from the LXX which have resulted from the MS. tradition of Philo.⁶ Ryle was critical of the cumbersomeness of the twelve categories of scriptural citation and attempted to synthesize and reduce their number. Consequently, Ryle reduced the classification system to four separate categories. The first category was that of variations arising from Philo's methods of teaching. Here, Philo often gives the sense of the biblical passage in his own words, or condenses his citations, omitting words which are unimportant for his interpretation, or "introduces his allegorizing interpretation into his quotations, introducing words, or substituting his interpretation for the word interpreted." Second, variations arise from Philo's "disregard for verbal accuracy." Ryle understood that this category included citations where variation was created in order to avoid Hebraisms (which then might have entailed a smoother construction) or when his memory failed him, or where he was not concerned with accuracy, or when he introduced words to expand the language of the text rhetorically. Third, according to Ryle, variations reproduce differences

of rendering and reading. Here, the variations reflect the variety of the early Greek renderings of the Hebrew text. A certain number of variations are produced by Philo's rendering being closer to the Hebrew than to the LXX. Others are "a reading derived from Greek versions that were in use, before the existing recension of the LXX had obtained general recognition." Ryle also argued that the suggestion that Philo is aware of a different Hebrew text rests on precarious evidence and that the readings of the LXX, supported by Philo, cannot be grouped under any one uniform type. The fourth category in Ryle's simplified system of classification was for variations due to errors in the existing text of Philo's work.⁷ The weakness of Ryle's system of classification is in the second category, where the variations are created because of some perceived disregard for the accuracy of the biblical text (and also slips of memory). One could easily argue against this position that Philo is everywhere careful and precise. Therefore, before this category could be filled in with examples, one would have to consider many other possibilities (e. g., could these variations be explained as intentional interpretations).

A number of studies during the 1940's addressed the issue of the biblical text in the corpus, but did not push the theoretical issues of Scripture and commentary to greater clarity. Knox suggested that the comparative rarity of quotations from outside the Pentateuch indicates that the bulk of Philo's citations goes back to an Alexandrian tradition of exegesis which was established when only the Pentateuch had been translated into Greek. Citation to other books represent what he called "infiltrations" from either Palestinian or Hellenistic provinces.⁸ Colson responded to this argument by suggesting that Philo's citation of the Pentateuch does not necessarily indicate an exegetical tradition which only had the Pentateuch in translation. The preponderance of Pentateuchal quotations, for Colson, has something to do with the superiority ascribed to Moses' writing and to the specific idea that Philo is commenting on the Pentateuch. Colson also attempted to distinguish two forms of citation; the direct (when Philo is formally expounding a specific chapter, verse or law) and the illustrative (when Philo seemingly "rambles" from the particular passage to some other passage).⁹ Knox responded to this criticism by indicating that the rabbis also clearly understand the Pentateuch to be more authoritative than other texts, but this does not preclude them from citing other books when they are commenting on a Pentateuchal text (e.g., *Genesis Rabbah*). Also, Knox indicated approximately fifty extra-Pentateuchal citations in the corpus in which they are used in groups of two or three and that more than a third of these citations treat the themes of wisdom and the birth of Samuel.¹⁰ R. Marcus, at the close of the decade, argued that Philo's biblical texts exhibit a critical reading of the LXX (Det 46, Philo reads the word *νέφθους* in Gen 27:41 as *νάθους*) which is in accord with textual criticism of the Hebrew Bible and should not be traced to a Christian scribe's efforts to bring Philo's reading into line with the LXX.¹¹

Peter Katz's study of the biblical quotations in the corpus is perhaps the most comprehensive study of the problem since the work of Siegfried and Ryle and is dependent on the development of Septuagintal studies during the late 1930's and the decade of the forties. Katz argues that lemma-alterations in the corpus can be accounted for along four lines. First, some alterations are due

to the technical process of assimilation in which the word of one passage is influenced by a parallel passage containing identical content in different wording. Second, assimilation of lemma and exposition in which alterations arise when the exegete, while leaving the biblical citations in their original shape, in his exposition uses an alternative style as demonstrated by dialect, word-formation, choice of words and syntax. This form of alteration, according to Katz, is most often found in the transmission of the author's own work. Third, some alterations reflect the influence of more recent recensions or translations. He reasons that as the Hebrew text underwent changes, the Greek text would be adapted to the contemporary Hebrew. Origen's Hexapla allowed the more recent translations of Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotion to be introduced, first into the margins of the LXX and later into the text itself. He states that "whenever we find a seemingly striking originality in a quotation, perhaps in a successful and close connection with the Hebrew original, this must not lead us to think at once that here we certainly have something authentic that has been lost. On the contrary, we have to check such readings by comparing them with every known form of the Greek Bible, including the more recent translations, and only where any possible connection is ruled out are we likely to be facing a hitherto unknown form of text."¹² The fourth alteration arises from deliberate interpolation. When the authors of the recensions detected some misunderstanding in the Greek text (although they were unable to consult the Hebrew), they introduced modifications intended to correct these misunderstandings. "This they did with a good conscience," Katz states, "for Scripture had to make sense, and existence of corruptions in MSS was a fact well-known to these learned and semi-learned men. These are scholarly interpolations, and hardly ever extend to the expositions."¹³ Those citations which cannot be accounted for by one or a combination of these factors is described by Katz as an "aberrant" text of the LXX. This aberrant text indicates interpolation reflecting a late recension of the LXX, heavily indebted to Aquila's version.¹⁴

Katz's study is exceedingly thorough and his argument that some citations reflect an interpolation based on the translation of Aquila is convincing. Yet, his study, along with the earlier research of Siegfried, Ryle, Knox, Colson and Marcus, reflects a certain weakness characterizing attempts to understand the place of Scripture and its relationship to commentary in the corpus. Attention is deflected from what Philo is actually doing with the text or how he interprets the LXX to how Philo transmits the LXX, recensions other than the received versions, or how Philo's citations were interpolated to bring them into accord with later recensions. Katz provides a precise method for sifting out the later interpolations, but it does not bring us closer to understanding the place of Scripture and commentary. Indeed, Katz's study is indicative of a major problem in Philonic studies. Philo, all too often, is studied from the perspective of what insight he gives to other problems and issues. In this specific case, it is the history of the LXX. This perspective is related to other fashions of scholarship in Philonic studies and the common element in these fashions is relegating Philo's interpretation of the biblical text to secondary or tertiary importance.¹⁵ The importance of Philo's treatment of the LXX is underscored when we recall the problematic quality of the LXX in the ancient world. Momigliano writes that "the translation must also

have helped proselytism, which acquired quite different dimensions as soon as the Jews began to speak Greek. I do not know of any Hellenistic evidence to show that a Gentile became a Jew or a sympathizer because he had read the Bible...The sacred books had become accessible to those who were interested in Judaism. There is, however, no sign that Gentiles at large, ever became acquainted with the Bible: it was bad Greek. No Hellenistic poet or philosopher quoted it, although modern scholars have sometimes deluded themselves on this subject."¹⁶ The very nature of the LXX's Greek usage made the task of the interpreter doubly difficult when an index of the LXX's transformations were added: offensive anthropomorphisms were toned down; there were very few allusions to Greek mythology; the geographical picture of the world was modernized; some passages reflected the political history of the Ptolemies; specific laws of the Pentateuch assimilated the legal practice obtaining in Egypt; the lascivious Canaanite nature religion was sometimes described in terms taken from the mysteries and indicated the presence of a polemical tendency; the reading of Ex 22:27 as *theous ou kakologēseis* was taken to mean a renunciation of polemic against foreign gods; some strata of the LXX indicate that the polemical tendency became an anti-Hellenistic tendency (the Philistines were made Hellenes and Haman in the Book of Esther, translated presumably in Jerusalem, was made into a Macedonian).¹⁷ This list of issues in the LXX, which is by no means exhaustive, makes the relationship of Scripture and commentary in Philo an even more critical problem. We might begin to resolve this issue by considering the following: 1) the terminology of Scripture and Law in the corpus; 2) an analysis of how Philo interprets a specific chapter of the biblical text (Leviticus 19); 3) the intention of commentary for Philo.

1. The Terminology of Scripture.

The terminology of Scripture and Law in the corpus is extensive, but their range of meanings might be controlled by dividing this extensive terminology into two classes: terms indicating the sanctity, veracity or authority of Scripture and Law, and terms indicating Moses' relationship to Scripture or Moses' role in the transmission of Scripture. One of the common images used by Philo to articulate the nature of Scripture and Law is that they are not the product of human invention. In *De Decalogo*, Philo begins his discussion with the problem of why the Law was given in the desert and not in the city. First, cities are filled with impiety towards God and wrong-doing between men. The greatest of these impieties is arrogance or conceit (*τῦφος*) which corrupts leaders and civic life (4-5). Second, the Law was given in the desert so that those who would receive it would be purged of impieties of the city (10-13). Third, giving the Law in the desert (and presumably, the years of wandering in the desert) allows the Israelites to practice the laws before they are institutionalized in their cities (14). The implication here is that this practice will allow the Israelites to avoid the errors found in other cities. Fourth, the Law was given in the desert so as to establish firmly the idea that the laws are not the inventions of man (*ἐντολὰ ἀνθρώπου*) but with certainty the "oracles of God" (*θεοῦ χρησμοὺς*). The certainty that the laws are *θεοῦ χρησμοὺς* is supported by the abundance of the means of life provided for the Israelites in the desert (15-17). This fourth reason seems to have two purposes. First, the absence of food and water in the

desert except for the sustenance provided by God, proves that the laws are divine oracles. Second, if the laws were given in the city, not only might there be a charge that they were only human invention, but also that they were a copy of other legal codes. The latter argument meant that the Jews had not only created their laws, but had also plagiarized them from other peoples. Consequently, the Jews, even in regard to their own laws, were a most uninventive people.¹⁸

Scripture or Law as *χρησμός* is a common metaphor in the corpus. In reference to the immutability of God, Philo states in Somn 2.220 that we have other truthful witnesses in the sacred oracles (*οἱ ἀψευδέστατοι μάρτυρες ἱεροὶ χρησμοί*). In Det 48, he states μαρτυρήσει δὲ τὸ χρησθὲν λόγιον which Colson and Whitaker translate as "to this the declaration of Scripture shall be our witness."¹⁹ Also, *χρησμός* is used to introduce a biblical text into the discussion; *φησὶν ὁ χρησμος*, "the oracle says" (Praem 49) or *ὡς δηλοῦσιν οἱ χρησμοί*, "as the oracles point out" (Conf 197). In Mos 2.188, he indicates that all things written in the sacred books (*ἱεραῖς βιβλοῖς*) and transmitted through Moses are oracles (*χρησμοί*). In some cases, the oracular quality of Scripture and Law is conveyed through cognate phrases such as *θεσπισθὲν λόγιον*, "a divine utterance" (Somn 1.231).²⁰

In many cases, Philo uses *ἱερός* or *θεός* to modify *γραφή*, *γράμμα*, *βιβλος*, or *λόγος*. In discussing the σωτήριοιον and why the biblical text stipulates the use of the lobe of the liver, the kidneys and fat in the sacrifice and excludes the heart or brain, he indicates that this question will arise for those reading the *ἱεραῖς γραφαῖς* (Spec Leg 1.214).²¹ In Det 161, he states λέγεται δὲ ἐν ἱεραῖς βιβλοῖς, "yet it is said in the sacred books." In Legat 195, he indicates that the truly noble are reared and trained *ἱεροῖς γράμμασιν*. In Ebr 143, he introduces 1 Sam 1:11 with the words *ὡς ὁ ἱερός λόγος φησὶν*, "as the sacred word says." A parallel construction is the phrase *θεῖος λόγος*; in Leg All 3.8, he introduces Num 5:2 with the statement *διδό φησι καὶ ὁ θεῖος λόγος*. The great majority of these constructions are intended to introduce biblical texts which serve either as the center of his interpretation or as a proof-text for a preceding discussion. They indicate, in either case, the authoritative nature of the material cited. Philo also builds the authority or veracity of Scripture upon the qualities of the lawgiver himself.²² Moses becomes *ὁ ἱερώτατος νομοθέτης* (Spec Leg 1.14), *ἱερώτατον Μωυσέως γράμμα* (Deus 6), *θεῶ φίλος* (Leg All 3.204) and by attaining all virtues is able to write sacred books under divine direction (Mos 2.11).²³

However, the most important terminology is that which describes Moses' relationship to Scripture or Moses' role in the transmission of Scripture. Unlike the first class of terms, which are intended to introduce Scripture into the discussion, these terms begin to clarify the real nature of Scripture for Philo. Moses is the perfect lawgiver and his laws (by extension his *ἱεραῖς βιβλοῖς*) are distinct from all other legal codes. In Mos 2.14, he draws this distinction by stating that "his laws, firm, unshaken, immovable, stamped as it were, with the seals of nature herself, remain secure from the day when they were first enacted to now, and we may hope that they will remain for all future ages as though immortal, so long as the sun and moon and the whole heavens and universe exist."²⁴ The immutability of the Law and

its total conformity to the laws of nature are self-evident for Philo and are common *topoi* in the corpus. But what is Moses' relationship to that which is immutable and in perfect harmony with the laws of nature? In Plant 117, Philo cites Lev 19:24 in reference to the sacrificial offering of the fourth year fruit. He states "in many parts of the lawgiving (νομοθεσίας), but above all in the record of the creation of the universe, we see the prophetic word (ὁ προφητικὸς λόγος) glorifying the number 4." This προφητικὸς λόγος is not the text of Genesis, what he describes as the "record of creation", but its transmitter, Moses. This is in accord with many other descriptions of Moses and his act of transmitting the oracles and sacred books described by the first set of terms. Moses is addressed as prophet (e.g., Leg All 2.1), but he is also an extension or personification of the prophetic word. So, Philo states in Leg All 3.43 that Moses is the prophetic word (καὶ Μωϋσῆς δὲ ὁ προφητικὸς λόγος φησὶν). It is true that this phrase introduces a biblical text, but it is unlike the terms in the first category in that it registers Philo's understanding of Moses himself. Again in Cong 170, Moses is described as the prophetic word (ὁ προφήτης λόγος, ὄνομα Μωϋσῆς) and in Praem 53, he defines him as ὁ θεολόγος. This terminology seems to indicate primarily the specific nature of Moses and only secondarily, the content of Scripture or what Moses transmits.

The critical passage in Philo's discussion of the προφητικὸς λόγος is Mos 2.187-191. Here, Philo distinguishes three forms of material or "oracles" delivered by Moses: 1) those spoken by God and interpreted by his prophet; 2) those delivered in the form of questions to God and answered by God; 3) those delivered by Moses himself in an ecstatic state. Philo states as follows:

We said above that there are four attributes that belong to the truly perfect ruler. He must have kingship, legislative skill, priesthood and prophecy, so that through his legislative skill he may command what ought to be done and forbid what ought not to be done, through the priesthood conduct not only things human but things divine, and through prophecy reveal by inspiration what is inapprehensible through reasoning. I have discussed the first three and have shown that Moses was the best of kings, of legislators and of high priests, and will now finally show that he was the most illustrious of prophets. Now I am not unaware that all things written in the sacred books are oracles delivered through Moses; but I will discuss those that are more particularly his, after making the following preliminary remarks. Of the divine oracles, some are spoken by God himself with his prophet as interpreter, some were revealed through question and answer, others by Moses himself, when inspired and possessed and transported out of himself. The first kind are entirely and exclusively tokens of divine virtues, graciousness and beneficence, by which he encourages all men to noble action, and especially the nation of his worshippers, for whom he opens up a road

that leads to happiness. The second kind entails mixture and partnership: the prophet makes inquiry about the things for which he has been searching and God responds and instructs him. The third kind are attributed to the lawgiver himself: God has granted him a share of his own prognostic power, through which he will prophesy the future. Now, the first kind must be deferred, for they are too great for human praise, scarcely indeed could heaven and the earth and the entire universe worthily sing their praises. Moreover, they are delivered as if through an interpreter, and interpretation and prophecy are two different things. The second kind I will at once attempt to describe, interweaving with it the third kind, in which the divine possession of the speaker is manifest, in virtue of which he is above all and in the strict sense considered a prophet.²⁵

This passage will become more important in our discussion of the relationship between Scripture and commentary, but in our first reading of the text it is only necessary to indicate a few simple points. First, the original tripartite division of the oracles delivered by Moses is compressed into two forms, dependent upon the two forms of prophecy: prophetic oracles involving interpretation and the strict prophetic oracle involving prognostication of the future. Second, Winston indicates in reference to Philo's deferral on the first kind (i.e., prophetic oracles involving interpretation) that he seems to be saying that these "are too grand and too complex to be dealt with as an aside to an encomium of Moses and must be analyzed in a separate treatise dedicated solely to that topic."²⁶ Winston's observation is correct and the separate treatise, which Philo perhaps later divided into two, is *De Decalogo* and *De Specialibus Legibus*.²⁷ Third, Philo's interpretation of Ex 14 (Mos 2.250-257) is an example of the strict prophetic oracle involving prognostication of the future. Moses, seeing the panic of the people at the advance of the Egyptian army and all possible escape routes closed by the sea, is taken out of himself and utters inspired words (250). The speech concludes with the statement that "you see them still alive: I have a vision (ἐγὼ φαντασίαν λαμβάνω) of them dead, and today you too shall see their corpses" (252). It is further stated, ἀπέβαινε γὰρ τὰ χρησθέντα θεῶν δυνάμει (253). At the conclusion of Philo's description of the event at the sea, he again says that Moses was ἐνθουσιασμόν προφητείας. Here, the prophetic experience is articulated through the prediction of future events, which in the specific case, are near at hand.

Carl H. Holladay indicates that there are two strands of thought in Philo; one in which Philo argues that it is impossible for man to become God and a second in which important figures in Israel's national history are divinized. The first strand is exemplified by a number of references to Ex 7:1. So in Mos 1.158 Moses is made the ideal king or in Mos 1.18-33, Moses becomes Plato's Philosopher-king. Holladay is correct in situating the above passage within the second strand. He notes that this passage is related to Quaes Ex 2.29 which reads as follows:

(29) (Ex 24:2) Why does He say, "Moses alone shall come near to God, and they shall not come near, and the people shall not go up with them?"

O most excellent and God-worthy ordinance, that the prophetic mind (τὸν προφητικὸν νοῦν) alone should approach God and that those in second place should go up, making a path to heaven, while those in third place and the turbulent characters of the people should neither go up above nor go up with them but those worthy of beholding should be beholders of the blessed path above. But that "(Moses) alone should go up" is said most naturally (φυσικώτατα). For when the prophetic mind becomes divinely inspired and filled with God (ἐνθεοῦσιν καὶ θεοφορεῖται), it becomes like the monad, not being at all mixed with any of those things associated with duality. But he who is resolved into the nature of unity, is said to come near God in a kind of family relation, for having given up and left behind all mortal kinds, he is changed into the divine, so that such men become akin to God and truly divine.

Holladay argues that these two passages, Quaes Ex 2.29 and, especially, Mos 2.188, are related in two respects: 1) they illustrate Philo's conception of the Divine-Human encounter and 2) they exemplify the language of deification in describing this encounter. Moses is described in the Mos passage as θεῖος προφήτης. The term θεῖος does not hint, according to Holladay, at "incorporealization", but is used as a synonym for ἐνθεος. He states that if this is the meaning, "it is an unusual use of θεῖος for Philo, who usually uses ἐνθεος itself, or θεομεσιος attributively. Thus, if θεῖος is to be understood here as 'inspired,' it is an unusual, though by no means impossible, use by Philo.²⁸

We might summarize the discussion to this point by indicating that the terminology of Scripture in the corpus is divided into two categories. First, there are a number of terms which indicate the veracity or authority of Scripture. Terms such as χρησιμός, θεοπλοῦθὲν λόγιον, or the phrases which employ either ἐπρός or θεός to modify writing, books or sayings underscore Philo's perception of the authority of Scripture. Second, a set of terms is intended to reveal something of Moses as transmitter of this authoritative material. Even this may be too general in describing this terminology. Mos 2.187-191 seems to describe the content of Scripture only at first reading. Philo's immediate concern is with the forms of revelation which he understands to take only two forms; revelation which involves the interpreter and revelation which exclusively involves prognostication. Therefore, we might specify the second class of terms as those which describe the nature of revelation in Scripture and not simply or generally the nature of Moses as transmitter of Scripture. Yet, the two classes of terms are only static and perhaps arbitrary categories.

The central question is the manner in which these terms inform Philo's commentary. This question might be addressed by considering how Philo treats a specific block of biblical material across the corpus.

2. *Leviticus 19.*

The Holiness Code, which spans Ex 35 to Num 9, may provide an excellent field in which to observe the interplay between these ideas of Scripture and interpretation or commentary. The particular stamp of this material, in which the idea of holiness is rendered in terms of both cultic and ethical cleanliness, provides Philo with the opportunity to demonstrate the cultic perfection of the Law and its constancy with other ethical systems. A complete analysis of this material is precluded in the present study and we might confine our discussion to a single chapter, *Leviticus 19*. A number of scholars have suggested that *Lev 17-26* may have once constituted an independent corpus which was eventually integrated into the larger Holiness Code. *Leviticus 19* contains some thirty individual commands and prohibitions of a religious and ethical character. Some of these commands and prohibitions have parallels in the ethical decalogue (*Ex 20:2-17*), especially vv. 3-4, 11-12 and 30, and in the cultic decalogue of *Ex 34*.²⁹ Philo's commentary to this chapter, when viewed across the corpus, is quite comprehensive, although he by no means treats every command and prohibition. We can initially register the comprehensive quality of his interpretation in the following manner:

<i>Leviticus 19</i>	<i>Philo</i>
1. v. 3 command to honor one's mother and father	Spec Leg 2.239
2. v. 3 command to keep the Sabbath	
3. v. 4 prohibition against idolatry	Leg All 3.22 and Spec Leg 1.25
4. vv. 5-8 the peace-offering	Spec Leg 1.220 and 1.223
5. vv. 9-10 prohibition against reaping the corners of the field	Virt 90, Somn 2.23 and Virt 91
6. v. 11 prohibition against stealing, dealing falsely and lying	Spec Leg 4.39
7. v. 12 prohibition against swearing falsely with the Lord's name	Spec Leg 4.39
8. v. 13 prohibition against oppressing your neighbor and robbing him	Spec Leg 4.195 and Virt 88
9. v. 14 prohibition against cursing the deaf and placing stumbling blocks in the path of the blind	Spec Leg 4.197-198
10. v. 15 command to be impartial in judgment	Spec Leg 4.44 and 72
11. v. 16 prohibition against slander	Spec Leg 4.183
12. v. 17 prohibition against hatred	
13. v. 18 prohibition against vengeance and bearing grudges	
14. v. 19 prohibition against the intermixing of livestock, seeds in the field and the composition of garments	Spec Leg 3.46

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|---|---|
| 15. v. 20 prohibition against sexual intercourse with a promised slave | |
| 16. vv. 21-22 the guilt offering for the above offense | |
| 17. v. 23 prohibition against using the produce of trees during the first three years | Virt 155-160, Plant 94-138, and Leg All 1.52 |
| 18. v. 24 command to offer the fourth year produce to God | Virt 155-160, Plant 94-138, Somn 1.33, and Abr 13 |
| 19. v. 25 command to use the produce during and after the fifth year | Virt 155-160 and Plant 94-138 |
| 20. v. 26 prohibition against eating meat with blood | |
| 21. v. 26 prohibition against augury and witchcraft | |
| 22. v. 27 prohibition against the ritual trimming of the hair and beard | |
| 23. v. 28 prohibition against cutting the flesh and tattoos | Spec Leg 1.58 |
| 24. v. 29 prohibition against profaning a daughter through harlotry | |
| 25. v. 30 command to keep the Sabbaths and to maintain the sanctity of the sanctuary | |
| 26. v. 31 prohibition against turning to mediums and wizards | |
| 27. v. 32 command to honor elders | Spec Leg 2.238 and Sac 77 |
| 28. vv. 33-34 command to treat sojourners equally | Virt 102-103 |
| 29. v. 35 prohibition against wrong judgment and false measures | Spec Leg 4.193-194, Her 162 and Hypoth 7.8 |
| 30. v. 36 command to have just balances | Spec Leg 4.193-194, Her 162 and Hypoth 7.8 |

This structure immediately reveals what Philo picks out for interpretation and what he omits from his commentary. It is also the case that Philo collapses some of the individual commands and prohibitions indicating that he understands what appears to us as two or three distinct commands to be one. This is particularly the case with vv. 35-36. Yet, this structure does not indicate what Philo is doing with the biblical text and here we must consider Philo's citation of the biblical text. The appendix to this paper is a synoptic arrangement of the received version of Lev 19 in the LXX and Philo's citation of the verses. The four columns (moving from left to right) first indicate the treatise and paragraph where either the biblical text is cited or where an allusion to Scripture is to be found. The second column contains the verse citation to the LXX. The third column contains the text of the LXX as established by Alfred Rahlfs, *Septuaginta* (7th edition, 1962). The fourth column contains the citation or the allusion to Scripture as it appears in the Philonic corpus. This system is followed exactly with the exception of Virt 155-160 in which the paraphrase and interpretation of Lev 19:23-25 is too extensive to be included in the synoptic arrangement.

The first thing that this arrangement reveals is that Philo's style contains certain Atticisms. In some cases, his style of composition is smoother than the LXX. It is a more correct Greek,

but it is not Attic Greek. This, of course, is a simple observation, but one which should not be overlooked. Philo's atticizing of the text is not heavy-handed and seems to be limited to removing the most noticeable and strident Hellenistic Greek vocabulary and syntactical constructions. He is not trying to make the biblical text like Demosthenes or Isocrates. Second, the synoptic arrangement of the text of the LXX and Philo's citation of the text immediately reveals that most of Philo's citations are not direct or literal citations, but paraphrases and interpolations of the biblical text. However, we can not say more than this without considering each case.

1. Spec Leg 2.239 on Lev 19:3 - Here is one of the few cases in which Philo cites the biblical text directly, although he omits the second half of the verse, καὶ τὰ σαββάτα τοῦ φυλάξεσθε, "and you shall guard my Sabbaths." The critical word in the biblical text is φοβεῖσθω and Philo cites this verse in order to show the two dynamics of filial piety. The first dynamic is honor, so the Decalogue (Ex 20:12) commands that one should honor (τιμῇ) his mother and father. In Dec 106-120, Philo only touches upon the honor due parents, so for example he states, "let them not then fail to understand that in the two courts, the only courts which nature has they stand convicted; in the divine court, of impiety (δόσεύς) because they do not show due respect to those who brought them forth from non-existence to existence and in this were imitators of God; in the human court, of hatred of mankind (μισανθρωπίας)" (111). In Spec Leg 2.224-238, Philo indicates that the father and mother deserve honor for other reasons: seniors are place above juniors (226-227), they are instructors to their children (228), they are benefactors to their children (229-230), and they have authority over them (231-233). Philo then praises the virtue of this honor (234-236) and then shows that the honor due to parents is generalized to the respect shown to all elders. Philo then introduces the second dynamic, fear (φοβέω) which Moses included "for the sake of those who are in the habit of neglecting their duty" (240). Here, the omission of the second half of the verse does not represent an interpretation of the verse; it is inappropriate to the discussion of the fifth commandment of the Decalogue.

2. Leg All 3.22 and Spec Leg 1.25 on Lev 19:4 - The LXX reads "You shall not follow idols and you shall not make for yourselves molten gods. I am the Lord your God." In Leg All 3.22, Philo uses the verse to draw a contrast between Laban and Jacob; the idols are taken to be "the voices of the senses" and the "operations of the passions." These are taken to be alien to the soul and Philo exploits χωνευτός in order to demonstrate that which is alien dissolves virtue and well-being and moulding in its place wickedness and passions. This is an obvious paraphrase of the text and the text cited is only τοὺς χωνευτοὺς θεοὺς (= LXX θεοὺς χωνευτοὺς). However, in Spec Leg 1.25 he offers a direct citation of the text, but its meaning is taken in an altogether different direction. Here, Philo takes the text to mean that it is improper to assign divine honors to wealth. It is gold and silver which melt and become the εἰδώλους of the biblical text for the multitude.

3. Spec Leg 1.220 on Lev 19:5-6 - The LXX reads "and if you will sacrifice a peace offering to the Lord, you will offer it acceptable from yourselves. It shall be eaten on the day you will sac-

rifice it and on the following day, but if any of it remains until the third day, it will be completely burned with fire." In Spec Leg 1.220, Philo offers a paraphrase of the text, indicating that only two days are allowed for the use of the *soterion*. He adduces several reasons for this proscription. First, the meat of the sacrifice decays rapidly. Second, the sacrificial meal should not be hoarded, but open to all who have need (221). The third reason is that the *soterion* is made on behalf of the soul and body, and one day is fixed for each element. Since there is no third element in the sacrifice, what remains after the two days have elapsed must be destroyed by the fire (220-223).³⁰

4. Spec Leg 1.223 on Lev 19:7-8 - Here, Philo maintains the order of the biblical text, moving from vv. 5-6 in Spec Leg 1.220 to vv. 7-8 in this paragraph. While the language of the LXX is impersonal, Philo transforms it into direct and personal diction. Moses says to the one who only tastes the meat after the second day, "Ridiculous one" (ὁ καταέλαστε). This phrase, along with "the one who is a slave to his stomach" (ὁ γαστρίμαργε) represent two epithets taken over from Attic literature and while Philo offers a free paraphrase of the biblical text here, it might be described as a mild atticism. It should also be noted that Philo's paraphrase excludes any reference to the destruction of the soul of those who eat the sacrifice (v. 8). Since Philo argues that one of the reasons for the sacrifice being eaten for two days is that it should not be hoarded (221), eating on the third day is an indication of gluttony; the punishment described by the biblical text is perhaps too extreme for this oversight.

5. Virt 90 and Somn 2.23 on Lev 19:9 - While M reads *לֹא תִקַּח* *pe'at šadeka*, the LXX reads οὐ συντελέσετε τὸν θερισμὸν ὑμῶν τοῦ ἀγροῦ σου ἐκθερίσαι, "you shall not complete the reaping of your field by mowing it completely." The prohibition of reaping the field completely, leads Philo to paraphrase the text in Virt 90 in such a way as to stress the incompleteness of the cutting, although he reverses the order of the text. He states, "he bids them at harvest time not to take up what drops from the sheaves, not to put the sickle to the whole crop." This inversion does not bear on the interpretation of the text for he simply underscores that this prohibition is intended to cultivate self-sacrifice in opposition to greed and to provide the poor with sustenance. In Somn 2.23, Philo removes some of the redundancy in the verse by omitting the Aorist infinitive, ἐκθερίσαι, although συντελέσετε seems strengthened by λοιπός, "you shall not complete that which remains." Here, the citation of Scripture is an interpretation reducing the ambiguity of the LXX, perhaps arising from the Hebrew verb *klh* and "the corner of your field." This clarification of the biblical text, if it may indeed be called that, aids Philo in his interpretation or it more clearly fits the argument advanced in *De Somniis* where "reaping the reaping" is taken to mean not only discrimination but also the pride of discrimination (2.24).

6. Virt 91 on Lev 19:10 - The legislation concerning the border of the field and that which drops from the sheaves is continued in v. 10 to include the vineyard. Here, Philo maintains the order of the biblical text, first treating v. 9 in Virt 90 and then treating v. 10 in this passage. His citation to the biblical text is a paraphrase in which he expands ῥῶγας (ῥῶξ) by adding the word ἀποπίπτουσας.³¹

7. Spec Leg 4.39 on Lev 19:11-12 - Philo's citation of the text is substantially the same as the received version, but he does not perceive the prohibitions of the verse as three separate interdictions, but as a series. Both Colson and Mosès interpret Philo's perception of the text as falling within the rhetorical structure of the $\kappa\lambda\upsilon\mu\alpha\varsigma$.³² Hence, Philo understands that the thief conceals his act by a lie, then in his eagerness to avoid penalty for his act brings a false accusation against his neighbor, and then swears an oath, invoking God, in order to make his account believable to onlookers or a court (40).³³

8. Spec Leg 4.195 and Virt 88 on Lev 19:13 - In Spec Leg 4.195, Philo offers a paraphrase of v. 13b by stating "he orders the employer not to postpone his payment but to render the stipulated wages on that very day." Philo takes $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\kappa\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, "you shall not wrong" to be the specific injunction against a delay of payment as if the verse read "you shall not wrong your neighbor by delaying the payment of wages." Mosès suggests that $\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\kappa\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\upsilon$ (196) is an allusion to $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\kappa\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ which then brings this verse into the general discussion of justice at this point in Spec Leg.³⁴ In Virt 88, he again offers a paraphrase of the text and maintains the general interpretation seen in Spec Leg that the wrong is the delay of payment. However, here we note that Philo has inverted the order of the biblical text in this section of Virt. The order is 19:13 (Virt 88), 19:9 (Virt 90) and 19:10 (Virt 91). This inversion is created by a logical association beginning in Virt 80 where Philo demonstrates the philanthropy of Moses' legislation. The chain of association begins with the prohibition against lending money with interest (82-87), moves to the payment of wages (88) and seems to end in 89 with the prohibition against a creditor entering a debtor's house to take a pledge. A second series of associations begins with 90 and the prohibitions against the complete harvesting of a field. The connecting link between the two series of associations is Moses' concern for the poor.

9. Spec Leg 4.197-198 on Lev 19:14 - Philo's paraphrase of the biblical text contains three examples of his mild atticisms: $\text{E}\ddot{\omicron}\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\iota\upsilon\omicron\ \delta\iota\epsilon\lambda\omicron\gamma\eta\tau\alpha\iota$, $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\nu\omicron\mu\omega\tau\acute{\iota}\tau\eta$, and $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omega\ \mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu\ \pi\alpha\beta\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$. Colson renders $\kappa\alpha\mu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ as a "deaf-mute" for Philo states "this offence of cursing those who have lost both the power of speech and the use of their ears."³⁵ This is not an expansion of the meaning of the term for Liddell-Scott (pp. 1019-1020) list cases in which the linguistic background of the nominal and verbal forms already suggest either deafness alone or deafness and the loss of speech.

10. Spec Leg 4.44 and 4.72 on Lev 19:15 - In Spec Leg 4.44 there may be only a faint allusion to Lev 19:15. Indeed, Colson indicates the "many places" as being Ex 23:7, Lev 19:15 and Deut 16:19-20, while Mosès indicates that Philo is thinking primarily of Ex 23:7.³⁶ The paraphrase is too loose to assign it without doubt to one verse or another and perhaps represents a thorough amalgamation or synthesis of all three. Philo steps beyond the literal reading of the text in the LXX by indicating the rational for such a prohibition; its violation encourages false testimony. In Spec Leg 4.72, there is an allusion to either Ex 23:3 or Lev 19:15. The LXX to Ex 23:3 reads $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\alpha\ \text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\theta\acute{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \kappa\omicron\lambda\acute{\omicron}\sigma\iota$, "and you shall not show mercy to the poor man in judgment."

Colson and Moses note that the allusion is most likely to Exodus and that Philo is struck by the absence of a corresponding precaution against being moved to side with the wealthy, as is found in Leviticus.³⁷ Philo's awareness to the problem posed by the verses is demonstrated in the statement following immediately after the paraphrase: "And this comes from one who has filled practically his whole legislation with injunctions to show pity and kindness, who issues severe threats against the haughty and arrogant and offers great rewards to those who feel it a duty to redress the misfortunes of their neighbors and to look upon abundant wealth not as their personal possession but as something to be shared by those who are in need" (72). Here, the "wise precept", Sophia as *philanthrōpos* teaches that the righteous man must be humane; in showing this kindness man most closely resembles the divine being (74).

11. Spec Leg 4.183 on Lev 19:16 - Philo's citation of Lev 19:16 falls within his "appendix" on justice which concludes his arrangement of the special laws. In Spec Leg 4.151-192, he addresses the king or ruler as an exemplification of justice. The LXX only offers a general prohibition against speaking deceitfully and Philo takes it as a prohibition directed to the king, the ruler or to the one who has assumed a public office. We might ask if this is an arbitrary meaning or interpretation given to the text? Colson suggests this by stating that "both in the Hebrew and in the LXX it is no doubt a general precept, but as it is preceded by 'in righteousness shall thou judge thy neighbour,' Philo might allege some reason for applying it to a person in authority."³⁸ Certainly, Lev 19:15 gives Philo the proper specific understanding of the verse, namely that it is directed to the ruler, but this is also bolstered by 16b. One area in which the ruler exemplifies justice is in the domain of judgment (Spec Leg 4.169) and the references to judgment surrounding 16a are more than sufficient for Philo to specify the commandment. It should also be noted that Philo's interpretation of justice, exemplified by the king and then the general principles of justice (Spec Leg 4.193ff.), produces another inversion of the biblical text's order. He begins with 19:16 (Spec Leg 4.183), then 19:13 (Spec Leg 4.195) and finally, 19:14 (Spec Leg 4.197-198).

12. Spec Leg 3.46 on Lev 19:19 - Both the M and LXX indicate three forms of intermingling: between cattle of different kinds, sowing the field (M) or vineyard (LXX) with different kinds of seeds, and wearing a garment woven of two materials. Philo only comments on the inter-breeding between species of cattle. He introduces this into his discussion of the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue as an example of the scrupulous regulations guarding sexual relationships. His paraphrase indicates that Moses is so scrupulous in these matters that he forbids even the mating of different species of cattle. Wolfson notes that at least one sage included the prohibition against the junction of heterogeneous animals by hybridization among the Noachian Laws (b. *Sanhedrin* 56b) and he argues that there is a striking similarity between Philo's natural laws and the Noachian Laws. Hybridization upsets the laws of nature (Spec Leg 4.204).³⁹ While rabbinic literature contains many discussions of this verse, the Rabbis seem most concerned with the prohibition against the garment woven of two materials. So, for example, *Pesikta de-Rav Kahana* 4:6 describes four laws in which the *yeger ha-ra'* discredits the word of Scripture. The second of these

laws is the prohibition against wearing a garment of intermingled threads (esp. in Deut 22:11). The *yesser ha-ra'* points out a contradiction in Scripture by stating: "Scripture says elsewhere (Num 15:38-39) that a linen cloak with wool fringes is permitted." Here, also Scripture does not acknowledge the exception to the statute, but again simply enjoins obedience to all the statutes, 'You shall keep my statutes' (Lev 19:19).⁴⁰

13. Virt 155-160, Plant 94-138, Leg All 1.52, Somn 1.33 and Abr 13 on Lev 19:23-25 - The Biblical text here stipulates the planting of fruit trees and prohibits their fruit from consumption during the first four years of their growth. While vv. 23-24 in M use the analogy of circumcision (*wa'āraltem 'ōrlātō 'et-piryō and yihyeh lakem 'āralīm lo' yē'ākēl*), the LXX does not retain this analogue. The LXX's reading of "you shall purge away its uncleanness" leads Philo in Virt 155-160 into a lengthy discussion of the manner in which trees are to be cultivated, including pruning and proper irrigation (156). The paraphrase of these verses is so extensive that the only distinct citations to the text are "three successive years" (156) and the thank-offering of the fruit from the fourth year (159). In regard to the latter, he offers an explanation of why this offering is appropriate; it is partially "a thank-offering for the past, partly in hope of fertility to come and the acquisition of wealth to which this will lead" (160). In Plant 95, Philo cites the text in a most literal manner and beginning in 96 he offers a phrase by phrase interpretation of the text, which he takes to be an analogue of the husbandry of the mind. First, he takes "when you shall enter into the land, you shall plant every tree yielding food" to mean that as long as the mind stands outside of wisdom, it will give its attention to wild trees (the passions, ignorance and evil things). The cleansing of the tree means removing the impurities from the mind and separating real wisdom from superstition (107). Philo then offers an interpretation of v. 23 in which he indicates that it can be read in two ways: 1) "Its fruit shall be for three years. It shall not be eaten uncleansed" or 2) "Its fruit shall be uncleansed for three years. It shall not be eaten" (113). According to the former reading of the text, it presents the three-fold division of time and he understands that the fruit of instruction is impervious to time. Incorrect instruction leads the soul to corruption and disease, and therefore the fruits of this uncleansed instruction are prohibited (114). He takes the second reading to mean that the fruit of true education requires cleansing throughout time (116). His interpretation of v. 24 centers upon the "fourth year" and the number four which he understands to encompass the principles of both physics and ethics (120). He says that it is appropriate to describe the fruit of proper instruction as holy and for praise (v. 24). Praise is crucial for it is impossible to demonstrate our gratitude to God through buildings and ritual acts. Gratitude is expressed in hymns of praise "and these not such as the audible voice shall sing, but strains raised and re-echoed by the mind too-pure for eye to discern" (126).⁴¹ In 132, he turns to the number five which has a special relationship to sense perception and demonstrates that creation is ontologically lower than God. Sense perception provides the "food" for the mind (133). This is demonstrated by the figures of Leah's sons, Judah and Issachar. Philo indicates that the name Judah, the fourth son, means "confession of praise to the Lord" and the name of the fifth son, Issachar, means "reward" (134).⁴² Judah is taken to be the mind that blesses God and which

has reached the farthest boundary of perfection (135). Issachar is taken as the offspring of the soul or the fruit of instruction which is the reward of the wise (137-138).

In Leg All 1.52, Philo takes up the motif of husbandry of the mind which was his starting point in Plant. Here, he cites two phrases from v. 23, πᾶν δὲ ἔϋλον βρώσιμον and περικαθαρίσαι τὴν ἀκαθάρτιαν αὐτοῦ. The phrase "every tree good for food" links the levitical text to Gen 2:8 which is under discussion at this point in the treatise. "Cleansing" the fruit is taken as cutting away self-conceit which is by its very nature unclean. In Somn 1.33, he cites the text as ἄγιον καὶ ἀνερτὸν and utilizes it to interpret the number four. Here, his interpretation is an abbreviated form of that given in Plant 117-120. Four represents that which is beyond comprehension and is comparable to the relationship between heaven in contrast to the elements of air, earth and water or the relationship between mind in contrast to body and sense perception. In Abr 13, he again cites the text as ἅγιός ἐστι καὶ ἀνερτός which is now applied to Enosh who is the fourth man, in the biblical sequence read as Adam, Abel, Seth and Enosh.⁴³ Four is held in greatest honor by those who have studied immaterial and conceptual realities and hence, Moses indicated its importance by speaking of the number four as "holy and for praise." The references to Lev 19:23-24 in these treatises seem to be based on the extensive interpretation of the text in Plant 94-138 and while my intent here is certainly not the chronology of Philo's treatises, the treatment of these verses in Leg All, Somn and Abr may indicate that the extensive interpretation found in Plant was well-established before these treatises. It might also be argued that the more extensive interpretations of this text in Virt and Plant, and the abbreviated citations in Leg All, Somn and Abr are taken from a *Quaestiones et Solutiones* on Leviticus which has not been preserved.

14. Spec Leg 1.58 on Lev 19:28 - Both Colson and Daniel suggest that this paragraph is an allusion to Lev 19:28. Colson indicates that the text from LXX is taken by Philo to refer to idolatrous practices, but how is it to be related to the preceding discussion in which the narrative of Phinehas (Num 25-26) is explicated? He argues that a few words ("such practices Moses absolutely forbids") have been lost. Philo would then contrast the bondage to idols with bondage to God.⁴⁴ Daniel concurs that δουλεία is taken as a contrast between slavery to God and slavery to idols and that Philo here alludes to forbidden practices (Lev 19:28 and Deut 14:1) which are interpreted traditionally as idolatrous practices. The γράμματα στικὰ is taken to be tattoos honoring a deity.⁴⁵ The contrast, seen by Colson and Daniel, between idolatry and the worship of God is also reflected in rabbinic interpretations of this verse (e.g., SongR 5.16.4).⁴⁶

15. Spec Leg 2.238 and Sac 77 on Lev 19:32 - Colson indicates that Philo in Spec Leg 2.238 may have taken the LXX reading ἀπο προσώπου πολιοῦ ἐξανσθήσῃ to mean "rise up away from," i.e., to make room for him.⁴⁷ Here, we find another inversion of the order of the text; Philo alludes here to Lev 19:32 and in Spec Leg 2.239 to Lev 19:3. This inversion is governed by the two dynamics of filial piety, τιμὴ and φοβέω. Since he takes yielding one's place to elders as a universally accepted form of respect or honor, it must come before Lev 19:3 and its statement that one should "fear" his father and mother. In Sac 77, Philo cites a literal version

of the received text of the LXX and draws a distinction between the verse's use of $\rho\alpha\lambda\iota\delta$, "hoary head" and $\pi\rho\epsilon\sigma\beta\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota$, "elders." He takes the term $\rho\alpha\lambda\iota\delta$ to mean "time which has no activity, from whose presence we must hurry to depart and shun the illusion which deceives the multitude, that time is capable of effecting anything."⁴⁷ The $\pi\rho\epsilon\sigma\beta\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota$ are the "truths that come from older days and are worthy of the highest reverence." The distinction between $\rho\alpha\lambda\iota\delta$ and $\pi\rho\epsilon\sigma\beta\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota$ is not paralleled in rabbinic literature where the Hebrew šēyḇān and zāqēn are taken as one and the same. In LevR 30:11, which comments on Lev 23:40, "And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of the tree hadar (hāḏār)...", hāḏār is taken to be the Great Sanhedrin, whom God honored with old age and the proof-text is Lev 19:32a. This interpretation is governed by the verb wehādartā , "and you shall honor" in 32b which is then associated with the tree hadar in Lev 23:40. Since the verb is from the second half of the verse, and the midrash cites only the first half, the assumption is that šēyḇān and zāqēn are equal terms.⁴⁸ LevR 35:3 again uses the verse without drawing a distinction between "hoary head" and "elder." R. Eleazar introduces a māšāl : "It is a custom in the world that when a king of flesh and blood issues a decree (and) if he wishes to execute it, he executes it. But if not, in the end he must execute it through others. But, with the Holy One, blessed be He, it is not so. Rather, He issues a decree and He himself executes it first. This is the meaning of that which is written in Lev 19:32, 'You shall rise up before the hoary head, and honor the face of the old man, and fear your God; I am the Lord.' 'I am the Lord' means that I am he who first carried out the commandment of standing before an old man." The incident of God standing before an old man is taken by the commentators as the moment when God stood before Abraham when he was weakened through circumcision (see GenR 48:7).

16. Virt 102-103 on Lev 19:33-34 - The LXX for these verses reads "And if a stranger ($\rho\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$) in your land comes to you, you shall not afflict him. The stranger that comes to you shall be among you as the native and you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers ($\rho\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota$) in the land of Egypt. I am the Lord your God." In Virt 103, Philo offers a paraphrase of Lev 19:33-34a by stating that "he [Moses] commands all members of the nation to love the newcomers, not only as friends and kinsfolk but as themselves both in body and soul." In 102, he offers a reason for why they are to be treated in this fashion: they have abandoned "their kinfolk by blood, their country, their ancestors and the temples and images of their gods, and the tributes and honors paid to them, they have taken the journey to a better home, from idle fables to the clear vision of truth and the worship of the one and truly existing God." Philo renders $\rho\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ with $\epsilon\pi\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ which reveals something of his own theory of proselytism. Philo holds that there are three forms of proselytes: the full proselyte, the uncircumcised follower of Judaism, and the non-Jew who lives among Jews. Wolfson argues that in this verse Philo takes $\rho\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ ($\epsilon\pi\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ being the same) as a full proselyte. He further states that Philo takes the term $\rho\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in Deut 10:18-19 when "applied to the Jews while they were in Egypt, merely in the general sense of one who is a newcomer, a stranger, and not a native."⁴⁹ Wolfson's understanding of Philo's use of $\rho\rho\omicron\sigma\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and its substitution by $\epsilon\pi\eta\lambda\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ is secured by Cher 120. However, Philo does not, in this case, have to read

προσῆλυτος as newcomer or stranger as in the case of Deut 10:18-19 (Spec Leg 1.308-309), but simply omits Lev 19:34b, "for you were strangers (προσῆλυτοι) in the land of Egypt," which would contradict the more technical meaning of vv.33-34a. Colson realized this when he wrote that "Philo ignores the obvious fact that the last clause shows that proselytes in his sense are not intended."⁵⁰ Colson's statement that Philo "ignores" the last clause is unfortunate, for his omission of this clause reveals his interpretative posture.

17. Spec Leg 4.193-194, Her 162 and Hypoth 7.8 on Lev 19:35-36 - The LXX for these verses reads "You shall not act unjustly in judgment, in measures and in weights and scales. There will be accurate balances, weights and liquid measure. I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt." In Spec Leg 4.193-194, Philo offers a paraphrase of the text in which he suggests that those who handle weights, scales and measures are normally supervised by ἀγορανόμοι. However, maintaining accurate weights and measure because of fear of penalty incurred at the hand of these market-place supervisors is inferior to self-motivation. Therefore, Moses in his pursuit of justice "commands tradesmen, merchants and all those who have taken up such a line of life to provide themselves with just scales and weights and measures..." (194). Here, once again, we have an inversion of the biblical text's order. Philo treats vv. 35-36 here, moves to v. 13 in Spec Leg 4.195 and then to v. 14 in Spec Leg 4.197-198. Is this inversion governed by a specific exegetical concern? Colson indicates that once Philo has completed his discussion of the king as an exemplification of justice (192), "the rest of the treatise is taken up with miscellaneous matters of justice."⁵¹ Philo's inversion of the text's order is not arbitrary or random. Once he completes his discussion of the ruler, he treats the issues of honesty in commerce and here Lev 19:35-36 is appropriate. Then, naturally comes the matter of wages paid to employees (Lev 19:13) and the prohibitions against ill-treating the blind and the deaf. The polity is just not simply by virtue of its ruler exemplifying justice, but that all its particular activities are ruled by justice. In Her 162, he cites the text in a most literal fashion and indicates that through it "Moses presents most clearly his glorification of justice and his censure of injustice." He also includes Deut 25:13-16 in support of Lev 19:35-36. Deut 25:13-16 expands the notion of just scales, balances, weights and measures, by making them a prerequisite to inheritance of the land. This expansion secures his prefatory remark that this law presents "most clearly his glorification of justice." In Hypoth 7.8, we find only a very abbreviated and loose paraphrase of the text. Philo only says, as part of his abbreviated discussion of the Mosaic constitution that "No unjust scales, no false measurements no fraudulent coinage must be substituted." As in the case of Lev 19:15 (#10), an exact citation can not be assigned to this allusion and hence, Colson's note indicates the sources as being Prov 11:1, 16:11, Lev 19:35 and Deut 25:13-16.⁵²

This sample chapter reveals a number of factors which condition or structure Philo's interpretation of the biblical text. I do not believe that this chapter is any different than any other when viewed across the corpus and that these same factors will reappear whenever Philo uses the biblical text. The range of these factors would not doubt expand as we consider other chapters. But

what are these factors? We might also describe them as exegetical phenomena. First, Philo's interpretation of the biblical text is not what we might recognize as a line-by-line commentary to the text. At points, he is uninterested in the meaning of a complete verse of Scripture and is only concerned with a phrase, a word or a few words. But his selection process or what he omits from his citation of the biblical text is of at least two kinds in this chapter. In Spec Leg 2.239 (#1), he omits reference to the Sabbaths, because he is only interested in what the verse says about filial piety. This is very different from his omission of Lev 19:34b in Virt 102-103 (#16) where the second half of the verse would seem necessarily to contradict the technical meaning he has given to προσήλυτος. This form of omission is perhaps similar to his anti-anthropomorphic interpretation which appears in his treatment of levitical sacrifices.⁵³ Second, this chapter reveals that allegorical interpretations structure how he uses the biblical text. This is particularly the case with his usage of Lev 19:4 in Leg All 3.22 (#2) where he understands Jacob and Laban to be allegorical designations. This is also the case with Plant 94, Leg All 1.52, Somn 1.33 and Abr 13 (#13), where "tree", "land", "three" and "four" are taken as allegorical designations, once again structuring the use of the text. Third, central ideas inform his reading of the text. Hence, in Spec Leg 1.220 (#3), his understanding of the sacrificial cult in general and the *soterion* in particular structure his use of the text. Virtues such as self-sacrifice in Spec Leg 1.223 (#4) or in Virt 90 (#5), the importance of *philanthrōpos* in Spec Leg 4.72 (#10), and justice in Spec Leg 4.183 (#11) act as principles of organization for interpreting the biblical text. The critical idea that the *nomos* is in harmony with the laws of nature plays an important role in his interpretation of the biblical text in Spec Leg 3.46 (#12). Lastly, Philo's perception that the worship of God, as enjoined by Moses, is a very different affair than other forms of worship, a fundamental perception for him, informs his understanding of the biblical text in Spec Leg 1.58 (#14). Fourth, his treatment of this chapter, across the corpus, reveals that his use of the biblical text is governed by a logics of association. Here, the order of Scripture and the contexts of verses, phrases and words are of secondary importance to his associative logics. Virt 88 (#8) is but one example in which his association structures and organizes the biblical text.

3. *The Intention of Commentary and Hermeneutical Prophecy.*

The exegetical phenomena seen in this sample chapter may appear arbitrary to us. Indeed, one might argue that these forms of interpretation are relatively unimportant for the biblical text is used almost in haphazard fashion to support Philo's particular ideas about one subject or another. Or, one might suggest that Scripture is only lending its authority to Philo's ideas about Moses' legislation. However, such conclusions would be incorrect. The exegetical phenomena only seem arbitrary when they are separated from Philo's perception and understanding of Scripture or when Philo's understanding of Scripture becomes only another idea within the work of Philo. Scripture is a dynamic reality for him and our understanding of what he was about must take that into consideration. Certainly, his descriptive terminology underscores its authority, immutability and perfection. But allied with this descriptive terminology is the specific idea of prophecy. Here, we must reconsider Mos 2.187-191, where Philo distinguished three types of

"oracles": 1) those spoken by God and interpreted by his prophet; 2) those delivered in the form of question and answer; 3) those delivered by Moses himself in an ecstatic state. These forms of prophecy can be reduced to two: prophetic oracles involving interpretation and prophetic oracles involving the prognostication of the future.

David Winston describes these two forms of prophecy as "hermeneutical prophecy" and "ecstatic prophecy"; the distinction between the two is fundamental to both Philo's concept of revelation and the intention of his commentary. Winston indicates that in the ecstatic form of prophecy, the prophet sovereign mind is entirely preempted by the Divine Spirit, so that the prophet becomes a passive medium for the divine message. Philo describes this experience at Spec Leg 4.49: "For no pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own; he is an interpreter (ἐρμηνεύς) prompted by Another in all his utterances, when knowing not what he does he is filled with inspiration, as the reason withdraws and surrenders the citadel of the soul to a new visitor and tenant, the Divine Spirit (θεῖου πνεύματος) which plays upon the vocal organism and dictates words which clearly express its prophetic message." Winston also indicates that this passivity extends to the degree that in Her 264 Philo states that human and divine illuminations cannot function simultaneously. However, in the hermeneutical form of prophecy, the individual is not rendered passive; reason does not withdraw and surrender its position to the other. The paradigm for this form of prophecy is the giving of the Decalogue. At Dec 35, he describes the Divine Voice in this way:

But the new miraculous voice was set in action and kept in flame by the power of God which breathed upon it and spread it abroad on every side and made it more illuminating in its ending than in its beginning by creating in the souls of each and all another kind of hearing far superior to the hearing of the ears. For this is but a sluggish sense, inactive until aroused by the impact of the air, but the hearing of the mind possessed by God (ἐνθεοῦ διανοίας) makes the first advance and goes out to meet the spoken words with the keenest rapidity.

Winston states that "it is clear from this description that the inspired mind that perceives this special rational soul newly created by God, far from being preempted or rendered passive, is rather extraordinarily quickened and sharpened." He further states that Philo's interpretation of prophecy through the Divine Voice follows a Middle Platonic tradition used to explain the nature of Socrates' δαιμόνιον and one of the interpretations of this sign recorded by Plutarch (*On the Sign of Socrates* 588Dff.) is very similar to Philo's interpretation of the Divine Voice at Sinai. This "hermeneutical prophecy," Winston continues, is "the activation of man's higher mind, his intuitive intellect, by means of which he grasps the fundamental principles of universal being viewed as a unified whole...Philo therefore undoubtedly understood the prophetic revelation through which Moses attained his understanding of the Law, as an intuitive grasp of the higher, divine realities, the fundamental principles of being, and the natural laws which constitute its structure."⁵⁴

This "hermeneutical prophecy" is not confined to Moses alone. Again, Philo's description of the events at Sinai suggests that the perception of all the Israelites was quickened as was the prophet's experience. Consequently, Philo understood that the higher minds of the Israelites were activated and they perceived the very structure of the Decalogue through their intuitive intellects. Philo's discussion of the singular form of the Decalogue's commandments at first leads away from this expanded understanding of the experience. He argues that in the singular imperative, God first teaches that each single person is equal in worth to the whole nation (Dec 37-38). Second, when instructions are given to an individual, they are also taken to apply to the whole body and the individual can not take the multitude as an excuse for disobedience (39). Third, in order that no ruler might steep himself in self-conceit, God, who is in need of nothing, speaks directly to the humble individual (40-43). At 47, he cites Ex 20:18, "All the people saw the voice," as confirmation that the quickening of perception extended to the Israelites. It is true that here he does not develop this specific meaning of the verse, but in Mig 47 his interpretation yields an approximate parallel to Dec 35. He states, "For what life is better than a contemplative life, or more appropriate to a rational being? For this reason, whereas the voice of mortal beings is judged by hearing, the sacred oracles intimate that the words of God are seen as light is seen; for we are told that 'all the people saw the voice' (Ex. xx.18), not that they heard it; for what was happening was not an impact on air made by the organs of mouth and tongue, but virtue shining with intense brilliance, wholly resembling a fountain of reason (λογικῆς ἀδιαφοροῦν πηγῆς)..." The difference between the event at Sinai and the particular laws of the Pentateuch arranged under the "heads" of the Decalogue is that the Decalogue at Sinai was presented without the mediation of Moses. In Mos 2.213, he states that the commands of the Decalogue were "commands promulgated by God not through His prophet but by a voice which, strange paradox, was visible and aroused the eyes rather than the ears of the bystanders."

Similarly, the "hermeneutical prophecy" is not confined to one temporal moment, but extends to other moments in history. It is not circumscribed by time. Philo's version of the LXX's translation is unique in view of other traditions concerning the translation process. Like Pseudo-Aristeas and Josephus, Philo glorifies the virtues of Ptolemy Philadelphus (Mos 2.29) and his view is in accord with their views on the education and repute of the seventy individuals selected to carry out Ptolemy's request. But his version is unique because of his notion of prophecy (32). According to Philo, each κατὰ πνεῦμα ἐνθουσιῶντες προεφῆτευον and each wrote the very same word, "as though dictated to each by an invisible prompter" (37). But this prophetic inspiration extended so far as to make the Greek words correspond exactly to the Hebrew (38). The problem that every translator knows well and which Philo is aware of is circumvented through this prophetic inspiration. The translators' higher minds were activated, we can presume, in much the same way as Moses and Israelites at Sinai or Moses' mind in the promulgation of the special laws.

The idea of "hermeneutical prophecy" suggests that we must construe Philo's commentary in a very particular fashion. Hermeneutical prophecy means that the translators of the LXX, Philo and any other person interested in real wisdom all have equal

access as Moses himself to the divine truths. Moses, the translators, or Philo could by-pass the written text altogether. Of course, this was impossible for the translators since they were commissioned to write something. The written text only "jogs" the rational soul. He describes the function of the written text of Scripture in Cont 78:

The interpretation of the Holy Scriptures are made in accordance with the deeper meanings conveyed in allegory. For the whole of the Law seems to these people to resemble a living being with the literal commandments for its body, and for its soul the invisible meaning stored away in its words. It is in the latter that the rational soul begins especially to contemplate the things akin to itself and, beholding the extraordinary beauties of the concepts through the polished glass of the words, unfolds and reveals the symbols, and brings forth the thoughts bared into the light for those who are able by a slight jog of their memory to view the invisible through the visible.⁵⁵

Here we find not only one of Philo's most precise descriptions of allegory, but also a description of the function of Scripture (λεπὸν γραμματέων). Here he also steps beyond his statement in Mig 89 that the written laws are "stewards beyond reproach" and indicates that the written words store up an invisible meaning. It is in these that the λογικὴ ψυχὴ begins to understand that which the symbols reveal. The rational soul is activated by the written text and Philo as commentator, or for that matter any other individual truly interested in the "oracles" of Moses, can see the operational details of universal reason. It is this aspect of hermeneutical prophecy which accounts for Philo's confidence throughout his commentary, whether it be allegorical or expository, and why at many points in the corpus Philo can so easily transpose himself into the biblical narrative. He knows what Moses knew, what Moses really meant or intended, because his mind, like the mind of Moses, has become one with the *logos*. We might restate this in the following way. Philo has the mind of the writer of Scripture; he has access to the very same source as had Moses its author.

This begins to clarify some of the exegetical phenomena found in Lev 19 and throughout the corpus. Certainly, Philo uses every exegetical device in making sense of the text, but he does not do so because of their immanent rationality. Scripture is the vehicle of rationality. There are rules for interpretation, but the rules are nowhere stated. Philo did not establish a canon of exegetical rules and then place them alongside of the biblical text in order to determine the meaning of Scripture. The exegetical phenomena of Lev 19 uncover one critical presupposition for Philo. It was possible to close the "historical" distance that separated him from Moses. In fact, the distance separating the two is so thoroughly overcome that Moses and Philo are interchangeable in the corpus. This does not mean that Philo was unable to distance himself from Moses and Scripture. At Spec Leg 1.214 he states:

And I believe the same question [the question why the brain and heart are not burned on the altar in the στήριον] will seek out not a few others who encounter the Holy Scriptures more by [their] understanding than by [their] eyes: anyway, if those who consider [it] find a more plausible reason, they will be of service to themselves and to us; but if not, let them determine whether what we contrived [is] approved.

The phrase τὴν ἐπινοηθεῖσαν ὑφ' ἡμῶν, "what we contrived" invites others not only to judge the value of Philo's interpretation, but also to come up with a better one, if they can. It is perhaps because Philo, on the one hand, could exchange places with Moses and, on the other, know that his interpretation was contrived, awaiting a more complete understanding, that presents us with difficulties in understanding his commentary. The exegetical phenomena of Lev 19 are necessary to the coherence of his argument at every point. Dillon suggests that "what emerges in Philo's case is, not an overall coherence holding together what has come down to us as one treatise, but rather a series of inquiries, based upon the text of Genesis [in the cases of *De Gigantibus* and *Quod Deus sit Immutabilis*], exhibiting an internal coherence, but no necessary coherence with each other."⁵⁶ The exegetical phenomena are essential to what Dillon describes as "the internal coherence" and this in turn is governed by what I referred to above as the logics of association. But, the internal coherence and the logics of association are achieved through Philo's hermeneutical prophecy. One last question remains. What is Scripture for Philo? Does it approximate what we would understand as Scripture? Only in a very particular way. Certainly, Philo knows that Scripture exists outside his perception. But our term "Scripture" may be a misnomer. Scripture does not exist apart and independently from commentary. Scripture and commentary are fused in one and their real subject, at every turn, is Moses.

Leviticus 19 in the Philonic Corpus

This appendix is based upon the critical appendix to Valentin Nikiprowetzky's study "L'exégèse de Philon d'Alexandrie dans le *De Gigantibus* et le *Quod Deus sit Immutabilis*" which will appear as the foreward to the translation and commentary to these treatises being prepared by David Winston and John Dillon. The appendix is divided into four columns. The first column (from left to right) indicates the treatise and paragraph where either the biblical text is cited or where an allusion to Scripture is to be found. The second column contains the citation to the LXX. The third column contains the text of the LXX as established by Alfred Rahlfs, *Septuaginta* (7th edition, 1962). The fourth column contains the citation or the allusion to Scripture as it appears in the corpus.

Spec Leg 2.239	19:3	ἐκαστος πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ μητέρα αὐτοῦ φοβείσθω, καὶ τὰ σάββατά μου φθαξέσθε· ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.	ἐκαστος πατέρα τε αὐτοῦ καὶ μητέρα φοβείσθω
Leg All 3.22	19:4	οὐκ ἐπακολουθήσετε εἰδώλοις καὶ θεοὺς χανευτοὺς οὐ ποιήσετε ὑμῖν· ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.	ἀπολλύναι καὶ διακρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλοτρούς τῆς ψυχῆς [τοὺς] θεοὺς, τοὺς χανευτοὺς θεοὺς, οὓς ἀπηγόρευκε Μωσὴς δημιουργεῖν
Spec Leg 1.25	19:4		οὐκ ἐπακολουθήσετε εἰδώλοις καὶ θεοὺς χανευτοὺς οὐ ποιήσετε
Spec Leg 1.220	19:5-6	καὶ ἐὰν θύσητε θυσίαν αὐτηρίου τῷ κυρίῳ, δεκτὴν ὑμῶν θύσετε· ἢ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ θύσητε, βρωθήσεται καὶ τῇ αὔριον· καὶ ἐὰν καταλειφθῇ ἕως ἡμέρας τρίτης, ἐν πυρὶ κατακαυθήσεται.	Δυσὶ δὲ μόναίς ἡμέραις ἐπιτρέπει τὴν χρῆσιν τῆς τοῦ αὐτηρίου θυσίας ποιεῖσθαι μηδὲν εἰς τὴν τρίτην ἀπολείποντας
Spec Leg 1.223	19:7-8	ἐὰν δὲ βρώσει βρωθὴ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ, αἰσχύνην ἐστίν, οὐ δεχθήσεται· ὁ δὲ ἔσθων αὐτὸ ἁμαρτίαν λήμψεται, ὅτι τὰ ἁγία, κυρίου ἐβεβήλωσεν· καὶ ἐξαλεθρευθήσονται αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ ἐσθουσαι ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτῶν	τὸν δὲ γευσάμενον αὐτὸ μόνον ἔνοχον ἀπαλείπει καὶ φθινὸν γούτῳ· τεθυμέναι νομίζων, ὡς καταγέλαστε, οὐ τέθυκας· οὐ προσηκάμην ἀθύτων, ἀνιέων βεβήλων, ἀκαθάρτων, ὧν ἡψηκας κρεῶν, ὡς γαστριμαργε, θυσίων οὐδ' ὕναρ ἐτηροθημένος.
Virt 90	19:9	καὶ ἐκθεριζόντων ὑμῶν τὸν θερισμὸν τῆς γῆς ὑμῶν οὐ συντελέσετε τὸν θερισμὸν ὑμῶν τοῦ αγροῦ ἐκθερίσαι καὶ τὰ σπείπτοντα τοῦ θερισμοῦ σου συλλέξεις	κελεύει γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἀμῆτῳ μήτε τὰ ἀσπίπτοντα τῶν δραγματίων ἀκαιρεῖσθαι μήτε πάντα τὸν σπῆρον κείρειν, ἀλλ' ὑπολείπεσθαι τι τοῦ

			κλήρου μέρος ατιμητον, ἅμα μὲν τοὺς ἐπιτόρους μεγαλόφρονας καὶ κοινολοικοὺς κατασκευάζων ἐκ τοῦ τι προῖναι τῶν ἰδίων καὶ μὴ πᾶσι προσκεχνηέναι καὶ πάντα συμφορεῖν καὶ συγκομίζειν θηραυροφυλάκῃσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς πένητας ευθυμότερους ἀπεργαζόμενος.
Samm 2.23	19:9		ὅταν θεορίζητε τὸν θερισμὸν ὑμῶν, οὐ συντελέσετε το λοιπὸν τοῦ θερισμοῦ
Virt 91	19:10	καὶ τὸν ἀμπελῶνά σου οὐκ ἐπανα- ρυγήσεις οὐδὲ τοὺς ῥῶγας τοῦ ἀμπελῶνός σου συλλέξεις· τῇ πτωχῇ καὶ τῇ προσηλύτῃ καταλεί- ψεις αὐτά· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.	ἐν δὲ καιρῷ τῆς ὀπώρας πάλιν δροπιμε- νοὶς κληρούχοις προ- σταττεῖ μὴτε ῥῶγας ἀποπιπτοῦσας συλλέγειν μὴτε ἐπαναρυγᾶν ἀμπελῶνας.
Spec Leg 4.39	19:11- 12	οὐ κλέφετε· οὐ ψεύσεσθε· οὐ συκοφαντῆρει ἕκαστος τὸν πλησίον· καὶ οὐκ ὁμείσθε τῷ ὀνόματί μου ἐπ' ἀδίκῃ καὶ οὐ βεβηλώσατε τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ ὑμῶν· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.	οὐ κλέφετε καὶ οὐ ψεύσεσθε καὶ οὐ συκο- φαντῆσατε τοὺς πλησίον ὑμῶν· καὶ οὐκ ὁμείσθε τῷ ὀνόματί μου ἐπ' ἀδίκῃ καὶ τὸ ἔμῃ ὄνομα οὐ βεβηλώσατε.
Spec Leg 4.195	19:13	οὐκ ἀδικήσεις τὸν πλησίον καὶ οὐκ ἀρπάξεις, καὶ οὐ μὴ κοιμη- θῇσεται ὁ μισθός τοῦ μισθωτοῦ παπὰ σοὶ ἕως πρωῒ.	Ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλεργίας ἄλλα μισθοὶ πρόκεινται τοῖς δημιουργοῖς, δημιουργοῖσι δὲ οἱ ἐν ἐνδείαις, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷς ἀφρονεῖν περιουσεῖν, κελεῖται μὴ ὑπερτίθεσθαι τὰς δόσεις, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ παρέχειν ἡμέρα τὸν διομολογηθέντα μισθόν.
Virt 88	19:13		μισθὸν πενήτος αὐθι- μερὸν ἀποδιδόναι, οὐ μόνον ὅτι τὴν χρεῖαν ἐφ' ἣν παρελήφθη παρασχόντα διαικονοῦν ἦν τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ μισθὸν ἀνωπερθέτως ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καί, ὡς εἰπὼν τινες, ἐφημερό- βιος ὁ χειροτέχνης ἢ ἀχθοφόρος, ὅλῳ τῷ σῶματι κακοπαθὼν υποζυ- γίου τρόπον, ἐπὶ τῷ μισθῷ τέθναι τὴν ἐλπίδα.

Spec Leg 4.197- 19:14
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οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς κακῶν καὶ
ἀπέναντι τυφλοῦ οὐ προσθήσεις
σημάνδαλον καὶ φοβηθήσῃ κήριον
τὸν θεόν σου· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος
ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.

Ἐὖ μέντοι κἀμεινὸ
διερίρηται, ὅπως μηδεὶς
μηδένα βλασφημῇ καὶ
κακηγορῇ. καὶ μέλιστα
κακῶν οὔτε ἐν τοῖς
[σοῖς αὐτὸ τοῦτο
ἀμύνασθαι. μάχη γὰρ
πασῶν ἐκνομωτάτη,
καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον
μέρος ἐν τῷ ὁρᾶν
ἐξετάζεται, τὸ δ' ἕτερον
ἐν τῷ μόνον πασχειν.
τοῖς δὲ κακηγοροῦσι
τοὺς ἀναύδους καὶ τὰ
ἅτα βεβλαμμένους ὅμοιον
ἀδίκημα δρᾶσιν οἱ
τυφλοὶς ὁλίσοθους
ἐμποιοῦντες καὶ ἕτερ'
ἅπτα ἐν ποσὶ τιθέντες.

Spec Leg 4.44 19:15

οὐ ποιήσετε ἄδικον ἐν κρίσει·
οὐ λήμνη πρόσωπον πτωχοῦ οὐδέ
θαυμάσεις πρόσωπον δυνάτου
ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ κρινεῖς τὸν
πλησίον σου

διὸ πολλοχοῦ παραινέι
τῆς νομοθεσίας ἀδίκῃ
μηδενὶ συνανεῖν μήτε
ἀνθρώπῳ μήτε πράγματι·
προκαλεῖται γὰρ ἡ
συναίνεσις ἐφ' ὅγεῖ
μὴ γενομένη τὰ ψευδῇ
μαρτυρεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
πᾶς, ὅτῳ πρόσαντες καὶ
ἐχθρὸν τὸ ἄδικον,
ἀληθεῖα φίλος.

Spec Leg 4.72 19:15

πρὸς δὲ τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν
ἦδη καὶ ἄλλο σαφὲς
εἰσπγγέται. κελεύει
[γὰρ] πένητα ἐν
κρίσει μὴ ἐλεεῖν ὁ
πᾶσαν σχεδὸν τι τὴν
νομοθεσίαν πεπιληρωκῶς
τῶν εἰς ἔλεον καὶ
φιλανθρωπίαν διαταγμά-
των καὶ μεγάλως μὲν
ἀπειλας ἐπανατεινόμενος
ὑπερόπτας καὶ ἀλαζόσι,
μεγάλα δὲ προθεῖς
ἄδλα τοῖς τὰ ἀτυχή-
ματα τῶν πέλας εἰς
ἐπανάρθωσιν ἀγειν
ἀξιουσι καὶ τὰς
περιουσίας οὐκ ἴδια
κτήματα νομίζουσιν
ἄλλα κοινὰ τῶν ἐν
ἐνδεαίαις.

Spec Leg 4.183 19:16

οὐ προεῖπῃ δόλῳ ἐν τῷ ἔθνεϊ
σου, οὐκ ἐπισυστήσῃ ἐφ' αἷμα
τοῦ πλησίον σου· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος
ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.

Ἀπαγορεύει δ' ὁ
νόμος τῷ τὴν προστα-
σίαν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν
τῶν κοινῶν ἀνειληφρότι
δικαιοσύνην ἀπαγορευ-
σιν, μὴ πορεύεσθαι

			δύλῳ ἐν τῷ ἔθνει· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀνελευθέρου καὶ σπύδρα δουλοπρεποῦς ἐπιβουλα ῥῆθη συσκιαζού- σης ὑποκρίσει τὸ ἔργον.
Spec Leg 3.46	19:19	Τὸν νόμον μου φυλάξεσθε· τὰ κτήνη σου οὐ κατοχεύσεις ἑτεροζύγῳ καὶ τὸν ἀπελθόνά σου οὐ κατασπερεῖς διάφορον καὶ ἱμάτιον ἐκ δύο ὕφασμένων κίβληλον οὐκ ἐπιβαλεῖς σεαυτῷ.	τοσοῦτον δ' ἄρα τὸ προσηθὲς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς νόμοις ἐστίν, ὥσθ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδεμίαν ἐκδοσμον διμύλιν ἀνδράπους προσέσθαι διείρηται μηδὲ κτήνος ἑᾶν ὑπὸ τινος ἑτερο- γενοῦς ὀχεύεσθαι.
Virt 155-160	19:23- 25	Ὅταν δὲ εἰσέλθῃτε εἰς τὴν γῆν, ἢ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν δίδωσιν ὑμῖν, καὶ κατακυτεύετε πᾶν ζῷον βρώσιμον καὶ περικαθαριεῖτε τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν αὐτοῦ· ὁ καρπὸς αὐτοῦ τρία ἔτη ἔσται ὑμῖν ἀπερικάθατος, οὐ βρωθήσεται· καὶ τῷ ἔτει τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔσται πᾶς ὁ καρπὸς αὐτοῦ ἅγιος αἰνετὸς τῷ κυρίῳ· ἐν δε τῷ ἔτει τῷ πέμπτῳ φάγεσθε τὸν καρπὸν πρόσθεμα ὑμῖν τὰ γεννήματα αὐτοῦ· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.	Extensive paraphrase and interpretation; no direct quotation.
Plant 94-138	19:23- 25		ὅταν εἰσέλθῃτε πρὸς τὴν γῆν, ἣν κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν δίδωσιν ὑμῖν, καὶ κατακυτεύετε πᾶν ζῷον βρώσεως, περικαθαριεῖτε τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν αὐτοῦ τρία ἔτη ἔσται ἀπερι- κάθατος, οὐ βρωθήσε- ται· τῷ δε ἔτει τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔσται πᾶς καρπὸς αὐτοῦ ἅγιος, αἰνετὸς τῷ κυρίῳ· τῷ δε ἔτει τῷ πέμπτῳ φάγεσθε τὸν καρπὸν πρόσθεμα ὑμῖν τὰ γεννήματα αὐτοῦ. ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν. Philo then presents a line by line interpretation.
Leg All 1.52	19:23		περικαθαρίσαι τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν αὐτοῦ
Somm 1.33	19:24		μήποτε μέντοι καὶ τὸ τετάρτον ἔτος ἅγιον καὶ αἰνετον
Abr 13	19:24		ἅγιός ἐστι καὶ αἰνετος

- Spec Ieg 1.58 19:28 καὶ ἐντομίδας ἐπὶ ψυχῇ οὐ ποιήσετε ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν καὶ γράμματα στικτὰ οὐ ποιήσετε ἐν ὑμῖν· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.
- Spec Ieg 2.238 19:32 ἀπὸ προαύπου πολιοῦ ἐξαναστήση καὶ τιμήσεις πρόσωπον πρεσβυτέρου καὶ φοβηθήση τὸν θεὸν σου· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.
- Sac 77 19:32
- Virt 102-103 19:33-34 Ἐὰν δὲ τις προσέλθῃ προσήλυτος ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὑμῶν, οὐ θλίψετε αὐτόν· ὡς ὁ αὐτόχθων ἐν ὑμῖν ἔσται ὁ προσήλυτος ὃ προσπαρευόμενος πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ ἀγαπήσεις αὐτόν ὡς σεαυτὸν, ὅτι προσήλυτοι ἐγενήθητε ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ· ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν.
- Spec Ieg 4.193-194 19:35-36 οὐ ποιήσετε δίκον ἐν κρίσει ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἐν σταθμίσι καὶ ἐν ζυγοῖς. Ζυγὰ δίκαια καὶ στάθμια δίκαια καὶ χοῦς δίκαιος ἔσται ὑμῖν. ἐγὼ εἰμι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ὁ ἐξαγαγὼν ὑμᾶς ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου.
- εἶνοι δὲ τοσαύτῃ κέχρηται μανίας ὑπερβολῇ, ὥστ' ἀναχώρησιν αὐτοῖς εἰς μετώοισιν ἀπολείποντες ἵενται πρὸς δουλείαν τῶν, χειροκμητῶν, γράμμασιν αὐτὴν ὁμολογοῦντες, οὐκ ἐν χαρτιδίοις, [ἀλλ'], ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων ἕδος [ἀλλ'] ἐν τοῖς σώμασι κατασίζοντες αὐτὰ σιδήρῳ πεποιημένῳ πρὸς ἀνεξάλειπτον μονήν· οὐδὲ γὰρ χρόνῳ ταῦτα ἀμεινύονται.
- ἔθεν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γράμμασιν οὐ μόνον προσεδρίας ἐξίστασθαι διείρηται νέους πρεσβύτεας, ἀλλὰ καὶ παριοῦσιν ὑπανίστασθαι πολλὰν γῆρας αἰδουμένους εἰς ἑπερ ἐλπίς ἀρικέσθαι τοὺς προνομίας τοῦτ' ἀξιούντας.
- ἀπὸ προαύπου πολιοῦ ἐξαναστήση, καὶ τιμήσεις πρόσωπον πρεσβυτέρου
- κελεύει διὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰθινοῦς ἀγαπᾶν τοὺς ἐπηλύτας, μὴ μόνον ὡς φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἑαυτοὺς, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν,
- Ἰκλιν οἱ σταθμίαι καὶ ζυγὰ καὶ μέτρα διαχειρίζοντες ἔμποροι καὶ κάπηλοι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τα πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ὄνια πιπράσκουσι ξηρὰ τε καὶ ὑγρατάττονται μὲν ὑπ' ἀγορανομίαις, ἀρείλουσι δ' αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐὰν αἰκρονῶσιν, ἀρχοντες εἶναι, μὴ ὥβρη τὰ δίκαια

		δρῶντες ἄλλ' ἐκουσίῳ γνώμῃ· τοῦ γὰρ μετ' ἀνάγκης τὸ αὐτοκέλευσ- τον κατόρθωμα τιμώ- τερον πανταχοῦ.
Quis Her 162	19:35- 36	οὐ ποιῆτε δίκον ἐν κρίσει; ἐν μέτροις, ἐν σταθμοῖς, ἐν ὕποψι. ζυγὰ δίκαια καὶ στάθμια δίκαια καὶ μέτρα δίκαια καὶ χοῦς δίκαιος ἔσται ὑμῖν
Hypoth 7.8	19:35- 36	μὴ ζυγον δίκον ἀντιποθέλλειν, μὴ χολόνικα ἀμετρον, μὴ νόμισμα δίκον.

NOTES

1. "Patterns of Exegesis in Philo's Interpretation of Leviticus," *SP* 6 (1979-80), pp. 77-155.

2. Samuel Poznanski, "Philon dan l'ancienne littérature judéo-arabe," *Revue des études Juives*, 50 (1905), pp. 10-31.

3. For general discussions of Azariah de Rossi, see, Joseph Dan, "Azariah (Bonaiuto) ben Moses dei Rossi," *ES*, 14, pp. 315-318; Israel Zinberg, *A History of Jewish Literature*, trans. by Bernard Martin (Cincinnati and New York: Hebrew Union College and Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1974), 4:106-114; Meyer Waxman, *A History of Jewish Literature* (1933; rpt., New York and London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), 2:516-522; Salo Baron, "Azariah de Rossi's Attitude to Life (*Weltanschauung*)," *Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams* (New York: Press of the Jewish Institute of Religion, 1927), pp. 12-53.

4. Ralph Marcus, "A 16th Century Hebrew Critique of Philo," *HUCA*, 21 (1948), esp. pp. 44-55.

5. Azariah de Rossi, *Me'or Einayim* (David Cassel ed., Wilna, 1866; rpt., Jerusalem: Makor, 1969), pp. 128-129. Azariah's neutrality in his final word on Philo may reflect his self-consciousness of the very problematic nature of his own treatise. Even before the printing of *Me'or Einayim* had been completed, the rabbis of Venice, headed by Samuel Judah Katzenellenbogen, published a proclamation putting the text in *herem*, prohibiting its possession, reading or use without special permission of the rabbis of the particular city in which the matter might potentially arise. See, David Kaufman, "Contributions a l'histoire des luttes d'Azariah de Rossi," *Revue des études Juives*, 33 (1896), pp. 77-87. Kaufman includes the text of Katzenellenbogen's proclamation (p.83): "Let the fear of God be upon you! Word has been heard of the book that Rabbi Azariah de Rossi wrote and published recently entitled *Me'or Einayim* with the parts *Kol Elohim*, *Hadrat Zekenim* and *Imre Binah*. Some of the chapters of part three were prepared long ago. And lo,

since all of it is full of new explanations and interpretations, some of which our holy ancestors never imagined in their lives. The undersigned scholars of every city in the holy community of Italy have agreed that no person of any congregation and court nor all those who tremble at their words may have this composition in their possession, either in whole or in part, or study it, unless they shall first have obtained permission in writing from the sages of their city. It will go hard with those who violate the words of the sages, but well will it be with those who obey them and blessing will come upon them." Azariah was forced to reply to his critics and this was later published with the full text of *Me'or Einayim*. The ban against the book persisted for well over a hundred years until in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it also was recovered by *maskillim*, such as Nahman Krochmal, who found in it ideas which were in accord with their philosophical systems and historiographies.

6. Carl Siegfried, "Philo und der überlieferte Text der LXX," *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 16 (1873), pp. 217-238, 411-428, 522-540. B. Rick, "Philo's Canon of the Old Testament and his Mode of Quoting the Alexandrian Version," *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis*, 4 (1884), pp. 126-143 does not develop the issue beyond its discussion in Siegfried's comprehensive study.

7. Herbert Edward Ryle, *Philo and Holy Scripture or the Quotations of Philo from the Books of the Old Testament* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1895), pp. xxxvii-xxxix.

8. W.L. Knox, "A Note on Philo's Use of the Old Testament," *Journal of Theological Studies*, 41 (1940), pp. 30-34.

9. F.H. Colson, "Philo's Quotations from the Old Testament," *Journal of Theological Studies*, 41 (1940), pp. 237-251.

10. W.L. Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1944), esp. pp. 51-54.

11. Ralph Marcus, "A Textual-Exegetical Note on Philo's Bible," *JBL*, 69 (1950), pp. 363-365.

12. Peter Katz, *Philo's Bible: The Aberrant Text of Bible Quotations in Some Philonic Writings and Its Place in the Textual History of the Greek Bible* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 4-5.

13. *ibid.*, p. 5.

14. *ibid.*, pp. 114-121. One of the most precise discussions and critiques of Katz's thesis is George E. Howard, "The 'Aberrant' Text of Philo's Quotations Reconsidered," *HUCA*, 44 (1973), pp. 197-208.

15. Valentin Nikiprowetzky, "L'exégèse de Philon d'Alexandrie," *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses*, 53 (1973), pp. 309-329 argues that the extraordinary variety of contradictory interpretations "procède, pour une grande part, de malentendus sur le sens et l'intention des écrits de Philon. En dernière analyse elle reflète une méconnaissance de la place qu'y occupe l'exégèse scripturaire" (p. 312).

16. Arnaldo Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 91. Also, Elias Bickerman, "The Septuagint as Translation," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, 28 (1959); rpt., *Studies in Jewish and Christian History* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), pt.1, pp. 167-200, suggests against this evaluation that "scholars are like to assume that the unidiomatic Greek of the LXX made it of no use for mission work. The Hellenistic Jews learned that it was not so. Toward the end of the second century B.C.E. Aristaeus thought that this version had been made for the sake of the Egyptian Jews 'and all the Jews in the world and their posterity' (38). A 150 years later, in the age of the Jewish mission to the pagans, Philo could state that the translation was made in order to give a share in the divine law to the Hellenic part of mankind (*Mos.* 2.6:36)" (p. 197). While Philo attests to a shift in understanding about the purposes of the LXX outside the Jewish community, it is not sufficient to negate the force of Momigliano's argument. Also, the observations of Ralph Marcus, "Jewish and Greek Elements in the LXX," *Louis Ginsberg Jubilee Volume* (New York: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1945), pp. 227-245, should be kept in mind: 1) the Hebrew Bible was translated into Greek primarily to serve the liturgical and educational needs of the Greek-speaking Jews of Egypt, especially Alexandria, and 2) that the language of the LXX is part of the Egyptian Koine and differs from contemporary pagan Greek only because it is translation-Greek and not because the Jewish translators spoke a peculiar Greek jargon (p. 233).

17. Martin Hengel, *Jews, Greeks and Barbarians: Aspects of the Hellenization of Judaism in the Pre-Christian Period* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), pp. 96-97.

18. This charge, that the Jews were not inventive, is a common motif in the polemics of Greek and Latin authors. For example, Josephus, *Contra Apionem* 2.148 indicates that Apion described the Jews not only as atheists and misanthropes, but also, the most witless of all barbarians...and the only people who have contributed no useful invention (εὐρημα) to civilization."

19. *PLCL*, vol. 2, p. 235.

20. In some cases, the word λόγος is not sufficient to carry the sense of oracle. For example, Agr 127, τὸ δὲ λόγιόν ἐστι τοιόνδε followed by Gen 4:7 is rendered by Colson and Whitaker, *PLCL*, vol. 3, p. 173 as "The divine message is this..." Here, λόγιόν carries the sense of admonition. J. Pouilloux, *PM*, vol. 9, p. 77 renders it correctly as "voici l'avertissement..."

21. Similar formulations of ἱεραὶς γραφαῖς are found in Fug 4, Her 106 and 159.

22. H.A. Wolfson, "The Veracity of Scripture from Philo to Spinoza," *Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume* (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950), pp. 607-630; rpt., *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays by Harry Austryn Wolfson* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 217-245 argues that from antiquity four arguments were made for the divine origin of the laws and the teachings of the prophets: 1) the miracles performed by the prophets; 2) the prophetic power to predict future events;

3) the revelation on Mt. Sinai, 4) the intrinsic excellency of the laws and teachings of the prophets. Philo, he indicates, uses all four arguments and "in great detail he describes the miraculous early history of Moses and the numerous miracles performed by him in Egypt and in the desert [Mos 1.2, 5-59, 327]. He also dwells upon the fulfillment of everything that Moses predicted in the name of God [Mos 1.14 and 71]. Then he represents with many explanations the account of the revelation on Mount Sinai when, in a miraculous way, the voice of God - which, of course, was not a physical voice - was heard by the entire people, men and women alike [Dec 9, and 32-35], and which like any direct experience is itself evidence for its veracity. Finally, there is to him the evidence of the intrinsic excellency of the laws of Moses, their comprehensiveness [Mos 2.3 and 12], their permanence [Mos 2.3 and 14], their universal appeal to all mankind [Mos 2.4 and 17-44], and their establishment of a perfect way of life in accordance with all the requirements of science and philosophy [Spec Leg 1-4]" (p. 21). In *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 138-143, Wolfson treats the problem of how philosophy can reach the same truths as Scripture. He finds three strands in Philo on this question: 1) Greek philosophy is dependent on the sacred revelation of Moses (e.g., Spec Leg 4.10 and 61); 2) the antiquity of Hebrew writings, without asserting the Greek dependence upon the Hebrew (e.g., Her 43 and 214; Prob 8, 57 and 186); 3) philosophy itself was a divine gift to the Greeks to enable them to discover by reason with the aid of the senses what to the Jews was made known by revelation (e.g., Mut 31 and 167-168).

23. David L. Tiede, *The Charismatic Figure as Miracle Worker* (Missoula: University of Montana, 1972), pp. 101-137 argues that the criteria used to understand Moses' special character are not that of a miracle worker. Philo, under the influence of the Stoic δ σοφός, interprets the special quality of Moses on the basis of δ σοτή and not his ability to perform miracles. He states (p.132) that "once moral virtue is established as the criterion which Philo uses to document levels of divine presence in men, his attempts to recast biblical accounts of miraculous events become more understandable." The aretalogical list of miracles is not sufficient for Philo to demonstrate the singular quality of Moses and therefore Tiede argues, the moral and intellectual criteria are decisive.

24. Philo's concluding phrase $\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\eta\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\sigma\epsilon\lambda\eta\eta\eta$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ δ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\mu\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\rho\alpha\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ η is echoed in Matt 5:18 and Luke 16.17. In *Contra Apionem* 2.277-279, Josephus notes that at the present time "the violation of the laws has with most nations become a fine act. Not so with us. Robbed though we be of wealth, of cities, of all good things, our Law at least remains immortal ($\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$)...Now, since time is reckoned in all cases the surest test of worth, I would call time to witness to the excellence of our lawgiver and of the revelation concerning God which he has transmitted to us." Baruch 4:1 preserves a similar idea: δ νόμος δ $\upsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omega\nu$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\alpha\iota\omega\acute{\nu}\alpha$, "the Law that endures forever." See, Emmanuel Tov, ed. and trans., *The Book of Baruch* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975), p. 31.

25. David Winston, trans., *Philo of Alexandria: The Contemporary Life, the Giants and Selections* (New York, Ramsey and Toronto: Paulist Press, 1981), pp. 155-156.

26. *ibid.*, n. 283, p. 354.

27. In Dec 19 he states "now we find that those which He gave in his own person and by his own mouth alone include both laws and heads summarizing the particular laws, but those in which he spoke through the prophet all belong to the former class." In Spec Leg 2.189 he states "and indeed what could men receive mightier or more profitable than the general laws which came from the mouth of God, not like the particular laws, through an interpreter?" The "heads" and "general laws" are the Decalogue (*De Decalogo*) and the "laws" or "particular laws" are those laws subsumed under each genus of the Decalogue (*De Specialibus Legibus*).

28. Carl H. Holladay, *Theios Aner in Hellenistic Judaism: A Critique of the Use of this Category in New Testament Christology* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 160-161. Holladay also cites another possible rendering of θεός (p. 161) in which it is taken as an expression equivalent to the genitival τοῦ θεοῦ and hence Colson's translation "Some are spoken by God in his own person with his (θεοῦ) prophet for interpreter." Also, Holladay summarizes his study by indicating (pp. 167-168) that "the language of deification is used to describe the ecstatic experience, for it is only when one is literally outside one's corporeal existence, either when receiving a divine revelation or when allowing one's soul to fly into the heavens in search of the true vision of God, that such language is appropriate. The νοῦς or ψυχή during the encounters can be called θεός, but the expression *theios aner* is not employed in describing either encounter. θεομῖζω and cognates are used in describing the prophetic experience, but in no instances does the explicit language of deification occur. Philo's use of non-LXX language, borrowed from assorted sources ranging from Plato to the mysteries, does not per se bear testimony one way or the other, but as Wolfson has convincingly shown, merely indicates his superimposition of Greek categories upon his concept of prophecy derived from Scripture."

29. For a general discussion of the Holiness Code see, Otto Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction* (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 233-239. Also, see Martin Noth, *Leviticus: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 136-144.

30. Suzanne Daniel, *Recherches sur le vocabulaire du culte dans la Septante* (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1966), pp. 273-297 notes that σωτήριον is not an exact translation of שמלמים, but approximates Hebrew שלמות. The translators of the historical books showed a preference for αἰσθησιαί as the translation of שמלמים. She indicates (p. 280) that "les σωτήρια des Grecs étaient manifestement des sacrifices 'pour la délivrance', du danger ou de la maladie, et à ce titre, pour ainsi dire toujours des sacrifices d'actions de grâces...C'est sans doute parce que σωτήρια ne leur avait pas paru rendre fidèlement ce que signifiait pour eux l'hébreu *šelāmîm*, que les traducteurs du Pentateuque ne l'ont pas utilisé sous cette forme même. Il a servi à constituer un autre terme, suffisamment voisin pour inciter à la comparaison des deux rites, assez différent cependant pour écarter l'idée d'une équivalence rigoureuse entre eux. Le rite des *šelāmîm* en effet, dans le Pentateuque tout comme dans le reste de la Bible grecque, s'entend uniquement du culte israélite." Philo shows no

awareness of this interpolation of שלמים by the translators of the LXX. However, this interpretation is of great service to his own interpretation of the sacrifice.

31. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 8, n.a, p. 218.
32. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 8, pp. 427-428 and A. Mosès, *PM*, vol. 25, pp. 220-221.
33. Rabbinic interpretation of these verses takes two perspectives. The first is to take each command separately. Hence, *Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael*, *Bahodesh* 8 (Lauterbach edition 8:51-65; Horowitz edition, *Yitro* 8, p.233) interprets "Thou shalt not steal" of the Decalogue to mean kidnapping while Lev 19:11 is taken to mean only the theft of money. The second interpretation parallels Philo's understanding of the verse as a series of actions. For example, *Pesikta Rabbati* 21:18 (Braude trans., vol. 1, p. 443) reads "R. Hiyya cited the verses, 'You shall not steal; neither shall you deal falsely, nor lie to one another. And you shall not swear by my name falsely' (Lev. 19:11-12): that is, if you steal, you will go on to deal falsely, go on to lie; and end up swearing by my name falsely."
34. A Mosès, *PM*, vol. 25, p. 324.
35. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 8, p. 131.
36. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 8, pp. 34-35 and A. Mosès, *PM*, vol. 25, p. 224.
37. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 8, p. 52 and A. Mosès, *PM*, vol. 25, p. 242.
38. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 8, pp. 120-121.
39. H.A. Wolfson, *Philo*, vol. 2, pp. 185-187.
40. *Pesikta Rabbati* 14:12 preserves a parallel tradition which develops the distinction between *miqvah* and *hδq*.
41. Philo's reference to the hymns of praise not heard by the organ of hearing is a motif within his "spiritualization" of sacrifice and ritual in general. See my "Patterns of Exegesis in Philo's interpretation of Leviticus," *SP*, 6 (1979-80), esp. pp. 77-85.
42. Philo develops the opposition between Judah and Issachar in Leg All 1.80, 2.95, 3.26, 3.146, Ebr 94 and Somn 2.34.
43. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 6, p. 597 cites Quaes Gen 1.81 as indicating this geneology: "Why, in the geneology of Adam, does (Scripture) no longer mention Cain, but Seth, who, it says, was made according to his appearance and form? When it begins to count the generations from him (Seth)."
44. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 7, pp. 132 and 618.
45. Suzanne Daniel, *PM*, vol. 24, pp. 44-45.

46. See also, *M. Makkot* 3:6 and *T. Makkot* 4:15.

47. Anita Méasson, *PM*, vol. 4, p. 138 suggests that Philo's use of the term *χρόνος* may indicate a subtle critique of the "Chaldean" supreme deity who creates chaos and ether. One of the best studies of the figure Kronos-Chronos remains Raffaele Pettazzoni, "Aion-(Kronos) Chronos in Egypt," *Essays on the History of Religions* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), pp. 171-179.

48. The idea that the *ššybbān* and *šāqēn* refer to the sages of the Sanhedrin or the Rabbis is clearly presented in the ancient translations of Lev 19:32. TO renders the verse as "You shall rise up in the presence of a scholar in the Torah and you will honor the face of an old man..." TN renders the verse, "You shall rise up before the wise men who are greater than you in the Torah, and you shall honor the face of the elder..." TUI renders the verse as "You shall rise before elders who are learned in the Torah and you shall honor the sage..." See also, NumR 15:17.

49. H.A. Wolfson, *Philo*, vol. 2, n. 329, p. 370.

50. F.H. Colson, *PLCL*, vol. 8, p. 226.

51. *ibid.*, p. 127.

52. *ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 429.

53. In commenting on Lev 1-2, Philo omits all reference to *ὁσὴ εὐωδίας*; see my "Patterns of Exegesis in Philo's Interpretation of Leviticus," pp. 91-100.

54. Professor Winston has kindly allowed me to read a small chapter on "Philo's Theory of Revelation", in manuscript, which is part of his essay in the forthcoming volume on Hellenistic Judaism of the McMaster University Project, *Judaism and Christianity in the Graeco-Roman Period: The Process of Achieving Normative Self-Definition*.

55. Winston, *Philo of Alexandria*, p. 55.

56. John Dillon, "Some Thoughts on the Commentary," *The Commentary Hermeneutically Considered*, Colloquy 31 of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture (Berkeley: Graduate Theological Union and University of California, Berkeley, 1978), p. 15.

PREPARING A CRITICAL EDITION:
AN APPRAISAL OF H. W. ATTRIDGE AND R. A. ODEN, PHILO OF BYBLOS

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0. Introduction

0.1 The steady publication of primary texts must be considered one of the most welcome signs of recent scholarship in North America. Increasing availability of texts from late antiquity, both pagan and Jewish, stands to deepen our understanding of ancient religions as well as continue to reshape the categories with which we interpret them.

0.2 As welcome as this trend is, it has served to focus our attention on other problems, one of the most urgent being the need to re-examine, and perhaps even re-think the question of what constitutes a critical text. With the establishment of such series as the SBL Texts and Translations Series, to name only one, a new genre of sorts has emerged, whose label may range from "study edition" to "critical edition". Though the expectations of the SBL Texts and Translations Series were clearly and modestly stated, the format of individual volumes has not been uniform. In fact, modest aims have begun to give way to longer and more detailed works. Since this trend is likely to continue, as it should, this is perhaps the appropriate time to raise the question of the task and responsibility an editor or compiler of such a volume assumes.

0.3 More specifically, this paper addresses the text-critical task, and attempts to raise the practical question of what one is obliged to include in the critical apparatus of such volumes. Naturally this involves the question of what is the proper use of other critical editions from which such volumes are being prepared.

0.4 In my work on a volume containing the fragmentary Hellenistic Jewish authors, I have become acutely aware of the immense debt all students of Hellenistic Judaism owe K. Mraz for his monumental edition of Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica and to F. Jacoby for his prodigious efforts in producing Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. But I have become even more acutely aware of the problems involved in producing a "critical edition" based on these two works.

0.5 Although the texts with which I have dealt in my work are Hellenistic Jewish texts, in this paper I have chosen to examine a recent critical edition of a pagan text, Philo of Byblos, not only because it is a recently published

specimen of this "new genre", but also because this pagan author sounds notes whose echoes are heard frequently in Hellenistic Jewish authors, and thus whose importance for our understanding of Hellenistic Judaism is undisputed. In addition, because it is based directly on the work of Mras and Jacoby, as is my own work, it has helped me to clarify certain fundamental questions of method in the preparation and construction of such editions.

0.6 The focus of this paper is the recently published work by H. W. Attridge and R. A. Oden, Jr., Philo of Byblos: The Phoenician History - Introduction, Critical Text, Translation, Notes [The Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series, 9] Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1981. As noted in the preface to this volume, the edition is based on the work of Mras and Jacoby:

"The text of the Phoenician History used in this edition is basically that of Karl Mras, Eusebius Werke, achter Band, Die Praeparatio Evangelica (GCS 43; Berlin: Akademie, 1954). Mras' text has been compared with that of Felix Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Dritter Teil, C. (Leiden: Brill, 1958) 790. The apparatus includes variant readings which are significant for translation or for the spelling of proper names as well as a fuller listing of conjectural emendations than is to be found in either Mras or Jacoby. In several places the current editors have adopted conjectures or readings not favored by either Mras or Jacoby."

0.7 This critical edition thus illustrates particularly well the problem identified above: in making available primary texts for use by students and more experienced scholars, how should one proceed in compiling a volume based on earlier critical editions? Should one be bound to the canons of text-critical 'purists' who insist that nothing short of examining the manuscripts themselves, either first-hand or in facsimile editions, is required? Should one actually collate the pertinent manuscripts before proceeding? What are the particular problems which arise when one reads one critical edition through another? Can one proceed without further ado in compiling a critical apparatus from Mras and Jacoby when in fact Jacoby himself has compiled an apparatus based on Mras, and has done so using significantly different methods?

0.8 In this paper, only Fragments One and Two of Attridge and Oden's Philo of Byblos (hereafter, A-O) have been examined closely. The investigation has been selective in order to highlight the methodological questions involved in preparing such a text. To expedite the discussion of particular passages, appendices providing a schematized comparison of Mras, Jacoby, and A-O have been included at the end of this paper.

1. Hazards of Abbreviation

1.1 The preparation of a "study edition" or "critical text" inevitably creates pressure to abbreviate the critical apparatus of the edition(s) from which the work is being prepared. This is quite understandable since every such critical text would otherwise turn into an editio maior itself. Yet, this abbreviating tendency must be rigorously monitored, indeed held in check, for it all too easily results in unclarity, distortion, or misinterpretation.

1.2 This is clearly illustrated in A-O, p. 46, lines 13-14, which read τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς στοιχεῖον. The corresponding apparatus reads: 13-14 τοῦ - στοιχείου A¹. Here A-O follow the Mras text, p. 46, line 17, which also reads τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς στοιχεῖον. Yet, Mras's apparatus is much more complete: 17 τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ περὶ A (τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ, 3.H.) | στοιχείου A¹ (verbess. 3.H.). Jacoby, p. 809, lines 16-17, reads the same text, but abbreviates the Mras apparatus as follows: 16-17 τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς στοιχείου A¹. Thus, both Jacoby and A-O have attempted to abbreviate Mras, yet in doing so have erred in the following respects. First, by writing 13-14 τοῦ-στοιχείου A¹ in their apparatus, A-O have failed to convey clearly which word(s) in lines 13-14 are actually under consideration, although this can eventually be deduced. Here, the -του of αὐτοῦ is slightly confusing. (Note also that στοιχείου should be accented with an acute; στοιχεῖου.) Second, A-O's critical apparatus suggests that A¹ retains ὑπὲρ, whereas Mras clearly indicates that ὑπὲρ is changed to περὶ in A, and presumably A¹, although this is not altogether clear in Mras. Jacoby's apparatus at this point, though abbreviated, shows this change correctly. Third, the gradations and complexity of the evidence presented by Mras is greatly oversimplified. Admittedly, Mras's apparatus itself must be deciphered, but it looks as if his information can be outlined as follows:

- 1) τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς στοιχεῖον BONV
- 2) τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς στοιχείου A
- 3) τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς στοιχείου A¹
- τὸ (στοιχεῖον)
- 4) τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς στοιχείου A³

1.3 In any case, this is an especially striking example because it illustrates the inevitable pitfalls of abbreviating. In fact, it shows two attempts at abbreviation neither of which is fully successful. Jacoby's attempt to abbreviate Mras failed to convey that in addition to A¹, A and A³ offered equally significant variants. A-O's apparatus, in attempting to abbreviate Jacoby, failed to note the change from ὑπὲρ to περὶ, thus producing yet another level of confusion.

1.4 Another instance in which there is an attempt to convey the information in Mras's apparatus in a more concise form occurs in A-O, p. 42, line 16, which reads Οὐσωον. The apparatus reads: Οὐσωνα B^C. Mras, p. 45, line 9, reads Οὐσωον, with the corresponding apparatus: οὐσωον^α (α 2.H.) B. Jacoby, p. 808, line 14, also reads Οὐσωον and his apparatus reads: οὐσωνα B^C. It should first be noticed that A-O capitalizes Οὐσωνα, whereas Mras systematically distinguishes between lower-case and upper-case forms. The second, and more serious question is whether Mras's variant has been correctly conveyed. In actual fact, it is not clear whether the second copyist of B meant to read οὐσωνα. The

position of the α over the ν may just as easily have been intended to be read before the ν , thus οὔσων; or even that α should have been read instead of ν , thus οὔσων, as unlikely as this may appear. In any case, a more precise alternative should have been attempted, perhaps one of the following:

- 1) οὔσων B : οὔσων^α B²
- 2) οὔσων B (α over ν B²)
- 3) οὔσων B : οὔσων (superscr. α) B²

None is completely suitable, and of the three, no. 3 is least desirable, yet still preferable to either Jacoby or A-O, although it employs the siglum $\times$ which is typically used by Mras for denoting an erasure.

1.5 Still another instance occurs in A-O, p. 42, line 25, where we find ἀλιείας καὶ ἄγρας, with the corresponding apparatus: 24 ἀγρείας καὶ ἄγρας O: ἀγρείας καὶ ἀγρέας ND. Confusion results, first, from a typographical error: the line number should read 25. It is doubly unfortunate in this instance because line 24 contains the proper noun forms: Ἄγρεια καὶ Ἀλιεία. Even so, were the line number correct, other problems would remain. First, it should be noted that here A-O follow Mras, p. 45, line 14, as well as Jacoby, p. 808, line 20, both of whom read ἀλιείας καὶ ἄγρας. Mras's apparatus, however, is quite detailed at this point. He provides four separate variant readings for line 14:

- 1) ἀλιείας καὶ ἄγρας A
- 2) ἀλείας καὶ ἄγρ. B (λ auf. Ras. 2.H., ἀλείας a.R. 2.H.) V
(λ 1.H. auf Ras., ἄγρ.ασ)
- 3) ἀγρείας καὶ ἄγρας O
- 4) ἀγρείας καὶ ἀγρέας ND

The most serious error in A-O (and Jacoby) occurs in the attempt to reduce the number of variant readings cited in Mras's apparatus from four to two. By recording 24 ἀγρείας καὶ ἄγρας O: ἀγρείας καὶ ἀγρέας ND, they imply that the text they have chosen (ἀλιείας καὶ ἄγρας) is supported by the other pertinent MSS left uncited, i.e. A, B, and V. Yet, as the fuller apparatus shows, only A supports the adopted reading, while B and V do not. Moreover, the peculiarities of the B and V readings are left unmentioned. They are admittedly complex, and would be difficult to render in a shorthand form. Nevertheless, Mras chose to include them. Granting the admissibility of ignoring the detailed information about B and V, a more correct form would have been:

- 25 ἀλιείας καὶ ἄγρας A: ἀλείας καὶ ἄγρ. B^CV^C:
ἀγρείας καὶ ἄγρας O: ἀγρείας καὶ ἀγρέας ND |

It can now be seen clearly that when Jacoby writes in his apparatus: 20 ἀλιείας καὶ ἄγρας AB^C ἀγρείας καὶ ἄγρ.ασ O, he incorrectly attributes the first variant to B^C.

1.6 Other instances in which Mras's apparatus has been abbreviated with questionable results include the following:

- 1) A-O, p. 46, line 18 (ἐν συμβολῇ); cf. Mras, p. 46, line 20; Jacoby, p. 809, lines 19-20.
- 2) A-O, p. 46, line 20 (οἱ); cf. Mras, p. 46, line 21; Jacoby, p. 809, line 20.
- 3) A-O, p. 48, line 7 (ἐπιών); cf. Mras, p. 47, line 5; Jacoby, p. 809, line 26.
- 4) A-O, p. 50, line 10 (συνθέντες); cf. Mras, p. 47, line 21; Jacoby, p. 810, line 17.
- 5) A-O, p. 50, lines 23-24 (ῥέας καὶ Διόνης); cf. Mras, p. 48, line 6; Jacoby, p. 810, line 24.
- 6) A-O, p. 52, line 22 (Δημαροῦντι); cf. Mras, p. 48, lines 20-21; Jacoby, p. 811, line 10.
- 7) A-O, p. 54, line 8 (πνεῦμα); cf. Mras, p. 49, line 4; Jacoby, p. 811, line 17.
- 8) A-O, p. 56, line 12 (Ποσειδῶνι); cf. Mras, p. 50, line 1; Jacoby, p. 812, line 13.
- 9) A-O, p. 58, line 1 (ἱπτάμενα); cf. Mras, p. 50, line 7; Jacoby, p. 812, line 21.
- 10) A-O, p. 58, line 20 (ὀργεῶσι); cf. Mras, p. 50, line 18; Jacoby, p. 813, line 6.

2. Hazards of Conflating Critical Editions

2.1 A special difficulty one encounters in preparing a "conflated apparatus" from two separate editions can be illustrated by A-O's use of Mras and Jacoby. Jacoby's text appears to be based on Mras's text. His apparatus has certainly been prepared by using Mras's text and apparatus. Yet, one of the consistent features of Jacoby's apparatus is his refusal to cite MS N or V, both of which are consistently consulted and cited by Mras. To my knowledge, Jacoby never explains this refusal, but one can surmise from Mras's discussion of the MSS in his introduction, pp. xiii-lx, that Jacoby may be following Heikel who regarded N as dependent on O, whereas Mras was convinced that N was an independent witness. If Heikel's research has influenced Jacoby, this would explain why he consistently deletes Mras's references to N. As to V, Mras himself states that V rarely provides anything fundamentally new, and conceivably Jacoby could have discounted V for this reason. Unfortunately, Jacoby's commentary on FG²H Teil III C appears never to have been completed, even though he occasionally refers to it in the apparatus, and thus the way in which he has actually consulted and used MSS must remain uncertain. It appears, however, that Jacoby is fully dependent on Mras for his knowledge of the MS tradition.

2.2 One must always be alert to Jacoby's bias against N and V, as well as to Mras's fondness for both, explained, in part, by the fact that Mras collated N and confidently argued against Heikel for its value as an independent witness. This means that due caution must be exercised in comparing Mras and Jacoby. This is generally the case with A-O, although there are some important exceptions.

2.3 A-O, p. 34, line 6, read βλαστήματι, following Mras, p. 36, line 2. Mras's apparatus reads: 2 καὶ βλαστήματα A. By adopting a 'negative' apparatus at this point (cf. M. L. West, *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique* (Stuttgart, Teubner, 1973), p. 87), Mras leaves the reader to deduce

that βλαστήματι is read in BONV. Jacoby, p. 807, line 15, also reads βλαστήματι, but typically chooses not to cite N and V, thus producing the following apparatus: 15 βλαστήματι BO καὶ βλαστήματα A. Had A-O followed their previous practice here, they would have read in their apparatus: βλαστήματι BONV: καὶ βλαστήματα A. Instead, they have simply reproduced Jacoby, and consequently slight N and V.

2.4 A-O, p. 46, line 19, read θηρίων, with the corresponding apparatus: θηρίων BO: αἰφρίων A. Jacoby, p. 809, line 20, reads θηρίων (?) with the corresponding apparatus: 20 θηρίων BO αἰφρίων (so) A. Mras, p. 46, line 20, also reads θηρίων, with the corresponding apparatus: 20 θηρίων] αἰφρίων A. Since Mras gives ABON(D)V in the register above the apparatus, the reader can deduce that θηρίων is read by BONV. Yet, Jacoby's rejection of N and V has been perpetuated by A-O, and the inattentive reader may even deduce that N and V read neither θηρίων nor αἰφρίων.

2.5 Another example of the peril of reading Mras through Jacoby occurs in A-O, p. 48, lines 21-22, which reads: ὑπὲρ τῆς Γῆς with the corresponding apparatus reading: 21-22 ὑπὲρ τῆς A. Both Mras, p. 47, line 13, and Jacoby, p. 810, line 9, agree on the reading. Mras, however, in his apparatus simply notes that τῆς has been omitted: 13 τῆς² <A. Jacoby, attempting to clarify Mras, opts for a less economical form, and reads: ὑπὲρ γῆς A, although it should be noted that he prints γῆς with a lower-case γ. Nevertheless, he has correctly read and recorded the content of Mras's apparatus. A-O's apparatus, which depends on Jacoby at this point, as it stands is clearly incorrect: 21-22 ὑπὲρ τῆς A, for A omits τῆς. Here, a typographical error has apparently occurred when Jacoby's γῆς is printed as τῆς. The error could have perhaps been avoided had Mras been followed directly. It certainly would have been more economical to have read 22 τῆς om. A. In a sense, the final mistake of A-O is less serious because it results from a typographical mistake, yet as far as the actual variant is concerned, it is more serious because it clearly misreports the reading in A. (Cf. other examples of typographical errors in a later section treating Accidental Errors and Omissions.)

2.6 A-O also perpetuate Jacoby's bias against MSS N and V on p. 50, line 6, which reads Βύβλον, with the apparatus: 6 βύβλον O: βίβλον A: βέβλον B. This is a duplicate of Jacoby's apparatus, p. 810, line 14. Mras, p. 47, line 19, also reads Βύβλον, yet opts for a 'negative' apparatus which presupposes the upper register ABON(D)V. Hence, Mras's apparatus: 19 βίβλον A βέβλον B leaves the reader to deduce that Βύβλον is read in ONV.

2.7 An additional example may be cited in which some confusion results both because of an attempt to abbreviate (cf. previous section) and because Mras is being read through Jacoby. A-O, p. 28, lines 7-8 read παρὰ πάντων with the corresponding apparatus: 7 παρὶ πάντων N²DV. Here, A-O depend on Jacoby, p. 804, line 24, whose apparatus is identical. But, Mras, p. 40, line 22, actually reads: 22 παρὰ] παρὶ N (α über ε und über ι, l.H.)DV. Here, Jacoby fails to represent Mras adequately, and A-O, by following Jacoby, perpetuate the inadequacy. A more economical as well as more accurate record of Mras would have been one of the following:

- 1) παρὰ ABO: $\overset{\alpha}{\pi}\overset{\alpha}{\epsilon}\overset{\alpha}{\rho}\overset{\alpha}{\iota}$ N¹: περι DV
 2) παρὰ ABO: $\overset{\alpha}{\pi}\overset{\alpha}{\epsilon}\overset{\alpha}{\rho}\overset{\alpha}{\iota}$ N^C: περι DV
 3) παρὰ ABON¹: περι N^{ac}DV
 4) παρὰ ABON^C: περι N^{ac}DV

This is perhaps an appropriate place to note that ^C does not occur in the list of sigla in A-O, p. 10.

2.8 In a final instance, while the mistake may be owing to a typographical error, it nevertheless results from the use of Jacoby. A-O, p. 40, line 8, read κληθῆναι Γένος, following Mras, p. 44, line 9. Their apparatus reads 8 κληθῆναι καὶ A, implying, presumably, that A reads κληθῆναι plus καὶ. The apparatus in Mras, however, reads: κληθῆναι] καὶ A, by which Mras clearly means that instead of κληθῆναι A reads καὶ. In this instance, Jacoby, p. 807, line 22, correctly conveys the information in Mras, although in a different form: κληθῆναι: καὶ A.

3. Lack of Clarity

3.1 One of the particular problems faced when preparing a critical edition involves the occurrence of different formats in constructing the critical apparatus, and the related problem of lack of uniformity in the use of sigla. Consequently, what may have been clear in the edition being used may become less than clear in the new edition.

3.2 In A-O, p. 30, line 21, we find γέγραφεν, τὴν in the text, with the corresponding apparatus: 21 γέγραφεν ἦν A. This would suggest that A reads γέγραφεν ἦν, τὴν ..., when in fact it does not. Mras, p. 41, line 24, whom A-O follow, also reads γέγραφεν, τὴν, yet the apparatus reads: 24 γέγραφεν ἦν (<τὴν) A, also an unusual way of citing A. Jacoby, p. 805, line 21, presents another text: γέγραφε, τὴν διαφωνίαν, with the corresponding apparatus: 21 ἦν διαφωνίαν A. In neither case does clarity result. It would be preferable to accept Mras's text and supply the following apparatus: γέγραφεν, τὴν BONV: γέγραφεν ἦν A.

3.3 Lack of clarity also results in reporting conjectures, as happens in A-O, p. 36, line 14, where the apparatus reads: 14 Μώτ om A: Μωχ Bunsen apud Jacoby: Τωμωτ Halevy apud Jacoby. The reader would therefore expect to find in Jacoby's text *ad loc.*, p. 806, line 21, these conjectures listed with their corresponding sources, but instead one simply finds: 21 Μώτ om. A. In fact, the diligent reader seeks in vain for the bibliographical source of either Bunsen's or Halevy's suggestion, and is left wondering where and how to pursue the question further.

3.4 Another conjectural reading is found in A-O, p. 56, line 22: <δύο μὲν ἀτενὲς ἐρηγορότα>, based on a conflation of conjectures in Mras and Jacoby. Mras, p. 50, line 6, reads <δύο μὲν ἀτενὲς βλέποντα>, with the corresponding apparatus: 6 <δύο μὲν ἀτ. βλ.> Mras <ABONV. Jacoby, p. 812, lines 19-20,

reads <δύο μὲν ἐγρηγορότα>, with the corresponding apparatus: 19-20 <δ. μ. έ.> Jac <δύο μὲν * > Gaisford <δ. μ. ἀτενὲς βλέποντα> Mras. The A-O apparatus reads: <δύο - ἐγρηγορότα> Jacoby: δύο μὲν ἀτενὲς βλέποντα Mras: δύο μὲν [...] Gaisford apud Jacoby. A-O's apparatus suggests that they have followed Jacoby's conjecture, yet Jacoby's conjecture does not include ἀτενὲς, as the A-O apparatus implies. That ἀτενὲς may have been included unintentionally is suggested by the translation "to awake" which does not appear to translate ἀτενὲς. In any case, if <δύο μὲν ἀτενὲς ἐγρηγορότα> is the intended conjectural reading, it should be attributed to the editors of the apparatus.

3.5 Failure to adopt a format which clearly conveys alternate readings results in a slight ambiguity in A-O, p. 40, line 4, where the text reads Βάαυ (τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.). Here, A-O follow Mras. The apparatus in Mras reads: 7 Βάαυ, τοῦτο BONV Bā (B aus P, l.H.) αὐτοῦ τι A Bā αὐτοῦ τὴν H Βάαυ, τοῦτο Dind. nach Bochart bei Heinichen. In transferring this information to their apparatus, A-O produce: 4 Βάαυ τοῦτο BONV: Bā αὐτοῦ τι A: Βάαυ Bochart apud Mras. Here, A-O have altered Mras's apparatus in two ways. First, they have omitted some information, most of which is clearly insignificant, although one must ask why they omitted the reading in H. But more importantly, they have misconveyed the suggestion of Bochart by implying that he did not read τοῦτο following Βάαυ.

3.6 Another instance of unclarity resulting from imprecise form of citation occurs in A-O, p. 48, line 24, which reads: ἐάλω δὲ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καί. The apparatus reads: 24 ἐάλω δὲ καί ἐν τ. μ. A. Here, A-O have adopted both Jacoby's text and apparatus, p. 810, line 10. Mras, by contrast, p. 47, line 15, reads: ἐάλω δὲ καί ἐν τῇ μάχῃ in the text, and in his apparatus reads: 15 καί hier A, nach μάχῃ BONV. Jacoby's formulation implies that A actually reads ἐάλω δὲ καί ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καί, whereas A clearly does not have καί after μάχῃ! A more precise form for recording transpositions would have been preferable, for example: 24 καί post δὲ transp. A; or, to be more complete: 24 δὲ ἐν τ. μ. καί BONV: δὲ καί ἐν τ. μ. A.

3.7 A final instance may be noted in A-O, p. 58, line 23, which reads: τριῶν, with the corresponding apparatus reading: 23 τριῶν MSS: τριῶς MSS: πρῶτων Dussaud ("L'invention," 337). Yet, neither Mras, p. 50, line 20, nor Jacoby, p. 813, line 9, mention these variants. It is difficult to see how the MSS could read both τριῶν and τριῶς.

4. Combination of Factors

4.1 In some instances, a combination of several mistakes results in a more serious level of confusion. In A-O, p. 52, line 25, the text reads: ἀποστάς Δημαροῦς <αὐτῷ>. The apparatus reads: 25 ἀποστάς Δημαροῦς <αὐτῷ> Jacoby: Δημαροῦντι MSS. In their text, A-O follow neither Mras nor Jacoby in this instance. Mras, p. 48, line 22 reads: ἀποστάς Δημαροῦντι, with the corresponding apparatus: 22 δημαροῦντι A (δὲ auf Ras.) H. Jacoby, p. 811, lines 11-12, reads: ἀποστάς Δημαροῦντι†, with the corresponding apparatus: 11-12 ἀποστάς Δημαροῦς (αὐτῷ) ?. It is seen that A-O thus adopt Jacoby's suggestion in his critical apparatus, yet the A-O apparatus as cited above presents two problems. First, the form adopted,

i.e. the decision not to repeat ἀποστὰς in the second variant, suggests that the MSS read ἀμαρῶντι instead of the paradosis cited. Second, the detailed information in Mras's apparatus is obscured. By writing ἀμαρῶντι MSS, A-O imply that all the MSS give this reading, when Mras specifically states that A and H read ὁμαρῶντι. In addition, Mras's observation that in A 6v is written upon an erasure (6v auf Ras.) is neglected, as it also is in A-O, p. 52, line 22.

4.2 The choice of sigla and abbreviations presents well-known difficulties, especially given the fluidity with regard to the choice and use of sigla within the discipline of textual criticism itself. Nevertheless, various attempts have been made to construct comprehensive lists, such as the one in Nestle-Aland²⁶, *Novum Testamentum Graece*, pp. 776-79. The special problem we encounter here is that which results when one attempts to standardize sigla from two different editors. An attempt must be made to provide a comprehensive list of sigla, with explanations, and even moreso, an effort to convey with the new set of sigla that which the original editor intended to convey.

4.3 A-O, p. 48, line 2, read: Βαίτυλον, as do Mras, p. 47, line 1, and Jacoby, p. 809, line 23. Several orthographical variants are cited, one of which Mras gives as Βηχτυλον Α. In his list of sigla on p. LX, Mras lists x = Rasur eines Buchstabens. He consistently employs x within a lacuna to indicate an erasure. Jacoby renders Mras's suggestion at this point in the following way: β..τυλον (rasur)Α. Apart from the fact that he changes the upper-case Β to a lower-case β, Jacoby here employs two full stops (..), which are typically used to indicate lacunae, yet he correctly notes in parentheses that an erasure has produced the lacunae. The A-O apparatus, interestingly, provides four variants, two of which are capitalized, two of which are not. The relevant variant here is read as follows: β..τυλον Α, with no indication that the lacunae have resulted from an erasure. In fact, given the explanation of sigla in A-O, p. 10, one might simply conclude that "some text has been lost at this point", yet one discovers that this is inapplicable because in this list of sigla the dots are bracketed ([...]). In the end, the dots remain unexplained. Here is another instance where the derivative quality of the A-O apparatus, constructed from Mras via Jacoby, results in imprecision, perhaps even distortion. In this instance, it would have been preferable to include Mras's symbol for an erasure (x) in the list of sigla, and to have used it in the apparatus at this point, since it can easily be produced with available typewriter technology.

5. Inadvertent Errors and Omissions

5.1 We treat next the bane of all text-critical projects, inadvertent errors and omissions on the part of the editors, and these, of course, can only be eliminated by repeated proof-readings, although it must be noted that Mras's edition of Eusebius, *Praeparatio* is remarkably free of such errors.

5.2 We begin by listing some errors which, in the end, are relatively minor. A-O, p. 46, line 1 (which reads ὁ Τάυτος): in the fourth variant cited, the apparatus should read οὗτος αὐτός Α. In A-O, p. 52, line 21, the apparatus should read

εὐφρώντας ἦ. In A-O, p. 54, line 4, in the apparatus (line 2), read A after περιτέμνει λοχῆσας; also accent λοχῆσας. In A-O, p. 60, line 1, in the apparatus, read πρώτου. In A-O, p. 60, line 15, in the apparatus, read ἦν παρεδ. In A-O, p. 56, line 5, the text reads δλοκαρποῦ, with the corresponding apparatus: 5 δλοκαρποῦ MSS: δλοκαυτοῦ Mras. Mras, however, p. 49, line 19, reads δλοκαρποῦ, but provides no apparatus. Jacoby, p. 812, line 7, reads δλοκαρποῦ, with the corresponding apparatus: δλοκαυτοῦ Mue. Apparently, "Mue" has been misprinted as "Mras" in A-O, though, technically speaking, their apparatus should read: δλοκαυτοῦ Mue apud Jacoby.

5.3 One of the most important omissions occurs in A-O, page 30, line 2. A-O typically report the peculiarities of B, notably its repeated omissions, often of large blocks of material. Cf. in A-O, p. 42, lines 3-6; p. 44, line 4; p. 50, line 12; p. 52, lines 6-8; p. 58, line 20. Because of these instances, their failure to report the omission of B on p. 30, line 2, is striking, and appears to be an oversight, yet it leads the reader to draw false conclusions when interpreting the apparatus on the rest of this page. The corresponding passage occurs in Mras p. 41, line 13, and Mras's apparatus reports the omission of B as follows: δ δὲ -- S.42,3 βαρβάρων om. B, which corresponds to A-O, p. 30, lines 2-27 δ δὲ -- βαρβάρων. It should also be noted here that Jacoby's citation of this omission is slightly inaccurate: Jacoby, p. 805, line 8, where his apparatus reads: 8-25 συμβαλῶν - βαρβάρων om. B. He has thus failed to convey that B also omits δ δὲ. The impact of A-O's failure to mention the omission of B may be sketched as follows: Mras, p. 41, lines 16-17 reads ἐπιγενόμενοι, which is adopted by A-O. Mras's apparatus reads: 16f. ἐπιγενόμενοι ONV ἐπιγιν. A (with a reference to line 12 - γενόμενα). Instead of citing a full set of witnesses at this point, the A-O apparatus reads: 9 ἐπιγινόμενοι A. Since the aorist form of the participle is not cited with its witnesses, the reader may conclude that it is read not only in ONV but in B as well, since the omission of B noted above has not been recorded.

5.4 Similar confusion results in A-O, p. 30, line 15, specifically with reference to πολλά and ἐξερυνησαμένους. Also, line 21 γέγραπεν ἦν A.

6. Transferring Complex Information Into Simplified Form

6.1 In this survey, we have noted various types of difficulties encountered in preparing a critical text. Many of these problems reflect a common difficulty any editor confronts in attempting to condense the results of another scholar's work, especially a text-critical work. In this instance, Mras's edition is the result of a lifetime of scholarship devoted to a single text, Eusebius' Praeparatio. For this reason, his apparatus is comprehensive and detailed. In fact, he repeatedly reproduces the MS evidence with as much realism as typesetting will allow. Attempts to abbreviate or condense such information with equivalent detail and precision are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, as the following instance shows.

6.2 A-O, p. 50, lines 23-24 read 'Ρέας καὶ Διώνης with the corresponding apparatus: 23-24 'Ρέαν καὶ Διώνην A^c. Mras, p. 48, line 6, has the same reading in the text, but gives the following information in the apparatus:

6 'Ρέα^υ καὶ Διώνη^υ (υ beidemal l.H.) A 'Ρέαν καὶ Διώνην H.

Jacoby, p. 810, line 24, reads the same text with the following apparatus: 24 ῥέα(ν) καὶ διώνη(ν) A^c (m.I.).

6.3 The difficulty of presenting Mras's information is manifest, and neither Jacoby nor A-O does justice to the complexity of the material. A-O assume, no doubt correctly, that the final reading of the first copyist of A was 'Ρέαν καὶ Διώνην, but it is an important fact that A^c, or perhaps A¹, left the previous letters ι and σ intact. As we have noticed before, A-O have chosen again not to include the reading from H, as does Jacoby, and here is another instance where A-O may be following Jacoby. Jacoby's apparatus is slightly more nuanced, but it too fails to record the initial and intermediate stages of the reading. Since Mras felt compelled to record the information, some attempt, however awkward, should be made to relay accurately the same information, and the following may be suggested, though with some reservation:

23-24 'Ρέας καὶ Διώνης BONV: 'Ρέαι καὶ Διώνηι A^{ac}:
'Ρέα(σ) καὶ Διώνη(σ) A¹ (σ superscr. ι): 'Ρέα(ν) καὶ Διώνη(ν) A¹ (ν superscr. σ): 'Ρέαν καὶ Διώνην H.

6.4 This raises again, in its sharpest form, the question of the propriety of altering an editor's apparatus at all, once the decision has been made to include a particular variant reading.

7. Conclusion

7.1 As primary texts come to be published in less 'provisional' form, the need for greater methodological clarity and precision in preparing 'study editions' or 'critical editions' will increase. This appraisal of a single specimen of such editions has been intended to force certain questions to the surface, and to open discussion about the underlying principles, as well as the formal considerations, guiding the preparation of such editions.

7.2 In view of the areas we have discussed in the previous sections, it is possible to make some tentative, though concrete suggestions for the consideration of the seminar.

7.2.1 Since guidelines designed specifically for the preparation of such study or critical editions do not exist, to my knowledge, and since those editions which have appeared have exhibited considerable formal and material diversity, I suggest that M. L. West, Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1973) be used as the standard reference. This handbook is particularly useful as a guide for preparing prefatory material, selecting critical symbols for the text and apparatus, and displaying omissions, additions, conjectures, etc. in the apparatus. It appears that A-O have generally followed the guidelines suggested by West, or ones similar, although this is never stated. It is perhaps worth discussing how rigorously subsequent editors should do so.

7.2.2 Since the preparation of such editions necessarily requires the abbreviation of the critical apparatus of previous editions, the implications of such a move must be clearly understood and carefully calibrated. Once the decision is made to include a particular variant, if at all possible, all the information provided in the previous critical edition should be transmitted to the apparatus of the study edition in a form which preserves the information in equivalent precision and detail, even though it may be presented more compactly. If this principle is not adopted, the preface should carefully explain the principles of selectivity which have been followed.

7.2.3 When such a study edition is prepared from two or more previous critical editions, the precise relationship between those editions should be clarified in the preface. In addition, this relationship should be preserved in both the collection and the presentation of the text-critical data in the critical apparatus of the study edition. Otherwise, distortion, however slight, is inevitable.

** I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Mr. Kenneth Frazier, Yale Divinity School, and Mr. Allen Black, Emory University, in the preparation of this paper.

APPENDICES

1.2 - 1.3

Mras, p. 46, line 17: τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς στοιχεῖον

ABON(D)V

app.: 17 τὸ ὑπὲρ] τοῦ περὶ A (τὸ über τοῦ,
3.H.) | στοιχείου A¹ (verbess. 3.H.)

Jacoby, p. 809, lines 16-17: τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς στοιχεῖον

app.: 16-17 τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς στοιχείου A¹

A-O, p. 46, lines 13-14: τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς στοιχεῖον

app.: 13-14 τοῦ - στοιχεῖου A¹

1.4

Mras, p. 45, line 9: Οὕσων

ABON(D)V

app.: 9 οὕσων^α (α 2.H.) B

Jacoby, p. 808, line 14: Οὕσων

app.: 14 Οὕσων: οὕσωνα B^C

A-O, p. 42, line 16: Οὕσων

app.: 16 Οὕσωνα B^C

1.5

Mras, p. 45, line 14: ἀλειείας καὶ ἄγρας

ABON(D)V

app.: 14 ἀλειείας καὶ ἄγρας A ἀλειείας καὶ ἄγρ. B
(λ auf. Ras. 2. H., ἀλειείας a.R. 2. H.)
V (λ 1. H. auf Ras., ἄγοχας) ἀγρεείας καὶ
ἄγρας O ἀγρεείας καὶ ἀγρέας ND

Jacoby, p. 808, line 20: ἀλειείας καὶ ἄγρας

app.: 20 ἀλειείας καὶ ἄγρας AB^C ἀγρεείας καὶ
ἄγρας O

A-O, p. 42, line 25: ἀλειείας καὶ ἄγρας

app.: 24 ἀγρεείας καὶ ἄγρας O: ἀγρεείας καὶ
ἀγρέας ND

2.3

Mras, p. 36, line 2: βλαστήματι

ABON(D)V

app.: 2 καὶ βλαστήματα A

Jacoby, p. 807, line 15: βλαστήματι

app.: 15 βλαστήματι BO καὶ βλαστήματα A

A-O, page 34, line 6: βλαστήματι

app.: 6 βλαστήματι BO: καὶ βλαστήματα A

2.4

Mras, p. 46, line 20: θηρών

ABON(D)V

app.: 20 θηρών] αἰψριων A

Jacoby, p. 809, line 20: θηρών (?)

app.: 20 θηρών BO αἰψριων (so) A

A-O, p. 46, line 19: θηρών

app.: 19 θηρών BO: αἰψριων A

2.5

Mras, p. 47, line 13: ὑπὲρ τῆς Γῆς

ABON(D)V

app.: 13 τῆς² <A

Jacoby, p. 810, line 9: ὑπὲρ τῆς Γῆς

app.: 9 ὑπὲρ γῆς A

A-O, p. 48, lines 21-22: ὑπὲρ τῆς Γῆς

app.: 21-22 ὑπὲρ τῆς A

2.6

Mras, p. 47, line 19: Βύβλον

ABON(D)V

app.: 19 βίβλον A βέβλον B

Jacoby, p. 810, line 14: Βύβλον

app.: 14 βύβλον O βίβλον A βέβλον B

A-O, page 50, line 6: Βύβλον

app.: 6 βύβλον O: βίβλον A: βέβλον B

2.7

Mras, p. 40, line 22: παρά πάντων

ABON(D)V

app.: 22 παρά] περί N (α über ε und über ι, l.H.) DV

Jacoby, p. 804, line 24: παρά πάντων

app.: 24 περί πάντων N^CDV

A-O, p. 28, lines 7-8: παρά πάντων

app.: 7 περί πάντων N^CDV

2.8

Mras, p. 44, line 9: κληθῆναι Γένος

ABON(D)V

app.: 9 κληθῆναι] καί A

Jacoby, p. 807, line 22: κληθῆναι Γένος

app.: 22 κληθῆναι: καί A

A-O, p. 40, line 8: κληθῆναι Γένος

app.: 8 κληθῆναι καί A

3.2

Mras, p. 41, lines 24-25: γέγραφεν, τὴν διαφωνίαν

ABON(D)V

app.: 24 γέγραφεν ἦν (<τὴν) A

Jacoby, p. 805, line 21: γέγραφε, τὴν διαφωνίαν

app.: 21 ἦν διαφωνίαν A

A-O, p. 30, line 21: γέγραφεν, τὴν διαφωνίαν

app.: 21 γέγραφεν ἦν A

3.3

Mras, p. 43, line 4: Μώτ

ABON(D)V

app.: 4 Μώτ BONV <A

Jacoby, p. 806, line 21: Μώτ

app.: 21 Μώτ om. A

A-O, p. 36, line 14: Μώτ

app.: 14 Μώτ om. A: Μωχ Bunsen apud Jacoby:
 Τωμωτ Halevy apud Jacoby

3.4

Mras, p. 50, line 6: <δύο μὲν ἀτενὲς βλέποντα>,

ABON(D)V

app.: 6 <δύο μὲν ἀτ. βλ.> Mras <ABONV |

Jacoby, p. 812, lines 19-20: <δύο μὲν ἐρηγορότα>,

app.: 19-20 <δ. μ. ἐ.> Jac <δύο μὲν*> Gaisford
 <δ. μ. ἀτενὲς βλέποντα> Mras

A-O, p. 56, line 22: <δύο μὲν ἀτενὲς ἐρηγορότα>,

app.: 22 <δύο - ἐρηγορότα> Jacoby: δύο μὲν
 ἀτενὲς βλέποντα Mras: δύο μὲν [...]
 Gaisford apud Jacoby

3.5

Mras, p. 44, line 7: Βάαυ (τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.)

ABON(D)V

app.: 7 Βάαυ, τοῦτο BONV Bā (B aus P, l.H.)
αὐτοῦ τι A Bā αὐτοῦ τὴν H Βάαυτ,
τοῦτο Dind. nach Bochart bei Heinichen

Jacoby, p. 807, line 20: Βάαυ (τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.)

app.: 20 Βάαυ (Βάαυτ Bochart) τοῦτο BO
Bā αὐτοῦ τι A

A-O, p. 40, line 4: Βάαυ (τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.)

app.: 4 Βάαυ τοῦτο BONV: Bā αὐτοῦ τι A:
Βάαυτ Bochart apud Mras

3.6

Mras, p. 47, line 15: ἐάλω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ

ABON(D)V

app.: 15 καὶ hier A, nach μάχῃ BONV

Jacoby, p. 810, line 10: ἐάλω δὲ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καὶ

app.: 10 ἐάλω δὲ καὶ ἐν τ. μ. A

A-O, p. 48, line 24: ἐάλω δὲ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καὶ

app.: 24 ἐάλω δὲ καὶ ἐν τ. μ. A

3.7

Mras, p. 50, line 20: τριῶν

ABON(D)V

app.: no reference to variants here

Jacoby, p. 813, line 9: τριῶν

app.: no reference to variants here

A-O, p. 58, line 23: τριῶν

app.: 23 τριῶν MSS: τριῶς MSS: πρῶτων Dussaud
("L'invention," 337)

4.1

Mras, p. 48, line 22: ἀποστάς Δημαροῦντι

ABON(D)V

app.: 22 διμαροῦντι A (δι auf Ras.) H

Jacoby, p. 811, lines 11-12: ἀποστάς Δημαροῦντι †

app.: 11-12 ἀποστάς Δημαροῦς (αὐτῶι) ?

A-O, p. 52, line 25: ἀποστάς Δημαροῦς <αὐτῷ>

app.: 25 ἀποστάς Δημαροῦς <αὐτῷ> Jacoby:
Δημαροῦντι MSS

4.3

Mras, p. 47, line 1: Βαίτυλον

ABON(D)V

app.: 1 Βαίτυλον ONV Βέτυλον B Βκκτυλον A
Βήτυλον H

Jacoby, p. 809, line 23: Βαίτυλον

app.: 23 βαίτυλον O βέτυλον B β..τυλον (rasur) A

A-O, p. 48, line 2: Βαίτυλον

app.: 2 Βαίτυλον ONV: βέτυλον B: β..τυλον A:
Βήτυλον H

5.3

Mras, p. 41, line 13: ὁ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

ABON(D)V

app.: 13 ὁ δὲ -- S.42,3 βαρβάρων <B

Jacoby, p. 805, line 8: ὁ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

app.: 8-25 συμβαλῶν - βαρβάρων om. B

A-O, p. 30, line 2: ὁ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

app.: no reference

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5.3 (cont.)

Mras, p. 41, lines 16-17: ἐπιγενόμενοι

ABON(D)V

app.: 16f. ἐπιγενόμενοι ONV ἐπιγιν. A; vgl. 12

Jacoby, p. 805, line 13: ἐπιγενόμενοι

app.: 13 ἐπιγινόμενοι A

A-O, p. 30, line 9: ἐπιγενόμενοι

app.: 9 ἐπιγινόμενοι A

6.2 - 6.3

Mras, p. 48, line 6: ῥέας καὶ Διώνης,

ABON(D)V

app.: 6 ῥέα^Υ καὶ Διώνη^Υ (Υ beidemal l.H.) A
ῥέαν καὶ Διώνην H

Jacoby, p. 810, line 24: ῥέας καὶ Διώνης,

app.: 24 ῥέα(ν) καὶ Διώνη(ν) A^C (m.I)

A-O, p. 50, lines 23-24: ῥέας καὶ Διώνης,

app.: 23-24 ῥέαν καὶ Διώνην A^C

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THE STUDY OF NEW TESTAMENT CHRISTOLOGY: NOTES FOR THE AGENDA

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The christological faith of early Christianity is undoubtedly its central and most distinctive characteristic. No attempt to understand the early church can be undertaken without dealing with this faith and, conversely, nearly everything about early Christianity bears upon its christological belief. But scholarly attempts to describe the rise of early christology have unceasingly issued forth in our century, and so it may seem either redundant or presumptuous to organize a "Consultation on New Testament Christology".¹ As one of those requesting the Consultation, I take comfort in the fact that the request was granted, and in the interest shown in the Consultation already, for these things lead me to believe that the sense that it is neither redundant nor presumptuous to hold this Consultation is shared by a number of colleagues. I cannot pretend to speak for these colleagues in offering the following remarks, and indeed my perceptions may be proven idiosyncratic or incorrect in the discussions that will make up the Consultation, but it may not be entirely without value for me to give some of my own reasons for requesting these discussions, and to offer suggestions for the possible future agenda of a Seminar.

The Recent Abundance of Data

Scholarly study of the New Testament is mainly a historical investigation, and, so, is at the mercy of both the fortuitous gaps in data connected with the early Church and its setting, and the changes in the way the available data are understood. Changes in the data available and/or changes in the way even some data are interpreted mean that reconsideration must be given to earlier views. Such a reconsideration does not signal ingratitude to earlier scholarship, but reflects the nature of all somewhat scientific study where a clearer view of the object of study is constantly sought, and where every participant in the enterprise ought to be ready to admit the provisional nature of nearly all work, including one's own. At the present time we are in the happy but uncertain situation of having to assimilate a great deal of new work that bears upon the study of New Testament christology as it has been conducted over the last several decades, and this abundance both forms part of the reason that a reconsideration of the topic is justified and provides us with at least part of our agenda. In the space of this paper it is possible only to list some of this newer evidence together with brief indications of its significance for the topic at hand.²

Gnostic Materials

Although scholars have argued about the importance of Gnosticism in the formation of New Testament christology for a long time, it is only in the last few years that the major cache of documents giving us direct access to Gnosticism has become available for widescale scholarly use.³ Even before the publication of the full Nag Hammadi collection scholarly opinion seems to have turned against earlier suggestions that a pre-Christian, Gnostic redeemer myth was a major factor in the development of early christology.⁴ But, even if the pre-Christian Gnostic redeemer-myth theory must be rejected, it seems

plausible that the newly-available Gnostic materials might enhance considerably our understanding of the syncretistic tendencies of Graeco-Roman religion, and might thus shed at least indirect light on the atmosphere of early Christian beliefs. That is, we must not only see whether the Gnostic evidence verifies or discredits this or that earlier theory, we must also seek to understand what new and positive contribution it makes to an understanding of early christology.

Even if it is concluded that the Nag Hammadi materials mainly throw into relief the New Testament expressions of belief in Jesus by contrasting with them, this still means that these documents will have enhanced our appreciation of the significance of New Testament faith in Jesus, though I am inclined to think that there may be more benefits to receive.⁵ We are all aware of the apparent diversity in early christological expressions, and perhaps now we are in a position to test J.M. Robinson's thesis that an early "wisdom" christology (as is seen by many in Matthew) may be linked in some way to the developed Gnostic-revealer christology shown in some Gnostic documents.⁶ We may also be in a position to determine whether the diversity of christological notions in the New Testament nevertheless forms a cohesion when compared to the christological views of the Gnostic documents, and if so, what constitutes this cohesion. That is, are we to think of the New Testament "christologies" as reflections of diverse religious convictions having in common perhaps little more than the name of Jesus, or is there an identifiable cohesiveness that makes these formulations in all their variety nevertheless distinct from other christological developments that came to be regarded as heresies?⁷ The Nag Hammadi materials give us examples of the latter category of beliefs, and the careful comparison of them with New Testament materials should illumine both sets of documents and both earlier and later varieties of christological developments. The fact that none of the major treatments of New Testament christology were able to make use of this data is itself an indication that new work must be done.⁸

Jewish Materials

In addition to the Nag Hammadi materials, which give us glimpses of post-New Testament developments in Christianity, we have before us now a rich profusion of Jewish materials, enhancing our knowledge of pre-Christian developments in the matrix of early Christian faith. Although New Testament scholars already have an appreciation for the importance of Jewish pseudepigrapha, thanks to the efforts of R.H. Charles and others, the last few decades have been a time of a rich harvest of newly-published materials and the re-study of previously-known writings. For example, the forthcoming Doubleday edition of the Pseudepigrapha, we are promised, will contain fifty-one documents, compared to seventeen in the older Oxford edition by Charles.⁹ As another example, major studies on the important I Enoch by Milik and Knibb have appeared in the last few years,¹⁰ and though some issues (such as the date of the Similitudes) are still debated, we have been provided with a good deal of information about the evidently variegated and prolific religious life of Graeco-Roman Judaism. In view of these developments, our earlier notions of what could have been present in the Palestinian background of Christianity demand to be updated.¹¹

The Qumran materials have provided us with evidence also

that the soteriological hopes of Palestinian Jews were more complex (and confusing!) than we might have desired, and it is still not clear whether the questions about the nature of messianic expectations in these documents have been resolved.¹² In addition, the research of the last couple of decades has taught us the need to take into account Samaritan religion and its possible role in the shaping of christology, though again what this role may have been is not agreed upon.¹³ The targums too have been the object of new scrutiny in recent years, illuminating further the ancient Jewish world,¹⁴ and, though there are disagreements about the use of particular targumic data, through these recent studies we have been provided with more information about ancient Jewish messianic interpretations of the Old Testament, perhaps illuminating the early Christian use of the Old Testament in christology.¹⁵

Thanks to the prodigious labors of Jacob Neusner, we have been made more cautious about the use of rabbinic materials in attempting to describe pre-70 C.E. Judaism, and this means that we must critically test previous use of these writings in reconstructing the Jewish background of early christology, and take account of Neusner's work in future study of this subject.¹⁶ This advance in the method of handling Rabbinic material is practically as significant as a new discovery of Jewish sources.

In addition to these developments, we may note that several important thematic studies have appeared since the last major treatments of New Testament christology, which illumine greatly our understanding of the religious thought of ancient Judaism, with particular importance for the background of christology. From as far back as 1967, we may note Meeks's study on Moses traditions.¹⁷ More recently, we have the important work by A. Segal on the "two powers" theme in Jewish polemics.¹⁸

Although probably none of the items mentioned here is unknown to New Testament scholars, and although each of us has no doubt attempted to integrate this mass of data into our own exegesis of New Testament texts, it seems appropriate that we should attempt a cooperative "re-mapping" of christological backgrounds in the interest of understanding better the way early christology developed. This re-mapping must involve not only the integration and consolidation of evidence but also the critical appraisal and re-sifting of scholarly interpretation of the evidence, and an SBL Seminar seems to be a highly desirable setting and vehicle for the sort of intensive and term-oriented work that is surely required, in which specialists in various bodies of evidence can be heard from and can participate in immediate and ongoing debate and collaboration.

The recent study by E. Schillebeeckx is a courageous attempt to integrate research on the background of christology into a presentation of the development of belief in Jesus, but at the same time his book shows the need for a less idiosyncratic and more judicious appraisal and use of such research.¹⁹ Dunn's even more recent work is another example of a bold attempt to address aspects of the development of christology by interacting with a wide assortment of data on the religious background of the church, and, however his handling of the data is adjudged, he shows the kind of industry and broad reading that must be involved in dealing with today's situation of abundant research and re-opened issues.²⁰ The labors of these individual scholars are very recent evidence that the origin and development of christology remains an engaging and unsettled area.

The Shape of Future New Testament Christology Study

No one should have the presumption to try to dictate or predict what may or may not be done in future research, and that is not my intention here. However, in the context of proposing a study group to be formed to deal with New Testament christology, it may be fitting to offer some observations and suggestions for our future work.

The Use of "Background" Data

Because modern study of the New Testament is a historically-oriented activity, it is the established procedure to try to set the early Church and the New Testament documents in their historical context, in the conviction that this context may furnish important information by which to understand better the phenomena of early Christianity. In this procedure we show ourselves to be the academic beneficiaries and descendants of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule whose prodigious labors and controversial hypotheses have so heavily determined the scholarly agenda in twentieth-century New Testament studies. Without diminishing the respect and gratitude due this scholarly group, it may be possible to learn from their mistakes as well as from their successes, and these lessons may be among the most important for our further work.

The mistakes of the scholars of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule did not arise from their desire to understand early Christianity in its Graeco-Roman context, from the use of non-canonical and non-Christian data as well as canonical and Christian data, but rather from the limitations of their data, and more seriously, from the failure to be sufficiently controlled by their data. For example, the once popular thesis that first-generation Christianity was already heavily influenced by pagan mystery cults and modelled its christological beliefs and religious practices after pre-Christian "saviour-cults" seems to have been reached in spite of the fact that the evidence shows (a) that the mystery cults reached their prominent stage only during or after the second century C.E., (b) that beliefs and practices attributed to these cults by some scholars were not in fact as widespread, as early, and as developed as claimed, and (c) that the first-generation Christian beliefs and practices in fact are sharply distinctive from the purportedly parallel phenomena in the pagan cults. It is, I trust, well known today that, though the mystery cults reflect an aspect of the religious life of the ancient world, they do not furnish us the source of early Christian doctrines and rites.²¹

As another example, we may cite the thesis that early christology was modelled after an originally Iranian or Gnostic redeemer myth.²² Though this thesis has, in various permutations, been defended by illustrious colleagues in earlier years, it has fallen upon harder times more recently, again because it had to be maintained by ignoring the chronological characteristics of the data and other serious objections.²³ As a result of the argument over pre-Christian redeemer myths, we have all profited by the study given to Mandaean, Gnostic and Hermetic materials, but this study has not verified the earlier assertions made as to the role of the religious ideas reflected in these writings in the origins of New Testament christology.

There is, of course, nothing terribly unusual about later research showing earlier theses to be incorrect, and no one can hope for the immortal validity of all one's scholarly views. Nevertheless, perhaps there is more to learn from these examples of revised conclusions than the contingency of all historical study of the New Testament. I suggest that the examples given above show certain methodological flaws in the scholarly work in question, and that we can learn from these flaws.²⁴

First, it has been noted by others that much *religions-geschichtliche Schule* work proceeded from the firmly-held assumption that the lines of influence were almost certainly from non-Christian groups and sources to Christian ones. On the basis of such an assumption firmly held, one could use the mere fact that an idea or practice appears in the New Testament to show that the idea or practice must have stemmed from pre-Christian and/or non-Christian groups, but to do so is to move from the legitimate activity of making a scholarly hypothesis—e.g., that such and such an idea, belief, practice might be derived from earlier religious groups—to the inappropriate procedure of treating as a valid argument a notion that itself demands substantiation.²⁵ Assumptions are useless in scholarly work to the degree that they are unfalsifiable. If such unexamined assumptions are unconsciously held they are nonetheless counterproductive. With reference to early Christianity, and other Graeco-Roman groups it seems wiser to assume that there may have been influences in both directions, and we may be allowed to speak of such influences with confidence only when the data warrant it.

Secondly, consonant with the aforementioned bias about directions of influence in the Graeco-Roman world were the tendencies to conscript data from various periods extending to centuries after the rise of Christianity to support assertions about pre-Christian religious history, and to describe confidently beliefs and conceptions and their pervasiveness on the basis of fragmentary and diffuse evidence.²⁶ Characteristics of this or that cult god or metaphysical scheme were pasted together to "reconstruct" the supposedly original beliefs; but the heat of subsequent investigation has often melted the paste, showing the "reconstruction" to be something that, for all its fascination, probably never existed outside scholarly writings.²⁷

Lest these comments be misunderstood, let us be assured that much historical study involves imagination and that the limited data from the ancient world demands that we venture provisional conclusions. But if we are to make progress we must also be disciplined and cautious in the use of the data. To describe religious history accurately, we must observe and respect the dates for our available evidence and we must be candid when our hypotheses rest upon fragments and are composed mostly of imagination. However much each of us may lean toward this or that "comfortable theory" (to borrow Sandmel's phrase),²⁸ we are well-advised to be critical of our evidence and of ourselves in our use of it. The methodological rigor advocated here is not meant to stifle hypothesis-making, but only to urge that the activity be judicious and disciplined.

Thirdly, and perhaps more profoundly, the *religions-geschichtliche Schule* teaches us the error of thinking that we have understood an ancient belief or practice by positing supposed genealogical parallels. To make clear what is meant here, let me distinguish my point from another, already made

far better than I am capable of doing by others, that we must not assume that all apparent similarities of beliefs and practices are evidence of genealogical relationships. In each case we must ask, in Deissmann's words, "Is it analogy or is it genealogy?"²⁹ Indeed the failure to observe this distinction might contribute to one making two somewhat parallel phenomena more parallel than they really are.³⁰ This is sound advice and already given, but my point here is something else, though it is related to this last matter.

Without minimizing the value of knowing the full historical context of early Christianity, for example, and with full appreciation for the insight gained from trying to categorize religious phenomena into types or patterns, we must also recognize the responsibility of all historical work to do justice to the peculiarities of each example of religious phenomena, and we must avoid determining the meaning of a term, concept, belief or practice too heavily on the basis of its occurrence in other sources and groups.³¹

It is a reasonable assumption that Christian beliefs of the Graeco-Roman period were conditioned to some degree by the contemporary social and religious environment, and indeed it can be shown how the use of environment information illumines aspects of the early Church.³² Further, it is the essence of scientifically-oriented study to try to classify phenomena into categories, seeking understanding of phenomena by observing apparent similarities and by linking them in phyla or other groups appropriate to the various sciences. No one could wish that New Testament studies were unscientific, but one might be allowed to ask that we note the inherent reductionist danger in crude categorization of phenomena.³³ The tendency of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule to make the alleged similarities of christological beliefs and the myths of mystery cults determine the meaning of New Testament christology amounted to a reductionist error from which we can learn.³⁴

In part also the reductionist direction of much religionsgeschichtliche work may have been taken not because they sought to be scientific, but because they were too controlled by religious concerns. Mankind is almost incorrigibly religious; but religious fashions change, and much scholarly work has been done overtly and covertly, or even unconsciously, under the influence of this or that religious fashion. It is perhaps not entirely coincidental, for example, that the leaders of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule were "modern" religious men of their day, that is, heirs of the Enlightenment fashion in religion with its distaste for dogma in general and christological dogma in particular, and that they found it easy to see early christological beliefs as basically examples of this or that primitive mindset.³⁵ For all their commendable emphasis that early Christianity was very much a part of an ancient world very distant and different from our modern time, they may have been too single-mindedly eager to use comparative-religions data to interpret early Christianity, and their eagerness may not have been caused entirely by the fact that this data and the comparative approach were still somewhat at a pioneering stage. One must, of course, beware of subtle apologetic motives in historical work, but apologetic motives come in more than one kind.³⁶ Just as it is a travesty of historical research to try to "prove" somehow the validity of Christianity by over-emphasizing its uniqueness, so is it necessary to beware of a more subtle failure to engage fully a historical phenomenon, a failure stemming from a discomfort with the values or beliefs

involved in the phenomenon. To put the matter positively, we should try to be aware of all aspects of our *Vorverständnis*, so as to obtain an appreciation for the meaning and significance of New Testament christology, in this case, as a part of its historical milieu and as a peculiar phenomenon in its own right.

"Background" data can be useful in clarifying the language and concepts of the New Testament, in illustrating the social and religious "agenda" addressed in the New Testament, and in clarifying the nature of the New Testament contribution to that "agenda".³⁷ This data must not be used too heavily-handedly, however, obscuring accurate perception and preventing sympathetic appreciation of the discreet characteristics of early Christianity.³⁸

Questions Before Us

In addition to these methodological observations, it may be appropriate to describe briefly a few more specific suggestions as to the questions that might profitably occupy our attention in future study of New Testament christology. This list cannot be regarded as complete, of course, but is intended to generate still more suggestions from others.

To begin, it seems evident that, although the newer data described in part earlier in this paper demand that previous views on the meaning of certain christological titles should be re-examined, future study of New Testament christology should include more than discussion of these titles, which have so preoccupied us in recent decades.³⁹ The preoccupation with New Testament christological titles has not only resulted in the debatable impression being given that each title may have represented a somewhat distinct "christology", it has also involved a highly selective inquiry, to say nothing of the fact that this line of investigation provides us with some of the clearest examples of the misguided use of "background" data to determine the exegesis of New Testament materials.⁴⁰

Though the commonly-accepted "hymns" in the New Testament have been the objects of repeated investigations, the efforts have been directed mainly at their sources, structure, conceptual background, and theological content.⁴¹ Comparatively little attention has been given to the phenomenon of early Christian liturgical practice, as to its importance in the development of christology. Scholars have too often tended to treat the development of christological faith too simply as a conceptual growth or synthesis, when what we are trying to understand is a phenomenon of a first-century, popular, living religious movement, in which other aspects of religious life, such as liturgical practices, may have outrun by far the conceptual formulas.⁴²

Further, we need to do more than simply attempt to describe the putative predecessors and analogies of New Testament christology, and the conceptual content of the terms expressing christological belief. We should inquire about the possible connections between this belief and the social characteristics of early Christianity. If, as Gottwald argues, religious beliefs reflect social values in some way, what social implications were explicit and inchoate in New Testament christology?⁴³ In at least some situations, christological confessions involved severe social consequences for early Christians, and this fact again reminds us that we should avoid abstracting

early christology as simply an item of the conceptual sphere.⁴⁴

New Testament christology has, probably quite properly, often been associated with other ancient conceptions of "ideal figures" or of "divine mediation",⁴⁵ but there is surely a good deal of refinement and perhaps correction to be done before we will understand clearly the significance of early Christian belief in Jesus as it took shape in the first century. The early Christians were aware that there were "gods many and lords many" (I Cor. 8:5-6), yet they also generally insisted that their use of these terms carried peculiar connotations, and it is well to investigate in what way their faith involved more than polemics over the parties to whom these terms were properly to be applied. That is, we might seek to understand not only how the conceptual background of Christianity influenced its christology, but also how New Testament christology reflects a distinctive contribution to ancient ideas about "divine mediation", "salvation", and such matters.⁴⁶

Conclusion

In the hope that I might at least precipitate the ideas and opinions of others, I have ventured the preceding comments as part of the program of this Consultation on New Testament christology. I do not expect that they will be seconded by everyone; nor do I claim that they are much more than proposals. These observations are offered to encourage the formation of an SBL study group to deal with New Testament christology in some thorough-going fashion, and they certainly reflect the conviction, arising from reading both primary and recent secondary materials, that a thorough re-study of the topic is desirable, a conviction that is shared, I hope, by others who will be willing also to contribute to, and help to shape, the work hoped for here.

NOTES

1. Surveys of literature have appeared several times in recent years. For example, H. Balz, Methodische Probleme der neutestamentlichen Christologie (WMANT 25; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1967); N. Perrin, "Recent Trends in Research in the Christology of the New Testament" in A Modern Pilgrimage in New Testament Christology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974); H. Boers, "Jesus and the Christian Faith: New Testament Christology Since Bousset," JBL 89 (1970) 450-57; id., "Where Christology is Real: A Survey of Recent Research on New Testament Christology," Int 26 (1972) 300-27; F. Hahn, "Methodenprobleme einer Christologie des Neuen Testaments," VF 15 (1970) 3-41; I.H. Marshall, The Origins of New Testament Christology (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity, 1976).
2. In an earlier essay, I offered other indications that there is a need to take up a thorough-going restudy of New Testament christology, "New Testament Christology: A Critique of Bousset's Influence," TS 40 (1979) 306-17.
3. The desk edition of these materials in English is J.M. Robinson, The Nag Hammadi Library (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1977). Two technical series on the materials are also in the works, The Facsimile Edition of the Nag Hammadi Codices (Leiden: Brill, 1972ff), and The Coptic Gnostic Library, appearing in the Nag Hammadi Series (Brill).
4. See, e.g., E. Yamauchi, Pre-Christian Gnosticism: A Survey of Proposed Evidences (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973).
5. See, e.g., C. Colpe, "New Testament and Gnostic Christology" Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough (ed. J. Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1968) 227-43.
6. J.M. Robinson, "On the Gattung of Q," in The Future of our Religious Past: Essays in Honour of R. Bultmann (London: SCM, 1971) 84-130. "Wisdom" christology in Matthew is described by M.J. Suggs, Wisdom, Christology and Law in Matthew's Gospel (Cambridge: Harvard, 1970).
7. A recent treatment of diversity in New Testament theology, together with copious bibliographical information, is J.D.G. Dunn, Unity and Diversity in the New Testament (London: SCM, 1977).
8. By these major treatments I mean W. Bousset, Kyrios Christos (ET, Nashville: Abingdon, 1970/1913, 1921/; R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament (New York: Scribner's, 1951, 1955); O. Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament (rev. ed.; London: SCM, 1963/1957/; R.H. Fuller, The Foundations of New Testament Christology (New York: Scribner's, 1965), to give a few examples.
9. See the informative essays by J.H. Charlesworth, "A History of the Pseudepigraph Research: The Re-emerging Importance of the Pseudepigrapha," Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II. 19.1 (eds. H. Temporini, W. Hasse; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979) 54-88 (this series hereafter abbreviated ANRW), and "The Concept of the Messiah in the Pseudepigrapha," ANRW II. 19.1:188-218.

10. J. T. Milik, The Books of Enoch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976); M.A. Knibb, The Ethiopic of Enoch: A New Edition in the Light of the Aramaic Dead Sea Fragments 2 vols. (New York: Oxford, 1979). Discussion of these materials is promising to be a major topic for some time to come, before issues are settled. See, e.g., the papers by J.H. Charlesworth, M.A. Knibb, and C.L. Mearns, in NTS 25/3 (1979) 315-69, and the reviews of Milik's book (CBQ 40 /1978/411-19) and Knibb's book (CBQ 43 /1981/ 133-35) by G.W.E. Nickelsburg.
11. W.A. Meeks, "Moses as God and King," Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough (ed. J. Neusner; Leiden: Brill, 1968) 354, drew attention to the new challenges to earlier conceptions about "normative" or Palestinian vs. "Hellenistic" Judaism. The major work credited often with helping to make NT scholars convinced of the need to make a re-assessment of categories is M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 2 vols. (London: SCM, 1974, /German, 1973/, but see the critical response by L.H. Feldman, "Hengel's Judaism and Hellenism in Retrospect," JBL 96 (1977) 371-82.
12. The major study of Qumran messianism is still A.S. van der Woude, Die messianischen Vorstellungen der Gemeinde von Qumran (Assen: van Gorcum, 1957), but other contributions include W. Brownlee, "Messianic Motifs of Qumran and the New Testament," NTS 3 (1956/57) 12-30, 195-210; R.E. Brown, "The Messianism of Qumran," CBQ 19 (1957) 53-82; W.S. Lasor, "The Messianic Idea in Qumran," Studies and Essays in Honor of A.A. Neuman (eds. M. Ben-Horin, B.D. Weinryb, S. Zeitlin; Leiden: Brill, 1962) 343-64; J. Starcky, "Les quatre étapes du messianisme à Qumran," RB 79 (1963) 481-505; R.B. Laurin, "The Problem of two Messiahs in the Qumran Scrolls," RevQ 13 (1963) 39-52; R.E. Brown, "J. Starcky's Theory of Qumran Messianic Development," CBQ 28(1966) 51-57; N.A. Dahl, "Eschatology and History in the Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls," The Future of our Religious Past: Essays in Honor of R. Bultmann (ed. J.M. Robinson; New York: Harper & Row, 1971) 9-28; M. de Jonge, "The Role of Intermediaries in Qumran Final Intervention in the Future According to the Qumran Scrolls," Studies on the Jewish Background of the New Testament, O. Michel, et al. (Assen: van Gorcum, 1969) 44-63.
13. See, e.g., W.A. Meeks, The Prophet-King: Moses Traditions and the Johannine Christology (NovTSup, 14; Leiden: Brill, 1967) esp. 216-57; G.W. Buchanan, "The Samaritan Origin of the Gospel of John," Religions in Antiquity, 149-75.
14. See now the helpful collection of references by J.T. Forestell, Targumic Traditions and the New Testament: An Annotated Bibliography with a New Testament Index (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981).
15. See, e.g., S.H. Levey, The Messiah: An Aramaic Interpretation: The Messianic Exegesis of the Targum (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 1974).
16. Neusner's published work is so immense that one can give only a partial list. The following articles are representative, "The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees before 70," JJS 22 (1971) 1-18; "The Use of the Later Rabbinic Evidence for the Study of First-Century Pharisaism," Approaches to Ancient Judaism: Theory and Practice (ed. W.S. Green; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978) 215-25; "New Problems, New Solu-

16. cont'd
tions: Current Events in Rabbinic Studies, "SR 8 (1979)
401-18.
17. See note 13 above.
18. A.F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1977). More recently, see his study, "Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and their Environment," ANRW II.19. 1: 1333-94.
19. E. Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology (ET, New York: Seabury, 1979). A second volume has appeared, continuing his christological studies, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord (ET, New York: Seabury, 1980), and now a volume in which Schillebeeckx replies to critics and explains his work, Interim Report on the Books Jesus and Christ (ET, New York: Seabury, 1981).
20. J.D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980). This book will be the subject of a symposium to be part of the Consultation on NT Christology for which this paper was prepared.
21. See the helpful article by D.H. Wiens, "Mystery Concepts in Primitive Christianity and in its Environment," ANRW II.23. 2: 1248-84.
22. The book frequently cited as most influential in changing scholarly opinion about pre-Christian redeemer myths is C. Colpe, Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule: Darstellung und Kritik ihres Bildes vom gnostischen Erlösermythus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961).
23. In English, see E. Yamauchi, note 4 above.
24. Some similar methodological criticisms are raised by B.M. Metzger, "Methodology in the Study of the Mystery Religions and Early Christianity," Historical and Literary Studies: Pagan, Jewish, and Christian (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968) 1-24.
25. Thus, for all his erudition, Bultmann's judgment about the existence of pre-Christian Gnosticism is not shared today by many, partly because it became clearer that for Bultmann almost no evidence could falsify his assumption.
26. Metzger, 6-9, 20-21; Wiens, 1255-58; Segal, "Heavenly Ascent", 1334-36.
27. A.D. Nock was repeatedly able to show the weaknesses in much use of the evidence for Graeco-Roman religious life, e.g., Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); "'Son of God' in Pauline and Hellenistic Thought," Essays on Religion and the Ancient World (ed. Z. Stewart; Cambridge: Harvard, 1972) 2:929-39.
28. S. Sandmel, "Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism and Christianity: the Question of the Comfortable Theory," HUCA 50 (1979) 137-48. Sandmel's candor is refreshing, for he at least realizes that there are personal stakes in historical

28. cont'd
matters connected with Judaism and Christianity for parties on more than one side of the issues.
29. A. Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East (reprint ET; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965 /German 4th ed.; 1922/) 265. Deissmann's discussion of this matter is still well worth reading.
30. Note the celebrated essay by S. Sandmel, "Parallelomania," JBL 81 (1962) 1-13.
31. In the same way that linguists recognize the dangers of determining word meanings by etymology instead of usage, NT scholars must be sensitive to the dangers of pressing the usage of terms and the meaning of rites, etc., too heavily across various religious groups. The most valuable evidence for the meaning of terms, practices, christological titles, etc., in the NT remains the NT itself!
32. From the pioneering study of Deissmann (note 29 above) on down to the present day, works dealing with the "pagan" and the Jewish religious setting, the social and economic setting, and the political setting have blessed us with an abundance of interpretive information. The essay by Segal, "Heavenly Ascent," (note 18 above) is a recent example of sensitive use of religious-conceptual data.
33. In the social-scientific realm, the kind of reductionism described here has been given the colorful term "nothing-but-ery" by Donald Mackay, the brain physiologist from Keel.
34. This reductionism reaches its rigorous extreme in the description of the rise of early Christianity as the result of a successful and well-orchestrated syncretism of various trends in the Graeco-Roman world. Unfortunately, this simplistic view continues to find its way into popular-oriented discussions, e.g., J.H. Randall, Hellenistic Ways of Deliverance and the Making of the Christian Synthesis (New York: Columbia, 1970).
35. Note the now quaint words of Bousset, Kyrios Christos, 117-18, as an example of the religious ideas favored.
36. Deissmann (note 29 above) referred to "apologists" and to "amateurs", but was most annoyed by those he called "shifters-on" (Weiterschreiber), 266-67.
37. By the word "agenda" I mean the religious issues of the day, the conceptual scheme of human-divine relations, the social, political and economic changes affecting religious groups, and the human needs to which religious beliefs and groups tried to speak.
38. Nock's Conversion (London: Oxford, 1933) remains one of the more balanced and erudite contributions to the background of early Christianity.
39. The "son of man" controversy is of course the best example of this preoccupation with titles. The literature is simply too voluminous to try to cite it all here, and the discussion goes on (so, recently, A.J.B. Higgins, The Son of Man in the Teaching of Jesus SNTSMS, 39; Cambridge: Cam-

39. cont'd
bridge University, 1980/7). The studies on Synoptic titles by Hahn, and on Pauline titles by Kramer, are, I trust, well known.
40. I have already noted the highly dubious nature of some widely-held views regarding the meaning of the term "son of man", in the light of recent research, in the article mentioned in note 2 above, pp. 309-12.
41. Note the representative summary of research J.T. Sanders, The New Testament Christological Hymns: Their Historical Religious Background (SNTSMS, 15; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1971). It is curious that, though Sanders deals with the well-known passages such as Phil. 2:5-11 and has a chapter on "The Shorter Passages" thought by some to be remnants of early Christian hymnody, he does not treat more obvious hymnic passages such as Rev. 5:9-13.
42. Schillebeeckx draws attention to the importance of early liturgical practice and the tradition of "devotion to Christ" in the formation of christology, Jesus, 565-67. See also the interesting study of early Christian devotion to Jesus by R. Bauckham, "The Worship of Jesus in Apocalyptic Christianity," NTS 27 (1981) 322-41.
43. N.K. Gottwald, The Tribes of Yahweh (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1979), esp. 667-710.
44. Although Deissmann may have over-estimated the role of emperor devotion in the early formation of christology, he had a healthy sense of the popular nature of early Christianity and of the social aspects of religious belief.
45. These terms are inspired from the title of a recent collection of essays edited by J.J. Collins and G.W.E. Nickelsburg, Ideal Figures in Ancient Judaism: Profiles and Paradigms (Chico: Scholars Press, 1980).
46. Segal's essay, "Heavenly Ascent" (note 18 above), is a suggestive example of this kind of investigation, though he tends to emphasize the common pattern and is less full in elaborating the significance of the variations on his pattern. Also helpful are the comments by Nock, "'Son of God'", 937-39, and by Colpe, "New Testament and Gnostic Christology," 242-43. We await eagerly the book promised by Segal in the essay mentioned here.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the origin of life.

In the second part, the author discusses the various theories of the origin of life.

The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various theories of the origin of life.

In the fourth part, the author discusses the various theories of the origin of life.

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The nineteenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various theories of the origin of life.

In the twentieth part, the author discusses the various theories of the origin of life.

"The Man" in Fourth Ezra:
Growth of a Tradition

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Fourth Ezra is a paradigmatic apocalypse in its literary form, its conceptual content, its implicit and explicit socio-historical context, and in the method by which it transforms tradition. Although this study concentrates on the last of these features, as the title implies, it is obligatory to consider all these features if any one of them is to be illuminated. Each reinforces the other; to concentrate on a single aspect -- such as literary genre or sources -- is to distort the picture as a whole. The response of an apocalyptic community to the social and political crises of its time is a typical feature, as is the corporate self-understanding of the sectarian group by and for whom the apocalypse is produced, as sociological analyses of millenarian movements have shown. Rather than merely transmitting tradition, the apocalyptic characteristically adapts and transforms the tradition on which his life-world is built, in order to demonstrate its relevance to the time and circumstances of his own community.

I.

The climax of Fourth Ezra comes in chapters eleven through thirteen, in which a vision of an eagle is followed by a vision of a "man from the sea". Each is followed by a divinely-furnished interpretation, the details of which will be considered later. But it is essential to observe that this climactic section of Fourth Ezra is preceded by a vision of eschatological Israel (9:26-10:59) and followed by a theophany to Ezra, in which his role as prophet and as conservator of the scriptures -- both the public and the esoteric writings -- is confirmed (14:1-48). Analogously, the climatic visions of Daniel (Dan 7 and 8) are preceded by assurances of God's eternal purpose for his faithful servants (Dan 6) and followed by the confession of Daniel concerning the disobedience of Israel, which then leads to a mystical confirmation of his mission (Dan 10), a final vision of the vindication of the faithful, and a final instruction to Daniel to preserve his writings for the "wise" at "the time of the end" (Dan 12:9-10). The pivotal point is the vision of the grotesque animals in contrast with one like a son of man" in Daniel 7.

That this is the tradition on which Fourth Ezra has built is not left to scholarly conjecture. The opening lines of the interpretation of the eagle vision (2 Esdras 12:10-12) state explicitly, "The eagle which you saw coming up from the sea is the fourth kingdom which appeared in a vision to your brother Daniel". Actually, the fourth beast in Daniel 7:7-8 is not given a specific designation, as are the first three (respectively, a lion, a bear, a leopard). Its description resembles a multi-horned rhinoceros, though most commentators settle for the vague, mythical term, dragon. The metaphorical meaning of the fourth beast of Daniel 7 is clear, however: it is the hellenistic kingdom, culminating in Antiochus Epiphanes, the "little horn", consisting chiefly of eyes and "a mouth speaking great things" (Dan 7:8).

The interpretation of the fourth beast is specifically different, however, in Ezra's vision: "It was not explained to him as I now explain it or have explained it to you" (2 Esdras 12:12). The details of the twelve kings, the second of whom holds sway longer than the others, is an unmistakable reference to the Twelve Caesars, and to the long reign of Augustus. Although the three heads (11:1) of the eagle are interpreted within the text as referring to kings "in the last days" (12:23), there is probably an

allusion to the triumvirate out of which grew Julius Caesar's principate, implying that the struggles with which the empire began will mark its demise. The instability of the empire toward the end of the first century is symbolized in the "opposing wings" as well (11:11).

Another clear indicator of the historical situation of the writer and his readers is the recurrent mention of the fall of Jerusalem into the hands of non-Jewish powers. The sign and consequence of the transgressions of God's law by his people, and indeed by all Adam's descendants, is the deliverance of David's city "into the hands of thy enemies" (2 Esdras 3:27). The details of that tragedy are described in the vision of the woman (= Zion) in 10:21-23. They include the destruction of the temple, with its altar and sanctuary, the silencing of the sacred music in the temple courts, the extinguishing of the menorah, the plundering of the ark, the pollution of the holy objects, the abuse and slaughter of the sacred officials and their wives, the expulsion or enslavement of many of Jerusalem's inhabitants, and stripping of power from the Jewish leaders. Even the seal of Zion is in heathen hands. There can be no doubt that this vivid account was written after the event. None of the vague features of the prediction of the temple's destruction in Mark 13, for example, is to be seen here. If we take as the latest historical reference the reign of the twelfth Caesar, Domitian (A.D. 81-96), and our earliest allusion to the events of A.D. 70, then we have at least a decade during which the details of this apocalypse could have taken their present shape. A more likely date is the early 90's, which would of course be concurrent with the very different reshaping of Jewish tradition then in process at Yavneh under Pharisaic auspices. It is precisely the sense of the powerless few against the group in power -- obviously regarded by "Ezra" as traitors to Israel's true heritage -- that provides a sociologically credible setting for the apocalypse we know as Fourth Ezra.

The characteristics of the true Israel are clearly depicted in 4 Ezra. Central is obedience to the law (3:36), even though specific legal precepts are never cited. The everlasting covenant God made with Abraham (3:15) has not led to an obedient human race; rather, all nations have sinned. Only a few individuals from within historic Israel have kept God's commandments (3:28-36). The obedient alone will be vindicated by God (7:88-99). Ezra is their communication link with God, since he has remained pure (6:29-34). Therefore, as God once revealed his law to Moses from a bush (Ex 3:4), so now he speaks from a bush to Ezra (14:1). God planned his creation before the wicked came and corrupted it, but now he will save from it "one grape out of a cluster, and one plant out of a great forest" (8:17-25).

From the beginning of time, God has reserved the secrets of his purposes and the times of their fulfilling for a few chosen ones. The ends of the times were revealed secretly by night to Abraham (3:14), just as they were disclosed privately to Moses on the mountain (14:4-5; cf. Ex 34:28). Ezra rejoices in the wisdom given to him, and prays that others might share in the divine knowledge of God's plan (8:4-19), even though he knows in advance that not all seed takes root (8:41). He alone fully understands what is to happen in the end time (13:53); he alone possesses eschatological wisdom (13:55). He alone has been commissioned by God to write down his revelations, so that later generations might know the divine plan (14:19-47). Yet the seventy secret books that he dictated are esoteric, reserved for the "wise" (14:44-47). It is the lowly who are to be comforted by this eschatological knowledge; it is the wise that he is to instruct by means of these divine disclosures (14:13). The outlines of an eschatological sect are unambiguously drawn through these self-descriptions of "the wise." The secret plan of God is for Ezra alone, and is to

be written in a book, which is to be kept for the end time (12:51; 9:24-26; cf. Dan 1:8-16). Ezra is not to concern himself for the heathen, who are to be compared with spittle (6:54-59), but is rather to rejoice in the blessings that are in store for the righteous (8:42-62).

II.

The recurrent recitals of Israel's history in Fourth Ezra⁴, as well as the oft-repeated summonses to obey the law, show that Ezra's aim is not a break with tradition, but for a repristination of it. The tradition on which he builds his case includes not only the law, but the prophets and the writings as well. We have already seen that the primary structure on which Ezra builds is the book of Daniel. Yet he has not merely reproduced that apocalypse; rather, he has modified it in ways which suited his own time and circumstances, as he perceived them. Plöger has made a convincing case for the rise of apocalyptic as a reaction against the Jewish establishment of the third and second centuries, because the theocratic king-priests concern was almost solely for the cult, justifying and even seeking to sanctify their basically secular, militantly hellenistic culture and life-style by arrogating to themselves the royal and sacerdotal titles. In reaction to this, conventicles arose within Judaism which seized on the eschatological dimension of the prophetic tradition, interpreting it and perceiving themselves in the light of Iranian dualistic cosmology, which enabled them to understand the evil and corruption around them, even while fostering a hope of soon vindication by God. As Plöger has described their outlook, "Apocalyptic eschatology ... expressed the future hope of a community which was conscious of being a religious body absolutely separate from the national and religious life of the rest of mankind and which, being unique, could only express a future hope in terms of the manifestation of its own distinctive existence, while living at the same time in the belief that 'the manner of this world is passing away.'" To define their distinctiveness, the apocalypticists synthesized the Iranian cosmic-dualistic views with the prophetic tradition, which was in danger of losing its significance for the masses within Judaism when Israel became a theocratic nation-state, as had occurred during the Persian and hellenistic periods. By reviving the concept of the people of God, and by reviving the prophetic hopes for renewal, they came to regard themselves as a voluntary community sharing the personal expectation that they were living in the end time.

There is no mistaking that the apocalyptic writers are reclaiming for themselves and their community the prophetic tradition. As Dexinger has shown, the strategy of the apocalypticist is to take over themes from earlier prophets and rework them, just as Daniel had transformed the seventy years of Jeremiah into his seventy heptads of years. In Fourth Ezra, as in the Enoch literature and in the synoptic apocalypse, we are at a second stage of this transformation process, in that Daniel has become a major source of the material that is being reworked to address the new situation of an apocalyptic community. The basic themes of Fourth Ezra are all to be found in Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dry bones, that is, of the rebirth of Israel: the resurrection of the dead (Ezek 37:13-14), the reconstitution of the twelve tribes (:15-22), the purity of the true people of God (:23); the ascent to power of David's heir (:24); the renewal of the covenant (:26), the restoration of the sanctuary (:27-28); the Gentile acknowledgement of the sovereignty of Israel's God (:28). Other prophetic passages which have obviously influenced Fourth Ezra or are directly quoted by him, include Isa 11, with its portrait of the power of the ideal king-messiah, and the appearance of the Lord for judgement on the mountain at Jerusalem in Zech 14⁵, a theme

also found in Joel 3:9-18. The bringing of Gentile believers to Jerusalem as offerings to Yahweh (2 Esdras 13:13) echoes Isa 66:20. Most important of all, however, is the recycling in Fourth Ezra of a metaphor from Amos of "mourning for an only son" (Amos 8:10) as an image of judgment on the faithless people of God. In Zech 12:10, the motif is linked with Israel's penitence for having failed to recognize Messiah. Purgation of the faithful remnant will follow (Zech 13), in preparation for the establishment of God's rule "over all the earth" (Zech 14:9).

It is Daniel, however, which has provided both basic structure and detail for the climactic visions of Fourth Ezra. Even the specific instructions given to Ezra to stand up in order to receive his instructions, after he had been rendered senseless by the impact of the eschatological vision, recall the orders given to Daniel (8:18; 10:9-11), which in turn mirror the experience of Ezekiel (1:4-28; 2:1-2). At the end of the explanation of the vision of the mourning woman (2 Esdras 10:55-59) Ezra is told to examine carefully the great building (= the New Israel), though fuller instruction is yet to come: "The Most High will show you in those dream visions what the Most High will do to those who dwell on earth in the last days"

III.

When we direct our attention to the passages from Fourth Ezra central to our theme -- the visions of the eagle and the man from the sea -- it is evident that they are transformations in detail of the visions described in Daniel 7. The grotesque fourth beast of Daniel (7:7-8) has been replaced by the eagle, the metaphor for the Roman empire. The conqueror of the beast in Daniel is "one like a son of man" (Dan 7:9-10), but in Fourth Ezra, the eagle is overcome by the lion (2 Esdras 11:36-37), or more exactly, by "a creature like a lion" who addresses the eagle with "a man's voice" to announce the doom of the final earthly kingdom, Rome. The image of the lion as symbol of Israel's royal line pervades the biblical tradition: it occurs in that section of Jacob's testament depicting Judah as a "lion's whelp" from whom the scepter shall not depart (Gen 49:8-10); it is found in the iconography of Solomon's throne (I Kgs 10:18-20); it is joined with Micah's portrait of the future ideal ruler from Bethlehem (Mic 5:1-9). It also appears in Hosea's warning of judgment that is to fall on the royal house (Hos 5:14) and in Ezekiel's lament over the captivity of Judah (Ezek 19). Ironically, Daniel (7:4) had linked the images of lion and eagle in his first kingdom: a lion with eagle's wings. For Fourth Ezra, however, the lion has a new lease on life (2 Esdras 12:31-34): he is the Messiah, who has been kept by God, until the end of days, who now appears as a descendant of David, who castigates Israel for the nation's wickedness, who accordingly destroys them in judgment, but who delivers the faithful remnant and preserves them to enter the new age. These themes have all been sounded in the earlier revelations to Ezra (2 Esdras 6-8), where the blessedness of the faithful few is recounted and the agent of their redemption is identified as "my son the Messiah" (7:28-29). Now they are reiterated in his vision, which acknowledges itself to be a reworking of Daniel's.

A detailed analysis of the vision of the man from the sea will show similar links with Daniel 7, as well as with the older prophetic tradition, now interpreted eschatologically. (All references are to 2 Esdras, unless otherwise indicated.) The reshaping of traditional motifs is apparent from the opening lines concerning the man: like the four beasts of Daniel 7, the dream vision portrays the wind stirring the sea (Dan 7:2-3), but what emerges is "something like the figure of a man", which immediately flies accompanied by the clouds of heaven, as does the "one like a son

of man" in Dan 7:13 (13:2-3). The link between four visionary creatures and human form is already to be found in Ezek 1:5, just as the one there depicted as enthroned in cosmic sovereignty is "a likeness as it were of a human form" (Ezek 1:26).

The man appears "with the clouds of heaven" (13:13). The clouds as Yahweh's mode of transportation appear in texts describing his role as sustainer of the order of creation (Psa 104:3) and as instrument of deliverance of his people from their enemies (Isa 19:1). The nimbus of glory is the sign of the divine presence and power in Torah (Ex. 13:21; 14:19; 16:10; 24:18; Num 12:5; Deut 31:15) as well as in the prophets (Isa 4:5; Ezek 1:28). The "man's" panoramic vision and its awesome effects (13:3) recall the theophany of Ezekiel 1:4-14. The power of his voice (13:4) echoes Isa 11:4 and Job 4:9, just as the comparison of the response to melting wax employs an image found in Mic 1:4, as well as in Judith 16:15. Paralleling the war that the fourth beast of Daniel 7 launches against the saints (Dan 7:21) is the worldwide coalition formed to "make war against the man who came up out of the sea" (13:5). The mountain carved as a place of vantage and protection for "the man" is reminiscent of the stone "cut out by no human hand" (Dan 2:34) which becomes a mountain and smashes to bits the pagan image which symbolizes human authority (Dan 2:35, 45). The instrument of triumph is the word from Messiah's mouth (13:10; cf. Isa 11:4), which comes forth as a stream of fire to consume the enemies (13:11; cf. Dan 7:10). The nexus between the man and the "peaceable multitude" which follows him (13:12-13) is similar to the shift in Dan 7 between "one like a son of man" and "the saints of the most high" (Dan 7:14 compared with 7:27). The primary concern in apocalyptic literature, therefore, is not the fate of the creation or the identity of the Messiah so much as the destiny of the true people of God.

The pattern of dream vision, followed by request for and grant of the request for an interpretation, evident in Daniel, is followed precisely by Fourth Ezra (13:12-22; cf. Dan 7:15-18). So closely does Fourth Ezra imitate the structure of Daniel, especially Daniel 7, that it is probably warranted to consider this apocalypse attributed to Ezra as a midrash on Daniel 7, directly analogous to the Similitudes of Enoch, which David Suter has shown to include a midrash on the apocalypse found in Isa 24:17-23. Features of Ezra's midrashic technique include the esoteric meaning, offered by means of an interpretive process called *peshar* in Daniel¹¹ as well as in the Habbakuk Commentary and other writings from Qumran. In all these instances the aim is similar: to reclaim prophetic traditions for the esoteric group for whom the divine mysteries of the future have been granted as an assurance of their impending vindication by God as his true people.

In a more recent essay¹² Suter has made a persuasive case for *mashal* (as in the Similitudes of Enoch) to be understood as carrying at least two sets of connotations: (1) a statement of the analogue between the cosmic order evident in the creation and the "moral equilibrium" which God is maintaining in spite of seeming present injustices¹³; (2) the "allegorical" aspect of apocalypses, by which one set of objects or events may be discerned -- by those to whom God has granted eschatological wisdom -- of events by which God will accomplish his purpose in the world and vindicate his own people. Both these dimensions of the Enochic Similitudes are present in Fourth Ezra, though Ezra finds in Abraham and Moses the precedent for his belief in God's secret revelation to the elect, rather than in the antediluvian, Enoch.

The transformational process which we have been observing in Fourth Ezra corresponds in detail to the interpretive method identified by Lars Hartmann in apocalyptic texts in general and in the

synoptic apocalypse in particular: "The basis consists of one text from the Old Testament, while the description is expanded with (or alternatively, is made up of) other textual quotations, to which associations are made from a common theme and/or via key words. He shows how in Mk 13:26 we can perceive an expansion of Dan 7:13 by the use of Zech 2:10 and Deut 30:4 (quoted from the LXX) and Isa 43:6.¹⁴ His conclusion is that Mk 13 is a midrash on Daniel that has become a mishnah, so that it now serves as a separate text itself, uniting eschatology and paraenesis.¹⁵ That description is not unsuitable for Fourth Ezra, which like Mark, is produced for a community which regards itself as the true heirs of God's promises to Israel. Perhaps even more striking than this overall similarity in midrashic technique among Daniel, Fourth Ezra, the Similitudes of Enoch and Mark, is their common use of the traditional designation of a human being as (son of) man. It is to this central consideration that we now turn.

IV.

If the late first century date we have suggested for Fourth Ezra is correct, then there can be no possibility of the document's having served as a source for the Son of Man theme in the gospels. The same could perhaps be said of the Similitudes of Enoch,¹⁶ though with less certainty, if the middle of the first century is the most probably time of origin of that much-debated writing.¹⁸ What may be more useful and illuminating than the guesswork of assigning dates and thereby drawing conclusions about literary dependence is to ask how variations in the exegetical tradition that built on Dan 7 correlate with the role of the (son of) man.

As unproductive as the attempt to set dates and determine literary dependence among the son of man sources is the effort to locate the conceptual roots of this figure, whether in primal man or in divine kingship mythical origins,¹⁹ since refractions of both images are evident in the use of the term by the apocalyptists of this period. In Fourth Ezra for example, the climax of the vision in 6:36-9:25 is the recounting of the seven days of creation, on the last of which Adam is placed as ruler over all God's works. As such, he is the progenitor of the whole human race, but especially of God's chosen people (6:54). As a consequence of Adam's disobedience, the whole race has perpetrated frauds and denied God's covenant (7:10-24). Yet through God's son, following a return to the primeval silence that preceded the creation, the new city of God will appear (7:26) when the creation is renewed (7:75). In Psa 8:5-6, the "son of man" in receiving dominion is crowned with glory and honor. In Dan 7:14 "one like a son of man" is "given dominion and glory and kingdom". In Fourth Ezra (7:97) the faithful remnant is shown "how their face is to shine like the sun, and how they are to be made like the light of the stars" -- images which are also found in Dan 12:3 (as well as in Mt 13:43).

In the Similitudes of Enoch, the writer has combined the image of the Elect One from II Isaiah (especially Isa 42:1; 45:4 as well as 14:1-27, with its blend of God choice of Israel and the cosmic struggle for sovereignty) with that of the "son of man" in Dan 7:14. David Suter is almost certainly correct that there was messianic speculation under way in Judaism in the post-hellenistic period based on Daniel 7,²⁰ although it does not seem to have assumed a definitive shape by the first century A.D. For the author of the Similitudes, Enoch is linked with "son of man" as the archetypal righteous man taken up to be with God until his eschatological role is to be accomplished -- just as Melchizedek and Elijah function in other traditions. Central is the synthe-

sizing and reworking of scriptural traditions in order to make the case for "that son of man", as Suter has demonstrated.²¹ What appeared in Daniel 7:14 as an anthropomorphic image, in contrast with the grotesque, bestial representations of the worldly kingdoms, was probably intended to depict the faithful remnant, who would finally attain to the role of divine vicegerency that God intended for Adam.²²

In the gospels, the Son of Man sayings have been grouped by Boltmann and followers into three categories: the future sayings, in which Jesus is speaking of some one other than himself; the suffering sayings, which are *ex eventu*; the present Son of Man sayings, in which the phrase is merely a circumlocution for "I".²³ I have sought to show elsewhere the basic flaws in this classification,²⁴ but it may be useful here to note the modern distinctions imposed on the material will not hold up in Daniel or in the midrashic expansions with which we are concerned. In Daniel, the faithful, who are compared with a "son of man" and who are to receive the kingdom and to exercise judgmental roles in the future, clearly suffer and are to be ready to accept martyrdom. The first six chapters of Daniel are integral to his overall message, as Plüger has noted.²⁵

In the Lukan form of the Q Son of Man sayings, there is a repeated stress on suffering and rejection and martyrdom as firmly linked with his role as is that of judge and ruler-designate. Furthermore, the fate of the Son of Man and that of his people are interrelated, as we have seen to be characteristic of "one like the son of Man" in Daniel 7:13-14. The fourth beatitude promises vindication to those who experience hatred, exclusion, reviling "on account of the Son of Man" (Lk 6:22). The Son of Man is denounced as a glutton and a drunkard because of his associating with people adjudged unclean or unworthy by the religious establishment (Lk 7:34). He has nowhere to lay his head (Lk 9:58), and is widely spoken against (12:10). Those who acknowledge him, however, will be acknowledged by the Son of Man in the day of judgment (Lk 12:8). In the midst of a complacent, business-as-usual generation, the Son of Man will be rejected (Lk 17:25).

Though the details differ, suffering and eschatological vindication are ordained for both the faithful few and "the man" in Fourth Ezra. In one of the characteristic apocalyptic analogies drawn between the natural world and the cosmic order, Ezra is told that the difficulty of access to a city surrounded by water or guarded by narrow defenses is like the responsibility of the faithful: "Unless the living pass through the difficult and vain experiences, they can never receive those things that have been reserved for them" (7:14). Or again, "The righteous can endure difficult circumstances while hoping for easier ones" (7:18). It is those who have been delivered from the evils that attend the end of the age who shall see the wonders of the new age: "For my son the Messiah shall be revealed with those who are with him, and those who remain [i.e., survive, endure] shall rejoice four hundred years" (7:28). But before the final resurrection occurs, even "my son the Messiah shall die," together with "all who draw human breath" (7:29), thereby confirming the solidarity of the Messiah (= Man) with his people. The image of the sorrowing woman (9:38-10:59) depicts the faithful Israel, whose existence is filled with sorrows, sadness and troubles (10:24), but whose fidelity will be rewarded by the establishment of the new city of God. In Ezra's final vision, the lowly are to comforted in the midst of their distress (14:13), confident that purifying their minds (14:14-15) and self-discipline (14:34) will, in spite of their difficulties, enable them to obtain to the resurrection life (14:

34-35), which lies beyond death for the faithful. Suffering and trials are essential, ineluctable features of the life of the true Israel, and of the Son through whom God accomplishes his purposes. There is in this apocalypse no formal doctrine of a suffering Son of Man, but there is a clear picture of a Messiah and his people who, through struggle and suffering and death, are both agents of and beneficiaries of the divine triumph.

It is obvious that in Mark 13 we have yet another example of midrashic development of Daniel's vision of "one like a son of man." The whole political and social structure is in disarray (Mk 13:3-8). The religious establishment has turned against those to whom the secret of God's purpose has been given (Mk 13:9-12). The Jerusalem sanctuary has been grossly polluted (Mk 13:14; cf. Dan 9:27; 11:31). The faithful are undergoing unprecedented persecution (Mk 13:17-20) as the time of the end approaches and the cosmic portents become more evident (Mk 13:20-25). The Son of Man appears to gather from the ends of the earth his faithful people -- an eschatological event described in words taken directly from Dan 7:13. The evangelist is doing for his own community what Jewish apocalypticists have done and will in the later first century be doing for their constituencies: building in midrashic fashion on older scriptural tradition with the aim of updating the eschatological wisdom of Daniel, thereby to demonstrate its relevance to the critical situation in the midst of which this new people of God awaits deliverance and vindication through "one like a son of man".

Conclusion

The apocalyptic vision of "the man from the sea" in Fourth Ezra exemplifies the literary, sociological, and conceptual process by which scriptural tradition is taken up, blended, adapted and transformed in changing circumstances. Prepared within and in behalf of a sectarian community, the writer adopts a stance in the earlier history of the covenant people, from which posture he describes and understands (1) the defection of the official political and religious leadership (together with the docile masses) from the divine purpose, and hence (2) the unique insight and role that has been granted to the faithful remnant. Although the details vary with the specific historical circumstances, Daniel, the Similitudes of Enoch, the synoptic tradition, and Fourth Ezra agree in expecting the divine vindication of the suffering faithful and the establishment of the divine sovereignty to be accomplished through a divinely ordained agent--an authentic fully obedient human being, or (son of) man -- whose identity and triumphant strategy they have been privileged to discern.

Notes

1. Ferdinand Dexinger, in Henochs Zehnwochenapokalypse und offener Probleme der Apokalyptikforschung (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 45, surveys the literature of apocalypticism and shows thereby that a purely literary approach (such as those based on prophecy or wisdom or on literary genre) cannot account for this phenomenon.
2. Thus, for example, K.O.L. Burridge, New Heaven, New Earth: A Study of Millenarian Activities (New York: Schocken, 1969); Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Harper, 1961); Bryan Wilson, Magic and the Millennium: A Sociological Study of Religious Movements among Tribal and Third-World Peoples (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
3. Otto Plöger, in Theocracy and Eschatology, tr. S. Rudman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 20, designates Daniel 7 as "the

keystone of the book."

4. In addition to historical allusions, Fourth Ezra includes heilsgeschichtliche summaries of God's dealings with Israel, some of which are exhortations and other are prayers: for example, 3:12-27; 5:21-30; 7:36-40; 9:26-37; 11:38-53; 14:1-9.
5. O. Plöger, Theocracy, 19, 43-45, 50.
6. O. Plöger, Theocracy, 19. Plöger conjectures, plausibly, that, following the disappearance of prophecy as a phenomenon in Israel, the apocalypticists began to collect the prophetic traditions, and thereby led to the development of the prophetic canon, (23-24).
7. F. Dexinger, Zehnwochenapokalypsen, 80-83, 185.
8. In Zech 14, it is God himself who comes to judge, and his standing place is the Mount of Olives, not Zion, as in Fourth Ezra (2 Esdras 13:35).
9. The theme of mourning has been expanded by use of Amos 5:16-20.
10. Foreordination does not imply pre-existence, as Jer 1:4 makes clear. The Messiah has been in God's plan from the beginning of creation, but is described as a human being, descended from a human line (David), and subject to the human limitation of death (2 Esdras 7:29).
11. David W. Suter, Tradition and Composition in the Parables of Enoch. (SBLDS 47, Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979), esp. 39-72.
12. David W. Suter, "Mashal in the Similitudes of Enoch", JBL 100 (1981), forthcoming.
13. This approach to theodicy, which Suter traces back to Job, is an important facet of the discussion now planned for the 1982 session of the SBL Pseudepigrapha Seminar.
14. Lars Hartmann, Prophecy Interpreted: The Formation of Some Jewish Apocalyptic Texts and of the Eschatological Discourse Mark 13 par. (Lund: C.W. Gleerup, 1966), 157.
15. L. Hartmann, Prophecy, 158.
16. For details on Mark's extraordinarily heavy use of Daniel, see my Community of the New Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977), 45-49.
17. J.T. Milik's proposal of a third century A.D. date for the Similitudes of Enoch is an unwarranted hypothesis which is based on a dubious historical reference (a late Parthian invasion), a fantastic conjecture (that the Similitudes were added to the Enochic corpus to form a new Pentateuch), and the unfounded claim that the Similitudes are Christian in their present form.
18. See David Suter's judicious survey of the present state of Enochic studies in RSR (forthcoming in 1981).
19. A careful, cautious, informed assessment of the evidence for "Royal Man" and "The First Man" as the original provenance for the Son of Man concept by F.H. Borsch, in The Son of Man in Myth and History (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967), led to the conclusion that both modes of symbolic representation lie behind the term as it was used in post-exilic Judaism (132).
20. D.W. Suter, Tradition, 27.
21. D.W. Suter, Tradition, passim, but esp. 101.
22. In "The Son of Man and the Saints of the Most High," (JBL 93, 1974, 50-66), John J. Collins has proposed that the Son of Man in Daniel 7:14 is Michael, the leader and heavenly counterpart of the earthly community of the righteous. The apocalyptic literature which he reviews -- notably Enoch and the DDS -- show that that kind of speculation did occur in sectarian Judaism of

this period, including the basic contrast between heavenly reality and earthly, transitory phenomena, but for Daniel "one like a son of man" seems to be neither a title nor an individual, but a symbol of the faithful community. The phrase did give rise, however, to broad speculation, as Enoch, Fourth Ezra and the gospel attest.

23. E. Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition (New York: Harper, 1963), 152-155.

24. See my Community of the New Age, 129-139.

25. O. Plüger, Theocracy, 16: "There is a much closer connection, quite deliberately contrived, between the narratives and the visions of the Book of Daniel than is usually assumed."

THE MYTHOLOGICAL RELIEFS FROM POZO MORO, SPAIN

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One of the most important events in the last 25 years of Iberian archeology has been the discovery of the tower monument at Pozo Moro. The tower and more specifically the relief scenes provide us with new evidence for a hitherto unknown domain of Iberian mythology, the details of which are still in the process of study.

Those who are concerned with the eastern Mediterranean in antiquity often overlook what was taking place at the western reaches of the Mediterranean basin. According to the literary sources Phoenician traders founded the city of Gadir (Cadiz) c.1100 B.C. with an eye to exploiting the riches of Tartessos, in particular its tin and copper resources. While the archeological evidence does not yet support such an early date for the arrival of the Phoenicians, by the eighth century trade was flourishing.¹ In Tartessos itself the recovery of weapons and fibulae that derive from Syrian and Cypriote prototypes of the mid-eighth century provides proof that there was an infusion of oriental culture and ideas into Andalusia comparable to that established by the Greeks in Magna Graecia.²

The course of the Greek colonization of Iberia, beginning at the end of the seventh century, B.C., can be traced in the settlement whose ancient names ended in -oussa. Pythioussa on Ibiza stands between Sirakoussa in Sicily on the one hand and Oinoussa (near Cartegena) and Kalathoussa (Huelva) on the other.³ Other entrepôts were established in the course of the sixth century: Hemeroskopeion (Denia) near the Cabo de la Nao and Emporion in Gerona. The defeat of the Greeks at Alalia in 539-538 B.C. by the Carthaginians and Etruscans marked the end of the Greek trading centers and saw the control of the Straits pass to the Carthaginians in the fifth century. It is against this historical tapestry that the discoveries made at Pozo Moro must be seen.

Pozo Moro is located in the village of Chinchilla, Albacete province, approximately 125 km. on a direct line southwest from the Mediterranean coast of Valencia. The natural road which winds some 200 km. from the coast towards the Meseta connects at Pozo Moro with another natural roadway extending from the valley of the Guadalquivir to the Spanish Levant.⁴

In the course of the excavations five levels were distinguished. From top to bottom they are as follows:

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| Level I | Surface accumulation and topsoil |
| Level II | Necropolis of burials from the Late Roman Period (5th-6th c., A.D.). |
| Level III | A rich Iberian tumulus of cremations. There are two phases in this level: the first is dated from the middle of the 5th c. until the beginning of the 4th c., B.C.; the second phase extended from the middle of the 4th c. up to the 1st c., A.D. |
| Level IV | The level of the construction of a funeral tower formed of large blocks of stone. |
| Level V | Level of the natural soil reflecting the condition of the terrain at the time the monument was built. |

It is the tower monument from Level IV that attracts the greatest attention. The remains preserved in situ consisted of the lower courses of stone and five ashlar of an upper course of a structure with a square plan measuring 3.65 m. on a side. The number of blocks recovered permits a reconstruction of a tower consisting of 10 or 12 courses with a total height of 5 m.

The interior of the structure contains a clay base colored red from firing. This was certainly the bustum, the place where the corpse was cremated. In the middle of this bed was a circle of black earth formed by ashes and bone remains, conclusively proving cremation. Also found in this material were pieces of furnishings, also burnt. Among the various objects in gold, silver, bronze, iron and bone (nearly entirely destroyed) was found an Attic kylix and a lekythos.⁵ This Greek pottery permits a dating to around 500 B.C. The excavator concluded that "if one supposes a fairly short period between the time of manufacture and their deposition in the tomb..., the dating of the monument can be done with some precision--slightly before 500 B.C., most likely 490 (+ 10) B.C."⁶

The area around the tower was covered with a pavement some 2 m. wide made of small stones, roughly square in shape and set in rows parallel to the surrounding wall. This outer wall was formed by a course of bricks nearly 40 cm. wide. The height of this enclosure wall cannot be determined. The east wall, which is better preserved, has a small passageway 50 cm. wide in the middle. This opening may have contained a door which allowed access to the monument.

At the corners of the tower were four figures of lions, more or less in fragments. In addition, fragments of two smaller lions were found on the north and east sides. The lions are characterized by their squarish shape and the partial sculpturing of half their bodies. In effect, the lions were part of the structure, serving as corner blocks. The heads projected out from the corners, so they and the fore parts are carved in the round. The neck, shoulders and back form the support for the upper courses of stone and are left uncut except for the relief carving on the outer faces of the blocks. It is difficult to know where the two smaller lions belong. Perhaps they were placed at the doorway as guardians or set in the upper part of the tower. It is also not clear whether the interior of the tower contained a room or was filled in with debris. (See Fig. 1)⁷

The architectural form of the funeral tower is well known in the Near East in the Achaemenid period in Persia and from Anatolia and Phoenicia.⁸ The lions at the base of the Pozo Moro tower recall the similar feature on the sarcophagus of Ahiiram at Byblos.⁹ A further affinity with north Syrian art is the use of a frieze of relief scenes to decorate the monument.¹⁰ That all these elements should converge at this crossroads in Spain bespeaks a cultural migration of the idea of sacral kingship or at least the heroization of some local chieftan. The construction work on the monument was apparently done by local builders using native stone. Their inexperience in such work may help to explain the rather precipitous collapse of the structure within a half-century. But the organizing principle of the monument came from the Near East. This can be most clearly seen in the relief panels which form a frieze on the upper portion of the tower.




Fig. 1. Hypothetical reconstruction of the funeral monument.

The Reliefs

The seventh course of stones in the tower were carved in a series of relief panels forming a frieze around the monument. Additional panels are found in the ninth course, but the fragments do not permit the conclusion that there was a second continuous frieze above the first. Three of the blocks show fairly complete scenes. Eight other large fragments present tantalizing bits which in some cases can be related to Phoenician types. One such instance is a piece showing the top of a female head with a lotus flower next to it, most probably the head of Anat.¹¹ In this paper we shall concentrate on only one of the more complete panels located on the southeast corner of the tower.

The Banquet Scene

The panel shows a banquet prepared for a two-headed monster with the body of a human.¹² He sits to the left of the scene on a throne with a fringed cushion or covering for the seat. The two heads of the monster are set one above the other, with large eyes, mouths open and tongues extending out and downwards. In its upraised right hand is a bowl. Over the rim of the bowl can be seen the head and feet of a small person with its head turned to look at the upper head of the monster. The monster's left hand holds the left hind leg of a pig which is lying on its back on the table in front of the throne. Behind the table stands a male figure wearing a long fringed tunic or robe. He raises a small bowl in a gesture of offering. The right-hand end of the panel is broken, but enough remains to show a third figure facing the monster across the table. This figure appears to be standing also, its upraised right hand holding a sword with a curved blade. The head of the figure, which is only partially preserved, is shaped like that of a horse or bull. Whether this is an actual head or a mask cannot be determined. The left hand of the figure reaches forward to touch the head of a second small person in a bowl that sits on the top of a low altar located alongside the banquet table itself.

The Identification of the Figures

The reliefs of Pozo Moro are for the present unique examples of mythological scenes from Iberia. The lack of epigraphical material from the site further impedes a solution of the identity of the figures. Faced with these limitations we are obliged to propose hypotheses. In the section that follows the tentative nature of these suggestions should be kept in mind. It should also be remembered that we are dealing with funerary art, which tends to be inherently conservative and durable over long periods of time. Even after the original meaning of a symbol is forgotten by a culture, the symbol may continue in use. Inasmuch as the cultural influences at Pozo Moro were a mixture of Phoenician, Punic, Greek and Iberian, the geographic area that must be covered in seeking parallels includes the entire length of the Mediterranean.

The Bi-cephalic Monster

In the art of the ancient world multiheaded creatures are almost universally associated with chaos and death. In the Canaanite texts *Leviathan* (ltn), one of the primeval monsters, is described as "the tyrant with the seven heads" (*šlyt.šb't. rašm*)¹³ and is probably to be identified as the creature shown on a seal from Tell Asmar.¹⁴ Cerberus, the three-headed dog at the mouth of Hades may have a Canaanite predecessor in the *klb ilm* ("Mighty Bitch") at Ugarit.¹⁵ The Egyptian bi-cephalic representation of Seth-Horus comes closest in form to the figure from Pozo Moro.¹⁶ The body of the god is shown in typical Egyptian style: in profile from the waist down, frontally above the waist. The two heads are shown in profile, the animal head of Seth facing toward the back and the falcon head of Horus facing forward. The two heads are said to represent the duality of the godhead which dispenses both mercy and wrath. There is also a solar interpretation in which Seth is Sky-by-Night and Horus Sky-by-Day. But both Seth and Horus are associated with the Underworld and the life-death-life cycle.

At Pozo Moro the two heads and two mouths gaping wide could be an indication of the monster's insatiable appetite. This is a characteristic frequently used to describe Mot/Death in the texts at Ugarit.

Even as Mot has
jaws reaching to earth, lips to heaven,
and a tongue to the stars, Baal
will enter his stomach and go down into his mouth
as the olive....¹⁷

Dahood sees a reference to Mot's appetite in Ps.5:10(ET9) where the biblical text speaks of enemies or The Enemy:

For there is nothing firm in his mouth,
his belly (*girbo-m*) is an engulfing chasm;
a grave (*geber*) wide open is their throat,
and with their tongue they bring death.¹⁸

In the Psalms it is the wicked who are accused of voracity, not Death, but on the basis of the Ugaritic texts it would seem that the Hebrew version has demythologized the original, changing the Evil One into evildoers among men. The subject has been changed, but the metaphor lingers on.

Another text from Ugarit may serve as a bridge between the bi-cephalic Seth-Horus and the monster of Pozo Moro. In UT 52:61-63 we read:

They [Dawn and Sunset] set one lip against the
nether world,
the other lip against heaven;
the birds of the heaven and the fish from the sea
entered their mouths.¹⁹

Like Seth-Horus the two divinities of Dawn-Sunset personify the limits of the sun and daylight as well as the limits of the darkness that envelopes the underworld. The plural form "their mouths" in the third line suggests that the word "lip" in the earlier lines should rather be translated as "mouth" and that the literary image is meant to be taken as something like the pictorial form of the two heads of Seth-Horus. The sun rises from the mouth of Dawn and sets into the jaws of Sunset. Between them they encompass all things in the heaven above and in the land and sea below. Like Mot in the text mentioned above, their mouths are agape, ready to swallow anything and everything that comes within reach. Eventually Death devours all creatures in every generation. Prov. 27:20 says that "Sheol and Abaddon are never satisfied." So both the Ugaritic texts and their biblical counterparts show that the idea of multiple heads as a literary figure or artistic convention for Death's voracity was known in the eastern Mediterranean as early as the second millennium, B.C.

Therefore we would propose that the two-headed monster of Pozo Moro be identified as Death (or whatever name may have been used locally).²⁰

The Monster with an Animal Head

The second major figure in the scene is preserved only partially. The back portions of the head, neck and shoulders are missing and the torso has been abraded or eroded away. From the photographs it appears that the body of this figure may be that of a horse on its hind legs, but the preserved parts of the arms shows hands like those of the other monster, not hooves. The right hand holds a sickle-sword, known in the Near East since the beginning of the second millennium, B.C.²¹

This combination of elements--an erect body, an animal's head, arms extended, one brandishing a weapon and the other grasping a victim--are familiar from Egyptian examples of the gods. A bronze statuette of the Nineteenth-Twentieth Dynasty (1320-1090 B.C.) is identified as Seth, shown striding forward, his right hand raised over his head, the fist clenched as if holding a weapon, the left hand reaching as if grasping a victim.²² The link between the Egyptian original and the figure at Pozo Moro

probably runs through Phoenicia and the Punic colonies, a route that would allow for certain mutations and even degenerations.²³ Seth's fortunes among the Egyptians seems to have changed as a result of his being associated with the Hyksos gods, viz. Baal.²⁴ At first Seth was regarded as a god of the blessed dead, but gradually he changes into the enemy and destroyer, the opponent of men and gods alike. It is also noteworthy that one of the offerings presented annually to Seth to prevent him from attacking the full moon in the month Pachons was a black pig, which was hacked to pieces on an altar of sand on the river bank.²⁵

The Little People in the Bowls

A third feature that calls for interpretation is the presence of two little people peering over the rims of bowls. While there is an artistic convention that human beings are frequently shown on a smaller scale than divinities in the same scene, the most obvious explanation for the little people in this relief is that they are children who are being offered as sacrifices to the monster.

The subject of infant sacrifice has prompted wide discussion and disagreement over the years, inasmuch as the poignancy of the deed affects modern sensibilities even more than the general topic of human sacrifice.²⁶ Yet the literary and archeological evidence demonstrates that as early as pre-pottery Neolithic Jericho and as late as the Roman era in North Africa ritual infanticide was known.²⁷ Between these extremes of time and place are the biblical accounts of fathers killing their children (Ju. 11:34-40; II Kg. 3:26-27; 16:3; Jer. 7:31).

Until the discoveries at Pozo Moro depictions of ritual infanticide have been rarely seen. A stele from the tophet of Carthage shows a priest carrying an infant destined for sacrifice. He cradles the child with his left arm while his right hand is raised in a gesture of offering.²⁸ The reliefs of Pozo Moro may show us the next stages of the ritual. The child was put to the sword by a priest, who perhaps wore a mask in the shape of an animal's head. The child becomes an offering to Death as shown by the second child in the bowl held aloft by the two-headed monster. It cannot be determined from the relief whether those making the offering participated in any way in sharing the blood or flesh (splanchna) of the child, although the supposition would be that they did. The fulfillment of any sacrifice was the sacrificial meal. The gods are called upon and receive their share, but the ones who bring the offerings also participate in the eating.²⁹

Conclusions

The banquet scene from Pozo Moro represents the Underworld where insatiable Death must be fed by a procession of offerings, principally the boar or pig, the animal pre-eminently associated with the netherworld.³⁰ Further victims were prepared by Seth (or his colonial counterpart) or by a priest wearing an animal head mask of the god. The scene may be the model for a ritual re-enactment of the anniversary meals for the dead and may be the explanation for the passage in Isa. 65:4:

They spent the night in tombs,
eating swine's flesh
and drinking the broth of abominable things.

The components from the banquet at Pozo Moro would seem to be present: a subterranean place at night, the flesh of a pig or boar to eat, and for drink the "broth of abominable things," which we would interpret as either the blood of the slain infant or the actual broth remaining after the flesh (i.e., splanchna)

of the child had been boiled.

FOOTNOTES

¹Antonio Arribas, The Iberians (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964) 47.

²Ibid., 50.

³A. Garcia y Bellido, "Las colonizaciones púnica y griega en la península ibérica," Prehistoria de España (Madrid, 1954) 1:13.

⁴The descriptions of the site and the monument that follow are taken from the report of the excavator, Dr. Martin Almagro-Gorbea, "Los relieves mitológicos orientalizantes de Pozo Moro," Trabajo de Prehistoria 35 (1978) 251-278 (with 8 pls.). A French translation was published in Mythe et Personnification (Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1980) 123-136 (with 7 pls.). The author wishes to thank Prof. Almagro-Gorbea for his assistance during the research for this paper.

⁵The kylix is from the circle of the painter of Pithos [cf. J. D. Beazley, Attic Red-figure Vase Painters (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942) 334-5]. The lekythos is classified as Athens type 581 [cf. C. H. E. Haspels, Attic Black-figured Lekythoi (Paris: E. deBoccard, 1936) 93-4; 724-5].

⁶Almagro-Gorbea, op. cit., 255.

⁷Ibid., 254, fig. 2.

⁸Perrot & Chipiez, Histoire de l'art dans l'antiquité, (Paris: Hachette, 1885) 3:144 ff.; 5:595 ff.; E. Akurgal, Die Kunst Anatoliens (Berlin, 1961) 122 ff., pl. 77.

⁹J. Pritchard, Ancient Near East in Pictures (hereafter ANEP) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) nos. 456-459; M. Haran, "The Bas-reliefs on the Sarcophagus of Ahiram King of Byblos in the Light of Archaeological and Literary Parallels from the Ancient Near East," IEJ 8 (1958) 15-25.

¹⁰H. Frankfort, The Art and Architecture of the Ancient Orient (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954) 175. (Hereafter AAAO)

¹¹Almagro-Gorbea, op. cit., Lam.VI, 2 & p. 266.

¹²Ibid., Lam.IV, 2.

¹³C. H. Gordon, Ugaritic Textbook (hereafter UT) (Rome: Analecta Orientalia 38, 1965) 67:I:3.

¹⁴"Leviathan," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962) 3:116, Fig. LEV 27; also ANEP, no. 691.

¹⁵T. H. Gaster, Thespis (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961) 239n.

¹⁶E. W. Budge, The Gods of the Egyptians (London: Methuen & Co., 1904; rep. New York: Dover Publications, 1969) 2:243.

¹⁷UT 67:II, 1-3. Kapelrud, The Ras Shamra Discoveries and the Old Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) 49 notes: "He [Baal] and Mot alternated in the same way as, for instance, the perennial antagonists Horus and Seth in Egyptian religion."

¹⁸M. Dahood, Psalms I (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965) 28. Dahood reads grbm as a substantive with enclitic mem which points up the wordplay with qbr, grave. Cf. Ps.73:9-10.

¹⁹M. Dahood, Psalms II (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968) 190.

²⁰Almagro-Gorbea, *op. cit.*, 263, proposed that one of the smaller fragments may show Resheph, a Canaanite chthonic god known in Egypt and North Africa and probably in Spain as well. A temple to Resheph was located on Ibiza. A theophoric name has appeared at Ebla: ed-du-dRa-sa-ap (Or. 44, 370). W. J. Fulco, *The Canaanite God Resep* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1976); D. Conrad, "Der Gott Reschef," *ZAW* 83 (1971) 157-183; E. Vattioni "Il Dio Resheph," *Annali dell' Istituto Orientale di Napoli*, NS 15 (1965) 39-74. Virroleaud reported (*UT Glossary*, 2356) a terra cotta lion's head with an inscription on its neck: "the lion's face that N. has offered to Resheph of the garden (gn)".

²¹Y. Yadin, *The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963) 1:172-3. A Cylinder seal from Larsa shows Nergal, god of the underworld, holding a sickle sword in his left hand and a mace in his right. Cf. *ANEP*, no. 699.

²²*ANEP*, no. 553. The statue was remodeled to represent Khnum. Since the hands of the statue presently hold nothing, it is conjecture as to what was originally there. A painting of Horus in a similar pose shows him holding a mace and a bow and arrows. Cf. E. W. Budge, *op. cit.*, 2:474.

²³Frankfort, *AAAO*, 188, remarks: "The hallmark of the Phoenicians is the lavish use of bungled Egyptian themes."

²⁴E. W. Budge, *op. cit.*, 2:250.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 2:248.

²⁶Cf. M. Weinfeld, "The Worship of Molech and of the Queen of Heaven and its Background," *Ugarit-Forschungen* 4 (1972) 133-154; and M. Smith's reply, "A Note on Burning Babies," *JAOS* 95 (1975) 477-479; and Weinfeld's rejoinder, "Burning Babies in Ancient Israel," *Ugarit-Forschungen* 10 (1978) 411-413.

²⁷K. Kenyon, *Digging Up Jericho* (London: E. Benn Ltd., 1957) 72; A. Henrichs, "Pagan Ritual and the Alleged Crimes of the Early Christians," *Kyriakon. Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970) 1:18-25.

²⁸G. Charles-Picard, *Les religions de l'Afrique antique* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1954) 45, fig. 4.

²⁹C. Kerenyi, *The Religion of the Greeks and Romans* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1962) 187.

³⁰R. deVaux, "Les sacrifices de porcs en Palestine et dans l'Ancien Orient," *Von Ugarit Nach Qumran* (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Topelmann, 1958) *ZAW Beihefte* 7, 250-265.

TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF IV EZRA

State of Affairs and Possibilities

A.F.J. Klijn

Textual criticism of IV Ezra has to go into the available material and the possibilities which exist with regard to the origin and development of its text.

Introduction

Textual criticism of IV Ezra starts with Violet's editions of 1910 and 1924 1) In parallel columns he printed the Latin version and German translations of the Syriac, Ethiopian, two Arabic versions and finally the Armenian version in a Latin translation. To all this a fragment of a Sahidic version was added.

In spite of an immense amount of work done by himself, Violet had to rely for a great deal on work done previously on the various versions of IV Ezra. He did not go into the relation of the various versions to each other. In his second volume of 1924, he gave a German translation of the Latin text, in which he appeared to be mainly interested in the problems regarding the supposed Semitic origin of IV Ezra.

Gry's edition of IV Ezra 2) does not show much progress. The Latin version and translations in French of the Syriac and Ethiopic texts are printed in three columns. Variant readings in the Arabic texts and in the Armenian text are given in footnotes. On the opposite pages Gry's reconstructed French translation has been printed mainly based upon elaborate footnotes dealing again with the supposed Aramaic "Vorlage". A Georgian version in a Latin translation, which was already known to Violet, but not yet available to him, is given in an Appendix.

Both Violet and Gry were mainly interested in reconstructing the Semitic background of this text. They tried to discover this text by means of retranslating the available Western and Eastern versions.

Material

Here we would like to give a survey of the available material discovered after Violet's edition of IV Ezra. What was known to him can easily be found in his two editions.

Textual material is known in Latin, Syriac, Ethiopic, Georgian, two different forms in Arabic, Armenian and a Sahidic fragment. We will leave out the Sahidic version of which only the passage XIII 29-46. 3) is known.

The versions can be divided into two groups. To the first group belong the Latin, Syriac, Ethiopic and Georgian version, and to the second belong the two Arabic versions and the Armenian version. The first group represents texts which are closely related to each other, while the second group has texts which can be called "free".

Now we will say something about the present state of affairs with regard to each individual version.

For his Latin text Violet used eight manuscripts (S A G M N C V and L) which can be divided into a French group, represented by A S and G, and a Spanish group, represented by M N C V and L. The French group is supposed to have a better text and is usually followed in the reconstructed Latin printed texts.

The so-called Confessio Esrae, viz. IV Ezra VIII 20-36, shows its own textual tradition. The French group is divided in this part into A and S on the one hand, and a number of liturgical texts on the other. The manuscript C, which seems to have been corrected in agreement with the liturgical texts also belongs to this group. The Spanish group is represented here by the manuscripts M N V and L.

Violet knew about two other Latin manuscripts, viz. E 4) and the palimpsest P 5), which he was not able to insert into his critical apparatus. However, in his second volume he wrote that E belongs to the Spanish group, in particular the manuscripts M and N, and that P showed both readings from the French and Spanish group, which he suggested, indicates that this text was apparently written in a time before the two groups existed. Gry accepted Violet's opinion. He printed variant readings of E and P in his critical apparatus. B. Fischer did the same in the critical apparatus of the edition of the newly published Latin Vulgate.

Fischer also used a number of liturgical texts of the Confessio Esrae still unknown to Violet and Gry, of which the most famous is the one discovered on Mount Sinai. 7)

In the following we would like to go into the text of p.

The Syriac text is known from one manuscript only. 8) It has recently been edited by R.J.Bidawid. 9) Previous emendations have been listed. Our knowledge of the Syriac version might increase after studying a newly discovered Arabic text of IV Ezra which seems to be a translation from a Syriac text. We shall speak about this manuscript again in connection with the Arabic version.

Apart from this, three small fragments of the Syriac text have been discovered in lectionaries with the text of VI 18-28, VII 26-42 (two times), and XII 31-38 (three times). 10) For our knowledge they are hardly of any importance.

The Ethiopic text was printed in Violet's edition according to the edition published by Dillmann in 1894. 11) Dillmann used ten manuscripts, although he knew of ten other ones in the British Museum. Violet made a German translation of Dillmann's text and added variant readings which he found in Dillmann's critical apparatus. However, he usually did not specify in which manuscripts the variant readings can be found. Gry printed a French translation of the Ethiopic text in his third column with footnotes in which the variant readings are given and the manuscripts where they can be found are mentioned.

Apart from the ten manuscripts in the British Museum with the Ethiopic text of IV Ezra known to Dillmann, Dr. W. Baars informed me about eleven more which are present in European libraries. 12) In addition to this, Dr. W.F. Macomber wrote to me that in the Ethiopian Manuscript Microfilm Collection of Hill Monastic Library, Saint John's University Collegeville, Minnesota, another twenty one manuscripts of the Ethiopic text of IV Ezra are available from Ethiopia and two more from Jerusalem. 13)

If we omit the manuscripts from the 18th and 19th century, we have in the European libraries one manuscript from the 16th century, two from the 17th century and one from the 17th or 18th century. In Ethiopia and Jerusalem we have two manuscripts from the 15th century, one from the 15th or 16th century, two from the 17th century and one from the 17th or 18th century. This means that only ten manuscripts are from before the 18th century.

The Georgian text known to Violet and printed by Gry has been published by R.P.Blake. In 1926 he published the text according to a manuscript in Jerusalem (I) dating from about the year 1050, and in 1929 the variant readings of a manuscript discovered on Mount Athos (O). 14) The

following parts are available in these manuscripts:
 III 1 - IV 26, IV 28 - VII 60, VII 95 - 105, VII 125 -
 IX 20 (from VIII 26 badly damaged) in I and III 1 - V 45,
 V 56 - VII 3, VII 76 - 114, VIII 20 - 61, XIV 18 - 24
 and XIV 27 - end in O.

In his introduction to the text Blake made a number of interesting remarks about the contents. He showed that the Georgian version is related with the Ethiopic text.

Recently the Georgian text has been edited by C. Kurcikidze. 15) In this edition the standard text of Prince Bakar, dating from 1742 and translated from the Slavonic, has been printed with the text of I and O on the opposite page.

Finally the fragment VIII 6 - 36 has been discovered in "Le grand Lectionnaire de l'Eglise de Jérusalem" 16) with a text deviating considerably from the one in I and O. I and O go back to the same archetype, which according to Blake is "by no means a remote one".

The Arabic texts are printed in Violet according to the editions of Ewald (E) and Gildemeister (G). Ewald based his edition on two manuscripts, one a copy of the other, and Gildemeister made use of three manuscripts.

Recently another Arabic text of IV Ezra has been discovered on Mount Sinai. It appears to have a text which is generally in agreement with an Arabic fragment, already known to Violet with the text of XIV 38 - 50 which was published by Gildemeister. 17) This text was apparently translated from the Syriac. In the same manuscript an Arabic text of the Apocalypse of Baruch can be found which is also a translation from the Syriac. This means that this text is more important for our knowledge of the Syriac than the Arabic version. However, it is to be expected that the Arabic translation will be rather free, and of minor importance for a better understanding of the Syriac IV Ezra, of which only one manuscript is known, as we said before.

The Armenian text which was printed by Violet and Gry according to the edition of Petermann, has been thoroughly studied and edited by M. Stone. 18) In this exemplary work all the available manuscripts have been used.

Possibilities

In the following we would like to go into the question of what has to be done and can be done with the available material, especially that which has been discovered recently.

The Latin text contains a great number of mistakes. Sometimes the text cannot be understood and has to be amended by the other versions. 19) Since these mistakes are found in all the available material, we can conclude that all Latin manuscripts of IV Ezra go back to a single Latin archetype. Needless to say, this archetype was a translation of a Greek text.

With regard to E we need not say very much. As we have already stated, the text belongs to the inferior Spanish group and is related with M and N.

P, however, is interesting since it is supposed to have a text older than the French and Spanish group. Since B. Fischer graciously entrusted me with photographs of this text and his own decipherment, I am able to say something about the text of P.

The text of P consists of VII 67 - 92b; 93b - 115a; 117b - 139a; VIII 2 - 6a; 8 - 38a. It contains the same obvious mistakes as those found in the other manuscripts. 20) This means that P ultimately goes back to the same archetype mentioned above. While P sometimes follows the French and at other times the Spanish group this correspondence is not sufficient to warrant an early date. Three other phenomena are important. In the first place, P shows a great number of singular readings. In the second place the text of P follows the text of A⁺⁺ and S⁺⁺. This is the text of A and S corrected in accordance with the Spanish group. 21) In the third place, P departs from A completely in the Confessio Esrae and follows the text of M N E V and L. The agreement with the corrections in A and S and with the Spanish group in the Confessio Esrae must be explained by the assumption that P was originally a French text which was corrected by a Spanish text at a later date.

Next we must say that the text of L has not received the necessary attention. It shows a great number of variant readings, but its relation with the other Latin manuscripts is clear since the mistakes mentioned above are also present in L. However, its additions to the text are sometimes in striking agreement with the "free" texts found in the Arabic and Armenian translation. 22) In at least one case, L seems to show a correct reading, which is corrupt in all other Latin manuscripts. 23) This means that the Latin text was influenced by a later "free" text, obviously in Greek, which is the basis of the Arabic and Armenian versions.

It would be possible to reconstruct the Latin archetype with the help of the available Latin material. From this text we could be able to receive an idea of the under-

lying Greek text. However, it would not always be possible to decide whether a homoeoteleuton in the Latin text was already present in the underlying Greek text. We are often dealing with a careless translator.

The lectionaries with parts of the Syriac text have no importance for textual criticism of this version.

The Syriac text was translated from a Greek text, which itself was related with the Greek text from which the Latin translation was made. The Syriac version, however, shows a number of variant readings which are in agreement with the Eastern versions. 24) We are apparently dealing with an underlying Greek text which was different from the one underlying the Latin translation. It can be called an Eastern branch of the Greek text.


The Ethiopic text cannot be adequately dealt with without knowledge of the contents of the many manuscripts which have been discovered recently. From the manuscripts used by Dillmann, one can see that they all go back to one archetype, since they all contain the same mistakes, usually due to homoeoteleuton. 25) Also here the original translation was made from a Greek text. This text deviates from that underlying both the Latin and Syriac text, but appears to be more in agreement with that underlying the Georgian translation.

Finally we have to deal with the Georgian text. This text belongs to the group to which the Latin, Syriac and Ethiopic texts also belong. Blake especially showed the relation between the Georgian and Ethiopic text. Apart from numerous other agreements, the close relation can especially be seen from a number of common omissions. 25)

The Ethiopic and Georgian texts do not go back to the same Greek one. Since the Georgian is, according to Blake, a translation from the Armenian, we have to assume an Armenian version different from the one we know.

Conclusion

The following development can be traced :



It need not be repeated that the Apocalypse of Ezra was originally written in Hebrew or Aramaic and that it was translated into Greek. We noticed that the Greek text must have had a Western and an Eastern branch. The Western branch seemed to have had a number of omissions. From this text the Latin translation was made. The Eastern branch can be divided into a text known from the Syriac version and one known from the Ethiopic and Georgian versions. From this branch an elaborate Greek text developed upon which the Arabic versions and the Armenian version depend. This text influenced the Latin manuscript L.

This stemma is possible since each individual version goes back to one single translator. With help of the available manuscripts of each individual version, we have to reconstruct their archetypes. From there we have to work back to the original Greek translation. Also here we are dealing with only one archetype.

NOTES

- 1) B.Violet, Die Esra-Apokalypse (IV. Esra). Erster Teil : Die Überlieferung, in: Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller, Leipzig 1910, and B.Violet, Die Apokalypsen des Esra und des Baruch in Deutscher Gestalt, in : idem, Leipzig 1924.
- 2) L.Gry, Les Dires Prophétiques d'Esdras (IV.Esdras) I and II, Paris 1938.
- 3) Joh.Lepoldt und B.Violet, Ein saïdisches Bruchstück des vierten Esrabuches, in: Zeitschr. f. Ägypt. Sprache und Altertumskunde 41 1904, p.138-140.
- 4) The manuscript E is now in Luxemburg, Bibliothèque Nationale 264, 11th c., and is called Epternacensis.
- 5) The Manuscript P is now in Léon, Biblioteca Capitulare nr. 15, 7th c.
- 6) Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam Versionem. Editio altera emendata. Tomus II, Stuttgart 1975, p.1931 - 1974.
- 7) E.A.Lowe, Un unknown Latin Psalter on Mount Sinai, in: Scriptorium 9 1955, p. 177 - 199, and J.Gribemont, Le mystérieux Calendrier Latin du Sinaï, in: Analecta Bollandiana 75 1957, p.105 - 134.
- 8) Milan, Ambrosian Libr. MS B. 21 Inf., fol. 267a - 276b.
- 9) in: The Old Testament in Syriac according to the Peshitta Version, Part IV, fasc. 3 : Apocalypse of Baruch and 4 Esdras, Leiden 1973.
- 10) See p. III of the Introduction of the edition mentioned in the previous note.
- 11) in: Veteris Testamenti Aethiopici Tomus Quintus... Libri Apocryphi, Berolini 1894, p. 153 - 193.
- 12) Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibl., Or. fol. 3067, f.46b - 51a, 18th c.
 Berlin Deutsche Staatsbibl., Or. qu. 986, f. 117a - 129b, 17th/18th c.
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 London, B.F.B.S. 7, f. 145a - 148b + 193b - 210(,), 17th c.
 London, B.M. Add. 24.990, f. 126a - 136b, 18th c.
 London, B.M. Add. 24.991, f. 56b - 64a, 17th c.
 London, B.M. Or. 484, f. 144a - 151a, 18th c.
 London, B.M. Or. 489, f. 83a - 91b, 1730
 London, B.M. Or. 490, f. 56a - 68a, 18th c.
 London, B.M. Or. 492, f. 122a - 135a, 18th c.
 London, B.M. Or. 502, f. 119 - 129b, 18th c.
 London, B.M. Or. 503, f. 46a - 57a, 18th c.
 London, B.M. Or. 504, f. 56b - 65b, 1755
 London, B.M. Or. 506, f. 160a - 174b, 18th c.
 London, B.M. Or. 8822, f. 64a(?) - 79a, 18th c.
 Paris, B.N. Eth. 307, f. 1a - 15b, 18th/19th c.
 Strassbourg, B.U. Ms. 4368, f. 38a - 54b, 18th c.
 Rome, Ms Viterbo f. 135b - 150a, 18th c.
 Bibl. Vaticana, Fondo Cerulli Etiopici 168, 202 and 75, 20th c.

- 13) EMLL 7014, f. 1a - 46b, 15th c.
 EMLL 1768, f. 150a - 161b, late 15th c.
 7017, f. 1a - 44a, 15th c.
 2440, f. 114a - 129a, 1663
 6379, f. 22b - 46b, 17/18th c.
 6287, f. 2a - 17b, 17th c.
 38, f. 138b - 150b, 18th c.
 36, f. 95a - 101a, 18th/19th c.
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 7000, f. 2a - 25b, 18th/19th c.
 147, f. 62a - 87b, 19th c.
 6962, f. 52a - 96b, 1866/7
 5596, f. 34a - 49a, 19th/20th c.
 6485, f. 63a - 82b, 19th/20th c.
 6563, f. 3a - 20b, 19th/20th c.
 5599, f. 18a - 46a, 1908/9
 524, f. 69a - 111b, 1921/2
 673, f. 83a - 93b, ca. 1933 (Amharic)
 179, f. 74a - 110a, 1955/6
 5028, f. 3a - 38a, 20th c.
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 66a, 20th c.
 14) R.P. Blake, The Georgian Text of Fourth Esdras from the
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 375, and R.P. Blake, The Georgian Text of Fourth Esdras from
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 15) For the information about the Georgian version I rely
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 very grateful. The edition of Mrs. C. Kurcikidze is in the
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 17) See about the manuscript P.Sj. van Koningsveld,
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 18) M.E. Stone, Concordance and Texts of the Armenian Version
 of IV Ezra, in: Oriental Notes and Studies No. 11, Jerusalem
 1971, and M.E. Stone, The Armenian Version of IV Ezra, in:
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 Number 1, Missoula, Montana 1978.
 19) Obvious mistakes are in IV 7.11.12.34.36.37.41, V 5.
 19.37.45, VI 1.9-10.29.44.48, VII 108, XI 2, XII 32, XIII 3,

XIV 42.

20) For example in VII 108 et Samuel et David pro confract-
ione,cf. Syr. Eth. Ar.^Eand G: and Samuel in the days of Saul
and David...,and VIII 43 hic pater et filius.

21) VII 87 quo viventes and quo incipient l. quem viv.
and quem inc. A⁺⁺,VII 98 confident l. confidebunt A⁺⁺,

VII 138 millesima l. millensima A⁺⁺ and S⁺⁺, VII 44 tua
imagine l. tuae imagini A⁺⁺,VIII 47 te met ipsum l.

te et ipsum A⁺⁺,VIII 52 abundantia l. habundantia A⁺⁺
In all cases P and A⁺⁺ and/or S⁺⁺ are supported by one
or more representatives of the Spanish group.

22) III 24 L adds after oblationes : et construxit Salomon
filium eius domum nominis tui et aram sacrificiorum erexit
in ea in qua sacerdotes munera tibi deferebant sicut prae-
cepisti Moysi famulo tuo, in Arm. we read : After him you
raised up his son Solomon whom you commanded to build the
temple in a night vision, and (you commanded) all the
people to say prayers and offer sacrifices in it. III 29 L
adds ecce after hoc : hoc ecce tricesimo anno,cf. Eth. :
See,thirt years. IV 8 In the Latin text we find : in abys-
sum...in infernum,but L adds at the end of the sentence
neque paradysum introivi. In Ar.^G we find : Sheol...bottom
of the sea...heaven...paradise,and in Arm. : the sea...
the deep...heavens...portals of hell...paradise. IV 30 L
adds after initio : quando transgressus est praeceptum
domini. In the verse nothing is said about the transgression
of Adam but in Arm. we read: If the little transgression
of Adam perpetrated that much evil,having increased evil
henceforth on earth... V 18 L adds after pastor the words
qui reliquit,cf. Eth. ...like a shepherd who leaves...
XIII 10 L reads et multitudo scintillarum tempestatis
in place of multitudo tempestatis,but Eth. : sparks of fire
like a storm.

23) In XIII 3 the text of the Latin manuscripts is corrupt
reading Et vidi et ecce.Obviously a few words are missing,
but L adds: virum ascendebat de corde maris,cf. Syr. Eth.
A^E and G: And I saw and see the wind brought out of
the heart of the sea something like the appearance of a
man (with slight variations in the various versions).

24)III 11 Noe Lat. Arm. om. Syr. Eth. Ar^E and G(in the rest
of this note L = Lat., S = Syr., E = Eth., G = Georg.
A = Ar. (E(wald) and G(ildemeister)),Arm = Arm.

III 25 deliquerent (M N E add. te),...before you SG,against
you A^E

III 26 faciesies , add. nothing new SG,nothing good E

IV 25 nomini suo LG (ms. I) A^GArm, great name SG(ms.O),holy
name EAE

VI veritatis via LA^E,part of the truth SEG(ms. O),land of
truth E(mss.AMOS),truth of the faith Arm,justice A^G

V 5 gressus, skies SGAE^Gstars E,cf. ἀέρες and ἀστέρεις

V 8 bestiae agrestes, animals of the desert SE, animals of the field G, ferocious animals AE, wild animals of the desert AG, which seems to be a conflate reading.

V 9 et amici, add. at once SE (om. E ms. L)

V 10 a multis (cf. AE in the active form), with many SEG

V 13 permissum est mihi LG, have I been sent E, have I been commanded SAE^{EG}Arm

V 24-25 floribus...abyssis LGAE^{Arm}, reverse order S, om. floribus E

V 24 lilium LG^{Arm}, a flower (in vs. 25) SAE

V 25 replesti L(AE), magnifies (in vs. 24) SG

VI 2 fundamenti paradisi LGAE^{Arm}, the land of paradise SE

VI 31 et iterum ieiunaveris LE(AE), om. iterum SAG^G

VI 35 flevi iterum et similiter ieiunavi, om. iterum and similiter SAE

VI 44 fructus...flores, fruit...flowers...trees SEGA^EArm

VI 48 nationes LG, the generations SEA^E

VIII 18 Non facias neque ingrediar civitatem sed hic moriar LEA^GArm, ...not going into the city and not to my husband but here I wish to die SAE

25) In III 15-16, IV 29, V 6-7, 47-48 and X 21. Other

omissions we find in VI 5.8.10, VII 11.62, VIII 39, IX 35 -

1. The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of the car was the cold. It was a sharp, biting cold that seemed to penetrate my coat. I shivered as I walked towards the building, my hands tucked into my pockets. The air was thick with a heavy mist, and the ground was slick with rain. I had never experienced such a cold before, and it felt like I was walking through a wall of ice.

2. As I approached the entrance, I saw a group of people standing in a line. They were all looking at their watches, some with expressions of impatience. I joined the line, feeling a bit out of place. The building was old and grand, with a large clock tower that stood out against the grey sky. The entrance was a wide archway, and the air inside was warm and smelled of old wood and books.

3. I was led to a small room where a woman in a white lab coat was waiting. She had short, curly hair and a friendly smile. She greeted me and led me to a table. On the table were several papers and a small bottle. She handed me the papers and explained the procedure. I felt a bit nervous, but she reassured me that it was simple and painless. I signed the papers and she handed me the bottle. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

4. The woman then led me to a small room where a man in a white lab coat was waiting. He had a serious expression and a few strands of grey hair. He looked at the papers and then at me. He asked me a few questions and then nodded. He handed me a small vial and a syringe. He explained that I would need to take the vial every day for a week. I nodded and he handed me the vial. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

5. The man then led me to a small room where a woman in a white lab coat was waiting. She had long, dark hair and a friendly smile. She greeted me and led me to a table. On the table were several papers and a small bottle. She handed me the papers and explained the procedure. I felt a bit nervous, but she reassured me that it was simple and painless. I signed the papers and she handed me the bottle. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

6. The woman then led me to a small room where a man in a white lab coat was waiting. He had a serious expression and a few strands of grey hair. He looked at the papers and then at me. He asked me a few questions and then nodded. He handed me a small vial and a syringe. He explained that I would need to take the vial every day for a week. I nodded and he handed me the vial. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

7. The man then led me to a small room where a woman in a white lab coat was waiting. She had long, dark hair and a friendly smile. She greeted me and led me to a table. On the table were several papers and a small bottle. She handed me the papers and explained the procedure. I felt a bit nervous, but she reassured me that it was simple and painless. I signed the papers and she handed me the bottle. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

8. The woman then led me to a small room where a man in a white lab coat was waiting. He had a serious expression and a few strands of grey hair. He looked at the papers and then at me. He asked me a few questions and then nodded. He handed me a small vial and a syringe. He explained that I would need to take the vial every day for a week. I nodded and he handed me the vial. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

9. The man then led me to a small room where a woman in a white lab coat was waiting. She had long, dark hair and a friendly smile. She greeted me and led me to a table. On the table were several papers and a small bottle. She handed me the papers and explained the procedure. I felt a bit nervous, but she reassured me that it was simple and painless. I signed the papers and she handed me the bottle. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

10. The woman then led me to a small room where a man in a white lab coat was waiting. He had a serious expression and a few strands of grey hair. He looked at the papers and then at me. He asked me a few questions and then nodded. He handed me a small vial and a syringe. He explained that I would need to take the vial every day for a week. I nodded and he handed me the vial. I took a sip and felt a warm, tingling sensation in my throat.

"EUOI SABOI" IN DEMOSTHENES DE CORONA: IN WHOSE
HONOR WERE THE WOMEN'S RITES?

Ross Kraemer

I. Introduction

In the fourth century B.C.E., the Athenian orator Demosthenes attempts to impugn his opponent Aeschines by detailing the latter's involvement in the religious affairs of an unnamed cult of women.

On attaining manhood, you abetted your mother in her initiations and the other rituals, and read aloud from the cultic writings. At night, you mixed the libations, purified the initiates and dressed them in fawnskins. You cleansed them off with clay and cornhusks, and raising them up from the purification, you led the chant, "The evil I flee: the better I find"...In the daylight, you led the fine thiasos through the streets, wearing their garlands of fennel and white poplar. You rubbed the fat-cheeked snakes and swung them above your head crying "Euoi Saboi" and dancing to the tune of "hues attes, attes hues." Old women hailed you "Leader," "mysteries instructor," "ivy-bearer," "liknon carrier" and the like.¹

Superficially, the cult bears great similarities to those associated with the Greek god Dionysus, with its nocturnal rituals, its processions, its use of snakes, ritual clothing and purifications, and its predominance of women.² Yet nothing in Demosthenes' description specifically identifies the participants or the deity they worship with the cult of Dionysus.

Demosthenes' relatively brief report contains one phrase which has led most scholars to identify the deity of the cult as Sabazios, an ostensibly Phrygian deity whose worship is presumed to have been imported into Greece not too long before the orator wrote. This is the chant "Euoi Saboi," which the worshippers are said to repeat as they dance through the city streets. Modern scholarship has been virtually unanimous in its identification of "Saboi" as worshippers of Sabazios, in much the same way that "Bacchoi" are taken to be worshippers of Dionysus. The passage in Demosthenes is then cited as one of the primary sources for evidence of the worship of Sabazios in fourth century Greece.³

The identification of the cult as Sabazian has also led scholars such as E. R. Dodds to discount Demosthenes as evidence for women's Dionysian cults in fourth century Athens, in spite of the cult's obvious affinities with other descriptions of Dionysiac groups.⁴ Just whose worship was attributed to Aeschines and his mother thus has several important ramifications. First, it bears directly on our knowledge of the history of the cults of Sabazios and Dionysus.⁵ Second, it has implications for the history of women's cults in ancient Greece. Third, it illustrates some of the methodological problems which characterize the study of ancient Western religions.

In spite of the contemporary scholarly consensus on the deity of the cult, a careful analysis of the pertinent sources reveals that the identity of the divinity worshipped is not immediately obvious. The traditional interpretation

rests on the assumption that Saboi is the masculine plural of Sabos; that Sabos is the proper name of a deity; and that Sabos is another name for Sabazios (or even, as some scholars assert, the short form of Sabazios). But as I will shortly illustrate, the ancient sources do not clearly corroborate either these assumptions, or the conclusion that the Saboi are worshipers of Sabazios. There are in fact only two direct references to Sabos in the relevant texts, and neither clearly indicates that the Saboi are worshipers of a god Sabos, linguistically peculiar though that may seem.⁶ The only one of these references which may be categorized as primary, the Orphic Hymn to Hipta, does suggest belief in a divinity named Sabos, but it is difficult to date with precision, although Athanasakakis suggests an origin in the third century CE. The identification of Sabos with Sabazios is, however, by and large unsubstantiated in the ancient testimony, except by virtue of a mediating connection through Dionysus.

Although Sabazios was clearly identified with Dionysus by some ancient authorities, it is less clear that worshipers identified the two. On the other hand, the early evidence for their identification or confusion intensifies the difficulties in identifying the cult in Demosthenes, for even if we could show (which I think we cannot) that the cult is clearly Sabazian, this would not altogether rule out a Dionysian association as well.

We possess both ancient primary and ancient and medieval secondary sources on Sabos and Saboi. The primary sources have an explicit cultic context (inscriptions, hymns) or occur in texts which, as incidental to their main intention, describe cultic activities and do not offer any commentary or explanation. The secondary sources, both ancient and medieval, are deliberate attempts at explication. The preponderance of the extant evidence must properly be called secondary.

II. The Primary sources

The scanty primary sources provide minimal clues to the meaning of the phrase "Euoi Saboi," or to the identity of the Saboi or of Sabos. Both Eupolis and Demosthenes indicate that the phrase "Euoi Saboi" would have had some meaning to an Athenian audience, and that it had a cultic context. The appearance of the feminine form, Euai Sabai, in a fragment from Eupolis' play, Baptai,⁷ on a cult apparently dedicated to a goddess, could be construed as evidence for the use of the term in the goddess cult, but not enough of the play survives to make this determination. Passing references in Aristophanes establish the presence of Sabazios in Athens in the fourth century, as well as that of foreign goddesses. But significantly, and frustratingly, the passages make no mention of Sabos, the Saboi, or the cry Euoi Saboi. Finally, the third century CE funerary inscription of a woman named Ilia Claudya may be interpreted to mean that initiates of Dionysus are awakened in the afterlife by the Saboi, if the phrase Nisi(i) ancilla refers to hand-maidens of Dionysus, and if we equate the Latin term savi-sabi with the Greek Saboi.⁸

This would further substantiate a connection between the Saboi and Dionysus, but presumably at a relatively late date.

The one actual occurrence of the name Sabos occurs in the Orphic Hymn to Hipta, and both supports the identification of Sabos with Dionysus and appears to preclude an identification with Sabazios.

In sum, the primary sources offer no confirmation that "Euoi Saboi" occurred in a cult of Sabazios, nor that Sabos and Sabazios are identical. The later primary sources point to an identification of Sabos with Dionysus and without any hint that this Dionysus is at the same time Sabazius.

III. The secondary sources before the modern period

Although the primary sources do not substantiate the modern consensus that Sabos is simply another name for Sabazios, the traditions which connect the Saboi with Sabazios are fairly early. In the sections which follow, I will summarize the traditions which bear on the identity of Sabos and the Saboi, and trace their development.

After the initial enigmatic references in Eupolis' *Baptai* and Demosthenes' *De Corona*, the next mention of the Saboi occurs in the third century BCE with Nymphis of Heracleia, who relates that some Greeks call the Bacchoi Saboi and that "the barbarians say 'Sabazein' for 'Euazein', from which also some of the Greeks say 'sabasmos' for 'euasmos'."¹⁰ If, as seems plausible, "some of the Greeks" refers to Greek settlers in Phrygia, while the "barbarians" are native Phrygians, the practice of calling Bacchic worshippers Saboi may only have been a local one, in line with Greek adoption of other Phrygian cultic language.

Plutarch next refers to the Saboi, claiming that "many even now call the Bacchoi Saboi, and utter that cry when celebrating the god."¹¹ For Plutarch, the god celebrated is clearly Dionysus, and his reference Demosthenes. While the orator witnesses to the cultic use of the cry "Euoi Saboi" he himself does not indicate the name of the god, and it is interesting to see Plutarch's assumption that the god is Dionysus. His claim that many call the Bacchoi Saboi, given without substantiation, may or may not depend on Nymphis. But plainly, for Plutarch, the Saboi are worshippers, they are Bacchoi, and their god is Dionysus. Plutarch makes no reference here at all to Sabazios.

The first to offer the identification of the Saboi explicitly as initiates of Sabazios is then Valerius Harpocration, who in the second century CE credits the term "Saboi" to Demosthenes *Against Ktesiphon* and notes that "some say the Saboi are initiates of Sabazios, that is Dionysus, just as the Bacchoi are initiates of Bacchos."¹² He observes that this source, which views the Bacchoi and Bacchos as separate from the Saboi and Sabazios-Dionysus, is contradicted by Nymphis and others, who equate Sabazios, Dionysus and Bacchos. The collection of traditions in Harpocration is then repeated in the ninth century by Photius, who further defines Saboi, Sabai and Sabaziai as those who perform cultic rites to Sabazios. Photius is the only one who mentions the Sabai in this context, and

the only reference that I have come across to the Sabazioi.¹³

Finally, the various medieval scholia on Aristophanes attribute to the Phrygians the custom of using Saboi to designate both the Bacchoi and those who consecrate places to a god whose identity remains ambiguous.¹⁴ Perhaps the terms are intended to differentiate cultic roles. In the twelfth century, Johannes Tzetzae claimed that the Saboi are priests of Dionysus, but the late date of Tzetzae and the lack of any other substantiation makes his testimony doubtful historical evidence.¹⁵

IV. Conclusions

1. Sabos

It is by no means certain that Sabos was the divinity worshiped by the thiasos in Demosthenes, despite the linguistic parallels with Bacchos and the Bacchoi. The name of Sabos appears only in one primary source (the Orphic Hymn to Hipta) and in the fifth century lexicographer, Hesychius, who relates that Sabazios is another name for Dionysus, and that some call Sabazios Sabos. The Hymn to Hipta identifies Sabos with Dionysus, but not Sabazios, while Hesychius, who knows the traditions equating Dionysus and Sabazios, links all three. Thus the weight of the evidence, meager though it is, points to an identification of Sabos primarily with Dionysus, and secondarily, through Dionysus, with Sabazios.

There is also even the possibility that, at least in Demosthenes' time, Sabos designated not a deity, but rather a cultic role. The absence of any mention of the term Sabos as a divine name before the relatively late Orphic Hymn to Hipta supports this. Perhaps at a later date, Sabos was interpreted as a divine name, analogous to Bacchos, the god whose identity was apparently assumed by his worshipers, the Bacchoi and Bacchae. The earliest evidence we have demonstrates only the use of the plural forms Sabai and Saboi.

2. Saboi

The early evidence, though scant, points to an identification of the Saboi with the worship of Dionysus, and with the Bacchoi. With the identification of Dionysus with Sabazios, the Saboi come to be identified with Sabazios, but through the link of Dionysus, not through any independent connection. There is no cultic evidence that links the Saboi with Sabazios, and no secondary evidence that does not depend on the link with Dionysus. Virtually all evidence supports a definition of the Saboi as cultic participants, with the exception of one strand of tradition represented by Stephanus and Eustathius that the Saboi are a Thracian people.¹⁶

3. The god of the thiasos in Demosthenes

From all this, we might conclude that the cult mentioned by Demosthenes was in fact one dedicated to Dionysus, and that if in the fourth century, that deity was also

understood to be Sabazios (which is by no means clear), he was never Sabazios separate and apart from Dionysus. Further, if the cry "Euoi Saboi" reported by Demosthenes refers to a divine figure, Sabos, the most probable identity of Sabos is with Dionysus.

Given, however, the tenuousness of all the evidence, there is at least one other possible identification for the cult. The first century geographer Strabo, who does not offer any of the traditions in Nymphis (to whom much of the lore of the Saboi may be traced), instead claims explicitly that the cries mentioned in Demosthenes are found in the rites of Sabazios and the Mother, but he does not indicate how he knows this.¹⁷ The question of sources aside, Strabo's testimony raises an intriguing suggestion. If the cries Euoi Saboi and Attes hues are found in the rites of Sabazios and the Mother, perhaps the cult described in Demosthenes was dedicated to a goddess! The only other reference to the cry, which occurs, as I noted at the outset, in a fragment of Eupolis' Dippers as Euai Sabai, might be taken as supporting evidence, or at least as not disconfirming the hypothesis. Interestingly, Strabo's testimony is not reflected in the later sources.¹⁸ The paucity of the evidence for this hypothesis cautions against identifying such a goddess with any certainty, but it would not be unreasonable to look in the direction of those Phrygian mother goddesses traditionally associated with Sabazios and Dionysus, such as Rhea and Cybele.

V. Implications for further study

The immediate conclusion of this study that the contemporary scholarly identification of the cult in Demosthenes de Corona is unwarranted, and that the cult was more probably dedicated to a god identified with Dionysus, and/or to a goddess, has several ramifications.

First, it requires that this passage be given more serious consideration as evidence for the history of Dionysiac worship than it has merited in the past. Second, it requires that serious attention be paid to this passage as evidence both for women's religious activities in fourth century Athens, and for the history of women's religious activities in antiquity in general. The occurrence of the term "sabi" in the Latin funerary inscription of a woman who appears to have been a life-long initiate of a Dionysiac immortality cult also warrants further attention. Since all the individuals mentioned are women (with the exception of the god and Ilia Claudya's father) this inscription may constitute evidence for a community of women in the service of Dionysus.¹⁹ The hint that the initiate's parents may have resisted her initiation because they preferred her to marry, and various other elements in the inscription point to motifs associated elsewhere with women's religions, and with the cult of Dionysus, that require more study.²⁰ Further, the ramifications of the possibility that this was a goddess cult deserve to be explored, even though the evidence for this may be inconclusive.

Finally, this study suggests that traditional assumptions which undergird much of the study of religions in antiquity should be accepted only with great caution. Clearly, the amount of leg-work necessary to reassess many of the consenses of scholarship in this field is substantial. Equally clearly, the nature of the field is such that it is imperative that we trust the groundwork laid by others at least to the extent that we are not forever trying to reinvent the wheel. But this brief study illustrates the fruits of judicious reexamination of conventional wisdom, and has served, at least for me, as a constructive methodological caveat.²¹

Footnotes

1. Demosthenes, De Corona, 259.
2. See R. Kraemer, "Ecstasy and Possession: The Attraction of Women to the Cult of Dionysus," HTR 72 (1979) 55-80, also Ecstasies and Ascetics: Studies in the Functions of Religious Activities for Women in the Greco-Roman World, doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1976.
3. E. R. Dodds, "Introduction" to his edition of the Bacchae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition 1970) xxii; C. H. Picard, "Sabazios, Dieu Thraco-Phrygien: Expansion et aspects nouveaux de son culte" Revue Archeologique 1961:2, p. 132; A. D. Nock, Conversion (Oxford: The Clarendon Press 1933, repr. 1969, p. 29; K. Kerényi, Dionysos: Archetypal Image of Indestructible Life, Bollingen LXV. 2, (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1976, p. 60, n. 26; Nilsson, Geschichte der Griechischen Religion, Munich: Beck, 11/ii p. 664; Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, 1908; reprinted ed., Chicago: Aegean, 1971, V, 294-5.
A number of scholars also routinely identify Sabos and Sabazius: Athanassakis; The Orphic Hymns, (Missoula: Scholars Press 1977) p. 129; Clement and Hoffliet, in the Loeb edition of Plutarch, Moralia VIII, pp. 364-5.
Both Eisele; ("Sabazios," in W. H. Roschen Ausführliches Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, IV, 232) and Schaefer ("Sabazios," in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Series 2, V. 1 pt. 2, c. 1541) identify Sabos as the short form of Sabazios. See also A. B. Cook, Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion, Cambridge, p. 392.
4. Dodds, "Introduction" to the Bacchae, p. xxii. See also Cruikshank's introduction to Euripides' Bacchae p. 3; H. Jeanmaire, Dionysos, Histoire du Culte de Bacchos (Paris: Payot, 1951) p. 151; Farnell, Cults V p. 151; A-J Festugière, "Les Mystères de Dionysos," Etudes de Religion Grecque et Hellenistique (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin) 1972, p. 16; Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods 1950 (Boxton: Brown, 1962 repr.) p. 178.
5. The literature both on Dionysus and on Sabazius is extensive, and I have no wish in this paper to become involved in general discussions about either. Some of the more pertinent historical studies on Dionysus include H. Jeanmaire, Dionysos; M. Nilsson's section on Dionysus in Geschichte; Nilsson, The Dionysiac Mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman Age (Lund: Gleerup, 1957); Deubner,

Attische Feste (Berlin: Keller, 1932) on the Attic Dionysiac festivals; Farnell, Cults V; E. R. Dodds introduction and commentary in his edition of Euripides Bacchae; Dodds, "Maenadism in the Bacchae," (appendix to The Greeks and the Irrational, Sather Classical Lectures 25, Berkeley: University of California, 1951); and Walter Burkhardt, Griechische Religion 251-260.

There are as yet no reliable, comprehensive treatments of Sabazius. For bibliography, see Sherman E. Johnson, "The Present State of Sabazios Research," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, ed. W. Haase, (New York: de Gruyter) 1981, II 17,3. See also Johnson, "A Sabazius Inscription from Sardis," in Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, ed. Jacob Neusner (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968) pp. 542-550. See also the entries in Roscher and Pauly-Wissowa; O. Erling, Dionysiac Sarcophagi in Baltimore (New York: New York University Press, 1942) pp. 20-54 on Sabazius.

6. Orphic Hymn 49, to Hipta in Athanassakis, The Orphic Hymns, Missoula: Scholars Press; "Sabazius" in Hesychius, Lexicon, ed. Johannes Albertus, 1766.
7. J. M. Edwards, The Fragments of Attic Comedy, (Leiden: E. J. Brill) 1957, Eupolis Fragment 84, pp. 336-337. See also Th. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta (Teubner, 1880) Vol. I.
8. See Rudolph Egger, Der Grabstein von Cekancevo (Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, Balkankommission, Antiquarische Abteilung XI, 2) Vienna: Rohrer, 1950. The inscription is reproduced in L'Annee Epigraphique: Revue des publications Epigraphiques Relatives a L'Antiquite Romaine, ed. A. Merlin, 1953, #243 pp. 77-78, with brief notes. Photographs of the stele may be found in Fasti Archaeologici V, 1950, fig. 61; Latomus X, 1951, pl. xv; and Syria XXIX, 1952, p. 276.
9. See note 6.
10. For texts of Nymphis, see F. Jacoby, Fragmente der Griechische Historiker, #431 and White, Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes (Boxton: Gin and Company) 1941, 166-169.
11. Plutarch, Quaestionum Convivialium. 671F.
12. Harpocration, Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos, ed. W. Dindorf, Oxford, 1853 (repr. Groningen: Boumas Boekhuis, 1969).
13. Photius, Lexicon E Codice Galeano Descripsit Ricardus Porsonus, ed. H. F. Hartmann Lipsius 1823 and Photius, Patriarchae Lexicon, ed. and annotated by S. A. Naber, (Leiden: Brill) 1864.
14. White, Scholia 168-169.
15. Johannes Tzetzae, Commentarii in Aristophanem, ed. L. M. Positano, D. Holwerda, W. Koster (Groninger: Bouma's Bockhuis).
16. Stephanus Byzantium, Lexicon; Eustathius, Commentary on Dionysus Periergetes, ed. G. Bernhardt, Lipsius: 1878, I.069.

17. Strabo Geography 10.3.18. He also claims that the rites of Dionysus among the Greeks, and the rites of the Mother of the gods among the Phrygians are related (10.3.13). He further identifies Sabazius as Phrygian, and as a "Child of the Mother, since he too transmitted the rites of Dionysus" (10.3.15).
18. With the remote possibility that it underlies the second entry for Euoi Saboi in the tenth century lexicon, the Suida.
19. See now Susan G. Cole, "New Evidence for the Mysteries of Dionysos" Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 21 (1980) 3:223-238, for new evidence of women's participation in private Bacchic initiations in the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE. Cole cites Harpocration's entry on leuke that the white poplar wreaths in Demosthenes were worn by Bacchic initiates, and herself treats Demosthenes as evidence for Bacchic rites.
20. R. Kraemer, "Ecstasy and Possession."
21. Lane's "Sabazius and the Jews in Valerius Maximus" provides an excellent example both of the necessity of re-examination and of its far-reaching ramifications. Lane effectively demolishes the conventional wisdom that Valerius Maximus testifies to "a conflation of Sabazius--cult with Judaism in antiquity" (p. 37), demonstrating its origins in a scribal error. Although Lane is both modest and tactful enough to refrain from pointing out the obvious, his work clearly gives one cause to wonder how many other pieces of conventional scholarly wisdom have equally faulty bases.

I would especially like to thank Tom Kraabel for detailed and constructive criticism of several drafts of this paper; Bob Kraft and Fred Mench for textual assistance and suggestions; the staff of the Stockton State College library, especially Marjorie Wallace and Virginia Vail; and Ann Revelle, for patiently typing draft after draft.

The Vision of the Eagle in 4 Esdras, a Rereading
of Daniel 7 in the first century C.E.

André Lacocque

Introduction

The present study focuses on Esdras' fifth vision, the so-called Vision of the Eagle. With it starts the second part of 4 Esdras. Whereas the first four episodes in the book are introduced by a prayer, in the last three there is substituted an initial vision or revelatory experience.

This general difference, as well as seemingly conflicting characters of eschatology and messianology in the two parts of the book, have induced G. H. Box and others to postulate that a Salathiel Apocalypse starting with chapter three came to an end with chapter ten. The final three visions are additional sources in which "eschatological conceptions...are radically opposed to those of S" (APOT II, p. 550).

I do not agree with Box on this point. I shall say why in the Critical Part of this study, when we turn to the problem of the doctrine or doctrines of the Last Things in as much as they relate to the Vision of the Eagle. Before this however I shall concern myself with the question of the literary genre; the problem of the allegorical identification of the different features of the Eagle; the parallels with Daniel (in particular with the chapter 7, but also with chapters 8, 11, & 12); the Messiah's role in the eschatological events.

In a second section, the Theological Part, I intend to show that the fifth Vision, and the book of 4 Esdras in general, represents a Pharisaism open to Apocalyptic, and remarkably close to a mentality illustrated by Paulinism in the New Testament. Finally, a Hermeneutical Part will study the dependence of the Vision of the Eagle upon Daniel and draw from it some conclusions as to ways of re-reading an apocalypse.

I - Critical Part

a. Genre

Like Daniel 7-12, the Vision is classified among the "Historical apocalypses with no other-worldly journey" (1). To this type belong also the "Animal Apocalypse" (1 En. 83-84); the "Apocalypse of Weeks" (1 En. 93; 91); Jubilees 23 and 2 Baruch. More specifically, we find here the kind of historical description which starts with the fictionally set time of the Author and goes on down till the end. To this type belong Daniel 8-12, especially 11; 2 Baruch 35-40; T. Levi 16-18; Ass. Mos. 2-10; and Apoc. Ab. 27-30 (2).

The vision is announced in 10:58-59 as having an eschatological character; it is about what God "intends to do to the inhabitants of the earth in the last days." Like in Daniel or 1 Enoch, the literary scheme is the

following:

- review of history,
- eschatological crisis,
- judgment/destruction of foes,
- cosmic and personal transformation.

In Daniel B (ch. 7-12), the protagonists of the final war between light and darkness -- almost a resurrection of the Goetterkampfmythus -- were one like a Son of Man and the fourth Avatar of the universal kingdom, i.e., the Hellenistic dominion. Here, the protagonists have become the Messiah b David and the Roman Empire. In animal symbolism, so much present in 1 Enoch and Daniel, and inspired here by Ezekiel 17:3, 7 and Daniel 7:4, the fight is between a monstrous Eagle with three heads, 12 wings, and eight sub-wings, on the one hand, and a Lion, on the other. Actually, from Daniel 2, 7, 8, to 4 Esdras 11f., one passes to a more accentuated allegory. This explains why, whereas Daniel was still satisfied with a figure as open-ended as "someone like a Son of Man," (someone appearing as a human being), here the leonine symbol is unequivocally identified with the Messiah son of David.

In the same vein, the eagle clearly represents the Roman Empire. Here the influence of Eze. 17 (especially v. 3 and 7) is evident; in Ezekiel also the Eagle is allegorical. In verse 3 it is Nebuchadnezzar, in v. 7 it is Pharaoh Psammetichus II (593-588) (3).

The Eagle is symbol of the divinized Roman Emperor. (The association of eagles with deity is old, already among the Akkadians (4)).

With the lion, we return to a metaphor: "I saw what appeared like a raging lion" (11:37). But in the development which follows, all terms of comparison are dropped: "While the lion was speaking" (12:1); "the raging lion which you saw" (12:31)...It is definitely identified with "the anointed one... from the seed of David" (12:32, the latter element is supplied by Syriac and the oriental Versions in general).

An important text is Genesis 49:9f. (Judah) with its accent on rulership over the other tribes and the world. There is here thus a possible "hint in the direction of the royal Messiah" as M. Stone puts it (5). The onomastic similarity brought the supporters of Judah the Maccabee to speak of him as being "like a lion in his deeds" (1 Mcc. 3:4) (6). As the Eagle was associated with divinity, the lion in Israel is sometimes metaphoric for God (cf. Hosea 11:10; 13:7; Amos 3:8; 1:2...). We should not dismiss those transcendental associations too lightly, for, clearly the Lion embodies here the true power which is actually divine and is only delegated to the Messiah. As for the Eagle, it is far from being excluded that the Author of 4 Esdras saw in the rising power of the Roman Empire a kind of anti-theophany; for him as a matter of fact evil events and evil powers belong as much to the divine plan as the Messianic victory over them.

It remains that the Eagle is only a deceiving idol, so inferior to its christic adversary that it remains voiceless, not even trying to defend itself, while the Lion speaks "in human language" (11:37) (7), a trait which is not without evoking Daniel 7:13 (cf. 8:16).

b. Allegorical identification

The most vexing question for the exegete is to identify what the different parts of the winged monster allegorically represent, especially the wings and the winglets. Whereas the three heads seem to be comfortably identified with the emperors Vespasian, Titus and Domitian, the problem evoked by the 12 wings is much more difficult. The different theories proposed by scholars are in general not convincing, for none is able to make sense of 12 emperors preceding the three Flavians, not to speak of the eight "counter-wings" whose identity seems to be totally elusive. First, it looks to me after others as if the "12 wings" are a later editing of a text which originally spoke of 6 pairs of wings for the six Julian emperors (from Julius Caesar down to Nero). Later, as the end of time did not coincide with the death of Domitian, as the Author had believed, the six pairs were divided into two sets to make 12 wings, thus adding in effect six emperors to the list, although without definite identity; hence the unclear situation of the present text in 11:20-22 where one side is considered but not the other (8).

The 8 winglets cannot have been similarly four pairs in parallel to the six sets of full wings, for, 11:26, 27 speaks of one winglet at a time and thus bars the way to that understanding. Now the first 2 winglets disappear with the last of the 12 wings representing 6 kings of which the last is Nero (11:12). It is thus easy to identify them with Vindex (whose insurrection and death happened in March 68) and Nymphidius (some months later). The 4 "middle" winglets were devoured by the 3 heads united for that task, viz., Vespasian and his sons Titus and Domitian. They are Piso and Galba (68-69); Otto and Vitellius (died Dec. 69). The last pair of winglets are more puzzling. They are said to have put themselves under Domitian before the latter became emperor (11:24) and before Vespasian started his reign (11:29), i.e., in 69 (9). But the decisive element is provided by 12:2 which says that those 2 winglets did actually reign for a short time after the demise of the last "head" (= Domitian). I thus believe with Bruno Violet that the two are Nerva (96-98) and Trajan (98-117). True, this last reign does not qualify for the shortness characteristic indicated by 12:3, but precisely this discrepancy allows us to come with a firm conclusion as to the date of composition of 4 Esdras. One must thus conclude that the Vision was composed during the reign of Trajan, not long after he acceded to power, hence ca. 100 C. E. This by the way confirms P. Bogaert's conviction that 2 Baruch precedes the composition of 4 Esdras as the

former was written ca. 95 C.E.

The suggestion of G. H. Box that a later Redactor saw in the three heads Trajan (98-117), Hadrian (117-138) and Lucius Quietus (well known by Rabbinical sources), seems to be far-fetched and unwarranted. Not only does it bring us down for Esdras' composition to the year 138, date of the death of Hadrian (L. Quietus had been executed by Hadrian in 117), but besides, the theory suffers at least two flaws.

On the historical level, the identification turns short. The 12 wings are the 12 Caesars of Suetonius (from Julius Caesar to Domitian), the 3 heads are the following emperors and L. Quietus, but who are then the eight winglets? Box sees the first two as probably Vindex and Nymphidius during Nero's reign. Then four of them "can be identified with the four senators who were executed by Hadrian at the beginning of his reign" (APOT II, p. 613). But what about the last two winglets which, according to 4 Esdras 12:2 reigned after the demise of the third head (here Hadrian)? They would be Antonius (138 to 161) and Marcus Aurelius (162 to 180), a possibility to be discarded on all scores.

Moreover, from a mythological view point, Box is gravely mistaken in assessing the Redactor's work. One thing is to divide into two sets the 6 pairs of wings (representing the 6 Julian Emperors), into 12 single wings, hence adding to the list because the expected end did not occur with the death of Domitian; another thing is to make the whole allegory fit in all details a new situation. This is not at all necessary. As a matter of fact, if the Apocalypse's resilience is such as to be able to "absorb changing interests" -- as F. Kermode puts it -- it does so, not so much in responding to literal disconfirmation by another literal re-confirmation, but "by typology, arithmology... (so that) a mistaken prediction can be attributed to error of calculation, either in arithmetic or allegory" (10).

In other words, the later re-reading of the Eagle Vision should be allowed to have enough movement space for the reader to come with several concurrent identifications. Such a room for free play is also constitutive of the Apocalypse. The latter is like the Sibyl about which Heraclitus remarked:

"The Lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives signs."

c. Parallelism with Daniel

Although Daniel and Esdras are set as living during the Exile, and even are made brothers (Esdras 12:11), in reality, almost 300 years separate the respective compositions that carry their names. There are however between them striking common features. Both are written in times of persecution and

they entertain in common the fiction of identifying with the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar the catastrophes of their own respective epochs. This they do with the same goal of showing that God is present to his people. The parallel between the two books goes further as the Eagle in 4 Esdras is expressly identified with "the fourth kingdom that appeared in a vision to Daniel, your brother" (12:11, cf. the words of the lion/Messiah in 11:39f.). There are other similarities:

The Eagle Vision is a dream in the night (4 Esdras 10:59, 11:1); so, too, is the vision in Daniel 7 (Dan. 7:1, 2, 7 specifically with introduction of the fourth beast, and 13). Esdras' vision is of an eagle, coming out of the sea; in Daniel 7, "the four enormous animals rose out of the sea" (7:3). In Daniel, the first beast like a lion had an eagle's wings, they are first plucked off before it was set up right and offered a human heart (Dan. 7:4). The third beast was a leopard with four wings of a bird (Daniel 7:6). The fourth beast in Daniel is not described as an eagle, but the only specified physical characteristic is that it had iron teeth and ten horns (7:7). The multiplicity of horns is a similarity with the 12 wings and 3 heads of the eagle (Esdras 11:1). Esdras 11:2 says "the winds of heaven" blew upon the eagle, and this falls in parallel with "the four winds of heaven" stirring up the Great Sea in Daniel 7:2. Esdras' observation that "rival wings sprang up out of its wings that became puny and petty wings" (11:3), may follow Daniel's vision of the little horn rising up and uprooting three horns (11:9). In 11:7-8 the eagle speaks, a dim echo of the horn uttering enormities in Daniel (7:8). The eagle vision then proceeds with wings supplanting one another in holding sway over the earth (11:12-35); from 11:29 on the once dormant eagle's heads are also involved in this series of rulers. All of this can be thought of as in parallel to the series of horns and the little horn's supplanting of three others in Daniel 7 (v. 8). Esdras 11:40-43 is a description of the terrors and injustices of the last head of the eagle; that adequately fills Daniel's general description of the fourth beast as terrible and dreadful (7:7) and of the horn as uttering enormities (7:8, 11, 20). In Esdras' vision all the wings and heads eventually were gone and "the entire body of the eagle burst in flames" (12:3). So, too, in Daniel the fourth beast "was killed and its body was destroyed and given to the burning fire" (7:11).

Esdras is awoken because of his "intense excitement and great fear." Daniel, apparently still in his dream-state, finds his spirit distressed and the visions of his head frighten him (7:15, 28). Esdras offered a prayer to the Lord for strength and for the interpretation of the dream (12:8); Daniel "approached one of those who stood there and asked him what was sure in all that" and received the interpretation (7:16). But while Daniel starts by telling us he is writing

all this down (7:1), it is after the Vision that Esdras is told to put it all down in a book (12:37).

In the interpretation made known to Esdras he is told, "the raging lion which you saw (coming) roaring out of the forest, speaking to the eagle, taking it to task for its injustice, and all its words which you heard (cf. Daniel 7:11), he is the annointed one whom the Most High has reserved till the end of days, who will arise from the seed of David" (12:31-32). This tells much about the Author's interpretation of the "one like a Son of Man" of Daniel; he is the Davidic Messiah. However the roles of the Danielic son of man and of the Ezrahide Messiah are not similar. I shall come back to this point later. In Esdras the lion functions to thwart the eagle, which is taken care of in Daniel by the Ancient of Days. The lion will "present (the ungodly) alive for judgment" (12:33). In Daniel the tribunal is seated, the books open, and the beast destroyed even before one like a son of man shows up (7:10-13). The lion, as a prominent figure at the end of the vision, fits the Ancient of Days even better than the "Son of Man." And there is the difference between roaring out of the forest, and coming with the clouds of heaven. Let us thus turn to the question of Messianism.

d. The Messiah's Role

M. Stone, e.g., has demonstrated that, with 4 Esdras, the eschatological war motif has gone through a legalization process. Actually the Messiah is Warrior rather than judge, although his victory over the last enemy "took over some aspects of the judgment language, but the final judgment remains the prerogative of the Most High" (p. 302). God therefore exercises personally the forensic functions in a more specific way than in Daniel 7 where those functions have spilled over the one-like-a-son-of-man. In that respect, 4 Esdras 7:37, describing as it does God's judicial activity is more dependent upon Daniel 7. The separation of the two motifs of war and judgment is especially clear in 12:34: the deliverance of the saints introduces them to bliss during the temporary Messianic kingdom (cf. 7:28). Then comes the Day of (God's) Judgment! If so, then 11:46, says Stone, refers to the final judgment after the Messianic kingdom has come to an end. This explains why it is not even alluded to in the interpretation (cf. 12:34).

The End is thus in two acts, and 4 Esdras uses the word in a flexible way. In 11:36-39; 6:7-10; 5:41; 14:9, the end comes right before the Messianic kingdom is inaugurated. In 7:113 and 12:34, it is the Day of Judgment after the Messianic kingdom. The meaning therefore, as defined by Stone, is "the decisive point in the eschatological sequence" (p. 298).

The import for the fifth Vision is great. The End has donned a dialectical character. It is the fall of Roman Empire, although the event is followed by a temporary Messianic kingdom and a Day of Judgment. G. H. Box has missed that point in what for him is R work and has wrongly set in opposition the Eagle vision's political eschatology to the more transcendent one of the "Salathiel" Apocalypse. This misunderstanding is rightly discarded by M. Stone.

But it seems to me that one can go further than the Jerusalem critic. The latter endeavors to justify the absence of cosmic-universal element in 4 Esdras 11-12 eschatology. There is here no universal resurrection nor enthronement, although Daniel 7 and 12 provided examples of both. This, Stone rightly but partially explains by an alleged Ezrahide re-working of a traditional apocalypse in which there was no cosmic element. Thus are explained the differences from Esdras 7 (belonging to "Salathiel" apocalypse according to Box) and it is needless to think of an independent source for it (Stone, p. 303).

Moreover, a comparison with Baruch 39-40 shows that in both cases there has been an amplification of Daniel 7's characterization of the little horn (cf. 4 Esdras 11:38-43 and 2 Baruch 39:5). This entailed, also in 2 Baruch, a special judgment of the leader of the last kingdom (40:1), and the advent of a temporary Messianic kingdom (40:3), hence the disappearance of the cosmic motifs present in Daniel. In brief, anti-Christ features have displaced the universal elements.

The solution is elegant. One can however wonder whether the polarization of meanings has not been pushed too far. If it is true, as contended by Stone followed on that point by the present writer, that there are no two sources independent from one another in the "Salathiel apocalypse" and the Eagle Vision, a text such as 5:42 should retain all our attention. In the judgment, there is, according to Rabbinic parlance, *lo mugdam we-lo me'upar*. The judgment is not a geometrical point, but a surface-area; not a line of demarcation but a zone where two periods overlap. Thus, if the meaning of the term "end" in 4 Esdras is flexible, it is not because it vacillates between two opposite senses, but because there are two stand points to look at it. In fact, there is only one judgment which appears within time to be early for those who come late, and late for those who come early. For the oppressed under the Romans, the bursting in flames of the Eagle does constitute the end. For the survivors to the event however, the end comes after 400 more years. 4 Esdras 7:26-28 shows that the former "end" constitutes at least a harbinger to the final judgment and its foretaste. The survivors after the "first" end have gone through the judgment, although the final judgment is still to come after the Messiah himself shall die as well as all mankind (7:29f.) and there will be a new

age. There will be a general resurrection (7:32) and the final judgment will requite the good with paradise and the wicked with hell (7:35-36). It is this dual conception of the judgment-end which imposed upon the Author the slanting of the traditional elements of Daniel 7, viz., the legalization of the cosmic battle, the inflation of the anti-Christ motifs (on the basis of Daniel 7's characterization of the little horn), the introduction of a temporary Messianic kingdom, and the complete wiping out of humanity including the Messiah before the Day of Judgment (possibly on the basis of the separation of Daniel 7 and Daniel 12). Were this a unique feature in 4 Esdras, we could speak perhaps of a genuine creation by the Author. But such is not the case. 2 Baruch 39-40 stands in parallel with our text, as M. Stone has emphasized (11). As writes P. Bogaert, in 2 Baruch the days of the Messiah are "un signe précurseur de l'avènement du monde à venir" (I p. 416).

In 40:1 the Messiah judges the last leader of Roman Empire, and in 40:2 he kills him. Then follows this paradoxical statement (40:3) that the Messiah's kingdom is established "forever, until the end of this world of corruption" — it is thus clear that the legal and the military are combined and that the judgment is the destruction. In 4 Esdras 11-12, similarly, the indictment (11:38-43) and the sentence (45f.) are followed by or, one could say, they amount to, an execution (12:11-3, cf. v. 33) (12).

In conclusion, the absence of cosmic elements in the Eagle Vision has to be balanced with their presence in the chapter 7 from which it should not be divorced. As the focus of the 5th Vision is on the end of the Roman Empire before the inauguration of the Messianic kingdom, the universal has no place here. Were the Day of Judgment which ends the Messianic kingdom detailed, we would have here the depiction of those scenes as in 7:32-36, viz., the enthronement of God (as in 7:33), the general resurrection (as in 7:32), the final judgment as exercised by the Most High (as in 7:33ff.). This of course does not disprove Stone's conclusions, it brings extra arguments on their behalf.

II - Theological Part

4 Esdras is definitely apocalyptic. As writes Box (APOT p. 555), "the contrast between the two ages -- the present and the future -- is emphasized in the strongest possible manner throughout. The corruptible world, and all that is mortal will dissolve and be succeeded by the incorruptible world and immortality."

But side by side with the apocalyptic visions, there also are dialogues with the angelus interpretes about eschatological problems as they relate to the present. H. Gunkel compares

the former with Daniel 7ff. or Revelation 4ff., and the latter with the speculations of the Pauline letters.

This dual character of the book is important. I'd like to suggest that the questions and counter-arguments of Esdras to the eschatological "solutions" of the Angel represent questions and objections of Pharisees of the first and second century C.E. to Apocalypticism. There is therefore in my opinion a partial truth in the theory that Esdras represents another standpoint in the book than the angel's (13). The situation is thus similar, within limits, with the one afforded by the book of *Jonah*. There, to recall, the Author is in dialogue with his hero, the latter representing the party in power at Jerusalem which needs to be convinced to open up its horizons. Similarly, the hero of the Pseudepigraph is Esdras-Ezra, a perfect name for the representative of the Pharisees. Even his mysterious identification with Salathiel in 3:1 becomes clear. Esdras is the one who questions God's plans, as the Pharisees do in questioning the validity of Apocalypticism (14).

The parallels between *Jonah* and 4 Esdras should not however be overstated. There is an important difference of skill between the two authors. Esdras is much less reluctant to accept the angel's lessons than was *Jonah* in his disputations with God. It means that the tension in 4 Esdras is much less taut. All the drama by now is not so much in the position itself between God/Angel on the one hand, and man on the other, but in the exceptional circumstances of the dialogue, viz., the catastrophe of 587 BCE/70 C.E. In *Jonah*, two diametrically opposed conceptions of justice were clashing, and until the end, each interlocutor remained firm in his stance (15). In 4 Esdras, to the contrary, the scribe is constantly "defeated" and, actually, wants to be defeated. That amounts to making the case too easy for the Author's convictions.

The question ultimately is whether it is only a matter of being more or less skillful, or whether the Author of 4 Esdras is trying to convince a group of coreligionists already much more open to dialogue than was the theocratic party in the time of *Jonah*. After Gunkel, followed by Box and many others, one is struck by the kinship of the argumentations about the Torah in 4 Esdras and in the Pauline letters. My contention is that both represent a kind of Pharisaism which was more attuned with apocalypticism than the other trend which became Rabbinic Judaism and anti-Apocalyptic. Charles short-circuits somewhat the process when he states: "The apocalyptic and legalistic sides of pre-Christian Pharisaism -- starting originally from the same source -- developed ultimately into Christianity and Talmudic Judaism." (*APOT*, p. VII).

By means of an elaborate schema, Charles makes also the point that given the two main centers of Jewish religious thought, viz. Messianic hope and Law, the greater the emphasis on the one, the less emphasis there is on the other.

"In 4 Esdras...man trembles before the law; he needs mercy, not the award of the law..." (16).

In other words, before Yamnia, there was a Pharisaism which could accommodate the apocalyptic conception of history because, contrarily to the doctrine which became official in Rabbinism, the Yeşer-ha-rā in man renders the Torah itself powerless (cf. here especially 9:36 and 7:116-131). The latter is thus incapable of eradicating the evil germ/root (3:22), the grain of evil seed (4:30) sown in the heart of man (cf. 8:35; 7:48) (17). This is all the more striking that, in the words of E. P. Sanders,

"In the entire body of Palestinian Jewish literature between Ben Sirah and the reaction of the Mishnah, with only the exception of 4 Esdras, membership in the covenant is considered salvation." (18)

G. F. Moore (vol. I pp. 479ff.), speaking of the Yeşer-ha-rā of Rabbinic teaching says, "It is the cor malignum of 4 Esdras" (3:21f.) (p. 479 n. 4). This Yeşer explains why the Torah cannot prevail in human heart despite its divine origin. The purity of Torah demands a pure receptacle, and this will only be secured in the world to come. There is in this world left to man only one recourse, to appeal against the law to God's compassion and forgiveness (cf. 7:132-8:3; 8:36).

The kinship with later Christian development goes further. Here and there we find the idea of a dying Messiah and consequently, of a delay between death and resurrection; the Messiah actually gives way before God (cf. in the N. T., 1 Cor. 15:28). In other words, between the end within time and the end without time, those who "survived" are put at the benefit of the "first fruits," already enjoying proleptically for "four hundred years" (ch. 7) a theocracy not yet fully inaugurated. I shall come back to this point below.

In short, we are close to a Christian understanding although not in a Christian document. It is even possible that there be some polemical allusions in 4 Esdras to Christianity (19).

Be that as it may, we are in presence of pseudepigraphic texts contemporary with the composition of the N. T. and presenting a striking kinship of ideologies while not proceeding from the same source. Are they however dependent

upon a common hermeneutical complex?

Qumrān seems excluded as such a source as the main criterion regarding Messianism, viz., the priestly aspect superseding even the royal, is absent from 2 Baruch and 4 Esdras. On the contrary, there is a moderate kinship with Psalms of Solomon 17-18 (between 63-48 B.C.E.) where the king Messiah is warrior, ethically supreme, and whose action is more than nationalistic, religious. Moreover he is nontranscendent in origin. There is also familiarity with Targum Yerushalmi on the Pentateuch. P. Grelot (20) cites Tg. Gen. 49:10-12 where are found the motifs of war and abundance, the latter phenomenon belonging to the same complex of the God Warrior in the mythopoetic language. Along the same line, when we find in 4 Esdras 7:29 "filius meus Christus," the expression may mean "my Servant, the Messiah." This expression is only present in the Tg. Zech. 3:8; Isa. 42:1; 43:10; 52:13, and only in God's mouth speaking about his Servant. Similarly, one finds the expression in 2 Baruch and 4 Esdras (cf. 2 Bar. 70:9 in Syriac, "my servant the Messiah").

On this score, the Messianism of 2 Baruch and 4 Esdras belongs, as also the belief in resurrection confirms, to Pharisaic literature. But these Jewish Apocalypses of the common era present characteristics more difficult to stamp with Pharisaic certification. There is the mention of the Messiah's death in 4 Esdras 7:28 which is not necessarily a Christian addition. There is moreover the conflation of the eschatological king-motif with the one of the "Servant of God." Indeed, although one finds no mention of "Servant" as such, the Greek word "pais" may mean, as seen before, servanthood (cf. 7:28; 13:32, 37, 52; 14:9). Let us also add to this list the final revelation by God of the one whom he kept for the appointed time. As writes P. Grelot (ibid.), the figure "does not belong any longer totally to this world. Some of his features tie him with the transcendent universe. of the apocalypses" (p. 30).

The solution to this series of problems is given by history. For the Pharisaism movement had at first been under apocalyptic influence. The Tg. Jerusalem testifies to it; the impact of Daniel 7 on Tg. Exodus 12:42 is clear,

"Moses shall come out of the desert
and the king Messiah, out of the heights (or: out of Rome).
The one shall be translated to the top of the cloud
and the other shall be translated to the top of the cloud."

It is thus not necessary to look elsewhere for the spiritual Sitz im Leben of this type of Messianism. It con-

stitutes a stage on the way to Rabbinism: a Pharisaism with Apocalyptic trends, before these were suppressed at and after Yammia.

Such a more open Pharisaism is Hellenistic, which does not necessarily mean that the ideological cradle of ⁴ Esdras is Alexandrian. Box, who about the ascetic tendencies in the book also thinks of an "influence of Alexandria...thought" recalls that Hellenization "saturated" Palestine. He adds: "The partial elimination of Greek elements, and the hardening and crystallization of the Rabbinic type of thought, was only effected later." (21)

Within such a Hellenized context, one better understands, e.g., the insistence of the Author upon the aloneness of God in creating the universe (3:4f; 6:6; 8:7; 9:19). Similarly there is a "populum unum" (5:27; 6:58) for which the world was created (6:55, 59; 7:11; cf. "your people" 3:30; 5:30; 6:58; 8:26, 45; "my people" 5:40; 12:34; 14:4).

Still another crux of the book might find here its explanation. In 7:28 the death of the Messiah together with the whole of humanity's is mentioned; so as to leave all the room for the age to come without any tie with this age. The basis for such a surprising statement is probably in Daniel 9:26 ("a Messiah will be cut off"). (22) Its bearing is very close to what a Judeo-Christian would probably also say about the limited scope of the Christ-event. P. Volz (23) is thus right when he sees in this verse a rebuttal of the doctrine (shared by Christians of non-Jewish origin) that Christ had a divine nature (24).

Also it is understandable that Esdras, representing the narrow conception of his party, must be reminded that the world at large is God's concern (6:25; 9:2, 20; 11:39; cf. 3:36; 8:15, 35, 59; possibly 6:25). Israel's responsibility is however superior to the Nations' because she has the Torah. That is why, in parallel with another voice coming from Hellenized Judaism, viz., Paul, there is as we saw only hope because God is misericors (7:132; 8:31, 36; 12:34).

Finally, it should be noticed that at the end of his work the Author of ⁴ Esdras places side by side the Torah (and other Scriptures) with Apocalyptic books (ch. 14)! For the Author, the discussion comes to an end. The apocalyptic conception triumphs. Already in the fourth section of the book which runs from 9:26 to 10:59 the Author -- in the words of M. A. Knibb -- had "manage(d) to come to terms with the problems that face him, and thereafter Ezra and the angel represent essentially the same viewpoint" (25).

Now the Author rests his case. We have come with him as close as it is possible to the point where Pauline Christianity starts. No wonder thus that 4 Esdras enjoyed such a high reputation in early Christianity. It could even provide a middle ground between the Pauline and the Judeo-Christian trends, with its pessimistic conception of the Law itself based on a pessimistic anthropology on the one hand, and its limitation of the Christ-event on the other. There is here an avenue worthwhile sometime to explore.

III - Hermeneutical Part

Approaching the Eagle Apocalypse from a hermeneutical viewpoint, first a warning note should be struck. The identifications provided by the Apocalypse itself, such as "the Eagle is the Roman Empire," do not exhaust the signification of the vision. When the Roman Empire is indeed destroyed but the eschaton does not come, the vision remains. As F. Kermode has emphasized in his The Sense of an Ending, no apocalyptic description, as accurate as it could be, ever becomes obsolete. In other words, the Eagle is the Roman Empire and something else which transcends the first referent. The problem therefore is more complicated than the one of allegorical correspondences which retained our attention in the first part of this paper.

The hermeneutical problem is partially answered by the response to two sub-questions, viz., the structure of text under consideration, and the temporality it conveys. I shall start with the first sub-question about the text's structure.

Of particular interest, I think, is the fact the vision occurs in three acts: the scenery itself, its impact upon the soul of the dreamer (or his spirit, his self), and the interpretation by the Angel. Actually, these three parts involve a three level happening in which the time-axis crosses the space-axis. The scenery comes down to the visionary, who has a hard time to integrate his experience, and needs angelic explanation which takes back as it were the vision to heavens wherefrom it came in the first place. That ternary movement forms a sort of geometrical parabola: from on high to down below and to on high again. Clearly the first move, from heavens to earth, is the main one, it is an epiphany. To a certain extent, it is independent from the rest. Whether understood or not, received or not by Ezra, there is -- we readers know it -- a revelation. From another viewpoint however, it remains totally sterile, unoperative, were it not for Ezra, the recipient of the epiphany, who cares to transmit his testimony about it. That is why levels two and three belong integrally to the vision.

The "soul" of the visionary is interestingly emphasized in 12:3 (cf. Daniel 7:15; 8:15-17; etc.). The model is Ezekiel (cf. 1:28; 2:1-2; etc.). It has been imitated in 1 En. 14:14, 24; Apoc. Ab. 10; and here in 4 Esd., cf. 10:28ff.; 13:13b-14. The more the revelation is profound, the more terrorized is the Seer (26). The reaction of the visionary is thus a mirror of the importance of his vision. It is a literary symbolic devise, but the interest shown by the Author for the psychological is striking. Sign of the times when the composition was made, it lays bare the triumphant individualism emerging among the Judeans (27). Its scope is however limited, for as we saw the seer's reaction serves as a springboard for the rebound of the action upward through the interpretation by the Angel.

Then comes the third part. The distinction must be maintained between the visionary language of part one and the interpretive language which starts here, for it demythologizes the former. For instance, the ascension of someone like a man from the sea (13:3) is a myth. Interpreted, the image becomes something different: the Messiah has been kept hidden until the end (13:25f.). The literary shift from one realm to another must be respected. N. Perrin and M. Stone, amongst others, have rightly protested against an interpretation of the trait as if it were mythological, thus pointing in the direction of the pre-existence and transcendence of the Messiah or of the Son of Man. As stressed by E. Breech (28), the accent is not on the symbolic figure; it is not on the heavenly conception of the Son of Man, but on the Most High's power.

The passage from the mythic to the demythologized does not however imply the leaving behind of secrecy. The discourse is in an indirect style and its aim is to reveal, but not too much. The character of mystery has somewhat subsided but is not done with. It is precisely the veiled revelation in the interpretive part of Daniel 7 (v. 23-27) which allowed 4 Esdras 11-12 to come with the new vision on the basis of the former one (cf. 12:11).

In other words, the mystery was not a transient literary devise of the first part only. On the contrary it permeates the whole experience of the visionary and is conveyed as such in order for the reader to be awestruck in imitation of the first recipient of the vision. The message is not for all ears to hear; it must fall in the ears of the elected only, and thus remain cryptic for the "uncircumcised." Hence a certain obscurity, although the visionary language is demythologized. The historical allusions are veiled, although rather precise. This clear-obscure effect is achieved by the Author by way of generalizing the particular events. Daniel 11:3-4, e.g., reads "a valiant king will arise; he will rule a great dominion...When he is well

established, his kingdom will be broken up and divided to the four winds of heaven..." the allusion of course is to Alexander the Great and to the Diadochi; but the implied identification in the text is not that precise as to foreclose the possibility that other circumstances in history could make other rulers qualify. Chiliasts of all epochs have largely taken advantage of such an opportunity.

Why keeping the secret while unveiling it? Certainly in the first place out of respect for the mystery of God. One does not throw one's pearls before swine. But also because the knowledge of the "sod/raz" makes one understand the meaning of history, i.e., of the plan of God. Indeed, it makes one witness the "telos" and already participate proleptically in the End. This however is a privilege shared only by the wise; they know the past, the present, and the future. Their existential universe is dual, it is this world and the next. Some of them report about travels more breath-taking than the ones of modern cosmonauts. They experience other-worldly journeys (cf. 1 En. 1:36; 72-82; 37-71; 2 En.; 3 Bar.; Apoc. Ab.; etc.). The absence of such a motif in Daniel, 2 Bar. or 4 Esdras, e.g., indicates another species of the same genre. As J. J. Collins and collaborators to *Semeia* no. 14 have shown, at times the spacial axis is stressed and the seer takes us in heavens; at other times the temporal axis is preferred and the visionary takes us to the end of days.

Those he takes with him are interpellated by the Apocalyptic message in the same way that the Master calls his disciples with a terse "you, follow me." The book of Revelation says that their robes are washed in the blood of the Lamb, that they are sealed with his seal (cf. Rev. 7:14; 8:4).

Hence, if the public to whom the Apocalypse is addressed is less conspicuously present than in the case of Prophecy, it is far from being absent. The geometrical parabola mentioned earlier is not self-sufficient. It is meant to be witnessed; its purpose is to invite participation. The Prophetic overt exhortation has become in the meantime a discreet winking signal. For the times have changed, the End is near. The moment has come for the saints to rally and to be prepared for the Lord's day which is dawning. There is in store no other consolation for the upset Esdras, or for the people of the saints.

In those conditions, the hermeneutical problem poses itself with far less urgency. The symbolic language used here is not susceptible at first of receiving varied interpretations. In Daniel 7 the arrogant little horn is Antiochus Epiphanes and its destruction means simply Antiochus's death. In 4 Esdras 11-12 the Eagle is the Roman Empire and its bursting in flames simply means the end

of that Imperium. At no point is the symbolic system seemingly open-ended. The wings (or pairs of wings) mean what they first meant for the Seer and his contemporaries. But no literary genre is so air-tight as to effectively prevent all deviations from the pattern. The Vision of the Eagle is a case in point. I shall base my demonstration on four counts.

First, the Vision's global context is a pseudepigraphal fiction: 4 Esdras presents itself as a document written by Ezra during the exile at the occasion of the catastrophe which befell Jerusalem in the 6th century B.C.E. and its devastating spiritual consequences are artificially put in a setting more ancient by seven centuries. The conclusion is clear: history is perhaps not circular, but its patterns are repetitive. I shall come back to this point below.

Second, the language of the Vision is purposely allegorical. On this score again, equivalences between what it says and what it hides in revealing are never so evident as becoming exhaustive. The Eagle is Rome, but other historical candidates might qualify. Even here, the symbol is polysemic (cf. P. Wheelwright: The Burning Fountain). It demands a bit of free play.

Third, the apocalyptic resurrects the mythological language. The reason for so doing is clear: the envisaged events are not accidental and contingent, but definitive and stamped by absoluteness. They are, on the spacial axis, not limited, but cosmic. Only a mythopoeic expression fits such a grandiose project. But that language is conducive to a multiplicity of interpretations, first because of its lack of specificity, and second because of the type of temporality it translates. The mythopoeic language becomes the cultic setting. Its temporality is thus "today and always," compounded, because of its being imbedded in an apocalyptic framework, by "already and not yet." The triumph of St. George on the Dragon happens each time the believers evoke that soteriological myth.

This 4.th point is the most important. By its own admission, the Vision of the Eagle is a re-reading of Daniel 7. Besides all what this means for the exegesis and the interpretation, it has also a decisive import for hermeneutic. Daniel 7 is not any model amongst other eligible ones. It is Apocalyptic, i.e., equally as close-ended as Esdras 11-12 claims in its turn to be. In other words, the latter relativizes the absolute, it makes provisional the definitive. Cf. 4 Esdras 12:12: "Daniel was not given the interpretation which I am now giving you." But, by the same token, the Eagle Vision itself is susceptible of being reread, like any other literary piece.

Something however has been accomplished. Esdras' Vision is no substitute for Daniel's. It only adds to the earlier understanding which was incomplete (cf. 12:12). Esdras does not tamper, e.g., with the first three animals of Daniel's tableau. The Eagle is not an additional fifth beast to the list of four previously established. The end of the impure bird, like the destruction of the monster in Daniel, is not questioned. And even the instrumentality, one can assume, if fundamentally the same, simply "the one like a Son of Man" in Daniel has become the Lion/Messiah in Esdras. So only one ingredient in the Vision has been altered, viz., the identity of the last enemy. From the Seleucide the hand of the Apocalyptic clock has shifted down to the Roman Empire. This move has entailed, within the scenic and literary language, the transformation of the animal symbol. It is still a monster, but now much more closely related to its referent, the Eagle is undoubtedly the Roman Empire, while the fourth beast of Daniel presented no evident affinity on the level of its symbolism, with the Seleucide empire (29).

The progression from the one (in Daniel) to the other (in 4 Esdras) is remarkable. It shows in what direction the subsequent re-interpretations of an Apocalyptic symbol are going. Those re-readings are not substitutive but cumulative. The known intermediary Apocalyptic stages between Daniel 7 and 4 Esdras 11-12 concur with this statement. Among them are the Parables of Enoch and their elaboration of the Son of Man figure. In 4 Esdras the Dragon has become aquiline, and the Judge with human features has donned messianic characters. We are on a continuous line of transformation; it is thus perfectly conceivable that it does not stop with the interpretation in the chapter 12 of 4 Esdras, but pursues its course with new partial alterations and new insights provoked by new historical developments.

From this perspective, the coalescence of the figure of the Judge-Warrior, is especially far-reaching. For, if N. Perrin and others were right in protesting against an unwarranted promotion by scholars of the "Son of Man" symbol to the rank of a title, it is clear that the New Testament literature is not the only one in the first century C.E. to have made that unscholarly step. From Daniel 7 to 4 Esdras, the common seedbed on which grows in importance the salvific figure is its confrontation with an enemy who is indeed the last because it is the most formidable in history. The two protagonists cannot but clash, by virtue of what they respectively represent. In them are personified, in their primordial polarity, good and evil. That is why the Judge-Savior-Messiah is presented as "setting free and providing gladness" (12:34). What permeates history is the struggle between good and evil. This is so from the beginning and will last to the end. In mythopoeic language,

there is a hero defensor of the good and an anti-hero champion of the evil. They are of course mythically "eternal." However many the names they are called by in history, there is but one Messiah and one Beliar.

We are now able, I believe, to raise the crucial hermeneutical question of how to read an Apocalypse today. The Vision of the Eagle in the first century C.E., re-interpreting the second century B.C.E. Vision of the four Beasts judged and destroyed by a Son of Man provides the model. It consists in dialectically affirming the antique vision while coming with a new one. So, the re-reading is not by way of a readjusting of one feature or another to fit new circumstances. This is what a later Redactor probably did in the pairs of wings of the Eagle in order to post-pone the End after Domitian's death, as we saw. Later reinterpretations of the Apocalypse did even infinitely worse in abstracting the Vision completely from its historical Sitz-im-Leben and transplanting it into a foreign soil.

The fifth vision of Esdras is based on the theological understanding of history according to which history is divisible in periods. These eons present surface features of their own, but hold deep characteristics in common. These however are more and more pronounced, and their negativity steadily increases in gravity. History is moving along a downward spiral with each new loop emphasizing more the wrinkles on the faces of the human empires, until we reach a caricature of sorts like the fourth beast of Daniel 7 which has definitely left the animal realm for the demonic.

Here precisely lies the decisive possibility of re-reading. It is always possible that what the sixth century B.C.E. people considered as the last rebound of evil be only a penultimate reality rather than the ultimate. This is clearly the perspective of the Author of Daniel in the second century B.C.E. "Babylon" was after all only a foretaste of the Seleucid Empire and Nebuchadnezzar only a harbinger of Antiochus IV Epiphanes-Epimanes.

But the "last" is endlessly transcended by a new monstrosity. The "last" rung of the ladder is followed by a deeper one yet. Daniel was mistaken. The last empire was not the Antiochian. The ultimate seems to be reached, in the eyes of its Jewish witnesses, by the catastrophe of 70 C.E. The 4 Esdras document shares in that belief. Later generations yet discover that, unfortunately, man can go still deeper in the abyss. Auschwitz occurs, but it is not yet the end, it only inaugurates the sway of the fourth animal which your brother Daniel saw...(12:11).

Such is the meaning today of 4 Esdras 11-12. The Eagle is the Roman Empire, and more. Its loathsome evil deeds are its responsibility and however escape its control. For retrospectively they ape what has been done by others before, in the sixth century B.C.E., e.g., and prospectively they announce perhaps worse deeds yet in store which will be perpetrated by a Beast still more bestial than the Daniel Dragon or the Esdras Eagle. There is indeed one Amaleq from the origins of the nation Israel. There is also from the beginning, although hidden to the eyes of many, one Judge Savior, one lion of Judah, someone like a Son of Man, whose triumph over Amaleq is as continuous as creation and, like the latter, can be praised retrospectively, actually, and proleptically, by those who have eyes to see, ears to hear, and a heart to understand. Thus says the Apocalyptist: "Listen to what the Spirit says to the Churches" (Rev. 2:7, 11, 17, etc.).

Notes

- (1) Cf. Semeia no. 14, 1979 (J. J. Collins ed.).
- (2) Cf. especially 4 Esdras 12:10-34 for this historical retrospective.
- (3) Per contra, there are texts within and without the Bible using the eagle in a metaphorical way, cf. Jer. 48:40 & 49:22 "like an eagle"; T. Moses 10:8 (which should not be forced like do Charles and Clemen to signify Rome). It is a simile as in Deut. 32:11, etc., cf. also Ex. 19:4; Obad. 4; Sib. Or. 3:611 where Anthiochus Epiphanes is said "a fiery eagle." In Daniel 7:4, one will remember that the animal represented Babylon (cf. Eze. 17:3 above).
- (4) Also from Mesopotamia comes the idea that the eagle carries some to heavens, so in the Babyonian Etana, the eagle says: "let's go, I shall carry you to heavens, under my breast put your back, on my wings' feathers put your hands, etc." cf. E. Dhorme: Textes religieux assyro-babyloniens, p. 177.
- (5) M. Stone: "the Concept of the Messiah in 4 Ezra": Goodenough Festschrift, p. 295-312.
- (6) But cf. below on the Messiah and the Eschaton.
- (7) Omitted by Ar. 2.
On the symbolism of the eagle, cf. 2 Bar. 77:20-26; Paral. Jer. 7:7-11. On the symbolism of the lion, cf. also Rev. 5:5; Apoc. of Elijah 2:5, 6 (end of third century C.E.).

- (8) Cf. J. Wellhausen: Skizzen und Vorarbeiten VI: 241ff.; G. H. Box: The Ezra Apocalypse, London: Pitman, 1912, in loco. Per contra, R. Kabisch: Das Vierte Buch Esra auf seine Quellen Untersucht, Goettingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1889, p. 159-161.
- (9) Cf. Gfoerer, followed by G. H. Box, saw here Agrippa II and Berenice (cf. Suet. "Titus" VII) who went over to the Romans and were in favor with the Flavian family. H. Gunkel thought of Licinus Mucianus, pro-consul of Syria and Tiberius Alexander, prefect of Egypt (69); but Box objects that they joined themselves to Vespasian, not to Domitian (cf. Suet. "Vespasian" VI).
- (10) Cf. Fr. Kermode: the Sense of an Ending, Oxford University Press, London, 1966, p. 8 and 9 of the 1979 reprint.
- (11) Moreover below I shall call forth still another witness, somewhat surprisingly omitted by Stone, viz., the N. T. literature.
- (12) The same thing in Daniel 7:9f., 26; Simil. of En. 62:2, 3, 5; 69:27; etc.
- (13) Harnish, followed by several modern critics including E. P. Sanders, holds that the Author's viewpoint is that of the angel in the dialogues.
- (14) The fact that Shealthiel is closely related with Zerubbabel, either as his uncle (1 Ch. 3:17-19) or his father (Ezra 3:2; 5:2; Neh. 12:1) underscores the symbolic belonging of the hero with the theocratic party in Jerusalem. At the same time the identification between Shealthiel and Ezra stretches chronology and renders plausible the presence of Ezra in exile.
- (15) Cf. the forthcoming book: The Jonah Complex, John Knox Press, 1981.
- (16) Charles' edition of The Apocalypse of Baruch, p. LXIX.
- (17) The situation is quite different in 2 Baruch, where the official Rabbinic doctrine is affirmed, cf. 2 Bar. 32:1; 51:3, 7; 48:22, 24 (texts judiciously selected by R. H. Charles, Ap. Bar., p. 31). As Baruch concludes: "...are only left to us the Most High and His Law" (85:3). As P. Bogaert puts it: "Baruch writes his letter to recommend the keeping of the law and of the Covenant with the Fathers (84:8)." (p. 391). Bogaert sees in this "the constructive optimism of Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai" (p. 389).

- (18) E. P. Sanders: "The Covenant as a Soteriological Category and the Nature of Salvation in Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism," in Jews, Greeks and Christians: Studies in Honor of W. D. Davies (ed. Hamerton-Kelly and Scroggs), Leiden, 1976, p. 15, emphasis mine.
- (19) C. C. Torrey ("The Messiah Son of Ephraim" JBL 66 (1947), 253-77) saw in 2 Bar. and 4 Esd. traces of such polemics. P. Bogaert cannot find them as far as he is concerned (see vol. I, p. 418).
- (20) P. Grelot: "Le Messie dans les Apocryphes de l'Ancien Testament" in La Venue du Messie, Recherches Bibliques VI, Desclee de Brouwer, 1962, pp. 26f.
- (21) APOT II, p. 557.
- (22) In that case, it may be that we'eyn lo was read as meaning, "and no one surviving him."
- (23) P. Volz: Die Eschatologie der Jüdischen Gemeinde..., Tübingen: Mohr, 1934, p. 34.
- (24) On the death of the Messiah, cf. 4 Esd. 7:28-31; 12:32-34; 2 Bar. 29; 30; 40; 1 En. 90:38; Sukk. 52a; Psiq. R. 36:2.
- (25) M. A. Knibb in Coggins and Knibb: The First and Second Books of Esdras, The Cambridge Bible, Cambridge, 1979, p. 109.
- (26) Only Moses -- as seen by P, cf. Deut. 34:10 -- remained upright during the dialogue with God.
- (27) I. Ephros has missed this point and over-emphasized the collective nationalistic character of the Apocalypse in his article, "Prophecy, Wisdom and Apocalypse" in Mordecai M. Kaplan Jubilee Volume, ed. M. Davis, New York 1953, 215-23.
- (28) "These Fragments have I Shored against my Ruins: The Form and Function of 4 Ezra" JBL 92/2 (1973), 267-74.
- (29) In P. Wheelwright's vocabulary, from Daniel 7's dragon to 4 Esdras' eagle, one has shifted from metaphor to symbol. (Cf. Metaphor and Reality).

Other works quoted in the text.

P. Bogaert: Apocalypse Syriacque de Baruch, Paris: Le Cerf, 2 Vol., 1969.

H. Gunkel: in E. Kautzsch: Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des A.T., Vol. 2, p. 331-401, Tübingen: Mohr, 1900.

W. Harnisch: Verhängnis und Verheissung: Unters. zum Zeit- u. Geschichtesverst. im 4. B. Esra u. in der Baruch-Apok., Göttingen: Vandenh. u. Ruprecht, 1969.

G. F. Moore: Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era, 3 Vol., Cambridge: Harvard U. P., 1927, 1930.

J. M. Myers: 1 and 2 Esdras, The Anchor Bible, Garden City: Doubleday, 1974.

N. Perrin: Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

B. Violet: Die Apokalypsen des Esra u. des Baruch in deutscher Gestalt, Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1924.

A PROLEGOMENON TO THE STUDY OF
THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF 4 EZRA

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4 Ezra, like 2 Baruch, the Apocalypse of Abraham, the canonical book of Revelation, and possibly the Similitudes of Enoch (chapters 37-71), derives from the confused and confusing era which postdates the destruction of Jerusalem. This event sent shock waves throughout both Jewish and Christian communities. For some Christians the destruction of Jerusalem and the desolation of Zion served as a portent, a sign, of divine displeasure with the Jews and as an imprimatur on the emerging self-confidence of the fledgling faith. For the Jews the destruction also was viewed as a sign of divine displeasure; but for them there was no confirmation, there was only confusion and questioning.¹ This is nowhere more evident than in the apocalypse known as 4 Ezra, or 2 Esdras.

Scholarship has often been preoccupied with discussions about which character in the various dialogues of 4 Ezra represents the viewpoint of the author.² Is the author the eternal pessimist Ezra:

O earth, what have you brought forth
. . . for it would have been better
if the dust itself had not been born
. . . Let the human race lament, but
let the beasts of the field be glad;
let all who have been born lament,
but let the four-footed beasts rejoice!
For it is much better with them than
with us; for they do not look for a
judgment, nor do they know of any
torment or salvation promised to them
after death.³

Or does the author share the aloofness of the angel (and/or the Lord at certain points):

The Most High made this world for the
sake of many, but the world to come for
the sake of few . . . Many have been
created, but few shall be saved.⁴

No matter which participants in the debate reflect the view of the author, if indeed either side does, the reader of the document sees only the whole.⁵ The audience,

unless they identify with either of the protagonists, is faced with a book containing both hope and hopelessness, both threat and promise. I propose to look at 4 Ezra from the standpoint of the response being elicited from the reader. The paradigm or model I will be using has been proposed by Bernard McGinn in his book Visions of the End.⁶

McGinn, working primarily with medieval apocalyptic documents, has noted that classical apocalypticism, including 4 Ezra, had twin offspring.⁷ On the one hand, a visionary literature was produced which increasingly centered on the fate of the individual soul, on the personal afterlife, with a detailed account of the pains of hell and the joys of heaven. Although such visions could exhibit the common eschatological pattern of crisis, judgment, and salvation, which is a trademark of inter-testamental apocalyptic, their interest in history as a unitary structure was not strong. On the other hand, there also existed a variety of texts which were linked by more general historical concerns, especially a view of the present as a moment of supreme crisis, and a fervent hope of an imminent judgment that would vindicate the Just. Texts of this latter sort frequently, though not invariably, incorporated concern with the structure of history, usually in terms of a theory of world ages.⁸

How do such works, both visions and the more traditional apocalyptic works, function in the life of a community? Many sociologists have in the past been inclined to view millenarian movements as agents of social change, as pre-political phenomena, at times as proto-revolutionary ones.⁹ They have proposed that the literature of eschatologically-minded groups functions, then, as a critique of social, political, and economic institutions.¹⁰ McGinn, I think, has correctly challenged this viewpoint and has observed that apocalypticism is broader than either millenarianism or messianism, and its literature can and usually does have more than one function.¹¹ Though 4 Ezra falls outside the chronological framework of McGinn's expertise, nonetheless certain portions of 4 Ezra aptly illustrate his point. In 4 Ezra 7, the seer asks the angel about the fate of individual souls after death and before the great judgment:

O Lord, show this also to your servant:
whether after death, as soon as everyone
of us yields up his soul, we shall be
kept in rest until those times come when
you will renew the creation, or whether
we shall be tormented at once?¹²

The angel responds by rebuking Ezra for including himself among the unrighteous who will be tormented, but then relents and describes the fate of those:

Who have shown scorn and have not kept the way of the Most High, and who have despised his law, and who have hated those who fear God--such spirits shall not enter into habitations, but shall immediately wander about in torments, ever grieving and sad, in seven ways. The first way, because they have scorned the law of the Most High.¹³

The angel continues his speech, listing the other torments of the wicked which will precede the final judgment. Nearly all the torments described relate to the disobedience of the unrighteous, although they appear quite mild when compared with later works which include visions of punishment and reward such as the Apocalypse of Paul, the Apocalypse of Peter, and works closely related in title and content to 4 Ezra, namely the Greek Apocalypse of Ezra and the Vision of Ezra. In these later works the torments are at times gruesome:

And there was a multitude of old men, lying prostrate, and over them molten iron and lead were being poured.

And he (Ezra) saw a caldron in which were sulfur and bitumen, and it was roiling just like the waves of the sea . . . And the sinners came, wishing to pass over (the caldron), and the angels of hell came and submerged them in the fiery stream. And from the fire they cried out, saying: "Lord, have pity on us!" But he did not have pity. A voice was heard, but a body was not seen because of the fire and the anguish.¹⁴

While not explicit, these threats serve a hortatory purpose; they attempt to dissuade people from particular courses of action.¹⁵

But the threat of punishment is usually balanced by the promise of reward, as it is in the passage in 4 Ezra immediately following the description of the torments of the wicked. The angel is still speaking in answer to Ezra's question about the fate of the individual after death:

Now this is the order of those who have kept the ways of the Most High, when they shall be separated from their mortal body. During the time that they lived in it, they laboriously served the Most High, and withstood danger every

hour, that they might keep the law of the Lawgiver perfectly. Therefore this is the teaching concerning them: First of all, they shall see with great joy the glory of him who receives them, for they shall have rest in seven orders. The first order, because they have striven with great effort to overcome the evil thought which was formed with them, that it might not lead them astray from life into death . . . The third order, they see the witness which he who formed them bears concerning them, that while they were alive they kept the law which was given them in trust.¹⁶

Once again the later works pick up on this abbreviated theme found in 4 Ezra: the just in the Vision of Ezra pass over the bubbling caldron of sulfur and bitumen mentioned earlier "greatly praising the name of the Lord, just like those who walk over dew or cool water."¹⁷

By correlating the punishment and rewards in the afterlife with actions committed in the earthly sphere, 4 Ezra, and especially the later visionary literature such as the Vision of Ezra,¹⁸ confront us with apocalyptic traditions intended to support and recommend values and mores espoused by the individual authors.¹⁹ To return our focus to 4 Ezra, the author of that document concentrates on the following of the Law, the wicked are punished because they failed to keep the way of the Most High, they despised his law, and hated those who fear God. The righteous, on the other hand, are those who "kept the law which was given them in trust."²⁰

It would be easy to pigeonhole this document if the passage in chapter 7 and a similar one in chapter 8 which discusses the sins of the wicked are representative of the whole of 4 Ezra. They represent one thread within the document, admittedly an important thread which is later elaborated in medieval apocalyptic literature, but still only one thread or theme. The rewards of the righteous and the promise contained within those rewards is balanced by the pessimism, or perhaps countered by the pessimism of the seer:

For in truth there is no one among those who have been born who has not acted wickedly, and among those who have existed there is no one who has not transgressed.²¹

And what good is it that an everlasting hope has been promised us, but we have miserably failed? Or that safe and healthful habitations have been reserved for us, but we have lived wickedly? Or that the glory of the Most High will defend those who have led a pure life, but we have walked in the most wicked ways? Or that a paradise shall be revealed, whose fruit remains unspoiled and in which are abundance and healing, but we shall never enter it, because we have lived in unseemly places? Or that the faces of those who practiced self-control shall shine more than the stars, but our faces shall be blacker than darkness? For while we lived and committed iniquity we did not consider what we should suffer after death.²²

So what then is the overall effect or function of the promises and threats found in 4 Ezra when set alongside the pessimism of the seer? Is the author recommending or espousing the existing values of his community, a community shattered by recent cataclysmic events? Is he taking a stance we might term "world maintaining"?²³ It is at this point that we must consider the world the author lives in. If our dating of 4 Ezra is reasonable, i.e., that 3:1 does indeed point to the aftermath of the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, the author's position and its expected audience response might be tied up with "world construction" cloaked in the shroud of "world maintenance."²⁴ The law is primary. The law referred to is the law which has been the possession of the community since Sinai, and perhaps even since Adam:

But though our fathers received the law, they did not keep it, and did not observe the statutes; yet the fruit of the law did not perish--for it could not, because it was yours.²⁵

For we who have received the law and sinned will perish, as well as our heart which received it; the law, however, does not perish but remains in its glory.²⁶

In that sense then Ezra, or the author, is espousing the law as a genuine means of salvation despite the difficulties inherent in its fulfillment. But it is not just the

law of Moses which is being commended. In chapter 14 the Lord is preparing to instruct Ezra to write down all which he has shown him and uses the example of Moses:

and I led him (Moses) up on Mount Sinai, where I kept him with me many days; and I told him many wondrous things, and showed him the secrets of the times and declared to him the end of the times. Then I commanded him, saying, "These words you shall publish openly, and these you shall keep secret."²⁷

This passage hints that parts of what Moses was told were to be kept secret until the appropriate time, as is also the case with the books Ezra is to write:

Make public the twenty-four books that you wrote first and let the worthy and the unworthy read them; but keep the seventy that were written last, in order to give them to the wise among your people. For in them is the spring of understanding, the fountain of wisdom, and the river of knowledge.²⁸

If these passages were indeed parallel, it appears that the author shares with his contemporaries not the stance of "world maintenance," but of "world reconstruction," which we would probably call by means of historical hindsight "world construction," the construction of the world based on the law as interpreted in post-70 Judaism.²⁹

What would be the purpose of espousing such values if indeed they set such a high standard and if indeed the end of the age is near and the world has lost its youth? Even though the end draws near there is apparently time for repentance and renewed fidelity to the law:

Now therefore, set your house in order, and reprove your people; comfort the lowly among them, and instruct those that are wise. And now renounce the life that is corruptible, and put away from you mortal thoughts; cast away from you the burdens of man, and divest yourself now of your weak nature.³⁰

Ezra then receives these words from the angel and gathers his people to exhort them to faithfulness:

Hear these words, O Israel. At first our fathers dwelt as aliens in Egypt, and they were delivered from there, and received the law of life which they did not keep, which you also have transgressed after them. Then land was given to you for a possession in the land of Zion; but you and your fathers committed iniquity and did not keep the ways which the Most High commanded you. And because he is a righteous judge, in due time he took from you what he had given. And now you are here, and your brethren are farther in the interior. If you, then, will rule over your minds and discipline your hearts, you shall be kept alive, and after death you shall obtain mercy.³¹

The author intends for his work to reflect a newly-constructed world based on the tradition of the law (including the interpretation of that law which had been kept secret up to the present time) and on the innovation of mercy, for while it is the deeds of the ungodly that will be disclosed, the parallel line, using I think antithetical parallelism, states that it will be the names of the righteous, those who discipline their hearts and receive mercy, which will become manifest. Thus 4 Ezra despite its pessimism and veneer of hopelessness, a hopelessness shared by the audience, functions, at least partly, as an exhortation, using the threats of punishments immediately after death and after the great judgment, and of rewards at the same times, for its readers to renewed fidelity to the past, a past masterfully reworked by the author to correspond to his ideals for the present.

Summary

B. McGinn has proposed that classical apocalyptic develops in the Middle Ages into two distinct forms: (1) visionary literature concocted to espouse certain values and mores; and (2) a variety of texts linked by more general historical concerns. This paper examines 4 Ezra to determine whether the author constructs a present which has meaning within the framework of his apocalyptic eschatology. It was found that the author does recommend certain values to his community based on the law, a law which represents links to the past and through interpretation represents a reconstructed present still invested with some meaning.

Notes

1. The questioning by Ezra throughout centers on the problem of theodicy. Though an integral part of the work discussion of this problem will be reserved until the 1982 Pseudepigrapha Seminar. Cf. A.L. Thompson, Responsibility for Evil in the Theodicy of IV Ezra (SBL Dissertation Series 29; Missoula, Mt., 1977).
2. For a brief review of major scholarly positions on this question, cf. A.P. Hayman, "The Problem of Pseudonymity in the Ezra Apocalypse," JSJ 6 (1975) 47-56.
3. 4 Ezra 7:62-66.
4. 4 Ezra 8:1-3.
5. Whether one views 4 Ezra as a compilation of sources which displays little or no intrinsic unity or as an original work by one author using traditional material, one is eventually forced to deal with the Apocalypse as it was presented to an audience. See the precedent for such a treatment of an apocalyptic work in J.J. Collins, "The Court-Tales in Daniel and the Development of Apocalyptic," JBL 94 (1975) 218-34; and *idem*, The Apocalyptic Vision of the Book of Daniel (Harvard Semitic Museum, Harvard Semitic Monographs 16; Missoula, Mt., 1977).
6. Records of Civilization 96; New York, 1979. See also *idem*, Apocalyptic Spirituality (The Classics of Western Spirituality; New York, 1979).
7. McGinn, Visions, pp. 14f.; *idem*, Apocalyptic Spirituality, pp. 8-11.
8. For a recapitulation of McGinn's thesis and a remarkable example of visionary literature which supports that thesis, cf. J.R. Mueller and G.A. Robbins, "The Vision of Ezra: Introduction, Translation, and Critical Notes," in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed. J.H. Charlesworth (Garden City, N.Y., in press). The text of the Vision of Ezra may be found in O. Wahl, ed., Apocalypsis Esdrae, Apocalypsis Sedrach, Visio Beati Esdrae (PVTG 4; Leiden, 1977) pp. 49-61.
9. Most prominent is the work by N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, revised and expanded ed. (New York, 1970); but cf. also P.D. Hanson, "Apocalypticism," IDBS, p. 31.
10. At the very heart of apocalyptic eschatology is the conviction that the present has been thrown into chaos; thus even the use of the framework or "genre" of

apocalyptic stands as evidence of the perceived breakdown of the social fabric. See Hanson, IDBS, pp. 28-33; Collins, "Jewish Apocalypses," in Apocalypse: The Morphology of a Genre, ed. J.J. Collins (Semeia 14; Missoula, Mt., 1979) pp. 21-59; J.Z. Smith, "The Influence of Symbols upon Social Change: A Place on Which to Stand," Worship 44 (1970) 466-68; *idem*, "Wisdom and Apocalyptic," in Religious Syncretism in Antiquity, ed. B.A. Pearson (Series on Formative Contemporary Thinkers 1; Missoula, Mt., 1975) pp. 131-56.

11. Apocalyptic Spirituality, pp. 8-12. See also his Visions of the End; and Hanson, IDBS, p. 31; H. Anderson, "A Future for Apocalyptic?" in Biblical Studies: Essays in Honor of William Barclay, eds. J.R. McKay and J.F. Miller (Philadelphia, 1976) pp. 56-71.

12. 4 Ezra 7:75.

13. 4 Ezra 7:80-81.

14. Vision of Ezra 45, 23-29. Translation is from The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha.

15. "Both the temporal eschatology and the other-worldly revelation provide a framework which sets the present time and place of humanity in urgent relief. All the apocalypses are therefore hortatory in purpose, whether this purpose is expressed explicitly or not." J.J. Collins, Semeia 14 (1979) 26.

16. 4 Ezra 7:88-94.

17. Vision of Ezra 24.

18. Included in the same category with the Vision of Ezra should be such works as the Vision of Paul, the Apocalypse of Peter, the Greek Apocalypse of Ezra, and the Apocalypse of the Virgin. Cf. A. Yarbro Collins, "The Early Christian Apocalypses," Semeia 14 (1979) 61-121.

19. Cf. McGinn, Visions; and *idem*, Apocalyptic Spirituality, pp. 8-12.

20. 4 Ezra 7:94.

21. 4 Ezra 8:35.

22. 4 Ezra 7:119-26.

23. I am indebted here to the work of P. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, N.Y., 1967) pp. 29-52. See also *idem* and T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, N.Y., 1966).

24. Through the use of traditional materials and the attribution of the work to Ezra, the reader is ostensibly transported to a time which parallels his own present; cf. S.A. Kaufman, "Prediction, Prophecy, and Apocalypse in the Light of New Akkadian Texts," in Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies, ed. A. Shinan (Jerusalem, 1977) vol. 1, pp. 221-28. Thus the reader is invited to share the less chaotic, more idealized world of the biblical Ezra, i.e. to maintain a strong continuity with that past; cf. J.Z. Smith, Worship 44 (1970) 473, and N.A. Dahl, "Eschatology and History in Light of the Qumran Texts," in The Crucified Messiah (Minneapolis, 1974) pp. 129-45, esp. p. 144 ("It has become only too clear to us to what a great extent fulfillment always involves a reinterpretation of the promise; only in that way can it be understood as fulfillment.").

25. 4 Ezra 9:31-32.

26. 4 Ezra 8:36-37. Cf. the comments by E.P. Sanders on legalism and apocalyptic in Paul and Palestinian Judaism (Philadelphia, 1977) pp. 423-24.

27. 4 Ezra 14:4-6.

28. 4 Ezra 14:45-47.

29. For the opposite view that the secret things represent the apocalyptic traditions, cf. G.H. Box, The Ezra-Apocalypse (London, 1912); and idem, "IV Ezra," in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament, ed. R.H. Charles (London, 1913) pp. 542-624.

30. 4 Ezra 14:13-15a.

31. 4 Ezra 14:28-34; cf. Box, APOT, vol. 2, p. 555: "it is the acceptance of the Law that is the standard by which men must be judged at the last, not the observance of it."

LUKE-ACTS AND THE ANCIENT NOVEL

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Of the New Testament narratives it is Luke-Acts which most often invites comparisons to the principal three prose narrative genres of Greco-Roman antiquity, history, biography, and novel. Acts continues to be read, both critically and uncritically so, as a history of first-century Christianity. According to this reading the author of Acts researched and wrote his Christian history in the manner of a Greco-Roman historian: he consulted and selected sources which he shaped into an episodic account enlivened by speeches.¹ Luke is considered by some to be more a popular aretalogical biography of Jesus along the lines of the lives of Greco-Roman heroes and sages than a gospel detailing his suffering and proclaiming his saving death.² It has even been proposed that Luke-Acts is a two-part Greco-Roman biography, the life and teaching of a founding figure, Jesus, and the lives and teachings of his followers, the apostles.³ Of late scholarly attention has turned toward the formal and functional relationship between Luke-Acts and the ancient novel. The plots of Luke and Acts correspond to the formal sequence characteristic of the plots of the ancient novels. The heroes of Luke-Acts and the heroes and heroines of the ancient novels participate in series of adventures issuing in penultimate scenes of trial or recognition.⁴ It has been argued that Acts and the ancient novels, as evidenced by the scenes of adventure and intrigue in both, functioned primarily as entertainment for popular audiences.⁵

In this study I apply narrative analysis and interpretation to the comparative study of Luke-Acts and the third of the three Greco-Roman prose narrative genres, the ancient novel. The *sine qua non* of any comparative study is a method for obtaining, organizing, and evaluating information and evidence from the objects of comparison. Since Luke-Acts and the ancient novels are narratives, their comparison is best served by a method which accounts for the elements of narrative meaning and the essentials of all narratives. Narrative analysis and interpretation, as outlined in part one of this study, is one such method. It enjoins those who practice it to include all four areas of narrative meaning (narrative world, narration, experience and imagination, and creation and reading) in their comparative investigations.

A comparison of Luke-Acts to the ancient novels raises the question of the generic relationship of the former work to the latter groups of works. Any answer to this question depends on general and particular definitions and determinations: definitions of genre and the genre "ancient novel" and determinations of inclusive and exclusive criteria for generic classification and classification as an ancient novel. In part two I define genre and discuss criteria for generic classification on the basis of the narrative paradigm, the model of narrative meaning and for narrative analysis and interpretation introduced in part one. At the same time as it provides guidelines for defining genre and determining generic criteria, the narrative paradigm also assigns a reduced role to generic classification in the process of narrative understanding. Genre, a literary historical category, is only one of the narrative contexts which can contribute to the understanding of narrative texts.

In part three, again on the basis of the narrative paradigm, I describe the ancient novel as a genre in and of itself and as distinguished from ancient history and biography. In part four, proceeding from the discussions in parts one, two, and three, I compare Luke-Acts to the ancient novels. My comparison rests on the two textual and two contextual areas of the narrative paradigm: the events, existence, sequence, structure, time, and space of the narrative-world textual message, the language, style, presence, voice, and perspective of the textual means of narration, the contextual message of experience and imagination, and the contextual means of creation and reading. The resemblance of Luke-Acts and the ancient novels is for the most part textual rather than contextual and appears most strikingly and significantly in their selection of events and existents, sequence, preference for scenic narrative time, and presence and voice of narration. Contextually, the ancient novels situate themselves in the experience and imagination of classical literature and Greco-Roman civilization. Luke-Acts is at most on the fringes of these literary and cultural contexts. As is abundantly attested by literary references in Luke-Acts, the literary context of Luke is scripture, and the literary contexts of Acts are scripture and Luke. The cultural context of Luke-Acts is that circle of readers versed in scripture and in the story of "the things that have come to fulfillment in our company." Through creation and reading the ancient novels bring authors and audiences together for pleasurable communication. Luke-Acts, although at times no less entertaining than the ancient novels, aims at theological communication.

Textually, Luke-Acts can be classified as an ancient novel. Its literary, cultural, and communicative contexts, however, add qualifications to this classification. It is not enough to read Luke-Acts as an ancient novel, as a curious relic of Greco-Roman literature intended for popular audiences. Along with Matthew, Mark, and John, Luke-Acts belongs to a "subgenre" of Christian ancient novels within the genre of the ancient novel and begs to be read subgenerically, that is to say, scripturally, theologically, and in the context of Christian community.

1. THE NARRATIVE PARADIGM, NARRATIVES, AND NARRATIVE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The narrative paradigm is a theoretical model of the elements of narrative meaning realized in all narratives and a procedural model for the method of narrative analysis and interpretation.⁶ According to the narrative paradigm narrative meaning, the potential for communication in narrative form, is an intersection of text, context, message, and means. The intersection of these four elements yields textual message, textual means, contextual message, and contextual means as the four areas of narrative meaning. The textual message and textual means, together the narrative text, imply a narrative context consisting of an area of reference, the contextual message, referred to in the contextual means of authorial-audience communication. Messages, both textual and contextual, are what is transmitted in narrative communication, and means, both textual and contextual, are the ways in which messages are transmitted. Narratives, Luke-Acts and the ancient novels among them, are particular realizations of narrative meaning in particular textual and contextual messages and means.

Narrative analysis and interpretation attempts to describe narratives and to determine their meanings through critical inquiry. The questions asked in narrative analysis and interpretation correspond exactly to the four areas of narrative meaning represented in the narrative paradigm and realized in all narratives. As narrative analysis and interpretation makes narratives answerable, as it were, to the narrative paradigm, so too the narrative paradigm serves as a procedural control in narrative analysis and interpretation. It not only prescribes what questions should be asked but also prevents those questions which should not be asked of narratives from entering into narrative analysis and interpretation. Narrative analysis and interpretation can be considered complete only when all the prescribed questions have been asked, and only the answers to such questions should be used in determining narrative meanings.

The one-to-one correspondence between the narrative paradigm, narratives, and narrative analysis and interpretation is illustrated by the three figures which follow, the first of narrative meaning according to the narrative paradigm, the second of narratives as productions of narrative meanings, and the third of narrative analysis and interpretation as an inquiry into narrative meanings.




FIG. 1 THE NARRATIVE PARADIGM AND NARRATIVE MEANING




FIG. 2 NARRATIVES AND NARRATIVE MEANINGS

Each of the four areas of narrative meaning, textual message, textual means, contextual message, and contextual means, admits of further description or division. The textual message is a narrative world of events, existence, sequence, structure, time, and space. The textual means is narration, the language, style, and situations of presence, voice, and perspective through which the narrator and narrative audience achieve expression. The contextual message is the experience and imagination which

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

	TEXTS?	CONTEXTS?
MESSAGES?	Textual messages?	Contextual messages?
MEANS?	Textual means?	Contextual means?
	NARRATIVE MEANINGS?	

FIG. 3 THE QUESTIONS OF NARRATIVE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

THE NARRATIVE PARADIGM

	TEXT	CONTEXT
MESSAGE	Narrative world- Events Existence Sequence Structure Time Space	Experience and Imagination
MEANS	Narration- Narrator Narrative Audience Language Style Situations- Presence Voice Perspective	Creation and Reading- Real Author Implied Author Real Audience Implied Audience
	NARRATIVE MEANING	

FIG. 4 THE NARRATIVE PARADIGM AND NARRATIVE MEANING

goes into or is gained by the author and audience in their respective acts of composition and reception. Creation and reading those respective acts of composition and reception, is the contextual means which enables the real author and the real audience to communicate through their implied counterparts, the implied author and the implied audience.⁷ Figure 4 represents the narrative paradigm redrawn to accommodate the above descriptions and divisions and assumes redrawings in corresponding detail for the figures of narratives and narrative analysis and interpretation.

With reference to the narrative paradigm as redrawn and only in as much detail as space permits and is pertinent to my comparative study of Luke-Acts and the ancient novel, I will now proceed to outline each of the areas of narrative meaning. The order of my outline follows that of narrative analysis and interpretation: textual analysis, contextual analysis, and narrative interpretation.

Narrative Texts

Narrative worlds. Narrative worlds are related to real worlds of experience and imagination through representation or reference. Although narrative worlds represent or refer to events and existents of real-world experience and imagination, they never reproduce them exactly as they occur or exist in real worlds. In narrative worlds real-world events and existents acquire expressive occurrence and existence different from real-world occurrence and existence and dependent on the "unnatural laws" governing narrative-world sequence, structure, time, and space. Narrative worlds differ from real worlds most significantly by virtue of their selective properties and sequential and temporal licenses.

Events are narrative-world occurrences expressed as actions, passions, or actions-passions of agents and/or patients. The five classes of events, mental, emotional, sensory, verbal, and physical events, contribute toward the inward or outward orientation of narrative worlds, in turn dependent on narrator-narrative audience perspective. For example, the expression of mental and emotional events creates narrative worlds conveyed through the thoughts and feelings of existents to whom the narrator and narrative audience have inner-world access.

Existence involves existents, the participants, places, and things in narrative worlds, together with their essences and states, their essential and stative attributes in narrative worlds. Existents are thus not only those participants with the narrative-world equivalent of real-world life, but all participants (persons, animals, and beings), places, and things (objects and concepts) which "are" in narrative worlds. Essences are characteristics, traits which existents retain throughout their narrative existence. States are their passing attitudes and temporary conditions.

Sequence, narrative-world order, reorders the order of real-world occurrences through omission, backward reference, forward reference, simultaneous expression, simulation of simultaneity, and exposition. Of importance to this study as a criterion for the genre of the ancient novel is backward reference. Backward references, in summary or scenic narrative time, transpose events and existents of the narrative-world or real-world past to the narrative-world present. Backward references include literary references to the events and existents of previous literary works.

Sequences are organized in units, both component and composite, each with a beginning, middle, and end. Patterning within one sequential unit or shared by two or more sequential units is structure. Structure overlaps with sequence and is distinguishable from it only when the pattern is different from sequential order.

The five categories of narrative time and space, omission, summary, scene, transcription, and exposition, measure the duration of narrative-world expression. Omission is the absence of narrative time and space, the negative result of narrative selectivity and an *ex silentio* indicator of what is not essential to expression. Ancient narratives usually range between summary,

narrative-world abbreviation of real-world time, and scene, narrative-world approximation of real-world time. In summary narrative time and reading time are shorter than real-world time. In scene narrative, reading, and real-world time are approximately equal. Transcription aims at a complete record of inner or outer world proceedings. In so doing it extends narrative time and reading time beyond real-world time. Exposition is a sequential "time out"; it suspends the sequence of events to specify existents.

Space is the dimension of narrative-world specificity, the degree to which and respect in which events and existents are specified. Specification in narrative worlds is selective description which rarely even approaches real-world specificity.

Narration. Narration is the medium of narrative-world expression. The language of narration, be it a cinematic, musical, pictorial, or verbal medium, is the set of rules which govern expression. In verbal narration these rules are grammar and syntax. Style is preference in the use of language, the preference, for example, of an author, age group, religious sect, region, genre, decade, or century.

Narrators and narrative audiences are the mediators of narration. These partners in narrative expression are positioned with respect to their narrative worlds in the three situations of presence, voice, and perspective. Presence is the extent to which narrators and narrative audiences participate in the worlds they narrate. Their presence or absence varies by degrees, and a certain degree of presence or absence of one of the two by no means requires a corresponding degree of presence or absence on the part of the other. The presence of narrators is often signaled by first person narration, their absence by third person narration, and the presence of narrative audiences by second person address.

Voice is the volume and tone of narration. Volume measures the audibility of narrators and narrative audiences. Less audible narrators allow events to take their course without explanatory or interpretive asides, avoid overtly favorable or unfavorable specifications, and afford existents the opportunity to speak in their own voices. By doing the opposite, more audible narrators occasionally or consistently make themselves, their opinions, or their source authorities abundantly known. Tone is the attitude, whether sympathetic or sarcastic, indifferent or inimical, of narrators and narrative audiences toward their narrative worlds. Their attitudes vary from narrative moment to narrative moment and need not correspond.

Perspective is the access which narrators and narrative audiences have to their narrative worlds. The perspective of narrators and narrative audiences ranges from unlimited access to limited access and can be restricted to inner worlds or outer worlds or to certain inner worlds and outer worlds. Unlimited and limited, inner-world and outer-world access overlap to form complex relations.

Narrative Contexts

Experience and Imagination. Experience and imagination is

the sum total of narrative contexts which contribute to and result from the creation and reading of narrative texts, potentially anyone or anything that forms a part of the real worlds of authors and audiences. For the purposes of narrative analysis and interpretation it is better to regard experience and imagination as a complementary unit rather than as a conjunction of opposites. Experience is the source of imagination, and acts of imagination, creation and reading among them, are parts of experience. Just when, if ever, narrative texts refer to experience to the exclusion of imagination or vice versa is difficult to determine and depends on the authors and audiences involved.

The experience and imagination used by real authors in creating narrative texts includes the strictly personal, authorial experience and imagination alone, and the variously interpersonal, the experience and imagination of a family, clan, club, school, civic, national, or ethnic history, literary or musical heritage. In narrative analysis and interpretation of literary works a special effort is made to reconstruct the shared literary and cultural heritage of implied authors and implied audiences.

Creation and Reading. Creation and reading involves the contextual communication of two pairs of authors and audiences, real authors and real audiences and implied authors and implied audiences. Real authors and real audiences are just that, those who create and all those who read narrative texts. Implied authors and implied audiences are textual implications, those images of authors and audiences formed by their real-world counterparts and opposites in their acts of composition and reception. In narrative analysis and interpretation it is possible to ascertain the identities of authors and audiences implied by narrative texts but not necessarily those of the real authors and real audiences outside narrative texts.

Implied audiences are not the same as intended audiences, the contemporaries, compatriots, combatants, coreligionists, or comrades of real authors, but roles available to all real audiences, those not intended as well as those intended by real authors. Real audiences are free to assume, reject, or remain indifferent to the implied-audience roles offered to them. For modern real audiences the implied-audience roles of ancient works can, if seriously assumed, prove demanding, requiring years of rehearsal in ancient languages and understudy with professors of classical philology and Christian origins.

Examination of the four areas of narrative meaning, narrative world, narration, experience and imagination, and creation and reading, supplies what is needed for the guessing game of sorts of narrative interpretation. What is true for readers in general, however, that "any interpretation goes," should not be true of interpreters. Narrative analysis and interpretation obliges them to play by the rules of the narrative paradigm and to propose only those narrative interpretations which can be defended on evidence from the four areas of narrative meaning.

In comparative studies narrative analysis and interpretation insures that the comparisons made are meaningful as far as narratives are concerned. In the definition of narrative genres and the determination of their generic criteria, the narrative

paradigm provides for a complete survey of the four areas of narrative meaning and a comprehensive selection of criteria from these areas. As a theoretical and procedural model, then, the narrative paradigm offers the advantages of completeness and constraints. And it is by reason of these two advantages that the narrative paradigm is the basis for my discussions of genre and generic criteria in part two, the ancient novel in part three, and Luke-Acts and the ancient novels in part four.

2. GENRE AND GENERIC CLASSIFICATION

"Genre," as generally understood, refers to a group of literary works related to one another by some sort of shared resemblance or set of shared resemblances. Resemblance or resemblances serve as the criterion or criteria for generic membership. There is little agreement among literary theorists as to the groups of literary works which are, properly speaking genres and the criteria which determine generic membership. Genres are transculturally and culturally, broadly and narrowly defined. For some, genres are transcultural or universal groups, for example, Tragedy and Comedy throughout the ages. For others, genres are cultural or historical groups, Attic tragedy, Elizabethan tragedy, Middle Comedy, *Commedia dell'Arte*. Broad definitions, both of transcultural and cultural groups, regard genres as expressions of innate forces such as "the inner spirit" or ingrained influences such as socio-economic realities--whence the lyrical and romantic or bourgeois and proletarian genres of literature. Narrow definitions, also of transcultural and cultural groups, conceive of genres in more specialized terms. Examples of narrowly defined genres are those for groups of works in which the teenage heroine attempts suicide or in which there is first person narration.⁸

If there is any agreement in the recent literary theoretical discussions of genre, it is that generic classifications, if they are to be at all useful, must rest on selections of significant criteria.⁹ Such is precisely what the narrative paradigm, with its representation of the four areas of narrative meaning, provides for the generic classification of narratives. Indeed, the configuration of the narrative paradigm itself aids in explaining some of the confusion over generic definition. Transcultural definitions of narrative genres such as Epic, Novel, or Short Story draw by and large on one textual area of narrative meaning, that of the narrative world. Broad definitions depend on the authorial contexts of experience and imagination and creation. Narrow definitions limit themselves to one or two textual or contextual elements. Only cultural definitions cover the four areas of narrative meaning.

In the remainder of this study I will use genre in its cultural sense. This means that I will examine Luke-Acts and the ancient novels as members of the genre of the ancient novel, not in relation to Byzantine novels or nineteenth-century novels or as realizations of the genre Novel. Before proceeding to parts three and four, however, it is necessary to discuss the determination of generic criteria for historically defined genres.

There are two general guidelines to keep in mind in determining such criteria. First, although all elements of

narrative meaning should be examined for generic criteria, not all of these elements will always supply them. Generic criteria are selected from rather than supplied by the narrative paradigm. For some narrative genres style may be a decisive criterion, for others time and space, for others events and existence, voice, experience and imagination, and so on. Second, there is much room for variety within genres. Narratives of the same genre should not be expected to be in every way similar. Those that are more similar than others belong to subgroups or subgenres.

Events and Existence. Narratives of the same genre vary in their selection of events and existents. Selection of some of the same or similar events and existents, however, is not unusual. Yet similar events and existents characterize subgenres rather than genres, for example, the *Bildungsromane* among modern novels and the Greek romances among the ancient novels. No story, no event or existent is the sole property of one genre. In antiquity the story of Alexander the Great was related in all three prose narrative genres, as a history by Arrian, as a biography by Plutarch, and as a novel by Pseudo-Callisthenes.¹⁰

Sequence and Structure. Sequence is often too simple, the ordering of one event after another, and structure too complex, a pattern which cannot be readily perceived as such, to contribute to discussions of generic criteria. In order to do so the two together must have a distinct plan or pattern. Backward references in the form of literary references assist in determining literary contexts, subgenres, and, sometimes, genres.

Time and Space. The categories of narrative time and space offer as generic criteria preference for summary, scene, or transcription, and proportional patterns in the use of these three categories. Narratives of the same genre need not be uniform in their preferences or proportions. The degree and respect of specification vary within genres. When they occur, patterns of specification, can be of use as generic criteria.

Language and Style. For language and style to be declared generic, the former must be more specialized than language in general and the latter preferred by more than one author.

Situations. Generic criteria obtainable from the situations of narration include tendencies toward any one of the situational poles, presence or absence, high or low volume, unlimited or limited perspective, inner-world or outer-world perspective, other patterns in situational usage, and tonal tendencies.

Experience and Imagination. As already indicated, references to the same or similar experience and imagination by representations of the same or similar events and existents, determine subgenres rather than genres. Genres are broad enough to accommodate a wide variety of authorial and audience experience and imagination.

Creation and Reading. Creative intentions and reading effects are by no means generically uniform. Within one and the same narrative genre there can be instructive and interesting narratives, propagandistic and philosophical narratives. Moreover, any one narrative may have more than one intention or

effect. And even the same story can be told and retold for different purposes in the same genre.

Such then are the sources of criteria for narrative genres according to the narrative paradigm. But genre is not the be all and end all of contextual study. It is merely one context of many, a literary historical category of considerable value to critics but not necessarily recognized by real authors and real audiences fulfilling their implied-audience roles. Any study of genre or genres must ultimately move "beyond genre" to put genre in the context of additional literary, cultural, and communicative contexts.

3. THE ANCIENT NOVEL

The genre of the ancient novel consists of a group of prose narrative works composed in Greek or Latin in the early Roman imperial period, the first through third centuries A.D., which refer to the cultural and subcultural experience and imagination of the peoples of the Roman empire. This preliminary definition sets the temporal and cultural limits for the genre of the ancient novel without yet distinguishing it from the genres of ancient history and biography. My purpose in part three is to make such a distinction by presenting the results of an application of the narrative paradigm to twelve works selected from those adjudged to be ancient novels. These works (with their authors, if known, in parentheses) are: The Acts of Thomas, The Alexander Romance ("Pseudo-Callisthenes"), Chaereas and Callirhoe (Chariton), Clitophon and Leucippe (Achilles Tatius), Daphnis and Chloe (Longus), The Ephesian Story or Habrocomes and Anthia (Xenophon of Ephesus), The Ethiopian Story or Theagenes and Chariclea (Heliodorus), Joseph and Asenath, The Life of Aesop, The Metamorphoses or The Golden Ass (Apuleius), The Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions ("Pseudo-Clement"), and The Satyricon (Petronius).¹¹

These twelve have been selected in order to represent the variety of the genre and as representatives of subgenres within the genre. The love stories Chaereas and Callirhoe, Clitophon and Leucippe, Daphnis and Chloe, The Ephesian Story, and The Ethiopian Story belong to the subgenre of Greek romance. The Acts of Thomas and The Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions are Christian novels, entertaining adventures of the apostles Thomas and Peter which are not, however, without their religious motives. The Latin comic novels The Metamorphoses and The Satyricon, indebted to previous literary tradition as they are, are nevertheless the undisputed masterworks of the genre. The Alexander Romance is a historical novel, and The Life of Aesop is a biographical novel. Joseph and Asenath is a Jewish novel, a brief account about the patriarch Joseph, like the Greek romances a love story, and like the Christian novels a religious work.¹²

Events and Existence. It is not the case, as is often supposed, that the events and existents of ancient novels are entirely fictional and that their fictionality at once separates them from the ancient histories and biographies with their historically-true narrative worlds. True, ancient novels tend toward fictional representation, but they are not without their historical events and existents. And although one of the aims of ancient histories and biographies is historical reporting, Greco-Roman historians and biographers, as is well known, often intentionally or unintentionally fall short of this mark. Thus,

not fictionality in itself but only a tendency toward fictionality can be used as a criterion for the genre of the ancient novel.

Whether historical or fictional, any or all events and existents can be represented in ancient novels. There are no events and existents *per se* uniquely novelistic; nor are any events and existents excluded *per se* from novelistic narrative worlds. Events and sequences of events tend to be fictional even if the existents involved are historical. Within historical sequences of events there are fictional expansions. Pseudo-Callisthenes inserts fictional records of Alexander's correspondence with the Persian king Darius and the Ethiopian queen Candace into the historical sequence of the eastern campaigns. The Egyptians did indeed revolt under Artaxerxes II as reported in Chaereas and Callirhoe, but Chaereas' roles as general and admiral in the war of rebellion are fictions.

The heroes and heroines of the Greek romances and Latin novels are fictional, but the heroes of the Christian, historical, biographical, and Jewish novels, Thomas, Peter, Alexander the Great, Aesop, and Joseph, are historical. Settings in the ancient novels make use of eastern Mediterranean sites. Italy and Sicily are the western and India the eastern boundaries for their narrative worlds. All but four of the twelve works selected, The Acts of Thomas, Daphnis and Chloe, The Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions, and The Satyricon take place at least in part in Egypt.¹³

Historicity and fictionality aside, the ancient novels typically contain a greater variety of personal participants than is true of ancient histories and biographies. Ancient histories record the deeds of leaders and rivals in the political and military arenas. Ancient biographies are about men of all-excelling virtue, wisdom, and, sometimes, vice, who distinguished themselves in public service or in the pursuit of philosophy. These are the well-born, the well-bred, those who succeeded in their chosen professions. In contrast, the ancient novels include men and women of every age, social standing, sexual preference, occupation, religious persuasion, and personal characteristic or circumstance among their principal participants. A sampling: the slave Aesop who is part practical joker and part moralistic philosopher, Lucius the distant relative of Plutarch, the ass, and the initiate into the mysteries of Isis, Eumolpus the paederast and master of doggerel verse, the goatherd Daphnis and the shepherdess Chloe, the homosexual brigand Hippothoos, Chariclea the white teenage daughter of the black king and queen of Ethiopia, and Peter and Thomas the apostles of Christ. Of the heroes and heroines of the ancient novels only Alexander the Great is a subject worthy of historical or biographical treatment.

Sequence and Structure. In overall sequence the ancient novels are ordered biographically. The order of narrative world events corresponds to that of their occurrence in the lives of the principal participants.¹⁴ The sequence of The Alexander Romance covers the hero's entire life, from conception and birth to death. In the other novels significant moments in the lives of the principal participants bound the sequence of events. The Life of Aesop begins shortly before Isis grants the mute slave

Aesop the gift of speech and ends with his death. In The Metamorphoses the sequence of events begins just before Lucius' bodily transformation and ends just after his bodily retransformation and religious conversion. In The Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions the sequential boundaries are those of Clement's coming into acquaintance with Peter and Christianity and re-acquaintance with his family in Christ. The Acts of Thomas deals with the mission of the apostle to India. The Greek romances and Joseph and Asenath center around years before and after the marriages of the heroes and heroines.

The basic biographical sequence of birth to death is a narrative-world element which the ancient novels share with ancient biographies. But within this basic sequence there are significant differences between the two genres. In the ancient novels events within sequential units, component sequential units within composite sequential units, and composite sequential unit after composite sequential unit give the impression of chronological order (clearly marked backward and forward references and occasional compromises of simultaneous occurrence aside). This impression is brought about through chronological specifications such as "then," "on the next day," "Immediately thereafter he boarded ship and put out to sea," and "After these words she drank the potion" (The Ephesian Story 3.5.11, 3.6.5). In contrast sequences in the biographies of Diogenes Laertius and Suetonius are ordered according to principles of anecdotal association and topical arrangement. Plutarch's biographies are chronological but not strictly so. On occasion he departs from chronological order to describe the characteristic activities or attitudes of his heroes during their entire adult lives.

The events of ancient histories unfold in chronological order but usually not in biographical sequence. Biographical sequence, at most the length of a human life span, is simply too brief to comprehend the many years and many arenas of civic, ethnic, imperial, or world history covered in most histories.¹⁴ But in ancient histories there are as a rule several biographical sequences, events ordered within the lives of a succession of principal participants, generals, kings, emperors and the like. When viewed as collections, the biographies of Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, and Suetonius are also series of biographical sequences. Diogenes Laertius relates the history of Greek philosophy, its origins, and its Ionian and Italian schools in a series of biographies of the Greek philosophers. Plutarch's parallel lives are the biographical highlights of the history of Greece and Rome, and Suetonius presents an emperor-centered history of early imperial Rome.

In the ancient novels backward references in the form of summary citations and allusions as well as scenic stories-within-stories place the narrative present in the context of the narrative or extranarrative past. In Chaereas and Callirhoe there are frequent references to Homer. Through citations the sufferings and separations of the young lovers Chaereas and Callirhoe are compared to those of Achilles and Patroclus in The Iliad and Odysseus and Penelope in The Odyssey. Daphnis and Chloe prefers allusion to citation, and some of its literary references not only retrieve the extranarrative past but anticipate the narrative future. Stories-within-stories serve primarily to insert into sequences material pertinent to but

otherwise outside them. In *The Ephesian Story* the brigand Hippothoos and the fisherman Aegialeus tell true-love stories-within-stories to Habrocomes. Both men lost their true loves to death, and Habrocomes, even as he listens to them, fears that he shares in their fate. Such a predilection for citation, allusion, and stories-within-stories is not found in ancient histories or biographies.¹⁵

Time and Space. All five categories of narrative time and space are attested in the ancient novels with alternation between summary and scene being the characteristic temporal rhythm. The proportion of summary to scene varies from work to work in each of the three ancient prose narrative genres, but it seems safe to say that the ancient novels are slightly more scenic in expression than ancient histories and biographies. This slight scenic advantage has a considerable affect on reading time. Scene, by making reading time almost equal to real-world time, increases audience interest, often leading audiences to believe that they are "on the scenes." Summary, because it abbreviates real-world time, is less likely to inspire audience interest.¹⁶

Presence. The narrators of the ancient novels are present in or absent from their narrative worlds as indicated by first person and third person narration. In *Clitophon and Leucippe*, *The Metamorphoses*, and *The Satyricon* the principal participants Clitophon, Lucius, and Encolpius are also the narrators and often the first person narrators. In *The Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions* the narrator Clement is a peripheral first person narrator. He uses the first person in reference to himself but, since he is not the principal participant in his narrative world, more often narrates in the third person. First person narration in the other novels is confined to letters and stories-within-stories, including the lengthy first person narrations of Cnemon and Calasiris in *The Ethiopian Story*. In ancient histories and biographies authorial narrators are usually not allowed to enter into their narrative worlds.

Voice. Ancient histories and biographies differ from novels by virtue of their use of volume for verification. The narrators of ancient histories and biographies audibly attempt to assess the relationship of their narrative worlds to real-world historical facts. They refer to sources, give their own opinions about historical reliability, and from conflicting source reports attempt to reconstruct "what really happened." The narrators of the ancient novels never do so. Arrian, Plutarch, and Pseudo-Callisthenes all mention Alexander the Great's encounters with the Amazons. Reasoning on the basis of his sources, Arrian doubts that the meeting which some of them report between Alexander and one hundred Amazon warriors ever took place (*The Anabasis of Alexander* 7.13.2-6). Plutarch lists five sources which support and nine sources which deny the story of the visit of the queen of the Amazons to Alexander. He agrees with the nine and in corroboration cites a letter of Alexander and a story about Onesicritus and Lysimachus (*Alexander* 46.1-5). Without any such evidence of historical research or reasoning from sources, Pseudo-Callisthenes presents the correspondence between Alexander and prominent Amazons and a letter of Alexander to his mother Olympias in which he describes his visit to the land of the Amazons (*The Alexander Romance* 3.25-27).¹⁷

Language, Style, Space, Perspective. The determination of generic criteria from these elements awaits further study. Of language and style the one seems to be the prerogative of education, cultural trends, region, or period and the other the practice of authors rather than of genres. Perhaps eventually to be included among the criteria of the genre of the ancient novel is a tendency toward typical rather than individual characterization, especially in the specification of minor participants. Among the principal participants Calasiris in The Ethiopian Story, Lucius in The Metamorphoses, and Aesop in The Life of Aesop are by no means types. And as an ancient biographical example, some of Plutarch's heroes are embodiments of various virtues and vices.¹⁸ Differences in perspective among the genres depend on differences in presence. First person narration tends to be more limited and inwardly oriented than third person narration.

Experience and Imagination, Creation and Reading. Experience and imagination and creation and reading are better used as illustrations of the contextual variety of the ancient novel than as criteria for differentiating ancient novels from ancient histories and biographies. Because the genre of the ancient novel comprehends the cultural experience and imagination of the peoples of the Roman empire, it also comprehends their subcultural experience and imagination, that, for example, of Jews and Christians. In turn subcultural experience and imagination accounts in part for the variety of narrative texts in the genre of the ancient novel. Joseph and Asenath refers to the patriarchs in Egypt rather than to Odysseus in captivity in the cave of Polyphemos, and the Christian novels dwell on the missionary successes of the apostles rather than on the athletic achievements of the likes of Chaereas, Habrocomes, and Theagenes.

The ancient novels are pleasurable communications, pleasurable in different ways and to different purposes. The Alexander Romance is an interesting, real life adventure. The Life of Aesop, The Metamorphoses, and The Satyricon are humorous, even though The Metamorphoses concludes on a serious, religious note. The Greek romances achieve a number of pleasurable effects: they arouse fear and pity in the reading world as well as in the narrative world, delight only to disappoint, excite and even enchant.¹⁹ The Jewish and Christian novels contain religious instruction or edification in the form of pleasurable communication.

To summarize, ancient novels are expected to conform to all of the following seven sets of criteria selected from the four areas of narrative meaning:

1. Events and Existence: historical or fictional events and existents, a tendency toward fictional events or fictional sequences of events, variety in the types of personal participants, a setting in the eastern Mediterranean (with the option of an Egyptian setting).
2. Sequence and Structure: biographical sequence covering the life or important years in the lives of personal participants, chronological ordering, backward references in the form of literary references (citations, allusions, and stories-within-stories).

3. Time and Space: alternation between summary and scene with scene predominating.

4. Presence: presence or absence of the narrator from the narrative world as indicated by first person or third person narration.

5. Voice: avoidance of overt verification through source references and authorial expressions of opinion.

6. Experience and Imagination: representation of the cultural and subcultural experience and imagination of the peoples of the Roman empire.

7. Creation and Reading: any number of intentions and effects achieved through pleasurable communication.

In part four I will argue that Luke-Acts meets these criteria and is therefore to be classified as a Christian ancient novel.

4. LUKE-ACTS AS AN ANCIENT NOVEL

Previous comparison of Luke-Acts to the ancient novels has been impeded by certain preconceptions about Luke-Acts or the ancient novels and too narrow an understanding of genre and generic criteria. There is a certain reluctance, even among critical scholars, to compare Luke-Acts to the ancient novels for fear, it seems, that if resemblances between the two are discovered, Luke-Acts will have to be declared fictional and Christianity's claims false. As shown in part three, there are no grounds for such a fear. Ancient novels contain historical as well as fictional events and existents, and even fictional genres allow for nonfictional subgenres. Classicists dismiss the ancient novels as popular literature unworthy of philological attention or affection, and New Testament scholars trained in the classics prefer to compare Luke-Acts to the Hochliteratur of Greco-Roman antiquity and the Kleinliteratur of other times and places than to an ancient genre held in such disrepute.

Comparisons, when made, err in their restriction to Acts and the ancient novels and to the criteria of events and existence or content. In generic study as in theological study, Acts cannot be considered apart from its companion volume Luke. It is a misreading of Luke-Acts to separate the two because of their creative history, Luke a product of the synoptic tradition and Acts more the work of a single author, and narrative-world form, Luke a gospel or aretalogical biography and Acts a history or historical novel. Taken together Luke and Acts are more than the life of Jesus and the first church history; they are the story of the salvation of God available to all people, first through Jesus, Savior, Christ, and Lord, and then through Christian community.

Content is too narrow a comparative criterion. Granted that Luke-Acts and the ancient novels contain miracle stories, trial narratives, and travel stories, in narrative analysis and interpretation the generic significance of these shared characteristics remains open until questions of their sequence, structure, time, space, and so on, are answered. Whatever their criteria, comparisons of Acts to the ancient novels have proceeded from an incorrect assumption of absolute uniformity within genres. As a result Acts, in order to be classified as an ancient novel, is forced to meet criteria which it simply does not meet. Conversely Acts is excluded from the genre of the ancient novel

for its failure to meet trivial criteria.²⁰ What follows attempts to advance beyond the prejudice and rigidity which are the legacy of the comparative study of Acts and the ancient novels.

Events and Existence. The principal participants of Luke-Acts, Jesus in Luke and Paul and Peter in Acts, are historical figures. So too are many of the other participants, as attested by sources outside Luke-Acts (for example, Pilate in Josephus, Gamaliel in rabbinical literature, and Priscilla-Prisca and Aquila in the Pauline epistles). It is probable that some of the personal participants not attested elsewhere (or at least the roles assigned to them) are fictional, and almost certain, to some modern minds at least, that personally portrayed angelic, demonic, and satanic beings are so. Participants, both individuals and groups, represent a cross section of Roman imperial society: Herod Antipas, son of Herod the Great and ethnarch of Galilee, Gallio, son of Seneca Rhetor, brother of Seneca Philosopher, and governor of Achaia, Jairus the archisynagogue, Cornelius the centurion, Zacchaeus the taxcollector, Lydia the purple-merchant, Peter's mother-in-law, Publius' father, Sadducees and Pharisees, Stoics and Epicureans.

The narrative-world boundaries of Luke-Acts are within those set in the ancient novels, Italy and Sicily to the west and Asia Minor and the Near East to the east. Given the cultural experience and imagination of Judaism inherited by Christianity and the later heterodox course of Egyptian Christianity, the omission of an Egyptian setting from the narrative world of Luke-Acts is not surprising. Moreover, the settings in Galilee, Jerusalem, Samaria, and Damascus more than supply the need for a setting in an exotic eastern locale.

In Luke-Acts historical and fictional events are embedded in fictional sequences of events. Both historical and fictional representations of Jesus' historical ministry of teaching and miracle-working are no doubt contained in the fictional sequence of his missionary journey to Jerusalem in Luke 9:51-19:44/48. The Antiochene mission in Acts 13:1-15:35 and the Pauline mission in Acts 15:36-19:40 are fictional sequences which represent the historical course of first-century Christianity from its origin in Judaism through its eventual confrontation with the Greco-Roman world. Some, if not most, of the events within these sequences, however, have been selected from those of the historical visits of Paul and his fellow missionaries to the cities of the eastern Roman empire. Luke-Acts seeks to represent a theological and historical reality, the salvation of God in Jesus Christ and through Christian community. In the narrative-world of Luke-Acts representation of this reality is not tied down to representation through the selection of historical events only. It is rather a reality represented through the selection of historical and fictional events and their ordering in fictional sequences.

Before turning to sequential criteria, a digression of sorts is in order as a critical supplement to previous comparisons of the events in Acts to those in the ancient novels. I will treat in brief three topics: events in Acts and the ancient novels, events in Luke and the ancient novels, and events in the ancient novels not in Luke-Acts.

The trial scenes and sea voyage in the final chapters of Acts are often included in lists of novelistic events in Acts. These events have been labeled novelistic because of their fictional properties but without due consideration of their representation in other ancient genres, both fictional and historical. Rather than being the possession of any one genre, the defense speeches of the trial scenes and sea voyages belong to the tradition of rhetorical training in antiquity. In fact the sea voyage in Acts 27-28 more closely resembles those in Latin epics of the first century than those in the ancient novels of any century.²¹

While a beginning has been made in the comparison of Acts to the ancient novels, I know of no full-length comparison of Luke or any of the gospels to the ancient novels. As an invitation to study in this area I offer a preliminary list of events and sequences of events shared by Luke and the ancient novels: infancy narratives, presentation scenes, dinner parties, crucifixions, and empty tomb narratives. In Luke 1-2, The Alexander Romance, Daphnis and Chloe, and The Ethiopian Story there are miraculous or unusual birth or infancy scenes. In Chaereas and Callirhoe Callirhoe and Dionysius, the supposed father, present the child of Chaereas and Callirhoe in the temple of the goddess Aphrodite; in Luke 2 Mary and Joseph, the father of Jesus "as was supposed," present Jesus in the temple in Jerusalem. In Luke 5,7,11,14,22,24 and in a number of the ancient novels, in particular in The Life of Aesop and most famously in the Cena Trimalchionis in The Satyricon, dinner parties provide the setting for teaching and story telling. Chaereas' discovery of Callirhoe's empty tomb almost reads as a fifth gospel account. The heroes of Chaereas and Callirhoe, The Ephesian Story, and The Babylonian Story of Iamblichus (preserved only in fragments and summarized by Photius) are crucified and delivered from death, Chaereas by his friend and cross-bearer Polycharmus and rival Mithridates, Habrocomes by the divine agency of the god of the Nile, and Rhodanes by his rival Garmus. It remains for future studies to establish the significance, if any, of these resemblances. Infancy narratives and dinner parties are certainly not unique to the narrative worlds of Luke and the ancient novels. But examples of presentation, crucifixion, and empty tomb scenes in the other ancient genres do not come readily to mind.

Events best designated by the general subject headings "war" and "love and/or sex" are regular features of the ancient novels not represented in Luke-Acts. The Alexander Romance describes Alexander the Great's wars of conquest. Near the conclusions of Chaereas and Callirhoe and The Ethiopian Story major sections are devoted to wars. Clitophon and Leucippe, The Ephesian Story, The Ethiopian Story, and The Metamorphoses depict the raids and rivalries of pirates and brigands by sea and by land. In Daphnis and Chloe Methymnians disturb the pastoral peace of Lesbos. In Joseph and Asenath Joseph's marriage to Asenath leads to hostilities between the hero and the son of the pharaoh. The Satyricon contains an epyllion entitled "Bellum Civile." Love and sex are favorite subjects of the Greek romances and Latin novels. The Greek romances not only relate the true-love stories of their heroes and heroines but their unwanted attractions to numerous others. Lucius' metamorphosis into an ass ends his affair with Fotis, and his return to human form follows his flight from a

public display of bestiality. Also in *The Metamorphoses* is the "little romance" of Cupid and Psyche. In *The Satyricon* bisexuality, heterosexuality, and homosexuality are all abundantly in evidence. According to *The Alexander Romance* Alexander was conceived of the love match of Olympias and Nectenabus. Only *The Life of Aesop* lacks war and love scenes. In the two works from the subgenre of Christian novels there are no wars, and affairs of the heart do not affect the principal participants.

Sequence and Structure. The sequence of Luke is biographical, beginning just before and ending just after the earthly existence of Jesus. Most of the events take place during the most important years of Jesus' life, those of his ministry. The sequence of events in Acts 13-28 is organized according to Paul's missionary career. In Acts 1-12, however, biographical sequence cannot be said to prevail. Peter is the principal participant, but there are also sequences featuring Stephen, Philip, and Paul. In its miniature biographical sequences about several apostles, Acts 1-12 is historical rather than biographical in sequence.

The departure from biographical sequence in Acts 1-12 and the separate biographical sequences in Luke and Acts 13-28 are acceptable generic variations performed by the author of Luke-Acts for the sake of his theological theme. His is a story of salvation in two parts, the life of Jesus continued in the lives of the apostles and the life of the church. He uses the biographical sequences of Acts 1-12 to claim that there is a continuity between the ministry of Jesus and Christian origins in Jerusalem and the Christian mission to the Gentiles originating from Antioch and ending up in Rome. Paul's life as presented in Acts 13-28 parallels the life of Jesus and the course of Christian history. Paul, like Christianity, has his origins in Judaism. In retelling the story of his conversion Paul insists that there is continuity between his former life as a Pharisee and present life as a Christian preacher. And he is the Christian missionary most responsible for the eventual universality of Christianity.

Luke-Acts gives the impression of chronological order even in the absence or sequential vagueness of chronological specification. Strictly considered, chronological specifications such as Luke 6:1 "It happened on a sabbath" or Luke 6:6 "It happened on another sabbath" say nothing about the chronological order of these sabbaths. But because they are part of the composite chronological sequence of Jesus' Galilean ministry in Luke 4:14-9:50 and component sequential units in Luke-Acts are in great part specified as chronological in order, the implied author and implied audience operate from the assumption of chronological order.

Luke-Acts, like the ancient novels, makes frequent use of backward references. But the experience and imagination to which Luke-Acts refers is unlike that referred to in the ancient novels. Luke-Acts cites and alludes to scripture; Acts does the same and in addition, alludes to Luke. In Luke stories-within-stories such as the parables refer to events and existents otherwise outside the narrative world of Luke. In Acts stories-within-stories retell the all-important events of Luke-Acts, the death and resurrection of Jesus and the conversions of Cornelius

and Paul, but also refer to scriptural events and existents outside Luke-Acts significant for Luke-Acts, for example, the story of salvation as told by Stephen in Jerusalem and Paul in Pisidian Antioch. Although Acts on occasion refers to general cultural experience and imagination (the allusion to the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues and citation of Aratus' *Phaenomena* in Acts 17 being cases in point), references in Luke-Acts are by and large to the subcultural experience and imagination of Christianity. The events and existents of Luke-Acts are thus seen in the context of the story of salvation as recorded in the Law, Prophets, and other sacred writings of the Jews and are the divinely sanctioned sequel, so the references argue, to this story.

Time and Space. Luke-Acts alternates between summary and scenic expression. It prefers scenic expression and uses summary expression to connect successive scenes. Sequences from Jesus' Galilean ministry in Luke 4:14-7:1 and the sequence of apostolic trial and testimony for the name of Jesus in Acts 3:1-5:42 provide examples of alternation between summary and scene: Luke 4:14-15 summary, 4:16-30 scene, 4:31-32 summary, 4:33-37 scene, 4:38-43 summary-scene, 4:44 summary, 5:1-14 scene, 5:15-16 summary, 5:17-26 scene, 5:27-28 summary-scene, 5:29-39 scene, 6:1-11 scene, 6:12-19 summary-scene, 6:20-7:1 scene; Acts 3:1-26 scene, 4:1-4 summary-scene, 4:5-31 scene, 4:32-35 summary, 4:36-37 summary-scene, 5:1-11 scene, 5:12-16 summary, 5:17-26 summary-scene, 5:27-40 scene, 5:41-42 summary.²²

Presence. In Luke the authorial narrator (the narrator of the work as a whole) is entirely absent from the narrative world. In Acts the authorial narrator is present in the narrative worlds of chapters 16, 20-21, 27-28 as a peripheral first person narrator. Although Acts, like the ancient novels, allows its authorial narrator to enter the narrative world, first person narration in Acts is not like that in the ancient novels. First person narration continues from the beginning to the end of the first person ancient novels. In Acts it is introduced in mid-sequence. The ancient novels specify their first person narrators by name; the first person narrator of Acts is anonymous. The first person narrators of the ancient novels appear as first person singular "I"-narrators as well as members of first person plural parties. The first person narrator of Acts never distinguishes himself from the first person plural group to which he belongs; he always mysteriously remains a "we"-narrator.²³

Voice. The narrator of Acts never voices his opinion about the historicity of narrative-world events or expresses his awareness of sources for these events. Nor does the prologue in Luke 1:1-4 suggest that historicity or historical research were central concerns of the real author. Through the voice of a Greco-Roman prologue the real author makes no other claim than to be retelling a traditional story which he has set in order for the benefit of his real audience Theophilus or real audiences willing to assume the role of Theophilus.

Experience and Imagination. As already remarked upon, the experience and imagination which contributed to the creation of Luke-Acts was that of Christianity, a first-century culture within a culture. In the first century Christian experience and imagination included the scriptural heritage of Judaism and arose from and reflected upon the Gentile mission. But the author of Luke-Acts also drew upon the experience and imagination of

mainstream Greco-Roman civilization. The gods Zeus and Hermes, the goddess Artemis of Ephesus, the emperors Augustus and Claudius, and the conventions of the Greco-Roman prologue and sea voyage also find representation in Luke-Acts.

Creation and Reading. The purpose of Luke-Acts is religious or, more precisely, theological in nature. The subject matter is the possession of the Christian community or a part of that community, "the things that have come to fulfillment in our company." Luke-Acts is a story retold to assure real audiences that God, at once the God of Israel and the God of all people (both Jews and Gentiles) who believe in him, sanctioned the course of fulfillment from beginning to end. God initiates the sequence of events in Luke-Acts by sending Gabriel to Zechariah in the temple in Jerusalem and initiates the sequence of events in Acts by sending forth the Spirit which gives birth to Christian mission and community. He raises Jesus from the dead and forces a Gentile mission upon Peter. Throughout Luke-Acts God intervenes in the narrative world through his agents, Jesus in Luke, the apostles in Acts, and angels in Luke-Acts. "God-language" pervades the teachings of Jesus and the speeches of Peter, Stephen, and Paul. There is no denying that Luke-Acts is interesting, even entertaining, reading, but to read it only or primarily as pleasurable communication is to miss its message of salvation.

In conclusion to part four and to the study as a whole, I would like to review what I consider to be the contributions of the four parts of this study to theory and method, discussion of the genre of Luke-Acts, and reading of Luke-Acts. First, the narrative paradigm provides for a definition of genre and comprehensive definitions of genres on the basis of narrative meaning and with reference to narrative criteria. Without such a firm foundation in genre theory or broad understanding of the particular genre or genres in question, comparative studies such as this all too often become mere "comparisons and contrasts" or succumb to "parallelomania." In comparative studies the method of narrative analysis and interpretation directs its users through the four areas of the narrative paradigm, whether the comparison be for the purpose of establishing generic criteria for a group of works such as the ancient novels or testing one work such as Luke-Acts against the criteria for membership in a genre of works.

Second, on the basis of criteria for the genre of the ancient novel dependent on the narrative paradigm and derived from narrative analysis and interpretation of the ancient novels, I have been able to identify Luke-Acts as an ancient novel in genre and as a Christian ancient novel in subgenre. As an ancient novel Luke-Acts exhibits historical and fictional events and existents, a tendency toward representation in fictional sequences of events, a variety of personal participants, a setting in the eastern Mediterranean, biographical sequence, chronological ordering, literary references, preference for scenic expression in the alternation between summary and scene, first person and third person narration, a narrative voice not attuned to verification, Roman imperial experience and imagination, and a religiously-motivated intention in pleasurable communication. Not any one of these criteria alone but all of them

together identity Luke-Acts as an ancient novel. As a Christian ancient novel Luke-Acts adapts biographical sequence to its theological scheme, cites, alludes to, and tells stories-within-stories about the story of salvation, and arises from Christian experience and imagination.

Third, awareness of the generic and subgeneric associations of Luke-Acts is important for reading and understanding the work. Identification of Luke-Acts as an ancient novel secures for it a place in a recognizable literary historical context. It no longer has only to be ridiculed in comparison to ancient histories for its failures in historical reporting or in comparison to ancient history and biography be awkwardly characterized as a biography-history in form. It can now in comparison to the ancient novels be considered as a first-century Christian adaptation of a popular form of communication. Subgeneric controls, however, prevent Luke-Acts from being read merely in the context of the genre of the ancient novel. As a member of a subgenre distinguished by authorial reference to Christian experience and imagination, Luke-Acts comes with the expectation of audience reference to Christian experience and imagination. It demands of real audiences, both ancient and modern, an acquaintance with the contexts of scripture and the "Jesus story" gained, at first hand, from Christian existence and participation in Christian community and, at second hand, from study of first-century Christian experience and imagination. When so generically and subgenerically read and understood, it should not be surprising that Luke-Acts with its message of salvation for all people came to expression in that one of the three ancient prose narrative genres most intended for all people, the ancient novel.

NOTES

¹The view of all the commentaries. For two very different views of "Luke the historian," see Ward Gasque, A History of the Criticism of the Acts of the Apostles, Beitraege zur Geschichte der biblischen Exegese 17 (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1975) and Eckhard Pluemacher, "Lukas als griechischer Historiker," Paulys Realencyclopaedie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Supplementband 14 (1974): 235-64.

²Helmut Koester, "One Jesus and Four Primitive Gospels," in Trajectories through Early Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), pp. 158-204.

³Charles H. Talbert, What is a Gospel? The Genre of the Canonical Gospels (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977).

⁴Susan Marie Praeder, "Luke-Acts as Ancient Historical Romance," Society of Biblical Literature Pacific Coast Section paper, April 1979.

⁵Richard Ivan Pervo, "The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles" (Th.D. Dissertation, Harvard Divinity School, 1979).

⁶A more detailed discussion of the narrative paradigm appears in Susan Marie Praeder, "The Narrative Voyage: An Analysis and Interpretation of Acts 27-28" (Ph.D. Dissertation,

Graduate Theological Union, 1980). For the practical purposes of narrative analysis and interpretation the narrative paradigm draws on the theories developed in Seymour B. Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), Wolfgang Iser, Der Akt des Lesens: Theorie aesthetischer Wirkung, Uni-Taschenbuecher 636 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1976), and Franz K. Stanzel, Theorie des Erzählens, Uni-Taschenbuecher 904 (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979). The narrative paradigm is a working model not meant to be a final determination of narrative form.

⁷"Reading" and "audience" are used here and throughout this study as designations, respectively, of the process of reception and those who engage in reception. Thus, reading refers to aural and visual reception as well as to reception through reading in its strict sense, and audiences are all receivers, whether movie-goers, visitors to art galleries, or readers. The study of Luke-Acts and the ancient novels is limited to verbal narratives and their reception by reading or listening audiences.

⁸On the distinction between universal types and historical genres, see Norman R. Petersen, "On the Notion of Genre in Via's 'Parable and Example Story': A Literary-Structuralist Approach," Semeia 1(1974): 134-81. Klaus W. Hempfer, Gattungstheorie, Information und Synthese 1, Uni-Taschenbuecher 133 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973) and Paul Hernadi, Beyond Genre: New Directions in Literary Classification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) summarize the history of the debate over the definition of genre and the definitions of genres.

⁹In addition to the works just cited, consult the collections of essays in Horst Ruediger, ed., Die Gattungen in der vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft, Komparatistische Studien, Beiheft zu "arcadia," Zeitschrift fuer vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft, Bd. 4 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974) and Joseph P. Strelka, ed., Theories of Literary Genre, Yearbook of Comparative Criticism 8 (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).

¹⁰This same generic adaptability of stories is attested by the story of Jesus in ancient, medieval, and modern times. Unfortunately, it is a factor all too often forgotten in proposals for gospel genre. The search for gospel genre should not be a quest for an existent like Jesus but a quest for a group of works like the gospels.

¹¹For a more complete list of novels, which I would at any rate both add to and abbreviate for reasons of date, length, and form, see Pervo, "Literary Genre" pp. 455-56. For bibliography the best source is G.N. Sandy, "Recent Scholarship on the Prose Fiction of Classical Antiquity," Classical World 67(1974): 321-59. For a recent discussion of dates and other matters, see B.P. Reardon, ed., Erotica Antiqua: Acta of the International Conference on the Ancient Novel (Bangor, Wales, 1977).

¹²Of these works only The Life of Aesop has not been previously described as an ancient novel. It is usually termed a

"popular biography" or a "romantic biography." For reasons which cannot be set forth here, it seems to me to be best described as an ancient biographical novel.

¹³In fact matters are a bit more complicated. Some of the heroes and heroines of the ancient novels may be based on historical figures. And, of course, a figure such as Joseph is more the product of tradition-history than historical research. Antonius Diogenes' *Wonders Beyond Thule* and Lucian's *True Stories* transgress the generally observed narrative-world boundaries set out here.

¹⁴The *Ethiopian Story* is an important exception to this general rule; see Ilse Nolting-Hauff, "Maerchenromane mit leidendem Helden: Zur Beziehung zwischen einfacher Form und narrativer Grossform in der Literatur (zweite Untersuchung)," *Poetica* 6(1974):417-55 for a diagram and discussion of sequence.

¹⁵For examples of citation in Chariton and allusion in Longus, see Carl Werner Mueller, "Chariton von Aphrodisias und die Theorie des Romans in der Antike," *Antike und Abendland* 22(1976): 115-36 and Antonio M. Scarcella, "La tecnica dell'imitazione in Longo Sofista," *Giornale italiano di filologia* 23(1971): 34-59.

¹⁶Tomas Haegg, *Narrative Technique in Ancient Greek Romances: Studies of Chariton, Xenophon Ephesius, and Achilles Tatius*, Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni Sueciae 8 (Stockholm, 1971), pp. 87-111 analyzes three of the ancient novels in this respect.

¹⁷In *The History of Alexander* 6.5.24-32 Quintus Curtius or rather his authorial narrator, one of the least audible of the ancient historical narrators, reports the meeting of Alexander and Thalestris, the queen of the Amazons, without question or source reference. Elsewhere, even if sparingly so, there is some source evaluation.

¹⁸Barbara Buecher-Isler, *Norm und Individualitaet in den Biographien Plutarchs, Noctes Romanae, Forschungen ueber die Kultur der Antike* 13 (Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1972).

¹⁹The view that the Greek romances are narrative portrayals of the secrets of the mystery religions no longer finds support in classical circles. For a well-reasoned account of the functions of the ancient novels, see B.P. Reardon, *Courants littéraires grecs des II^e et III^e siècles après J.-C.*, *Annales littéraires de l'Université de Nantes* 3 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1971), pp. 309-403.

²⁰Pervo, "Literary Genre" and Stephen P. Schierling and Marla J. Schierling, "The Influence of the Ancient Romances on Acts of the Apostles," *The Classical Bulletin* 6(1978):81-88 are valuable for their comparisons of events and existents. But Pervo insists that Acts is entertaining rather than theological, and the Schierlings reduce genre to a common store of events and existents.

²¹Praeder, "Narrative Voyage," pp. 227-45 and Fred Veltman,

"The Defense Speeches of Paul in Acts," in Perspectives on Luke-Acts ed. Charles H. Talbert, Special Studies Series No. 5 (Danville, Va.: Association of Baptist Professors of Religion; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd., 1978), pp. 242-56 and his 1975 Graduate Theological Union dissertation of the same title.

²²"Summary-scene" designates a subcategory of scenic expression. These scenes are briefer and spatially less precise than scenes proper but are not yet summaries. For the sake of simplicity I have passed over the omissions and expositions in the sequences cited.

²³For the latest discussion of the "we"-passages, see Praeder, "Narrative Voyage," pp. 186-226. Here I show that first person plural narration in Acts cannot be explained as a narrative convention of sea voyages in ancient literature.

LAUDATION STORIES IN THE GOSPEL OF LUKE

AND PLUTARCH'S ALEXANDER

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It is rather widely recognized that the book of Acts reflects the activity of a hellenistic author. Most importantly, the style shifts with the setting. The account of the church in Jerusalem bears the marks of imitation of LXX style,¹ the events at Lystra, Philippi, Athens, and Ephesus contain the strategies of dramatic episodes at home in Livy, Kleitarch, Duris, and Curtius Rufus;² the final speeches of Paul exhibit the characteristics of defense speeches written in the setting of Greek and Roman courts;³ and the voyages of Paul capture the dynamics of sea travel in the characteristic style of periploous literature.⁴

Fewer interpreters suggest that the Gospel of Luke reflects the strategies of a hellenistic author. To be sure, it is recognized that the preface to Luke reveals a literary approach akin to historiographical and biographical writing during the hellenistic period.⁵ But only recently have the first four chapters of Luke been analyzed in relation to topoi common to hellenistic biographical literature.⁶ For the most part, interpreters presuppose too much influence from Mark and Q upon Luke to consider it appropriate or fruitful to analyze the Gospel of Luke in relation to strategies in hellenistic literature.

This paper employs comparative criticism to explore the literary strategy of laudation and self-praise in the Gospel of Luke.⁷ Through a comparison of Luke with two hellenistic documents, one Jewish and one secular, the interpretation establishes a base that reaches into biblical, Jewish, and Graeco-Roman traditions. The intent is to describe an aspect of the Gospel of Luke that reflects a coalition of traditions and conventions characteristic of Christian literature written by an author who lived in the literary environment of Graeco-Roman culture.

Josephus' Antiquities and Plutarch's Alexander have been chosen for the comparative interpretation since the compositional and rhetorical strategies in the Gospel of Luke lie somewhere in the vicinity of biographical historiography as it appears in the writings of Josephus and historical biography as it appears in the Parallel Lives of Plutarch. The possibility of a relationship between the historiography of Josephus and Luke-Acts has been recognized for many years,⁸ and recent analysis of the use of sources in Josephus and the Gospel of Luke has raised the issue in a new form.⁹ Awareness of the relation of certain strategies in Plutarch's Parallel Lives and Luke-Acts has been stimulated by recent analysis of the biographies and treatises of Plutarch.¹⁰

The analysis of laudation and self-praise in the Gospel of Luke proceeds through four stages. First, comparison of the opening chapters of Luke, of Josephus' portrayal of Moses in *Antiquities*, and of Plutarch's *Alexander* reveals basic similarities in laudation strategy in the documents. Second, analysis of divine participation in the mother's conception in Luke and Plutarch's *Alexander* uncovers the nature of the interaction between the protagonist and his parents in the narrative. Third, exploration of the special sonship of the protagonist exhibits the basis for his engagement in self-praise. Fourth, investigation of the settings in which the protagonist praises himself reveals that the authors proceed according to Graeco-Roman conventions that make the self-praise inoffensive to the reader. These stages of analysis suggest that the Gospel of Luke as well as the book of Acts reflects the activity of a hellenistic author.

Introductory Laudation Strategy in Luke, Josephus, and Plutarch

One of the noticeable features of the Gospel of Luke when one has just read through Plutarch's *Alexander* is the large number of stories and narrational comments in both documents that contain laudatory remarks about the protagonist. In general terms, this feature suggests the rhetorical tradition of the encomium.¹¹ Casting the comparative net on the side of Jewish as well as secular hellenistic literature, one sees that especially the opening chapters of Luke have been composed in a manner that relates them both to Josephus' account of Moses' birth and youth in *Antiquities* II.201-237 and Plutarch's account of Alexander's birth and youth in *Alexander* II.1-X.8.¹²

First, Plutarch's *Alexander*, the Gospel of Luke, and Josephus' account of Moses contain promises of future greatness of the protagonist in the midst of assertions that his leadership will bring woe and calamity upon certain people. In *Antiquities* II.205 Josephus recounts that one of the sacred scribes:

announced to the king that there would be born to the Israelites at that time one who would abase the sovereignty of the Egyptians and exalt the Israelites, were he reared to manhood, and would surpass all men in virtue and win everlasting renown.

When the Hebrew Amaram prayed to God out of fear because his wife was pregnant, God appeared to him in his sleep and told him:

This child, whose birth has filled the Egyptians with such dread that they have condemned to destruction all the offspring of the Israelites, shall indeed be thine; he shall escape those who are watching to destroy him, and, reared in marvellous wise, he shall deliver the Hebrew race from their bondage in Egypt, and be remembered, so long as the universe shall endure, not by Hebrews alone but even by alien nations... (II.215-216).

At the birth of the child Moses:

their [the parents'] belief in the promises of God was confirmed by the manner of the woman's delivery, since she escaped the vigilance of the watch, thanks to the gentleness of her travail, which spared her any violent throes (II.218).

Then, in Antiquities II.233 when Pharaoh took the young child in his arms and placed his diadem upon the child's head in response to his daughter's hope that Moses could be her child and heir to Pharaoh's kingdom:

Moses tore it off and flung it to the ground, in mere childishness, and trampled it underfoot; and this was taken as an omen of evil import to the kingdom. At that spectacle the sacred scribe who had foretold that this child's birth would lead to the abasement of the Egyptian empire rushed forward to kill him with a fearful shout: "This," he cried, "O king, this is that child whom God declared that we must kill to allay our terrors; he bears out the prediction by that act of insulting thy dominion and trampling the diadem under foot"

When Pharaoh's daughter Thermuthis quickly snatched Moses from the arms of the Pharaoh, Moses remained safe to fulfill the promise of greatness that would bring freedom to the Israelites and calamity upon the Egyptians.

Similarly, in Luke 1:32 the angel Gabriel announces to Mary that her son:

will be great, and will be called the Son of the Most High;
and the Lord God will give to him the throne of his father David,
and he will reign over the house of Jacob for ever;
and of his kingdom there will be no end."

Then, at the time of the birth an angel of the Lord appeared to shepherds in the field announcing to them:

"... to you is born this day in the city of David a Savior, who is the Lord Messiah.
And this will be a sign for you:
you will find a babe wrapped in swaddling cloths and lying in a manger."

When the shepherds found the babe lying in a manger (1:16) they revealed the saying which had been told them concerning the child and all the people who heard it were amazed at it (1:17-18). Then, when the child was taken to the Temple for the purification, Simeon, a righteous and devout man to whom it had been revealed that he would not see death before he had seen the Messiah of the Lord, prayed:

"... mine eyes have seen thy salvation
which thou hast prepared in the presence of all peoples,
a light for revelation to the Gentiles,
and for glory to thy people Israel" (2:30-32).

Then the prediction of woe upon some people occurred when Simeon said to Mary:

'Behold, this child is set for the fall and rising of many in Israel,
and for a sign that is spoken against
(and a sword will pierce through your own soul also),
that thoughts out of many hearts may be revealed"
(1:34-34).

Then Anna, a prophetess of eighty-four years of age, gave thanks to God and spoke "of him to all who were looking for the redemption of Israel" (1:36-38). As in Josephus' account of the child Moses, so in Luke's account promises of future greatness provide the setting for an announcement that the protagonist will bring woe and calamity upon some people.

As in *Antiquities* and Luke, so in Plutarch's *Alexander* promises of future greatness contain a warning that some people will meet disaster through his leadership. Prior to Alexander's birth, Philip dreamed that he was putting a seal in the figure of a lion on his wife's womb, and Aristander of Telemessus, a seer, interpreted this to mean that Olympias was pregnant with a son whose nature would be bold and lion-like (II.5). Then, the day Alexander was born, the temple of Ephesian Artemis was burnt, to which Hegesias the Magnesian said:

it was no wonder that the temple of Artemis was burned down, since the goddess was busy bringing Alexander into the world. But all the Magi who were then at Ephesus, looking upon the temple's disaster as a sign of further disaster, ran about beating their faces and crying aloud that woe and great calamity for Asia had that day been born.

To Philip, however, who had just taken Potidaea, there came three messages at the same time: the first that Parmenio [one of Philip's generals] had conquered the Illyrians in a great battle, the second that his race-horse had won a victory at the Olympic games, while a third announced the birth of Alexander. These things delighted him, of course, and the seers raised his spirits still higher by declaring that the son whose birth coincided with three victories would be always victorious" (III.5-9).

Amidst the predictions of Alexander's future greatness emerges an announcement that some people will suffer hardship and destruction in the setting of the protagonist's prestigious, successful leadership.

Second, all three accounts contain laudatory remarks by the narrator about the growth and wisdom of the protagonist. In *Antiquities* II.230-231, the narrator tells the reader:

His [Moses'] growth in understanding was not in line with his growth in stature, but far out ran the measure of his years: its maturer excellence was displayed in his very games, and his actions then

gave promise of the greater deeds to be wrought by him on reaching manhood. When he was three years old, God gave wondrous increase to his stature; and none was so indifferent to beauty as not, on seeing Moses, to be amazed at his comeliness. And it often happened that persons meeting him as he was borne along the highway turned, attracted by the child's appearance, and neglected their serious affairs to gaze at leisure upon him: indeed childish charm so perfect and pure as his held the beholders spellbound.

Similarly, in Luke 2:40, 52 the narrator tells the reader:

And the child grew and became strong, filled with wisdom; and the favor of God was upon him.... And Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man.

Likewise, in Alexander IV.8 the narrator tells the reader:

But while he was still a boy his self-restraint showed itself in the fact that, although he was impetuous and violent in other matters, the pleasures of the body had little hold upon him, and he indulged in them with great moderation, while his ambition kept his spirit serious and lofty in advance of his years.

All three documents therefore contain narrational comment whereby the child is characterized as exceptional in wisdom and physical attributes at an early age. This feature in the midst of stories that predict his future greatness reveals a similar laudation strategy in the three narratives. The reader can be sure that the protagonist will achieve great things in the midst of adversity and opposition.

Parental Involvement in Divine Conception

While the three documents contain a common laudation strategy, Plutarch's Alexander and the Gospel of Luke share a number of features in common against Josephus' account of Moses. In Alexander and Luke the mother has an experience prior to marriage that points to divine generation of her son. On the night before the marriage of Philip and Olympias was consummated:

the bride dreamed that there was a peal of thunder and that a thunder-bolt fell upon her womb, and that thereby much fire was kindled, which broke into flames that travelled all about, and then was extinguished (II.3).

Later events suggest the possibility of divine conception to Philip:

Moreover, a serpent was once seen lying stretched out by the side of Olympias as she slept, and we are told that this, more than anything else, dulled the ardour of Philip's attentions to his wife, so that he no longer came to sleep by her side, either because he feared that some spells and enchantments might be practiced upon him by her, or because he shrank from her embraces in the conviction that she was the partner of a superior

being (II.6).

Finally, Philip's suspicions of divine activity in the conception of the child were borne out by a Delphic oracle:

Philip sent Chaeron of Megalopolis to Delphi, by whom an oracle was brought him from Apollo, who bade him sacrifice to Ammon and hold that god in greatest reverence, but told him he was to lose that one of his eyes which he had applied to the chink in the door when he espied the god, in the form of a serpent, sharing the couch of his wife (III.1-2).

Similarly, before the marriage of Mary and Joseph was consummated the angel Gabriel appeared to Mary and told her that she would conceive in her womb and bear a son whom she should call Jesus (1:31). When she wondered how this could be, since she was not yet married, the angel told her:

The Holy Spirit will come upon you,
and the power of the Most High will overshadow you;
therefore the child to be born will be called holy,
the Son of God (1:35).

Despite the presence of divine powers in the conception of the child by the mother, a genealogy through the parental father to a god (or God) is included both in Luke and in Plutarch's *Alexander*.¹³ In *Alexander* II.1 the author tells us that Alexander, through his father Philip, was descended from the hero-god Heracles through Caranus. Likewise, in Luke 3:23-28 the author tells us that Jesus, through his father Joseph, was descended from God through Adam. Nevertheless, divine participation in the conception of the child creates a role for the mother which calls forth special episodes in *Alexander* and Luke. In both accounts the mother is featured in interaction with her son that concerns his divine conception. Plutarch recounts that:

Olympias, as Eratosthenes says, when she sent Alexander forth upon his great expedition, told him, and him alone, the secret of his begetting, and bade him have purposes worthy of his birth (III.3).¹⁴

In Luke the interchange takes place when Jesus' parents return and find him in the Temple. When Mary asks why he had caused them such anxiety and he responded that he must be in "his father's house," his mother kept all these things in her heart (2:51). In Luke, as in Plutarch's *Alexander*, the mother of the protagonist carries knowledge that plays a special role in her interaction with her son.

The Interaction of the Son with his Parental Father

In both Luke and Plutarch the divine conception of the child introduces a motif that supports the portrayal of tension between the child and his parental father. The initial portrayal of the tension occurs in the stories that exhibit the wisdom of the protagonist some years before the

inauguration of his public career. In Luke the story recounts the episode concerning Jesus at twelve years of age remaining in the Temple at Jerusalem when his parents began to travel back to Nazareth after the Passover feast. The climax of the story, already referred to above, occurs when Jesus asserts:

"How is it that you sought me? Did you not know that I must be in my Father's house?" (2:49).

With this statement, Jesus disclaims his sonship to Joseph and asserts a sonship to God. Similarly, in Alexander V.1-3 we are told:

He [Alexander] once entertained the envoys from the Persian king who came during Philip's absence, and associated with them freely. He won upon them by his friendliness, and by asking no childish or trivial questions, but by enquiring about the length of the roads and the character of the journey into the interior, about the king himself, what sort of a warrior he was, and what the prowess and might of the Persians. The envoys were therefore astonished and regarded the much-talked-of ability of Philip as nothing compared with his son's eager disposition to do great things.

This story sets the stage for the next unit in which Alexander issues a sharp remark about his father that is similar to Jesus' statement to Mary in the temple:

... as often as tidings were brought that Philip had either taken a famous city or been victorious in some celebrated battle, Alexander was not very glad to hear them, but would say to his comrades: "Boys, my father will anticipate everything; and for me he will leave no great or brilliant achievement to be displayed to the world without your aid" (V.4).

Here the son makes a poignant statement that separates him from the parental father who would like to receive credit for his son's success. Here also the interpreter sees where the portrayal by Plutarch differs from the portrayal by Luke. In Plutarch, Alexander's divine parentage becomes a sub-motif within a setting dominated by the agonistic relation between Alexander and his parental father. For this reason, Alexander still refers to Philip as "my father" (V.4) when he addresses his friends. In contrast, the divine conception of Jesus in Luke brings forth the title "son of God" (1:35). Since the divine power behind the conception of Jesus is the God of Israel, Jesus' sonship and obedience to the Lord God of all reduces Joseph's role to a bystander. For this reason, when Jesus speaks of "my father" in the Temple scene (2:49), he is referring to the Lord God of Israel.

Both Plutarch's Alexander and Luke contain a dramatic test of the son prior to his public debut in his career.¹⁵ The divergent theology within the common literary procedure becomes even more evident at this point in the narrative. The test of Alexander occurs when Philoneicus the Thessalian brings a spirited, untamed horse named Bucephalas to sell to Philip (VI.1-8). When no one could mount the horse, Alex-

ander intervened with a statement that a marvellous horse was about to be lost because they could not manage him for lack of skill and courage:

At first, then, Philip held his peace; but as Alexander many times let fall such words and showed great distress he said: "Dost thou find fault with thine elders in the belief that thou knowest more than they do or art better able to manage a horse?" "This horse, at any rate," said Alexander, "I could manage better than others have."

When Philip asked Alexander what penalty he would pay if he was not able to handle the horse, Alexander agreed to forfeit the price of the horse. After Alexander quieted, mounted, and rode the horse:

Philip and his company were speechless with anxiety at first; but when Alexander made the turn in proper fashion and came back towards them proud and exultant, all the rest broke into loud cries, but his father, as we are told, actually shed tears of joy, and when Alexander had dismounted, kissed him, saying: "O son, seek thee out a kingdom equal to thyself; Macedonia has not room for thee."

As a result of the successful meeting of the test by Alexander, his parental father makes a laudatory comment that announces his recognition that this young man is not an ordinary son who will simply inherit the kingdom of his father. This son possesses such extraordinary wisdom, skill, and courage that he must find a kingdom of his own to rule.

In contrast, the test of Jesus occurs immediately after the heavens have announced his sonship to God (Luke 3:17). Accordingly, the test does not concern itself with Jesus' parental father, but with the ability of Jesus to outmaneuver Satan. In Luke, therefore, Jewish theology provides the framework for the testing of the divinely generated son. The test is initiated by Satan, and the event tests the wisdom and skill of Jesus as Son of God. When Satan asks Jesus to bow down and worship him, Jesus refuses by quoting Deuteronomy:

"You shall worship the Lord your God,
and him only shall you serve" (4:8).

Finally, when Satan fails three times, he goes away and leaves Jesus alone until an opportune time will again arise. The test of Alexander exhibits the manner in which he transcended his parental father. In contrast, the test of Jesus exhibits the manner in which he accepted sonship to the Lord God who was active in his conception. Jewish theology intersects with *topoi* common to hellenistic biography producing a protagonist with a lineage as great as that of Alexander and a quality of character as great as that of Moses.

Therefore, both Luke and Plutarch feature the protagonist breaking away from the influence of the parental father in a setting where the mother became pregnant through the intervention of a god and the heritage of the protagonist leads

back to a divine personage through the parental father. At this point the ideology, but not the literary strategy, becomes distinct. The theology around the God of Israel in Luke leads to a diminution of the role of Jesus' parental father and an emphasis on obedience and sonship to God. In contrast, Plutarch's *Alexander* allows a diminution of Alexander's divine origin in a setting that highlights the agonistic relation between Alexander and his parental father. The literary result is the portrayal of Jesus and Alexander through *topoi* common to hellenistic biography. The theological result is the portrayal of Jesus in a mode whereby a theological vision similar to that of Josephus has been filled with a vision of divine generation as it is entertained by Plutarch.

Self-Praise by the Protagonist

Josephus' account of Moses in *Antiquities* does not contain any connotations that Amaram was not the sole father of Moses, nor does it contain any rivalry between Moses and his parental father. Rather, in a *topos* common to Hebrew narrative, God appears to Moses' father prior to the birth and tells him that the important child to be born will be his. In accord with this, the narrator makes laudatory remarks about Moses in the early portions of the story, but Moses does not praise himself in the narrative. He is a paradigm of humility who regularly offers praise and blessing to God. Finally, however, Moses must defend himself before Pharaoh when he is dubbed a criminal for his activity. At this point Moses engages in the kind of self-praise necessary to defend himself and to explain that the powers that perform the miracles are God's:

"Indeed, O king, I too disdain not the cunning of the Egyptians, but I assert that the deeds wrought by me so far surpass their magic and their art as things divine are remote from what is human. And I will show that it is from no witchcraft or deception of true judgment, but from God's providence and power that my miracles proceed" (II.286).

Outside of settings like this, however, Moses does not praise himself. For this reason, the arrogant self-praise of Korah toward the end of the account emerges as a complete reversal of the positive attributes of Moses. When Moses appoints Aaron as the head of the priests according to God's directive, Korah objects by saying:

"What reason, pray, could Moses give for having conferred the priesthood upon Aaron and his sons? If God has decided to award this honour to one of the tribe of Levi, I have more right to receive it, being by birth on a level with Moses, in wealth and years his superior. If, on the other hand, it is meant for the oldest of the tribes, naturally that of Rubel should have this dignity, to be held by Datham, Abiram, and Phalaus; for they are the eldest of the members of that tribe, and powerful

through abundance of possessions" (IV.19).

The narrator comments about the speech as follows:

Now by these words Korah wished it to appear that he was concerned for the public welfare; in reality, he was but scheming to have the dignity transferred by the people to himself (IV.20).

As a result of this arrogant self-praise, Korah and his associates are destroyed by God (IV.51-56).

In contrast to the account by Josephus, Luke and Plutarch's Alexander feature the protagonist engaging in self-praise early in the narrative sequence. Already Jesus' comment in the Temple at twelve years of age contains an element of self-praise: when he asserts that he must be in "his father's house" (2:49), he is praising himself as son of God. Then, Jesus' public debut in the synagogue at Nazareth is a dramatic exercise in self-praise:

He opened the book and found the place where it is written:

"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me,
because he has anointed me to preach good news to
the poor.
He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives
and recovering of sight to the blind,
to set at liberty those who are oppressed,
to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord."

And he closed the book, and gave it back to the attendant, and sat down; and the eyes of all in the synagogue were fixed on him. And he began to say to them, "Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing" (4:17-21).

The sequence of first person singular pronouns in the quotation and the announcement that this scripture has been fulfilled in their hearing represents self-praise in a form unparalleled in Josephus' account of Moses.

Alexander also engages in self-praise early in the narrative. His complaint about the lack of skill and courage among those who cannot control the horse Bucephalas is based on a premise that "This horse, at any rate, I could manage better than others have" (VI.4). This statement contains a first person singular assertion by which the protagonist praises himself as one who has exceptional skill and courage.

Then, in the setting of Alexander's first campaign after receiving the kingdom at twenty years of age, he makes an announcement that contains self-praise:

on learning that the Thebans had revolted and that the Athenians were in sympathy with them, he immediately led his forces through the pass of Thermopylae, declaring that since Demosthenes had called him a boy

while he was among the Illyrians and Triballians, and a stripling when he had reached Thessaly, he wished to show him that before the walls of Athens he was a man (XI.6).

With a literary strategy similar to the Gospel of Luke, therefore, Plutarch's *Alexander* features the protagonist announcing his program of activity in a setting where he expresses his confidence in language of self-praise.

The Art of Inoffensive Self-Praise

Plutarch's *Alexander* and the Gospel of Luke, therefore, both contain a literary strategy whereby the protagonist's public career is launched in the midst of self-praise by the protagonist. But how can this be? Xenophon had asserted that a person should never engage in self-praise, and, indeed, he should show embarrassment if anyone praises him (*Memorabilia* II.i.21). Applying this principle to the act of authorship, an author should never allow his protagonist to enter into self-praise, and, indeed, the protagonist should show embarrassment if anyone praises him. An author, therefore, who is sensitive to principles of appropriateness within hellenistic literature should portray the protagonist in his narrative refraining from self-praise.

In his treatise entitled *De Laude Ipsius*, Plutarch suggests that Xenophon's position was not dominant in hellenistic literature. Against Xenophon's position, Plutarch argues that there are situations in which self-praise is not only appropriate but is recommendable.¹⁶ Analysis of Plutarch's *Alexander* and the Gospel of Luke shows that both narratives feature the protagonist praising himself only in appropriate settings and with appropriate caution.

When the Gospel of Luke introduces Jesus' public ministry in a situation where Jesus praises himself, the narrative provides a number of features that make the self-praise appropriate. First, self-praise can be useful if it is not done for personal glory or pleasure, but because the moment or circumstances demand the person to speak about himself.¹⁷ Since Jesus has already engaged in public ministry prior to the scene at Nazareth (Luke 4:15, 23), this scene portrays Jesus clarifying for the people in his home town what he is doing and why. Self-praise is necessary in this circumstance to clarify why he started to engage in these activities at thirty years of age (Luke 3:23). Second, self-praise can be appropriate if it is blended with praise by the audience.¹⁸ Immediately after Jesus sits down, the narrator tells us that people spoke well of him and marvelled at the graceful words that proceeded from his mouth (Luke 4:22). Third, self-praise is acceptable if the one praising himself does not claim all the credit but gives credit to God or "Chance."¹⁹ Jesus begins the statement of self-praise with the assertion, "the Spirit of the Lord has anointed me" (Luke 4:18). Fourth, it is important not to reiterate praise offered by someone

else, or it will become flattery (*kolakeia*). Moreover, a person should identify shortcomings in his own performance to keep the activity from appearing to be perfect.²⁰ When Jesus receives praise from the audience, he notices not the praise but the criticisms which are likely to come from the activities in which he engages (Luke 4:23). Fifth, self-praise is appropriate when one praises others whose aims and deeds are the same as one's own.²¹ Jesus addresses the criticism of him by comparing his own activity with that of Elijah and Elisha (Luke 4:25-27).

Plutarch is also careful to provide an appropriate setting for Alexander to enter into self-praise as he launches his public career. Alexander's march soon after receiving the kingdom at the age of twenty required special actions on his part. First, it was necessary to create a climate of confidence for his troops.²² By indicating that during previous exploits he himself was at first simply a boy, then later still just a stripling, but now finally a man (XI.6), he attempts to remove any fears the troops may have about his inexperience. Second, it is necessary to clear one's good name against a charge.²³ With his statement to his troops, Alexander is appropriately removing the stigma placed upon him by Demosthenes at earlier stages in his life. Third, it is appropriate to employ self-praise as a pedagogical device to give hope that the task can be attained and is not impossible.²⁴ Alexander's statement to his troops should not only give them confidence in his leadership but give them hope that the overcoming of the Theban revolt and the removal of the Athenian support of the revolt can be successful. Therefore, the self-praise by Alexander was useful and necessary much as the self-praise by Jesus at the beginning of his public career was essential for explaining the range of activity and the reasons for engaging in this activity.

Second, both the Gospel of Luke and Plutarch's Alexander guard against the protagonist's acceptance of laudatory remarks that appear to be excessive. Both narratives contain two stories in which the protagonist does not accept laudatory statements about him when the acceptance of those statements could imply that he had become overly self-possessing and arrogant. In the Gospel of Luke, when a woman cries out:

"Blessed is the womb that bore you, and the breasts that you sucked,"

Jesus says:

"Blessed rather are those who hear the word of God and keep it" (Luke 11:27-28).

Again, in Luke 23:27-31 when women are wailing and mourning Jesus, he turns to them and says:

"Daughters of Jerusalem, do not weep for me, but weep for yourselves and for your children" (23:28).

Even though the protagonist enters into self-praise and his actions elicit praise from others, on two occasions he resists laudatory remarks by making a corrective response.

Similarly, in Plutarch's Alexander the protagonist corrects excessive laudation of himself. When people began to praise Alexander as divine, he corrected them by showing them, when he was wounded, that blood was flowing out:

"and not ichor as the gods possess" (XXVIII.3).

Also, when asked if he, the son of Zeus, could thunder like the heavens had just done as a storm approached, Alexander responded with a corrective remark that exhibited that he was not foolishly affected or puffed up by belief in his divinity:

"Nay, I do not wish to cause fear in my friends, as thou wouldst have me do, thou who despisest my suppers because, as thou sayest, thou seest the tables furnished with fish, and not with satraps' heads" (XXVIII.4).

In other words, Alexander as well as Jesus responds twice in the narrative with a remark that turns a statement of blatant laudation back upon itself to avoid the possibility of accepting excessive praise.

Although both the Gospel of Luke and Plutarch's Alexander follow the principles whereby the protagonist in the narrative engages only in inoffensive self-praise, they each contain one example of self-praise that appears at first blush to be offensive. Jesus' sharp remark about being in "his father's house" (2:49) and Alexander's claim to have the skill and courage to handle the horse Bucephalas (VI.4) strain the limits of appropriate self-praise. In both instances the protagonist as a youth wilfully initiates a situation in which he puts down his parental father. Once the situation has been initiated, it is appropriate for the son to defend himself with self-praise that clarifies who he himself really is. But what right was there to initiate such a situation? At this point it would appear that there is an additional situation of appropriate self-praise within hellenistic biography that is not covered by Plutarch's treatise. Evidently, a son whose conception appears to have occurred through participation by a divine being has the right to clarify his superiority to his parental father in a setting initiated by the son which requires a statement of self-praise by the son to defend himself. This principle appears to have been extended to include the son's interaction with his mother in John 2:1-11 and with the neighborhood children and parents in the Infancy Gospel of Thomas.

Conclusion

Proceeding from similar laudation strategies in Josephus' account of Moses in *Antiquities*, the Gospel of Luke, and Plutarch's Alexander, the burden of this paper has been to pursue distinctive features of laudation and self-praise that emerge in Luke and Plutarch's Alexander in relation to the participation of divine powers in the conception of the protagonist. The analysis suggests that both documents contain an event initiated by the son as a youth in which he praises

himself at the expense of his parental father. Second, the protagonist announces the program of his activity in the setting of his public debut in a form that includes self-praise. Third, when excessive praise arises around him, the protagonist resists the laudatory statements with corrective remarks to those who have praised him. These strategies of portrayal of the protagonist appear to follow basic principles within Graeco-Roman biography whereby an important personage may praise himself inoffensively.

The strategies in common between the three documents suggest that all three authors are proceeding on the basis of *topoi* common to biographical portrayal in hellenistic culture. Theological assumptions held in common by Josephus and Luke initially suggest much more common ground between the Gospel of Luke and Josephus' *Antiquities*. A more detailed comparative analysis, however, suggests that the theologically common ground may obscure significant similarities the Gospel of Luke shares with secular Graeco-Roman literature like Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*. It may be more accurate to suggest that the strategies of portrayal in the Gospel of Luke lie somewhere between the strategies in Josephus' biographical historiography and Plutarch's historical biography. As a result, the theology of Luke incorporates a step further into the hellenistic portrayal of its protagonist than the theology of *Antiquities*. To suggest, as Luke does, that his protagonist is a divinely generated son is to take a decisive step beyond the *topoi* of Israelite and Jewish literature into a literary world where significantly new strategies function in the portrayal of the protagonist. The incorporation of new literary strategies is accompanied by the development of new theological understanding. Therefore, the Gospel of Luke has taken a decisive step, both literarily and theologically, beyond many other hellenistic Jewish documents as it has incorporated strategies and conceptions of the divinely generated son.

FOOTNOTES

1. Eckhard Plümacher, (Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller) (SUNT 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972) 38-79.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-136.

3. Fred Veltman, "The Defense Speeches of Paul in Acts," *Perspectives on Luke-Acts*, ed. Charles H. Talbert (Special Studies Series No. 5; Danville, VA: ABPR, 1978, 1978) 243-56.

4. Vernon K. Robbins, "By Land and By Sea: The We-Passages and Ancient Sea Voyages," *Perspectives*, *ibid.*, pp. 215-42; Eckhard Plümacher, "Wirklichkeitserfahrung und Geschichtsschreibung bei Lukas. Erwägungen zu den Wir-Stücken der Apostelgeschichte," ZNW 68 (1977) 2-22.

5. Vernon K. Robbins, Prefaces in Greco-Roman Biography and Luke-Acts," Perspectives in Religious Studies 6 (1979) 94-108. For other recent studies of the preface to Luke, see Richard J. Dillon, "Previewing Luke's Project from His Prologue (Luke 1:1-4)," CBQ 43 (1981) 205-27; Schuyler Brown, "The Role of the Prologues in Determining the Purpose of Luke-Acts," Perspectives, ibid., pp. 99-111.

6. Charles H. Talbert, "Prophecies of Future Greatness: The Contribution of Greco-Roman Biographies to an Understanding of Luke 1:5-4:15," in The Divine Helmsman: Studies on God's Control of Human Events, Presented to Lou H. Silbermann, ed. J. L. Crenshaw and S. Sandmel (New York: KTAV, 1980) 129-41.

7. For another example of comparative criticism as it is employed in this paper, see Vernon K. Robbins, "Mark 1:14-20: An Interpretation at the Intersection of Jewish and Graeco-Roman Traditions," NTS forthcoming.

8. E.g., Max Krenkel, Josephus und Lucas (Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1894).

9. F. Gerald Downing, "Redaction Criticism: Josephus' Antiquities and the Synoptic Gospels," JSNT 8 (1980) 46-65; 9 (1980) 29-48. See also Benjamin J. Hubbard, "Luke, Josephus and Rome: A Comparative Approach to Lukan Sitz im Leben," SBLSP I (1979) 59-68.

10. H. Dieter Betz (ed.), Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature, SCHNT III (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature, SCHNT IV (Leiden: Brill, 1978); Alan Wardman, Plutarch's Lives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974); Vernon K. Robbins, "Pronouncement Stories in Plutarch's Lives of Alexander and Julius Caesar," SBLSP II (1978) 21-38; "Classifying Pronouncement Stories in Plutarch's Parallel Lives," Semeia 20 (1981) 31-57.

11. For recent analysis of encomium and the Gospels, see Philip L. Shuler, "The Griesbach Hypothesis and Gospel Genre," Perkins Journal 33 (1980) 45-49.

12. Talbert, ibid., p. 134-8.

13. Cf. Talbert, ibid.

14. In accord with Plutarch's tendency with legends, he presents a counter-story immediately after it:

Others, on the contrary, say that she repudiated the idea and said, "Alexander must cease slandering me to Hera" (III.4).

15. Cf. Talbert, ibid., p. 132.

16. See H. Dieter Betz, "De laude ipsius (Moralia 539A-547F)," Plutarch's Ethical Writings, ibid., pp. 367-93.

17. 539E-F; Betz, ibid., p. 369.

18. 542B-C; ibid., p. 370.

19. 542E-543A; ibid.

20. 539D-E; 543F-544C; ibid., pp. 369, 371.

21. 542C-D; ibid., p. 370.

22. 539F; ibid., p. 369.

23. 540C-541A; ibid., p. 370.

24. 544E; ibid., p. 371.

THE HIGH PRIESTHOOD OF
SIMON MACCABEUS: AN ANALYSIS OF
1 MACC 14:25-49

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The question of why and how the Hasmoneans from Jonathan on obtained the high priesthood is complex and intriguing. By assuming that office they significantly departed from established tradition, even though that tradition had been violated before in the appointment of the high priests Jason and Menelaus.

Surprisingly, Jonathan's assumption of the high priesthood receives little comment in 1 Maccabees. The author is singularly laconic about the event: "And Jonathan put on the sacred vestments in the seventh month of the one hundred and sixtieth year at the Feast of Tabernacles (October 152 BC) and he gathered troops and prepared a large supply of arms. And Demetrius heard these things . . ." (1 Macc 10:21-22).

When one compares this statement with other texts that deal with the high priesthood, the difference is immediately evident. Of the elaborate installation ceremonies described in the P sections of Exodus and Leviticus, nothing except the donning of the vestments is mentioned, nothing of the high priestly splendor described by Ben Sira.¹ Interesting too is the fact that Jonathan entered office a few days after Yom Kippur when the presence of a high priest would have been needed most. There is not even a reference to the connection between the Hasmonean priesthood and Phinehas, so carefully pointed out earlier (1 Macc 2:26, 54).

Such taciturnity suggests that Jonathan's appointment as high priest met with strong and widespread resistance. We hear nothing further of his high priestly office, except in connection with official diplomatic acts and correspondence where his title is confirmed or referred to.

After Jonathan was murdered by the Seleucid pretender Tryphon, Simon became high priest. We are not informed when and how this came to pass. We may be sure he was not nominated by Tryphon, and he was only confirmed by Demetrius (1 Macc 14:38; cf. 13:36). According to 1 Macc 14:35 it was the people (ho laos) who made him high priest. But this cannot have happened at a "great assembly," of which 1 Macc 14:27-49 claims to be a documentary record, since that assembly is dated in the "third year of Simon the High Priest,"² a fact often neglected in the literature.³

This document in honor of Simon is a central, yet highly problematic part of 1 Maccabees. It is introduced as a spontaneous expression of thanks to Simon and his sons by the people (ho demos) because Simon and his family had fought off the enemies of Israel.⁴ The document, as we have it, is structured as follows:

- A. Preface (14:27-28)
- B. Account of Hasmonean achievements (vv 29-40)
 - I. Simon's family

1. Genealogy and general goals (v 29)
 2. Jonathan's achievements and demise (v 30)
- II. Simon's achievements (including those before Jonathan's death)
1. Response to aggression (vv 31-32)
 2. Fortifications (vv 31-32)
 3. The people (ho laos) reward Simon by the high priesthood (v 35)
 4. Crowning internal achievement: expulsion of Gentiles, cleansing and fortification of Jerusalem (vv 36-37)
 5. King Demetrius rewards Simon by the high priesthood because he heard of his success with Rome (vv 38-40)
- C. I. The Ioudaioi and the priests reward Simon by the high priesthood and other functions and privileges (vv 41-43)
- II. Acts of this document made binding on the people (vv 44-45)
- D. Final resolutions (vv 46-49)

The preface and dispositions about the publication of the decree (vv 48-49) correspond generally to the style of contemporary inscriptions.⁵ The distinction of social classes in v 28--priests, people, rulers of the ethnos, and elders of the land--raises questions to be dealt with later.

Part B lists achievements of the Hasmoneans, primarily the military and political accomplishments of Simon. In addition to what we know from the narrative, we find out that Simon was wealthy enough to furnish and pay his soldiers out of his own funds (v 32; cf. 16:11-12). We are also told that Simon was first made high priest by the people (v 35 laos). The sequence of events differs in several instances from that in the narrative of 1 Maccabees. With the exception of relations with Demetrius and with Rome, these differences may be explained by the topical arrangement of the material in the document, though it is not certain that this explanation is the correct one. For our purposes the most important part is the definition of Simon's position (vv 41-45), but before we discuss that we must put the whole process in proper perspective.

The assembly as described in 1 Maccabees has some antecedents in Jewish history⁶ and the record of it is in many ways similar to honorary decrees in fashion in the hellenistic world. Yet, the purported document poses many problems that have led some scholars to doubt its authenticity.⁷ Whereas the account of past achievements follows familiar patterns, the powers granted to Simon are almost unparalleled because, as a rule, a polis would not grant such powers to any individual, and a king would not need them. A situation like Simon's arose only when someone came to power by unusual means and wanted his authority legitimized.

The case of Vespasian is quite instructive, as we shall see below.

Extended discussion⁸ has shown that 1 Macc 14:27-29 is a report--probably in the main accurate, but certainly far from verbatim--of an honorific decree set up in the Temple as a testimonial to Simon. One reason for thinking there was an actual text of the sort described is that the report of its contents contradicts in some points the story told in the rest of 1 Maccabees. Because of these differences, we are justified in assuming that the author of 1 Maccabees was using a source. On the other hand, many details show that the source has not been followed exactly,⁹ and others suggest that the source did not exactly follow the hellenistic model. At the beginning, this decree seems not to have been "proposed," but "announced" (v 28)--we are not told by whom. At the end, the pretense of recording a text is dropped and we are told that "the people approved" (v 46) and "said" (v 48) what are normally parts of a proposed decree (the provisions of publication etc.). Hence scholars are divided between those who think that the source stopped at v 45, because the decree form is abandoned, and those who think it continued to v 49 because it is resumed.¹⁰ Goldstein has an ingenious solution which I interpret as follows and think may be correct, namely that vv 29-45 were a proclamation drawn up by "the leaders of the nation" and announced to the people by a herald and that the whole transaction, including the subsequent action taken by the assembly, was then recorded in a document (vv 27-49) which was the source of vv 25-49.¹¹

At both the beginning and end--legally the most important parts--the hellenistic decree form is not followed precisely. But it is unlikely that the holding of a large assembly in the third year of Simon is a later invention, because a forger would have been inclined to put the definition of Simon's powers at the beginning of his independent career and would have avoided reference to a conspicuous record of it in the Temple, if no such record existed.

Perhaps a later situation may be helpful in understanding how Simon gained power in Jerusalem. Vespasian was proclaimed emperor by his troops in Egypt on July 1, 69 C.E. Late in December of that year, the Roman Senate recognized him and formulated his extensive powers in a *senatus consultum* which was soon afterwards transformed into law by a popular assembly. The wording of this law, the latter part of which is extant, still bears the characteristics of the *senatus consultum*.¹² Similar stages of acceptance may be detected in the decree for Simon:

(1) After he had raised a force of his own and distinguished himself in fighting off the enemies (vv 32-34: Tryphon?), he was proclaimed leader and high priest by "the people" (ho laos 14:35; cf. 13:2, 7). This term normally means common people, sometimes common soldiers (e.g., 1 Macc 5:30; 12:44), differentiated from the clergy (cf. Neh 10:35), from the ruling (lay?) aristocracy (cf. Neh 7:5) or from military leaders.¹³ In 1 Maccabees, "the people" specifically excludes also opponents of the Hasmoneans (7:6). It is plausible that Simon was proclaimed high priest soon after Jonathan's death, but since at first he lacked confirmation by the temple aristocracy and did not have full control over the temple, the exact date of his accession as high priest is never given in 1 Maccabees. Josephus' accounts about Simon's accession are contradictory. According to BJ 1.53, Simon was

appointed high priest (by whom?) in the Seleucid year 170 (143/2 B.C.E. [autumn era] or, perhaps, 142/1 B.C.E. [spring era], confirming 1 Macc 13:41-42. But the purported occasion for his accession, a victory over Cendebeus, did not occur until several years later. Perhaps Josephus or his source confused it with the successes of Simon alluded to in 1 Macc 14:35. In AJ 13.213, Josephus indicates that Simon was appointed high priest by the multitude (plēthos) and that in the first year of his high priesthood, 170 Sel., he liberated the people from Macedonian rule. Josephus may here have tried to harmonize his material from 1 Maccabees and other sources. A striking fact that 1 Maccabees as well as AJ and even BJ suggest is that Simon was first appointed high priest not by the Seleucid authorities, as at least his four immediate predecessors had been, but reached the post by some other means. Whether it was by "popular" decision or by his own initiative or a combination of both is impossible for us to know, but the confused and fragmentary accounts in 1 Maccabees and Josephus suggest some irregularity.

(2) Sometime after Simon's accession his position was recognized by Demetrius (14:38).

(3) Only in his third year did Simon gain official approval by the priests and other leaders of the country. Such a stage seems to be reflected in the body of the decree (vv 29-45). A clue may be found in the fact that the formula of approval (v 41) does not mention the members of the assembly as in v 28, but only priests and Ioudaioi, which here clearly does not mean all Jews or Judeans, since at least the clergy is shown as a separate group (again v 47). In postexilic literature the term "Israel" similar to the term "people" (laos), often refers to lay people only and excludes priests and Levites (Neh 11:3; 1 Chr 9:2; QJS 9.11). Ioudaioi may here be used in that sense (cf. 1 Macc 14:44: tou laou kai tōn hierōn), but it more likely means a restricted influential group with some official standing, as in several instances in Nehemia (2:16; 5:1, 17).¹⁴

(4) The decree as we have it would then represent a fourth and last stage: a large assembly of the entire people, including priests and (lay) leaders,¹⁵ received and approved an announcement of the honors and powers awarded Simon by the leaders of (3). Also common folk (perhaps Simon's most ardent supporters) were allowed to participate. The assembly was informed of the decree and accepted it without major changes. Thus, while the decree proper ends at 14:45, the acceptance by the assembly and provisions for publication were appended and made part of the permanently inscribed record.¹⁶

By assuming these different stages, we are able to account for the repetition of the approval formula (vv 41, 46), for the several awards and final acceptance of Simon's high priesthood (vv 35, 38, 41, 46, 47), and for the fact that "the people" (ho laos) started to use Simon's name in documents from his first year on (1 Macc 13:42), whereas only from his third year on, by order of the Ioudaioi and priests, no contract was allowed to omit it (14:41, 43). We can see, then, that after starting from a limited power base of Hasmonean supporters, Simon had won acceptance and support from wider segments of Judean society, which are here specified as "the people" and "the Ioudaioi and the priests." Significantly, Seleucid acceptance had come before that by "the Ioudaioi and the priests." The old guard dies, but it does not surrender until it has to.

Simon's Powers

The powers Simon was granted were extensive: He was confirmed as high priest, political leader and military commander,¹⁷ given charge over the Temple and control over the countryside, the armories and the fortresses (vv 41-42). Also, he alone was to wear purple and gold. Any form of opposition, including verbal criticism and assembly without his approval, was put under heavy penalty.¹⁸ Thus, his powers were almost unlimited.

If we ask why Simon wanted these powers officially granted him, and the grants publicly recorded, the evidence suggests that this display of support was intended to counter some opposition. From the provisions of the decree we may infer that his opponents had included influential priests, because even in his third year as high priest Simon had to be assured that he was in charge of the Temple and that he could make necessary appointments "on his own authority" (14:42). Furthermore, since the wearing of purple and gold had to be forbidden, opposition to Simon would seem to have included aristocrats or would-be aristocrats. The ban on speaking against Simon and on meeting "without him" (v 44)--i.e. without his approval--suggests fear that opponents, by public meetings and speeches, might win a popular following. Also, the opponents were evidently thought able to organize such meetings. Finally, the specific authorization to appoint deputies in charge of the countryside, the armories, and the fortresses, suggests that Simon's control of these was not as secure as the narrative of 1 Maccabees would make us believe.

Opposition to Simon certainly included the Qumran community or its antecedents in which dissident priests played a prominent role.¹⁹ This, however, was not the only opposing faction. Not to mention the former Hellenizers and Seleucid supporters, other members of the established priestly and lay aristocracy in Jerusalem and in the countryside must have felt threatened by Simon. Where the Sadducees stood--if at this time they existed at all as an organized group--cannot be ascertained, but those who considered Zadokite ancestry essential for the high priesthood probably had difficulty in accepting Simon.²⁰

Given the existence of such an opposition, it would seem that in spite of the extensive powers granted Simon, the document recording the grants is, in its final form, the fruit of a compromise. The fact that Simon had been in office for two years before these powers were officially bestowed on him by a general assembly suggests that negotiations took place earlier. We shall try to define the segments of the population which supported him.

From the beginning, Simon had troops which gave him his initial success (1 Macc 14:32). They will have consisted largely of Jonathan's forces. Presumably few held out for Jonathan's sons or were irreconcilably alienated by their disposal.

After his early successes, according to the document as well as according to the narrative, Simon was first proclaimed successor of Jonathan by "the people".

In 1 Macc 14, "the people" are distinguished on the one hand from Simon's original followers (v 32), on the other from "the priests" and "rulers of the nation (*archontes tou ethnous*) and "the elders of the countryside" (*presbyteroi tēs chōras*) (14:28). No dignitaries by exactly these titles are mentioned elsewhere in

1 Maccabees, but Jonathan is said to have relied on the assistance of "elders of the people" (12:35; cf. 11:23), and the sons of "the leaders of the countryside" (tōn hēgoumenōn tēs chōras) had been held hostages by Bacchides (9:53), evidently in order to prevent their fathers from assisting the Hasmoneans. These local leaders may be the "elders" of our document (v 28). We should not, however, deduce that the rural population was solidly in support of Simon. The long survival of the pro-Seleucid forces in the Akra would have been impossible without support in the countryside. It is plausible to suppose that other local notables were, or tried to seem, neutral. Accordingly, the document's specific grant to Simon of control of "the countryside" (v 42) may be understood as directed against local centers of resistance.

Many of the priests who concurred in the approval of the document (vv 28, 42, 47) may have been long-standing supporters of the Hasmoneans (cf. 1 Macc 4:42). Others may have joined Simon's side only reluctantly, because his high priesthood put a seal of near permanence on the Hasmonean tenure of the office, thereby further weakening the position of the former priestly aristocracy, already shaken up by the unconventional accessions of Jason, Menelaus, Jonathan, and perhaps Alcimus.

This supposition is supported by the fact that, although the people are said to have made Simon high priest and (political) leader without reservation, the approval given by "the Ioudaioi and the priests" stipulated that he should hold those offices "in perpetuity until a trustworthy prophet should arise" (v 41). "In perpetuity" (eis ton aiōna) has been understood as a reference to the hereditary character of his position,²¹ but the Greek says nothing of this and Abel pointed out that it may be a hebraized rendering of the common hellenistic formula for granting an office or honor "for life" (dia biou).²² In fact, eis ton aiōna like its Hebrew equivalent (l'olam), is sometimes used in connection with a person's lifelong activity or condition (e.g., Deut 15:17; Exod 21:6). Thus, this phrase does not necessarily suggest the institution of a new dynasty, and in fact, its failure to mention Simon's descendants suggests that Abel's conjecture may be right.

It is difficult to gauge how serious the limitation "until a trustworthy prophet shall arise" was considered. For one thing, it indicates that Simon's reign might someday, before his death, have to be terminated--the prophet might designate another ruler.²³ On the other hand, the Hasmoneans too expected a future prophet--if the decision concerning the polluted stones of the altar was that of the Hasmoneans, in this case Judas (1 Macc 4:46). Here too the matter in question was one in which the conservative Jerusalem priesthood, that here would have sided with Judas, would have had much to say. So the postponement of the question until the arrival of a true prophet, found in both cases, may reflect a consistency in the policy of the same group.

Some think that John Hyrcanus, to whom the gift of prophecy was ascribed, was considered the prophet whose coming was expected according to 1 Macc 4:46 and 14:41. This is unlikely,

however, since he evidently did not dispose of the stones of the defiled altar. Their storage place was still remembered in Mishnaic times (m. Middot 1:6). Furthermore, his predictions that his two older sons would not remain in power and that Alexander Jannaeus, whom he disliked, would rule, do not fit the image of an expected prophet. At all events, "the Ioudaioi and the priests" were not willing to grant Simon unqualified perpetual authority, and Simon was willing to accept the high priesthood on these terms.

Other limitations of Simon's power may be inferred from what is omitted in the document. He is not declared king, and this may be due to consideration for Jewish as well as Seleucid sensitivities.²⁴ Other arguments from the document's silence have suggested to scholars additional compromises or limitations of Simon's power and some of those conjectured may perhaps have been intended.²⁵

CONCLUSION

Simon's accession to the high priesthood is documented more amply than that of any other Hasmonean. Yet, the various accounts are contradictory and fraught with difficulties. We have attempted to find a solution to some of the difficulties associated with the document honoring Simon, which at first sight appears repetitive and somewhat disorganized. Our study has shown that the apparent repetitions are evidence of successive stages of Simon's accession to high priesthood and leadership of the nation. Although he became high priest in 142 B.C.E. with the approval of "the people" and was soon confirmed by the Seleucid King Demetrius II, it took over two years before he was fully accepted in Jerusalem where the aristocracy seems to have approved his position only after hesitation and with certain limitations.

While it is tempting to assign roles in these developments to Pharisees and Sadducees, at the present state of our knowledge it seems wise to resist such temptations. The origins and history of the Hasmonean high priesthood, however, deserve further careful study.

NOTES

¹Exod 29:1-35; Lev 8:5-36; Sir 45:6-24; 50:1-21.

²1 Macc 14:27; cf. 13:42. The phrase *etous tritou epi Simōnos* translates Hebrew *bišēnat šālōs lē-Sim'on* or similar and follows a pattern frequently used in the LXX with respect to regnal years; see Hag 1:1, 15; 2:10; Sach 1:1, 7; 7:1; Dan (LXX) 1:1; 9:1; cf. Sirach, Prologue; also *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* III.128. Therefore, Goldstein's conjecture that an era "of the freedom of the Jews" is implied seems unnecessary and unlikely (J.A. Goldstein, *1 Maccabees* [AB 41; Garden City: Doubleday, 1976] pp. 479-480). The meaning of the attribute given Simon "great in the asaram of God" (*asaramel*) has been lost by corruption of the transcribed Hebrew. For conjectures see A. Schalit, *König Herodes* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969), pp. 781-787.

³E.g., E. Rivkin, *A Hidden Revolution* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1978), pp. 12, 217; J. VanderKam, *Textual and Historical Studies in the Book of Jubilees*. (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977), p. 248 (reviewing earlier studies without approving their conclusions).

Rivkin tries to show that the Pharisees were the moving force that gave Simon the high priesthood, contrary to Pentateuchal law (*A Hidden Revolution* pp. 215-251, especially pp. 217-223, 239, 249). His argument depends on equation of the "great assembly" of 1 Macc 14:28 with the "great assembly" of tannaitic literature. Since the Pharisees claimed descent from the men of the latter assembly, he argues the assembly must have been a creation of Soferim/Pharisees, and since the former assembly gave Simon the high priesthood, it was the Pharisees who did so (pp. 220-221). However, (1) there is no mention of Pharisees in connection with the assembly of 1 Macc 14; (2) this assembly did not give Simon the high priesthood--in fact it took place in Simon's third year as high priest; (3) the gift is represented by 1 Maccabees as in accord with Pentateuchal law--the author points out that the (high) priesthood belongs to the descendants of Mattathias as heirs of Phinehas (2:26, 54). In addition, the Hasmoneans themselves were willing and able to reinterpret biblical law for new situations and did not need the assistance of the Pharisees for this. See 1 Macc 2:40-41 (Sabbath observance); b. *Sanh.* 82a; b. *Abod. Zar.* 36b (intercourse with a heathen woman); m. *Ma'aser Seni* 5:15 (tithe).

Josephus' assertion that at Jonathan's time the Pharisees existed (*AJ* 13.171) may be correct. However, the claim is suspect, though not necessarily false, because it is made out of context, and it tells us nothing of any influence the Pharisees may have had in the political and religious life of the country. The "great assembly" of tannaitic literature (m. *Abot* 1:1) may, indeed, be a literary reflection of that of 1 Macc 14:28, but to use such a literary reminiscence as evidence for Pharisaic domination of the Hasmonean assembly is improper.

⁴1 Macc 14:25-26. The following phrase, *kai estēsan autō eleutherian*, would normally mean "they (Israel) established freedom for him (i.e. Simon)." In fact, the Lucianic MSS and the Syriac versions add his name here. But since this interpretation does not agree with the context, translators generally assume *constructio ad sensum* and posit that "they (Simon and his family) established freedom for it (i.e. Israel)." See F. -M. Abel, *Les Livres des Maccabées* (Paris: Gabalda, 1949), p. 255; Goldstein, *1 Macc.*, p. 486. This rendering makes sense, but is grammatically implausible, since the earlier verbs referring to Simon and his family are in the singular, whereas Israel is here, as usual in 1 Maccabees, construed with the plural (cf. 1:25, 53; 2:70; 9:20; 13:26; exceptions: 12:52; 14:11). A possible solution would be to read *eleutheria* (Liddell-Scott; thanksgiving for liberty) instead of *eleutherian*. Then the phrase may be rendered: "They (Israel) established a thanksgiving to him (Simon) for (their) freedom." Liberty was an ideal frequently appealed to in the hellenistic period. The liberation of cities as well as of individuals was commemorated in festivals and inscriptions. For the *Eleutheria*

celebrated at Plataeae see Plutarch, Aristides 21. For private thanksgiving see IG vol. 9, fasc. 2, 1034.

⁵ See especially Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae 737.

⁶ See Goldstein, 1 Macc., p. 503.

⁷ See H. Willrich, Urkundenfälschung in der hellenistisch-jüdischen Literatur pp. 69-72.

⁸ See Abel, Macc., pp. 254-262; F.M. Cross, The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies (Rev. ed.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1961) 137-141; Goldstein, 1 Macc., pp. 501-509.

⁹ Later additions and changes: topography of conquered towns (vv 33-34): added by translator (A. Momigliano, Prime linee di storia della tradizione maccabaica [Torino, 1931, reprinted Amsterdam: Hakker, 1969] p. 169); hoti (v 41): scribal error (Goldstein, 1 Macc., p. 507); kai hopōs melē autō peri tōn hagiōn (vv 42, 43): Dittography (Goldstein, 1 Macc., p. 508). Only according to this document (v 40) were the Jews ever called "brothers" by the Romans. Abel (Macc., pp. 259-260) and Goldstein (1 Macc., pp. 506-507) consider this an intrusion into an otherwise authentic document. A. Geiger (Urschrift und Übersetzungen der Bibel [2nd ed.; Frankfurt/Main: Mada, 1928] p. 212 note) conjectured that in v 29 Simon's name may have been substituted for that of Judas in order to emphasize Simon's role.

¹⁰ Ended at v 45: H. Bévenot, Die beiden Makkabäerbücher (Bonn, 1931) p. 160; Schürer-Vermes-Millar 1.194 n. 15. Continued to v 49: Abel, Macc., p. 261.

¹¹ 1 Macc., pp. 503, 509. Goldstein plausibly conjectures that egnōrisen is a mistranslation of Hebrew hwd which here should have been understood "was brought to our attention," but can also mean "he informed"; cf. Vulgate: nota facta sunt haec. Abel comes to a similar conclusion by a different route (Macc., p. 257).

¹² Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae 244.

¹³ See also OGIS 90.12, ho te laos kai hoi alloi pantes, and Dittenberger's note 48.

¹⁴ See M. Smith, Palestinian Parties and Politics That Shaped the Old Testament (New York: Columbia Univ. Pr., 1971) pp. 152 and 264 n. 17. In other occurrences of Ioudaios in the decree (vv 34, 37, 40), Jews or Judeans seem to be meant, but with reference to the garrison of Beth-zur, the term clearly refers to law-abiding (pro-Hasmonean) Jews as opposed to apostate (former?) Jews (14:33; cf. 10:14).

¹⁵ Cf. Neh 10:15 and 3:12-19 respectively. See M. Smith, Parties, pp. 153-154.

¹⁶ 1 Macc 14:46-49. Similarly Goldstein, 1 Macc., p. 509.

¹⁷ Simon's titlature in 1 Maccabees is unfortunately rather inconsistent. He is called high priest fifteen times, leader (*hēgoumenos*) four times (the latter perhaps synonymous with *ethnarchēs* which occurs three times; cf. 1 Macc 13:42 with AJ 13.214), and *stratēgos* three times. All these terms occur in our document as well as in other documents incorporated in 1 Maccabees and seem to fairly represent his various official functions. The high priesthood was the most important or, perhaps, the most controversial of these offices. Josephus uses similar terminology. See further Goldstein, *1 Macc.*, p. 479.

¹⁸ Goldstein (*1 Macc.*, pp. 487, 509) thinks that the death penalty was imposed on actions contrary to these provisions.

¹⁹ Cross (*Ancient Library*, p. 141) considers the early years of Simon's high priesthood "the appropriate occasion for the crystallization of the Essene sect."

²⁰ Yet even according to the pro-Pharisaic account in AJ 13.293, John Hyrcanus had a close friend among the Sadducees before he broke with the Pharisees.

²¹ Schürer-Vermes-Millar 1, p. 193 without evidence; Goldstein, *1 Macc.*, p. 508, referring to Exod 32:13, 2 Sam 7:12-13, where, however, the promises are made explicitly for dynasties, not individuals.

²² *Macc.*, p. 260; cf. *OGIS* 737.

²³ Not necessarily an eschatological messiah--all anointed kings and high priests were "messiahs." See M. Smith, "What Is Implied by the Variety of Messianic Figures?" *JBL* 78 (1959) 66-72. At least in some circles, one or more prophets were expected with one or more messiahs. See *1QS* 9.11; John 1:21 and *passim*.

²⁴ Evidence for this supposition may be found in the history of Alexander Jannaeus, who did declare himself king, encountered violent Jewish opposition, and finally took the title "King" off his coins. See Y. Meshorer, *Jewish Coins of the Second Temple Period* (Tel-Aviv: Am Hassefer, 1969) pp. 58-59, 120, no. 17.

²⁵ Goldstein sees the following omissions as indications of compromise: Jonathan's political title (*1 Macc.*, p. 504), Judas (*ibid.*), liberation of Israel (p. 500), liberation from taxation (p. 505), contacts with Sparta (p. 493). Against S. Zeitlin (*The Rise and Fall of the Judaean State* [3 vols. Philadelphia: JPS, 1968-1978], 1.149), there is no evidence that the "privilege of legal interpretation was taken from Simon and his descendants" and given to an independent *Bet Din*. Against Rivkin (*Hidden Revolution*, p. 249), there is no evidence that the great assembly of 140 BC established such a *Bet Din* "to exercise ultimate authority over the two-fold Law."

MEALS AND MORALITY IN PAUL AND HIS WORLD

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In 1 Cor 10-14, Paul presents an extended discussion of the Christian communal meal in a context in which he also defines aspects of social ethics within the Christian community. That social ethics is discussed in relation to a meal setting is not at all inappropriate, for, as I will argue in this paper, it was common in Greco-Roman morality to connect a specific kind of ethical instruction with a communal meal setting. Indeed, not only does Paul share this connection with his culture, but he also shares many of the specifics of his ethical instruction. By analyzing Paul's argument from this perspective, one is able to understand more clearly the inner coherence of Paul's theology and ethics in these chapters.

In order to understand the relationship of Paul and his culture, we must first survey the meal customs and popular ethics of the Greco-Roman world. This will be done in brief outline form.¹ Then Paul's argument will be sketched so as to illustrate his continuity with his culture. Finally, some conclusions will be suggested as to the significance of this study for understanding Pauline ethics.

A. Meals and Morality in Paul's World

1. The Greco-Roman Communal Meal

a. As is well known, the basic form of the communal meal or banquet in the ancient world was widely followed in a variety of settings and cultural contexts. Thus Romans, Greeks, Jews, and apparently Christians, followed the same basic format for a formal meal, whether it was a private meal, philosophical banquet, club banquet, or religious meal.²

b. A formal meal generally consisted of two (or sometimes three) courses: the *deipnon* (δεῖπνον), or eating portion, and the *symposium* (συμπόσιον), or drinking party. An appetizer portion prior to the *deipnon* sometimes constituted a third course.³

An example of the division between the two main courses is provided in Plato's *Symposium*: "After this, it seems, when Socrates had taken his place and had dined with the rest, they made libation and sang a chant to the god and so forth, as custom bids, till they betook them to drinking." (μετὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, κατακλιθέντος τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ δειπνήσαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, σπονδὰς τε σφᾶς ποιήσασθαι καὶ ἄσαντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν πότον, 176A). Note that a formal ceremony marked the transition from *deipnon* to *symposium*, one which traditionally included a libation, or wine ceremony in which wine was poured out to the gods. Other religious rituals were also included, such as, in this case, a hymn. These are all designated customary rituals.

The transition ritual included the mixing of the wine, since wine was generally mixed with water for the drinking party. Athenaeus refers to this mixing custom, as well as the libation ceremony, in this reference: "... when the unmixed wine is poured during the dinner (παρὰ δεῖπνον), the Greeks call upon the name of the Good Deity (τὸν Ἀγαθὸν ἀποφωνοῦσι Δαίμονα), giving honor to the deity who discovered the wine; he was Dionysus. But with the first cup of mixed wine given after the dinner (μετὰ δεῖπνον), they call upon Zeus the Savior (Δία Σωτῆρα ἐπιλέγουσι), because they assume that he, as the originator of rain-storms, was the author of the painless mixture derived from the mingling of wind and rain" (15.675b-c).

c. The symposium or drinking party tended to be especially drawn out and usually included entertainment of some kind, which could range from flute girls to dramatic presentations to elevated conversation. While excess and drunkenness could characterize the event, and while rather prurient activities might characterize the entertainment, there were consciously nobler definitions of suitable symposia for the more sober-minded.

Vase paintings of symposia delight in depicting prurient activities, primarily drunkenness combined with sexual promiscuity, the latter often with the ever-present flute girl. A famous description of an orgiastic Roman banquet is found in the section on the banquet of Trimalchio in Petronius' *Satyricon*. Xenophon's description of a Socratic symposium was probably typical of most banquets: "When the tables had been removed, and the guests had poured a libation and sung a hymn, there entered a man from Syracuse, to give them an evening's merriment" (*Symp.* 2.1). The closing entertainment was a mimic dance in which Dionysus and Ariadne were portrayed in a romantic interlude that aroused such intense desires in the banqueters that: "...those who were unwedded swore that they would take to themselves wives, and those who were already married mounted horse and rode off to their wives that they might enjoy them" (*Symp.* 9.7).

In marked contrast is Plato's version of a Socratic symposium, in which the evening's entertainment is described in this way: "'Since it has been resolved, then,' said Eryximachus, 'that we are to drink only so much as each desires, with no constraint on any, I next propose that the flute-girl who came in just now be dismissed: let her pipe to herself or, if she likes, to the women-folk within, but let us seek our entertainment today in conversation' (*Symp.* 176E). To this may be compared Plutarch's description of a banquet in which the "philosophical talk at the drinking party" (φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πόντον) took place "after dinner" (μετὰ δεῖπνον) (*Quaest. conv.* 612E-F). Doubtless, Plato's *Symposium* helped to provide a standard for emulation with its designation of a philosophical dialogue as the preferred entertainment. This concept is reflected in a stock definition of philosophical banquets found in Athenaeus, in which he describes the dinner parties of the philosophical sects who came together "not that they should indulge in intemperance when they came together, but that they might carry out with decency and refinement the practices which accord with the idea of the symposium" (5.186a). The "idea of the symposium" (τὰ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ συμποσίου λόγον) to which he refers is obviously an idealization of the symposium which he sees as inherent in its definition and which functions to prescribe a particular type of behavior at the meal.

d. The use of the reclining posture is especially helpful in tracing meal customs, for it was an invariable characteristic of the Greco-Roman formal meal.⁴ Both the Greeks and Romans had adopted this posture, with its accompanying requirements for dining furnishings, etc., and both were evidently consciously imitating what they saw as a more elegant form of dining as found in Eastern culture. It tended to retain its association with elegance and social rank, an association it had had in its Eastern context, in which kings and rulers were the ones who reclined.⁵ In the Greek and Roman contexts, only free citizens were allowed to recline; women, children, and slaves, if present, were to sit.⁶ Thus the use of this custom promoted a consciousness of social ranking. Even when aspects of this custom changed, e.g. when, in the first century C.E., women were evidently allowed to recline, the stigma of social class was still connected with it. Thus in Lucian's description of a banquet at which women were present, a late-arriving guest is invited to sit, since all the reclining positions were taken. He refuses, on the grounds that sitting at a banquet is "womanish and weak" (γυναικεῖον καὶ μαλθακόν). Rather he elects to recline on the floor (*Symp.* 13).⁷

e. The setting of meals where one would recline also tended to raise questions of relative status within the meal community, for usually there was an explicit or implicit ranking of the positions around the table. Although the locations of these ranked positions might vary, their existence at a formal meal was assumed.⁸ Consequently, the question of status had always to be addressed. Either one would follow some conventional rules as to the ranking of one's guests, placing foreign guests at the first rank, for example. Or one might decide to do away with rankings entirely, as Plutarch's brother Timon once did, to the consternation of some of his guests. The scene is set at the beginning of the meal when Timon announces that there will be no assigning of places. After the meal has begun, a distinguished foreign guest arrives. Whenever he surveys the gathering and sees that there is no place remaining which is worthy of his status, he is insulted and leaves immediately. This leads to a discussion on the subject: "Whether the host should arrange the placing of his guests or leave it to the guests themselves" (*Quaest. conv.* 1.2). Interestingly, both sides in the debate argue on the basis of the same argument: that which best promotes the basic friendship and pleasure of the event. Note that the same customs and same basic situation are reflected in Jesus' parable of the places of honor at a banquet (Luke 14:7-11).

2. The Philosophical Discussion of Meal Ethics

a. The philosophical schools often gathered for banquets at which philosophical discussions usually took place. Aulus Gellius in the 2nd century C.E. describes the regular dinner meetings at the home of the philosopher Calvisius Taurus in this way: "At the entertainments which it was the custom of us young men to hold at Athens at the beginning of each week, as soon as we had finished eating and an instructive and pleasant conversation had begun . . ." (*NA* 15.2.3).

b. The description of philosophical banquets took a literary form of its own, that of symposium literature.⁹ One archetype for the development of symposium literature was Plato's *Symposium*, in which a meal is described at which Socrates is

present. As Plato tells the story, the deipnon portion is passed over briefly, while the philosophical dialogue which takes place during the symposium is described in detail. This discussion takes place, as noted above, as the substitute for the scheduled entertainment. The subject discussed is ἔρως or "love", and the discussion proceeds jovially, with asides and other references to the setting interspersed within. Thus Plato provided a literary form in which a certain type of topic and a certain type of discussion were considered more appropriate to the symposium setting. This was a point picked up and developed in later works of this genre, and was elaborated on by Plutarch in his explanation of the proper dinner party.

Plutarch clearly saw himself as writing in the symposium tradition, for he describes his work in the tradition of "the most famous of the philosophers . . . Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epicurus, Prytanis, Hieronymus, and Dio of the Academy, who all considered the recording of conversations held at table a task worth some effort" (*Quaest. conv.* 1 praef.); that is, they all wrote *Symposia*. He further saw his accounts of table conversations as "examples" (παράδειγματα) of proper meal conversations (*Quaest. conv.* 697E). He thus described in some detail the nature of proper conversations appropriate to the occasion: "Some are supplied by history; others it is possible to take from current events; some contain many lessons bearing on philosophy, many on piety; some induce an emulous enthusiasm for courageous and great-hearted deeds, and some for charitable and humane deeds. If one makes unobtrusive use of them to entertain and instruct his companions as they drink, not the least of the evils of intemperance will be taken away" (*Quaest. conv.* 614A-B). Thus his categories correspond well with the description of Gellius quoted above; that is, they produce conversations that are both "instructive and pleasant". On the other hand, Plutarch also specified that symposium conversations should be conducted in a manner that is appropriate to the occasion. In one argument, he especially made reference to the communal nature of the occasion. That is, the conversation should be conducted in such a way that all can participate, just as all participate in the wine and other entertainment of the evening (see *Quaest. conv.* 614D-E).

c. Plutarch's discussions of meal ethics are especially useful for our study, for he reflects second century C.E. philosophical and popular ethics,¹⁰ and he provides rich discussions of meals. What emerges from an analysis of Plutarch's material is a definition of an ethical relationship of the participants at a meal created by the sharing of the meal. His description of this relationship is stated in terms of friendship terminology, a traditional category for discussions of social ethics in Greek philosophy. Thus he refers to "the friend-making character of the table" (τὸ φιλοποιὸν τῆς τραπέζης, *Quaest. conv.* 612D) which in turn provides guidance as to the proper behavior at a meal. For, "a guest comes to share not only meat, wine, and dessert, but conversation, fun, and the amiability that leads to friendship" (ὁ γὰρ σύνδειπνος οὐκ ὄψου καὶ οἴνου καὶ τραγημάτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων κοινωνὸς ἦκει καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης εἰς εὐνοίαν τελευτώσης, *Quaest. conv.* 660B). One who shares only the food has been a "fellow-diner only with the stomach, not with the mind" (τῇ γαστρὶ σύνδειπνος οὐ τῇ ψυχῇ, *Quaest. conv.* 660B). But if one conducts the meal according to the principle of friendship, then one will be guided as to the proper conversation, the proper arrangement of the guests, and the other aspects of the formal meal. Such a tradition may also trace back to Plato, who

spoke of "symposium laws" (νόμοι συμπότικοι) as the basis for orderly conduct at a meal whose function was to make of the participants friends rather than enemies (*Leg.* 2.671C-72A).

3. Meal Ethics in Popular Morality and Culture

a. The popular morality of the Greco-Roman world, that is, its unsystematic ethical tradition, is reflected not only in a philosophical moralist like Plutarch, but also in non-philosophical moralistic literature.¹¹ Here also one finds many of the same concepts of meal ethics as are found in Plutarch.

b. An example of a literary tradition reflecting popular morality is that of satire. In this tradition, in both its Latin and Greek forms, a standard motif is that of the banquet, which is usually used as the setting for comments on gluttony or ostentatiousness, societal evils particularly associated with the wealthy and pretended aristocrats.¹² Here the banquet functions as a symbol for the pretensions of cultured living, and thus serves an ethical function, for by ridiculing the society there represented, satire implicitly refers to a standard of conduct that should be present. Thus the banquet carries a symbolic force in itself, functioning as a kind of paradigm for comments on social ethics.

c. Whenever the basic Greco-Roman meal form was adopted in different contexts, the standard ethical concepts tended to accompany it. Especially illustrative of this are the rules of conduct of the various Greek and Roman clubs and associations. The most common club activity to which these rules apply is the club banquet, which itself was usually the primary activity in which the club members participated as a group.

d. Typical rules of conduct at club banquets include: 1) injunctions against quarreling and fighting, 2) injunctions against taking the assigned place of another, 3) injunctions against speaking out of turn or without permission, 4) injunctions against fomenting factions, 5) injunctions against accusing a fellow member before a public court, 6) specifications for trials within the club for inter-club disputes, 7) specifications for worship activities.

For example, the statutes of the "Gild" of Zeus Hypsistos¹³, an Egyptian religious association of the first century B.C.E., specify as the primary activity of the president "that he should make for all the contributors one banquet a month in the sanctuary of Zeus" (line 8). The banquet is described with the terms πόσις (line 8) and συμπόσιον (lines 15, 16, 18) and is described in a form which correlates with Greco-Roman meal customs: "... at which they should in a common room pouring libations, pray, and perform the other customary rites on behalf of the god and lord, the king" (έν αἷς έν άνδρώνι κοινῷ σπένδοντες εύχέσθαισαν καί τάλλα τά νομιζόμενα ύπέρ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καί κυρίου βασιλέως, line 9).¹⁴ Among the activities listed as "not permitted" are the following: 1) "making factions" (σχίσματα συνίστασθαι, line 13); to this may be compared the problem of "factions" (σχίσματα) among the Christian community at Corinth (1 Cor 1:10, 11:18, 12:25); 2) "entering into one another's pedigrees at the banquet" (line 15); obviously the issue of relative status at the banquet could cause continual problems; 3) "abusing one another" (line 16); 4) "chattering" (line 16); this appears to refer to disorderly speaking of some kind; 5) "indicting or accusing another" (έπικαλήσειν καί

κατηγορήσειν τοῦ ἑτέρου, line 17); this is interpreted as a reference to bringing a fellow member into court¹⁵; compare 1 Cor 6:1-8.

The statutes of the College of Diana and Antinous¹⁶, an Italian funerary society of the second century C.E., specify appropriate behavior at the banquet according to the principles of "peace and good cheer" (*quietus et hilaris*) in the following rule: "if any member desires to make any complaint or bring up any business, he is to bring it up at a business meeting, so that we may banquet in peace and good cheer on festive days" (lines 2.23-24). Immediately afterward are listed the following rules, which, according to the context and the specificity of the last rule, refer primarily to banquet meetings: "Any member who moves from one place to another so as to cause a disturbance shall be fined 4 sesterces; any member, moreover, who speaks abusively of another or causes an uproar shall be fined 12 sesterces; any member who uses any abusive or insolent language to a *quinquennales* [a club officer] at a banquet shall be fined 20 sesterces" (lines 2.25-28). The rule against "moving from one place to another" suggests that some kind of ranking system of the places at table was in effect, thus explaining why such movement would take place and why it would cause a disturbance.

The statutes of the Iobakchoi¹⁷, a second century C.E. Athenian religious association dedicated to Bacchus or Dionysus, refer to the communal banquet using a variety of terms. Their special term is *stibas* (στῖβας), a reference to a dining couch with special rustic features appropriate to the Dionysiac grotto. It appears to have taken on a special meaning to refer to this club's banquet meetings; thus it is used in a parallel reference to the term ἐστῖας ("feast"; compare lines 104-5 and lines 48-49).¹⁸ Among the rules for the banquet is this one: "No one is allowed to sing, cheer, or applaud at the *stibas*, but with all good order and quietness they shall speak and act their allotted parts under the direction of the priest or the archibakchos" (lines 63-67). The term "allotted parts" evidently refers to some kind of dramatic ritual performed by the members. Note especially that proper speaking at the meal is determined by the ethical terminology "good order and quietness" (εὐκοσμία καὶ ἡσυχία). Indeed, there are several references to "good order" in the statutes as the basis for the rules of conduct (e.g. lines 15-16). Thus the officer charged with the job of enforcing the rules is called a εὐκομοῦς or "orderly officer" (lines 94, 136-41), and those who break the rules are called ἀκομοῖ or "disorderly" (lines 137-38).

Among other rules are the following: "If anyone starts a fight or is found being disorderly or occupying the couch of another member or using insulting or abusive language to anyone [he shall be fined]" (lines 72-75). Notice the injunction against "occupying the couch of another," another evident reference to a ranking system for the places at table. The Iobakchoi also provide detailed instructions for conducting trials within the club for disputes between members (lines 84-94); compare the similar reference above under the Gild of Zeus Hypsistos.

4. Conclusions

The basic Greco-Roman formal meal could function in a variety of contexts. Wherever it occurred, it tended to include certain presuppositions concerning social ethics among the meal

participants. These rules of social ethics tended to follow similar lines, although taking on terminology appropriate to the individual setting.

B. Meals and Morality in Paul (1 Cor)

In 1 Cor 11:17-34, Paul argues against abuses of the Christian meal at Corinth. This is followed by an extended discussion of issues of social ethics in chapters 12-14. To trace the relationship between these sections in Paul's letter, we must first analyze the form of the meal described in 11:17-34.

1. The Form of the Christian Meal at Corinth

The problem at 1 Cor 11:17-34 concerns the "Lord's Supper" (κυριακὸν δεῖπνον, 11:20) which is celebrated at the Christian assembly ("when you come together in an assembly;" συνελθόντων ὑμῶν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, 11:18). Since Paul quotes the tradition of the eucharistic words of Jesus at 11:23-25, the "Lord's Supper" includes the Eucharist. But since the problem addressed concerns the fact that some are not getting enough to eat, while others are evidently getting plenty to eat and drink (11:21), the meal celebrated by the Corinthians must have been intended to be the evening meal of the community.

Indeed, the tradition Paul quotes at 11:23-25 provides significant information about the form of the meal. It began with a consecration of bread to the Lord by means of the opening blessing. The bread ritual also marked the beginning of the deipnon proper, which of course is the term for a formal evening meal. It was "after the deipnon" (μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνῆσαι, 11:25) when the wine ceremony took place.¹⁹ A wine ceremony customarily ended the deipnon and began the symposium in Greco-Roman formal meals. Here the customary wine ceremony has been adapted and reinterpreted according to the self-identity of the Christian community.²⁰

But is there a symposium following this ceremony? The symposium would normally be the time for entertainment and/or conversation as well as drinking. Notice that the subject of 1 Cor 12 and 14 is the problem of proper "conversation" or verbal instruction at the Christian assemblies. Indeed, the description of Christian worship in these chapters pictures an unstructured, undisciplined affair in which everyone is free to take part. This format is consistent with a symposium setting.²¹ In addition, the members all bring contributions to the worship: "When you come together, each one has a hymn, a lesson, a revelation, a tongue, or an interpretation" (ὅταν συνέρχησθε, ἕκαστος ψαλμὸν ἔχει, διδασκίην ἔχει, ἀποκάλυψιν ἔχει, γλῶσσαν ἔχει, ἐρμηνεύειν ἔχει; 14:26). This is reminiscent of the philosophical banquets attended by Aulus Gellius where each guest brought a topic for discussion at the symposium.²² Indeed, a worship activity is appropriate at any formal meal, but the format of the Christian worship service described in 1 Cor 12 and 14 is especially reminiscent of the use of the institution of the symposium by clubs and associations for their liturgical activities.²³

The location of chapters 12-14 in the text of 1 Cor is immediately after the description of the deipnon proper, which could indicate a logical relationship of the activities described in the two sections.²⁴ Indeed, they do appear to describe events

taking place at the same assembly; thus compare 11:20, "when you come together for a meeting . . . to eat" (συνερχομένων . . . ὕμων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ . . . φαγεῖν) with 14:23, "if then the whole church comes together for a meeting and all speak in tongues . . ." (ἐάν οὖν συνέλθῃ ἡ ἐκκλησία ὅλη ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάντες λαλῶσιν γλώσσαις . . .). The implication is that the entire meeting is taking place at table and that the portion following the meal proper corresponds to the symposium portion of a formal banquet.²⁵

This hypothesis is further supported by the figurative expression in 12:13, where unity is argued on the basis of the image of sharing a bowl of wine: "we were given to drink of one spirit" (πάντες ἐν πνεύμα ἐποτίσθημεν). Although the expression is figurative, the figure used has never made much sense in this context as traditionally interpreted.²⁶ But if we place it in the context of a discussion at table where drinking is taking place, then it not only would be appropriate to its setting, but it would also be identifiable with a common type of argument for unity in the setting of a meal.²⁷

2. The Unity of the Context

As already suggested, the context of chapters 10-14 shows an inner unity as well. This I would argue despite the fact that chapter 12 begins with the important phrase "now concerning . . ." (περὶ δέ), indicating that a new subject is being taken up.²⁸ Certainly Paul is moving to a new issue, from problems concerning factions at the meal to problems concerning spiritual gifts. But these issues are in fact related both in terms of the setting in which they occur and the theological themes to which they refer.

The common setting, that of worship at table, has already been delineated above. Further correlations in the context in this regard can be traced in terms of the subject matter being discussed. For example, the theme of prophecy, which is identified as a worship activity in chapter 14, is also discussed at 11:2-16, 12, and 13. Further, the theology of soma (σῶμα), which is discussed below, appears clearly to underlie Paul's argument in 11:17-34 (see 11:29). But it receives its explanation and elaboration at 12:12-27, and the logic of its relation to the meal setting depends on its earlier use at 10:17.

Two primary ethical terms in chapters 12-14 are οἰκοδομή ("upbuilding, edification") and συμφέρον ("useful, expedient"). Both are used to define the ethical function of spiritual gifts (see 12:7 and 14:3-5, 12, 17, 26) and both are themselves defined earlier in chapters 8 and 10, especially as they relate to social ethics. In 10:23-11:1, in the context of a meal (10:27), one's ethical relationship to the other is defined by συμφέρειν and οἰκοδομεῖν (10:23). At 8:1, in an undefined community context but on the same issue (i.e. meat sacrificed to idols), the ethical relationship is defined by οἰκοδομεῖν. Verse 8:1 is especially important in relating chapter 13 to 12 and 14, for it states the principle that "love upbuilds" (ἡ ἀγάπη οἰκοδομεῖ); thus chapter 13 defines ἀγάπη while chapter 14 defines its implications in terms of οἰκοδομή.

Finally, the movement of Paul's argument from chapter 11 to chapter 12 can be traced. This has already been indicated above with reference to the use of the term σῶμα and the reference to

the Eucharistic cup at 12:13. In addition, there is a similarity in the issues discussed. This is indicated by an apparent word play on Paul's part. At 11:19, he identifies the issue at the meal as one of "αἰρέσεις" ("factions"). Similarly, at 12:4 what is at issue with reference to spiritual gifts is that there are "διαίρέσεις" ("distinctions"). To be sure, the terms are used differently: the "factions" at the meal are to dissolve into unity; the "distinctions" of spiritual gifts are to continue, but with a unified purpose and function. Indeed, the issues to which they refer are not necessarily the same. But the basic problem of which they are a part is the same: a problem of disunity being manifest during the worship of the community.

3. The Question of Status

The issue that Paul addresses at 11:17-34 is that of "schisms" (σχίσματα, 11:18) at the meal gatherings. These are characterized as consisting of each taking a "private dinner" (ἑῷον δεῖπνον; 11:21) as opposed to the one "Lord's dinner" (κυριακὸν δεῖπνον; 11:20). The result is that "some are hungry, while others are drunk" (ὁς μὲν πεινᾷ, ὁς δὲ μεθύει; 11:21), implying that there is an inequity in the distribution or availability of food. Paul then addresses this problem with an argument that begins by quoting the tradition by which the meal is to be interpreted (11:23-25). He next provides an interpretation of the tradition (11:26-32) that leads to his concluding advice: "therefore my brethren, when you come together to eat, wait for one another" (ὥστε, ἀδελφοί μου, συνερχόμενοι εἰς τὸ φαγεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐκδέχεσθαι; 11:33).

The suggestion that 11:17-34 is concerned with a dinner meeting which is of the same form as any Greco-Roman banquet can help explain many of the problems Paul struggles with here. Gerd Theissen, for example, has taken this approach in a recent study with marked success.²⁹ He suggests that the problems here derive from distinctions in social class in the Corinthian church. This is indicated, for example, by the reference at 11:22 to "those who have nothing" (οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες) as opposed to those who are getting too much to eat and drink. Problems arise, then, whenever the wealthy begin eating early ("take beforehand" [προλαμβάνειν], 11:21), before the poorer members, who presumably are still at work, can arrive. Other possible explanations derive from the perquisites that one might expect the wealthy to claim, since such claims were not uncommon in the Greco-Roman world. These would fall under the heading of eating "one's own meal" (ἑῷον δεῖπνον, 11:21); i.e., eating their own contributions to the common meal. This could be done prior to the utterance of the Eucharistic words (11:23-26), at which point the individual contributions would become the "Lord's Supper" (κυριακὸν δεῖπνον, 11:20) and would then be community property. In doing this, the wealthy would probably be eating a greater quantity and better quality food than the less wealthy members, since they would be able to bring more and better food. Thus the situation would develop as described in 11:21-22: "one is hungry and another is drunk," an act by which they "humiliate those who have nothing."

As Theissen rightly points out, to claim the right to more or better food at a banquet was not unusual for aristocrats at a meal; this could be considered their "right", just as the positions of honor at the table would normally be theirs by right.³⁰ However, Theissen's argument, though appealing, may

be overstated. It is difficult to understand Paul's conclusion at 11:33-34 if such inequities were actually present. For Paul does not correct the inequities; he merely says not to bring them into the assembly. Thus his instruction at 11:34, "if any is hungry, let him eat at home," would have the same effect as if he were to say, "let them eat cake."

Thus Theissen's reconstruction of social class as the major explanation for schisms at Corinth needs to be examined more closely. He is correct to emphasize the importance of the question of relative status at formal meals, but status need not be equivalent to social class.³¹ One's status in a community could indeed reflect one's status in society at large. But it could also be defined by the community itself. In fact, one of the functions commonly served by Greco-Roman clubs was to provide alternative means to status, since status within society was often not available to their membership because of their social class.³² And the meal was very important in this process because its customs provided a highly-visible means for acknowledging status.

On the other hand, even when status is imputed to social class in the literature, it should not be taken at face value. For example, the conflict between rich and poor at a meal appears to have been a literary *topos* in the Greco-Roman world.³³ Thus whenever Plutarch's brother Timon spoke against "the rich lord-ing it over the poor,"³⁴ he could not have been defining the banquet in which he was participating in literal terms, for the participants were all of the same social class. He rather was using a figure of speech or a *topos*. That is not to say that meal customs did not provide for rigid distinctions among the guests according to their status. But these levels of status could all be within the same basic economic and cultural level, and often were.³⁵

If, then, the idea of "rich vs. poor" was already a *topos* in discussions concerning status at meals, then Paul's reference to "the have-nots" need not be seen as a reference to poor people at the meal. It implies that a question of status was under discussion, but it need not imply that the social levels in the Corinthian church were widely divergent. Rather, for Paul the issue of status involved other factors than the economic ones, factors which he evidently thought were much more important. Thus he establishes the issue of unity at the meal as primary in chapter 11, and on that basis addresses the issue of status in regard to spiritual gifts in chapters 12-14.

Already in chapter 11, however, Paul begins to develop his own argument as to the proper status system in the Christian community. This can be seen in his use of the term *δόκιμοι* ("genuine", 11:19). As Paul sees it, the schisms function correctly in one sense, because they separate out those individuals who are "genuine". Since the schisms in this context refer to the "individual meals" (*ἰδια δεῖπνα*), it is at the meals that the *δόκιμοι* are revealed. Since *δόκιμοι* is a forensic term,³⁶ and since forensic terminology is appropriate in the context of assigning positions at a meal,³⁷ then the *δόκιμοι* could be interpreted as those taking positions of rank at the communal meal. But the term appears to be used in an ironic sense, for the true ranking at the *κυριακὸν δεῖπνον* will be assigned by God: "God has given the greater honor to the inferior part, in order that there might be no schism in the body" (*ὅ θεὸς . . . τῷ ὑστεροῦ-*

μέμφε περισσοτέρων δοῦς τιμὴν, ἵνα μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, 12:24-25). The δόκιμοι, therefore, appear to be those who have been made manifest by the ranking system of the Corinthians, but manifest at its lower end. Thus the δόκιμοι are those judged by God to be "genuine": "For it is not the one who commends himself who is genuine, but the one whom the Lord commends" (οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἑαυτὸν συνιστάνων, ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν δόκιμος, ἀλλὰ ὃν ὁ κύριος συνίστησιν, 2 Cor 10:18). Thus the term δόκιμοι refers primarily to a distinction between those who claim privileges for themselves for whatever reason ("those who boast" in Paul's theology; see e.g. 1 Cor 1:31, 3:18-23, 4:6-7, 5:2, 8:1) and those whom God attests as righteous, who are the truly "genuine".

Although there is an eschatological aspect to Paul's use of the term, that is not the only referent for it. For while one is required to test himself (11:28) with a view toward the final judgment (11:32), he is also to do so with reference to specific activities at the meal itself, as the entire context suggests. Therefore the δόκιμοι would presumably be those who do not provoke schisms, those whose attitudes and actions promote the communal nature of the meal, as is called for in the conclusion at 11:33. Thus the δόκιμος would be one who tested himself (δοκιμάζειν ἑαυτὸν, 11:28) rather than judging others, who discerned the body (διακρίνειν τὸ σῶμα, 11:29) or community as a whole rather than the individuals in it. When one tests oneself with a view to the community as a whole rather than with a sense of comparing oneself with others, then one gives proper regard to the unity of the community rather than succumbing to the divisiveness of individualism.³⁸

4. Paul's Ethical Terminology

a. Σῶμα

Paul's argument for unity at the meal centers on the term σῶμα, which takes from the bread saying in the tradition: "This is my body" (τοῦτό μου ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα, 11:24).³⁹ This he interprets as the basis for unity: "Just as the body is one ..." (καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἓν ἐστὶν, 12:12). Thus the proper eating of the meal is interpreted as properly "discerning the body" (διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα, 11:29), an idea that leads to the conclusion at 11:33, viz. "eat together." The connecting link for this interpretation appears to be found in the interpretation of the liturgy at 10:17: "Because there is one bread, we many are one body, for we all share in the one bread" (ὅτι εἷς ἄρτος, ἓν σῶμα οἱ πολλοὶ ἔσμεν, οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν). In other words, the idea of unity at the meal is based on the metaphor of sharing food together. This was, of course, a common usage in popular philosophy as well.⁴⁰ For Paul the metaphor is taken quite seriously; thus he prescribes that the ritual of the meal be carried out in such a way that it is true to the metaphor (i.e., "eat together," 11:33).

The content of Paul's argument, however, is centered not on the food but on the term which defines it in the liturgy: σῶμα. This term provides him with multiple metaphorical dimensions, for he can then extend his discussion into the "parts" of the body in order to define "distinctions" that exist in the unified body (12:4-6, 12-27). It also provides the basis whereby he can make a theological connection of great significance: the body is Christ's, so you are the body of Christ (12:12, 27). Thus unity comes to be founded ultimately on Christ and the relation-

ship of the believers to him, but it is brought to focus in the action of sharing bread, as his σῶμα, at the communal meal.

With his argument on the unity of the parts of the body in 12:12-27, Paul uses his theology of σῶμα to overturn the system of status at the meal in Corinth. In this way, this term functions similarly to the term φιλία in popular philosophy. One argument in popular philosophy connected "friendship" (φιλία) and "equality" (ἰσότης), with the conclusion that equality, expressed by the non-ranking of the guests, was necessary for friendship.⁴¹ On the other hand, in most clubs and associations, the problem of ranking at the communal meal was solved in another way. There it was not abolished, but regulated, and used to designate those whom the club wished to honor.

Paul appears to take a middle ground between these two, for he argues not for equality but for unity. He replaces "factions" (αἰρέσεις, 11:19) with "distinctions" (διαίρεσεις, 12:4). Thus, like many of the clubs, he allows for differences in "status," as for example in his list of spiritual gifts at 12:28-30, but he defines this status according to his own categories of social ethics, rather than those of society, or even those that previously existed in the Corinthian church.⁴²

Indeed, these "distinctions" are χαρίσματα or "spiritual gifts" (12:4). They differ from normal categories of status because God is the one who assigns honor and, as is often the case in Pauline rhetoric, God's standards are distinguished by being the opposite of those of humankind. God's honor goes to "the inferior part" (τὸ ὑστερούμενον, 12:24), "the weakest" (τὰ ἀσθενέστερα, 12:22), "the secret parts" (τὰ ἀσκήμονα, 12:23). He assigns status according to his principles, "as he wishes" (καθὼς ἠθέλησεν, 12:18).

The purpose of the argument is to emphasize that the distinctions within the community cannot be disharmonious, because they all derive from "one God . . . one Lord . . . one Spirit" (12:4-6). They cannot produce "schisms" (12:25) as did the other system (11:18). Thus the principle of unity, which develops from the concept of "one body", serves an ethical function, for it tends to prescribe certain behavior on those who participate in it. After establishing this principle in chapter 12, Paul begins to work out its implications in more detail. The movement in that direction is indicated already at 12:7: "The manifestation of the spirit is given to each for the common good" (ἐκάστω δὲ δίδοται ἡ φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον). Here Paul relates the concept of unity to one of his key ethical terms, συμφέρον, which in its usage is identical to οἰκοδομή (see 10:23).

b. Οἰκοδομή

Whenever Paul speaks of the relationships of the spiritual gifts within the community, he does so on the basis of the terms συμφέρον and οἰκοδομή. These function as ethical principles and constitute the real basis for the new ranking system in the community. It is God who gives the rank or "honor", but it is the principle of οἰκοδομή which in fact lies behind the ranking at 12:28-30. This becomes clear in chapter 14.

Chapter 14 is a continuation of chapter 12, providing a commentary on the rankings of spiritual gifts with which 12 ends. The issue is primarily between prophecy and speaking in tongues.

Paul's first point is summarized at verse 4: "One who speaks in a tongue edifies oneself, but one who prophesies edifies the church" (ὁ λαλῶν γλῶσση ἑαυτὸν οἰκοδομεῖ· ὁ δὲ προφητεύων ἐκκλησίαν οἰκοδομεῖ). Thus οἰκοδομεῖν is the principle on which Paul's discussion is based. Here he defines its basic meaning: it is a term that refers to community responsibility or social ethics. This means, on the one hand, that one is to speak out in the service in such a way that all can understand and participate; i.e., all can say the "amen" to one's message (14:16). This is the kind of manifestation of the spirit that prophecy represents; thus it is ranked first (14:5).

Tongue speaking is not only judged as of less value, it is even judged to be detrimental. Thus if there is no one to interpret the tongue speaker, she or he is to remain silent: "If there is no one to interpret, let each of them keep silence in church and speak to oneself and to God" (14:28). Whatever the inherent religious value of the tongue speaking for the individual, unless it was a message in which all could participate, it was not to be spoken in the assembly. The ethic of social obligation takes precedence: "Seek to edify the church [assembly]" (πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομήν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ζητεῖτε, 14:12).

Οἰκοδομή is also defined in the sense of speaking in an orderly manner. After summarizing the variety of activities at a worship assembly, Paul explains how they are to be conducted according to οἰκοδομή: "When you come together, each one has a hymn, a lesson, a revelation, a tongue, or an interpretation. Let all things be done for edification (πρὸς οἰκοδομήν) . . . but all things should be done decently and in order (εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν)" (14:26, 40). The terms εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν here function to define οἰκοδομή. If τάξις ("order") is the rule at the worship services, then also εἰρήνη ("peace") rather than ἀκαταστάσια ("confusion") should result (14:33). Paul's instructions defining these concepts in vss. 26-33 specify that only three at the most from each type of spiritual gift are to speak per service, that they are to speak in turn and not all at the same time, and that a tongue speaker is not to speak at all if there is no interpreter. Again, the primary sense is that there is no inherent value in these gifts for the community as a whole, no matter that they are spirit inspired, unless the entire community can participate in them.

Paul's concept of a proper worship service as outlined here is clearly related to the concept of a proper symposium conversation, especially as Plutarch defines it. Plutarch also emphasized "good order" (εὐταξία) as opposed to "lack of order" (ἀταξία). In the context of his discussion, this principle applies to "all details" (περὶ πάντα) of a drinking party, and especially the reclining arrangement, if it is to be "a symposium that is as agreeable as possible" (συμπόσιον ἡδιστόν) (*Quaest. conv.* 615E-F). In his rules concerning the conversation, he emphasized that it should be of a type that all could understand and participate in, and for this he used an analogy very much like Paul's in 1 Cor 12:13. Paul there speaks of unity based on the analogy of a shared cup of wine. Plutarch's argument states: "Indeed, just as the wine must be common to all, so too the conversation must be one in which all will share ... [otherwise]... gone is the aim and end of the good fellowship of the party, and Dionysus is outraged" (δεῖ γὰρ ὡς τὸν οἶνον κοινὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ὄγον, οὗ πάντες μετέξουσιν ... οἴχεται τῆς συμποτικῆς κοινωνίας τὸ τέλος καὶ καθύβρισταὶ οἱ Διόνυσος) (*Quaest. conv.* 614E, 615A).

Like Paul, Plutarch here constructed an argument for a community bond on the basis of the shared wine, and this bond then determined the nature of the conversation. Also like Paul, what is to characterize the conversation is that it be participated in by all just as the wine is. In the context, the point is applied in an ethical sense to the philosopher at a non-philosophical banquet. The principle stated here requires him to speak on the level of the rest of the guests so that all can understand and participate in the conversation.

Similar rules are found in Greco-Roman club statutes. To Paul's ethical use of εἰρήνη ("peace", 14:33) may be compared the use of *quietus* ("peace") in the statutes of the College of Diana and Antinous and the use of ἡσυχία ("quietness") in the statutes of the Iobakchoi. Indeed, since Paul contrasts εἰρήνη with ἀκαταστασία ("confusion", 14:33) and uses it with an analogous meaning and function to εὐσεβῶς καὶ κατὰ τάξιν ("decently and in order", 14:40), his combined ethical terminology in this section is quite close to the Iobakchoi's εὐκοσμία καὶ ἡσυχία ("good order and quietness"). Further, among the rules of the Iobakchoi which contributed to the standard of "good order" were several which defined orderly conversation. For example, one was not to speak without permission of the priest (lines 107-09); one was not to "sing, cheer, or applaud" at the meal (lines 63-64); one was to speak one's assigned part at the direction of the priest (lines 65-67). Thus, although the terminology and some of the specifics differ, Paul shares with the Iobakchoi and with Plutarch similar concepts of meal ethics that apply to proper "table-talk". The differences may largely be attributed to the adaptation of the same ethical concepts to the different contexts.

c. Ἀγάπη

To a certain extent, the term ἀγάπη, as elaborated in 1 Cor 13, functions to provide an extended definition of the term οἰκοδομή. The two terms are related at 8:1 ("love upbuilds" [ἡ ἀγάπη οἰκοδομεῖ]), with the suggestion that the placement of chapter 13 in correlation with chapter 14 was already in mind. Indeed, although the transitions from chapters 12 to 13 and from 13 to 14 are rough, chapter 13 nevertheless has an important function in the context. It tends to bear out what is already stated at 8:1, that ἀγάπη provides the ethical underpinning for οἰκοδομή. It thus functions as a further elaboration of the brief definition of οἰκοδομή found at 10:24: "Let no one seek one's own good, but the good of the other."

In terms of content, the "hymn" to ἀγάπη in 1 Cor 13 is closely related to its context. In particular, it makes reference to the ethical issues under discussion, e.g. prophecy (8:2, 8-9) and tongues (8:1, 8). Thus it appears to have been composed with this context in mind.

In terms of content as well as form, it appears especially appropriate to a symposium context. In popular philosophy it was the term ἔρως that was deemed appropriate to the banquet setting. Indeed, one of the most famous discourses on ἔρως in the ancient world was that at the table of Agathon in Plato's *Symposium*. A hymn to ἀγάπη instead of ἔρως in the context of a meal offers a striking and ingenious contrast.

Whenever the form of the text is analyzed, it is found to

be closest to a particular kind of encomium to the greatest virtue. This seems to have been a stock subject for philosophical discourse, and often such praise was framed in a poetic form. One speech in Plato's *Symposium* had such a form, and is quite similar to 1 Cor 13.⁴³ Among the attributes of *ἔρω* in this passage are the following:

It is he who makes . . . peace among men . . . He it is who casts alienation out, draws intimacy in; he brings us together in all such friendly gatherings as the present; at feasts and dances and sacrificial meals he makes himself our leader; politeness contriving, moroseness outdriving; kind giver of amity, giving no enmity . . . in toil and fear, in drink and discourse, our trustiest helmsman, boatswain, champion, deliverer . . . (197c-e)

There is clearly an emphasis here on *ἔρω* as the quality that creates harmony and fellowship at the meal, a type of argument that is attributed to *φιλία* in other contexts in popular philosophy and to *ἀγάπη* in this context in 1 Cor.

The function of the *ἀγάπη* hymn in its context in 1 Cor serves to emphasize the nature of Paul's system of social ethics. For while he appears to present an alternative status system, the altruism of his system in effect overturns the idea of status altogether. For example, Paul presents a goal for which one should strive, but that goal does not serve to enhance oneself but is based on serving others (12:31). Similarly, the gift of prophecy is a worthy goal to seek, not because of worth inherent in it, but because it "upbuilds" the church (14:1-5). Finally, love itself, as the ultimate ethical "way" (*ὁδός*, 12:31), is not a path to glory but a path to service. Thus *ἀγάπη* is placed above faith and hope (13:13) precisely because it "edifies", whereas faith and hope are of value primarily to the individual.

In relation to the meal setting, 1 Cor 13 is striking in its similarities to the praise of *ἔρω* in Plato's *Symposium*. Indeed, one wonders whether Paul intended such a contrast. Certainly Plato's *Symposium* was sufficiently well known that the similarities in Paul would not go unnoticed. Thus Paul appears to be making a conscious effort to adopt and adapt symposium traditions and make of the institution a *κυριακὸν δεῖπνον*. Accordingly, he altered the Platonic praise of *ἔρω* by applying the term *ἀγάπη* to the definition of *φιλία*, and thereby he created a new ethical terminology.

C. Conclusions and Observations

1. A study of the various contexts in which the Greco-Roman meal occurred reveals a consistent pattern of social ethics associated with it. This same pattern lies behind Paul's ethical instruction in 1 Cor 10-14.

2. Accordingly:

- a. The meal is understood to create a special relationship among meal participants. This relationship is defined in terms of *φιλία* in philosophical writings; in terms of *σῶμα* and *ἀγάπη* in Paul.

b. An implication of this special relationship is that each member has an ethical responsibility toward the group.

c. The resulting ethical instructions emphasize speaking and acting in such a way that best serves the group as a whole.

3. What this means for Paul is that there is a clear and explicit relationship in the argument of 1 Cor between chapters 10-14. Thus the interpretation of the meal at 11:17-34 serves to establish the basis for an argument in which the ethical relationships of the members to one another are defined. Thus there is provided a theological undergirding for the practical instructions e.g. of chapter 14.

4. Consequently, Paul's correlation of the meal with the larger context of his argument brings it more into the center of the worship and life of the community, for it defines not only the form of worship but also the ethical life of the community.

5. Finally, some methodological observations should be made. Paul's relation to the ethical thought of his culture is usually traced in terms of literary forms, such as lists of virtues and vices, haustafeln, etc. In this study, such methods of literary analysis have not proved useful. Rather a more subtle relationship has been suggested, one in which neither literary forms nor terminology are carried over, but rather one in which certain ethical concepts and constructs appear to be held in common. Admittedly the methodology for this analysis has been rather unsystematic. Yet it may be that an analysis of a category as elusive as "popular morality" must of necessity be less rigid in terms of method if we are to understand it properly.

ENDNOTES


- ¹ Arguments summarized here are presented in more detail in my dissertation: "Social Obligation in the Context of Communal Meals: A Study of the Christian Meal in 1 Corinthians in Comparison with Graeco-Roman Communal Meals" (Unpublished Th.D. Dissertation, Harvard University Divinity School, 1980).
- ² Meal customs are summarized in the various handbooks and monographs on the private lives of the Greeks and Romans. Especially useful on the Greek side is W. A. Becker and H. Göll, *Charikles* (8th ed.; London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889) 89-108, 310-55. For Roman customs, see especially J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) 19-54. For a comparison of the Jewish passover liturgy to Greco-Roman meal customs, see Gordon J. Bahr, "The Seder of Passover and the Eucharist Words," *NovTest* 12 (1970) 181-202; reprinted in H. A. Fischel, ed., *Essays in Greco-Roman and Related Talmudic Literature* (New York: KTAV, 1977) 473-94.
- ³ See e.g. Martial *Epig.* 11.31.4-7; Ath. 2.58c; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 734A.
- ⁴ See especially Jean-Marie Dentzer, "Aux origines de l'iconographie du banquet couché," *Revue Archéologique* (1971) 244-45. Note that at virtually all the meals of Jesus in the Gospels, the posture is reclining; the references are collected in Joachim Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (New York: Scribner's, 1966) 48-49.
- ⁵ Ibid. Dentzer notes that the earliest example of the reclining figure in iconography is the relief of Assurbanipal of Nineveh reclining at banquet. The relief dates from the 3rd quarter of the 7th century B.C.E. The motif first appears on Greek reliefs a generation later, in the 6th century B.C.E. The king on the Nineveh relief is surrounded by signs of his power and served by submissive figures. Similarly, in the Greek reliefs, the reclining figure is accompanied by symbols of wealth and class and accompanied by figures in submissive roles, e.g. the wife who sits instead of reclines (see pp. 215-17, 240-44).
- ⁶ On Greek iconography, see note 5 above; see also e.g. the Macedonian custom alluded to in Athenaeus whereby a male child had to undergo a sort of initiation rite in order to take the position of manhood at the table: "In Macedonia it was not customary for anyone to recline at dinner unless he had speared a wild boar without using a hunting net. Until then they must eat sitting. Cassander, therefore, at the age of thirty-five continued to sit at meals with his father, being unable to accomplish the feat, though he was brave and a good hunter" (Ath. 1.18a).
- ⁷ Cf. the following requirement in the Jewish Passover liturgy: "And even a poor man in Israel does not eat until he reclines" (*m. Pesah* 10.1); this appears to reflect a consciousness of social class in relation to the custom of reclining.

- 8 See e.g. the discussion in Plutarch's *Quaest. conv.* 1.3: "Why the place at banquets called the consul's acquired honor." The discussion began with the recognition that "different peoples hold different places in honor: the Persians the most central place, occupied by the king; the Greeks the first place; the Romans the last place on the middle couch, called the consul's place; and some of the Greeks who dwell around the Pontus . . . contrariwise the first place of the middle couch."
- 9 See Josef Martin, *Symposion; Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1931). For the influence of this genre on the literary form of the Jewish Passover liturgy, see S. Stein, "The Influence of Symposia Literature on the Literary Form of the Pesah Haggadah," *JJS* 8 (1957) 13-44; reprinted in Fischel, *Essays* 198-229. For its influence on Christian literature, see X. de Meeûs, "Composition de Lc. XIV et genre symposiaque," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 37 (1961) 847-70.
- 10 For Plutarch as an example of the mixture of ethical philosophy and popular morality of his day, see Hans Dieter Betz, "Introduction," *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. H. D. Betz; Leiden: Brill, 1978) 1-10; for a discussion of "Misch-Ethik" and popular morality in general, see Albrecht Dihle, "Ethik," *RAC* 6 (1966) 661-78.
- 11 On the concept of popular morality, especially in the classical Greek period, see K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley: University of California, 1974); see also Lionel Pearson, *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1962).
- 12 On Greek and Roman satire see especially Edwin S. Ramage, David L. Sigsbee, Sigmund C. Fredericks, *Roman Satirists and their Satire* (Park Ridge, N. J.: Noyes, 1974); J. Wight Duff, *Roman Satire: Its Outlook on Social Life* (Berkeley: University of California, 1936).
- 13 Text and translation from Colin Roberts, T. C. Skeat, and A. D. Nock, "The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos," *HTR* 29 (1936) 40-42.
- 14 Compare the ritual at Plato's *Symposium* 176A; quoted above under A.1.b.
- 15 Skeat-Roberts-Nock, "Gild," 53.
- 16 Text from J.-P. Waltzing, *Etude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains* (4 vols.; Louvain: C. Peeters, 1895-1900) 3.642-46, no. 2311; and Dessau, *ILS* 7212. Translation from Naphtali Lewis & Meyer Reinhold, *Roman Civilization* (2 vols.; New York: Harper, 1966) 2.273-75.
- 17 Text from F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris: De Boccard, 1969) 95-100, no. 51. Translation adapted from M. N. Tod, *Sidelights on Greek History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1932) 86-91.

- 18 Smith, "Social Obligation," 153-56.
- 19 The earliest forms of the Lord's Supper liturgy consistently connect it with a regular meal, viz. Mark 14:22/Matt. 26:26, "while they were eating"; *Did.* 10:1, "after you are filled". The forms of the meals in which these liturgies functioned, that is, whether they included an agape separate from the Eucharist or as part of the Eucharist, or whether they included an agape at all, has been variously debated. For the Pauline meal in 1 Cor 11:23-25, however, it appears unlikely that Paul would quote a liturgy in which a meal intervened between the bread and cup unless it were being practiced in that form by the Corinthian church; thus Gerd Theissen ("Soziale Integration und sakramentales Handeln: Eine Analyse von I Cor. XI 17-34," *NovT* 16 [1974] 187-88) vs. Paul Neuenzeit (*Das Herrenmahl* [München: Kösel-Verlag, 1960] 70-73) and Günther Bornkamm ("Lord's Supper and Church in Paul," *Early Christian Experience* [New York: Harper, 1969] 137-38), et al.
- 20 This cup is identified with the "cup of blessing" (τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας) at 1 Cor 10:16. If this term is to be connected with a traditional Jewish ceremony at the conclusion of a meal, as claimed by Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*, 87 n. 8, it may simply reflect that the adaptation of the Greco-Roman formal meal had already begun within Judaism; see also Bahr, "Seder".
- 21 See e.g. Lucian's parody of the philosophical conversation in which the participants compete in their own fields of expertise: "Most of the company were drunk by then, and the room was full of uproar. Dionysodorus the rhetorician was making speeches, pleading first on one side and then on the other, and was getting applauded by the servants who stood behind him. Histiaeus the grammarian, who had the place next to him, was reciting verse . . . But Zenothemis was reading aloud from a closely written book that he had taken from his attendant" (*Symp.* 17). His description is farcical, yet probably also true to the atmosphere at some symposia, hence e.g. the restrictions against speaking out of turn at the meetings of the Iobakchoi (lines 107-110).
- 22 NA 7.13.12.
- 23 See e.g. the Iobakchoi.
- 24 Thus Günther Bornkamm, "On the Understanding of Worship," *Early Christian Experience* (New York: Harper, 1969) 176 n. 2; David E. Aune, "Septem Sapientium Convivium," *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. H. D. Betz; Leiden: Brill, 1978) 78.
- 25 The physical setting for the meal at Corinth is difficult to define. Note that their posture in chapter 14 is sitting (καθίσθαι, 14:30). They would have evidently met in a home and would have eaten together in one place. The seated posture may have been necessitated by the relative large number of people crowded together.

- 26 See e.g. Conzelmann (*1 Corinthians* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975]) who translates the phrase, "we were all imbued with one spirit" and asks in a note, "Is [this phrase] an allusion to the Lord's Supper?" (212 n. 17).
- 27 See e.g. Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 614E: "Just as the wine must be common to all, so too the conversation must be one in which all will share . . ."
- 28 On the organization of 1 Cor, see especially John Hurd, *The Origin of I Corinthians* (New York: Seabury, 1965).
- 29 "Soziale Integration".
- 30 Pliny (*Ep.* 2.6) and Martial (*Epig.* 3.60) both refer with disfavor to the practice of some wealthy of serving more and better food to themselves and their closest friends than to their other guests.
- 31 See the comments by John G. Gager in a review of recent works by Robert M. Grant, Abraham J. Malherbe, and Gerd Theissen in *RelSRev* 5 (1979) 180; and on class and status in general, see Ramsay MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations, 50 B.C. to A.D. 284* (New Haven: Yale University, 1976) 88-120.
- 32 MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations*, 76-77. Note that club membership, such as that of the College of Diana and Antinous, often included slaves and other individuals to whom civic status was not available.
- 33 See e.g. the use of the banquet theme in satire.
- 34 *Quaest. conv.* 616F. The contrast is between "the rich person" (ὁ πλούσιος) and "the less well-endowed" (οἱ εὐτελέστεροι). It is not a contrast between social classes, but between extravagant wealth and "the simple life."
- 35 Note, however, that the Corinthian community contained slaves (1 Cor 7:21-22), but such a classification of status need not indicate poverty; see e.g. S. Scott Bartchy, *First Century Slavery and 1 Corinthians 7:21* (SBL Dissertation Series 11; Missoula: University of Montana for the Society of Biblical Literature, 1973) 40-44, 73-74.
- 36 The forensic connotations of δοκιμος derive from the context of 1 Cor 11; e.g. note the legal terminology at 11:27-31: ἔνοχος (27), δοκιμάζειν (28), κρίμα (29), διακρίνειν (29,31), κρίνεσθαι (31,32), κατακρίνεσθαι (32); on this see Ernst Käsemann, "The Pauline Doctrine of the Lord's Supper," *Essays on New Testament Themes* (Naperville, Illinois: Allenson, 1964) 119-27.
- 37 See e.g. Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 616C.

- 38 Compare the rules of conduct for the Gild of Zeus Hysistos, where the proscription against schisms (σχίσματα, line 13) not only includes restrictions about forsaking the community (line 14), but also prohibits various disagreements among the members (lines 15-19) including disagreements over their relative status (line 15).
- 39 For the importance of the term *σῶμα* for Paul's Eucharistic theology, see especially Bornkamm, "Lord's Supper".
- 40 See e.g. Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 660B.
- 41 Ibid. 616E.
- 42 Cf. Hurd, *Origin*, 186-95.
- 43 See this and other examples of this form collected in Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 219ff.



JEWISH, CHRISTIAN, AND PAGAN VIEWS OF MIRACLE

UNDER THE FLAVIAN EMPERORS

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Rome under the Flavians witnessed the presence of many noted luminaries, among whom were Josephus, a Hebrew priest from Jerusalem and Roman sympathizer; Plutarch, a conservative Greek still clinging to his ancestral religion, who was in later life a priest of Apollo; and Apollonius of Tyana, the somewhat flamboyant wise man-magician-prophet-figure. In Rome during the same period the Gospel of Mark, the basic source of the Synoptic miracles, was being disseminated, while stories testifying to the "miracles" performed by Vespaasian circulated. The religious thought expressed by this representative group reflects a shared "belief" in miraculous phenomena. Yet Josephus, Mark, and Plutarch, at any rate, followed three different paths - Judaism, Christianity, and Hellenic paganism. This paper discusses the extent to which Plutarch's view of miracle reflects contemporary Jewish and Christian attitudes, examined from the perspective of what he meant by miracle, the manner in which he expressed and presented his views, and the function that miracle served in his work.

Plutarch is eminently suitable as a representative of Hellenic paganism during an age of religious conflict. For three generations his prominent and well-to-do family had lived in Chaeronea, a relatively undistinguished area in Boeotia. Plutarch felt a strong emotional attachment to the traditions of his people, and was proud both of his native city and of his heritage. He was devoutly religious and deeply concerned to uphold the ancestral faith.

Plutarch's religious feelings were no doubt shaped by his father who, as an interlocutor in *THE DIALOGUE ON LOVE*, expresses a view that was surely Plutarch's own.

Pemptides, it is, I believe, a grave and dangerous matter that you are broaching; or rather, you are altogether violating our inviolable belief in the gods when you demand an account and proof of each of them. Our ancient traditional faith is good enough. It is impossible to assert or discover evidence more palpable than this faith... This faith is a basis, as it were, a common foundation of religion; if confidence and settled usage are disturbed or shaken at a single point, the whole edifice is enfeebled and discredited... If you are going to demand a proof of each one of them, probing every temple and attacking every altar with sophistic assault, not a god will you exempt from malicious prosecution and inquisition.¹

Plutarch believed absolutely in divine philanthropia, that the gods were, above all, good and took a beneficent interest in mankind. Divine intervention manifested itself principally through inspiration. Plutarch, then, is a defender of the ancestral religion and faith, a part of which encompassed the miraculous activities of the gods. His brand of religion represents that which in pagan circles Christianity was attempting to combat. With this as background, it remains to examine what part miracle played in Plutarch's religious faith and to compare his attitude with what we find in the Marcan Gospel and in the *ANTIQUITIES* of Josephus.

To establish evidence for miraculous activity in Plutarch it is important to have in mind the relationship which he believed to exist between God and the world. Plutarch believed in a transcendental Deity who, for the most

part, eschewed direct involvement in earthly matters and operated through intermediaries: the higher gods or Olympians and the *daimones*, who in turn through their divine power communicated with man. The presence and the power of the gods is manifested, Plutarch tells us, in Nature and in Matter, although the originating influence is God.² On this model, then, miracle is a demonstration of divine power.³ It is the *telos* of that for, or of which, divine power is the *arche*. It is the result of that which divine power begins.

Such demonstrations of divine power (*dynamis*) reflect the *pronoia* of the gods. Thus votive offerings, which are instruments of the gods, are said to have movement and significance in sympathy with the gods' prescience and are filled with the divine spirit. Examples are given of this phenomenon in Plutarch, among which was the collapse of the bronze pillar of Hiero, which occurred on the day that he died in Syracuse.⁴ Other terms employed by Plutarch within a context of a demonstration of divine power or miracle are *epiphaneia*, *semeion*, and *paradoxon*.⁵ The language of the miraculous in the *ANTIQUITIES* of Josephus and the Marcan Gospel is the same as we have just seen in Plutarch. Thus in Josephus true miracles result from the *pronoia* and *dynamis* of God and are *semeia* of his *pronoia*. The drying up of the Red Sea he terms a manifestation of God (*epiphaneia tou theou*).⁶ Miracles in Mark are mighty works (*dynamis*). Mark records that when a woman who had been bleeding for twelve years touched the garment of Jesus and was healed, Jesus felt that power (*dynamis*) had left him.⁷ On the evidence of the language of miracle in Plutarch, Josephus, and Mark, there would appear to be a basis for agreement as to what constituted the phenomenon.

Notwithstanding, Plutarch would allow a limitation to divine omnipotence which Mark and Josephus do not, a limitation based on what is possible according to nature. This view emerges most forcefully in his discussion of talking statues. Plutarch disbelieves in this phenomenon on the grounds of reason. In the *CORIOANUS* Plutarch records an instance of a statue which reportedly spoke twice as it was being placed inside of a temple. He flatly states that such a thing is difficult to believe and to his ears sounds like something that never happened. It is clearly impossible for coherent and articulate speech to result from a statue because, says Plutarch, neither soul nor deity has ever spoken without being part of a body with vocal apparatus.⁸ Elsewhere he states that it is not possible to deal with an inanimate or lifeless body in a way contrary to its nature by bringing force to bear upon it; the use of each thing is nothing other than its natural use.⁹ Votive offerings, as we have seen, are dependent upon the power of the god to whom they are dedicated and respond in accordance with their own nature to divine purpose. A miracle occurs when a god causes an instrument to behave in a certain way at a certain time. That instrument, however, can only be used according to its own nature. A statue cannot speak by nature, but it can move if an external agency is brought to bear upon it. No matter what agency is brought to bear upon a statue, however, by its own nature it cannot and will not speak.

Two other examples of divine works in Plutarch which are affected by nature should be noted here: the manner of the Pythia's oracular responses and the formation of the cosmos. In prophecy the soul is the instrument of God. The arete of any instrument is to reflect through imitation and as nearly as possible divine purpose by making use of its natural power. It is not possible to reflect this intention in the same perfect manner in which it exists in the divine, but it necessarily becomes mixed with something that is foreign. Thus the manner in which the prophetic priestess expresses herself is not the responsibility of the god, since each woman brings something from herself to that which she imitates. In prophecy the god indicates his thoughts through the human body and soul. The nature of the instrument, however, exerts an influence on the effects of divine inspiration, for a living thing which has self-movement and reason cannot be employed in a way contrary to its own nature. Just as a statue cannot speak, one who is unmusical cannot suddenly become musical, nor can one who is ignorant become suddenly eloquent. Although almost nothing happens without divine initiative, different instruments are used for different purposes and in different ways in accordance with the natural faculties which each thing possesses. This is true even if the originating power is the same.¹⁰ In theory, then, the priestess (a body which is one

form of matter and soul) does not differ vastly from the votive offering, which is another kind of matter and which is filled with divine spirit. Both respond to divine pronouncement when affected by divine power or dynamis. Thus human beings, too, are instruments of god, are dependent on god's power, and respond through sympathy to his movement, just as the votive offering.¹¹

Plutarch's statements concerning the formation of the cosmos reflect the same relationship between God, matter and soul that we have just discussed with reference to talking statues and prophecy. Before creation there existed a body and a soul in a chaotic mass of confusion and disorder. By presenting himself as a model, the Demiurge imposed order and form upon precosmic body, which was nothing other than Nature. Thus through the form and excellence of God, Nature became a cosmos and received from God a share of life and divinity. In forming the cosmos out of Nature, God did not take away anything which had been present before creation, but simply rearranged previously existing material by imposing order. In the process of creation, Nature is in no way diminished; she remains what she had been, a source of both good and evil. For as Plutarch points out, according to the law of nature there can be no existence without a cause. And since God is pure Goodness, He cannot be the cause of evil. Consequently, Nature must possess within herself evil as well as good.¹²

In miracle, divine limitation, based on what is possible according to nature, does not in any way detract from the power of God. On the contrary, it merely reflects the primordial act of creation. The Creator did not eradicate evil from within precosmic Nature, but rearranged the elements and formed order from disorder. The fact that evil exists in the world attests to divine limitation, but in no way diminishes the act of creation. The good predominates in spite of the evil in Nature, and any beneficial deed can be achieved within the natural limitations.

By contrast, the Christian and Jewish God is Omnipotent. In Mark's Gospel, Jesus prays: "Father, for you all things are possible," and "for God all things are possible."¹³ The nature miracles in the Gospel show this: for example, Jesus' stilling of the storm, his walking on water, his feeding of the multitude, the withering of the fig tree as a result of Jesus' curse. Jesus says to the amazed:

Have faith in God. Truly I tell you; if one says to this mountain, rise up and throw yourself into the sea, and does not deliberate in his heart, but believes that what he talks about is happening, it shall be his.¹⁴

In Josephus the omnipotence of God is likewise manifested. As the Jews in flight from the Egyptians reach the Red Sea, Moses prays:

For our part, despairing of other hope or resource, we fling ourselves upon thy protection alone, and expectantly, if aught be forthcoming from thy providence of might to snatch us from the wrath of the Egyptians, we look to thee. May it come quickly, this aid that shall manifest to us thy power....nor are these straits in which we find ourselves without thy domain; nay, thine is the sea, thine the mountain that encompasseth, this then can open at thy command, or the deep become dry land, or we might even find escape through the air, should it please the almighty power that after this manner we should be saved.¹⁵

Moses then strikes the sea with his staff and the sea withdraws, yielding dry land, which the Jews journey across. The Egyptians, in hot pursuit, are caught in the sea as it returns and a downpour of rain descends from heaven. The differences in the view of Josephus and Plutarch are nowhere more apparent, perhaps, than in their separate understanding of the creation of the world. Plutarch's Demiurge works through pre-existent matter, as we have seen; whereas as the God of Josephus, in his omnipotence, creates the world *ex nihilo*.¹⁶ Plutarch's God works within nature; Josephus' God controls nature.

Those miracles in Josephus and Mark recounted above which are not contrary to nature would have seemed possible to Plutarch: the stilling of the storm, the withering of the fig tree, perhaps even the collapse of the mountain into the sea and the recession of the Red Sea, since these instruments of God are not asked to do anything outside of their nature. He would certainly have questioned, however, the notion in Josephus that escape was possible through the air. An account regarding Numa sheds light on Plutarch's probable attitude toward the feeding of the multitude in Mark. It was said that Numa once had given a dinner at which he offered his guests only a very simple meal served on poor dishes. Suddenly he announced that the goddess who was his companion has entered the room, and within a matter of seconds the table was laden with rich foods and expensive dishes. This story appeared ridiculous to Plutarch.¹⁷

Reports of Jesus' virginal conception and subsequent resurrection would not have been novelties to Plutarch's ears. Judging from his attitude toward similar alleged phenomena with respect to Romulus, such reports would have strained his credulity. It is most implausible, he states, that an immortal could derive any pleasure from a mortal body. If anything is believable, it is the idea of the Egyptians that it is not the god, but his divine spirit (*pneuma*) which causes a mortal to become pregnant. But then Plutarch throws suspicion even on this idea by dismissing it with the observation that intercourse is a mutual union.¹⁸ The same argument of what is possible according to nature applies to the account in Plutarch of the disappearance of Romulus' body after death. This story reminded Plutarch of similar incidents of sudden disappearances which had been associated with Aristaeas, Cleomenes, and Alcmena. Aristaeas is said to have died in a fuller's shop, but by the time that his friends had come to claim the body, it had vanished. Someone later reported that he had seen Aristaeas traveling along the road. As for Cleomenes, after having committed a crime, he jumped into a chest. When the angry populace opened the chest, Cleomenes had disappeared. Likewise the body of Alcmena disappeared and a stone was seen to have taken its place within the coffin.¹⁹ Nor did Plutarch need to consult legend for samples of this phenomenon, for his own contemporary Apollonius of Tyana allegedly vanished from sight in the presence of the emperor Domitian. Such an act would not have seemed reasonable to Plutarch, for he could not personally accept the notion that it is possible for a body to disappear; it is not within the nature of a body to vanish any more than it is within that of a statue to speak. Although in the case of Romulus Plutarch is thinking in terms of the rising of the body, it is clear that the survival of the spirit would have had validity for him. Concerning Alcmena he states: "Many such fables are told by writers who improbably ascribe divinity to the mortal features in human nature, as well as to the divine. To reject entirely the divinity of human virtue is impious and base; but to mix heaven with earth is foolish." He then quotes Pindar to the effect that although the body dies, something living still survives, the eidolon, which comes from the gods. "Yes it comes from them and to them it returns, not with its body, but only when it is most completely separated and free from the body, and becomes altogether pure, fleshless and undefiled." ²⁰

And yet, there are other facets to Plutarch's attitude toward the miraculous which rather complicate the issue. So great was his love for the gods and such was his faith that he was unwilling to categorically deny the possibility of a favorable report attributed to the gods, even though it might run counter to his actual belief. He felt absolutely convinced of the transcendent and marvellous character of divine power which is entirely unlike man in nature. Thus, the fact that a god may be able to do something that a man

cannot do, when viewed from this perspective, is not irrational. It is for this reason that although he does not himself believe in talking statues, he refuses to condemn those who, on the basis of faith, adopt the opposite view. His own non-dogmatic position rests on the recognition that man's knowledge and understanding of the ways of the gods are limited and that an abiding faith in the goodness of the gods and the manifestation of that goodness in the human sphere is never misplaced. The idea that the ways of the gods are inscrutable to man appears in other contexts as well, most notably in the *DELAY OF DIVINE VENGEANCE*. Here the subject that is examined is the slowness of God to punish wrongdoers, which undermines confidence in providence. Plutarch's position, although he does offer reasons to account for this problem, is to adopt the attitude that we cannot understand human laws and why certain men act the way in which they do.²¹ How much more difficult is it, then, to understand the ways of the gods. Thus Plutarch's native piety qualifies his reason.

We have just discussed two of Plutarch's approaches to miraculous phenomena - the approach which reason proclaimed and the approach which faith demanded. When encountering reports of wondrous events, therefore, his solution was to apply reason on the basis of what was possible according to nature, while at the same time recognizing that man's knowledge is limited and the ways of the gods surpass a mere mortal's understanding.

When examining a report of a miraculous event which reason rendered suspect in his view, Plutarch had an interesting way of citing results and the testimony of witnesses. Thus the tradition regarding the birth of Romulus as a result of divine conception was viewed by Plutarch with reference to the present power of Rome. More than once he ascribes the power (*dynamis*) and the glory of Rome to divine agency (*theos*). He cites as evidence of this divine favor the fact that from apparently insignificant origins Rome developed into the vast empire of which he himself was a subject. In his view, this never could have happened unless the city itself had been of divine origin (*theia arche*) and, indeed, under the very protection of divine powers which manifested themselves (*epiphaneia, paradoxon*) throughout its history.²² With respect to witnesses to buttress miracle Plutarch records that even the sceptics were won over when they heard the testimony of the highly respected Julius Proculus. This man claimed that he had seen Romulus coming along the road dressed in bright armour, and that Romulus had told him that just as he had originally come from the gods, so the gods now saw fit to reclaim him to their company. Henceforth he would be a protecting deity for the city and was to be worshipped as such. Due to a divineline inspiration, adds Plutarch, everyone believed the story on the testimony of Proculus.²³ Thus Plutarch indicates that the legends concerning Romulus receive validity only when connected with the power of Rome.

Just so in Mark, Jesus' miracles are intimately connected with the good news of the Kingdom of God.²⁴ In neither author are the miracles significant outside of a broader context. But in Mark, although Mary the Magdalene, Mary the mother of James, and Salome were witnesses to the risen Christ, they said nothing to anyone. Anderson ascribes their fearful silence to "the truth that the first word and the last word of the good news in not anything men or women can think to say or do, but God's own witness to his Son (verse 7)," and comments further that Mark "could hardly have declared more effectively that God's Word is mightier than man's words, or that it is first and foremost the God who speaks in Jesus and for Jesus who brings to pass the promise of Easter and confers the gift of Easter faith."²⁵

Josephus, in his account of Jewish tradition and teaching, evinces a tendency toward rationalization in matters which appear suspect. Thus, after he records the fact that Noah lived for 950 years, he evidently feels a need to defend this statement. He therefore gives no less than four reasons in support of the tradition of the longevity of the patriarchs: the love of God, the nature of their diet, the certainty that God would grant them a long life in order to accomplish their work, and the testimony of historians. He concludes, however, by saying, "But in these matters, let each one decide

according to his own fancy. Plutarch also takes this approach with respect to the legend that Numa and other heroes held frequent conversations with the gods. He ends his discussion of this subject with, "If anyone is otherwise minded, I say, with Bacchylides, Broad is the way."²⁶ But whereas Plutarch is demonstrating a non-dogmatic attitude toward the views of members of his own faith concerning matters in which no one man can claim to be an expert, Josephus, writing for a pagan audience is, perhaps, displaying a certain sensitivity to the reputation that the Jews had among the pagans for being superstitious. For indeed Plutarch, as well as others, considered the Jews in this light. In his essay *ON SUPERSTITION*, he mentions that because it was the Sabbath, the Jews, bound by superstition, refused to fight when their city was attacked, and thus were captured by the enemy.²⁷ Josephus may be alluding to this event at 10. 3-7, where he glosses over the incident. Josephus states that Ptolemy captured Jerusalem by trickery by entering the city on the Sabbath on the pretext of offering sacrifice. The Jews, suspecting nothing, and "because of their lack of suspicion and the nature of the day were enjoying themselves in idleness and ease." He then goes on to quote Agatharchides who, in relating the event, accuses the Jews of having lost their liberty due to superstition. Josephus inserts the commentary of Agatharchides without comment other than to say, "This then was the opinion that Agatharchides expressed about our nation."

It is clear from Plutarch's attitude toward the miraculous that his faith in the gods did not depend upon miracle, and in this respect, he reflects the feeling of Mark. Such an outward witness of God was superfluous to him, for in his view a conception of God resides in the soul of man and shines by its own light. A man who knows God in his own soul needs no further validation through the senses. What was important to the faith of Plutarch, then, was not miracle, but rather the knowledge of the goodness of the gods and their love for man to which man responds. Thus, when the truth of Apollo was attacked because his prophetic priestess delivered the oracular responses in simple and ungrammatical language, whereas Apollo was the "leader of the Muses", Plutarch, who served as the priest of Apollo for at least twenty years, was willing to attempt an explanation for the faithful perplexed who asked for such. "In Heaven's name," said Diogenianus, "do not jest, but solve for us this problem which is of universal interest."²⁸ Plutarch then indicated that the manner of the oracular responses was not the responsibility of the god.²⁹ The voice and the language of the Pythia do not belong to the god, but to the Pythia herself, who speaks in her own natural way. Apollo does not enter her body; he is no ventriloquist. Apollo inspires his priestess and indicates the future to her, but he has nothing to do with the manner in which she expresses herself. Everyone agrees that the gods make use of birds to declare their will and to act as divine messengers, but it occurs to no one to insist that a bird's call should be rational and articulate. It is the same with the Pythia. She who has had no schooling cannot be expected to deliver her message in the phraseology of a poet or a trained orator. She is the instrument of the god who responds to his inspiration, yet she delivers the message of the god in accordance with her own nature and recounts the truth.³⁰

Although Plutarch offered explanations when called upon, his true attitude is reflected by the following: "We act as though we were anxious and and fearful lest the place here (Delphi) lose its repute of 3000 years and some few persons should cease to come here, condemning the oracle as if it were the lecturing of some popular speaker, and we offer a plea in defense and invent reasons and arguments for matters which we do not understand and which it is not fitting that we understand.... We try to appease and win over the man who complains instead of bidding him take his leave for all time.... If they cannot ascertain to their satisfaction the reason for the change, they go away, after pronouncing judgment against the god, but not against us nor against themselves for being unable by reasoning to attain to a comprehension of the god's purpose."³¹ Plutarch does not consider signs and explanations essential to belief.

The function of miracle in Plutarch, then, is not to create belief. His knowledge of the God was in the soul. Miracle was simply another part of that divine machinery which he accepted along with his faith in the gods.

The Marcan Gospel carries the same message. The miracles of Jesus are not meant to inspire belief in the Word or to establish the authority of Jesus for non-believers. Rather the authority of Jesus comes from God, a fact which is emphasized by Mark at the beginning of his work. Non-believers in the Kingdom of God and in Jesus as the Son of God and those who demand signs are rebuked.³² Faith in Jesus precedes miracle. For example, a leper says to Jesus: "If you wish, you can make me clean." A bleeding woman states: "If I touch your mantle, I shall be healed."³³ In Mark, then, the miracles of Jesus are not "evidential"; often Jesus cautions that his works are to be kept a secret. Mark expects his readers to accept the miracles as a part of the Gospel, rather than as isolated testimony to the divine nature of Jesus.³⁴

In Josephus, however, the miracles function to authenticate the prophet. God says to Moses: "Use miracles to convince all men that thou art sent by me and doest all at my command." And the people admired Moses for being so highly esteemed by God. Miracles also serve to reassure the prophet himself and to buttress his faith in divine favor. In proof of this, God changes the staff of Moses into a serpent and water into blood.³⁵

To conclude, although Plutarch shared the view of Josephus and Mark that miracle was the result of divine power originating in God, and although many of the miracles reported from Jewish and Christian contexts might have had validity for him, nevertheless his attitude toward miracle was in basic conflict with these two authors. He would not have shared their belief in the omnipotence of God, since this idea ran counter to his own tradition. His reasoned belief proclaimed that God's miracles do not overturn nature, but rather work through nature. Nor would he have considered that such an attitude diminished divine authority and purpose, since God had no wish, in his view, to overturn nature and anything that could be accomplished for the good of mankind could be achieved notwithstanding this limitation. His qualifying statements with respect to the phenomena should be understood as pragmatic recognition of human limitations in an area in which no man is expert and, moreover, are concessions, I suggest, to the faith of his fellows, concessions which he would not have made to a foreign religion. Native piety, buttressed by festivals and sacrifices, and his deeply rooted cultural heritage set him apart intellectually and emotionally from the Judaic Law, feelings against idolatry, circumcision, as well as the Christian baptism, sacraments, and the acceptance of Jesus and his Word. Finally, although Plutarch would have had no reason to doubt either Jewish or Christian miracles that occurred in accordance with nature, such miracles would ultimately have been meaningless to him. For he could not have shared the concomitant belief in the religion itself. And for Plutarch, miracles were intimately connected with religious faith.

NOTES

1. 756A-B, D; Loeb translation.
2. Plutarch's transcendental Deity is the Demiurge of the *TIMAEUS*. Neither this Deity nor the Olympians maintain direct involvement with earthly affairs. The daimones preserve the gods from contact with matter; *OBSCULESCENCE*, 415A, 437A; 425F-426A; 431E; 414E; *ISIS*, 382F. *ORACLES*, 398A.
3. For evidence of miracle understood as a demonstration of divine power during the time of Plutarch, see S. Reinach, "Les Aretalogues dans l'Antiquité," *BULLETIN DE CORRESPONDANCE HELLENIQUE* 9(1885)257.
4. *ORACLES*, 397E-398A.
5. *IBID.*, 409B; *CAMILLUS*, VI.2-4.
6. *ANT.*, II. 286-87; 339; cf. III. 19. In Josephus dynamis, although used

- in a context of miracle, is not used to mean miracle: G. MacRae, S.J., "Miracle in the *ANTIQUITIES* of Josephus," *MIRACLES: CAMBRIDGE STUDIES* (1965), 144; 136; R.M. Grant, *MIRACLES AND NATURAL LAW*, 154-55.
7. 8.11; 5:30; cf. Hugh Anderson, *THE NEW CENTURY BIBLE COMMENTARY: THE GOSPEL OF MARK*, 198.
 8. XXXV111. 1-3; cf. *OBSOLESCENCE*, 436D-E; 414D-415A.
 9. *ORACLES*, 404F-405A.
 10. *IBID.*, 397B-C; 404B-405A; *SEVEN WISE MEN*, 163E-F.
 11. *ORACLES*, 404C.
 12. *DELAYS*, 550D; *PROCREATION OF THE SOUL*, 1015D-E; *TABLE TALKS*, 615F-616A; 719C-E; *PLATONIC QUESTIONS II*, 1001B; *PLATONIC QUESTIONS IV*, 1003A; cf. *TIMAEUS*, 29E-30A; *DION*, X.2; *ISIS*, 369B; *PERICLES*, XXXIX.2.
 13. 14,36; 10.27.
 14. 4.39; 6.49; 6.35-44; 8.19; 11.12-14; 11.20-25. Lattimore translation.
 15. II. 335-37; cf. II.333; Loeb translation.
 16. II. 338-345; I.27f.
 17. *NUMA*, XV.2
 18. *IBID.*, IV.2.
 19. *ROMULUS*, XXV111.4-6.
 20. *IBID.* 6-7; Loeb translation.
 21. 549B; 549F-550C; 558D.
 22. *CAMILLUS*, VI.6.
 23. *ROMULUS*, XXV111.4-6.
 24. See Anderson, *op. cit.*, 150.
 25. *IBID.*, 358.
 26. *ANT.*, I. 104-08; cf. III. 269,348; *NUMA*, IV.8. Loeb translation.
 27. 169C.
 28. *ORACLES*, 397D.
 29. See text on divine limitation in Plutarch.
 30. *ORACLES*, 397C; 404B-E; 405B-D; 408F.
 31. *IBID.*, 408D; 409D. Loeb translation.
 32. 8.11-12.
 33. 1.40; 5.28; cf. 10.46-52; 6.5-6.
 34. 1.21-28; 2.1-12; 1.43-44; 3.12.
 35. II. 274; III. 38; II. 272-274; cf. 275-276.

The study of superstitio has been plagued by neglect of the question, What did the ancients mean by the term? and by a consequent oversupply of articles about what modern writers believe to be "superstitions". Thus the great Dictionnaire des Antiquités of C. Daremberg and E. Saglio (Paris, 1977-1919, repr. Graz, 1963) contained no article on superstitio, but Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie (2 ed., ed. G. Wissowa et al., Stuttgart, 1894-1980) began with a long article by Riess on "Aberglaube" (1.1894.29 ff.) which treated both Greek deisidaimonia and Latin superstitio as terms for aspects of the great Indogermanic Aberglaube, of which it catalogued ancient examples recognizable by nineteenth century standards, but did not consider what the ancients would have thought of them. (1) When, almost forty years later, the lexicographers finally came to superstitio they permitted Pfaff to dismiss the subject in two columns (14.1931.937 ff.) by referring to Riess' article, adding a few general remarks, and going on to superstitio "in the narrower sense", by which he meant Romans' worship of non-Roman gods - this in spite of the fact that Riess' article had insisted on the native character of Aberglaube as Volks Glaube and had consequently distinguished from its magic, which Riess actually believed to be of alien origin.

Though Pfaff did not notice this contradiction, he at least was on the right side of it. His remarks about superstitio were based on clear passages and correctly reported one meaning the word commonly had in the pronouncements of Roman emperors. (2) However, he did not ask whether the cults of foreign gods were thought superstitiones simply because they were foreign, or whether foreignness and superstitio were distinct and sometimes separable objections. He also left unexplored the other meanings that superstitio might have had for Romans. Since the literature on these latter has been widely diverse and diffuse, I shall mention only the admirable survey of ancient and modern definitions in A. Pease's edition of Cicero, De divinatione, on book 2.148, (3) and for the rest refer to the citations in the paper of D. Grodzynski, "Superstitio", Rev. Et. Anc. 76.1974.36 ff., the latest extensive discussion of the term that I have seen.

Many of the articles cited by Grodzynski present etymological conjectures to explain how, from its obvious roots, superstitio came to acquire its common meanings. The definitions collected by Pease, several of them pseudo-etymological, prove that the relation of the meaning to the roots was unknown to the ancients, and the contradictions of the modern conjectures leave it still unknown. We therefore go on from the conjectures to the evidence.

Superstitio appears first in Cicero, (4) but so little remains of the Latin written before Cicero's time that few would think the word a creation of his. (5) Indeed, he explicitly says that, "Our ancestors distinguished superstitio from religio" (De natura deorum 2.71 end). Moreover, the adjective superstitiosus was used three times by Plautus, probably in the 190's. (6) In the Curculio, line 397, when one character correctly guesses how another lost his eye, the latter exclaims, "This fellow's really superstitiosus, he gives true revelations." Again in the Amphitruo, 323, a display of pretendably abnormal perception draws from a gullible observer the comment, "That man is superstitiosus!" Both comments are made ridiculous by their contexts, but testify to common use of superstitiosus with meaning, "possessed of prophetic or divinatory powers." In the Rudens 1139, when a girl is asked to prove her ownership of a box by describing its contents before she sees them, another character objects that she may be superstitiosus - have divinatory powers - and so may get the box undeservedly.

Probably ten or twenty years later Ennius used the word with a similar sense in his tragedy Alexander (frag. 8, ed. Vahlen²),

when he made Cassandra claim she was sent with prophetic (superstitiosis) predictions inspired by Apollo. Of course she was telling the truth - her veracity is guaranteed by her legend. Cicero, who quoted the passage (*De divinatione* 1.66), made his brother Quintus use it as evidence of the nature of true prophecy. Later on, in *De divinatione* 2.115, the words, "O holy Apollo, who hold the sure navel of the world, whence first the terrible prophetic voice (vox superstitiosa) went abroad" are quoted from an unknown poet (Ribbeck thought, perhaps Ennius)(7). With these words Cicero begins an attack on the Delphic oracle. He probably chose the quotation because of the pejorative sense he himself attributed to superstitiosa (cp. *De natura deorum* 2.71 f., etc.), but the wording of the selection makes it seem likely that the term was originally one of praise.

Against these five passages from the first half of the second century B.C., which show this favorable use of superstitiosus, there is one that shows it used in a context of abuse. Ennius, in his tragedy *Telamo* (frag. 4, ed. Vahlen²), made the hero attack "superstitiosi, prophets, and impudent inspectors of guts (of sacrificed animals), either lazy or mad or driven by poverty, who don't know their own way, but direct others." This is put by Cicero into the mouth of Quintus at the end of the speech already quoted (*De divinatione* 1.132). Quintus now is defending himself against the charge of credulity; he distinguishes true prophets, such as Cassandra, from "hill-billy augurs...village diviners...astrologers from the race track...Isiac soothsayers", to all of whom he applies these verses. That Cicero here intended superstitiosi to be used as a term of abuse is indubitable. But what was Ennius' intention? Ennius probably thought his readers would know the speaker was mistaken. The speaker, Telamon, was headed for disaster; his abuse of prophets was probably a piece of dramatic irony, like that of Sophocles' Ajax 316 ff. on which Vahlen believed it modelled. In such a context superstitiosus may have meant only "claiming prophetic powers". We cannot confidently conclude that it was in itself a term of abuse. The other passages already quoted show indisputably that it could be, by itself, a term of praise. We conclude that in the early second century B.C. it meant roughly "prophetic" and, like other approbative adjectives, could sometimes be used ironically.

This conclusion is not new. It is close, for instance, to what was said by K. Latte.(8) Nevertheless, I have argued the case because Ms. Grodzynski overlooked three of these six passages, misinterpreted the rest, and arrived at the conclusion, "Even for this archaic period of Latin literature, the pejorative connotation of superstitio prevails."(9)

By this conclusion she was spared the necessity of explaining how the meaning of superstitio changed between 169 B.C., when Ennius died, and the period after 69 B.C., in which our next group of examples, from Cicero and his contemporaries, appears. In the course of this century superstitio became predominantly, but not exclusively, a term of abuse. Moreover, it lost its specific reference to prophecy or divination and became a general term for any religious or quasi-religious belief or practice, especially one the writer happened to dislike. In sum, it became as far as it could the Latin equivalent of the Greek deisidaimonia. This new sense is well exemplified by the quotations Grodzynski has selected from Cicero and other writers of his and later times. These spare us the need of repeating the evidence, and so give us the time to try to explain it.

Explanation must begin from the great influence of Greek on later Roman republican thought. Since this is well known in general, we can go on at once to the particular role of deisidaimonia, which in Greek meant "fear of supernatural beings". Like superstitio, it was not originally pejorative. In its earliest occurrences it refers to a virtue, as does the English "godfearing".(10) Theophrastus, however, included a caricature of the deisidaimon - the man who suffers from

deisidaimonia - in his Characters (no. 16), and from then on the term was most often used to mean excessive fear of supernatural beings, and consequent absurd precautions, some of them grotesque in themselves, others merely excessive reactions to trivial events: When such a man meets a funeral he washes his hands to rid himself of the impurity, sprinkles himself with holy water from a temple, and goes about all day with a sprig of laurel in his mouth - laurel was the plant of Apollo and Apollo was par excellence the destroyer of impurity. Again, when a weasel crosses the path of this crank he will not go on until somebody else goes through the area in which the weasel ran, so as to take off the cobweb-like curse left by that ill-omened animal. And so on.

For a word with deisidaimonia's range of meanings, superstitio, with the senses it had in the early second century, would not seem to have been an appropriate translation? How did it happen to be chosen? We may conjecture that superstitiosi - self-appointed prophets and diviners - played an important role in the Roman society of the second century B.C. They would have been persons to whom one could go for advice when some untoward happening made one afraid of something supernatural. The Romans were much given to asking advice, as the development and powers of their advisory bodies and classes - e.g. the senate, the pontifices, and the jurisconsults - show. This characteristic may be seen as a consequence of the importance of authoritative opinion in their relatively closed society, but that is another question. Whatever the cause, there is no doubt of the importance in early Rome of consultation, and a man who was superstitiosus would have been thought a good one to consult about what should be done in re special impurity, evil omens, puzzling dreams, odd behaviour of ominous animals, etc. Hence the sorts of observances the superstitiosi prescribed for such emergencies could have come to be called after them superstitutiones, and the singular superstitio could have come to be used to designate all such popular but unofficial practices, as distinct - in origin, if not in nature - from those prescribed by legally established religious authorities.

Thus the change in the reference of superstitio can be explained. The change of its connotation, from approval to disparagement, probably came later, perhaps continuing into the early first century B.C., as one item in the general change of Roman religious attitudes during the hellenistic age. When the Greeks and Romans discovered the incompatibility of their religious traditions with their rational conclusions about the world they found themselves facing a many sided problem. We know best the philosophical and literary side: How could the old myths be reconciled with the new notions of natural order and moral laws? More difficult, however, were the questions about practice, because both peoples had established by law a multitude of religious institutions and officials for ceremonies which now seemed useless at best. Moreover, the beliefs and fears indicated by representatives of the religious tradition - parents and teachers, far more than public officials - were recognizedly important factors in maintaining public order and private morality. And finally, the masses, both Greek and Roman, were devoted to the gods and their rites and were constantly adding new ones, imported or invented. They also maintained, out of their own poor pockets, a complex social class of religious quacks: Theophrastus' deisidaimon consulted "interpreters" of omens, "judges" of dreams, "prophets", "bird watchers", and "Orphic initiators"; cp. De divinatione 1.132 above.

In this state of affairs, Theophrastus' attack could have suggested a practical compromise. It left mostly unquestioned the structure of official religion (institutions, personnel, ceremonies, and festivals) and the standard observances of private religion, e.g., in the family cults, but foolish scrupulosity of observance, excessive and outre practices, were ridiculed as were, by tacit implication, many private religious practitioners: the suggestion was that their best patrons were fools. For Romans who were conservative politically and socially, but admired Greek philosophy, this distinction between the standard family

and official religion on the one hand, individual fanatics and hole-in-the-corner holy men on the other, must have been a godsend. Best of all, it could be expressed in Latin by a distinction between superstitio (the sorts of things that superstitiosi prescribe or do) and religio (the proper, familiar practices of state and home). Greek had no equivalent for religio; eusebeia came closest, (11) but commonly referred to private attitude, not publicly established cults, whereas religio covered both. Consequently it was in Rome that the distinction between "religion" and "superstition" was given classic expression by Cicero and launched on its career as a characteristic of the western world, at once a favorite resort of apologists and tool of reformers. The enormous differences of intellectual structure and social role, between the major occidental and oriental religions, are to no small extent consequences of the convenience of this great distinction.

The loss of most Latin literature from the century between 169 and 69 prevents us from tracing this transition in detail. It must have taken much time and been complicated by many factors, among them the basically favorable sense of superstitio and the common use of religio to mean "religious fear", "taboo", and the like - just the sort of thing to which deisidaimonia referred. Thus in the second century B.C., and even later, deisidaimonia was often used by Greek writers to translate religio, (12) the most famous instance being Polybius' pronouncement that one of the great advantages of the Roman state, and one of the things that helped to hold it together, was "that which is ridiculed by other peoples, I mean deisidaimonia" (6.56.7). That he was thinking of religio is proved by the examples he goes on to give: it is because of deisidaimonia that, unlike the Greeks, the Romans will not swear falsely, will perform what they have sworn to do, will not embezzle public funds, etc.

Conversely, Roman writers use both religio and superstitio in the sense of deisidaimonia and sometimes put them side by side, almost as equivalents. So, for instance, Livy reports that Tullus Hostilius, after sickness broke his spirit, "became liable to all (sorts of) superstitiones and therefore filled the people with religiones", meaning by religiones, as Weissenborn-Müller remarked, the practices corresponding to his superstitious beliefs; in Greek both would have been deisidaimoniai. (13) Again Vergil, when religio would not fit the meter, used superstitio in the favorable sense of deisidaimonia for "pious and justified fear of supernatural things, religious awe": The Styx is the una superstitio superis quae reddita divis (Aen. 12.817) - the one thing by which they dare not swear falsely. The equivalence with religio was noticed by Servius, (14) that with deisidaimonia is indicated by the string of passages in Diodorus, Vergil's older contemporary, recommending deisidaimonia as the basis of good government and of the observance of oath (1.70.8; 79.1; etc., and especially 34-35.2.47). At the same time Vergil knew the common, pejorative force of deisidaimonia and used superstitio with that sense, too: Aeneas, visiting the village where Rome is to be built, finds the cult of Hercules already established there. He is assured by his local hosts that their worship of the Greek god has not been imposed upon them by "unjustified (vana) superstition, neglectful of the old (local) gods" (8.187). Hercules himself had visited the spot and won his cult by delivering the residents from a malevolent demigod. Their reverence of him, therefore, as Servius said (ad loc.) was not due to "needless fear" (15) (i.e. deisidaimonia) nor was it an alien cult.

As Servius also recognized, this apology for what was, in Vergil's time, one of the most popular cults of Rome (16) must be seen against the background of Roman hostility to foreign cults, a hostility not wholly alien to Greek thought (so Socrates had learned) but particularly strong in the Roman aristocracy and in the mind of Vergil's Roman Apollo, Augustus. (17) Worship of alien gods does not appear in the list of meanings of deisidaimonia compiled by Koets, (18) but it could easily be thought to exemplify needless or excessive fear of divine beings, and the

absurd practices to which such fear might lead. Hence we may plausibly suppose that identification with *deisidaimonia* accounts for the extension of *superstitio* to refer to alien cults, especially (but not exclusively) when introduced into Rome.

As polytheists the Romans generally did not doubt the existence of the gods of other peoples. Therefore when they wrote of foreign peoples and lands they commonly referred to their "religions" (as Ms. Grodzynski has correctly pointed out, *op. cit.* 44 ff.). However, when a writer wanted to characterize foreign practices as needless, excessive, absurd, or the like, he was apt to use *superstitio*. Thus when the Samnites resorted to their native (and of course secret) religious rites in order to stop a Roman invasion, Livy contemptuously described them as "busied with superstitions" and went on to list the Roman conquests (10.39.2). When Cicero wanted to give an example of "superstition" he referred to the (Egyptians') worship of cats and dogs (*De legibus* 1.32). When he was defending Flaccus against the accusations of the Jews he spoke of Judaism as a "barbaric superstition" and then at once went on to refer to it as a "religion of (Rome's) enemies", equating *superstitio* and *religio* in the way we have already noticed, (19) though, like Livy, he repeatedly used *religio*, without any pejorative implication, for non-Roman cults. (20)

Later writers take the same liberties. Tacitus writes of the "ancient religion" of the Nahanarvali (*Germania* 43.4, cp. 39.2, of the Sannones) and commends their cult for its lack of "foreign superstition"; he refers to the cult of Isis among the Suebians as a "religion introduced" (from abroad, 9.6); and he often uses *superstitio* for non-Roman cults. (21) Suetonius speaks with apparent approval of Titus' wearing the diadem at the consecration of an Apis bull in Memphis "according to the custom of the ancient religion" (*Titus* 5.3), but he describes "the religion of the Druids among the Gauls" as being "of dreadful inhumanity" (*Claudius* 25.5), which suggests an equation with *superstitio*, and he bluntly describes the cult of Isis at Rome as a "shady superstition." (22) On the other hand these same authors continue to use *superstitio* for Roman beliefs and practices they think unjustified; so Tacitus *Annals* 1.28 f. (fear of eclipses), 79 (fear of altering the courses of rivers); *Historiae* 2.78 (trust in astrology and omens); Suetonius, *Nero* 56: Nero "was contemptuous of religions" (whether scruples or cults)... "but was captivated by another superstition, (viz., trust in) a little image of a girl which he worshipped faithfully as the highest god ... because, just after he had received it from some unknown plebeian as a gift which would protect him from plots, a conspiracy had been discovered." Pliny the Younger thought that the distinguished lawyer Marcus Regulus was too superstitious because he always consulted the haruspices about the outcome of his cases - an utterly traditional Roman practice. (23)

Such examples, which could easily be multiplied, show that it is equally mistaken to maintain that *superstitio* was first used for cults of foreign peoples in the time of Pliny, Tacitus, and Suetonius, (24) and that in their time and afterwards it was used almost exclusively for such cults and no longer employed for excessive use of Roman rites, nor for individual eccentricities, except for magic. (25) The facts are that from Cicero's time on we find *superstitio* used with the sense of *deisidaimonia* and, by an extension of this sense, as a term to describe alien cults. The chief change that does occur is the disappearance of the favorable sense which *superstitio* had originally, and also its loss of the favorable sense of *deisidaimonia*. The last favorable use of *superstitio* that I can think of, is Vergil's.

The mistaken limitation of the later use of *superstitio* to magic and to the cults of foreign peoples is compounded when the latter usage is taken to explain its use for Christianity. (26) I do not know of any good evidence that before 150 the Christians were thought by their

neighbors to be a peculiar people. They themselves at first claimed to be the true Israel (Gal. 6.16; I Peter 2.9; etc.) and later, when they no longer could or wished to pass as Jews, began to claim that they were a third people, distinct from both Jews and Greeks (Aristides, *Apology* 2, etc. - probably a bid for legal recognition and privileges like those granted the Jews). However, these claims of Christian propagandists cannot be taken as reliable evidence of the attitudes of pagans, and the few pagan references to them that can securely be dated before 150 simply do not consider them a peculiar people, nor, indeed, a people at all, nor do they refer to Christianity as a foreign cult (which, in the Roman Empire, it certainly was not).

The first pagan to mention them is Pliny the younger, writing as governor of Bithynia in 110/1 (*Epistolae* 10.96). He knows them as members of a private organization (*hetaireia*) which they could leave if they wanted to, as many had. Membership carried with it the designation (*nomen*) "Christianus". On the emperor's orders Pliny, as his legate, had recently published an edict prohibiting such organizations. He now asks the emperor (*inter alia*) whether mere membership (*the nomen*) is to be punished, or whether it must be shown that each member in question had in fact committed at least one of those crimes of which Christians were commonly suspected (*the flagrantia cohaerentia nomini* - all of them aspects of magic). (27) He seems to consider Christianity simply as one example of the class of prohibited organizations, an extensive and important one, but not in any way a "peculiar people". He says nothing of any relationship between the Christians; instead he specifies that among them were persons of every social class, even a few Roman citizens. He says nothing of their being strangers to the area; instead he declares that not only townspeople, but villagers and even countrymen are involved. He has investigated their goings on and has found nothing criminal, only a *prava et immodica* ("depraved and immoderate") *superstitio* - obviously a form of *deisidaimonia*. (We know from Tacitus that Roman lawyers were not including magic in the class of *superstitiones* - *Annals* 12.59 - but the Christian slave girls examined by Pliny resolutely denied any magical practice, and Pliny, after torturing them, took their words.) Pliny knew this *superstitio* was a cult of Christ "as a god"; we may presume he knew that Christ had not lived in Bithynia; but there is nothing in his letter to indicate that the place of the cult's origin had anything to do, either with his description of it as a *superstitio*, or with the legal measures he took against it.

Pliny may have had with him in Bithynia his friend Suetonius who about ten years later, in his life of Nero, referred to the Christians in passing as a "sort of men of a new and maleficent superstition" whose punishment had been one of the few good things done in Nero's reign (*Nero* 16). The word here translated "sort" is *genus*, but it can hardly be forced to mean "race" or "people", since Suetonius used it in the preceding clause of the same sentence to refer to "all sorts of goodies" which cookshops had been prohibited to display. The sort of men who were Christians were simply those who held this peculiar superstition which involved the practice of magic (this is implied by "maleficent"). (28) Suetonius says nothing of the origins, either of the men or of the superstition; apparently origin was not an important question.

Another friend of Pliny was Tacitus, probably Proconsul of Asia during 112/13, the year after Pliny's last term in Bithynia, which Asia adjoined. A couple of years later Tacitus wrote the account in his *Annals* (15.44.3-8) of Nero's persecution of the Christians. Again there is not a word of their being a people. As a historian, Tacitus explains that the source of the *nomen* - the name given to members of the organization - was *Christus*, and that this "deadly superstition" had originated in Judea and later spread to Rome. He says nothing, however, to indicate that the superstition's place of origin had anything to do with its classification or legal treatment. Terminology and ideas are noticeably similar to Pliny's. Christianity is a *superstitio*

not because it is the belief of an alien people, but because its members, an unidentified "multitude", hold a belief that results in criminal practices and a generally anti-social attitude (the modern equivalent for odium humani generis). In short, a very unpleasant form of deisidaimonia.

The Christians returned these compliments. Believing that the pagan gods did not exist, they thought all reverence of them unjustified, took up the old philosophical attacks on mythology, and supplemented them by attacking pagan worship. At the same time they followed Paul in describing the pagan gods as demons, and went on with him to maintain that the demons were powerless against Christ. On both counts, all pagan belief and worship was deisidaimonia. So, again by extrapolation from Paul, was observance of the Jewish law. (I would not be understood as saying that Paul was the only source of these notions in Christian thought; he is merely the earliest preserved.) As everyone knows, these Christian teachings touched off centuries of religious conflict, which ended only when the political triumph of Christianity enabled it to give legal authority to its description of its opponents' beliefs and practices as "superstitions".

(The numbers in parentheses refer to footnotes, the text of which Prof. Smith will distribute at the San Francisco meetings --- A.T.K.)

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UNDERSTANDING THE WAY OF GOD
FORM, FUNCTION AND MESSAGE OF THE
HISTORICAL REVIEW IN 4 EZRA 3:4-27

Pieter G R de Villiers

Melius erat nos non adesse, quam
advenientes vivere in impietati=
bus, et pati et non intellegere
de qua re ...

4 Ezra 12

0 Historical reviews in apocalyptic literature

Historical reviews figure prominently in Jewish apocalypses, though they are not found in all of them. They play such an important role in these works, that they can be used as a criterion for the classification of books as belonging to a certain type of the genre of apocalyptic literature¹. Usually these reviews are presented as *ex eventu* prophecies, e.g. 4 Ezra 11-12². Important discussions took place on the significance for apocalyptic thought of these reviews and the relevance of history to the apocalyptists: while according to some interpreters they were denied any positive interest in history, others maintain that no doubt exists about this fact, so that the only question seems to be what the nature of their interest in history was³. The historical review in 4 Ezra 3:4-27 differs from the other reviews because it lacks an eschatological conclusion and is not presented as an *ex eventu* prophecy. It is rather an explicit recollection of past history, and seems to be an important passage for the answer to the question about the nature of apocalyptic thought on history⁴ in 4 Ezra.

1 The Historical Review: contents

1.1 The introductory narrative to the address (3:1-3) contains material which is repeated in the sections which follow e.g. the emotional experience of the seer and the formulation "*coepi loqui ad altissimum*"⁵. Throughout the narrative the author employs a temporal and local framework: he is writing in Babylon, thirty years after the destruction of Jerusalem. After describing the history, he refers again to the thirty year-period.

It is a period of contrast between the desolation of Sion and the abundant riches of Babylon and the gentiles (1:2, compare 1:29, 31 and 33). He uses "*vidi*" (3:2) to indicate the reason for his agitation (cf 3:29-30).

1.2.1 The first part describes the creation of Adam by God (4-7a). Adam is then led into paradise and punished for his transgression of God's commandment. The impiety of his descendants and their punishment by the flood is described in the second half (7b-10). Verse 10 concludes the first part by combining the history of Adam and his descendants: both end in destruction - by death (Adam) and by the flood (his descendants): "*sicut Adae mors, sic et his diluvium*" (cf 3:21 and 26).

1.2.2 The same terminology is used in the description of the creation of Adam as e.g. in the Ezra-address of 6:38-59, at the

beginning of the third section. In contrast to the description in 6:53, a much more detailed exposition of the creation of Adam is given in 3:4-7a. God's acts are depicted in a positive light: He, the eternal and sole Lord of creation created Adam, gave him the gift of life and paradise, the precious possession created long before the earth. He expected Adam to be obedient to one commandment only⁶. Of Adam it is merely stated that he disregarded God's commandment (3:7). God, therefore, immediately punishes him with death. A stark contrast is depicted between the positive life-giving deeds of God and the disregarding, death-deserving act of Adam. It is important further to note that the giving of the commandment is the last (and most important) of God's deeds. The meaning of "diligentiam" is clear from 3:19, where it is employed in a parallelism. The law is a theme in the rest of 4 Ezra, although its content is never mentioned or quoted⁷. Ezra then immediately brings the punishment of Adam to bear on mankind: death is the result of his sin.

1.2.3 The description of the impious action and the fate of Adam's descendants forms the second part of this first section: they follow their own will, behave impiously and reject God⁸. Initially God does not restrain them⁹, but eventually he destroys them. They share the fate of Adam, because they are guilty of the same transgression. Thus, the moral character of God's punishment is clear. He is questioned almost reproachfully by the remark of Pseudo-Ezra: "et tu non prohibuisti eos" in 3:8. But the apocalypticist sees this as part of the predestined course of events and therefore he adds "in tempora" in 3:9. In comparison with Adam, a more extensive description of the impious deeds of his descendants is given. A small inverted pattern is thus created:

A God creates Adam: He gives him life, paradise and the law (actions). B Adam transgresses the law (reaction). C He is punished with death (result). A His descendants sin: they follow their own will, behave impiously and despise him (actions). B God permits this (reaction). C They are punished by the flood (result).

1.3.1 The second part (3:11-12) is a short interlude to the extensive third part, but clearly forms a whole in itself: "unum ex his" is mentioned at the beginning of part two and three (cf 3:11 and 13). The two parts are furthermore delineated by the phrase "et factum est cum ..." (3:12 and 13).

The second part (a) tells of the election of Noah and (b) of the increasing impiety of the many peoples. Thus it continues the pattern of the first section in this regard: the time of Adam (a) was followed by the innumerable nations (3:7) acting impiously (b). The pattern is Adam - many sinners, Noah - many sinners, and is reinforced by the repetition of the key word "impie agebant" (3:8) in "impietatem facere" (3:12).

1.3.2 Nothing whatsoever is said about the actual Noah-events¹⁰ and in comparison with Adam and Abraham it is glossed over. The picture of history is highly schematized and cursory, and indicates that the author is not interested in recording the events¹¹.

1.3.3 After the destruction of the peoples by the flood, one almost anticipates the chain reaction which follows: once again many people are born. They sin again ("iterato", 3:12) -

this time, however, "plus quam priores" (3:12).

1.4 The third part is the most extensive of the four.

1.4.1 In the first section (3:13-15) no reasons are given for the remarkable activities of God in connection with Abraham: he is chosen by God; to him alone is revealed in secret the end of the times, he receives an eternal covenant and a promise that his generations would be protected forever. No actions or deeds of Abraham are recalled. When compared with the first part, it is clear that Abraham stands out (even above Adam) as a unique figure - not only because he receives so many gifts and promises from God, but especially for the exceptional insight into the "temporum finem" which he is secretly granted in the night¹². This is an honour denied to all the other important persons in the rest of this review and 4 Ezra, excluding Moses (14:5) and Ezra (14:37ff)¹³.

1.4.2 In the second section (3:16) the narrative of Abraham is concluded in the figures of Isaac, Jacob and Esau. It is interesting that the first section ended with the remark that Jacob became a vast multitude. The second section proceeds with God's action in connection with the seed of Jacob (3:17 and 19) thereby elaborating on the last phrase of the first section¹⁴.

1.4.3 The seed of Jacob is led from Egypt and brought to Sinai where it receives the law (according to the third section, 3:17-22). Heaven, earth and the underworld become involved in this event as God passes through four "gates" to give the Law to Israel. This continues God's acts toward Abraham. The appearance of God is reminiscent of a theophany¹⁵. The apocalyptic features of this section are conspicuous.

At the end of the section the first mention of the cor malignum¹⁶ in this work is made. At Sinai God does not remove the cor malignum. The victory of the cor malignum is then compared with the sin of the first Adam (3:21) and its implications for his descendants (cf 3:7 and 10). The generations after Abraham have the same option as Adam had: to obey or to transgress the commandments. The results of their eventual transgression are the same: good departed, evil remained.

As in the previous part, there is no mention of any punishment for the descendants of Abraham. This is once again a demonstration of the author's lack of interest in historical detail.

1.5 In the fourth part the historical review (3:23-27) deals with David (3:23-24) and the period before the exile (3:25-27): it is the history of the city and its downfall.

1.5.1 In the evil times God acts again by raising David and ordering him to build a city in which the people can sacrifice. The three references to the city serve to unify the last part of the historical review: 1. God orders David to build the city. 2. Those who inhabited the city, transgressed (contrast this description with those given earlier: "qui habitant super terram" 3:12 and "habitantes saeculum" 3:9). 3. God gave his city in the hands of his enemy. This continues the progressively exclusive line introduced in the third part with Abraham and the seed of Jacob, where Esau is cut off and the law given to the seed of Jacob: God has not only given his law to the seed of Jacob, but has procured for Himself a city

("civitatem nominis tui" 3:24) which stood in a privileged position towards God above other nations¹⁷. These other nations are the enemies of God.

1.5.2 After many years the inhabitants of the city sinned as Adam and all his generations did. Once again the positive salvific acts of God are contrasted with the culpable sin of men. This phrase in 3:26 echoes 3:10 and 21 (at the end of part 2 and 3). The cor malignum is mentioned again: the inhabitants of the city clothed themselves with the evil heart¹⁸. The latter links this part effectively with the first three parts, and indicates the cause of God's punishment: it is not a lot which is the inevitable fate of the people. They are rendered guilty by their own actions as were Adam and all his descendants. There is, however, this difference, that the author continues with the reproof in 3:20 that God did not remove the cor malignum from the seed of Jacob. He does qualify this, however, with: "ut faceret lex tua in eis fructum".

2 Context of the historical review.

With the description of the downfall of the city, the historical review becomes firmly embedded in the narrative framework of 4 Ezra: it was announced as the theme of the introduction that Pseudo-Ezra saw the desolation of Zion. Attention now turns to the framework in which the review is placed, because it presents important clues to its understanding.

2.0 The contemporary situation of 4 Ezra.

The historical review is distinguished by a narrative link ("et dixi ego tunc in corde meo": 3:25¹⁹) from the following section: the author changes his scene from past to present, which is, as is customary, extensively described.

2.1 Verses 28b-31, as a description of the antithesis between Zion and Babylon, forms a coherent whole. It starts with the phrase "numquid meliora faciunt qui habitant Babilonem" (3:28b) which is repeated at the end of this part as "numquid meliora facit Babilon quam Sion" (3:31b). The same antithesis of the introduction, Babylon-Zion, is repeated. The author expresses his shock that the sinners, the impious people and the enemies of God in Babylon are preserved, and continues with what may be considered the climax of this first half: the reason for his shocked reaction was the fact that God did not reveal to any one how his way was to be comprehended²⁰.

2.2 In the part²¹ which follows this concluding section, reference is made to the fact that no other people or nation believed in God or in his covenants. A description is given of the worldwide phenomenon of impiety and unbelief: no "gens" (3:32,33,35,36) or "tribus" (3:32) or "qui habitant in saeculo" (3:34) have been mindful of his commandments (3:33,35,36)²². The description is developed by contrasting Israel or Jacob (instead of Zion) with the Gentiles (instead of Babylon). By extending his comparative material in this way, he stresses his argument: from "factum est autem cum venissem huc" (3:29), he moves to: "pertransiens enim pertransivi in gentibus" (3:33)²³. In the same manner he repeats what he said regarding Babylon in 3:2 "vidi ... habundantiam eorum qui habitabant in Babilone", concerning the nations in 3:33: "et vidi habundantes eas"

The author hereby reverses the exclusivistic line of his historical review, so that the following pattern can be delineated: A History of mankind (4-12), B History of Israel (13-27), B Present history of Israel (28-31), A Present history of mankind (32-36).

Pseudo-Ezra accentuates his view that Israel compares favourably not only with Babylon (3:28a, 31b), but even with the whole world. His remark that Israel did not receive a reward or fruit for their labours reflects his belief that their deeds were meritorious. He was convinced, according to 3:19, that the law was in the hearts of the people, and that it bore fruit, notwithstanding the fact that the evil heart remained. He also stated in 3:24 that the inhabitants of the city only sinned after many years during which time they sacrificed according to the law of Moses (cf the reading of L). And even if Israel had sinned, they were in comparison with other nations not nearly as apostate. This renders the calamity which struck them in the desolation of Zion inexplicable.

3 Understanding the way of God.

Uriel's reaction to Ezra's opening address is important. He sums up Ezra's position and engages in a dialogue with him. The motives which are appropriated by Uriel and put into use in the dialogue which follows, are worth noting:

3.1 According to the previous section, Ezra was confronted with the inexplicable fact that the greater impiety of Babylon and the nations are overlooked, and themselves preserved, while Israel, God's people, is ruined. He is not only deeply shocked ("excessit cor meum" 3:29), but also unable to understand this way (via haec, 3:31). The first question of the angel, therefore, aptly sums up the gist of Ezra's argument: "excedens excessit cor tuum in saeculo hoc et comprehendere cogitas viam altissimi?" (4:1, cf 3:29).

Klaus Koch has correctly indicated the important function of the via altissimi as a Leitwort in the first vision: "Leitwort in der gesamten 1. Vision ist Erkennen des Weges des Höchsten als zusammenfassender Ausdruck für die göttliche Zuwendung zur Menschheit und für göttliches Walten in der Welt. Dieser Weg sondert sich in mehrere naturhafte und geschichtliche Wege, die allesamt von Zeit und Mass und Zahl geprägt sind und um dessen besondere Erkenntnisse in den einzelnen Gesprächsgängen gerungen wird"²⁴. He paid most attention to the employment of "via" as a Leitwort²⁵. It will become clear that the understanding of this way is of equal importance in 4 Ezra.

3.2 In 4 Ezra 4:3 the angel refers to the way which Ezra desires to see (cf 3:31). He then asks Ezra questions about three "ways": to weight the fire, measure the wind and recall the past day. Ezra considers this out of everyone's reach; to which the angel replies: "tu quae tua sunt tecum coadulescentia non potest cognoscere. Et quomodo poterit vas tuum capere altissimi viam? Nam in infinito via altissimi creata est"²⁶. Et iam exeritus corrupto saeculo intellegere incorruptionem?" (4:10-11).

3.3 It is difficult for Ezra to accept that God's way is incomprehensible. He therefore replies: "melius erat nos non

adesse, quam advenientes vivere in impietatibus, et pati et non intellegere de qua re" (4:12). This phrase reveals the importance "understanding" has for Ezra: Suffering is bearable, if only it is possible to understand why one suffers. In the following dialogue the angel presents Ezra with a problem to which the solution once again is "qui super terram inhabitant quae sunt super terram intellegere solummodo possunt ..." (4:21). Ezra finds this acceptable, however. He is not enquiring "de superioribus viis", and he replies therefore: "deprecor te, domine, ut quid mihi datus est sensus intellegendi?" (4:22), after which he reiterates his problem. The first phrase of his question is related to 3:28-36.

3.4 But Ezra proceeds with the intriguing second half of his problem: he refers for the first time to the transitoriness of human existence (4:24) and the problem of the law (4:24). These subjects were adumbrated in his historical review. This is taken up by the angel who promises Ezra that he will receive an answer ("videbis"), because the age would soon pass away. "Videbis" (4:26) is to be linked with 4:4 where it is said that Ezra desires to see the "way", while "saeculum pertransire" continues the "pertransimus" of 4:24, only this time in connection with the age and not with the individual existence. The introduction of the Leitwort "festinat" in 4:26 is important. Cf. also 4:34(2x) and 4:42(2x)²⁷. This section is then concluded by the telling remark: Tunc tibi demonstrabitur de his, quae concupiscio videre" (4:43, compare further 5:4).

When the angel in 4:26ff succumbs to Ezra's questions and begins to provide him with answers, it is not because of Ezra's convincing arguments to do this. Ezra's questions in 4:23 are basically the same as those asked earlier. What has been clarified in the initial phase of this dialogue, is the type of knowledge which is at stake in this writing. Pseudo-Ezra is rejecting the established "speculative" knowledge which was considered by other apocalyptists as central to their revelatory experiences. In comprehending the problem of his work, this knowledge is of limited value. What was needed in his situation (4:23), was saving knowledge and instruction which would enable the faithful to discern the signs of the time and to recognize what God would do for the Name that his followers bore (4:25): i.e. essentially, to comprehend the way of God ("cotidie", 4:23) and not to be curious "de superioribus viis" (4:23)²⁸. This is the knowledge that God reveals to his followers and which Ezra partly receives in the first three sections of this work (4:31-38).

The introduction of new material in 4:24ff²⁹ does not lead to the abandonment of the motif of comprehension. One should bear in mind, e.g. that the reply of the angel in 5:1-13 at the end of the first section is also in reaction to the question of Ezra in his historical review³⁰: the time before the end will be characterized by great confusion: the way of truth and faith will be hidden (5:1), as will be wisdom and understanding (5:10). This time will be a time of increasing injustice (5:2 and 10), exceeding that which was then seen and heard among the inhabitants of the world. Pseudo-Ezra is describing the Messianic woes; a time of the absence of the knowledge of God. And this means the absence of faith (5:1).

The motif of comprehension is transferred from the religious

problem of Ezra's understanding of the way of God to the description of the evil times before the end. The author is working towards a climax in his work: Ezra is struggling to understand this evil time. It is then revealed to him that in coming days people would experience the total absence of reason and insight³¹, and the inability to know the truth - even if they fervently desired it. No attempt on their part would bring about its return (5:10). This time of injustice³² over the world would surpass the present situation (5:2)³³. These "days" of ignorance and incomprehension are sure and predictable. The signs are given to Ezra by God as part of the inspired works (4:52, 5:13) so that the wise ones amongst his people would discern the times (cf c.14) and be saved.

It is possible to know from the signs that the end is near even if one does not know what the end comprises. This is a partial answer to Ezra's remark in 3:31³⁴.

A detailed analysis of "understanding" and its employment by the author at strategic points in the rest of 4 Ezra, especially in the last section, lies beyond the scope of this essay. It will be sufficient to draw attention to one last example: the conclusion of the work contains the imperative: "priora quae scripsisti in palam pone, et legant digni et indigni; novissimos autem LXX conservabis, ut tradas eos sapientibus de populo tuo; In his enim est vena intellectus et sapientiae fons et scientiae flumen (14:45b-48)"³⁵. This final remark must be understood against the background of Ezra's last address to God in 14:18-26. He is worried about future generations (his contemporaries?) and requests that he might write down everything that has happened in the world from the beginning (14:22), because no one knows (nemo scit) what God has done or will do (14:21). This is to enable men to understand the way of God ("invenire semitam"³⁶) and "qui voluerint vivere in novissimis vivant" (14:22). The request is granted him after God promises: "ego accendam in corde tuo lucernam intellectus"³⁷, quae non extinguetur quoaduoque finiantur quae incipies scribere" (14:25).

Thus, according to 4 Ezra, the following points seem to be constitutive for knowledge and comprehension:

- 1 Many people are and will be without understanding in this age (14:20-21, 3:13), and especially in the time of the Messianic woes.
- 2 Salvation and life is dependent on finding the way of God (14:22).
- 3 The seventy books of Ezra mediate the knowledge of God through which man will be saved (12:36 and 47).
- 4 These books are revealed to him by God ("inmitte in me spiritum sanctum" 14:22)³⁸.
- 5 These books contain descriptions of what God has done and will do (14:21). The fact that Ezra writes down all that has happened in the world since the beginning is particularly instructive concerning the function of the historical review in 4 Ezra, which will be discussed below.

The historical review, therefore, is firmly embedded in the first section, and is an integral part of the attempt of Pseudo-Ezra to present the basic problem about which he writes to his readers. He is confronted with the riddle of the working of evil forces in this world, of human transitoriness, of the in-

explicable fate of his people, of the function of the law in Israel's religion. In short, he is struggling to understand the way of God to secure a firm basis for his faith in the God of his fathers.

4 Form of the historical review.

The historical review in 4 Ezra reveals a division of history into different epochs:

I History of mankind

- 1 Adam: God creates and blesses Adam. He sins and dies.
Generations: They sin and die in the flood.
- 2 Noah: God saves him and his household.
Generations: Their sin increases more than ever.

II History of Israel

- 3 Abraham (Jacob): God elects and blesses Abraham together with his seed.
Generations: They sin. Good disappears.
- 4 David (Solomon): God raises David (Solomon) to build a city and temple.
Generations: They sin and are taken into exile.

Characteristic features are the prominence of one Biblical person in every phase, towards whom God acts positively and whose reaction is never recorded - that is, except Adam's transgression. But every phase ends with the description of the failure and transgressions of the generations. The first two persons (Adam - Noah) represent the history of mankind, while the last two are representative of the history of Israel (Abraham - David)⁴⁰.

4.1 Moses is not mentioned at all⁴¹. The phase to which he belongs historically, is associated with Abraham. The epoch of Abraham, Jacob and his seed is clearly the most important of the four: it is the time of special revelation to Abraham and unique acts of God toward him and his seed. It could, therefore, be considered as the climax of the described history. "The division of history into epochs, together with a degree of chronological ordering, is already indicated - as a sign of a rational and systematic approach to history - in the Priestly writing, which comes from the early Persian period. This, however, finds its culmination in the law-giving at Sinai and in the conquest, and does not clearly envisage the establishment of an eschatological kingdom of God"⁴². The fourfold pattern⁴³ of the historical review in 4 Ezra seems to be a confirmation of this important pronouncement by M Hengel. This fact indicates the influence of the Priestly writing on a document as late as 4 Ezra.

The first three phases (Adam, Noah, Abraham) represent three attempts by God to bring salvation⁴⁴, as in the Priestly writing. The association of the fourth period with David and Solomon is brought about by the specific situation of 4 Ezra and the necessity of the reference to the city and its destruction. The similarities with P are only formal, as must now be shown.

5 Wisdom and the historical review

An analysis of the content of the historical review will indicate its proximity to wisdom thought, which at the same time distinguishes it from P and its attitude towards history.

5.1 The historical review can be effectively contrasted with other apocalyptic writings to delineate the function of history in it: in Rev 12:10-11, where the battle between Michael and his angels against the dragon is described, the author refers to the past historical event of Christ's crucifixion and the death of early disciples to "draw assurances from the past that he (i.e. Satan) will be definitively defeated in the future"⁴⁵. It is clear that the historical review does not function in this way at all. Past history does not establish a paradigm as to how salvation will be given to believers, it reveals rather how God's initiative in the past was time and again frustrated by men. His positive acts of salvation repeatedly failed. The reason for this failure was not that mankind was fated to sin⁴⁶. In fact, God through his law indicated a way by which it was possible to serve him: e.g. for many years this was the case in the city (3:23). What the author really wants to express in the review, is: as with Adam, so (sicut) with his generations (3:10, cf 3:7); and so again (iterato) with the generations of Noah (3:12); as with Adam, so also (sed et) with all his descendants; as with Adam, so (sicut) with all his generations (3:20). Every phase is illustrative of the failure of man to accept God's salvific will, on the one hand, and a paradigm of the frustration of His intention on the other. It is indeed an extremely pessimistic review of Israel's history, and is clearly in contrast with the more positive attitude in e.g. Rev 12 and, of course, in P.

5.2 The historical review reflects the conviction of Pseudo-Ezra that salvation cannot be found in the history of the present age. Even the climax of the described history, the election of Abraham, seems to contain a revelation that this age will be terminated (3:14)⁴⁷. This world and its history of failure is hastening to its end and will be replaced by a new world (4:26-37 etc). Thus, not only is eschatology, but also history understood in terms of the physical cosmos. Cosmological events characterize the Messianic woes (5:4-9) and the end (6:13-16 etc), but also accompany certain historical moments (3:18). From this it is clear that "history comes to an end by a cosmological necessity"⁴⁸ and that history is to be understood in terms of the cosmos. The importance of cosmology in 4 Ezra indicates the world view of Pseudo-Ezra which he has in common with wisdom literature.

Pseudo-Ezra contends further that history consists of a predestined⁵⁰ course of events which are laid down in the structure of the world: "For he has weighed the age in the balance, and with measure has measured the times, and by number has numbered the seasons: neither will he move nor stir things, till the measure appointed be fulfilled"⁵¹ (4 Ezra 4:36b-37). This is a second feature Pseudo-Ezra shares with wisdom thought, and, as in the previous case, with apocalyptic literature in general⁵².

A third feature illustrative of common ground between wisdom and 4 Ezra, is the way to salvation. As has been extensively demonstrated above, Pseudo-Ezra stresses the understanding of God's way with this world as a *sine qua non* for salvation. The wise will, by accepting his teaching described as (12:37-38, 14:26, 46-47), the spring of understanding, the fountain of wisdom, and the river of knowledge (14:47), achieve life and

immortality. Although this is a feature Pseudo-Ezra shares with other apocalyptic literature, it is also a conspicuous aspect of wisdom thought. Understanding as the way to salvation, stands in contrast to the Old Testament prophets with their call for obedience to the word of God. It certainly also transcends the traditional Biblical concept of human understanding, which is unable to grasp the way of God. Man is referred to fear of God as wisdom. Once again this characteristic of understanding in 4 Ezra and wisdom has a cosmological background: God speaks through the fixed order of the world and its history. The predestined course of events and structure of the universe are unchangeable. Man can only subject himself to it in righteousness in an effort to achieve immortality. For this he needs an interpretation of the constitution and course of the universe and its history⁵³. This is the assumption of 3:13 where Ezra bewails the mystery of God's way with the world, and of chapter 14 which describes how the information of 4 Ezra's seventy books on the world is to be given to the wise. Salvation, according to Pseudo-Ezra, is also brought about by understanding God's way with his world - even if there is an essential distinction from wisdom thought, namely, that it is a future world!

As has been indicated above, this motif of understanding is an important key to the decoding of Pseudo-Ezra's thought: without a revelation granted to a visionary and its subsequent interpretation, God's way with the world and its history is inaccessible. He teaches the wise in his community the secret contents of the seventy books of divine wisdom. This includes everything he saw (12:37, 14:8) and what God has done or will do (14:21). He also promises the bestowal of wisdom to the elect in the end⁵⁴.

6 The functions of the historical review.

The wisdom-context in which Pseudo-Ezra's work is to be understood will be helpful in explaining the functions of the historical review with its negative adjudication of history, and its distinction from the concept of history in the Priestly writing.

6.1

Pseudo-Ezra conceives his work in the face of the desolation of Jerusalem and the abundant wealth and power of the Roman empire. The second cruel blow in the form of the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE confronted him with the experience of God's absence from history. The contradiction between the factual situation of the subjugation of Israel and the as yet unfilled prophetic promises of a glorious restoration, posed him with a question which undermined his belief and trust in God⁵⁵: nothing in his review is able to explain the absence of God in his time. The history of this world, in fact, seems devoid of efficacious salvation.

It illustrates the repeated failure of God's salvific initiatives. What inspires confidence, is not history or God's deeds in the past, but as Pseudo-Ezra indicates later on, the fact that salvation is to be found in the future, in a new world. The review, therefore, is constituted by an interplay between historical events and biblical data, and the historical situa-

tion of 4 Ezra. His presentation of history as illustrative of the failure of God's initiatives, fits into the theology of his work. It could even be described as an interpretation of con-temporary history⁵⁶:

6.2 Closely associated with this illustrative function, is a second, more implicit function. According to the historical review God kept history in its totality, in his hand: He spoke at the beginning (3:4); He created the earth (3:4 compare 7:50, 8:1) and paradise before it (3:6); He tolerates the sinners (3:8), but punishes them "in tempore" (3:9); He reveals the "finem temporum" to Abraham (3:14). Although Pseudo-Ezra considers history as illustrative of the failure of God's salvific actions, it is further also indicative of the irreversible course of events⁵⁷. God is no captive of the events in this age: this is indicated *inter alia* by his decision to create the new world. He does not change the preordained course of history. The reason why Pseudo-Ezra thinks the faithful can be confident, therefore, is not founded only in the coming of the new creation, but essentially in the view of history in its totality, preordained by God. The predestined character of history forms a basis for his belief in God: what happens and will happen in the end, has been preordained at the beginning. No one, therefore, can prevent the end of the times God has ordained. It is part of the irreversible way of God⁵⁸. This aspect would explain the intriguing remark in 14:22, where Ezra asks to record all that has happened in the world since the beginning. Although pessimistic about history, he abandons it not. It is the history as he wrote and understood it in a preordained way - enables man to find the path of God and live⁵⁹. This message which is conveyed in the whole of his work, is already implicitly expressed in the historical review. He introduces his readers at once to his belief in a predestined history and in the rest of his work he climactically unfolds the implications thereof.

6.3 The historical review functions as the background for the description of the present situation of Ezra. He is puzzled by the *via altissimi*. This way includes not only the inexplicable fact of the domination by impious gentile people over a more law-abiding Israel, but it extends e.g. to the fate and destruction of the laws of God and the transitoriness of human existence (4:23ff). The historical review introduces and embodies the motives concerned with the way of God which the author explicates in the rest of his work: Jerusalem as city of God (cf 9:38-10:24), the *cor malignum* and why it exists (3:21-26, cf 4:4, 7:47ff, 9:36), Israel and its place as people of God (3:33, cf 3:19-20, 8:26-30), the law (3:33-36, cf 3:17, 19-22 and the discussion thereof in c.13, and in 9:29-37 60).

The historical review is presented to the readers to adumbrate the subjects summarized under the common denominator of the way of God, about which instructions are to be given. This would be in line with the coherence of the first three sections of 4 Ezra and would illuminate the important function of this review as introduction which at the same time indicates the basic issues of his work and thought-world. The review could be likened to a prism from which many rays are refracted through the work as a whole.

7 The affinities to wisdom thought in 4 Ezra are extensive and several more coinciding areas - even in formal matters - could be indicated⁶¹. The above mentioned examples sufficiently illustrate the disparity between 4 Ezra and the salvation-historical approach to history, evident in many Hebrew scriptures and even in certain apocalyptic parts⁶², and in so doing facilitate our understanding of the historical review.

It would be simplistic to explain the obvious relation to wisdom thought in a genetic way and one should rather think in terms of a Hellenistic mood of anomie and alienation they have in common⁶³.

8 Pseudo-Ezra has been called the most "rational" apocalypticist⁶⁴. Gruenwald has suggested that in 4 Ezra revelation should be associated with the actual study of the Scriptures⁶⁵. This would be in line with the content of 4 Ezra: his attachment to his community, his mediation of special knowledge, his desire to instruct them concerning events in the past and the future, the stress on understanding the way of God, his involvement with Israel and the manner of his rejection of Roman rule. J Z Smith defined apocalypticism as "Wisdom lacking a royal court and patron and therefore it surfaces during the period of Late Antiquity not as a response to religious persecution but as an expression of the trauma of the cessation of native kingship"⁶⁶. He indicates as implication of this definition that it "will serve at least to question ... the 'lachrymose theory' of apocalypticism as growing out of a situation of general persecution"⁶⁷.

The content and function of the historical review in 4 Ezra 3 would at least indicate the plausibility of this exposition.

S U M M A R Y

The historical review is firmly embedded in the narrative framework of 4 Ezra. It can be divided into four sections according to four Biblical persons as objects of God's acts of salvation. Every phase ends with the description of the sinning of the descendants of every person. The history of mankind and Israel is described in the first and last two sections respectively.

The review displays formal similarities with the historical pattern in the Priestly writing, but its content was decisively influenced by Wisdom theology.

The historical review functions illustratively of the failure of God's salvific action in history. It further indicates the preordained character of historical events and introduces the subjects to be discussed in the rest of 4 Ezra.

The historical review is part of the attempt of Pseudo-Ezra to instruct his readers on the divine knowledge which is required to become wise and to attain salvation. He surveys the history of mankind and Israel to indicate to his readers the negative forces at work in history, but also to teach them that history or past actions of God is not a basis for the belief in Him. It is ultimately the eternal preordained character of the course of events and the final end which provoke faith in Him.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Cf J J Collins, "Introduction: Towards the Morphology of a Genre", *Semeia* 14 (1979), 1-20. "Historical" apocalypses constitute about one-third of the Jewish apocalypses and are very rare elsewhere 19.
- 2 Other examples are: 2 Bar 36-40, 53-74; 1 Enoch 91:12-17; 93; 1 Enoch 85-90; Dan 8; and from the Testament literature: T Levi 16-18; T Judah 21-24; T Moses 2-10.
- 3 For one example of a negative evaluation of history cf S B Frost, "Apocalyptic and History", *The Bible in Modern Scholarship* (ed J P Hyatt; Nashville: Abingdon, 1965) 110-112. For a less negative attitude, cf G I Davies, "Apocalyptic and Historiography", *JSOT* 5 (1978) 15ff.
- 4 J J Collins ("Pseudonymity, Historical Reviews and the Genre of the Revelation of John", *CBO* 39 [1977] 333) refers to the unique character of this review, but did not elaborate on his remarks.
- 5 Latin quotations are always from R L Bensly, "The Fourth Book of Ezra", *Texts and Studies* (ed J A Robinson; Cambridge: University 1895). "Coepi loqui ad altissimum" as an introductory formula is repeated in 5:22 (elaborated by a significant "iterum") and in 6:36 (accompanied by "et cor meum iterato turbabatur in me"). Compare, by way of contrast, this form of address with 12:6 and 13:13. The emotional experiences of Ezra are also mentioned again in 5:21 and 6:36. This, together with the practice of fasting (deriving from Dan 10:4f) gives coherence to the first three sections of 4 Ezra.
- 6 Syntactically, the positive action of God is clarified by e.g. the accentuating "nonne tu dixisti" (3:4) and "factus est vivens coram te" (3:5) and the repeated: "in eum" (1:5), "eum" (1:6) "huic" (1:7).
- 7 Vide infra. Also D Rössler, *Gesetz und Geschichte* (WMANT 3; 2d ed; Neukirchen - Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1962) 45-47.
- 8 Mss S A insert praecepta tua.
- 9 Cf J M Myers, *I and II Esdras* (The Anchor Bible; Doubleday: Garden City, NY 1974) 160 note 169.
- 10 Compare Gen 6:9 and 7:1.
- 11 Collins, op cit (n 4) 333.
- 12 On "finem temporum", cf P Volz, *Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter nach den Quellen der rabbinischen, apokalyptischen und apokryphen Literatur* (2d new ed; Tübingen: J C B Mohr, 1934) 164. Vide infra.
- 13 2 Baruch 59:1 which is part of an *ex eventu* prophecy delineates Moses extensively as the one to whom God revealed inter alia the consummation of the times, the measures of the fire, the depth of the abyss, the weight of the winds, and in v 7: the root of wisdom, and the riches of understanding, and the fount of knowledge. Abraham is mentioned in the previous section (2 Baruch 57:1-3), as well as Adam (56:1-5), but the special knowledge is omitted. For secret

revelations to Abraham and other Biblical figures cf I Gruenwald, "Jewish Apocalyptic Literature", Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (ed H Temporini and W Haase; Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1979) II.19.1. 104-106, and the literature given by W Harnisch, Verhängnis und Verheissung der Geschichte. Untersuchungen zum Zeit- und Geschichtsverständnis im 4. Buch Esra und in der syr. Baruchapokalypsen (FRLANT 97; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1969) 111 n.2. Cf G H Box, The Apocalypse of Abraham Translations of Early Documents 1; 2nd ed; London/New York: SPCK/Macmillan, 1919 63ff).

- 14 Pseudo-Ezra did the same in the first section of part one, where he ended with a (superfluous) "et in nationibus eius" (3:7). But in the following section he describes the history of the increasing numbers of descendants of Adam.
- 15 G H Box, "4 Ezra", The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English (2 vols.; ed R H Charles; Oxford: Clarendon, 1913) 2.562.
- 16 On the cor malignum, cf K Koch, "Estras erste Vision. Weltzeiten und Weg des Höchsten", BZ N F 1978 60 n.11., G Reese, Die Geschichte Israels in der Auffassung des frühen Judentums: Eine Untersuchung der Tiervision und der Zehnwochenapokalypse des äthiopischen Henochsbuches, der Geschichtsdarstellung der Assumptio Mosis und des 4 Esrabuches. (Heidelberg: PhD 1967) 138-139 and A L Thompson Responsibility for Evil in the Theodicy of IV Ezra (SBL Dissertation Series 29; Missoula, Montana: Scholars, 1977) 331-340.
- 17 In 10:46 it is said that Solomon built the city and offered offerings. This indicates the combination and association of the "city" with the "cult". Cf 10:20-23. The Armenian manuscripts insert after 3:24: "After him you raised up his son, Solomon whom you commanded, in a night vision, to build the Temple. And (you commanded) all the people to give prayers and offer sacrifices in it". In favour of the originality of this reading is Latin ms L: "et construxit salomon filius eius domum nominis tui et aram sacrificiorum erexit in ea in qua sacerdotes munera tibi deferebant sicut precepisti moysi famulo tuo". Cf M E Stone, "Manuscripts and Readings of Armenian IV Ezra", Textus 6 (1968), 48.
- 18 Box, op cit 563 according to the Syriac and Ethiopian reading.
- 19 K Koch, op cit 62 correctly calls it a "markierte(m) Übergang". It is significant that this formula reappears in the fourth section (9:38), after Ezra's opening address.
- 20 According to the Syriac. The other versions read: "dere=lingui" instead. See Myers, op cit 180 n.4. The point is that God's way is inexplicable.
- 21 The analysis by Thompson, op cit 171-176 correctly questions the assumption of most expositors that verses 35 and 36 continue the comparison Zion-Babylon. Thompson's own analysis is, however, determined by Uriel's statement that he will show Ezra the origin of the cor malignum, and he overlooks the interesting previous phrase in 4:4 re the via altissimi and its function in the first section.

- 22 The possibility to differentiate between "qui habitant in saeculo" (3:34) for the Gentile nations on the one hand, and "qui habitant terram" (3:35) for all the nations (including Israel) on the other hand was suggested by Thompson, op cit 172-173. It is, according to him, a logical necessity to differentiate thus: "for if the sins of Israel are to be compared with those of the inhabitants of the world, Israel should not thereupon be immediately thrown in with those same 'inhabitants of the world'", 173. He, however, concedes that this differentiation is only a "distinct possibility". But, on this see the extensive remarks by M E Stone, Features of the Eschatology of IV Ezra, (PhD; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1965) especially 181-182. The two terms are used interchangeably.
- 23 These indications of locality are important for this work. Compare, to name one example, the employment of the significant antithesis room - field, bed - grass in 3:1 and 9:26-27.
- 24 Koch, op cit 59ff. His italics.
- 25 As his subtitle indicates.
- 26 This phrase omitted in Latin because of homoioteleuton, cf H Gunkel, "Das 4. Buch Esra", Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments (2 vols; ed E Kautzsch; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962) 2. 355-356.
- 27 M A Beek, Inleiding in de Joodse Apocalyptiek van het Ouden Nieuw-Testamentisch Tijdvak (Haarlem: De Erven Bohn, 1950) 81: "Rondom deze korte formule cirkelt de gedachten-gang van het ganse boek".
- 28 M E Stone, "Lists of Revealed Things in the Apocalyptic Literature", in Magnalia Dei: The Mighty Acts of God. Essays on the Bible and Archaeology in Memory of G E Wright, (ed. F M Cross, W E Lemke and P D Miller (Jr); Garden City N Y, Doubleday, 1976) 419-423. In this important contribution to the research of apocalyptic literature, Stone discusses the "daring, perhaps even polemical" (420) denial of some areas of speculative knowledge in 4 Ezra, and also the meaning of the knowledge of the Most High. It is more than just general information about his conduct of the world. It implies saving knowledge, i e understanding principles which can explain the problems of Ezra (423). Cf also his Features, 26-28, and "Paradise in 4 Ezra iv:8 and vii:36, viii:52", JJS 17 (1966) 85-88.
- 29 Gunkel already recognized the new development from 4,27ff (op cit 2. 336-337). This is also the case with Koch when he remarks: "An dieser Stelle ... erhält Esra zum ersten Mal einen positiven Bescheid", op cit 66 (his italics). What makes Koch's analysis interesting is his sevenfold division of the first Vision. The above passage under discussion belongs "... zweifellos mit Absicht in der Mitte der sieben Gesprächsgänge" This would focus attention even more on the understanding of the way.
- 30 Cf e g Myers, op cit 184.

- 31 On the experience of anomie and alienation in Hellenism and in Jewish apocalyptic, cf J J Collins, "Cosmos and Salvation: Jewish Wisdom and Apocalyptic in the Hellenistic Age", HR (1977) 141 and further below.
- 32 In 1 Enoch 42 wisdom is absent and consequently unrighteousness spreads over the world.
- 33 Compare the progressing evil in the historical review (3:12).
- 34 M E Stone, Features 226 records Pseudo-Ezra's lack of interest in the future state as such, but denotes his interest in the nature, mechanics and time of the end one of the most striking characteristics of the book. "It serves to emphasize the author's use of eschatological ideas as solutions to his questions rather than his interest in them as such". (My italics). This quotation indirectly illustrates the perusive search for knowledge and comprehension to his questions which characterises this work. Compare further Reese, op cit 144.
- 35 The way in which the motif of understanding functions in 4 Ezra 14 lends a climactic character to this chapter. The instruction in 14:46-47 to deliver the seventy books to the wise, contrasts starkly with the desperate remark of Ezra in 3:31. Cf below. This seems to cause problems in accepting the pronunciation of E Breech, "These Fragments I have Shored Against my Ruins", JBL 92 (1973) 274 (in agreement with Gunkel) that c.14 functions as an aesthetically pleasing conclusion to the book. But, it is mark-worthy that God instructs Ezra not only to comfort his people, but also to teach them: "consolare humiles eorum" (14:13), followed by the Syriac: "teach their wise ones". Compare Ezra's reaction in 14:19, and see further below. This would seemingly imply that 4 Ezra should not be seen against a consolation-background only.
- 36 Cf the second section for this "Leitwort".
- 37 Compare 14:34 and 40-41!
- 38 Stone, Lists 422 writes in connection with Ben Sira 18:4-5 and Wisd Sol 9:13-18 which state the unknowability of God's way, that God Himself has the power to make his way known.
- 39 Cf also D S Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (2d ed; London: SCM, 1971) 86-88.
- 40 J Wellhausen, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels (Berlin: Georg Reiner, 1886) 352f. On P cf further the important remarks by F M Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1973) 293-325.
- 41 It may be because the author did not associate Moses with the cor malignum.
- 42 M Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period (2 vols; London: SCM, 1974) 1.189. Cf also G I Davies, op cit 23.
- 43 Cross, op cit 295. See also his description of the "somber, sin-obsessed consciousness of P, as opposed to the buoyant and free spirit of J".

- 44 Cf Wellhausen, op cit 352, and Reese, op cit 31-33, 73, 126. For a more detailed discussion, but essentially accepting a four period-division in P, cf Sean E McEvenue, The Narrative Style of the Priestly Writer (A.B.50. Rome: Biblical Institute, 1971) 184-185.
- 45 Collins op cit (Pseudonymity) 340. Cf also 338.
- 46 Cf the discussion on 3:6-8, 21 and 25.
- 47 Compare with this: 7:70!
- 48 Reese, op cit 144.
- 49 J J Collins op cit (Cosmos and Salvation) 136.
- 50 I Gruenwald, "Knowledge and Vision", Israel Oriental Studies 3 (1973) 79 note 47 gives an interesting distinction between predestination and determinism. His discussion of the motif of knowledge is of importance for the study of apocalypticism, not only because, as he correctly states, it has been overlooked, but also because of the contribution to an understanding of gnosticism. Cf 73. He provides important relevant material from Qumran writings.
- 51 Cf Box, op cit, 567. Compare 7:74 ("...providit tempora ...").
- 52 Cf further below in 6:2.
- 53 Collins, op cit (Cosmos and Salvation) 136-137.
- 54 Cf further Gruenwald, op cit 68-73. The affinities of Pseudo-Ezra with wisdom thought has been extensively discussed by Reese, op cit 136-144.
- 55 R J Bauckham, The Rise of Apocalyptic, Themelios 3 (1976), 20-22. Cf also E Janssen, Das Gottesvolk und seine Geschichte (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1971) 70-73.
- 56 Cf further D Patte, Early Jewish Hermeneutic in Palestine (SBL Dissertation Series 22; Missoula Montana: Scholars, 1975) 169-170.
- 57 It is interesting to note that Pseudo-Ezra carefully provides his review with a temporal framework. He starts at the beginning ("ab initio" in 3:4) and ends with "et transierunt tempora et finiti sunt anni" in 3:23. Compare also the "et factum est cum..." at the beginning of the second (3:12) section (Noah), as well as the third (3:13, Abraham). The predestined character of history is also spelled out in the ex eventu historical review in 4 Ezra 11 and its explanation: in 11:38ff a man's voice addressed the eagle: "the Most High saith to thee: Art thou not it that remaineth of the four beasts which I made to reign in my world, that the end of my times might come through them?" (Translation by Box, op cit 611). Cf also 11:44 and 14:5. God has given the rule to the Roman empire and He will also take it from them. This implies a relativization of pagan rule over Israel, but also the irrevocable purpose of salvation for Israel. Cf also the short, but very illuminating remarks by A F J Klijn, "The Sources and the Redaction of the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch", JSJ 1 (1970) 5ff. He accepts that Pseudo-Baruch displays little interest in history in his

reviews, but rules out that this eliminates any significant history may have had. The wise will discern between disasters, realise his place in the periods of time. In this way the apocalypticist indicates that the world is not surrendered to utter helplessness (74). What he says on 72 re Syr Baruch 80,2 is applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to Ezra's historical review: "Details (i.e. on the rebuilding of the temple) are of no importance. The destruction of the temple is nothing but a suitable starting-point to reflect on God's government of this world. The reader is allowed to know that he is not governed by fate but by God who punishes all men who disobey his law". J C H Lebram, "Apokalyptiek als Keerpunt in het Joodse Denken", *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 30 (1976) refers to the absence of God in history, as is taught in Daniel 9. God does not intervene in history, although he reveals his sovereignty by saving some men. History is the time of the working of evil. Evil is not inhibited or prohibited by Him. God and man are bound to the irreversible course of events (280). Man can determine his place in this course of events by the apocalyptic revelation; he is even obliged to do so: knowledge of his own situation has a soteriological effect - it is a *medium salutis* (278). The relevance of these remarks for 4 Ezra is clear. Cf further his important contribution to the article on apocalyptic in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (eds G Krause and G Müller; Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1978) 192-202.

- 58 Cf Koch, op cit 59ff, and especially 73-75. For this section cf G von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (London: SCM, 1972) 274-276.
- 59 Cf the several important remarks by Thompson, op cit 341-342 on whether this could be considered a firm basis for faith. A discussion on objections to the faith of the author which are not solved in this work, is given by A P Hayman, "The Problem of Pseudonymity in the Ezra Apocalypse", *JSJ* 6 (1975) 47-56. He also discusses the problem how the viewpoint of Pseudo-Ezra is to be ascertained from the work. He correctly rejects the thesis that the angel reveals his thinking and accepts that both Ezra and Uriel reveal Pseudo-Ezra's thought.
- 60 Cf Koch op cit 62-63
- 61 G Reese, op cit 136-144 and further the remarks by W Mundle, "Das religiöse Problem des IV. Esrabuches", *ZAW N F* 6 (1929) 227-231. On this, and its relationship with judgment, resurrection and the souls of all men in 4 Ezra, cf G W E Nickelsburg (jr), *Resurrection, Immortality and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism* (HTS 26; Cambridge/London: Harvard University, Oxford University, 1972) and his important remarks on 138-140.
- 62 Cf A Nissen, *Tora und Geschichte im Spätjudentum*, *NT* 9 (1967) 269-277, esp 271-273.
- 63 Collins, op cit (Cosmos and Salvation) 141, Bauckham, op cit 276 and J Z Smith, "The Influence of Symbols upon Social Change A Place on Which to Stand", *Worship* 44 (1970). In this learned essay Smith refers to a situation of "cosmic paranoia" to describe the situation of Hellenistic man,

467. On the transformation of prophetic tradition and royal ideology, as well as on the role of wisdom in this process, cf Cross, op cit 343-346.

64 Stone, Lists 446 n.11.

65 Op cit 68.

66 In "Wisdom and Apocalyptic", Religious Syncretism in Anti-quity (ed B A Pearson; Missoula, Montana: Scholars, 1975) 154-155.

67 Cf further J J Collins, "Jewish Apocalyptic against its Hellenistic Near Eastern Environment", BASOR 220 (1976) 30-31 and Lebram, op cit 281.

Text Analysis

- 1 Anno tricesimo ruinae civitatis eram in Babilone, ego Sala=
thihel, qui et Ezdras
et conturbatus sum super cubili meo recumbens
2 et cogitationes meae ascendebant super cor meum;
Quoniam vidi desertionem Sion et habundantiam eorum qui habi=
tabant in Babilone
Et ventilatus est spiritus meus valde,
3 et coepi loqui ad altissimum verba timorata.

- Et dixi
4 O dominator domine, nonne tu dixisti ab initio, quando plas=
masti terram, et hoc solus
et imperasti pulveri
5 et dedit tibi ADAM, corpus mortuum?
sed et ipsum figmentum manuum tuarum erat
et insufflasti in eum spiritum vitae
et factus est vivens coram te.
6 et induxisti eum in paradisum, quem plantavit dextera tua
antequam terra adventaret
7 et huic mandasti diligentiam unam tuam:
et praeterivit eam
et statim instituisti in eum mortem et in nationibus eius
et natae sunt ex eo gentes et tribus, populi et cognationes,
quorum est numerus
8 et ambulavit unaquaeque gens in voluntate sua
et impie agebant coram te
et spernebant
et tu non prohibuisti eos
9 Iterum autem in tempore induxisti diluvium super habitantes
saeculum
et perdidisti eos
10 Et factum est in uno casus eorum, sicut Adae mors, sic e=
his diluvium

- 11 Dereliquisti autem unum ex his NOE cum domo sua ex eo iustos
omnes
12 Et factum est cum coepissent multiplicari qui habitabant
super terram
et multiplicaverunt filios et populos et gentes multas,
et coeperunt iterato impietatem facere plus quam priores
13 Et factum est cum iniquitatem facerent coram te
elegisti tibi ex his unum, cui nomen erat ABRAHAM;
14 Et dilexisti eum,
et demonstrasti ei temporum finem solo secrete noctu
15 Et disposuisti ei testamentum aeternum
et dixisti ei ut non unquam derelinqueres semen eius
et dedisti ei Isaac
et Isaac dedisti Iacob et Esau.
16 Et segregasti tibi Iacob
Esau autem separasti
et factus est Iacob in multitudine magna

- 17 Et factum est cum educeres semen eius ex Aegypto
et adduxisti eos super montem Sina.
- 18 Et inclinasti caelos
et statuisti terram
et commovisti orbem,
et tremere fecisti abyssos,
et conturbasti saeculum.
- 19 Et transiit gloria tua portas quattuor, ignis et terrae
motus et spiritus et gelus.
ut dares semini Iacob legem, et generationi Israel diligenti-
am.
- 20 Et non abstulisti ab eis cor malignum, ut faceret lex tua
in eis fructum.
- 21 Cor enim malignum baiolans primus Adam transgressus et
victus est, sed et omnes qui ex eo nati sunt
- 22 Et facta est permanens infirmitas, et lex in corde populi
cum malignitate radicis
et discessit quod bonum est
et mansit malignum.

-
- 23 Et transierunt tempora
et finiti sunt anni
et suscitasti tibi servum nomine DAVID
- 24 Et dixisti ei aedificare civitatem nominio tui et offerre
in ea de tuis oblationes

IV

- 25 Et factum est hoc annis multis
et delinquerunt qui habitabant civitatem.
- 26 In omnibus facientes sicut fecit Adam et omnes generationes
eius
utebantur enim et ipsi cor malignum
- 27 Et tradidisti civitatem tuam in manibus inimicorum tuorum

Et dixi ego tunc in corde meo.

- Numquid meliora faciunt qui habitant Babilonem?
Et propter hoc dominavit Sion?
- 29 Factum est autem cum venissem huc
et vidi impietates, quorum non est numerus
et delinquentes multos vidit anima mea hoc tricesimo anno
et excessit cor meum, quoniam vidi quomodo sustines eos
peccantes
- et pepercisti impie agentibus
et perdidisti populum tuum
et conservasti inimicos tuos
- 31 Et non significasti nihil nemini quomodo debeat comprehen-
dere via haec
- Numquid meliora facit Babilon quam Sion?
- 32 Aut alia gens cognovit te praeter Israel?
Aut quae tribus crediderunt testamentis tuis sicut haec
Iacob?
- 33 Quarum merces non comparuit, neque labor fructificavit.
Pertransiens enim pertransivi in gentibus
Et vidi habundantes eas, et non memorantes mandatorum tuorum
- 34 Nunc ergo pondere in statera nostras iniquitates, et eorum
qui habitant in saeculo;
Et inveniatur momentum puncti ubi declinet.

- 35 { Aut quando non peccaverunt in conspectu tuo qui habitant
terram?
Aut quae gens sic observavit mandata tua?
36 Homines quidem per nomina inuenies seruas mandata tua
gentes autem non inuenies.
-

1 Et respondit ad me angelus, qui missus est ad me, cui nomen
Uriel

Et dixit mihi:

~~excedens excessit cor tuum in saeculo hoc~~
~~et comprehendere cogitas viam altissimi?~~ 

2 Et dixi;
ita, dominus meus.

3 Et respondit mihi et dixit
tres vias missus sum ostendere tibi, et tres similitudines
proponere coram te

4 De quibus si mihi renunciaveris unam ex his, et ego tibi
demonstrabo viam quam desideras videre et doceam te quare
cor malignum.

INCORRECT APOCALYPTIC
David N. Wigtil

Introduction

The Latin "Asclepius" tractate in the Corpus Hermeticum is a translation of a Greek text, the "Logos Teleios."¹ As a translation, the "Asclepius" is necessarily different in its religious outlook than the source in Greek from which it was drawn. The Latin work manifests many characteristics that appear in Jewish and Christian apocalyptic literature, and a portion of the work (chapters 24-26) is actually termed an apocalypse by many. By happy coincidence there remains a fragment in Greek of this very section which, along with several fragments of other parts of the work, can provide a basis for comparison between the original and the version. Naturally it cannot be presumed that the Greek fragments are precisely like the source text used by the Latin translator, nor even that the current text of the version is identical with the autograph translation.² Nevertheless, conclusions that can be substantiated by evidence drawn from a cross-section of the version and the Greek fragments are not likely to be inaccurate.

One of the more noteworthy of these conclusions is the translator's effort to increase the apocalyptic character of the work being translated. That is, while the "Asclepius" tractate displays many features of apocalyptic literature, the Greek fragments of the "Logos Teleios" demonstrate such features in fewer numbers and with less intensity. It can be safely asserted that the Greek original as a whole would less likely appear as an apocalyptic text, than the Latin version does now. Hence the resemblances of this tractate to apocalyptic literature must be generally assigned to the Latin translator, and not to the author of the original. Any evidence that the study of the genre of apocalyptic literature might adduce from the "Asclepius" of the Corpus Hermeticum must therefore be recognized as originating primarily with the Latin translator, and hence also as originating later and farther west than the date and location of the Greek original.

The Translator's Task of Revision

The attempted correction of the "Logos Teleios" by the Latin translator is a part of the broad phenomenon of translation of religious texts, a phenomenon which is particularly common among Jewish and Christian literary activity of antiquity. A multidisciplinary approach is essential to study such translations. The language of the texts under consideration warrants the closest scrutiny to reveal the details that effect the differences from the original in meaning and emphasis. This textual study often requires tabulations of vocabulary correspondences between original and version, prose rhythms or poetic meter, rearrangements of the text, grammatical alterations, and so on. But the religious content also must be understood so that the divergences of thought may also become evident. This matter is complicated by the cross-cultural nature of any translation: the cultural and religious backgrounds of both the source text and the version are very important for a fair comprehension of the alterations that a translator accomplishes.

This multi-faceted study of texts and their versions then can produce results that are valuable for the study of religion, for the versions of ancient texts can be compelled to reveal the thought of their translators. Such a use of a version is much more valuable to scholarship than its function merely as a witness to a source in some text-critical discussion. This worth of ancient versions for religious studies arises from the nature of translation itself, where a person in effect rewrites a text entirely. The grammar and vocabulary of the original text are abandoned for an entirely different set of linguistic structures, and the only control over this rewriting process is the idea or thought of the source.³ If a translator therefore understands this thought, which the language of the source is meant to portray, in a different way than the author understood it, the literary result in the target language will vary accordingly from the source. It is just such differences that the study of religious text translations should discover.

The "Asclepius" tractate is clearly a version of a Greek source text. The external evidence of various extant fragments has already been noted. Internally there are numerous Greek terms, even written in Greek at times, Greek constructions such as genitive absolutes and *uideri* with a supplementary participle (just as *phainomai* would require), and Greek morphology imitated in the form of the genitive *Hermu* (from *Hermes*).⁴ Yet even these internal reflections of the source language and text begin to appear as evidence for the thought of the translator, for they reveal the willingness of the translator to yield to the source entirely, if necessary, and to neglect or minimize the transformation of the material from Greek into Latin.

At those points where Greek fragments resembling the source used by the translator are known (for portions of chapters 8, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, 38, and 41), it becomes imperative to compare directly the texts of the two pieces. It is here that the divergences of the translation from the source begin to clarify the religious thought of the translator. However, the task is complicated in this instance by the wild nature of the fragments⁵ of the source: where two citations for a given text exist (in chapters 8, 28, and 29) there is extremely frequent disagreement on the form of many readings; at times (chapters 19, 28, 29, and 39) much of what is cited in Greek has no corresponding material in the version; and the fragment corresponding to chapter 41 is not a normal *testimonium* but a prayer found in a magical papyrus⁶ and doubtless somehow adapted and altered for its use there. Yet it bears repeating that any conclusion that can be supported by several fragments and by material from throughout the Latin tractate is unlikely to be faulty, since the ground for that conclusion will have been so broadly based. The examination of all the fragments should support any tendency that might be noted in the translation. In the "Asclepius" tractate one notable tendency which is clearly divergent from the Greek source is the increased stress on features that can be classified as apocalyptic.

Apocalyptic Generally

A general characterization of apocalyptic literature is in order, therefore, against which the translation may be tested.⁷ In form, apocalyptic is primarily literary. Hardly a religious movement in and of itself, it is clearly an important element within the literature of more than one religious tradition. The literature lays claim to being restricted or secret, known

or understood only by a select group. The esoteric content is cast as being revealed by supernatural means. This revelation is then represented as coming to a person of high repute from the past, or as having been written down by such a person. This person sees visions or actually journeys to another world to receive the revelation, or receives the information in an encounter with a supernatural being, listening to or conversing with that being. In accord with the esoteric nature of the revelation, the visions or communications are often coded in highly symbolic form, though often with accompanying interpretation. The revelation is frequently brought to a formal conclusion which terminates the work.

Among the many facets of the content of apocalyptic literature, there is an over-arching concern with the beyond, that which is supernatural to earthly life and particularly that which is posterior to present time and history. Often there are descriptions of the origin and nature of the cosmos, of gods, and of humans. The approach of the coming crisis is of great interest, a crisis which will bring trouble on human beings and disaster on the earth, culminating in judgment for evildoers and in blessings or salvation for the righteous. This emphasis on the beyond is reflected in a pessimistic dualism of heaven and earth, soul and body, reward and punishment, future and now, and the dualism, though its ultimate goal is positive for some people, stresses the negative and any matters that pertain to the negative -- disruptions of nature, punishment for error, and destruction of the world. All of this dualistic thought, however, is based on a concentration on things other than this world, and hence there is a concomitant intensity in the sense of the presence of the divine. The coming judgment and salvation are due to the proximity of the divine (though not always directly caused by divine action). Thus a righteous person has cause to acknowledge the presence or imminent appearance of the divine or the expectation of an imminent journey to the divine.

"Asclepius" as Correction

This outline of the general features of apocalyptic literature can facilitate a comparison of the Greek fragments of the "Logos Teleios" with the Latin "Asclepius" text. The Latin text has a different purpose than the Greek did. The Greek Hermetica were written in Greek for a Greek-speaking audience. But the existence of a Latin version of a Greek Hermetic text reflects either an attempt at reaching a new and wider audience or else a translation meant to serve a Latin-speaking group of Hermetists. Either goal requires a different motivation for writing on the part of the translator than on the part of the author. The translator is not composing a revelation but rather playing a dual role, that of copyist and of reviser, of keeper of the tradition and of changer of the tradition. To keep the work alive in the west, the Latin translator had to change it--not only in words and grammar, but also in religious content and understanding.

The "Asclepius" is also a Hermetic work in its own right. The original is normally independent from the version, once the translation is complete, as is the version from the original. The new work in Latin is that of a person doubtless dedicated to a certain understanding of Hermetic religion as expressed in the "Logos Teleios," yet also with different religious thought, although not likely perceived as different

by that translator. This is clear from the adaptation of the Hymn of Thanksgiving at the end of the tractate. If it may be presumed that this hymn was not at all a part of the Greek source (a hypothesis not yet substantiated),⁸ then the translator has taken a gnosticizing prayer from a separate source and grafted it onto the version just written. The hymn with its devotion of the heart, its stress on a knowledge attained through revelation, and its dualism would have been well-suited to the translator's purpose of writing a Latin Hermetic text.

If the hymn was in fact included in the Greek source of the "Asclepius," the translator still has clearly maintained some essential Hermetic features in the text. The format consists of a secret revelation of knowledge, in dialogue form, which initiates one into a blessed life now and hereafter, bestowed by the god Hermes Trismegistus. Like other Hermetic tractates (compare I and XIII) the narrative frame is that of an initiation into a mystery, which is completed at the end of the "Asclepius" with a communal meal. The religion itself purports to be of Egyptian origin. Its content involves doctrines on the nature of the cosmos and of humanity, the sequence of divine genealogy, death and the rewards awaiting the soul, and other typically Hermetic thought that is found in many other tractates.

But the emphases of the "Asclepius" appear to be quite different from those of the fragments of the Greek source. In matters of the imminence of judgment, of the proximity of the divine presence, and of the individual worshiper's reaction to the religious experience, the version can be termed more apparently "apocalyptic" than the "Logos Teleios." What was begun as a simple comparison between the Latin and Greek texts turned up some surprising tendencies which can best be explained as the translator's attempts at improving the original.

In chapter 26, within the "Asclepius apocalypse" which describes natural upheavals and divine judgment on Egypt for its irreligion, a lengthy Greek fragment offers several aorist participles and aorist indicatives where the Latin text has present participles and a future indicative. The indicative verb which changes tense is particularly informative, for it is the correspondence *apokatestēsen/reuocabit*, the verb which announces the renewed blessings of heaven on the purged land of Egypt after the cessation of the disasters of judgment for its error. While the Greek tale, told in historical tenses, sounds like a recounting of past woes for exhortation to the initiate, the Latin text, by altering each of the verbs to a present or future tense, presents the story as a prophecy of things to come. Such a prophecy accords with the prophecies found in Middle Eastern apocalypses, and it appears that the "Asclepius" translator has tried to improve upon this section, perceived as being an apocalyptic prophecy but as failing to use just the right style, and therefore has corrected the verbs, so to speak, to bring the message into clearer focus.

Again, the Hymn of Thanksgiving, known from a magical papyrus, provides a text something like the source for the final chapter of the "Asclepius." Here, too, all but one of the Greek verbs are shifted forward in tense (aorist to present, perfect to future, and present to future)--and the two future verbs in Latin are gerundives, further altering the tone of the version. This tense shifting does not create a prophecy here. Rather,

it intensifies the sense of the divine presence: now the god has a name worthy of honor, a name that should be honored by the worshiper (*honorandum*), not merely a name that has been honored (*tetimenon*); he must be called blessed (*benedicendus*), which statement renders his presence more immediate than merely noting his state of blessedness (*eulogoumenon*). He did not show his gifts only in the past, nor did the worshipers adore him or make requests of him, but he and they still do so now, in the present, according to the Latin version. This effect is aided by the translation of *egnorisamen* three out of four times by the perfect *cognouimus*, a perfect with a strong present sense. The divine presence is drawn out of its position in the past and made immediate and present to the reader or worshiper. This effect, too, is consonant with the tone of apocalyptic literature, for along with its mythic element of the tales of the past and of righteous deeds and divine action in days gone by, there is an insistence that the divine is now at hand--ready to judge the wicked and to reward the righteous, to hear their prayers, and to expect their adulation and honor.⁹ In apocalyptic texts, this increased presence of the divine among the righteous is the natural outcome of the intensified separation between the good and the wicked immediately prior to the time of judgment.¹⁰ In the "Asclepius" this enhancement is most likely due to the translator's belief in a diminished distance between the god and the worshiper, perhaps, though not necessarily, because of a strong sense of imminent judgment.

Other fragments also diverge from the Latin text in the matter of the proximity of the divine. In chapter 8 the Greek witnesses say, "He (the First God) loved him (the Second God) as his own offspring," but the Latin inserts *diuinitatis* with the result, "He loved him as the offspring of his divine essence." Chapter 39 shows an insertion on the subject of the Second God in the "Asclepius" where no such reference exists in the extant Greek fragment. This inserted reference to the god stresses the close relationship of universal fate--the *heimarmenē* which controls all things--to the divine which is the ultimate source. Several further differences appear in the final chapter (41), stressing the same divine proximity: there are some additions to the text, such as *tua enim gratia tantum sumus cognitionis tuae lumen consecuti* (against the Greek *pros se anatetamenē*), *numine saluati tuo gaudemus* (where the papyrus has only *khairōmen*), *cognitio maiestatis tuae* (for *to gnoisai*), and *cognouimus te et lumen maximum solo intellectu sensibile* (for the exclamation *egnorisamen ō tēs anthrōpinēs zōēs zōē*); occasionally the source is paraphrased, as *sanctum* for *aphraston*, *praebere dignaris* for *enedeixō*, and *aeternitati fueris consecrare dignatus* for the verb *apetheōsas*; and the emphasis on *gnōsis* in the Greek hymn is diminished by the translator, who omits any Latin equivalent for the term twice, once renders it with *intellegentia*, and once with *amor cognitionis tuae*. These changes in the treatment of *gnōsis* stress the presence and person of the god rather than the revelation itself. The divine is itself the center of the attention and is desired for its own sake.

The reaction of the worshiper is more personal and emotional, and less formal, in the "Asclepius." Chapter 8 paraphrases *hon theon kalein nenomikamen as quem recte dicimus deum*, so that the text overtly blesses the use of the term "god" instead of simply calling it a customary usage. In chapter 27

the phrase *spes timorque mortis* expands *ho thanatos*, which makes plain that the individual's response to death is the major concern to the translator, not merely death itself. The assembly of the body is not merely a number, but a number *quo corporis membra in unam machinam ad usus uitalis aptantur*. The rewards for the righteous after death are stated first in the Latin text of chapter 28, whereas the punishments of judgment is *timōria*, vengeance, while in the version it is *examen meriti* [*animae*], a review of the soul's merits--again the version stresses the personal side of the religion. The *anankē* of chapter 39 becomes *diuinis legibus* in Latin, personalizing the source of the control of the universe, and the unity of *heimarmenē* and *anankē* is elaborated in a remarkably homely fashion, *indiuiduō conexae sunt glutino*. Chapter 41 shows a deeper personal or emotional involvement of the worshiper than the Hymn of Thanksgiving, including the heavy emphasis on the divine presence noted earlier. The replacement of *psykhē pasa kai kardia* with *tua enim gratia* moves the worshiper's focus of attention to the divine and lessens the concentration on the self. The rather worldly blessings of *patrikē eunoia kai storgē* are revised to *paterna pietas et religio*, again moving the attention of the devotee to the level of the divine and strengthening the direct bond between the individual and the god. The god granted *gnōsin*, *hina epignōsōmen* in the Hymn, but blessed with *cognitione*, *ut te cognoscentes gaudeamus* in the "Asclepius." The request, *thelēson hēmas diatērēthenai en tē sē gnōsei*, yields to the phrase *nos uelis seruare perseuerantes in amore cognitionis* *tuae*, which makes the *gnōsis* a basis for an emotional response and which affirms the initiate's fidelity (*perseuerantes*) while using an active infinitive to underscore the god's active participation in the life of the faithful.

All three changes--the greater imminence of judgment, the closer proximity of the divine, and the more intense personal reaction of the devotee--are typical of the literature commonly termed apocalyptic. It is apparent that the translator of the "Asclepius"--whether subconsciously or deliberately--was conforming the source text to a personal or communal religious understanding that resembled apocalyptic thought more closely than the source itself. The translator thus appears to be correcting the text in the course of translation. And in light of this proclivity to correct, the "Asclepius" must be used only with great caution as a textual witness to its Greek source or as an ideological witness to Greek Hermetic religion. As with other Hermetic tractates, the study of the "Asclepius" must first examine the work independently, and only afterward with other tractates in the tradition.

(This demonstration of the distance between the ideas and thought of the source and the version of the "Asclepius" tractate should be instructive for other bilingual or multilingual texts as well. A version cannot merely be treated as an additional textual witness to a particular text. The reconstruction of the Greek "Logos Telios" on the basis of the Latin version would go very far astray, unless one were to take careful account of the ideological alterations that occurred in the translation process. So in other attempts at reconstructing an original text, an editor must be keenly aware of the possibility of both subtle and apparent alterations in the versions that are normally adduced to support one reading or

another. This is certainly an important yet often overlooked facet of textual criticism in Biblical studies, where the multitude of versions is unparalleled among ancient texts.¹¹ Much valuable information remains to be uncovered, which can only benefit the field of religious studies.)

In view of the creative work of the translator in adding apocalyptic features to the work, one might speculate that the temporal and geographical distances between the two works (the original and the version) are greater than often surmised, because the ideological distance is greater than usually supposed. Hence the "Logos Teleios" might be assigned to a somewhat earlier date than the oft-mentioned third century of this era, and the "Asclepius" might be located with little hesitation in Africa or Italy in the west. The very act of translation, particularly translation with such alterations, might also point to a community of Hermetic devotees, whose religious idiosyncracies, though perhaps unknown even to themselves, had to be reckoned with by an astute translator.

NOTES

1. Texts published in A. D. Nock and A.-J. Festugière, Corpus Hermeticum vol. 2 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973), which is the text followed here, in W. Scott, Hermetica vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), and in J.-P. Mahé, Hermès en Haute-Égypte vol. 1 (Laval, Québec: Université Laval, 1978), which prints the text of chapter 41 of the "Asclepius" and a heavily reconstructed Hymn of Thanksgiving. A version of chapter 41 also exists in Coptic, published in M. Krause and P. Labib, Gnostische und hermetische Schriften aus Codex II und Codex VI (Glückstadt: Augustin, 1971), and in Mahé.

2. See Nock-Festugière, p. 276, "Ces fragments grecs ne sauraient être considérés comme représentant l'original," and Mahé's attempt to reconstruct the Greek prototype, free of the presumed adaptations in the text of the magical papyrus, of the Hymn of Thanksgiving on the basis of the Latin and Coptic versions.

3. See G. Steiner, After Babel (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 296-303, on the disruption of a text that occurs when it is translated into another language.

4. See Nock-Festugière, pp 278-279, for further details.

5. Fragments are found in Lactantius, Pseudo-Anthimus, Johannes Lydus, Stobaeus, and Cyril of Alexandria (citations ad loc., in Nock-Festugière).

6. The Hymn of Thanksgiving is in the Papyrus Mimaut (codex Paris gr. 2381).

7. On the outlines of apocalyptic see D. S. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964), J. J. Collins, "Introduction: Towards the Morphology of a Genre," Semeia 14 (1979), 1-20, and the several articles of that volume of Semeia, including

H. W. Attridge, "Greek and Roman Apocalypses," 159-186, and P. D. Hanson, "Apocalypse, Genre," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible suppl. vol. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976), pp. 27-28.

8. W. C. Grese, "The Transformation of a Magic Text: Magic and Hermeticism in 'R. G. M. III. 494-611,'" XIVth International Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions...: Abstracts (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1980), p. 20, reconstructs the textual history of the Hymn as that of an independent work attached to a spell, which was then taken up into the magical papyrus.

9. Mahé, 148, 153-155, asserts that the changes render the god more distant, because "l'épithète / summus exsuperantissimus / tend a s'appliquer au Dieu suprême, sans connotation particulière," and that "l'enseignement d'Hermès a perdu beaucoup de sa spécificité" in the Latin version. This universalization of the deity ought not lead one, however, to think that the god becomes less personal or immediate.

10. Compare the expectations of the Messiah and of the Son of Man prior to the final judgment in Jewish apocalyptic, and the belief in the possession of one's person by the spirit of God in highly apocalyptic sectors of early Christianity, such as Paul (in the Corinthian correspondence), the book of Revelation, and second-century Montanism.

11. See for instance the work of B. M. Metzter, The Early Versions of the New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), A. Vööbus, Early Versions of the New Testament (Stockholm: 1954), K. Aland, ed., Die alten Übersetzungen des Neuen Testaments, die Kirchenväterzitate und Lektionare (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), J. W. Bowker, The Targums and Rabbinic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), S. Jellicoe, The Septuagint and Modern Study (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), and numerous other studies on Biblical versions. The predominant intent in most of this effort appears to be to establish the form of the text in the source language. Little detailed attention is paid to the ideological complexities of the versions, unless some major theological issue is at stake.

