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Introductory Note

The papers in this volume were prepared for discussion at the One Hundred Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, convened at Boston, Massachusetts, 5-8 December, 1987. The papers represent, in most cases, experimental and initial work on a subject. Therefore, they should not be considered finished works but works in progress. The Society encourages this type of publication to stimulate discussion which may lead to the refinement and precision necessary in a journal article or monograph.

The Society's publication program has generated research among its members. Younger scholars and the veteran are able to prepare papers for discussion. This dispenses with time allotments for the reading of papers and permits significant debate at the Annual Meeting.

The Editor expresses appreciation to The Scriptorium, Denver, Colorado, for its able preparation of the text of this volume. The Editor also takes this opportunity to thank the chairs of all Annual Meeting program units for their assistance in developing a stimulating program.

Kent Harold Richards, Editor
The Iliff School of Theology

2 Corinthians 2:14-4:6: The Motive for Metaphor

Stephen B. Heiny
Earlham College

In his poem "The Motive for Metaphor" Wallace Stevens suggests that human beings have a deep need for metaphor.[1] We prefer, he says, the muted "half colors of quarter-things" to the glare of "the weight of primary noon." In metaphor, he suggests, we find a way to talk about a world in which we feel at home.[2] In Stevens' suggestion I find an invitation to study the metaphors people use to see the kind of world in which they feel at home. In this paper I study 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 to see where Paul is at home, to see, in other words, what are his motives for metaphor.

Paul has, I argue, two kinds of motives for the metaphors he uses in this passage. First, he has rhetorical motives. Students of rhetoric from Aristotle to Wayne Booth have seen in metaphor an important means of persuasion. In 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 Paul is trying to persuade, and his metaphors are important to him because they help him persuade. But in some of his metaphors he seems to have another no less important motive, which can be called semantic. Modern students of metaphor, Paul Ricoeur among them, have shown that in certain metaphors we see not so much a means of persuasion as a means of saying what could be said in no other way. I argue, in short, that Paul's motives for metaphor in 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 are complex. In his chief metaphors we see portrayed a world Paul can portray in no other way and a means by which he can make that world as compelling to others as it is to him.

It is not immediately clear that 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 is a unit. I agree with Lambrecht that there is a unity to the passage, but this unity is not obvious. Because part of my rgument later in this paper is that the metaphors of the passage define its unity, I will not develop this argument here. Suffice it to say that there is a break between 2:13 and 14 and that, as Lambrecht shows, 4:1–6 takes up for review so many words used earlier in 2:14–4:1 that we have some kind of unity that ends with this review.[3] Finally, 4:7 seems to sum up an earlier conclusion in τὸν θησαυρὸν τοῦτον and to move from this summation to a new and different point.

[1] I gratefully acknowledge the help of Daniel Patte, in whose Paul seminar I completed an early draft of this paper, and Mary Ann Tolbert, in whose Literary Criticism of the New Testament seminar I completed a later draft. I alone, of course, am responsible for errors in the paper.

[2] I work with the text of Stevens' poem found in Northrop Frye, *The Educated Imagination* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 30–1. I have found Frye's discussion of the poem, pp. 31–3, helpful.

[3] Jan Lambrecht, "Structure and Line of Thought in 2 Cor 2,14–4,6," *Bib* 64 (1983): 344–65.

2:14–4:6 as Part of an Apologia

If it is useful at this point to offer a one-word characterization of Paul's aim in 2:14–4:6 we cannot do better than the "apologia" used by several scholars.[4] With the possible xception of 6:14–7:1 Paul is concerned throughout 2:14–7:4[5] with defining and defending his notion of the apostle. In 2:17 he distinguishes himself from the καπηλεύοντες; in 3:2–3 he claims his audience is his letter of recommendation; he returns twice to the uestion of his competence in 3:5–6 after introducing it in 2:16; and in the conclusion of the passage in 4:6 he validates his apostleship by associating it with the act of creation.

By reflecting on this defense we can imagine at least some of the charges it is meant to answer. It is obvious that Paul is writing to an audience that has heard criticisms of him. Although we cannot reconstruct these criticisms point-by-point, we can imagine some of the things charged against Paul: that he was not competent (2:16; 3:5–6),[6] that he recommended himself (3:1) but yet offered no letters of recommendation (3:2–3), that he was too bold in speech (3:12), that his gospel was obscure (4:3), and that he was not always fair in dealing with others (2:17; 4:2). If these are some of the charges Paul intends to address in this defense, we must assume that his motives for metaphor will be consistent with this intention.

To explain Paul's motives for metaphor, however, we need a fuller account of the nature of this apologia. There are a number of ways of developing such an account. Here I use the structural method developed and used by Daniel Patte in *Paul's Faith and the Power of the Gospel: a Structural Introduction to the Pauline Letters* and in *The Gospel According to Matthew: a Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith.* Throughout my discussion of Paul's apologia in 2:14–4:6 I refer to what Patte calls the "oppositions" in the text. These ppositions are listed in the Appendix to this paper. Oppositions are the explicit statements Paul makes in positive and negative terms to establish as clearly as possible his views on various matters. By studying these oppositions we arrive at a partial understanding of Paul's world view. This world view, in turn, is finally what lies behind his apologia and therefore ultimately motivates his metaphors. The oppositions in 2:14–4:6 show Paul's understanding of the apostle; they show the divine initiative to which the good apostle responds and they show the transformation the apostle effects in the world.

The first thing we learn from a study of the oppositions of this passage is that Paul is concerned more than anything else with distinguishing the good apostle, the good religious leader, from the bad. Of the positive actions nearly a third are performed by religious leaders (2:17b; 3:1; 3:5; 3:12; 4:2; 4:5). Among the religious leaders are the "we" who include Paul. The agents of the negative actions are either "we," when the actions are hypothetical (3:5; 4:2; 4:5), καπηλεύοντες (2:17a), Moses (3:13) or those who need

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[4] Lambrecht, p. 345. So Earl Richard, "Polemics, Old Testament, and Theology: A Study of II Cor., III,1–IV, 6," *RB* 88 (1981): 364 and W. C. van Unnik, " 'With Unveiled Face,' An Exegesis of 2 Corinthians iii 12–18," *NovT* 6 (1964): 153. I agree with Victor Paul Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1984), p. 225 that there is no reason to press the distinction between the apologetic and the polemical dimensions of the text unless to determine the identity of Paul's rivals.

[5] It is not at all clear that 6:14–7:1 is part of 2:14–7:4 and not unanimously agreed that 2:14–7:4 is a letter apart from 1:1–2:13 and 7:5–9:15. See Furnish, pp. 371–83, on the first question and pp. 35–44 on the second.

[6] See Thomas E. Provence, " 'Who Is Sufficient for These Things?': An Exegesis of 2 Corinthians ii 15–iii 18," *NovT* 24, 1 (1982): 56–7.

letters of recommendation (3:1). In 4:4–6 the agents are both divine, though on the negative side the agent is the false "god of this age." In every other case but one the agent is unspecified, which suggests some kind of divine agency or a simple vagueness which we may attribute to the particular rhetorical aims Paul is at this point pursuing. The agents on the negative side are the same as the ones on the positive side in the case of hypothetical actions (3:3a; 3:3b), or unspecified. 3:6 is in a miscellaneous category. What we can conclude from this survey of the agents in 2:14–4:6 is that Paul builds his apologia around two kinds of agents, religious leaders and divine agents. Because Paul is somewhat more specific in the case of religious leaders than in the case of divine agents, we may further conclude that the former are more the particular focus of this passage than the latter.

One way Paul distinguishes good and bad religious leaders is by studying the divine nitiative to which they respond. The divine initiative to which good religious leaders espond is that described in 4:6. God decreed at creation[7] that light shine, λάμψει, and then he caused this light to shine, ὃς ἔλαμψεν,[8] with the purpose πρὸς, of providing a light, in some way related to glory, δόξης, for humankind. Good religious leaders, though not only the leaders, are transformed in this δόξα (3:18). In spatial terms, good religious leaders speak ἐκ θεοῦ κατέναντι θεοῦ (2:17); because of their confidence, πεποίθησιν (3:4), and their hope, ἐλπίδα (3:12), they speak with great boldness, παρρησίᾳ (3:12; cf. 4:13). It is, in short, the presence of God in their world to which good religious leaders respond. And because they understand the presence of God as the source of their confidence and hope, they realize that their sufficiency comes not from themselves but from God, to whose light-giving initiative they are responding. Accordingly, they see it as their mission to make clear the presence and power of God even if it means displaying for public view their own relative weakness and frailty (4:7, 10,11).

We may speak of a contrary divine initiative, but only with qualification. We see this initiative in 4:4 where, in pointed contrast to 4:6, Paul speaks of "the god of this age" who has blinded the minds of people, ἐτύφλωσεν τὰ νοήματα, with a purpose contrary to that of the God of creation described in 4:6, "in order that they not look upon the light," φωτισμὸν, of the gospel of Christ. Who is "the god of this age"? We may join the commentators in identifying him with Satan,[9] but this is not saying enough. For Paul this god is only an idol, but at the same time as much as an idol. He is only an idol in that "there is no God but one" (1 Cor. 8:4) but he is at the same time, perhaps as something like a personification of the law of sin that holds human beings captive (Romans 7:23), of superhuman power. If this is correct, it follows that "the god of this age" is the evil within human beings that manifests itself as idolatry and that has a supernatural power

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[7] Plummer thinks the allusion to Genesis 1:3 here is "obvious." Alfred Plummer, *The Second Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1912), p. 73. C. K. Barrett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 134–5 and Rudolf Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), pp. 108–9, agree. Richard on the other hand follows Collange in seeing an allusion to Isaiah 9:1, p. 360. Jean-Francois Collange, *Énigmes de la deuxième épître aux Corinthiens. Étude exégétique de 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 138–9.

[8] Several witnesses omit the relative pronoun, Eberhard and Erwin Nestle, *Greek-English New Testament*, 26th rev. ed., ed. Kurt Aland et al., (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979). I follow Furnish in reading ἔλαμψεν as transitive, p. 224.

[9] So Barrett, p. 130, Bultmann, p. 103, Collange, p. 133, Plummer, p. 72.

over them, a power they are by themselves unable to overcome (Romans 7:13–23). In 4:4 "the god of this age" obscures the light of God and the δόξα that is associated with this light. Those over whose minds there is a veil, κάλυμμα, 3:14, 15, 16, are accordingly in bondage to "the god of this age." Among these we should surely understand the καπηλεύοντες of 2:17.[10] These "peddlers" preach the word of God, but they do so for a profit, insincerely, and presumably away from the presence of God (2:17). Even those who need letters of recommendation, innocuous as such a need seems, are presumably guilty of idolatry in that, as I will argue more fully later, their view of God has been obscured to such an extent that they worship some other god in his place. In the pposition in 3:18–7 the good religious leaders are opposed to people who cannot see μὴ δύνασθαι ἀτενίσαι. In 3:5, 4:2, and 4:5 the "we" who are good religious leaders are opposed to bad religious leaders, hypothetical "we," who would, respectively, see themselves as the source of their own sufficiency, practice evil-doing, and preach themselves. In each of these cases we see an idolatry in which the individual idolizes the self instead of worshiping the God of 4:6 and accordingly does what is evil. In short, if good religious leaders respond to the divine light with worship and with a mission to spread it, e.g., φανεροῦντι (2:14), φανερώσει (4:2), φανερωθῇ (4:10, 11), bad religious leaders obscure it in their idolatrous worship of "the god of this age" whose intent it is to blind people.

If the conclusions we have reached so far are sound, we can now imagine some of the ways good and bad religious leaders will transform the world around them. We imagine that good religious leaders will above all share the light they have and that bad ones will be blind to this light themselves and make others blind to it. It turns out that good religious leaders do indeed try to transform the rest of the world as they themselves have been transformed, μεταμορφούμεθα (3:18), by sharing the light, φωτισμὸν (4:4, 6). In 2:15 "we" are εὐωδία which means, as we will see more clearly later, that "we" are agents of communication. In 3:3 "you" as a letter have been served/delivered (see footnote 22), διακονηθεῖσα, by us in such a way that you are seen and read by everyone; people can see that the "spirit of the living God" is in the heart (see footnote 25). In 3:12 "we" speak out with great boldness πολλῇ παρρησίᾳ because of the hope we have in the greater δόξα. In 4:2 "we" openly speak the truth. In 4:5 "we" preach Christ as the lord and ourselves as slaves, a message that reflects "the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ" (4:4) and the "light of the knowledge of the glory of God that is on the face of Christ" (4:6). In 4:7–11 "our" weakness itself is a sign of the power of God, the source of the light (4:6). And in 5:11 "we" identify it as our mission to persuade human beings.

The ways in which bad religious leaders transform the world are more difficult to see and yet more interesting. First, although many of them do share the light, they do so in ways that obscure it or are in other ways unacceptable to Paul. The καπηλεύοντες of 2:17 spread the word of God just as "we" do even if they do so without sincerity and apart from God. Apparently they in fact contradict the word they preach, in this way openly falsifying it (cf. δολοῦντες in 4:2) by openly profiting from it. The bad religious leaders implied in 3:3 spread the word of God, but they misplace it, putting it in a written text, with the result that people need not openly face (κατέναντι, 2:17, πρὸς 3:4, ἐνώπιον, 4:2) God. In 3:13 Moses obscures the τέλος though it is not entirely clear what τέλος means here or why Moses does what he does.[11] In 4:2 bad religious leaders "falsify"

[10] See Barrett, p. 103, Plummer, p. 54, and Windisch, TDNT, 3:603–4. All see in the καπηλεύοντες people who not only make a profit from what they do but adulterate the product as well. Bultmann seems to miss the second point, p. 69.

[11] Furnish surveys various opinions and suggests that τέλος means "terminus," p. 207.

δολοῦντες the word of God in some way even as they apparently share it. In 4:5 the bad religious leaders envisioned would preach themselves, though it seems that they would not do so baldly but in the process of their preaching the word of God, in this way showing what it means to falsify the word of God. If there were a negative counterpart to the good religious leaders in 4:7–11 who display their own weakness in order to show God's power, it would be leaders who displayed their own power instead of God's. Such leaders would be the kind criticized in 3:5 for attributing their sufficiency to themselves.

It is interesting at this point to imagine the profile of the bad religious leader Paul has in mind. Such leaders seem on the one hand to be people who do in fact speak the word of God or in some other way make it known to others. On the other hand they seem to send, perhaps inadvertently, a message contrary to that which they speak. Perhaps they openly profit from it (2:17), misunderstanding it or themselves—though the former must entail the latter—or perhaps they misplace it, again displaying a fundamental misunderstanding of the word they preach. To seek profit is to confess the god of 4:4, not the God of 4:6, as one's own. To misplace the word as in 3:3 is not to understand that the spirit of God must reach into the heart of human beings. To speak the word of God in a way that makes one's own power seem sufficient (3:5) and that in this way obscures the power of God (4:7–11) is to falsify the very word one speaks. When the preacher becomes the center of attention instead of the word preached (4:5), the word is to this extent falsified and contradicted.

In this apologia, then, Paul defines the apostle and tries to make this definition persuasive to his audience. If his metaphors matter to Paul, they must matter because they help him define and persuade. Before examining Paul's motives for metaphor, however, we need first to see the mechanics of these metaphors.

The Mechanics of Metaphor

We need an extended analysis of the mechanics of metaphor in this passage not only because these metaphors are complex in themselves and in their relation to one another but also because no such analysis exists so far as I know. None of those who mention metaphor in this passage go much beyond noting parallels and antecendents or faulting this or that infelicity in them.[12] One need only see what students of metaphor from Aristotle to Riceour make of metaphor to see the attention Paul's metaphors in 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 deserve. There are in this passage three major clusters of metaphor: the εὐωδία cluster in 2:14–17, the ἐπιστολή cluster in 3:1–3:6, and the φωτισμός cluster in 3:7–4:6.

The first cluster, the εὐωδία cluster, runs from 2:14 to 2:17 and involves three major metaphors. In 2:15 Paul calls himself—though at this point he uses the plural—[13]a εὐωδία, literally an aroma. Exactly how we are to understand the word in the present passage is not clear. Barrett argues that "the apostles are the smoke that arises from the sacrifice of Christ to God, diffusing as it ascends the knowledge of God that is communicated in the cross."[14] For Furnish on the other hand there is no connotation of sacrifice in the word

[12] On the flaws in 3:2–3, see Barrett, p. 108, Bultmann, p. 74, and Morna D. Hooker, "Beyond the Things that are Written? St. Paul's Use of Scripture," *NTS* 27 (1980–81):296.

[13] Furnish observes that it is "notoriously difficult" to understand why Paul alternates between the singular and plural first person pronoun, p. 32, but he offers a plausible suggestion, pp. 43–4.

[14] Barrett, p. 99.

here.[15] The contrast with the καπηλεύοντες in 2:17, who sacrifice the word of God to their own interests, seems to support Barrett here, and I think a later analysis of the εὐωδία metaphor will further support Barrett. In any event, the "we" seen as εὐωδία are certainly agents of communication. ὀσμή, "fragrance," in 2:14 and 16 seems related in meaning to εὐωδία. Without trying to answer all the questions that surround θριαμβεύοντι and ὀσμή in 2:14, I find it most natural to understand the two as going together. If θριαμβεύοντι, as Peter Marshall argues, is "a metaphor of social shame which reflects one nuance of the triumphal motif 'led captive in triumph,'"[16] ὀσμή must, as Barrett argues, be the incense used in the triumphal procession.[17] In this way both εὐωδία and ὀσμή define the apostle as an agent who communicates the word of God to human beings. Paul uses the two together, I suspect, to amplify his point and to intensify the contrast he will make in the mention of the καπηλεύοντες in 2:17.

The καπηλεύοντες (see footnote 10) are "peddlers" of the word of God and are further defined in the contrasts of 2:17. When Paul contrasts them with the "we" who speak "sincerely," "from God" ἐκ θεοῦ, "before God" κατέναντι θεοῦ, and "in Christ," he implies that the καπηλεύοντες speak insincerely, apart from and away from God, and not in Christ. The καπηλεύοντες speak the word of God, but they do so, as we have suggested, in a way that somehow falsifies it. As we will argue below, the structure of 2:14–4:6 suggests that we are to understand the καπηλεύοντες as among those who worship the false "god of this age" of 4:4. As "peddlers," they receive some kind of immediate profit from the word of God. The εὐωδία, by contrast, communicate the greatness of the God of creation of 4:6. Unlike the καπηλεύοντες, who have a will of their own contrary to the will their preaching the word of God would imply, the "we" seen as εὐωδία are so without will and concern for self that they are seen as inanimate things in the metaphors that describe them.

The next striking metaphor in 2:14–4:6, one Paul's critics have faulted, with some justice, as poorly constructed (see footnote 12), is the letter metaphor in 3:1–6. It is striking not only in its improbable description of human beings as a letter of recommendation but also in its acrobatic leap from letters of recommendation to the letter of the Mosaic law. While it has been convincingly demonstrated that Paul is drawing heavily here on the Hebrew Bible, no one so far as I know has offered a comparably full account of the function of the metaphors here.

Earl Richard points out, as others before have, that in 3:2 Paul draws on Jeremiah 38(31):33 to speak of a letter written on the heart. Richard then goes on to show that in 3:3 "in a manner typical of the exegesis of the period " Paul draws on other texts of the Hebrew Bible to elucidate the first text.[18] This elucidation, proceeding by "association," leads Paul from letters of recommendation to the letter of the law. 3:3 is a commentary that takes up in order the three key terms of 3:2, ἐπιστολή, ἐγγεγραμμένη, and καρδίαις. Exodus 31:18 provides the commentary on ἐγγεγραμμένη. Two Ezekiel passages, 11:19 and 36:26, provide the commentary on καρδίαις.[19]

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[15] Furnish, pp. 176–7.

[16] Peter Marshall, "A Metaphor of Social Shame: ΘΡΙΑΜΒΕΥΕΙΝ in 2 Cor. 2:14," *NovT* 25, 4 (1983): 302.

[17] Barrett, p. 98. Barrett's account of ὀσμή and θριαμβεύοντι recommends itself chiefly because it sees a coherence one would expect to see between these two terms.

[18] Richard, pp. 347.

[19] Richard, pp. 344–9.

The ἐπιστολή metaphor is puzzling in a number of respects. Although no study of the metaphor seems entirely satisfying, Baird's[20] comes close. Accordingly, I will outline his argument and at the same time indicate major areas where other scholars disagree with his conclusions. First, Baird shows that the letter of recommendation that lies behind the passage was a familiar form in antiquity (p. 168). Second, in accordance with the fact that the person being recommended carried his or her letter of recommendation, Baird argues that in 3:2 the much disputed[21] ἡμῶν should remain, here probably referring only to Paul (p. 170). Third, in accordance with the idea that Paul is to be understood as the carrier of the letter, a letter "to you" in 3:1 would be a letter written by someone else, perhaps a church, to the Corinthians about Paul; a letter "from you" would be one from the Corinthians to some other party, perhaps a congregation, about Paul (p.170). Fourth, for Baird the participle διακονηθεῖσα, itself much disputed,[22] goes with the idea of the person recommended carrying his or her own letter of recommendation; hence here it means "deliver": "when the apostle says in vs. 3 that 'you are an epistle . . . διακονηθεῖσα ὑφ' ὑμῶν' he is not changing the figure to make it refer to his ministry of the gospel, but is still employing the metaphor of the epistle of recommendation" (p. 169). Fifth, the author of the letter is Christ, as indicated in Χριστοῦ in 3:3 (p. 170). Finally, the "hearts" of 3:3 refers to the same thing as the "hearts" in 3:2: Paul (pp. 171–2).

Διακονηθεῖσα, I would suggest, has both of the meanings people have seen in it, both "delivered" and "cared for" (see footnote 22). First of all, it means "delivered," as Baird argues, because with this meaning it completes the metaphor in the obvious way. But here it also means "cared for" because Paul has cared for the Corinthians. The notion of "cared for" goes with both εὐωδία, in the contrast with καπηλεύοντες, and with the claim in 4:5 that Paul is the among the δοῦλοι of the Corinthians. Indeed, the word διακονία in one of its forms appears seven times in 2:14–4:6, and in six of these instances seems to mean "cared for" or "ministry." It is difficult to imagine Paul's asking us to ignore the presence of the one meaning in these six, which amount to a theme in the text, when we encounter another quite different meaning in one instance of the word. Paul means for the word to have both of these meanings here finally because both point toward the intimate relationship that has existed between himself and the Corinthians and each reinforces the other: Paul's caring for the Corinthians has earned him the " letter of recommendation" he delivers and his delivering the "letter" testifies to his caring for them, to his ministry.

The alternatives Paul develops in his commentary in the second half of 3:3 are intended to characterize ἐπιστολή. The first, suggested by Exodus 31:18, opposes the media in which a letter might be written, ink or the spirit of the living God. One might object that Paul ought to allow for the possibility of a letter written in both because the two are not mutually exclusive, but Paul is not trying here to be logical or fair; he is trying to lead his reader to a certain view of the world. Paul contrasts real letters with the letter he has "served/delivered" and sees only in the latter the possibility of the presence of "the living God."

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[20] William Baird, "Letters of Recommendation: A Study of II Cor 3 1–3," JBL 80 (1961):166–72.

[21] Barrett prefers ὑμῶν, pp. 96, fn. 3, and 107, as do Bultmann, p. 71 and Collange, p. 46.

[22] Some think it means something like "delivered" (Baird, p. 169, Barrett, p. 108, Bultmann, pp. 62, 72, Plummer, p. 57, RSV) while others think it means "served" or "cared for" (Beyer, TDNT 2:86, Furnish, pp. 182, 195).

In the same way Paul develops a second set of alternatives to characterize the ἐπιστολή further. Here it is a matter of the location where one might expect to find writing, on stone tablets or on tablets of the heart. These alternatives are suggested by the Ezekiel passages. Here, as in the case of the earlier set of alternatives, Paul recognizes no possibility of a letter in both locations even though strict logic would have to recognize this as at least a possibility.

What is no less remarkable than the description of human beings as a letter is the linking by means of the γραφ- root of ordinary letters of recommendation and the Mosaic law. The key question here is whether this linking is merely a linking of two quite different things through identical sounds, a practice known as "tallying" and common among Rabbis and Pharisees using scripture to explain scripture,[23] or a linking in sense as well as sound. The evidence, while not entirely conclusive, suggests that for Paul the linking is in sense as well as in sound and that the sense that is common to letters of recommendation and the Mosaic law is an obscuring of the divine light, which apostles must never allow.

We may examine the possibility of this linking in sense by setting the alternatives out thus:

	positive	negative
medium	πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος	οὐ μέλανι
location	πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις	οὐκ . . . πλαξὶν λιθίναις

In the first opposition in 3:3 concerning the media Paul says that the Corinthians as letter of recommendation are written not "in ink" but "in the spirit of the living God." Here "spirit" and "living" on the positive side suggest the vitality of human letters in contrast to the letters "in ink" which seem by contrast dead and devoid of the presence of the spirit of God. "God" on the positive side suggests the source of this vitality and suggests as well the distance of God from ordinary letters of recommendation. Ordinary letters of recommendation, going from one person to another and telling of a third, are a dead intermediary between persons, obscuring the presence of God among them, a presence more likely to be recognized in Paul's kind of letter.

The next opposition, no less artifically dichotomous, complements the first. Here Paul criticizes the Mosaic law as external to the heart, the center of vitality and will. Paul thinks it possible, in other words, to separate the law from the heart in such a way as to provide for an idolatrous legalism. Even if the law is God's word, it somehow intervenes between God and persons so that the two do not come into vital contact. 3:6 picks up the γραφ- root and offers a commentary on the second opposition in 3:3. Käsemann comments usefully that "Just as the law is perverted when it is turned into the demand for works, so it perverts the man who falls in with this demand, and delivers him up to the power of death by setting him at a distance from the creator who gives and receives."[24] In recognizing the distancing effect of the law Käsemann seems to me to hit upon what is

[23] On this point see Daniel Patte, *Paul's Faith and the Power of the Gospel: A Structural Introduction to the Pauline Letters* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 106–9, Richard, p. 347, fn. 30, and Jacob Mann, *The Bible as Read and Preached in the Old Synagogue*, vol. I (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1971), pp. 11–16. Mann observes that frequently there was an "intrinsic connection" in addition to the "linguistic affinity" (p. 11).

[24] Ernst Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), pp. 150–1.

for Paul also the essential problem with letters of recommendation. Like the law, the letter, according to Paul's rather artificial dichotomy, sets "ink" in the place of the "spirit of the living God."

The evidence that suggests a linking of letter of recommendation and Mosaic law in sense as well as sound comes also from the effect achieved in such a linking in sense, an effect consonant with Paul's aims in the whole of 2:14–4:6 and therefore likely intended by Paul. In linking medium and location on the positive side Paul can more fully characterize the Corinthians as a letter that recommends him. They, in part because of his service, διακονηθεῖσα, reflect the presence of "the spirit of the living God" in our[25] "hearts." That is, both positives, both medium and location, both "spirit of the living God" and "in tablets of the heart," characterize the Corinthians as letter of recommendation.

The linking of ink and stone tablets on the negative side also characterizes the Corinthians as letter. They and Paul constitute a society in which no writing intervenes between God and persons in such a way as to deny them the possibility of seeing in one another the "spirit of the living God." More than that, they see God in their service to one another, a service that shows that the word of God is heart-felt and fixed in the will. The society in which writing does intervene is one in which the presence of God is less clear and in which there are likely found idolatrous gods.

What this linking in sense of ordinary letters of recommendation and the Mosaic law shows is the way in which writing may intervene between one person and another, in this way making it more difficult for them to see in one another the presence of God, and between God and persons, in this way making it less likely that God's word will be in the hearts of persons. Because the unmediated presence of God in the hearts of persons is what recommends them as religious leaders just as the absence of God from their hearts is what characterizes bad religious leaders (4:4–6), it is likely that this same theme is on Paul's mind here as well. It is part of his apologia. The linking in sense as well as sound of the ordinary letter of recommendation and the letter of the Mosaic law therefore seems likely.

The third major cluster of metaphors in 2:14–4:6, and the one most fully developed, is the light metaphor. This cluster begins in 3:7 with the word δόξα, etymologically what seems or is seen,[26] and concludes in 4:6 with the same word. At the same time the use of ἐν γράμμασιν and λίθοις in 3:7 shows the connection between the second and third set of metaphors.[27] The center of the cluster of light metaphors is in 4:4–6 where δόξα and other words are subsumed under the word φωτισμός that occurs in both 4:4 and 6. I hope to show that in 4:4–6 Paul uses light as a metaphor to describe something of the divine, that he develops this metaphor as a comment on the words δόξα and κάλυμμα in 3:7–18, and that in the developed metaphor of light he reviews a number of important words going all the way back to 2:14.

The use of light as a metaphor to describe something else is traditional in Biblical texts.

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[25] Baird argues that Paul means his own heart, pp. 171–2.

[26] Kittel has a lengthy article on δόξα in TDNT 2:232–55 with a paragraph on 2 Cor. 3:7ff., p. 251, but I miss in Kittel the sensitivity to the change in the meaning of the word that Bultmann shows: "The meaning of δόξα as manifestation of power is uniformly retained, though with Moses it is apparent to the senses, but not in the new covenant" (p. 82). C. J. A. Hickling, "The Sequence of Thought in II Corinthians, Chapter Three," *NTS* 21 (1974) 389, fn. 2, recognizes some kind of change in the meaning of δόξα but does not develop the point.

[27] I owe this point to Professor Mary Ann Tolbert.

In Isaiah 42:5–7 and 49:6 the God who created the world gives Israel as a light to the nations. Light as a metaphor is used often in the New Testament, e.g., 1 John 1:7 and Romans 2:19. This metaphor, as Philip Wheelwright says, is one of the great symbols by which human beings in every culture talk about their world.[28] Indeed, so common is the use of light as a metaphor that it must be one of the tasks of every author who wishes to use it to keep it vital, to bring it back to life somehow lest its power as a metaphor be lost. I hope to show below that Paul manages to keep it alive and preserve its metaphorical power.

In 4:4–6 it is clear enough that Paul uses light to describe something having to do with God, but he avoids too precise a specification of whatever it is light describes. In 4:4 we find the phrase φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου and in 4:6 φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως. Barrett calls the genitive in 4:6, which seems like the ὀσμὴν τῆς γνώσεως in 2:14, a genitive of apposition.[29] Barrett, Bultmann, Blass-Debrunner, Furnish, and several others take the genitive in the 4:4 phrase to be a genitive of origin or source;[30] Richard, though not explicit on this, understands εὐαγγέλιον and γνῶσις to be synonyms in 4:4 and 6[31] and so presumably takes both to be genitives of apposition. I think it most natural, especially given the fact that γνώσεως is a genitive of apposition, to take εὐαγγελίου as a genitive of apposition as well. In that case it is parallel to γνῶσις in every way and the φωτισμόν before each is meant to characterize each but not to be limited to either. The transposed parallels that follow δόξης in both 4:4 and 6 are further support for this position.[32] If I am right, Douglas Berggren would call φωτισμός the subsidiary subject of the metaphor and εὐαγγελίου and γνώσεως the principal subjects.[33] The result would be a filtering of the latter two through the former so that the reader would be asked to see "gospel" and "knowledge" as having some of the qualities of light. In particular, they would become for the moment perceived by the senses in a way they ordinarily are not. More than that, they would seem for the moment to have the same effect on our lives that light does, an effect part of the everyday experience of everyone and therefore undeniable. Finally, "gospel" and "knowledge" would then be associated with the light of creation, 'Εκ σκότου φῶς λάμψει, in 4:6 (see footnote 7).

The φωτισμός metaphor in 4:4–6 both supports and is supported by its immediate environment. To see how it supports its immediate environment we must closely examine the purpose clauses in 4:4 and 6. Both are strings of genitives and both for that reason seem distinctly stylized and have a Hebraic flavor.[34] In 4:4, as we have seen, εὐαγγελίου either restates φωτισμός as genitive of apposition or specifies its source or origin. τῆς δόξης is summed up in εὐαγγελίου, of which it is a genitive of content.[35] In 4:6 τῆς γνώσεως

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[28] Philip Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 116–23.

[29] Barrett, p. 134.

[30] Barrett, p. 131, Bultmann, p. 106, Furnish, p. 221, and F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, trans. and rev. Robert Funk, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961) # 168, p. 93.

[31] Richard, p. 361, fn. 77.

[32] I owe this point to Professor Mary Ann Tolbert.

[33] Douglas Berggren, "The Use and Abuse of Metaphor," *Review of Metaphysics* 16 2 (December 1962): 238 et passim.

[34] Blass-Debrunner, # 168, p. 93.

[35] Blass-Debrunner, # 168, p. 93.

is appositional genitive with φωτισμόν and τῆς δόξης is to τῆς γνώσεως what it is to τοῦ εὐαγγελίου in 4:4, a genitive of content. At this point three things are worth noting.

First, the δόξα spoken of in 4:4 and 6 must recall the δόξα spoken of in 3:7 and repeated in noun or verb form 12 times before 4:4. Δόξα is a key term in other words in 3:7–4:6 in spite of the fact that there is an obvious break in sense between 3:18 and 4:1. Paul has stitched together two separate discussions of δόξα here. Second, although the δόξα in 3:7 is a literal δόξα, it changes in meaning, perhaps becoming metaphorical (see footnote 26) in the course of the passage. I suspect it becomes a metaphor in 3:9 in that it makes no sense to speak of a sensible δόξα associated with the new covenant. Support for this understanding of δόξα is found in the fact that Paul quite clearly moves from a literal κάλυμμα in 3:13 to a metaphorical one in 3:14,15,and 16. Finally, the purpose clauses gather up the previous discussion of δόξα in such a way as to suggest that we are to review 3:7–18 in the light (as it were!) of 4:4–6.

This claim needs development and support. As a metaphor φωτισμός serves as a filter that colors all that follows in each purpose clause, adding some qualities and subtracting others. It adds to the things it describes the quality of sensibility: it pretends that we can see the gospel or knowledge or δόξα with our eyes. More than that, all previous instances of δόξα are reviewed here and even reinterpreted. In particular, the temporary and sensible δόξα of the Exodus account is here put in its proper place in the scheme of sacred history; set against the original light of creation and again measured against a superior δόξα it now appears bracketed as a particular point in sacred history which is transcended in every way in the new covenant. 4:4–6 gives substance to the claim made in 3:8–10. In short, 4:4–6 reviews and comments on 3:7–18 by reviewing and interpreting δόξα just as 3:7–18 reviews and interprets the word διακονία which is introduced in διακόνους in 3:6.

But 4:4–6 is itself supported by 3:7–18. Because the light metaphor is so familiar it is likely to lose its vitality and power to filter. But in its use of a real, literal δόξα the Exodus account sets up 4:4–6 by reminding us that both δόξα and φωτισμός are metaphors in 4:4–6 and so point beyond themselves to some divine reality insensible and otherwise ineffable. It is as if I were to introduce a description of a clock with talk of human hands and faces and in this way to set up talk about the hands and face of the clock to make these metaphors more effective.

The reviewing and interpretive function of 4:4–6 extends even beyond 3:7 though. Although I do not find convincing Bultmann's limiting of 4:6 to Paul's conversion, I do agree that 4:6 supports the claim made in 4:5 and therefore the similar claim made in 2:14–17, that the apostle is to spread the light as a δοῦλος or εὐωδία. As Bultmann puts it, "what was asserted in 2:14–17 is proven from the character of the gospel. The ring is closed."[36] Lambrecht recognizes the word echoes in 4:1–6 and sees the whole of 2:14–4:6 as having the structure A-B-A' with 4:1–6 being the A'.[37] But in counting all word echoes as of equal weight Lambrecht misses something in the text. What weighs most in 4:1–6 is the light language around which so much else in 4:1–6 clusters. κρυπτά and φανερώσει in 4:2 are obviously light-related and thereby draw δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, which itself echoes καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ (2:17), into the context of 4:4–6. This leads us to see in the καπηλεύοντες the kind of idolatry suggested in 4:4. κεκαλυμμένον, used twice in 4:3, is obviously light-related. Used in connection with τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις in 4:3, it thereby recalls the τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις of 2:15 and so suggests that the agent of their destruction is in one sense the "god of this age," their idolatry. The ἐν

[36] Bultmann, p. 109.

[37] Lambrecht, pp. 348–9.

ταῖς καρδίαις of 4:6, the place where the light shines, recalls the ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις of 3:2 and the ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις of 3:3 in such a way as to suggest that the fundamental problem with writing is that it keeps the light of God, present since creation, from the hearts of persons. In sum, the light metaphors of 4:4–6 review and interpret not only 3:7–18 but 2:14–3:6 as well. They make 2:14–4:6 a coherent whole. And the basic familiarity of light, perhaps the dominant metaphor in the Bible, makes much else in 2:14–4:6 familiar.[38]

So far, then, we have examined 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 to understand its nature as an apologia because any motive for metaphor must be consistent with Paul's overall aims in the text. We have examined the mechanics of metaphor in the passage because seeing how they work will help us understand why they are there in the first place. Now we turn to the question toward which we have been working: what are Paul's motives for metaphor? Again, there are two kinds of answers to this questions. There are rhetorical motives and what can be called semantic motives. In what follows I examine first the rhetorical motives and then the semantic ones.

The Rhetorical Motives for Metaphor

At the outset it is useful to survey the range of motives that students of rhetoric, ancient and modern, have seen for the use of metaphors. In his *Rhetoric* Aristotle locates metaphor in book three where he discusses style; for him metaphor is a matter not of what to say but of how to say what is said (3:2).[39] Here he finds three general motives for metaphor: τὸ σαφές, "clarity," τὸ ἡδύ, "pleasure," and τὸ ξενικόν, "strangeness" (3:2:8). A bit later he adds two additional motives, κοσμεῖν, "to adorn," and ψέγειν, "to depreciate" (3:2:10) without showing clearly how the last two fit with the first three, but it is clear in each case what he means. We appreciate the clarity of a metaphor that has the power to put things before our eyes (3:11:2). We derive pleasure from the metaphor that reveals a new quality in something familiar (3:10:2–3). Aristotle does not clearly show what he means by "strangeness," but one suspects he means the quality of a metaphor that challenges the ingenuity of the audience as something quite unfamiliar even when it later rewards this ingenuity with a flash of insight. In sum, for Aristotle metaphors help persuade by virtue of their power to clarify, to please, and to present what is strange.

For the author of the *Ad Herennium*,[40] as for Aristotle, metaphor is part of style (4:1). The motives for metaphor are: *rei ante oculos ponendae causa*, "putting the matter before the eyes," *brevitatis causa*, "brevity," *obscenitatis vitandae causa*, "avoiding obscenity," *augiendi causa*, "magnifying," *minuendi causa*, "diminishing," and *ornandi causa*, "decorating" (4:34). In Cicero's *Orator*[41] metaphor is motivated by *suavitas*, "pleasure," or by a need to supply

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[38] Northrop Frye sees the familiarizing function of metaphor as crucial, and he nicely adapts the point for the student of Paul: "The motive for metaphor, according to Wallace Stevens, is a desire to associate, and finally to identify, the human mind with what goes on outside it, because the only genuine joy you can have is in those rare moments when you feel that although we may know in part, as Paul says, we are also a part of what we know" (p. 33).

[39] Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, trans. John Henry Freese, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1926).

[40] [Cicero], *Ad Herrenium*, trans. Harry Caplan, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954).

[41] Cicero *Orator*, trans. H. M. Hubbell, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939).

a word presently missing (27:92). These motives are much the same as those in Aristotle with the exception of the added motives of avoiding obscenity and of supplying a missing word.

For the author of the ΠΕΡΙ ΥΨΟΥΣ, *On the Sublime*, metaphor is motivated by the desire for sublimity (8:1; 32:4; 32:6).[42] Metaphor is motivated as well by a desire to move and to clarify (32:6), but the desire for sublimity itself is what chiefly interests the author. Without exploring exactly what sublimity means here, it is obvious that the metaphor of height serves in this text to describe qualities of a style. Accordingly, we can say that a desire to speak in some way higher than the ordinary may motivate metaphor. Such a metaphor lifts up the audience and fills it with such joy and pride that it imagines the metaphor is its own (7:2–3). This effect, as we shall see, is appreciated as well by at least one modern student of metaphor.

Quintilian sees two motives for metaphor in *Institutio Oratoria*,[43] to achieve meaning and stylistic ornamentation, *quosdam [tropos] gratia significationis quosdam decoris assumi* (8:6:2). Meaning metaphors are motivated when we lack a word for some antecedent thing (8:6:5; 18; 34; 35).[44] Style metaphors are a way for the author to avoid the common, the ordinary, and the unpleasant (*Neque enim vulgaris esse neque humilis nec insuavis apte ac recte modo adscita potest*) (8:6:5). For Quintilian as for the author of the *On the Sublime*, then, there is a special quality about metaphorical language, apart from its ability to serve us by supplying missing terms, that impresses the audience in a special way.

Among Hellenistic critics Demetrius[45] contributes in a special way to our understanding of Paul's metaphors. The chief thing to notice in Demetrius is where he discusses metaphor. Although he touches on metaphor briefly in his account of the forceful style (chp. 272), he locates it centrally in the elevated style (chp. 78–90). This itself is significant. Not only does Demetrius here agree with the author of *On the Sublime* and with Quintilian that metaphors go with lofty language, he goes a step further to distinguish the style in which metaphor is appropriate from those in which it is less so. Hence Demetrius implies one important motive for metaphor: a desire to speak in an elevated way. To be sure, Demetrius talks about the clarity and precision metaphor brings to speech (chp. 82), but in locating it in the elevated style he suggests as much about what motivates it.

This point becomes clearer when we turn to Demetrius' account of the plain style,

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[42] "Longinus" *On the Sublime*, in *Aristotle: the Poetics*, trans. W. Hamilton Fyfe, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1932).

[43] Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans. H. E. Butler, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1921).

[44] "Meaning" here is Butler's translation of Quintilian's *significatio*. Ricoeur argues that the kind of phenomenon Quintilian is talking about here, where a metaphor is thought of as substituting one word for another or for one that is missing, is more a matter of ornamentation than meaning. See Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 20, 198, 211, 247.

[45] Demetrius, *On Style*, in *Aristotle: the Poetics*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1932). I am aware that I am inconsistent in the way I refer to texts the authors of which we do not know. I refer to "the author of the *Ad Herennium*" and "the author of *On the Sublime*" but not to "the author of *On Style*." The last of these would be a fitting title for too many texts, including the first two, and so I prefer "Demetrius" even if it is inaccurate.

where he locates the style of the letter. Here he is quick to point out that the plain, ordinary style is not where metaphor belongs: "the more familiar the expression is, the less elevated it is, while the unfamiliar and the metaphorical are elevated" (μικρότερον γὰρ τὸ συνηθέστερον πάντων τὸ δὲ ἀσύνηθες καὶ μετενηνεγμένον μεγαλοπρεπές, chp. 190). Although we find considerable latitude by Demetrius' own admission in the style of the letter (chps. 232–234) and although it is not accurate to see Paul as working solely in the genre of the plain epistolary style,[46] we have some reason to suppose *a priori* that Paul chooses metaphor in spite of—maybe even because of—the genre expectations that would make this an unexpected choice.

Among modern students of metaphor, most of whom talk about metaphor as a semantic matter rather than a rhetorical one, Wayne Booth seems out of step. We should be grateful for this. Booth follows the great tradition of rhetoric handbooks and offers the following motives for metaphor: 1) A desire to make speech active, vivid, and energetic. 2) A desire to be economical. Metaphors, even when they are paraphrasable, are not easily so. 3) A desire to magnify or diminish. 4) A desire to accommodate one's particular audience. 5) A desire to develop the speaker's ethos, his or her self.[47] Notice that, as Booth says, most if not all of these motives are cited in ancient texts. Aristotle makes Booth's first point in the *Rhetoric* (3:11:2), as does the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4:34). The *Rhetorica* anticipates Booth's second point in what it says about brevity. Both Aristotle (3:2:10) and the author of the *Rhetorica* (4:34) mention the power of metaphor to magnify or diminish. And Demetrius, in his distinguishing four styles and in locating metaphor in the elevated one, comes close to Booth's fifth point.

Ted Cohen addresses what seems to me to be yet another rhetorical power in metaphor. Rightly observing the modern contempt for the rhetorical qualities in metaphor and the corresponding insistence that useful metaphor have what I call semantic content, Cohen identifies a rhetorical dimension of metaphor hinted at but not developed in *On the Sublime* (7:2–3). Cohen argues that metaphor is for the author an opportunity to achieve intimacy with the audience. For Cohen in the metaphoric process the author issues a tacit invitation to the audience to put forth the special effort it takes to transcend the literal meaning and move to the metaphorical one. The audience accepts the invitation and makes the effort, and the result is an intimate sharing of views between author and audience.[48] I would take Cohen's point along with the similar one made by the author of *On the Sublime* and respond to Quintilian and Demetrius, who fear the danger that the audience will not understand a metaphor (Quintilian 8:6:11; Demetrius chps. 80 and 85), by saying that clever authors may well risk the dangers inherent in the metaphorical process in return for the possibility of achieving the kind of intimacy Cohen recognizes.

If these are some of the motives for metaphor students of rhetoric have seen, what are Paul's rhetorical motives for the chief metaphors in 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6? To answer

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[46] I argue below that part of 2 Corinthians, 7:2–4, is in this genre. For a balanced characterization of the genre of Paul's letters see William G. Doty, *Letters in Primitive Christianty* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), pp. 22–7.

[47] Wayne C. Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric," in *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 54–6.

[48] Ted Cohen, "Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy," in Sacks, pp. 5–6. R. Alan Culpepper makes use of Cohen's point in his discussion of the metaphors in the Fourth Gospel. R. Alan Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 181–2.

this question I follow Booth's lead and try to answer this question by discussing alternatives to the metaphors chosen. First, εὐωδία in 2:15. If a εὐωδία is the aromatic smoke emanating from a sacrifice to God (see footnotes 14 and 15), we might try as a paraphrase: "a person so utterly selfless and faithful that he or she sacrifices himself or herself to show others what is expected of human beings." Obviously I have gone out of my way a little to make the paraphrase cumbersome, but not much. One clear motive for metaphor here is the economy some of the critics mention. Closely related to economy is the vividness mentioned by several critics. Both because it is briefer and because it is a concrete, tangible image εὐωδία is more vivid than my paraphrase. Finally, there seems to be a shock value to εὐωδία lacking in my paraphrase. Far more powerfully than my paraphrase and even more powerfully than if it were a simile introduced by "like" or "as," the assertion that we are εὐωδία excludes any mealy-mouthed qualifications.

Many of the same advantages can be seen in καπηλεύοντες in 2:17 over a literal paraphrase like "those who, falsifying the word they preach, exploit their position as preachers to cheat others and to benefit themselves." The metaphor is more economical, more vivid, and more shocking. In addition, here we see yet another rhetorical advantage the ancients recognized in metaphor. Paul might have chosen another metaphor, calling the preachers ἔμποροι, "wholesalers," instead of καπηλεύοντες, which implies retailing.[49] The advantage of καπηλεύοντες of course is that at the same time it condemns Paul's adversaries as frauds it reduces them to petty frauds. This is one of the maneuvers most mentioned by the ancient critics of metaphor, e.g., in Aristotle's φέγειν (3:2:10), in the *Rhetorica* (4:34), and Booth makes it his third point.

Economy is probably the chief rhetorical advantage in 3:2 of ἐπιστολή over something like "a person who knows me well and can tell others about me." Not only does it replace several words with one, but it allows Paul to contrast his audience both with those who use letters of recommendation and with the letters of the Mosaic Law. ἐπιστολή far more eonomically than any alternative brings all of these people together under the same umbrella, as it were in order, to show the more clearly what distinguishes them. They are all people with whom one associates the notion "letter," but notice for all that how radically different they are.

Light is a common metaphor in all times and places for certain qualities of things and people, as Philip Wheelwright observes (see footnote 28). It is so common that it is difficult to find a paraphrase that is not itself some kind of light metaphor. In 2 Corinthians 4:4 and 4:6 Paul might have written λαμπάς, "torch," but we would still have a light metaphor. If we insist on a non-light paraphrase and try something like "truth," it costs us dearly. We lose first of all the connection in 4:6 with the light of creation and so miss a crucial part of the sacred tradition with which Paul associates the apostle. More than that, we lose all the vividness of light in the abstract, insensible "truth." As Furnish observes, Paul chooses his metaphors in part for the particular sensible qualities they have. The olfactory metaphors of 2:14–16 are appropriate to the spreading of the word throughout the world, "in every place," (2:14), while here light metaphors are appropriate to the establishment of the gospel in human hearts.[50] Again, ecomony and vividness motivate Paul's metaphors. But there may well be yet another rhetorical motivation for them.

[49] Windisch, TDNT 3:603–5.

[50] Furnish, pp. 187, 250.

We find this motivation in the notion of *ethos*. We first meet this notion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* where he argues that the *ethos* of the speaker is an important means of persuasion (1:2:4).[51] Here *ethos* means "character" or "self." Aristotle's point is that the speaker can present himself or herself in such a way as to inspire confidence in the audience. Here is how Booth puts the matter of *ethos:*

> such a metaphor [i.e. an effective, persuasive one] should build a proper *ethos* for the speaker, building or sustaining his character as someone to be trusted. Here we approach something difficult to talk about indeed. But once we think about it we realize that every speaker who uses any figure with the intent that it be recognized as a figure, instead of using it as an art that disguises art, calls attention to himself in ways that the user of "ordinary, usual," untwisted language does not. Every speaker, of course, makes a character, an *ethos* for himself, whether he is using figurative language or not. He may even choose to build a character like the Jonathan Swift Samuel Johnson described—the sort of "rogue" who "never hazards a metaphor."[52] (Booth's italics)

Two points deserve elaborating in what Booth says. First, there is no way for a speaker not to build some kind of *ethos* when he or she writes. A careful speaker, it follows, one who cares about persuading his or her audience, will build an *ethos* that will contribute to this persuasion. Second, an author who uses metaphor and who calls attention to his or her metaphors—and we have evidence that Paul means to call attention to his metaphors, as I will show—must be building an *ethos* in which metaphor is meant to be an obvious constituent.

For our purposes I do not think there is much difference between the *ethos* Aristotle and Booth discuss and the self that is portrayed in each of the four styles Demetrius identifies. This means that for Demetrius there is an elevated *ethos,* of which metaphor, and certainly a metaphor that calls attention to itself, is an important part. An author who calls attention to his or her metaphors must intend to be regarded as speaking in an elevated manner. Paul seems often in his metaphors to eschew the subtle art, recommended by critics (*Rhetorica ad Herennium,* 1:10:17; *On the Sublime,* 17:2), of concealing his own art. He confesses quite openly that he is constructing metaphors. In 2:14–16 the awkward moving back and forth from εὐωδία τὸ ὀσμή calls attention to both. The obvious awkwardness of 2 Corinthians 3:2–3, where Paul constructs a metaphor and then so elaborates on it that no one can miss its metaphorical quality, is another instance (see footnote 12). Whatever mixing of metaphors there is in ἐστε ἐπιστολή Χριστοῦ διακονηθεῖσα is hardly subtle. In 4:4 and 4:6 the elaborate string of genitives after φωτισμόν suggests that here at least Paul is almost parading his metaphor.

But there is still more in Demetrius. In separating the elevated style in which metaphor is typical and the plain style, where epistles are most often found, Demetrius implies that a metaphor in a letter would be still more striking, would all the more call attention to itself. And as we have seen, he makes this explicit in chp. 190: "the more familiar the expression is, the less elevated it is, while the unfamiliar and the metaphorical are elevated" (μικρότερον γὰρ τὸ συνηθέστερον πάντων τὸ δὲ ἀσύνηθες καὶ μετενηνεγμένον μεγαλοπρεπές). What I think is clear is that there are at least two styles, two kinds of *ethos* in 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:4, one in which metaphor is important, an elevated style,

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[51] See David Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1987), p. 190, on *ethos* in letters.

[52] Booth, p. *55.*

and another style, either the plain or the forceful, in which elaborate metaphor is out of place.

Demetrius identifies a number of the constituents of each style he discusses. In discussing Paul I borrow three from Demetrius and one from students of Paul's pronouns.[53] In sketching the outlines of each style Demetrius mentions, among other things, sentence length and complexity, metaphor, and subject matter. In the elevated style sentences are longer and more complex than they are in the plain or forceful styles (chps. 5, 44, 204). Again, metaphor is much more appropriate in the elevated style than in any other, certainly than in the plain, epistolary style (chps. 78–90, 190). And finally, subject matter. Each style is appropriate to a certain kind of subject matter (chps. 75, 132, 190, 237). It would be ridiculous, for instance, to talk about a trivial thing like a cup in the elevated style (chp. 114). Demetrius says nothing about the use of the singular and plural in the first person pronoun, but he says enough about the epistolary style to suggest that the more personal singular would be more appropriate here than the plural. A letter, he says, is where a person reveals his or her soul (chp. 227); it is where we expect good wishes in brief and simple language throughout (231). If this is a correct reading of Demetrius, it becomes clear that in 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:4 we see two distinct styles, two kinds of *ethos*, each made up of the four constituents I have discussed.

In 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 sentence length is about 26 words on the average while in 7:2–4 it is about 15 words.[54] In 7:2–4 sentences are composed of relatively short, staccato clauses while in 2:14–4:6 the sentences are relatively more complex. In 4:4–4:6 for instance we see some of Paul's most periodic sentences and, more than that, an architectonic playing off of one lengthy periodic sentence against another in 4:4 and 4:6. In 2:14–4:6 there are, as we have seen, a number of striking metaphors while in 7:2–4 there are metaphors, as there are in most authors in a passage of this length, but they are not the striking metaphors of the earlier passage. The subject-matter of 7:2–4 is an assertion in rather personal terms of Paul's innocence and an appeal, again rather personal, for a fitting response from his audience. The subject-matter of 2:14–7:4, by contrast, is as we have argued an apologia, a defense not so much of Paul the person but of Paul the apostle and an interpretation of apostleship that supports this defense. Paul talks about himself

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[53] See the brief bibliography in Furnish, p. 32.

[54] If we adopt Furnish's division of the text my argument is invalidated in certain details, but not in principle. Furnish recognizes chapters 1–9 as one letter, with 6:14–7:1 "marginally Pauline" (p. 383) and with 7:2–3 distinct from 7:4ff as parts of different sections of the letter (pp. 35–44, 371–83, 391–3). Clearly, separating 7:3 and 4 invalidates some of what I have argued about the intimate *ethos* of 7:2–4. And Furnish would require me to take into account other first person singular passages like 2:1–13. In 2:1–13 average sentence length is a little over 25 words, so one constituent of the intimate *ethos* is missing here. But constituents of an *ethos* are just that, constituents. Not all need be present at once to establish the *ethos*. In 2:1–13 we seem to have a more or less intimate *ethos* in spite of the intrusive presence of one constituent of the elevated *ethos*.

If 6:14–7:1 is in fact an insertion, my argument changes again in some details but not in principle. If 6:11–7:4 (omitting 6:14–7:1) is a unit, average sentence length is about 20 words, still less than the average in 2:14–4:6. And short, staccato clauses are still the rule. There are metaphors in 6:11–13, but they are relatively modest ones. There is a unity of subject between 6:11–13 and 7:2–4: the overall intimate tone is clear in ὡς τέκνοις λέγω, both in the simile and in the first person singular. See Furnish, pp. 368 on what I call the *ethos* of 6:11–13 and 7:2–3.

to be sure in the earlier passage, but here he includes himself among others in the plural of the first person pronoun. In contrast to the intimacy of 7:2–4, the plural pronouns in 2:14–4:6 convey an air of what Furnish calls "solemn purposefulness and authority."[55] There are plural pronouns in 7:2–4, to be sure, but the number of singular verbs and first person pronouns is striking. If we have in fact correctly identified these levels of style in 2 Corinthians, we have at the same time articulated yet another motive for metaphor. We have in 2:14–4:6 an ethos in which metaphor is motivated, among other things, by the desire to elevate the talk to the highest level. But to make this a convincing point we need to see why Paul would do such a thing.

We do not have time here for a full analysis of the rhetoric of 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:4, but we can say this much. 2:14–6:10 prepares the way for 7:2–4 even as the latter depends on the former. A personal appeal of the sort we see in 7: 2–4 would be quite out of place without the foundation laid in 2:14–6:10. The earlier passage shows by what authority the apostle may in the later passage make such an appeal. To reverse the order of the passages would destroy the effect of the whole because it would present a personal appeal before the audience had any reason to feel disposed to entertain such an appeal. 2:14–6:10 and 7:2–4 as a whole is in this sense a kind of map of a developing relationship in which the movement is from distance and authority to intimacy. If we find it odd that Paul would be quite so acrobatic as to build two such different selves, two distinct kinds of *ethos* in the same letter, even playing each off against the other, we need only recall 1 Corinthians 9:19–23 and its claim that Paul will become whatever he needs to to win people to the faith. Professor Richard Davis has suggested to me in conversation that the 1 Corinthian passage is an important key to Paul's rhetoric, and I think he is right. If Paul will build an *ethos* for the particular audience to whom he is at the moment speaking, why should he not go a step further and build two separate and mutually supporting ones for the same audience?

Professor Mary Ann Tolbert has suggested to me that this switching from one *ethos* to another shows us a Paul who is trying to transcend in his letters the very problems he addresses in his critique of written letters in 3:2–3. He moves from one *ethos* to another in his letters just as he would if he were present in person. We find evidence to support this point in Galatians. The Paul who says he wishes he were present so that he could change his voice (4:20), seems capable of effecting some kind of change even in his letters. In 2 Corinthians 10:10 there is some evidence that Paul was even more compelling in letters than in person. Paul's switching from one *ethos* to another may amount, as Professor Mary Ann Tolbert puts it, to injecting the spirit back into the letter.

Finally, the intimacy at the end of 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:4 between Paul and his audience is effected in yet another way by the metaphors he uses. We can see this point by recalling Ted Cohen's argument that the metaphorical process itself creates an intimacy between author and audience such that they constitute a small community. The audience hears that Paul is a εὐωδία and they realize that this cannot be literally true and so they go beyond the literal meaning to another meaning that will make sense of the assertion. They hear that they are an ἐπιστολή and they realize that this cannot be literally true and so again they search for some other meaning that will make sense of this assertion. It is only when the audience discerns the meanings that make sense of the words that it shares the perspectives of Paul. At this point they have become a community with him, a community within, apart from, the broader, far less subtle, far more literal community of speakers of Greek. And this cultivation of intimacy is a precious thing for a man trying

[55] Furnish, pp. 43–4.

to defend himself in an apologia. His audience becomes, surely without realizing just what is happening to them, close to the person whose argument they are judging.

The Semantic Motive for Metaphor

There is at least one quality in some of the metaphors in 2 Corinthians 2:14–4:6 everyone will recognize: they are contrived. εὐωδία ἐσμὲν in 2:15 seems contrived because there is so little obvious similarity between an aroma and a human being. Anyone who asserts that he or she is an aroma owes us some explanation. ἡ ἐπιστολὴ ἡμῶν ὑμεῖς ἐστε in 3:2 and ἐστὲ ἐπιστολὴ in 3:3 are just as contrived. There is no obvious sense in which a letter and a human being are similar. By contrast it seems somewhat less contrived to speak of the "light of knowledge" in 4:6 because our ordinary experience of the two suggests a similarity between them.

There seem to be at least two reasons why Paul would contrive such unlikely metaphors as εὐωδία and ἐπιστολή. One would be for rhetorical effect. We have argued above that being perceived as a user of metaphors is one constituent of the elevated *ethos* important to Paul. And if metaphors also function to establish author and audience as a community, there might be special power in Paul's most contrived metaphors. But Paul's almost surrealistic assertion to the Galatians "It is not I who live but Christ who lives within me" (2:20) seems for Paul as much a way of perceiving himself as of persuading others.[56] It therefore makes sense to explore the possibility that in some of Paul's metaphors in 2:14–4:6 he is not only persuading but perceiving what can be perceived in no other way.

A number of students of metaphor argue that some metaphors enable us to perceive what we could otherwise not perceive. Here I follow Douglas Berggren's argument because of its brevity and coherence. Borrowing Wheelwright's distinction between epiphoric and diaphoric metaphor, Berggren argues that in diaphoric metaphor an author constructs a "subsidiary subject" that serves as a lens through which we are to view the "principal subject."[57] More important for an understanding of contrived metaphors, Berggren follows Black in arguing that in diaphoric metaphor whatever similarity exists between subsidiary and principal subjects may be the result rather than the cause of the similarity. In Black's words, "it would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently existing."[58] Finally, because the lens formed in the subsidiary subject reveals "a special meaning, and even in some cases a new sort of reality,"[59] it is absolutely crucial and cannot be altered or removed without a consequent change in meaning. Hence we are justified in calling this kind of metaphor "semantic."[60] For example, chess as subsidiary subject reveals qualities of battle, the principal subject, we could see in no other way. And notice that it does not matter how unlike one another chess and battle really are, how contrived the comparison seems. All that matters is what the chess lens allows us to see of battle. What motivates diaphoric metaphor, in sum, is its power to mean.[61]

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[56] H. Richard Niebuhr, "Metaphors and Morals," in *The Responsible Self*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 156.

[57] Berggren, pp. 237–58.

[58] Berggren, p. 242.

[59] Berggren, p. 244.

[60] Ricoeur, p. 198.

[61] Berggren, p. 242.

If the contrived metaphors εὐωδία and ἐπιστολή are diaphoric in this way, what motivates them must in part be their power to mean. In εὐωδία ἐσμὲν the apostles are seen through the εὐωδία lens. This lens ruthlessly excludes all it regards as irrelevant and reveals as the salient quality of the apostles their self-sacrificing service as agents of communication. As Collange puts it, Paul's self and life are his apostleship.[62] In the words of Furnish, "Paul's conception of the apostle as one who is bound over in the totality of his being to the service of the gospel surely lies behind this present image of the apostles as themselves the aroma of Christ (Furnish's italics).[63] One suspects that Paul's limiting the apostles here to nothing but εὐωδία excludes some of what motivates the καπηλεύοντες in 2:17 to serve their own ends even as they preach the word of God. Διακονηθεῖσα in 3:3, if it means "served," points to the same idea. Whatever rhetorical considerations motivate εὐωδία, an important semantic one does too. The apostles are seen through this contrived lens as they could not otherwise be seen. Paul's overall aim in 2:14–4:6, to develop an apologia of his apostleship, is well served by a metaphor that creates a meaning available in no other way.

The ἐπιστολή metaphor in 3:2–3 is more than contrived; it is tortured. As we have seen, it takes some ingenuity to see exactly what the subsidiary subject is in this case. It turns out to be the letter of recommendation. Again, as Baird has shown, this letter is authored by Christ, carried by Paul, the one being recommended, and the Corinthians are its content. It follows that anyone who "reads" the letter in Paul's heart, γινωσκομένη καὶ ἀναγινωσκομένη, will find in the Corinthians' presence there testimony to Paul's apostleship. In contrast to the familiar letter of recommendation which is written by one person and carried by the person being recommended, Paul's letter as we have seen is no letter at all and therefore allows no writing to come between apostle and congregation. We may even have here an indirect appeal to the Corinthians to read through the present letter to Paul's heart. Contrived as it is, the subsidiary subject here for the moment excludes from consideration all but the letter qualities of the Corinthians. In no other way could these qualities be seen.

On the other hand, it is still difficult to know what these letter qualities might be. What seems to be on Paul's mind in this metaphor is not defining the special qualities of the Corinthians but the special qualities of the relationship between himself and the Corinthians. To show what this relationship is Paul tries more than anything else to show what it is not, to show the difference between the relationship the Corinthians have with him and the one they would have in a community where real letters intervened between one person and another and between persons and God. It is because of its power to show this difference, because of its rhetorical, not its semantic qualities, that the ἐπιστολή metaphor is useful to him. Indeed, if the letter metaphor fails for all its contrivance to fulfill its semantic promise, its obvious energy and sincerity may very well move the Corinthians more than any subtle semantic success would. What is above all clear is that Paul cares deeply about them.

Conclusion

A study of the motives for metaphor in 2:14–4:6 shows that in the case of the three main metaphors, εὐωδία, ἐπιστολή, and φωτισμός, the first is sematically motivated while the second two are not. All are to some extent rhetorically motivated as constituents of

[62] Collange, p. 33.
[63] Furnish, p. 188.

ethos, and as more vivid and briefer than literal alternatives. ἐπιστολή has additional rhetorical value because of the contrast it effects between good and bad religious leadership. φωτισμός has additional rhetorical value because of the overall coherence it establishes throughout 2:14–4:6. The semantic motivation of εὐωδία is important because here Paul defines the apostle as he could in no other way and as he must given his apologetic aim in this passage. The rhetorical motivation of the other two is no less important because Paul must fail in his apologetic aim if he is not persuasive.

If we recall Wallace Stevens' poem, we can now say we have seen where Paul is at home. Paul is at home where literal meanings have long since stopped short. Just as Stevens prefers the reality available when words are manipulated to divide the reality of "the weight of primary noon" to give him "the half colors of quarter-things," so Paul is at home only when he has manipulated words. By means of contrivance and even violence[64] he shatters the word boundaries that distinguish parts of reality[65] in order to create an image of the apostle as e!yvd5ia that is a new reality and that is his reality. Because it is his reality it compels him and he does his metaphorical best to make it compelling to an audience which can join him only by participating in the metaphorical process.

[64] Ricoeur cites a "metaphor of metaphor" by Nelson Goodman, "an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting" (p. 196). Ricoeur then speaks of the violence of metaphor: "Can one not say that the strategy of language at work in metaphor consists in obliterating the logical and established frontiers of language, in order to bring to light new resemblances the previous classification kept us from seeing? In other words, the power of metaphor would be to break an old categorization, in order to establish new logical frontiers on the ruins of their forerunners" (p. 197).

[65] Berggren, p. 244; Ricoeur says, "we must reserve the possibility that metaphor is not limited to suspending natural reality, but that in opening meaning up on the imaginative side it also opens it towards a dimension of reality that does not coincide with what ordinary language envisages under the name of natural reality" (p. 211).

Appendix

	positive	negative
1.	2:15 ἐν τοῖς σῳζομένοις	ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις
2.	2:17b-17a ἐν Χριστῷ λαλοῦμεν	οἱ πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον
3.	3:1 μὴ χρήζομεν . . . συστατικῶν ἐπιστολῶν . . . ;	ὥς τινες [χρήζουσι . . .]
4.	3:3a ἐγγεγραμμένη . . . πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος	. . . οὐ μέλανι
5.	3:3b ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις	οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις
6.	3:5 [λογίσασθαί τι] ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ	λογίσασθαί τι ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν
7.	3:6 τὸ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ	τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει
8.	3:12–13 παρρησίᾳ χρώμεθα	Μωυσῆς ἐτίθει κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον
9.	3:18–7 ἡμεῖς . . . κατοπτριζόμενοι	μὴ δύνασθαι ἀτενίσαι τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἰσραὴλ
10.	3:14 [τὸ αὐτὸ κάλυμμα] καταργεῖται	τὸ αὐτὸ κάλυμμα μένει
11.	3:16–15 περιαιρεῖται τὸ κάλυμμα	κάλυμμα . . . κεῖται
12.	3:18–14 μεταμορφούμεθα	ἐπωρώθη τὰ νοήματα
13.	4:1-2a οὐκ ἐγκακοῦμεν	[ἐγκακοῦμεν]
14.	4:2 συνιστάνοντες ἑαυτοὺς	μὴ περιπατοῦντες ἐν πανουργίᾳ
15.	4:4–6 [ὁ θεὸς] ἔλαμψεν . . . πρὸς φωτισμὸν	ὁ θεὸς . . . ἐτύφλωσεν . . . εἰς τὸ μὴ αὐγάσαι τὸν φωτισμὸν
16.	4:5 [κηρύσσομεν] . . . Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν	οὐ ἑαυτοὺς κηρύσσομεν κύριον

A Structural Exegesis of 2 Corinthians 2:14-7:4 with Special Attention on 2:14-3:6 and 6:11-7:4

Daniel Patte
Vanderbilt University

1. Goals of this Paper.

The title "a structural exegesis of 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:4" suggests that this is one of the several possible structural exegeses that can be envisioned on the basis of A. J. Greimas's semiotic theory.[1] Semiotics allows us to distinguish among several dimensions of meaning which interact to produce the overall meaning effect of a text. A semiotic analysis might strive to account for all the dimensions of meaning, with the goal of further verifying their interaction and of refining the theory. By contrast, because its goal is, each time, the elucidation of certain aspects of the text, a given structural exegesis selects one or a few of these dimensions of meaning as the primary focus of the study. Yet, the other dimensions are taken into consideration insofar as they help the exegete elucidate the selected dimension(s). Thus, even though a structural exegesis might deal with the same issues as other kinds of exegesis, it does so by taking advantage of the overall semiotic theory which shows how other dimensions of meaning contribute to the dimension(s) of meaning under investigation.

The selection of the dimension(s) of meaning to be investigated may be dictated by many factors. In the present instance, I chose to focus the study on dimensions of meaning suggested by well known exegetical problems posed by 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4, namely the issues regarding its unity and integrity. This passage has long been isolated as an independent unit (and often as a distinct letter) primarily because the argument which Paul develops in the first part of 2 Corinthians is suddenly interrupted after 2:13 and seems to continue in 7:5ff. Yet, this "external" evidence by itself does not show that 2:14–7:4 forms a coherent discursive unit. A first issue concerns the integrity of this passage, and especially whether 6:14–7:1 is[2] or is not[3] an intrinsic part of it. In addition, while it is generally

[1] See A. J. Greimas and J. Courtés, *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary*, Bloomington: Indiana, 1982, and the second volume of the "dictionary," A. J. Greimas and J. Courtés, ed., *Sémiotique: Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du language, II*, Paris: Hachette, 1985.

[2] As argued by C. K. Barrett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, HNTC, New York: Harper, 1973, pp. 192–203; G. D. Fee, "II Corinthians VI.14–VII.1 and Food Offered to Idols," *NTS* 23, 1977, pp. 144–61; J. Lambrecht, "The Fragment 2 Cor vi 14–vii 1. A Plea for Its Authenticity," *Miscellanea Neotestamentica II*, NovTSup 47, ed. T. Baarda et al, Leiden: Brill, 1978, pp. 143–61; M. Thrall, "The Problem of II Cor. VI.14–VII.1 in Some Recent Discussion," *NTS* 24, 1978, pp. 132–48; D. Rensberger, '2 Corinthians 6:14–7:1. A Fresh Examination," *Studia Biblica et Theologica* 8, 1978, pp. 25–49.

[3] As argued for instance by H.-J. Klauck, *2 Korintherbrief*, Wurzburg: Echter, 1986, pp. 60–61. Other scholars argue that Paul is here citing a non-Pauline text: V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians*, AB, Garden City: Doubleday, 1984, p. 383; R. P. Martin, *2 Corinthians*,

agreed that 2:14–7:4 includes "an apology for Paul's apostleship,"[4] there is no such agreement concerning the precise organization and goal of the overall argument of this passage.[5] Actually, these two issues are interrelated. One of the basic reasons invoked for rejecting 6:14–7:1 as a (Pauline or non-Pauline) insertion is that it does not seem to fit into the overall argument of the passage. The difficulty in interpreting this passage is due to its highly metaphorical character.

From the perspective of Greimas's semiotics, these issues concern dimensions of meaning which belong to *the process of "discursivization"* (governed by "discursive structures"). This is to say that the overall coherence and unity of 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4 (if they exist) are those of a discourse addressed by an author, Paul, to certain readers, the Corinthians, with the hope to achieve some kind of effects upon the readers, and this through the overall organization of the discourse and its figurativization. For this purpose, Paul presents himself in a certain way to his readers; this is a "discursive Paul," Paul as the *enunciator* constructed and inscribed in this specific discourse. Similarly, Paul envisions his readers in a certain way, the Corinthians as the *enunciatee* constructed and inscribed in this discourse (who might or might not correspond to the actual Corinthians).

The interrelation of enunciator and enunciatee is quite complex. The discourse does not merely present the enunciator's point of view; it strives to communicate this point of view to readers for whom it will be new and eventually contradictory to their own. For this purpose, this point of view must be discursivized, a process which involves expressing this point of view in terms of the (presumed) knowledge and point of view of the readers/enunciatee. This means that the discursive dimensions of meaning of the text involve a twofold semantic investment; the enunciator's point of view and the enunciatee's point of view are thoroughly integrated with each other. One cannot claim to understand the coherence and goal of the argument of a text as long as these two points of view and the way they interact have not been elucidated.

Historico-critical exegesis calls upon extra-textual data to elucidate and reconstruct the author's and the readers' points of view and their interaction in the discourse. For the same purpose, structural exegesis seeks to reconstruct these two points of view on the basis of intra-textual relations. This observation shows both the complementarity and the difference between these two types of exegesis. Structural exegesis can dare to proceed as it does because semiotics provides the means to identify in the text primary characteristics of the author's point of view (the enunciator); these are the specific "actualizations of the semio-narrative structures" in the text (manifested especially by oppositions and contrasting parallelisms, as we shall see). Then the readers' point of view can be elucidated. Thus, a structural exegesis can by itself elucidate *the primary characteristics* of the interaction of these two points of view which gives coherence to the discourse (if such a

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(continued)
Word Biblical Commentary 40, Waco: Word Books, 1986, p. 193.

[4] The designation used by Kümmel in P. Feine, J. Behm and W. G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, Nashville: Abingdon, 1966, p. 206.

[5] See, for instance, J.-F. Collange, *Enigmes de la deuxième epître de Paul aux Corinthians. Edute exégétique de 2 Cor. 2,14–7,4*, SNTSMS, Cambridge: University Press, 1972. This work illustrates well the problems raised by previous attempts to understand the overall argument of the letter in that it ends up arguing for two editions addressed to different groups. A first edition (ending in 6:13) would be a presentation of true apostleship. A second edition (including 6:14–7:4) would be a much more polemic version of the same letter addressed to a different group.

coherence exists). Yet, structural exegesis does not deny the role of the extra-textual; it acknowledges this role in the process of discursivization, especially as an essential dimension of the enunciatee (the readers with an "old," extra-textual knowledge). Thus, a structural exegesis is necessarily complemented by the historico-critical studies which have identified the possible correlations of the text with other texts, traditions, and extra-textual data. Otherwise, the structural exegesis remains skeletal.

These brief introductory remarks are enough to suggest how we shall proceed. First, we shall consider the main features of the overall theme of 2:14–7:4, a primary feature of its discursivization. As we proceed, it will become clear that, for that purpose, our study needs to be focussed on 2:14–3:6 and 6:11–7:4. We shall then study these two passages more closely in order to elucidate how the author's points are discursivized (especially through metaphors) in terms of the readers' old knowledge. In this way our structural exegesis will have elucidated both the main points and the discursive (rhetoric) strategy Paul uses in this entire passage, even though lack of space will limit our discussion of 3:7–6:10 to a few observations.

2. Preliminary Identification of the Overall Theme of 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4.

If 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4 is a complete discursive unit, its theme should be posited in the first part and found posited again, although in an inverted form, in the last part.[6] Thus, in order to identify in a preliminary way the overall theme of this passage, our first task is to examine its beginning and its end to discover whether or not they echo each other through contrasting parallelisms. If it is so, we will have identified what can be called the "introduction" and the "conclusion," i.e., the passages in which such contrasting parallelisms are found, namely, as we shall argue, 2:14–3:6 and 6:11–7:4. Simultaneously we will have shown that the overall passage is indeed a self-contained discursive unit and what its overall theme is.

2.1 Comparing The Introduction and The Conclusion.

As we consider the end of our passage, we find in 7:2a a call to the Corinthians to "make room for us" (*chōrēsate hēmas*) which reexpresses the similar (but not identical) call in 6:13b: "widen your hearts you also" (RSV, *platynthēte kai hymeis*).[7] This is a call to accept Paul, as he accepted them ("Our mouth is open to you, Corinthians; our heart is wide," 6:11, RSV). Thus, we recognize that, generally speaking, the goal (theme) of this discourse is

[6] This is for Greimas one of the features of the "discursive syntax" called "narrative schema" in the case of narratives. It involves the transformation of an "inverted content" into a "posited content," and is a characteristic of any discourse (be it narrative, poetic, or didactic as here). In its simplest form, the introduction of a didactic discourse posits a problem that is presented as resolved in the conclusion. In more complex cases, as here, the overall transformation might be, for instance, from one formulation of a problem (and its resolution) to another formulation of the same problem (and its resolution). For a more technical presentation of this issue, see Greimas and Courtés, *Semiotics and Language*, entry "narrative schema."

[7] Since it has been argued in various ways that 6:14–7:1 is a text fragment inserted between 6:13 and 7:2 from another context, in the first part of my investigation I do not take these verses into consideration, so as to avoid prejudging this issue. I examine 6:14–7:1 later on.

to reestablish the broken-down relationship between Paul[8] and his readers. When we consider 2:14ff, it becomes clear that it is a relationship between ministers and believers that needs to be reestablished, since in 3:6 Paul and his collaborators are presented as "ministers of a new covenant."[9]

Beyond this first observation, we note that 6:11–13 expresses *a shift of perspective:* in 6:11 the focus is upon Paul's attitude toward the Corinthians while in 6:13 and 7:2 it is upon the Corinthians' attitude toward Paul. In other words, the breakdown of the ministers/believers relationship can be viewed as being either the responsability of the ministers or that of the believers. Thus, concerning the reestablishment of this relationship, 6:12–13 as well as 7:2a emphasizes the responsibility and role of the believers, the Corinthians; by contrast, 6:11 emphasizes the responsibility and role of the ministers. Could it be that the discourse's overall theme is to bring the Corinthians to the realization that the breakdown in relationship between Paul and them is not Paul's fault (as they think) but their fault? But, this formulation (prompted by 6:12) is certainly too crude and one sided, since in 7:3 Paul denies that he wants to blame his readers. There is indeed a shift of perspective, but it is more complex. Could it be that 6:11–13 introduces the conclusion by marking explicitly the more complex shift of perpective which the entire discourse aims at manifesting?

This suggestion is confirmed when one notes that 7:2–4 is *centered upon the believers and the ways they affect this relationship and are affected by it,* while 2:14–3:6 is *centered upon the ministers and the ways they affect this relationship and are affected by it.* Let us review these contrasting parallelisms, identifying in each case the common feature and the shift in perspective.

In 7:2a (and 6:13) Paul calls the Corinthians to open themselves to him; a characteristic of true *believers* is *"openness"* (of heart). In 3:2 and 2:14 (as well as in 6:11 which marks the shift of perspective), the same connotation, "openness," is a characteristic of the ministers. That the letter written on their hearts[10] is "known and read *by all human beings*" (3:2) expresses the *openness of the ministers'* hearts toward everybody. Similarly, Paul's ministry involves spreading "the fragrance of the knowledge of him (God or Christ) everywhere" (2:14), another expression of the openness of his ministry. Thus, the same attitude must characterize both ministers and believers who participate in this relationship. Does it mean that Paul views the ministry as a relationship between partners with a similar status (here, involving "openness"), rather than the ministers' exclusive activity and responsibility?

In both 7:2b and 2:17 Paul defends himself against being a bad minister. In 7:2b, Paul states that his ministry has not brought about any ill effect to the Corinthians, as the ministry of bad ministers would have done; the emphasis is on the *effect of the ministry for believers.* By contrast, in 2:17, Paul defends himself against being a "peddler of God's word" by emphasizing the "sincere" character of his ministry; the emphasis is on *the nature*

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[8] I use the name "Paul" as a convenient short-hand designation of the collective subject "Paul and his collaborators."

[9] We shall use the term "ministers" (instead of apostles) to designate the collective subjects ("we") because, as we shall see, Paul uses cultic metaphors, that is, metaphors expressing that his ministry is a "service of God." Furthermore, the term "apostle" might convey that the view of ministry he presents is restricted to special people (apostles), while, through the use of the first person plural "we," Paul signals that his comments apply to any number of ministers.

[10] In 3:2a, I read with Nestle-Aland *tais kardiais hēmōn,* as will be discussed below.

of the ministers' competence.[11] The ministry is so intimate a relationship that the competence of the ministers directly affects the believers. In view of the preceding contrasting parallelism, could it be that the reverse is also true?

Both 7:3a and 3:1 deal with evaluations of the participants in the ministers/believers relationship. In 7:3a, Paul claims "I do not say this as a condemnation." Not condemning as well as condemning involves *assessing the value of the Corinthians* as participants in this relationship. By contrast, in 3:1, self-commendation as well as recommendation involves *assessments of the value of the ministers* participating in this relationship, assessing their "competence" as trustworthy ministers. Could it be that the ground upon which these assessments are made is the same? The next contrasting parallelism shows that it is.

In 7:3b Paul affirms, as he already said ("for I said before") in 3:2–3, that the Corinthians are in his heart.[12] In both cases, this metaphorical statement is presented as a basis for the different evaluations discussed above. The intimate character of the ministry as relationship between partners is thus underscored. In addition, 7:3 emphasizes *the beneficial effect for the believers* of this close relationship ("in our hearts"), namely, they are not condemned by Paul. By contrast, in 3:2–3, Paul emphasizes *the beneficial effect for the ministers* themselves of having the Corinthians in their hearts; the Corinthians are a letter of recommendation for them, and therefore confirm the validity of their ministry. The ministry as intimate relationship is equally beneficial, and through the same means, for both ministers and believers as partners.

In 7:3c as well as in 2:16 and 3:6 Paul writes about death and life. It soon appears that the contrasting parallelism on this issue does not follow the usual pattern. Let us first compare 7:3c and 2:16. We note that in both cases death and life are related to the ministers (origin of the ministry) and the believers (receivers of the ministry); "to die *together* and to *live together*" (7:3c); "a fragrance from death [origin] to death [effect for receivers] . . . a fragrance from life [origin] to life [effect for receivers]" (2:15). The difference between the two statements is in the ways in which death and life are interrelated. In 7:3c, death and life are correlated as *two positive aspects* of the common experience of believers and ministers, while in 2:15 death and life seem to be contrasted both as opposite origins of the ministry (*ek thanatou . . . ek zōēs*) and as opposite effects of the ministry for people (*eis thanaton . . . eis zōēn*). Similarly, in 3:6 death and life are opposed as contrary outcomes of "good" and "bad" ministries. This unusual relation between the conclusion and the introduction on this issue is most striking because the usual pattern is found again in 7:4 and its parallels.

Both in 7:4a and in 3:4, we find expressions of "confidence." In 7:4a, this confidence, expressed by the phrase *parrēsia pros hymas,*[13] is related to Paul's "pride" *in the Corinthians.* His confidence, which is also an openness (connotation of *parrēsia*) toward them is rooted

[11] The term "competence" is suggested by the terms of the family of *hikanos* in 2:16b and 3:5–6. Note also that 7:2b could be contrasted with the mention in 2:16 that Paul's ministry has either a negative (*eis thanaton*) or a positive (*eis zōēn*) effect for people. We deal with this point below.

[12] "You are in our hearts" (7:3b); "You yourselves are our letter (of recommendation) to you, written in our hearts" (3:2a). Yet Paul is certainly also referring to 6:11.

[13] This phrase also involves the connotation of "openness toward the Corinthians." As the Corinthians should be "open" toward Paul (7:2a, 6:13), so Paul is "open" toward them (7:4a, 6:11). Thus 7:4a balances 6:11, with a focus on Paul, a mark that 6:11–7:4 (with or without 6:14–7:1) is a complete sub-unit (the conclusion) of the discourse.

in the Corinthians. By contrast, in 3:4, Paul writes about his *confidence in his own "competence"* as a minister, a confidence which is also an openness (cf. 3:12).[14] Thus both ministers and the believers are sources of confidence and also of openness for each other.

Finally, both in 7:4b and 2:14, we find expressions of euphoria. In 7:4b, since it is the effect that faithful believers have on Paul, this euphoria is presented as a "joy" (*chara*). By contrast, in 2:14, since it is related to God, who is the actual agent in Paul's ministry, this euphoria is presented as a "thanksgiving" (*charis*).[15]

2.2 Main Features of the Overall Theme of 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4.

All these contrasting parallelisms between 7:2–4 and the beginning of our passage show that 2:14–7:4 is indeed a complete self-contained discursive unit. Furthermore, we have to conclude that the introduction is 2:14–3:6, since we found parallelisms to all these verses in 7:2–4. A closer examination of these verses will show that 2:14–3:6 is indeed a sub-unit of the discourse. Yet we still need to determine the extent of the conclusion. It certainly includes 6:11–13 and 7:2–4. Is 6:14–7:1 also a part of the conclusion? The question is: Are there contrasting parallelisms between 2:14–3:6 and 6:14–7:1? Before addressing this question, we need to gain a more precise understanding of the overall theme as it is expressed by the contrasting parallelisms between 2:14–3:6 and 7:2–4, and to study the former passage more closely.

As we had anticipated, through this discourse Paul aims at reestablishing the broken-down relationship between him as a minister and the Corinthians. Yet, by taking note of the features which are marked as particularly significant by the contrasting parallelisms, we begin to appreciate his rhetorical strategy. We can now sketch this theme in a tentative way.[16]

As can be readily understood, in order to catch the interest of the readers the introduction of a discourse needs to express the theme in terms of the assumed perspective of the readers. Consequently, we can say that in 2:14–3:6 Paul addresses *problems* regarding his relationship to the Corinthians *as they are perceived by his readers.*[17] Thus, since Paul emphasizes in the introduction the ways in which he affects believers through his ministry, we provisionally conclude that, for the Corinthians, such problems arise because

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[14] Note that in 3:4 Paul emphasizes that the competence in which his confidence/openness is rooted is not a competence that he has in himself, but a competence from God (a point already alluded to in 2:16b–17). We shall come back to this.

[15] Note that in 7:4, Paul speaks of a joy "in the midst of affliction." Consequently, because of the contrasting parallelism between 2:14 and 7:4b, we find a first indication that we must understand the metaphor of the triumphal procession led by God in 2:14 as also referring to Paul in affliction (as a prisoner in chains in the triumphal procession of God as victorious general).

[16] What follows is the formulation of an hypothesis regarding this theme. Formulating "hypotheses" (or models) which are then verified and refined by further study of the evidence is a characteristic of the approach of structural semiotics. See Greimas and Courtes, *Semiotics and Language*, entry, "hypothesis."

[17] Let me express once and for all that when I speak of "the Corinthians' views," such as their perception of Paul's ministry, I mean: "*the Corinthians' views as envisioned by Paul and inscribed in the text*, that I, as exegete, recognize through a study of the discursive features of the text." These views might or might not correspond to the views of the actual Corinthians.

of shortcomings in Paul's ministry. From the contrasting parallelisms, we can infer that the Corinthians reject the authority of Paul's ministry (condemn Paul, 3:1, cf. 7:3) because, in their view, it is self-serving (2:17), self-commending and self-confident (3:1 and 3:4). So, Paul defends his ministry by emphasizing that his ministry is "sincere," "from God," and "before God" (2:17); that his ministry is "open" to everybody (3:2); that neither self-commendation nor recommendation are appropriate grounds for evaluating a ministry (3:1)—but that which is written on hearts is (3:2–3); that his confidence/openness is based upon a God-given competence and not upon a competence that he would have by himself (3:4–5).

Yet all this is merely the formulation of the theme in terms of the readers' perspective according to which the problems in the ministers/believers relationship are exclusively evaluated in terms of the ministers' role. As the contrasting parallelisms show, for Paul, minister and believers are equally responsible for what happens in a ministry (cf. 6:11–13). More to the point, minister and believers are intrinsically associated as participants in the ministry. They share in the ministry. Thus, in agreement with the Corinthians, Paul affirms that "bad" ministers bring ill-effects for believers (2:17 and 7:2b). Yet, a breakdown in relationship might also be due to the lack of openness of the believers (6:11–13). Positively, both ministers and believers benefit from each other in the ministry (3:2–3 and 7:3). Furthermore, both need to have the same characteristic attitude, "openness" (2:14, 3:2, 6:13, 7:2). And we can expect that they need to have many other common characteristics (competencies), since they also share death and life together (7:3). All this suggests that one of the main characteristics of the overall theme of 2:14–7:4 is the transformation of the readers' view of the ministry; from a view of the ministry as fully centered on ministers to a view of the ministry as a reciprocal relationship between ministers and believers as partners with similar status.

In this transformation of the readers' view about the ministry, an issue is underscored as particularly important by being involved in another kind of contrasting parallelism;[18] the issue of "death and life." In 2:16 the phrases "from death to death" and "from life to life" taken by themselves *could be viewed* as expressing that death and life are opposite effects of ministries which have opposite origins (in death or life); this is the point expressed in 3:6.[19] May we not infer that this is the basis for the Corinthians' rejection of Paul? That is, could it be that his ministry is rejected because of what the Corinthians perceive as its death-like ill-effects for believers? This hypothesis seems to be supported by 7:2b in which Paul emphasizes that his ministry did not have any ill-effect for the Corinthians. Yet, when the phrases "from death to death" and "from life to life" are read in their context in 2:15–16, it appears that, here, Paul *affirms* that his own good ministry (through which God is at work; 2:14) brings about these opposite effects. This observation complicates the issue. A single thing is clear: one of the effects of the overall discourse is to transform radically the perception of death and life as they relate to ministers and believers. There are three options.

(1) Death can be viewed as the negative effect of bad ministries (ministries which have their origin in death). In 3:6 Paul affirms this view, which might have been the basis of the Corinthians' rejection of Paul (according to Paul). Thus, as he defends himself, Paul denies that his ministry is a bad ministry, i.e., a ministry originating in death (2:17–3:6),

[18] And also because this issue is directly related to oppositions of sections in 2:15–16, 3:6, and in 7:3.

[19] This verse emphasizes the opposite effects. Yet, in the context, "letter" (*gramma*) and "Spirit" refer to the human and divine origins of these ministries.

and denies that his ministry had "death-like"[20] ill-effects for the Corinthians as believers (7:2).

(2) Death can be viewed as one of the outcomes (beside life) of a good ministry. Death is indeed negative from the standpoint of those to whom it is brought, but also positive, since it is the appropriate outcome of a good ministry. This view seems to be expressed in 2:15–16a. In such a case, there must be another factor bringing about the negative outcome (death) of the good ministry for certain people. Since we can infer that those for which a good ministry brings "death" are people who do not become believers, this option is only indirectly mentioned in 7:2–4; Paul is confident in the Corinthians and joyous (7:4) because, so to speak, his ministry brought life to them.

3) Death can be viewed from a positive perspective; it is a normal part of the experience of believers as well as of ministers (7:3c).

Is one of the goals of the discourse to bring the Corinthians to the realization that "death" should be understood in this threefold way, rather than exclusively according to the first option? Could it be that, for Paul, the Corinthians' rejection of his ministry is caused by their misunderstanding of the ministers/believers relationship, and that this misunderstanding is itself based upon an inappropriate view of death and death-like situations in their experience? Could it be that the communication of a proper understanding of "death and life" in the believers' experience is, for Paul, the key to overcome the Corinthians' rejection of his ministry? If this were the case, we could understand the repeated emphasis on this issue in the body of the discourse (cf. 3:9, 4:3, 4:10–12, 4:14, 5:4, 5:9, 5:14–15, 6:9).[21]

All that precedes is the formulation of an hypothesis concerning the overall theme of 2:14–7:4. In order to verify it and refine it, we need to study more closely the metaphors that Paul uses in the introduction (2:14–3:6), since, quite clearly, "death" and "life" are used in a metaphorical way—they refer to more than simple physical death and life!

3. The Introduction: 2 Cor. 2:14–3:6.

A first reading shows that this passage can be tentatively subdivided into three subsections: 2:14–17; 3:1–3; 3:4–6. Let us consider them successively so as to elucidate the points Paul underscores in them. In this way we shall progressively gain a better understanding of the overall theme of the discourse, and prepare ourselves to evaluate whether or not 2:14–3:6 forms a complete sub-unit. Simultaneously, we will identify the features of the introduction which have no contrasting parallel in 6:11–13 and 7:2–4. We will then be ready to raise the question of the relation of 2:14–3:6 with 6:14–7:1, and thus of the relation of this latter passage with 6:11–13 and 7:2–4.

3.1 2 Cor. 2:14–17

In this first passage, Paul's ministry is described in a highly metaphoric language which is so rich in connotations that the interpretation is quite difficult when each metaphorical statement is considered in and of itself. Let us list the main metaphors (excluding terms which might have a metaphorical sense, such as "death" and "life") identifying their semantic fields, yet without attempting to interpret them at this point, i.e., without

[20] I suggest here that "death" is used as a metaphor for negative effects of a ministry.

[21] A list in which we included some of the indirect references to death and life.

attempting to identify which of their connotations participate in the text's meaning effect.[22]

Thriambeuonti (2:14) evokes the image a *triumphal procession* led by God. Is Paul's ministry a glorious participation in this procession, e.g., as a victorious general (Allo, Kümmel, Barrett, Héring)? Or is it the participation of a prisoner in chains led by a victorious general (Filson, Hughes, de Boor, Collange, Marshall, Furnish)?[23]

Osmē (2:14), "odor," "fragrance," as a metaphor for the "content" of the ministry (the "knowledge of God [or Christ]") is an *olfactory* image. Is it related to the preceding one (Barrett)?

Phanerounti (2:14) introduces a *visual* metaphor with connotations associated with "*light*": "manifesting" in the sense of "bringing to light what is in darkness". A new shift in metaphor seemingly without significance until we discover many visual images (including *doxa;* cf. 4:6) in the following verses.

Euōdia (2:15) as a metaphor for Paul (and not for the message, as *osme* was in 2:14) is a new *olfactory* image with, this time, *cultic and sacrificial connotations,* the aroma of a burnt-offering to God.

Osmē (2:16) is now used as a metaphor for Paul (equivalent to euodia, to which it is associated in the LXX) in a context in which the effect on human beings is considered.

Kapēleuontes (2:17), as a designation for "false preachers," introduces an *economic* image (trading for profit) with the negative connotation of "dishonesty," or "corruption."

One metaphor has the effect of stopping readers long enough to call their attention to a feature that needs to be interpreted in terms of an unexpected relation. The association of Paul's ministry with the image of a triumphal procession invites readers to conceive the ministry in terms of this other semantic field. For us, as exegetes of another time, this association is ambivalent, as is any metaphor read out of its specific cultural context; thus, the diverging interpretations. For Paul's intended readers the image of a triumphal procession might have been clearer—they might not have any hesitation regarding the prisoner status of Paul in the "procession"—, yet the effect is similar. Such a metaphor *in the first words* of a development on Paul's ministry, and consequently a metaphor without any context as of yet, cannot but raise a question for readers: Is the understanding that we as readers have (whatever it might be) that which Paul actually intends to convey? The multiplication of metaphors belonging to other semantic fields (olfactory, visual/light, olfactory/cultic, economic) to refer to the ministry amplifies this question. For readers, the effect of these simultaneous evocations is that they can no longer rely on their "old knowledge" of Paul's ministry or of these images which, for them, belonged to different and discrete semantic contexts. They are teased into looking for the semantic framework that Paul sets up as the context in which the ministry and these four images can be understood to belong together.

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[22] From a semiotic perspective, difficulties in interpretation are not due to a lack of meaning but rather to the ambiguity brought about by a surplus of meaning, i.e., the reader's inability to discern the few connotations which participate in the meaning effect among the great number of possible connotations available in the "cultural encyclopedia" of the time.

[23] The contrasting parallelism with 7:4 suggests the latter reading as we noted. But, here, we adopt the attitude of first time readers.

This "semantic framework" is, so to speak, the point of view of Paul as enunciator. We refer to dimensions of meaning that semiotics identifies as actualizations of the semio-narrative structures, and especially the micro-semantic universe which establishes the semantic identity of the enunciator.[24] In religious vocabulary, as I have argued elsewhere, one can speak of the system of convictions of the author.[25] One can understand what convictions are and how they are expressed in a discourse without introducing the technical terminology. Since convictions provide the meaning of the author's life and his/her identity, the author cannot accept the possibility of being misunderstood on these points. Consequently, he/she specifies them by also expressing *what he/she does NOT mean to say*. In other words, convictions are most directly expressed and underscored through *oppositions*. We can be more specific. Since, as self-evident truth, convictions have the power to drive believers *to act in certain ways*, the oppositions which most directly express the convictions of a text are associated with *oppositions of actions*.[26] Thus, in brief, by identifying and studying the oppositions of actions, one elucidates the main convictions which most directly express the point of view of the author as enunciator, and which provide the semantic framework for a discourse. These convictions are also expressed in terms of the readers' presumed views (and thus more indirectly) by the rest of the text, including its metaphors.

The readers are thus led by this series of metaphors to look in these verses for at least some preliminary clues concerning the semantic framework of this discourse. Paul provides such clues by underscoring two complex points that he makes by setting up two oppositions of actions: he opposes "those who are being saved" to "those who are perishing" (2:15, an opposition further expressed elliptically in 2:16) and "peddling God's word" to "speaking in Christ" (2:17). Let us study these oppositions.

2 Cor. 2:15–16a.

The first opposition ("being saved" vs "perishing") underscores that Paul does not speak in the abstract about all those who are saved or perish, but more specifically about those who are affected by his ministry.[27] What is at stake is Paul's ministry and the way it affects people. In 2:15a Paul claims that his ministry is acceptable to God, since he and his companions are an "acceptable burnt offering (*euōdia*) of Christ to God." In these verses taken by themselves, it does not seem that the cultic (or sacrificial) connotation is kept as a whole; yet two connotations associated with the cult are kept. Since those who are saved are "acceptable" to God (by contrast with those who are perishing), by implication the ministers as *euodia* are also acceptable to God. Furthermore, one can say that these

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[24] Each of these technical terms is explained in the two volume work of Greimas and Courtes cited in note #1.

[25] See D. Patte, "The Interface of Semiotics and Faith; Greimas's Semiotics Revisited in Light of the Phenomenon of Religion," *Recherches Sémiotiques/Semiotic Inquiry*, II, 2, 1982; *Paul's Faith and the Power of the Gospel*, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983, pp. 7–27; *The Gospel according to Matthew*, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987, pp. 4–11.

[26] This is the "polemical structure" of a discourse, a feature of the semio-narrative syntax.

[27] The eschatological connotation that these phrases have, as Kummel notes, do not seem to play any role here. There is no opposition which would underscore that not understanding the eschatological character of the ministry would be missing the author's point. Thus, although this connotation is available for these phrases, it does not participate to the point the author makes.

ministers are acceptables to God because, as the smoke of a holocaust rises toward God, they are themselves "oriented toward God," *tō theō*[28] (the validity of this connotation is confirmed by the fact that the text underscores "orientations" in the following verses, and first in 2:16, *ek . . . eis*). Thus, this metaphor evokes the ministry of *"good" ministers primarily oriented toward God.* This ministry affects people in different ways. The same ministry—the ministry oriented toward God—brings death to those who are perishing and life to those who are being saved (2:16).

In brief, Paul's ministry has two contradictory effects. Since in both cases it is a "good" ministry of persons aiming at serving (ministering to) God, another factor causes this ministry to have contradictory effects. That which makes the difference is expressed by the phrases *"osmē ek thanatou"* and *"osmē ek zōēs"* (2:16). When the ministers[29] and their ministry are associated with (originate in) death, they bring about death (people are perishing); when they are associated with (originate in) life, they bring about life (people are being saved).

For readers, this opposition raises a basic question: Why does Paul and his ministry bring about these contradictory results? The readers can indeed find the answer to this question, yet only tentatively at this point. Since Paul claims to be a "good" minister before God (*euōdia tō theō*), could it be that his association with death (*as osmē ek thanatou*) or with life (*as osmē ek zōēs*) be *merely the perception*[30] that either "those who are perishing" or "those who are being saved" have of Paul?[31] For readers, especially for antagonistic readers, this remains a question, since there might be another possibility: Paul might not be as good a minister as he claims to be. For them, it is also possible that his ministry has these contradictory results because (at times) it actually originates in death and thus becomes deadly. The contradictory effects would then result from the fact that Paul does not have the appropriate "competence," or more precisely that he has a "bad competence" (originating in death).

2 Cor 2:16b.

Paul fuels the ambiguity of the preceding statements by asking a rhetorical question which, in line with this latter possibility, focusses on the issue of the competence of the minister: "And who is equal (*bikanos*) for these things?" Paul presupposes the latter antagonistic reading and confronts it so as to make it impossible. Yet the rhetorical question also implies that one should not consider oneself competent for such a ministry. In oneself, nobody is "equal" for such a ministry; such a competence must be received from God.

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[28] Against Bultmann who follows Weiss, *to theo* cannot be viewed as a gloss. At any rate there is not textual evidence for this view.

[29] Here *osme* refers to Paul and his companions (against Barrett).

[30] This interpretation is further confirmed by the fact that both in 2:14 and 2:16 *osme* seems to be a designation of the ministry as related to those who are receivers of this ministry, and thus *from the perspective of those who are ministered to.* By contrast *euodia* is used as a designation of the ministry (and ministers) in absolute terms (as they relate to God).

[31] See Collange, pp. 35–36. Our interpretation differs from that of Collange only in that we formulate it as a question rather than as an affirmation. My claim is that the meaning effect of 2:15–16 *for readers* is not yet fully clarified, and therefore remains a question. Paul sustains this ambiguity in 2:16b and in 2:17 as well as 3:1–6.

2 Cor 2:17.

The opposition between "peddling God's word" and "speaking in Christ" underscores that Paul has the right kind of competence and clarifies its characteristics by contrasting the "peddlers of God's word" with Paul who is qualified as acting "out of sincerity" (*ek eilikrineias*) and also *ek theou*, that is, out of (something from) God, as well as "before God" and "in Christ." This contrast makes it clear that the difference between "the peddlers" and Paul concerns their respective *motivations*. Two issues are underscored. First, the motivation must have the proper *orientation* (or proper goal): rather than a motivation which leads to acting for one's profit (the economic connotation of *kapēleuontes*) and thus greedily, the proper motivation is to act (speak) for the sake of God, that is, "before God" (*katenanti theou*):[32] they are oriented toward God (cf. 2:15, *euōdia tō theō*). Second, the motivation is "*sincere*" when it has its *origin in God:* in such a case the goal of the action, preaching God's word, and its origin fit each other. They are "equal," appropriate for each other (cf. 2:16b, *hikanos*). It then appears that, by contrast, peddlers have a motivation which has a human origin, and therefore which is "not fitting" the preaching of God's word, "crafty" (a connotation of *kapēleuontes*), and "not sincere," since its origin is in tension with the goal of the action.

In all this, it is important to keep in mind that here Paul refutes an anticipated misinterpretation of his preceding point. Through a first opposition Paul affirms that *his ministry has both negative and positive effects:* it brings death to those who are perishing as well as life to those who are being saved. For Paul it is so because of the attitude of people toward his ministry—his ministry brings death to those who consider that its origin is death. In other words, *the negative effects of his ministry have nothing to do with the intrinsic quality of his ministry,* that is, with his competence.[33] But, if his readers are antagonistic, they will reject this view, and claim that the failures of his ministry result from some defect in Paul, his "bad competence." So he underscores that his competence, and more specifically his motivation, is indeed good. In so doing, he defines *the nature of the motivation (competence) of true ministers of God's word:* it must be characterized both by a proper orientation (toward God) and a proper origin (it is from God and thus "sincere").

We can then recognize that the metaphor of the "acceptable burnt-offering" (*euodia*) refers to this essential characteristic of a "sincere" ministry and of the ministers (and their competence); they must be oriented toward God, as a burnt-offering goes up toward God. The cultic/sacrificial connotation is, therefore, an intrinsic part of Paul's argument. Paul does not expect that this statement concerning his "good competence" will suffice to convince antagonistic readers. Consequently, in 3:1–3 he continues arguing this point.

3.3 2 Cor. 3:1–3.

3:1a.

In the preceding verses Paul presupposed antagonistic readers. He continues doing so

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[32] And "in Christ," a phrase which is not clarified by this verse. As the rest of the discourse suggests, it means that the minister needs to be Christ-like; cf., for instance, "carrying in the body the death of Jesus . . . so that the life of Jesus may be manifested in our mortal flesh," 4:10–11.

[33] Conversely, we could say that the success of his ministry does not depend on Paul's competence. We can then recognize that this is the point expressed in 2:15 and by the metaphor of the triumphal procession; it now appears that in this procession God is the triumphant general, and Paul a prisoner in chains.

in 3:1a through a rhetorical question which anticipates that his readers might have interpreted 2:14–17 as a "self-commendation." He also expresses (by *palin*) that he has good reasons for anticipating such an interpretation; he has already been accused of "self-commendation."

Through this question, the argument moves from the issue of the "nature of a ministers' competence" to that of "*the way of recognizing the validity of a ministers' competence*." Self-commendation could be viewed as a way of making people recognize the validity of one's ministry. Yet Paul anticipates that, for his readers, self-commendation does not establish the validity of someone's competence, but rather signals that the minister's competence is inappropriate. By this rhetorical question, Paul denies that he is commending himself, and thus simultaneously implies that he agrees with his readers; he also rejects self-commendation. This interpretation is confirmed by the semantic context that Paul has set before introducing this issue. Following 2:17, the *self*-commendation mentioned in 3:1a is seen as duplicating the orientation *toward the self* (for one's own profit) and the origin *in the self* (or at least in human beings) of the motivation of "peddlers of God's word!" Peddlers would commend themselves.

3:1b.

For the Corinthians, since "*self*-commendation" can in no way be the proof of the validity of someone's ministry, "letters of recommendation" *by others* provide such a proof. The antonym of "self-commendation" is, for them, "recommendation by others." Consequently, they not merely receive (and accept) but also write such letters as Paul suggests (*pros bymas ē ex bymōn*).

Through the opposition contrasting "Paul not needing letters of recommendation" and "others who need such letters," Paul denies that letters of recommendation constitute an appropriate proof of the validity of his or anybody's ministry any more than "self-commendation" does.[34] This opposition raises the question: Why is it that Paul does not need such letters? Since he agrees with the Corinthians that "self-commendation" is a mark of the false preachers' self-centered ministry, should he not also agree that letters are the appropriate way for establishing the validity of someone's ministry? The juxtaposition of 2:17 and 3:1a has already shown that self-commendation is to be rejected because it is in contradiction to the divine orientation and origin of Paul's ministry. We can anticipate that a validation of his ministry by other human beings (by means of letters) is rejected as inappropriate for the same reason. God alone can provide the validation of a ministry which is sincere only when it has a divine orientation and origin. This is what Paul expresses in 3:2–3.

3:2–3. Preliminary observations. Once again the discourse becomes highly figurative. Now, the term "letter" metaphorically refers to the Corinthians; furthermore, this letter is written on "our hearts"[35] (3:2). The metaphor of a "letter written on hearts" alludes to

[34] Consequently, Paul certainly did not use letters of recommendation for his own benefit (with Lietzmann, against Barrett). From the perspective of the Corinthians (as presented by Paul) for whom letters of recommendation and self-commendation are antonyms, the only possible conclusion is that, since he did not use such letters, he commended himself. Thus they accused him of self-commendation, not because he was actually doing so (as Collange, p. 45, suggests), but because they *believed* he did so.

[35] The reading which, as we shall see, must be kept despite the variants.

biblical texts such as Jeremiah 31:33, as becomes clear in 3:3. Thus, this metaphor should be interpreted in terms of connotations drawn from the biblical texts to which it alludes. Nevertheless, we should not neglect the connotations that the context in Paul's discourse also provides; this new metaphor is a part of the metaphorical network that Paul is progressively setting up, as is marked by the use of themes and connotations we have already encountered. For instance, Paul says that the Corinthians are "shown to be" (*phaneroumenoi*, 3:3a, a passive verb evoking visual connotations —and divine agency expressed by the same verb in 2:14) "a letter from Christ[36] served" by Paul (*diakonētheisa* has here cultic connotations,[37] as *euōdia* had in 2:15). Furthermore, this "letter" is written with "the Spirit of the living God" (the theme of "life" found in 2:15 is now associated with God). These features signal that the "letter in our hearts" is related to preceding metaphors despite the apparent shift in topic.

These preliminary observations remind us that our interpretation needs to take into account that two conditions must be fulfilled for a metaphor to function as an effective rhetorical figure. On the one hand, it needs to evoke a series of potential connotations that readers can readily recognize on the basis of their "old knowledge" (here, their knowledge of scripture). On the other hand, and simultaneously, it needs to involve something "new" for the readers by emphasizing certain of these connotations and associating them with other semantic fields. The "newness" of the metaphor, which most directly expresses the author's point, is produced by the insertion of the metaphor in a specific semantic framework set up by the metaphorical network of the text and its oppositions. Consequently, the metaphors must be interpreted both in terms of the biblical texts (which serve as the reservoir of connotations without which the metaphor would not make sense), and in terms of this semantic framework (which determines the connotations actually participating to the meaning effect).

3:2–3.

The twofold opposition of 3:3b ("written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts") evokes for the readers many connotations that they presumably should recognize because of their knowledge of scripture. In effect, Paul declares that in him prophecies such as Jeremiah 31:33 ("I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts;" cf. also Ezekiel 11:29 and 36:26) are fulfilled.[38] Provided that it can be accepted as such, a fulfillment of prophecies in Paul's ministry would be an ideal prolongation of the preceding argument (cf. 2:14) in the sense that it would be a demonstration that God is at work in his ministry.

Yet, for readers, Paul's allusions to these prophecies can only be puzzling. According to Jer. 31:33, it was God's law which was supposed to be written on hearts; but Paul says that it is the Corinthians who are! How can Paul substitute, and thus implicitly equate, the Corinthians with God's law? Furthermore, by contrasting "tablets of stone" (which evoke the Law of Moses written on such tablets) to "tablets of human hearts" (on which the Corinthians are "written"), Paul suggests a contrast between the Law of Moses (to be

[36] The genitive *Christou* has to be interpreted as a subjective genitive, since Paul specifies that his role is merely to "serve" the letter.

[37] Since it involves "serving" something directly related to the divine, namely, the "letter of Christ" written with "the Spirit of the living God." Thus it is a "service" of God.

[38] On Paul's original combination of these prophecies with the concept of the tablets of the Law of Moses, see Collange, pp. 51–52.

rejected) and the Corinthians. This contrast makes sense only when it is understood as a contrast between the "old covenant" and the "new covenant." This theme is developed in the following verses. Yet, in 3:2–3, the identification of the Corinthians as that which is written on hearts is so incongruous that readers cannot but question it.[39]

We should not be surprised by all these tensions created by the text for the readers. A metaphor, when it really functions as such, goes beyond the readers' expectations, otherwise it would not bring about a new vision of reality. This is why this metaphorical passage must also be interpreted in terms of its immediate context in Paul's discourse, and not merely in terms of the readers' old knowledge that it evokes.

When one examines the opposition of 3:3 by itself and in its relations with what precedes in Paul's argument, its point appears. One recognizes that it primarily underscores why, according to Paul, the "letter written on our hearts" (the Corinthians) is the only true validation of his ministry, a validation which is neither self-commendation nor an actual letter of recommendation. The first part of the opposition underscores that since it is written by Christ (and with the Spirit of God), the "letter's" origin is the same as that of the competence (motivation) of a true minister: a divine origin rather than a human origin. In the same way as the origin (from God) and orientation (before God) of the motivation of a ministry must match (be "equal" to) the object of that ministry (God's word), so must the "letter" validating this ministry.

This point is further underscored through the evocation of Biblical texts showing that the writing of this "letter" on Paul's heart is the fulfillment of prophecies. In order to understand in which sense the Corinthians as written on Paul's heart are the fulfillment of Scripture, we first need to note that the Corinthians are end-results of Paul's service (*diakonētheisa hypb' hēmōn*). As such the Corinthians clearly manifest that the actual agent in Paul's ministry is not Paul (who only serves) but Christ ("letter from Christ") with "the Spirit of the living God." In brief, the Corinthians as end-results of Paul's ministry are the demonstration of the divine origin and orientation of Paul's ministry. Second, as noted above, for Paul the "letter" of validation is closely associated with the minister's motivation; locating it in the ministers' seat of motivation, their hearts,[40] is thus another way to express this same point. Yet note *what is now located in Paul's heart:* both a motivation which is "from God," and the Corinthians who, as end-results of Paul's "service," are also and primarily the fruits of God's activity. So to speak, Paul's heart contains both the source (motivation) and the end-results (the Corinthians) of his ministry, and all this is from God. Motivation and end-results fit together (are "equal" to each other). Then, we can understand why Paul substitutes the Corinthians for God's law (the paradigm for that which should motivate believers) as that which is written on hearts. For Paul, *the Corinthians as end-results of his ministry are semantic equivalent of this entire ministry and more specifically of the motivation from God (the paradigm of which is God's law)* that is the source of his ministry.[41] The prophecy of Jeremiah 31:33 is indeed fulfilled in Paul on whose heart the Corinthians are written.

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[39] It is this difficult reading that the variant *en tais kardiais hymōn* (3:2) seeks to overcome. Indeed, in this case, the Corinthians are no longer that which is written on hearts; they are the letter because this letter (whatever its content) is written in their hearts, and not any more because they are the content of the letter (that which is written),

[40] Among the many possible connotations of "heart," we can readily recognize that in the present context the connotation "seat of motivation" is certainly kept.

[41] This semantic equivalence can be conceived as a double metonymy: metonymy of the end-results with the ministry; and metonymy of the motivation with the ministry.

Another common connotation for "heart" (cf. 6:11–13) is "seat of affection and concern for other people." Although it is not emphasized here, this connotation becomes an open possibility:[42] the fact that the Corinthians are written on Paul's heart shows his affection and concern for them. Consequently, we can anticipate that the concrete manifestations of affection and concern of Paul for the Corinthians (cf. 6:11) would be a sign that they are "written in his heart."

3.4 2 Cor. 3:4–6.

These verses conclude the introduction as is clearly marked by the fact that the oppositions found in 3:5 and 3:6 underscore the two central themes of 2:14–3:3.

In 3:5–6a, by using three terms of the family of *bikanos* (already found in 2:16b), the opposition underscores that the origin of Paul's competence is not to be found in himself but in God—a point already made in 2:17. Simultaneously, it emphasizes that this is the competence of "ministers of a new covenant" (3:6a). Thus, Paul's competence is also associated with the "letter written on hearts" (3:2–3), the Corinthians as both the end-results and the motivation/competence of his ministry.

Consequently, the opening phrase of 3:4, "such is the confidence that we have," refers both to the confidence that he has because his competence has a divine origin (2:17), and to the confidence that he has because of the Corinthians as "letter written on his heart" (3:2–3).[43] Then it becomes clear why Paul can speak of his confidence in (openness toward) the Corinthians in the conclusion (7:4a). His confidence in his God-given competence is intrinsically linked with the Corinthians. In brief, if Paul could not have confidence in the Corinthians, they would not be a "letter written on his heart," and thus he could not have the confidence that his competence is "from God" (*ek tou theou*, 3:5b) "through Christ" (*dia tou Christou*, 3:4) and oriented toward God (*pros ton theon*, 3:4b).

In 3:6, the opposition between "the written code kills" and "the Spirit gives life" introduces the following development (3:7–18) which contrasts the ministry of the Mosaic covenant with the ministry of the "new covenant." Yet, it also concludes the preceding development by underscoring once again the contrast between two opposite outcomes of a ministry, death and life (2:16a). Furthermore, we find here again cultic connotations expressed by the term *diakonos* (3:6; cf. 3:3, and the term *euōdia* in 2:15) used once again to refer to a service of God (of the covenant of the Spirit). Yet, the original point that a "good ministry" as *euōdia* can have both death and life as outcome (2:15–16a) is left out (as it is since 2:16b). The emphasis is on Paul's ministry *for the Corinthians*, that is, some of "those who are saved," and on the fact that a ministry which has a competence with a wrong origin (not from God) brings death. Since Paul's competence is from God, a letter written on hearts "by the Spirit of the living God," his ministry among the Corinthians is the ministry of "a new covenant" which gives life to the Corinthians (and thus has no ill-effect for them, 7:2).

3.5 The Main Thematic Features of The Introduction (2:14–3:6).

In sum, the central problem raised by the introduction (2:14–3:6)—a problem that Paul anticipates will concern his readers (that which he perceives to be the major issue in their

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[42] As we shall see, this possibility will be realized in the conclusion.

[43] By contrast with most commentators who argue that 3:4 should be interpreted as referring either to 2:17 (so Strachan, Godet, Windisch) or to 3:2–3 (so Plummer, Hughes, Collange).

polemics against him) and that he proposes to resolve by his argument—concerns *Paul's ministry as having both negative (death) and positive (life) effects upon people* (2:15–16). He does not deny that this is the case. Yet he challenges his readers' anticipated contention that the failures of his ministry are due to some kind of deficiency related to his competence or motivation (2:17). Indeed, he affirms (with his readers) that a ministry characterized by a "bad" competence ("the letter," *gramma*, 3:6, i.e., a competence "not from God") brings death. But this is not the case of his ministry, characterized as it is by a God-given competence ("the Spirit," 3:6, i.e., a competence "from God"). Consequently, we can also say that the central problem raised by the introduction concerns *the Corinthians' negative evaluation of Paul's ministry as having negative effects for people (and especially the Corinthians themselves) because it is governed by bad motivations.*

Paul's aim is therefore to convince his readers that this negative evaluation of his ministry is wrong. For this, their basic view of the ministry needs to be transformed. Ultimately, Paul must convince them that a true and faithful ministry in Christ has both positive (bringing life) and negative (bringing death) effects (2:16a), by contrast with their view that it should only have positive effects. Indeed, he must also convince them that it has such an effect on both ministers and believers who, consequently, are "to die together and to live together" (7:3c). But, before they can accept this view, he needs to lead them to abandon other views. He needs to convince them that their view of the role of the ministers' motivation in what happens in a ministry is somewhat distorted. It is not as central as they might think. God (or Christ) is the actual agent to whom the positive effect of this ministry needs to be attributed. Conversely, the negative effects of a ministry are not necessarily to be attributed to the ministers and their competence. Therefore, the basis for evaluating the minister's competence should be whether or not this competence is "equal" (*bikanos*) to God's work, and thus whether or not it is received from God. For this evaluation, letters of recommendation are as inadequate as self-commendations. Rather, one needs to consider that which is written on the ministers' hearts where both their motivations and the end-results of their ministry are inscribed. Since the end-results of a ministry (believers) fit together with (are "equal" to) its motivation, if one discovers that the end-results are from God, one has then the proof that the ministers' motivation is from God. When they will have adopted all these views, the Corinthians, as end-results of Paul's ministry and as readers, will hopefully be in a position to recognize that God was at work among them through Paul's ministry, and that this ministry had a positive effect for them, and thus no ill-effect (7:2).

4. The Conclusion, 6:11–7:4.

4.1 Preliminary Observations.

We noted that one of the central characteristics of the overall theme of 2:14–7:4 is a shift of focus; from a focus upon the minister (in the introduction) to a focus upon the believers (in the conclusion). This shift, that we recognized in 6:11–13, finds expression in a series of contrasting parallelisms between 2:14–3:6 and 7:2–4. Yet, one strongly emphasized point of the introduction is not found in 7:2–4—namely, that the competence of a minister is proper only when, both in its origin and its orientation, it is "equal" with (*bikanos*), matches, or fits the minister's vocation, that is, the fundamental character of the ministry as "cultic (*euōdia*) ministry (*diakonos*) of God's word." If our identification of the pattern formed by the contrasting parallelisms is correct, we should find in the conclusion a similar point concerning believers. It does not take long to recognize that 6:14–7:1 emphasizes this very point: 6:14–16 repeatedly underscores through a series of rhetorical questions that faithful believers cannot be "mismated" with that which is not "equal" to

their vocation; thus they should not be mismated with "unbelievers" (*apistoi*).

This observation suggests that 6:14–7:1 belongs to the conclusion, and fits well into it, despite all the studies which, for one reason or another, argue that it does not belong here in Paul's text, or even that it is a later, non-Pauline insertion. Yet, these studies raise quite appropriately the question of the relationship between 6:11–13 and 6:14–7:1. Is not the case that this latter passage disrupts the logical flow of the argument that otherwise would exist between 6:11–13 and 7:2–4? This question cannot be ignored. Yet, at the outset, we need to note that it is poorly formulated. These exegeses are primarily concerned with the *logical flow of the argument* and neglect that, as we noted regarding the introduction, Paul's argument is not primarily governed by an argumentative logic,[44] but rather by a *metaphorical way of thinking.*[45] We can therefore anticipate that the same kind of metaphorical way of thinking also governs the conclusion.[46]

By taking into account Paul's metaphorical way of thinking and the relationship of 6:11–7:4 with the rest of the discourse, we propose to show the coherence and unity of this entire passage (including 6:14–7:1) and how it functions as the conclusion of the discourse. In brief, 6:11–7:4 forms a complete discursive unit, with an introduction (6:11–13) in which an issue is posited, a conclusion (7:2–4) where the same issue is restated in a new way, and a "body" (6:14–7:1) which justifies the statement of the introduction and prepares the readers for the new formulation of that issue in the concluding verses. 6:11–13, introduces this unit by providing the basis for the exhortation, "In turn, you also, be wide open" (6:13). Note that the text does not specify *toward whom* the Corinthians should be open;[47] the issue is "openness" in general, as characteristic of their life as believers. Yet, an essential condition for being "open" is "not being mismated with unbelievers" or positively, being "saint." So a second section is introduced by the exhortation, "Do not be mismated with unbelievers" (6:14a) and concluded by a call to holiness (7:1), the body of that section supporting this twofold exhortation. In the process, a transformation of the exhortation has also taken place: rather than applying merely to the Corinthians (6:14a), it applies to both Paul and the Corinthians (cf. 7:1). Then, in the third section (7:2–4), the exhortation to openness can be repeated and specified. It is a call to be open toward Paul: "make room for us" (7:2a). The further justification of this new form of the exhortation leads to the concluding expression of joy. Such is the thesis I propose to demonstrate.

4.2 2 Cor. 6:11–13.

We have discussed how these verses reverse the focus of the discourse: from a focus upon ministers (6:11) to a focus upon believers (6:13). We now note that in 6:12 Paul sets

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[44] An argumentative or discursive *syntax*, in semiotic terminology.

[45] According to semiotic terminology, its organization is primarily governed by the discursive *semantics*. This is not denying the role of the discursive syntax; even in the most highly figurative discourses (such as poetry) a semantics is necessarily also expressed syntactically. Yet one needs to weigh the respective roles of semantics and syntax in the unfolding of each discourse.

[46] We must also remember that as conclusion 6:11–7:4 includes features directly related both to the body of the discourse and to the introduction.

[47] The absence of the mention that the Corinthians should be open "toward Paul" is all the more surprising that it is "in return" (*tēn de autēn antimisthian*) of the openness of Paul toward them that they must be open.

up an opposition: "you are not confined by us, but you are confined in your own affections (*en tois splagchnois hymōn*)" (6:12). First, this opposition underscores that "openness" (and not "confinement") should be a characteristic of believers as it is a characteristic of Paul (6:11). We can now recognize that this essential point is repeatedly expressed about Paul's ministry throughout the discourse as a kind of leitmotiv, even though it is expressed in different ways. Openness and confidence are first alluded to in 2:14 ("everywhere") and in 3:2 ("read by all people"); then more explicitly expressed in 3:4 ("having this confidence," *pepoithēsin de taiautēn echomen*) and 3:12 (Paul's openness, *parrēsia*, by contrast with Moses' veiled ministry); and further expressed in different ways in 4:1–2, 4:6, 4:16, and 5:6.[48] We can also note that this openness of Paul is expressed both in the opening of the conclusion (6:11) and in its last verse (*parrēsia pros hymas*, 7:4). The opposition emphasizes that "openness" should also be a characteristic of (faithful) believers.

Second, the opposition of 6:12 contrasts two possible *origins* of confinement: Paul or the Corinthians themselves. Paul denies that he is the origin of the Corinthians' confinement. This affirmation is readily understandable when we keep in mind the metaphorical reasoning we found in 2:14–3:6, according to which all the features of a ministry (minister's competence, object of the ministry, effects on people) are so closely interrelated that each feature reflects the same basic characteristics as the entire ministry.[49] According to this metaphorical way of thinking, since Paul's ministry is characterized by "openness" (on the part of the minister), its effect on people cannot be "confinement." To understand that this is indeed Paul's reasoning, remember that Paul first mentions "openness" in 2:14 and 3:2 in the process of showing that the effects of a ministry are directly related to the character (origin, orientation) of this ministry. A ministry which finds its origin in the "*living*" God and is oriented toward this God (3:3) is the only kind of ministry which can bring *life* to people (3:6). According to the same reasoning, an "open" ministry is the only kind which can bring "openness" to believers; its effect cannot be to "confine" believers. Thus, Paul affirms: "You are not confined by us." Since the "confinement" of believers cannot result from an "open" ministry such as Paul's, the Corinthians' confinement must have another origin. One of the possibilities is that the origin of the Corinthians' confinement be in themselves: "you are confined in your own affections."

In order to access the significance of this statement, we need to ask: Why did Paul choose this possibility rather than another one? Keep in mind that the issue of the Corinthians' confinement is an aspect of the issue of the *effects of a ministry upon believers*. In this broader perspective, the affirmation of 6:12 expresses that believers are responsible for the ill-effects that a good ministry has for them. This affirmation in the conclusion is, of course, prepared and supported by preceding parts of the discourse; otherwise Paul could not hope that it would be accepted by his antagonistic readers. Let us consider its place in the overall discourse.

One of the major points of the Corinthians' polemics against Paul is that his ministry has detrimental effects for them; they accuse him of having such detrimental effects because of some basic defects in his "competence." That such an accusation is a major

[48] In 4:1–2 *egkakeo*, being weary, losing heart, is clearly contrasted to "openness" to everybody, and thus takes the connotation of "being confined." Thus, when Paul uses this verb in the negative both in 4:1 and 5:16, he expresses that he "is not confined," and thus "open."

[49] Consequently, as we noted, each of these aspects can serve as a metonymy for the entire ministry.

concern for Paul is shown in that, as late as 6:3, he still emphasizes: "We put no obstacle in any one's way (*mēdemian en mēdeni didontes proskopēn*), so that no fault may be found with our ministry." We noted that in the first part of his defense—in order to establish a common ground which will serve as a basis for his argument—Paul expresses that he shares with the Corinthians their view that a ministry governed by "bad competence" would have negative effects upon people. Thus, he defends himself by emphasizing that his "competence" is from God (2:17–3:6). Yet, Paul also expresses in 2:16 that his "good" ministry has "bad" effects upon people: he is "to one a fragrance of death to death, to other a fragrance of life to life." In 2:14–3:6 Paul does not develop this point according to which people who have been the beneficiary of a good ministry can still suffer "detrimental effects" (death, but also possibly confinement) from such a good ministry. Yet, this point is once again expressed in 4:3: "And even if our gospel is veiled, it is veiled only to those who are perishing."

This latter verse is directly relevant for our understanding of 6:12 and of the issue of openness/confinement, because the situation of people for whom the gospel is "veiled" (4:3) is presented as a "confinement," since it is contrasted with the "freedom" (*eleutheria*) of those for whom the Gospel is "unveiled" (3:17–18). These verses belong to the concluding part of a section which in 3:7–13 begins with a discussion of the opposite competencies and effects (3:6) of the ministries of Moses and Paul. A first reason for the fact that the ministry of the "letter" (*gramma*) kills (3:6) is that Moses veiled the *doxa*.[50] As a ministry characterized by a good competence (from God; the unveiled *doxa;* the Spirit) brings about positive effects for believers (life, 3:6), so a ministry characterized by a bad competence (figurativized by Moses "putting a veil over his face," 3:13) brings about ill-effects for believers. This is the same kind of argument we found in 2:17–3:6. But in 3:14 the focus shifts toward the believers. It is now because of a veil upon their hardened minds (3:14–15) that the ministry has an ill-effect for them. Indeed, one could trace the origin of this veil upon their minds to Moses (3:14) of to the "god of this world" (4:4), yet it remains that the cause for the ill-effects of a ministry for those who are perishing is most directly *located in themselves* (be it in their "minds," *ta noēmata autōn*, 3:14 and 4:4, in their "hearts," *epi ten kardian autōn*, 3:15, or in the seat of their emotions, *en tois splagchnois hymnōn*, 6:12). Thus the Corinthians are like the "Israelites" described in 3:14–15, like "those who are perishing" in 4:3, and like the "unbelievers" in 4:4. It is, therefore, in the "logic" of this previous argument that Paul emphasizes in 6:12 that ill-effects (here, confinement) in the believers' experience result from defects *in the Corinthians themselves* rather than in Paul and his ministry. This also explains the shift from a focus upon ministers (6:11) to a focus upon believers and their responsibility regarding the relation ministers/believers (6:13).

4.3 How 6:11–13 is Related to 6:14–7:1.

Now we can ask: Are there any relations between 6:11–13 and 6:14ff? Could it be that 6:11–13 is related to 6:14ff according to the same metaphorical way of thinking? In order to address these questions, we need to consider further the rest of the discourse. As we have noted in passing, in 3:7–4:6 the issue of the ill-effects of a ministry for those who are perishing is related to the issue of the "openness" of Paul's ministry. In 3:12–14 Paul contrasts the "veiled ministry" of Moses (a ministry "confined," closing out the Israelites)

[50] A complete analysis of 3:7–13 shows that, despite "quantitative" differences (3:7, the "fading" *doxa*), both ministries are characterized by *doxa* (3:9–11).

with the "*parrēsia*" of Paul's ministry, a term which expresses its "openness" toward the public (as we noted regarding 7:4). Furthermore, in 4:6 we read that God "has shone in our hearts to give the light (*pros phōtismon*) of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ." This highly metaphorical verse is directly related to the metaphorical expression of the "openness" of Paul's ministry to everybody in 2:14 (cf. also 3:2 and 4:2).[51] In all these cases, Paul underscores that this openness is directly associated to a *competence with divine origin and orientation.*[52] It is the openness of a faithful *cultic* ministry (cf. 2:15; 3:3; 3:6, where we found cultic connotations). In other words, a ministry which is faithful in that the minister's competence fits its fundamental vocation (its orientation toward God, a "cultic" vocation) is also "open." Similarly, regarding people affected by the ministry, hardened and veiled minds (3:14; 4:3–4) and a veiled heart (3:15) are contrasted with freedom (3:17), and thus with openness.

When we keep in mind the contrasting parallelisms of the conclusion as compared with the introduction (focus upon believers rather than upon minister), it follows that, for Paul's metaphorical way of thinking, "openness" on the part of the Corinthians would manifest that their "competence" and their vocation as believers are properly matched, as the minister's "openness" (2:14, 3:2, etc.) manifests that his competence (2:16b–17; 3:5–6) properly matches, through its divine origin and orientation, the *cultic* vocation (oriented toward God) of a faithful ministry. Conversely, *the Corinthians' confinement "in their own emotions" is symptomatic of the "mismatching" of their competence and of their vocation as believers.*

We now understand why, according to Paul's metaphorical way of thinking, a point regarding the "confinement" of the Corinthians (6:11–13) leads him to exhort them "not to be mismated with unbelievers" (6:14a). Their "confinement" manifests that their "competence" does not fit[53] their vocation to be oriented toward God, because their competence is neither "from God" nor oriented toward God, and is therefore related to ("mismated with") iniquity, darkness, Beliar, etc.

4.4 2 Cor. 6:14–7:1.

It has long been recognized that 6:14–7:1 is a self-contained passage. But even if one wants to argue that Paul borrowed it from some source,[54] as is suggested by its vocabulary (seven *hapax legomena*),[55] it must be emphasized that Paul made this text an integral part of *his* own discourse, as we have already begun to see. The fact that it is almost entirely composed of rhetorical questions and Biblical quotations[56] suggests that this passage has primarily a "discursive" (or rhetorical) function. This formal observation allows us to formulate a hypothesis concerning its origin. Indeed, "discursive" passages in a text

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[51] The light metaphor of 4:4 (and especially *pros phōtismon*) is directly related to the visual connotation found in 2:14 (*phanerounti*) also found in 3:2–3 (*phaneroumenoi*).

[52] The *doxa* mentioned in 4:6 in the phrase "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ" is directly related to the "competence from God," as a study of 3:7–4:6 would show.

[53] Cf. the terms of the family of *hikanos* in 2:16b and 3:5–6.

[54] Cf. J. A. Fitzmyer, "Qumran and the Interpolated Paragraph in 2 Cor. 6:14–7:1," *CBQ* 23 (1961), pp. 271–280; Collange, pp. 302–303, and the bibliography in notes.

[55] *Heterozygountes, metochē, symphōnesis, Beliar, Sygkatathesis, emperipatesō, molysmos,* and in addition a Pauline hapax, *pantokrator.*

[56] And that is does not contain any formal opposition of transformations (actions).

reexpress the main points of a discourse in terms of the presumed "old knowledge" of the readers so as to convince them of the validity of these points. Thus, rhetorical questions are questions that the author presumes the readers will answer correctly, because for them these answers should be self-evident. Similarly, quotations of scripture are presumed to be authoritative warrants for readers who are believers. Such discursive passages are even more convincing if they allude to, or are quasi quotations of, a teaching which readers consider to be authoritative. This is what Paul seems to do here; the ***hapax legomena*** and foreign concepts suggest that he uses a source or tradition that he presumes his Corinthian readers know and value. Thus, 6:14–7:1 might refer to the teaching of Paul's opponents in Corinth, a teaching that he uses against them. Yet, simultaneously, such discursive passages are integrated in the discourse of the author who eventually alters them to for his/her purpose. Consequently, such passages first need to be interpreted as any other part of the discourse, that is, primarily in terms of the rest of the discourse (the tradition or source provides a reservoir of connotations that Paul uses for his own purpose).

It does not take long to recognize that 6:14–7:1 is indeed a complete discursive sub-unit with an introduction, a central development, and a conclusion. Its theme is expressed in a first way by the introductory exhortation (6:14a) and in a contrasting way by the concluding verse (7:1). Its "body," formed by a series of five antitheses (6:14b–16b) and by a chain of biblical quotations (6:16c–18), both justifies the first formulation of the theme (6:14a) and leads to its second formulation (7:1).

2 Cor. 6:14a and 7:1.

The theme of this short passage appears when we compare the exhortations of 6:14a and of 7:1.[57] Both are calls to a life with characteristics appropriate for faithful believers. The contrasting parallelisms of 6:14a and 7:1 underscore two points.

The first contrasting parallelism concerns the separation from (or rejection of) "defilements." In 6:14a having as appropriate life is not being associated[58] with unbelievers; as they carry out their vocation, faithful believers should not cooperate with people who are not themselves faithful believers. In 7:1 the focus is no longer on the rejection of "external defilement" (unbelievers), but on the rejection of "internal" ("body and spirit") defilement (***molysmos***). The necessity of this progression appears when we remember that in 6:12 Paul has posited that the lack of openness of the Corinthians has its origin ***inside*** of them (***en tois splagchnois hymōn***). Paul expects that his readers will NOT be convinced by this point; Thus he underscores it by an opposition in 6:12 and further demonstrated it by 6:14–18 before restating it in 7:1. Conversely, Paul expects that the Corinthians will more readily accept the premise of his demonstration, namely that they should not be associated with unbelievers. At this point in our study, we can understand why this is the case. We have repeatedly noted that Paul assumes that his readers view any defect in their life as believers to result from a defective ministry, and especially Paul's ministry. Since

[57] With Prümm who underscores the importance of these verses as framework in the context of which 6:14b–18 must be understood.

[58] The verb ***heterozygeō*** first suggests an association "to do something together" (as two beasts working under the same yoke), that is, an association in the context of carrying out one's vocation as believers. It certainly also involves connotations related to inappropriate "mating" of beasts of different species (cf. Lev. 19:19), and thus possibly a connotation like "prostitution" which is itself related to "idolatry" (in the Hebrew Bible), a connotation which might be retained here since idols are mentioned in 6:16. But these latter connotations do not eliminate the pertinence of the former.

Paul hopes to have demonstrated that his ministry is not defective, and therefore that he is not the cause of their lack of openness, from the point of view of the Corinthians, other ministers, "unfaithful" ministers, must be the cause of their lack of openness. Paul, in agreement with this view, exhorts the Corinthians to separate themselves from such "unbelievers."[59] Yet, for him, this is primarily a way of leading to a more important point; he aims at convincing the Corinthians that they are also responsible for their own "defilement" (located in themselves) and must, therefore, cleanse themselves.

The second contrasting parallelism concerns the relation between Paul and his readers or, more generally, the relation ministers/believers. It is expressed by the shift from the second person plural form of 6:14a (*mé ginesthe*, "Do not be") to the first person plural of 7:1 (*kathatisōmen heautous*, "let us cleanse ourselves"). The preceding point already implied that, for Paul, the Corinthians have a wrong understanding of this relationship since they do not perceive that they, themselves, and not merely ministers, are responsible for their defilement. In 6:14a the relation ministers/believers[60] is presented as the relation of two groups with different status: ministers affect believers; believers can be either associated with (and thus affected by) or not associated with (not affected by) the ministers. For Paul, this view is correct (he affirms it by his exhortation); because of their role vis-a-vis believers, ministers have a different status. Yet, it is an incomplete view of this relationship; indeed, simultaneously, *ministers and believers have the same status.*[61] Both the minister Paul and the Corinthians ("we") need to cleanse themselves from "internal" defilement; both need to "make holiness perfect in the fear of God" (7:1); both need to be holy.

From our study of 2:14–3:6 we can readily understand that ministers need to be "holy": so that their ministry might truly be a "service" of God and before God, the ministers' competence needs to match the goal of this service. Since God is "holy," they must be "cleansed" and "holy,"[62] or at least strive toward such a holiness (strive to make holiness perfect). But, since believers must also be "cleansed" and "holy," does it not mean that their vocation is similar to that of the ministers? Is it not what is already suggested in a negative way by the use of the verb *heterozygeo* in 6:14a? Is not Paul suggesting once again (as we repeatedly noted in our study of other passages) that believers cooperate with ministers in their ministry? The validity of these suggestions will appear as we study how 6:14b–18 explains and justifies both 6:14a and 7:1.

2 Cor. 6:14b–16b.

Through their parallelism, the antithesis associate "unbelievers" (6:14a, term used again in 6:15) and "defiled" ministers and believers (7:1), with "lawlessness" ("iniquity," *anomia*), "darkness," "Beliar," "idols"; similarly, the Corinthians as (potentially) faithful and holy "believers" (7:1, cf. also 6:15) and faithful ministers (7:1) are associated with "righteousness" (*dikaiosynē*), "light," "Christ," "temple of God." This formulation of the relationship among the antithesis is meant to underscore that the text sets up *a series of homologations of different*

[59] Our analysis supports, therefore, the studies (e.g., Collange, against Barrett and Furnish) which identify these "unbelievers" with Paul's opponents, unfaithful ministers.

[60] We have noted that "unbelievers" refer to (bad) ministers.

[61] As the contrasting parallelisms between 2:14–3:6 and 6:11–13 and 7:2–4 have already suggested.

[62] See 6:6 where "purity" (*en hagnotēti*) and the "Holy Spirit" (*en pneumati agiō*) are complementary features of the competence of the faithful ministers.

semantic fields. The question is: What are the features that these different semantic fields have in common and through which they are held together?

6:14b.

The term *anomia* suggests that the first antithesis belongs to the ethical field. Yet we can be more specific by noting that it is opposed to *dikaiosynē*, a term also used in 3:9, 5:21 and 6:7. The ultimate result of the reconciliation through Christ is that "we [both ministers and believers] might become the righteousness of God" (5:21). In 6:7 righteousness is one of the main characteristics of the ministers' competence; such a competence fits the object of their ministry (their righteousness is the righteousness *of God*, and their ministry is a service *of God*). Furthermore, the ministry of the Spirit can be described as a "ministry of righteousness" (3:9), that is, as a ministry whose effect is to cause people to become righteousness of God,[63] by contrast with the ministry of the letter which brings condemnation and death. Consequently, in 6:14b, "righteousness" designates the competence that believers should have for faithfully carrying our their own vocation, and that they should have received through Christ and as a result of a faithful ministry. Yet it is noteworthy that 6:14b expresses that believers should have the same competence, "righteousness," as the ministers. Then, since for Paul a true competence necessarily fits one's vocation, the vocations of ministers and of believers, distinct as they might be (6:14a), are fundamentally similar.[64] This suggestion is supported by the following antitheses.

6:14c.

The same pattern is found in the second antithesis: "or what fellowship has light with darkness." As we noted, "light" is a connotation associated with the ministry of Paul in 2:14 and 3:3 (use of the verb *phaneroō*) and more explicitly in 4:6 where this "light" is directly related to the *doxa* of Christ. Since becoming righteousness of God (5:21) is equivalent to being transformed in the likeness of the glory of the Lord (3:18), we can readily recognize that, as was the case with "righteousness," "light" serves as a designation of both the competence and the effect of the vocation *of believers*, in the same way as it designates both the competence and the effect of the ministry *of ministers*.[65]

6:15a.

In Paul's metaphorical way of thinking, the second antithesis is naturally followed by the antithesis opposing Christ (characterized by his "light" or *doxa*, cf. 4:6) and Beliar (a name which can serve as a designation of the "god of this world," cf. 4:4).

6:15b.

This antithesis comes back to the main focus of the theme of 6:14–7:1, that is, to the

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[63] Or, as is expressed in 3:18, to be "transformed into this very image (the image of the glory of the Lord) from glory to glory." In other words, becoming "righteousness" is being transformed into the image of the Lord's glory. Note also that in 3:18 as in 5:21 (and 7:1) all this applies to both ministers and believers ("we").

[64] It follows from this parallelism between the competence and vocation of ministers and those of believers that *anomia* corresponds to the description of "bad ministers" as "peddlers of God's word" in 2:17 and 4:2.

[65] "Darkness" (also opposed to light in 4:6) similarly expresses a characteristic of both bad ministers and unbelievers, with an emphasis on the origin of this darkness in the "god of this world" which blinds the minds of unbelievers (4:4).

opposition "believers vs unbelievers," a necessary transition between the preceding antithesis and the next one.

6:16.

Regarding the final antithesis, "what agreement has the temple of God with idols?", we note that Paul identifies the "temple of God" with the faithful whether they are ministers or believers ("we"). In the case of ministers, we noted that Paul uses cultic metaphors or terms to designate his ministry (*euōdia,* 2:15, *diakoneō,* 3:3, *diakonia,* 3:6ff), in contexts in which he also emphasizes that it is divine (God, Christ) which is the actual agent in it. In other words, ministers who faithfully carry out their ministry are the *locus of divine manifestations;* their designation as "temple of the living God" expresses this same point. In view of the preceding homologations, one can then say that, similarly, believers who faithfully fulfill their vocation are also the locus of divine manifestations, that is, the "temple of the living God."

For certain commentators, this collective use of the designation "temple of God" is more reminiscent of the Qumran community and of its teaching than of Paul's teaching elsewhere, such as in 1 Cor. 3:16–17 and 6:19 where the individual believer is God's or the Spirit's temple.[66] Yet, in the context of a discourse where Paul emphasizes the parallelism of a collective ministry (the "we" to designate "ministers") with the believers and their vocation, this collective use of the metaphor "temple of God" is quite appropriate.[67]

2 Cor. 6:16b–18.

The repeated expression that the quotations are words of God ("as God said," 6:16, "says the Lord," 6:17, "says the Lord Almighty," 6:18) emphasizes that they are to be read as trustworthy warrants of the exhortations and "promises" (promises to be associated with righteousness, light, Christ, and to be the temple of God) contained in the preceding verses.

6:16b.

It has been recognized that this first part of the chain of quotations is inspired by Ezekiel 37:27 (LXX). The main transformation of the text [68] is the addition of *emperipatesō* (by combining Lev. 26:11–12 with Ez. 37:27). This addition has the effect of making the quotation express Paul's point more directly. Believers (and ministers) are the temple of God in that their ministry is the locus of God's *active* manifestation, where God "moves" (*emperipatesō*) and not merely where God "dwells" (*enoikesō*).

6:17–18.

The first part of 6:17 is based on Isaiah 52:11, although with several changes (order of

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[66] See B. Gartner, *The Temple and the Community in Qumran and the NT. A Comparative Study in the Temple Symbolism of the Qumran Texts and the NT,* Cambridge, 1965; Collange, p. 309.

[67] By contrast with many exegetical studies, such as that of Gartner, structural semiotics does not seek the coherence of Paul's views in the images, metaphors, and other figurative expressions of his letter. Such "figures" are discursive features of each discourse, and thus are formulated differently according to the presumed old knowledge of the readers and the points the author attempts to make in that specific discourse. Even "stock" images are used in different ways in different contexts.

[68] The other one being the transformation of the noun *kataskenosis* into the verb *enoikesó.*

the clauses). It warrants the exhortation to be separated from unbelievers (6:14a), and from iniquity (*anomia*, 6:14b).[69] The last clause of 6:17 is added from another text (possibly Ez. 20:41) and provides a transition from the exhortations to separation to "promises" (cf. 7:1), especially the prophecy of Nathan (2 Sam. 7:14) used as the basis for 6:18. The remarkably sex-inclusive formulation ("my sons and daughters") has the effect of emphasizing that God is in a special (parental) relationship with all believers, and not merely with people (wrongly) viewed as having a special status, such as ministers.

In sum, 6:14–7:1 conveys in the context of 2:14–7:4 that believers have a status similar to that of ministers. When they faithfully carry out their vocation as believers, they are the locus of God's manifestations, as Paul and other faithful ministers are. Thus, the main theme of the introduction concerning the fact that the competence of the ministers needs to fit (be equal to) their vocation (2:14–3:6) is now transposed to apply also to believers and their vocation. Consequently, the believers' attitude should be the same as that of ministers. All of them should cleanse themselves and be holy, since they share a cultic ministry.

2 Cor. 7:2–4.

We have discussed most of the features of this concluding passage. Only a few additional comments are necessary.

"Make room for us" (*Chōrēsate hemas*, 7:2a) reexpresses 6:13b (*platynthēte kai hymeis*), but with the significant difference that now Paul calls the Corinthians to be open *toward him* (rather than calling them to be open without mentioning toward whom). After showing that "openness" is a characteristic of his attitude toward the Corinthians (6:11), and that it should be a characteristic of their own attitude (6:12–13), Paul has shown that believers share with the ministers the same cultic vocation, and thus that they should have the same attitude. He is then, at last, in a position to affirm the reciprocal character of openness with the hope that his readers will accept his exhortation. As he is open toward them (6:11), so they should be open toward him.

In the following verse, Paul underscores[70] that the defense of his ministry (7:2) is not a condemnation, as his readers might have interpreted it, "for I said before that you are in our hearts" (7:3). A first reading of this statement might be that Paul could not have condemned the Corinthians because of his affection for them (by interpreting "I said before" as a reference to 6:11–13). Yet, for Paul, "you are in our hearts" has a much broader meaning, especially when one thinks of all the connotations found in 3:2 where he emphasized that the Corinthians are a letter written on his heart. Here in 7:3 this metaphorical statement expresses that they are inseparably associated with each other, because that are associated by bonds of affection, but also because their respective vocations and competencies are similar if not identical (6:14–7:1). Furthermore, in the same way as "the Corinthians in Paul's heart" contribute to establish Paul's faithful vocation (3:2–3), so "Paul in the Corinthians' heart" (because of their openness, 7.2a) would contribute to establishing their faithful vocation.

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[69] Note also that Isaiah 52:11 is addressed to priests, a point which Paul might or might not expect his readers to recognize.

[70] Paul sets up an opposition between what he has already said (*proeireka*) and what would be a misunderstanding of what he says (*legō*), namely that he expressed a condemnation.

The fates of believers and ministers are so closely intermingled that they shall die together and live together (*eis to synapothanein kai syzēn*, 7:3b). Our comparison of this statement with 2:15 led us to conclude that in 2:14–7:4 Paul presents the relationship of death and life (as effects of a ministry upon people) from three perspectives.

(1) Death (or death-like effects) can be the effect upon people of a false ministry. At this stage of the discourse, Paul hopes to have convinced his readers that this cannot have been the effect of his ministry, since it is a faithful ministry.

(2) Death (or death-like effects) can be caused by a faithful ministry because those affected by this ministry are "blinded by the god of this world" (4:4) and have hardened minds (3:14), a veiled heart (3:15), or confining bowels (6:12). While this was, in Paul's view, the situation of the Corinthians, he now envisions "ideal believers" who have cleansed themselves "from every defilement of body and spirit" (7:1). Death and death-like features of the experience of such ideal believers cannot have such an origin.

(3) It follows that, in the present context, death (or death-like situations, such as afflictions, 7:4) is to be, along with life (and life-like situations), a characteristic of faithful believers associated with faithful ministers. Since, as was demonstrated by 6:14–7:1, believers share the ministers' vocation, and thus should have the same competence, believers should expect to have an experience similar to that of ministers, itself an experience similar to that of Christ. Indeed, this experience is life-like; it involves freedom (3:17), being transformed into the likeness of the glory of the Lord (3:18, cf. 4:6), having the Spirit (5:5), becoming the righteousness of God (5:21), possessing everything (6:10). Paul does not need to emphasize this point for readers who believe that life is in them (4:12). But, for his readers who, Paul assumes, had the first of the three views of death, he needs to demonstrate that death-like situations are a necessary part of the experience of faithful believers. This is what he achieves by successively emphasizing: a) the faithful character of his own ministry (2:14–4:6); b) the death-like character of a faithful ministry (4:7–6:10, e.g., "carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our bodies," 4:10); c) and finally by demonstrating that ministers and believers share the same cultic ministry (6:14–7:1). At the end of such an argument, the readers hopefully should understand that, as faithful believers sharing this ministry with Paul, they should expect to share with him both death-like situations and life-like situations. Indeed, the Corinthians should be ready to say with Paul: "with all our affliction, [we are] overjoyed" (7:4). In brief, they should be ready to be Christ-like.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion of our study, it appears that in 2:14–7:4 Paul defends his ministry against his antagonistic Corinthian readers by attempting to convince them that what they viewed as detrimental effects of a false ministry on their experience (death-like situations) should in fact be viewed as marks of faithfulness; the marks of the faithfulness of his ministry, as well as the marks of the faithfulness of their own life as believers, if they are indeed faithful. The central theme of this discourse is, therefore, focussed on the relationship between ministers and believers. From Paul's perspective, the Corinthians' hostility toward him and his ministry is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of this relationship, ultimately based upon their lack of recognition that their vocation as believers is basically identical with the vocation of the minister. As Paul is, they should be a burnt-offering (*euōdia*) through which God (or Christ, or the Spirit) manifests the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ (cf. 2:14–15 and 4:6). Consequently, together with Paul they should be ready to die, manifesting in their bodies the death of Jesus, as well as to live, manifesting in their bodies the life and glory of Jesus the Christ.

Defining Rich and Poor Using Social Sciences

Paul Hollenbach
Iowa State University

"Blessed are you poor (ptochoi)." "But woe to you that are rich (plousiois)" (Luke 6:20,24). Do we understand *poor* and *rich* in these statements? Do we assume blithely that we understand them? Do we think it is easy to understand them? Do we think these terms have straightforward meanings, when actually there are severe pitfalls to giving them accurate definition? Most persons assume the former rather than the latter. To take two examples at random: Plummer (180) refers to "actual poverty" without defining the term except for the adjective. He refers us to his comments on Luke 4:18, but doesn't even mention *poor* or *poverty* at that point. More recently Caird (102) uses the term *poverty* without the slightest attempt at definition. He also refers without more ado to the "wealth . . . of the kingdom" which contrasts with "the world."

These and most other scholars interpret these terms and Jesus' use of them in this uncritical way partly because they assume that there is simple continuity between the ancient social context of Jesus' language and our modern social context. In this particular case they assume continuity of economic matters and meanings. But what right have they or we to make such assumptions? Sometimes there has been some awareness of the "strange new world of the Bible" (Barth), but this has most often been understood to mean theological strangeness. Recently, however, there has been a growing awareness of a much more comprehensive strangeness, a radical difference in character between ancient and modern societies. If this is indeed the case, it behooves us to use this new insight in order to arrive at more accurate and comprehensive interpretations of biblical texts. We should not repeat the failure, for example, of ancient historians indicated by M. Finley (noted below).

A clear example of such failure is M. Hengel's book on *Property and Riches in the Early Church*. Hengel seems totally oblivious to social science insights. Hence, ignoring the full cultural setting of possessions and riches in antiquity, he uses the term, private property, as the equivalent of possessions (1, 3, etc.), sees artisans such as Jesus as members of a "middle class" (27, 37), and views the liberation of slaves, remission of debts, and the redistribution of land as minimal reforms (8). The latter case especially shows Hengel's essentially theeological approach to the issues of possessions and riches: the basic problem is the "religious" one of the selfish nature of persons. Thus, e.g., Jesus addresses this problem essentially through a "free attitude to property" (26), i.e., by a Cynic-type renunciation of family and possessions (30). This solution is the whole of Jesus' "social" preaching and a basic cause of his condemnation and execution (30).

It seems consistent with Hengel's uncritical ethnocentrism that he is both naive about ancient cases of ideological masking (e.g., in Ecclus., 16–17), and patently ideological himself: Jesus did not use his parables "for the 'social protest' which is so beloved today" (28), while any instructive value that early Christianity might have for us today is subject to "many qualifications" (84, and all of chap. 12, "Ten Concluding Theses"). In particular, the need today is "constant reform" (87), not revolution. It is only to justify this social

philosophy that Hengel finally notes the relevance of the distinction between pre-industrial and industrial societies (84–88).

Very recently (1987), Pedrito V. Maynard-Reid has again defined poor and rich mainly, if not wholly, in economic terms. For example, in the synoptics, "the poor are those who lack the necessities and are oppressed, while the rich are those who have considerable possessions and wealth" (32). His failure to see the rich cultural character of poverty seems to be due to two factors: 1) In contrast to Echegaray (noted immediately below) Maynard-Reid does not see the non-capitalist character of ancient society. He constantly refers to "capitalistic organization" and the "policy of laissez-faire" (14, 15, etc.), despite his explicit warnings about imposing "a twentieth-century Western model upon a first-century Eastern culture" (3, 13). 2) Maynard-Reid also seems unaware of the modern anthropological tradition about ancient "economics" noted in section I of this essay. Despite his claim that "economic, ecological, political, cultural, educational, and religious factors are all intertwined" in ancient society (14), he maintains that economics (14, 18) and religion (19) can be treated independently of each other as well as apart from kinship or politics. These ambiguities mar an otherwise admirable attempt to place the letter of James in a richer social setting.

More recently, J.M. Ford and H. Echegaray do a much better job of definition because they utilize studies that attempt to describe the actual social conditions in Palestine. Ford, using a study of R. Horsley (1981) on social banditry, has some awareness of two "classes" at war with each other (1984: 4–6), though she also uses anachronistic terminology such as "anticlericalism" (3–4) and "purely religious movement" (97), with their implied ethnocentrist model of society (3–4). This lack of a clear model appropriate to ancient society leaves her usage somewhat ambiguous.

In contrast to these scholars Echegaray is explicitly aware of the dangers of ethnocentrism: "We shall not understand the society of Jesus' time if we think of it as resembling our own in all respects. This is implied when I speak of 'a non-capitalist mode of production' (1984:25). His use of an agricultural aristocratic-peasant model makes it possible for him to come close to the meaning of poor and rich given in this essay, namely, the poor and the rich as long-standing social castes, and the poor as any person from either class who has fallen into misfortune (24). However, the need still remains for the development and use of a much more explicit model.

I. A Model for Ancient "Economy"

It is not necessary here to point to very many of those recent scholars who have emphasized the strange world of ancient, including biblical, societies compared to modern ones. But it is profitable to mention a few prominent ones who have made it a special point of emphasizing the difference between ancient and modern especially with regard to economic matters.

Just as Polanyi "effectively brought economic anthropology into the limelight so far as ancient historians were concerned" (Carney: 224, note 1), to my knowledge it was Bruce Malina who was most influential in opening up for biblical scholars the world of cross-cultural anthropology and its significance for biblical interpretation. In addition to his book, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology*, to date the fullest systematic description of ancient Mediterranean culture as it relates to the Bible (cf. also, Osiek and Gilmore), Malina has published many articles on both general social science themes and particular topics. Perhaps the best short introduction to his work is the article in *Interpretation*. (One should also note his new book on using high level social science models.)

Perhaps Malina's most important lesson for us is his insistence that if our interpretation of biblical materials is directly relevant to today's world it is very likely inaccurate because it is ethnocentric and anachronistic. Thus, in order to be accurate it must be irrelevant to today's world because cross-cultural anthropology shows us the radical cultural difference between ancient and modern societies. This irrelevance does not necessarily imply unimportance, for that which is inimitable may very well still be instructive. In fact, our interpretation will likely be more instructive because the recognition of material and cultural differences between ancient and modern will force us to do our own critical analysis of our contemporary world in depth if we wish to make ancient traditions relevant.

The central importance of this contrast between ancient and modern is also emphasized by many others. A sample of their views especially as it relates to "economic matters," given in chronological order follows: Polanyi emphasizes the distinctiveness of the 19th century in the rise of the new "international economic system." "Only a madman would have doubted that the international economic system was the axis of the material existence of the race" (18). "Nineteenth-century civilization alone was economic in a different and distinctive sense, for it chose to base itself on a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, . . . namely, gain" (30). These, as well as other factors, such as the "market economy", "show the entirely unprecedented nature of such a venture in the history of the race" (43).

"The economic man familiar to moderns would have been a stranger in a strange land in antiquity" (Carney:224; this is the conclusion of Carney's 100-page long chapter on " 'Economics' in Antiquity").

"What did contemporary economists think" of the "economic system of antiquity"? "The answer we find is an interesting one: there were no contemporary 'economists' " (Heilbroner:37; see also 46). The reason was that "ancient society did not have an economic system" (Finley:22). What we would call economic aspects of life were always embedded in, i.e., subordinated to, either family or political structures (Heilbroner:36, 37).

Finley complains that a whole generation or more of anthropological work including the basic work of Weber, Polanyi, and others, was "all to little avail" (26) as far as ancient historians were concerned. "The pull on the historian of the capitalist, market-oriented economy" (49) led to the use of models that "tend to draw us into a false account of the past" (23). Central to this false account was the failure to see that economic matters were always subordinated to either family or political institutions (17ff, 26, 50). For example, the category "class" as understood in modern society cannot without significant redefinition be legitimately used for ancient society. The reason is that "the structuring of ancient society into castes and estates means that economic elements are *inextricably* joined to political . . . factors" (50, quoting G. Lukacs; emphasis in original).

Finally, and central to our effort to understand *poor* and *rich*, Malina emphasizes for us biblical scholars that there were only two basic "institutions" of which people in ancient societies were aware: kinship and politics. All other realities that we moderns perceive as quite separate and distinct such as education, religion, and economics, were embedded in *kinship* and *politics*. (This understanding is already present in these mentioned above: Polanyi: 46; Finley: 50; and Heilbroner: 37, 46; Carney: 149). "An embedded economy means that economic goals, roles, output, hiring, firing, planning and the like are determined by kinship or political considerations, either alone or primarily, and not on the basis of 'economic' considerations" (Malina, in a recent unpublished paper).

Briefly, *kinship* "refers to patterns of such social norms that regulate human relationships which are directly based upon" biological realities from birth to death (Malina 1981:94).

Especially important are marriage and family patterns and caring for the well-being of family members. The latter aspect will be especially important as we interpret biblical traditions about *poor* and *rich*.

Politics refers to gaining and exercising power to run society, and it is limited in the ancient world to the dominating aristocrats (generally about 5% of the population). Since peasants (about 95% of the population) have no power, there could be no political relations between them and aristocrats. The "only necessary link" between the castes was strictly one of domination, in which the peasants were exploited (in both the neutral and pejorative senses of that term) by the aristocrats. They were thus "two separate societies" not "two classes within the same society" (Kautsky:75; Carnry: 99), as, e.g., upper and lower classes of one society as in modern society. The reason is that peasants were not in any modern sense politically conscious or active. They had no sense of class conflict between themselves and aristocrats. Their consciousness was characterized by "wantlessness" (Carney:137, 198–99, 218). Hence, e.g., there could be no such thing as revolution in the modern sense; there could be only infrequent, spontaneous, unorganized, temporary riots and insurrections (Hobsbawn, and Guha). Mark 10:42–44 reflects this situation perfectly, and such arguments, e.g., as that between Brandon and Hengel, about Jesus being a revolutionary are thus spurious.

Exploitation requires two dominant activities on the part of aristocrats, taxation and warfare (Kautsky: chap. 7, "Governmental Functions of Aristocracy";Carney: chap. 5, "The Military and Society in Antiquity," and 61, 105, 120, 185, 191–92; 173, 236, 245–47, 252–53, 260–63; Finley: 54). Both of these activities are also basically political. It is especially important to see that taxation is not for the benefit of the whole population as one thinks of it (mostly!) in modern industrial societies. Rather it was purely and simply forcible expropriation of peasant "surplus" produce by aristocrats to serve the latter's own way of life of "conspicuous consumption." Likewise, military activity was strictly for the sake of expanding and maintaining the base of aristocratic exploitation so as to increase taxation so as to increase conspicuous consumption.

For peasants the highest values are local tradition and custom, work and family, while the highest virtues are passive obedience and submission to local authorities. Peasants live in their own small world, and may not even be conscious of regional or larger traditions and authorities. They may not even be aware of who the highest authorities are since their whole life is encompassed in family and village. Thus the "religion" of peasants is also usually different from the "religion" of aristocrats in that the former celebrates the basic values and virtues of the peasantry (Kautsky: 81, 161–164).

Another important element in this picture is that neither aristocrats nor peasants have any sense of unfairness about the reigning arrangements. Peasants generally see themselves as appropriately exploited by those who appropriately rule (Kautsky: 99–110, especially 102). Malina's description of the consciousness of "limited good" (1981, chap. 4; cf. also Heilbroner: 17 and 49) is essential for understanding peasant awareness: their lives were "determined and limited by the natural and social resources of their village" (75). Hence, peasants expected nothing other than existing conditions unless new ideas and opportunities arose from outside their immediate setting. So for example Gottwald describes the disturbing effect of deteriorating political structures and the introduction of Yahwism on an ancient Canaanite peasant population. One also thinks naturally of the disturbing effect the Old Testament prophets threatened to have on the peasant population. In the case of Palestine we shall have to take into account the disturbing nature of various strains of Jewish tradition, especially when combined with natural occurrences such as famines and social developments such as commercialization. (Another example is apparent in the

peasant society of contemporary Latin America, where Freire inspired a transformation of consciousness through educational coaching.)

Finally and more specifically, how are what we call "economic" matters handled within kinship and politics? "The answer is provided in the main by two principles of behavior not primarily associated with economics: *reciprocity* and *redistribution*" (Polanyi: 47; emphasis in original; cf. also, 47–55; and Carney: 166–175). *Reciprocity* took place within the "dominant economic unit in ancient society . . . ,the extended household . . ." (Carney: 149), while *redistribution* occurred within the larger units of society such as the large estates or the state itself.

Polanyi develops this aspect of the model clearly by using the example of the Trobriand Islanders: "reciprocity works mainly in regard to the sexual organization of society, that is, family and kinship; redistribution is mainly effective in respect to all those who are under a common chief and is, therefore, of a territorial character," i.e., of a political nature (47; cf. 47–53). Reciprocity thus is subordinate to maintaining the reputation and honor of the householder, while redistribution is subordinate to maintaining "the social system as a whole," i.e., to political stability. Polanyi concludes: "In such a community the idea of profit is barred. . . . The economic system is, in effect, a mere function of social organization" (49). This kind of "economic system" is not restricted to primitive or small communities, for as all these scholars agree, "all large-scale economies in kind were run with the help of the principle of redistribution" (Polanyi: 51; cf. Heilbroner: chap. 3: "The Pre-Market Economy").

This then is the basic pattern of life, especially of "economic matters," that existed in the partially commercialized Roman aristocratic-peasant society, including Jesus' Galilee.

II. Two Examples of Recent Biblical Scholarship Using Social Sciences

Let us take two recent examples of scholars who focus on the poor and see to what extent and how they use social sciences to understand poor and rich in Jesus' career. Schottroff and Stegemann properly insist that we must look at Jesus' whole world, not only "religion" but also all social relations including politics and economics. They intend to bring the "social historical dimension of Jesus' following more carefully into view" (14). They do this mainly through a social description of tax gatherers, sinners, prostitutes, beggars, and crippled people (15–28), all of which is very helpful for enriching our picture of these groups and persons, and for impressing upon us their dire human plight.

However, for our purposes, most important is the form of their basic question about the poor and their answer. Were there only a few poor people amidst a basically prosperous society or was a good part of the population poor (12)? Their answer is that first century economic conditions in Palestine were very bad and that widespread poverty of all sorts was caused by this structural economic situation (27–28). In short, the question of the poor is treated by them quantitatively and wholly in economic terms: there were large numbers of people in economic straits.

Jesus' responses to these many poor are two: 1) He blesses the poor and offers them hope with the promise of a complete reversal of their fortunes. 2) He begins to bring salvation to the poor, i.e., daily bread and drink, and healing of their illnesses. His ultimate aim is to end all need, a veritable utopia (32).

However, problems remain with Schottroff and Stegemann's formulations. Are there no people who are neither rich nor poor? What is the relationship of economic condition to political power and social status? How are the poor understood culturally e.g., in relation to honor and shame? Does the evil of poverty inhere simply in economic

condition, or is it related to such values as honor and shame? As far as I noticed, at only one point do Schottroff and Stegemann relate the poor and rich to "social position" (38), but the full character of that reality is not developed.

It is precisely at this point that we must turn to Malina's insights into first century life gleaned from cultural anthropology. Only in this way can we get a clearer picture of the social groups and social dynamics that form the setting of Jesus' movement, especially as it relates to poor and rich. He has heeded the warning of those mentioned above, and so in contrast to Schottroff and Stegemann, Malina does not see Galilee in terms of categories that characterize modern industrialized society, but rather in terms of ancient partially commercialized aristocratic-peasant society. We need Malina's qualitative approach to our issue in order to supplement Schottroff and Stegemann's quantitative approach.

We may begin to move in Malina's direction by noting how the poor are referred to in the gospels, especially how the poor are associated with other groups (Malina 1981:84–5). Chart one shows the results of this kind of analysis.

CHART ONE: GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POOR

	Luke 4:18	Matt 5:3ff//	Matt 11:5//	Luke 14:13,21	Luke 16:19-31	Mark 12:42-43//	(Matt 25:31-46)
captives (s)	x						x
blind (i)	x		x	x			
oppressed (s)	x						
mourners (f)		x					
humble (s)		x					
hungry (e,f)		x			x		x
thirsty (e,f)		x					x
lame (i)			x	x			
lepers (i,f,s)			x		x		
deaf (i,f)			x				
dead (f)			x				
maimed (i,f)				x			
widows (f)						x	
homeless (e,f)					x		
beggars (e,f)					x		x
strangers (f)							x
naked (e,f)							x
ill (i,f)							x

f=family; s=state; i=illness; e=economic


Of the 18 groups associated with the poor, only five are in what we might call economic straits (e). Six are ill (i) persons of various sorts. Seven are persons who have met with misfortunes of various sorts. The point, then, is that all of these groups are made up of persons who have met misfortunes brought upon them by either natural or social circumstances. The term, poor (ptochos), does not refer primarily to economic deprivation. It cannot, because economic matters are inbedded either in kinship or political reality. Every one of these terms refers to persons who have met misfortune in relation to either family (f) or state (s). There are no references to economic or social classes. Very important at this point is the distinction between economic straits and economic rank or class. We find the former, but not the latter. This means among other things that our

modern concepts of political economy (Marxist, capitalist, profit, class, etc.) cannot be used to interpret NT texts and to understand the career of Jesus. When Jesus says: "Blessed are you poor," he is talking about groups of people who have fallen into misfortune; he is not referring to a socio-economic class. Using a model for Palestinian society based on cultural anthropology relevant to aristocratic-peasant societies, Malina summarizes the meaning of poor and rich as follows (1981:85):

> A poor person seems to be one who cannot maintain his inherited status due to circumstances that befall him and his family, like debt, being in a foreign land, sickness, death (widow), or some personal physical accident. Consequently, the poor would not be a permanent social class, but a sort of revolving class of people who unfortunately cannot maintain their inherited status. Thus day laborers, landless peasants, and beggars born into such situations are not poor persons in first-century society, and poor would not be an economic designation. Furthermore, the opposite of rich would not necessarily be poor. In the perception of people in limited-good society, the majority of people are neither rich nor poor, just equal in that each has a status to maintain in some honorable way. Personal assessment is not economic, but a matter of lineage. Thus in this context, rich and poor characterize two poles of society, two minority poles—the one based on the ability to maintain elite status, the other based on the inability to maintain one's inherited status of any rank.

Malina's view of poor and rich may be diagramed as follows:

CHART TWO: MALINA'S VIEW



Thus, the terms rich and poor are not economic categories at all; rather they are status, i.e., lineage designations. This way of seeing people certainly emphasizes the kinship and political nature of the meaning of rich and poor, and is an important advance over Schottroff-Stegemann. Malina also thinks quantitatively in terms of majorities and minorities, but now he introduces a basic new qualitative aspect through the ideas of inherited status and its maintainance or loss. Furthermore, Malina's picture is presented in terms of a model in which the two basic groups are aristocrats and peasants. If we accept this picture, then Jesus would be blessing the disinherited and promising them restoration to their inherited status, whether it were peasant or aristocrat; and he would be meeting the immediate needs of the disinherited such as food, clothing, and healing. In this way he would restore the honor of those who had been shamed by their loss of inherited status. Salvation would be the restoration of lost honor, i.e., lost inherited status.

This view certainly places both the poor and Jesus firmly in the first century, and we can tell by our surprise at what salvation turns out to be that we have gone a long way toward overcoming ethnocentrism. Yet, some questions still remain. For example, in

Malina's portrayal we may ask why the rich are limited to elite status? If the poor are those who fail to maintain their inherited status, why aren't peasants who maintain their inherited status also "rich" along with the elite? Is it because it doesn't seem quite right to call "day laborers, landless peasants, and beggars" rich? Not quite right, partly because of their economic deprivation? Or because their position vis-a-vis aristocrats as such is somehow incongruous? And does it seem right to call aristocrats rich because they not only maintain their status, but also because in fact most of them are rich in an economic sense? Granted that economics are imbedded in kinship and politics (and that insight from cultural anthropology must surely be maintained), these questions suggest the possibility that the terms rich and poor have not yet been satisfactorily defined and that, e.g., they do at least sometimes have an economic and/or social dimension that should be retained.

This possibility must now be examined with the hope that we may achieve even greater precision in our definitions. We may find that just as the analysis of Schottroff-Stegemann needed to be supplemented by cultural anthropology, so also Malina's needs to be modified by introducing distinctive features of Jewish tradition which conditioned first century Jews including Jesus and his followers. This tradition of course flourished in the setting of Mediterranean culture, and so must be understood in that context. Yet, it might have had particularly distinctive features that distinguished it to some degree from other Mediterranean traditions. In any case, it now behooves us to examine at least part of that tradition as it relates to the poor in order to see whether we can make an advance in understanding.

III. Distinctive Jewish Tradition: The Sabbatical-Jubilee Year

In a recent article (1985) I have summarized one aspect of Jewish tradition, the sabbatical-jubilee tradition, as I expected it would have appeared in Jesus' Palestine, and as it may have been influential in Jesus' actions and teachings. The conclusions reached there are relevant to this present discussion in the following ways.

1. It was clear that all facets of the sabbatical-jubilee tradition were embedded in kinship or politics, as the following summary shows.

   a. *Kinship* ties provide
      1) Care: immediate responses to hunger, etc.
      2) Redemption: short-term response to landlessness, etc.
   b. *Political* action provides
      3) Release: long-term response to landlessness, etc.

2. What we call "economics" in the modern world is part of this picture; however, it is totally embedded in kinship and political relationship.

3. The new element in these traditions is that the poor were seen as both (a) those who have met misfortunes (temporary deprivations) and (b) those who belong (more permanently) to the oppressed peasant class. The assumption that lies behind definition (b) is that the sabbatical-jubilee regulations address a familial-political structure that has "fallen" from an original utopian egalitarian society. It has been transformed into an oppressive aristocratic-peasant social structure in which peasants are dominated and exploited by aristocrats. These peasants as such are the poor and the aristocrats as such are the rich. Kautsky speculates about such a historical development, while Gottwald thoroughly describes the case of ancient Israel. These traditions then provide further data to help us develop more precise definitions. They are especially important in showing us that the poor and the rich were also understood to be permanent groups within society,

i.e., the peasantry and the aristocracy. If this is so, then poor and rich remain of course political terms, but they have an economic content. They may be called economic-political terms. Now our question is: do we see evidences of these understanding in the Jesus traditions?

These conclusions may be portrayed graphically as follows.

CHART THREE: POOR & RICH IN BIBLICAL SOCIETIES





Type of Society	Historical Period	Ideology	Distribution of wealth	Poor and Rich
Tribal	Shofets	Egalitarian		no poor; no rich
Monarchical	Aristocratic-Peasant			rich; aristocrats poor: 1) peasants 2) unfortunate: aristocrats & peasants
Theocratic	Persian-Roman	Partially Commercialized Aristocratic-Peasant		rich: aristocrats and peasants poor: 1) peasants 2) unfortunate: aristocrats, peasants

CHART FOUR: THE COURSE OF LIFE OF POOR AND RICH IN BIBLICAL THINKING



IV. Testing the Model: The Jesus Traditions

Do the gospel data cohere with this model? And does the model help us to understand the data more accurately? Some of the more important references to poor and rich are the following:

Stories in which the meaning of the poor is ambiguous:

1) The "rich young ruler" (Matt 19:16–30//) had great wealth which he refused to sell so as to have money to give to the poor. Here the poor could easily be either unfortunate people or a deprived class.

2) Lazarus (Luke 16:19–21) was a poor, starving, ill man who languished at the gate of the rich man. He is said to have received evils during his life, while the rich man received good things. Here again the poor man could be either.

3) Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1–10) was a rich tax farmer who gave half his income to the poor. Again, the meaning of the poor cannot be specified.

4) The woman who anointed Jesus (Matt 26:6–13//) with expensive ointment could have sold it instead and given the large amount of money to the perennially present poor. Again, we are faced with uncertainty. There is one case, Jesus' dual parables on humility at banquets (Luke 14:7–24), where the meaning of the poor seems to be unambiguously the unfortunate. For here the poor are linked clearly with other unfortunate people: the maimed, the lame, and the blind (14:13,21). This seems to be the strongest bit of evidence in narratives for Malina's equation of the poor and unfortunate people.

Finally, there is at least one case, the poor widow's gift (Mark 12:41–44//), where the meaning seems unavoidably both economic in some sense, as well as related to a more permanent caste structure. For there is a clear contrast between rich and poor in monetary terms. The rich have a lot of money from which they give large amounts, while the poor widow has only a penny and she gives it all. Hence, the rich and poor seem to be defined clearly in both monetary and caste terms. The widow may also be poor because she is a widow, but she is surely poor because she doesn't have any money. It could be, in other words, that a woman would be poor as a widow, but rich by possessing lots of money. But would she then be a poor widow? Maybe she would be a weeping (mourning) rich widow, but would she be a weeping poor widow? In any case, it seems clear in this instance that the poor (ptochoi) and poverty (hysteresis) have both some economic-political and some caste meaning.

This instance shows that in each case of economic deprivation its more exact character can only be determined by the context if sufficient data are given. Two possibilities exist: a) it could be a temporary particular economic hardship such as those faced by the king's clients in the parable of the king's unmerciful servant (Matt 18:23–35), or b) it could be a more permanent structural economic deprivation such as seems to be presupposed by the parable of the workers in the vineyard (Matt 20:1–16) or expressed by Jesus in his comments about the half-shekel tax (Matt 17:24–27): " 'From whom do kings of the earth take toll or tribute: From their sons or others?' And when he said, 'From others,' Jesus said to him, 'Then the sons are free.'" "Sons" and "others" seem to refer to aristocrats and peasants, rich and poor, as the factor of taxation shows. The former possibility might not in every case entail the structural injustice condemned by Amos and other OT prophets, while the latter would entail such injustice. Again, in the former case there would be no challenge to the ideology of fated socio-economic status held by both aristocrats and peasants in ancient societies, while in the latter case there would be such a challenge. Do some other teachings of Jesus help us at this point?

We cannot begin with the beatitudes because there the meaning of the poor is as ambiguous as in the analogous case of the parables about humility at banquets. For the

same reason, we cannot begin with the answer to John's question (Matt 11:2–6//). However, Jesus' preaching at Nazareth seems to be another matter (Luke 4:16–30). For here the poor seem to be defined as captives, blind, and oppressed. This seems to be the meaning of the quotations from Isaiah which express the traditional prophetic concern for economic-political justice, as a glance at the context of the quotations shows (especially Isa 58:6–7; 61:1–2). The poor are captives and the oppressed. They are the peasants exploited in both the economic-political and the moral sense by (in this case) the priestly aristocracy (Hanson). Peasants are both captives who are debt prisoners and those who are oppressed by structural economic deprivation. Hence, the poor encompass the peasantry as a whole who have fallen into morally, i.e., convenantally, unjustified economic conditions. The term "poor" refers not merely to the general class of unfortunate people, but especially to the economic side of the whole peasantry in their total socio-political oppressed state. In short, Jesus refers to perennial structural economic-political oppression which he is called (anointed) to overcome, not simply to temporary misfortunes such as hunger, nakedness, etc.

If this result has some validity it opens up for reconsideration all those occurrences of "the poor" referred to earlier. They need to be reread in the light of our findings. How then may we reread those earlier passages? The rich young ruler was evidently an aristocrat, and Jesus asks him to share his wealth certainly with the temporarily unfortunate, though perhaps with the permanently poor. In the story of Lazarus again the rich man seems to be an aristocrat, while Lazarus appears to be no more than an unfortunate person, though it is possible that he belongs to the permanently deprived caste. Zacchaeus is certainly an aristocrat, while those whom he taxes are certainly the permanently deprived caste. The woman with the ointment could be an aristocrat or a wealthy peasant, while the reference to the perennially present poor could refer either to the continual presence of people who have met misfortune or to a persistently present caste.

If the argument so far is valid then we may interpret some other even more crucial texts which we have bypassed up to this point, through paraphrasing them as follows:

> Among temporarily unfortunate people, the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the more permanent structurally oppressed poor have the good news (of liberation) preached to them (Matt 11:5//). Blessed are you structurally oppressed poor, for the ***kingdom*** of liberation belongs to you. But woe to you structurally oppressing rich, for you've had all the good you'll ever get (Luke 6:20,24).

In addition we now have all the more reason for insisting on the ambiguity of the meaning of the poor in the first four texts examined above. Even in the case of the dual parables on humility at banquets there is now the possibility that the poor are the structurally deprived in contrast to the structurally rich. Finally, the economically deprived widow could belong to the structurally deprived poor.

Conclusion

While we cannot specify with certainty the meaning of each occurrence of poor and rich, nevertheless, with the help of, especially, cultural and economic anthropology we can at least get a more accurate picture of life in Jesus' time. Moreover, at times we can also specify quite fully the meaning of Jesus' actions and teachings. The result could be that Jesus will be found to have concern not only with economic straits (such as the five kinds specifically mentioned in the gospels) as temporary misfortunes, which he surely

is, but that he will be found to have concern for them (as well as other misfortunes) as manifestations of an evil socio-political structure. In addition, it might also be discovered that he sees non-economic misfortunes such as illness (blindness, for example) equally related to oppression with its economic dimension. If this were so then Jesus would be seeking not merely the immediate relief of temporary economic misfortunes, but a basic change in the very structure of society; and furthermore we would then have found also an understandable reason to explain why the aristocracy eventually turned against Jesus. His call to repentance must then have entailed not only "philanthropic" acts to meet immediate needs within the kinship structure ("care"), but also a fundamental reconstruction of society within the political realm ("release"), of such depth and proportions, no less than "the acceptable year of the Lord," that he was a dire threat to their privileged position. Their natural response then of course was to liquidate him.

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The Peril of Modernizing Henry Joel Cadbury

Beverly Roberts Gaventa
Columbia Theological Seminary

Recent studies of Luke-Acts testify to a growing interest in the literary character of this early Christian text. While these studies take their impetus from literary criticism of other biblical texts as well as from current literary theory, they frequently connect themselves also to the work of Henry Joel Cadbury. At the outset of his study of literary patterns in Luke-Acts, Charles Talbert laments the lack of scholarly interest in the formal patterns within Luke-Acts since the time of Cadbury, who interpreted the Lukan parallels stylistically.[1] In his dissertation on the narrator of Acts, Allen Walworth identifies Cadbury as one whose work foreshadowed the current generation of literary interpretations of Luke-Acts, for Cadbury "devoted a lifetime to the elucidation of Luke's literary style."[2] Joseph B. Tyson identifies Cadbury, along with Dibelius, as one who pays serious attention to the literary qualities of Luke-Acts.[3]

None of these scholars is claiming to find in Cadbury a misplaced literary critic of the late twentieth century variety. Nevertheless, the fact that each of them introduces Cadbury at the outset of his work may not be the result of mere coincidence and suggests the possibility that the literary interests of Cadbury are seen as a kind of path not taken. According to this view of Lukan scholarship, in the midst of various options in research on Luke-Acts, Cadbury's perspective was lost and needs now to be recovered. Admittedly, his contributions to the study of Luke-Acts were great in their own day (e.g., his study of the so-called "medical" language in Luke), but his importance is only now fully understood.

The paper that follows assesses the accuracy of this view of Cadbury's place in Lukan studies. As the title itself indicates, I see a certain "peril" in this interpretation of Cadbury.[4] It is appropriate to laud his work and draw upon it, but we need to be careful lest we impute to him a view he actually did not have.

Ranking Henry Joel Cadbury among the leading twentieth century American contributors to the study of Acts amounts to an understatement. Colleagues, attempting to convey the importance of his contribution to our understanding of Acts, have variously

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[1] *Literary Patterns, Theological Themes, and The Genre of Luke-Acts* (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1974) 1–5.

[2] *The Narrator of Acts* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1985) 3–4.

[3] *The Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1986) 25.

[4] "Peril" is admittedly an overstatement when applied to the issue of evaluating and assessing the work of Cadbury. It is worth noting that he also regarded it as an overstatement in his own title (*The Peril of Modernizing Jesus* [New York: Macmillan, 1937]). The title was selected by his publisher ("The Peril of Archaizing Ourselves," *Interpretation* 2 [1949] 331).

referred to him as "the doyen of Anglo-Saxon research on Acts,"[5] "one of the best specialists on the Acts of the Apostles,"[6] "the most important name in the history of Lucan research in America,"[7] "one of the great pioneers of modern Lucan studies,"[8] and "the high-water mark in Lucan studies."[9]

The sheer volume and scope of Cadbury's work on Acts is impressive.[10] Even prior to his doctoral dissertation on Luke's literary style and method, published in 1920,[11] Cadbury wrote an article on the Lukan style of the notorious *pericope adulterae.*[12] Over the next five decades, Cadbury published a number of studies of Luke-Acts that continue to influence our interpretation. To my knowledge, his last publications on Luke-Acts appeared in 1972 and addressed litotes in Luke-Acts and Luke's references to animals.[13] What makes this productivity the more remarkable is that during these same decades Cadbury contributed significantly to other issues in the study of the New Testament.[14] He also wrote extensively on the history of the Quakers, whom he served as chairman of the American Friends Service Committee for twenty-two years.[15]

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[5] Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 43.

[6] Jacques Dupont, *The Sources of Acts: The Present Position,* trans. Kathleen Pond (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1964) 13.

[7] W. Ward Gasque, *A History of the Criticism of the Acts of the Apostles* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975) 168.

[8] Robert Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts,* ed. by John Riches (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1982) 1.

[9] Paul W. Walaskay, *'And So We Came to Rome': The Political Perspective of St. Luke* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 7.

[10] See the bibliography of Cadbury's works below pertaining to Luke-Acts. I would appreciate having any omissions brought to my attention. I am grateful to my former student assistant, A. Pieter Kiwiet-Pantaleoni, for his help in preparing this bibliography.

[11] *The Style and Literary Method of Luke,* HTS 6 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920).

[12] "A Possible Case for Lukan Authorship (John 7:53–8:11)," *HTR* 10 (1917) 237–44.

[13] "Litotes in Acts," in *Festschrift to Honor F. Wilbur Gingrich,* ed. Eugene Howard Barth and Ronald Edwin Cocroft (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972) 58–69; "Animals and Symbolism in Luke," in *Studies in New Testament and Early Christian Literature. Essays in Honor of A. P. Wikgren,* ed. D. E. Aune (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972) 3–15.

[14] Cadbury wrote one of the first articles in this country on the development of form criticism ("Between Jesus and the Gospels," *HTR* 16 [1923] 81–92). Among his later works were *The Peril of Modernizing Jesus; Jesus: What Manner of Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1947); and *The Eclipse of the Historical Jesus* (Wallingford, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill Publications, 1964).

[15] For biographical treatments which attend especially to Cadbury's involvement with the Quakers, see the following: Mary Hoxie Jones, "Henry Joel Cadbury: A Biographical Sketch," in *Then and Now: Quaker Essays: Historical and Contemporary,* ed. Anna Brinton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960) 11–70; Margaret Hope Bacon, "Let This Life Speak: The Legacy of Henry J. Cadbury," *Friends Journal* 29 (December, 1983) 9–13; idem, *Let This Life Speak: The Legacy of Henry Joel Cadbury* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987). For essays written by Cadbury's colleagues at Harvard, see the following: Amos N. Wilder, "In Memoriam: Henry Joel Cadbury, 1883–1974," *NTS* 21 (1975) 313–17; idem, "A Grammarian with a Difference," *Harvard Magazine* (May,

In his work on Luke-Acts, Cadbury left few topics untouched. His well-known *The Making of Luke-Acts* and *The Book of Acts in History* treat the large issues of Luke's literary method and historical context. His many articles in periodicals and in *The Beginnings of Christianity* address problems in Acts as divergent as the use of relative pronouns, the "odor" of the spirit at Pentecost, the titles given to Jesus, and the notorious "we" passages. While his interests are often characterized as literary and historical rather than theological, he wrote on the eschatology of Acts as well as on the religious "interests" evidenced in Luke-Acts. His apparently voracious reading and exacting mastery of detail lend to all of these contributions an encyclopedic quality that enhances their on-going usefulness. To one who reads extensively in Cadbury's work, it comes as no surprise to find that he frequently greeted colleagues with the salutation, "What have you learned that I ought to know?"[16]

In order to assess Cadbury's contributions to the study of Acts, especially in the context of the current interest in literary criticism, I shall survey Cadbury's major treatments of Acts. The aim here is to understand the shape of Cadbury's work and the assumptions behind it in order to place his contributions to our understanding of the literary character of Luke-Acts in their proper perspective.

The Style and Literary Method of Luke

While the second part of Cadbury's dissertation deals exclusively with Luke's use of sources in his gospel and thus falls outside the scope of this paper, the briefer first part takes up several problems regarding the vocabulary of both Luke and Acts. The stated aim of both parts of the dissertation is "to examine the work of the *auctor ad Theophilum* as an individual writer of the Hellenistic age."[17] Cadbury begins by articulating the several assumptions that govern these studies. First, it must be recognized that the New Testament collects a number of diverse works. Since it does not have a homogeneous style or vocabulary, individual writers must be treated distinctly. Second, Cadbury rejects the category "New Testament Greek," observing that early Christian writers employed the common language of the Roman empire rather than some special "language of the Holy Ghost."[18]

Following his insistence on the distinctiveness of individual New Testament writers, Cadbury's first study of Luke's vocabulary consists of an attempt to estimate its size relative to the vocabularies of other New Testament writers. Here he employs various earlier vocabulary studies to show both that Luke's vocabulary is larger than that of any other New Testament writer and that the number of words peculiar to Luke is greater than that of any other New Testament writer. Cadbury also shows that Luke's vocabulary is roughly

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(continued)
1975) 52; George H. Williams et al., "Henry Joel Cadbury: A New Testament Scholar and Nobel Laureate," *Harvard Gazette* (February 6, 1976) 7; George W. MacRae, "Henry Joel Cadbury (1883–1974)," in *Profiles from the Beloved Community*, eds. G. H. Williams, George W. MacRae, and Paul D. Hanson (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1976) 13–21. Professor Eldon Epp kindly drew my attention to the article by George MacRae.

[16] Bacon, *Let This Life Speak*. 110.

[17] *Style and Literary Method*, v.

[18] Ibid.

of the same size as that of some writers outside the New Testament whose works are of about the same length as one or both of Luke's volumes.[19]

Next Cadbury turns his attention to the issue of Luke's literary standing by investigating Luke's vocabulary in comparison with that characteristic of Attic Greek. Here again he departs from earlier studies in which the New Testament as a whole was compared with the vocabulary of classical Greek writers and in which Luke's vocabulary is judged to be sophisticated but is in fact only compared with that of other New Testament writers.[20] Cadbury's work shows that Luke's vocabulary contains many more post-classical words than are found in the Atticists. He also points out, however, that many of the post-classical words found in Luke appear solely in those passages that Luke takes from the LXX, Mark or Q. In addition, some of the post-classical words are found prior to 200 C.E. only in Jewish or Christian texts, and they may be part of a technical vocabulary rather than reflecting Luke's "normal" Greek style. Cadbury's own careful conclusion is that Luke's vocabulary "has its natural affiliation with the Greek of the Bible" but "is not so far removed from the literary style of the Atticists as to be beyond comparison with them."[21]

In the third and best known of Cadbury's studies of Luke's vocabulary, he conducts the first thorough and critical investigation of W. K. Hobart's thesis that Luke's vocabulary reflects the training of a physician.[22] Cadbury takes the words and phrases cited by Hobart and shows that the terms Hobart regards as "medical" are not employed principally or exclusively by medical writers. Indeed, most of them appear frequently in writers who are not medically trained (e.g., in the LXX, Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian). This "medical language" cannot be regarded as demonstrating that the author of Luke and Acts was a physician, although Cadbury is clear that the opposite case, that Luke was not a physician, can also not be made from the available evidence.[23]

The Making of Luke-Acts

While a number of articles and notes follow Cadbury's dissertation, his next major work is the well-known *The Making of Luke-Acts*, first published in 1927.[24] In the opening pages Cadbury distinguishes his work from that of his predecessors, who primarily study Acts in order to reconstruct the history of early Christianity:

> The present study does not aim to deal as such with the events narrated by

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[19] Ibid., 1–4.

[20] Ibid., 4–6. Cadbury also notes here and elsewhere that the uniqueness of a word within the New Testament is better regarded as the result of a statistical accident than as a revealing piece of the author's vocabulary. He makes this point as early as 1917 in "A Possible Case of Lukan Authorship," 242.

[21] Ibid., 37–38.

[22] "The Medical Language of St. Luke," *The Medical Language of St. Luke* (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis, 1882).

[23] *Style and Literary Method*, 39–64. It is this study, of course, that prompted the familiar quip of Cadbury's students to the effect that he gained his doctor's degree by depriving Luke of his (Wilder, "Henry Joel Cadbury, 1883–1974," 314).

[24] References here are to the repint (London: SPCK, 1958).

> this writer [Luke], but with an event of greater significance than many which he records—the making of this work itself.[25]
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> [Previous studies of Luke and Acts] . . . all contribute to our understanding of the making of Luke-Acts. But their scope is not identical with the present inquiry. Their ultimate interest is not the author and his times, but the subject matter of his history. His own interests are considered merely as they color or adulterate his story. He is someone to be allowed for, eliminated and discounted, not someone to be studied and appreciated for his own sake. His literary methods are examined in order that we may discover the earlier sources behind them, or the facts and personalities lying behind the sources. All this is significant and valuable, but when these studies are completed and even while they are going on there is still place for concurrent studies of the historian himself.[26]

Cadbury thus clearly intends to investigate the work of the author of Luke-Acts. He is not interested in the reconstruction of early Christianity or in merely identifying the sources used by Luke. He intends to focus on the author himself.

Within the pages that immediately follow Cadbury further distinguishes his work from that of his predecessors by criticizing the practice of treating the Third Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles in isolation from one another. Since their common authorship is recognized and their interdependence likewise understood, Cadbury proposes that what is needed is a single name. He offers the apparently novel suggestion that Luke's two-volume work be designated "Luke-Acts."[27]

In the second chapter Cadbury identifies four major factors that contribute to any composition: the materials that are available, the conventional means of thought and expression, the individuality of the author, and the author's conscious purpose.[28] These factors in turn form the major parts of Cadbury's investigation into the writing of Luke-Acts.

Cadbury's discussion of the materials available to Luke begins with the several stages of their development. He compares the process with Luke's own comments in his preface. That is, first come the impressions of those who witness events ("eyewitnesses and ministers of the word"), followed by the transmission of these traditions ("they were delivered to us"), and then by the arranging and recording of events ("many have undertaken to compile a narrative").[29] Even at the stages of eye-witness impressions and early transmission, motives of early Christians shaped the material they selected and handed on. Cadbury emphasizes the complex character of these motives, which ranged from the inherent interest of the events themselves to interest in the activities of particular individuals to defense of the Christian movement.[30] As these motives varied, so did the forms acquired by the stories themselves. In Acts no less than in the Gospel, we can see the "rounding" of stories and the collection of stories into groups "by mortising the joints or by utilizing summaries as both conjunctive and disjunctive interludes."[31] Many of these

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[25] Ibid., 3 (brackets mine).
[26] Ibid., 7.
[27] Ibid., 7–11.
[28] Ibid., 12–17.
[29] Ibid., 23.
[30] Ibid., 34–40.
[31] Ibid., 59.

stories came to Luke from written sources. Cadbury argues that it is reasonable to think that Luke had written sources for Acts as he did, in Mark and Q, for the gospel. We need not expect to find internal evidence of written sources for Acts, since the passages used from Mark and Q contain no sign that they had been copied.[32]

Whatever materials Luke received, in common with all authors he employed those materials according to the methods of his era. These methods included the common language (vernacular Greek), popular literary forms, a conventional means of using available sources, the composition of appropriate speeches, and other literary formalia.[33] Cadbury underscores the element of convention here, insisting that the writing process is "hemmed in with the compulsions of convention."[34]

In addition to the sources available to Luke and the writing conventions of his day, the third factor identified by Cadbury is Luke's own "personality." The burgeoning interest in psychological analysis during this same period makes it important to point out that by "personality" Cadbury is referring to the individuality of an author. Nowhere does he engage in speculation about the psychological make-up of Luke:

> The third factor to be considered in the work of Luke is the author's individuality. His sources represent the deeds and records of predecessors. His general language, method and viewpoint he shares with others of his group. There remains, however, something distinctive in his writing, as there is something distinctive in everyone's writing—his own personality.[35]

The "personality" of Luke may be glimpsed through his writing style. While the conventions of the day influence him, Luke also has an individual way of expressing himself. In this context, Cadbury identifies several characteristics of Luke's writing that he later develops more fully in notes and articles. Luke varies his style and vocabulary to make his writing appropriate to the literary setting.[36] Even the notorious "we" sections in Acts may be "somehow connected with . . . mental habits of the editor."[37] Luke displays an interest in parallel individuals and parallel scenes, but he also enjoys contrasting persons within a story (e.g., the rich man and Lazarus) as well as contrasting events.[38] In general, Luke's writing has a compelling dramatic quality, but it is difficult to know to what extent this drama derives from Luke and to what extent from his sources. Cadbury several times notes that "the more general traits of his work . . . were doubtless due to his sources in very large measure. For good or for ill he had to depend on earlier material."[39] In the following chapters, Cadbury explores the secular, social, and theological concerns displayed in Luke-Acts. Here he includes such issues as Luke's cosmopolitan outlook, his preoccupation with cities in general and with Jerusalem in particular, his universalism, his concern for outcasts, his emphasis on the roles of women. Here again he is careful not to attach too much meaning to the interests he identifies, since in some instances Luke's

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[32] Ibid., 66.

[33] Ibid., 113–209.

[34] Ibid., 113.

[35] Ibid., 213.

[36] Ibid., 223–25.

[37] Ibid., 230. See also Cadbury's later treatment of the "we" sections in " 'We' and 'I' Passages in Luke-Acts," *NTS* 3 (1956) 128–32.

[38] Ibid., 231–35.

[39] Ibid., 231.

"sources are responsible for his matter, and even when he appears to change his sources the changes are slight. . . ."[40] He also notes the difficulty of moving beyond these isolated "interests" to an inferred identification of the author.[41]

The final section of *Making* addresses the purpose of Luke-Acts. Cadbury notes at the outset that the form of Luke's work, narrative, "carries with it the intention of supplying information."[42] In addition, Cadbury again argues that Luke is indebted to his sources even for the purposes that are part of Luke-Acts. Luke's own purposes are "minor and secondary" and are "to be detected rarely, if at all, and only in slight hints and details. . . ."[43] Among Luke's several purposes is the desire to correct Theophilus' misunderstanding about the Christian movement, especially as that misunderstanding focuses on charges that Christians have broken Roman law.[44]

Cadbury regards the attempt to identify the "plan" or structure of Luke-Acts as a modern device. Once again he insists that the shape of Luke's work comes from the material he inherited. The omissions which modern interpreters find difficult to understand in Luke's account probably stem from all of the four factors which enter into authorship (materials, convention, personality, and purpose). Luke was also limited in what he could write by the length of the rolls of papyrus that were in use at the time.[45]

The Making of Luke-Acts is a rich volume which has now influenced scholarship on Luke for sixty years. Despite Cadbury's description of his work as having a narrow focus on the author of Luke-Acts, *Making* in fact deals with the author largely by means of asking what materials he received. In it Cadbury touches on a multitude of issues that subsequent scholars have retrieved and explored, not always with more insight or depth. The program for the next several decades of Cadbury's own work on Acts is determined in this volume.

The Beginnings of Christianity

Probably Cadbury's best-known contribution to the study of Acts occurs through the publication of *The Beginnings of Christianity*, with which virtually all students of early Christianity are familiar. The fact that *Beginnings* was reprinted again in 1979, although the final volume was published in 1933, conveys its lasting contribution to the field.[46] It is difficult to assess properly Cadbury's contributions to this five-volume work, both because his contributions are numerous and diverse and because the commentary itself (Volume 4) was written by Kirsopp Lake together with Cadbury.

In order to offer some characterization of Cadbury's contributions to these volumes, I have selected three of his notes for comment: "Names for Christians and Christianity in Acts," "The Summaries in Acts," and "The Speeches in Acts." While these studies are adjacent to one another in Volume 5, they differ in method and approach. The study of names for Christians and Christianity examines some nineteen different words in Acts,

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[40] Ibid., 271.

[41] Ibid., 273.

[42] Ibid., 299.

[43] Ibid., 300–301.

[44] Ibid., 315.

[45] Ibid., 320–25.

[46] In his survey of the history of the interpretation of Acts, Haenchen comments that the detail of *Beginnings* renders it "now as then, indispensable to the scholar, and ensures its value even on the Continent" (*Acts*, 37).

primarily with a view to their linguistic and historical origins. If a term is used in only a few places (e.g., *sozomenoi* in Acts 2:47), Cadbury considers the possibility that its appearance is merely *ad hoc* and that it is not a conventional expression for Christians or Christianity. Cadbury suggests that some terms may come to Luke from the sources he employs. He compares their usage in Acts with that in other early Christian sources, considering the historical origin of each expression.[47]

In "The Summaries in Acts," Cadbury begins with a point made earlier in *The Making of Luke-Acts*, that he does not regard the summaries as shaping the structure of Acts. Instead, using K. L. Schmidt's work on Mark, he compares the summaries with the Markan framework. Luke, especially in the first part of Acts, brings together separate scenes from separate sources. The summaries constitute the "connective tissue by which memorabilia are turned into the beginnings of a continuous narrative."[48] The summaries have been created by a process of "generalization" from adjacent material, and are susceptible to very free treatment by the ultimate editor of Acts. When they appear similar to one another, it may be because of Luke's tendency to repetition,[49] but it also may be that he has repeated them from an underlying source. While Cadbury regards it as clear that the summaries are editorial in nature, he also insists that they may already have been written prior to Luke's final editorial stage.[50]

Cadbury's treatment of the speeches in Acts deals primarily with the issue of their historicity. He begins by noting that speeches in antiquity were a literary convention, and their presence did not imply that they contained definite information about a particular historical address. Within Acts itself, the occasions on which speeches are given do not lend themselves to the presumption of an immediate written record. While it might be assumed that the speakers reported on their own words, such a report after the fact would diverge to some degree from the actual speech as delivered. Also undermining the assumption of the historicity of the speeches in Acts is the fact that their style is Lukan and that the subject matter of many of the speeches is shared.[51]

Cadbury acknowledges and criticizes the several arguments made in favor of the historicity of the speeches. He deals at some length with the argument that the speeches of individual leaders in Acts contain idioms similar to those found in their letters (i.e., Paul's speeches recollect his letters, Peter's recollect 1 Peter, James' recollect the Epistle of James). A careful examination of the expressions adduced by others shows that the similarities are no more than can be explained by a generally common Christian faith and a common use of contemporary language.[52]

Cadbury's contributions to *Beginnings* are consistent with and often build upon the earlier work of his dissertation and of *Making*. In these articles, as in much of *Beginnings*, the focus is almost entirely historical and lexicographical. They do not attempt an analysis either of the theological argument of Acts or of its literary structure.

The Book of Acts in History

While nearly twenty years separate *The Beginnings of Christianity* from *The Book of Acts in History*, this 1955 volume follows easily from Cadbury's earlier work. The basic

[47] *Beginnings*, 5:375–92.

[48] 5:395.

[49] This is developed further in "Four Features of Lukan Style," in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, eds. L. E. Keck and J. L. Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966) 87–102.

[50] Ibid., 395–401.

[51] Ibid., 405–409.

[52] Ibid., 410–415.

perspective on Luke-Acts remains unchanged, although the focus shifts. Here Cadbury takes up, as the title indicates, the place of Acts within history. That is, he addresses the "concentric cultural environments" of Acts: "general," Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Christian.[53] In his discussion of the "general" cultural environment Cadbury refers to those many features of Luke-Acts that are not easily identified as either Greek, Roman, Jewish or Christian. "In the ancient as in the modern world cultures and ideas have no frontiers."[54] While some features may be broadly described as "oriental," others can be classed only as "ancient." For example, the story of the conversion of the Ethiopian eunuch in Acts 8 is a kind of "cultural amalgam" which depends upon the ancient view of Ethiopia as a "peculiar and exotic country."[55]

Cadbury's discussion of the Hellenic character of Luke-Acts centers primarily on Luke's language. Cadbury takes both Acts 28:2 ("And the natives [*barbaroi*] showed us unusual kindness. . . .") and 21:37–39 as suggesting that Luke identified with a Greek viewpoint and sympathized with a certain Greek "sense of superiority."[56] Cadbury attributes Luke's variation in style to the cultural contexts in which his narratives occur. In the early chapters of Acts, therefore, the language used has a more Semitic character, perhaps in imitation of the Septuagint. The second half of Acts, by contrast, contains most of those terms and expressions that are associated with Luke's "superior" Greek.[57] While Luke does include quotations from classical Greek literature, these appear to be quotations such as would have been widely known and referred to in contemporary thought. His discussion of events in various Greek cities shows a familiarity with them and their customs. Cadbury concludes from these observations that Luke was "a man of some cultivation, at home in the speech of the current Greek and not to be reckoned a mere barbarian or one ill at ease in the speech and civilization of the far flung area in which the Greek influence had come to dominate."[58]

The Roman background of Acts is more generalized. While Luke's language and intellectual background are Greek, the broad outline and condition of the contemporary world is Roman. This Roman environment appears in Acts in the rulers who are mentioned, the security of travel, the Roman roads. Cadbury addresses at some length the issue of Paul's Roman citizenship, assessing various theories concerning the means by which Paul obtained his citizenship. Cadbury's own view, offered with characteristic reticence, is that Paul may have had an ancestor among those individuals granted citizenship by virtue of some particular service offered to the state.[59] Cadbury attributes Luke's positive attitude toward the Roman government to the growing and broad appreciation for Rome's "genius . . . to assimilate into a single citizenship the whole world."[60] If Luke seems to us naive in this optimistic assessment of Rome, it is because he cannot anticipate the conflict that would later characterize the relationship between Rome and the church.

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[53] (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1955) vi.
[54] Ibid., 27.
[55] Ibid., 15–16.
[56] Ibid., 32.
[57] Ibid., 34.
[58] Ibid., 53.
[59] Ibid., 75.
[60] Ibid., 81–82.

In his consideration of the Jewish environment of Acts, Cadbury argues that Luke was knowledgeable about contemporary Judaism. Acts is particularly valuable for its picture of the synagogue in Diaspora Judaism, although the Pentecost account demonstrates that Luke knows of the presence of Diaspora Jews in Jerusalem itself.[61] The speeches draw not only upon the Septuagint but also upon traditions of contemporary Judaism which are evidenced in Josephus and Philo.[62] Cadbury sees in Luke's story a negative response to Judaism, which Luke views as the center of opposition to Christianity.[63]

Not surprisingly, Cadbury's discussion of the Christian environment of Acts pertains more to the importance of Acts as a source for Christian history than to the light shed on Acts by other information about early Christianity. A brief review of non-Christian sources and both canonical and non-canonical Christian sources underscores the scantiness of information about Christianity in the first century. This review leads Cadbury to conclude that Acts is "our principal narrative source" for knowledge of the period in which gospel materials were being developed and collected. Acts is even more important for interpreting the letters of Paul. "A narrative of Paul's life would be almost impossible without" Acts. "Acts is to Paul's letters what Mark is to Q,—in fact, what biography usually is to letters, what history is to literature."[64] Cadbury does not regard Luke as having had access to Paul's letters. The coincidences between them arise from the genuine agreement of two independent sources. Their differences are sometimes serious but often complementary.[65]

The final chapter of *The Book of Acts in History* addresses the subsequent history of Acts. Here Cadbury suggests that Acts may have played a role in the process of canonizing both the gospels and the letters of Paul. When separated from the gospel of Luke, Acts became figuratively the "arch, lintel or keystone" between these two parts of the canon.[66] He concludes with a discussion of the canonization of Acts and the limited and selective interest in Acts evidenced in the first centuries of Christian history.[67]

In some ways this book reveals Cadbury's view of Acts more openly and directly than did *The Making of Luke-Acts*. He identifies Luke himself as a Hellene. While Luke knows about contemporary Judaism, he views it as an outsider and stresses the distance between Christianity and Judaism. *The Book of Acts in History* also reveals an optimistic stance toward the history *within* Acts. When Cadbury discusses the importance of Acts for understanding early Christianity, he gives little indication that the accounts in Acts may be unreliable. Instead, he seems to assume that Acts can be used to reconstruct the history of early Christianity. This tendency appears also in Cadbury's treatment of Paul's Roman citizenship, where we see no question about the notion that Tarsus is Paul's home or about Luke's claim that Paul is a Roman citizen.

"Acts and Eschatology"

Because it deals with an important issue in Luke's theology, I devote separate attention to this single article.[68] Cadbury's work in the 1920's and 1930's contains little explicit

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[61] Ibid., 86–88.
[62] Ibid., 98–106.
[63] Ibid., 91–92, 106.
[64] Ibid., 122–23.
[65] Ibid., 124.
[66] Ibid., 143.
[67] Ibid., 158–60.
[68] "Acts and Eschatology," in *The Background of the New Testament and Its Eschatology:*

discussion of Luke's theology, although *The Making of Luke Acts* does devote some chapters to theological and religious characteristics of Luke. Hence, it will be instructive to see how Cadbury addresses this issue in Luke's theology just prior to the debate provoked by Conzelmann's *Die Mitte der Zeit.*[69]

Cadbury begins his study by identifying, based on the gospels, Acts, and the letters of Paul, three convictions shared by early Christians: (1) Jesus had risen from the dead; (2) he would return from heaven; and (3) Jesus' followers had received the Holy Spirit. Consistent with what Cadbury terms Luke's "orderly mind" and "strong belief in objective reality," Luke does not transfer these convictions to the realm of the imagination. Instead, Luke treats these convictions through the use of objective narratives. For example, Luke treats the gift of the Holy Spirit not as a figurative gift but as an objective gift of speaking in particular human languages. The risen Jesus is not an apparition, but a real human being who has a physical body (Luke 24:39, 41–43; Acts 10:41).[70]

While Cadbury concedes that Acts itself has little eschatology, he attributes this to the fact that Acts is narrative. He goes on to say that the eschatology of Acts, like any of its theological elements, is to be located in the "missionary addresses, though we may legitimately add the conversations and other briefer spoken parts." The narrative does not so much omit eschatological hopes as it assumes them and does not need to restate them.[71] A survey of Acts shows that many of the familiar themes of early Christian eschatology do appear here (e.g., the kingdom of God, the last times, final judgment), which means that Luke was not ignorant of these themes. He may have drawn some of them from his sources, but the eschatology throughout is reasonably consistent and thus indicates the author's acceptance of these teachings.[72]

Disagreeing with Dodd's view that Acts contains a realized eschatology, especially in the early speeches, Cadbury insists that Acts "does not spiritualize away the concrete eschatological hopes of Christianity nor on the other hand does it emphasize their imminence and urgency." Instead, Acts retains "the old and literal expectation but is satisfied to leave the time to God's ordering." The gospel of Luke discourages a "too early expectation," and Acts does not contradict that view. Nevertheless, Luke also does not find the future hope embarrassing and he does not "blur" its concreteness.[73]

Luke accepts the fact of the delay of the parousia, but this acceptance only strengthens "the assurance of the final events." Both the life of Jesus and the story of the early church are part of the assurance about the future that Luke offers. These events of the past "do not reduce the importance of the future, or much alter the nature of its expected fulfilment. The *eschaton* remains intact in the future."[74]

(continued)
Studies in Honour of C. H. Dodd, ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube (Cambridge: University Press, 1956).

[69] While Cadbury knew that Conzelmann's work would deal with Lukan eschatology, he had not seen it when he wrote this article. By the time he corrected the proofs for the *Festschrift* he was able to supply only the name and bibliographical information for this new work (Ibid., 320).

[70] Ibid., 303–309.

[71] Ibid., 310.

[72] Ibid., 311–12.

[73] Ibid., 315–16.

[74] Ibid., 321.

The contribution of this article, which does not seem to have played a significant role in the on-going debate about Lukan eschatology, is its attention to the varying features of the eschatological elements in Acts. Typically, Cadbury gives careful attention to the details of the text. If they conflict with one another, he tries to hold those in tension rather than to over-interpret one element at the expense of another.

Methodologically, this article is consistent with the approach taken in *The Making of Luke-Acts*. Cadbury describes features of the text and then draws conclusions about the theological convictions they reflect. While he says little here about the sources of Acts, he does still introduce them as a factor to be considered. Unlike the tentative suggestions offered at the conclusion of *Making*, however, this article does not even speculate on the author's setting. Cadbury makes no move from the description of eschatology in Acts to a reconstruction of the author's *Sitz im Leben*.

Cadbury reveals here his own assumption about where the theology of Acts is located. As noted above, he explains the relative lack of eschatology in Acts as a result of the narrative character of Acts. Apparently that means that narrative does not bear theology. Instead, Cadbury suggests that we look to the missionary speeches or other elements of public address and conversation in order to find Luke's theology. While these assumptions are by no means unique to Cadbury, they do indicate his view of the relationship between theology and narrative.

Conclusions

This survey takes into account Cadbury's major contributions to the study of Acts, but it leaves aside numerous articles (see the bibliography below). Most notably omitted from discussion is Cadbury's study of the "we" sections of Acts and his article on Lukan style. Each of these articles builds on observations already present in *The Making of Luke-Acts* and therefore may not require separate discussion. Also omitted is the series of articles Cadbury published as lexical notes, which begins in 1925 and runs through 1972.

Despite the fact that Cadbury's publications on Luke-Acts extend over more than five decades, this review of Cadbury's work on Luke-Acts demonstrates its overarching continuity. There is little change in Cadbury's work over the years, although he does take up some new issues, particularly in *The Book of Acts in History*. He also expands his earlier work, as is seen especially in "Four Features of Lukan Style," which builds upon some observations from *The Making of Luke-Acts*. I do not, however, recall any instance in which Cadbury repudiates a position taken at an earlier period. His work exhibits no fundamental change of perspective or judgment, so that moving from *Making* to *Acts in History* scarcely seems to be crossing several decades.

Another feature of Cadbury's work, and one which may contribute to this continuity, is that he seldom presents his argument as conversation or debate with other scholars. This feature stands out most clearly in the case of the work of Dibelius and Conzelmann. Cadbury certainly knew of Dibelius' work on form criticism,[75] and "Style Criticism of the Book of Acts" was first published 1923, well before Cadbury's *Making*. The common interests of the two scholars would seem to make them natural conversation partners, but neither draws on the work of the other. Similarly, Conzelmann and Cadbury make virtually no use of each other's work. As was observed earlier, Cadbury did not have access to Conzelmann's *Die Mitte der Zeit* while writing his essay on the eschatology of Acts, but it is noteworthy that Cadbury's later article on Acts in the *Interpreter's Dictionary*

[75] See "Between Jesus and the Gospels," *HTR* 16 (1923) 81–92.

of the Bible does not refer to Conzelmann, not even in the bibliography.[76]

This silence with regard to Dibelius and Conzelmann needs to be placed in its proper context. Cadbury does not discuss their work, but he also does not often discuss the work of other scholars. References in the text of Cadbury's writings to the positions of other scholars are extremely rare. Even the footnotes refer largely to items of information found in other scholars' work and seldom to their theses or conclusions. The prime exception to this comes in Cadbury's dissertation, with its extensive examination of W. K. Hobart's argument for the medical language of Luke. Put concisely, Cadbury engages in conversation with the text and only on rare occasions with fellow scholars.

A third feature of Cadbury's work concerns his view of the text itself. Particularly in *The Making of Luke-Acts*, what we find throughout is a perspective that is best described as form-critical. Since Cadbury's announced goal for *Making* is to study the author of Luke-Acts, it may seem unusual to link the work with form criticism. Recall, however, that he begins his discussion of authorship by identifying among those things that make for authorship the sources used. In that discussion of sources, Cadbury speaks about the rounding of episodes and the handing down of traditions. Even when he takes up the "personality" of the author, he again and again speaks about the constraints placed upon the author by his sources. He insists that our reconstruction of the "interests" of the author may only reflect the interests present in his sources. If there is a polemical edge to Cadbury's view of Acts as presented in *Making*, it comes from a desire to show that the material in Acts does not spring full-blown from the author or from some pure and early tradition.

Cadbury does not identify this book explicitly with form criticism. The names of the emerging form critics do not appear as he introduces his work or his intentions for it. This silence should not be understood to dissociate *Making* from form criticism, however. The comments made earlier about Cadbury's usual method of working pertain here. The antecedents for this book are in Dibelius and Bultmann. While Cadbury does not analyze the history of individual units of the text as Bultmann might have, he does nevertheless work with an archaeological view of the text.[77] In Cadbury's case, this archaeological viewpoint appears in his discussion of the factors involved in authorship. Cadbury's discussion of the author is at every point shaped by references to the sources which constrained the author and dictated the shape and content of his work.

It is difficult to state concisely Cadbury's general theory of Acts, since, as one of his earlier reviewers noted, "the chief criticism which most readers will make on the book is that it so often avoids definite pronouncements."[78] It is clear that he regards Luke-Acts as having the general purpose of apology. Further, Cadbury understands Luke to be a Hellene who identified with claims of Greek superiority. Luke sees the importance of Jewish tradition and draws upon it in the speeches in particular, but Luke also understands the Jews to be the opponents of Christianity and clearly views them as outsiders.

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[76] "Acts of the Apostles," *IDB* 1:28–42.

[77] In "Between Jesus and the Gospels," Cadbury refers to form criticism as "literary excavation" (p. 92).

[78] E. F. Scott, "The Genesis of Luke-Acts," *JR* 8 (1928) 286. It is also Scott who comments that *Making* has "more genuine scholarship in it than in nine-tenths of the ostentatiously learned books that are being written today about the New Testament" (p. 285.

Perhaps more important than these slender and tentative conclusions about the person of Luke is what this review reveals about Cadbury's methodological stance toward Acts. As we have seen, he associates narrative with the goal or implicit purpose of conveying information about something or someone. It is not surprising, therefore, that Cadbury see in Luke-Acts the purpose of defending Christianity. The narrative informs Theophilus and other readers so that they may make an accurate judgment about Christianity.

Further, Cadbury characterizes Luke's narrative as an "objective" narrative. By "objective" what Cadbury means is not that Luke is somehow detached from the story he tells or uninvolved with it, but that he describes in an objective way events that others might describe more spiritually or subjectively (e.g., the fulfillment of the promise of the Holy Spirit).

The content, extent, and structure of Acts are determined by the sources to which Luke had access. Cadbury's discussion of the plan and scope of Luke-Acts questions attempts to see the work as organized around the summary statements or around other patterns. While Cadbury acknowledges the movement in Acts from Jerusalem into the Gentile world, he contends that these stages come to the author from his material.

As noted in the discussion of *The Book of Acts in History,* Cadbury at points operates with what seems a naive view of the history *within* Acts. This is most clear in *Acts in History,* where he speculates on the citizenship of Paul without reference to the historical problem created by the fact that only Luke speaks of Paul's citizenship. Again in Cadbury's discussion of the importance of Acts for the study of early Christianity, he seems to insist upon the usefulness of Acts because of the scarcity of historical evidence outside the New Testament. Here also Cadbury's investment in the presuppositions of form criticism becomes apparent, since he continues to argue that Luke made use of sources and that these sources have value as historical evidence.

The historical element in Acts, however, is to be distinguished from the speeches, which reveal the theology of Acts. Two important and related points emerge here. One is that the speeches themselves are not to be regarded as historically accurate. The other is that the speeches in Acts are the primary place in which its theology may be located. Cadbury would find very peculiar the notion that the shape of Luke's story itself reveals something about his theology. For him, it is the speeches that reveal Lukan theology. Even in the speeches we cannot be certain of locating the author's own theological viewpoint, however, since the speeches are also shaped by pre-Lukan tradition.

In many parts of Cadbury's work, especially in *The Making of Luke-Acts,* we find observations about Luke's literary style. As I indicated at the beginning of this paper, these observations have been very important in the development of the literary criticism of Luke-Acts. One thinks especially of Cadbury's work on parallels, repetition, the "we" sections.

The number and significance of these contributions tempt us to think of him as a literary critic in the contemporary sense. However, this review of his work demonstrates that viewing Cadbury as a literary critic would be modernizing as surely as Cadbury's own example of a painting of Mary Magdalene wearing Florentine headdress.[79] What is important about Henry Joel Cadbury is not that he is a literary critic, but that, even in the context of work that is dominated by the concerns of form criticism, history, and lexicography, he offers a multitude of insights that continue to stimulate and instruct our interest in the literary character of Luke-Acts.

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[79] *The Peril of Modernizing Jesus,* 1.

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Women's History and the Book of Revelation

Adela Yarbro Collins
University of Notre Dame

Although the genre of the book of Revelation is disputed, no one is arguing that it belongs to the category of historiography. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean historical information from its pages. The attempt to derive historical data from Biblical books of various literary forms has long been one of the primary methods and goals of historical-critical scholarship. Biblical scholars have often erred in pursuing this goal. At times highly expressive, perspectival texts have mistakenly been accepted as objective historical accounts. At other times, accounts with an obvious perspective have been disregarded as uninteresting or useless because of their lack of perfect historical reliability.

This essay will not assume that the text of Revelation presents events objectively. It will assume that the work is an apocalypse presented in letter form. It makes use of conventional genres and is heavily dependent on traditional motifs in its content. Nevertheless, it is a distinctive, creative response to a particular historical situation. This situation can most easily be inferred from the prophetic, hortatory messages presented as words of the risen Christ to individual congregations (chapters 2–3). This essay will assume also that the visions in the body of the work (chapters 4–22) are shaped by the same historical situation and that they reflect the [at least implied] author's view of how things ought to or will be.

The purpose of this essay is to infer from the book of Revelation something about the lives of women in the environment in which it was written. The lives, feelings and thoughts of ancient women could of course best be discovered from their own writings.[1] Another way to reconstruct women's history is to look critically at texts written by men, trying to correct whatever male or patriarchal bias may have shaped them and to read "between the lines" to get a glimpse of women's lives.

Women and Early Christian Prophecy

When we turn to the book of Revelation, we find that actual historical women are invisible in it, with two exceptions. The first passage is the message to Thyatira (2:18–29):

> And to the angel of the congregation which is in Thyatira write, "Thus says the Son of God, whose eyes are like a flame of fire and whose feet are like fine bronze; 'I know your works, including your love, faith, service and endurance, and your later works are greater than your first. But I hold against you the fact that you tolerate the woman "Jezebel," who calls herself a prophet

[1] On the evidence and methods for reconstructing women's history in the Biblical world, see Bernadette J. Brooten, "Early Christian Women and Their Cultural Context: Issues of Method in Historical Reconstruction," in *Feminist Perspectives on Biblical Scholarship* (ed. Adela Yarbro Collins; SBL Centennial Publications; Chico: Scholars Press, 1985) 65–91.

> and teaches and leads astray my servants so that they prostitute themselves and eat food sacrificed to idols. And I gave her a respite, in order that she might repent, but she did not wish to repent from her prostitution. Behold! I will put her to bed[2] and those who have committed adultery with her into great tribulation, unless they repent from her works, and I will kill her children with a plague. And all the congregations will know that I am the one who searches minds and hearts and I will give to each of you in accordance with your works. But I say to the rest of you who are in Thyatira, as many as do not hold this teaching, who do not know "the deep things of Satan," as they say,—I do not lay upon you another burden, only hold on to that which you have until I come. And as for the one who conquers and who keeps my works until the end, I will give him authority over the nations and he will rule them with an iron rod as ceramic vessels are crushed, as I also have received authority from my father, and I will give him the morning star. Let him who has ears listen to what the Spirit says to the congregations."[3]

Many commentators, even some who consider themselves to be historical critics, take these words at face value; that is, as an accurate, objective, unbiased description of the state of affairs in Thyatira. Some do so because they accept the book's claim that these are words of Christ. Others do so because they believe that the author was John the son of Zebedee and thus one of the twelve. His presumed apostolic authority sways them. For others the reason may simply be the book's canonical status. Because these are the words of an authoritative text, they must reflect reality like a mirror. It the text calls a woman in Thyatira "Jezebel," then she must have been similar in essential ways to the wife of King Ahab described in the books of Kings in the Hebrew Bible. She must have been a false prophet, a false teacher, an immoral woman.[4] A truly critical reading of this text must ask whether such assumptions are appropriate and whether androcentric bias is playing a role.

A more critical reading of this passage starts from the asumption that here John is claiming the authority of Christ for his own point of view in a struggle in the early Christian movement.[5] The messages suggest that John was an itinerant prophet who visited the congregations addressed, proclaimed his message to them and taught them. His authority, however, was not unquestioned. He had rivals, other traveling prophets and teachers whose message and teaching were also Christian, but shaped by different values: these rivals had points of view different from John's on what it meant to be a follower of Jesus.

John praises the Christians in Ephesus for testing and rejecting certain people who claimed to be apostles (2:2). An apostle at this time was apparently a traveling proclaimer of the gospel. 2 Corinthians shows that other traveling apostles besides Paul taught in Corinth and that they and Paul disagreed and were rivals. John also praises the Ephesians

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[2] Reading βαλω with ℵ², P, 046 et al. rather than βαλλω with the 26th edition of the Nestle-Aland text.

[3] Translations from the New Testament are my own. They are based on the 26th ed. of the Nestle-Aland text of the Greek New Testament.

[4] It should be noted that the portrait of Jezebel in the Hebrew Bible itself is highly biased.

[5] See Adela Yarbro Collins, "Vilification and Self-Definition in the Book of Revelation," *Harvard Theological Review* 79 (1986) 308–20.

for rejecting the teaching of the Nicolaitans (2:6). Some commentators in the early Church thought that this group was the followers of Nicolaus, one of the seven mentioned in Acts 6, but this is probably only a guess. Another possibility is that the name is not what these teachers called themselves, but John's nickname for them meaning "conquerors of the people," in a negative sense. The message to Ephesus says nothing about the content of their teaching.

The Christians in Pergamum are criticized because some of them accept the teaching of a man whom John calls "Balaam." In this case it is virtually certain that "Balaam" is not the man's actual mane, but that John is speaking typologically, as in the case of "Jezebel." Thus in Rev 2:14 a Christian teacher who was influential in Pergamum is called by the name of the Canaanite diviner Balaam who appears in Numbers 22–24. Even though God caused Balaam to bless rather than curse Israel, the book of Numbers blames Balaam for Israel's fall into idolatry at Peor (Numbers 31:16, 25: 1–2). Israel's sin at Peor involved intermarriage with the women of Moab, eating the sacrifices offered to their gods, and worshipping those gods. Rev 2:14 describes this sin as "eating food sacrificed to idols and practicing prostitution." The text suggests that the Christian prophet is encouraging the Pergamene Christians to behave in an analogous way. In 2:15 the teaching of this prophet is closely linked to that of the Nicolaitans.

In the message to Thyatira, a woman influential there is called "Jezebel" by John. In 2:20 she is criticized for leading the servants of Christ astray by teaching them to practice prostitution and to eat food sacrificed to idols. Thus the teachings of "Jezebel," "Balaam," and the Nicolaitans seem to be similar. This similarity suggests that it is not just a matter of individual, local teachers who differed with John, but a regional movement carried by itinerant teachers.

"Food sacrificed to idols" is a way of describing, in Jewish or Christian terms, food which had been offered to Greek, Roman, or Asiatic gods. Whether it was permissible to eat such food had been a debated issue also in Corinth, as 1 Corinthians 8–10 shows. Some of the Christians in Corinth argued that it was permissible to eat such food since the Greek, Roman and Asiatic gods did not exist. This point of view could have called upon the book of Isaiah for support, because of its criticism of the worship of idols made by hands. They probably argued that since there is one God, the creator, all food is clean and may be eaten after giving thanks. In 1 Cor 8:6 Paul agrees with this point of view in principle: "for us there is one God." In chapter 10, however, he says that "what the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to intermediary beings (δαιμονιοις) and not to God" (v 20). Paul suggested that eating dedicated food would make the Corinthians partners with spirits opposed to God and thus offend God. The members of the Corinthian community who advocated eating such food evidently felt that such spirits, if they existed, had no power over them. Paul himself had taught them that through the Spirit they knew "the deep things of God" (1 Cor 2:10). Paul had also said that such knowledge and possession of the Spirit made them superior to angels and other intermediary beings. This can be inferred from 1 Cor 6:3, where he says, "do you not know that we are to judge angels?" Paul's final word was that these Christians with a "strong" conscience on this matter should forgo eating dedicated food whenever doing so would scandalize other Christians whose conscience was "weak" in this regard.

The teaching of the woman John calls "Jezebel" seems to have been similar to that of the "strong" in Corinth. She told her followers that eating dedicated food was permissible. Apparently, her teaching also involved "the deep things of Satan" (2:24). By analogy with the reconstruction given above of the argument of the "strong" in Corinth, we may infer that she communicated revelations concerning Satan and the spirits associated with him. This knowledge involved power over these intermediary beings who were identified with

the Greco-Roman gods. Such power would allow her followers the freedom to eat dedicated food unharmed and without sin.

For the "strong" in Corinth and for the followers of "Jezebel," the issue of dedicated food was not an abstract theological debate, but a practical matter. A tolerant position on this point would allow Christians to mingle socially with non-Christian Gentiles. Such social contact would have been important for Christians who wanted to maintain relationships with non-Christian relatives or who wished to join or maintain membership in one of the numerous local associations.[6] Meals taken in common were virtually always religious. The associations normally had a patron god or goddess who was honored at meetings. The club's common meals often took place on the grounds of a local temple. Christians may have wished to join local burial associations or associations of artisans who shared the same craft. Inscriptions provide evidence that there were many such trade associations in Thyatira.[7] John's teaching advocated a form of Christianity which would remove Christians from the social fabric of their surrounding communities.

Besides allowing the consumption of dedicated food, "Jezebel" is accused of advocating the practice of prostitution (2:20). In the text alluded to, Numbers 25:1–2, the "prostitution" of the Israelites was twofold: intermarriage with non-Israelites and idolatry. The question arises whether "prostitution" in 2:20 is purely metaphorical and thus refers to idolatry only, or whether some actual sexual practice is involved. In verses 22–23, the sexual metaphor is extended. Those who accept her teaching (or her partners in leadership) are described as those who commit adultery with her. The reference to her "children" is probably a way of describing her followers. This figurative language suggests that prostitution means idolatry only, although tolerance of mixed marriages may also be a factor.[8]

What can we infer from the accusation of idolatry? It is unlikely that a Christian leader advocated polytheism in a theological sense. What was at stake was the question whether Christian and Greco-Roman culture were compatible. This was a difficult issue since no ancient culture even attempted to be secular or religiously neutral. John implies that they are incompatible and that Christians must avoid Greco-Roman cultural institutions and forms.

The position of "Jezebel," therefore, was probably not as extreme as it appears when the text is accepted at face value. Persons who took a position apparently similar to hers were accepted as members of the congregation in Corinth. Paul attempted to modify their views and especially their practice, but he did not vilify them as John does his opponents.

John says that the female teacher "calls herself a prophet" (2:20). Evidently she not only claimed to be a prophet, but was recognized as such be a considerable number of Christians in the vicinity. If she had not been well received in at least Thyatira, John would not have been so concerned about her influence.

The phenomenon of early Christian prophecy has been studied intensively in recent

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[6] Ramsay MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

[7] Colin J. Hemer, *The Letters to the Seven Churches of Asia in Their Local Setting* (Journal for the Study of the New Testament, Supplement Series; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986) 108 and 246 n. 10.

[8] Compare Tobit 4:12: "Be on your guard, my child, against all prostitution (πορνεια) and, to begin with, take a wife from the seed of your fathers." Translation is my own, based on Vaticanus and Alexandrinus as edited by Alfred Rahlfs (*Septuaginta*, 7th ed.; Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1935; reprint, 1962).

years.[9] The gift of prophecy played a major role in early Christianity as is shown by 1 Corinthians 11–14, portions of Matthew and the book of Acts. These texts suggest that prophecy was important from the 50s through the 80s. A work called the Teaching of the Lord[10] is probably evidence that prophecy was still significant in Syria toward the end of the first century and possibly into the second. The author of Revelation is now widely regarded as an early Christian prophet. His presence in Asia Minor and the preservation of his book show that prophecy was still practiced and well received in that region around the turn from the first to the second centuries C. E.

Prophecy was a gift often received by early Christian women. Paul acknowledges the activity of female prophets in 1 Cor 11:2–16. According to the book of Acts, the four daughters of Philip prophesied in Caesarea Maritima, a city in the land of Israel and the Roman captial of the province of Judea. John's mention of "Jezebel" is evidence that a woman, whose actual name has not been preserved, exercised the gift of prophecy in Asia Minor toward the end of the first century. It is unlikely that she was the only woman to prophesy in her time and region.[11] John's name-calling has obscured the fact that we have here an important indication of the leadership of women in the early Church of this region.

Sexuality and Salvation

The other text in the book of Revelation which bears upon the lives of actual Christian women of this period is 14:1–5:

> And I saw, and behold, the Lamb standing on Mount Zion and with him one hundred and forty-four thousand, who had his name and the name of his Father written upon their foreheads. And I heard a sound from heaven like the sound of many waters and like the sound of a mighty thunderclap, and the sound which I heard was like the sound of harpists playing their harps. And they were singing a new song before the throne and before the four living creatures and the elders, and no one was able to learn the song except the one hundred and forty-four thousand, the ones who were redeemed from the earth. These are the ones who have not defiled themselves with women, for they are virgins; these are the ones who follow the Lamb wherever he goes.

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[9] David Hill, "Prophecy and Prophets in the Revelation of St. John," *NTS* 18 (1971–72) 412–13; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "Apokalypsis and Propheteia: The Book of Revelation in the Context of Early Christian Prophecy," in *L'Apocalypse johannique et l'apocalyptique dans le Nouveau Testament* (ed. J. Lambrecht; BETL 53; Gembloux: Duculot, 1980) 105–128; David Aune, *Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983); see the bibliography in Aune for further literature on the subject.

[10] This work is usually classified with "the Apostolic Literature" and referred to as the *Didache*. See Jean-Paul Audet, *La Didache: Instruction des apotres* (Paris: Gabalda, 1985); Robert Kraft, *Barnabas and Didache* (Apostolic Fathers, vol. 3; New York: Nelson & Sons, 1965); K. Wengst, *Schriften des Urchristentums: Didache, Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet* (Munich: Kösler-Verlag, 1984).

[11] On the religious activites of women in Asia Minor, see Dennis R. MacDonald, *The Legend and the Apostle: The Battle for Paul in Story and Canon* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983).

> These were redeemed from humanity as first-fruits for God and the Lamb, and in their mouths was no deceit; they are unblemished.

This vision belongs to the second great cycle of visions which extends from 12:1 to 22:5. It is the fourth vision in the unnumbered series of symbolic visions which opens the second cycle.[12] The 144,000 who are seen with the Lamb are making in this passage their second appearance in the book. They were introduced first in 7:1–8, one of the two visions intercalated between the sixth and the seventh seals. In chapter 7 they are portrayed as an assembly consisting of 12,000 persons from each of the twelve tribes of Israel. It is unlikely that the references to the twelve tribes should be taken literally and that Jewish Christians are meant. In 2:9 and 3:9, the local Jewish communities in Smyrna and Philadelphia are called synagogues of Satan.[13] In these passages John, in effect, denies membership in Israel to some who were Jews by birth.[14] In 7:1–8, he assumes the corollary: Gentiles may be members of God's people. Compare Paul's argument in Romans 11:13–24.

The number 144,000 clearly has symbolic significance as a multiple of twelve. Thus it should not be taken as a precise, literal enumeration. Nevertheless, the use of a specific number should not be dismissed as "purely symbolic." Those who do so want to take the 144,000 as the same group mentioned in the following vision (7:9–17), namely all the faithful. The problem with this interpretation is that the faithful in the following vision are called "a great multitude, which no one was able to number, from every nation, from all tribes and peoples and tongues" (v 9). Equating the two groups disregards the explicit descriptive contrast between them: numbered and innumerable; from twelve specific tribes, from all tribes. The more appropriate interpretation is that the 144,000 represent a particular group within the whole body of the faithful.

In 14:1–5 the identity of this group becomes clearer.[15] In verse 4 it is said that they "follow the Lamb wherever he goes." According to chapter 5, the most distinctive characteristic of the Lamb is the fact that he was slain. The 144,000, therefore, seem to be those who are called to suffer death for the sake of their faith in Jesus, as Antipas did, who is mentioned in the message to Pergamum (2:13). It is impossible to determine the precise relation of this group to actual historical persons and events. It is not clear whether

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[12] See Adela Yarbro Collins, *Crisis and Catharsis: The Power of the Apocalypse* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984) 111–116; idem, *The Combat Myth in the Book of Revelation* (Harvard Dissertations in Religion; Missoula: Scholars Presss, 1976) 5–44.

[13] Some scholars argue that the allusion is not to Jews, but to Judaizing Christians. This interpretation is not persuasive; see Adela Yarbro Collins, "Insiders and Outsiders in the Book of Revelation and Its Social Context," in *"To See Ourselves As Others See Us": Christians, Jews, "Others" in Late Antiquity* (ed. Jacob Neusner and E. S. Frerichs; Studies in the Humanities; Chico: Scholars Press, 1985) 204–207; idem, "Vilification and Self-Definition in the Book of Revelation," 310–13.

[14] This polemic must be seen in the context of inner-Jewish polemic; see Adela Yarbro Collins, "Insiders and Outsiders in the Book of Revelation and Its Social Context," 208–209.

[15] Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza has argued that this vision has an important literary, symbolic role in the book as a whole; she suggests that it is an antithetical vision to those of the beasts and their followers ("The Followers of the Lamb: Visionary Rhetoric and Socio-Political Situation," in *Early Christian Apocalypticism: Genre and Social Setting, Semeia* 36 (ed. Adela Yarbro Collins; 1986) 131. The argument is persuasive on the whole, but

the group includes persons who have already died or whether the vision expresses solely the author's expectation of future events. Given the genre of the book as a whole and the form of this passage, it seems most appropriate to bracket the historical question and to understand the vision as a rhetorical presentation of ideal discipleship. The author does not expect all Christians to achieve this ideal; thus the contrast between the numbered group and the innumerable multitude.[16]

The hypothesis that the 144,000 are a special group within the faithful who die for their loyalty to the word of God and Christ is supported by the use of sacrificial terminology in the context. In v 5 they are said to be "unblemished" (αμωμοι). This is a technical term meaning the absence of defects in sacrificial animals.[17] It is here used metaphorically, but such use does not mean that the sacrificial connotations are lost. Another sacrificial term is the designation of the 144,000 as "first fruits for God and the Lamb" (v 4). The term "first fruits" (απαρχη) is a sacrificial technical term.[18] Here it is used metaphorically to portray violent death for one's faith as a sacrifice offered to God.[19] The statement that these were redeemed "from humanity" (απο των ανθρωπων) suggests that this special group is the first fruits and the rest of humanity is the harvest. This metaphorical distinction is analogous to the one between the first resurrection described in 20:4–6 and the general resurrection which is related to the final judgment in 20:11–15. Those who were beheaded on account of the testimony of Jesus and the word of God are to be specially honored by the first resurrection. They will reign with Christ for a thousand years. This special honor does not imply that all Christians will or ought to die for their convictions. But the visions of the 144,000 and the first resurrection encourage Christians to stand firm if and when the occasion arises.

In the description of this group we also read: "These are the ones who have not defiled themselves with women, for they are virgins" (v 4). Some commentators argue that this statement is not meant literally.[20] In support of this position, they point to the use of the term "prostitution" in connection with "Jezebel" and "Babylon" and its symbolic meaning of idolatry. This argument is not persuasive. In the messages and other visions, idolatry is symbolized by forbidden sexual acts: prostitution and adultery. Here any kind of heterosexual relation is portrayed as defiling. The distinctiveness of the language used here, along with its concreteness, suggests that the reference is to literal sexual relations.

As was noted above, the possibility cannot be excluded that, in the message to Thyatira, "practicing prostitution" (πορνευσαι) includes mixed marriages as well as idolatry. The similarity of the language of 2:20 to that of the so-called "apostolic decree" of Acts 15:20,

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(continued)
this literary or socio-rhetorical function does not by any means preclude or invalidate the search for clues in the text as to how the [at least implied] author understood the identity of the group depicted in the vision.

[16] The notion that some Christians may take greater obligations upon themselves than others was not uncommon in the early Christian movement. See Matt 19:11; 1 Cor 7:8–9, 9:12b; *Didache* 6:2–3.

[17] BAGD, s.v.

[18] BAGD, s.v.

[19] Compare Rev 6:9, in which the souls of those who have died because of their testimony are depicted as "under the altar." This vision suggests that their life-blood, as it were, was poured out upon the heavenly altar before God as a sacrifice. See also Ignatius, *Romans* 4:2.

[20] For example, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "The Followers of the Lamb," 133.

29 supports the idea that actual sexual practices or marriage laws are involved. The "apostolic decree" requires Gentile Christians "to avoid instances of pollution caused by idols, to avoid prostitution (πορνεια; the translation "sexual immorality" or "unchastity" may be more appropriate here), to abstain from the meat of animals which were not properly slaughtered, and from blood" (v 20).[21] A number of scholars have argued persuasively that "prostitution" (porneia) in the "apostolic decree" refers to failure to observe ritual regulations related to sexuality, such as those given in Leviticus 12, 15, and 18.[22]

The reference in Rev 14:4 to those "who have not defiled themselves with women" calls to mind such sexual regulations. The term "defile" (μολυνω) in the ancient world was used especially for sexual defilement.[23] The allusion here could be to the failure to cleanse oneself after intercourse or to observe the rules concerning menstruation.[24] Such an allusion is not the primary point of the passage, however, given the statement that the 144,000 are "virgins" (παρθενοι). The passage thus expresses a point of view in which the defiling potential of sexual relations with women is to be avoided by avoiding such relations altogether. The question arises as to the occasion and rationale for this intensification of the quest for ritual purity and for the androcentric way in which the achievement of purity is expressed.

One possibility is that the occasion for the intensification of the value of purity was the adaptation of holy war tradition in the book of Revelation. The ancient Israelite notion of holy war involved the understanding that Yahweh and his angels fought alongside the men of Israel and were present in the military camp. Because of this heavenly presence, the camp had to be kept holy. Various regulations were developed to that end, among which were restrictions on sexual relations. Such relations were forbidden for a time preceding the gathering of the military force and within the camp.[25] The ancient holy war traditions had not been forgotten in John's time. The Maccabees had revived them in the second century B.C.E.[26] The community at Qumran who produced the Dead Sea Scrolls adapted the notion of holy war to articulate their understanding of the last days.[27] Revelation also makes use of this tradition, especially in

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[21] A number of scholars have concluded that the remarks in Rev 2:20 are directly dependent on the "apostolic decree." It is more likely that the similarity between the two was due to common tradition or similar approaches to local issues. See Yarbro Collins, "Insiders and Outsiders in the Book of Revelation and Its Social Context," 211–13.

[22] See Marcel Simon, "The Apostolic Decree and Its Setting in the Ancient Church," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 52 (1970) 437–460; Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 469.

[23] F. Hauck, μολυνω, μολυσμος *TDNT* 4 (1967) 736.

[24] See Lev 15:18, the tractate *Niddah (The Menstruant)* in the Mishnah, and the Pseudo-Clementine *Homilies* vii.8; the latter text is cited and discussed by Simon, "The Apostolic Decree," 447–48.

[25] See Frank M. Cross, Jr., *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of the Religion of Israel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973) 91–111; Patrick D. Miller, *The Divine Warrior in Early Israel* (Harvard Semitic Monographs; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).

[26] Adela Yarbro Collins, "The Political Perspective of the Revelation to John," *JBL* 96 (1977) 242–43.

[27] Frank M. Cross, Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies* (rev. ed.; Anchor Books; Garden City: Doubleday, 1961) 61 n. 16, 98–99.

the account of the last battle in 19:11–21.[28] The expectation that the faithful were to have an active role in the eschatological battle (Rev 17:14) could be the occasion for the high value placed on sexual continence and for the androcentric point of view (warriors were normally men).

Cross points out that the ascetic tendencies at Qumran can also be understood as an intensification of the priestly purity regulations and their extension to the whole community.[29] The notion of the priesthood of the whole Christian community is an important one in the book of Revelation.[30] As at Qumran, the notion of the purity of holy war and that of the priesthood may have reinforced one another in the milieu of the book of Revelation. The androcentric point of view would thus in part reflect the traditional Israelite-Jewish state of affairs in which only men were priests.

The priest had to be holy because of his special closeness to God. Similarly, around the turn of the era in some contexts the prophet was seen as one especially close to God. Philo treated the priestly and the prophetic roles of Moses as virtually identical. Near the beginning of his treatment of the third aspect of the life of Moses, his priesthood, Philo states that Moses had to be clean (καθαρευσαι), in order to exercise his priesthood, which is the service of God:

> But first he had to be clean, as in soul, so also in body, to have no dealings with any passion, purifying himself from all the calls of mortal nature, food and drink and intercourse with women. This last he had disdained for many a day, almost from the time when, possessed by the spirit, he entered on his work as a prophet, since he held it fitting to hold himself always in readiness to receive the oracular messages. As for eating and drinking, he had no thought of them for forty successive days, doubtless because he had the better food of contemplation, through whose inspiration, sent from heaven above, he grew in grace. . . . (*On the Life of Moses* 2.68–69)[31]

Philo's rationale for Moses' sexual continence is clearly a metaphysical dualism in which material, earthly things are devalued in comparison with the heavenly. Nevertheless, one may ask whether the book of Revelation, as an apocalyptic work, did not link the prophet in a similar way to the heavenly world and thus to sexual continence.

Besides understanding themselves as priests and as potential holy warriors, the community at Qumran understood themselves to be living with and like the angels.[32] This notion appears to be a characteristically apocalyptic one. The aim of apocalyptic revelation and piety is to share in the life of the heavenly world and to overcome the evils, dislocations and limitations of finite, earthly life. This aim is often expressed by the expectation of human transformation into a heavenly or angelic existence (e.g., Dan 12:3). In the present special individuals may attain that angelic existence, at least temporarily (see the Book of the Watchers, i.e., *1 Enoch* 1–36, and the *Ascension of Isaiah*).

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[28] Yarbro Collins, "The Political Perspective of the Revelation to John," 246–48.

[29] Cross, *The Ancient Library of Qumran*, 98.

[30] Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *Priester für Gott: Studien zum Herrschafts- und Priestermotiv in der Apokalypse* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972).

[31] Translation by F. H. Colson, LCL.

[32] Cross, *The Ancient Library of Qumran*, 99; John J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to the Jewish Matrix of Christianity* (New York: Crossroad, 1984) 133–35.

The Book of the Watchers is especially interesting in relation to Rev 14:1–5. This early apocalypse[33] contains a narrative about the fallen angels which is similar to, but much more elaborate than Gen 6:1–4. It is said that some angels came down from heaven and took human wives for themselves. These angels taught the women heavenly secrets, including charms and spells, the arts of war etc. This illegitimate revelation (and the illegitimate children which they produced, the giants) was the cause of all the evils upon the earth (*1 Enoch* 6–9). The good angels comment that the fallen angels "lay with those women and became unclean" (9:8).[34] Later in the text the Lord, while decreeing the punishment of the wayward angels, remarks that they "have associated with the women to corrupt themselves with them in all their uncleanness" (10:11). Enoch, who had been "hidden" (compare Gen 5:24) and was dwelling with the angels or Watchers, was sent to the fallen Watchers to inform them of the divine decree. They ask Enoch to intercede with the Lord on their behalf, so that they might be forgiven. Instead of forgiving the Watchers, the Lord instructs Enoch to go and say to them,

> "You ought to petition on behalf of men, not men on behalf of you. Why have you left the high, holy and eternal heaven, and lain with the women and become unclean with the daughters of men, and taken wives for yourselves, and done as the sons of the earth and begotten giant sons? You were spiritual, holy, living an eternal life, but you became unclean upon the women,[35] and begat children through the blood of flesh, and lusted after the blood of men, and produced flesh and blood as they do who die and are destroyed" (15:2–4).

A clue for interpretation is the remark "You ought to petition on behalf of men, not men on behalf of you" (15:2). Enoch and some of the angels have exchanged places. The heavenly and spiritual existence of some angels has been transformed into an earthly existence, involving flesh and blood, procreation, and death. Enoch's earthly and fleshly existence has been transformed into a heavenly and spiritual one. Sexual intercourse with women is a narrative emblem for earthly existence. The exchange by the angels of a spiritual existence for an earthly one is symbolized by their having sexual relations with women. Although it is not explicit in the narrative, the corollary is that a man's exchange of an earthly existence for a spiritual, heavenly one may be symbolized by abstaining from sexual relations with women.

The underlying logic of Rev 14:1–5 seems to be the same. The 144,000 exemplify the ideal of an apocalyptic Christian piety, in which the goal is a transformed human existence. Through a faithful death, Christians may participate in eternal, heavenly life (see 14:13, 12:10–11, 7:14–17). In the present, that existence may be anticipated by a life of sexual continence (14:4; compare Luke 20:34–36).

Even apart from the question of gender, this passage is problematic in a twentieth-century American context. The rationale for sexual continence is purity and an orientation toward the heavenly world. Even in the Catholic tradition, which continues to require celibacy for priests, contemporary reflection on celibacy centers on the forgoing

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[33] It is at least pre-Maccabean and may be earlier; see Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination*, 36.

[34] Translation by M. A. Knibb in *The Apocryphal Old Testament* (ed. H.F.D. Sparks; Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

[35] So the Ethiopic; according to Knibb, the original Greek read "through the blood of the women."

of intimacy and family in order to devote oneself more freely to service.

The particular wording of the passage, moreover, raises questions about the underlying definitions of maleness and femaleness. In the first case, the wording is one-sided. It assumes that the model Christian is male. If the model Christian were female, the wording would be: "These are those who have not defiled themselves with men." If mutuality and reciprocity were the rule, the point would be expressed thus: "These are they who have not defiled themselves through sexual relations." In this particular case, it is not just a matter of the generic masculine used to refer to both males and females. There is also a suggestion that males are more pure than females and that females are more defiling than males.

Within the Bible, this underlying logic is most clearly expressed in the book of Leviticus in its regulations related to sexual purity. For example, if a woman bears a male child, she is unclean for forty days. If she bears a female child, she is unclean for eighty days, twice as long (Lev 12:1–5). If a man has an emission of semen, he is unclean until evening, and after sexual relations, both the man and woman are unclean until evening (Lev 15:16–18). But a woman's monthly discharge is treated like a man's abnormal discharge; in these cases the person is unclean for seven days (Lev 15:1–12, 19–30).

It is tempting for Christians to claim that the logic of purity affects only observant Jews and that it plays no role in Christian thought and life. This claim is probably not justified. American women seeking ordination in the Episcopalian Church in the 1970s were sometimes told in private that menstruation and priesthood were incompatible. Such remarks are a sign that the logic of purity is still operative on a deep, usually unconscious level in American society.

History-of-religions and anthropological studies are helpful in coming to terms with this heritage and transforming it into attitudes more affirming of femaleness. Two paths of exploration have been opened: the search for origins and the question of function. Mircea Eliade argued that the distinction between "clean" and "unclean" or "pure" and "impure" is a relatively late development.[36] Originally, there was the simple experience of the numinous, the sacred. The original distinction then was between the sacred and the profane, the numinous and the ordinary. All that was awesome, mysterious and beyond human control was experienced as sacred. Birth and death were numinous events. The female cycle, closely associated with birth, was also numinous because of the anomaly of bleeding without being injured. It was only later that some numinous processes were labelled positive, some negative. This path of exploration suggests that we attempt to recapture the original numinous attitude and its positive aspects and reject the negative attitudes as having roots in fear, including fear of women, and later, in anti-material bias.

The question of function has been explored by Mary Douglas.[37] She pointed out a correlation between patriarchal societies and purity laws restrictive of women. In more mutual or matriarchal societies, purity laws tend to be reciprocal, if they appear at all. This line of thought suggests that attempts be made to change social structures along with negative attitudes toward women's bodies.

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[36] Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1959).

[37] Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).

Conclusion

We have looked at two passages which reflect something of the ordinary daily lives of women in the seven congregations addressed by the Apocalypse. Rev 14:1–5 makes these women worse than invisible. Not only are the ideal Christians portrayed in male terms, but women are depicted as dangerous: sexual contact with women is defiling. This passage suggests that women in these congregations be defined as inferior and subordinate to men. The other passage, however, suggests that some women exercised leadership in these communities as prophets. The association of the nameless woman prophet with Jezebel and false teaching casts a shadow on this leadership and anticipates later struggles in the Church. These two passages show that the Bible has a dual role in the history of women: it is a record of our oppression as well as a source for the the reconstruction of a usable past and of images of hope.

Possible Orphic Influence on a Group of South Italiote Terracottas

Catherine Clark Kroeger

Of all the ancient ceramists, those of ancient Canusium (modern Canosa in southern Italy) most allowed their imaginations to run riot. In a period when the potters of mainland Greece had abandoned their rich artistic heritage, those of Apulia—Greek in ancestry and heritage—continued and flourished. The art which remains of the tomb hordes is rich in religious value though of dubious artistic merit. The wall paintings, the vases, and the terracotta statues reveal much of life here and hereafter as viewed by the Canosans. Canosa and much of Apulia can be demonstrated to have had an Orphic view of the after-life which was expressed in funerary pottery. One Canosan vase, now in the Berlin Museum, is an important source for the study of Orphic beliefs. It was this vase upon which Bachofen based his studies of ancient Orphism.[1]

The highly embellished statuettes which served as grave offerings excite more astonishment than admiration. Their style appears excessive and extravagantly ornate to our modern taste, their conception grotesque, and their size monstrous. Some stand almost six feet tall and fill the viewer with perplexity. Since typical examples of Greek taste are found at the same site, it seems evident that these strange works of art communicate a special religious message which needed to be conveyed in forms that gave a secondary importance to grace and beauty. Of terracottas in Magna Graecia, Zuntz wrote:

> They are primarily religious not artistic objects. They are indeed *agalmata;* things, that is, in which the deity of a sanctuary and the dead in his grave were meant to delight; . . . These were primarily tokens of devotion; of this devotion, and of its divine objects, they may tell us, if we make bold to ask after this, their essence.[2]

A special genre of Canosan terracotta is that of a female head. Such heads were also known in burial sites in Asia Minor and were generally thought to rerpresent the head of a goddess of the dead, such as Cybele, Demeter or Persephone. More astonishing yet are the female heads which are surmounted by a smaller feminine figure, usually swathed in graceful drapery. (See drawing on next page) These strange statuary configurations, a large female head beneath the standing figure of a woman, date mostly to the third and fourth century B.C. The lower head forms the belly of a vessel while the standing figure constitutes part of the handle. The lack of apertures and sometimes even of a base preclude the use of these artifacts as vases which might hold a fluid. They could only have been used as funerary offerings.

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[1] J. J. Bachofen, *Die Unsterblichkeitislehre der orphischen Theologie,* Berlin,1871 1867; See also K. Meuli in *J. J. Bachofens Gesammelte Werke* VII, (Basel, 1958) frontispiece and "Nachwort" pl. Q, 493 ff; and E. P. Biardot, *Les terres-cuites grecques funèbres dans leur rapport avec les mystères de Bacchus,* Paris, 1872. p. 414 ff.

[2] Günther Kuntz, *Persephone: Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia.* Oxford,1971. p. 91.



Although there are certain differences in execution, the same configuration always prevails. The lower head is executed in garish and crude fashion,[3] while the upper figure is of more refined Tanagran influence. The colors of the latter are muted and subtle, and present a marked contrast to the head below. Perhaps this contrast indicates two different realms of existence between the large head and the smaller figure.

More than twenty-five such statuettes are known, and they appear to have been a convention in the graves around Canosa.[4] Fewer have been discovered in other parts of southern Italy. They form a distinct genre, usually discovered as pairs, or in one case, in fours. In all cases, the lower head wears a crown within which the upper figure stands. The large head has a net or snood painted over the hair. All that I have examined show a crown, earrings, and a necklace on the lower head as well as leaves, an iconographic symbol of a chthonic goddess, usually Persephone.

The crown of the lower head in some pieces is composed of seven laurel leaves, perhaps reminiscent of the seven spheres through which the departed spirit must travel in certain ancient theologies. The laurel, a symbol of immortality, was often planted in cemeteries and was, Cook suggests, originally intended "as a vehicle for the soul of the deceased."[5] Empedocles looked upon the laurel plant as the abode of righteous daimones who were ready to progress to a higher stage of incarnation.[6]

That these strange grave offerings have a religious significance is scarcely to be doubted, but what can it be? Certainly the concept of one woman standing upon the head of another is highly unusual. The general consensus is that the upper figure depicts the dead person in whose honor the funerary gift was made. All of these figures are female and may well represent a dead woman,[7] but some are winged and may simply denote the departing soul. But what of the lower head? Very often in Apulian funerary art, such heads denote Persephone, queen of the dead. The other grave goods deposited with these remarkable terracottas demonstrate a preoccupation with the final journey of the soul.

> Their iconographic "program" expresses the current belief regarding the afterlife: voyage to the Islands of the Blessed (biga, quadriga, sea monsters, dolphin, Pegasus), persons accompanying the dead's soul (figurines, relief head), demons of the other world (gorgoneion, relief head).[8]

Biardot painstakingly examined these artifacts and offered minute interpretations in terms of Orphic and Bacchic beliefs.[9] Most he related to the soul's ascent to the moon, but the

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[3] Biardot describes the lower heads as "semi-archaic" in style (p. 419).

[4] See bibliography in Andrew. Oliver, Jr., "The Reconstruction of Two Apulian Tomb Groups," *Antike Kunst*, Supplement 5 (1968), p. 19, n. 99.

[5] A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, p. 687, n. 3.

[6] Frags. 117,127 and 140, Diels.

[7] In some cases it is possible to ascertain that the terracottas came from the grave of a woman (Oliver, p. 16 and Biardot, p. 418) but in many other cases the gender of the person interred is unknown. A considerable number of these statuettes have appeared recently in the catalogues of dealers of antiquities.

[8] Fredike van der Wielen-van Ommeren, "Polychrome Vases and Terracottas from Southern Italy in the J. Paul Getty Museum," *Occasional Papers on Antiquities, 3. Greek Vases in the J. Paul Getty Museum* 2. Malibu, 1985. p. 176.

[9] E. P. Biardot, *Les terres-cuites grecques funèbres dans leur rapport avec les mystères de Bacchus*, Paris, 1872. p. 414 ff.

strange figurines with one woman atop another he related to a chthonic journey.[10]

Among the many objects interred with the dead in southern Italy, perhaps the most informative have been tablets made of thin gold leaf and inscribed with mystic texts. They lay either close to the skull of the dead person or in their hands. At Thurii four such tablets dating to the fourth century B.C.-ca-have been unearthed from a funeral mound known as the Timpone Piccolo. Therefore these texts were nearly contemporaneous with the terracottas, and they tell of the passing of the soul from one state to another. Three in particular tell of the arrival of the pure soul in the presence of Persphone.[11] A collation of these fragmentary texts produces a formula addressed to the goddess of the underworld and runs in part:[12]

> And I have paid the penalty for unrighteous deeds,
> I have flown out of the troublesome circle of hardship.
> With eager feet I have stepped inside the lovely crown for which I longed.
> I have sunk beneath the bosom of the goddess, the chthonic queen.
> Now I come as a suppliant to holy Persephone
> That she may graciously escort me to the seats of the pure.
> "Happy and blessed one, you shall be divine instead of mortal."[13]

In the last line, there is a switch from the first to the second person singular. The preceding lines are the prayer of the soul to Persephone, and the final verse is the response of the goddess. The petition has been granted and the soul apotheosized.

The curious statuettes of Canosa and its environs appear to give a crude visualization of this formula. Although there is scholarly debate as to whether the gold plates are Orphic, Pythagorean or Bacchic, it is generally agreed that this formula must refer to some sort of ritual which prepared the departed during his or her lifetime for a blessed hereafter. Burkert remarked that behind the phrase δεσποίνας δ' ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας βασιλείας "lies an essentially pre-Pythagorean mystery rite in which Pythagoreans were free to participate."[14]

Initiation into the mystery cults was known to simulate both marriage and death, and all three experiences were called by the same name.[15] In the Greek mysteries the death of the believer was prefigured in an initiation that somehow brought the adherent into

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[10] For later interpretations, see M. Trumpf-Lyritzaki, Griechische Figurenvasen, Bonn, 1969, p. 128 ff., and A. Riccardi, "Vasi configurati a testa umana di provenienza o produzione conosina nel Museo di Bari" in Ada Riccardi, Angela Ciancio, Marcella Chelottia, *Canosa I*, Bari, 1980, p. 7–21.

[11] A degenerated version of the same text dating some six hundred years later, was found in the grave of Caecilia Secundina. See Zuntz, p. 333–335.

[12] I have followed here a collation of the texts as reconstructed by Gilbert Murray in his "Appendix C", Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, repr. New York, 1975. p. 669.

[13] ποινὰν δ' ἀνταπέτεισ' ἔργων ἕνεκ' οὔτι δικαίων· κύκλου δ' ἐξέβαν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο, ἱμερτοῦ στεφάνου ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι, δεσποίνας δ' ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας βασιλείας. νὺν δ' <ἱ>'κ<έτης> ἥκω παρ' ἁ<γνὴν Περσεφ<όνειαν> ὣς με πρόφρων πέμψῃ ἕδρας ἐς εὐαγέων. ὄλβιε καὶ μακαριστὲ, θεὸς δ' ἔσῃ ἀντὶ βροτοῖο. Emended text in Zuntz, p. 300–305.

[14] Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, tr. Edwin L. Minar, Cambridge, 1972, p. 113 n. 21.

[15] Schol. *ad Soph. Antig.* 1241.

a special relationship with the deity, either by a second birth process for adoption, by simulated death, or a marriage ceremony. It is possible that the terracottas represent the moment at which the dead woman assumes immortality, when she becomes divine instead of mortal. If the lower head is that of Persephone, then the upper figure stands within the lovely crown, perhaps to sink beneath the bosom of the goddess.

The term κόλπος might be understood as lap or bosom or womb. Plato speaks of a rite by which the inititiate passed though the throne of a seated goddess, in this case Ananke.[16] ὑπὸ κόλπον was sometimes an explicitly sexual term[17] and may be a sexual euphemism referring to a mystic marriage of the inititiate with the goddess. Men were indeed supposed to mate with Persephone, queen of the dead.[18] But where did this leave room for women?

In the Orphic hymns Dionysos himself is called ὑποκόλπιε "he who is beneath the bosom", which Harrison argues must be a symbol of birth.[19] Burkert suggests that the phrase in the gold leaf of the Timpone Piccolo may refer to a rebirth.[20] The statuette may indicate a naive belief that the deceased quite literally descended beneath the bosom of the goddess. Women as well as men might lie within the womb of the goddess, to be born into immortality or a better incarnation.

We note that each figure of a standing woman wears a crown. Theo Smyrnaeus tells us that the fourth stage of initation is that in which the initiate is crowned with garlands, and the fifth is that of knowing oneself beloved of the gods.[21] It was said that those who had been intitiated into the Bacchic mysteries were crowned with a garland of poplar as a memorial of the wreath of poplar which Hercules donned in Hades during his *katabasis* after his conquest of Cerberus.[22] Plato says that the blessed in the after-life are crowned with garlands.[23]

Many South Italiote funeral vases show a Cupid swooping down to crown the dead woman, and a magnificent gold crown was actually found in one of the tombs of Canosa.

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[16] Plato *Rep.* 620 e.

[17] ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τοῦ ὀλεθρίου ἐκείνου ἀνδρὸς φιλήματά τε ἐγίγνετο ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ περιπλοκαί. εἰ δὲ μὴ πολλαὶ ἦσαν αἱ δᾷδες τάχ' ἄν τι καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ κόλπου ἐπράττετο. Lucian *Alexander the False Prophet* 39. Clement of Alexandria (*Protrep.* 2:16) explains the phrase ὁ διὰ κόλπου θεός as having a sexual implication (διελκόμενος τοὺ κόλπου τῶν τελουμένων, ἔλεγχος ἀκρασίας Διός).

[18] For references to death as entry into the bridal chamber of Persephone, see J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion,* repr. New Hyde Park, 1964. p. 595 f.

[19] Harrison, p. 593.

[20] Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion,* p. 295; 459, n. 10. See also Rohde, "Initiation Considered as Adoption by the God," *Psyche,* Apppendix XI p. 601–603.

[21] Theo. Smyrn. *Mathem.* I. p. 18. For other references to the use of wreaths in initiation rites, see Aristophanes *Clouds* 254 and IG II/III 2. 4077. For the use of wreaths at funerals, Plutarch *Aristides* 21.

[22] Poplar grew in Hades "because this plant is chthonic, and so is Dionysos the son of Persephone." Harpocratian *leuke,* cf. Photius, *leuke,* and Schol. A. Il. 13.389. Eratosthenes FGr Hist 241 F 6. Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion,* tr. John Raffan, Cambridge, 1985,p. 294. For wreaths at funerals Plutarch *Aristides,* 21, and the burial of the dead with black poplar leaves. Pliny 35, 160.

[23] Plato *Repub.* 363 C.

In the Orphic Canosan vase, the father of the departed family is crowning himself as he approaches Persephone, queen of the dead.

As we have seen, in each case the standing figure, supposed to be that of the dead woman, is crowned. This I understood to be a sign of the completion of the telestic rites.The most magnificent of these statuettes stands some four feet tall and is now in the Bari Museum. The upper figure bears wings and is dancing. We are reminded of Lucian's comment that no initiation is performed without dance.[24] Does she dance with joy at the culmination of her initation as does the initiated Dionysiac woman at the Villa of the Mysteries in Pompeii? Or does she dance at the moment of her own apotheosis? Socrates maintained that the soul was always thirsting for the realms of immortality and striving after the heavenly choral dance. Perhaps the dancing soul has flown out of the weary circle of human existence, and the wings are an indication of her transformed status. Perhaps we are afforded here a glimpse of a transition to immortality in ancient Canusium, a visualization of the moment when divinity was achieved. The dead person has arrived safely within the lovely crown of the goddess.[25] Now she may sink down beneath the bosom of the goddess to be adopted as her own, no longer mortal but divine. The promise of the initiation has been fulfilled in apotheosis.

The occurrence of the remarkable Canosan terracottas in doublets or in one case as a foursome may indicate a representation of both birth and death. Perhaps the second in the pair represents not the moment of death but the moment of rebirth nine years later when Persephone sends the soul again up to the light of the world. Pindar wrote

> But those from whom Persephone accepts atonement for her ancient grief, she sends their souls in the ninth year up again to the sun of this world above; thence spring noble kings, men distinguished by strength and speed and those who are greatest in wisdom; and for all time to come people call them holy heroes.[26]

As we have seen, the text of the Gold Plates also mentions expiation for sin.[27] Here, however, Persphone sends souls up into the light of day rather than receiving them downward into her bosom. "The concept of Persephone as giver of Life no less than of Death was, as we have seen, alive among the Western Greeks."[28] The Canosan heads of Persephone are covered with leaves, fruit and flowers, all symbols of the fertility which she pushes up from the earth beneath. In some of statuettes, tiny human heads emerge

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[24] *De Salt.* 15.22. For the use of dance in initiation, see Walter Burkert, *Homo Necans,* p. 288.

[25] The κύκλος from which the initiate has escaped is generally conceded to be the cycle of generation. According to the neo-Pythagoreans, those initiated to Dionysos and Kore were saved from the κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως. (Orph. Frag. 229, Diehl) But see Kuntz, p. 320–321.

[26] οἵσι γάρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέξεται, εἰς τόν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῃ ἔτει ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν, ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι ἄνδρες αὔξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλέονται. Pindar, fr. 133, Sandys.= 127 Bowra. Plato *Meno,* 81 b-c, see also Pindar *Ol.* 2.56ff

[27] See Larry J. Alderink, *Creation and Salvation in Ancient Orphism,* Chico, CA, 1981. p. 72–74.

[28] Kuntz, *Persephone,* p. 257.

from the larger one of Persephone. Like sprouting buds, they arise from between spreading leaves.

In classical antiquity, the head frequently was viewed as the source of life.[29] The sperm as well as life-giving moisture came from the brain.[30] From the concept of the head as the source of generation, it followed that the father was viewed as procreator and head of the family. Artemidorus of Ephesus, a philosopher of the second century C.E., wrote that the head was like one's father[31] because just as the head was the source of light and life for the whole body, so a father was the source of life for his son.[32] He wrote again "The head is like one's parents because it is the cause of one's having life."[33]

The concept of head as source of life was so strongly entrenched among the Pythagoreans that they were forbidden to eat any meat from the head lest it prove to be that of an ancestor who had become an animal in a subsequent reincarnation. This practice precluded a descendant eating the very organ from which he or she had sprung.[34] Even the head of Orpheus continued to prophesy after it was dismembered from the rest of his body.

Athena had sprung directly from the head of her father Zeus, a remarkable birth which circumvented several steps in the normal process of generation. In Orphic cosmogony, all things had their beginning in Zeus. He was called "the head, the middle, and the ultimate culmination."[35] I suggest that in these unusual funerary pieces the head of Persephone, like the head of Zeus, was the source of all life as well as its culmination. The tiny human heads which in some of the statuetes spring from the lower head must indicate the power to send up human life as well as vegetation from the earth beneath. In certain sets of the statuettes, one of the lower heads is tilted slightly upwards as though perhaps in send-off; and the figure atop it raises her head, and the arms stretch forward as though in expectation.

But how are we to understand the crown of the goddess herself? Why does the upper figure always stand within the crown of the lower head? The Orphic gold plates speak of escaping the circle and later of stepping with eager feet within the crown. Jane Harrison wrote of the formula from Thurii:

> If the rites are enumerated in the order of their performance, this rite of birth

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[29] For early Christians, the concept of κεφαλή as ἀρχή became a matter of intense doctrinal importance. See my essay, "The Classical Concept of 'Head' as 'Source' " in an appendix of Gretchen Gaebelein Hull, *Equal to Serve*, Old Tappan, NJ, 1987.

[30] Alcmaeon of Croton, ed. Diels A13. Aristotle explained that the semen descended from the head through the spinal cord to the genitals and was then sent forth to produce new life. ἡ γᾶρ γονή ἐστιν ἀπὸ τοὺ ἐγκεφάλου χωροῦσα διὰ τῆς ῥάχεως. Aristotle *Problemata*, X.57. δοκεῖ δὲ πηγὴ εἶναι ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ ὑγροῦ· *Problemata* .10 (867a).

[31] οἷον κεφαλὴ εἰς πατέρα Artemidorus Daldiensis. *Oneicr.* I, 2, p. 9 ed. Teubner.

[32] ὃς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς αἴτιος ἦν, ωσπερ καὶ ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ παντὸς σώματος. Artemidorus Daldiensis. *Oneirocritica* I, 2, p. 7 ed. Teubner.

[33] γονεῦσι μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ κεφαλὴ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ζῆν αἰτίαν εἶναι: ibid. I.35, p. 43.

[34] Plutarch told of those who abstained from eating an egg just as others did from the brain "thinking it to be the source of generation." Plutarch *Symposium* 2.3. Athenaeus II.65, ἐγκέφαλον, ἀρχὴν ἡγούμενος γενέσεως.

[35] Orph. Frag. 168.

> or adoption must have taken place *within* the Circle, after the entrance into and before the exit *from*.[36]

It is possible that the emerging soul issued forth from the crown upon the goddess' head. As we have seen, the formula Thurii speaks of stepping forth, after expiation has been made, from the weary sorrowful circle. An alternate reading of the gold-leaf text declares ἱμερτοῦ δ' ἀπέβαν στεμάνου ποσὶ καρπασίμοισι "With eager feet I have stepped out of the lovely crown." This may, I suggest, describe birth, subsequently to be followed by death. Damascius, the last of the Neo-platonists, declared that the wreath of Hecate (another chthonic goddess) was the ultimate primal source of generation.[37]

One cannot establish a connection conclusively, but these statuettes pictorialize, either consciously or unconsciously, certain Orphic doctrines pertaining to salvation, immortality, and rebirth. They bring us no closer to the telestic rites which might have been described by the gold leaves, but they do appear to give us a primitive conceptualization of the actual moment of birth and of apotheosis.

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[36] Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, reprinted New York: 1975, p. 593.

[37] Damascius I.241.24ff. Hekate is often associated with Persephone and is called by Apuleius "triple-faced Proserpina" (*Metamorphoses* XI.2).

Greco-Roman Slave Terminology and Pauline Metaphors for Salvation

Wayne G. Rollins
Assumption College, Worchester MA

> "[18]I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us. [19]For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God; [20]for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of him who subjected it in hope (*eph'elpidi*); [21]because the creation itself will be set free (*eleutherôthêsetai*) from its bondage (*douleias*) to decay and obtain the glorious liberty (*eleutherian*) of the children of God. [22]We know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now; [23]and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits (*aparchên*) of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as sons (*huiothesian*), the redemption (*apolytrôsin*) of our bodies (*sômatos*). [24]For in this hope (*elpidi*) we are saved (*esôthêmen*). Now hope (*elpis*) that is seen is not hope (*elpis*). For who hopes (*elpizei*) for what he sees? [25]But if we hope (*elpizomen*) for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience." Romans 8:18–25

Gerd Theissen of the University of Heidelberg has recently provided us with a fresh definition of the goal of Biblical criticism, namely "to make the texts intelligible on the basis of their connection to life."[1] The purpose of the present paper is to make the text of Romans 8:18–25 more intelligible by identifying its description of *salvation* as a metaphor drawn from the institution of slavery in Greco-Roman life in the first century C.E.

I. Salvation-language and Salvation Metaphors in the Pauline Epistles

Salvation-language is well-represented in the Pauline epistles with the verb *sôzô* (18 times),[2] the noun *sôtêr* (twice),[3] and the noun *sôtêria* (15 times).[4] However, as Werner Foerster has observed, the use of salvation language in Paul and in the NT as a whole, differs from that in both the Greco-Roman and Jewish traditions of the period.[5] Salvation

[1] *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology*, tr. John P. Galvin (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), p. 394.

[2] Rom. 5:9, 10; 8:24; 9:27; 10:9, 13; 11:14, 26; I Cor. 1:18, 21; 3:15; 5:5; 7:16; 9:22; 10:33; 15:2; 2 Cor. 2:15; I Thess. 2:16.

[3] Phil. 3:20; (Eph. 5:23).

[4] Rom. 1:16; 10:1, 10; 11:11; 13:11; 2 Cor. 1:6(*bis*); 6:2, 12; 7:10; Phil. 1:19, 28; 2:12; I Thess, 5:8, 9.

[5] With Georg Fohrer in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, VII, ed. Gerhard Friederich; tr. & ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), pp. 965–1024.

in the NT is not a matter of being snatched by the gods from personal peril nor a matter of well-being or of "health of body and soul" in a strictly physical or temporal sense as in Greek understanding; nor is it simply the guarantee of life after death mediated by a "magical sacramental act" as with the Mysteries; nor is it a matter of liberation of the people of God from their enemies, as in late Judaism.[6] Salvation in the NT in general, but in Paul specifically, is the liberating not of the soul, but the whole person, from sin and its effects, including the divine wrath. As such, *sôtêria* in Paul is both a present (realized)[7] and future (yet to be fully realized)[8] reality, including not only the self but all creation.

Paul employs a range of alternative terms to express in whole or in part the reality to which the above *sôs*-root group of terms refer. These include the terminology of "justification" (*dikaiosynê*),[9] "reconciliation" (*katallagê*),[10] "forgiveness of sins" (*aphesis tôn hamartiôn*),[11] and "new creation" (*kainê ktisis*).[12] He also enlists five key metaphors:[13] (1) *the metaphor of propitiation drawn from Jewish sacrifical practice,* where Jesus is portrayed as the one who saves by offering propitiation for sin through the shedding of his blood (cf. Rom. 3:25f.; 5:9; I Cor. 11:24).[14] (2) *The metaphor of vicarious sacrifice, drawn from "cultic-juristic" thinking,* where Christ is imaged as the one who saves by dying in place of another ("for us," Gal. 3:13; "in our place," 2 Cor. 5:21, etc.). (3) *The metaphor of participation in the fate of a cult Divinity through sacral rites, drawn from the Mystery religions,* where the "saved" are figuratively identified with those who share in the death and resurrection of Christ, the Lord of the cultic community, through rites of baptism and sacramental communion (cf. Rom. 6:4–11; I Cor. 10:16–21; 11:17–31). (4) *The metaphor of the Second Man drawn from the Adamic speculation of first-century C.E. Judaism.*[15] The Christ Hymn of Phil. 2:6–11 along with Paul's resurrection discourse in I Cor. 15:42–50 advances an image of Christ as a "second man" who provides the model of a new humanity with which the saved community is now identified. (5) *The metaphor of redemption and the consequent fully-realized freedom from the powers of law, sin, and death, drawn from the institution of slavery as defined by Roman Law and practice in the first century C.E.* Although prior

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[6] Ibid., pp. 1002–3.

[7] E.g., 2 Cor. 6:2, "Now is the day of *sôtêria*."

[8] E.g., Phil. 3:20, "We await a *sôtêr,* the Lord Jesus •Christ, who shall transform our body of humiltiy and conform it to his body of glory."

[9] A central term in the Pauline epistles, occurring 30 times in Romans alone. It is significant however that this and other alternative expressions for "salvation" generally focus on the present dimension of "realized salvation," lacking the eschatological note so fundamental to Paul's thought and experience.

[10] Rom. 5:11; 11:15; 2 Cor. 5:18f.

[11] Only in Eph. 1:7 and Col. 1:14 does the nominal form, *aphesis tôn hamartiôn* occur. Cf. Rom. 4:7 for the verbal form.

[12] 2 Cor. 5:17.

[13] See Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament,* I, tr. Kendrick Grobel (NY: Scribners, 1951), pp. 295–300. Although Bultmann's basic *schema* is followed here, some of his conclusions are not with respect to the cultural provenance of the metaphors.

[14] Cf. related expressions, e.g., Christ died "for our sins" (I Cor. 15:3) or "for us" (Rom. 5:6, 8).

[15] Cf. W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (London: SPCK, 1955), pp. 36–57; Robin Scroggs, *The Last Adam* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), pp. 89-91. Cf. also Rom. 5:12–21; 8:29.

scholarship has identified Paul's use of servile metaphors for the salvation-event in other passages,[16] the purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate their use in Romans 8:18–25.

II. Ubiquity and Variety of Servility and Servile Imagery in the NT Era

In the fifth decade B.C.E. Cicero attacks the policies of Marcus Antonius before the Senate with a familiar image:

> After six years, members of the Senate, we can now hope for our freedom. We have suffered slavery for a longer period than careful and hardworking captives taken in war normally have to. Should we refuse to be wakeful, to be anxious, to make every effort, in order to give the Roman people back its freedom?[17]

The metaphor of slavery comes as naturally to the lips of Cicero in his opposition to imperial policy as it does to the pen of Paul as he envisions the plight and possibility of Christian existence. Slavery reached into every aspect of Roman life providing a ready metaphor for any occasion analogous to the high tragedy and sad comedy of this ubiquitous institution. Surveying the concerns of Roman law, W. W. Buckland observes that the topic of slavery in the *corpus iuris* constitutes "the most characteristic part of the most characteristic intellectual product of Rome."[18] No law could be written without a proviso attending to the question, "What if a slave is involved?", because no conceivable situation was exempt from their presence.

Although the art of population statistics in Roman studies is only partially refined, recent computations estimate a one-to-three ratio of slave to free men in Rome during the Principate, leaving a slave population in all of Italy during the reign of Claudius at 20 million and the slave population in the city of Rome at approximately 400,000.

In individual households the number of slaves varied greatly, from 20,000 in the *familia Caesaris*, to perhaps a squad of eight among the *petit bourgeois*. As late as the fourth century C.E., Libanius of Antioch, head of a philosophical school, complains of the poor economic status of teachers who can afford no more than three or four slaves apiece.

Slaves served in occupations ranging from personal stewards, custodians of children (*paidagôgoi*), to grammarians, geometricians, muscians,[19] managers of farms, masters of ships, estate stewards (*oikonomoi*) and money-lenders. An inscription from Rome identifies the retinue of slaves accompanying an imperial officer, who was himself a slave, on a trip

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[16] For a recent summary see Francis Lyall, *Slaves, Citizens, Sons: Legal Metaphors in the Epistles* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), p. 46. Lyall includes references to I Cor. 7:23 ("You were bought with a price;" Gal. 5:1. "For freedom Christ has set us free; . . . do not submit again to a yoke of slavery"; Rom. 6:16-22 (". . . you who were once slaves of sin . . . have become slaves of righteousness . . ."). Cf. also H. Lietzmann, *An die Roemer* (HNT, VIII; 4th ed., 1933), *ad loc.*, Rom. 6:12–23; A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East* (Eng. Tr. and ed., 1927), who explores similarities between Pauline language of redemption and that os sacral manumission.

[17] *Philippic* 8, 11.32. Cf. Thomas Wiedemann, *Greek and Roman Slavery* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 51.

[18] *The Roman Law of Slavery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908).

[19] See Philo, *Quod imnis Probus Liber Sit* 157.

to the capital, specifying the function of each: "Venustus, buying agent; Decimianius, treasurer; Dicaeus, attendant; Agathopus, physician; Primio, in charge of wardrobe; Mutatus, attendant; Creticus, attendant; Communis, chamberlain; Firmus, cook, etc."[20]

A major source of this massive slave population, in addition to homebred slavery, debt-enslavement, and victims of kidnapping, was the vast slave trade fed by military conquest, as mirrored in a sparse biography inscribed on a tombstone in Ravenna, Italy:

> Gaius Julius Mygdonius, a Parthian by origin, born a freeman, captured when a youth and sold into slavery in Roman territory. When I became a citizen with fate's help, I got together a nest egg against the day when I reached fifty. Ever since youth I sought to attain my old age; now receive me gladly, O stone; with you I shall be freed from care.[21]

As many as 30 to 50,000 captives could be taken in a single campaign and shipped off for sale in the empire.[22] It is estimated that at the major slave clearing houses at Delos and later at Ostia 10,000 slaves could be processed in a single day, farmed to businesses and households thoughout the empire, justifying Juvenal's quip that "the Syrian Orontes has poured . . . into the Tiber."[23]

The early church differs little if at all from the society at large with respect to its participation in the institution of slavery. The slave presence in the early church can be taken for granted but is actually documented only on those rare occasions when the slave situation presents a citable problem, e.g. the case of a runaway slave in Philemon or the typical but homely tensions in the slave-master relationship.[24] Not unlike their Stoic contemporaries, early Christians urge the acceptance of slaves as brothers (Phm. 16) or the treatment of slaves with equality and fairness (Col. 4:1), at the same time sharing general cultural concern over servile thievery (Tit. 2:9,10) or disrespect (I Tim. 6:2). Beyond the solitary denunciation of the inhumanity of the slave trade in Rev. 18:13 and repudiation of slave-nappers in I Tim. 1:9–10, the NT accepts the reality of slavery (and of manumission) as unexceptionable facts of life.[25]

NT acceptance of slavery as a part of life is reflected also in its imagery and metaphor. In the Gospels the appearance of a slave on the scene occasions no surprise,[26] and slaves repeatedly surface as stock figures in the parables and sayings of Jesus,[27] much as they do

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[20] Wiedemann, op. cit., pp. 123f.

[21] Referred to in Wiedemann, op. cit., p. 113, referring to *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* 11, 137 = *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* 1980 = N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, *Roman Civilization,* II (New York, 1966), p. 72.

[22] 2 Maccabees 8:10–11.

[23] Satire III, 60.

[24] Cf. Eph. 6:5–9; Col. 3:22–4:1; I Tim. 6:1–2; Tit. 2:9–10; I Pet. 2:18–25; also Barn. 19:7; Did. 4:10–11.

[25] Cf. the treatment of Paul's acceptance in I Cor. 7:21 of servile status within the church in view of its irrelevance for defining Christian identity either individually or communally, in Scott Bartchy, *First Century Slavery and the Interpretation of I Corinthians 7:21,* SBLDS, XI (1973).

[26] E.g., Lk 7:1–10; 22:50; Mt. 8:5–13; Mk. 14:47; Jn 18:10, 18, 26.

[27] Cf. Wayne G. Rollins, "Slavery in the NT," *IDB, Supplement* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1976), p. 832, col. 1.

in the plays and essays of the period. NT epistles employ servile metaphors variously (a) to describe the state of the sinner enslaved to sin, to the passions, to the elements of the universe, or to corruption;[28] (b) to express the role of the Christian as slave of Christ[29] or as Christ's freedman[30] bought with a price;[31] and (c) to portray Christ as one who took on the form of a slave[32] and who, as the Gospels add, elected to wash his disciples' feet[33] and offer his life as a redemption price for others.[34]

Beyond this generally acknowledged set of terms and images associated with the institution of slavery lies another much broader vocabulary that NT and Classical scholarship is just beginning to uncover, a set of images that would have evoked immediate associations with slavery in the mind of the first century C.E. reader. Many of these terms appear in the NT, but the task remains to identify them as such.

For example, the term *doulos* is only one of over a dozen words that can have the semantic value of "slave." Philo Judaeus provides a remarkable example in *De Josepho* in dramatizing the scene in Genesis 44 where, after the planted cup is discovered in Benjamin's saddlepack, Joseph's brothers plead with the officers not to take Benjamin back to Egypt. Philo writes,

> they volunteered to submit to enslavement (*douleian*), they called him their master (*despotês*) and themselves his slaves of any and every kind, outcasts (*problêtous*), household bred (*oikotribas*), or purchased in the market (*argyrônêtous*); no servile name (*oiketikôn onomatôn*) did they leave unsaid.[35]

In addition to the terms *problêtous, oikotrips, argyrônêtous,* and *oiketês* (a houseborn slave) one finds the terms *andrapodon,* a slave taken in battle;[36] *therapôn,* a personal slave;[37] *syndoulos,* a fellow-slave;[38] *korasion,* often *korasion doulikon,* a young female slave;[39] *pais,*[40] *paidarion* (the diminutive form), and *paidiskê,*[41] the first century equivalent of "boy" (or "girl"); *sôma,* a common term referring to "body-count" in slave lists, as will be discussed below; *aichmalôtos,* a slave taken captive in battle; *chreôstas,* debt-slave;[42] and the terms *oikonomos* and *epitropos,* managers and overseers of farms or estates, often slaves.[43]

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[28] Rom. 6:6f.; Tit. 3:3; Gal. 4:3, 9; II Pet, 2:19. Cf. II Pet. 2:19; "Whatever overcomes a man, to that he is enslaved."

[29] Rom. 6:22; I Pet. 2:16; Jas. 1:1.

[30] I Cor. 7:22.

[31] I Cor. 6:22, 7:22–23.

[32] Phil. 2:6–11.

[33] John 13:1ff.

[34] Mk. 10:45.

[35] Jos. 219.

[36] See the noun *andrapodistês,* I Tim. 1:10.

[37] The term often appears with religious signification, e.g. Heb. 3:5.

[38] Cf. Matt. 18:28, 29, 33.

[39] The term is not used in Philo or Josephus and does not occur with the meaning of "slave" in NT.

[40] Cf. Luke 7:8 in the context of vv. 2–3, 10.

[41] Cf. Gal. 4:22–23.

[42] Cf. Philo, De Virt. 122.

[43] Cf. the citation from Xenophon, *The Householder,* 9 in Wiedemann, op. cit., p. 128. Also, on slave-terms in general cf. C. Spicq, O.P., "Le vocalulaire de l'esclavage dans le nouveau testament," *Rev. biblique,* LXXXV, 1978, pp. 201–26.

In addition, beyond the multiple terms for "slave", we find a contellation of associated servile term. Though no comprehensive glossary of servile terminology has yet been compiled, the following indicate some of the species of words that would constitute such a collection. Many of them occur in the NT and frequently with servile connotations. They include the following: (a) the language for "being sold" (*piprasko*,[44] *agorazô*[45]) and for the title-deed of the slave (*ônê*); (b) the terms for masters and mistresses of slaves (*despotês, kyrios, despoina, kyria*); (c) images of the status most opposed to slavery and to which the slave aspires (*eleutheria, huiothesia,* and *klêronomos,* the states of "freedom," of "sonship" and "adoption," and of becoming an "heir"; (d) the visible signs by which slaves were occasionally marked (*stigma* and *sphragis*[46]); e) the language associated with the process of manumission, e.g. the terms for "release" (*apodidômi, aphiêmi*), for "redemption" (*apolytrôsis*), for the "freedman" (*apeleutheros*),[47] and for the contractual obligation of the freed slave to his/her former master (*paramonê*); along with (f) the variegated glossary of personal names that carried with them the taint of a servile past, e.g. the series Primus, Secundus, Tertius (Rom. 16:22) and Quartus (Rom. 16:23), or pet names such as Onesimus ("useful"; Col. 4:9), Ampliatus ("magnificent," Rom. 16:8), or Fortunatus (Grk., Tychichus) ("lucky," I Cor. 16:17; Acts 20:9).[48]

All of these names and terms, of course, are polysemous and their meanings cannot be limited to a univocally servile value. Thus when they appear by themselves or with perhaps one other member of this semantic group it is not always possible to demonstrate conclusively that their specifically servile connotation is intended. However, when a series of six or seven such terms occur within a given literary unit, the exegetical odds increase that their specifically "servile meaning" is what brings them together, as is the case, we propose, in Romans 8:18–25, where Paul employs an extended servile metaphor to clarify his understanding of salvation.

III. A Servile Metaphor for Salvation in Romans 8:18-25

The focal point of the passage in Rom. 8:18–25 is the affirmation, "In this hope we are saved (*esôthêmen*)." "Hope" is the central theme, occurring four times in the nominal form (*elpis;* vv. 20, 24) and twice as a verb (*elpizô;* vv. 24, 25) in this brief passage. Salvation in Paul, as noted above, has an eschatological or future dimension as well as a "realized" or past dimension. In classical Bultmannian terms, the "saved" Christian exists between an "already" and a "not yet."

To make his point, Paul turns to the experience of the slave for a metaphor that will be tansparent to everyone in his reading audience, many of whom are of servile origin or even presently of servile status, and will at the same time capture his intention.

Paul has already introduced servile metaphors in the preceding section (7:1–8:17) to portray the "already" or "realized" aspect of salvation.[49] Speaking of the person who

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[44] Cf. Rom. 7:14; Matt. 18:25.

[45] I Cor. 6:20, "You were bought with a price."

[46] Cf. Rev. 7:3.

[47] Cf. I Cor. 7:22.

[48] Cf. Rollins, op. cit., p. 831, for a fuller list.

[49] In fact, in chapter 6:16–23 Paul has indulged in an extended servile metaphor in speaking of psychological and spiritual slavery to sin: "Do you not know that as you yield yourselves to anyone as obedient slaves (*doulous*), you are slaves (*douloi*) of the one whom you obey (*hypakouete*), either of sin, which leads to death, or obedience, which leads to

"serves" (*douleuein;* 7:25) and is held captive by sin (*aixmalôtizonta;* 7:23), Paul announces the good news that the "law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" has set him free (*êleutherôsen*) "from the law of sin and death" (8:2) to "serve" (*douleuein*) in the new life of the Spirit rather than under the old written code (7:6).

Now in 8:18–25 Paul turns to the "not yet" dimension of salvation, introducing a new servile imagery equally familiar to his readers, namely that of the good, enduring, patient slave who continues to bear his suffering with hope (*elpis*) motivated by an initial downpayment (*aparchê*) that promises in time he will be set free (*eleutherôthêsetai*) from his bondage (*douleian*) to obtain a freedom (*eleutherian*) known to the children of the free. Accepting his present state he awaits manumission ("redemption;" *apolytrôsis*) from his state as a "body" sold on the slave-market (*soma*), daring to hope for adoption as a son (*huiothesia*).

[Ernst Kaesemann in his *Commentary on Romans*[50] in general ignores the possibility of servile imagery in 8:18–25, and in specific repudiates the identification of the word *apolytrôsis* with servile language. Commenting on Rom. 8:23 Kaesemann states that the theory "that *apolytrôsis* means concretely the redeeming of slaves is absurd here."[51] Likewise, commenting on Romans 6:12–23 he insists that "there is nothing here . . . to suggest the ancient custom of redeeming slaves."[52] The rationale for Kaesemann's disclaimer is the argument that Paul could not be speaking of redemption in any real or metaphorical sense, since Paul does not see the "redeemed" Christian as literally redeemed,in the sense that he is a freedman with absolute autonomy. Kaesemann comments that "the independence which Stoicism and popular philosophy promise as human self-realization must not be read into Paul's statement."[53]

Kaesemann's reading of Paul's anthropology is quite correct, but his understanding of Pauline metaphor is faulty. Kaesemann fails to note Paul's acknowledgement that he uses servile imagery with the conscious awareness of the limits of metaphor,[54] and that in Romans 6–8 he employs servile terminology in a mixed fashion. In chapter 6 Paul speaks of redemption from slavery to sin and transposition to a new servility, namely slavery to righteousness, a transition that does not conform to real manumission, but appeals as a metaphor, as Philo Judaeus also demonstrates.[55] In chapter 8, however, Paul speaks of a final redemption from human enslavement to suffering and a transposition to Divine sonship. In both instances Paul does not, as Kaesemann correctly insists, speak of the Christian as absolutely autonomous. But in both instances Paul is employing servile metaphors as the most apt images to express his meaning. Kaesemann in fact seems to have a degree of suspicion that this might be the case in observing that Rom. 8:19 along

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(continued)
righteousness?" (Rom. 6:16). Paul signals the reader that he is using a metaphor to include seven words with the root for "slave" (*doul-*) and three with the root for freedom (*eleuther-*).

[50] Tr. & ed., Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980),

[51] P. 237.

[52] P. 179.

[53] P. 178.

[54] Cf. 6:19; "I am speaking in human terms."

[55] Cf. LA III, 193, where Philo speaks of being freed from enslavement to the passions to become a "slave of the wise one" (*doulos . . . tou sophou*).

with 7:21f. and 24, express "the cry of an enslaved person" who is "looking for the liberation from forces which rule it."[56]]

Paul employs seven terms and cognates associated with the institution of slavery in Romans 8:18–25: a) *douleia* (v. 23); b) *eleutberoun, eleutheria* (v. 23); c) *aparchê* (v. 23); d) *huiothesia* (v. 23); e) *apolytrôsis* (v. 23); f) *sôma* (v. 23); and g) *elpis* (vv. 21, 24, 3x's), *elpizein* (vv. 24,25).

a) *Douleia.* In 1943 Edgar Goodspeed wrote an article on "Paul and Slavery" contending that the term *doulos* in Paul's letters was to be translated "slave," not "servant." Goodspeed's contention was no doubt rooted in the realization of the shocking value the term carried in the Greco-Roman world, particularly if a Roman citizen such as Paul were to arrogate to oneself the role of a "slave." In his article on *doulos, ktl.* in the Kittel *Wordbook,* K. H. Rengstorf writes the following:

> The distinctive feature of the self-awareness of the Greek is the thought of freedom. The Greek finds his personal dignity in the fact that he is free . . . His self-awarenes stands out sharply from anything which stands under the concept *douleuein*. . . . This does not mean there is no place for the thought of service. . . . What is repudiated is service after the manner of the *doulos,* who not only has no possibility of evading the tasks laid upon him but who also has no right of personal choice, who must rather do what another will have done, and refrain from doing what another will not have done. In the *doulos,* the free Greek world always sees its own anti-type, and in *douleuein* it sees the perversion of its own nature.[57]

Rengstorf's observation, which applies equally to the Roman world of the first century C.E., assures us that Paul's use of the term *doulos,* with its potently opprobrious connotation, would not be used unless the notion of servility and its profound connotations were allowed in the meaning. We would suspect that Paul selects this jarring term as a metaphor for at least three reasons: first, because it is "language" that will be understood by his audience, consisting of individuals who have known what servility means; second, because he wishes to find a metaphor, common in religious cults of the period, to express complete submission to Christ (*doulos tou Christou*); and third, to provide an image that captures the plight of a person who cannot escape from the inner or outer forces that hold him captive, which in Romans 8: 18–25 consist of the structures of suffering to which humanity and the whole creation is exposed as it awaits its "freedom."

b) *Eleutheria, eleutheroun.* The word "freedom" was as powerful as a positive symbol in the Greco-Roman world as the word "slavery" was negative. Dio Chrysostom writes that "men desire above all things to be free and say that freedom is the greatest of blessings, while slavery is the most shameful and wretched of states,"[58] echoing a tale Philo tells of the thunderous applaud and approving clamor that was raised in a theater on an occasion when the players recited lines of Euripides, proclaiming that " The name of freedom is worth all the world; if one has little, let him think that much."[59] For Paul the metaphor of "freedom," deriving its power from its implied contrast with the deplorable state of slavery, was an invaluable image to express the existential relief one experiences when freed

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[56] P. 236.

[57] Kittel, op. cit., II, p. 262.

[58] On Slavery and Freedom, Discourse xiv.1.

[59] Prob. 41.

from the disabling captivity under the law and of sin as well as of the final freedom he envisioned in the end. For Paul *eleutheria* in this passage is materially synonymous with *doxa*, "eschatological glory in perfected freedom."[60]

c) *Aparchê*. Although the term is rarely cited in connection with servility, Philo provides us with one instance, referring to the custom of the Alexandrian Jewish community to refer to the "first-fruits" (*aparchê*) presented to the temple as "ransom money" (*lytra*). Philo explains: "For the donors bring the first-fruit expecting that the payment will give them release from slavery, or healing of diseases or the enjoyment of liberty fully secured."[61] Kaesemann, likewise comments that *aparchê* is to be construed as synonymous with *arrabôn* (2 Cor. 1:22, 5:5) the "downpayment" of the Spirit. The *aparchê* is not the "birth certificate" of the free man, as some commentators have proposed, but "the reference is to a deposit on a purchase."[62] For Paul the term as a metaphor connotes that initial evidence on which the slave (or believer) can base his hope for eventual manumission (or redemption as a son).

d) *Huiothesia*. The extended servile metaphors in Romans 8:15–17 and Gal. 4:1–7 make it clear that the opposite of "sonship" or "adoption" (*huiothesia*) from Paul's perspective is "slavery", and that *huiothesia* for Paul implies the state of becoming "children of God" (*tekna theou*) and "heirs" or "fellow heirs" (*klêronomoi, synklêronomoi*). Paul writes, "you did not receive the spirit of slavery . . . but . . . the spirit of sonship (*huiothesian*), . . . and if children, then heirs . . . and fellow heirs with Christ" (Rom. 8:15–17). Gal. 4:1–7 states, "So through God you are no longer a slave but a son, if a son then an heir." Paul would thus seem to be suggesting that in his experience he had known of slaves that were manumitted and adopted as sons or heirs in the master's family. Did such a possibility exist or is this the point at which Paul's metaphor breaks down in the face of actual manumission practice?

Francis Lyall would maintain that only citizens, not slaves, could look forward to adoption as sons in the Greco-Roman era.[63] But A. M. Duff in his classic work on *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire*[64] informs us that especially with the *manumissio testamento*, a slave could be made heir at the time of his manumission. The Shepherd of Hermas offers a striking example of this in a parable that finds a master discussing his slave as follows:

> I promised this servant his freedom if he kept the orders which I gave him. Now he has kept my orders, and has added good work in the vineyard, and greatly pleased me. So in reward for this work which he has done I wish to make him joint heir with my son (*synklêronomon tô huiô mou poiêsai*), because, when he had a good thought he did not put it on one side, but carried it out.[65]

From this evidence it would seem that Paul's use of *huiothesia* comports with authentic expectations a slave might have in the first century, along with the hopes of the faithful for a fully realized sonship with the Father.

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[60] Kaesemann, op. cit., p. 234.
[61] Spec. I, 77.
[62] P. 237.
[63] Op. cit., p. 90.
[64] Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928.
[65] Hs V. ii. 7.

e) *Apolytrôsis.* Next to the terms *douleia* and *eleutheria,* the term *apolytrôsis* is most transparently of servile origin. The standard meaning of the term is the buying back of a slave through the payment of a ransom (*lytron*). The term occurs ten times in the NT, seven occurrences of which are in the Pauline epistles.[66]

f) *Sôma.* Only recently have NT scholars acknowledged the servile connotations the term *soma* can bear in the Greco-Roman world.[67] The term appears regularly in papyri and inscriptions in the form of slave lists and commemorations of sacral manumissions. An example in 2 Macc. 8:8ff. may suffice, telling of the plans of Nicanor in battle with Judas Maccabeus to replenish the royal treasury by selling prisoners taken in battle, inviting the slave traders to "buy Jewish slaves" (*epi agorasmon Ioudaiôn sômata*) at a price of ninety slaves per Talent. Beyond this the vocabulary of the period includes the terms for male and female slaves (*sôma andreion; sôma gynaikeion*) along with a list of *termini technici* associated with slave maintenance and transport, e.g. the slave trader (*sômatemporos*), the slave depot (*sômatophoreion*), and slave food (*sômatotrophèia*). Rev. 18:13 with its ship's list of goods, including cattle, sheep, horses and human *sômata,* is the only concrete use of the term with its servile sense in the NT, though one is moved to explore the servile metaphorical connotations of the term in I Cor. 6:20 ("You were bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your *sôma*") and I Cor. 9:17 ["But I pommel my *sôma* and drive it into submission (*doulagôgô*)"]. In Romans 8:23, when Paul looks forward with hope to the "redemption of his *sôma*" he is employing a readily transparent servile metaphor.

g) *Elpis, elpizein.* The language of "hope" can hardly be regarded as intrinsically servile. At the same time it is indigenous to servile existence. Paul identifies hope as a primary element in his catena of servile images, as seen in the frequency with which he uses *elpis* and *elpizein* in this passage. As noted earlier, "hope" is cited in this passage as the quintessential ingredient of salvation, borrowing on the fact that it is also a quintessential factor in the life of a slave awaiting manumission. Philo corroborates this fact in a passage discussing the Jewish practice of allowing slaves to abstain from labor on the Sabbath. Philo characterizes these sabbaths as days of hope:

> the servants are not to refuse still higher hopes (*ameinoous elpidas*), but should find in the relaxation allowed after six days an ember or spark of freedom (*zôpyron eleutherias*) and look forward to their complete liberation (*to panteles aphesin*) if they continue to serve well and loyally.[68]

And in another passage Philo recommends fleeing from the tyrants of sense and passion and running to God who is a "*philodoulos despotês*" who holds out bright hopes of freedom (*ep' elpisis chrêstais eleutherias*) and who will not give you up again to your former masters."[69]

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[66] Romans 3:24; 8:23; I Cor. 1:30; Eph. 1:7, 14; 4:30; Col. 1:14. Wiedemann, op. cit., cites a commentary on St. Theodoret on I Cor. 7:21–3, which prompts Wiedemann to write: "the terminology of slave-ownership was metaphorically applied to salvation: the word *Redemption* means buying a slave his freedom, as this fifth-century Syrian bishop's commentary on St. Paul makes clear.

[67] Cf. Spicq, op. cit., and Wayne G. Rollins in an unpublished paper on "The Use of *Sôma* as a Servile Metaphor in Hellenistic Greek," SBL, Atlanta, 1971.

[68] Spec. II, 67.

[69] LA III, 192–199.

For both Paul and Philo, the hope of the slave provides a telling metaphor for the hope of the God-seeker.

In closing, we might ask why it is that Paul, Philo, and Cicero among so many others are drawn to metaphors and images from the netherworld of slavery? The fact of the ubiquity of slaves in the church and society as a whole is part of the answer. Paul's personal life may be another part of the answer, if the report from Jerome can be trusted that Paul's parents had been deported to Tarsus from Gischala as a result of Roman military conquest,[70] possibly implying they were slaves who eventually won their freedom and citizenship. But the etiology may be more general and fundamental along lines suggested by Carl Jung:

> The fact that an incredibly large proportion of the people languished in the black misery of slavery is no doubt one of the main causes of the singular melancholy that reigned all through the time of the Caesars. It was not in the long run possible for those who wallowed in pleasure not to be infected, through the mysterious working of the unconscious, by the deep sadness and still deeper wretchedness of their brothers.[71]

It may have been in that deep sadness of the slave and in the profound joy of the freedman that Paul found the most fitting metaphor to express his understanding of life between the times as a *syndoulos en Kyriô*.[72]

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[70] Jerome, Comm. Phil. 23.

[71] *Symbols of Transformation*, Vol. V., *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (NY: Pantheon, 1952), p. 71.

[72] Cf. Col. 4:7.

Apotheosis in Later Platonism: Salvation as Theurgic Embodiment

Gregory Shaw
Stonehill College

I. Introduction

> "O master," the disciples of Iamblichus once asked him, "a rumor has reached us through your slaves that when you pray to the gods you soar aloft from the earth more than ten cubits to all appearance; that your body and your garments change to a beautiful golden hue; and when your prayer is ended your body becomes as it was before you prayed, and then you come down to earth to associate with us." Iamblichus was not at all inclined to laughter, but he laughed at these words. And he answered them, "He who has thus deluded you was a witty fellow—but the facts are otherwise."[1]

Eunapius' tale may be more hagiography than history, but it provides an appropriate image to begin our discussion of salvation in later Neoplatonism. Though the ascent Iamblichus denies in this story was merely physical, his attitude with respect to the ascent of the soul remained the same, and if Iamblichus were presented with our current explanation that Neoplatonic salvation was equivalent to the ascent of the soul he would probably laugh again, telling us that we too have been deluded and that the facts are otherwise.

In the Platonic tradition salvation has long been associated with the soul's transition from embodied particularity to its universal principles, and this has been imagined as an ascent to the heavenly gods and their Maker. This otherworldly thrust in Platonic literature is exemplified in the well-known *homoiosis theō* passage in the *Theaetetus* (176ab) where Plato says:

> . . . we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other; and that means becoming like the divine so far as we can. . . .

In the Platonic tradition the divine has always been imagined as "up there," and consequently the soul's salvation has been measured by the degree to which it accomplished an upward journey, its *anagogē*, to the gods. Scholars of late antique religion have accepted this portrayal of Platonic salvation, and now it is generally understood that the ascent of the soul for Platonists was synonomous with its salvation.

The value of this interpretation may be questionable with respect to the work of Plato himself for he remained very much involved in the political and worldly realities of his time, but for the Neoplatonists—and particularly Plotinus—the correlation of *anagogē* with *sōteria* seems entirely appropriate and justified. Plotinus accentuated almost

[1] Eunapius, *The Lives of the Philosophers*, tr. W. C. Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb, 1952), pp. 365–367.

exclusively the anagogic elements of Plato's teaching. Speaking from his own experiences of divine unification, Plotinus urged souls to divest themselves of everything but the divine and to take flight to "our beloved Fatherland," the Intelligible realm.[2] By the 3rd century C.E. this flight was imagined by Hermeticists,[3] Gnostics,[4] and Platonists alike[5] as an ascent through the seven planetary spheres. As the soul made its heavenly journey it was imagined to divest itself of the psychic sheaths acquired from those planets when the soul descended into a body. Thus, the disembodiment of the soul became a correlate to its ascent and salvation.

The salvation-as-ascent motif has been the predominant interpretive paradigm that has influenced our understanding of the soteriology of the later Platonists. And if Plotinus' otherworldly asceticism properly defined the spirituality of his successors, the anagogic scheme would be an adequate model. However, after Plotinus, the Platonic tradition was defined less by Plotinian thought than by the theurgical disciplines introduced by Porphyry and developed by Iamblichus. While anagogic elements are evident in the Platonism of Iamblichus, and of central importance,[6] the *anagogē* as *sōteria* paradigm fails to account for important aspects of the hieratic school, most notably its emphasis on salvation as an embodied experience. Until recently, the theurgical phase of Platonism has been dismissed as an aberration within the tradition.[7] Therefore, Iamblichus' descriptions of salvation as an "embodied" phenomenon could be passed over, and the failure of theurgy to fit the anagogic model could be explained as due to the aberrant nature of theurgy in general. It is precisely this embodied and theurgical expression of salvation, however, that will be examined in this essay. For Iamblichus and his successors, the ascent of the soul was necessary, but it was not a sufficient condition to establish its salvation. For the theurgists, an *anagogē* that lacked a simultaneous and reciprocal *katagogē* was not an ascent at all but a mere fantasy.

The embodied model of salvation for the later Platonists has already been noted by the late Jean Trouillard in his studies on Proclus, most recently in a 1983 article entitled "Proclos et la joie de quitter le ciel."[8] John Dillon has also noted this aspect of Iamblichus' soteriology and has aptly compared the role of embodiment in theurgical salvation to the function of the *bodhisattva* in Mahayana Buddhism.[9] I propose simply to follow the suggestions of these scholars and to cite significant passages from Iamblichus' *On the*

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[2] *Ennead* I. 6. 8.

[3] *Corpus Hermeticum* I. 25 (Nock-Festugiere)

[4] See, e.g., *The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth*, tr. by Brashler, Dirkse, and Parrott, *Nag Hammadi Library*, James Robinson and Marvin Meyer, eds. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 292–297.

[5] See, e.g., Plotinus, *Ennead* I. 6. 7.

[6] See Hans Lewy, Excusus VIII: On the Designation of the Theurgical Sacrament of Immortality as Elevation (*anagogē*) in *Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy*, ed. by Michel Tardieu (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978), pp.487–489.

[7] For a critical review of the scholarly trends in the study of theurgy see G. Shaw, "Theurgy: Rituals of Unification in the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus," *Traditio*, 1985, pp.1–28.

[8] Jean Trouillard, "Proclos et la joie de quitter le ciel," *Diotima* 11, 1983, pp.183–192.

[9] John Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p.243.

Mysteries[10] and *On the Soul*[11] to demonstrate how integral a role descent and embodiment played in the understanding of salvation for post-Iamblichian Platonists.

II. The Cosmological Context

Probably the most significant difference between the Platonism of Iamblichus and that of Plotinus was in their views of matter. Plotinus emphasized the negativity of matter in the experience of the soul. He described matter as "absolutely evil" (*kath hauto kakon*)[12] and this cosmological position was a correlate to his exortation to take flight from the pollution of the body. Plotinus himself avoided all involvement in the worship of cosmogonic deities, and Porphyry condemned animal sacrifice as a form of extortion paid to malevolent demons.[13] For Plotinus and Porphyry the philosopher should avoid the contamination of such rites in order to return "alone, through himself, to god alone."[14] The soul, for Plotinus, was essentially "undescended,"[15] and, according to Porphyry, was identical with the Divine Nous.[16] It is not surprising, therefore, that Porphyry believed the soul could effect a permanent escape from the cosmos and "never again find itself held and polluted by the contagion of the world."[17] Plotinus himself never adopted such a platonically unorthodox position, but it was not inconsistent with his own break with Platonic orthodoxy seen in his doctrine that the soul remains undescended.[18] Despite Plotinus' explicit condemnation of the Gnostics' anti-cosmic views, his soteriology was gnosticized to a pronounced degree, and I would suggest that Porphyry's belief in a permanent escape from the cosmos reflects this.

For Iamblichus, on the other hand, matter was not evil, but good, and created by god. He says:

> God produced matter out of the scission of materiality from substantiality, which the Demiurge, receiving as a living substance, fashioned into simple and impassible spheres and organized the last of this into generated bodies.[19]

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[10] The standard edition is E. des Places, *Jamblique: Les mysteres d'Egypte* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1966). Also useful is Thomas Taylor's translation: *Iamblichus on the Mysteries of the Egyptians* (2nd ed.; London, 1895). Unless otherwise noted all translations are my own.

[11] See Stobaeus, *Anthologium* Vol.1, Wachsmuth and Hense, eds. (Berlin: Weidmanns, 1958). Also see Festugière's translation and commentary in *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Appendix I, (Paris: Gabalda et Cie, 1953), pp.177–248.

[12] *Enn.* I. 8. 3. (39–40)

[13] Porphyry, *De l'Abstinence*, (*DA*), II. 42, 2, text and translation by Jean Bouffartigue and Michel Patillon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1977).

[14] Porphyry, *DA*, II. 49, 1.

[15] *Enn.* IV. 8. 8 (1–2).

[16] *DA* I. 29. 4

[17] *De regressu animae* 40* 15–16.

[18] *Enn.* IV. 8. 8 (1–2). For a discussion of this point see H. J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus Psychology and His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

[19] *De Mysteriis* (*DM*) 265,6–10. For similarly positive portrayals of matter in Iamblichus, see: *In Nich. Arith. Intro.* (Teubner, 1975) 79,5–8; *De Communi Math. Scientia* (Teubner, 1975) 18.1–13; 16,1–2; 16,4–6.

Following the *Timaeus,* Iamblichus understood the suffering and evil endured by the embodied soul to be caused by the confusion within the soul itself, not by matter. Iamblichus' cosmology, in this respect, was consistent with Plato's view that the cosmos served as the matrix into which the soul assimilated itself to regain its divinity.[20] The *homoiosis theō* of Plato, therefore, was realized through an assimilation to, not an escape from, the cosmos. Similarly, for Iamblichus, the sensible world manifested the invisible ratios of the Divine Mind, and theurgic disciplines were supposed to initiate souls into sympathetic resonance with them.[21] In a theurgic ritual the embodied soul became the vehicle of divinely empowered acts that expressed symbolically the creative act of the Demiurge. In the cosmology of Iamblichus, the human soul descended completely into a body, and its salvation was realized only through its assimilation to the body of the cosmos. For Plotinus and Porphyry the soul, ultimately, was not embodied, and Porphyry maintained that salvation was realized only through a permanent escape from the demonic world.

In effect, Plotinus and Porphyry's cosmological pessimism necessarily led to a desacralizing of the cosmos and to the loss of its soteriological function. To deny that the gods permeate and oversee every aspect of embodied life would cut the world off from the presence of the gods, and it is precisely this separation that Iamblichus condemned.

> This doctrine, he says, spells the ruin of all holy ritual and theurgic communion between gods and men since it places the presence of superior beings outside this earth. For it amounts to saying that the divine is at a distance from the earth and cannot mingle with men and that this lower region is a desert, without gods.[22]

Iamblichus' doctrine of the wholly descended soul does not reflect a pessimism about the soul, as some have argued, but rather a profound optimism about the cosmos. In his doxography, *On the Soul,* Iamblichus reports the views of the Platonic school of Taurus on the purposes for the soul's descent. The Taurians' first position was that of the *Timaeus* where the embodiment of souls is said to be necessary for the perfection of the cosmos. The second position, to which Iamblichus was particularly partial,[23] was a development of the first.

> The purpose of the soul's descent, Iamblichus says of the Taurians' view, is to reveal the divine life, for the will of the gods is to be manifested through souls. Indeed, the gods are led into bodily appearance and are revealed in the purifications and the faultless life of human souls.[24]

For Iamblichus, the embodiment of souls was part of a great demiurgic labor, an expression of the "generosity" (*aphthonos*) of the Platonic Demiurge in his effort to share his divinity as far as possible (*Tim.* 30a). The ruling motif for the Iamblichian cosmos, therefore, was not "flight" or "escape" but "transformation," the uncovering of a divine

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[20] See, e.g., *Tim.* 90cd.

[21] See *DM* 65,6–14.

[22] *DM* 28,6–11; translation by Peter Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p.101.

[23] James Finamore, *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul* (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1986) pp. 99–100.

[24] *Stob.* I 378,30–379,6.

cosmos through the initial chaos of embodiment. For human souls this transformation was realized by participating in the creative activity of the Demiurge through the ritual performance of divine acts: theurgies. Insofar as souls descended to reveal the demiurgic will, they communicated this presence through the "faultlessness" of their lives, and like Iamblichus' encosmic gods who descend into the generated world "for its salvation,"[25] human souls entered bodies not only to complete the cosmos but to save it.

This cosmological context is essential for understanding Iamblichus' soteriology, for while he shared with all Platonists the belief that the soul must purify itself and ascend to the divine world, Iamblichus believed that its apotheosis was not realized in a state of heavenly repose, but in cosmogonic action, sharing in the theurgies of cosmogenesis. Rather than being an escape from the world, salvation effected a deeper penetration for the soul into the world and with that a greater responsibility for its creation. In his discussion of apotheosis and liberation in *On the Soul* Iamblichus explains this by juxtaposing the views of the Ancients (i.e., theurgists) with the Platonists. He says:

> According to the Ancients, the souls freed from generation co-administer the cosmos with the gods, and according to the Platonists they contemplate their divine hierarchy. And in the same way, according to the Ancients, *liberated souls create the cosmos together with the angels*, and according to the Platonists they accompany them in their circular journey.[26]

The apotheosis of the soul was realized in its unification with the will of the Demiurge and thus with the divine generosity that creates the cosmos. In a paradox that was logically inconsistent yet resolved in action, the soul remained "above" with the Demiurge by "descending demiurgically" in the act of creation. Since this act, in principle, is outside of time, it is as available "now" as at any time in the past, and for Iamblichus it was communicated by means of theurgic rites given to embodied souls by the gods[27] and preserved by the sacred races who honored them.[28]

The purpose of creation, therefore, was to share in the work of the Demiurge not to escape the cosmos, and the recognition of this divine responsibility contributed to the sacred aura that surrounded the theurgists of later Platonism. To be in the audience of a theurgist was to be in the presence of a divine, yet embodied being. The cosmology of the later Platonists was consistent with this, because for them the purpose of creation was to reveal the Demiurge through human souls. In *On the Mysteries* Iamblichus attests to this embodied apotheosis:

> Through this [divine] will, therefore, the gods, being benevolent and gracious, generously (*aphthonos*) shine their light upon theurgists, calling their souls up to themselves, habituating them—while still in bodies—to be detached from their bodies and turned to their eternal and noetic principle.[29]

"Still in bodies" yet "detached from their bodies," another paradox that Iamblichus resolved in the rites of the theurgist, not in the thinking of the philosopher.[30]

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[25] *DM* 53,16.

[26] *Stob.* I 458,17–21.

[27] *DM* 65,6–8.

[28] *DM* 258,1–259,5.

[29] *DM* 41,4–11.

[30] For Iamblichus' position on this point see his often-quoted passage from *On the Mysteries* (*DM*) 96,13–97,19.

II. The Anthropological Context

Certainly, some souls were more capable than others of receiving this divine light and were therefore more able to share demiurgic responsibilities. Iamblichus recognized this and distinguished three kinds of souls embodied for different purposes. In *On the Soul* he explains that the nature of the soul's descent revealed the purpose for its embodiment as well as the quality of the soul. He says:

> I think that since there are different purposes for the soul's descent this creates differences in the manner of descent. For if the soul descends for the salvation, purification, and perfection of things in this world then it descends purely. But if the soul is turned toward the body for the sake of exercising and correcting its habits the descent is not entirely without passion, nor is the soul, in itself, released and liberated. And if the soul descends as if being dragged down here for punishment and judgement, the descent is forced.[31]

In *On the Mysteries* Iamblichus refers to these three types of souls again and distinguishes them as 1) materialistic—the "great herd" of humanity; 2) noetic—the extremely rare souls; and 3) intermediate—those somewhere between the two extremes.[32] While each kind of soul had a theurgy that was appropriate to it, only the noetic souls are said to take on bodies for the salvation, purification and perfection of the generated world.[33] These are the souls that never returned to the Porphyrian cosmos but returned perpetually to the Iamblichian cosmos as benevolent overseers, the equivalent, Dillon suggests, to the *bodhisattvas* of Buddhism.[34]

Such liberated souls rescue other souls by delivering them from the confusion of embodied existence, but, strictly speaking, this salvific function occurs only within the drama of human life. More importantly, they preserve the cosmos itself through their cooperation with the Demiurge and the creative angels. Therefore, it may be helpful to ascribe to theurgic *soteria* a "salvific" function insofar as it purifies, exercises, and elevates souls, and ascribe to it a "preserving" function once the soul has become elevated and assimilated to the demiurgic will. Henceforth, it becomes a cooperative agent in the creation and preservation of the cosmos and shares with the creative gods the task of revealing the divine will as it becomes the visible world. While this distinction of "salvific" and "perserving" *soteria* may be helpful conceptually, in fact, these two senses of *soteria* cannot be separated, for the performance of theurgy was simultaneously anagogic and cosmogonic. In Neoplatonic terms, the divine *probodos* was realized only in its *epistrophe*.

Iamblichus' most explicit reference to the necessity of descent in the soul's apotheosis appears in his discussion of catharsis. Iamblichus contends that the catharsis that liberates the soul from matter and mortality was merely a "lesser goal" compared to the greater catharsis of preserving the continuity of the parts of the cosmos with their wholes, and thus of sustaining the link between the gods and man. He says:

> Indeed, of catharsis, one must conceive its most useful aspects to be 1) withdrawal from alien things; 2) restoration of one's own essence; 3)

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[31] *Stob.* I 380,6–14.

[32] *DM* 223,10–224,6; cf. 224,6–225,11

[33] Cf. Iamblichus' statement in the *DM* 295,5–8 that theurgists pray only for the sake of the "purification, liberation, and salvation of the soul."

[34] John Dillon, op. cit., p.243.

> perfection; 4) fullness; 5) independence; 6) ascent to the creative cause; 7) conjunction of parts with wholes; and 8) contribution from the wholes to the parts of power, life, activity and similar things.[35]

Immediately following he adds:

> The separation from the body, freedom from [material] bonds, liberation from mortality and generation, and similar goals are but the lesser goals (*smikra telē*).[36]

A similar distinction was drawn by Plato in the *Symposium* where Diotima tells Socrates that the erotic practices that serve to immortalize the personal identity are but the "lesser mysteries" of Eros. The deeper mysteries are those which translate the soul into the great ocean of Beauty and whose practical results are exemplifed in Socrates himself, the embodiment of Eros in both its anagogic and katagogic functions.

For post-Iamblichian Platonists the salvation and apotheosis of the soul demanded that the soul's *anagogē* arouse a reciprocal descent of demiurgic powers in the theurgies of the embodied soul. After all, in a cosmos that was considered a theophany, and with matter created by god, the body was understood to be a divinely created vehicle—however weak—and one perfectly appropriate for the human soul, the lowest divinity of the Neoplatonic cosmos. For the theurgists, human souls were intended to take part in cosmogenesis through the human form. In theurgy the soul was called up to the gods and was assimilated to the Demiurge, yet precisely because of its ascent, it remained embodied because this was the expression of its demiurgic will—to manifest itself in a body for the salvation, purification and perfection of the cosmos. Theurgic rites simultaneously lifted the soul up and brought the divine down, with the result that the theurgist became a spiritual and somatic amphibian, living in both the divine and mortal worlds. As a divine being sharing in creative responsibilties the theurgist commanded cosmogonic powers, yet he remained a man.

> All of theurgy, Iamblichus says, has a two-fold character. One is that it is a rite conducted by men which preserves our natural order in the universe; the other is that it is empowered by divine symbols, is raised up by them to be joined on high with the gods, and is led harmoniously round to their order. This latter aspect can rightly be called "putting on the form of the gods." According to this distinction therefore, as is proper, [the theurgist] invokes, as his superiors, the powers from the universe, since the one making the invocation is a man, yet on the other hand he commands them, since somehow by means of the ineffable symbols he is invested with the hieratic form of the gods.[37]

This divine yet human status of the theurgist was the goal of post-Iamblichian Platonism. Each human being was potentially a theandric entity waiting to awaken to its role in sustaining the cosmos. It is significant that this Platonic soteriology was not given its explicit form until the 4th and 5th centuries C.E., a time when Christians were attempting to work out their own Christ-centered salvation. Like the Platonic theurgists, the Church Fathers asserted the complete descent of a divine being, Christ, as well as a

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[35] *Stob.* I 455,25–456,4.

[36] *Stob.* I 456,6–8.

[37] *DM* 184,1–14; cf. 246–247.

paradox of divine and human natures unmixed, yet present, in one Person.[38] The similarities in the imaginal schemes of Christian and Pagan salvation cannot be explored adequately here, but they merit further study. Among the Platonists, Proclus followed Iamblichus' teaching and expanded his hieratic view of the embodiment of liberated souls to the embodiment of every kind of soul—both the pure and impure.

For Iamblichus and Proclus divinity was defined first as *proousios:* it was before essence, not essence, and similarly it was pre-noetic, that which is prior and gives rise to the intelligible. In Neoplatonic terms, since that which produces a good is superior to the good produced, the pre-essential and pre-noetic activity of the gods was understood by Proclus to be superior to the divinities that received it. According to Trouillard, Proclus used this metaphysical principle to explain the descent of souls into bodies.

> The soul descends into the body, Proclus says, because it wants to imitate the prenoetic activity of the gods, and it is for this reason that it proceeds into generation while abandoning its contemplation. Since, indeed, the perfection of the gods is of two kinds: the one noetic, the other prenoetic, the one in repose, the other in movement, the soul reproduces by contemplation what is permanent, noetic and stable in them, and by its life in generation what is prenoetic and active in them. And just as the thought of souls is partial, so also their prenoetic activity is partial—and being partial, it makes a partial body its own.[39]

While it would be incorrect to equate embodiment in itself with theurgy, embodiment was certainly its precondition as well as its field of expression. In Proclus' terms, the similarity between the embodiment of souls and the performance of theurgy is that both were understood to be a mimesis of the gods. In the case of theurgy, however, this mimesis was the result of a lifelong labor[40] that liberated the theurgist from the world while establishing him within it demiurgically. The *homoiosis theō* of traditional Platonism was realized by theurgists, therefore, not as an upward journey, an *anagogē*, but as a descent into the body charged with a demiurgic command.

IV. Conclusion

If the trend of late antique religion was to associate salvation with the ascent of the soul and its escape from the cosmos, from what source did Iamblichus develop his notion of a somatic apotheosis? Philippe Derchain has pointed to the parallels between the rites described in *On the Mysteries* and those of traditional Egyptian cults.[41] Is it possible that the theurgy of Iamblichus was developed under the influence of Egyptian priests? Was he guided by their belief in the doctrine of divine embodiment seen exemplified in the pharaoh, the living god of their culture? Perhaps. Yet it is more likely, I think, that the

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[38] See especially the language of the Council of Chalcedon, 451 C.E., on the two natures of Christ.

[39] Proclus, *In Tim.*, III, 324,5–14; translated from the French version of J. Trouillard, "Proclos et la joie de quitter le ciel," *Diotima*, 11, 1983, p. 193.

[40] *DM* 230,18–231,2.

Philippe Derchain, "Pseudo-Jamblique ou Abammon?" *Chronique d'Egypte*, 76, 1973, pp.220–226.

[41] Philippe Derchain, "Pseudo-Jamblique ou Abammon?" *Chronique d'Egypte*, 76, 1973, pp.220–226.

notion of embodied apotheosis was not new for Platonists, but was understood to be implicit in the dialogues of Plato, specifically in the *Timaeus*, the *Republic*, the *Sophist*, and the *Symposium*. And it was also present in the writings of Plotinus. In his essay on the descent of the soul Plotinus says:

> Souls must not play the solitaries, their issue stifled. Every nature must produce its next, for each thing must unfold, seedlike, from indivisible principle into a visible effect. Principle continues unaltered in its proper place; what unfolds from it is the product of the inexpressible power that resides in it. It must not stay this power and—through jealousy—limit its effects. It must proceed continuously until all things, to the very last, have within the limits of possiblity come forth.[42]

Like Proclus, Plotinus asserts that souls imitate the fecundity of the One and the Demiurge by proceeding into bodies, communicating the inexpressible powers that they bear. Despite these views, and due perhaps to the dualism of his Middle Platonic predecessors, Plotinus was never able to develop a metaphysics consistent with an optimistic cosmology, and he finally adopted the admittedly unorthodox view that the soul never really does descend into a body.[43]

Nevertheless, Plotinus' remarks reveal an important aspect of Iamblichus' thought for, as a Neo-Pythagorean, Iamblichus understood that a principle, an *arche*, cannot be counted within the order that it supports. Yet to remain a principle and sustain its independence, it must actively function as principle and thus, "seedlike," unfold its powers into its subordinate order. For Iamblichus the soul was principle of the body. Therefore, in order to remain free of somatic constraints the soul had to descend into the body and, as its principle, continually sustain its existence. The attempt to abandon or escape from the body would in fact produce opposite results, for it would be the abdication of the soul's function as ordering principle and would enthrall it to the generative and somatic powers that it refused to command.

In conclusion, Iamblichus' emphasis on embodied deification and salvation should not be seen as a novel or unplatonic teaching. The later Neoplatonists believed that their theurgical views were perfectly consistent with Plato's dialogues and with all genuinely Platonic writings, including much of Plotinus. This certainly is what the Platonists of Iamblichus' school would have believed, and I would argue that our knowledge of their embodied soteriology is essential for understanding them properly. At the least, it would provide a necessary complement to our present practice of identifying salvation and apotheosis with *anagogē* alone. I believe that anagogic models of salvation are tied to a pessimism about the cosmos—whether it is expressed in the dualism of the Gnostics or in the utopian eschatology of Christianity. The cosmos of the later Platonists, on the other hand, was optimistic in a manner that has long since become alien to us. Perhaps this is why their notion of soteriological descent has largely gone unnoticed.

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[42] *Enn.* IV. 8, 6, (6); translated by O'Brien, *The Essential Plotinus* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1975; original copyright 1964), p.68.

[43] See above, f.n. #18.

The Monarchy Begins: 1 Samuel 8-10

Robert Polzin

Heaven is above all yet; there sits a judge that no king can corrupt.
Shakespeare, King Henry VIII

Do your duty bravely. Fear God. Honour the king.
Earl Kitchener, 1914

This displeased Samuel.
1 Samuel 8

The Rights and Duties of the King: 8:1–22

Ch. 8 introduces Israel's first request of Samuel for a king, the LORD's reluctant decision to grant their request and his command to Samuel to solemnly warn them about the rights and duties (*mišpaṭ*) of the king who would reign over them.

Dialogues between the elders of Israel and Samuel and between Samuel and the LORD comprise the events of this chapter. Its center-piece is Samuel's long description of the king's *mišpaṭ* in vv. 10–18. To discover how this solemn declaration of Samuel's relates to the chapter's obvious emphasis on God's command to him to hearken to the voice of the people requesting a king—repeated three times, in vv. 7,9 and 22—is the reader's main task. This responsibility should take account of the following compositional features of the chapter.

First, the narrator's use of imperfective verb-forms highlights what is actually happening in the chapter and the author's evaluative position about these events: God describes to Samuel the people's continual idolatry as "so they are doing (*'osîm*) to you." (v.8), that is to say, the people "were asking (*baššo'alîm*) a king from him." (v.10) These imperfective verb-forms contrastively look back to the central action in the previous chapter highlighting the people's historiographic and idealized repentance: "If you are returning (*šābîm*) to the LORD . . ." (7.3). But given this fundamental picture expressing the narrator's basic perspective in ch. 8, what more can the reader *provisionally* learn about the text's ultimate semantic authority—the implied author's fundamental ideological stance—concerning the events recounted in this chapter?

Second, in the dialogue of this chapter, the reader encounters only a *selective* reporting of the direct words of its characters.[1] Thus, it is important to note that the words of God to Samuel and the words of Samuel to the people are highlighted both in quantity and in compositional terms through the use of direct discourse. On the other hand, what

[1] This is always the case in the relationship between the dominant narrator and his characters: how the narrator chooses to highlight dialogues through the use of direct, indirect and other forms of reported speech is one of the chief indicators by which the reader is able to tease out the implied author's ideological perspectives.

Samuel specifically says to God is not highlighted: he simply "prayed to the LORD (v.6)" and after hearing all the words of the people "repeated them in the ears of the LORD." (v.21)

At the same time, even though we are given the direct words of God to Samuel and Samuel to the people, the narrative is constructed in such a way as to keep the reader in the dark—or at least suspicious—about whether the directly quoted words of God in vv. 7–9 and the directly reported words of Samuel in vv. 11–18 are supposed to represent *all* that God and Samuel said on these occasions. That is to say, the words of God *end* with his command to Samuel to declare to the people the *mišpaṭ hammelek*, the rights and duties of the king (v.9), and the words of Samuel *begin* with "This is the *mišpaṭ hammelek* . . . (v.11)." In between these two verses the narrator states that "Samuel told all the words of the LORD to the people." (v.10) The effect of these three verses, therefore, is to render it uncertain whether what Samuel says in detail about the *mišpaṭ* in vv. 11–18 was itself part of what God had said to him previously, or "really" only Samuel's own interpretation or adaptation of God's words to him or, finally, simply a matter already known to both of them—that which "goes without saying" between a prophetic judge, who knows his law, and God.

Moreover, the dialogues are constructed in such a way as to make the reader uncertain about what else besides the *mišpaṭ* Samuel told the people as he related to them "all the words of the LORD." (v.10) On one hand, this statement of the narrator in v. 10 implies that Samuel did in fact tell the people that their request for a king was in God's eyes tantamount to idolatry, but that God nevertheless would grant them their request. On the other hand, if this be so, the reader quite naturally is struck by the fact that the narrator chooses *not* to directly report this part of Samuel's speech to the people, nor do the people, in their response in vv. 19–20, appear to have heard such. Given the inherent importance of this divine evaluation of the request—its sinfulness and God's amazing decision to go along with it nonetheless—why does the narrator choose not to highlight this fundamental feature of the request for the people's benefit (the reader already knows about it from the narrator), but rather to have Samuel emphasize those aspects of the *mišpaṭ* which would limit the freedoms now enjoyed by the people under their present judicial government? A serious reading of this chapter ought to recognize and integrate this central problem of gaps in the reader's knowledge of who said what to whom.

Third, the narrator's new non-directive style is immediately signalled by the redundant nature of the two central expository facts in vv. 1 and 3, followed by the words of the elders at the start of the "narrative event" [2] in v.4:

Exposition		Beginning of Event	
v. 1	When Samuel became old . . .	v.4a	"Behold you are old
v. 3	Yet his sons did not walk in his ways.	v.4b	and your sons do not walk in your ways."

This narrative situation—obvious from the elders' words alone—becomes the occasion for Israel's request of "a king to govern us like all the nations." (v.5) All along, as he states how displeasing these words were to Samuel (v.6), as he reports God's words about his, God's, attitude toward them, and as he generally emphasizes God's command to Samuel to listen to the people's voice (vv.7,9,22), the narrator keeps his own viewpoint in the

[2] I am using Alter's terminology here, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York, 1981) pp. 63ff.

background and chooses to use the reported words of God both to condemn the Israelites for their request and to authorize Samuel's later actions in granting it. Authorial evaluation is thus more thoroughly refracted than in previous chapters.

Characterization in Ch. 8

What does this chapter tell the reader about its characters and the zones surrounding them? In spite of the narrator's lack of explicit evaluation, God comes across as particularly magnanimous, whereas the imperceptive lad of ch. 3 now appears a stubborn, self-interested judge, who for his own reasons is slow to do the LORD's will. Finally, the people's request, however sinful, seems not wholly impractical. All these characterizations depend in large part upon the meaning of the king's *mišpaṭ* in vv. 9 and 11 and Samuel's obvious delay in obeying the LORD's command.

To treat the last first, the narrative event that begins with the elders of Israel gathering together at Ramah (v.4) and ends with Samuel sending them off "each to his own city (v.22) is all talk and no action, even though the series of dialogues that comprise it has the people repeatedly requesting Samuel to give them a king and God repeatedly commanding him to do so. The narrative event ends without resolution and we do not yet know how Samuel's delaying tactics will turn out. The inconclusive progression of the events is obvious: the story begins with the people's double request of Samuel to give them a king (vv.5,6), proceeds with God's double command to him to do so (vv.7,9), with Samuel's long speech to dissuade them (vv.11–18), with the people's refusal to be dissuaded (vv.19–20), and with the LORD's third and strengthened command—not just "listen to their voice," as in vv. 7 and 9, but listen to their voice *and make them a king*" (v.22a)—and ends with Samuel doing nothing except sending the people away. (v.22b)

Seeing the chapter's obvious progression in this way and primed by the narrator's reference to Samuel's initial displeasure at the people's request (v.6), the reader develops a picture of a judge whose words and inaction show him to be obstructive in a self-interested way. As the event works itself out in this chapter, there is not a hint that the LORD himself intends to choose the king or that the people intend that this be so. The people say to Samuel, "Appoint for us a king (v.5)," "give us a king (v.6)," and "we will have a king (v.19)"; God commands Samuel, "Hearken to the voice of the people *in all that they say to you* (v.7)," "hearken to their voice (v.9)," and "hearken to their voice and make them a king (v.22)." The force of this progressive build-up of pressure on Samuel to act, with no reference to God's desire to do the choosing—contrast Dt 17.18 where God himself is to do the choosing of the king—is in sharp contrast to Samuel's decision at the end of the chapter to do nothing but send the people home.

That Samuel's response to God's command is shown to be subversive as well as dilatory is clear from the people's response to Samuel's description of the king's *mišpaṭ (in vv. 19–20)* and Samuel's subsequent reaction. The people are reported by the narrator as understanding Samuel's words to be an attempt at dissuading them: "No! but we *will* have a king over us . . . (v.19)," and indeed this is the obvious import of Samuel's words to the reader as well. Nevertheless, dissuasion of the people is not at all what Samuel has been commanded by God to accomplish. Moreover, when his attempts to dissuade the people fail, Samuel returns and repeats the people's words "in the ears of the LORD (v.21)," as if this superfluous act of telling God what he obviously already knows might, as a last resort, give God an opportunity to change *his* mind about allowing the monarchy. But when God issues his command yet a third time and in strengthened form, the narrator confirms the reader's suspicions about Samuel's inner motivation by having him send the people away, thus temporarily short-circuiting God's command.

Samuel's Speech to the People

Besides these progressive means by which the narrator gradually "shows up" Samuel without ever saying a word against him—surely a paradigm-example of how even the purest kind of "objective reporting" can be filled through-and-through with the ideological and evaluative perspectives of the reporter—the narrator's focussing on the *mišpaṭ hammelek*, "the rights and duties of the king," in Samuel's speech helps to expose Samuel's character and motivation in a particularly forceful way.

Samuel's words to the people in vv. 11–18 are often interpreted as a thumb-nail sketch of the "greedy abuse of power" reflecting Israel's "long and bitter experience with kingship."[3] Whatever the literary history behind this pericope—and its alleged counterpart in Dt 17.14–17—scholars have rarely examined the central function of Samuel's speech to the people within the context of ch. 8 itself. To consider the royal practices listed here by Samuel as particularly abusive is, in my opinion, tendentious. Surely for ancient citizens—as even more so for the modern reader—the king's predilection for tithing seems, for example, more responsible than corrupt; indeed the people's response in vv. 19–20 recognizes this.[4]

What Samuel's words appear to exploit, as do the king's practices themselves, is the natural tendency of a king to make servants of his people (v.17) rather than to serve them himself. *This* move on Samuel's part is precisely what has to be incorporated into a credible interpretation of this chapter. What is Samuel reported to be warning the people about? And how does this warning fit in with God's injunction to him in v.9 to issue the people a solemn warning or testimony?

The phrase, *he'îd bĕ* (v.9), here strengthened by an infinitive, means "to testify against someone" or "to solemnly warn someone." Does God enjoin Samuel to tell the people how sinful they are in requesting the king he will nevertheless grant them, or how abusive their kings will become, or to what standards the king must conform? Is Samuel's warning supposed to emphasize the evil that the people have already committed in requesting a king, or the evils that they and their kings are to avoid, but will not, in the future? The context does not make any of these questions especially easy to answer. Nevertheless, what is clear in the chapter is that Samuel's speech in vv. 11–18 addresses none of these supposed responsibilities at all.

If, as we have suggested, abusive royal actions are not the issue in his speech, neither does anything Samuel say to the people convict them of the idolatrous implications of their request or deal adequately with the standards of conduct future kings must follow. Rather, Samuel is reported as concentrating solely on those monarchic rights and practices without which no king could effectively govern and which are, in fact, the normal baggage accompanying an ancient royal state. What is missing in the reported words of Samuel is precisely what the context clearly calls for: appropriate prophetic and judicial witness or admonition about past sins or future obligations—and the retributive implications of fulfilling such obligations or not. This is what all the occurrences of *he'îd bĕ* in the Bible are concerned with and what is significantly lacking in Samuel's words to the people. The only "warning" he gives them is about how restrictive their life will become under the monarchy. And this is the problem with his speech. It is hard to imagine that God's words to him in vv. 7–9 enjoin the following: "Samuel, the people's request for a king is clearly idolatrous and tantamount to rejecting me. Nevertheless, give them want they ask for, but

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[3] K. McCarter, *I Samuel* (AB), pp. 161–2.

[4] As Hertzberg has pointed out: *I and II Samuel*, p. 74.

instead of emphasizing these points, tell them only how hard life will be for them under their king."

It seems much more likely that the LORD, whose magnanimity and forbearance permeates his plaintive words in vv.7–9—as Elkanah's does his in ch.1—would not concentrate on having the people informed about how harsh their life will be under their new governors, but rather on having Samuel set down limits to the rights *and* duties of the king he is giving them.[5] However, Samuel is depicted by the narrator as concentrating solely on the future king's *rights* and one can only conclude that his speech is to be understood as an attempt to delay—if not also to subvert—the LORD's decision. Samuel is not just worried about the new king's powers; his rhetoric is an attempt to block the institution itself.

Why Samuel's *Mišpaṭ* Is Only Half the Story

The meaning of "*mišpaṭ*" throughout the Bible extends from its very weak and rare use for something like "appearance" (2 Kg 1.7) to stronger legal usages like "custom or manner of acting' (e.g., Jd 18.7) up to its strongest sense of divinely decreed regulations involving, say, primogeniture (e.g., Dt 21.17) or the powers of judges (e.g., Jd 13.12), priests (e.g., Dt 18.3; 1 Sam 2.13), or kings (as I am suggesting for 8.9,11 and 10.25).[6] With respect to the monarchic contexts of this word in 1 Samuel (8.9,11;10.25), both the rights *and* duties of the king appear to be what Samuel would have "written in a book and laid before the LORD" (10.25); surely one without the other would have ill-served both God and the community.

If we concentrate upon this obvious feature of Samuel's speech on the king's *mišpaṭ*, then the narrative ambiguities of vv. 9–11 mentioned earlier—the completeness or incompleteness of God's and Samuel's directly reported words—lose much of their relevance as the reader attempts to understand the author's ideological perspectives in this chapter. Whether God is supposed to have told Samuel what specifically to say about the *mišpaṭ*, whether Samuel is understood to have recounted to the people God's characterization of their request as idolatry and his decision to grant it nevertheless, and whether Samuel is depicted as giving an expurgated version of the LORD's words to him about *mišpaṭ*—all

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[5] B. Halpern, *The Constitution of the Monarchy in Israel* (Chico CA, 1981), p.224, has seen the necessity of this interpretive move, but has not attempted to explain *why* Samuel in vv. 11–18 limits his speech to the restrictive aspects (from the people's viewpoint) of the monarchy. Halpern, so far as I am aware, does not deal with the *narrative* implications flowing from Samuel's speech as "meant to discourage the assembly from adopting monarchy." (p.220).

[6] B. Halpern, *The Constitution of the Monarchy in Israel*, pp. 224ff., has nicely analyzed the range of biblical usages of this term and rightly focusses on its predominantly legal and decretal meanings. Nevertheless, his source-oriented perspective—I use Sternberg's terminology here (*The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* [Bloomington, 1985], Ch. 1)—keeps him from seeing how *mišpaṭ hammelek*, as Samuel describes it, precisely functions with respect to Samuel fulfilling or not God's injunction in v. 9. Why would God command him to detail just the king's powers without any of the corresponding restrictions or limitations? Or if God did not so limit Samuel, why then is Samuel's speech so limited? So far as I know, Halpern because of his historiographic emphases does not direct his attention to this discourse-oriented question.

these matters lose much of their hermeneutic relevance when we look at the chapter from the perspective of the narrator's principles of selection in reported speech and its effect on characterization: why does the narrator choose directly to report God's and Samuel's speech precisely as he does in the chapter? Why do the directly quoted words of the LORD emphasize his decision to institute kingship in spite of its equation with idolatry and to the neglect of the *mišpaṭ's* details, whereas the directly quoted words of Samuel emphasize the *mišpaṭ's* details to the neglect of God's command and kingship's idolatrous nature? Why, moreover, does Samuel's description of the king's *mišpaṭ* concentrate on royalty's rights, that is, on those matters that constitute an infringement of the people's freedoms, to the neglect of corresponding royal obligations protecting God's and the people's interests—obligations that also must have been part of the decrees laid up before the LORD?

The answer to these questions seems to lie in the area of contrastive characterization. Given what God says in the chapter, his character-zone with respect to Israel is remarkably close in its emotive register to Elkanah's with respect to Hannah. The love of God for Israel comes across as predominantly disinterested and remarkably magnanimous: "Oh Israel, am I not worth more to you than 10 kings? Your desires here are so like your previous idolatrous deeds. Nevertheless, I will grant your request, only there will be limits set." On the other hand, Samuel's words in vv. 11–18 are full of self-interest and this understanding of them corresponds both to the people's subsequent reaction and Samuel's own lack of action at the end of the chapter.

Certainly what Samuel says about the king's future actions is properly contained within the boundaries of *mišpaṭ*. Nevertheless, his speech is made to concentrate solely on the king's rights to the exclusion of his corresponding restrictions or obligations, because Samuel is being portrayed here as trying to delay or subvert the LORD's command even as he wants to appear fulfilling that command with a solemn warning. His motivation is clearly self-interested. God is poignantly giving, Samuel shrewdly self-serving. God is not reported as describing the *mišpaṭ* in detail because his decision in the face of personal rejection is what the narrator highlights. Samuel is not shown as declaring to the people either kingship's idolatrous nature or God's amazing decision because neither serves his desire to dissuade the people: God's decision makes kingship's idolatrous nature rhetorically irrelevant for Samuel. Thus the narrator paints the picture of a god who reveals his love in spite of being rejected, in contrast to a judge who fails to conceal his selfish reluctance to become the maker of kings.

At the same time and by all these means the narrator creates in the reader a curiosity about how God and Samuel will deal with the problems facing them. As this chapter indicates with respect to Samuel's reluctance, God will have to initiate the action.

The Rhetoric of Prophetic Persuasion: 9.1-27

Because of the ideological clarity of ch. 8, the reader is allowed no doubt about the intrinsic evil of kingship; throughout the entire history of the monarchy until the very end, this aspect of the royal institution forms the bed-rock of the story. What now needs to be worked out in detail, therefore, is how kingship is to function. Given the LORD's magnanimous decision to allow Israel their request, what are the divine ground-rules according to which the king will rule? We have characterized Samuel's speech on the *mišpaṭ hammelek*, "the ways of the king," in ch. 8 as a lopsided, self-interested beginning of an answer. Chs. 9–12 now expand the discussion to include a fundamental constraint upon the king: the necessary role of the prophet (*nābî'*) for the royal period of Israel's history. The end of Samuel's farewell address puts it succinctly:

> Moreover, as for me, far be it from me that I should sin against the LORD by ceasing to pray for you; *and I will instruct you in the good and right way. . . . But if you do wickedly, both you and your king will be swept away (tissāpû)* (12.23,25)

Samuel, like Jeremiah after him, will carry out this obligation despite his personal inclinations and obstructive will. That his warning words in ch. 12 even express what will come true with respect to Saul, the very king before him there, is epitomized in the verb *sāpāh* "to be swept away, destroyed (in the *nifal*)." David will later echo this warning of Samuel's with prophetic words about Saul near the end of the book: "As the LORD lives, the LORD will smite him; his day shall come to die; and he shall go down into battle and be swept away (*wĕnispāh*)" (26.10) On the other hand, when David escapes to the land of the Philistines, it is to avoid what would surely happen if he remain: "I should now be swept away (*'essapeh*) by the hand of Saul." (27.1) Thus Samuel's prophetic words in 12.25 will come to pass concerning "your king" at the end of 1 Samuel with the death of Saul, and—even though "*sāpāh*" itself is not used—concerning "you" (that is Israel) at the end of 2 Kings with the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile.

What now appears to be addressed in the story are these questions: What is a prophet and how does he operate in relation to the king? Once Samuel dies, how will Israel distinguish the true from the false prophet? Even during Samuel's life, which words of his are truly words of the LORD? As the narrator tells his story about Saul becoming Israel's first king, he builds into his account an introductory portrait of that institutional and personal check meant by the LORD to keep the king on the good and right path, the prophet.

The ideological and narrative background to this portrait of the prophet in 1 Sam 8–12 is Dt 13 and 18. In Dt 18 Moses himself details the main criterion by which Israel will be able to distinguish true from false prophecy once he, Moses, the greatest prophet of them all (Dt 34.10), dies and the prophet to come after him is on the scene:

> And if you say in your heart, "How may we know the word which the LORD has not spoken?"—when a prophet speaks in the name of the LORD, if the word does not come to pass or come true (*wĕlo' yābo'*), that is a word which the LORD has not spoken. (Dt 18.21–22)

Dt 13 further qualifies this prophetic criterion by stipulating that not all prophetic signs that come true are necessarily from God; for example, those that lead to idolatry are not from God.

Chs. 9 and 10 of 1 Samuel are paradigmatic as they recount how God introduces Saul, Israel's first and future king, to the very prophet who—however reluctantly—is to keep his kingship in check. The story of Saul's journey to find his father's asses is meant to provide us with an outline of how God intends Israel's royal journey to proceed if it is indeed to remain "on the good and right path." (12.23) Saul's introduction to the LORD's prophet is the reader's introduction as well: ch. 9 begins a narrative instruction on the rhetoric of prophetic persuasion.

Perspectives in Ch. 9

The story's shift from the well-known judge of ch. 8 to the unknown local seer of chs. 9 and 10 has often bothered scholars. Typically for them, the "new" Samuel is symptomatic of ch. 9 as derived from a "source" different from that of previous chapters. This supposed source is a necessary element in the text's literary history because of the very

manner in which the source is considered to have been unsuccessfully integrated into the larger story-line. The reader's journey between chs. 8 and 9—from that Samuel who is but a popular and universally recognized judge of Israel to a Samuel who is a local seer or man of God, and thus largely unknown even to people who matter like Saul—can only be literary-historical or genetic in nature if it is to remain coherent; so we have been taught. A heavy-handed redactor carved out a connecting path from one chapter to the next, but did a rather clumsy job in the process—an ancient prototype of our modern "literary hack." His crudity—never so baldly stated, but implied nonetheless—should not scandalize us too much, we are usually counselled, since ancient Israelites were not so concerned about or bothered by historiographic, esthetic or ideological "dis-integration" as we orderly and right-thinking moderns are. Their standards of coherence were either less demanding than, or at least often different from, ours. Not to worry: this is the stuff of which many a literary history is ingeniously constructed.

Apart from the patronising and disdainful attitude hidden in such views, it is equally unfortunate that such literary-historical constructions do not seriously deal with the *real text* in its intricacy and literary sophistication. Such an attitude takes no account of many of the text's features because of an accompanying belief that such features are of little account.

How might the obvious shift in perspective between chs. 8 and 9 *fit* from a non-genetic or compositional point of view? Why might this shift take place and how might it serve coherent ideological, historiographic or esthetic purposes?

One answer has to do with the story's ability to generate curiosity, suspense and surprise in the reader by the manner in which its narrator withholds relevant information—and thereby shapes the plot.[7] In ch. 9, the reader is kept in the dark concerning the identity of the nameless man of God or seer mentioned by the characters until v. 14, when the narrator has "Samuel" coming to meet Saul and his servant. If the reader comes to know this seer as Samuel, it is never clear when Saul recognizes him as the judge of Israel. Coupled with the narrator's *temporary* shielding of Samuel's identity is the *permanent* concealment from the reader of the city where Saul and Samuel first meet. From first to last, reference to it is anonymous (vv. 6,10,11,12,13,14, 25,27). All we are told is that the city is in the land of Zuph.[8] These varying degrees of ignorance and knowledge, discovery or the lack of it on the part of the reader and characters, work together to form the chapter's complex play of perspectives.

The narrator's manipulation of the reader's knowledge and ignorance seems bent on generating surprise and wonder even as the reader's curiosity is satisfied: given Samuel's subversive short-circuiting of the LORD's will in ch. 8, how will the LORD accomplish his purposes nonetheless? Briefly put, God is shown as having decided that if Samuel will not go to Saul, Saul will have to come to Samuel. But the narrator delays this expository information so that the reader encounters it simultaneously with Saul, who first encounters Samuel only in v. 14: "As they were entering the city, behold *Samuel* coming out toward them." This order of narration—first the encounter in v. 14, and then the reason for it in v. 15—generates surprise on the part of the reader: the story of the lost asses, which apparently had no relation to the preceding story, is now seen to be intimately connected to it. The LORD controls all men's words and actions: he *makes* plot

[7] Lyle Eslinger (*Kingship of God in Crisis* [Sheffield, 1985], pp. 291ff) nicely explores this aspect of the chapter.

[8] Presumably, all the characters in the story know the name of the city.

and the narrator, who can only shape it,[9] highlights the LORD's omnipotence by the manner in which he chooses to manipulate the reader toward the surprise encounter in v. 14.

If the reader's temporary ignorance of the identity of the seer or man of God in vv. 1–13 can be plausibly viewed as ideologically and esthetically motivated, his permanent ignorance concerning the identity of the city of encounter is not so easily explained. That the city's anonymity *is* relevant to the narrator's purposes seems clear: all voices in the chapter, narrator's and characters' alike, consistently refer to a nameless city all eight times it is mentioned. What is not so clear is precisely what narrative purpose such anonymity serves. The narrator's tendency elsewhere is toward urban specificity: what does his refusal to divulge the city's name here signify? Perhaps the *secret* anointing of Saul by Samuel in 10.1—Saul's servant is made to go on ahead so that Saul and Samuel will be alone; and later on (10.16) Saul does not reveal to his uncle anything "about the matter of the kingdom"—is dramatized by the narrator's permanent concealment of the very city at the boundaries of which the anointing takes place. All this is in contrast to the later, slightly more open anointing of David by Samuel: the city, Bethlehem, is named and the anointing takes place familially, "in the midst of [David's] brothers." (16.13)

This shift between chs. 8 and 9 from knowing to unknowing, from having a prophet to the unwitting search for one, serves, however, a much more generalized ideological purpose than simply the author's creation of curiosity and surprise in his readers and the depiction of limited vision in his characters. At the beginning of ch. 9 Saul's servant says about the anonymous man of God, "Perhaps he will declare (*yaggîd*) to us about the path (*darkenû*) on which we have set out." (9.6) The end of this section (chs. 8–12) has Samuel say to Israel, "I will instruct you (*wĕboreti*) on the good and right path (*derek*)." (12.23) Beginning in ch. 9, the manner in which Samuel declares what Saul's journey is all about is paradigmatic of how later prophets will instruct Israel in their journey along the king's road. Chs. 9 and 10 constitute the Deuteronomist's opening declaration of the *mišpaṭ hannabî'*, "the ways of the prophet."

The Four Dialogues in Ch. 9

Ch. 9 tells the story of two men inquiring of the LORD (v.9). When an Israelite went to a prophet to inquire (*lidroš*) of the LORD, how could he distinguish the true from the false word of God. Dt. 18 had provided the beginning of an answer: words that are not from God do not come true (*lo' yābo'*) (v.22); conversely, it would seem, those that do come true are from God. The four dialogues in 1 Sam 9—between Saul and his servant (vv. 5–10), between both of them and the young maidens (vv. 11–14), between God and Samuel (vv. 15–17) and between Samuel and Saul (vv. 18–21)—enlarge upon and refine this answer. Each encounter shows how a character's question generates a predictive response. Not only does each dialogue's response then come true, but each dialogue successively increases the magnitude of its predictive power, so that only the final two involving Samuel are seen to be truly prophetic: what God predicts in vv. 15–17 and what Samuel promises in vv. 19–20. (As we shall see, ch. 10 will greatly intensify this pattern with a whole series of miraculous predictions by Samuel to Saul of what would come to pass—"signs" [10.7] that Samuel speaks for God.)

When one inquires of another in normal circumstances, the response often correctly predicts what will come to pass. The prophet's word, however, is of a higher order. During

[9] Meir Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, p. 128.

the journey of Saul and his servant, the dialogues they engage in embody, as it were, a search for the prophetic word. Once the chapter makes clear—both to Saul and the reader—how the prophetic word operates and how it is to be distinguished from the "ordinary" predictions that precede it in the chapter, Samuel is ready to say to Saul at its end: "Stop now, that I may make known to you the word of God." (9.27)

The first dialogue, a conversation between Saul and his servant, is a carefully crafted introduction to the chapter's main ideological concerns. It starts off with the weakest of predictions: Saul's servant says about the man of God: "Perhaps (*'ûlay*) he will declare to us the path upon which we have set out." (v.6) There is hope here, buttressed by the man of God's reputation as a "seer": "all that he says is certain to come true (*bo' yābo'*) (v.6) The story indeed goes on to show how the servant's hope-filled statement comes to pass.

The servant's speech contains elements often found in prophetic speech as the book and the history abundantly reports it. First, "now, therefore (*'attah*)" in v. 6 echoes forth with the prophetic accents of Samuel himself in 8.9; 10.19; 12.2.7.13.16 and even of the Philistine sorcerers in 6.7. (This key word is certainly not exclusively prophetic, as even 2.16;8.5 and 12.10 show, but it is a *typical* element of prophetic rhetoric as commentators generally recognize.) Then the servant's use of *hinnēh*, "look" or "behold," in vv. 6 and 8 also intones a rhetoric of persuasion superficially similar to a prophet's.[10]

Saul's servant, of course, is not speaking *as* a prophet, but *of* a prophet and this is precisely the point: the lad is made to speak with faintly prophetic tones or accents so that the contrast between obviously non-prophetic predictions and the prophetic predictions to come will be highlighted. Authentic prophetic speech is more than "perhaps," more even than "certainly will," as Dt 13.1–5 had already made clear. Here, however, the emphasis is on a common experience: things that all men say often come to pass. What makes a prophet's word—and the rhetoric surrounding it—different?

At this point in the first dialogue, the author signals to the reader the ideological perspective according to which the entire account has been constructed. The heart of this dialogue—as of the three dialogues to follow in the chapter—involves a question, an inquiry that requires a character to respond or answer (*'ānāh*), just as a man inquires of God through a prophet, and expects an answer. Here in the first dialogue, however, the Deuteronomist even goes so far as to artfully conceal the primary subject-matter about which the entire series of dialogues ending in 10.16 has been structured. For when the servant suggests visiting the anonymous man of God in the anonymous city, Saul is reported as asking, "But if we go, *what can we bring the man?* (*mah nābî' lā'îš*)." (v. 7)

What is most significant about this initial question in the initial dialogue of the chapter is its double-meaning; besides its obvious import in context, the phrase also expresses the main question of this and the following chapters: given that Israel is to have a king, what is the manner of the office which God has chosen to keep him in line? "*mah nābî' lā'îš*" also means in this context: "What is a prophet to man?"[11] With this opening question

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[10] "*Hinneh*" serves many functions in narration. When spoken by the narrator, it can signal a transition either from the narrator's to a character's point of view (e.g., 9.14) or from narrated past to narrator's present (e.g., Dt. 3.11); when spoken by a character, it points to something either present or made present by him to his interlocutor. In this last characterological function its prophetic appropriateness is obvious.

[11] That "*'îš*" can be used not just to refer to a specific man (*lā'îš*) but (rarely) to man generally speaking (*lā'îš*)—that is, "any man," "a man in general," or "some representative of mankind"—is seen from the statement of one of the Hebrews whom Moses had stopped

in v. 7, followed by the narrator's later statement in v. 9 that "he who is today called a prophet (*nābî'*) was formerly called a seer (*ro'eh*), the Deuteronomist calls attention to what Saul's journey to Samuel is all about: the *mišpaṭ hammelek*, the rights and duties of the king, will necessarily involve the *mišpaṭ hannabi'*, the rights and duties of the prophet.[12]

The servant responds (*la'ănot*) a second time in v. 8: "I will give [the money] to the man of God and he will declare (or "that he may declare") to us our path." Obviously this prediction is exactly what will happen later on in the chapter, and just as obviously the servant's words in vv. 6 and 8 are *not* prophetic in spite of their predictive value: what the servant purposes to accomplish comes to pass, but this fact in no way makes his words "prophetic."

This dialogue is followed by a second—between Saul and his servant, on one hand, and the young maidens they meet coming out to draw water, on the other. (vv. 11–14) The meeting is a truncated "type-scene of annunciation," as Robert Alter has pointed out, and therefore "in all likelihood a clue of meaning."[13] Its precise function here lies in the fact that it is constructed remarkably like the dialogues that precede and follow it. The encounter begins with a question, an inquiry, posed to the maidens by Saul and his servant, "Is the seer here?" (v.11) As the servant before them (v.8) and the LORD (v.17), Samuel (v.19) and Saul (v.21) after them, "they answered (*watta'ănenāh*), '. . . Look (*hinnēh*) he is just ahead of you. Now therefore (*'attah*) make haste for today (*hāyyôm*) he has gone to the city. . . . As soon as you enter the city, you will find him . . . the people will not eat till he comes, for he will bless the sacrifice, afterwards the people invited will eat, now therefore (*we'attāh*) go up, for this very day (*kĕbayyôm*) you will meet him.'" (vv. 12–13)

This breathless, garrulous response to the two men's curt question gives them almost more than they care to know. It is packed with predictive information clothed in typical prophetic rhetoric; the narrator is quick to point out that these predictions immediately begin to happen:

Maidens	Narrator
As soon as you enter the city you will find him . . .(v.13)	As they were entering the city, they saw Samuel coming out toward them. (v.14)

The Hebrew writer's "technique of contrastive dialogue," so clearly described and emphasized by Robert Alter[14], sets off the short/long contrast between the men's question and the maiden's response, but more importantly and generally it explains how the non-prophetic predictions of the servant and the maidens in the first two dialogues differ fundamentally from the authentically prophetic statements of God, the narrator and Samuel found in the other "dialogues" in the chapter. Something more is necessary for a true prophet than simply predicting the future.

(continued)

from fighting with his fellow: "He answered, 'Who made you a prince and a judge over a man (*le'îš*)?" (Ex 2.14).

[12] As noted below in the last endnote, scholars like Buber, Sternberg and Eslinger have recognized various kinds of wordplay in the use of *nābî'* in v. 7.

[13] *The Art of Biblical Narrative*, pp. 60–61.

[14] *The Art of Biblical Narrative*, pp. 72ff.

With the *implicit* dialogue between the LORD and Samuel in vv. 15–17—I write implicit because v. 17 has God *respond* to Samuel (*'ānābu*), "Here is the man . . ." as if in reply to Samuel's prior but unreported question, "Is this the man?" in the space between vv. 16 and 17—the narrator begins to represent authentic prophetic speech. Most notable here is a prophecy's origin in the LORD in response to man's questioning or inquiring. The prophet or seer conveys or communicates the words of the "Seer (*ro'eh*)" par excellence, God himself, who is made, therefore, to say in v. 16: "I have seen (*rā'îtî*) my people; indeed their cry has come to me." This dialogue between the LORD and Samuel is the expository basis for the prophetic promises and predictions Samuel makes to Saul in the dialogue to follow. The LORD's statement of what will happen, his "tomorrow" (v.16), is intrinsically different from the human predictions of the preceding dialogues: the LORD's words "establish" the prophetic words of Samuel to Saul.

The *content* of God's words also set out the boundaries of Saul's future actions and are in contrast to Samuel's previous words. For God, Saul is sent by the LORD and will save the people from the hands of the Philistines (v.16); at the same time, God predicts that Saul—and his successors on the throne—will constrain, hinder, imprison (*ya'ṣor*) his people. (v.17) Whereas Samuel in 9.10–18 had subversively emphasized to the people only how the king would restrict their freedoms, God here balances these constraints with the office's advantages. This difference between the narrow, self-interested, discourse of a prophet and the wider, more magnanimous vision of the God he is supposed to represent is not lost on the reader.

Because of the contrastive nature of the first three dialogues in the chapter (the first two in contrast to the third), the reader is prepared for the fourth dialogue, that between Samuel and Saul. This encounter concentrates on the miraculously predictive powers of Samuel as seen by fellow Israelites—but always and only to be understood by the reader against the background of the third dialogue's seer needing constantly to be led by God step-by-step, in an almost infantile way: God had told Samuel, "Make them a king," but Samuel had obstinantly sent the people home; Samuel needs to ask, "Is this the man?" and God answers, "This is the man." (Ch. 16 will further emphasize the groping sight of Samuel as he struggles to discover which one of Jesse's sons the LORD has chosen to replace Saul.) His contemporaries see mostly the prophet's miraculous gifts, the Deuteronomist's even the prophet's flaws and weaknesses.[15]

The dialogue between Samuel and Saul (vv. 18–21) is structured like those that precede: it is fueled by a question that provokes a response (*wayya'an:* v. 19). This response is also full of predictive information that the narrator is careful to fulfill. Nevertheless, the information and promises of information which Samuel gives Saul are mostly of a higher order than what is contained in the first two dialogues. If it is hardly remarkable that Samuel tells Saul he will eat with him that day and be sent off on the morrow, Samuel also claims nothing less than a participation in the omniscience of God at least on a par with that of the narrator: "I will declare to you all that is in your heart." (v. 19) And whereas the compact between the omniscient narrator and his less knowledgeable reader has the latter only able to *believe* or *accept* the narrator's information about what is "truly" in a character's heart, Saul on the other hand—within the world of the narrative—is in a position to *know for sure* how extraordinary the prophet's knowledge is, since it is *his* heart that the prophet probes, and what is in it that he declares. Samuel reveals to Saul the very purpose for his journey and even declares the search no longer necessary: "As for your asses that were

[15] See especially Meir Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* (Bloomington, 1985) pp. 94–96, on the ironic portrait of Samuel in ch. 9.

lost now three days, do not set your heart on them for they have been found." (v.20) Samuel not only reveals men's hearts, his knowledge, like that of the narrator, spans space and time.

Following this remarkable dialogue, vv. 22–27 detail the rest of Saul's visit with Samuel and their leaving the city together on the next day, as Samuel had promised. The stage is now set for the secret anointing of Saul and a more detailed exposition of the *mišpaṭ bannabi'* in ch. 10.

Ch. 9's Dialogue Between Author and Reader

Once the reader sees this chapter as a carefully worked-out meditation on prophetic declarations and the rhetoric by which they are conveyed, he is able to fit together many of its narrative elements to form a coherent picture. A number of significant features are conspicuously distributed throughout the chapter.

First, the narrator himself takes care to speak mostly in the narrative past—using imperfective verb-forms only five times, either to bring the reader into the action of the story or to describe a scene from a character's perspective (vv.11,14 and 27). This emphasis of the narrator on past action is, of course, normally to be expected; it is distinctively accentuated nonetheless. The Deuteronomist wants thereby to highlight by contrast the present and future perspectives of his characters' speech in the chapter as he reports them speaking mostly in ways that are either prophetic or prophetic-like.

Nevertheless, even here the narrator makes it explicitly clear that his voice is to be understood like the LORD's and Samuel's in its prophetic and omniscient powers, rather than like Saul's, his servant's or the young maidens'. For just as the Deuteronomist had his narrator periodically "break-frame" in the Book of Deuteronomy to remind the reader of his prophetic and authoritative voice in narrating the exploits of the prophet Moses,[16] so also here the narrator breaks narrative frame in 9.9 by switching from narrative past to narrator's present in order to underline the omniscient and prophetic qualities that belong to *his* voice through the very contract between him and the reader that makes up the Israelite narrative convention.[17] Here in 1 Sam 9 as in The Book of Deuteronomy generally, and despite their enormous differences, the epistemological similarities between Israelite narrator and Israelite prophet are explicitly underlined:

> He who is now (*bayyôm*) called a prophet was formerly (*lĕpānîm*) called a seer. (v. 9)

This relationship between "now" and "then" is of the essence of the narrative act; the narrator *now* reports what was the case *then* and his reporting is obviously omniscient whenever he chooses it to be so.

In fact, this omniscient power, belonging by right of convention and ideology to the Israelite narrator, is very much like a predictive power: the narrator brings about events

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[16] See *Moses and the Deuteronomist*, ch. 2, for a detailed explanation of this phenomenon.

[17] See on this point the brilliant analysis of Meir Sternberg in *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, Ch. 3. The application of these theoretical concepts to 1 Sam 9 is fully my responsibility and not Sternberg's. It should be noted, however, that Sternberg at one point in his book refers to the unknown writers of biblical narrative as necessarily having "assumed a prophetic role in writing" (*Op. cit.*, p. 94), so that, in this respect at least, our views are similar.

by the very act of narration. As if, therefore, to make this point about the "prophetic" nature of the narrative act and to underline its similarity to the prophetic and predictive powers of the LORD and Samuel in this chapter, the narrator breaks the flow of his story, forces the reader to attend focally to *his* words rather than his characters' and then "brings his words about:"

> Formerly in Israel when a man went to inquire of God he said, "Come let us go to the seer . . ." (v.9)
> And Saul said to his servant, ". . . Come let us go" and they went. (v.10)

Narrative "post-diction" is simply prophetic prediction in reverse. Like the Israelite prophet's knowledge, the Israelite narrator's omniscience is always and everywhere constrained by the LORD's omnipotence. Concerning future events, the prophet can speak about only what the LORD *will accomplish;* concerning the past, the narrator can describe only what the LORD *has accomplished.* This commonly shared trait is why the narrator, as Sternberg has pointed out,[18] is the shaper rather than the maker of plot.

Second, therefore, we can now see one of the reasons why ch. 9 places its scenes in a permanently anonymous city—*bā'ir* in vv. 6,10,11,12,13,14,25 and 27—and temporarily depicts Samuel as an anonymous man of God (vv. 6,7,8,10) or seer (vv. 9,11). The narrator all along knows him to be Samuel and so designates him in his own discourse (vv. 14,15, 17,18,19,22,23,24,26,27). The reader, on the other hand, *discovers* the man of God to be Samuel only in v. 14, when the narrator chooses to disclose the fact. This epistemological symmetry between reader's and characters' ignorance up to at least v. 14 *dramatizes* the ideological perspective of the chapter—the quest to discover who is a prophet in Israel—by emphasizing the precariousness of identifying the true prophet and the true word of God. From v. 14 on, the dissymetry between the reader's knowledge and Saul's ignorance of Samuel's position in the scheme of things allows the reader to learn how a true prophet operates, even as he is told the story—from v. 18 on into the next chapter—of Samuel convincing Saul of his prophetic authority.

Far from necessitating the introduction of "another source" with a differing ideology, therefore, the shifts in perspective between chs. 8 and 9, on one hand, and within ch. 9 on the other, may be simply suggestive of the varying play of perspectives—between narrator and reader, between reader and characters and between character and character—that forms the stuff of sophisticated narrative. The challenge of any reading is to put these various shifts in perspective in the service of a plausible ideological, esthetic and historiographic framework.

Third, if the reader sees ch. 9 as beginning a search for the authentically prophetic word—occasioned at this point, we might add, by the reader's immediately preceding experience in ch. 8 of a true prophet uttering words that are at least partially subversive to God's plans—it becomes clear why the narrator distributes upon the lips of all the characters in the chapter who respond to questions mostly predictive statements, all of which come true:[19]

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[18] *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative,* p. 128.

[19] In fact, as we shall shortly point out, *all* the characters speak mostly with imperfective verb-forms, at least 35 of them, with the emphasis on the future.

Saul's Servant:	Perhaps he will tell us about the journey on which we have set out. (v.6)
	I will give [the money] to the man of God and he will tell us our way. (v.8)
Saul:	Behold we will go. (v.7)
The Maidens	He is just ahead of you. (v.12)
	As soon as you enter the city you will find him before he goes up to the high place to eat. (v. 13)
	The people will not eat till he comes. (v.13)
	Afterward they will eat who are invited. (v. 13)
	Go up, for you will meet him immediately. (v.13)
The LORD:	Tomorrow about this time, I will send you a man from the land of Benjamin. (v.16)
	And you will anoint him . . . (v.16)
	He shall save my people . . . (v. 16)
	He it is who shall constrain my people. (v.17)
Samuel:	Today you will eat with me . . .
	And in the morning I will let you go
	And tell you all that is on your mind. (v.19)

Fourth, seeing this chapter as beginning the Deuteronomist's instruction on man's search for the prophetic word in the midst of normal human rhetoric about present meanings and future happenings helps to explain why the characters' speech uniformly concentrates on the present and future not only with over 35 imperfective verb-forms, but also with a noticeable distribution of words and phrases that rhetorically point to the present or future: in each character's answer (*'ānāb*) to an interlocutor's prior question (vv. 8,12,17, 19,21), the answer is made to point at least once to something present or future using *hinneh*, "look, behold" (vv. 6,7,8,12,17,24) and his speech is sprinkled with "now" words and phrases employing *'attāb* "now therefore" (vv. 6,12,13) and *yôm* "today, now" (vv. 12,13,19,20,27).

At the same time and in contrast to this chapter's declarations about the present and future, only Samuel's telling of affairs is referred to by the solemn term, *biggîd* "to announce, declare" (vv. 6,8,18,19): others may speak or answer, but only Samuel, like Moses before him, "declares" the LORD's "declared one (*nāgîd*)"[20]

The Power and Limits of Prophetic Persuasion: 10.1-16

Following the dialogues in ch. 9 which contrast humanly predictive with divinely prophetic discourse, the first part of ch. 10 (vv. 1–16) provides a fitting climax. First, the power of truly prophetic speech is emphasized by Samuel's control over even the smallest details of what will befall Saul after his anointing: vv. 2–8 are loaded down with geographic and circumstantial detail that is meant to overwhelm Saul, if not the reader, with

[20] I do not mean to imply that *biggîd* is necessarily a prophetic term, but simply that in the *immediate* context concerning the nature of kingship and prophecy the word serves a connective function in the narrator's choice of words, in accordance with the LORD's injunction to Samuel in 8.9 to "declare" to the people the rights and duties of the king, the LORD'S *nāgîd*.

its predictive power. Saul's three-staged itinerary, how many people meeting him at each stage, what precisely they will say to him, what they will be carrying and offering him, how he will respond and "be turned into another man," and what finally he will do at Gilgal—all this is spelled out and commanded with impressive prophetic authority. Second, after the narrator establishes that "all these signs came to pass that day (v.9), he singles out for specific narrative fulfillment Samuel's prediction that Saul would prophesy among the prophets. There follows a second dialogue, one between the people and "a man of the place" questioning Saul's prophetic status (vv. 11–12), and finally a third dialogue, between Saul and his (unexpected) uncle. (vv. 14–16)

The first "dialogue" in ch. 10 continues the predictive perspective outlined above in the dialogues of ch. 9, but everything is now raised to a higher power. Samuel's opening statement, "Has not (*halô'*) the LORD anointed you to be prince over his inheritance?" (v.1), does double-duty as both question and answer, and therefore makes vv. 1–8 an implicit dialogue. Although the form of v.1 is a question, it is also a delayed response to Saul's previous question to Samuel in 9.21: "Why then have you spoken to me in this way?" In fact, since it introduces a question that requires a positive answer—"Yes, the LORD has anointed you to be prince . . ."—the particle "*halô'*" functions here very much like *hinneh*, ("behold"): "Behold, the LORD has anointed you to be prince. . . ." Thus ch. 10's opening "dialogue" begins with the series of questions which Saul addresses to Samuel in 9.21 to which it is an appropriate response.

This first dialogue introduces in an especially graphic way the central problem of the chapter, indeed of the entire section (chs. 8–12): what is to be the precise relationship between prophet and king? If 10.1–8 shows the prophet in his predictive and commanding roles with reference to Israel's first king, it also immediately introduces a complicating question: may not Israel's king be Israel's prophet also? The conflict with which Samuel ends his opening speech in ch. 10—Saul is commanded on one hand to do whatever his hand finds to do (v.7), yet he will (have to?) wait until Samuel shows him what to do (v.8)—is simply representative of the entire section: how does God intend the rights and duties of Israel's king to be related to the rights and duties of the LORD's prophet? How does the *mišpaṭ hammelek* relate to the *mišpaṭ hannabî*?

When the narrator introduces the second dialogue of ch. 10, that between the people and an anonymous individual (vv. 11–12), he centers it around the fulfillment of Samuel's third prediction to Saul in vv. 5–6: God does give Saul another heart and his spirit does come upon him, so that by prophesying he occasions the proverbial question, "Is Saul also among the prophets? (v.12)" It is clear from vv. 9 and 10 that if Samuel had foretold this turn of affairs it is God who brings it about. The conflict in Saul between the freedom of v. 7 and the limitations of v. 8 is the result of the very action of God himself.

By v. 13, the *mišpaṭ hannabî'* in conflict with the *mišpaṭ hammelek* has taken central stage in the story. If vv. 1–8 show Samuel in prophetic action and vv. 9–13 have Saul join him in this activity, thus causing the people's wonderment at this turn of affairs, vv. 14–16 now surround Saul with a prophetic aura. For Saul is asked by his uncle to "please declare (*higgîd*)" what Samuel had said; and Saul responds by indicating—but only partially—what Samuel the prophet had himself declared. If it is Samuel's prophetic role to declare to Israel what God had said about the rights and duties of the king (8.9), but in fact gives them only a partial answer, here the fledgling prophet, Saul, tells his uncle what Samuel had said, but does not declare to him *anything* about the matter of the kingship. This use of *higgîd* paronomastically clothes Saul with both royal and prophetic garb: it thematically compares his prophetic "declarations" with Samuel's and at the same time calls fresh attention to him as the newly anointed *nāgîd*, or "royal designate" of 9.16 and

10.1: the *nāgîd lo' biggîd.* Prophet and king are both etymologically and ideologically intertwined.

The remaining verses of ch. 10 (vv. 17–27) may be profitably discussed in conjunction with those aspects of characterization that are crucial for an understanding of this chapter's main ideological points of view.

The Characterization of Saul, Samuel and God: 10.1-27

A coherent picture of the main characters in the drama of Israel's monarchic beginnings is gradually emerging. Certainly the most enigmatic and unpredictable character is Yahweh himself. The gulf between the omniscient and omnipotent LORD, on one hand, and fallible man struggling to make his way in the tangle of this world on the other, is central to the "drama of reading" so well described by Meir Sternberg in *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative.* Man continually strives to put a fence around the words and actions of God in an effort to tame them, but they somehow resist such domestication. Such is a constant theme of biblical literature: God resists man's attempt to "pen him in." The spirit of God which comes so mightily upon Saul in 10.10 remains elusive to us, just beyond our grasp: like Saul, Samuel and their fellow Israelites, we labour to understand the LORD's intentions. As for our grasp of Samuel, the inner and outer man slowly comes into focus. By ch. 10 we already have a clear idea of what motivates him as judge and prophet. And concerning Saul, we now have our first opportunity to get beyond his good looks, his unusual height (9.2), his humility (9.21) and filial piety. By the end of ch. 10 we feel we have somehow gotten hold of the characters of Saul and Samuel. If divine ultimacy remains mysterious, the path upon which the Deuteronomist takes us is nevertheless filled with a range of valuable insights into the ever variable human character. The marvel of the author's craft lies in his ability to characterize the players in his drama with only the sparsest of explicit evaluation or ideological judgment; that shadowy figment of our imagination, that personified reconstruction of our reading we call "the author" remains a master of indirection.

Perhaps the greatest surprise awaiting the reader in ch. 10 concerns Saul. By means of a brilliant set of interlocking compositional and thematic features, the history of Saul's reign is foreshadowed, his insurmountable problems deftly indicated, and his mysterious rejection already suggested.

First, even before Saul is chosen king by lot in vv. 20–24, the narrator already sets him up for failure by clothing him in the discordant garb of a prophet. From the beginning of the monarchic history to its very end, no king of Israel except Saul is ever said to prophesy, no king at all ever so much as called a prophet. Given Saul's disastrous royal tenure and his abortive dynastic hopes, the proverb in v. 12, "Is Saul also among the prophets?", (repeated in 19.24), surely expresses a central problem with the reign of Saul, a reign in which there was a tragic mix-up of theocratic roles. God's part in Saul's prophetic activity (v. 10) need not obscure for us the disastrous confusion of monarchic and prophetic offices which co-existed in the person of Saul only to end abruptly and disastrously with him, any more than the divine command to Samuel to make Israel a king should cause us to ignore its essentially idolatrous nature in terms of the story's ideology.

The build-up of Saul as prophet begins with the very first words we hear him utter: "Come, let us go back," he says to his servant, "lest my father cease to care about the asses and become anxious about us." (9.5) These words express an understandable filial concern, not particularly unusual for someone in his circumstances. The narrator, however, chooses to highlight these first words of Saul by having Samuel's first sign to him in ch. 10 echo them: ". . . and now your father has ceased to care about the asses and is anxious about

you, saying, 'What shall I do about my son?'" (10.2) Certainly this first sign highlights Samuel's prophetic ability to see into the hearts of Saul and his father, or at least miraculously to know almost the very words that Saul and his father had said about the matter. At the same time, the impact on the reader of this prophetic repetition by Samuel of Saul's earlier words works in the other direction. Once Samuel repeats Saul's words, the reader cannot avoid the knowledge that Saul in fact foretold his father's concern—unknowingly, to be sure, and ostensibly through filial empathy, but foretold it nonetheless—even before Samuel mentions it to him. Moreover, in the story itself not only does Saul express his father's state of mind before Samuel does, he also is made unwittingly to foretell the sign itself. Thus, when the reader comes upon the first of Samuel's signs in v. 10.2, he is reminded that Saul was there before him, as he was there even before Samuel himself. Given that Samuel's information about the finding of the asses is truly wondrous, the rest of this first sign follows as the normal expression of any father in a similar situation, so that Samuel's reference to the father's feelings is no more marvelous than Saul's was. In terms, however, of communication between author and reader, this foreshadowing function of Saul's first reported words in the story, this "prophesying of Samuel's prophecy," is the reader's first hint of the prophetic aura that will surround Saul in ch. 10.

Other compositional means of preparing Saul for the illicit garb of a prophet have already been mentioned: wordplay concerning the word *nābî'* itself as well as concerning the theme of a prophetic "declaring (*biggîd*) about kingship" initiated by God's command to Samuel to solemnly declare to the people the *mišpaṭ hammelek*, the rights and duties of the king. (8.9)

Consider first how the wordplay of 9.7 to which we alluded above is continued in ch. 10. If Saul's words to his servant can mean both "What can we bring to the man?" and "What is a prophet to man?", this key statement of Saul's serves also to form a kind of prophetic *inclusio* with the very end of ch. 10. In v. 27, after Saul is chosen king, "[some worthless fellows] despised him and brought him no present (*lo' bebî'û lô minḥāb*)." The narrator's words here allow the reader to direct Saul's question toward himself and to answer it: the worthless fellows must have said to themselves something like, "*lo' nābî'*" that is, "we will not bring (a present to him). Which is also to say, "He is not a prophet," in response to the people's proverbial question, "Is Saul also among the prophets?" (10.11; 19.24) Then recall the paronomastic comparison of Samuel and Saul brought about in vv. 14–16 through the use of *biggîd*, "to declare," by both Saul's uncle and the narrator with reference to both Samuel and Saul. This term clearly carries prophetic associations.[21]

Not only is the question of Saul's prophetic activities *dramatized* within ch. 10, therefore, it is also woven into the very fabric of the story by compositional means such as paronomasia and thematic *inclusio*.

Second, the centrality of Saul's problematic status *from the very beginning* is best seen in the continuous questioning that accompanies him throughout these opening chapters, but with special intensity in ch. 10. This chapter, which starts with Saul's anointing and proceeds to an account of the people's public acclamation of him as king, begins and ends with a question about him:

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[21] Following Buber, Eslinger and Miscall (as mentioned in the last end-note) are just two of the many authors who have pointed out the paronomastic play of *biggîd* in 10.14–16.

'Has not (*balô'*) the LORD anointed you to be prince over his inheritance?' (v.1)
'How can this man save us?' (v. 27)

Although, as we have seen above, the opening question functions as an answer, the question form is used nonetheless as if to prepare the reader for Saul's being inundated by questions to and about him throughout the chapter. His character zone is filled with doubt and uncertainty. Surrounded by a dubious aura, Saul is the epitome of a questionable choice. Consider how all the characters in the chapter are reported by the narrator as having questions sometimes *for,* but more often *concerning* Saul. So it is with Samuel (vv. 1,24), Saul's father (v.2), the people (vv. 11,22), an anonymous man (v.12), a proverb (v.12), Saul's uncle (vv. 14,15) and, finally, the chapter's worthless fellows (v. 27). Consider also that, although Saul does make statements in chs. 9 and 10 (9.5,7,10; 10.10,14,16), our introduction to him in ch. 9 is as one who himself continually asks questions:

Look, if we go what shall we bring to the man? . . . What have we? (9.7)
Is the seer here? (9.11)
Declare to me please, where is the house of the seer? (9.18)
Am I not a Benjaminite from the least of the tribes of Israel?
And is not my family the humblest of all the families of the tribe of Benjamin?
Why then have you spoken to me as you have? (9.21)

Saul therefore is a seeker of answers as well as asses, a travelling question-mark.

Third, besides this weary dubiety that surrounds him, a somber shadow of sin and guilt is cast upon Saul's kingship from the very beginning by means of ch. 10's depiction of the manner in which he is chosen king (vv. 17–24).[22]

There are only three biblical passages in which someone is taken by lot (*nilkad*) before the LORD: Joshua 7, wherein inquiry of the LORD effects the discovery of Achan who had kept for himself some of the devoted things of Ai; here in 1 Sam 10; and 1 Sam 14 where Jonathan is discovered by lot to be the one who against Saul's command had eaten some food and was thereby responsible for the LORD's silence. That is to say, apart from 1 Sam 10, the ritual whereby Israel drew near (*liqrob*) or was drawn near to God to inquire (*liš'ol*) of him by lot is described only in situations where an unknown person needs to be singled out (*nilkad*) because of some kind of covenantal transgression (Josh 7.15), shameful thing (*ibid.*) or sin (1 Sam 14.38; Josh 7.20).

The public choice by lot of Saul for king follows this pattern of "seizing the culprit." In the prophetic judgment oracle that precedes, Samuel accuses Israel: "You have this day rejected your God . . . and you have said, 'No! but set a king over us.'" (10.19) The manner in which Saul is publicly chosen or taken by lot, therefore, is intended, above all else, to emphasize the guilt and sin inherent in the royal office for which he is taken: Saul, as Israel's first king, is singled out as a personification of kingship's sinfulness.

Finally, in contrast to the self-interested and obstructive features introduced into Samuel's character in ch. 9, Saul rather strikes the reader as docile, humble and diffident. He directly obeys his father's command to look for his lost asses (9.3); he does everything Samuel asks him to do in chs. 9 and 10; he is humble about his origins (9.21); as if to

[22] Scholars such as Kyle McCarter (*1 Samuel,* pp. 195–6) and Peter Miscall (*1 Samuel,* pp. 64ff.) have perceptively pointed out the negative implications here of choosing Saul by the casting of lots, preceded as it is by a prophetic judgment oracle.

emphasize the distance between the forceful prophet and the timid man underneath it all, he is characterized by Samuel as being turned into another man (v.6) and by the narrator as being given another heart (v.9), through the agency of God; when chosen by lot, he—whether shrewdly or timidly we cannot tell—hides himself among the baggage (v.22); nor, finally, does he divulge to his uncle the matter of the kingship (v.16). All in all, Saul appears to be exactly the kind of man whom Samuel would have every hope of molding into a compliant king who would least limit the prophetic and judicial powers Samuel has been accustomed to exercise in the past and now sees threatened. Moreover, if a docile king is just what the prophet Samuel orders, a docile prophet is doubly what Samuel, himself the head of the prophets (19.20), would want.

This picture of a hesitant and potentially pliable Saul leads us into a consideration of the character-zone of Samuel through ch. 10, and helps to explain why Samuel, after delaying the move to monarchy in ch. 9, will come to be Saul's defender and promoter even in the face of God's clear rejection of him. If the people's request for a king had displeased Samuel (8.6), God's coming rejection of Saul will make Samuel angry (15.10), so much so that he will "turn back after Saul" in response to Saul's pleading. (15.31) The motivation for this prophetic about-face has its roots in the characterization of Samuel in the chapters immediately following ch. 8.

Sternberg aptly summarizes the narrator's characterization of Samuel in these chapters: "On the threshhold of the monarchy, the outgoing prophet-judge hardly appears in an attractive light."[23] Nowhere is this unfavourable depiction of Samuel better seen than in ch. 10. Take, for example, the reported speech within it. On one hand, the emphasis throughout is on the prophetic words of Samuel. Whereas the other characters utter only brief sentences (in vv. 11b, 12b, 12d (a proverb), 14b, 15b, 16b, 22b, 24d and 27b), Samuel's speech is given prominence in both its content and length (vv. 1–8; 18–19; 24b). The boundaries of Samuel's speech range from the prediction of future events to the reporting of God's prior speech. In both cases, the information conveyed is represented as inaccessible within normal human experience, that is, it is *privileged prophetic speech.*

On the other hand, Samuel's series of signs to Saul in vv. 1–8 amounts to something like prophetic over-kill. Through the use of 13 predictive verbs—12 in the waw-converted perfect and 1 in the imperfect—Samuel appears almost to be "showboating" his prophetic powers. The contrast in ch. 9 between the simply predictive statements of Saul, his servant and the maidservants on one hand, and the truly prophetic words of Samuel on the other, finds an impressive climax here at the beginning of ch. 10 where there can be no doubt about how fundamentally different prophetic speech is from simply predictive speech. Nevertheless, Samuel exhibits his prophetic clairvoyance like a strong man publically flexing his muscles in an excessive or unseemly fashion. The plethora of predictions is certainly not meant to convince the reader, who shares the narrator's knowledge of Samuel's role and is aware of the people's belief in him as prophet, a belief established long before in the narrative ("And all Israel from Dan to Beer-sheba knew that Samuel was established as a prophet of the LORD." [3.20]) So this prophetic show must be for Saul's benefit.

Samuel's three-fold prediction leads up to Saul's joining the prophetic band he will meet on his journey, the only "sign" singled out for specific narrative fulfillment in 10.10. One can argue, therefore, that Samuel is here portrayed as intent upon providing Saul with motivation for joining the prophetic band by showing him how impressive a prophet's powers can be. In addition, since Saul, as we have seen, is presented in these chapters as someone who is as timid as he is tall, his initial experience of prophetic power offers the

[23] *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, p. 96.

reader some insight into why he, Saul, initially so hesitant about God's royal plans for him, would gradually accede to Samuel's and the people's insistence that he become their king.

Samuel's conduct in ch. 10, however, does more than convince Saul; it also provides the reader with a character-portrait of Israel's last judge and first monarchic prophet, a portrayal that is as critical of his teaching about the *mišpaṭ hannabî'*, the rights and duties of the prophet, as ch. 8 was of his teaching about the rights and duties of the king. How Samuel conducts himself here will give an ironic dimension to his self-righteous words at the end of ch. 12: "Moreover, as for me,. far be it from me that I should sin against the LORD by ceasing to pray for you; and I will instruct you in the good and right path." (12.23) How precisely do Samuel's words and actions in ch. 10 declare and embody this pedagogic obligation of a prophet? The answer to this question will help to explain why Samuel's protestations of innocence at the beginning and end of ch. 12 belie a defensive self-awareness of his failures as God's prophet.

Interpretations of ch. 10 have understandably focussed upon Saul—his personal encounter with prophecy and his eventual acclamation as king by the people. Samuel, on the other hand, although a multi-dimensional character with important ideological functions in the Deuteronomist's story, is too often seen as a flat, mechanistic trigger who simply propels Saul into the royal office chosen for him by the LORD. Things are not so simple.

Consider, for example, Samuel's shift from prediction to command in 10.7–8. His command to Saul to join the prophetic band and to do "whatever your hand finds to do" (v.7) is, as we pointed out above, in profound tension with his word that Saul later wait 7 days at Gilgal until he come to show him what to do. (v.8) These two verses epitomize the entire section of chs. 8–12, foreshadow the tragedy of Saul's kingship and implicate Samuel in the Deuteronomist's explanation for Saul's downfall. King and prophet may not be united in the same person, yet this is precisely the path upon which Samuel's prophetic words send Saul as they declare and embody the *mišpaṭ bannābî'* in ch. 10.

Personal control appears to be what Samuel is after: Saul as both king and prophet offers a double warrant for royal dependence on Samuel, who himself heads the prophets. As vv. 9 and 10 show, God cooperates for a time with this disastrous path, just as he cooperates for centuries with the mix-up of divine and human leadership that constitutes kingship itself. If the people are not absolved of their sin by Yahweh's reluctant and magnanimous fulfilment of their request for a king, neither can Samuel be exempt from the Deuteronomist's censorious depiction of him as a prophet who fails his commission by leading his people down a false path.

The words of Moses come to mind as a commentary on Samuel's conduct at this crucial point in Israel's history:

> If a prophet arises among you or a dreamer of dreams, and gives you a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder which he tells you comes to pass, and if he says, "Let us go after other gods," which you have not known, "and let us serve them," you shall not listen to the words of that prophet . . . for the LORD your God is testing you, to know whether you love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul. (Deut 13.1–3)

Kingship in Israel was tantamount to idolatry, as God himself asserts in 1 Sam 8.8. If we understand that God's allowance of this institution is predicated on its providential powers being limited by the office of prophecy, then the wholesale neutralization of this divine constraint effected by Samuel's encouragement of Saul to be both king and prophet can be seen as tantamount to leading the people once more into the very idolatry God

intended to avoid (or at least diminish). The events described in 1 Sam 10 constitute a striking application of the situation envisioned in Dt. 13: a prophet, Samuel, gives signs and wonders that come to pass; his words lead the people into the "idolatry" of a prophet-king; the people, in turn, question the situation ("Is Saul also among the prophets?[10.12]) yet ultimately fail God's test by responding positively to Samuel's blandishments: "'Do you see him whom the LORD has chosen? There is none like him among all the people.' And all the people shouted, 'Long live the king!'" (10.24) The so-called tragedy of Saul is a tragedy also for Israel, as it is for Samuel himself. The LORD chose Saul for kingship; the people are misled into accepting him for prophecy as well. At this point in the story everyone—with the possible exception of Saul—has failed God's test.

One final facet of the story is little emphasized in the literature, but significant concerning the rights and duties of the prophet: we need to bear in mind that the very last events Samuel predicts to Saul in this chapter will not come to pass. What may be read as a series of commands in v. 8 (Go down to Gilgal and wait until I come to you . . .) is actually a continuation of the predictive waw-converted perfects in this section. Whereas Samuel's command in v. 7 is in the imperative, "Do whatever your hand finds to do . . . ," in v. 8 Samuel tells Saul, "'You *will go down* before me . . . and you will wait 7 days until I come and I *will show* you what you are to do.'" Interpreters rarely spell out the ideological implications of Samuel's failed prediction: not only does Samuel foolishly push Saul into joining a prophetic band, he also is shown as setting up a situation in which neither his word comes true nor his king acts obediently.

The ideological importance of this (failed) prediction of Samuel's in v. 8 is that it foreshadows Samuel's failures as prophet as much as Saul's failure as king. What Samuel is shown predicting here is a king obedient to the divine obligations imposed upon him by God's prophet. Not only will Saul fail to be obedient in the crucial incident at Gilgal, much of the responsibility for his failure must be laid at the feet of Samuel who had encouraged Saul's prophetic independence ("Do whatever your hand finds to do, for God is with you." [10.7]) at the same time as he has paradoxically commanded strict royal dependence upon prophetic direction. In other words, Samuel is shown placing Saul in a double-bind.

This failure of Samuel to appear at the appointed time, as he said he would, brings to mind Dt. 18.22: "When a prophet speaks in the name of the LORD, if the word does not come to pass or come true, that is a word which the LORD has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it presumptuously, you need not be afraid of him." Saul, therefore, can be seen in 10.7–8 as being set up for disaster in a double sense: not only does Samuel encourage his prophetic taking-of-things-into-his-own-hands, Moses' words about unfulfilled prophecies will further justify this independent action of his at Gilgal. For now it is enough to realize that the "failed appointment" involves Samuel's failure as well as Saul's.

Ch. 10 ends with the narrator's contrast between "men of valour" who follow Saul and whose hearts God had touched (v. 26) and "worthless fellows" who express serious doubts about Saul. (v. 27) The narrator's departure from his largely non-judgmental statements since ch. 8 began is significant. God, who will acomplish his purposes despite the personal plans and inclinations of Samuel and Saul, had promised, [Saul] shall save my people from the hands of the Philistines." (9.16) As the reader is expected to know, therefore, those who express doubt about Saul ("How can this man save us?") express doubt about God himself: they are indeed "renegades," in Eslinger's apt translation.[24]

[24] This paper has largely ignored the immense body of secondary literature—most source-oriented in nature—relating to 1Sam 8–10. Nevertheless, a few closing

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bibliographic remarks may help to put my own reading into better context.

In his balanced discussions of secondary literature and in the painstaking close-reading he has provided, L. Eslinger (*Kingship of God in Crisis* [Sheffield, 1985]) is often helpful on chs. 8–10. Especially noteworthy are his emphasis on Samuel's balking at the LORD's command and initial failure to obey it, his linking up of the explicit parallels between Samuel and Saul (e.g., 1.1–2 like 9.1–2; the use of "*sā'al*" in the Samuel birth story) and his underlining of the sense of mystery and uncertainty developed by the narrator. Equally helpful is his recognition of Buber's original insights about the *leitwort, biggûd*, in these chapters and its connection with *nāgîd*, the "declared one" of the LORD, and about the servant's words in 9.7 ("What shall we bring [*nābî'*] to the man?") as the narrator's hint concerning the identity of the anonymous man of God.

At the same time, I differ with Eslinger in his contrastive depiction of the LORD, who is portrayed as against the monarchy, but unsympathetically so, by a narrator who is in favor of it in a limited way. Nor do I agree with Eslinger's belief that Samuel at first fails to obey God's command to make Israel a king "out of a sense of loyalty" to the covenant (p. 281).

Meir Sternberg's description of Samuel the prophet as the ironic butt of the narrator in ch. 9 (*The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* [Bloomington, 1985], pp. 94–96) is also consistent with the narrator's pejorative depiction of Samuel as we have characterized it in this paper. Sternberg, like Buber, Eslinger, Miscall and others, picks up on the "*nābî'*" wordplay in 9.7, but gives it a denigrating twist in correspondence with the other features of the prophetic portrait he finds in ch. 9. My analysis of this chapter has emphasized that the word-play on "*nābî'*" is even more ideologically central than previously recognized.

David Gunn has a number of interesting and valuable observations relating to chs.8–10 in *The Fate of King Saul* (Sheffield, 1980). His recognition of the ambiguous depiction of Saul's prophesying in 1 Sam 10 (p. 63) is certainly on the mark, as my discussion below will argue. Also, his attention to apparently unimportant aspects of the text that help us sort out important ideological issues helps to explain his uncanny ability often to go to the heart of the matter—if not with respect to that illusory goal of what a text "really means," at least with regard to plausible solutions to what strikes many of today's readers of the Bible as textual cruxes. Gunn emphasizes the role of a critic "as one whose most important task is to discriminate between, and mediate, aesthetic and moral values" (p.16) This basic attitude of Gunn's, as well as his willingness to go wherever the text leads him—however ambiguous and unpalatable the result—characterize his work and help to explain its influence within biblical studies.

Peter Miscall's recent *1 Samuel: A Literary Reading* (Bloomington, 1986) has many original insights and suggestions. I share D. Jobling's cautions about aspects of Miscall's approach: Miscall tends to "deconstruct" so much, that one is not always clear about what precisely it is that he is dismantling. Nevertheless, consulting Miscall is almost always profitable. In the present section, his emphasis on the ambiguous question, *mah nābî'* in 9.7 and on the abiding wordplay involving *biggûd* (pp. 53ff), his perceptive description of the negative aspects of Saul's being chosen by lot in ch. 10 (pp. 64ff) and his suggestion about the *qeren/pak* alternation which sets off David's anointing from Saul's (p. 59) are all indicative of his valuable contributions.

In all these studies, only Sternberg, writing on biblical narrative in general, comes close to giving us a beginning perspective on the forgotten individual in the chapters under consideration, Samuel himself. His crucial role in the "fate of King Saul" has largely been neglected by commentators; the interpretations of *1 Samuel* that result turn out to be flat

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and unconvincing in their characterization of this central figure in the story.

Finally, David Jobling's *The Sense of Biblical Narrative II* (JSOT Supplement Series 39, 1986) has some important things to say on the monarchic attitudes of the Deuteronomists. I am awaiting arrival of this volume to review it, and apologize to him for not bringing his most recent views into the present paper. His *The Sense of Biblical Narrative I* discusses 1 Sam 13–31, and is thus beyond the concerns of the present paper.

Biblical Megatrends: Towards a Paradigm for the Interpretation of the Bible in Electronic Media

Thomas E. Boomershine
United Theological Seminary

The purpose of this paper is to offer some observations about megatrends in Biblical interpretation and, in particular, the interpretation of the Bible in the electronic media culture of the late 20th century. The generative question can be put in several ways: what is the shape of the paradigm of the electronic Bible, of the traditions of Israel's religion on the holy TV and the holy computer as well as in a holy book? What does an electronic hermeneutic look like or sound like? Would you know one if you met one in a vision or walking beside you on the street? And if you met one should you run away, kill it or take it to your heart? We are not at a stage in which a fully documented theory can be formulated. The absence of footnotes is an indication of the seriousness of my intent only to suggest rather than to prove. The value of this type of essay may be in drawing some tentative observations together and submitting them for reaction and further discussion. This is a think piece.

Thomas Kuhn's description of paradigm shifts in the history of science identifies some of the processes involved in paradigm shifts that is appropriate here. Paradigm shifts occur when there is a failure in normal problem solving, when the results yielded by the old methods no longer work. This leads to thought experiments and to a proliferation of various articulations and willingness to try new approaches. Out of this comes a new gestalt, a primary shift in the way in which the material is perceived. Two things happen: 1) the achievements based on a new theory and type of research attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity 2) the theory is sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for future practitioners to resolve.

I hear the symptoms of a crisis of paradigmatic proportions in current Biblical research. The primary reason is that the paradigm no longer achieves its purpose. The promise of the historical critical paradigm was that it would render the past alive and would result in illumination and vitality for the religious community. The religious communities that have accepted historical criticism since the 19th century are in decline and the educational enterprise of critical study of the Bible has been massively reduced in theological curriculums since the '30's because it did not produce spiritual vitality and life. The symptoms of the problem are also reflected in the Society.

The basic paradigm of historical criticism that was generally accepted even fifteen years ago has been fractured. The multiplication of methodologies and research paradigms at an SBL meeting is incredible in comparison to meetings as recent as 1970. But, in spite of all our labor, the impact of historical critical study of the Scriptures on religious communities and the culture in general is minimal in comparison to the beginning of this century. But normal science goes on as if the same formulas and patterns of research will have the same effect. We continue to undertake research projects and to publish books. But increasingly we only write for each other and the results of our research are ignored even by the religious community. We write more and more with less and less effect. To put it simply, the existing paradigm is not producing the results it promised.

Theories have two primary functions: they make it possible to account for the data that can be presently observed and they make possible predictions that can be tested by normal scientific research. I want to suggest a theory that explains why this is happening and generates a radically different paradigm for future research. Arthur Schlesinger made a clear statement of the primary principle of this theory on a recent PBS program on Marshall McLuhan. He said, "Marx argued that the major movements in history are caused by changes in the modes of production and exchange. McLuhan said that the major movements in history are caused by changes in the modes of communication." Stated in relation to the interpretation of the Bible, the thesis would be that the major movements or paradigm shifts in the history of Biblical interpretation are related to changes in the dominant medium of communication.

The task of Biblical interpretation is to render the primary traditions of the Bible meaningful and alive for persons and communities in later, radically different, cultural and historical contexts. The primary communications system of the community provides the context within which Biblical interpretation happens. It determines the values, attitudes, and overall hermeneutical options for the interpretation of the Biblical tradition in that cultural context.

The Paradigms of Biblical Interpretation

If the theory is accurate, the expectation would be that major changes in communications systems are followed by paradigm shifts in Biblical interpretation. The theory appears to work and a discernible paradigm of Biblical interpretation can be identified in each media age.

The Bible in Oral Culture

In the oral age, the medium was exclusively sound and the sounds were transmitted by memory. The sounds were generally a kind of chant at least for the narrative, prophetic, and psalm traditions. In the narrative material this chant was improvised on known formulas as in oral poetry now. The way of connecting the present experience of the audience with the holy event of the past was by retelling or representing the material in light of later experience. Thus, the editors of the Pentateuch and the authors of the Gospels all used a common hermeneutical system. Interpreters of this oral tradition were accredited by oral authority generally granted by a master of the tradition. Storytellers and prophet preachers constituted the primary system of distribution.

The Bible in Manuscript Culture

The historical analysis of the appropriation of writing is more complex. But to make the complex simple, I would propose that writing was appropriated as a servant of oral hermeneutics until the late first century. At that time, a decision had to be made within Israel because of a combination of social, political, and cultural factors of which the prevelance of writing as the dominant communications system in the Hellenistic world was the most important sign of the growing dominance of Hellenistic culture. The new paradigm was based on the distribution of the primary traditions of Israel in writing. Symptoms of this paradigm were: the collection and organization of oral traditions in manuscripts, the production of multiple Biblical manuscripts, the formation of a canon, the cantillation of manuscripts in public worship, the formation of the synagogue/congregation as a place for public readings, and the development of oral forms of commentary on the written manuscripts. Both Pharisaic and Christian Judaism adopted the reading

aloud of manuscripts as a primary form for the experience of the written tradition. The words were recited exactly as written and even the chants began to be regulated. This regulation developed until it was written down and fixed by the development of an accent system, in Hebrew the trope marks and in Greek accents. The accreditation of an interpreter of the tradition was accomplished by oral disputation. All of these characteristics the movements shared in common.

But Christian Judaism developed a new hermeneutic of Biblical interpretation growing out of this communications system. The primary characteristic of this new hermeneutic was interpretation by ideas. It was essentially an appropriation of the philosophical methods of the Greeks for which Eric Havelock's description of the earlier transition in Athenian culture is instructive. In order to render the Scriptures meaningful in relation to this Neo-Platonic system, allegorical interpretation was developed and became the normative form of Biblical interpretation in Christianity. Theology, the identification and development of doctrine, and the formation of a communications sytem based on writing in a catholic church—these are symptoms of this paradigm shift.

Pharisaic Judaism also adopted writing as an integral part of Biblical interpretation. But in that new paradigm the oral law remained primary. The oral tradition which produced the Mishnah and the Talmud was organized around memorization of oral law, the interpretation of the written law in relation to the living of individual and communal life, and the maintenance of face to face community. Rabbinic Judaism never developed a full-orbed theological tradition and it appropriated writing in strict subordination to orality. Thus, the paradigm shift associated with writing is evident in the divergent hermeneutics of Christianity and Judaism as each community sought to respond to Hellenistic culture in which writing was the most powerful medium of communication

The Bible in Print Culture

The paradigm shift in Biblical interpretation associated with printing is relatively easy to identify. The replacement of the highly allegorical heremenutics of medieval exegesis by the combination of literal and figural heremeneutics in the Reformation was part of a new paradigm of Biblical interpretation. Vernacular translations, the printing and distribution of the Bible, historical studies of Greek and Hebrew documents in relation to their original meaning, the priority of the sermon, the development of Lutheran hymns and Calvinist psalmody—these were all parts of the new paradigm of Biblical interpretation that emerged in the aftermath of the printing press. The sounds of the Scriptures continued to be read aloud but increasingly in a normal voice without intonation. The availability of texts made it possible for private reading of the texts to be a normal context for study and interpretation. The accreditation of interpreters shifted from an oral disputation to the oral defense of a written thesis. A new distribution system emerged as printed texts of the Scriptures and interpretations of the Bible in printed books and tracts became highly marketable.

The Bible in the Culture of Silent Print/Documents

Historical criticism developed in the context of the age of silent reading. In the late 17th and 18th centuries in Europe and in the 19th and 20th centuries in America, silent reading became the normal mode for perception of written texts. This is evident in the shift of audience address from "Listen, lordings" in the poems of the 16th century to "Dear reader" in the novels of Henry Fielding and Jane Austen. In this period, for the first time, the Biblical documents were normally studied in silence and the text became increasingly disassociated from sound. Sometimes the sounds continued to be imagined by the readers.

But my perception is that this has declined in recent generations as speed reading has become more widely adopted by graduate students as a necessity for survival as secondary literature has multiplied.

Hans Frei's work, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative,* is an accurate description of the paradigm of Biblical interpretation in the age of the Enlightenment. As Frei shows, both the radical historical critics and the supernaturalists shared a new common presupposition which he calls "meaning as reference." The meaning of the texts was defined by their value as documentary sources for the establishment of either historical facticity—what Frei calls "ostensive reference"—or theological truths or ideas—what Frei calls "ideal reference." The system of distribution of both Biblical texts and interpretations was and is a massive multiplication of books—thousands and thousands of books—reference sources, the Biblical texts themselves in various arrangements and translations, and books about the Bible in ever increasing numbers up to the present avalanche.

Thus, there appears to be a demonstrable correlation between media change and the emergence of paradigm shifts in the history of Biblical interpretation. And certain characteristics can be identified when one examines each of these paradigms as a separate system. When seen as a whole history, sound, chant, and memorization decline and largely disappear in the dominant paradigm. But the old paradigms do not disappear totally. Instead, the old paradigms are reappropriated and used in new ways within the context of the new paradigm. Thus, the chanting of the original oral medium persisted in the manuscript paradigm and the allegorical hermeneutic of the manuscript paradigm has been continued in new forms in each of the subsequent paradigms.

Furthermore, in each age, other paradigms including virtually all of the paradigms of previous ages have persisted in groups that have resisted earlier paradigm shifts. As a result, paradigm shifts happen at very different stages in the development of different religious and cultural groups. Thus, Raymond Brown in Roman Catholicism and Jacob Neusner in Judaism have been leaders in the quite recent appropriation of the paradigm of historical criticism for the interpretation of the Scriptures in the Catholic tradition, and of the Mishnah and the Talmud in the Jewish tradition. Perhaps not coincidentally, these scholars have generated a prodigious output of books not unlike the output of earlier generations of German Protestant scholars.

A Pattern of Response to Biblical Paradigm Shifts

There also appears to be a discernible correlation between the major schisms in the communities of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the development of new paradigms of Biblical interpretation. In each period of adjustment to the culture generated by a new communications medium and a new paradigm of Biblical interpretation, there is a pattern of response that can be characterized as resistance, appropriation, and capitulation.

The conservative response in each age is to resist the new culture generated by the new medium but to incorporate the medium into the old culture and its hermeneutics. Thus, in the period of the adaptation of the tradition of Israel to the manuscript paradigm, Pharisaic Judaism resisted the Hellenistic culture associated with writing. It incorporated writing and the written law into Jewish culture and even formed a canon of the written law. But the written law was studied and appropriated in the context of orality and the characteristic cultural patterns of the oral age. The ongoing formation of the oral law in first the Mishnah and then the Talmud contined the primary oral hermeneutic of Biblical interpretation. Interpreters of the tradition continued to be authorized by the oral processes of rabbinic education rather than in any sense by publication of written works.

Christian Judaism appropriated the new medium and its culture and formed a new

synthesis which integrated the old medium and its culture into a new hermeneutical paradigm. The struggle between the Antiochene and Alexandrian schools of literal and allegorical interpretation were the primary sign of the tensions in this new paradigm. The Antiochene wing maintained close relationships with Rabbinic Judaism while the world of Hellenistic philosophy formed the primary cultural matrix of the Alexandrians. In the end, the new synthesis formed by Christianity adopted the allegorical methods of Hellenistic culture while maintaining essential continuity with the more literal methods of interpretation generated by the oral culture which gave birth to the Scriptures. The tension between Origen and Jerome resulted in a new hermeneutical synthesis.

Gnosticism in both its Jewish and Christian forms can be seen as a capitulation response in which the new medium and its culture became so dominant that the old medium and its culture was rejected. The highly individualistic culture of the world of writing with its consuming interest in speculative and creative ideas became the norm of Biblical interpretation. The new culture and its values generated a hermeneutical system and institutions that actively sought to disassociate the sophisticated present from the primitive past.

In the period of adjustment to the paradigm of print and the culture with which it was associated, the Roman Catholic response was to resist the new culture of which the printing, distribution and historical interpretation of the Scriptures was a part. In the aftermath of the Council of Trent, Catholics appropriated the essential patterns of the culture associated with printing. But in relation to Biblical interpretation, this adaptation maintained strict subordination to the cultural patterns and "fourfold" hermeneutical paradigms of the manuscript period. In no way was independent interpretation of the Scriptures allowed to compromise the tradition.

Protestantism adopted the new medium and its culture and developed a new synthesis that maintained essential continuity with the tradition. Luther and Calvin were Biblical scholars who generated a massive series of printed texts including vernacular translations, commentaries on the original Greek and Hebrew texts, and doctrinal systems that used the texts as the primary source. The hermeneutical system was primarily theological but a doctrine based on a literal interpretation of the Biblical texts. This new hermeneutic made possible the widespread distribution of the texts and the formation of communities of independent Biblical interpreters that were held together by a common hermeneutical framework.

Protestant scholasticism capitulated to the culture of the university and rejected both the old culture and the old medium. The university rather than the church became the primary institutional matrix for this form of culture Christianity.

Finally, in the age of silent print, in various stages in Europe and America, the historical critical study of the Bible as a document to be read in silence was resisted by Catholics, Protestant supernaturalists and fundamentalists, and orthodox Jews. In each instance, the new medium and the study of the Bible as a historical document has gradually been incorporated into the old culture. But the synthesis of a scientific interpretation of the Bible and the culture of the Enlightenment took place first within the mainstream of the Protestant churches. The Protestant churches adopted the new medium and its culture and created a new hermeneutical paradigm while maintaining continuity with the tradition. The formation of scientific societies for the study of the Bible, the SBL, SNTS, and CBA are the institutional offspring of this paradigm shift. Kummel's history of interpretation, *The New Testament,* is a chronicle of this paradigm and its development. The critics of the radical liberal tradition capitulated to the culture of the university and eliminated the basic characteristics of the old medium such as, for example, the memorization and recital of the Scripture.

Thus, the theory that changes in the dominant communications medium of the culture are closely correlated with the megatrends of Biblical interpretation also may shed light on the sources of reformation and schism in the history of religious communities. There is a close correlation between the ecclesiastical divisions in the history of Christianity, paradigm shifts in Biblical interpretation, and changes in the systems of communication.

Biblical Scholarship Now in Light of Media Megatrends

The implications of this theory for the present context of Biblical interpretation are interesting. In relation to communications technology, the 20th century has witnessed the most extensive changes in the means of communication since the development of writing. The printing press was only a more efficient and uniform way of producing written materials and silent reading was a change in the way in which writing was normally perceived. But the elements of continuity with the written manuscript were primary: marks on paper, bound together in books, read with the eyes, distributed by being moved from place to place, and requiring extensive training in order to be perceived. Electronic communications is a radically different means of communication: no needed paper, widely varied distribution systems, both audio and visual data, instant availability, and no required education to be perceived. The only media change that compares in magnitude with the shift from literacy to electronics is the shift from orality to literacy. In light of the changes in Biblical interpretation that took place in response to earlier media shifts, we live at a critical juncture in the history of Biblical interpretation.

The most powerful interpreters of the Bible in electronic media are conservative evangelicals and pentecostals most of whom have little or no scholarly training. The Bible is talked about constantly but is rarely presented in electronic media. The Living Bible has been by far the most successful and widely used new version of the Bible. And the religious communities in which this type of interpretation is done are growing at a rapid rate. In my judgment, the interpretation of the Bible in the present world of electronic media is a capitulation to American media culture and is profoundly flawed in ways that do not maintain essential continuity with the tradition. The new culture that has developed with electronic media has become the norm for Biblical interpretation. What will sell on American TV has become the primary norm of exegetical validity. However, while this is in my opinion an accurate generalization, it needs to be tested by more detailed evaluation of the range of Biblical interpretation that is being produced in records, TV and film.

The community of Biblical scholarship and the churches which it serves have almost exclusively resisted electronic media and its culture. The guild has refused to enter into the interpretation of the Bible in the electronic world. Biblical scholarship has integrated elements of audio-visuals such as slides and some films into its paradigm to a minimal degree. Computers, which make possible the electronic processing of texts, have been enthusiastically integrated into the paradigm of historical critical scholarship. But the world of audio tapes and records, TV, and films has been an alien culture for orthodox Biblical interpretation. At this point in history, the best Biblical interpreters of our culture have abandoned the defense and commendation of responsible interpretation of the Biblical tradition in the most powerful communications medium of our age. That task has been given over to self-appointed religious entrepreneurs.

A projection on the basis of the megatrends of the past would suggest that this response will become increasingly retrogressive and will result in a withdrawal of the scholarly community from the dominant culture into a defensive posture. This response is not necessarily cataclysmic. Those parts of the tradition that have resisted earlier media

changes—Rabbinic Judaism, Roman Catholicism, conservative/fundamentalist Protestantism—have made important contributions to the interpretation of the Bible. But the culture that is being formed by electronic media will thereby be ignored. And the consequences of allowing this travesty of authentic Biblical interpretation to go unchallenged in the present religious and political context will be great.

However, while Biblical scholarship has not consciously addressed the issue of media change, the theory does explain the fracturing of the historical critical concensus that has taken place in the last two decades. The collapse of Biblical theology as a strong and viable hermeneutic, the emergence of narrative theology and literary critical methods of exegesis, the impact of semiotics and deconstruction, the development of social science methods of analysis—all are connected by a common epistemological thread which moves away from the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal to the phenomena of sense experience itself. In electronic media and its cultures, what is known is what is seen and heard. That is, the theory would suggest that the declining impact of historical critical scholarship is a symptom of a change in the culture. These developments in Biblical scholarship are responses to that new culture and its ways of knowing. This effort is more likely to succeed, however, if the need for a new paradigm of Biblical interpretation is addressed directly.

A Paradigm for Biblical Interpretation in Electronic Media

The transmission and interpretation of the Bible is a process of communication. The meaning of communication acts is directly influenced by the means or media of communication in any particular cultural setting. This fact is particularly evident when new communications technologies emerge and gradually establish a new communications system. The meaning of the old system of interpretation changes and becomes associated with the past rather than the present. The old system can only be maintained by cutting the connection to the emerging new culture, generally by attacking the new medium and the culture with which it is associated. Inevitably, however, even the maintenance of the old system requires adjustments to the new communications situation and the old hermeneutic is modified.

The transmission and interpretation of the Bible in a new communications system and its various cultural matrices requires the development of a new paradigm. Some of the major elements in the paradigms of Biblical interpretation are: the reformation of the Biblical traditions themselves for transmission in the new medium, the development of systems of production and distribution, the formation of a hermeneutic that will make possible meaningful connections between the traditions in the new medium and the original tradition.

The Bible in Electronic Media

The first step is to put the Biblical tradition into the new medium, what might be called the transmediazation of the tradition. In each new media age this is the first task: e.g., the writing of the original manuscripts of the oral tradition, the translations into the Vulgate and German, Codex Vaticanus and the Gutenberg Bible, Westcott and Hort and the spate of recent translations for silent reading. In each case, the Bible was put into the new medium of the age in a loving and responsible manner that preserved continuity with the traditions of the past. What is needed, therefore, is an electronic Bible that accomplishes the same purpose for this new media age.

The computer is making this possible in electronic text with relative ease and with much greater breadth than has ever before been possible: e.g., Ibycus and the TLG CD-Rom

system. But in the audio and video media the task remains to be done in ways that integrate the previous paradigms into the new paradigm. Audio tapes of the King James have been made by Elizabethan actors and videos of dramatized versions of central Biblical narratives are being made in the New Media Bible. But they are anachronistic and poorly conceived. To dramatize Biblical narratives is to change their form from narrative to drama, from a single speaker to a series of actors. However, this is only one of a whole series of problems that need to be solved. Audio is easier than video in which the problem of images must be resolved. But, regardless of the problems, the task is clear. The Biblical tradition itself needs to be made available in the medium of the age, electronic media.

A foundational step will be to reconceive the Bible as sounds rather than as documents. This in turn raises a new set of questions for historical research: how did the Bible sound in its original form? While it may be impossible for us to know precisely how Greek and Hebrew were pronounced in the ancient world and the exact melodies that were used for a particular text, historical research is eminently possible that will at least get us in the ball park. The basic methodology for this study is to compare the extant traditions of Hebrew and Greek cantillation and to reconstruct by comparison the sounds of the original sources from which these extant traditions developed. The scholarship in this area has reached a high degree of agreement that cantillation has been an integral part of Christian and Jewish worship and education throughout the the East and until as late as the medieval period in the West. That is, we know that the Scriptures were originally chanted in services of both synagogue and Church. In view of recent research on oral poetry and narrative such as the studies of Lord and Parry, the probability is also high that this practice in the recital of the manuscripts continued and formalized a more spontaneous process of chanting that was characteristic of oral tradition. Thus, we will need to know more about the sounds of the Biblical tradition in order to accomplish an informed translation of the Bible into the sounds of our age.

Thus, a major element in the paradigm shift is the recognition that the Bible is sounds that were recorded in manuscripts so that they could again be resounded rather than texts to be studied in silence. We also need to know the basic units of sound in the history of the tradition. Rather than the units of the documentary tradition as an editing of words or ideas as we have tended to think, the tradition history of the Bible was a recomposition of sounds not unlike the transposition of and development of American hymn tunes in the music of Ives or Copeland. The entire paradigm on which the study of the Pentateuch and the Synoptic problem has been based is fundamentally flawed because of an anachronistic reading back of our media world of silent documents into the ancient world. We need, therefore, to reexamine the entire tradition history of the Scriptures historically as a tradition of sound.

Once this is known to a greater degree it will be possible to develop interpretations of the tradition using the melodies and harmonies that are more characteristic of modern civilization in electronic media. Thus, we need to develop a whole new translation of the Bible for recital rather than for study. New ways of printing the texts will indicate the units of sound in the tradition. Various types of recitals of the tradition in experiemental modes will make the Scriptures directly available in electronic media. Thus, just as a primary task of scholarship has been to produce the best documentary form of the tradition, a new task is to produce the best electronic form of the tradition, the electronic version of Codex Vaticanus, the Masoretic text, the King James Bible, and whatever modern translation you think is best. But a foundational element of that Bible will be the music and melody of the sounds of the tradition.

In relation to video, the question is: what are the appropriate visual components of Biblical texts? Symbols, art both icons and paintings, photographs and video montage, the

sights of liturgy and worship, the faces of living persons, historical documentary footage, and dramatizations—all are possible visual elements of Biblical texts. Answering this question will involve research into the history and theology of images and experimentation with a range of options.

The Production and Distribution of the Electronic Bible

As is evident from the book display at SBL, the community of Biblical interpreters is presently organized to produce and distribute interpretations of the Bible in the medium of print, primarily print intended to be read in silence. The task before us is the development of systems of production and distribution for the Bible in electronic media. The religious communities will probably be the primary source for these systems but Biblical scholars may need to take their own initiatives. To my knowledge, there are no existing production houses or distribution agencies that have been persuaded of this need. The past sales record of the Bible itself and related materials may eventually provide the commercial motivation once viable projects are generated. But this is unlikely in the early stages. Biblical interpreters will have to fight to maintain integrity because of the complexity and cost of the electronic production and distribution systems needed to accomplish the task.

The Medium of Interpretation of the Electronic Bible

In the previous paradigms of Biblical interpretation, the earlier media of interpretation were continued and reformed in relation to the new paradigm. The original oral medium of the storytellers, prophets, and psalmists was reformed in the paradigms of writing into oral interpretation of the written texts in preaching and teaching. In an electronic paradigm, oral and written interpretation will be continued and reformed. New forms may emerge. For example, storytelling has experienced a renaissance in the culture and in Biblical interpretation in the last ten years. The development of narrative preaching and Biblical storytelling is a post-literate orality that could only have happened in the context of the culture of the electronic age. The character of books is also changing: e.g., fewer tomes, more short books, multiplication of specialized publications and journals. The medium of interpretation of the electronic Bible will be a media-mix of oral, written, and electronic elements.

The Hermeneutics of the Electronic Bible

The most complex issue is the way in which meaningful connections will be made between the contemporary world and the world of the Bible in an electronic paradigm of Biblical interpretation. Media change is a major factor that has generally been unrecognized in the hermeneutical literature including that of the "new" hermeneutic. What will be the hermeneutics of the electronic age?

The medium of communication establishes certain constraints that operate in the formation of meaning in that medium. In *Preface to Plato,* Eric Havelock has shown the way in which the transition from orality to literacy necessitated an epistemological revolution of separating the knower from what is known through reflecting on the ideas reflected in sense experience. This primary revolution of the perception of sense experience as pointing beyond itself to transcendent ideas is an essential component of the world of literacy. I would suggest that, in the tradition of Biblical interpretation, this epistemological revolution associated with literacy took place in the development of theology as the primary hermeneutical system for Biblical interpretation within

Christianity. In its various forms, theology has been the way in the Christian tradition that connections have been made between the contemporary world and the world of the bible. Theology as a hermeneutic has been based on the distinction between the phenomena of the Bible itself and the theological truths or noumena to which the Bible points.

The problem of Biblical interpretation in an electronic paradigm is that theological modes of interpretation do not work in this medium of what Ong calls secondary orality. One sign of the problem can be observed when one contemplates the transmediazation of theological works. Imagine the grandeur of Tillich's *Systematic Theology* or Barth's *Church Dogmatics* on TV or audio tape; or the fascination of theologians and Biblical scholars on TV having a theological or exegetical debate. This is death with no resurrection. Electronic media reinforce a thoroughly empirical epistemology. Sense experience is reality, not simply a shadow on a wall. Theology is based on the distinction between sense experience and reality; it relies on abstractions and argumentation. In audio and video, midrash, well done, is far more interesting than theology. The need then is for a non-theological hermeneutic for the interpretation of the Bible in an electronic paradigm.

Narrative hermeneutics, semiotics, phenomenology, and process hermeneutics may all be candidates for this primary role in the transposition of the Bible into this new context. But my inclination is to let the hermeneutic develop from the Bible itself. This has been the mainstream of the Biblical interpretive tradition in which the hermeneutics have never been philosophically pure but have combined elements in unique ways that are finally generated by the Biblical tradition itself. This does not mean that we can go back to proof-texting, pesher, or to simple repetition of the traditions themselves. But it does mean that various interpretive methods will need to be used over a period of time and evaluated in relation to their appropriateness and faithfulness to the spirit that formed the Bible. It is the doing of this evaluative task for which theology will be of indispensible assistance in the future.

The argument can be stated in a less abstract manner. When we have put the authoritative interpreters of the orthodox tradition, namely, scholars who have spent their lives writing books, on TV, they are a disaster. They come off as boring, above it all, irrelevant, wordy, and generally a drag. And because they know that, most of them have never even dreamed of trying. On the other hand, fundamentalist evangelists who have never been to seminary, who practice an utterly irresponsible form of Biblical interpretation and who couldn't write their way out of a paper bag get on the boob tube and they are terrific. They are engaging, sharp, and accessible. Their exegesis sheds light on the Biblical text and helps people connect with it. As interpreters of the tradition, they are far more effective in the medium than scholars.

What are we to conclude? Their content is horrible but it works in the medium; the content of the orthodox is true but it does not work in the medium. Most scholars have concluded that the problem is the medium, that electronic media are demonic and that we should fight it by writing more and more books. This strategy is increasingly becoming like that of the Polish army who sent division after division of calvary against Hitler's tanks.

But another analysis is possible. The tradition of the scholarly community has been definitively shaped by the mastery of writing. We all got our degrees by proving our competence in the medium of silent print. Our tradition has been determined by the hermeneutics of the world of writing. That hermeneutical system and its styles of communication do not work well in electronic media.

The tradition of the evangelicals on TV and radio has been definitively shaped by

resistance to historical criticism. Most of the people on TV either never went to seminary and, if they did, learned as little as possible about historical criticism. Most of them cut their eye teeth on the sawdust trail and are masters of oral communication. The oral hermeneutics of the revival and of pesher interpretation work well in electronic media.

That is, the problem may not be the medium but the norms we use for defining what is authentic Biblical interpretation. The study of the paradigm shifts makes it clear that the groups most highly committed to the paradigms of the previous media age resist the new age most vigorously. We as Biblical scholars are highly invested in the traditions of the media age of silent print with its values of detachment, reflective critical analysis, and urbane sophistication. These may be radically different than the values of Elijah, Paul, the rabbis or Luther but they are ours and they are necessary components of our hermeneutical paradigm. But it may be that this hermeneutical paradigm is appropriate in the age of electronic media in the same way that allegorical interpetation is appropriate in the world of silent print and historical critical analysis.

We have concluded as scholars that our message is incompatible with electronic media. And theological discourse and scholarly analysis in its traditional forms appears to be. But must we equate our tradition with the Bible itself?

In the paradigm of the world of writing, the Bible has been defined as a set of reference sources for the historical events and theological ideas of the Biblical period. To be faithful has meant, therefore, that one must be faithful to those traditions. In Christianity, authenticity has been defined by theological orthodoxy, by the recognizable presence of certain ideas and styles. But theology is not the Bible nor is it the primary language of the Biblical tradition. It is a hermeneutical language, a secondary, reflective language. If we use the language and literature of theology as our norm for what is authentically Biblical, our approach to electronic media will be as if we would put literary, music, and film critics on TV and never have storytellers, musicians or athletes. Imagine TV as a series of critical discussions about stories, music, and sports.

I would propose, therefore, that the problem of the Bible in electronic media is a new form of the old problem of the authority of the tradition and the Scriptures. If the tradition of the interpretive paradigm of silent print is the authority of Bible in electronic media, it is impossible. But if the Scriptures themselves are taken as the authority and the model, the world of electronic media is open to a new world of interpretive possibilities.

We have become radically confused about the character of the Bible. In the traditions of Israel of which the early Christian sect was an integral part, over half of both the Hebrew and Christian canon were stories. The traditions of prophecy and psalm were poetry. The wisdom tradition was proverbs not unlike contemporary advertising. Parables, proverbs, poetry, apocalyptic—those were the primary languages of the Biblical tradition and they will work well in electronic media.

We have equated the Bible and its faithful interpretation with theology. Our entire paradigm is designed to yield information about the ideas of the tradition rather than the experiences. The shape of a new hermeneutic is the shape of experience, of the direct rendering of the revelation of God in story, song, proverb, and vision.

Just as the Church faced a new situation in the second and third century in which the leaders and thinkers of the Church finally had no choice but to develop allegorical and theological methods in order to interpret the traditions of Israel and the early Church in the Hellenistic world, so now we may have no choice but to develop new methods in order to interpret those same traditions in this new cultural context. Thus, we might begin to produce the Bible as a series of audio and video tapes in which connections to the contemporary culture are explored in parabolic, symbolic, and storytelling styles. But the

question is: how can we accurately communicate the meaning of the Biblical tradition in its original historical context in the world of electronic media and its various cultures?

A Personal Paradigm Shift

I had a paradigm shift once and, while I am not a great scientist who has had a major impact on the field, it might be helpful in clarifying the character of the electronic paradigm. When I was doing research for my dissertation on Mark's passion narrative, I wanted to know what his story meant as a story. So I read all the commentaries and was trying to identify the units of Mark's narrative. And all I could see were the seams between Mark's redaction and the pre-Markan tradition and the implications of those additions for Mark's theology. But I literally could not see anything about the story as a story. And the harder I looked, the more frustrated I became. After weeks of frustration getting nowhere, I decided to start over. The conclusion of most scholars was that Mark's passion narrative had probably been passed on by memory for some years before it was written down. And I knew that narratives in the ancient world were generally chanted, often with a lyre.

I put all my books away, got my guitar, and sat down at my desk and began to memorize Mark's narrative in Greek and to chant it. At first I thought I was crazy and then later when I sang it for my friends and my advisor, I knew I was crazy. But I worked on it until I could do the whole thing. In the process, I went through a paradigm shift. I have never been able to experience the documents in the same way since that time. For me, the Bible is no longer a document to be studied in silence. It is sounds that were intended to be heard again.

Concluding Suggestions

Changes in the dominant medium of communication create radically new situations for the transmission and interpretation of the Bible. There is a direct correlation between the development of writing, printing, and silent reading and the major revolutions in Biblical interpretation, namely, allegorical interpretation, literal/figural interpretation and historical critical interpretation. The development of electronic communications in the 20th century is the most radical change in the primary means of communications since at least the printing press and probably since the development of writing.

This communications revolution has had a major effect on Biblical criticism and has been a primary source of the fracturing of the historical critical paradigm in the last 25 years. But the formative cause of this change has largely been unrecognized. Biblical scholarship has continued to operate within the communications world of silent print as if electronic communications has not happened. It may be time now to recognize that the transmission and interpretation of the Bible in the world of electronic communications is the most important shaping influence and constructive challenge for the future of Biblical scholarship. The reason for the declining impact of historical critical work may be that we are not interpreting the Bible in electronic media, specifically radio, audio, and TV. But in order to do that, we will have change our ways of perceiving and interpreting the tradition. If this theory is accurate, Biblical scholarship is in the early stages of a paradigm shift of major proportions. And if previous media changes are at all indicative of the future, religious communities will experience some significant conflicts over the issues that will be generated by this transition.

Chart I
The Bible and its Interpretation in Pre-Electronic Media

Dominant Medium of Mass Communication	The Medium	Character of Sound	Hermeneutical System	System of Distribution
Oral	sounds	improvised chant	Retelling/ Interpretation by representation	Storytellers Preachers
Manuscript	Writing read aloud/public sounds	Regulated chant	Ideas as locus of meaning: Allegorical interpretation	Manuscripts
Print	Print read aloud/Private sounds	Normal reading	Literal/Figural Interpretation	Books read aloud/Tracts
Silent Print	Document studied in silence	Imagined sounds	Meaning as reference Historical facts & theological ideas	Books

Chart II
Patterns of Response to Biblical Paradigm Shifts

Resistance against the new medium in the old culture	*Appropriation* of the new media in the new culture in continuity with the tradition	*Capitulation* in the new medium and its culture
Writing		
Rabbinic Judaism	Christianity	Gnosticism
Print		
Roman Catholicism	Protestantism	Scholastics
Silent Print		
Fundamentalism	Historical criticism-Mediating Liberalism	Deists/Radical Liberalism
Electronic/Television		
Orthodox Christianity		Electronic Church


Chart III
The Bible in Electronic Media

Electronic Transmission
and Interpretation

Symbolic Image

Chant/Liturgy

Empirical
Hermeneutic



Electronic
Distribution

Sound

Electronic
Accreditation

Integration of
Historical Criticism

Dream/Brain/Text: The Media-Brain Connection in Mental Processing of Texts

Ronald W. Roschke
Peace Lutheran Church, Manhattan, KS

0. This is a paper about dreams and texts and how our brains process them. The world of *texts* seems to be a world of "hard" data, rationally manipulated to extract meaning from symbol. The world of *dreams* is the "soft" world of strange, irrational images.[1] We manipulate texts during our waking hours; dreams come to us while we sleep. *Brain* acts as a mediating term between the "hard" world of rational analysis and the "soft" world of our unconscious. It is our brains that process both texts and dreams. This paper will explore that relationship. As we shall see, it is more than an intellectual curiosity that the same brain performs rational processing of texts and surrealistic creativity in the production of dreams. Current brain/dream research reveals that dreaming opens to us a significant window through which to view the human brain at work.

Dream

1.0 When you lay down to go to sleep, a complex series of physical and mental processes begins.[2] You close your eyes, and when you do, the pattern of your brain waves changes: the more regular alpha waves (electrical activity of neurons firing at a rate of ten cycles per second) emerge; they seem to represent the work of the visual cortex neurons when they are not being flooded with visual stimuli. As you continue to rest, your heart and breathing rates slow, and your body temperature begins to drop. You probably experience hypnogogic imagery: fragmented juxtapositions of visual memories, words and scenes in an apparently chaotic order. Eventually, your brain wave activity decreases and you enter what sleep researchers call Stage 1 sleep. This is quiet, non-dreaming sleep. As the sleep progresses the pattern of brain waves goes through several modifications (Stages 2, 3 and 4), each bearing characteristic brain wave traces. However, after about an hour of sleep, the pattern of brain waves begins to reverse, and eventually, perhaps an hour and a half after sleep began, several important changes in the brain begin to happen. Alpha waves begin to appear again, perhaps indicating a reactivation of the visual cortex. In addition,

[1] The distinction between hard reality and soft reality is from Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *Dreams, Illusion and Other Realities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), esp. pp. 9f.

[2] The literature on sleep and dreams is extensive. An especially helpful introduction to sleep research is William C. Dement, *Some Must Watch While Some Must Sleep* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976). An excellent introduction to brain research is the PBS television series *The Brain*, which has an accompanying book by Richard M. Restak, *The Brain* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1984). One more fine introduction, which is especially important to my work, is Jonathan Winson, *Brain and Psyche* (Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1985).

muscles controlling the eye begin to contract. If someone were watching you sleep, they could see your eye moving beneath the lid. Scientists could attach electrodes to your face to measure this electrical activity around your eyes and facial muscles. Because of the nature of this stage of sleep, it is most often called REM sleep (Rapid Eye Movement). Other areas of the brain apparently begin to activate as well, and metabolism increases, especially cerebral blood flow, brain temperature and breathing. If you were to be awakened during this stage of REM sleep, there is a high probability that you would report that you had been dreaming.

1.01 In your dream, you may "act out" intense physical activity (running from a pursuer, for example), yet you never move your large muscles except for an occasional twitch. Brain researchers have discovered that near the brain stem the brain blocks neuron messages, preventing the commands from reaching the spinal column and beyond. If this were not so, presumably you would leap out of bed and act out your dream of running! In fact, scientists who made lesions in the brain stems of cats destroyed this paralysis function; in their sleep these cats would at times leap and attack invisible objects, apparently acting out their dreams.[3]

1.02 The first episode of REM dreaming will probably not last very long—perhaps 10 to 15 minutes. Afterwards, brain wave activity begins to recycle again through stages 2 through 4; pulse, breathing and metabolism slow again; lower brain stem paralysis "switches off" and you sink back into deep sleep once again. From this point on, you will cycle back and forth through deep sleep and REM dreaming in ninety-minute cycles, perhaps going through four to six cycles before awakening the next morning.

1.03 What is happening during these cycles of sleep? What role do they play in human life and thought? Why do we sleep? Why do we dream? The popular perspective from which we most often view sleep is that it is a time of rest. Sleep research reveals that sleeping and dreaming are carefully orchestrated psychic phenomena in which the brain is highly organized to carry out the functions of dreaming. In fact, as we shall see, it may be true that we sleep in order to dream.

1.1 In the opening months of the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* was published.[4] It gave the first modern systematic analysis of the role of dreams in human thought. Freud's interest in dreams came by way of interest in hypnosis as a means for treating mental illness. He recognized that dreams often gave highly symbolic insights into the emotional states of his patients. By reflecting upon the meaning of his patients' dreams, Freud was able to suggest several important aspects about dreams and their relation to human thought and personality.

1.11 First, Freud understood dreams to be an expression of a wish on the part of the dreamer. Freud, however, saw another psychic force at work which prevented the dreamer from giving clear expression to the wish. This "censor" of our wishes leads to a distortion of the wish and a masking of the true purpose of our dreams. In a real sense, Freud thought, dreaming represents something of an "end run" in which the wish-making part of our brain tries to get around the censor and express the wish in ways which will "sneak by" the repressive function which would deny the wish.

1.12 For Freud, a key insight about dreaming is that the content of the dream is shaped by the experiences of the previous day: "I believe, then, that the instigating agent of every

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[3] Work of M. Jouvet and A. R. Morrison, noted by Winson, pp. 46f.

[4] All references to vol. 4 of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, tr. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1958).

dream is to be found among the experiences which one has not yet 'slept on' " (p. 169). Freud would begin to unlock the meaning of his patients' dreams by asking them to free-associate possible points of contact between images of the dream and the events of the previous day. Furthermore, Freud noted that within the dream, the dreamer made associations between images, memories, thoughts and words, connecting them in what appear, to the waking mind, to be irrational juxtapositions. An excellent example is given by Freud in his analysis of his own dream of the botanical monograph. In this dream, Freud's brain combined many separate and seemingly unrelated events into a remarkable interrelation with each other: seeing a monograph on cyclamens in a book shop window (the precipitating event from the previous day), his feeling of self-reproach for not bringing his wife her favorite flower, a monograph Freud had once written on the coca plant, a conversation with a colleague in which Freud congratulated him on his wife's *blooming* looks, and so on. It is instructive to hear Freud's comments on his analysis of the dream:

> So long as I was aware only of the dream's *manifest* content, it appeared to be related only to a *single* event of the dream-day. But when the analysis was carried out, a *second* source of the dream emerged in another experience of the same day. The first of these two impressions with which the dream was connected was an indifferent one, a subsidiary circumstance: I had seen a book in a shop-window whose title attracted my attention for a moment but whose subject matter could scarcely be of interest to me. The second experience had a high degree of psychical importance: I had had a good hour's lively conversation with my friend the eye-surgeon; in the course of it I had given him some information which was bound to affect both of us closely, and I had had memories stirred up in me which had drawn my attention to a great variety of internal stresses in my own mind (p. 174f).

1.13 Through his analysis of many such dreams (his own and those of his patients), Freud began to understand that the dream operates "under a necessity to combine [two or more experiences from the previous day] into a unity. . . . Many experiences such as this lead me to assert that the dream-work is under some kind of necessity to combine all the sources which have acted as stimuli for the dream into a single unity in the dream itself" (pp. 178ff). Seen from this perspective, the mental activity of dreaming is a powerful unifying force in human mental life, and the dream becomes a window into the deep structures of the human brain, through which the very integrating powers and forces of human thought become visible.

1.14 The publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams* eventually revolutionized Western understanding about dreams and mind. Freud continued to elaborate his theory of human life and thought. He suggested a "three-story" model of mind, in which our rational, waking thought is only the tip of the mental iceberg. Beneath the surface of our consciousness lies a submerged world of unconscious wishes and associations. Dreams, for Freud, were important bridges between the conscious and unconscious worlds. Psychoanalysis was the structured activity of bringing submerged and repressed materials from the unconscious into the world of consciousness. In psychoanalysis, the human mind dares to wander into the nighttime world and explore it.

1.2 The genius of Freud's work is that he was able to discern a mechanism of brain function before there were any "high-tech" tools for observing it. As the decades of the twentieth century unfolded, technology created these tools for analyzing and observing the brain at work. Sleep deprivation studies were already begun in the 1890s, but it was the introduction of the electroencephalograph in the 1930s which revolutionized sleep research. With the EEG, researchers were actually able to observe the brain at sleep rather

than waking a subject to ask what sleep was like. You might say that in some respects this represents the difference between sending a photo-reconnaissance satellite over an area to see what is there, rather than asking travelers from the region what they had seen while they visited. The use of EEG, and the subsequent discovery of REM sleep, shifted the focus of sleep- and dream-research. Whereas Freud was interested in the function of *mind*, later sleep researchers became interested in the function of *brain*. Freud's "soft" and artful practice of psychoanalysis gave way to "hard" scientific data, quantified and mathematically manipulable. To later generations of scientists, many of Freud's insights appear quaint and questionable. His conviction that all dreams represent a hidden wish seems difficult to support. One reads with curiosity some of Freud's analyses of dreams, and detects his own avoidance of issues and his apparent manipulation of data to fit the model.[5] Under Freud's direction, psychoanalysis became *mythic*, both in the positive and pejorative senses of the word, in proportion as well as content.

1.21 Meanwhile, sleep research continued to develop. While much of the data called Freud's psychoanalytic model into question, the research has confirmed several key points which Freud made in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. First, sleep deprivation experiments have shown that humans need REM sleep. We have always known that we need sleep, but it appears that we especially need dreams. Subjects who are constantly awakened from REM sleep on consecutive nights experience REM rebound: the brain increases its attempt to create REM sleep the longer it is denied. It becomes more difficult to arouse subjects from REM sleep, and once they are permitted to sleep undisturbed, the amount of REM sleep increases; for example, the initial ten-minute episode of REM sleep in the first sleep cycle can go longer than an hour.[6] Research would indicate that dreaming is more than a psychic curiosity. It would appear that we have a *need* for dreams, and that if denied, we will scramble to "make up for lost time" in our dreams.

1.22 A 1978 experiment by Roffwarg has validated another key aspect of Freud's dream theory.[7] Nine subjects were monitored for a week to create a baseline of dream images during REM sleep. Then, for five to eight days, the subjects wore goggles throughout their entire waking hours; these goggles filtered out all blue and green light, so that all visual images from the day had a red-orange hue. After the first day with the colored goggles, subjects experienced red/orange visual images in the first of the cycles of REM sleep. On succeeding nights, the colored images worked their way back further and further into later dream cycles. Later, some earlier memories of images began to appear red-hued in dreams. In some cases, subjects began to integrate red images with normal-colored ones; for example, a room might appear in normal coloring, but the scene outside the window will be in red/orange. This experiment points to two important aspects about dreaming. First, it indicates that Freud was correct in assuming that dreams have something to do with our experience during our previous waking hours. And second, it indicates that dreams may play an integrative function in weaving together new experiences with our memories of former images and associations.

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[5] A good example comes from Winson, chapter 4, "The Interpretation of Dreams," pp. 91–126.

[6] Dement, pp. 90–92.

[7] H. P. Roffwarg, J. H. Herman, C. Bowe-Anders, and E. S. Tauber, "The Effects of Sustained Alterations of Waking and Visual Input on Dream Content," chapter 9 in A. M. Arkis, J. S. Antrobus, and S. J. Ellman, eds., *The Mind in Sleep* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, Associates, 1978).

1.23 The development of EEG research also opened the investigation of brain function in other species. Research confirms that REM sleep is almost universally present in all mammals. There is one significant exception, however. Allison has found that there is no REM sleep in the echidna, a small, shy relative of the duck-billed platypus which lives in the forests of Australia and neighboring islands.[8] The platypus and echidna are the only living examples of monotremes. The monotremes were the first mammals; they evolved from reptiles about 180 million years ago. Like reptiles, the platypus and echidna hatch their young from eggs, but they are warm-blooded, nurse, and have a four-chambered heart like other mammals. Although the echidna has well-developed slow wave sleep, it apparently does not dream. Furthermore, the echidna is unique in that of all mammals, it has the highest ratio of prefrontal cortex to brain weight. We shall return to this fact in a moment. For now, it is instructive to note that dreaming must have first appeared among descendants of the monotremes about 140 million years ago. The development of dreaming was of such importance that no other mammal has ever evolved without it.

Brain

2.0 During our waking hours, the brain orchestrates a complex process for receiving and analyzing data.[9] For example, visual information is received as electrical impulses from the retina of the eye, sent along the optic nerve to the lateral geniculate nucleus. From here the information passes to the visual cortex in the back areas of the brain. Neurons are the cells by which this information is transmitted as electrical potentials. These neurons are so structured that they can integrate information from many other neurons, gather it and coordinate it. In the visual cortex, neurons are bundled in cortical columns that analyze and process the information, refining the data as it is passed from each stage to the next. Spot detectors are coordinated to identify lines, and lines are brought together to create shape recognition, and shapes are analyzed to finally allow coordination with speech centers that can identify shapes as particular objects which can be named. Part of this information, by now highly organized and analyzed, reaches the limbic system, deep within the brain. Here the perceptual information is coordinated and modified further, given its emotional ambience and sent further on its way as perception slowly is transformed to new signals which will ultimately be sent to muscles for action.

2.01 The importance of the limbic system in coordinating and consolidating this mental process is illustrated by the case of H.M., an epileptic patient.[10] Scoville performed brain surgery on him in 1953, removing portions of the limbic system, including the amygdala and almost all of the hippocampus. In other schizophrenic and epileptic patients, surgical removal of some of these organs had been shown to improve their condition. However, in H.M.'s case, removal of these specific parts of the brain had a dramatic and unforeseen

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[8] See Winson, pp. 53–55 and 257, for full list of references.

[9] See Restak, chapter 2: "Vision and Movement," pp. 51–99. Also Winson, pp. 18–34.

[10] Discussed by Winson, pp. 10–17; and Restak, pp. 206–209. Also Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, *The Self and Its Brain* (Berlin, New York, London: Springer International, 1977), pp. 390–393. The original reference is by B. Milner, "Amnesia Following Operation on the Temporal Lobes," in C. M. W. Whitty and O. L. Zangwill, eds., Amnesia (London: Butterworths, 1966). Popper/Eccles cite a comment made by H. M. himself: "Right now, I'm wondering. Have I done or said anything amiss? You see, at this moment everything looks clear to me, but what happened just before? That's what worries me. It's like *waking from a dream* [my emphasis]; I just don't remember" (p. 392).

consequence: the patient lost all ability to remember recent events. Everything in the three most recent years was wiped from memory, although older memories remained intact. Furthermore, H.M. lost almost all ability to learn anything new from that moment on. Evidently, the limbic system is essential for memory of recent events. However, after a period of three years, memory apparently is distributed throughout the brain so that the hippocampus is not needed for recall of "old data."

2.02 Winson's research on the importance of the limbic system yields important clues for understanding how the brain processes information. With Abzug, for example, he has shown that the lamellae of the hippocampus act as a neuronal gate, directing information to certain structures of the limbic system during attentive behavior while the subject is awake, and redirecting neuronal information to other limbic structures when the subject is experiencing REM sleep.[11] The implication of this research is twofold. First, it implies that during conscious-waking periods, as well as during REM dreaming, the brain is processing information. Second, it implies that consciousness and REM sleep represent two different ways of handling neuronal information.

2.1 Actually, Winson's work represents the latest in a series of theories which attempt to model information processing in the brain. In 1969, Dewan proposed that in REM sleep recent and remote information is reprocessed by the brain and transformed from semipermanent storage to a completely coded, permanent state.[12] Cohen consolidated a great amount of brain research in 1979 to develop a similar information processing model. During REM sleep the brain processes "new learning" which had implications for changing the structure of the brain's database and relates it to "old learning." Eventually, new events are added to the long-term memory where they become "old learning."[13] Winson's contribution (1985) not only adds additional perspective through his work on neuronal gating, but helps us to appreciate the evolutionary advancement which REM dreaming represents. He suggests that REM sleep was an evolutionary innovation to provide more efficient use of the brain. The echidna's large prefrontal cortex may be necessary because it must do all its information processing during consciousness. REM sleep among the marsupials and placentals provided a new option: a smaller brain could act in two modes, with "on-line" processing during wakeful periods and "off-line" processing during sleep. Quips Winson, "Should the organization of man's brain have been similar to the echidna's, he might have needed a wheelbarrow to carry it around. In short, man would not have evolved" (p. 206).

2.2 My own model of brain information processing was developed independently of Dewan, Cohen and Winson, but shares many similarities with them.[14] I am especially grateful for Winson's work, which provides a physiological basis for some of the processes which I have only been able to intuit. In my model I propose that we live in two worlds of thought, but rather than characterizing them by the terms "conscious" and "unconscious," I prefer to designate them as wake-mode consciousness and sleep-mode consciousness. In designating them in this way, I take a phenomenological stance toward

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[11] *Brain and Psyche*, pp. 196–202. See pp. 269 for list of original references.

[12] E. M. Dewan, "The programming (P) hypothesis for REM sleep," *Physical Science Research Papers*, No. 388, Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories. Also in Ernest Hartmann, ed., *Sleep and Dreaming*, International Psychiatry Clinics, vol. 7, no. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 295–307.

[13] David B. Cohen, *Sleep and Dreaming* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 126–134.

[14] My model is worked out in detail in "Woven Word," an unpublished manuscript.

dreaming somewhat similar to that of Medard Boss and Wendy O'Flaherty.[15] We live in two worlds, and from the perspective of each world, the other world is difficult to comprehend. To our waking mind, the world of sleep seems strange and mysterious. To our sleeping world, the world of wakeful reality seems strangely absent; our dream worlds operate by their own rules of logic which seem totally oblivious to the conventions by which the wakeful world operates.

2.21 During most of our waking hours our brains are busy processing information. What is genuinely amazing is that we do not have to think about thinking. Like waking or riding a bike, thought takes place without much conscious effort. But during our waking hours, the brain has so much data to process that it finds itself unable to sort through all the information. The heart of my proposal is the suggestion that one important purpose of sleep is to allow our brain the opportunity to "play" with the thoughts and memories we acquire during our waking hours and to cross-reference these thoughts with other items already stored in the brain's memory. The experience of this cross-referencing activity is what we call a dream. During sleep, our sensing organs are "turned off," or, if not turned off, the "volume" is at least turned down. The brain is not bombarded by the constant flow of information which characterizes wake-mode consciousness; neural messages to gross motor muscles are blocked, thus effectively paralyzing the dreamer. This assures that intense brain activity can take place—even thoughts which would, in wake-mode consciousness, lead to involuntary startle reflexes—and the dreamer can be left to sleep. The evidence suggests that sleep is so structured as to maximize the amount of work a brain can perform without any interruptions from outside stimuli or body movement.

2.22 Cell assembly theory of memory gives us a hint at how the brain might perform cross referencing tasks in REM sleep.[16] If a memory is really a configuration of a network of neurons firing together, the implication is that a given neuron may be involved in many different thoughts and memories. What makes the memory is the *configuration* rather than the single neuron itself. (This is why H.M.'s long term memories were possible without his hippocampus and amygdala.) Associations may happen because a thought fires a pattern of neurons which are also fired for another thought. The closer these two neuron patterns are to each other, the more similar are the thoughts to one another. Dreaming, in my model, would be understood as the brain's exploration of the previous day's experiences as read against the billions of previously stored memories in the database of the mind. Through REM sleep, the brain cross-references new data with old data and weaves the mental *matrix* which we experience as *mind.*

2.23 I would suggest that sleep-mode consciousness is not uniquely a property of sleep, but rather represents a way of thinking also accessible to the brain during its waking hours. The most obvious example would be the *daydream.* Although I am wide awake when I daydream, the quality of a daydream is more similar to a real dream than it is to waking consciousness. I am not aware of my daydream until it is over. I never find myself saying, "Oh, here I am going into a daydream." Rather, I suddenly realize that I have been daydreaming; my mind was off somewhere else. I was not attending to the situation around me. In fact, in many ways my mind did exactly what it does during sleep. What I was "seeing" was an image in my memory. My ego was really there, in that room with those people. I was hearing what they were saying. I could "see" them. But the quality

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[15] For an introduction to the work of Boss see Charles E. Scott, ed., *On Dreaming* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1977). For O'Flaherty, see footnote 1.

[16] See Restak, pp. 226–235.

of sight is like that of a nocturnal dream. It is a different kind of seeing from, say, looking at a picture. It is not really an hallucination but more like the memory of an appearance. And yet, it is not simply the *memory* of a scene either, for in my daydream I can see things that I have never seen in "real life." Daydreaming, like nocturnal dreaming, is a very creative experience. New "memories" can be forged out of existing images as they are woven together into a matrix.

2.31 As in nocturnal dreaming, so in daydreaming my perceptual facilities are turned off or, perhaps more accurately, "turned down." Evidently I am still seeing and hearing, still tuned into the external world. If someone were to call my name, I would probably respond. But the experience of that would be as if I were "pulled out" of my daydream. My ego was "there" in the room with the people, and somehow my consciousness was not tuned into the perceptual cues coming from my ears and eyes and other sensory organs.

2.32 In both modes, wake-mode as well as sleep-mode consciousness, we are indeed "conscious," if by that term we mean that our ego can be said to be present somewhere. When I am awake, it is usually quite easy to answer the question "Where am I?" But even in a dream, if I can be said to be anywhere at all, I would have to say that I am there in the dream. The same is true of a daydream. And insofar as we are aware of anything, we are aware of what is happening when we are in a wake-mode or a sleep-mode. But there is an important difference between these two modes of consciousness. In wake-mode consciousness, I seem to be more in control of where I am. I am determining what I am going to do. In sleep-mode consciousness, however, my thoughts appear to be less under my volitional control. In my nocturnal dreams, I can even *want* to do something—run away from whatever it is that's chasing me—but my legs won't carry me away fast enough. The same is true of a daydream; it is not as if I am deciding what it is I am going to imagine. The thoughts come into my head "of their own accord" and I view them as a passive observer. Of course, I am not passive at all. It is my brain which is producing it, but somehow my consciousness gets to watch the show! That is why I used the term "play" before as I spoke about the brain's activity during a dream. The brain appears to "play" with images and memories during this alternative mode of thinking, sleep-mode consciousness.

Text

3.0 We are now ready to consider the place of *text* in mental processing. For the purpose of analysis and discussion in this paper I wish to define *text* as *any bonded matrix of words, associations or images.* This is a radical departure from the usual usage of this word in English, which has limited *text* almost exclusively to printed or written communication. My latitude with this word is based upon its etymology: *texere* means "to weave"; *textus* is "that which is woven." I suspect that the original use of *textus* for written communication is based upon the act of writing—transforming communication into a linear "thread" and applying it to a two-dimensional surface (a piece of paper or other such medium). My wider definition of *text* is intentionally meant to break with our print-obsessed culture so that we might consider the broader spectrum of possible communications which our brain processes.

3.01 It is significant that the brain performs REM processing in discrete cycles, rather than simply cross-cataloguing throughout the night. A dream has a perimeter; it has a beginning, a middle and an end. It would be the primal example of a text. Because of its goal of cross-referencing new material with older memories, the dream also has a matrix structure, the woven web of associations that form the fabric (texture) of the dream

(text). As a bound matrix, the dream exhibits *internal referents:* the associations and links which are being made internally within the dream. These are the internal "hooks" that give the dream its own coherence; they represent the particular associations which the brain is attempting to weave at a specific time with specific data. The dream also exhibits *external referents;* these are a product of the way that new material is related to the already existing catalogue of associations which forms the human mind. External referents provide the "hooks" with the larger body of associations that we call memory, and place a specific text in the larger world of texts which define the totality of discourse.

3.02 When considered as a genre, dream perhaps comes closest to being a "proto-narrative"; occasionally it seems to exhibit a well-developed plot, but even when it appears more chaotic, it still includes elements such as character, setting, atmosphere and tone. The proto-narrative character of dreams is exceptionally significant. It is more than a mere curiosity that humans happen to tell stories. If REM dreaming represents the brain's attempt to cross-reference experiences and memories, then narrative is simply the other side of the coin; it is an example of "dreams" created during periods of wakefulness, and therefore more easily accessible to wake-mode consciousness. Stories are our way of prolonging the discourse of our dream worlds, relating new experiences to the database of acquired learning.

3.03 Dreams represent the most primal texts, and narratives are the innovation of mammals who have language. But from here the human brain has developed an amazing assortment of "woven things" which communicate information, which exhibit internal structure, and which help to cross-reference new information with the larger matrix of mind. All of these would legitimately be called *text* according to my definition: an oral account of a cosmogonic myth, a song or poem, a letter, a scientific treatise, an oral performance of a written text, a movie, a television program, a dramatic improvisation. What these all have in common is that they are modeled on the brain's own attempt to cross-reference new and old information within a bounded matrix.

3.1 At this point we can discern a hierarchy of matrices at work in human life. A *text* is an example of a *bounded matrix,* and could also be called a *submatrix,* having a perimeter and an internal structure. *Mind* is a *global matrix,* or a *macromatrix,* including all of the interrelated submatrices and the woven web of associations which they create. *World* is the ultimate external referent of this global matrix—its projection beyond the human mind onto the cosmic screen. *Culture* points to the way in which the macromatrix of the human mind is able to be shared; language frees the mind to share internal structure interpersonally. Stories are told communally during the day rather than being merely experienced in the solitude of sleep at night. As O'Flaherty correctly notes, "Narrative makes it possible for us to share our dreams by transforming them into stories and exchanging them for other peoples' stories" (p. 127). But in a sense, the reality goes beyond this and includes not just narratives of dreams, but all narratives—indeed, all texts. By sharing stories and other bounded matrices, humans are able to assure that the structures of individual human minds bear some homologous relationship to each other; worlds are not merely private but shared and inhabited communally.

3.2 The fact that a text has a perimeter (that it is bounded) implies that a text has an inside which can be distinguished from its outside (the part of mind which is not the text). We can differentiate the world of the text (submatrix) from the larger world of mind (macromatrix). For example, the world created by a novel or short story is not the world in which we live; it is a subset of all the possible worlds which create the inhabited world. Thus, any text can be analyzed from two perspectives: from the perspective of its internal referents, and from the perspective of its external referents. When we view a text from the perspective of its internal referents, we are concerned with its manifest, surface

structures. When we explore a text from the perspective of its external referents, we are exploring its deep structures.

3.21 My matrix model of the human mind suggests that structuralist analysis of deep structures is, in effect, a psychoanalysis of the text. The psychoanalytic model attempts to look beyond the manifest content of a dream (its internal referents) to discover its deeper relationships to the unconscious web of memories and associations (external referents). Likewise, structuralist analysis of a text seeks to move beyond the surface structures (internal referents) and to discern the deep structures which lie behind the text (external referents) and which express the latent convictions about reality which the text expresses obliquely.

3.22 If structuralist analysis of a text is done from the perspective of a text's external referents (its relation to the larger macromatrix of mind and culture) then reader response criticism and other literary methods can be seen to be internal-referent approaches toward the text. In reader response criticism, the textual analyst enters the subworld of the text and seeks to explore how that world is created and maintained. This hermeneutical approach honors the integrity of the textual world and champions the text's autonomy as an independent model of reality. But as Ong has correctly noted, no text, not even a written text, ever exists independently of the discourse out of which it is created. Every text—every submatrix—is linked with the universe of discourse out of which it emerges and which is created anew by its own utterance. "Texts have meaning only in so far as they emerge from and are converted into the extratextual. All text is pretext."[17]

3.3 Because a text is a submatrix, it is a small-scale model of the macromatrix of the human mind. The microcosm of the text seeks to manipulate data in small scale. The woven matrix of many different submatrices creates the larger world of mind. The socially-shared universe created by many different texts (shared dreams) creates a culture. And these socially created definitions of reality work back dialectically upon the individual human mind, defining the constraints and the socially-shared reality in which it is permitted to operate sanely.[18] A given text creates its own world, but that world is woven with other worlds in human mind. Reality is nested—worlds within worlds, a network of interlocking, woven worlds.[19] Furthermore, the matrix model of mind helps us to appreciate that the unconscious works in human thought not merely due to repression, the "dark" desire of the human mind to deny and censor part of reality, as Freud thought. Rather, the unconscious is more accurately described as a reflection of the magnitude of human mind. To return to our friend the echidna: we do not have the liberty or the luxury of carting our brains in wheelbarrows; no one is able to attend to the entire macromatrix at a given time. Because our brains cannot attend to all reality at once, we sleep and dream so that we may turn off our perceptual apparatus and concentrate instead upon the more subtle relationships between new learning and old data. In texts we continue to make models of mind on smaller scales, to continue the investigation of some reality with all reality. And we weave our texts into linguistic discourse through which the world is made and by which the world makes us.

3.4 Every text has a perimeter; by definition a text is bounded. This fact is so basic to our understanding of texts that we overlook the primary cause of this matter and its

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[17] Walter J. Ong, "Text as Interpretation: Mark and After," *Semeia 39: Orality, Aurality and Biblical Narrative* (Decatur, GA: Scholars Press, 1987), p. 9.

[18] See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966).

[19] See O'Flaherty, pp. 206–214.

implications. We think that texts are bounded because we deal better in finitudes than in infinities. But when we analyze texts from the perspective of brain and mind we realize that is not the case at all. As a submatrix, every text is bounded; as a macromatrix, every mind is open-ended and responsive to a seemingly infinite amount of new information. Our brains do not seem to have any difficulty working with an open-ended structure. The perimeter of a text, however, is a reflection of how our brains have evolved. We live in two modes of consciousness: wake-mode consciousness and sleep-mode consciousness; our brains "take in" information and process that information in two distinct cycles. The perimeter of a text is a reflection of the discontinuity between these two modes of brain function. We are awake, and then we fall asleep, and then we dream, and then we wake up. The implication is clear: if all texts are built upon the primal text of dream, then it must be the case that *we "fall asleep" into a text and "awake" from it again.* We leave behind the open-ended world of mind and enter the finite world of text; we must negotiate a passage from wake-mode consciousness to sleep-mode consciousness. And from this follows one additional implication: *every experience of a text must be some variety of trance.*

3.5 Every text involves us in some form of trance, and the medium of the text creates variations in the type of trance and the way it is experienced. Since dream is the primal mental text, it is easiest to understand trance here. It is obvious to us in our Western mode of thought that dream involves trance. O'Flaherty has made a brilliant analysis of dreams in Eastern culture and thought, and through the window created by this analysis she helps us to view a great deal in our own Western tradition as well.[20] Within the Indian traditions, stories and philosophical texts deal with the question of the epistemology of dreams. How does the dreamer know s/he is dreaming? Within the dream, I cannot know. The only validation which exists for the dreamer is the act of waking up! Only then, in enlightenment, can I be aware that I have been in a dream. Westerners naively think that reality exists in two rooms: the room of sleep-dream and the room of wakefulness. Indian thought realizes that reality is nested, and that I may awake from a dream, only to discover that I am still dreaming and must wake again. Enlightenment is no once-for-all, but a continuing possibility for existence. The point I wish to make here is that our natural tendency in Western thought is to consider dreams as the "obvious" realm for trance, and rational thought to be the "obvious" mode in our waking experience. It is true that we are obviously "entranced" in our dreams; the matrix model of mind suggests that trance may also be accessible to us during our waking experiences. Our earlier discussion of daydreams also pointed us in this direction as well.

3.51 Anthropologists have studied trance in a variety of cultures. Consider, for example, Clifford Geertz's description of Balinese trance:

> The Balinese fall into extreme dissociated states in which they perform all sorts of spectacular activities—biting off the heads of living chickens, stabbing themselves with daggers, throwing themselves wildly about, speaking with tongues, performing miraculous feats of equilibration, mimicking sexual intercourse, eating feces, and so on—rather more easily and much more suddenly than most of us fall asleep. Trance states are a crucial part of every ceremony. In some, fifty or sixty people may fall, one after the other ("like

[20] *Dreams, Illusions and Other Realities*, esp. chapters 1 (pp. 14–60) and 4 (pp. 127–205). Descartes raised a similar query into the epistemology of dreams in his *Meditations*. For an interesting discussion see Charles E. M. Dunlop, ed., *Philosophical Essays on Dreaming* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1977).

> a string of firecrackers going off," as one observer puts it), emerging anywhere from five minutes to several hours later, totally unaware of what they have been doing and convinced, despite the amnesia, that they have had the most extraordinary and deeply satisfying experience a man can have.[21]

This type of trance, I would suggest, is not a cultural oddity, but is perhaps a feature of oral culture to a degree which we in our print-culture do not appreciate.[22] It must be operative in some form throughout oral cultures. It would be present, for example, in a ritual involving the cosmogonic myth which transports the community to the Beginning (*in illo tempore*), where they again participate in the creation of the world.

3.51a The medium of oral text creates the conditions by which this trance is experienced. It is built upon the very functioning and structure of the human brain, and the ability of the mind to weave current experience with the imaginative structures from stories and myths. The internal referents of the oral text include more than words: gestures and ritual actions, costume, perhaps specific music or rhythm. These internal referents are all shared communally, and the community is formed and built up as the community itself interacts in the creation of the text. The speech may be poetic and metric. In shamanistic practices, trance may be obvious even to us, but to some extent trance is foundational in every example, as human brains leave behind wake-mode consciousness and enter the finite submatrix of the oral story.

3.52 Werner Kelber has excellently documented the implications created when the Christian kerygma passes from oral into written text.[23] The story is now decontextualized, lifted out of its social setting and given a fixed form. No longer can the audience's reactions modify the *structure* of the words on the page; the telling of the tale, to a certain extent, becomes fixed, and the author becomes an unseen character in every telling of the tale, able to exert her/his powerful influence even when not physically present at a reading of the text. But we must remember that until more recent times, the overwhelming majority of written texts were read out loud in community. The dynamics of an oral reading of a text somewhat soften the antithesis of orality and (written) textuality. The lector of a written text works in the context of a community which still hears the text. Internal referents of a written text which is read out loud would still include the dynamics of the community. Many of the qualities of trance in the oral performance of a text are still present and accessible in the oral reading of text. Those who have experienced David Rhoads' performance of Mark's Gospel can appreciate the world created by an oral performance of a written text.[24] The quality of the experience is entirely different from a silent reading of Mark. Audience reactions, giggles, frowns, gestures and inflections all become part of the text and its experience. Good drama creates a world in which the text is brought to life again. Even simple and mundane aspects of Mark's prose take on new vitality in oral performance. For example, the Markan connective *kai* is experienced as something more than the seam between two "independently circulated accounts"; it

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[21] *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books,11973), p. 36. For further discussion of Balinese trance see Jane Belo, *Trance in Bali* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).

[22] See, for example, Mircea Eliade, *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, Bollingen series #76 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964).

[23] *The Oral and the Written Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983).

[24] For example, "A Dramatic Performance of Mark 1:1–3:6 in English Translation," presentation at 1986 SBL Annual Meeting, Atlanta.

becomes, in the mouth and by the gesture of the performer, a powerful narrative force, propelling the listening community further into Mark's world. The trance deepens! Reflection upon experiences of performance help to sensitize us to the "rites of passage" which must be effected if we are to leave the world of wake-mode consciousness and enter the submatrix of the text. In the telling of a story, there may be phrases that act as codes to bring the listener into the dream-trance: "once upon a time," "the kingdom of God could be compared to. . . ." In a dramatic production, the house lights dim (a mimesis of going to sleep?) and perhaps there is an overture. Each of these cues serves to help the listener make the passage from one mode of consciousness to the other. The specific media will shape how this is effected, but the matrix structure of mind will demand that the passage be made.

3.53 It is with the innovation of silent reading that the situation changes dramatically. If it were not so commonplace to us, the act of silent reading could be seen for the unusual experience that it is—every bit as exotic as Balinese trance! Perhaps we can appreciate the exotic quality of silent reading if we step back and watch ourselves doing it. If I am going to silently read for a long time, I will probably sit and relax. My eyes will scan the type line by line, but in almost no time at all, I am totally unaware of the visual symbols. Rather, my ego is "spirited away" to another place. This is easiest to see if I am reading a narrative: my ego is present in the story wold. The trance quality is not unlike a dream or a daydream. I will "see" things and "hear" things. In rare instances, I will actually experience what I am reading physiologically; I may get "jumpy" if I am reading a particularly scary story. And if I am interrupted in my reading, the effect will be the same as suddenly pulling me out of the story world (dream) and back into the "real world." I should know I have been in trance because the effect is much the same as being awakened from sleep; I know it is a trance as soon as I wake up from it. Silent reading makes us aware that trance is not a unitary experience; there are levels of trance, and I can go into trance lightly or more deeply. We experience the "depth" of our reading by the depth of our trance. If I really "get into" a book, my sense of discontinuity in being pulled out of the text is much stronger than if I am "just skimming."

3.53a The world created by silent reading is a non-social world. There is no community to support me in my reading; silent reading is a private act, not unlike dreaming, except that the author (present *in absentia* through the semantic signs) plays the role of director rather than having my own brain do it as in a dream. The external referents for the text now are created by the partnership of my own imagination and the descriptive skills of the author. Because there is no flesh-and-blood community in which to experience the text, the print-bound culture of silent reading is forced to create new external links so that the highly privatized acts of personal imagination do not degenerate into schizophrenia or total collapse of socially shared bonds. Silent reading takes place within Gutenberg culture, where mass production of texts is coupled with wide-scale development of literacy. The world of silent reading is a world in which people talk about written texts, and where the sheer magnitude of production of printed texts assures the continuation of motifs and external referents between separate written texts. In the world of scholarship, footnotes provide additional external "hooks" to interrelate one scholarly submatrix to the wider world (macromatrix) of scholarship. And professional societies create opportunities for face-to-face social encounters to make up for the loss of two-way interpersonal communication and feedback in the world oral cultures.[25]

[25] For a more complete analysis of the role of media shifts in scholarship see Thomas Boomershine, "Biblical Megatrends: Towards a Paradigm for the Bible in Electronic

3.54 When we come to electronic media we find another variant of daydream mental processing. When I "watch TV" I am really not watching the television at all. Rather, almost the same as in silent reading, I am watching the story being acted out. It is as if the television screen were a window through which I am peering. Television viewing has the same hypnotic quality as daydream. For example, I really do not "see" the edge of the screen, or the tuner dial, or the wall beside the television, even though those objects are clearly visible within my field of vision. But if I am engaged in the story, I find that my ego stands present *in* the story. This is most obvious f we look at people who are watching TV. They are not present in the living room. They are entranced. Their egos have been spirited away. But again, there is an important difference between television and daydream: no longer can I say that when I view television my fantasy is directed by my own brain. The plotting for the narrative now comes from somewhere outside my brain. And yet, the *experience* of watching television can be remarkably similar to the experience of "watching" a dream. For example, I can be surprised! And I can find that the story does not go the way I "think" it ought to go.

3.54a The remarkable parallels between the experience of television and the experience of daydream show how mind is actively engaged during the time when I view a television drama. The images on the screen and the sounds from the speaker may give me extremely important perceptual cues—and guide the course of this "daydream"—but my own brain "fills in the details" as it were, and makes it possible for me to make the jump of consciousness that puts my ego there in the story. What this suggests is that when I view television, the data from the screen combines with acts of creativity in my own brain to produce a new matrix which is the story, and my total absorption in this matrix creates the reality effect that makes television viewing so hypnotic. The medium of television differs from that of silent reading in that the visual and auditory cues have more definition; in this way, television demands less imaginative involvement. But the intensity of this perceptive stimulation is so much more intense that the overall effect is much the same—it is a hypnotic and entrancing experience. Again, if it were not so familiar, do you not think we would find it as strange as Balinese trance—people staring in hypnotic silence at a piece of furniture?

3.55 The electronic media are unique in their sense of immediacy. Whereas written texts could be valued for creating the sense of permanency in data,[26] the strength of electronic

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(continued)

Media," paper presented at 1986 SBL Annual Meeting, Atlanta.

[26] For an excellent example of this and a paradigm for the transition from oral to written culture see Karen Blixen (Isak Dinesen), *Out of Africa* (New York: Random House, 1938). Blixen tells the story of how she once wrote down a statement of Jogona, who was unable to write, for presentation to the District Commissioner in a case involving a shooting accident on the farm. When she finished taking down the statement, Blixen presented the document to Jogona for his verification. Blixen says that Jogona gave her "a great fierce flaming glance":

> Such a glance did Adam give the Lord when He formed him out of the dust, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. I had created him and shown him himself: Jogona Kanyagga of life everlasting. When I handed him the paper, he took it reverently and greedily, folded it up in a corner of his cloak and kept his hand upon it. He could not afford to lose it, for his soul was in it, and it was the proof of his existence. Here

media is the creation of simultaneity. When we begin to think about the impact of computers on the processing of texts, we encounter a new feature: modifiability. Cybernetic computer texts modify themselves as data shifts and evolves. No longer do we need to create a new text to meet a new situation; rather, the electronic computer text can be upgraded instantaneously to keep pace with the changing environment. Internal and external referents are linked, and the structure of text is modified even as the brain modifies neural pathways to accommodate new learning. The implications of these shifts in media are difficult to assess, but we might anticipate new genres and types of texts in the future. Max Headroom opens the way for the creation of synthetic characters, and when narrative dramas are able to be created in real time by large mainframe computers, we could anticipate a new genre of narrative in which communal decisions could shape the way the story unfolds. The 1986 Broadway production of *The Mystery of Edwin Drood: The Solve-It-Yourself Broadway Musical* by Rupert Holmes, already anticipates this development. This winner of the Tony Award for Best Musical contains a half-dozen different possible endings; the audience votes on their preference at each performance and thus determines the outcome of the play.

3.6 In every example of text, we see a similar process being played out in amazing variations with different media: a matrix is being woven, incorporating old data with new experience. The new creation has its own internal structure which defines it, and it also relates to the universe of discourse through a system of external referents. The boundaries of the text define point of entry and exit, and the human mind "shifts gears" so to speak in order to enter the world of the text and leave it again. If we speak about this perimeter from the perspective of *the text,* we may talk about phrases or gestures or conceits which act as cues to the reader/listener/watcher to mark the transition from one mode of consciousness to another. If we speak about the perimeter from the perspective of the *experience* of passing into and out of the text, we will talk about dream or trance. If we speak about the perimeter of a text from the perspective of *mental processing,* we will note how human mind has evolved in such a way as to function in two distinct modes so that all of the needed mental processes may be handled by a brain small enough to fit inside a human skull. By paying attention to the *media* in which the text is woven, we can gather important cues about how texts function internally to process world and mind, and how texts function within communities to assure that individual minds live in relation with each other.

Concluding Observations and Implications

4.0 My reflection of brain processing of texts leaves me with several impressions and some suggestions about possible future research and scholarship.

(continued)

> was something which Jogona Kanyagga had performed, and which would preserve his name for ever: the flesh was made word and dwelt among us full of grace and truth. . . . (pp. 120f)
>
> The importance of the account was not lessened but augmented with time, as if to Jogona the greatest wonder about it was that it did not change. The past, that had been so difficult to bring to memory, and that had probably seemed to be changing every time it was thought of, had here been caught, conquered and pinned down before his eyes. It had become History; with it there was now no variableness neither shadow of turning (p. 124).

4.1 First, as we consider the hierarchy of texts, my model gives an obviously privileged position to dreams. I have attempted to bring dreams out of the twilight netherworld of the unconscious and into the light of day. In that sense I see this paper in continuity with the work of Freud and the psychoanalysts, as well as with O'Flaherty and others who would sensitize us to the "soft" side of reality. But perhaps more importantly, I suggest that the rational side of scholarship has an essential, unconscious character as well. Our Western two-room flat, in which waking worlds and sleeping worlds are comfortably delimited and separated, is not spacious enough for us anymore. There is, indeed, a profound difference between wakefulness and dreams, but the line which separates them does not run *between* our bedrooms and our studies; it runs *through* them.

4.2 Second, since dreams play a foundational role in the study of mind, textual scholarship will do well to continue to pay attention to brain and dream research. As the next several decades unfold, brain research should continue to give us an ever-more detailed picture of how the brain processes text.

4.3 Third, we need to think more broadly about text and continue the liberation begun by Ong, Kelber and others. We must continue to widen the scope of our studies away from categories and presuppositions appropriate only to written texts and silent reading.

4.4 Fourth, I recognize within my paper and thought an admitted bias toward narrative. Like dreams, stories also hold a privileged position, largely because I analyze dreams as proto-narratives. If I am correct about the important connection between dreams and texts, then we would be well advised to also consider the relationship between narrative and other genres of text. Perhaps we will discover that narrative elements such as plot, character, setting and mood are transmuted and present in non-narrative communications. Now that "story theology" is no longer a fad, we may be in a position to consider this more seriously.[27]

4.5 Fifth, I would also urge for a continuing scholarly engagement with structuralism. Here, too, the wave has passed; the cutting edge seems to have sliced into other, newer territories. However, structuralism's concern for deep structures offers some important options for dealing with the latent, unconscious elements of a text. In the same way that psychiatry has backed away from the total vision of Freud's myth, so structuralism may

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[27] The work and vocation of Mircea Eliade may prove fruitful in this regard. Eliade's vocation revolved around two foci: scholar and novelist. See his especially entertaining *Autobiography: Volume I, 1907–1937, Journey East, Journey West*, trans. Mac Linscott Ricketts (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981). See also Seymour Cain, "Poetry and Truth: The Double Vocation in Eliade's Journals and Other Autobiographical Writings," in Norman J. Girardot and Mac Linscott Ricketts, eds., *Imagination and Meaning* (New York: Seabury Press, 1982), pp. 87–103. Cain lifts up two especially engaging quotes from Eliade's journal *Fragments d'un journal*, in which he reflects upon the tension he feels between his scholarly and narrative vocations:

> There lies my fundamental weakness: I cannot keep myself both awake and in the world of dreams or play. As soon as I "make literature," I find myself in another universe; I call it oneiric because it has another temporal structure and because my relations with the characters are of an imaginary and not a critical nature (p. 90 in Cain).
>
> If during the next few years I do not succeed in rebinding the threads woven in my "subconscious," I risk losing forever the gift of imagination (p. 92 in Cain).

need eventually to break from those who would search too vigorously for universal archetypes. I am especially fond of the way that Clifford Geertz is able to see within the varieties of cultural expression a specific "incarnation" of human nature.[28] It seems to me that this perspective offers the greatest opportunity to deal with universals in the specifics of a given text, rather than the attempts to straightjacket every expression into a predetermined structure. We need to discuss this further, but we *do* need to discuss it.

4.6 Sixth, I would encourage the scholarly community to continue to reflect on the strange and profound experiences of textual functioning, especially those most commonplace to us, such as silent reading and watching television. I was surprised to find that an online computer search for articles dealing with brain wave function while watching TV came up with nothing. There is some valuable work to be done here which could add more pieces to the puzzle.

4.7 Finally, I am intrigued by the theological implications of dream, brain and text. Writing this paper as I have during Eastertide, I have become sensitive to how biblical language will express resurrection as "awakening." Perhaps this is more than metaphor, or an attempt to declare that the obvious finality of death has been overturned. Perhaps at the point of death we may discover that all of life is a text we have been dreaming (submatrix) and that now it is time to wake to Reality (metamatrix, *Logos*, mind of God). To suggest that life is a text-dream is not permission to enter into a Gnostic disparagement of history and flesh. Rather, it points to the importance and integrity of our dream-work vocation: to weave matrices of meaning whose full meaning can be realized only when we awaken from our text and enter the Beyond. Every text holds within it the possibility for further discourse; every piece of history contains within itself the seed of transcendence.

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[28] A good example comes from Geertz's treatment of Balinese trance, to which I referred already; see "The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man" in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, pp. 33–54. The danger, says Geertz, is that we may see Balinese trance as an "accident" which deflects us from the search of the "true substance" of human nature. This false anthropology treats human nature as if culture were an accident that must be peeled away to find the true "core" of what it means to be human. Human nature, Geertz suggests, is more like an onion—there is no universal core: "We are, in sum, incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves through culture—and not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it" (p. 49). Without understanding this plasticity of human nature, we always run the risk of treating other cultures as "exotic," while blinding ourselves to the wonder of our own cultural modes, e.g. thinking of texts only from the perspective of silent reading, yet failing to discern the psychic wonder of the very act of reading a text. See also Geertz's critique, "The Cerebral Savage: On the Work of Claude Lévi-Strauss," op. cit., pp. 345–359.

Parenthetical Pregnancy: The Conception and Birth of Jesus in Matthew 1:18–25

Fred L. Horton, Jr.
Wake Forest University

Matthew's remarkably brief account of Jesus' conception and birth (1:18–25) stands as a tiny interlude or parenthesis between the genealogy that establishes Jesus' claim by descent to Davidic sonship (1:1–16) and the elaborate infancy narratives of the second chapter. In addition to reiterating this sonship and explaining its meaning, the passage introduces and resolves a problem (Mary's pregnancy before marriage) that in no way plays a role in the rest of the Gospel. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that in addition to its informational function, this parenthetical pregnancy in Matthew's Gospel accomplishes certain transactions between author and reader that are critical in establishing the discourse of the Gospel as a whole.

I

The *biblos geneseos*[1] of Jesus Christ in Matthew 1:1–16 and the *genesis* of Jesus Christ in Matthew 1:18–25 represent parallel but self-contained units.[2],[3] Between the two the author has inserted an explanatory comment (1:17) about the genealogy that has the effect of providing reiteration of the genealogy and space for a virtual new beginning with a

[1] Because of the limitations of the IBM extended character set and of my printer I have been forced to simplify the transliteration of Greek and Hebrew texts to eliminate many of the diacritical marks. For Greek texts this should pose no difficulty for the reader. In Hebrew texts, however, the reader needs to be aware that I depart from the usual transcriptions by employing *T* to represent *tet*, *H* for *bet*, *c* for *tsade*, *sh* for *shin*, and *S* for *sin*.

[2] Daniel Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew: A Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 16, sees 1:1–17 and 1:18–25 as "two distinct parts" which, however, must be taken as a "unit." Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 44, has used the designation "genealogy" to encompass the entire first chapter. Robert H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 20, considers 1:1–17 as a "Christological statement" transformed out of a genealogy and 1:18–25 as a "theological tale" converted from a "historical report," but he also calls attention to the relationship between the two sections.

[3] For a review of the literature on Matthew's infancy narratives from 1976–1986 see Raymond E. Brown, S. S., "Gospel Infancy Research from 1976 to 1986: Part I (Matthew)," *CBQ* 48(1986) 468–483. A companion article on Luke appeared in the following number of the journal. These articles bring the reader up to date on research in this area since the completion of Brown's formative work, *The Birth of the Messiah* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977).

genesis that consists of narrative instead of genealogy.[4]

Matthew's Gospel begins with what Meir Sternberg picturesquely calls a "lump of history"[5] – an element in narration (like names, places, dates, and aetiologies) that bespeaks facticity.[6] The writer begins as an historian, laying claim to the specifics of descent and then interpreting those specifics.[7] Research has ordinarily laid stress upon the particular Christological affirmations of this genealogy,[8] and this is certainly a proper emphasis. But scant attention has been paid to the role of the narrator in providing the genealogy.

For Patte the genealogy of 1:2–16 provides a recasting of an "old knowledge," the readers' presumed understanding of genealogies.[9] But what of the one who possesses both the "old knowledge" and the power to manipulate it to new ends? Sternberg, it seems to me, rightly draws our attention to the fact that the mere provision of a genealogy is an authorial intrusion into the text. The manipulation of that genealogy and the closing commentary on it (1:17) underscore the authority of the implied author.

There are two *geneseis*, not just one, and whatever we say in relation to the *genesis* of 1:1–16 must be considered for the *genesis* of 1:18–25 as well. Both of these passages are *geneseis* of Jesus Christ (1:1 and 1:18). Both bring us to the inauguration of the human life of Jesus (1:16 and 1:25), whom each initially identifies as "Jesus Christ" (1:1 and 1:18). If, then, the genealogy in 1:1–16 is a "lump of history," then the story of Mary's pregnancy and of the birth of Jesus in 1:18–25 may act similarly to establish the author as historian by employing devices that reflect the superior knowledge of the historian.

Even more powerfully than in the first *genesis*, the author insinuates an omniscient presence in the second *genesis*. Of the fourteen intrusions Sternberg lists as signifying an "omniscience equal but subservient to God's,"[10] Matt 1:18–25 demonstrates no less than five (Figure 1).[11]

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[4] I have dealt with the dual sense of *genesis* here in my article "Authorial Presence in the Gospel of Matthew and the Question of Genre," *Essays in Ancient Historiography* (John van Seters, Fred L. Horton, Jr., and James Moyer, eds.; "Albritton Studies in Bible and Culture," 1; Winston-Salem: Wake Forest University, forthcoming). The word occurs in the LXX of the Book of Genesis, for instance, *biblos geneseos* in Gen 2:4a refers to a preceding narrative, and in Gen 5:1 it refers to a genealogy. Similarly, *hai geneseis* refers in 6:9; 10:1; 11:10,27; 25:12; and 36:9 to lists of offspring; but in Gen 25:19 and 36:1 the expression refers to a list of offspring with a narrative, and in 37:2 it refers to a narrative alone. A recent article on the genealogies of Genesis by Robert B. Robinson, "Literary Functions of the Genealogies of Genesis," *CBQ* 48 (1986) 595–608, discusses the various narrative possibilities. Very helpful on the connections between 1:1–17 and 1:18–25 is the discussion of George M. Soares Prabhu, *The Formula Quotations in the Infancy Narrative of Matthew* (AnBib 63; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1976) 176–180.

[5] Meir Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Reading and the Drama of Reading* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) 42.

[6] Ibid. 41.

[7] This narrative effect was noticed briefly by Georg Strecker, "The Concept of History in Matthew," *The Interpretation of Matthew* (Graham Stanton, ed., Philadelphia: Fortress and London: SPCK, 1983) 71. Hereinafter all references to this collection of essays will be as *The Interpretation of Matthew*.

[8] Recently, for instance, Patte, *Matthew* 18–20; Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* 43–45.

[9] Patte, *Matthew* 18.

[10] Sternberg, *Poetics* 119.

[11] For the complete list see Sternberg, *Poetics* 120–121.

Intrusion	Compare
1. Expositional antecedents	Mt. 1:1
8. Identifications	Mt. 1:23b
9. Value judgments	Mt. 1:19[12]
10. Telescoped inside views	Mt. 1:19
13. Bibliographical references	Mt. 1:23a

Figure 1

Although Sternberg's list is not terribly different from a similar list of attributes of the narrator in Matthew catalogued recently by Kingsbury,[13] Sternberg's listing is very important for this paper because it illustrates all of those categories with reference to the historical books of the Hebrew Bible. The effect of those intrusions in Matthew is not only to have the author appear as an omniscient narrator but also to have him appear as a historian like the historians of scripture itself.

According to Robert Alter, the particular quality of biblical history is that it is a history enacted in narration and, as such, is a kind of fictionalized history.[14] This view seems to me preferable to the overly rigorous and idealized approach of Herbert Schneidau who has described the biblical prose history as an exercise in metonomy as over against metaphor (epic poetry).[15] John Van Seters has drawn attention to the fact that this prosaic reenactment of history is by no means limited to the Hebrew Bible. For instance, in a compelling discussion of the Journey of Wenamun Van Seters is able to demonstrate that this New Kingdom text makes sense only as a literary enterprise that imitates the style of the administrative report.[16] But for Van Seters the work of Dtr utilizes such literary advances in narration, already known in the ancient world, in the service of a new literary project, a national history. This accomplishment finds its first parallel in the Greek-speaking world in the great history of Herodotus.[17]

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[12] Brown, *Birth* 125, disagrees with Charles Thomas Davis, "Tradition and Redaction in Matthew 1:18–25," *JBL* 90 (1971) 413, that *dikaios* is redactional because the usage of *dikaios* appears more like that of Luke (1:6) than it does of Matthew and so should belong to a pre-redactional phase. Davis correctly observes that *dikaios* departs from the lack of characterization in the story and binds it to the prophecy and its introduction in 1:22–23. Even if we were to agree with Brown about the history of the tradition, the fact remains that *dikaios* is a characterization and reads like an authorial intrusion even if we were able to discover that it in fact actually stems from earlier tradition. The effect is exactly the same.

[13] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* 30–32.

[14] Robert Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York: Basic Books, 1981) 32: "The point is that fiction was the principal means which the biblical authors had at their disposal for realizing history."

[15] Herbert N. Schneidau, *Sacred Discontent: The Bible and Western Tradition* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1976).

[16] John Van Seters, *In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and the Origins of Biblical History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983) 167–169. While Van Seters does not directly concern himself with the issue of fiction, he is not insensitive to the imaginative work required to build narrative history from its oral and written sources.

[17] Ibid. 359: "Dtr's unfortunate fate was that, unlike Herodotus, he remained

According to Van Seters, Schneidau, Sternberg, and Alter, Dtr's history is an imaginative reenactment of Israel's story that employs the modality of prose narration to achieve an effect quite different from that available in epic poetry. This work of Dtr was the paradigm history available to all subsequent biblical historians, including the Chronicler, the authors of the Maccabean history and (in Greek translation) the author of the First Gospel.

These intrusions do not begin with Matt 1:18. Already in the first 17 verses the author has insinuated his presence by *bibliographical reference (biblos geneseos,* 1:1), by prospect (1:16), by the *genealogy* itself (1:2–16), and by the *retrospect* of 1:17.[18] When we add the intrusions already noted for 1:18–25, 8 of Sternberg's 14 varieties of intrusion have already occurred in the Gospel by the end of its first chapter. The effect of the two *geneseis* is that of an author in tight control of the material to be presented the reader. The narrator controls authoritative writings (*biblos geneseos,* 1:1, and "the prophet," 1:22) and interprets them. The narrator is privy to the thoughts and dreams of others (1:19–21). Nothing emerges in the narration of the first chapter without the author's direct presence as narrator and, more importantly, as historian. Additionally, as Kingsbury has shown,[19] the narrator claims a special relationship to the main character of his narrative, a special relationship to which we shall shortly return.

The amount of story in Matt 1:18–25 is very slight.[20] There is a poverty of the kind of narrative detail that appears for the first time in chapter 2. In terms of external events we learn only that Mary, engaged to Joseph, is pregnant before her marriage *ek pneumatos hagiou.*[21] Joseph considered a quiet divorce, but by virtue of a dream he changed his mind and married her, refraining from conjugal relations until after the birth of the child whom he named "Jesus." Missing is any setting in time and place or any direct discourse between Joseph and Mary. Mary receives no characterization, and the birth of her son finds mention only in passing.

Like the first *genesis,* the second *genesis* is a self-contained "lump of history." The factuality of Mary's pregnancy and delivery are assumptions that receive authoritative commentary with little narrative reenactment. Focus in the second *genesis* is upon the child's name: "Jesus." Indeed, there is something of a reduction in the narrative down to the bare name "Jesus." The genealogy (1:1–16) begins with "Jesus Christ" (1:1) and ends with the personal name "Jesus" (1:16). This personal name, however, is quickly explained: *Iesous ho legomenos Christos.* The designation *Christos,* not *Iesous* is the focus of 1:17; and the second *genesis* begins, as did the first, with reference to "Jesus Christ." In the second *genesis* the angel commands Joseph to name the child *Iesous* (1:21). There follows immediately an interpretation of the name,[22] but from this point on in the Gospel that

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(continued)
anonymous, so that his work has been fractured into a number of canonical books, or, worse yet, has been hopelessly dissected by modern scholars into numerous collections and redactions."

[18] Employing still Sternberg's categories. See Sternberg, *Poetics* 120–121.

[19] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* 43–44. See below, note 22.

[20] Francis Wright Beare, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981) 67, rightly comments about the "severe economy of the narrative." Beyond the name "Mary" there is no characterization of Jesus' mother.

[21] This is, of course, an interpretative comment, but the author offers it as a kind of factual information. On this curious expression see the possibilities discussed by Brown, *Birth* 124–125. We shall return to this interpretative comment later.

[22] Unlike the interpretation of the name *Emmanouel* in 1:23, the explanation of the name *Iesous* is not presented as an etymology, Neither interpretation, however, betrays a

single name is the preferred referent for the subject of the Gospel.

We are grateful to J. D. Kingsbury for showing us the importance of this name in Matthew.[23] Kingsbury rightly observes that the narrator reserves the name "Jesus" for his own use and never has other characters in the Gospel use it to address Jesus.[24] This name, then, serves in the text of the Gospel as an unmistakable marker of the presence of the author which shows the privilege of the narrator who uses it in a distinctive manner. Although the reader discovers that name in the genealogy, only the second *genesis* establishes the author's special use of it.

Matt 1, therefore, is as much about the one who will tell the reader the story (the narrator) as it is about the subject of that story (Jesus). In this chapter, and especially in 1:18–25, the reader becomes accustomed to the several ways in which the author will insinuate himself into the entire work.

II

The conception and birth of Jesus in Matt 1:18–25 is not presented as miraculous, and it is strange to read Daniel Patte's remarks in this regard:

> Yet the contrast between the conception of Jesus and the rest of the genealogy remains; the conception of Jesus is even more extraordinary. What is new is that Jesus' birth manifests *without ambiguity that it is by the intervention of God* that he is Son of David, son of Abraham, since there is no biological role of a human father.[25]

Brian M. Nolan more accurately understands that Matt 1:18–25 reports the fact of the virginal conception but does not focus upon it.[26] Unlike Luke 1:34, Mary's virginity does not even find treatment as an impediment to conception of the child *ek pneumatos hagiou*, and there is nothing at all like the sad confrontation between Joseph and Mary in the *Prot. Jas.* 13:1–3. Mary's pregnancy presents to Joseph only the difficulty that it would to any other prospective bridegroom in first-century Palestine.

In Matt 1:20 the angel tells Joseph what the narrator has already disclosed to the reader:

(continued)
knowledge of the Hebrew language other than what would generally be available to a Greek-speaking Jew of the first century. For the name *Iesous*, W. Foerster (*TDNT* 3:286) draws attention to Philo's understanding of the two parts of the name: *Iesous soteria kyriou* in *De Mutatione Nominum* 121. Less to the point because of its date is the text (also cited by Foerster, ibid.) from the 3d or 4th century cited by A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East* (Grand Rapids, Baker, 1965) 405 and Figure 73: *Iesous Iosoter.* Krister Stendahl, "*Quis et Unde?* An Analysis of Matthew 1–2," *The Interpretation of Matthew* 61, maintains correctly that this reference to the meaning of Jesus' name necessarily shows anything other than general knowledge.

[23] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* 43–44.

[24] We might show this feature by reference to Matt 8:29. In Mark 5:7 the demoniac addresses Jesus with the words *ti emoi kai soi Iesou hyie tou theou tou hypsistou* (so also Lk 8:28). In Matt 8:29 the address reads *ti hemin kai soi hyie tou theou.*

[25] Patte, *Matthew* 20. Emphases author's.

[26] Brian M. Nolan, *The Royal Son of God: The Christology of Matthew 1–2 in the Setting of the Gospel* (OBO 23; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1979) 63.

to gar en aute gennetben ek pneumatos estin bagiou. Repetition of the expression *ek pneumatos bagiou* in 1:18 and 1:20 is clearly a sign of divine action, but exegetes have found it difficult to reconcile this divine element with the matter-of-factness of the account. In all, there seems to be agreement that reference to the *pneuma* does not imply impregnation by sexual means or that the Spirit played a male role in the process.[27] But that does not address adequately the question of the role the Spirit *does* play in the account.

Matthew has, without further explanation, narrowed the conception of Jesus down to two essentials: a human mother and the Spirit.[28] Matthew does not echo Luke in depriving Joseph of his status as Jesus' father through this reduction,[29] but it is clear to the reader that Joseph has played no role in Jesus' conception. The involved legalisms that interpreters have brought forward to have Matthew insinuate Jesus into the Davidic line through formal adoption[30] or through acceptance of the child by Joseph[31] express a modern difficulty that the text itself does not reflect. Some attempts to resolve this modern difficulty have been instructive. For instance, Cyrus Gordon has correctly shown that dual paternity, divine and human, is to be found both in Egyptian and Greek sources,[32] and that insight certainly speaks to Jesus' frequent reference to God as "father" in Matthew even though his descent from David comes through Joseph. But in Matt 1:18–25 there is no discussion of who the "real" father of Jesus might be. The only figure who can play that role is Joseph, but Joseph clearly has no part in causing the pregnancy of his betrothed. Do we need to agree with Beare that Matthew here presupposes an understanding of Jewish law on the part of his readers?[33] Certainly not. What we must understand is that the story has efficiently separated the issue of paternity from that of conception.

How then can one deal with conception apart from the question of paternity? In the case of Matthew the answer should be obvious—the scripture itself. Even a cursory review of the few passages in scripture that deal with the issue of human conception reveal important parallels to the treatment of the conception of Jesus in Matt 1:18–25.

The first passage is Psalm 138:13–16 (MT: 139:13–16) where the psalmist makes the following affirmations about how God created him:

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[27] So, for instance, Brown, *Birth* 124 and 140n22.

[28] At this point it would serve no purpose to discuss the anarthrous *pneuma bagion* of 1:18 and 1:20. The remarks to follow in this section will make my position on this issue clear. I use the capitalized "Spirit" throughout this paper merely as a reference to *pneuma bagion.*

[29] In addition to the genealogy that traces Jesus' descent through Joseph (1:16), the crowd in Nazareth calls Jesus *bo tou tektonos byios* (Matt 13:55), which has nothing of the misinformed parallel question in Lk 4:22: *ouchi byios estin Ioseph boutos.* The Rejection in Nazareth occurs in proximity to the genealogy of Jesus in Lk 3:23–27 where the author makes the disclaimer about Jesus' parentage *bon byios os enomizeto Ioseph* (Lk 3:23). There is no such disclaimer in Matthew. Gundry, *Matthew* 283 correctly comments on the way in which Matt 13:55 changes Jesus' sonship from Mary (Mk 6:3) to Joseph, but insists on calling Joseph a "foster father."

[30] For instance, Gundry, *Matthew* 23 and Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* 45.

[31] Brown, *Birth* 132.

[32] Cyrus H. Gordon, "Paternity at Two Levels," *JBL* 96 (1977) 101.

[33] Beare, *Matthew* 67.

su ekteso tous nephrous mou, kyrie,
antelabou[34] *mou ek gastros*
metros mou. (vs 13)

ouk ekrybe to ostoun mou apo sou, ho epoiesas
en kryphe.[35]35 (vs 15)
to akatergaston[36] *mou eidosan hoi*
ophthalmoi sou. (vs 16)

To gain some understanding of this text we might begin with the reference to the various aspects of the human being mentioned in the text: kidneys (vs. 13), bone (vs. 15), and embryo (vs. 16). H. Wheeler Robinson mentions the kidneys only as one of the less important organs mentioned in the Hebrew Bible, but he also notes that the kidneys are associated with emotion.[37] Wolff,[38] somewhat more correctly, terms the kidneys second in importance only to the heart, but to call them the "seat of the conscience," as he does, involves us in the error of making the organs of the body psychic repositories.[39] The metaphor of the kidneys cannot be absolutely distinguished from that of the heart (Psalms 7:9; 16:17; 26:2; 73:21; Jeremiah 11:20; 17:10; 20:12; Proverbs 5:21).[40] If there is a difference, it is that "kidneys" as metaphor have a clear emotional connotation "heart" does not always have. To say here that God created the psalmist's kidneys is to suggest an intimate relation between God and the psalmist's innermost being.

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[34] The rather colorless *antilabou* may be questioned here. At issue is whether the Hebrew verb *t•sukkenî* implies "weave together" or merely "protect." M. Dahood, *Psalms III* (AB 17A; Garden City: Doubleday, 1970) 292, takes the meaning of the root *skk* as "screen" or "shelter" on the basis of parallelism with *qanîta*, but "weave" and "create" seem also reasonably parallel to me. The LXX may have, indeed, understood the word as did Dahood, but in Greek the parallel force of *ekteso* is stronger than that of *qanîta* since the verbal root *qnb* has both the meaning of "create" and "possess." In Greek the text tells us that God created the psalmists' kidneys and "aided"(?) him from (*ek*) the womb. Since vss. 14–16 continue to describe the psalmist before birth, even the weak *antilabou* has to do with the creative care of God for the psalmist in the womb.

[35] The LXX translates ". . . bone . . . which you made in secret," which differs from the Masoretic Text only in reading *'Syt* for *'Syty*. The LXX, I believe, has the best text, and the Peshitta follows it.

[36] For the Hebrew *golmî* as "my embryo" cf. BDB, 116bc. The term is often used in later Hebrew in reference to an embryo (cf. Jastrow, 222b), but it occurs only at this place in the Hebrew Bible. The translation "embryo" may be too definite for the period of the psalm, and we should note that the LXX's translation "unfinished form" (*akatergaston*) may, indeed, most closely correspond to the meaning of the Hebrew original. Cf. Hans Walter Wolff, *Anthropology of the Old Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974) 240n17.

[37] H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man* (2d ed.; Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1913) 25–26.

[38] Wolff, *Anthropology* 65–66.

[39] The *locus classicus* for this belief is H. Wheeler Robinson's *The Christian Doctrine of Man* 12, where he claims that the Hebrews linked the psychical functions to physical organs "by a primitive and instinctive logic." This appeal to "primitive thought" (or, in the case of biblical scholars, "Hebrew thought") has recently found devastating criticism in J. W. Rogerson's *Anthropology and the Old Testament* (Sheffield: JSOT, 1984) 46–65.

[40] Wolff, *Anthropology* 65–66.

The term "bone" is likewise important. In later Hebrew the word came to form the base of a virtual reflexive pronoun[41] and here means something like "substance." In Genesis 2:23 the man uses the term "bone" in parallel with "flesh" to show the complete identification of the woman with his physical being. In the plural the term is 12 sometimes found with expressions of sensation (Psalm 102:4; Lamentations 1:3; Job 30:17,30). In Psalm 35:10 the bones can be described as speaking to God in praise.[42] In the present context the term is a reference to the human being both in psychic and physical reality.

Even though the psalmist's formation was secret, hidden in the womb, it was not concealed from God's eyes; and God was involved in the formation of every strand of the psalmist's psychic and physical life. Further, God's intimate knowledge of the psalmist extends to knowing exactly the days of life available to the him. His days have already been written in God's book,[43] implying that this knowledge God first gains of him continues throughout his life.

The effective agents of the psalmist's conception and gestation are God and the psalmist's mother. Although the psalmist describes his creation as fearfully wonderful, there is no hint of any special miraculous intervention. The same two effective agents are to be found in Jeremiah's call (Jer 1:5):

> *pro tou me plasai se en koilia epistamai se kai pro tou se exelthein ek metras heiaka se,*[44] *propheten eis ethne tetheika se.*

Again, even though there is no suggestion of a miraculous birth for Jeremiah, there is also no reference to the agency of a human father.

In the one passage where there does seem to be clear mention of the father's seed in reference to conception, the actual description is still somewhat surprising from our modern standpoint:

> *e ouch hosper gala me emelxas,*
> *etyrosas de me isa tyro;*

While this may seem to Wolff simply an example of "archaic biology,"[45] it is difficult to see what difference a knowledge of the facts of ovulation and insemination could make here. Whatever the author's "archaic biology," it is clear that God, not the poet's father, "poured" him and "curdled" him. As Wolff correctly points out, the whole of the reproductive process is the work of God.[46]

None of these biblical passages, however, portray God as "father" in relation to the processes of conception and gestation. Indeed, the passage from Job assumes the action of the biological father. The Hebrew scriptures generally refer to God in his capacity as

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[41] Jastrow 1103a.

[42] Robinson, *Christian Doctrine of Man* 25–26. Against Robinson, however, one must insist that we have here a figure, not a primitive belief in the psychic qualities of human bone.

[43] The theme of God's book is well known in the Hebrew Bible (Exod 32: 32; Pss 56: 8; 69: 28), but nowhere else does mention of the book suggest knowledge of the future. The reference here is more like those references to the books that contain God's foreknowledge as in Job 1: 27, and this may be suggestive of a date.

[44] The Hebrew reads slightly differently: *b•Terem Tece' mereHem biqdashtîka.*

[45] Wolff, *Anthropology,* 96.

[46] Ibid. 97–98.

creator of human beings as "maker" (Hebrew: *'oseb*, Greek: *ho poiesas*).[47] The Second Isaiah warns his listeners: *hôy rab 'et-yocrô HereS 'et HarSey 'adamah.*[48] Here we have the same terminology as that of the Yahwist who describes the creation of the first human with the words: *wayyîcer*[49] *ybwb 'elohbîm 'et-ha'adam 'apar min ha'adamah.*[50] There is certainly no obvious interest in the passages in the biological details of conception—archaic or otherwise. In his creative activity, God is "maker" rather than "father."

Returning to Matt 1:18–25, it becomes clear how the unusual circumstances of Jesus' conception can find treatment in Matthew's matter-of-fact, non-miraculous manner. The author presents all of the essentials of human conception and gestation found in the scriptures: the action of God within the womb of a human mother. This biblical portrayal has no room for the action of a human father in conception, and Mary's virginity is no impediment to it as in Luke.

It is meaningless to argue that God or his Spirit do not play a male role in the conception of Jesus if one must turn around and assign that same virtual role to the Spirit in Matt 1:18 and 20 on other grounds. But that is exactly what most interpreters have done. Brown, for instance, rightly argues against such a male role in Matthew[51] and then explains at a later point that begetting by the Holy Spirit entails a "counterexplanation to human parentage."[52] Is the alternative divine parentage? This is certainly the case in Luke where Joseph's paternity is denied, but it is not the case in Matthew. We do not meet Jesus as "son" of God until Matt 2:15, and that in a very different context from Matt 1:18–25.

Kingsbury sees rightly that there is no direct reference to Jesus' divine sonship in the first chapter, but he does find indirect reference in the theological passives *egennethe* (1:16) and *gennethen* (1:20).[53] He paraphrases 1:16a as "Jesus *was born* [by a special act of God]."[54] While admitting that in the Hebrew Scriptures "son of David" in some senses entails the further predicate "Son of God," he takes "Son of God" as outranking the title "son of David."[55] Kingsbury believes that Matthew is reserving the title "Son of God" for Jesus' presentation at his baptism.[56] Yet from 1:1 to 3:17 Jesus as Son of God has been before us, under wraps, as it were, in the theological passives of 1:16,20, the neutral expression "the child" in chapter 2, and in the prophecy of Hosea 11:1 cited in Matt 2:15.[57] Jesus'

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[47] Job 35:10; Ps 95:6; Prov 14:31; 17:5; 22:2; Isa 17:7; 51:13; 54:5. But see in Hebrew also Job 4:17; 32:22 and Job 36:3: *ûlpo·lî 'etten cedeq.*

[48] The LXX reads this verse slightly differently, but the wording for our purposes is still important: *poion beltion kateskeuasa hos pelon kerameos.*

[49] Greek: *eplasen.*

[50] The formation of the writer of Psalm 139 *b·taHtîyôt 'arec* (139:15; Greek: *en katotatois tes ges*) is not different from his formation *b·beTen 'immî* in 139:13. Job 1:21; Qoh 5: 14 and Sir 40:1 conflate the earth with the mother's womb. Wolff, *Anthropology*, 96–97, again sees a kind of archaic viewpoint here, and he brings forward an Assyrian text in which human beings are described as springing up from the earth "like corn."

[51] Brown, *Birth* 124–125.

[52] Ibid. 135n9.

[53] Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) 43. See also Nolan, *Royal Son of God* 222 and the literature cited 222n1.

[54] Kingsbury, *Structure* 43. Emphasis author's.

[55] Ibid. 44.

[56] Ibid. 49–51.

[57] Ibid. 51.

divine sonship is clearly tied for Kingsbury to his conception *ek pneumatos hagiou.*[58]

Nolan has presented the problem in a different light from Kingsbury. There is no essential interdependence, Nolan informs us, among the three points that Matthew and Luke have in common in their stories of Jesus' conception and birth: divine sonship, conception by the Spirit, and exclusion of human fatherhood.[59] He deals with the title "Son of God" as the divine legitimation of the Son of David, following models of filiation provided in scripture.[60] For Matthew's audience, he contends, sonship involves a familial relationship that involves three aspects: (1) the father's training of the child, (2) the child's subordination to the father, (3) and the succession of the son to the father's position.[61] The issue in the scripture, Nolan contends, is not adoption (for which there is no provision in the biblical law) but legitimation through the three aspects of the paternal relationship.[62]

Nolan, it seems to me,correctly understands that sonship in scripture is not a matter of biological generation but of paternal acceptance. This is true for the king in ancient Israel, and it is true for the Messiah in Matthew. So, it is difficult to understand why Nolan must still put God in the virtual position of a biological father even though he has given us good reason to doubt the importance of that position in Matthew's context, but that is exactly what he does. The theological passives in 1:16 and 1:20 as well as the fulfillment formulas in 1:22 and 2:15 are for him a discreet legitimation of Jesus as son by God.[63] Further, he finds in Jesus' conception *ek pneumatou hagiou* a weighty objection to his thesis that Jesus divine sonship must be linked to the divine legitimation of the Davidic kings.[64] What, exactly, is the problem? Although Nolan can find some biblical references that involve the spirit with the process of legitimation of the Davidic kings, he cannot find a creative role for the spirit except in an admittedly tortured conflation of Wis 1:14 and Wis 9:17–18.[65] Thus, it seems, a paternal and generative role for the Spirit must be admitted for Matt 1:18–25 even though there is no scriptural precedent for them.

Exactly what the theological passives have to do with legitimation escapes me, and it appears that Nolan elsewhere thinks of divine sonship as involving some kind of divine begetting and finds this to be a difficulty for his thesis. We are reminded that for all of his arguments about the nature of fatherhood in scripture, he believes also that Matthew, like Luke, excludes human fatherhood.[66]

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[58] That paternity is an issue for Kingsbury comes very clear in his more recent work. He asks, "How can Jesus legitimately be designated the Son of David (1:1) when Joseph son of David (1:20) is not his father, and Mary, his mother, is not said to be from the line of David?" (Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* 45.) My contention is, however, that Matthew does present Joseph as Jesus' father.

[59] Nolan, *Royal Son of God* 64.

[60] Ibid. 216–240.

[61] Ibid. 216.

[62] Ibid. 220.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid. 235–236.

[65] Ibid. 236. The passages from scripture are 1 Sam 16 (1 Sam 16:13?); Isa 11:2–4; 61:1–3; and Ps 51:11. This last reference requires one to read the psalm in the context of its opening historicizing colophon. Two rabbinic passages, *Gen. Rab.* 2:4 and *Exod. Rab.* 48:4, he also brings forward in the belief that they contain pre-Christian materials.

[66] Ibid. 64.

Nolan is on much firmer ground when he refers to the legitimation of Matt 2:15 than when he deals with the function of the Spirit in 1:18–25. In Matt 2:15 the scripture (Hos 11:1) does indeed refer to Jesus as *hyios mou*. There is nothing particularly discreet about that claim, and, against Kingsbury, it is difficult to see how this first reference to Jesus as God's son should be subordinated to the scriptural allusion in Matt 3:17 or Matt 17:5 where the same expression is used. Jesus is first unequivocally called God's son in a passage that stresses Jesus' identification with his people.[67] Prabhu has clearly shown how the quotation from Hos 11:1 fits both the context in Matthew while fitting Matthew's narrative into its own context.[68] We see Jesus as divine son in his recapitulation of the story of God's deliverance of his son Israel from Egypt.

Despite his misunderstanding of the conception of Jesus as miraculous, Daniel Patte has correctly drawn attention to the fact that both Davidic and divine sonship have to do with Jesus' vocation and not his nature.[69] This seems also to be an insight contained within the work of Nolan and Kingsbury. Patte has Jesus recognized as God's son by call (2:15) and by God's pleasure (3:17). His function is to save his people, and he receives in Matthew's narrative the divine qualifications[70] required to fulfill that vocation.

Nolan's quest for the creative function of the Spirit of God in the scriptures did not lead him to Psalm 139 (LXX: 138) where that function is clear. In verse 7 the psalmist asks:

> *pou poreutbo apo tou pneumatos sou*
> *kai apo tou prosopou sou pou phygo;*

This same spirit, who is not different from God-as-present, would be found wherever the psalmist might seek to escape it, whether in Hades, in heaven, in the sea, or in the darkness (verses 8–12). Nor is it a different being who was present to form him in the womb of his mother (verse 13) and in secret (verse 15). Indeed, following a convention to be seen in several places, this secret formation in the womb can also be termed *en to katotatois tes ges*.

By itself the action of the *pneuma hagion* in Matt 1:18 is no more or less remarkable, special, or miraculous than the action of God-as-spirit is in Psalm 139 (138). Patte, however, helps us keep in focus the fact that the Spirit does not stand by itself, and the full meaning of the conception and birth of Jesus *ek pneumatos hagiou* comes clear in its context. This child, God-with-us, is the messianic son of David whose name means salvation for his people. Beginning in Matt 2:15, and continuing in 3:17 and 17:5, this son of David receives recognition as the royal Son of God. It is not his conception by the Spirit that makes him divine but his acceptance, recognition, or legitimation by God that accomplishes this.

None of this is to say that conception by the Spirit is unimportant in Matthew's narrative or that the virginal conception is a trivial matter even though it does come to us, as it were, in parentheses.[71] The biblical exemplars I have produced to show the

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[67] A point made long ago by C. H. Dodd, *According to the Scriptures* (London: Nisbet, 1952) 103.

[68] Prabhu, *Quotations* 216–228.

[69] Patte, *Matthew* 21–22.

[70] I take Patte to mean "divine qualifications" in the sense that Nolan used "divine legitimation."

[71] Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975) 34, is certainly not correct in calling the virginal conception and birth "quite peripheral."

background to Matthew's use of conception by the Spirit are all forward-looking. In Jeremiah 1, the prophet's formation in the womb was with a view towards his prophecy (*eis ethne tetheika se,* 1:5). In Psalm 139 (138) God's intimate knowledge of the psalmist includes knowledge of all the days of the psalmist's life:

> *kai epi to biblion sou pantes graphesontai hemeras plasthesontai, kai outheis en autois* (138:16b).

And even in Job 10, Job, in lamenting the fact of his existence, wonders why God would expend such care for his formation only to destroy him. In 10:9 he asks:

> *mnestheti hoti pelon me eplasas eis de gen me palin apostrepheis;*

In other words, conception by the Spirit never stands by itself as a qualification by nature. Rather, it always discloses God's purposeful action.

When the narrator informs the reader (1:18), and the angel announces to Joseph (1:20) that Mary's unborn child is *ek pneumatos hagiou,* the reader, on the basis of biblical parallels, should expect information about the divine purpose of that conception. Such information is exactly what the story provides. Following the announcement to Joseph, the angel immediately (1:21) gives Joseph the child's name and explains the function that name bespeaks:

> *kai kaleseis to onoma autou Iesoun, autos gar sosei ton laon autou apo ton hamartion' auton.*

Following this announcement, the author insinuates himself into the narrative to give the reader[72] further explanation not only of the angel's instructions but of the whole narrative of conception in terms of the prophecy of Isa 7:14 (Matt 1:22–23). The reader learns that Mary's puzzling pregnancy was the birth prophesied long ago by the prophet, the birth of Emmanuel from a virgin. Brown is certainly correct to maintain that the function of the textually difficult *kai ouk eginosken auten heos hou* (1:25a)[73] is to stress the virginity of Mary before Jesus' birth in fulfillment of the prophecy of Isaiah.[74] But in Matthew we may go on to ask what the function of that virginity is. At the thematic level, its function is certainly not to establish Jesus as Son of God. Rather, it is to establish the special and specific calling of Mary's child to be the royal son of David and savior of his people. But within the structure of the narrative the prophecy serves a second function. The stress Brown finds on the virginity of Mary before Jesus' birth makes sense only when we recognize that Mary's virginity—so far as the text of Matthew is concerned—is not a problem (as it is in Luke) but the solution to the problem of Mary's premarital pregnancy. To this second level of significance we now turn.

III

Matthew's evaluation of Joseph that he was a "righteous" (*dikaios*) man (Matt 1:19) has

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Nor can I agree with Stendahl, "*Quis et Unde*" 62, that the virgin birth story is "theologically mute."

[72] But not Joseph, a fact that I shall take up later.

[73] Missing in k and sy•.

[74] Brown, *Birth* 132.

undergone much scholarly discussion. Brown disagrees with my contention above[75] that *dikaios* represents an authorial intrusion and assigns it instead to the pre-Matthean tradition.[76] He believes that Joseph's resolve derives from a righteousness of obedience to the law that is tempered by compassion.[77] If we reframe the issue, however, to take into account the work of the implied author and of the implied reader, this discussion will fall into a useful context that avoids guessing about motivation.

Joseph is the one character in the narrative who is in the position of having to respond to the fact of Mary's pregnancy. Nothing in the text before 1:20 makes him privy to any special information about the circumstances of that pregnancy, and so his resolve to divorce her expresses the assumption that she has been unchaste.[78] Notice here that Joseph's decision to divorce Mary falls into the single exception Matthew allows to Jesus' teaching against divorce (Matt 5:32).[79] In other words, Joseph's decision to seek a divorce shows the reader what the reader is to take as his understanding about Joseph's motivation: Mary has been unchaste, and Joseph does not want to marry her. Within the Gospel's understanding of the law, he is entitled to put her away and resolves to do so.

Joseph's decision, however, to divorce Mary on the one ground that would not interfere with the author's characterization of him as *dikaios* does not exhaust the meaning of that characterization. Joseph also determines to do put her away *lathra.*[80] That neither biblical nor rabbinic law make any provision for secret divorce[81] is irrelevant to the narrative. Law finds its basis in the cases brought before it for adjudication, and just what law might be applied to this case is a matter of no interest whatsoever in the narrative. All we see is Joseph's decision to do the thing "secretly," and within the scope of the narrative this serves to modify the meaning of the assertion that Joseph was *dikaios.* His compassion finds expression in the manner in which he elects to divorce this clearly unchaste woman. Nothing tells the reader that secret divorces are impossible, and a sound literary analysis requires that we stay within the world created by the narration. Only an intervention of some sort could deter Joseph from his resolve, and that intervention is the dream in Matt 1:20–21.

What the actual reader might believe about Mary is, of course, not something that we can estimate; but the implied reader will understand from the preceding verses that Jesus' descent from David (1:1 and 1:16) requires Joseph to go through with the marriage. Achievement of this end will require a compelling intervention of some kind, one that will remove Joseph's righteous desire for a secret divorce. Revelation to Joseph by the angel

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[75] See above, page 3.

[76] Brown, *Birth* 125. See above, note 11.

[77] Brown, *Birth* 127.

[78] So, for instance, Beare, *Matthew* 68. How Gundry, *Matthew* 22, can conclude that Joseph's hesitation stems from a reverential awe of the divine conception escapes me. Brown's criticisms of the "awe" theory of Joseph's hesitation are compelling. Further, such theories always involve a historicizing fallacy that speculate on what Joseph knew and when he knew it even though the text provides no basis for such speculation. See Brown, *Birth* 126–127 and "Infancy Narrative Research" 479–480.

[79] *parektos logou porneias.* See the parallel in Mk 10:11–12 and the equally strong prohibition in Lk 16:18.

[80] Davis, "Tradition and Redaction" 413 agrees that *lathra* must be taken with *dikaios* as redactional.

[81] Brown, *Birth* 128, is certainly right that there is no known legal provision for a secret divorce. So also Gundry, *Matthew* 21.

that Mary is, indeed, a virgin[82] would be sufficient within the narration to gain that end, since unchastity is the only allowable grounds for divorce; but that information is not what the angel reveals to him. The angel reveals to Joseph only the vocation of the unborn child, and this alone can motivate his change of mind as the author tells the story. It is not accidental that this vocation is the main thrust of Matt 1 as a whole. Here Joseph is the righteous son of David who acts in response to his people's interest. That Joseph will marry his intended is already certain by virtue of the genealogy, but Joseph's reluctance offers a momentary complication that must be overcome and offers the author an opportunity to explain to the reader the nature of the Davidic sonship which Jesus receives, i.e. he will function as Emmanuel to save his people.[83] The righteous Joseph abandons his desire for divorce in response to that promise.

The implied reader works within the narrative world created by the author, and nothing in that narrative world has told the reader that Mary has been chaste. Whatever the actual reader might know or believe about Mary's virginity on the basis of the various pre-Matthean traditions scholars have conjectured,[84] the implied reader has only the twice repeated *ek pneumatos hagiou*[85] that in no sense speaks clearly to the issue of unchastity but only argues that the unborn child represents the will of God. By removing for his implied reader Joseph's single available exit as a righteous man from the union with Mary, the narrator at the same time provides that reader with the fact of Mary's virginity which he establishes not by Mary's own words as in Lk 1:34, but by his own (historian's) recourse to the documentation of scripture. Since the author offers this explanation to the reader alone, and not to Joseph through the angel, we have to regard Joseph as responding to the angel's promise about the child, not to information about Mary's virtue. But the reader is in a position superior to that of Joseph in the narrative. Joseph's suspicion about Mary receives no answer, but the reader's does. Finally, any lingering suspicion of the reader that might attach itself to the narrative also finds a resting place in the author's privileged assurance that Joseph had no relations with his betrothed before the birth of the child.

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[82] Matt 1:23: *idou be parthenos en gastri exei* accomplishes this, not the *to gar gennetben ek pneumatos estin hagiou* of 1:20b, which is not, as I have explained, a claim for divine paternity or for Mary's virginity.

[83] Cf. Patte, *Matthew* 18.

[84] This is the opinion of a large number of commentators. Brown, *Birth* 38, considers that the basic material agreed upon by Matthew and Luke had probably been fixed in the apostolic preaching. Gundry, *Matthew* 5, believes the nativity already existed in a fixed Greek text that Matthew altered freely and Luke less freely. (Brown, "Infancy Narrative Research," 478 and 478n16 may have misunderstood Gundry at this point to be saying that Matthew has actually rewritten Luke's account.) Kingsbury, *Matthew* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977) 18, believes that to all intents and purposes Matt 1:18–25 can be regarded as composed by Matthew himself. Prabhu has given a very complex tradition-critical reconstruction in which he contends that 1:18–25 derives ultimately from a firmly entrenched tradition about the virginal conception (Prabhu, *Quotations* 252, 299) and appears to agree with Kingsbury about the heavy reshaping of the tradition undertaken by the author. Nevertheless, he believes that he can find pre redactional dream narratives behind Matthew's "Infancy Gospel" (ibid. 252).

[85] I am not sure that Davis, "Tradition and Redaction" 413 has to be followed on the meaning of the displaced adjective *hagiou* in 1:20. Citing, Bl-D 473 (413n35), he rightly contends that there is emphasis upon the adjective; but that emphasis does not establish

IV

Two primary transactions go on between the narrator and implied reader of Matt 1. One of them is quite clear: The vocation of Jesus Christ as son of David and savior of his people finds its initial and thematic statement for the reader. This is the one about whom the reader will read. The second transaction has been less clear than the first to interpreters: The implied author as narrator establishes himself as the privileged conveyor of information and interpretation to the reader and does so using conventions of the historians of scripture. That is to say, the author establishes himself as the historian upon whom the reader must depend not only for the facts but for their interpretation.

In Matt 1 there is very little true narrative, and the account of the conception and birth of Jesus in 1:18–25 stands as a short parenthesis between the genealogy (1:1–17) and the infancy narratives proper. But in that brief parenthesis the author stakes out claims to the privileges of the historian with conventions of omniscience, authoritative interpretation, and access to the thoughts and dreams of the subjects of narration. The reward to the reader for accepting this position is a resolution to the problem of Mary's unwed pregnancy that is superior to the resolution offered to the character who must deal with it in the narrative.

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that the expression as a whole means "a holy spirit" as opposed to an unholy spirit, the meaning of which in the present context would be difficult to determine. I have attempted to keep discussion of the *pneuma hagion* of Matt 1:18–25 within its scriptural context. Whatever *pneuma hagion* might mean to the author, it is not likely that it departs significantly from the "spirit" of Psalm 139.

Matthew's Understanding of the Temple Tax (Matt 17:24–27)

David E. Garland
The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

Matthew 17:24–27 presents the interpreter with a conundrum. It seems clear that the passage teaches that one is not to cause offense to "them"; but the problem is, who is in mind? The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that this passage has been made to fit a wide variety of historical situations envisioned by interpreters.

I. The Historical Jesus

The incident could be a reminiscence from the historical ministry of Jesus. It is not improbable that collectors of the temple dues[1] asked whether Jesus paid this offering since his orthodoxy and his attitude toward the temple were open to suspicion, although their question, as it is phrased in the Greek, expects a positive answer that Peter readily gives. Because it has been commonly assumed that all Jews faithfully paid the Temple tax and that to refuse would be tantamount to withdrawing from Judaism, some have argued that the question would not have been raised during the ministry of Jesus.[2] The evidence,

[1] The half-shekel was levied on all males from age twenty; women, slaves, Samaritans, and Gentiles were excluded. It was due by the beginning of Nisan, announcements went out on the first of Adar, and the money was collected on the fifteenth (*m. Šeqal.* 1:1). The tables of the money changers were set up on the 15th of Adar in the provinces and on the 25th in the temple to change money into ritually acceptable coins (*m. Šeqal.* 1:3). The half-shekel, translated δίδραχμον in Exod 30:13, Neh 10:32–33 (LXX), no longer existed; and two Roman denars or tetradrachms (Josephus *J.W.* 3:194–196) or a Tyrian shekel were substituted (*b. Bek.* 50b; *B. Qam.* 36b). Pledges were collected where a man lives, and it appears that communities had certain persons assigned to make the collections and forward them to Jerusalem (*m. Šeqal.* 2:1). See L. Kadman, "Temple Dues and Currency in Ancient Palestine in the light of Recent Discovered Coin-Hoards," *Israel Numismatic Bulletin* 1 (1962) 9–11, on the hoard of temple dues recovered at Isfiya on Mount Carmel, representing the dues of approximately 7,800 men, presumably from Galilee, in 67 C.E. H. Strack and P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1926) 1:761, interpreted *m. Šeqal.* 1:3 to mean that they used distraint in forcing the tardy to pay; but this may have been only wishful thinking read into the past and not actual practice. This does indicate, however, that not everyone was prompt to pay.

The Diaspora communities also collected offerings and sent them to Jerusalem (Josephus *Ant.* 14:110–111, 18:312–312; Philo *Spec. Leg.* 1:76–78, *Heres.* 38; Cicero *Pro Flacco* 67), but one cannot be sure that all these references refer to the temple dues (see Philo *Gaium* 156).

[2] F. W. Beare, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 371, who therefore claimed (372) that the situation envisioned in v 24 was an artificial

however, belies this assumption. For various reasons, not all Jews did comply; and Jesus could have been suspected of being either indifferent or a conscientious objector.

After citing Deuteronomy 28:47–48, "because you did not serve . . . therefore shall you serve your enemy," the *Mekilta* records the lament of R. Johanan b. Zakkai after the debacle with Rome when he spied a girl picking out barley corns from the excrement of an Arab's horse. He attributed the present plight of Israel to its unwillingness to be subject to God, including, among other things, its unwillingness to pay a head tax to God, a *beka* a head (Exod 38:26), while paying a head tax of fifteen shekels to an enemy government (*Mek. Yithro Bahodesh* on Exod 19:1, Lauterbach, II:192–193). Freyne took R. Johanan's reproach to mean "that the Galileans did not observe the institution with any great enthusiasm."[3] Whether one can legitimately infer this about Galileans is debatable; but this statement and the provision for an "Old Shekel dues" Shofar-chest in the temple (*m. Seqal.* 6:5) suggest that, as one might expect when it comes to humans and money, not all were eager (or able) to pay their offering.

Other, more scrupulous Jews, also did not pay the tax, but not out of laxity. They claimed special exemption from the tax on the pretext of some loophole found through the exegesis of the Scripture. Schweizer claimed, "even the monastic community at Qumran, which came into being as a protest against the Temple at Jerusalem and its priesthood, paid the Temple tax without objection."[4] But this misrepresents the case. In his much criticized edition of DJD V, Allegro argued that the half-shekel offering did not become an established institution until the end of the Hasmonean rule, about the time Qumran separated themselves from the temple and the rest of Israel. 4Q*159* is an exposition of biblical legislation; and Allegro translated its explanation of the temple dues (2:6–7): "Concerning . . . the money of Valuations that a man gives as ransom for his soul: half [a shekel]. Only once shall he give it during his lifetime."[5] On this interpretation, the

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construction to set up the saying of Jesus. But see W. Horbury, "The Temple Tax," *Jesus and the Politics of His Day,* ed. by E. Bammel and C. F. D. Moule (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1984) 265–286, who made a strong case for the fact that this incident stemmed from the historical Jesus.

[3] S. Freyne, *Galilee From Alexander the Great to Hadrian 323 B.C.E. to 135 C.E.* (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1980) 280. According to Freyne, it was not because of the Galileans ignorance of the law but their conservative resistance to new religious developments that was behind any indifference to the payment of the half-shekel offering (281). The tax was, in his view, a comparatively recent development; and he speculated that, for agriculturalists, the produce of the land rather than money, especially Tyrian money, was a more suitable offering for the Temple. See G. Theissen, "Lokal- und Sozialkolorit in der Geschichte von der syrophönikischen Frau (Mk 7 24–30)," *ZNW* 75 (1984) 202–225, on the antipathy of Galileans toward Tyre. See also, Horbury, "The Temple Tax," 281–282; and S. Mandell, "Who Paid the Temple Tax When The Jews Were Under Roman Rule?" *HTR* 77 (1984), 223–232, who contended that not all Jews willingly paid the tax.

[4] E. Schweizer, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975) 356. See also R. H. Mounce, *Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper & Row) 172.

[5] J. M. Allegro, "An Unpublished Fragment of Essene Halakah (4Q Ordinances)," *JSS* 6 (1961), 71–73. See J. M. Allegro and A. A. Anderson, DJD V (1968), 6–9; and corrections by J. Strugnell, "Notes en marge du volume V des 'Discoveries in the Judean Desert' " *RevQ* 7 (1970) 165, nn. 3–5; 175–179.

shekel dues applied to every Israelite upon reaching his twentieth birthday. Liver cogently argued that the relation of the half-shekel in the Pentateuch to an annual tax for the support of the temple was a development after the sect had sequestered itself from the community and that this text was an objection to that institution.[6] However one reconstructs the history of the temple half-shekel, it would seem to be clear that the Dead Sea sectarians interpreted the Scripture in such a way that they did not disobey it but did relieve themselves from the annual responsibility of temple dues. Vermes contended that this interpretation was a compromise solution to a dilemma:

> Having withdrawn from the the sanctuary of Jerusalem because of their condemnation of the existing form of Temple worship, and being obliged to choose therefore between faithfulness to their convictions and obedience to the written law, the sectaries adopted a peculiar exegesis and decided to follow the letter of the Bible and pay a single installment of ransom money.[7]

This exegesis is not so peculiar, however, when it is realized that Exodus 30:11–16, which was appealed to as the legal grounds for the tax, nowhere specifies the frequency of it; and the tendency of 4Q*I59* is to clear a biblical text of ambiguity but never to contradict it.[8]

Mishna *Šeqalim* 1:3–5 provides evidence that priests also considered themselves to be exempt from the half-shekel on the basis of Leviticus 6:16. Mishna 4 contains a debate in Yavneh between R. Judah, citing Ben Buchri, and R. Johanan b. Zakkai over the obligations of priests concerning the half-shekel. R. Judah is said to have argued that any priest who did not contribute did not commit any sin. The reasoning was based on Leviticus 6:23, "every meal offering of the priest shall be wholly burnt and not eaten" (the homer, two loaves, and showbread). These offerings, however, were provided from the shekel contributions. If the priests contributed to this fund, these offerings would have to be burnt and not eaten. But Scripture specifically requires that they be eaten (Lev 6:16); therefore, the priests apparently maintained they could not contribute to the fund. R. Johanan countered that the priests interpreted Leviticus 6:16 to their own benefit. The ruling is that the priests are liable;[9] the conclusion, however, is, "no pledges may be taken from the priests, for the sake of peace."

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[6] J. Liver, "The Half-Shekel Offering in Biblical and Post-Biblical Literature," *HTR* 66 (1963) 196–197. See also Horbury, "The Temple Tax," 277–279. Against this reconstruction, see N. J. McEleney, "MT 17:24–27—Who Paid the Temple Tax? A Lesson in Avoiding Scandal," *CBQ* 38 (1976) 180–181.

[7] G. Vermes, "The Qumran Interpretation of Scripture in its Historical Setting," *Post Biblical Jewish Studies* (Leiden: Brill, 1975) 42.

F. D. Weinert, "4Q*I59*: Legislation for an Essene Community Outside of Qumran?" *JJS* 5 (19?) 179–207, made a case for 4Q*I59* originating in a Diaspora community where Essene values were shared, and that it was later accepted at Qumran.

[8] See Ibid., 187.

[9] The exemption of the priests is challenged in *p. Šeqal.* 1:46a, 63. R. Leszynsky, *Die Sadduzäer* (Berlin: Mayer & Muller: 1912) 287, maintained that certain priests, probably Sadducees, declined to pay the tax because the half-shekel tax had no basis in the Torah. See also J. D. M. Derrett, "Peter's Penny: Fresh Light on Matthew xvii 24–27," *Law in the New Testament* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1970) 250–251.

Jesus could very well have been another conscientious objector; and scholars have come up with various explanations to penetrate his thinking on this issue. If one interprets the "sons" in the analogy to be the kings' physical sons or members of the royal household, and if one grants that Jesus was aware of his unique relationship with God as his Father, one would not find his rationale for not being required to pay the tax improbable. Kings[10] do not tax members of their immediate family,[11] and Jesus would be exempt from any tax imposed by God by virtue of his relationship to God.[12] If one interprets "the sons" in the analogy to refer to the kings' citizens whom they do not tax, and "the others" to refer to subject peoples who are required to pay tribute, then the point would be, since kings do not tax their own people but subjugated peoples, God does not require tribute from God's own people.[13] The citizens of a theocracy should not be required to pay taxes to God. If the latter is what Jesus had in mind, it would be an implicit protest against the temple, since there would be no one who would qualify to support it with half-shekel offerings.[14] Or, this account could be evidence that Jesus sided with a Sadducean position that the *tamid* should be funded by the free-will offerings of individuals over against the Pharisees' advocacy of the cost coming from the half-shekel fund to which all contributed.[15]

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[10] The phrase "kings of the earth" is found in the royal Psalms and refers to earthly rulers who stand in opposition to the king of heaven (Pss 2:2, 76:13 (12), 89:27 (28), 102:16 (15), 138:4, 148:11; see also Acts 4:26; Rev 1:5, 6:15; 17:2, 18; 18:3, 9; 19:19; 21:24). C. H. Dodd, *Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1963) 381, n. 4, observed: "The 'king of flesh and blood' is a stock character in the rabbinic parables designed to illustrate the dealings of God with men." See also A. Schlatter, *Der Evangelist Matthäus* (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1933) 540. It probably has that same connotation here and does not have some particular system of government in view. It is akin to the phrase, "rulers of the gentiles" that appears in Matt 20:25. The mention of kings of the earth would immediately bring to mind the heavenly king; and the analogy implies, if this is the case with earthly kings, then how much more so with the heavenly king.

[11] This assumption that kings and their entourage do not pay taxes to themselves is the basis for R. Johanan's parable in *b. Sukk.* 30a. The human king does what is highly unusual by paying the custom tax which belongs ultimately to him. He does this to set an example for all travelers in hopes that they will not try to evade their tax obligation. The sugya concerns invalid offerings; and the parable is intended to show that offerings presented to God that are stolen are invalid even though, technically, everything belongs to God and cannot be considered stolen.

[12] So A. Plummer, *An Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew* (London: Robert Scott, 1915) 245; F. Stagg, "Matthew," *The Broadman Bible Commentary* (Nashville: Broadman, 1969) 8:180.

[13] See W. C. Allen, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Matthew* (ICC; 3d ed.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1912) 191.

[14] C. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels* (London: Macmillan, 1927) 243, believed that this argument was "too wide" and that Jesus was thinking of himself and the disciples as the true sons of the kingdom and not all Jews.

[15] On this debate, see *b. Menah.* 65a. See further, L. Finkelstein, *The Pharisees* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938) 2:683; H. Montefiore, "Jesus and the Temple Tax," *NTS* 11 (1964) 68–71; and S. Légasse, "Jésus et l'impôt du Temple (Matthieu 17, 24–27)" *ScEs* 24 (1972) 376–377. The dominance of the Pharisees' position is reflected by Josephus *Ant.* 3:237.

In spite of Jesus' declaration of his freedom from the tax, he decided to submit to this Jewish custom so as not to offend "them." The "them" could be any number of groups. They could be disciples who had not yet been emancipated from Jewish legal scruples,[16] or others, who might learn of Jesus' non-compliance without being able to comprehend or accept the reasons behind it. They would be repelled by Jesus' apparent impiety and would then be unable to grasp the truth about Jesus.[17] Or, it may refer to religious rivals, such as the Pharisees, whom Jesus did not want to provide with further evidence to counteract his ministry. If this account is historically accurate, it is interesting, that Jesus' response was based on much the same principle that the rabbis endorsed in the reported dispute with the priests over the temple dues. They refrained from demanding payment "for the ways of peace" (מפני דרכי שלום, *m. Seqal.* 1:3).[18] Jesus refrained from withholding payment, for the ways of peace.

However plausible or implausible these explanations might be, they do not elucidate why Matthew alone chose to preserve the story or why he included it where he did. Therefore, it has been more widely held by scholars that the incident was created or conserved to speak to the special circumstances of the Evangelist and his audience than to report an event from the ministry of Jesus.[19] It is then assumed that the issue addressed has to do either with the question of the responsibilities of Jewish Christians regarding the half-shekel for the temple prior to its destruction, or with the problem presented after 70 C. E. by Rome's appropriation of the offerings as a war indemnity.[20] Whichever option

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[16] See H. B. Green, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1975) 158.

[17] Ibid. G. Stählin, *Skandalon: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte eines biblischen Begriffs* (BFCT 24; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1930) 249, contended that when the Jews who are true to the law hear of his stance toward the tax they would want to hear nothing more of him and his message. It would prevent them from believing in him. R. Banks, *Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition* (SNTSMS 28; Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1975) 92–94, believed that the issue is "Jesus' willingness or otherwise to observe a custom that is honoured by the majority of his fellow Jews" (94) and argued that since the questioners are not identified as scribes and Pharisees, they are not antagonists. Jesus' response reflects his unwillingness to offend those who were not necessarily antagonistic to his mission as distinguished from his determination to oppose those who, on legalistic grounds, were (see 15:12–14). This, Banks claimed, indicates that for Jesus it is not the practice involved "but the attitude of the people involved" which determines his reaction to them. McEleney, "MT 17:24–27," 186, offered that it could refer to those who would be offended by the messianic pretensions behind Jesus' refusal to pay. Mounce, *Matthew*, 172, thought that Jesus feared setting "a bad example for others." Derrett, "Peter's Penny," 256–258, interpreted σκανδαλίζειν to mean "cause to sin," and argued that Jesus sought to save the collectors from committing a sin by collecting the tax from someone who was exempt as one of God's dependents. This is, in Derrett's own words, an "extraordinary conclusion" (257).

[18] This principle urged rabbis to be lenient in spite of their scruples and appears elsewhere in *m. Git.* 5:8–9; *t. Git.* 3:14; *b. Git.* 59a–61a.

[19] See W. D. Davies, *The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1963) 390. E. Lohmeyer, *Das Evangelium des Matthäus* (MeyerK; 3d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962) 275, contended that the passage teaches through the exemplary word and deed of Jesus and answers a practical question of the community.

[20] Davies, *Setting*, 390.

is chosen, many have argued that Matthew included this account to provide precise moral guidance on the question of the payment of this tax. Davies reasoned that the first possibility best fits the emphasis on avoiding offense (to Jewry); the second, best fits the reference to the kings of the earth.[21]

II. The Situation of the Jewish Christian Church

The story could have had its origins in a debate of the Jewish Christian community about its present obligations to the temple.[22] One can imagine conservative Jewish Christians (such as James) having to reconcile their faith that Jesus had offered the atoning sacrifice for the forgiveness of sins (26:28) with their attachment to the temple. They believed themselves to be uniquely related to God through their relationship to Christ. They also may have believed that they were free from cultic restraints because of that relationship. It is possible that this freedom had to be moderated by the consideration that they were surrounded by Jews who were becoming increasingly suspicious and hostile. The story confirms the freedom of Christians from the half-shekel requirement, but urges compliance as a policy to keep from causing offense to unbelieving Jews.[23] On the one hand, failure to pay the dues would have been the final proof to unsympathetic Jews that the Christians were apostates and had decided to withdraw completely from the community.[24] On the other hand, payment of the tax would have enabled them to remain within the Jewish religious community and would also have helped to avoid conflict and persecution.[25] Grundmann suggested that the account therefore had an example character

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[21] Ibid.

[22] So Allen, *Matthew,* 191; B. W. Bacon, *Studies in Matthew* (New York: Henry Holt, 1930) 228; R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) 34–35; K. F. Nickle, *The Collection* (SBT 48, Naperville: Alec R. Allenson, 1966) 96; W. Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus* (HKNT 1; 5th ed.; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1981) 409–410; M. D. Goulder, *Midrash and Lection in Matthew* (London: SPCK, 1974) 396; Schweizer, *Matthew* 356; and Beare, *Matthew,* 371.

[23] Schweizer, *Matthew,* 355–357, commented that the point of the incident "combines the fundamental liberty of the community of Jesus with a readiness to follow the prevailing norms of Jewish law in externals like payment of the Temple tax." It emphasizes "the total and fundamental freedom of the Christian community from the Jewish Temple community while maintaining the principle that one must not offend one's Jewish contemporaries in matters that are not central to the faith." He compared this to the prayer that they not have to flee on the Sabbath (24:20; compare Mark 13:18).

[24] A. Schlatter, *Matthäus,* 541, asserted that the renunciation of the temple was for every Jew the final proof of godlessness. Refusal to pay the half-shekel tax would be equivalent to deliberate withdrawal from the religious community of Judaism. See Beare, *Matthew,* 371–372.

[25] G. Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963) 92, commented on 24:20 that the concern about flight on the Sabbath has more to do with fear of the dangers from hate-charged Jews than with fear of sin. He cited E. Hirsch, *Die Frühgeschichte des Evangeliums* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1941) 2:313, who, as an ardent Nazi, ironically wrote: "A Christian congregation fleeing on the Sabbath would have been as recognizable in Palestine as a spotted dog." Barth suggested that the desire to pay the temple tax to give no offense may have been attributable to a similar fear of conspicuousness.

for how the community of Christ should relate to the Jewish synagogue.[26] And it is possible that this attitude reflects the quietistic community, envisioned by Farmer, that strove to preserve a sense of solidarity within the group over against the world which, though hostile to the group, cannot fault its good works, or, we might add, its Jewishness.[27] The church is then instructed not to cause unnecessary friction over such inessentials as the temple dues and that it "must deal kindly with the orthodox Jewish world, and have patience with it,"[28] not because of a required loyalty to the temple and the law but because of loyalty to a higher principle of not causing offense to others. This approach may also have been motivated, as Hummel insisted, by a concern that a refusal to pay the tax would finally close the door to any further mission among the Jews.[29]

Some have drawn conclusions about the date and setting of Matthew by assuming that the pericope mirrors the situation of the community. Gundry argued from this incident that Matthew "must be writing before A. D. 70."[30] Bornkamm did not date the gospel this early but did insist in one of his first essays on the gospel that this pericope unmistakably supported Matthew's understanding of the church as clearly conscious of its own special position but as still attached to Judaism because they do not claim any exemption from the temple tax.[31] According to this view, the passage reflects a struggle within its own walls—a struggle of those on the edge of heresy to maintain some semblance of status within Judaism.

If this passage has in view the temple dues, it must have originated sometime prior to the destruction of Jerusalem. But if one believes that Matthew was composed after that catastrophe, to what would this pericope apply? The rabbis themselves asserted that the laws concerning the shekel dues were valid only while the temple stands (*m. Seqal.* 8:7). And where would Gentile Christians—assuming that any had become a part of the church—stand in this debate since their contributions would not have been acceptable? Many scholars, while conceding that the story probably evolved while the temple was still functioning, have postulated that it must have been preserved by Matthew to answer a quite different question from that of paying dues to support the temple in Jerusalem.

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[26] Grundmann, *Matthäus,* 409.

[27] W. Farmer, "Matthew and the Sermon on the Mount," *SBLASP* 25 (1986) 66.

[28] Derrett, "Peter's Penny," 261.

[29] R. Hummel, *Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kirche und Judentum im Matthäusevangelium* (BEvT 33; Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1963) 105; see also D. R. A. Hare, *The Theme of Jewish Persecution of Christians in the Gospel According to Matthew* (SNTSMS 6; Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1967) 142; Légasse, "Jésus et l'impôt," 372; and Gundry, *Matthew,* 356–357, who maintained that Matthew wanted to portray Peter as a paradigm of obedient discipleship in paying the temple tax in order that Jewish Christians might not cause unbelieving Jews to reject the gospel.

[30] R. H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1982) 357.

[31] G. Bornkamm, "End-Expectation and Church in Matthew," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963) 19–20, but his view changes in "Die Binde- und Lösegewalt in der Kirche des Matthäus," *Geschichte und Glaube* (BEvT 53; Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1971) 2:37–50. In this article, the community is cut off from the the Jewish community; and the key passage is 18:19–20 where the community is gathered around Jesus, not the Torah.

III. The Tax to the *fiscus Iudaicus*

As a token of the subjection of Israel's God to Rome after the failed revolt, payment of the temple half-shekel was diverted by the Emperor Vespasian to the coffers of the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol.[32] This was in addition to all existing taxes (such as the *tributum capitis* and any duties), and it served to humiliate the Jews further by forcing them to send what was formerly considered sacred money[33] to the principle, idolatrous sanctuary of the enemy, where victorious Roman generals returned in ostentatious triumph. A treasury board, the *fiscus Iudaicus*, was set up to administer collection of the tax.[34] The tax itself was identified as simply the δίδραχμον[35] or as the τιμὴ δηνάριον δύο Ἰουδαίων[36] or Ἰουδαικὸν τέλεσμα.[37]

Prior to the fall of Jerusalem, those who were considered obligated to pay the temple half-shekel were males, ages 20–50. These contributions were voluntary and were sent out of a sense of piety. Under Vespasian the tax was now compulsory. The age limit appears to have been extended to ages 3 to 62; and women[38] and slaves were also assessed, the tax for slaves being paid by their masters.[39] Smallwood observed that this not only presented an economic burden, particularly for the large family; but, "to Jews of all social and economic levels it will have formed a psychological burden, marking them out as members of a defeated race punished for their nationality."[40] Tcherikover likened it to the " 'yellow spot' on Jews' clothes in the Middle ages; it marked the Jews as a dangerous and

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[32] Josephus *J.W.* 7:218. Although the tax primarily served to reinforce the subjugation of the Jews, it was also happy timing for the Romans since the proceeds were used to rebuild the temple of Jupiter which had burned during street fighting in December 69 C.E. M. S. Ginsberg, "Fiscus Iudaicus," *JQR* 21 (1930–31) 285–286, postulated that after the war Vespasian preferred to conserve the privileges of the Jews than eliminate Judaism and used this tax to increase revenue for a depleted treasury, but S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York: Columbia Univ., 1952) II: 106, proposed that it also served to quieten the restless tribes on the Rhine and the Loire who had seen the destruction of the supreme sanctuary as an omen of Rome's impending demise (see Tacitus *Ann.* 4.54). See also S. L. Wallace, *Taxation in Egypt: From Augustus to Diocletian* (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1938) 172–174.

[33] See Philo *Heres* 186, τὸ δίδραχμον τὸ ἅγιον; and Josephus *Ant.* 16:166, χρήματα ἱερα.

[34] Ginsberg, "Fiscus," 286–287 and E. M. Smallwood, *The Jews Under Roman Rule* (SJLA 20; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976) 375, compared it to the *fiscus Asiaticus* and the *fiscus Alexandrinus*. See also Rostowzew, "*Fiscus*," PW 6/2. 2402–04; and I. A. F. Bruce, "Nerva and the *Fiscus Iudaicus*," *PEQ* 96 (1964) 35. Mandell, "The Temple Tax," 228, however, argued that the *fiscus Iudaicus* simply refers to the bureau that collected the variety of taxes placed on the Jews and should not be identified only with the specific temple tax.

[35] Josephus, *Ant.* 18:312; Suetonius, *Dom.* 12.2; Dio Cassius, *Hist.* 66.7.2; see also Origen, *Epist ad Afric.* 20 (14).

[36] *CPJ* II. nos. 160–168, 170–182, 183a–188.

[37] *CPJ* II. nos. 181, 183, 189–214, 216–230, 421; III. no. 460. See the discussion in Tcherikover, 112–113; and M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1980) 2:129.

[38] On the liability of women, see *CPJ* II, 168, 169, 171, 218, 223, 421.

[39] See Wallace, *Taxation*, 171–172.

[40] Smallwood, *Roman Rule*, 374; see also "Domitian's Attitude Toward the Jews and Judaism," *Classical Philology* 51 (1956) 2–3.

seditious people."[41] No doubt it also vexed the pious to know that they were contributing to idolatry.

The question that requires our attention is, whom did the Romans consider obligated to pay the tax? Josephus says that it was imposed on "all Jews wherever they resided" (*J.W.* 7:218). This would mean, as most scholars have assumed, that it included all Diaspora Jews even though they were not involved in the revolt.[42] Dio Cassius (*Epit.* 66, 7, 2), however, states that the tax was imposed on the Jews who "continued to observe their ancestral customs" (τὰ πατρια αὐτῶν ἔθη), that is, practicing Jews. This could be taken to imply that non-practicing Jews were exempt. Smallwood explained the apparent discrepancy between Josephus and Dio Cassius by claiming, "Josephus implicitly excludes apostates by his reference to the former Temple tax, which such people will surely have ceased to pay as a sign of their dissociation from Judaism."[43] She assumed that for Josephus "all Jews everywhere" meant all practicing Jews, not simply those of Jewish stock. The tax was compulsory only for those Jews who wished to continue to practice their religion, and these needed to register with the proper authorities.[44] Mandell argued that the primary data do not support the assumption that all Jews were required to pay the tax because they were Jews.[45] No evidence suggests, for example, that Samaritans or Jewish Christians were liable. She believed that it was a religious tax imposed on those "deemed responsible for the revolt," and that it was not a national or race tax. She contended that it was levied only on one sect of Jews, what she called the Pharisaic Rabbinic, who followed the paternal customs and lived a Jewish life.[46] The surviving evidence of tax receipts from Egypt does not tell against this conclusion;[47] those who paid the tax there could be identified as those who wished to continue their practice of Judaism. The ready assumption that Jewish Christians, let alone Christians, were also liable to this tax from its inception because they were Jewish or Jewish-like must therefore be questioned.

Evidence for the reign of Domitian is limited, but it does suggest that he engineered greater severity in the administration of the tax on the Jews. Suetonius recalls the strict enforcement of the tax and an incident of suspected tax evasion:

> Besides other taxes, that on the Jews was levied with the utmost rigour, and those prosecuted who without publicly acknowledging that faith yet lived as Jews as well as those who concealed their origin and did not pay the tribute

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[41] *CPJ* 1:81; see also A Carlebach, "Rabbinic References to Fiscus Iudaicus," *JQR* 66 (1975–76) 61.

[42] Ginsberg, "Fiscus," 285, maintained that the tax was paid annually by the Jews in all parts of the empire "for the right to practice their religion."

[43] Smallwood, *Roman Rule*, 371. Mandell, "The Temple Tax," 224, n. 6, maintained that ὄντες Ἰουδαίοι in *J.W.* 7:218 means "to live as a Jew."

[44] P. Keresztes, "The Jews, the Christians, and Emperor Domitian," *Vigillae Christianae* 27 (1973) 3. He declared that the privileged *gens Iudaeorum* ceased to exist with the destruction of Jerusalem, and Judaism then became a *religio licita*. See Tertullian *Apol.* 18.8.

[45] S. Mandell, "The Temple Tax," 223–232. See also, Keresztes, "The Jews," 3.

[46] Mandell, "The Temple Tax," 232.

[47] Mandell, "The Temple Tax," 224–225, challenged the identification of the Edfu *Ostraka* and the Arsinoe Papyrus with the *didrachmon* because the amounts on the receipts differ from one another. These discrepancies, however, have been explained by Wallace, *Taxation*, 170–171, whom she did not cite.

> levied on the people. I recall being present in my youth when the person of a man of ninety was examined to see whether he was circumcised (*Dom.* 12.2).

One can infer from this that Suetonius believed all Jews to be liable to the tax and that those suspected of trying to conceal their faith (*inprofessi Iudaicum viverant vitam*) or their Jewishness (*dissimilata origene imposita genti tributa non pependissent*), betokened by their circumcision, were mercilessly interrogated. The latter could include apostate Jews, Gentile proselytes and Jewish Christians. It is probable, then, that Domitian, in the interest of replenishing a depleted treasury (see Suetonius *Dom.* 12.1), extended liability to the tax to all Jews whether they practiced the religion of the fathers or not.[48]

The coin legend on *sestertii* minted during the reign of Nerva, *FISCI IVDAICI CALVMNIA SVBLATA S.C.*, surrounding a date palm, a symbol of Judea,[49] is another problematic piece of the tax's tangled history; but it sheds more light on the situation under Domitian. The best explanation of the legend is that it proclaims an end to the kind of abuse hinted at by Suetonius that occurred in Domitian's reign. It certainly does not proclaim an end to the tax,[50] nor does it refer to the degrading procedures connected with the collection of the tax. And one would hardly expect the minting of a coin to celebrate the relief of a minority that was widely despised.[51] Dio Cassius reports that when Nerva became emperor he forbade accusations against others of ἀσέβεια (lack of respect for the gods, including the emperor) and for adopting a Jewish mode of life, and many former informers were condemned to death (*Epit.* 68.1.2). The *calumnia* probably pertains to the terroristic denunciations of people to the office of the *fiscus Iudaicus*. *Calumnia* means wrongful accusation or perversion of justice.[52] The victims of these denunciations would not be Jews, who would not be wrongfully accused of being Jews and who were quite safe when they had paid the tax, but those who were quite unattached to Judaism and were falsely accused by enemies.[53] Since coins were used for propaganda

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[48] See Smallwood, "Domitian Attitude," 4; and Keresztes, "The Jews," 3–7. C. Hemer, "The Edfu *Ostraka* and the Jewish Tax," *PEQ* 105 (1973) 11, allowed it as a possibility but recognized that the evidence is inconclusive.

[49] H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham (ed.) *The Roman Imperial Coinage* (London: Spink and Son, 1962) 2:227–228, (Nerva nos. 58, 72, 82).

[50] G. D. Kilpatrick, *The Origins of the Gospel According to St. Matthew* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946) 42, wrongly claimed (so also Beare, *Matthew*, 373) that the tax was abolished by Nerva and that it must have been obsolete because the rabbis at the beginning of the second century were confused about the details. The tax was still in existence later on as evidenced by the document at Karanis from the reign of Trajan (*CPJ* no. 460). See also Tertullian *Apol.* 18.8; Origen *Epist. ad Afric.* 20 (14); and the assessments of Bruce, "Nerva," 41; Hemer, "Edfu," 10–11; and E. Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ*, rev. and ed. by G. Vermes, et. al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986), 3/1:123 n. 67. Ginsberg, "Fiscus," 290–291, argued for the possibility that the tax was finally abolished by Julian (see *Epist.* 486a), but the evidence does not warrant any conclusion about when the tax ended.

[51] Hemer, "Edfu," 6.

[52] P. G. W. Glare (ed.), *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982) 261; and Schürer, *History*, 3/1:123 n. 67.

[53] Hemer, "Edfu," 11, emphasized the literal force of *calumnia* and linked it with the activities of the *delatores* in the later years of Domitian. He wrote:

> When payment of the Jewish tax constituted a *de facto* licence to practice

purposes like stamps are today, Nerva probably minted the coins as part of a public relations campaign to evoke popular applause and to contrast his more enlightened reign with the terrors associated with Domitian.[54] One no longer needed to fear accusations of being a tax evading Jew guilty of *maiestas* or the sycophancy associated with these indictments.

It is difficult to argue convincingly that this pericope was originally composed to meet the situation of Christians now required to pay the tax to Rome. Surely it was not. As Hummel has pointed out, Jesus' response in v 25 appears to give a religious basis for the freedom of the sons from the tax.[55] He understood it to mean that because of the disciples' special relationship to the king as sons they are exempt from the king's taxes. This would only be applicable to the disciples if the king is presumed to be God; and this would only be pertinent to the issue of taxes if it were speaking of some religious tax such as the one intended for the support of the temple. It hardly applies to the later situation of the church when the tax was directed to Rome. In that situation, it is an anachronism.[56] Second, the Romans would be something more than scandalized by a refusal to pay the assessment. And it is hard to imagine how Jews would be scandalized by this failure to pay a tax to Rome by those who were probably already judged to be apostates.

Montefiore thought that he could trace the origin of this incident to a controversy in Jesus' life between the Pharisees and Sadducees about the tax, but held that Matthew used this inherited tradition to advise Christians to pay the tax to the *fiscus Iudaicus* to avoid creating a scandal with the Roman authorities.[57] Beare, on the other hand, argued that

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> Judaism, a religion exempted from the imperial cult, and when also Domitian was enforcing emperor worship as a test of loyalty, an irregular association with Judaism could have been construed as treasonable "atheism."
>
> Christians and Gentile adherents of Judaism may have been the prime victims. But when the *delatores* were unleashed no man was safe.

He suggested that the coin-legend of Nerva has the emotional connotation of the *delator* in mind and argued that the Jewish tax was convenient grounds for bringing charges against anyone. If one was charged with living a Jewish life *inprofessi*, it would be difficult to disprove. Therefore, Hemer contended that the victims of the *delatio* were Gentiles who did not pay the Jewish tax but were accused of Jewish affiliations: "The charge might be unfounded slander, or primarily directed at those whose claims to be regarded as Jews were disputable or legally ambiguous." If this is correct, Christians would have been ready targets for denunciation of treasonable tax evasion. See also Smallwood, "Domitian's Attitude," 4–5; and Kerestzes, "The Jews," 5–7.

For the many other conjectures to explain the legend, see Bruce, "Nerva," 41–45.

[54] See Bruce, "Nerva," 45; and P. Richardson and M. B. Shukster, "Barnabas, Nerva, and the Yavnean Rabbis," *JTS* 34 (1983) 44.

[55] Hummel, *Die Auseinandersetzung,* 103–104.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Montefiore, "Jesus and the Temple Tax," 60–71. He expressed the opinion that the pericope about the tribute money did not provide sufficient guidance since "it was a secular, not a religious obligation; and it was binding on all non-Romans without exception." According to Montefiore's reconstruction, the Jewish Christians had "the worst of both worlds." They were not regarded as members of the *religio licita* of Judaism and so could not enjoy the privileges that they were afforded. On the other hand, they were not exempted from the tax levied on all Jews (64). Jesus sets the example: they must pay

the passage is a vestige of an earlier debate in the church which resolved that Jewish Christians would continue to pay the temple tax; it was now used by Matthew to answer the question whether Jewish Christians would accept the obligation laid upon all other Jews to pay this tax for the Roman cult.[58] Davies suggested that the Romans are in view in 17:24–27, because it follows immediately after the passion prediction in 17:22–23. In the other passion predictions in Matthew, the elders, chief priests, and scribes are specifically mentioned (16:21, 20:17–19). In 17:22–23, however, Jesus says that he will be betrayed into "the hands of men" who will kill him; and this, Davies believed, refers to the Romans. He then reasoned that this would have led to the question, what attitude should the Christian have toward Rome? The account in 17:24–27 gives the answer that though Christians are not legitimately obligated to pay, they are to comply to prevent scandal with the Romans.[59]

The investigation of the history of the Roman appropriation of the temple dues makes it unwise to conclude that Jewish or Gentile Christians were liable from the beginning since the evidence indicates that those who were considered obligated to pay were those who wished to continue to observe the customs of the fathers—to practice Judaism. This would not have included Christians. The outbreak of violence against Christians in Rome in 64 C.E. indicates that the Romans were quite able to differentiate Christians from Jews, because the Jews were not targets of the persecution. If this passage were intended to provide guidance to Christians regarding the tax to the *fiscus Iudaicus*, it must be set in the time of Domitian's rigorous administration of the tax when Christians may have been subject to false accusations of tax evasion. But no indications exist elsewhere in Matthew's gospel that the Evangelist is particularly concerned about relations of Christians with the Roman government. Therefore, the Roman appropriation of the temple tax does not appear to be the backdrop for understanding why this pericope was included in the gospel.

IV. Taxes in General

Cassidy contended that the tax collectors in the story were taking up a civil tax of two drachmae that has been confused with the temple half-shekel because both were pegged at the same value.[60] According to Cassidy, the question put to Peter raises the volatile issue of civil taxes owed to Rome, which resurfaces in 22:15–22 (Mark 12:13–17; Luke 20:20–26). He argued that Jesus' statement about kings of the earth and their subjects

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the tax to the Roman authorities not because they were legally bound to pay but to avoid the scandal which might be caused by refusal (65). See also R. Eisler, *Orpheus—The Fisher* (London: J. M. Watkins, 1921) 95–100; McNeile, *Matthew*, 257–258; and Bacon, *Studies*, 228.

[58] Beare, *Matthew*, 373. Beare claimed that this is "undoubtedly" the case, but one cannot say this without providing some evidence. "Undoubtedly" really means here presumably. There is no evidence that this question arose for Jewish Christians except that this text is interpreted to reflect that debate; it is a circular argument.

P. Perkins, "Taxes in the New Testament," *JRE* 12 (1984) 189, suggested that the question addressed is, how far Christians should become implicated in the plight of the fellow Jews. Payment of the tax by Christians would be a gesture of solidarity with the Jews.

[59] Davies, *Setting*, 391.

[60] R. J. Cassidy, "Matthew 17:24–27—A Word on Civil Taxes," *CBQ* 41 (1979) 574.

delineates a principle concerning civil taxation that has nothing to do with the issue of paying the voluntary religious pledge to the temple. His argument is based on the fact that the analogy employs terms for civil taxes. Κῆνσος is a Latin loan word that refers to Roman taxes based on the provincial census (22:17, 19), and τέλος refers to customs and duties (Rom. 13:7).[61] Interpreting σκανδαλίζειν to mean "to mislead," Cassidy claimed that the point for Jesus was that he did not wish to mislead the larger community into thinking that he was a Zealot because his view of taxes was similar to these agitators.[62] Therefore, he paid his taxes.

Walker took a similar tack but concluded that the pericope represents the church's concern about paying taxes. Christians asked about their duty to pay taxes to the Roman state, and this story provided one answer. They were free, but they would pay taxes on missionary grounds. They were not to scandalize the powers that be. For Walker, the "them" refers to the kings of the earth and not the tax collectors or Jesus' contemporaries.[63]

While many church fathers understood the passage to contain instruction about the Christian's duty to the state,[64] it is questionable that this was the intent either of Jesus or Matthew. First, because an analogy is used from the civil world of kings does not mean that the issue revolves around civil taxes. Second, if this did refer to Roman tax collectors, could they be realistically portrayed as politely asking if someone paid an obligatory tax and being satisfied with an affirmative answer rather than payment? This hardly accords with the record of threatening and extortion that is reported about the collection of taxes.[65] The situation as it is presented best fits the voluntary nature of the temple half-shekel that could not be forced except by moral suasion and fear of shame. Third, the δίδραχμον equals the temple assessment and goes by that name (Exod 30:13, A has δίδραχμα; Neh 10:32–33, Josephus *Ant.* 18:312).[66] What civil tax can be so readily identified?[67] Fourth, the tax collectors refer to Jesus as "your teacher" which is the typical

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[61] Ibid., 572–573; see also A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament* (Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1963) 126.

[62] Ibid., 576, n. 19. See also D. Hill, *The Gospel of Matthew* (London: Oliphants, 1972), 272.

[63] R. Walker, *Die Heilsgeschichte im ersten Evangelium* (FRLANT 91; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967) 102–103.

[64] See the helpful discussion of the exegesis of this passage by the Greek church fathers in E. Wilhelms, *Die Tempelsteuerperikope Matthäus 17,24–27 in der Exegese der griechischen Väter der Alten Kirche* (SFEG 34; Helsinki: Finnische Exegetische Gesellschaft, 1980).

[65] See Philo *Spec. Leg.* 2:93–95 and Luke 3:12–15.

[66] One would expect the singular, δίδραχμον, in v 24 rather than the plural, δίδραχμα. Several explanations have been offered. Some have said that the tax collectors are not asking for the amount but whether or not Jesus pays the taxes. The plural refers to the tax due every year. So McNeile, *Matthew,* 258; and E. Klostermann, *Das Matthäusevangelium* (HKNT 4; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1927) 146. M. Black, "ΕΦΦΑΘΑ (Mk 7.34), [ΤΑ] ΠΑΣΧΑ (Mt. 26.18W), [ΤΑ] ΣΑΒΒΑΤΑ (passim), [ΤΑ] ΔΙΔΡΑΧΜΑ (Mt 17.24 bis). *Mélanges bibliques en hommage au R. P. Béda Rigaux.* (ed. A. Descamps and A. de Halleux; Gembloux: Duculot, 1970) 61–62, suggested that the plural is possibly an Aramaised form of δίδραχμον that is a "false plural" in the same way that σάββατα is an Aramaised form of σάββατον.

[67] The examples listed by Cassidy, "Matthew 17:24–27," 578–579, are designated by names and not by the amount assessed. Two drachmae may be a plausible amount for a civil tax, but Cassidy cannot identify what that tax might be. The text implies, however, that the tax involved is readily identifiable by its amount.

designation applied to him by the Jewish leaders in the gospel.[68] Fifth, as Thompson observed, the half-shekel for the temple had rich religious associations for the Jews; and it would seem highly unlikely that this symbolism was suppressed in the service of a purely political question.[69] The issue of tribute to Caesar is addressed later in the gospel and quite unambiguously. Finally, the statement, "the sons are free," would hardly be applicable to the question of civil tribute. Christians did not claim a special bond with the kings of the earth, how could they consider themselves exempt from their taxes? They did understand themselves to be specially related to God, and their accompanying freedom would only be relevant in the case of some religious tax. While one could extract from this story a lesson about civil taxes, as the church fathers regularly did, this was neither its meaning in the ministry of Jesus nor how Matthew understood it in his gospel.

V. The *Aurum Coronarium*

Some scholars have argued that Matthew intended to apply the story to a situation when R. Johanan b. Zakkai established a new central authority for the Jews in Yavneh. Here the study of the law replaced the temple cult. Support for this new enterprise came from voluntary contributions. Later, the so-called *aurum coronarium* was instituted, which was assumed by Thompson to be a legal tax with imperial sanction. Thompson asserted that it was "the true successor to the defunct half-shekel tax."[70] He claimed that Matthew inserted this pericope into his gospel because Jewish members of the community were concerned about their relation to Yavneh:

> Such a contribution continued to symbolize solidarity with Judaism and submission to the observances of the law. Therefore, the Jewish Christians wondered whether they should support this new religious institution.[71]

The story advises Jewish Christians to contribute to the High Council to avoid offending their fellow Jews.

The major problem with this hypothesis is that it has no basis whatever in any primary data. Thompson cited only secondary references; and his main source, Juster, appealed to Codex Theodotianus (Theodotius II), which hardly comprises evidence for a practice in the first century.[72] Hagner's comment concerning Yavneh bears repeating: "Our knowledge of what took place at Yavneh is tenuous at best";[73] and Goodman has shown that it took some time before the rabbis became as formidable an institution as imagined by some New Testament interpreters.[74] Also, what evidence we have for contributions to the rabbis indicates that the amount was not fixed; and generous donors were given seats

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[68] A. G. van Aarde, A. G. "Matthew's Portrayal of the Disciples and the Structure of Matthew 13:53–17:27," *Neotestementica* 16 (1982) 30; see Matt. 8:19; 12:38; 19:16, 22; 22:16, 23–24, 36.

[69] W. G. Thompson, *Matthew's Advice to a Divided Community* (AnBib 44; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970) 67.

[70] Ibid. 68. See also Banks, *Jesus and the Law*, 93.

[71] Ibid.

[72] See J. Juster, *Les Juifs dans l'empire Romain* (Paris: Geuthner, 1914) 1:385–388.

[73] D. A. Hagner, "The *Sitz im Leben* of the Gospel of Matthew," SBLASP (1985) 251.

[74] M. Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee A. D. 132–212* (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983).

of honor.[75] This contrasts with the temple half-shekel which was a set fee for rich and poor alike. Therefore, this theory should be discarded as having little or no evidence to support it.

VI. A Theological Object Lesson

Scholars can usually find their presuppositions about the *Sitz im Leben* of Matthew confirmed by what they think this passage is saying about taxes. In my opinion, however, the tax issue is a red herring that has caused them to misread Matthew's understanding of this story. Therefore, I agree with Frankemölle who argued that the passage no longer has anything to do with the problem of paying the tax but is intent on a *theologische Aussage.*[76] The passage bears all the marks of Matthean composition,[77] and its similarities with 18:1–20 suggest that the Evangelist has woven together the second prediction of the passion, the question about the *didrachma* and the issue about greatness and not causing offense.[78] The answer to why this was done is to be found from the context of the passage in the gospel and not from an imagined context in which Matthew wrote.

Avoiding scandal

The primary reason that Matthew included this incident and at this point was to furnish a lesson about relinquishing one's rights to live harmoniously with others and also to avoid offending and perhaps harming them. Jesus decided for payment of the *didrachmon* not because he was bound to do so by the law nor because of fear of recriminations from the authorities, but to avoid causing offense. This response then becomes a concrete example of surrendering one's rights out of a loving concern for the interest of others (whoever they may be) and prepares for the emphasis in ch 18 on disinterested concern for the neighbor and the spirit of forgiveness that are to be the hallmarks of the community.[79] The stern warning against causing one of these little ones who believe in me to stumble (18:6) reveals that the principle of not causing offense concerns insiders as well as outsiders.

That this is the central emphasis of the text was confirmed by Patte's structural reading

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[75] H. Mantel, *Studies in the History of the Sanhedrin* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 1961) 197–198.

[76] H. Frankemölle, *Jahwebund und Kirche Christi* (NTAbh 10; Münster: Aschendorff, 1974) 176. See also G. Strecker, *Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit* (2d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966) 31 n. 1; S. Schulz, *Die Stunde der Botschaft* (Hamburg: Furche, 1966) 161.

[77] See C. F. D. Moule, *Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1968; Plummer, *Matthew, 248; Kilpatrick, Matthew,* 41; Strecker, *Der Weg,* 200–201; Goulder, *Midrash and Lection,* 397; and Gundry, *Matthew,* 355–357. On the textual variants, see J. C. Margot, "Les problèmes posés par la traduction de Matthieu 17.24–27," *Traduire sans trahir: la theorie de la traduction et son application aux textes bibliques* (Lausanne: Age d'homme, 1979) 168–169.

[78] Thompson, *Matthew's Advice,* 85–87; Meier, *Matthew,* 196, saw it as a bridge to the discourse on church life.

[79] J. D. Kingsbury, *Matthew* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977) 51–52. See also J. C. Fenton, *Saint Matthew* (London: Penguin, 1963), who considered it to be illustrating the teaching of not causing offense that is to be developed in the following discourse. G. Barth, "Matthew's Understanding," 85, n. 1, considered it an enactment of the love command.

of the passage.[80] He pointed out how the the reader is constantly misdirected and thrown off guard in the text. Jesus' question, "What do you think?" misleads the reader into thinking that Peter's perception of the matter needed to be corrected (as was the case in 16:22–23, 17:4); and the analogy, which asserts that the sons are free, seems to confirm this impression—they are not obligated to pay. But it turns out that Peter was not wrong; Jesus will pay the tax. This tension, Patte noted, "underscores the reason for paying this tax."[81] Jesus pays but does not pay because he is obliged to do so or because it is customary to do so but in order not to scandalize them.

The rationale for paying is also in tension with the reader's expectations. Jesus' has consistently ruffled religious feathers. His teaching caused Nazareth to be scandalized, but he responded to this almost indifferently with a pronouncement that a prophet is without honor in his own country (13:57). In 15:1–2, the Pharisees censure the disciples because they violated the traditions of the fathers by eating with unwashed hands. In 15:12, the disciples report that the Pharisees were scandalized by Jesus' parabolic response to their objections. Jesus sweeps aside their agitation with a further attack against these Jewish leaders as plants that will eventually be rooted up and as blind guides (15:13–14). If he did not fret about scandalizing them by his teaching then, and if he pronounced blessed those who are not scandalized by his unorthodox ministry (11:6), why does he now shrink from causing offense—to these Jewish tax collectors or any one else who might take umbrage by his stance on this matter?[82] It is possible that this inconsistency requires one to make a distinction between issues that are crucial and those that are not. In this case, the question about the temple half-shekel would not be considered so vital as to allow it to create ill will.[83] Patte proposed, however, that the readers should be puzzled by all this; and Jesus' answer "begs for an explanation."[84] The explanation centers on the necessity of denying one's own rights and submitting to others and is developed in ch 18. The sons may be free, but they are not free from the claims of love.[85] Chapter 18 will also deal with the question of what are the limits of such an attitude and will show that there are none. The section begins in 17:24–27 with a dialogue between Peter and Jesus and an example from the world of kings and ends with a dialogue between Peter and Jesus and an example from the world of kings (18:21–35). As does 18:21–35, 17:24–27 provides an illustration of how the sons are to conduct their lives. In 18:21–35, they are to be forgiving; in 17:24–27, they are to be those who make for peace (5:9).[86]

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[80] D. Patte, *The Gospel according to Matthew* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 246–247. He commented that the text plays with the readers' expectations, misleading them into thinking that there are oppositions only to show that these are not actual oppositions (258, n. 4).

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] R. A. Edwards, *Matthew's Story of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 64.

[84] Patte, *Matthew*, 247. Schlatter, *Matthäus*, 541, noted this contradiction and explained that 17:26 differs from 15:12 because the latter has to do with a false understanding of purity. Jesus honored the temple, however, along with the requirement of temple dues and never wrangled over money matters.

[85] Meier, *Matthew*, 197. Stählin, "σκανδαλίζω," *TDNT* 7:351, commented that one must be able to forego one's own freedom and privileges to guard against causing unbelief in others (see 1 Cor 9:19–20). But this principle applies to more situations than simply forestalling another's unbelief.

[86] Horbury, *The Temple Tax*, 266, observed that this resembles injunctions on secular

Jesus as the Son

I would argue more tentatively that the text also reflects theological suppositions of the Evangelist that can be corroborated by the fact that they emerge elsewhere in the gospel. The first involves the analogy about the sons. Matthew certainly understood Jesus to be the son of God. Jesus has been declared by God to be the beloved son at the baptism (3:17); and this has just been reiterated in the hearing of the disciples at the transfiguration (17:5). He is recognized as God's son by Satan (4:3, 6) and the demons (8:29). Jesus also knows himself to be God's son (11:27, 13:37), and frequently refers to God as "my Father."[87] His sonship is confirmed by his acceptance of his Father's will that he must die (17:22–23, 26:39). The fact that Jesus is God's son is beginning to dawn on the disciples as well (14:33, 16:16), although they do not fully understand the implications of this in relation to his death. It will become apparent to the temple hierarchy that Jesus claims to be God's son with the parable of the wicked tenants (21:33–46);[88] and this, along with his threat against the temple, will be at issue in the trial before the Sanhedrin (26:61–63). It will also resurface in the taunts of the high priests during the crucifixion (27:43). At his death, the centurion confesses that this was truly God's son (27:54); and the gospel closes with the command to baptize in the name of the son (28:19).

It would have been clear to Matthew that as God's son, Jesus should never have been obligated to pay a tax imposed by his Father. The question about the temple tax therefore provided another opportunity for Matthew to unfold the sonship theme. Jesus is not required to pay dues to God's temple because he is God's son, and sons, as everyone would surmise, do not pay taxes to their fathers. Through the analogy, Jesus lays claim to a status for which no Israelite qualified. He presumes to be above the law concerning the temple half-shekel which affirmed the equality of all Jews in their obligation to pay: "The rich shall not give more and the poor shall not give less than half a shekel" (Exod 30:15). Jesus' claim to exemption from this tax is not based on some exegetical loophole but on the implicit assertion that he is not an equal to other Israelites.

To my mind, this christological interest best explains the fish story attached to this incident. It has prompted all kinds of exegetical *Kunststücke* to solve everything from how a fish could take the bait with a stater in its mouth to why Jesus solved his cash flow problems in such a manner.[89] Other questions arise: What about the payment for the other disciples? Why is the miracle not actually reported? How could this miraculous expedient possibly give direction to the way Matthew's community should solve whatever dilemma they were facing? Are they to fish for their staters too?

The fact that the miracle is not reported suggests that Matthew was more interested in Jesus' rationale for paying than in the miracle itself, but one should not make too much

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(continued)
tax (Rom 13:5, 1 Pet 2:13–15); but it has closer affinities with the fundamental principle, espoused by Paul, of avoiding unnecessary offense to others (see 1 Cor 8:1–13, 10:23–11:1; Rom 14:21; 2 Cor 11:29).

[87] Matt 7:21; 10:32, 33; 11:27; 12:50; 16:17; 18:10, 14, 19, 35; 20:23; 25;34, 41; 26:29, 39, 42, 53.

[88] J. D. Kingsbury, "The Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen and the Secret of Jesus' Divine Sonship in Matthew," *JBL* (1986) 651.

[89] J. Weiss, *Die Schriften des neuen Testaments* (2d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1907) 1:348, objected that the miracle neither satisfies a human need nor serves a religious goal and appears selfish. See also G. M. Lee, "Matthew 17, 24–27," *Theology* 68 (1965) 380.

of this so-called missing ending. Haenchen is correct that neither Matthew nor the reader doubted that it actually came to pass as Jesus had said.[90] But what would this signify to the believer? Schlatter was on the right track when he compared this to the provision of the donkey in Bethphage and the room in Jerusalem for the last supper; Jesus receives all that he needs from the Father. For Schlatter, this miracle confirms the belief that God will care for their needs.[91] I would suggest, however, that the miracle confirms that Jesus is, as he implied in the analogy, God's son; because God provides the money for him to pay God's tax. Jesus has pre-vision of God's provision. Therefore, Chrysostom was not off the mark when he said that the miracle of Jesus reveals who he is, Lord over all including the sea (Matt. Hom. 58:1 MG, Sp. 567; see 8:23–27; 14:28–33).

The Disciples as Sons and the Jews as Aliens

The analogy contrasts the free sons, Jesus and those who are associated with him, with those who are bound to pay the temple half-shekel, namely, the Jews. Haenchen reasoned that since Christians are to be understood as the sons and the Jews as the aliens, it is a clear sign of later tradition from a time when the two ways of faith have already lived apart from one another.[92] While this need not indicate a later tradition,[93] it would imply that the evangelist assumes that those related to Jesus belong to the royal household while unbelieving Jews, who are obligated to pay the tax, do not. The analogy embraces Matthew's view of the disciples as sons of God through their relationship with Jesus. Frankemölle argued that, for Matthew, Jesus is the mediator between the Father and the disciples: relationship to God depends on relationship to Jesus.[94] Jesus also refers to God

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[90] E. Haenchen. *Der Weg Jesu: Eine Erklärung des Markus-Evangeliums und der kanonischen Parallelen* (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1966) 333–334. He maintained that when the interest in the question of the temple tax no longer existed, this account was treasured as a miracle story.

Many have attempted to explain away the miracle. Hirsch, *Frühgeschichte,* 2:236, suggested that it was a dream of Peter's like that in Acts 10 which was later recounted as an actual event. Blass amended the text from "you shall find" to read "it shall find," meaning that the fish will find (sell for) a stater (see C. Jaeger, "Remarques philogiques sur quelques passages des Synoptiques," *RHPR* 16 (1936) 248). Similarly, J. Jeremias, *New Testament Theology* (New York: Chas. Scribners & Sons, 1971) 87, thought that what Jesus originally meant was, "Cast your hook into the sea, sell your catch and pay the tax with the proceeds." The delight in elaborating on stories and the influence of other fish stories resulted in this saying evolving into a miracle. T. H. Robinson, *The Gospel of Matthew* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1927) 150, took it as a joke; the only chance of paying this is to find a fish with a stater in its mouth. See McNeile, *Matthew,* 259. Goulder, *Midrash and Lection,* 397, believed it to be an instance of Matthean hyperbole; and H. A. Homeau, "On Fishing for Staters: Matthew 17, 27," *ExpT* 85 (1973–74) 340–342, argued for an ironic thrust (originally spoken beside the Dead Sea) that was misunderstood by the literal-minded tradents.

[91] Schlatter, *Matthäus,* 542.

[92] Haenchen, *Der Weg Jesu,* 333–334.

[93] Grundmann, *Matthäus,* 411 n. 10, noted that this conception of freedom can be found as early as Gal 4:21–31 (see also, Gal 3:23–4:7). The concept of Christians as sons can also be found early (see Rom 8:14, 19; 9:26; Gal 3:26, 4:24–26; 2 Cor 6:18).

[94] Frankemölle, *Jahwebund,* 159–177.

as "your father,"[95] and recognizes the disciples as his brothers and sisters (12:49–50). The proof that they are indeed sons of the Father will be seen in their behavior as peacemakers (5:9) and in their loving response to those who may persecute them (5:44–45). The Jews, however—and this is the bad news of this gospel—are the "others" (ἀλλοτρίοι) in the analogy who are not children but aliens and strangers (and perhaps hostile) to the Lord of the temple.[96] The truth of this for Matthew is borne out by the increasingly negative statements about the Jews that appear later in the gospel (21:43, 22:8, 23:38–39, 27:25, 28:15).

Freedom from the Cultus

The disciples are pronounced free from any obligation to pay the temple half-shekel that went primarily to fund the daily sacrifices in the temple. This would mean that Matthew viewed the temple cultus as being irrelevant to Christians.

Patte argued against extrapolating from this passage any view of the temple, that it is, for example, no longer the center of the community and that its sacrifices are no longer required to reconcile humans to God. It is not that this is necessarily wrong, but he thought that it diverted one's attention from Matthew's primary point about causing offense.[97] I would agree that the sons' freedom from the temple is not the central teaching of the passage, but it should not be ignored.[98] It does reflect a Matthean perception and prepares the reader for further statements about the temple later in the gospel. The temple in Jesus' estimation has become a den of robbers instead of being a house of prayer (21:13). Jesus is said to abandon it (23:39) and then immediately predicts its imminent destruction (24:1–2). Prior to Jesus' death, the defiling "blood money" for the betrayal of Jesus finds its way back to the ναός (27:4–7; see 23:35); after Jesus' death, the temple veil is rent in two, from top to bottom (27:51). The temple has become superfluous, because something greater than the temple is here (12:6). For Matthew, Jesus is the rejected stone who will become the head of the corner (21:42); and the temple's predicted obsolescence and the sons' freedom from the temple dues is not unrelated to the issue of atonement.

As mentioned above, the Pharisees insisted that the regular daily sacrifices were to come exclusively from the funds provided by the annual half-shekel offering of the entire community (*m. Šeqal.* 4:1–4, *b. Šeqal.* 29b, *Roš. Haš. 7a).*[99] Lohse noted that since every Jew could not go to Jerusalem to offer sacrifice, the idea of the power of the atonement was widened so that the contribution of the half-shekel itself could atone, since it served

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[95] See Matt 5:16, 45, 48; 6:1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 26, 32; 7:11; 10:20, 39; 23:9.

[96] E. Lohmeyer, *The Lord of the Temple* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1961) 55. According to Josephus, Eleazar, the son of Ananus, persuaded those in charge of the Temple services to refuse any gift or sacrifice from a foreigner (*J.W.* 2:409), which laid the foundation for the war since the sacrifices on behalf of the emperor and paid for by the Roman funds were rejected. The word appears in 1 Clem 7:7 to refer to the Ninevites who were aliens to God.

[97] Patte, *Matthew,* 247.

[98] D. Daube, "Responsibilities of Master and disciples in the Gospels," *NTS* 19 (1972) 14–15, pointed out that the miracle makes Jesus counsel mininmal performance not compliance. They actually surrender nothing of their own to the temple. Therefore, the principle of avoiding offense when translated into practice is to be "flexible, devious, subtle, clever." If this is true, the passage reflects some antipathy toward the temple.

[99] See Finkelstein, *The Pharisees,* 282.

to purchase sacrifices for the whole sanctuary.[100] This idea was fostered by the fact that Exodus 30:16 it identifies the contribution as "atonement money"; and *Tosepta Šeqalim* 1:6 directly connects the half-shekel to sin atonement: "They exact pledges from the Israelites for their sheqels, so that the public offerings might be made of their (funds). . . . For public offerings appease and effect atonement between Israel and their Father in heaven."[101] If the disciples are free from this obligation, it is because of the atonement which they will receive through the death of Jesus (26:28, 27:42). This incident immediately follows the second of the three predictions of Jesus' passion which will effect atonement, and the forgiveness obtained through Jesus' death is assumed in the parable that ends this section (18:23–35). The disciples have been forgiven so much by God, they are expected to be forgiving. Therefore, Origen was not entirely wrong when he interpreted the freedom of the sons as freedom from sins (Matt. XIII, 10; GCS 40).

The Role of Peter

The freedom extends from Jesus to Peter and through him to the other disciples. Peter has a unique position in this section of Matthew vis-a-vis any other of the disciples. Just enough money is provided for the payment of the tax for Jesus and Peter ("for me and you," singular). Therefore, one can conclude with Meier (and many others) that Peter is not conceived of as a local leader but the unique leader of the whole church as in 16:18–19 and 18:15–20, 21.[102]

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[100] E. Lohse, *Märtyrer und Gottesknecht* (FRLANT 46, Gottingen: 1955, 22.

[101] It then cites Exod 30:16. See also *b. B. Bat.* 9a, the passages cited in Strack and Billerbeck, *Kommentar,* 1:761–762, and 11QTemple 39:7–10.

[102] R. E. Brown and J. P. Meier, *Antioch and Rome* (Ramsey, N.J.: Paulist, 1982) 69. See also Thompson, *Matthew's Advice,* 58, who saw the freedom extending from Jesus to Peter and through him to the other disciples.

Apocalyptic Ascent and the Heavenly Temple

Martha Himmelfarb
Princeton University

Ascent to heaven plays a central role in several early Jewish and Christian apocalypses. These ascents are one form of a more widespread phenomenon in the hellenistic and Roman period;[1] they show significant similarities of structure and of detail to other bodies of literature like the magical papyri and the gnostic texts. Yet despite these undoubted parallels the apocalyptic ascents constitute an identifiable tradition distinct from other bodies of literature not only because of the formal features associated with the apocalypses in which they appear,[2] but also because of characteristic elements of content. These elements are tied to the understanding of heaven as temple, an understanding that informs almost all of the Jewish and Christian ascent apocalypses of the centuries on either side of the turn of the ear, sometimes explicitly, sometimes quite subtly.

Any discussion of heaven as temple in the apocalypses must begin with the Book of the Watchers (1 Enoch 1–36), which contains the earliest ascent in Jewish literature.[3] For the heavenly edifices through which Enoch passes to reach the divine throne are a temple.[4] Of course this is true almost by definition; anywhere God dwells is in some sense a temple.[5] But the correspondences between the buildings Enoch sees and the earthly temple go beyond this tautology.

To reach God on his throne Enoch passes through a wall (14:9), an outer house (14:10–14), and an inner house (14:15–17) in the Ethiopic, or three houses in the Greek. More clearly in the Greek but also in the Ethiopic this arrangement echoes the structure of the earthly temple with its vestibule (*'ulam*), sanctuary (*hekhal*), and holy of holies (*dvir*).

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[1] See recently A. F. Segal, "Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and Their Environment," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Roemischen Welt* II.23.2: 1333–94; and J. D. Tabor, *Things Unutterable: Paul's Ascent to Paradise in Its Greco-Roman, Judaic, and Early Christian Contexts* (Studies in Judaism; Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986) 57–111.

[2] For a discussion of the formal features of apocalypses, see J. J. Collins, ed., *Apocalypse: The Morphology of a Genre, Semeia* 14 (1979).

[3] For the Book of the Watchers quotations and references are to E. Isaac, "1 Enoch," in J. H. Charlesworth, ed., *Old testament Pseudepigrapha* 1 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983). All other quotations and references to apocalypses, including the other sections of 1 Enoch, are to the translations in H. F. D. Sparks, *The Apocryphal Old Testament* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1984).

[4] See J. Maier, *Vom Kultus zur Gnosis, Kairos:* Religionswissenschaftliche Studien 1 (Salzburg: Otto Mueller, 1964) 127–28; and G. W. E. Nickelsburg, "Enoch, Levi, and Peter: Recipients of Revelation in Upper Galilee," *JBL* 100 (1981) 576–82.

[5] As Nickelsburg points out ("Enoch," 580n. 19). The Jerusalem temple is often called "the house of God" in the Bible.

The throne on which God is seated in the innermost chamber of this heavenly structure is a throne of cherubim (14:18). Thus it is the heavenly counterpart to the cherubim found in the holy of holies of the Jerusalem temple, also intended as God's throne.

the ceiling of the first house (Eth.) or middle house (Grk.) of the heavenly building Enoch sees fiery cherubim (14:11). These are not the cherubim of the divine throne, but rather figures that correspond to the figures on the hangings on the walls of the tabernacle (Ex 26:1, 31; 36:8, 35) or to the figures engraved on the walls of the temple (1 Kgs 6:29, 2 Chr 3:7, Ezek 41:15–26).[6]

The angels of the Book of the Wtchers are understood as priests. The language used to describe the activities of the angels standing before God's throne in the heavenly temple (14:22–23) suggests this identification,[7] but unlike their counterparts in later apocalypses these angels are not seen engaging in such clearly liturgical activities as sacrifice or praise. God does, however, describe intercession, a central priestly task, as the proper function of angels when Enoch presents the petition of the fallen watchers (15:2). The sins of sexual defilement and rapacity of which the watchers are guilty in the narrative of the Book of the Watchers are found elsewhere in roughly contemporary literature as part of the polemic against the Jerusalem priesthood; the author of the Book of the Watchers seems to have been using the ancient legend of the fall of the angels to attack the Jerusalem priests of his day for polluting the temple through their sins.[8]

These examples by no means exhaust the points of correspondence between the heavenly temple and the earthly in the Book of the Watchers, but they should suffice to make the point. The idea of a heavenly temple is widespread in the ancient near east, and there are hints of it in early biblical literature.[9] Mt. Zion is understood as the place at which heaven and earth intersect; thus Isaiah (ch. 6) sees God enthroned in the Jerusalem temple.[10]

After the destruction of the first temple, interest in the heavenly temple increases, often together with a desire to criticize the earthly, as in the Book of the Watchers. This process can be traced back to Ezekiel, who takes the throne of cherubim out of the holy of holies of the Jerusalem temple and turns it into a vehicle that can carry the glory of God from the defiled temple (chs. 1, 8–11). In the concluding vision of his book, the chariot throne brings the glory of God back to the eschatological temple (43:1–4). The divine throne that Enoch sees, a fixed furnishing of the heavenly temple, is nonetheless described as wheeled (1 En 14:18), a striking sign of the debt of the Book of the Watchers to Ezekiel.

In Isaiah's vision God is seen engaged in discussion with his angelic courtiers. Isaiah joins in the proceedings, volunteering to carry God's message to his people. This is one of several places in prophetic literature where the prophet takes part in the proceedings of the divine council. In the Bible as in its Canaanite sources, the deliberations of the

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[6] Carol Newsom, *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice: A Critical Edition* (Harvard Semitic Studies 27; Atlanta: Scholars, 1985) 301–2.

[7] Nickelsburg, "Enoch," 580 n. 19, 585 n. 37.

[8] Nickelsburg, "Enoch," 588–90; D. Suter, "Fallen Angel, Fallen Priest: The Problem of Family Purity in 1 Enoch 6–16," *HUCA* 50 (1979) 115–35.

[9] The idea of a heavenly archetype or the earthly temple appears in the instructions for building the tabernacle (Ex 25:9, 40; 26:30; 27:8).

[10] For more detail on Isaiah and Ezekiel in relation to the subject here, see M. Himmelfarb, "From Prophecy to Apocalypse: The *Book of the Watchers* and Tours of Heaven," in A. Green, ed., *Jewish Spirituality: From the Bible to the Middle Ages* (World Spirituality 13; New York: Crossroad, 1986) 149–53.

council are those of the royal court.[11] But it is no accident that Isaiah's vision takes place in the temple. The heavenly palace is easily transformed into the heavenly temple; both are the house of God. The acclamation of the angelic courtiers in Isaiah's vision, "Holy, holy, holy," becomes a central part of the liturgy of the synagogue, a liturgy intended to replace that of the temple,[12] and thus it is not too long a distance to the picture of the angelic host as priests in the heavenly temple.

Through his participation in the proceedings of the heavenly court, the prophet Isaiah claims for himself the status of an angel. The author of the Book of the Watchers claims angelic status for Enoch through his service in the heavenly temple. While Enoch is identified by his profession as "scribe of righteousness" (12:4, 15:1), the ascent shows him passing through the outer court of the temple and the sanctuary to the door of the holy of holies, where God addresses him "with his own mouth" (14:24). Although God rejects Enoch's intercession on the watchers' behalf, it is not through any failing of Enoch, but rather of the fallen watchers. The tour to the ends of the earth in the company of the archangels confirms Enoch's status.

The idea of heaven as a temple was not invented by the author of the Book of the Watchers, and one need not have read the Book of the Watchers to share it. Nor is the idea restricted to apocalypses; 4QShirShabb, the Angelic Liturgy from Qumran, is a striking example of the use of the idea in the quite different literary genre. Several of the later apocalypses (the Testament of Levi, 2 Enoch, and the Similitudes of Enoch) show literary dependence on the Book of the Watchers, while others show no signs of knowledge of it. Still, with the single exception of the Testament of Abraham, all the later ascent apocalypses (2 Enoch, The Similitudes of Enoch, the Apocalypse of Abraham, the Testament of Levi, the Ascension of Isaiah, 3 Baruch, the Apocalypse of Zephaniah) understand heaven as a temple either explicitly or implicitly.[13] All make reference to an angelic liturgy of some kind.[14] Particular ascents contain other details that indicate that heaven is understood as a temple, like the throne of cherubim in the Apocalypse of Abraham (18:3).

Equality with the Angels and the Heavenly Temple

Ascent is widely understood to confer superhuman status on the human being who is priveleged to undertake it. In gnostic texts ascent means the reunification of the spirit with the divine from which it comes. In the magical papyri the purpose of ascent is often divinization, taking on the power of a god. In the apocalypses the visionary usually achieves equality with the angels in the course of the ascent. This equality is expressed

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[11] On the divine council in the Bible and its background, see E. T. Mullen, Jr., *The Assembly of the Gods: The Divine Council in Canaanite and Early Hebrew Literature* (Harvard Semitic Monographs 24; Chico, Ca.: Scholars, 1980) 175–209.

[12] Maier suggests that the trishagion was part of an inner temple liturgy known only to priests, which then made its way into the synagogue (*Vom Kultus*, 111).

[13] I consider here neither Revelation, which describes heaven but not an ascent, nor the early Christian apocalypses that involve tours of hell and paradise, which represent a separable tradition that is itself indebted to the Book of the Watchers but in a rather different way from the apocalypses treated here.

[14] For example, 2 Enoch 7–9; Testament of Levi 3; Similitudes of Enoch 40; Apocalypse of Abraham 18; Ascension of Isaiah 7–9; Apocalypse of Zephaniah 3; 3 Baruch 11–15. These references are by no means complete.

through service in the heavenly temple. I have already argued that Enoch in the Book of the Watchers becomes a priest like the angels in the course of his ascent. In most of the later ascent apocalypses the visionary attains his place among the angels by putting on a special garment or joining in the praise the angels offer to God. Although these activities do not appear in the Book of the Watchers, they grow out of the picture of heaven as temple.[15]

In the Testament of Levi, Levi's ascent culminates in his appointment as priest by God himself (5:2). In this ascent there is no language of transformation. Yet in a second vision (ch. 8) angels anoint Levi as priest. The ceremony includes dressing Levi in priestly garments and anointing him with oil as for priestly ordination (Ex 29).[16]

In 2 Enoch Enoch becomes the equal of the angels through a process like the ordination of a priest. When Enoch comes to stand before God's throne, the archangel Michael removes his earthly garments, anoints him with oil, and clothes him in "glorious garments" (9:17–18). "And I looked at myself," Enoch tells us, "and I was like one of the glorious ones, and there was no apparent difference" (9:19). Enoch then serves as scribe first for the revelations of the angel Vreveil (ch. 10) and then for those of God himself (ch. 11), who tells Enoch that these secrets have never been revealed before, not even to the angels (11:3).

The concluding chapters of 2 Enoch (chs. 20–23) describe the priestly succession after Enoch's death, from Methuselah, Enoch's son, through Nir, Methudelah's grandson, to the appearance and disappearance of the child Melchizedek, who is to serve as eschatological priest. The robes of Enoch's priestly successors receive some attention (21:7, 22:15, 23:20). The point of 2 Enoch's concern with the preiesthood is far from clear; perhaps the antediluvian priests serve as a means of criticizing contemporary priests.[17]

The idea that angelic and priestly dress are related is by no means restricted to the ascent apocalypses. It goes back at least as far as Ezekiel, that most priestly prophet, where angels are described (9:2–3, 11; 10:2) as clothed in linen (*bad*), the fabric the high priest wears once a year on the Day of Atonement when he enters the holy of holies (Lev 16:4). The same angelic dress appears in Daniel (10:5; 12:6,7).[18]

I turn now to three apocalypses with no particular interest in temples that continue to use motifs associated with them to describe the visionary's achievement of equality with the angels. In the Apocalypse of Abraham when Abraham is terrified by a frightening sight as he ascends to heaven (chs. 15–16), his angelic guide tells him to sing a hymn (ch. 17). Abraham sings it and arrives in heaven before the divine throne unharmed. Upon his arrival he discovers that this hymn is the very hymn of the creatures of the throne and the angels surrounding it (ch. 18). In other words, Abraham is kept safe during his

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[15] An earlier stage of my thinking about transformation is found in "The Experience of the Visionary and Genre in the Ascension of Isaish 6–11 and the Apocalypes of Paul," in A. Yarbro Collins, ed., *Early Christian Apocalypticism, Semeia* 36 (1986) 97–111.

[16] There are other aspects of the ceremony without parallel in the biblical instructions, and M. de Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Study of Their Text, Composition, and Origin* (Assen: van Gorcum, 1953) 43–46, has suggested early Christian baptismal practice as the background to this picture.

[17] It is not even clear which temple the priests being criticized operate in. Could it be the temple of Onias, as U. Fischer (*Eschatologie und Jenseitserwartung im hellenistischen Diasporajudentum* [BZNW 44; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978] 40–47) has suggested?

[18] On the fabrics used for priestly garments, see M. Haran, *Temples and Temple-Service in Ancient Israel* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1977) 165–74.

ascent by singing the song of the angels. Since the inner reaches of the temple are off limits to all but priests, to enter the heavenly temple Abraham becomes a priest by engaging in heavenly worship.[19]

Unlike the heroes of the other apocalypses considered here the hero of the Apocalypse of Zephaniah is a dead soul.[20] At the end of the work, Zephaniah crosses the lake of heaven on a boat with a crowd of angels. "I also put on an angelic garment. I saw all those angels praying. I too prayed together with them: I knew their language that they spoke with me" (3:3–4). Zephaniah's knowledge of the language of the angels is particularly significant because earlier the roll on which he finds his sins recorded is explicitly described as written "in (his) own language" (2:15). It is the angelic robe, then, that allows Zephaniah to understand the language of the heavenly liturgy.

In the Ascension of Isaiah the prophet Isaiah discovers in the highest heaven that the righteous dead, clothed in their "higher garments" (9:9), offer their praise to God before the angels (9:28–29) and gaze upon him directly while the angles can only glance at him (9:37–38). The righteous dead are thus not the equals but the superiors of the angels! Isaiah himself occupies a level between the angels and the righteous dead (9:28, 38). Again the highest status in heaven involves robes and praise.[21]

Isaiah also hears of thrones and crowns reserved for the righteous, which they are not to use until Christ's ascent after his mission on earth (9:11–12). These royal symbols represent a move back toward heaven as palace. Yet it is worth noting the priestly headdress in the second vision of the Testament of Levi (8:9–10), Methuselah's crown in 2 Enoch (21:7), and the thrones and crowns of the twenty-four elders in Revelation (4:4). These instances demonstrate once again the intimate relationship between temple and royal court.

At this point I turn briefly to 3 Baruch and the Similitudes of Enoch. Both ascents treat heaven as a temple, but neither describes a transformation in which the visionary becomes a heavenly priest. Indeed in 3 Baruch the visionary undergoes no transformation at all, and the souls of the righteous dead have become birds that sing God's praises rather than heavenly priests (ch. 10). I suspect that these features are part of a polemic against the ideas of transformation and equality with the angels found in other apocalypses. After all, according to 3 Baruch the heavenly temple is not open to human beings, not even great heroes like Baruch, nor even to most angels, but only to the archangel Michael (chs. 11–15). Baruch cannot go beyond the gates of the temple in the fifth heaven, and he remains subordinate to his angelic guide throughout the ascent.

The Similitudes in its present form suggests the transformation of Enoch into the Son of Man, but this equation appears to be the result of a later redaction of the Similitudes. The Similitudes also offers two descriptions of the fate of the righteous after death.

> And there I saw another vision, the dwelling of the righteous and the resting-places of the holy. There my eyes saw their dwelling with the angels and their resting-places with the holy ones, and they were petitioning and supplicating and praying on behalf of the sons of men . . . And in those days my eyes saw the place of the chosen ones of righteousness and faith . . . And I saw their

[19] There is also mention of a garment reserved for Abraham (13:15), but it is not associated with Abraham's participation in the heavenly liturgy.

[20] The work I refer to as the Apocalypse of Zephaniah is called the Anonymous Apocalypse in Sparks.

[21] I treated the Ascension of Isaiah in more detail in "Experience," 98–101.

> dwelling under the wings of the Lord of Spirits, and all the righteous and chosen shone before him like the light of fire; and their mouth was full of blessing, and their lips praised the name of the Lord of Spirits (39:4–7).

The righteous are described reciting praise before the divine throne in familiar priestly terms, but they are also said to shine.[22] This alternative mode of describing transformation, often put as becoming like a star, appears of the righteous dead also in Daniel (12:1–3), the Epistle of Enoch (1 Enoch 92–105) (104:2–6), and 2 Baruch (51:12).[23]

This understanding of the fate of the righteous should certainly be placed in the context of Greco-Roman astral piety. But it should also be seen as the other side of the transformation of the righteous into members of the divine council, visualized not as angels but as stars. The heavenly host in the form of stars fights for Deborah and her army in the Song of Deborah (Ju. 5:20). In Job the morning stars are found in parallel to the sons of God (38:7).

Conclusions

Let me try to sketch some consequences of the observations offered above and suggest some subjects for further consideration. One important result is for the question of the origins of apocalyptic eschatology. Paul Hanson, following the lead of Otto Ploeger, has recently argued that apocalyptic eschatology grows out of conflict in the community of the return between a "hierocratic" group whose hopes are realized in the rebuilding of the temple and a "visionary" group that sees the second temple as defiled and looks forward to a more glorious future.[24] The presiding prophetic presence for the hierocratic group is Ezekiel, for the visionary group, 3 Isaiah. The progressive loss of power of the visionary group leads to its loss of interest in history and thus to the emergence of an eschatology that can be characterized as apocalyptic.

This is not the place to offer detailed criticism of Hanson's understanding of Ezekiel and 3 Isaiah.[25] Let me simply point out that the Book of the Watchers, after the Astronomical Book (1 Enoch 72–82) the earliest apocalypse to come down to us,[26] makes Hanson's hierocratic/visionary dichotomy impossible. I would not suggest the Book of the Watchers as a parade example of apocalyptic eschatology, but it clearly has some such interest. What Hanson fails to appreciate is that condemning priest for their sins is not the same as rejecting the institution they represent.[27] The community at Qumran teaches us the same lesson.

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[22] It is not important for our purposes whether the chosen ones of righteousness and faith are a group distinct from the righteous and holy.

[23] For a treatment of most of these texts, see J. J. Collins, "Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death," *CBQ* 36 (1974) 21–43.

[24] Ploeger, *Theocracy and Eschatology*, tr. S. Rudman (Richmond: John Knox, 1968); Hanson, *The Dawn of Apocalyptic: The Historical and Sociological Roots of Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology* (rev. ed.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979). The terminology is Hanson's.

[25] For brief but trenchant criticism, Joseph Blenkinsopp, *A History of Prophecy in Israel* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983) 247–48 nn. 47–48.

[26] To be fair Hanson did not have the new, early dates for the Book of the Watchers for *Dawn*.

[27] Hanson treats chs. 6–11 of the Book of the Watchers in "Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6–11," *JBL* 96 (1977) 195–233. He finds here the rejection of the biblical ritual for the Day of Atonement.

What about the significance of the heavenly temple for the apocalypses that follow the Book of the Watchers? The Book of the Watchers dates to the third century BCE, while some of the apocalypses considered here come from the first and second centuries CE. Some are indisputable Jewish, others certainly Christian in their present forms. Some are directed at least in part to problems of temples and priests, while others are not. Thus the significance of treating heaven as temple surely differs from work to work.

For the apocalypses concerned with temples and priests—the Book of the Watchers, the Testament of Levi, and to a lesser extent 2 Enoch—the picture of heaven as temple serves a real purpose, and there is good reason to treat the visionary's transformation in priestly terms. For other works, especially the Ascension of Isaish and the Apocalypse of Zephaniah, where heaven functions more like a royal court, the continued importance of priestly imagery is less readily understood.

It seems reasonable to assume that describing heaven as a temple is associated with a positive attitude toward the temple as an institution, although often not toward the actuality of the temple. Yet it is not at all clear that the authors of the later ascent apocalypses, especially those with very little interest in temples, intended to take a stand when they used imagery associated with the heavenly temple. One could argue that after the Book of the Watchers the heavenly temple is so much a given of the world in which the authors of the later apocalypses lived that their use of it means no more than our assumption that the earth is round.

But the shared picture of the heavens was only very broadly drawn, as the different ways the authors of these apocalypses fill seven heavens show. And while some authors are using seven heavens, others, more conservative, stick to one. Thus whatever consensus there was applied only to the outlines of the picture, allowing individual authors great freedom.

Further we have seen that some apocalypses, although not on the whole ascent apocalypses, describe transformation as becoming a star. So the authors of the ascent apocalypses are doing more than using the only available mode of description of transformation when they represent the righteous dead and privileged visionaries as angelic priests; they are choosing one possible representation over another.

Thus the use of temple imagery in those apocalypses that are not interested in making a point about temples shows a sense of connection to other works that treat the heavens this way. This observation is not as obvious as it may seem. After all the Apocalypse of Abraham, the Ascension of Isaiah, and the Apocalypse of Zephaniah show the influence of the Book of the Watchers in only the broadest sense. It is notable that the authors of these works prefer the imagery of the Book of the Watchers to the imagery of Daniel and 2 Baruch. The absence of temple imagery in the Testament of Abraham points to a rather different relationship to the early Jewish and Christian apocalypses.

Several of the apocalypses considered here (2 Enoch, 3 Baruch, Apocalypse of Zephaniah) seem to come from Egypt. It has been noted that diaspora apocalypses show a certain commonality of concern as compared to apocalypses written in Palestine.[28] What about the relationship between, for example, the author of 2 Enoch and the Book of the Watchers? Is the relationship strictly literary, a relationship of reader to text, or are there some other lines of social continuity? Do these apocalypses represent the views of

[28] J. J. Collins, "The Genre Apocalypse in Hellenistic Judaism," in D. Hellholm, ed., *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Apocalypticism, Uppsala, August 12–17, 1979* (Tuebingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1983) 531–48.

individual authors or do communities subscribe to them? Careful scrutiny of the way in which common materials like the picture of heaven as temple are used in different apocalypses may given us some insight into these questions.

Heavenly Ascension in Ancient Judaism: The Nature of the Experience

David L. Halperin
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27514

> . . . as to paradise, we have heard a lot about it from the priests. So we decided to find out for ourselves. First, we sent up our explorer, Yuri Gagarin. He circled the globe and found nothing in outer space. It's pitch dark there, he said, no Garden of Eden, nothing like heaven. So we decided to send another. We sent Gherman Titov and told him to fly for a whole day. After all, Gagarin was up there only an hour and a half. So he might have missed Paradise. . . . We told him to take a good look. Well, he took off, came back, and confirmed Gagarin's conclusion. He reported there was nothing there.
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> —Nikita Khrushchev, in an interview with C. L. Sulzberger (*New York Times*, September 9, 1961)

In this paper, I will deal with certain psychological aspects of ancient Jewish accounts of heavenly ascent. I understand "psychological aspects" primarily to designate questions of what these accounts meant to the people who told them, and to those who read them or listened to them.

Some of the narrators of ascension stories seem to make the claim that they describe their personal experience. Many modrn scholars have given some measure of credence to this claim. Until we have dealt with the question of the experiential component of ascension stories, any approach to their psychology will be blocked. The issue of "real ecstatic experience" therefore heads my agenda, and will dominate this paper.

I will suggest that modern discussions of this issue are normally bedevilled by three false dichotomies, which are in fact different aspects of the same one. These dichotomies are grounded in legitimate distinctions, but are exaggerated to the point that they distort our thinking. All involve one basic fallacy, unstated but influential: that "genuine" ecstatic experience somehow comes to the visionary from the outside.

It is hardly surprising that the visionaries themselves believed this, or that modern scholars may be tempted to follow them. Often enough, we have dreams so vivid that it seems to us on awakening as if we had watched a movie shown to us by some outside force. But, if we are to understand our dreams, we must never forget that, alien to us as they sometimes seem, they are truly ours. So the visions of the ancients.

I. Preliminary: The Jewish Ascension Literature

The potentially relevant sources may be divided into five groups. I arrange these groups, not chronologically, but in the order that is most convenient for my presentation.

(1) Rabbinic sources preserve legends of humans who travel to heaven or to paradise. The list of travellers includes Alexander the Great (BT Tamid 32b, PT 'Abodah Zarah 3:1, 42c; Heller 1931:18–19) and R. Joshua b. Levi (BT Ketubbot 77b; Himmelfarb 1983:32–33). But its star member is Moses. *Pesiqta Rabbati* 20 and its parallels describe,

often in vivid and gripping detail, how Moses ascends to heaven, confronts the angels, and returns to earth with the Torah (Grözinger 1976). These stories are normally told in the third person, although one occasionally finds exceptions: in one brief text, which seems to be based on an earlier third-person narrative, Moses describes his own celestial adventures. (Jellinek 1967:5:165–166, based on 1:58–61; cf. Gaster 1971:1:124–164.) But the narrators are usually detached from the events they describe, and do not claim to have participated in them any more than the narrator of "Jack and the Beanstalk" claims to have shared his hero's ascent.

For this reason, these stories are seldom discussed in connection with the "reality" of the ascensions. But they nevertheless belong with our data. For it is at least thinkable that the satisfaction one gets from imagining someone else's ascension to heaven (either as narrator or as audience) is of the same kind and springs from the same motives as the satisfaction one gets from imagining or hallucinating one's own.

(2) Some Jewish apocalypses, from the centuries just before and after the turn of the eras, describe the heavenly ascensions of such Biblical figures as Adam, Enoch, Abraham, Levi, and Baruch. The essential difference between these narratives, and the ones in our first category, is that the apocalypses tell their stories in the first person. The ascending hero is also the narrator.

If we were to suppose that the use of the first person is a purely literary convention, like the first person in some modern historical novels, this difference would be of slight importance. But it is hard to read the apocalypses without having the impression that their authors claim something more by using the first person. The reader of the Enochian pseudepigrapha, it seems, is meant to believe that it is indeed Enoch's voice that he hears. It follows that the "I" of the fictional Enoch is in some way bound to the "I" of the real narrator. It is at least possible, therefore, that Enoch's ecstatic experiences are in fact those of the narrator, who describes them as he remembers them, in the first person.

The New Testament Book of Revelation[1] seems also to belong in this category, with the important distinction that it does not appear to be pseudepigraphic.

(3) The *Hekbalot* literature, now splendidly published by Peter Schäfer and his colleagues (1981), contains both descriptions of and prescriptions for heavenly ascent. The descriptions include several versions of the Talmudic story of the "four who entered a garden" (*pardes*), which the *Hekbalot* writers plainly understood as a heavenly journey. Some of these versions are in third person; others are in first, with R. Akiba as narrator (details in Halperin 1987b:199–210). R. Akiba and R. Ishmael are elsewhere made to describe or allude to their ascensions. The fullest of these accounts, which the text called *"3 Enoch"* puts into R. Ishmael's mouth, includes an ascension narrative within an ascension narrative: the angel Metatron, born the human Enoch, describes to R. Ishmael his ascension and transformation (Odeberg 1973, now in Charlesworth 1983).

The *Hekbalot* prescriptions for the ascent, which often use the second person, are more detailed and vivid than the descriptions. Although neither prescriptions nor descriptions dominate the *Hekbalot* literature to the extent one might imagine from reading Scholem (1954 and 1965), there is no question they are an important element. The best-known of the prescriptive passages is the discourse of R. Nehuniah b. ha-Kanah in *Hekbalot Rabbati*, summarized in Scholem 1965:9–13. But another such passage, published from a Genizah manuscript by Ithamar Gruenwald (1969; summary in Gruenwald 1980), is even more impressive. The angel Ozhayah instructs R. Ishmael in "the descent to the

[1] I treat Revelation as a Jewish text, on the basis of the self identification implied in 2:9 and 3:9.

merkabah," and promises his protection to "you and anyone else who wants to descend to the *merkabah*, whether in your own generation or in future generations." R. Ishmael is not quite convinced until "the least of the students in our college" makes the hazardous journey successfully. (Translations from Halperin 1987b:368–372.) It is not easy to understand the point of these prescriptions unless we suppose that their authors sought, and expected others to seek, ecstatic experiences.

(4) Many scholars suppose that Talmudic references to *merkabah*, *ma'aśeh merkabah*, and the "four who entered *pardes*," point to some sort of ecstatic mysticism. This is indeed the probable interpretation of two passages in the Babylonian Talmud. BT Hagigah 14b has R. Akiba warn his companions against saying "water, water" when they "draw near the stones of pure marble." This reference, and the subsequent account of how Elisha b. Abuyah saw Metatron (15a), strongly suggest that the Babylonian writers identified the *pardes* these rabbis entered as some celestial territory. In BT Megillah 24b, R. Judah b. Ilai's colleagues remark that many hoped to expound the *merkabah*, yet never saw it; that is, their hopes were disappointed. It follows that expounding the *merkabah* is bound up with having a vision of it. I have argued that both of these passages are Babylonian reinterpretations of older Palestinian sources which originally intended nothing of the kind (Halperin 1980). *Ma'aśeh merkabah*, as perceived by certain Babylonian Amoraim (and by the *Hekhalot*), has to do with ecstatic experience. As perceived by the Tannaim and Palestinian Amoraim, it does not.

(5) Paul's account of his heavenly ascent, in II Corinthians 12:1–10, belongs in a category by itself. It is, as Tabor says, a rare "case of a named and known individual who tells of his own experience" (1986:97). The closest thing to it, among the sources we have considered, is the Revelation of John of Patmos.

II. Dichotomy #1: Is the Vision "Real" or Not?

When modern writers discuss the visionary experiences described in ancient sources, they often raise the qustion of whether these experiences are "real," or "genuine," or "authentic."[2] What do these words mean, applied to a vision?

Unless we wish to appear naive, we must assume that these writers intend the *subjective* reality of the visions, their reality in the perceptions of the people who think they experience them. A journey through the seven heavens is "real" if it is real *to the visionary*. Its objective reality, which no post-Copernican can believe in anyway, is beside the point. Or so it seems.

When we look more closely at modern discussions of visionary "reality," however, we can hardly escape feeling that some authors are indeed flirting with the idea that this "reality" is in some degree objective.

Take, for example, Gershom Scholem's discussion of the Babylonian Talmud's account of the four rabbis' visit to the *pardes*, and Akiba's mysterious warning to them: "When you draw near the stones of pure marble, do not say, Water, water . . ." (Hagigah 14b):

> Modern interpretations of this famous passage, which clearly enough refers to a *real* danger in the process of ascending to "Paradise," are extremely far-fetched and not a little irrational in their determination at all costs to preserve the characteristic essentials of rationalism. We are told that the passages (sic) refers to cosmological speculations about the *materia prima*, an explanation which lacks all plausibility and finds no support in the context or in the subject

[2] The antonym of "real," as we will presently see, is "literary."

> matter itself. The fact is that later Merkabah mystics showed a perfectly correct understanding of the meaning of this passage, and their interpretation offers striking proof that the tradition of Tannaitic mysticism and theosophy was really alive among them, although certain details may have originated in a later period.

In *Hekbalot Zuṭarti*, Scholem points out, the traveller to the *merkabab* is tested at the gate of the sixth heavenly palace by being shown "the ethereal glitter of the marble plates with which the palace was tesselated." If he is foolish enough to ask, "What is the meaning of these waters?", the angels "began to stone him and said: 'Wretch . . . are you unworthy to see the King in his beauty?' . . . And he does not go until they strike his head with iron bars and wound him."

> Thus the text. The authenticity of the story's core, the ecstatic's vision of water, hardly requires proof. Nothing could be more farfetched than to treat it as a *post festum* interpretation of the Talmudic passage; there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that the mystical experience of the dangers of the ascent is really the subject of the anecdote. (Scholem 1954:52–53)

What does Scholem mean with his italicized "real"? If he means only subjectively "real," his explanation does not explain anything. The sixth palace, its marble plates, the angels, the iron bars with which they strike the visionary—none of these has any reality outside the imagination of the visionary himself. Curled up in his trance (cf. Scholem 1954:49–50), the mystic is exposed to no "*real* danger" whatever. What, then, leads him to imagine or hallucinate dangers; and, particurly, these specific dangers?

If I go to Australia and come back with a report of a hopping pouched animal, my experience requires no explanation beyond that it was *real:* the animal was really there, I really saw it. But, if I dream of a weird creature in some faraway land, we cannot explain that creature's appearance by saying that my dream was subjectively real; that is, that I really dreamt it. I do not deny the possibility that *Hekbalot Zuṭarti's* account of the "water" test may reflect visionary experiences that were, like your dreams and mine, subjectively real. But I deny that, if this is so, it can stand as an explanation for the content of the experiences. If Scholem says that it does, we must suppose that he is claiming a reality for the experiences—and, indeed, for the things experienced—that goes beyond the subjective.

A second example: Johannes Lindblom includes chapter 12 of Revelation among those passages of the book that seem to describe genuine visionary experiences. When, therefore, John of Patmos sees a woman flee into the wilderness (12:6), we are not to rationalize this detail as a symbolic allusion to the Jerusalem Christians' flight to Pella. "Rather, it is a visionary detail, which requires no explanation beyond that the seer saw in the vision how the woman fled into a wilderness, in order there to bring herself to safety."[3] Lindblom's treatment of the passage is not altogether consistent. But it is difficult to understand the quoted sentence unless we suppose it reflects a half-admitted belief in the vision's objective reality. John really saw the woman; therefore she must really have been there for him to see.

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[3] My translation of the German: ". . . sondern ist ein visionärer Zug, der keiner anderen Erklärung bedarf, als dass der Seher in der Vision sah, wie das Weib in eine Wüste floh, um sich dort in Sicherheit zu bringen" (1968:227n).

And a third: Martin Samuel Cohen offers the following as a possible solution to the problem of pseudepigraphy in the *Hekbalot* and the *Shi'ur Qomah:* "If it was the author of the [Shi'ur Qomah] Urtext, himself, who experienced the mystic union of which the divine names and dimensions are the revelatory result, then perhaps it was also he who attributed the texts which presented them to R. Aqiba, R. Ishmael and R. Nathan. . . . Ultimately, the question rests on the obscure issue of the way in which the attributor understood his own creative process. If he was a *bona fide* mystic, who experienced visions and revelations of Metatron, who told him these teachings in the names of the tannaitic authorities to whom they are attributed, then the question of pseudepigraphy is solved—the ascriptions are part of the revelation, not its frame. . . . As such, they need not be justified any further; the attributions may have been as mysterious to the author as they are to his readers, and have come from the same inner source as the rest of his mystic information" (1983:87). Despite his confusing reference to an "inner source," Cohen's argument seems to require that the author of *Shi'ur Qomah* have been in contact with some real source other than himself, who reveals to him things he would not otherwise have known. Cohen elsewhere refers to "facts," "mystic data," and "real mystic revelation" underlying *Shi'ur Qomah,* as if they had objective existence (ibid., pp. 6, 19, 51, 80, 101, 168). Once again, a modern scholar talks as if he believes or half-believes that the visions he discusses are real in some objective sense, but does not quite want to say so.

I have quoted from these authors at some length, lest I be supposed to have set up a straw man for demolition. They seem to me to express a fairly widespread attitude, of half-belief in some sort of worlds that contain the things described in the apocalypses and the *Hekbalot.*

I would not dogmatically deny that such worlds exist, simply because none of the astronauts managed to see them. But I do need to know how they are to be fit into a scientific view of the universe. In the absence of such an explanation, I will stand on one premise: that the things described in an account of heavenly ascension (or of any other visionary experience), insofar as they are not ordinary objects in the material world, are the creations of the author of that account (or of his ultimate human source). It was *he* who shaped them, consciously or unconsciously. To ask what they mean is to ask what *he* meant by imagining them.

The dichotomy, then, of a "real" vision and one that is not "real," is misleading. The appropriate distinction is between *fantasy* and *hallucination.* In the former case, the originator of the account imagines something, consciously aware that it has no existence outside his imagination. In the latter, he constructs it in his unconscious, as we construct our dreams, and consciously misperceives it as something given him from the outside. Lindblom reminds us that there is a range of experiences between these two (1967:36–43). All have in common that the individual constructs them, out of his personal experiences and out of his cultural background.

I will presently take up the question of how we can distinguish fantasy from hallucination; and, once we have made our decision, what follows from it.

III. Dichotomy #2: Vision vs. Report of Vision

To illustrate the second dichotomy, I quote Morton Enslin's skeptical view of the ecstatic experience underlying the Book of Revelation:

> Again, the book is solely the product of study and reflection. No living man, even in the wildest vision or nightmare, actually saw the things he describes. They are simply paper descriptions. Again and again the same event is portrayed in different visions—as is also notably the case in Daniel—or, as

> has already been remarked, he *sees* it again in preparation. Nor is it out of place to remark that, even if he had actually *seen* them, the mind of man is such that he could not have remembered them all in this welter of detail. He may well have been an ecstatic. But his *seeing* is simply the conventional means of describing what he wants to represent. (Enslin 1938:363–364)

Enslin's italicized *seeing* reflects the same fallacy as Scholem's italicized *real.* After all, no one ever "actually *saw*" anything in a nightmare. But, when Enslin doubts whether John of Patmos could have remembered so elaborate a vision long enough to write it down, he raises a different issue. This is the split between the vision *as experienced,* the vision *as remembered,* and the vision *as reported.*

There is no doubt that we often forget our dreams or portions of our dreams, or that our memory may distort those dreams that we do remember (Freud 1965:550–571). But the process is very different from that of forgetting or misrepresenting the details of something that happens in the external world, such as a complicated auto accident. The extent to which I can describe the accident accurately will depend on the extent to which my senses can register the bewildering variety of stimuli, the extent to which my memory can preserve them, and the extent to which I can later verbalize my memories. At each stage there is a loss, and each loss makes it harder for me to put what I have seen into words.

A dream is different. Nothing has happened outside me; my senses have had to perceive nothing. Rather, I have made a pictorial representation from my own thoughts. The "I" who remembers this representation, and the "I" who describes it, are no other than the "I" who first created it. When I remember my dream, I am in a sense rethinking my own thoughts. Considered this way, "How can I remember my dreams?" is less a problem than, "Why should I forget them?" And the Freudian answer to the latter question, that I am repressing thoughts I have had but do not want to own up to, seems plausible to me.

This has an important implication for us. Where an external event is at issue, memory and verbalization are bound to be successive veils cloaking the reality of the event. But, in the case of a vision, there is no need to imagine a gap between the experience and the report of it, or to conceive the report as a barrier between us and the significance of the experience. Enslin may be right: what John of Patmos describes in Revelation may not have been a vision. But, if we choose to believe John's claim, we need not think it would have been any harder for him to remember his vision than to have created it in the first place. Nor have we any reason to believe that the language he chose to express his vision is a less reliable guide to its meaning than the (irretrievable) vision itself would be.

I am therefore wary of any treatment of apocalyptic visions that assumes a tension between the vision itself and the words chosen to describe it. I do not, for example, accept Lindblom's view that "inexpressibility" is a distinguishing mark of an authentic vision; that, "on account of the nature of the material, and on account of the unique nature of the experiences, the visionaries always have difficulty communicating what they have experienced. What they see and hear goes beyond all human understanding and resists all attempts to report it in human words" (Lindblom 1968:219, followed by Rowland 1982:235–236).[4] The human mind itself created the vision. How then can it go beyond all human understanding?

[4] "Unaussprechlichkeit: Wegen der Art des Stoffes und der Eigenart des Erlebens haben die Visionäre immer Schwierigkeiten, das Erlebte wiederzugeben. Was sie sehen und hören, geht über allen menschlichen Verstand und widerstrebt aller Nacherzählung mit menschlichen Worten."

As I put my trust in the language the visionary uses to describe his experience, I put a more qualified trust in the interpretation he gives to his experience. Not that I believe it is the only, or even the deepest, interpretation. We will see that visions, like dreams, can have meanings which the visionary himself gives no sign of being aware of. But, as long as I believe that the visionary is the author of the interpretation, I would not oppose vision and interpretation to one another.

I would thus disagree with Christopher Rowland; who, in a thorough and judicious discussion of the experiential basis of apocalyptic visions (1982:214–247), takes it as a sign that a vision is genuine if it does not quite jibe with the interpretation of it that the apocalyptist gives. This argument would be entirely plausible if we were to suppose that the vision is a prior source which lay before the apocalyptist, and which he cannot be supposed always to have understood correctly. Sometimes, of course, this may be the case: an apocalyptic writer may copy a vision from some older text, and then set about interpreting or misinterpreting it. But if, as Rowland assumes, the vision is the apocalyptist's own, I will assume that the interpretation he gives of it conveys at least part of what he intended when he created it.

Rowland at one point qualifies his position: "No doubt the visionary believed that the interpretation itself was just as much under the influence of divine guidance as the original vision. . . . Although the part which reflection played on the original vision was probably considerable, the evidence which we possess of the apocalyptic seer preparing himself to learn more about the vision which he has already seen suggests that he considered the reflective process itself and the answers which emerged equally the result of divine guidance" (ibid., 240). I agree entirely. I further believe that the visionary was objectively correct in seeing the same spirit behind the vision and its interpretation. Only, the spirit was his own.

IV. Dichotomy #3: "Real" vs. "Literary"

What is the opposite of a "real" vision or ecstatic experience? The antonym that most frequently occurs in modern discussions is "literary." (The opening sentence of Lindblom 1968:206 is one example out of many.)

This antithesis reflects two opposing images. In the first, the visionary goes into trance, sees what he sees; and, emerging from trance, hastily scribbles it down or relates it to his disciples. (Or, perhaps, his disciples take down the words he utters while he is still in trance; Scholem 1965:10.) This is a "real" visionary, who has "real" experiences. In the second image, the so-called "visionary" sits tranquilly at his desk, deliberately constructing his "visions" from bits and pieces of older sources and traditions. His Bible, and perhaps the writings of older apocalyptists, lie open before him. He ponders the words of the sacred text, combining and expounding them in ways he learned from his teachers, or perhaps has now devised himself. Out of this conscious intellectual process comes a "vision" which is nothing more than a literary creation.

Imagine, for example, John of Patmos writing what is now the tenth chapter of Revelation. He remembers an episode from one of his favorite prophets, Ezekiel, in which the seer eats a scroll which God has handed to him (2:8–3:3). He thinks: That's a fine detail for my own vision! But wait: Ezekiel says that the scroll *was in my mouth as sweet as honey* (3:3); yet, a little later on, *I went in bitterness in the heat of my spirit* (3:14). Why should he be *bitter*, if he had eaten a *sweet* scroll? But, on the other hand, how could the scroll be *sweet* if it had *written on it words of lamentation and mourning and woe* (2:9)? This consideration will explain what any midrashic thinker would perceive as a problem, the otiose *in my mouth* in 3:3. The solution: it was only *in my mouth* that the scroll was as

sweet as honey; somewhere else, presumably in the prophet's stomach, it was *bitter.* Satisfied, John of Patmos turns his midrash into first person: "And I took the little scroll from the hand of the angel and ate it; it was sweet as honey in my mouth, but when I had eaten it my stomach was made bitter" (10:10).[5] Thus a "literary" vision is created.

We might imagine from this that an apocalyptic writer's heavy use of literary texts, notably the Hebrew Bible, would betray that his visions are "literary." But modern scholars do not seem to find this a very useful criterion. Lindblom, for example, observes that Revelation 16:1–19:8 is saturated with Biblical allusions, and seems to think this indicates that this section is "literary (1968:234). But the heavy use of Biblical images in 1:9–20 and chapter 4 does not prevent Lindblom from regarding these passages as genuinely visionary. "The visionaries," he observes, "do not create *ex nihilo.* Their visions are always to a great extent constructed from traditional material, material which had a latent existence in their inner selves, before it was objectified in ecstasy."[6]

Rowland goes further. He sees meditation on the text of Scripture as a way in which real visions were generated (1982:215–218). If he is right—and experiences claimed by the mystics of sixteenth-century Safed (Werblowsky 1977:50–55) confirm that his view is at least plausible—we can imagine an alternative account of the formation of Revelation 10, this time conceived as a "real" vision.

Rowland formulates the alternatives as follows: ". . . whether the vision of God in the apocalypses is merely a description of God which is a repetition of material in Ezekiel 1 and Isaiah 6 or shows signs of being a subject of interest in its own right which may have involved the writer in actually seeing again the vision of Ezekiel" (1982:218–219). At first sight, this seems fair enough. But cross out the meaningless pejorative "merely"; cross out the misleading "actually" (the writer "actually" saw nothing)—and what exactly is the difference between Rowland's alternatives? Either way, the author has taken material left him by Isaiah and Ezekiel, and made something of his own out of it.

Indeed, I question whether the ingredients that go into a "real" vision are in any way different from those that go into a "literary" one. I would recall, too, that there is such a thing as "literary inspiration," which may be claimed by people who have never gone into a trance in their lives. The "inspired" writer, hardly less than the visionary, perceives his inspiration as something outside his control, and perhaps outside himself altogether (Merkur 1985:58–63, cf. Lindblom 1967:2–4). These points considered, the gulf between "real" and "literary" visions shrinks dramatically.

It does not vanish altogether. We are right to put the third-person rabbinic accounts of Moses' ascent in a distinct category from the first-person apocalyptic accounts of Enoch's ascent, and from the instructions for ascent that *Hekhalot Rabbati* puts in the mouth of R. Nehuniah b. ha-Kanah. The Moses stories are plainly "literary"; there is little evidence that anyone ever claimed them as his own experience. But we will also be right if we treat the three categories of evidence in the same framework, suppose that they share common understandings of the significance of the ascent, and attach only secondary

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[5] So Charles 1920:1:267–268. The parallel exegesis of Ezekiel 3, by the twelfth-century French-Jewish commentator Eliezer of Beaugency (ed. Poznanski 1913:7–8), persuades me that Charles has correctly understood the exegetical process behind Revelation 10:8–11.

[6] "Die Visionäre schöpfen nicht aus dem Nichts; ihre Visionen sind immer zum grossen Teil aus herkömmlichem Material aufgebaut, einem Material, das latent in ihrem Innern existierte, ehe es in der Ekstase objektiviert wurde" (1968:221–222).

importance to the question of whether the authors know they have imagined what they describe or think they have experienced it. The distinction between "real" and "literary," between hallucination and fantasy, is a matter of shading rather than opposition. Whichever side we take on the question of the "reality" of the ascensions in the apocalypses and the *Hekbalot,* the essential difference between these passages and the Moses legends lies in the degree of conviction claimed by their originators.

V. How To Tell Fantasy From Hallucination

Can the decision between hallucination and fantasy, "real" and "literary" visionary experience, be made at all?

Lindblom, discussing the visions of the Book of Revelation, proposes eight indicators of the "genuine" vision: spontaneity; simplicity; dreamlike quality; freshness; concern with the supermundane; inexpressibility (see above); emotional side effects; and notation of date or locality (1968:219). Rowland accepts all of these indicators except for spontaneity and concern with the supermundane (1982:235–236).

My own view is that Lindblom's criteria, though including some useful observations, are arbitrarily conceived and indeed self-contradictory.[7] I have the impression that Lindblom, and other modern writers, are working from one other, unstated, criterion: If it is vivid, exciting, and moving, it is likely to be "real." This criterion may have some value when we are talking about accounts of objectively real experiences in the material world, and asking whether they are true or not. But, applied to experiences which are on no account objectively real, which are on any hypothesis products of the human mind—whether fantasy or hallucination—it is bound to be ineffective. The fantasies of science-fiction writers are often enthralling. And, it has been said, nothing is duller than other people's dreams.

Only one criterion seems to me to have the slightest validity in distinguishing consciously created fantasy from unconsciously created hallucination. It is this: Do the images used by the writer have symbolic meanings which, when deciphered, yield a more or less coherent and convincing interpretation, but which the writer gives no indication he is consciously aware of? To the degree to which the symbols of the vision are outside the writer's conscious control, we may assume that the vision itself is outside his conscious control.

This distinction is not quite the same as the one implied by Rowland, which I earlier criticized, between the vision itself and the visionary's interpretation or elaboration of it. For one thing, I stress the word *conscious:* the visionary creates the vision himself, at all its levels, out of his own background and needs; but he is not necessarily conscious of all the needs that impel him. Second, I do not suppose that the visionary's understanding is false to the vision's meaning. But it may be incomplete: his conscious understanding may not embrace the totality of what he wanted to convey.

The literary artist, too, does not always consciously understand the full meaning of

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[7] A vision must be spontaneous, yet may be to some extent prepared for (criterion #1). Visions "will never have the appearance of being creations of the visionary himself" ("werden sie niemals als Schöpfungen des Visionärs selber angesehen," #1); yet their perceived material "is drawn from the experience and knowledge of the visionary" ("[d]er Wahrnehmungsstoff der Visionen ist der Erfahrung und dem Wissen des Visionärs entnommen," #3).

everything he writes. This criterion, therefore, has only relative validity. It is a matter of degree: If I am a fiction writer, I *normally* understand what I mean to convey in the stories I write. I *normally* do not understand my dreams.

Enoch's second dream vision, in 1 Enoch chapters 85–90, seems to me a particularly clear example of a symbolic vision whose author is in complete conscious control of his symbols. (I use the translation in Sparks 1984; f Charles 1913, Charlesworth 1983.) The author describes a long series of dream-events involving animals, all of which represent figures of Biblical and contemporary history. A white bull and heifer appear first, and beget three bulls, black, red, and white. Plainly enough, these are Adam, Eve, and their sons. The bulls' offspring tend to degenerate into other animals. At one point, a white bull (Isaac) begets a black wild boar and a white sheep, and that white sheep begets twelve more sheep. The vision then traces the adventures of the sheep descended from those twelve, and their relations with "the Lord of the sheep." At the very end, a ram with a great horn, helped by "the Lord of the sheep" and his deputy, defends the sheep against predatory birds who menace them. There follows a judgment, the building of a new house for "the Lord of the sheep," the gathering of all birds and animals to that house. Finally, "I looked until all their species were transformed, and they all became white bulls. . . . And the Lord of the sheep rejoiced over them and over all the bulls" (90:38).

Not all of these details are clear to us. (Does the ram with the great horn represent Judah the Maccabee?) But we have no reason to believe that any of them was unclear to the writer, or involves layers of meaning which he did not consciously grasp. One part of Enoch's dream is openly sexual: stars fall from heaven, "let out their private parts like horses and began to mount the cows of the bulls, and they all became pregnant and bore elephants and camels and asses" (86:4). But nothing about this leads me to suspect the author is expressing unconscious sexual impulses. The fallen stars are the fallen angels of Genesis 6:1–4; this passage, like the rest of the dream, is a symbolic recapitulation of Biblical history. The fiction of a "dream" notwithstanding, I see no reason to believe the author does not know exactly what he is doing with his images.

But now consider a passage from *Hekbalot Rabbati*, one of the prescriptions for ascent that I mentioned earlier.[8] When the traveller to the *merkabah* enters "the gate of the seventh palace," R. Nehuniah b. ha-Kanah explains, the "holy *ḥayyot*" will "look at him with their five hundred and twelve eyes.[9] Each one of the eyes of the holy *ḥayyot* is split open, the size of a large winnowers' sieve; and their eyes look as if *they race like lightnings*.[10] Besides them, there are the eyes of the mighty cherubim and of the *'ofannim* of the Shechinah, which look like torches and flaming coals. The man shudders and trembles and recoils; he faints in terror and collapses."

The visionary's affect is connected with one specific feature of the celestial beings: their eyes. When they turn their eyes upon him, he faints in terror. When, in the sequel, they cover or turn away their faces (and hence their eyes), he can recover. We must ask if there is something inherently terrifying about these eyes. And we must complement this question with the observation that the eyes are in fact very odd. Not only are they

[8] Paragraphs 241–250 of Schäfer's edition (1981), chapters 23–24 of Wertheimer's edition (1968) and Grodner's translation (Blumenthal 1978). I here summarize my full discussion of the passage (1987a).

[9] The number derives from an exegetical tradition based on Targ. Ezekiel 1:6, developed in the *Hekbalot* (details in Halperin 1987a, 1987b).

[10] Nahum 2:5; cf. Ezekiel 1:13–14.

enormous, as one might perhaps expect from the enormous angels of the *Hekbalot;* they are *split open.* What can this mean? Why is a *sieve* specifically chosen to compare with them? If we can provide an answer to these questions that will simultaneously answer the question of why the eyes are terrifying, we may suppose that we have correctly understood the dynamics that underlie this passage.

I believe this can be done. Another passage of *Hekbalot Rabbati,* which uses similar language in a different context, suggests that the "split open," sieve-like eyes are representations of female genitals. Evidence from rabbinic and classical sources supports this view. (Details in Halperin 1987a.) Once this is supposed, the visionary's reaction becomes wholly intelligible. Myths, legends, and folk customs from a wide variety of cultures point to a widespread male terror of the female genitals, for which psychoanalytic writers have offered various explanations (Freud 1955:273–274, Slater 1968:16–23, 317–324, Spiro 1982:113–10). We do not normally find that males are conscious of this fear; or that, when they use representations of the genitals as fear-inspiring (often apotropaic) images, they are consciously aware of what they are doing. I see no reason to suppose that the *Hekbalot* writer was different in this respect. His representation of the female genitals and of his dread of them, which we must presume him to have shaped unconsciously, contrasts sharply with the conscious representation of the male genitals in 1 Enoch 86:4.

We perhaps have another example of unconscious sexual symbolization in Revelation 12:13–18:

> [13]And when the dragon saw that he had been thrown down to the earth, he pursued the woman who had borne the male child. [14]But the woman was given the two wings of the great eagle that she might fly from the serpent into the wilderness, to the place where she is to be nourished for a time, and times, and half a time. [15]The serpent poured water like a river out of his mouth after the woman, to sweep her away with the flood. [16]But the earth came to the help of the woman, and the earth opened its mouth and swallowed the river which the dragon had poured from his mouth. [17]Then the dragon was angry with the woman, and went off to make war on the rest of her offspring [*spermatos,* literally "seed"], on those who keep the commandments of God and bear testimony to Jesus.

The image of verses 15–16, like the rest of chapter 12, is surely rich in mythological resonances of the most varied kinds (Collins 1976). But, when I hear of a dream or vision or fantasy in which a snake chases a woman and squirts water at her out of his mouth, I cannot doubt that one of the things the dreamer or visionary has on his mind is sex.[11] The earth's opening its mouth, to swallow the dragon's water, confirms this understanding. And it is perhaps in this connection that we can understand verse 17's puzzling reference to "the rest of her seed"; conceivably, the seed with which the woman is now impregnated.

What might be the role of these sexual images in the visionary complexes in which they occur? I can answer only very tentatively. I have suggested (1987b and forthcoming) that

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[11] *Drakōn* and *opbis* both mean "serpent." It is curious, however, that the author uses *drakōn* throughout the chapter, *opbis* only in verse 15 and the very end of 14 (in the Greek; RSV changes the word order)—plus verse 9, where, as in 20:2, *drakōn* and *opbis* are equated. Perhaps *opbis* has a more clearly phallic association than *drakōn?* The article "Schlange," in Pauly-Wissowa (1923:495), claims that Aristophanes uses *opbis* for a limp penis, in *Lysistrata* 759 and *Ecclesiazousae* 909.

the theme of heavenly ascent is bound up with what Ernest Jones has called "the world-old conflict between father and son, between the younger and the older generation, the favourite theme of so many poets and writers, the central *motif* of most mythologies and religions" (1949:75–76). The child climbs from the ground to the heights of the adult world, and, at the end of his climb, grasps at the power (sexual and otherwise) that once belonged to the adult alone. His body is transformed in the process. (The paradigm for this ascension and transformation in the *Hekhalot* is Enoch-Metatron; who, significantly, is regularly given the title "youth.") If, now, the ascension in *Hekhalot Rabbati* reflects, at least in part, a child's fantasy of climbing to the lofty and forbidden realms of adult sexuality, it makes sense that the visionary would unconsciously expect to meet obstacles in the form of his sexual fears.

The Book of Revelation states fairly explicitly the theme of the son's struggling for and finally grasping a share of his father's power. "He who conquers," Jesus promises, "I will grant him to sit with me on my throne, as I myself conquered and sat down with my Father on his throne" (3:21). The Lamb's progress reflects this achievement. At first he stands before his father's throne, bloodily slaughtered (5:6, 9, 12). At the end of the book, joined with his bride (21:9), he shares that throne (22:1–3). If generational conflict is one of the motifs underlying the Book of Revelation—naturally, I do not suggest that it is the only or even the primary motif—it may perhaps provide a context for the vivid sexual image of 12:15.

In both *Hekhalot Rabbati* and the Book of Revelation, we may imagine that unconscious images, perhaps originally created in dreams, found their way into the authors' conscious fantasies. But *Hekhalot Rabbati's* explicit claim, to prescribe a method for an ecstatic journey to the *merkabah*, suggests another model. Some men, perhaps, believed that ecstatic techniques would give them the power to act out early fantasies of growth, transformation, and sexual achievement—fantasies which they consciously held only in a much disguised form. Some of them managed to do so, in trance-induced hallucinations. Primitive sexual fears found their way, again in disguise, into these hallucinations. Terrifying visions resulted. Over the years, these were shaped into a mythology of celestial dangers, ultimately recorded in the *Hekhalot*. If this is true, we at last can fathom "the mystical experience of the dangers of the ascent" (Scholem 1954:53), and can understand in what ways it is and is not "real."

VI. What Does It Profit?

In the preceding section, I have shown how we can sometimes decide whether a vision is likely to be "real" or "literary." But, earlier on, I argued that the importance of this distinction is very far from crucial. What, then, do we gain from making the choice?

We do *not* gain any fuller understanding of the vision's meaning. I have indicated the fallacy of supposing that, by saying that the *Hekhalot* "water" test reflects some "real" ecstatic experience, we have done anything to explain it. True, by postulating a bona fide hallucination behind a visionary account, we may make ourselves more sensitive to any unconscious material that account may contain, and our understanding of it will gain thereby. But this postulate will be only a heuristic device that encourages us to do what we ought to be doing anyway.

Ecstatic trance has implications, not only for the psychology of the individual who practices it, but also for his society and his relation to it (Lewis 1978). If we could show that some Jews in antiquity used certain techniques to achieve hallucinatory experiences, and that they made claims to religious authority on the basis of those experiences, we would have made a valuable contribution to the social history of early Judaism. Given,

however, that there are other ways beside ecstatic trance for unconscious material to make its way into visionary reports—most obviously, through dreams—it is risky to deduce the practice of visionary ecstasy solely from the presence of such material. Where, as in the *Hekhalot*, we have explicit evidence for ecstasy outside the visions themselves,[12] we can use unconscious material in the visions to confirm this evidence. But where such evidence is missing, as in the apocalypses (except, perhaps, for Revelation), unconscious material in the visions cannot take its place.

The consequences of distinguishing "real" from "literary" visions, then, are rather meager. Nevertheless, the question of the place of the heavenly ascent and other visionary experiences in the psychic lives of the people who imagined them—were they fantasies? dreams? hallucinations?—retains the greatest inherent interest.

Our ancient predecessors, living in a time and place remote from us, shaped by a culture alien to us, were nevertheless our fellow-creatures; not least in that they, like us, had hidden selves to which they had only occasional access. No one who cares about their experience can be indifferent to the question of what their modes of access were.[13]

That is why the experiential questions bound up with the heavenly ascension remain, for all the reservations I have expressed here, topics of substantial importance and continuing fascination.

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[12] I have, however, noted some reservations (1984, 1987b).

[13] Erwin R. Goodenough has some marvellously eloquent observations on the difficulty, and the necessity, of understanding people of the past (1962:22–29).

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The Transformation of the Spectator: Power, Perception, and the Day of Salvation

Paul Duff
College of St. Thomas
St. Paul, MN 55105

The present study explores the role of the cultic, epiphany-type procession[1] as the mediator of salvation in the Greco-Roman world. It focuses on two texts, each of which link the occurence of a procession with "the day of salvation:" 1) Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* 11 which describes an Isis procession and 2) an independent letter fragment found in 2 Corinthians (2 Cor. 2:14–6:13; 7:2–4)[2] in which the apostle Paul metaphorically depicts his missionary activities with images drawn from the cultic processions of the Greco-Roman world.

Despite their obvious differences, these two texts contain a surprising number of common themes, all revolving around the phenomenon of the procession. In each text, the procession is viewed as a vehicle for the propagation of the cult. As such, the procession presents an epiphany of the deity, described as the "power of the god," to the general public. Both authors entertain the possibility of either a positive or a negative response to the epiphany. A positive response from those viewing the epiphany insures

[1] This type of procession featured the visitation of the deity in any number of ways: 1) The deity could appear in person a) represented by a statue (0. Nussbaum, "Geleit," RAC 9 [1976], col. 984) as in the Attic Anthesteria (see Ludwig Deubner, *Attische Feste* [Berlin: H. Keller, 1932], p. 139; A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953], pp. 59–60; Herbert William Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977], p 127) or the City Dionysia (Deubner, pp. 102–11; Pickard-Cambridge, pp. 12–13; Parke, p. 109) or b) an individual representing the deity (Nussbaum, col. 984) as in the Isis procession described by Apuleius 11. 11 (274, 14ff), in the Theban Daphnephoria (see Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion,* trans. John Raffan [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985], pp. 100–101) or in the procession for Artemis Laphria in Patrai (Paus. 7. 18. 11; See S. Eitrem, *Beiträge zur griechischen Religionsgeschichte* III *Die Prozessionen,* Schrifter utg. av Videnskapsselskapet i Kristiana. Hist.-Phil. Klasse, 1919), p. 88.); 2) The deity could be represented by sacred objects or symbols as in the Dionysus processions where the deity was represented by the phallus (see Bömer, "Pompa," PW 21.2 [1952], cols. 1900–1901; Nussbaum, col. 985); or even scenes from the life of the deity (see Ptolemy's Dionysus procession in Athen. 200B-C).

[2] This study presupposes the division of 2 Corinthians as hypothesized by Günther Bornkamm in "Die Vorgeschichte des sogenannten Zweiten Korintherbriefs," in *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse,* 1961, 2 (A shorter English version of this study has been published in *NTS* 8 [1962], pp. 258–264 and reprinted in *The Authority and Integrity of the New Testament* [London: SPCK, 1965]).

salvation which, in turn, effects the transformation of the believer, whereas a negative response leaves the individual at the hands of Fate or "the god of this age."

THE TEXTS

In chapter 11 of the Metamorphoses, Apuleius describes the celebration of the *navigium Isidus* (*ploiaphesia*), a yearly festival, during which a ship, dedicated to Isis, was launched in the sea to mark the opening of the navigation season.[3] Apuleius' Isis herself describes the festival:

> When the storms of winter have been calmed, and the wild waves of the sea have been stilled, my priests are wont to vow a new barque to the now navigable sea and offer it as first-fruits of a new year's navigation." (11. 5 [270, 6–8])[4]

Prior to its launch, the ship was carried in procession to the seashore. It is during this procession that Lucius, by the power of Isis, regains his human form.[5]

In 2 Cor. 2:14–7:4, Paul presents the Corinthians with a detailed defense of his ministry. Throughout his defense, he metaphorically depicts himself as a participant in a cultic procession. This hearkening to the procession is especially apparent in 2 Cor. 2:14–16; 4:7–12; 6:13–7:2, the beginning, middle, and end of the letter fragment.

At the beginning of the letter (2:14), Paul states: "Thanks be to God who always leads us in triumph (*thriambeuō*) alluding to the triumphal procession in which prisoners of war were paraded to their execution.[6] In the verses immediately following, he describes himself as a "pleasant fragrance," (*euōdia*) alluding to such aromatic substances as incense or scented oil which accompanied many processions in the Greco-Roman world.[7]

In 2 Cor. 4:7, Paul refers to himself as a "clay vessel" containing the "transcendent power [which] belongs to God." (*hēhyperbolē tēs dynameōs ē tou theou*). This self-description calls to mind certain vessels carried in procession which contained sacred objects manifesting the epiphany of the deity. Some examples include the water jar (*hydreion*) carried in the processions of the Egyptian cults[8] or the *kistē* carried in the processions of the mystery

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[3] For a description of this ritual, see J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Apuleius of Madauros: The Isis Book*, Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'empire romain (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), pp. 31ff.

[4] Unless otherwise specified, all translations of Apuleius are by Griffiths.

[5] Although the procession is an offering procession, that is, it has as its function the presentation of an offering to the deity, in Apuleius' account, the procession's manifestation of the epiphany of Isis is highlighted. This is characteristic of Greco-Roman offering processions. During this time offering processions often came to include the carrying of the deity's image or objects sacred to the deity.

[6] See especially Peter Marshall, "A Metaphor of Social Shame: *THRIAMBEUEIN* in 2 Cor 2:14," *NovT* 25 (1983), pp. 302–317. See also Scott Hafemann, *Suffering and the Spirit*, WUNT 2, 19 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1986), especially pp. 7–39.

[7] E.g. Athen. 194Cff.; 197E; Apul. *Met.* 11.9 (273, 3–5). For other references see Nussbaum, col. 988.

[8] Cf. Plut. *Is. et Os.* 36 (365B); 38 (366A).

cults. In such instances, the vessels gained their significance as the bearers of the more significant epiphany of the deity.[9]

2 Cor. 4:10 describes Paul's missionary journeys as a continuous apiphany procession. It depicts the apostle as "always carrying around (*peripherōn*) the dying of Jesus" in his body. The verb *peripherō* is a term often used in descriptions of epiphany processions to refer to the carrying of the image of a deity or a sacred object.[10]

Finally, at the end of the letter, in 2 Cor. 6:13b–7:2a, Paul addresses the Corinthian community: "Be wide open (*platunthēte*) for us . . . Make room (*chorēsate*) for us." This language calls to mind the cry of the cultic official responsible for leading the procession.[11]

THE PROCESSION IN GRECO-ROMAN CULTURE

In a sense, these texts reflect the culmination of the development of the ritual of the procession in Greco-Roman culture, a culture which saw a dramatic shift in the focus of the cultic procession. In the city state of classical times, the offering procession—a ritual whose function was the presentation of a gift or gifts to the deity—was the dominant type of procession. In the Hellenistic period, on the other hand, theophoric processions—ceremonies which featured the epiphany of the deity—rose to prominence.[12] This change in emphasis was accompanied by an incredible rise in the popularity of religious processions in the Hellenistic and Roman eras. One modern scholar has hypothesized that an individual travelling through Greece at this time would have been able to participate in a cultic procession practically every day.[13]

These theophoric or epiphany processions often featured the carrying of sacred objects which were associated with the deity. Frequently, the objects reminded those viewing the procession of a beneficent action of a deity. For example, Plutarch explains the reason for the various objects carried in some of the processions of the Egyptian cults:

> Not only the Nile, but every form of moisture they call simply the effusion of Osiris; and in their holy rites the water jar in honor of the god heads the procession. And by the picture of a rush, they represent a king and the southern region of the world, and the rush is interpreted to mean the watering and fructifying of all things, and in its nature it seems to bear some resemblance to the generative member. Moreover when they celebrate the

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[9] Plutarch (*Is. et Os.* 3 [352B]) uses a similar metaphor: "These [i.e. the bearers of the sacred vessels"] are they who within their own soul, as though within a casket (*kistē*), bear the sacred writings about the gods clear of all superstition and pedantry; and they cloak them with secrecy, thus giving intimations, some dark and shadowy, some clear and bright, of their concepts about the gods." (Trans. Frank Cole Babbitt, LCL).

[10] E.g. Plut. *Is. et Os.* 17 (357F); 36 (365B) Cl. Al. *Prot.* 4. 59. 2; Paus. 9. 22. 1–2. The use of the verbal root *-phero* in connection with Greco-Roman processions is well known and need not be discussed here.

[11] Nussbaum, cols. 986–7. For examples, see Apul. *Met.* 11. 9 (273, 13–14): et plerique qui facilem sacris viam dari praedicarent ("and there were many shouting out, 'Keep the way clear for the holy procession' "); also Aristoph. *Ran.* 353ff.; Eur. *Ba.* 68ff.; Athen. 622C.

[12] This change in emphasis was due, at least in part, to the influence of oriental culture. See Nussbaum, col. 984; Bömer, col. 1897.

[13] Bömer, col. 1895.

> festival of Pamylia which, as has been said, is of a phallic nature, they expose and carry about a statue of which the male member is triple; for the god is the Source, and every source, by its fecundity, multiplies what proceeds from it . . . .[14]

Likewise, Diodorus describes an Isis procession in which Isis is clearly identified with Demeter:

> Moreover in some cities, during the festival of Isis as well, stalks of wheat and barley are carried among the other objects in procession, as a memorial of what the goddess so ingeniously discovered at the beginning.[15]

In the same way, in the Dionysian section of Ptolemy's procession, the beneficent action of that deity on behalf of mankind is graphically portrayed:

> Next, another four-wheeled cart, 30 feet long by 24 feet wide, was pulled by 300 men, on which there was set up a wine-press 36 feet long by 22½ feet wide, full of ripe grapes. Sixty Satyrs trampled them as they sang a vintage song to the flute, and a Silenos superintended them. The grape juice flowed through the whole street.
>
> Next there came a four-wheeled cart 37½ feet long by 21 feet wide, which was pulled by 600 men. On it was an askos made of leopard skins which held 3,000 measures. as the wine was released little by little, it also flowed over the whole street.[16]

In this description, two vehicles, whose resemblence to modern day parade floats cannot escape notice, are depicted. The first "float" contains a large wine press where grapes are actually being trampled as the cart moves through the city. The next "float" holds a huge askos, in this case stitched from leopard skins (an animal sacred to Dionysus).[17] From this "float" wine flowed through the street. During the course of the procession through the city of Alexandria, a miracle was shown to the viewers: grapes were transformed into wine, Dionysus' gift to mankind.[18]

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[14] Plut. *Is. et Os.* 3 (352B), trans. Babbitt.

[15] Diod. S. 1. 14. 3. cf. the Demeter procession described by Callimachus in his hymn to Demeter (Callim. *Hymn.* 6, 1–5).

[16] Athen. 199A-B, trans. E. E. Rice. *The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 21.

[17] The usual askos was made from a goat skin. See Rice, pp. 70ff.

[18] The processions of some of the Greco-Roman mystery cults show a further development which can be seen in the procession of the devotees of the Dionysus Mysteries. The elements and order of their procession has been preserved in an inscription found in Italy in the early part of this century. (The inscription is preserved on the base which once held the statue of Pompeia Agrippinilla, wife of Gaius Squilla Gallicanus, consul in 150 A.D. For a reproduction, description, and commentaries on the inscription, see A. Vogliano and F. Cumont, "La grande inscrizione bacchica del Metropolitan Museum," *AJA* 37 (1933), pp. 264ff.) Two of the most significant objects carried in the procession were the phallus and the *liknon* or winnowing fan. These objects in some way represented the presence of the god in that they recalled the mythology of the deity in its various manifestations (The connection of the phallus and Dionysus' death is found in Cl. Al. *Prot.* 2.19.4 with schol. The connection of the *liknon* with Dionysus death and rebirth is

The processions depicted in Apuleius and alluded to in Paul (especially in 2 Cor. 4:7ff.) suggest a development in the ritual. In each of these processions, whether literal or figurative, the saving action of the deity is displayed in a dramatic way for the purpose of converting those watching. Whereas, it seems that, originally, epiphany processions were staged for the benefit of believers, these processions were aimed at unbelievers.

THE PROCESSION IN APULEIUS AND PAUL

In each of the texts under discussion, it is divine power exhibited in the midst of the procession which manifests the presence of the deity: the *maximi numinis potentia* in Apuleius' text (11. 13 [276, 11]), *bē dynamis tou theou* in Paul's letter (2 Cor. 4:7).

In the former text, the asinine Lucius is offered a garland of roses during the course of the procession. As he eats the roses and is transformed into a human being, the bystanders are astonished by the miraculous power of the deity.

> The people marvelled, and the devotees expressed their adoration of such a manifest token of the highest deity's power (*maximi numinis potentiam*) as well as her easy skill in achieving my transformation. This they did with clear voices in unison, raising their hands to heaven and acclaiming the radiant blessing bestowed by the goddess (11. 13 [276, 10–13].

In the Pauline text, the "power of God" is demonstrated in such a way that there can be no question of its source (2 Cor. 4:7). This divine power is manifested in the apostle's participation in the experience of Jesus (2 Cor. 4:10). Paul's participation in Christ's sufferings (4:10a; 4:11a) enable him to also participate in the resurrection life (hē *zoē*) of Jesus. Of course, every Christian could claim the same experience. However, for the apostle, this drama unfolds in a public context. Paul's suffering, Paul's participation in the dying (*nekrōsis*) and rising (*zoē*) of Jesus takes place before the eyes of the Corinthians. 2 Cor. 4:12 clearly reveals the public nature of his experience: "So that death works in us, but life works in you." Consequently, it is not just the apostle who experiences the power of God at work in his life. The Corinthians also experience it. They see the apostle miraculously snatched from the jaws of death over and over again. Paul's processional imagery is particularly effective in this section of 2 Corinthians. Both the dying of Jesus and the miraculous life of Jesus are likened to cult objects displayed to bystanders in a procession. Paul ties the theological idea of Christ's saving death and subsequent

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(continued)
is illustrated in Servius' schol. on Verg. *G.* 1.165.) but more importantly, they symbolically evoked the hope of the initiates, that is, their imminent ritual death and rebirth. For example, just as grain was winnowed with the *liknon* so the initiate was purified with the winnowing basket (see Walter Burkert, *Homo Necans*, trans. Peter Bing [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983], pp. 267–268). According to a popular belief of the time, the human race sprang up from the ashes of both Dionysus and the Titans (cf. Plut. *Carn. Es.* 996C). The *liknon* quite suitably expressed the process of winnowing the "chaff" or Titanic elements of the individual and thus leaving only the Dionysian elements. The phallus, originally a fertility symbol, in Greco-Roman times symbolically disclosed the life-giving power of the generative organ (see Martin P. Nilsson, *The Dionysiac Mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman Age* [Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1957], pp. 44ff. and 142–43). The procession, by the display of these particular symbols, communicated the *saving* action of Dionysus to his devotees.

resurrection to his own experience and to the Corinthian's perception of that experience by means of the metaphor of the procession. The Corinthians might perceive Paul to be at death's door but, according to the apostle's metaphor, he is in reality carrying around and displaying the process of Jesus' death as a procession would carry around a cult object or even a scene from the life of the deity.[19] This "dying" results in the miraculous renewal of the Paul's life which the apostle identifies with the resurrection life of Jesus. As Erhardt Güttgemanns has put it, Paul depicts his body as "the object and site of the epiphany of the Kyrios."[20] An interesting, if less dramatic, parallel to Paul's metaphor is found in the letter of Ignatius of Antioch to the Ephesians. Ignatius addresses the Ephesians as though they were participants in an epiphany procession:

> You are all then members of the same cultis society (*synodoi*)[21] as "God-bearers" (*theopboroi*)[22] and "temple-bearers" (*naopboroi*),[23] "Christ-bearers" (*Christopboroi*), "bearers of the holy objects" (*hagiopboroi*), and in all ways adorned with the commandments[24] of Jesus Christ.[25]

Both Apuleius and Paul emphasize the power of the deity. This power, made apparent in the procession, is the vehicle of salvation in that it rescues both Apuleius and Paul from their misfortune. It is not insignificant that each text refers to the event of the procession, whether a literal or metaphorical rite, as the "day of salvation."

The phrase "the day of salvation" occurs in the *Metamorphoses* during Lucius' vision of Isis the night before his miraculous transformation. During his visionary experience, Isis addresses Lucius:

> I am here taking pity on your ills; I am here to give you aid and solace. Cease then from fears and wailings, set aside your sadness; there is now dawning for you, through my providence, the day of salvation (*dies salutaris*) (11. 5 [270, 4]).

In this narrative the "day of salvation" (*dies salutaris*) refers to the day of the Isis procession. The adjective *salutaris* in this context connotes a spiritual as well as physical salvation. Lucius is saved from his animal form but, at the same time, he also dedicates his life to the deity.[26]

In 2 Cor. 6:2b, Paul provides his readers with a commentary on Isa. 49:8 which he has cited in 6:2a.

> For he [God] says, "At the acceptable time I have listened to you, and helped you on the day of salvation (*hēmera sōterias*)." Behold, now is the acceptable time; behold, now is the day of salvation (*hēmera sōterias*).

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[19] Athen. 200B-201C.

[20] Erhardt Güttgemanns, *Der leidende Apostel und sein Herr* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p. 116.

[21] LSJ, s.v.

[22] The term *theopboroi* is used in the inscription mentioned above (see note 17) to describe the officials who carried the statue of the deity in procession. See Vogliano and Cumont, p. 267.

[23] The term *naopboroi* most likely refers to those who carried portable shrines in procession (see Hdt. 2. 62; Diod. S. 1. 97; 20. 14; Apul. *Met.* 11. 10 (274, 5).

[24] Cf. X. Eph. 1. 2.

[25] Ign. *Eph.* 9:2.

[26] Griffiths, p. 157; cf. Apuleius use of *salus* in 11. 21 (283, 5–6) and 11. 12 (275, 13).

It is in the context of an admonition (2 Cor. 6:1) that the Corinthians are warned to react to the grace of God "not in vain" (*mē eis kenon*). The phrase "day of salvation" which Paul adopts from the Isaiah text is unique in the Pauline writings. What is especially striking about this passage is the fact that Paul usually refers to the eschatological day as a future event.[27] The procession motif clarifies the temporal context of the phrase. The "day of salvation" is the day of the procession, the day that the deity manifests himself in the demonstration of his power.

But is the "day of salvation" really comparable in the two texts? On the surface it seems that the day of salvation for Paul and Apuleius are not at all comparable, for in the *Metamorphoses* Lucius is the recipient of the salvation of the deity, whereas in Paul salvation is made available to those who are bystanders at Paul's metaphorical procession. Nevertheless, the differences are only seeming differences, for the salvation offered to Lucius is also offered to those watching the procession.

As mentioned above, in the *Metamorphoses* Lucius' salvation is twofold. His physical form is restored and he begins a new life dedicated to Isis.[28] However, Lucius' physical salvation leads not only to his own salvation. The power of the deity is also manifested for the benefit of the bystanders, so that they might also dedicate their lives to Isis. The day of the procession is a potential "day of salvation" for all. So too for Paul the "day of salvation" is the day that the Corinthians respond positively to Paul's proclamation, that is the day they accept the grace of God "not in vain" (2 Cor. 6:1). But it is the miraculous physical salvation effected for Paul (4:8ff) that clearly shows the power of God to the Corinthian community, the bystanders at Paul's metaphorical procession.

The perception and response of those viewing the procession is clearly highlighted in both texts. In Apuleius' narrative, Lucius functions as a model for those viewing the procession so that Lucius' salvation, this demonstration of the power of the goddess, functions as an invitation to others to be transformed and thus gain their salvation. Shortly after his transformation, Lucius joins the procession so that others may perceive the power of the goddess:

> Then I mingled with the sacred procession and went forward, accompanying the shrine, so that I was plain and prominent (*notus ac conspicuus*) for the whole populace to see (11. 16 [278, 4–5]).[29]

The bystanders are clearly impressed by the epiphany that they have witnessed:

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[27] Here the event is clearly in the present. The context is most frequently explained by commentators as the moment that the apostle's preaching encounters its hearers. See Hans Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, KEK, newly edited from the 1924 ed, by G. Strecker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), p. 201; Güttgemanns, pp. 318–319; J.-F. Collange, *Enigmes de la deuxième épître de paul aux Corinthiens*, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 289; Rudolf Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985), p. 167; Victor Paul Furnish, *II Corinthians*, Anchor Bible 32A (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1984), p. 353.

[28] See 11. 16 (278, 9) where Lucius is described as "reborn" (*renatus*).

[29] It is interesting to note that the shrine that Lucius accompanies is probably the *cista* (Griffiths, p. 256). The box contained some remembrance of Osiris' role of benefactor. For a review of the discussion of the possible contents of the *cista* see Griffiths, pp, 222ff.

> Men pointed to me with their fingers and nodded their heads. All the people were talking about me: "This is the man who has been today restored to human shape through the splendid divinity of the all-powerful goddess (*omnipotentis . . . deae numen augustum*). Happy is he, by heaven, and thrice blessed, to have clearly deserved, by the purity of his former life and his pious loyalty, such a wondrous favour from heaven that he is, as it were, born again and has at once pledged himself to service in the sacred rites (11. 16 [278, 5–10]).

But Lucius is not simply a model for those believers who are watching the procession. After Lucius' transformation, the priest specifically addresses the unbelievers:

> Let the unbelievers take note (*videant*), let them take note (*videant*) and acknowledge their mistake: behold, here is Lucius! He has been freed from his former sufferings and, rejoicing in the providence of mighty Isis, he is victorious over his Fortune (11. 15 [277, 18–20]).

The unbelievers are clearly warned. They have experienced the epiphany of the deity. It is now up to them to respond. They are told to recognize their errors (*errorem suum recognoscant*). What is emphasized, stated twice in fact, is the invitation to perceive (*video*) things as they really are. Proper perception, it seems, will lead to the unbelievers' transformation and salvation from the power of Fate. Just as Lucius has been saved from "the wildest storms of Fortune and her heaviest gales," (11. 15 [277, 4–5]) so too those who "see" and "recognized their errors" will be saved from Fate's caprice. In the words of Apuleius they will "come to the haven of rest and the altar oi Mercy" (11. 15 [277, 5–6]) for "hostile Fate has no power over those whose lives have been claimed by the majesty of the goddess" (11. 15 [277, 12–13]). Conversely, those who fail to recognize their errors will, like Lucius in his former life, be plagued by "the blindness of Fortune" which will torture them "with the worst of dangers" (11. 15 [277, 9–10]).

In the same way, Paul, in 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:4, connects the role of perception with salvation. The concepts of vision, understanding, and insight loom large in this section, as do their antitheses.[30] Most importantly, however, Paul continually returns to the idea that believers have a choice in the way that they perceive the apostle, and this choice means the difference between salvation ("life") and destruction ("death") for them.[31] This is especially apparent in the antitheses of 2 Cor. 4:8–9.

> We are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but not destroyed.

In these verses Paul's self-description characterizes him as "afflicted" (*thlibomenos*), "perplexed" (*aporoumenos*), "persecuted" (*diōkomenos*), and "struck down" (*kataballomenos*). Paul summarizes the above in 4:lOa as "always carrying around [as in a procession] the dying

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[30] See Dieter Georgi, *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), p. 260; See also J. Louis Martyn, "Epistemology at the Turn of the Ages: 2 Corinthians 5:16," in *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox*, ed. W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, R. R. Niebuhr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 269–287.

[31] See especially 2 Cor. 2:14–16; 3:12ff; 4:3ff; 4:8ff; 5:llff; 5:16ff; 6:8ff.

of Jesus." But the above description of vv. 8–9 is only half the story. The second element of each antithesis provides the other half. The apostle is "not crushed" (*stenochōroumenos*), "not driven to despair" (*exaporoumenos*), "not forsaken" (*egkataleipomenos*), and most importantly "not destroyed" (*apollumenos*).[32] To use Paul's metaphor: the "dying of Jesus" is presented to the bystanders of the procession so that: "the resurrection life (*zoē*) of Jesus may also be manifested" in the apostle's body (4:10b). Just as the divine drama of salvation is played out in Paul's repeated, miraculous rescue from life threatening situations, so too the Corinthians proper perception of this drama leads to their transformation: "It is all for your sake, so that as grace extends to more and more people it may increase thanksgiving, to the glory of God" (4:15).

The connection of perception and salvation is exemplified in 2 Cor. 3:12–18. In this section, Paul explicitly contrasts himself with Moses and implicitly contrasts the Corinthians with the Israelites. Moses is described as putting a veil over his face to hide the glory of God whereas Paul's message is not hidden (3:12; 4:3) except from those blinded by Satan (4:4). The Israelites, like Moses, are veiled but, they have a veil over their minds (3:15). The Christians, on the other hand, have had the veil removed (3:16). The Christians have been transformed (*metamorphoō*) so that they can see (*katoptrizomenoi*)[33] the glory of the Lord with unveiled face.

Those who fail to properly perceive the divine drama in the apostle, those who have been blinded by the "god of this age," are condemned to perish. Everything hinges on how the Corinthians perceive Paul's metaphorical procession. In 2:14–16, Paul, describing himself as the "aroma of Christ" (*euōdia tou Xristou*), uses the metaphor of the aromatic substances such as incense or scented oil which preceded the apearance of the deity in Greco-Roman epiphany procession.[34] Those who perceive in Paul's apostolic sufferings the "odor of death" (*osmē ek thanatou*) condemn themselves to death (*eis thanatos*) whereas those who properly perceive in Paul's sufferings the "scent of [Christ's resurrection] life" (*osmē ek zoē*) participate in that life (*eis zoē*).

CONCLUSIONS

Both Apuleius and Paul present the reader with accounts of extraordinary processions. In each case, the reader encounters an astounding miracle which effects physical restoration to an individual thought to be beyond hope. These accounts demonstrate the change of the epiphany procession in Greco-Roman culture. As processions in the Greco-Roman world came to be used more and more as an instrument for the propagation of a particular cult, they began to emphasize in a particularly dramatic way the power of the deity whose cult they were proclaiming.

Ramsay MacMullen, in several recent works, has attempted to overthrow the commonly held opinion that conversion in the Roman Empire resulted less from great sermons or "dramatic inner spiritual crisis" than from "demonstrations, or the report of demonstrations, that seemed beyond all but the divine *virtus*."[35] In order to win over

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[32] See also the antitheses of 2 Cor. 6:8ff.

[33] The verb *katoptrizo* either means "to see as in a mirror" or simply "to see." For a discussion, see Furnish, p. 74.

[34] See note 6.

[35] Ramsay MacMullen, "Two types of Conversion to Early Christianity," *VC* 37 (1983), p.187. See also his work *Christianizing the Roman Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

devotees, a religious community had to show the superiority of its religion over another. It had to demonstrate:

> . . . that even a being supposed to be great . . . proved less great than the other that was being preached.
>
> Driving all competition from the field head-on was crucial. The world, after all, held many dozens and hundreds of gods. Choice was open to everybody. It could thus be only a most exceptional force that would actually displace alternatives and compel allegiance; it could be only the most probative demonstrations that would work.[36]

Or as he says in another place:

> For both the Christian and the non-Christian . . . the only thing believed in was some supernatural power to bestow benefits.[37]

The procession of Apuleius and Paul presuppose precisely this function. Apulieus shows that Isis, by her intervention on behalf of Lucius, is, in fact, "the mother of the universe, the mistress of the elements, the highest of the deities, . . . the foremost of heavenly beings" (11. 5 [269, 9–11]) because of her ability to overcome the power of Fate.[38]

Paul—locked in a struggle with competing missionaries who, so the apostle claims, are preaching a "different" Jesus (2 Cor. 11:4)—is intent on demonstrating the power of his Jesus, a power "made perfect in weakness" (2 Cor. 11:9). The divine drama, the dying and ensuing resurrection of Jesus is played out in Paul's metaphorical, proselytizing procession which he displays "in every place" (2 Cor. 2:14).

In a sense, both of these processions bear a close resemblance to another literary procession, that is, the procession of maenads described by Euripides. This procession lead Dionysus from Asia to the streets of Thebes:

> —You on the streets!
> —You on the roads!
> —Make way!
> —Let every mouth be hushed. Let no ill-omened words profane your tongues.
> Make way! Fall back!
> —Hush. . . .
> —On, Bacchae, on, you Bacchae,
> bear your god in triumph home!
> Bear on the god, son of god,
> escort your Dionysus home.
> Bear him down from Phrygian hill,
> attend him through the streets of Hellas![39]

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[36] MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, p. 27.

[37] MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, p. 4.

[38] Note that as a result of the miracle bystanders make vows to the deity (11. 16 [278, 11]).

[39] Eur. *Ba.* 68–87, trans. William Arrowsmith in *Greek Tragedies* 3, ed. David Grene and Richard Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

In the final analysis, this procession, like the more dramatic epiphany processions of the Greco-Roman world serves a single purpose, a purpose which the playwright has Dionysus himself voice: "that I might be revealed on earth for what I am: a god."[40]

[40] Eur. *Ba.* 22, trans. Arrowsmith.

The New Testament Canon and the Mishnah as Consolidation of Knowledge in the Second Century C.E.

Michael R. Greenwald
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

In his discussion of the transition from oral to written transmission of tradition in the early Christian churches, Hans von Campenhausen claims that the Church in the second Christian century was acting "in contrast to Judaism and its Law. . . ."[1] However, were he to analyze what was taking place in Rabbinic Judaism, he would find that even after their separation, Judaism and Christianity were still following strikingly parallel paths. For at the same time that Christians were moving from reliance upon the oral transmission of "words of the Lord" to dependence upon written gospels, and while, in the second Christian century, the Epistles of Paul were being collected, and at the same time that four gospels were gradually gaining precedence over the expanding number of what are now called non-canonical or apocryphal gospels so that the rudimentary beginnings of what would come to be called the New Testament can be seen, and while the Church was asking from whence its own authority derived, the survivors of Palestinian Jewry, the rabbis, were also collecting and compiling their traditions, customs, and the debates about them into a code or compendium that would eventually be called the Mishnah, and, in the process, were also asking from whence their authority derived.

Furthermore, were one to examine the pagan literature of the Graeco-Roman world, one would find that numerous other compilations, collections, and epitomes appear in the second century: extant are Florus's Epitome of Livy, Flavius Arrianus's Ἐγχειρίδιον which is an epitome of the Διατριβαί of Epictetus, and Galen's collections of the medical knowledge of the ancient world. From Galen there is also the epitome, Σύνοψις περὶ σφυγμῶν ἰδίας πραγματείας, and two other no longer extant epitomes.[2] Also extant is the dream-collection of Artemidorus, the Ὀνειροκριτικά. From Aulus Gellius there is the *Noctes Atticae*, a collection of miscellaneous reminiscences and erudition. There are geographies from Pausanias and Claudius Ptomelaeus. Also from Ptolemy are the collection of astonomical knowledge, the Μαθηματικὴ σύνταξις, better known by its Arabic name, the *Almagest* and the Μαθηματικὴ τετράβιβλος σύνταξις, a collection of astrological principles. Hadrian ordered and patronized a codification of Roman law by Salvius Julianus and a collection of legal decisions by P. Iuventius Celsus also dates from the Hadrianic period. The *Institutes*, a topical codification of laws by Gaius dates from the Antonine period. In her article in the *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum*, Ilona Opelt has compiled a list of all known epitomes of Graeco-Roman antiquity, both extant

[1] Hans von Campenhausen, *The Formation of the Christian Bible*, trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 121.

[2] Cited in *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum*, s.v. "Epitome," by Ilona Opelt, col. 954.

and lost. Her list is arranged topically, but if one were to re-arrange it chronologically, one would find that in the first century B. C., there are fourteen known epitomes (either extant or known from other sources), and that there are fourteen epitomes known from the first Christian century. From the third Christian century, there are five epitomes that are known, but from the second Christian century, there are twenty-three. This disparity becomes all the more striking if one removes the historical epitomes from the list. There are four non-historical epitomes known from the first Christian century and twenty from the second. In other words, although epitomization was not an invention of the second Christian century, it was, compared to the two centuries that preceded it, an era in which the production of epitomes increased and the range of subjects that were epitomized expanded.

Thus we are apparently observing phenomena of collection, codification, and epitomization that were not simply the province of Jews or Christians, but widespread across a greater milieu. But if this is not to be merely an intuitive observation, how can we understand these phenomena in a coherent and cogent way. As they appear in emerging Rabbinic Judaism, the developing Church, and the larger Roman world, these phenomena are indeed parallel; but they are too parallel, there are no intersecting lines. There is no evidence of significant contact in this regard between Jews and Christians or, for that matter, between Jews and Romans or Christians and Romans, in other words, no evidence that any author in any one of the groups was reading the material of any one of the others. In fact, the preponderence of the evidence tends toward the opposite view: Christians and Jews were both engaged in the process of self-definition and as such were trying to remove themselves as much as possible from the larger Roman world. But this means that ordinary historical-critical methods cannot be used. To attempt to draw conclusions based on these data would mean concluding on the basis of apparently similar phenomena that genetic relationships, for which we otherwise have no evidence, existed between the different groups.

Methods which allow for commonalities as a result of human behavior or thought, such as the comparative method of Mircea Eliade, the archetypes and collective unconscious of Carl Jung, or the "inventory of mental patterns" residing in "deep structures" which comprise the characteristics of all human social behavior of Lévi-Strauss and the structuralists, likewise must be discarded.[3] All of these methods attempt to derive universal explanations for human behavior, but in so doing, they render particular historical data irrelevant. Yet here we are presented with discrete historical data from one era which differ from the data of the preceding era. Thus it is the historical data themselves that must remain the focus of investigation.

Another possibility is a sociological approach. This offers the advantage of allowing the study of a single society or social collectivity and the formulation of general statements about it precisely because it *is* a *single* society or social collectivity. But it also allows the postulation of sub-groups within that society; sub-groups which precisely because they

[3] For Eliade, see Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*, trans. Willard R. Trask (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1959). For Jung see Carl G. Jung, *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, trans. R. F. C. Hall, vol. 9 pt. 1: *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, 2nd ed. Bollingen Series XX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). For Lévi-Strauss see Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, 2 vols. (New York: Basic Books, 1963–1976) and idem, *The Raw and the Cooked. Introduction to a Science of Mythology: I*, trans. John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

are *sub*-groups, must share to some extent in the general statements made about the larger society as a whole. However, one must insure that the groups in question are indeed sub-groups within a larger society and, in order to reduce the number of variables, that the same timeframe is being used for the entire study. In this case, the timeframe is the same for all groups in question—that was the initial observation; and the fact that Christians for the entirety of the existence of Christianity and Jews for the previous two centuries had lived under the aegis of the Roman Empire should permit the treatment of Jews and Christians as sub-groups within the Roman Empire. Thus, genetic relationship is eliminated as a necessary explanation for the similarities in the phenomena under study and, at the same time, the connecting link between the similarities is expanded beyond individual human minds to an entire human society. Furthermore, the historical data peculiar to a given sub-group, all too often studied in isolation, can now be observed within the context of the full group of which that sub-group is a part. Such observation further allows the examination of the function of a phenomenon within the sub-group or sub-groups in question and at the same time the phenomenon's function in one sub-group may be compared to its function in another or to its function within the society as a whole.

The branch of sociology which provides the most fruitful insights for the present problem is the sociology of knowledge. The operating hypothesis of the sociologists of knowledge is that the social stock of knowledge, that is, that knowledge which is held in common and taken-for-granted[4] within a given society, stands in a dialectical relationship to that society; that is, the social stock of knowledge and the way in which it is structured is socially determined; conversely, owing to the taken-for-granted nature of the social stock of knowledge and its structure, it determines what is knowable in a given society and in what form a given element of knowledge can be known by that society. The understanding of this basic statement has taken two directions: one is that of Karl Mannheim who considers knowledge to be that which is determined and structured by the "socially unattached intellectual elite" of a given society (by which Mannheim meant philosophers and others who engage in theoretical constructions) and then imposed upon the unwitting masses whose knowledge is thereby constrained by the structure thus established. This pattern is broken only when the masses are able to percolate upward and infiltrate the intellectual elite.[5] The other path is that of Alfred Schutz, Thomas

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[4] "Taken-for-granted" is defined as "experienced as possessing a reality of its own, a reality that confronts the individual as external and coercive fact" by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966; Anchor Books, 1967), p. 58.

[5] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, with a Preface by Louis Wirth (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968), pp. 2–10. The term "social stock of knowledge" is not Mannheim's but Alfred Schutz's [Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Life-World*, trans. by Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973)] who used it in a much broader sense than that which Mannheim meant to imply. Mannheim used instead the term "collective unconscious" (pp. 5ff., pp. 30ff.) but not with Jung's meaning. That Mannheim's "collective unconscious" is closer to the taken-for-granted social stock of knowledge of Schutz than it is to the collective unconscious of Jung can be seen in Mannheim's statement that "underlying even the profound insight of the genius are the collective historical experiences of a group which

Luckmann, and Peter L. Berger. For Schutz, Luckmann, and Berger, it is precisely the taken-for-granted knowledge of the masses which is most relevant for determining the social stock of knowledge and its structure.[6] Furthermore, Berger and Luckmann, borrowing from Emile Durkheim, have added a third element to the dialectical relationship that exists between a society and the social stock of knowledge: the objective facticity or objective reality of society itself.[7] That this dialectic exists in all human societies in the tripolar form posited by Berger and Luckmann is the principle operating assumption of this investigation.

With underlying theoretical assumptions established, it is possible to proceed with the historical elements of the investigation. But if Jews and Christians are to be treated as subgroups within social collectivity of the Roman Empire, then the phenomenon under study must first be described in Roman society with respect to the theoretical model. It is, of course, impossible to present either a history or an analysis of the literature of the early Empire in the space of a single paper. However, there are certain salient features of that history and that literature that need to be mentioned.

In the first pre-Christian century and on into the first century C.E., the power of Rome was continually expanding and absorbing new peoples and new cultures. This resulted in a highly cosmopolitan, syncretic "empire." This cosmopolitanism encompassed and emanated from the City of Rome itself where it was resented by the Roman aristocracy.[8] Coincidently (perhaps) this was also the Golden Age of Latin letters: the age of Cicero, Virgil, Horace, and Ovid. But one hundred fifty years later, by the time of the reign of Hadrian, all such expansion had ceased. Hadrian established the *limes*, the boundaries,

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(continued)
the individual *takes for granted* [emphasis added], but which should under no circumstances be hypostatized as 'group mind' " (p. 241). Therefore the term "social stock of knowledge" is used throughout this paper for the sake of uniformity of meaning.

[6] The argument of Berger and Luckmann against Mannheim's notion of the sociology of knowledge is "that the problem of 'ideas,' including the special problem of ideology, constitutes only part of the larger problem of the sociology of knowledge, and not a central part at that. *The sociology of knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for 'knowledge' in society*" [emphasis Berger's and Luckmann's]. Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, pp. 14–15. Berger elsewhere reiterates this distinction between the two branches of the sociology of knowledge stating that "the concentration on theoretical ideation has been one of the major weaknesses of the sociology of knowledge as generally understood so far. The work of the present writer [i.e., Berger] in the sociology of knowledge has been greatly influenced by the insistence of Schutz that the sociologically most relevant knowledge is that of the man in the street, that is, 'commonsense knowledge,' rather than the theoretical constructions of intellectuals." Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 191, n. 2.

[7] Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (Chicago: Free Press, 1950), p. 14 quoted by Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, p. 18. See Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, pp. 47–128 for society as objective reality. The tripolar interrelationship of "society [as] . . . objective reality," "society [as] . . . human product," and "man [as] . . . social product" is shown diagrammatically on p. 61.

[8] The elder Seneca complained that the City of Rome was made up more of foreigners than of citizens–"plures tamen hic peregrini quam cives consistunt." *Ad Helviam Matrem* vi. 5.

of the Empire. There was no longer an absorption of new peoples. And the cosmopolitan nature of the Empire and the city began to diminish as the peoples absorbed earlier became increasingly Romanized.[9]

Libertas, the Roman ideal of liberty under the Republic (referring to the liberty of the Senatorial class), was in suspension between serious curtailment and utter non-existence under the Julio-Claudian and Flavian emperors. Under Nero and Domitian, random murders and forced suicides decimated the upper, literary, classes. Repression of Stoic philosophers under these emperors and under Vespasian and the nearly constant repression of literary expression since the latter part of the reign of Augustus served to stifle creativity.

After the assasination of Domitian, however, came the reigns of the five so-called "Good Emperors": Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius. The reigns of Nerva and Trajan are hailed as marking the return of *libertas* both by the younger Pliny and by Tacitus[10] (with the caveat that flattery of the emperor was a commonplace in the literature of the Roman world). What is more significant is that thirty years after the *Panegyricus* of Pliny, Aelius Aristides, in his panegyric Εἰς Ῥώμην, praises the emperor Antoninus Pius only in the context of praising Rome, reflecting not only approval, but institutionalization of the Principate, the Empire, and the idealization of Rome itself.[11] Institutionalization used in this sense does not have the Weberian meaning of bureaucratization, but the taken-for-granted meaning assigned by Berger and Luckmann.[12]

This ebullient praise of Rome and Roman culture is an interesting contrast to what is found in the Latin literature of the so-called Silver Age. In the writings of both Senecas, the elder Pliny, in Quintilian, in Petronius, in Tacitus, and in the Greek Περὶ Ὕψους,[13] we find the ever-present theme of literary and oratory decline. Although several reasons for this decline are given, the decline of morality in Roman society is the one found most frequently.[14] One also finds, in some of the older authors (although also in Pliny the

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[9] Spain had already produced emperors in the persons of Trajan and Hadrian. Edward Courtney has pointed out that Juvenal's attacks on "foreigners" are restricted to Greeks, Egyptians, and Jews, precisely those peoples who had developed cultures that were older than that of Rome. He does not attack Spaniards, Gauls, or Africans. Edward Courtney, *A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal* (London: The Athlone Press, 1980), p. 27.

[10] Pliny the Younger, *Panegyricus* 2, 47–49; Tactius, *Agricola* 3.1.

[11] Aelius Aristides Εἰς Ῥώμην 29, 31–32, 38–39, 60, 90, 107.

[12] Berger and Luckmann define "institutionalization" as the "reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors." Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, p. 54.

[13] *On the Sublime*, whose author is identified in a Medieval document (Parisinus 2036—the 10th century ancestor of all extant editions) by the name "Dionysius Longinus" or "Dionysius or Longinus." This paper assumes, with the majority of classical scholars, that this essay was produced in the first century C.E.

[14] This is sometimes expressed as *cupiditas* and sometimes as *luxuria* but in one form or the other it is found in both Senecas, Petronius, Pliny the Elder, and "Longinus." Seneca the Elder *Controversiae* 1 praef. 6–8; Seneca the Younger *Epistles* 114:11; Petronius *Satyricon* 1–4; Pliny the Elder *Naturalis Historia* xiv. 1. 3–4; Περὶ Ὕψους 44.6–9. To a lesser extent, this argument can also be found in the *Dialogus* of Tacitus where the problem is placed in the reign of Vespasian and in the Second Epistle of Pliny (the Younger) where it is placed in the reign of Nero. Tacitus *Dialogus* 26–32; Pliny the Younger *Epistles* ii. 14. 9. This set of arguments is worked out in detail in John M. Crosset

Elder), a "natural" cause hypothesis—that is, all things ultimately decay.[15] We do not know the causes of decline postulated by Quintilian because he does not mention it in his *Institutio Oratoria*. However, he does mention in that work, that he had previously written a *De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae*.[16] Tacitus, both in the *Dialogus* and in the *Annales*, suggests that political repression had caused the decline.[17] Modern critics frequently mention the over-whelming inferiority that Roman writers felt with respect to Greeks.[18]

Tacitus, however, the latest in this group of authors, is optimistic about the *future* of Latin literature. Indeed, in his time, we do find a brief resurgence of Latin letters not only in his own works, but also in those of the younger Pliny, Suetonius, and Juvenal. But by the middle of the reign of Hadrian, all of these men had either died or stopped writing. And Latin literature seems to have died with them. It is as if the Latin genius which was at its height but one hundred fifty years before, had been completely spent. The Latin writing that was produced during the remainder of the century was produced primarily in the law courts or by the Africans Fronto, Apuleius, and Tertullian. The lone non-African Latin writer was Aulus Gellius.

The literary language of the second century after 130 was Greek. In part, this can be attributed to the official patronage of Hellenica by Hadrian and later by Marcus Aurelius. But although Greek writers were producing large quantities of material, its substance too, appears to have been spent.[19] Missing from the second century are the formal tragedies and comedies, missing too are Greek contemporary histories (Arrianus' Ἀναβάσις is a history of Alexander the Great, Appian ended his history with Augustus), and gone from both Greek and Latin literature is any poet of note. There are three characteristics of both the Greek and the Latin literature of this period which must be pointed out: first, the language of the literature itself was archaized, or, by many accounts, atticized. Greatest

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and James A. Arieti, *The Dating of Longinus*, Studia Classica III (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, [1975]) and in Gordon Williams, *Change and Decline: Roman Literature in the Early Empire*, Sather Classical Lectures, vol. 45 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978).

[15] Pliny the Elder *Naturalis Historia* xiv. 1. 4. See note 14 above.

[16] Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* vi. praef. 3; viii. 6. 76.

[17] Tacitus *Dialogus* 38; *Annales* 1. 4. See note 14 above.

[18] Quintilian offers the best evidence: he is defensive with regard to Greek literature and assumes that Latin authors, at least, are bilingual. In the tenth book of the *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian consistently defends Roman literary competence over against that of the Greeks as if it indeed stood in need of defense. x. 1. 85, 93, 98, 101, 105. But see also xii. 10. 20–21, 26–27, 33–35, 38 where Quintilian gives his reasons for Greek superiority over the Romans in eloquence. Note the assumption of bilingualism of educated Romans in xii. 1. 27ff. In contradistinction, note that in *Demosthenes* 2.2, Plutarch admits that he does not know Latin. The word "Graeculus," used by Petronius, Juvenal, and the author of the *Vita Hadriani* in the *Historia Augusta*, usually translated "Greekling," is an epithet, not a compliment—Petronius *Satyricon* 88; Juvenal *Satires* iii. 78; vi. 185; *Historia Augusta: Vita Hadriani* i. 4, and anti-Greek sentiment is commonplace in the Latin authors of the first and early second centuries C.E.—Seneca the Elder *Controversiae* 1. praef. 6; Pliny the Elder *Naturalis Historia* xxix. 7. 14; Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* ii. 4. 19; Juvenal *Satires* iii. 58–65, 72–78; vi. 185–196; x. 173–175.

[19] Most modern critics except Lucian from this characterization.

praise was given to the one who could find the most obscure or most archaic word and then phrase it in the most rhythmic and sonorous manner. Second, the dominant form of "literature" was public declamation—for this was the period known as the Second Sophistic. These declamations are characterized by the same archaic use of language, by an exaggerated reverance for the past, and by argument for its own sake. A typical theme for such declamation can be seen in the Eleventh Discourse of Dio of Prusa (Chrysostom) in which he argued that the Trojans had in fact defeated the Greeks—in other words, an attempt to demonstrate as true a proposition that everyone already knew to be false. And the final characteristic is the aforementioned proclivity for epitomes, lists, and collections. It is indeed true that there was an encyclopaedic tradition going back two centuries, although the encyclopaedists saw in themselves a different function. Pliny the Elder, often considered the last of the encyclopaedists, said that he was writing his *Naturalis Historia* because he was afraid that the information would otherwise be lost.[20] The collectors of the second century were satisfied with the knowledge of the past and, rather than seek new knowledge, they attempted to establish the old as authorative. The impact of Galen and Ptolemy on medieval thought shows that to some extent, they succeeded. Many modern observers see this as tangible evidence of the decline discussed by the Latin authors of the previous century. But rather than use the aesthetic perjorative "decline," it is more useful to understand such phenomena as evidence that the social stock of knowledge was in the process of being restructured and consolidated.

The sociologists of knowledge can now help in explaining these phenomena. Burger and Luckmann have shown that pluralistic societies are those most conducive to social change. "Indeed, pluralism encourages both skepticism and innovation and is thus inherently subversive for the taken-for-granted *status quo*."[21] We may also understand that the opposite is true: in a society wherein pluralism is diminishing, that society, now becoming more homogeneous, resists social change. The additional factor of political repression must now be added. Judith Willer, citing a study by Stephen F. Mason, has shown how political repression also represses the expansion of knowledge.[22] So even though Tacitus and the younger Pliny have announced a rebirth of *libertas* under Nerva and Trajan, the repression of the previous century had already enfeebled the capacity of Graeco-Roman intellectual society to expand its stock of knowledge.[23]

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[20] Pliny the Elder *Naturalis Historia* xiv. 1. 3–4.

[21] Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, p. 125. Quite coincidentally, they chose Graeco-Roman society in particular to demonstrate their point.

[22] Judith Willer, *The Social Determination of Knowledge* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 130. She cites as evidence Stephen F. Mason, *A History of the Sciences* (New York: Collier Books, 1956; rev. edition, 1962), p. 586.

[23] An example of subtle repression operating even during the second century can be seen in a story about the philosopher Favorinus found in the *Historia Augusta*. Favorinus had an argument with Hadrian over the use of a certain word. Ultimately, Favorinus backed down and ceded the Emperor's point. When his philosopher friends chided him for yielding to the Emperor on a point on which Favorinus had in fact been correct, Favorinus replied, "You are urging a wrong course, my friends, when you do not suffer me to regard as most learned of men the one who has thirty legions."—"Non recte suadetis, familiares, qui non patrimini me illum doctoriem omnibus credere, qui habet triginta legiones."—*Historia Augusta: Vita Hadriani* xv, 10–13. The translation is from *The Scriptores Historia Augusta*, trans. David Magie, 3 vols. The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and London: William Heineman Ltd., 1921, reprint ed., 1953),

Furthermore, although the Roman Empire had been institutionalized as a political fact by the time of Hadrian, that is, it was now taken-for-granted by all participants in Roman society, legitimation was not yet complete.[24] The old Republican order had been largely eliminated. The new order was in the process of emerging during the first century. Berger and Luckmann tell us that "the background of habitualized activity opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation."[25] During the first century C.E., there was a tension between the innovative effects of the rapid absorption of new peoples in the previous century and the stifling effects of the Principate. By the second century, there was a need for consolidation (habitualization) and legitimation in the intellectual realm before a new period of "deliberation and innovation" and institutionalization could take place. This need for habitualization and legitimation can be seen in the quest for authority evident in the compilations of the second century. This establishment of authority and control is itself institutionalization—but it is now occurring in other than the political sphere. To define itself, a society, or group within that society, must define and delimit what its available stock of knowledge is. What we see in the second century is Roman society, or at least that part of it which left us literary remains as evidence, engaging in this process of self-definition as the climax of the legitimation and institutionaliztion of the life-world which had evolved in the creation and expansion of the Empire.

How then are the New Testament and the Mishnah to be seen against this model? As processes, both are occuring at the same time. Furthermore, both are occurring wholly within the boundaries of the Roman Empire. In the case of the New Testament, there is an additional problem of not knowing any details with regard to who compiled it, or why, when, where, or how it was compiled. Prior to the fifth decade of the second century, virtually nothing at all is known. The conclusion that a collection of Pauline Epistles existed at the end of the first century is based on the interpretation of Ignatius's Epistle to the Ephesians 12:2 wherein he says that Paul mentions the Ephesians in each of his epistles.[26] This proves only that Ignatius new more than one epistle ascribed to Paul

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vol. 1, pp. 48–49. And this is purported to have been said about a time when the political repression of literature was at a minimum.

[24] Legitimation is defined as the "way in which [the institutional world] can be explained and justified."—Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, p. 61.

[25] Ibid., p. 53.

[26] "ὃς ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιστολῇ μνημονεύει ὑμῶν." That Ignatius had a collection of Paul's epistles is the position of Theodor Zahn, *Geschichte des neutestamentliche Kanons* (Erlangen, 1898), I:837; Adolf von Harnack, *Die Briefsammlung des Apostels Paulus und die anderen vorkonstantinischen Christlichen Briefsammlung* (Leipzig, 1926), p. 7 (both cited by John Knox, *Marcion and the New Testament: An Essay in the Early History of the Canon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 173); Knox, *Marcion*, pp. 172–176; Robert M. Grant, *The Formation of the New Testament* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 88; and Werner Georg Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, trans. Howard Clark Kee, 17th edition (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1975), pp. 480–481. In agreement with the position taken in this paper are Campenhausen, *Formation*, p. 144, n. 187; Walter Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, trans. by a team from the Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins, ed. Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 218; and Heinrich Rathke, *Ignatius von Antiochien und die Paulusbriefe* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1967) pp. 21–27. A more radical position is that of Wilhelm Schneemelcher, "Paulus in der griechischen Kirche des zweiten Jahrhunderts," *Zeitschrift*

and that in each of those that he knew, the Ephesians were mentioned. There is also the mention of Paul's epistles in II Peter 3:15–16. The tone of this passage indicates that a collection of Paul's epistles probably did exist when II Peter was written, but since no certain date can be ascertained for the writing of II Peter, we do not know when, where, or how this collection came into existence. It is also clear that the author of Acts does not know of a collection of Paul's epistles or even of their existence (or perhaps he does not care). The first clear evidence we have for a collection of Paul's epistles is Marcion, sometime between 140 and 144 C.E. Marcion has a collection of 10 Pauline Epistles or epistles ascribed to Paul and what has been described as an abridgement or an epitome of the Gospel of Luke. Marcion, then, whatever the content of his writings might have been, was, with his collection and his epitome, an archetypical second century literary man. Harry Y. Gamble has asserted on historical-critical grounds that the process of collection of what would ultimately become the New Testament is not a response to Marcion, as Harnack and those who followed him have maintained. If this were the case, we should expect to see a new collection fairly soon after Marcion's, if not within one year, at least within five or ten, but we do not.[27] It cannot even be demonstrated that Justin Martyr knew a four-gospel "canon." It was his student, Tatian, who published his *Diatessaron* circa 175 C.E., who provides the first and clearest proof of the supremacy of the current collection of four gospels. But to argue whether or not Marcion or the Gnostics were the impetus for the Christian canon is to beg the question. Why did Marcion have a collection and an epitome? Indeed, Marcion and the Great Church were engaged in the self-same enterprise and for the same reason—the establishment of authority, that is, legitimation. Note that another option for establishing authority, new revelation, might have been open to the Church or to Marcion. This was indeed the route chosen by Montanus—but revelation was a vehicle acceptable only to the uninstitutionalized, unbureaucratized church (or churches) of the first century—it was not a viable option in the second century. Hence Montanus was declared a heretic.

The rabbis also are collecting the traditions, customs, and laws of the Judaism that survived the catastrophe of 70 C.E. At the end of the second century, this collection is published by the head of the Palestinian patriarchate, Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi, in a topically arranged form known as the Mishnah. As such, the Mishnah represents the first published document of Rabbinic Judaism. For the dating and appraisal of the material within the Mishnah itself, this paper is dependent on the analysis of Jacob Neusner and his students. Neusner says that the attestations of rabbinic sayings should be taken seriously—at least so much as to say that they are datable to the era in which that rabbi lived.[28] One should first try to determine whether of not the arguments fall in a logically prior to logically later pattern and then ask if the issues that concerned one group of rabbis are the same as those that concerned a later group or if not, did the the later group have other

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für Kirchengeschichte 75 (1964):5ff. who claims that Ignatius "had very little knowledge of the Pauline Epistles." Rathke and Schneemelcher are both cited in Campenhausen, *Formation*, p. 144, n. 187.

[27] Harry Y. Gamble, *The New Testament Canon: Its Making and Meaning* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 59–62.

[28] That is, the periods pre-70, between the wars (i.e. Javne: 70–132), 135–170 (i.e. Usha), and 170–210 (the closing of the Mishnah).

concerns.[29] What Neusner found was that both of his hypotheses were correct. The arguments do indeed fall in a logically prior to logically later order and that the rabbis of one period do indeed have different concerns from those of another. Neusner's schema challenges all other formulations of the development of the Mishnah;[30] but the one element that all models, including that of Orthodox Judaism[31] have in common is that the Mishnah was the result of a collection process that began in the late first or early second century C.E., that it continued throughout the second century, and that it was essentially complete by the conclusion of that century. It is as impossible to determine with great precision when the Mishnaic process begins as it is to determine the beginning of the canonization of the New Testament. So although certain of the traditons are indeed prior to 70, the actual process of collecting them does not begin until the period between the wars, and the final compilation and publication of the Mishnah takes place sometime in the latter part of the second century. Hence the rabbis too were using the process of collection to effect legitimation.[32] They too had the option of new revelation but specifically denied its validity.

In the final stages of their quest for authority, both the rabbis and the Church used historical chains of transmission to establish legitimacy. Appended to the Mishnah is the tractate *Pirke Avot,* the *Sayings of the Fathers.* In it it says that "Moses received the Torah at Sinai and handed it on to Joshua; Joshua to the elders; the elders to the prophets; and the prophets handed it on to the men of the Great Assembly."[33] After the mention of the Great Assembly, individual sages of the Pharisaic-Rabbinic past are named. The

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[29] This is a common theme in Neusner's writing. See Jacob Neusner, *The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees before 70,* 3 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 3:180–184; idem, *A History of the Mishnaic Laws of Purities,* 22 vols., Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity, no. 6 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974–1977), vol 21; idem, "The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees before 70: The Problem of Oral Transmission," in *Early Rabbinic Judaism: Historical Studies in Religion, Literature, and Art,* Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity, no. 13 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), p. 79; idem, *Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 14–22; idem, *From Mishnah to Scripture: The Problem of the Unattributed Sayings,* Brown Judaic Studies, no. 67 (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1984), pp. 7–8.

[30] Saul Lieberman postulates successive versions of the Mishnah from the time of Rabbi Akiba through the second century to Rabbi Meir and finally to Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi. But, says Lieberman, even this final version of the Mishnah was published only in oral form. Saul Lieberman, *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine,* Texts and Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, no. 18 (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1962), pp. 83–99.

[31] This is the model of Sherira Ga'on (Ga'on of Pumbeditha from 968 to 998) wherein a corpus of memorized material reliably handed down from Jewish antiquity was collected and compiled in its final form by Judah Ha-Nasi at the end of the second century. This schema is traced in detail in Jacob Neusner, ed., *The Modern Study of the Mishnah* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. xiii-xiv.

[32] The relationship between the significance of publication in the Graeco-Roman world and that of Rabbinic Judaism has been shown by Lieberman, *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine,* pp. 83–84, n. 3.

[33] "Mōšę qibēl tôrāh misînā(y) ûmesārāh lîhôšua' wîhôšua' lizeqēnîm ûzeqēnîm linebî'îm ûnebî'îm mesārûhā le'anešê kenęšęt hagedôlāh." Pirke Abot 1:1.

implication intended is that rabbinic authority derives directly from God as delivered to Moses at Sinai. Meanwhile, in Lyons, France, the bishop Irenaeus says that his authority derives from his teacher Polycarp whose authority derived from "apostles with many who had seen Christ."[34] The details are different but the method of establishing legitimation is the same. There is no evidence of contact between the author of *Pirke Avot* and Irenaeus. From whence does the connection come? They clearly both had the same goals and used the same methods to achieve those goals. Both institutionalizing Judaism and institutionalizing Christianity were at similar stages of their development. And the vehicles available to each of them to effect that development were those provided by the system of structuring knowledge within the Roman Empire of which both groups were a part.

[34] "ὑπὸ ἀποστόλων μαθητευθείς, καὶ συναναστραφεὶς πολλοῖς τοῖς τὸν Χριστὸν ἑωρακόσιν." *Adversus Haereses* iii. 3. 4. The implication in *Adversus Haereses* is that one of the apostles in question is John. In the letter to Florinus quoted by Eusebius, Irenaeus states specifically that it is John–"καὶ τὴν μετὰ Ἰωάννου συναναστροφὴν ὡς ἀπήγγελεν καὶ τὴν μετὰ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἑορακότων τὸν κυρίον."–*Hist. Eccl.* v. 20. 6. This relationship between Polycarp and John is also mentioned by Tertullian, *De Praescriptione Haereticorum* xxxii. 2. Eusebius uses chains of authority to demonstrate the authority of the Bishop of Rome (*Adv. baer.* iii. 3. 3.) and the authority of the apostles themselves [*Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* 40–42 from *St. Irenaeus: Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* trans. from the Armenian and annotated by Joseph P. Smith (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press and London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952]. This latter chain shows authority descending from Moses to the apostles.

Reflections on the Gospel of Mark: A Structural Investigation*

Hendrikus Boers
Candler School of Theology

A. Mark and the Mystery of the Kingdom of God

1. The Problem of the Interpretation of Mark

These reflections are an attempt to discover the unity of the gospel of Mark on the basis of its internal text-syntactic structure, rather than a proposed central theological motif, or traditional structural features that may have influenced the author, such as, for example, rhetorical forms. The unity of a text may depend on a central meaning which holds even syntactically uncohesive elements together, as much as a rhetorically well-structured text may express little meaning. It is nevertheless worth reflecting on the syntax of Mark as a means of grasping its meaning. That the gospel's textual syntax may conform with rhetorical structures and other conventional forms need not surprise, nor that the meaning derived from these reflections may confirm features that have been widely recognized before. It is my hope, of course, to come to a better understanding of the gospel, syntactically and semantically, if not in *what* it means, then in *how* it means as a deepening of the sense of *what* it means. The primary task will be to reflect on features in the gospel that may help us understand how it coheres as a text-syntactic unit.

2. The Gospel-Heading

Mk 1:1 was evidently intended as a type of heading for the gospel. If *arxhē* is translated as "beginning," in the sense of "the *beginning* of the gospel of Jesus Christ," the question arises when the beginning ends and the gospel itself begins. Other meanings of *arxhē* may be more appropriate, "origin," "source or "ground." And if *euaggelion* is taken to mean, not the "story" about Jesus, but the "good tidings" of the kingdom of God in Christ Jesus, as for example in Paul, one might take *arxhē* in the gospel-heading in the sense of the origin or source of the gospel, the basis on which the good tidings in Christ Jesus is proclaimed. In that sense Mark's story about Jesus is not itself the gospel, but the narrative source from which New Testament Christianity's proclamation of salvation, of the good tidings in Christ Jesus, is derived.

Thus it would be better to translate the heading of the gospel as, "The Source of the Gospel of Jesus Christ." In that sense Mark should be understood as the basis for the proclamation of the good tidings in Christ Jesus by the early church. The events described by the evangelist provide that basis. Mark wants to do more than tell the story of Jesus; the evangelist tells that story as the basis of the Christian proclamation. What that means begins to emerge when we now also consider the abrupt ending of the gospel.

*A study in structure before structuralism by a structuralist, in honor of Ferdinand de la Saussure.

3. The Ending of Mark

After the young man whom the women encountered at the empty tomb had told them to go and tell the disciples and Peter that Jesus would go ahead of them to Galilee, and that they would see him there as Jesus had told them, the women fled from the tomb, because they were trembling and beside themselves. "And they told no-one anything, for they were afraid." It would be well to accept that the gospel originally ended with 16:8, and try to understand what could have motivated the author to end his writing in this abrupt manner, rather than assume that its original ending got lost. The rounded off endings of Matthew and Luke, compared with Mark, have the effect of placing the events recorded in those gospels in the past. The effect of Mark's abrupt ending is that it leaves everything hanging, as if one is still involved in the events. Because one expects the end still to come, the events that have been narrated are not allowed to become something of the past to which one can look back from the end of the story. One is still involved in them. That may have been the evangelist's intention.

In reply to a critical question an Italian film producer, I believe, agreed that every story had to have a beginning, a middle and an end, but, he added, not necessarily in that order. This may be what we have in Mark. The real ending of the gospel may be found at the end of the chapter that is called the little apocalypse, i.e., chapter 13. After Jesus had instructed his disciples about the events that were to happen before the end of the world would finally come, he warned them to remain constantly on the alert because they did not know the hour of the end. He then compared their situation with that of a man who had gone on a journey, leaving full authority over his things in the hands of his servants, and telling the doorkeeper to remain alert. And then, applying this simile to his own departure, Jesus added: "Remain alert then, for you do not know when the Lord of the house comes, in the evening or at midnight, at the crow of the cock or at dawn; so that when he suddenly comes he will not find you slumbering." Jesus then ended his discourse with the warning: "What I say to you, I say again, remain alert!" (Mk 13:35–37).

If we also bear in mind that Mark evidently did not intend his story about Jesus to be taken as the gospel itself, but as its source or origin, it becomes clear that the evangelist may have terminated his narrative with 16:8 at precisely that crucial point where the narration of the *source* of the gospel was complete, so that the reader (or hearer) would be fully alert, ready now for gospel itself. An important aspect of that may have something to do with what is called the messianic secret in Mark.

4. The Messianic Secret in Mark

In Mk 4, after Jesus had told the Parable of the Sower, the disciples ask him concerning the parables. Jesus replied: "To you have been given the *mystērion* of the kingdom of God, but to those outside everything is in parables" (Mk 4:11). We do not need to rehearse here again the complex issue of parable interpretation, but we do need to give attention to the possible meanings of *mystērion* in our passage. The term must have called to mind for Marks's readers the mystery religions, which we know provided New Testament Christianity with one of the ways of expressing the meaning of Jesus.

The feature of the mystery religions that is most relevant for us in considering Mark's gospel is that they provided their adherents the conceptual means of participating cultically in the dying and rising of their respective cult deities as the means of salvation. By making use of certain forms of expression provided by these cults, New Testament Christianity was able to communicate with those familiar with these forms of expression, and to proclaim to them that it was Jesus who was the lord who died for the salvation

of humanity by letting those who believed in him participate in his death and resurrection, for example, Paul in Rom 6:3–5, "Or are you not aware that those of us who were baptized in Christ, were baptized in his death? We were co-buried with him in his death, in order that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also will exist in a new life. For if we have become co-physical by participation in his death, we will also be that in his resurrection."

Today's reader looks back on the death and resurrection of Christ as something that can be taken for granted; his death is not experienced as awesome, unacceptable, because it is taken for granted that it was appropriate, and was followed by his resurrection. For the earliest Christians this was not the case, as Luke's story of the two Emmaus disciples reveals. They tell the incognito Jesus how their chief priests and leaders betrayed and crucified him. They thought that he was the one who would redeem Israel, "but now with all of this it is already the third day since these things happened" (Lk 24:21). They also mention the women going to the grave, which they found empty, and that they had a vision of an angel, and that they said that Jesus was alive; also that some of the disciples went to the tomb and confirmed that it had been empty. Here in Luke, even though the news about Jesus' resurrection has reached the disciples, they still despair. And then Jesus tells them the mystery: "Oh, how unknowing and hard of heart you are to believe everything spoken by the prophets. Did the messiah not have to suffer these things and enter his glory? And beginning from Moses and from all the prophets he interpreted for them in all the scriptures the facts about him[self]" (Lk 24:25–27).

This is the point at which Mark's gospel concludes. It is the mystery of the kingdom of God: Jesus, the messiah, the son of God, suffers, dies and is expected to be resurrected, not as an ordinary event, but as something terrible, which, paradoxically, someone with *understanding* could face only with *uncomprehending* awe. Only when one looks back at it as an event of the past in which one is not involved does it become comprehensible, even acceptable. The disciples in Mark may thus have had less a lack of understanding than uncomprehending awe before what Jesus predicted would happen to him. After everything that happened, including their desertion of him, Jesus lets them know through the young man at the grave and the women that he would go before them to Galilee, where they would see him, as he had told them (Mk 16:7, cf. 14:28). According to Mark, Jesus had known all along that the disciples would betray him, as had been predicted in scripture: "I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep will be scattered" (Zech 13:7, Mk 14:28). Nevertheless, not losing confidence in them, he tells them: "After my resurrection I will go before you to Galilee" (Mk 14:28). As we have seen, Mark's gospel concludes with those words. The women flee in awe, and don't tell anything to anybody, but the readers or hearers of the gospel know that Jesus goes before his disciples to Galilee, and that they should be ready to meet him there.

That is what Mark's "*arxbē* of the gospel of Jesus Christ" prepares the readers and hearers for. They too should now be ready for him to meet them. In Jesus' message to his disciples the readers/hearers should recognize themselves addressed, and rather than elevate themselves in arrogant self-esteem above the disciples, they should accept with humility the mystery which engages them in Mark's story about Jesus.

B. Mark, a Story for Christian Worship

1. The Place of Peter's Confession in the Gospel

Peter's confession and Jesus' first prediction of his passion (Mk 8:27–33) form a clear transition in the gospel. From that point on everything moves forward to Christ's passion.

The story of Peter's confession (Mk 8:27–30) is structured similar to that of Jesus' transfiguration (9:2–10). In both cases Jesus' identity is revealed in the circle of his intimate followers, followed by a command to secrecy (8:30 and 9:9). Peter's declaration that Jesus is the messiah (8:29) is paralleled by the divine voice declaring that Jesus is his beloved son (9:7). This parallelism of structure gives expression to a parallelism in the meanings of the two passages: both contain statements about Jesus' identity, that he is the messiah (8:29), the son of God (9:7), combined in a single formulation in the trial before the Sanhedrin when the high priest asks Jesus if he is the messiah, the son of the most high, to which Jesus responds with an affirmative "I am" (14:61f.).

All three passages appear related in that they answer the question concerning Jesus' identity. There is however also a difference. Whereas Jesus commanded his disciples to keep his identity secret in the first two (8:30 and 9:9)—according to 9:9 "until the Son of Man rose from the dead"—he himself allowed it to become public at his trial before the Sanhedrin by accepting the high priest's charge that he claimed to have been the messiah, the son of the most high (14:61f.). In that regard it is also significant that already at his death—not after his resurrection—the centurion recognized that he was "indeed a son of God" (15:39).

If we now include Jesus' first prediction of his passion (8:31–33) in our deliberations, another structural similarity between our passage and Jesus' declaration before the Sanhedrin becomes clear. In both cases the affirmation that Jesus is the messiah (the son of God) is followed by an interpretation, in 8:31 by Jesus' prediction of his suffering, death and resurrection, and in 14:62 by messianic passages from scripture: "You will see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of the power, and coming with the clouds of heaven." These interpretations are progressive. The interpretation of 8:31 in terms of Jesus' suffering is not repeated in 14:62 because by then he had already entered into the suffering he predicted in 8:31. The entry into that suffering is announced dramatically by Jesus himself in Gethsemane. After he returned for the third time to find his disciples asleep once again, he announced to them: "You may sleep now and rest. Do not bother! the hour has come. Behold, the Son of Man is handed over in the hands of sinners" (14:41). The focus in 14:62 is exclusively on what was to happen after the resurrection and exaltation since the passion is now already a fact.

2. The Internal Structure of Mk 8:27–33

In constructing this passage Mark evidently made use of two pieces of already formulated material which occur elsewhere in his gospel: verse 29 already appeared in 6:14f., and verse 31 is repeated in slightly different forms in 9:31 and 10:33f., and possibly, in another variation, in 14:41. The first of these formulations (8:29), which repeats the speculation of "the people" concerning Jesus' identity already mentioned in 6:14f., looks back to the first part of the gospel, bringing it to a close. Contrasted with the vague speculations of the people is Peter's statement that Jesus is the messiah.

Crucial as Peter's statement is, it is ambiguous. He evidently understood it in a different way from the meaning it had for Jesus. When Jesus interpreted what his being the messiah meant by predicting that he would suffer, die and be resurrected, Peter rejected his interpretation. Peter spoke for all the disciples when he expressed his dissatisfaction with Jesus' interpretation. He obviously had something else in mind. Probably his understanding of Jesus' messiahship was similar to that of the two disciples on the way to Emmaus who expected Jesus to redeem Israel, i.e., liberate Israel from Roman rule.

As the statement of the peoples' speculation about the identity of Jesus in verse 29 looks back to the first part of the gospel, so Jesus' prediction of his passion, death and resurrection

looks forward to the second part. At the center is Peter's confession that Jesus is the messiah. It is the turning point of the gospel. On the one hand it points back to the earlier part of the gospel by contrasting the speculation of the people with the correct identification of Jesus as the messiah. Because of its ambiguity, however, it also points forward through Jesus' interpretation in terms of his passion to the second part of the gospel which further discloses that meaning. To the intimate circle of the disciples the mystery of the kingdom of God is revealed, namely, that the messiah must suffer, die and be resurrected, but it remains a mystery even to them: they do not understand it. After the second time that Jesus predicts his passion, in 9:31, the disciples still do not understand him, but "were afraid to ask him" (9:32). Nevertheless, by their ignorance the disciples put us to shame; they were sensitive to the fact that Jesus was not disclosing something ordinary, but an incomprehensible mystery.

We may now be able to recognize that Jesus' interpretation to the intimate circle of the disciples that as the messiah he had to suffer and die was what Mark intended with the statement in 4:11: "To you the mystery of the kingdom of God is revealed (literally 'given'); to those outside everything comes in parables." Note in this regard the comment which follows Jesus' interpretation in our passage: "And he spoke the word openly" (v 32). The disciples nevertheless did not understand the mystery. According to Mark, only Jesus, the son of God worshipped in the Christian cult, understood what was happening before (and during) the passion—except for, ironically, the impure spirits—until the centurion recognized it when he saw the way Jesus died (15:39). But Jesus was more than just the messiah, the son of God, who had to suffer and die; he himself as the only one who really understood the mystery of his death and resurrection, was also the initiator into it.

Mark made good use of Peter and the other disciples' inability to understand messiah in the sense intended by Jesus to bring out that meaning in the rest of the gospel. The disciples had come to the stage of recognizing that Jesus was the messiah (8:29), and in that regard were ahead of the people with their vague speculations (v 28), but they could not understand what messiah meant (vv. 32f.), until after the crucifixion and resurrection, i.e., when it was no longer possible to understand Jesus' messiahship except in terms of his passion and resurrection. The ignorance of the disciples serves Mark as the occasion to introduce the readers/hearers of the gospel into the mystery of the kingdom of God, that salvation is through the death and resurrection of Jesus. The way in which salvation is appropriated by the believer is through discipleship.

3. Mark as a Cult Story

The gospel of Mark, thus, appears to be not a mere report of events in the life of Jesus leading up to his death, but a cult myth in which the mystery of the kingdom of God is gradually disclosed, coming into clear focus for the first time with Peter's confession and the interpretation of that confession with Jesus' prediction of his passion, death and resurrection, and leading deeper into it with his second and third predictions, until in 14:41 he finally announces that the mystery is about to be enacted: "The hour has come; behold, the Son of Man is handed over into the hands of sinners."

The disciples' ignorance too should not be taken as a mere report of their inability to understand Jesus, although that too is involved. In the sense of Mark's gospel as a cult myth they represent those who are to be initiated into the mystery, those who stand in uncomprehending awe before what is being disclosed, in contrast with those outside, standing further off, less involved, with their loose speculations. This also applies to the centurion who remains a mere spectator notwithstanding it is he who first recognizes that Jesus is "truly a son of God" (15:39). This agrees with the way in which, as we have seen, the gospel

comes to an abrupt end in 16:8. It now becomes clear why it has to come to such end, with the young man's statement, "Say to the disciples and to Peter, 'He proceeds ahead of you to Galilee. There you will see him, as he told you,'" and with the women's awed flight from the grave (16:7–8). The gospel prepares for the manifestation of the risen Lord in the worshipping community.

Matthew and Luke, who used Mark's gospel as one of the sources for their own writings, did not recognize Mark as such a cult myth, and certainly did not intend their gospels in that sense. Therefore they could also not end their gospels where Mark did, because without the resurrection appearances *their* gospels would have been incomplete. Thus it also becomes understandable why Matthew eliminated all the references to the disciples' inability to understand in his gospel. In the sense of Matthew the disciples represent the beginning of the understanding Christian community, in contrast with the ignorant crowds. In the gospels of Matthew and Luke a transition was made from the present reality of the resurrected Jesus in the cult of the worshipping community, as in Mark, to an interest in that same story as the past history of Jesus to which one could look back.

Each of these gospels has a value of its own. The value of Mark is that it brings its readers and hearers immediately back to the events of Jesus' suffering, death and resurrection, not as events of the past, but as a story in which the participants in the Christian worship service are personally involved. For Mark, God's offer of salvation in Christ Jesus is not something of the past, but an event to which the readers/hearers of the story of Jesus are called to respond immediately, by recognizing that the story which is the source of that salvation, is too awesome to be true, and yet true.

C. Of Roles and of Actors

1. The Roles in Mark Are Set

The roles which the actors in Mark's story of Jesus have to play are set; there is no character development. The Pharisees, scribes and Herodians are the same when they first enter the scene, trying to trap Jesus with words, and so they remain all through the story. The same applies to the chief priests, the scribes and the elders who conspire to put Jesus to death, also to the impure spirits and demons, all of whom act in almost exactly the same way, and to the disciples who remain loyally around Jesus almost to the end, but who never understand what the "drama" that is being enacted is all about. That they desert Jesus is not something that emerges from a development in their characters, but from the role which they have to play.

Even Jesus, the main actor in this drama, never wavers from the set role he has to play in it. That role is clearly formulated for the first time, ironically, when the first impure spirit he drives out shouts: "What is there between you and us, Jesus of Nazareth? You came to destroy us! I know who you are; the holy one of God!" (Mk 1:24; cf. 3:11). That is the strength of this gospel. Drama is being enacted, one could say, between heaven and earth; it centers around the role which Jesus has to play, announced here for the first time by the impure spirit, who belongs to one of Jesus' groups of opponents, ironically the only ones besides Jesus himself who know who he is and the role he has to play, namely, to destroy them.

2. Two Roles, One Group of Actors

The crowds in Mark play two different, even contradictory, roles, first, as the people who are constantly around Jesus, following him all over and listening to his teaching, but

then suddenly, in Gethsemane, their role switches around when, as henchmen of the chief priests, the scribes and the elders, "with swords and sticks," they are lead by Judas to arrest Jesus (Mk 14:43). Nowhere is it as clear that there is no character development in Mark. The crowd does not gradually come under the control of the chief priests, scribes and elders, but suddenly switches roles when it appears in Gethsemane. Thus one can distinguish two clearly separable roles for the crowds, that of the people up to the Gethsemane scene, and that of the henchmen of the chief priests, scribes and elders from that scene on.

In the role of the people, the crowds are primarily those who enthusiastically crowd around Jesus (cf. esp. 3:7f.), and from whom he frequently seeks solitude (e.g. Mk 6:31f.). He takes a deaf-mute aside to heal him (7:33), and he drives the crowd of mourners out of the house before he raises a little girl from the dead (5:38–40). Jesus also distinguishes sharply between the crowds as those outside, and the disciples as the intimate group to whom the mystery of the kingdom of God is revealed, when he tells the disciples privately: "To you are given (revealed) the mystery of the kingdom of God; to those outside everything comes in parables, in order that looking sharply they do not see, and listening intently they do not understand, in order that they do not turn around and it be forgiven them" (Mk 4:11f.). The crowd is included with those from whom the kingdom of God is concealed.

But the crowds in the role of the people are also those about whom Jesus is primarily concerned. He heals their sick and drives out the impure spirits of those that are possessed (Mk 1:34, 39; 3:10f.; 5:54–56; 6:13; 7:37). This concern also comes to expression in his giving the twelve power to drive out demons as an extension of his care for them (Mk 3:15). As we have already seen, the demons know only too well that it is Jesus' program to destroy their power (Mk. 1:24). This compassion which he has for the people comes to expression in another way as well in his statement that "they are like sheep without a shepherd" (6:34). Twice he feeds the multitude because, as he says to the disciples, "I am distressed about the crowd, for they are already with me three days, and do not have anything to eat. If I let them go home hungry they will faint on the way. Some of them came a long way" (Mk 8:2f.). At the previous feeding, the disciples wanted to send the crowd away so that they could buy food in the surrounding villages, but Jesus said to them; "You give them to eat!" (Mk 6:37). All of this makes clear that the welfare of the people was a major concern for Jesus.

It is then also significant that, although the crowds count among those who are outside for whom "everything comes in parables" (Mk 4:11), Jesus calls them with the disciples to him when he begins his teaching on discipleship after Peter's confession and the first prediction of the passion (Mk 8:27–33). And when the chief priests, and the scribes and elders conspire against him, they dare not take action immediately, because they are afraid of the crowds who are beside themselves concerning his teaching (Mk 11:18, cf. 12:12). The conspirators have a similar fear to say something against John the Baptist, because "they feared the crowd, for everyone held John to have certainly been a prophet" (Mk 11:32).

It is a completely different role which the crowd has to play during the passion of Jesus. They are plain henchmen, at the bidding of the chief priests, the scribes and the elders. Not only do they appear in Gethsemane with Judas, the betrayer, to arrest Jesus; when Pilate offers to set free a prisoner at their request, a mere sign from the chief priests assures that they choose Barabbas, and demand that Jesus be put to death (Mk. 15:11 and 13).

3. Similar Groups of Actors, Distinct Roles

Jesus has three distinct groups of opponents in Mark: The impure spirits and demons whose power he is out to destroy, the Pharisees, scribes and Herodians who try to entrap

him with words, and the chief priests, scribes and elders who plot against him to have him put to death. Scribes belong to both of the latter two groups, but evidently they are not identical. In 2:16 those from the one group are distinctly identified as "the scribes of the Pharisees." That the latter two groups are distinct is also indicated when Mark states that the chief priests, scribes and elders (cf. 11:27) "sent some of the Pharisees and the Herodians to him to entrap him with words" (12:13). It is true that the Pharisees and Herodians also got together to plan "how to destroy him" (Mk 3:6), but nowhere are they part of those who actually effect the death of Jesus. The relationship between the two groups, Pharisees, scribes and Herodians, on the one hand, and the chief priests, scribes and elders, on the other, may be explained in Jesus' warning to the disciples to watch out for "the leaven of the Pharisees, and the leaven of the Herodians" (8:15). The Pharisees and the Herodians are not themselves the conspirators, but they are the leaven which ferments the conspiracy of the chief priests, their scribes, and the elders.

The other group of opponents is the impure spirits and demons. They are never out to get Jesus; it is Jesus who is out to destroy them, as we have already seen. They oppress the people with sickness and possession, and Jesus' chief task is to destroy their power in order to liberate the people from them. They know who he is, and that he is there to destroy them. For that reason he commands them to secrecy every time there is a chance that they might expose him (1:25, 34; 3:12; cf. 9:25).

Jesus does, of course, also repeatedly command those whom he healed and from whom he drove out impure spirits to keep quiet about it (1:44; 5:43; 7:36; 8:26). The only exception is the Gerasene demoniac whom Jesus commanded to go "to your house to your own people and proclaim to them what God has done for you, and how he was merciful to you" (5:19). The commands to secrecy given to the demons and impure spirits and to those whom he healed and from whom he drove out impure spirits are related. The identity which the demons and impure spirits try to expose is what is also revealed in his power to heal the sick and to drive out the impure spirits and demons.

Mark does not make explicit why Jesus does not want his identity exposed. The demons and impure spirits evidently want to prevent Jesus from destroying them, and try to do so by exposing him. In what way would exposing him prevent him from achieving his objective? There is a statement in Paul which may shed light on the matter. In I Corinthians he points out that none of the leaders of this age knew the wisdom of God which is pronounced in a mystery (I Cor 2:7f.), "for if they did know, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory" (v 8b). That may have been the knowledge which Jesus wanted to prevent the demons from revealing to the chief priests, scribes and elders, because if they did not have him crucified, he would not have been able to achieve his objective. That too may be part of the mystery of the kingdom of God, which may shed light on the obscure statement concerning the house divided against itself. Scribes from Jerusalem (are they, since they come from Jerusalem, scribes of the chief priests and the elders?) accuse Jesus of driving out the demons with the chief of the demons, to which Jesus replies with a parable: "How can Satan drive out Satan. And if a kingdom is divided against itself, such a kingdom cannot remain standing; and if a house is divided against itself, such a house cannot remain standing. And if Satan stands up against himself and is divided, he cannot stand, but will come to an end. And no-one can enter the house of a strong man to plunder his goods, unless he first binds the strong man, and then he will plunder his house" (3:23b-27). Is this a cryptic reference to the fact that the chief priests, the scribes and elders are divided against what should be their allies, the demons and impure spirits, and therefore contribute to the downfall of their kingdom? Is what Jesus does in Mark's gospel to enter the divided house of the metaphoric strong man to bind him and plunder his house?

4. Jesus' Support Group: The Disciples

The final group of actors is the disciples, of whom Peter is the spokesman. Their role is described precisely when Jesus establishes them as a group of twelve. "He made them twelve, so that they would be with him, and he could send them to proclaim, and to have power to drive out demons" (Mk 3:13f.).

The first aspect of the disciples' role is to be with Jesus: he withdraws time and again from the crowds into their intimate circle, as a type of refuge from the enthusiastic crowds; he tells the disciples to have a boat ready for him "because of the crowd, to prevent them from crushing him" (3:9). To them he gives private instruction concerning the mystery of the kingdom of God (4:11, 34). The other side of their role is that, even though Jesus knows that they will desert him, he gives them the responsibility for the people after his forthcoming departure, comparing them with servants charged with full authority after their master went on a journey (13:34–37). Already during his own activity on earth, the disciples are charged with responsibility for the people; he gives them power to drive out demons and to proclaim to the crowds.

The disciples are thus involved in a dual relationship to Jesus and the people: on the one hand they provide Jesus with the privacy of an intimate circle of trusted followers away from the throng of the crowds, and, on the other, they serve as an extension of his care for the people.

5. Jesus, the Main Actor

Jesus is obviously the main actor in Mark's story. The entire narrative is organized around the role he has to play. That role is already clearly defined with the protest of the first impure spirit: "You came to destroy us! I know who you are; the holy one of God!" (1:24). In this protest Jesus' role and identity are closely tied together: Jesus' identity is his role.

The unity of Jesus' identity and role also comes to expression in Peter's confession. Even though Peter confesses him as the messiah, he does not recognize Jesus' true identity. That becomes clear when he rejects Jesus' own interpretation of his role as messiah with the first prediction of his passion. For his rejection he calls on himself Jesus' sharp rebuke: "Go away from behind me, Satan, for you do not have in mind the things of God, but of humans" (8:33), an evident reference to political messianic aspirations. Peter's rejection of Jesus' interpretation of his role as messiah amounts to a failure to grasp his identity.

We have already noted the pivotal position of Peter's confession. By also recognizing the intimate relationship between Jesus's identity and his role as messiah, we can now see even more clearly how that confession holds together the entire narrative, reaching back to the impure spirit's protest that Jesus as the son of God came to destroy them (1:24), and forward to the final enactment of that role in his death and resurrection through which he achieved the destruction of the demons' and impure spirits' power over the people, culminating in the centurion's statement that he was "truly a son of God." The destruction of the power of the demons and impure spirits through the death and resurrection of Jesus is the mystery of the kingdom of God.

And so all the actors become interrelated through the intertwining of their roles in relation to the central role of Jesus. The crowds in their role of the people are oppressed by the rule of the impure spirits and demons, manifest not only in sickness and possession, but also in their lack of direction. They are like sheep without a shepherd. Freeing the people from the power of the impure spirits and demons is the main role enacted by Jesus, who was filled with the spirit of God for that purpose at his baptism (Mk 1:9–11). To enact

that role he calls the twelve, to be with him, so that he could send them out to proclaim and to cast out the demons and impure spirits (3:13), but also to take responsibility for the people after his departure (13:33–37).

That Jesus could achieve his objective was finally dependent on the disunity of his opponents; to destroy the power of the impure spirits and demons he had to die. That was carried out by those who tried to destroy him, by the Pharisees, scribes and Herodians who tried to entrap him with words, by the chief priests, scribes and elders who conspired to have him put to death, and finally by their henchmen, a role that was also filled by the crowd, through whom the conspirators had Pilate do their bidding.

D. The Meaning of Suffering in Mark

1. The Problem of Christ's Power and Humility in the Gospel

Jesus appears frequently as a powerful, divine figure in Mark. At his baptism he receives the Holy Spirit coming down on him as a dove, and a voice from heaven proclaims: "You are my beloved son; with you I am very pleased" (Mk 1:11). On a mountain he becomes transfigured before the three most intimate of his disciples, and again the voice, from a cloud this time, proclaims: "This is my beloved son; listen to him" (9:7); with undaunted power he drives out impure spirits and heals the sick (1:34, 39; 3:10f.; 5:54–56; 6:13; 7:37). But Jesus evidently wants to keep his power as the son of God secret. He commands the impure spirits and the demons to remain silent to prevent them from exposing him. Similarly, he tells those whom he heals not to talk about it. His renown nevertheless becomes so great that finally he tries—unsuccessfully—to move about without being recognized (7:24).

After Peter recognizes him as the messiah, he charges the disciples to keep their knowledge secret (8:3), and after his transfiguration on the mountain he again tells the three disciples who had been with him on that occasion to tell no-one what they saw "until the Son of Man has risen from the dead" (9:9). This secrecy is evidently related to what we already know as the mystery of the kingdom of God; it is through his death and resurrection that Jesus, the messiah, brings about release from the forces of evil, the impure spirits and the demons.

Once more the crucial nature of Peter's confession and Jesus' interpretation of its meaning in terms of his coming passion becomes clear. In the combination of that confession and its interpretation we have a remarkable coordination of power and humbleness: The messiah, son of God and Son of Man, brings about salvation through humility, by submitting to a role of suffering and death.

This reminds of the hymn which Paul quotes in his letter to the Philippians (Phil 2:6–11), according to which he who had been in the image of God, gave up his divine prerogatives and became a human being to bring salvation to humanity by becoming obedient unto death (Phil 2:6–11). As is well-known, the statement in the second part of this hymn that "in the name of Jesus every knee of those in heaven and on earth and under the earth shall bow" (v 10), refers to the demonic powers in every part of the universe, in heaven, on earth and under the earth, subjecting it to chaos, like Mark's impure spirits and demons. Jesus' victory in the Philippians hymn is achieved when those powers subject themselves to him as lord of the universe.

In the hymn Jesus accomplished his victory by reversing the human desire to be equal to God. Having been in the image of God, he did not consider it something to strive for to be equal to God, but emptied himself of his divinity, taking up the existence of a human being, enslaved to the demonic powers that subject the universe to their rule (vv. 6f.). By

giving up his divine existence, choosing instead to become human, Jesus robbed the demons of the means by which they had control over humanity, the temptation to be like God. For that achievement "God exalted him and gave him the name which is above every name" (v 9). Jesus' victory was not achieved only when God exalted him; it had already been achieved in the act of unlimited obedience through which he robbed the demons of their power over the universe and over humanity. By exalting him God confirmed that victory.

In Mark too, Jesus achieves his victory through humility, but here the son of God does not give up his divine glory. Nowhere is the power of Jesus in question in the gospel—except by those who do not understand. To the contrary, the problem with which the gospel deals is his willingness to be humbled. That is why Peter is scandalized by Jesus' interpretation of his messiahship in terms of his suffering and death.

What we need to ask, however, is whether the role of humility which Jesus, the messiah, the son of God, had to assume, was only a transition to his glory, as seems to be the case in the interpretation which Jesus gave in Luke's gospel to the disciples on their way to Emmaus, that "the messiah must suffer and so enter into his glory" (Lk 24:26). This tradition in Luke is very early. It reflects the earliest Christians' attempts to cope with the humiliation of Jesus' suffering and death, as the comments of the two disciples earlier in the conversation with Jesus reveal: "We thought he was going to redeem Israel, but now it is already three days since this happened" (Lk 24:21). The question is whether the suffering of Jesus, the messiah, was merely something transitory with which the Christian community tried to cope—by interpreting it as the way in which he entered into his glory—; or is suffering and humility an inherent feature in Mark's understanding of salvation? We can find an answer to this question only when we consider the relationship of Jesus' suffering to Christian discipleship.

2. Christian Discipleship according to Mark

It is noteworthy how in Mark each of the three predictions of the passion (8:31; 9:31 and 10:33f.) are followed by instruction in discipleship (8:34–38; 9:33–37; 10:35–45). After the first prediction Jesus calls together the crowd with the disciples and says to them: "If someone wants to follow me, he should deny himself, take up his cross and follow me, for whoever wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake and for the gospel will save it" (8:34f.). And after the second prediction, the disciples, while they are still on the way, debate the question, who is the greatest? Jesus calls them together, and tells them: "If someone wants to be first, she/he should be last, and serve everyone" (9:35). Finally, after the third prediction, James and John, the sons of Zebedee, request that they be allowed to sit respectively at his right and his left when he is in his glory. After Jesus explains to them that that is not for him to decide, the other disciples, hearing of their request, become annoyed with the two brothers. Jesus again calls them together and tells them: "You know that those who think they lead the nations rule over them, and those who are great among them exert authority over them. It should not be like that among you, but, whoever wants to be great among you should be your servant, and whoever wants to be first among you should be your slave" (10:42–44).

And then he relates this teaching on discipleship to his own paradoxical role as the Son of Man who is a servant of humanity: "For the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to give his life as a ransom for many" (10:45). The relationship between Jesus' predictions of his passion and his instruction in discipleship reveals that the role of Jesus and that of his followers are coordinate. The suffering and death of Jesus is not merely a transition to his glory, but a model for discipleship.

3. Mark's World View

The most specific feature of Mark's understanding of the world was that it was inhabited by impure spirits and demons, under whose rule humanity was burdened with sickness, possession, and a lack of direction; they were like sheep without a shepherd (6:34). Opposed to these demonic forces came Jesus, endowed with the Holy Spirit and proclaimed the son of God by a voice from heaven at his baptism (1:9–11). The impure spirits and demons know that his role is to destroy them (1:24; 3:11; 5:7). In his struggle against these evil forces, he also gives power to his disciples to drive out demons (3:14).

Notwithstanding Jesus' power to drive out the impure spirits and demons, and his empowering of his disciples to do the same, it is not with power that he finally destroys these forces, but through his suffering, death and resurrection. Similarly, even though he gave power over the evil spirits and demons to his disciples, his instructions to them concerning discipleship was not in the use of power, but self-denial, taking up one's cross and following him.

The images in terms of which Mark brings his world-view to expression are antiquated, demons populating the world and subjecting it to illness and suffering, the destruction of their power by the suffering death and resurrection of the savior. To understand these images we have to move to the deeper level of the meanings which come to expression in them. To do that we have to try to understand the mindset of the world in which Mark and the other New Testament writers lived.

4. The Mindset of the Hellenistic World

What is decisive about the time of history in which Christianity emerged is that the conquests of Alexander the Great left the ancient Near East in turmoil for centuries, not only politically and militarily, but also, and maybe especially, culturally. Even the Romans fought their most decisive internal battles in the eastern Mediterranean. Swept with constant civil strife and warfare beyond their control, the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean had a deep sense of the loss of control over their own destinies. The world in which they lived was no longer hospitable, but was overwhelmed by alien forces, concretely in opposing political/military forces, and culturally by demons that inhabited and controlled the world. In a variety of ways they tried to escape their destinies which had become intolerable. The Stoic philosophers did so by internalizing the conflict, and finding calm in the surrender of desire, especially of what was not one's own. More typical was the hope for a better existence in another world to come in Jewish apocalypticism, or by denying that one's existence is of this world in gnosticism. In the mystery religions people tried to escape from the exigencies of human existence by participating in the destiny of their cult deities.

Typical of the Hellenistic mindset was the sense of a clash between human existence, and a life in a world that had become inhospitable. This clash between individual existence and existence in the world may be true for humanity as a whole, and not only for the Hellenistic age, where the clash had merely become particularly intolerable. It is the clash between existing at the same time as an individual and a social being. The flight from the world in the Hellenistic world was not because people in that time were less social, but because involvement in the world had become intolerable.

5. Mark's Answer to the Conflict in Human Existence

The answer which Mark gave to the conflict of human existence was not particularly his own. In giving his answer he was indebted to the Christian tradition of which he was

a part. Mark's answer to the intolerable human situation was, to begin with, not to try and escape from it, but engaging in it, not by dominating, but serving humanity: "You know that those who think they lead the nations, rule over them, and those who are great among them, exert authority over them. It should not be like that among you, but, whoever wants to be great among you should be your servant, and whoever wants to be first among you should be your slave" (10:42–44). This advice was given with the confidence that it had the sanction of Jesus: "For also the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve and to give his life for many" (10:42–45).

Mark took over the image of the dying and rising savior from the mystery religions. What he wanted to say with that image was that salvation was not achieved by the exertion of power, but by humility and service to others. In contrast with the mystery religions, salvation, according to Mark, was not through participation in the power of the resurrected cult deity, but by the imitation of him in his humbleness and service to humanity. He achieves this by coordinating each prediction of the passions with instruction in discipleship. In Mark the shift was from participation in the resurrection of the savior to participation in his humility. In his own way, thus, Mark understood that there was no escape from human existence, that salvation for humanity was not to be like God.

The role of Christ in Mark was not complete with his own suffering, death and resurrection; it was complete only when those who belonged to him, those whom he called to deny themselves, took up their crosses and followed him, when they recognized that salvation could not be achieved except by accepting human destiny, which Mark defined as not ruling over others and exerting authority over them, but serving them, and being their slaves.

When the disciples argued about who was the greatest, Jesus took a child and, placing it in their midst, said: "Whoever embraces someone like this child in my name, embraces me" (9:37). For anyone to accept existence as unpretentious as that of a child is to understand and accept the meaning of Christ. Salvation can be achieved only in the humbleness of human existence, and that, according to Mark, is an enormous responsibility: "A man who went abroad, leaving his house, gave authority to his slaves, to each her/his work, and to the doorkeeper he gave instructions to be alert. So you too should be alert, for you do not know when the lord of the house returns" (13:34f.). After Jesus' departure it is his followers who are, before God, responsible for the mystery of the kingdom of God, because it now appears that that mystery also means that participation in Christ's victory can be achieved only as a participation in his humbleness.

Jewish and Christian Apocalyptic Letters: 1 Peter, Revelation, and 2 Baruch 78-87

J. Ramsey Michaels
Southwest Missouri State University

There is irony in the fact that "apocalyptic literature" is, for the most part, unaware of itself as "apocalyptic," and more irony in the fact that the first work ever to introduce itself as an "apocalypse" (Rev 1:1) was in fact a letter, the longest letter by far in the NT. Debates over whether the genre of the Book of Revelation is "apocalypse" (1:1) or "prophecy" (1:3; 22:7, 10, 18–19) tend to downplay the book's epistolary framework (1:4–6; 22:21),[1] but to do so is to overlook a very clearcut and clearly-defined genre in favor of ones about which no consensus exists—and probably ones about which no consensus is possible. What *formal* characteristics define an "apocalypse"? Or, for that matter, a "prophecy"? The formal characteristics of a letter (in this case, specifically an early Christian letter) are, on the other hand, easy to list: the name of the letter-writer, a designation of the recipients, a "grace and peace" formula of some kind, a doxology or blessing, and at the end a salutation conveying again the grace or peace of Jesus Christ.

The issue has become further confused by designating Rev 2–3 as the "seven letters" (as if each was sent to only one church!) instead of the "seven oracles," or seven prophetic messages, which would have been more accurate. The impression is left that seven "letters" are here embedded within an "apocalypse," but is it not more correct to say that an "apocalypse" (in the sense of a narrative of a series of visions) has been embedded within a very long circular letter from "John" to "the seven churches that are in Asia"? It is quite true that the long letter is prefaced with an apocalyptic or prophetic introduction (1:1–3), but far from negating the epistolary character of what follows, the preface simply alerts the reader and the hearers that the letter is to be no ordinary letter but a letter from God himself, through Jesus Christ and "his servant John" (cf. 1:11). If this is indeed its function, then the genre of the Book of Revelation is perhaps best defined as an "apocalyptic letter" (Is it possible that our first mistake was making the adjective "apocalyptic" into a noun?).

What has all this to do with 1 Peter? Like the Book of Revelation, 1 Peter is clearly a letter: it names the author, designates the recipients, adds a "grace and peace" formula and a blessing, and ends with a final wish of peace in Christ. And like Revelation, 1 Peter is a circular letter to a group of Asian churches, except that the churches are designated not by their respective cities, but in relation to several Roman provinces encompassing a much larger area than the seven churches in Revelation. Unlike the Book of Revelation, 1 Peter has no preface defining it as a apocalyptic letter. There is no possibility of mistaking it for an "apocalypse" in any generic sense of that word. But if we are content to use "apocalyptic" as an adjective, is there a sense in which 1 Peter can be regarded as an "apocalyptic letter" in its own right, or at least as a legitimate source for early Christian apocalyptic ideas? This question must be addressed first in relation to the genre of 1 Peter, and then in relation to its content.

[1] See, e.g., J.J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination* (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 11.

The Genre of 1 Peter

If 1 Peter is a letter, and specifically a circular letter, what kind of circular letter is it? Can we be even more precise about genre? There is nothing prefaced or appended to it that identifies it in any way as an "apocalyptic letter" (if such a genre exists). The more appropriate term for 1 Peter is perhaps "diaspora letter" (cf. 1:1: "to the elect strangers of the diaspora of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia"). The diaspora letter in Judaism was a formal communication of instruction or encouragement from Jerusalem to Jewish communities scattered in Babylon (Jer 29:4–23), Egypt (2 Macc 1:1–10a, 1:10b–2:18), or Assyria (2 Bar 78–87). The validity of the definition does not depend on whether the letters in question were ever actually sent in history, or only in a narrative of some kind (as may be the case in the above examples).

That this Jewish epistolary form influenced early Christian correspondence can be seen both from the Epistle of James (1:1) and from the letter of the Jerusalem Council (also in the name of James), to "the brothers in Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia who are Gentiles" (Acts 15:23–29). The second of these is exceptional in being addressed not to the Jewish community but to Gentile Christians. The same is undoubtedly true of 1 Peter (cf. 1:14, "do not be conformed to the passions of your former ignorance"; 1:18, "the futile ways inherited from your fathers"; 2:10, "Once you were no people, but now you are God's people; once you had not recieved mercy but now you have received mercy"; 4:3, "Let the time that is past suffice for doing what the Gentiles like to do"). Peter is using a distinctly Jewish literary genre to address Gentiles.

1 Peter is unique in one other respect as well: i.e. that its place of origin is not Jerusalem, as the genre would lead us to expect, but "Babylon," symbolically the place of exile par excellence, and geographically (in all likelihood) Rome. Even the Epistle of James was probably no exception to the rule that diaspora letters are sent from Jerusalem. Its place of origin is not stated, but the strength of traditions associating James with Jerusalem could have made an explicit statement to that effect unnecessary. In contrast to all other examples, 1 Peter is a diaspora letter purporting to be written from "Babylon" (5:13). There is a correspondence between "Babylon" at the end of the letter and "diaspora" at the beginning: the author and his readers are in the same boat. Instead of a letter from "home base" to a group of homeless exiles, 1 Peter is a letter from the homeless to the homeless! It is a diaspora letter with a difference. Its point of reference for addressing Gentile Christians is the fundamentally Jewish experience of exile or dispersion (cf., e.g., 1:17). The Gentile "aliens and exiles" who read the letter (cf. 2:11) are put in the place not so much of Israel before she had a land (cf. Heb 11:13) as of Israel dispossessed of her land.

Though the reference to "Babylon" near the end of 1 Peter gives the letter a vaguely apocalyptic cast (at least to modern readers familiar with the Book of Revelation), there are no formal features to justify calling it an "apocalyptic letter" in any generic sense. Among the Jewish diaspora letters that could be cited as parallels, however, one at least is distinctly apocalytic in character: 2 Bar 78–87. A comparison between 1 Peter and this letter appended to the so-called "Apocalypse of Baruch" may shed light on the early Christian use of letters (especially diaspora or other circular letters) as significant vehicles for apocalyptic ideas.

"The letter of Baruch, the son of Neriah" (2 Bar 78.1) introduces itself as a letter "sent to the nine and a half tribes which were across the river . . . to the brothers who were carried away in captivity" (78.1–2).[2] The reference is to the Assyrian captivity of 721 B.C.,

[2] The translation of 2 Baruch is that of A.F.J. Klijn, in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*

yet the letter is occasioned by a request from the people to write "to our brothers in Babylon a letter of doctrine and a roll of hope" (77.12). Baruch agrees to do so, but adds that "I shall write to the nine and a half tribes, and send it by means of a bird" (77.17). He proceeds to write the two letters: "One I sent by means of an eagle to the nine and a half tribes, and the other I sent by means of three men to those who were in Babylon" (77.19). With this the letter to Babylon is promptly forgotten. After a brief lecture to the messenger eagle (77.20–26; e.g., v 22, "But now go and do not stay in any place, do not go into a nest, do not sit on any tree until you have flown over the breadth of the many waters of the river Euphrates and have come to the people that live there and cast down to them this letter"), Baruch's letter to Assyria is recorded in full (chapters 78–86). Then, Baruch says, "I folded it, sealed it cautiously, and bound it to the neck of the eagle. And I let it go and sent it away. The end of the letter of Baruch, the son of Neriah" (87.1). The use of the eagle as messenger implies that the letter is indeed an apocalyptic letter, a message from God himself (cf. Baruch and the eagle that delivered his letter to Jeremiah in 4 Bar 7.1–23: e.g., 7.11, ". . . like an arrow shot straight, go forth in the power of God, and may the glory of the Lord be with you on the entire journey which you will travel").

The apocalyptic letter of Baruch clearly had a different textual history from 2 Bar as a whole. Only one Syriac manuscript of 2 Bar in its entirety is extant, in contrast to thirty-six different Syriac manuscripts of the letter.[3] This suggests that 2 Bar 78–87 had a life of its own in the Syriac-speaking church, probably undergoing significant Christian interpretation (though without evidence of actual interpolation or redaction).[4] Like the rest of 2 Baruch, the apocalyptic letter is essentially Jewish rather than Christian, yet there seem to have been elements in it that caught the attention of certain Christian communities (encouraged perhaps by 86.1: "When therefore you receive the letter, read it carefully in your assemblies. And think about it, in particular, however, on the days of your fasts").

A sampling of parallels between 2 Bar 78–87 and 1 Peter may help illumine the apocalyptic character of the latter:

	2 Baruch		**1 Peter**
78.2	". . . to the nine and a half tribes which were across the river	1:1	"To the exiles of the dispersion
78.2	". . . to the brothers who were carried away in captivity"		
78.3	"Grace and peace be with you"	1:2	"May grace and peace be multiplied to you".

(continued)

(ed. J. H. Charlesworth; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983), Vol. 1, pp. 615–52.

[3] Klijn, 616.

[4] R. H. Charles cites one example (in 85.14) of possible *antiChristian* polemic (*The Apocalypse of Baruch;* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1896, p. 164; cf. p. 76 on 2 Bar 48.24), but there is no sign of a Christian hand in the letter as it stands.

78.3 "I remember, my brothers, the love of him who created me"	1:3 "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who by his great mercy brought us to new birth, to a living hope . . ."
78.4 "Are we not all, the twelve tribes, bound by one captivity as we also descend from one father?"	5:9 " . . . your brotherhood throughout the world"
78.6 "Therefore, if you think about the things you have suffered now for your good so that you may not be condemned at the end and be tormented, you shall receive hope that lasts forever and ever"	1:6 "Then you rejoice, though now for a little while you may have to suffer various trials"
	1:3 " . . . to a living hope" (cf. 1:13, 21; 3:15)
82.1 "My brothers, I have written to you that you may find consolation with regard to the multitude of tribulations"	5:12 " . . . I have written briefly to you, encouraging you and testifying that this is true grace form God. Stand fast in it."
82.2 " . . . that the end which the Most High prepared is near, and that his grace is coming, and that the fulfillment of his judgment is not far off"	4:7 "The end of all things is at hand"
	1:13 " . . . set your hope fully on the grace that is coming to you at the revelation of Jesus Christ"
83.2 "And he will surely judge those who are in his world, and will truly inquire into everything with regard to all their works which were sins"	4:5 " . . . to him who is ready to the living and the dead"
	1:17 " . . . him who judges each one impartially according to his deeds . . ."
82.7 " . . . but like grass which is withering they will fade away"	1:23 "All flesh is like grass and all its glory like the flower of grass. The grass withers and flower falls, but the word of the Lord remains forever"

These are not the kind of parallels that suggest literary dependence either way. They do, however, confirm that the contrast between present suffering and future vindication,

whether in a Jewish or Christian document, took shape on occasion in the framework of reflection on the Jewish experience of exile—specifically the deportations to Assyria in 721 B.C. and to Babylonia in 586—and of consequent dispersion. This framework is not carried through so consistently in 1 Peter as in 2 Bar 78–87, for redemption is not viewed as a re-gathering of the dispersed "aliens and strangers," yet the present predicament of the people of God in the world is set forth in a similar way in this short letter from "Babylon" to the "diaspora."

The Apocalyptic Content of 1 Peter

When we turn from form to content, the parallels between 1 Peter and apocalyptic material associated with Baruch are not confined to Baruch's final letter. The perspective of 2 Baruch as a whole, articulated at the outset in 1.4, that "I will scatter this people among the Gentiles that they may do good to the Gentiles," expresses the vision of 1 Peter as well (see especially 2:12: "Maintain good conduct among the Gentiles, so that in case they speak against you as wrongdoers, they may see your good deeds and glorify God on the day of visitation"; cf. 2:14, 20; 3:6, 13, 17; 4:19). At other points as well there are similarities of thought or terminology or both, especially centering on the documents' common interest in suffering and vindication. For example:

> "Therefore, he did not spare his own sons first, but he afflicted them as his enemies because they sinned. Therefore, they were once punished, that they might be forgiven" (13.9–10; cf. 1 Pet 4:17).
> "For this world is to them a struggle and an effort with much trouble. And that, accordingly, which will come, a crown with great glory" (15.8; cf. 1 Pet 5:4).
> "And after these things I saw that the cedar was burning and the vine growing, while it and all around it became a valley of unfading flowers" (37.1; cf. 1 Pet 5:4).

More important for the apocalyptic character of 1 Peter, however, are its actual uses of *apokaluptein* and *apokalupsis*, especially in relation to the "revelation" terminology of 2 Baruch and other Jewish "apocalyptic" writings. *Apokalupsis* is used three times (1:7, 13; 4:13), never with reference to a present revelatory experience, but always to an eschatological event. In particular, the phrase "revelation of Jesus Christ" (1:7, 13; cf. 5:4, ". . . when the chief Shepherd appears") refers to the Parousia (cf. 2 Thess 1:7), not to the vision of a prophet or seer (contrast Gal 1:12, Rev 1:1). The "apocalyptic" experience par excellence belongs to the future and not the present (cf. "revelation of his glory" in 4:13; also the uses of the verb *apokaluptein* in 1:5 and 5:1). The only exception is the *apekalupbtbe* of 1:12, where the "revelation" (i.e. to the ancient prophets) is actually a non-revelation: the message the prophets brought from God was not for them, but for a future time!

The author of 1 Peter comes closer than any other NT writer to defining *apokalupsis* in 1:8, where the phrase, "revelation of Jesus Christ" (1:7) is further explained: "You have never seen him, but you love him. Even now, without seeing, you believe in him; you [will] rejoice with inexpressible and glorious joy on receiving the outcome of your faith, salvation of [your] souls." *Apokalupsis* is here understood as the making visible of someone or something now invisible. Jesus Christ is not absent from his people so that he must "come" to them. Rather, he is present with them, though invisible; consequently he must be "revealed." The author's intent is not to make a statement about his readers' experience—or lack of experience—of the historical Jesus, still less to make a distinction

between himself and them, as if to imply, "You have not seen Jesus, but I have, as an apostle and eyewitness" (cf. 2 Pet 1:16).[5] His intent is rather to make a generalization about the experience of *all* Christian believers. None of them, himself included, has ever seen Jesus Christ in the way they will see him at his great future *apokalupsis.* It has often been noted that verbs of seeing occur twice in this verse, almost in a single breath:

> "You have never seen him . . ." (*ouk idontes*).
> "Even now, without seeing . . ." (*arti me borontes*).

The distinction between the two participles (one aorist and the other present) is that the first points to what is necessarily and universally the case—i.e. that Christ and the salvation he brings are hidden from human view until the moment of his revelation[6]—while the second focuses more specifically on the "various ordeals" (1:6) now confronting the author and his readers (*arti*, "now," in v 8 corresponds to the same word in v 6). The present suffering of the Christian community is tied in to some extent with the invisibility of its Savior; the coming "revelation" of the now invisible Christ means vindication for those who trust in him.

What is true of Jesus Christ personally is true of his salvation, which is "ready to be revealed" (1:5), or of the inheritance "kept in heaven for you" (1:4), or of Christ's "glory," soon to be revealed but present already through the Spirit among those reproached for his name (4:13–14). For communities facing slander, hostility, and suffering, salvation rests not in what is seen, but in the unseen. Vindication is already a reality, but a reality waiting to be unveiled. In the sense that the "apocalypse" is yet to come, 1 Peter could be designated a "pre-apocalyptic" letter. The author can assure his readers of divine vindication, but he claims no vision assuring him (and them) of the form it will take.[7] All he can offer are "the things now announced to you by those who brought you the gospel through the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, things on which angels desire to look" (1:12; cf. 1:25). This is what distinguishes 1 Peter from an "apocalyptic letter" such as the Book of Revelation.

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[5] See, e.g., E. G. Selwyn, *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (London: Macmillan, 1961), 131; cf. J. N. D. Kelly, *A Commentary on the Epistles of Peter and of Jude* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 56.

[6] Cf. Paul's quotation from an unknown source in 1 Cor 2:9: "The eye has not seen, the ear has not heard, nor has there come up in the human heart the things God has prepared for those who love him." Though Paul seems not to refer here to the future appearing of Jesus Christ, several other ancient uses of this quotation do (e.g., 1 Clem. 34.8; 2 Clem. 11.7, 14.5; Mart. Pol. 2.3), and the same saying may have contributed to the choice of words in 1 Peter as well (note especially the phrase, "those who love him," in the quotation in relation to Peter's language, "You have not seen him, but you love him"; cf. also 2 Tim 4:8, "to all those who love his appearing").

[7] Consequently, 1 Peter refers to the vindication only in the most general terms: opponents will either "see your good deeds and glorify God on the day of visitation" (2:12) or else be "put to shame" (3:16; cf. 2:8) as they "give account to him who stands ready to judge the living and the dead" (4:5). In the latter instance, the author does not venture to describe what their "end" will be (4:17b-18). The righteous, on the other hand, can "entrust their souls to a faithful Creator" (4:19); God will exalt them "in due time" (5:5), and at last "restore, establish, and strengthen" them (5:10).

The notion of an already-existing salvation waiting to be revealed is common in Jewish "apocalyptic" literature as well, not least in 2 Baruch. Among the parallels in 2 Baruch to the "pre-apocalyptic" perspective of 1 Peter are the following:

> "It is not this building [i.e. the temple] that is in your midst now; it is that which will be revealed, with me, that which was already prepared from the moment that I decided to create Paradise" (4.2–3).
> "Therefore . . .let your glory appear, and let the greatness of your beauty be known . . ." (21.23).
> "And it will happen that when all that which should come to pass . . . has been accomplished, the Anointed One will begin to be revealed" (29.3).
> "And it will happen after these things when the time of the appearance of the Anointed One has been fulfilled and he returns with glory, that then all who sleep in hope of him will rise" (30.1).
> "And it will happen when the time of its fulfillment is approaching . . . that at that time the dominion of my Anointed One which is like the fountain and the vine, will be revealed" (39.7).
> "For they shall see that world which is now invisible to them, and they will see a time which is now hidden to them" (51.8).
> "And if you have heard the names of the good and evil things which will come at that time, and if you are grieved, what about when you will see what the Majesty will reveal, who will convince some and cause others to rejoice?" (55.8).
> "And it will happen that after he has brought down everything which is in the world, and has sat down in eternal peace on the throne of the kingdom, then joy will be revealed and rest will appear" (73.1; cf. 1 Pet 1:8, 4:13).

"But the end of everything will come to light" (83.23). Similar sayings about the revelation of what is now hidden can be cited from 4 Ezra:

> "For behold, the time will come, when the signs which I have foretold to you will come to pass; the city which now is not seen shall appear, and the land which now is hidden shall be disclosed. And everyone who has been delivered from the evils that I have foretold shall see my wonders. For my son the Messiah shall be revealed with those who are with him . . ." (4 Ezra 7.28).
> ". . . this is the Messiah whom the Most High has kept until the end of days, who will arise from the posterity of David . . ." (4 Ezra 12.32).
> ". . . this is he whom the Most High has been keeping for many ages, who will himself deliver his creation" (4 Ezra 13.26).
> "And when these things come to pass and the signs occur which I showed you before, then my son will be revealed, whom you saw as a man coming up from the sea" (4 Ezra 13.32).
> "Just as no one can explore or know what is in the depths of the sea, so no one on earth can see my son or those who are with him, except in the time of his day" (4 Ezra 13.52).

The main difference in 1 Peter, of course, is that the "Anointed One" to be revealed is Jesus of Nazareth, who "went to heaven" (3:22) and is now hidden there until he becomes visible again (for this perspective on Jesus, cf. Acts 1:11, 3:20–21). Unlike 1 Peter, 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra are "apocalyptic" as well as "pre-apocalyptic." The narrators present themselves as seers to whom the future is revealed in visions before the fact. Baruch's

belief, expressed to God in a prayer, is that "You are the one who reveals to those who fear that which is prepared for them so that you may comfort them. You show your mighty works to those who do not know. You pull down the enclosure for those who have no experience and enlighten the darkness, and reveal the secrets to those who are spotless, to those who subjected themselves to you and your Law in faith" (54.4–5). The author of 1 Peter holds no such view and plays no such role. He presents himself neither as prophet nor visionary, but as "an apostle of Jesus Christ" (1:1), and "fellow elder" to the leaders of the churches in Asia Minor (5:1). His letter is no apocalyptic message borne on eagle's wings, nor is it a direct communication from God through the risen Christ. At most it is "true grace from God" (5:12),[8] an example of "God's diversified grace" (4:10) in the ministry of one Christian congregation (5:13) to others in similar circumstances, and as such it foreshadows the fuller "grace to be brought to you" at the great future *apokalupsis* (1:13).

Conclusion

A definition of "apocalyptic literature" broad enough to include 1 Peter would have to refer to "revelatory literature . . . *disclosing a transcendant reality which is both temporal,* insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world" omitting the words, "with a narrative framework in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient."[9]

[8] "This" (*tautēn*) in 1 Pet 5:12b is usually taken to be the difficult situation in which the churches of Asia Minor find themselves, but if this were the case the neuter *touto* (as in 2:19, 20) would have been expected. The feminine *tautēn* more likely refers to the letter itself, which the author says he has "written to you briefly" (v 12a). In a sense, *epistolē,* "letter," is understood here, just as *ekklēsia,* "congregation," must be supplied in the next verse.

[9] See J. J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination,* 4.

I Peter 4.17, Ezekiel 9.6, and Apocalyptic Hermeneutics

Dr. William L. Schutter

I Peter 4.17–9 starts with a ringing pronouncement: "The time is come for the judgment to begin with the house(hold) of God." With it the author sums up his treatment of the theme of suffering in relation to the conduct expected from his letter's intended recipients.[1] The commentators have typically taken him to mean that the final Day has at long last dawned.[2] So F. W. Beare has observed about the force of ἄρξασθαι, "The aorist is not used lightly; it signifies a definite event in God's dealing with the world, sustaining the thought that the outbreak of organized persecution is not a mere intensifying of the normal difficulties which beset the life of Christians in a pagan environment, but is the first act in the great drama of the Last Judgment (194)."

Yet despite the emphasis upon the End which the author's statement shares with much apocalyptic thought, the actual relationship of that statement to conventional apocalyptic speculation is problematic. As L. Goppelt notes,

> Der καιρός ist für den 1 Petr demnach nicht die Zeit der Wehen, die nach der Apokalyptik dem Endgericht vorhergeht (Mk 13,8–13 par) und auch Verfolgung der Gemeinde bringt (Mk 13,9 par), sondern die von der Prophetie angekündigte "bestimmte Zeit", nämlich die Endzeit, in der das Endgericht selbst bereits einsetzt (311f.).

Perhaps the distinction is somewhat overdrawn, but still Goppelt is justified to argue that the author has advanced beyond the understanding of the Messianic Woes as heralds of the End to one which sees the manifestation of the End itself in at least some of the struggles of his addresses.

Another feature which distinguishes his claim to a degree from the apocalyptic environment lies in its insistence that the long-awaited Assize had become a present reality in some strict sense, because this could be disconfirmed should events prove otherwise. Unlike many, he does not veil his claim with obscurities, or carefully couch it in such fashion as to minimize the risk of error.[3] He also differs from the preponderance of seers

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[1] For a more extensive discussion of the relationship of 1 Pet 4.17–9 to its immediate context see the author's *Hermeneutic And Composition In First Peter (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament* II), forthcoming. Quotations from Josephus are according to the edition of his works in The Loeb Classical Library. Quotations from the pseudepigrapha are according to J. H. Charlesworth, ed., *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, I, unless otherwise indicated. The commentators are cited by name and page only.

[2] See, for example, Bigg (181), Selwyn (300f.), Reicke (126), Kelly (193f.), and Brox (222).

[3] The phenomenon is too familiar to require documentation here. Perhaps an instructive parallel to the kind of pronouncement in 1 Pet 4.17a may be adduced in 1 Thess 2.16, regardless of whether this controverted text may be an interpolation (cp. also Mk

who take their stand on ecstatic experience. Hence the question becomes acute as to the actual basis for his claim. It is something of a puzzle regarding the factors which had produced such conviction in himself that he was prepared to stake the integrity of his message upon it.

The context of 4.17 provides no more conspicuous a clue to the process behind his reasoning than the apparent allusion to one of three possible Old Testament texts, Mal 3.1, Jer 25.29 (32.29 LXX), or Ezek 9.6. The relevant portion of 1 Pet 4.17 reads, καιρὸς τοῦ ἄρξασθαι τὸ κρίμα ἀπὸ τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ θεοῦ. It does not compare closely with Mal 3.1, for example, καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἥξει εἰς τὸν ναὸν ἑαυτοῦ κυρίος, and compares only slightly more favorably with Jer 25.29, ἐν πόλει, ἐν ᾗ ὠνομάσθη τὸ ὄνομα μου ἐπ' αὐτήν, ἐγὼ ἄρχομαι, whereas the comparison is distinctly closer with Ezek 9.6, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἁγίων μου ἄρξασθε. It therefore may prove to be the case that an examination of his approach to Ezek 9.6 may help to explain how the ordeal of Christians had come to assume the proportions of the Last Judgment in his mind. Of course, this is not to say that he must have treated Ezek 9.6 in complete isolation from the other texts just cited, or from other biblical and post-biblical sources related to it, so that these too need to be taken into account. It seems safe to say, accordingly, that on any view the author's hermeneutic is likely to be an important factor in how he handled such materials.

Earlier on in his letter he leaves little room to wonder as to the nature of the hermeneutic with which he operated. In 1.10–2 he commits himself to a hermeneutical stance which has its closest parallel in 1QpHab VII, 1–5, a fact which has been gaining wider recognition.[4] The disclosure of the precise "time" of fulfillment is the central concern, as reflected in 1.11, τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρὸν. The same noun does not reappear in I Peter until, significantly enough, 4.17, καιρὸς, where it immediately precedes the allusion to Ezek 9.6. In view of the noun's status as a virtual technical term within the apocalyptic discourse to which the author is indebted there, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the noun has the same status in 4.17a, where it indicates that yet another discrete period has appeared in the sequence of God's End-time programme, namely, the End itself. This is an unmistakable case of the "periodization" of history, an idea familiar to the author of 1 Peter (1:20, ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τῶν χρόνων). It therefore seems likely that the author's declared hermeneutic in 1:10–2 is immediately relevant to his interpretation of Ezek 9:6 in 4:17a.

Central to the allusion's interpretation is its mention of a judgment that "begins with the house of God." By the Tannaitic period the conviction that God calls his people to account first was well-established, especially in the Bible's eschatological strata.[5] It is a theme that reappears in various other sources too. According to Test. Ben. 10,8f., "The Lord first judges Israel for the wrong she had committed, and then he shall do the same for all the nations (*TOTP* I, 628)." Nor were later authors slow to recognize the principle

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(continued)

13.14). E. Bammel has proposed that a specific, historical event triggered Paul's declaration there, namely, Claudius' Ban of the Jews from Rome in C.E. 49 ("Judenverfolgung und Naherwartung," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 56, 1959, 294–315). It is clear that such pronouncements depend on the perception of an eschatologically-nuanced nature, whatever the precise bases for them may have been.

[4] See F. F. Bruce (*Biblical Exegesis in the Qumran Texts*, 66f.), C. F. D. Moule (*The Birth of the New Testament*[2], 82), C. Rowland (*The Open Heaven*, 45), Goppelt (107f.), and Brox (69f.). Cp. also 1QS V. 11.

[5] Often cited are Amos 3.2, Jer 7.8ff., 25.29ff., Zeph 1–2, Zech 13.7–9, and Mal 3.1f.

when events, such as the disastrous Jewish Revolts, might suggest its relevance: "Therefore, he did not spare his own sons first, but he afflicted them as his enemies because they sinned (II Bar. 13.9 in *TOTP* I, 625, and cp. 32.2f.)." Rabbinic sources reflect similar ideas, like Midr. Qoh. 45a, Bab. Qam. 60a, Rosh Hash. 8b, Midr. Pss. 17a, 44b, 212a, and Ex. R. 88d (see *S.-B.* III. 767). The evidence in the Midrash on Psalms is particularly notable, because its explicit mention of God's "holy place" (ממקדשיה) tallies verbally with Ezek 9.6 (ממקדשי). From such parallels it is safe to say that the author of I Peter was relying to some extent on tradition when he decided to allude to Ezek 9.6 in the context he did.

This is not to say, however, that the motive is entirely clear behind his decision to cite Ezek 9.6 rather than Jer 25.29 or Mal 3.1, for example. Like Ezek 9.6, they refer to the Temple, they describe the enactment of divine judgment, and they are aware of a similar chronology of events. Whereas it is conceivable that either one of the other or both of these allusions might have served his purposes equally well, given his exegetical sophistication elsewhere in the letter, the possibility must at least be entertained that he turned to Ezek 9.6 because it offered him something its rivals did not. Hence it is necessary to study the allusion further to ascertain whether some specific advantage can be seen attaching to it. The allusion is so brief that its OT locus is likely to be decisive.

In order to facilitate the investigation Ezek 9.4–7 may be quoted in extenso, followed by the Greek for vv. 6–7.[6]

> And he said to him, "Go through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a mark on the foreheads of the men that groan and that grieve for all the iniquities that are done in the midst of them." And he said to the first in my hearing, "Go after him into the city, and smite: and let not your eyes spare, and have no mercy. Slay utterly old man and youth, and virgin, and infants, and women: but go ye not nigh any on whom is the mark: begin at my sanctuary." So they began with the elder men who were within the house. And he said to them, "Defile the house, and go out and fill the ways with dead bodies, and smite."

> πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεανίσκον καὶ παρθένον καὶ νήπια καὶ γυναῖκας ἀποκτείνατε εἰς ἐξάλειψιν, ἐπὶ δὲ πάντας, ἐφ' οὕς ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον, μὴ ἐγγίσητε· καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἁγίων μου ἄρξασθε. καὶ ἤρξαντο ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἳ ἦσαν ἔσω ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ. καὶ εἶπε πρὸς αὐτούς Μιάνατε τὸν οἶκον καὶ πλήσατε τὰς ὁδοὺς νεκρῶν ἐκπορευόμενοι καὶ κόπτετε.

The main difference between this locus and the others is its graphic scene of carnage within the Temple precincts proper. As a matter of fact, a thorough search uncovered but one other OT passage where there is any mention of actual slaughter within the Temple, Lam 2.20, and this is restricted to priests and prophets. Of course, Lam 2.20 does not compare closely to Ezek 9.6, because it is not an oracle, and was not generally regarded as such at the time of 1 Peter.[7] Regarding oracular materials, in addition to Ezek 21.1–4,

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[6] The English translation is from *The Septuagint*, Zondervan, 1970.

[7] Josephus terms Lamentations a μέλος θρηνητικόν, in which he no doubt reflects the Rabbinic interpretation of 2 Chron 35.25. Moreover, Josephus clearly distinguishes Lamentations from those writings in which Jeremiah is said to have predicted the events of the Revolt (see *Ant.* X. 78–9).

the nearest OT parallels seem to be in Jeremiah, esp. chaps. 7, 14, and 25, yet these know only of an indiscriminate slaughter commencing in the city or land. It remains, nevertheless, to determine whether the author of 1 Peter might have been moved to allude to Ezek 9.6 because of this feature which sharply distinguishes it from the alternatives.

For the sake of completeness, however, a relatively minor difference between the allusion and its parallels may also be mentioned. Ezek 9.6 alone uses "house" (הבית, τῷ οἴκῳ) in its immediate context to designate the Temple (cp. Mal 3.10). It may be that the author had a particular interest in this word in light of the elaborate Temple-community he portrayed in 2.4ff. using related terminology.[8] Such an explanation would probably have to suffice should the attempt to produce a satisfactory account in terms of the main distinctive element discussed above fail.

In this regard it is appropriate to call attention to certain evidence germane to the interpretation of Ezek 9.6 which seems to have been neglected, insofar as it may be significant for the allusion in 1 Pet 4.17a. Part of the evidence comes from *Ant.* X.79, where Josephus says of Jeremiah,

> This prophet also announced the misfortunes that were to come upon the city, and left behind writings (ἐν γράμμασι) concerning the recent capture of our city, as well as the capture of Babylon. And not only this prophet predicted these things to the multitude, but also the prophet Ezekiel, who left behind two books which he was the first to write about these matters (ὃς πρῶτος περὶ τούτων δύο βίβλους γράφας κατέλιπεν).[9]

Josephus' statement may thus be seen to authorize a search of his works for instances which involve applications of oracles from either Jeremiah or Ezekiel to the Revolt.

Apart from certain of the omens listed by Josephus because, according to him, they were fulfilled in the Revolt, there are just a few full references to such "ancient prophecies" which might possibly qualify, but none of these actually names either Jeremiah or Ezekiel.[10] The texts are reproduced below to aid in their evaluation.

> *Bell. V. 15–9*
> For although these frenzied men had stopped short of no impiety, they nevertheless admitted those who wished to offer sacrifices, native Jews suspiciously and with precaution, strangers after a thorough search; yet these, though

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[8] J. H. Elliott has stressed the social dimension of the "house" terminology in 1 Peter to the exclusion of the sacral dimension despite the undeniable importance of the latter in 2.4ff., nor does he demonstrate how the latter is foreign to the context, whereas the durability of the Temple-community idea in the period is manifest (see his *The Elect and the Holy*, esp. 208ff., and, *A Home For The Homeless*, esp. 165ff.).

[9] As the translator, R. Marcus, explains in his note, ad loc., Josephus' reference to "two books" from the prophet Ezekiel could involve no more than the canonical book recorded on two scrolls because of its length, rather than the canonical book along with some other spurious work no longer extant.

[10] For a useful discussion of the evidence from Josephus see D. E. Aune (*Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World*, esp. 138ff.). It so happens that an exception may exist in *Ant.* X. 276, where Josephus states that Daniel 8 and 11–2 were fulfilled in both the events of the Maccabean Revolt and the First Jewish Revolt. For Josephus' understanding of prophecy in its historical context see esp. U. Fischer (*Eschatologie und Jenseitserwartung im hellenistischen Diaspora-judentum*).

successful at the entrances in deprecating their cruelty, often became victims of the sedition. For the missiles from the engines flew over with such force that they reached the altar and the sanctuary, lighting upon priests and sacrificers; and many who had sped from the ends of the earth to gather round this far-famed spot, reverenced by all mankind, fell there themselves before their sacrifices, and sprinkled with libations of their own blood that altar universally venerated by Greeks and barbarians. The dead bodies of natives and aliens, of priests and laity, were mingled in a mass, and the blood of all manner of corpses formed pools in the courts of God. What misery to equal that, most wretched city, has thou suffered at the hands of the Romans, who entered to purge with fire thy internal pollutions? For thou wert no longer God's place, nor couldest thou survive, after becoming a sepulchre for the bodies of thine own children and converting the sanctuary into a charnel-house of civil war (θεοῦ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε ἦς ἔτι χῶρος οὔτε μένειν ἐδύνασο, τάφος οἰκείων γενομένη σωμάτων καὶ πολέμου τὸν ναὸν ἐμφυλίου ποιήσασα πολυάνδριον)?

Bell. IV. 386–8

Every human ordinance was trampled under foot, every dictate of religion ridiculed by these men, who scoffed at the oracles of the prophets as impostors' fables. Yet those predictions of theirs contained much concerning vice and virtue, by the transgression of which the Zealots brought upon their country the fulfillment of the prophecies directed against it. For there was an ancient saying of inspired men that the city would be taken and the sanctuary burnt to the ground by right of war, whensoever it should be visited by sedition and native hands should be the first to defile God's sacred precincts. This saying the Zealots did not disbelieve; yet they lent themselves as instruments of its accomplishment (ἦν γὰρ δή τις παλαιὸς λόγος ἀνδρῶν ἐνθέων τότε τὴν πόλιν ἁλώσεσθαι καὶ καταφλέξεσθαι τὸ ἁγιώτατον νόμῳ πολέμου, στάσις ἐὰν κατασκήψῃ καὶ χεῖρες οἰκεῖαι προμιάνωσι τὸ θεοῦ τέμενος· οἷς οὐκ ἀπιστήσαντες οἱ ζηλωταὶ διακόνους αὑτοὺς ἐπέδοσαν).

Bell. VI. 109–10

Who knows not the records of the ancient prophets and that oracle which threatens this poor city and is even now coming true (τὸν ἐπιρρέποντα τῇ τλήμονι πόλει χρησμὸν ἤδη ἐνεστῶτα)? For they foretold that it would then be taken whensoever one should begin to slaughter his own countrymen (ὅταν ὁμοφύλου τις ἄρξῃ φόνου). And is not the city, aye and the whole temple, filled with your corpses (τῶν ὑμετέρων δὲ πτωμάτων οὐχ ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν δὲ πᾶν πεπλήρωται)? God it is then, God Himself, who with the Romans is bringing the fire to purge His temple and exterminating a city so laden with pollutions.

Beginning with the first text above, it is not immediately evident whether any oracle is concerned whatsoever. Nevertheless, Josephus had some grounds or other for stating that the body-pile in the Temple had made its survival impossible (οὔτε μένειν ἐδύνασο).

A similar certitude is reflected in Sib. Or. IV. 115–8, referring probably to Zealot massacres in the Temple precincts.[11]

> An evil storm of war will also come upon Jerusalem
> from Italy, and it will sack the great temple of God,
> whenever they put their trust in folly and cast off piety
> and commit repulsive murders in front of the Temple. (*TOTP* I, 387)

> ἥξει καὶ Σολύμοισι κακὴ πολέμοιο θύελλα
> 'Ιταλόθεν, νηὸν δὲ θεοῦ μέγαν ἐξαλαπάξει,
> ἡνίχ' ἂν ἀφροσύνῃσι πεποιθότες εὐσεβίην μέν
> ῥίψωσιν στυγεροὺς δὲ φόνους τελέωσι πρὸ νηοῦ. (J. Geffcken, ed.)

It is conceivable that in Josephus' view the mere fact of human slaughter in the Temple bounds constituted such defilement as to necessitate in the divine scheme of things its radical purification. He certainly emphasizes the Temple's desecration in the immediate context, mentioning earlier the devastating efforts of the forces of John to capture the inner courts of the Temple, "Thus there were continual sallies and showers of missiles, and the temple on every side was defiled with carnage (καὶ φόνοις ἐμιαίνετο πανταχοῦ τὸ ἱερόν v. 10)."

However, there is no good reason to approach *Bell.* V. 15–9 and Sib. Or. IV. 115–8 in isolation from *Bell.* IV. 386–8 and VI. 109–10, since they refer to the same desecration of the Temple. In addition they clearly attribute the inevitability of its impending destruction to the fulfillment of certain ancient oracles about Jews killing Jews in the Temple precincts (see IV. 388, στάσις . . . χεῖρες οἰκεῖαι, and, VI. 109, ὁμοφύλου, and cp. V. 19, πολέμου . . . ἐμφυλίου). Hence it seems safe to ascribe Josephus' conviction about the inescapability of the Temple's doom cited at V. 19 likewise to the testimony of revered prophecies. Moreover, both IV. 388 and VI. 109 use conditional constructions in a manner comparable to that in Sib. Of. IV. 117f., in order to adduce the prophetically-mediated necessary condition the satisfaction of which guarantees that the predicted judgment will come to pass (so, IV. 388, στάσις ἐὰν κατασήψῃ καὶ χεῖρες οἰκεῖαι προμιάνωσι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τέμενος, and, VI. 109, ὅταν ὁμοφύλου τις ἄρξῃ φόνου, with ἡνίχ' ἂν ἀφροσύνῃσι πεποιθότες εὐσεβίην μέν ῥίψωσιν στυγεροὺς δὲ φόνους τελέωσι πρὸ νηοῦ). Thus there are grounds to conclude that Sib. Or. IV. 115–8 likewise reflects the traditional exegesis of specific oracles known to Josephus.

What is less clear is the actual source of these oracles. In the light of their unquestioned authority, according to Josephus (see VI. 109, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀναγραφάς, and cp. IV. 388b), they might well be attributed to certain of the classical prophets of Israel. Indeed, the fact that Josephus goes to some lengths in the passage from *Ant.* X. 79 cited above to explain the special contribution by Jeremiah and Ezekiel in this regard strongly suggests that this would be the case. On the other hand, it is possible that the

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[11] Against J. J. Collins (*TOTP* I, 387, n. w), the Romans are probably not in view at Sib. Or. IV. 117f., because they are not aptly described as having cast off piety, nor as having put their trust in folly. In the context of the oracle those responsible for such actions are the same as those who commit the repulsive murders, something which may be ascribed to the Zealots but not the Romans. See also the way the campaign of Vespasian and Titus has been described in Sir. Or. IV. 125f., such as to distinguish it clearly from the preceding events.

oracles came from works no longer extant and perhaps of a pseudepigraphical nature. The difficulty is that no parallels from surviving works have been adduced with the exception of the text from Sib. Or. IV already quoted (which must be dated later than C.E. 79) whereas parallels are not lacking from OT prophecy (see above n. 5).

It should be evident at this point that the contents of the oracles summarized by Josephus bear unmistakable affinities with Jer 25.29 and Ezek 9.6. The same chronological concern is reflected in *Bell.* VI. 109 using the same verb, ἄρξῃ (see Jer 32.29, LXX, ἄρχομαι, and, Ezek 9.6, ἄρξασθε), a concern which seems to be reflected as well in *Bell.* IV. 388a, προμιάνωσι. All three texts from Josephus stress the degree of wanton slaughter which pollutes both Temple and city, the parallel being especially close here with Ezekiel, because only in it is the desecration of the Temple made explicit and only in it does the same verb appear, μιάνετε (see *Bell.* IV. 388a, προμιάνωσι, and, cp. *Bell.* V. 10, ἐμιαίνετο). By way of contrast, preparatory to *Bell.* IV. 386–8 Josephus makes much of the numbers of Jews left unburied inside and outside of the city, such as to suggest Jer 14.16 or 25.33 (see IV. 380–5). Finally, all three texts pointedly emphasize that the desecrating massacre cannot be blamed on the Romans, but is the result of Jew pitted against Jew, an idea probably behind the reference to "folly" in Sib. Or. IV. 117. The idea may be illuminated by a detail in the text from Ezekiel. In 9.1 certain city officials charged with carrying out punishment (פקדות העיר) are summoned to perform the indiscriminate slaughter described in the ensuing verses. And thus those responsible for the desecration are Jews. It is probably not very significant that the analogy with the Zealots is an imperfect one, for the executioners in Ezekiel are obeying God's orders, inasmuch as the degree of ambiguity typical to oracles invited a measure of freedom in their interpretation (cp. χρησμὸς ἀμφίβολος, *Bell.* VI. 312). On the strength of so many correspondences with the texts of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, and, given Josephus' acknowledgement of the precision of their predictions concerning the Revolt, it is surely more justified to claim that these texts are foremost in his mind than any others, and there is clearly no reason to postulate dependence on works that have not survived.

Furthermore, there looks to be still another passage from Josephus which refers implicitly to the same context in Ezekiel, and likewise addresses the Temple's imminent fate. Towards the end of a series of omens which in his view were fulfilled in the Temple's destruction he writes:

> Moreover, at the feast which is called Pentecost, the priests on entering the inner court of the temple by night, as their custom was in the discharge of their ministrations, reported that they were conscious, first of a commotion and a din, and after that of a voice as of a host, "We are departing hence" (*Bell.* VI. 299f.).

The allusion is, of course, to the terrible moment when God withdrew his protection of the Temple by removing his Glory from it along with the company of his cherubim (Ezek 9.3, 10.4ff., and, 11.22–3). That Josephus is demonstrably aware of the relevance of at least one important feature from Ezek 9–11 to the Temple's fate during the Revolt strengthens the grounds for a similar awareness on his part of the relevance of other details, and militates against discounting such evidence as so much coincidence.

The preceding discussion has produced fairly solid evidence of Josephus' knowledge of exegetical tradition relative to Ezek 9–11 and the First Jewish Revolt. He understands that both Jeremiah and Ezekiel, but particularly the latter, predicted a number of events which were literally fulfilled. Chief among these was the defiling carnage within the Temple bounds which was the fruit of civil war. Thus there appear to be grounds for the existence

of a contemporary parallel to the way 1 Pet 4.17a alludes to Ezek 9.6 which may prove instructive.

The author does, after all, think of himself as an exile in "Babylon" (5.13). Once he accepts to conceive of the Christian movement as the Temple-community (2.4ff.), then he is in a position to transfer such an exegetical tradition and to apply it to the circumstances before him. Familiarity on his part with such tradition might easily predispose him to view a collective assault on the Temple-community in terms of Ezek 9–11 and to surmise that the long-awaited Judgment described by the prophet had begun. Consequently, there might well be reason for him, or his addresses, to fear that God had withdrawn, or was about to withdraw, his Glory from his Temple-community, since that is a crucial part of the judgment scenario recounted by Ezekiel. Hence the author might have anticipated such a problem already at 4.14, where he emphasizes that their experience of the Spirit of Glory, that is, the Spirit of God, must be taken as a sign of divine favor and protection instead. According to him, God has not abandoned his Temple-community to its fate, but remains pledged to its defense, sending the Spirit to render the kind of aid that Isa 11.2f. details, which accounts for the shift in the application of Isa 11.2 from a reference to the Anointed One to a corporate reference.[12]

Another advantage to this position is that it explains the author's preference for Ezekiel over Jeremiah. The prominence of the *Shekina* in Ezekiel is due precisely to the central place which is given to the Temple in chaps. 8–11, whereas the Temple receives nowhere near the same attention in the context of Jer 25. For that one has to turn, for example, to chaps. 7ff. or 14ff. Even the term οἶκῳ appears in Ezek 9.6, and is therefore readily available to the author of 1 Peter to be substituted in 4.17a for τῶν ἁγίων, which is the actual object of the preposition as it stands in Ezek 9.6. And again, Ezek 9 alone identifies the scene where the judgment begins as the Temple proper. It is tempting, as well, to note that the judgment takes the form of capital punishment, possibly the main issue in 1 Pet 4.14f. In the epistle's setting, however, such punishment comes primarily at the hands of provincial governors in routine criminal proceedings, whereas the original text of Ezek 9.1 indicates that those responsible are Jews, a feature probably significant for the interpretation Josephus followed. But the Greek versions read simply that a judgment has been inaugurated (ἤγγικεν ἡ ἐκδίκησις), facilitating the application made in 1 Peter by leaving open the question of the identity of those who perform it. Lastly, Ezekiel 9 serves well the context in 1 Peter by facilitating the transition at 5.1f. to the exhortation aimed at the πρεσβυτέροι and νεώτεροι. They appear at the head of the list of those to be killed in Ezek 9.6, and the axe falls on them first (πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεανίσκον κτλ., and καὶ ἤρξαντο ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, οἳ ἦσαν ἔσω τῷ οἴκῳ). At the very least their accountability for their conduct as leaders exposes them to greater risk of Judgment.[13]

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[12] Cp. other instances where the manifestation of God's eschatological Glory is identified first and foremost with the Temple (Pss. Sol. 17.32f., 11Q Temple 29.8f., and perhaps 4QFlorilegium 1.5). In each of these the Presence seems to be more than simply a sign of divine protection, but the power of God at work establishing the (new) Temple in the midst of his people. It is not difficult to suppose that a similar idea may be present in 1 Peter.

[13] The beginnings of such an interpretation are incipient in the way R. J. McKelvy (*The New Temple*, 133) returns to Ezek 9.6 and its reference to the elders in order to suggest how the transition was facilitated in 1 Pet 4.17ff. from the idea of the Temple similiciter to the idea of the people as the Temple, but he does not see any link with the mention of the elders in 5.1f.

The cumulative weight of so many details makes it plain to see that Ezek 9.6 offered the author of 1 Peter advantages the alternatives did not. Nor does the explanation ventured here require that his addressees perceive the allusion for them to grasp the essence of his message. He believes that he has sufficient grounds to be absolutely confident about the veracity of his declaration that the Judgment has started, which, given the apostolic authority of the letter's alleged author, probably would be adequate for most of the addressees quite apart from the testimony of the Scriptures. What is important, rather, is that it seems possible to identify certain significant components instrumental in producing the conviction in the author which he exhibits, and that these primarily involved the interpretation of Scripture. Yet, at the same time, how could they fail to recognize that the purport of the message was eschatological? In fact 4.17a looks to be an eschatological pronouncement-formula with an even sharper edge to it than that in 4.7a. From its relationship with Ezek 9.6 as interpreted by the author, however, it approximates to a surrogate fulfillment-formula distinctly reminiscent of a pesher-like hermeneutic, emphasizing the exact correspondence between a detail in Scripture and the sect's salient history, namely, its immediate experience of an unprecedented development that begged for a plausible explanation consistent with popular understandings of God's End-time plan. Astonishingly, the author discloses that the collective assault against Christians represents nothing less than the start of the Last Judgment itself.

The History of the Composition of The Synoptic Sayings Source, Q

Arland D. Jacobson
Concordia College
Moorhead, MN

Along with the reconstruction of the text of Q, the most basic problem in Q research today is the unravelling of the history of the composition of Q. That Q has such a history, that is, that it was subjected to revisions, now seems to be widely granted. But there is no consensus on *how* to determine the history of the composition of Q, nor about the results thus far achieved.

The history of the composition of Q is the most basic problem in that other problems depend for their solution upon it. Thus it is, in my judgment, premature to define the genre of Q, except as a heuristic exercise. As such, it can be and has been extremely suggestive. But the heuristic nature of such genre definitions must be remembered, i.e., they must be tested for their fruitfulness rather than simply taken as accomplished results. Similarly, attempts to describe the theology of Q are premature at this point in Q research except, again, as a heuristic exercise. As such, these attempts are useful and suggestive, particularly because they try to make theological sense of the whole of the body of Q, and thus can either suggest unsuspected coherence or unnoticed aporias. Again, the study of the Q community must also be subordinate to the history of the composition of Q, even though it too can be of great heuristic value. If Q has a history, then it is quite impossible to describe its genre, theology or community except as the genre, theology, and community of a *stage* in the history of Q. John Kloppenborg's 1984 Toronto dissertation bore the title, *The Literary Genre of the Synoptic Sayings Source*, but in its revised, published form, it now bears the title, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections*. The priority thus seems to have shifted from genre to the history of the composition of Q.

The history of the composition of Q is, then, the most fundamental problem in Q research, along with the related problem of reconstructing the text of Q. But over this fundamental issue there are important differences in approach and result. And the purpose of this paper is to examine this issue, primarily focusing on two issues: methodology in determining the history of the composition of Q, and some specific textual issues. Moreover, I will largely confine myself to a debate with John Kloppenborg, whose excellent work on the genre of Q represents the latest major proposal concerning the history of the composition of Q.[1]

[1] The principal investigations into the history of the compositions of Q are: Dieter Luehrmann, *Die Redaktion der Logienquelle* (WMANT 33; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969); A. Polag, *Die Christologie der Logienquelle* (WMANT 45; Neukrichen-Vluyn: Neukrichener Verlag, 1977); S. Schulz, *Q: Die Spruchquelle der Evangelisten* (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972); Paul Hoffman, *Studien zur Theologie der Logienquelle* (NTAbh NF 8. 2.Aufl,; Muenster: Aschendorff, 1975); Arland Jacobson,

Kloppenborg's Proposal

Before discussing methodology, it will be useful to describe Kloppenborg's proposal. He describes two recensions of Q which involved extensive compositional activity, followed by a third stage during which only the temptation account (Q 4:1–13) was added.

The first recension contained Q 6:20b–23b,27–49; 9:57–62; 10:2–11,16; 11:2–4,9–13; 12:2–7,11–12,22b–31,33–34; 13:24 + 14:26,27 + 17:33 + 14:34–35.[2] He describes this stage as "sapiential," and denies that many of the sayings in these texts which are often described as prophetic need be so understood. The genre of this recension of Q is that of "instruction," characterized by the predominance of imperatives or admonitions, usually ascribed to a named sage. Further, the sayings in this recension are "community-directed."

Kloppenborg's second recension consists of a series of interpolated sayings (Q 6:23c; 10:12–15,21–24; 12:8–10; 13:26–30,34–35; 14:16–24) plus the addition of whole blocks of new material (Q 3:7–9,16–17; 7:1–10,18–23,24–26,31–35; 11:14–26,29–36,39–52; 12:39–40,42–46,49,51–53,[54–56],57–59; 17:23,24,26–30,34–35,37b). This second recension more than doubles the size of the original Q adding, by my count, 115 verses to the original 73. The theme pervading this material is the announcement of judgment, often framed in the deuteronomistic perspective. Sapiential sayings now give way to prophetic sayings, and these are outer-directed rather than community-directed. The genre of Q also shifts, to chriae collection.

Although Kloppenborg does not indicate how this proposed history of the composition of Q might translate into a history of the Q community, there are some indications of what he seems to assume. The earliest or "formative" layer of Q itself involved the redaction of earlier sayings which had been largely intended for wandering missionaries. The redaction at this formative stage consisted of various additions which had the effect of broadening the significance of these sayings so that they would be relevant to a larger community. It was this missionary-sending community which produced the first recension of Q. Kloppenborg does not adopt the increasingly common phrase "wandering charismatics," presumably because, according to his view, the oldest material is sapiential, not prophetic. Thus we have as predecessors of Q, and presumably the earliest bearers of its tradition, the wandering (sapiential) missionaries. They were succeeded by a community which was perhaps established by these missionaries but was itself a sedentary, Greek-speaking Jewish-Christian community.

(continued)

Wisdom Christology in Q (Ph.D. Diss., Claremont, 1978); and John Kloppenborg, *The Literary Genre of the Synoptic Sayings Source* (Ph.D. Diss., University of St. Michael's College/Toronto School of Theology, 1984), revised and published as *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections*. Studies in Antiquity and Christianity. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987. For Kloppenborg, see also "Tradition and Redaction in the Synoptic Sayings Source," *CBQ* 46 (1984), 34–62 and "The Formation of Q and Antique Instructional Genres," *JBL* 105 (1986), 443–462. For Jacobson, see also "The Literary Unity of Q," *JBL* 101 (1982), 365–389.

[2] Comparison of the tables of content in the dissertaton and its revised, published version might appear to suggest that Kloppenborg has shifted some material earlier assigned to the first recension to the second recension, and vice versa. But that is not the case, as closer examination reveals. The only important change is that the speech beginning with Q 12:39 is more clearly identified as a "speech" or sayings composition in the book.

What prompted the second recension seems to have been the failure of the mission to Israel. This is reflected in the often bitter announcements of judgment against those fellow Jews who refused to receive the missionaries and their message. For reasons not immediately apparent, the prophetic mode now comes to dominate, though the tendency at work in the redaction is "historicizing" rather than "contemporizing." This is evident in the "chriic" forms into which the sayings are cast. Several other features of this second recension are noteworthy: the sudden appearance of a large batch of material related to John the Baptist, the appearance of the idea of Sophia, the deuteronomistic perspective, an infusion of apocalyptic material, and the generally "polemical" nature of the material.

This is an attractive reconstruction in that it traces a trajectory from the earliest followers of Jesus, the wandering missionaries, on to the earliest Palestinian (?) communities and sees already in Q itself, in its second recension, the polemic that would eventually lead the sect to separate from Judaism. It also agrees with Helmut Koester's view that apocalyptic is not characteristic of the earliest Jesus tradition; rather, wisdom is primary and apocalyptic develops later.

An Alternative Analysis

In my own work on Q, especially in my dissertation, I was concerned to establish the *sequence* of the Q materials. Most introductions to Q deal, of course, with the question of the "order of Q," but rarely if ever is the question asked whether this order is *meaningful.* My concern was to see whether it was possible to discern some structure, some organization, to Q. I thought I was able to discern "sections" of Q, that is, units which seemed to have a logical structure.

According to my reckoning, the first section of Q contained Q 3:4,7–9,16–17; 4:1–13; 6:20b–23,27–49; 7:1–2,6–10,18–23,24–27,28; 16:16; 7:31–35, in that order. This section introduces John the Baptist and allows him a brief sermon. Jesus is then introduced and also given a sermon, albeit a longer one, which is punctuated by the story of the centurion's servant, where the accent fittingly is on Jesus's word. There follows a discussion of the relation between John and Jesus. And the section culminates in sayings which provide a theological solution to their relationship (Q 7:31–35), namely that both are emissaries of Sophia/Wisdom.

The second section of Q contained the following: Q 9:57–60a; 10:2–16,21–22,(23–24); 11:2–4,9–13. Here the theme of the homeless Human One (or "Son of Man") found in Q 9:58 is replicated in the experience of his homeless followers, the "laborers," who leave home and parents and experience rejection (Q 10:2–16), yet are supplied in their needs by their divine Parent (Q 11:2–4,9–13).

The third section of Q contained the following: Q 11:14–20,23,29–32,24–26,(27),28, 33–35,46,42,39–41,44,47–48,49–51, in that order. In this section, we have a piling up of indictments against "this generation." Their failure to discern the action of God in the present (Q 11:14,15–20), indeed their perverse misunderstanding of it as the action of Satan, contrasts sharply with Gentiles of old (the queen of the South, the men of Nineveh) who discerned the presence of God's messengers. A series of specific indictments follows. And the section culminated in the oracle of Sophia which says that "this generation" has followed the path of previous rebellious generations, rejecting those sent to them, and now they will pay the terrible price.

This way of dividing up the Q material unintentionally coincided with the division by T. W. Manson.[3] However, Manson thought of these sections as thematically related

[3] *The Saying of Jesus* (London: SCM, 1949), p. 5.

clusters of material, not as coherently organized and theologically tendentious units of material. My division of Q was followed by Dominic Crossan[4] who, however, added a fourth section containing all the remaining material in Q. Crossan's title for this fourth section, "Jesus and Apocalypse," is much like Manson's ("Jesus and the Future") and seems to reflect the same assumption, that is, that this material is united by theme. I am less confident of the usefulness of this fourth "section" because, in my usage, "section" means a coherent sequence of sayings and/or sayings compositions, and I have not yet been able to discern such unity in this fourth "section" of Q.

The basis for trying to discern meaningful sections in Q was the methodological principle that one must begin by trying to make sense of the "extant" document, i.e., all the material which by common definition belonged to Q. To "make sense" of this material means that one attends to the ***structure*** of the document, and thus one needs to determine the sequence of the Q material.

In describing my method initially, I spoke of it as "composition analysis" or "composition criticism," and described it as the "analysis of the structure of the document and the interior dynamics of its parts."[5] By "interior dynamics" I meant the ways sayings interact and interpret each other when placed in sayings compositions; but I also spoke of "structure" in the conviction that Q is meaningfully organzied not just within sayings compositions (e.g. the Sermon) but in much larger "sections" and even perhaps with respect to the document as a whole.

I tried first to catch sight of some literary design in the Q material and then used this as the basis for asking whether material which for a variety of reasons is intrusive or disruptive should be regarded as all products of a "stage" in the composition of Q. In other words, I worked ***backward,*** peeling away those bits of material which were disruptive of the underlying literary scheme. Not surprisingly, when one proceeds in this fashion, the basal layer of Q turns out to be the "compositional stage" of Q. And yet, had no literary scheme been evident, then one obviously could not have postulated such a compositional stage and, in fact, the method itself would have proven useless because inapplicable.

By contrast, Kloppenborg proceeds in a quite different fashion. Kloppenborg begins with the observation made by Luehrmann, Steck, and myself that the announcement of judgment pervades much of Q. He then asserts that there are "at least four clusters of Q texts which have been composed with this polemic against 'this generation' in view: (1) Q 3:7–9,16–17; (2) Q 7:1–10,18–23,24–28,(16:16?),31–35; (3) Q 11:14–15,17–26,16,29–32,33–36,39–52; and (4) Q 17:23–37."[6] He notes a "remarkable uniformity" among these texts "in 'projected audience,' constituent forms, and dominant motifs."[7] But, asks Kloppenborg, is this material early or late? His answer is that it must be late because we can find other blocks of materials in Q that "are either untouched or only minimally influenced by the motifs of the Deuteronomistic view of God's relation to Israel, the announcement of judgment, and the condemnatory ramifications of Gentile faith,"[8] and in this material one can also find evidence of a later redaction which inserts just such views into this material. Examples would include Q 6:23c and Q 10:13–15. Therefore this other material, which does not have the announcement of judgment as its

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[4] *In Fragments: The Aphorisms of Jesus* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 342–345.

[5] Jacobson, *Wisdom Christology,* 8.

[6] Kloppenborg, "The Formation of Q," 452.

[7] Kloppenborg, "The Formation of Q," 452.

[8] Kloppenborg, "The Formation of Q," 451.

focus, must be the earliest layer of Q; put otherwise, it must represent the first recension of Q.

My attention to larger structures within Q, rather than sayings compositions alone, led to different results in terms of the compositional history of Q.

My "compositional stage of Q" represented what for me was the basal level of the compositional history of Q. The first section at this stage included Q (3:1–6),3:7–9,16–17 [except v. 16c]; 6:20b–23ab,27–49; 7:1–10; 7:24–27; 16:16; 7:31–35. This was composed, to be sure, of earlier material. I detected the activity of the "author" especially in the addition of Q 3:8b; 6:23c; 6:39,42; 7:1–10; 16:16; 7:31–35. The second section of the compositional stage of Q included Q 9:57–60; 10:2–12,13–15,16. And in the compositional stage, the third section included Q 11:14–20,23,29–32,24–26,[27],28,33–36,46,42,[43],39–41,44,47–48,49–51,[52]. I also identified some material as being added during an "intermediate stage" in the composition of Q, namely Q 3:16c; 7:28; 7:18–23; 10:21–22; 11:2–4,9–13; and perhaps 17:5–6; 12:22–34; 12:2–12. My final redaction included, as Kloppenborg's does, only the Temptation narrative.

Aside from questions about exegetical judgments, two weaknesses of my approach are quickly apparent. First, I did not seek to identify the genre of Q as a whole or at any of its stages. In this respect, Kloppenborg's work is clearly superior. Secondly, my method prevented me from identifying stages of Q before the "compositional stage." To be sure, I assumed that the material taken up into the compositional stage of Q had an earlier form, but I did not seek to identify an earlier stage of Q. Kloppenborg's second recension is similar to my compositional stage of Q, but he believes that an earlier, "formative" stage is identifiable.

Some Questions Concerning Kloppenborg's Recensions

Kloppenborg makes a rather sharp distinction between the sapiential nature of his first recension and the qualities of his second recension (prophetic and apocalyptic announcement of judgment, "chriic forms," polemic as opposed to community instruction). On the one hand, it is curious to note that though the first recension is "sapiential," it is in the second recension that we get the figure of Wisom. Further, and more serious, there are a number of sayings in Kloppenborg's first recension which are commonly identified as prophetic. This is especially true of Q 10:2–16 and Q 12:2–12. Eugene Boring, for example, identifies as prophetic (i.e., either created or shaped by Christian prophets) the following sayings assigned by Kloppenborg to the first recension: Q 10:2,3,4,5–11,16; 12:2–3,4–7,11–12,22–34.[9] Thus the distinction between the first two recensions as a distinction between sapiential and prophetic material seems, at the very least, in need of further examination. Of course, even if Kloppenborg is wrong in finding no prophetic material in his first recension, that would not of itself argue against the correctness of his division of the Q material into two main recensions. But it would call into question his view of the genre of the first recension.

Another distinction between the first and second recensions is that the latter "is characterized by chriic forms."[10] Yet, Q 9:57–62, assigned by Kloppenborg to the first

[9] Eugene Boring, *Sayings of the Risen Jesus: Christian Prophecy in the Synoptic Tradition* (SNTSMS 46; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982). See chapter 11, "Christian Prophecy in Q," pp. 137–182.

[10] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, p. 322.

recension, contains formally the best examples of chriae in Q. The use of the ambiguous "chriic forms" is made, moreover, to include material in the second recension which is "chriic" only in the broadest sense. For example, Q 7:1–10 is described as "chriic." Q 3:7–9 seems to have ben provided with a brief setting (with no direct relation to the saying), but the saying itself is a prophetic utterance. And the number of chriic forms adduced is really rather small: Q 3:7–9; 7:1–10,18–23; 10:21–22; 11:14–15.

According to Kloppenborg, large chunks of new material make their appearance in the second recension. This includes all the sayings related to John the Baptist, the Beelzeboul controversy, and so on. Apparently, this material circulated neither as isolated sayings nor as a single collection of material but as "speeches," i.e., sayings compositions. This need to postulate an influx of new materials which had been "edited" in the (presumably) oral stage, raises questions which require answers. From where did these materials come? How can we account for the sudden appearance of a large block of Baptist materials? The peculiarities of the theology of Q suggest that the Q community was relatively isolated; but the influx of materials suggests that, at the second recension stage at least, the community was not so isolated.

Methodology

The study of the history of the composition of Q is made difficult by a double handicap. On the one hand, Q is not a real, extant document. Second, unlike the situation with Matthew and Luke where we have the Markan *Vorlage*, we have no such *Vorlage* for Q. Therefore, the outcome of any attempted reconstruction of Q depends almost entirely upon the method used. We can observe such differing results depending on the methods used, for example, by Luehrmann, Schulz, Kloppenborg and myself.

How then do we adjudicate among these various methods? It seems to me that there are two basic criteria. First, is the method appropriate to the material? That is, e.g., does the method take into consideration that Q ia not extant, that no extant *Vorlage* exists, that some structure is evident, that Q is a collection of sayings compositions, that Q was subjected to revisions? Second, is the method based on sound assumptions? Sound assumptions are those consonant with the present state of research.

I would contend that composition analysis is particularly appropriate to the nature of the Q material. To make this point clear, some observations regarding sayings collections are pertinent.

Sayings collections appear to be particularly poor candidates for compositional analysis because they are generally seen as rather haphazardly arranged. But this apparent lack of organization, this use of simple organizational techniques such as association by catchword, theme or formal analogy, is not really evidence of compositional primitiveness. For as Max Kuechler observes, "Wisdom sayings have a tendency to lead as contextless an existence as possible, so as to prove useful in ever new contexts."[11] This useful observation implies that trivial means of stringing sayings together are adopted for a very specific purpose, to preserve the multivalency of the sayings. The use of catchwords, for example, to link seemingly unrelated sayings makes clear that the sayings are not meant to interpret each other, that the focus is upon the sayings themselves. The stereotyped formula, "Jesus said," used in the Gospel of Thomas, together with the usual lack of

[11] Max Kuechler, *Fruehjuedische Weisheitstraditionen* (OBO 26; Freiburg: Universitaetsverlag and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), p. 167.

apparent connection between the sayings, is a way to keep the sayings hermeneutically open, and to focus attention on the individual sayings themselves. Thus the way Thomas is put together corresponds with the hermeneutic implied in its opening logion, "Whoever finds the interpretation of these sayings will not experience death." The pondering of the individual sayings leads to life.

In Q, we are dealing with a very different situation. No longer are sayings, for the most part, to be pondered individually. They are made into building blocks for larger literary schemes. Clearly, we have at least "speeches" or sayings compositions; but we probably have even larger structures, as I have argued (the so-called "sections" of Q). If the genius of a sayings collection is its ability to preserve the hermeneutical openness of discrete sayings, then Q has transcended the category "sayings collection." To be sure, it is still comparable to other sayings collections; but its purpose is different. Likewise, a certain orthodoxy is evident in the fact that now an interpretation is imposed upon the sayings. But the extent to which orthodoxy is evident is far less than when a mythic world is created through narrative, and sayings become fixed in their meaning. The juxtaposition of sayings, in fact, not only limits (or makes more "orthodox") but also can release new possibilities of interpretation. Thus the beatitudes serve to provide a context of interpretation for the whole inaugural Sermon, but linking them together, allowing them to become a solemn-sounding liturgical chant, also allows each beatitude to interpret the other, to add meaning to it. Reverberations of meaning are created by the seemingly primitive organizational technique of association by formal analogy. If, then, Q has moved beyond the usual function of the sayings collection, then attention to its structure is critical. It seems to me that much work remains to be done before we understand the internal structure of Q. But caution needs to be exercised lest the effort to sort the Q material into stages in the history of the composition of Q jeopardize our understanding of the literary unity of Q.

The importance of the methodological concerns cited above needs to be demonstrated by the analysis of Q texts. I will confine myself to the complex of Baptist materials which, according to Kloppenborg, entered during the second recension, namely Q 3:7–9,16–19; 7:1–10,18–23,24–28,(16:16),31–25.

All of this material was added, as I noted, in the second recension. It already formed at least two coherent units: Q 3:7–9,16–17 and Q 7:18–26,31–34. The second recension redactor added, apparently from another source, Q 7:1–10, and some smaller additions, such as Q 7:35.

In the case of Q 7:24–28, the second recension redactor's contribution was to interpolate the Malachi 3:1 quotation in Q 7:27. Its purpose was to assert that "he [John] belongs alongside Jesus as a precursor"[12] and thus to blunt the point of Q 7:28, which subordinates John to Jesus. However, before the redactor set to work, someone else had already added the "commentary word" Q 7:28 to the original "kernel," which was Q 7:24–26.

According to Kloppenborg, Q 7:18–23, which is "a post-Easter creation, arising in the effort to attract Baptist disciples into the Christian fold,"[13] also belongs to the earliest pre-second recension stage. So does Q 7:31–34, to which the second recension redactor added the "commentary word," Q 7:35, which again rehabilitates John, placing him in tandem with Jesus.

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[12] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 110.
[13] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 107.

Note first that the Baptist material already formed a unit before the second recension. Most notably, Q 7:18–23 is said by Kloppenborg to have belonged with Q 7:24–26 at this early pre-second recension stage. But Q 7:24–26 yields high praise of the Baptist as "more than a prophet" while the directly preceding material demotes the Baptist. As Kloppenborg rightly notes, in Q 7:18–23, "John's inferiority to Jesus is obvious."[14] For these reasons, I find it hard to imagine these two units being linked together in either an oral or written source.

According to Kloppenborg, the subordination of the Baptist to Jesus characterized some of the material taken up into the second recension, but the redactor of the second recension rehabilitated the Baptist to a position alongside Jesus. I took the opposite view, and continue to maintain that view. Examination of some of the texts reveals, to my eyes at least, why this view is preferable.

In the case of Q 7:24–28, the rehabilitation of John occurs in Q 7:27, which for that very reason is assigned by Kloppenborg to the second recension redactor. But the verse that immediately follows (Q 7:28) asserts, according to Kloppenborg's interpretation, the clear subordination of John to Jesus. So a weak counterpoint precedes the point it seeks to counter. It is better to regard Q 7:28 as the later addition which created the aporia here, i.e., the contrasting estimations of the Baptist. But that Q 7:28 is later than Q 7:27 seems evident for two reasons. First, Q 7:28 reflects what is perhaps the concern of the somewhat later community as to who is the greatest and who is the least. To be sure, the "greater than" language appears in Q 11:31,32; but the question of John's greatness vis a vis Jesus is probably a relatively late development. Second, Q 7:27 contains a text (Malachi 3:1) which seems to have attached very early to the Baptist. It is cited in Mark 1:2 where it seems to be used of John preparing the way for Jesus. In Q, however, the speaker is Jesus, and the saying occurs during the ministry of Jesus, not before it. Thus John does not prepare the way for Jesus but for Yahweh. This seems to me consistent with the context (Q 7:24–26) and more primitive theologically than Q 7:28.

In the case of Q 7:18–23, I continue to see this as a late addition. Not only does it subordinate John nearly to the point of insignificance, but it assumes that Jesus is attested mainly by a string of miracles. In spite of Kloppenborg's argument that this use of miracles is consistent with the allusions to miracles in Q 10:9,13–15; 11:20, the fact is that in these texts miracles attest the presence of the Kingdom. We have a quite different situation in Q 7:18–23, where miracles attest Jesus as the "coming one." Moreover, the miracles that are mentioned in Q are not related in Q, except for preaching good news to the poor, which is a beatitude not a miracle.

Q 3:16–17 is an especially important text for determining whether the subordination of John to Jesus is early or late. My argument was that the two baptism scheme (water/Holy Spirit), which seems clearly present in Q as well as in Mark, is the result of a slight redactional change which had a major effect. When ὁ ἐρχόμενος of Q 3:16 is understood of Yahweh, as I believe must originally have been the case, then we have this contrast: John baptizes with water, but Yahweh, who is to come, will baptize with wind/fire (i.e., function as end-time judge). Thus, only "holy" needed to be inserted to alter the whole scheme. This reconstruction would make abundantly better sense because it would then connect up to Q 3:17, the following verse, which speaks of Yahweh as a judge whose winnowing fork is in his hand and who will burn the chaff with unquenchable fire. Likewise, this continues the theme of judgment in Q 3:7–9. So we have a very coherent unit, and what is disruptive—hence later—is the alteration of the

[14] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q* 108.

two baptism scheme so as to refer to John's mere water baptism as opposed to Jesus' superior Holy Spirit and fire baptism, where the "and fire" now stands out as an ill-fitting fragment. Here we can see with particular clarity that the primitive reading, "and fire," made sense within an earlier context, one which led to the joining of Q 3:16–17 to Q 3:7–9, and so the earliest stage must be the one which linked John with Jesus. Of course, it is clear that Jesus was pre-eminent in Q. What is surprising, however, is the functional equivalency that exists not only between John and Jesus, but between Jesus and other exorcists (Q 11:19), later emissaries (Q 10:16), and even earlier figures like Jonah and Solomon (Q 11:29–32). This functional equivalency is evident with respect to judgment: the rejection of any of these messengers of God has the equally severe consequence for the rejectors themselves that they are rejected.

Kloppenborg also prefers to connect Q 7:1–10 (about the centurion's servant) with the Baptist material in Q 7:18ff rather than with the Sermon (Q 7:20b-49). He offers two reasons for rejecting the quite commonly made link with the Sermon. First, the centurion's faith is in Jesus as a miracle-worker, not as a teacher.[15] Second, the story focuses on recognition of Jesus' ἐξουσία by outsiders, not by members of the community (to whom the Sermon was directed).[16] True, he admits, there are catchword connections with Q 6:46–49 (Κύριε: Q 6:46/7:6; λόγος: Q 6:47,49/7:7), but he apparently reads this as evidence of the artificiality and lateness of the linkage. In any case, the primary link between Q 7:1–10 and Q 7:18–23 is one of subject matter: both deal with the miraculous. It will be recalled that the Sermon was first recension Q, according to Kloppenborg, and that Q 7:1–10 entered in the second recension.

That an outsider recognizes Jesus' ἐξουσία is not a telling argument, since the point of the story is that even a Gentile was able to recognize Jesus' ἐξουσία and thus to put Israel to shame. Nor is the fact that the faith is faith in Jesus as miracle-worker a problem because the story itself does not place the accent on miracle but on faith itself.

It is true that the accent in the story falls as much, or more, upon the reproach of Israel for its lack of faith as it does upon the centurion's faith. To that extent, it does not seem to function merely as a kind of exclamation mark after the Sermon, particularly after Q 6:46–49. Indeed, Kloppenborg notes that this polemical edge to the story connects it more with what follows than what precedes. And yet, according to his reconstruction, the next material (Q 7:18–23) does nothing to continue this emphasis, and one has to go to Q 7:32–35 to find it picked up again. But once the theme of the unreceptive Israel, this recalcitrant generation, was introduced into Q, even the Sermon which in fact contains (from 6:39 on) material that could be understood as a reproach, would come to be read in the light of this controversy with Israel. The Sermon, of course, concludes not only with the command to both hear and do, but with the warning about the ruined house. The story of the Gentile centurion's faith picks up both the faithful response to Jesus' words and the warning implicit to Israel, and thus forms a fitting conclusion to the Sermon.

What is at stake in how Q 7:1–10 is understood in its context is the literary unity of the larger section of Q material. Kloppenborg's linkage of Q 7:1–10 to Q 7:18ff not only severs the connection to the Sermon but it recasts the Baptist material as simply polemical material. That is, it no longer recognizes another motif in this section (Q 7:24–35), namely the relationship between John and Jesus, whose sermons have just been displayed.

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[15] Jacobson, *Wisdom Christology*, 76.

[16] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 117.

Indeed, the link to the earlier Baptist material (Q 3:7–9,16–17) is also lost. The whole section of Q, from Q 3:7–9 to Q 7:35, needs to be recognized as a compositional unit. Neither John nor Jesus is provided with more than a perfunctory introduction (Q 4:1–13 is a later addition providing such an introduction for Jesus), but each is given the chance to proclaim his central message. Then (in Q 7:24–35) the relationship between the two is discussed, leading to the conclusion that they form a united front against "this generation." Both are envoys of Sophia. The concluding unit (Q 7:31–35, especially verse 35) therefore gives expression to the theological assumptions underlying the composition of the whole section. Thus, for example, the presentation in Q of John as an independent prophet finds its theological justification in Q 7:24–35.

Conclusion

The question of method is critical to any attempted reconstruction of the history of the composition of Q. Any such method must be appropriate to the nature of the materials being studied. In the case of Q, greater attention needs to be given to literary structures in Q and to evidence of large scale composition in Q. This means that we need to be able not only to take Q apart but to put it back together, to understand what the author was trying to do when he or she put the parts where we find them.

[17] Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 117, n. 74.

Semitic Traditions in Some Synoptic Accounts

Ray Martin
Wartburg Theological Seminary

I: Syntactical Criteria for Isolating Semitic Traditions in Greek Documents

It has been frequently noted that the Greek of the Synoptic Gospels and of the first half of Acts contains Semitisms. There is less agreement, however, whenever specific words, phrases and constructions are discussed and designated as Semitic.

Further, little agreement has been reached on the question of the cause of these Semitisms. Over the years a variety of explanations have been postulated and often vigorously defended, such as:

1. The use of Semitic sources;
2. Translation of an entire Semitic Gospel or, in the case of Acts, a Semitic document roughly equivalent to Acts 1–15;[1]
3. Thinking in Hebrew or Aramaic,[2] whether the result of
   a) those languages being the writer's vernacular, and/or
   b) the writer's familiarity with the Septuagint which has resulted in a "Biblical Greek" vernacular;
4. *Conscious imitation* of the language and style of the Septuagint.[3]

Both Wilcox[4] and Sparks[5] in their detailed studies of Semitisms in Luke-Acts have noted, correctly, that more than one of the above factors may be the cause of Semitisms in the Gospels and Acts.

It is also generally agreed that the writers of the Gospels and Acts used sources[6] and that some of these were Semitic (though it is generally felt to be difficult, if not impossible, to say exactly where these sources appear in Acts as it now exists).

In the light of the above, the question arises whether it is possible to distinguish those Semitisms which indicate underlying sources and traditions, rather than merely being features of the writer's natural or consciously-artificial Semitic style.

Luke-Acts is particularly suited for such an attempt. In the second half of Acts, a "control" is available for the determination of the writer's natural style with which his style

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[1] Cf. for example, the writings of C. C. Torrey on the Gospels and Acts 1–15, and C. F. Burney on the Gospel of John.

[2] A recent example of this view is N. Turner. Cf. e.g., "The Relation of Luke I and II to Hebraic Sources and to the Rest of Luke Acts", *N.T. Studies*, Vol. 2, (1955–56), pp. 100–109.

[3] Cf. H. F. D. Sparks and many writers on Luke-Acts in recent times.

[4] M. Wilcox, *The Semitisms of Acts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 180.

[5] "The Semitisms of the Acts", *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. Vol. 1 (1950), p. 26.

[6] Cf., for example, E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1971), pp. 81f.

in the first half of Acts and the Gospel may be compared. It is generally agreed that the writer is not using Semitic sources in the second half of Acts; therefore any Semitisms which appear there and which also appear in the Gospel and the first half of Acts, cannot be used, *in themselves*, as clear evidence of Semitic sources in these parts of Luke-Acts.[7]

Further, the way Luke handles Markan material will be instructive for understanding how he handles Semitisms found in *Greek* sources used by him.

In attempting to solve the problem of the origin of Semitisms in the Gospels and Acts various approaches have been pursued. Torrey and others emphasized instances in the Greek text of mistranslation of an underlying Semitic word or construction. This approach is least satisfactory and has generally been less emphasized today; for it is very subjective, both as to whether a problem exists in the Greek and as to the hypothetical Hebrew/Aramaic behind it.

More frequently used today is the analysis of individual words and phrases considered to be "Semitisms," isolating those which can only be caused by translation of written Semitic sources.[8] While this is a convenient method and could conceivably lead to an indisputable "core" of Semitisms useful for isolating sections of a document being translated from written Semitic sources, in actual fact, however, it results in an emphasis on *few and infrequently occurring* Semitisms which thereby have limited usefulness for source discrimination, and, further, often leads to the erroneous conclusion that since these distinctive Semitisms are few and far between, therefore Semitic sources have not been employed.[9]

A very important aspect to be kept in mind in the study of this problem concerning the nature and origin of Semitisms in the Gospels and Acts is *the degree of consistency in distribution of the Semitisms.*[10]

Some of the above explanations of Semitisms require a more or less *consistent* distribution of Semitisms throughout the document, namely, 2.) translation of an entire Semitic document and 3.) thinking in Aramaic or Hebrew (due to influence of the vernacular and/or unconscious familiarity with the LXX). Other of the explanations listed above require an *inconsistent or erratic* distribution of Semitisms—namely 1.) use of *some* Semitic sources or 4.) conscious imitation of the LXX.[11]

The study of frequently occurring syntactical features which are not good or bad Greek in themselves but which show a difference in known translated and known original Greek documents with respect to their frequency or infrequency will be found to be a more useful tool for discovering whether a writer is using Semitic sources or not.[12]

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[7] Actually there could be one explanation for a Semitism in one part of Acts and a different explanation for the same Semitism in the other part; but such a Semitism is not a *clear* indicator of the use of a Semitic source.

[8] Cf. the works of Sparks and Wilcox referred to above. Cf., also, J. de Zwaan "The Use of the Greek Language in Acts", *The Beginning of Christianity* (MacMillan, 1922), Vol. II, pp. 30–65.

[9] Thus Wilcox concludes: "These little knots of Semitic material surviving unrevised, although affording a rather strong indication of the general authenticity of the stories in which they are embedded, nevertheless do not permit us to argue in favor of translation of Aramaic or Hebrew sources by Luke." *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

[10] Wilcox recognizes this aspect when he discusses "randomly distributed" Septuagintalisms. *Op. cit.*, pp. 58–60.

[11] Cf. ibid., pp. 60f.

[12] Cf. R. A. Martin, *Syntactical Evidence of Semitic Sources in Greek Documents, Septuagint*

There are in fact a number of Greek syntactical usages which occur with significantly different frequencies in documents which are or contain translations of Semitic sources.[13] That this should be the case need occasion no surprise, since there are Semitic constructions which are frequent and quite unalterable, whereas the corresponding Greek idiom is often more flexible and variable, preferring, at least in word order, what would be impossible or uncommon in Hebrew or Aramaic.

Therefore, the difference between the style of Greek which is a translation of Semitic originals and original Greek style is often to be seen in the *relative frequency or infrequency of an idiom, rather than in its mere occurrence or non-occurrence.*

Further, the syntactical features which will be found most useful for source criticism are those which occur *frequently* in the text—in every verse, preferably in every line, since very often source criticism is concerned with small units of the text.

Detailed analysis of nearly 10,000 lines of Greek text in a variety of documents resulted in the isolation of 17 syntactical criteria for the distinguishing of translated Greek and original Greek.[14] For convenience the analysis of a Greek document with reference to the frequency of these 17 criteria will be designated as "Syntax Criticism" of that document.

The frequently occurring syntactical features found to be significant indicators of translated and original Greek are as follows:

(a) Syntactical features which are *less frequent* in Greek which is a translation of Hebrew or Aramaic than in original Greek prose writings:

(1) eight prepositional usages: *dia* with the genitive; *dia* with all its cases; *eis; kata* with the accusative; *kata* with all its cases; *peri* with all its cases; *pros* with the dative; *hypo* with the genitive;

(2) the use of *de;*

(3) the separation of the article from its substantive;

(4) the placement of a genitive before the word upon which it depends;

(5) the placement of attributive adjectives before the words they qualify;

(6) the use of the adverbial (circumstantial) participle;

(7) the use of the dative case, other than its use as the object of *en.*

(b) Syntactical features which are *more frequent* in Greek which is a translation of a Semitic original than in original Greek:

(1) the use of the prepostion *en;*

(2) the use of *kai* to join main (independent) clauses;

(3) the use of genitive personal pronouns;

(4) the use of genitive personal pronouns dependent on an anarthrous substantive.

It was found that whenever these syntactical features occur with the following frequencies,[15] the Greek is characteristic of translation Greek rather than original Greek:

1. *dia* with genitive 6%—1% as frequent as *en;*
2. *dia* with all cases 18%—1% as frequent as *en;*
3. *eis* 49%—1% as frequent as *en;*

(continued)

Documents, Septuagint and Cognate Studies (Missoula: Scholar's Press, 1974), pp. 1f.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., Chap. 1; cf. also R. A. Martin, *Syntax Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels,* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), pp. 7ff.

[15] A brief description of the procedure for counting the occurrences of these specific constuctions and then calculating the percentages for each is appended to this paper.

4. *kata* with accusative 18%–1% as frequent as *en;*
5. *kata* with all cases 19%–1% as frequent as *en;*
6. *peri* with all cases 27%–1% as frequent as *en;*
7. *pros* with dative 2.4%–1% as frequent as *en;*
8. *hypo* with genitive 7%–1% as frequent as *en;*
9. *kai* (coordinating main clauses) 2.1 or more for each occurrence of *de;*
10. 5% or fewer articles separated from their substantives;
11. 22 or more dependent genitives following the word they qualify for each such genitive preceding the word qualified;
12. 9 or fewer lines of Greek text for each dependent genitive personal pronoun;
13. 77 or fewer lines of Greek text for each genitive personal pronoun dependent on an anarthrous substantive;
14. 35% or fewer attributive adjectives preceding the word qualified for each such adjective following the word qualified;
15. 10.1 or more lines of Greek text for each attributive adjective;
16. 6 or more lines of Greek text for each adverbial participle;
17. 2 or fewer datives not used as the object of *en* for each occurrence of *en.*

Of course, the appearance of merely one or two of these frequencies in a Greek document would not indicate that the document is a translation of a Semitic language, since the idiosyncrasies of a writer's style, especially in small units of text, may result in an uncharacteristic overuse or underuse of an idiom.

In the following table all 17 criteria for each of the documents studied are presented.[16] A study of the 5th column counting back from the right hand margin (titled "Total No. of Translation Greek Frequencies") will reveal that only Philo and Epictetus of the known original Greek documents have any frequencies characteristic of translation Greek (and they each have only 3). On the other hand, those documents known to be translations of Semitic languages have from 9 to 14 occurrences of translation Greek frequencies, 9 in the more idiomatic Genesis translation and 14 in the translations of Daniel and Ezra.

[16] For convenience of reference those frequencies falling within translation frequency limits have been underlined in the table.

Frequencies of the 17 Criteria in Translated and Original Greek Documents

Frequencies of the 17 Criteria in Translated and Original Greek Documents

	No. of lines of Greek text	No. of occur. of en	No. of occur. of prepositions/ea. occur. of en: dia W. gen.	dia W. all cases	eis	kata W. accus.	kata W. all cases	Peri w. all cases	Pros w. dative	Hupo w. genitive	No. of occ. of kai for each occ. of de	Percent of separ. articles	Dependent genitives: No. of dep. gen. post. ea. prec. dep. gen.	No. of lines ea. dep. gen. pers. pronoun	Lines ea. gen. pers. pronoun on anarth. subst.	No. of prec. attr. adj. for each attr. adj. post position	No. of lines ea. attrib. adjec	No. of lines each adverb. participle	No. of dat. not used w. en for ea. occur. of en	Tot. no. of transl. Grk. frequencies	Tot. no of orig. Grk. frequencies	No. of inst. where occ. of criter. are too few to be meanc	Net original Grk. frequencies	Net translat. Grk. frequencies
Translation			.06-	.18-	.49-	.18-	.19-	.27-	.024	.07-	2.1+	.05-	22+	9-	77-	35-	10.1+	6+	2-	17				
Frequencies			.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01														
Plutarch	325	28	.07	.21	.64	.21	.25	.64	–	.29	.24	.24	1.4	40.6	325	1.3	3.6	2.0	3.3	–	16	1	16	
Polybius	192	4	.75	2.0	1.3	3.8	3.8	2.8	–	–	.06	.43	.80	38.4	192	6.1	3.8	5.1	12.3	–	15	2	15	
Epictetus	487	18	.28	.84	.44	.94	.94	1.4	.11	.17	.32	.16	1.6	28.6	97.6	3.8	10.2	6.7	8.6	3	14	–	11	
Josephus	215	10	.40	1.3	.60	.40	.40	3.5	–	.80	.36	.30	1.2	16.5	215.0	5.6	4.7	3.2	7.3	–	16	1	16	
Papyri	630	38	.50	.79	1.4	.74	.82	.61	.026	.08	.39	.22	2.9	10.3	210.0	1.4	6.0	5.4	7.0	–	17	–	17	
2 Macc.	495	26	.50	1.8	1.8	1.1	1.2	.80	.27	.54	.19	.35	.74	23.8	495	3.5	4.8	2.5	4.2	–	17	–	17	
Philo	251	14	–	.07	.36	.86	.86	.14	–	.21	.02	.33	.90	50.2	251	5.5	3.9	4.3	3.6	3	12	2	9	
Hebrews	535	47	.85	1.2	1.3	.57	.62	.43	–	.17	.58	.13	6.3	11.6	178.3	1.7	5.1	3.8	3.1	–	16	1	16	
Acts 15:36-28:31	1056	99	.17	.30	1.7	.48	.58	.49	–	.23	.72	.13	5.9	17.6	151	1.0	8.8	2.1	3.1	–	16	1	16	

Frequencies of the 17 Criteria in Translated and Original Greek Documents

			No. of lines of Greek text	No. of occur. of en	No. of occur. of prepositions/as. occur. of en: dia W. gen.	dia W all cases	kata W. accus.	kata W all cases	Para w all cases	Pros w. dative	Huios w. genitive	No of occ. of kai for each occ. of de	Percent of separ. articles	Dependent genitives: No of dep. gen. post as prec. dep. gen.	No. of lines as dep. gen. pers. pronoun	Lines as. gen. pers. pron. dep. on anarth. subst.	No. of prec. attr. adj. for each attr. adj. post position	No. of lines as attrib adjec.	No. of lines each adverb participle	No. of dat. not used w en for as occur of en	Tot no of transl Grk frequencies	Tot no of orig Grk frequencies	No. of instances where dep. gen. precedes the few to be made	Net original Grk frequencies	Net translat Grk frequencies
Translation Frequencies					06- 01	18- 01	49- 01	18- 01	19- 01	27- 01	024 01	07- 01	21	05-	22	9-	77-	35-	101	6	2	17				17
Gen. 1-4,6,39			382	50	.10	.20	.76	.63	.63	–	–	–	6.0	.03	28.3	3.9	76.4	.14	15.3	15.9	1.5	9	5	3		-4
1 Sam. 3,4,22			194	40	.08	.08	.60	.03	.08	.05	–	–	178	.01	104	3.4	28.0	.00	21.6	19.4	.83	13	2	2		-11
1 Kings 17			58	10	.10	.10	.70	.40	.40	–	–	–	58.0	.00	42.0	3.2	29.0	.33	14.5	58	1.6	10	4	3		-6
2 Kings 13			71	20	–	.10	.10	.05	.05	–	–	–	61	.00	53	3.7	17.8	–	71	17.8	.60	12	–	5		-12
Daniel	Heb		482	99	.02	.04	.57	.16	.16	–	–	–	58.0	.04	42.5	2.8	32.1	.27	7.3	17.1	.82	12	2	3		-10
	Aram	Theod.	460	117	–	.01	.38	.09	.09	.02	–	–	343	.01	77.4	2.3	17.7	.05	10.0	23.0	.50	13	1	3		-12
		LXX	595	72	.03	.03	.56	.10	.17	.14	–	.03	7.2	.04	22.5	3.9	66.1	.15	7.1	6.9	1.7	14	2	1		-12
		Theod.	634	102	.02	.04	.47	.02	.06	.10	–	–	32.6	.01	238.0	2.8	57.6	.04	6.8	18.1	1.3	14	1	2		-13
Ezra-Hebrew			328	96	–	.01	.34	.04	.04	.00	–	–	134	.01	167.0	2.9	6.0	.04	13.1	27.0	.82	14	–	3		-14
Ezra-Aramaic			211	55	–	.09	.40	.07	.07	.07	–	–	82.0	.04	34.0	5.7	15.0	.17	10.0	53.0	.76	13	1	3		-12
Jeremiah	A	Prose	201	35	–	.14	.51	.09	.09	.20	–	–	110	.02	165	2.2	20.1	.21	8.7	22.3	1.7	12	2	3		-10
	A	Poetic	357	65	.02	.18	.48	.06	.06	–	–	–	17.9	.01	291.0	1.9	8.9	.03	10.2	27.5	1.1	14	–	3		-14
	B	Prose	216	41	–	.12	.76	.20	.22	.07	–	–	101	.02	162	4.0	18.0	.20	18.0	9.8	1.3	11	3	3		-8
	B	Poetic	171	34	–	.21	.85	.06	.06	.03	–	–	90	.02	139	2.2	4.5	.18	8.6	19.0	.80	11	3	3		-8
Ezekiel	A	Prose	200	49	.02	.10	.41	.12	.12	–	–	–	80.5	.03	80.5	2.1	8.3	.00	13.3	40.0	.49	14	–	3		-14
	A	Poetic	74	29	–	–	.17	–	.04	–	–	–	43	.00	93	1.2	4.9	.00	18.5	37.0	.48	11	–	6		-11
	B	Prose	203	46	–	.22	.28	.02	.02	.02	–	.02	51.0	.04	27.7	2.3	33.8	.08	15.6	18.2	.91	14	1	2		-13
	B	Poetic	132	50	–	.12	.12	–	–	–	–	–	41.0	.01	68.5	1.8	26.4	.20	22.0	66.0	.38	11	–	6		-11
1 Maccabees			732	173	.03	.04	.63	.18	.18	.04	–	.01	25.6	.03	91.0	3.5	22.3	.06	8.1	12.6	.88	14	2	1		-12

This sharp difference between documents written originally in Greek and documents translated from Hebrew or Aramaic is graphically illustrated in the chart below:

Number of Occurrences of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek in the Greek Documents Studied

Name		Total No. of Lines	Number of Occurrences of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek													
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Genesis 1-4, 6, 39		382										X					
1 Samuel 3, 4, 22		194														X	
1 Kings 17		58											X				
2 Kings 13		71													X		
Daniel	Hebrew-LXX	482													X		
	Hebrew-Theod.	460														X	
	Aramaic-LXX	595															X
	Aramaic-Theod.	634															X
Ezra	Hebrew	328															X
	Aramaic	211														X	
Jeremiah	Prose A	201													X		
	Poetic A	357															X
	Prose B	216												X			
	Poetic B	171												X			
Ezekiel	Prose A	200															X
	Poetic A	74												X			
	Prose B	203															X
	Poetic B	132												X			
1 Maccabees		732															X
Plutarch-Selections		325	X														
Polybius-Bks I, II		192	X														
Epictetus		487				X											
Josephus-Selections		215	X														
Papyri-Selections		630	X														
2 Maccabees		495	X														
Philo		251				X											
Hebrews		535	X														
Acts 15:36-28:31		1056	X														

From the above chart it will be observed that there is a gap of 5 spaces (nos. 4–8) between the data for the original Greek documents and the data for the translated Greek documents. This gap can be more than doubled in size if the *net* occurrences of original Greek frequencies are compared to the *net* occurrences of translation Greek frequencies.

The last 2 columns in the chart on pages 299-300 give the *net* original and *net* translation Greek frequencies. This figure was arrived at as follows: Whenever a section has more occurrences of original Greek frequencies than occurrences of translation Greek frequencies, the number of occurrences of translation Greek frequencies was subtracted from the number of occurrences of original Greek frequencies and the resulting number is the *net occurrence of original Greek frequencies.*

For example, Plutarch in the chart on page 299 has 16 occurrences of frequencies characteristic of original Greek and no occurrences of frequencies characteristic of translation Greek—16 less 0 equals 16 *net* original Greek frequencies.

Conversely, whenever a section has more occurrences of translation Greek frequencies than occurrences of original Greek frequencies, the number of occurrences of translation Greek frequencies, and the resulting number is the *net* occurrence of translation Greek frequencies.

For example, in the date for Genesis in the chart on page 300 there are 9 occurrences of frequencies characteristic of translation Greek and 5 occurrences of frequencies characteristic of original Greek—9 less five equals 4 *net* translation Greek frequencies. These *net* translation Greek frequencies are *expressed as negative numbers,* to distinguish them more readily from the *net* original Greek frequencies.

In the chart below, using net original and net translation frequencies, the gap between the figures of original Greek documents and the figures of translation Greek documents is now 12 spaces (nos. 8 to -3)!

CHART I A

Net Frequencies in Original Greek Documents of More Than 50 Lines in Length

	No. of Lines	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek												
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Plutarch - Selections	325		X																													
Polybius - Bks I,II	192			X																												
Epictetus - Bks III,IV	138	X																														
Bks I,II	349									X																						
Bks I,II,III,IV	487							X																								
Josephus - Selections	215		X																													
Papyri - Selections	630	X																														
II Maccabees 2:13-6:31	495	X																														
Philo - On Creation I-VIII	251									X																						
Hebrews	535		X																													
Acts 15:36-28:31	1056		X																													

Chart 1A

CHART I B

Net Frequencies in Translated Documents of More Than 50 Lines in Length

	No. of Lines	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek														
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	-7	-8	-9	-10	-11	-12	-13	-14
Genesis 1-4,6,39	382																						X									
1 Samuel 3,4,22	194																													X			
1 Kings 17	58																								X							
2 Kings 13	71																														X	
Dan. - Hebrew - LXX	482																												X			
Hebrew - Theod.	460																														X	
Dan. - Aramaic - LXX	595																														X	
Aramaic - Theod.	634																															X
Ezra - Hebrew	328																															X
Aramaic	211																														X	
Jer.-Prose A (Chaps 1,3,7,11,16)	201																												X			
Poetic A (Chaps 2,4,5,6,10)	357																															X
Jer.-Prose B (Chaps 33-36)	216																										X					
Poetic B (Chaps 30,31,37,38)	171																										X					
Ezek.-Prose A (Chaps 2-5)	200																															X
Poetic A (Chaps 19,27)	74																													X		
Ezek.-Prose B (Chaps 28,30-32)	203																														X	
Poetic B (Chaps 33-35)	132																													X		
I Maccabees (Chaps 1-5)	732																														X	

In the light of the above statistics it is clear that in known original Greek and in Greek which is known to be a translation of a Semitic document the differences in frequency of these 17 syntactical features are quite striking when a considerable number of lines of Greek text are being dealt with (50 lines or more).

These frequencies also differ, but as might be expected with less consistency, in units of fewer lines and this is the aspect of the problem which will be taken up next.

When the net frequencies[17] are plotted for the various documents studied and for the various subsections of them, as is done in charts I A–IV B, it will be seen that certain ranges are established for original Greek and translated Greek. In the larger amounts of text (more than 50 lines in length–Charts I A and B; and 31 to 50 lines in length–Charts II A and B) there is an area separating the ranges of original and translated Greek from one another. If the net frequencies for a document or subsection falls into this area, it is most probably a mixture of original and translated Greek.

In the charts of the smaller units (16 to 30 lines in length–Charts III A and B; and 4 to 15 lines in length–Charts IV A and B) a line was drawn below which original Greek documents do not go.

[17] For the method of calculating net frequencies cf. *Syntactical Evidence*, pp. 40, 41. Cf. also Appendix "Directions for Counting and for Calculating Percentages," at the end of this study.

CHART II A

Net Original Greek Frequencies Appearing in Each Unit of Text 31 to 50 Lines in Length

Name	No. of Units	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek												
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Plutarch - Selections	4						3	1																								
Polybius - Books I,II	3						1	1	1																							
Epictetus - Bks III,IV	2					1			1																							
Bks I,II	2									1			1																			
Bks I,II,III,IV	4					1			1	1			1																			
Josephus - Selections	1							1																								
Papyri - Selections	3					1			1			1																				
II Maccabees 2:13-6:31	2			1				1																								
Philo - On Creation I-VIII	4						2			1	1																					
Hebrews	5			1		1	1			1	1																					
Acts 15:36-28:31	2									1	1																					

Chart IIB

CHART II B

Net Translation Greek Frequencies Appearing in Each Unit of Text 31 to 50 Lines in Length

Name	No. of Units	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek												
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Genesis 1-4,6,39	4																				1	1			2								
1 Samuel 3,4,22	--																																
1 Kings 17	--																																
2 Kings 13	--																																
Dan. - Hebrew - LXX	1																	1															
Hebrew - Theod.	1																									1							
Dan. - Aramaic - LXX	--																																
Aramaic - Theod.	--																																
Ezra - Hebrew	3																								1		1	1					
Aramaic	2																					1					1						
Jer. - Prose A	2																									1							1
Poetic A	1																															1	
Prose B	2																				1									1			
Poetic B	4																		1				1	1		1							
Ezek. - Prose A	1																														1		
Poetic A	--																																
Prose B	--																																
Poetic B	--																																
I Maccabees 1-5	--																																

CHART III A

Net Original Greek Frequencies Appearing in Each Unit of Text of 16 to 30 Lines in Length

Name	No. of Units	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek													
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Plutarch - Selections	7						1	1		1	1			2		1																
Polybius - Books I,II	5							1	2	1	1																					
Epictetus - Bks III,IV	5							1		1	1	1	1																			
Bks I,II	10									1	1	2		3	3																	
Bks I,II,III,IV	15							1		2	2	3	1	3	3																	
Josephus - Selections	5							1			3		1																			
Papyri - Selections	12							2	2	3	3	1				1																
II. Maccabees 2:13-6:31	15				3		5		5	1	1																					
Philo - On Creation I-VIII	4								1			1	1	1																		
Hebrews	9						1			1	2	2	1	1		1																
Acts 15:36-28:31	27				1	1	1	2	3	3	8	2	2	1	3																	

Chart IIIB

CHART III B

Net Translation Greek Frequencies Appearing in Each Unit of Text 16 to 30 Lines in Length

Name	No. of Units	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek												
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Genesis 1-4,6,39	5																1		2	1			1										
1 Samuel 3,4,22	4																			1	1	2											
1 Kings 17	--																																
2 Kings 13	1																			1													
Dan. - Hebrew - LXX	6																1		2	2	1												
Hebrew - Theod.	4																				2					2							
Dan. - Aramaic - LXX	10														1	1	2		3		1		1				1						
Aramaic - Theod.	13															1			1	2	1	3	2		1	1	1						
Ezra - Hebrew	10																					1	1	1	5			2					
Aramaic	7																		1		1	1	2	2									
Jer. - Prose A	5																			2	1		1	1									
Poetic A	3																				1	1	1										
Jer. - Prose B	1																		1														
Poetic B	1														1																		
Ezek. - Prose A	4																	1	1				1	1									
Poetic A	3																				1							2					
Ezek. - Prose B	6																	2	1			1		1		1							
Poetic B	3																							1	1	1							
1 Maccabees 1-5	13														1		2	2	1	2		2	1	1		1							

CHART IV A

Net Original Greek Frequencies Appearing in Each Unit of Text 4 to 15 Lines in Length

Name	No. of Units	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek													
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Plutarch - Selection	49								1	5	3	6	12	8	4	6	2	2														
Polybius - Bks I,II	12							1	3	2	1	2	3																			
Epictetus - Bks III,IV	2							1							1																	
Bks I,II	30									3	2	4	5	7	5	2	1	1														
Bks I,II,III,IV	32							1		3	2	4	5	7	6	2	1	1														
Josephus - Selections	22								1	2	3	3	6	6	1																	
Papyri - Selections	75						2	1	2	5	7	16	9	13	12	2	2	3	1													
II Maccabees 2:13-6:31	8					1	1	1	1	3		1																				
Philo - On Creation I-VIII	30										4	4	8	5	3	4		1	1													
Hebrews	46						2	5	1	5	3	6	7	4	6	4	1	2														
Acts 15:36-28:31	36						2	1	2	3	9	7	7	3	2																	

Chart IVB

CHART IV B

Net Translation Greek Frequencies Appearing in Each Unit of Text 4 to 15 Lines in Length

Name	No. of Units	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek												
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	-7	-8	-9	-10	-11	-12	-13	-14
Genesis 1-4,6,39	13																2	3	2	3		3										
1 Samuel 3,4,22	12																	1	1	5			1	2	2							
1 Kings 17	5																	1	1	1	1		1									
2 Kings 13	5																			1		1	1	1	1							
Dan. - Hebrew - LXX	35											1				1	3	2	5	7	8	4	3	1								
Hebrew - Theod.	37																2	3	3	2	7	8	10	2								
Dan. - Aramaic - LXX	38											1	1		3	4	3	4	6	3	6	4	2		1							
Aramaic - Theod.	36															2	5	1	4	6	3	6	5	3	1							
Ezra - Hebrew	15															1		2	3		2	2	2	2	1							
Aramaic	6														2				1	2	1											
Jer. - Prose A	12																1	2	2	1	1	5										
Poetic A	28																3	5	4	1	5	3	4	1	2							
Jer. - Prose B	19											1		1	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	3			2			1				
Poetic B	18																1	4	2	2	5	1	3									
Ezek.-Prose A	15																		1	4	2	3	1	1	2		1					
Poetic A	2																					1			1							
Ezek. Prose B	12														1	2		2	1		3	1		2								
Poetic B	9																		1	3	2	1	1	1								
1 Maccabees 1-5	45														1	2		7	6	6	7	7	3	4	2							

Any subsection of a Greek document which falls below these lines is translation Greek. It will be noticed that some subsections of *translated* Greek go beyond this line into the original Greek range. In such cases translation Greek cannot be detected by these 17 syntactical criteria.

Stated another way, any subsection of a Greek document whose net frequencies falls below the line drawn on the chart for units of text of that size is *clearly translation Greek;* however, concerning any subsection of a Greek document of 16 to 30 lines in length which falls into the area +2 to +4 (cf. Charts III A and B) or any subsection of 4 to 15 lines in length which falls into the area of 0 to +7 (cf. Charts IV A and B) it cannot be decided on the basis of these 17 criteria whether it is translated or original Greek.

When the book of Acts is studied with respect to these 17 syntactical features (cf. Chart V), it will be seen that the second half of Acts (15:36–28:31) is *consistently* like original Greek, i.e. neither the total, nor any of the smaller units fall outside of the original Greek area (that is, to the right of the solid lines on Chart V); and in the case of units 30 to 4 lines in length only 22 fall into the area shared by original and translation Greek for such units (i.e. between the dotted and the solid lines).

The first half of Acts (1:1–15:35), however, as Chart V shows, is *erratic* with respect to these syntactical features, both with respect to the entire unit (1144 lines) and with respect to 16 smaller units which fall outside the original Greek area (to the right of the solid lines). Further 34 other units fall into the area shared by original and translation Greek (i.e. between the dotted and the solid lines.)

Chart V

CHART V

Net Original and Translation Greek Frequencies in the Two Halves of Acts

	No. of Units	Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Original Greek																Net No. of Frequencies Characteristic of Translation Greek												
		17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	-7	-8	-9	-10	-11	-12	-13	-14
Acts 15:36-28:31[1]																																	
Entire (1056 Lines)			X																													
Units 31 to 50 Lines in Length	2									1	1																					
Units 16 to 30 Lines in Length	27				1	1	1	2	3	3	8	2	2	1	3																	
Units 4 to 15 Lines in Length	36						2	1	2	3	9	7	7	3	2																	
Acts 1:1-15:35[1]																																	
Entire (1144 Lines)											X																					
Units 31 to 50 Lines in Length	3									1		1						1														
Units 16 to 30 Lines in Length	29						1	1		2	5	2	3	1	3		4	3	2		1	1										
Units 4 to 15 Lines in Length	40							1	1	2	1	4	5	7	6	3	4	2		2	1	1										

Note: The solid lines indicate the lowest limit of original Greek units of this size; the dotted lines indicate the highest limits of translated Greek units of this size.

1. Cf. Martin, cf. Syntactical Evidence, pp. 88, 92 and 97.

The table below for convenience of reference lists in order those passages in Acts 1:1–15:35 which are or most probably are translations of Semitic sources.

Passages in Acts Evidencing Translation Greek

	Translated from[1] Semitic Sources			Probably Translated[2] from Semitic Sources		
The Choosing of Matthias	1:15-26	(26 lines)	0			
The Descent of the Spirit	2:1-4	(8 lines)	-1			
Part of Peter's Speech				2:29-36	(13 lines)	+1
Response to Peter's Speech				2:37-42	(15 lines)	+2
The Believers Pray for Boldness	4:23-31	(17 lines)	0			
The Apostles' Escape from Prison	5:17-26	(23 lines)	+1			
The Trial of the Apostles	5:27-32	(13 lines)	-2			
Gamaliel's Advice	5:33-42	(24 lines)	+2			
The Appointment of the Seven	6:1-7	(18 lines)	+2			
The Arrest of Stephen	6:8-15	(18 lines)	+2			
Stephen's Speech				7:1-8	(13 lines)	+2
Stephen's Speech	7:9-16	(14 lines)	-3			
Stephen's Speech	7:17-22	(11 lines)	-1			
Stephen's Speech	7:30-43	(20 lines)	+1			
Stephen's Speech				7:44-50	(9 lines)	+1
Ananias Visits Saul	9:10-19a	(23 lines)	-2			
Saul Preaches in Damascus				9:19b-22	(9 lines)	+2
Peter Heals Aeneas				9:32-35	(8 lines)	+2
Peter Reports on His Visit to Cornelius	11:1-18	(36 lines)	+1			
Paul's Sermon at Antioch	13:16b-25	(20 lines)	+1			
Paul's Sermon at Antioch	13:26-41	(27 lines)	-3			
Paul and Barnabas at Lystra	14:8-20	(29 lines)	+2			

1. The 16 passages to the right of both the solid and the dotted lines on Chart V.

2. The 6 passages in the lowest part of the area shared by both original and translation Greek in units of 4 to 15 lines in length. Cf. also Syntactical Evidence, pp. 99-101.

The *erratic* nature of Acts 1–15 with respect to these 17 criteria excludes Torrey's theory that all of Acts 1–15 has been translated from a Semitic document; it also excludes the view that this Semitic style is the natural vernacular of the writer; for both these theories would require a more consistent use of these syntactical features (such as the consistency found in Acts 15:36–28:31).

Thus there remain only two possible explanations for the erratic frequency of these 17 syntactical features in Acts 1–15—either Semitic sources lie behind those sections where Semitic frequencies occur, or the writer is deliberately and consciously imitating there a Semitic style which differs from his own natural style. As noted earlier, in recent times it has been most common to explain the writer's Semitic style in Acts 1–15 and in the Gospel of Luke (particularly in Luke 1 and 2) in this way, namely as a consciously Semitizing Septuagintal style—the writer's conscious effort to provide for his narrative the local color most suited to it, thereby revealing his great artistic skill.[18]

Winter in reference to the Semitisms of Luke 1 and 2 has rightly called this explanation by Sparks "artificial."[19] However, the main refutation of the view that this erratic Semitic style (at least with respect to the 17 syntactical criteria of translation Greek) is due to *deliberate imitation* of the LXX lies in another direction.

Why does the writer of Acts 1–15 choose to use a Semitic style with respect to these 17 syntactical features *only in some sections* (some of which are Palestinian in setting and some of which are not Palestinian in setting)? And why does he not adopt this style in the many other places where the Palestinian background is clear and obvious, since according to Sparks the Palestinian setting determines Luke's conscious Semitic style?

Why, for example, as illustrated in Chart VI in "Classification of the Material in Acts" at the end of this section, should Luke *deliberately adopt* a Semitic style for narrating Paul's experiences and the healing of a man crippled from birth at *Lystra in Asia Minor* (Acts 14:8–20) but use his natural non-Semitic style to describe Peter and John's *similar experience with a man lame from birth in Jerusalem* (Acts 3:1–10)?

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[18] Sparks writes concerning Luke's Septuagintalisms: "They are, if the phrase may be excused, nothing less than 'pieces of literary scenery', deliberately devised and cunningly conceived to provide the right background for the action. . . . Yet not all parts of Luke-Acts are equally Septuagintal. This is due, I suggest, to St. Luke's historical as well as to his dramatic sense. . . . The background of the ministry was historically Palestinian, and so also was the background of the primitive Church; so St. Luke selects for both a consciously Semitic and, because he was a Gentile writing for Gentiles, a necessarily almost entirely Septuagintal style." *Op. cit.*, p. 28. Cf. also Haenchen, *op. cit.*, p. 74 and H. Conzelmann, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1963), p. 3, among others.

[19] P. Winter, "Some Observations on the Language in the Birth and Infancy Stories of the Third Gospel," *N.T. Studies*, Vol. 1, (1954/55), p. 111.

Or why should Luke deliberately adopt a Semitic style to narrate the arrest, imprisonment and trial of Peter and other apostles in Jerusalem in Acts 5:17–32 but not use it for the arrest, imprisonment and trial of Peter and John in Jerusalem in the previous chapter (Acts 4:5–22)?

Or why should Luke's narration of Peter's vision and his visit to Cornelius be told in his natural, non-Semitic style (Acts 10:1–48) but Peter's retelling of it in Acts 11:5–17 be highly Semitized as indicated by these 17 syntactical features?

Finally, why would the writer use a very Semitic style for Paul's sermon in Antioch of Asia Minor (Acts 13:16b–41) but employ his natural, non-Semitic style for Paul's speech before the mob in Jerusalem, which Luke specifically states was delivered in Aramaic (Acts 22:2–21)? There, if anywhere, he surely ought to seek to give an Aramaic coloring to the Greek!

The same anomalous situation will be seen in Luke's Gospel.[20] If Luke's Semitic style was as Sparks claimed "deliberately devised and cunningly conceived to provide the right background for the action," why is the entire Gospel not written in such a style—for the Gospel material is entirely set in a Palestinian environment? And *why does he tend to lessen these Semitic syntactical frequences whenever he uses Markan narratives and sayings* (as he does nearly ¾ of the time)? Since all of Mark's material is Palestinian in setting, it is difficult to understand why Luke would make the Markan material he uses less rather than more Semitic.

Further, only about ⅓ of Luke's special material reveals this same Semitic style as does only some of his Q material—but all of the Q and special material has a Palestinian setting!

This same erratic Semitic style with respect to these 17 syntactical features *appears in both Mark and Matthew!* Is it to be assumed that they, like Luke, are so skilled as to be able consciously to imitate the style of the Greek Old Testament so as to give appropriate color to their Gospels? And, if so, *why do they,* like Luke, *also do it only in some stories and sayings and not in others?*

Whatever may be the explanation for other kinds of Semitisms found in the Gospels and Acts 1–15, as far as the 17 syntactical criteria of Syntax Criticism are concerned, it is much more probable that where these 17 syntactical features appear with Semitic frequencies they provide evidence that the writer is, in these instances, dependent upon Semitic sources. Against this background, then, the Syntax Criticism of 4 gospel pericopes will be undertaken in Part II of this paper.

[20] For the demonstration of this and the following judgments on Matthew and Mark cf. Martin, *Syntax Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels,* chaps. 1–3.

Chart VI - Classification of the Material in Acts

Content	Acts	Lines	Net Freq.	Original	Original/ Transl.	Transl.
Promise of Holy Spirit	1:1-5	12	9	x		
Ascension	6-11	15	5		x	
Judas' Successor Chosen	12-14	9	3		x	
	15-26	26	0			x
Coming of the Spirit	2:1-4	8	-1			x
	5-13	17	9	x		
Peter's Pentecost Speech	14-21	6	5		x	
	22-28	9	7	x		
	29-36	13	1		x	
	37-42	15	2		x	
Life Among the Believers	43-47	10	8	x		
Lame Man Healed	3:1-10	21	8	x		
Peter's Speech in Solomon's Porch	11-26	33	9	x		
Peter and John before Council	4:1-4	7	4		x	
	5-12	10	3		x	
	13-22	22	8	x		
Praying for Boldness	23-31	17	0			x
All Things in Common	32-37	14	6		x	
Ananias and Sapphira	5:1-6	13	5		x	
	7-11	11	5		x	
Signs and Wonders	12-16	11	6		x	
Persecution of the Apostles	17-26	23	1			x
	27-32	13	-2			x
	33-42	24	2			x
Seven Appointed	6:1-7	18	2			x
Arrest of Stephen	8-15	18	2			x
Stephen's Speech	7:1-8	13	2		x	
	9-16	14	-3			x
	17-22	11	-1			x
	23-29	12	4		x	
	30-43	20	1			x

Chart VI continued

Content	Acts	Lines	Net Freq.	Original	Original/ Transl.	Transl.
Stephen's Speech	44-50	9	1		x	
	51-53	7	4		x	
Stoning of Stephen	7:54-8-1a	15	4		x	
Saul Persecutes the Church	8:1b-3	7	5		x	
Gospel Preached in Samaria	4-8	8	6		x	
	9-13	11	10	x		
	14-25	24	7	x		
Ethiopian Eunuch	26-33	16	5	x		
	34-40	14	4		x	
Conversion of Saul	9:1-9	17	6	x		
	10-19a	23	-2			x
Saul Preaches at Damascus	19b-22	9	2		x	
Saul Escapes to Jerusalem	22-31	21	8	x		
Healing of Aeneas	32-35	8	2		x	
Dorcas Restored to Life	36-43	20	4		x	
Peter and Cornelius	10:1-8	16	9	x		
	9-16	14	7		x	
	17-23a	16	7	x		
	23b-33	25	8	x		
Peter Speaks in Cornelius' House	34-43	23	8	x		
Gentiles Receive the Holy Spirit	44-48	11	3		x	
Peter's Report in Jerusalem	11:1-18	36	1			x
The Church at Antioch	19-26	19	4		x	
	27-30	9	5		x	
James Killed; Peter Imprisoned	12:1-5	10	11	x		
Peter Delivered from Prison	6-19	38	7	x		
Death of Herod	20-25	13	6		x	

Chart VI continued

Content	Acts	Lines	Net Freq.	Original	Original/ Transl.	Transl.
Barnabas and Saul Commissioned	13:1-3	8	9	x		
Apostles Preach in Cyprus	4-12	21	6	x		
At Antioch in Psidia	13-16a	10	6		x	
Paul's Sermon in Antioch	16b-25	20	1			x
	26-41	27	-3			x
Paul Driven from Antioch	42-52	23	12	x		
At Iconium	14:1-7	14	7		x	
At Lystra	8-20	29	2			x
Return to Antioch in Syria	21-28	16	6	x		
Council in Jerusalem	15:1-5	16	11	x		
	6-11	13	5		x	
	12-21	14	7		x	
Reply of the Council	22-29	20	4		x	
	30-35	9	6		x	
Paul and Barnabas Separate	15:36-41	13	7		x	
Timothy and Paul and Silas	16:1-5	12	7		x	
Macedonian Vision	6-10	10	11	x		
Conversion of Lydia	11-15	13	8	x		
Imprisonment at Philippi	16-24	23	4		x	
	25-34	20	9	x		
	35-40	15	5		x	
Uproar in Thessalonica	17:1-9	22	6	x		
The Apostles at Beroea	10-15	16	10	x		
Paul at Athens	16-21	16	8	x		
	22-27	15	5		x	
	28-34	15	5		x	

Chart VI continued

Content	Acts	Lines	Net Freq.	Original	Original Transl.	Transl.
Paul at Corinth	18:1-4	9	7		x	
	5-11	17	4		x	
	12-17	13	6		x	
Paul's Return to Antioch	18-23	13	8	x		
Apollos' Preaching at Ephesus	24-28	14	7		x	
Paul at Ephesus	19:1-7	13	7		x	
	8-10	8	6		x	
The Sons of Sceva	11-20	25	8	x		
The Riot at Ephesus	21-27	20	14	x		
	28-40	31	8	x		
Paul's Journey to Greece	20:1-6	14	8	x		
Paul's Farewell at Troas	7-12	13	4		x	
Voyage to Miletus	13-16	11	6		x	
Paul Addresses Ephesian Elders	17-24	19	11	x		
	25-35	23	5	x		
	36-38	6	6		x	
Paul's Journey to Jerusalem	21:1-6	15	8	x		
	7-16	24	9	x		
Paul Visits James	17-26	24	10	x		
Paul Arrested in the Temple	27-36	25	8	x		
Paul Defends Himself	21:37-22:2	14	9	x		
Paul's Aramaic Speech	22:3-5	10	8	x		
	6-11	13	8	x		
	12-16	10	8	x		
	17-21	10	8	x		
Paul and the Roman Tribune	22-29	19	8	x		
Paul Before the Council	22:30-23:5	13	9	x		
	23:6-11	18	8	x		

Chart VI continued

Content	Acts	Lines	Net Freq.	Original	Original/ Transl.	Transl.
The Plot vs Paul	23:12-22	31	9	x		
Paul Sent to Felix	23-30	17	8	x		
	31-35	10	12	x		
The Case Against Paul	24:1-9	16	11	x		
Paul's Defense Before Felix	10-23	29	10	x		
Paul Held in Custody	24-27	12	10	x		
Paul Appeals to Caesar	25:1-5	10	7		x	
	6-12	19	7	x		
Paul Before Agrippa and Bernice	13-22	24	13	x		
	23-27	15	9	x		
Paul's Defense before Agrippa	26:1-11	25	7	x		
	12-18	16	8	x		
	19-23	12	4		x	
	24-32	19	4		x	
Paul Sails for Rome	27:1-8	18	12	x		
	9-12	11	10	x		
The Storm at Sea	13-20	15	6		x	
	21-26	12	6		x	
	27-32	14	6		x	
	33-38	12	5		x	
The Shipwreck	39-44	16	6	x		
On the Island of Malta	28:1-10	24	9	x		
Paul Arrives at Rome	11-16	13	8	x		
Paul Preaches in Rome	17-22	17	8	x		
	23-31	15	12	x		

II: Semitic Traditions in 4 Gospel Accounts

Four stories in the Gospels are particularly interesting when the separate accounts of these stories are analyzed by the 17 criteria of syntax criticism. The four stories are: The First Passion Prediction; The Miraculous Feeding; Peter's Confession (at Caesarea Philippi); and The Transfiguration.

The First Passion Prediction.

There are 3 accounts of Jesus' predicting his impending suffering, death and resurrection in Jerusalem in Mark's gospel (Mark 8:31–9:1; 9:30–32; 10:32–34). Of these, only the first (Mark 8:31ff.) has translation Greek frequencies when analyzed by the 17 criteria of syntax criticism. Further, none of the parallels in Matthew and Luke to the 3 Markan passion predictions have such Semitic frequencies.[21] From this it would appear that in 8:31–9:1 Mark has made use of a Palestinian Semitic tradition concerning Jesus' prediction of his impending suffering and that the subsequent predictions in Mark (and probably the Matthew and Luke parallels, as well) are in some sense derivative from that tradition.

The Miraculous Feeding.

There are 6 accounts of a miraculous feeding in the Gospels: a) The Feeding of 5000 (Mark 6:30–44; Matt. 14:13–21; Luke 9:10–17 and John 6:1–13); b) The Feeding of 4000 (Mark 8:1–10 and Matt. 15:32–39).

When these 6 accounts are analyzed by the 17 criteria of syntax criticism, it will be seen that only Mark's account of the Feeding of the 4000 has translation Greek frequencies. It is even more striking to note that Mark's Feeding of the 5000 and the Matthew and Luke parallels to both feedings fall at the opposite extreme of the range, well into the original Greek area.[22]

An interesting phenomenon is John's account of the Feeding. That account falls into the area which is neither clearly original nor clearly translation Greek, and as a detailed study of the language of this account in general shows there is little or no contact with any of the Synoptic accounts.[23] This would seem to confirm the view that the Fourth Gospel here makes use of an independent tradition for this material.[24]

Peter's Confession at Caesarea Philippi.

There are 4 accounts of this incident: Mark 8:27–30; Matthew 16:13–20; Luke 9:18–21 and John 6:66–69. When these accounts are studied, it will be seen that Luke is less Semitic than Mark here,[25] as is usually the case when he parallels Markan material;[26] but Matthew is much more Semitic than Mark, as well as being considerably

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[21] Cf. Chart VII at the end of this section.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Cf. the detailed comparisons in Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke* (*The Anchor Bible*, 1981), Vol. I, pp. 762f.; Raymond E. Brown, *The Gospel According to John* (*Anchor Bible*, 1966), Vol. I, pp. 236–250.

[24] Cf. also Brown, *John*, pp. 236f., 250.

[25] Cf. Chart VII.

[26] Cf. Martin, *Syntax Criticism*, pp. 30, 37, 73.

longer, and has translation Greek frequencies. Matthew follows Mark very closely in Matt. 16:13–16 and 20, but adds a block of material in vv. 17–19 which is not paralleled in Mark or Luke.

When the frequency of the 17 criteria are calculated for each of these units separately, it will be seen that in those verses where Matthew parallels Mark, Matthew has the same net frequencies as Mark; the additional material in Matthew, however, has translation Greek frequencies.[27]

It is most probable that the additional material in Matthew 16:17–19 reflects a Semitic Palestinian tradition.[28]

The Transfiguration.

When the 3 Transfiguration accounts (Mark 9:2–8; Matt. 17:1–8; Luke 9:28–36) are studied, it will be seen that the Matthew and Luke accounts are both longer than Mark and the Lukan account is considerably more Semitic, having translation Greek net frequencies.[29] Further, a detailed study of the Lukan account reveals that it is precisely those sections where Luke makes the least use of Mark that are most Semitic.

In the first, the account of the Transfiguration itself (Mark 9:2–4; Luke 9:28–30), Luke parallels Mark's *ideas,* with very little use of Markan terminology. Luke then inserts a block of material which is not found in either Mark or Matthew (Luke 9:31–33a). Luke's final verse (v. 36) also does not parallel Mark. This material is very Semitic, with translation Greek net frequencies.[30]

In the middle portion (Mark 9:5–7; Luke 9:33b–35) Luke follows Mark very closely and is considerably less Semitic than Mark.[31]

The conclusion from the above study seems clear. As usual when Luke follows Mark closely, Luke improves Mark's Greek and thus is less Semitic than Mark.[32] Since, however, in verses 28–33a, 36 Luke differs radically from Mark and is more Semitic than Mark (and more Semitic also than normal Lukan style as seen in Acts 15:36–28:31[33]), it is most probable that in these verses Luke is dependent on a Semitic tradition in addition to his Markan source.[34]

Conclusion

In these 4 instances those accounts or part of accounts which appear Semitic by the 17 criteria of syntax criticism most probably go back to Palestinian Semitic traditions which are being used by the writer. If this data is used with other criteria of authentic Jesus material (such as: criteria of Dissimilarity, Multiple Attestation, Coherence, Palestinian Milieu, etc.), it may assist in indicating material in the Gospels most likely to go back to the historical Jesus.

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[27] Cf. Chart VII.

[28] Cf. also the discussions in Brown, *John,* pp. 301f. and F. N. Beare, *The Earliest Records of Jesus,* (1964), p. 139.

[29] Cf. Chart VII.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Cf. note 26 supra.

[33] Cf. Martin, *Syntactical Evidence,* Chapter III.

[34] Cf. Fitzmyer's discussion of the question whether Luke used a variant tradition here in his commentary on Luke, *op. cit.,* pp. 791f.

Chart VII - Classification of the Four Accounts[35]

	LINES	NET FREQ.	ORIGINAL	ORIGINAL/TRANSLATION	TRANSLATION
1st PASSION PREDICTION					
Mark 8:31-9:1	24	-1			Mk
Matt. 16:21-28	22	+5	Mt		
Luke 9:22-27	15	+6		Lk	
6 OTHER PASSION PREDICTION ACCOUNTS[36]					
Mark 9:30-32	6	+4		Mk	
Matt. 17:22,23	4	+3		Mt	
Luke 9:43b-45	7	+4		Lk	
Mark 10:32-34	10	+2		Mk	
Matt. 20:17-19	7	+3		Mt	
Luke 18:31-34	8	+5		Lk	
THE MIRACULOUS FEEDING					
OF 4000					
Mark 8:1-10	18	-1			Mk
Matt. 15:32-39	16	+3		Mt	
OF 5000					
Mark 6:30-44	30	+9	Mk		
Matt. 14:13-21	19	+11	Mt		
Luke 9:10-17	21	+10	Lk		
John 6:1-13	25	+4		Jn	
PETER'S CONFESSION					
Mark 8:27-30	8	+4		Mk	
Matt. 16:13-20	17	-2			Mt
16:13-16,20	9	+4		Mt	
16:17-19	8	-1			Mt
Luke 9:18-21	8	+5		Lk	
John 6:66-69	6	+2		Jn	
THE TRANSFIGURATION					
THE COMPLETE ACCOUNTS					
Mark 9:2-10	19	+8	Mk		
Matt. 17:1-9	19	+2		Mt	
Luke 9:28-36	21	0			Lk
WHERE LUKE FOLLOWS MARK CLOSELY					
Mark 9:5-7	6	0		Mk	
Matt. 17:4-7	9	0		Mt	
Luke 9:33b-35	7	+5		Lk	
WHERE LUKE DOES NOT FOLLOW MARK CLOSELY					
Mark 9:2-4,8-10	13	+4		Mk	
Matt. 17:1-3,8,9	10	+4		Mt	
Luke 9:28-33a,36	14	-2			Lk

[35] The actual numerical counts and the frequencies of each criteria upon which this chart is based are appended at the end of this paper.

[36] For the actual count and frequencies of these accounts cf. Martin, *Syntax Criticism*, pp. 200f. and 85, 87.

Chart VII continued

	No. of lines of Greek text	No. of occur. of ἐν	No. of occur. of prepositions/ea. occur. of ἐν: διά W. gen.	διά W. all cases	εἰς	κατά W. accus.	κατά W. all cases	Peri w. all cases	Pros w. dative	Hupo w. genitive	No. of occ. of καί for each occ. of δέ	Percent. of separ. articles	Dependent genitives: No. of dep. gen. post/ea. prec. dep. gen.	No. of lines/ea. dep. gen. pers. pronoun	Lines/ea. gen. pers. pron. dep. on nearth. subst.	No. of prec. attr. adj. for each attr. adj. post position	No. of lines/ea. attrib. adjec.	No. of lines/each adverb. participle	No. of dat. not used w. ἐν for ea. occur. of ἐν	Tot. no. of transl. Grk. frequencies	Tot. no. of orig. Grk. frequencies	No. of inst. where acc. of criter. are too few to be indic.	Net original Grk. frequencies	Net translat. Grk. frequencies
Translation Frequencies			.06-.01	.18-.01	.49-.01	.18-.01	.19-.01	.27-.01	.024-.01	.07-.01	2.1+	.05-	22+	9-	77-	.35-	10.1+	6+	2-	17	—	—		17
1st Passion Prediction																								
Mark 8:31-9:1	24	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.33	3.5	.029	16	3.0	–	.33	6.0	4.8	1.7	5	4	8		-1
Matt. 16:21-28	22	2	–	–	.50	.50	.50	–	–	–	1.3	.10	19	1.8	22.0	–	22	5.5	3.0	3	8	6	+5	
Luke 9:22-27	15	1	–	–	–	1.0	1.0	–	–	–	.50	.23	10	3.8	–	2.0	7.5	3.8	2.0	2	8	7	+6	
Miraculous Feedings of 4000																								
Mark 8:1-10	18	2	–	–	1.5	–	–	–	–	–	7.0	.07	6	3.6	9.0	–	18.0	2.6	2.0	5	4	8		-1
Matt. 15:32-39	16	2	–	–	1.0	–	–	–	–	–	2.5	.20	2	16.0	–	.33	4.0	4.0	1.5	3	6	8	+3	
of 5000																								
Mark 6:30-44	30	1	–	–	4.0	4.0	4.0	–	–	–	13.5	.24	1.0	15.0	–	3	10.0	3.0	9.0	1	10	6	+9	
Matt. 14:13-21	19	1	–	–	3.0	1.0	1.0	–	–	–	1.3	.21	2	19.0	–	1.0	9.5	1.9	6.0	–	11	6	+11	
Luke 9:10-17	21	1	–	–	4.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	–	–	1.3	.33	3.0	21.0	–	1	21.0	2.3	6.0	1	11	5	+10	
John 6:1-13	25	1	–	–	2.0	–	–	–	–	–	.50	.067	7.0	8.5	–	–	12.5	4.3	3.0	2	6	9	+4	
Peter's Confession																								
Mark 8:27-30	8	1	–	–	1.0	–	–	1.0	–	–	1.7	–	5	4.0	–	–	8	2.7	1.0	2	6	9	+4	
Matt. 16:13-20	17	3	–	–	.33	–	–	–	–	–	.50	.00	10.0	8.5	–	–	17	4.3	1.0	5	3	9		-2
Matt16:13-16,20	9	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	.00	–	6	9.0	–	–	9	3.0	–	1	5	11	+4	
Matt. 16:17-19	8	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.0	–	4.0	8.0	–	–	8	8.0	.67	4	3	10		-1
Luke 9:18-21	8	1	–	–	–	1.0	1.0	–	–	–	.29	–	2	–	–	–	8.0	2.0	2.0	1	6	10	+5	
John 6:66-69	6	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	3	6.0	–	–	6.0	6	–	2	4	11	+2	

	No. of lines of Greek text	No. of occur. of en	No. of occur. of prepositions/aa. occur. of en: dia W. gen.	dia W. all cases	dia	kata W. accus.	kata W. all cases	Peri w. all cases	Pros w. dative	Hupo w. genitive	No. of occ. of kai for each occ. of de	Percent. of separ. articles	Dependent genitives: No. of dep. gen. post/aa. prec. dep. gen.	No. of lines/aa. dep. gen. pers. pronoun	Lines/aa. gen. pers. pron. dep. on anarth. subst.	No. of pres. attr. adj. for each attr. adj. post position	No. of lines/aa. attrib. adjec.	No. of lines/each adverb. participle	No. of del. not used w. en for aa. occur. of en	Tot. no. of transl. Grk. frequencies	Tot. no. of orig. Grk. frequencies	No. of inst. where acc. of rel. was too few to be indic.	Net original Grk. frequencies	Net translat. Grk. frequencies
Translation Frequencies			.06-.01	.18-.01	.49-.01	.18-.01	.19-.01	.27-.01	.024-.01	.07-.01	2.1+	.05-	22+	9-	77-	.35-	10.1+	6+	2-	17	—	—		17
The Complete Accounts																								
Mark 9:2-10	19	–	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	–	13	.06	3	9.5	–	–	9.5	4.8	8	1	9	7	+8	
Luke 9:28-36	21	7	–	–	.29	–	–	–	–	–	2.0	.09	6	4.2	–	–	21	3.5	1.0	4	4	9		0
Matt. 17:1-9	19	1	–	–	1.0	1.0	1.0	–	–	–	4.0	.05	7	3.2	19.0	.00	6.3	2.1	5.0	5	7	5	+2	
When Luke Follows Mark (Matthew Does)																								
Mark 9:5-7	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	–	1	6.0	–	–	6.0	6.0	4	3	3	11		0
Luke 9:33b-35	7	1	–	–	1.0	–	–	–	–	–	1.5	–	1	7.0	–	–	7	2.3	3.0	1	6	10	+5	
Matt. 17:4-7	9	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.0	–	2	4.5	9.0	–	4.5	1.8	3.0	4	4	9		0
When Luke Doesn't Follow Mark (Matthew Does)																								
Mark 9:2-4,8-10	13	–	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	–	9	.08	2	6.5	–	–	13.0	4.3	4	3	7	7	+4	
Lk 9:28-33a,36	14	6	–	–	.17	–	–	–	–	–	2.3	.13	5	2.8	–	–	14	4.7	1.5	5	3	9		-2
Mt 17:1-3,8,9	10	–	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	–	3.0	.08	5	2.0	–	–	10.0	2.5	2	3	7	7	+4	

1st Passion Prediction

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w
	LINES	EN	DIA G	DIA T	EIS	KATA A	KATA T	ΠΛΗΝ Τ	ΠΡΟΣ Δ	ΥΠΟ Θ	ΚΑΙ	ΟΤΙ	ARTICLE UN-SEP.	ARTICLE SEP.	DEPENDENT GENITIVES PREC.	ART. c GS dS	ART. c GS dP	NO ART. c GS dS	NO ART. c GS dP	ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVES PREC.	ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVES POST	ADVERB. PARTICIPLES	DATIVES
Mark																							
8:31										1	1		5			1							
32											2		2									1	2
33												1	6			2	1					2	1
34											3		3				2					1	2
35												1	3				2						
36													2				1						
37													1				1	1					
38		2											8	1		2	1			1	3		
9:1		1									1		3			1		1				1	
Total	24	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7	2	33	1	-	6	8	2	-	1	3	5	5
Matt.																							
16:21					1								3	1			1		1				2
22											1		1									2	3
23												1	6			2						1	
24											2		3				2						1
25												1	2				2						
26												1	2	1			2	1					
27		1				1	1				1		6			2	3						
28		1											3	1		1	1	1				1	
Total	22	2	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	4	3	26	3	-	5	11	2	1	-	-	4	6
Luke																							
9:22													3	1		1						1	1
23						1	1				2	1	1				1						1
24												1	2				2						
25												1	1									3	
26		1											4	2		3	1			2			
27												1	2	1		1		1					
Total	15	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	4	13	4	-	5	4	1	-	2	-	4	2

The Miraculous Feedings continued

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w
	Lines	Dia			Kata		Pre T	Pre D	Hupo G		Kai	De	Article		Dependent Genitives					Attributive Adjectives		Adverb. Participles	Datives
		En	G	T	Eis	A	T						Un-sep.	Sep.	Prec.	Art. c GS dS	Art. c GS dP	No Art. c GS dS	No Art. c GS dP	Prec.	Post		
Mt. 14:13		1			1	1	1					1	1	3							1	2	2
14												3		1			1					1	1
15					1							1	1	5								3	2
16												1		1									
17												1	1										
18												1	1										1
19					1							2	1	6	3							4	
20												2		2			1				1		
21													1		1								
Total	19	1	-	-	3	1	1	-	-	-		9	7	19	5	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	10	6
Lk 9:10					1	1	1					2		1								2	1
11								1				2	1	2	2		1		1			2	1
12		1			1								2	2	2						1	2	1
13					1								2	2								1	1
14													1	1			1						
15												2											
16					1							1	1	3	2							2	1
17												2		1		1							1
Total	21	1	-	-	4	1	1	1	-	-		9	7	12	6	1	1	1	1	-	1	-	9	6
Jn 6:1														4			1						
2													1	2									1
3					1							1	1	2				1					
4													1	3			1						
5														2								2	
6													1									1	
7														1		1							1
8														2			1	1					
9					1																1		
10		1											1	5									
11												1		4								1	
12													1	1	1			1					
13												1		2	1				1		1		1
Total	35	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-		3	6	28	2	1	3	3	1	-	-	2	4	3

The Miraculous Feedings (4000, 5000)

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w

	Lines	EN	DIA G	DIA T	EIS	KATA A	KATA T	PERI T	PROS D	HUPO G	KAI	DE	ARTICLE UN-SEP.	ARTICLE SEP.	DEPENDENT GENITIVES PREC.	ART. c GS oS	ART. c GS oP	NO ART. c GS oS	NO ART. c GS oP	ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVES PREC.	ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVES POST	ADVERB. PARTICIPLES	DATIVES
Mk 8:1		1											2									3	
2													1										1
3		1			1						2		1						2				
4											1		1				1						1
5											1	1	1										
6											4		4	1			1					2	2
7											2										1	1	
8											2							1					
9											1	1											
10					2						1		3				1					1	
Total	18	2	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	14	2	13	1	-	-	3	1	2	-	1	7	4
Mt 15:32		1									1	1	3	1			1					1	1
33		1									1		1								2		1
34											1	1	2							1			
35											1		2									1	1
36											2	1	3	2								1	
37											2		2			1					1		
38												1		1									
39					2						2		3									1	
Total	16	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	10	4	16	4	-	1	1	-	-	1	3	4	3
Mk 6:30											2		2										1
31					1	1	1				3		2							1			
32		1			1	1	1				1		1							1			
33											4		1									1	1
34											3											1	
35											2		2				1					2	1
36					1									1								1	2
37											2	1	1		1							2	
38											1	1	1									1	
39											1			1						1			2
40						2	2				1												
41					1						4		3	3			1					2	2
42											1												
43											1		1		1								
44											1		2										
Total	30	1	-	-	4	4	4	-	-	-	27	2	16	5	2	-	2	-	-	3	-	10	9

Peter's Confession

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w
	LINES	EN	DIA		EIS	KATA		EPI T	PRO D	HUPO G	KAI	DE	ARTICLE		DEPENDENT GENITIVES					ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVES		ADVERB. PARTICIPLES	DATIVES
			G	T		A	T						UNSEP.	SEP.	PREC.	ART. cGS dS	ART. cGS dP	NO ART. cGS dS	NO ART. cGS dP	PREC.	POST		
Mark																							
8:27		1			1						2		7			1	2	1				1	
28											1	2	3					1				1	
29											1	1	2									1	
30								1			1												1
Total	8	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	5	3	12	-	-	1	2	2	-	-	-	3	1
Matt.																							
16:13					1							1	7			2	1	1				2	
14												3	4					1					
15												1											
16												1	4			1						1	
20													2										1
Subtotal	9	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	17	-	-	3	1	2	-	-	-	3	1
17		1										1	4				1					1	1
18											2	1	2		1			1					1
19		2									2		7			2							
Total	8	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	13	-	1	2	1	1	-	-	-	1	2
All of Matt. 16:13-20	17	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	8	30	-	1	5	2	3	-	-	-	4	3
Luke																							
9:18		1				1	1				2		3									1	1
19												3	3					1			1	1	
20												3	2			1						1	
21												1	1									1	1
Total	8	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	7	9	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	4	2
John																							
6:66					1						1		2				1						
67													3										
68																		1			1		1
69											1		3			1							
Total	6	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	6	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	1

The Transfiguration

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w

	LINES	EN	DIA G	DIA T	EIS	KATA A	KATA T	PERI T	PROS D	HUPO G	KAI	DE	ARTICLE UN-SEP.	ARTICLE SEP.	DEPENDENT GENITIVES PREC.	DEP. GEN. ART. cGS dS	DEP. GEN. ART. cGS dP	DEP. GEN. NO ART. cGS dS	DEP. GEN. NO ART. cGS dP	ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVES PREC.	ATTRIBUTIVE ADJECTIVES POST	ADVERB. PARTICIPLES	DATIVES
Mk 9:2-10	19	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	13	-	17	1	-	1	2	-	-	-	2	4	8
Lk 9:28-36	21	7	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	10	5	21	2	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	6	7
Mt 17:1-9	19	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	12	3	19	1	-	1	5	-	1	-	3	9	5
When Luke Follows Mark																							
Mk 9:5											2		2									1	3
6																							
7											2		3				1				1		1
Total	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	4
Lk 9:33b											1		2									1	3
34		1			1						1	2	2									1	
35											1		3				1					1	
Totals	7	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	3
Mt 17:4												1	2									1	3
5		1									1		3				1				2	2	
6											2		1						1			1	
7											3		1									1	
Total	9	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1	7	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	5	3
When Luke Doesn't Follow Mark																							
Mk 9:2					1	1	1			-	3		4								1		
3											1		2				1						
4											2		1										2
8											1		1									1	
9											1		3			1						1	2
10											1		1	1								1	
Total	13	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	9	-	12	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	3	4
Lk 9:28					1						1	1	2									1	
29		1									1		4			1	2						
30											1												1
31		2											1				1					1	
32												2	3	2			1					1	2
33a		1									1		1										
36		2									3		3										1
Total	14	6	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	7	3	14	2	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	3	4
Mt 17:1					1	1	1				2		3				1				1		
2											2	1	3	1			2						
3											1											1	
8												1	1				1					1	
9											1		5			1						2	
Totals	10	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	6	2	12	1	-	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	

APPENDIX

Directions for Counting and for Calculating Percentages

It may be useful to include in this study directions for counting the criteria and for figuring the percentages.

1. Count the following criteria in each verse

a.[37] No. of lines
b. All occurrences of *en*
c. All occurrences of *dia* with an object in the genitive
d. All occurrences of *dia* (including c above)
e. All occurrences of *eis*
f. All occurrences of *kata* with an accusative object
g. All occurrences of *kata* (including f above)
h. All occurrences of *peri*
i. All occurrences of *pros* with an object in the dative
j. All occurrences of *hupo* with an object in the genitive
k. All occurrences of *kai* connecting *main* (independent) *clauses only*
l. All occurrences of *de*
m. All occurrences of the article which are not separated from the word they go with
n. All occurrences of the article which are separated by something (other than a negative) from the word they go with
o. All dependent genitives which *precede* the word they qualify
p. All dependent genitive substantives following a governing substantive which has an article
q. All dependent genitive personal pronouns following a governing substantive which has an article
r. All dependent genitive substantives following a governing substantive which does not have an article
s. All dependent genitive personal pronouns following a governing substantive which does not have an article
t. All attributive adjectives which precede the word they qualify (excluding *pas, polus, heteros, poios, autos* and numerals)
u. All attributive adjectives which follow the word they qualify (excluding *pas, polus, heteros, poios, autos and numerals)*
v. All adverbial participles
w. All datives not used with *en* (expressed), excluding datives used with forms of *lego, eipon* and *didomi*

[37] Cf. the sample counting sheet at the end of this appendix with these letters indicated at the top of the appropriate column.

2. Adjust the number of lines to equal the standard line length of 51 letter/spaces per line, the length of lines in the Aland-Black-Metzger Wikgren edition of the Greek New Testament.[38]
3. Figure the % or proportions as follows (the letters in the margin refer to the letters designating the criteria listed in 1 above).

$\frac{c}{b}$ 1. *dia* with Genitive (.06–.01 as frequent as *en* is translation frequency)[39]

$\frac{d}{b}$ 2. *dia* with All Cases (.18–.01 as frequent as en is translation frequency)

$\frac{e}{b}$ 3. *eis* (.49–.01 as frequent as *en* is translation frequency)

$\frac{f}{b}$ 4. *kata* with Accusative (.18–.01 as frequent as *en* is translation frequency)

$\frac{g}{b}$ 5. *kata* with All Cases (.19–.01 as frequent as *en* is translation frequency)

$\frac{h}{b}$ 6. *peri* with All Cases (.27–.01 as frequent as *en* is translation frequency)

$\frac{i}{b}$ 7. *pros* with Dative (.024–.01 as frequent as *en* is translation frequency)

$\frac{j}{b}$ 8. *bupo* with Genitive .07–.01 as frequent as *en* is translation frequency)

$\frac{k}{l}$ 9. *kai* Coordinating Main Clauses (2.1 or more frequent than all occurrences of *de* is translation frequency)

$\frac{n}{m+n}$ 10. Separated Articles (.05 or fewer articles separated from their substantives is translation frequency)

$\frac{p+q+r+s}{o}$ 11. Preceding Dependent Genitives (22 or more dependent genitives following the word they qualify than such genitives preceding the word they qualify is translation frequency)

[38] The procedure for making this adjustment is explained in Appendix 1 of Martin, *Syntactical Evidence*, pp. 109f.
[39] For the evidence establishing these translation frequencies cf. Martin, *Syntactical Evidence*, pp. 5–43.

$\frac{a}{q+s}$ 12. Dependent Genitive Personal Pronouns (9 or less lines of Greek text for each dependent genitive personal pronoun is translation frequency)

$\frac{a}{\sim s}$ 13. Genitive Personal Pronouns Dependent on Anarthrous Substantives (77 or less lines of Greek text for each genitive personal pronoun dependent on an anarthrous substantive is translation frequency)

$\frac{t}{u}$ 14. Preceding Attributive Adjectives (.35 or less attributive adjectives preceding the word they qualify than such adjectives following the word they qualify is translation frequency)

$\frac{a}{t+u}$ 15. Attributive Adjectives (10.1 or more lines of Greek text for each attributive adjective is translation frequency)

$\frac{a}{v}$ 16. Adverbial Partciples (6 or more lines of Greek text for each adverbial participle is translation frequency)

$\frac{w}{b}$ 17. Datives (2 or less datives not used as the object of *en* for each occurrence of *en* is translation frequency)

4. Calculate the *net* number of original or translation Greek frequencies.

In *Syntactical Evidence* (pp. 40f.) it was noted that the *net* number of translation Greek frequencies or the *net* number of original Greek frequencies was most significant. These *net* frequencies are arrived at as follows:

Whenever a section has more occurrences of original Greek frequencies than occurrences of translation Greek frequencies, the number of occurrences of translation Greek frequencies was subtracted from the number of occurrences of original Greek frequencies, and the resulting number is the *net occurrences of original* Greek frequencies.


For example, Luke 9:22–27 in the 1st Passion Prediction chart at the end of this paper has eight occurrences of frequencies characteristic of original Greek and two occurrences of frequencies characteristic of translation Greek—eight less two equals six *net* original Greek frequencies.

Conversely, whenever a section has more occurrences of translation Greek frequencies, the number of occurrences of original Greek frequencies was subtracted from the number of occurrences of translation Greek frequencies, and the resulting number is the *net occurrences of translation Greek frequencies.*

For example, Mark 8:31–9:1 in the above mentioned chart has five occurrences of frequencies characteristic of translation Greek and four occurrences of frequencies characteristic of original Greek—five less four equals one *net* translation Greek frequency.

For convenience of representation *net* original Greek frequencies in the charts are expressed as positive numbers and *net* translation Greek frequencies are expressed as negative numbers.

Sample Counting Sheet



Method and Criteria for Historical Jesus Research

Dennis Polkow
College of DuPage

This paper represents a preliminary attempt to reconsider and reorganize a very complex and controversial area within historical Jesus research, establishing a specific and reliable method for determining what is historically attributable to Jesus. The need for such a method has been widely recognized ever since the advent of form-criticism, and many "criteria for authenticity" have been proposed over the years, but no single method or specific set of universally recognized criteria have yet met with general acceptance with historical Jesus researchers.

I. The Sources

Agreement on interpretation is hardly possible without agreement on the extent and the nature of the sources to be interpreted. Theoretically this should mean, as J. G. Gager pointed out over a decade ago, that "any reported saying or deed, no matter what its present literary setting, merits at least initial consideration." Scholarship based on subjective means of source selection should be examined with caution and suspicion, and one wonders what could justify the drastic reduction in the overall extent of available sources usually employed. "The answer," says Gager, "would appear to lie in the canonical status of the Synoptics. Their religious authority as sacred scripture has been extended to cover their historical authority as well."[1]

The usual presumption that canonical material represents the earliest material on Jesus that we have, and that noncanonical material is not only much later, but secondary and heretical (and therefore historically unreliable), has been shown by the work of H. Koester to be simply an unfounded prejudice. Our earliest fragments of gospel material, P 52 from the Gospel of John and Pap. Egerton 2 from a noncanonical *Unknown Gospel*, both date from about the same time (first half of the second century C.E.). Our earliest fragments of the noncanonical *Gospel of Thomas* (Pap. Oxy. 1) date alongside our earliest fragments of Matthew (P 54 + 67) from the late second/early third century C.E., and *before* our earliest fragments of Luke (P 4, 69), which come from the late third century C.E. (notably those from the large Coptic collection known as *The Nag Hammadi Codices* which date from the late fourth century C.E.), the same time as our earliest complete manuscripts of the NT—i.e., *Codex Sinaiticus, Codex Alexandrinus, Codex Vaticanus*, et al.

Since noncanonical material can be at least as well-attested to as canonical material at each and every stage of the tradition from the earliest time on, and were used and referred to quite early and often by the same writers, Koester challenges the very distinction and pejorative use of "canonical" over "apocryphal" writings: "Neither the external attestation nor the internal evidence permits such a separation."[2]

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[1] J. G. Gager, "The Gospels and Jesus: Some Doubts about Method," *Journal of Religion* 54 (1974): 244–272, pp. 245–6.

[2] H. Koester, "Apocryphal and Canonical Gospels," *Harvard Theological Review* 73 (1980): 105–130, pp. 105–7.

For the sake of clarity and convenience however, we do need to be able to distinguish materials on the basis on their deliberate inclusion or exclusion from the NT Canon. Such neutral terminology has been implicitly in use and deserves to find general acceptance: *intracanonical*—sources included within the NT Canon, and *extracanonical*—sources excluded form the NT Canon.[3]

Although there are a handful of isolated sayings of Jesus in the letters of Paul and the early church epistles, our major segments of intracanonical source material are (1) *the Triple Tradition,* or all of the units or pericopes common to Matthew, Mark, and Luke, (2) *the Double Tradition,* or all of the units common to Matthew and Luke that are not found in Mark, and (3) *the Jobannine Tradition,* or all of the units in John.

Thus far, the only useful divisions of extracanonical material are (1) *Intracanonical Parallels,* or extracanonical material that has intracanonical parallels or variant texts, and (2) *New or "Unknown Sayings,"* or extracanonical material without synoptic or Johannine parallels or variants. Perhaps as further work progresses on the Nag Hammadi texts, further divisions may be employed.

II. The Criteria

We now turn to an application of specific criteria to the sources, which will proceed in five careful steps: (1) the attempt to compile an exhaustive (rather than selective) list and description of all of the various criteria that have been proposed, both explicitly and implicitly; (2) the removal/dismissal of any invalid criteria founded on false presumptions; (3) the unifying of criteria expressing repetition of fundamental principles; (4) the critical examination of that list for any intrinsic hierarchical order among the proposed criteria; (5) the critical examination of each of the valid criteria considered in their proper, hierarchical order: *Preliminary Criteria,* which determine the history of transmission, *Primary Criteria,* which determine judgment on originality, and *Secondary Criteria,* which corroborate originality.

Along with that established order, we will consider a brief test case, the Parable of the Mustard Seed, chosen because there are four parallel versions, three intracanonical (Matthew 13:31–32, Mark 4:30–32, and Luke 13:18–19), and one extracanonical (*Thomas* 20).

1. The Cataloguing of Criteria

In order to establish the present catalogue, reference will be made to five prior catalogue attempts: that of W. O. Walker in 1969 (ten criteria), N. J. McEleney in 1972 (eleven), R. H. Stein in 1980 (eleven), J. Breech in 1983 (ten), and M. E. Boring in 1985 (ten).[4]

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[3] The terminology is that of J. D. Crossan, borrowed from my student years at DePaul University.

[4] W. O. Walker, "The Quest for the Historical Jesus: A Discussion of Methodology," *Anglican Theological Review* 51 (1969): 38–56; N. J. McEleney, "Authenticating Criteria and Mark 7: 1–23," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 34 (1972): 431–460; R. H. Stein, "The 'Criteria' for Authenticity." In R. T. France and D. Wenham (eds.), *Gospel Perspectives,* Volume I: *Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980): 225–263; J. Breech, *The Silence of Jesus: The Authentic Voice of the Authentic Man* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), especially pp. 9, 22–6, 66–85; M. E. Boring, "Criteria of Authenticity: The Beatitudes as a Test Case," *Forum* 1, 4 (1985).

With the exception of Breech (who, it should be said, makes no explicit attempt to "catalogue" criteria as such), the original list compiled by Walker is the clear basis for the other three compilations, and all maintain a similar order and presentation.

Here then is a chart and catalogue which lists and then describes all of these proposed criteria, noting the number of each in the five original presentations; wherever possible, criteria titles and descriptions have been shortened and/or changed for clarity and consistency:

1969 Walker	1972 McEleney	1980 Stein	1983 Breech	1985 Boring	1987 Present
1	2	1		1	1. Multiple Source Attestation
2	3	2		2	2. Multiple Form Attestation
3	5	3		3	3. Language
4,A		4		4	4. Environment
5	4	5	5	5	5. Discounting Tradition
6	6	6	3	6	6. Dissimilarity
7	7	7		7	7. Modification
8	8	11		8	8. Coherence
B					9. Execution
C					10. Birth of Christianity
	1		6		11. Discounting Redaction
	9				12. Vividness
	10		9		13. Style
	11				14. Intracanonical Presumption
		8			15. Theological Divergency
		9			16. Environmental Contradiction
		10			17. Contradiction
			1		18. Scholarly Consensus
			2		19. Embarrassment
			4		20. Incongruity
			7		21. Form
			8		22. Content
			10		23. Function
				9	24. Plausible Transmission
				10	25. Hermeneutic Potential

1. *Multiple Source Attestation*—the identification of material that appears in more than one independent source (such as material found in both Mark and Q), and therefore attributable to Jesus.

2. *Multiple Form Attestation*—the identification of material that appears in more than one independent traditional literary form (such as parable, miracle story, aphorism, etc.), and therefore attributable to Jesus.

3. *Language*—the identification of material containing Semitisms or Aramaisms, that is, awkward Greek passages that suggest an Aramaic original (usually considered to be the original language spoken by Jesus), and therefore attributable to Jesus.

4. *Environment*—the identification of material that reflects the environmental conditions of first century Palestine (such as social, domestic, agricultural, and religious ideas and customs), and is therefore attributable to Jesus.

5. *Discounting Tradition*—the identification of traditional material thought to have existed

as tradition prior to its incorporation by an evangelist, and therefore *not* attributable to Jesus.

6. *Dissimilarity*—the identification of material that is dissimilar to characteristic emphases of ancient Judaism and/or early Christianity, and is therefore attributable to Jesus.

7. *Modification*—the identification of material that has been less modified than a parallel version or versions of the same material, and is therefore attributable to Jesus.

8. *Coherence*—the identification of material that coheres with material established by Dissimilarity (No. 6), and is therefore also attributable to Jesus.

9. *Execution*—the identification of material that accounts for (or at least elucidates) the death of Jesus at the hands of the Romans, and is therefore attributable to Jesus.

10. *Birth of Christianity*—the identification of material that accounts for (or at least elucidates) the birth of the Christian community, and is therefore attributable to Jesus.

11. *Discounting Redaction*—the identification of redactional material thought to be the creation of the evangelist, and therefore *not* attributable to Jesus.

12. *Vividness*—the identification of narrative material containing vivid descriptions, details, etc., indicating eyewitness authority, and therefore attributable to Jesus.

13. *Style*—the identification of material characterized by a uniqueness of style thought to be Jesus' own, or the reconstruction of material accepted through Scholarly Consensus (No. 18) to conform with the uniqueness of the style as observed in other material considered attributable to Jesus.

14. *Intracanonical Presumption*—the identification of material at odds with the overall theology of the source containing it, and which therefore *may* be attributable to Jesus.

15. *Theological Divergency*—identification of material at odds with the overall theology of the source containing it, and which therefore *may* be attributale to Jesus.

16. *Environmental Contradiction*—identification of material that presupposes an impossible situation in the life of Jesus, and is therefore *not* attributable to Jesus.

17. *Contradiction*—identification of material that contradicts material already established as being from Jesus, and is therefore *not* attributable to Jesus.

18. *Scholarly Consensus*—the identification and acceptance of material that is held to be attributable to Jesus by virtually all historical Jesus researchers.

19. *Embarrassment*—the identification of material that is embarrassing either to Jesus himself, or to the early Christian community, and is therefore attributable to Jesus.

20. *Incongruity*—the identification of material in which there exists an inherent incongruity or tension between the subject matter and the use(s) to which it is put within the tradition through which it is transmitted, and is therefore attributable to Jesus.

21. *Form*—the identification of material that is characterized by a uniqueness of style thought to be Jesus' own, or the reconstruction of material accepted through Scholarly Consensus (No. 18), to conform with the uniqueness of form as observed in other material considered attributable to Jesus.

22. *Content*—the identification of material that is characterized by a uniqueness of content or subject matter thought to be Jesus' own, or the reconstruction of material accepted through Scholarly Consensus (No. 18) to conform with the uniqueness of content as observed in other material considered attributable to Jesus.

23. *Function*—the identification of material that is characterized by a uniqueness of function or purpose thought to be Jesus' own, or the reconstruction of material accepted through Scholarly Consensus (No. 18) to conform with the uniqueness of function as observed in other material considered attributable to Jesus.

24. *Plausible Transmission*—the identification of the earliest material found when a unit's history of transmission is recovered, which therefore may be attributable to Jesus.

25. *Hermeneutic Potential*—the identification of material which best explains the

hermeneutical multiplicity engendered in the tradition, and which is therefore attributable to Jesus.

2. Dismissal of Invalid Criteria

In sifting through this total catalogue of twenty-five criteria, we can easily see that several of the proposed criteria can be rendered immediately invalid because they are based on false presumptions.

Walker discusses three criteria at the conclusion of his article—Environment (No. 4), Execution (No. 9), and Birth of Christianity (No. 10)—that we could call general or context criteria. They are based on an observation by N. A. Dahl about what he considers "the fixed starting point of all of our knowledge about Jesus," and it includes three general points, which Walker claims we can know "with a fair degree of certainty: he was born a first century Palestinian Jew, he was put to death by the Roman authorities, and he was the focus of the faith of the primitive Christian community."[5] Walker suggests that fundamentally, any "adequate" picture of the historical Jesus must account for, or at least illumine, these three facts.

Although Environment and Execution have some value, Environment as a corroborative or secondary criterion, and Execution as the resultant historical data shown by Dissimilarity (No. 6), Modification (No. 7), Embarrassment (No. 19), Incongruity (No. 20), and Hermeneutic Potential (No. 25), Birth of Christianity is neither useful in constructing or corroborating an historical portrait of Jesus since it presumes (via No. 14, Intracanonical Presumption, perhaps?) that the historical Jesus was directly and personally responsible for the birth of Christianity. No such presumption should be taken as a given and then applied as a criterion. If this data are correct, then it will likely emerge when other criteria are applied.

McEleney can be credited for explicitly pointing out and naming No. 14, Intracanonical Presumption, though he calls it "Historical Presumption." The change of name employed here points out the fundamental problem with No. 14: that which is presumed to be historical under this criterion is only that which is found inside of the NT Canon. This intracanonical prejudice has, as we have argued earlier, no theoretical or historical basis, only a theological one. But even if we enlarge this criterion to include extracanonical material, it still remains a virtually useless criterion because it also falsely presumes that material would be rejected by scholars as being unattributable to Jesus without good reason.[6]

McEleney considers No. 12, Vividness, a variant of his "Historical Presumption," though he credits V. Taylor and E. Grasser with its prior usage.[7] We need hardly point out that the acceptance of the vividness of a narrative as an indication of its historicity is simply a confusion of good writing with history. This obviously applies to any literature, not just that of the NT: Mario Puzo's *The Godfather* and Peter Benchley's *Jaws* are both vivid works—indeed, far more vivid than many classic eyewitness accounts of gangster experiences or shark attacks, and yet the vividness is precisely possible because the literary imagination does not have the limitations of memory.

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[5] Walker, pp. 54–5; p. 55, and N. A. Dahl, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus." In C. E. Braaten and R. A. Harrisville (eds.), *Kerygma and History* (New York: Abingdon, 1962): 138–171, p. 154.

[6] On this issue see H. K. McArthur, "The Burden of Proof in Historical Jesus Research," *Expository Times* 82 (1971): 116–19.

[7] McEleney, p. 444.

Stein's defining of Environmental Contradiction (No. 16) after D. G. A. Calvert,[8] is also problematic. Stein acknowledges that No. 16 "possesses a very serious handicap in that it is extremely difficult to determine what Jesus could not have said in the first *Sitz im Leben*."[9] We can only agree, and the improbability of obtaining such abstract data removes its effectiveness.

3. The Combining of Criteria

With our dismissal of Nos. 10, 12, 14, and 16 in the preceding section, we are left with twenty-one remaining criteria. Many of these are repetitions of the same underlying principles, and we will therefore attempt to combine criteria under one label wherever possible.

Both Multiple Source Attestation (No. 1) and Multiple Form Attestation (No. 2) have the same principle underlying them, that of Multiple Attestation. We will refer to the principle as such from now on, and will discuss both uses under one section.

McEleney sees both the criteria of Language (No. 3) and Environment (No. 4) as sharing the same concern for tracing any elements (including language) that would suggest a first century Palestinian environment or context.[10] Since the principle underlying both is basically the same, we will refer to this approach as Palestinian Context and will discuss both of its uses under one section.

There are several criteria that are basically variations on an old and familiar theme in historical Jesus research, that of Dissimilarity (No. 6). Among these are Modification (No. 7), Execution (No. 9), Embarrassment (No. 19), Incongruity (No. 20), Theological Divergency (No. 15) and Hermeneutic Potential (No. 25). These uses of Dissimilarity therefore need not be treated as separate criteria.

Likewise, Contradiction (No. 17) is simply a negative use of Coherence (No. 8), and as such does not need to be treated as a separate criterion.

Similarly, Form (No. 21), Content (No. 22), and Function (No. 23) are all basically characteristics of Style (No. 13), and as such they will be treated together under that heading.

Last, Plausible Transmission (No. 24) is a general label for what is actually a two-part process, Discounting Redaction (No. 11) and Discounting Tradition (No. 5), and is therefore absorbed into these two separate, but related criteria.

4. A Hierarchical Reordering of Criteria

The preceding combining of criteria leaves us with eight valid and fundamental criteria, but it is important to note that one could falsely get the impression that all of these are of equal value and that the more criteria that can be applied to a particular saying or unit, the better the evidence that we are dealing with something directly attributable to Jesus. The criteria do not work this way, and must be seen in their proper hierarchical order for them to work at all. This order is a three-way hierarchical division that seems intrinsic to the criteria. Here is the breakdown, including how the twenty-one remaining criteria have been regrouped into eight valid and fundamental criteria; they are all listed with their

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[8] Stein, pp. 248–9, and D. G. A. Calvert, "An Examination of the Criteria for Distinguishing the Authentic Words of Jesus," *New Testament Studies* 18 (1972): 209–19, p. 212.

[9] Stein, p. 249.

[10] McEleney, pp. 438–40, 443.

catalogue numbers (although these numbers will not be utilized in our further discussion) and put into their proper, hierarchical order:

Preliminary Criteria	1. Discounting Redaction (no. 11)	
	2. Discounting Tradition (no. 5)	Plausible Transmission (no. 24)
Primary Criteria	1. Dissimilarity (no. 6)	Modification (no. 7) Execution (no. 9) Embarrassment (no. 19) Incongruity (no. 20) Theological Divergency (no. 15) Hermeneutic Potential (no. 25)
	2. Coherence (no. 8)	Contradiction (no. 17)
	3. Multiple Attestation	Multiple Source Attestation (no. 1) Multiple Form Attestation (no. 2)
Secondary Criteria	1. Palestinian Context	Language (no. 3) Environment (no. 4)
	2. Style (no. 11)	Form (no. 21) Content (no. 22) Function (no. 23)
	3. Scholarly Consensus (no. 18)	

III. Preliminary Criteria: Determining the History of Transmission

It is obvious that we cannot jump to the Jesus stage of the tradition immediately in analyzing sayings or units—how far does the material in question go back? We must therefore always begin by bracketing the Jesus question entirely and determine as detailed a history of the tradition as we possible can, reconstructing the earliest recoverable version of a given saying or unit of tradition.

Two important steps must always precede the application of these critera when there is more than one version of the saying in question: (1) the determination of the precise extent of any parallel and/or variant texts, both intracanonical and extracanonical, and (2) the determination of the precise extent of the independent sources that lie behind them.

In our test case of the Parable of the Mustard Seed, we have four parallel versions—three intracanonical (Matthew 13:31–32, Mark 4:30–32, and Luke 13:18–19), and one extracanonical (*Thomas* 20). Following the Two-Source Model as a solution to the perennial synoptic problem and assuming that *Thomas* represents a tradition independent of the double and the triple traditions,[11] this leaves us with three independent sources for

[11] Dealing with these issues is far beyond the scope of the present paper, although the use of the method and criteria outlined in this paper could theoretically be employed by scholars who reject the Two-Source Model and the independence of *Thomas* with little change.

the Mustard Seed: Mark, Q, and *Thomas*. Notice however that despite this fact, it would be invalid to apply the criterion of Multiple Attestation *at this point*—even material attested to in multiple independent sources *may* be products of the tradition since Jesus. A unit must first pass through the Preliminary Criteria before we can attach any significance to its independent sources regarding Jesus.

1. Discounting Redaction

In establishing what McEleney calls "the Redactional Criteria" he writes: "Logically, the first step in attributing materials to different stages of the Gospel tradition is to begin with the end product, the Gospels as they now stand, and to discover in them the work of the evangelists themselves."[12]

In the case of Matthew and Luke, source criticism and the Two-Source Model have made it relatively easy to see what they have added to Mark and Q. In the case of Mark, all Markan scholars will set up some kind of criteria for separating what is received tradition from the evangelist's own redaction or literary creativity, and it is significant that many of these scholars are not concerned with historical Jesus research at all, but with establishing Markan theology for its own sake. What we are "discounting" (which should in no sense be taken in a pejorative manner) is of primary interest to them—we are only bracketing this material to peel away that which makes it difficult to see the Jesus level of the tradition by itself. Our object is not to make value judgments about the material we must bracket to arrive at that level; indeed, studying the compositional techniques of the evangelists themselves is one of the most fascinating areas of NT study. Our purpose here is not a better one, it is simply a different one.

Most of the redactional studies on Mark attempt to be quite specific in pointing out uniquely Markan features with regard to language, syntax, and theology that point to an overall Markan style of composition. Among the more recent and important studies that thoroughly formulate and employ specific criteria for Markan redaction are those by J. Rohde, R. H. Stein, N. Perrin, J. R. Donahue, W. H. Kelber, and E. J. Pryke.[13]

One of the best ways to determine Markan redaction is to study the work of his earliest-known and most careful readers, Matthew and Luke. Those places where both Matthew and Luke see the need to change or omit Mark most thoroughly and consistently are precisely the places that are probably the most distinctively Markan.

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[12] McEleney, p. 432.

[13] J. Rohde, *Rediscovering the Teaching of the Evangelists* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968); R. H. Stein, "What is Redaktionsgeschichte?" *Journal of Biblical Literature* 88 (1969): 45–56, "The Proper Method for Ascertaining a Markan Redaction History," *Novum Testamentum* 13 (1971): 181–193, and "The 'Redaktionsgeschichtlich' Investigation of a Markan Seam (Mc 1.21f)," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 61 (1970): 70–94; N. Perrin, *What is Redaction Criticism?* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), and *A Modern Pilgrimage in New Testament Christology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974); J. R. Donahue, *Are You the Christ? The Trial Narrative in the Gospel of Mark?* (Missoula: University of Montana, 1973); W. H. Kelber, *The Kingdom in Mark: A New Time and a New Place* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), (ed.) *The Passion in Mark: Studies on Mark 14–16* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), and *Mark's Story of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979); E. J. Pryke, *Redactional Style in the Markan Gospel: A Study of Syntax and Vocabulary as Guides to Redaction in Mark* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

Redaction in the Mustard Seed

In our test case, J. D. Crossan has observed a classic Markan sandwich, a bizarre repetition of "on the ground" surrounding the reference to the smallness of the seed.[14] Although the smallness of the seed is probably pre-Markan (it is contained in *Thomas*), the *contrast* of smallest to greatest does appear to be Markan redaction, as Crossan's analysis argues. This would explain the awkward repetition surrounding "smallest of all the seeds on earth," used as a pause to contrast it with "greatest of all shrubs and puts forth large branches," which is also awkwardly worded—a shrub is by definition small, so "greatest" of all shrubs is a contradiction—Mark seems to be trying to enlarge the shrub to set up his own contrast of smallest/greatest. Supporting this idea is the fact that neither Luke (Q) nor *Thomas* contain the contrast, and Matthew, who does, is probably following Mark on this.

The remarkably similar wording of *Thomas* to Mark should also be noted here—*Thomas* says that after the seed has fallen to the tilled earth "it puts forth a great branch," wording almost identical to Mark, minus the redactional emphasis on size (Mark's great-*est* of shrubs, and branch-*es*). Mark's enlarged version of what the seed becomes also explains why the birds of the air "can make nests in its shade," versus *Thomas'* "and becomes a shelter for the birds of the air."

A theological reason can also be posited for Mark creating the smallest/largest contrast: it has often been observed the extent to which this particular chapter (four) of Mark emphasizes the uniquely Markan idea that "there is nothing hid, except to come to light." (Mark 4:22).[15] In other words, what is revealed in secret now will later be revealed in fullness; the Kingdom revealed but hidden for now, but revealed in its total fullness and glory later—or, smallest now, biggest later.

2. Discounting Tradition

Determining the middle layer of tradition between the redaction level and the Jesus level is a process fraught with special difficulties, since by its very nature the tradition is much more ambiguous.

Although this criterion was defined by H. K. McArthur,[16] it was also implicitly used in the work of R. Bultmann.[17] Its point is to basically locate specific tendencies in the transmission of material in the gospels as we now have them and then apply these back into the pre-gospel stages. Although both Bultmann and McArthur list and discuss some of these specific tendencies,[18] McArthur points to two significant problems with

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[14] J. D. Crossan, *In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 46, following Donahue, *Are You the Christ?* pp. 241–3, "The Markan Insertions."

[15] On this, see especially Kelber, *Kingdom in Mark*, pp. 25–43, and *Mark's Story*, pp. 27–9.

[16] H. K. McArthur, "Basic Issues: A Survey of Recent Gospel Research," *Interpretation* 18 (1964): 39–55, pp. 48–9.

[17] R. Bultmann, "The New Approach to the Synoptic Problem." In S. M. Ogden (ed.), *Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann* (New York: Meridian, 1960), pp. 35–54, p. 41.

[18] R. Bultmann, "The Study of the Synoptic Gospels." In R. Bultmann and K. Kundsin, *Form Criticism: Two Essays on New Testament Research* (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 7–76, especially pp. 32–5; McArthur, p. 49.

recognizing such tendencies: (1) that like actual statistics, they can only indicate what will happen on the average and cannot determine what must happen in every given instance, and (2) they may only be operative within the level of textual transmission and may not necessarily apply in the same way within the level of oral transmission.[19]

The recent work of Kelber into oral tradition has at last begun to show us what a truly complex problem this is. He calls into question the standard model of "the virtual inevitability of synoptic evolution from oral simplicity to gospel complexity" and the tendency "to minimize the effect of the transition from oral motion to textual still life."[20]

Kelber thus sees both Bultmann's model of evolutionary progression and the B. Gerhardsson model of passive transmission[21] as being too limited, and instead proposes a model of oral transmission as a process of both "social identification and preventive censorship." This view suggests that the sayings of Jesus that made their way through the initial process of oral transmission were principally those that "struck a responsive chord in the hearts of hearers . . . and could become a focus of identification for speakers and hearers alike." On the other hand, sayings of Jesus which were not met with understanding or enthusiasm would be either "adjusted to prevailing social expectations, or eliminated altogether."[22]

The point here is that we want to bracket material that can specifically be attributed to the tradition on an oral and/or textual level, noting when and where possible, tendencies governing textual transmission are the same as or similar to those governing oral transmission.

i. Tradition in the Mustard Seed

As we examine the various texts of our case study, a curious phenomenon is revealed: the mustard plant can be seen literally growing in size from text to text! It moves from the "large branch" (singular) in *Thomas*, to the "large branches" (plural) that make up the "greatest of all shrubs" in Mark, to Matthew's "the greatest of all shrubs and becomes a tree," (combining Mark and Q) and finally Luke's (following Q) "and became a tree." Along with this curious development comes the growth of the shelter for the birds of the air—from "a shelter" in *Thomas*, to "making nests in its shade" in Mark, to "make nests in its branches" in Matthew and Luke (Q).

Why is there the tendency within the tradition to enlarge the mustard plant? What could the original wording of the parable have been to allow for such subsequent development in the history of its transmission? This development needs to be considered against the background of texts from the Hebrew Bible that paint a grandiose eschatological image of God's Kingdom in terms of a giant tree (symbolized by a cedar of Lebanon) so large that all of the birds of the air could make nests in its branches, and all of the beasts

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[19] McArthur, p. 49.

[20] W. H. Kelber, *The Oral and the Written Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), p. 8.

[21] See B. Gerhardsson, *Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity* (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1961), *Tradition and Transmission in Early Christianity* (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1964), and *The Origins of the Gospel Traditions* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979). The forerunner to Gerhardsson's approach was H. Riesenfeld, *The Gospel Tradition and Its Beginnings: A Study in the Limits of 'Formgeschichte'* (London: Mowbray, 1957). These controversial works and the memorization theory that they represent are often referred to as the "Scandinavian Gospel Theory," a theory which has found little acceptance.

[22] Kelber, *Oral*, pp. 14–32.

of the earth could rest in its shade. Commentators particularly cite Psalm 104:12, Daniel 4:10–12, and Ezekiel 31:6, 17–23 in connection with this parable.

The problem with assuming that these texts are the allusions to which the end of the parable is referring is that three of them explicitly, and one of them implicitly, are referring to a tree—namely, the mighty cedar of Lebanon. As parable commentators[23] are apt to point out, a mustard shrub is in no sense a tree, let along a match for the cedar of Lebanon. It is a hollow plant that would prove grossly inadequate as a nesting place for birds, even in the spring. At its very best, it reaches a height of eight to ten feet, grows wildly and rapidly around the desert (everywhere in Palestine), and is usually classified as a shrub. According to Breech, it is an undesirable plant, "a weed, something like a dandelion."[24]

The ordinary image of the mustard seed is apparently being inflated within the tradition in order to attempt to align it with the more convential and grand eschatological image of the Lebanese cedar. The awkwardness of this alignment can best be seen in Matthew, who has combined his two sources—one heading in this direction (Mark), and the other (Q), already there—"but when it has grown it is the greatest of all shrubs and becomes a tree."

ii. The Earliest Recoverable Version

On the basis of the Preliminary Criteria, we can make two conclusions about the original content of the Parable of the Mustard Seed: (1) we can discount the Markan redaction concerning the contrast of smallest/greatest, and (2) we can discount the tendency of the tradition to enlarge the size of the mustard plant. When we also consider that the wording of *Thomas* is very similar to the wording of the Markan text minus the Markan redaction, we can more or less determine what the original wording of the parable might have been:

> The Kingdom of God is like a grain of mustard seed, smaller than all seeds.
> But when it is sown upon the ground, it puts forth a great branch,
> and provides shade for the birds of the air.


IV. Primary Criteria: Determining Judgment on Originality

The method we are working with deals with the outermost layer first and works inward, much like peeling away the layers of an onion, wherever it happens to end. The three maximum possible layers of words attributed to Jesus are: (1) Redactional Words, (2) Traditional Words, and (3) Original Words, or:

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[23] See especially H. K. McArthur, "The Parable of the Mustard Seed," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 33 (1971): 198–210, Crossan, *In Parables*, pp. 45–52. *The Dark Interval: Towards a Theology of Story* (Niles: Argus, 1975), pp. 93–6, R. W. Funk, "The Looking-Glass Tree is for the Birds. Jesus: The Parable of the Mustard Seed." In *Jesus as Precurser* (Missoula: Scholars Press/Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), pp. 19–75, and Breech, pp. 76–7, 81–4.

[24] Breech, p. 88.



The point here is that if material can be shown to be the creation of the evangelist or of the tradition, then such material is obviously not attributable to Jesus, and no further criteria should be applied to it—it is material that is disqualified from going any further because we have determined its origins. Only the earliest recoverable version of material which is not attributable to redaction or tradition then goes on to be subjected to the Primary Criteria.

By "original words" or OW we mean, *insofar as it is historically possible to determine,* words as spoken by Jesus himself. This deliberately avoids the usual and pejorative language of "authentic" versus "inauthentic" (we wish to infer no judgment whatsoever concerning the theological value of one level over another). In saying this however, we do not want to imply that the particular form of such a saying as it can be reconstructed through our criteria is necessarily the only form or even the original form that a given saying could take on the lips of Jesus. As Kelber points out, "the first utterance did not produce 'the original,' nor was the second one a 'variant' thereof, because each moment of speech is wondrously fresh and new."[25]

1. Dissimilarity

By whatever name one chooses to call it, whether "discontinuity," "distinctiveness," "dual irreducibility," "incongruity," et al., or its most common name, "dissimilarity," it is the fundamental starting point in determining the OW of Jesus and, in fact, is the real basis for the entire "new quest" of the historical Jesus.

It was Bultmann who first pioneered this criterion, although it was largely a side issue for him: "We can only count on possessing a genuine similtude of Jesus where, on the one hand, expression is given to the contrast between Jewish morality and piety and the distinctive eschatological temper which characterized the preaching of Jesus: and where on the other hand we find no specifically Christian features."[26]

It was with Bultmann's students, however, that the criterion became explicitly reformulated and put into its now common usage. Writes E. Käsemann, "In only one case

[25] Kelber, *Oral,* p. 30.

[26] R. Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition,* Revised Edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 205.

do we have more or less safe ground under our feet; when there are no grounds either for deriving a tradition from Judaism or for ascribing it to primitive Christianity, and especially when Jewish Christianity has mitigated or modified the received tradition, as having found it too bold for its taste."[27] Writes H. Conzelmann, "whatever fits neither into Jewish thought nor the views of the later church can be regarded as authentic."[28]

One classic criticism of Dissimilarity is that, due to its very nature, it will give us a very narrow view of the historical Jesus, and may even eliminate characteristic and historical features of Jesus' teaching that do not meet the criterion.

On the other hand, many scholars have pointed out that Dissimilarity provides, as D. L. Mealand puts it, a "critically tested minimum" of material,[29] or as Breech writes, "a relatively secure starting point." Says Breech, "If Jesus did share much in common with his contemporaries and worshippers, then the core material will provide many points of smooth transition . . ."[30]

Another common criticism of Dissimilarity is that it attempts to do what cannot really be done—namely, find material that cannot be derived from early Judaism or Christianity. "It could be," writes M. D. Hooker, "that if we knew the whole truth about Judaism and the early church, our small quantity of 'distinctive' material would wither away altogether."[31]

Yet later reformulations and uses of the criterion, such as that by Perrin, emphasize that "Sayings and parables may be accepted as authentic if they can be shown to be dissimilar to *characteristic* emphases of both ancient Judaism and early Christianity."[32] Characteristic emphases are obviously not the same as anything distinctive or unusual that could be considered under the general labels of ancient Judaism and early Christianity; we are looking for anything unusual that contradicts the norm.

One major challenge to Dissimilarity which necessitates its reformulation is the discovery of the Nag Hammadi material. *Thomas*, for example, features many parables and aphorisms attributed to Jesus which are clearly dissimilar to characteristic emphases in either Judaism or Christianity, yet are hardly from Jesus. They do, however, reflect characteristic emphases of Gnosticism, the origins of which are now being sought in the pre-Christian era; an increasing number of scholars are working with a model of primitive Christian history which would see Christianity as we know it emerging out of two movements that preceded it: Judaism and Gnosticism.[33]

Yet even if this model becomes a standard one, it is not enough to simply add Gnosticism to Judaism and Christianity in pointing out the various movements that

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[27] E. Käsemann, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus." In E. Käsemann, *Essays on New Testament Themes* (Naperville: Allenson, 1964; reprint ed.—Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), pp. 15–47, pp. 36–7.

[28] H. Conzelmann, *Jesus: A Reprint of his Famous RGG Article* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), p. 16.

[29] D. L. Mealand, "The Dissimilarity Test," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 31 (1978): 41–50, p. 47.

[30] Breech, p. 10.

[31] M. D. Hooker, "On Using the Wrong Tool," *Theology* 75 (1972): 570–581, p. 575. See also, "Christology and Methodology," *New Testament Studies* 17 (1971): 480–487.

[32] N. Perrin, *The New Testament: An Introduction* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974) p. 281 (italics mine), and also, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 39.

[33] Much of the basis for this view can be found in the important and influential series

material must be "dissimilar to" to be considered as Jesus' own; the dissimilarity that is often present within the very transmission of a given saying or unit is far more important—for it is in watching and understanding the process of change that dissimilar material will emerge in sharp relief. To put it another way, we don't need to speculate as to the characteristic emphases in Judaism, Christianity, and Gnosticism because we can actually see such emphases by how the evangelist (in the case of a single text) or the evangelists and/or writers (when there are multiple texts and/or variants) change or use a given Jesus saying or event for their own theological purposes. When we trace the history of a unit's transmission with the Preliminary Criteria, we can often see the dissimilarity because it is obvious that *something* is consistently being changed. This "something" is precisely that which is dissimilar material, and which can therefore be attributed to Jesus himself.[34]

Dissimilarity in the Mustard Seed

Tracing the history of the transmission of the Parable of the Mustard Seed revealed a consistent dissimilarity: a tension between the parable itself and how the tradition interpreted it. The double irony in this particular case is the fact that the image suggested in the original parable is one of paradox and surprise; if the typical image of the Kingdom of God for the contemporaries of Jesus was the mighty cedar of Lebanon (that is, one of the biggest and most grandiose images that they could think of), imagine their disappointing surprise when they're told a parable that tells them that the Kingdom is like an ordinary grain of mustard seed.

The sheer negativity and everyday character of this image was apparently so strong that the tradition (perhaps even the parable's first hearers?) immediately begins to revert the image of the parable back to the precise image it was opposing in the first place. What we have is an image known to and accepted by Jesus' contemporaries (tree), and anti-image from Jesus given to combat it (mustard seed), and a further anti-image by the tradition to combat the ordinary and unacceptable character of Jesus' image, as well as to restore the grandiose character of the original and acceptable image (tree). It is no wonder that this parable has traditionally been labeled a parable of growth by those who have only noticed what the tradition did with it; it could just as easily be categorized as a parable of *decline*, since this seems to be its original point.

Parable commentators, particularly Crossan and Funk,[35] refer to all of this as Jesus' lampooning, satirizing, or light-hearted burlesquing of the noble cedar in Ezekiel—in this parable, the grandiose image is reduced, especially in the parable's climax, to an everyday and unwanted weed-like shrub. A hollow and unattractive plant with little or no purpose, here it provides temporary shade for the birds (its small and fragile frame would be incapable of properly supporting their nests, however).

(continued)
of essays contained in J. M. Robinson and H. Koester, *Trajectories Through Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971).

[34] A similar process was noted in J. D. Crossan, "Divine Immediacy and Human Immediacy: Toward a New First Principle in Historical Jesus Research," Unpublished Jesus Seminar Paper, 1985, although Crossan called this "the criterion of adequacy." Boring, however, more properly renamed the criterion "Hermeneutic(al) Potential," although both names seem redundant given that both are basically synonyms for Dissimilarity.

[35] Crossan, *In Parables*, p. 48, *The Dark Interval*, p. 95, and Funk, p. 23.

The point of the original parable for Jesus seems not so much to simply trade in an old image of the Kingdom for a new one, but rather, to caution his contemporaries against the fixation of any single image to the Kingdom—the true Kingdom transcends being fixated by symbols. Since the power of this image is derived against that which it is opposing, if the typical image of the Kingdom at the time of Jesus had been a mustard seed, perhaps Jesus would have told a parable about a cedar of Lebanon.

2. Coherence

That which can be attributed to Jesus under Dissimilarity is our surest Jesus material, but our methodology need not come to an abrupt end at this point. It is possible to go beyond this criterion, even if not as surely. If material has successfully passed through the Preliminary Criteria but cannot be accepted under Dissimilarity, it can be compared to the dissimilar material (or the core material) to see if they cohere. When they do, that material should be accepted as likely attributable to Jesus himself.

Those who would criticize Dissimilarity would obviously reject Coherence (which has Dissimilarity as its underlying principle), yet Coherence *may* invalidate the common criticism that Dissimilarity only shows us what is unique but not characteristic in the message of Jesus by providing many points of smooth transition to other Jesus material.

Both Walker and McEleney attribute the formulation of Coherence to Bultmann, and then subsequently, to C. E. Carlston.[36] In Bultmann's case however, Coherence is virtually indistinguishable from Dissimilarity, and where Carlston adds to Bultmann, it is identical to what we are terming "Palestinian Context," which will be discussed under Secondary Criteria.

It was really Perrin that began to discuss and use Coherence as it now generally understood, as a criterion apart from Dissimilarity itself: "once characteristics of the teaching of Jesus are established . . ., these . . . can be used to validate sayings which themselves would not meet the requirements of the criterion of dissimilarity."[37]

3. Multiple Attestation

The third and final of our Primary Criteria is actually the oldest and most obvious of them all; we are calling it Multiple Attestation, but it is sometimes referred to as the cross-section method, or, as we have seen, is sometimes divided separately into Multiple Source and Form Attestation. Its first use goes back to 1906, to F. C. Burkitt, who attempted to determine "some external test that will give us a general assurance that the saying we have before us is really from Him, and is not the half-conscious product of one school of His followers." Burkitt sees such a starting-point "in those Sayings which have a real double attestation . . . Where Q and Mark appear to report the same saying." He goes on to list 31 such "doubly attested Sayings."[38]

B. H. Streeter extended this criterion with his "Four Document Hypothesis," adding M and L (special Matthean and special Lukan material, respectively) to Mark and Q as

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[36] Walker, p. 49, and McEleney, p. 443, referring to Bultmann, *Synoptic Tradition*, pp. 105, 135, and C. E. Carlston, "A Positive Criterion of Authenticity?" *Biblical Research* 7 (1951): 33–44, p. 34.

[37] Perrin, *Rediscovering*, p. 43.

[38] F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and Its Transmission*, Third Edition (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1911), p. 147, 168. See the entire section pp. 147–168.

independent witnesses.[39] More recently, Crossan has included parallels from *Thomas*along with Mark and Q as one of the three main independent attestations of synoptic material,[40] and Koester has included other parallels from Nag Hammadi (including *Thomas*) along with sayings from the Gospel of John.[41]

The major problem with Multiple Attestation as it is often used is that it equates multiple tradition with original tradition. As McEleney puts it, we "must allow for the possibility that non-authentic material entered the tradition before the 'sources' were formed and so found a place in several or all of them. In this case, antiquity, not authenticity, is being attested."[42] We also need hardly point out that some of our most important OW of Jesus are only "attested to" in a single source.

If, however, we only employ this criterion after the Preliminary Criteria, it can effectively do one of two things: (1) establish the originality of a unit that does not meet the criteria of either Dissimilarity or Coherence, or (2) corroborate the originality of a unit already accepted under Dissimilarity or Coherence. In both cases, the independent sources should include any extracanonical sources considered independent traditions (such as *Thomas*) and, where possible, it should also include John, and/or extracanonical parallels to John.

A variant of this principle has been formulated and employed by E. Hoskyns and N. Davey, and then taken up extensively by C. H. Dodd. Instead of sources, the attempt is made to discover motifs in multiple literary forms (parable, aphorism, miracle story, etc.).[43] This approach also has validity, but not for establishing originality, only for corroborating it.

Multiple Attestation in the Mustard Seed

In our test case, we have three independent sources: Mark, Q, and *Thomas*, and as a parable, it reflects a motif (Kingdom of God) found in other literary forms (particularly aphorism and miracle story). Both of these facts can be seen as helping to corroborate the parable's originality that was established under Dissimilarity.

V. Secondary Criteria: Corroborating Originality

Application of Secondary Criteria are only valid on material that has successfully passed through one or more of the Primary Criteria intact. Like the Primary Criteria, they

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[39] B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins* (London: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 223–270, especially p. 270.

[40] See especially Crossan, *In Parables*, and *In Fragments: The Aphorisms of Jesus* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983).

[41] See H. Koester, "Dialog and Spruchüber liefeferung in dem gnostischen Texten von Nag Hammadi," *Evangelische Theologie* 39 (1979): 532–556, "Gnostic Writings as Witnesses for the Development of the Sayings Tradition." In B. Layton (ed.), *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, Vol. One: *The School of Valentinus* (Leiden: Brill, 1980), pp. 238–288, and "Gnostic Sayings and Controversy Traditions in John 8:12–59." In C. W. Hedrick and R. Hodgson, Jr. (eds.), *Nag Hammadi, Gnosticism, and Early Christianity* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1986), pp. 97–110.

[42] McEleney, p. 434.

[43] E. Hoskyns and N. Davey, *The Riddle of the New Testament* (London: Faber and Faber, 1931), pp. 162–207, and C. H. Dodd, *History and the Gospel* (New York: Scribners, 1938), pp. 91–101.

should only be used positively—that is, as additional reasons to confirm (never to deny) the originality of material already established under one or more of the Primary Criteria.

1. Palestinian Context

It has often been suggested that if material is truly to be accepted as Jesus' own, then it should exhibit at least some traces of its original Palestinian Context. This should most obviously apply to a shift in language, since the language of Jesus was obviously not the same as the Greek of the NT; it is usually presumed that Jesus' own language was Semitic, probably Aramaic. If one accepts this presumption, then the presence of "Aramaisms," or traces of Aramaic within the Greek text, are often accepted as indications of an Aramaic original—namely, that of Jesus.

A pioneer in this regard was G. Dalman, who influenced the work of J. Jeremias, who felt that "Dalman proved conclusively . . . that Jesus spoke Galilean Aramaic."[44] It should be remembered however, as McEleney points out, that of the four languages spoken in Palestine at the time of Jesus (Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and Aramaic), only Latin has not been attributed to Jesus.[45]

Indeed, Semitists such as R. H. Gundry, J. Barr, and J. A. Fitzmyer have shown that the language milieu of first-century Palestine is a far more complicated matter than is often presumed.[46] All three, however, would still see Galilean Aramaic as at least the principal language of Jesus; the issue is simply whether or not Jesus may have been bilingual given the cultural climate of his day, and if he was, to what extent this would affect historical Jesus research and NT study. Writes Fitzmyer, "farmers and craftsmen of less obviously Hellenized areas used Greek, at least as a second language . . . pockets of Palestinian Jews also used Hebrew, even though its use was not widespread. . . . The real problem is the influence of these languages on one another."[47]

The problem here is that even if it is presumed that the basic language of Jesus was Aramaic, the presence of Semitisms and/or Aramaisms within the Greek NT text obviously does not necessarily lead us back to Jesus himself. It may well, in fact, only lead us back to early Palestinian Christians, or even simply to a Semitic mind thinking in Hebrew or Aramaic, but writing in Greek.

This problem can be avoided if this criterion is employed only in a secondary manner—that is, if the material in question has successfully passed through both the Preliminary and the Primary Criteria, and if a Semitic original can be supposed because of very awkward Greek. Under these conditions, indications of a Semitic original have some value for further confirming that we are indeed dealing with OW of Jesus.

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[44] J. Jeremias, *The Problem of the Historical Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1964), p. 17, after G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus Considered in the Light of Post-Biblical Jewish Writings and the Aramaic Language* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902).

[45] McEleney, p. 438.

[46] R. H. Gundry, "The Language Milieu of First-Century Palestine: Its Bearing on the Authenticity of the Gospel Tradition," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 83 (1964): 404–408, J. Barr, "Which Language Did Jesus Speak? - Some Remarks of a Semitist," *Bulletin of the John Rylands University of Manchester* 53 (1970): 9–29, J. A. Fitzmyer, "The Languages of Palestine in the First Century A.D." *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 32 (1970): 501–531.

[47] Fitzmyer, ibid., p. 531. More recently, see "The Aramaic Language and the Study of the New Testament," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 99 (1980): 5–21, and *A Wandering Aramean: Collected Aramaic Essays* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979).

Jeremias was optimistic about our also having been "carried an important step further on the way back to Jesus himself by studies of his day which have disclosed to us his environment, informing us of the religious climate and of Palestinian customs in his day. I am referring to the study of rabbinical literature and of late Jewish apocalyptic."[48] Carlston proposes a similar criterion: "An authentic parable will reflect or fit into the conditions (social, political, ecclesiastical, linguistic, etc.) prevailing during the earthly ministry of Jesus, rather than (or, in some cases as well as) conditions which obtained in the post-resurrection church."[49]

Of course, what constitutes "Palestinian environment" is obviously open to considerable discussion, and could theoretically include almost anything. If, however, such factors can be noticed *along with* the at least more concrete phenomenon of language, then Palestinian Context can be further established, and we have even more corroboration for our established OW of Jesus.

Palestinian Context in the Mustard Seed

Is there anything in the Mustard Seed that indicates a shift in language in the transmission of the parable? M. Black points to the awkward Greek grammar of Mark 4:31–32 and suggests that it can be explained as a fairly literal Greek translation of an Aramaic original.[50] Crossan explains this bad grammar as a combination of both translation Greek and Mark's own editorial tampering.[51]

In any case, the evidence clearly suggests that there was a pre-Markan Aramaic original of the parable which we can take as a further support for attributing the parable to Jesus. The fact that the vivid image of the mustard seed and the resultant mustard plant was and is so common in Palestine could also be seen as corroborating the parable on the basis of authentic environment.

2. Style

A pioneer in attempting to discern a style of Jesus was C. F. Burney, who set out to analyze Jesus' use of parallelism, rhythm and rhyme against the formal characteristics of Hebrew poetry.[52] Like Dalman, his work strongly influenced Jeremias, who made extensive use of this criterion. In fact, Jeremias compiled an appendix of what he termed "Characteristics of the *ipsissima vox Jesu*." Since this list had been compiled from material that he had already established as OW of Jesus, it is a valid and useful list.[53]

More recently, Breech has employed the criterion throughout his *The Silence of Jesus*, pointing not only to a style of Jesus, but to form, content, and function as well.

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[48] Jeremias, *Problem*, p. 16.

[49] Carlston, p. 34.

[50] M. Black, *An Aramaic Approach to the Gospel and Acts* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), pp. 165–6.

[51] Crossan, *In Parables*, pp. 46–8.

[52] C. F. Burney, *The Poetry of Our Lord: An Examination of the Formal Elements of Hebrew Poetry in the Discourses of Jesus Christ* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1925).

[53] J. Jeremias, *The Prayers of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967), pp. 108–115. Perrin argues, quite convincingly, that Dissimilarity was implicitly used by Jeremias in many of his famous discussions of Jesus' use of language—*abba* for instance, where not only the concept but even the language is so distinctive (or dissimilar) that it remains intact. See Perrin, *Rediscovering*, pp. 40–41.

As an example, Breech compares the various versions of the Parable of the Sower (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and *Thomas*), determining that Mark and *Thomas* are the two underlying independent sources. He goes on to reconstruct the earliest recoverable version of the Parable, showing that "once Mark's redaction has been removed, Mark and *Thomas* are very similar to one another." The very inclusion of the Parable in Breech's book means that it has already met the criterion of Dissimilarity (via Scholarly Consensus), and most scholars would be quite satisfied with this—the earliest recoverable version of a parable that is truly distinctive or dissimilar, attested to almost identically in two independent sources. It satisfies all possible criteria.

But in a rather unusual step, Breech asks, "But was this the original wording of the parable?" Perhaps not, but there is no methodologically sound way to do anything further with the parable. Breech, however, proceeds to rewrite the original wording of the parable, noting a "characteristic economy" in the narrative style of several other of his rewritten parables of Jesus: "there are . . . strong reasons, using stylistic criteria, for viewing all explanatory phrases in the parable as secondary efforts to clarify its meaning as the early Christians understood it."[54] This is as much a negative use of Dissimilarity as it is a use of "stylistic criteria." Similar analyses can be found, including the elimination of any references to specific persons in the Parable of the Good Samaritan (including the Samaritan), in a book that is otherwise quite sound and fascinating, particularly in many of its hermeneutical insights.

If Breech's use of Style is invalid, what would constitute its valid use? Its value in a unit such as a parable with multiple texts and sources would be principally to corroborate (never to conform) the details of the earliest recoverable version of the parable by comparing those details with the style of Jesus as observed in other material. This would be particularly true if there are conflicting details present in the parable, such as the Parable of the Great Supper where Luke (Q) has three guests, but *Thomas* has four; here Style would favor three guests, since many other original parables of Jesus use the example of three (the Sower, the Good Samaritan, et al.). Such a use of Style would be invalid, however, if both independent versions had four guests; that is rewriting one's own text, rather than corroborating an established text. If one wants to argue that the tradition added the fourth guest before Mark and *Thomas* were written, then this should be shown (with convincing appropriate reasons) under Discounting Tradition, the second of the Preliminary Criteria.

Style in the Mustard Seed

Are there details in the earliest recoverable version of our test case that compare with the style of Jesus as observed in other material? Here we can only make some general observations, such as the fact that the form of the Mustard Seed is that of parable, a literary form common to, and considered even distinctive to, Jesus himself.

The content of the parable, namely the fact that it brings together "Kingdom of God" and "mustard seed" can be seen elsewhere—Kingdom of God is the consistent theme of virtually all established OW of Jesus, and at least three other parables can be considered "seed" parables: the Sower, the Seed Growing Secretly, and the Tares Among the Wheat.[55]

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[54] Breech, pp. 81–84, 82, 83.

[55] See J. D. Crossan, "The Seed Parables of Jesus," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 92 (1973): 244–266, which was later revised into "Parables of Advent," pp. 37–52 of *In Parables*. This neutral classifying by content stands in marked contrast to classifying these parables by interpretation, such as "Parables of Growth" (see N. A. Dahl, "The Parables of Growth,"

One could even see the function of the parable as an indication of Jesus' style, the fact that the point seems to be surprise and reversal, themes also found in other parables of Jesus. Crossan sees the function of this and all parables within the ministry of Jesus as "help(ing) others into their own experience of the Kingdom and to draw from that experience their own way of life."[56]

3. Scholarly Consensus

The great value and usefulness of the criterion of Dissimilarity is demonstrated in the fact that scholars using it independently of one another have come to very similar, and often virtually identical conclusions as to which material is accepted under this criterion. So much so, in fact, that Breech can simply bypass the issue of criteria altogether by concentrating on the "core material": "Virtually all scholars working in the field would agree that at least these sayings and parables are authentic."[57] In establishing such a procedure, Breech has actually introduced a new criterion, that which we are calling Scholarly Consensus.

Scholarly Consensus is basically a head count—which material is accepted (regardless of the reason) by which scholars? It can serve as a useful, final way to "check up" on one's own work, to see if scholars working independently have come to similar conclusions. In this respect it has some corroborative value, but only when *all* else is said and done.

To use this criticism as a starting point is obviously to weaken one's argument all the way down the line, since one is basically dependent on the conclusions of others. On the other hand, it is the nature of scholarship to do precisely that, particularly if it "avoids the controversy surrounding the question of the criteria which are valid for determining authentic material (and) debating (over) which sayings are authentic and which are not, which are the products of early Christianity or borrowed from the contemporary world and attributed to Jesus."[58]

Scholarly Consensus in the Mustard Seed

As a final consideration, and for whatever it is worth, if we take a head count of the various scholars that have worked with our test case and who also consider it attributable to Jesus himself (regardless of the reasons), we would have a seemingly endless list of the who's who of NT and historical Jesus researchers spanning decades. A far easier task in the case of this particular parable is to list those who would *not* consider it attributable to Jesus, and the present writer doesn't know of a single significant name to even start such a list.

VI. Concluding Remarks

The bypassing of an issue as fundamental and central as method in a book as important as Breech's is reflective of a much wider issue—the shift currently taking place in much

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(continued)

Studia Theologica 5 (1951): 132–165) or "harvest or contrast parables" (see C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (New York: Scribners, 1961), pp. 140–156). The discussion is updated in B. B. Scott, "Parables of Growth Revisited: Notes on the Current State of Parable Research," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 11 (1981): 3–9.

[56] Crossan, *In Parables*, p. 52.

[57] Breech, p. 9.

[58] Ibid.

of scholarship moving away from the quest (old or new) of the historical Jesus, to pursue the quest, as Crossan has termed it, of "the hermeneutical Jesus."[59] That is to say, discussions of *establishing* OW of Jesus have gradually and subtly given way to discussions of *interpreting* OW of Jesus.

Could it be that the bypassing of discussions of method and criteria are based not so much on an implicit consensus on these issues, but rather on an inability of recent scholarship to clarify and standardize a single method and specific set of universally recognized criteria for historical Jesus research? Could it further be that such an inability contributes to, and/or is responsible for, what P. Hollenbach has referred to as "a hopeless diversity of historical Jesus pictures in modern scholarship"?[60]

[59] J. D. Crossan, "The Hermeneutical Jesus," *Michigan Quarterly Review* 22 (1983): 237–249.

[60] P. Hollenbach, Unpublished response to Crossan, "Divine Immediacy," 1985.

The Gates of Hell: An Alternative Approach

Colin Brown
Fuller Theological Seminary

Throughout much of the history of the Christian church the promise of Matt. 16:18c that "the gates of Hell shall not prevail" against the church has stood as warning of trial and an assurance of eventual triumph over hostile powers. As such it has been a source of consolation and strength to countless people. But critical study has raised serious questions about Matthew's account of the words of Jesus to Peter following Peter's confession of Jesus as the Christ. In this paper I wish to do two things. First, I wish to review different approaches to Matt. 16:18c, and in so doing question their appropriateness. Second, I wish to propose an alternative approach, and in so doing suggest how this passage may throw some light on the historical Jesus.[1]

I. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

A. Catholic and Protestant Tradition

Catholic and Protestant tradition exhibits a broad consensus over the general tenor of the text, but sharp and predictable differences over the precise nature of the threat that is posed to the church. The "gates of hell" are generally seen to represent hostile attacks on the church instigated by supernatural agencies. But the exact form of the attack depends on whom the enemies happen to be. Cyprian saw in the text a warning against troubles instigated by schismatics.[2] Jerome identified the gates of hell with "vices and sins or at least doctrines of heretics."[3] The Council of Trent appealed to the text in its endorsement of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed.[4] Luther, on the other hand, saw in the words an assurance that Christ would find ways to preserve the evangelical church (as distinct from the pope's church) against emperors, kings and the raging of "a whole world of devils."[5] For Calvin the promise gave assurance of triumph over Satanic attacks, adding that *gates* without doubt meant "quodvis potentiae et munitionis genus."[6]

Although the identity of the "gates" differs widely in these traditional Catholic and Protestant interpretations, they appear to share a common method of interpretation.

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[1] I have developed the argument of this paper more fully in my study of "The Gates of Hell and the Church" in *Church, Word, and Spirit: Historical and Theological Essays in Honor of Geoffrey W. Bromiley*, edited by James E. Bradley and Richard A. Muller (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, scheduled for publication in the Fall of 1987). The present paper draws on some of this material with the kind permission of the editors.

[2] *De ecclesiae catholicae unitate*, 6ff.

[3] *Comm. in ev. Matt.*, 3.

[4] Session 3, 1546 (Denzinger-Schönmetzer, # 1500).

[5] *Luther's Works*, 41 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 10.

[6] *Harmonia Evangelica*, ad loc. (*Corpus Reformatorum*, 73, 474).

It could be called *a hermeneutic without exegesis.* None of them pause to ask what "the gates of hell" might mean in the linguistic, cultural and religious context of their setting. Instead, the interpretations assume that the term denotes some dire threat to the church which in the last analysis is supernatural in origin. But the precise form of the threat depends on whatever crisis the interpreter finds present. Even Calvin's certitude in identifying the "gates" with "any kind of power and fortification" was at best a guess. It does not carry us very far in determining the meaning of the saying in Matthew.

B. Critical Exegesis

Critical exegesis has attempted to interpret the passage more precisely. I will mention six lines of approach.

(1) *Christ's Descent into Hell as a Rescue Mission.* Wilhelm Bousset saw Matt. 16:18 as one of a number of NT passages which indicated "even if only in fragments, the strong popular and mythological conceptions of the struggle of Christ with the powers of the underworld, conceptions of which the theologoumenon of the preaching in Hades is only a feeble reminiscence."[7] Thus, the passage meant that the gates of Hades would be unable to hold back those members of the Christian church who had already passed through them. However, the notion of Christ's journey into hell and his struggle with the powers of the underworld was "a myth which originally had nothing to do with the person of Jesus but only later has been adapted to him."[8]

Bousset's interpretation has the merit not only of making sense out of the word "gates" but also of locating the term in the region of the world of the dead. But it has been sharply criticized. Bultmann, for example, rejected it on the grounds that Matt. 16 nowhere hints at a descent into Hades and that it does not envision the church being imprisoned there.[9] It would seem to be anachronistic to read into either Jesus or Matthew the notion of a descent into hell as a rescue mission.[10]

(2) *Exemption from Death.* In view of the saying in Matt. 16:28 that there would be some among Jesus' hearers that would not taste death before seeing the Son of man coming in his kingdom, it has been suggested that Peter is here promised either resurrection or exemption from death before the parousia.[11] However, the promise can be made to apply to Peter only if the text is emended in such a way that it does not apply to the church generally. Moreover, the imagery of gates suggest that they represent something through which one must pass. The prophecy of Jesus, own death (v. 21), the call to take up one's cross (v. 24) and the saying about the willingness to lose one's life (v. 25), all suggest that the church is not promised exemption from death.

(3) *Triumph over the Powers of Evil.* A number of scholars have restated in various ways the traditional view that "the gates of hell" represent assaults on the church by diverse powers of evil. Some scholars have seen the expression as an instance of metonymy in

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[7] *Kyrios Christos* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 65.

[8] *Kyrios,* 66.

[9] *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), 139.

[10] See (e.g.) W. Bieder, *Die Vorstellung von der Höllenfahrt Jesus Christi* (Zürich: Zwingli-Vrlag, 1949), see especially 43–48.

[11] A. von Harnack, "Der Spruch über Petrus als den Felsen der Kirche, Matt. XVI, 17f.," *SAB* 32 (1918): 637–654.

which "gates" stands for a city, stronghold, or hostile force.[12] Thus, the city or kingdom of evil will assault the church, but will fail to overcome it because it is founded on the rock of Christ. However, such interpretations appear to ignore an established meaning of "the gates of Hades" (which we shall note presently) and stretch the use of metonymy beyond endurable limits. As Alfred Plummer observed long ago, "If aggressiveness were the prominent idea, we should hardly have the metaphor of a building with gates. Gates keep people in and keep people out, and are necessary for the strength of a citadel, but they do not fight."[13]

However, such considerations did not deter Joachim Jeremias from arguing that the gates in question are "a *pars-pro-toto* term . . . for the ungodly powers of the underworld which assail the rock."[14] The latter evoked for Jeremias the symbol of the cosmic rock which serves the double function of supporting the sanctuary and sealing the underworld with its imprisoned spirits and primeval flood. To Jeremias Matt. 16:18c refers to the final, eschatological assault of the forces of the underworld upon the rock. Jeremias found support for his interpretation in rabbinic pronouncements in the Qumran Hodayot, drawing on Otto Betz's study of possible parallels between the Qumran hymns and Matt. 16.[15] But with due deference to Jeremias' learning, one cannot help wondering whether his interpretation involves reading into the text a whole complex of ideas, some of which are drawn from later sources. Moreover, even in the allegedly related passages from the Qumran Hodayot the gates do not function in quite the way that Jeremias envisages them to function in Matthew. In 1QH 6:24f. the psalmist (in a manner evocative of the psalm in Jonah 2) finds himself in a life-threatening situation depicted as a storm-tossed sea. His soul journeys "to the gates of death." But he remains secure "as one who enters a fortified city." The basic imagery is that of the godly person being brought near to death. Figuratively Hell and the Pit are depicted as a stronghold which threatens human life. Essentially they are the place of doom and destruction from which "the conceivers of wickedness" and "spirits of naught" do not return (1QH3:17–18).

A more recent appeal to Qumran literature, though with somewhat different results, has been made by Richard H. Hiers who argues that the authorization to bind and loose was originally an authorization to Peter and the Twelve to serve as exorcists.[16] The saying about the gates "appears parallel to Jesus' assurance in Luke 10:19 that the power of Satan shall not hurt his followers as they pursue the task of exorcising demons."[17] Hiers finds support in G. Bornkamm's ambiguous concept of the gates as "the powers of the underworld" and W. Manson's composite notion of "Satan-Hades."[18] While there is much

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[12] C. Spicq, in M. Carrouges et al., *L'Enfer* (Paris: Éditions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1950) 118; T. Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthäus (Leipzig: Deichert, 3rd ed. 1910) 548; M.-J. Lagrange, L'Évangile selon S. Matthieu* (Paris: Gabalda: 8th ed., 1948) 326.

[13] *Matthew* (London: Stock, 1910) 230.

[14] *TDNT* 6, 927.

[15] "Felsenmann und Felsengemeinde (Eine Parallele zu Mt. 16.17–19 in den Qumranpsalmen)," *ZNW* 48 (1957): 49–77.

[16] " 'Binding' and 'Loosing': The Matthaean Authorizations," *JBL* 104 (1985): 233–250.

[17] Ibid., 242. Hiers takes the reference to the opening of the "gates of Hell" (1QH 3:18) to allude to the release of "worthless" spirits. He notes T. H. Gaster's report of "a later Jewish superstition that demons are released from the netherworld during weekdays" (cf. Gaster, *The Scriptures of the Dead Sea Sect* [London: Secker & Warburg, 1957] 205, n. 14).

[18] G. Bornkamm, *Jesus of Nazareth* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) 187; W. Manson, *Jesus and the Christian* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967) 83.

to be said for Hiers's general thesis, I remain unconvinced about the details of the argument at this point. Matt. 16:18 belongs to a different context from that of Luke 10:19. The two passages do not necessarily have the same meaning. Moreover, as Hiers himself recognizes, in some NT writings at least the sphere of Satan is not hell or Hades but the air or the heavens (Luke 10:18; Eph. 2:2; 6:11–12; Rev. 12:7–9). He is active in the wilderness (Matt. 4:1–11 and even present in Peter (Matt. 16:23). Satan may be instrumental in bringing evil-doers to Hades or the Pit,[19] but Hades is not depicted in biblical and intertestamental literature as a kind of stronghold over which Satan rules and from which he makes repeated assaults on human beings. According to Rev. 20, it is Satan's lot to be cast into the pit where he is bound. We cannot without more ado speak of "Satan-Hades" as a single entity or loosely identify "the gates of hell" with "the powers of the underworld."

(4) *Emendations.* In view of the difficulties that arise as soon as one tries to press the imagery of the text along the lines that have been noted so far, it is not surprising that several exegetes have proposed emendations of the text.

J. H. Bernard believed that the underlying imagery was that of the floods of evil beating against the rock (Ps. 18; Matt. 7:24; Luke 6:48; cf. Gen. 7:11).[20] He suggested that the Semitic original underlying the Greek *pylai* was not the Heb. word for "gate" (*ša'ar*) but *śa'ar* ("storm"; cf. Isa. 28:2). Thus the present text of Matt. gives a mistranslation. Instead of the more familiar renderings, Bernard suggested that the passage should read: "Upon this Rock I will build my Church and the storms of hell shall not prevail against it." He thus succeeded in bringing together the metaphors of the rock and the storm, but it was at the expense of separating the gates from the keys. Moreover, his interpretation required the assumption of misunderstanding a clear Semitic original in favor of a rather more difficult Greek idea. It also required that hell (Gk. *hadēs*) be understood not as the place of the dead but as the bastion of the powers of evil.

More recently Robert Eppel has proposed that the underlying Hebrew was not *ša'arê* ("gates") but *šō'arê* ("gatekeepers").[21] Such terrifying guardians are described in Sl. Enoch 42:1. Thus Matt. 16:18 contains a prophecy that the church will be subjected to "the vain assault of the demonic powers symbolized by the guardians of hell." The image of the guardians of hell is opposed by that of Peter as the guardian of the church. Although this interpretation solves some difficulties, it also creates others. Like Bernard's reconstruction, it presumes that an original clear and meaningful pronouncement was inexplicably replaced by one that is awkward and not really intelligible. It makes the same assumption that Hades is the abode of the evil powers. It also seems to suggest that the "gatekeepers" quit their posts as guardians of Hades and assume the role of assault troops in order to attack the church.

Alternative approaches have been proposed by Syriac experts who draw attention to Syriac fathers and the Syriac tradition of Matt. 16:18c which reads *mûklê* ("bars") instead of "gates." One interpretation suggests an invasion by Christ of the realm of the dead which the bars of Hades are unable to withstand.[22] Another view is that *mûklê* might be a

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[19] Heb. 2:14; Test.Reub. 4:7, 11; Test.Levi 18:10–19 (cf. Luke 10:19); Test.Sim. 6:5–6; Test.Zeb. 9:8; Eth. Enoch 10:4–10; 54:1–56:8; 1QH 3, 29, 32; 6:22–24.

[20] *Studia Sacra* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917) 76–89.

[21] In *Aux Sources de la Tradition Chrétienne. Mélanges offert à M. Maurice Goguel* (Neuchatel and Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1950) 71–73.

[22] Robert Murray, *Symbols of the Church and Kingdom: A Study in Early Syriac Tradition* (Cambridge: CUP, 1975) 228–36.

loanword from the Greek *mochlos,* meaning "lever" or "crowbar." On this view Hades is personified as a giant vainly trying to pry loose the firm rock on which the church is to be built.[23]

(*5*) *Triumph over Death.* Many of the difficulties in the interpretations noted so far arise from the fact that they depend on what R. H. Hiers terms "commendable ambiguity."[24] They derive their strength from identifying "hell" with "the powers of the underworld." But this is also the source of their weakness, for having launched upon the ambiguity, the imagery does not seem to fit. As A. H. M'Neile succinctly put it, apart from the "awkward metonymy" involved in identifying Hades with the organized powers of evil, "it is doubtful if Hades was ever thought of as the *abode* of the powers of evil, from which they emerge to injure men."[25]

Ancient literature provides numerous accounts of the underworld. Some times gates are mentioned and also gatekeepers.[26] But the gates themselves do not attack; they serve as vivid reminders that those who go to the realm of the dead do not return to the land of the living. Both the KJV ("the gates of hell") and the RSV ("the powers of death") are at best loose and at worst misleading translations of the Greek *pylai hadou.* Literally the Greek means "gates of Hades." In the LXX *hadēs* occurs more than 100 times, generally translating the Hebrew *še'ôl* ("Sheol"). In other words, "gates of Hades" means "gates of Sheol." Jeremias is doubtless correct in ascribing the absence of the definite article to the construct state of the underlying Hebrew *ša'arê še'ôl,* and thus in seeing the term as a Semitism.[27] Moreover, there are several examples of *pylai hadou* used as a set phrase. Hezekiah laments that he is consigned to "the gates of Sheol" for the rest of his years (Isa. 38:10). Wis. 16:13 speaks of the Lord who has the power to lead down to "the gates of Hades" and to lead back again. 3 Macc. 5:51 tells of the prayers of the assembled Jews about to be massacred, standing "at the gates of Hades." Pss. Sol. 16:2 tells how the author was "near the gates of Hades with the sinner." This latter reference, and perhaps some of the others too, contains a hint of an association of the term with judgment.

In the intertestamental literature that we have just noted the term "gates of Hades" appears to be preferred to the older OT term "gates of death" (Pss. 9:13; 107:18; Job 38:17; cf. also "bars" in Job 17:16 and Jonah 2:6). With the possible exception of Job 38:17,[28] the expression "gates of Hades/Sheol/death" denotes the one-way entrance to the realm of the dead from which there is no return. To be near the gates is to be dying. Or, to put it in a modern idiom, to be at these gates is to be "at death's door."

In view of such considerations a number of scholars have seen in Matt. 16:18c a

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[23] S. Gero, "The Gates or Bars of Hades? A Note on Matthew 16.18," *NTS* 27 (1980–81):411–414.

[24] Op. cit., 242.

[25] *The Gospel According to St. Matthew* (London: Macmillan, 1915) 242.

[26] For details see (e.g.) N. J. Tromp, *Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Nether World in the Old Testament, Biblica et Orientalia* 21 (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969); J. B. Pritchard, ed., *ANET,* 3rd ed. 1969, 106–109; J. Zandee, *Death as an Enemy according to Egyptian Conceptions, Studies in the History of Religions (Supplements to Numen), 5* (Leiden: Brill, 1960); and references given by C. Brown in "The Gates of Hell and the Church," nn. 27–31.

[27] *TDNT* 6, 926; so too Bultmann, *History* 139.

[28] Here the context suggests reflection on the mysteries of light and darkness with possible oblique allusions to pagan deities.

warning of impending death but also an assurance of eventual triumph over death.[29] Thus to Adolf Schlatter the thought was not that of Hades sweeping people along like a stream through its open gates, for the notion of a stream does not easily fit that of gates. Nor is it likely to be a promise of exemption from death. "The thought is more likely to be that even the disciples and those gathered by them to be the community of Jesus are destined to die and go through the gates; they are indeed 'the bearers of crosses.' "[30] This, argues Schlatter, not only fits the language and imagery of the passage, but also fits the context of the following verses, where Jesus not only predicts his own impending death and resurrection, but also warns would-be followers of the need to be willing to lose their lives for his sake (Matt. 16:21–28).

In my view, of all the interpretations that we have noted so far, this line of approach best fits the passage. But can we go even further? I wish to suggest that we can. But before we do so, I wish to note the question of authenticity.

(6) *Authenticity.* The basic objections to the authenticity of Matt. 16:17–19 are well known and need only to be noted for the sake of completeness. The sayings about the church have no parallel in Mark and Luke. Indeed, the only references to the church (*ekklēsia*) in the Gospels occur in Matt. 16:18 and 18:17. As Bornkamm put it, the authenticity of the passage is questioned chiefly "because it is not easily compatible with Jesus' proclamation of the imminent coming of the kingdom of God."[31] Moreover, if an interpretation like that of Bousset were correct, it would not easily fit the historical Jesus.

To Oscar Cullmann the question of authenticity was bound up with the question of Jesus' messianic consciousness.[32] The idea of a church was not a Christian creation, but belongs to the Jewish sphere as the LXX translation of the Hebrew *qāhāl.* Moreover, the notion of a messiah without a messianic community was unthinkable. But even Cullmann felt constrained to suggest that the sayings about Peter and the church should be detached from Peter's confession and located in the context of the Last Supper, when Jesus' death was imminent.[33] The proposal that I shall now make presses further along the path followed by Schlatter and others. It also suggests that the saying may be feasible as an utterance of the historical Jesus, made at the time of Peter's confession.

II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

I would like to make my alternative approach in four steps: A. Negative Considerations; B. Positive Considerations; C. General Considerations; D. Conclusion.

A. Negative Considerations

Here I simply want to sum up the reasons why I think that most of the traditional interpretations are inappropriate. Most of these interpretations tacitly assume that *hadēs* is the same as "hell" which in turn is the stronghold of Satan and the powers of evil. By metonymy *hadēs* is understood to represent these powers. This seems to me to be illegitimate and anachronistic. *Hadēs* is Sheol, the abode of the dead from which there

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[29] See (e.g.) D. Hill, *Matthew* (London: Oliphants, 1972) 261–262; R. H. Gundry, *Matthew* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 335; R. Schnackenburg, *Matthäusevangelium* I (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1985) 152.

[30] *Der Evangelist Matthäus* (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 6th ed. 1963) 509.

[31] *Jesus of Nazareth,* 187.

[32] *Peter: Disciple, Apostle, Martyr* (London: SCM Press, 2nd ed. 1962) 192–217.

[33] *Peter* 191.

is no return. It is the place of perdition (as in Matt. 11:23; Luke 10:15; 16:23; Acts 2:27; Rev. 1:18; 6:8; 20:13). Moreover, gates do not attack. They serve to grant and deny entry and exit. Other instances of "the gates of Sheol/Hades/death" belong to contexts which have to do with dying. They denote the boundaries of life and death, the point from which there is no return. There may even be present a hint of judgment. Why should this sense not also be present in Matt. 16:18?

B. Positive Considerations

Gates were familiar features of cities in the ancient world. Apart from making cities secure, gates were places where justice was enacted (Ruth 4:1). Malefactors and evildoers were led to the gates of the city and – as Jesus was – put to death.[34] Not only did Jerusalem have gates, but so did the temple. Indeed, to the pious Jew the real significance of Jerusalem lay in the fact that it was the "holy city" (Matt. 4:5; 27:53) which housed the temple. The psalmist asks the question "Who shall ascend the hill of the LORD?" and gives an answer that finds an echo in Matt. 5:8 (Psalm 24:3–4). The Psalm goes on to proclaim:

> Lift up your heads, 0 gates!
> and be lifted up, 0 ancient doors!
> that the King of glory may come in (Psalm 24:7).

It may be that Jesus' entry into Jerusalem and the temple are to be seen as an implicit enactment of this Psalm. But if this is so, the allusion remains implicit. On the other hand, Psalm 118 makes significant references to gates. Moreover, Psalm 118 plays an important part in Matthew's account of Jesus' entry into Jerusalem and his cleansing of the temple.

In Psalm 118 the Psalmist who is evidently a king or some important figure approaches the sanctuary in order to give thanks for his deliverance from his enemies and from death. The speaker is like a stone that had once been rejected, but has now become "the chief cornerstone" (v. 22). He now seeks entrance to the temple in order to give thanks.

> I shall not die, but I shall live,
> and recount the deeds of the LORD,
> The LORD has chastened me sorely,
> but he has not given me over to death.
>
> Open to me the gates of righteousness,
> that I may enter through them
> and give thanks to the LORD.
>
> This is the gate of the LORD;
> the righteous shall enter through it (Psalm 118:17–20)

H.-J. Kraus observes that the gates are called "gates of righteousness" on account of the

[34] In the case of "a stubborn and rebellious son" who was deemed "a glutton and a drunkard" the parents were to deliver the son to the elders of the city at the gate, where he was to be put to death, so that the evil may be purged from their midst (Deut. 21:18–21; cf. Matt. 11:19; Luke 7:34). Jesus was led out of the city and put to death "outside the gate" (Heb. 13:12; cf. Matt. 27:33 par.).

scrutiny to which worshippers were subjected.[35] Only the righteous could enter (v. 20; cf. Psalms 15; 24; Isa. 26:2). To enter was a sign of righteousness. Kraus sees v. 26 as a liturgical blessing pronounced by the priests from the sanctuary upon the one who enters (cf. Psalm 24:5; Num. 6:23).

> Blessed is he who enters in the name of the LORD!
> We bless you from the house of the LORD.

Sacrifice and thanksgiving then follow (Psalm 118:27–29).

It is not without significance that the first part of Psalm 118:26 finds an echo on the lips of the crowds who welcome Jesus to Jerusalem on the first Palm Sunday: "Hosanna to the Son of David! Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord! Hosanna in the highest!" (Matt. 21:9; cf. Mark 11:9–10; Luke 19:38; John 12:13). But this welcome is not given by the priests from within the sanctuary. When Jesus proceeds to enter and cleanse the temple, and heal in it the chief priests and scribes are indignant (Matt. 21:15). On being questioned about his authority, Jesus replies with a counter-question concerning the baptism of John, the parable of the vineyard in which the son and heir is put to death by the tenants, and a pronouncement taken from Psalm 118:22–23.

> Have you never read in the scriptures:
> 'The very stone which the builders rejected
> has become the head of the corner;
> this was the Lord's doing,
> and it is marvellous in our eyes'?
> Therefore I tell you, the kingdom of God will be taken away from you and given to a nation producing the fruits of it (Matt. 21:42–43).

Thereupon the chief priests and Pharisees try to arrest Jesus, but fear the multitudes because they held him to be a prophet.

Matthew gives yet another allusion to Psalm 118. Significantly it follows the lament over Jerusalem—the city which kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it (Matt. 23:37). Having refused to be gathered together by Jesus, Jesus pronounces a final oracle:

> Behold, your house is forsaken and desolate. For I tell you, you will not see me again, until you say, 'Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord' (Matt. 23:38–39).

In view of these considerations, I wish to propose that the saying about the gates of Hades has a double reference. In the first instance, it alludes to Jesus' intention to go to Jerusalem and fulfill his calling as the Lord's anointed. Like the royal figure in the Psalms he must enter "the gates of righteousness" and be duly received in the temple. But Jesus was not duly received. His action in the temple was not seen as an act of consecration, but as a desecration. It was an act which sealed his own fate. Jerusalem proved to be for Jesus what it had been for so many that had been sent to it in the past—the city of death. The gates of righteousness would therefore prove to be for Jesus the gates of the place of death.

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[35] *Psalmen, BKAT* 15/2 (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 5th ed. 1978) 982–983.

C. General Considerations

I believe that this line of approach is further supported by certain general considerations which may only be alluded to here.

(1) *The Significance of the Temple.* I believe that the so-called cleansing of the temple was not an incidental act but one of climactic significance. Jesus' action involved not merely the purification of an existing order,[36] but the inauguration of a new order. Matthew presents it as the climactic fulfillment of John the Baptist's prophecy (Matt. 21:23–27) John had baptized with water; Jesus will baptize with the Holy Spirit (Matt. 3:11). In response to the question as to his authority for doing what he did, Jesus responds with a counter-question about John the Baptist's authority. For if John was a prophet sent by God, his prophecy concerning Jesus was also from God. In other words, Jesus' authority for his action in the temple was conferred on him by the Spirit, as John had prophesied.[37]

(2) *Jesus as the Christ, the Lord's Anointed.* The saying about the gates of Hades is clearly linked with Peter's confession of Jesus as the Christ. But what did this mean? It is widely recognized that there was no single unified concept of a messianic deliverer in intertestamental literature.[38] I believe that there is much to be said in favor of A. E. Harvey's suggestion that "the Christ" in the Gospels has the sense of "the anointed one" and was used as a designation in order to distinguish Jesus from others.[39] It was linked with the coming of the Spirit upon Jesus at his baptism, an event which qualified Jesus to be the messianic "Son" (Matt. 3:16–17; cf. Ps. 2:7; Matt. 42:1; Matt. 12:18 21; cf. Isa. 42:1–4). The synoptic accounts of Peter's confession indicate that Jesus was widely regarded as a prophet (Matt. 16:14; cf. 21:46; 26:68; Mark 8:28; Luke 9:19). Matthew's form of the confession ("You are the Christ, the Son of the living God," Matt. 16:16) like the question of the high priest (Matt. 26:63) reflects a Semitic way of speaking about the anointed one. Jesus' authority and activity is linked in the minds of the evangelists with the divine Spirit.[40] As such it has overtones of both prophecy and kingship (cf. Matt. 21:5, 9, 11; 22:41–45; 26:63–68; 27:11, 37, 42).

(3) *The Conflict with the Jewish Authorities.* I believe that the root of the conflict between Jesus and the Jewish authorities had to do with the question: Was Jesus doing the things that he did under the authority of the Spirit or was he possessed by an evil spirit?[41] To his enemies he was a deceiver (Matt. 27:62), a false prophet who was leading the people astray by performing signs and wonders and who should rightly be purged from the midst

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[36] See E. P. Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 61–76.

[37] I have stated this argument more fully in *That You May Believe* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985) 126–129.

[38] J. H. Charlesworth, "The Concept of the Messiah in the Pseudepigrapha" in *Aufstieg und Neidergang der römischen Welt,* 2, 19, 1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979) 188–218; Charlesworth, *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha and the New Testament, SNTS* Monograph Series 54 (Cambridge: CUP, 1985) 87–93.

[39] *Jesus and the Constraints of History* (Philadelphia: Wstminster, 1982) 80–82; 139–143, 149–153; see also J. A. T. Robinson, *The Priority of John* (London: SCM, 1985) 206–208.

[40] See the strong case for a Spirit-christology made by James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit* (London: SCM, 1975).

[41] I have argued the point more fully in *Miracles and the Critical Mind* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984) 293–325; *That You May Believe* 110–150; and "Synoptic Miracle Stories: A Jewish Religious and Social Setting," *Foundations and Facets Forum* 2, 4 (1986): 55–76. Other discussions of Jesus' social deviance as the root of the onflict with the authorities

of the people in accordance with the teaching of the Torah (Deut. 13:1–5). I believe that this explains why the Pharisees took counsel how to destroy him (Matt. 12:14) and why he was accused of being possessed by Satan (Matt. 12:24). To Jesus' followers, however, Jesus' actions were to be attributed to the Spirit (Matt. 12:17–18, 28–32). When viewed in this light, the question put to Peter in the district of Caesarea Philippi involved a question about which spirit really possessed Jesus and a question about which side Peter was on. The authorities had already made up their minds that Jesus was Satanic and should be liquidated.

(4) *The Jonah Theme.* The Jonah theme (Matt. 12:40–41; 16:4) raises complex redactional questions.[42] Here I wish to make three observations. First, there is more to the sign of Jonah than a prediction of the resurrection. Jesus, like Jonah, was deemed to be an evildoer under divine condemnation whose death would remove the evil and restore peace (Jonah 1:7–16). Second, the designation "Simon Bar-Jona" (Matt. 16:17) may perhaps best be understood as a statement that Simon through his confession now stands in a filial relationship to Jesus as the new Jonah. As such, he must be prepared for the same fate as his master (cf. Matt. 16:24–28). Third, the sign of Jonah ties in with the above interpretation of the gates of Hades. The psalm in Jonah speaks of going "down to the land whose bars were closed upon me forever" (Jonah 2:6). Yet the Lord brought Jonah's life from the Pit, and heard his prayer from his holy temple. The prophet is dispatched to the realm of the dead by men who are convinced that they are doing God's will by removing evil from their midst. But the bars of death do not prevail.

D. Conclusion

Let me now sum up my conclusion. I wish to propose that the saying that "the gates of Hades shall not prevail" against the church has to do with the divine imperative to go to Jerusalem. It is occasioned by Peter's confession of Jesus as the Christ, which inaugurates a new and climactic phase in Jesus' activity. Like the rejected figure in Psalm 118 Jesus seeks entrance to the temple through the gates of righteousness. But in view of his rejection by the priestly authorities the gates of righteousness turn out to be the gates of death. With the death of Jesus wickedness reaches new depths, and the holy city is the city of death.[43] If this is correct, "the gates of Hades" is an ironical designation of Jerusalem under the rule of the contemporary religious authorities who reject Jesus. The term may thus be added to the list of examples of irony that are increasingly being recognized in the Gospels.[44] To say that the gates of Hades will not prevail against the

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(continued)
include David E. Aune, "Magic in Early Christianity," in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, 2, 23, 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 1507–1557; Paul W. Hollenbach, "Jesus, Demoniacs, and Public Authorities: A Socio-Historical Study," *JAAR* 49 (1981): 567–588.

[42] See R. A. Edwards, *The Sign of Jonah in the Theology of the Evangelists and Q*, *SBT* Second Series 18 (London: SCM, 1971).

[43] Jerusalem is called "the holy city" again, but significantly it is after the rending of the temple veil and after the death and resurrection of Jesus (Matt. 27:53). Death is no longer able to hold Jesus and the saints.

[44] See (e.g.) J. Jónsson, *Humor and Irony in the New Testament*, *BZRG* 28 (Leiden: Brill, 1985); Paul D. Duke, *Irony in the Fourth Gospel* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1985); James M. Dawsey, *The Lukan Voice: Confusion and Irony in the Gospel of Luke* (Macon: Mercer, 1986). Jónsson sees humor and irony in the name given to Peter in Matt. 16 (pp. 175, 204–205).

church is to repudiate the opposition, and to express confidence in divine vindication, restoration, and the ultimate survival of the messianic community.

In other words, I wish to suggest that Matt. 16:18c is a laconic, cryptic way of stating what is developed in the more general and unambiguous terms of Easter theology in Matt. 16:21 and parallels: "From that time Jesus began to show his disciples that he must go to Jerusalem and suffer many things from the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and on the third day be raised" (cf. Mark 8:31; Luke 9:22). In short, it is a passion and vindication prediction. It may even reflect an original form of the passion prediction in a pre-Easter form. But it may also contain a further note of irony. *Hadēs* in Matt. 11:23 is the place of judgment. Jesus was judged as an evildoer and, if one might put it like this, was condemned to *hadēs*. But the oracle of Matt. 16:18c suggests a reversal of roles. The holy city itself and its temple will be cast down in judgment (cf. Matt. 23:38; 24:2).

Is there any reason to think that Matt. 16:18 contains an allusion to Psalm 118 apart from the use of the word "gates" and the congruence of ideas that I have suggested? I believe that there may well be in view of the "rock" motif, if the rock on which the church will be built belongs to the same complex of ideas as Matt. 21:42 which explicitly refers to Psalm 118:22–23. Jesus has already been rejected (Matt. 12:14, 24), and he in turn has accused his adversaries of blasphemy against the Spirit (Matt. 12:30–32). As the Christ Jesus must go to Jerusalem (Matt. 16:21), and events must play themselves out. Is the saying feasible as an utterance of the historical Jesus? Certainly the term *pylai hadou* is widely thought to reflect an underlying Semitic term. The use of OT Scripture here appears to be compatible with the Targumic interpretation that Jesus seems to have used.[45] The saying also seems to satisfy criteria for an utterance to be regarded as a prophetic oracle of Jesus.[46] In view of the already determined opposition to Jesus, it is certainly feasible to think of his journey to Jerusalem as walking into a death trap.[47] But in the end the answer to our question will largely be determined by the answer we give to the questions: "Did Jesus think of himself as the Lord's anointed, and what did this entail?"

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[45] See Bruce D. Chilton, *A Galilean Rabbi and his Bible* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1984) 172–181.

[46] See D. E. Aune, *Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) 177–179. See also Aune's discussion of the oracles concerning the temple and Jerusalem (pp. 173–177).

[47] So Bieder, *Vorstellung* 46.

Parables and the Kingdom
The Vision of Jesus in Fiction and Faith

Charles W. Hedrick
Southwest Missouri State University

Introduction

New Testament scholarship has, in the main, been quite positive about two aspects of the Jesus tradition: i.e., that the proclamation of the Kingdom of God is an essential feature of the message of Jesus, and that Jesus announced his message of the Kingdom of God in "parabolic" stories. Any discussion of the "historical Jesus"[1] will include, therefore, an analysis of the sayings of the Kingdom and also the parables of Jesus.[2]

Because a number of the parables are formally associated by the synoptic evangelists with the Kingdom,[3] it is usually assumed that all of the parables are "full of the secret of the kingdom of God."[4] Of course how the parables and the kingdom are related is far

[1] The term "historical Jesus" is actually a misnomer, if one assumes that the figure that can be reconstructed from sayings validated by the "criteria for originality" is Jesus as he "actually was." What one accomplishes in applying these criteria is to reconstruct a rather radical Jesus, a figure who has little in common with early Christianity or first-century Judaism. Norman Perrin who was first to set out these criteria as such (though was certainly not the first to use them for judging the originality of the tradition) clearly recognizes this. See his statement in Norman Perrin and Dennis Duling, *The New Testament: An Introduction* (2nd ed.; New York: Harcourt/Brace/Jovanovich, 1982) 405. For the most recent survey of the criteria see M. E. Boring, "The Historical-Critical Method's 'Criteria of Authenticity': The Beatitudes in Q and Thomas as a Test Case" in C. W. Hedrick, ed., *The Historical Jesus and the Rejected Gospels* (Semeia 41, forthcoming).

[2] See N. Perrin, *Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) 47.

[3] See C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (revised ed.; Collins: London and Glascow, 1961) 27–28.

[4] The statement is quoted with approval by J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus* (revised ed.; New York: Scribners, 1963) 230. The association of the parables with Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God is routinely made by modern scholars. Indeed such an association may be said to be one of the primary assumptions of the modern study of the parables of Jesus. Compare for example: M. Boucher, *The Parables* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1983) 59; R. H. Stein, *An Introduction to the Parables of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981) 82–147; S. McFague, *Speaking in Parables* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 78–79; M. A. Tolbert, *Perspectives on the Parables: An Approach to Multiple Interpretations* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 116; J. D. Crossan, *In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) 23–36; R. W. Funk, *Parables and Presence: Forms of the New Testament Tradition* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 3; D. O. Via, *The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967) 95, 104–5; James Breech, *The Silence of Jesus: The Authentic*

from clear in the gospel literature and that lack of clarity is responsible for an extensive history of parables' interpretation that commences with the earliest level of the Jesus tradition. Not even the gospels themselves uniformly agree on the meaning of the parables they share in common.

It is somewhat shocking to realize that critical study of the parables is just one hundred years old. Until Adolf Jülicher's pivotal study of parables in 1888–89, the parables were thought to be allegories whose interpretive key lay in understanding them in the context of the Christian church.[5] In reaction to the excessive and fantastic detail of allegorical interpretation, Jülicher argued that parables were stories that made a single (moral) point. Later, drawing upon the work of Schweitzer, C. H. Dodd argued that the parables were to be interpreted against a background of early Jewish apocalyptic; or, more pointedly, the parables of Jesus were parables of the Kingdom of God.[6] Jeremias, following Dodd's stress on the parables as teaching about the Kingdom of God, reconstructed the earliest form of the parables and argued their one point meaning (following Jülicher) against a hypothetical setting in the first-century context of Jesus's preaching to the masses, and debates with the Jewish religious authorities.[7] Dodd had also pointed out that "at its simplest the parable is a metaphor or simile drawn from nature or common life, arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and leaving the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease it into active thought."[8] Recent studies, following Dodd's stress on the metaphorical quality of the parables, emphasize their linguistic character as stories that function symbolically and metaphorically.[9] The reader is directed to Norman Perrin's, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom* as the best brief overview of the history of parables interpretation.[10]

What are "parables" and how have they functioned in early Christian literature? These two questions are, it seems to me, intimately related. In this paper I wish to survey the evidence from early Christian literature for formulating answers to the questions, and to consider the significance of the survey for developing a hermeneutic for the parables.

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Voice of the Historical Man (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 66–74; B. B. Scott, *Jesus, Symbol Maker for the Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981) 5–22; J. R. Michaels, *Servant and Son: Jesus in Parable and Gospel* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981) 89–91.

[5] See the excellent brief review of the history of Parables interpretation by Norman Perrin, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) 89–181 and also the study by G. V. Jones, *The Art and Truth of the Parables. A Study in their Literary Form and Modern Interpretation* (London: S.P.C.K., 1964) 3–54.

[6] See the preface to Dodd, *Parables of the Kingdom.* In particular see page 28: "I shall try to show that not only the parables which are explicitely referred to the Kingdom of God, but many others do in fact bear upon this idea."

[7] Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus,* 115–229. The principle of interpreting the parables against a first-century Palestinian background is correct, but we scarcely know the actual historical context of any of the sayings. Compare pp. 128–32, however, where Jeremias accepts Luke's setting for the parable of the Prodigal Son/Elder Brother as the "historical context."

[8] Dodd, *Parables of the Kingdom,* 16.

[9] See, for example, the discussion by Crossan, *In Parables,* 7–36.

[10] See pp. 89–193.

I. An Inventory of Parables in Early Christian Literature

In this section I wish to survey early Christian texts whose date of origin may reasonably be assigned to the first century C.E. Apart from the Synoptic Gospels, there are actually few sources for sayings of Jesus that may be assigned to the first century. Although the Gospel of John is a first-century text, it is not a source for the narrative (plot) parables of Jesus. It does not use the word "parable" (παραβολή) and it does not report any of the "story" parables that are found as a hallmark of the teaching of the synoptic Jesus.[11] Ron Cameron's excellent little book, *The Other Gospels: Non-Canonical Gospel Texts,*[12] identifies other early Christian gospel texts that reasonably might be dated into the first century. Even in expanding the data base to include noncanonical texts, however, the number of narrative (plot) parables that can be collected is disappointingly small.

What is it that we inventory when we make a list of "parables"? In the main there is general agreement on what constitutes the corpus of Jesus' "parabolic" discourse. A distinction is usually made among types of sayings in the "parabolic" discourse. For example it is customary to distinguish among parables, similes, similitudes, metaphors, aphorisms, and example stories. And there are also formal differences among those sayings in the gospels that are designated by the evangelists as "parables." For example, Luke refers to the story about the Lost Sheep as a "parable" (15:3), but Matthew (18:10–14) does not. Luke also calls the figures of the unshrunk cloth and the new wine in old wine skins (5:36–39) *a* (i.e., one) parable but Matthew (9:16–17) and Mark (2:21–22) do not use the term "parable" to describe these two figures. The forms of these two literary units (the story of the Lost Sheep, and the figures of the unshrunk cloth/new wine in old wineskins) are quite different. The sheep saying is a "story" that has narrative "plot" (i.e., a structural plan having beginning, middle, and end), while the sayings about the unshrunk cloth and new wine in old wineskins are figurative language, and are characterized by Crossan as aphorisms.[13] In any case, while they trade in metaphor, they are not stories having a "plot" (i.e., beginning, middle, and end); they are more similar to John's figures of the good shepherd and the sheepfold, rather than to Luke's story of the Samaritan.

For the purposes of this paper, I am interested in making an inventory[14] of the "stories" of Jesus, that is to say, I am interested in narrative units that have "plots," i.e., narratives with a structural plan consisting of beginning, middle and end.[15] I have in the chart that follows set out all versions of the stories attributed to Jesus that appear in early Christian

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[11] See the discussion below.

[12] R. Cameron, *The Other Gospels: Non-canonical Gospel Texts* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982).

[13] J. D. Crossan, *In Fragments: The Aphorisms of Jesus* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983) 121–27.

[14] Compare the inventory by Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus,* 247–48 and the most recent inventory by J. D. Crossan, ed., *Sayings Parallels: A Workbook for the Jesus Tradition* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 2–20. My inventory will differ from both of these two lists. I do not include in my inventory of "parables" the following listed by Jeremias: the Budding Fig Tree (Mark 13:28–29, Matt 24:32–33, Luke 21:29–31), the Children in the Marketplace (Matt 11:16–19, Luke 7:31–35), the Servant Supervisor (Matt 24:45–51, Luke 12:42–46), the Last Judgment (Matt 25:31–46), the Closed Door (Luke 13:24–30).

[15] The criterion is taken from Aristotle's *Poetics,* vii.1–7: see the Loeb edition: W. H. Fyfe, *Aristotle, the Poetics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953) 29–31. See Crossan (*Sayings Parallels,* xi) who uses the same criterion.

Jeremias	Crossan Title Numb.	*Ap. Jas.* *Jas.*	"L"	"M"	"Q"	Thomas Log. # Pg.&Ln.	(Luke)	(Matt)	Mark	Source Title
The Sower	The Sower #1					#9 34,3-13	8:5-8a	13:3b-8	4:3-8	A Sower
Patient Husband-man	The Harvest Time #16					#21d 37,15-18			4:26-29 4:26-29	A Sprout-ing Seed
The Mustard Seed	The Mus-tard Seed #3					#20 36,28-33	13:19	13:31b-32	4:31-32	A Mustard Seed
Wicked Husbandman	The Tenants #3					#65 45,1-15	20:9b-16a	21:33b-40	12:1b-9	A Vineyard
Return of Unclean Spirit	Ø				M12:43-45a L11:24-26a					The Unclean Spirit
The Door Keeper	The Return-ing Master #17						12:36-38		13:34	A Man Going on a Journey
Going before the Judge	Ø				M5:25-26 L12:58-59					On Settling out of Court
Ø	Ø				M7:24b-27 L6:48-49					Two Houses
The Tares among the Wheat	The Planted Weeds #2			13:24b-30		#57 42,34-43,7				Good Seed and Weeds

Jeremias	Crossan Title Numb.	*Ap. Jas.* *Jas.*	"L"	"M"	"Q"	Thomas Log. # Pg.&Ln.	(Luke)	(Matt)	Mark	Source Title
The Leaven	The Leaven #4				M13:33b L13:21	#96 49,2-5				The Leaven
The Treasure	The Treasure #5			13:44		#109 50,31-51,3				The Hid Treasure
The Pearl	The Pearl #6			13:45		#76 46,14-18				Merchant in Search of Pearls
The Seine Net	The Fish Net #7			13:47-48		#8 33,29-34,2				A Net Thrown into the Sea
The Lost Sheep	The Lost Sheep #8				M18:12-13 L15:4-6	#107 50,23-27				The Lost Sheep
The Unmerciful Servant	The Unmerciful Servant #9			18:22-34						A King Settling Accounts
The Good Employer	The Vineyard Laborers #10			20:1-5						The Wage of the Workmen
The Father's Love	The Prodigal Son #23		15:11-32							The Prodigal Son/Elder Brother
The Two Sons	Ø			21:28-30						The Two Sons

Jeremias	Crossan Title Numb.	*Ap. Jas.* *Jas.*	"L"	"M"	"Q"	Thomas Log. # Pg.&Ln.	(Luke)	(Matt)	Mark	Source Title
The Guest without a Wedding Garment	The Feast #12				M22:2-10 L14:16-23	#64 44,10-34				The Feast
The Ten Virgins	The Closed Door #14		[13:25?]	25:1-10						The Lamps of the Maidens
The Talents	The Entrusted Money #15				M25:14-28 L19:12b-24					The Entrusted Money
The Two Debtors	Ø		7:41-42a							The Two Debtors
The Good Samaritan	The Good Samaritan #13	10:30-35								The Samaritan
The Friend Asked for Help at Night	Ø		11:5-8							The Persistent Friend
The Rich Fool	The Rich Farmer #18		12:16b-20			#63 44,3-9				The Rich Man
The Barren Tree	The Barren Tree #19		13:6b-9							The Barren Fig Tree
The Tower Builder	The Tower Builder #20		14:28-30							The Tower Builder
The King Contemplating a Campaign	The Warring King #21		14:31-32							The Warring King

Jeremias	Crossan Title Numb.	*Ap. Jas.* *Jas.*	"L"	"M"	"Q"	Thomas Log. # Pg.&Ln.	(Luke)	(Matt)	Mark	Source Title
The Lost Drachma	The Lost Coin #22		15:8-9							The Lost Coin
The Unjust Steward	The Unjust Steward #24		16:1b-7							The Dishonest Steward
The Rich Man and Lazarus	The Rich Man and Lazarus #25		16:19-31							A Rich Man and Lazarus
The Servant's Reward	Ø		17:7-9							The Servant
The Unjust Judge	The Unjust Judge #26		18:2-5							The Unjust Judge
The Pharisee & the Publican	Pharisee and Publican #27		18:10-13							The Pharisee & the Publican
The Little Children in the Field	Children in Field #31					#21a 36,35-37,6				Children in Field
The Careless Woman	The Empty Jar #32					#97 49,8-14				The Empty Jar
The Slayer	The Assassin #33					#98 49,16-20				The Assassin
Ø	The Palm Shoot #28	7,24-28								The Date Palm Shoot
Ø	Grain of Wheat #29	8,16-23								The Grain of Wheat
Ø	Ear of Grain	12,22-27								The Ear of Grain

texts that may plausibly be dated within the first century C.E. This first chart indicates the various versions of the individual stories by literary source; the citations to the stories consciously exclude what I take to be early Christian interpretation, or "enhancement," appended as a conclusion to each. Hence all that is indicated in the chart are those verses I take to be part of the narrative plot of the story. For convenience I have followed the usual titles for these story "parables" as they appear in the inventories of Jeremias and Crossan, except where I felt it necessary to change.[16]

Although both Crossan and I are following the same criterion for identifying the story "parables," we have arrived at slightly different results. I have designated as stories six more narrative units than Crossan, as having features of plot. They are "the Unclean Spirit," "On Settling out of Court," "the Two Houses," "the Two Sons," "the Two Debtors," "the Persistent Friend," and "the Servant."

Of these stories the Unclean Spirit, the Two Houses, the Two Sons, and the Two Debtors in my opinion are clearly stories reflecting narrative plot and need no further argument to justify their inclusion in the inventory. The other three (On Settling out of Court, the Persistent Friend, and the Servant), while not cast in story form in their extant versions, nevertheless, give clear evidence of narrative structure, i.e., they are more story than simple figure. I am not assuming that these stories derive from an originally abbreviated ur-story, though I would not exclude that possibility. I am merely arguing that in their present form there exists enough of a narrative structure to qualify them as story and hence have included them in my inventory.

On Settling out of Court (Matt 5:25–26=Luke 12:58–59) concerns an individual (whom the story in its present form casts as "you") who has been sued by another party (a nameless accuser) over a debt. The reader is not permitted to see the beginning of the story where the loan is made, or to know the circumstances that led to the court action, but one naturally assumes these lacking elements, and subsconsciously projects them onto the existing structure, when one consents to enter the story world. The story picks up at its middle part, i.e., as the case is being called before the bench. The conclusion is presented proleptically as two possibilities. The story calls on the hearer to provide a conclusion from two possible endings. Either reconciliation is made and the story ends comically before a trial takes place, or the case goes before the bench and the story ends tragically. But in either case, an anticipated conclusion to the story "exists" proleptically before the reader.

The story of the Persistent Friend (Luke 11:5–8) describes an individual who has a guest that suddenly arrives after a journey and the individual discovers that there is no food in the house to serve the unexpected guest. This beginning of the story exists only in the middle part in the host's stated explanation to the householder from whom he wishes to borrow. The reader will, however, necessarily "evoke" that beginning retroactively as the required circumstance from which the middle part of the story necessarily derives. The host, therefore, goes to his friend and requests three loaves with which to entertain the unexpected guest. It is at this (middle) point that the reader actually enters the story. The hour being late, the sleeping friend refuses the request of the individual who was caught unawares by the unexpected guest and tells him not to bother him since he has retired for the night. The story ends with the narrator's authoritative conclusion that the insistent person will receive the loaves he requested because of his persistence. Although that particular event is not "shown" as a part of the story, the reader naturally infers it and that

[16] The whole issue of titles for the parables should be rethought in the light of a literary/critical analysis of the structure of the parables.

inference satisfies the reader's sense of closure.

The Servant (Luke 17:7–9) describes an individual (whom the story casts as "you") who has a servant (δοῦλος) tasked with plowing, tending sheep, and waiting tables. Although this information is not formally stated as the circumstance from which the action in the story proceeds, it is naturally to be inferred as the case by the reader who consents to enter the story. I take it as the beginning of the story. The reader enters the story at its middle part as the servant comes in from the field at meal time. Again the conclusion to the story is presented as two possibilities, and it is left to the reader to fill in the "actual" conclusion from these two potential endings. Is the servant invited to the table to dine with the master of the house or is he directed to prepare the master's meal? While the conclusion is not actually "shown," it exists proleptically in the two options presented for the reader's response. In each of these three "narratives" there appears to me to be sufficient evidence of plot to justify including them in the inventory of story "parables."

II. How Do These Stories Function in Early Christian Literature?

A. Mark

The earliest extant discussion of the function of these stories is found in the Gospel of Mark (4:1–34). According to Mark's theory of "parables" (4:10–12), the stories function as secret ciphers whose meaning/significance is not intended by Jesus for the enlightenment of the masses but only for the disciples,[17] those who belong to the inner group around Jesus. Indeed according to Mark Jesus generally speaks in enigmatic riddles in order to keep outsiders from understanding, for if they understood they would "turn and be forgiven" (4:12).[18] Mark 4:11–12 and 34, the heart of the theory, is probably a pre-Markan tradition describing one view of Jesus' teaching by some anonymous Christian group that flourished between the death of Jesus and the writing of Mark (i.e., roughly C.E. 30–70).[19] But it is nevertheless true that Mark uses it and interprets Jesus' "parabolic" (i.e., story-telling) discourse in the light of it.

All but two of Mark's story "parables" appear in chapter four: i.e., a Man Going on a Journey (13:34) and the allegory of a Vineyard (12:1b–9). An analysis of Mark's treatment of these stories demonstrates that Mark regarded them as "allegories." That is to say, they are stories that say one thing but mean something quite different. In a true allegory one describes one subject under the guise of another suggestively similar subject. The elements of the allegory are cast in such a way so as to have a one-to-one correlation with the "real" subject being described.[20] When one "allegorizes" an already existing story, one brings a different subject to the story and attempts to correlate elements of the existing story to the reality existing in the mind of the allegorist. This appears to be what Mark has done with the story of a Sower. Compare Mark 4:9. where Mark invites his reader

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[17] David Rhodes, "Narrative Criticism and the Gospel of Mark," *JAAR* 50 (1982) 424–25.

[18] Mark's parable theory has been treated to extensive discussion. See in particular Jeremias. *The Parables of Jesus,* 13–18 and C. E. Carlston, *The Parables of the Triple Tradition* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 97–109.

[19] Jeremias (*The Parables of Jesus,* 15) and Carlston (*Parables of the Triple Tradition,* 101) agree on this point.

[20] See the discussion by John MacQueen, *Allegory* (London: Methuen, 1970).

to hear "more" in the story than it actually says. For example, the story of a Sower/Seeds/Ground (Mark 4:3–8) describes the difficulty of farming in first-century Palestine. Yet Mark's "explanation" (4:14–20) makes a one-to-one correlation of the elements of the farming story to the difficulties of ecclesiastical evangelism in the first century. This "interpretation" is the real subject of Mark's interest. Once that is stated, Mark no longer needs the story. Allegorical interpretations are "carnivorus"; they consume and dispense with "stories."

The collection of sayings (4:21–25) extended as "discourse" following the interpretation to the story of a Sower supports the view that the stories in Mark's understanding are really ciphers, or riddles, whose concealed meaning is only open to a select group. I assume that 4:21–25 is to be read in the light of Mark's calculated literary frame (i.e., 4:10–11 and 4:33–34) provided for the segment in which 4:21–25 appears, as well as in the light of the model interpretation of the story of a Sower (4:14–20). Hence, I read this section (4:21–25) as I assume Mark intended for the collection of sayings to be understood. Mark 4:21: The lamp/bushel, bed/stand image implies that these stories do contain the secret of the Kingdom of God (4:11) intended only for the disciples. One does not conceal the "light," for the lamp is intended to illuminate. Mark 4:22: That which is concealed in the stories is intended to be revealed. Mark 4:23 (cf. 4:9) is an invitation to the disciple to seek after that secret meaning concealed in the stories. Mark 4:24–25 affirms the inner group of disciples as the only ones who can understand the concealed message about the Kingdom of God. Mark 4:26–29 and 4:30–32 are stories that conceal information about the Kingdom of God. In the light of Mark's interpretation to the story of a Sower (4:14–20) and the allegory of a Vineyard (12:1b–9) it seems clear that Mark would understand these two stories in an ecclesiastical/Christological sense, although Mark does not provide the reader with any formal interpretation.

B. Matthew

Matthew agrees with Mark that the stories are allegories, i.e., that they are stories that contain secrets about the Kingdom of God[21] that must be explained (though he scarcely accepts Mark's "hardening" theory; cf. 13:10–17). And accordingly in Matthew one finds two fully developed allegorical explanations relating to early Christian eschatology (13:37–43,49–50) in addition to Mark's explanation of a Sower (Matt 13:19–23), which Matthew appropriated. In these explanations one notes both the detailed one-to-one correlation between the story and the experience of the church as well as the lack of consistency when each feature of the story cannot be fitted into the rather fantastic explanation.[22] Of course Matthew's briefer explanations of the other stories, appended as a short "moral" to the story, also assume that the stories relate to the life and faith of Matthew's early Christian community and in that sense the stories "mean" something quite different from what they actually say.[23]

A Vineyard (21:33b–40) is a story-become-allegory of Jesus' rejection by Israel (21:42–43). The possessed man in Jesus's story of the Unclean Spirit (12:43–45a) is an allegorical figure for Matthew's evil generation (12:45b). On Settling out of Court

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[21] See C. W. Hedrick, "The Treasure Parable in Matthew and Thomas," *Forum* 2.2 (1986) 41–56 for a redactional analysis of Matthew 13.

[22] See in particular Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, 66–89.

[23] I do not discuss here Matt 13:33b,44,45–46. They are allegorically interpreted by Matthew as being secrets about the Kingdom of God. See note 21 above.

(5:25–26) has no explanation appended by Matthew since it is not in the form of a story, but it is treated as an example of how the church ought to worship (5:23–24). The Two Houses (7:24b–27) also has no appended interpretation since it is offered by Matthew as an example (7:24a) of the life-style of the Christian scribe (to 7:24a, "wise man" [not in Luke] compare 13:52). The Lost Sheep (18:12–13) is an allegory on preserving the Christian disciple in the church (18:14). A King Settling Accounts (18:23–34) is an allegory on judgment (18:35). In the Wage of the Workmen (20:1–15) Matthew uses a floating saying (cf. 19:30; Mark 10:31; Luke 13:30) to indicate that the story is intended to illustrate reversal of rank at the last judgment (20:16).[24] The Two Sons (21:28–30) has no formally appended explanation since it is used by Matthew to illustrate the rejection of Israel at the last judgment (21:31).[25] And finally the Lamps of the Maidens (25:1–10) is an allegory on the parousia (25:13).[26]

C. Luke

While Luke also does not subscribe to Mark's "hardening" theory (and hence omits the offensive phrase "lest they should turn and be forgiven"–to Mark 4:12 cf. Luke 8:10), Luke nevertheless does regard the stories as allegories, i.e., concealed secrets about the Kingdom of God that must be explained to the disciples (8:9–10a) and concealed from outsiders (8:10b). Hence, Luke too, following Mark, offers a detailed explanation (8:11–15) to the story of a Sower (8:5–8a) followed by the cryptic statements about concealing and revealing (8:16–18) discussed above in connection with Mark 4:21–25. The result is the same; the message of the allegorical stories is still meant for the insider, although one may argue that Luke is more optimistic about the potential ability of the outsider to understand. For example, Luke does not make the sharp insider/outsider contrast that one finds in Mark (Luke omits the following: Mark 4:10, the statement about the outsiders in Mark 4:11, and the offensive "hardening" statement in Mark 4:12b; and stresses in Luke 8:18 that one should take care "how" one "hears," a statement suggesting that one may be able to understand if one listens carefully).

Luke follows Mark in the allegorical interpretation (20:16b–19) to the allegory of a Vineyard (20:9b–16a). Luke also takes the story of a Man Going on a Journey (12:36–38) as an allegory of the church's expection of the parousia (12:40). In Luke there is no appended interpretation to On Settling out of Court (12:58–59), since it is cast not as a story but as an admonition to make a correct judgment about proper human behavior (12:57) in the light of the fact that the parousia could occur at any moment (to judge from the eschatological nature of the context–12:35–56). Likewise the Two Houses (6:48–49) is cast as an example of what it means to be obedient to the Lord (6:46–47). The stories of the Lost Coin (15:8–9), the Lost Sheep (15:4–6), and the Prodigal Son/Elder Brother (15:11–32) Luke casts as allegories concerning the conversion of sinners, i.e., bringing the lost (cf. 15:24,32) into the church (15:1–2,7,10).

Luke is quite conservative in the explanation (14:24) to the story of the Feast (14:16–23), but the context (14:7–14,25–27) in which the story is placed suggests that Luke

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[24] See Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, 35.

[25] See Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, 80–81. The association of the figure with John the Baptist (21:32) was probably made before Matthew.

[26] I take Matt 25:11–12 to be Matthew's intensification of the story's conclusion in 25:10. The sayings in 25:11–12 are "floating" sayings; to Matt 25:12 compare Matt 7:23 and Luke 13:25b,27; to Matt 25:11 compare Luke 13:25a.

understands it as an allegory of the church's mission activities. The Entrusted Money (19:12b–24) conceals teaching about the church's expectation of the parousia (19:11). Hence the interpretive expansion (19:25–27) of the story relates to final judgment. The Two Debtors (7:41–42a) is not given as story, but functions for Luke as an example clarifying the gratitude of sinners at the forgiveness of God (7:36–39, 42b–50). The story of the Samaritan (10:30–35) is used by Luke as an example story illustrating what it means to act as a neighbor (10:25–29, 36–37). The Persistent Friend (11:5–8) is ofered by Luke as an example of how one ought to pray (11:2–4,9–13). The Rich Man (12:16b–20) functions as an example warning against the dangers of wealth (12:21) and as a warning against coveteousness (12:13–15). Luke offers no explanation for the following stories: a Mustard Seed (13:19), the Leaven (13:21), the Barren Fig Tree (13:6b–9), and a Rich Man and Lazarus (16:19–31). The Unclean Spirit (11:24–26a) seems to function as an example of the dangers of demon possession (11:26b), and in this case for Luke demon possession seems to be a figure for those who do not heed the "word of God" (11:27–28), i.e., the evil generation (11:29–32). The Tower Builder (14:28–30) and the Warring King (14:31–32) Luke uses as examples of the kind of personal evaluation that is required of those who will become disciples of Jesus. Compare the explanation of the two stories (14:33) and the context in which the stories are used (14:25–27).

The Dishonest Steward (16:1b–7) is an example story with a series of four different appended interpretations: 16:8—an example of shrewdness; 16:9—an example of "worldly wisdom"(?); 16:10–12—an admonition to a faithful use of "mammon"; 16:13—a warning that one can only serve God or "mammon."[27] Luke reads the Servant (17:7–9) as an example of Christian discipleship. Doing all that the Lord commands does not qualify one for praise; it was the least that one could do (17:10). The Pharisee and the Publican (18:10–13) serves Luke as an example story illustrating the Christian ideal of humility (18:9,14). The Unjust Judge (18:2–5) is Luke's illustration of persistence in prayer (18:1), and faithfulness in view of the parousia (18:6–8).

D. John

One of the interesting differences between the Synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of John is that John does not make any use of the stories that Mark (4:34) indicates was a characteristic feature of Jesus' teaching. The word παραβολή does not even appear in the Gospel of John. John does, however, use figurative language. For example, John uses the figures of the vine and the branches (15:1–8), the sheepfold (10:1–5,7–10) and the good shepherd (10:11–18). This kind of image language the author of John refers to as παροιμία, a word that can be translated as proverb, maxim, figure, comparison, or even by the word "parable"—but the point to note here is that John does not use the word παραβολή, nor does John make use of stories with narrative plot that are characteristic of Jesus' teaching in the Synoptic Gospels. John quite deliberately uses παροιμία (figure). Compare, for example the reaction of the crowd to Jesus' image of the sheepfold (10:6); it was regarded as a "figure" that they did not understand. In John the word παροιμία carries the idea of obscure language. The assumption of the text of John is that "figures" need explanation.[28]

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[27] The questionable moral character of the teaching of this story apparently created problems for a church that regarded them as ciphers for the kingdom of God, or as providing moral examples of right behavior for the community of faith.

[28] The "explanation" (10:7–10) to the figure of the sheepfold is equally obscure, however.

Indeed, figures in John are used in contrast to plain or open (παρρησία) language (cf. 16:16–30), the term "openly" or "plainly" (παρρησία) is used in contrast to secret or concealed language (7:4,13,26; 11:54 [public versus private]; 18:20–21). For example, compare the use of this language in John chapter 11. John 11:14 understands the figure (sleep for death) in John 11:11 as cryptic language that confuses the disciples (11:12), while the unraveling of the cryptic language is described as open or plain language (παρρησία –11:14).

Hence both the Synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of John agree that the language of Jesus was, in certain aspects, at the very least, unclear or cryptic, and this was particularly the case in his use of images and stories.

E. The Gospel of Thomas

The *Gospel of Thomas* has preserved fourteen story "parables" in their story form (logia 8, 9, 20, 21a, 57, 63, 64, 65, 76, 96, 97, 98, 107, 109) and one Marcan story "parable," (i.e., it appears in Mark in story form) in the form of a logion (a Sprouting Seed–log. 21d=*Gos. Thom.* II, *2*:37,15–18). Three of the story "parables" in Thomas were unknown in the canonical gospel literature prior to the discovery of the *Gospel of Thomas:* The Assassin (log. 98=*Gos. Thom.* II, *2*:49,16–20), The Empty Jar (Log. 97=*Gos. Thom.* II,*2*:49,8–14) and the Children in a Field (log. 21a=*Gos. Thom.* II, *2*:36,35–37,6).[29] One of the unusual features of the stories in Thomas is the virtual lack of appended contiguous allegorical interpretation that one finds so prominent in the canonical gospel literature. This feature in Thomas is so striking when compared with the character of the "parables" in the canonical gospels that it may be the best evidence we have that Jesus did not originally cast his stories as allegories, such as is the case in the canonical gospels.[30]

Thomas' use of the stories is striking. Seven have no appended contiguous interpretations whatsoever (a Sower-log. 9, a Mustard Seed-log. 20, the Good Seed and Weeds-log. 57, the Empty Jar-log. 97, the Assassin-log. 98, the Lost Sheep-log. 107, the Hid Treasure-log. 109). One of the stories in Thomas (the Feast-log. 64) has a brief antibusiness interpretation (viz., "tradesmen and merchants shall not enter the places of my father," 44,34–35).[31]

Two of the stories (Children in a Field-log. 21a, and a Merchant in Search of Pearls-log. 76) may have more extensive interpretation; it depends on how one understands the literary introductory frames for the sayings in Thomas.

The editors of the *editio princeps* of the *Gospel of Thomas* judged it to have 114 individual sayings on the basis of the fact that each saying is introduced by a schematic "Jesus said," or "he said." In certain instances they emended the text to include the introductory frame,

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[29] I regard the "parable" of the Great Fish (log. 8=II, *2*:33,28–34,2), as it has been titled by some, to be an earlier version of the story of a Net Thrown into the Sea in Matt 13:47–48; see Hedrick, "The Hid Treasure Parable in Matthew and Thomas," 44. Both are apparently variants of a traditional story; compare Aesop's fable "The Fisherman and the Fish." The fable describes a small fish (ὁ λεπτός) escaping through the net, while the "large fish" (ὁ μέγας) was caught: B. E. Perry, *Babrius and Phaedrus* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press/London: Heinemann, 1975) 8–11.

[30] See W. Stroker, "Extracanonical Parables and the Historical Jesus" in C. W. Hedrick, ed., *The Historical Jesus and the Rejected Gospels* (Semeia 41: to appear).

[31] The lack of such interpretations is unusual in the light of the opening lines to Thomas (32,10–19) where it is indicated that the "author" has in mind hidden meanings.

"Jesus said," apparently because they felt that they could clearly see the beginning of another different and separate logion (logia 27, 93, 101) and in other cases they felt that a new logion had begun because they recognized a different introductory frame (logia 6, 12, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 37, 43, 51, 52, 53, 79, 91, 99, 100, 104, 113, 114). Logion 69 they divide into two separate macarisms (69a and 69b) even though 69b is not introduced by an introductory frame. And once they emend the text to begin a new logion with "they saw" (log. 60). When one realizes that within the limits of what the editors of the *editio princeps* of Thomas regard as a single saying of Thomas, one can find several sayings that appear in the canonical gospels as separate and different sayings, one begins to suspect that the modern numbering system for Thomas may be somewhat arbitrary. Or put another way, the numbering system of Thomas in the *editio princeps* is a modern convenience and does not necessarily imply ancient scribal interpretation. Therefore what the ancient scribe understood to be the parameters of given logia must be argued in each individual case.

For example, when one compares numbered logion 21 to the synoptic tradition, it appears to be comprised of four different logia: the Children in a Field (36,35–37,6), the image of the householder (37,6–10), the interpretation to the image of the householder (37,10–15), and a Sprouting Seed (37,15–18). Is the image of the householder an interpretation of the Children in a Field, or have they simply been collected together, or were they conflated into and conceived as one saying in antiquity? While it seems clear that the householder and the immediately following interpretation are concretely related as saying and interpretation, such a connection is not as clear for the Children in a Field and a Sprouting Seed. On the other hand, logion 76b (46,19–22) does have the appearance of being an interpretation to the story of a Merchant in Search of Pearls.

What is more significant for understanding Thomas' use of these stories is that at the end of five of the stories (logia 8, 63, 65, 96, 21d [serves as a conclusion for log. 21]) Thomas has added the "floating" saying "He that has ears to hear, let him hear" as an invitation to the reader to reflect on the meaning of the story. This invitation, suggesting that the reader should "hear" more in the story than is actually stated, corresponds to the introductory frame of the *Gospel of Thomas* where the reader is invited to reflect on, and seek, the secret meaning of all the sayings (32,10–19). In other words, with the exception of one instance (or possibly two), Thomas does not openly tell the reader the point(s) the story is intended to score, but rather solicits the reader, any reader, in the search for the "meaning" that provides "eternal life." In this respect, Thomas is in open conflict with Mark's exclusivism, i.e. in Mark's contrast between insider and outsider.

The same floating saying inviting the reader to reflect on the meaning of the stories in Thomas is also used in connection with four of the canonical story parables. It ends a Sower (Matt 13:9, Mark 4:9, Luke 8:8) as its earliest conclusion. It comes at the end (13:43b) of Matthew's explanation (13:37–43a) of the Good Seed and Weeds (13:24b–30). Mark uses it at 4:23 following the lamp/bushel, bed/stand saying (4:21–22). And it is used by Luke at 14:35b (immediately following the cryptic statement of the salt–14:34–35a) following the double stories of the Tower Builder (14:28–30) and the Warring King (14:31–32).

I consider the use of this "floating" saying in connection with these stories to indicate that Thomas finds some "hidden" significance in the stories. In its conservatism in this regard, however, it contrasts rather dramatically with the allegorical interpretations drawn from the stories by the Synoptic Gospels. If the floating saying used in the synoptic tradition in connection with the stories be determined to be an early presynoptic

interpretation,[32] then one would have to conclude that the use Thomas makes of them also likewise probably stems from an earlier presynoptic memory, assuming Thomas to be independent of the synoptics.

F. The Apocryphon of James.

The *Apocryphon of James* clearly knows a "parables" tradition and even names certain of them: the Shepherds, the Seed, the Building, the Lamps of the Virgins, the Wage of the Workmen, the Didrachmae, and the Woman (*Ap. Jas.* I, *2*:8,1–10). Whether or not these titles correspond to the stories known in the canonical tradition is not completely certain.[33] I, however, regard the Wage of the Workmen and the Lamps of the Virgins to be early Christian titles for the stories that are usually designated by the titles "the Workers in the Vineyard" (Matt 20:1–15) and "the Ten Virgins" (Matt 25:1–10). The similarity seems to me to be too close to be accidental.[34]

In addition to mentioning these titles, the *Apocryphon of James* also reports three narrative story "parables," each of which is followed by a fully developed interpretation. The interpretation (I, *2*:7,29–35) to the Date Palm Shoot (I, *2*:7,24–28) is clearly allegorical, as well as cryptic and obscure. The Grain of Wheat (I, *2*:8,16–23) as a story is so heavily allegorized that one despairs of reconstructing the story from which it may have derived.[35] Its allegorical interpretation (I, *2*:8,23–27) is likewise cryptic. The interpretation to the story of the Ear of Grain (I, *2*:12:22–27) understands it to refer to the Kingdom of God, which appears to be a cipher for a certain kind of knowledge that brings wisdom (I, *2*:12:27–31).

III. What are Parables in Early Christian Literature?[36]

A. The Literary Classification "Parable"

1. The Synoptic Gospels

The Synoptic Gospels are scarcely consistent in what they designate by the rubric "parable." All three of the Synoptic Gospels agree that the following stories are to be designated as "parables" (παραβολή): A Sower (Matt 13:3,10,18; Mark 4:2,10,13,33–34; Luke 8:4,9–10), a Vineyard (Matt 21:33,45; Mark 12:1,12; Luke 20:9,19), and the Fig Tree (Matt 24:32; Mark 13:28, Luke 21:29). Neither Crossan nor I regard the Fig Tree "parable" as a story having narrative plot, since it is a simple image lacking the structure of a story. All three of the evangelists report the Mustard Seed but only Matthew (13:31) and Mark (4:2,30,33–34) describe it as a "parable." Luke (13:19) gives it no formal

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[32] So J. D. Kingsbury, *The Parables of Jesus in Matthew 13: A Study in Redaction-Criticism* (Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1969) 145, n. 50, and Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, 14, n. 8, and 109–10.

[33] See the discussion by F. E. Williams in H. W. Attridge, ed., *Nag Hammadi Codex I (The Jung Codex)* (NHS 22–23; Leiden: Brill, 1985) 2:21–22.

[34] It is less certain that "the Seed" is to be associated with the "parable" of the Mustard Seed in Mark 4:31–32=Matt 13:31b–32=Luke 13:19=Thomas II, *2*:36,28–33 (log. 20).

[35] See Cameron, *Sayings Traditions in the Apocryphon of James* (HTS 34; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 12–16.

[36] For the following discussion refer to charts #2 and #3.

X=has O=omits [/]=story lacking "Parable"	Designated as a parable in the introduction					Has an introduction calling for a comparison					Has an appended interpretation				
	Mk	Mat	Lk	Thos	Ap Jas	Mk	Mat	Lk	Thos	Ap Jas	Mk	Mat	Lk	Thos	Ap Jas
A Sower	X	X	X	Ø	[/]	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	[/]	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	[/]
A Sprouting Seed	Ø	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]
A Mustard Seed	X	X	Ø	Ø	[/]	X	X	X	X	[/]	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	[/]
A Vineyard	X	X	X	Ø	[/]	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	[/]	X	X	X	Ø?	[/]
The Unclean Spirit	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	X	[/]	[/]
A Man Going on a Journey	Ø	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
On Settling out of Court	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]
Two Houses	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]
Good Seed and Weeds	[/]	X	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]
The Leaven	[/]	X	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	X	X	[/]	[/]	Ø	Ø	Ø	[/]
The Hid Treasure	[/]	Ø	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	Ø	[/]
Merchant in Search of Pearls	[/]	Ø	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	X	[/]
A Net Thrown into the Sea	[/]	Ø	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	Ø	[/]
The Lost Sheep	[/]	Ø	X	Ø	[/]	[/]	Ø	Ø	X	[/]	[/]	X	X	Ø	[/]
A King Settling Accounts	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]
The Wage of the Workman	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]
The Prodigal Son/Elder Brother	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]
The Two Sons	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]
The Feast	[/]	X	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	X	X	X	[/])

X=has Ø=omits [/]=story lacking "Parable"	Designated as a parable in the introduction					Has an introduction calling for a comparison					Has an appended interpretation				
	Mk	Mat	Lk	Thos	Ap Jas	Mk	Mat	Lk	Thos	Ap Jas	Mk	Mat	Lk	Thos	Ap Jas
The Lamps of the Maidens	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]
The Entrusted Money	[/]	Ø	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	X	[/]	[/]
The Two Debtors	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]
The Samaritan	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
The Persistent Friend	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
The Rich Man	[/]	[/]	X	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	Ø	[/]
The Barren Fig Tree	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]
The Tower Builder	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø?	[/]	[/]
The Warring King	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
The Lost Coin	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
The Dishonest Steward	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
A Rich Man and Lazarus	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]
The Servant	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
The Unjust Judge	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
The Pharisee & the Publican	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]
Children in Field	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]
The Empty Jar	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]
The Assassin	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]
The Date Palm Shoot	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X
The Grain of Wheat	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X
The Ear of Grain	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	Ø	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X	[/]	[/]	[/]	[/]	X

Chart #3

THE "PARABLES": FORMS AND FRAMES

I. The designation of stories as "Parables" in the Synoptic Gospels

A. Common Tradition

1. All three designate the following as "Parable"
   A Sower
2. Mixed designation in Introductory Frame
   Mustard Seed (Matt, Mark = "parable"; Luke = not designated as "parable")

B. Matthew's Special Tradition

1. Designated as "parable"
   Good Seed and Weeds
2. Not designated as "Parable" in Introductory Frame
   Hid Treasure (but broader context implies that it is "parable")
   Merchant in Search of Pearls (but broader context implies that it is "parable")
   Net Thrown into the Sea (but broader context implies that it is "parable")
   King Settling Accounts
   Wage of the Workmen
   Two Sons
   Lamps of the Maidens

C. Luke's Special Tradition

1. Designated as "Parable"
   Rich Man
   Barren Fig Tree
   Unjust Judge
   Pharisee and Publican
2. Not Designated as "Parable"
   Introductory Frame
   Prodigal Son/Elder Brother
   Two Debtors
   Samaritan
   Persistent Friend
   Tower Builder
   Warring King
   Lost Coin
   Dishonest Steward
   Rich Man and Lazarus
   Servant

D. Mark's Special Material
   Not designated as "parable" in Introductory Frame
   A Sprouting Seed (but broader context implies it is "parable")

E. Q Material (Matthew and Luke)

1. Not designated as Parable in Introductory Frame
   Unclean Spirit
   On Settling Out of Court
   Two Houses
2. Mixed Designation in Introductory Frame
   Leaven (Matt = "parable"; Luke = not designated as "parable")
   Lost Sheep (Matt = not designated as "parable"; Luke = "parable")
   Feast (Matt = "parable"; Luke = not designated as "parable")
   Entrusted Money (Matt = not designated as "parable"; Luke = "parable")

II. Introductory Frames that Call for Comparison

A. All extant versions agree: stories that do not call for a comparison in introductory frames

Sower	Tower Builder
Vineyard	Warring King
Unclean Spirit	Lost Coin
On Settling out of Court	Dishonest Steward
Prodigal Son/Elder Brother	Rich Man and Lazarus
Two Sons	Servant
Samaritan	Pharisee and Publican
Persistent Friend	Two Debtors
Rich Man	Unjust Judge
Barren Fig Tree	

B. The Introductory Frames are divided on whether a comparison is called for
A Sprouting Seed (Mark=comparison; Thomas=no comparison)
Lost Sheep (Thomas=comparison; Matt, Luke=no comparison)
Feast (Matt=comparison; Luke, Thomas=no comparison)
Entrusted Money (Matt=comparison; Luke=no comparison)

C. In all extant versions a comparison is made between story and Kingdom of God/heaven/Father

Good Seed and Weeds	Lamps of the Maidens
Leaven	Empty Jar
Hid Treasure	Assassin
Merchant in Search of Pearls	Date Palm Shoot
Net Thrown into the Sea	Ear of Grain
King Settling Accounts	Mustard Seed
Wage of the Workmen	

D. A comparison is called for in all extant versions but to something other than the Kingdom
Net Thrown into the Sea (Thomas=to the "Man")
Two Houses (Matt, Luke=to one who hears and does Jesus' words)
Entrusted Money (Matt=to the return of the Son of Man)
Children in a Field (Thomas=to the disciples)
A Man Going on a Journey (Mark=to the return of the Son of Man)
Grain of Wheat (*Ap. Jas.*=to the "word")

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literary designation. They are also divided on the Leaven. Matthew (13:33) calls it a "parable," but Luke (13:21) does not, and Mark does not report it.

In the Matthean special material only the Good Seed and Weeds (13:24) is designated as a "parable" in an introductory frame. It is implied, however, by Matthew's broader literary frame (13:53) that the following are "parables": the Hid Treasure (13:44), a Merchant in Search of Pearls (13:45), and a Net Thrown into the Sea (13:47–48).

In the Lucan special material the following are designated as "parables": the Rich Man (12:16), the Barren Fig Tree (13:6), the Unjust Judge (18:1), and the Pharisee and the Publican (18:9). In the Marcan special material a Sprouting Seed is not in its own introductory frame designated as a "parable," although it is implied by Mark's broader literary frame (4:2,33–34) that it is a "parable."

In the material that Matthew and Luke share (Q), the evangelists are divided on the

following stories: Luke calls the Lost Sheep (15:3) and the Entrusted Money (19:11) "parables," but Matthew does not. Matthew calls the Leaven (13:33) and the Feast (22:1) "parables," but Luke does not. Neither Matthew nor Luke calls the following stories "parables": the Unclean Spirit, On Settling out of Court, and the Two Houses.

Finally, all three synoptic evangelists use the term "parable" to include units of material that do not have narrative structure. The image of the householder, regarded by Crossan as an aphorism,[37] is called a parable by Luke (12:41), but not by Matthew (24:43) or Thomas (log. 21b). Both Matthew (15:13–15) and Luke (6:39) agree that the aphorism of the blind man leading a blind man is a "parable." While Matthew (9:16–17) and Mark (2:21–22) know the twin aphorisms of the new patch on an old garment/new wine in old wineskins, only Luke (5:36–38) describes them as "parable." Mark, on the other hand, apparently regards the aphorisms in 4:21–22 as "parables" since they are included in the literary frame Mark 4:2,33–34, and Mark even concludes them with the "floating" saying (4:23) inviting the reader to reflect on the significance of the cryptic sayings, just as was done after the story of the Sower (4:9). Likewise Mark regards the Beelzebul controversy (3:23–26) with its appended aphorisms (3:27–29) as "parabolic" speech, although Matthew (12:25–32) and Luke (11:17–23) do not share this understanding of the formal designation of the pericope. Luke even regards Jesus' teaching on seating etiquette at a marriage banquet (14:8–10) as "parable" (14:7) and follows it with a moralistic conclusion (14:11), the same moral that Luke used for the Pharisee and the Publican (18:14b). Luke likewise designates the traditional proverb at 4:23 as "parable."

Thus, in the early Christian canonical literature there does not appear to be any consensus as to what the designation "parable" should include. "Parables" may be stories with narrative structure, aphorisms, proverbs, simple figures or images, or even discursive language which seems to reflect no imagery at all. The synoptic writers do seem to agree that "parables" are difficult-to-understand and cryptic sayings that need clarification. It is either that, or one must conclude that they regarded them as so banal that they could not possibly mean simply what they said, and hence surely must have had some esoteric meaning. In this latter respect they agree with the Gospel of John that regarded even the plain discursive language of Jesus as difficult to understand (16:16–30).

2. The Gospel of Thomas and the Apocryphon of James

The Gospel of Thomas does not use the word παραβολή; hence Thomas does not identify any of its stories, or any other literary form, by the designation "parable." The *Apocryphon of James*, on the other hand, is aware of the parables as a special literary tradition in the church. Not even the canonical gospels are as self conscious of parables as a formal literary tradition. James lists a collection of seven titles (I, 2:8,1–10) with no description of their contents, as though his readers were completely familiar with the "parable" designated by the title. Citing the "parables" by a specific title alone is enough to lead one to the conclusion that we are at a level of the tradition where the "parables" were recognized as a distinctive body of tradition, but it is the assumption of the author of James that the reader will evoke the contents of the "parables" by the title alone that confirms the parables collection behind Mark chapter four as a conscious literary tradition like sayings collections (Q and *logoi sophon*) and the early Christian *testimonia*.[38]

It is all the more interesting that James narrates three new stories that are attributed

[37] Crossan, *In Fragments: The Aphorisms of Jesus*, 58–61.

[38] On the testimony lists see R. Hodgson, Jr., "The Testimony Hypothesis," *JBL* 98 (1979) 361–78.

to Jesus, none of which are designated as "parables." The author of James, however, clearly regards these stories as a type of obscure discourse that must be explained to the reader; note the contrast between "speaking in parables" and "speaking openly" in *Ap. Jas.* I, 2:7,1-10. The fact that Jesus must remain on earth another eighteen days "for the sake of the parables" (8,1–4) implies that the named "parables" too are a type of obscure discourse (cf. 7:1-10).

B. Do the "Parables" (i.e., Narrative Stories) Call for a Comparison?

1. This may seem to be a question whose answer is obvious. After all, the very meaning of the word "parable" is a thing cast alongside something else to clarify it. The Greek word can even be translated by various comparative words, viz., figure and symbol. Indeed the whole history of scholarship has treated "parables" as image language of one sort or another: Today the stories of Jesus are widely regarded as metaphors or symbols evoking a broader conceptual reality. Again the evidence from early Christian literature is mixed.

Surprisingly there are nineteen stories whose introductory frames in all versions do not make a comparison between the story and some other reality outside the story. These are a Sower,[39] a Vineyard, the Unclean Spirit, On Settling out of Court, the Prodigal Son/Elder Brother, the Two Sons, the Two Debtors, the Samaritan, the Persistent Friend, the Rich Man, the Barren Fig Tree, the Tower Builder, the Warring King, the Lost Coin, the Dishonest Steward, a Rich Man and Lazarus, the Servant, the Unjust Judge, and the Pharisee and the Publican.

2. There are four stories where the evidence with regard to comparative introductory frame is divided among the various versions of the story. Some versions of the story do introduce the story with a literary frame that calls for a comparison to be made by the reader, but other versions of the story do not: the Lost Sheep (Thomas compares the story to the Kingdom, but Matthew and Luke have no introductory frame calling for a comparison), a Sprouting Seed (Mark compares the story to the Kingdom of God, but Thomas provides no introductory frame calling for a comparison), the Feast (Matthew compares the story to the Kingdom of Heaven, but Luke and Thomas provide no introductory frame calling for a comparison), the Entrusted Money (Matthew compares the story to the parousia (25:10,13–14?), but Luke provides no introductory frame calling for a comparison [but Luke does associate the story with the Kingdom of God–19:11]).

3. There are, however, thirteen stories where a comparison is made in all versions between the Kingdom of God (Heaven, Father) and the story: a Mustard Seed (Matthew, Luke, and Thomas–Kingdom of Heaven; Mark–Kingdom of God), the Good Seed and Weeds (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven; Thomas–Kingdom of the Father), the Leaven (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven, Luke–Kingdom of God; Thomas–Kingdom of the Father), the Hid Treasure (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven; Thomas–the Kingdom), a Merchant in Search of Pearls (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven; Thomas–Kingdom of the Father), a King Settling Accounts (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven), the Wage of the Workmen (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven), the Lamps of the Maidens (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven), the Empty Jar (Thomas–Kingdom of the Father), the Assassin (Thomas–Kingdom of the Father), the Date Palm Shoot (James–Kingdom of Heaven),

[39] This is true in all three versions. In the Synoptic Gospels, however, it is treated as figurative language by the inclusion of allegorical interpretations. The Thomas version, however, has no interpretation, or comparative introduction.

the Ear of Grain (James–Kingdom of Heaven), a Net Thrown into the Sea (Matthew–Kingdom of Heaven; Thomas–the Man).

4. In six instances stories are compared to something other than the Kingdom of God (Heaven, Father): In the story of a Net Thrown into the Sea Thomas makes a comparison to the "Man"; Matthew and Luke compare the Two Houses to one who hears and does the words of Jesus; Matthew compares the Entrusted Money to the return of the Son of Man; Thomas compares the Children in a Field to the disciples; James compares the Grain of Wheat to the Word; Mark compares a Man Going on a Journey to the return of the Son of Man; Luke compares it to the "disciples" in view of the return of the Son of Man.

IV. Analysis and Conclusions

The general conclusion of scholarship (beginning with the judgment of the author of the Gospel of Mark) from this rather surprisingly diverse and fluid use of the "parables" has been: (1) The "parables" of Jesus are intended to present the Kingdom of God/Heaven in various images. They are symbolical or metaphorical stories that evoke the Kingdom as their referrant. This includes even those stories that use no introductory comparative frame.[40] (2) The allegorizing and moralizing of the parables by the evangelists are to be rejected in principle because such interpretations derive from the life setting of the early church.[41] (3) The example stories, contrary to the understanding of early Christianity, were not really example stories that make moral points about some aspect of proper human behavior, but are actually figurative, i.e., symbolical and/or metaphorical.[42] (4) Indeed the decision has been made to reject, for the most part,[43] the early Christian understanding of the parables as to meaning but to accept largely without question the early Christian use of the parables as to function; that is to say, to accept that they are intended to make a comparison between a known area of human experience and a hidden concealed world. The reconstruction of an Aramaic *Vorlage* for the introductory comparative frame to the parables (viz., It is the case with the Kingdom of God as it is with. . . .) has been without serious question assigned to the historical Jesus, although it could equally well derive from early Palestinian Jewish Christianity.

It seems to me, however, that the evidence from early Christian literature proves a serious challenge to assuming automatically that Jesus used the stories figuratively. It would appear that the early Christian understanding of these stories as figurative could derive equally as well from the early Christian difficulty with understanding the language of Jesus (i.e., from the necessity that early Christianity sensed for deriving a relevant meaning from the sayings of Jesus, one that related to its *Sitz im Leben*), as it could from the historical Jesus himself.

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[40] In this regard compare Jeremias' interpretation to the story of a Sower, a story having no introductory comparative frame: *The Parables of Jesus*, 149–51, and also the interpretation by J. D. Kingsbury, *The Parables of Jesus in Matthew 13*, 35–37.

[41] See, for example, Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, 66–89.

[42] Compare the treatment of the story of the Samaritan by R. W. Funk, "The Good Samaritan as Metaphor" in R. W. Funk, *Parables and Presence; Forms of the New Testament Tradition* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 29–34.

[43] Cf. Jeremias (*The Parables of Jesus*, 31) who occasionaly accepts the synoptic literary setting of the "parable" as its historical setting in the life of Jesus.

On balance it seems more probable that early Christianity *resorted* to allegory to make sense out of Jesus' difficult-to-understand stories, than it is that early Christianity was led to allegory by the historical memory that Jesus was a paraboler. The diversity in the way the same stories are utilized in early Christian literature suggests that their use hinged on the interpreter's skill in making sense out of them, rather than on some innate metaphorical quality in the story itself. Some distance from the historical figure Jesus and the concrete historical setting of his teaching, and in the new context of the post-resurrection worshipping church, the sayings and stories of Rabbi Jesus are suddenly strange and require interpretation. Hence it seems to me that any argument for the symbolical/metaphorical use of the stories as stemming from the historical Jesus must show why that thesis is more plausible or convincing than the argument that such use of the stories derives from the frustration of early Christianity with the lack of an appropriate religious meaning for the stories in the crisis of the church's changing historical context.[44]

To put the matter differently, one must show why the following historical reconstruction is less plausible than the current assumptions about the stories of Jesus: Jesus told stories (that may or may not have had metaphorical/symbolical significance). The early church turned them into allegories and example stories because the stories as they were preserved had little significance for the changed and continually changing historical situation of the church. In time the entire corpus of the sayings tradition was treated as obscure or cryptic language, if the simple meaning could not be understood in terms of an ecclesiastical interpretation. With regard to the stories of Jesus, the stages of that evolution can be traced in Thomas' invitation to hear more in the stories than appears on the surface, the authoritative allegorical and example-story interpretations of the synoptic evangelists, the cryptic Jesus of John who puts everything in figures, and the exclusivistic Marcan parable theory that distinguishes between insiders and outsiders.

It is clear that the crisis of understanding Jesus runs throughout early Christian literature. John uses none of the problematical stories and even finds the "discursive" language of Jesus enigmatic, while Mark, who uses the stories, regards them as enigmatic allegories intended to keep the outsider from understanding, and which even required explanation for those inside the community of faith. If we reject Mark's understanding of the stories as allegories, why do we assume that Mark is correct about the figurative character of the stories? That too could derive from the absolute quandry the early church felt about the meaning of the stories. Our assumption that the stories are figurative could derive from the same frustration the early church felt. If his stories and figures are not more significant than what they say discursively, then Jesus is open to the charge of banality!

Jeremias' identification of an Aramaic *Vorlage* for the comparative frame that introduces some of the stories only proves that the loss of meaning occurred quite early, in the context of the Palestinian Jewish-Christian communities of faith. For example, one can easily imagine an early Christian prophet trying to make sense of the story of a Sower. Unless it is a figure that contains some hidden "spirtual" meaning, it appears to be an inane (although accurate) description of farming practices in first-century Palestine. But since Jesus was believed to be the resurrected Son of God such an interpretation is by definition an inadequate understanding of the story. Therefore it must have some latent secret meaning that related to the church, or the Kingdom of God. Under the inspiration of the

[44] This was recognized by A. T. Cadoux, *The Parables of Jesus: Their Art and Use* (New York: Macmillan, 1931) 24.

resurrected Christ, who dwelled in and among his people, significant interpretations were inevitable!

The understanding that the *Gospel of Thomas* has of the stories may reflect an earlier (pre-canonical gospels) stage in a development from simple story (with possible metaphorical or symbolical significance) to enigmatic saying. Thomas employs the comparative frame, but has virtually no appended contiguous interpretations, apart from the general invitation to look for a deeper meaning in the story (which is a tacit admission that the "meaning" of the stories was by the time of Thomas no longer self evident).

The fact that some of these stories have neither comparative frame nor appended contiguous interpretation that treats them comparatively requires explanation by anyone who would assume that Jesus intended to make comparisons with his stories. The following stories have neither comparative frame nor appended contiguous interpretation that treats them figuratively: a Sower (Matthew, Mark, Luke, Thomas), a Vineyard (Thomas), the Rich Man (Thomas), the Barren Fig Tree (Luke), the Two Debtors (Luke), and On Settling out of Court (Matthew, Luke).

Along with these, one should also consider those stories that have no introductory comparative frame, but nevertheless draw a simple moralistic lesson from the story, or are used as simple example stories, illustrating proper Christian behavior: the Unclean Spirit (Matthew and Luke), the Two Sons (Matthew), the Persistent Friend (Luke), the Servant (Luke), the Lost Sheep (Matthew and Luke), the Feast (Luke, Thomas), the Entrusted Money (Luke), the Rich Man (Luke), the Tower Builder and Warring King (Luke), the Lost Coin (Luke), the Dishonest Steward (Luke), the Unjust Judge (Luke) and the Pharisee and the Publican (Luke).

I think, therefore, that James Breech is correct that it is more likely that the introductory comparative frames to these stories derive from the early Christian community and should not be used as the crucial interpretive principle for understanding them as figurative.[45] The introductory comparative frames are evidence that the early church had problems making sense out of Jesus' stories as they were preserved. On the other hand it is the early church's difficulty with understanding the stories that may be the very best historical evidence for the metaphorical/symbolical character of Jesus' language, rather than the comparative frame itself.

The "parables" of Jesus are basically stories with a literary structure that may or may not have been told by the historical figure Jesus of Nazareth. Barnard Scott begins his recent paper for the Westar Institute's Jesus Seminar ("Essaying the Rock: The Authenticity of the Jesus Parable Tradition") with the premise that Jesus was a paraboler because of the relative lack of parables in the Greek and Jewish traditions. What is perhaps more significant is that he begins with the premise that the stories of Jesus, like the mashal, "reference a transcendent symbol."[46] But it should be noted that he *assumes* that these stories have metaphorical quality. I am inclined to agree that Jesus was a "teller of tales," since that fact appears to be reflected in all strands of our literary sources for Jesus of Nazareth: Q, Mark, M, L, Thomas, and James (and there may have been a parabolic story at the basis of the metaphors of the sheepfold and good shepherd in John, as well as behind some of the other sayings in the canonical gospels, viz. the good and wicked

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[45] James Breech, *The Silence of Jesus: The Authentic Voice of the Historical Man* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 66–74.

[46] B. B. Scott, "Essaying the Rock: The Authenticity of the Jesus Parable Tradition," *Forum* 2.1 (1980) 4.

servants, Matt 24:45–51a and Luke 12:42–46). But that such stories have metaphorical or symbolical quality is not to be *assumed* from an introductory comparative frame. Such a metaphorical or symbolical quality must be derived from the story itself.

This is the position taken by Robert Funk in his treatment of the story of the Leaven.[47] He looks for concrete evidence in the story itself that the story has a broader symbolical or metaphorical significance. In such instances one must ask oneself what is there in the story that "flips" the mind out of the narrow world of the story into a broader symbolical world. Usually it is some anomaly in the story, something that does not fit well, or exactly, the world of the story.[48] Funk finds three such "clues" to trigger his imagination in the story of the Leaven.[49]

> The proximity of the three terms, "leaven," "hide," "three measures of meal," within the confines of the brief sentence that comprises the parable, thus reverberate against each other and against the sedimented language tradition in such a way that the parable as a whole becomes plurisignificative. The terms are so subtly arranged that the unwary may well read it as a commonplace illustration of a commonplace bit of wisdom. But for the alert the parable triggers the imagination: The terms and the whole are set free to play against one another and against the tradition. Those who have ears hear strange voices.

The problem that one faces with the stories of Jesus is not unlike what one faces with the nature of language in general, since even discursive language is capable of several levels of significance at the same time. How exactly, for example, does one sort out irony or ridicule in a written text? Such language is subtle indeed! The problem is particulary acute in poetic language. For example, note the poem "My Star" by Robert Browning:[50]

> All I know
> Of a certain star
> Is, it can throw
> (Like the angled spar)
> Now a dart of red,
> Now a dart of blue;
> Till my friends have said
> They would fain see, too,
> My star that dartles the red and the blue!
> Then it stops like a bird; like a flower, hangs furled:
> They must solace themselves with the Saturn above it.
> What matter to me if their star is a world?
> Mine has opened its soul to me; therefore I love it.

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[47] R. W. Funk, "Beyond Criticism in Quest of Literacy: The Parable of the Leaven," *Interpretation* 25 (1971) 149–70.

[48] Of course the form in which we have the stories derives from the faith experience of early Christianity. Hence one must be careful to reconstruct the transmission history of the story, since without such reconstruction the "trigger" may derive from early Christian allegory. In this regard care must be taken to distinguish allegory from deliberate caricature.

[49] Funk, "Beyond Criticism," 162.

[50] As quoted in L. Perrine, *Sound and Sense: An Introduction to Poetry* (New York: Harcourt/Brace, 1956) 64.

Laurence Perrine in his discussion of this poem by Browning, in connection with a discussion of figurative language, finds that there is nothing in the language of the poem that causes one to think that the poem has symbolical significance. It is only the importance of the star to Browning "that makes us suspect that he is talking about something more [than just a star]."[51] Perrine "suspects" that the poem has symbolical significance, but his only clue is the unusual and unexpected feeling the poet expresses for the star. Stars do not have souls and one does not normally "love" stars. Though this may be only heightened poetical language, it is the esteem for the star that such language communicates that causes us to think that perhaps something more is being said. If the stories of Jesus are found to have metaphorical or symbolical significance that quality must be derived from the language of the story itself. It is the clue that one finds in the story proper that must trigger the symbolical world. Hence, one must justify one's position that the story has such a figurative quality by concretely pointing out, and quantifying, the trigger to the imagination in the story itself. These stories should not be initially approached with the assumption that they are symbols for the Kingdom of God, or some other cryptic reality. This is not to deny that the message of Jesus was vitally concerned with the Kingdom of God.[52] It is simply that we do not know how he used the stories, nor can we tell from the evidence in early Christian literature. We must begin with the story rather than the Kingdom of God, for even that expression itself is a symbol.[53]

These stories, if original with Jesus, are freely contrived and brief fictions that derive from the creative energies of Jesus' imagination.[54] They show a sharp economy in the presentation of characters/agents and plot. Most of them deal with human activity, although some few treat nature subjects and some concern superhuman activity.[55] They appear to have much in common with poetry, in that poetry too is a product of the poet's personal vision. A poem is a mimetic fiction, a product of the poet's imagination. According to Aristotle, the poet has the option of re-presenting in the poetic fiction things as they are or were, as they are believed to be, or as they should be.[56]

Hence the "imagination" of the poet produces a *mimesis* (i.e., a representation, an "image") that derives from the poet's personal vision of reality. This image may be cast realistically (Aristotle = the way things are or were) or "idealistically" (Aristotle = the way things are believed to be or should be) as paradox, comedy, or tragedy.

The stories of Jesus may trigger our minds into a broader symbolical world, but until one identifies and quantifies a certain trigger in the story itself, they should be read poetically—as freely created fictional descriptions of Jesus' poetic vision of reality. Hence, these tales of Jesus mean exactly what they say—and maybe more.

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[51] Perrine, *Sound and Sense*, 65.

[52] Compare, for example, Jesus' aphorisms about the Kingdom of God: Crossan, *In Fragments*.

[53] Perrin, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom*, 15–32.

[54] Compare D. O. Via, Jr., *The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967) 96. Compare J. R. Michaels, *Servant and Son*, 101-4 who affirms their "visionary" character but rejects a description of the parables as products of the creative imagination of Jesus: "he did not create or invent them. He experienced them" (p. 104).

[55] I break down the stories of Jesus into the following four categories: nature stories, societal stories, stories dealing with individual human action, and mythical stories. The stories that deal with superhuman activity are as follows: the Unclean Spirit, The Rich Man (only the version in Luke; in Thomas the story deals with individual human action), and the Rich Man and Lazarus.

[56] Aristotle, *Poetics*, xiv.25.1–7.

A Survey of Previous Scholarship on Philo's *De Somniis 1–2*

Earle Hilgert
McCormick Theological Seminary

Philo's two extant treatises on dreams have received relatively little specific attention in the course of Philonic scholarship. This is especially true of the second, which appears to have had negligible impact even on patristic thought and has been the object of surprisingly little direct attention in modern scholarship. In the present survey, we shall consider work that has been done on the mss. of *Somn*, editions and translations, and a number of specific studies, which deal in large part with questions of Philo's sources.

The Manuscripts

As with the Philonic corpus in general, the ms. traditions of *Somn* 1–2 were first thoroughly investigated by Leopold Cohn.[1] In addition to listing and discussing all mss. known to him, he was able to establish textual affinities for most of them. According to his determination, most of the mss. containing *Somn* 1 and/or 2 fall in three families, A, H, and UF, although several mss. stand outside these groupings. Cohn-Wendland's critical apparatus cites for *Somn* 1 the major representatives of these families (Codices A, H, F, P) and two others which stand apart from them (Codices G, M). For their edition of *Somn* 2, Cohn-Wendland depended only on Codex A.[2] Goodhart and Goodenough[3] in as far as mss. containing *Somn* 1–2 are concerned, list only those already identified by Cohn.[4] Their style of listing, however, is more succinct than the discursive manner of Cohn, and as a consequence the information they offer is more easily usable.

F. H. Colson, who was responsible for the editing of *Somn* 1–2 in the Loeb edition, contributed to our knowledge of the mss. by collating Codex Cantabrigiensis Collegii S. Trinitatis B 9, 6, which apart from those codices identified by Cohn as belonging to Family A, is the only one that contains *Somn* 2. Cohn had adjudged it as worthless and had, for practical purposes, left it unused.[5] Colson, however, while establishing its affinity with A, discovered that in "a not negligible number of cases" it was more correct.[6]

A subsequent discovery of importance for the text of *Somn* 1 was announced in 1977

[1] Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt (PCW)* (Berlin, 1896–1930; 1962) 1.I-LXX; 3,XIX-XX.

[2] *PCW* 3.XX.

[3] Howard L. Goodhart and Erwin R. Goodenough, *A General Bibliography of Philo Judaeus (GG)*, in Goodenough's *The Politics of Philo Judaeus* (New Haven, 1938) 139–54.

[4] One codex, Cantabrigiensis Collegii S. Trinitatis B 9, 6 (GG 121) is not discussed by Cohn in *PCW*, but in his earlier work, *Philonis Alexandrini libellus de opificio mundi* (Breslau, 1889) XXX; cf. PCW 1.LXXVI, and below.

[5] See n. 4 above.

[6] *PLCL* 5.606; cf. 5.433, n. *a*.

by P. J. Alexander as a result of his study of Codex Atheniensis Bibl. Nat. 880.[7] He had found this ms., a palimpsest, to contain as its underlying text, a tenth- to eleventh-century ms. of parts of eleven treatises of Philo, including about one-sixth of *Somn* 1. Alexander reported that in as far as could determine, the text is that of Family UF. This ms., though difficult to read and fragmentary, is our earliest extant witness to the text of *Somn* 1.

The evidence for the text of *Somn* 2 presents special problems, in that it rests on only two witnesses, Monacensis gr. 459 (Codex A; 13th c.) and Catabrigiensis Collegii S. Trinitatis B 9, 6 (15th-16th c.), both representatives of Family A. Even in the early church this treatise appears to have had little currency. James Royse, in his yet unpublished work on the fragments of Philo, has found no instance of its being quoted in patristic literature. Our ms. evidence suggests that by later Middle Ages at least, it had almost disappeared from the Philonic corpus.

Following are listed the Greek mss. containing *Somn* 1 and 2:[8]

Siglum	G-G No.	Name	Date	Content	Family
		Atheniensis Bibl. Nat. 880	10–11	S1	UF
M	100	Laurentianus pluteus X 20	13	S1	
A	35	Monacensis gr. 459	13	S1,2	A
	41	Vaticanus gr. 2174	13?	S1,2	A
P	104	Petropolitanus XX Aa 1.	13–14	S1	A
	258	Escurialensis X 1 13	14	S1	
	89	Genuensis bibliothecae Congr. missionis urbanae 39	14	S1	H
	37	Palatinus gr. 183	14	S1,2	A
Pal	268	Palatinus Heidelbergensis	14	S1,2	A
G	83	Vaticanus Palatinus gr. 248	14	S1	
	81	Vaticanus gr. 379	14	S1	UF
H	84	Venetus gr. 40	14	S1	H
	85	Venetus gr. 382	14	S1	H
	90	Escurialensis 30	15	S1	H
F	80	Lauentianus pluteus LXXXV 10	15	S1	UF
	101	Neapolitanus 100	15	S1	UF
	39	Vaticanus gr. 378	15	S1,2	A
	87	Venetus gr. 39	15	S1	H
	121	Cantab, Col. S. Trinitatis	15–16	S2	A
	93	Vaticanus Palatinus gr. 311	15–16	S1	H
	36	Matritensis Est. 11	1508	S1,2	A
	86	Monacensis gr. 124	16	S1	H
	95	Oxoniensis Collegii Novi 143	16	S1	H
	91	Ottobonianus gr. 48	17	S1	H

[7] "A Neglected Palimpsest of Philo Judaeus: Preliminary Remarks *editorum in usum*," *Studia Codicologica*, ed. Kurt Treu (TU 124, 1977) 1–14.

[8] In a private communication, Royse tells me that there are further Greek mss. of Philo that are not included in the published lists on which the listing presented here is based. I have no information on what such mss. may contain of *Somn* 1–2.

Editions and Translations[9]

The first printing of *Somn* 1 was in the *editio princeps* of Philo edited by Adrien Turnebe, Φίλωνος Ἰουδαίου εἰς τὰ τοῦ Μωσέως, κοσμοποιητικὰ, ἱστορικὰ, νομοθετικὰ. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μονοβίβλα. *Philonis Iudaei in libros Mosis, de mundi opificio, historicos, de legibus. Eiusdem libri singulares* (Paris, 1552). *Somn* 2 first appeared in a collection of three treatises (with *Mut, Leg All 2*) issued by David Hoeschel, *Philonis Judaei opuscula tria . . . Graece nunc primum edita* (Frankfurt: Johannes Wechel, 1587).

On the basis of Turnèbe's and Hoeschel's texts, a Greek and Latin edition including both treatises under the title Φίλωνος ἐξηγητικὰ συγγράμματα . . . *Philonis Iudaei opera exegetica* appeared at Geneva published by Pierre de la Rouiere in 1613. This was reprinted at Paris in 1640 and at Frankfurt in 1691.

Somn 1 and 2 were not published again until the great Greek and Latin edition of Thomas Mangey, Φίλωνος τοῦ Ἰουδαίου τὰ εὑρισκόμενα ἅπαντα. *Philonis Judaei opera quae repiri potuerint omnia* (London: William Bowyer, 1742, 2 vols.; *Somn* is in Vol. 1).

What was in the main Mangey's text was reissued by August Friedrich Pfeiffer, *Philonis Iudaei opera omnia* at Erlangen in 1785–92 in five volumes and was reprinted there in 1820. This was followed by C. E. Richter's edition, *Philonis Iudaei opera omnia,* which appeared as Part II of the Bibliotheca Sacra Patrum Ecclesiae Graecorum at Leipzig, published in eight volumes by E. B. Schwickert in 1828–30. This edition was reprinted there by Karl Tauchnitz in 1851–53 and again by Otto Holtze, 1880–93.

The definitive critical edition of *Somn*, as with the rest of the Greek corpus of Philo, is that of Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1896–1930) in which these treatises appear in Vol. 3, edited by Wendland, which was issued in 1898. This work was reprinted by Walter de Gruyter in Berlin in 1962.

Somn 1 and 2 are not found in the ancient Armenian version of Philo. The first publication of a Latin translation of *Somn* 1 was by Sigmund Gelenius, *Philonis Iudaei . . . lucubrationes omnes quotquot haberi potuerunt* (Basel: Nicolaus Episcopius, Jr., 1554). This was reprinted at Basel and Lyons several times during the sixteenth century and was included in the Greek-Latin edition of 1613 noted above. The Latin text alone was reprinted in 1614 at Antwerp by Johannes Keerberg.

The initial English translation of *Somn* 1 and 2 was that of C. D. Yonge, *The Works of Philo Judaeus* (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854–55, 4 vols.; *Somn* is in Vol. 2). This was reprinted at New York in 1894 and 1899 and at London in 1900.

The standard English translation of *Somn* 1 and 2 appeared in the Loeb Classics edition, Vol. 5, in 1934. The translation of *Somn* 1 was for the most part made by G. H. Whittaker, while that of *Somn* 2 was largely prepared by F. H. Colson, who was also responsible for the introductions and most of the notes to both treatises.[10] These notes in large part deal with textual matters (a summary list of proposed textual emendations is provided on pp. 625–26) and with parallels in thought to classical writers (Appendices, pp. 593–611).

The first and only German translation of *Somn* 1–2 was the work of Maximilian

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[9] For information on the early editions and translations I am dependent on *GG* 187–97.

[10] *PLCL* 5.vii.

Adler[11] in Leopold Cohn's and Isaak Heinemann's *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria in deutscher Übersetzung* (Breslau, 1909–38, 6 vols.; *Somn* 1–2 are in Vol. 6). This edition offers analytical introductions to each treatise and notes dealing particularly with linguistic matters and relationships to classical literature. This work was reprinted at Berlin, 1962–64, with the addition of a seventh volume edited by Willy Theiler.[12]

The French translation of *Somn* 1–2, in the series edited by Claude Mondésert et al., *Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1961–) is the work of Pierre Savinel, and appeared in 1962 as Vol. 19 of that series. As with all volumes in this series, a Greek text is supplied with the French translation. Savinel gives no indication of how he established his text, but from his notes he appears to have worked mainly from the Cohn-Wendland and Loeb editions. Where these disagree significantly, he indicates cryptically which editor he follows, often without giving his reasons.

Savinel's edition has elicited the most diverse reactions. J. C. M. van Winden[13] declares it to be "d'une très bonne qualité," with an "introduction excellente" and a translation that is "claire et exacte." On the other hand, Françoise Petit, after pointing out deficiencies in both the introduction and the translation, declares as her verdict, "Bref le *De somniis* nous parait moins bien servi par son présentateur que les volumes précédemment parus [in the French edition]."[14] In the view of the present writer, Savinel's edition should be considered more as a literary contribution than a critical one. His translation is recognized by critics and admirers alike as generally exact and felicitous; at times it becomes *spirituel*.[15] But as a critical presentation of *Somn* 1–2, Savinel's work lacks much. His introduction is really not an introduction to these treatises, but a general essay on Philo's allegorism, his faith and his poetry. En route Savinel tips his hat to a parade of literary figures—Dante, Pascal, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Gerard de Nerval, Joyce, Valéry, Bernanos and more—so that one easily loses the thread of his allusions, not to mention their connection with Philo. Perhaps their chief relevance is that this dream-like recital is offered as an introduction to two treatises on dreams! There is virtually nothing in this introduction of a technical nature. Savinel's notes likewise leave the reader wishing for more. They are brief and not highly informative, they concern largely problems in the text pointed up by previous editions, and comparisons with classical passages. In all of this Savinel appears to be largely dependent on the much richer notes of Colson in the Loeb edition. A Spanish edition of *Somn* 1–2 has also appeared in José María Triviño's *Obras completas de Filón*

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[11] It appears that Adler revised a translation made by Cohn; see the remarks of Roberto Radice, *Filone di Alessandria, Bibliografia generale, 1937–1982*, (Elenchos 8; n.p.: Bibliopolis, 1983) 38, No. 40/VI.

[12] The modern German editions, i.e., the Greek of Cohn-Wendland and the German of Cohn-Heinemann-Adler-Theiler, do not include the works extant only in Armenian: *Quaestiones in Genesim, Quaestiones in Exodum*, and *De Animalibus*.

[13] Review in *VC* 24 (1970) 300–302.

[14] Review in *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 29 (1962) 315.

[15] A notable example is *Somn* 1.102, where Philo refers to τοὺς τῆς ῥητῆς πραγματείας σοφιστὰς καὶ λίαν τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπαχότας, which Savinel renders as "messieurs les professeurs au sourcil doctoral et qui tiennent pour le sens littéral" (cf. *PLCL*: "the self-satisfied pedantic professors of literalism"). This proves to be too much for more critical tastes, cf. F. Petit, n. 14 above, on Savinel's translation of this sentence; at the same time, Marc Philonenko (review in *Theologische Zeitschr.* 18 [1962] 438) adjudges the same turn of phrase "brilliante."

de Alejandría (Buenos Aires, 1975–76, 5 vols.; *Somn* 1–2 are in Vol. 3). This edition offers no Greek text; it provides a few brief notes dealing largely with matters of translation.[16]

A Hebrew translation of *Somn* 1–2 with notes was prepared by Yoḥanan Cohen-Yashar (=Jean-Georges Kahn) and was announced by him in 1973 as shortly to be published by Bar Ilan University.[17] I have not seen this work and have been able to find no further information regarding it.

Specific Issues in the Study of *Somn* 1-2

The place of *Somn* 1–2 in the original Philonic corpus and their relation to other, lost, works on dreams is something of a riddle. From *Somn* 1.1 we learn that there was a previous treatise on dreams. *Somn* 2.1 makes clear that Philo intends it to follow on our *Somn* 1. Each of these treatises is concerned with a particular kind of dream:

First treatise (now lost):	"Heaven-sent dreams, in which . . . the Deity of His own motion sends us the visions" (*Somn* 1.1; *PLCL* 5.295).
Second treatise (our *Somn* 1):	"In which our own mind, moving out of itself together with the Mind of the Universe, seems to be possessed and God-inspired, and so capable of receiving some foretaste and foreknowledge of things to come" (*Somn* 1.2; *PLCL* 5.295)
Third treatise (our *Somn* 2):	"Arises whenever the soul in sleep becomes frenzied, and with the precient power due to such inspiration foretells the future" (*Somn* 2.1; *PLCL* 5.443).

Wendland thought that the three classes of dreams set forth here found parallels in Posidonius' three types of dreams as reported by Cicero (*De Div.* 1.64). This view was also adopted by Emile Brehier.[18] After comparing Posidonius' and Philo's classifications, however, Colson[19] concluded that "the main ideas underlying the two classifications are different. . . . The conclusion seems to be that while he [Philo] probably had the Stoic classification in mind, he has put it into a very different shape."

The problem does not end here, however, for while it is clear that Philo wrote at least three treatises on dreams, Eusebius (*EH* 2.18.4) reports that there were five. Since from *Somn* 1.1–2 and *Somn* 2.1 it is clear that the three described above constituted a sequence, if Eusebius is correct the other two must have come before or after these three.

L. Massebieau[20] concluded that the lost treatise dealing with the first class of dreams must have focused on those of Abimelech (Gen 20:3–7) and Laban (Gen 31:24), the only

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[16] I have not seen this work. The information offered here is derived from R. Radice, *Filone*, 56, No. 81.

[17] J.-G. Kahn, " 'Connais-toi toi même' à la manière de Philon," *Rev. d'Hist. et de Phil. Rel.* 53 (1973) 293, n.1.

[18] *Les idées religieuses et philosophiques de Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1908, ³1950) 179–205.

[19] *PLCL* 5.593–94.

[20] *Le classement des oeuvres de Philon* (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, sciences religieuses; Paris, 1889) 30, cited by *PCW* 3.XIX, n.2.

dreams in Genesis not discussed in our *Somn* 1–2. He also argued that the other two treatises had preceded the three mentioned by Philo and that these two initial treatises, since they could not have dealt with Biblical dreams, must have discussed the opinions of the philosophers on dreams, a procedure that Philo follows also in *Aet* and *Ebr.* Wendland accepted this view[21] and tied it with his theory of a parallel between Philo's classification and that of Posidonius discussed above. This solution was also accepted by M. Adler in his introduction to *Somn* 1–2 in the Cohn-Heinemann German edition.[22] The reconstruction remains, of course, conjectural and rests also on the undemonstrable accuracy of Eusebius' report.

Several studies have focused on the sources of specific ideas in *Somn* 1–2. Wendland[23] directed attention to three instances in *Somn* 1 where Philo lists series of doxographical or speculative questions regarding the structure of the universe and the nature of the human mind which find parallels in Hellenistic natural philosophy (*Somn* 1.21–24; 30–33; 53–54). After identifying a range of authors on whom these lists draw and whose views are at times muddled in them, Wendland concluded that Philo had used a lost compilation of speculations concerned with heaven, the stars, the moon, and the nature, origin, continued existence and seat of the soul, which was also drawn on by Aetius (*ca.* 100 C.E.). Such a source had already been posited by Diels for Aetius, who gave it the title *Vetusta placita* and dated it to the mid-first century C.E. Wendland concludes: "Diese Schrift kann allein als Quelle Philo's in Betracht kommen . . . dass der echte Philo diese in der That gekannt und benutzt hat, darf nun als erwiesen gelten."[24]

Many of the same sources cited here by Wendland are carried over by Colson in his edition, who also adds further ones.[25] Colson does not, however, have recourse to Wendland's theory of a lost doxographical source.

Antonio V. Nazzaro[26] in a study of Philo's use of the Delphic maxim "Know thyself," has addressed the question of the correct translation of *Somn* 1.57. Here the text reads: καταγαγὼν δ' ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ τὸν κατάσκοπον καὶ ἀντισπάσας ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκεῖ ζητήσεος γνῶθι σαυτόν. The central problem of this passage is whether γνῶθι σαυτόν is to be taken as a substantive functioning as the object of ἀντισπάσας, or as an imperative clause. The two understandings are reflected in the translations of Colson on the one hand and Savinel on the other:

Colson: "But bring the explorer down from heaven and away from these researches draw the 'Know thyself.' "[27]

Savinel: "Fais-le plutôt redescendre du ciel, ce scrutateur, arrache-le à ses recherches là-haut et 'connais-toi toi même.' "[28]

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[21] *PCW* 3.XIX-XX.

[22] *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria in deutscher Übersetzung* (Breslau, 1909–38; Berlin, 1964).

[23] "Eine doxographische Quelle Philo's," *Sitzungsberichte der königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (1897) 1074–79.

[24] "Eine doxographische Quelle," 1079.

[25] *PLCL* 5.593–611.

[26] "Il ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ nell'epistomologia filoniana," *Annuali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Napoli* 12 (1969–70 49–86.

[27] *PLCL* 5.327.

[28] *PM* 19.47.

In support of his translation Colson cites Juvenal 11.27: "e caelo descendit γνῶθι σεαυτόν." Nazzaro investigates this passage and concludes that Juvenal and Philo are concerned with quite different matters: "Siamo, come si vede, in due mondi diversi."[29]

Turning to the relation of the text in question to its context, Nazzaro points out a series of imperatives which cast the whole passage in that mode. He therefore rejects Colson's translation and proposes the following improvement on Savinel's: "Ma tu scrutatore, sceso dal cielo e staccatoti dalla celeste investigazione, conosci te stesso."[30]

Jean-Georges Kahn[31] has also studied this passage in its broader setting. He notes that Philo gives the maxim, "Know thyself," a turn that was unprecedented in his time, for at the end of his discussion Philo concludes, "And this is nature's law: he who has thoroughly comprehended himself, thoroughly despairs of himself. . . . And the man who has despaired of himself is beginning to know Him that Is."[32] Kahn points out that this understanding constitutes "une nouveauté dans l'histoire de la pensée humaine. Nulle part, ni dans la philosophie grecque ni dans la Bible, nous n'avons vu que la connaissance de soi puisse devenir une sorte d'auto-annihiliation en vue de se rendre disponible pour un nouvelle éclairage divin."[33] Kahn undertakes then to trace the development of thought that leads Philo to this understanding. He contrasts Philo's attitude with Greek philosophical interest in an understanding of nature for its own sake, and points to the existence of a fear of desacralizing nature found in certain writers such as Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.1.11–13 and especially Horace, *Odes* 1.3. Kahn also notes rabbinical reluctance to be involved with matters of nature lest one be distracted from the study of Torah. He then traces various ways in which attitudes toward self-knowledge were related to the knowledge of God in patristic (esp. Clement, *Paid.* 3; *Strom.* 2.15.70.5) and medieval Jewish and Arabic writings. Kahn concludes: "L'idée que nous sommes à nous-mêmes un obstacle pour Dieu, et, que, cet obstacle vaincu, nous aurons quelque chance, tout en restant nous-mêmes, d'entendre tant soit peu la musique archétypale du monde, c'est là un message philonien original, que ne doit rien à Socrate."[34]

Madeleine Petit has devoted a short article to "Les songes dans l'oeuvre de Philon d'Alexandrie."[35] After studying the various Greek terms used by Philo in reference to dreams (ὄνειρος, φαντασία, ἐνύπνιον, ὄναρ, ὄνειραρ), which she notes go quite beyond the vocabulary of the LXX, she discusses Philo's classification of dreams in *Somn* 1.1 and 2.2. She then addresses his criteria for the interpretation of dreams: "Pour trouver le véritable sens des songes, l'interprète doit être sous l'inspiration divine; il ne peut se soustraire à cette prise de possession par le divinité et doit révéler le message quel qu'il soit."[36] In this the true interpreter stands in contrast to the "sophists" who learn their art through books. Petit also addresses the theory of Bréhier (and Wendland, whom she does not cite), that Philo's classification of dreams corresponds with Posidonius'.[37] Bréhier went on to identify

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[29] "Il ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ," 81.

[30] "Il ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ," 84.

[31] " 'Connais-toi toi même' à la manière de Philon," *Rev. d'Hist. et de Phil. Rel.* 53 (1973) 293–307.

[32] *PLCL* 5.327, 329.

[33] " 'Connais-toi toi même'," 293–94.

[34] " 'Connais-toi toi même'," 306.

[35] *Melanges d'histoire des religions offerts à Henri-Charles Puech* (Paris, 1974) 151–59.

[36] M. Petit, "Les songes" (n. 35 above), 157.

[37] See n. 18 above.

the source of the classification with Artemidorus and asserted that Philo's theory of prophecy owed nothing to Judaism but was drawn entirely from Greek and Egyptian sources. Petit rightly calls this in question and concludes on Biblical and rabbinical evidence that in his understanding of dreams, "Philon reste dans la ligne de la spiritualité juive tout en coulant dans le moule des catégories grecques des éléments hébraïques préexistants."[38]

W. Schwarz[39] has compared Philo's interpretation of linen, wool and color in the garments of the High Priest, *Somn* 1.216–18, with those of other classical writers, and in particular of Plutarch (*De Iside* 4; 77). Philo implies a contrast between linen and wool in that the former "is made from no mortal creature" (*Somn* 1.217, *PLCL* 5.413; cf. *Spec Leg* 1.84). Plutarch (*De Iside* 4) gives a not dissimilar explanation of why the priests of Isis wear linen and shun wool. Schwarz explains Plutarch's position on the basis of Aristotle's theory that hair is a result of secretion/excretion (περίττωμα), and proposes that a similar idea lies behind Philo's symbolism. He suggests that both Philo and Plutarch may have been dependent for this on a common source.

Similarly in regard to colors of the white and variegated robes of both the High Priest and the priests of Isis and Osiris, Philo and Plutarch give closely parallel interpretations (*Somn* 1.216–18; *De Iside* 77). Schwarz suggests that this second parallel strengthens the probability that Philo and Plutarch share a common source. The significance of their use of these theories regarding material and color is summarized by him thus: "For the first time after Aristotle 'philosophy' and religion were combined. It is noteworthy that in this process religion predominated and that 'philosophy' was used for the explanation and interpretation of religion."[40]

Raniero Cantalamessa in a brief note[41] points to *Somn* 1.232, 238 as the source of a curious allusion in Origen, *Contra Celsum* 4.19. There Origen replies to an accusation by Celsus that the belief that God does not change but only appears to do so in the incarnation makes of him a deceiver. Origen answers that while "others" have this view, it is not true of Christians, who hold that God truly entered humanity.

The question is, then, who are these "others" who believe this way? Cantalamessa suggests that Origen has in mind Philo's statement that "to souls which are still in a body," God gives "Himself the likeness of angels, not altering his own nature . . ., but conveying to those which receive the impression of his presence a semblance in a different form, such that they take the image to be not a copy, but that original form itself."[42] Cantalamessa notes that it is clear that Origen knew *Somn*, since in his commentary on John,2.2.13, he makes the same distinction between ὁ θεός (=the father) and θεός (=the Logos) that Philo proposes in *Somn* 1.228–30.

J. C. M. van Winden[43] notes several passages in Clements *Protrepticus* that are taken from Philo. He introduces these with the remark: "The following observations will show

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[38] M. Petit, "Les songes," 159.

[39] "A Study in Pre-Christian Symbolism: Philo, *De Somnis* I.216–218, and Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 4 and 77," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London* 20 (1973) 104–17.

[40] Schwarz, "A Study,"110.

[41] "Origene e Filone: a proposita di *C. Celsum* IV, 19," *Aevum* 48 (1974) 132–33.

[42] *Somn* 1.232; *PLCL* 5.421.

[43] "Quotations from Philo in Clement of Alexandria's Protrepticus," *Vig. Chr.* 32 (1978) 208–13.

how Clement had Philo's writings, so to speak, on his desk, when he was writing his Protrepticus."[44] Among these parallel passages are *Somn* 2.139, which helps to explain *Protr.* 69.1–2, and *Somn* 2.258, which aids in solving a textual problem in *Protr.* 67.2. In the latter passage φθορᾷ, the reading of the mss., was emended by the editor of the GCS edition of the Protrepticus to φορᾷ. The parallel in *Somn* 2, however, also reads φθορᾷ, which van Winden argues should be taken as the correct reading both in Philo and in Clement.

Irmgard Christiansen,[45] in seeking to understand Philo's interpretive technique, how he proceeds rationally from a Biblical text to an allegorical interpretation, subjects two passages from *Somn*, 1.102–04 (where ἱμάτιον = λόγος) and 1.133–56 (where an elaborate interpretation of Jacob's ladder is advanced) to minute analysis. As a result she is able to show a reasoned procedure that moves from a key word or concept in the Biblical text to a "ἕτερον," another concept which for Philo is its true meaning. The "proof" of the relationship between the two is provided by a variety of techniques, such as syllogisms, diaereses, definitions that share properties in common, et al. Christianisen summarizes: "In ganz besonderer Weise fällt bei allen symbolischen Auslegungen [Philos) das Bestreben auf, überzeugend darzustellen, dass die Definition des "ἕτερον" mit der Definition des biblischen Begriffes identisch oder teilweise gleich ist. Die Identität beider Begriffe bezieht sich auf ihre gemeinsame Teilhabe an einer oder auch mehreren Ideen, die sich in den angegebenen Artmerkmalen der Definitionen ausdrückt."[46] A similar analysis of Philo's allegorical techniques has been developed by Burton L. Mack,[47] who terms the type of interpretation identified by Christiansen in *Somn* 1.102–04 and 133–56 the "reasoned allegory." Mack uses a variety of passages to demonstrate this and other forms of allegorical interpretation employed by Philo; note particularly his detailed analysis of *Congr.*[48]

The foregoing survey makes clear the need for studies of *Somn* 1–2 in several directions. As yet we have no comprehensive investigations of either treatise as a treatise: its sources, structure, literary forms, or techniques of interpretation; and as in the early and medieval church *Somn* 2 was almost totally ignored by patristic writers, so today it remains virtually untouched by contemporary scholarship.

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[44] Van Winden, "Quotations," 208.

[45] *Die Technik der allegorischen Auslegungswissenschaft bei Philon von Alexandrien* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Hermeneutik 7; Tübingen, 1969) 47–67.

[46] Christiansen, *Die Technik*, 76–77.

[47] Burton L. Mack, "Exegetical Traditions in Alexandrian Judaism: a Program for the Analysis of the Philonic Corpus," *Stud. Philonica* 3 (1974–75) 71–112.

[48] Burton L. Mack, "Weisheit und Allegorie bei Philo von Alexandrien," *Stud. Philonica* 5 (1978) 57–105.

Arcana Mundi: Magic and Divination in the *De Somniis* of Philo of Alexandria

Robert M. Berchman
Michigan State University

Introduction

How many meanings are implied in the simple Greek word, *oneiros*—dream? The occasion is famous, the dreamer is celebrated, and the dream interpreter is known to us. Jacob dreams of a ladder at Bethel.[1] Philo is suitably present to interpret it.[2] The men and women of the Pentateuch dream, and with Philo we ask how many meanings do their dreams imply?

A peculiar lacuna persists in studies on Philo's *De Somniis*. In his study of Philo's prophetic dreams, H. A. Wolfson observes,

> . . . there is no evidence that Philo was influenced, in his enumeration of these three types of prophecies, by non-Jewish sources (*Philo* ii, 55).

The ironic implication is that Philo's views on the nature and function of prophecy and divination have little in common with Hellenistic ones.

The inconsistency inherent in this notion derives from at least three fundamental fallacies: a mistakenly philosophical view of what prophecy and divination meant to the Greeks; a lack of appreciation for the oneirological view of prophecy and divination in the Hellenistic period; and the assumption that Philo's views on prophecy and divination were removed from the sphere of *oneirocritice*.[3]

What are the prophecies of the Pentateuch for Philo if not dream-prophecies? The *De Somniis* pullulates with the word *oneiros*, and the technical vocabulary of dream interpretation—*horama, chresmos, eidolon, phantasma, phantasia, onar*.[4] Consequently, this

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[1] Gen. 28:10–15.

[2] Cf. *De Somniis*, 1.3 begins this interpretation of Jacob's dream. Philo continues his oneirocritic analysis of Gen. 28:10ff. throughout the work.

[3] E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1951, ch. 4 is devoted to dreams. See also G. E. V. Grunebaum and R. Caillois, eds., *The Dream and Human Societies*, Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1966 and G. Luck, *Arcana Mundi*, Baltimore-London, 1985, 229–260; 261–305. Artemidorus' *Oneirocritica* is our earliest extant work on dream interpretation. There is a French translation by A. -J. Festugière (Paris, 1975) and an English one by R. J. White (Park Ridge, 1975). Little work has been done on Philo's *De Somniis* in the context of the oneirocritic traditions of antiquity, cf. P. Wendland's article in *Sitzungsberichte der Königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, (1897), 1074–1079; H. A. Wolfson, *Philo ii*, Cambridge, 1947, esp. 55–72. See also T. H. Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, diss. Chicago, 1919 and D. T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*, Amsterdam, 1983.

[4] For Philo's use of *onar*, cf. e.g., *De Somn.*, 1.157. For the use of this term in its Asclepian context see, R. Herzog, *Die Wunderheilungen von Epidauros*, Leipzig, 1931; E. J.

paper attempts to demonstrate that Philo's *De Somniis* belongs to a long oneirocritic tradition,[5] and that his understanding of prophecy, divination, and magic must be assessed from an oneirological perspective.[6] Such an agenda requires a brief summary of the character and development of dream theory and dream interpretation in antiquity.

Oneiros and Oneirocritica Before Philo

Oneiros: Cosmos and Psyche

How the dream was interpreted in antiquity has a long history.[7] In complex cultures such as these one should not expect to find one attitude towards dreams. In each writing from the Archaic through the Hellenistic age there emerges an extended range of subtle interpretations. Indeed, it is not possible to talk of a general ancient attitude toward dreams and their interpretation without differentiating between epochs, locales; and their cultural and social environments.

As a starting point for our inquiry, it is useful to begin with J. Z. Smith's general observation that every text represents a particular perspective, bias, and purpose (*Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions*, Leiden, 1978, esp. ch. 13). Smith's metaphor is apt for two reasons. As in much contemporary history of religion study we address a subject that yields a kind of map of a cultural system's understandings of the meaning and function of dreams.

Dreams are known by the terms used to describe and place them. Initially, in the epic and tragic literatures, they are given objective spatial and temporal loci and placed at the periphery of the known cosmos. Later, in the philosophical and medical literatures, they are endowed with subjective psychic and physiological loci and placed at the recesses and

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Edelstein and L. Edelstein, *A Collection and Interpretation of the Testamonies*, 2 vols. Baltimore, 1965.

[5] See E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 102ff.

[6] Cf. *De Somn.*, 1.1–2; 2.1–2. See also, 1.127; 190; 241.

[7] For general studies on dreams in antiquity see, R. S. P. Allier, *Magie et Religion*, Paris, 1935; H. I. Bell, *Cults and Creeds in Greco-Roman Egypt*, Liverpool, 1952; K. Beth, *Religion und Magie: Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Beitrag*, Leipzig, 1927 (2); A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire de la divination dans l'Antiquité*, 4 vols. Paris, 1879–82; S. Eitrem, "La Magie comme motif littéraire chez les Grecs et les Romains", *Sym. Os.*, 6 (1928); A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, 2 vols., Paris, 1944–55; F. Lexa, *La Magie dans l'Egypte antique*, 3 vols., Paris, 1923–25; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, 2 vols., München, 1955 (2); A. D. Nock, *Essays on Religion in the Ancient World*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1972; L. Petzoldt, ed., *Magie und Religion*, Darmstadt, 1978; G. Sarton, *A History of Science: Hellenistic Science in the Last Three Centuries B.C.*, Cambridge, 1959; K. F. Smith, "Magic, (Greek and Roman" in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (1970 ed.), 1.265ff.; J. Thorwaldt, *Science and Secrets of Early Medicine*, tr. R. and C. Winston, New York, 1963; A. M. Tupet, *La Magie dans la poésie Latine des origines jusqu'à la fin du règne d'Auguste*, Paris, 1976; O. Weinreich, *Antike Heilungswunder*, Giessen, 1908; A. Wiedemann, *Magie und Zauberei im Alten Aegypten*, Berlin, 1905; R. E. Witt, *Isis in the Greco-Roman World*, Ithaca, 1971; R. Xella, ed., *Magia: Studi di storia della religioni in memoria di Raffaela Garosi*, Roma, 1976.

then the heights of the human soul.[8] Whether dreams are viewed cosmologically and cosmogonically or psychologically and physiologically dreams are either out-of-place in an essentially horizontal map of center and periphery, domains and boundaries, or in-place in an essentially vertical map of a human world and divine world. The first map is cosmological; the second anthropological. According to both maps dreams stand at the periphery and the middle: the depths and the heights of either horizontal or vertical reality.

The place of dreams depends on the cartographer's assessment of the value of dreams. This, in turn, depends upon the judgement whether or not dreams are god-sent or the product of psychological and physiological disturbances. *Oneiros*, in sum, is a special instance of W. C. Smith's observation as to how rare it is that anything is really known by a term of its own choosing (*The Meaning and End of Religion*, New York, 1964, 58ff.). Consequently, two maps one horizontal, of center and periphery, of domains and boundaries, and another vertical, of up and down, of divine and human define the place, function, and meaning of dreams in the dream literature of antiquity.

To begin: Dreams are given spatial and temporal significance.[9] Homer informs us that dreams are situated at the edge of the known world. In the twenty-fourth song of the *Odyssey* Hermes leads the souls of the dead past the Isles of the Blessed, where Kronos rules, to the outer edge of the cosmos. Skirting Okeanos they arrive at white rock (*leukas petrē*), which stands at the gate of the sun. Here is located the village of dreams (*demos oneirōn*). Finally, passing through this territory they arrive at their destination, the mede of asphodele where dead souls dwell.

Dreams are at the boundary of the cosmos. Beyond lies the realm of the dead. From Homer's account it is clear that dreams are linked to the divine,[10] but because of their location they are considered baneful.[11] Location signifies ambiguity.[12]

Hesiod, Euripides, and Aristophanes speak of the temporality of dreams. They measure time by genealogy. Their pedigree is divine but their status again ambiguous. Dreams, brought forth by night, are the daughter of Chaos, who once impregnated by Erebus, gives birth to Moros, odious destiny, to Ker, inexorable doom, to Thanatos, death, and to Hypnos, sleep[13] (*Theogony* 212).

Dreams are also called the children of Earth. The mother is not Ge but Chthon, who is called mother of black-winged dreams (*Hecuba*, 71; *Iphigenia in Taurus*, 1263). Dreams are sent to us by night, the servant of Hades (*Frogs*, 15). They come from the lower world and are associated with the primordial powers of darkness.

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[8] See E. R. Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, esp. 64–134 and G. Luck, *Arcana Mundi*, 229–260.

[9] See A. Brelich, "The Place of Dreams in the Religious World Concept of the Greeks" and C. A. Meier, "The Dream in Ancient Greece and its Use in Temple Cures (Incubation)" in Von Grunebaum-Caillois, *The Dream and Human Societies*, 293–301; 303–318.

[10] *Iliad*, 2.56.

[11] Ibid., 2.6.

[12] For the psycho-social contexts of dream ambiguity see, E. R. Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 102–134, who follows psycho-analytic categories of interpretation. For a sociological analysis, cf. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Oracles and Magic Among the Azande*, Oxford, 1976, 230ff. P. Brown, *The Cult of the Saints*, Chicago, 1982 applies this interpretive paradigm to the dream experience of late antiquity.

[13] See A. Brelich, "The Place of Dreams", 298ff.

These maps of space and time locate dreams at the boundary of the cosmos and at the frontiers of genealogical pedigree. In time these spatial and temporal magnitudes are translated into inverted ones. This occurs when this foundation myth of dreams is invested with psychological significance.[14] These immemorial beliefs about the locus of dreams are invested with precise and palpable psychic features.

This transformation has its origins in the epic and tragic literatures. In Homer dreams are personified and called divine. They are almost, at least in this mode, independent of place and time.[15] They come from Zeus or through his angel.[16] They are messages from the gods.[17] Hermes is called the guide and mediator of dreams, and Nestor visits Agamemnon as the *angelos* of Zeus.[18] The notion of a *hēgētor oneiron*, the guide of dreams, is found in Pindar,[19] Euripides,[20] Aeschylus,[21] and Xenophon.[22] Indeed, in this context Euripides softens an earlier view of Earth as the Mother of black-winged dreams.[23] Although cthonic in origin dreams serve to guide the soul through the tempests of life.[24]

Despite the domestication of dreams, Homer's warning, entrusted to Penelope, still holds. Dreams are ambiguous. Although true dreams fly through the gate of Horn, false dreams pass through the gate of Ivory (*Odyssey*, 19.560ff.) Penelope's warning signifies the adjustment of place dreams have undergone. Once in the realm of the soul and no longer the cosmos, dreams are now judged as true or false by the human mind itself. The soul proves its right to stand with the gods by demonstrating a knowledge of the dream's origin and taxon.

Sophocles ascribes to dreams a high dignity, warning that they must be closely observed and watched for they bring good and evil.[25] They are observed and interpreted, and it is to Prometheus that Aeschylus ascribes the invention of dream-interpretation.[26] Dreams clearly have prognostic value since they come from the gods. They had to be told to Helios whose bright daylight would frighten away their dangerous implications, or sacrifices had to be made to the apotropaic gods to deflect their ominous warnings.[27] Here we encounter the origins of oneirology and oneirocritic science. Dreams, whether precognitive or veridical, because of their divine origin and propituous meaning, demand interpretation.[28]

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[14] See E. R. Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 64–101.

[15] *Iliad*, 2.20; 23.68; *Odyssey*, 4.803; 6.21.

[16] *Iliad*, 2.56; 2.26.

[17] Oneiros in Homer always means dream figure not dream experience, cf. J. Hundt, *Der Traumglaube bei Homer*, Griefswald, 1935.

[18] *Iliad*, 2.26.

[19] Fr. 131 S.

[20] *Hecuba*, 70.

[21] *Prometheus Bound*, 486.

[22] *Cyropaedia*, 8.7; 21.

[23] *Hecuba*, 70.

[24] Philo clearly understands Abraham's dream (Gen. 32:3ff.) as an incubation dream, cf. *De Somn.*, 1.64–65.

[25] Sophocles, *Electra*, 424: cf. Euripides, *Ipbigenia in Taurus*, 42.

[26] *Prometheus Bound*, 486.

[27] Xenophon, *Symposium*, 4.33; Hippocrates, *Peri Enypniōn* 2.10 (ed. D. G. C. Kuhn, *Lipsiae*, 1826.

[28] Plato preserves the notion that in sleep the soul is able to perceive and converse with higher beings, cf. *Phaedrus*, 250c.

This shift in the understanding and valuation of dreams between Homer and Aeschylus is one of inverted magnitudes. Space and time once understood cosmogonically are now comprehended psychologically. An archaic map of relations between the dream and the dreamer is replaced by a Greek one.

Classical Greeks had an acute sense of the multiplicity of self and of the chain of intermediaries that reached, yet further still, from the psyche to God. The dream became an intermediary figure between the human and the divine.[29] Sent by the gods to man the dream is taken from the suspect regions of place and time and put into the category of the new invisible companion who nonetheless lingers perceptively in its old setting. Yet the function of dreams has changed. The dream aids the soul. It is the protector entrusted with the care of the individual. Furthermore, it becomes an upward extension of the individual, and the lower extension of the gods. The identity of the self is in its keeping. There is nothing strange, then, in the emergence of dream theory and dream interpretation in this period.

Dreams may be true or false. If correctly assessed and interpreted they serve to protect man against external and possibly hostile powers. Those dreams not associated with chaos and death may be a means for the soul to transcend terrestrial place and gain access to divine place.

It is a short step to invest god-sent dreams with re-locative powers, and to imbue them with prophetic significance. It is from this context that divination arises. This new dream configuration encounters resistance and then acceptance in the philosophical schools. Plato and Aristotle resist; the Stoa accepts.

Plato's interpretation of dreams is complex.[30] His criticism is directed against the proponents of divination and manticism.[31] These criticisms rest on his view of the origin of dreams and their limited function.

For Plato dreams do not come from the gods but from daemons. Their validity is determined by which part of the soul receives the dream. Dreams may pass through the rational part of the soul (*logistikon*) or the irrational parts of the soul (*thēriōdes* and *thumoeides*).[32] It is only when the rational soul is active in dreaming that the dream has the capacity to reveal an image of the truth.[33] If the irrational parts of the soul are active in dreaming then the dream yields falsehoods. In the first case dream knowledge is mere opinion. In the second case it is mere apparition.[34] In both cases dreams are the perceptible residue of the soul's movements in sleep.[35] Since they come from a daemonic source his specialist on dreams, Diotima, councils they be judged by one's *daimones anēr*.[36]

Dreams yield perceptible knowledge at best, hallucinations at worst. Since their origin arises in the daemonic sphere dream knowledge cannot bring one to a knowledge of the ideas. It is the misguided soul that attempts its relocation on the basis of dreams. It is

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[29] This idea is found in Pindar, Fr. 131S; Xenophon, *Cyr.*, 8.7; 21; and Euripides, *Iphigenia in Taurus*, 42.

[30] See E. R. Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 179–206.

[31] *Timaeus*, 71ff; *Rep.*, 571ff. See F. Pfeffer, *Studien zur Mantik in der Philosophie der Antike*, Meisenheim, 1976, esp. 10–39.

[32] This refers to Plato's three-fold division of the soul, cf. *Rep.*, 571ff.

[33] *Rep.*, 571c.

[34] Ibid.

[35] *Sym.*, 203a.

[36] See F. Pfeffer, *Studien*, 43–112.

the deceitful soul that practices divination and manticism.[37]

Aristotle's theory of dreams is more negative than Plato's.[38] The origin of dreams is daemonic. They possess no epistemic validity because they are the mere residue of the affection of the *koinon aisthētērion*, the irrational part of the soul.[39] Dreams occur because while asleep the heart is moved by residual movements left over the waking state.[40] From these perturbations arise wild mental images.

Dreams represent the illusions of the sane and the hallucinations of the insane. Since their origin is not divine but daemonic they do not yield any higher kind of knowledge.

With this judgement Aristotle removes dreams from any serious philosophical consideration. Diviners and mantics are exploiters and charlatans. If the gods wished to communicate with men, they would do so in daytime and pick their recipients carefully.

> The most skillful judge of dreams is the man who possesses the ability to detect likenesses; for anyone can judge the vivid dream. By likenesses I mean that the mental pictures are like reflections in water, as we have said before. In the latter case, if there is such movement, the reflection is not like the original, nor the images like the real object. Thus he would be a clever interpreter of reflections who could quickly discriminate, and envisage these scattered and distorted fragments of the images as representing a man say, or a horse or any other object. Now in the other case too the dream has a somewhat similar result; for the movement destroys the clarity of the dream.[41]

Aristotle's view has a profound effect on dream theory and interpretation down to the close of antiquity.[42]

A more neutral theory and evaluation of dreams was proposed by Democritus. According to our sources Democritus viewed dreams as self-contained atomic *eidōla*. They fill the air carrying messages from one soul to another (Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.43; 2.67).[43] While awake the soul is not aware of these telepathic communications. Since dreams are the perception of atoms during sleep they yield knowledge.[44] They contain all the qualities of a dreamer's individual world and when another dreamer grasps these atoms he receives images of an unconscious universe quite distinct from the conscious universe of wakefulness.[45]

For Democritus the origin of dreams is neither divine or daemonic, but anthropomorphic. Their epistemic veracity is minimal, but they are a source for knowledge of a world outside one's own. Although Democritus' theory has little impact beyond the circle

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[37] Calcidius, *In Tim.*, 256 quoting *Crito* 44b and *Phaedo*, 60e.

[38] *Insomn.*, 458b 25ff; 460b 3ff.

[39] He denies dreams are god-sent, cf. *Div. p. somn.*, 463b 15ff.; 464a 20ff.

[40] These two words are contained in his *Parva Naturalia*, esp. 464bff.

[41] Ibid., 464a6ff. Aristotle also suggests that the mind responds best to such stimuli when it is empty and passive as in some kinds of insanity (464a 22ff.).

[42] See E. R. Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 120. With Aristotle dreams become part of psychopathology.

[43] This theory is preserved in Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.52–57, cf. fr. 89d (Diels-Kranz) ascribed to Heraclitus.

[44] The imagination becomes the mental faculty that mediates dreams. This becomes the basis of all dream theory henceforth.

[45] Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.52–57; Heraclitus, fr. 89d (D-K).

of his followers his terminology and notion of telepathic dreams does. The word *eidōlon* surfaces in later Platonic and Stoic writings. It takes on two meanings. Either it refers to a telepathic dream sent to the soul from outside or it signifies a soul's own telepathic dream produced from inside.

There is no information on Democritus' views of divination and manticism. We do not know if he offered a theory on prophecy. This is not the case with the Stoa. They offer an extensive dream theory.

Illustrative of the attitude of the Stoics towards dreams are their views on prophecy and divination. They claim that dreams contain true knowledge, that they were sent to, or were a product of, the ruling part of the soul,[46] and that they explained, indeed predicted, the natural laws of divine providence.[47]

The Stoics classify dreams into three types: from god; from daemons; and from the activity of the soul itself.[48] Their first two classifications are familiar. How the Stoics understood the third is not. The power of dreams is based on the relationship of the human soul to God (Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.30; 64; 2.10). Through dreams God speaks directly to sleeping souls or through a daemonic proxy. In some cases souls see the future because of their own divine-like nature (Cicero, *De Div.*, 2.10; 15). This is because in these souls, as they withdraw from the world of sensation and passion, become cognizant of the universal *pneuma* diffused throughout the world, usually grasping it in innocent sleep (Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.57; 129).

For the Stoics dreams possess prophetic and divinatory significance. They yield divine knowledge, and the individual who practices divination knows fully that dreams are most important in uncovering the most important philosophical issues.

The Stoics subsume dreams under the category of natural divination.[49] If observed carefully, dreams yield signs that foretell the future.

Stoic acceptance of the efficacy of natural divination and the truth-character of dreams rests on their theory of causation.[50] All things occur in accordance with fate and since fate is the causal link running through and connecting all events (*SVF* 2.915):

> . . . the prophecies of the diviners would not be true if all things were not encompassed by fate (SVF 2.939).

The assumption is that all things are determined and linked causally. Sometimes this link is explicit and obvious. Other times it is implicit and hidden. In the second case, which often encompasses dream material, the diviner uncovers the hidden causes under the surface (*SVF* 2.973). In sum, divination is a science of the interpretation of causes (*SVF* 2.1191).

Since dreams are a source of knowledge of predetermined events a careful study of them furnishes knowledge of the future. This type of knowledge comes from a careful study of the causal elements within dreams and between dreams. The prophetic character of dreams is scientifically demonstrated from their signs according to the rules (*theōremata, praecepta*) of propositional logic (*De Fato*, 5.2; 7.13). An example of this is as follows:

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[46] Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.64.

[47] All the essential information is given by A. S. Pease's article in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (2nd ed.), s.v. divination.

[48] Cicero defines divination from dreams as "the art of those who follow up new things by inference . . ." *De Div.*, 1.34. On "pores", cf. Plutarch, *Plac. Phil.*, 5.2; *Quaest.*, 8.10.2.

[49] Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.11; 2.2c.

[50] This is suggested by J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*, Albany, 1970, 76ff.

> . . . if it were not the case that all things are encompassed by fate, then the prophecies of the diviners would not be true; but the prophecies of the diviners are true (this premise is surpressed but understood); therefore all things are encompassed by fate (*SVF* 2.939).

This *modus tollens* argument form according to the rules of the second undemonstrated argument permits Chrysippus to define divination as:

> The power of knowing, understanding, and explaining the signs, which are presaged by the gods for men (*SVF* 2.1189).

Fate is the *ratio essendi* of divination. This is what makes it a science (*technē*). Consequently, its predictions or prophecies are always fulfilled. Logic is the *ratio cognoscendi* of divination. This is what makes its prognostications demonstrable. Therefore, this is how one argues from divination to fate. The existence of fate guarantees that divination is efficacious. The predications of divination are scientific because its signs reveal the connections of events in nature.

This understanding of divination and the role of dreams in prophecy functioned to offer proof of the existence of the gods and the government of all things in nature according to providence. Since the human soul is divine it possesses the capacity of receiving and interpreting the providential signs given to it by the gods. Prophecy always reveals natural laws and their causal connections.

This gift which manifests itself in sleep through dreams is a form of ecstasy (Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.50, 115). Dreams present to the soul presentiments from god, the universal *pneuma* dispersed throughout the world (Cicero, *De Div.*, 2.10, 26; cf. 2.15,35), or his daemonic agents (Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.30, 64). The *pneuma* of man and god makes communication possible through the medium of dreams. Dreams reveal the sympathy of the whole and if correctly interpreted present to the soul the harmony and unity of the cosmos.

Aristotle's denial that dreams are god-sent and his sweeping devaluation that dreams are merely daemonic and thus the hallucinations of the sick or the illusions of the sane are reversed by the Stoa.[51] Dreams are divine, daemonic, and most importantly pneumatic—a judgement that contains deep meaning if correctly interpreted. The principle of cosmic sympathy stands at the basis of all dreams and makes their prophecies rational and legitimate.

The Stoic defense of dreams, divination, and prophecy on the basis of physics, logic, and ethics guarantees that dreams are no longer out-of-place. They fit into a large scientific system of explanation, and are fundamental to psychological relocation and epistemological illumination. With the Porch oneirology emerges as a legitimate science. Although there is little evidence to suggest that others employed logic to demonstrate the philosophical efficacy of dreams. There is ample evidence that shows Middle Platonic appropriation of much of Stoic oneirology.

Dream theory has been long in place in another context. As early as the fifth century B.C. dreams are under scrutiny in the medical texts. In the *Peri Enypnion* a physiology of dreams is offered.[52] Later Hippocrates turns his attention to the prognostic and diagnostic value of dreams. Assessing dreams in a clinical setting, Hippocrates exhibits

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[51] *Div. p. somn.*, 463b15ff; 464a 20ff.

[52] Hippocrates, 2.1–16. (English tr. W. H. S. Jones, London-New York, 1931).

little interest in divination and prophecy.[53] Dreams yield images that reveal the health of the dreamer. Once decoded these images yield pictures of the patient's hygienic[54] and urpoietic systems.[55]

This interest in, and translation of, dream-language represents the beginnings of a oneirocritical tradition in antiquity. Eventually this approach to dream symbols results in a corpus of writings called the *oneirocritica*. If dreams present images that merely repeat what occurs during the day, the body is judged healthy. If dreams picture war, strife, and discord these are signs that the body is in ill-health. Specifically dreams of springs and wells yield images of the urpoietic system, rivers of the circulatory system, flooding and drought are signs of hypertonia or anemia.[56]

Posidonius relates divination to medicine and employs the physicians use of dream imagery to uncover the hidden meaning of dreams (Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.12; 24; 112). The three methods of the physicians used in the analysis of dreams; personal experience, transmitted experience, and analogy surface in the *Oneirocritica* of Artemidorus (*Onic.*, 1.50; 51; 2.12; 25; 57; 3.47). Although the medical writers left the *somnia a deo missa* and the *somnia a litteris* to others for interpretation, their methods of dream interpretation greatly influenced other oneirological and oneirocritical traditions. Their influence is most evident on the type of dream analysis and interpretation associated with the cults of Asclepius, Isis, and Serapis.

The healing cults that proliferated in the Hellenistic period were many and varied, their practices determined by regional cultic contexts. Nonetheless, certain gods were recognized as healers. They were associated with the cthonic deities.[57] Tapping immemorial beliefs preserved in the epic and tragic literatures that *potnia chthōn* was the mother of dreams, and that the chthonic gods had definite physical loci in which they resided, cthonic deities and heroes like Amphiaraus and Trophonius were celebrated in Hellenistic times. One old physician, who had been granted an apotheosis, had cult centers throughout the Mediterranean basin. This was Asclepius.[58] It was his Temple at Epidaurus with its records that allow entrance into the dream theory practiced there.[59]

The spirit of healing permeated the Asklepia and the dream theories of the philosophers and physicians were known and practiced there. One type of dream practiced there merits our attention. It was the incubation dream which brought the epiphany of the god in dream and the cure of the dreamer's malady from the data provided in the dream. In the Asclepian cult this type of dream was known as the *enypnion enargēs*, the healing dream that brought about a cure.

Upon entering the temple the patient enters the *abaton* or *adyton*. Laying his head on a *klinē* the patient rests, hoping Asclepius appears either in a dream (*onar*) or in a vision

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[53] See C. A. Meier. "The Dream in Ancient Greece and its Use in Temple Cures (Incubation)", *The Dream and Human Societies*, 303–319.

[54] Op. cit., 4.421ff.

[55] Ibid., 4.428ff.

[56] Ibid., 4.421–447.

[57] This idea goes back to the Archaic period, cf. E. R. Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 64ff.

[58] See, R. Herzog, *Die Wunderheilungen von Epidauros*, Leipzig, 1931; O. Weinreich, *Antike Heilungswunder*, Giessen, 1908; E. J. Edelstein, L. Edelstein, *Asclepius: A Collection and Interpretation of the Testamonies*, 2 vols, Baltimore, 1965.

[59] Ibid., E. J. Edelstein, L. Edelstein, *Asclepius*, Baltimore, 1965, 205ff.

(*bypar*). The god would appear personally, as the bearded man of his cult-image, or by proxy through his theiromorphic aspects as a snake or dog. Touching the afflicted part of the patient's body he would disappear. Hope was that the *kairos oxys* would then occur.[60] Once cured the patient would become a *religiosus* or even a *fanum*, and would join the other *katochē* and the *katochi*.

The cure signified rebirth.[61] Not only did the clinics heal the body they also healed the soul.[62] The full range of oneirological and oneirocritica knowledge and practice found their religious niche in the healing cult of Asclepius. By means of this theory and practice the priest-physician interprets dreams, using them for diagnostic, prognostic, and divinatory ends.[63] Through dreams patients are healed and contact with the divine assured. The relocative power of dreams is assumed, their prophetic significance unquestioned.

It is a short step from the Temple records of the Asclepian Epidaurus to the *Oneirocritica* of Artemidorus.[64] Although his empirical approach to dreams suggests Epicurean, Sceptic, and Stoic influence,[65] his use of dream theory and practice echoes the clinical concerns of the Asclepion.[66] The work describes the uniform laws that govern dreams and a classification of the many types of dreams and their symbols. In sum, Artemidorus' knowledge is encyclopedic concerning the oneirological and oneirocritical traditions that precede his own.[67] Significantly, he was well-aquainted with the literatures of his time, and gives extensive evidence of the interpretation of dreams from literature.

It is not possible to give in any detail a complete analysis of the contents of the *Oneirocritica*. What follows is a general outline of Artemidorus' dream principles.

Artemidorius classifies dreams under five headings. The first three are considered prophetic and true dreams, the last three non-prophetic and false dreams.[68] These are the:

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[60] This process is nicely described by C. J. Singer, *Greek Biology and Greek Medicine*, Oxford, 1922; C. A. Meier, "The Dream in Ancient Greece and its Use in Temple Cures (Incubation)," 314–318.

[61] Damaskios, in *Suidas*, s.v. Domninos.

[62] Op. cit., C. J. Singer, *Greek Biology and Greek Medicine*, Oxford, 1922, explains that the ancients saw nature permeated by divine power and the healing powers of the universe (macrocosm) sympathetically work miracles of healing on the soul (microcosm).

[63] See G. Luck, *Arcana Mundi*, 135–139.

[64] Artemidorus' work was written in the second century C.E. but contains earlier oneirocritic materials, see *The Interpretation of Dreams*, tr. and comm. by R. J. White, Park Ridge, 1975. R. A. Pack, *Artemidori Daldiani Onirocriticon Libri V*, Leipzig, 1963.

[65] *Onic.*, 1.1ff.

[66] Op. cit., R. J. White, *Interpretation*, 6.

[67] Artemidorus mentions a number of words no longer extant which he was familiar with, see R. J. White, *Interpretation*, 6–7.

[68] *Onic.*, 1.2. Artemidorus classifies dreams under five main types: *oneiros*, *horama*, *chrēmatismos*, *enypnion*, and *phantasma*. Dreams are largely the product of the daily activity of the dreamer and background, cf. *Onic.*, 1.8–9. His empirical approach to dreams is largely influenced by his distinct Epicurean, Stoic, and Sceptic approach to dreams, see C. Blum, *Studies in the Dream Book of Artemidorus*, Uppsala, 1936, 23ff.; 83–89. Like Posidonius, Artemidorus relates divination to medicine, cf. *De Div.*, 1.12; 24; 112 and *Onic.*, 4.20; 45; 2.32; 66; 70.

enigmatic dream—the *oneiros*
prophetic vision—the *horama*
oracular dream—the *chresmatismos*

and the:

nightmare—the *enypnion*
apparition—the *phantasma*[69]

Dreams are either straightforward or theorematic and enigmatic or allegorical. In both cases dream-symbols require interpretation (*Onic.*, 4.1; 35). Anatomical, psychological, and typological symbols are listed and interpreted by relating them to the dreamer's experience, the dreams transmitted experience, and the possible analogies each holds for further analysis. In order to understand the outcome of dreams Artemidorus advises to investigate the dreamer's personal circumstance. This results in understanding the function the dream plays in wish-fulfillment and wish-substitution.

There are six elements found in all dreams. These are nature, law, custom, professional skill, art, and name. To grasp the full meaning of these dream-elements the interpreter needs to know about the dreamer's life and situation, his character, and the customs of the land he comes from.

Artemidorus notes that a large number of dreams contain divine epiphanies. The god appears personally, through surrogates, or symbolically through his attributes. Usually they give prescriptions for the health of the dreamer's body and soul. He cautiously avoids the question whether dreams are sent by the gods or motivated by something within the dreamer.

Artemidorus' concern is with the diagnostic and prognostic value of dreams. This explains his interest in the dreamer's character, habits, financial status, and land of origin. The meaning and outcome of a dream depends on this information. This holds for dreams in anamnesis, catamnesis and epicrisis.

Recalling our methodological paradigm archaic dreams were out of place in an essentially horizontal map of center and periphery, of domains and boundaries. In the epic and tragic literatures dreams achieved an adjustment of place through rites of removal and relocation. Divine in origin, yet ambiguous, dreams found their locus at the center of a horizontal map that abandons the cosmological for the anthropological.

In the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions of the Hellenistic age a shift occurs from this locative view to what can be called a vertical one. Within this world view dreams again are out-of-place, located at the nadir of psychological processes. Dreams are dispossessed of their divine pedigree and allotted only a daemonic or psychological one.

In the traditions of the Stoa, Asclepius, and Artemidorus there is yet a further map that combines the cosmological, anthropological, and psychological perspectives of these earlier traditions. In a horizontal map of center and periphery, of domains and boundaries, dreams occupy the divine center. Here the boundary, which protects the soul against external hostile powers, becomes the religious association, the social group.

The chief means of access to the divine center is the prophet, diviner, and dream interpreter whose chief skill is the locative skill of relocation and the vertical skill of

[69] This terminology and theory is used by Philo in the *De Somniis*. cf. *chrēsmos*, 1.172; 2.142; 221; *horama*, 1.159; *phantasma*, 2.162; *oneiros*, 1.1–2; 2.1–2. This is merely a brief list of Philo's dream vocabulary in the *De Somniis*. His theoretical position will be discussed presently.

healing and salvation. This latter configuration crystallizes in the *De Somniis* of Philo. It is to this work we now turn.

II
Philo of Alexandria: The *De Somniis*

Oneiros and Oneirocritica

The *De Somniis* may justifiably be regarded as part of the dream-literature of the Hellenistic age. Since there are no previous studies to guide us in an oneirocritical analysis of this work a preliminary method will have to be devised to deal with our subject. Although it would be highly desirable to make a detailed analysis of each aspect of Philo's *oneirocritice* this is not possible in the limited scope of our study. For our purposes it must suffice that a representative sample of the evidence be presented under various headings. The results gained will permit us to draw some general conclusions on Philo's purpose in writing the *De Somniis* and the relation it has to Hellenistic dream theory and interpretation.

Philo exegetes the various types of dreams recorded in the Pentateuch according to the classification and interpretation of dreams as found in the oneirological and oneirocritical traditions discussed above.

1. Dream Classification

According to Philo dreams are classified under five headings:

a. the enigmatic dream—the *oneiros*
b. the distinct dream—the *horama*
c. the oracular dream—the *chresmos*
d. the imaginative dream—the *hypnos-eidōlon*
e. the apparative dream—the *phantasma*

The first three types of dreams have a divine origin; the fourth may have a divine origin; and the fifth has an anthropological origin.[70] Dreams (a), (b), and (c) are always true; dream (d) may be true or false; and dream (e) is always false. Dreams classified under the first three headings have prophetic significance and are considered modes of natural divination. Dreams classified under the last two headings are not prophetic. They are associated with various forms of witchery and magic mentioned in the Pentateuch (Deut. 18:10–11). The rational soul is the recipient of the first type of dream; the irrational soul produces the second kind of dream.[71]

The term *horama* refers to any straight-forward oracular dream or *chrēsmos*. The term *oneiros* refers to any enigmatic oracular dream, the *chrēsmos*, to any enigmatic imaginative dream, the *eidōlon*, and to any apparative dream, the *phantasma*. Straight-forward dreams do not require interpretation. All enigmatic dreams require interpretation. The lost books of the *De Somniis* apparently dealt principally with *horama-chrēsmoi*. The extant books of the *De Somniis* focus on the *oneiros* as *chrēsmos*, *eidōlon*, and *phantasma*.

Philo employs this terminology to classify and define the dreams of the Pentateuch. His use of dream vocabulary also illustrates the character of the dreamer. For example, the

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[70] *De Somn.*, 1.1–2; 2.1–2.

[71] For Philo's psychology, see J. Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, London, 1977, 145–155; D. T. Runia, *Philo*, Amsterdam, 1983.

dreams of Moses, Abraham, and Isaac are generally of the straight-forward type; those of Jacob and Hannah enigmatic but nonetheless oracular; those of Joseph enigmatic, non-oracular, and sometimes apparative; and those of Pharaoh and his chief butler and baker always enigmatic, non-oracular, and false. We shall have more to say on this later.

2. Dream Theory

Philo has four general categories for dreams in the *De Somniis*. There is the clear and distinct dream that resembles the plain oracle. This dream offers a straightforward account of events and does not need interpretation. Philo calls this dream by the terms *horama* and *chrēsmos*.[72]

In this type of dream:

> . . . the Deity of his own motion sends to us dreams (*oneirōn*) which are presented to us in sleep (*De Somn.*, 1.1).

This type of dream is prophetic by divine influence.

There is the enigmatic dream that resembles the oracular dream. Philo calls this dream, the *chrēsmos*[73]

> The second kind of dreams is that in which our own mind, moving out of itself together with the mind of the universe, seems to be possessed and God-inspired, and so capable of receiving some foretaste and forknowledge of things to come (*De Somn.*, 1.2)

This type of dream is also prophetic by divine influence.[74]

There are dreams that spring from human emotions triggered by the powers of enthusiasm:

> This third kind of dream arises whenever the soul is in sleep, setting itself in motion and agitation of its own accord, becomes frenzied (*korybantia*), and with the prescient power due to such inspiration (*enthousiosa*) foretells the future (*De Somn.*, 2.1).

This type of dream is efficacious because the soul's enthusiasm points to their divine origin. This type of dream is called by the terms *chrēsmos* or *eidolōn*.[75]

Only the straight-forward dream, the *horama*, does not require interpretation. both the oracular and the eidolic dream, the *chrēsmos* and the *eidōlon*, require interpretation. Dreams

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[72] This type of dream was presumably sent to Moses and was discussed by Philo in the sections of the *De Somniis* lost. This term appears in *De Somn.*, 1.159 reading the mss, *horama* not *terma* following Mangey. In this pericope Abraham receives the straight-forward dream.

[73] Like Cicero (*Acad.*, 1.40; 2.18; 77) and Artemidorus (*Onic.*, 1.2), Philo subordinates the *horama* (?) and *chrēmatismos* to the *oneiros*. The *phantasma* is subordinated to the *pseudon eidōlōn*, cf. *De Somn.*, 2.162.

[74] That is the category of dreams that have prophetic significance, the *oneiros*, *horama*, and *chrēsmatismos*. Of the dreams interpreted in *De Somn.*, 1 most are called by the term *chrēsmatismos*. In *De Somn.*, 2 Philo's focus is on this type of dream as well as the *phantasma*.

[75] The *eidōlōn-atomos* is thoroughly discussed by Cicero, cf. *De Div.*, 1.52–57.

of the first type are *theoorematikoi.* Those of the second type are *allegorikoi.* This is why:

> It is now fitting . . . to see how the science of dream interpretation (*oneirokritikē technē*) explains it (*De Somn.*, 2.110).

There are dreams that arise from the soul itself. These lack any divine connection. They are the product of the irrational strain of sense-perceptions and are associated with bodily pleasures (*De Somn.*, 2.16). Philo calls this type of dream a *phantasma,* a *pseudon eidōlon* (*De Somn.*, 2.162). Like other enigmatic dreams it also requires interpretation.

3. The Evidence

a. Horama-Chrēsmoi. Philo calls the dream recorded at Gen. 28:10 a *horama* (*De Somn.*, 1.159. mss. *horama* not *terma*). Dreams of this type are also called *chrēsmoi:*

> In accordance with these distinctions, the sacred guide gave a perfectly clear and lucid sign (*sēmainomenon) of the visions* (*phantasias*) which come under the first description, inasmuch as the intimations given by God through these dreams were of the nature of plain oracles (*chrēsmois*) (*De Somn.*, 2.3).

b. Oneiroi-Chrēsmoi. Philo calls the vision of the stairway recorded at Gen. 28:10 a *oneiros* (*De Somn.*, 1.2–3). Dream visions of this type fall under the category of *chrēsmoi:*

> . . . this vision was indeed enigmatic (*ainigmatōdēs*), but the enigma (*ainigma*) was not in very high degree concealed from the quick-sighted (*De Somn.*, 2.3).

Philo appears to suggest that while the dream itself is hormatic, the vision in the dream is oneirotic. This example illustrates his tendency to telescope his dream classifications. He explains his method in the following manner:

> The first kind of dreams we saw to be those in which God originates the movement and invisibly suggests things obscure to us but patent to himself: while the second type consisted of dreams in which the understanding moves in concert with the soul of the universe (*tē tōn holōn sugkinoumenes psychēs,* sic. the Logos) and becomes filled with a divinely induced madness (*mania*) which is permitted to foretell many coming events (*De Somn.*, 2.2).

c. Oneiroi-Eidola. Philo defines the dream recorded at Gen. 28:10 as also containing an *eidōlon* (*De Somn.*, 1.153):

> I must not fail to mention another idea which is present in the vision (*eidōlon*). The affairs of men are naturally linked to a ladder owing to their uneven course. For one day, as the poet says, brings one man down from high, and lifts another up, and nothing related to man is of a nature to remain as it is, but all such things are liable to changes of every kind. . . . Such is the road human affairs go up and down, a road liable to shifting and unstable happenings, their uneven tenor manifestly laid bare by time's unerring test (*De Somn.*, 1.153–156).

This aspect of the dream is enigmatic, but non-oracular. This is because the image yields a vision that concerns human affairs not divine ones. Again we see Philo utilizing one of his dream classifications to interpret one aspect of a Pentateuchal dream.

Dreams of the third kind:

> . . . are more obscure than the former, swing to the deep and impenetrable nature of the enigma involved in them . . . (*De Somn.*, 2.4)

They demand:

> . . . a scientific skill in discerning the meaning of dreams (*tēs oneirokritikēs epistēmēs*) (*De Somn.*, 2.4).

d. Oneiroi-Pseuda Eidōla. Philo calls Pharaoh's dream at Gen. 40:9 a *pseudon-eidōlon* (*De Somn.*, 2.162). Dreams of this type are also called *pseudōn phantasmatōn* (*De Somn.*, 2.162).

> And that deep and abysmal sleep which holds fast all the wicked and robs the mind of true apprehensions, and fills it with false phantoms and untrustworthy images and persuades it to approve the blameworthy as laudable: thus in the present case the dreamer treats sorrow as joy and does not perceive the vine of his vision is the plant of folly and madness. "There was", he said, "a vine before me" (Gen. 40:9), the wanted and the wanter, wickedness and the wicked, facing each other. The vine we fools till, little thinking that it is to our own harm . . . (*De Somn.*, 2.162–263).

The dream is enigmatic, non-oracular, and the giver of false visions. It concerns itself with human affairs and reflects the debauchery of the dreamer himself. Despite this, however, the dream serves a didactic end for Philo. Thus, it has value. To grasp its enigmatic meaning dream interpretation is needed.

4. Dream Topics: The Character Topics

Philo uses such topical information as the dreamer's identity, occupation, birth, financial status, state of health, age, and land of origin to assist in the exegesis of dreams. The significance and possible outcome of Pentateuchal dreams are correctly interpreted if the dreamer's personal attitudes and habits are examined. This analysis, in turn, leads to a basis for character analysis.

Philo identifies two types of personality:

> . . . those who have maintained that only the morally beautiful is good, preserving it unmixed, have attributed the good to the reasoning faculty (*logismō*) the noblest part in us; while those who have regarded it (sic. the good) as mixed have associated it with three things, soul, body, and things external to us. The latter class belong to the softer and luxurious way of life . . . Those others are austere of life . . . eager for what will do them good rather than for what is pleasant (*De Somn.*, 2.9).

On the basis of this distinction he contrasts Isaac and Joseph:

> There are two companies as leaders which Moses introduces, Isaac and Joseph. The noble company is led by Isaac who learns from no teacher but himself, for Moses represents him as weaned (Gen. 21:8), absolutely distaining to make any use of soft and milky food suited to infants and little children, and using only strong nourishment fit for grown men, seeing that from a babe he was naturally stalwart, and was ever attaining fresh vigour and renewing his youth. The company which yields and is ready to give in is led by Joseph, for he is one who does not indeed take no account of the excellences of the

> soul (*tōn kata psychēn aretōn*), but is thoughtful of the well-being of the body also, and has a keen desire to be well off in outward things; and he is naturally drawn in different directions since he has set before him many ends in life, and as he experiences the counter-attraction after another, he is shaken this way and that and can never attain to fixity . . . Such is the cycle of unceasing warfare ever revolving around the many sided-soul (*De Somn.*, 2.10–11; 14).

Therefore, Joseph:

> . . . represents opinion (*doxēs*) . . . For there is manifest in him . . . the rational strain of self-control, which is of the masculine family, fashioned after his father Jacob: manifest again, is the irrational strain of sense-perception (*to alogon aisthēseōs*), assimilated to what he derives from his mother, the part of him that is of the Rachel type: manifest is also the breed of bodily pleasure, imposed on him by association with chief butlers and bakers and chief cooks: manifest too is the element of vain-glory . . . (*De Somn.*, 15–16).

Moses, Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac are not characters of the mixed type, but of the pure type. Their personal habits reflect souls wedded to reason and to the pursuit of the good. Their occupations and associations reflect the wholesome nature of their psychic makeups. These are facts Philo employs when he attempts his analysis of their dreams. They are utilized to explain why some dreams are sent by God, his Logos, and his angels to some, while others have dreams motivated by something that is within the dreamer. Dreams are a reflection of the soul's constitution and are a continuation of the soul's activities.

Philo also stresses the necessity of studying the customs of the lands in which his dreamers live. Knowing their identity, occupation, birth, and state of psychological health is filled out by this additional information.

Haran is called the mother city of the senses. Laban is the occupant of Haran because:

> . . . it is Laban, a man without knowledge of species or genus or archetypal form or conception or of anything whatever of the objects of solely intellectual comprehension, but dependent wholly on things patent and palpable, which are known by seeing and hearing and the powers akin to them (*De Somn.*, 1.45).

This land is wholly alien to Jacob:

> Jacob the lover of virtue dwells as in a foreign land for a little while, with his mind ever set on the return to his home (*De Somn.*, 1.45).

And:

> Owing to this, as it seems to me, the grandfather also of his knowledge, called Abraham, did not brook a prolonged stay in Haran. For we read that Abraham was seventy-five years old when he left from Haran (Gen.12:4) (*De Somn.*, 1.47).

The customs of Haran as exemplified in Laban are alien to Jacob and Abraham. These are men of reason, not the senses. Indeed for Philo the report that Terah left Chaldaea for Haran with Abraham is used to underscore his son's poetic pedigree.

> The Chaldaean's are astronomers, while the citizens of Haran busy themselves

with the place (*topos*) of the senses (*De Somn.*, 1.52).

Joseph, on the other hand, resides in a land of sense-debauchery. He luxuriates in food and drink (*De Somn.*, 2.48–51), clothing (*De Somn.*, 2.52–53), houses (*De Somn.*, 2.54–55), beds (*De Somn.*, 2.56–57), perfumes (*De Somn.*, 2.58–59), drinking cups (*De Somn.*, 2.60–61), and golden crowns (*De Somn.*, 64). Egypt's customs are Joseph's. This information assists Philo in interpreting his dreams.

Philo uses Abraham's land of origin to assist in explaining his superiority over Joseph:

> The information that Terah left the land of Chaldaea and migrated to Haran . . . is given us not with the object that we may learn as from a writer of history, that certain people become immigrants, leaving the land of their ancestors, and making a foreign land their home and country, but that a lesson . . . may not be neglected (*De Somn.*, 1.52).

Abraham's land of birth symbolizes his heavenly, indeed noetic pedigree, and reflects his need to leave Haran, the land of the senses. It also explains the god-sent nature of his dreams.

5. Dream Topics: The Medical Topics.

Philo employs medical *topoi* in his analysis of dreams. He finds them useful in exegesis. We noted that in Hippocrates' *Peri diaitēs* (4.88) springs and wells correspond to the urpoietic system and rivers to the circulatory system. One example from the *De Somniis* suffices to illustrate this point.

In the context of his interpretation of Jacob's ladder dream at Bethel, Philo inquires about the four wells dug by Abraham and Isaac (*De Somn.*, 1.14). His allegorization of Gen. 21:25 and 36:19–23 operates on several levels. Of importance to us is his cosmological allegory: the four wells signify the four constituents of the cosmos—earth, air, water, and heaven. Of equal importance is his physiological allegory: the four wells signify the four aspects of man's nature—body, senses, speech, and mind (*De Somn.*, 1.15–24).

Philo's association of dream cosmology and physiology is a common device in diagnostic dream-analysis. Each well symbolizes a relation of macrocosm to microcosm. The method of exegesis is called analogy (*bē tou homoiou metabasis*). From this universal dream Philo makes a general observation: sensible things are known through the senses, intelligible things and the mind are not. Although the results of Philo's exegesis merely underscore a pedestrian Platonic postulate, how he deduces this postulate from a dream illustrates a common technique of the medical interpretation of dreams.

Within this pericope also exists evidence that Philo knew that streams correspond to the circulatory system. Working within a cosmological context he calls the thousand springs of the cosmos the veins of the universe (*De Somn.*, 1.19). The physicians were fond of such analogies and employed them extensively in dream analysis.

6. Dream Topics: An Incubation Dream

As a part of his extensive analysis and exegesis of Gen. 28:10 we noted that Philo called an aspect of Jacob's vision an *eidōlon* (*De Somn.*, 1.153). Later, Philo calls this god-sent dream by a term commonly used by the followers of Asclepius.[76] It is called an *onar*:[77]

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[76] Like Artemidorus, Philo understands the god-sent dream as having medical as well as theological implications, cf. *Onic.*, 1.9.

[77] Cf. E. J. Edelstein, J. Edelstein, *Asclepius*, 205ff.

> The dream (*to onar*) showed the ruler of the angels set fast upon the stairway, even the Lord: for high up like a charioteer high over his chariot or a helmsman high over his ship must we conceive of him that is standing over bodies, over soul, over doings, over words, over angels, over earth, over air, over sky, over powers described by our senses, over invisible things, yes all things seen and unseen: for having made the whole universe depend on and cling to himself, he is the charioteer of that vast creation (*De Somn.*, 1.157).

We know from the temple records of Epidaurus that dreams often revealed images (*eidōla*) of the god that yield cosmological meaning. We also know that the term, *eidōlon*, originally meant a telepathic dream. It could be that Philo combines these two understandings to suggest that Jacob's god-sent vision is a telepathic dream.[78]

This *eidōlon-onar* appears to Jacob through a proxy. The Logos is the medium of the dream (*De Somn.*, 1.144). God does not appear personally to the dreamer (*De Somn.*, 1.68–71). Like the Asclepian *onar* the dream comes from without (*ex heatou: De Somn.*, 1.2); it enters the head through a kind of pillow, in this case a stone (*lithos*); and from the dream the dreamer comes to know "the divine place" and a "holy land full of divine words" and these words are immortal souls (*De Somn.*, 1.127). In sum, Philo interprets Jacob's dream as a kind of incubation dream that signifies much of what the followers of Asclepius would understand as a *kairos oxys*.[79]

The dream reveals the health of Jacob's soul and the nature of his character (*De Somn.*, 2.19ff.). His knowledge, reason, and moral excellence explains why God sent this dream to him. In contrast, Joseph's *eidōla* are not god-sent. His soul is not properly balanced. His visions are symptomatic of a soul in psychic and physical distress (*De Somn.*, 2.10–16).

Joseph's character is flawed. It is wedded to the senses and addicted to bodily pleasures. Joseph's not only thinks falsely, he dreams falsely. In sleep he dreams enypniotic visions.[80] For Philo this explains his character:

> In what we have said so far we have been giving a rough sketch of Joseph's character. We must now consider in detail each of his dreams. And the one which must be examined first is the one concerning the sheaves. "Methought he says, that they were binding sheaves" (Gen. 37:7). The very first word "methought", is the utterance of one at a loss, hesitating dimly supposing, not seeing steadily and distinctly. For "methought" is a word which becomes those waking up out of deep sleep and still in dreamland, not those who are thoroughly awake and see things clearly. You will not find the Practicer Jacob saying "me-thought", but "behold a stairway firmly fixed, whose top reached to heaven" (Gen. 28:12), and again "at the time that the sheep conceived, I saw them with my eyes in my sleep, and behold the he-goats and the rams

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[78] The interpretation suggests a kind of telepathic correspondance between God and Jacob following Democritean-Stoic principles, cf. Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.52–57.

[79] Cf. G. Björek, "onar idein: De la perception de a reve che les aniens", *Eranos* 44 (1946), 309ff. Except for the Peripatetic tradition dreams the ancients thought dreams to be objective and sent to the dreamer from without. Philo seems to follow in this understanding of dreams, at least in regard to god-sent dreams. *Phantasma*, for example, are subjective and arise from psychic and ethical deficiencies in the subject. More on this below.

[80] This type of dream has the characteristic of Aristotle's daemonic dream, cf. *Insomn.*, 464a6–22, signifying a kind of insanity.

> leaped upon the sheep and the goats wholly white, and streaked, and sprinkled as though with ashes" (Gen. 31:1c, 11). For the very visions seen in their sleep (*tas en tois hypnois phantasias*) are of necessity clearer and purer in the case of those who deem the morally beautiful eligible for its own sake, even as their doings by day are bound to be more worthy of approbation (*De Somn.*, 2.17–20).

The dreams of Pharaoh, the chief butler, and the chief baker also arise from souls which are gluttonous and full of drink. These dreams of vainglory (*oneirata tēs kenēs doxēs: De Somn.*, 2.154) arising from morally corrupt souls represent:

> . . . he who gives way to the intoxication which is of folly rather than of wine (he) bears a grudge against upright standing and wakefulness, and lies prostrate and sprawling like sleepers with the eyes of his soul closed, unable to see or hear that which is worth seeing or hearing. And thus brought low, as he passes through life he finds no road but a pathless tract where neither eye nor hand can guide him . . . bringing miserable destruction both to himself and them. And that deep and abysmal sleep (*bo de bathys kai diōlygios hypnos*) which holds fast all the wicked robs the mind of true cognitions (katalēpseis), and fills it with false phantoms (*pseudōn . . . eidōlōn*) and untrustworthy visions (*abebaiōn phantasmatōn) and persuaded it to approve of the blameworthy as laudable: thus in the present case the dreamer treats sorrow as a joy and does not perceive that the vine of his vision is the plant which produces folly and madness (De Somn.*, 2.160–162).

7. Dream Symbols

Philo also employs dream-*symbola* in his exegesis of Pentateuchal dreams. Since the *De Somniis* is full of such symbolic interpretation we shall focus on two such dream symbols: that of the well and the vine (*De Somn.*, 1.4ff.; 2.163). Each example is prefaced by Artemidorus' interpretation of the symbol.

According to Artemidorus a well:

> overflowing with pure water means good luck for all men, but especially for the sick and the needy. For, to the sick, they are a sign of recovery; to the poor they are a sign of wealth. For there is nothing so nourishing as water. But if they are dried up and without water, they signify the exact opposite for everybody (*Onic.*, 2.27).

For Philo the well is a symbol of knowledge (*symbolon . . . epistēmēs: De Somn.*, 1.6). Jacob is able to draw from this well. Other diggers, however, find no water in it (*De Somn.*, 1.8). Jacob's dream which combines elements of the social, public, and universal meaning of dreams offers the symbol of the well to teach the benefits of knowledge and the difficulties involved in aquiring it. He follows up by stating that Isaac did not even find water at this well, and this means that complete knowledge is beyond us. This leads to a prolonged allegory of the faculties of knowing and the constitution of the universe each of which is associated with biblical personalities and loci.

Another example is edifying. This has to do with Pharaoh's cup (*De Somn.*, 2.159–163). Artemidorus states:

> . . . drinking cups symbolize those who greet us with a kiss. And so if they break it means that some of the dreamer's family or friends will die. But if

> anyone is alone in this world, the dream signifies that he himself will die . . . This indeed was the ancient interpretation (*Onic.*, 1.67).

According to Philo:

> In my sleep there was a vine over against me, and on the vine there were three stalks, and itself was blossoming having put forth shoots. The grapes in the cluster were ripe, and Pharaoh's cup was in my hand (Gen. 40:9–11).

Artemidorus says that:

> Crowns of vine leaves mean . . . imprisonment because of the tendrils of the vine (*Onic.*, 1.73).

and that:

> Everything that sprouts up or grows quickly—among the plants, the vine . . . signify good and bad things that will come true quickly (*Onic.*, 2.11).

Finally that:

> . . . the vine was a symbol of death which was about to overtake the other girl because it springs up from the earth (and it is in the earth that dead bodies decompose) and also because a vine is robbed of its fruit at the height of its maturity (*Onic.*, 5.39).

In Hellenistic dream theory cup and vine can symbolize death. Philo takes both symbols in his interpretation of Pharaoh's dream. Pharaoh has no true insights when he dreams. They are false phantoms and untrustworthy visions that persuade him that sorrow is joy (*De Somn.*, 2.162–163). This is a kind of death for as Philo states:

> The vine we fools till, little thinking it is to our own harm . . . (it) is a possession which proves to entail no half measure but a wholesale complete totality of mischief (*De Somn.*, 2.163).

He who drinks from Pharaoh's cup dies a kind of death. The vines symbolize a kind of imprisonment that signify bad things that come true quickly—Pharaoh's false dream. The cup is a kiss of death, the vine a portent of misfortune.

Again Philo begins his extended exegesis of scripture with a oneirocritic commonplace. The dreams of the drunken sleep are those in which all the wicked are plunged. The results are thanatonic—dreams are not god-sent but merely false and lead the soul to mischief.

Keeping this observation in mind it is not surprising to discover that Philo uses the five categories of enigmatic dreams to classify the dreams of the Pentateuch.

There is the personal dream, when one dreams only of oneself; the alien dream, when one dreams about someone else; the social dream when one dreams of others and oneself; the public dream, when one dreams that some misfortune or benefit befalls a community; and the universal dream, when one dreams of the meaning of the cosmos.[81]

In the partial, yet, it is hoped, representative survey of the *oneirocritice* of the *De Somniis*, it appears that false dreams are generally personal, while true dreams contain elements of the alien dream, the social dream, the public dream, and the universal dream. This

[81] This is outlined in Artemidorus, *Onic.*, 1.2.

aspect of his dream theory deserves more attention. It has not, because, in the words of our colleague, again we meet a Cinderella of Philonic studies.[82]

For Philo dreams are reflective of the health of the soul. To this extent they have diagnostic and prognostic value. They reveal the moral character of those who dream them.

Oneirocritical *topoi* abound in the *De Somniis*. Their use suggests that they serve as an integral part of the exegetical arsenal employed by Philo. Hopefully, these exegetical examples suffice to illustrate this point.

Not only is Philo's *oneirodritikē technē* highly developed in the *De Somniis*. The work also displays a solid knowledge of Hellenistic dream theory. Since dreams are associated with issues germane to physics, epistemology, and psychology it is appropriate that we turn and approach the *De Somniis* from these perspectives and attempt to reconstruct the theoretical matrices of Philo's interpretation of dreams.

Oneiros and Psyche

The organ of dreams is the *pneuma*. It is the *psychē psychēs* with the purest and most divine *ousia*. It functions for Philo as the dream protagonist and underscores his claim that all dreams are important for their prophetic quality.[83]

The mental faculty which receives dreams is the image making faculty of the soul, i.e., the *phantasia*. Philo is careful to associate the *phantasia* with the *nous*. Thus even when the mind moves out of itself when dreaming the images it receives from God are efficacious and capable of yielding some foretaste and foreknowledge of things to come.

Prognostication is possible because when an idea is transmitted to the image-making faculty of the soul from without in sleep objects of divine knowledge are communicated.[84] The soul then has an unconscious perception of divine wisdom represented in mental images and words. The mind moves in unison with the mind of the universe.[85]

This coupling of the imagination with *nous*, the higher faculty of soul, is an explicit rejection of earlier Platonic and Aristotelian associations of the imagination with the lower psychic faculties. This step involves a complete reinterpretation of an older dream theory.[86] The crucial step lay in the identification of a detachable self with the divine mind. The dreamer's ecstasy claims the authority of God's *logos*. The knowledge aquired

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[82] "Secondary Texts in Philo's *Queastiones* (unpublished)," presented to the 1986 meeting of the Philo Seminar, Atlanta, November, 1986.

[83] Philo refers to the practice of prophecy and divinely inspired divination prominently in his writings, cf. *De Somn.*, 1.1–2; 2.1–2; *Mos.*, 2.188–191; *Cong.*, 132. See, T. H. Billings, *Philo*, 66–69; H. A. Wolfson, *Philo ii*, 11–22. Prophecy and divination lead to an *epistēmē tōn ouranion* and one of the means to this aquisition is through dreams. His classification and interpretation of the dreams of the Pentateuch is driven by his desire to know the extent to which God and his powers are involved and not involved in the sending of dreams. To this extent he adopts Hellentistic *oneirocritice* to assess dreams and their resultant prophecies.

[84] Here Philo picks up on one of Plato's few positive statements about manticism, cf. *Rep.*, 572a, where he says the soul as mantic searches, "touching on truth" in dreams, and Aristotle's assessment at *De Phil.*, fr. 12 Ross. However, his position finds its closest parallel in the Stoa, cf. fr. F108; 110 (Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.64; 129–130).

[85] *De Somn.*, 1.2.

[86] The Platonic and Aristotelian, see F. Pfeiffer, *Studien*, 10–42.

becomes a vision of divine truth. This vision becomes an imaginative perception of the divine ideas and becomes part of a new Platonic epistemology.[87]

When the soul grasps the ideas through the imagination while dreaming she acquires a transcendent, rational self whose union with God guarantees a knowledge of the immortal ideas. Dreams are no longer attached to non-rational factors of psychic behavior. They have become a part of its rational activity. For Philo dreams have become a new kind of imaginative knowledge whose psychic structure links the mind with God.[88] This paradigm shift involves transformations in Platonic ideational theory and a corresponding elevation of the epistemic value of the imagination. Both transformations stand outside of the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, they can be seen in the range of functions Philo ascribes to Jacob's dream.

In the first vision (*phantasia*) in which Jacob meets the Logos, he comes to know (*eidenai*) a divine place (*theios topos*), a holy space (*hiera chōra*) full of incorporeal words (*asomatōn logōn: De Somn.*, 1.127). This place and its words are grasped by the understanding (*dianoia*) whose vision of them enters the head because Jacob's head sleeps on a stone which is the divine word (*epi logō theiō: De Somn.*, 1.128). Elsewhere Philo calls these incorporeal words ideas and seminal words (*spermatikoi logoi*). They are the divine ideas whose place is in the Logos. Consequently, when Jacob dreams he comes to know God's conceptual universe. Significantly, the mental faculty that receives this data is the understanding through the image-making activity of the soul, i.e. the imagination.[89]

Next Philo examines the details of this god-sent vision (*theopemtou phantasias: De Somn.*, 1.133–134). His interpretation of Gen. 28.12 runs as follows:

> Stairway when applied to the universe is a figurative name for the air; whose foot is earth and its head heaven. For the air extends in all directions to the ends of the earth from the sphere of the moon . . . The air is the abode of incorporeal souls, since it seemed good to their maker to fill all parts of the universe with living beings . . .

And:

> Such then is that which the universe is figuratively called stairway. If we consider that which is so-called in human beings we shall find it to be soul. Its foot is sense-perception, which is as it were the earthy element in it, the mind which is wholly unalloyed, the heavenly element, as it may be called. Up and down throughout its whole extent are incessantly moving the words of God (*hoi tou theou logoi*) drawing it up with them when they ascend and disconnecting it with what is mortal, and exhibiting to it the spectacle of the only objects worthy of our gaze . . . (*De Somn.*, 1.146–147).

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[87] Philo's dream epistemology has close associations with his theory of ideas, see J. Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 155–162; R. M. Berchman, *From Philo to Origen: Middle Platonism in Transition*, Chico, 1984, 170–176.

[88] Philo self-consciously links dreams with the imaginative or image-making faculty of the soul. Throughout the *De Somniis* the word *phantasia* and its cognates are used to characterize the dream-vision, cf. e.g., 2.2–3.

[89] Wendland was among the first to see Philo's association with Posidonius on this point, cf. *Sitzungsberichte* (1897), 1074–1079, cf. ap. Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.64. Wolfson is surely incorrect to distance Philo from this formulation and its philosophical trajectory, cf. *Philo ii*, 55. See Cicero, *De Div.*, 2.63; 130; See A. S. Pease's notes in his edition.

Jacob's imagination does not link him with the passions of sense-perception. Rather it couples him to divine reason and knowledge. Philo self-consciously places Jacob's dream in a *logos*, not a *pathos* context. Here Jacob's dream does not signify a dreamer who is insane or drunk, but one who is enlightened and sober. It is not Aristotle but Posidonius' understanding of the dream that dominates Philo's interpretation. Jacob's dream is god-sent and divinatory. It reveals the working of the divine *logos* in the world (cf. Cicero, *De Div.*, 1.110):

> there are three ways in which men dream as a result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the gods; second the air is full of immortal souls (i.e. daemons), already clearly stamped, as it were, with marks of truth; and third, the gods converse personally with men while they sleep (*De Div.*, 1.30).

Dreams permit one:

> the power to see, understand, and explain premonitory signs given to men by the gods (*De Div.*, 2.63).

Dreams offer presentiments from God, the universal *pneuma* dispersed throughout the universe (*De Div.*, 2.10, 26). The agents of God are his daemons and his ideas (*De Div.*, 1.30, 64) who present themselves to the dreamer thereby conveying the divine message.

Philo's theory is strikingly similar. There are three sources of prophecy: God, the Logos, and the angels. Dreams are a prophetic medium wherein knowledge of the divine ideas are attained through the frenzy of divination.

> What I say is vouched for by that prophetess and mother of the prophet, Hannah, whose name is in our tongue Grace (*charis*). For she says that she is giving as a gift to the holy one her son Samuel (1 Sam. 1:11), not meaning a human being but rather an inspired temper possessed by a god-sent frenzy (*alla tropon entbousiōnta kai katechomenon ke manias theopboretou*). And Samuel means appointed of God (*De Somn.*, 1.254).

For Philo the human mind makes contact with the divine through dreams. The faculty of imagination functions as the connecting link between god-sent dreams and the human soul. It is that which makes communication possible. Dream-visions (*phantasia-eidōlōn*) are the basis for divination and the one who possesses these inspired visions is blessed by the grace of God. The dreamer is possessed by a god-sent frenzy that is reasonable and which imaginatively grasps the divine ideas. The soul rises from a knowledge of things sensible to prophetic knowledge of things intelligible.

Dreams lead the soul to a kind of divine intoxication (*theia methē*).[90] When grace fills the soul, the soul rejoices and smiles and dances, for it is possessed with frenzy (*bebakobeutai*).[91] It is god-possessed (*theopbrētois*). Without grace it is impossible to leave the ranks of mortal things or to stay forever among things imperishable.[92]

Philo sets this view of the dream-soul relation over against the Platonic and Aristotelian. Both use the traditional language of oneirology and psychology. Each, however, qualifies

[90] *Leg. Alleg.*, 3.26; 82.
[91] *Ebr.*, 145–147.
[92] *De Somn.*, 1.254.

it differently. For Plato and Aristotle, the *oneiros* afflicts the *psychē;* for Philo the *oneiros* leads the *psychē* to *epistēmē,* to the *theoi logoi.* Dreams do not arise from the soul and proceed outward. They come from without and enter the soul leading it to divine possession.

That this type of dream is generally identified with the *chrēsmatismos,* or god-sent dream, tells us much about Philo's view of the soul who receives it. It is a charitic soul who discharges to his community admonition and guidance. The divine character of the dream bestows on the soul who visions it a divine character. This, at least partially, explains Philo's profound interest in the divinatory character of dreams. These dreams and their dreams provide a chief means of access to the divine center. The one who unlocks the door to the divine becomes someone like Philo himself whose chief skill is that of interpretation.

For Philo dreams reveal a direct vision of reality on a number of levels. They are not exclusively the mere *phantasmata* of the soul's innermost, hallucinatory life. Philo refuses to accept Aristotle's *dictum* that all dreams pass through the gate of Ivory. Some pass through the gate of Horn as well. It is the role of the dream interpreter to inform his audience of this fact and to herd their dreams and those of their heroes through these passageways.

In conclusion, we shall examine Philo's understanding of *mania, enthusiasmos,* and the role of the *prophetēs.* This is undertaken because Philo goes to great lengths to distinguish the mantics and prophets of the Pentatuech from the magicians of Egypt in the *De Somniis.* Philo's understanding of the character and function of the dreamers and dreams of the Pentateuch opens both to charges of magic. His defense is that the figures in the Pentateuch are prophets who practice divination, not magicians who practice the deceptive art of magic (*goēteia).*

Oneiros: Mania and Goēteia

In his characterization of Hannah, Philo uses the terms *mania* and *enthusiasmos* to describe her charismatic character. He associates her character with the gift of divination.[93] She is one who speaks for God as his prophetess:

> What I say is vouched for by the prophetess and mother of a prophet, Hannah, whose name is in our language Grace. For she says she is giving as a gift to the Holy One her son Samuel (1 Sam. 1:11), not meaning a human being but rather an inspired (*enthousiōnta*) temper possessed by a god-sent frenzy (*manias theophorētou*) . . . (*De Somn.,* 1.254).

As a prophetess she receives god-sent dreams and is possessed by a god-sent frenzy.[94] Yet even her dreams are enigmatic and their divine message clouded with ambiguities. Therefore, they must be skillfully interpreted. Philo makes this plain in a general proposition:

> In accordance with these distinctions, the sacred guide gave a perfectly clear and lucid interpretation of the visions (*phantasias*) which come under the first description, inasmuch as the intimations given by God through these dreams were of the nature of plain oracles (*chrēsmois*). Those which fall under the

[93] For Philo's use of this term, cf. H. A. Wolsfon, *Philo ii,* 22–72.

[94] Cf. Artemidorus, *Onic.,* Pr. 4.

> second description he interpreted neither with consummate clearness nor with excessive indistinctness. A type of these is the vision that appeared on the heavenly stairway. For this vision was indeed enigmatic (*ainigmatōdēs*), but the enigma (*ainigma*) was not in high degree concealed from the quick-sighted. The visions (*phantasiai*) of the third type being more obscure than the former, owing to the deep and intense blackness of the enigma (*ainigma*) involved in them, demanded an oneirocritical knowledge (*oneirokritikēs epistēmēs*) in discerning the meaning of dreams. Accordingly all the dreams of this sort recorded by the law-giver received their interpretation at the hands of men who were experts in the aforementioned art (*technē*) (*De Somn.*, 2.3–4).

Few could argue with Philo's defense of Hannah as a prophetess with the power of divination or with the need to interpret her enigmatic dreams. But what of someone like Joseph who even Philo characterizes in less than flatteringly terms? His dreams are those of a sick soul. Is it not possible to characterize him as a magician, as one who practices magic?

Yet, even Joseph, whose dreams are most problematic for Philo, stands apart from the sophists, augurs, ventriloquists, and soothsayers of Egypt. Those who are proficient in decoying, charming, and bewitching (*goēteusai*) their audience.[95] Even Joseph whose desires are set on human statecraft, and whose robe is bespeckled with large portions of false, probable, plausible, and conjectural matters, is no magician (*De Somn.*, 1.219–220). That he is no prophet and possesses no powers of divination does not mean he can be characterized by this odious epithet.

None of the dreamers of the Pentatuech are *goēs* who cast spells and charms that bewitch and beguile. Jugglers and cheaters do not populate the Pentateuch unless they are non-Jewish. Egyptians are called by this term. It is a sign of their 'outsider' status. Among the 'insider' group diviners abound and no magicians can be found. The dreams of Jewish prophets and even statesmen are divinely sanctioned. Only those of Pharoah and his servants are fully characterized to resemble the hallucinations of the sick and the illusions of the sane. In the *De Somniis*, who, representing which group, possessing what type of dreams, is clear-cut.

The heroes of the Pentateuch dream prophetic dreams the content of which is divinatory. The villans dream hallucinatory dreams the content of which leads to magic and wizardary. The lines between types and social groups are firmly drawn. Penelope's warning is heeded. The dreams of the Pentateuch pass through the Gate of Horn and the Gate of Ivory. That they do provided Philo with the opportunity to argue the superiority of Jewish dreams over Egyptian ones and to contrast divination and magic. This can be shown through oneirology, it is reasonably and demonstrably so.

In view of our methodological paradigm dreams stand at the center of a horizontal map of center and periphery, of domains and boundaries. The chief means of access to the divine is through the Pentateuch that contains divine prophecy often expressed in the medium of dreams. Superimposed on this horizontal map is a vertical one of down and up, of the sensible world and the intelligible world. The chief means of access to the divine here is through excellence of soul or through a highly skilled dream interpreter whose

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[95] On the term *goēs* in Hellentistic times, cf. Plato, *Sym.*, 202e, where he grants *goeteia* a measure of efficacy as a function of the daemon Eros. However in most contexts the connotation is derogatory, cf. Josephus, *Ant.*, 20.92; 167; 188; *Bellum*, 2.261ff. See, J. Bidez, F. Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés*, Paris, 1938, i. 144ff.

chief skill is that of dream interpretation. His skill includes the powers of relocation, and healing. The dream interpreter demonstrates his right to this locative role by exhibiting his knowledge of a dream's name, place, and taxon. The gaining of such taxonomic knowledge is the central task in such texts as the *De Somniis.*

Conclusion

This partial, yet it is hoped, representative survey of Philo's *De Somniis* does not yield firm conclusions about the author's use of Hellenistic *oneirocritice.* The full extent of Philo's knowledge and use of *oneirologia* and *oneirocritica* can be drawn only when all the evidence has been collected and analyzed. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions:

1. Philo employs oneirocritic *topoi* throughout the *De Somniis.* They form an integral part of his exegetical approach.
2. Philo makes extensive use of the technical terms and symbols common to the oneirocritic traditions. He applies them to a Pentateuchal context.
3. Philo knows the oneirological basis of dream interpretation. He is aware of dream theory as it is expressed in the philosophical, medical, and cultic contexts of his time.
4. Philo uses *oneirocritice* to make four main points:
   a. The dreams of the Pentateuch are god-sent and prophetic.
   b. Their divine origin and character permits Philo to argue for their *logos* character and to define them in their wider philosophical context.
   c. Dreams are linked to a series of philosophical postulates that illustrate their ontological, epistemological, psychological, and ethical significance.
   d. On this basis he argues that the dreams of the Pentateuch have divinatory and not magical significance.

Oneirocritice, then, is a tool valuable for Philo's intentions. It represents a constellation of theories and methods concerning dreams that Philo uses to lift the dream world of the Pentateuch out of the *arcana mundi* to which it was consigned.[96] To this extent the *De Somniis* stands as an important and independent work within the *corpus Philonicum* that serves to link Philo with the long and varigated traditions of Hellenistic dream theory and interpretation. Finally, to view Philo's *De Somniis* from this perspective is to connect it with its proper contextual world—that of the relation of dreams to divination, magic, and philosophy. If this study has shed some light on these topics and stimulates students of Philo to investigate these connections further, it will have more than fulfilled its purpose.

[96] See G. Luck, *Arcana Mundi,* xiii.

Politics and Exegesis in Philo's Treatise on Dreams

David M. Hay
Coe College

Not long ago Isaac Bashevis Singer published a story entitled "A Safe Deposit"[1] which tells of a modern scholar whose speciality is Philo Judaeus. He is so committed to his subject that he dreams of Philo and subscribes to Philo's disdain for the deceptions of flesh and blood. But, as the story unfolds, the scholar experiences the flesh-and-blood realities of existential confusion, illness, and the affectionate care of a strange woman who has survived Russian slave labor camps. Singer's story presses readers of Philo, like his fictional scholar, to ask the question, "Does Philo have anything to do with the world of flesh and blood?"

Almost the only fact about Philo's life that we know is that at one critical moment in the history of the Alexandrian Jewish community he led a delegation to Rome to represent that community before the Emperor Caligula. He himself felt that the fate of Jews throughout the Roman world might have hinged on how he and his fellow delegates spoke and acted (*Legat* 370).[2] His leadership of the embassy suggests that he had already acquired a strong reputation for political skill and devotion to Jewish interests.

De Somniis is the last preserved work in the series of writings that has come to be called Philo's "Allegorical Commentary." The purpose of the present article is to explore how exegesis and politics are interrelated in this two-volume treatise. In large measure this means "How are political ideas expressed in the context of the interpretation of scripture?" My concern here is not so much with the political ideas per se as with the compositional structure of the treatise and the exegetical methods Philo employs in relation to political issues.

More than one scholar has concluded that political statements form an vital part of Philo's overall thought.[3] Those statements have been examined especially in relation to four treatises: the *Legatio ad Gaium*, *In Flaccum*, *De Josepho* and *De Vita Mosis*. Goodenough in particular has developed an intriguing theory to the effect that *De Somniis* presents political ideas (especially sharp criticism of Roman rulers) "in code," whereas *De Josepho* presents his political ideals by innuendo. He finds an allusion to Philo's messianic

[1] *The New Yorker*, 4/16/79, 36–42.

[2] Abbreviations of Philo's treatises are taken from D. Winston, *Philo of Alexandria: The Contemplative Life, the Giants, and Selections* (Classics of Spirituality; New York: Paulist, 1981), xix-xx.

[3] See now R. Barraclough, "Philo's Politics: Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 21.1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984) 417–553 and the literature he cites. Of special importance also is E. R. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus: Practice and Theory* (New Haven: Yale, 1938).

hopes in the image of a "great husbandman."[4] Barraclough denies that Philo is particularly anti-Roman in his thinking. While he is faithful to Jewish interests, Philo is considerably influenced by hellenistic political ideas, and he appreciates the order brought by Rome. What he hates most politically is "mob-rule," especially as that might show itself in anti-Jewish riots in Egypt. His nationalism is ambiguous and messianic ideas have little significance for him.[5]

The general situation of Jews in Roman Egypt has often been discussed in terms of the basic historical and legal issues.[6] In examining Philo's writings for their political content, it is worth reflecting on the political statements and implications of 3–4 Maccabees, the Wisdom of Solomon,[7] the Treatise of Shem,[8] and especially the third book of Sibylline Oracles.[9] Philo was not the first or last Hellenized Jew to ponder politics and religion. We may also suppose that atittudes toward literal and allegorical interpretation of the scriptures in the Alexandrian Jewish community of his day, especially regarding laws like circumcision and the Sabbath, were to a degree correlated with conservative and liberal political groupings.[10]

A. The General Character of *De Somniis*

This work is extant in only two volumes, but apparently it originally contained at least three.[11] Rather than being basically a commentary on a single stretch of text in Genesis (like other treatises in the Allegorical Commentary), *De Somniis* is organized topically around dreams sorted into three basic categories in the existing volumes. The dreams in *Somn* 1 are those of Jacob in Gen. 28 and 31; the ones treated in *Somn* 2 are those of

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[4] Goodenough, *Politics*, 21–63. The "husbandman" interpretation (based on *Somn* 2.61–64) is on pp. 24–25. H. A. Wolfson also maintains that Philo's works imply a Messianic hope, although he does not mention *Somn* 2 in this connection (*Philo* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1947) 2.395–426. Deborah Sills has recently analyzed Wolfson's interpretation in relation to modern Zionism; see her "Re-Inventing the Past: Philo and the Historiography of Jewish Identity" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1984) 236–372.

[5] Barraclough, "Philo's Politics," 476–486, 491–506, 550–51.

[6] See esp. V. A. Tcherikover and A. Fuks, *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum*, 1 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1957), esp. 48–93; E. M. Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman Rule from Pompey to Diocletian* (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 220–255; Barraclough, "Philo's Politics," 421–440; P. Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria: A Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research since World War II," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 21.1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984) 108–113.

[7] Cf. D. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (Anchor Bible; Garden City: Doubleday, 1979) 43–46.

[8] J. H. Charlesworth sees in this work special interest in the defeat of Antony and Cleopatra at Actium (Charlesworth (ed.), *The OT Pseudepigrapha* 1 [Garden City: Doubleday, 1983] 474–475).

[9] Thus Goodenough suggests that Philo's relative silence about messianism stems simply from caution and sees here a parallel of sorts of Jewish apocalytic such as that in SibOr 3.46–50 (*Politics*, 25, n. 21).

[10] Barraclough, "Philo's Politics," 448.

[11] Eusebius reports that Philo wrote five volumes on dreams (*H.E.* 2.18.4). Of course we can only conjecture what dreams were treated in the other volume(s).

Joseph, the butler and baker, and pharaoh. The *Somn* 1 dreams are said to be ones in which the mind is inspired and can thereby foresee the future. Those in *Somn* 2 are said to contain no direct divine message, but something is seen by the dreamer, obscure in itself but explained by the art of dream interpretation.[12] This distinction could be stated otherwise: the dreams of *Somn* 1 are represented as fairly clear (however strange to a modern reader Philo's allegorizing gymnastics in interpreting them may see!), while those in *Somn* 2 are repeatedly characterized as requiring interpretation. (though, again, the interpretations are presented directly by Philo—and no reference is made to the predictive interpretations of those dreams offered by the Biblical Joseph).[13] Another significant difference between the dreams of *Somn* 1 and those of *Somn* 2 are that the former reveal an admirable spiritual mind-set, whereas the latter reveal only folly and wickedness.[14] A final distinction between the two volumes of considerable significance for our present investigation is that political images and ideas occur almost exclusively in the second (and there they are prominent). Yet there are important similarities as well as differences. One significant feature of the two-volume treatise is a repetition of motifs, terms, and ideas, which gives the whole a kind of unity. The recurrent items of political consequence include the name of Joseph (frequent in *Somn* 2, and in 1.78, 219–223), addiction to luxury (1.121–123; 2.46–66), the conviction that evil-doers will be punished by God (*Somn* 1.233; 2.81, 292–295), recognition that "standing" is a prerogative of God (1.157–159, 245–251; 2.219–237).

One of the "classic" problems in interpreting *De Somniis* pertains to its interpretation of Joseph. Jouette Bassler has recently urged that the views of Joseph in Philo's writings are actually not fundamentally inconsistent.[15] Earle Hilgert has urged that they could be attributed to different pre-Philonic exegetical traditions.[16] Only in passing does Philo offer remarks on dreams in general, and it seems clear—despite his references to scientific principles of dream interpretation (2.4,110)—that his guiding concern is not to forth a theory of dreams in general but rather to interpret the particular dreams in scripture to which he refers. It is further intriguing that he says almost nothing about the general contours of the careers of Jacob and Joseph. No mention is made of Joseph's favorable interpretation of the dream of the butler or his restoration to favor in pharaoh's court: what matters to Philo is the spiritual character of the butler that is, as it were, projected by his dream.

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[12] On the classification and its background in the OT and Posidonius, see H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1947) 2.55–59.

[13] In contrast to *Jos* 90–125.

[14] The hope held out for Joseph in *Somn* 2.105–109 is not based on his dreams.

[15] "Philo on Joseph. The basic Coherence of *De Iosepho* and *De Somniis* ii," *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 16 (1985) 240–255.

[16] "A Survey of Previous Scholarship on Philo's *De Josepho*," *Society of Biblical Literature 1986 Seminar Papers*, ed. K. Richards (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 270. Hilgert argues that the term ἔθος in *Mig* 159, 203 indicates a pre-Philonic tradition of negative interpretation of Joseph. T. Tobin ("Tradition and Interpretation in Philo's Portrait of the Patriarch Joseph," *Society of Biblical Literature 1986 Seminar Papers*, 271–277) argues that similarities between the accounts of Joseph in Josephus and Philo imply that they probably relied on a common pre-Philonic hellenistic Jewish encomium emphasizing the Joseph's *positive* qualities as statesman. For an argument for pre-Philonic tradition based on the text of *De Somniis*, see Goodenough, *Politics*, 22, n.5.

Interestingly enough, Philo also mentions "rules of allegory" in the treatise (*Somn* 1.73, 102), but of course he nowhere spells out what these rules are. *De Somniis* as a whole is richly suggestive of the multiple dimensions that allegorization has for Philo. For him allegory may perhaps be best defined negatively, as "non-literal" interpretation.[17] At only one point in *Somn* 1–2 does Philo plainly find important meaning in the literal meaning of the biblical texts (1.120–126),[18] and he several times condemns actual literalists or literalistic exegesis on the ground that it conflicts with the symbolic intention of Moses (1.15, 52, 92–9,102, 164–172, 234–237, 250, 254; 2.98, 255, 302). The treatise, moreover, reveals the variety of directions in which Philo's allegorical interpretation can move, meaning by "directions" different types of subject matter. (There do not appear to be any obvious differences in the exegetical procedures Philo employs in these different modes of allegorizing; they are distinguishable only by their "end results.")[19] Thus we find Epistemological Allegory (1.6–13), Cosmological Allegory (1.16–24), Metaphysical Allegory (2.223–225), Ethical Allegory (274–277), Political Allegory and, most prevalent of all, Allegory of the Soul.[20] In a few cases Philo presents a series of allegorical interpretations of the same item in the scriptural text ("sun"–1.77–92, 112–114; "stairway" –1.134–156), all of which he apparently approves. Sometimes he explicitly mentions other allegorists (1.39, 118, 164–165), and he speaks of "we who allegorize" (2.142; cf. 2.31). At several points Philo draws a political lesson for persons like himself (1.224–227) or specifically endorses a political interpretation of a text (2.115). Whether political or not, Philo at several points seems to emphasize the significance of the scriptural text for himself and persons like him (1.224–227; 2.101–108, 123, 153, 170–171, 224 [?]). Occcasionally he writes about an exegetical point as though he knows some persons criticize his approach to interpretation (1.102, 115, 164–167, 172, 254; 2.169, 261;300–301). Once he directly speaks of being inspired in his exegesis by an inner guide (2.252–254; cf. 1.164–165).

If, now, we ask how Philo interprets the dreams in *Somn* 1–2, we may say that he for the most part does so in terms of Allegory of the Soul.[21] The primary emphasis of *Somn* 1 is on Jacob as the exemplary Practicer of virtue (e.g., *Somn* 1.126, 146–152, 177, 256), that of *Somn* 2 is on the generally-reprehensible characters of Joseph, the butler, the baker, and pharaoh (*Somn* 2.98, 158, 206,302). If a general theory of dreams emerges in these

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[17] Cf. Wolfson, *Philo*, 1.134.

[18] *Somn* 2.123–132 does, however, imply that Philo assumes that Jews should obey the Sabbath law (and probably other "ancestral customs") at the literal level of meaning. Cf. *Mig* 89–93.

[19] In a somewhat different fashion Barraclough also emphasizes that Philo could use allegory in varying ways. He suggests that *De Somniis* is written partly to present criticism of Flaccus ("Philo's Politics," 501–502).

[20] I limit the term "Allegory of the Soul" to interpretations pertaining to intrapersonal elements and struggles and the spiritual pilgrimage of the individual. By "Ethical Allegory" I refer to interpretations dealing with virtues individuals practice in relating to other human beings. Cf. my article, "Philo's References to Other Allegorists," *Studia Philonica* 6 (1979–80) 62–63, n. 4.

[21] Thus Barraclough (487) accounts for the different views of Joseph in *De Josepho* and *De Somniis* by saying that the works display different purposes; in *De Somniis* Philo's emphasis is on the superioity of the soul over the body. Given this "non-political" view of *De Somniis*, it is not surprising that Barraclough devotes relatively little discussion to it.

treatises, it is that the dreams reveal the representative natures, thoughts and desires of the dreamers (cf. 1.172).[22]

Despite the predominance of interest in Allegory of the Soul, it is clear that Political Allegory is also important, especially in *Somn* 2. I use the term "Political Allegory" to mean any interpretation dealing with politics which is not simply a literalistic rendering of the biblical narratives in the treatise. In the treatise we are examining, all the political ideas are developed in relation to visions or dreams of characters in Genesis, not in relation to outward political events; hence all the political ideas are set forth on the basis of allegory. Of course the dreams sometimes involve persons who have or will have political authority (Joseph, Pharaoh); yet Philo's interpretations are of the dreams and not of outward political actions of these characters. Did Philo see a resemblance (or essential identity) between dream-interpretation and allegorical interpretation of scripture? We can easily imagine that he must have thought there was some connection between the two, but he nowhere seems to discuss the point directly.

Whereas Philo had some Jewish predecessors in the Allegory of the Soul,[23] it is not obvious that he had any in political allegorizing. In *this* department he may have been something of a pioneer.[24] Yet in *De Somniis* Philo practices Political Allegory so readily that we must assume his readers were expected to find it neither objectionable nor altogether novel.

B. Overt Political Allegory

The three passages most obviously offering political observations are *Somn* 1.219–225, 2.78–91 and 2.115–133.

In the first passage, Philo is in the midst of explaining Jacob's dream of multi-colored sheep. After praising the image of the High Priest, he moves on to speak of Joseph as "the man whose desires are set on human statecraft (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη πολιτεία). Joseph's many-colored coat signifies attachment to a mixture of truth and falsehood, the sophistry of Egypt. That it becomes blood-stained is appropriate since "the man who is thoroughly immersed in public affairs" experiences continual conflict (221–223). The passage ends with Philo asking his readers, "Why then do we invest ourselves with the tokens of political importance?" (224) Here Philo suggests that political leaders inevitably face a series of spiritual dangers: half-truths and plausibilities, continual conflict and fear. At the end he declares the pursuit of political glory foolishness; he implies that he himself is politically active and ought to "cast off the showy tunic" (whether by this he means that he should get out of politics altogether or simply beware of political temptation is unclear).

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[22] So there is, after all, some kinship with Freud, for whom dreams were expressions of wishes. Compare the distinction made by Artemidorus between dreams that reflect the anxieties or wishes of the dreamers and those that foretell the future (see R. J. White, *The Interpretation of Dreams: Oneirocritica by Artemidorus* [Park Ridge, N. J.: Noyes, 1975) 20f. Despite Philo's reference to prophecy (e.g., *Somn* 1.2), his interpretations of dreams in *Somn* 1–2 emphasizes not forecasts of future outward events but rather revelation of character types and principles (e.g., in *Somn* 1.256 the dream-promise of Jacob's return to his father's house is "spiritualized" away from any sense of temporal prediction).

[23] Hay, "Philo's References," 55–58.

[24] Even if Tobin is right that Philo builds on a tradition of praising Joseph as an exemplary statesman, this would not imply more than a line of literalistic interpretation.

In the second overtly political passage Philo begins his interpretation of Joseph's dream that his sheaf rose up (Gen. 37:7). He speaks at once of "all the votaries of vainglory," who exalt themselves "above everything, above cities and laws and ancestral customs and the affairs of the several citizens" and move from leadership to dictatorship (78–79). He soon turns to speak of "the man of worth" who, recognizing the unstable movements of power in this world protects himself with a shield of caution. By contrast there are "lunatics and madmen who take pains to display untimely frankness and sometimes dare to oppose kings and tyrants in words and deeds."[25] Such persons fail to realize that their foes are in a position to torture and kill not only them but their families, friends, and kinsfolk. Philo goes on to speak of some men "more fierce and malicious than boars, scorpions, or asps, men whose spite and malice can only be avoided by using some method of taming and soothing them" (89). He points out that Abraham did obeisance to the sons of Cheth (Gen. 23:7), respecting not their virtue but only their power. He goes on to say that "we too, when we are spending time in the market-place, make a practice of standing out of the path of our rulers and also of beasts of carriage"–showing honor to the rulers and acting from fear of the beasts. He concludes somewhat cryptically:

> And if ever occasions permit it is good to subdue the violence of enemies by attack, but if they do not permit the safe course is to keep quiet, and if we wish to gain any help from them the fitting course is to soften and tame them (92).[26]

There can be little doubt that Philo is effectively teaching his readers that in general even tyrannical rulers should be submitted to and obeyed, lest they exercise overwhelming power to injure Jews and their loved ones.[27]

What follows in §§92–109 is an account of how Joseph's brothers resisted the arrogant claims of Joseph's dream. This emphasis on resistance makes an interesting contrast to the general counsel of submission that has dominated the previous paragraphs.[28] But just as important is the contrast between the emphasis on political life in those paragraphs and the priority given to the Allegory of the Soul in §§92–109. In §98 we are explicitly told that Joseph represents the craving for glory in every person's soul, whereas his brothers are not men but symbols of pious thoughts of submission to reason and God, which obviously ought to resist the pursuit of vain dreams. It seems evident that Philo has deliberately set side by side Political Allegory and Allegory of the Soul.

In §110 Philo turns to interpret the second vision of Joseph, the dream of sun, moon, and stars bowing before him. He interprets it first in terms of astronomy and a theory that the stars compete with each other for glory, but adds that he leaves the truth of such

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[25] Along with 2.4, one might hypothesize that the present passage intends to suggest to the astute reader that Philo is trying to communicate a political message without speaking too directly.

[26] Translation from F. H. Colson, *Philo* 5 (LCL: London: Heinemann, 1934) 485.

[27] Goodenough, *Politics*, 5–7; Barraclough, "Philo's Politics," 530–531. Barraclough (536), however, argues that Somn 2.83–92 implies that Philo is thinking not of Roman rulers but of Alexandrian Greeks as "beasts" who must be tamed, whereas the (Roman) rulers deserve "respect."

[28] The importance of the lesson of caution in §§81–91 seems all the more evident since the Genesis text it ostensibly elucidates seems much more readily interpreted along lines of resistance to arrogance, as §§92–109 makes clear.

claims to experts (115).[29] In any case, this interpretation would be at the level of "Cosmological Allegory."

"But we say" (λέγομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς)." Thus Philo introduces a line of interpretation which brings the reader back into Political Allegory, and he claims it just as firmly as he claimed the Allegory of the Soul in §§93–109. He speaks of vainglorious persons exalting themselves not only above humans but above the elements of the universe (cf. the description in §78 of political self-exaltation over everyting, cities, laws, ancestral customs and affairs of citizens). Xerxes, king of the Persians, is condemned for shooting arrows at the sun (117–120). Some German tribes (no reference to rulers as such) are conscientiously mocked for threatening the sea with their weapons (121–122).

Having begun this section with brief references to an ancient king and distant barbarians, Philo brings matters much closer by turning to describe a recent ruler of Alexandria (123) he knew personally, one who had the audacity to threaten not sun or sea but the Jews, seeking like Antiochus Ephiphanes to destroy their religion. He tried to persuade them to violate Sabbath laws, expecting that this would lead "to irregularity in all other matters and a general backsliding." (123) When the Jews resisted, he sought to argue them into law-breaking by comparing himself with a destructive power of nature (129). Philo interprets these words to mean that the ruler was blasphemously likening himself to God (130–131).[30] Exasperatingly enough, Philo does not say what the outcome of this pagan bluster and threat was. Presumably his readers knew very well, just as presumably they could be counted on to identify the governor.[31]

In this passage, unlike §§78–91, Philo does not offer any specific political advice or exhortation. Yet it seems reasonable to infer from the passage as a whole, as especially §§123,126–127, that Philo means to imply that Jews, faced with such tyrannical and blasphemous threats, should hold fast to obedience to the literal laws of Moses and continue to study their scriptures. He may well wish to suggest that he and his fellow Jews, faced with the raging storm of political tyranny, may still find peace and political wisdom in studying the "ancestral philosophy" found in their holy books. The Jews' outward passivity, symbolized in the immobility of their hands during worship (§126), implies a firm confidence in God and His providence, which can be trusted to punish in due course such governmental folly. That Jews have good reason to trust in divine providence is the major lesson of *In Flaccum* and *Legatio*.[32]

In §133 Philo concludes this section of the treatise, "Such is our description of the leaders of vainglory." Apart from some short remarks (that we will speak about shortly), the Political Allegory submerges and the rest of the treatise focuses primarily on the Allegory of the Soul.

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[29] It is not clear if §113 is intended to offer a complete interpretation by itself or if §114 is an essential part of this "cosmological interpretation."

[30] Cf. the persuasive argument of W. A. Meeks that Philo regards Jews as uniquely able to recognize the religious pretensions of politicians in "The Divine Agent and His Counterfeit in Philo and the Fourth Gospel," in E. S. Fiorenza (ed.), *Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity* (Notre Dame: University, 1976) 43–67.

[31] Cf. Barraclough, "Philo's Politicis," 532.

[32] Cf. P. Borgen, "Philo," 131: in his allegories Philo develops principles which can be applied to specific events, like the persecution described in *Somn* 2.110–138.

C. Allegory within Allegory

It seems altogether possible, however, to detect Political Allegory beneath or mixed with Allegory of the Soul in several other passages of *De Somniis*. It is important to avoid making Philo too subtle in communicating by "code,"[33] but it is a fact that political terms and images occur within passages that concentrate on Allegory of the Soul. In these passages we may then detect some political "overtones", particularly if the messages conveyed seem consonant with the more overt Political Allegory we have already examined and with Philo's political thought as expressed in other writings.

In the midst of praise of the Jacob-like soul, a passing reference to persons who erect inscriptions not to God but to themselves (*Somn* 1.243) could well allude to the folly of a politician, even to folly on the part of Augustus.[34]

Since Joseph is so often presented as allegorically symbolizing the politician or statesman (as in 1.219–225), we may be inclined to view any description of his nature, even without obvious political terminology, as conveying a political message, even if there is also a more direct expression of Allegory of the Soul. For example, *Somn* 2.5–16 describes the character of Joseph: he mixes concern for the soul with concern for the body, seeks to be well off in external things, and is naturally distracted because he has many goals—"he represents opinion with its vast medley of ingredients" (15). In *Mut* 92–93 Joseph is described as representing brilliant but empty opinion as expressed in such political forms as the acclamations of the masses, decrees, statues and crowns. Hence we can readily see "between the lines" of *Somn* 2.5–16 an interpretation of political leaders and their values within the context of Allegory of the Soul.

Similarly, *Somn* 2.42–64 deals directly with Joseph as governor (ἐπίτροπος)[35] as representing devotion to luxuries of all sorts. Within the lengthy listing of needless extravagances, political terms do not appear (except, probably, in a reference to golden weaths in §62), but Joseph's name is understood to mean 'addition' in the sense of vainglory. It is likely that Philo intends to suggest that political leaders tend to love and promote costly frills. Earlier (in 1.120–126) Philo has contrasted the frugality of the virtue-loving Jacob with the passion for luxury of dreamers, including persons who wield power in law-courts and council-chambers. Within allegory applicable to everyone's soul, Philo seems bent on identifying corruptions to which politicians are particularly prone. Goodenough's hypothesis, however, that the brief mention of a "husbandman" who has not yet been found (§64) is intended to remind Jewish cognoscenti of their Messianic hopes seems far-fetched,[36] the more so since there is no clear Messianic statement elsewhere in the

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[33] L. H. Feldman (*Studies in Judaica: Scholarship on Philo and Josephus, 1937–1962* [New York: Yeshiva University, 1963] 5 remarks ironically of Goodenough's theory that *De Somniis* presents anti-Roman propaganda in code that "it would seem strange that the propaganda is so carefully concealed that no one before G. should have been able to discern it." Yet Feldman agrees with Goodenough (against Bréhier and Heinemann) that Philo "was not an impractical theologian but . . . actively participated in politics, and not merely in the mission to Caligula in his old age." See also the critical remarks of V. Nikiprowetzky, *Le commentaire de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie;* ALGHJ 11; Leiden: Brill, 1977) 217–219, n. 161.

[34] So Barraclough, "Philo's Politics," 541.

[35] On the significance of this term, see Barraclough, "Philo's Politics," 499–500 (where the literature critical of Goodenough's interpretation of the word is discussed).

[36] *Politics*, 24–25.

treatise and little on the subject anywhere in the Philonic corpus.

If we now return to 2.92–109 (which stands between two major overt political passages already discussed), we again have Allegory of the Soul in which Philo may desire readers to hear a political message. Joseph signifies the vanity-loving mind in everyone's soul (98), his brothers signify thoughts honoring God alone as "the true king, the true Lord" and opposing the idea of giving divine honors to a man. Precisely such tyrranical blasphemy will soon be attributed to the governor in 123–133.

When Philo declares that he has himself been like Joseph, blind and stumbling (101–104), he does not specify that his own follies have been political, but it seems highly possible that he is thinking of Joseph-like political arrogance.[37] His use of "I" here probably is meant to invite every reader to self-scrutiny; and yet we have no reason to doubt that Philo is also with real humility expressing a sense of his personal failings.

It seems not unlikely that the references to Pharaoh as the mind in love with pleasure in passages like 2.182–184, 219 (in the latter passage the issue of political leadership claiming divine prerogatives is again emphasized) is meant to suggest something about hedonistic selfishness of the Egyptians of Philo's own time who often conspire against Jewish political rights.

In a final major passage, near the end of the treatise (2.283–299), we have Allegory of the Soul through which glimmers of Political Allegory can also be seen. The sinful mentality of atheism is understood as an attack on "the greatest binding force in the universe, government" (284); it seeks to produce confusion and audacious revolution ("for what is more full of confusion than want of government?"). Philo speaks of cities and nations as ruined when mob-rule takes over. The political images (or messages) continue in 290–294: the foes of God enroll themselves as rulers and kings, claiming to be supreme leaders, but divine necessity will chasten them. Given the emphasis on the vain arrogance and blasphemous tendencies of politicians earlier in the treatise, it does not require much "stretching" to see Political Allegory here, with a special warning to political rulers not to go to far.[38] At the same time a passage like this one has a complexity (and verbiage) that may be best explained by Philo's thinking in terms of more than one level of allegorical meaning.

Rather than having an elaborate deliberate plan to locate political comments and interpretations at carefully chosen points near or not so near the surface of his commentary, Philo seems simply to have approached the writing of *De Somniis* with strong convictions about politics and the political significance of the dreams in the Joseph story. This concern is shown by his frequently turning to Political Allegory in *Somn* 2, sometimes alongside, sometimes "buried within" other types of allegory. Although he saw a certain superiority in philosophical contemplation and the individual's spiritual progress, Philo also finds importance in political events and theory. He has a rather broad sense of the subjects Jewish scriptures teach people to care about.[39]

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[37] Cf. Goodenough's assurance on this point: *Politics*, 27–28.

[38] Barraclough ("Philo's Politics," 524–525) sees here a link between materialist philosophies and ochlocracy.

[39] Commentators like Colson (*Philo* 5.433) who characterize the thought of *Somn* 2 as "weak" or "impoverished" may thereby indicate that for them political issues are on the periphery of true religion. Cf. the preoccupation with Allegory of the Soul in P. Savinel, *De Somniis* 1–2 (Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie 19; Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1962) 12–18.

Conclusion

As a whole, Philo's treatise on dreams may be said to teach consistently at least the following basic political principles, which could help Jewish individuals and communities interpret and respond wisely to particular situations: the conviction that God alone is truly King, good human government is essential to earthly well-being, human political leaders tend to pursue vanities and to claim excessive honor, Jews facing persecution for their religion should steadfastly trust in God (keeping the laws of Moses) and not resist their human political foes too aggressively "unless circumstances permit."

Our investigation tends to support Goodenough's claim that part of Philo's purpose in writing *De Somniis* was to present answers to some of the practical political problems which he and his fellow Jews were facing. Whether Philo was also deliberately trying to present these answers in a code-like style that would conceal them from some persons or classes of persons, and whether these were Roman police or fellow Jews with different exegetical and political commitments, we have not ventured to decide. Goodenough's contention that the treatise offers specifically anti-Roman and Messianic sentiments has, however, not been confirmed.

In *De Somniis* Philo offers Political Allegory alongside other types and apparently sometimes concealed within or "beneath" Allegory of the Soul. The main content of these political passages in *De Somniis* seems congruent with his more direct political teaching in other treatises, although it seems to go further than some other treatises in the direction of recommending political strategies for Jews suffering under tyrants and in terms of suggesting the spiritual and moral temptations faced by Jews (like Joseph) who seek or accept political responsibility. The passages in which Philo emphatically refers to his own experiences suggest that he is personally acquainted with the power of political temptation, but he nowhere says flatly that a faithful Jew can have nothing to do with politics. Finally, we may reasonably infer that one of Philo's purposes in writing this treatise on dreams is to demonstrate that the highest and most practical political wisdom can be gained through allegorical study of the scriptures.

Philo Judaeus and the Ancient Library of Alexandria

J. Harold Ellens

I. Introduction

It is not altogether clear whether Philo Judaeus of Alexandria was born in 20 BCE or a decade later. It is clear that he arrived on the scene in the most illustrious city and intellectual center of his day just as the Hellenistic Age was moving into the Age of Rome. He lived to a ripe old age since we know that he was appointed to a Jewish delegation to Rome in 39–40 CE to address the Roman Emperor and Senate with complaints against Flaccus, Roman Governor in Alexandria, who had fomented an outbreak of anti-Jewish fanaticism. He had by this time, lived a life of retirement and contemplation during which he had written most of his large spate of books. Philo was a member of a prominent Jewish family in the influential Jewish community in Alexandria of his day and his brother, Alexander the Alabarch, was the head of that community.

Philo lived in Alexandria at a time when that city was the cultural and intellectual center of the civilized Western World. He was highly honored for his scholarship and Hellenistic adaptation of Judaism, both by his own community and by the Romans, who appointed him occasionally to significant tasks. Indeed, Philo was the leading cultural figure in the Jewish community of Alexandria at a time when the Jewish community held a central role in the cultural and intellectual activity of the city and its university center. The university center in Alexandria had grown out of the ancient library of Alexandria during the two centuries preceeding Philo, and had in turn enriched that library. Ptolemy I, Soter, under the urging of Demetrios of Phaleron, had established the ancient Alexandrian Library in 306 BCE. By 250 BCE the library held 532,800 documents, by 100 BCE it had expanded to 700,000 books, and by the birth of Philo the holding stood at just over 1,000,000 volumes. The university center included a second library for public use which held 50,000 volumes and was called the Serapion after the shrine of Serapis with which it was associated. There was also a facility for housing the scholars associated with the main research library. It contained a refectory. In addition, a museum stood nearby containing the kind of cultural artifacts which museums hold today. Finally, there seems to have been a building housing the working spaces allotted to the scholars, most of whom were supported by royal patronage during their tenure at the university center.

The Alexandrian Library and its research center were experiencing their most prosperous decades during the years of Philo's scholarship. It is inevitable, therefore, that a study of the relationship between the function of the library and university center, on the one hand, and of Philo's scholarly work, on the other, will be a revealing exploration of the degree to which Philonic methodology or categorization of concepts and issues was influenced or shaped by Callimachus' great bibliographical library catalogue, the *Pinakes;* and the degree to which key Philonic concepts such as that of the logos and of the primacy of Jewish virtues as reflected secondarily in Hellenistic ideals; were shaped or influenced by the intellectual-cultural milieu of the ancient library and its scholarly community.

There is a regrettable paucity of helpful literature on this subject so that any research on the matter is forced back to basic textual analysis and critical sleuthing for subtle and indirect clues to the interraction enjoyed between Philo and the library.

This paper attempts a mere beginning exploration of those connections. In the context of the earlier significant Jewish scholarship in Alexandria which produced the LXX and its rescensions, this paper merely attempts some preliminary ground clearing in the hope of setting the direction of the course and the nature of the scholarship required to get at the issues to be addressed in discerning the extent to which Philo influenced the great Alexandrian Library and its scholarly community and was shaped and influenced by it.

II. Before Philo

It is not surprising that Judaism in Egypt in the first centuries BCE and CE diverged from Palestinian Orthodoxy. The Jewish community comprised half of the city of Alexandria in Philo's time and a large part of the general population of Egypt. While Philo and his contemporaries considered themselves to be Orthodox Jews an extensive independence was evident in their Hellenized perspective. The Hellenizing of Judaism was welcomed by the Jews of Egypt and included both the interpretation of Judaism to the Greeks and the interpretation of Hellenism to themselves, stretching it upon the canvas of historic Jewish traditions. The Jews sought to demonstrate that their own religion could be acceptable to the Greeks as a universal wisdom and insight into truth while they endeavored to see historic Judaism in universalistic and humane terms. For Philo this was not just a generalized monotheism or unitarianism with strong ethical concerns. It was a world view which demonstrated that all the Hebrew virtues, epitomized by the Patriarchs and heroes of the faith, were really the ideals subsequently perceived by the Greeks and established as the roots and foundations of their admirable humanism.

In this atmosphere of cross-cultural openness and mutual admiration in Hellenistic Egypt, and at the invitation, apparently, of a royal intellectual voraciousness for learning and books, the Jewish community had produced the historic translation of the Hebrew scriptures into Greek. This Septuagint (LXX) translation was complete by the middle of the second century BCE and was a dominant influence upon Hellenistic Jewish scholarship from that time forward. Philo depended heavily upon it for the text of the scripture and as a model of Jewish ambition to adapt to the Greek world.

III. Philo's Method and Callimachus' *Pinakes*

Callimachus was the third Head Librarian of the ancient Alexandrian Library and served in that capacity from 282–260 BCE. Only Zenodotus of Ephesus held the position between Demetrious of Phaleron and Callimachus. Callimachus developed and elaborated the extensive and efficient system for organizing the library contents and the research procedures for the ancient library. His efforts are set forth in the encyclopedic bibliographical catalogue of the library's contents which he titled, the *Pinakes*.

> . . . the *Pinakes* was the first great library catalogue of western civilization . . . ; it contained, in original form, the essentials of all the modern systems worthy of the name, and earns for its author the title of Father of Bibliography. . . . The proof of the importance of this great work lies in the fact that the least that can be said of it is that it was a work according to the principles of Aristotle, who taught that the material had first to be collected before being wrought into forms of art . . . A veritable flow of critical research writers and

> specialized workers tapped the 120 volumes of the *Panakes* for their writings. . . .
>
> That the original *Panakes* is lost is a major disaster to learning. . . . (Parsons, pp. 217–218).

The term "pinakes" refers to the tablets which were attached to the stacks, cabinets, or rooms of the library to identify the contents of a section or division. These tablets carried the names of the authors and perhaps the titles of their works. They were arranged according to the division or discipline of their type of literature. It is tragic that the *Pinakes* is lost and that we know of its content and organization only from fragments and secondary references. We know that this catalogue was one of at least three. There was a catalogue of the contents of the museum and a chronological list of the dramatic poets as well as this general annotated bibliographical catalogue of the literary holdings of the library. We also know that the divisions or disciplines distinguished in the *Pinakes* and, therefore, in the organization of the library, included at least Oratory, Law, and Miscellany. There is some indication that there were categories for tragic poets, for comic poets, for lyric writers, for historians, philosophers, rhetoricians, and dramatists. Parsons ventures to indicate ten main categories: epic and other non-dramatic poetry, drama, law, philosophy, history, oratory, medicine, mathematics, natural science, and miscellany.

Callimachus provided a brief description of each work listed in his 120 volumes, together with the name of the author, his birthplace, the name of his father, his teachers and education, his nickname or pseudonym, a short biography, the titles of his works, a comment on their authenticity, the first line of the work, and the total number of lines in it. (Parsons, 211). The *Pinakes* is an attempt to organize the encyclopedic structure of knowledge according to logical or rationalized principles. In this regard one may see in the work of Callimachus a precursor and perhaps a model of the structure of the scholarship of Philo. W. R. Inge notes that the main evidence of the influence of Greek philosophy upon Hellenistic Judaism appears chiefly in the conception of a harmonious and beautifully ordered world directed by an immanent principle (Wisdom). ("Alexandrian Theology," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. I, p. 309).

There is also a formal correspondence of sorts between Callimachus' categories, assuming that Parsons is near to the truth, and the variety of subjects addressed by Philo. Though he mainly wrote essays on scriptural subjects and philosophical theology, he also addressed matters of law and the standard subjects related to oratory, history, and literary criticism. However, Philo's motive or bias seems to have been more important than objective scientific exploration of knowledge. It is clearly his passion to demonstrate that all that is valuable and virtuous in Greek thought and ideals is derived from the virtues and heroes of Jewish religious tradition. His address to the classically Greek subject of the Logos is designed as an apology for his perception that the Logos is the universal expression of the Hebrew perception of God's (Wisdom) revelational self expression in the cosmos.

IV. Philo's Message and Hellenistic Thought

It is possible in a general way to list a number of aspects in Philo's thought which dramatically reflect the shape of Hellenistic ideas current in Alexandria in his day. First, he takes the Hebrew concept of personified Wisdom and translated it directly into the Greek concept of Logos, giving it in the process a palpably divine quality and character. Second, his political theory is in large part a product of his Hellentistic rationalization of Jewish principles, as he conceives of a kind of Platonic Idealism derived from Jewish

revealed law. He appeals to the inherent dignity of the individual and its derivative: society based upon the order and structure of the universe as created by God and imbued with inviolable implications for justice and order. The king is a herdman of humanity who must execute his task in harmony with the universal *rerum natura.*

The third evidence of Philo's affinity for the prevailing mindset at the Alexandrian university center of his day is his Platonic Metaphysical Idealism. In this case also he rationalizes or integrates Hebrew religious concepts of God, creation, and revelation, as is well known to Philo scholars. Fourth, ethics for Philo are consequences of philosophy; the act of giving real expression to the principles which underlie all things in the universe. It is of no apparent difficulty for Philo to affirm such Hellenistic perceptions and then indicate how clear it is to him that the divine revelation in Hebrew religion has long since made all this philosophical information clear.

Finally, there is no place in Philo's thought at which his debt to Hellenistic Platonism is more clearly seen than in his soteriology. Whatever one may observe about Gnosticism, Stoicism, and Orthodox Judaism in Philo's soteriology, it is plain that he assumes that the primary problem in human existence and destiny is the problem of attaining conformity to the philosophical ideal. In so far as he wishes to retain his Hebrew notion of personal communion with a personal God, it is a philosophical quest which is carried out in a universe categorized in terms of Plato's world view. Philo's God is a philosopher. The role of the Logos and of mystical transcendence by faith are essential, but the objective is a gnostic philosophical experience of the rationalized universe in which God is the center piece and principle. Salvation is ultimate absorption into the divine mind.

V. Conclusion

It is difficult at this stage of the research to isolate finite indicators of the influence of the Alexandrian Library and its intellectual community upon the method and thought of Philo Judaeus. The extent of Philo's Hellenistic perspectives is obvious and well known. There is no good reason for not assuming that the Hellenization of his thought was directly shaped by the virile scholarly community of which he was a part.

Carefully textual studies will need to be undertaken to isolate the tangible detailed evidence of the ways in which this is so. This paper proposes to be a gentle beginning in setting the direction of the course to that objective.

Additional References:

Michael Grant. *The Jews in the Roman World,* Dorset, 1984.
Martin Hengel. *Judaism and Hellenism,* Phila: Fortress, 1981.

Are the Gospels Unified Narratives?

Dr. Stephen D. Moore
Trinity College, Dublin

> The following study will emphasize the unity of Luke-Acts. This unity is the result of a single author working within a persistent theological perspective, but it is something more. It is a ***narrative*** unity, the unity appropriate to a well-formed narrative.
>
> —Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, vol 1.

In the 1980s narrative criticism has replaced structuralism in North America as the prevalent way of doing narrative analysis of the gospels. A central assertion of narrative criticism is that the gospels are unified narratives. I feel that this assertion/assumption may well be a blind spot in narrative criticism, and will attempt to put it in fresh perspective in this paper.

I. Unified Text, Autonomous Story-World

The approach that developed into narrative criticism had its center and forum in the 1970s in the Markan Seminar of the SBL. In 1980, the tenth and final year of the Seminar, David Rhoads presented a paper entitled "Narrative Criticism and the Gospel of Mark,"[1] which surveyed the (non-structuralist) literary work on Mark of the preceding decade. Here, for the first time, the approach is explicitly labeled "narrative criticism."[2] For Rhoads, this is a rather broad area of inquiry, its principal foci being "plot, conflict, character, setting, narrator, point of view, standards of judgement, the implied author, ideal reader, style, and rhetorical techniques."[3]

Two interrelated ideas undergird the study of these areas. First, the gospel text should be approached as a coherent integrated whole. The literary approach, for Rhoads, involves a major shift in perspective from "fragmentation to wholeness."[4] "We know how to take the text apart to analyze it; adding narrative criticism to our study is an opportunity to reaffirm the original achievement of Mark in creating a unified story."[5] Closely allied to the idea that Mark's *text* has integrity and deserves to be read as it stands is the idea that

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[1] Subsequently published in *JAAR* 50 (1982) 411–34. Page numbers will be taken from the published version.

[2] This term is used occasionally, though in a less definitive way, in earlier works such as Norman R. Petersen's *Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978). It seems to be pretty much a coinage of New Testament scholars. This is appropriate since, as we shall see, narrative criticism does not correspond exactly to anything in nonbiblical literary criticism.

[3] "Narrative Criticism," p. 412.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 413.

Mark's *story-world* also has "autonomous integrity."[6] Mark tells a story which generates a world of people, places, and events, which has its own internal consistency and validity independent of its resemblance or nonresemblance to the real world of Jesus' or Mark's day. Indeed, he defines narrative criticism in terms of this idea:

> . . . narrative criticism works with the text as "world-in itself." Other approaches tend to fragment, in part because their purpose is to put elements of the text into contexts outside the text; so, for example, biblical scholars may identify the feeding of the five thousand as an historical event in Jesus' time or as an oral story emerging from the early church or as vehicle for a theological truth . . . or as a story which reveals the author's intention, or as instructions to Mark's community. *Narrative criticism brackets these historical questions and looks at the closed universe of the story-world.* (Of course, knowledge of the history and culture of the first century is a crucial aid to understanding Mark's story-world, but that is a different matter from using elements of a text to reconstruct historical events.)[7]

In a sense, ideas such as these push the holistic emphasis of "composition criticism," which had gained momentum in the 1970s, to its logical climax. But it would be a mistake to think that narrative criticism arose "naturally" out of composition criticism, as composition criticism arose out of redaction criticism. Narrative criticism's text-theory, as Rhoads expounds it, is an imported one; it is not indigenous to biblical studies. Rhoads' conception of the text and the critical task has strong affinities with the "New Criticism," which was the dominant mode of Anglo-American literary criticism from the late 1930s through the 1950s. What was new about the New Criticism was its rejection of "extrinsic" approaches to the text—biographical, historical, sociological, philosophical, etc.—in favor of an "intrinsic" approach:

> The natural and sensible starting-point for work in literary scholarship is the interpretation and analysis of the works of literature themselves. . . . But, curiously enough, literary history has been so preoccupied with the setting of a work of literature that its attempts at an analysis of the works themselves have been slight in comparison with the enormous efforts expended on the study of environment.[8]

(Uncanny echoes of the same dissatisfaction resound in the biblical arena today, as has often been noted.) The New Critics' answer was to reconceptualize the literary text as an autonomous, internally cohesive, nonreferential organism. Rhoads makes parallel claims for the Markan text.

The New Criticism (many now prefer the name "American Formalism") was a great deal more complex than my brief definition has suggested,[9] but a detailed discussion of it is

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.: my italics. Cf. David Rhoads and Donald Michie, *Mark as Story: An Introduction to the Narrative of a Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), pp. 3–4.

[8] René Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature*, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956), p. 139.

[9] Excellent discussions may be found in the following works: Gerald Graff, *Literature against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); William E. Cain, *The Crisis in Criticism: Theory, Literature, and Reform in Enlish Studies*

not necessary for the point I wish to make. Nowhere in "Narrative Criticism and the Gospel of Mark" (or elsewhere, to my knowledge) does Rhoads acknowledge the striking affinities of the views he advocates with those of the New Critics. It is not that Rhoads leans exclusively on the New Criticism; he draws heavily on other areas of literary study also.[10] I would argue, however, that his views of the text and of the critic's task are essentially New Critical views. That he cannot be unaware of this influence is suggested by his citation of Hans Frei.[11] Frei's extraordinarily successful *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*[12] has been the major conduit through which New Critical ideas have flowed into biblical studies.[13]

"Early" literary critics of the Bible who depended heavily on the New Critics (e.g., Frei or William Beardslee[14]) made their indebtedness explicit. Norman Petersen, upon whose *Literary Criticism for New Testament Critics* Rhoads draws, likewise makes it plain when he borrows from the New Critics. Roughly since the late 1970s, however, there has been a growing tendency among narrative critics to voice their holistic, story-centered views with no indication of their origins.[15] The impression being fostered among scholars and students, in consequence, is that the discipline of literary studies, as it pertains to literary narrative, is preoccupied by questions of unity, cohesion, and the selfsufficiency of story-worlds—an impression that is well wide of the mark, except in the sense that these are some of the concepts most disputed today![16] Pronounced "dead" for more than twenty years, the New Criticism has shown a remarkable tenacity and resilience. Nevertheless, the views of text and meaning which it canonized should be seen for what they are: the legacy of a particular movement, and not the whole of literary criticism or its definitive concerns.[17]

(continued)
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984); Lynn M. Poland, *Literary Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics: A Critique of Formalist Approaches* (Chico: Scholars, 1985).

[10] Along with narrative critics generally (this will be discussed in section III).

[11] "Narrative Criticism," p. 413.

[12] Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

[13] On Frei's relationship to the New Criticism, see Poland, *Literary Criticism*, pp. 132–37.

[14] See William A. Beardslee, *Literary Criticism of the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970).

[15] See, e.g., Rhoads and Michie, *Mark as Story;* Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation. Volume 1: The Gospel according to Luke* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986); Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986). For his view that "Matthew is a unified narrative, and recognition of this is essential to its literary-critical study," Kingsbury (p. 1, n. 2) cites the influence of Rhoads' "Narrative Criticism" and *Mark as Story.* (Kingsbury is what I would call a "second generation" narrative critic.)

[16] See section III.

[17] Jonathan Culler puts it nicely:

> Once upon a time it might have been possible to think of criticism as a single activity practiced with different emphases. The acrimony of recent debate suggests the contrary: the field of criticism is contentiously constituted by apparently incompatible activities. Even to attempt a list—structuralism,

The metonymic characterization of literary study as a holistic (or "totalizing") activity is correlated to a tendency to *assume* that the gospel text is unified. Were we to recognize that concepts like textual unity are at the storm center of current critical debate, the following story, which we tell over and over, would not run quite so smoothly: Historical criticism has gone down the path of fragmentation, and though it has certainly gleaned some indispensible insights along the way, it has come to a dead end. All this time, meanwhile, literary critics have known what biblical scholars are only coming to discover, namely, that a narrative text should first of all be read on its own terms, as a unified story. One then sets out to reveal the full extent of the unity that the historical critics have missed. Deferring our discussion of the complications that recent literary theory introduce to the story, let us see how the narrative critic deals with the obstacles which s/he encounters as s/he attempts to demonstrate the unity of the text. What does s/he do with seams and ruptures induced by the conflation of gospel sources, which threaten with inconsistency "the unity appropriate to a well-formed narrative" (see epigraph)? To illustrate we turn to the recent work of Robert C. Tannehill and James M. Dawsey on Luke.

II. Unifying The Text: Two Approaches

Tannehill notes how certain characters in a story may be "especially reliable in their judgements and perceptive in their statements. These characters are likely to become spokespersons for the author in interpreting events of the story."[18] Here he follows Wayne Booth: "The author is present in every speech given by any character who has had conferred upon him, in whatever manner, the badge of reliability."[19] There are elements in the reliable speech of the Lukan birth stories that are realized as the narrative progresses; one thinks particularly of Simeon's oracle concerning the destiny of Jesus ("a sign that is spoken against") and the universality of the salvation he signifies (1:29–32, 34–35). But there are also elements that are not realized. "The few words in the birth narratives suggesting salvation for Gentiles and conflict in Israel," writes Tannehill, "are surrounded by much fuller statements about Israel's salvation through Jesus. These statements are phrased in such a way as to make clear that they refer to the Jewish people."[20] The following in particular should be noted. According to the angel, God will give Jesus "the throne of his father David, and he will reign over the house of Jacob for ever. . . ." (1:32–33). According to Zechariah, God has fulfilled what "he spoke by the mouth of his holy prophets from of old, that we should be saved from our enemies and from the hand of all who hate us . . . that we, being delivered from the hand of our enemies, might serve

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reader-response criticism, deconstruction, Marxist criticism, pluralism, feminist criticism, semiotics, psychoanalytic criticism, hermeneutics, antithetical criticism, *Rezeptionsästhetik* . . .—is to flirt with an unsettling glimpse of the infinite that Kant calls the "mathematical sublime" (*On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982], p. 17).

[18] *Narrative Unity*, p. 22.

[19] Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 18, quoted in Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, p. 22, n. 20.

[20] "Israel in Luke-Acts: A Tragic Story," JBL 104 (1985) 72. This article is a more sustained treatment of the "nonrealized" predictions in the birth stories than the overlapping discussion in *Narrative Unity* (pp. 34–37, 41, 147, etc.).

him. . . ." (1:70–71, 73). "Consider the impact of such words on readers who are aware of the Jewish-Roman war and its outcome," says Tannehill. "They would sense the tragic disappointment of this hope."[21] Subsequently, Anna speaks of the newly born Jesus "to all who were looking for the redemption of Jerusalem" (2:38). Author and reader both, we can take it, are well acquainted with the actual fate of Jerusalem (see 13:35a; 19:43–44; 21:5–6, 20–24). Also, contrast the "very strong emphasis" in the infancy narrative "that Jesus means redemption for Israel, that is, for the Jewish people," with the situation in Acts where the Jews reject the Word, a rejection highlighted in a series of scenes in which Paul responds by turning to the Gentiles (Acts 13:44–47; 18:6; 28:24–28). "So it seems that the expectation most emphasized in Luke 1–2 is largely *not* fulfilled in the following narrative."[22]

How does one deal with this discrepancy? In the wake of Paul Minear's "Luke's Use of the Birth Stories,"[23] caution prohibits many scholars from too easily dismissing such dissonance as an effect of poor redacting (Minear showed strong points of contact between the birth narratives and the rest of Luke-Acts). Tannehill extends Minear's approach, arguing that the incongruity between initial expectation and final reality is part of the author's strategy; the reader is being guided to experience the story of Israel and its messiah as a tragic story. (This is not to say that Luke-Acts as a *whole* is tragic, or that the outcome is tragic for *all* Jews.[24]) In the remainder of the article, Tannehill presents a detailed argument for this thesis.

But the question remains hanging: what sort of dynamic do the incongruous expectations of the birth stories set up with the reader, if it is allowed that the latter knows about the Jewish-Roman war and the destruction of Jerusalem? The text is remarkably ambivalent here. To begin with, those who voice these expectations have all the marks of "reliability." Anna is a model of faith within expectant Israel (2:36–37), Zechariah speaks in the Spirit (1:67), and the angel is "sent from God" (1:26; cf. 1:19).[25] The function of such speakers ordinarily is to impart information to the reader that will elevate him/her to their vantage point—to a level of knowledge, that is, superior to that of the rank and file in the story-world, and on a par with that of the narrator. From this vantage point, the ignorance of story participants is experienced as *irony* (e.g., 1:61–63; 4:22b., 7:39).[26] However, in this instance the narrator and the reader share a level of knowledge that the *reliable* characters do not share. Technically these characters, who are ordinarily the instruments of irony, are here the *victims* of irony. And yet their credentials of reliability

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[21] "Israel in Luke-Acts," p. 72. Cf. David L. Tiede, " 'Glory to Thy People Israel': Luke-Acts and the Jews," *SBL 1986 Seminar Papers*, ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta: Scholars), p. 145.

[22] "Israel in Luke-Acts," p. 72.

[23] In *Studies in Luke-Acts*, ed. Leander E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966), pp. 111–30. For similar approaches, see Raymond E. Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in Matthew and Luke* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), pp. 241–43; David L. Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), pp. 22ff.

[24] "Israel in Luke-Acts," p. 74.

[25] Ibid., p. 73.

[26] To put it another way, the narrator communes with his reader/hearer at the expense of a character or character group, and with the aid of reliable characters.

and authority (those of the angel and the Spirit-filled Zechariah[27] in particular) seem to block any firm decision we might make that their words are indeed ironic. To put it another way, two characterizations are open to us (fully reliable speakers? victims of irony?), but we cannot apply both simultaneously.

When we press the incongruities noted by Tannehill through to their logical conclusion, therefore, we come to an irreconcilable opposition. Such is the effect of the text as it stands, suggesting that in the last analysis the birth stories do resist integration with the rest of Luke-Acts, in spite of the unifying attempts of scholars such as Tannehill.

Narrative Unity shows how firmly grounded in the concept of a recoverable authorial intention is the unity which the narrative critic seeks in the text. Tannehill is quite explicit on this; it is the "overarching purpose" of the author which unifies the narrative.[28] In this respect, narrative criticism veers sharply away from the tenets of the New Criticism. For the latter, one of the "extrinsic" factors to be excised from criticism was the "intentional fallacy," the notion that the meaning of a literary work is identical with its author's intention.[29] David Rhoads includes the approach to Mark "as a story which reveals the author's intention" in his list of historical approaches, quoted earlier, which it is narrative criticism's business to "bracket." Not only would one be hard put to find a narrative critic who does so, but one can safely assert that Rhoads himself does not do so.[30] The New Critics found few jarring inconsistencies in the works they analyzed. The reason was simple; their attention was directed mainly to the poem. In contrast, without a unifying authorial intention to posit, the narrative critic's arguments for the unity of the gospels would sink like a stone. Tannehill is well aware of this: "To be sure, our expectations of narrative unity, shaped perhaps by the modern novel, are not always fulfilled in Luke. . . . The neglect of clear causal connections among episodes (indications that one event leads to the next) is striking when we compare the synoptic gospels with modern narrative." However, "Despite the episodic style of large portions of Luke, it traces the

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[27] Tannehill does not perceive any deep contradiction here. To an extent, Zechariah *is* "an unreliable interpreter of the story, but he expresses what should have been and would have been apart from rejection. Furthermore, there are some indications in Luke-Acts that the narrator has not given up hope of a messianic kingdom for Israel with Jesus as king. . . ." (*Narrative Unity*, p. 35, n. 46). Tannehill has to go far afield to find a context which will enable him to posit the unifying authorial intention he wants to posit. In the immediate and intermediate context things look very different, and suggest simply that the author has left loose ends. Zechariah is filled with the Holy Spirit and prophesies (*eplēstbē pneumatos hagiou kai epropbēteusen*)—giving an unreliable interpretation of the story! And why should Zechariah, speaking in the Spirit, "not know that much of Israel will reject its king" (ibid., p. 35), when Simeon, similarly moved by the Spirit (2:27), *does* know (2:34)?

[28] Ibid., p. 1.

[29] See William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley's enormously influential manifesto, "The Intentional Fallacy," *Sewanee Review* 54 (1946) 468–88.

[30] Consider the following quotation from *Mark as Story*, p. 1: ". . . the [Markan] writer has told the story in such a way as to have certain effects on the reader. . . . The author . . . developed the characters and the conflicts, and built suspense with deliberateness, telling the story in such a way as to generate certain emotions and insights in the reader." Sentences like these abound in *Mark as Story*, and indeed in narrative criticism generally: the text produces specifiable effects on the reader, effects which originate in the author's intention.

unfolding of a single dominant purpose." This is the purpose of God, the logic and coherence of which it is the author's intention to disclose.[31] It seems to me, however, that the disruptive tensions we noted in the birth narratives (tensions which do not admit of resolution) suggest that, even if Tannehill is right about the author's intention, the source-spliced gospel text sets readings in motion which run counter to the grain of that intention and relativize the kind of unity that one can claim for Luke-Acts.

These questions are raised in a much more direct way by James Dawsey's *The Lukan Voice.*[32] It is almost as though Dawsey decided to let what disunity there is in Luke run rampant, and gamble on being able to posit an authorial intention that would pull it back together again. Essentially, this is a study of Lukan style, but with a peculiar twist:

> While the technique of giving story characters identifiable patterns of speech is readily associated with such modern day geniuses as Mark Twain and William Faulkner, it is in fact an old storyteller's device used by, among others, Petronius, Aristophanes, and Homer. It is not so surprising, therefore, to find that the Lukan author distinguished among the voices of the characters in his story, and that when he spoke through them he spoke a very different language than when he spoke through his narrator.[33]

The first chapter analyzes the narrator's voice, the second that of Jesus, for specific speech traits. On the basis of features such as the narrator's use of short sentences, the lack of variety in his use of connective particles, and the small number of syllables in his average word, Dawsey concludes that the narrator's voice is of an "oral" type.[34] Moreover, "the narrator's language has as its locus the community of faith"; it belongs to, and is directed to, that community.[35] He bases this on the extensive use of Septuagintal formulae in Luke, interpreted as indicators of a specialized language of worship.[36] Analysis of Jesus' speech yields rather different results. Jesus "speaks the simple language of common people."[37] The evidence for this is mainly presented in one of the three appendixes that buttress the arguments of the first two chapters. There, "212 instances of the popular standard of Jesus' speech" are listed.[38] Also, on the basis that Jesus' sayings in Luke are for the most part pronouncements with little persuasory intent, Dawsey concludes that his speech is more prophetic than didactic.[39] "While the narrator speaks a language of worship, Jesus speaks a language of prophecy."[40]

But this is only the beginning. With the stylistic findings in place, Dawsey engages in a more general review of Jesus' speech that builds on the earlier analysis but is now oriented more to content, to see what sort of understanding is ascribed to him, of himself and of his mission. The narrator's understanding of Jesus is similarly analyzed, and the two

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[31] *Narrative Unity,* p. xiii. See also p. 2.

[32] James M. Dawsey, *The Lukan Voice: Confusion and Irony in the Gospel of Luke* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1986).

[33] Ibid., p. 15.

[34] Ibid., pp. 21–24, 32.

[35] Ibid., p. 32.

[36] Ibid., pp. 25–31.

[37] Ibid., p. 41.

[38] Ibid., pp. 177–83.

[39] Ibid., pp. 37–41.

[40] Ibid., p. 41.

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Based on a painstaking and heavily statistical analysis of style, Dawsey's reading of Luke amplifies every chord of disharmony arising from the many nuances of difference in Luke's sources. What interests me is not how often he is right or wrong in these portions of the book, but what one can come up with when one goes to the gospel text in search of contradictory voices as opposed to a harmony of voices. The question then is, having loosed a cacophony of voices and viewpoints, can Dawsey instigate "closure" and subjugate these opposing voices to a controlling authorial voice and viewpoint?

Jesus' view throughout, as gleaned from his own speech, is highly consistent, according to Dawsey, and "seems to hearken back to a very early theology"[48]—one which the Lukan author endorses, but which the narrator (the author's special creation) misunderstands. "In a sense, the author sided with Jesus against his own narrator."[49] But why create such a narrator in the first place? The vital clue, for Dawsey, is to be found in the narrator's prologue (Luke 1:1–4). He contrasts the prologue, "written in high Attic style to a 'most excellent Theophilus,' so that he might 'know the truth concerning the things of which [he] has been informed,' " with Jesus' statement in 10:21 that God has hidden the kingdom from the wise and understanding and revealed it to babes.[50] "There is immense irony at play in this portrait of a narrator who . . . sets out to pass on the the most excellent Theophilus, in his educated, cultic language, a knowledge of the things that the wise and understanding cannot see."[51] And the purpose of the irony?

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[41] Ibid., p. 49.
[42] Ibid., p. 88.
[43] Ibid., p. 89.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., pp. 77–82.
[46] Ibid., p. 87.
[47] Ibid., p. 88.
[48] Ibid., p. 103.
[49] Ibid., p. 110.
[50] Ibid., p. 147.
[51] Ibid., p. 149.

> . . . one can imagine a variety of settings and ways in which the Third Gospel could have been read or presented in the early Church so that the ironic stance of the narrator would have allowed the community to be confronted again with the saving humiliation of Jesus. For example, through the narrator, a proud church might have relived its own tendency to exalt Jesus, and therefore its denial of the suffering Son of God. . . . And at every point, Jesus would have confronted the community, saying, "If any one would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me" (Lk 9:23).
>
> It might be, then, that the narrator's misunderstanding of Jesus was the bridge that allowed for full participation in the story and led to decision. The meeting of Jesus and his community would have become possible when the community became so immersed in the character of the narrator that it could be confronted by the incongruity between its words and Jesus' words. . . . As the distance between the hearers' view and Jesus' view was laid bare through the narrator, Jesus appeared.[52]

There are many things that could be said about this extraordinary interpretation, but I shall have to confine myself to a few observations. A number of key tactical moves underpin Dawsey's arguments throughout. Jesus' speech is analyzed in strict isolation from that of the narrator, and vice versa. The differences found between the two voices are explained, not as incidental effects of the author's redaction, but as deliberate effects of the author's intention[53] (most traditional scholars would begin to part ways with Dawsey at this point). Self-consistent and opposing viewpoints for Jesus and the narrator are built upon the stylistic evidence: The author's viewpoint is said to coincide with that of Jesus over against the narrator's. Finally, a listener/readership is constructed that would experience the divergence of Jesus and the narrator as meaningful.

The lynchpin of Dawsey's interpretation, therefore, and the feature that takes it where previous analysts of Lukan style would not have thought to go, is the attribution to the narrator of a theology that the Lukan author does not sanction. In literary-critical parlance, Luke's narrator is an *unreliable* narrator. This term, coined by Wayne Booth in *The Rhetoric of Fiction*,[54] has nothing to do with historical reliability, but instead denotes a custom-made narrator whose ideology and perceptions deviate from those of its author-creator. Dawsey, who amply footnotes his debts to *Lukan* scholarship, fails to mention the currency of this concept in literary criticism (it is now very widely used). Indeed, though he makes full use of the concept of the unreliable narrator, he does not use the term. More importantly, he does not mention, if he knows, that the unreliable narrator is generally assumed to be a *modern* device. To my knowledge, the view of Scholes and Kellogg, that the unreliable narrator is "quite uncharacteristic of primitive or ancient narrative," has never been seriously contested. "The author of an *apologia* is expected to be presenting himself in the best possible light, and thus is to be taken *cum grano salis*," but the creation of a full-fledged unreliable narrator is a development of the modern novel.[55] Does Dawsey realize just how radical is his casting of the Lukan narrator as

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[52] Ibid., p. 155.

[53] Ibid., pp. 32, 41, 103, 124, 183.

[54] Pp. 149ff., 304–309.

[55] Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 264.

unreliable? He presents us with a Lukan audience of proto-Wayne Booths, equipped to recognize an unreliable narrator when they see one (a subtle one, since it has been overlooked since the first century), and with a Lukan author who is technically almost two millenia ahead of his time.

The lesson for the redaction-, composition-, and narrative critic is plain. The more one is prepared to home in on the cracks and crevices that result in the gospels (the synoptic gospels particularly) from the conflation of sources, the more unusual the account of the authorial intention one will have to resort to to fill in these widened cracks. Rigorous attention to contradictions and differences (as in source criticism, for example) does indeed knock our textual Humpty Dumpty off the wall, as Norman Petersen would say.[56] Form criticism showed that clearly. Redaction-, composition-, and narrative criticism have stepped in to reconstitute Humpty Dumpty with a totalizing authorial intention, each in its own way.[57] A book like Dawsey's inadvertently suggests the possibility, however, that the ghost of fragmentation may not so easily be laid to rest. Dawsey is no form critic, certainly, but the ghost he raises is that of the old paradigm of the splintered and agglomerated text—the text that is not a "well formed narrative." The ghost can be summoned all too easily to subvert the paradigm on which composition—and narrative critics have come to rely: that of a monologic gospel text in which opposing perspectives are synthesized, canceled, or harmonized by a masterful authorial purpose.

III. Narrative Criticism and Literary Theory

Having viewed the question of unity from within the biblical studies discipline, so to speak, let us now try to situate it in a broader context. As we saw, narrative criticism's holistic text-theory has its closest parallel in aspects of New Criticism's theory of literature. Methodologically, however, it is not on the New Criticism that narrative critics most rely, but on the area of narrative study commonly called "narratology." I begin this section by arguing that narrative criticism's preoccupation with textual unity sets it well apart from narratology (despite its methodological borrowings) and turns it into a method, or set of methods, with no exact parallel in the literary studies discipline. (In other words, it is not simply a case of biblical scholars doing with New Testament narrative what literary scholars do with nonbiblical narrative.) To conclude I glance at areas of literary theory which narrative critics have thus far tended to avoid—areas which raise profound questions about concepts such as textual unity.

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[56] *Literary Criticism*, p. 20. I am indebted to Petersen's comments in *Literary Criticism* and especially in " 'Point of View' in Mark's Narrative"(*Semeia* 12 [1978] 104) for alerting me to the fact that the unity of the gospels is not something that can be in the least assumed. He would feel, however, that that unity is something which literary critical methods can prove. I am not so confident.

[57] Composition criticism extends the thrust of redaction criticism, arguing that the evangelist's theological vision imposes a high degree of unity on his text. Narrative criticism mounts a parallel argument, though it sees the unifying purpose revealed more in the evangelist's crafting of the story. Discussion of the idea of a primary and recoverable authorial intention, the unquestioned basis of so much biblical study but a highly contested notion in literary study for more than forty years, is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader may consult, for example, J. Timothy Bagwell, *American Formalism and the Problem of Interpretation* (Houston: Rice University Press, 1986).

Narratology, narrowly defined, is rooted in structuralist narrative theory,[58] and seeks not to *interpret* narrative so much as to investigate its structures and techniques—to develop general theories which would stand to narrative as linguistics stands to language, and which would make explicit the *system* of narrative (its constituent parts, devices, and conventions) which enables narrative works to have the form and meaning that they do. French and American streams of this tradition came together in Seymour Chatman's *Story and Discourse*,[59] a lucid and highly accessible synthesis of narrative theories. Rhoads and Michie used Chatman's schema in *Mark as Story* to fuse the different narrative approaches to Mark which had developed in the 1970s (studies of plot and character, point of view, literary technique, the reader) into a unified method. Independently, Culpepper used a similar method on John, one equally dependent on Chatman's synthesis,[60] but which makes important secondary use of a further narrative theory, that of Gérard Genette. More recently, Kingsbury has done a study of Matthew[61] which also relies on Chatman, though to a lesser degree. Tannehill's book on Luke, which we glanced at earlier, takes its lead in significant ways from structuralist narrative theory and from Wayne Booth.[62] Other narrative critics draw heavily on Booth, Boris Uspensky, etc.

Narrative criticism thus has strong affinities with narratology—but the differences are just as strong. Narratology is about *theory*, narrative criticism is about *exegesis*. Narratologists usually analyze texts only to develop theories. Narrative critics utilize theory only to explicate texts. To date, narrative critics have been little interested in theory. They use narratology to do interpretation of individual narratives—something that is the exception rather than the rule in literary scholarship. Two points should be made here. First, narratology does not privilege or emphasize the *unity* of individual literary works. When one thumbs through the work of contemporary narrative theorists (e.g., Chatman, Stanzel, Rimmon-Kenan, Prince[63]) one does not find sustained discussion of individual texts. Instead one finds a myriad of *examples*, ranging from phrase to paragraph length, culled from a wide spectrum of literature, ancient and modern, to illustrate whatever point happens to be under discussion. It is not with the unity of the given narrative that these writers are concerned but with the final unity of the narrative *theories* which they are

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[58] *Narratologie* referred originally to works by theorists such as A. J. Greimas, Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov, Gérard Genette, and Claude Bremond. More broadly conceived, narratology encompasses a wide variety of different approaches to narrative (see Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986]).

[59] *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[60] See R. Alan Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983). In a forthcoming book, *Story and Reader: The Literary Turn in Recent Gospel Research*, I show how Rhoads' and Culpepper's work marked a watershed in emerging narrative criticism, and discuss their strategic use of Chatman's *Story and Discourse*. (The rather negative treatment of Tannehill's work which this paper entailed will be counterbalanced also in the book.)

[61] *Matthew as Story*.

[62] E.g., *Narrative Unity*, pp. 21ff.

[63] See Chatman, *Story and Discourse*; Franz K. Stanzel, *A Theory of Narrative*, trans. Charlotte Goedsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics* (London and New York: Methuen, 1983); Gerald Prince, *Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative* (Berlin and New York: Mouton, 1982).

advancing. In narrative criticism the priorities are reversed. It is the unity of the individual (biblical) text that is prized, and the critic dips at random into the reservoir of narrative theory.

Second, we should consider the exception that proves the rule, where narratology bases itself on the interpretation of a single text. Does such a project show strong affinities with narrative criticism? The most notable example of this approach is Gérard Genette's *Narrative Discourse.*[64] In contrast to structuralist predecessors who opted for less challenging primary material, Genette adopts Marcel Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu* as his base-text. *Narrative Discourse* is an elegant dialectic of theoretical and descriptive poetics, description giving rise to inductive theory, theory enabling further description, built on a refusal to give ultimate priority to either.[65] But here, where we might expect to find close affinities between narratology and narrative criticism, the differences are particularly striking. The salient characteristics of narrative criticism's text-theory were noted in section I. The view of the biblical text (specifically the gospel text) which narrative critics are urging is ultimately a comforting one. It reassures us that in the wake of a long history of fragmentation, exposure of internal contradictions and the like, it is now again possible, using the methods of literary criticism, to see that the gospel narratives do after all possess wholeness and internal consistency. Genette's views on Proustian narrative, on the other hand, are calculated more to unsettle than to reassure. As Genette reads it, this celebrated work "which seems so massively committed to representing a world and a character's experience of it"[66] is fraught with repeated violations, both flagrent and subtle, of the conventions of representation to which it seems to subscribe. The traditional, humanistic, rather "comfortable" view of the *Recherche* is ruptured by Genette's disclosures of anomalies, impossible combinations, and internal contradictions. This is a side of Genette which I have never come across in narrative criticism, and which sets him at a far remove from the unitive concerns of the latter. Just how far is revealed by his ending:

> . . . readers will not find here a final "synthesis" in which all the characteristic features of Proustian narrative noted in the course of this study will meet and justify themselves to each other. . . . [I]t would be unfortunate, it seems to me, to seek "unity" at any price, and in that way to *force* the work's coherence—which is, of course, one of criticism's strongest temptations, one of its most ordinary (not to say most common) ones, and also one most easy to satisfy, since all it requires is a little interpretive rhetoric.
>
> Now, if we cannot deny in Proust the will for coherence and the striving for design, just as undeniable in his work is the resistance of its matter and the part played by what is uncontrolled—perhaps uncontrollable.[67]

Clearly these strains of *Narrative Discourse* owe something to the French intellectual climate of the late 1960s, a time when structuralist positivism was giving way to a

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[64] *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method,* trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). This is a translation of "Discours du récit," a self-contained unit within Genette's *Figures III* (Paris: Seuil, 1972). Along with the works of Booth, Chatman, and Uspensky, *Narrative Discourse* is heavily mined by narrative critics.

[65] See *Narrative Discourse,* pp. 22–23.

[66] Ibid., p. 12 (from Jonathan Culler's Foreword).

[67] Ibid., pp. 266–67. I feel that the second paragraph could be aptly applied to Luke, and perhaps to any of the gospels.

"poststructuralist" skepticism. In 1967 Jacques Derrida had inaugurated "deconstruction" with the publication of three books.[68] (The seeds of deconstruction were sown in America the previous year in a paper which he read at The John Hopkins University.) Deconstruction has not yet become a force to be reckoned with in biblical studies,[69] though it may well be soon, given the inroads it is making in theology.[70] To attempt to set our topic ("Are the gospels unified narratives?") in a deconstructive or poststructuralist perspective—the latter is a more encompassing term—may seem like overkill. After all, Derridean deconstruction arises out of philosophy. On the other hand, the time is passing when, for the literary critic if not yet for the biblical critic, philosophy is something done "down the hall" in a department bearing the name. If we are seriously interested in a "literary" approach to the gospels and Acts, we should at least be aware of the different perspectives now available, and of the volume of water which has passed under the bridge since the New Criticism.

One convenient (and hence reductive) way of looking at deconstruction is as a way of thinking language through that amplifies strains in philosophy (e.g., Nietzsche) that drive a wedge between words and things. This amplification is enabled by a strategic drawing on the discipline of linguistics. Ferdinand de Saussure, the "father" of modern linguistics, had argued that the linguistic sign is arbitrary and conventional (different languages have different words for the same thing, etc.). In consequence, the sign is defined not by *essential* properties—its sensible (acoustic) properties are arbitrary, after all—but by the *differences* that distinguish it from other signs ("in the linguistic system there are only differences. . . ."). The sign had two constituents, for Saussure: the *signifier,* which was the acoustic, differential constituent, and the *signfied,* which was the concept or meaning communicated by the signifier.

Deconstruction appropriates Saussure's dictum that language is a play of differences, but rejects any recourse to a signified which would give language a firm base. The signified does not stand outside the play of differences; it can only be grasped differentially itself, i.e., in a relationship of difference to other signifieds. Hence, the distinction between signifier and signified is itself arbitrary and conventional. Signifiers do not hook up to signifieds and have done with it, but instead engender further signifiers. Signifier begets signifier in a potentially infinite regress that touches base with nothing outside itself—nothing which could halt the play of differences by being grasped non-differentially.

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[68] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology,* trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976); idem, *Writing and Difference,* trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); idem, *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs,* trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[69] Though see, e.g., John Dominic Crossan, *Raid on the Articulate: Comic Eschatology in Jesus and Borges* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); idem, *Cliffs of Fall: Paradox and Polyvalence in the Parables of Jesus* (New York: Seabury, 1980); "Derrida and Biblical Studies," ed. Robert Detweiler, *Semeia* 23 (1982); Robert Detweiler, "What Is a Sacred Text?," *Semeia* 31 (1985) 213–30; Gary A. Phillips, "History and Text: The Reader in Context in Matthew's Parables Discourse," *Semeia* 31 (1985) 111–38.

[70] Recent works include Thomas J. Altizer et al., *Deconstruction and Theology* (New York: Crossroad, 1982); Mark C. Taylor, *Deconstructing Theology* (New York: Crossroad., Chico: Scholars, 1982); idem, *Erring: A Postmodern A/theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); George Aichele, Jr., *The Limits of Story* (Philadelphia: Fortress; Chico: Scholars, 1985). (Aichele's book could as easily be included in n. 69.)

The history of Western thought, for Derrida, is the quest for such a "nothing," a "transcendental signified" or order of meaning conceived as primary or foundational (God, Truth, Reality, Being, etc.). What recognition of the radically differential character of language denies these concepts is *presence*. The play of differences

> prevents there from being at any moment or in any way a simple element that is present in and of itself and refers only to itself. . . . [E]ach "element"—phoneme or grapheme—is constituted with reference to the trace in it of the other elements of the sequence or system [which define the element relationally or differentially]. . . . Nothing . . . is anywhere simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.[71]

Derrida's general project is directed against the Western "metaphysics of presence."

What has all this got to do with texts? Post-structuralists generally, whether deconstructionist or not, deny the text a substantial presence. The "Platonic" notion of an ideal text,[72] untouched in its inner structure, meaning, and essence by the incessant play of interpretations, goes by the board in this kind of thinking. Such thinking poses an immense challenge to the biblical text as biblical scholars have traditionally conceived it:[73] an objective, independent entity, possessed of stable, inherent, discoverable properties. It is an entity which embodies a more or less recoverable authorial purpose, a purpose which represents the text's primary meaning, and (in the case of recent gospel scholarship, for example) is its primary source of unity.

Of all the modes of biblical scholarship, it is perhaps to narrative criticism, as currently practiced, that deconstruction is most diametrically opposed. Narrative criticism's central project is to disclose the text's inherent unity. Deconstruction's project is to untie the knot that holds the text together. This is done by targeting any literal, self-evident, unquestioned ground upon which the text or its interpretations seem to rest, and showing that it is no "ground" after all, but figure, trope, metaphor, and the slippery working of language. Anything a critical practice might rest upon (Text, Origin, End, Author, Meaning, Intention, Unity, Structure, Reader) would be fair game for the deconstructor. In its more rigorous forms (Derrida, and especially Paul de Man,[74] deconstruction targets its own practice in addition. Deconstruction in this mode entails a constantly shifting position, a refusal to privilege any one position, to the limited extent that that is possible, and an attempted suspension of its own truth claims in addition to that of its object.

So where does all this leave us—or should we even care? Many would feel that the less attention paid to deconstruction the better. But it is not an isolated phenomenon. It is but one manifestation (admittedly the most relentlessly skeptical manifestation) of a much wider movement of thought, with roots in thinkers as diverse as Nietzsche, Freud, and

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[71] Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 26. *Positions*, which consists of three interviews with Derrida, is a convenient access to some of his major themes.

[72] See J. Hillis Miller, *Fiction and Repetition: Seven English Novels* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 6.

[73] See my "Negative Hermeneutics, Insubstantial Texts: Stanley Fish and the Biblical Interpreter," *JAAR* 54 (1986) 401–413.

[74] See Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

Einstein. This general shift of thought has generated a new kind of discourse which is neither literary theory nor criticism, exactly, nor epistemology, linguistics, philosophy of science, sociology, psychology, etc. Jonathan Culler simply, and aptly, "nicknames" it "theory."[75] Works of theory "exceed the disciplinary framework within which they would normally be evaluated. . . ."[76] What distinguishes writers in this genre (one could include Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Paul de Man, Fredric Jameson, Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, etc.) is the way in which their work functions "not as demonstrations within the parameters of a discipline but as redescriptions that challenge disciplinary boundaries. The works we allude to as 'theory' are those that have had the power to make strange the familiar and to make readers conceive of their own thinking, behaviour, and institutions in new ways."[77] "Theory," should we decide not to disregard it, would compel us to step back from the incessant task of adding interpretation to interpretation of our biblical texts and take stock of what we are about.

IV. Conclusion

We have recently witnessed a paradigm shift in gospel scholarship from "fragmentation" to "wholeness," one associated particularly with narrative criticism. In section II I tried to show how the paradigm of the unified well-formed story depends for its effectiveness on a repression of the older paradigm of fragmented and agglomerated sources—a blocking out of the potentially disruptive data that the older paradigm would bring into view. Since Kuhn, knowledge has been conceived more in terms of breaks and jumps than in terms of strict evolutionary development,[78] and I think that this is the case also with recent gospel scholarship.

I have also tried to show, in sections I and III, that to appeal to "literary criticism" as a kind of a priori legitimation of the holistic approach (an appeal now frequently made) is simply not viable. No consensus exists in that discipline which might support such an appeal; moreover, "literary criticism" of the gospels, as currently practiced, does not correspond exactly to any approach in nonbiblical literary criticism. I argued that narrative criticism has carved out its own unique niche by a highly selective (and creative) combining of different elements from the literary studies discipline: a text-theory which derives ultimately from the New Criticism; a method which relies heavily on narratology, etc.

I feel that narrative criticism's approach to the gospels and Acts as unified story has tremendous pedagogic potential (it is just what freshmen need), but that its theoretical base is weak. It seems poised between two threatening "fragmentations." On the one hand, there is the old paradigm which was discarded, but which has never been fully annulled or defused, and which threatens a kind of "empirical" fragmentation of narrative criticism's unitive claims (the solid, objective gospel text is inherently fragmented; does the gospel writer's unifying purpose bring these recalcitrant materials fully to heel?). This is the "intradisciplinary" problematic. The "extradisciplinary" problematic is far more serious, however. Modern literary theory suggests that the ground from which we claim to

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[75] *On Deconstruction*, p. 8.

[76] Ibid., p. 9.

[77] Ibid.

[78] See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

connect with a text "out there," with inherent and discoverable properties such as unity, might be extremely shaky and unreliable. (Philosophy has jumped the wall to rudely accost traditional scholars in several fields.) It is not that "there is nothing out there." Neither is it that "anything goes," or that "all interpretations are now equal(ly wrong)," or even that we might not claim unity for our texts, but rather that what is at stake in these claims is now conceived differently: "The ability of the mind to set up by acts of judgement, formally coherent structures is never denied, but the ontological or epistemological authority of the resulting systems . . . escapes determination."[79]

Redescription of the critical task in terms of such "postpositivist" realizations has become a major project of "theory." The text is conceived less in terms of immanent properties waiting to be discovered (continuity or discontinuity, unity or disunity, wholeness or fragmentation) and more in terms of the forces and interests that converge upon it and determine its meaning—a meaning on which real issues hinge and which is not "subjectively" determined. Moving from the specific rehabilitation of textual meaning to a more general rehabilitation of knowledge (of which the former is but a single instance), we may distinguish the following factors said to define our (re)construction of the text: (1) interpretive tactics, strategies, and ways of reading specific to our particular discipline(s), general socially-shared interpretive conventions, and the (still more) general context or situatedness in terms of which the text comes into view;[80] (2) the historical, ideological, and socio-economic situatedness of the interpreter or "subject";[81] (3) the implication of the subject in a network of power relations manifested in authorities, hierarchies, institutions, fields of inquiry, disciplinary and other consensuses, rules, procedures, prohibitions, exclusions, etc. that determine the knowledge of a particular era and its truth(s).[82] What would a postpostivist redescription of New Testament studies look like? That will have to wait for another paper—should I ever have the capability or the courage to attempt it!

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[79] Paul de Man, "The Timid God," *The Georgia Review* 29 (1975) 550.

[80] This approach has been variously called "interpretationism," "institutionalism," "professionalism," "constitutive hermeneutics," and "New Pragmatism." Representative works include Stanley E. Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); idem, *Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming; Steven Mailloux, *Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in the Study of American Fiction* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); *Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism*, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Richard Rorty, "Texts and Lumps," *New Literary History* 17 (1985) 1–16.

[81] This comes under the purview of Marxist criticism. Recent British and American examples include Terry Eagleton, *The Function of Criticism: From The Spectator to Post-Structuralism* (London: Verso, 1984); Raman Selden, *Criticism and Objectivity* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984); Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); Michael Ryan, *Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982).

[82] This is the special field of Michel Foucault; see esp. his *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Either of the following provide a convenient entry to Foucault's thought: Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8 (1982) 777–798; *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984). See also David J. Leigh, "Michel Foucault and the Study of Literature and Theology," *Christianity and Literature* 33 (1983) 75–85.

A Review of Recent Research in the Tradition History of the Pentateuch

Simon J. De Vries

At four p.m. on October 10, 1956, I was sitting in the Senate chamber of Leiden University, witnessing Jacob Hoftijzer's public defense of his doctor's thesis, *Die Verheissungen an die drei Erzväter* (Leiden: Brill, 1957). Little did I realize that I was attending the birth of a radical new opening in Pentateuchal criticism. I fully expected that this attack on Alt's seminal study of the patriarchal gods and on von Rad's influential treatment of the promises as the foundational theme in J, Genesis, and the Pentateuch would not receive such deferential treatment in the scholarly world at large as at the hands of the august assemblage of Leiden theological faculty. Hoftijzer's study has in fact been the object of formidable criticism, but it has not been refuted to the extent that contemporary Pentateuchal scholarship can simply return to the *status quaestionis* prevailing during the Alt-Noth-von Rad heyday. The problem of the tradition-history of the Genesis promises has elicited a wide gamut of proposed solutions, but has also proven to be the turning point upon which some scholars have based a complete rejection of the Documentary Hypothesis or a postexilic dating for J. The influence of Hoftijzer's *Verheissungen* is still very much with us. As so often happens, what one scholar may propose without awareness of its logical outcome, other scholars may take up and develop to unheard of consequences.

1.0 Orientation

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Numerous questions and misgivings have led to the present impasse in Pentateuchal Studies. I have alluded to Hoftijzer's book as a symptom and portent of the direction in which Pentateuchal studies have moved during the past thirty years. It no longer seems an act of arrogance or disrespect to challenge the Documentary Hypothesis as laid out by Wellhausen—or, for that matter, as modified by von Rad and Noth. After all that these truly great scholars have achieved, vexing uncertainties and contradictions remain. Were J, E and P actually written documents or were they merely "strands" of random writings, or even blocks of oral tradition? Do the distinguishing criteria for separate documents still hold their validity? Why is it that the most distinctive criteria for separate documents appear early in Genesis but become increasingly elusive in Exodus and Numbers? Does not Gunkel's programme of identifying the original, smallest oral units make the hypothesis of literary documents unnecessary and therefore irrelevant? Should we not welcome the programme (Rendtorff's) of showing how smaller units of tradition were gradually built up into larger and still larger complexes before assuming literary form? May we not ask whether Noth's common J-E source ("G") is a figment of his imagination, along with the discrete "themes" that he has identified? And why does biblical material outside the Tetratecuh and Deuteronomy show so little acquaintance with the supposedly "epic" works, J and E? The Wellhausen school held that the Pentateuchal documents continued into Joshua; Noth's denial of the presence of P in Joshua has gained general assent, but why then does the Tetrateuch leave the Israelites still wandering in the wilderness? And where does the work of the Deuteronomic school fit it? Does not the sophisticated theological reflection found in Genesis 15 and 18 show affinity with Deuteronomy? These and similar questions have found no satisfying solutions in the opinion of some of our contemporaries. But can the alternatives that have been proposed provide superior solutions, or do they make a comprehensive solution even more elusive?

One should be aware that on the basis of certain contemporary revisionist schemes, serious problems assert themselves with respect to Israel's cultural and religious developments. Literary criticism requires a sound historical criticism. Biblical scholars are only beginning to understand how to assess historical data from the ancient Near East and relate them effectively with relevant biblical data. We must solve a highly complex textual and literary development both within the Pentateuch and within the Old Testament as a whole. Trying to do justice to a vast and complex field of inquiry, we all look eagerly for each ray of new light, but remain skeptical about, and sometimes resentful of, hasty, cavalier solutions that only compound our problems.

It seems high time that so prestigious an organization as the Society of Biblical Literature should organize a seminar for the study of "The Tradition History of the Pentateuch." Agitated discussion on radically inconsistent alternatives has been going on for at least a decade in Europe. Rolf Rendtorff, the acknowledged leader of Pentateuchal revisionism, has already achieved the distinction of having a doctoral dissertation written about him (L. Zaman's R. *Rendtorff en zijn Ueberlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem des*

Hexateuchs. Schets van een Maccabeër binnen de hedendaagse Pentateuchexegese, Brussels 1984)! But now our own hindsight may possibly produce a sounder evaluation than what has appeared in hastily drawn up and sharply polemical debates on this question. It all depends, I suppose, on how this Seminar proceeds in its forthcoming deliberations. I have the honor of having been asked to draw up a review of recent Pentateuchal research, which aims to orient participants to major problems, responsibilities and opportunities in this area. This paper will not endeavor to describe and evaluate any particular work at length, nor does it restrict itself only to the most controversial writings and critiques or refutations of them. In order to see this debate in proper perspective, it is necessary to identify and in some cases evaluate a whole range of treatments of specific passages and problems. I intend, accordingly, to present a lengthy yet selective bibliography for each area of study and to follow this in each case with a brief narrative of research.

Beginning at about 1970, when Pentateuchal studies began to proliferate exponentially, will give us substantial perspective. We remain with what was recent, defining this to mean the past fifteen years or so. Just by scrutinizing our lists, one can readily perceive a profile of what has been going on in this beehive. Needless to say, short articles do not generally carry the same weight as lengthy monographs, but by correlating them all chronologically we can get some vision of how each type of treatment has influenced the others. Although we cannot assume that each writer has been acquainted with everything previous, we can assume that every scholar worthy of the name has at least endeavored to keep relevant and responsive to contemporary issues and endeavors.

Most commentaries published on the Pentateuchal books during recent years have followed the traditional pattern of presentation. The two that have been truly innovative, and must be identified as the more important for our survey, are C. Westermann's massive commentary on Genesis in BKAT I and G. W. Coats's commentary on Genesis in the FOTL series. In standard books of introduction, five have performed an adequate job of identifying the critical issues: G. Fohrer's *Introduction to the Old Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1968), pp. 103–95, O. Kaiser's *Introduction to the Old Testament* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1975), pp. 66–133, J. A. Soggin's *Introduction to the Old Testament* (Philadelphia: Westminster, rev. ed. 1980), pp. 79–160 (all three from German originals), R. Smend's untranslated *Die Entstehung des Alten Testaments* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, rev. ed. 1981), pp. 33–109, and B. S. Childs's *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), pp. 109–225. All of them accept the results of historical criticism and adopt one variation or another of the Documentary Hypothesis.

One of the phenomena of recent Pentateuchal criticism is the proliferation of innovative methodologies for interpreting biblical texts. Some of these remain experimental, while others have already proven some potential value as auxiliaries to the literary-critical methodology. Only treatments that follow, or assume, a strict literary-critical methodology can be considered in this survey. Weeded out are examples of applied structuralism, mythological interpretations in the Graemas tradition, materialist (= Marxist) treatments, applications of "process theology," feminist interpretations, and treatments that serve mainly a theological-hermeneutical purpose. Except in rare cases, "literary" treatments in the Richter style, along with rhetorical criticism, have been passed by because they add nothing to the main issues of historical criticism. For the same reason, purely philological analyses have also been omitted. Extensive as it is, our selection has included writings whose authors' aim is, or whose potential promises to be, the elucidation of Pentateuchal texts in relation to specific issues in Pentateuchal criticism as a whole. It also includes, therefore, tradition-critical studies, form-critical analyses, and treatments of redaction history. Although these procedures are sometimes applied in isolation for the purpose of clarifying particular problems germane to them, they are not seen as distinct

"methods" that can be applied in isolation from other procedures. Anyone who does not understand this interrelationship will be well advised to study the balanced and penetrating essay by Rolf Knierim, "Criticism of Literary Features, Form, Tradition, and Redaction," Knight and Tucker, eds., *The Hebrew Bible and its Modern Interpreters* (1985), pp. 123–65. Source analysis as it is currently practiced depends heavily both on the insights of tradition-history and of form-criticism, while redaction criticism is in fact an analysis of redactional processes within the later stages of literary development.

Upon the basis of this orientation, we shall proceed with our narrative of recent research on specific matters relating to the relative order of the Pentateuchal literary sources, with special emphasis on tradition development. Because we are primarily concerned with narrative materials, we will not be able to include in our survey treatments of apodictic codes, civil and cultic law, or the Deuteronomic paraenesis.

2.0 Pentateuch

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2.1 Criteria and methodology.

Rendtorff (1969) gave an early hint of how his more systematic application of tradition-criticism might threaten the Documentary Hypothesis. Cazelles (1972) provided a useful summary of problems and challenges in current Pentateuchal criticism. Resenthöfft (1974) countered by extending the Sellin-Hölscher "scissors and paste" method to strands and sub-strands both within the Pentateuch and within the remaining "historical" books. Showing the influence of M. Weiss and L. Alonso-Schökel, Fokkelman (1975) subjected Gen 11:1–9, 25:19–34, 37–33, 28:10–22, chap. 25 to a synchronistic (not structuralist!) analysis. Rendtoff (1975) challenged von Rad and his followers with respect to their claim that J. was a "theologian." Van Seters (1975, pp. 125–53) sought to discredit the work of Gunkel and Koch for form-criticism and the work of Alt, Noth and von Rad for source criticism in Genesis, charging that the Wellhausen hypothesis is a colossal error. Weinfeld (1975) accepted the Documentary Hypothesis, but followed Kaufmann in dating P to the pre-exilic period.

In his path-breaking monograph (1977) Rendtorff analyzed the patriarchal promises as a prime example for identifying extensive, internally developing tradition complexes; these remained isolated from one another until redacted within the Deuteronomistic and priestly circles. Rendtorff claimed that J, E and P had no relevance to this process and hence never existed as separate literary sources (see early reviews by R. E. Clements, *JSOT* 3: 46–56, B. S. Childs, *JBL* 97: 272–73; W. McKane, *VT* 28: 371–82).

To the challenge of Rendtorff's and similar studies, Salvone (1979) proposed three lines of alternative research: (1) study of the substance, rather then the literary development, of the Pentateuchal sources, (2) stylistic research, and (3) a structural analysis of oral tradition. Van Seters (1979) defined a clear choice between Rendtorff's proposal (replacing the Documentary Hypothesis in principle with a comprehensive traditio-historical development) and that of himself and H. H. Schmid (*Sogenannte Jahwist*), employing a literary analysis that agrees on J's content but dates it late in the chain of Pentateuchal documents and redactions; in spite of efforts on the part of revisionists to bridge this gap, the disparity still stands. Auld (1980 "Joshua") adhered to Noth's view that the Pentateuchal sources do not continue into Joshua, but pointed out that P in Numbers attributed to Moses what Joshua describes Moses' successors as carrying out. Houtman (1980), claiming to have produced "the standard work" for the future, took random shots at all major Pentateuchal scholars, substituting a modified fragment theory (see my review in *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 39/1–2: 178f.). W. H. Schmidt (1981) reaffirmed the common view that J was written in the "golden age" of Solomonic imperialism. Vermeylen (1981) argued that the analysis of Pentateuchal sources and redactions must think of literary development as an organic rather than mechanical process.

At the Vienna congress, Weinfeld (1981) showed that each Pentateuchal narrative source is related to a lawcode (JE to the Covenant Code; Deuteronomy to the Lawbook, chaps. 12–26; P to the priestly legislation); he pointed out that Deut 1–3 quotes directly from a crystallized literary work, and that Ezra-Nehemiah and Chronicles quote directly from Pentateuchal laws or narratives; also that the concept of territorial expansion, integral to the patriarchal promises, fits the historical situation of Solomon, but hardly that of the

impoverished postexilic community—all this in rebuttal to a late date for J. Labuschagne (1982, 1984 "Additional Patterns," 1986) quite ignored the ongoing debate and argued instead for one final, numerologically organized Pentateuchal composition (cf. the sharp critique in Davies/Gunn, 1984). North (1982) countered Rendtorff's idea of isolated tradition-circles with arguments that J is Judahite and E is Ephraimite, and that the two shared primitive traditions with each other. Radday et al. (1982) tried computer technology on the Pentateuchal sources (see the critique of Portnoy-Pederson, 1984, and the response of Radday et al. (1985). Lauha (1984) affirmed that Schmid and Rendtorff had not made the Documentary Hypothesis irrelevant. In an English article appearing in an Italian journal, Rendtorff (1984) offered a clear formulation of his hypothesis; the divine-names criterion is invalid; Gunkel's and Wellhausen's methods are incompatible; evidence for documents is insufficient; collectors/redactors developed independent tradition complexes. Using Gen 6–9 as a test case, Blenkinsopp (1985) argued that the Documentary Hypothesis offers a better analysis than revisionist theories. Johnstone (1987) argued that Chronicles is a "holiness" redaction parallel to the "covenant" redaction of the Deuteronomistic History, and that this analogous situation applies also to the "holiness" theme of P versus the "covenant" theme of Deuteronomy.

Gunneweg (1983), 1985) offered an extensive and incisive critique of an array of revisionist works; Schmid, *Sogenannte Jahwist,* assumes that Israel refrained from literary composition during the entire monarchical period—though writing was widely practiced throughout the Near East—but showed "eine überproduktive Schreibwut" just at the period of its severest decline; Rose, *Deuteronomist und Jahwist,* adopts the absurdity that Israel completely lacked a theology of history until the "virulent" development of the land-promise theme at the end of the exile; Van Seters, *Abraham,* seems arbitrary in ascribing the patriarchal narratives to the literary activity of an exilic J document; Vorländer, *Jehowistisch Geschichtswerkes,* depends on the argument from silence that leads to unacceptable consequences in its assumption that Israel's entire historical tradition arose among the Babylonian diaspora; Donner, *Josephsgeschichte,* dates a unitary Joseph story to the exile period, removing an essential narrative link between the patriarchs and exodus cycles and requiring a late date for the entire promise theme because of Gen 39:1ff.'s dependence on Gen 12:1ff.; Tengström, *Hexateucherzählung,* depends entirely on a redactional expansion of early fragments, ignoring the criteria for parallel documents; Rendtorff, *Ueberlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem,* ignores early thematic motifs in the patriarchal narratives and fails to explain the pan-Israelite orientation of all the major tradition complexes, as well as the fact that they clearly assume one another even where direct linkings are lacking.

2.2 Traditions, themes and structures.

Weinfeld (1970) argued that a sacral P implies a theocentric religion, while a political and nationlistic D implies an anthropocentric religion. Cross (1973) offered valuable insights into patriarchal religion (*contra* Alt) and analyzed the Deuteronomistic History and P in relation to Pentateuchal criticism. Mölle (1973) studied the use of *RʾH* niph. in texts chosen from J, JE, D, and P. White (1973) argued on the basis of oath ceremonies among Semitic nomads that the Genesis promises reflect old tribal traditions handed down in narrative form. Zimmerli (1977) argued that preclassical forms characterize speeches in the Abraham cycle, that Num 11 shows Moses as a charismatic but not as a *nābîʾ,* and that Moses first became a prophetic mediator in Deuteronomy. Clines (1978) argued that the final form of the Pentateuch featured the partial fulfillment of promises to the patriarchs. Lohfink (1983) countered Rose's view that Israel's war traditions are

postexilic in review of these traditions within the successive Pentateuchal strands, emphasizing that Deuteronomic references are ideological astractions in support of Josianic expansionism. Van Seters (1983 "Passover") argued that an exilic J substituted *mazzoth* for passover victims because sacrifices had ceased.

2.3 Final redaction.

Donner (1980) compared the final redactor of the Pentateuch to the Gospel harmonists; incapable of tolerating discrepancies, he assumed the equivalent of a "pre-critical" stance. Friedman (1981) described the final redactor's skill. Seebass (1985) showed how promise precedes torah in the intention and wording of the final redaction. Wiseman (1985) reaffirmed the traditional view that Moses himself was the final redactor of the Pentateuch.

2.4 Documentary sources.

Winnett (1965) had argued for a second "J" source from Deuteronomic times. This was seconded by Wagner (1967), drawing on his dissertation. Wallis (1971) argued that J used "Yahweh" in Genesis because this hiph. form implied creation, whereas E's aetiological reformulation in Exod 3 intended to emphasize this god's saving actions. Danecki (1972) argued that sickness is seen as an opportunity for divine intervention in E, but in D as punishment, while in J the tradition is mixed. In his Heidelberg dissertation Kessler (1972) prepared the way for Rendtorff's *Ueberlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem;* some important results of this study are the following: cross-references, especially numerous in Deuteronomy, are a device of the final redactor of the Pentateuch, whose content consists of "Ueberlieferungseinheiten," not the same as Noth's "themes"; Exod 14 belongs to the wilderness-wandering unit and the Sinai unit is separate; there are no J, E or P sources, only expansions (such as Gen 31:3–16, 38–42 to Gen 29–30, Exod 3–4, 8 to the Exodus unit "Grundschicht"); there is expansive redactional material, as at Gen 28:13–16, 20–22, 32:10–13, 35:1–7 and elsewhere; the Joseph story may consist of two strands or of an original with expansions; Exod 34 is no literary doublet to Exod 19–24; Num 23–24 is a literary unity.

Wagner (1972) denied the ideological identification of Abraham as a type of David. Diebner (1974) argued that since the linking of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is unknown outside Genesis, we must believe that it ceased to exist after the ninth century, that it remained in oral tradition until written down in the exile, or that it was freshly created during the exile; it is clear that for Diebner, the third choice is correct. Tengström (1976) argued that a *Grundschrift* from eleventh-century Ephraim was brought to Jerusalem after the fall of Samaria and was redactionally expanded by "J," "E," and "P" materials during and after the exile. Within this growing stream of revisionism, Deist (1977) seemed out of step in arguing from comparative stylistics that there are no significant differences between J and Eissfeldt's "L," the unevenness being due to the uneven course of tradition-history. Vorländer (1978) argued that the entire Pentateuchal composition was created in the Jewish diaspora (see Gunneweg, § 2.1). Pella (1979) argued that the final Pentateuchal redactor was the composer of apparent doublets in Genesis. Le Roux (1979) maintained the validity of von Rad's concept of J's role in the formation of the Hexateuch. Rose (1981) argued extensively for a postexilic J; Deut 1–3 is utilized by J; the actual temporal sequence of Pentateuchal sources is P, D, E, J, but preceding them all is the Deuteronomistic History (see Gunneweg in § 2.1). Brettler (1982) argued that the patriarchs both received the promise and occupied the land, as in D, but that the development of the exodus tradition caused J, E, and some passages in P and proto-D to identify their descendants as occupiers

of the land. Another revisionist essay, that of H.-C. Schmitt (1982), relied entirely on a late redactional process as the explanation for Pentateuchal development; a source emphasizing faith (Gen 15, Exod 4–9, 14, 19, Num 14), equivalent to Winnett's "later Yahwist," shows the influence of classical prophetism in the final redaction derived from eschatological circles rather than from a priestly theocracy. Zenger (1982) meanwhile defended the traditional sources from the revisionistic claims of Rose (1981). Resenthöfft (1983) found P, E, and a second Yahwist in the Joseph story, along with two separate recensions of the Sinai cycle. Larson (1985) tried to relate the Stenring chronology (see my critique in "Chronology, OT," *IDBS*) to the analysis of Pentateuchal documents.

2.4.1 JEP source material.

Fritz (1970) identified five separate wilderness aetiologies, all southern traditions, which J expanded and reinterpreted with the addition of the Moses figure. Loza (1971) attributed aetiological catachesis to the "minor judges." Anderson's introduction (1972) to his translation of Noth's *Ueberlieferungsgeschichte des Pentateuch* reappraised the strengths and weaknesses of Noth's definitive work on the tradition sources of the Pentateuch. From a Levi-Strauss "mythicist" perspective, Polzin (1976) critiqued Noth's criteria and inconsistencies. Examining references to Aaron in Exod 4, 17, 32, Num 12, Valentin (1978) identified only his appearance in the Amalek story as original and concluded that all extra-Pentateuchal references are postexilic. Wolf (1980) questioned Gunkel's methodology on the basis of medieval European sagas. McKenzie (1986) decided that it is impossible to date Pentateuchal strands on the basis of Hosea, although the latter probably drew his tradition from a ninth-century E document.

2.4.2 The Yahwist (J).

Wolff (1964), dating J to Solomon's times, argued that the blessing theme explicated petition and forgiveness rather than imperial politics. Coppens (1966) refuted Lipinski's eighth-century dating. Ellis (1968) synthesized J's "theology." Hölscher's pupil, Schulte (1972) dated J *ca.* 931 and identified him as the author of the basic history-work in Gen-1 Kgs. H. H. Schmid (1976) identified J as a comprehensive, prophetically influenced redaction from the time of Deuteronomy (for early reviews, see G. J. Wenham, *JSOT* 3; 57–60, J. A. Soggin, *Bib* 59: 576–79). Rendtorff (1977 "Theologian") received critique in the same issue from Whybray, Van Seters, Wagner, Coats, Schmid, and Clements (see Rendtorff's response in the same issue).

It was just at this juncture that L. Schmidt (1977) argued that Gen 12:1–3 is programmatic for J, who sees the Davidic-Solomonic phenomenon positively, as an eschatological contrast to the curse of the Genesis prehistory; only at this time did Israel become the great *gōy* of Gen 25:23. Seebass (1977) took note of necessary correctives to the Wellhausenian hypothesis, but at the same time maintained a tenth-century dating. Campbell (1979) interpreted J as the clarification of the Balaam promise, making David the recipient of the promise to Abraham. Niedner (1979) argued against Van Seters and Rendtorff that J is late tenth to early ninth century. W. H. Schmidt (1981) argued that J, living in Solomon's time, saw that the ideology of the capital Court History (2 Sam 7) explains why J connected the Babel story to the call of Abraham. Van Seters (1983 "Search") drew upon Greek historiography as a parallel to the way in which J utilized ancient legend; J is exilic, the throne-succession narrative is postexilic. Wifall (1983) identified J as Jehoiada and the fall story as an allegory of Athaliah's wickedness. Van Seters (1986) argued for analogies between J as a historian and the Deuteronomistic History in the light of Greek historiography.

2.4.3 The Elohist (E).

Wolff (1972) repeated for an English-speaking readership the essence of his inaugural address (Wolff, 1969), arguing that, though fragmentarily preserved, E employed a distinctive compositional technique (dialogue as a transition between stories) and featured the theme of reverential fear; it was composed in Elijah's time in response to Baalistic syncretism). Craghan (1977) reviewed study on the Elohist and suggested that R^{JE} may actually have been the Elohist. According to Jenks (1977) E must be dated to the end of the tenth century even though its affinities are with the early prophetic traditions and Deuteronomy. Klein (1977) maintained that E can be identified from its usage respecting the divine names and the way in which it features dreams as a mode of revelation; it was composed *ca.* 800 in connection with the Bethel shrine. McEvenue (1984) held that, with a view to J's Abraham saga, E consciously composed Gen 20:1–8, 21:8–21, 22:1–13, 19 to show God's power in human events.

2.4.4 R^{JE}.

Though the redactor of JE is often mentioned, apart from Craghan's suggestion (see § 2.4.3) only Mölle's study of the Shechemite covenant (1980) assigns to him a major role, viz., after E gave his historical account an all-Israel framework embodying influences from the Sinai tradition, R^{JE} refocused it as a warning to erring Judahites.

2.4.5 D materials and redactions in the Tetrateuch.

We take note of Reichert's Tubingen dissertation (1972), as well as of the extensive treatment in Rendtorff's *Ueberlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem,* in E. Blum's *Die Komposition der Vätergeschichte* (1984), pp. 362–419, and in other recent Pentateuchal studies. Davies studied the wilderness itinerary (1983), identifying the D redactor as the one who related a series of old itinerary notices to Num 33:1–49 in order to create the impression of a continuous wandering period.

2.4.6 P materials and redaction.

We may begin this section with mention of Vink (1969), maintaining an extreme position; according to Vink, P is a single, unified book, dated to the fourth century and relating to the programme of Ezra-Nehemiah; it is a "sophisticated aetiology" independent of primitive aetiologies from early tradition (see the harsh critique in S. McEvenue, *Bib* 52: 138–41; also that of Van Seters, *JBL* 89: 94f.). Scharbert (1970) held on the basis of Gen 2:4a that the Toledoth formula was employed by P to structure his patriarchal stories as a reflex of creation. McEvenue (1971) analyzed stylistic devices in the flood story, in Num 13–14, and in Gen 17, which he held to be similar in structure to children's narratives. Brueggemann (1972) held that P was preaching to the exiles that the Pentateuchal story is an explication of the "blessing" of Gen 1:28. Cortese (1972) explained that P tended to omit J stories about the patriarchs because of his special notion about the promised land. Hurvitz (1974) argued in detail that P's language is pre-exilic. Weimar (1974) made an extensive study of the Toledoth formula. Blenkinsopp (1976) held that the outline of P's narrative, from creation to the cult sanctuary, reflects mythic restructuring; P's consequential development and attribution of law directly to God is seen also in Joshua, suggesting that, despite Noth, the question of P's conclusion should remain open. Cortese (1977) sought improved demarcations between the basic P narratives (dated in the exile) and its expansions. Sheehan (1977) picked up McEvenue's claim that the P narrative employed materials resembling childrens' narratives. Brin (1980) showed how P ascribed Mosaic authorship to non-Mosaic materials. Cortese (1980) wrote about P's distinctive view of the promised land. Walkenhorst (1980) argued on the basis of P's treatment in Gen 17 and Exod 6 that this writer's claim of oneness with God and

knowledge of his name seemed to promise a gift of land not yet realized in exilic times. Haran (1981) dated P to the time of Hezekiah. R. W. Klein (1981) made a sharp distinction between the theme of the original P and the P supplements, to the effect that the former featured God's memory of Israel as the source of its hope, while the latter envisioned the temple cult as bringing Israel back to remembrance of God. Saebø (1981) denied that P is a narrative strand parallel to J and E because cultic elements such as the festival calendars are original. Ska (1981) argued that God's sovereignty over the waters in Gen 1, Gen 6–9, and Exod 14 implies that the crossing of the sea was in effect a new "creation." Tengström (1981), showing that the genealogies in Gen 5 and 11:10–26 contain fragments of narrative, argued that the Toledoth formula was a linking device by which P expanded an early core (cf. Tengström, 1976 [§ 2.4], 1981; also J. A. Emerton's review in *VT* 35: 509f. and Gunneweg, 1985 [see § 2.1]). Weisman (1981) contrasted Deuteronomy's national-territorial bias with P's extraterritorial religious bias. Zevit (1982) collected historical, linguistic and literary considerations as evidence that P could not have been composed after the exile (cf. Haran, 1981). Cortese (1983) discussed P's ideology of divine presence in tent and cloud. In addition to these special studies, the criticism of P has played a large part in all broader treatments of Pentateuchal sources. We mention finally Weimar's study (1984) of structural elements in P (Toledoth formula, wandering motif, chronological notices, inversions and nominal sentences, a word and fulfillment pattern, inclusio and pairing) as evidence that P was an independent narrative strand parallel to J and E, dating from the sixth century.

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Cassuto's, de Fraine's, Speiser's, and van Selms's commentaries on Genesis appeared during the sixties. Those of Plaut (1974) and Mahar (1981) do not call for special comment. In addition, a number of theological-homiletical-devotional commentaries, not noted here, have appeared. The only Genesis commentaries from this period that truly stake out new ground are those of Westermann (1967–82) and Coats (1983). It is noteworthy that no published commentary has adopted radical revisionism or departed from more than a modified form of the Wellhausenian documentary scheme. Westermann's and Coats's commentaries together serve as a bulwark against revisionism by

defending the Documentary Hypothesis in their detailed treatments. As such, they point the way out of the present impasse.

The massiveness of Westermann's treatment of the Genesis prehistory (vol. I, 824 pages) may distract one from what touches upon the central problems of Pentateuchal criticism. It is especially in vol. II (on the patriarchal cycle) and in vol. III (on the Joseph story) that his most relevant treatment of these problems appears. At the onset Westermann makes clear that he cannot defend the Documentary Hypothesis in its Wellhausenian form (ascribing all to the relatively late literary activity of composers) or in Eissfeldt's modification (acknowledging oral sources but identifying literary composition as the central concern). He finds close kinship with the method of de Pury (see § 3.3.2.4). He criticizes Noth for ignoring the difference between oral and literary source materials and neglecting the form-critical analysis of small units. He criticizes von Rad and others for failing to see that the kerygma of the Pentateuchal documents does not directly express the intentionality of the pre-Israelite traditions. We are to cease thinking of J, E and P as "composers" in the modern sense; although P's literary independence is more prominent than that of J or E, they must all be seen essentially as tradents. Though a line of development may be traced, many motifs go back to authentic origins in the second millenium "patriarchal" period. In spite of attacks on Alt's analysis of patriarchal religion (*Der Gott der Väter*), it is clear that it was different from other primitive religions, yet not the same as the Yahwism of historical Israel; witness the locution, "the god of Abraham (etc)" in distinction from "the god of Israel" in the national period and "the ancestral god" in Chronicles. There are prominent programmatic elements such as Gen 12:1–3, yet J adds little of his own to the Abraham stories, somewhat more in the Jacob stories and still more in the Joseph story. Very primitive are two special "aufzählende" forms: genealogy and itinerary, into each of which narrative materials ("erzählende" forms) have been rooted. The literary "doublets" reflect varying circles and stages of tradition development. The patriarchal stories reflect the original social-economic situation of half-nomads. It is clear that the promise stories have undergone a development from a patriarchal familial setting to a tribal setting, then to a national setting (the last being mainly literary). The family stories reflect the situation of individuals within a three-generational context; their grouping into larger narrative complexes reflects a generational concern and reveals a motive towards memorialization. Since their concern is not for recording historical events as such, the patriarchal stories are not to be utilized for historical reconstruction, yet the patriarchs were real persons living in the pre-exodus period. While the excessive claims of fundamentalists and scholars of the Albright school have crumbled under the critique of Van Seters and Thompson, ancient Near Eastern records do attest to the authenticity of their social-economic-religious situation. The solution to the dilemma concerning the Joseph story, claims Westermann, is in the identification of an independent Joseph novella redactionally combined with the original conclusion to the J Jacob cycle (Coats).

The publication of this commentary over a period of sixteen years attests to Westermann's long and profound involvement in the study of Genesis. He draws copiously on the insights gained throughout a distinguished career as the acknowledged master in form- and tradition criticism. Although Coats's Genesis commentary is relatively compressed and brief, reflecting the sharper focus of the FOTL project, it too is the product of many years of intensive research and publication. Although Coats is hesitant about reconstructing materials belonging to the Elohist, he not only acknowledges the validity of the Documentary Hypothesis in its essentials, but makes a major contribution in showing in precise detail the role of literary composition within the tradition-building process. He sets a model for further commentaries within the FOTL project, treating the largest and

then the smaller and still smaller units according to their structure, genre, life-setting, and intention. This procedure outflanks Rendtorff's search for major tradition units and demonstrates the arbitrariness and inadequacies of the radical redating of sources.

3.1 Themes, structures and redaction.

Clines (1976) affirmed a unified theme in the final redaction of Gen 1–11, to the effect that though man destroys the good that God has created, God's grace never fails to rescue the sinner from its consequences. Miscall (1978) found a plot and structure common to that of the Jacob and Joseph stories: treachery, separation, reunion. Luke (1980) made a philological and form-critical study of two twin stories, those of Esau-Jacob (Gen 25) and of Zerah-Perez (Gen 38). Kikiwada (1981) analyzed Genesis on three synchronic levels: (1) five primeval stories, (2) Genesis, (3) the Pentateuch. Cohn (1983) claimed to be able to identify four distinct phases of thought concerning the divine presence in the final redaction of the Pentateuch. Houk (1983) assayed to show the relevance of a syllable-word structural analysis from Genesis doublets and chap. 22. In the Genesis prehistory, Neveu (1984) found examples of basic structure, complementary or parallel structure, and doublet or antithetical structures. Kikiwada (1985) claimed that Gen 1–11 is a literary unity and that the Pentateuch as a whole has a five-part structure irreconcilable with analysis into documents.

3.2 Genesis prehistory, chap. 1–11.

Grelot (1973) offered a detailed analysis of Gen 1–11. Hill (1977) showed that J and P imposed an historical pattern on materials without historical content. Anderson (1978) emphasized the artfulness with which the final redactor combined the J and P narratives. Without making explicit identification with P or J, Doukhan (1978) identified separate literary sources in Genesis 1:1–2:4a and 2:4b–3:25, respectively. P. D. Miller, Jr. (1978) showed that the redactional combination of J and P preserved J's divine first-person plural, his theme of sin and judgment, and the *'ādām-'adāmāh* motif. Wenham (1978), identifying parallels in both J and P with the Gilgamesh epic, emphasized the careful palistrophic structure of the redactional combination in Gen 6:8–9 and 6:10–9:19. Ruppert (1979) disagreed with Westermann in defending Gen 1–11 as an element of underlying *Heilsgeschichte*. Berthoud (1980) brought out the purpose of the prehistory as a preparation for the Abraham cycle. Neveu (1981) offered a detailed critique of Gen 6:5–9:17. Applying text-semantic strategies to redaction criticism, Oberforcher's dissertation (1981) showed how creation and flood were combined in J, in P, and in the final redaction. Oden (1981) drew upon the theme of human unruliness in the Atrahasis myth, representing mankind's aspiration to efface the distinction between the divine and the human, shedding light on the Genesis flood story.

3.2.1 P prehistory.

Zenger (1983) showed how P offered an integrative theology to the exiles. Cryer (1985) explained P's chronological conflict with J with the argument that P used three different calendars.

3.2.1.1 Creation. Toeg (1972) interpreted Gen 1 as a sabbath liturgy. Kapelrud (1974) identified the author of Gen 1 as no priest but as a learned scribe. Loretz (1975) employed a stichometric analysis to uncover an ancient Canaanite poem. Carlson (1976/77) showed that P anchored holiness in creation as a comfort to the exiles. Pasinya (1976) studied set formulae, dissymetric structure, and priestly style. Adducing parallels from Ugarit,

Weinfeld (1977, 1982) showed that Gen 1 is liturgy for the Jerusalem temple. Kapelrud (1978) argued for an exilic dating, direct influence from Enuma Elish, and a programmatic concern to correct J. Ultvedt (1980), on the contrary, argued that Genesis is independent of Enuma Elish. Southwell (1982) argued that Gen 1 was a production of Solomonic wisdom with didactic purposes prior to being taken over by P.

3.2.1.2 Genealogies. Though Westermann correctly identified the role of genealogies in the tradition-building process, it was Wilson's two solid studies (1972, 1977) that identified their life-setting and intention. It was Hasel's aim (1978) to disprove influence from the Sumerian king-list on the genealogies of Gen 5 and 11. According to the Indian scholar Luke (1981, 1982), P's purpose in Gen 5 is to display divine providence amidst human sinfulness, and in chap. 10 to identify human propagation as a disclosure of divine grace.

3.2.1.3 Noachian covenant. Stachowiak (1981), dating the Noachian commands to mid-Persian times, identified the *berith* as a promise and the commands as paraenesis. In Gen 9:8–17 Bonara (1982) discovered a chiastic A,B,C,D,E,D',C',B',A' pattern; he too saw *berith* as promise.

3.2.2 J prehistory.

Clark (1971) described J's composition as the embodiment of three parallel cycles; Urgeschichte, patriarchal history, Noah cycle. Steck (1971) argued against Rendtorff that the J flood story assumes the annihilation of earthly life and not just its diminution, showing that Gen 12:1–3 has a salvific purpose. Scharbert (1974) identified sources and redaction in Gen 2:4b–16. Von Soden (1974) interpreted J's prehistory as a subtle criticism against the pretensions of Solomon. Drewermann (1977) exegeted the J prehistory with an eye to the structure of evil; volumes featuring psychological and philosophical insights were to follow. Tsukimoto (1979) identifying J as a Levite exiled with Abiathar (!), ventured that the expressions, "live forever," "be as god," and "good and evil" expressed the ideology of the Solomonic court. Crüsemann (1981) argued that non-priestly Gen 2–11 comprises an independent, self-contained literary unit, and that the purpose of Gen 12:1–3 is to invite the postexilic diaspora to return. Zenger (1983 "Beobachtungen") offered a critical analysis of von Rad, Steck, Westermann and Crüsemann.

3.2.2.1 Creation and fall. Analyses refining structure and ideology as aspects of J composition were: Haag (1970), Steck (1970), Thompson (1971), Müller (1972), Vermeylen (1977), Dockx (1981), and Neveu (1982). Nielsen (1972) identified five independent fragments combined into a creation myth and a paradise myth. Mendenhall (1974) saw it as a late *mashal.* Walsh (1977) approached it synchronically in terms of its final redaction. Görg (1981)—a pan-Egyptian—interpreted Gen 3 as a polemic against Solomon's Egyptian wife and snake-worship. Rosenberg (1981) identified a chiastic structure in his synchronic treatment. Wyatt (1981) argued the late origin of the Eden tradition and related Gen 2–3 to a parable of the deposition and deportation of a king, applied first in Northern Israel and later in Judah. Sandys-Wunsch (1982) saw a henotheistic J, unabashedly employing mythological motifs, motivating the final redactor to use Gen 1 as a monotheistic corrective.

3.2.2.2 Chap. 4. J. M. Miller (1974) saw two traditions combined in Gen 4, that of Cain as a city builder, the prototype of settled farmers, and that of Cain as the eponym of Kenite metallurgists. Dietrich (1977) traced the development from tribal tradition to universal prehistory. To Hauser (1980), Gen 2–4 was a single literary composition and not the reconstruction of a redactor. Klemm's religio-historical study (1981) argued that this material demythicizes the hero theme in primitive tradition.

3.2.2.3 6:1–4. Houtman (1976) held that Gen 5:1–3's notion of man as a divine image-bearer provides the background for "sons of God" in 6:1–4, disregarding the standard assignment to separate literary sources. Clines (1979) agreed with Westermann that the "sons of God" were primeval kings; the 120 years is the duration up to the flood. Marrs (1980) showed that the common theme of man's intrusion into the realm of the divine links Gen 3:22–24, 6:1–4, 11:1–9. Marzel (1981/82) identified separate stories of punishment for intermarriage and of death as the penalty for rebellion. Luke (1983) saw a primitive myth, theologized and incorporated into the final redaction in response to the marriage reforms of Ezra-Nehemiah. Hendel (1987), comparing motivations for a cataclysm in Atrahasis and the Trojan War traditions, identified J's source as the original introduction to the flood, complaining about mankind's uncontrollable proliferation rather than about human wickedness.

3.2.2.4 Flood. Brueggemann (1971) saw Absalom's rebellion as the background of Noah's history (cf. ibid., "Weariness, Exile and Chaos," *CBQ* 34 [1972] 19–38). Clark (1971) argued that both in the pre-J tradition and in P Noah's righteous is the precondition for his rescue, while in J (6:8, 7:1) it reflects royal ideology, first as an initial decision, next as a public declaration. According to Petersen (1976) J was unlike Atrahasis and P in viewing man as essentially unchanged by the flood. Fritz (1982) interpreted Gen 8:22 to mean that, while man's nature cannot be changed, his behavior can no longer endanger the world.

3.2.2.5 J narratives in chaps. 9–11. According to Seybold (1976), an ancient Babylonian aetiology was expanded in two separate J redactions as an instrument of political instruction. Sasson (1980) argued that Gen 1:1–6, 8 is parallel in structure to 6:9–11:9, and that the Babel story follows the table of nations (chap. 10) to show that God will not destroy mankind even though he intends to make a new beginning in Abram. Schwantes (1981) argued that the "tower" was actually a wall, standing for a walled city, and that accordingly Gen 11:1–9 must be taken as a diaspora polemic against city life and military power.

3.2.2.6 J genealogies in chaps. 9–11. Cf. Wilson, § 3.2.1.2 Prewitt (1981) pointed to the purpose of providing an ideal sociological model for the kingdom of Judah, legitimizing the Davidic kingship (cf. Luke, 1982).

3.3 Patriarchs.

Diebner/Schult (1975) argued that the patriarchal marriages constitute an element in a postexilic polemic (Ezra-Nehemiah). De Pury (1975) was of quite a different opinion and employed a far more meticulous methodology in analyzing the Jacob cycle in a two-volume work running to 721 pages; it is a model of how the analysis of the patriarchal traditions ought to proceed (cf. Chr. Barth's laudatory review in *RTP* 110: 291–98). Rose (1976) argued that because of J's "pacifism" he is to be dated between Isaiah and Deuteronomy. Weeks (1976) admitted that since Nuzi parallels have been discredited, scholars must rely on the outline of the Documentary Hypothesis for historical reconstruction. J. M. Miller (1977) resisted S. M. Warner's effort to bolster evidence for a Middle or Late Bronze Age patriarchal setting (cf. Warner, 1977). Reventlow (1977) identified a pre-Israelite internationalism in the patriarchal narratives. Selman (1977) pleaded for the judicious application of truly relevant cuneiform materials for light on the patriarchal age. Uffenheimer (1977) argued for the historicity of the Genesis El, who was not the heaven god of the second millennium; this god was taken over by the Israelites

because the intrusion of Baalism had not yet become a threatening factor. Warner (1977) admitted the validity of Van Seter's and Thompson's critiques, but argued that extrabiblical information may still be used where there is a high level of correlation (cf. Miller, 1977). McKane (1979) offered a meticulous and detailed study of methodology for solving the problem of the patriarchal narratives, claiming first place for an analysis of literary forms. Warner (1979) critiqued the methods of Gunkel and Olrik. In Millard-Wiseman (1982) seven conservative scholars (J. Goldingay, J. J. Bimson, M. K. Selman, G. J. Wenham, Millard, Wiseman, and D. W. Baker) published essays in support of a second-millennium historicity for the patriarchs; nothing could express better the urge of conservatives to secure an historical foothold even where literal facticity must be given up. Meanwhile Van Seters (1980) argued that El epithets, sacred trees, pillars, and altars do not reflect ancient tradition because they were consistent with exilic and postexilic conditions. J. A. Emerton seemed on firmer ground in his analysis of the patriarchal promises (1982), identifying as original the promise of a son in Gen 16:11, 18:10, 14 and the promise of land in Gen 12:7, 28:13, 15, and, as seventh to sixth century additions, all other elements. Seebass's argument (1983) was similar: Gen 15 is not proto-Deuteronomic but reflects the conditions of the Davidic kingdom; the original promises were of land (Gen 28:13b), of Ishmael's posterity (21:18), to Hagar (16:10) and to Israel/Jacob (21:18). It was just at this juncture that the other shoe dropped in Heidelberg: Blum's 564–page monograph (1984), which covered in profuse detail the same ground that Blum's teacher, Rendtorff, had covered in his major study (1977): (1) the ever-expanding patriarchal complexes; (2) an expansive deuteronomic redaction; (3) a priestly redaction; (4) the absence of pre-deuteronomic narrative documents. The scholarly world is still endeavoring to digest and assess this far-reaching presentation, but it is already clear that it will strengthen Rendtorff's position if proven right but will hardly save it if proven wrong. We mention finally Weisman's two 1985 studies ("Diverse," "National") arguing that E is earlier than J.

3.3.1 Abraham-Isaac cycle.

The historical research of scholars like W. F. Albright into the records of the second-millennium Near East seem now to have proceeded from a less than disinterested agenda. The aim was not to illustrate, but to prove the historicity of the patriarchal stories. By apparent coincidence two imposing critiques of this tendency appeared almost simultaneously, and by their convergence have put a virtual stop to such misguided efforts.

Thompson (1974) offered a lengthy and incisive refutation of alleged parallels to distinctive elements within the Abraham stories. For lack of space, this can only be recorded, not explained. The upshot of Thompson's work was both negative and positive; it closed off the possibility of an Abraham living during the Middle Bronze Age, 2000 to 1500 B.C., the period favored by traditionalists; it suggested instead that the Abraham stories arose independently of one another during the Late Bronze Age, 1500–1200 B.C. In effect this would telescope the Abraham traditions into those of the possession of Palestine, as reflected in Joshua and Judges. It is a disappointment that Thompson himself has not been able to follow this lead in extensive publications

Van Seters (1975) in effect confirmed the negative judgment of Thompson with respect to a Middle Bronze-Age Abraham. This led him, however, to a strikingly different alternative. Claiming to find numerous parallels in mid-first millennium sources, Van Seters suggested that the Abraham traditions emerged in that particular era. This would suggest that the J materials were approximately contemporaneous with Deuteronomy and exilic documents. Not content to leave this as a suggestion, Van Seters devoted the second half of his book to a literary criticism completely independent of the Documentary Hypothesis, offering a series of studies on the various components of the Abraham cycle.

Further studies on this topic are the following. Beek (1977) argued that the belief that Abraham's god was not bound to a local shrine identifies the intention of J, of Genesis, and of biblical theology as a whole. Wiseman (1977) argued against Van Seters that tent-life was more common in the second than in the first millennium, and that camels were in fact domesticated already in the second millennium. Golka (1978) renewed the dialogue with Westermann; not only Gen 12:1–3, 15:1–6, 18:17–23, 22:1–9, but chaps. 23 and 24 as well, all of them belonging to the latest level of literary composition, could not have been part of Gunkel's saga collections. Sutherland (1983) identified the redaction of the Abraham stories to have constructed a concentric pattern in which theologically sophisticated materials at both termini and in the center counteract the negative theme of disbelief and confrontation characteristic of the cycle as a whole. A sociological study by Worschech (1983) pointed to parallelisms in second-millennium nomadism. Hunter (1986), opting for an exilic J, argued that Abraham served as a hero-model for Jewish exiles in danger of assimilation to Babylonian culture.

3.3.1.1 12:1–4a. Refinements of the common view that this pericope is programmatic material for an early J composition were the following: Scharbert (1973), Diedrich (1979), Yarchin (1980), Coats (1981), Auffret (1982), and Miller (1984). Jenkins (1978) argued that the element of "making one's name great" provides the redactional link between the J prehistory and J's patriarchal cycle. Ruprecht (1979 "Vorgegebene") argued that the two basic elements, "I will bless you" and "you shall be a blessing" reflect the ideology of the Davidic-Solomonic empire. His article, "Hintergrund," reaffirmed a Davidic-Solomonic background and pointed to parallel ancient Near-Eastern monarchic materials. For Steck (1971) and Crüsemann (1981), see § 3.2.2.

3.3.1.2 Endangerment to the Ancestress. G. Schmitt (1973) identified the earliest narrative motif in Gen 26:1–14, acknowledging that in its present form this passage has been influenced by 12:10–20. Sociological concerns were involved in Augustin's study (1983), which argued that Gen 12:10–20 was told along with 2 Sam 11:2–27a by powerless groups in protest against arbitrary expropriation. Berg (1983 "Nochmals") attempted to show that Gen 12:10–20 is J's effort to narrate Abram's "Sündenfall."

3.3.1.3 Abram-Lot cycle. Kilian (1970 "Lot") identified four stages in the development of the Lot figure: (1) eponym of pre-Moabite transjordanians; (2) the rescued righteous man of Sodom (pre-Moabite); (3) eponym of the Moabites and Ammonites after their occupation of their respective territories; (4) following Israelite occupation, Abram's companion. Vogels offered three separate essays on this cycle (1974, 1975, 1979); it was the redactor who made Lot into a model of unbelief; originally, Gen 13:2–18 aimed to put Abram in the wrong because God's intent was the continuing fellowship of the Lot and Abram groups. Keel (1979) argued that a sun-god, not Yahweh, was involved in the original form of the Sodom tradition, and that this is testimony to an important Shemesh-cult in pre-Israelite Judah or Jerusalem. Rudin-O'Barsky (1982), offering a careful delineation of literary development in Gen 18–19, identified two originally independent folk-tales, in one of which the gods were welcomed and in the second of which the gods were abused. According to Helyer (1983), the separation of Lot was intended as an illustration of the curse in 12:3 and constituted one of eight crises in which personages endangering the promise of 12:1–3 were successively eliminated.

3.3.1.3.1 Chap. 14. According to the Documentary Hypothesis in its classical form, Gen 14 does not belong to any one of the Pentateuchal documents, but recent study has tended to interpret it as part of the J narrative. In two 1971 studies, Emerton cleared the ground of wayward hypotheses and identified six distinct literary levels, from a pre-Davidic

core to a late dating aiming to attach Lot more securely to the Abram cycle. Gammie (1971) traced the Melchizedek tradition from Shechem to Shiloh to Jerusalem. Schatz's Basel dissertation (1972) dated this chapter to the Davidic age—the aim of which was to legitimize Jerusalem—with exilic redaction within the deuteronomistic circle. Lubsczyk (1974) interpreted the motif of blessing, supporting the Davidic kingship, as a high point in J's overall conception. Kirkland (1977), on the other hand, identified evidence that this story is not an aetiology for the Jerusalem shrine. Peter (1979) argued that in the ancient form of this tradition, it was the king of Sodom who blessed Abram, but that E in v 18 tried to counteract this objectionable conception. Theophilus (1979) devoted his dissertation to the analysis of vv 17–24. According to Doré (1981), vv 18–20 are monarchial, vv 12f. are from the early monarchy, and the rest of the chapter is post-Deuteronomic. According to Zeron (1982/83), the reference to David's retainers goes back to a non-Israelite tradent of David's time, intent on defending the interests of Canaanites in the Hebron area, while the references to Lot are early Judahite and aim to show God's role in the rescue of Lot.

3.3.1.4 Chap. 15. Rogers (1970) argued that the covenant notion is early. Anbar (1978/79) claimed vv 1–6 for prophetic circles, vv 7–12 for deuteronomistic circles, and the other redactional elements for the exile period. Rebić (1979) assigned various elements to J and to E and identified a succession of redactors. Rendtorff (1980) ascribed the chapter to the same redactor as that of 22:17 and 26:4, claiming that the entirety of vv 1–21 was addressed to the exiles. H. H. Schmid (1980) identified vv 1–6 as a victory oracle influenced by ancient Near-Eastern concepts of "righteousness." According to Hasel (1981), vv 9ff. describes a covenant-ratification sacrifice based on third- to second- millennium models and different from what is described in Jer 34:18f (cf. Wenham's rejoinder [1982]). Anbar (1983) preferred to explain this chapter as an exilic composition combining the son, posterity and land promises and alluding to the United Monarchy as the model for an eschatological consolation for the exiles.

3.3.1.5 Chaps. 16, 21. Neff (1972) identified Gen 17:15–21 and 21:22–24 as fragments of healing stories. Berg (1983 "Sündenfall" identified Gen 16:1–6 as a fall story.

3.3.1.6 Chap. 17. For Neff (1980) see § 3.3.1.5. Oliva (1974 "Revelaciones") analyzed Gen 17 as modeled after Gen 18 but avoiding its anthropomorphisms; in Gen 35 P avoids the cultic setting of Gen 28 (E) because of P's idea that God spoke, but did not dwell, in Bethel. Westermann (1975 "Verheissungen") identified as original patriarchal themes (1) the promise of a son, (2) the promise of the divine presence, and (3) the promise of fresh pasturage; promises of many descendants, land and blessing are latter elements connecting Israel as a people with the Patriarchs. Westermann (1975 "Genesis 17") explained P's ideology as exemplified in Gen 17: *berith* means a binding assurance; it no longer refers to a ritual act but to an essential change in relationship.

3.3.1.7 Chap. 18. Kumpel (1977) applied a thorough-going philological, form-critical, tradition-critical, and composition/redactional analysis to the Mamre story. Blenkinsopp (1982) suggested that the Abraham-Yahweh dialogue is a midrash on the destruction of Sodom occasioned by the destruction of Jerusalem. In analyzing J material in Gen 18:23–26, Mafico (1983) explained that Lot's family were not counted among Sodom's citizens because they were *gērîm*, "strangers." Schweizer's two studies (1985) identified wisdom influence, suggesting a late date of composition. (See also Rudin-O'Brasky, § 3.3.1.3).

3.3.1.8 Chap. 22. Kilian's venturesome tradition-analysis of the sacrifice of Isaac (1970 "Isaaks") identified it as an E story from a shrine *'el yir'eh*, into which themes of a pilgrimage and the change from human to animal sacrifice had been absorbed long before appropriation by the Abraham clan. Von Rad's treatment (1980) was an intriguing popularization. Magonet (1973) saw the story as a combination of Isaac and Ishmael traditions. Identifying the earliest level of tradition in Gen 22, White (1979) suggested the background of initiation rites among Isaac tribes. Duhaim (1981) was a plea for the recognition of various diachronic levels. Saviv (1981) saw three late interpolations into Gen 22: (1) the theologizing introduction, (2) the reference to Moriah, displacing the original shrine site with Jerusalem, and (3) deuteronomistically influenced references to *hammāqôm* and the use of words from the root *R'H*. Alexander (1983) made a synchronistic comparison of the structures of the Noah and Abraham covenants, identifying Gen 22:15–18 as assurance that Abraham had met the test. Bypassing historical criticsm, Qoller (1983/84) interpreted the transition, "after these things," as connecting the test of Abraham's obedience to an offensive planting of a tamarisk in chap. 21 (cf. Deut 16:21).

3.3.1.9 Chap. 23. Westbrook (1971) dated the purchase negotiation to the exilic period. See also G. M. Tucker, "The Legal Background of Genesis 23," *JBL* 85 (1966) 77–84.

3.3.1.10 Chap. 24. In vv 2–9, N. Tucker (1971) identified a contrived structure: AB/BC/CBBC. Roth (1972) identified a "Beispiel-Geschichte" for training court officials, historicized and theologized by J (cf. Coats, FOTL I, *in loco*). Rofé (1976), denying Gen 24 to J, gave it a postexilic dating (cf. Rofé, 1981). García López (1980), applying an extensive form-criticism and composition/redaction criticism, identified a ninth-century J core and a deuteronomistic (ninth to seventh century) redaction.

3.3.2 Jacob cycle.

Weimar (1974 analyzed a priestly Jacob cycle ending in Exod 1:1–4a, 5b, 7; there are three symmetrical elements, the middle of which has three sub-elements, while the framing elements have each two sub-elements introduced by the Toledoth formula (Gen 25:12, 19, 36:1, 37:2). Fishbane (1976) uncovered an elaborate chiastic structure in the Jacob cycle featuring the three themes of birth, blessing and inheritance. In disagreement with Gunkel and Eissfeldt, Thompson (1979) categorized the Jacob narratives according to respective levels of historiographical intentionality, as follows: (1) hero and family tales, (2) tribal tales, (3) redactional elements, (4) situational tales, and (5) aetiologies. According to Coats (1980) J, E, and P have traces of an ancient conflict tradition both in the Jacob-Laban and in the Jacob-Esau cycles. Evans (1986) interpreted the reference in Gen 25:27 to Jacob as *'tZZZs tām*. Friedman (1986), claiming that, like the Court History, Genesis does not glorify human heroes, assessed the fact that the Jacob stories are built around the themes of conflict and deception.

3.3.2.1 Conflict with Esau. Bartlett (1969) argued that the brotherhood with Esau theme reflects the conditions of late pre-exilic times. Keukens (1982) saw Gen 27 as a mocking "empty blessing" story whose purpose was to nullify the traditional hatred between Israel and Edom.

3.3.2.1.1 The Jabbok incident. The studies of Barthes (1971), Hentschl (1977), and Ross (1985) reviewed the origins of Gen 32:23–33 along conventional lines. De Pury (1979) drew upon an old Irish parallel to argue that (1) Jacob's separation from his family, his physical impairment, his name-change, and the food taboo belong to the story's original form; (2) v 23 is intrusive; (3) it was Jacob who performed the wrestling trick (Gunkel);

and (4) the theme of the story is both "overcoming" and "initiation." According to McKenzie (1980), J used this story to teach triumph over all opposition. Blum (1980) and Brody (1981) searched for evidences of late dating.

3.3.2.2 Revelation at Bethel, 28:10–22, 35:1–15. For Oliva (1974) see § 3.3.1.6; for de Pury, see § 3.3. Oliva (1974 "Vision") identified J, E. and R^{JE}. Eckart (1976) identified an old Jacob tradition anchored at the Shechem and Bethel shrines. Rendtorff (1982) studied the structure of Gen 28:10ff., with a view to refuting the separation into J and E sources; a chiastic structure reveals the promise speech as intrusive and vv 20–22 as a separate episode. Ross (1985 "Bethel") offered a literary and theological study.

3.3.2.3 Conflict with Laban, birth reports. According to Amir (1972), it was the self-conscious process of formulation that produced compositional unity in the birth stories. Halevi (1973) is an extensive study of the structure and historical background of the various arrangements in which the names of Jacob's sons appear. According to Mabee (1980), the legal procedure seen in Gen 31:26–42 established Jacob as *pater familias.* Morrison (1983) adduced against Van Seters's analysis evidence for the patriarchal herding practice in Old Babylonian and Larson texts as well as in the Hammurabi code; she also maintained that the Nuzi texts illustrate the patriarchal brideprice, dowry, and marriage agreement.

3.3.2.4 Shechem. De Pury (1969) identified separate Hamor and Shechem stories intertwined in Gen 34. Keel (1973) offered evidences from comparative religions and archaeology to show that the burial of gods was a preparatory ritual connected with the holy war: E in Gen 35 shows a pro-Bethel, anti-Shechem bias. Otto (1979) placed Gen 34–35 in a historical situation in which the transjordanian Simeonites and Levites moved to the Shechem area to fill a gap left by Merneptah's raid; this reflects a tradition development in which, at the transition to the Late Bronze Age, the Jacob figure was anchored in Transjordania, and through which the Simeon and Levi aetiologies were linked to the Shechem and Bethel shrines. According to Zakowitz (1979), Gen 35:2. 4 is a late polemic against the Samaritans, who responded in their tradition that Moses hid holy artifacts at Gerizim. Kevers (1980) offered the results of his Louvain dissertation, to the effect that Gen 34 is an original unity, but with intrusion of Simeon and Levi in 13b, 25a and late additions in vv 27–29, 30–31; the story reflects authentic Bedouin customs as well as ancient Near Eastern law. According to Diebner (1984), Gen 34 reveals the work of orthodox Jerusalemite redactors objecting to the Samaritans' circumcision as a common bond with the Jews. Rendsburg (1984) saw the migration of Gen 35 as a glorious homecoming similar to the Odyssey and the return of Sinuhe and Gilgamesh.

3.3.2.5 Genealogy. Knauf (1985) dated the Edomite king-list to the end of the sixth or beginning of the fifth century.

3.4 Joseph narrative.

Much scholarly attention has been directed to the analysis of the Joseph story during recent years. Redford (1970) boldly revealed the basis and consequences of a late dating: it is a well-constructed *Märchen* with a historical theme, dating from 650–425; there is no trace of J or E and, *contra* von Rad, no sign of wisdom influence; P was the final redactor. Martin-Achard (1972) reviewed the work of Vergote, Redford, von Rad, and Ruppert on the Joseph story. Coats (1973) identified a historical kernel in chaps. 39–41, a narrative of cleverness and insight on the part of a person in power; this was expanded by the Joseph novella as a whole, describing the life of a family. Coats (1974) made a case

for redactional unity. According to Meinhold (1975–76), structural parallels with Esther mark the Joseph story as an apologia for diaspora Judaism. Coats (1976) presented a definitive analysis. Donner (1976) found traces of J in Gen 41:50–52, 46:1–5, chap. 48, 50:23–25, but otherwise the apparent presence of wisdom influence suggests that this is an independent tale substituted by RJE for the original J and E accounts (see Gunneweg in § 2.1). Duvshani (1976) argued that the dreams story reflects determinism, shows wisdom influence, and provides redactional links. According to Michaud (1976) the historical Joseph was a Machirite taken to Egypt, who returned with Moses in the thirteenth century; the Joseph saga embodies Palestinian and Egyptian legendary material and has been expanded into a historical novella underlying the J and E strands. Niditch/Doran (1977) made a form-critical comparison of Gen 41 with Dan 2 and the Ahiqar legend. Melchin (1979) applied McEvenue's stylistic criteria to an analysis of J and E in the Joseph story. Willi-Plein (1979) argued for a literary unity employing principles of doubling and exposition; the story explains how the Israelites got to Egypt and how Joseph, Ephraim, Manasseh and Israel were connected. Savage's rhetorical analysis (1980) of 44:14–45:15 identified elements of pathos overlooked by Redford and Coats. H.-C. Schmitt's study (1980) identified an old pro-Judah, a later pro-Reuben (E), and an exilic redactional (J) stratum. Westermann's vol. III in BKAT I appeared in final form in 1982; it explained the Joseph novella as a redactional combination of an independent Joseph story with the concluding elements of the J Jacob cycle, with later elements from P (see § 3.0). McKenzie (1983) explained that the Joseph story has three blessing narratives (for Pharaoh, 47:7–10, 13–26; for Ephraim and Manasseh, 48:8–22; for the twelve tribes, 49:1–27); the intent of the Pharaoh blessing was to illustrate the meaning of Gen 12:3a. Bartelmus (1985) explained that the purpose of chap. 50 was to unite northern Jacob/Israel traditions with southern Abraham traditions. Ruppert (1985) identified a short original J story, an E expansion, and extension to novella form in a secondary J strand. Schmitt (1985) applied the results of his 1980 study to the theory of late redaction. Seebass (1986) identified as steps in the redactional process (1) a now-lost JE narrative featuring the promise of hegemony in middle Palestine; (2) an exilic rearrangement of materials in chaps. 46–47; and (3) the placing of chap. 48 in its present position under the influence of Deut 33.

3.4.1 Judah-Tamar, chap. 38.

Coats (1972) explained that the levirate law for widows explains the present positioning of chap. 38. Emanueli (1972) saw this chapter as serving the same purpose as the book of Ruth: identifying an ancestress to David. Emerton (1975) argued that chap. 38, reflecting the situation shortly before David's time, is an original element in J; only the birth stories in vv 27–30 reflect ancient tradition (cf. Emerton, 1979). Gilad (1975) interpreted Gen 38 as a subtlely disguised polemic against David on the part of Saul's supporters. Goldin (1977) argued that chap. 38 is an ideological link, explaining why God may prefer the youngest to the eldest son. Emphasizing strong verbal and contextual ties to the surrounding Joseph story, Burden (1980) interpreted chap. 38 as an explanation why Judah, first in line of succession from Abraham, could be subject to divine disposal. O'Callaghan (1981) explained thematic structure, contacts between Judah and Tamar, chiasmus, and the stylistic use of irony in this chapter. Wright (1982) argued that Gen 38 reflects the myth of the dying and returning savior, but serves in its present form to explain the emergence of Israel's salvation through Judah. Rendsburg (1986), rejecting on *a priori* grounds the Documentary Hypothesis, explained chap. 38 as a spoof on David dating from the ninth century.

3.4.2 Chap. 49.

Testa (1973) identified epigrammatic, prophetic and mixed elements in "the blessing of Jacob," which is based on tribal oracles both of Israelite-Canaanite and of Hebrew-Amorite origin. Martin-Achard (1981) identified the Judah oracle as praise for the king in Jerusalem. Seebass (1984) recognized venerable antiquity; the sayings derive from the thirteenth to the twelfth centuries; vv 2, 8b-9, 28 reflect a late Davidic reinterpretation.

4.0 Exodus

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Commentaries published since 1970 include those of Clements (1972), Hyatt (1972; 2nd ed. 1980), Childs (1974), and Schmidt (1974–). That of Childs is distinctive both in its concentration on the "canonical" meaning and in its treatment of Christian and Jewish exegesis.

4.1 Traditions, themes and structures.

Coats (1968) was the starting point for an imposing list of critical essays over a wide range of traditio-critical problems in the book of Exodus. J. M. Schmidt (1970) compared the exodus and Sinai traditions, identifying the latter as Shechemite in origin. Nicholson (1973) argued for an original connection between the exodus and Sinai cycles and criticized Beyerlin and Mendenhall for their effort to apply analogies from Hittite treaty forms. Zuber (1976) identified Sinai as Hal'l-Bedr, discussed the nature of oral tradition, and explained the distinction between nomadic and settled societies. According to Cazelles (1977), only P comprises a literary unity in Exodus; J and E are uneven because they incorporate a whole range of independent traditions. Perlitt (1977) explained that "Horeb" meant "dry area" and originally referred to a geographic region that was eventually identified with Sinai. Schrieber (1977) argued that separate "mishkan" and "mitswah" traditions underlie literary and legal materials in Exodus. Buis (1978) argued against Coats and Fritz that the conflict theme is not anti-Ephraimite but, both in J and P, is intended to valorize Moses. Butler (1979) explained that an old struggle for the priesthood preserved anti-Moses materials in Exod 2, 4, 18, Num 12, 14, 16. Arenillas (1980) argued that the Moses traditions received their definitive redaction during the exile and reflect the ideology of the new temple. W. H. Schmidt (1983) offered a review of recent criticism.

4.2 Call and deliverance cycle.

Coats (1972 "Transition") showed that Exod 1:1–14 makes no mention of the promised land and that, both in J and in P, the deliverance theme ends in chap. 12. Weimar (1973)

offered a detailed form- and tradition criticism of P elements in chaps. 1, 2, 6, and 7. In a broad study of Exod 5–15, Weimar/Zenger (1975) identified a pre-J story which J reinterpreted in the light of emerging national self-consciousness during David's reign, aiming to counter rising bureaucracy by emphasis on Israel's freedom under Yahweh. Eakin (1977) showed how Exod 7:9–11:10, 12:29–32, 13:27–14:31 attest to Yahweh's mighty deeds. Kohata (1986) offered a fresh review of the relation between the J and P documents.

4.2.1 From Egypt to Midian.

Von Rad (1971) elucidated the theme of faith and unfaith in Exod 1–14. Coats (1973) identified the kernel of the Midian tradition in the story of Moses' marriage. Sadakata (1977) made a structural analysis of Exod 1:5–22, identifying the king's demand (v 22) as an E addition. According to Schneeman (1979), Exod 4:24–26 reflects an apotropaic rite in which a covenant ceremony functions as a marriage contract. Wicke (1982) interpreted Exod 1:2–2:10 as a three-part editorial composition featuring irony (cf. Lawton, 1985).

4.2.2 Call and divine self-revelation.

According to Weimar (1980), the J elements in Exod 2:23–5:5 derive from Hebron, dating from *ca.* 900, while the E elements derive from Bethel and date from 800–700; there is also an anti-Manassite "Jehovistic" redaction (cf. Rendtorff, *BibOr* 38: 408–11, A. R. Müller, *BN* 17: 56–72).

4.2.2.1 Chaps. 3–4. During the period under study a variety of publications not listed here have dealt with the divine-name problem. Wyatt (1979) rejected a J and E source-analysis while maintaining the central importance of this pericope in the Yahweh cult.

4.2.2.2 6:1–13. Oliva (1971) identified the genre, "prophetic judgment oracle" with grounding, messenger formula, and announcement. Ska (1982) on the contrary emphasized the uniqueness of its formal structure; it was written by P to reinforce Exod 3 (JE). In *JSOT*, 1983, Auffret and Magonet carried on an extended debate concerning the theological importance of the divine name in this passage.

4.2.3 Plagues-passover cycle.

Greenberg (1971) praised the plagues narrative as a redactional masterpiece. Haran (1971) studied the route of the exodus. Loewenstamm (1974) identified contradictory materials in the J narrative. De Vries (1975) discussed the crucial role of time-words in the plagues and deliverance cycle, culminating with 14:31's retrospect of 6:1. R. Schmidt (1975; rev. ed. 1982) sided with Noth against Fohrer in identifying pre-Deuteronomic , Deuteronomic, and priestly elements in Exod 12–13, arguing that the *pesaḥ* originated as the tradition of a single pre-Exodus tribe, absorbed by all Israel at Gilgal. Zevit (1975/76), on the other hand, showed that the J narratives were anchored in institutional recitation. Fox (1977) identified the ninth plague as the keystone of the series. Reindl (1977) dated Exod 7:8–13 the early Egyptian diaspora because of its anti-syncretistic aim. It was the view of Görg (1978) that the earliest exodus traditions spoke of a divine rescue rather than freeing from slavery; the background of the J material lies in the administrative relations between Solomon and the Egyptians. Ska (1979) argued for the dependence of Exod 7–14 on prophetic influence, specifically that of Ezek 2. Schreiner (1977) made a source analysis of Exod 11:1–13:16 and a structural analysis of 12:21–23, identifying the intention of urging the people to contribute to their deliverance. Steingrissom (1979) identified two originally independent complexes: (1) the passover-mazzoth laws with narrative framework and (2) homilies; the intent of the insertion of these complexes into JE was to demonstrate

divine revelation through signs and wonders and to create a prolongation of tension between Moses' call and the deliverance at the sea. Vater (1982) identified Exod 7–11 as a prophetic commission story.

4.2.4 Deliverance at the Sea.

According to Childs (1970), P was influenced by Exod 15 and differed from J and E in making the deliverance at the sea climactic. Mann (1971) argued that the pillar of cloud motif in J was influenced by the Jordan-crossing tradition. Patrick (1976) and Coats (1979) continued the discussion with Childs, 1970. According to H.-C. Schmitt (1979), the final Pentateuchal redaction conceived of the sea-deliverance as an inscrutable act of God, breaking with a priestly-theocratic ideology which sees history as a cyclical and manipulable process. Smith (1981) argued that the presence of Moses in the deliverance story transformed an historical event into a divine act and placed it within a pan-Israel perspective. Auffret (1983) offered a fresh literary analysis of Exod 14. Ska (1983) rejected the claim of Stolz and H. H. Schmid that Exod 14 shows literary dependence on Deuteronomy; calling for reverential witnessing to the mighty act of God, its affinities are rather with pre-Deuteronomic passages such as 1 Sam 12:18 (see v 31).

4.2.4.1 Victory hymn. Coats (1969) argued that, though the "song of the sea" is secondary in its literary context, it shows unity in form and tradition. Butler (1971) was concerned mainly with analyzing poetic features. Labuschagne (1971) made a study of its framework and structure. P. D. Miller, Jr. (1973) drew attention to Ugaritic parallels in identifying it as the embryo of Israel's epic tradition. Zenger (1981) held that the original hymn was redacted to reflect the Zion ideology. Foresti (1982) made a lexicographical analysis and ascribed its origin to a deuteronomistic redaction. Strauss (1985) analyzed it as a postexilic hymnic confession.

4.3 Exodus wandering narratives.

Coats (1972 "Exposition") identified Exod 13:17–22 as the structural exposition for the wandering theme. "Itinerary" identified the wandering stories as a transition between independent exodus and Sinai blocks. Davies (1974) made a comparative study of the wilderness itineraries. Ruprecht (1974) saw Exod 16 as a unified P narrative with a deuteronomistic redaction, forming the transition from the exodus to the Sinai cycle. Aharoni (1975) analyzed the pillar, angel, and ark as embodiments of the divine presence. Studying the wilderness itineraries from Exodus to Numbers, Walsh (1977) identified at least two competing traditions. Lohfink (1981) ascribed the reference to Yahweh as Israel's "healer" in 15:25b-26 to postexilic redaction. Beuken (1985) defended the compositional unity of Exod 16.

4.3.1 Victory over Amalek.

Coats (1975) interpreted Exod 17:8ff. as an aetiology of Moses as Yahweh's servant combined with a legend about Moses as a hero. Identifying a chiastic structure in this pericope, Robinson (1985) interpreted it as an address to a sixth-century audience, offering divine help as a substitute for the help of an idealized Moses figure.

4.4 Sinai pericope.

For Schmidt (1970), see § 4.1. In interpreting the meaning of *berith* in Exod 24 and 34 (= communication of the divine will), Zimmerli (1970) pointed out that it is never mentioned in the Sinai pericope without an accompanying proclamation of its requirements. Summarizing his Hebrew University dissertation, Toeg (1977) identified an

original narrative in 19:3–8, 10–19, 20:18–21, 24:3–8, explaining that RJE inserted the legal materials; he also showed how Josh 24, Deuteronomy and P have reshaped the lawgiving theme. Naor (1981/82) completely rearranged the text of Exod 33–34. Davis (1982) tried to explain how the theme of Moses' intercession has created a literary unity in Exod 32–34. According to Weisman (1982), Exod 24 is a Judaic, and Exod 32–34 an Ephraimite tradition. Zenger (1982) offered a modified JDP analysis of Exod 17–34, identifying a pre-exilic ("Jehowistic"), a deuteronomistic, and a priestly redaction. Phillips (1984) argued that the placing of the Decalogue within the Sinai narrative was the work of the deuteronomistic redaction that was responsible also for 20:4ff., 23:20–33, and 34:1ff., 14.

4.4.1 Theophany stories.

Zenger (1971) identified the work of RJE (from Hezekiah's time) and the deuteronomistic combination of independent J and E materials. Vriezen (1972) argued that a Jethro-Midian tradition is preserved in Exod 18:12 (E), a Sinai tradition in chaps. 19ff. (E), and a Shechem tradition in 24:9–11 (also E). Nicholson (1974, 1975, 1976) maintained that Exod 24:9–11 embodies an ancient pilgrimage tradition independent of J and E, inserted redactionally with transitional materials in vv 1–2. Kapelrud's lectures (1975) followed Mowinckel's source analysis, maintaining the unity of the exodus and Sinai traditions. Ruprecht (1980) gave Exod 24:9–11 an exilic date. Booij (1984) argued that Exod 19–20, 24, 32–34 are all from the seventh century because neither Deut 25:5–9 nor Josh 24 makes reference to this material; these Sinai narratives gained canonical authority only after the exile. Nicholson (1982) argued against Perlitt that the blood ritual in Exod 24:3ff. was not Deuteronomic, and against Kutsch that it was no rite of self-imprecation; in the light of 19:6a, it must be seen as a symbol of holiness and of belonging to God.

4.4.2 Tabernacle and cult.

Important work on the Tabernacle pericope has been carried out by Lehming, Levine, Görg, Hurvitz and Walkenhorst in the sixties. Pelzl (1976) argued that the projection of the temple in the form of a tent was intended for the situation of the exile. According to Kearney (1977) P as the redactor of J and E materials constructed a three-part pattern: Creation, 25–31; Fall, 32–33; Reconstruction, 34–40.

4.4.3 Chaps. 32–34.

Moberly's Cambridge dissertation (1983) discarded the results of the Documentary Hypothesis and attempted a new analysis of the final textual form of these chapters.

4.4.3.1 Golden calf. Davenport (1973) made a fresh analysis of Exod 32. According to Loza (1973), Deut 9 depends on Exod 32, in which vv 7–14 are secondary; RJE's work is placed in Judah after the downfall of Samaria. Loewenstamm (1975) argued against L. G. Perdue, *Bib* 54: 237–47, that Exod 32:4, 20, 24 are from a source familiar with an Ugaritic epic (cf. also Loewenstamm, *Bib* 48: 481–90). Halpern (1976) argued that Exod 32 was produced by a Shilonite reaction to Jeroboam I. Lestienne (1976) studied the theme of divine repentance, while Honeycutt (1977) made an analysis of Aaron, the priesthood, and the calf. Brichto (1983) maintained the literary unity of chaps. 32–34. Vermeylen (1985) claimed that Exod 32–34 ia exilic, having been subjected to four late redactions prior to that of P.

4.4.3.2 Chap. 34. According to G. Schmitt (1970), the prohibition against making peace with the inhabitants of the land, found in Exod 23:32f., 34:12, Josh 9:1ff., etc., concerned ethnic intermixing in the premonarchical period, but was given a sharply polemical edge in the deuteronomistic redaction, condemning idolatry, encouraging xenophia, and

prohibiting mixed marriages. Walkenhorst (1984) offered a structural analysis of Exod 34, defending the literary unity of vv 8–9. Zuurmond (1984) discussed the demand for ethnic separation, the cultic decalogue, and the reference to Moses' shining face.

5.0 Narrative materials in Leviticus, Numbers, Deut 34.

1970

Bartlett, J. R., "Sihon and Og, Kings of the Amorites," *VT* 20: 257–77; Kellermann, D., *Die Priesterschrift von Numeri 1:1 bis 10:10 literarkritisch und traditionsgeschichtlich untersucht*, BZAW 120 (Berlin: de Gruyter); Wifall, W., Jr., "Asshur and Eber, or Asher and Heber? A Commentary on the Last Balaam Oracle, Num 24,21–24," *ZAW* 82: 110–14

1972

Loewenstamm, S. E., "The Relation of the Settlement of Gad and Reuben in Num 32,1–38. Its Background and its Composition" (Heb) *Tarbiz* 42: 12–26; Van Seters, J., "The Conquest of Sihon's Kingdom: A Literary Examination," *JBL* 91: 182–96

1973

Coats, D. W., "Balaam: Sinner or Saint?" *BR* 18 (1973) 21–29; Mittmann, S., "Num 20,14–21—eine redaktionelle Kompilation," *Fest. Elliger*, pp. 143–49; Seybold, K., "Das Herrscherbild des Bileamorakels Num 24, 15–19," *TZ* 29: 1–19

1974

Beltz, W., *Die Kaleb-Traditionen im Alten Testament*, BWANT 18 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer); Gross, W., *Bileam*, STANT 39 (Munich: Kosel); Gunn, D. W., "The 'Battle Report': Oral or Scribal Convention?" *JBL* 93: 513–18

1975

Sakenfield, K. D., "The Problems of Divine Forgiveness in Numbers 14," *CBQ* 37: 317–30; Vetter, D., *Seherspruch und Segensschilderung. Ausdruckabsichten und sprachliche Verwirklichungen in den Bileam-Sprüchen von Numeri 23 und 24*, CalTM 4 (Stuttgart: Calwer); Wagner, S., "Offenbarungsphänomenologische Elemente in der Bileamgeschichte Numeri 22–24," *Theologische Versuche* 5: 11–31

1976

Coats, G. W., "Conquest Traditions in the Wilderness Themes," *JBL* 95: 177–90; Kselman, J. S., "A Note on Numbers XII 6–8," *VT* 26: 500–5; Sturdy, J., *Numbers*, CBCNEB (London: Cambridge)

1977

Coats, G. W., "Legendary Motifs in the Moses Death Reports," *CBQ* 39: 34–44; Kohata, F., "Die priesterschriftliche Ueberlieferungsgeschichte von Numeri XX, 1–13," *AJBI* 3: 3–34; Rost, L., "Fragen um Bileam," *Fest. Zimmerli*, pp. 377–87

1978

Bartlett, J. R., "The Conquest of Sihon's Kingdom: A Literary Reexamination," *JBL* 97: 347–51; Seebass, H., "Num xi, xii und die Hypothese des Jahwisten," *VT* 28: 214–23

1979

Rofé, A., *"The Book of Balaam" (Numbers 22:2–24:25)*: A Study in Methods of Criticism and the History of Biblical Literature and Religion (Heb), Jerusalem Biblical Studies I (Jerusalem: Simor); Schmidt, L., "Die alttestamentliche Bileamüberlieferung," *BZ* 23:

234–61; Tosato, A., "The Literary Structure of the First Two Poems of Balaam," *VT* 29: 98–106; Wenham, G. J., *The Book of Leviticus*, NICOT (London: Hodder & Stoughton)

1980

Gabel, J. B., and Wheeler, C. B., "The Redactor's Hand in the Blasphemy Pericope of Leviticus xxiv," *VT* 30: 227–29; Morag, S., "Layers of Antiquity. Linguistic Studies on the Oracles of Balaam" (Heb), *Tarbiz* 50: 1–24; Rouillard, H., "L'anesse de Balaam," *RB* 87: 211–41

1981

Milgrom, J., "Korah's Rebellion: A Study in Redaction," *Mélanges Cazelles*, pp. 135–46; Wenham, G. J., "Aaron's Rod (Number 17, 16–28)," *ZAW* 93: 280–81; ibid., *Numbers. An Introduction and Commentary* (Downer's Grove: Inter-Varsity)

1982

Coats, G. W., "The Way of Obedience. Traditio-Historical and Hermeneutical Reflections on the Balaam Story," *Semeia* 24: 53–79; Kallai, Z., "The Wandering-Traditions from Kadesh-Barnea to Canaan: A Study in Biblical Historiography," *JJS* 33: 175–84; Magonet, J., "The Korah Rebellion," *JSOT* 24: 3–25; Seebass, H., "Machir im Ostjordanland," *VT* 32: 496–503; Vogels, W., "The Spirit in Joshua and the Laying on of Hands by Moses," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, 38: 3–7

1983

Ahuis, F., *Autorität im Umbruch: Ein formgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Klärung der literarischen Schichten und der zeitgeschichtlichen Bezüge von Num 16 und 17*, CalwTM 13 (Stuttgart: Calwer); Jagersma, H., *Numeri, Deel 1*, POT (Nijkerk: Callenbach)

1984

Budd, P. J., *Numbers*, WBC (Waco: Word)

1985

Rendtorff, R., *Leviticus*, BKAT III (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1985)

Kellermann (1970) offered a literary analysis in which only Num 1, 2 and 4 were seen as belonging to original P. Sturdy's commentary (1976) took the position that inconsistencies within Numbers are due to the incorporation of individual traditions into a single line of older materials formed in the Davidic-Solomonic period; in the narratives, P is dependent on J; R^{JP} sacrificed much older material; the Balaam story is an original continuous whole. Wenham (1979) in his Leviticus commentary claimed that this book was pre-exilic but not necessarily Mosaic (!). In his Numbers commentary (1981) he rejected the Documentary Hypothesis while conceding that some materials are very early. Jagersma's commentary on the first part of Numbers (1983) isolates the various literary strands and discusses the practice of retrojecting late events into the Mosaic period. In his Numbers commentary Budd (1984) identified possible proto-J and proto-E elements, dated J to Josiah's time, rejected the role of R^{JE} and dated P to the fifth century. Rendtorff (1985) has just begun to publish his Leviticus commentary in BKAT, but takes the position that P is no independent narrative but the redactional reworking of old materials for an idealized postexilic community.

5.1 Leviticus narrative.

According to Gabel/Wheeler (1980), the priestly redactor employed the sole narrative pericope in the H-code at Lev 24:10–23 to redefine blasphemy as the mere mention of the divine name (cf. vv 11, 16).

5.2 Num 10–12.

Kselman (1976) identified a stichochiastic structure in Num 12:6–8, identifying this as a remnant of archaic poetry utilized by J. Seebass (1978) identified four literary strands in Num 11–12: J, pre-Dtr, Dtr, and postexilic.

5.3 Num 13–14.

Beltz (1974) studied these chapters along with Josh 14–15 and 1 Chr 2 and 4; he accepted the Documentary Hypothesis, but identified Eissfeldt's L as the special tradition of a Caleb group, observed also in the above-mentioned passages; he argued that Caleb, not Joshua, was original to the spy story and that the Caleb group was loosely related to Judah up until the postexilic period, whose conditions are reflected in Hexateuchal references. Sakenfield (1975) identified the section on Moses' intercession as a P addition to fragments of an old epic tradition.

5.4 Num 16–17.

In Milgrom's analysis of Korah's rebellion (1981), a second recension was held responsible for transferring Korah's death from the tabernacle to the earthquake, inserting the Dathan-Abiram episode at vv 5–11 and moving the episode of the incineration of the chieftains to 17:1–5; all these events dated from the beginning of the First Temple period (!). Wenham (1981) identified vv 27–28 as the climax of Num 17:16ff., not as an introduction to chap. 18. Magonet (1982) argued that Num 16 has to do with a single rebellion with numerous factions, in which Korah endeavored to replace Aaron as priest. Ahuis's monograph (1983) dated elements of Num 16–17 to various times in Israel's history, from the beginning of the monarchy to the end of the exile; as such this pericope sheds light on various facets of Israel's religious history.

5.5 Num 20–21.

Bartlett (1970) saw in Num 21:21–34 (upon which Deut 2:24–37 depends) as the combination of a Gadite tradition of victory over Sihon and a Jairite tradition of victory over Og; this was celebrated at the Gilgal sanctuary (cf. Pss 135:11, 136:19f.), and the Deuteronomist utilized the combination resulting from a long tradition-building development. Van Seters (1972) endeavored to turn this around by arguing that the Numbers passage depends on Deuteronomy and Judg 11:19–26, making it post-Deuteronomic (see the response of Bartlett (1978) as well as D. M. Gunn's critique in *JBL* 93: 513–18 and Van Seter's rejoinder in *JBL* 99: 117–19). Mittmann (1973) identified Num 20:14–21 as a redactional piece reflected in Deut 2:4–6, 8a and Josh 11. In his analysis of Num 20:14–21, 21:1–3, 21–25, Coats (1976) saw evidence for an ideology that connected all the old Mosaic conquest traditions with the wandering theme in order to avoid connecting the Moses figure with the conquest of Joshua. Kohata found three P levels in Num 20:1–13: (1) a narrative of Moses' wrath on the disobedient people; (2) God's word blaming Moses; (3) development of the people into a *qāhāl-YHWH*.

5.6 Num 22–25.

Wifall (1970) held that the last Balaam oracle reflects Solomon's negotiations with Phoenicia in the tenth century. Coats (1973) identified the original Balaam as a "saint" (cf. Coats, 1982). Seybold (1973) argued for a Davidic origin for Balaam's ruler-figure. Gross (1974) applied Richter's literary method in place of the usual literary criticism to the prose material in Num 22–24, identifying a series of originally independent units. Vetter (1975) did the same for the poetic sections, discovering "seer-sayings" common throughout the ancient Near East and useful in the transition from a family-clan organization to that of tribal society. Wagner (1975) distinguished between the concept of revelation according to E (the word of blessing) and according to J (word confirmed by sight). Rost (1977) identified Balaam with secret sacrifices held in the temple in the Assyrian period, eliminated in the Josianic reform. L. Schmidt (1979) discovered two strands, in the first of which Balaam is an obedient prophet, and in the second of which (exilic) this image is nullified. Tosato (1979) identified Num 23:7–10, 18–24 as examples of pre-exilic poetry. According to Morag (1980/81), the heavy concentration of rare words in Balaam's oracles reflects the extreme antiquity of this tradition. Rouillard (1980) saw an independent story in Num 22:21–35, a J framework, and a redaction by a J supplementer (8th-7th century) reflecting the end of pre-exilic prophecy.

5.7 Num 26–27, 32–33, 36, Deut 34.

Loewenstamm (1972) explained Num 32:1–38 as follows: old tribal tradition permitted Gad and Reuben to settle in Transjordan, but the emerging dominance of the Joshua tradition required the notion that these tribes would have participated in the Cisjordanian wars; late elements are Moses' speech, Eleazar and the princes, and the sequence Reuben-Gad. Coats (1977) studied Num 27:12–23 along with Deut 34:1–12, identifying legendary elements congenial with Moses' role within the Pentateuchal themes. According to Kallai (1982), old wandering tales in Exod-Num are condensed in Num 33 and the narrative in Num 20–21 is a tendentious adaptation of Num 33 under the influence of Deut 1–2. Seebass (1982) distinguished authentic from redactional elements in Num 26, 32, 36 and Josh 17. Vogels (1982) studied Num 27:18–23 and Deut 34:9; by reading an asseverative *kî* in the latter passage, the notion that Moses' act imparted the divine spirit is avoided.

6.0 Deuteronomy

1969
Weinfeld, M., "Deuteronomy. The Present State of Inquiry," *JBL* 86: 249–62

1970
Perlitt, L., *Bundestheologie im Alten Testament*, WMANT 36 (Neukirchen: Neukirchener); Carmichael, C., "A New View of the Origin of the Deuteronomic Credo," *VT* 19: 273–89

1971
Airoldi, N., "A proposito dei passi a singolare in Dtn 1,6–3:29," *Augustinium* 11: 355–87; Lindblom, J., *Erwägungen zur Herkunft der Josianischen Tempelurkunde* (Lund: Gleerup); Lohfink, N., "Zum 'kleinen geschichtlich Credo,' Dtn 26,5–9," *TP* 46: 19–38

1972
Weinfeld, M., *Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School* (Oxford: Clarendon)

1974

De Vries, S. J., "The Development of the Deuteronomic Promulgation Formula," *Bib* 55: 301–16; Labuschagne, C. J., "The Tribes in the Blessing of Moses," *OTS* 19: 97–112; Rofé, A., "The Laws of War in Deuteronomy. Their Origin, Intention and Postivity," *Zion* 39: 143–56

1975

Mittmann, S., *Deuteronomium 1,1–6,3* literarkritisch und traditionsgeschichtlich untersucht, BZAW 139 (Berlin: de Gruyter); Rofé, A., *Introduction to Deuteronomy* (Jerusalem: Akademon, 1975, 1982)

1976

Craigie, P. C., *The Book of Deuteronomy,* NICOT (London: Hodder & Stoughton); Milgrom, J., "Profane Slaughter and a Formulaic Key to the Composition of Deuteronomy," *HUCA* 47: 1–17

1977

Hidal, S., "Some Reflections on Deuteronomy 32," *ASTI* 11: 15–21; Seebass, H., "Die Stämmesliste von Dtn. XXXIII," *VT* 27: 158–69

1979

Bee, R. E., "A Study of Deuteronomy based on Statistical Properties of the Texts," *VT* 29: 1–22; Skweres, D. E., *Die Ruckverweise im Buch Deuteronium* AnBib 79 (Rome: Biblical Institute)

1981

Dissing, J., "Deuteronomismens traditionsproblemer. Forskningen fra Martin Noth til Moshe Weinfeld," *DTT* 44: 145–65; Mayes, A. D. H., *Deuteronomy,* NCBC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans); ibid., "Deuteronomy 4 and the Literary Criticism of Deuteronomy," *JBL* 100: 23–51; ibid., "Deuteronomy: Law of Moses or Law of God?" *PIBA* 5: 36–54

1982

Caquot, A., "Les bénédictions de Moïse (Deutéronome 33,6–25)," *Sem* 32: 67–81, 33: 59–76; Nielsen, E., "Moses and the Law," *VT* 32: 87–98; Seebass, H., "Garizim und Ebal als Symbole von Segen und Fluche," *Bib* 63: 22–31; Preuss, H. D., *Deuteronomium,* Erträge der Forschung 164 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft)

1983

Collier, G. D., "The Problem of Deuteronomy: In Search of a Perspective," *RQ* 26: 215–33; Hoffmann, Y., "Exigencies of Genre in Deuteronomy" (Heb), *Shnaton* 5–6; 41–54; Hoppe, L. J., "The Levitical Origins of Deuteronomy Reconsidered," *BR* 28: 27–36 [cf. ibid., *EgT* 14: 259–72]; Veerkamp, T., "Israels Wende. Eine Auslegung von Dt:1,20–2,1," *Texte und Kontexte* 19: 5–24

1985

Christensen, D. L., "Prose and Poetry in the Bible. The Narrative Poetics of Deuteronomy 1,9–18," *ZAW* 97: 179–89; Hernando, E., "El Deuteronomio. Sus valores y motivaciones," *Burg* 26: 9–36; Rofé, A., "The Laws of Warfare in the Book of Deuteronomy: Their Origins, Intent and Postitivity," *JSOT* 32: 23–44; Wenham, G. J., "The Date of Deuteronomy: Linch-Pin of Old Testament Criticism," *Themelios* 10: 15–20; 11: 15–18

Although we have listed titles of a general nature for the sake of a balanced image, our concern for the analysis of narrative tradition prevents a discussion of the following: Perlitt

(1969), Lindblom (1971), Weinfeld (1972), De Vries (1974), Rofé (1974, 1982, 1985), Milgrom (1976), Nielsen (1978), Bee Skweres (1979), Dissing (1981), Mayes (1981), Nielsen (1982), Seebass (1982), Preuss (1982), Collier (1983), Hoffman (1983), Hoppe (1983), Wenham (1985). As in previous sections, we pass over treatments of cult-legislation and paraenesis.

6.1 Historical retrospect, chaps. 1–3.

Airoldi (1971) identified the singularly styled passages in these chapters as non-editorial. According to Veerkamp (1983), Israel is still faced with the decision between belief and resistance; in 1:20–2:1, the journey through the wilderness becomes a paradigm for the exile. Christensen (1985) offered an analysis of narrative poetics in 1:9–18.

6.2 Credo.

Carmichael (1969) identified an ancient Kadesh tradition in the Deuteronomic credo, 26:5–11, a passage analyzed also in Lohfink (1971)

6.3 Song of Moses, chap. 32.

Hidal (1977/78) identified Deut 32, along with Isa 63 and Neh 9, as witness to the Restoration; though it retains elements from the time of the judges, most of the archaic elements are artificial constructs popular in the exile.

6.4 Blessing of Moses, chap. 33.

Labuschagne (1974) found a very early core featuring the six Northern tribes and deriving from the Tabor shrine, to which the Benjamin and Joseph sayings were added when these tribes came into prominence, and the sayings of the southernmost tribes, which were added during David's rule at Hebron. Seebass (1977) explained that the predominance of the Northern tribes in this pericope reflects their role in the Sheba revolt; as a whole, it fits the Davidic-Solomonic period. Caquot (1982, 1983), on the contrary, dated the "blessings" to the exile or later.

7.0 Summation and Outlook.

Revisionist studies have been numerous, but so have conventional studies. The former have come far from driving the latter from the field. Very few would still wish to defend the Documentary Hypothesis precisely as explained by Wellhausen and his school. Almost everyone agrees that individual units of tradition were drawn together into larger complexes and eventually into documents. Even according to Noth, the literary strands both utilized growing tradition and received supplementary expansions from the continuing process of oral and literary development; thus there is plenty of room for adherents of a documentary theory to allow for parallel tradition-development at every stage, up until the time of final redaction.

Without a doubt, it is the J document, and more particularly the tradition of promises to the patriarchs, that will determine which way the waters will run. There seems to be plenty of reason to argue that J was created for and reflects the enthusiastic achievement of Davidic-Solomonic nationalism. To date it anytime during the period of the Divided Kingdom, and even after refugees from the North had been assimilated into the Hezekian community, seems less than satisfactory. The choice seems to be, then, between a David-Solomonic dating and one that reflects a period analogous to it, and the only substitute

would be that of the exile and return. One way or the other, it is J that decides the difference. Even in Rendtorff's rejection of a J document, exilic dating is applied to the J material.

The problems of maintaining this revisionist view are, however, formidable. It truly looks, from the way some of its adherents not only stretch but bend the evidence, that the proponents of an exilic J have painted themselves into a corner. They are forced to argue that pre-exilic Israel left no significant written records harking back to patriarchal or pre-kingdom times, that J simply gathered materials from untraceable sources. The literary seams and contradictions that adherents of the Documentary Hypothesis have explained on the basis of the complexity and variety of family and tribal traditions need now to be ascribed to the vagaries of J's own stylistic effort. Where there was plenty of temporal space into which to date various documents and recensions, it is now necessary to compress everything into a short period of frenzied redactional activity. It is necessary to disregard evidence for the historical verisimitude for the patriarchal stories. In the accepted theory, it was possible to account for the Joseph story's attitude of friendly curiosity toward Egypt as based on prevailing attitudes up until the time, but not after, the pro-Egyptian administration of Solomon; but in the revisionist scheme an absurd alternative is the only choice: that of dating the Joseph story down to the time of the Egyptian diaspora. One question seems insolvable: how could a Moses who had become so obscure, presumably, during the monarchial period now suddenly become the model prophet and the prime law-giver? For that matter, how can one account for the Torah's primacy within the Canon? With the late dating of J, prophetic eschatology precedes the quasi-primeval traditions of the basic narrative document in the Pentateuch.

H. H. Schmid gave vent to his frustration when he read his paper to the Vienna congress, "Auf der Suche nach neuen Perspektiven für die Pentateuchforschung" (VTSup 12: 375–94). He argued that because both schools work from the identical textual and historical premises, it must be the evolutionistic and romantistic philosophy of von Rad, Noth, and their followers that prevents agreement on the literary history of the Pentateuch. In a rare display of historical positivism, Schmid declared that his preference for the latest and "highest" level of literary development has equal status with the working philosophy of his opponents. Schmid continued with the pretentious claim that nothing had really been settled in the long history of Pentateuchal criticism, and that he bore no greater burden of proof for his theory than adherents of the Documentary Hypothesis bear for theirs.

It is Rendtorff who stands in a far stronger position, although the source of his strong antagonism for the Documentary Hypothesis remains a mystery. We all owe him thanks for having shown that Noth is vulnerable in failing to define the precise course of tradition development prior to and following literary composition and for neglecting the formal analysis of the independent units and the larger complexes into which they have incorporated. As for form-criticism, Rendtorff does little better than Noth. Where his theory is at its weakest is in failing to explain the pan-Israelite orientation of every major tradition-complex.

Adherents of the Documentary Hypothesis will have to be more careful in appealing to the traditional criteria for separate documents. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify meaningful themes and structures in the various literary documents. Also, whatever might be said to show the gaps in Alt's theory of religious development in the patriarchal period, it is a certainty that the patriarchs did have a distinctive religion, upon which it was later possible to construct Israelite Yahwism. Also, every denial of, or attack upon, the criterion of the divine names, fails to excise the tenacious appearance of the Tetragrammeton in the J document. It is different with the Yahwist than with, say, Chronicles, where an

alternation between "Yahweh" and "Elohim" seems to reflect nothing more than habit or mood. J has a theory about the existence of Yahwism already in the prehistory (Gen 4:26), and, even though he sometimes adopts a different divine name or appellation from his source material, he is consistent in mentioning this name for God.

"No doubt you are the people, and wisdom will die with you," said Job (12:1). We know that no person or school possesses a monopoly on truth or wisdom. If this review can demonstrate anything worthwhile, let it be the importance of openness, integrity and devotion to the biblical word—which will always remain sovereign in its claim on all our intellectual and moral powers.

The Theology of Philemon

Mary Ann Getty
Catholic University of America

Introduction

The importance of Philemon has been overshadowed since it appears as a personal letter devoid of significant theological content. It is the only one of Paul's letters that does not deal with doctrinal or ecclesiastical issues. Further, the exact nature of Paul's request to Philemon is unspecified; we cannot be certain that the Apostle asked for Onesimus' emancipation.

Nevertheless, the authenticity of this letter has not been seriously challenged. It reveals an Apostle sensitive to the position of Philemon in society yet crossing over all boundaries of class distinction in his clear affection for and confidence in Onesimus. My assumption is that Paul dictated or actually wrote this letter in his own hand near the end of his life, from captivity in Rome (61–63).[1] Paul writes to Philemon, a Christian of Colossae, who was previously converted by Paul. Philemon represents not only himself in a personal relationship with Paul but is addressed as the leader of a house church, together with other named individuals as well as all those who gather at his home. Thus the letter has public implications beyond the personal. Onesimus' dilemma likewise was not strictly personal or Paul might have simply kept Onesimus while writing to inform Philemon concerning Onesimus' whereabouts and perhaps to ask for Philemon's mind on how to proceed regarding the renegade slave. Another assumption is that behind the muted tones and implications of Philemon, this is actually a letter of significant theological import, especially for the ecclesiology it develops.

Nevertheless, if a distinction between an epistle and a letter is relevant, this is a letter addresssing a specific situation in a particular community intended for a certain specified audience. The traces of liturgical character and influences nothwithstanding, Paul intended this letter to form the basis of an individualized decision regarding the specific case of Philemon and Onesimus. Philemon can be categorized as an intercessory letter; Stower cites its frequent comparison with a letter from Pliny to Sabianinus.[2]

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[1] Cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "Philemon," *JBC* II, 54: 332–333, 332.

[2] Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter-Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986. The reasons for this comparison are obvious from the letter's reproduction: (translated by W. Melmoth; revised by Stanley K. Stowers, p. 160) [Provenance unknown; date uncertain]

Your freedman with whom you said you were angry has been with me; he threw himself at my feet and clung to me with as much submission as he could have done at yours. He earnestly requested me with many tears, and even with all the eloquence of silent sorrow, to intercede for him; in short, he convinced me by his whole behavior, that he sincerely repents of his fault. And I am persuaded he is thoroughly reformed, because he knows that he is wrong.

I know you are angry with him, and I know too, that it is not without reason; but mercy is never more worthy of praise than when there is the justest cause for anger. You

I. Shared Theological Assumptions

Despite the obvious personal dimensions of this issue, this is a letter of significant social implications since the circles of author and addressees is widened to include others. Paul joins Timothy to himself as author, perhaps because Timothy takes dictation of this letter to which Paul adds a note in his own hand (v. 19). More significantly perhaps, Paul wishes to give Philemon an example of his own "team ministry" with Timothy whom he joins to himself not as apostles possessing authority, but as servants. Paul is thus portrayed as one who lives and acts out a communal context just as he exhorts Philemon to do. Apphia is addressed as "our sister," and Archippus as "our fellow soldier." If Paul is following the custom of including wife with husband, Apphia is here further identified as a significant person in the community, sister to Paul and Timothy and Philemon. The addition of "our" indicates more than a fellow Christian, but a person exercising a certain amount of influence and prestige.[3] As brothers and sisters, Christians recognize a new dimension of personal identity as well as mutual relationship.

Further Paul includes in the final greetings a number of those he calls "fellow prisoner" (Epaphras: v. 23) and "fellow workers" (i.e. Mark, Aristarchus, Demas, Luke: v. 24).[4] These are other Christians with Paul apparently known to Philemon's community. The mention of these adds to the weightiness of the issues Paul raises as well as to his own views on them. Likewise Paul includes members of Philemon's household, named (Apphia, Archippus) and unnamed, which implies that some common discernment on the contents of the letter is to be expected from the community of Philemon.

The liturgical language (vv.3–7, 25) goes beyond the mere epistolary form, suggesting that Paul could have intended this letter to be read during the liturgy and reflected upon for action by the whole community. This could help explain why Paul (uncharacteristically), is rather obtuse about exactly what he expects of Philemon and also why Paul is reluctant to command. Paul seems to imply that the grounds of his appeal and the good will of Philemon and the whole church will be the basis for their discerning to "do even more than I say" (v.21).

(continued)
once loved this man, and, I hope will again; in the meantime, let me only prevail upon you to pardon him. If he should incur your displeasure hereafter, you will have so much the stronger a reason for your anger, as you show yourself willing to forgive him now. Allow something to his youth, his tears, and to your own gentle disposition; do not make him uneasy any longer, and I will add too, do not make yourself so; for a man of your kindness of heart cannot be angry without feeling great uneasiness.

I am afraid that if I add my prayers to his, I will seem to be compelling you rather than asking you to forgive him. Yet I will do it and in the strongest terms since I have rebuked him very shraply and serverely, warning him that I will never intercede for him again. Although it was proper to say this to him, in order to frighten him, it was not intended for your hearing. I may possibly have the occasion to again intercede for him and obtain your forgiveness if the error is one which is suitable for my intercession and your pardon.

[3] Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, *The Church with the Human Face. A New and Expanded Theology of Ministry.* New York: Crossroad, 1985, p. 58.

[4] The mention of Epaphras (cf. Col 1:7; 4:12) and Mark, Aristarchus, Demas and Luke in Col 4:10–14 as well as of Onesimus in Col 4:9 suggests that Colossians and Philemon were written around the same time. For Mark, Demas and Luke, see 2 Tim 4:9–13; Aristarchus is also named in Acts 14:29; 20:4; 27:2.

The community assembled at Philemon's house recognized the common "fatherhood" of God, an image indicating not only the intimacy of relationship reflected in the experience and ministry of Jesus, but also the gospel command to imitate God, acting as God acts. God is father and Paul is father. Since Paul fathered both Philemon and Onesimus, these latter have become brothers in a special way. The familial terms do not suggest the hierarchical style which patriarchy evoked in the normal pagan society of the Greco-Roman world. Rather, Philemon, patriarch of a church, is implicitly invited to follow the example of a new way of being leader, one modelled on the example of Paul and even of God.

As patriarch, Philemon enjoyed almost absolute authority over members of the household. But the gospel introduced some challenges and potential conflicts. Contrary to custom, Onesimus had not become Christian when other members of Philemon's household were converted. We cannot know for sure whether he had already fled Philemon's house by the time other members became Christians. In any case, he would have been under Philemon's authority and slaves were expected to practice the religion of their masters. Nevertheless, Christianity apparently appealed to women and slaves particularly because it offered an alternative to the subordinate status these experienced in the patriarchal state and family. Despite the common practice of whole households converting simultaneously, the invitation for citizens, women, slaves and children to follow Christ freely, apart from whether those over them were converted, introduced some significant grounds for conflict among Christians and left Christianity open to suspicion in an alien society.

When Onesimus is converted during Paul's imprisonment, some practical implications were becoming clear to Paul. Ironically Onesimus seems to have enjoyed some freedom than Paul himself under house arrest. Onesimus was free to come and go, as witnessed by the fact that he himself is apparently bearer of Paul's letter to Philemon. Onesimus possesses some education and skills as evidenced by the fact that he is of special service and assistance to Paul in jail. Paul is tempted to keep Onesimus with him because of his usefulness, and even suggests that Philemon will return Onesimus to Paul after the two have been reconciled. Perhaps the disparity of the slave's freedom and Paul's own imprisonment, helped influence Paul's developing consciousness about Onesimus' value and equality "in the Lord." That could help explain why Paul advises Philemon also to accept Onesimus not only as a brother "in the flesh" (i.e., as a slave member of the household), but as a brother "in the Lord" (i.e. a fellow Christian and worker for the gospel).

Also Paul implicitly appeals to Philemon's own new status as Christian leader and example to the Christian community as well as to Onesimus' new identity as a Christian to stress that former sins must be forgiven and remitted by reconciliation within the community. Paul does not underestimate the wrongs Onesimus must be both committed and confessed. Previous to his conversion, Onesimus, like others including Philemon himself, was a sinner. Paul subtly reminds Philemon of this while also stressing Philemon's new identity which is best expressed in the example of his reception of Onesimus.

II. New Insights from This Letter

New dimensions of relationships among believers "in Christ" require new forms of decision making (not merely authority-obedience) as well as new decisions. Onesimus was a runaway slave who had wronged Philemon (vv. 11, 18). In prison Onesimus was converted by Paul who therefore became Onesimus' father (v. 10), just as he was also to Philemon. Formerly Onesimus, as a member of Philemon's household, was subject to him. Later

Onesimus even became a liability (=useless; v. 11). Paul appeals to Philemon as a father and brother, not only of Philemon but also of Onesimus. Familial relationships are part of the story behind the Philemon narrative.[5] They also provide the model for developing a wholly new way of relating within the Christian community.[6] Further, Paul, in prison, is an "old man" (v. 9), one with enough authority to command (vv. 8, 13, 21). Philemon "owes" Paul (v. 19); Paul indicates that he hopes soon to be a guest of Philemon (v.22), with the implication of this not-so-subtle pressure, that he will personally inquire about the status of his request.

Paul's inclusion of Apphia (Philemon's wife?) and Archippus (their son? or another member of the household?) might represent an implicit enlisting of their support as other subordinates who could be in natural sympathy with a fellow in difficulty with an authority. Paul's mention of these could signify his recognition that in the Christian assembly they have an identity and status beyond what they would have enjoyed in an ordinary pagan household where only Philemon's leadership and authority would have been recognized.

Onesimus may be the bearer of this letter which would serve as a "shield" in the sense that it was a kind of representative of Paul's own personal authority in his absence. In any case, Onesimus would soon return to Philemon, a frightening prospect for the slave as a lawbreaker and criminal. Onesimus and Paul share a great deal of trust which they also mutually show to Philemon. Paul makes his appeal to Philemon to receive Onesimus as a brother on several grounds, and thus faces Philemon and Onesimus both with a serious dilemma.

III. Preliminary Conclusions

A common Baptism changes the basis for relationships among persons. Christians define themselves and their relationships on new familial and ministerial grounds distinct from those recognized in an alien society. Former class distinctions are transformed. Former debts are abolished. Forgiveness is not a purely personal option. Retaliation is precluded. A new form of justice is required.

Paul's identities himself as father, brother, prisoner, old man and guest vis-à-vis both Philemon and Onesimus. He thus encourages their forming new alliances between themselves. As Philemon has "refreshed the hearts of the saints" (v.7) who recognize his role as church leader, he is now required to validate that authority and leadership, "refreshing the heart" of the prisoner, Paul. Onesimus has fulfilled Philemon's obligation to Paul in prison (v. 13); Philemon is therefore indebted to Onesimus who remitted his debt to Paul. Philemon's debt will be remitted in his brotherly reception of Onesimus.

This short letter contains great potential for social conflict among Christians. If the order of the home, paradigm of the political order according to Aristotle, was upset, all of society was in trouble.[7] If Philemon heeded Paul's request and received Onesimus back "no longer as a slave but more—a beloved brother . . . in the flesh as well as in the Lord (v. 26), what would Onesimus' new status be? In Paul's time, the hierarchical order practiced in a patriarchal household was considered ordained by the natural order of creation

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[5] Cf. Norman Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul. Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World.* Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985.

[6] Cf. Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians.* New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1983. *Idem. The Moral World of the First Christians.* Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986.

[7] Meeks, *Moral World,* p. 113.

and therefore sacred. In the words of Elisabeth Fiorenza, "The religious ethos of equality was transferred to and came into conflict with the patriarchal ethos of the household. The Christian missionary movement provided an alternative vision and praxis to that of the dominant society and religion."[8]

Paul was an itinerant preacher. Hospitality was extremely important in early Christianity. Paul's appeal to Philemon is not as Apostle and not either solely on the grounds of being Philemon's apparently frequent guest and in view of Paul's imminent visit. Paul also refers to Philemon as host and therefore as leader of the church that meets in his home. Although in an ordinary home the patriarchal host wields great authority over all who are in the house and who are therefore subordinate to him, in the Christian community the host is exhorted to lead by example, to extend unlimited and unconditional forgiveness, to return good for evil.

There is no indication of what particular task Onesimus performed in Philemon's service, but Paul's eagerness to have his help in the mission and Paul's own indebtedness to him suggests, despite the pun about his former uselessness (v. 11) that he may have had special skills. Philemon himself ranks high at least in the dimension of wealth and reputation within Christianity; he has a large house which can accommodate the Christians who gather there (v. 2) as well as guests such as Paul must have been (v. 22). He has been a patron to Christians in other ways, too. That he owns several slaves besides Onesimus is suggested by the fact that Paul implies he would like Onesimus' return, as if to say that the loss would not be too great for Philemon.

Apphia is "sister" as Timothy is "brother"; she is also "beloved." Archippus is Paul's "fellow-soldier." The mention of the other members of the team as well as Paul's reference to Onesimus' aid all suggest that Paul relied on other members of the community and did not exercise authority or ministry autonomously. As distinct from the markedly hierarchical order of the household, early Christianity was a brotherhood and sisterhood or equal partners, theologically as based in the baptism in the Spirit and sociologically in accordance with Roman-Hellenistic model of free societies called *collegia*. The original Christian mission was collegial throughout.[9] The "team" consisted of 5 to 7 members. Moreover, one (in this case, Philemon), is often leader of a city community of belivers, from which surrounding cities are evangelized. The functions of the co-workers of the Apostles was partly local, partly more than that. Sometimes they joined in writing to the other "brothers and sisters." "Our" brother and "our" sister in these contexts means more than fellow Christian.[10] They are brothers and sisters in collegial leadership in the Pauline communities.

Regarding the proximity of dating Colossians and Philemon, we came up against some problems, especially with respect to the apparent egalitarianism advocated in Philemon vis-à-vis the "household rules" expounded in Colossians 3:18–4:1. The writer of Colossians exhorts slaves to be subject to your masters (3:22), and masters to treat slaves justly (4:1). According to 1 Corinthians 7, slaves are told to remain as they were when God called them (cf. 7:21–24). Paul's exhortation to Philemon is to receive Onesimus "not as a slave but as a brother." This suggests that conversion to the gospel, especially of the master, implies a new, freedom-promoting responsibility where all are brothers and sisters. Fiorenza notes that "the disciple os Paul who wrote Colossians quotes Gal 3:28 in Col

[8] Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her. A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins*. New York: Crossroad, 1983, p. 251.

[9] Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[10] Ibid., p. 58.

3:11 with some significant changes.[11] Fiorenza adds that by the time of the writing of Colossians, the relationship of Jews and Gentiles was no longer a great problem and concern to the author. Fiorenza says:[12]

> In quoting the baptismal formula Colossians mentions Greeks first and elaborates the second member of the pair circumcision and uncircumcision with barbarian and Scythian, in order to stress that national and cultural differences and inequalities are overcome in the new humanity of Christ. . . . While the third pair of Gal 3:28—male and female is not mentioned at all, Col 3:11 also dissolves the slave-free polarization that defines the social-political stratifications of institutional slavery.

Perhaps Fiorenza is correct in asserting that the return to and the canonization of the patriarchal order modelled on the household was responsible for the repression of freedoms which the Jesus movement originally promoted. This insight could help explain the differences between Philemon and Colossians, but not the similarities which support the assumption that both were written by Paul and around the same time.

Despite Philemon's personal character and extreme brevity, despite the absence of great doctrinal and ecclesiastical issues, Philemon is a very important Christian document. It dramatically testifies to the practical implications of Christian baptism for the priority of personal and social relationships among believers.

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[11] Fiorenza, *op. cit.*, p. 251; Col 3:11 reads, "Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcized and uncircumcized, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all and in all."

[12] Ibid., p. 252.

Christology, Friendship and Status: The Rhetoric of Philippians

Pheme Perkins
Boston College

Scholarly literature on Phil has been preoccupied with three issues: integrity of the letter;[1] the nature of the various opponents mentioned in the letter,[2] and the "Christ hymn" of Phil 2:6–11.[3] We will accept as working hypotheses the following hypotheses about Phil:

(1) on integrity: Phil may be composed of sections from as many as three letters, receipt for aid received (4:10–20); letter on the impending disposition of Paul's case (1:1–3:1a; 4:2–7 [8–9]); warning against a Judaizing type of preaching with affinities to the opponents of 2 Cor (3:2a–4:1, 8–9). Documentary papyri show that letters could be appended to one another.[4] Phil 4:10–20 may well have been dispatched with the letter about Paul's case even though it formally fits the patterns of a receipt for aid. Since Phil 2:19–24 envisages some time before Paul is able to dispatch Timothy, the warning against intruding Judaizers may have been dispatched with the latter's departure for Philippi not long after the previous correspondence. Since Timothy is able to inform the Philippians about the resolution of Paul's case, there would be no necessity to discuss it.

(2) on opponents: three sources of opposition are clearly indicated: (a) tensions among Christian preachers both in the city of imprisonment [Ephesus?] and in Philippi. These tensions are connected with the fact that the apostle is imprisoned.[5] (b) non-Christians responsible for imprisonment of the apostle and hostility that may be experienced by Christians at Philippi as well. Paul takes the possibility of such *thlipsis* as a "given" of Christian life.[6] (c) a group of judaizing Christian missionaries with similarities to the

[1] E.g. R. Jewett, "The Epistolatory Thanksgiving and the Integrity of Philippians," *NovT* 12 (1970) 40–53.

[2] R. Jewett, "Conflicting Movements in the Early Church as Reflected in Philippians," *NovT* 12 (1970) 362–90.

[3] See J. Gnilka, *Der Philipperbrief* (HTKNT X,3; Freiburg: Herder, 1968) 111–47.

[4] See J. L. White, *Light from Ancient Letters* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 35–36, 40–43, 87, 217–18. In the case of administrative chain letters, the opening conventions might be reduced to "to B" and the closing omitted. In some cases the contents of an appended letter may be referred to, with the original attached for the recipient's information.

[5] Possibly as a result of the real possibility that Paul's death would dissolve the consent to a common endeavor that bound persons in the missionary association together. On the terms of a *societas* see P. Sampley, *Pauline Partnership in Christ* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 14–16.

[6] So W. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians* (New Haven: Yale, 1983) 174. The appearance of such hostility in the experience of the community confirms the apostle's prediction and the solidarity of Christians with one another and with Christ to whose

opponents of 2 Cor. They have either not gained a base within the Philippian community or were not organized as an "anti-Paul" group in contrast to the sustained assault on Paul's apostolic credentials as was the case in Corinth.[7]

(3) on Phil 2:5–11: Verse 5 marks Paul's transition into a pre-Pauline hymn (vv. 6–11), which the apostle has "glossed" and uses as the central metaphor to specify the intra-Christian relationships imbedded in the epistles's repeated appeal, *to auto phronein.* This expression dominates Phil (1:7; 2:2 twice [cp. Rom 12:16]; 2:5; 3:15; 3:19 [cp. Rom 8:5; Col 3:2]; 4:2 [cp. Rom 15:5]; 4:10).[8] Unlike the situations in which Paul's apostolic authority is challenged (Gal 5:10; 2 Cor 13:11), the use of the epistolatory topos, expressing confidence in the addressees agreement,[9] does not stand in tension with conflict between Paul and the addressees. The foundations of such agreement are intact. Paul's intent is to specify the significance of such agreement in terms of the "example" made evident in Christ much as he does in Rom 15:1–6.[10]

Phil 2:5–11 and Status Inconsistency

Wayne Meeks has proposed that the appeal of Paul's paradox of the cross must be incarnated in the social experience of Pauline Christians. He has proposed a sociological model of "status inconsistency" to explain the appeal and function of such symbolism. The achievements of persons in the economic and perhaps even cultural sphere might well out distance any status to which the rigidly controlled traditional codes of family and citizenship entitled them. Consequently the tensions of status inconsistency may find symbolic expression in the humiliation/exaltation pattern of crucifixion/exaltation.[11]

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sufferings theirs are analogous. Paul can point to the fact that persecutions attended the birth of the communities in both Thessalonica and Philippi, (see R. Jewett, *The Thessalonian Correspondence* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986] 93f.).

[7] E.g. G. Friedrich, *Der Brief an die Philipper* . . . (NTD 8; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985) 131–34. There is no reason to assign "gnosticizing" traits to these opponents or to presume that another group is introduced at 3:19. Phil 3:19 reflects a sloganizing attack on the opponents typical of Paul's composition (e.g. 1 Cor 6:13; 15:32b). Though we disagree with Martin's argument for a group of gnosticizing opponents in this section of Phil, he has correctly identified the sloganizing character of the expression "their God is their belly" as a proverbial description of those preoccupied with material concerns, (R. Martin, *Philippians* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980 (1976)] 144f.).

[8] Sampley (*Partnership,* 15) emphasizes the importance of such agreement to the continuation of a *societas.*

[9] See the discussion of Gal 5:10 in H. D. Betz (*Galatians* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979] 266–68).

[10] Kaesemann's observation that Rom 15:3 does not use the example of Christ to reflect the humble mind of Jesus, but Jesus as the one who bears emnity against God, that is, Jesus' passion not incarnation (*Commentary on Romans* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980] 382) might also apply to Paul's use of the hymn in Phil. He has glossed the references to death with "the cross." His own imprisonment and any afflictions suffered by the Philippians are also examples of emnity against God, and he will castigate the judaizing opposition as "enemies of the cross."

[11] Meeks, *Urban Christians,* 53–73, 182–83. "Paul and others who are weak in terms

Evidence for both the intensity and social divisiveness of struggles for status are evident in the documentary evidence for the Jewish community in Egypt. John White has pointed out that tax enrollment also impeded social status. In Roman Egypt one finds the following groups: (a) small number of Roman citizens living in Egypt; (b) "urban Greeks," citizens of the four greek *poleis* in Egypt; (b1) "urban Jews," who sought to be considered members of the "urban Greek" class but lost that status when they were included in the poll tax initiated by Octavian; (c) "metropolites," townspeople of Greek descent who lived in the district capitals and were taxed at a reduced rate; (d) the rest of the population. All Jewish attempts to move into the class of Greek citizens were rejected and definitively cut off by Claudius' decree of 41 C.E. At Alexandria the Greek populace was denied the right to form an independent council—a privilege which the Jews, organized as a separate *politeuma* did enjoy. The *Acts of the Pagan Martyrs* reflect the anti-Roman sentiment of the "urban Greeks." Discontent among the "town gentry" was fueled by the fact that they were "better than" the "Egyptian peasants" and yet were classed among them by the stratification of the tax system. Finally, revolt and resistance among the peasants is evident in acts such as abandonment of the land and formation of robber bands. The cataclysmic destruction of the oppressors imaged in the *Narrative of the Potter* is evidence for their hostility.[12]

Only Roman citizens and urban Greeks were eligible to bid for public lands when they were put up for auction. Any land they owned was exempt from taxation, even when it was in another district. They were exempt from compulsory services. Like Roman citizens, an "urban Greek" could enlist in the Legions and would become a Roman citizen immediately upon doing so.[13] The pride and possibilities for advancement attendent upon such enlistment are evident in the surviving papyri (e.g. White: nos. 103–105). "Metropolites" might join auxiliary troops and would receive citizenship only upon honorable discharge after 25 years service.

We also find examples of efforts by both Greek and Jewish inhabitants to elevate their status by claiming a status denied them by others. A petition from a resident of Alexandria against being forced to pay the poll tax on the grounds that his parents were Alexandrians and that he received the requisite Greek education may well have failed on the basis of the scribal notation that the petitioner was a Jew.[14] Claudius' decree confirms the citizenship status of Greek residents of Alexandria except for those whose parents had been slaves and had secretly entered the lists of *epheboi.* Claudius also prohibits Jews from forcing their way into athletic contests presided over by *gymnarchoi* and *kosmetai.* Nor are they to admit to their community any Jews from outside, either from Egypt or Syria.[15]

These examples admit a number of connections with Philippi, a city in which the mix of ex-soldiers, Roman citizens; Greek settlers; various immigrants brought in by the trade routes, and a native population would provide equally fertile ground for such conflicts and disputes. The expression *to auto phronein* has its analogues in political writing of the

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of the dominant value system nevertheless do powerful things—for example, they survive despite the most extraordinary pressures and afflictions—therefore this power must not be their own but God's," (Ibid, 183).

[12] White, *Ancient Letters,* 16–19.

[13] White, *Ancient Letters,* 17.

[14] See White, *Ancient Letters,* 128.

[15] White, *Ancient Letters,* 135f.

period.[16] The "Roman" setting of Paul's own imprisonment, an opportunity for the gospel to be heard in the "household of Caesar," is analogous to Philippi. His references to *politeuma* and even to crowns and athletic contests may also reflect common social aspirations. Yet the "example" set in Christ does not further such attempts. It suggests, rather, an exaltation through "downward movement" in the social system.

Rhetorical Presentation of the Social World

In his analysis of Philemon, Norman Petersen "maps" the social world as it is represented in the terminology of relationships used by the apostle.[17] As in Phil, Phlm has Paul speak of a "partnership" between himself and Philemon which is grounded in the *koinonia* of faith and acts which are commensurate with that reality. In Phlm, Paul uses this language to set the conditions for further action on Philemon's part. Unless he expresses the special relationship between himself and the apostle in appropriate treatment of Oneisimus, the relationship cannot continue. Thus, the rhetoric of "equality" implicit in the use of "partner" and "fellow-worker" only partly covers the appeal to Paul's authority as superior party to set conditions for the relationship.[18]

A similar inventory of roles for Phil reveals a much less complex situation in Paul's relationships with the addressees. We only once meet the relationship "father (Paul)/son (Timothy)" (Phil 2:22). There it serves to confirm the unique position of Timothy as "*isopsychos*" with the apostle where the welfare of the church is concerned (2:19). *Pater* is only used of God in liturgical formulae (Phil 1:2; 2:11; 4:10); not to draw any consequences about the relationship of believers to one another across divisive social boundaries as it is in Phlm. Jesus is never referred to as *huios* in Phil. He is only referred to as *kyrios* except in the hymn where "*en morphe theou*" is opposed to "*morphe doulou.*" Similarly the use of "brother expressions" in Phil seems to represent little more than epistolatory convention heightened by the "familial ethos" of the early Christian communities.[19]

When we look at the terminology of equity in Phil, we find along with the "fellow worker" and "fellow soldier" applied to Epaphroditus (2:25), terms applied to a number of persons in Phlm, expressions of sharing which cluster around a common suffering in defense of the gospel. "Fellowship in the gospel" implies a "share" in the fruits which Paul's suffering brings (1:5; 1:7, sharers in Paul's imprisonment; engaged in common struggle: 1:27–30; 4:3). Similarly the apostle speaks of himself as sharing the sufferings of Christ (3:10). Participation in the sufferings of the apostle takes two forms: (a) actual suffering or imprisonment (1:27–30); (b) material aid which the Philippians as a result of their *koinonia* with the apostle provide (4:14–16).

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[16] So V. Furnish, *2 Corinthians* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1984) 582.

[17] N. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

[18] Petersen, *Rediscovering*, 103–108.

[19] Phil contains some characteristic marks of the "family letters" in the documentary papyri: expressions of joy over receipt of a letter (and accompanying gift); explanation of the circumstances of the sender; desire to receive "family news"; expansion of the health wish with formulae referring to the sender's prayer to the gods; encouragement to the recipients and other absent family members, and expansion of the concluding greetings to third parties (cf. White, *Ancient Letters*, 196f.).

Terminology which refers to subordination is similarly muted. Paul and Timothy are referred to as *douloi* in the greeting (1:1). The Christ-hymn equates *morphe doulou* with the humiliation of Christ in taking on human form, and in Paul's rendering dying on a cross. However this status is "reversed" by the "super-exaltation" to the position of *kyrios* over all the powers of the cosmos. Having been exhorted to show humility in counting others better than themselves (2:3), the Philippians are presented with the example of Christ's humbling himself in obedience even to death (2:8). Phil 3:21 draws the contrast with which the Christ hymn ended to its conclusion in the expectation of the believer: a "body of lowliness" changed to become like "the body of his glory" through the power which the exalted Lord now possesses.

Paul works a similar transformation on the dominant example of subjection in the letter, his own position as "prisoner" (of the Roman guard). As in Phlm, the "defense" which Paul must make is not a defense against specific charges or crimes but "of the gospel" (1:7). Since this defense represents the charge for which he was called, Paul continues to relate to his addressees on the basis of the status which his relationship to the gospel gives him. He does not speak as a prisoner seeking aid.[20]

Friendship, Absence and Death

Just as Paul has muted the "worldly status" that he experiences as a prisoner, so he also plays on the theme of death, absence and presence in such a way as to render the eventual outcome indifferent. Unlike the strong affirmations of impending apostolic presence in most of the other letters, including Phlm 21–22, the anticipations of Paul's presence in Phil are weakened by the fact that no concrete actions are anticipated as a consequence of his return. Paul's return will give the Philippians occasion to rejoice and glory in Christ (1:25–26) just as they and Paul rejoice at God's mercy in returning Epaphroditus to them from an illness which is also described as "nearly died for the work of Christ" (2:25–30). Paul's return (2:24) is almost incidental in comparison to the extended anticipation of visits by Epaphroditus and Timothy. The lack of "closure" in Paul's references to his return may be the real dynamic which leads some scholars to propose that the visit to Ephesus in Acts 20:3–6 was really to "settle accounts" with the heretics, along the model of 2 Cor 13:5–11.[21]

The peculiar use of distance in Phil leads Craddock to describe it as an epistle of "intimate distance." The Thanksgiving (1:3–11) and the acknowledgment of aid sent by the Philippians (4:10–20) evoke the time when Paul was present. By means of their gifts the Philippians are able to work together with Paul as they had in the past. But each description of Christian life is proceeded by a soliloquy-like reflection on the approach of death.[22] The expression of friendship and love for the Philippians in 1:7–8 is exceptionally strong:[23] *kathos estin dikaion emoi touto phronein hyper panton hymon dia to echein me en te kardia hymas, . . . martys gar mou bo theos hos epipotho pantas hymas en splagchnois Christou Iesou.* He takes the unusual step of guaranteeing his feelings for them with an oath formula (cp Rom 1:9, to a community he does not know), an expression otherwise reserved for affirmations of apostolic integrity (e.g. 2 Cor 1:23; 1 Thess

[20] See Petersen, *Rediscovering,* 101f.

[21] See the discussion of this view in Martin, *Philippians,* 33. Luke would have to have suppressed or been unaware of the purpose of the visit he recounts.

[22] F. Craddock, *Philippians* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1985) 6.

[23] So Craddock, *Philippians,* 18–20.

2:5,10).[24] Not surprisingly, commentators have suggested that this emphasis must be connected with the situation in the letter. Paul's self-description may point toward the sentiments he expects to evoke in the addressees in contrast to the disharmony among his co-workers. It forms part of the injunctions to "imitate" what they have seen from the apostle (1:29f.; 2:12; 3:17; 4:9a).[25]

Others assume that something must have occurred to make the Philippians doubt the quality of Paul's affection.[26] Within the conventions established in the documentary letters, the expression would serve as reassurance to the recipients, whose status as "friends" is established by the opening prayer formula (v. 3). An example from 229 B.C. indicates the sender's anxiety over lack of news from the addressee, which has finally been lifted by the report of others; request for various forms of material assistance that have gone unheeded, and explanation of the author's legal affairs:

> Nechthosiris to Leon his brother greeting. May you be well and Apollonios our brother and Epidoros and all your people. I myself am also well. Though I have written many letters to you no word has been declared by you to me; being the more anxious because up to the present I have heard nothing about your affairs, I consulted the god many times. So, when Protolaos reported to us about your affairs, I rejoiced greatly. Therefore, from Thoth onward, I have sent to Dionysios, one of our people, (requesting him) to send me a cloak and tunic, but he has neither sent them nor has he sent any bread to the servants for their sustenance even up till now. Wherefore, I request that you concern yourself, for they are coming to the city by the fifteenth of Choiach, by seeing to it that these things be sent to me and that he give bread to the servants. If he does not give it, write to me whether he came to you without holding back anything. Concerning my affairs, do not be anxious. Everything has happened according to expectation. They have been convicted by the Chrematists, and on this account I have been detained by the dioiketes, lest having been asked he might make it clear to the dioiketes that they cannot be held (for trial). For the king himself is set to hear the case. The outcome is up to the gods. Concerning your brother, I judge that he should come to the city under the present conditions, for he will be acquitted as soon as we clear him in the suit against him. Therefore, you would favor me by taking care of yourself to stay well. Good-bye.[27]

Another example combines assurance about the sender's health with acknowledgement of gifts received:

> Theonas to his mother and lady, Tetheus, very many greetings. I want you to know that the reason I have not sent you a letter for such a long time is because I am in camp and not on account of illness; so do not worry yourself (about me). I was very grieved when I learned that you had heard (about me),

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[24] J.-F. Collange, *The Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians* (London: Epworth, 1979) 46–48.

[25] So G. P. Wiles, *Paul's Intercessory Prayers* (SNTSMS 24; London: Cambridge University, 1974) 194–99.

[26] So Collange and Craddock.

[27] White, *Ancient Letters*, 54f.

> for I did not fall seriously ill. And I blame the one who told you. Do not trouble yourself to send me anything. I received the presents from Herakeides. My brother, Dionytas, brought the present to me and I received your letter. I give thanks to (the gods) . . . continually . . . [marginal addition: Do not burden yourself to send anything to me . . .][28]

These examples parallel several of the concerns evident in Phil. Reports of Epaphroditus' illness have stirred up concern at Philippi (2:26). Paul will be the one to dispatch this "fellow soldier" back to those who are longing for him (2:25, 28) along with the "official" explanation for his absence. Thus "fellow soldier" suggests some subordination. Paul is the "officer" who can dispatch his "fellow worker" even though he is imprisoned.

The uncertainty of legal proceedings as well as the probability of delays makes a tempered expression of confidence appropriate. But the expressions of confidence may be conventional as much as a realistic assessment of the outcome. Were Paul to decide, he would remain with the Philippians for the greater increase of their faith and joy (1:24–16). But Paul's restraint in speaking of that future suggests a real possibility that he will not be released. If the latter reflects Paul's real conviction, a sentiment more in keeping with his later characterization of his sufferings in Asia (2 Cor 1:8–10),[29] then Paul's concern for agreement among his associates as to the conditions of their *koinonia* has a more pressing side. He expects that in his absence (or death) they will maintain or reconstitute that *koinonia* which they have previously enjoyed with him.

The "Thankless Thanks": Phil 4:10–20

Commentators have also noted a reserve in the thanks with which Paul acknowledges the aid he has received from Philippi.[30] The documentary letters show that thanks for gifts; solicitation of needed supplies, and even the injunction not to trouble oneself to send an unneeded gift are the stuff of daily correspondence. The conventions of a *societas* would have make receipt of material aid from other members of the association and the commercial language of payment on account used in this passage commonplace. Paul's "need" can imply aid which he has requested of others as in the letter examples.[31]

As petitioner requesting aid, Paul might be seen as "inferior" to those from whom he must make such a request. Paul avoids this position by evoking the Stoic theme of self-sufficiency and contentment through adaptation to any circumstances (4:11–13). The Cynic Crates censures his wife for the gift of a tunic:

> Some have come from you bringing a new tunic, which they say, you made so that I might have it for the winter. Because you care for me I approve of you, but because you are still uneducated and not practicing the philosophy for which I tutored you, I censure you. Therefore, give up doing this right now, if you really care, and do not pride yourself in this kind of activity, but endeavor to do those things for which you wanted to marry me. And leave

[28] White, *Ancient Letters*, 158f.

[29] Even here Paul moderates the severity of his sentence by not using the expression *katakrima*, "condemnation," but the more general word for a decree or decision at the end of an inquiry, *apokrima*. This linguistic shift may represent Paul's concern to interpret his affliction theologically, (so Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 113f.

[30] E.g. Gnilka, *Philipperbrief*, 171.

[31] See Sampley, *Pauline Partnership*, 52–58.

> the wool-spinning to other women, who have aspired to none of the things you do.[32]

Paul cannot deny that he has accepted aid from Philippi more than once. He will face charges of deceitful behavior on that account from his detractors (2 Cor 11:7–11). There acceptance of material aid from those in Macedonia while refusing it from those among whom he preached in Cor was interpreted as a lack of love. Furnish has pointed out that Paul would have become, in effect, the "client" or dependent of those who supported him.[33] Paul's special relationship with the Philippians may have mitigated somewhat the social consequences of "giving and receiving" (4:15f). But to make sure that is not forgotten Paul stresses the infrequent and occasional character of such gifts. He presents himself as independent of any "need" to demand them of the Philippians. Instead the material aid is subordinated to the true purposes of their fellowship, the "fruit" which comes from preaching the gospel and issues in a pleasing offering to God (4:17–18).[34]

Against the Judaizers: Our Heavenly Politeuma

We have seen that while the ideology of those being opposed in Phil 3:1b–4:1 may have been that of the Judaizers in 2 Cor, Paul's authority as apostle and his relationship with the community are not under attack. Over emphasis upon Paul's difficulties in Corinth has led to neglect of the different focus in this passage. Paul uses two "political" terms to characterize Christians, the "true circumcision" and those whose "commonwealth" (*politeuma*) is in heaven. Both expressions contrast with membership in Israel. Paul's opponents preach fleshly circumcision. In a section whose striking reversal recalls that of the Christ hymn (3:4–11),[35] Paul describes his own "self-emptying" to identification with the sufferings of Christ. In the final act, his (and the Philippians') hope is to share the exaltation of the risen Christ (3:11,21).

In this context Paul's abandonment of his Jewish heritage to "know Christ" and find a righteousness based on faith, is pictured as abandoning a position of "earthly" status for one of present humiliation. Paul's own credentials in "Jewish terms" are clearly presented as superior to those of the opposition, who may even have been gentiles converted by the preaching of Israel's superiority.[36] Why might Christians at Philippi seek to enhance their status by adopting this version of Christianity? The conflicts at Alexandria exemplified in the decree of Claudius provide a clue. There the Jewish community was viewed by some Greeks as privileged because it was organized as an independent political unit within the city, a *politeuma*. Scholars have often noted that the language of *politeuma* and citizen obligation (1:27) is unique to Phil. They often attribute it to a "civic pride" in their position as a Roman city governed by Roman Law. But the term *politeuma* also applies to the Jewish communities of the diaspora.[37]

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[32] A. Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles* (Missoula: Scholars, 1977) 82f.

[33] Furnish, *2 Corinthians*, 507f.

[34] The topos that God (the gods) will supply the needs of one who is generous (to them) recurs in the collection appeal of 2 Cor 9:6–12 (see H. D. Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985] 109–117.

[35] So Collange, *Philippians*, 128.

[36] So Gnilka, *Philipperbrief*, 186–89.

[37] Cf. Gnilka, *Philipperbrief*, 206.

Rather than assume on the basis of Acts that Paul's converts in Philippi were among a prosperous and well-established citizenry[38] we might take Paul's characterization of their poverty relative to that of Corinth as a more adequate index of their social position (2 Cor 8:2–3). Such persons would not, as we have seen, belonged to the privileged citizen body. The opponents may have held out some concrete expectations of forming a *politeuma* and thus enhancing the status of the Christians. Petition for such a privilege might be pressed under the claim that the Christian community lived under the Law of Moses and ought to enjoy the same privileges of self-determination that Rome had granted to other Jewish communities. Paul uses his own example to demonstrate that faith in Christ is not a "way into" such an elevation of one's status. Instead, he had had to go in the opposite direction, to count all of that "loss" in order to know Christ. The Christian hope for a *politeuma* remains with the Lord in heaven.

Kyrios, Politeuma and the Cult

Paul's reference to defense of the gospel before the praetorian guard (1:13) and the greetings from Christians of "Caesar's household" (4:23) are often correlated with the special status of Philippi as a Roman city whose population included a number of veterans. Though it is sometimes said that Paul's trade as a "tentmaker" or "leather-worker" would have brought him into contact with such persons and that the "citizenship" enjoyed by the apostle had been granted his father for service to the Roman army or administration,[39] the rhetoric of Phil suggests otherwise. Paul's imprisonment has become the source of a unique opportunity to bring the gospel before persons attached to the Roman administration. Although Paul creates the impression that his apologia for the gospel has been successful, the only evidence we have for that are Paul's expressions of confidence that his case will be resolved favorably and the reference to Christians among those involved in imperial service, probably slaves employed in administration.

Scholars who rely on Acts 16:11–40 to reconstruct the earlier conflict which led to Paul's departure from Philippi for Thessalonica (1 Thess 2:2; alluded to in Phil 1:30), conclude that the "opposition" which has led to Paul's imprisonment must also have been grounded in charges of disturbing civic order.[40] Phil 1:28–30 makes it evident that the situation at Philippi still admits the possibility that Christians will suffer similar persecutions. 1 Thess, written after Paul's trials at Philippi and probably expulsion from Thessalonica as well, appeals to the apostle's prophetic word that Christians must expect persecution (1 Thess 1:6; 2:14; 3:1–5). Like Philippi, Thessalonica was an hellenistic foundation with strong ties to Rome that had resulted from the wars between the Triumvirs. Numenismic evidence testifies to the cultic embodiment of civic virtue around the Augustan house.[41] Claudius' decree to the Alexandrians specifies those "honors" which the citizens may pay him: observance of his birthday as a deified Augustus; erection of statues of the emperor and his family; carrying of statues in public processions; sacred groves and a "tribe" of Claudians "according to the custom of Egypt. But the decree also prohibits appointment of a high priest and erection of a temple to the emperor, "not

[38] As Friedrich (*Brief an die Philipper*, 128) does, for example.

[39] E.g. W. Meeks, *Urban Christians*, 14.

[40] E.g. Craddock, *Philippians*, 12–13.

[41] See R. Jewett, *Thessalonian Correspondence*, 123–25; K. Donfried, "The Cults of Thessalonica and the Thessalonian Correspondence," *NTS* 31 (1985) 341–46.

wishing to be offensive to my contemporaries and because I consider temples and the like to be set apart in all ages for the gods alone."[42]

The civic pride which motivated such honors to the Roman emperors and divine benefactors of the city could not be shared by Christians whose conversion had led them to renounce participation in the cultic activity of their neighbors. If Roman rule was not always hailed with the same enthusiasm by the lower classes of citizenry on whom the burdens of taxation fell, Christians who have suddenly withdrawn from even nominal participation in such activities could hardly help drawing attention to themselves as potentially subversive persons in the city.[43] It has been suggested that the emphasis on Christ's "parousia" from heaven with the Christians who have died (as a result of some form of hostility?) deliberately evokes the symbolism of an imperial visit.[44] A similar terminological conjunction occurs in Phil 3:20. Christians have a heavenly *politeuma* from which they await the Kyrios as *soter*. Since the use of "*soter*" for Christ is unique in Paul's own letters, we may suggest that it too alludes to the language of imperial cult. The expectation of Christ's parousia is indicated by *apekdechesthai*, a verb Paul frequently uses in connection with the parousia (1 Thess 1:10; 1 Cor 1:7; Gal 5:5).[45]

Assuming that the political language of Phil 3:20–21 is linked to the claims being advanced by those whose position Paul is opposing,[46] we may suggest that seeking "status" as a *politeuma* of "Israelites" provided an alternative to the persistent danger of suspicion and persecution. Christians would be able to defend their rejection of civic cult by reference to their Jewish heritage and the privileges granted the Jewish community even by emperors who were also suspicious of the Jews as a cause of civic discord.[47] Paul's insistence upon the heavenly *politeuma* not only rejects such aspirations, it also insists that Christians remain vulnerable to the sufferings attendant upon their confession that Christ is "kyrios"; not the various benefactors of the civic order. A similar function has been attributed to the "speculative mythologizing" of the Christ hymn in Phil 2:6–11. The Lordship of Christ over all the powers destroys the claims advanced by other "lords" whether religious or political.[48]

Regional differences in the types of honors paid to members of the imperial family may also explain the difference between sporadic persecution and "shameful treatment" in the cities of Macedonia and an imprisonment that could have cost Paul his life in Asia Minor. H. Hendrix has shown that in Thessalonica Romans were honored as humans. Even in the somewhat ambiguous case of Augustus who was proclaimed as son of the divine "theos" Julius, one finds restraint. The "priest" of the emperor is the one who serves as "games executive" (*agonothete*) of the city. In Asia Minor, on the other hand, the "threshold" for offering divine honors to humans seems to have been much lower. A wide

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[42] White, *Ancient Letters*, 134f.

[43] E.g. Jewett, *Thessalonian Correspondence*, 125.

[44] Meeks, "Cults," 344.

[45] Gnilka, *Philipperbrief*, 207.

[46] So Gnilka, *Philipperbrief*, 210.

[47] White (*Ancient Letters*, 17) argues that the Roman attitude toward Jews was colored by the civil discord in Alexandria. Claudius' decree even suggests that a Palestinian element was involved in the problems at Alexandria.

[48] E. Schussler-Fiorenza, "Wisdom Mythology and the Christological Hymns of the New Testament," *Aspects of Wisdom in Judaism and Early Christianity* (ed. R. Wilken; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1975) 17–41.

range of humans are honored in ways traditionally restricted to the gods.[49] When Paul speaks of himself and the Philippians as participating in the same *agon* (1:27–30) and uses the imagery of running a race in order to win the prize in a race whose goal is set by the upward call of God in Christ (3:13–14), his readers may have been reminded of the games staged to honor members of the imperial family. Even the association of Paul's own "success" in the judgment with the "success" of his churches (2:16) has some analogies in that world. The letter from a trainer to Zenon requesting supplies for a young man he has been told to train only if the individual can be expected to win, reports that the youth will soon far exceed those who started training long before him and that "by the gods leave I hope to see you crowned."[50] In other words, the patron is "crowned" at the victory of his protege.

If the cities of Asia Minor more readily blurred the distinctions between humans and the gods in rendering such honors to emperors and benefactors, then the price of disregard for such civic pieties may also have been higher. Exegetes have tried to explain the apparent suspicions that call for the strong affirmations of love and participation in a mutual endeavor that transcends the divisiveness of competing preachers in a number of ways. Has Paul given signs of preference for some members of the community which now call for a strong statement of his concern for *all* the Philippians?[51] Is Paul suspected of being at fault in his imprisonment? A conclusion that might easily be drawn if Paul has in fact suffered imprisonment and trial for an offense which would have merited a lesser punishment in Philippi.

Or, as Collange speculates had Paul decided to obtain his release by appeal to his Roman citizenship? Such an action after some time in prison might have been interpreted by some as cowardice on Paul's part. Consequently he uses all the persuasive powers at his disposal to convince the reader that death would be the "easy way" out. The difficult job is to remain in the contest for the sake of further gains from his missionary work.[52] Indeed, he deliberately refers to the possibility of death not with the metaphor of sacrifice, but with that of a libation, an offering that could be as serious as the pouring out of the victim's blood or as simple as the pouring of wine or water while invoking the god (2:17).[53] But it may be the consequences of his death in the behavior of his converts that Paul is concerned to avoid; not charges of a sudden invocation of privileged status to avoid suffering.

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[49] H. Hendrix, "Beyond "Imperial Cult" and "Cults of Magistrates," *SBL 1986 Seminar Papers* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1986) 301–308.

[50] White, *Ancient Letters*, 38.

[51] Craddock, *Philippians*, 20.

[52] So Collange, *Epistle to the Philippians*, 9–10.

[53] The ambiguity of the expression has led to disputes over whether or not Paul is speaking of his death in sacrificial terms (see Gnilka, *Philipperbrief*, 154f.) White's observation that "martyrdom" expressed the sentiments of resistance to Rome among the greek citizens of Egyptian *poleis* while the rebellion of the non-citizen populace is expressed in apocalyptic oracles, suggests that Paul is engaged in a double attempt to moderate the devisive effects of his impending death: (a) he only uses apocalyptic language obliquely and often speaks of his death as a departure to be "with Christ," thus eliciting images of martyrdom and heroic defense of the gospel; (b) he avoids the negative sentiments attendant upon martyrdom for another segment of the population with expressions of confidence about his eventual release and a generalized imagery of liturgical service that could refer to a variety of cultic acts. The social implications of the more apocalyptic stance of Thessalonians require further exploration in this context.

Indeed the consistent repetition of the pattern established by the Christ hymn: privilege surrendered in obedient lowliness, even death, is the prelude to exaltation, makes it unlikely that Paul would suddenly use "earthly status," a citizenship that would also separate him from many of his compatriots, to obtain release. To "know Christ" and share his sufferings, Paul has already surrendered as "nothing" those signs of status and pride which he had enjoyed as a Jew. Further Paul has consistently resisted every opportunity which his addressees might have exploited to enhance or even clarify the uncertainty of their own status. Even the receipt for aid in 4:10–20 follows this pattern. Paul's *autarkia* prevents them from enjoying any status as "patrons" of the apostle. Instead, their service to him is transmuted into obedient subordination through the liturgical imagery that renders such service an offering to God (4:18b-19; also 2:40).

Epistolatory rhetoric, the conventions of friendship and imagery from the civic life of Paul and his addressees have been skillfully woven into the structural pattern of the Christ hymn. The hints we have been able to discern about the epistolatory situation indicate that Paul seeks to enable the Philippians to negotiate some of the most difficult situations facing any Christian community: (a) how does their allegiance to Christ as Lord express itself in the context of competing civic pieties?; (b) can Christians find "shelter" from hostility evoked by the gospel in "status" acquired through some arrangement with an earthly polity?; (c) do the giving and receiving attendant upon the association of Christians for purposes of spreading the gospel endow the financial patrons of the church with privileges commonly granted to patrons?; (d) will the death of the apostle spark division, competition or even rebellious hatred of Rome as "enemy" among his followers? In all these cases Paul's answer is decisively determined by the powerful imagery of the Christ hymn to run against some of the most deeply rooted instincts of humans and their communities. Such discernment is the root of theology in the Pauline tradition.

The Theologies of 1 Thessalonians and Philippians: Contents, Comparison, and Composite

John Reumann
Lutheran Theological Seminary
Philadelphia, PA 19119

I. Introduction

(1.1) The *aim* of this paper, within the context of the Consultation, is to provide an initial attempt to describe the thought in these two letters of Paul and to compare what is said in them about God, Christ, the human situation, salvation, community, ethics, etc. It is an assignment only rarely carried out by commentators (recent exception: Hawthorne 1987).

(1.2) The problem is *how to organize Paul's theological thoughts* without succumbing to later systems or even other NT theologies. Obviously it must be in a way appropriate to each letter, but also in a manner that facilitates comparison between 1 Thess and Phil and later among other letters (hence the paragraph numbers). We shall follow an unfolding for each letter that rests on thematic frequency, in terms of actual vocabulary occurrence and the observations of previous exegetes, but with a certain logic of progression in thought that also leaves room for comparison of the (two) letters.


(1.3) We must be clear on *what we seek*. It is *the theology of Paul* but *in dialogue with the Christians at Thessalonica or in Philippi*. It is Paul's thought as seen in a particular letter, and then these results combined. Our target is Paul's thought, not the theology of the Philippian intruders (3:2ff.) or the Thessalonian slackers (5:14),though these may shape his response. It is Paul's thinking that we seek, not the sociology of the community addressed or the *religionsgeschichtlich* setting or the literary forms employed by him. What Paul says may include material from the Hebrew (LXX) Scriptures; a "word of the Lord" (1 Thess. 4:15); common apostolic teaching or paradosis, early Christian hymns (Phil 2:6–11) or catechesis; we shall assume this is material Paul accepts to one degree or another, unless it can be shown that he seriously modifies it, disagrees, or hints it is being forced on him by the situation. We must look especially for autobiographical passages (like Phil 3:4–14) and give place to his Jewish background, Jewish and Greek education, social status, and religious experiences, just as we say what we can about the background, experiences, and status of the people to whom Paul writes, and any threats, opponents, or dissonence in the picture. While a general model of "how Paul does theology" can probably be worked out, at this stage we can be content to sketch the situation depicted in each letter, a sort of *skiagraph* for Thessalonica and another for Philippi (see 2.1 and 3.1).

(1.4) While we have indicated how "pre-pauline material" can enter into Paul's theology, a further *problem* looms *if a letter is composite*. "Phil may be composed of selections from as many as three letters" (Perkins 1987: 1). A major problem for the Consultation to

consider is whether, in seeking Paul's theology vis à vis the Philippians, one works from the canonical document we have in hand or from a putative reconstruction of (three) earlier letters from his hand in a reconstructed sequence. "Canonical interpretation" sees this problem but, in my opinion, does not solve it. We shall treat all of Philippians as Paul's, aware of an original three letters, now combined. One must be on the lookout for places where our following a reconstructed sequence gives a different meaning for Paul's thought than using the letter as a whole does.

II. The Theology of 1 Thessalonians

(2.1) The *situation* in which Paul does theology as reflected in 1 Thess can be sketched thus:



(2.2) Faced by what may be called the "persecution" (Donfried), "pastoral" (Malherbe), and "millenarian" (Jewett) readings of 1 Thess, members of the Consultation are surely not of one mind. Holtz, without being aware of all these specific options, has put the matter well when he speaks of sufferings as a factor in 1 Thess, but it was not yet "massive" and likely came in the form of "social disintegration" and "discrimination" (EKK 282–83).

(2.3) One must be reluctant to assign any phrases in 1 Thess to opposition *teachers and their slogans*. Jewett 1971 (*Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 179–82) regards "spirit, soul, and body" at 5:23 as a trichotomy of the "libertinists" at Thessalonica. See (2.31) below.

(2.4) We may read 1 Thess as a single letter, without interpolations.

(2.5) The *date* is disputed. We opt for spring A.D. 50 (Jewett 1986: 59–60; Malherbe 1987: 5; Collins 10–12).

(2.6) The *Thessalonian community,* while beloved (2:8) sisters and brothers (*adelphoi,* 14x in the vocative), is an object of the missionaries' concern. The letter offers warm *support* as well as fatherly and apostolic *admonition.*

(2.7) The *purpose(s)* of the letter vary with the reconstruction of the situation. E.g., Donfried: (1) to console, and defend (2) the gospel and (3) himself (112). Jewett 1986: 93–109 sees (1) an effort to show that "persecution is normal"; (2) to meet criticism that Pauline leadership was not "pneumatic" enough, exhibiting ecstatic manifestations; but (3) to respond to the enthusiasts and their contention that the day of the Lord was already present (and believers nonetheless have died, the *ataktoi* resist authority, there is a libertinist anthropology, and traditional marriage ethics are being attacked). If Paul writes *without* such specific opponents or problems his letter is more generally to nurture. Collins 47–51 sees "confusion" at Thessalonica, with perhaps "the rapture" (4:17) the special issue (see 2.41 below). On these matters there is no consensus.

(2.10) *Overall, theologically,* 1 Thess is about God and the strengthening and encouraging (3:2) of the Thessalonians in the faith of the gospel, the Thessalonians seen in concert with Paul, especially with regard to recent events and the immediate future. Eschatology, often of an apocalyptic cast, plays a major role. Affliction, community, and an ethics worthy of God and the divine will, exemplified by Paul and, in turn, the Thessalonians, all loom large.

(2.11) *God* pervades 1 Thess as theme and actor (Whiteley 18–21; Collins 57–58, 230–52; cf. 1–2–6 and 7). *Theos* occurs 36 times, throughout all five chapters. 1 Thess particularly stresses God's role *at the end* and *at the beginning.* At the parousia God will bring those who have fallen asleep (4:14); the trumpet of God will sound (4:16). Yet "God has not destined us for wrath (cf. 2:16, God's wrath; 1:10) but to obtain salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ" (5:9). "God is faithful and will do it" (5:24). The thought at 5:9 serves also to introduce God's work of *predestining* (Whiteley; cf. Collins 45–46), as also at 1:4 ("God has chosen you") and 3:3 ("we are destined for [sufferings]"). The reference to Paul at 2:4 should probably also be read in this light: "we have been judged fit by God to be entrusted with the gospel."

(2.12) There is a considerable *Christology* to 1 Thess (cf. Whiteley 21–22; Collins 54–56, 253–84). Terminologically *kyrios* occurs 24 times, "Jesus" 14x, *Christos* 10x, and "[God's] son" once (1:10). Seven of the 10 uses of "Christ" are combined with "Jesus." "Christ" is well on the way to becoming a name, rather than a title. No preexistence of Christ is indicated, even in *huios* at 1:10. What is said deals with Jesus' "work," less so with "person"; the Christology is functional, not ontological (with Collins 284).

(2.12.1) Nothing is said of the *historical Jesus* (unless 4:15[-17] reports a logion) except the emphasis on his death, implied at 1:10, stated in 2:15 and 4:14, and interpreted in the *Sterbensformel* at 5:10 (*hyper hēmōn;* variant *peri hēmōn*), the first soteriological statement in Christian literature about Jesus' death. God raised Jesus (1:10, cf. 4:14). Christ's death and resurrection obtain salvation for us (5:9), though no theory of expiation is offered. Jesus' status as *Christos* and *kyrios* helps account for there being "apostles of Christ" (2:7) and "the word of the Lord" that goes forth (1:8; cf. 4:15), etc.

(2.12.2) Even more is said about the Lord Jesus *coming* from heaven in the future *at*

the day of the Lord (1:10; 5:2; 4:14–17; 5:11–12). This Jesus is our "Rescuer" from the coming wrath (1:10), but is also seemingly the executor of judgment (4:6). Believers will "live with him" as a result of his dying for us (4:10).

(2.12.3) One cannot say the *en Christō* theme has as yet developed very clearly in 1 Thess.

(2.13) *The (holy) Spirit* is referred to in a limited number of ways in 1 Thess. Of the 5 occurrences of *pneuma*, the most important are the pair at 1:5–6, which probably should be interpreted in light of 4:8, "God gives his holy Spirit to you" (OT phraseology, in a possible sentence of holy law," undergirding the authority for Thessalonian Christians of the call to holiness). This God was active when "our gospel came to you not in word only but also with power (*dynamei*) and *pneumati hagiō* . . ." (1:5). The Thessalonians (1:6) "became imitators," "receiving the word in much *thlipsis*, with joy *pneumatos hagiou*." "Do not quench the *pneuma*" at 5:19, in parallel with "Do not despise prophesying" (5:20), probably means God's Spirit.

(2.14) The *Gottesbild* in 1 Thess thus includes dominant references to God (the Father) and to the Lord Jesus Christ (the Son) and occasionally some to the holy Spirit. By and large the priority and emphasis is with God (cf. 1:10), and the many prayers are addressed directly to God (1:2; cf. 2:13; 3:9–10, 11–12; 5:18).

(2.15) *Predestination* has been discussed above (2.11). The topic of *providence* might be seen in Paul's comments about afflictions (persecutions) (e.g., 2:2–4; 3:6–9) and the future (e.g, 5:10). Perhaps Paul's pastoral, fatherly care for the Thessalonian converts can be said to reflect his own experiences with the Lord's care (cf. Malherbe 1987: 52–60). The letter vividly refers to "the tempter tempting you" (3:5) and Satan hindering Paul's plans to come to Thessalonica (2:18). In one passage an archangel is mentioned (4:16; cf. also 3:13 *hoi hagioi*), and recall the apocalyptic scenario in 4:14–17 for reflection of the more-than-this-worldly. The letter may raise the *theodicy* problem (Bassler, as quoted in Jewett 1986: 171). *Hope* is a characteristic of life now, leading to patient endurance (1:3) and future expectation (2:19) of salvation (5:8), in contrast to the pagan outlook (4:13).

(2.16) Is a *plan of salvation* suggested in Thessalonians? Broadly, in terms of what God has appointed for us (5:9, cf. v. 8), through Christ's death and resurrection (5:10) and future rescue of us (1:10). But not through references to Israel's history or figures like Abraham or Moses in it or to Sin (only the sins of the Jews are mentioned, 2:16, where possibly Gen 15:16 could be in view, and then it might be termed *heilsgeschichtlich*).

(2.20) *Gospel*, a chief point of entry into Paul's thought, occurs 6x in 1 Thess (verb 1x). The good news burst upon the scene in Thessalonians with power through the preaching by Paul and Timothy (1:5; 2:2, 4 [also *lalein*], 8 [*metadounai*, along with themselves], 9 [*kēryssein*]; 3:2). They announced "the gospel of God" (2:2, 8, 9, obj. and subj. gen.) or "the gospel of Christ" (3:2). When Timothy returned from his trip to Thessalonica and reported "good news" about their faith and love (3:6), we have what I think is the only NT reference to *euangelion* as the attitude and actions of believers rather than to the Christ-event and God's doing salvation more directly. To refer to the basic apostolic message the letter can also use "word (of the Lord)" (1:5, 6, 8; 2:5, 13 [bis]) or "speaking (to the Gentiles)" (2:16; cf. 1:8; 2:2). The "gospeling" vocabulary of the letter also puts a heavy emphasis on *paraklēsis* (2:3; verb at 2:12; 3:2, 7; 4:1, 10, 18; 5:11, 14) and related terms.

(2.21) A *missionary advance* of the gospel is suggested not only by the work of Paul and Timothy but also through the efforts of the Thessalonians themselves in Macedonia and Achaia (1:8). This seems to have especially involved their example (1:7, *typos*) and faith in God "sounding forth everywhere" (by preaching?) (1:8). There is great emphasis on the preaching and labors of Paul and party (2:1–12), who are led by God (3:11) and gave "their very selves" (2:8) when they were in Thessalonica. They call to repentance (1:9) and seek to save (2:16). There is no evidence, however, that the Thessalonians have been involved in (financial or other) support for the on-going work of those who had evangelized them (as the Philippians were when Paul *et al.* were at Thessalonica, Phil 4:16). Indeed, Paul stresses his own labor and self-support at Thessalonica (2:9). In any case the word (or God self) continues at work in these believers (2:13).

(2.22) The gospel advances through *preaching and deeds*, as these references above suggest. Baptism and Lord's Supper are not mentioned.

(2.23) It cannot be said that the *gospel* is spelled out in 1 Thess in any particular *thematic* way like justification or reconciliation. There are bits on *conversion* (1:9, *epistrephein*, emphasized by Malherbe 1987: 28–33, along lines of the philosophers' call, not of the OT prophets or the sermons in Acts), *future rescue* (1:10), and *sanctification* (5:28; at 4:3, 4, 7 in sexual ethics). *Grace* is mentioned only in conventional formulas at 1:1 and 5:28.

(2.24) One may speak of *God's call* (*kalein*, 2:12; 5:24; *parakalēsis* and *parakalein*, 9x) as a particularly frequent emphasis, however. The proper response is especially characterized by *faith*, *love*, and *hope* (1:3 and 5:8 as a triad)—faith in God (1:8), communal faithfulness (3:2, 5–7), a *pistis* among the Thessalonians that has gaps (3:10), though they are reckoned "believers" (2:10, 13; 4:14; cf. 1:7). Taught by God to love, they do it with regard to other Christians (4:9–10). *Judgment* is relatively a pronounced theme in 1 Thess; cf. "wrath" (1:10; 2:16; 5:9), the Lord as avenger (4:6), etc.

(2.30) *Anthropology* is not prominent, and the few references are controversial, especially 5:23.

(2.30.1) R. Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms* (1971), proposes a solution by assigning the trichotomy at 5:23 to Paul's "libertinist" opponents at Thessalonica.

(2.30.2) Because so much rides on 5:23 and the opponents in Jewett's continuing reconstruction of the situation in 1 Thess, several questions must be posed. If in the libertinists' view it is the apportioned *pneuma* that survives, would they really have also used *psychē* and *sōma* for the life of the redeemed person now or at any later parousia? Cf. the usual Greek contrast of *sōma* and *sēma*. Are not all three terms—*sōma* and *pneuma* surely, but also *psychē* (as in Phil; Jewett 448–49)—words that denote anthropological *continuity* for Paul in the person "saved" now and in the full consummation later? And does the somewhat gnostic anthropology of the libertinists in Jewett 1971 really mesh comfortably with the (apocalyptic) millenarian piety of the opponents in Jewett 1986? Best, 243–44, does not follow the idea of opponents' terminology at 5:23, and Holtz, 265 n. 704, terms it "problematisch."

(2.31) 1 Thess is more interested in addressing the present *life of Christians* than in depicting "human beings prior to faith" (except for "the Gentiles"). There is relatively little on what the future "life with Christ" will be like; even 4:17 leaves things in mid-air. The Christian life as holiness stands in contrast to uncleanness (*akatharsia*, 2:3; 4:7).

(2.40) The *eschatology* in 1 Thess is primarily of the *futurist* variety, about what will

happen "at the End." Especially when 2 Thess is brought in, one can construct a program of "events of the Day of the Lord" (Whiteley 25–26). 1 Thess offers the two blocks of material in 4:14–17, the scenario leading to "the rapture," and 5:1–10, under the heading of "the times and the seasons" (*peri de tōn chronōn kai tōn kairōn*). The "*parousia* of (our) Lord Jesus (Christ)" is not only described to some extent (4:15–17) but also is the focus of hopes and even prayers (2:19; 3:13; 5:23), involving both "those asleep" (4:13–16) and living Christians (4:17; 5:10). But one must not overlook the sense of *present* eschatology felt throughout 1 Thess. That Jesus died for us suggests obtaining salvation and living with him already in the present (5:9–10), at least in some sense. Best, 200–202, 218–19, suggests that there is a relation with/in Christ for believers via baptism already in the present life. Satan's activity (2:18; 3:5) and the events depicted in 2:14–16 about suffering and "the wrath" also suggest eschatology in the present.

(2.41) Collins' survey, 44–45, rightly raises the question of "relationship between the rapture, to which 4:17 makes reference, and salvation." (The term rests on the Vulgate of 4:17, *rapiemur*.)

(2.50) Collins 285–98 outlines "the ecclesiology of 1 Thess"; he finds *the church* "one of the main points of interest in recent studies" (58–63) on 1 Thess, especially Paul's preaching as "the foundation of the church" and "the eschatological situation of that church." Reflective of quite recent approaches are Jewett's use of models for the congregation (1986:133–78) and Malherbe 1987 on "the nurturing congregation" and church (78–81, 88–94). The term *ekklēsia* already existed for Jewish-Christian communities in Palestine (2:14) when Paul and companions wrote to the church "of the Thessalonians" (1:1, partitive gen., Collins 288). We need not repeat what the letter tells in 2:1–12 about the missionaries' entry (*eisodos*) into the city and how people were converted (Malherbe 1987: 5–33 for a recent review). The members (*adelphoi*, believers) are regarded as elect (1:4), beloved of God (1:4), taught by God (4:9), and nurtured over the intervening months by Paul and Timothy, who nursed these children (2:7) and parented them (2:11). They needed strengthening, as Timothy's later visit shows (3:3) and the imperatives, guidance, and prayers in the letter (4:1, 10b; 5:12–22; 3:12, e.g.). They are "people of the day" (5:5), a hope, joy, and crown of boasting for the missionaries (5:19–20). They as a community are destined for a place in God's kingdom (2:12; 4:17b; 5:9–10). But one has the impression of a somewhat halting band of Christians *in via* ("we live, if you stand," 3:9); they need to encourage and build up (*oikodomein*) one another (5:11).

(2.60) That *ethics* is a prominent part of the gospel and of the teaching in 1 Thess has already been indicated. Most of the material is concentrated in chaps. 4–5, but 2:12 signals a deep concern "to walk worthily of God" and the Thessalonians are at the outset of the letter lauded for their work, labor, and steadfastness (1:3). Above all, the "imitators-of-us-and-of-the-Lord" theme appears very early in the letter (1:6; 2:13); the Thessalonians also in some ways became an example (1:7, *typos*). Specific precepts touch on God's will for holiness with regard to one's body/wife/financial dealings (4:4–6, depending on how *skeuos* and *pragma* are interpreted); abstaining from *porneia/akatharsia* (4:3, 7); more positively, *philadelphia* and *agapē* (4:9, 10) in the community; and "living quietly."


(2.61) The *motivations* for Christians' ethical response are several (cf. Merk, *Handeln* 45–58). God's will (4:3; 5:18) can be said to be both norm and motive, and the gospel and eschatology envelop all that is said paraenetically. But specifically 4:6b–8 mentions the future judgment, the call of God, and the gift of the Spirit, future, past, and present activity of God, respectively (Merk, *Handeln* 50; Collins 65). That the Thessalonians

were "taught by God" (4:9) heightens the import of the moral teaching. New aspects are provided in v. 12, "that you may command the respect of outsiders (*tous exō*) and be dependent on nobody." While Paul seems to envision an independent community (like himself in ministry, cf. Phil 4:11 *autarkia*), he is concerned about what the pagan public thinks; cf. Malherbe 1987: 99). (*Futurist*) eschatology influences the Pauline ethics not only directly in verses like 4:6b and 5:2–6 but also by the propinquity of sections on the parousia in 4:13–18, 5:1–11, and 5:23.

III. The Theology of Philippians

(3.1) The *situation* in which Paul does theology as reflected in his letter(s) to Philippi can be sketched thus:

Paul's background in Judaism and the Hellenistic world; "call," experiences in missionary work;	Hebrew Bible exegetical methods Other missionaries (Timothy)	Common "apostolic" *Christianity* (kerygma, catechism worship. etc.) *Philippi:* city, ethnic, social, religious, and cultural factors



(3.2) With Perkins on "*opponents*," we distinguish (a) the *rival preachers where Paul is* (1:14–18), Christians whose gospel is not questioned and whose ire may be directed against Paul's use of his Roman citizenship to ease out of this imprisonment (Collange 9–10, 18, 51–52; Perkins, p. 10, seems to decide against this); (b) the *pagan opposition* that has jailed Paul and in Philippi threatens the congregation (1:27–29); and (c) the "judaizing Christian missionaries" similar to those encountered in 2 Cor 10–13 (so Perkins). It is

possible that 3:2–16 and 3:17–21 reflect two such (itinerant) groups (cf. Jewett 1970; Martin NCB Phil 29, 33, 34). Occam's razor urges just one such group.

(3.3) To *opposition teachers* one may wish to attribute such phrases in chap. 3 as "workers" (3:2), circumcision, confidence (or boast) (3:3) and later the emphasis on "resurrection power" and perhaps *koinōnia* (3:10); "I have already obtained/become perfect" (v. 12); *teleioi*, reveal, have attained (v. 15); "goal" or end, God, glory, "earthly things/our *politeuma*" (vv. 19–20; cf. Perkins, p. 9).

(3.4) As a working hypothesis, let us agree (with Perkins, p. 1) that our document includes parts of three letters, Paul being imprisoned in Ephesus:

Letter A (4:10–20)—danklose Dank, receipt for aid; Paul not yet imprisoned? (cf. 4:14 *thlipsis*); Ephesus A.D. 53–54 (?).

Letter B (1:1–3:1a; 4:2–7 [8–9])—on the impending outcome of Paul's case; imprisoned, Ephesus, A.D. 54–55 (?).

Letter C (3:2–4:1, 8–9)—polemical letter warning against possible appearance in Philippi of preachers of a Judaizing type; Paul at liberty, Ephesus area, 55 (?).

(3.6) The *Philippian community* holds a *warm place* in Paul's affections (1:8). It is *commended* for its "partnership in the gospel" (1:5), but must be *admonished* (1:6, 9–11, 27–2:16; 3:17; 4:1, 4–9) and *warned* (2:1–5; 4:2–3).

(3.4) H. Paul Sampley holds that Paul and the Philippians have entered into a "consentual contract" as a *societas* (=Greek *koinōnia*); they are each and all equal partners, sharing assets, giving and receiving (4:15) (Perkins, pp. 1, 2, 6). If this analysis be correct, we have an absolutely unique ecclesiology in Philippians. I would be very cautious in pressing these claims.

(3.10) *Overall, theologically,* Phil is about God, the gospel in Christ, Paul, and the Philippians. While a variety of topics flow from God's working salvation for them, such as we might expect in a Pauline letter—themes such as eschatology and ethics, Christology and community—Phil is marked by several characteristic emphases including righteousness/justification and joy. The Christ hymn exercises great influence over interpretation.

(3.11) *God* (*theos*) is mentioned 23 times. Cf. Hawthorne 1987: 21–30. From God comes salvation (1:28), in that God exalted the crucified Jesus, gave him the name "Lord," and bestows "the righteousness of God which is through faith in Christ" (3:9). This God continues to be active among the Philippians (2:13), that they may be "children of God" (2:15). Divine promises extend into the future: "the God of peace will be with you" (4:9), and "God's peace . . . will keep" you (4:7).

(3.11.1) God is the object of glory and praise (1:11; 2:11; 4:20), of prayer (1:3; 4:6), and worship (3:3, if the dative is read). Though others may create a god in earthly, shameful things (3:19), our deity is a Father from whom come grace and peace (1:2), in whose form Christ was, possessing equality with God (2:6, 9, 11).

(3.12) Though "the Lord *Jesus Christ*" can be mentioned in tandem with God, as at 1:2, Phil regularly distinguishes the one through whom God brings righteousness, resurrection hope (3:9–11, 20–21), peace (3:7), and all riches (4:19) from God; cf. 3.14 below. The name "Jesus" appears 22x (but only at 2:10 by itself), *Christos* 37x. *Christos* alone, as a name, occurs 17x (esp. in 1:13–29). "Son" never appears, but *kyrios* resounds 15x (taking 4:5 as now a parousia reference, not an OT statement about God). *Kyrios Iesous Christos*

is the climactic acclamation (2:11). To this Lord the term savior is applied at 3:20.

(3.12.1) It is customary in seeking *Christology* in Phil to stress titles and then the Christ hymn (so Hawthorne 1987: 41–59, 61–76). But by the time Paul is writing to Philippi christological honorifics have probably lost, at least for the hearers, much of their (OT) background and were heard with Greco-Roman connotations; they may indeed be used almost promiscuously. As for the hymn, its Christology at what level? Few passages have a more disputed tradition history. Was it composed by Paul, with an eye to the historical Jesus at the footwashing (John 13:3–17) as a model for imitation (so Hawthorne 1983, further influenced in 1987 by Wright 1986)? Or pre-pauline (Aramaic or Hellenistic origins), used in worship, redacted by Paul, and employed for ethical purposes here? We shall assume an earlier hymn, implying preexistence, redacted by Paul at least by the addition of *thanatou de staurou* (v. 8), used to show how the Philippians' life, like his own, is to be under the Crucified and Risen One; *en Christō Iesou* in v. 5 denotes not "how Jesus thought" but deals with Christians' relations among themselves and with others under the domain of the gospel, in the sphere of Christ Jesus.

(3.12.2) *Jesus Christ,* in the form of God, exhibited serving self-giving in his human career. (A contrast with Adam and reflection of Suffering Servant imagery may lie behind 2:6–8, but such Christologies are no longer obvious.) Obedient humility and death on the cross were reversed by God with exaltation and lordship (2:6–11). This Lord, to whom all is ultimately subject in the universe (2:10; 3:21), will come as savior to transform those who live, hearts and minds, in Christ Jesus (3:20–21; 4:7), at the day of Christ (1:6, 10; 2:16). Meanwhile (the gospel of) Christ is preached (1:15, 17, 18, 27), as the object of faith that brings God's righteousness (3:9, *dia pisteōs Christou* obj. gen., cf. 1:29) and fruitful righteousness (1:11). Living means (knowledge of) Christ for Paul (1:21; 3:8), and thanks to Christ's resurrection (3:10) our death means being "with Christ" in a fuller way (1:23). Hence Christ is magnified by us in life and death (1:20). One ventures all to gain Christ (3:7, 8), presses on in Christ Jesus (3:14), boasts in Christ, not self (3:3), and understands oneself to have been laid hold upon by Christ (3:12). *Grace* is especially identified with Christ (4:23, but cf. 1:2).

(3.12.3) Is *en Christō* then the central theme in Philippians? Christ is the focus of what God has done in the past; "in Christ" believers encounter God's working (1:6; 2:30) now and in the future (M. Bouttier, *En Christ* [Paris, 1962] 98–116, 122–33, 116–22). But the prepositional phrase often means no more than "Christian" (e.g., 1:1, 13; 3:1; 4:4, 10; 2:29 *en kyriō*). Exact applications vary. Neugebauer, *In Christus,* views it as participation in what Christ has done for us, in connection with (a) *Heilsbegriffen* (3:14; 4:7, 9) (add 2:5); with (b) the *ekklēsia* (1:1–2; 3:3–4; 4:7, 19; he places 2:5 here); and (c) in connection with the apostle (1:13, 25–26; 3:8b–9, 14; 4:13). On this analysis the "in Christ" motif connects God, Paul, and the Philippians. But see section 3.50 below also. Neugebauer also argues that *en Christō* reflects the "indicative," about what God in Christ has done for us, and that en kyrio is used with imperatives, for the response demanded of Christians (e.g., 4:1, 2, 4).

(3.13) *The (holy) Spirit* plays surprisingly little role in Phil. Paul at 1:19 expects "the help of the Spirit of Jesus Christ." Part of the basis for his ethical appeal in 2:1 is common "participation in the Spirit (*koinōnia pneumatos*)." We Christians are people who worship "by the Spirit of God" (3:3, reading *pneumati theou,* unless taken as "who whose worship is spiritual," NEB).

(3.14) One cannot say the *Gottesbild* in Paul's letter is triadic, even at 2:1 (Christ, *agapē,*

the Spirit; cf. 2 Cor 13:13). For all its christocentricity, the thought is theoultimate. Precisely when Christ is exalted as Lord, it is added that this too is "to the glory of God the Father" (2:11; cf. 1:11). As so often, it is in 3:14 and 4:7 "*from* God, *through* Christ."

(3.15) Is Phil concerned with God's *providence*, the problem of *evil*, or *theodicy*, as Hawthorne 1987: 31–39 suggests? Not in the way Romans is. But Paul does take up Jesus' death (2:8), his own imprisonment and possible death (1:13–23), and Epaphroditus' bout with death (2:27), and the imperfections in the congregation at Philippi (1:27–28, by implication; 2:3–4, 21; and 4:2). He has to discuss "bad things happening to good people." Through it all he sees God at work (2:13, 27b), to save (1:28; 3:21). Suffering is given [by God] for Christ's sake (1:29). Paul views hostile endeavors as having beneficial results for the gospel (1:12–18). This optimistic position seems to stem from his christological paradigm (2:9–11). *Hope* and expectation characterize Paul's outlook (1:20; cf. 2:19, 23).

(3.16) Is there a *plan of salvation* apparent in Phil? Not in terms of vocabulary like *mystērion*, nor by attention to seminal figures like Adam (unless behind 2:6–8), Abraham, or Moses. Instead of Israel's history or attention to Sin (*hamartia* vocabulary is unused), we get Paul's personal experience (3:4–14) and the song about salvation in Christ (2:6–11). The savior (3:20) and salvation (1:19, 28; 2:12) are presented in christological and personal terms of existence, not historical overviews.

(3.20) The intertwining of Christ, Paul, and the Philippians is especially to be seen in the word *gospel* (*euangelion*, 9x) and similar terms. "The gospel of and about Christ" (1:27) came to Philippi through Paul as preacher, and from that first day (1:5; cf. 4:15) the Philippians have been enlisted in its advance, as co-participants with Paul in its grace (1:7). They supported the task financially. Co-workers who labor with Paul, like Timothy (2:22), and persons in Philippi (4:3) are mentioned by name. Now the Philippians must continue to stand firm as they struggle there "for the faith of the gospel" (1:27), even as Paul does (1:16) in prison for its advance (1:12). Since the gospel is what counts, Paul can be optimistic about those who "proclaim (*kēryssousin*) Christ" (1:15) and "speak the word" (1:14) even out of different and unfriendly motives. It is the "word of life," which the Philippians are to hold fast to and offer in a world where they "shine like lights" in the sky (2:15–16).

(3.21) There is thus a distinct *missionary* or *evangelistic* note in Philippians. This comes in the *advance* or progress of the word (1:12, 25, an *inclusio* using this Stoic term), but suggesting also the progress of faith in the community and in each believer; cf. G. Stählin, *prokopē*, *TDNT* 6:703–19, esp. 712–15. Equally of concern with spreading faith is the deepening of faith in converts. Hence the prayer in 1:9–11 and the hope for "completion" (*epitelesis*) at the day of Christ Jesus (1:6).

(3.22) The means for advancing the gospel is preaching, speaking "the word," and the example of a unified congregation (1:29).

(3.23) One particular way the gospel is spelled out in Phil is in terms of *righteousness/justification* (*dikaiosynē* 4x). Phil 3:9–11—in the context of vv. 4–16 about seeking security in "the flesh," followed by Paul's experience of "the great reversal" via this gospel, and its applicability to all Christians—is the prime passage. On either a partition or canonical theory, Paul has earlier made reference to his hope that the Philippians may stand at the judgment with "the fruit which comes through Jesus Christ from (God's) righteousness (that depends on faith)" (1:11; cf. 3:9). Then, to those who propose a "righteousness of one's own, based on law," Paul urges in contrast "the righteousness from God, which is through faith in Christ, a righteousness that depends on faith, to come to know Christ

and the-power-of-the-resurrection-and-participation-in-sufferings-of-his," one being "conformed to Christ's death" in the hope to attain to "the resurrection of the dead." Justification is gift and power, expressed in personal terms in this passage, and linked to the phrase "in Christ" (*eurotbo en autō*, 3:9). See J. Reumann, *Righteousness* ##107–13, cf. 386, citing Ziesler on 1:11.

(3.24) There is a certain emphasis on *faitb* (3:9 bis), faith in the good news (1:27), *pistis* that the Philippians both possess and need to reawaken (1:25; 2:17 cf. Collange). Also on *the cross* (2:8, contrast 3:18), but not particularly on *sanctification* or *judgment* (though cf. 3:18–19, 1:28).

(3.30) Phil, while not an extremely rich source for recovering Paul's *anthropology*, may provide certain insights, particularly if we note that the references often come in polemical passages (cf. Jewett 1971: 20–23). Flesh, *sarx*, at 1:22, 24, is non-polemical, but at 3:3–4 denotes not simply "earthly nature" but "self," with fatal implications of relying on circumcision, in contrast to trust in Christ. *Pneuma* at 4:23 is liturgical, for God's Spirit given to community members. At 3:21 *sōma* is a vehicle of continuity between our present lowliness (cf. 1:20) and the future "glorious body." Jewett 322–27 and 348–52, stresses as new contributions in first-century thought (1) the way Paul employs *kardia* (1:7; 4:7) as "the center of each person from which thoughts and affections flow," and (2) the host of words with *psychē* (2:30; *eupsychein, isopsychos* at 2:19–20; *sympsychoi*, 2:2; *miq psychē* 1:27) to indicate "life in its social rather than its individual dimension," esp. ecclesiastical oneness. What attention to anthropology there is in the letter is clearly to the Christian person "after Christ," not "before." Or rather, to persons in Christ, communally.

(3.40) *Eschatology* runs through a great deal of the letter. Though seemingly late among the genuine letters and reflecting the view that Paul could suffer death during his current imprisonment (1:20–23) prior to the parousia, Phil nonetheless continues to voice the expectation that Christ will come (3:20–21) and the day of Christ affect believers (1:6, 10), Paul (2:16), and enemies (3:18–19 in the context of 20–21). Since hearing about Christ, the Philippian community has been living with both a present and a future eschatology. The crux passage at 3:20–21 suggests that Christian existence is not so much a progressive development (*metamorphousthai* does not occur in the letter) as a sudden change when the savior comes.

(3.41) But does Paul, in Phil, then expect an *interim state* for himself (1:21, 23) and other believers, when they are "with Christ" but it is not yet the full consummation of 3:21? Cf. Beare (HNTC 35–37, 64–65, 125–27, 138–41) on an intermediate existence between the individual's death and the general resurrection. Being "with Christ" began in baptism and continues with Christ after the *en Christō* of earthly existence.

(3.50) *Ecclesiology*—Paul calls the community in Philippi an *ekklēsia* (4:15, "no church . . . except you [pl.]") The "holy ones (in Christ Jesus)," *hagioi*) is used for members at 1:1; 4:21 and 22. In 3:3, "the true circumcision" (contra the false teachers), we have a term expressing continuity with Jewish roots, but "Israel terms" do not otherwise occur in Phil (unless *politeuma*, 3:20), nor does "body of Christ." Note also the "*koinōnia=societas* theory." Some of the *en Christō* references are ecclesiological (e.g., 1:1; 4:21). There is great emphasis on a united church (1:27; 2:2), a community for others (2:4), marked by humility (2:3, 8) and joy as well as faith (1:25).

(3.60) The *ethical admonitions* in Phil are scattered: Letter A gives thanks, not orders; in B, see 1:27—2:5, 12–18, 29; in C, 3:2, 15–17; 4:1–9. There are *no Haustafeln*, virtue and vice lists (the closest would be the series of things to "think on" at 4:8), little talk

of love (1:9; cf. 2:1–2). Much of the exhortation has to do with life within the church community and relations among its members, as noted above. Prayer occupies a particular place, emphasized by Paul's example (1:3–11) and by precept (4:6). The theme of imitation (3:17, *symmimētai*) and models (Hawthorne 1983 sees Jesus as model in 2:6–11; Paul as model, 2:12–18; Timothy as model, 2:19–24) is prominent.

(3.61) The *ethical motivations* in Phil include the gospel or God's word for and in (among) us, promise, and eschatology. Cf. Merk, *Handeln* 175–200. The imperatives of 1:27–30 root in God's action (1:6) and believers' participation in grace (1:7). The admonitions of 2:1–5 rest on the *Heilsbandeln Gottes* in 2:6–11. For 2:12–18, vv. 13 (God's activity) and 16 (holding fast to the "word of life" en route to the eschatological goal, that they will provide for Paul "grounds to boast at the day of Christ") provide the motivation. "Boasting in Christ Jesus" (3:3) and the paradoxes of "'now already' but 'not yet'" (3:12–16) and of *koinōnia* in both sufferings and resurrection (3:10–11) undergird the paraenesis of 3:17–4:9. So also does the futurist eschatology of Christ as savior and judge (3:20). For 4:1–9 motivations are to be seen in the fact that "the Lord is near," an eschatological formula in 4:5, and in the promise of 4:7. In v. 9 the example of Paul, who does not function independently, on his own, but is dependent on God, and the promise that "the God of peace will be with you" interpret the Hellenistic "virtues" in v. 8 eschatologically. For 4:10–20, eschatology (in 17b, "credit" at the judgment, cf. 1:1; 2:16), the notion of sacrifice *for God* (v. 18), and promise (of future eschatological riches) (v. 19) provide the motivations for ethical actions. So Merk.

(3.62) Given the emphases on God, salvation in Christ, and Paul's good relations with the Philippians, it is not surprising that the document is often termed "the epistle of *joy*" (*chara* 5x; *chairō* 9x; *synchairō* 2x). Somewhat surprisingly, Phil never uses joy as an appropriate reaction to what God has done in Christ (unless one wishes to see the references above as a response to the *Heilsereignis*). It applies rather to the life of Christians now and in the future.

IV. 1 Thessalonians and Philippians: Comparison and Composite

(4.1) The theological profiles presented above for each letter *need* to be refined by *discussion* in the Consultation before the next step can properly be taken with confidence of combining them into a single picture of Paul's thought on the assumption of these two letters alone. Of course, on some points, like the opponents in a situation or the unity of a letter, there will remain differences of opinion that may affect one's understanding of the theology of the document, even after discussion.

(4.3) I have deliberately at this stage, partly for space reasons, not gone into approaches to Paul that massively treat *a theme as "center"* (e.g., apocalyptic). Nor have I at this stage sought to make comments on the coherence/contingency issue and others mentioned at our initial Consultation meeting. At this stage it is work enough to try to be somewhat descriptive.

(4.4) Readers can *compare* 1 Thess and Phil for themselves on many topics by looking up the paragraphs above with the same extension number: e.g., 2.13 and 3.13 on the holy Spirit, or "the rapture" (2.41) and the question of an "interim state" (3.41) as striking, singular features of the eschatology in each letter. Gaps in the numbering above anticipate the need for new topics in other epistles.

(4.10) The following observations may tentatively be offered on *composite* features of a Pauline theology based only on 1 Thess and Phil.

(4.11) *God* Paul emphasizes in these letters to his two churches, has worked through Jesus Christ for our salvation. There is nothing said about a divine role in creation or in Israel's history, though many characteristics of God derive from or fit with the OT depiction of Yahweh. God has chosen apostles and converts, is active in the word (message) among them, and will call the shots at the End. Much of what Paul says about God is doxological, i.e., spoken as glory-giving prayerful praise.

(4.12) *Jesus Christ,* whom God raised after his death and exalted, the son of the Father, is Lord and in the future will appear as savior. While Christ's preexistence is suggested, there is nothing specific stated about his historical life. I would hesitate using the term "incarnation" (cf. J. D. G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980] 114–21, 127–28). Death, resurrection, and parousia are the points of emphasis, the first two often spoken of together, the third by itself on other occasions. His death was "for us" (but there is no "atonement" theory spelled out). He will rescue us but also serve as judge. What was accomplished for us in Christ, as indicative, is the core of the gospel; what his lordship calls for, often in imperatives, is also part of that gospel. Living, for Paul, means Christ.

(4.13) God gives *the (holy) Spirit* (of Jesus Christ) to those who believe the gospel. The Spirit's presence means power and joy, even amid afflictions. Participation in and worship by the Spirit mark the community. Nothing is said about specific gifts of the Spirit, but the *pneuma* is active in communal life and hence in individual Christians.

(4.14) Raw material for a *Gottesbild* of Father, Son, and Spirit is present, but not in a demonstrably triadic way. For all the emphasis on Christ, Paul ultimately roots all in God (e.g., Phil 2:11).

(4.15) Since God chooses and cares for community members and they nonetheless still suffer afflictions and death, while the tempter, Satan, hinders even Paul's plans, elements of what we term *providence,* the problem of *evil,* and *theodicy* appear in Paul's thought. Hope. however, characterizes Christian life now and for the future more than such questions condition it.

(4.16) A "*plan of salvation*" can be seen in broad terms in what God does through Christ. It does not particularly deal with the times prior to Jesus' crucifixion, and it puts great emphasis on the future. Paul can speak of it in personal terms, stating what all this means for him.

(4.20) *Gospel* and a series of related terms sum up the message Paul and his helpers, and their converts in turn, present from and about God and Christ. This word of life includes *kērygma* and *paraklēsis* as well as other forms of admonition/exhortation and witness. Good news to Paul also involved how converts responded with faith and love.

(4.21) Not only do we see Paul and party as missionaries; those who respond are, to one degree or another, also caught up in the *advance* or progress *of the gospel,* spreading and deepening the application of the word.

(4.22) *Preaching* is the particular form of introducing and sharing the good news. The conduct of Paul and his assistants and of converts, including support financially for the mission, along with prayers, also play a role. The target audience is Gentiles.

(4.23) The gospel can be expressed particularly in terms of God's (saving) *righteousness* or *justification* as Paul recounts his own experience. He contrasts "being right on one's own, by law," with "righteousness from God" depending on faith in Christ suffering and raised.

(4.24) Other themes in connection with the gospel are God's *call*, Christ's *cross*, *conversion*, faithfulness of God's part and *faith* as the response (not yet complete), along with *love* (toward other believers), and *hope*. Being holy and future *judgment* are also part of the message.

(4.30) *Anthropology* is only casually brought in, partly through OT-Jewish concepts (in Greek vocabulary) to emphasize the wholeness of the human person, partly also to counter possible views from the Greek world and opponents in the church. "*Heart*" is used for the center of the person before God as he/she thinks and feels; *psychē*, for "life," in a social, not isolated individual, sense; *sōma*, for the expression of the person, now and when Christ subjects all things to himself at the glorious kingdom to come. The *spirit* given to Christians in their community also provides a continuity between life now, in the "flesh," and the wholeness to come. While *sarx* can be used rather neutrally, it may also denote the sphere in which persons trust in themselves and in the rites of the law, like circumcision, rather than in Christ as our "boast."

(4.31) As part of the life of Christians, *holiness* is both gift (they are *hagioi* now) and goal (not to succumb to *akatharsia* or other lapses from integrity, 1 Thess 2:3–6). The challenge is to make fruitful in many possible ways the salvation from God, which needs to be worked out especially in relationship among members of the community. Within the church the concern to "build up" or provide "pastoral care" points to ecclesiology, ministry, and ethics.

(4.40) Paul's *eschatology*, while aware of the *present* as a time when God has already raised Jesus and when the word and Spirit are at work, especially emphasizes the *future*, above all Christ's *parousia*. Vivid scenarios may depict certain events at the sudden return of the Lord, though these stop short of describing future bliss and are meant to comfort, not alarm. While Paul, in the later of our two letters, must face his being put to death before the parousia occurs, he does not give up that corporate future hope. There is a certain continuity in that the Coming One is Christ who died for us and is our risen Lord and in the fact that our relationship "in Christ" is relevant for being in the future "always with the Lord."

(4.41) The *rapture*, when the living (believers) and Christian dead are caught up to meet together the returning Lord, and a possible *interim state* "with Christ," for those who die chronologically before the parousia, are two special features of the eschatology of these letters.

(4.50) The *church* exists in Thessalonica, Philippi, Judea, and elsewhere, where people respond to the gospel. The communities of "holy ones in Christ Jesus" are the true circumcision, elect, beloved, and taught of God, a group of sisters and brothers. Paul and Timothy were gentle, paternal, pastoral, with them but on occasion must admonish, especially at failings toward each other, lack of unity, humility, and unselfishness. These people are destined for the kingdom, however, if they hold fast to the word, stand firm, and live as in the light and in the day. The church communities were to be concerned about advancing the gospel and hence about their conduct in and before the world and about help for Paul's further mission work.

(4.55) *Ministry*—Omitted above for reasons of space.

(4.60) *Ethics* as part of the gospel message is a continuing exhortation to live in a manner worthy of the God who calls, to please God by doing the divine will. The admonitions can take the form of precepts, not from the Ten Commandments or other OT laws, but about holiness, watchful living, faith, love for one another, and hope. They can touch on quite specific issues in sex or business. Community tensions and selfishness, conceit, and lack of care for other believers seem the areas most frequently addressed. Because the gospel came through the preaching of Paul and Timothy to these converts, their conduct as exemplification of living in and under Christ is held up at times to be followed as model: of the Lord, of us, be imitators, together, and an example in turn for others. How Christians act ought to build up their community and be a witness to outsiders. At times, giving financial support and oneself for the work of the gospel is stressed.

(4.61) The *motivations* for such responses include what God in Christ has done for us (gospel, grace), what will occur (parousia, judgment), God's call and will, the gift of the Spirit, promise, and authoritative commands (e.g., to abstain).

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Marriage Rules, Kinship Terms and Family Structure in the Bible

Susan Rattray
University of California, Berkeley

According to Leviticus 18:6–18 a man may not marry (or have intercourse with):

1. his mother
2. his father's wife, i.e. his stepmother
3. his half sister, whether the daughter of his father (and his stepmother) or the daughter of his mother (and her previous husband)[1]
4. his granddaughter, whether his son's daughter or his daughter's daughter
5. his stepsister, who is related to his father (*môledet 'abî kā*),[2] that is the daughter of his stepmother and a male relative of his father[3]
6. his aunt, specifically his father's sister
7. his aunt, specifically his mother's sister
8. his aunt, specifically his father's brother's wife
9. his daughter-in-law
10. his brother's wife
11. his stepdaughter or stepgranddaughter
12. his sister-in-law, i.e. his wife's sister, while his wife is still alive.

Punishments for some, but not all, of these unions are given in Leviticus 20.

The prohibition against intercourse with the father's wife is repeated in Deut 23:1, sandwiched between laws concerning rape and laws about who may "enter the congregation of the Lord."

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[1] The Hebrew adds *'môledet bayit 'ô môledet bûs.'* This phrase is often interpreted as either legitimate vs. illegitimate or as synonymous with *bat 'āb 'ô bat 'ēm,* but legitimacy does not seem to be a factor in the other cases, and the second interpretation is redundant. Both these interpretations take *môledet* to mean "born," but then we would expect the vocalization *mûledet.* The form *môledet* is a verbal noun and means "family" (cf. Gen 12:1; 24:4 and compare v. 38; 43:7). The phrase is best understood as referring to the mother's daughter, and indicates that the half sister is forbidden whether she is a member of one's own family (*môledet bayit*), i.e. her father is related to one's own father, or not (*môledet bûs*).

[2] This cannot mean "born of your father" since it would then be redundant; Lev 18:9 already mentioned the father's daughter. Nor is it a motive clause, similar to the following phrase *'ābōtkā hî',* since if it were it too should have been followed by the word *hî'.* For the meaning of *môledet* cf. note 1, above. This interpretation, as well as the interpretation of no. 3 (see note 1) is derived from the discussion of these verses in a seminar given by Prof. Jacob Milgrom at the University of California, Berkeley.

[3] This male relative could not have been one's father's brother or one's father's father's brother, since one's father could not marry the wife of his brother or uncle. Hence the stepsister would not be one's first cousin or one's father's first cousin. The nearest she could be would be first cousin once removed (father's brother's son's daughter, implying

In addition, the following unions are cursed in Deut 27:20, 22, 23:
(1) a man with his father's wife (his stepmother), cf. (2) above;
(2) a man with his half sister (father's side or mother's side), cf. (3) above;
(3) a man with his mother-in-law (*bōtenet*).

Notably absent from the above lists (to our way of thinking) are the daughter, full sister, grandmother, a stepsister who is the daughter of one's stepfather, mother's brother's wife, niece, and cousins (especially first cousins). Moreover, Leviticus 18 does not mention the mother-in-law (unless v 17 includes the mother-in-law: the exact words are that a man may "not marry a woman and her daughter"). Note also that all the relationships in the Leviticus list are said to have been indulged in by the Canaanites and/or the Egyptians (Lev 18:3).[4]

These lists raise three questions: (1) Do any cultures actually permit such unions? (2) What is the exact meaning of the Hebrew kinship terms? For example, can *'aḥôt* include cousins, and if so are cousins also prohibited? (3) What organizing principle is the basis for the list?

Assuming, for the moment, that the list of Leviticus 18 is complete and that the terms mean exactly what they mean in English and no more (e.g. *'aḥôt* means only a full sister), the Hebrew rules on incest are remarkably permissive. In our own system, for example, nieces and usually first cousins as well are prohibited. Even in Islam, which permits first cousin marriage, nieces are forbidden.[5] In many patrilineal cultures, the lineage is exogamous, that is, one could not marry any woman related on the father's side.[6] Naturally, the brother's daughter and the father's brother's daughter as well as more distant relatives would be in one's own lineage, and hence forbidden, although close relatives such as mother's brother's daughter, father's sister's daughter and sister's daughter are permitted or even preferred as wives since they belong to a different clan.[7]

(continued)
that one's father has married his nephew's former wife) or second cousin (father's father's brother's son's daughter, implying that one's father has married his cousin's former wife).

[4] And, apparently, by the ancestors of the Israelites; for example: Abraham and his father's daughter Sarah (Gen 20:12; even if this is a later explanation of a "wife-sister" story, the editor apparently did not feel that there was anything wrong with Abraham being married to his half sister); Jacob and the two sisters Rachel and Leah; Judah and his daughter-in-law Tamar; and Moses' father Amram and his father's sister Jochebed (Exod 6:20; cf. Num 26:59). The case of Amnon and his half sister Tamar (2 Sam 13:13) does not necessarily imply that the rules of Leviticus were unknown at that time; it is possible that the royal family was considered exempt from those rules. There is an illuminating parallel in the customs of the Inca: ordinary men could not marry their direct ancestors, direct descendants, sisters, aunts, or nieces (they could marry their first cousins); *but nobles could marry their half sisters* (John Rowe, "Inca Culture at the Time of the Spanish Conquest," *Smithsonian Institution, Bulletin of the Bureau of American Ethnology* 143 vol. 2 [1947], 183–330, esp. pp. 249–255).

[5] Cf. Koran IV:23.

[6] An example of clan or lineage exogamy can be found in Chinese culture, where one may not marry anyone with the same surname as oneself (Hugh Baker, *Chinese Family and Kinship* [1979], p. 23). Matrilineal cultures usually have a similar rule about not marrying anyone in the mother's lineage.

[7] Cf. Baker, p. 43 and Irawati Karve, *Kinship Organization in India* (1968), pp. 218ff.

There are, however, a few cultures which do permit the unions forbidden by Leviticus 18. In a survey of 250 cultures worldwide, Murdock[8] found that while no culture generally permits marriage or intercourse with mother, sister or daughter, there are cultures which permit half sisters, aunts, sisters-in-law, etc. One group, the Kaingang of Brazil, permits a man to marry just about any woman outside the nuclear family, although they "refrain from marrying a son's wife and rarely wed a half sister."[9] Moreover, in many cultures marriage with "a woman and her sister" (Lev 18:18) is not only permitted but preferred. Thus, in the list of Leviticus 18, all the relationships except the first (that with the mother) are permitted by some cultures. A few cultures (ancient Egypt, Samoa) even permit marriage with the sister in royal or noble families[10] or with the daughter (Azande nobles)[11] but even in these cultures the mother is forbidden.[12] But are the rules of Leviticus as permissive as they look? In many societies, anyone in one's own lineage and generation is called "brother" and "sister"; this includes father's brother's children and more distant cousins on the father's side, and the prohibition against marrying one's sister is logically extended to all relatives who are called "sister." In addition, many societies (patrilineal included) also prohibit the mother's sister's daughter, since the mother's sister is typically equated with the mother and hence her children are equated with one's own brothers and sisters.

The biblical system, however, clearly does not follow this pattern, for the daughters of Zelophehad, and afterwards any heiress, were *required* to marry within their lineage in order to keep the family property from being alienated (Num 36:6). They fulfilled their obligation by marrying their father's brother's sons (Num 36:11). Thus even though the Hebrew term for "sister" may refer to more distant relatives (see below), the incest taboos were not extended to include them.

Biologically speaking, all possible kinship relationships can be expressed using only the following eight terms:

Father—*'āb*	Mother—*'ēm*
Brother—*'āb*	Sister—*'āḥôt*
Son—*bēn*	Daughter—*bat*
Husband—*'îš* (= "man")	Wife—*'iššâ* (= "woman")

To these, Hebrew adds only the following:

Father's brother—*dôd*[13]	Father's sister—*dôdâ*

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[8] *Social Structure* (1949), pp. 284ff.

[9] Murdock, op. cit. p. 286.

[10] Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1969), pp. 9–10.

[11] Murdock, op. cit. p. 13.

[12] The rules of the Betsileo of Madagascar illustrate this: ordinary people may not marry sisters, half sisters, aunts, nieces, cousins, in-laws, etc. but kings and nobles may marry anyone except the mother (H. M. Dubois, *Monographie des Betsileo* [1938], pp. 397, 879).

[13] *Dôd* could also include father's half-brother: cf. 2 Kgs 24:17. Zedekiah/Mattaniah is Jehoiachin's uncle, i.e. the brother of his father Jehoiakim. But Jehoiakim's mother was Zebuddah (2 Kgs 23:36) while Zedekiah's mother was Hamutal (2 Kgs 24:18). Thus Jehoiakim and Zedekiah were half brothers (and Zedekiah was the full brother of Jehoahaz, who was deposed by Pharaoh Necho: 2 Kgs 23:31). Whether the term *dôd* also included father's half-brothers on the mother's side is uncertain, but in view of the fact that the *dôd* is a potential heir (Num 27:9), a maternal half-brother may have been excluded unless his father was a member of the same clan.

Son-in-law—*ḥātān*	Daughter-in-law—*kallâ*
Father-in-law (a man's)—*ḥōtēn*	Mother-in-law (a man's)—*ḥōtenet*
Father-in-law (a woman's)—*ḥām*	Mother-in-law (a woman's)—*ḥāmôt*[14]

Since *ḥātān* and *kallâ* also mean "bridegroom" and "bride" respectively, the exact relationship may be spelled out, e.g. *ʾēšet binkā = kallātkā (Lev 18:15). All other relationships are described by combining the above terms (cf. the many examples in Leviticus 18).*[15] Thus the primary kinship terms in Hebrew include the members of the nuclear family, the father's siblings, son and daughter-in-law, and mother and father-in-law. When the terms are extended, they do so as follows: *ʾāb* (and probably *ʾēm*) refer to ancestors (Gen 28:13);[16] *bēn* and *bat* refer to descendants (Gen 31:28; 32:1; 2 Sam 19:25 [24]; 2 Kgs 8:26; etc.);[17] *ʾāḥ* (and *ʾāḥôt*—cf. Gen 24:60) refer to the descendants of any common (usually male) ancestor.[18] Thus Lot is specifically Abraham's brother's son (*ben ʾāḥîw*, Gen 12:5) but also his "brother" (*ʾāḥîw*, Gen 14:14), and Jacob is Laban's sister's son (*ben ʾăḥōtô*, Gen 27:13) and also his "brother" (*ʾāḥî ʾābîbā*, speaking to Rachel; Gen 27:12)—note that Jacob is related to Laban in two ways: Laban is his uncle (mother's brother) and also his second cousin in the paternal line (through their common great-grandfather Terah: specifically Laban is his father's father's brother's son's son—cf. Gen 11:27, 29 with Gen 22:20–23). However, this extended use of these basic terms cannot be taken to mean that all one's fellow tribe-members came under the incest prohibitions of Leviticus 18!

There is no doubt that the Israelite family was patrilineal, as has been assumed thus far. At least two important characteristics of a patrilineal society are clearly found in Israel: inheritance is through the male line (Num 27:8–11; 36:6; by requiring heiresses to marry within the father's tribe, the inheritance was in effect passed on to "his . . . kin from his own clan" just as it would have been if he had had no children at all) and the duty of assisting relatives in trouble falls to the male relatives (Lev 25:48–49). However, it cannot be assumed that an Israelite family was an extended household, i.e. with grandfather, father, father's brothers and their wives and children, one's own brothers and their wives and children, together with one's own wife and children all together under the same

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[14] Cf. Kutsch, *TDOT*, s.v. htn. The terms *ḥōtēn* and *ḥōtenet* occur only with masculine suffixes while *ḥām* and *ḥāmôt* are found only with feminine suffixes; hence the former seem to refer only the wife's parents while the latter denote the husband's parents. However in Mishnaic Hebrew *ḥām* and *ḥāmôt* refer to the wife's relatives too (b. B. Bat. 98b; Dem. 3:6). This situation obtains in the cognate languages as well: Akkadian *emu, emētu*, Arabic *ḥam, ḥamāt*, Aramaic *ḥāmā, ḥămātā* all refer to parents-in-law of either husband or wife while for the root *ḥtn* only the cognates to *ḥātān*, "bridegroom, son-in-law" are common. Kutsch rejects the notion that the root *ḥtn* is connected to Akkadian *ḥatānu*, "protect," yet when the term *ḥōtēn* or the denominative verb *biṯḥattēn* appear, the son-in-law often seems to be in a subordinate position vis-a-vis his father-in-law: Moses and Jethro (Moses came to Jethro's family as a refugee; Exod 2:21); David and Saul (1 Sam 18:21ff.); Solomon and Pharaoh (1 Kgs 3:1); Jehoram of Judah and Ahab (or his successors) through Athaliah (2 Chr 18:1; cf. 2 Kgs 8:27). Thus the terms *ḥōtēn* and *ḥōtenet* may denote more than just "wife's parents."

[15] I have omitted the terms *yābām* and *yĕbāmâ* since they apparently refer to sister and brother-in-law in a special situation, viz. that of a widowed childless sister-in-law to whom her brother-in-law owes special duties.

[16] Cf. Ringgren, *TDOT*, s.v. ʾābh.

[17] Cf. Haag, *TDOT*, s.v. bēn, bath.

[18] Cf. Ringgren, *TDOT*, s.v. *ʾāch, ʾāchôth.*

roof.[19] Rather, the family was more or less nuclear, consisting of father and mother and their children (cf. Josh 7:24; Achan's family included his sons and daughters but not grandchildren or brothers), similar to the modern Western family, but a man lived near his male relatives (where his inherited land was).[20] This may also make the situation predicated in Deut 25:5 more intelligible: "when brothers are living together and one of them dies without a son, the dead man's wife shall not be married outside to a strange man; her brother-in-law (yābām) shall come in to her and marry her and fulfill a brother-in-law's duty." In such a case the brothers have not (yet) formed separate households; one wonders whether this is because only one of them has married (cf. the case of Judah's sons and Tamar in Gen 38; the sons are evidently still in their father's household and apparently only the eldest living son is married).

This kind of family structure may be illustrated by the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. The preferred form of marriage is with the father's brother's daughter, although of course marriage outside the clan also occurs.[21] Moreover, when a man marries he acquires his own tent (pitched next to that of his father) and brings his wife home to live in it. Thus he remains in the camp of his father's family but not in the same dwelling. Furthermore, any man is potentially the founder of a new lineage.[22] The latter is reflected in the biblical texts by the successive splitting off from Abraham (founder of Ishmaelites and also other groups through Keturah, as well as father of Isaac), Isaac (forefather of both Israel and Edom), and Jacob (father of the twelve tribes, themselves divided into clans (*mišpāḥôt*) who were considered to be descended from the sons or grandsons of the twelve sons of Jacob (cf. Gen 46:8ff).

To return to the list of prohibited unions of Leviticus 18, it is clear that the list is not organized according to membership in a patrilineage or household constituency. That is, the list is not simply forbidding union between members of the same patrilineage, for brother's daughter and father's brother's daughter are apparently permitted. For the same reason one cannot assume that members of an extended household were forbidden to marry, and in any case neither hypothesis accounts for the prohibition of the mother's sister and the daughter's daughter (who might well be in a different patrilineage and who would certainly be living in a different household). Moreover, the omission of the daughter from the list is unexplained (unless it is due to haplography in v. 10), since she would both be in one's patrilineage and in one's household (even a nuclear one).

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[19] The extended or joint family is illustrated by the Indian family where "those men who trace descent from a common male ancestor form the core of the family, with them are associated women who are brought as brides and the young unmarried daughters of the family" (Karve, p. 9).

[20] Biblical Hebrew also seems to differentiate between the two kinds of family distinguished by anthropologists: the "family of orientation," i.e. the family one is born into, Hebrew *bêt 'āb*, and the "family of procreation," i.e. the family one creates by marrying and having children, Hebrew *bayit* (i.e. one's own *bayit*).

[21] E. L. Peters, "Aspects of the Family Among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica" in *Comparative Family Systems*, ed. M. F. Nimkoff (1965), p. 133. Note that marriage with one's father's brother's daughter makes one's uncle and aunt also one's father and mother-in-law; likewise if one's parents were similarly paternal cousins one's mother's brother—an important relationship—is also one's paternal cousin (once removed). Clearly any two people in such a system will be related in a variety of ways.

[22] Peters, p. 125.

But the real question is not why the daughter and the full sister are omitted from the list (though full sister may be deduced a fortiori from the law prohibiting half sisters), but why the mother is included. For the prohibition against intercourse with one's mother is universal and is also the rarest type of incest to occur, while intercourse between father and daughter is fairly common (even though prohibited).[23] Thus, we should have expected that the daughter would be mentioned in Leviticus 18 and the mother would not be. Moreover, no penalty is mentioned in Leviticus 20 for incest with either mother, full sister, or daughter—a striking omission; nor is it possible to argue haplography there.

The key lies in the opening verse to the incest prohibitions (Lev 18:6): one may not marry close kin (*šĕ'ēr bĕśārô*). Who are they? In Lev 21:2 we have the expression *šĕ'ērô haqqārōb 'ēlāyw*,[24] which is spelled out as follows: mother, father, son, daughter, brother, and maiden sister (sister who has never married). Hence mother, sister and daughter, as close kin, are automatically forbidden by Lev 18:6. The purpose of the list of Leviticus 18 is to indicate *who else* is forbidden by extension from these basic relationships. The reason for beginning the list with the mother is to establish the principle with the one case least likely to occur and most universally abhorred. In other words, just as one would "not expose the nakedness of one's father, that is of one's mother" so one must not expose the nakedness of father's wife, half sister, etc.

So the list does prohibit union with the mother, sister, and daughter. In addition, the *šĕ'ēr* of one's *šĕ'ēr*, so to speak, are also forbidden. At this level there is a hierarchy of closeness: wives, then parents and children, then collateral relatives (siblings and parents' siblings). Wives are so closely connected[25] that their relatives are treated as one's own relatives: one may not marry one's wife's mother (one's mother-in-law), daughter (stepdaughter), granddaughter (cf. the prohibition against marrying one's own granddaughter), or sister—though in this case the restriction only applies to marrying the sister while the wife is still alive. In the case of one's parents and children the prohibited *šĕ'ēr* include the wife, mother, sister, and daughter: hence, father's mother,[26] father's sister, father's daughter (half sister) and father's wife are prohibited, likewise mother's mother, mother's sister, and mother's daughter (half sister) and son's daughter, son's wife and daughter's daughter are excluded. In the case of collateral relatives, the *šĕ'ēr* includes only the wife: hence brother's wife, and in a patrilateral extension, father's brother's wife. The stepsister is only prohibited if she is also a member of one's father's lineage—in other words, she is already a cousin of some kind, but would have been a suitable wife if her mother had not married one's father. Beyond these limits, female relatives where permitted, hence, a man could marry his first cousin or his niece.

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[23] Robin Fox, *Kinship and Marriage* (1967), p. 71.

[24] Both these phrases are also used with the meaning "next of kin" (with the restriction *mimmišpaḥtô*, "from his clan"); cf. Lev 25:49 and Num 27:11.

[25] Cf. Gen 2:24, *wĕḇāyû lĕḇāśār 'eḥāḏ*.

[26] The list actually only takes up four generations: parents, ego, children and grandchildren. Therefore grandparents are not mentioned, though the rule can be easily inferred using the principle given above.

The penalties set forth in Leviticus 20 follow the same pattern, with incest with near affines punished by execution while incest with blood relatives was punished by *kārēt* and incest with collateral affines by *kārēt* and barrenness.

The following chart sets out these relationships; those in parentheses are not mentioned in Leviticus 18, and the reason for the omission is stated.

Ego's mother—prohibited (18:6,7)
Ego's daughter—prohibited (18:6)
Ego's sister—prohibited (18:6)

Wife's mother—prohibited (cf. 18:17; Deut 27:23); punished by burning (20:14)
Wife's daughter—prohibited (18:17); punished by burning (cf. 20:14)
Wife's sister—prohibited only during wife's lifetime (18:18)
Wife's granddaughter—prohibited (18:17)

Father's wife—prohibited (18:8); punished by execution (20:11)
(Father's mother—outside the span of four generations in question)
Father's daughter—prohibited (18:9); punished by *kārēt* (20:17)
Father's sister—prohibited (18:12); punished by *kārēt* (20:19)

Father's wife's daughter—prohibited only if already of father's patrilineage (18:11)

(Mother's mother—outside the span of four generations)
Mother's daughter—prohibited (18:9); punished by *kārēt* (20:17)
Mother's sister—prohibited (18:13); punished by *kārēt* (20:19)

Son's wife—prohibited (18:15); punished by execution (20:12)
(Son's mother = ego's wife)
(Son's sister = ego's daughter)
Son's daughter—prohibited (18:10)


(Daughter's mother = ego's wife)
(Daughter's sister = ego's daughter)
Daughter's daughter—prohibited (18:10)

Father's brother's wife—prohibited (18:14); punished by *kārēt* and barrenness (20:20)
(Father's brother's mother = father's mother and in any case is outside four generation span)
(Father's brother's sister = father's sister)
Father's brother's daughter—permitted

Brother's wife—prohibited (18:16); punished by *kārēt* and barrenness (20:21)
(Brother's mother = ego's mother or ego's father's wife)
(Brother's sister = sister)
Brother's daughter—permitted

(Sister's mother = ego's mother or ego's mother's wife)
(Sister's sister = sister)
Sister's daughter—permitted

Prohibited Relationships According To Lev 18:6-18



1. ʾēm (v. 6, 7)
2. ʾāḥôt (v. 6)
3. bat (v. 6)
4. ʾēšet ʾāb (v. 8)
5. bat ʾāb (v. 9)
6. bat ʾēm (v. 9)
7. bat bēn (v. 10)
8. bat bat (v. 10)
9. bat ʾēšet ʾāb (v. 11)
10. ʾāḥôt ʾāb (v. 12)
11. ʾāḥôt ʾēm (v. 13)
12. ʾēšet ʾāḥî ʾāb (v. 14)
13. ʾēšet bēn (v. 15)
14. ʾēšet ʾāḥ (v. 16)
15. bat ʾiššâ (v. 17)
16. ʾēm ʾiššâ (v. 17)
17. bat bēn ʾiššâ (v. 17)
18. bat bat ʾiššâ (v. 17)
19. ʾāḥôt ʾiššâ (v. 18)

Male and Female Slaves in the Sabbath Year Laws of Exodus 21:1–11

Timothy John Turnham

Exodus 21:2–11 outlines the provisions for a Sabbath Year observance which includes the manumission of slaves. Current concensus for Exodus 21:2–11 is that the passage concerns the manumission of male Hebrew slaves in an attempt to preserve the proper society in the land; however, attention paid to the sabbatical manumission of male slaveshas overshadowed the fact that female slaves are also to be freed. This paper examines the rhetorical shaping of Exodus 21:2–11, pointing out the parallels and the tensions between the provisions for male slaves, found in verses 2–6, and those for female slaves in verses 7–11.

The key phrase in understanding the implications for female slaves is "kz't" in verse 7. Typically the verse is translated "When a man sells his daughter as a slave, she shall not go out as the male slaves do," reading the preposition "ki" in an adversarial sense. However, the use of "ki" with an infinitive construct is most frequently read as a temporal. The phrase "kz't" is also found in Exodus 9:29 and 33:8, both of which use the phrase in a temporal sense. Exodus 9:29 reads, "Moses said to him, 'When I have gone out of the city . . .' "; and Exodus 33:8 reads, "When Moses went out to the tent, all the people rose up, and every man stood at his tent door. . . ." Clearly a better reading of verse 7 is ". . . she shall not go out when the male slaves do."

The distinction between male and female slave is not one of temporary versus permanent indenturement; rather, it is understood that under certain provisions both male and female slaves are to be liberated. While the female slave is not under the specific provision of the Sabbath Year cycle, she still benefits from its emphasis on the worth of slaves. As we shall see, the female slave, unlike the male slave, can be set free at any juncture of her slavery, either before or after six years of service.

The two pericopes are each bracketed by a beginning and ending verse. The initial verses for both the section on male and the section on female begin with a conjecture on the case to be considered. A parallel between male and female slaves is established by use of the same phrase form: "ki tikneh" in verse 2 and "ki yimkor" in verse 7. In spite of the parallel construction a tension is established between male and female by using different verbs. The male is bought; the female is sold. For the male, the action is on the part of the master: "When you buy. . . ." This indicates that the man has arrived at a destitute condition which has driven him to offer himself for sale as slave. Therefore, it is the choice of the man—albeit a reluctant one—to enter slavery. In contrast, the section on female slaves begins with the master as a passive recipient of the slave: "When a man sells his daughter. . . ." The woman is offered for sale without her consent by her father. So the tension between male and female slaves is set from the beginning as a difference between selling oneself and being sold, between the master being an active force and being passive.

The tension is magnified in the second half of each introductory verse. For the male, the pattern of six years service is established with the phrase, "he shall go out free, for nothing." The focus is on the freedom granted to the male slave after a period of service. The introductory phrase for the female slave has precisely the opposite emphasis: "she shall not go out as the male slaves do." When the male is purchased by the master at his

consent, he is allowed to go free; when a female is sold to the master without her consent, she does not go free.

The closing verses of the sections on male and female slaves, while maintaining the tension established in verses 2 and 7, reverse the roles and negate the claim of permanent indenturement for female slaves.

Verse 6 concludes the section on male slaves with provisions for permanent indenturement. Just as the male slave is acted upon—though with his consent—in verse 2, again here in verse 6 he is acted upon by the master with his consent. In the opening verse the master is active in purchasing the male slave; here the master is active in piercing the ear of the slave. The verse concludes, ". . . and he will be slave to him forever." So the bracketing verses concerning the male slave move from focusing on freedom to speaking of permanent slavery.

The section on female slaves ends in verse 11 with precisely the opposite conclusion. This verse concludes in the same manner the section on male slaves began, ". . . she shall go out for free, without payment." As in verse 7 the woman's action is determined not by herself but by anotherin this case the master. It is the father's choice to sell her; it is the master's choice or actions which set her free. Unlike the male slave, she never gives consent for her enslavement, nor does she share in the decision to be set free. Neither is the master given the power to act on her slavery. With the male slave the master is the active force—he buys, he bores a hole in the slave's ear; with the female slave the master is passive—she is sold, she is set free.

The sections on male and female slaves are each bracketed at the beginning and at the end with phrases on leaving and staying. In spite of this parallel they are kept in tension by the different roles of the master (active vs. passive), the attitudes of the slaves (consent vs. non-consent), and by the flow of the passage (go out, not go out vs. not go out, go out).

Now that the two sections have been delineated, we can investigate the specific provisions pertaining to the male and female slaves. The parallelism established in the beginning and ending verses is continued in the body. Just as the bracketing verses move in opposite directions, so does the body of each section. The provisions concerning the male slave go from a focus on freedom to bondage; those concerning the female slave go from bondage to freedom.

The first statement of the male slave is that if he comes in single he leaves single and if he comes in married he leaves married. The condition in which he is set free is determined by a wife from outside the master's household, not by the will of the master or of any member of the household. Once again, the slave has a choice in the way in which he is to leave.

It is the final provision of the female slave's release which provides the parallel to the ruling on the male slave. The female slave's release is also affected by a wife from outside the master's household. "If he takes another wife to himself, he shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or her marital rights." If the master brings in a wife from the outside and reduces the status of the female slave, she is to be set free.

The male slave enters and leaves with the same marital status. So does the female slave; however, with the female slave the implication is harsher. She enters single, sold by her father. If while in the master's care she again becomes effectively single through the addition of a preferred wife from the outside, then she is set free. Unlike the male slave, the conditions of her freedom are not determined by herself but by the master's unfair practices; she has no choice in the matter.

The second provision of the male slave is found in verse 4. If he marries a wife given by the master and has children he must leave them when he is released: "he must go out

alone." The gift from the master of a wife who has born the slave children entices the slave to stay in the master's camp, whereas the act of leaving is given a negative cast with the word "alone." If the slave chooses to exercise his freedom he will be alone, without wife, without children, without home.

The second provision for the female slave also concerns children and family. "If he designates her for his son, he shall deal with her as with a daughter." As in the case of the male slave, the master has provided family. For the male, the master has provided wife and children. For the female he has provided husband and father, but again the implication for the female is harsher than for the male. The male is given community through family; he is no longer alone. The female is threatened with dissolution of family. The choice once again goes to the male slave, while the female has no option of consent.

The last provision of the male slave, in verse 6, allows the male to choose permanent slavery if he loves his master, his wife, and his children. The harmony provided by his master pleasing him and wooing him with family overcomes the negative implications of slavery. Again, the male slave has a choice in the matter; he can determine whether to stay or leave.

In the case of the female slave, verse 8 states "If she does not please her master . . . then he shall let her be redeemed." For both the male and female their status as slave depends upon their relationship with the master. However, the male is allowed to choose if the master is pleasing to him while it is the female slave who must be pleasing to the master. The male slave has the promise of provision and family, while the female slave has only the threat of rejection.

In the provisions for male and female slaves, the tension evident in the bracketing verses is maintained but the roles are reversed. In verses 2 and 6 the master is the active figure, though he acts with the consent of the slave. In verses 7 and 11 the master is the passive figure, though the female slave cannot give consent. In the body of each section, the male slave becomes the active figure and the female slave passive. The male slave is given the option of consent where the female is denied it.

To summarize the flow of the two sections, we see that the male slave begins with the offer of freedom after six years. His status as single or married upon release is determined by his status coming in. The next step outlines the provisions for his family if the wife is a gift of the master and the children are a result of that union. Leaving becomes less attractive because of the loss of family, emphasized in the phrase, "He shall go out alone."

This leads to the next step, that the male may choose to stay with the master because he says, "I love my master, my wife, and my children." Love and unity have brought the male slave from a position of unwanted temporary indenturement to a place of permanent slavery. The section on the male slave moves from freedom to bondage, from the promise of emancipation to the choice of permanent enslavement. We are drawn in by the passage to believe that permanent slavery might be the better choice. At the outset, the promise of freedom seems quite positive; however, by the time the pericope ends we are led to believe that it is with the master that the male slave will find family, children, and home.

Unlike the pericope on male slaves, the section on the female slave begins with a rejection of her freedom, "she shall not go out. . . ." Where the provisions of the male slave outline ways of bringing the slave into the master's family, the verses on the female slave describe ways she is excluded from the master's household. The male slave chooses to stay because he loves his master, his wife, and his children. The female slave is sent out because of the master, the master's children, or the master's wife. In contrast to the male slave the female slave moves from slavery to freedom. The female slave begins with the provision of family, and implicitly of children; the provisions for her involve rending the hope of family, children, and home from her.

A clear example of the opposite movements in the two passages is found in the explanation of piercing of the ear. The piercing of the ear no doubt has sexual overtones which paralleled the piercing of the female slave by the master or the master's son. Thus through the ritual of piercing, the male and female slave can be brought into the permanent care of the master. The piercing of the male slave's ear is the conclusion of the pericope, for with the piercing the slavery becomes permanent. The piercing of the female slave in intercourse is in effect the beginning of her enslavement. Should this ritual be denied her through abuse of the master the endenturement of the female slave ends.

At first glance the roles of the male and female are so varied that one suspects the Hebrew originators of this legislation of considering the female as property. However, the tension in the passage is due not to different understandings of the worth of the male and female slave, but to different understandings of the needs of the slaves.

The male slave enters service as a result of poverty. He is forced to sell himself to survive because he has no funds or resources for continued independent living. He has become one of the poor of the land, a status which not only humiliates the individual, but also reprimands the other Hebrews. The concern of the entire Hebrew society is to remove this man from the status of being poor.

The options for the male slave are essentially two: leave after six years service and become a free person or become a permanent slave in a household which has proven to be beneficial. If he feels that he can now make a living without the care of the master he can leave and once again become a functioning member of society. This step would be very difficult for one who had no funds or possessions. The Deuteronomic Sabbath Year passage reflects this when it requires the master to outfit the departing slave. If the cause of his initial poverty still exists or he feels that he is better off in his master's care, he becomes a functioning member of society by being a permanent slave.

The Sabbath Year laws help the slave to escape the societal role of being poor. The best way a male without means can avoid being one of the poor is to accept the consistent care and provision of a wealthy sponsor. As we have seen, the male slave is encouraged to remain in the master's care through the offering of family and home. Far from being a statement on the importance of Hebrew society being composed of free males, as Phillips has suggested, the regulations endorse the benefits of staying with a good master. Still, the worth of the male slave is underlined in that he has the right to exercise his choice throughout the process. He sells himself and he decides whether to leave or stay.

The female who enters slavery is a single woman who had not married. In lieu of a dowry the father settled on a purchase price. The section on female slaves understands the role of the woman to be that of wife to the master or to the master's son. This is not concubinage, however, for she is given the title "wife" and is expected to retain high status before the master even if he obtains another wife. It is the enslavement which offers the woman the opportunity of fulfilling her expected societal role—that of the good wife. As wife to the master or his son, she too can escape the status of being poor. Her worth is affirmed in that the master's choices are limited to maintaining her at a high standard or setting her free. She cannot be sold to another as would a piece of property. If the enslavement does not provide her with the opportunity to function fully in society, then the slavery must end. Whereas the rhetorical movement in the provisions for male slaves is toward permanent slavery, the flow of those for female slaves is toward freedom. The male slave is encouraged to stay if the situation is good; the female slave is allowed to go if the situation is bad.

Unlike the male slave the female is never given the privilege of choice. Because she had no choice in the matter, she is protected by stipulations on her continued enslavement. If at any time the master proved in violation of those regulations, she can once again be

set free. The male slave has no such option. He exercised his free will in entering service and in requesting that the enslavement become permanent. However, once that decision is made it cannot be revoked. The female can be set free at any time—either before or after six years of service.

Now that the laws of Exodus 21:2–11 have been clearly delineated, we can look briefly at the ethical assumptions from which they arose. One principle is that slavery, while an undesirable state, is preferable to poverty. The move of verses 2–7 toward the positive aspects of slavery is surprising in light of later legislation condemning the use of Hebrew slaves. It is more a commentary on the unthinkable possibility of being poor, however, than on the institution of slavery itself. The presumption is that if one can avoid being one of the poor by being enslaved to a good master then slavery is a legitimate alternative.

A second concept presented in the passage is the importance of family. The presence of family is an enticement to permanent endenturement for the male slave and is a necessity for the continued enslavement of the female slave. Finding family is part of being properly related to society, so long as that family is loving and caring. The male chooses to stay because he loves his wife and children. The female must be released if the master abuses her status as wife.

Finally, the idea of individual worth is clearly expressed here. Even a person reduced to selling himself or being sold has rights and privileges. Though economic classes are certainly a reality, the wealthy are prohibited from establishing social classes with varying degrees of human rights. The slave laws are so designed that men and women can escape poverty while maintaining dignity and worth.

Fighting the Good Fight: The Pastoral Epistles in Canonical-Critical Perspective

Thomas Scott Caulley
Eastern New Mexico University
Portales, NM 88130

As in so many other matters, Dibelius' work has pointed the direction for future studies in the Pastoral epistles. His commentary, which has seen four editions—two with revisions by H. Conzelmann after Dibelius' death in 1947—was destined to become the standard for most of the ensuing century.[1] At the commentary's conclusion, in an excursus on "The Situation of the Epistle to Titus," Dibelius posed a challenge for study of the Pastorals which has set the agenda for many subsequent investigations, including this one. After judging this collection of three epistles to be pseudonymous, Dibelius wrote,

> because of [the various considerations which indicate artificiality] the following hypothesis [to explain the phenomenon of the Pastorals] is quite probable: the author wanted to invest congregational regulations . . . with the authority of the apostle and to direct them against heretics. But it is precisely at this point that the question must be asked, why an epistle to Titus was necessary *after* the first epistle to Timothy, or vice versa.[2]

Dibelius' answer to this question—now often accepted—is based on the observation that Titus was addressed to a mission situation and 1 Timothy to an organized church setting, so that

> 1 Timothy is . . . intended mainly for the leader of the congregation, while Titus is written primarily for the missionary. Therefore, each epistle can with equal right claim its place beside the other in the canon of the NT. Of course, no conclusion as to the sequence of the epistles can be drawn from their purposes."[3]

Dibelius concludes with this challenge: "The duty of the exegete, once he has declared a work 'inauthentic,' is to set out to answer the question why these 'epistles' were written

[1] Martin Dibelius, *Die Pastoralbriefe.* HNT 13. Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1913. (now Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles,* trans. from 4th, rev. ed by Hans Conzelmann, 1966; Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972).

[2] Dibelius/Conzelmann 153–154; cf. 5–8. The question is based on the observation that much of Titus is also found in 1 Timothy, at least in substance, and, given the assumption of most scholars that the three epistles were produced as a literary unit, the question of the interrelation of Titus and 1 Timothy becomes integral to the understanding of the Pastorals.

[3] Dibelius/Conzelmann 154.

and why they were written in their present form."[4] In a significant way this challenge is the basis for the present investigation.

Dibelius judged the personal/epistolary portions of the Pastorals to be primarily the vehicle for the real purposes of the pseudonymous author, and therefore of no great significance in detecting the purposes behind the writings.[5] Citing as artificial the letter's apparent repetition of the most elementary rules for organizing a congregation (which Titus would have known since that is precisely what he had been left on Crete to do) as well as instructions regarding the heresies, Dibelius (in addition to using several other criteria) concludes the inauthenticity of the Pastorals.[6] Whereas recent investigations have suggested that such a repetition of instruction which would have been known by the recipient need not be taken as artificial,[7] the overall judgment of pseudonymity in these letters leaves intact the above agenda for study of the Pastorals with only minor adjustments.

The purpose of this paper, as suggested in the title, is to provide a basis for discussion in the attempt to place the Pastorals in perspective as regards canonical-critical issues. As a discussion paper it seeks to raise appropriate questions in relation to methods and procedures by (1) surveying some key recent literature related to methods in studying the Pastorals, and (2) using observations related to that material as a springboard for new ways of approaching the old questions, as well as for formulating new ones. Any answers offered to questions raised are necessarily tentative and are not intended to be definitive, in keeping with the discussion format of the paper.

The area of canonical-critical inquiry as here undertaken seeks to understand the functions of the Pastoral Epistles in their historical context and the hermeneutics of the author as he re-presents Pauline Christianity to his own time and situation. It is hoped, too, that this discussion will allow at least a small step in the direction of answering the subsequent question, "What do the Pastoral Epistles have to say to the modern interpreter who seeks to appropriate the Biblical material to his or her own setting?" It is in this sense that this inquiry takes up Dibelius' question, "Why were these epistles written and why were they written in their present form?" and, more specifically, assuming with Dibelius and many others that the three Pastorals were written and issued as a unit, "Why was an epistle to Titus necessary *after* the first epistle to Timothy, or vice versa?" It is assumed, moreover, that certain clues to "why these epistles were written and why they were written in this form" are to be found within the form they were given.

That "some clues as to why the Pastorals were written and why they were written in this form can be found in the forms themselves" is by no means a self-evident proposition. Much of recent study on the Pastorals has been caught up in the controversy over how

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[4] Dibelius/Conzelmann 154.

[5] Dibelius/Conzelmann 4–5; 153.

[6] Dibelius/Conzelmann 153–154.

[7] S. K. Stowers (*Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* [Library of Early Christianity 5, ed. Wayne A. Meeks. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986] 103), citing as an example Pliny's letter to Maximus, points out that giving advice which the addressee already knows is a "paraenetic commonplace." In fact, the very selection of a paraenetic letter "presupposes that the addressee is . . . already substantially . . . acting in the right way . . . , (and that) the addressee already knows what is right and merely needs help in putting that knowledge into practice." Stowers concludes the section by noting that ". . . just this sort of situation is envisaged in the pastoral epistles (sic). . . ."

the polemical, paraenetic, and traditional material ought to be interpreted, and what, if anything, can be inferred about the situation behind the Pastorals—especially regarding opponents—from the author's use of these forms. The following survey of some recent literature on the subject will set the stage for further observations.

I

Expanding an approach to interpretation of traditional material advocated by Dibelius and other form critics, R. Karris has made a strong statement in favor of what he calls the "minimalist" position in interpreting the situation behind the Pastorals, especially as regards the nature and identity of the false teachers.[8] After showing that the polemic used in the Pastorals has several parallels in Hellenistic writing, notably against sophists by "true" philosophers, and against wandering philosophers by other philosophers, Karris argues that the polemic is stereotyped and therefore of no help in inferring from it the nature of the opponents' behavior in any of the cases cited. His conclusion regarding the Pastorals is that nothing can be learned from the polemic about the opponents' teaching or the identity of the opponents themselves since the polemic used is stereotyped.[9] The same is true, he argues, for the *Haustafel* and *Gemeindeordnung* material, since it is traditional, and has been incorporated into the Pastorals by the author not in reaction to a real situation (specific heresy by specific false teachers), but as part of the general admonition of the author who operates within the Hellenistic milieu of early second century Asia Minor. The purpose of the polemic and the traditional material, according to Karris, is to make a general case for the "soundness" of the Pauline tradition based on the then-current ethical argument that good morals demonstrates the correctness of a teaching.

Several authors are uncomfortable with the narrow application Karris makes of his arguments, but L. Johnson has gone further, to demonstrate that Karris did not treat some important examples of the polemical style he analyzes; examples where the function of

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[8] Robert J. Karris, *The Function and Sitz im Leben of the Paraenetic Elements in the Pastoral Epistles*. Unpub. ThD diss., Harvard University, 1971. See his article, "The Background and Significance of the Polemic in the Pastoral Epistles," *JBL* 92 (1973) 549–564. Karris equates "minimalist" with "cautious" (Function 132).

[9] Whereas the opponents may have been guilty of some charges made, Karris maintains that sound methodology requires that charges parallel to the polemical schema be deemed ". . . traditional, i.e., non-actual unless there is a clear indication in other [non-polemical] sections of the Pastorals to the contrary" (Background, 563 n. 58). He grants that some facts may be inferred about the opponents from the few related statements which occur outside paraenetic, polemical, or traditional material. These he identifies as the statement that the resurrection has already taken place, the forbidding of marriage, and abstinence from certain foods (Function 113). All of this is academic for Karris, it appears, since he concludes that the Pastorals have no real opponents in mind—merely theoretical possibilities which the church at large may or may not encounter (Function 64, 83, 131–132, etc.). Karris appears to have modified his position somewhat, (Background 562–563, where he identifies the opponents as "Jewish Christians who are teachers of the law" in addition to the above qualifications), and, interestingly, later refers to the opponents in the Pastorals as "gnostic" (Robert J. Karris, *The Pastoral Epistles*. New Testament Message: A Biblical-Theological Commentary, vol. 17. Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1979] xvi).

the polemic are "quite plainly different" from the use he suggests.[10] Following the work of A. Malherbe and others[11] Johnson cites several texts where the same polemical language Karris treats ". . . is employed, not to establish the credentials of the writer for his audience, but to provide an antithesis to the description of the ideal teacher, that is, in paraenetic or protreptic discourses" which offset by means of contrast the positive ideal.[12] Johnson treats 2 Timothy apart from the other letters because the literary pattern he discusses is found most clearly there.[13] Citing the schoolbook models of the post-100 C.E. rhetorical schools and actual examples which follow those models, Johnson shows that 2 Timothy closely follows that form, which includes imitation of a personal example and remembrance of formerly imparted teaching, presented as antitheses to the bad example of opponents.[14] After showing that 1 Timothy and Titus give some evidence of also following this pattern, Johnson emphasizes that ". . . the polemical language against false teachers in II Timothy has the function within a paraenetic framework of providing a contrast to the ideal Christian teacher."[15] In contrast to Karris, Johnson concludes by stating that acceptance of the position that the polemical language is stereotyped and that identifying opponents is hazardous does not mean that there were no real opponents. And, while he notes there is ample evidence for real opponents in the hellenistic material which uses the stereotyped polemic, Johnson hesitates to identify those behind the Pastorals.[16] The contrast of their positions notwithstanding, both Karris and Johnson end up espousing a similarly cautious approach to the polemic through which little can be inferred from the writings about their real-life struggles with opponents.

Malherbe student B. Fiore continues this approach to the paraenetic material of the Pastorals in a lengthy study of literature, concentrating on the "second sophistic" period, that is the first three Christian centuries.[17] Citing contrast and personal example as the two main hortatory features of the Pastorals, Fiore spends two hundred sixty pages to survey primary literature concerned with the use of personal example including (as background) the areas of ancient rhetoric, kingship literature (in which a young ruler or prince is exhorted by a teacher), and epistolary exhortation, finally concentrating his study on the Socratic letter corpus, in which many of the elements in the first three literary types are found.[18] He sets out to study the interrelation of hortatory features and structural elements in an effort to place the Pastorals in a literary context. He claims five

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[10] Luke Timothy Johnson, "II Timothy and the Polemic Against False Teachers: a Re-examination." *Journal of Religious Studies (Obio)* 6–7 (1978–1979) 3. Johnson also claims for his case some texts which Karris covers.

[11] Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," in *Aufsteig und Niedergang der roemischen Welt* part 2, Vol. 27, ed. W. Haase and H. Temporini. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, forthcoming. See A. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation, a Greco-Roman Sourcebook*, (Library of Early Christianity 4). Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986.

[12] Johnson 4, 16.

[13] Johnson 4.

[14] Johnson 14–15. On the Pastorals as paraenetic letters, see above, n. 7.

[15] Johnson 25.

[16] Johnson 25–26.

[17] Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles*. PhD diss. Yale University, 1982. (= Analecta Biblica 105. [Rome: Biblical Institute, 1986]). Fiore's citations of the Socratic epistles are from A. J. Malherbe [*The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition*, SBLSBS 12 (Missoula: Scholars, 1977)]; Fiore 182.

[18] Fiore 36; 44–354.

advantages to this approach over others (especially that of Karris), in that it (1) avoids treating features in isolation, (2) it clears common ground between 2 Timothy and 1 Timothy/Titus (showing common hortatory elements in distinct letter forms), (3) it takes into account the principal stylistic features of the letters, (4) it provides a clue to understanding material outside the main passages under consideration and (5) it puts the church order material into perspective.[19] Fiore devotes a section to fine tuning Karris' arguments. Whereas the texts Karris cites cover a broad time span, Fiore concentrates on a literary group which covers roughly the same time frame as the Pastorals (namely, the first three Christian centuries).[20]

In the Socratic epistle corpus,

> examples in antithetical relationship are the key hortatory device. The letters themselves constitute implicit examples embodying the attitudes and actions of the people to whom they are ascribed. The contribution of this study is that the same is true of example in the Pastoral Epistles.[21]

These attitudes and actions of the Socratic epistles (examples of good and bad) are not simply confirmation of the teaching, as Karris would have it, but *they are the teaching.* The same is true, says Fiore, of the Pastorals. Whereas there is an ongoing polemic in the Pastorals in which the letters take one side, the letters are still hortatory pieces, not polemical writings.[22]

Fiore sees the Pastorals as a blend of hortatory instructions to young rulers (primarily 2 Timothy) and epistolary exhortation to a way of life consistent with a philosophic school. Pseudonymity, a key device in the appeal to tradition in both the Socratic and Isocratean literature, is at home in the paraenetic Pastoral Epistles, since pseudonimity uses the example of the very authority figure which the paraenesis seeks to keep alive and transmit, allowing the author to cast the letters in a way that best depicts those examples. Fiore counts this as the likely historical setting for the Pastorals.[23] As regards understanding a specific, real-life situation behind the Pastorals, Fiore changes little from the positions of Karris or Johnson.

In a 1981 dissertation D. Verner has sought to establish the social setting of the Pastorals based on observations of the epistles' appropriation of the *Haustafel* form.[24] Reviewing previous research, Verner breaks with the "minimalist" position of Karris and others who

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[19] Fiore 43. Noting that the line between church order and exhortation-testament is vague in the Pastorals, F. contends that "church order" as a description of the Pastorals cannot explain the two types of letters used. "Since the qualifications of bishops [and others] are not specific to Christianity nor to a particular office, the obligations and duties are vague. . . . The result is that the 'Church Order' is neither explicitly church, nor definitely order" (8–9).

[20] Fiore 368.

[21] Fiore 368. F. lists twelve points of contact between the paraenesis of the Pastorals and that of the Socratic epistles.

[22] Fiore 369.

[23] Fiore 425.

[24] David C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles.* (1981 PhD diss. Emory University). SBLDS 71. Chico: Scholars, 1983. A fascinating study of possible social ramifications of the Pastorals is given by Dennis Ronald MacDonald (*The Legend and the Apostle: The Battle for Paul in Story and Canon* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983]) who explores the suggestion that the Pastorals are the result of the orthodox

are essentially following Dibelius, and follows the more recent studies of J. Crouch[25] and D. Balch.[26] Whereas Crouch and Balch do not agree on their assessments of the function of the Haustafel in the Pastorals, both argue that real situations in churches motivated the use of Haustafeln in the first place, such that the specific use of the Haustafel can illuminate the real situation behind the writings. Whereas he notes that Crouch and Balch disagree as to the origin of the Haustafel schema in the New Testament (Crouch argues for a historical development of the schema, whereas Balch argues that the various versions of the codes arose independently as individual responses to particular needs),[27] Verner finds allies in these two writers because Crouch can argue that the Colossian Haustafel reveal social tensions in the Colossian church, and Balch maintains a similar position for the code in 1 Peter.[28]

Verner demonstrates that the Haustafeln employ the ancient topos, "on household management," and carry forward its basic ethical perspective while at the same time using it differently than pagan philosophical or apologetic literature. "The topos is employed in conjunction with a schema which involves ethical exhortation addressed to various specific social groupings within the church, especially social groupings within the household. While the topos is traditional, the individual schema is understood to have originated and developed within Christian circles. The particular combination of topos and schema in the Pastorals Verner calls "station codes" after a suggestion by von Campenhausen.[29] "The form of the Haustefeln thus strongly suggests that they address real, concrete, and in some cases persistent social needs within the church."[30] Verner argues that paraenetic discourse can express traditional ideas in a variety of ways, and the relation to tradition for any given piece of paraenesis can only be determined by detailed examination of each instance. Moreover, against Dibelius and his followers he argues that paraenesis should not always be taken as totally general, but can in fact function to embody the developed, coherent viewpoint of a particular author.[31] Thus Verner sees that the Pastorals arose in a social climate in which the role of women was changing[32] and insubordination (of women, heretics, and perhaps slaves) was a threat to the well-being of the church. The author identifies with his upper class leadership and writes "these

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(continued)
response to heretical Pauline legends, especially those represented in *The Acts of Paul and Thecla.* Contrary to Dibelius and others, MacDonald insists that to understand the Pastorals the false teachers against whom they were written must be identified (56) but these he identifies not with the one group of standard candidates (Gnostics, Jewish Christians, Marcionites, etc.), but with those purveyors of a Paulinism which sought to continue the tradition of radical sectarianism (78; 81). "The author of the Pastorals stands within the tradition which tried to domesticate the apocalyptic radicalism of the church" (78) and preserve a good image for the church in society.

[25] James E. Crouch, *The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafel.* FRLANT 109. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972.

[26] David L. Balch. *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter.* SBLMS 26. Chico: Scholars, 1981.

[27] Verner 22–23.

[28] Verner 18–22.

[29] Verner 90.

[30] Verner 90–91. Verner notes that this analysis supports the basic position of Crouch.

[31] Verner 113; 115.

[32] Verner 64.

things" (1 Tim 3:14–16)—a reference at least to the "station code" material—to encourage proper behavior in the "household of God" and to minimize social tensions both between members of the community and between the community and outsiders.[33]

Finally, one last study will be reviewed: that of L. Donelson.[34] Using the pseudepigraphical letter as his overarching construct, Donelson attempts a synthetic reading of the Pastorals, setting out to show that the author interrelates his material and it is therefore inadvisable for the interpreter to fragment the Pastorals into groups of materials with autonomous functions.[35] He contends that the hermeneutic of the Pastorals is based on (1) pseudepigraphy and (2) the logic and categories of Greco-Roman ethics, such that ". . . the author is best understood as a Greco-Roman ethicist whose arguments constitute an ethical system with warrants and argumentation analogous to Epictetus, Seneca, and other contemporary ethicists."[36] The closest analogy to the uneven and eclectic paraenetic writing style of the Pastorals is the diatribe used by Greco-Roman ethicists, and the author's main tool is example. Variety masks his ethical system.[37] The use of logic and example, Donelson maintains, should be taken formally as descendents of the Aristotelian rhetorical categories of enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism) and paradigm, which he sees as controlling Greco-Roman ethical method and hermeneutics.[38]

Donelson cites favorably both Fiore and Verner who support his positions to the point of speaking of the author's argument as diatribe, and conceding its coherence. He faults both authors, however, for generalizing from one phenomenon and not attempting a synthetic reading which relates theology to ethics. He concedes that Fiore is moving in the right direction, but maintains that he does not carry the concept of paradigm far enough (especially in the persons of Paul, Timothy, and Titus). Verner, on the other hand, is criticized for misunderstanding the fictional nature of the argument and reading the Pastorals as if they more or less accurately reflect the actual conditions in the community of the Pastorals.[39] Donelson maintains that the arguments and all the details of the Pastorals (including the "personal notes") are fabrications, functions of pseudepigraphy, and are idealized accounts or wishes, not fact.[40]

For Donelson, the pseudepigraphical letter genre and the author's theology of tradition handed down in unbroken succession to figures with a paradigmatic function are "nearly automatic companions."[41] Whereas he acknowledges that there is no one analogy for "the pseudepigraphical letter" so that "pseudepigraphical letter genre" is not a formal

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[33] Verner 109–111; 182–184.

[34] Lewis R. Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles.* PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1984. (= Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie 22. [Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1986]).

[35] Donelson 113.

[36] Donelson 3.

[37] Donelson 109. The best analogy to the Pastorals' use of contrast (antithesis) is that found in Epictetus and Seneca (112).

[38] Donelson 80.

[39] Donelson 112; 4–5.

[40] Donelson 5; 24; 25–26. "The frequency and effectiveness with which the Socratic letters employ the pseudepigraphical devices of extraneous detail and personal references vitiate any arguments about the Pastorals which insist that no pseudepigraphical letter could contain such mundane remarks about parchments and winter cloaks or such intimate greetings. . . ." (36–37).

[41] Donelson 66.

designation, Donelson maintains that category best describes the literary background of the Pastorals. They are closest in form and function to the "diverse and sophisticated" Socratic letters which were written to propogate philosophic life.[42]

Following the model of Greco-Roman ethical writing found primarily in Epictetus, Donelson traces what he calls the cosmological-ethical system which is the development of the theology in the Pastorals. The author's theology develops around the cosmological plan of God for the salvation of mankind. This is worked out in the first and second epiphanies of Christ, and places the church within that framework as waiting for the second coming. The primary purpose of the letters is identified in 1 Tim 3:14–15, "I am writing these things to you . . . that you might know how to behave in the household of God."[43] Since cosmology does not necessarily produce the desired specific behaviors, the author makes "cosmological-anthropological connections" through the entrusted tradition. Here, Donelson says, is the climax of the author's creative task: he weaves together three fictions: (1) the existence of the Pauline tradtion as *paratbeke*[44] (2) the realization of a life style modelled upon Paul's paradigmatic behavior, and (3) the process of transmission of succession. All of this takes shape in the deeds and teaching of the orthodox church officers.[45]

The point of all of this, according to Donelson, is to provide the author with the means to carry out his radically exclusive Christianity in the face of opposition by false teachers. Judging by Donelson's stress on the fictional character of the all aspects of the letters as a function of the pseudepigraphical letter genre, one might assume that he is "minimalist" in the extreme as regards detecting the situation behind the letters. Such is not the case. Following the idea of the personalities as paradigms, Donelson posits three levels of opponents: "Paul's," those of "Timothy and Titus," and the author's own. "Only by examining the opponents in these three 'moments' can we be certain how the genre functions in describing them."[46] "The tendency to see all (the figures) as paradigms . . . suggests that all the portraits should be combined into one picture and that the resultant picture is of the author's own opponents."[47]

Having dispensed with the possiblity of historical opponents (of Paul or Timothy and Titus), Donelson is free to speculate about the author's opponents. Against a group of false teachers who do not value quiet virtue nor rigid church hierarchy (Donelson suggests that they may be Paulinist theologians)[48] the author conveys absolute authority to

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[42] Donelson 41. "The Pastorals are typical pseudepigraphical letters. . . . They do not employ a single device of deception or literary technique which cannot be paralleled elsewhere" (66).

[43] Donelson 152–154; 171.

[44] Donelson 165–167. D. says that the *paratbeke* is the creation of the author and comes into existence here for the first time. It contains essentially everything in the Pastorals, and, indeed is identified with them (192).

[45] Donelson 162–163.

[46] Donelson 118.

[47] Donelson 118.

[48] Donelson 126. D. suggests that these false teachers, paying attention to *muthoi* and *genealogiai* might acutally have been "puzzling out the difficulties in Paul with a detailed and aggressive hermeneutice of the OT." Based on a "Lordship Christology" they may have had a dynamic idea of the spirit which went against quiet virtue and promoted a kind of asceticism, thereby causing instability. "They were not unethical, but super-ethical."

authorized church leaders. Salvation is in the hands of the church leaders; baptism brings the spirit which provides the power to live virtuously. Thus, through education (paideia), the orthodox theolgical/ethical orientation and power structure is maintained. All of this is possible because of the pseudepigraphical letter format and the author's success at deception in its use.[49]

II

The debt which students of the Pastoral Epistles owe to these studies is immediately obvious. The location of the author's thought world within hellenistic ethical literary parameters has been amply demonstrated, and the detailed analyses of the paraenesis, Haustafeln, and other material is most illuminating. We are presented with several avenues to explore, as well as several questions to address in the discussion of the canonical perspective of the Pastorals.

While the discussion of the form and tradition criticism of the Pastorals has been greatly enhanced by these studies, our beginning question—"why were these epistles written, and why were they written in this form?"—has been in some senses skirted. The question of why there are three letters, instead of one, has not been significantly addressed, nor has Dibelius' question, "why does the author need both a 1 Timothy and a Titus?" The problem of the different genre forms in the Pastorals is brought up—indeed Fiore objects to studies which treat the Pastorals *en bloc*—yet it is not dealt with in a thoroughgoing fashion.

Whereas it might be objected that these questions fall outside the parameters of the studies surveyed, it should be noted that two of the studies ostensibly attempt to engage the Pastorals at some of these levels. Fiore ponders certain aspects of these interconnections (seeking to show how 2 Timothy, distinct in genre from the other two letters, functions paraenetically in relation to the other letters), and concludes that the author has used as models two forms of Socratic letters which both participate in a similar paraenetic style. Donelson's study begins with a clear, conscious attention to hermeneutical issues and methods in ordering his study. His attempt to give a synthetic reading of the Pastorals and avoid the "malaise" of other studies is to be applauded, even if he has perhaps overstated his case for the role of the pseudepigraphigal letter. However, though he cites R. Funk, who is followed by W. Stenger, in the development of the apostolic parousia motif as a possible category through which to understand the genres of the three letters and their interrelation, he does not take up the discussion. He assumes (correctly, I believe), that the central theme of the three letters is stated in 1 Tim 3:14–15, yet does not attempt to relate the three together on the basis of this theme. In his search for a system, he consistently appears to have read the three as one document. Nonetheless, the value of his work is not to be minimized.

Verner's insights are helpful, pointing out as he does that Dibelius' distinctions between Haustafel and Gemeindeordnung as used by Karris are probably too strict. Verner sees the inner developments of the schemata within the individual station codes as responses to real situations, and thus provides a way to compare the different lists and the letters themselves.

Karris' argument is, as noted above, uncomfortably confining. His self-declared minimalism is undoubtedly too cautious. It was gratifying, therefore, to read in his

[49] Donelson 183; 187.

commentary[50] the all-too brief ruminations about some of the issues I have raised. In a delightfully engaging discussion for laypeople Karris has broken with the traditional order of commentaries on the Pastorals and treats 2 Timothy first. His reasons for this, designed to make his public think about what I would call canonical issues, are (1) the canonical order of the three epistles is not sacrosanct, since it is merely mechanical, based on the length of the documents; (2) since the Pastorals were all written at the same time, there is no reason to assume that the author wanted 1 Timothy read before 2 Timothy; (3) because of the similarity of 1 Timothy and Titus they should be read together; and, most important for Karris, (4) 2 Timothy is treated first because of its great emphasis on the image of Paul, which Karris is using as a focal point in his discussion. Karris notes that in 1 Timothy and Titus the image of Paul recurs, somewhat diminished, as the means by which the author interprets his traditional material of regulations and creeds. "By commenting on 2 Timothy first I will highlight the various dimensions of the image of Paul and thus prepare us for the reptition and development of those dimensions in 1 Timothy and Titus."[51] Even though I think that the author had some definite ideas about which document should be read first, I find this approach insightful, as far as it goes, because it asks about the interrelatedness of the documents and their presentation of themes, noting that the modern order is arbitrary.

A few indirect suggestions have been made as to important topics for a canonical-critical inquiry into the Pastorals. Stated more formally, I believe that there are three areas which need to be further investigated. These are (1) the order of composition of the three letters, (2) their generic interrelation, and (3) the development of material (traditional, paraenetic, paradigmatic, etc.) from letter to letter. As regards method, I also suggest that the investigation should logically follow this order, since the order of composition is the most basic of the three, and decisions at that level affect the other two. The above studies—all largely working out of the same literary milieu—have shown that demonstrating literary analogies alone does not guarantee that the author's methods have been fully explored and understood. As a result of these three areas of investigation it is hoped that (a) the answer to the beginning questions will become clearer, and (b) that some perspective will be gained for evaluating the contributions on the use of hellenistic literary forms made by the above studies.

Both the social and literary backgrounds to the Pastorals are as important as they are elusive. Neither should be scorned in favor of the other, but they should be explored together in an attempt at a synthetic reading which best explains the phenomena therein. In short, I believe that the author of the Pastorals was more eclectic, and his literary and social background more diverse than Karris, Fiore or Donelson are willing to admit. As a reminder of the pervasive influence of hellenism in empire at the end of the 1st century C.E., W. Jaeger has stressed how important to the age was the concept of *paideia*.[52] He notes that Christianity, through its contacts with hellenism (including hellenistic Judaism!) truly becomes a product of the hellenistic world. Specifically, in tracing the development of the Christian use of *paideia* as found in Clement of Rome and later Christian writers, Jaeger points out the emergence of the concept in later Pauline circles, namely Ephesians 6:4, and also 2 Timothy 3:14–16.[53] Jaeger says that Clement's use of the idea of the "paideia of God," though greatly expanded over Ephesians, is used the same way as that

[50] See above, n. 9.

[51] Karris (1979) 3.

[52] Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, (Oxford: 1961).

[53] Jaeger 117–118.

work's "paideia of the Lord," and not as Clement's LXX sources use it, which roughly equals "chastisement." The phrase stands for ". . . the sum total of all the Logia of the written tradition . . . ," an idea corresponding to Greek usage. It is used in the same sense, according to Jaeger, in 2 Tim 3:14–16. "Under the influence of . . . the much admired 'Greek paideia,' which was common knowledge for all men, a new concept of Christian paideia was being evolved. . . ."[54]

In such developments we should consider not only hellenistic Greek backgrounds, but also the possiblity that hellenistic Jewish influences are at work in the early church. As has often been noted, Philo represents a major Jewish thinker who is indebted to hellenism for his vocabulary, structure and style. Specifically in this case, Jewish Wisdom—also influenced by hellenistic Greek thought—contains several parallels to this and other passages of the Pastorals. As in 2 Timothy inspired Scripture—defined as "able to make you wise unto salvation"—is profitable (ophelimos) for teaching (didaskalian), reproof (elegmon), correction (epanorthosin), and training in righteousness (paideian ten en dikaiosunen), so in Wisdom are these concepts important. Wisdom is the source of *paideia* and *didaskalia* (Sir 24:32–33); she teaches *dikaiosune*. In Wisdom the mercy of God is *elegmos* and *paideia* and *didaskalia* (Sir 18:13), and "Wisdom teaches self-control and understanding, righteousness and courage; there is nothing in life for man more profitable than these" (WisSol 8:7). "All wisdom is fear of the Lord; all wisdom is following the Law" (Sir 19:20), such that, similar to 2 Timothy, following the Law is *paideia en dikaiosune* (Bar 4:13). Whereas Jaeger notes development in Christianity toward a more comprehensive idea of "paideia" and I do not claim to see the background of our passage here in exclusion to pagan sources, we should not discount the background of Jewish wisdom for the Pastorals (and the rest of Christianity), as it reflected on living in a hellenistic world.[55]

An example of social background, which suggests implications for literary understanding, can be adduced in the athletic metaphors used in the Pastorals.[56] The gymnasium was an essential element of Greek life in the hellenistic age, and formed the center of civic and, to some extent, religious life.[57] These schools were organized in the hellenistic age as centers of both civic and military training (see athletic and military imagery in 2 Timothy) and had clubs attached to them for the older and younger men.[58] One text speaks of the necessity to deposit the "laws of gymnasiarchy" in the public archives and to inscribe them on a stele for the gymnasium itself, so that the young men (neoteroi) will be more obedient to their leader. The text speaks of the procedure for registration of approved teachers (grammatodidaskoloi) and provisions for hearing complaints against the leaders.[59] Some of these topics are also found in the ethical texts, but the circumstantial similarities of details suggest a situation in the Pastorals familiar with everyday life in the hellenistic world.

With the author's diverse background and complex literary tastes in mind, we turn the question of the order of the Pastorals. Very little external evidence is available to us. The

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[54] Jaeger 117.

[55] I would argue that Donelson's concept of "paideia" as education toward virtuous living from the Greco-Roman ethicists does not do justice to 2 Timothy 3:14–17.

[56] See Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agnon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup. 16. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967).

[57] A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City From Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford: 1941) 220; 225.

[58] M. M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest* (Cambridge, 1981) 201; 203. Even the clubs for older men had "gumnasiarchs."

[59] Austin 203.

Pastorals are simply not widely known at an early time. Tatian recognized Titus, but not 1 and 2 Timothy. Fragments of Titus are found in P32 and P61—1 and 2 Timothy have the dubious distinction of being the only New Testament documents not found in extant papyri.[60] Absent in Marcion and P46, they are listed by some of the Fathers expressly according to length, that is in our modern order. The major exception, of course, is the Muratorian Canon, which lists Titus first. We must conclude that the probable reason for the present order is simply the mechanical judgment made by the church regarding length. The only external evidence that the documents existed in another order suggests that Titus was first.

When we look for internal evidence for the original order of composition, we find a few clues that seem to support the priority of Titus. J. Quinn has made some observations which seem to uphold the order "Titus, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy."[61] These include (1) the unusually long introduction of Titus—percentage-wise longer than the authentic Paulines—which serves in a way as an introduction to all three letters; (2) the repetition of much of the material in Titus within 1 Timothy; (3) the abrupt ending of 1 Timothy and the way in which 1 and 2 Timothy "telescope" into each other; (4) the appropriateness for the final position of 2 Timothy as "testament of Paul;" and (5) the fact that this order—Titus, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy—is found in the Muratorian canon.[62]

If we are correct in taking Titus as first, then the second part of our concern, the interrelation of the letters, including genre, comes to the fore. It has been noticed by many students that Titus is not only shorter than 1 Timothy, but also less focused in its concerns. This includes both the address to the church leaders and the image of Paul. In church matters Titus seems theoretical; 1 Timothy gives a much stronger impression of reflecting a real situation. Likewise, both the image of Titus and of Paul is flat in Titus, unlike the progressively heightening personal images in 1 and 2 Timothy.[63]

In another paper I have argued that in the Pastorals the figure of Timothy is presented as the primary Pauline successor in a conscious analogy to Moses and Joshua. The figure of Timothy is given special attention over that of Titus. In 2 Timothy, Paul's "dear son" (2 Tim 1:2), for whom Paul has great concern and whom he longs to see, who wept over Paul's absence, and about whose family we learn certain details (2 Tim 1:5; cf. 3:15), is called "the Lord's Servant" (2 Tim 2:24), and is styled as an "evangelist" (2 Tim 4:5). Unlike Titus, Timothy follows Paul as *kerux* (2 Tim 4:2). His ministry has a special relation to the handling of Scripture (2 Tim 3:15–17; cf. 2:15).

More importantly, there are significant things said in relation to Timothy in 1 and 2 Timothy which do not appear in Titus. In both 1 and 2 Timothy, Timothy is called "Man of God" (1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 3:17).[64] In both epistles Timothy has a gift by the

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[60] Bruce M. Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament* (Oxford, 1968) 250–254.

[61] Jerome D. Quinn, "The Last Volume of Luke: The Relation of Luke-Acts to the Pastoral Epistles," in *Perspectives in Luke-Acts*, ed. Charles Talbert (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1978), p. 63, n. 7. Whereas I do not believe that Luke wrote the Pastorals, I think Quinn's observations regarding their order stand on their own.

[62] Quinn 63–64, n. 7.

[63] I believe that Karris (1979; see above, n. 51) has asked some important questions, but I think he has inadvertently reversed the original order of the letters.

[64] "Man of God" has Old Testament associations, referring to the prophets (1 Sam 2:27; 9:6f; 1 Kings 12:22; 13:1f; etc.), but also of Moses (Deut 33:1; Josh 14:16; Ps 89:1 [LXX]). The phrase implies inspiration, not only of the prophets, who lived at a spiritual level); Test Isaac 4:7 (of Isaac, who was said to have the Spirit of God). Men of God are

laying on of hands (1 Tim 4:14; cf. 1:18; 2 Tim 1:6).[65] And, as already noted, in both 1 and 2 Timothy it is Timothy who "guards the deposit" (*paratheke* 1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:14; cf. 1:12 [see above, p. 2]). In 1 Tim 1:18 Paul "commits" (*paratitbemi*) his instruction to Timothy, and in 2 Tim 2:2, Timothy is told to "commit" (*paratitbemi*) Paul's teaching to faithful men, who may teach others. Viewed in this fashion, these unique elements together point to the conclusion that, unlike Titus, Timothy has a special charismatic role which is compared to the prophets—even Moses (cf. Man of God, Servant of the Lord—Paul is "Servant of God" in Tit 1:1), which is related to the receiving and passing on of Paul's gospel (cf. 1 Tim 1:18), to preaching (*kerussein*), and to the handling of Scripture. To put it another way, "in the Pastoral Epistles there is a massive emphasis on the Holy Spirit with relation to one person, Timothy".[66]

But what then of Titus? It is helpful to look at the work of W. Stenger, as noted above by Donelson.[67] Stenger follows the lead of R. Funk in applying the idea of the Pauline travelogue motif to the Pastorals. Funk has argued that Paul develops the classical travelogue through idea of levels of presence ("parousia"), first by his own presence, then that of an emissary, and, finally, through his letters. Stenger has applied this format to the Pastorals, arguing that Titus and Timothy are presented in temporary emissary roles (Paul will eventually come).

With Titus seen in a missionary role and Timothy pictured in an established church setting (as Dibelius sees it), the roles of Titus and Timothy are partially explained. When one views the increasing importance of Timothy, along with the ever heightening image of Paul, however, the function of the three letters in this order is still unclear. Because it does not fit with his conception of the travelogue motif, Stenger falters in the explanation of the existence of 2 Timothy. Stenger wishes to show a distinct open-endedness to the apostolic tradition and mission of the Pastorals, and the testament-like 2 Timothy obviously is closed: Paul is no longer coming to see Timothy; Timothy is indeed looking like a permanent church leader. I would argue that Stenger has inadvertently discovered an important insight into the purpose of the Pastorals in the very thing he cannot explain. Timothy and Titus are paradigms (so Donelson); they are the "same" church leader at three stages of the church's existence. Titus is the missionary at

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(continued)

pneumatophoroi (Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* 2:9; cf. Hos 9:7 [LXX]), and the prophets are *hoi hagioi tou theou* who are "borne along by the Spirit of God" (2 Pet 1:21). Moreover, "Man of God" and "Servant of the Lord" are parallel in Josh 14:6f.

[65] gift = "charisma" in both passages. In 1 Timothy the gift was bestowed by the laying on of hands by the elders; in 2 Timothy it is by the laying on of hands by Paul himself.

[66] Jerome D. Quinn, "The Holy Spirit in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Sin, Salvation, and the Spirit*, ed. D. Durkin (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1979), p. 359. Quinn remarks that the relation of Paul through Titus to the presbyter-bishops may serve a different function than that of Paul through Timothy, but reserves the development of the idea for a later work, to my knowledge not yet completed.

[67] Werner Stenger, "Timotheus und Titus als literarische Gestalten." *Kairos* 16 (1974), 252–267 (esp. pp. 252–254); Stenger cites Robert W. Funk, *Language Hermeneutic, and the Word of God*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966; cf. also, R. W. Funk, "The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Function," in *Christian History and Interpretation*. Studies Presented to John Knox. ed. W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, R. Niehbuhr. Cambridge, 1967, 249–268. See Peter Trummer, *Die Paulustradition der Pastoralbriefe*. Beitraege zur biblischen Exegese und Theologie, Bd. 8. (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1978), pp. 113–114.

the church's inception. In 1 Timothy, Timothy is the apostolic emissary; in 2 Timothy, he is the successor. The use of different genre structures are best explained in this light. Titus provides a lengthy introduction, with theoretical ideas and a shorter Haustafel. 1 Timothy expands upon this format, introducing the unique features of the person of Timothy. The oft-noted "testamental" character of 2 Timothy has the function of pointing the church into its future; the transition from apostolic to post-apostolic age is complete.

If our assumptions are correct, then we ought to be able to see some development in the paraentic and traditional material from Titus into 1 Timothy, and from 1 Timothy into 2 Timothy; in fact, we can. All three letters show a concern with the household motif although the Haustafeln only appear in Titus and 1 Timothy.[68] When these lists are laid out side by side,[69] one can characterize 1 Timothy as a greatly expanded version of Titus, with the two major sections in 1 Timothy (2:1–3:15; 5:1–6:2) separated by paraenesis. 1 Timothy adds to Titus' list the concern for deacons, kings, the rich, and women, including widows. The material in the second section of 1 Timothy can be seen as an expansion of that of the first, being largely concerned with widows, as a special expression of the concern for women from the first section. It is interesting that 1 Tim 3:14–15, taken by many as the statement of purpose for all three letters, is in conjunction with the travelogue motif ("I plan to come to you, but if I am delayed here is how you should behave in the household of God. . . .")

The paraenesis is also developed within the Pastorals. As Johnson has noted, "If one were to eliminate the rest of 1 Timothy and link together the four units dealing with Timothy the ideal teacher, as opposed to the false teachers, one would have a fairly coherent personal paraenetic letter like 2 Timothy."[70] To this general observation we would add that the prophecy of 1 Timothy 4 is closely paralleled in that of 2 Timothy 3, in such a way as to suggest that there is a conscious attempt by the author to connect to two letters in that manner. The development of the figure of Timothy from 1 Timothy to 2 Timothy tends to confirm the tentative order of the Pastorals.

With this brief overview it is hoped that some appropriate and promising questions have been raised. It is obvious that many details remain to be worked out. However, we have shown, albeit with very broad strokes, that a canonically related rationale for the existence of these three letters, and for both a Titus and a 1 Timothy, as well as for a possible original order of the three, can be suggested on the basis of the evidence available. The

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[68] Obviously 2 Timothy is less concerned with this, although 2 Tim 2:20 makes it quite clear that Timothy is a minister in the household of God. That the first Haustafel of 1 Timothy is related to the topos of household management seems clear from 3:14, where the *ekklesia*, a term from the Greek *polis*, is called the household of God. The comparison of household to city is commonplace in the topos on household management. See Jaeger 15.

[69] Surprisingly, the vocabulary of the Haustafel material in the two letters shows a great deal of independence. There are a few places where the language of duty, vice and virtue overlap between Titus and 1 Timothy—notably Titus 1:7 and 3:2 are very similar to 1 Tim 3:2–3—but many more instances where the language unique to either Titus or 1 Timothy (there are several hapax legomena included in this list, but more of the vocabulary is found elsewhere outside the Pastorals). This would seem to suggest, against Verner, that there may be traditional sources behind the lists, not just author adaptations for different purposes.

[70] Johnson 25.

herculean efforts of the above scholars whose works are surveyed above have blazed a trail for us to follow, asking of them and the hellenistic literature they cite whether the above hypotheses can indeed fit the literary evidence.

Community and Character: Matthew's Vision of the Church

Edgar Krentz
Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago

Matthew is universally recognized as "the ecclesiastical Gospel." He alone of the four gospel writers uses the term ἐκκλησία (16:18; 18:17); concern for the character and life of the disciple community runs throughout the gospel. As Donald Senior says,[1] the "study of Matthew's view of the Church takes us into almost every area of the Gospel." This paper uses Matthew 23 as a starting point for discussing the Matthaean vision of the church. That vision is in part a response to the actual church for which Matthew writes. Its life and character are also reflected in this gospel, but Matthew does not affirm everything that is and is critical of some tendencies that he sees.

Recent scholarship has given due attention to the study of Matthew's view of church. Bornkamm, for example, concentrated interest on the eschatological dimension in Matthew's ecclesiology.[2] Later he examined in detail the language of church order in Matthew 18.[3] Eduard Schweizer[4] has examined the life of the Matthaean community in a series of articles, conveniently gathered in one volume. Frankemoelle[5] focussed interest on the covenant in the Old Testament as paradigm for the relation of church and resurrected Christ in Matthew and described how Matthew relates the disciple community to Israel and the Old Testament. In short, we are not entering an uncharted sea.

Matthew 23, however, has not been utilized in this study as much as it deserves. J. Duncan M. Derrett[6] calls Matt 23:8–10 "an unpopular and relatively neglected passage," a description that might be applied to the entire chapter. Specific attention to this chapter has been rare; scholars frequently draw on it to discuss Matthew's rejection of Judaism

[1] *What are they saying about Matthew?* (New York, Ramsey: Paulist, 1983) 67.

[2] Guenther Bornkamm, "End-expectation and Church in Matthew," in Guenther Bornkamm, Gerhard Barth, and Heinz Joachim Held, *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* (Tr. Percy Scott; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963) 15–57.

[3] Guenther Bornkamm, "The Authority to 'Bind' and 'Loose' in the Church in Matthew's Gospel: The Problem of Sources in Matthew's Gospel," in *Jesus and Man's Hope* (Pittsburgh: Perspective, 1970) 1: 37–50; William G. Thompson, *Matthew's Advice to a Divided Community Mt. 17,22–18,35* (Analecta Biblica 44; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970).

[4] *Matthaeus und seine Gemeinde* (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 71. Stuttgart: KBW Verlag, 1974) [one chapter published in English translation in Graham Stanton, ed., *The Interpretation of Matthew* (Issues in Religion and Theology 6. Philadelphia: Fortress; London: SPCK, 1983) 129–155.

[5] Hubert Frankemoelle, *Jahwebund und Kirche Christi* (Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen 10; Muenster: Aschendorff, 1974).

[6] "Mt 23,8–9 a Midrash on Is 54,13 and Jer 31,33–34," *Biblica* 62 (1981) 372.

in his environment, but do not study it as a text in its own right. Recent studies known to me include only the following. Ernst Haenchen published a sharp-eyed study of its component traditions, based on form and content, in 1951,[7] a study reprinted in 1965[8] and again in 1980.[9] David E. Garland, in *The Intention of Matthew 23*,[10] examined the composition of the chapter [structural criticism], the editorial alterations made by the evangelist [redaction criticism], and the function of the chapter in the Gospel [literary criticism] to conclude that the chapter is

> . . . not Matthew's attack upon Israel but an attempt to provide a solution for the *Christian* problem of Israel's rejection of the Jewish Messiah and the increasing takeover of the kingdom of heaven by Gentiles, in addition to the problem of explaining the recent destruction of the Temple and city of David. (p. 212)

Finally, J. Duncan M. Derrett[11] holds that Matt 23:8–10 is a midrash on Is 54:13 and Jer 31:33–34. That pre-Matthaean midrash is adapted by Matthew "for a specific purpose, historically intelligible." The church is in competition with the synagogue, either to make or keep converts. Matthew, Derrett argues, holds that the intermediation of Jesus was essential in the past and remains such in the present. Therefore, "no charismatic developments (e.g. possession, trance, glossalalia, prophesyings) could draw the worshipper nearer to God than Jesus, nor equally with Jesus" (p. 383). Derrett's interpretation, like Garland's, points us to a positive function for Matthew 23 inside the Matthaean church. Therefore, a reexamination of the chapter might prove valuable in assessing Matthew's ecclesiology.

Literary analysis of Matthew supports the suggestion. Walter Grundmann suggested that the Sermon on the Mount and the last great discourse (Matt 23:1–25:46) were complementary pieces.[12] They enclose the public ministry of Jesus:

> So entsteht ein bedeutsames Gegenstueck zur Bergpredigt; beginnt diese Jesu Wirken, so endet es nun, ihr Thema noch einmal aufnehmend, in der Trennung von den Pharisaeern und ihren Schriftgelehrten, die das Leben Israels zur Zeit des Matthaeus allein bestimmen und beherrschen, in den apokalyptischen Worten und Gleichnissen und im Ausblick auf das Weltgericht so, wie auch die Bergpredigt endet. Ging ihr Jesus Vorgeschichte voraus, so folgt den letzten Reden die Passion Jesu und das Ostergeschehen. So rundet sich das Matthaeus-Evangelium und gibt ein ausgewogenes Bild von Jesu Sendung.

Thus two great sermons mark off the ministry of Jesus in Matthew. Robert Gundry[13] points to other similarities between these two sermons: they are of unusual, but similar

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[7] "Matthaeus 23," *ZTK* 48 (1951) 38–63.

[8] Ernst Haenchen, *Gott und Mensch. Gesammelte Aufsaetze.* (Tubingen: Mohr, 1965) 29–54.

[9] In Joachim Lange, ed., *Das Matthaeus-evangelium* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980) 134–163.

[10] Supplements to Novum Testamentum 52; Leiden: Brill, 1979.

[11] In the article mentioned above, 372–386.

[12] *Das Evangelium nach Matthaeus* (THKNT 1; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1968) 481.

[13] *Matthew. A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art.* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 453.

length; both are associated with a mountain (24:3); Jesus takes a seated position in both (5:1–2, 24:3, cf. 23.2); both end with a judgment scene in which the condemned address Jesus as κύριος. Matt 23–25 forms a single great discourse that serves as the conclusion to his Jesus' public ministry. One expects, therefore that this discourse will sum up major concerns of the evangelist.

Scholars have debated whether Matthew 23 should be included as part of the final sermon. A number of facts argue for its inclusion. The omission of Mark 12:41–44 (the Widow's Mite) in the text of Matthew creates a direct tie between chapters 23 and 24.[14] In that way chapters 23–25 are the commentary on the temple controversies and their significance for the disciples. Moreover, there is precedent in Matthew for a sermon having a double audience, both disciples and crowd[s]. While Matt 5–7 begins with Jesus calling the disciples to himself on the mountain (Matt 5:1–2), it ends with the crowds expressing amazement at his authoritative teaching (7:28–29). Third, like the third discourse (13:1–52) the fifth sermon "is broken by a change of scene and audience."[15] Thus neither the change of location or audience implies that the three chapters should not be taken together as a single discourse.

The recognition of the "sermonic unity" of Matthew 23–25 has important consequences for reading the story and interpreting the message. Matthew 23 is part of the final teaching of the disciples. Key themes that appeared earlier in the gospel reappear here. Richard A. Edwards points out in his narrative interpretation of Matthew[16] that the address reminds the reader of significant items in the Sermon on the Mount: disciples' righteousness exceeding that of scribes and Pharisees (5:20); warning against hypocritical actions done for admiring observation (6:1–18, identified in 6:1 as δικαιοσύνη ὑμῶν). He argues that the first woe is not really directed towards the scribes and Pharisees, but is "a rhetorical device intended to instruct the followers by describing the opponents, the antitype of the disciple" (79). Edwards does not make clear whether he regards Matthew 23–25 as one or two discourses; but his work makes extensive use of the five great sermons in telling the story of Jesus.[17]

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[14] Cf. Erich Klostermann, *Das Matthaeusevangelium* (HNT 4, 4th ed.; Tubingen: Mohr, 1971) 191.

[15] F. W. Beare, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981) 446.

[16] *Matthew's Story of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 78.

[17] It is therefore surprising to discover what little use Jack Kingsbury makes of the sermons in his presentation of *Matthew as Story*. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986). The sermons receive no specific attention; rather he summarizes "The Preaching of Jesus" (58–64) and "The Teaching of Jesus" (64–70) in the section "The Ministry of Jesus to Israel and Israel's Repudiation of Jesus (4:17–16:20." The five sermons are not discussed in relation to their location in the narrative, that is, they do not appear as an integral part of the Matthaean story. The closest Kingsbury comes to dealing with the placement of the sermons as literary or narrative features is his comment on p. 84: "Thus, by reducing the Jewish *leaders* in open debate to silence, Jesus forces their withdrawal from the scene (22:46). With the leaders gone, Jesus publicly addresses the *crowds* in the temple, together with the disciples (23:1). And leaving the temple, Jesus delivers his eschatological discourse to the *disciples* alone (24:1–3). Through the use of this *chiastic* pattern, Matthew signals the implied reader that the culmination of the story is at hand." This is a sharp-sighted observation. It is nonetheless a curious fact that Kingsbury does not give the content of

Matthew 23–25 offers several specific insights into Matthew's view of life in the disciple community. Matthew presents the leaders in Jerusalem as negative models of disciple activity. The seven woes all illustrate failures in leadership that are destructive of community. Haenchen[18] describes Matthew 23 as an answer to the question "Was trennt die Gemeinde von den das geistliche Leben Israels beherrschenden Maechten, Rabbinat und Pharisaeismus?" He thus implies a positive value for the community in chapter 23.

Matt 23:1-12

The first major unit of the discourse, Matt 23:2–12, discusses leadership in the disciple community. The scribes and Pharisees are the foil. They took [and have] their seat upon the seat of Moses (ἐπὶ τῆς Μωϋσέως καθέδρας ἐκάθισαν, 23:2). The verb "sit" in this context denotes authority and power, as it does when Jesus teaches (5:1, 24:2). Rulers (20:21, 23), judges (19:28), and teachers all sit.[19] The "seat of Moses" indicates that scribe and Pharisee were interpreting the law of Moses. M. 'Aboth 1.1 says "Moses received the Law from Sinai and committed it to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the Prophets; and the Prophets committed it to the men of the Great Synagogue. They said three things: Be deliberate in judgement, raise up many disciples, and make a fence around the Law."[20] To "sit in the seat of Moses" is to interpret the Torah; the authority of the Torah attaches to the interpretation of Torah; it claims the same authority as Moses.[21]

Matthew recognizes this authority of the Torah. Therefore everything (πάντα οὖν) that the teachers of the law say is to be done should be observed by the disciples (23:3). The law's authority is not at issue (cf. 5:17–20). Rather the problem is the gap between word and deed, between precept and practice. "They talk and do not perform" (23:3). The result is that they load heavy burdens upon their disciples that they themselves make no effort to move (23:4). The contrast to 11:28–30 is evident: Jesus' "yoke is easy and burden is light." Jesus, the teacher, is quite different from scribe and Pharisee. 23:5–7 seems at first to be a digression in the argument. Its point is not the gap between precept and practice, but the desire to gain public approbation and honor. The relationship to Matt 6:1–18 is close. The phrase πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (23:5) is close to ὅπως φανῶσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (6:5, 16). The last honor, a Matthaean addition to the Markan parallel (Mark

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(continued)
either address contained in 23–25. The sermon in Matt 18 fares better; it receives a four-line summary on p. 80.

[18] *Matthaeus 13*, 134 (cited from the reprint in Lange, *Das Matthaeus-Evangelium*).

[19] Cf. BAGD,s.v.

[20] Cited according to H. Danby, *The Mishnah*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) 446; R. Travers Herford, *The Ethics of the Talmud: Sayings of the Fathers* (New York: Schocken, 1962 = 1945) 19, points out that the Great Synagogue was historically the "ancestor of Pharisaism."

[21] The phrase may imply a function in worship; a seat of black basalt stone was found in the ruins of the Chorazin synagogue; a simpler one was discovered in the synagogue of Hammath-Tiberias. See N. Avigad, "Chorazain," in *Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land*, ed. Michael Avi-Yonah (Jerusalem: The Israel Exploration Society and Massada Press, 1975) 1.299–303, with illustration. The sarcophagus of Ahiram of Tyre, which shows him seated on his throne, pictures the authority of the ruler (cf. the scene on the top of the stele of the code of Hammurabi much earlier).

12:38–39), is that they love "to be called 'rabbi' by people." (23:7; cf. ὅπως δοξασθῶσιν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων, 6:2). The function of these verses is thus clear; the mention of "rabbi" ties 23:5b–7 to the direct address to the disciples that follows.

The point is that concern for titles shows that such hypocrisy and lawlessness (cf. 23:28) is present in the disciple community.[22] The change in auditor that follows stresses that fact. Matt 23:8–12, unique Matthaean material, is addressed directly to the disciples (ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ κληθῆτε ῥαββί). The address is emphatic, drawing a sharp contrast to the preceding. Its content is, at first reading, surprising. Logically Jesus should command the disciples to "do what they teach." What follows is quite different. The disciples are forbidden to accept titles that denote status or position. Three titles are abjured: ῥαββί-διδάσκαλος, and πατήρ. All are titles of honor for teachers of the Law inside Judaism.[23]

The first title is "rabbi." No disciple is to bear the title because "One is your teacher" (εἷς γάρ ἐστιν ὑμῶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, 23:8). Is there a linguistic play on the εἷς ὁ θεός confession of Judaism? The analogous formation in Mark 10:18, "No one is good except εἷς ὁ θεός," might favor that interpretation. However, the term διδάσκαλος makes it necessary to interpret rabbi as a title for a teacher. (Cf. 9:11, 12:38 for "teacher" applied to Jesus by non-disciples.)[24] The reference to "first seats in the synagogue" in 23:6 supports this opinion. Thus "rabbi" in this passage does not mean "My great one," i.e. God, as teacher of the Law.[25] What is at issue for Matthew is the authority of Jesus as the teacher of the post-Easter community. In Matthew Jesus is the one who teaches "with authority" (7:28, 13:54; cf. 22:33). All post-Easter authority is given to him (28:18; cf. 11:27). There is no room in the Matthaean church for any other teacher than Jesus, who is present with the disciples "to the close of the age" (28:20). The implications for the community are made explicit: there is no distinction among the disciples, for they are all ἀδελφοί ("siblings," in an age when inclusive language is desirable). The term "brother" means that one is a member of the same religious community in 18:15–18; the use is similar here (cf. 5:22, 23, 24; 23:11–12). The implications are clarified in 23:11–12.

Jesus forbids the use of a second honorary title, "Father," a widespread title in Israel; it is used of the great ancestors in Sir 44:1, while *M. 'Aboth* shows that the title was applied to outstanding teachers of the law.[26] The ὑμῶν stands in an unusual position in the sentence. It should probably be understood as a partitive genitive used as the object of the verb, not as a modifier of "Father."[27] The basis for the command is that the disciples have "one who is your father, the heavenly one." Klostermann (183) suggests, hesitantly, that Mal 2:10 may lie behind the appeal to the one father: "Is it not the one God who created us? Is there not one father of us all? What is this, that you have left, each of you,

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[22] John P. Meier, *The Vision of Matthew. Christology, Church and Morality in the First Gospel* (New York: Paulist, 1978) 161.

[23] Derrett provides convincing evidence in his article, 377–381.

[24] Grundmann, 486; see also E. Lohse, ῥαββί, *TDNT* 6, 962.

[25] Cf. Frankemoelle, 99–101; contrary to Daniel Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew. A Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith.* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 322. It is possible that a saying about God underlies the tradition here applied to Jesus by Matthew. Cf. Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975) 431.

[26] Cf. Str-B 1.918–919.

[27] Grundmann, 486; contra Gundry, 458.

his brother so as to defile the covenant of your fathers?" Schweizer (431) holds that this saying was originally directed against an appeal to Abraham as father of Israel (cf. 3.9); if he is correct, there may be a quiet apologetic against Peter as leader of the community, since Matt 16:18, read in the light of Isaiah 51:1, suggests that Peter is the Abraham of the Matthaean community. The "heavenly Father," the "Father who is in the heavens," is a Matthaean emphasis. The Father is the standard by which the maturity (τέλειοι) of disciples is measured (5:48); he is the one who observes and suitably rewards the righteousness (piety) of the disciples (6:1, 4, 6, 18), the one addressed in prayer (6:9), the one who cares for sparrows and disciples alike (6:27, 32), the one whose will determines the life of disciples (7:21; 18:14). The title "father," applied to a disciple, usurps the place and power of God. It raises the disciple to the position of God. The third prohibition is formulated like the first two. The title "leader" is forbidden because there is one leader only, the "Anointed One." Jesus is both teacher and guide; no other dare take those roles.

The implications of this threefold prohibition are made clear in the description of the disciples. The titles used to honor teachers and leaders in Judaism are not to be used by them, for they are all equals, brothers. Positively that means that all dispute about rank and all search for status is ruled out. (Cf. Matt 10:42–44; 18:1–5; 20:20–28). Matthew is concerned over a "tendency of Christian teachers and other leaders to assert authority and insist on being treated with deference."[28] Status is achieved by service and all are "servants." Position is found in concern for the weak members of the community (18:6–14). Greatness is accorded the humble. The community is ordered to give up the use of all titles; rank and office are unknown in the ideal community.

Matthew gives a corrective to the life of his church. There are people in his church who are designated by titles, all of which come out of Judaism.[29] No specifically Christian titles of offices are to be found, outside of the singular use of ἀπόστολοι in 10:2. Two further passages support this claim. The first is Matt 23:13–32, which teaches by negative example. The woes indicate how bad teachers *prevent* mission (23:13), turn the community into a destructive force (23:15), lead to a false emphasis on appearance rather than reality (23:23–28), and provide [false] security in the face of preachers of judgment (23:29–32). Such teachers bring judgment upon self and students, as the doom oracle (23:43–36) taken from the common source of Matthew and Luke states with uncommon sharpness. The Christianizing language of Luke ("prophets and apostles," Luke 11:49) is not reflected in Matthew who uses Jewish categories for teachers ("prophets, wise men, and scribes," Matt 23:34). The instruction that began with a denunciation of Jewish teachers ends with a statement of the futility of such teachers in calling Judaism to repentance. The "wise man" in this passage is probably a teacher of the law. There is no other evidence that this was a title for a specific class of leaders in the Matthaean church. "Scribe" certainly was used in the church; Matt 13:52 speaks of the "scribe discipled to the Kingdom of the Heavens"; he is the one to whom it has been given to come to know the mysteries of the Kingdom of the Heavens" (13:11), made public in the proclamation of Jesus, and thus is the one to see meaning in the Old Testament that the scribes of Israel did not find. He finds meaning not in the things "said by people of old time" (5:21), but in the new that came with the proclamation of Jesus.

The second passage is Matt 10:40–42. Four types of Christian are mentioned in order: "you" (the twelve), "prophets," "the righteous person," and "the little ones." The sequence

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[28] Beare, 450.

[29] Cf. Bornkamm, *End-Expectation*, 39.

is a descending climax. The first group, "Prophets," are certainly present in the Matthaean church. Christians claim to be prophets in Matt 7:15. In 7:16 Matthew introduces the test for determining a false from a true prophet: the fruits they bear, i.e. the deeds they do. (Did 11:7–12, probably also written in Syria, proposes a similar test of prophets by their actions.) It is not the Christian *homologia*, the confession of Jesus as Lord, that identifies the true prophet, but the doing of the will of Jesus' father who is in the heavens (7:21). False prophets cite the pyrotechnical works they have done by invoking the name of Jesus the Lord: prophecy, exorcisms, and the doing of mighty deeds (7:22). But Jesus will make the inverse confession (ὁμολογήσω) that he never recognized them; they are "doers of lawlessness" (οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι τὴν ἀνομίαν, 7:23; cf. Ps 6:9). Lawlessness is action that does not correspond to the Torah. In the apocalyptic section of the last sermon, the upsurge of false prophets is a feature of the final apocalyptic persecution (θλίψις). It will be accompanied by a multiplication of lawlessness (24:11–12). False prophets will do signs and wonders that deceive (24:24). Their works betray them.

Character, Not Structure

It is not confession, but character that determines recognition by the Lord. Character [the term is not Matthaean] is doing the will of the heavenly Father (7:21). I use the term to describe the way of life that charaterizes the disciple. Character is shown by good acts, by good works that lead people to glorify God; the demand for good works begins early in Matt 5:13–16. Matthew calls this character the practice of piety or righteousness (both valid translations of δικαιοσύνη), an important term in Matthew.[30] It denotes the proper response to the will of God. Even Jesus must fulfill that righteousness (3:15). The scribes and the Pharisees, according to Matt 23:23, pay attention to the details of religious observance, but fail in κρίσις, ἔλεος, πίστις. Righteousness is the hallmark of every Matthaean disciple, not of a special class within the disciple community. The "righteous person" in 10:41 is not, as Kingsbury[31] interprets it, a "teacher of righteousness,"[32] but simply the disciple who carries out the Law as interpreted by Jesus. (Cf. 13:43, 49; 25:37, 46; Ps Sol 10:3; 13:6, 7; Wis 2:12, 18) He is hungry and thirsty for this piety (5:6) that surpasses that of scribe and Pharisee (5:20) and so qualifies for entry into the Kingdom of the Heavens. That piety expresses itself in almsgiving, prayer, and fasting that are done not for public observance, but the eyes of the heavenly father alone (6:1–18). Righteousness, the proper goal of disciples, is prior to all other loyalties (6:33). In every passage where the term is used, it describes the ethical activity of disciples; the term implies deeds.[33] It leads to response, commitment, and change of direction, as the preaching of John the Baptist made clear (21:32). The righteous person is simply the disciple as he or she should be. The "little ones" of 10:42 are then the most recent converts to the community, as in 18:10, 14.

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[30] See Georg Strecker, *Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit* (FRLANT 82. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962) 149–158.

[31] Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew.* (Proclamation Commentaries. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 104; identical formulation in *Matthew as Story* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 130, with reference to E. Cothenet. Also E. Schweizer, *Good News* 181, 253.

[32] Qumran's phrase for its founder, "Teacher of Righteousness," is proper title if that were what was intended in 10:41.

[33] Strecker, 157.

It is not surprising then that Matt 28:18–20 commands that those baptized be taught to observe "all that Jesus commanded." The inner life of the community fosters both knowledge of and commitment to the righteousness mandated in Jesus' teaching.[34]

The terms for leaders in the community are all Jewish. Only two of them, prophet and scribe, are certainly used of Christians. There are no specifically Christian terms for leaders in the community; "servant" (διάκονος) is not defined in relation to other ecclesial offices, but is to be characteristic of all disciples. There are no orders of deacons or bishops. "All signs of special offices" are missing.[35] Matthew's ideal is an egalitarian church in which all members bear equal responsibility for leadership, edification, and service.

Community and Discipline

That egalitarian attitude also carries over into the what Kilpatrick (127) calls "Discipline." He holds that discipline in Matthew has two functions.[36] The first is to "maintain moral standards." Matthew certainly stresses actions as criteria of judgment. The motif of the trees that bear good fruit is present in 3:8–10, 7:16–20, and 12:33. The Son of Man will "repay each person according to his action," an uncredited citation of Ps 62:13 (LXX). Matthew edits Mark 8:38 to stress human action as the basis of judgment. And that is precisely how the Son of Man judges in 25:31–46. It seems clear that the local assembly has jurisdiction, not some church official. The community is called to "bind and loose" (18:18; cf. 16:19). Bornkamm[37] points out that this statement is in tension with its context; it is preceded by the parable of the lost sheep as illustration of the saving will of the Father and followed by the command to forgive seventy times seven times. Bornkamm argues that expulsion from the community is regarded as an extreme possibility, not to be practiced for the sake of forming a "holy remnant," but to keep the community of the forgiven a forgiving community.

Two points reinforce that conclusion. (1) Matt 18:17 describes the one who will not listen to the church as a "gentile and tax collector" (ὁ ἐθνικὸς καὶ ὁ τελώνης). The gentile is described as the object of the disciple mission in 28:19, while the tax collectors were among the outcasts with whom Jesus ate in table fellowship (9:10–11; 11:19; cf. 21:31–32). "Gentile and tax-collector" describe the sinner as one who is the object of proclamation and mission for the church. (2) Two parables in chapter 13 stress that the church is and will remain a corpus mixtum until the eschaton. Both have a clear end-time orientation. The Tares among the Wheat (13:24–30; interpreted in 13:36–43) stresses that the separation of tares from wheat occurs when the Son of Man sends out his angels to gather those who produce lawlessness (the term is significant!). The same point is made in the parable of the Dragnet (13:47–50). The church is not to be concerned about purity until the eschaton, when the Son of Man will judge and decide. Thus the Matthaean church carries out its "discipline" in the name of Jesus, in fulfillment of his words and his description of the ultimate judgment.

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[34] Strecker, 209.

[35] The phrase is Bornkamm's, *End-Expectation*, 39. There were some functionaries in the Matthaean church, but Matthew does not affirm them; for a contrary opinion see Bornkamm, 39, n.1; Kilpatrick, 126.

[36] Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story*, 130, follows him in describing the two functions of structure as deciding "doctrine and discipline."

[37] G. Bornkamm, "Bind and Loose," 42.

If there is any structure implied in Matt 18:15–20, it is that of the God who hears and responds to prayer (18:19), the Christ who is powerfully present in the community as authority (ὄνομα, 18:20), and the community that acts under the word of him who says ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, 18:18, 19).[38]

Kilpatrick ascribes a second function to discipline in the Matthaean community: it is to guard against false doctrine. He appeals to the words spoken against false prophets which we discussed above. But Matthew nowhere describes a process for judging doctrine; rather he gives a practical test for prophets, whether their actions produce lawlessness or righteousness. That test is not doctrinal, but functional. The second role for discipline appears to vanish upon closer examination of Matthew's text.

Matthew has a glorious vision of community, which he opposes to tendencies that are current in the actual situation in the church. Suspicious of charismatic, power-oriented prophets, he proposes a practical test to distinguish true from false prophets. He reflects an attitude similar to that of Ignatius. In the face of a community that was seeking security in structure modelled on that of Judaism, the authority of teachers and leaders, Matthew envisions a community of equals, joined under the lordship of Jesus to do the will of the heavenly Father. The gospel ends with the command of this authoritative Lord to make disciples by teachings the observance of all that this one supreme teacher had taught. And so, he will be present to teach and guide the community of equals in service.

[38] W. Trilling, *Das wahre Israel* (3rd ed. Munich: Koesel, 1964) 121.

The Death of Jesus and the Raising of the Saints: Matthew 27:51-54 in Context

Ronald D. Witherup, S.S.
St. Patrick's Seminary
Menlo Park, CA 94025

The problematic reference to resurrection in v. 53 has made this passage a *crux interpretum* of Matthean studies.[1] Numerous suggestions have been made to explain the meaning of the passage. Some scholars have tried to show how the passage describes the descent of Christ into hell, the death of the divine man (*theios anēr*), or the death of the cosmic deity.[2] Others have seen in it a displaced resurrection narrative (Hutton), an ancient Jewish apocalyptic hymn (Schenk), a polyvalent passage with confessional, salvation-historical, and soteriological implications (Senior), or a fulfillment of the vision of Ezekiel 37:1–14 (Monasterio).[3]

Most of these approaches have in common the use of historical and traditio-historical concerns to try to explain the text; they seek to go outside of the text itself in order to shed light on it. Even the redaction-critical approaches of Senior, Hill, and Monasterio expend considerable energy on details external to the text itself, e.g., the background role of Ezekiel 37.

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[1] The most important studies of this passage include: R. A. Monasterio, *Exegesis de Mateo 27:51b-53: Para una teologia de la muerte de Jesús en el Evangelio de Mateo* (Biblica Victoriensa 4; Vitoria, Spain: Eset, 1980); M. Riebl, *Auferstehung Jesu in der Stunde seines Todes? Zur Botschaft von Mt 27,51b-53* (SBB 8; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1978); D. D. Hutton, "The Resurrection of the Holy Ones (MT 27:51b-53). A Study of the Theology of the Matthean Passion Narrative" (Th.D. diss. Harvard Divinity School, 1970); D. Senior, "The Death of Jesus and the Resurrection of the Holy Ones (Mt 27:51–53)," *CBQ* 38 (1976) 312–329; D. Hill, "Matthew 27.51–53 in the Theology of the Evangelist," *IBS* 7 (1985) 76–87; and J. W. Wenham, "When Were the Saints Raised: A Note on the Punctuation of Matthew 27:51–3," *JTS* 32 (1981) 150–152. See also W. Schenk, *Der Passionsbericht nach Markus* (Leipzig: Gerd Mohn, 1974), pp. 64–86 and R. Kratz, *Auferweckung als Befreiung: Eine Studie zur Passions- und Auferstehungs-theologie des Matthäus* (SBS 65; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1973). The article by Senior conveniently lists bibliography of older important studies such as those by J. Blinzler, R. C. Fuller, K. Gschwind, A. Winklhofer, and H. Zeller.

[2] Hutton, "Resurrection," pp. 1–2 has adequately demonstrated the insufficiency of these three views, represented by Gschwind, Fascher, Kratz and others. See also Monasterio, *Exegesis*, pp. 153–71.

[3] Senior "Death," pp. 314–21 has offered a solid critique of both Hutton and Schenk's proposals. Monasterio's monograph is ultimately unsatisfying because it lacks any uniform conclusion despite its exhaustive exploration of the pericope.

Since there is little unanimity about how this crucial text is to be understood, I propose to re-examine it from the viewpoint solely of how it functions within the context of Matthew 27 and the Gospel of Matthew as a whole. The method I will use can be described as a "close reading" of the text, a synchronic approach which is sensitive to modern literary-critical concerns, especially to plot,[4] narrative style, and rhetorical devices.[5]

This paper will include three sections. Section one will discuss the structure of Matt. 27 and its significance for interpretation. Section two will present a brief exposition of 27:51–54. The final section will present concluding observations about salvation history in Matthew.

I. THE STRUCTURE OF MATTHEW 27

The following is the structure of Matt. 27:[6]

Part I: Events Leading to Jesus' Crucifixion (1–31)

1–2	Jesus Delivered to Pilate
3–10	The Fate of the Betrayer
11–26	Jesus Before Pilate
27–31	The Mockery by the Roman Soldiers

Part II: Jesus' Crucifixion and Death (32–56)

32–44	The Crucifixion of Jesus
45–56	The Death of Jesus

Part III: Jesus' Burial and the Empty Tomb (57–66)

57–61	The Burial of Jesus
62–66	The Empty Tomb

This outline is hardly novel. It is, however, literary-critically sound and has implications for interpretation, as the following observations will indicate.

The phrase "against Jesus" (27:1 *kata tou Iesou*) dictates the orientation of the rest of the chapter. This observation must be understood in the larger context of the opposition Jesus incurs in Matthew's Gospel. It is a device which indicates that chapter 27 brings to a climax the opposition to Jesus which builds throughout the Gospel from Herod's attempt on Jesus' life in 2:16–18.

This insight is confirmed by the occurrence of this phrase in two other significant passages in Matthew. A comparison of these occurrences is instructive.

12:14	"against him, [*kat' autou*] how to destroy him"
26:59	"against Jesus [*kata tou Iesou*] that they might put him to death"
27:1	"against Jesus [*kata tou Iesou*] to put him to death"

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[4] For a recent exposition of this notion, see F. J. Matera, "The Plot of Matthew's Gospel," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 233–53.

[5] For a brief introduction to such methods, see T. J. Keegan, *Interpreting the Bible: A Popular Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics* (Mahwah: Paulist, 1985), especially chapters 3, 6, and 7. The method I use in this paper prescinds from any source theory about the relationship of the Synoptic Gospels.

[6] For a more thorough discussion of the structure of Matt. 27, see my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Cross of Jesus: A Literary-Critical Study of Matthew 27" (Richmond, VA: Union Theological Seminary, 1985), pp. 151–161.

From this comparison it is apparent that 27:1 recapitulates in a forceful way what was spoken by the narrator at the beginning of the session before the Sanhedrin (26:59). Furthermore, it also recapitulates what was indicated much earlier in the story in the plotting of the Pharisees "against" Jesus (12:14). This verse (12:14), in fact, is important in the plot of Matthew's story because it marks the first explicit mention of plotting against Jesus. The significance of this notion is underscored by Jesus' own point of view. In 12:30, within the context of a controversy with the Pharisees about his authority, Jesus himself says: "He who is not with me (*met' emou*) is against me (*kat' emou*). . . ."[7]

Beyond these observations, there are four elements in the structure of chapter 27 which direct the flow of the narrative towards its climax in the cross, especially vv. 51–54.

First, the use of the phrase "against Jesus" in 27:1 marks a shift in the portrayal of Jesus in Matthew's passion narrative. In contrast to the portrayal in 26:1–56, where Jesus is seen more as one who is in charge of his own destiny, 27:1 directs the portrayal of Jesus as the object of people's action "against" him. In other words, with chapter 27 the portrayal of Jesus in the passion narrative shifts from one who is the protagonist in an active sense to one who is a victim, the main actor in a passive sense.[8] Thus, 27:1 orients the story to its inevitable conclusion at the cross.

The second significant structural element of 27:1 as it dictates the course of the rest of the chapter is the use of the phrase "[in order] to put him to death". This phrase expresses the explicit purpose of the plotting of the Jewish leaders against Jesus. It not only echoes the expressed intention of the gathering of the Sanhedrin (26:59) but also expresses in more concrete terms the general plotting against Jesus seen in 12:14 (cf. 2:13; 27:20 *apollymi* "destroy"). Thus, the phrase "to put him to death" purposefully expresses the goal or climax toward which the chapter is headed: the death of the protagonist.

There is a third structural element which reinforces the first two elements. The narrative flow of chapter 27, already oriented toward the death of Jesus from v. 1, is given added emphasis and specificity in the double mention of crucifixion at two crucial points in the narrative. Both the scene before Pilate (vv. 11–26) and the mockery by the Roman soldiers (vv. 27–31) conclude with the ominous mention of crucifixion as the way in which Jesus is to die. Fulfilling the wish of the crowds that Jesus be crucified (vv. 22, 23), v. 26 records Pilate's deliverance of Jesus "to be crucified" (*bina staröthē*). In addition, the mockery concludes at 27:31 with the notice that the soldiers "led him away to crucify him" (*eis to staurōsai*). Both of these phrases are equivalent in meaning and express purpose or

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[7] Cf. also 12:32, *kata tou huiou tou anthrōpou* ("against the Son of man"). In addition, Jesus indicates to the disciples (5:11) that they, too, may experience opposition (*kath' hymōn* "against you") precisely because of him (*beneken emou* "on my account"). The alignment of these points of view confirms that this opposition is coming to its fulfillment in the passion narrative and that Jesus himself was aware of this imminent opposition during his ministry. He even predicted that this would also be the fate of his disciples (cf. 10:16–25, 26–31). This observation, of course, is not meant historically but only according to the way Matthew tells his story. On the importance of point of view in narrative, see Witherup, "Cross," pp. 76–81.

[8] Because of its portrayal of Jesus, there is some justification for those who include 26:57–75 in the first section of their structure of chapter 27, e.g., 26:57–27:10. Cf. F. W. Beare, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 502, and J. P. Meier, *The Vision of Matthew* (New York: Paulist, 1979), p. 191

intended result.[9] Coming at the conclusion of two such important scenes, these short phrases serve to move the narrative forward dramatically to its climax at the death of Jesus. They prepare explicitly for the first mention of the cross in v. 32 (*stauron*), which marks a shift from the preparation for the crucifixion to the narration of it.

There is, then, a progression in Matthew's story in the opposition to Jesus. General opposition to "destroy" him leads to an explicit mention of wishing to "kill" him. Finally, chapter 27 explicitly narrates the means of Jesus' destruction by crucifixion. It is not the crucifixion per se which is of primary interest, since it is very briefly described by the use of a participle (27:35 *staurōsantes*). Rather, it is the scene surrounding the crucifixion and that of Jesus' death which hold the primary focus of the entire chapter (Note *ta genomena* v. 54).

A fourth structural element gives added weight to the other three elements. The importance of the temporal and spatial point of view in the passion narrative helps the flow of the story toward its climax at the cross.

Commentators have often noted that Matthew gives quite vague references to time and location throughout his Gospel through the use of many broad temporal terms to indicate narrative movement.[10] A partial listing includes such terms as: *tote* ("then"), *kai* ("and"), *apo tote* ("from that time on"), *en ekeinō tō kairō* ("at that time"), and *en tē hēmera ekeinē* ("on that day").

But in the passion narrative time becomes much more specific. The pace of the narrative seems to slow down as days, evenings, mornings, and even hours are mentioned. The first temporal reference is at 26:2 where Jesus recalls for the disciples that "after two days the Passover is coming. . . ." The last explicit temporal reference occurs in the resurrection account: "Now after the sabbath, toward the first day of the week. . . ." Between these two references there is actually a telescoping of time in chapter 27 which leads to the death scene as the climax. A chart helps to visualize this process.

27:1	morning
:19	while sitting on the judgment seat
:32	while going out of the city
:45	from the sixth to the ninth hour
:46	around the ninth hour
:48	immediately
:51	and behold
:57	evening
:62	on the next day

There is a progression within chapter 27 from the reference to the morning in 27:1 to the mention of the evening in 27:57. Although the sequence of events is often

[9] See J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, vol. 3, by N. Turner (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. 143, where the construction *eis to* plus the infinitive is said to take the place of *hina* or *hōste* at times to express purpose.

[10] E.g., J. D. Kingsbury, *Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) pp. 27–28; G. Strecker, *Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), pp. 89–93; H. Frankemölle, *Jahwebund und Kirche Christi* (NTAbh 10; Münster: Aschendorff, 1974), p. 352. It is not necessary to adopt Strecker's notion of the "historicizing" tendency in Matthew to recognize the importance of these temporal references.

punctuated by the favorite Matthean word *tote*, itself a vague term, the temporal and spatial plane outlined in the chart is frequently more precise. As the crescendo of the plot against Jesus escalates to the death scene, there is a corresponding narrowing of the temporal references which help the reader to focus on the most important events of the story. The use of the words "immediately" and "and behold" also strengthen this development since they are frequently employed in contexts which highlight important and miraculous events.[11] The narrowing is then reversed with the mention of the evening (v. 57), the next day (v. 62), and finally late on the sabbath (28:1).

The effect of these careful temporal references in Matt. 27 cannot be missed. Although such references do not satisfy the curiosity of historical researchers, they do contrast with the more vague references in earlier sections of Matthew. Time is carefully delineated and places are named in order to strengthen the climactic pitch of the narrative, especially in vv. 45–56.[12] This technique creates an atmosphere of closeness to the narrative and serves to mark the most important events of the story.

To summarize briefly, the very literary structure of Matt. 27 dictates the direction one is to take in the interpretation of vv. 51–54, the chapter's climax. The chapter receives its orientation from 27:1, which shows how the plot "against" Jesus will lead inevitably to his death, a death by crucifixion. As the narrative moves forward it is punctuated by reminders that Jesus is headed for the cross. The narrowing of the temporal sequence and the heightened divine eschatological happenings establish the climactic nature of the death scene. In short, the correct interpretation of 27:51–54, to which we now turn, hinges on this structure.

II. AN EXPOSITION OF MATT 27:51–54

The sequence of events which follow immediately upon the death of Jesus in vs. 50 can be best seen in the following chart:

kai idou . . . eschisthē "And behold the curtain . . . was torn in two"
kai . . . eseistbē "and the earth shook"
kai . . . eschistbēsan "and the rocks were split"
kai . . . aneōchtbēsan "and the tombs also were opened"
kai . . . ēgertbēsan "and many bodies of the saints were raised"
kai exelthontes . . . eisēlthon "and coming out . . . went into the holy city"
kai . . . enephanistbēsan "and appeared to many"

A few preliminary observations are in order. The composition of this passage, with its paratactic style, use of divine passives, and even similar sounding words, helps to reinforce the breathtaking sense of this scene, punctuating the narrative in staccato fashion. There is, as R. Monasterio observes, a crescendo in the passage; however, it does not lead to a climax in vs. 52 with the rising of the saints.[13] This is precisely where earlier studies of this passage have missed the forest for the trees. The crescendo inevitably leads to

[11] See W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, (4th rev. ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), p. 371, and A. Berlin, *Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative* (Sheffield: Almond, 1983) pp. 95, 151.

[12] There are at least thirty-five characters or character groups that appear in Matt. 26–27 in some active role and numerous examples of specificity in time, location, and characters. See Witherup, "Cross," p. 232, note 17 for specific examples.

[13] Contra Monasterio, *Exegesis*, p. 66.

vs. 54, the acclamation by the centurion and his companions. The use of the conjunction *de* breaks the parataxis of vss. 51–53 but nonetheless connects the acclamation with the other powerful events at the cross. This observation is confirmed by the reference to "the happenings" (vs. 54 *ta genomena*) which can only refer to all of the cosmic, earth-shattering events at the cross (vss. 51–53). Redaction-critical studies have too often overlooked this fact because of concentrating only on specific redactional elements (namely, from vss. 51b to 53), forgetting that the context of the passage demands that both the tearing of temple curtain (51a) and the confession of the soldiers (54) are integral to the passage. With these comments made, we move to a more specific exposition of the passage.

The series of events which happen suddenly at the death of Jesus begins with the dramatic expression *kai idou* ("and behold"), signalling both the importance and the extraordinary nature of these happenings.[14] This phrase serves to mark significant events sometimes by shifting the point of view in the narrative away from that of the narrator to that of a character in the story. In narrative contexts this technique is similar to the historical present in its effect on the reader. It brings the reader synchronically into the story as a direct witness.[15] Furthermore, it is also significant to note that *idou* serves phraseologically to connect events introduced by this word with divine happenings (e.g., 1:20; 2:1, 9, 13, 19; 3:17; 4:11; 8:24; 17:5). In this particular verse the phrase fulfills four functions: a)it introduces the entire series of dramatic events, connected by the conjunction *kai*;[16] b)it marks the events as climactic and preparatory for the soldiers' exclamation in v. 54; c)it marks the divine nature of these happenings; and d)it takes the reader synchronically to the various locations to experience these happenings directly.[17]

These cosmic events in vv. 51–53 must be seen not as isolated occurrences at the death of Jesus but within the context of Matthew's total story of Jesus. For Matthew, Jesus' entire existence, stretching from birth, through the ministry, and to the death/resurrection event has been stamped with eschatological phenomena which indicate God's overwhelming role in this drama. Thus, in parallel fashion, Matthew marks the death of Jesus by miraculous events of cosmic significance, just as he had marked the birth of Jesus by similar events (cf. Matt. 1–2). The events at the cross, however, are more concentrated and cosmic in scope. These events at the cross break the darkness that surrounded the death of Jesus (v. 45). Just as Jesus' cry (27:46) breaks the awesome silence, so these events shatter the ominous darkness. God speaks in these events as a vindication of Jesus' obedient act of dying as the beloved Son and as dramatic confirmation of the point of view expressed at the baptism (3:17) and transfiguration (17:5).[18] Yet these events do not

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[14] A check of the concordance reveals how fond Matthew is of using the word *idou* (ca. 90 times) in both narrative and dialogical material to indicate sudden and/or important happenings or significant and solemn sayings. In the passion/resurrection narratives see 26:45, 46, 47, 51; 27:51; 28:2, 7 (2x), 9, 11, 20.

[15] Cf., e.g., 3:16, 17; 8:29, 32, 34; 9:2, 20; 12:10; 17:3, 5; 19:6. See E. Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975), p. 210.

[16] This parataxis is neither indicative of a Semitic background nor an example of non-Matthean style. See Senior, "Death," pp. 319–20.

[17] The frequent use of *kai idou* and *idou* in Matthew points out all the more the significance of the phrase in 27:51. This is the only occurrence of the phrase in this chapter, despite the fact that the dream of 27:19 would have served well as another passage in which to utilize it.

[18] Note the use of *kai idou* in these pericopes.

constitute a "theophany" per se,[19] nor do they represent God's direct and unmediated revelation, as occurs at 3:17 and 17:5. Rather, these signs are God's dramatic mediated intervention in nature to confirm the identity and mission of his Son.

The sequence begins with the tearing of the temple veil in two from top to bottom. In the context of Matthew's Gospel, this event has both a negative and positive meaning and is clearly a salvation-historical indicator. Negatively, in line with the rejection of Jesus by Israel (27:25), the sign is a dramatic confirmation of the shift in salvation history. It is a sign of the destruction of the temple and a judgment upon Israel for rejecting Jesus.[20] As such it culminates the opposition to Jesus seen throughout the story and shows the consequences of the rejection of Jesus (cf. 23:37–39, which culminates the most volatile speech of Jesus against Israel). Positively, it signals the inclusivity of the new faith to which God calls all nations (cf. 28:19). The tearing of the temple veil from top to bottom indicates that the act is not accomplished by human hands but by God alone.[21] The death of Jesus thus signals an end to the exclusivity of sacrificial worship and opens the way for faith on the part of the Gentiles. This first dramatic sign prepares the way for the climax of the passage, the exclamation of the Gentile soldiers.[22]

The second happening, more cosmic in scope, is that "the earth shook" and "the rocks were split." Scholars have often noted Matthew's fondness for the verb *seiō* and the cognate noun *seismos*. For Matthew, earthquakes connote signs of the end time (24:7 *seismos*), the harbinger of miraculous events like the death of Jesus and the resurrection (27:54; 28:2), or the occasion for Jesus to exercise his power and authority (8:24).

Even more important is the connotation of the verb *seiō* in 21:10 and 28:4. In the former passage (21:10) *seiō* describes the response of the whole city (cf. 2:3) upon Jesus' entry into Jerusalem as the meek and humble king. The city quaked with joy at the arrival of its king, but the joyous response was short-lived, as the city turned upon its king and brought upon itself its period of desolation (cf. 23:38 *erēmos*). In the latter passage (28:4) there is a note of irony. The response of the guards at the tomb is to "quake with fear" (*apo tou phobou eseisthēsan*) and become as dead men in the face of the earthquake (*seismos*) that signals Jesus rising to new life. This entire scene provides an ironic counterpoint to 27:51–54. The moment of Jesus' death (though he is the risen one for Matthew's community) brings new life and faith; the moment of Jesus' resurrection (as the crucified one) brings unbelief and metaphorical death.

In short, the motif of "quaking" either in literal or metaphorical terms is loaded with christological significance and indicates God's action in the person of Jesus. Moreover, a specific connection is made christologically in three of the above passages.[23] The response of the disciples in the boat after Jesus' stilling of the storm is: "What sort of man is this, that even the winds and sea obey him?" (8:27). The response of those in Jerusalem after Jesus' triumphant entry is: "Who is this?" The crowds respond (inadequately): "This is the

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[19] Contra Riebl, *Auferstebung*.

[20] Kingsbury, *Structure*, p. 76; T. Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthäus* (4. Aufl.; Leipzig: Dr. Werner Scholl, 1922), p. 716; P. Bonnard, *L'Évangile selon Saint Matbieu* (Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1963), p. 407.

[21] R. H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), p. 575.

[22] Note that this observation further supports the importance of connecting vs. 54 with vv. 51–53.

[23] See Riebl, *Auferstebung*, pp. 67–70 for what follows and for an exposition of the *seismos* motif in Matthew.

prophet Jesus from Nazareth of Galilee" (10–11). Finally, in response to the quake (*seismos*) and other happenings, the Roman soldiers confess Jesus as the Son of God (27:54). In all three of these passages the motif of the earthquake or quaking is tied to the issue of Jesus' identity. There is, in fact, a progressive revelation in these three passages from questioning, to inadequate confession, to a fully adequate confession which coincides with God's own view.

Intimately tied to the earthquake is the splitting of the rocks. This happening provides the gateway for the opening of the tombs but also dramatically heightens the effect of the scene. The very stones "rock and reel" at the death of Jesus testifying to the cosmic importance of this event.[24]

The next happening describes in two short verses another dramatic effect of these cosmic events. The text reads as follows:

> The tombs also were opened, and many bodies of the saints who had fallen asleep were raised, and coming out of the tombs after his resurrection (*meta tēn egersin autou*) they went into the holy city and appeared (*enephanisthēsan*) to many.[25]

Nothing in the narrative more dramatically shows the effect of Jesus' death as bringing new life than this little scene. In his obedience as the righteous and innocent Son of God, Jesus' death atoned for sins (1:21; 20:28; 26:28) and brought new life to those faithful ones who had died. In this sign God vindicates not only his Son Jesus but also all of the righteous ones (*hoi dikaioi*) in Israel's history who had faithfully undergone persecution and rejection for the sake of righteousness (cf. 23:28–35; 27:4, 19).[26] These holy ones of Israel are raised and go into the holy city and appear to many. They are signs that God has vindicated his Son as he will vindicate all of the righteous whom he will make his sons and daughters in the eternal kingdom. These holy ones are to be seen in conjunction with the Roman soldiers in v. 54. Both faithful Jew and faithful Gentile will be incorporated into the new kingdom.

The troubling phrase, *meta tēn egersin autou*, must be seen in the context of the entire passage. Its role cannot be solved by changing the punctuation of the text to resolve whether it modifies the participle *exelthontes* (thus indicating they came out of their tombs after Jesus' resurrection) or the finite verb *eisēlthon* (thus indicating that they entered the holy city after Jesus' resurrection).[27] This phrase is more integral to Matthew's story than it might first appear. This is true for four reasons.

First, Matthew's narrative shows a tendency to jump ahead and complete a story line that he interjects into the main plot (cf. 14:1–12; 27:3–5). This phrase consequently serves in this location of the story as part of the climax which builds up to the crucifixion and resurrection.)

Second, the text indicates that the rising of the saints in the sense of a general resurrection is intimately bound to Jesus' own resurrection. But this does not necessarily mean that the resurrection of the saints is the actual beginning of the new age characterized by

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[24] Schwiezer, *Matthew*, p. 515.

[25] Note that the word *enephanistbēsan* is not a divine passive since it regularly has an active sense in the middle and passive voice. However, it appropriately continues the rhyme pattern established by the series of other passive verbs.

[26] Cf. also 1:19; 5:45; 9:13; 10:41; 13:17, 43; 25:37, 46.

[27] Hill, "Matthew 27.51–53," p. 78.

the resurrected life. If this were the case, the lack of further mention of these resurrected saints would be problematic in light of the rest of Matthew's story, which finds its fullest climax in the open-ended great commission to go and evangelize throughout the world (28:16–20). Instead, I suggest, the purpose of the saints rising is to testify against Jerusalem for the rejection of Jesus.[28] That is why it is important to mention the rising of the saints precisely at the moment of Jesus' death. Jerusalem's judgment against its messiah now becomes a judgment against itself, in fulfillment of Jesus' own words expressed in the parable of the wicked husbandmen (21:33–43; cf. 22:7; 23:37–38; 24:2).

Third, Matthew here makes a very strong connection between the risen Lord and the crucified Jesus which provides a counterpoint to 28:5 where the risen Jesus is specified as the "crucified one" (Note that *estaurōmenon* is a perfect passive participle, indicating that Jesus remains the crucified one). Indeed, there are other connections between 27:51–54 and 28:2–5 which reinforce the connection between these two passages, including the recurrence of the words *kai idou, seismos* and *seiō, tērountes,* and *phobos* (cf. *phobeomai*).

Fourth, Matthew is fond of foreshadowing and preparation for events in the narrative. For example, J. P. Meier has rightly characterized the infancy narrative as a type of "proleptic passion narrative."[29] In line with this tendency Matthew emphasizes what the reader already knows from the reliability of Jesus' character. Jesus' words about his passion (16:21; 17:22–23; 20:18–19; 26:2), the destruction of the temple (24:2), the rejection of Israel (21:43,) and the welcoming of the Gentiles into the Kingdom of God (8:10–12; 21:43) all come true. Even at the cross Jesus is seen as the victorious risen one whose words come to complete fulfillment as God's will.

The reference to the holy city harkens to the significance of Jerusalem for Matthew's story.[30] The same phrase is used in the temptation story when the devil takes Jesus to Jerusalem to the top of the temple for the second temptation. The city becomes more than the scene of temptation; it becomes the scene of rejection and for this reason Jerusalem along with the temple is in turn rejected by God and condemned to judgment. The significance that Jerusalem plays as the setting for the entire passion (cf. 16:21; 20:17–18; 21:1, 10; 2:3) also makes it appropriate that the appearances of the holy ones should take place there. They symbolize the vindication by God of his Son in the very city where he was rejected. The city where Jesus had earlier refused to perform signs now

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[28] Contra Hill, "Matthew 27.51–53," p. 83 and R. Aguirre, "Cross and Kingdom in Matthew's Theology," *TD* 29 (1981), p. 152, I do not see the difference in eschatological value between the resurrection of the dead in this passage and the resurrection of the dead during Hesus' ministry (11:5). What warrant exists in the text to assert that these resurrected ones live forever while the earlier ones were merely resuscitated for a time? I believe the vocabulary of 27:52–53 indicates another direction for interpretation. The use of the verb *empbanizō* may connote an element of "testifying against" as well as "appearing." See Monasterio, *Exegesis,* pp. 49–50. A further support for this contention might be the use of the verb *egeirō* in the sense of "rising" to make a judgment against someone (e.g., Matt. 12:42). See J. Jeremias, *New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 135. I am grateful to my colleague, Michael L. Barre, for mentioning this reference to me.

[29] Meier, *Vision,* p. 53.

[30] L. Sabourin, *L'Évangile Selon Saint Mathieu et Ses Principaux Parallèles* (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1978), p. 383 correctly shows against Benoit and others that "the holy city" does not represent the heavenly Jerusalem.

is made to witness the signs that confirm the significance of Jesus for salvation history.[31]

With these happenings described, the text reaches its climax:

> When the centurion and those who were with him, keeping watch (*tērountes*) over Jesus, saw the earthquake and what took place, they were filled with awe (*ephobēthēsan sphodra*) and said: "Truly this was the Son of God!"

The text makes an explicit connection between these Roman soldiers and the ones at the beginning of the crucifixion by the recurrence of the verb *tērēo* (cf. vv. 36, 54). These soldiers are indeed the Gentiles sitting in the darkness watching all of these events take place (cf. 4:14–16). Just as Jesus was mocked by groups of people (27:39–44), so he is confessed by a group, but one which represents the new shift that salvation has taken with the coming of Jesus.

The text also makes a causal connection between the confession of the soldiers and the earthquake and happenings; i.e., it is not merely the manner of Jesus' death which brings them to faith but the dramatic effects which accompanied the death.[32] Since these are all expressed by means of the divine passive, God is the one who really stands behind the confession of faith. This fact is confirmed by the words of the confession itself which reiterates God's own view of his Son expressed at the baptism (3:17), the transfiguration (17:5), and the confession spoken by Peter (16:16).

There is, however, one major difference between the confession of the soldiers and the confession of Peter. After confessing Jesus rightly to be the Messiah, the Son of the living God, the disciples are given a command to silence (16:20). With the confession of the soldiers there is no command to silence.[33] They have not only witnessed to the *identity* of Jesus; in contrast to Peter and the disciples (cf. 16:21–28), they have witnessed the *mission* of Jesus as the implied reader understands it—to die on the cross and give his life as a ransom for all (20:28; 26:28). The way is now opened for the gospel of the kingdom to be spread to all the world (cf. 8:10–12; 24:14; 26:13; 28:18–20).

The text heightens the importance of this confession in subtle ways by the choice of language and structure. The emphatic *houtos* again points out the incongruity that this man who died on a cross is God's Son (cf. 3:17; 12:23, 24; 14:2; 17:5; 21:11, 38, 42; 26:61; 27:37, 47).[34] The use of the term *ephobēthēsan* contributes to the scene's portrayal as a revelation, since the notion of reverential awe can express an appropriate attitude in the context of divine power being manifested (cf. 14:30, 33; 17:6, 7). This verb also prepares ironically for 28:4–5, where the guards at the tomb react in fear while the women at the tomb are told not to be afraid. Finally, the imperfect verb *ēn* in this context might indicate that the soldiers are testifying to Jesus having been the Son of God throughout his life. Not only does he prove himself to to be the beloved and obedient Son in his death, but he truly *was* God's Son throughout his entire life and ministry.[35]

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[31] Gundry, *Matthew*, p. 577.

[32] The participle *idontes* is translated with "when" in a temporal sense (RSV), but the implication is causal.

[33] See J. D. Kingsbury, "The Figure of Jesus in Matthew's Story: A Literary-Critical Probe," *JSNT* 21 (1984), p. 19.

[34] On the question of the definite or indefinite nature of *theou hyios* see E. C. Colwell, "A Definite Rule for the Use of the Article in the Greek New Testament," *JBL* 52 (1933), pp. 13–14, 20–21.

[35] See J. D. Kingsbury, *Matthew As Story* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), p. 90.

III. MATTHEW 27:51–54 AND MATTHEW'S UNDERSTANDING OF SALVATION HISTORY

What is the significance of these events in Matthew's story? The Old Testament background and the apocalyptic imagery which underlies this portrayal are well recognized.[36] Many of these occurrences are indeed associated with the eschatological Day of the Lord, e.g., Joel 2:10; 4:14–17; Ezek 37; Isa 26:19; Amos 8:8–10. Should we interpret these signs either as a proleptic Parousia or a proleptic resurrection scene? Should we see in the death of Jesus the turning of the aeon to the new, eschatological age?[37] How should we understand this passage?

The evidence from context suggests to me that the thrust of this passage is christological and salvation-historical in nature, building to the climax at v. 54. We have already seen above the christological implications of this passage. But what about salvation history, a much-disputed topic in Matthean studies?[38] I will make just a few observations.

I do not believe that the purpose of this passage is to signal the beginning of the new age for three reasons.

First, in the salvation-historical outline of Matthew's Gospel, the new age begins with the birth of Jesus and not with his death. It also extends to the Parousia and includes the time of the church.[39] This understanding is expressed by the eschatological implications of 1:23 and the fact that Jesus' birth culminates the history of salvation summarized in the genealogy. In addition, the important phrase "in those days" expressly begins John the Baptist's ministry (3:1) as the forerunner of the Messiah and extends throughout the life and ministry of Jesus.[40] Consequently, the outline of salvation history in Matthew's Gospel focuses on Jesus' life, death, and resurrection as the central event of salvation, culminating Israel's salvation history and providing the source of the church's role in this history which is to last until "the end of the age" (*bē synteleia tou aiōnos* 13:39, 40, 49; 24:3; 28:20).

The second reason is that the eschatological signs at the death of Jesus are not entirely unexpected in Matthew's story. Indeed, the whole of Matthew's Gospel is stamped clearly with eschatological significance.[41] The dead have already been raised in the ministry of Jesus (cf. 11:5; cf. 9:18–19, 23–26; 10:8) and the quaking (*seismos, seiō*) which is mentioned is also a sign that the text records in relation to Jesus' marvelous power (cf. 8:24, 27). These events at Jesus' death do not represent the turning of the ages, though they are dramatically eschatological in character. In fact, the eschatological time had already arrived with John the Baptist and Jesus but Israel failed to recognize it. These signs, then, are meant to be confirmatory. They contain christological and salvation-historical

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[36] Kratz, *Auferweckung*; Riebl, *Auferstehung*; Hutton, *Resurrection*.

[37] So Meier, *Vision*, pp. 33–35, 204–210.

[38] For an overview of the discussion about salvation history in Matthew see D. Senior, *What Are They Saying About Matthew?* (New York: Paulist, 1983), pp. 28–36.

[39] Kingsbury, *Structure*, p. 31.

[40] Note that John the Baptist's message is the same as that of Jesus and the disciples (cf. 3:2; 4:17; 10:7). This aligns their points of view. All three character groups are harbingers of the eschatological time of salvation history.

[41] On the breadth of apocalyptic imagery in Matthew, especially in comparison to Mark, see L. Sabourin, "Apocalyptic Traits in Matthew's Gospel," *RSB* 3 (1983) 19–36.

implications by vindicating Jesus in his identity and mission as God's Son and consequently by bringing the Gentiles to expressed faith in Jesus.[42]

The third reason is the importance of the notion of prophecy and fulfillment in Matthew.[43] Not only does Matthew's Gospel uniquely stress this motif through the use of fulfillment citations, but the passion narrative itself runs its course under the rubric of prophecy and fulfillment (cf. 26:54, 56). Jesus' death and resurrection are necessary (cf. *dei* 16:21; 26:54) for Jesus to fulfill completely his heavenly Father's will. Furthermore, as we pointed out earlier, Jesus' own prophetic words come to fulfillment in the events of the passion, death, resurrection, judgment against Israel, and outward thrust to the Gentiles. Prophecy and fulfillment are thus virtually programmatic for the Matthean passion. And the primary purpose of this dramatic pericope is to vindicate Jesus' role in salvation history as the obedient and faithful Son of God who by suffering, death, and resurrection fulfills his Father's will to perfection.

In conclusion, context demands that Matt. 27:51–54 be seen for its christological and salvation-historical implications as the vindication of Jesus' role in salvation history as God's obedient Son. At the climax of the cross, death and resurrection alike proclaim God's "stamp of approval" on Jesus' life which proclaimed the kingdom of God and the promise of his presence until the end of time (1:23; 18:20; 28:20).

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[42] Thus, Senior, "Death," pp. 325–329 is correct, that the major implications of this scene are confessional, salvation-historical, and soteriological in nature. I do not agree with J. Meier's attempt (*Vision*) to see in the death/resurrection complex a threefold gradation of eschatological inbreaking. He tries too sharply to see the death and resurrection as one eschatological event. This position ignores the intervening material (27:57–66) and also distorts Matthew's understanding of salvation history. See Kingsbury, *Structure*, pp. 34–35.

[43] See Senior, *What Are They Saying*, pp. 37–46 and Witherup, "Cross," pp. 325–32. Note that the passion narrative picks up on the notion of prophecy and fulfillment in a manner parallel to the infancy narrative (cf. 26:56, 59, 27:9–10 and the numerous allusions to Old Testament texts such as Wisdom 2 and 5; Pss 22 and 69).

Worksheets for Q 12

James M. Robinson

WORKSHEETS FOR Q 12

The following reformatting of Q 12 for the reconstruction of a critical text has been prepared by Jon Daniels and Sterling Bjorndahl. It supercedes the pamphlet Pap Q, in that variation units have been more precisely delimited, and in that the sigla now are refined with the help of the micro-Ibycus computer. For Q 12:2-31 only the blank format is provided, to be filled in by seminar members for the Boston meeting. Q 12:33-59 has already been filled in by Philip Sellew, whose text is here included.

- James M. Robinson

Q 12:2-31

Sigla:

[ ] Square brackets enclose words or letters found in Luke but not in Matthew.
( ) Parentheses enclose words or letters found in Matthew but not in Luke.
{ } Braces enclose words or letters shared with Mark, where Matthew's and/or Luke's text may exhibit Markan interference.
/ \ Slashes surround transpositions in the order of Matthew's and Luke's shared material. The relative position where the other evangelist has placed the indicated material is shown by the siglum /\, enclosing no text.

12:2-3

Q 12:2
¹/( )²
οὐδὲν [( )]³
⁴/[ ]⁵κεκαλυμμένον\⁴ ἐστιν /\⁴
ὃ οὐκ ἀποκαλυφθήσεται καὶ κρυπτὸν ὃ
οὐ γνωσθήσεται
\¹ -> Q 12:9.

Matt 10:26
¹/(Μὴ οὖν φοβηθῆτε αὐτούς)²·
οὐδὲν (γάρ)³
/\⁴ ἐστιν ⁴/[ ]⁵κεκαλυμμένον\⁴
ὃ οὐκ ἀποκαλυφθήσεται καὶ κρυπτὸν ὃ
οὐ γνωσθήσεται.

Luke 12:2
¹/( )²
Οὐδὲν [δὲ]³
⁴/[συγ]⁵κεκαλυμμένον\⁴ ἐστὶν /\⁴
ὃ οὐκ ἀποκαλυφθήσεται καὶ κρυπτὸν ὃ
οὐ γνωσθήσεται.

Q 12:2¹: Position of Q 12:2-9.
Luke = Q: After Q 11:52; before Q 12:10.
Pro:
Con:
Matt = Q: After Q 12:12, 6:40; before Q 12:51.
Pro:
Con:
Evaluation:

Q 12:2²: Matthew's imperative clause with connective οὖν.
Luke = Q: ( )²
Pro:
Con:
Matt = Q: (Μὴ οὖν φοβηθῆτε αὐτούς)²·
Pro:
Con:

12:2-3

Evaluation:

Q 12:2[3]: Luke's connective particle or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: οὐδὲν [δὲ][3]
Matt = Q: οὐδὲν (γάρ)[3]
Evaluation:

Q 12:2[4]: Position of [ ][5] κεκαλυμμένον
Luke = Q: [4]/[συγ][5] κεκαλυμμένον\[4] ἐστὶν /\[4]
Matt = Q: /\[4] ἐστιν [4]/[ ][5] κεκαλυμμένον\[4]
Evaluation:

Q 12:2[5]: Luke's compound formulation.
Luke = Q: [4]/[συγ][5] κεκαλυμμένον\[4] ἐστὶν /\[4]
Matt = Q: /\[4] ἐστιν [4]/[ ][5] κεκαλυμμένον\[4]
Evaluation:

Q 12:3
[ ][1]
ὃ[( )][2] ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ
εἴπατε ἐν τῷ φωτι [ ][3]
καὶ ὃ [( )][4]ς τὸ οὖς
[( )][5]τε
[ ][6]
κηρυ[( )][3] ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων

Matt 10:27
[ ][1]
ὃ (λέγω ὑμῖν)[2] ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ
εἴπατε ἐν τῷ φωτί [ ][3],
καὶ ὃ (εἰ)[4]ς τὸ οὖς
(ἀκούε)[5]τε
[ ][6]
κηρύ(ξατε)[3] ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων.

Luke 12:3
[ἀνθ' ὧν][1]
ὅ[σα][2] ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ
εἴπατε ἐν τῷ φωτὶ [ἀκουσθήσεται][3],
καὶ ὃ [πρὸ][4]ς τὸ οὖς
[ἐλαλήσα][5]τε
[ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις][6]
κηρυ[χθήσεται][3] ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων.

Q 12:3[1]: Luke's connective phrase.
Luke = Q: [ἀνθ' ὧν][1]
Matt = Q: [ ][1]
Evaluation:

Q 12:3[2]: Luke's use of ὅσα as relative pronoun or Matthew's relative clause.
Luke = Q: ὅ[σα][2] ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ
Matt = Q: ὃ (λέγω ὑμῖν)[2] ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ
Evaluation:

Q 12:3[3]: Luke's formulations with future passives or Matthew's imperatives.
Luke = Q: εἴπατε ἐν τῷ φωτὶ [ἀκουσθήσεται][3]. . . κηρυ[χθήσεται][3] ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων.
Matt = Q: εἴπατε ἐν τῷ φωτί [ ][3]. . . κηρύ(ξατε)[3] ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων.
Evaluation:

Q 12:3[4]: Choice between prepositions.
Luke = Q: καὶ ὃ [πρὸ][4]ς τὸ οὖς
Matt = Q: καὶ ὃ (εἰ)[4]ς τὸ οὖς
Evaluation:

12:2-3

Q 12:3[a]: Choice between verbs.
Luke = Q: [ἐλαλήσα]^{a}τε
Matt = Q: (άκούε)^{a}τε
Evaluation:

Q 12:3[e]: Luke's phrase of location.
Luke = Q: [ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις]^{e}
Matt = Q: [ ]^{e}
Evaluation:

12:4-7

Q 12:4
[( )]¹
μὴ φοβ[( )]² ε
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτε[( )]³ νόντων τὸ σῶμα
[( )]⁴
μὴ [( )]⁵ ων
[( )]⁶ αι

Matt 10:28a
(καὶ)¹
μὴ φοβ(εῖσθ)² ε
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτε(ν)³ νόντων τὸ σῶμα,
(τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν)⁴
μὴ (δυναμέν)⁵ ων
(ἀποκτεῖν)⁶ αι·

Luke 12:4
[Λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν τοῖς φίλοις μου]¹,
μὴ φοβ[ηθῆτ]² ε
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτε[ι]³ νόντων τὸ σῶμα
[καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα]⁴
μὴ [ἐχόντ]⁵ ων
[περισσότερόν τι ποιῆσ]⁶ αι.

Q 12:4¹: Luke's introduction or Matthew's conjunction.
Luke = Q: [Λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν τοῖς φίλοις μου]¹,
Matt = Q: (καὶ)¹
Evaluation:

Q 12:4²: Luke's aorist or Matthew's present.
Luke = Q: μὴ φοβ[ηθῆτ]² ε
Matt = Q: μὴ φοβ(εῖσθ)² ε
Evaluation:

Q 12:4³: Luke's spelling or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτε[ι]³ νόντων τὸ σῶμα
Matt = Q: ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτε(ν)³ νόντων τὸ σῶμα,
Evaluation:

Q 12:4⁴: Luke's temporal reference or Matthew's mention of the soul.
Luke = Q: [καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα]⁴
Matt = Q: (τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν)⁴
Evaluation:

Q 12:4⁵: Luke's way of expressing capability or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: μὴ [ἐχόντ]⁵ ων
Matt = Q: μὴ (δυναμέν)⁵ ων
Evaluation:

Q 12:4⁶: Luke's verb with object or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: [περισσότερόν τι ποιῆσ]⁶ αι.
Matt = Q: (ἀποκτεῖν)⁶ αι.
Evaluation:

Q 12:5
¹/[ ]¹ δὲ
[( )]¹\¹
φοβ[( )]² ε
/\¹
τὸν
[( )]³

12:4-7

[( )]⁴
ϵ[ ]⁵ν γϵϵννν[( )]⁵
[ ]⁶

Matt 10:28b

/\¹
φοβ(ϵῖσθ)² ϵ
¹/[ ]¹ δὲ (μᾶλλον)¹\¹
τὸν
(δυνάμενον)³
(καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀπολέσαι)⁴
ἐ[ ]⁵ν γϵέννν(η)⁵.
[ ]⁶

Luke 12:5

¹/[ὑποδϵίξω]¹ δὲ
[ὑμῖν τίνα φοβηθῆτϵ]¹·\¹
φοβ[ήθητ]² ϵ
/\¹
τὸν
[μετὰ τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι ἔχοντα ἐξουσίαν]³
[ἐμβαλεῖν]⁴
ϵ[ἰς τὴ]⁵ν γϵέννν[αν]⁵.
[ναὶ λέγω ὑμῖν, τοῦτον φοβήθητϵ]⁶.

Q 12:5¹: Luke's connection to prior verse or Matthew's; position of δέ relative to φοβ[( )]ϵ.
Luke = Q: ¹/[ὑποδϵίξω]¹ δὲ [ὑμῖν τίνα φοβηθῆτϵ]¹·\¹ φοβ[ήθητ]² ϵ /\¹
Matt = Q: /\¹ φοβ(ϵῖσθ)² ϵ ¹/[ ]¹ δὲ (μᾶλλον)¹\¹
Evaluation:

Q 12:5²: Luke's aorist or Matthew's present.
Luke = Q: φοβ[ήθητ]² ϵ
Matt = Q: φοβ(ϵῖσθ)² ϵ
Evaluation:

Q 12:5³: Luke's formulation of the direct object or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: [τὸν μετὰ τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι ἔχοντα ἐξουσίαν]³
Matt = Q: (δὲ μᾶλλον τὸν δυνάμενον)³
Evaluation:

Q 12:5⁴: Luke's infinitive or Matthew's infinitive and objects.
Luke = Q: [ἐμβαλεῖν]⁴
Matt = Q: (καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀπολέσαι)⁴
Evaluation:

Q 12:5⁵: Choice of prepositions and the resultant case of object; use of article.
Luke = Q: ϵ[ἰς τὴ]⁵ν γϵέννν[αν]⁵.
Matt = Q: ἐ[ ]⁵ν γϵέννν(η)⁵.
Evaluation:

Q 12:5⁶: Luke's repeated admonition to fear.
Luke = Q: [ναὶ λέγω ὑμῖν, τοῦτον φοβήθητϵ]⁶.
Matt = Q: [ ]⁶
Evaluation:

Q 12:6

οὐχὶ [ ]¹ /\¹ στρουθία
²/πωλ[( )]³ται\²
ἀσσαρί[( )]¹ ¹/δύο\¹
/\²
καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ[( )]⁴
ἐπι[( )]⁵ν
[( )]⁶

12:4-7

του [( )]⁷

Matt 10:29
οὐχὶ [ ]¹ ¹/δύο\¹ στρουθία
/\¹
ἀσσαρί(ου)¹ /\¹
²/πωλ(εῖ)³ται\²;
καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ (πεσεῖται)⁴
ἐπὶ (τὴν γῆ)⁵ν
(ἄνευ)⁶
τοῦ (πατρὸς ὑμῶν)⁷.

Luke 12:6
οὐχὶ [πέντε]¹ /\¹ στρουθία
²/πωλ[οῦν]³ται\²
ἀσσαρί[ων]¹ ¹/δύο\¹
/\²;
καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ[κ ἔστιν]⁴
ἐπι[λελησμένο]⁵ν
[ἐνώπιον]⁶
τοῦ [θεοῦ]⁷.

Q 12:6¹: Luke's numbers for sparrows and pennies or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: οὐχὶ [πέντε]¹ /\¹ στρουθία ²/πωλ[οῦν]³ται\² ἀσσαρί[ων]¹ /δύο\¹ /\²;
Matt = Q: οὐχὶ [ ]¹ /δύο\¹ στρουθία /\² ἀσσαρί(ου)¹ /\¹ ²/πωλ(εῖ)³ται\²;
Evaluation:

Q 12:6²: Position of πωλ[( )]³ται.
Luke = Q: οὐχὶ [πέντε]¹ /\¹ στρουθία ²/πωλ[οῦν]³ται\² ἀσσαρί[ων]¹ /δύο\¹ /\²;
Matt = Q: οὐχὶ [ ]¹ /δύο\¹ στρουθία /\² ἀσσαρί(ου)¹ /\¹ ²/πωλ(εῖ)³ται\²;
Evaluation:

Q 12:6³: Luke's plural ending or Matthew's singular.
Luke = Q: ²/πωλ[οῦν]³ται\²
Matt = Q: ²/πωλ(εῖ)³ται\²;
Evaluation:

Q 12:6⁴: Luke's periphrasis or Matthew's verb.
Luke = Q: καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ[κ ἔστιν]⁴
Matt = Q: καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ (πεσεῖται)⁴
Evaluation:

Q 12:6⁵: Luke's participle or Matthew's prepositional phrase.
Luke = Q: ἐπι[λελησμένο]⁵ν
Matt = Q: ἐπὶ (τὴν γῆ)⁵ν
Evaluation:

Q 12:6⁶: Luke's preposition or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: [ἐνώπιον]⁶
Matt = Q: (ἄνευ)⁶
Evaluation:

Q 12:6⁷: Luke's "God" or Matthew's "your Father."
Luke = Q: τοῦ [θεοῦ]⁷.
Matt = Q: τοῦ (πατρὸς ὑμῶν)⁷.
Evaluation:

Q 12:7
/\¹
[( )]² καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς
/ὑμῶν\¹
πᾶσαι ἠριθμη[( )]³
μὴ ( )⁴ φοβεῖσθε
πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε ( )⁵

12:4-7

Matt 10:30-31	**Luke 12:7**
/ὑμῶν\[1]	/\[1]
(δὲ)[2] καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς	[ἀλλὰ][2] καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς
/\[1]	/ὑμῶν\[1]
πᾶσαι ἠριθμη(μέναι εἰσίν)[3].	πᾶσαι ἠρίθμη[νται][3].
10:31 μὴ (οὖν)[4] φοβεῖσθε·	μὴ ( )[4] φοβεῖσθε·
πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε (ὑμεῖς)[5].	πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε ( )[5].

Q 12:7[1]: Position of ὑμῶν.
Luke = Q: /\[1] [ἀλλὰ][2] καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς /ὑμῶν\[1]
Matt = Q: /ὑμῶν\[1] (δὲ)[2] καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς /\[1]
Evaluation:

Q 12:7[2]: Choice of adversative.
Luke = Q: /\[1] [ἀλλὰ][2] καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς /ὑμῶν\[1]
Matt = Q: /ὑμῶν\[1] (δὲ)[2] καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς /\[1]
Evaluation:

Q 12:7[3]: Luke's formulation with finite verb or Matthew's periphrastic construction.
Luke = Q: πᾶσαι ἠρίθμη[νται][3].
Matt = Q: πᾶσαι ἠριθμη(μέναι εἰσίν)[3].
Evaluation:

Q 12:7[4]: Matthew's use of οὖν.
Luke = Q: μὴ ( )[4] φοβεῖσθε·
Matt = Q: μὴ (οὖν)[4] φοβεῖσθε·
Evaluation:

Q 12:7[5]: Matthew's expressed subject.
Luke = Q: πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε ( )[5].
Matt = Q: πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε (ὑμεῖς)[5].
Evaluation:

12:8-9

Q 12:8
[ ]¹ πᾶς ( )¹
ὁσ[( )]² ὁμολογήσ[( )]³ ἐν ἐμοὶ
ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
/\³ κα[( )]⁴
³/ὁμολογήσ[( )]⁴\³ ἐν αὐτῷ
ἔμπροσθεν τ[( )]⁵
τοῦ [( )]⁵

Matt 10:32
[ ]¹ Πᾶς (οὖν)¹
ὅσ(τις)² ὁμολογήσ(ει)² ἐν ἐμοὶ
ἔμπροσθεν των ἀνθρώπων,
/ὁμολογήσ(ω)⁴\³ κά(γὼ)⁴
/\³ ἐν αὐτῷ
ἔμπροσθεν τ(οῦ πατρός μου)⁵
τοῦ (ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς)⁵·

Luke 12:8
[Λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν]¹, πᾶς ( )¹
ὃς [ἂν]² ὁμολογήσ[η]³ ἐν ἐμοὶ
ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
/\³ κα[ὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου]⁴
/ὁμολογήσ[ει]⁴\³ ἐν αὐτῷ
ἔμπροσθεν τ[ῶν ἀγγέλων]⁵
τοῦ [θεοῦ]⁵.

Q 12:8¹: Luke's introduction or Matthew's connective particle.
Luke = Q: [Λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν]¹, πᾶς ( )¹
Matt = Q: [ ]¹ Πᾶς (οὖν)¹
Evaluation:

Q 12:8²: Luke's way of generalizing or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: ὃς [ἂν]² ὁμολογήσ[η]³ ἐν ἐμοὶ
Matt = Q: ὅσ(τις)² ὁμολογήσ(ει)² ἐν ἐμοὶ
Evaluation:

Q 12:8³: Position of ὁμολογήσ[( )]⁴.
Luke = Q: /\³ κα[ὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου]⁴ ³/ὁμολογήσ[ει]⁴\³ ἐν αὐτῷ
Matt = Q: ³/ὁμολογήσ(ω)⁴\³ κά(γὼ)⁴ /\³ ἐν αὐτῷ
Evaluation:

Q 12:8⁴: Luke's third-person reference to "son of man" or Matthew's first person.
Luke = Q: /\³ κα[ὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου]⁴ ³/ὁμολογήσ[ει]⁴\³ ἐν αὐτῷ
Matt = Q: ³/ὁμολογήσ(ω)⁴\³ κά(γὼ)⁴ /\³ ἐν αὐτῷ
Evaluation:

Q 12:8⁵: Choice between objects of preposition and modifying phrases.
Luke = Q: ἔμπροσθεν τ[ῶν ἀγγέλων]⁵ τοῦ [θεοῦ]⁵.
Matt = Q: ἔμπροσθεν τ(οῦ πατρός μου)⁵ τοῦ (ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς)⁵·
Evaluation:

Q 12:9
ὁ( )¹ δ[( )]¹ ἀρνησ[( )]³ με
ἐ[( )]²ν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
[ ]³αρνη[( )]⁴αι ( )⁴
ἐ[( )]²ν
τ[( )]⁵
τοῦ [( )]⁵
\12:2¹

12:8-9

Matt 10:33
ὅ(στις)[1] δ('ἂν)[1] ἀρνήσ(ηται)[1] με
ἔ(μπροσθε)[2]ν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
[ ][3]ἀρνή(σομ)[4]αι (κἀγὼ αὐτὸν)[4]
ἔ(μπροσθε)[2]ν
τ(οῦ πατρός μου)[5]
τοῦ (ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς)[5].

Luke 12:9
ὁ( )[1] δ[ὲ][1] ἀρνησ[άμενός][1] με
ἐ[νώπιο][2]ν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
[ἀπ][3]αρνη[θήσετ][4]αι ( )[4]
ἐ[νώπιο][2]ν
τ[ῶν ἀγγέλων][5]
τοῦ [θεοῦ][5].

Q 12:9[1]: Luke's articular participle or Matthew's indefinite pronoun and finite subjunctive verb.
Luke = Q: ὁ( )[1] δ[ὲ][1] ἀρνησ[άμενός][1] με
Matt = Q: ὅ(στις)[1] δ('ἂν)[1] ἀρνήσ(ηται)[1] με
Evaluation:

Q 12:9[2]: Choice between prepositions.
Luke = Q: ἐ[νώπιο][2]ν . . . ἐ[νώπιο][2]ν
Matt = Q: ἔ(μπροσθε)[2]ν . . . ἔ(μπροσθε)[2]ν
Evaluation:

Q 12:9[3]: Luke's compound.
Luke = Q: [ἀπ][3]αρνη[θήσετ][4]αι ( )[4]
Matt = Q: [ ][3]ἀρνή(σομ)[4]αι (κἀγὼ αὐτὸν)[4]
Evaluation:

Q 12:9[4]: Luke's third person passive or Matthew's first person transitive with emphatic pronoun.
Luke = Q: [ἀπ][3]αρνη[θήσετ][4]αι ( )[4]
Matt = Q: [ ][3]ἀρνή(σομ)[4]αι (κἀγὼ αὐτὸν)[4]
Evaluation:

Q 12:9[5]: Choice between object of preposition and modifying phrase.
Luke = Q: τ[ῶν ἀγγέλων][5] τοῦ [θεοῦ][5]
Matt = Q: τ(οῦ πατρός μου)[5] τοῦ (ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς)[5]
Evaluation:

12:10

Q 12:10
[1]/καὶ
[ ][2] ὃς ( )[3] ε[( )][3] λόγον
[( )][3] το[( )][3] υἱο[( )][3]
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ
[(( )][4] δ[( ))][4·5]
/\[6]
{[( )[3]
[7]/{το}[8]( )[3] {ἁγιο[( )]}[3·8]\[7]
({ })[3·7] {πνευμα}( )[3·8]
/\[7]
[6]/{[[ ]]}[4·9]\[6]
{οὐκ}[10] {ἀφε}[10]θήσεται

({ })[11]\[1]

Matt 12:32
[1]/καὶ
[ ][2] ὃς (ἐὰν)[2] ε(ἴπῃ)[2] λόγον
(κατὰ)[3] το(ῦ)[3] υἱο(ῦ)[3]
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ·
({ὃς)[4] δ('ἂν}[4·5]
[6]/εἴπῃ)[4·9]\[6]
(κατὰ)[3]
/\[7]
({το}ῦ)[3·7] {πνεύμα}(τος)[3·8]
[7]/{το}[8](ῦ)[3] {ἁγίο}(υ)[3·8]\[7]
/\[6]
{οὐκ}[10] {ἀφε}[10]θήσεται
(αὐτῷ οὔτε {ἐ}ν τούτῳ {τ}ῷ {αἰῶν}ι
οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι)[11].\[1]

Luke 12:10
[1]/Καὶ
[πᾶς][2] ὃς ( )[2] ἐ[ρεῖ][2] λόγον
[εἰς][3] τὸ[ν][3] υἱὸ[ν][3]
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ·
[τῷ][4] {δ}[5][ἐ][4]
/\[6]
{[εἰς]}[3]
[7]/{τὸ}[8]( )[3] {ἅγιο[ν]}[3·8]\[7]
({ })[3·7] {πνεῦμα}( )[3·8]
/\[7]
[6]/{[βλασφημήσ}αντι][4·9]\[6]
{οὐκ}[10]{ἀφε}[10]θήσεται.

({ })[11].\[1]

Q 12:10[1]: Position in Q.
Luke = Q: After Q 12:9; before Q 12:11.
Matt = Q: After Q 11:23; before Q 6:43.
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[2]: Luke's way of generalizing or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: καὶ [πᾶς][2] ὃς ( )[2] ἐ[ρεῖ][2] λόγον
Matt = Q: καὶ [ ][2] ὃς (ἐὰν)[2] ε(ἴπῃ)[2] λόγον
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[3]: Choice between prepositions and resultant case.
Luke = Q: [εἰς][3] τὸ[ν][3] υἱὸ[ν][3] . . . {[εἰς]}[3] [7]/{τὸ}[8]( )[3] {ἅγιο[ν]}[3·8]\[7]
({ })[3·7] {πνεῦμα}( )[3·8]
Matt = Q: (κατὰ)[3] το(ῦ)[3] υἱο(ῦ)[3] . . . (κατὰ)[3] /\[7] ({το}ῦ)[3·7] {πνεύμα}(τος)[3·8]
[7]/{το}[8](ῦ)[3] {ἁγίο}(υ)[3·8]\[7]
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[4]: Luke's formulation with dative articular participle or Matthew's relative clause plus subjunctive.
Luke = Q: [τῷ][4] {δ}[5][ἐ][4] . . . [6]/{[βλασφημήσ}αντι][4·9]\[6]
Matt = Q: ({ὃς)[4] δ('ἂν}[4·5] . . . [6]/εἴπῃ)[4·9]\[6]

12:10

Evaluation:

Q 12:10[5]: Whether agreement on δ[έ] is due to Mark or Q.
Luke and Matt = Mark:
Luke and Matt = Q:
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[6]: Position of the verb.
Luke = Q: /\[6] . . . ({ })[3·7] {πνεῦμα}( )[3·8] /\[7] [6]/{[βλασφημήσ}αντι][4·9]\[6]
Matt = Q: ({δς)[4] δ('ἄν)[4·5] [6]/εἴπῃ)[4·9]\[6] (κατὰ)[3] . . . /\[6]
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[7]: Position of {το}( )[3] {ἁγιο[( )]][3].
Luke = Q: [7]/{τὸ}[8]( )[3] {ἅγιο[ν]][3·8]\[7] ({ })[3·7] {πνεῦμα}( )[3·8] /\[7]
Matt = Q: /\[7] ({το}ῦ)[3·7] {πνεύμα}{τος)[3·8] [7]/{το}[8](ῦ)[3] {ἁγίο}(υ)[3·8]\[7]
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[8]: Whether agreement on the reference to the holy spirit is due to Mark or to Q.
Luke and Matt = Mark:
Luke and Matt = Q:
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[9]: Choice of verb.
Luke = Q: [6]/{[βλασφημήσ}αντι][4·9]\[6]
Matt = Q: [6]/εἴπῃ)[4·9]\[6]
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[10]: Whether agreement on οὐκ and ἀφε- is due to Mark or Q.
Luke and Matt = Mark:
Luke and Matt = Q:
Evaluation:

Q 12:10[11]: Matthew's phrase about "this age" and "the coming age."
Luke = Q: {οὐκ} {ἀφε}θήσεται ({ })[11].
Matt = Q: {οὐκ} {ἀφε}θήσεται (αὐτῷ οὔτε {ἐ}ν τούτῳ {τ}ῷ {αἰῶν}ι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι)[11].
Evaluation:

12:11-12

Q 12:11
°{1/{ὅταν} δὲ
[({ })]2{ωσιν ὑμᾶς}

[ ]3
{μὴ} {μεριμν}ήσητε{τε} πῶς ἢ {τί}
[({ })]4ητε}
\1}° -> Q 12:12.

Matt 10:19a
°{1/{˜Οταν} δὲ
({παραδ})2{ῶσιν ὑμᾶς}

[ ]3,
{μὴ} {μεριμν}ήσητε{τε} πῶς ἢ {τί
(λαλήσ)4ητε}·

Luke 12:11
°{1/{˜Οταν} δὲ
[εἰσφέρ]2{ωσιν ὑμᾶς}
[ἐπὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας]3,
{μὴ} {μεριμν}ήσητε{τε} πῶς ἢ {τί}
[ἀπολογήσησθε ἢ τί εἴπ]4{ητε}·

Q 12:11°: Whether agreements are due to Mark or Q.
Luke and Matt = Mark:
Luke and Matt = Q:
Evaluation:

Q 12:11¹: Position of Q 12:11-12.
Luke = Q: After Q 12:10; before Q 12:22.
Matt = Q: After Q 10:3; before Q 6:40; 12:2.
Evaluation:

Q 12:11²: Luke's verb or Matt's verb.
Luke = Q: {˜Οταν} δὲ [εἰσφέρ]2{ωσιν ὑμᾶς}
Matt = Q: {˜Οταν} δὲ ({παραδ})2{ῶσιν ὑμᾶς}
Evaluation:

Q 12:11³: Luke's mention of "synagogues, rulers, and authorities."
Luke = Q: [ἐπὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας]3,
Matt = Q: [ ]3,
Evaluation:

Q 12:11⁴: Luke's two clauses or Matt's one; Luke's verbs or Matthew's verb.
Luke = Q: [ἀπογήσησθε ἢ τί εἴπ]4{ητε}·
Matt = Q: (λαλήσ)4ητε}·
Evaluation:

Q 12:12
[ ]1 /\1 γὰρ [ ]1
/{δ[({ })]1ι\1 {ὑμ[({ })]1
{ἐν [({ })]2{ῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ}
[({ })]3
12:11\1 }12:11°

Matt 10:19b
[ ]1 /{δ(οθῇ)σεται)1ι\1 γὰρ [ ]1
/\1 {ὑμ}(ῖν)1
{ἐν} (ἐκείν)2{ῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ}

Luke 12:12
[τὸ]1 /\1 γὰρ [ἅγιον πνεῦμα]1
/{δ}[ιδάξε]1ι\1 {ὑμ}[ᾶς]1
{ἐν} [αὐτ]2{ῇ τῇ ὥρᾳ}

12:11-12

(τ)ί (λαλ)ήση(τε))³.
12:11\¹)12:11⁰

[ἃ δεῖ εἰπεῖν]³.
12:11\¹)12:11⁰

Q 12:12¹: Luke's subject; position of verb; choice of verb; case of verb objects.
Luke = Q: [τὸ]¹ /\¹ γὰρ [ἅγιον πνεῦμα]¹ /(δ)[ιδάξε]¹ι\¹ (ὑμ)[ᾶς]¹
Matt = Q: [ ]¹ /(δ(οθή)σεται)¹ι\¹ γὰρ [ ]¹ /\¹ (ὑμ)(ῖν)¹
Evaluation:

Q 12:12²: Choice of modifiers.
Luke = Q: (ἐν) [αὐτ]²(ῇ τῇ ὥρᾳ)
Matt = Q: (ἐν) (ἐκεί(ν)²(ῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ)
Evaluation:

Q 12:12³: Luke's relative pronoun or Matt's interrogative; Luke's formulation with δεῖ + infinitive or Matt's second person; choice of verb.
Luke = Q: [ἃ δεῖ εἰπεῖν]³.
Matt = Q: ((τ)ί (λαλ)ήση(τε))³.
Evaluation:

12:22-31

Q 12:22
[1]/
[ ][2] διὰ τοῦτο λέγω ὑμῖν
μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ( )[3]
τί φάγητε ( )[4]
μηδὲ τῷ σώματι ( )[3] τί ἐνδύσησθε
\[1] -> Q 12:31.

Matt 6:25a
[1]/
[ ][2] Διὰ τοῦτο λέγω ὑμῖν·
μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ (ὑμῶν)[3]
τί φάγητε (ἢ τί πίητε)[4],
μηδὲ τῷ σώματι (ὑμῶν)[3] τί ἐνδύσησθε.

Luke 12:22
[1]/[Εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς
αὐτοῦ][2]· διὰ τοῦτο λέγω ὑμῖν·
μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ( )[3]
τί φάγητε ( )[4],
μηδὲ τῷ σώματι ( )[3] τί ἐνδύσησθε.

Q 12:22[1]: Position of Q 12:22-31 in Q.
Luke = Q: After Q 12:12,(21); before Q 12:33.
Matt = Q: After Q 16:13; before Q 6:37.
Evaluation:

Q 12:22[2]: Luke's introductory formula or Matthew's.
Luke = Q: [Εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ][2]· διὰ τοῦτο λέγω ὑμῖν·
Matt = Q: [ ][2] Διὰ τοῦτο λέγω ὑμῖν·
Evaluation:

Q 12:22[3]: Matthew's use of the possessive pronoun.
Luke = Q: μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ( )[3] . . . μηδὲ τῷ σώματι ( )[3]
Matt = Q: μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ (ὑμῶν)[3] . . . μηδὲ τῷ σώματι (ὑμῶν)[3]
Evaluation:

Q 12:22[4]: Matthew's use of the parallel clause "or what you drink."
Luke = Q: τί φάγητε ( )[4],
Matt = Q: τί φάγητε (ἢ τί πίητε)[4],
Evaluation:

Q 12:23
( )[1] ἡ [ ][1] ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστιν
τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐνδύματος

Matt 6:25b
(οὐχὶ)[1] ἡ [ ][1] ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστιν
τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐνδύματος;

Luke 12:23
( )[1] ἡ [γὰρ][1] ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστιν
τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐνδύματος.

Q 12:23[1]: Luke's connective particle and declarative sentence or Matthew's emphatic negative particle and interrogative sentence.
Luke = Q: ( )[1] ἡ [γὰρ][1] ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστιν
Matt = Q: (οὐχὶ)[1] ἡ [ ][1] ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστιν
Evaluation:

Q 12:24
[( )][1]ατε ( )[1]
τ[( )][2] ὅτι οὐ
σπείρουσιν οὐδὲ θερίζουσιν

12:22-31

[ ]³ οὐδὲ ( )³
ἀποθηκ[( )]³
καὶ ὁ [( )]⁴ος
τρέφει αὐτ[( )]²
[( )]⁵
/\⁶ μᾶλλον /ὑμεῖς\⁶
διαφέρετε [( )]⁷ῶν

Matt 6:26
(ἐμβλέψ)¹ατε (εἰς)¹
τ(ὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ)² ὅτι οὐ
σπείρουσιν οὐδὲ θερίζουσιν
[ ]³ οὐδὲ (συνάγουσιν εἰς)³
ἀποθήκ(ας)³,
καὶ ὁ (πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνι)⁴ος
τρέφει αὐτ(ά)²·
(οὐχ)⁵
/ὑμεῖς\⁶ μᾶλλον /\⁶
διαφέρετε (αὐτ)⁷ῶν;

Luke 12:24
[κατανοήσ]¹ατε ( )¹
τ[οὺς κόρακας]² ὅτι οὐ
σπείρουσιν οὐδὲ θερίζουσιν,
[οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν ταμεῖον]³ οὐδὲ ( )³
ἀποθήκ[η]³,
καὶ ὁ [θε]⁴ὸς
τρέφει αὐτ[ούς]²·
[πόσῳ]⁵
/\⁶ μᾶλλον /ὑμεῖς\⁶
διαφέρετε [τῶν πετειν]⁷ῶν.

Q 12:24¹: Choice between verbs.
Luke = Q: [κατανοήσ]¹ατε ( )¹
Matt = Q: (ἐμβλέψ)¹ατε (εἰς)¹
Evaluation:

Q 12:24²: Luke's "ravens" or Matthew's "birds of heaven."
Luke = Q: τ[οὺς κόρακας]² ὅτι οὐ . . . καὶ ὁ [θε]⁴ὸς τρέφει αὐτ[ούς]²·
Matt = Q: τ(ὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ)² ὅτι οὐ . . . καὶ ὁ (πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνι)⁴ος τρέφει αὐτ(ά)²·
Evaluation:

Q 12:24³: Choice of predicates for the ravens/birds; the resultant case, and the number, of "barn."
Luke = Q: [οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν ταμεῖον]³ οὐδὲ ( )³ ἀποθήκ[η]³,
Matt = Q: [ ]³ οὐδὲ (συνάγουσιν εἰς)³ ἀποθήκ(ας)³,
Evaluation:

Q 12:24⁴: Luke's "God" or Matthew's "your heavenly father."
Luke = Q: καὶ ὁ [θε]⁴ὸς
Matt = Q: καὶ ὁ (πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνι)⁴ος
Evaluation:

Q 12:24⁵: Luke's interrogative (or indefinite) adverb or Matthew's negative particle.
Luke = Q: [πόσῳ]⁵
Matt = Q: (οὐχ)⁵
Evaluation:

Q 12:24⁶: Position of ὑμεῖς.
Luke = Q: /\⁶ μᾶλλον /ὑμεῖς\⁶
Matt = Q: /ὑμεῖς\⁶ μᾶλλον /\⁶
Evaluation:

Q 12:24⁷: Luke's noun or Matthew's pronoun.
Luke = Q: διαφέρετε [τῶν πετειν]⁷ῶν.

12:22-31

Matt = Q: διαφέρετε (αὐτ)⁷ῶν;
Evaluation:

Q 12:25
τίς δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν μεριμνῶν δύναται
/\¹ ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ
/προσθεῖναι\¹
πῆχυν ( )²

Matt 6:27
τίς δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν μεριμνῶν δύναται
/προσθεῖναι\¹
ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ /\¹
πῆχυν (ἕνα)²;

Luke 12:25
τίς δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν μεριμνῶν δύναται
/\¹ ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ
/προσθεῖναι\¹
πῆχυν ( )²;

Q 12:25¹: Position of the infinitive.
Luke = Q: /\¹ ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ /προσθεῖναι\¹
Matt = Q: /προσθεῖναι\¹ ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ /\¹
Evaluation:

Q 12:25²: Matthew's use of the adjective "one."
Luke = Q: πῆχυν ( )²;
Matt = Q: πῆχυν (ἕνα)²;
Evaluation:

Q 12:26
[( )]¹
/τί\²
περὶ [( )]³
/\² μεριμνᾶτε

Matt 6:28a
(καὶ)¹
/\²
περὶ (ἐνδύματος)³
/τί\² μεριμνᾶτε;

Luke 12:26
[εἰ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐλάχιστον δύνασθε]¹,
/τί\²
περὶ [τῶν λοιπῶν]³
/\² μεριμνᾶτε;

Q 12:26¹: Luke's clause or Matthew's conjunction.
Luke = Q: [εἰ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐλάχιστον δύνασθε]¹,
Matt = Q: (καὶ)¹
Evaluation:

Q 12:26²: Position of τί.
Luke = Q: /τί\² περὶ [τῶν λοιπῶν]³ /\² μεριμνᾶτε;
Matt = Q: /\² περὶ (ἐνδύματος)³ /τί\² μεριμνᾶτε;
Evaluation:

Q 12:27
κατα[( )]¹τε
τὰ κρίνα ( )²
πῶς αὐξάν[( )]³ οὐ κοπι[( )]³
οὐδὲ νήθ[( )]³
λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ( )⁴
οὐδὲ Σολομὼν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ
περιεβάλετο ὡς ἓν τούτων

12:22-31

Matt 6:28b-29
κατα(μάθε)[1] τε
τὰ κρίνα (τοῦ ἀγροῦ)[2]
πῶς αὐξάν(ουσιν)[3]· οὐ κοπι(ῶσιν)[3]
οὐδὲ νήθ(ουσιν)[3]·
6:29 λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν (ὅτι)[4]
οὐδὲ Σολομὼν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ
περιεβάλετο ὡς ἓν τούτων.

Luke 12:27
κατα[νοήσα][1] τε
τὰ κρίνα ( )[2]
πῶς αὐξάν[ει][3]· οὐ κοπι[ᾷ][3] οὐδὲ
νήθ[ει][3]·
λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν, ( )[4]
οὐδὲ Σολομὼν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ
περιεβάλετο ὡς ἓν τούτων.

Q 12:27[1]: Choice between verbs.
Luke = Q: κατα[νοήσα][1] τε
Matt = Q: κατα(μάθε)[1] τε
Evaluation:

Q 12:27[2]: Matthew's modifying phrase.
Luke = Q: τὰ κρίνα ( )[2]
Matt = Q: τὰ κρίνα (τοῦ ἀγροῦ)[2]
Evaluation:

Q 12:27[3]: Luke's singular verb endings or Matthew's plurals.
Luke = Q: πῶς αὐξάν[ει][3]· οὐ κοπι[ᾷ][3] οὐδὲ νήθ[ει][3]·
Matt = Q: πῶς αὐξάν(ουσιν)[3]· οὐ κοπι(ῶσιν)[3] οὐδὲ νήθ(ουσιν)[3]·
Evaluation:

Q 12:27[4]: Matthew's use of ὅτι.
Luke = Q: λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν, ( )[4]
Matt = Q: λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν (ὅτι)[4]
Evaluation:

Q 12:28
εἰ δὲ /\[1]
[( )][3] ἀγρ[( )][2]
/τὸν χόρτον\[1]
/ὄντα\[3] σήμερον /\[3]
καὶ αὔριον εἰς κλίβανον βαλλόμενον ὁ
θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέ[( )][4]
( )[5] πο[( )][5]ῳ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς
ὀλιγόπιστοι

Matt 6:30
εἰ δὲ /τὸν χόρτον\[1]
(τοῦ)[2] ἀγρ(οῦ)[2]
/\[1]
/\[3] σήμερον /ὄντα\[3]
καὶ αὔριον εἰς κλίβανον βαλλόμενον ὁ
θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέ(ννυσιν)[4],
(οὐ)[5] πο(λλ)[5]ῷ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς,
ὀλιγόπιστοι;

Luke 12:28
εἰ δὲ /\[1]
[ἐν][2] ἀγρ[ῷ][2]
/τὸν χόρτον\[1]
/ὄντα\[3] σήμερον /\[3]
καὶ αὔριον εἰς κλίβανον βαλλόμενον ὁ
θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέ[ζει][4],
( )[5] πό[σ][5]ῳ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς,
ὀλιγόπιστοι.

Q 12:28[1]: Position of τὸν χόρτον.
Luke = Q: εἰ δὲ /\[1] [ἐν][2] ἀγρ[ῷ][2] /τὸν χόρτον\[1]
Matt = Q: εἰ δὲ /τὸν χόρτον\[1] (τοῦ)[2] ἀγρ(οῦ)[2] /\[1]
Evaluation:

12:22-31

Q 12:28[2]: Luke's preposition or Matthew's genitive.
Luke = Q: /\[1] [ἐν][2] ἀγρ[ῷ][2] /τὸν χόρτον\[1]
Matt = Q: /τὸν χόρτον\[1] (τοῦ)[2] ἀγρ(οῦ)[2] /\[1]
Evaluation:

Q 12:28[3]: Position of ὄντα.
Luke = Q: /τὸν χόρτον\[1] /ὄντα\[3]
Matt = Q: /\[3] σήμερον /ὄντα\[3]
Evaluation:

Q 12:28[4]: Luke's use of ἀμφιέζω or Matthew's use of ἀμφιέννυμι.
Luke = Q: θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέ[ζει][4],
Matt = Q: θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέ(ννυσιν)[4],
Evaluation:

Q 12:28[5]: Luke's interrogative adverb or Matthew's negative particle and adverb.
Luke = Q: ( )[5] πό[σ][5]ῳ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς,
Matt = Q: (οὐ)[5] πο(λλ)[5]ῷ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς,
Evaluation:

Q 12:29
[ ][1] μὴ ( )[1]
[( )][2] τε
( )[3] τί φάγ[( )][3]
[( )][4]
τί πί[( )][3]
[( )][4]
[( )][5]

Matt 6:31
[ ][1] μὴ (οὖν)[1]
(μεριμνήσῃ)[2] τε
(λέγοντες)[3]· τί φάγ(ωμεν)[3];
(ἢ)[4]·
τί πί(ωμεν)[3];
(ἢ)[4]·
(τί περιβαλώμεθα)[5];

Luke 12:29
[καὶ ὑμεῖς][1] μὴ ( )[1]
[ζητεῖ][2] τε
( )[3] τί φάγ[ητε][3]
[καὶ][4]
τί πί[ητε][3],
[καὶ][4]
[μὴ μετεωρίζεσθε][5]·

Q 12:29[1]: Luke's conjunction and use of pronoun or Matthew's connective οὖν.
Luke = Q: [καὶ ὑμεῖς][1] μὴ ( )[1]
Matt = Q: [ ][1] μὴ (οὖν)[1]
Evaluation:

Q 12:29[2]: Choice between verbs.
Luke = Q: [καὶ ὑμεῖς][1] μὴ ( )[1] [ζητεῖ][2] τε
Matt = Q: [ ][1] μὴ (οὖν)[1] (μεριμνήσῃ)[2] τε
Evaluation:

Q 12:29[3]: Luke's indirect discourse or Matthew's participle and direct discourse.
Luke = Q: ( )[3] τί φάγ[ητε][3] [καὶ][4] τί πί[ητε][3]
Matt = Q: (λέγοντες)[3]· τί φάγ(ωμεν)[3]; (ἢ)[4]· τί πί(ωμεν)[3];
Evaluation:

12:22-31

Q 12:29[4]: Choice between conjunctions.
Luke = Q: [καί][4] . . . [καί][4]
Matt = Q: (ἤ)[4] . . . (ἤ)[4]
Evaluation:

Q 12:29[5]: Choice between verbs; Luke's negative command or Matthew's first-person direct discourse.
Luke = Q: [μὴ μετεωρίζεσθε][5]·
Matt = Q: (τί περιβαλώμεθα)[5];
Evaluation:

Q 12:30
/ταῦτα\[1] /\[1] γὰρ /\[1] /πάντα\[1]
τὰ ἔθνη [ ][2] ἐπιζητοῦσιν
/ὑμῶν\[3] /\[3]
[( )][4]
ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /οἶδεν\[3]
( )[5] ὅτι χρῄζετε τούτων
( )[6]

Matt 6:32
/πάντα\[1] /\[1] γὰρ /\[1] /ταῦτα\[1]
τὰ ἔθνη [ ][2] ἐπιζητοῦσιν·
/οἶδεν\[3] /\[3]
(γὰρ)[4]
ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /ὑμῶν\[3]
(ὁ οὐράνιος)[5] ὅτι χρῄζετε τούτων
(ἁπάντων)[6].

Luke 12:30
/ταῦτα\[1] /\[1] γὰρ /\[1] /πάντα\[1]
τὰ ἔθνη [τοῦ κόσμου][2] ἐπιζητοῦσιν,
/ὑμῶν\[3] /\[3]
[δὲ][4]
ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /οἶδεν\[3]
( )[5] ὅτι χρῄζετε τούτων
( )[6].

Q 12:30[1]: Interchanged position of ταῦτα and πάντα.
Luke = Q: /ταῦτα\[1] /\[1] γὰρ /\[1] /πάντα\[1]
Matt = Q: /πάντα\[1] /\[1] γὰρ /\[1] /ταῦτα\[1]
Evaluation:

Q 12:30[2]: Luke's modifying phrase.
Luke = Q: τὰ ἔθνη [τοῦ κόσμου][2] ἐπιζητοῦσιν,
Matt = Q: τὰ ἔθνη [ ][2] ἐπιζητοῦσιν,
Evaluation:

Q 12:30[3]: Interchanged position of ὑμῶν and οἶδεν.
Luke = Q: /ὑμῶν\[3] /\[3] [δὲ][4] ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /οἶδεν\[3]
Matt = Q: /οἶδεν\[3] /\[3] (γὰρ)[4] ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /ὑμῶν\[3]
Evaluation:

Q 12:30[4]: Choice between connective particles.
Luke = Q: /ὑμῶν\[3] /\[3] [δὲ][4] ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /οἶδεν\[3]
Matt = Q: /οἶδεν\[3] /\[3] (γὰρ)[4] ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /ὑμῶν\[3]
Evaluation:

Q 12:30[5]: Matthew's adjective "heavenly."
Luke = Q: ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /οἶδεν\[3] ( )[5]
Matt = Q: ὁ πατὴρ /\[3] /ὑμῶν\[3] (ὁ οὐράνιος)[5]
Evaluation:

Q 12:30[6]: Matthew's use of modifier.

12:22-31

Luke = Q: ( )[6].
Matt = Q: (ἁπάντων)[6].
Evaluation:

Q 12:31
[1]/( )[1] π[( )][1]ν\[1] ζητεῖτε /\[1]
τὴν βασιλείαν
( )[2]
αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῦτα ( )[3]
προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν
\12:22[1]

Matt 6:33
/\[1] ζητεῖτε [1]/(δὲ)[1] π(ρῶτο)[1]ν\[1]
τὴν βασιλείαν
(τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην)[2]
αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα (πάντα)[3]
προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν.
\12:22[1]

Luke 12:31
[1]/( )[1] π[λὴ]ν\[1] ζητεῖτε /\[1]
τὴν βασιλείαν
( )[2]
αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα ( )[3]
προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν.
\12:22[1]

Q 12:31[1]: Luke's opening adversative or Matthew's postpositive particle and adverb.
Luke = Q: [1]/( )[1] π[λὴ]ν\[1] ζητεῖτε /\[1]
Matt = Q: /\[1] ζητεῖτε [1]/(δὲ)[1] π(ρῶτο)[1]ν\[1]
Evaluation:

Q 12:31[2]: Matthew's modifying phrase and reference to righteousness.
Luke = Q: τὴν βασιλείαν ( )[2]
Matt = Q: τὴν βασιλείαν (τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην)[2]
Evaluation:

Q 12:31[3]: Matthew's adjective "all."
Luke = Q: αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα ( )[3]
Matt = Q: αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα (πάντα)[3]
Evaluation:

The Q Saying on Confessing and Denying

Harry Fleddermann
Alverno College

An intense debate has long swirled around the Q Saying on Confessing and Denying (Q 12:8–9).[1] In its Lucan form the saying appears to draw a distinction between Jesus and the Son of Man: "But I say to you, everyone who confesses me before men, the Son of Man will also confess him before the angels of God, but one denying me before men will be denied before the angels of God" (Luke 12:8–9). Bultmann and Tödt argued that the early church would not invent a saying that distinguished Jesus and the Son of Man, and they used this saying to establish the authenticity of the future Son of Man sayings.[2] Vielhauer, on the other hand, claimed that the verbs "confess" and "deny" and the preposition "before" point to a legal setting and consequently reflect the persecution experience of the early church, not the conditions of Jesus' ministry.[3] The Son of Man does not appear in Matthew's form of the saying: "Everyone, therefore, who confesses me before men, I also will confess him before my Father in the heavens; but whoever denies me before men, I also will deny him before my Father in the heavens" (Matt 10:32–33). But this saying is not unique. Parallel to many Son of Man sayings the tradition included other forms of the sayings that did not mention the Son of Man. Jeremias maintained that the oldest form of these parallel sayings was the one without the title, and he found the oldest layer of the tradition in those Son of Man sayings that did not have rival sayings without the title.[4] Käsemann included the Saying on Confessing

[1] We find other forms of the saying in Mark 8:38; Luke 9:26; 2 Tim 2:12b; Rev 3:5; *2 Clem* 3:2. Although Kümmel tried to prove that Mark 8:38 was closest to the original, Pesch and Lambrecht have shown that the Marcan form is secondary to the Q form. See W. G. Kümmel, "Das Verhalten Jesus gegenüber und das Verhalten des Menschensohns: Markus 8,38 par und Lukas 12,3f par Mattäus 10,32f," in *Jesus und der Menschensohn: Für Anton Vögtle* (ed. R. Pesch and R. Schnackenburg with O. Kaiser; Freiburg: Herder, 1975) 210–224, esp. pp. 216–219; R. Pesch, "Über die Autorität Jesu: Eine Rückfrage anhand des Bekenner- und Verleugnerspruchs Lk 12,8f par.," in *Die Kirche des Anfangs: Festschrift für Heinz Schürmann zum 65. Geburtstag* (ed. R. Schnackenburg, J. Ernst, J. Wanke; Leipzig: St. Benno, 1977) 25–55, esp. pp. 36–39; J. Lambrecht, "Q-Influence on Mark 8,34–9,1," in *Logia: Les paroles de Jésus–The Sayings of Jesus* (ed. J. Delobel; BETL 59; Louvain: Peeters/Leuven University, 1982) 277–304, esp. pp. 285–287.

[2] R Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) 112, 128, 151–152; H. E. Tödt, *The Son of Man in the Synoptic Tradition* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965) 55–60, 224–226, 339–344.

[3] P. Vielhauer, "Gottesreich und Menschensohn in der Verkündigung Jesu," *Aufsätze zum Neuen Testament* (Theologische Bücherei 31; Munich: Kaiser, 1965) 55–91, esp. pp. 76–79; idem, "Jesus und der Menschensohn," *Aufsätze zum Neuen Testament* (Theologische Bucherei 31; Munich: Kaiser, 1965) 92–140, esp. pp. 101–107.

[4] J. Jeremias, "Die älteste Schicht der Menschensohn Logien," *ZNW* 58 (1967) 159–172.

and Denying among the sentences of holy law which he attributed to early Christian prophets,[5] and the saying continues to play a role in the discussion of Christian prophecy.[6]

This intense debate, though, produced neither a consensus on the reconstruction nor a completely satisfying interpretation.[7] In what follows I will provide a broader base for the Q reconstruction, and I will offer an interpretation that starts from a literary analysis of the saying in its Q context.

I. THE RECONSTRUCTION

To listen to Vielhauer we should quit before we begin, for he claims that "it is no longer possible to reconstruct the original wording of the saying."[8] Although premature, Vielhauer's judgment alerts us to the formidable task we face. Not only must we resolve a score of details, but we must also answer two major questions. First, Jesus refers to the Son of Man in the Lucan form of the saying, but in Matthew he only speaks of himself in the first person. What about Q? Did Q mention the Son of Man or not? Second, the two halves of the saying parallel each other in Matthew, but Luke shows no parallelism. Did Matthew introduce the parallelism into Q or did Luke eliminate it? We begin by comparing the two forms of the saying.

	Matt 10:32–33	Luke 12:8–9	
		λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν	8a
32a	πᾶς οὖν ὅστις ὁμολογήσει ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,	πᾶς ὃς ἂν ὁμολογήσῃ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων	
b	ὁμολογήσω κἀγὼ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς·	καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁμολογήσει ἐν αὐτῷ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ θεοῦ·	b
33a	ὅστις δ' ἂν ἀρνήσηταί με ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,	ὁ δὲ ἀρνησάμενός με ἐνώπιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων	9a
b	ἀρνήσομαι κἀγὼ αὐτὸν ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.	ἀπαρνηθήσεται ἐνώπιον τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ θεοῦ.	b

The saying falls into two parts—a confession half (Q 12:8) and a denial half (Q 12:9). We will investigate the connectives first, then the two halves.

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[5] E. Käsemann, "Sentences of Holy Law in the New Testament," in *New Testament Questions of Today* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969) 66–81, esp. p. 77.

[6] See, for example, M. E. Boring, *Sayings of the Risen Jesus: Christian Prophecy in the Synoptic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982) 165–166, 180.

[7] For reconstructions that print a Greek text, see A. Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus* (New York: Putnam, 1908) 85, 139; R. Pesch, "Über die Autorität Jesu," 26–30; D. R. Catchpole, "The Angelic Son of Man in Luke 12:8," *NovT* 24 (1982) 255–265, esp. pp. 255–256; A. Polag, *Fragmenta Q: Textheft zur Logienquelle* (2d ed.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1982) 58–59.

[8] P. Vielhauer, "Gottesreich und Menschensohn," 77.

We can claim neither Matthew's οὖν nor Luke's λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν for Q. Although οὖν appears five times in Q,[9] Matthew uses it so frequently that we must attribute its presence in this passage to him.[10] Besides taking it over four times from Mark[11] and five times from Q,[12] Matthew introduces it fourteen times into his Marcan source,[13] and he uses it seventeen times in Q material where Luke does not.[14] In particular Matthew uses οὖν three times in the Q context of the Saying on Confessing and Denying (Matt 10:26, 31, 32). Luke has parallels to all three verses but nowhere has οὖν. Since Luke does not show a tendency to avoid οὖν,[15] we conclude that Matthew has introduced οὖν three times into a Q text that used connectives sparingly.

Schulz claims that Luke's λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν preserves the Q connective because the phrase appears frequently in Q at the end of a discussion or parable,[16] and Pesch sees behind λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν an original ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν which either Luke or Q changed to λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν.[17] Various forms of λέγω ὑμῖν (σοι) appear fourteen times in Q,[18] but a decision on the present verse depends on a careful study of Luke's redaction. Originally Q 12:2–10 was an exhortation to fearless preaching. Although Matthew pared off the final saying (Q 12:10) to conflate it elsewhere with Mark (Matt 12:31–32; compare Mark 3:28–30), he does preserve the original Q thought sequence in Matt 10:26–33. Luke, though, broke the section into three parts (12:2–3, 4–7, 8–10) and radically reinterpreted the first part. In the original Q section, vv. 2–3 exhorted the hearers to proclaim publicly what Jesus taught them privately. Luke transformed these verses into a warning against hypocrisy, and he created an introduction for this section in 12:1: "In the meantime, when so many thousands of the multitude had gathered together that they trod on one another, he said to his disciples first, 'Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees which is hypocrisy.' "[19] Luke's v. 2 is fairly close to Matthew, but Luke has completely rewritten v. 3 to make it conform to his hypocrisy theme.[20] Because of his extensive editing Luke has created much more of a break between vv. 3 and 4 than Q originally had, and the original καὶ (Matt 10:28)

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[9] Q 3:8, 9; 10:2; 11:13, 35.

[10] Matthew uses οὖν fifty-six times.

[11] Matt 19:6; 21:25; 24:42=25:13; 27:22.

[12] Matt 3:8, 10; 6:23; 7:11; 9:38.

[13] Matt 12:12; 13:18, 56; 17:10; 19:7; 21:40; 22:17, 21, 28, 43, 45; 24:15; 26:54; 27:17.

[14] Matt 5:48; 6:9, 22, 31, 34; 7:12, 24; 10:16, 26, 31, 32; 12:26; 18:4; 22:9; 24:26; 25:27, 28. See R. Pesch, "Über die Autorität Jesu," 33.

[15] Luke uses οὖν 33 times in his Gospel and 61 times in Acts. He introduces it into his Marcan source ten times (Luke 8:18; 20:15, 17, 29, 33, 44; 21:7, 14; 22:70; 23:22). See R. Pesch, "Über die Autorität Jesu," 33.

[16] S. Schulz, *Q: Die Spruchquelle der Evangelisten* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972) 67. See also J. Jeremias, *Die Sprache des Lukasevangeliums* (MeyerK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980) 106.

[17] R. Pesch, "Über die Autorität Jesu," 30–35.

[18] Q 3:8; 6:27; 7:9, 26, 28; 10:12, 24; 11:51; 12:22, 27, 44, 59; 13:35; 15:7.

[19] See D. M. Sweetland, "Discipleship and Persecution: A Study of Luke 12,1–12," *Bib* 65 (1984) 61–79, esp. pp. 64–66.

[20] Lührmann maintains that Luke 12:3 is closer to the original than Matt 10:27, but he ignores the context Luke created in Luke 12:1. See D. Lührmann, *Die Redaktion der Logienquelle* (WMANT 33; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969) 50.

no longer sufficed as a connective. Luke structured the second section (vv. 4–7) around three phrases, all peculiar to him:

4a λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν τοῖς φίλοις μου,
5a ὑποδείξω δὲ ὑμῖν τίνα φοβηθήτε·
5c ναὶ λέγω ὑμῖν, τοῦτον φοβήθητε.

The expression ὑποδείξω ὑμῖν appears also in Luke 6:47 and is redactional in both places.[21] With the three phrases Luke builds a new section (vv. 4–7) which he clearly marks off from the preceding section (vv. 2–3). The redactional λέγω ὑμῖν phrases in vv. 4a and 5c probably led Luke to introduce the final section (vv. 8–10) with another redactional λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν. Several other Q passages where Luke has probably added a λέγω ὑμῖν phrase confirm this conclusion.[22] So neither Matthew's οὖν nor Luke's λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν comes from Q.

The confession half of the saying consists of a conditional relative clause (Q 12:8a) and a main clause in the future indicative (Q 12:8b). In the relative clause Matthew changed ὅς to ὅστις. The nominative singular masculine ὅστις is Matthean. Mark uses the form only once and Luke just three times, but Matthew employs it nineteen times.[23] Matthew substitutes ὅστις for ὅς in 12:50 (compare Mark 3:35), 19:29 (compare Mark 10:29), and twice in 13:12 (compare Mark 4:25). He introduces ὅστις in 21:33 (compare Mark 12:1), and he uses πᾶς ὅστις in 19:29, ὅστις οὖν in 18:4, and the full expression πᾶς οὖν ὅστις in 7:24. In conditional relative clauses the future indicative carries the same meaning as the subjunctive, so Matthew's future indicative ὁμολογήσει means the same as Luke's aorist subjunctive ὁμολογήσῃ.[24] However, the subjunctive is much more common in these clauses. In the synoptics we find eighty-five conditional relative clauses with the subjunctive[25] and only nine with the future indicative.[26] As a result we would expect a strong tendency to switch from the future indicative to the subjunctive. Mark has only one future indicative in a conditional relative clause (Mark 8:35), and both Matthew and Luke switch

[21] Compare also Acts 9:16; 20:35. See J. M. Creed, *The Gospel according to St. Luke* (London: Macmillan, 1930) 171.

[22] Luke 11:9; 12:51; 13:24; 14:24; 17:34; 19:26. See F. Neirynck, "Recent Developments in the Study of Q," in *Logia: Les paroles de Jésus–The Sayings of Jesus* (ed. J. Delobel; BETL 59; Louvain: Peeters/Leuven University, 1982) 29–75, esp. pp. 56–69.

[23] Matt 2:6; 5:39, 41; 7:24 *bis*, 26; 10:32, 33; 12:50; 13:12 *bis*, 52; 18:4; 19:29; 20:1; 21:33; 22:2; 23:12 *bis*. See V. Spottorno, "The Relative Pronoun in the New Testament," *NTS* 28 (1982) 132–141, esp. p. 135.

[24] J. H. Moulton and W. F. Howard, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek* (4 vols.; vols. 3 & 4 by N. Turner; Edinburgh: Clark, 1906, 1929, 1963, 1976) 3. 106–110; H. P. V. Nunn, *A Short Syntax of New Testament Greek* (5th ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1938) 121; M. Zerwick, *Biblical Greek Illustrated by Examples* (SPIB 114; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1963) 113–116; BDF #380.

[25] Matt 5:19 *bis*, 2, 22 *bis*, 31, 32; 7:12; 10:11, 14, 33, 42; 11:6, 27; 12:32 *bis*, 50; 14:7; 15:5 *bis* 16:19 *bis*, 25 *bis*; 18:5, 6, 18 *bis*, 19; 19:9; 20:4, 26, 27; 21:22, 24, 44; 22:9; 23:3, 16 *bis*, 18 *bis*; 26:48; Mark 3:28, 29, 35; 6:11, 22, 23; 7:11; 8;35, 38; 9:37 *bis*, 41, 42; 10:11, 15, 35, 43, 44; 11:23; 13:11; 14:44; Luke 4:6; 7:23; 8:18 *bis* 9:4, 5, 24 *bis*, 26, 48 *bis* 10:5, 8, 10, 22, 35; 12:8; 17:33 *bis*; 18:17; 20:18.

[26] Matt 5:41; 10:32; 12:36; 18:4; 23:12 *bis* Mark 8:35; Luke 12:10; 17:31.

to the subjunctive in their editing of this verse (Matt 16:25; Luke 9:24).[27] So Matthew's future indicative preserves the Q form. The following Q saying (Q 12:10) confirms this conclusion, for in the Saying on Speaking against the Holy Spirit Luke has a future indicative (ἐρεῖ) in a conditional relative clause, indicating that both Q 12:8–9 and Q 12:10 were originally formulated with the future indicative. If Matthew's ὁμολογήσει is original, then the relative clause has the same verb form as the main clause. This should not surprise us. As we shall see, a strict parallelism dominates the saying, and the identical verb forms constitute just one aspect of this parallelism.

In the main clause we face the first major question, the choice between Matthew's "I" and Luke's "the Son of Man." In Peter's Confession Matthew switches between "the Son of Man" and a personal pronoun in his editing of Mark. When he redacts Mark 8:31 Matthew replaces τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου with αὐτόν. He has just anticipated the title in v. 13 where it replaced a Marcan "me" (Mark 8:27). Matthew's editing of Peter's Confession indicates that he changed an original Son of Man saying into an I saying in Q 12:8–9. The persecution beatitude provides a second example. Matthew probably substituted "me" (Matt 5:11) for Q's "the Son of Man" (Luke 6:22).[28] Two other considerations indicate that Luke's "the Son of Man" is original. The title provides a catchword link with the following saying which also mentions the Son of Man (Q 12:10), and it plays on the word "men" in the relative clause.[29] Although Matthew clearly avoided the title in 10:32–33, his reasons remain elusive. It is not that he wished to avoid distinguishing between Jesus and the Son of Man, for in 19:28 he introduced a distinction between Jesus and the Son of Man into a Q saying that originally had none.[30] Instead what seems to be operating is an easy movement from "I" to "the Son of Man" and back again. Any writer like Matthew who uses "the Son of Man" as a self-designation of Jesus creates a fluid situation in which he can substitute one for the other. Matthew uses "the Son of Man" as a self designation of Jesus four times (8:20; 9:6; 11:19; 12:8) which creates the conditions for his redactional moves between "the Son of Man" and a personal pronoun in 5:11; 10:32–33; 16:13, 21; 19:28. So Luke preserves the Q subject, the Son of Man. Luke also preserves the Q word order. Matthew placed the subject after the verb to juxtapose it with ἐν αὐτῷ. By bringing κἀγώ and ἐν αὐτῷ together Matthew further highlights the retribution motif that dominates the saying. Matthew introduced "my Father in the heavens" into the final ἔμπροσθεν phrase of the confession half of the saying. Matthew uses πατὴρ ὁ ἐν (τοῖς) οὐρανοῖς thirteen times,[31] and in 12:50 he introduces

[27] Compare also Luke 8:18 with Mark 4:25.

[28] J S. Kloppenborg, "Blessing and Marginality: The 'Persecution Beatitude' in Q, Thomas & Early Christianity," *Foundations & Facets Forum* ⅓ (1986) 36–56, esp. p. 41.

[29] See further F. H. Borsch, *The Christian and Gnostic Son of Man* (Naperville: Allenson, 1970) 1–28; A. J. B. Higgins, "'Menschensohn' oder 'ich' in Q: Lk 12,8–9/Mt 10, 32–33?," in *Jesus und der Menschensohn: Für Anton Vögtle* (ed. R. Pesch and R. Schnackenburg with O. Kaiser; Freiburg: Herder, 1975) 117–123; W. G. Kümmel, "Das Verhalten Jesus gegenüber und das Verhalten des Menschensohns," 214–215; D. R. Catchpole, "The Angelic Son of Man in Luke 12:8," 255.

[30] In 19:28 Matthew introduces the Son of Man in the same language he will use in the last judgment scene (Matt 25:31).

[31] Matt 5:16, 45; 6:1, 9; 7:11, 21; 10:32, 33; 12:50; 16:17; 18:10, 14, 19. See J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae: Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem* (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1908) 7, 32.

it into his Marcan source (compare Mark 3:35). Luke's τῶν ἀγγέλων reflects Q, but Luke has added a clarifying τοῦ θεοῦ. This genitive appears in several places in Luke. The clearest example occurs in Peter's Confession where Luke changes Mark's "You are the Christ" (Mark 8:29) to "The Christ of God" (Luke 9:20), but Luke also adds a clarifying τοῦ θεοῦ in 8:11 (compare Mark 4:14) 11:42 (compare Matt 23:23), 22:69 (compare Mark 14:62, and 23:35 (compare Mark 15:32). He also uses τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ θεοῦ in 15:10 and the singular ἄγγελον τοῦ θεοῦ in Acts 10:3 (see also Acts 27:23).[32] So Q originally had ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀγγέλων in the main clause corresponding exactly to ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων in the relative clause.

When we turn to the denial half of the saying, we face the second major problem in reconstructing the saying. In the denial half Matthew has a fully developed parallel to the confession half, but Luke has a shorter sentence with a participle instead of a relative clause and a future passive instead of an active main verb. Did Luke destroy the original parallelism of Q or has Matthew imported parallelism into a saying that originally had none? We begin with the participle. Luke shows a preference for participles. In editing Mark he uses a participle forty times to eliminate parataxis,[33] four times to replace a relative clause,[34] and nine times to replace a variety of other constructions.[35] The participle, then, flows from Luke's pen. Luke is also responsible for the preposition ἐνώπιον. Matthew and Mark never use it, but Luke uses it twenty-two times in his Gospel and thirteen times in Acts.[36] He introduces it twice into his Marcan source in 5:18 (compare Mark 2:3) and 8:47 (compare Mark 5:33), and once he replaces a Marcan ἔμπροσθεν with ἐνώπιον (Luke 5:25; compare Mark 2:12).[37] Luke uses ἐνώπιον in the second half of the saying for variety. He similarly alternates the two prepositions in the Cure of the Paralyzed Man (Luke 5:17–26). Finally, the form ἀπαρνηθέσεται is Lucan, reflecting three tendencies of Luke's style. First, Luke favors compound verbs, and he frequently switches from simple to compound verbs both in Marcan and Q material.[38] Second, he also likes the future passive, again introducing it into his sources.[39] Third, Luke tends to lengthen the future passive forms by prefixing prepositions, even though the

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[32] Compare also "the wisdom of God" (Luke 11:49), "the church of God" (Acts 20:28), and "the high priest of God" (Acts 23:4). See J. Jeremias, *Sprache,* 208–209.

[33] Luke 4:42; 5:13, 24, 25; 8:6, 7, 15, 24, 25, 39, 41, 47, 51; 9:1, 10, 11, 22, 28; 18:16, 28, 33, 38; 19:30 *bis,* 32, 35, 46; 20:10, 11, 15, 27, 29; 22:13, 19, 20, 41, 42, 45, 64; 23:52. See H. J. Cadbury, *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1920) 134–135; J. Jeremias, *Sprache,* 116.

[34] See Luke 8:8 (compare Mark 4:9); 8:21 (compare Mark 3:35); 20:27 (compare Mark 12:18); 23:49 (compare Mark 15:41). See further H. J. Cadbury, *Style,* 135–136; J. Jeremias, *Sprache,* 116 n. 3.

[35] Luke 5:14; 8:38, 45; 9:25, 33, 48; 18:18; 20:2; 22:3. See H. J. Cadbury, *Style,* 136; J. Jeremias, *Sprache,* 116 n. 4.

[36] J. C Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae,* 18.

[37] J. Jeremias, *Sprache,* 38.

[38] See Luke 4:38, 42; 6:38, 39; 8:6, 28, 33, 35, 44; 9:7, 47; 10:21; 11:17, 18; 12:2; 17:37; 18:22; 19:36; 20:10, 27 *bis.* See H. J. Cadbury, *Style,* 166–167.

[39] Luke introduces future passives into his sources in 5:37; 11:51; 12:53; 21:16. He shows his fondness for the form especially in passages where he inserts several future passives—two in 12:3 and 21:6 and four in 17:34–35 and 18:32. See H. J. Cadbury, *Style,* 164–165.

forms are already quite long.[40] So the participle, the preposition ἐνώπιον, and the future passive point to Luke. In short, Luke left his fingerprints all over the denial half of the saying. Matthew did not introduce the parallelism, Luke eliminated it.[41] We cannot, though, identify Matthew's denial half with Q. Matthew redacted the second half of the saying the same way he edited the first half. He replaced Q's ὅς with ὅστις, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου with κἀγώ, and τῶν ἀγγέλων with τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. Matthew also probably changed an original future indicative (ἀρνήσεται) in the relative clause to the more common subjunctive (ἀρνήσηται) as Luke did in the first half of the sentence. So the Q Saying on Confessing and Denying originally looked like this:

Q 12:8–9

8a πᾶς ὅς ὁμολογήσει ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
b καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁμολογήσει ἐν αὐτῷ ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀγγέλων·
9a ὅς δὲ ἀρνήσεταί με ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
b καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρνήσεται αὐτὸν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀγγέλων.

II. THE INTERPRETATION

The Q Saying on Confessing and Denying carries so much weight that Günter Haufe claims the solution of the Son of Man problem depends on it.[42] One line of research, represented by Vielhauer and Käsemann, tried to exploit the saying's vocabulary and form to place it in a legal context.

According to Vielhauer the verbs "confess" and "deny" and the preposition "before" are legal terms that point to trials the early Christians faced.[43] But the linguistic data do not support Vielhauer. Catchpole has shown that "confess" refers primarily to an expression of religious conviction based on an experience of God.[44] The antithetical term "deny" means to retract an expression of conviction. Some examples. In the final speeches of the Book of Job, God challenges Job to act like God, and then he mocks Job by saying, "Then I will confess (ὁμολογήσω) that your right hand can save" (Job 40:14 LXX). In describing the situation under Antiochus, the author of 2 Maccabees states, "A man could neither keep the sabbath, nor observe the feasts of his fathers, nor so much as confess himself to be a Jew (οὔτε ἁπλῶς Ἰουδαῖον ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι)" (2 Macc 6:6); and in 4 Maccabees a martyr responds to his torturers, "No, by the blessed death of my brothers, by the eternal destruction of the tyrant, and by the glorious life of the pious, I will not deny (οὐκ

[40] Luke lengthens μετρηθήσεται (Mark 4:24; Matt 7:2) to ἀντιμετρηθήσεται (Luke 6:38) and συναχθήσονται (Matt 24:28) to ἐπισυναχθήσονται (Luke 17:37). Compare also ἐπαναπαήσεται (Luke 10:6), ἀφαιρεθήσεται (Luke 10:42), ἀνταποδοθήσεται (Luke 14:14), συνθλασθήσονται (Luke 20:18), and αἰχμαλωτισθήσονται (Luke 21:24). See H. J. Cadbury, *Style*, 164.

[41] See further H. J. Cadbury, *Style*, 85–88.

[42] G. Haufe, "Das Menschensohn-Problem in der gegenwärtigen wissenshaftlichen Diskussion," *EvT* 26 (1966) 130–141, esp. p. 140.

[43] See note 3 above.

[44] D. R. Catchpole, "The Angelic Son of Man," 257–259.

ἀρνήσομαι) our noble brotherhood" (4 Macc 10:15). These texts show that "confess" and "deny" are religious rather than legal terms. Nor does the preposition "before" support Vielhauer's position. Although it can be used in a legal context,[45] more often it appears in a non-legal one.[46] The vocabulary does not yield a judicial setting. In Q 12:8–9 "to confess" means to express openly one's religious conviction, "to deny" means to retract it.[47]

Käsemann appealed to the form of the saying to establish a legal background. He started with an analysis of the Pauline sentence: "If anyone destroys God's temple, God will destroy him" (1 Cor 3:17). He called this and similar sayings "sentences of holy law," and saw in them early Christian prophets at work proclaiming an end-time *jus talionis* in which the punishment corresponded to the crime. The prophets cast these sentences into a fixed form. The protasis contained a conditional clause, and the apodosis announced judgment with a future indicative main verb or a curse. Käsemann cited Mark 8:38 and Q 12:8–9 as his prime examples from the synoptics.[48] But Klaus Berger found the root of these sentences not in the legal sayings of the OT but in wisdom retribution sayings.[49] These wisdom sayings announce a retribution in which the reward or punishment corresponds to the deed. For example, we find in the Book of Proverbs "One who sows evil, will reap evil" (Prov 22:8 LXX) and in the Book of Tobit "If you turn to him . . . then he will turn to you" (Tob 13:6). In the wisdom literature retribution takes place in this life, but when the apocalyptic writers took up these sayings they shifted the retribution to the end-time. For example, in the Testaments of the 12 Patriarchs Levi exhorts his children, "Do righteousness on earth (ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς), my children, that you may find it in the heavens (ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς)" (*T. Levi* 13:5). These wisdom retribution sayings in their apocalyptic form provide the background for Q 12:8–9. The efforts to set Q 12:8–9 against a judicial background have failed.

The dominant view of Q 12:8–9 follows the interpretive line laid down by Bultmann and Tödt.[50] According to this view the saying distinguishes between Jesus and the Son of Man, portraying the Son of Man not as an eschatological judge, but as an advocate or witness. The eschatological Son of Man will confess one who confesses the earthly Jesus and will deny anyone who denies Jesus. Because the early church would not distinguish between Jesus and the Son of Man, the saying goes back to Jesus himself and provides important clues to his eschatology.[51] Despite the popularity of this view, it labors

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[45] Matt 25:32; 27:11; Luke 21:36; 2 Cor 5:10.

[46] Matt 5:16, 24; 6:1; 11:26; 17:2; 18:14; 26:70; Mark 2:12; Luke 5:19; 14:2; John 12:37. See D. R. Catchpole, "The Angelic Son of Man," 259.

[47] See further H. Riesenfeld, "The Meaning of the Verb ἀρνεῖσθαι," *ConNT* 11 (1947) 207–219; H. Schlier, "ἀρνέομαι," *TDNT* 1 (1964) 469–71; O. Michel, "ὁμολογέω," *TDNT* 5 (1967) 199–220; J. M. McDermott, "Luke, XII, 8–9: Stone of Scandal," *RB* 84 (1977) 523–537, esp. pp. 530–531.

[48] E. Käsemann, "Sentences of Holy Law," 66–81.

[49] K. Berger, "Zu den sogenannten Sätzen heiligen Rechts," *NTS* 17 (1970–1971) 10–40, esp. pp. 19–25.

[50] See note 2 above.

[51] With individual differences the following carry forward the Bultmann-Tödt interpretation: F. Hahn, *The Titles of Jesus in Christology: Their History in Early Christianity* (London: Lutterworth, 1969) 28–34; J. M. McDermott, "Luke, XII, 8–9: Stone of Scandal," 532–533; R. Pesch, "Über die Autorität Jesu," 41–53; B. Lindars, "Jesus as Advocate: A Contribution to the Christological Debate," *BJRL* 62 (1979–1980) 476–497; D. R. Catchpole, "The Angelic Son of Man," 259–265.

under some serious difficulties. First, it fails to situate the saying in its Q context; and, second, it does not adequately account for the saying's parallelism. I will first sketch Q's view of the future Son of Man, and then I will probe the saying's parallelism.

Q paints a coherent picture of the future Son of Man. The coming Son of Man rewards the faithful and punishes the faithless, he saves and destroys. We see this role most clearly in the Householder and the Servant Left in Charge (Q 12:39–40, 42b–46). In the Servant Left in Charge the returning master rewards the faithful servant and destroys the servant who does not fulfill his charge (Q 12: 44–46). The Householder identifies the master with the future Son of Man by describing the coming of both in the same way (compare Q 12:40 and Q 12:46). Although these parables describe this role most explicitly, the references to the Son of Man in the Q eschatological discourse (Q 17:24, 26, 30) fit easily into this picture, but they emphasize only one pole of the dual role, the punishing, destroying pole. We should probably also interpret the Sign of Jonah pericope in this way (Q 11:29–32). Although it is not easy to spell out what the sign of Jonah is, the context shows the Ninevites and the Queen of the South rising up to condemn this generation. So if we look at the other future Son of Man sayings in Q, we find a consistent picture of the Son of Man's role. He will come to reward and punish, to save and destroy. The problem remains how to fit Q 12:8–9 into this general view of Q. To answer this question we need to investigate the saying's parallelism.

The Saying on Confessing and Denying consists of four parallel clauses:

> Everyone who confesses me before men,
> the Son of Man will also confess him before the angels;
> but whoever denies me before men,
> the Son of Man will also deny him before the angels.

If the sentence were poetry instead of prose we would call it a tetracolon.[52] The four clauses show complex grammatical and lexical patterning.[53] First, the grammatical patterning. Each half of the saying has a relative clause followed by a main clause so that the four clauses form an *abab* pattern. But the clauses also yield a second pattern. The two relative clauses are pendent nominative clauses.[54] They do not fill a grammatical role in the main clauses, but are resumed by the pronouns αὐτῷ and αὐτόν. Because of the pendent nominative construction, each relative clause mirrors the sentence structure of the main clause exactly. In the confession half both clauses have a subject and verb followed by two prepositional phrases; in the denial half both have a subject and verb followed by a direct object and a prepositional phrase. The identical future indicative verb forms further bind each relative clause to its main clause. So superimposed on the *abab* pattern is a second *aabb* pattern.

We turn now to the lexical patterning. Biblical parallelism lives on word pairs—two corresponding terms that bind the parallel clauses together.[55] For example, we find the following parallelism in Ruth 1:21:

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[52] W. G. E. Watson, *Classical Hebrew Poetry: A Guide to its Techniques* (JSOTSup 26; Sheffield: JSOT, 1984) 11–15, 185–187.

[53] See A. Berlin, *The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1985) 83–86.

[54] See M. Zerwick, *Biblical Greek*, 9–10.

[55] See J. L. Kugel, *The Idea of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and its History* (New Haven/London: Yale University, 1981) 27–40; W. G. E. Watson, *Classical Hebrew Poetry*, 128–144; A. Berlin, *The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism*, 65–80.

I went forth full;
and Yahweh brought me back empty.

The word pair "full//empty" captures the stark contrast between Naomi's experience of life and death. Q 12:8–9 contains four word pairs—three pairs of nouns and pronouns ("whoever//him," "me//the Son of Man," and "men//angels") and a verb pair ("confess//deny"). In the pair "men//angels" both nouns have the same grammatical role in the sentence, but the first two pairs—"whoever//him" and "me//the Son of Man"—are examples of subject-object parallelism.[56] Subject-object parallelism also occurs in Ruth 1:21:

I went forth full;
and Yahweh brought *me* back empty.

In Q 12:8–9 the double subject-object shift creates the retribution that lies at the center of the saying:

Whoever confesses ME . . .
THE SON OF MAN will also confess *him* . . .
whoever denies ME . . .
THE SON OF MAN will also deny *him* . . .

All three pairs of nouns and pronouns fall into an *abab* pattern. The verb pair, on the other hand, superimposes an *aabb* pattern so that the lexical patterning shows the same overlay of patterns the grammatical analysis revealed.

To understand the saying we need to see how the word pairs function. The first pair, "whoever//him," does not pose any problems, but the interpretation hinges on the other three pairs. When the apocalyptic writers took over the wisdom retribution sayings, they shifted the retribution from an inner-worldly to an eschatological reward and punishment. If the Q saying did not have the word pair "men//angels," we could interpret the retribution as inner-worldly. The two phrases "before men" and "before the angels" add the eschatological dimension. They are roughly equivalent to "on earth" and "in the heavens" in the example cited above from *T. Levi* 13:5 or to "in this age" and "in the age to come" in Matt 12:32. The saying uses "men//angels" instead of one of the other pairs in order to create the word play between "men" and "the Son of Man."

As we saw above, the dominant interpretation of Q 12:8–9 sees a distinction between Jesus and the Son of Man in the word pair "me//the Son of Man." But we also saw that any writer who uses the Son of Man as a self-designation of Jesus can potentially move back and forth between "I" and "the Son of Man." Matthew does this, but so does the author of Q. Q uses "the Son of Man" as a self-designation of Jesus in Q 7:34, 9:58, thereby creating the conditions needed to shift between "I" and "the Son of Man." The saying does not distinguish between two people. However, the word pair "me//the Son of Man" is connected in two ways with the word pair "men//angels." First, "men//angels" distinguishes between the present age and the age to come. The use of "me" and "the Son of Man" carries the distinction over into two phases of Jesus' existence, a phase before the eschaton and an eschatological phase. Second, "the Son of Man" creates the word play between "men" and "the Son of Man."

The word pair "confess//deny" plays a special role in the saying. It is the only pair in

[56] On subject-object parallelism, see A. Berlin, *The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism*, 57–58.

the *aabb* pattern, and the identical verbs in the relative and main clauses form the linchpin of the parallelism. To understand how the verb pair functions we need to look closely at parallelism. Parallelism unlocks many potentialities of language, including the metaphorical power of language.[57] We can see this in the Q saying on John and the Coming One (Q 3:16–17).[58] A parallel statement lies embedded in the saying:

> I baptize you in water . . .
> He will baptize you in the holy spirit and in fire . . .

The saying uses the verb "to baptize" literally in the first clause, but we must understand it metaphorically in the second clause. As a result, the saying introduces the twin metaphors of baptism in the holy spirit and baptism in fire. Rhetorically these metaphors are quite effective, resulting in a memorable saying that would lose something if non-metaphorical language were used. A similar shift takes place in the Q Saying on Confessing and Denying. The saying uses the verbs "confess" and "deny" literally in the two relative clauses, but metaphorically in the two main clauses for the eschatological role of the Son of Man in Q—to save and destroy, to reward and punish.

Once we take into account the dynamics of the saying's parallelism, many far-reaching conclusions that have been drawn from the saying appear less certain. The saying does not prove that Jesus, the editor of Q, or any early Christian believed in a Son of Man figure distinct from Jesus. The saying does not support an advocate or witness role for the Son of Man. The saying does not provide the key to the Son of Man problem. Instead, the saying fits rather smoothly into Q's view of the future Son of Man. The saying also fits nicely in its immediate context, the Q section on fearless preaching (Q 12:2–10). The disciples must proclaim publicly what Jesus taught them privately (vv. 2–3). They must not fear those who kill the body, but trust the God who marks the death even of a sparrow (vv. 4–7). The Son of Man will reward them for their confession, but he will punish those who deny Jesus (vv. 8–9). Above all, they must not speak against the Holy Spirit (v. 10). The Q Saying on Confessing and Denying is both a promise and a warning. For Q Christian life unfolds in confessing Jesus.

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[57] On metaphor in parallelism, see A. Berlin, *The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism*, 99–102.

[58] For a reconstruction of the saying, see H. Fleddermann, "John and the Coming One (Matt 3:11–12//Luke 3:16–17)," in *Society of Biblical Literature 1984 Seminar Papers* (ed. K. H. Richards; SBLSPS 23; Chico: Scholars Press, 1984) 377–384.

Reconstruction of Q 12:33-59

Philip Sellew
University of Minnesota

Introduction

This section of the *Synoptic Sayings Source* (Q12:33–59) illustrates virtually all of the potential hazards awaiting an unwary reconstructionist; we are spared only the difficulty of the Mark-Q overlaps. In its place, however, is a different source of parallel texts only too rarely brought into account in work on Q reconstruction, namely, the *Gospel of Thomas*. This section of Q has an unusually high proportion of close parallels with *Thomas*, whose number can be expanded even further if we consider so-called Lucan *Sondergut*. If some or all of the sayings contained in Luke 12 but not found in Matthew were once part of Q, it could well be that the *Thomas* parallel will give us our best or only control case with which to examine Luke's reception and redaction of the Q material. In the present contribution I have taken as a basic working hypothesis the suggestion that these *Thomas* texts are not directly dependent on Luke but instead go back ultimately to a similar stream of transmission of the Jesus sayings tradition. For further discussion of such a perspective see the contributions of **Sieber** and **Koester** listed in the section "Works Cited" below.

The most appropriate way in which to make use of the *Thomas* materials is, to be sure, by no means settled as of yet in NT scholarship. Even some recent commentators on the Synoptics (e.g. **Gundry** or **Fitzmyer**) give virtually a blanket assessment that the sayings of Jesus in *Thomas* are derived in direct literary fashion from our canonical gospels. If this were correct there would of course be little point in giving the *Thomas* versions a serious hearing. Apart from *a priori* theological dismissals, however, such a judgment must in any case be derived from the detailed analysis of individual cases in the transmissional history, not by a quick glance at the supposed "Matthean vocabulary" or "special Lucan source material" embedded in *Thomas*. The very existence of such overlaps should call the claim for these "special" or "unique" sources of sayings material used by any particular gospel writing into serious question. The claim that the version of a saying contained in *Thomas* may be form-critically and otherwise as ancient as a version found in one of our NT gospels need not imply the further claim that the current exemplar of the *Gospel of Thomas*, in its Coptic and perhaps Gnostic presentation, is itself as old as Q or either of its primary NT witnesses. What is becoming all the more clear in current scholarship on the sayings tradition is that all known ancient gospel texts, including Mark, Luke, Q, and *Thomas*, share an impressive amount of similar or allied streams of transmission in their heritage. The interconnections are less often literary, more commonly one of collateral development. There is still much work to be done to unravel more fully and better understand those relationships and complexities.

A first step is to list the *Thomas* (and other) parallels as equal partners in our synoptic analytical tables, so that their data may be sufficiently recognized and then utilized. **Crossan** is the one among us who has followed this principle most consistently and with very impressive results. It is not enough to list the parallel passages in an appendix (so Aland's synopsis, and only in modern translations); now at least one neo-synopticist (**Greeven**) does print the most obvious *Thomas* parallels on the same page with the NT

sayings, though only in footnotes. As a bonus, however, **Greeven** provides the *Thomas* parallels not in a German or English translation, but in a largely plausible retroversion into Greek, providing a much more immediately digestible and useful point of comparison.

An immediate difficulty in using the *Gospel of Thomas* as an added column in synoptic analysis is of course its survival in Coptic, for the most part, rather than in Greek. (For details on this and other points see **Koester**). None of the sayings paralleling Q 12:33–59 was found in the Greek Oxyrhynchos papyri. It is not much help for most NT specialists to print the bare Coptic, and may even be unhelpful or misleading in view of the substantial differences in the structures of the two languages. In place of that I have instead quoted **Greeven's** Greek retroversions as though they were the original *Thomas* readings—which they could well be in many cases, though in doing that work there seems to have been a natural tendency to be influenced in both vocabulary and word order by the familiar NT parallels. The comparative advantages of clarity and accessibility will in my judgment more than offset any such potential difficulties.

When a parallel in the *Gospel of Thomas* is known to me, I have treated it as a fully competent witness to an early form of the saying also attested in Q or one of its successors. This means that in the discussion of any particular variant of wording, theme, or structure, the *Thomas* evidence can be decisive when Matthew and Luke disagree or when one does not record a saying. The nature of the preservation of *Thomas* and the dangers while retroverting its text of being overly influenced by familiar canonical parallels demands that we be cautious about giving too much weight to the use of vocabulary in a *Thomas* parallel in making decisions between synonymous or nearly synonymous Matthew/Luke variants. I do not believe nor do I pretend that *Thomas* is a *direct* witness to the text of Q in the way that we customarily believe Matthew and Luke to be; instead *Thomas* seems to give us access to the form of many individual sayings as they were *potentially* received in Q (or some later gospel). *Thomas* does not preserve the order or wording of Q but instead can provide independent information about the probable pre-redactional wording of a saying otherwise preserved in only one Q witness. Of course we must be on guard for *Thomas'* own editorial and other alterations, just as in any early Christian text, but such worries in practice do not impede us all that greatly in the instances under consideration here.

My use of parallels to Q 12 and Luke 12 from the *Gospel of Thomas* is further justified by a widely recognized feature of Luke's redactional and compositional practice, namely, his tendency to follow one source *en bloc* and then another (meaning normally either Mark or Q), and not to conflate or intermingle his source texts in the manner of Matthew's gospel. (On this Lucan procedure see, classically, **Streeter** and **Cadbury**.) This suggests that when Luke 12 contains sayings not in Matthew but still formally and thematically coherent with the fully attested Q material surrounding it, such as the parabolic material in 12:35–38, or the prophetic and/or sapiential sayings in 12:49ff, we have good warrant for considering whether those sayings were part of Q but omitted by Matthew. It is at least as likely that Luke preserves the more complete Q sequence than the alternative possibility, that Matthew, in his much more severe rearrangement of Q 12 sayings (those from Q 12:33–59 now appearing in Matthew 5, 6, 10, 16, and 24) nonetheless happened to preserve every section of the Q material. In some cases, such as Luke 12:35–38, scholars have argued that indeed Matthew has not repeated the Q text because of a partial overlap with his own special material (in this instance Matt 25:1–13). The existence of *Thomas* parallels in several instances of so-called Lucan *Sondergut* in Luke 12 should enable us to examine the question of the utility of the *Thomas* parallels in more thoroughgoing fashion than is presently typical.

One further note: As others have mentioned, a particular scholar's overarching perspective on the development of the tradition will have enormous impact at the level of individual choices among variant readings. A famous example is von **Harnack**, who is so respectful of the literary self-consciousness of Luke, as well as convinced of Matthew's "Judaism," that if any Lucan reading *can* be explained as a revision of the Matthean version, it is. Thus "Q" nearly always means the "Matthew" version of a double-tradition text. It is refreshing, therefore, to read **Gundry's** commentary on Matthew's "literary art": **Gundry** has such a penetrating and comprehensive picture of Matthew's aims and techniques of composition, as well as of his theology, that he can nearly always explain a Matthean reading as a deliberate alteration of what we read in *Luke*. Though this procedure gives pause to one accustomed to starting with source analysis and then following up its implications more or less systematically, and many times the results seem needlessly strained, nonetheless it leads to an impressively consistent picture of Matthew's achievements. It is pleasant when sorting out opinions to discover a scholar who actually tries to explain a variant reading as part of a sensible understanding of the document as a whole (in this case, however, the parallel texts are somtimes only poorly understood). So **Gundry** has turned **Harnack** on his head: if any Matthean text *can* be understood as a revision of the Lucan version (never mind how Matthew found it), it is. Perhaps these examples give me sufficient warrant for bringing the *Thomas* parallels into the equation in points of Matthew/Luke disagreement (without this now meaning that *Thomas* will always be judged correct).

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Previous commentators on Q 12 used in my work are listed here; these are cited in the apparatus of opinion to each variant by author's name in bold print and page number. For example, "**Harnack 66–67**" means "Adolf von Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus* (New York: Putnam's, 1908) pp. 66–67." Secondary references within quoted sources are normally not listed here unless I have consulted them independently. References to "Sellew" in plain, unbolded print introduce my own observations or arguments as appropriate; "**Sellew**" in bold print, with page numbers, refers to my dissertation, listed below.

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RECONSTRUCTED TEXT OF Q 12:33-59

For convenience I provide here in advance the reconstructed text of Q 12 (with only limited use of sigla) that has resulted from the detailed analysis reported below:

*33 (μὴ θησαυρίζετε ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ὅπου σὴς καὶ βρῶσις ἀφανίζει, καὶ ὅπου κλέπται διορύσσουσιν καὶ κλέπτουσιν·) θησαυρίζετε δὲ ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ὅπου οὔτε σὴς οὔτε βρῶσις ἀφανίζει καὶ ὅπου κλέπται οὐ διορύσσουσιν οὐδὲ κλέπτουσιν. 34 ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θησαυρὸς ὑμῶν, ἐκεῖ ἔσται καὶ ἡ καρδία ὑμῶν.

*35 [ἔστωσαν ὑμῶν αἱ ὀσφύες περιεζωσμέναι καὶ οἱ λύχνοι καιόμενοι· *36 καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅμοιοι ἀνθρώποις προσδεχομένοις τὸν κύριον ἑαυτῶν, πότε ἀναλύσῃ ἐκ τῶν γάμων, ἵνα ἐλθόντος καὶ κρούσαντος εὐθέως ἀνοίξωσιν αὐτῷ. *37 μακάριοι οἱ δοῦλοι ἐκεῖνοι, οὓς ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος εὑρήσει γρηγοροῦντας· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι περιζώσεται καὶ ἀνακλινεῖ αὐτοὺς καὶ παρελθὼν διακονήσει αὐτοῖς. *38 κἂν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ κἂν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ φυλακῇ ἔλθῃ καὶ εὕρῃ οὕτως, μακάριοί εἰσιν ἐκεῖνοι.] 39 ἐκεῖνο δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι εἰ ᾔδει ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης ποίᾳ φυλακῇ ὁ κλέπτης ἔρχεται, (ἐγρηγόρησεν ἂν καὶ) οὐκ ἂν ἀφῆκεν διορυχθῆναι τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ. 40 καὶ ὑμεῖς γίνεσθε ἕτοιμοι, ὅτι ᾗ οὐ δοκεῖτε ὥρᾳ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔρχεται.

42 τίς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πιστὸς δοῦλος καὶ φρόνιμος ὃν κατέστησεν ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκετείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ δοῦναι αὐτοῖς ἐν καιρῷ τὴν τροφήν; 43 μακάριος ὁ δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος ὃν ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ εὑρήσει οὕτως ποιοῦντα· 44 ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῦ καταστήσει αὐτόν. 45 ἐὰν δὲ εἴπῃ ὁ δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ· χρονίζει μου ὁ κύριος, καὶ ἄρξεται τύπτειν τοὺς σύνδουλοι αὐτοῦ, ἐσθίῃ δὲ καὶ πίνῃ μετὰ τῶν μεθυόντων, 46 ἥξει ὁ κύριος τοῦ δούλου ἐκείνου ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ οὐ προσδοκᾷ καὶ ἐν ὥρᾳ ᾗ οὐ γινώσκει καὶ διχοτομήσει αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀπίστων θήσει.

*47 [ἐκεῖνος ὁ δοῦλος ὁ γνοὺς τὸ θέλημα τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ ἑτοιμάσας ἢ ποιήσας πρὸς τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ δαρήσεται πολλάς· *48 ὁ δὲ μὴ γνούς, ποιήσας δὲ ἄξια πληγῶν δαρήσεται ὀλίγας. παντὶ δὲ ᾧ ἐδόθη πολύ, πολὺ ζητηθήσεται παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ᾧ παρέθεντο πολύ, περισσότερον αἰτήσουσιν αὐτόν.

*49 πῦρ ἦλθον βαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ τί θέλω εἰ ἤδη ἀνήφθη. *50 βάπτισμα δὲ ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι, καὶ πῶς συνέχομαι ἕως ὅτου τελεσθῇ.] 51 δοκεῖτε ὅτι ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν; οὐκ ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην, ἀλλὰ διαμερισμόν. 52 πέντε γὰρ ἔσονται ἐν ἑνὶ οἴκῳ· τρεῖς ἔσονται ἐπὶ δυσὶν καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τρισίν· 53 διαμερισθήσονται πατὴρ ἐπὶ υἱῷ καὶ υἱὸς ἐπὶ πατρί, μήτηρ ἐπὶ τὴν θυγατέρα καὶ θυγάτηρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητέρα, πενθερὰ ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην αὐτῆς καὶ νύμφη ἐπὶ τὴν πενθεράν.

*54 ἔλεγεν δέ· ὅταν ἴδητε τὴν νεφέλην ἀνατέλλουσαν ἐπὶ δυσμῶν, εὐθέως λέγετε ὅτι ὄμβρος ἔρχεται, καὶ γίνεται οὕτως. *55 [καὶ ὅταν νότον πνέοντα, λέγετε ὅτι καύσων ἔσται, καὶ γίνεται.] 56 ὑποκριταί· τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οἴδατε δοκιμάζειν, τὸν καιρὸν δὲ τοῦτον οὐκ οἴδατε δοκιμάζειν.

58 ὡς ὑπάγεις μετὰ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου σου ἐπ' ἄρχοντα , ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ δὸς ἐργασίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, μήποτέ σε παραδῷ ὁ ἀντίδικος πρὸς τὸν κριτήν, καὶ ὁ κριτής σε παραδώσει τῷ ὑπηρέτῃ, καί σε βαλεῖ εἰς φυλακήν. 59 ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως ἂν ἀποδῷς τὸν ἔσχατον κοδράντην.

What follows here is the text divided into smaller units along with a compact but detailed apparatus presenting my analysis of evidence and opinion. The apparatus is arranged according to the variant numbers for each verse provided by the "PapQ" project of the Seminar. In many cases an item o precedes when the question of a text's inclusion in Q is at issue, not just its wording within Q. I am glad to acknowledge the assistance of my graduate seminar on Q at the University of Minnesota in Fall 1986, where I was able to discuss the theory and practice of hypothetical source reconstruction with some sober-minded but good-natured skeptics: Russell P. Dudrey, Glen Menzies, and especially Markus Schiller, who has provided me additional aid as my research assistant.

For each verse I provide the **PapQ** reading in a left column, faced by my own reconstruction of the relevant verse in Q. Next the readings of Matthew and Luke are provided in parallel columns. When relevant, parallels from the *Gospel of Thomas* are then provided in parallel to the proposed reconstruction of the Q verse. Each Q variant is numbered and discussed in the apparatus that accompanies the particular verse. Sigla representing the nature of particular variants in **PapQ** are those of the Seminar:

EXPLANATION OF SIGLA

( ) Material found in Matthew but not in Luke.
[ ] Material found in Luke but not in Matthew.

[( )]	Material found in both Matthew and Luke but in different form.
/ \	Beginning (/) and end (\) of a unit in variation.
*	Verse or part of verse whose presence in Q is disputed.

Note: In this contribution I use the sigla [[ ]] in some special charts to draw attention to divergences in instances of *Thomas*-Q overlaps. These sigla are employed only in tables showing these *Thomas*-Q parallels.

[[ ]]	Material found in *Thomas* but not in a Q witness (Matthew or Luke).
[[ ]]	Material found in both *Thomas* and in Luke, but not in Matthew.
([ ])	Material found in both *Thomas* and in Matthew, but not in Luke.
[([ ])]	Material found in both *Thomas* and in Q (=Matthew//Luke), but in different forms.

A. Q 12:33-34: Matt 6:(19)-21//Luke 12:33-34; cf. *Gos. Thom.* 76

***Q/Matt 6:19**
μὴ θησαυρίζετε ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ὅπου σὴς καὶ βρῶσις ἀφανίζει, καὶ ὅπου κλέπται διορύσσουσιν καὶ κλέπτουσιν·

Q 12:33

PapQ 12:33	Reconstruction of Q 12:33
1/	
[( )]^{2}	μὴ θησαυρίζετε ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ὅπου σὴς καὶ βρῶσις ἀφανίζει, καὶ ὅπου κλέπται διορύσσουσιν καὶ κλέπτουσιν·
	θησαυρίζετε
θησαυρο[( )]^{3}	δὲ ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς
[ ]^{4}	ἐν τοῖς
οὐραν(ῷ)^{6}	οὐρανοῖς,
ὅπου /\$^{7}$	ὅπου οὔτε σὴς
( )^{8}	οὔτε βρῶσις ἀφανίζει καὶ ὅπου
κλεπτ[( )]^{9}	κλέπται
οὐ[ ]^{10}	οὐ
^{7}/οὐ[( )]^{11}ε σὴς\$^{7}$	
δι[( )]^{12}	διορύσσουσιν οὐδὲ κλέπτουσιν.
\$^{1}$→Q 12:34	

Matt 6:20	Luke 12:33
$^{0.1}$/[cf. 6:19 above]	$^{0.1}$/[πωλήσατε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὑμῶν καὶ δότε ἐλεημοσύνην· ποιήσατε ἑαυτοῖς βαλλάντια μὴ παλαιούμενα]^{2},
(θησαυρίζετε δὲ ὑμῖν)^{2}	

θησαυρο(ὺς)[3]	θησαυρὸ[ν][3]
[ ][4]	[ἀνέκλειπτον][4]
ἐν [ ][5]	ἐν [τοῖς][5]
οὐραν(ῆ)[6]	οὐραν[οῖς][6],
ὅπου	ὅπου
/οὗ(τ)[11]ε σὴς\[7]	/\/
(οὔτε βρῶσις ἀφανίζει καὶ ὅπου)[8]	( )[8]
κλέπτ(αι)[9]	κλέπτ[ης][9]
οὐ [ ][10]	οὐ[κ ἐγγίζει][10]
/\/	/οὐ [δ][11]ὲ σὴς\[7]
δι(ορύσσουσιν οὐδὲ κλέπτουσιν)[12]	δι[αφθείρει][12].

Cf. also *Gos. Thom.* 76b (according to the Greek retroversion of **Greeven**, p. 38): ζητεῖτε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸν θησαυρὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀνέκλειπτον, ὅπου σὴς οὐκ ἐγγίζει φαγεῖν οὔδὲ σκώληξ ἀφανίζει.

Gos. Thom. 76b Arranged according to Pap Q 12:33	Reconstructed Q 12:33b
	. . .
[([[ζητεῖτε	θησαυρίζετε
καὶ ὑμεῖς]])]	δὲ ὑμῖν
τὸ[[ν]] θησαυρὸ[[ν]]	θησαυροὺς
[[αὐτοῦ τὸν]]	
[[ἀνέκλειπτον]]	
	ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς
ὅπου	ὅπου
	οὐτε
[([[σὴς]])]	σὴς
οὐ[[[κ ἐγγίζει]]]	
[[φαγεῖν]]	
οὐ[[[δε]]]([[σκώληξ	οὔτε βρῶσις
ἀφανίζει]])	ἀφανίζει
	. . .

Q 12:33:^{0}: Presence of Matt 6:19 in Q

Pro: Harnack 66–67: "the thief and the moth [of Luke 12:33 par.] are not easily understood apart from St. Matt. vi. 19; . . . Only if reference had been made to treasures upon earth do the moth and thief explain themselves." Also **Guelich** 326: Luke 12:33a is likely a reorientation of not only Q/Matt 6:20a, but of v 19 as well.

Con: Matthew might well have constructed 6:19 out of Q 12:33–34 to provide a more structured parallelism: so **Schweizer** *Matthew* 162: "Matthew . . . elaborates verse 20, introducing two double members into the subordinate clause . . . , and precedes the whole with an antithesis formulated in parallel terms." **Gundry** 111: "Typically, Matthew recasts the sayings on treasure for closer parallelism and a purer, more prominent emphasis on treasures." idem 113: "Before making those revisions of the positive command found also in Luke 12:33, Matthew composes an exactly matching negative form of the saying (v 19),

just as he composed the negative saying about forgiveness from a positive saying (vv 14–15)."
Evaluation: Perhaps the differences between Matthew and Luke here suggest that Q had no equivalent to either Matt 6:19 or Luke 12:33a (cf. lack of parallel in *Gos. Thom.* 76b).

Q 12:33:^{0}: Presence of Q 12:33 in Q.

Pro: The differences between Matthew's and Luke's versions of Q 12:33–34 may be explained by referring Matt 6:19–21 to "M" and Luke 12:33–34 to Q (so **Bußmann** 82–83; **Manson** 114). Present in Q in different recensions; Q/Luke is secondary (so **Harnack** 66; **Marshall** 531); or both evangelists have made changes (so **Polag** 63).
Con: Differences reflect separate sayings (**Burney**, 88, 115).

Q 12:33^{1}: Placement of 12:33–34 in Q.

Luke = Q: After Q 12:31; before Q 12:[35], 12:39.
Pro: Luke follows Q's order more closely than Matthew in the sequence of sayings and sections. **Harnack** 140–41, **Streeter** 284, and **Polag** 62 locate after 12:22–32.
Matthew = Q: After Q 11:4; before Q 11:34.

Q 12:33^{2}: Luke's formulation including admonitions to "sell possessions, give alms, make purses for yourselves that do not age" or Matthew's admonition to "lay up treasures for yourselves."

Luke = Q πωλήσατε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὑμῶν καὶ δότε ἐλεημοσύνην· ποιήσατε ἑαυτοῖς βαλλάντια μὴ παλαιούμενα
Pro: Gundry 111: "In Luke's parallel, disciples of Jesus are to gain heavenly treasure by selling their possessions and giving alms. But Matthew has already written about almsgiving (vv 2–4) and will yet put 'sell your possessions' (19:21) where Mark and Luke have 'sell' with another object (Mark 10:21;; Luke 18:22). Therefore he omits those matters here." **idem** 112: "Matthew's ὑμῖν and Luke's ἑαυτοῖς are stylistic variants. . . . Matthew does not take over the command to provide purses that do not grow old (so Luke), because for him the old treasures are good (see 13:52, peculiar to his gospel), and he does not want his readers to think there is a contradiction. . . . Cf. the omission of a purse also in 10:9 (contrast Luke 10:4). In place of 'provide' Matthew chooses 'treasure up' in order to match 'treasures' with a cognate and thus heap all possible emphasis on the motif of treasures." **Jeremias** 218 lists τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, δότε ἐλεημοσύνην, ποιήσατε ἑαυτοῖς, βαλλάντια [!] as "Tradition" at least partly "im Nicht-Markus-Stoff." Furthermore, Luke most commonly writes singular of "heaven," not the plural as here (53 times singular, 6 times plural). **Polag** 62 prints Luke's verb ποιήσατε twice in the verse, while otherwise mostly following Matthew.
Con: Harnack 66: "St. Luke adopts, as it were, only a reminiscence of this saying, which he binds up with the command to sell all things and give alms (cf. his enthusiasm for this ideal in the Acts). . . ." **Schulz** 142: "V 33a dürfte ganz von Lk formuliert sein: πωλεῖν ist lk gefärbt; . . . ὑπάρχειν ist . . . in seiner sonstigen Verwendung ausgesprochen lk; ἐλεημοσύνη ist lk." **Bultmann** 327: Luke has given the Q wording a positive formulation. βαλλάντιον is a Lucan term (**Crossan** 130, citing **Sieber** 57); cf. also **Sellew** 123 on βαλλάντιον in Q/Luke 10:4. **Schweizer** *Matthew* 162: "[Luke] stated his interpretation at the very outset (vs. 33a)." Similarly **Guelich** 326. **Fitzmyer** 981: echoes Luke 11:41. **Crossan** 130: Matthew's parallel structure could represent either a text closer to the

original or else reflect his "own sense of poetic parallelism"; Luke's positive formulation probably represents Q.
Matthew = Q θησαυρίζετε δὲ ὑμῖν θησαυρούς
Pro: Guelich 326: "Since Luke's parallel assumes the contrast underlying [Matt] 6:19, and since his paraenetic introduction is Lucan in theme and style, Matt 6:19–21 appears to offer the earlier form of the sayings. This conclusion gains support from the Lucan vocabulary and wealth motif in 12:33 ab" [citing **Schulz** 142 and **Pesch** 358–60]. **Harnack** 140–41 and **Schenk** 92–93 follow Matthew completely in Q 12:33. **Polag** 62 follows Matthew for the most part. **Zeller** 79 follows Matthew completely in both verses (33–34).
Con: Schweizer *Matthew* 162: "Matthew . . . elaborates verse 20, introducing two double members into the subordinate clause. . ., and precedes the whole with an antithesis formulated in parallel terms." **Gundry** 111: "Typically, Matthew recasts the sayings on treasure for closer parallelism and a purer, more prominent emphasis on treasures." idem 113: "Before making those revisions of the positive command found also in Luke 12:33, Matthew composes an exactly matching negative form of the saying (v 19), just as he composed the negative saying about forgiveness from a positive saying (vv 14–15)."
Evaluation: The many Lucanisms argue that Matthew's simpler version better represents the Q text.

Q 12:33[3]: Luke's singular "treasure" or Matthew's plural.

Luke = Q θησαυρόν
Pro: Gundry 111: "For the saying in v 20, [Matthew] draws 'treasures in heaven' from 'treasure in the heavens' (so Luke). The singular 'treasure' changes to the plural 'treasures' to sorrespond with the compound treference to moth and rust in the second clause." **Crossan** 131: singular "treasure" fits structure of vv 33–34; note singular also in *Gos. Thom.* 76b.
Con: Schweizer *Matthew* 162: "Luke changed [to plural] in the interests of uniformity." Luke's reading may be due to attraction to the singular adjective.
Matthew = Q θησαυρούς
Pro: Harnack 140, **Polag** 62, **Schenk** 92, and **Zeller** 79 follow Matthew.
Con: Matthew may have changed the singular to correspond with the plural verb; this would be the only place in Q where the plural θησαυροί is used (Sellew).
Evaluation: Luke's singular θησαυρόν is not a direct parallel with Matthew's plural; instead it is in apposition with βαλλάντια, Luke's replacement for Q/Matthew's θησαυρούς.

Q 12:33[4]: Luke's adjective "inexhaustible."

Luke = Q ἀνέκλειπτον
Pro: Note presence of adjective in *Gos. Thom.* 76b.
Con: The adjective seems to be a Lucan addition, since it is "literary Greek" (**Harnack** 66; **Schulz** 142). **Fitzmyer** 983: "Luke has added the descriptive adj. to the treasure of 'Q'; it is to be understood as a treasure not to be lost through death."
Matthew = Q [ ]
Pro: Harnack 140, **Polag** 62, **Schenk** 93, and **Zeller** 79 omit Luke's ἀνέκλειπτον.
Evaluation: The adjective should most likely be omitted, although its presence in *Gos. Thom.* 76b increases the likelihood of a different reading in the "Q^{Lk}" tradition.

Q 12:33[5]: Luke's article

Luke = Q τοῖς οὐρανοῖς
Matthew = Q οὐρανῷ
Pro: Harnack 141 prints the plural without the article. Schulz 142, Polag 62 and Zeller 79 follow Matthew.
Con: Schenk 93 leaves the matter undecided by translating "bei Gott."
Evaluation: May well be translation variants; in any case items [5] and [6] should be considered together.

Q 12:33[6]: Luke's plural or Matthew's singular.

Luke = Q τοῖς οὐρανοῖς
Pro: Harnack 66: ". . . the plural οὐρανοῖς is much rarer in St. Luke than in St. Matthew. . . "; idem 141 prints the plural without the article. Jeremias 218: "Lk 12,33 ist eine der 6 Stellen, an denen Lukas οἱ οὐρανοί schreibt (Lk 10,20; 12:33; 18:22; 21:26 cit. = Mk 13,25; Apg 2,34; 7,56) gegenüber 53 (29 + 24) Stellen mit dem Singular. . . . Alle 6 Pluralstellen bieten traditionelles Formelgut. . . ."
Matthew = Q οὐρανῷ
Pro: Schulz 142: Matthew's reading is more likely since he prefers the plural (16 times). In Matt 19:21 he replaces the Markan singular with the plural.
Con: Gundry 111: "For the saying in v 20, [Matthew] draws 'treasures in heaven' from 'treasures in the heavens' (so Luke). . . . The original, Semitic plural for heaven . . . becomes a singular to match the singular of 'earth' in the preceding, parallel v 19."
Evaluation: Luke's strong preference for the singular is decisive (à la Harnack): read οὐρανῷ

Q 12:33[7]: Use and position of οὔτε/οὐδὲ σής.

Luke = Q κλέπτης οὐκ ἐγγίζει οὐδὲ σῆς διαφθείρει
Con: Bultmann 93: here as elsewhere (6:40; 11:17; 13:23–24) Luke recasts parallelisms.
Matthew = Q οὔτε σὴς οὔτε βρῶσις ἀφανίζει καὶ . . . κλέπται οὐ διορύσσουσιν οὐδὲ κλέπτουσιν.
Pro: Matthew seems to preserve a parallelism which is destroyed in Luke (so e.g. Schulz 142); Sellew: cf. partially similar structure in *Gos. Thom.* 76b. Harnack 141, Polag 62, and Zeller 79 follow Matthew; Schenk 93 follows Matthew's structure.
Con: Schweizer *Matthew* 162: "Matthew . . . elaborates verse 20, introducing two double members into the subordinate clause . . ., and precedes the whole with an antithesis formulated in parallel terms."
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:33[8]: Matthew's formulation with repetition of οὔτε, ὅπου; Matthew's reference to βρῶσις ἀφανίζει

Luke = Q ( )
Con: Pernot 8: "Lc 1233 supprime βρῶσις *rouille*, de Mt 619-20, sans doute parce qu'il veut garder à ce mot le sens classique de *nourriture*."
Matthew = Q οὔτε βρῶσις ἀφανίζει καὶ ὅπου
Pro: Schulz 142 considers the βρῶσις-clause to be part of Q. Sellew: cf. partially similar

structure in *Gos. Thom.* 76b. **Harnack** 141, **Polag** 62, **Schenk** 93, and **Zeller** 79 follow Matthew.
Con: Schweizer *Matthew* 162: "It is possible that in elaborating verse 20, Matthew used the rare word for 'destroy' [ἀφανίζει] as an echo of the same word in 5:18 [*sic;* = 6:16?], replacing the commoner word found in Luke 12:33." **Gundry** 112: "[Matthew] seizes on the idea in διαφθείρει . . . but switches to the synonym ἀφανίζει in assimilation to and wordplay with the same verb in v 16: moth and rust destroy earthly treasures just as the hypocrites 'destroy' (i.e., disfigure) their faces."
On βρῶσις cf. BAD s.v. and **Guelich** 326–27.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading should be preferred.

Q 12:33[9]: Luke's singular or Matthew's plural.

Luke = Q κλέπτης
Pro: Kilpatrick 22.
Con: Sellew: Luke made the alteration to conform with the householder/thief parable that follows in 12:39.
Matthew = Q κλέπται
Pro: Schulz 142: "Da Matt durchweg die Priorität zuerkannt werden mußte, wird auch der Singular κλέπτης auf Lk zurückgehen." **Harnack** 141, **Polag** 62, **Schenk** 93, and **Zeller** 79 follow Matthew.
Con: Gundry 112: "Matthew imports the verb [διορύσσουσιν] from the tradition behind 24:43; Luke 12:39. The singular 'thief' (so Luke) becomes the plural 'thieves' to match the compound reference to a moth and eating. Together, these two expansions result in two clauses beginning with 'where.' Originally there was only one (in this saying by itself—so Luke)."
Evaluation: The Matthean plural more likely represents the Q reading.

Q 12:33[10]: Luke's verb "approach."

Luke = Q ἐγγίζει
Pro: Notice presence of verb in *Gos. Thom.* 76b. **Zeller** 79 may be partly following Luke in omitting a translation for κλέπτουσιν.
Con: Cadbury 174–75 shows Luke's liking for the verb ἐγγίζειν **Harnack** 66: ἐγγίζειν is a feeble word which St. Luke was fond of using (it is not found in St. John, occurs three times in St. Mark, six or seven times in St. Matthew, twenty-four times in St. Luke)." **Schulz** 142: "Die beiden Verben διορύσσειν und κλέπτειν sind bei Lk durch blasses ἐγγίζειν zusammengefasst, das deutlich lk ist." **Jeremias** 218: ἐγγίζει Lucan "Redaktion."
Matthew = Q [ ]
Pro: Harnack 141, **Polag** 62, and **Schenk** 93 follow Matthew.
Con: Gundry 112: "The making of the compound expression 'neither moth nor eating' leads [in Matthew] in the next clause to the expansion of 'comes near' (so Luke). The result is another compound expression, 'do not break in and steal.'"
Evaluation: The verb should most likely be omitted, although its presence in *Gos. Thom.* makes the possibility of a Q^{Lk} transmission variant considerably stronger.

Q 12:33[11]: Choice between conjunctions.

Luke = Q οὐδὲ σής
Matthew = Q οὔτε σής

Pro: **Harnack** 141 and **Polag** 62 follow Matthew.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading should be preferred in conformity with items [7] and [8].

Q 12:33[12]: Luke's verb "destroy" or Matthew's verbs "break in and steal."

Luke = Q διαφθείρει
Pro: διαφθείρειν occurs only here in Luke-Acts or other gospels. **Kilpatrick** 22. **Gundry** 112: "Matthew imports the verb [διορύσσουσιν] from the tradition behind 24:43; Luke 12:39. The singular 'thief' (so Luke) becomes the plural 'thieves' to match the compound reference to a moth and eating. Together, these two expansions result in two clauses beginning with 'where.' Originally there was only one (in this saying by itself—so Luke)." Sellew: Luke's concept, but not his wording, is supported by *Gos. Thom.* 76b.
Con: **Pernot** 12: διαφθείρει shows Luke's preference for a less familiar synonym: "La forme familière envisagée ici est ἀφανίζει." **Schulz** 142 and **Harnack** 66 consider διαφθείρειν a classical term which is not part of the language of the evangelist. **Cadbury** 183 suggests that its use here is due to to Luke's wish to improve the "literary tone."
Matthew = Q διορύσσουσιν οὐδὲ κλέπτουσιν
Pro: **Pernot** 7: "Suppression de διορύσσω, l'impossibilité de creuser au ciel étant trop évidente. La rédaction de Mt pouvait en outre laisser croire qu'il y a des voleurs au ciel; d'où la correction de Lc. . . ." **Schulz** 142: "Die beiden Verben διορύσσειν und κλέπτειν sind bei Lk durch blasses ἐγγίζειν zusammengefaßt, das deutlich lk ist." **Polag** 62 follows Matthew.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred, since his vocabulary seems more picturesque and reminiscent of the socio-economic background of Palestine.

Q 12:34

PapQ 12:34	Reconstruction of Q 12:34
ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θησαυρὸς [( )][1] ἐκεῖ /\[2] καὶ ἡ καρδία [( )][1] /ἔσται\[2] \12:33[1]	ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θησαυρὸς ὑμῶν ἐκεῖ ἔσται καὶ ἡ καρδία ὑμῶν.
Matt 6:21	**Luke 12:34**
ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θησαυρὸς (σου)[1], ἐκεῖ /ἔσται\[2] καὶ ἡ καρδία (σου)[1] /\[2]	ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θησαυρὸς [ὑμῶν][1], ἐκεῖ /\[2] καὶ ἡ καρδία [ὑμῶν][1] /ἔσται\[2].

Q 12:34[1]: Luke's plural or Matthew's singular "your."

Luke = Q ὑμῶν
Pro: **Schulz** 143: "Wahrscheinlicher aber ist es doch, daß Mt primären Plural (so Lk) in Singular abgeändert hat, um eine Verbindung zum folgenden Logion 6,22f herzustellen" (citing **Harnack**). **Polag** 62 prints the plural. **Gundry** 113: "Matthew changes ὑμῶν (so Luke) to σου for closer agreement with the singular references to treasure and heart." **Schenk** 93 prints plural. Sellew: note that *Gos. Thom.* 76b uses the plural ὑμεῖς.
Con: **Marshall** 532: Luke's plural "is grammatically better and indicates the universal application of the saying." **Schweizer** *Matthew* 162: "Luke changed [to plural] in the

interests of uniformity." **Fitzmyer** 982: Luke has made the plural "your" conform with the second plural in vs. 33.
Matthew = Q σου
Pro: Zeller 79 follows Matthew ("dein").
Undecided: Harnack 141 prints σου with ὑμῶν in brackets.
Evaluation: The variant could be explained as due to either evangelist's editing, but Matthew's context (Harnack) provides the most cogent explanation for the change, suggesting that Luke's plural is to be preferred.

Q 12:34[2]: Position of ἔσται.

Luke = Q (after "also your heart")
Pro: Polag 62 follows Luke. **Sellew**: ἔσται ends a sentence in Q 11:34.
Con: Sellew: This arrangement has a chiastic structure which may be due to Luke's editing.
Matthew = Q (before "also your heart")
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew. **Sellew**: in Q 13:28 Matthew and Luke both read ἐκεῖ ἔσται; Q generally seems to prefer the sequence of adverb/ἔσται (e.g., Q 11:30; 17:24, 26, 30).
Con: Gundry 113: "In the last clause [of Matt 6:21] ἔσται comes forward to give ἡ καρδία σου the last position, in line with ὁ θησαυρός σου. The final accent falls, then, on the importance of treasure as the determinant of the heart."
Evaluation: Certainty is not possible, since both structural patterns fit the evangelists; stylistic preferences, but analysis of the Q usage suggests that Matthew's wording is preferable.

***Q 12:[35-38]**

[Q/Luke 12:35-38
ἔστωσαν ὑμῶν αἱ ὀσφύες περιεζωσμέναι καὶ οἱ λύχνοι καιόμενοι· 12:36 καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅμοιοι ἀνθρώποις προσδεχομένοις τὸν κύριον ἑαυτῶν, πότε ἀναλύσῃ ἐκ τῶν γάμων, ἵνα ἐλθόντος καὶ κρούσαντος εὐθέως ἀνοίξωσιν αὐτῷ. 12:37 μακάριοι οἱ δοῦλοι ἐκεῖνοι, οὓς ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος εὑρήσει γρηγοροῦντας· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι περιζώσεται καὶ ἀνακλινεῖ αὐτοὺς καὶ παρελθὼν διακονήσει αὐτοῖς. 12:38 κἂν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ κἂν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ φυλακῇ ἔλθῃ καὶ εὕρῃ οὕτως, μακάριοί εἰσιν ἐκεῖνοι.]

Q 12:35-38[0]: Presence in Q.

Undecided: Schweizer *Luke* 211: "If vs. 39 once followed vs. 34 . . . , vss. 35–38 could be a Lukan interpolation. He did not make up the parable."
Pro: Matthew omitted in favor of the Wise Virgins parable of 25:1–13 (so Streeter in **Sanday** 193; **Bultmann** 118; **Streeter** 279; **Manson** 115; **Marshall** 533). "This is supported by the formal parallelism. . . ." (**Crossan** 58). **Schmid** 340: "An das Gleichnis von den wachenden Knechten (V 35–38) ist in V 39 (ad vocem γρηγορεῖν) das vom wachenden Hausherrn angeschlossen, das in V 40 eine praktische Anwendung auf die Zuhörer findet, während die folgende Frage des Petrus (V 41) und die Antwort Jesu (V 42ff) darauf keine Rücksicht nehmen, sondern auf V 37f Bezug nehmen. Daraus folgt, daß V 39f in den Zusammenhang von V 35–38, 41ff eingeschoben sind. . . . Die Konsequenz aus diesem Tatbestand ist, daß nicht erst Lk den Abschnitt 12[35–48] zusammengestellt haben kann, sondern daß er und Mt ihn schon in einer gemeinsamen

Quelle so vorfanden, wie Lk ihn bietet." **Schürmann** 124: "Einige Reminiszenzen machen es gewiß, daß Lk 12,35–38 auch dem Matthäus in der Redequelle an dieser Stelle vorgelegen hat: Die φυλακή Mt 24,43 (Lk 12,39 ὥρα) stammt aus der fortgelassenen Einheit Lk 12,35–38 (vgl. V. 38). Sie korrespondiert der sekundären Einfügung des ἐγρηγόρησεν und beschränkt die völlige Ungewißheit der Stunde sekundär auf die nächtlichen Stunden; die Einfügung stammt ebenfalls aus Lk 12,38." So too **Gundry** 495 and **Tuckett** 182. **Schweizer** *Luke* 212: "The parable of the thief in Matthew includes the words 'wake' and 'watch (of the night)' like Luke 12:37–38. Does this show that the parable with its two catchwords came before Luke 12:39 in Q . . . but was omitted by Matthew on account of Matthew 25:1–13? . . . It is also more likely that Luke would have inserted vs. 41 between vss. 38 and 39 if vss. 37–38 had not already been linked to vss. 39–40." **Polag** 62 tentatively includes 35–38 in his Q reconstruction, citing Müller 7; Weiß 58; **Knox** 67; **Streeter** 279; **Bußmann** 82; **Schürmann** 124, 213. **Tuckett** considers the parable pre-Lucan, but vv 35 and 37b "are probably additions by Luke to his source." 37b "disrupts the sense of reality in the story, and the master of the house clearly becomes the Lord of the church in the role of a servant. . . . The language is very close to that of Luke xvii.8. . . . Thus verse 37b is probably a Lukan allegorizing feature . . . the introductory καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅμοιοι in verse 36 suggests that verse 35 is not an integral part of the parable which follows." Sellew: the use of ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν in v 37 is not Lucan, since he prefers either to omit ἀμήν or to translate it (cf. in this section 12:44, 51, 59).

Con: **Fitzmyer** 984: "Apart from the common theme of watchfulness [with Matthew 25] . . . the question of detail shifts the emphasis. Hence it is better to regard vv. 35–38 as derived from "L," since vv. 35–38 are not common to Matthew and Luke." **Boring** 224: "These sayings were probably not in Q, nor are they a Lukan composition, but represent a small cluster of traditions taken over by Luke and included without editing or rewriting." **Kloppenborg** 148 n. 202: "There are no verbatim agreements between Matt 25:1–13 and Luke 12:35–38, and despite the common image of a wedding feast, the narrative logic is quite different." **Schenk** and **Zeller** do not include 12:35–38 in their Q reconstructions.

Evaluation: If Matthew has substituted the parable in 25:1–13 for this Q passage, then disagreements in wording or theme are irrelevant. The next Q verse seems connected (τοῦτο/ἐκεῖνο δὲ γινώσκετε . . .). The section should be tentatively included in the Q text.

B. 12:39-46: Luke 12:39//Matt 24:43; cf. *Gos. Thom.* 21

Q 12:39

PapQ 12:39	Reconstruction of Q 12:39
[1]/ [( )][2]ὁ δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι εἰ ἤδει	ἐκεῖνο δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι εἰ ἤδει
ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης ποίᾳ [( )][2]	ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης ποίᾳ φυλακῇ
ὁ κλέπτης ἔρχεται	ὁ κλέπτης ἔρχεται
( )[4]	(ἐγρηγόρησεν ἂν καὶ)
οὐκ ἂν [( )][5] εν διορυχθῆναι	οὐκ ἂν ἀφῆκεν διορυχθῆναι
τ[( )][6]ν οἰκ[( )][6]ν αὐτοῦ	τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ.

Matt 24:43	Luke 12:39
[1]/ (ἐκεῖν)[2]ο δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι εἰ ἤδει	[1]/[τοῦτ][2]ο δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι εἰ ἤδει
ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης ποίᾳ (φυλακῇ)[3]	ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης ποίᾳ [ὥρᾳ][3]
ὁ κλέπτης ἔρχεται	ὁ κλέπτης ἔρχεται

(εγρηγόρησεν ἂν καὶ)[4]
οὐκ ἂν (εἴσασ)[5]εν διορυχθῆναι
τ(ὴ)[6]ν οἰκ(ία)[6]ν αὐτοῦ

( )[4]
οὐκ ἂν [ἀφῆκ]ε[5]ν διορυχθῆναι
τ[ὸ]ν[6] οἰκ[ο][6]ν αὐτοῦ

Cf. *Gos. Thom.* 21b (Greeven, p. 160):
διὰ τοῦτο λέγω· εἰ οἶδεν ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης ὅτι ἔρχεται ὁ κλέπτης γρηγορήσει πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀφήσει αὐτὸν διορύσσειν τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ, ἵνα ἄρῃ τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ

Gos. Thom. 21b
[[διὰ τοῦτο λέγω·]]

εἰ [([[οἶδεν]])]
ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης
[([[ὅτι]])]
ἔρχεται ὁ κλέπτης
([[γρηγορήσει]])
[[πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν]]
([[καὶ]])
οὐκ [[ἀφήσει]]]
[[αὐτὸν]]
[([[διορύσσειν]])]
[[τὴν οἰκίαν]] αὐτοῦ
[[τῆς βασιλείας,
ἵνα ἄρῃ τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ]].

Reconstructed Q 12:39

ἐκεῖνο δὲ γινώσκετε ὅτι
εἰ ἤδει
ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης
ποίᾳ
ὁ κλέπτης ἔρχεται
ἐγρηγόρησεν ἂν

καὶ
οὐκ ἂν ἀφῆκεν

διορυχθῆναι
τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ.

Q 12:39[1]: Position of 12:39-46 in Q.

Luke=Q After Q 12:34; before Q 12:(49), 51
Pro: **Harnack** 141 prints here (as do **Schenk** 94 and **Polag** 62). **Schweizer** *Matthew* 460: "This warning was probably already connected with Luke 12:39ff. in Q, because both sections speak of 'thieves' and . . . 'breaking in.'" So too **Zeller** 81: "Die Stichwortklammer mit 'einbrechen' und 'Dieb' (Mt 6,19f./Lk 12,39) macht es wahrscheinlich, daß die lukanische Abfolge auch die von Q gewesen ist."
Matthew = Q After Q 17:35; before Q 19:12.

Q 12:39[2]: Choice between demonstrative pronouns.

Luke = Q τοῦτο
Pro: **Gundry** 495: "Instead of Luke's τοῦτο . . . [Matthew] writes a more emphatic and characteristic ἐκεῖνο." **Polag** 62 follows Luke. **Schenk** 94 prints "das Folgende" (= τοῦτο). Sellew: note *Gos. Thom.* 21b διὰ τοῦτο.
Con: **Harnack** 32: Lucan correction "on linguistic grounds."
Matthew = Q ἐκεῖνο
Pro: **Harnack** 32;141 follows Matthew, as does **Schulz** 268: "Lk wird das singuläre und wahrscheinlich primäre ἐκεῖνο bei Mt dem gängigen Sprachgebrauch τοῦτο angepaßt haben." Similarly **Marshall** 538.
Con: **Fleddermann** 19: "Matthew assembles several parables of vigilance in his Eschatological Discourse. In this complex he twice urges his readers to watch (24:42; 25:13), the first time immediately before the Householder–"Watch, therefore, for you do

not know what day your Lord comes" (24:42). Matthew's indicative and his demonstrative ἐκεῖνο only make sense in reference to this verse. . . . So Luke's τοῦτο and imperative reflect Q."
Evaluation: If 12:35–38 is part of Q, then Fleddermann's observation is not as telling: the ἐκεῖνο would then refer back to v 38. Luke has corrected Q/Matthew's ἐκεῖνο to refer to what follows.

Q 12:39[3]: Choice between designations of time.

Luke = Q ὥρᾳ
Pro: **Manson** 116 prefers Luke's "hour," citing its use later in Q 12:40, 46. **Marshall** 538 cites **Jeremias** *Parables* 48 that ὥρᾳ translates Aramaic "moment" *sha'atha*. **Polag** 62 follows Matthew, as does **Schenk** 94 ("Stunde").
Con: **Harnack** 33: Lucan correction "because the thief does not only come during the φυλακή, but at any time." **Schulz** 268: ὥρᾳ bei Lk ist gegenüber dem ursprünglichen φυλακή bei Mt sek Angleichung an Lk V 40." So too **Marshall** 538: "but it could also be that he [Luke] has conformed the original wording here to v. 40." **Crossan** 61: "[Hour] is used for the Son of Man's advent in the following . . . (Q/Matt. 24:50 = Luke 12:46), and it also appears along with 'day' in Q/Matt. 24:50 = Luke 12:46. I would consider Luke an assimilation, an inevitable one once the image is applied to the Son of Man's 'hour.'" So too **Fitzmyer** 989: cf. φυλακή in v 38; "It is also a more traditional Christian term." Similarly **Fleddermann** 18.
Matthew = Q φυλακῇ
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew, as does **Schulz** 268. **Zeller** 81 prints Matthew's "Nachtwache."
Con: **Gundry** 495: φυλακή . . . comes from the preceding saying in the tradition (cf. Luke 12:38). It replaces ὥρῃ . . . and compensates for Matthew's ommitting the names of the four night watches in v 42." **Evaluation:** Matthew's reading should be preferred.

Q 12:39[4]: Matthew's clause about watching.

Luke = Q
Pro: **Manson** 116. **Schenk** 94 and **Zeller** 81 follow Luke here.
Con: **Harnack** 33: Luke "drops as superfluous." Sellew: the agreement of Matthew and Thomas could mean that the phrase was omitted by Luke (cf. Crossan's comments below), or point to a difference in the Q^{Lk} and Q^{Mt} transmission.
Matthew = Q ἐγρηγόρησεν ἂν καί
Pro: **Harnack** 141. **Crossan** 61: "I prefer Matthew's to Luke's version as being closer to Q, since both Thomas texts [i.e., *Gos. Thom.* 21b; 103] also mention the owner's precautionary measures (see **Sieber**: 256)."
Con: **Manson** 116 "This shorter text may be original in Lk. and Q, and the added words an editorial gloss in Mt., which has crept into MSS. of Lk." (For discussion of text see **Metzger** 161–62). **Schürmann** 124 considers clause a secondary intrusion; see n. 60: [ἐγρηγόρησεν] "Sonst bei Matthäus immer nur par Mk (14,34.37.38) oder par Lk (vgl. Mt 24,42 und 25,13 par Lk 12,37)." **Schulz** 268: "ἐγρηγόρησεν ἂν καί stellt dagegen wohl einen Zusatz des Mt dar, der Vv 43f mit dem vorangestellten V 42 verbindet, in dem die Mahnung γρηγορεῖτε vorkommt." **Schweizer** *Matthew* 460: "Matthew introduces the catchword 'keep watch' into verse 43 in order to link it more closely with verse 42." **Polag** 63: Matthean elaboration, from Mark 13:35. **Gundry** 495: "To summarize the tradition behind Luke 12:37–38, Matthew inserts 'he would have watched,' which echoes the

command to watch in his own v 42." **Marshall** 538: "probably an editorial addition to stress the lesson in Mt. 24:42." **Fleddermann** 18: "In the apodosis Matthew adds ἐγρηγόρησεν ἄν καί, repeating the key word γρηγορέω from the preceding verse to reinforce his vigilance theme."
Evaluation: Print in parentheses. Matthew's reading is related to his "watchfulness" motif, but the presence of the phrase in Thomas suggests that it came to him in his tradition; perhaps we have here an instance of separation in the Q^{Mt} and Q^{Lk} transmissional histories.

Q 12:39[5]: Choice between verbs.

Luke = Q ἀφῆκεν
Pro: Polag 62. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 21b supports Luke.
Matthew = Q εἴσασεν
Pro: Harnack 33: ". . . I find difficulty in conjecturing St. Luke's reason for the change; εἴσασεν is, however, certainly the original reading, for ἐᾶν is found only here in St. Matthew, while it often occurs in St. Luke (ten times in the gospel and Acts)"; on 141 he follows Matthew. Similarly **Schulz** 268 n. 7: "Mt wird kaum geändert haben, da ἐᾶν bei ihm nur an dieser Stelle vorkommt." Similarly **Fleddermann** 19.
Undecided: Manson 116: "translation variants," citing Greek versions of Dan 4:12, 23. **Schulz** 268: "Eine Entscheidung . . . ist nicht mehr möglich und auch sachlich belanglos." **Marshall** 538: "may reflect different recensions."
Evaluation: Matthew alters the Q reading to be more specific.

Q 12:39[6]: Choice between nouns for "house."

Luke = Q οἶκος
Pro: Cf. Q/Luke 11:17 οἶκος diff. Matt 12:25//Mark 3:25 οἰκία, on which see **Sellew** 38. **Fleddermann** 19: "Although these statistics might show a slight preference for οἶκος, Luke never switches from one word to the other in editing his sources and except for set phrases like οἶκος Ἰσραηλ and κατ' οἶκον he uses the two words interchangeably. In other words Luke had no reason to alter whichever word appeared in Q.
Con: Harnack 33: Luke "replaces οἰκία by οἶκος, which is in fact the more appropriate word." So too **Marshall** 538.
Matthew = Q οἰκία
Pro: Polag 62. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 21b supports Matthew.
Con: Fleddermann 19: "Matthew . . . clearly prefers οἰκία, using it 26 times compared to only 10 times for οἶκος. In 9:23 he changed a Marcan τὸν οἶκον το τὴν οἰκίαν (compare Mark 5:38), so he probably changed Q's οἶκος here also."
Undecided: Schulz 268: "kann ebenfalls nicht mehr entschieden werden."
Evaluation: This may be an example of standard variation in the Q^{Mt} and Q^{Lk} witnesses; with the *Thomas* evidence in mind, Matthew's reading should perhaps be preferred.

Q 12:40

PapQ 12:40
°/( )[1] καὶ ὑμεῖς γίνεσθε
ἕτοιμοι ὅτι ᾗ /ὥρᾳ\[2] οὐ δοκεῖτε /\[2]
ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔρχεται.\°

Reconstruction of Q 12:40
°/καὶ ὑμεῖς γίνεσθε
ἕτοιμοι ὅτι ᾗ οὐ δοκεῖτε ὥρᾳ
ὁ υἱος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔρχεται.\°

Matt 24:44	Luke 12:40
°/(διὰ τοῦτο)[1] καὶ ὑμεῖς γίνεσθε	°/( ) καὶ ὑμεῖς γίνεσθε
ἕτοιμοι ὅτι ᾗ /\[2] οὐ δοκεῖτε /ὥρᾳ\[2]	ἕτοιμοι ὅτι ᾗ /ὥρᾳ\[2] οὐ δοκεῖτε /\[2]
ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔρχεται.\°	ὁ υἱος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔρχεται.\°

Cf. *Gos. Thom.* 21b (Greek retroversion according to Greeven, p. 160).
ὑμεῖς δὲ γρηγορεῖτε ἐνώπιον τοῦ κόσμου·

Q 12:40°: Presence in Q.

Pro: Usually treated as part of Q by commentators.
Con: **Harnack** 34: "The verse in St. Luke corresponding to St. Matthew, verse 44, is perhaps an interpolation from St. Matthew. If so, we cannot be sure that it stood in Q."

Q 12:40[1]: Matthew's connective phrase.

Luke = Q καί ( )
Pro: **Schenk** 94 and **Zeller** 81 follow Luke here ("auch").
Con: **Harnack** 33: Luke "drops the superfluous words . . ."
Matthew = Q διὰ τοῦτο καί
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew (in brackets), as does **Polag** 62 (smaller type). **Schulz** 268: "Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, daß Mt die ursprüngliche kommentierende Abschlußformel erhalten hat." **Fleddermann** 19: "This phrase occurs three times in Q (Q 11:19, 49; 12:22). . . ."
Con: **Gundry** 495: "Typically, Matthew introduces . . . διὰ τοῦτο (4:2) in order to base the exhortation to readiness on uncertainty concerning exact time." **Marshall** 538–39: "probably secondary, since it is typical of his [Matthew's] style." Similarly **Fleddermann** 19 (with detailed discussion of usage): "Matthew probably added the phrase here because there is clear evidence that he uses it redactionally and no clear evidence that Luke eliminates it."
Evaluation: Matthew's phrase is a secondary addition.

Q 12:40[2]: Position of ὥρᾳ.

Luke = Q (before οὐ δοκεῖτε)
Con: **Harnack** 32: Luke "improves the order of the words . . ." So too **Schulz** 268. **Marshall** 539: "Luke's word order . . . is less Semitic than Mt . . . and hence secondary . . . ; the antecedent has been attracted into the relative clause." Similarly **Fleddermann** 19, who cites Luke 1:20; 17:27, 29, 30; Acts 1:2; 7:20 and **Jeremias** 88.
Matthew = Q (after οὐ δοκεῖτε)
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew, as does **Polag** 62.
Con: **Gundry** 495: Matthew postpones ὥρᾳ slightly.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading should be preferred.

*Q 12:41

Q/Luke 12:[41]
[1]/εἶπεν δὲ ὁ Πετρός·
κύριε, πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην λέγεις ἢ καὶ πρὸς πάντας;\°

Q 12:41°: Presence in Q.

Pro: **Manson** 117: "Mt. may have omitted it because it was difficult to understand what it meant"; 118: "Perhaps . . . it was as obscure to him as it is to us." Moule (*Birth of the New Testament* [1962] 147–49), cited by **Marshall** 540, argues that Matthew dropped the verse due to its "unintelligibility." **Gundry** 495: "To avoid a narrative interruption of Jesus' discourse, Matthew omits Peter's question and the introduction to Jesus' reply (Luke 12:41–42a)."
Con: **Harnack** 33–34: "St. Luke has interpolated between verses 44 and 45 of St. Matthew the words. . . . They interrupt the connection of the passage, which shows here only a seeming hiatus, and they answer to the style and manner of St. Luke, who lays great weight upon the definite address of the discourses." **Bultmann** 193 (cf. 335): "Luke has formulated a question by Peter . . . and has thereby intended to apply it to the officials of the Christian Church—quite against its original meaning, it would seem." So too **Schulz** 271; **Fitzmyer** 985. **Cadbury** 126: Luke commonly introduces material about the point or application of parables (cf. 15:1–2; 18:1; 18:9; 19:11). So too **Lührmann** 69 (citing Jülicher *Gleichnisreden* 2. 159). **Jeremias** 220: "τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην λέγεις": nur bei Lukas begegnende Wendung. . . . Die an unsere Stellung vorliegende Wendung λέγειν πρὸς πάντας kommt im ganzen NT sonst nur noch Lk 9,23 (redaktionell, diff. Mk 8,34) vor." **Schweizer** *Luke* 213: "totally Lukan question, distinguishing sayings addressed to the disciples from those addressed to everyone. . . ." **Schweizer** *Matthew* 461: "Luke is probably thinking of leaders of the Christian community . . . ; this is why he inserted Peter's question in 12:41 between the two parables, which were right together in Q." **Kloppenborg** 151 n. 212: Lucan redactional insertion. **Polag, Schenk** 95 and **Zeller** 81 do not include Luke 12:41 in their Q reconstructions. **Fleddermann** 19–20: "The vocabulary betrays Luke's hand, for he frequently uses εἶπεν δε, λέγω παραβολήν, λέγω πρός, κύριε as an address for Jesus, and ὁ κύριος for Jesus in narrative."
Evaluation: Should be omitted as a Lucan insertion.

Q 12:42

PapQ 12:42	Reconstruction of Q 12:42
[ ]¹ τίς ἄρα ἐστὶν	τίς ἄρα ἐστὶν
ὁ πιστὸς [( )]² ος	ὁ πιστὸς δοῦλος
[( )]³ φρόνιμος ὃν	καὶ φρόνιμος ὃν
κατ [( )]⁴ στησει [( )]⁴ ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς	κατέστησεν ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς
[( )]⁵ είας αὐτοῦ	οἰκετείας αὐτοῦ
τοῦ δ[( )]⁶ναι	τοῦ δοῦναι
( )⁷	αὐτοις
/ ἐν καιρῷ\⁸	ἐν καιρῷ
τ[( )]⁹ τρ[( )]⁹ν	τὴν τροφήν;

Matt 24:45	Luke 12:42
[ ]¹ τίς ἄρα ἐστὶν	[καὶ εἶπεν ὁ κύριος]¹ τίς ἄρα ἐστὶν
ὁ πιστὸς (δοῦλ)²ος	ὁ πιστὸς [οἰκονόμ]ος
(καὶ)³ φρόνιμος ὃν	[ὁ]³ φρόνιμος, ὃν
κατ(έ)⁴στησε(ν)⁴ ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς	κατ[α]⁴ στησε[ι]⁴ ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς
(οἰκετ)⁵είας αὐτοῦ	[θεραπ]⁵είας αὐτοῦ
τοῦ δ(οῦ)⁶ναι	τοῦ δ[ιδό]⁶ναι
(αὐτοῖς)⁷	( )⁷

/\[8]
τ(ὴν)[9] τρ(οφὴ)[9]ν
/ἐν καιρῷ\[8];

/ἐν καιρῷ\[8]
τ[ὸ σιτομέ]ρ[ιο]ν
/\[8];

General comments on 12:42–46:
Luke seems to have rewritten the whole story with a particular picture of a well-run household in mind; therefore in many points of detail Matthew's reading is to be preferred.
Jeremias 221: "Antithetische Parallelismen sind nicht lukanisch."

Q 12:42[1]: Luke's introduction.

Luke = Q καὶ εἶπεν ὁ κύριος
The question of the presence of this phrase in Q is bound up with that of v 41.
Con: **Polag** 64, **Schenk** 95 and **Zeller** 81 e.g. omit both vv 41 and 42a. **Harnack** 33 considers it part of the Lucan insertion. **Gundry** 495 considers it tradition that Matthew omitted. **Fleddermann** 19–20: "The vocabulary betrays Luke's hand. . . ." Sellew: note that the title ὁ κύριος occurs nowhere else in Q as the subject of a verb of saying.
Evaluation: Omit as Lucan insertion required as part of his addition of 12:41.

Q 12:42[2]: Luke's householder or Matthew's slave.

Luke = Q οἰκονόμος
Con: **Harnack** 33: Luke "changes the δοῦλος, who indeed even in St. Matthew is not an ordinary slave but both slave and overseer, into an οἰκονόμος, and accordingly the σύνδουλοι must also be transformed [v 49]. . . ." **Schweizer** *Matthew* 460–61: "Luke turns the servant into a majordomo set in charge of the other servants (Luke 12:42; but merely 'servant' in 12:43, 45, 46). . . . Luke is probably thinking of leaders in the Christian community. . . ." **Gundry** 495: due to "Luke's editing: (1) δοῦλος will occur throughout the rest of the parable even in Luke; (2) Luke has a penchant for οἰκονόμος and cognates, which occur eight times in his gospel but never in the others. . . ." **Marshall** 540: "Luke's change makes it all the more clear that it is the leaders of the church who are being addressed (cf. 1 Cor. 4:1f.; Tit. 1:7; 1 Pet. 4:10; also 1 Cor. 9:17; Eph. 3:2; Col. 1:25). . . ." So too **Fitzmyer** 989. So too **Fleddermann** 21, who adds: "The command of the master makes no sense if the subordinate held the position of steward, for then the care of the other servants would be part of his job and would not need a special charge [referring to **Schulz** 271]."
Matthew = Q δοῦλος
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew, as does **Polag** 64. **Marshall** 540: "generally thought to be original in the parable (12:43, 45, 46, 47)." **Schenk** 95 splits the difference in Matthew's favor here ("Angestellte"), as does **Zeller** 81 ("Knecht").
Evaluation: Luke seems to have rewritten the whole story with a particular picture of a well-run household in mind; therefore Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:42[3]: Luke's definite article or Matthew's conjunction.

Luke = Q οἰκονόμος ὁ φρόνιμος
Con: **Schulz** 271 and **Fleddermann** 21 consider Luke's reading a stylistic improvement.
Matthew = Q δοῦλος καὶ φρόνιμος
Pro: **Harnack** 141 and **Polag** 64 follow Matthew.

Evaluation: Since Luke's Greek is more stylish, Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:42[4]: Luke's future tense or Matthew's aorist.

Luke = Q καταστήσει
Con: Harnack 34: "Also καταστήσει (instead of κατέστησεν) is intended to be an improvement; it however stands in a certain connection with the interpolated question of St. Peter [v 41]." Marshall 541: "The future tense . . . is no doubt to be understood allegorically of the appointment of leaders in the church after the departure of Jesus . . ." Schweizer *Luke* 213: "Luke is thus still thinking in terms of special instruction for the disciples (vs. 22). He therefore sets vs. 42 in the future." Similarly Fleddermann 21.
Matthew = Q κατέστησεν
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew here, as do Polag 64, Schenk 95 ("eingesetzt hat") and Zeller 81 ("gesetzt hat").
Con: Gundry 496: "The aorist tense . . . looks like a historicizing reference to ecclesiastical leaders already ensconced in positions of authority."
Evaluation: Matthew's reading fits the parabolic style and thus is to be preferred.

Q 12:42[5]: Luke's "service" or Matthew's "household."

Luke = Q θεραπείας
Con: Harnack 33: Luke "takes offence at the vulgar οἰκετεία, and replaces it by the classical θεραπεία."
Matthew = Q οἰκετείας
Pro: Harnack follows Matthew, as does Polag 64. Gundry 496: "Because of the repeated mention of slaves throughout the parable and because of the attraction Luke the physician would have felt to θεραπείας . . . (cf. Luke 12:42) . . . Matthew's οἰκετείας . . . looks closer to the original." Zeller 81 prints Matthew's "sein Gesinde." Fleddermann 21: Matthew's οἰκετεία is traditional, for it is a NT *hapax legomenon*. Luke has already used θεραπεία in 9:11."
Undecided: Schenk 95 does not choose, translating both words as "Belegschaft."
Evaluation: Luke seems to have rewritten the whole story with a particular picture of a well-run household in mind; therefore Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:42[6]: Luke's present or Matthew's aorist infinitive.

Luke = Q διδόναι
Con: Harnack 32: "on linguistic grounds, St. Luke replaces δοῦναι . . . by διδόναι (as in the Lord's Prayer). . . ." So too Fleddermann 21: "Luke also changed Q's δοῦναι to διδόναι because the present more accurately indicates repeated action. . . ."
Matthew = Q δοῦναι
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew, as does Polag 64.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:42[7]: Matthew's stated indirect object.

Luke = Q ( )
Con: Harnack 33: Luke "drops the superfluous words . . . αὐτοῖς. . . ." So too Fleddermann 21: "Luke . . . dropped a superfluous dative as he frequently does . . . [referring to Cadbury 191–92]."

Matthew = Q αὐτοῖς
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew. Polag 64 prints αὐτοῖς in smaller type. Gundry 496: "'To give them food at the proper time' comes from Ps 104:27. αὐτοῖς corresponds to the LXX (but not to the Hebrew text . . .) and does not appear in Luke, where the substitution of θεραπείας for οἰκετείας takes away its referent."
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:42[8]: Position of the phrase ἐν καιρῷ.

Luke = Q (before "portion of food")
Con: Harnack 32: Luke "improves the order of the words (the unnecessarily emphatic positions of . . . !en kair92 . . .)." So too Fleddermann 22.
Matthew = Q (after "food")
Pro: Harnack 141 and Polag 64 follow Matthew.
Con: Sellew: Matthew seems to be pressing his theme of eschatological urgency by repositioning ἐν καιρῷ in the final emphatic position.
Undecided: Gundry 496: "'To give them food at the proper time' comes from Ps 104:27. The putting of τὴν τροφήν before ἐν καιρῷ matches both the Hebrew text and the LXX, but contrasts with Luke's word order. It is hard to tell whether Luke has strayed from the OT or Matthew has drawn closer."
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:42[9]: Luke's "portion of food" or Matthew's "food."

Luke = Q σιτομέτριον
Pro: Luke's σιτομέτριον is rare (for related verb see Gen 47:12, 14 LXX, Marshall 541), while Matthew's τροφή is frequent though perhaps also preferred by him (cf. discussion of τροφή/μισθός in Q 10:7 in Sellew 129–30). Schenk 95 follows Luke here. Fleddermann 21–22 considers that a *hapax legomenon* is a sign of tradition not redaction.
Con: Harnack 33: "the colourless τροφή gives place to σιτομέτριον, certainly a technical term which moreover is not met with elsewhere. . . ." Fitzmyer 990: Luke's substitution (no reason given).
Matthew = Q τροφή
Pro: Harnack 141 and Polag 64 follow Matthew, as, apparently, does Zeller 81 ("die Nahrung").
Evaluation: Luke seems to have rewritten the whole story with a particular picture of a well-run household in mind; therefore Matthew's reading is to be preferred. Rare words are no more likely to be Q readings than due to editorial revisions by the evangelists (contra Fleddermann).

Q 12:43

PapQ 12:43
μακάριος ὁ δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ὃν ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ εὑρήσει
/ποιοῦντα\[1] οὕτως /\[1]

Matt 24:46
μακάριος ὁ δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ὃν ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ εὑρήσει
/\[1] οὕτως /ποιοῦντα\[1]

Reconstruction of Q 12:43
μακάριος ὁ δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ὃν ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ εὑρήσει
οὕτως ποιοῦντα·

Luke 12:43
μακάριος ὁ δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ὃν ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ εὑρήσει
/ποιοῦντα\[1] οὕτως /\[1]

Q 12:43[1]: Position of ποιοῦντα.

Luke = Q (before οὕτως)
Pro: Polag 64 follows Luke.
Con: Harnack 32–33: Luke "improves the order of the words (. . . οὕτως in too unemphatic a position). . . ." So too Fleddermann 22.
Matthew = Q (after οὕτως)
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:44

PapQ 12:44
ἀ[( )][1] λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι
ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῦ
καταστήσει αὐτόν.

Reconstruction of Q 12:44
ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι
ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῦ
καταστήσει αὐτόν.

Matt 24:47
ἀ(μὴν)[1] λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι
ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῦ
καταστήσει αὐτόν.

Luke 12:44
ἀ[ληθὼς][1] λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι
ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτοῦ
καταστήσει αὐτόν.

Q 12:44[1]: Matthew's ἀμήν or Luke's ἀληθώς

Luke = Q ἀληθώς
Con: Marshall 541: "Luke has altered the wording as he does often; contrast 12:37)." So too Harnack 32; Fitzmyer 990; Gundry 496; Jeremias 221; Fleddermann 22.
Matthew = Q ἀμήν
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew. Polag 64 prints ἀμήν.
Undecided: Schenk 95 ("mit Bestimmtheit") and Zeller 81 ("wahrhaftig") need not choose.

Q 12:45

PapQ 12:45
ἐὰν δὲ εἴπῃ ὁ ( )[1] δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ· χρονίζει
/\[2] ὁ κύριος /μου\[2]
[ ][3] καὶ ἄρξεται τύπτειν
τοὺς [( )][4]
ἐσθί[( )][5]
[( )][6]ε καὶ
πίν[( )][5] μεθυ[( )][5]

Reconstruction of Q 12:45
ἐὰν δὲ εἴπῃ ὁ δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ· χρονίζει
μου ὁ κύριος
καὶ ἄρξεται τύπτειν
τοὺς σύνδουλοι αὐτοῦ,
ἐσθίῃ
δὲ καὶ
πίνῃ μετὰ τῶν μεθυόντων,

Matt 24:48
ἐὰν δὲ εἴπῃ ὁ (κακὸς)[1] δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ· χρονίζει
/μου\[2] ὁ κύριος /\[2]
[ ][3] 49 καὶ ἄρξεται τύπτειν
τοὺς (συνδοῦλους αὐτοῦ)[4],

Luke 12:45
ἐὰν δὲ εἴπῃ ὁ ( )[1] δοῦλος ἐκεῖνος
ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ· χρονίζει
/\[2] ὁ κύριος /μου\[2]
[ἔρχεσθαι][3] καὶ ἄρξεται τύπτειν
τοὺς [παιδὰς καὶ τὰς παιδίσκας][4]

ἐσθί(η)[5]	ἐσθί[ειν][5]
(δ)[6]ὲ καὶ	[τ][6]ε καὶ
πίν(η μετὰ τῶν)[5] μεθυ(όντων)[5]	πίν[ειν καὶ][5] μεθύ[σκεσθαι][5],

Q 12:45[1]: Matthew's adjective "bad."

Luke = Q ( )
Pro: Polag 64, Schenk 95, and Zeller 82 follow Luke here.
Con: Harnack 33: Luke "drops the superfluous words . . . κακός. . . ."
Matthew = Q κακός
Pro: Harnack 141 prints κακός (in brackets).
Con: Schulz 272 and Polag 64: Matthean addition. Gundry 496: "To accentuate the evil character of the inhospitable ecclesiastics, Matthew inserts κακός . . . in the clause. . . . The adjective ocurred as an insertion also in 21:41. It has a parallel only once (cf. Matthew's four insertions of κακῶς . . .)." Fleddermann 22: ". . . three considerations show . . . that Matthew has added the word. First, κακός comes too early, since it is not yet clear why the servant is evil [referring to Fitzmyer 990]. Second, Matthew introduced the word into his Marcan source in 21:41 (compare Mark 12:9). . . . Finally, if Q orginally referred to the servant as 'evil' we would expect the Q word πονηρός rather than κακός." ibid. n. 43: The adjective κακός does not appear in Q, but πονηρός occurs 10 times. . . . In Q 19:22 πονηρός modifies δοῦλος. . . ."
Evaluation: Matthew's moralistic insertion should be omitted.

Q 12:45[2]: Position of μου.

Luke = Q (after "lord")
Con: Harnack 32: Luke "improves the order of the words (unnecessarily emphatic positions of μου. . . .)" Similarly Fleddermann 22: "Luke has also changed the position of μου, shifting it to its usual place after the noun."
Matthew = Q (before "lord")
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew, as does Polag 64.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:45[3]: Luke's complementary infinitive.

Luke = Q ἔρχεσθαι
Con: Harnack 33: Luke "adds ἔρχεσθαι to χρονίζει, because he wishes to express the principal verb which is implied in St. Matthew." So too Fleddermann 22: "Luke . . . likes to make sentences complete [referring to Cadbury 149–51]. With this addition Luke emphasizes that it is the 'coming' of the Lord that has been delayed." Schenk 95 and Zeller 82 omit Luke's "zu kommen."
Matthew = Q [ ]
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew. Sellew: With his interest in the parousia, there is no clear reason why Matthew would have omitted the word.
Con: Schulz 272 and Polag 64: Matthean omission.
Evaluation: Luke's addition; Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:45[4]: Luke's "male and female servants" or Matthew's "his fellow servants."

Luke = Q παιδὰς καὶ τὰς παιδίσκας

Pro: Marshall 542: "Matthew emphasises the way in which the slave puts himself above his fellows, whereas Luke emphasises his superior position (Creed, 177), and is probably original."
Con: Harnack 33: Luke "changes the δοῦλος, who indeed even in St. Matthew is not an ordinary slave but both slave and overseer, into an οἰκονόμος, and accordingly the σύνδουλοι must also be transformed (this word is never found in St. Luke, while it occurs again four times in St. Matt. xviii. 28–33)."
Matthew = Q συνδούλους αὐτοῦ
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew here, as do **Polag** 64, **Schenk** 96 ("seine Mitangestellten") and **Zeller** 82 ("seine Mitknechte").
Con: Gundry 496: "For 'the male and female slaves,' who suffer beating, Matthew substitutes 'his fellow slaves.' See 18:28, 29, 31, 33 for other distinctive occurrences of 'fellow slaves.' This substitute brings out the need for Christian brotherhood based on mutual love and humility." So too **Fleddermann** 22–23.
Evaluation: Luke seems to have rewritten the whole story with a particular picture of a well-run household in mind; therefore Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:45[5]: Luke's infinitive forms or Matthew's subjunctives and participle.

Luke = Q ἐσθίειν . . . πίνειν . . . μεθύσκεσθαι
Con: Harnack 32: "On linguistic grounds, St. Luke . . . replaces the forms εσθίῃ, πίνῃ, by the infinitive (at the same time transforming the descriptive phrase μετὰ τῶν μεθυόντων). . . ." Similarly **Fleddermann** 23: "Luke switched to the infinitives to achieve a more unified construction. . . . In abandoning the prepositional phrase μετὰ τῶν μεθυόντων for another infinitive, Luke destroyed the parallelism. . . . Finally, whereas Q only associated the servant with those who are drunk . . . , Luke makes it explicit that the servant himself gets drunk (μεθύσκεσθαι)."
Matthew = Q ἐσθίῃ . . . πίνῃ μετὰ τῶν μεθυόντων
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew here, as do **Polag** 64, **Schenk** 96 ("mit den Betrunkenen zu essen und zu trinken") and **Zeller** 82 ("mit Betrunkenen isst und trinkt").
Con: Gundry 496–97: "Matthew's turning the infinitives "to eat" and "to drink" into finite verbs makes a new line parallel to the preceding. Consequently, new emphasis falls on the eating and drinking. Furthermore, the infinitive "to get drunk" (so Luke; cf. 1 Thess 5:7) becomes the prepositional phrase 'with drunkards' for a parallel with the inserted 'fellow slaves.' The drunkards are absent from the original form of the parable and consist in those false disciples who follow the antinomian ways of the settled ecclesiastics."
Evaluation: Luke seems to have recast Q/Matthew's syntax so as to make the verbs "eat" and "drink" parallel infinitives with "beat"; therefore Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:45[6]: Choice between conjunctions.

Luke = Q τε καί
Con: Jeremias 222: "Lukas benutzt die enklitische Partikel τε ständig (141mal) in der Apg und 8mal im Ev; die an unserer Stelle vorliegende Kombination τὲ καί . . . καί findet sich im NT nur im Doppelwerk (5), bei Paulus (3) und im Hebr (3). . . ." So too **Fleddermann** 23.
Matthew = Q δὲ καί
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew, as does **Polag** 64.
Undecided: Gundry 496: "Instead of the Lukanism τε, Matthew writes δέ, which

contrasts the beating of the fellow slaves by the bad slave and his eating and drinking with drunkards."
Evaluation: Luke's favored word τε suggests that Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:46

PapQ 12:46
ἥξει ὁ κύριος τοῦ δούλου ἐκείνου ἐν
ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ οὐ προσδοκᾷ καὶ ἐν ὥρᾳ ᾗ
οὐ γινώσκει καὶ διχοτομήσει αὐτὸν
καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν
[( )]¹των θήσει ( )²
\12:39¹

Reconstruction of Q 12:46
ἥξει ὁ κύριος τοῦ δούλου ἐκείνου ἐν
ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ οὐ προσδοκᾷ καὶ ἐν ὥρᾳ ᾗ
οὐ γινώσκει καὶ διχοτομήσει αὐτὸν
καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν
ἀπίστων θήσει.

Matt 24:50
ἥξει ὁ κύριος τοῦ δούλου ἐκείνου ἐν
ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ οὐ προσδοκᾷ καὶ ἐν ὥρᾳ ᾗ οὐ
γινώσκει,
51 καὶ διχοτομήσει αὐτὸν
καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν
(ὑποκρι)¹τῶν θήσει
(ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς
τῶν ὀδόντων)².

Luke 12:46
ἥξει ὁ κύριος τοῦ δούλου ἐκείνου ἐν
ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ οὐ προσδοκᾷ καὶ ἐν ὥρᾳ ᾗ οὐ
γινώσκει
καὶ διχοτομήσει αὐτὸν
καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν
[ἀπισ]¹τῶν θήσει.

( )²

Q 12:46¹: Luke's "unfaithful ones" or Matthew's "hypocrites."

Luke = Q ἀπιστῶν
Pro: **Polag** 64, **Schenk** 96, and **Zeller** 82 follow Luke here. **Tuckett** 180–81: "ὑποκριτής" is a favourite word of Matthew's (13–1–3), whereas ἄπιστοι is not characteristic of Luke (1-1-2+1) (The other occurrence in Luke is ix. 41 which . . . comes to Luke from his tradition. . . .) Thus a change by Luke is extremely difficult to envisage since (a) Luke's word here is not Lukan, and (b) Luke was not apparently adverse to using Matthew's ὑποκριτής" (cf. Lk. vi. 42; xii. 56; xiii. 15). . . ." Similarly Kloppenborg 150 n. 210.
Con: **Harnack** 33: Luke "replaces ὑποκριταί by ἄπιστοι, a word which was more current with his readers (ὑποκριταί are much less frequently met with in this gospel than in St. Matthew). . . ."
Matthew = Q ὑποκριτῶν
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew.
Con: **Schweizer** *Matthew* 461: "The term 'hypocrites' . . . derive[s] from Matthew himself." **Gundry** 497: "Matthew substitutes 'the hypocrites' for 'the unfaithful.' The substitute suits his special interest in the condemnation of hypocrisy (9,3) and forges a link with the polemic against the Pharisees in chap. 23." **Fitzmyer** 990: "Recall the frequency of 'hypocrites' in the Matthean Gospel (6:2, 4, 16; 7:5; 15:7; 22:18; 23:13, 14, 15; 24:51)." **Fleddermann** 23.
Undecided: **Marshall** 544: "it is hard to know which is original. . . . Both words may represent Aramaic *bnp*, 'wicked, hypocrite.'"
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred over against the Mattheanism.

Q 12:46²: Matthew's clause about weeping and gnashing of teeth.

Luke = Q ( )
Pro: The clause is not Lucan. **Pernot** 24: "Nulle trace chez lui [Lc] du κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων dans la géhenne, cher à Mt. Voir Mt 8$_{12}$, 13$_{42}$, 5$_{0}$, 22$_{13}$, 24$_{51}$ = Lc 12$_{46}$, 25$_{30}$ = Lc 19$_{27}$. Lc n'a repris l'expression qu'à un seul passage et en modifiant le contexte d'une manière qui montre combien son point de vue est different: Mt 8$_{11-12}$ . . ."
Matthew = Q ἐκεῖ ἔσται ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν ὀδόντων
Con: The clause is a favorite of Matthew's gospel. **Harnack** 141 omits the clause. **Lührmann** 69 n. 2 "Mt 25,51b ist sekundärer Zusatz; Mt bringt diesen urprünglich aus Q stammenden Satz (Lk 13,28a/Mt 8,12b) häufiger: 13,42b.50b; 22,13c; 25,30b." **Schweizer** *Matthew* 461: "The threat of 'crying and gnashing of teeth' . . . derive[s] from Matthew himself." **Marshall** 544: "It is probable that the addition is due to Matthew . . ."; "the clause goes beyond the parabolic situation and envisages the lot of the wicked . . ." **Gundry** 497: "Matthew characteristically underlines judgment by adding the clause. . . ." So too **Fleddermann** 23. **Polag** 64, **Schenk** 95, and **Zeller** 82 omit the clause.
Evaluation: Omit the clause.

*Q 12:47–48

[Q/Luke 12:47–48]
°/ἐκεῖνος ὁ δοῦλος ὁ γνοὺς τὸ θέλημα τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ ἑτοιμάσας ἢ ποιήσας πρὸς τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ δαρήσεται πολλάς· ὁ δὲ μὴ γνούς, ποιήσας δὲ ἄξια πληγῶν δαρήσεται ὀλίγας. παντὶ δὲ ᾧ ἐδόθη πολύ, πολὺ ζητηθήσεται παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ᾧ παρέθεντο πολύ, περισσότερον αἰτήσουσιν αὐτόν.\°

12:47°: Presence in Q.

Pro: **Manson** 118–19: "It may be conjectured that Matthew omitted them [these verses] because he realised the finality of 'cut him asunder' [cf. 12:46c]. Luke will have kept them, being, as usual, faithful to his source." **Schmid** 340 would include in Q. **Crossan** 60: "I consider, but rather tentatively, that Luke 12:41, 47–48 is from Q. My reason is that there is a similar parabolic distinction of outsiders ('citizens') and insiders ('servants') and then among insiders themselves in the double-parable of [Q]Luke 19:11–17. Matt. 25:14–30 also avoided this Q parable. . . ." **Jeremias** 222 identifies several elements of "Tradition" in these verses' vocabulary and usage, and no "Redaktion."
Con: **Marshall** 544: "appears to be an addition to the original parable since it has a different theme. Where the parable spoke of trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, this saying speaks of greater and lesser knowledge of the will of God. It could thus be appropriately directed to the Twelve and to the church leaders who may be presumed to have greater knowledge (Am. 3:2; Jas. 3:1)." **Bultmann** 119: "secondary formulations concerning the Christian teacher and layman." **Schweizer** *Luke* 214: "part of Luke's special material but can hardly originate with him, as is shown by the change to the third person plural as periphrasis for God. . . ." **Kloppenborg** 151n. 212: "Luke 12:47–48 relates directly to the redactional insertion in 12:41. . . . Weiser (*Knechtsgleichnisse*, 222–24) has shown that in vocabulary, 12:47–48 is closer to Lucan *Sondergut* than to Q." Neither **Harnack** nor **Schenk** includes 12:47–48 in his Q reconstruction.
Undecided: **Streeter** 289: "we cannot be sure that Luke . . . xii. 47–50, xii. 54–57, have not similarly been interpolated from L into what looked like highly appropriate contexts of Q." **Polag** prints in an appendix.
Evaluation: Can only be included in Q text with reservations.

C. Q 12:49–53: Matt 10:34–35//Luke 12:49–53; cf. *Gos. Thom.* 10, 16.

*Q 12:49–50

[Q/Luke 12:49]

πῦρ [ἦλθον] βαλεῖν
ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
καὶ τί θέλω
εἰ ἤδη ἀνήφθη.

Cf. *Gos. Thom.* 10a (Greeven, p. 161)
[[Λέγει Ἰησοῦς·]]
πῦρ [[ἔβαλον]]
ἐπὶ [[τὸν κόσμον]]
καὶ [[ἰδοὺ τηρῶ αὐτὸ(ν)
ἕως ἂν ἀνακαίηται]].

[Q/Luke 12:50]
βάπτισμα δὲ ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι, καὶ πῶς συνέχομαι ἕως ὅτου τελεσθῇ.

Q 12:49°: Presence of 12:49–50 in Q.

Luke = Q
Pro: **Manson** 120: Perhaps Matthew omitted "as not strictly relevant in the context in which he was incorporating the rest of the Q passage" (i.e., Matthew 10). **Schürmann** 213 n. 24: a Matthean "reminiscence" in 10:34 of Q/Luke 12:49 suggests that this verse was in the "Q-Vorlage." So too **Marshall** 545: "The verbal link between Lk. 12:49 and Mt 10:34 (βάλλω) supports the second possibility" that the verses were in Q and omitted by Matthew, "when forming his second major discourse by Jesus, in which the following verses (12:51–53) have a parallel (Matt. 10:34–36)." **Jeremias** 223: [on 12:49] "Lukas ist kein Freund der Asyndeta. . . . πυῤ βάλλω ist vorlukanisch. . . . Gleiches gilt von ἦλθον+Inf. mit Jesus als Subjekt: diese Wendung entnimmt Lukas 5,32 . . . seiner Markusvorlage (2,17), und 12,51. . . ." [on 12:50] "ἕως ὅτου: mit Konj. Aor. ist eine erstarrte präpositionale Wendung, die im NT nur im Nicht-Markusstoff des LkEv vorkommt: 12,50; 13,8; 22,16. Lukas selbst bevorzugt ἕως οὗ (12:59)." **Polag** 64 prints in smaller type, meaning that the passage is part of Q but the wording is uncertain. **Wernle** 91 and **Schmid** 276 would include in Q.
Con: There is no Matthean parallel. **Koester** (*TDNT* 7. 885–86) thinks that Luke has reformulated the saying in Mark 10:38b: "the exclamatory πως in 12:50, in keeping with Hellenistic usage, expresses a strong wish. This is a further sign that only Luke himself, who almost alone in the NT uses συνέχω, can have formulated the expression. . . ." Similarly **Arens** and **Kloppenborg** 151 n. 213 ("probably redactional, influenced by Mark 10:38, which Luke does not take over in his chap. 18"). **Schulz** 258: a Lucan creation; so too **Klein** 374 n. 4. **Fitzmyer** 994: v 49 "is derived from 'L,' being unique to this Gospel. The second comment (v. 50) . . . could be considered as deriving from 'L,' but it has been so heavily modified by Luke that it borders on Lucan composition." **Schweizer** *Luke* 215: "special Lukan material." Neither **Harnack** nor **Schenk** includes 12:49–50 in his Q reconstruction.
Matthew = Q [ ]
Pro: **Fitzmyer** 994: "[Matthew] preserves the 'Q' form better."
Undecided: **Streeter** 289: "we cannot be sure that Luke . . . xii. 47–50, xii. 54–57, have not similarly been interpolated from L into what looked like highly appropriate contexts of Q."
Evaluation: The close parallel in *Gos. Thom.* 10 shows that 12:49 is not a Lucan invention; his known tendency not to conflate sources suggests that it therefore most likely was available to him in Q; Matthew omitted it due to its obscure meaning. In turn

Thomas may have omitted what we know as Luke 12:50.

Q 12:51

PapQ 12:51	Reconstruction of Q 12:51
^{1}/[( )]^{2}τε ὅτι	δοκεῖτε ὅτι
^{3}/εἰρήνην\$^{3}$	
[( )]^{4}ν	ἦλθον
[( )]^{5}	βαλεῖν
/\$^{3}$	εἰρήνην
ἐ[( )]^{6} τη( )^{6} γῆ( )^{6}	ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν;
οὐ[( )]^{7}ν	οὐκ ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην
ἀλλ[( )]^{8}ν	ἀλλὰ διαμερισμόν.
\$^{1}$→ Q 12:53	

Matt 10:34	Luke 12:51
^{1}/(μὴ νομίσῃ)^{2}τε ὅτι	^{1}/[δοκεῖ]^{2}τε ὅτι
^{3}/\$^{3}$	^{3}/εἰρήνην\$^{3}$
(ἦλθο)^{4}ν	[παρεγενόμη]^{4}ν
(βαλεῖν)^{5}	[δοῦναι]^{5}
/εἰρήνην\$^{3}$	/\$^{3}$
ἐ(πὶ)^{6} τὴ(ν)^{6} γῆ(ν)^{6}	ἐ[ν]^{6} τῇῃ( )^{6} γῇ( )^{6};
οὐ(χ ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνη)^{7}ν	οὐ[χ.ι, λέγω ὑμῖ]^{7}ν
ἀλλ(ὰ μάχαιρα)^{8}ν	ἀλλ' [ἢ διαμερισμό]^{8}ν.

Cf. *Gos. Thom.* 16a (Greek retroversion by Greeven, p. 59):
Λέγει Ἰησοῦς· τάχα δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὅτι ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τὸν κόσμον, καὶ οὐκ οἴδασιν οτι ἦλθον βαλεῖν διαμερισμοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πῦρ, μάχαιραν, πόλεμον.

Comparison arranged according to *Thomas:*

Gos. Thom. 16a	Reconstructed Q 12:51
[[Λέγει Ἰησοῦς·	
τάχα]] [[[δοκοῦσιν]]]	δοκεῖτε
οἱ ἄνθρωποι	
ὅτι ἦλθον	ὅτι ἦλθον
βαλεῖν	βαλεῖν
εἰρήνην	εἰρήνην
[[ἐπὶ τὸν κόσμον,	
καὶ]] οὐκ	οὐκ
[[οἴδασιν ὅτι]]	
ἦλθον βαλεῖν	ἦλθον βαλεῖν
	εἰρήνην ἀλλὰ
διαμερισμο[[ὺς]]	διαμερισμὸν
ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,	ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.
[[πῦρ, μάχαιραν, πόλεμον]].	

Q 12:51^{o}: Presence in Q.

Pro: Harnack, Polag, and Schenk include in their Q reconstructions. Schmid 276: "Sämtliche Verse dieses Stückes mit Ausnahme von V 36 hat Lk ebenfalls, jedoch an drei

verscheidenen Stellen. Die sprachliche Übereinstimmung der Parallelen ist aber hier ungewöhnlich gering. Zum Teil erklärt sich das daraus, dass bei Mt 10,35f eine Reminiszenz aus Mich 7⁶ vorliegt, die bei Mt deutlicher durchschimmert. . . ." Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16abc has the same combination of sayings as Q 12:51–53.
Undecided: **Schweizer** *Luke* 215: "Vss. 51–53 are a revision of Matthew 10:34–36 . . . , linguistically pre-Lukan. The two sections may have been combined before Luke (Q; 'cast' in vs. 49 and Matt. 10:34)."
Evaluation: The verse should be included in the Q text.

Q 12:51[1]: Position of 12:[49], 51, [52], 53 in Q.

Luke = Q After Q 12:46; before Q 12:54.
Pro: **Harnack** 141; **Polag** 64.
Matthew = Q After Q 12:9; before Q 14:26.

Q 12:51[2]: Luke's interrogative δοκεῖτε or Matthew's imperative μὴ νομίσητε.

Luke = Q δοκεῖτε
Pro: **Harnack** 86: "μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον occurs also in St. Matt. v. 17; δοκεῖτε is found in Q (st. Matt. xxiv. 44=St. Lk. xii. 44); yet there is some doubt whether this verse [i.e. Q 12:44] belongs to Q. As, however, St. Luke has here the interrogative form, which he has often obliterated elsewhere, we must decide in his favour." **Schmid** 276 n. 2: "Die Frage bei Lk wird darum ursprünglich sein, weil Lk Fragen gerne beseitigt." Similarly **Schulz** 258 (but see below). **Jeremias** 223: "δοκεῖτε ὅτι. . . . Das Asyndeton ist Kennzeichen der vorlukanischen Überlieferung. . . ." **Polag** 64 and **Schenk** 97 follow Luke here. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16a agrees with Luke's δοκεῖν against Matthew's νομίζειν.
Con: **Schulz** 258: "Der Spruch in der lk-Fassung entspricht dem Muster von 13,2f.4.: δοκεῖτε ὅτι . . . οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλὰ . . . "
Matthew = Q μὴ νομίσητε
Con: **Schmid** 276: "Sicher hat aber Mt in V 34 die ursprünglichere, plastischere Fassung, abgesehen von μὴ νομίσητε (Lk δοκεῖτε als Frage)." idem 276 n. 2: "Zu μὴ νομίσητε bei Mt bgl Mt 5[17]. **Gundry** 199a: 'Luke's question . . . becomes a command . . . , just as in 5:17 (so Matthew alone).
Evaluation: The evangelists' preferred styles shows that Matthew's reading is secondary.

Q12:51[3]: Position of εἰρήνην.

Luke = Q (before παρεγενόμην δοῦναι)
Pro: **Polag** 64 follows Luke's positioning.
Con: **Harnack** 86: "Εἰρήνην δοῦναι ἐν τῇ γῇ is certainly an improvement in style. . . ." idem. 87; "The arrangement of the word in St. Luke shows more artistic skill."
Matthew = Q (after ἦλθον βαλεῖν)
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16a supports Matthew's order.
Con: **Gundry** 199: "To secure his emphasis on Jesus as the Coming One . . . Matthew pushes εἰρήνην out of its emphatic position to an unobtrusive spot after its infinitive."
Evaluation: Matthew's order is to be preferred.

Q 12:51[4]: Choice between verbs "to come."

Luke = Q παρεγενόμην

Pro: **Bußmann** 80.
Con: **Harnack** 86: "παρεγενόμην is a choicer word than ἦλθον. . . ." **Schmid** 276 n. 2: "lukanisch" (cf. 19:16). **Manson** 548: παραγίνομαι is a favourite word of Luke (7:4 *et al.*) and may have displaced an original ἔρχομαι (Mt.) in the interest of literary variation from v. 49." **Schulz** 258; **Jeremias** 223.
Matthew = Q ἦλθον
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew, as does **Polag** 64 (on choice of verbs). Sellew: The wording of *Gos. Thom.* 16a gives support to Matthew.
Evaluation: Lucan usage shows that Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:51[5]: Luke's "to give" or Matthew's "to cast."

Luke = Q δοῦναι
Pro: **Bußmann** 80. **Marshall** 548: The use of δίδωμι 'to put, place' is Semitic (15:22; Black, 133 n. 1); Matthew's use of the rougher βάλλω may be with a view to the second accusative μάχαιραν in his formulation." **Polag** 64 and **Schenk** 97 ("stiften") seem to follow Luke.
Con: **Harnack** 86: "Εἰρήνην δοῦναι ἐν τῇ γῇ is certainly an improvement in style. . . ." **Cadbury** 183 lists Luke's δοῦναι εἰρήνην here as contrasted with Q/Matthew as an "improvement of literary tone." **Schmid** 276 n. 2 calls it a "Milderung für βαλεῖ." So too **Schulz** 258.
Matthew = Q βαλεῖν
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew here. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16a supports Matthew.
Con: **Gundry** 199: Matthew changes "δοῦναι to βαλεῖν, a favorite of his (12,8), which is rabbinic in style (Str-B 1. 586)."
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred over against Luke's improvement.

Q 12:51[6]: Choice between prepositions and case of object.

Luke = Q εἲ τῇ γῇ
Con: **Harnack** 86: "Εἰρήνην δοῦναι εἲ τῇ γῇ is certainly an improvement in style. . . ."
Matthew = Q ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew, as does **Polag** 64. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16a supports Matthew.
Con: **Gundry** 199: Matthew's change of infinitives [item 5] "enables him to replace 'in' with 'on.' The resultant phrase 'on the earth' parallels the same phrase in v 29, where Matthew alone had it."
Evaluation: Matthew's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:51[7]: Luke's elliptical denial and transition or Matthew's repetitive denial.

Luke = Q οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ' ἢ
Pro: **Jeremias** 223: "Vorlukanisch ist auch das parenthetische λέγω ὑμῖν (12,51; 13,3. 5.24; 15,10). . . ."
Con: **Harnack** 86: "St. Luke has again inserted λέγω ὑμῖν. . . . idem 87: " the arrangement of the words in St. Luke shows more artistic skill." **Schmid** 277 [n. 2]: "lukanisch." Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16a lacks the phrases λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ' ἤ.
Matthew = Q οὐκ ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν.
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew.
Con: **Gundry** 199: "For unity, parallelism, and yet greater emphasis on Jesus as the

Coming One, 'I did not come to bring peace' replaces 'No, I say to you' (cf. earlier omissions of Luke 12:4a, 5cd, 8a)."
Undecided: Polag 64 prints a mixed text: λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐκ εἰρήνην ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:51[8]: Luke's "division" or Matthew's "sword."

Luke = Q διαμερισμόν
Pro: Bußmann 80.
Con: Wernle 73; Harnack 86–87: "διαμερισμόν (here only in the New Testament" is a choicer word . . . than μάχαιραν. . . ." Schmid 276 n. 2: "Abstractum pro concreto . . . und überdies durch das nachfolgende zweimalige διαμερίζειν, das Lk statt des selteneren διχάζειν gebraucht, als lukanisch bestätigt (das Verbum 8X bei Lk, sonst noch Mk 15^{24}+). Zudem liebt gerade Lk Substantiva auf -μός. . . ." So too Schulz 258. Schweizer *Matthew* 250: "The Lukan term 'division' . . . looks like a weaker substitution for the Matthean 'sword.'"
Matthew = Q μάχαιραν
Pro: Polag 64 follows Matthew here, as does Schenk 97.
Con: Gundry 199: "The 'division' Jesus brings becomes [in Matthew] a 'sword' for conformity to Ezek 38:21: 'every man's sword will be against his brother.' Cf. the three occurrences of μάχαιρα in 26:52, an inserted saying peculiar to Matthew."
Undecided: *Gos. Thom.* 16a supports both readings. Did Q or perhaps Matthew or Luke choose between διαμερισμός and μάχαιρα here? Either reading agrees with the corresponding NT gospel's preferences. Or does *Gos. Thom.* 16a reflect a conflation of translation variants?
Evaluation: Matthew's text should perhaps be preferred here.

*Q 12:52

[Q/Luke 12:52]	*Gos. Thom.* 16b (retroversion by Greeven, p. 59)
	πέντε
°/ἔσονται γὰρ	γὰρ ἔσονται
ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν	
πέντε	
ἐν ἑνὶ οἴκῳ	ἐν οἴκῳ
διαμεμερισμένοι,	
τρεῖς ἐπὶ δυσὶν	τρεῖς [[ἔσονται]] ἐπὶ δυσὶ
καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τρισίν·\°	καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τρισίν

Reconstruction of *Q 12:52
πέντε γὰρ ἔσονται ἐν ἑνὶ οἴκῳ·
τρεῖς ἔσονται ἐπὶ δυσὶ
καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τρισίν.

Q 12:52°: Presence in Q.

Pro: Zeller 74 includes the verse in his Q reconstruction. Polag 64 prints the verse,

omitting the Lucan addition ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν.
Con: Schulz 258–29: a secondary interpretation of v 53: it is absent from Matthew and includes special Lukan vocabulary (ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν, διαμεμερίζειν). So too ("may be") Marshall 548. Fitzmyer 997: "from now on: A sign of Lucan redaction" (following Conzelmann); the periphrastic future construction is also Luke's. Similarly Schmid, 277 [n. 2]; Jeremias 224. Harnack omits the verse from his Q reconstruction.
Evaluation: The verse should be included in the Q text.

Luke = Q
Evaluation: With the aid of the *Thomas* parallel for comparison, the following can be seen as Lucan redaction: ἔσονται γάρ repositioned for emphasis; second ἔσονται omitted. ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν sign of Lucan periodization. διαμεμερισμένοι is added to better relate the two sayings (already connected in the tradition). ἐνί is presumably a translation variant which Luke rather unexpectedly preserves from the Q version. Therefore the Q 12:52 text can be reconstructed tentatively as above.

Q 12:53

PapQ 12:53	Reconstruction of Q 12:53
( )[5]	
( )[2]	
δι[( )][3]αι	διαμερισθήσονται
[ ][4]	πατὴρ ἐπὶ υἱῷ
[( )][5]	καὶ υἱὸς
[( )][6]	ἐπὶ
( )[7]	
πατρ[( )][6]	πατρί,
( )[7]	
[ ][4]	μήτηρ ἐπὶ τὴν θυγατέρα
καὶ θυγατ[( )][1] ρ( )[1]	καὶ θυγάτηρ
[( )][6] τη[( )][6] μητ[ ][6] ρ[( )][6]	ἐπὶ τὴν μητέρα
[ ][4]	πενθερὰ ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην
αὐτῆς καὶ νύμφη( )[1]	αὐτῆς καὶ νύμφη
[( )][6] τη[( )][6] πενθερα[( )][6]	ἐπὶ τὴν πενθεράν.
( )[7]	
\12:51[1]	

4Matt 10:35	Luke 12:53
(ἦλθον)[5]	( )[1]
(γὰρ)[2]	( )[2]
δι(χάσ)[3]αι	δι[αμερισθήσοντ]αι
[ ][4]	[πατὴρ ἐπὶ υἱῷ καὶ][4]
(ἄνθρωπον)[5]	[υἱὸς][5]
(κατὰ)[6]	[ἐπὶ]
(τοῦ)[7]	( )[7]
πατρ(ὸς)[6]	πατρ[ί][6]
(αὐτοῦ)[7]	( )[7]
[ ][4]	[μήτηρ ἐπὶ τὴν θυγατέρα][4]
καὶ θυγατ(έ)[1]ρ(α)[1]	καὶ θυγάτ[η][1]ρ( )[1]
(κατὰ) τῆ(ς)[6] μητ[ ][6] ρ(ὸς)[6]	[ἐπὶ][6] τὴ[ν][6] μητ[έ][6]ρ[ὰ][6],

[ ][4]	[πενθερὰ ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην][4]
αὐτῆς καὶ νύμφη(ν)[1]	αὐτῆς καὶ νύμφη( )[1]
(κατὰ)[6] τῆ(ς)[6] πενθερα(ς)[6]	[ἐπὶ] τὴ[ν][6] πενθερά[ν][4]
(αὐτῆς)[7]	( )[7]
\12:51[1]	

Gos. Thom. 16c (Greeven, p. 59):
ὁ πατὴρ ἐπὶ τῷ υἱῷ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἐπὶ τῷ πατρί. καὶ στήσονται αὐτοὶ μόναχοι (=μόνοι).

Comparison of *Gos. Thom.* 16c with Q 12:53, arranged according to *Thomas:*

Gos. Thom. 16c	Reconstructed Q 12:53
	διαμερισθήσονται
[[ὁ]] πατὴρ ἐπὶ [[τῷ]] υἱῷ	πατὴρ ἐπὶ υἱῷ
καὶ [[ὁ]] υἱὸς ἐπὶ [[τῷ]] πατρί·	καὶ υἱὸς ἐπὶ πατρί
[[καὶ στήσονται αὐτοὶ μόνανχοι (=μόνοι).]]	

General comments:
Matthew = Q
Pro: Wernle 72; **Schulz** 259: Matthew has preserved the Q wording. **Schenk** 97 follows Matthew for Q 12:53.
Luke = Q
Pro: **Streeter** 494 n. 1: "Mt. x. 34–36 looks like a conflation of Lk. xii. 49–53 (*i.e.*, Q) with the passage in Micah." **Gundry** *Matthew* 199: Matthew has rewritten the section, in part conforming it to Mic 7:6. Gundry cites his earlier work *The Use of the Old Testament in St. Matthew's Gospel* (1967) 78–79: Luke's wording is more primitive, but conforms slightly to the LXX, while Matthew has assimilated to the MT and extended the quotation. Sellew: the *Gos. Thom.* 16c parallel shows similarity to Luke's son/father wording and also evidences his structure of corresponding pairs; otherwise the Thomas version appears to be a briefer telling of the generational conflict seen in Q.
Con: **Harnack** 87: "the arrangement of the words in St. Luke shows more artistic skill." **Jeremias** 224: "Aus dem dreifachen Parallelismus, den Micha 7,6 LXX bot (Sohn/Vater, Tochter/Mutter, Schwiegertochter/Schwiegermutter), macht Lukas drei Chiasmen: Vater-Sohn/Sohn-Vater; Mutter-Tochter/Tochter-Mutter; Schwiegermutter-Schwiegertochter/Schwiegertochter-Schwiegermutter."

Q 12:53[1]: Matthew's first person formulation and use of verb "to come."

Luke = Q ( )
Matthew = Q ἦλθον
Pro: **Harnack** 141 follows Matthew; so too **Schmid** 276; **Schulz** 259: "der antithetische Parallelismus . . . [ist] sehr effektvoll. . . ." Sellew: Matthew's wording is supported by the earlier phrasing in *Gos. Thom.* 16a (repetition of ἦλθον βαλεῖν).
Con: **Gundry** 199: Matthew is rewriting to emphasize Jesus' role as the Coming One. **Polag** 64 omits.
Evaluation: Matthew has historicized Q's prophetic statement: Jesus has already divided families. Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:53[2]: Matthew's connective particle.

Luke = Q ( )
Matthew = Q γάρ
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew, as does Polag 64.
Con: Gundry 199: Added in Matthew's rewriting.
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:53[3]: Choice between verbs; Luke's finite verb or Matthew's infinitive.

Luke = Q διαμερισθήσονται
Pro: Polag 64 (but Luke added the prefix δια-). Sellew: The future tense fits well with the preceding verse. *Gos. Thom.* 16c (στήσονται) indirectly supports Luke's finite future form.
Con: Harnack 87: "διαμερισμός was the cause of the substitution of διαμερισθήσονται for ἦλθον διχάσαι (the latter word is wanting in the LXX, and may also have been disliked by St. Luke). . . ." Also Schulz 258: a more common word.
Matthew = Q διχάσαι
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew, as do Schmid 276 and Schulz 259. Sellew: the use of the ἦλθον clause in Matthew of course requires the infinitive; see item [1].
Con: Gundry 199: "Matthew uses διχάσαι (literally 'to halve') because of its appropriateness to his noun 'sword': Jesus divides families just as a sword slices in half."
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:53[4]: Luke's doubled phrasing, with nominative nouns (subjects of διαμερισθήσονται), or Matthew's accusative nouns (objects of διχάσαι).

Luke = Q πατήρ-υἱῷ, υἱοὶ-πατρί, μήτηρ-θυγατέρα, θυγατήρ-μητέρα, πενθερά-νύμφην, νύμφη-πενθεράν
Pro: Polag 64 follows Luke. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16c supports the doubled phrasing (at least for father/son, son/father).
Con: Harnack 87: "For symmetry St. Luke also repeated the 'mother and daughter' and the 'mother-in-law and 'daughter-in-law.'" Jeremias 224: "Aus dem dreifachen Parallelismus, den Micha 7,6 LXX bot (Sohn/Vater, Tochter/Mutter, Schwiegertochter/Schwiegermutter), macht Lukas drei Chiasmen: Vater-Sohn/Sohn-Vater; Mutter-Tochter/Tochter-Mutter; Schwiegermutter-Schwiegertochter/Schwiegertochter-Schwiegermutter."
Matthew = Q ἄνθρωπον, θυγατέρα, νύμφην
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew.
Con: Gundry 199: "For yet another emphasis on Jesus as the Coming One, Matthew skips the division of the household of five into three against two and two against three. . . ." "To conform the wording more closely to [Mic 7:6], Matthew adopts only the second phrase in each of the three pairs."
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:53[5]: Luke's "son" or Matthew's "man."

Luke = Q υἱός
Pro: Polag 64 follows Luke. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16c supports Luke's "son."
Con: Harnack 87: "πατὴρ ἐπὶ υἱῷ καὶ υἱὸς ἐπὶ πατρί is more correct than the awkward ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ."
Matthew = Q ἄνθρωπον

Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew.
Con: Gundry 199: "Though Luke's 'son' is a better complement to 'father' than 'man' is, Matthew substitutes the latter to set up an inclusio with 'man' in v 36. Furthermore, he is fond of ἄνθρωπος ([inserted 35 times in shared traditions, used 17 times in special material])."
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:53[6]: Choice between prepositions.

Luke = Q ἐπί
Pro: Polag 64 follows Luke. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16c supports Luke's reading.
Matthew = Q κατά
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew.
Con: Gundry 199: "The substitution of κατά for ἐπί makes the thought of antagonism more immediately apparent and conforms to Matthew's style (κατά+genitive—[inserted 10 5times in shared traditions; used 1 time in special material])."
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:53[7]: Matthew's possessive pronouns.

Luke = Q ἐπὶ ( ) πατρί ( ), ἐπὶ τὴν μητέρα ( ), ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην αὐτῆς, ἐπὶ τὴν πενθεραν ( )
Pro: Polag 64 follows Luke.
Con: Sellew: Luke's use of the definite article in the mother/daughter and mother-in-law/bride pairings is likely a translation or stylistic variant of Matthew's αὐτῆς.
Matthew = Q κατὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτῆς, κατὰ τῆς πενθερᾶς αὐτῆς
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 16c uses the definite article, which is likely a variant of Matthew's αὐτοῦ, αὐτῆς.
Con: Gundry 199: "The addition of 'her' to 'mother' and again to 'mother-in-law' provides two further assimilations to the OT text. For parallelism, Matthew adds 'his' to 'father.'"
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:53[8]: Case of object of preposition.

Luke = Q ἐπὶ πατρί
Matthew = Q κατὰ τοῦ πατρός

Comment: This question is bound up with the change in prepositions in item 6. *Gos. Thom.* 16c supports Luke.
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

*Q(Matt 10:36)
καὶ ἐχθροὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οἱ οἰκιακοὶ αὐτοῦ.

*Q/Matt 10:36[9]: Presence of this verse in Q.

Pro: Schulz 259: perhaps Luke omitted this verse when he introduced 12:52.
Con: Gundry 199: "Yet another assimilation to Mic 7:6. . . . By filling out the quotation in this manner, Matthew gains a link with v 25, where members of a household appeared."
Evaluation: Omit the verse.

D. Q 12:54–56: Luke 12:54–56//Matt 16:2–3; cf. *Gos. Thom.* 91

*Q 12:54

PapQ 12:54	Reconstruction of Q 12:54
$^{o/1\cdot2}$/ε[( )]^{3} εν\$^{2}$ ( ) δὲ	^{2}[ἔλεγεν δέ·
[( )]^{4}	
/\$^{2}$	
( )^{5} τοῖς [ ]^{5}	
ο[( )]^{6}ς	ὅταν ἴδητε τὴν νεφέλην ἀνατέλλουσαν
	ἐπὶ δυσμῶν, εὐθέως
λέγετε	λέγετε
[( )]^{6}\$^{o}$	ὅτι ὄμβρος ἔρχεται,
	καὶ γίνεται οὕτως.

Matt 16:2	Luke 12:54
$^{o/1}$/\$^{2}$ (ὁ)^{2} δὲ	$^{o/1\cdot2}$/ἔ[λεγ]^{3}εν\$^{2}$ ( ) δὲ
(ἀποκριθεὶς)^{4}	[καὶ]^{4}
/(εἶπ)^{3}εν\$^{2}$	/\$^{2}$
(αὐ)^{5}τοῖς [ ]^{5}	( )^{5} τοῖς [ὄχλοις]^{5}
ὀ(ψίας	ὅ[ταν ἴδητε τὴν νεφέλην ἀνατέλλουσαν
γενομένη)^{6}ς λέγετε·	ἐπὶ δυσμῶν, εὐθέω]^{6}ς λέγετε
(εὐδία, πυρράζει γὰρ ὁ οὐρανός· 16:3a	
καὶ πρωί· σήμερον χειμών, πυρράζει	[ὅτι ὄμβρος ἔρχεται, καὶ γίνεται
γὰρ στυγνάζων ὁ οὐρανός)^{6}.\$^{o}$	οὕτως]^{6}·\$^{o}$.

Q 12:54^{o}: Is this verse or are these verses part of Q?

Comment: This passage is quite peculiar since **PapQ** identifies only two or three actual words that are shared by Matthew and Luke. "Only six Greek words out of forty-seven/forty eight in the Lucan text of this passage agree with the Matthean vocabulary" (**Fitzmyer** 999). Because of this lack of verbal agreement **Harnack, Schulz** et al. omit this passage from their discussion of Q. **Pro: Schürmann** 116: The verbal link of κρίνετε and διακρίνειν shows a pre-Lucan connection between 12:54–56 and 57ff. **Crossan** 248 speaks similarly about the word-linkage (διακρίνειν occurs only in Matt 16:3 and κρίνειν only in Luke 12:57) but also argues on more theoretical grounds for some relationship between these passages: Contrary to the scribal tendency to harmonize texts, "this scribe would have had to effect an almost classic performancial variation on Luke 12:54–56 and then locate it in a completely different but verbally quite appropriate context in Matthew." This is only plausible, according to Crossan, if the scribe knew the Matthean version independently of Luke's text and felt that it needed to be included in Matthew's gospel. Sellew: The logic of Crossan's point may not hold if one assumes the possibility of an independent saying separate from and differently conceived from that of Luke 12:54: not all wise weatherman sayings are variations of this Lucan text! **Kloppenborg** 152 is uncertain but tentatively ascribes 12:54–56 to Q, pointing to thematic resemblances with Q 3:7–9, "which likewise presupposes the nearness of the end and chastises the impenitent for their lack of response to what, to the speaker, are the obvious signs of the end"). Polag 66 prints this section within brackets, that is, as conjecturally part of Q.
Con: Matt 16:2–3a is missing in ℵ **B** OSyr **al.** Indeed the Matthean parallel has often been seen as "an early interpolation in that Gospel" (**Manson** 121) or "a later addition"

(Bultmann 116) "probably added later through the influence of Luke 12:54–56" (Schweizer *Matthew* 333); for discussion of text-critical evidence on the point see Schmid 302 or Metzger 41. This addition is usually explained as a corrective over against Luke's version in climates where his weather information seems strange or incorrect. Crossan 247–48 prefers to consider the passage original in Matthew and omitted in one or more stream of the tradition which did not understand the weather references. Schmid 302: Matt 16:2–3 does not stand in a literary relationship with Luke 12:54–56. Schweizer *Luke* 217: "Luke's special material." Marshall 549–50: Matt 16:1–2, 3 are not Q but a "variant" or "different" tradition. Gundry 323 sees Matt 16:2–3 not as a later interpolation, nor as the Q-text, but as Matthew's revision of the tradition: "The hypothesis that later scribes inserted Luke's material in Matthew's text necessitates the further hypothesis that they also revised the Palestinian signs of weather in Luke's material to agree with other signs of weather in their own land. It seems easier to think that Matthew himself made such revisions. This judgment is confirmed when we discover that Matt 16:2b–3 differs from Luke 12:54–56 in ways that typify his writing. [Listed later: e.g., use of parallelism; omission of recititative ὅτι; use of favorite vocabulary; "Notably, Matthew has transposed the sayings in the tradition to conform to the beginning of the Jewish day in the evening."] The omission of the material may have come about, then, through parallel influence from Mark, where it is lacking, or from the strangeness of Matthew's signs of weather to scribes living where those signs did not obtain. . . ." Boring 169: "Due to the uncertain textual attestation of Matt. 16:2–3 and its awkwardness in its present context, this text may be a later interpolation into the text of Matthew; if so, its presence in Q is very uncertain." Neither **Harnack** nor **Schenk** includes 12:54–56 in his Q reconstruction.
Undecided: Streeter 289: "we cannot be sure that Luke . . . xii. 47–50, xii. 54–57, have not similarly been interpolated from L into what looked like highly appropriate contexts of Q."

Q 12:54[1]: Position of Q 12:54–56.

Luke = Q After Q 12:53; before Q 12:[57],58
Pro: Polag places here.
Matthew = Q After Q 13:20–21; 6:29; 11:16; before Q 11:29.

Q 12:54[2]: Position of the verb "to say"; Matthew's ὁ . . . ἀποκριθείς.

Luke = Q ἔλεγεν δὲ καί
Con: Fitzmyer 999: "the introductory clause (v. 54a) is of Lucan composition. . . ."
Matthew = Q ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν
Evaluation: Matthew (or a later scribe) also seems to have composed the introduction to fit this context.

Q 12:54[3]: Luke's imperfect or Matthew's aorist.

Luke = Q ἔλεγεν
Con: Fitzmyer 999: "the introductory clause (v. 54a) is of Lucan composition. . . ."
Matthew = Q εἶπεν
Evaluation: The choice of tense will depend on which witness is followed for the overall saying.

Q 12:54[4]: Luke's adverbial καί or Matthew's participle.
Luke = Q καί
Con: Polag 66 prints καί.
Matthew = Q ἀποκριθείς
Evaluation: Matthew (or a later scribe) seeems to have composed the introduction to fit this context.

Q 12:54[5]: Choice between indirect objects.

Luke = Q τοῖς ὄχλοις
Matthew = Q αὐτοῖς
Evaluation: The level of difference in the introductions to the saying suggests that there was no such introduction in Q (if both are indeed Q variants).

Q 12:54[6]: Luke's imagery for a rainstorm or Matthew's imagery of a blazing sky at dusk and morning.

Luke = Q ὅταν ἴδητε τὴν νεφέλην ἀνατέλλουσαν ἐπὶ δυσμῶν, εὐθέως λέγετε ὅτι ὄμβρος ἔρχεται, καὶ γίνεται οὕτως.
Pro: Polag 66 follows Luke, within brackets (indicating the verse's conjectural status), but omitting καὶ γίνεται οὕτως. The weather conditions described seem to fit the Q context (Syria-Palestine); so e.g. Marshall 549: "This agrees with conditions in Palestine (1 Ki. 18:44), or indeed in any country with a western seaboard. [Similarly v 55.]"
Con: Luke may have suppressed ὀφίας γενομένης due to its "vulgarité" (so Pernot 8–9).
Matthew = Q ὀφίας γενομένης λέγετε· εὐδία, πυρράζει γὰρ ὁ οὐρανός· καὶ πρωΐ· σήμερον χειμών, πυρράζει γὰρ στυγνάζων ὁ οὐρανός.
Pro: Gundry 323 suggests that scribes in Egypt might well have omitted the sentence since a red sky does not augur rain there.
Con: Polag 64 considers this a Matthean revision.
Evaluation: Include Luke's version in asterisked form to show its problematic status.

*Q 12:55

[Q/Luke 12:55]
καὶ ὅταν νότον πνέοντα, λέγετε ὅτι καύσων ἔσται, καὶ γίνεται.

Q 12:55[0]: Presence in Q.

Pro: Must be considered along with the previous section (12:54).
Con: Schenk does not include 12:54–56 in his Q reconstruction.
Evaluation: Include with asterisk along with *Q 12:54.

Q 12:56

PapQ 12:56	Reconstruction of Q 12:56
[0]/[ ][1]	ὑποκριταί
τὸ ( )[2] πρόσωπον	τὸ πρόσωπον
[ ][3] τοῦ οὐρανοῦ	τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
[( )][4]τε	οἴδατε

d[( )]^{5} x[( )]^{5}ειν
^{6} τ[( )]^{7}ν καιρ[( )]^{7}ν ^{6}
( )^{8} δὲ ( )^{8}
/\$^{6}$
[ ]^{9}
οὐ[( )]^{9}
12:54^{1} ^{0}

δοκιμάζειν,
τὸν καιρὸν
δὲ

τοῦτον
οὐκ οἶδατε δοκιμάζειν.

Matt 16:3b
^{0}/[ ]^{1}
τὸ (μὲν)^{2}
πρόσωπον
[ ]^{3} τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
(γινώσκε)^{4}τε
δ(ια)^{5}κ(ρίν)^{5}ειν
/\$^{6}$
(τὰ)^{8} δὲ (σημεῖα)^{8}
^{6}/τ(ῶ)^{7}ν καιρ(ῶ)ν\$^{6}$
[ ]^{9} οὐ (δύνασθε)^{9}
\12:54^{1}\$^{0}$

Luke 12:56
^{0}/[ὑποκριταί]^{1},
τὸ ( )^{2}
πρόσωπον
[τῆς γῆς καὶ]^{3} τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
[οἶδα]τε
δ[ο]^{5}κ[ιμάζ]^{5}ειν,
^{6}/τ[ὸ]^{7}ν καιρ[ὸ]^{7}ν\$^{6}$
( )^{8} δὲ ( )^{8}
/\$^{6}$
[τοῦτον πῶς]^{9} οὐ[κ οἶδατε δοκιμάζειν].^{9}
\12:54^{1}\$^{0}$

Cf. *Gos. Thom.* 91b (Greek retroversion by **Greeven**, p. 126):
εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· δοκιμάζετε τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ τὸν (τὰ ?) ἐνώπιον ὑμῶν ὄντα οὐκ ἐγνώκατε καὶ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον οὐκ οἶδατε δοκιμάζειν.

With so little correspondence evident on **PapQ** it will be fruitful to compare the *Thomas* version directly with that of Luke:

Gos. Thom. 91b
[[[δοκιμάζετε]]]
τὸ πρόσωπον
τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς,

[[καὶ τὸν (τὰ ?) ἐνώπιον ὑμῶν
οὐκ ἐγνώκατε]]
[[[καὶ]]] τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον

οὐκ οἶδατε δοκιμάζειν.

Luke 12:56

τὸ πρόσωπον
τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
οἶδατε δοκιμάζειν,

τὸν καιρὸν δὲ τοῦτον
πῶς
οὐκ οἶδατε δοκιμαάζειν.

Q 12:56^{0}

Pro: **Schürmann** 116: The verbal link of κρίνετε and diakr*i*nein shows a pre-Lucan connection between 12:54–56 and 57ff. δοκιμάζειν in 12:56 is Luke's redaction (only here and 14:19 diff. Matthew) of a previous διακρίνειν. **Polag** 66 includes this section in his Q reonstruction.
Con: **Harnack** and **Schenk** do not include 12:54–56 in their Q reconstructions.

Q 12:56^{1}: Luke's use of the address "hypocrites."

Luke = Q ὑποκριταί

Pro: Polag 66 follows Luke.
Matthew = Q
Pro: Gundry 324: "Because of his predilection for ὑποκριταί ([inserted 8 times in shared material, used 1 time in special material] . . .), it is hard to think [Matthew] omitted it. Yet he will replace ὑπόκρισιν with πονηρίαν in 22:18 (cf. Mark 12:15). Possibly, however, Luke here inserts ὑποκριταί, for in the first verse of this same chapter he has ὑπόκρισις against Mark 8:15; Matt 16:6."
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[2]: Matthew's use of μέν . . . δέ construction.

Luke = Q τὸ ( ) πρόσωπον
Pro: Luke likes the construction (Cadbury 146) and so would have no reason to omit it from his text of Q.
Matthew = Q τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον
Con: Gundry: This construction is Matthean (15 insertions in common tradition, 1 use in special material). Polag 66 considers μέν a Matthean addition.
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[3]: Luke's mention of "the earth and" heaven.

Luke = Q τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
Pro: Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 91b supports Luke's reading (in the other order). The many MSS of Luke that read "of the heaven of the earth" (e.g., $\mathfrak{p}^{45,75}$ ℵ[c] D) are most likely reacting against this (original) unusual word order.
Matthew = Q τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
Pro: Polag 66 follows Matthew here.
Con: Gundry 324: "Matthew deletes 'of the earth and' because he changed the south wind, which relates to the earth, to a red sky, with the result that neither of his signs has to do with the earth."
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[4]: Choice between verbs "to know."

Luke = Q οἴδατε
Pro: Sellew: οἶδα=infinitive appears in Luke only in non-Lucan material (e.g., Luke 11:13//Matt 7:11). *Gos. Thom.* 91b supports Luke's reading.
Matthew = Q γινώσκετε
Pro: Polag 66 follows Matthew here. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 91b has a form of γινώσκειν (but in a different context).
Con: Gundry 324: "γινώσκετε, a favorite of [Matthew's] ([inserted 8 times in shared material, used 2 times in special material]), stands in the place of Luke's synonymous οἴδατε."
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[5]: Luke's infinitive "to differentiate."

Luke = Q δοκιμάζειν
Pro: Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 91b supports Luke's reading.

Con: Schürmann 116: δοκιμάζειν is Luke's redaction (only here and 14:19 diff. Matthew) of a previous διακρίνειν.
Matthew = Q διακρίνειν
Pro: Polag 66 follows Matthew here.
Con: Gundry 324: "δοκιμάζειν yields [in Matthew] to διακρίνειν, which belongs to a class of words having κρι- as their base and appearing often in the first gospel ([inserted 11 times in shared traditions, used 0 times in special material])."
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[6]: Position of the time reference.

Luke = Q τὸν καιρὸν δέ
Pro: Polag 66 follows Luke here.
Matthew = Q τὰ δὲ σημεῖα τῶν καιρῶν
Con: Sellew: Matthew's addition could be interpretive (away from the metaphor of weather and seasons).
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[7]: Case and number of ὁ καιρός

Luke = Q τὸν καιρὸν
Pro: Polag 66 follows Luke here. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 91b supports Luke.
Matthew = Q τῶν καιρῶν
Con: Gundry 324: "Matthew probably pluralizes the word for 'time' to match the different kinds of weather."
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[8]: Matthew's use of "the signs" as direct object of verb.

Luke = Q ( )
Pro: Polag 66 follows Luke here. Sellew: *Gos. Thom.* 91b supports Luke.
Matthew = Q τὰ δὲ σημεῖα
Con: Gundry 324: "With the insertion of τά . . . σημεῖα, which Matthew will insert also in 24:30; 26:48, the traditional 'this time' becomes 'the signs of the times.'"
Evaluation: Luke's wording is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[9]: Luke's formulation with demonstrative pronoun, πῶς, and repetition, or Matthew's ellipsis using δύνασθε.

Luke = Q τοῦτον πῶς οὐκ οἴδατε δοκιμάζειν.
Pro: Luke MSS $\mathfrak{p}^{75}$ ℵ B Θ (οὐκ οἴδατε δοκιμάζειν); diff. $\mathfrak{p}^{45}$ A D W (οὐκ δοκιμάζετε). *Gos. Thom.* 91 (end) supports Luke, except for inclusion of πῶς.
Con: Some of Luke's phrasing seems stylized (placement of πῶς).
Matthew = Q οὐ δύνασθε
Con: Gundry 324: For the Lucan version "Matthew uses a favorite verb of his in δύνασθε ([inserted 13 times in shared material, used 0 times in special material]) and writes 'you are not able [to discern]. . . .' Thus the traditional question becomes a declaration. Matthew again heightens the guilt of the Pharisees and Sadducees, who represent the persecutors of the church at the time of writing, in a worse light."

Undecided: Polag 66 prints a mixed text: τοῦτον πῶς οὐ δύνασθε.
Evaluation: Read with Luke, omitting πῶς.

E. Q 12:57–59: Matt 5:25–26//Luke 12:[57]–59

*Q 12:57

[Q/Luke 12:57]
τί δὲ καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν οὐ κρίνετε τὸ δίκαιον;

Q 12:57^{0}: Presence in Q.

Pro: Gundry 86: Matthew dropped the question when he inserted this material into the sermon, since its "reproachful tone" ill suits his context.
Con: Bultmann 172: "a Lucan transitional formulation, see p. 91: [nothing else than a connecting piece by Luke intended to join vv. 58f. to vv. 54–46]." Knox 74: "xii. 57 may be an editorial insertion by Luke . . . ; the change from the plural to the singular in 58 suggests that originally the two sets of sayings were uttered on different occasions, while it is hard to see what the reference to τὸ δίκαιον means." Similarly Schulz 421 and Fitzmyer 1001: note e.g. use of second-person plural in contrast to singular "you" in vv 58–59. Neither Harnack 142 nor Schenk 98 includes 12:57 in his Q reconstruction.
Evaluation: Do not include this verse in the Q text.

Q 12:57^{1}: Placement of unit in Q sequence.

Luke = Q After Q 12:56; before Q 13:18.
Pro: Harnack 142; Guelich 191: (Matthew has made alterations to fit the setting of 5:23–24.
Matthew = Q After Q 16:17; before Q 16:18.

Q 12:58

PapQ 12:58	Reconstruction of Q 12:58
$^{0.1}$/	
^{2}/( )^{3}ως ( )^{3}	ὡς
[ ]^{4}	
[ ]^{5} ει[ ]^{5}	ὑπάγεις
μετ[ ]^{2}\$^{2}$	μετὰ
( )^{6} τ[( )]^{6}ἀντιδίκ[( )]^{6} σου	τοῦ ἀντιδίκου σου
[( )]^{7}	ἐπ' ἄρχοντα
/\$^{2}$	
^{8}/ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ\$^{8}$	ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ
[ ]^{9}	[δὸς ἐργασίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀπ']
αὐτοῦ,	αὐτοῦ
/\$^{8}$	
μήποτε /\$^{10}$	μήποτέ
[ ]^{11}	[σε παραδῷ]
( )^{12}	ὁ ἀντίδικος
[ ]^{13} τ[( )]^{13} κριτη [ ]^{13}	πρὸς τὸν κριτήν

καὶ ὁ κριτὴς [10]/σε παραδω[ ][14]\[10]
τῷ [( )][15]
καὶ [ ][16]
[ ][17]
[18]/β[( )][17]\[18] εἰς φυλακην /\6[18]
0.1 → Q 12:59

καὶ ὁ κριτής σε παραδώσει
τῷ ὑπηρέτῃ
καί
σε
βαλεῖ εἰς φυλακήν.

Matt 5:25
[1]/

/\[2]
(ἴσθι εὐνοῶν)[6] τ(ῷ)[6] ἀντιδίκ(ῳ)[6] σου
(ταχύ)[7]
[2]/(ἕ)[3]ως (ὅτου)[3]
[ ][4]
[ ][5] εἰ[ ][5]
μετ'[ ][2]\[2]
/\[8]
[ ][9]
αὐτοῦ,
[8]/εὐ τῇ ὁδῷ\[8]
μήποτέ[10]\σε παραδῷ[ ][14]\[10]
[ ][11]
(ὁ ἀντίδικος)[12]
[ ][13] τ[ῷ][13] κριτῇ [ ][13]
καὶ ὁ κριτὴς /\[10]
τῷ (ὑπηρέτῃ)[15],
καὶ [ ][16]
[ ][17]
/\[18] εἰς φυλακὴν [18]/β(ληθήσῃ)[17]\[18].

Luke 12:58
[1]/
[2]/( )[3] ὡς ( )[3]
[γὰρ][4]
[ὑπάγ][5]ει[ς][5]
μετ[ὰ][2]\[2]
( )[6] τ[οῦ][6] ἀντιδίκ[ου][6] σου
[ἐπ' ἄρχοντα][7],

/\[2]
[8]/ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ\[8]
[δὸς ἐργασίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀπ']
αὐτοῦ
/\[8]
μήποτέ /\[10]
[κατασύρῃ σε][11]
( )[12]
[πρὸς][13] τ[ὸν][13] κριτή[ν][13]
καὶ ὁ κριτής [10]σε παραδώ[σει][14]\[10]
τῷ [πράκτορι][15],
καί [ὁ πράκτωρ][16]
[σε][17]
[18]/β[αλεῖ][17]\[18] εἰς φυλακήν /\[18]

General comments:
Harnack 57: "Close consideration of the . . . saying also shows that St. Matthew has excellently preserved the text of Q. . . . In all these cases it is simply inconceivable that St. Matthew had before him, and altered, the text presented in St. Luke." **Bultmann** 96: "It is not entirely clear how Luke understood the pericope; he seems to have retained it in better state than Matthew." **Schmid** 226: "Lk hat . . . den ursprünglichen Zusammenhang und die primäre Auffassung der Parabel." 227: "Überhaupt hat Lk in diesem Verse in allen wesentlichen Zügen die primäre Fassung, wo Mt abweicht. . . ." **Schulz** 421: "Mt ist weithin ursprünglicher." **Fitzmyer** 1001: "The Lucan redaction has actually made use of more technical Roman judicial terms in contrast to the Matthean form (see E. Klostermann, *Lukasevangelium*, 141)"; idem 1003: "Luke uses the proper term for the constable of a debtors' jail." So too **Schweizer** *Luke* 217. Sellew: Matthew seems to have reoriented the sentence somewhat in an ethicizing direction consonant with his placement of it in the Sermon, leading to some changes in wording.

Q 12:58^{0}: Presence in Q.

Pro: Schmid 225: "Noch viel deutlicher läßt sich aber Mt 5^{25f} als Einschub des Mt aus einem anderen Zusammenhang erkennen, der uns noch bei Lk 12^{57-59} erhalten ist." Guelich 191: ". . . the root of Luke's 'to settle' (ἀπηλλάχθαι) is the same as the imperative be reconciled (διαλλάγηθι) in 5:24. Such a 'reminiscence' might have offered another point of contact between the two parables." **Harnack** and **Polag** include the section in their Q reconstructions.

Q 12:58^{1}: Position of 12:58–59 in Q.

Luke = Q After Q 12:56; before Q 13:18.
Pro: **Harnack** 142; **Polag** 66.
Matthew = Q After Q 16:17; before Q 16:18.

Q 12:58^{2}: Position of the letters ως . . . ει . . . μετ. . . .

Luke = Q [ὡς . . . ὑπάγεις . . . μετὰ. . .]
Matthew = Q (ἕως . . . εἶ . . . μετ' . . .)
Evaluation: This set of variants is not significant for reconstruction.

Q 12:58^{3}: Matthew's prepositional phrase.

Luke = Q ὡς
Pro: **Jeremias** 225: "Von den 47 belegen im Doppelwerk für die Verwendung von ὡς als temporale Konjuktion ist unsere Stelle die einzige, die ein Präsens folgen läßt; ὡς (temp.)+Praes. ist also nicht lukanisch."
Con: **Harnack** 57: "The temporal ὡς at the beginning is specifically Lukan (references here are unnecessary). . . ." **Bußmann** 53: Lucan redaction. **Schmid** 226: "Sekundär sind bei Lk sicher das temporale ὡς [n. 3: Blass 455.2]. . . ." So too **Schulz** 422.
Matthew = Q ἕως ὅτου
Pro: **Harnack** 57: "St. Luke has just as happily avoided the awkward phrase ταχὺ ἕως ὅτου εἶ μετ' αὐτοῦ. . . ." idem 142 follows Matthew, as does **Polag** 66 (smaller type). The combination is hapax in Matthew (so **Schulz** 421), but cf. next note.
Con: **Gundry** 86: "Matthew's diction appears in ἕως ὅτου [? perhaps referring to ἕως simple or ἕως+οὗ—Sellew] ([inserted 4 times in shared traditions, used 2 times in special material]), where Luke has ὡς, for the meaning 'while.'"
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:58^{4}: Luke's connective γάρ.

Luke = Q γάρ
Con: Presumably added (if and) when v 57 was inserted.
Matthew = Q [ ]
Pro: **Harnack** 142 follows Matthew, as does **Polag** 66.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:58^{5}: Choice of verbs.

Luke = Q ὑπάγεις

Pro: Jeremias 225: "Von den 47 belegen im Doppelwerk für die Verwendung von ὡς als temporale Konjuktion ist unsere Stelle die einzige, die ein Präsens folgen läßt; ὡς (temp.)+Praes. ist also nicht lukanisch."
Con: Harnack 57: "St. Luke has just as happily avoided the awkward phrase ταχὺ ἕως ὅτου εἶ μετ' αὐτοῦ. . . ." Schulz 422: "Lk schreibt ὑπάγεις anstelle von primären εἶ, weil er als Ziel ἐπ' ἄρχοντα angibt," and Fitzmyer 1001: Luke's redaction.
Matthew = Q εἶ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Gundry 86: "The use of 'go' in the preceding verse [in Matthew] results in its rejection here in favor of a simple 'you are.'" Sellew: Matthew seems to have reoriented the sentence somewhat in an ethicizing direction consonant with his placement of it in the Sermon; here a specific legal situation is generalized into a rule about treatment of adversaries.
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:56[6]: Luke's use of ὁ ἀντίδικος as object of preposition; Matthew's command and use of ὁ ἀντίδικος as dative object.

Luke = Q μετὰ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου
Matthew = Q ἴσθι εὐνοῶν τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Schmid 226: ". . . gewisser ist ἴσθι εὐνοῶν erst von Mt ergänzt, da es mit dem Grundgedanken der Parabel nicht recht harmoniert, bei Mt aber den Zusammenhang mit dem Vorausgehenden herstellen soll." Gundry 86: "This shift away from a verb of motion leads, in turn, to the dropping of 'to the magistrate' and the attachment of 'on the road' to 'you are' rather than to 'make friends with.'"
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[7]: Luke's phrase indicating location [i.e., "to the judge"] or Matthew's temporal adverb.

Luke = Q ἐπ' ἄρχοντα
Con: Harnack 57: "an explanatory interpolation." Schulz 422 "das ist sek und hat verdeutlichenden Charakter." Schenck 98 omits both Luke's "auf dem Weg zum Vorsteher" and Matthew's "rasch."
Matthew = Q ταχύ
Pro: Harnack 57: "St. Luke has just as happily avoided the awkward phrase ταχὺ ἕως ὅτου εἶ μετ' αὐτοῦ. . . ." idem 142 follows Matthew.
Con: Gundry 86: Matthew inserts ταχύ to emphasize reconciliation (cf. similar insertions in 28:7, 8); similarly Guelich 191. Gundry 86–87: ". . . the elimination of 'to the magistrate' not only relates to the loss of the verb of motion and keeps readers from wrongly distinguishing between the magistrate and the judge; it also makes the judgmental activity of the magistrate stand out in unrelenting fashion."
Undecided: Polag 66 omits both words, as does Schenck 98.
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred, since it fits smoothly with his (Q's) hypothetical legal context.

Q 12:58[8]: Position of the phrase ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ.

Luke = Q ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ δὸς ἐργασίαν . . .

Matthew = Q αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66. Schenk 98 locates "unterwegs" in Matthew's position.
Con: Gundry 86: "This shift away from a verb of motion leads, in turn, to the dropping of 'to the magistrate' and the attachment of 'on the road' to 'you are' rather than to 'make friends with.'"
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[9]: Luke's command.

Luke = Q δὸς ἐργασίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀπ' . . .
Con: Schulz 421: "ἐργασία ist rein lk."Jeremias 225: "ἐργασίαν ist eine Vokabel, die Lukas mehrfacht gebraucht; sie findet sich im NT ausser Eph 4,19 nur bei ihm (Luke 12,58/Apg 16,16.19; 19,24f.)." Schenk 98 omits this phrase.
Matthew = Q [cf. his ἴσθι εὐνοῶν
Pro: Harnack 57: "ἴσθι εὐνοῶν (here only in the New Testament) seemed to St. Luke too weak—he replaced it by the transparently clear phrase δὸς ἐργασίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (ἐργασία is not found elsewhere in the four gospels, see however Acts xvi. 16, 19; xix. 24, 25; Ephes. iv. 19; neither is ἀπαλλάσσειν found elsewhere in the four gospels, see however Acts xix. 12: ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν.)" idem 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Guelich 191: ". . . if Matthew was responsible for this change, the opening command might also pick up the note of the Beatitude to the peacemakers (5:9) that precedes and the demand to love one's enemy that follows." Gundry 86: "[Matthew] draws 'make an effort to be released from him' . . . from its original later position (so Luke) up to the very beginning and, having anticipated ἀπηλλάχθαι with his own διαλλάγηθι in v 24, changes the wording to a more positive ἴσθι εὐνοῶν. . . ."
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred (though some of the precise wording is Lucan).

Q 12:58[10]: Position of σε παραδ[( )].

Luke = Q μήποτε κατασύρῃ σε πρὸς τὸν κριτήν, καὶ ὁ κριτής σε παραδώσει
Con: Harnack 57: Luke's "sense of style would not allow him to describe the action of the adversary and the judge with one and the same word. . . ."
Matthew = Q μήποτέ σε παραδῷ ὁ ἀντίδικος τῷ κριτῇ καὶ ὁ κριτής
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Gundry 86: "Matthew also advances 'will give over' to substitute for the vivid 'drag.' This revision satisfies his liking for παραδίδωμι ([inserted 6 times in shared material, used 3 times in special material]), which in the next clause he leaves to be supplied. It also avoids the appearance of a distinction between going and being dragged . . . and makes a good contrast with ἀποδῷς . . . in the last clause of v 26."
Evaluation: Matthew's positioning is to be preferred (but see the next item).

Q 12:58[11]: Luke's use of the verb "to drag."

Luke = Q κατασύρῃ σε
Pro: Schmid 226: Matthew has softened the "drastische κατασύρειν."
Con: Harnack 57: Luke's "sense of style would not allow him to describe the action of the adversary and the judge with one and the same word . . . he writes here κατασύρειν

and παραδοῦναι (κατασύρειν does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament, but σύρειν [of men] is peculiar to St. Luke, occurring indeed three times in the Acts). . . ." So too Schulz 422. Fitzmyer 1001: Luke's redaction. Schenk 98 omits "zerrt."
Matthew = Q
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Gundry 86: "Matthew also advances 'will give over' to substitute for the vivid 'drag.'"
Evaluation: Luke probably changed an originally doubled παραδῷ in the interest of vividness and avoidance of repetition.

Q 12:58[12]: Luke's unexpressed subject or Matthew's expressed subject.

Luke = Q
Con: Harnack 57: "St. Luke has just as happily avoided . . . the unnecessary repetition of ὁ ἀντίδικος. . . . Moreover, his sense of style would not allow him to describe the action of the adversary and the judge with one and the same word. . . ."
Matthew = Q ὁ ἀντίδικος
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as do Polag 66 and Schenk 98.
Evaluation: Matthew's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[13]: Luke's use of prepositional phrase or Matthew's use of dative.

Luke = Q πρὸς τὸν κριτήν
Con: Schulz 422: Lucan revision.
Matthew = Q τῷ κριτῇ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Sellew: Matthew may be regularizing the parallel clauses.
Evaluation: Luke's reading is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[14]: Luke's future indicative or Matthew's aorist subjunctive.

Luke = Q σε παραδώσει
Pro: Luke's text is more vivid, Matthew's more fitting in the Sermon's exhortation.
Matthew = Q σε παραδῷ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Evaluation: Luke's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[15]: Luke's πράκτωρ or Matthew's ὑπηρέτης.

Luke = Q τῷ πράκτορι
Con: Harnack 57: "St. Luke has replaced the very indefinite word ὑπηρέτης by the technical term ὁ πρακτώρ. . . ." Similarly Schulz 422. Fitzmyer 1001: "The Lucan redaction has actually made use of more technical Roman judicial terms in contrast to the Matthean form (see E. Klostermann, *Lukasevangelium*, 141)"; idem 1003: "Luke uses the proper term for the constable of a debtors' jail." So too Schweizer *Luke* 217; Guelich 191–92.
Matthew = Q τῷ ὑπηρέτῃ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as do Polag 66 and Schenk 98.
Evaluation: Matthew's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[16]: Luke's repetition of the agent.

Luke = Q καὶ ὁ πράκτωρ
Con: Luke's use of καί is emphatic; so Schmid 226: "Sekundär sind bei Lk sicher . . . in V 59 das steigernde καί. . . ."
Matthew = Q καί
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Gundry 86: "Matthew eliminates the second mention of the officer," so "it is left uncertain who throws the debtor in prison."
Evaluation: Matthew's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[17]: Luke's third-person future active with object σε, or Matthew's second-person future passive.

Luke = Q σε βαλεῖ
Con: Schulz *422: "Die aktive Konstruktion bei Lk* (σε βαλεῖ εἰς φυλακήν) führt den vorangehenden Satzbau effektvoll weiter und ist wohl sek Umstilisierung gegenüber dem passivischen καὶ εἰς φυλακὴν βληθήσῃ bei Mt."
Matthew = Q βληθήσῃ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66 and Schenk 98.
Con: Gundry 86: "Matthew . . . changes the verb of throwing from active to passive, and puts it last—all . . . in agreement with his own emphasis on the last judgment, in which βάλλω figures prominently, often in the passive and without parallel ([inserted 2 times in shared tradition, used 4 times in special material])." Sellew: Matthew apparently uses the "divine passive" here.
Evaluation: Luke's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:58[18]: Position of the verb from βάλλω.

Luke = Q βαλεῖ εἰς φυλακήν
Matthew = Q εἰς φυλακὴν βληθήσῃ
Pro: Harnack 142 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Con: Gundry 86: "Matthew . . . changes the verb of throwing from active to passive, and puts it last—all . . . in agreement with his own emphasis on the last judgment, in which βάλλω figures prominently, often in the passive and without parallel ([inserted 2 times in shared tradition, used 4 times in special material])."
Evaluation: Luke's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:59

PapQ 12:59
( )[1] λέγω σοι,
οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως [( )]²
/\³
τὸ ( )⁴ ἔσχατον [( )]⁴ν
/ἀποδῷς\³
\12:58[1]

Reconstruction of Q 12:59
ἀμὴν λέγω σοι,
οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως ἂν
ἀποδῷς
τὸν ἔσχατον κοδράντην.

Matt 5:26
(ἀμὴν)[1] λέγω σοι,

Luke 12:59
( )[1] λέγω σοι,

οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως (ἂν)[2]	οὐ μὴ ἐξέλθῃς ἐκεῖθεν ἕως [καὶ][2]
/ἀποδῷς\[3]	/\[3]
τὸ(ν)[4] ἔσχατον (κοδράντη)ν[4]	τὸ( )[4] ἔσχατον [λεπτὸ][4]ν
/\[3]	/ἀποδῷς\[3]

Q 12:59[1]: Matthew's use of ἀμήν

Luke = Q ( ) λέγω σοι
Pro: Harnack 57: "perhaps ἀμήν is secondary."
Con: Sellew: could well have been in Q, since Luke prefers to omit or translate ἀμήν (all but 3 times; see list in Cadbury 157).
Matthew = Q ἀμὴν λέγω σοι
Pro: Gundry 86: "As in other passages, Luke has avoided this transliteration of a Semitic word (cf. 5:21–48)." Guelich 192: ". . . evidence of Luke's having avoided it [ἀμήν] elsewhere (e.g., 9:27, cf. Mark 9:1; 21:3, cf. Mark 12:43; 22:34, cf. Mark 14:30) and the absence of concrete evidence that Matthew ever added simply ἀμήν to a formula should caution one. . . ." Fitzmyer 1001: Luke's omission.
Con: Harnack 142 prints ἀμήν in brackets. Schulz 422: "Mt fügt—wie öfters—der λέγω-Formel ἀμήν hinzu." Polag 66 and Schenk 98 omit.
Evaluation: Matthew's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:59[2]: Luke's καί or Matthew's ἄν.

Luke = Q ἕως καί
Con: Schmid 226: "Sekundär sind bei Lk sicher . . . in V 59 das steigernde καί. . . ."
Matthew = Q ἕως ἄν
Pro: Harnack 141 follows Matthew, as does Polag 66.
Undecided: Schulz 422: "Über die Differenz . . . läßt sich nichts mehr ausmachen."
Evaluation: Matthew's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:59[3]: Position of the verb ἀποδῷς

Luke = Q ἔσχατον λεπτὸν ἀποδῷς
Con: Luke has repositioned the words for rhetorical effect ("even the last . . .").
Matthew = Q ἀποδῷς τὸν ἔσχατον κοδράντην
Pro: Harnack 141 and Polag 66 follow Matthew.
Evaluation: Matthew's text is to be preferred.

Q 12:59[4]: Luke's λεπτόν or Matthew's κοδράντης.

Luke = Q λεπτόν
Pro: Manson 122: Luke's term is more Palestinian; cf. Mark 12:42 (only other NT example of Matthew's κοδράντης) where it is an explanation of λεπτόν. Marshall 552: "Luke is more likely to be original" (in part because the "Latin quadrans . . . equal to two *lepta*").
Con: Harnack 57: "St. Luke has replaced . . . the vulgar κοδράντης by λεπτόν." Schmid 226: "Sekundär sind bei Lk sicher . . . in V 59 . . . das griechische λεπτόν. . . ." Knox 74: "Luke . . . changed κοδράντης into λεπτόν to avoid the barbarism." Schulz 422: "Lk schreibt λεπτόν anstelle von κοδράντης [cf. also Luke 21:1]." Gundry 87: "Luke's coin, along with the ascensive καί and the putting of the direct object ahead of its verb,

highlights the smallness of the amount. Matthew, having made his emphases, probably follows the phraseology of the tradition." **Fitzmyer** 1001: Luke's redaction (refers to Jeremias 225).
Matthew = Q κοδράντης
Pro: Gundry 87: "Matthew . . . probably follows the phraseology of the tradition." **Harnack** 142, **Polag** 66, and **Schenk** 98 follow Matthew here.
Evaluation: Matthew's text is to be preferred.

John Knox and the Acts of the Apostles

Joseph B. Tyson
Southern Methodist University

To talk about the contribution of John Knox to the study of the book of Acts is to highlight only one of the many contributions this scholar has made to the study of the New Testament, the history of Christianity, and Christian theology. His interests have ranged from the historical study of Pauline chronology to practical interests in the church's ministry and the integrity of its preaching. He has been equally at home in theoretical studies of Christology and in the assessment of the bearing of biblical criticism on faith. I continue to refer some of my students to John Knox's *Criticism and Faith,* now thirty-five years old, when they are perplexed about the ways in which their discoveries about the Bible stand in tension with their earlier expressions of faith. Inevitably they come away from a reading of this book with greater maturity and sophistication in dealing with their problems.

Knox's contribution to the study of Acts should be seen within the context of his larger religious and theological concerns, but there is no sense in which these concerns have affected the outcome of his studies. Whether he is doing exegetical work, tackling methodological problems, or working out a detailed table of chronological relationships, he adheres strictly to the principles of critical scholarship. In this sense, he links us with that influential group of scholars that Edgar J. Goodspeed assembled at Chicago a generation ago.

My assignment is to call attention to the character of Knox's work on Acts and to attempt a critical assessment of it. I think this can best be done by concentrating on two specific foci of Knox's work that represent distinctive approaches and contentions. One of these foci deals with a hypothesis that has met with moderate success among NT scholars; the other seems to have been largely neglected.[1]

Acts as a Source for Pauline Biography

The first focus I should want to call to your attention is a methodological concern. It has to do with the way in which the book of Acts might be used in the study of Paul. Knox had begun to work out his views on this subject as early as 1936, when he published an article entitled, " 'Fourteen Years Later:' A Note on the Pauline Chronology." He began the article with a clear methodological statement about the priority of Paul's letters to the book of Acts: "It does not need to be said that our principal sources for the life of Paul are the letters generally esteemed authentic and the several sections of Luke-Acts that deal with his career. It is equally unnecessary to add that of these the letters are by all

[1] I am greatly indebted to John C. Hurd, Jr., who has compiled a very helpful and detailed bibliography of John Knox's work and reviews of it in *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox,* ed. by W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, and R. R. Niebuhr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. xxiii-xxxii. A more detailed and unpublished version of the bibliography was kindly made available to me by the library staff at the Episcopal Theological Seminary of the Southwest, Austin, Texas.

odds the more important and in cases of conflict with Acts, whether explicit or implied, are always to be followed."[2] The force of the article, if persuasive, would be to revolutionize Pauline chronology by identifying the period of fourteen years (Gal 2:1) as the time of Paul's active missionary work. For Knox, the fourteen year period was not a silent period before Paul began his work among the Gentiles, but was precisely the period of that mission and the time of his greatest literary production.

This article was followed in 1939 by, "The Pauline Chronology."[3] Here Knox expressed caution about the use of Acts in Pauline studies but nevertheless hesitated to relegate it to an irrelevant role. He finds no reason to doubt the accuracy of the account in Acts about Paul's trial before Gallio in Corinth, although he wants to locate it at a different time in Paul's career. He is able to work out a Pauline chronology that differs from the traditional especially in filling in the fourteen year period of Gal 2:1 with meaningful activity. But he also wants to contend that this chronology, based entirely on a study of Paul's letters, does not significatly conflict with Acts. He writes,

> Although it is my conviction that students of the life of Paul must rigidly hold themselves to using Acts as a secondary source and must be ready to disregard it whenever the letters give the slightest ground for doing so, nevertheless a chronological arrangement which involved constant or even frequent conflict with the Acts narrative would be open to serious question.[4]

Later he claims that his new chronology "does not involve wholesale disregard of the statements of Acts."[5]

At this point it is important to say something about the relationship between this early work of John Knox and the work of D. W. Riddle, a relationship that is sometimes confused. In the preface to his *Paul, A Man of Conflict*, published in 1940, Riddle paid more than courteous respect to John Knox:

> This book owes a particular debt to my friend and colleague, Professor John Knox. It was Dr. Knox's article, "Fourteen Years Later, A Note on the Pauline Chronology," which stimulated the investigations and largely shaped the basic perceptions upon which the present work is projected. Frequent discussions have been of great assistance. While I assume responsibility for all generalizations, most cordially I share with Dr. Knox any credit which may accrue for what is presented herewith."[6]

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Riddle's remarks, especially since the chronology of the relevant publications supports their accuracy. Indeed, it seems likely that Riddle moved the argument about the use of Acts farther along than Knox did, for he maintained that Luke did not intend to write a biography of Paul any more than he intended to write a biography of Jesus in his gospel. So Riddle contended that Acts is not

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[2] John Knox, " 'Fourteen Years Later:' A Note on the Pauline Chronology," *JR* 16 (1936), 341.

[3] John Know, "The Pauline Chronology," *JBL* 58 (1939), 15–29.

[4] Ibid., p. 23.

[5] Ibid., p. 26.

[6] Donald W. Riddle, *Paul, Man of Conflict: A Modern Biographical Sketch* (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1940), p. 9.

useful for understanding Paul himself; rather it is useful only to the reader who understands its purpose and the relationship of its portrayal of Paul to the overall scheme of the book. Riddle thus adopts the methodological stance of confining himself to Paul's letters in writing about Paul.

John Knox's fundamental statement about the position of Acts came in his book, *Chapters in a Life of Paul*, an outgrowth of his Quillian Lectures, delivered at Emory University in 1949. The book begins with a methodological section on the sources for understanding Paul. Knox first acknowledges that the student of Paul has an apparent advantage over the student of the historical Jesus. The advantage is that, whereas we have no writing directly from Jesus, we have letters from Paul and an extensive biography. But this advantage is deceptive, since there is no ground for any greater confidence in Acts than in the gospels. Even the epistles in their present form cannot be regarded as exact replicas of Paul's original letters. They have been collected, arranged, and in some cases conflated. The collector or collectors of Paul's letters also engaged in pseudepigraphy in including Ephesians and the Pastorals as if they were genuine letters of Paul. Nevertheless, despite these problems with the letters, Knox agrees that the student of Paul is in far better position than the student of Jesus. The reason is that we have at our disposal letters—Romans, 1, 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, Colossians, 1, 2 Thessalonians, and Philemon—that, for the most part, come to us "substantially as they left their author's hand."[7] And he concludes, "They constitute our only primary sources for the life of Paul."[8]

If pseudepigraphy is to be seen as one way of reinterpreting Paul for the post-Pauline church, biography ought to be seen as another way. The Acts of the Apostles, although its author is not solely interested in writing a biography of Paul, is nevertheless the earliest and worthiest of these biographies that attempt to bring Paul into later times. In approaching the question of its historical reliability, one ought to assume that it is neither more nor less reliable than the gospel of Luke, and Knox intends this to be an affirmative recognition of substantial reliability. But then he calls attention to some differences between the writing of the gospel and the writing of Acts. In writing the gospel, Luke drew on earlier materials for his recording of the teaching of Jesus, whereas in Acts he substantially wrote speeches for his heroes, including Paul. In addition, Luke had a well-organized document as a source for the gospel, i.e., the gospel of Mark, but for Acts he "probably had available only brief accounts of particular episodes; or, perhaps occasionally, of short sequences of episodes, as, for example, of some journey of Paul; or, possibly, longer overlapping accounts written from divergent points of view. . . ."[9] Thus, in writing Acts, "it is probable that he was more the author and less the compiler than when he wrote Luke; we may confidently believe that he had fuller control of the arrangement of his materials and was in large part responsible for it."[10]

If Luke was in substantial control of the arrangement of his materials, what conceptions led him to arrange the materials in the way that he did? Knox finds three such conceptions that are important for the study of Paul. The first is the tendency to emphasize the significance and place of Jerusalem in the history of the early Christian movement. This emphasis, probably born of the need to legitimate Christianity to the Roman officials and thus to connect it with Judaism, is to be found in the gospel as well as in Acts, but in Acts Knox calls attention to the fact that the activities of the Christians in the first seven

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[7] John Know, *Chapters in a Life of Paul* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1950), p. 20f.
[8] Ibid., p. 21.
[9] Ibid., p. 24.
[10] Ibid.

chapters are confined to Jerusalem and that Paul periodically returns there. He writes, "Not only is Jerusalem the point from which the world-wide expansion of Christianity takes its start; Jerusalem remains the center of the whole development, the source of direction and control in the expanding church."[11]

The second tendency that Knox notes is related. "It is the view that the Twelve at Jerusalem exercised a careful and authoritative oversight of the entire Christian church."[12] The authority of Paul is derivative from that of the apostles, and the process of his selection is of a different order from theirs. By emphasizing the leadership of the twelve and their relation to Paul, Luke wants to stress the sense of harmony that he thinks prevailed in the early church.

The third Lukan tendency consists of Luke's emphasis on the "political innocuousness" of the Christian movement. Its enemies are never responsible Roman officials but Jews, "false to the true meaning of their own faith and culture."[13] Knox observes that the reason Luke ends his book without a narrative describing the final outcome of Paul's trial at Rome is "a consequence of his unwillingness to conclude his book with the story of its failure."[14]

The tendencies that Knox notes are fairly standard in the critical literature on Luke-Acts. A recognition of their importance leads Knox to reaffirm the priority of Paul's letters for the student of Paul. The letters are "obviously and incomparably the more trustworthy."[15] Despite the obviousness of this observation, there is insufficient clarity in regard to the way in which it might impact the actual study: "The truth in principle of this last statement no serious student of Paul's life is likely to deny, but its meaning in practice is not so widely or so clearly seen."[16] Therefore, Knox next turns from the "meaning in principle" to the "meaning in practice" of his observations about sources.

He begins the chapter on "The Use of Sources" with a distinction between internal and external spheres of Paul's life. The internal sphere is that which is concerned with ideas and beliefs, while the external consists of the chronological and geographical circumstances, the observable course of his career. The usual way in which the study of Paul is pursued is to draw on the letters for the internal facts and to draw on Acts for the external. "The consequence is that while we tend to harmonize Acts with the letters as regards the inner facts of Paul's life, we tend to harmonize the letters with Acts as regards the outer."[17] But this procedure, though common even for perceptive and informed scholars, cannot be justified: "Whereas the first is relatively innocuous, since the letters are given their true importance in the process, the second is seriously distorting."[18] The letters are primary sources not only for the internal but also for the external details of Paul's life, even though Acts gives fuller information about the latter. This leads Knox to state the principle, "A fact only suggested in the letters has a status which even the most unequivocal statement of Acts, if not otherwise supported, cannot confer. We may, with

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[11] Ibid., p. 27.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., p. 28.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., p. 31.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., p. 32.
[18] Ibid.

proper caution, use Acts to supplement the autobiographical data of the letters, but never to correct them."[19]

To show how this principle should work out, Knox next examines the major external facts that come from Acts. Some of these "facts" may be reasonably accepted. For example, although only Acts refers to Paul's Jewish name, Saul, there is no reason to doubt it. Paul had no occasion to use it in his letters, and no alternative tradition is known. The reference to Tarsus as his place of birth, likewise, causes little trouble, since Paul's own letters suggest that he is a Jew of the Diaspora whose early Christian missionary work was carried on in Cilicia. His arrest in Jerusalem, his trials, and his trip to Rome seem plausible. Nothing in Paul's letters conflicts with these points, since all of the letters were written before the events in question.

But grave doubts must be expressed about several of the external "facts" found in Acts. Paul's training in Jerusalem under Gamaliel is one of these "facts." Here Paul's silence in the letters is important, and the connection of Paul with Jerusalem and with a leading Rabbi serves to reinforce Luke's sense of the linkage between Christianity and Judaism. The circumstances surrounding Paul's conversion must be rejected, because they conflict directly with the testimony in Paul's letters. There is, of course, fundamental agreement on the fact that Paul was a persecutor of the Christian movement, but Luke sets the scene of the persecution in Jerusalem and Judea, while Paul claims not to be known to the Christians there (Gal 1:22–23). These Christians had heard about his earlier persecuting activity and about his conversion, but they did not know Paul first-hand. Likewise, there is disagreement on Paul's actions following his conversion. "Paul says, 'I did not go up to Jerusalem to those who were apostles before me'; Acts says that he did precisely that."[20] Knox concludes that the story in Acts 9:1–2, "while not incredible, is improbable."[21] The conception of Paul as engaged on three great missionary journeys, likewise, "represents a later way of seeing and interpreting a career which originally did not appear so at all."[22]

After this preliminary study, Knox turns to a more detailed application of his principles, and he attempts to lay out the chronology of Paul's career drawing on the letters alone. This chronology differs from that derived from Acts in major respects. For one thing, Paul himself referred only to three visits to Jerusalem, visits that Knox designates as "acquaintance," "conference," and "offering." Acts, however, has five such visits—9:26–27; 11:29–30; 15:1–29; 18:22; and 21:15. Knox shows that the second has been confused with Paul's final "offering" visit and that the fourth in Acts is the result of some confusion about the real location of the third, the "conference" visit. But the key to Knox's treatment of these differences between Acts and the letters is his identification of the third visit in Acts with the "conference" visit in Galatians and his claim that Acts has located this visit earlier in Paul's career than it really belongs. Here Knox goes back to his earlier work, "Fourteen Years Later," and repeats his contention that the conference between Paul and the Jerusalem pillar-apostles occurred at the peak of Paul's career rather than earlier. He thinks that Luke had a source for the report about this visit but intentionally altered the chronology in order to avoid any implication of a long-standing disharmony between Paul and the Jerusalem apostles. In actual fact, the conference visit occurred in close proximity to the time when the letter to the Galatians and the letter to the Romans reflected Paul's great concern with the issues discussed at this meeting.

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[19] Ibid., p. 33.
[20] Ibid., p. 37.
[21] Ibid., p. 39.
[22] Ibid., p. 41.

Similarly, Luke did not understand Paul's last visit to Jerusalem as the "offering" visit but moved that to an earlier point and changed it from a peace offering to a famine relief offering in order to avoid any implications of disharmony.

Knox's fundamental principle for using Acts in the study of Paul, in its theoretical formulation, is clear: Acts is a secondary source. It must be used cautiously, the intentions of its author must be considered, and its tendentiousness must be carefully weighed. The letters are the primary sources. The impact of this principle on the actual study of the external sphere of Paul's life, its "meaning in practice," must be more carefully nuanced. Clearly, if there is disagreement between a point made in a letter and a point made in Acts, we must either reject Acts or harmonize it with the letters. In the case of the visits of Paul to Jerusalem it is possible to show how and why Luke went wrong. But if the question regards a point made in Acts on which the letters are silent, then the situation appears to be more difficult. Knox then wants to examine the significance of the silence in the letters and the relationship of the point in Acts to the tendentiousness of Luke. Although Tarsus as Paul's birthplace is not confirmed in the letters, it may be accepted. But the concept of the three missionary journeys, likewise not confirmed in the letters, must be rejected.

In his article on "The Pauline Chronology," Knox was cautious, even suspicious, about any move to reject Acts. There he observed that there would be something problematic about a historical construction that goes against Acts on several major points. He does not repeat this observation in *Chapters in a Life of Paul.* Indeed, he seems prepared to reject Acts on a number of points important to the scheme of that book, especially those points that are useful to the author in developing his basic conceptions of things. Knox is here less apologetic about his treatment of Acts as a source for Paul's external sphere. But his method does not involve the wholesale rejection of Acts; rather Knox's intent is similar to that of Riddle, namely to treat Acts as a secondary source, a source limited in usefulness not only by the fact that it comes from an "outsider" but also by the fact that the author is committed to certain principles for conceiving Paul and making him available to a later generation.

The early reviews of Knox's *Chapters* were mixed. Some reviewers were offended by any suggestion that there were inaccuracies in Acts. The editor of *Expository Times* said that the author of Acts, identified as Paul's traveling companion, must have known more about Paul than any American professor.[23] Others expressed a decided preference for harmonistic methods. Donald G. Miller preferred the methods of William Ramsay, Adolf von Harnack, and W. L. Knox, "of seeking to reconcile differences between Acts and Paul's Letters wherever possible, and of admitting that where a reconciliation is impossible it may be due to the limitations of our knowledge."[24] J. W. Beardslee thought that Knox was too rigorous in distinguishing the letters and Acts. He wrote, "Paul, of course, at one time and in some moods knew much more about his movements and their purpose than did the author of Acts. But Paul wrote Galatians in a burst of anger, which climaxed his usual deeply emotional temperament. Cannot his statements—still more the implications of these statements—be too literalistically accepted?"[25] Floyd Filson was not convinced by Knox's reconstruction of Pauline chronology, and he thought that Knox was too skeptical of the historical value of Acts, but he agreed with his basic methodological principle.[26]

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[23] *ExpTimes* 66 (1954/55), 632–33.

[24] *Int* 6 (1952), 373.

[25] *JR* 30 (1950), 275.

[26] *Religion in Life* 19 (1949/50), 632–33.

Other reviewers were, however, clearly supportive of Knox's position. Henry J. Cadbury commended not only the methodology employed in *Chapters* but also agreed with the reconstructed chronology. He wrote, "But undoubtedly the usual arrangement, with its unbalance of too little record for many years before the Jerusalem council and too much activity for the few available years after it, must be corrected somehow, and that at the expense of Acts."[27] Although she had strongly negative criticisms of some late chapters, Mary E. Andrews gave the historical section of *Chapters* a ringing endorsement: "This reviewer has never seen a better demonstration of the value of a rigidly historical approach to a New Testament problem than is here presented. It ought to be a deterrent to the continued employment of harmonistic method which so often has added only confusion."[28] R. T. Stamm defended the book against fundamentalist critics, who might prefer harmonistic approaches: "Yet we have to recognize that *any* harmonization of Acts with Paul is a *human* construction, and hence can lay no claim to infallibility, however much it may satisfy the minds of its advocates."[29]

A more substantial and more recent appraisal of Knox's contributions to the study of Acts and Pauline chronology is provided by John Hurd in the Knox *Festschrift* of 1967.[30] Hurd begins by calling attention to the distinction Knox had made between principle and practice, where principle refers to the basic methodology proposed by Knox (and Riddle) and practice refers to the ways in which the methodology is used in this case in the study of Paul. On the matter of principle, Hurd distinguishes three groups of scholars. A very few have adopted the methodology and consistently applied it, among them Frederic R. Crownfield[31] and M. Jack Suggs.[32] In this connection one should also call attention to an article by Donald T. Rowlingson,[33] who accepted Knox's methodology and attempted to find support for its application from another direction. A second group of scholars, says Hurd, "have responded to the proposals of Riddle and Knox merely by becoming more guarded in their statements about the dates and sequence of events in Paul's life."[34] He refers to the work of Donald J. Selby as an example of this tendency.[35] The largest group of scholars has rejected Knox's chronological conclusions, on the grounds that they depend on a devaluation of the historical accuracy of Acts. Here Hurd refers to Dieter Georgi,[36] G. B. Caird,[37] and W. G. Kümmel.[38] Hurd also treats the work of Thomas H. Campbell,[39] who deals specifically with the matter of principle and attempts to show

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[27] *Christian Century* 67 (1950), 560.

[28] *JBR* 18 (1950), 197.

[29] *IQ* 2 (1950), 345.

[30] John C. Hurd, Jr., "Pauliune Chronology and Pauline Theology," in Farmer et al., op cit., pp. 225-48.

[31] *A Historical APproach to the New Testament* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).

[32] "Concerning the Date of Paul's Macedonian Ministry," *NovT* 4 (1960), 60–68.

[33] "The Jerusalem Conference and Jesus' Nazareth Visit: A Study in Pauline Chronology," *JBL* 71 (1952), 69–74.

[34] Hurd, op. cit., p. 227.

[35] *Toward the Understanding of St. Paul* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962).

[36] *Die Geschichte der Kollekte des Paulus fur Jerusalem* (Hamburg-Bergstedt: Herbert Reich, 1965).

[37] "The Chronology of the New Testament," in *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), I, 599–607.

[38] *Introduction to the New Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966).

[39] "Paul's 'Missionary Journeys' as Reflected in His Letters," *JBL* 74 (1955), 80–87.

that, in respect to the number of missionary journeys and the general course of Paul's ministry, there are significant correspondences between the letters and Acts. W. D. Davies has also faced the methodological problems directly. He outlined three ways in which the book of Acts may be assessed. This outline, quoted by Hurd, bears repetition here:

> Three positions can be taken: (1) We may regard Acts as so unreliable historically that we have to depend entirely, or almost entirely, on the Epistles. (2) We may take the Epistles as primary but take Acts with utmost seriousness as containing reliable information which must be reconciled with the Epistles. This is the position taken by British scholars usually. (3) We may take a mediating position. The Epistles are primary, but while we should not twist their evidence to fit that of Acts, Acts does provide valuable information which deserves to be considered as historically significant. This position is held by J. Munck.[40]

Hurd claims that Knox and Riddle belong in the third category and that it is difficult to find scholars in the first. Although Davies is not explicit in the quotation, it is probable that he thinks of Knox as the chief representative of the view that Acts is not reliable.

At this point Hurd makes an important clarification that calls attention to the deficiencies in almost all of the previous responses to Knox's work on Acts and Paul. The distinction between primary and secondary sources "means not just a difference in the degree of reliance that is to be placed on each type of source, but also involves necessarily the order in which these sources are to be consulted. Thus the basic first step in the reconstruction of Paul's career is the examination of his letters entirely apart from Acts."[41]

In turning to the second major section of his paper, on "the meaning in practice," Hurd shows how Knox and Riddle applied their basic principle in studying the biography and theology of Paul. Here Hurd is able to show that, despite claims to the contrary from the majority of scholars, one aspect of the historical reconstruction of Knox and Riddle is quite close to traditional views. Hurd claims that this is due to a failure on the part of both Riddle and Knox to connect the analysis of Paul's thought with the order in which the letters were written. This point, surely of great significance for the study of Pauline thought and chronology, goes beyond our current interest in Knox's contribution to the study of Acts and so may be noted only in passing.[42]

In my judgment, Hurd's major contribution to the assessment of Knox's work is in rigidly stressing the distinction between primary and secondary sources and in drawing out the implication that primary sources must be analyzed first and in their entirety before secondary sources are consulted. But in so stating the matter, Hurd also showed that Knox and Riddle have had far fewer followers than they have deserved.

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[40] W. D. Davies, *Invitation to the New Testament* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), p. 240.

[41] Hurd, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[42] Cf. Charles Buck and Greer Taylor, *Saint Paul: A Study of the Development of his Thought* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969). These authors accept Knox's principle but also recognize the problem for Pauline chronology. "If the chronology of Paul's life is to be based on the evidence of the letters, it is necessary to know beforehand the order in which the letters were written, and once the framework of Acts is dispensed with, some of the letters are extremely difficult to date even relatively" (p. 9). Buck and Taylor propose to establish the sequence of the letters by means of an analysis of the development in Paul's thought.

The Knox *Festschrift* appeared in 1967. By 1980, the influence of John Knox's work on Pauline chronology appeared to have strengthened considerably. Professor Knox was honored and his influence assessed in a seminar held in Fort Worth, Texas, in November, 1980.[43] Here again, John Hurd was a moving force, but the seminar was connected also with the publication of two recent books dealing with Pauline chronology, one by Robert Jewett,[44] and the other by Gerd Luedemann.[45] Both Jewett and Luedemann presented papers to the seminar, for which Hurd acted as moderator. The published proceedings include not only papers by Luedemann and Jewett and a transcript of the discussion, but also a response from John Knox.

Both Luedemann and Jewett are engaged in the attempt to establish the chronology of Paul's life and letters. Luedemann appears to follow Knox's method with consistency and fully recognizes his indebtedness to him. He attempts to reconstruct the chronology of Paul by a critical use of the letters that examines such things as the genre of the individual sections of the letters and their historical background. Then he turns to Acts and isolates some of the traditions that Luke used. He is able to identify these traditions by a redactional study of Acts that makes use of the indications provided in Paul's letters. Luedemann's work may, thus, be regarded as a genuine advance on Knox's. As Knox says in the foreword to the English edition of the book, "The extraordinary significance of Gerd Luedemann's book lies in its being the first full-length, full-bodied, and fully documented study of Paul's apostolic career which is based solely on the letters. It is the author's aim to use material from Acts only when it supports what the letters either state or suggest."[46]

Jewett also affirms the superior value of Paul's letters in establishing a chronology. After a discussion of the possible source material that may be useful, he writes:

> The result is that the general outline of Paul's life must be worked out on the basis of the evidence from the letters and these alone. This means one must break with Luke's framework of five different trips to Jerusalem after Paul's conversion, and one must seriously investigate the possibility of articulating Pauline chronology on the basis of the three Jerusalem journeys and the various phases of missionary activity reflected in the letters. To compromise between Luke's general outline and that reflected in the Pauline letters is to open the door to a subjective chaos that can never be tamed by the whim of the scholar. A general rule therefore is that material from Acts is usable in the chronological experiment only when it does not conflict with evidence in the letters.[47]

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[43] The seminar was one of three that met at that time, the other two being on the synoptic problem and the question of gospel genre. The papers, together with transcripts of the seminar dialogues, have been published in *Colloquy on New Testament Studies: A Time for Reappraisal and Fresh Approaches*, edited by Bruce Corley (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983).

[44] *A Chronology of Paul's Life* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979).

[45] *Paulus, der Heidenapostel*, vol. 1: *Studien zur Chronologie* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980); E. T.: *Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).

[45] *Paulus, der Heidenapostel*, vol. 1: *Studien zur Chronologie* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980); E. T.: *Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).

[47] Jewett, *op. cit.*, p. 23f.

Jewett's application of the principle allows him to sift the book of Acts for chronological suggestions and other details. Those details that are useful are those that seem to be irrelevant to Luke's overall theological or chronological framework and do not conflict with the evidence in Paul's letters. In his paper for the Fort Worth colloquy, Jewett emphasizes his indebtedness to Knox and describes his work as an effort to expand on and sustain Knox's hypothesis. He also indicates that the reviews of his own book have given "the impression that the Knox hypothesis is gaining decisive headway."[48]

In his introduction to the seminar papers, John Hurd questioned Jewett's adherence to the Knox hypothesis. Hurd claimed that Jewett had misunderstood the real force of Knox's work. Jewett was able to locate his work as an advance upon the Knox hypothesis by defining it as a claim that Paul paid only three trips to Jerusalem instead of the five reported in Acts. On this point, of course, Knox and Jewett are in agreement. In this way, Jewett can claim that his work is an advance, since he starts with a three-journey structure and fills in details drawn from a data-base that, in turn, draws on Paul's letters, Acts (as critically qualified), and other relevant sources. Hurd affirms that this is a misunderstanding of Knox's contribution, which is totally in the area of method. The concept that Paul paid only three trips to Jerusalem is a result of the application of the method, to which Jewett does not fully adhere. The same point was made within the seminar discussion. Indeed, Professor Knox himself is perplexed by Jewett's claim.[49] He says that, in reading Jewett's book, he was led to believe that Jewett did not consider himself to be an adherent of the method Knox had earlier outlined and that he had come at his views more or less independently. In describing the differences between himself and Jewett, Knox calls attention to Jewett's disposition to accept material in Acts that is not contradicted in Paul's letters. Knox writes, "But, one might ask, if Acts can be shown to be wrong at so many points where the letters happen to provide a 'check,' what assurance can one have that it is right when the letters do not provide a 'check'?"[50]

An analysis of the work of Luedemann and Jewett helps us to sharpen the perception of Knox's contribution to the study of Acts. Clearly, the work of Luedemann is very close to that of Knox in terms both of methodology and substantive result. He has, however, developed a more sophisticated way of sifting Acts for authentic historical traditions. Whereas Knox was willing to accept certain minor details that were not contradicted by Paul's letters, Luedemann uses the letters as control documents in his redaction-critical study of Acts. Knox's comments on Luedemann's work indicate that he finds himself in agreement with the younger scholar's position.

The discussion of Jewett shows that the real force of Knox's work was not to commend any particular Pauline chronology, least of all a particular structuring of Pauline chronology along a three-journey hypothesis. Rather, his major contribution is in the area of methodology and in his strictures about the relative use of Acts and Paul's letters in the study of Paul's internal and external life. As he himself says, in commenting on his own work and that of Hurd, Suggs, H. L. Ramsey, C. H. Buck, Paul Minear, and E. P. Sanders, "There has never been complete agreement within this group on chronological

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[48] Robert Jewett, "Chronology and Methodology: Reflections on the Debate Over Chapters in a Life of Paul," in Corley, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

[49] See his "Chapters in a Life of Paul—A Response to Robert Jewett and Gerd Luedemann," in Corley, *op. cit.*, pp. 339–64, esp. pp. 361–64.

[50] Ibid., p. 363.

details, but we have all agreed on methodology, which is the principal thing."[51] Hurd echoes this judgment: "But for Knox 'method is everything.' "[52]

In summary, one may say that, in respect to methodology, Knox has presented a hypothesis about the use of Acts for Pauline studies that is irrefutable. The fact that those who embrace his hypothesis may still be in the minority is not due to any lack of clarity in the presentation of the hypothesis. The future for scholarship in this area probably lies with those who, like Luedemann, take the hypothesis seriously and attempt to apply it rigorously.

Marcion and the Acts of the Apostles

If Knox's work on Acts as a source for Pauline biography has met with moderate success, his work on Marcion and Acts has been almost totally ignored. Although treated here as the second of two foci, the work on Marcion appeared earlier, in a more general work, *Marcion and the New Testament.*[53]

John Knox's argument about the relationship of Acts and Marcion can only be understood in the larger context of his analysis of the relationship of Marcion to Luke-Acts and, indeed, to the NT as a whole. The usual view about Marcion, based on patristic statements, is that his scriptures consisted of an abbreviated version of canonical Luke and certain letters of Paul. These scriptures would have provided the authority for Marcion's theology of two Gods and for his rejection of scriptures and theology associated with Judaism. But Knox raises a serious question about this viewpoint. If Marcion was intent on stressing the discontinuity between Judaism and Christianity, then, says Knox, his alleged choice of Luke is incomprehensible. "Why did he select a book [the gospel of Luke] from which he was forced to delete so large a portion – a book so steeped, especially in its opening chapters, in Jewish lore?"[54] Considering Luke-Acts as a whole, Knox comments: "That the one work among early Christian documents whose primary purpose was to demonstrate the continuity of Christianity with Judaism should have been deliberately selected and adopted by the one church leader whose primary interest was to deny that continuity is to me almost incredible."[55]

Knox not only rejects the traditional view of the relationship of Marcion to Luke, he reverses it. In his theory, canonical Luke was written, in part, as a reaction against Marcionism. Marcion had a slightly abbreviated form of a proto-Luke (not to be confused with the proto-Luke of B. H. Streeter). His gospel contained approximately the same Markan and Matthean materials that canonical Luke contains. But canonical Luke is an expansion of the more primitive gospel by the addition of peculiar Lukan material. Knox writes:

> This would mean that the relation between Marcion's Gospel and the canonical Gospel of Luke is not accurately described either by the simple statement that Marcion abridged Luke or by the assertion that Luke enlarged Marcion. The position would rather be that a primitive Gospel, containing approximately the same Markan and Matthean elements which our Luke

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[51] Ibid., p. 345.

[52] Hurd, "Introduction," in Corley, *op. cit.*, p. 266f.

[53] John Knox, *Marcion and the New Testament: An Essay in the Early History of the Canon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

[54] Ibid., p. 163.

[55] Ibid., p. 139

> contains and some of its peculiar materials, was somewhat shortened by Marcion or some predecessor and rather considerably enlarged by the writer of our Gospel, who was also the maker of Luke-Acts.[56]

The book of Acts, therefore, was written with the express purpose of counteracting Marcionite theology. It does this in two major ways. First, it emphasizes the relationship of Christianity to Judaism, indeed the continuity of the two. Second, it places Paul as one among the apostles and emphasizes the harmony between him and the others. Acts was written by one who was fully informed about the use that Marcion was making of Paul, and his solution to the problem was not to attack Paul but to neutralize him. So, Knox sees Luke-Acts as, at least in part, an early apologetic response to Marcionism and an attempt "to reclaim both a Gospel and Paul from the Marcionites."[57] Knox also contends that the Marcionite canon of gospel and apostle served as a model for Luke-Acts and subsequently for the orthodox canon.

A major part of Knox's argument about Luke is a linguistic one. He divides the material into three categories: material in Luke that certainly was in Marcion's gospel; material that certainly was not in Marcion's gospel; and material about which there is substantial uncertainty. This categorization, largely based on Harnack's analyses, is used by Knox for linguistic and theological comparisons. In making the linguistic comparisons, his main purpose is to call into question the argument of William Sanday, who had claimed that characteristic Lukan terms are found both in the materials that Marcion included and in those he did not have.[58] Knox readily concedes that Sanday's thesis, if true, has the effect of settling the question about priority in favor of the traditional view. If it can be proven that there is homogeneity of vocabulary between the text of those parts of canonical Luke which Marcion's gospel did *not* contain and the Marcionite text of those parts of Luke which Marcion's gospel *did* contain, the view that Marcion abbreviated the canonical Luke would almost be required. But Knox seeks to demonstrate that Sanday's thesis is not established by his argument because he does not take into any account the actual text of Marcion's gospel, which is known to be significantly different from the text of our Luke. He seeks by examining Harnack's reconstruction of that text to demonstrate this. In his book he makes some attempt not only to discredit Sanday's thesis but also to build upon the textual data a positive argument for his own case. In later writings he has expressed the wish that he had not made this latter attempt but had been content with the more modest endeavor, concluding finally that we simply do not know enough about the text of Marcion's gospel to make confident judgments on the basis of merely linguistic evidence either confirming or rejecting the traditional view.[59] He, nevertheless, claims that much of this evidence points away from it.

Knox then turns to considerations of a more general nature affecting the content of Luke. Drawing mainly on Cadbury, he studies the special features of Luke's writing, such as the concern for local color, interest in soldiers, cities, lodging and entertainment, emphasis on joy, grace, divine guidance and control, interest in Gentiles, women, and Samaritans, and the stress on Jerusalem. By use of the three categories mentioned above,

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[56] Ibid., p. 110

[57] Ibid., p. 139

[58] William Sanday, "Marcion's Gospel," *Fortnightly Review* 23 [17n.s.] (1875), 855–75. Cf. also his *The Gospels in the Second Century* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1876).

[59] Cf. John Knox, *Marcion and the New Testament*, second edition (New York: AMS Press, 1980), preface.

Knox is able to show that, while some of the features are certainly present in Marcion's gospel, none of them is stressed and most are altogether absent. This observation is consistent with the view that these features were added to Marcion's gospel in the process of producing canonical Luke.

Knox points out that many of these features are to be found in passages peculiar to Luke. His statistical observations are worth quoting at this

> It will be apparent at once that verses lacking in Marcion are predominantly from among the peculiarly Lukan materials in the Gospel. Although 50.4 per cent of the verses of the Gospel of Luke are peculiar to that Gospel, only 38.5 per cent of the verses which there is even the slightest positive reason to believe belonged to Marcion's Gospel fall within that category. In Luke as a whole there are 1.4 per cent more peculiar verses than common verses, but in "A" [Knox's category of materials certainly in Marcion] there are 60 per cent more common verses than peculiar. And of the verses which there is positive evidence to show did *not* belong to Marcion, 79.7 per cent are peculiar to Luke. Of all the verses of Luke which are peculiar to Luke, 39 per cent are known to be missing in Marcion, whereas of verses of Luke paralleled in Matthew or Mark or both, only 10 per cent are known to be missing from Marcion.[60]

These observations show that, on the traditional view, Marcion omitted a much higher proportion of material peculiar to canonical Luke than he did of material common to the three synoptic gospels. Knox asks: "Why should he have done this? If he did not like what was distinctively Lukan, why did he choose this Gospel, when, according to the usual view, he had all the Gospels at hand, including Mark and John? On the other hand, if our Luke is a later composition than Marcion's Gospel, the peculiarly Lukan character of the material in it which is not also in Marcion is precisely what we would expect."[61] Thus, in Knox's judgment, Marcion's version of Luke was an abbreviated proto-Luke that contained most of the material common to Luke and either Matthew or Mark or both. Canonical Luke is an expansion of this material by a second-century author who added mostly Lukan *Sondergut*, the material that makes the third gospel distinctive.

Closer to the interests of the Group on Acts is Knox's Chapter IV, entitled, "Marcion's 'Gospel-Apostle' and Luke-Acts." Here he makes the point that the arrangement of Marcion's canon, the short gospel of Luke and letters of Paul, was a model for Luke-Acts, i.e., an expanded Luke and a narrative of the apostles and Paul. The chapter begins with a question about the place of Paul's letters in the NT canon. By their very nature, letters are not especially suited for inclusion in a religious canon. Even if the letters of Paul were widely read, a conclusion that Knox questions, it is not inevitable that they would have been included in the Christian Bible, unless there were some compelling reason for doing so. Further, given the conservatism of churches such as that at Rome, the letters of Paul would constitute problems. Knox contends that the factor that impelled the acceptance of Paul's letters was their use by the heretics, especially Marcion. Recognizing the heretical and partisan use of Paul's letters, the "orthodox" church was faced with two choices: either to accept Paul or to repudiate him. But the repudiation was not a viable choice in view of Paul's general reputation and the respect that adhered to his martyrdom. Although the "orthodox" church opted to accept Paul and to do so wholeheartedly, the letters by

[60] Know, *Marcion*, p. 108.

[61] Ibid., p. 110.

themselves still constituted problems. For one thing, they might suggest, as Marcion claimed, that Paul was the only apostle, or that he was completely independent of the group in Jerusalem. Here is where the book of Acts comes in. At precisely the point at which there is a need for "catholicizing" Paul, the book of Acts appears and provides the basis for doing so. Here Paul is not independent; here he is clearly subject to the Jerusalem apostles, to whom he reports on a regular basis. The book of Acts, together with other apostolic letters and the Pastorals, allowed for the acceptance of Paul as one among the apostles. Knox notes that in the Muratorian canon, Acts is called, "The Acts of All the Apostles."

Knox, therefore, dates the writing of Luke-Acts in the first half of the second century, favoring the latter part of that period, a time that is sufficiently early to account for external references to both documents. The first clear use of Luke in its present form is Justin's, and the first reference to Acts is that of Irenaeus. There is no reason to think that Marcion was aware of Acts. The alleged connection between Luke and Josephus does not rule out a date as late as 150 for Luke-Acts in its present form. The author's knowledge of letters of Paul, if indeed he knew them, likewise does not preclude this date. So Knox concludes this chapter, "The author of Luke-Acts sought to reclaim both a Gospel and Paul from the Marcionites."[62]

Knox returned to the question of the connection between Acts and the Pauline letter corpus in his contribution to the *Festschrift* for Paul Schubert, published in 1966.[63] In this article, he confronts an apparent impasse. First, in agreement with Edgar Goodspeed, he recognizes that Luke made no use of Paul's letters. Second, he agrees with Morton S. Enslin,[64] that Luke must have been acquainted with at least some of the letters. Knox writes:

> This impasse should lead us to examine the hidden major premise of both sides, namely: If Luke knew the letters of Paul, he must have used them. I believe we are forced by the literary evidence (or rather, by the lack of it), on the one hand, and by the a priori probabilities, on the other, to question this premise and to consider seriously the possibility that Luke knew, or at least knew of, letters of Paul—even *the* (collected) letters of Paul—and quite consciously and deliberately made little or no use of them."[65]

So Knox is able to return to his earlier suggestion that Acts was prompted by the heretical use of Paul's letters. It is worth observing, however, that here Knox allows this stimulus to come either from a pre-Marcionite or a Marcionite source, and he allows the date of the finished product, Luke-Acts, to be as late as 125.

The early reviews of Knox's *Marcion and the New Testament*, while sometimes appreciative of the treatment of the role of Marcion in respect to the development of the NT canon, were almost totally negative in respect to the date of Luke-Acts. Harvie Branscomb maintained that much of the material in the Lukan *Sondergut* was irrelevant to the Marcionite problem.[66] Similarly, the structure of Acts and much of its material does

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[62] Ibid., p. 139.

[63] "Acts and the Pauline Letter Corpus," in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, ed. by Leander E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966), pp. 279–87.

[64] " 'Luke' and Paul," *JAOS* 58 (1938), 81–91.

[65] Knox, "Acts and the Pauline Letter Corpus," p. 284.

[66] *Christendom* 8 (1943), 408–310.

not seem to apply. Carl Kraeling objected to a literary analysis of Luke that involved several precanonical stages.[67] He writes, "Like all other arguments that posit several stages in the development of a document without the support of a careful literary analysis of the document itself, it hangs in the air and is hard to answer but still harder to maintain. The burden of proof lies with the proponent."[68] Notably, Kraeling proposes an alternative in which there are several versions of Luke. Morton S. Enslin called attention to the linguistic homogeneity of Luke-Acts and wondered how a second-century author could have used an earlier source and produced an expanded version with such homogeneity.[69] Others, such as Otto Piper, doubted that the sources for Acts would only have become available in the middle of the second century.[70] Many objected to a second-century date for the finished product, Luke-Acts, and emphasized the Tübingen pedigree for Knox's hypothesis. Henry Cadbury found himself unimpressed with Knox's argument and continued to incline toward a first-century date.[71]

In his review, W. F. Howard predicted that Knox's book would show "the direction which the debate is likely to take in the next few years."[72] It is difficult to account for the failure of this prediction. Indeed, a search of NT literature from 1942 almost to the present shows that Knox's theory about the relationship of Acts to the Marcionite controversy has been virtually ignored, a fact that has recently been confirmed by John T. Townsend.[73] Townsend himself has called attention to some evidence that tends to confirm the Knox hypothesis, namely linguistic and ideological similarities between Acts and the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions. His point is that a second-century date for Luke-Acts is more likely than a first-century date in view of (a) the absence of any references to either document prior to 170 CE; and (b) the similarities in Luke-Acts to the second-century sources for the Clementine literature. Although he explicitly rejected Knox's linking of Luke-Acts with Marcion, Charles Talbert claimed that it was a response to Gnostic, specifically docetic, versions of Christianity.[74]

But I should avoid any treatment of either Townsend or Talbert in view of the fact that the former will respond to this paper and the latter will be treated extensively later in this session. One observation, however, is necessary: there is a striking contrast between the two foci of Knox's work that we are treating here. Substantial discussion followed the publication of his *Chapters in the Life of Paul*, and his hypothesis worked out there has not been without adherents. But there has been little comparable discussion or critical assessment of *Marcion and the New Testament*. If a review of this work, coming even forty-five years after its publication, should serve to generate such discussion, then the community of NT scholarship will be well served.

There are grounds for making a very positive assessment of Knox's 1942 work. In the first place, the argument itself is persuasively presented, as is characteristic of Knox. It is

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[67] *Crozier Quarterly* 20 (1943), 159–61.

[68] Ibid., p. 160.

[69] *JR* 23 (1943), 140–42.

[70] *Princeton Seminary Bulletin* 36 (1943), 41. Cf. also the review by Sherman Johnson in *ATR* 25 (1943), 228–33.

[71] *JBL* 62 (1943), 123–27.

[72] *JTS* 44 (1943), 224.

[73] Cf. his "The Date of Luke-Acts," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, ed. by Charles H. Talbert (New York: Crossroad, 1984), pp. 47–62. See especially note 6 on page 59.

[74] *Luke and the Gnostics* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966).

a model of clarity and precision. He has recently written to me that he would like to rework the material in the chapter on Marcion and Luke, in which he deals with William Sanday's work on the linguistic data. He is probably correct in perceiving that this chapter falls short of his usual clarity. But, as for the rest, he cannot be faulted for haziness or lack of precision.

In the second place, Knox's study posits for Luke-Acts a *Sitz im Leben* that comes out of known historical situations, and this is a decided advantage for his hypothesis. The *Sitz im Leben* for Luke-Acts has always been a difficult problem in NT scholarship, and many plausible representations have been drawn. Most call on us to imagine a particular Lukan community dominated by Gentile Christians who need to understand their place vis-à-vis their foundation and their connection with the scriptures. But it has been difficult to find a historical community that meets this description. Knox, however, has found a plausible location for Luke-Acts in the history of the second century. Further, he is able to situate Luke-Acts against the background of events in which it is known that at least one component of it, the Marcionite version of Luke, was a point of controversy.

Third, Knox has shown why there was a necessity for Luke to write a life of Paul and why that life differed from the Paul that might be known in the letters. Here Knox's work on Marcion connects with the work on Pauline chronology. If the contention is valid that the image of Paul in Acts is not the same as the one in the letters, one is led to question why this is the case. Virtually all who understand these differences say that the author of Acts was interested in de-emphasizing any problems that may have occurred in the early church and in harmonizing Paul with the apostles. So, Knox takes this answer and presses it one more step to show why Luke felt it necessary to write things in this way. To be sure, any individual during the late first or second century may have had an interest in an unproblematic harmonization of the early church. But the situation in the middle of the second century is known to be a time during which diversity was seen by many to be a particularly serious problem and unity was seen to be a pressing need. If there were Christians who were using an understanding of Paul, based on his letters, to bolster factional purposes, then the need for a life of Paul that would undermine those purposes is manifest.

If there are grounds for a positive assessment, there are also questions that should be faced by anyone who wishes to take Knox's work seriously. One obvious question is, given the situation that called forth Luke-Acts and the major purpose it was intended to serve, why is there nothing more explicit that points to Marcion, or Marcion's theology, or the misuse of Paul's letters or the Hebrew scriptures? To be sure, we should not expect Luke to have made a gross anachronism, such as mentioning Marcion by name. But the author of 1 Timothy seems to have been able to make an allusion to *The Antitheses* (1 Tim 6:20), and the author of 2 Peter commented on the misuse of Paul's letters (2 Pet 3:16). There is nothing comparable in Acts, unless 16:7 may be understood as an allusion to the region of Marcion's initial influence. Here we read that Paul and his missionary party "attempted to go into Bithynia, but the Spirit of Jesus did not allow them." Is this, perhaps, Luke's way of severing any relationship between Paul and Marcion? The verse has the effect of leaving Bithynia untouched by Paul, so one may ask how Marcion was able to learn of him. Acts 16:7 might lead to the conclusion that, however Marcion came to embrace his theological concepts, his faith could not be compared for validity with that found in those communities established by Paul himself. But this is precious little to find in a document supposedly aimed to rescue Paul from Marcionite Christianity.

A second question has to do with the portrait of Paul that is found in canonical Acts. Knox calls attention to the fact that Paul is pictured here in harmony with the Jerusalem apostles and, indeed, subordinate to them. Luke signifies this subordination by denying

to him the title apostle. All this, of course, is correct and constitutes a major difference between Acts and Paul's letters. But the picture of Paul in Acts is more complex than Knox suggests. Simply from a literary perspective, Paul is the hero of Acts 12–28. In more than half the book, he is on stage, and all other characters are secondary at best. Despite the fact that Peter is instrumental in converting the first Gentile, it is Paul who brings the gospel to the Gentile world—Asia, Macedonia, and Achaia. No reader who gets to the end of Acts 28 is likely to be greatly concerned about the fate of Peter, or Philip, or James, although he may not be satisfied about what happened to Paul. To be sure, Paul is shown to be subordinate to James in the apostolic conference described in Acts 15, but he is still the central character. He may not be an apostle, but he is led by God's word to him. Several scholars have observed the parallels between the life of Jesus in Luke and the life of Paul in Acts. Such parallelism is a literary device that cannot fail to suggest to the reader that the two most important characters in Luke-Acts are Jesus and Paul. These considerations suggest that the matter is not so simple as Knox has imagined, that Paul is harmonized with the others. He is, but he also outstrips them. There is a tension in the way in which Luke presents Paul—Paul is a kind of superapostle and a missionary of the second generation, one of heroic stature who is nevertheless subordinate to other leaders, one who is led by the spirit and is, thus, independent of human supervision but who nevertheless needs to report to the apostles in Jerusalem. To relieve the tension in Acts by overlooking either side of Luke's portrayal may lead to a misapprehension about the author's intent.

A third question has to do with the attitude toward Judaism and the Hebrew scriptures in Luke-Acts. A significant part of Knox's argument is based on the supposition that one intention of Acts is to link Judaism and Christianity. Knox had asked why any one would think that Marcion would have chosen the one NT book that forges this link, when he could have chosen others in which the connection is denied or at least seriously modified. There is, however, a possible problem at this point. While it is clear that the book of Acts emphasizes the continuity between Judaism and Christianity, it is not so clear that the gospel of Luke, standing alone, would have been so problematic for Marcion. In the traditional view, Marcion did not explicitly reject Acts; rather he rejected those portions of Luke in which the continuity between Judaism and Christianity might appear to be affirmed, such as Luke 1–2. It is uncertain that the reader of canonical Luke would be so impressed with this sense of continuity, although a reader of Luke-Acts might well be. Even here, however, some recent studies of Luke-Acts have raised serious questions about Luke's attitude toward Judaism and the Jewish people.[75] My own studies have led me to come to the tentative conclusion that Luke's attitude toward Judaism and to the Hebrew scriptures displayed a good deal of ambivalence and tension. Even in the gospel of Luke, the Hebrew scriptures do not hold the position of authority that one might expect if a primary intention of the author is to counteract Marcionite theology.[76]

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[75] Cf., e. g., Jack T. Sanders, "The Jewish People in Luke-Acts," in *Society of Biblical Literature 1986 Seminar Papers*, ed. by Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), pp. 110–129. For different approaches cf. Robert C. Tannehill, "Rejection by Jews and Turning to Gentiles: The Pattern of Paul's Mission in Acts," in *ibid.*, pp. 130–141; and David L. Tiede, "'Glory to Thy People Israel!': Luke-Acts and the Jews," in *ibid.*, pp. 142–151.

[76] Cf. my "Scripture, Sabbath, and Torah in Luke-Acts," in the forthcoming *Festschrift* for William R. Farmer (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1987).

Although other questions might be raised, I should like to close with some suggestions for future discussion. If Knox's work on Marcion and Acts is to be taken seriously, there are certain kinds of studies that will be required. Two come readily to mind.

Knox has proposed that, although Acts was written with the primary purpose to counteract Marcionite Christianity, he was convinced that Luke did not write this book *de novo*. He worked with traditions about the early church and Paul. NT scholars have probably had difficulty with this understanding of Acts partly because Knox's hypothesis was not accompanied by an attempt to distinguish between tradition and redaction (to use more recent language) in Acts. The hypothesis therefore would be aided by a new source analysis that would show what Luke had at his disposal and what he did with his materials. With that information in hand, scholars could then see if there were sufficient signs of anti-Marcionite polemic in that work that came from the hand of the final redactor. Of course, no confidence can be placed in a source analysis that uses a hypothesis to demonstrate itself, and previous attempts at a source analysis of Acts have foundered. Gerd Luedemann has, however, shown that there are ways of separating tradition and redaction in Acts, and perhaps his method can be extended to provide a more comprehensive treatment.

There is probably even greater need for comprehensive literary studies of Luke-Acts. Such studies have the value of being independent of hypotheses about authorship, date, *Sitz im Leben*, literary development, and sources. They could provide a check on Knox's effort to determine the character of Luke-Acts. Thus, studies that concentrate on the treatment of the Hebrew scriptures in Luke-Acts, the attitude toward Judaism in Luke-Acts, the picture of Paul in Acts, and any number of additional relevant topics would improve our ability to assess the value of Knox's work in this area.

In conclusion, I should simply want to affirm that John Knox belongs in that small body of twentieth-century American scholars who have contributed mightily to the study of Acts. His contention about the way in which it should be used in the study of the life of Paul is beginning to produce positive results. My hope is that, at long last, his hypothesis about the historical situation that lay behind the writing of Acts will have a similar salutary effect.

Reading Talbert: New Perspectives on Luke-Acts

Mikeal C. Parsons
Baylor University
Waco, TX

Introduction

Charles Harold Talbert was born in Jackson, Mississippi, to Carl E. and Audrey Hale Talbert in 1934. After finishing high school in Bessemer, Alabama, Talbert was graduated in 1956 from Howard College (now Samford University) in Birmingham. Upon completing a Bachelor of Divinity degree in 1959 at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky, he enrolled as a doctoral candidate in biblical studies at Vanderbilt University from 1959–63. During those years he received fellowships from the Lilly and Rockerfeller Foundations. His doctoral dissertation, written under the supervision of Leander E. Keck, received an award from the Christian Research Foundation. Since 1963 Talbert has taught in the Department of Religion at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, NC. He and his wife, Betty, have two children.[1]

Talbert has been active in several scholarly societies. In addition to chairing the SBL Luke-Acts Group (1973–78) and Seminar (1979–83), he has served as vice-president and president of the Southeast Region of the SBL (1975–76; 1976–77) and of the National Association of Baptist Professors of Religion (1984; 1985). He also holds membership in the *Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas* and the Catholic Biblical Association. He has served on the editorial boards of *Perspectives in Religious Studies* (1979–87) and the *Journal of Biblical Literature* (1981–83). From 1981 to 1984, he was editor of the NABPR Dissertation Series, and since 1984, he has served as the Editor of the SBL Dissertation Series.

Throughout his scholarly career Talbert (henceforth "T.") has been engaged in the quest for an interpretive method with which to explicate the theological message of the biblical

[1] Though very little will be said in this essay about Talbert's confessional background and commitments, it should be noted that for him, the study of the New Testament is not a purely academic exercise. The reader who is interested in this dimension of Talbert's work should be aware of two significant articles which position him in his own confessional community. "The Bible as Spiritual Friend" was originally delivered as the Presidential address to the National Association of Baptist Professors of Religion meeting in Anaheim, California, 25 November 1985, and was subsequently published (1986b). In it Talbert offered a "personal statement about the Bible as Canon within the context of the current controversy agitating my confessional community, the Southern Baptist Convention" (1986a: 55). In "Biblical Criticism's Role" (1986g), Talbert addressed the role of the scholar in the confessional community: ". . . scholars need to be heard, if for no other reason than to prevent those who are religiously zealous from expressing their devotion to the Lord in ways that run counter to what the Bible meant and means" (1986g: 9).

material. In that pursuit T. has employed several different methodological tools. To gain a sense of the development and transitions in his thought, his major scholarly publications will be examined chronologically. For convenience, T.'s academic pilgrimage may be divided into three periods. 1) 1965–1973. T.'s initial work employed redaction criticism as he learned it from the Germans and his *Doktorvater*, Leander Keck. In this first period, T. was primarily in dialogue with the premier Lucan scholar of that time, Hans Conzelmann. 2) 1974–80. After post-doctoral fellowships studying ancient art and literary criticism at the University of North Carolina and Duke (1968–69) and ancient history, biography, and romance at the Vatican Library in Rome (1971–72), T. began applying "architecture analysis" to the biblical texts as he learned it from the classicists. The second period is marked by the publication of *Literary Patterns, Theological Themes, and the Genre of Luke-Acts* (1974d) and *What Is a Gospel?* (1977a), as well as the establishment of a Working Group on Luke-Acts in the Society of Biblical Literature. 3) 1981–1987. In his most recent contributions, T. has combined a synthesis of a close reading of the text, the use of parallels from the literary environment of Luke-Acts, and a focus on the theological message. The third phase covers the most recent contributions of T. to biblical scholarship with the publication of *Reading Luke* (1982b), *Acts* (1984a), and *Reading Corinthians* (1987a).

Several objections could be lodged against this particular approach. First, these dates are obviously arbitrary, particularly dates which are based on the appearance of a manuscript in print. That everything which T. wrote was published sequentially is unlikely. Nor does such an approach allow the pinpointing of the germination and maturation of ideas. Still, these dates are useful in delineating the overall ways in which T.'s work has developed. Second, it may seem premature to assess the work of a man at the height of his intellectual prowess. It is both hoped and expected that T. will continue to make creative and innovative contributions to biblical scholarship. This essay, however, is concerned with his contributions to Lucan scholarship and all the data—personal conversations, recent publications, and professional involvement—indicate that he has turned his attention from Luke-Acts to other parts of the New Testament. Still what follows could only be considered an interim assessment of the work of one who has already significantly shaped his discipline of study.

The plan of this study is to trace T.'s scholarly contributions through the three periods identified above. Luke-Acts was the laboratory for methodological inquiry and he often tested his tools on other NT writings. Hence, our survey may at times take us beyond the parameters of Luke-Acts. Cataloguing the immediate reactions by his colleagues to the major works will safeguard from hasty or anachronistic judgments. Following this survey of "peer evaluation," T.'s particular contributions to Lucan scholarship will be assessed, with some probing of potential areas for further research.

Conversations with Conzelmann: The Redaction Critical Quest for Luke the Theologian (1965-73)

Two articles on the watershed work by Hans Conzelmann serve to frame the effort of T. during these early years of scholarly endeavor. These two essays, one a short review of *The Theology of St. Luke* (1965a) and the other a longer working paper prepared for the Pittsburgh Festival on the Gospels in 1970 (1970a) demonstrate the way in which T.'s agenda in this first period was set by Conzelmann. Indeed, the redaction-critical work of the German redaction critics fell with sledge-hammer swiftness, setting the agenda for the entire American scholarly community.

Accepting Conzelmann's method of *Redaktionsgeschichte*, T. maintained in this short review of *The Theology of St. Luke:* "Any adequate criticism of Conzelmann's effort must be directed against his presentation of the Lucan *tendency* and *occasion*" (1965a: 97). According to T., Conzelmann understood the Lucan tendency to be "the recasting of primitive Christian eschatology into a history of salvation, removing the *parousia* to a distant future" (1965a: 97). Further, the delay of the parousia was the occasion which precipitated this Lucan tendency. The redaction-critical questions of tendency and occasion engaged T. for most of this first decade.

The Lucan Occasion

The question of the Lucan occasion was actually first addressed by T. in his 1963 dissertation, subsequently published as *Luke and the Gnostics: An Examination of the Lucan Purpose* (1966b). As would be expected, he employed the method of redaction criticism, at this time barely a decade old:

> This work is largely an exercise in *Redaktionsgeschichte*. As such it assumes the priority of Mark; the existence of some source or sources, whether written or oral, common to Matthew and Luke, which will be designated "Q" according to scholarly custom; and the existence of oral tradition peculiar to Luke which according to custom will be designated "L" (1966b: 15).

Method in hand, T. attempted to substantiate his thesis that, rather than being a reaction of the church to the delay of the parousia, "Luke-Acts was written to serve as a defense against Gnosticism" (1966b: 115). This Gnosticism, was vaguely defined as "a Christian heresy" (1966b: 16). Three Lucan motifs, authentic witness, legitimate exegesis, and the succession of tradition, serve the Lucan purpose of anti-Docetism.

T. acknowledged: "The most obvious difficulty standing in the way of the thesis that Luke-Acts was written to serve as a defense against Gnosticism is the striking absence of references to Gnosticism in Acts" (1966b: 83). He sought to overcome this difficulty with an argument from silence: heresy is absent in the apostolic age depicted in Acts because of the early Christian belief that "truth precedes error" (1966b: 83–97). Hence Gnosticism is a later distortion of the authoritative apostolic age. The conclusion which he urged on the reader is clear: "The purpose of Luke-Acts is anti-Gnostic" (1966b: 115).

Judging from the dearth of reviews, T.'s thesis made little immediate impact. Criticism by those who did review the work clustered at four points: 1) The importance of the anti-Gnostic tendency as the Lucan purpose was overemphasized.[2] 2) Gnosticism is loosely defined.[3] 3) The problematic of the silence of Acts on gnosticism is a consensus among most reviewers. 4) Using redaction criticism to determine the occasion of the writing is exceedingly difficult.[4]

Two years after the appearance of *Luke and the Gnostics*, T. published a short, but significant essay, "An Anti-Gnostic Tendency in Lucan Christology" (1968a). At first glance, one might think the article is simply a condensation of his dissertation results. Closer examination, however, reveals that he made several advances in his argument, most of which may be seen as an indirect response to criticisms of his earlier work. 1) In this

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[2] Frank Stagg, *RevExp*, 4 (1967), 537.

[3] Peter Kjesth, *JR*, 47 (1967), 78; Edgar Krentz, *CTM*, 39 (1968), 54; E. Earl Ellis, *JBL*, 85 (1966), 264–266.

[4] Ellis, "Review," p. 265.

article, T. does not make explicit the claim that the singular purpose of Luke-Acts is a defense against Gnosticism. Rather he said: "*At least a major facet* of Lucan Christology is a way of saying to docetism that the church's Saviour was really human from first to last" (emphasis mine; 1968a: 271). 2) For the first time, T. made some suggestions as to the specific identity of the Gnosticism against which Luke is reacting. Appeal to some Gnostic writings from Nag Hammadi is coupled with citations from Irenaeus to conclude that Luke is arguing against first-century Docetists, particularly of the brand of Cerinthus (1968a: 270–271). 3) The question of the silence of Acts on the gnostic issue is avoided since the article deals with Lucan christology. Only the ascension narrative in Acts 1 plays any significant role in T.'s line of reasoning. 4) T. combined the accepted methodological tool of redaction criticism with a type of "audience criticism" to discern Luke's christology. He remarked:

> When Luke-Acts was read aloud in the worship of the early church, its readers and hearers did not sit with copies of Luke's sources before them so that they could compare what they heard with Mark and Q. . . . Consequently, if an author wanted to be understood, he would write with this in mind. It would be through the overall structure of Jesus' career that he would seek to convey his Christology (1968a: 260).

He then proposed that "any attempt to speak of the Christology of Luke-Acts must take into account both the situation of Luke's audience and that of the modern scholar" (1968a: 261). It is arguable that in "An Anti-Gnostic Tendency" T. has presented his case more concisely and incisively than in the earlier monograph. While failing to convince colleagues that an anti-gnostic polemic was the primary purpose behind the writing of Luke-Acts, T. did manage to raise a voice against the "new look" in Luke-Acts given by Conzelmann and others, a voice that would soon be joined by a chorus of others.

The Lucan Tendency

Not only did T. disagree with Conzelmann's evaluation of the occasion which gave rise to the Lucan writings, he also disagreed with Conzelmann's judgment that the Lucan tendency was a consistent substitution of an imminent expectation of the parousia by a periodized salvation-history, removing the parousia to some point in the far future. He first addressed this issue in *Luke and the Gnostics*. There he argued 1) there are certain passages in Luke-Acts which indicate an expectation of an imminent parousia; and 2) it is possible to read the postapostolic evidence (especially of 2 Peter and John) as something other than a readjustment to the delay of the parousia. This second contention is more fully developed "II Peter and the Delay of the Parousia" (1966d: 137–45). The former thesis is argued extensively in "The Redaction Critical Quest for Luke the Theologian" (1970a: 171–22).

The significance of this latter article has rarely been acknowledged. According to T.: "This programmatic paper has as its purpose the presentation of an alternative picture of the Lucan theological perspective to that proposed by Conzelmann" (1970a: 171–72). The paper is divided into two parts: the first examined "certain key passages that are explicitly related to the question of Lucan eschatology"; the second treated "two Lucan traits related implicitly to the eschatological problem of Luke-Acts" (1970a: 172). The passages considered in the first half of the essay are Luke 19:11–27; Acts 1:6ff.; Luke 17:20–37; Luke 21:5–36; and Luke 12:35–48. Following his analysis of these passages, T. observed:

> Exegesis has led to the conclusion that there are two dominant eschatological emphases in Luke-Acts. One is the proclamation that the End is near. . . . The

> other eschatological emphasis in the Lucan writings is the attempt to prevent a misinterpretation of the Jesus-tradition by someone in the Lucan sphere of influence to the effect that the eschaton had been and could be fully experienced in the present (1970a:191).

Further, salvation-history functions in Luke not as a response to the delayed parousia, but addresses the issues raised by those who hold overly-realized eschatological views. In these claims, T. was challenging the very heart of Conzelmann's redactional work and his conclusions regarding the function of the salvation-history schema in the Lucan community.

Other Redactional Work

Despite these points of departure from Conzelmann's conclusions, T. continued to use redaction criticism as his basic methodological tool, turning his attention from Luke-Acts to the Pauline literature. In "A Non-Pauline Fragment at Romans 3:24–26?" he argued that a traditional fragment stood behind Romans 3:25–26 (1966c). Using the now familiar twin concerns of tendency and occasion, he concluded: "If our theory of interpolation be true, then the phenomena presented in this article serve as a call for an application of 'redaction criticism' to Paul's letters corresponding to this type of approach in the study of the gospels and Acts" (1966c: 296). Likewise, in "Tradition and Redaction in Romans XII.9–21" (1969), he argued: "It is my suggestion that the problems . . . and the ensuing discussion of Rom. xii.9 ff. can be solved if we approach the section in tradition-redaction terms" (1969: 84). Both these articles show T.'s commitment to the methodological tool of *Redaktionsgeschichte* and his conviction that the method would work equally well on non-narrative materials, particularly the Pauline letters.

Emerging Interests in Style and Structure

From the beginning, T. displayed an interest in the literary style and structure of the biblical literature. This claim is best substantiated by looking at four articles published in 1967. Although these articles address three of the thorniest problems in NT scholarship—the question of the Apostolic Decree and the Jerusalem Council (1967a); the christology of Phil. 2:6–11 (1967b); and the speeches in Acts (1967c)—the conclusions in these studies are not so pertinent here as the methods involved in reaching them. In each article, T. showed a deep interest in the structure of the text, based on the assumption that "a proper delineation of *form* leads to a correct interpretation of *meaning*" (1967b: 141).[5]

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[5] One other work by T. in this period should be mentioned in passing. In 1970, Volume 1 of the "Lives of Jesus Series," *Reimarus: Fragments*, appeared. Editor Talbert provided a forty-three page historical introduction in addition to voluminous notes throughout the text. These notes are especially helpful in determining T.'s assessment of current biblical scholarship. This volume is the first of five volumes edited by T. and demonstrates his continued indebtedness to his *Doktorvater*. Earlier T.'s dissertation appeared in the same year by the same publisher as Keck's edited volume, *Studies in Luke-Acts*. Later T. would publish *Literary Patterns* in a series edited by Keck (SBL Monograph Series). See the reviews of *Reimarus* in *Encounter*, 32 (1971), 248; *Int*, 25 (1971), 530–31; *CBQ*, 34 (1972), 119–21; *Dialog*, 11 (1972), 308–09; *JBL*, 91 (1972), 120–21; *Theology*, 75 (1972), 211–13; and *RevExp*, 71 (1974), 399–400.

Throughout this first decade, T. was preoccupied with answering the redactional questions of Conzelmann regarding tendency and occasion. His research toward the end of this period definitely point toward new interests, particularly the relationship between literary patterns and theological themes.

Architecture Analysis and Genre Criticism: Literary Patterns, Theological Themes And the Genre of Luke-Acts (1974-80)

In a review of Joseph Fitzmyer's work on Luke, T. suggested: "At the risk of oversimplification, one may attempt a summary of two distinct approaches to Luke, with 1974 as roughly the dividing line" (1986a: 337). Major commentaries like that of Fitzmyer which "traditionally have gathered up and evaluated the findings of research derived from the acknowledged methods of a specific period of time" in a sense "mark the end of an era" (1986a: 337–38). In order to justify choosing this particular date as the end of an era in Lucan scholarship, he wrote:

> I use 1974 as a watershed because in that year lectures by Paul Minear, later published as *To Heal and To Reveal* . . . signaled a new methodological departure, and because in that year the Luke-Acts Seminar of the SBL, which was to give expression to a new way of doing Lucan studies, began" (1986a: 337).

Though 1974 may be termed a "watershed" in Lucan studies, of far greater significance for methodology than Minear's lectures (heard by only a few and not published until 1976) was the appearance in 1974 of T.'s monograph, *Literary Patterns* (1974d).

Architecture Analysis

Literary Patterns was a ground-breaking work because, for the first time, T. departed from the "acknowledged method" of redaction criticism to explore extensively the narrative of Luke-Acts in terms of literary style and patterns. Though redaction criticism (and the two-source theory) were still part of his methodological repertoire, his interpretive tools now included "architecture analysis." Hans Conzelmann had been his primary dialogue partner in the "first phase" of his research; now by examining the literary patterns and style of Luke-Acts T. reclaimed his inheritance as one of the descendents of Cadbury.

The first fruits of T.'s 1968–69 research leave had actually appeared earlier in "Artistry and Theology: An Analysis of the Architecture of Jn 1,19–5,47" (1970b).[6] His purpose was "to uncover the architectural design by which the present form of the Fourth Gospel was constructed" (1970b: 341). T. argued that Jn 1:19–5:47 was arranged in a chiastic pattern and, on the basis of redaction or compositional analysis, concludes that the pattern is a "conscious effort on the part of the Evangelist (or Redactor) . . ." (1970b: 356). He went on to suggest that chs. 12–16 and 13–17 also reflect a chiastic structure.

T. then shifted attention to literary patterns in Luke-Acts. After noting the hiatus in Lucan scholarship since Cadbury in terms of appreciating the style and literary method of Luke, he noted that even those studies which are interested in pursuing Cadbury's stylistic investigations "are limited by their failure to use comparative materials from the

[6] That this article actually appeared during the "first" period of T.'s research demonstrates the fluidity of the divisions, particularly at the "ends" of the first two phases.

wider Mediterranean world of Luke's time" (1974d: 3). "What is needed," he suggested, "is a method of operation which will allow us to investigate certain of the formal patterns of Luke-Acts . . . in such a way as to see them within Luke-Acts as a whole and in the author's environment" (1974d: 5). The methodological solution is a combination of architecture analysis and a redaction criticism based on the two-source hypothesis (see 1972).

The primary concern of architecture analysis "is to detect the formal patterns, rhythms, architectonic designs, or architecture of a writing. That is, this approach is concerned with style insofar as it shapes the final product by the arrangement of the larger units of material, especially the whole" (1974d: 7). Assuming that architecture analysis and redaction criticism are "mutually enriching methods," T. argued that redaction criticism needs architecture analysis to "guard against scholarly subjectivity"; conversely, architecture analysis needs redaction criticism to "deal effectively with the relation of a formal pattern to meaning" (1974d: 8).

T.'s method was three-pronged. 1) Architecture analysis should demonstrate patterns which control large thought units throughout the narrative as well as units of all sizes. 2) Redaction criticism should demonstrate that the discerned pattern is located in redactional rather than traditional material. 3) Finally, any architectonic pattern detected in a NT writing should be readily found in the literary, artistic, and cultural environment of the writing.

The structure of *Literary Patterns* follows the three major emphases of the method employed. Chapters 2–4 delineate the architectural patterns of Luke-Acts, with special attention given to locating those patterns in the redactional activity of the author. These patterns are conveniently diagrammed for the reader at the conclusion of Chapter 4 (1974d: 63). In chapter 5, T. attempted to situate Luke-Acts in the literary, artistic, and cultural milieu of first-century Greeks, Jews, and Christians. In so doing, he observed that symmetrophobia, an adversity to perfect symmetry, in Greco-Roman and Jewish literature and art explains the imperfections in architectonic patterns of Luke-Acts. The chapter ends by addressing questions raised by the survey (the same as those found in 1970b).

T. then attempted to explain the theological significance of these parallels. In Chapter 6, he suggested that five of the detected parallels (between Luke and Acts; between Acts 1–12 and 13–28; between Acts 1:12–4:23 and 4:24–5:42; those in Luke 1:5–2:52; and those in Luke 3:1–4:15) are shaped by the Lucan concern for salvation-history. In the process, he proposed to modify Conzelmann's *Heilsgeschichte*, suggesting that "it may very well be necessary to speak of a four phase salvation history" in which "the apostolic age must be separated from the post-apostolic age" (1974d: 106). Chapter 7 accounts for three more sets of correspondences (Luke 9 and 22–23; Luke 9 and Acts 1; Luke 24 and Acts 1) in terms of Lucan christology (see 1968a). Three sets of correspondences (those in Luke 4–8; Luke 9–18; and Acts 15–21) do not readily serve Luke's theological interests and are best explained as existing "primarily for aesthetic reasons" (1974d: 120).

In the last chapter of the book, T. turned to a consideration of the genre of Luke-Acts. Assuming that Luke-Acts is most closely related to ancient biography, he drew the bulk of his comparative material from Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. He concluded: "Luke-Acts like Laertius' Lives has the life of a founder as the first structural unit, followed by a second, namely, the narrative of successors and selected other disciples" (1974: 129–30). Following such a genre allowed the Third Evangelist to address the problem of heresy in his community by showing that the life and teachings of the apostles were rooted in the life of the founder of the community, Jesus of Nazareth.[7]

[7] T. addressed several problems with his thesis (1974d:129–32). The most difficult is

The immediate reception of this book, like that of *Luke and the Gnostics*, was mixed. The evaluations may be conveniently considered under several headings which correspond to the major divisions of T.'s work: 1) literary patterns; 2) the Lucan milieu, 3) and theological themes and the occasion of Luke-Acts.

1) The value of the literary patterns is variously reckoned. Donald Miesner finds convincing T.'s view that many correspondences promote the *imatatio Magistri* theme.[8] Paul Minear, on the other hand, criticized the preponderance of literary parallels: "I find the study to be an excellent example of industrious and ingenious parallelomania. So many instances are cited of the architectural symmetries that I became more skeptical of them all."[9]

2) The evaluation of T.'s setting Luke-Acts in its larger literary and cultural milieu was almost uniformly positive. David Reeves comment is representative: "The book is worthwhile to read, especially for the sections which summarize Talbert's considerable study of literary matters in Greek and Roman classics."[10] T.'s utilization of literary parallels, particularly Greco-Roman, becomes a hallmark of his work from this point on and subsequent assessments of his work have tended to bear out these early impressions.

3) Evaluations of the occasion of Luke-Acts, e.g. defense against heresy, have been as uniformly negative as assessments of T.'s use of Greco-Roman parallels were positive. One reviewer wrote: "Arguments from silence rest at the base of the conception of Luke and Acts as compositions in opposition to Gnostic Christians. When one presumes the existence of an enemy, one finds tell-tale evidence with some regularity."[11] The thesis about the occasion of Luke-Acts fared no better in this outing than it did in *Luke and the Gnostics*.

Despite the shortcomings surfaced by these reviewers, T.'s efforts did in many ways mark a "new era" in the way Lucan scholarship would proceed. Donald Miesner's judgment may not be altogether off the mark when he suggested that *Literary Patterns* "may well become a milestone in Lucan studies, perhaps of the stature of the works of Conzelmann, Cadbury, and Haenchen."[12]

The Genre of the Canonical Gospels

Throughout his career, when experiments in methodology have rewarded Charles Talbert with an interpretive tool which he could employ with confidence, he has ventured out of his laboratory of Luke-Acts to try his hand at some other part of the New Testament. When genre criticism proved to be a satisfying way of placing Luke-Acts in its literary milieu in *Literary Patterns* (esp. Ch. 8), T. widened his scope to investigate the other gospels using this particular method. The result was one of his most noted, and controversial, studies *What Is a Gospel?* (1977a; cf. also 1978a).

In *What Is a Gospel?* T. extended his argument that Luke-Acts shares remarkable generic similarities with the ancient Hellenistic biographies of philosophers and rulers to include

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(continued)
is that Acts is more fully developed than any of the "succession narratives" in Laertius' Lives. This problem and T.'s response will be discussed later.

[8] Donald Miesner, *CurTM*, 3 (1976), 361.

[9] Paul S. Minear, *JAAR*, 45 (1977(, 85–86. See also, Geoffrey Graystone, *CBQ*, 38 (1976), 131.

[10] David Reeves, *Int*, 31 (1977), 94.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Miesner, "Review," p. 361.

the other canonical gospels. He challenged the "critical consensus" that the gospels are *sui generis*. This *opinio communis* rests on three pillars: "1) the gospels are mythical, the Graeco-Roman biographies are not; 2) the gospels are cultic, the Graeco-Roman biographies are not; and 3) while the gospels emerge from a community with a world-negating outlook, the literary biographies are produced by and for a world-affirming people" (1977a: 2). These pillars correspond to 1) structure; 2) function; and 3) attitude, and are "the criteria usually assumed to be necessary for establishing the genre of a document" (1977a: 6). T. attempted to refute the majority position and argued that the canonical gospels were, in fact, very similar to the genre of the ancient biography. Having addressed these obstacles, he surmised: "The gospels are biographies, albeit ancient ones" (1977a: 135).

This book received more immediate attention than either of T.'s two previous studies. Again, as would be expected, reactions were mixed. Fellow genre critic, Philip Shuler, suggested: "The altering of mind-sets—like the slaying of giants—is a formidable undertaking, and Talbert's significant book on gospel genre represents just such a conquest. . . . It is the ambitious nature of the task that will leave Talbert open to criticism."[13] T.'s knowledge of Greco-Roman sources was again extolled,[14] though several reviewers were dissatisifed with T.'s explanation regarding the relationship between mythical structure and genre in John, since none of the biographies in question employ the myth of the descending/ascending redeemer.[15] Norman Petersen pointed out that T. had caught himself in a methodological crossfire: "Having wedded himself to the literary categories of the old literary history, which is now under seige, Talbert exposes himself to attack from both the old school, for contradicting it, and from the new criticism, for not having been critical enough."[16] Despite quibbles with this and that detail of the book, most of the early reviewers would agree with Philip Shuler's assessment: "T.'s work presents the latest and, to date, most convincing case for the view that the gospels may be considered biographies."[17]

Another indication that T.'s work was well received was his invitation to serve as moderator of a Seminar on Gospel Genre which was part of a "Colloquy on New Testament Studies" held in Fort Worth, Texas, 5–6 November 1980.[18] T. himself wrote in the Proceedings to that Conference:

> At the present moment, among those who are working with the problem most directly, the burden of proof seems to have shifted from those who wish

[13] Philip R. Shuler, *JBL*, 98 (1979), 439; 440.

[14] See Richard H. Hiers, *Int*, 33 (1979), 215; Walter E. Pilgrim, *Dialog*, 19 (1980), 72; Victor P. Furnish, *PSTJ*, 31 (1978), 45.

[15] J. K. Riches, *Theology*, 82 (1979), 301; Sakae Kubo, *AUSS*, 17 (1979), 130.

[16] Norman R. Petersen, *JAAR*, 47 (1979), 314.

[17] Shuler, "Review," p. 439.

[18] This seminar served as a sequel to several other colloquies and festivals on the Synoptic Gospels, so popular during the 1970's. Previous conferences were held at Pittsburgh (1970), Munster (1976), San Antonio (1977), and Cambridge (1979). T. participated as an invited principal in three of these conferences (Pittsburgh, San Antonio, and Fort Worth). For T.'s contribution to these meetings, see 1970a; 1978c; and 1983b. He also provided a written response to Alan Dundes' "The Hero Pattern and the Life of Jesus" the main position paper presented at the Twenty-fifth Colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 12 December 1976 (1977b).

> to falsify the Schmidt-Bultmann hypothesis of the literary uniqueness of the Gospels to those who would deny that the canonical Gospels belong in some way to the biographical genre of Mediterranean antiquity (1983b: 200).

The most notable exception to this positive reception of T.'s work was a review by David Aune.[19] This fifty-one page review of a one hundred and thirty-five page book could only be described as scathing. Aune asserted: "In spite of the generally positive tone of the reviews which have thusfar appeared, it is my view that he has unwittingly misinterpreted the ancient evidence to such an extent that his book is unusable in its present state."[20] Though Aune brought numerous charges against T., the failure to consult the major reference works and secondary literature of classical scholarship is the most serious flaw in the study. Aune concluded: "The general failure to draw on the achievements of modern classical philology is perhaps the main reason for the many false assumptions, misinterpretations and oversimplications which permeate Talbert's work."[21]

The only written response which T. has made to Aune's allegations is found in a footnote to a paper in which he assessed recent contributions to studies in gospel genre. Aune, he claimed "has produced a confused and confusing essay that does nothing to advance research" (1983b: 200). The last part of this statement, at least, has some truth in it. After fifty pages of critique, one does not have a clue about what genre, if any, Aune believes the canonical gospels fit or about the method which he would employ to discern such generic features.[22]

Even those who are generally sympathetic with T.'s argument often share a common question regarding the genre of the gospels: "So what?"[23] In an article on the opening chapters of Luke, T. addressed this question and concluded:

> The biographical tradition of the Greco-Roman world would have conditioned a person in the Mediterranean region at the end of the first century C.E. to expect an account of the hero's career before he embarked on his public activity. . . . When the reader confronted Luke 1:5–4:15, this narrative unit fulfilled these expectations in a remarkable way (1980a: 135).

For those willing to accept T.'s presuppositions regarding genre, he has shown convincingly in this essay that generic studies can make a contribution to the interpretive task by clarifying reader expectations.

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[19] David E. Aune, "The Problem of the Genre of the Gospels: A Critique of C. H. Talbert's *What Is a Gospel?*" in *Gospel Perspectives: Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels*, ed. by R. T. France and D. Wenham, vol. 2 (Sheffield: JSOT PRess, 1981), 9–60.

[20] Ibid., p. 11.

[21] Ibid., p. 18.

[22] This deficiency has now been sufficiently removed in Aune's most recent book, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment*, Library of Early Christianity, ed. Wayne A. Meeks (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), esp. pp. 17–76. Ironically, Aune argued that the canonical gospels (with the notable exception of Luke) belong to the genre of ancient biography. He claimed (p. 32): "the canonical Gospels constitute a distinctive type of ancient biography combining (to oversimplify slightly) Hellenistic form and function with Jewish content." Aune took Luke with Acts to argue that that the two together represent ancient historiography (see pp. 77–157).

[23] See Pilgrim, "Review," p. 72; see also 1983b: 247–49.

Perspectives From the SBL Luke-Acts Group

Before passing on to the next section, one other volume published during this period should be mentioned because of the significance of the context out of which it emerged. T. served as editor of *Perspectives on Luke-Acts* (1978e) and made the following explanatory comments in the "Foreword":

> After consultations in 1972 and 1973, the Luke-Acts Group of the Society of Biblical Literature was formed in 1974 with a five year lifespan. This collection of essays is an attempt to bring together the results of some of the work that was undertaken between 1972 and 1978 by those related directly or indirectly to the Group. It is hoped that this book will offer both assistance in and a stimulus to further study of the Third Gospel and Acts (1978e).

The articles by Horton, Mattill, S. Brown, Karris, R. E. Brown, Trites, Robbins, and Veltman, were originally presented in some form to the Luke-Acts Group (See Appendix One).[24] Already the influence of T. on his peers is seen in some of the presentations to the Group. Krodel and Karris offer critiques of *Literary Patterns,* while S. Brown, Miesner, Robbins, Quinn, Tyson, and Veltman, to varying degrees, either assume or extend the arguments found in *Literary Patterns* (See Appendix One).[25]

During this second period of his scholarship, T. emerged as a leading interpreter of Luke-Acts on the American scene. This volume provides a useful summary of the major issues in Lucan scholarship during the late '70s. Those issues—the genre, style, and literary milieu of Luke-Acts—reflect the shift, at least in American scholarship, away from the agenda set by Conzelmann and toward the questions raised by T. and his colleagues.

Close Readings: At Home in the Biblical Text Itself (1981–87)

In the concluding footnote to "The Redaction Critical Quest for Luke the Theologian" (1970a: 222), T. wrote:

> Only if we solve the riddles of Luke the theologian and Luke the literary artist will we be able, with some degree of success, to resume the quest for Luke the historian. In the meantime one can hope that until research has had time to deal with the items on these two agendas, a moratorium may be declared on the production of further commentaries on Luke and Acts which add nothing material to the discussion (1970a: 222b159).

With *Reading Luke,* T. has broken his own self-imposed moratorium. This important volume should be understood both as a new methodological venture and a summary of T.s scholarship to this point. Both points are examined below.

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[24] The lists which appear in Appendixes One and Two were taken from the Annual Programs of the Society of Biblical Literature (1974–83). I have assumed athat the programs are accurate, though such an assumption could be erroneous.

[25] For reviews of *Perspectives on Luke-Acts,* see those by Pierson Parker, *ATR,* 61 (1979) 410–412; I. Howard Marshall in *ExpT,* 90 (1979), 280; E. V. Hamrick in *PersRelSt,* 6 (1979), 254–58; and especially those by Robert O'Toole in *TS,* 40 (1979), 351–54; and Robert Maddox in *RTR,* 38 (1979), 88–89.

A Literary and Theological Commentary on the Third Gospel

Joseph Tyson lamented that in *Reading Luke* T. had made "no attempt to . . . set forth the methods he intends to pursue."[26] In a previously noted review, however, T. did distinguish between the earlier redactional approach to Luke-Acts and a "new way of doing Lucan studies" (1986a:337). His remarks there serve as a convenient summary of T.'s methodology adopted in this *Reading Luke.*

Reading Luke: New Perspectives.

If Literary Patterns in 1974 contributed to the inauguration of a new era in Lucan scholarship, particularly in North America, then this "new look" burst into full flower with the publication of a spate of studies in the early 1980's, not the least of which was *Reading Luke.* (1) T. claimed: "Prior to 1974 the units studied are roughly equivalent to the pericopes of a traditional Gospel Parallels. After 1974 there is a concern to examine larger thought units within the Gospel, as these can be discerned from indications within the Gospel text and from analogies from the milieu" (1986a: 337). This latter procedure is carefully followed in *Reading Luke:* "The thrust of this approach is on understanding large thought units and their units and their relationship to Lukan thought as a whole rather than focusing on the individual pieces of the narrative" (1982d: 2). T. divided his commentary into four major sections (1:5–4:15; 4:16–9:50; 9:51–19:44; 19:45–24:53). He dealt with these divisions in thirty-three segments, focusing on the heart of each thought unit. In so doing, he effectively captured the broader strokes on the gospel canvas, which are often overlooked by those who are intent on examining the evangelist's portrait in minute detail.

(2) On the use of sources, T. proposed:

> The earlier approach, using a synopsis, involved a careful scrutiny of every variant between the Lucan text and an alleged earlier source. The later tendency has been to start with the continuous text of the Gospel and to do a close reading of it as a finished product by either rhetorical criticism or modern narrative criticism. Then a synopsis is used to compare Luke with the other Gospels, which are viewed not as alleged sources but as independent developments of the same basic tradition (1986a: 337).

As a major methodological departure from most previous studies on Luke-Acts (including his own), T. discarded the two-source theory as "a questionable control on redaction critical work" and proceeded with a method that does "not assume the two-source theory, nor any other source theory, for that matter" (1982d: 1).

(3) On the intended purpose of such an interpretive method, T. observed:

> The end sought in the earlier approach is basically a history of the tradition, including not only the pre-gospel stages of the church's transmission but also the question of the historical Jesus. The later trend has been to look for a message of the text in its canonical form. The earlier method uses the Gospel as a window through which to see something else (the development of the tradition); the latter as a mirror to reflect its own narrative world (1986a: 337).

T. described his approach in *Reading Luke* as " a type of redaction criticism heavily influenced by nonbiblical literary criticism" (1982d: 2). As such, the interest in Luke is

[26] Joseph Tyson, *JBL*, 104 (1985), 341.

almost exclusively at the level of the *Sitz im Leben Kirche.*[27] That is, he focused on the text as a religious document and was eager to unfold its theological character and message (see 1986f: 280).

(4) Finally he commented on the shift to a "post-Conzelmann era"(a phrase used in 1979b: 342): "Whereas the dialogue partners of Lucan scholars prior to 1974 were basically Conzelmann and his colleagues, the post-1974 period seeks to dialogue with Greco-Roman literature and with modern literary criticism" (1986a: 337). The fact that *Reading Luke* has no references to *The Theology of St. Luke* highlights the degree to which T. himself now eschews Conzelmann's redaction-critical agenda.

Some would dispute that this description of the "new way of doing Lucan studies" fits all of the work on Luke-Acts since 1974, but there can be little doubt that T. has here described the procedure he followed in writing *Reading Luke!* In this volume he has provided numerous new perspectives on the literary techniques and theological emphases of Third Evangelist.

Reading Luke: Précis of T.'s Scholarship

Though there is much that is new in this book which distinguishes it from other commentaries, *Reading Luke* is "vintage Talbert." If one does not appreciate the way he has drawn upon his own previous work in this commentary, then one misses the insight that *Reading Luke* "brings together in one volume the mature insights of a major North American interpreter of Luke-Acts."[28] Below are summarized four ways in which *Reading Luke* may be understood as a précis of T.'s previous work.

1. Genre Criticism. The most obvious indebtedness *Reading Luke* owes to T.'s previous work is in the area of genre criticism: "This book operates from a perspective indebted to genre criticism. Luke-Acts belongs to the ancient biographical tradition" (1982d: 2).

2. Literary Patterns. In dealing with the Lucan "large thought units" T. made numerous references to the architectural designs of Luke-Acts noted earlier in *Literary Patterns.* In addition to the three explicit references to *Literary Patterns* (1982d: 42, 115, 186) he noted a large number of parallelisms and chiasms, many of which are drawn from his previous work, all of which are informed by it.[29]

3. Purpose of Luke-Acts. In *Reading Luke* T. still assumes that the gospel of Luke is functioning as defense against heresy. This view, of course, was first presented in *Luke and the Gnostics* and was sharpened in subsequent publications (1968a; 1970a; 1974d). That Luke is combatting overrealized eschatology is explicitly assumed by T. in his discussion of Luke 17:22–37 and 19:11–27 (1982d: 166–69; 177–78). An anti-docetic function is implied in the commentary on Luke 24:36–43 (1982d: 228–29). Though much less significant now than twenty years ago, the apologetic purpose remains a part of T.'s system.

4. Methodology. T.'s decision to employ a type of "redaction criticism" which assumed

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[27] Occasionally, though, T. exchanged mirror for window and discussed the meaning of a passage within the context of Jesus' ministry (e.g. 1982d: 122–24). As Tyson, "Review," 341, observed: "One may not quarrel with this procedure if one is trying to learn something about the meaning of the parable in the context of Jesus' life, but the relevance of this information to the literary meaning of Luke is at best questionable."

[28] Robert J. Karris, *TS,* 44 (1983), 533.

[29] See his coments on the chiastic structures at 3:21–22; 4:16–20; 6:39–45; 7:37–50; 9:51–19:44; 9:52–10:24; 9:57–62; 14:1–24; 17:11–19:44; 21:8–36; passim. One wonders if chiasm was a more favorite literary technique of T. than Luke.

no particular source theory was the upshot of a growing dissatisfaction with the "critical consensus." Earlier he had observed: "Employing Mark as a control today is about as compelling as using Colossians and Second Thessalonians to describe Paul's theology. It may very well be legitimate to do so, but so many have problems with the procedure that such an assumption narrows considerably the circles with whom one can converse" (1976c: 393–94). This methodological concern first finds full expression in *Reading Luke*.[30]

Though there was some concern for certain aspects of T.'s exegesis,[31] structure,[32] or use of Greco-Roman parallels,[33] the immediate response to *Reading Luke* was almost uniformly positive. Joseph Tyson hailed it as "a pioneering effort."[34] Jerome Kodell called it a "first-rate guide to the Gospel of Luke."[35] Frederick Danker labeled it "a very helpful and sensitive exposition of Luke's literary strategy and techniques."[36] Though not written for peers, *Reading Luke* received generally high marks from the scholarly guild for applying "contemporary insights and approaches and awareness of the world of the Gospel in a way that builds ordinary people's faith."[37]

Reading Acts

As one would expect, T. applied his methodology of close readings to Acts (1984a). As one reviewer remarked: "An appropriate sub-title for this most recent commentary would be 'A Literary and Theological Commentary on Acts.'"[38] The methodological assumptions are the same as in *Reading Luke:* 1) Acts is a succession narrative of one sub-genre of ancient biography and "portrays the Twelve and Paul in such a way that they reproduce in their careers the prototypical events of the career of the earthly Jesus" (1984a: 3). 2)

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[30] Not only do the previous emphases of genre criticism, literary patterns, and the purpose of Luke-Acts guide T. in this commentary, but a "source analysis" demonstrates a close literary relationship between *Reading Luke* and previous writings of T. where blocks of varying material have been taken over with few or no editorial modifications. These literary "roots" may be found in 1967d; 1968a; 1970a; 1974d; 1976c; 1980a; 1982c; and 1982e. It is not surprising, and is certainly legitimate, that T. should draw upon the fruits of previous, intensive research in LukeActs; however, the source analysis does serve to buttress my argument that *Reading Luke*, while an innovative interpretation of Luke, in many ways is the culmination of a twenty-year pilgrimage in Luke-Acts research.

[31] See Tyson, "Review," 341; Mikeal C. Parsons, *PersRelSt*, 11 (1984), 284; Kurz, "Review," 417; Archie L. Nations, *Faith and Mission*, 1 (1983), 96; Robert L. Brawley, *CumSem*, 21 (1983), 26.

[32] Despite his concern for the architecture of Luke, at several points, T. displaced material in order to consider it with texts on a similar theme. Jerome Kodell, *BTB*, 14 (1984), 158, noted that this procedure caused T. to overlook completely Luke 1:18–25 and led him "to violate his principle of following the author's compositional design." See also Kurz, "Review," 417.

[33] Frederick W. Danker, *CBQ*, 46 (1984), 377.

[34] Tyson, "Review," 342.

[35] Kodell, "Review," 159

[36] Danker, "Review," 377.

[37] Kurz, "Review," 417.

[38] Roger L. Omanson, *RevExp* 82 (1985), 443.

The focus is on large thought units. There are three major sections: a) The Comission: A Mission to Do (1:1–14); b) The Commission Fulfilled: Stage One (1:15–12:24); and c) The Commission Fulfilled: Stage Two (13:1–28:31). These last two sections are each divided into twelve subsections. In each subsection, T. examined the literary patterns, now called the surface structure (borrowing a term from structuralism), and gave some indication as to the theological message of the text.[39] 3) As might be expected there is little emphasis on the anti-heretical purpose of Acts (though see 1984a: 86–88). 4) Since Acts has never been hampered by any particular source theory, T. did not have to justify his particular method of comparing Acts with Jewish (cf. Acts 6:1–7) or Greco-Roman parallels (e.g. Acts 28:1–10). To date, the volume has received little attention from reviewers. An evaluation of Acts as a companion voulme to *Reading Luke* will follow later.

New Perspectives from the SBL Seminar

The second volume generated by the Luke-Acts Seminar appeared in 1983. In the "Preface," T. remarked: "This volume of essays is an attempt to bring together some of the work done between 1979 and 1983 by those related directly or indirectly to that seminar" (1983f: vii).[40] Many of the contributions, both to the volume and the Seminar, demonstrate shared interest with, and in some cases an indebtedness to T., particularly in the area of Greco-Roman parallels and Luke-Acts.[41] Not intended as a replacement for *Perspectives on Luke-Acts* (1978e), T. expressed his hope that "this book, like its predecessor, will serve as a stimulus to further study of the Lucan writings" (1983f: vii). For a decade, the participants in the program segment of the SBL on Luke-Acts, through their publications and presentations, have insured that this hope was not in vain.

Reading Corinthians

As in the earlier periods, T. soon applied his newly discovered method to other NT material.[42] The fruit of this labor was the recently published *Reading Corinthians: A*

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[39] In addition to the parallel structures in Acts 1:3–11; 13:44–52; 15:36–18:22; 18:23–21:26; 13:16–52; and 18:5–18a, T. noted chiasms in Acts 1:16b–19; 1:23–26; 4:32–35; 6:8–8:4; 9:1–25; 10:22–33; 15:1–5; 20:19b–27; 20:28–31; 20:31b–35; 23:12–24:27. Interestingly the chiastic surfact structure found in Acts 20:28–31 and 20:31b–35 do not match the chiasms discovered by T. and Cheryl Exum almost twenty years earlier (1967c)!

[40] Interestingly, only two of the twelve essays (Jones and Richard), which represent "new perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature seminar," appeared on the program of the SBL Luke-Acts Seminar 1979–83 (See Appendix Two).

[41] As Robert Smith, *CurTM*, 13 (1986), 55–56, noted about these essays: "all illustrate the conviction that Luke-Acts must be interpreted within the broad Mediterranean milieu and make good use of Greco-Roman as well as OT materials, convictions nurtured and promoted by editor Talbert over the years, and rightly so." In the Seminar, see especially the work of Tyson, Robbins, Praeder, Danker. In the *Luke-Acts* volume see the essays by Brodie, Barr and Wentling, Brawley, and Kurz. T.s article in this volume, "Promise and Fulfillment in Lucan Theology," appeared in a modified form in Excurses A in *Reading Luke*.

[42] T.s intention to leave the familiar territory of Luke-Acts is seen also in his collaboration with Jack Dean Kingsbury in a SBL Consultation on Matthew and his editorial leadership of two volumes, one on 1 Peter (1986d), the other a Festschrift for Frank Stagg

Literary and Theological Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (1987a), an eminently readable, theologically sensitive, treatment of the Corinthian correspondence. The opening lines situate this book in the context of T.'s ongoing work: "Like its predecessor, *Reading Luke* . . . this volume . . . is concerned to understand large thought units and their relationship to Pauline thought as a whole. The focus, moreover, is on a close reading of the text" (1987a: xiii). After more than two decades of challenging Luke-Acts scholarship with new perspectives, Charles Talbert is now applying those insights to other parts of the NT, aiding both the scholar and the general reader "to feel at home in the biblical text."[43]

Contributions to Lucan Scholarship: Methodological Considerations

Charles Talbert appeared on the scene of Lucan studies in *die Mitte der Zeit*. By the time he completed his doctoral work and published his first book, the work by Hans Conzelmann would cause W. C. van Unnik in 1966 to speak of Luke-Acts as a "storm-center" in New Testament scholarship.[44] Responses to Conzelmann's agenda took several tacts. A number of conservative scholars attempted to correct what they considered to be a radically critical approach. I. Howard Marshall is representative. He defended the historical reliability of Luke-Acts, maintaining that Luke was both historian and theologian, but as the the title of his book evinces, his emphasis was on Luke as historian.[45] Other scholars, and by far the larger number of them, accepted the redaction-critical method and engaged in the task of sustaining, modifying, and rejecting Conzelmann's picture of Luke's theology. Surveys of this research abound and there is no need to rehearse it again here.[46]

The third major area of response to Conzelmann is in the area of methodology. It is here obviously that T. has made his greatest contribution, facilitating the shift of Lucan scholarship to a "post-Conzelmann" era. In a forthcoming review, "Luke-Acts in Research Since World War II," T. offered his assessment of Lucan scholarship over the past three decades, organizing his discussion around four questions.[47] The third of those questions

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in which he contributed an article on 1 Corinthians (1985c).

[43] This phrase first appeared in T.'s review of R. E. Brown's *The Birth of the Messiah* (1978d: 215). Since that time, he has used it repeatedly and it serves as a convenient summary of T.'s changing understanding of what a biblical commentary should be (see 1982a: 163; 1982d: 2; 1987a: xiii).

[44] Van Unnik, "Luke-Acts," p. 16.

[45] See I. Howard Marshall, *Luke: Historian and Theologian* (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1970. See also H. Flender, *St. Luke: Theologian of Redemptive History* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967); W. Gasque, *A History of the Criticism of the Acts of the Apostles* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975).

[46] See especially, Francois Bovon, *Luc le theologien: Vingt-cinq ans de recherches (1950–75)* (Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestle, 1978); Earl Richard, "Luke–Writer, Theologian, Historian: Research and Orientation of the 1970's," *BTB*, 13 (1983), 3–15. Note T.'s contribution to this task, especially in modifying Conzelmann's views of Lucan eschatology and *Heilsgeschichte*.

[47] This article, scheduled to appear in 1987, serves as a companion and update to T.'s earlier article, "Shifting Sands" (1976c). Gratitude is expressed to Professor for making this

addressed the place of redaction criticism in Luke-Acts study, particularly of the Gospel: "Recent years have witnessed a good deal of experimentation in methodology designed to cope with the inadequacies of redaction criticism" (1987c: 20). Since T. has been at the forefront of methodological experimentation, it is fitting to raise his own question about his approaches to Luke-Acts: "Is the method workable?"

Redaction Criticism and the Purpose of Luke-Acts

Much work has been done on the purpose of Luke-Acts. Luke's purpose in writing has been variously defined as 1) evangelism (F. F. Bruce, J. C. O'Neill); 2) a defense of Paul at his trial (A. J. Mattill); 3) a Christian apology to the Roman empire (B. S. Easton; E. Haenchen); 4) a defense against Jewish Christian attacks on Paul's memory (F. C. Baur; S. G. F. Brandon; to an extent J. Jervell); 5) a response to the delayed parousia (Conzelmann); 6) the need to defend the continuity of salvation history (Maddox).[48] One other alternative is that of T.: Luke-Acts is a defense against gnosticism.

What began as an explicit reference to anti-gnostic heresy in *Luke and the Gnostics* was gradually effaced in T.'s writings. In *Literary Patterns,* he spoke of gnosticism, but more specifically of anti-docetism. Overrealized eschatology was the occasion identified in *What Is a Gospel?.* Finally, in *Reading Luke,* T. referred explicitly to overrealized eschatology and implicitly to anti-docetism at specific passages, but mentioned neither of these concerns in his introduction.

T. has since rejected the redaction-critical method which engendered his understanding of the Lucan occasion; the occasion, however, has not been abandoned. It has simply been submerged, surfacing now and then in his exegesis of certain passages. In fact, his understanding of Luke-Acts as a legitimation document presupposes some type of opposition to (or in) the Lucan community, and when he bothered to identify it, he usually does so as some form of heresy. T. himself observed: ". . . redaction criticism has been unable to delineate either the Lukan purpose or the Lukan Sitz im Leben" (1987c: 13). Specifically, while one could make a case for Luke being anti-heresy, the earlier criticisms raised against *Luke and the Gnostics* still apply. Any argument from silence is questionable and T. has not adequately explained the "silence of Acts" on the heresy issue.

Architecture Analysis

T.'s next stop along his methodological sojourn was the study of parallelisms and chiasms as discerned by architecture analysis. The study of parallelisms in Luke-Acts has a long history, dating back to the nineteenth century. Noteworthy among T.'s predecessors are the works by F. C. Baur, E. Zeller, R. Morgenthaler, and M. D. Goulder.[49] The most incisive critique of T.'s methodology in his work on parallelisms was offered by Norman Petersen and addressed the question of methodology. T. had anticipated some criticism regarding his proposal to combine architecture analysis with redaction criticism:

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paper available. Page numbers refer to the unpublished manuscript.

[48] For a discussion of this issue, see Robert Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), esp. pp. 1–30.

[49] For a summary and critique of scholarship on Luke-Acts parallels, see Susan M. Praeder, "Jesus-Paul, Peter-Paul, and Jesus-Peter Parallelisms in Luke-Acts: A History of Reader Response," *1984 SBL Seminar Papers* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1984), 23–39.

> At this point I am aware of being caught in a crossfire. On the one hand, opponents of the two source theory will be unhappy because I assume it here. . . . On the other hand, New Testament scholars under the influence of certain currents of modern literary criticism will claim that such source analysis is unnecessary and should be discarded (1974d: 14).

Petersen's criticisms fall into the latter camp. He maintained "T.s selection and application of a literary model largely uninformed by general literary criticism leads me to doubt that he has succeeded in explaining what Luke did and why he did it."[50] He did not criticize T.s choice to combine "complementary models" but maintains that in doing so, "the possibilities of a literary model have been restricted even before they have been explored."[51] Petersen's conclusion is worth quoting here in full:

> In consequence of his premature abandonment of a more comprehensive literary model, T. also precludes answers to the question of style and content that might come from a strictly internal analysis of the stylized sections of Luke's composition. Thus he does not and cannot proceed from a literary analysis of stylized content to its functions within Luke's narrative, . . . as literary critics do in their work generally.[52]

Petersen's comments are on target and indicate a methodological flaw in T.s work, at least during this period. Though he has yet to adopt a "comprehensive literary model," at least not the type which Petersen probably had in mind, he does redress the situation by developing his own literary model which is free from problematic source theories.

Genre Criticism

During the 1970's, gospel genre was a burning issue. In addition to published studies antecedent to or slightly later than T.s work, there was a Gospel Genre Group in the Society of Biblical Literature in the early '70s. The cumulative effect was a mounting challenge to the posture that the gospels were *sui generis*. In general, the alternatives concerning the genre of the gospels were two. 1) The gospels took their generic conventions from the Jewish milieu and had parallels with the Old Testament or they were Christian midrashim patterned on the Jewish lectionary cycle.[53] 2) The Gospels were influenced by the literary conventions of the Greco-Roman milieu.[54] With regard to

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[50] Norman R. Petersen, *JBL*, 96 (1977), 456.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid., p. 457.

[53] Old Testament parallels were suggested by D. A. Baker, "Form and the Gospels," *Downside Review*, 88 (1970), 13–26 and R. E. Brown, "Jesus and Elisha," *PersRelSt*, 12 (1971), 85–104. The liturgical origins of the Gospels were argued more thoroughly by P. Carrington, *The Primitive Christian Calendar: A Study in the Making of the Marcan Gospel* (Cambridge: University Press, 1952); M. D. Goulder, *Midrash and Lection in Matthew* (London: S.P.C.K., 1974); idem, *The Evangelists' Calendar: A Lectionary Explanation of the Development of Scripture* (London: S.P.C.K., 1978). This theory is harshly criticized by Leon Morris, "The Gospels and the Jewish Lectionaries," in *Gospel Perspectives*, vol. 3: *Studies in Midrash and Historiography*, ed. by R. T. France and D. Wenham (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1983), 129–56.

[54] On the gospels as biography, see H. Cancik, "Die Gattung Evangelium: Das

Luke-Acts specifically, several options are available. In addition to the ancient biography proposed by T., Luke-Acts has been characterized as having generic features similar to the ancient novel[55] or a type of ancient history.[56]

David Aune has most recently argued that Luke-Acts belongs to the genre of Hellenistic general history. In the course of considering the problem of genre in Luke-Acts, Aune cited several telling criticisms of T.'s thesis that Luke-Acts is patterned after the ancient cultic biography. The basic problem, according to Aune, was: "Luke does not belong to a type of ancient biography for it belongs with Acts, and Acts cannot be forced into a biographical mold."[57] After reading Aune's description of the generic features of Luke-Acts, however, one could turn Aune's statement on its head and make an apt critique of his own work: Acts does not belong to a type of ancient history for it belongs with Luke, and Luke cannot be forced into an historiographical mode. Though both affirmed that genre studies must address the genre of Luke-Acts as a whole,[58] T.'s genre study favors the Gospel and argues for biography; Aune's study favors Acts and argues for historiography.[59] The issue of the genre of Luke-Acts remains an unresolved issue.

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Evangelium des Markus im Rahmen der antiken Historiographie," and "Bios und Logos: Formengeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu Lukians 'Demonax,' " in *Markus-Philologie*, (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1984). Other suggestions for Greco-Roman parallels are chronicled by T. (1983b: 197–202). For a survey of the problem, see R. A. Guelich, "The Gospel Genre," in *Das Evangelium und die Evangelien*, ed. P. Stuhlmacher (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1983), pp. 183–219.

[55] See especially Richard I. Pervo, *Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

[56] F. F. Bruce, "The New Testament and Classical Studies," *NTS*, 22 (1976), 229–242; most recently, David. E. Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment*, pp. 77–157.

[57] Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment*, p. 77. Aune's specific charges are three: 1) The usual pattern of life + successor + teachings which T. claimed was typical of Diogenes' Lives is found in only six of the eighty-two lives; 2) Contrary to T., Diogenes is concerned only with who succeeded whom, not with the legitimacy of their views; and 3) To speak, as T. does, of a succession *narrative* in ancient biography is an "inappropriate description of brief *lists* of students or successors" (p. 79). Even those sympathetic with T.'s work are critical at this last point. See David Barr and Judith Wentling, "The Conventions of Classical Biography and the Genre of Luke-Acts: A Preliminary Study," (1983f: 63–88).

[58] In fact, Aune (p. 79) commended T.'s proposal because it "has the merit of attempting to find an analogy in genre to Luke-Acts as a whole." Like wise Aune (p. 80) criticised Pervo: "Luke-Acts *must* be treated as affiliated with *one* genre, but Pervo treats Acts in isolation."

[59] Future studies of Gospel genre no doubt will also be shaped to some degree by a writing which has appeared since T.'s intial work in this area. Werner Kelber's *The Oral and the Written Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) is a watershed study that has reopened the question of the relationship between the oral kerygma and narrative gospel. Kelber argued that the shift in medium from orality to textuality also had an effect on the message. The result of this process of "textualization" is a gospel, Mark, a generic form Kelber called a "written parable" (p. 117). One need not be tied to every part of Kelber's argument to grant certain implications for genre studies, particularly in providing a nuanced argument which takes seriously the change from oral to written medium. T.'s

Non-Biblical Literary Criticism

Talbert finally "stumbled on the combination found in *Reading Luke:* a synthesis of close reading, use of parallels from Jewish and Greco-Roman worlds, and focus on the theological message."[60] As was noted earlier, this method is the culmination of T.'s previous methodological ventures. His interest in a "close reading" emerges out of experiments in architecture analysis. The constant reference to Greco-Roman parallels was a natural result of genre criticism. Finally, the focus on the theological message has its roots in his redaction-critical interests in the theology of the Evangelist. This method, particularly the sensitivity to the way in which Luke-Acts participated in the literary conventions of Greco-Roman antiquity, has a long and distinguished heritage, recalling the work of Henry Cadbury and Martin Dibelius.[61]

T.'s new method was forged, in part, by a disenchantment with redaction criticism. On the first page of *Reading Luke,* he claimed others shared this disillusionment: "This volume reflects the widespread loss of confidence in the two-source theory that has occurrred during the past fifteen years" (1982d: 1). Joseph Fitzmyer has challenged the extent of this "loss of confidence": "It is characteristic of a small group of students of the Synoptic relationships, mostly American, a few British, and still few Continental scholars."[62] Both are partially correct. The "loss of confidence" may be limited to North American scholarship, but judging from recent publications and professional meetings, it is becoming increasingly widespread in that community.

Experimentation in new methods of interpreting Luke-Acts by North American interpreters has thus far developed along two parallel, but distinct, paths. Some, like T., have been interested in placing Luke and Acts in their historical and literary milieu, treating them as first-century texts. Others, like Robert Tannehill, have treated them as timeless literary structures.[63] Talbert himself has commented on these differences:

> If a critic searches for those unconscious structures that are rooted in the human mind as such, as structuralists seem to do, then boundaries of time, geography, and culture mean nothing. . . . If the critic looks for those structures that have a definite funciton in a specific social and cultural context, as genre critics seem to do, then the boundaries of time, geography, and culture are crucial (1976c: 395).

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response to A. B. Lord's proposal that the gospels represented "oral traditional literature" is found in 1978b: 93–102.

[60] Private correspondence dated 2 February 1987.

[61] See H. J. Cadbury, *The Book of Acts in History* (London: Adam & Charles Black), 1955; Martin Dibelius, *Aufsätze zur Apostelgeschichte,* ed. Heinrich Greeven (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1951).

[62] J. A. Fitzmyer, *Luke,* II, x. Fitzmyer goes on to comment: "Fortunately, there is much good in Talbert's commentary, which saves it from the fate that it might otherwise encounter."

[63] See Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation,* Vol. I (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986). Still others, like Joseph Tyson, *The Death of Jesus in Luke-Acts* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1986) have attempted a compromise in these two positions, using modern literary theory to understand the texts, but giving priority to the way the original readers of Luke-Acts would have read those documents.

Using Tannehill and Talbert as representative of these distinct perspectives, one may observe the practical differences between the two approaches just by noting that Tannehill made ten references to ten non-canonical ancient sources in the entirety of *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, while T. referred twenty-nine times to fifteen ancient non-biblical sources in the first eleven pages alone of *Reading Luke!* Though both eschew the two-source theory and traditional historical criticism, the concerns and interests of these two approaches are obviously different.

Whether these two methods will inevitably pass each other like ships in the night is difficult to predict. It could be that a further methodological development in terms of reader response criticism could provide some way out of the present impasse. As Edgar McKnight has correctly observed, reader response criticism grew out of structuralism and represents the next natural development beyond text-oriented criticism.[64] Talbert's method of discerning how the "ordinary Mediterranean man on the street" would respond to the literary conventions of Luke-Acts has certain affinities with such a model, though his interest would be primarily in *original* readers.[65]

Such a methodological shift, however, would also mean a change of paradigms no less dramatic than when redaction critics shifted the locale of meaning from historical research into sources and historicity to the "intention of the evangelist" or when literary critics shifted the locus of meaning from authorial intentionality to the interrelationships of the narrative structures. To locate the meaning of a text in the reader's experience would be to adopt a radically new paradigm of meaning, not merely to add a methodological tool to the critics' expanding repertoire.[66] Until the literary structures of biblical narrative have been fully explored, serious application of such models may be somewhat premature. Literary critic, Herbert Schneidau observed: "It may even be that the gospels need a phase of formalist analysis before they come under the scrutiny of more currently popular methods such as reader-response or 'reception' theory. . . ."[67] I, for one, see the advantages

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[64] See Edgar V. McKnight, *The Bible and the Reader: An Introduction to Literary Criticism* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985). See also vol. 31 (1985) of *Semeia* entitled, "Reader Response Approaches to Biblical and Secular Texts."

[65] As Dennis Smith, *JAAR*, 53 (1985), 137, has correctly observed: "Literary analysis as Talbert practices it however is historically conditioned; that is, he seeks for models for the literary form of Luke from the literature of Luke's day." Actually Talbert may be closer to an even newer development in biblical studies than literary criticism, media criticism. The basic presupposition of media criticism as articulated by Thomas E. Boomershine ("Peter's Denial as Polemic or Confession: The Implications of Media Criticism for Biblical Hermeneutics," *Semeia*, 39 [1987], 51) is: "a change in the medium in which we study and experience an ancient text will inevitably change its meaning. Therefore, to the degree that our goal is to understand the meaning of the biblical documents in their original historical context, it is essential to know the medium in which they were intended to be experienced."

[66] A point made by Werner Kelber in "Literary Criticism and Biblical Narrative," Paper presented to the SBL Southwest Regional Meeting, 13–14 March 1987. Kelber has also recently questioned whether literary and historical readings are actually mutually exclusive or whether they "dissolve into the single, overriding reality of interpretation." See "Narrative as Interpretation and Interpretation of Narrative: Hermeneutical Reflections on the Gospel," *Semeia*, 39 (1987), 107–33.

[67] Herbert N. Schneidau, "Let the Reader Understand," *Semeia*, 39 (1987), 137.

in developing a poetics of biblical narrative which takes its cue from the literary conventions of first-century writings rather than nineteenth- and twentieth-century literary theory.[68] On this point, it seems to me that Talbert has the better of the argument.

Is Talbert's method workable? The answer to this question is a qualified "yes." One may, and should, examine Luke's literary context for parallels which enlighten the literary techniques employed in the narrative. This procedure has and will continue to be applied to biblical texts in fruitful ways. To engage fully in Talbert's method in interpreting Luke-Acts, however, may require accepting Talbert's presuppositions regarding purpose, architecture, and genre of Luke-Acts—all of which are, as yet, unsettled issues. In that sense, Talbert's method is an idiosyncratic one and may explain why the full model has not been appropriated by other scholars in significant measure.

In fact, one could argue that T. himself has not yet explored the full implications of his model, particularly with regards to Acts. Though nothing inherent in the model itself would inhibit its application to Acts, the fact remains that such a comprehensive application of the method as is found in *Reading Luke* is missing on Acts.

The method in T.'s commentary, *Acts*, is essentially the same as in *Reading Luke*; the results, however, are not. While there are helpful insights throughout the book, one is not made "to feel at home in the biblical text itself" as one is in *Reading Luke*. The stated aim of the "Knox Preaching Guides" in which this volume is published, is to "offer realistic, professional assistance for the vital task of proclaiming the word of God" (1984a). Ironically, the generic form, content, and function of this series may contribute, in part, to the book's shortcoming. In *form*, most volumes in this sries rarely exceed 150 pages—they are "designed for quick reference." T.'s slim volume is no exception, with 105 pages of exposition. In terms of *content*, significant portions of these volumes give sermon ideas or outlines—at least, it is evident that such were the editorial instructions to the contributors. *Acts* follows this pattern, and at the end of each unit several paragraphs are devoted to sermon ideas which emerge from the text. A conservative guess would estimate that approximately seventeen of the 105 pages of Acts are devoted to homiletical issues.

Though the Library of Congress has catalogued these books as biblical exegesis rather than homiletics, the *function* of the series at least is intended to "offer invaluable resources . . . for renewing and reviving possibilities of biblical preaching today." Such aims are admirable and certainly T.'s work fulfills this aim better than some, but the inherent purpose of a "preaching guide" is at points in direct conflict with T.'s stated aim in his Introduction: "The object in reading the two volumes is to enter into the narrative world of the text and listen to what Luke-Acts wants to say about religious reality. It is the Lukan theological point of view that is sought" (1984a: 3). Because of the type of literature in which this volume appears, the "Lukan theological point of view" is often shortchanged. Those looking for a companion volume worthy of *Reading Luke* will not likely find it here.

The Usefulness of a Method: Two Test Cases

By T.'s own standards, the value of a new method is in its ability to assist in dealing with "the problem of author's thought taken as a whole" and to offer something "useful

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[68] Even R. Alan Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), p. 9, has admitted: "It would be preferable if we could utilize literary categories which are peculiarly suitable for the study of the gospels rather than those which have been developed from the study of other literary genres. . . ."

or new on the passage under consideration" (1987c: 20). Based on these criteria, the change in T.s methodology usually, though not always, produced a change in perspective on the text at hand. By observing the way he has applied different methods to the same passage, it is possible to guage the degree to which T.s method does or does not inform his interpretation.

T.s treatment of martyrdom in Luke-Acts is a good test case for the ways in which his method informs or shapes his interpretation. In *Luke and the Gnostics*, T. argued that Luke parallels the martyr deaths of Jesus and Stephen, not only accenting the unity between Jesus and the church, but also suggesting that "the author of Luke-Acts portrayed Jesus' death as a martyrdom . . . to defend against the Gnostic denial of the legitimacy of suffering-martyrdom for the Christian" (1966b: 82; cf. 76–81).

In *Literary Patterns*, T. viewed the parallels between the deaths of Jesus and Stephen as part of the larger "correspondences between the career of Jesus in the Third Gospel and the life of the apostolic church in Acts" (1974d: 98). Since the biography of the ancient philosopher tried to link the philosopher with his successors, T. concluded that by connecting the founder, Jesus, with his followers, the disciples, Luke had employed these correspondences to"contribute to the overall Lucan appropriation of the Hellenistic image of the philosopher" (1974d: 99). Finally, in *Reading Luke*, T. argued: "Any appreciation for the Lukan understanding of Jesus' martyrdom must come from a knowledge of pagan, Jewish and, early Christian attitudes toward martyrdom" (1982d: 221; see also 1983a). He then marshalled examples from these various sources to argue that Jesus' death legitimated his profession (1982d: 221–224). He also drew parallels with the death of Stephen, slightly different than those noticed before: "This legitimation is evidenced in the conversion of the criminal on the cross: Jesus' martyrdom had such evangelistic benefits (cf. Acts 8:1, 4; 11:19ff. for the evangelistic benefits of Stephen's martyrdom" (1982d: 224).[69]

These passages demonstrate that, for T., a change in method does entail a change in emphasis or interpretation. Such changes in perspective are expected. What is surprising are the places where the method yields little new. Below is printed one example where the method has changed but little is altered in the material argument. Column 1 is taken from a 1967 redaction-critical analysis of Luke 4:31–9:50. Column 2 is from *Reading Luke* which disavows any source theory:

> In Luke 7:1–10 we find a Q tradition (cf. Matthew 8:5–13) to which the Evangelist has added vv. 3–6a. Thus, we have a story of a pious centurion who sends others to secure assistance for him. The point of the tradition as it stands here is the centurion's faith as contrasted with Israel's lack of faith (1967d: 491–92)

> In Luke 7:1–10 is tradition also found in Matt 8:5–13. In Luke's version, vss. 3–6a are distinctive. Thereby it becomes a story of a pious centurion who sends others to secure assistance for him. The point of the tradition as it stands in Luke is the centurion's faith as contrasted with Israel's lack of faith (1982d: 53)

[69] Some of these earlier emphases on martyrdom are present in *Reading Luke*, but no means do they constitute the major focus of his comments (see 1982d: 223; 225).

The removal of the reference to "Q" in *Reading Luke* has the cosmetic effect of ignoring problematic source theories. Pragmatically, T. drew conclusions regarding the meaning of Luke 7:1–10 based on Luke's redaction of traditional material, rather than on his conformity to or deviance from literary conventions of contemporary Greco-Roman parallels. Such "lapses" are infrequent, but occur often enough to question how much previous conclusions based on intensive redaction-critical analysis have shaped T's interpretation of certain passages and how much new is being added by his new interpretive method.

Conclusion

Recently, T. predicted: "A new methodology seems likely to emerge which . . . will be able to come to terms with the unity of Lukan thought." (1987c: 25). Ironically, the real difficulty with T.'s method of interpretation has been the failure to incorporate Acts in a convincing way into his interpretive model. This problem has plagued his methodological explorations throughout his career. The "silence of Acts" was the weakest link in the argument that the purpose of Luke-Acts was to serve as an apologetic against Gnosticism. One of the most severe criticisms lodged against T.'s genre studies was the way Acts so poorly fit the biographical genre. Finally, the most recent method of close reading and observing parallels is certainly as applicable to the text of Acts as to Luke, but the point remains that T. has yet to do so in a thorough-going way.[70]

A decade ago, T. closed his insightful survey of Lucan studies with these words: "At present, widespread agreement is difficult, except on the point that Conzelmann's synthesis is inadequate. Until the scholarly community can agree on a proper procedure for studying Luke-Acts, there is little likelihood that another synthesis will fare any better" (1976c: 395). More recently T. has been somewhat more optimistic: "It is still too early to see the final shape of a methodology that will supercede redaction criticism. It is not unlikely, however, that it will combine elements of modern literary criticism, genre criticism, and the type of comparative study now being done in Acts" (1987c: 23). That T. has significantly shaped this new method is clear; that his own particular method is unlikely to emerge as the one which replaces redaction criticism is equally as obvious. Nonetheless, the assessment of *Literary Patterns* written a decade ago by Norman Petersen still rings true for T.'s scholarly endeavors as a whole:

> We are therefore left with the need for a more comprehensive literary model than the one proposed by Talbert. . . . Although Talbert has prematurely abandoned the search for such a model, he can nonetheless take comfort in knowing that his efforts to rectify the eclipse of biblical narrative have been as suggestive in their failures as they have been in their successes. At this point in critical time, that is no little achievement.[71]

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[70] Failure to deal with the "unity of Lukan thought" may reflect not so much T.'s personal shortcoming as much as it underscores a problem shared by the larger scholarly community. One could interpret the existence of an Acts Group in the SBL at this time not merely as fortuitous, but as the (perhaps unconscious) admission of the futility of implementing that to which we have paid lip service, the unity of Luke-Acts. I am hopeful that the notion of "the unity of Luke-Acts" can be re-examined when this Acts Group addresses the topic "The Literary Integrity of Luke-Acts" at its 1989 meeting.

[71] Petersen, "Review," pp. 457–58.

For more than twenty years, Charles Talbert has provided a creative impulse in the Society of Biblical Literature. He has provided new perspectives on the texts of Luke and Acts and the methods used to understand their message. His own methodological pilgrimage has both mirrored and shaped the quest of the larger community of scholars, providing new insights in both his successes and his failures: "May his tribe be legion!"[72]

CHARLES H. TALBERT
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Appendix One:
Program of the SBL Luke-Acts Group
1974-78

1974 **Consultation on the Acts of the Apostles**
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, Convener

A Critique of Richard F. Zehnle's Peter's Pentecost Discourse
Karl Paul Donfried, Smith College

A Spectrum of Opinion on the Value of Acts as a Source for the Study of Paul: Tradition and Redaction in the Pauline Portions of Acts
A. J. Matill, Jr., Winebrenner Theological Seminary

The Title Kurios *in Luke-Acts*
Donald L. Jones, University of South Carolina

1975 **SBL/Luke-Acts Group**
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, Chairman

Luke's Method in the Annunciation Narratives of Chapter One
Raymond E. Brown, Union Theological Seminary, New York

A Critical Review of C. H. Talbert, Literary Patterns, Theological Themes and the Genre of Luke-Acts
Gerhard Krodel, Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia

1975 SBL/Luke-Acts Group continued

A Critique of J. Jervell, Luke and the People of God
Mary Moscato, College of St. Teresa

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The Prologues of Luke-Acts and the "We" Passages in their Relation to the Tendency of the Author
Schuyler Brown, General Theological Seminary

Anti-Jewish/Pro-Roman Sentiments in Luke-Acts
Karl Paul Donfried, Smith College

The Significance of the Stephen Episode in Acts
T. C. Smith, Furman University

1976 SBL/Luke-Acts Group
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, Chairman

Salvation to and from Zion: The Lukan Birth Narrative in Tradition and Redaction
Lloyd Gaston, Vancouver School of Theology

The Lukan Sitz im Leben: *Methodology and Prospects*
Robert J. Karris, Catholic Theological Union

Panel Discussion: *Semitisms in Luke-Acts*
Fred L. Horton, Wake Forest University
Jerome D. Quinn, St. Paul Seminary

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By Land and by Sea: A Study in Acts 13-28
Vernon K. Robbins, University of Illinois at Urbana

The Picture of Paul in Acts and the Pastorals
S. G. Wilson, Carleton University

The Accounts of Paul's Conversion in Acts
P. Boyd Mather, Dubuque Theological Seminary

1977 SBL/Luke-Acts Group
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, Chairman

Establishing a Text for Luke-Acts
Frank Stagg, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

Some Aspects of Prayer in Luke-Acts
Allison Trites, Acadia Divinity College

Weeping for Jerusalem: Luke 10:41-44 as vaticinium post eventum
David L. Tiede, Luther Theological Seminary

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1977 SBL/Luke-Acts Group continued

Karl P. Donfried, Smith College, presiding

Acts 3:19-26 as a Test of the Role of Eschatology in Lukan Christology
William S. Kurz, Marquette University

The Defense Speeches of Paul in Acts
Frederick Veltman, Pacific Union College

Some Dead Ends in Lukan Research
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University

1978 SBL/Luke-Acts Group
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, Chairman
Karl P. Donfried, Smith College, presiding

Prefaces in Greco-Roman Biography and Luke-Acts
Vernon K. Robbins, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

An Interpretation of Acts 7:35-37: From the Perspective of Major Themes in Luke-Acts
E. Jane Via, University of San Diego

The Circumferential Speeches of Luke-Acts: Patterns and Purpose
Donald R. Miesner, Concordia College

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Panel Discussion: *New Directions for Lukan Research*
P. Boyd Mather, The Schools of Theology in Dubuque
Horst R. Moehring, Brown University
Stephen G. Wilson, Carleton University

Appendix Two:
Program of the SBL Luke/Acts Seminar
1979-83

1979 SBL/Luke-Acts Seminar
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, Chairman

Windows and Mirrors: Literary Criticism and Luke's Sitz im Leben
Robert J. Karris, Catholic Theological Union

Luke, Josephus and Rome: A Comparative Approach to the Lukan Sitz im Leben
Benjamin J. Hubbard, University of Waterloo, St. Jerome's College

The Problem of Food in Acts
Joseph B. Tyson, Southern Methodist University

On Finding the Lukan Community: A Cautious Cautionary Essay
Luke T. Johnson, Yale Divinity School

1980 **SBL/Luke-Acts Seminar**
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, Chairman

Luke-Acts and the Relationship between the Church and Judaism
David M. Scholer, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary

Law in Luke-Acts
Stephen G. Wilson, Carleton University

The Divine Purpose: The Jews and the Gentile Mission (Acts 15)
Earl Richard, Somerville, Massachusetts

Luke-Acts and Historiography in the Greek Bible
William S. Kurz, Marquette University

1981 **SBL/Luke-Acts Seminar**
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, presiding

Laudation Stories in the Gospel of Luke and Plutarch's Alexander
Vernon K. Robbins, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Luke-Acts and the Ancient Novel
Susan Praeder, Boston College

The Endangered Benefactor in Luke-Acts
Frederick W. Danker, Christ Seminary-Seminex

1982 **SBL/Luke-Acts Seminar**
Charles H. Talbert, Wake Forest University, presiding
Theme: *Christology and Soteriology in Luke-Acts*

The Title Pais *in Luke-Acts*
Donald L. Jones, University of South Carolina

The Salvation of the Jews in Luke-Acts
Jack T. Sanders, University of Oregon

Does Luke Make a Soteriological Statement in Acts 20:28?
Waldemar Schmeichel, Kalamazoo College

Jesus and the "Wilderness Generation": The Death of the Prophet Like Moses According to Luke
David P. Moessner, Basel, Switzerland

1983 **SBL/Luke-Acts Seminar**
Joseph B. Tyson, Southern Methodist University, presiding

Paul and the Pattern of the Prophet Like Moses in Acts 3:45
David P. Moessner, Louisiana State University

The Lukan Writer's Stories about the Call of Paul
Norman A. Beck, Texas Lutheran College

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1983 SBL/Luke-Acts Seminar continued

The Paulusbild *in the Trial of Paul in Acts*
William R. Long, Reed College

Paul in Acts as martus *and* hupertos
Boyd Mather, The Schools of Theology in Dubuque

Miracle Worker and Missionary: Paul in the Acts of the Apostles
Susan Praeder, Boston College

Paul in Luke-Acts: The Savior Who Is Present
Glenn R. Jacobson, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania