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Contents

S5 The Theology of Galatians
James D. G. Dunn 1

S5 The Singularity of the Gospel:
A Reading of Galatians
Beverly Roberts Gaventa 17

S6 The Narrator in the
Book of Tobit
Irene Nowell 27

S6 Tobit and Folklore Studies,
with Emphasis on Propp's Morphology
William Soll 39

S6 Tobit and Enoch: Distant Cousins
with a Recognizable Resemblance
George W. E. Nickelsburg 54

S9 The Ethics of Interpretation or What's Left
Over After the Elimination of Meaning
Stephen Fowl 69

S14 The Pauline Letters and the Lucan
Account of Paul's Missionary Journeys
Joseph A. Fitzmyer 82

S14 Paul in Acts: Aspects of
Structure and Characterization
Robert L. Brawley 90

S14 Literary and Social Dimensions
of Luke's Apology for Paul
John T. Carroll 106

S14 Acts 9:1-29 and Early Church Tradition
John T. Townsend 119

S18 Group Solidarity in the
Revelation of John
Randall C. Webber 132

S35 Stories of Reading: Doing Gospel Criticism As/With a "Reader"
Stephen D. Moore 141

S40 Who Were the First Urban Christians? Urbanization in Galilee in the First Century
J. Andrew Overman 160

S40 First Century Urban/Rural Relations in Lower Galilee: Exploring the Archaeological and Literary Evidence
Douglas R. Edwards 169

S40 Bandits, Messiahs, and Longshoremen: Popular Unrest in Galilee Around the Time of Jesus
Richard Horsley 183

S40 Political and Social Roles of the Pharisees and Scribes in Galilee
Anthony J. Saldarini 200

S40 Neither Passivity Nor Violence: Jesus' Third Way
Walter Wink 210

S40 Jesus and the Baptist—Two of a Kind?
Ben Witherington 225

S56 Transumptive Narration and the Structure of Wisdom 1-5
David Seeley 245

S57 Narrative Christology in Early Jewish Christianity
William Richard Stegner 249

S59 Wrath and Persuasion: The *Iliad* and Its Context
Gregory D. Alles 263

S59 Epidaurian Miracle Cures
Lynn R. LiDonnici 272

S59 Plato and the Primal Being
Gary E. Kessler 277

S63 The Rhetoric of Memory in the Stories of Saul and David: A Prospective Study
Mary Katharine Deeley 285

S67 Egypt as an "Iron Furnace": A Metaphor of Transformation—A Writer's Perspective
Paula M. McNutt 293

S70 Hezekiah in the Books of Chronicles
Mark A. Throntveit 302

S75 How Mithra Won the West
Howard M. Teeple 312

S97 Crucified with Christ: A Synthesis of 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and Galatians
Richard Bevan Hays 318

S101 The Costs of Proselytism and Conversion
Alan F. Segal 336

S101 The Influence of the Roman Family and Social Structures on Early Christianity in Rome
James S. Jeffers 370

S106 Arcana Mundi: Prophecy and Divination in the *Vita Mosis* of Philo of Alexandria
Robert M. Berchman 385

S106 Prophets and Prophecy in Josephus
Louis H. Feldman 424

S106 Two Types of Mosaic Prophecy According to Philo
David Winston 442

S107 A Proposed Reconstruction of Q 10:23-24
M. Eugene Boring 456

S107 The Cross and Discipleship in Q
Harry Fleddermann 472

S107 Q Bibliography: 1981-1988
David M. Scholer 483

S116 Matthew: Sermon and Story
Janice Capel Anderson 496

S116 The Gospel of Matthew:
Hypocrisy as Self-Deception
Dan O. Via, Jr. 508

S129 Kings of Israel: A Question
of Crime and Punishment
Victor H. Matthews 517

S130 Mission in Matthew:
The Second Discourse as Narrative
Karen A. Barta 527

S130 Matthew and the Law
Klyne Snodgrass 536

S139 The Exegesis of God:
Jesus' Signs in John 1-11
Mark Kiley 555

S151 The Rebellion of Korah, Numbers 16-18:
A Study in Tradition History
Jacob Milgrom 570

S151 The Story of Korah's Rebellion:
Key to the Formation of the Pentateuch
Ellis Rivkin 574

S155 The Woes in Q (and Matthew and Luke):
Deciphering the Rhetoric of Criticism
Leif E. Vaage 582

S155 The Kingdom That Didn't Come:
A Social History of the Q Tradents
Burton L. Mack 608

S155 The Social Setting of the
Q Mission: Three Dissertations
Jirair S. Tashjian 636

Introductory Note

The papers in this volume were prepared for discussion at the One Hundred Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature convened at the Chicago Hilton & Towers, Chicago, Illinois, 19-22 November 1988. The papers represent, in most cases, experimental and initial work on a subject. Therefore, they should not be considered finished works but works in progress. The Society encourages this type of publication to stimulate discussion which may lead to the refinement and precision necessary in a journal article or monograph.

The Society's publication program has generated research among its members. Younger scholars and the veteran are able to prepare papers for discussion. This dispenses with time allotments for the reading of papers and permits significant debate at the Annual Meeting.

The Editor expresses appreciation to The Scriptorium, Denver, Colorado, for the able preparation of the text of this volume. The Editor also takes this opportunity to thank the chairs of all Annual Meeting program units for their assistance in developing a stimulating program.

David J. Lull, Editor
Executive Director, Society of Biblical Literature

The Theology of Galatians

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My thesis is that Galatians is Paul's first sustained attempt to deal with the issue of covenantal nomism. His arugment is basically; (i) that the outworking of God's saving power will be consistent with its initial decisive expression: (ii) that that initial expression of God's covenant purpose was in terms of promise and faith and always had the Gentiles in view from the first; and (iii) that the law, where it is understood in a way which conflicts with that initial expression, has been given a distorted role.

I will begin (1) by recalling what "covenantal nomism" means and why it was so important at the time of Paul; then attempt to demonstrate exegetically (2) that covenantal nomism is the issue underlying Paul's argument in Galatians, and (3) how Paul deals with it in what I see to be his three-stranded argument; next (4) I will try to indicate why I think that Galatians is Paul's first full-scale attempt to deal with this issue; and finally (5) it may be appropriate to indicate by way of corollary the circumstances which probably led up to the letter itself. In all this I take it for granted that however else we may want to speak of and to use "the theology of Galatians," we must at least start by asking what Paul was saying within the context of his times and of his mission and in relation to the specific situation in Galatia, and what he wanted his Galatian readership and audience to hear and to understand in what he wrote. In the spirit of the seminar I will confine my discussion to Galatians itself and not attempt to underpin or develop the main part of the thesis by reference to any other Pauline text.

1. "Covenantal nomism," as coined by E. P. Sanders,[1] is a phrase well-fitted to characterize Jewish self-understanding, or, more precisely, the understanding of the relation between God and his people Israel as it comes to espression consistently (though not uniformly)[2] within Jewish literature, particularly from Deuteronomy onwards.

1.1 Fundamental to Judaism's sense of identity was the conviction that (i) God had made a special covenant with the patriarchs, whose central feature was the choice of Israel to be his peculiar people (e.g., Deut 4:31; 2 Macc 8:15; Pss Sol 9:10; CD 6:2; 8:18), and (ii) God had given the law as an integral part of the covenant both to show Israel how to live within that covenant ("This do and you shall live"–Deut 4:1, 10, 40; 5:29–33; 6:1–2, 18, 24; etc.) and to make it possible for them to do so (the system of atonement).[3] Hence "covenantal nomism," where the former word emphasizes God's prevenient grace, and the latter cannot and should not be confused with legalism or with any idea of "earning" salvation.

The typical mind-set of covenantal nomism included a strong sense of special privilege and prerogative over against other peoples (e.g., Bar 3:36–4:4; Pss Sol 13:6–11; Philo,

[1] *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (London: SCM, 1977) 75, 420, 544.

[2] J. J. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem* (New York: Crossroad, 1983) Index "covenantal nomism."

[3] Rightly emphasized by Sanders.

Mos. 2:17–25; Jos. *Ap.* 2:277–86). But it also and inevitably meant a reinforcing of the sense of national identity and separateness from other nations (e.g., Jub 22:16; Ep Arist 139, 142; Philo, *Mos.* 1:278). This was evidently a major motivating factor in the reconstitution of Judea after the exile (Ezra 9–10). And the same sense of a basic need to remain loyal to its covenant obligations was obviously one of the most powerful factors in the Maccabean attempt to restore national integrity and to retain national identity. At that time the obligations of covenantal nomism focused on those featurees of national and religious life which marked out the distinctiveness of the Jewish people—circumcision and food laws (1 Macc 2.60–63)—since, for the same reason (they prevented assimilation and integration into a large international and religious whole), these demands of the law had become a principal target of Syrian persecution. At the same time "Judaism" first appears in our literature precisely as a protest against such Hellenizing pressure (2 Macc 2:21; 8:1; 14:38), that is as a way of marking off the entity of Jewish self-identity from a Hellenism which had swamped and threatened to obliterate such national distinctives. And the verb "to judaize" is coined to indicate those Gentiles who choose to live their lives in accord with the ancestral customs and practices distinctive of the Jewish nation (Esther 8:17 LXX: Jos. *War* 2:454, 462–63).

Equally it is evident that these concerns shaped so clearly by the Maccabean national crisis continued to be a dominant factor in the following period. All the literature from that time on through the next two centuries bears testimony to a concern to assert, define, and defend the boundaries of the covenant, as different groups claimed that it was their understanding and practice which was what we might call the proper covenantal nomism; that they (alone) were the "righteous" and "devout," and the other non-practitioners were "sinners," disloyal to the covenant if not apostates by their failure to keep the law as it should be kept (e.g., Wisd Sol 2–5; Jub 6:32–35; 1 Enoch 1:1, 7–9; 1QS 2:4–5; Pss Sol 3:3–12; 13:5–12). In this period circumcision and food laws, together with other specific commandments like sabbath and festivals, remained the clearest identity- and boundary-markers of Judaism as a whole, as indicated by evidence both within and without the corpus of Jewish writings.[4]

All this I would take to be more or less non-controversial—the evidence is clear and consistent. I emphasize it by way of introduction to the particular study of Galatians for the obvious reason that the thrust of Paul's argument regarding these same two features, covenant and law, is unlikely to be understood without an adequate grasp of the taken-for-granted nature of covenantal nomism within Jewish circles. The extent to which Paul is actually addressing covenantal nomism has of course yet to be established, but where such a fundamental mind-set was involved (covenantal nomism), any discussion of covenant and law in regard to Judaism was bound to be influenced in greater rather than less degree by that mind-set and its taken-for-granteds.

1.2 More controversial, I suppose, may be two specific claims which I have already advanced elsewhere,[5] even though they seem to me to follow inevitably from the above. First, the claim that covenantal nomism is so tightly bound up with a sense of national or ethnic identity, that the law became coterminous with Israel, marking out the Jews in their distinctiveness as God's people and in their distinctiveness from others (Gentiles=

[4] See, e.g., the texts cited in my "The New Perspective on Paul," *BJRL* 65 (1983) 95–122, here 107–10.

[5] "New Perspective"; and "Works of the Law and the Curse of the Law (Galatians 3:10–14)," *NTS* 31 (1985) 523–42.

not God's people).[6] That is to say, however universal the claims made for the law, it never ceased to be the Jewish law; its religious appeal (evident in the many God-fearers who attached themselves in differing degrees to the diaspora synagogues) was never such as could be divorced from its national function as the civil and criminal code of the Jews as a distinct ethnic entity. This "social function of the law" I believe to be important for our fuller understanding of the mind-set with which Paul is engaging in Galatians.

Second, the claim that the phrase "works of the law" was a way of describing the same convenantal-nomistic mind-set—"works of the law" as the praxis which the law of the covenant laid upon the covenant member. This I believe is borne out by the use of an equivalent phrase, "deeds of the law" in the DSS, where it describes the obligations laid upon the sectarian by his membership of the Qumran community (1QS 5:21, 23; 6:18; 4QFlor 1:1–7; and an unpublished 4Q text), though whether it was of wider currency or simply a natural way of expressing covenantal obligations we cannot say. In particular, such sense of obligation probably came to particular expression in those commandments which focused the distinctiveness of the claim to be a people set apart by the one God. In the Maccabean crisis that meant specifically circumcision and the food-laws; and there are sufficient indications thereafter that wherever Jewish identity came into question the issue of covenantal nomism would focus on these same commandments and on any others which reinforced Jewish distinctiveness. Such deeds/works of the law became the test-cases for Jewish faithfulness.

With one of our key terms thus clarified, we can now turn to Galatians and attempt to explicate the line of argument and emphases Paul employs to meet the challenge confronting his understanding of the gospel among his Galatian converts.

2. Paul was concerned with the issue of covenantal nomism as it was affecting his converts in Galatia.

2.1 This becomes clear in Paul's consistent focus on what we might call the "second phase." It is most explicit in 3:3: What follows from the beginning they have made? How do they think the completion of God's saving work will be achieved? But the same concern lies behind almost every paragraph of the letter, in a whole sequence of variations. What follows from the gospel and its acceptance (1:6–7; 2:14)? What is the outworking of the grace of God (1:6)? For Paul it was apostleship to the Gentiles (1:15; 2:9); for those he opposes it was evidently the law (2:21; 5:4). If the issue of circumcision for Gentiles has been settled (2:1–10), what about the issue of continuing life-style, as focused (as also with the Pharisees)[7] in table-fellowship (2:11–14)?

Most persistent of all is the argument regarding the relation of faith and the law. How is "the initial expression of faith" to be correlated with "works of the law"? The implication of the *ean me* of 2:16a, especially in its context as referring back to the food laws issue at Antioch (2:11–14), is that Jewish Christians thought works of the law (like observance of the dietary laws) were quite compatible with faith in Christ and still a necessary (covenantal) obligation for Jewish believers in Messiah Jesus. But Paul drives that distinction (faith in Christ, and works of law) into an outright antithesis (2:16bc,[8] 3:2, 5, 10–12); to regard the law (covenantal nomism) as the outworking of faith is retrogressive, a

[6] See also T. D. Gordon, "The Problem at Galatia," *Interp* 41 (1987) 32–43, here 38, and those cited by him.

[7] J. Neusner, *From Politics to Piety* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973): also Judaism (University of Chicago, 1981).

[8] See further below.

stepping back from the freedom of sonship into immature childhood and slavery (3:23–4:11, 21–31). The outworking of faith has to be conceived in different terms from works of the flesh (5:16–26; 6:7–9), a focusing on physical features which would include a nationalistic evaluation of circumcision (3:3; 4:21–31; 6:12–13); or indeed, in terms of the law, but the law focused not in such Jewish distinctives as circumcision, but rather in love of neighbor (5:6, 13–14), as exemplified by Christ (6:1–4).

2.2 The issue underlying all this is covenantal nomism, that is, the issue of whether those Gentiles who had come to faith in the Messiah of the Jews and who thus claimed a share in the benefits of God's covenant with Israel needed to live in accordance with the law of Israel, that is, to live in accordance with Jewish customs ("to judaize") or to become proselytes, in order to sustain that claim.[9] That this is the issue has been observed by several factors. (1) One is the fact that covenantal nomism was such a taken-for-granted for the typical Jewish mind-set that it did not need to be spelled out any more clearly than it is, as indicated above. (2) A second is that "works of the law" have for too long been understood as "good works by which individuals try to gain acceptance by God"; that fundamental misunderstanding has skewed the whole exegesis of the letter, distorting or concealing the Jewish (as well as Christian) recognition of the priority of God's grace, and losing sight of the corporate dimension of the discussion in an individualistic doctrine of justification by faith.

(3) Sanders' own rebuttal of that misplaced emphasis in turn clouded the issue by making too sharp a distinction between entry (into the covenant) and continuance or maintenance of status within the covenant. "Justification" (being "righteoused") was classified as "transfer terminology,"[10] with the implication that that was also where Paul's emphasis on faith belonged, that is, only with the question of entry and not that of continuance (but 5:4 indicates that justification has as much to do with continuance and 5:5 with final outcome). Consequently the issue of the continuum between faith and its outworking/corollary was obscured—whether (covenant) faith comes to expression in (covenant) works of the law (necessarily, inevitably?) or continues to be the basis of continuance (as well as of entry), or what?

(4) This last confusion has been the more plausible since so much of the issue in Galatians focuses on circumcision, which seems to reinforce an "entry into covenant"/"maintenance of status" distinction. But the issue of works of the law first comes to expression as a result of the Antioch incident (2:11–16), where the concern was clearly the maintenance of covenant status on the part of the Jewish Christians in Antioch through faithful observance of the food laws. Moreover, it was not merely circumcision which the Galatian converts were being exhorted to undergo, but circumcision as the beginning of that law observance which was expected of all devout covenant members (4:10; 5:3). At this point it is as well to recall that circumcision was not typically thought of within Judaism as a rite of entry to the covenant, but as one of the commandments by obeying which one expressed one's status as a Jew (or proselyte),[11] the first act we may say of covenantal nomism.

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[9] I had formulated this thesis before reading C. K. Barrett, *Freedom and Obligation: A Study of the Epistle to the Galatians* (London: SPCK, 1985) 10. The theology of the Judaizers "seems to me to tally in some remarkable ways (though not in every way) with the covenantal nomism of E. P. Sanders."

[10] E. P. Sanders, *Paul the Law and the Jewish People* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983).

[11] P. Borgen, "Observations on the Theme 'Paul and Philo,' in *Die Paulinische Literatur*

3. The main thrust of Paul's argument against covenantal nomism has three strands.

3.1 The expression of life within the covenant should be consistent with its beginning. (a) This is evident from Paul's initial appeal to his readers; what they are doing is to abandon the grace of God which first brought them to faith, in favor of a different gospel (1:6–9). And the appeal is regularly repeated throughout the rest of the letter—3:1–5, 4:8–11 and 5:1–12. It was by faith that they became participants in the promises of God; their continuing status as such would be maintained in the same way. (b) Paul equally sees his own experience of being commissioned with the gospel in the same light (1:11–2:10; 2:18–20). Whatever his relationship with Jerusalem after his conversion, and whatever may have passed between himself and the pillar apostles on his two visits there, the crucial fact is that they added nothing to him, but gave full recognition to the grace of God which was the manifest proof of his original commissioning (2:6–9). Similarly he is concerned to make it clear that to have resumed a full-scale observance of the food laws in table-fellowship would have been equivalent to his building again what Christ's death and commissioning had pulled down for him (2:14–21). (c) Hence also the heart of his argument in chap. 3; that the law neither annuals nor alters the terms of the original covenant promise to Abraham (3:15–20). That is to say, the original promise to Abraham, as given to faith, continues to characterize the covenant and the relationship with God which it sustains; to insist that covenantal nomism with its now traditional check-points was the only way to live for heirs of the promise was to make the promise void. (d) It is still, of course necessary to know how faith will work out in practice. Guidance on life-style and praxis is still necessary. Hence the final exhortation in 5:13–6:10. And there Paul clearly shows that he sees the law as still having a function. He still believes in a kind of "covenantal nomism"! But it has markers different from the ancestral customs of the Jews—love and Spirit, not circumcision.

Paul's argument is thus clear. Ongoing praxis must be a continuing expression of the faith by which his readers first began to function within God's covenant promise and purpose—a beginning whose divinely given character was self-evident both to Paul and his readers. Stated like this the argument is certainly open to sharp criticism (the law was also given by God; why should works of the law be regarded as an antithesis to faith?), a line of criticism we hardly need James 2:18–26 to spell out for us. But at least its logic is clear. And it is only part of the complete argument.

3.2 The second strand of Paul's argument is that God's promise always had the Gentiles in view from the beginning. This is obviously the point of 3:6–9, where the gospel is focused in the original promise to Abraham, "In you shall all the nations be blessed" (3:8, following LXX).[12] The point is clear: the original promise is to be offered to those originally in view in it and on the original terms—to the Gentiles, by faith. The covenant promise was not intended solely for Jews.

The following paragraph (3:10–14) has been much disputed and much misunderstood. But it is most obviously to be taken as speaking of a curse which the law has interposed between the Gentiles and their share in the promise, since the whole thrust and climax

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(continued)
und Theologie," hrsg. S. Pedersen (Aarhus: Aros, 1980) 85–102; "Philo's and Hillel's understanding has thus been that bodily circumcision was not the requirement for entering the Jewish community, but was one of the commandments which they had to obey upon receiving status as a Jew" (88).

[12] See F. F. Bruce, *Galatians* (NIGTC; Exeter: Paternoster, 1982) 156–57.

of the paragraph is the opening up of the blessing of Abraham to the Gentiles which Christ achieved by removing that curse in his death (3:13–14). Whatever else is in view, therefore, Paul almost certainly has in mind the law's function in branding the Gentile per se as "sinner" (2:15)—outside Israel, outside the law, therefore sinner and transgressor, and under a curse. The curse of the law on the Gentile as Gentile is precisely that corollary of covenantal nomism as it had come to be understood in nationalistic presumption (we the righteous, they the sinner) and ethnic restrictiveness (inheritance limited to the Jews and proselytes—*hoi ex ergōn nomou*) which Paul now contests.[13]

Similarly with the argument about Christ as Abraham's "seed" according to the promise (3:16). Its whole point is to enable Paul to make the claim that Gentiles have become partakers of the promise "in Christ" (3:14; 28–29),[14] through the Spirit (3:2–5, 14; 4:6, 5:5–6).[15]

We might simply note also how much of Paul's own self-understanding of his commission (that is, of his whole existence as a Christian) was bound up with the conviction that it was now time to reach out to and bring in the Gentiles on equal terms with the Jews (that is, without their ceasing to be "Greeks" as distinct from "Jews"). Hence the emphasis in his description of his conversion and calling—"called . . . to preach God's Son among the Gentiles" (1:15–16).[16] Clearly his conviction that he had been called from the first to go to the uncircumcision was bound up with his understanding that the Gentiles were in view from the first expression of the covenant promise. Which of these two came first and gave rise to the other it is not possible now to say.

3.3 What then was the purpose of the law? The question arises inevitably from the line of argument outlined above. The fact that it also arises in 3:19 and 21 may be taken as at least some confirmation that our analysis of Paul's argument so far is on the right lines.

The question arises, obviously, because Paul's treatment of the law as so far outlined has had strongly pejorative features. "Works of the law" he clearly regards in a very

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[13] For a fuller exposition see my "Works of the Law." Cf. the main thesis of G. Howard, *Paul: Crisis in Galatia* (SNTSMS 35; Cambridge University, 1979), though I disagree with several subsidiary aspects of Howard's argument.

[14] Cf. J. C. Beker, *Paul the Apostle* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 50–52, 96. J. L. Martyn, "Paul and his Jewish-Christian Interpreters," *USQR* (1987–88) 1–15 (here 3–4).

[15] Paul felt no need to justify the assumption that the gift of the Spirit was the fulfillment of the promise to Abraham. This must be because the gift of the Spirit to Gentiles was both recognized among the first Christians, and acknowledged as the sure indication of God's acceptance/justifying act (so Gal 3:2–5; 4:6, 29; 5:5; cf. particularly Acts 10:44–48; 11:15–18; Rom 8:9, 14). "This reception of the 'Spirit' is the primary datum of the Christian churches in Galatia" (H. D. Betz, "Spirit, Freedom and Law, Paul's Message to the Galatian Churches," *SEÅ* 39 [1974] 145–60, here 145). Cf. D. J. Lull, *The Spirit in Galatia* (SBLDS 49; Chico: Scholars, 1980).

[16] See further J. D. G. Dunn, "A Light to the Gentiles: the Significance of the Damascus Road Christophany for Paul," *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament. Studies in Christology in Memory of G. B. Caird*, ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (Oxford Clarendon, 1987) 251–66. Cf. also Gordon (n. 6 above) 3. A corollary of this is that Paul's principal concern in chaps. 1–2 was not to defend his apostleship (or apostolic authority) as such (so still G. Lüdemann, *Paulus, der Heidenapostel. Band II. Antipaulinismus in frühen Christentum* [Gottingen: Vandenhoeck, 1983] 145).

negative light (2:16; 3:2, 5, 10). It is the law which is understood to condemn Gentiles as "sinners" (2:15), to place a curse on the law-less which prevents them participating in the covenant promise (3:10–14). But we have also noted that he does see a positive role for the law, at least in that he speaks of loving the neighbor as fulfilling the whole law (5:14). What then is Paul objecting to so strongly?

The answer has already been suggested in the treatment of the curse of the law (in 3.2): Paul objects to covenantal nomism understood as it then was consistently throughout Judaism—that is, covenantal nomism as restricting the covenant to those within the boundaries marked by the law, to Jews and proselytes.[17] This is confirmed by his emphasis on another word used with strong negative overtones—"flesh" (3:3, 5:19, 24; 6:8). For "flesh" marks out also a misunderstood relationship with Abraham, or rather a relationship with Abraham in which the emphasis has been misplaced. Hence the allegory of 4:21–31: there is a line of descent from Abraham understood in terms of the flesh—a racial, or ethnic or national identity; and that is not the line of promise. To limit participation in the promise to a relationship *kata sarka* is to misunderstand the promise.[18] Hence too the point of 6:12–13; the glorying in the flesh which Paul condemns is a glorying not in human exertion, or in ritual action, but in ethnic identity;[19] to insist that Gentiles must be circumcised is to assume that God's purpose means the triumph of Israel as a nation state, whose supremacy is acknowledged by those who seek to become part of it by their crossing the ritual boundaries which divide Gentile from Jew.[20]

I suspect this also provides the key to the puzzling 3:19—the law given through angels ("in hand of mediator" probably in apposition to "ordained through angels" in the light of the next clause). Anyone familiar with the Jewish understanding of the one God's ordering of his creation and of the nations within it, would be familiar also with the idea of God having appointed guardian angels for each state (Deut 32:8–9; Sir 17:17; Jub 15:31–32; 1 Enoch 20:5; Targ. Ps Jon on Gen 11:7–8). The usual corollary in Jewish

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[17] Hence also 2:21: if righteousness was still in terms of the law, still included a covenantal nomistic "us and them" distinction between Jews and Gentiles, then Christ's death was "in vain" (since it had not ended the covenantal nomistic function of the law as a dividing line which excluded Gentiles as such from the blessings of the covenant promise).

[18] Cf. particularly J. L. Martyn, "A Law-Observant Mission to Gentiles: the Background of Galatians," *Michigan Quarterly Review* 22 (1983) 221–36 (here 231–32); reprinted in *SJT* 38 (1985) 307–24 (here 318–20); also "Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul's Letter to the Galatians," *NTS* 31 (1985) 410–24. My exegesis does not exclude the possibility that Paul was reacting to his "opponents" at this point; so advocated by Martyn, and earlier by C. K. Barrett, "The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians" (1976), in *Essays on Paul* (London: SPCK, 1982) 154–70, who appositely cites *Jub* 16:17–18 as an indication of the sort of exposition they would probably have used. Note also 1 Macc 2:16. See now particularly G. Bouwman, "Die Hagar- und Sara-Perikope (Gal 4:21–31)," *ANRW* II.25.4 (1987) 3135–55.

[19] W. Schmithals' threadbare hypothesis falls apart here in his argument that the "glorying in the flesh" is expressed in a Gnostic "contempt for the flesh" ("The Heretics in Galatia," *Paul and the Gnostics* [Nashville: Abingdon, 1972] 55). Not Gnostic, but ethnic identity is the issue at this point.

[20] This false evaluation of circumcision and flesh means also a failure to recognize the proper function of the law (3:19; 4:8–10) and so also to keep it (3:10; 6:13; cf. Rom 2:17–29).

thought was that God, having appointed angels over other nations, kept Israel for himself, with no mediator interposing. The point Paul is probably making is that to treat the law in such an exclusivist, restrictive way is equivalent to treating the law as though it was given through Israel's guardian angels, or indeed, as though the law itself was Israel's guardian angel (the implication of 4:8–10, coming as it does at the end of 3:23–4:10); hence also the definition of the characteristic state of the Jews as "under the law" as a ruling power (3:23; 4:4–5, 21; 5:21).[21] To thus regard the law as a national identity marker, as a boundary dividing Jew from Gentile, is in effect to deny the oneness of God.

Even this treatment of the law is not unreservedly negative. There was a positive side to this giving of the law to Israel. It gave the covenant people a way of dealing with sin in the period of time prior to the coming of Christ (3:19);[22] the law (guardian angel) served as a guide and guardian for Israel until the promise could be fulfilled in Christ (3:23–4:7). But now that Christ has come the promise is open to Gentile as well as Jew on the original conditions. Consequently, to return under the oversight of the law in its role as guardian of national rights and prerogatives is to return to childish subserviency and servility, is to deny the fullness of the promise.

The upshot is that Paul is able to pose a different alternative from that usually posed by Judaism. Judaism asserted: within the law=within the covenant. Paul in contrast asserted: within Christ=within the covenant; within the law=outside Christ (5:4).

In short, Paul's attitude to the law in Galatians has regularly been misperceived as more unyieldingly negative than it is. The misunderstanding has been based on a misperception of "works of the law"="good works," and of 3:10 as requiring perfect compliance to the law.[23] But once the point has been grasped that Paul's chief target is a covenantal nomism

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[21] Here I dispute such views as those of J. W. Drane, *Paul: Libertine or Legalist?* (London: SPCK, 1975), that 3:19 amounts to "a categorical denial of the divine origin of the Torah" (34), or of H. Hubner, *Law in Paul's Thought* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1984), that 3:19 means that the law "is the product of demonic angelic powers" (24–36), both of which read too much into the text and ignore the context of Jewish thought, where the association of angels in the giving of the law was quite familiar and unthreatening (Deut 33:2 LXX; *Jub* 1:29ff.; Philo, *Som.* 1:143; Josephus, *Ant* 15:136; cf. Acts 7:38, 53; Heb 2:2). So too I must register my dissent with Howard, *Paul,* 60–61, and L. Gaston, "Paul and the Torah," *Antisemitism and the Foundations of Christianity,* ed. A. T. Davies (New York: Paulist, 1979) 62–64, who maintain that "under the law" could include (Howard) or even specifically designate (Gaston) the Gentile situation.

[22] I see no grounds within this phase of Paul's argument to take 3:19 ("the law was added for the sake of transgressions") in a negative way (as most modern commentators)=to multiply transgressions. That reads Gal 3:19 too much through the differently slanted and more careful argument of Rom 5:20. Here Paul is explaining the positive side of covenantal nomism in the period before Christ. Likewise the point of 3:21 is not totally to dismiss the law; the mistake Paul objects to is the assumption that the law fulfills the role of the promise (giving life) as well as its own role (regulating life within the covenant [2:12], particularly in the period before Christ).

[23] This is the hub of Hubner's consistent misinterpretation of Paul's treatment of the law in Galatians in his *Law.* His insistence that 3:10 has in view "the primarily *quantitative* demand of the law that all . . . its stipulations be followed out, so that whoever transgresses against even a single one of these stipulations is accursed" (38) ignores the facts that "doing what the law requires" includes the provision of atonement for failure (see

understood in restrictively nationalistic terms–"works of the law" as maintaining Jewish identity, "the curse of the law" as that which excludes Gentiles as such from the covenant promise–then it becomes clear that Paul's negative remarks had a more limited thrust, and that so long as the law is not similarly misunderstood (as defining and defending the prerogatives of a particular group) it still has a positive role to play in the expression of God's purpose and will.

4. The last main part of my thesis is the claim that Galatians is Paul's first sustained attempt to deal with the issue of covenantal nomism within the new movement we call Christianity.

4.1 The main ground for the claim is that covenantal nomism does not seem to have been an issue before the Antioch incident (2:11–14). Here the relation between 2:1–10 and 2:11–14 is important. What had been settled at Jerusalem (2:1–10) was the issue of circumcision. What emerged at Antioch (2:11–14) was a different issue–food laws. Just how different was at the heart of the disagreement.

If we assume that the "certain individuals from James" (2:12) had accepted the Jerusalem agreement (however unwillingly, perhaps), then it follows that they must have regarded the agreement not to require circumcision of Gentile converts as permitting a concession, rather than as conceding a principle. This they may well have regarded as simply extending the degree of hospitality to God-fearers which diaspora Judaism had hitherto regularly practiced (not least in Syria–Jos. *War* 2:462–63; 7:50–51). That they did not think the principle of covenantal nomism had thereby been conceded is probably indicated by 2:10; almsgiving was such a fundamental expression of covenantal righteousness (Dan 4:27; Sir 29:12; 40:24; Tob 4:10; 12:9; 14:10–11)[24] that Paul's ready agreement to maintain the practice could easily be read as an expression of his own readiness to maintain the principal of covenantal nomism. Moreover, since the tradition of Gentile sympathizers willingly embracing the ancestral customs of the Jews ("judaizing") was so well established, the men from James may well have assumed that the table-fellowship in Antioch was on a judaizing basis. This would be sufficient to explain why the issue did not emerge earlier from the Jerusalem side.

On Paul's side the agreement at Jerusalem was probably taken as a point of principle. As we might now say, Paul understood circumcision in covenantal nomistic terms (not simply as a rite of entry), as the first act of a continuing compliance to the law. The agreement in Jerusalem would be understood by him as providing a precedent for the downplaying of other boundary-defining, Gentile-excluding commandments. However, if, once again, 2:10 is anything to go by, the issue was not yet so clearly defined for him. He warmly agreed to a continuing emphasis on almsgiving without seeing it as a qualifying of the agreement on circumcision. Perhaps the relief at winning the day on his principal objective made him eager to assent to this one request (requirement?), without sufficient thought for how it would be understood in Jerusalem. Or perhaps the tie-in between covenantal nomism and Jewish ethnic identity had not yet become sharply enough focused for him (after all, any almsgiving by Gentile to Jew could be readily understood

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above n. 3); and that Paul equally expects "the whole law" to be "fulfilled" by believers (5:14).

[24] See further K. Berger, "Almosen für Israel: zum historischen Kontext der paulinischen Kollekte," *NTS* 23 (1976–77) 180–204.

within such a mind-set as part of Gentile acknowledgment of Jewish hegemony—Isa 45:14; 60:5–17; 61:6; Mic 4:13; Tob 13:11; 1QM 12:13–15).

Whatever the precise facts on either side, and whatever the shared or differing understandings of the Jerusalem agreement,[25] the Antioch incident itself seems to have come as a surprise to both sides—the men from James surprised at Jewish Christians disregard of the food laws to such an extent—Paul surprised that there still was an issue here. At all events, the Antioch incident seems to have been the first major dispute on the issue of food laws, or in more general terms, on the issue of whether covenantal nomism as hitherto understood was still binding on Jewish Christians.

4.2 2:14–16 does look as though Paul is marking out a step beyond a previously agreed position. Or, to be more precise, in these verses Paul seems to be making explicit a theological logic which he may well previously have taken for granted (and so not previously formulated) but which others (even close associates) had not recognized or agreed to, as the Antioch incident demonstrated. What he (now) saw with clarity was that the gospel to Gentile through faith relativized the nationalistic expression of covenantal nomism, and it is this which he (probably for the first time) expressed at Antioch to Peter. Since Peter and the other Jewish Christians at Antioch probably did not accept Paul's argument at that time,[26] Paul uses the opportunity of this letter to Galatia to restate, and presumably to strengthen, the argument used then.

The issue is clearly posed in ethinic terms—Jew and Gentile, "living like Gentiles," "judaizing" (2:14). Here the traditional parameters of covenantal nomism are in view—they can be defined simply as "not living like the Gentiles" (cf. e.g. Jub 6:35; 15:34; Pss Sol 8:13). Likewise the traditional life-style of the God-fearer—"judaizing." The assumption of the men from James and of Peter and the other Jewish Christians is clearly implied: in order for the Jewish Christian to continue to practice his covenantal nomism, the Gentile God-fearer/Christian should be prepared to judaize=live like a Jew. What Paul cannot stomach, however, is that this should be made a requirement for faith. The use of the same verb in 2:3 and 2:14 ("compel") is not accidental. What Paul objects to is that the agreement made in Jerusalem is being set at naught by the *de facto* compulsion of the Jewish Christians' behavior in regard to table-fellowship at Antioch.

The sense of ethnic boundary and distinctiveness is again to the fore in v 15—"Jews by nature," "Gentile sinners." And since "sinner" indicates the law-less person (e.g., Ps 27:3; 54:3; etc.; 1 Macc 1:34; 2:44), again the implication is clear, that the issue focuses on the function of the law as defining the Gentile *per se* as "sinner" (Ps 9:17; 1 Macc 2:48; Pss Sol 1:1; 2:1–2; Luke 6:33/Matt 5:47).[27] To be noted is the fact that Paul expresses himself in traditionally Jewish terms ("we are Jews by nature"); he speaks as one who is

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[25] I question whether it is right to speak of a "unilateral reversal of the earlier agreement" on the part of James—so P. J. Achtemeier, *The Quest for Unity in the New Testament Church* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 54. Barrett's formulation is probably nearer the mark: "what agreement there was had probably been inadequately thought through" (*Freedom*, 12).

[26] That Paul's plea to Peter was unsuccessful is now accepted by most commentators. See, e.g., Achtemeier, *Quest*, 59 and those cited by him in nn. 8–9; and see further below.

[27] A. Suhl completely ignores this whole dimension of the historical context when he attempts to defend the paraphrase, "We, of course Jews by nature and not stemming from the Gentiles, are nevertheless sinners (as much as them)" ("Der Galaterbrief—Situation und Argumentation," *ANRW* II.25.4 [1987] 3102–6).

consciously within Judaism, and conscious of his distinctiveness from the Gentile; he speaks as one within the law, who had traditionally seen the Gentile as outside the bounds marked out by the law, and so by definition a sinner. Since it is this very distinction which he will be going on to question, it must be that Paul is trying to argue from an agreed position and perspective within Judaism in an attempt to lead those who share it into a new position and perspective. It is probable also that the movement in self-understanding which he is thereby trying to encourage was a reflection of his own changed self-understanding. But he remains a Jew; it is still an inner-Jewish dispute.[28] And he is still able to identify himself with the older mind-set, implying that the full implications of his own changed perspective are still only becoming clear to him.

Hence the much misunderstood opening to 2:16, which I still think has to be read as follows: "We are Jews by nature . . . knowing that someone is not justified by works of law except through faith in Jesus Christ. . . ."[29] Paul continues to locate himself within the Jewish mind-set but now the traditional Jewish perspective as qualified by faith in Christ.[30] What is expressed here is the viewpoint of Peter and the other Jewish Christians at Antioch. They are all at one so far as the gospel call for faith in Jesus Christ is concerned. The Jewish Christian understanding is that this is the only qualification necessary for covenantal nomism. The life of righteousness within the covenant is still defined by works of the law. But that alone, the Jewish Christians now believe, is not enough for acceptance by God and final acquittal. Faith in God's Messiah is also necessary. "No one is justified by works of law unless they also believe in Messiah Jesus."

This is Paul's starting point, as his own Jewish identity was in v 15. But he goes on from that to underline the point that faith in Christ Jesus has been exercised and has been fully effective without works of the law. Experience has demonstrated that God's acceptance is not conditional on covenantal nomism, certainly as so far usually understood. Experience of grace has given sufficient proof that this is how Ps 143:2 should be

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[28] See further K. Haacker, "Paulus und das Judentum in Galaterbrief," *Gottes Augapfel Beiträge zur Erneuerung des Verhältnisses von Christen und Juden*, hrsg. E. Brocke & J. Sein (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1986) 95–111; also W. D. Davies' critical review of H. D. Betz, *Galatians* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) in *Jewish and Pauline Studies* (London: SPCK, 1984) 172–88.

[29] See further my "New Perspective."

[30] I remain quite unconvinced by the now renewedly popular argument that "the faith of Christ" means "Christ's faith" rather than "faith in Christ." The latter is wholly in line with the sustained thrust of the letter, including the fundamental distinction between (human) faith and (human) works; whereas the latter introduces a quite different tack. For example, the most sustained recent treatment, R. B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ* (SBLDS 56; Chico: Scholars, 1983) chap. 4, finds itself drawn into arguing that effectively all the key *pistis* references in Gal 3:1–14 denote the faithfulness of Christ. But the relevant *pistis* references of 3:7–9 are bracketed by talk of Abraham's believing and Abraham's *pistis* (vv 6, 9), and are more naturally understood as carrying the same sense of *pistis*. And 3:14 is more naturally understood to speak of the mode of *receiving* ("through faith") than of the mode of bestowing. The problem with "the faith of Christ" interpretation is that to be sustainable it must draw in most other *pistis* references, leaving the verbal reference to human believing without a noun counterpart at important points in the argument, the mode of human reception thus unspecified, and references like Gal 5:5–6 in some confusion.

understood: "no one will be justified before God"; and that must include anyone who depends on his Jewish status and praxis for justification or who thinks of himself as righteous because he lives in accordance with the ancestral customs.

Here again, therefore, the very structure of the argument seems to indicate a transition in Paul's own thinking and perspective, Paul working through the implications of his understanding of the gospel, Paul forced by the turn of events in Antioch to bring to clear expression consequences and corollaries which he had previously practiced without having had to spell out their theological rationale.

4.3 A further indication that there has been some development in Paul's own position, or at least in his articulation of it as it related to more traditional Jewish perspectives, is the change in Paul's attitude towards the Jerusalem apostles as it becomes evident in 2:1–10. In this passage the tension between a readiness to accept their authority and a clear distancing of himself from them is quite evident.[31]

On the one hand he readily acknowledges that their reception of his understanding of the gospel would determine whether his work had been or was in vain (2:2). He expresses himself with great care when he describes the actual encounter in Jerusalem (2:3ff), but the implication of v 3 is that Paul recognized the Jerusalem authorities right to require circumcision, if they so chose; his relief that they did not "compel" Titus to be circumcised is fairly evident. As is his relief that they "added nothing to him" (2:6), so far as his understanding and preaching of the gospel was concerned. But the implication is the same: he acknowledged thereby that they had a right to make such stipulations. Hence too the readiness to accept the obligation which was actually laid down in v 10, to remember the poor. There is even an implication that he recognized the pillar apostles' authority to confirm his mission to the Gentiles (2:9—the right hand of fellowship given in order that Barnabas and Paul should go to the Gentiles, just as Peter and the others should go to the circumcised).

At the same time, Paul also clearly wants to distance himself from the Jerusalem authorities. He describes them as "those reputed to be of some account," "those regarded as pillars" (2:6, 9), phrases neatly chosen to indicate that they were highly esteemed, but not necessarily by him. In v 10 he coyly omits the verb which would have been most appropriate to describe the obligation laid upon him by the pillar apostles, lest, presumably, it seem that he had agreed to an element of traditional covenantal nomism at their behest. Clearest of all is the parenthesis inserted into v 6: "what they (the pillar apostles) once were matters nothing to me; God takes no account of human evaluation of status." Here Paul is almost explicit in his implication that he had once accorded the Jerusalem apostles an authority which he no longer recognized and to which he was no longer willing to submit.

The best way to explain the tension between these rather different attitudes to the Jerusalem authorities is that they reflect different stages in Paul's own career and mission. There was a period when he acknowledged and would have been ready to defer to the authority of Peter and the others. Presumably this was the period when he was active as a member of the church in Antioch. That is to say, during his time both as a teacher in Antioch (if we follow Acts 13:1) and as a missionary commissioned by Antioch (Acts 13:2–3).[32] The decisive factor here, presumably, would be that Antioch saw itself as a

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[31] In the following paragraphs I draw on my "The Relationship between Paul and Jerusalem according to Galatians 1 and 2," *NTS* 28 (1982) 461–78.

[32] I take "apostles" in Acts 14:4, 14 in the sense emissaries/missionaries of Antioch (cf.

daughter church of Jerusalem. Consequently Paul probably attended the Jerusalem consultation (Gal 2:1–10) as a delegate from Antioch. All during this period, and immediately thereafter, he recognized and operated within the terms of Jerusalem authority. The degree of mutual acceptance implies that covenantal nomism as such had not yet become an issue.

That issue only came to the surface in the Antioch incident (2:11–14). Whether it would have exploded into outright disagreement at Jerusalem if the pillar apostles had after all tried to "compel" Titus to be circumcised we cannot tell. Quite likely the answer is Yes. Paul was sufficiently clear-headed on the circumcision issue to fight his corner with the utmost resolution (2:5). But the acceptance of his argument at that time was probably enough to prevent the issue emerging as a clear-cut either-or-*either* covenantal nomism *or* faith. What is clear enough is that when such compulsion was exerted by the men from James and by the acquiescence of Peter and the other Jewish Christians to what they demanded, at that point Paul drew the line (2:14ff). And his rejection of the demands of covenantal nomism as they affected the Gentile Christians was at the same time a rejection of the Jerusalem authority which laid them down.

Here again, therefore, there is sufficient indication that the Antioch incident was a decisive factor in the development of Paul's understanding of the gospel: both of how it related to covenantal nomism, and what that meant for Gentile believers in relation to the hitherto unquestioned assumption that covenant membership was bound up with Jewish ethnic identity.

4.4 To complete the argument I should at least attempt a brief response to those[33] who claim that Paul's attitude to the law (and so also to covenantal nomism) was a consequence of his Damascus road conversion and was a more or less immediate consequence. Only a brief response is possible, and, hopefully, necessary.

In the first place, I find no evidence to indicate that the Hellenists had already "abandoned" the law. The only material which explicitly claims to express Hellenist views (Acts 7) is directed against the temple, and not against the law. In Acts 7 the attitude to the law is positive (7:38, 53). That temple and law were tightly bound together is, of course, true (the laws of sacrifice, etc.); hence the formulation of the accusation against Stephen in Acts 6:14. But it requires no argument to claim that the law could be held in high esteem even when the temple was heavily criticized or, subsequently, ceased to be a factor in the life and praxis of Judaism. We cannot assume therefore that what Paul was converted to was a Hellenist rejection of the law.

Paul's persecution of the church was certainly an expression of his zeal for the law (Gal 1:13–14; Phil 3:6). This should not be taken as implying a wholesale rejection of the law by the Hellenists who were being persecuted. The key word here is "zeal." It indicates the attitude of a zealot, one who wanted to define the boundaries round the covenant more sharply, to mark off the righteous more clearly from the sinner. It expresses an attitude evident in such writings as 1 Enoch 1–5, the Psalms of Solomon and the DSS, and also, it would appear, among the Pharisees—a factional or even sectarian attitude, which was prepared to condemn and even to persecute fellow Jews whose loyalty to the ancestral traditions was not so firm and whose practice seemed to question and so to threaten these

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2 Cor 8:23; Phil 2:25), since according to Acts 1:21–22 neither Paul nor Barnabas could be accounted apostles=witnesses of Christ's resurrection (as claimed by Paul for himself, 1 Cor 9:1; 15:7–11).

[33] Particularly S. Kim, *The Origin of Paul's Gospel* (WUNT 2:4; Tubingen: Mohr, 1981).

more tightly drawn boundaries.[34] Thus we should probably envisage a persecution by Paul of Jews who *in their own reckoning* were being properly observant of what the law required—a condemnation of fellow Jews equivalent to that of the Pharisees by the Qumran covenanters, or of the Saduccees by the Psalms of Solomon, or subsequently of the fainthearted by the Zealots.

Paul's own view of his conversion is not of a conversion as such, including not of a conversion in his attitude to the law, far less of a conversion *from* Judaism, but of a commissioning to go to the Gentiles (Gal 1:15–16). His acknowledgment of the crucified as Lord did not lead him at once to the conclusion that the law which counted the crucified as accursed was an ass, wholly discredited and disowned by God. Such a line of reasoning appears nowhere in Paul's writing. The theological logic focuses rather on the relation between the curse of the law and the Gentile. For Christ to have died as one cursed by the law meant that he had been put outside the covenant, had become, in effect, like a Gentile. For God to have vindicated this Christ therefore meant that that boundary line between Gentile and Jew no longer counted with God. God accepted the outsider; his promise could now be accepted by the Gentiles without their coming within the boundary of the law (3:13–14).[35] The seed and principle of Paul's full-blown theology of justification was thus given him from the first; which is why he puts so much emphasis on the "revelation of Christ" (1:12) in the letter. But evidently the full implications of it were not worked out and did not become clear in these early years—presumably because the ambiguity of God-fearers and proselytes both believing in Jesus and willing to judaize to some extent (as they had done before they heard about Jesus) meant that the issue had not yet come into focus. Certainly it is hard to believe that Jew and Gentile believers in Messiah Jesus had completely abandoned the law in Antioch for a decade or more before it came to the attention of the more conservative brothers in Judea or caused any kind of surprise or comment.

In short, the evidence of Galatians seems to indicate that an evolving situation at Antioch, and a double confrontation with what had hitherto usually been regarded as central in covenantal nomism, brought home to Paul what he now saw always to have been implicit in his initial commissioning to the Gentiles. It is this implication for covenantal nomism which he works out, probably for the first time in such detail, in his letter to his converts in Galatia.

5. A final corollary may also be drawn with regard to the occasion for the writing of Galatians itself. The passion and urgency of the letter in its restatement of the argument which had failed in Antioch suggests that the letter was written not so very long after that failure. The following sequence of events therefore suggests itself.

Paul was defeated at Antioch. However compelling the logic of faith which Paul spelled out in his rejoinder to Peter on that occasion it probably was insufficient to shake Peter himself or to win the Jewish Christians back to the practice they had abandoned. Had Paul been successful it is almost inconceivable that he would not have said so (as he had with regard to the earlier confrontation in 2:1–10), since an agreement in Antioch on

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[34] Cf. Haacker (above n. 28) 104–7, and my forthcoming commentary on Rom 10:2 in *Romans* (WBC 38B). Despite Sanders' rejection of the claim that Paul's persecution of the church was tied up with his conviction as a Pharisee, it must be significant to the contrary that Paul uses the same word, "zeal," to characterize both his commitment to the ancestral customs of his people (that is, as a Pharisee, Gal 1:14) and his energy in persecution (Phil 3:6).

[35] See the fuller exposition in my "Light to the Gentiles" (above n. 16).

Paul's terms would have gone a long way to counter the current threat in Galatia. This defeat at Antioch resulted not only in the transformation in his attitude to Jerusalem (already noted—4.3), but that would inevitably also include a breach with Barnabas (who had taken the opposite side from Paul in the Antioch incident) and a breach with Antioch itself. Paul leaves Antioch and embarks on a fresh round of evangelism, eventually establishing his base first in Corinth and then subsequently in Ephesus, now in effect an independent missionary, jealous of encroachments on his sphere of work (2 Cor 10:13–16). It may be indicative of his state of mind following the Antioch incident that at first he had no clear sense of direction (according to Acts 16:6ff.), and that in Thessalonica his preaching evidently avoided any mention of the now controversial teaching on justification and placed the emphasis of the gospel elsewhere.

In the meantime it is likely that the new policy and practice at Antioch would be consolidated, with the terms on which Gentile believers could be accepted within the community of *Christianoi* more carefully defined to enable Jewish believers to maintain their covenantal nomism. It would also be natural for the Antioch believers to assume that the churches established by their missionaries should follow suit; as Antioch followed the lead given from Jerusalem, so it would be expected that the churches of the Antiochene mission should follow the lead given by Antioch. This is probably confirmed by the "Jerusalem decree" which is addressed specifically to the churches in Antioch, Syria and Cilicia (Acts 15:23), a letter and judgment which, significantly, James later claims as his own (Acts 21:25).

If the churches in Galatia were those established by Paul during his time as a missionary from Antioch it would follow that delegates would soon be sent to them to inform them of the terms agreed at Antioch. And if the churches in question were established by Paul after the break with Antioch, it would still be natural for Antiochene emissaries to assume that the virtually unanimous consensus at Antioch (Gentiles as well as Jews) should set the pattern for all new churches.[36]

But the crisis in Galatia is over circumcision, not over food laws. This fact can still be contained within the above developing scenario. All we need assume is that some at least from Jerusalem and Antioch used the same logic as Paul, but in the reverse direction. Paul argued in effect that the agreement in Jerusalem regarding circumcision undermined the whole pattern of covenantal nomism as hitherto understood and practiced. His opponents no doubt argued conversely that the Antioch incident had confirmed the principle of covenantal nomism, and drew the natural conclusion that circumcision should also be practiced, as the first act of covenantal nomism.[37] It looks as though they were remaining faithful to the Jerusalem agreement, at least to the extent that they did not require circumcision as a *sine qua non*. But that would not have prevented them urging it as a logical corollary to a covenantal nomistic perspective and almost inescapable as such.

Whatever the precise facts of the matter, it is not hard to envisage the resulting sequence of events. Pauline loyalists sent word to Paul of the demands being made by the newly

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[36] This makes better sense than J. Munck's overreaction against the Tübingen school in his argument that Paul was confronted in Galatia only by judaizing *Gentile* Christians (*Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* [London: SCM, 1959] chap. 4). In particular his claim that "Jewish Christianity carried on its mission only within Israel" (130) is highly suspect (see further n. 18 above).

[37] Cf. Martyn in n. 18 above.

arrived Antiochenes. It would presumably take some time to reach him; since his movements had not followed any predetermined plan the Galatian churches might not have known where to find him; quite possibly it did not arrive till he was already established in Corinth, and after the Thessalonian correspondence. But when it did arrive his reaction was predictable; he exploded in indignation. The importance of restating his understanding of justification by faith became paramount. If the churches of Galatia abandoned him on this score the whole of his missionary work since the Antioch incident would be put in jeopardy (all the more so if the churches in question were in northern Galatia); his gospel would be counted a no-gospel and cut off from its Jewish roots; he would be reckoned simply as a Jewish apostate and those groups which remained faithful to him be counted as an unacceptable syncretistic fringe sect. He had to take a stand, to restate with greater force and detail the argument which had failed at Antioch.

And so he wrote Galatians.[38]

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[38] In the much debated question of Galatians' date I therefore tend to side with those who place it early (such as Zahn, J. Weiss; cf. Betz), rather than as the earliest (as Burkitt and Bruce), or as written in the middle 50s (e.g. Lightfoot, Kümmel, and Suhl), or as one of the latest of Paul's letters (as J. Knox and Beker).

The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians

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In his letter to Galatian Christians Paul responds to a problem that has arisen because, following his initial preaching and teaching in this region, other Christians have offered a different interpretation of the gospel. Those who have entered the Galatian churches after Paul insist that circumcision and keeping of (at least portions of) the law of Moses are a necessity for full membership in the people of Israel. The advent of Jesus Christ means that Gentiles may become full partners in Israel, but it does not in any way call into question the law itself. Paul's letter responds in the sharpest manner to those who find this "other gospel" attractive, arguing that Gentile Christians *must not* take on the observance of the law. Paul's strategy in dealing with this problem is to argue both from the experience of believers and from the interpretation of scripture that the law belongs to a past age and *must not* be observed by Gentiles who are "in Christ." While one could scarcely speak of a consensus among Pauline scholars, this scenario would at least be typical of the ways in which Galatians is read.[1]

For the purpose of identifying the theology reflected in this particular Pauline letter, it is important to ask whether Paul's response to this problem constitutes the theology of the letter. That is, in order to discern the theology of Galatians, do we look primarily at Paul's response to the stated problem? Apparently H. D. Betz would answer that question in the affirmative. His discussion of the theology of Galatians focuses on the problem, which he takes to be the threat posed to the freedom of the Galatians by the outsiders who insist that Gentile believers in Christ must submit to the law of Moses if they are to be full members of the people of Israel. Betz's presentation of the theology of the letter thus delineates Paul's arguments against the position of his opponents, identifying as central Paul's concept of freedom.[2]

Despite his careful articulation of the relationship between coherence and contingency in Paul's letters, J. Christiaan Beker's interpretation of Galatians appears to tip the balance toward contingency by identifying the theology of this letter with the argument Paul

[1] For discussions of the situation behind the letter, see the following: J. B. Tyson, "Paul's Opponents in Galatia," *NovT* 4 (1968) 241–54; R. Jewett, "The Agitators and the Galatian Congregation," *NTS* (1970–71) 198–212; J. Eckert, *Die urchristliche Verkündigung im Streit zwischen Paulus und seinen Gegnern nach dem Galaterbrief* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1971); W. Schmithals, *Paul and the Gnostics* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972); G. Howard, *Paul: Crisis in Galatia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 1–19; B. H. Brinsmead, *Galatians: Dialogical Response to Opponents* (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1982); J. Louis Martyn, "A Law-Observant Mission to the Gentiles: The Background of Galatians," *SJT* 38 (1985) 307–324; T. David Gordon, "The Problem at Galatia," *Int* 41 (1987) 32–43.

[2] *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Church in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979) 28–33.

makes against the position taken by his opponents.[3] Because his Jewish-Christian opponents have presented a version of salvation history which stresses the continuity between Abraham, the law, circumcision, and Christ, Paul is forced to insist on the disjuncture between law and Christ, between law and faith. Although Beker insists that the function of Paul's discussion about Abraham and the law in Galatians 3 can only be understood within the "total context of the letter,"[4] he follows the conventional wisdom in distinguishing between the "personal" part of Galatians (Chapters 1–2) and the "material considerations" in 3:1–5:25.[5]

It is worth noting that both these understandings of the letter focus almost exclusively on Chapters 3–4. Indeed, analyses of Galatians almost universally identify Chapters 3–4 as the theological center of the letter. Since the first two chapters are regarded as a defense of Paul's apostleship, they do not enter the discussion of "theology." Similarly, the last two chapters are frequently bracketed off as paraenesis which, by virtue of its traditional character, is not regarded as shedding light on Paul's theology. The result of this analysis of the letter is that discussions about the theology of Galatians take Chapters 3–4 as their starting point and then move backward to Chapters 1–2 and forward to Chapters 5–6.

Such a reading of Galatians has the effect of virtually ignoring Chapters 1–2 (with the possible exception of 2:16–21). These chapters enter the picture when the goal is to reconstruct something of a "life of Paul" or the history of early Christianity, but not when the issue is assessing the theological argument of the letter.[6] Similarly, Chapters 5–6 are bracketed off as pragmatic advice of a traditional character, advice that bears no material relationship to the preceding chapters.[7]

If we attend not simply to Chapters 3–4 but to the whole of the letter,[8] an alternative possibility emerges, namely, that, although the letter arises out of the issue of the law, the underlying theological convictions that shape Paul's response to the problem derive not from his interpretation of the law but from his christology. The theology reflected in Galatians is first of all about Jesus Christ and the new creation God has begun in him (1:1–4, 6:14–15), and only in light of that christocentrism can Paul's remarks concerning the law be understood.[9] The word christocentrism is the right word, in that Paul

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[3] Beker himself acknowledges that this is the case (*Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980] 56–58).

[4] *Paul the Apostle,* 41.

[5] *Paul the Apostle,* 47. Elsewhere I have attempted to show the problems with this conventional notion that Galatians 1–2 deal entirely with matters of self-defense. See "Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm," *NovT* 28 (1986) 302–26.

[6] Ibid., 311–13.

[7] On the relationship between the exhortations of Galatians 5–6 and the theological argument in Chapters 1–4, see Richard B. Hays, "Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 268–90.

[8] I take this methodological point to be consistent with George Kennedy's comment that Paul's audience would have anticipated that the argument in the letter would develop cumulatively (*New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984] 5, 146).

[9] So also J. Louis Martyn, who writes: "And even in the parts of Galatians that are heavily concerned with the Law, it is clear that Paul's theological point of departure is not the Law, but rather the advent of Christ, and specifically Christ's faithful death" ("Paul and His Jewish-Christian Interpreters," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* [1988] 4).

presupposes from beginning to end that there is only one gospel (1:6–9), the singularity of which consists of the revelation of Jesus Christ as God's son whose crucifixion inaugurates the new age. This singular gospel results in a singular transformation for those called as believers, who are themselves moved into a new identity in Christ alone (2:19–21, 3:26–29).[10] The new creation results in the nullification of previous identifications, whether those identifications come from within the law (1:11–17) or from outside it (4:8–11). The position to be defended here, then, is that the governing antithesis in Galatians is between Christ/new creation and the cosmos, and that the antitheses between Christ and the law, and between the cross and circumcision, follow from this central premise.

Three initial objections to this approah require brief comment. First, it may be thought that the argument that the theology of the letter is to be found elsewhere than in Paul's problem-solving strategy is tantamount to the view that Paul's theology is a timeless essence expressed differently in different contexts. That is not my intent. Indeed, a side glance at Romans (were that permitted) would show the dramatic difference between the christocentrism of Galatians and the theocentrism of Romans. My argument is not that Paul takes from his theological storehouse the appropriate response for this setting, but that the theology expressed in the letter is not determined by merely adding up responses to a particular problem. Just because the present problem concerns the law does not mean that, in Paul's perspective, the central theological issue at stake is the law. It is entirely possible that the Galatians themselves did not see the need to submit to the law as a theological issue. For them, it may have been an act of social identification or a pragmatic response to the demand of the outsiders. Whatever their view of the nature of the demand for circumcision, Paul sees it as a theological problem.

The second objection arises as a result of introducing the term christology, which we customarily associate with the systematic tasks of Christian theology in later periods. I am not suggesting that Paul's view of the relationship between divinity and humanity in Christ or his view of the relationship between Christ and God dictates his argument in Galatians. Nevertheless, it is his understanding of who Jesus Christ is and what Jesus Christ has accomplished and inaugurated that stands as the focus of this letter.

Third, it may be objected that it is true but not important to say that Galatians is primarily to be understood as a christological statement. Paul makes use of traditional christologoumena, e.g., in 1:4, but those are only gestures to common tradition, gestures that have no impact on his argument and no significance for reading the letter itself. It will be my objective to show that these traditional expressions are not mere concessions to Paul's intended audience, but that they constitute an important part of the argument itself.[11]

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[10] The phrase "the singularity of the gospel" comes from John Schütz's discussion of Galatians in *Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 121. In my judgment students of Paul have seriously neglected that work, in part at least because Schütz was several years ahead of the discussion of Paul in the context of the social sciences. On the issue of transformation in Paul, see John T. Koenig, "The Motif of Transformation in the Pauline Epistles: A History-of-Religions/Exegetical Study" (Ph.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary, 1970); B. R. Gaventa, *From Darkness to Light: Aspects of Conversion in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 40–46.

[11] This is consistent with the methodological procedure employed by Jouette Bassler

"Why *Not* Observe the Law?"

We begin with a question that might be addressed to Paul in response to a reading of Galatians. Perhaps a group of believers from among the Galatians approach Paul, eager to find a solution that will satisfy both Paul and their more recent visitors. The question from this imaginary "compromise party" runs as follows:

> Why make such a point of saying that Christians *must not* follow the law? Perhaps the Gentiles will benefit from keeping some portions of the law. It surely cannot adversely affect their Christian lives, and it might help to restrain their enthusiastic or libertinistic tendencies. Would not the external sign of circumcision ensure that Gentile Christians identified themselves with the people of Israel and their God? You are perhaps right to contend that Gentiles are not *obliged* to follow the law, but why do you insist that they *must not do so?*

What arguments might be inferred from the letter in response to this imaginary proposal for a reasonable compromise between the two conflicting positions? Several possibilities can be considered and discarded. As is widely recognized, Paul's initial argument against the law is that it does not justify. Justification comes about only *ek pisteōs Christou* (2:16–21). To this may be added his reminder to the Galatians that they received the spirit *ex akoēs pisteōs* and not *ex ergōn nomou* (3:1–5). Such statements do not adequately respond to the compromise position, however, since the compromise does not propose that the law saves or that the Galatians came to faith through the law, but only that the law might be profitable for identifying Gentiles with Israel and for curbing the temptation to sin.

A second kind of argument Paul employs is the priority of faith over the law in the history of Israel. Here, of course, Abraham enters the discussion, since God grants righteousness to Abraham on the basis of his faith, not on the basis of his observance of the law (3:6–9). Indeed, the law comes into the world some 430 years after the promise to Abraham, a promise made to faith (3:15–18). Again, this argument does not meet the position of the compromisers, who suggest (somewhat more emphatically this time) that, even if the law is historically secondary to faith and the promise made to Abraham, it still has the important functions, given by God, of setting Israel apart and protecting against evil.

Paul also claims that all who are *ex ergōn nomou* are under a curse (3:10–14) and that Christ's death on the cross, itself resulting in the law's curse, removes believers from that curse. Contrary to the way in which this passage is sometimes read, Paul does not conclude that Christ therefore nullifies or curses the law. The compromisers still have room to suggest that, even if Christ's death removes believers from the law's curse, its power to discipline and direct the behavior of believers is still in force and is still necessary.

These aspects of Paul's argument about the law do not seem effective as a response to the hypothetical question, "Why *not* observe the law?" One remaining feature of his

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in her study of Paul's use of the axiom of divine impartiality (*Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom* [SBLDS 59; Chico,CA: Scholars Press, 1982]). Bassler rightly contends that, instead of assuming that traditional formulations reveal nothing of Paul's own thought, students of Paul need to attend to the way in which he uses traditional affirmations.

argument even serves to reinforce the reasonableness of the compromisers' position, and that is Paul's contention that the law was intended as a protection (*paidagōgos*) against sin.[12] To be sure, Paul introduces this claim in connection with the argument that the law was a temporary measure, superseded by Christ, but even *in* Christ the law might be understood as a curb against sin. To our sense that this argument is something less than satisfying we may add George Kennedy's observation that Paul might easily have employed more common arguments against circumcision as unaesthetic and unnatural.[13]

This imaginary exchange deliberately omits the most dominant thread in Paul's comments about the law in order to highlight the fact that the argument regarding the law in Galatians 3–4 consists of statements used to bolster a previously chosen position.[14] That is, these are arguments which reinforce a position already taken, and it is that position, rather than these subordinate arguments, which leads us to understand what Paul's primary response to the compromise party would be.[15]

What the imaginary exchange deliberately omits is the antithesis Paul perceives between Christ and the law. Turning back now to Paul's comments about the law, we see that, as early as the letter's first reference to the law in 2:16, the law stands in direct opposition to Christ. One is either justified *ex ergōn nomou* or *dia pisteōs Iesou Christou* (2:16). The same kind of antithesis dominates much of the argument in Chapter 3. The Spirit came to the Galatians *either* through faith *or* through the law (3:1–5). The extremely complex section, 3:10–14, turns on this opposition, since Paul sets over against each other Hab 2:4 ("the righteous one will lives by faith," 3:11b) and Lev 18:5 ("the one who does these things will live by them," 3:12b) in order to show that the law is not from faith.

The baptismal formula employed in 3:26–29 makes it clear that Paul is not simply arguing against some defect in the law. Those who are baptized are baptized into Christ. That identification is not only primary; it is exclusive. There can be no identification both in Christ and under the law—not even under some portion of the law, understood as an aid for those in danger of succumbing to temptation in the form of libertinism.[16] Paul's

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[12] This understanding of the *paidagōgos* image in Galatians 3 is influenced by the work of David J. Lull in "'The Law Was Our Pedagogue': A Study in Galatians 3:19–25," *JBL* 105 (1986) 481–98. See also Norman Y. Young, "*Paidagōgos:* The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor," *NovT* 29 (1987) 150–76.

[13] *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism*, 151.

[14] In N. T. Wright's paper last year, he distinguished between the way in which an individual arrives at a conclusion and the arguments that same individual may employ when demonstrating that conclusion to others ("Towards a Synthesis of Pauline Theology: 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon," 13–15). Of course, Paul would insist that he did not choose this position; it was chosen for him (1:11–17).

[15] Here I am clearly influenced by the argument of E. P. Sanders that for Paul the solution precedes the problem (*Paul and Palestinian Judaism* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977] 442–47). Or, to put it as Sanders does elsewhere:

> Paul's various statements about the law are not the result of theoretical thought about the law as such, but spring from and serve other convictions. The main lines of his discussions about the law are determined by christology, soteriology (especially their universal aspects), and what we may call Christian behavior (*Paul the Law and the Jewish People* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983] 143).

[16] It has, of course, been argued that *nomos Christou* refers to just such a law, appropriate for the Messianic age (C. H. Dodd, "ENNOMOS CHRISTOU," *More New*

response to the compromisers' proposition is clear: There can be no compromise between Christ and the law. Compromise is the thing Paul cannot do, and that not for psychological or social reasons but for profoundly theological reasons.[17] There can be no compromising of the gospel's singular and exclusive location in Jesus Christ and in Christ alone.

This antithesis between Christ and the law becomes explicit in 5:1–6. To receive circumcision means that one derives no benefit from Christ (5:2). Circumcision obligates one to the whole law, which means that one is set apart from the grace of Christ. Again we find the expression "in Christ" used antithetically to circumcision (5:6). One may be under the law, or one may be in Christ, but it is impossible to be both.

The Singularity of the Gospel

We have seen that the antithesis between Christ and the law dominates Paul's argument regarding the law in Galatians 3–4, and the question arises whether this same pattern holds in the remainder of the letter. Since the term *nomos* does not appear until 2:16, the letter does not begin with an explicit antithesis between Christ and the law. Instead of an attack on the law, here we find an assertion about the singular character of the gospel and its claims.

The letter opens with a salutation that immediately focuses on Jesus Christ. While it is customary to see in 1:1 the beginnings of Paul's defense of his apostleship, even on this reading of the verse Paul points immediately to the source of his apostleship: "Jesus Christ and God [the] father who raised him from [the] dead." The grace reverses this order of "Jesus Christ and God," and introduces a more extended formula: "God our father and lord Jesus Christ, who gave himself on behalf of our sins, in order that he might deliver us from the present evil age according to the will of God and our father. . . ." It is worth noting how much we learn from these few lines. Already we know that Paul's apostleship comes from Jesus Christ. Jesus is identified as one who gave himself for "our" sins. This act had as its goal "our" deliverance from the present age, which Paul identifies as evil. God, who is identified as father, not only willed the action of Jesus Christ, but finally raised him from the dead. The fact that Paul may be using traditional language here does not diminish the importance of this opening statement. The common "story" to which he refers is one about Jesus Christ and his actions, in accordance with God's will and as a result of God's power, as savior ("on behalf of our sins," "to deliver us").[18] Since the letter lacks the traditional thanksgiving, in which we would expect to find indications of the

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Testament Studies [Manchester: Manchester University, 1968] 134–48; W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, 4th ed. [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980] 142–45). However, the expression is better understood as an ironic formulation designed to counter Paul's opponents (Hays, "Christology and Ethics in Galatians," 275).

[17] To some this will appear to be an exaggerated statement. It may be that Paul was himself psychologically constructed such that he could not compromise; or it may be that he pereived a threat to the boundary of the community and, hence, would not compromise for a social reason. However, all the reasoning that is presented here for our discussion and analysis is theological reasoning.

[18] On the issue of the "story" of Jesus that underlies Galatians, see Richard B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11* (SBLDS 56; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983).

subject of the letter, the suspicion arises that in Galatians the salutation itself introduces the main issue to be addressed.[19]

What Paul wishes to say about Jesus Christ becomes more focused in vv 6–9. The Galatians have turned away from the one who called them and are turning to "another gospel." With a variety of expressions, Paul insists that there is no second gospel: *ho ouk estin allo, metastrepsai to euaggelion tou Christou euaggelizetai par' ho parelabete.* For Paul, it is essential to understand that the gospel is singular and the Galatians may have left its sphere for that of "another" gospel, which does not exist. Little in vv 6–9 allows us to identify the content or character of this singular gospel. Paul identifies it only with the word "of Christ" and with the indication that he ["we"] preached it among the Galatians. It is worth noting that Paul does not say that this gospel brings freedom, that it has to do with justification by faith, or that it pertains to membership in Israel. It is simply the "gospel of Christ." That formulation points back to the language identifying Christ in vv 1–5.

If we read no further than vv 1–9, we would surely conclude that what motivates Paul's letter to the Galatians has to do with a differing understanding of the gospel, an understanding introduced by those who "trouble" the Galatians. While Paul does not specify the source of the difference, the identification of the gospel he preached as the "gospel of Christ" suggests that the difference concerns their understandings of Christ.

What is often regarded as Paul's defense of his apostleship, 1:10/11–2:14/21, also insists on the singular and exclusive nature of the gospel's claims. In Paul's retrospective account, he makes a sharp and uninterpreted transition from his former life (1:13–14) to his apostolic call (1:15–17). The two parts of his life, standing next to each other as they do here, support his conviction that the gospel comes from God alone and that it demands a singular and exclusive response.[20] Paul illustrates his own singular response to that gospel in 1:15–2:21.

We have already seen the christocentrism in the central portion of the letter, Chapters 3–4, but it might be objected that the ethical exhortations of the last part (5:13–6:10) derive little from the christological perspectives of Chapters 1–4. Certainly it is true that the name of Christ appears seldom in this section, and commentators have often concluded from this omission that Paul's ethics have little material connection with his christology. Before we agree to this partitioning, we need to look at the kinds of exhortations presented here. Richard B. Hays has recently argued that Paul's exhortations in this part of the letter concern themselves largely with issues of freedom and slavery and address those issues within the context of communal responsibility. Although Paul does not directly invoke the name of Christ (but see 5:6, 5:24, 6:2) the exhortations correspond to Paul's claims about the actions of Christ, whose crucifixion directly resulted from his obedience and love.[21]

The conclusion of the letter confirms the impression left by its opening, that the letter itself is preoccupied with the Christ event, particularly with the exclusive nature of its claim upon believers. Here, where the argument of the letter culminates,[22] the antithesis

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[19] So also Richard B. Hays, "Christology and Ethics in Galatians," 277 n. 28.

[20] More extensive discussion of this reading of 1:11–17 may be found in Gaventa, *From Darkness to Light*, 22–28; "Galatians 1 and 2," 314–16.

[21] So also Hays, "Christology and Ethics in Galatians," 276–83, 289–90.

[22] Kennedy notes that, in the epilogue, Paul sums up what believes he has demonstrated with the words, "neither circumcision counts for anything nor uncircumcision, but a new creation" (*New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism*, 151).

between Christ and the law is first foused and then radialized. In vv 12–13, Paul takes up the Christ-law antithesis, but in what appears to be a highly focused way, for he contrasts a specific law, circumision, with the cross of Christ. Those who urge circumcision do so only in order that they will not be persecuted because of the cross (6:12). They wish to boast in the flesh, while Paul boasts only in the cross (6:14a). It is at this point that Paul radicalizes the contrast: in the cross of Christ, the whole cosmos has been crucified to Paul, and Paul to the cosmos (6:14b). Therefore, the primary antithesis is not Christ-law, or cross-circumcision. These are but subsets of the more fundamental antithesis, which is between Christ/new creation and cosmos (whether circumcision or uncircumcision).[23]

Elements in the Christology of Galatians

We have seen that in Galatians Paul responds to a claim that believers must also observe the law, or at least parts of the law, by insisting that an antithesis exists between Christ and the law, or more accurately, between Christ and the cosmos. Can we be more precise about the content of the christology of Paul's letter to the Galatians and, therefore, about this antithesis? What is the nature of this opposition? Is it moral, philosophical, apocalyptic?

It is clear, first of all, that Christ is viewed by Paul as an agent of God. The dominance of language about Christ and the scarcity of language about God here could cause us to miss this point, but 1:1–4 and 4:3–5 make it clear that it is God who acts to send Christ and to raise him from the dead. The dominance of language about Christ should not lead us to read christomonism in Galatians, for Christ is clearly subordinate to God. It is God who reveals Christ, who calls Paul to proclaim Christ as God's son (1:15–16), and who calls the Galatians (1:6, cf. 3:5).

Although the letter refers to Christ's resurrection, it is the crucifixion that dominates Paul's christology in Galatians. Paul sharply reminds the Galatians that Christ was presented to them publicly as "crucified" (3:1). Paul allows himself to boast only in the cross (6:14). This crucifixion results from Christ's own act of self-giving (1:4, 2:20). Because in the crucifixion the law placed Christ under a curse, that event purchased freedom from the law for those who are in Christ (3:10–14). This freedom is not merely freedom from the law (circumcision) but also from uncircumcision (5:6). In other words, the freedom Christ brings is not merely freedom from certain practices legally understood but freedom from all things—save Christ himself.

Here Betz's discussion about freedom in Galatians makes an important point, namely, that the preaching of those who followed Paul in the Galatian churches was attractive precisely because it offered a means to "protect the new Christian life from deterioration and destruction."[24] By being both "in Christ" and "under law," believers could be certain that they were full members of God's *ekklēsia*. At some level, they saw in Paul's preaching a threatening claim that they must live in—and only in—the gospel of Jesus Christ. The uncertainty of that claim and the perceived inability of this gospel to offer them concrete instructions for living out their faith made them willing to undertake the more secure avenue of the law.

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[23] On the conclusion of Galatians, I have been greatly helped by the unpublished paper of my colleague, Charles B. Cousar, "Galatians 6:11–18: Interpretive Clues to the Letter."

[24] *Galatians*, 29.

Do Paul's references to the cross carry an implicit reference to resurrection as well, as is sometimes suggested? The answer to that question, at least in Galatians, must surely be no. Paul's references to the cross or crucifixion or death of Christ are multivalent in that they carry within them references to God's action in sending Christ, to Christ's love and faithfulness in the cross, and to the curse of the law, but that multivalence does not mean that cross for Paul includes resurrection. Although the formula of 1:1 refers to Christ's having been raised from the dead, most of the references to Jesus' death/cross in Galatians are sufficiently specific to exclude our attaching to them allusions to resurrection.[25]

More significant in Galatians is what the crucifixion expresses or reflects about Christ. One explanation Paul gives is that Christ's crucifixion stems from his self-giving, from his love, as noted earlier. Paul also affirms that what has brought about the salvation of the Galatians is the *pistis Christou.* While scholarly consensus has long understood this expression to refer to faith in Jesus Christ, recent studies of *pistis Christou* argue persuasively for the translation "faithfulness of Christ" or "obedience of Christ."[26] This interpretation means that the references to Jesus' self-giving love in 1:4 and 2:20 ought not be sentimentalized, for the self-giving of Jesus stems from his faithfulness to God's will (1:4). Jesus does not act out of an individualized affection for believers, as a reading of 2:20 out of context might suggest,[27] but out of faithful obedience to God's intent.

In what has been said thus far there is little indication that this understanding of Christ has anything to do with Israel, but that is to neglect an important though elusive feature of Galatians. While Christ is not confined to history, it is clear that Christ belongs to history. Born of a woman (4:4) Christ enters history. It is precisely within history, in the person of a son of woman, in the person of one crucified, that God reveals the end of history's distinctions between and among peoples. While Christ is born under the law, his cross brings to an end both law and unlaw. His birth under the law (4:4) also means that he is born into Israel's particular history of relationship with God. Christ is *the* offspring of Abraham (3:16), and as such he represents God's intervention in a particular history, now radicalized to include all humankind.

This observation returns us to the question raised earlier, namely, what is the character of the antithesis between Christ and the law, or more properly, between Christ and all things. We may immediately rule out both the philosophical and the moral as descriptions of the antithesis. In Galatians, the historical locus of the Christ event means that Christ is not some eternal aeon which exists in contrast to the realm of the flesh. Neither does Paul interpret Christ and the law as ontological opposites. Similarly, Christ does not represent the moral good in contrast to evil. It is not as the good that Christ is cruified, but as the faithful, loving son of God.

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[25] To be sure, both 2:20 ("Christ lives in me") and the numerous references to the activity of the spirit reflect Paul's conviction about the resurrection of Jesus, but the letter makes few explicit references to the resurrection. Beker notes "the virtual absence of the resurrection of Christ" in this letter (*Paul the Apostle,* 58).

[26] G. M. Taylor, "The Function of PISTIS CHRISTOU in Galatians," *JBL* 85 (1966) 58–76; George Howard, "On the Faith of Christ," *HTR* 60 (1967) 459–84; idem, "The 'Faith of Christ,' " *ExpT* 85 (1974) 212–15; L. T. Johnson, "Romans 3:21–26 and the Faith of Jesus," *CBQ* 44 (1982) 77–90; Richard B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ,* 139–76; Sam K. Williams, "Again *Pistis Christou,*" *CBQ* 49 (1987) 431–47.

[27] The first person singular here refers not only to Paul but to believers in general.

That the underlying antithesis in Galatians between Christ and the law stems from Paul's apocalyptic convictions has recently been forcefully argued by J. Louis Martyn.[28] Because what is said above about this antithesis bears a striking similarity to Martyn's arguments, and is indeed informed by them, his proposal warrants particular attention. My reluctance to identify the antithesis (or, to use the term Martyn uses, antinomy) as apocalyptic stems in part from the confusion that surrounds that term. Does apocalyptic refer to a movement, to a general thought world, or to a body of literature? In Martyn's work, apocalyptic seems to refer to none of these but rather to God's *apokalypsis* of Jesus Christ and to the new creation. Martyn does identify certain of the motifs related to the Christ-cosmos antithesis with motifs found also in apocalyptic literature, but the question remains whether the use of similar motifs makes Paul's thought apocalyptic.[29] Given the confusion that continues to surround the term "apocalyptic," it obscures at least as much as it clarifies.

A second, more substantive, disagreement with Martyn's proposal has to do with the relationship between the in-breaking character of the gospel in Galatians and its continuity with Israel. Martyn rightly draws attention to the way in which the gospel invades the old age,[30] but, as noted earlier, in Galatians Paul also identifies Christ as the seed of Abraham, and therefore interprets him in the context of Israel's history. Moreover, Paul constantly uses biblical interpretation and imagery, not only in response made to his opponents' claims about the law but in reference to his own apostolic role (1:15). This absorption in scripture indicates that the gospel's invasion does not negate the place of Israel (cf. 6:16). An adequate statement of the theology of this letter requires attention both to the elements of continuity and to the elements of discontinuity.[31]

The characterization of the Christ-law or Christ-cosmos antithesis in Galatians as either philosophical or moral is untenable. While the term "apocalyptic" captures part of the antithesis in Galatians, it also proves inadequate because of the many problems surrounding the term itself. At present, I shall resist the temptation to create a new phrase for describing the Christ-law or Christ-cosmos antithesis in Galatians. For the moment, it is more important to identify the antithesis than to name it.

In light of the work of the Pauline Theology Group, the following may be offered by way of conclusion: Although the issue that prompts Paul to write to Galatian Christians arises from a conflict regarding the law, in addressing that problem Paul takes the position that the gospel proclaims Jesus Christ crucified to be the inauguration of a new creation. This new creation allows for no supplementation or augmentation by the law or any other power or loyalty. What the Galatians seek in the law is a certainty that they have a firm place in the *ekklēsia* of God and that they know what God requires of them. It is precisely this certainty, and every other form of certainty, that Paul rejects with his claim about the exclusivity and singularity of Jesus Christ.[32]

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[28] "Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul's Letter to the Galatians," 410–24.

[29] Ibid., 416–20.

[30] "For Paul there are no through-trains *from* the patriarchal traditions and their perceptive criteria—whether Jewish or Greek—*to* the gospel of God's Son ("Paul and His Jewish-Christian Interpreters," 6).

[31] In my judgment this issue in Pauline theology (the relationship between continuity and discontintuity) cries out for extended discussion.

[32] I am grateful to C. Clifton Black II, Charles B. Cousar, Susan Garrett, Richard B. Hays, David J. Lull, and J. Louis Martyn, for generously reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.

The Narrator in the Book of Tobit

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In the Book of Tobit, as in most OT narrative, the narrator plays a minor role.[1] The bulk of the story is carried by dialogue. For this reason, however, the few contributions of the narrator to the content of the story grow in significance and demand careful attention. There is little or no unnecessary description. What the narrator tells has meaning for the story.

The narrator in Tobit will be analyzed from two perspectives: the technique of the narrator, and the functions served by the narration.

1. Narrative Technique

Wayne Booth points out that "the author's judgment is always present, always evident to anyone who knows how to look for it. . . . We must never forget that though the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to disappear."[2] In most ancient literature the author's hand is obvious and taken for granted. The voice of the narrator, it can be assumed, reflects the judgments and values of the author.[3] This fact, however, does not minimize the care and skill with which ancient authors constructed their stories. Careful reading reveals the art by which information is given at the time and in the way it will have the most effect.

Norman Friedman proposes a useful set of questions by which to analyze the technique of the narrator:

> 1. Who talks to the reader? (author in third or first person, character in first, or ostensibly no one);
> 2. From what position (angle) regarding the story does he tell it? (above, periphery, center, front, or shifting);
> 3. What channels of information does the narrator use to convey the story to the reader? (author's words, thoughts, perceptions, feelings; or character's words and actions; or character's thoughts, perceptions, and feelings: through which of these or combination of these three possible media does information regarding mental states, setting, situation, and character come?); and
> 4. At what distance does he place the reader from the story? (near, far, or shifting).[4]

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[1] See R. Alter (*The Art of Biblical Narrative* [New York: Basic Books, 1981] 63–87) for further discussion of the art of the narrator.

[2] W. C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago, 1961) 20.

[3] Ibid.

[4] N. Friedman, "Point of View in Fiction: The Development of a Critical Concept," *PMLA* 70 (1955) 1168–69.

1.1. Speaker

The Book of Tobit is told to the reader by two different speakers. After the title (1:1–2), which is presented from a third-person perspective, the long section which introduces characters, scene, and problem is told by Tobit in the first person (1:3–3:6). When the second plot is introduced and the setting changes (3:7), the narrative switches into third person and remains in third person until the end of the book. From 3:7 on, even portions of the story in which Tobit is an actor and present, i.e., additional portions of the story which could also be told by Tobit in first person, are narrated in the third person. The perspective changes in 3:7 and remains changed throughout the remainder of the book.[5]

There are three implications of the switch of speakers. First, the effect of the speaker on the historicity of the book must be considered. The use of a first-person narrator may indicate the fictional character of a work.[6] An eye-witness was considered to be less reliable than a third-person *histor.* Since, however, the first-person narrator is necessarily limited to his own location and perception, the narrative slides into third person when the scene changes, in order to tell the facts essential to the story which are unavailable to the first-person narrator.[7] Second, the distinction between the first-person and the third-person narrator must be carefully examined. It is possible that the actual stance in each section is the same, even though the grammatical person is different. It must be determined if one or both sections are told from a personal stance, i.e., from Tobit's perspective; or if one or both sections are told from an apersonal stance, i.e., from that of an omniscient, "objective" narrator.[8] Finally, the three questions concerning angle, channels of information, and distance must be answered both with regard to the first-person narrator, Tobit, and the third-person narrator.

1.2. Angle

The angle from which the story of Tobit is told is an omniscient position above the action. The narrator has freedom of time and place as well as access to the characters' thought and feelings. The angle is similar for both the first-person narrator and the third-person narrator.

The first-person narrator Tobit, in his review of his own youth, presents his story from the vantage point of omniscience. Tobit the narrator knows more than Tobit the character. Tobit the narrator knows that God has chosen Jerusalem (1:4). He knows that God has blessed him because of his faithful service and that this blessing is the reason for his favor

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[5] In the VG the story is told in third person throughout. All three Greek recensions, VL, and the Peshitta, however, witness to the first-person narrative from 1:3–3:6.

[6] Authors of antiquity frequently used first-person style for narratives of questionable veracity. The teller of the tale is made responsible for its truth, not the author. See B. E. Perry, *The Ancient Romances: A Literary-Historical Account of Their Origins* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California, 1967) Appendix 3, 325–26; cf. R. Scholes and R. Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative* (New York: Oxford University, 1966) 244–45.

[7] Cf. Scholes and Kellogg, *Nature,* 259–61. They also list three other possible solutions to the limitations of a first-person narrator (pp. 261–65).

[8] See R. Barthes, "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative," *New Literary History* 6 (1974–75) 262–64. He gives a full discussion of personal and apersonal stance. Cf. Booth, *Fiction,* 150–51.

in Shalmaneser's eyes (1:12–13). He knows that God pronounced judgment against Sennacherib because of his blasphemies (1:18).

It may be objected that any of this "knowledge" could have been inferred from the principles in the Book of Deuteronomy. That book proclaims Jerusalem as chosen (e.g., Deut 12:5–14; 14:23–24; 15:20; cf. 1 Kgs 11:32; 14:21) and can be interpreted to imply that, since obedience is blessed and disobedience cursed (Deuteronomy 28), success must be a result of obedience, suffering a result of disobedience. One further example, however, shows that the narrator Tobit states that Anna was paid the full salary for her work and *was given* a young goat. The narrator Tobit then quotes the character Tobit who accuses his wife of theft: "Perhaps it was stolen! Give it back to its owners; we have no right to eat stolen food!" (2:13).

The similarity in stance between the narrator in 1:3–3:6 and the narrator in the rest of the book can be seen by substituting "he" for "I" in the first section (1:3–3:6; cf. VG). Nothing else needs to be altered. No piece of information would be unavailable to a third-person narrator. Even the need for narrative omniscience is minimal. The inner thoughts and feelings of the character Tobit are rarely mentioned. In two chapters we are told only these things: he fears reprisal (1:19); he remembers a citation from Amos (2:6); he does not know that the birds are above him (2:10); he does not believe Anna and is angry with her (2:14); he is grief-stricken (3:1). Many of these thoughts and emotions can be inferred from his words and actions. The third-person narrator in 3:7–14:15 has similar knowledge of other characters. He knows Sarah's grief and recounts her interior monologue (3:10); he knows Tobit's inner thoughts (4:2) and worry (10:2–3); he knows Raguel's inner thoughts (8:10); he knows Tobiah's love for Sarah (6:18).

On the side of omission, however, it must be observed that Tobit the narrator reveals no other character's thoughts and feelings except those of Tobit himself. The only other characters available in 1:3–3:6 are Anna and Tobiah. Anna's feelings as such are never mentioned by either narrator throughout the book. Her emotions must always be deduced from her words and actions (cf. 5:18–6:1; 10:4–7; 11:5–9). Tobiah's emotions only begin to emerge with the narrative comment concerning his love for Sarah (6:18). There is no comment on Tobiah's emotions by the third-person narrator as Tobiah bids farewell to his parents (5:17–6:2). Thus, with regard to the characters' inner thoughts and feelings, the omniscience of Tobit as first-person narrator appears equivalent to that of the third-person narrator.

With regard to knowledge of the plans and activity of God, the third-person narrator and the first-person narrator manifest the same omniscience. The third-person narrator knows that the prayers of Tobit and Sarah have been answered and what that answer is (3:16–17). He knows that Raphael is an angel (5:4). He knows that a demon has been killing Sarah's husbands (Tobiah knows this too, cf. 6:14), and he also knows the demon's name, Asmodeus (3:8).

The third-person narrator has greater freedom of movement than that manifested by the first-person narrator. He is capable not only of observing action in Nineveh, Ecbatana, and Rages, but also of observing Raphael's angelic pursuit of Asmodeus to Upper Egypt (8:3). Since he has no character role is capable of observing actions even when characters seem to be alone.

Thus the angle of narration appears for both narrators to be an omniscient stance from above. The third-person narrator reveals great freedom of movement and access to more characters, but a degree of omniscience is also characteristic of the first-person narrator. Both narrators tell the story from an apersonal stance, observing the characters' action with a minimum of reflection on their motivation or feelings. As narrators, they do not reveal their own feelings.

1.3. Channels of Information

The channels of information available to the narrator are:

1. the author's own words, thoughts, perceptions, feeling;
2. the characters' words and actions; or
3. the characters' thoughts, perceptions and feelings.

The story of the Book of Tobit is conveyed primarily through the characters' words and actions. The thoughts and feelings of the characters are sparingly revealed, and the information thus gleaned is usually also supported by words and actions. The thoughts of the author are rarely stated directly.

In 1:3–3:6 the story centers on Tobit himself. In chap. 1 the character Tobit is revealed exclusively through narrative statement of his actions: his fidelity to the laws concerning worship and his charitable deeds. In chap. 2 he is revealed in two scenes through his actions (2:4–7) and his words (2:2; 2:13). His thoughts and feelings are mentioned: lack of belief, anger, grief (2:14–3:1). His prayer is quoted (3:2–6). Anna and Tobiah are revealed through their own words (2:3, 14) and actions (2:3, 11–12). Their emotions are not mentioned. The author himself emerges, if at all, only in the comments on Jerusalem and on the Deuteronomic theory of retribution (1:4; 12–13, 18).

In the remainder of the book the bulk of the story is carried by the characters' words. Chaps. 4–7 consist almost exclusively of direct speech. There is only slightly more narrative comment in the remaining chapters. Significant actions of the characters are also shown to us. Tobit greets Raphael first (5:10). Raguel digs a grave for Tobiah (8:9), and prepares a feast (8:19). Raphael travels to get the money (9:5). Tobiah follows Raphael's instructions, thus delivering Sarah from Asmodeus (8:1–9) and healing his father's blindness (11:10–14). Most of the characters' thoughts and feelings must be deduced from these actions and words. The thoughts and feelings of the characters, however, are also directly available to the narrator and are, from time to time, made directly available to the reader. Sarah is grieved (3:10). Tobit remembers the money and decides to inform Tobiah (4:1–2). Tobiah falls in love with Sarah (6:18). Raguel thinks he must be prepared to bury Tobiah secretly to avoid ridicule (8:10). The author's thoughts appear only in 3:16–17 in his summary of the plot, and in 5:4 in the comment that Tobiah did not know that Raphael was an angel.

Thus the characters' words and actions are the primary channel of information. Additional information concerning the characters' thoughts, perceptions, and feelings is occasionally provided. This information is usually supported by the characters' words and actions. The author's words, thoughts, and feelings are rarely expressed directly.

1.4. Distance

There are several different ways in which distance is controlled in the story of Tobit. First, there is no apparent distance between the narrator and the reader. The narrator reveals his knowledge to the reader. The reader trusts the narrator's judgment and information.

Second, there is distance between the narrator (and reader) and the action. This distance is achieved by moving the narrator and reader away from the action in time and/or space. Narrative summary, which condenses a long time span of the story in to a few sentences or paragraphs, is one means of creating the distance in time. The first chapter of Tobit which summarizes Tobit's life up to his becoming blind, places the reader at a distance in time. So also do the one-sentence summary of the four years of blindness (2:10), the

account of Sarah's plight (3:8), and the concluding summary of the last days of Tobit (14:1–2) and Tobiah (14:12–15). The narrator and reader are set at a spatial distance from the action in the rapid account of the two journeys (6:2, 7, 10; 11:1). Only three conversations interrupt the first journey (6:3–6, 7–9, 11–18); there is no report of the intermediate days of the second journey. Narrator and reader witness the travelers only from the beginning and end points of the trip. Raphael's journey to recover the money (9:5–6) is also told at a distance. The narrator seems to be witnessing the journey from Ecbatana with Tobiah. A skillful control of spatial distance is demonstrated in chap. 11. The perspective of the narrator (and reader) alternates between the viewpoint of the travelers (11:2–4, 7–8, 10) and of the parents (11:5–6, 9–10) as the distance diminishes between them.

Alternating Perspectives

"Have the *gall* in your hand!" (11:4)

> Meanwhile *Anna* sat watching the road . . .
> When she saw him coming
> she exclaimed to his father,
> "Tobit, your son is coming" (11:5–6).

"I am certain that his eyes will be opened.
Smear the fish *gall* on them.
This *medicine* will make the cataracts
shrink and peel off from his eyes:
then your father will again be able
to see the light of day" (11:7–8).

> Then *Anna* ran up to her son,
> threw her arms around him, and said to him,
> "Now that I have seen you again, son,
> I am ready to die!" And she sobbed aloud.
> *Tobit* got up and stumbled out
> through the courtyard gate (11:9–10).

Tobiah went up to him
with the fish *gall* in his hand,
and holding him firmly,
blew into his eyes.
"Courage, father," he said.
Next he smeared the *medicine* on his eyes,
and it made them smart.
Then, beginning at the corners of Tobit's eyes,

[9] Emphasis mine. Note the threefold repetition of the healing process. One of the epic laws of folk narrative according to A. Olrik ("Epic Laws of Folk Narrative," *The Study of Folklore* [ed. A Dundes; Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964] is the "Law of Three." In folklore "three is the highest number with which one deals" (p. 133). See also W. O. Hendricks, "Folklore and Structural Analysis of Literary Texts," *Language and Style* 3 (1970) 114.

> Tobiah used both hands to peel off the cataracts.
> When Tobit saw his son,
> he threw his arms around him and wept.
> he exclaimed, "I can see you, son,
> the light of my eyes!" (11:10–14).[9]

Third, distance is created between the narrator (and reader) and the characters when the narrator/reader has knowledge which the characters do not possess. This form of distance has two effects: the removal of suspense and the creation of irony. The plot summary in 3:16–17 removes the suspense for the reader with regard to the resolution of the conflict. The possibility of irony is created by the narrator's revelation to the reader that Anna was given the controversial goat (2:12), that Raphael is an angel (5:4), and that Raguel's grave-digging and Anna's worry are unnecessary (8:9–14; 10:4–7). There is a notable absence of commentary in these latter situations. The narrator allows the action to speak.

For the reader, therefore, the distance from which the story of Tobit is told is shifting. In the beginning of the story the reader is placed at a far distance by narrative summary. This distance diminishes gradually through the action in chap. 2, until, in the argument between Tobit and Anna, the reader approaches the center. The second plot begins at an intermediate distance as Sarah's past is recounted (3:7–8a), but the reader is drawn into the action almost immediately during the maid's harangue. Beginning with 3:16–17 the reader is distanced from the characters by privileged information which the characters do not have. At the same time, however, from chap. 5 through chap. 12 the reader is usually close to the action in space and time, with the exception of the three journeys. As the story closes, the spatial and temporal distance grows between the reader and the action even as the distance of disparate knowledge is diminished and finally eliminated.

Finally, it must be noted that there is no distance in the book of Tobit between the narrator and the author. There is no evidence of conflict between the values and judgments of the author and the account of the narrator. The reader can trust the narrator to report the story as the author sees it. In Booth's terms the narrator is "reliable."[10]

2. Functions of Narration

Robert Alter describes several functions of narration in the Bible:

1. to provide a chronicle of public events and context of meaning;
2. to provide textural contrast for dialogue;
3. to convey actions essential to the unfolding of the plot;
4. to communicate expository data supportive of the plot; and
5. to comment on the dialogue, whether mirroring, confirming, subverting, or focusing.[11]

Examples for each of these functions may be seen in the Book of Tobit.

2.1. Chronicle of Public Events and Context of Meaning

The chronicle of public events is minimal in Tobit, occurring only in chaps. 1 and 14. The title of the book situates the beginning of the story in the reign of Shalmaneser. The

[10] Booth, *Fiction*, 158–59.
[11] Alter, *Art*, 75–81.

succession of Assyrian kings is briefly (and incorrectly) noted, and a few pertinent events during each reign are mentioned. "When Shalmaneser died and his son Sennacherib succeeded him as king, the roads to Media became unsafe" (1:15). Sennacherib killed many of the Israelite exiles when he returned from his defeat in Judea (1:18). Sennacherib was assassinated by two of his sons who then fled into the mountains of Ararat, and his son Esarhaddon succeeded him as king (1:21).

The story of Tobit's early days is woven into this brief chronicle. Tobit was taken into exile under Shalmaneser. He was favored during his reign and became Shalmaneser's purchasing agent. The accession of Sennacherib put an end to Tobit's good fortune. His money deposited in Media was no longer accessible because of unsafe roads. His life was threatened and his property confiscated because of his practice of burying those whom Sennacherib slew. The restoration of his property and status occurred, through the intercession of Ahiqar, under the reign of Esarhaddon.

From the last mention of the reign of Esarhaddon in 2:1 until the final chapter the book is silent concerning public events in Assyria. In chap. 14 the fall of Nineveh to Cyaxares, king of Media, is reported.[12] This public event is also woven into the lives of Tobit and Tobiah. Tobit predicts Nineveh's fall, relying on the prophet's word. Tobiah, having heeded the warning and left Nineveh, rejoices over its fall.

The chronicle of events does not simply provide a historical backdrop for the story of Tobit. There is also a subtle context of meaning provided. Assyria, personified in its kings, was wicked. These kings were responsible for the exile, suffering, and death of many of God's people. Tobit is an example of one who suffered under their rule. His virtue grew under the distress they caused. But, as his life witnesses to the truth that God rewards the righteous, the fate of Nineveh witnesses that God punishes the wicked. It is for this reason that Tobiah rejoices (14:15). Narrative economy is again striking. Nineveh and its rulers appear only at the beginning and end of the story. But even this subtle reference to the wicked city and its fall provides an effective contrast to the story of the just man set in its midst.

2.2. Textural Contrast

The textural contrast in Tobit is carefully wrought. The opening chapters build gradually through narrative summary which grows more and more specific until it blends into the two short dialogue scenes in chap. 2 (2:1–8, 11–14). Scenes of monologue (3:2–6, 10–15; 4:3–21) and dialogue (3:7–9; 5:1–6:1) alternate through the next few chapters until dialogue virtually takes over. The only major scene in the central section which is told in narration rather than dialogue is the summary of Raphael's journey to Rages and his conversation with Gabael (9:5–6). The final section returns to monologue (12:6–20; 13:1–18; 14:3–11a) and narrative summary (14:1–2, 11b–15).

2.3. Essential Actions

Actions which are necessary for the progress of the plot, but which are difficult to convey in dialogue, are usually told by the narrator. Alter points out that such narration is usually characterized by a "dense concentration" of verbs, frequently with one subject.[13]

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[12] In 14:15, instead of Αχιαχαρος read Κυαξαρης. All versions are corrupt here.

[13] Alter, *Art*, 80.

In the first specific scene in Tobit, the burial of the man on Pentecost, such a chain of verbs is found. Tobit as narrator reports: "I *sprang* to my feet, *leaving* the dinner untouched; and I *carried* the dead man from the street and *put* him in one of the rooms, so that I might *bury* him after sunset. *Returning* . . . I *washed* . . . *ate* . . . *wept*. Then at sunset I *went* out, *dug* a grave, and *buried* him" (αναπηδησας, αφηκα, αναιρουμαι, εθεκα, θαφω, επιστρεψας, ελουσαμεν, ησθιον, εκλαυσα, ωχομην, ορυξας, εθαφα; 2:4–5, 7, emphasis mine).[14]

Edna's preparation of Sarah for her eighth wedding night is told with a similar concatenation of verbs. "She *went* and *made* the bed . . . and *brought* the girl there. After she had *cried* over her she *wiped* away the tears and *said* . . ." (βαδισασα, εστρωσεν, ηγαγεν, εκλαυσεν, απεμαξατο, ειπεν; 7:16, emphasis mine).[15]

The most striking concentration of verbs and attention to detail in such a narrative segment is found in the description of the maid's investigation of the bridal pair (8:13–14). The action slows almost to a stop as each movement is told in sequence. "She [Edna] *sent* the maid, who *lit* the lamp, *opened* the bedroom door, *went* in, and *found* them sound asleep together. The maid *went* out and *told* the girl's parents that Tobiah was alive and that there was nothing wrong" (απεστειλεν, ηψεν, ηνοιξεν, εισηλθεν, ευρεν, εξελθουσα, υπεδειξεν; 8:13–14, emphasis mine).[16]

The worry of Tobiah's parents over his delay is conveyed through a narrative description of their actions. Tobit counts the days (10:1); Anna goes out to keep watch all day, eats nothing, wails, cries, and cannot sleep (10:7; cf. 11:5). Their joy at Tobiah's return is also conveyed through a narrative description of their actions. Anna runs up to her son, throws her arms around him and sobs; Tobit gets up and stumbles blindly through the courtyard.

The progress of the plot and particularly its suspense are served by these narrative segments. Tobit's immediate burial of the stranger without thought of the consequence introduces the question: What will be his reward? The action of the two women, Edna and the maid, at the beginning and end of Sarah's wedding night frames that event; Edna's courage and sorrow heighten the anticipation; the maid's favorable report relieves the tension. The worry of Tobiah's parents (10:1, 7; 11:5) adds to the suspense and their joy adds to the relief of tension (11:9–10).

Thus the actions which lead to the initial complication of the plot, the actions surrounding the crisis of the wedding night, and the actions surrounding the healing of Tobit are described by the narrator. These narrative segments are detailed and carefully draw the reader's attention to the important turning points of the plot. The power of these passages flows from their simplicity. The narrator tells only the essential actions without added description, but tells those essential actions in painstaking detail.

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[14] These verbs comprise 12 of the 51 words in vv 4, 5, and 7, i.e., 23.5%. It is notable that, even in the Greek translation where hypotaxis could be expected to replace some instances of Semitic parataxis, only three of the 12 verbs are participles.

[15] These verbs comprise six of the 24 words of the verse, 25%. Again they are primarily active, finite verbs.

[16] In 8:13 read απεστειλεν, ηψεν, ηνοιξεν as singular with LXX dp (ανεωξε) and VL: *misit, accensa, aperuit.* So also P. Omit και υπνουντας with LXX dp, VL, and P; it is a variant of καθευδοντας. In v 13 these verbs comprise five of the 21 words, 23.8%. Considering vv 13–14 together, the verbs are seven of 33 words, 21%.

2.4. Expository Data

The book opens, as many biblical narratives do, with a title (1:1–2) which answers the basic questions necessary for the understanding of the story: who, when, what and where.[17] The title presents the genealogy of the principal character, the geographical location of his original home, his political situation as an exile, and an indication of the initial time period of the story:

> This book tells the story of Tobit, son of Tobiel, son of Hananiel, son of Aduel, son of Gabael of the family of Asiel, of the tribe of Naphtali, who during the reign of Shalmaneser, king of Assyria, was taken captive from Thisbe, which is south of Kedesh Naphtali in upper Galilee, above and to the west of Asser, north of Phogor (1:1–2).[18]

Subsequent data concerning who, when, and where are also conveyed through narrative statement. The information that Raphael is an angel is provided by the narrator (5:4; cf. 3:17). The narrator continues to refer to him as Raphael (5:8, 10[4x], 12, 13, 16; 6:11 [2x], 16, 18; 7:9; 8:2, 3[2x]; 9:1, 5 [2x]; 11:2, 4, 7; 12:5, 6) or as "the angel" (6:2, 4, 5, 7), never as Azariah. The reader is not allowed to forget that Raphael's actions are those of an angel of God even though the characters do not know this.

There are some simple time indications, such as the one referring to the end of the fourteen-day wedding celebration (10:7), and those referring to the duration of Tobit's blindness (2:10) and his age at his death (14:1–2). Most of the time references, however, carry added significance, such as the "day"/"night" references[19] and the references to simultaniety (3:7, 10, 11, 16, 17; 4:1).[20]

Geographical notations are conveyed through narrative statement. Sarah's story is introduced by a change of scene (3:7). The journey to Ecbatana is begun and punctuated by geographical indications (6:2, 7, 10; 7:1). Raphael's journey to Rages and the return journey to Nineveh are marked by narrative comments concerning place (9:5; 11:1). The most important of the geographical notations is the constant reference to Media in the first half of the book (1:14, 15: 3:7; 4:1), drawing attention to that place as a significant scene of action.

The first of the four summaries of the plot is presented in simple exposition by the narrator:

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[17] See Alter, *Art*, 80.

[18] In 1:1 omit τον Ραφαηλ του Ραγουηλ; so all other LXX MSS and VL.

[19] "Day" (ημερα) occurs 32 times in the book, 14 times between 1:1–6:1, 14 times between 8:19–11:18, 4 times between 12:1–14:15. It does not occur at all between 6:2–8:18. "Night" on the other hand, occurs 12 times, 7 times between 6:2–8:18 referring to the wedding night, once between 1:1–6:1, 3 times between 6:2–8:18, and once between 8:19–11:18 referring to nights other than the wedding. Thus it seems that Tobit's journey from day to night to day is reflected in the vocabulary.

[20] Simultaneity is a key technique in describing the first long day of the narrative. *On the same day* Tobit and Anna argue, Tobit prays for death, Sarah is abused by her father's maids, she prays for death, their prayer is heard, and both return to the house. The two scenes which mirror each other show the linking of the two lives.

> At that very time, the prayer of these two suppliants was heard in the glorious presence of Almighty God. So Raphael was sent to heal them both; to remove the cataracts from Tobit's eyes, so that he might again see God's sunlight; and to marry Raguel's daughter Sarah to Tobit's son Tobiah, and then drive the wicked demon Asmodeus from her (3:16–17).

The other summaries are in dialogue (12:3, 12–15) or reported dialogue (11:15).

The emotions of the characters, although usually presented only in essential actions, are sometimes revealed through expository comments. In each of the two opening scenes the narrator comments on the grief of the sufferer. Tobit as narrator says, "Grief stricken in spirit, I groaned and wept aloud. Then with sobs I began to pray" (3:1). Of Sarah the narrator says, "That day she was deeply grieved in spirit. She went in tears to an upstairs room in her father's house with the intention of hanging herself" (3:10).

Grief is the most frequent emotion noted in the first half of the book. The narrator reports that Tobit's kinsmen were grieved at his blindness (2:10) and that Raguel too was grieved over Tobit's condition (7:7). Joy is the predominant emotion conveyed by the narrator in the second half of the book. Raguel is the first who rejoices. He sheds tears of joy over Tobiah's arrival (7:6). Tobiah's departure from Raguel is also marked by happiness and joy (10:13 [NAB 10:14]). The narrator reports general rejoicing in chap. 11 after Tobit's healing. We are told twice that Tobit rejoices and praises God (11:15, 16). All the Jews of Nineveh rejoice (11:17). Ahiqar too and his nephew come to rejoice with Tobit (11:18). Finally, in the last verse of the book, the narrator tells us that Tobiah rejoiced over the fall of Nineveh (14:15).

In addition to revealing the grief and joy of the characters, the narrator informs us of the beginning of Tobiah's deep love for Sarah (6:18), of Tobit's worry over Tobiah's delay (10:3), and of Tobit's and Tobiah's fear when Raphael's identity is revealed (12:16). In general, however, there is little narrative description of the inner states of the characters. Their feelings must be inferred either from the dialogue or from such comments as: "Then she [Anna] stopped weeping" (6:1); "Tobiah kissed his father and mother" (5:17); cf. 10:11, 12); "After she [Edna] had cried over her, she wiped away the tears" (7:16).

2.5. Dialogue-Bound Narration

Dialogue-bound narration repeats, mirrors, contradicts, or focuses statements made by characters.[21] Some dialogue-bound narration occurs because of the typical biblical pattern of command-execution.[22] The effect on the reader is an impression of literal obedience.[23]

παιδιον, βαδιζε και ον αν ευρης	και επορευθη Τωβιας ζετησαι τινα
πρωχον των αδελφων ημων.	πτωξον των αδελφων ημων.

[21] Alter, *Art*, 77–79.

[22] E.g., Gen 7:1–4, 5, 7–9; 8:15–17, 18–19. See S. McEvenue, *The Narrative Style of the Priestly Writer* (AnBib 50; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1971) 17, 28, 30; cf. also C. Westermann, *The Genesis Accounts of Creation* (trans. N. E. Wagner; FBBS 7; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1964) 7–8; S. McEvenue, "Word and Fulfillment: A Stylistic Feature of The Priestly Writer," *Semitics* 1 (1970) 104–10.

[23] Cf. Gen 7:5, 9. See McEvenue, *Priestly Writer*, 28.

My son, go out and try to find a poor man from among our kinsmen (2:2).

και νυν, παιδιον, ζητησον σεαυτω ανθρωπον πιστον ος πορευσεται μετα σου.

So now, my son find yourself a trustworthy man who will make the journey with you (5:3).

Επιλαβου και εγκρατης του ιχθυος γενου.

Take hold of the fish and don't let it get away (6:4).

Ανασχισον τον ιχθυν, και εξελε την χολην και την καρδιαν και το ηπαρ αυτου και αποθες αυτα μετα σαυτου.

Cut the fish open and take out its gall, heart, and liver, and keep them with you (6:5).

Tobiah went out to look for some poor kinsman of ours (2:3).

εξηλθεν δε Τωβιας ζητησαι ανθρωπον ος πορευσεται μετα αυτου εις Μηδιαν ος εμπειρει της οδου.

Tobiah went to look for someone acquainted with the roads who would travel with him to Media (5:4).

και εκρατησεν το παιδαριον του ιχθυος και ανηνεγκεν αυτον επι την γην.

The boy seized the fish and hauled it up on the shore (6:4).

και ανασχισας το παιδαριον τον ιχθυν συνηγαγεν την χολην και την καρδιαν και το ηπαρ.

After the lad had cut the fish open, he put aside the gall, heart, and liver (6:6).

The same technique is used in describing the actions of Edna (7:15–16) and Raphael (9:2, 5).

Dialogue-bound narration on a larger scale is found in the repetition in both dialogue and narration of the passages concerning Sarah's seven husbands and the passages concerning the two healings. The narrator is the first to give an account of Sarah's affliction. His account is simple and straightforward. Each repetition of the account by the maids, Tobiah, and Raguel underlines the specific concerns of the speaker. The narrator's report is the reliable account by which all the other accounts are measured. The narrator is the last to give a description of Tobiah's actions in the two healings (8:2, 4–5; 11:11–13). The process for each healing has been described twice previously by Raphael (6:8, 17; 6:9; 11:7–8). In each case the narrator's description corresponds to Raphael's but is the most detailed of the three accounts.

A final category of dialogue-bound narration concerns the summary of speech rather than actual quotation. Although most of the story of Tobit is told through dialogue, there are several examples of reported speech. Instructions are frequently summarized. Raguel tells Edna to bring the scroll for the marriage contract (7:13). He also instructs his servants to fill in the unnecessary grave (8:18), and orders the necessary arrangements to be made for the wedding celebration (8:19). Edna, herself instructed by Raguel, instructs the maid to see if Tobiah is alive or dead (8:13). The maid in turn "told the girl's parents that Tobiah was alive" (8:14). Raphael is reported to have informed Gabael of the wedding (9:5). At the end of the journey Tobiah told Tobit of his success (11:15), and Tobit proclaims to his fellow Ninevites the merciful healing of God (11:17). The chief purpose of such summaries seems to be economy of speech and a desire to keep the story moving.

3. Conclusion

The narrator in the Book of Tobit is unobtrusive, as is the case in most biblical narrative. Several of his characteristics emerge as a result of this investigation.

1. He is reliable. He "speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author's norms)."[24] The message intended by the biblical author is never contradicted by the voice of the narrator which he employs.

2. He is omniscient.[25] He has access to the thoughts and feelings of the characters. He has freedom of space and a limited freedom of time. He speaks with authority of the actions of God. As Alter points out about biblical narrators in general, however, "he is highly selective about sharing this omniscience with his readers."[26] We learn most about the story from the speech and action of the characters.[27]

3. He is brief. Economy is his most powerful tool. Short narrative comments carry a weight of meaning with a minimum of words, e.g., "when Raphael entered the house, Tobit greeted him first" (a sign of reverence even for an apparently younger man; 5:10, emphasis mine); "and she [Anna] stopped weeping" (6:1); "Raguel overheard the words" (revealing his concern about his daughter's situation; 7:10, emphasis mine). The smallest detail becomes significant: even Sarah [who says nothing to anyone except God in the whole book] began to weep" (7:8, emphasis mine); "she exclaimed to his father" (11:6, emphasis mine).[28] Economy of expression is one of the greatest signs of the artistry of the author.[29]

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[24] Booth, *Fiction*, 158.

[25] See the paragraphs on "Neutral Omniscience" in Friedman, "Point of View," 1172–74.

[26] Alter, *Art*, 158.

[27] Alter (*Art*, 183) also says: "Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the role played by the narrator in the biblical tales is the way in which omniscience and inobtrusiveness are combined."

[28] Throughout the story Anna refers to Tobiah as "*my* child" until this moment when she sees him return. Then, aware of Tobit's worry and inability to see, she says, "to *his* father, '*Your* son is coming.' "

[29] The dog, which appears in 6:2 and 11:4, seems to be the only gratuitous piece of description in the work. For this reason it has occasioned much discussion. See e.g., F. Zimmermann, *The Book of Tobit* (Dropsie College Edition: Jewish Apocryphal Literature; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958) 7–12, 78–79, 104–5; J. C. Dancy, W. J. Fuerst, R. J. Hammer, *The Shorter Books of the Apocrypha* (Cambridge Bible Commentary; Cambridge: University Press, 1972) 39, 53; D. C. Simpson, "The Book of Tobit," *APOT* 1. 184, 194–95; R. H. Pfeiffer, *History of New Testament Times* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949) 266. The most reasonable explanation for the presence of the dog seems to be that it originated in the folktale background of the story.

Tobit and Folklore Studies, With Emphasis on Propp's Morphology

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The fact that the Book of Tobit has as its source a folktale or folktales is common knowledge, but interpretation of the book has not profited from this insight as much as it could. This paper will contend that an approach to Tobit's folklore origins based on Vladimir Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale* (1968) will prove more fruitful in the interpretation of Tobit than approaches based on the so-called "Finnish School" of folktale scholarship, of which the Aarne-Thompson indices are perhaps the best known examples.

I. The "Finnish School" and the Study of Tobit

The "Finnish school" attempted to delineate the complete historical and geographical life history of a particular tale, making questionable historical and aesthetic judgments as they did so. As Heda Jason writes,

> [T]he "Finnish school" assumes that the tale is once created at a point in time-and-space (Krohn 1926:23–4) and that it is, at least theoretically, possible to determine this point (Aarne 1913:15–16, 39). The creation of a tale as a finished product is thought of as the act of an individual; the bearers of tradition can change it (and so "spoil" it—Aarne 1913:35) but they are not co-creators. The monogenesis of the tale is assumed.
> . . . The transmission is thought of as going on by rules of memory to a great extent, and to the element of "forgetfulness" a considerable role is assigned. (Jason 1970, 288)

This assumption of monogenesis may well be false, and even if it were true, the recovery of the "original" at this point seems chimerical. Moreover, the idea that transmission "spoils" the story arbitrarily discounts the skill and creativity of the storytellers.

In its quest for the historical Ur-folktale, the Finnish school concentrated on "motifs" and "tale types." But the term "motif" is too broadly defined to be a meaningful unit of comparison. S. Thompson simply defines the motif as "the smallest element in a tale having the power to persist in tradition" (1951, 415–416). These elements range from actors to magic objects, unusual customs or beliefs, and finally to "single incidents." The "tale type" analysis suffers from a certain arbitrariness, being governed by whichever "motif" appears most striking in the eyes of the classifiers. For example, tales with identical plot lines may be grouped in this system under radically different headings, depending on whether they feature a bear, a "supernatural adversary," or a "stupid ogre" (Dundes, 1962, 97–99).

One can see the defects of the Finnish school in Frank Zimmerman's commentary on Tobit. In his section *Folk Themes in Tobit* he proposes to "deal with some of the leading motifs in the construction of the tale," acknowledging his dependence on Aarne-

Thompson as he does so. Zimmerman describes the evolution of the Tobit tale "in a long process of storytelling" as follows:

> The folkloristic ingredients have been skillfully mixed; echoes and motifs were blended from the Grateful Dead Man, the Monster in the Bridal Chamber, the Dragon Slayer, with slight piecings from the Two Brothers, and further splinterings no doubt from other sources. (1958, 11)

These "sources" are actually headings in the Aarne-Thompson index, which, as we have already said, were not established according to the structure of the tales but by the presence of a particularly striking motif. Since the presence of a motif is determinative for the establishment of a "tale type," and since this approach further assumes the monogenesis of the tale, each time we encounter a different motif in Tobit an entire story is posited. But it is questionable whether so many different complete stories were employed as sources in the composition of Tobit.

Moreover, such classification ignores the fact that similar motifs may be used to very different ends in very different plots. The story classified as "The Grateful Dead Man," which Zimmerman and others regard as the main source of Tobit, is a striking case in point. Simpson states that the oldest occurrence of a Grateful Dead story in Cicero "proves that the kernel of the fable was already in existence" when Tobit was written [1913:188]. But what we find in Cicero bears little resemblance to Tobit or the fairy tales usually cited as parallels.

> Who again can despise those two dreams which are so frequently dwelt upon by the Stoics?—One concerning Simonides who having found the dead body of a man who was a stranger to him lying on the road, buried it. Having performed this office, he was about to embark in a ship, when the man whom he buried appeared to him in a dream at night, and warned him not to undertake the voyage, for that if he did he would perish by shipwreck. Therefore he returned home again, but all the other people who sailed in that vessel were lost. (*De Divinatione* i. 27, quoted in Glasson 1959, 275)

Thus, the motif of a "grateful ghost" can occur apart from a fairy tale context. This confirms the point about motifs made by Propp (1968) and Dundes (1962): motifs are highly variable elements in the tale and can even pass from one genre to another. That Simpson could refer to this notice in Cicero as the *kernel* of the Tobit story shows how a system of classification based on motifs can overemphasize secondary elements.

Finally, the only interpretive use Zimmerman makes of his folktale parallels is to point out where degeneration or forgetfulness occurs, much of which concerns Tobiah's dog. The dog, we are told, originally had a more active role, but time and transmission took its toll so that eventually, "all that the storyteller could remember was that somewhere in the story there had been a dog," thus explaining why the dog makes only a cameo appearance (1958, 10). As an explanation this may or may not be true; my point here is that this emphasis on degeneration and forgetfulness yields a rather poor return on the scholarly investment.

While Zimmerman is the most thorough in his explanation and application of the Aarne/Thompson system, he is by no means the only commentator to exaggerate the importance of particular motifs and the obscurity of the present text of Tobit. Pfeiffer, commenting on the liberties taken with the folktale source for religious purposes, appears to be considerably perplexed by the question of

> . . . which variant of the Dangerous Bride motif was utilized in the story of Sara: was she the wife of Asmodeus (Bride of the Monster motif), his captive (Ransomed Maiden motif), or the object of his courtship ("the demon loves her" [6:14, Gr. 6:15] in the standard Greek text [Codd. B, A] and the Old Latin)? Or was she a victim of demonic possession (E. Renan; M. Hippe; G. Huet [RHR 71 (1915) 19])? Or again, was Sara a Poison Maiden (Gerould, op. cit., pp. 45, 73f.)? The author obviously obscured this crucial point of the tale for his own purposes. (1949, 271)

But, as Pfeiffer's own catalogue of possibilities would indicate, the precise nature of Sarah's predicament is not a *crucial* point in the tale, but a highly variable one; one which a narrator might leave unspecified (as in S[1]) or alter depending on circumstantial factors. While Tobit's religio-ethical intentions certainly do influence his treatment of his folktale source, that source may have had nothing more to say about Sarah's enchantment; it is quite common for folktales to describe the most unusual things in a cursory, matter-of-fact way, without elaboration or explanation (Lüthi 1982, 38–45, 60–64). One senses that the only reason that the manner of Sarah's enchantment is crucial for Pfeiffer is that it is through this motif that entire tales have been identified and their life history allegedly determined.

In conclusion, treatments of Tobit's folklore origins in earlier commentaries suffered from their dependence on folklore scholarship dominated by the "Finnish School." Their emphasis on motifs prevented scholars from seeing any coherent core around which these motifs might crystallize, and their emphasis on "forgetfulness" and "spoiling" in the transmission of a supposed "original" tale meant that scholars looked primarily for allegedly misunderstood or vestigial elements of the folktale tradition in Tobit.

II. Propp's *Morphology*

Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale* was first published in Russia in 1928 and first translated into English 30 years later. It has proved a seminal work, but also a much misunderstood one as to both its specific terminology and its overall intent. To begin with, Propp's subject is not the folktale in general, but rather the fairy tale,[2] a specific kind of folktale. Propp based his morphology on the first one hundred tales classified as fairy tales in Afanas'ev's collection of Russian folklore.[3] Propp had originally called the book

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[1] J. D. Thomas (1972) has demonstrated that BA (Vaticanus) is a revision of S (Sinaiticus) made in the interests of streamlining the narrative and making the Greek more idiomatic. S is now generally regarded as the preferred recension (see the NAB and NEB translation) and is so treated here.

[2] Most scholars who use this term have misgivings about it, including Propp himself (1968, 99–100). Their reasons vary, but especially in English " 'fairy tale' . . . suggests something pretty and tongue-in-cheek" (J. D. Niles, translator's preface to Lüthi 1986, xxiv). A recent anthology of Propp's scholarship employs the more satisfactory term "wondertale," (1984, e.g. p. ix) but since most available scholarship still employs the older term it is here retained.

[3] This immediately raises the question of the applicability of this morphology to non-Russian tales. But, while Propp's morphology does appear to be vulnerable to some criticisms (see note 5 below) it is generally conceded that the kind of tale he is working with shows a great deal of uniformity over a wide cultural range within European cultures

Morphology of the Fairy Tale, but, as he later explained, "To make the book appeal to a larger audience, the publisher eliminated the term 'fairy' from the title, and thereby led the reader . . . to believe erroneously that one would find in it general laws about the folktale as a literary genre" (1978, 62). It should also be noted that the text of *Morphology of the Folktale* generally does not suffer from the ambiguity of its title, and that the revised English translation takes pains both in its prefaces and in the translation of the book to clarify this matter.

Yet there remains a tendency to make more sweeping applications of Propp's work,[4] despite the fact that folklore scholars who follow in Propp's footsteps make, if anything, an even more restricted application of his model than he envisioned. Israeli folklorist Heda Jason deems Propp's model to be valid not for all fairy tales, but for one particular subgenre, the *heroic* fairy tale.[5] This qualification does not diminish the usefulness of Propp's morphology in the interpretation of Tobit if one assumes that the heroic fairy tale was the kind of story on which Tobit was based.

Propp's morphology seeks to uncover a single compositional scheme that is the basis for all fairy tale plots. Like many useful generalizations, this scheme is an abstract, theoretical entity found only in human consciousness; yet Propp has arrived at it through careful study of actual fairy tales. Propp analyzes the composition of the fairy tale in terms of seven *tale roles* which carry out up to thirty-one *functions.* "Tale role" is an abstract designation (such as "villain" or "donor"), whereas "character" refers to the particular personage who fills the role (such as Prince Ivan or Baba Jaga; see Jason and Segal 1977 for ways in which even the English translation obscures these distinctions). The tale roles are constant elements of the fair tale; the characters are variable.

The tale roles are identified and brought into relation by their *functions.* Propp defines a function as an act of a tale role "defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action" (1968, 21). In other words, not only action, but the causal and sequential relationship to other actions, constitutes a function. Propp is far from insisting that all the functions he has identified occur in every "true" fairy tale; on the contrary, he regards the presence or absence of certain functions as decisively useful in classification.

(continued)
and even beyond (see Dundes' introduction to Propp, 1968, xiv). For Propp, the main advantage of Afanas'ev's collection was not its locale, but rather what he perceived as its relative authenticity with respect to the oral tradition (1968, 100; he rearded the Grimm brothers as less authentic, and is seconded in this by a critic who approaches the fairy tale in a very different way, Max Lüthi [1986, e.g. 25–26]).

[4] See Milne (1986, 40–46) for her critique of Sasson (1979); see also Niditch 1987, 6–7.

[5] The other kinds of fairy tales cited by Jason (1977, 38–40) are: 1) *Female fairy tale.* This is similar to the heroic fairy tale, but the female persona has her own peculiar series of ordeals to undergo before she wins or regains her husband. 2) *Reward and punishment fairy tale.* "In these tales a positive and a negative human hero confront each other. The positive hero obtains the marvelous object and the negative one tries unsuccessfully to either appropriate the marvelous object or gain wealth in the same way as the positive hero" (Jason 1977, 39). 3) *Carnivalesque fairy tale.* Here the fairy tale is parodied; a mock hero's very cowardice helps him overcome, or he wins a bride by obscene acts, or the monsters are so stupid that they are defeated by use of a little intelligence.

But Propp does insist that he has identified all the functions there are, and that when those functions do occur they fall along the same sequential axis. Propp has received some criticism on this latter point, and indeed his assertion that the functions occur in the same sequence does seem to be exaggerated, though it could be claimed that the degree of variation is limited and governed by certain constraints.[6]

Max Lüthi raises a further objection against Propp's tendency to make categorical claims:

> Propp considered his structural research a necessary prerequisite for historical and genetic folktale research, as well as for stylistic analyses, since first one must establish what the [fairy tale] really is. I find this view almost as mistaken as the Finnish school's concept that only after identifying the original form of the various folktale types can one attempt to interpret them. While strict definitions are always problematical, there exists an adequate pre-existing consensus concerning the concept of the [fairy tale] and the folktale in general. In fact, Propp himself bases his work on tales numbered 50 to 151 in the Afanas'ev collection, and he thereby accepts Afanas'ev's prior decision as to which narratives are to be regarded as [fairy tales]. (1982, 132; in citing Lüthi I have retranslated the German *Märchen* as "fairy tale")

This "pre-existing consensus" is a necessary corrective to some of Propp's hyper-scientific pretensions. It is interesting to note that an analogous "pre-existing consensus" exists in the case of Tobit; most scholars would agree that Tobit has a fairy tale source. But Lüthi is not arguing against the claim made by Propp and affirmed here that we have a clearer, more analytically useful concept of what a fairy tale is as a result of Propp's morphology.

At this point it will be useful to quote Propp's morphological definition of what constitutes a single tale:

> Morphologically, a tale may be termed any development proceeding from villainy or lack [8] through intermediary functions to marriage [31], or to other functions employed as a denouement. . . . This type of development is termed by us a *move* (*xod*). Each new act of villainy, each new lack creates a new move. One tale may have several moves, and when analyzing a text, one must first of all determine the number of moves of which it consists. One move may directly follow another but they may also interweave; a development which has begun pauses, and a new move is inserted. (1968, 92)

Function 8 thus serves as the clue to untangling the various moves in a text where more than one move is employed. Propp refers to this function in his initial description as "villainy" and he adds a correlative function "lack" (#8a) which, while having no connection with a particular act of villainy, can occur at the same point in the fairy tale with

[6] For a fuller discussion of critical response to Propp, see Milne 1988, 90–96. She cites this problem and Propp's relegation of functions 1–7 to a less important, "preparatory" status as the two criticisms of his work that "appear to be well-founded and addressed to matters of consequence" (96). In addition, there are editorial difficulties. Propp's work is an abbreviation of a much larger study, and in preparing this abridgement he was guilty of some careless errors. "These include such things as incorrect tale references, or lack of documentation altogether, and lack of agreement among the various lists and tables in the book" (Milne 1988, 91).

the same effect. He also refers to this function comprehensively as "misfortune" (1968, 37, 95) Thus function 8 is often, but not always, brought on by one who fills the role of villain; the crucial condition is that a state of misfortune exists which gives rise to the ensuing functions of the plot.

III. Analysis of The Plot of Tobit According to Propp's Functions

It has become common to speak of Tobit as a narrative with two strands, one arising out of Tobit's misfortune, the other out of Sarah's. But in terms of Propp's definition, Tobit has two problems which create two moves: one connected with his blindness, the other with his poverty. Thus, there are a total of three "moves" in Tobit: two pertaining to Tobit, one to Sarah.

The existence of three moves in Tobit creates a composite text. This is not in itself a radical break from the fairy tale tradition. Quite a number of composite texts occur in Propp's Russian sources (1968, 93–96). We may have in Tobit the combination of originally separate tales, but there is no way of knowing whether the author of Tobit or his source is responsible for the combination. Even the existence of these "moves" as originally separate tales cannot be affirmed with certainty.[7] The three moves in Tobit will be designated as follows, in order of their appearance in the narrative: the move arising out of Tobit's poverty will be termed Move 1, the move arising out of Tobit's blindness will be termed Move 2, the move arising out of Sarah's demon oppressor will be termed Move 3.

The following commentary and chart indicates how I see Propp's functions in relation to the plot of Tobit.[8] In composite texts, certain functions overlap (see the instances cited in Propp 1968, 93–94). Examples of "double duty functions" in Tobit are function 20 ("return") in moves 1 and 2, and the functions involving the encounter with the donor (12–14) in moves 2 and 3. Remember also that moves "may interweave; a development which has begun pauses, and a new move is inserted" (Propp 1968, 92). Nothing will be said about functions that do not occur in Tobit, but their absence presents no difficulty

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[7] "[T]he Bible scholar's concern with Ur-forms, first, original versions of pieces of literature, find [sic] a parallel in the historical geographic scholar's search for the place where a tale type originates, a search implying that one can ascertain the earliest form of a tale. Contemporary folklorists such as Dan Ben-Amos suggest, to the contrary, that multiplicity is at the heart of all folklore; tales always exist in multiplicity" (Niditch 1987, 13 and literature cited there [the Ben-Amos reference is an unpublished paper]).

[8] The application of Propp's morphology to Tobit was first suggested by J. Blenkinsopp, but because of the scope of his article he was able to do little more than, as he put it, "gently lay out this little story on Propp's grid" (1981, 38). More recently, P. Milne criticized Blenkinsopp for the superficial nature of his analysis, but endorsed the position that Propp's model could be applied to Tobit (1986, 46–52). P. Deselaers (1982, 248–252) and I. Nowell (1983, 53–60) both make some identifications of plot incidents in Tobit with Propp's functions, but the level of discussion does not go very far beyond Blenkinsopp's initial proposal. For example, neither Nowell nor Deselaers distinguishes all three moves in Tobit, and both avoid Propp's categories in favor of other models in their subsequent literary analysis.

for this kind of analysis; as was stated above, it would simply serve to help classify the kind of fairy tale which served as the source of Tobit.[9]

CHART: ANALYSIS OF TOBIT ACCORDING TO PROPP'S FUNCTIONS

PROPP'S FUNCTIONS	MOVE 1	MOVE 2	MOVE 3
1. Absentation			
2. Interdiction	1:17b, 18b	2:3	
3. Violation	1:18a	2:4–8	
4. Reconnaisance			
5. Delivery	1:19		
6. Trickery			
7. Complicity		2:9	
8. Villainy/Lack = Misfortune	1:20	2:10	3:8
9. Mediation (hero is told of misfortune and is dispatched)	4:20, 5:3		6:9–17c
10. Beginning counteraction	5:1		6:17d
11. Departure	5:4a, 5:17		
12. Donor encounters hero	5:4b	6:3	6:3
13. Hero's reaction	5:5–15	6:4	6:4
14. Provision of magical agent	5:16	6:5–6	6:5–6
15. Spatial transference, guidance	9:5a		7:1
16. Struggle			8:2–3a
17. Branding			
18. Victory			8:3b
19. Misfortune or Lack Liquidated	9:5b	11:10b–14a	8:13–14
20. Return	11:1–6	11:1–6	
21. Pursuit			
22. Rescue			
23. Unrecognized Arrival			
24. Unfounded claims of false hero			
25. Difficult task			
26. Solution			
27. Recognition	12:12–15	11:14b–15	
28. Exposure			
29. Transfiguration	12:16–22		
30. Punishment			
31. Wedding		11:17–18	8:19–21

Move 1. In addition to the 31 functions, Propp speaks of an "initial situation" which provides the hero with, among other things, a family context. Propp does not include

[9] "Tales with H-I [= 16–18 on our chart] and M-N [= 25–26] are essentially tales of different formation, since these features exclude one another" (Propp 1968, 102). Propp numbers the functions consecutively (using Roman numerals) when he first describes them in chapter II, but then assigns them either a Greek letter (functions 1–7), an arrow (functions 11 and 20) or a Cyrillic letter (the remaining functions). For ease of typography and perception of sequence I have used the consecutive numbering employed by Propp in chapter II, using Arabic rather than Roman numerals.

the initial situation in his tabulation of functions, since for him a function implies action. Nevertheless, he regards the initial situation as constituting "an important morphological element in the tale." The initial situation almost always involves a family. One possibility is simply that "the members of a family are enumerated" (1968, 25), which occurs in 1:9. The initial situation also presents a picture of "particular, sometimes emphasized prosperity" (Propp 1968, 27); Tobit's success as Shalmaneser's purchasing agent (1:13) therefore fits with the prosperity of the initial situation upon which the subsequent villainy intrudes.

The fortunes of the Tobit family begin to change when Sennacherib succeeds Shalmaneser as king. Tobit's burial of Jews executed by Sennacherib as criminals is done in violation of the royal will (functions 2 and 3). A citizen of Nineveh tells the king that it is Tobit who has buried them (function 5, delivery: "the villain receives information about his victim," 1968, 28). Sennacherib, it appears, would kill Tobit, but since Tobit has gone into hiding, the king has to content himself with seizing his property (function 8, villainy; Propp specifically mentions plunder as one form of this function, 1968, 31). Sennacherib had earlier harmed the wealth of the Tobit family through his misrule, which rendered unsafe the road to Media, where Tobit had left a large sum of money in trust. But now that he has confiscated the remainder of Tobit's property, the recovery of that money becomes considerably more urgent.

After Tobit has been blinded (see move 2), Tobit informs his son Tobiah of the money deposited in Media, and dispatches him to undertake the apparently dangerous journey to recover it (function 9; "misfortune or lack is made known; the hero is approached with a request or command; he is allowed to go or he is dispatched"). Tobiah agrees (function 10, "the seeker agrees to or decides upon counteraction"), but the whole family is anxious that some suitable guide be found for the hero, and Tobiah goes in search of one. Tobiah's "departure" (function 11) is irregular in that it may be said to occur twice; once when he goes in search of the guide (5:4), and once after the guide is procured (5:17). He encounters one Azariah, who gives himself out as an Israelite kinsman but is really the angel Raphael who has been sent to help them (functions 12–13). Azariah/Raphael offers his services as a guide; since he is actually an angel, he himself is the magical agent provided (function 14). "Donors" of this type go on to become "helpers" (Propp 1968, 50), and this is the role Azariah/Raphael will fill from this point on (thus the human alias of this angel could not be more apposite). In fact, after Tobiah's wedding in Ecbatana, Azariah/Raphael makes the trip to Media by himself (function 15) to recover the missing money (function 19). Tobias and Azariah/Raphael return with the money to Nineveh (function 20).

One might identify additional functions in the scene following the Tobits' offer to Azariah/Raphael of half the money he brought back with him, in which Azariah/Raphael is recognized as an angel (function 27) and ascends (function 29). In Propp's discussion of these functions, he speaks of the recognition and transfiguration of the hero rather than the helper, but notes later that "a helper may perform those functions which are specific for the hero" (1968, 83).

Move 2. The opening of this move takes pains to re-establish an "initial situation" (compare the discussion of the beginning of Move 1). Tobit is restored to his family after the death of Sennacherib and the accession of Esarhaddon, and the members of the Tobit family are once again enumerated (2:1). Moreover, despite their poverty, the situation is one of relative prosperity inasmuch as we encounter them as they sit down to dinner during the Feast of Weeks, and Tobit expresses satisfaction at the "many dainties" that have been provided (2:1–2). He wishes to share his feast with a poor kinsman, and instructs

Tobiah to find such a person; Tobiah does indeed find a kinsman, but one past caring about wealth or poverty.

As in move 1, misfortune befalls Tobit after he buries a corpse, but the connection between the misfortune and the burial is less clear. Flouting of royal will is not directly involved, but we can identify Tobiah's announcement to Tobit that there is an unburied Israelite in the street with Propp's function 2, since "[a]n inverted form of an interdiction is represented by an order or suggestion" (1968, 27). The actual burial would then correspond to function 3. Tobit then makes the mistake of sleeping outside with his face uncovered.[10] This episode corresponds with Propp's function 7, complicity. This is usually related to an attempt at deception on the villain's part (function 6), with the complicity then consisting of the cooperation of the victim. But, Propp adds, "It can be observed that this function can also exist separately. No one lulls the hero to sleep: he suddenly falls asleep by himself in order, of course, to facilitate the villain's task" (1968, 30). Whereupon, the sparrows' droppings fall into Tobit's eyes, causing blindness (function 8). The sparrow activity is natural rather than malicious, but morphologically this too is "villainy" rather than "lack," since it is inflicted on Tobit by an agent, however unwittingly (note that among Propp's examples of "villainy" are damages inflicted by animals, such as "a mare eats up a haystack," or "a crane steals the peas" [1968, 31]).

In the fish which attacks Tobiah (function 12) we have a different kind of "donor" than appeared in move 1. Where Azariah/Raphael is a friendly, intentional donor, the fish is a hostile, unintentional donor. Both kinds are common in fairy tales (Propp 1968, 46–48). Tobiah responds by seizing the fish, bringing it ashore (function 13), and removing its gall, heart and liver for future use (function 14), all at the instruction of Azariah. After their return home (function 20, see move 1), Tobiah applies the fish gall to his father's eyes, which cures his blindness (function 19) and permits him to recognize his son (function 27; Tobit does not merely say "I can see," but rather "I can see you, my son, the light of my eyes. . . . Now, look, I see my son Tobiah!" [11:14]). The wedding of Sarah and Tobiah, which had of course been celebrated at the end of move 3 (see below), is celebrated again (function 31).

Move 3. Just after Tobit's blindness and his subsequent prayer, we learn of Sarah, daughter of Raguel, who is oppressed by a demon who kills her husbands on their wedding night (function 8). This move is then suspended until Tobiah's encounter with the fish described above in move 2 (functions 12–14), an encounter which is equally crucial to Move 3. Immediately after this episode, Azariah/Raphael tells Tobiah that Sarah, a marriageable kinswoman, lives nearby; when Tobiah objects that he has heard of the demon who kills her husbands, Azariah/Raphael assures him that this can be overcome, and that he can and should wed her (function 9). Whereupon Tobiah sets his heart on marrying Sarah (function 10), and Azariah/Raphael leads him to Raguel's house (function 15).

The struggle (function 16) and victory (function 18) over the demon are virtually simultaneous; note that again it is Azariah/Raphael who does most of the work. Meanwhile, Raguel has been preparing a grave for his latest son-in-law, and asks his wife to send the maid to see if Tobiah is dead. The maid finds the couple peacefully asleep, verifying

[10] Zimmerman believes that the audience would have recognized the description of Tobit falling asleep in the courtyard as "a signal that something is about to happen" and cites Pes. 111a: "He who sleeps in the shadow of a single palm tree in a courtyard, and he who sleeps in the shadow of the moon, has his own blood on his head" (1958, 57).

that Sarah's predicament has indeed come to an end (function 19). Although the marriage has already been contracted and consummated, a wedding feast is celebrated the following morning (function 31).

Tale Roles. In Propp's morphology there are seven "tale roles": villain, dispatcher, hero, donor, helper, the princess and her father (Propp regards father and daughter as one role, since they "cannot be exactly delineated from each other according to functions" [1968, 79–80]), and the false hero. In the Book of Tobit, two roles are filled by the same character in all three moves: the hero is always Tobiah,[11] the helper is always Azariah/Raphael. There is no false hero in any of the moves. The princess and her father are found only in move 3, where this role is filled by Sarah and Raguel; in this move, the villain is Asmodeus, the donor is the fish, and the dispatcher is Azariah/Raphael. In move 1, the villain is Sennacherib, the dispatcher Tobit, and the donor Azariah/Raphael. In move 2, the role of the villain is filled by the sparrows, and the donor is again the fish; there is no dispatcher.

IV. A Generic Approach to Tobit's Fairy Tale Source

Propp's *Morphology* allows us to approach Tobit's fairy tale source on a generic level, one which leads us away from particular tales and highly variable motifs toward a description of the genre (strictly speaking, sub-genre) in terms of its more constant plot elements. It should be noticed, however, that we are still speaking in terms of a fairy tale *source* and its subsequent *use* by a Jewish author. We are not arguing that the Book of Tobit in its present form can be adequately described by Propp's morphology; in other words, the book of Tobit as it now stands is not a fairy tale pure and simple.

The fact that we are speaking of a source and its use means that a diachronic or historical element enters into our interpretation. Some may find this surprising, since Propp is generally known as a "structuralist." But there is considerable difference between the structuralism of Propp and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss. For example, Propp is particularly serious about plot as the content of the fairy tale and finds it signally instructive that Levi-Strauss misunderstands him on this point:

> For the folklorist and the literary historian the central concern is the plot. In Russian the word "fabula," as a literary-historical term, has a well-defined meaning: the complex of actions and events which are developed concretely in the course of the narrative. The English translator caught this very well with the word "plot." And it is not pure chance that a German periodical on the art of popular narrative bears the title "Fabula." But for Levi-Strauss plot is of no interest; he translates it with the word "theme" (1976, 117). Evidently he prefers this term *since plot is a category which makes reference to time* [italics mine], while the word "theme" does not have this characteristic. But no literary scholar will ever accept this substitution. Both the term "plot" and the term "theme" can be understood in very different ways, but can never be used identically or interchangeably. (Propp 1978, 75)

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[11] Morphologically, there is no basis for Eissfeldt's assertion that "the hero [from Tobit's putative "source," "The Grateful Dead Man"] has split into two characters, father and son" (1965, 584). All the functions pertaining to the hero (10, 11, 13 and 31) are performed by Tobiah. This error again alerts us to the danger of taking a particular version of a fairy tale and treating it as the source for Tobit.

Propp, in taking the diachronic element to be the essential content of the fairy tale, has already put some distance between his "structuralism" and that of Levi-Strauss. But the difference goes even deeper. Where Levi-Strauss approaches any text with prior assumptions about polar oppositions that a text will somehow attempt to resolve, Propp's structural categories are derived from the material. The two structural approaches are most commonly distinguished by saying that Propp seeks to uncover the "surface" structure and Levi-Strauss the "deep" structure of a text. Propp himself refers to his own approach as "empirical," that of Levi-Strauss as "philosophical" (1978, 58). While this may be too general and grandiose all around, it at least has the advantage of stressing the extent to which Propp's results are based on careful scrutiny of a particular genre, and not on prior assumptions about the human mind.

The empirical nature of Propp's work makes him particularly useful in both historical and literary investigation. If Propp has indeed discovered the compositional scheme of a particular genre, then the morphology he has constructed ought to make it possible to identify works which show clear traces of the influence of that genre without relying too much on the presence of particular motifs, or without having to identify a particular text as *the* source of the work. Even more significant, in my opinion, are the applications of Propp's morphology to literary analysis. By clarifying what the heroic fairy tale consists of, Propp allows us to compare its compositional scheme with particular texts. If the work in question is a more developed literary text based on a (presumably oral) fairy tale, then both points of correspondence *and* points of omission, divergence and elaboration will allow for a far more incisive analysis than was previously possible.[12]

For despite the detailed correspondence between the Tobit story and Propp's morphology, there are many components of the work that do not fit the fairy tale genre. In marked contrast to the fairy tale, we are introduced to characters located in a definite place and time, carefully provided with a genealogy that extends through many generations.[13] The book contains several long prayers and admonitory discourses, and concludes with a hymn of praise, a farewell discourse including *ex eventu* prophecy, and a final notice of divine judgment against Nineveh. The title its author gave it is "The Book of the Words of Tobit," a title modeled on prophetic or wisdom literature. This designation "book" not only indicates its written nature, in contrast to the fundamentally oral nature of the fairy tale, but also bespeaks our author's attempt to model his narrative on the sacred literature of his people.[14]

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[12] Clearly Propp himself thought his work could be used in historical and comparative studies. In his introduction to *Morphology* he writes, "We shall insist that as long as no correct morphological study exists, there can be no correct historical study. If we are incapable of breaking the tale into its components, we will not be able to make a correct comparison. And if we do not know how to compare, then how can we throw light upon, for instance, Indo-Egyptian relationships, or upon the relationships of the Greek [plot] to the Indian, etc.?" (15). Lüthi may be right that Propp presumes too much on the priority of his approach, but the point I wish to make here is that Propp clearly thought that historical and comparative work could proceed based on his study.

[13] "The characters depicted in [fairy tales] have . . . no environment, no relationship to past or future generations, no relationship to time" (Lüthi 1986, 37).

[14] G. Nickelsburg has pointed out the affinity of some of the aforementioned features of Tobit (e.g., *ex eventu* prophecy and angelic revelation) with apocalyptic literature, and goes on to say that while Tobit cannot be considered an apocalypse in form or theology,

Yet enough of the structure and flavor of the fairy tale remains that one must say that the fairy tale belongs not merely to the pre-history but also to the present form of the text. Propp encourages us to discern its presence not in various "echoes, piecings, and splinterings" of fairy tale motifs, but in the basic structure of the plot. We can assume that those aspects which correspond to Propp's functions derive from Tobit's fairy tale source. In some cases they may represent the author's elaborations of the source in a customary fairy tale manner, but even in that event the author would still be dependent on the traditional fairy tale genre. Once we have used Propp to discern this underlying fairy tale plot structure, we can then see how the author of Tobit adapts this plot to his audience's circumstances, elaborates on it, shifts its emphases, and otherwise enrolls it in the service of his larger purpose of Jewish edification and encouragement. In this way, both Tobit's debt to the traditional genre of the heroic fairy tale and the more distinctively Jewish features appropriate to its final form as a sacred book stand out against each other in sharper relief, and their creative interplay can be demonstrated.[15]

V. The Fairy Tale in the Interpretation of Tobit: The Initial Situation and Function 8

As an example of the kind of analysis I am proposing for the Book of Tobit, let me offer these concluding observations about the initial situation and function 8 (villainy or lack).

The Book of Tobit is set in the Assyrian exile. This is different from the characteristic milieu of the fairy tale. The kingdom in which the fairy tale family dwells and to which its hero ultimately returns is usually described in very vague terms, but it is implicitly their own kingdom, the place where they habitually live and desire to live. But in Tobit, a more specific historical setting consists of an exile interpreted as a judgment that imparts to the community a lingering background of shame, an abnormal dislocation which renders the time "out of joint" so long as it endures. The effect of this dislocation on the entire narrative is profound. Recall that the basic progress of a fairy tale move is from "villainy" or "lack" to "lack liquidated." This sequence is followed in all three moves in Tobit, but a more chronic "lack" remains: the situation of exile itself. This more chronic lack is not liquidated in the narrative; its resolution can only be anticipated and prophesied.

(continued)

"the uniqueness of the apocalyptic phenomenon must be discussed with such parallels in mind" (1984, 46). What seems clear is that much Jewish post-exilic literature, apocalyptic and otherwise, employs canonical models at the same time as it incorporates other sources and new beliefs.

[15] Of further interest in this regard is Milne's comment, in the light of Jason's study of multigenre texts (1978), that "[t]he likelihood that many biblical narratives are multigenre rather than pure types is strong" (1988, 173). The genres Jason refers to are cross-cultural (see her *Ethnopoetry*, 1977); if one seeks to establish genre simply within the bounds of a given culture (as many biblical scholars and folklorists do), one will regard fewer texts as being "multigenre." In the long run, both approaches may be necessary. But in using Propp, one is employing a model that is valid across many cultures for the sub-genre of the heroic fairy tale. I propose to explore the interaction of this cross-cultural genre with Jewish literature modeled on the Torah and the Prophets.

Indeed, all three instances of "villainy" in Tobit can be seen as acute manifestations of the chronic condition of exile. This is clearest in move 1, where Sennacherib is the cause of Tobit's misfortune (see the discussion above), but it is present in the other moves as well. In Move 2, before Tobit leaves his table to attend to yet another unburied Jewish corpse, he recalls the words of Amos, "Your feasts will be turned into mourning, and all your ways[16] into lamentation." Distracted by his own fear and sorrow, which again stem from the exile, Tobit makes the fateful mistake of sleeping outdoors without protection. After his blindness, in the course of his prayer for death, Tobit portrays himself as being caught up in the judgment of the exile:

> . . . You handed us over
> to plunder, captivity and death,
> Until we have become an object lesson,
> a byword, a reproach.
> to all the nations among whom you scattered us. (3:4)

Last, in Move 3, exile leaves Sarah vulnerable to the interference of a local demon,[17] and separates her from one who, according to Azariah/Raphael, not only has the pre-eminent right of kinship to her hand (6:11–12), but was destined to marry her from the beginning of the world (6:18).

The personal losses are thus acute manifestations of a more chronic problem, one which is not dealt with in the manner of the fairy tale, but through the tradition of the Torah and the Prophets. In the last chapter, Tobit warns Tobias to flee Nineveh, because what Nahum prophesied against it will surely happen (14:4). After Tobit's death, Tobias, now in Media, hears of the destruction of Nineveh (14:15). With this disclosure, the book ends. For the author of the Book of Tobit and for his Diaspora audience, Nineveh symbolizes their condition of exile and dispersion. The choice of Nineveh is effective for several reasons. It was a real place whose role in the divine plan is amply documented in Jewish Scriptures, yet it is sufficiently remote in time to serve as a symbol for the

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[16] *hodoi;* so S. BA has "festivities" (*euphrosynai*). The S reading is frequently emended to *ōdai,* "songs," since this would bring the text into line with both Hebrew and Greek versions of Amos 8:10. But the reading in S may be intentional in view of the thematic use of *hodos* in Tobit (Deselaers 1982, 342–48). Indeed, the resulting couplet parallels the progress of the narrative: Tobit's "feast has been turned to mourning" (by Tobiah's bad news), and his "ways into lamentation" (in having to go out into the street to fetch the corpse).

[17] A Persian derivation for the name Asmodeus was once thought to be virtually certain: "This name is borrowed directly from the Persian 'Aeshma Daeva,' the demon of violence and wrath in the later Avesta" (Manson 1951, 154). But the philological evidence is ambiguous (see the thorough, if equivocal, discussion in Barr, 1985, 214–218), and an alternative Hebrew derivation from *šmd* ("to destroy") has found increasing favor (Zimmerman 1958, 63). Moreover, whatever malevolent being fulfilled Asmodeus' role in Tobit's fairy-tale source, it was probably not one with Aeshma's cosmic proportions. But if Asmodeus' name is not Persian, he might still have been thought to have centered his activities there. The *Testament of Solomon* has Asmodeus state that the fish which wards him off "is found in the rivers of Assyria and is hatched only there; I am also found in those parts" (5:10). It is plausible that the author of Tobit thought that exile made Jewish maidens more vulnerable to evils of this kind.

current exilic situation anywhere in the Diaspora. The Jews could look back on Nineveh as an instance where the divine judgment they await was consummated.

When we notice that the exile is the enduring "lack" underlying the particular lacks that are resolved in the Tobit narrative, the unity of the work impresses itself more forcibly on us. Chapters 13 and 14 are not merely tacked on, but are necessary in view of the way the author has portrayed the initial situation as one of exile and explicitly connected the misfortunes that befall the Tobit family to that exile. For it is in these chapters that the prospect of an end to the exile is held out. For the author of Tobit, it is ultimately the Law and the Prophets, rather than the fairy tale, which provides the model for the resolution of evil. Yet the smaller healings in the story are signs of a larger healing to come, and what Tolkien called the fairy tales's "eucatastrophe" ("sorrow turned to joy," 1966, 85–87) becomes incorporated into the biblical vision of a people under judgment who are ultimately restored and vindicated.[18]

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[18] For a fuller interpretation of Propp's function 8 in Tobit, see my article "Misfortune and Exile in Tobit: The Juncture of a Fairy Tale Source and Deuteronomic Theology," forthcoming in *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*; the permission of the editors of *CBQ* to use parts of that article in this paper is gratefully acknowledged.

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Tobit and Enoch: Distant Cousins With a Recognizable Resemblance

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In one of the better known instances of duping in ancient literature, Raphael the archangel, fresh from the heavenly throneroom, shows up on Tobit's doorstep at a moment of crisis, offering his services as a tour guide and bodyguard for young Tobias. When Tobit asks Raphael about his family background, the heavenly messenger produces bogus credentials, claiming to be Azariah the son of the patriarch Hananiah—a relative of Tobit. The scene is played well, and Tobit falls for the line, hook and sinker. With his cover story firmly established, Raphael, alias Azariah, sets out with Tobias on an adventure in which family relationships play an important role and appearances must be deceiving.

In this paper I shall turn Tobit's question back on the author of the Book of Tobit—but with a twist. From what intellectual and religious family does this author hail? Where in the literature of Judaism do we find some look-alikes?

There is an obvious candidate in the Book of Job. Both texts are stories from a wisdom tradition which focus on the problem of theodicy. Their heroes—whose names even sound a bit similar—are wealthy men, introduced as pious and righteous (Job 1:1–3; Tob 1:3–9), who lose both their wealth and their health. After a bitter exchange with his wife, each wishes that he were dead (Job 2:9–10; 3:1–26; Tob 2:11–3:6). Ultimately, however, both are restored to health and obtain new wealth, and the stories end with reference to the heroes' deaths and the inheritance of their goods. In both cases, the story, which is played out on earth, makes explicit reference to the heavenly realm, in which an angelic witness—in Job the accuser, in Tobit, the intercessor— plays a prominent role. Both texts, though in very different proportions—make use of narrative form and poetic wisdom.[1] While the book of Tobit is obviously very different from the book of Job, on some basic details there are recognizable similarities.

While these family resemblances suggest some sort of relationship, I shall make a case for a less obvious relationship. Their major difference in appearance notwithstanding, I perceive some resemblance between features in the book of Tobit and parts of 1 Enoch. Is it possible that the author(s) of this wisdom tale and the apocalyptic authors of 1 Enoch are distant intellectual relatives?[2]

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[1] For the latter, see especially Job 31:13–22, which addresses some of the specific concerns in Tob 4:7–11, 14.

[2] For a source-critical analysis of Tobit, see Paul Deselaers, *Das Buch Tobit: Studien zu seiner Erstebung, Komposition, und Theologie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982). For the purposes of this paper, I have consulted neither this book nor Deselaers' paper prepared for this session.

My comparison will confine itself in 1 Enoch to chapters 1–36 and 91–105. My text of Tobit is based the longer recension of the Greek (S and some allied MSS, and the Old

The major differences between the two texts are obvious and can be briefly summarized. Enoch is a collection of revelatory texts, in which the primordial patriarch transmits secret information about the hidden recesses of the cosmos and the hidden events of the future, information gathered during journeys through the cosmos and in elaborate eschatological dream visions. Tobit is a narrative tale (albeit pseudepigraphic like 1 Enoch and recounted, in part, in the first person singular) about the trials and tribulations of an exiled Israelite family living in Mesopotamia after the Assyrian Exile. The Enochic texts are heavily mythic in their content and cryptic in their allusion to history; proper names are scarce and limited almost exclusively to angels and demons and to the patriarch and a few members of his family. The story in Tobit, though it is fiction, takes place in a realistic and recognizable historical setting, and its characters are for the most part human beings with names, who live in places with names.

Fully recognizing these substantial differences, which could be elaborated in greater detail, I shall pursue my comparison with reference to four aspects of the two works: their cosmology, angelology, and demonology; their eschatology; their ethical teaching; and their liturgical vocabulary. In my comparison, I shall note details of similarity, at the same time attempting to sharpen and elaborate the aforementioned differences. On the basis of this analysis, I shall suggest the hypothesis that the two works reflect an older common stock of ideas, traditions, and terminology, not simply to be found in the Hebrew Scriptures, which has developed in different directions in the respective texts.

A. Cosmology, Angelology, and Demonology

1. 1 Enoch

The Enochic writings presume a well-defined dualism between the empirical world and the hidden recesses of the universe. Lengthy sections of 1 Enoch are devoted to descriptions of these hidden cosmic realia. Chapters 72–82 describe the structures and mechanics of the heavenly bodies and the meteorological phenomena, and chapters 17–19 and 20–36 track Enoch's journeys across the earth. Both sections are presented as the revelation of hidden knowledge, mediated by the seer. In chapters 72–82, the purpose of the revelation is to teach an astronomical Torah—the truth about the solar orientation of the universe and the calendar. The accounts of Enoch's journey provide the assurance that God has built into the universe the places where the final judgment will be administered, and thus the factuality of that judgment is guaranteed.

Heaven is not only the place of the luminaries, but also, or preeminently, the dwelling of God. The throneroom of the divine King is located in a celestial palace or temple. Its *temenos* is bounded by a wall built of hailstones and belted by fire. The throneroom itself is an oven of raging fire, whose walls are stone-like slabs of snow. It is roofed with shooting stars and lightning flashes and floored with snow, and access is possible only through doors

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Latin), now attested in principal by the Qumran Aramaic and Hebrew MSS; see J. T. Milik, "La Patrie de Tobie," *RB* 73 (1966) 522. Occasionally, I have adopted a reading from the S tradition which agrees with the shorter recension when S appears to be defective.

Some points made here briefly have been developed at somewhat greater length in my short commentary on "Tobit," in James L. Mays, ed., *Harper's Bible Commentary* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).

of blazing flame. Enthroned on a chariot of ice with wheels like the sun is "the Great Glory," who is attended by myriads of courtiers, known as watchers and holy ones. All of this is recounted by the seer, who was granted the unique privilege of being taken up on high to hear the Divine Judge pronounce a sentence of doom on the rebellious watchers (chaps. 14–16).[3]

The holy ones—by whatever name (see n. 4)—are an essential feature in the Enochic revelations. Their numbers are legion, and their functions are many and varied. In the Astronomical Book, they are in charge of the operation of the heavenly bodies. In chapters 1–5 they appear as a divine army (1:4, 9). In chapters 12–16, they are described as priests in the heavenly sanctuary and as courtiers in the throneroom. Elsewhere they function as agents or messengers of God, although it is uncertain whether or where the original Aramaic ever used the work מלאכא to describe them.[4] Chief among the heavenly entourage is a special group, which is four or seven in number, depending on the tradition.

In chapters 6–11 the four, named Sariel, Raphael, Gabriel, and Michael, intercede with God in behalf of humanity and then are sent as the agents of God's judgment at the time of the Flood and presumably at the eschaton.[5] The names of two of them signify their area of responsibility. Raphael "heals" the earth of the plague brought by the rebellious watchers. Gabriel sends the giants (among them the *gibborîm*) into a war of mutual extermination.

To the four, chapters 20–36 add the names of Uriel, Raguel, and Remiel. In this tradition, the seven are in charge of various parts of the cosmos and the activities that take place there. Uriel presides over the luminaries. Raphael is in charge of the mountain of the dead, where the shades reside. Michael, the protagonist of God's people, looks after Jerusalem. These functions, listed in the onomasticon in chapter 20, are elaborated in the narrative, as the "holy angels" or "holy watchers" (see n. 4) accompany Enoch on his journey and explain what he sees in their respective areas of responsibility.

Chapters 92–105 presume the heavenly world and its activity rather than describe it. Here, too, allusions are made to the functions of the heavenly courtiers, although their number and proper names are not indicated. Their roles closely approximate those of the four in chapters 6–11. As scribes, they keep a daily record of the sins of the wicked. As

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[3] For details supporting my interpretation of chapters 12–16, see George W. E. Nickelsburg, "Enoch, Levi, and Peter: Recipients of Revelation in Upper Galilee," *JBL* 100 (1981) 575–82.

[4] In the Qumran Aramaic fragments of 1 Enoch, in those relatively few places where the text is extant, every occurrence of "holy angel(s)" in the Greek and Ethiopic has for its counterpart "watcher(s) and holy one(s)." This could indicate, though it is by no means certain, that wherever "angel" occurs in the Greek and Ethiopic of 1 Enoch, it translates "watcher" in the original Aramaic. This could be the case also in Tobit.

[5] For my interpretation of chapters 6–11, and particularly the idea that the story reflects aspects of both primordial and eschatological times, see George W. E. Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic and Myth in 1 Enoch 6–11," *JBL* 96 (1977) 383–405. On other matters relating to these chapters, see Paul D. Hanson, "Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6–11," *JBL* 96 (1977) 195–233; and the papers by Hanson, Nickelsburg, John J. Collins, and Devorah Dimant in Paul J. Achtemeier, ed., SBLASP 1978, Vol. 2:309–39.

intercessors they bring memoranda (μνημόσυνον; 97:5–6; 99:3; 103:4) to the attention of the heavenly King and "call to remembrance" (ἀναμιμνήσκουσιν) the contents of the prayers of the righteous "in the presence of the glory of the Great One" (ἐνώπιον τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου, 104:1)[6] Chief among these prayers are complaints about oppression and injustice and petitions that God intervene as Judge. When the judgment occurs, the heavenly ones will function as God's agents (100:4; 102:3).

Another specially mentioned group among the watchers—though never called *holy* watchers for obvious reasons—are the two hundred who rebelled against God in the time before the Flood. Chapters 6–11 recount the story of this rebellion in three versions, or fragments of three versions (see n. 5). According to the first version, which controls the present shape of the narrative, the heavenly watchers became enamored of the beauty of the daughters of men, and at the behest of their leader Šemiḥazah, descended, took these women as wives, and begat bastard (half-divine, half-human) offspring—giants who ravaged the earth and its inhabitants. In the second version, the watcher chieftain was named 'Aśael (presently he is the lieutenant of Šemiḥazah); he rebelled by revealing the secrets of metallurgy and mining, which made it possible for humans to fashion weapons, as well as the jewelry and cosmetics that facilitate sexual seduction. The third version of the story, if it was a separate version ascribed to the watchers, is the revelation of the secrets of astrological forecasting and of the magical arts.

These myths function to explain the presence of certain kinds of evil in God's world and to promise their extirpation. These evils originated in primordial antiquity, and their cause was the rebellion of divine beings. The violence of war experienced in the present time is not due simply to human intentions and actions. According to the myth about Šemiḥazah, the captains and kings of the earth are incarnations of evil bred into the world through the lust of rebellious heavenly beings. In the story of 'Aśael, war has been made possible by the forbidden revelation of the technology that facilitates the fabrication of effective weapons. Similarly, occult knowledge about the future and magical means to manipulate one's world constitute a body of knowledge that God has proscribed for humanity. The evils brought by the rebel watchers are dealt with in two stages. In primordial times, God sent the four holy ones to imprison the villains and kill their offspring. At the end of time, God's agents will take the rebels to their final punishment and will extirpate the evil that they brought and will heal and cleanse the creation.

Chapters 12–16 of 1 Enoch recast the old myths in a significant way. Because the rebellious watchers were spirit, which is not mortal, the death of the giants released their spiritual components, which now constitute a world of demons which ravage the earth and humanity through acts of violence "against the sons of men and against the women, because they have come forth from them," through sickness and possession, and, possibly, by tempting humans to sin. This condition will prevail until God intervenes and exterminates the demons at the eschaton (15:11–16:1).

2. Tobit

On the first reading, the book of Tobit appears to depict a world that is very different from Enoch's. Its author offers no elaborate revelations of cosmic phenomena and heavenly secrets, recounts no myth about the primordial origins of evil, and posits no final

[6] See also 103:1. The title "The Great Holy One," occurs in 1 Enoch 1–36 and 91–105 with considerable frequency.

angelic extermination of evil to usher in a renewed and cleansed creation. These striking differences notwithstanding, the author of Tobit presumes and employs some important elements which we have seen in 1 Enoch, mixing material that is found in various of 1 Enoch's sections or strata.

Although the author did not describe or claim to have seen the heavenly world, he alludes to it. God dwells there in glory, attended by "holy angels" or "holy ones," evidently a multitude of them (8:15; 11:14).[7] Seven of them, including Raphael, serve as witnesses of human deeds and as intercessors who bring the memorandum of the prayer of the righteous into the glorious presence of the Great One or Holy One (3:16–17; 12:12–15; ἐγὼ προσήγαγον τὸ μνημόσυνον τῆς προσευχῆς ὑμῶν ἐνώπιον τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἁγίου,[8] and they are sent to earth as God's agents to combat evil and help those in trouble. As in 1 Enoch 10:4–8, Raphael is the divinely sent healer (3:17; 12:14). Like the angels in 1 Enoch 20–36, Raphael also accompanies Tobias on a journey (albeit an earthly journey, Tobit 6–11). When Tobias asks him about the strange pharmacopeia he has been ordered to take with him, Raphael acts as an interpreter (6:6–8). When Tobias cries out for help, Raphael saves him from danger (6:3 S).[9]

The author of Tobit ascribes some forms of evil to the activity of "evil demons." The villain is Asmodeus, whose desire for Sarah causes intense suffering for her and her parents, to say nothing of her seven bridegrooms. The duel between Raphael and Asmodeus concludes with the former binding the latter and removing him from the scene. The wording of Tob 8:3 resembles the description of the duel between 'Aśael and Raphael in 1 Enoch 10:4,[10] although the demon's passion for Sarah is similar the motivation of the sin of Šemiḥazah and his associates (6:2), whose opponent in 1 Enoch 10 is Michael, and its attribution to a demon recalls the statement in 15:11 cited above. In a particular nuance that differentiates Tobit from 1 Enoch (7:1; 8:3; 9:8), the good angel reveals magical information that enables Tobias to combat the demon and cure Tobit (6:1–8).

Against the background of these parallels, the difference between 1 Enoch and Tobit stand out more clearly. Sometimes the righteous do suffer as victims of demonic activity, as in the case of Sarah.[11] They may be oppressed by other human beings (cf. 1 Enoch 92–105) either because they seek to fulfill God's Law (as when Tobit buries the dead) or simply in spite of the fact that they act righteously (as when Tobit is taken into exile although he fulfills God's commandments, 1:3–10). But Tobit's chief explanation for his own suffering is that God chastises even the righteous because of their sin, and Tobit employs a similar paradigm to explain Israel's exile. God is smiting his people, so that they may repent and find mercy.[12]

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[7] See all the references to "the holy ones" in 8:15.

[8] The "Great One" is indicated by the B text of 3:16, when compared with S, and "The Holy One" is indicated by 12:15 B, when compared with S.

[9] For angelic response to a human appeal, cf. 1 Enoch 7:3; 8:3 and chapters 9–10.

[10] See especially the reading of Syncellus, which uses two verbs and, in fact, the same roots as does the Greek of Tob 8:3.

[11] On the possibility that the bird in Tob 2:10 is an agent of the devil, see my commentary, ad loc.

[12] For the formula, "scourge, have mercy," see 11:15 of Tobit and 13:2, 5, 9 of Israel. On the parallelism between the two stories see George W. E. Nickelsburg, *Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981) 33.

God's mercy for Israel lies in the future (see the next section), as in 1 Enoch. However, in an emphasis very different from 1 Enoch, the author of Tobit focuses on the presence of God and the activity of God's healing angel *here and now.* Raphael's mission is placed neither in primordial times nor at the eschaton; it is in historical time that he descends to heal the suffering of human beings. In this sense, the difference in genre between 1 Enoch and Tobit is significant. Although the book of Tobit is set in past time, its characters are real human beings with whom the readers can identify. The implication is that God is now present among his people, and God's angels are active to heal the ills of God's people.

Herein lies the importance of the element of revelation in Tobit and the significance of its difference from Enoch's revelations. In Tobit, people do not understand the real meaning of what is happening to them, nor do they perceive the real identity of the heavenly agent who claims to be a long lost cousin. Only at the end of the story, when Azariah reveals that he is really Raphael, does Tobit understand that even in his suffering, God was with him. The reader may deduce that in other cases the suffering of the righteous does not indicate divine absence or neglect, or the lack or failure of justice. Although the anguish in the prayers of Tobit and Sarah may elicit the sympathy of the reader who also suffers, the angelic revelation assures the same reader that in reality things are not as they appear and that help and vindication are on the way. This focus on God's presence now in the lives of individuals distinguishes Tobit from 1 Enoch, where God's beneficent, saving will, which is being done in heaven, will be realized on earth only in an eschatological denouement.

B. Eschatology

1. 1 Enoch

The eschatological emphasis in 1 Enoch is evident in the first lines of the collection, which announce the coming of a final judgment that will bring blessing to the righteous chosen ones and punishment to the wicked (1:1). This superscription leads into a prophetic oracle, said to be the crystallization of Enoch's heavenly vision. At many other points, in almost all strata of the collection, this eschatological judgment is announced and emphasized. A brief description of the renewed creation forms the climax to the myth about the rebellious watchers (10:17–11:2). Like a prophet Enoch hears God's announcement to this effect in chapters 12–16. In the journeys accounts in chapters 17–19 and 20–36, mythic geography and cosmology undergird the eschatological message by describing the places of its enactment. In chapters 92–105 the woes and assurances, again with prophetic analogies, announce, warn, and assure that human deeds are subject to God's future judgment.[13] Only in two instances, however, is the eschatological judgment placed in historical perspective, in a "historical apocalypse." Contrary to some stereotypes of apocalyptic literature, the authors of the Enoch texts do not dwell on the "when" of the judgment and the consummation. The two apocalypses are Enoch's extended dream vision in chapters 85–90 (the Animal Vision) and the Apocalypse of Weeks in 93:1–10; 91:11–17.[14] Both texts—one in great detail, the other in brief schematic form—trace the

[13] On these forms, see idem, "The Apocalyptic Message of 1 Enoch 92–150," *CBQ* 39 (1977) 310–13.

[14] This order in the Apocalypse is attested in the Qumran Aramaic fragments; see J. T. Milik, *The Books of Enoch* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) 265–66.

course of history from creation to the eschaton. The Apocalypse of Weeks is of special importance here, because it has an interesting parallel in the book of Tobit.

The author of this little apocalypse claims to present the contents of a vision which Enoch received in heaven, as well as the contents of the heavenly tablets, which he read (93:1–2). It is introduced twice in language that parallels Enoch's experience to that of Balaam the prophet (93:1, 3: cf. 1:2–3).[15] Speaking from the fictional perspective of Enoch's time, the author forecasts history from the end of the first "week," the seventh generation from Adam, to the time of the tenth "week" and the many weeks without end that will follow it.

The following features in the Apocalypse are important for our consideration. In the third week, Abraham is "chosen as the plant of righteous judgment" (93:5). The fourth and fifth weeks are marked by the building of the tabernacle and the temple respectively (93:6–7). The sixth week concludes when "the temple of the kingdom is burnt with fire" and "the chosen root is dispersed" (93:8). No mention is made of a return or of the rebuilding of the temple. The seventh week is characterized as totally perverse (93:9), but at its conclusion, "the chosen are chosen as witnesses of righteousness from the eternal plant of righteousness" (93:10).[16] They are given sevenfold knowledge so that they can uproot violence and deceit (91:11), and in the eighth week all the righteous are given a sword to execute judgment against all the wicked. The "the temple of the kingdom of the Great One will be built in the greatness of its glory for all the generations of eternity" (91:12–13). In the ninth week, "righteous judgment (or law) will be revealed to all the sons of the whole earth, and the deeds of wickedness will vanish from the earth and descend into the eternal pit, while all humanity turns to the path of eternal righteousness" (91:14).

2. Tobit's Eschatology

Although the story of Tobit's and Sarah's troubles and their alleviation begins and concludes in a past historical time period, the book has a significant orientation toward the future. The story of Tobit's suffering and its alleviation is paralleled by the story of Israel's suffering and its alleviation. Both are interpreted as divine chastisement and mercy (see n. 12). But whereas the healing of Tobit (and Sarah) brings closure to that plot, the story of Israel's suffering remains unfinished. From the time perspective of the alleged author and from the point of view of the real author, God's mercy on Israel will be realized in the future. Tobit's story, with its happy conclusion, is the paradigm for Israel's story, which remains to be concluded.

This point is made through the use of two separate literary forms in chapters 13 and 14. Chapter 13 is an eschatologically oriented psalm, set in the land of captivity, where the author anticipates God's mercy, when the people will return from exile and dispersion and Jerusalem will be rebuilt in the glory predicted in the latter chapters of Isaiah. Chapter 14 repeats the point in a section of text that parallels the Apocalypse of Weeks. On his deathbed, the patriarch summons his children so that he can transmit his testament. Its contents are primarily a forecast of the future that closely shadows important features of Enoch's Apocalypse. Since Tobit is speaking during the exile, the forecast picks up at this point, near the conclusion of Enoch's sixth week. Significant events have their counterparts in 1 Enoch.

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[15] On the parallels between chapter 93 and chapter 1, see James C. VanderKam, "Studies in the Apocalypse of Weeks," *CBQ* 46 (1984) 516–17.

[16] My reconstructions of the text of the Apocalypse of Weeks are based on the Qumran Aramaic, 4QEng.

Tobit's "brethren will be scattered," Jerusalem will be desolate, and "the house of God . . . will be burned until the time" (14:4; cf. 93:8). "God will return them to the land of Israel, and again they will build the house, but not as the first one, until the time, when the time of the seasons is fulfilled" (14:5; contrast 93:9). "After these things, they will all return from their captivity, and they will build Jerusalem in glory, and the house of God will be built in it as a glorious building for all the generations of eternity, as the prophets of Israel spoke concerning her" (14:5; see 91:13). "And all the nations in the whole earth will all turn and fear the Lord in truth, and they will all discard their idols, which lead them astray . . . and they will bless the God of eternity in righteousness" (14:6–7; see 91:14). "And those who love God in truth will rejoice, and those who do sin and iniquity will disappear from the whole earth" (14:7; see 91:14).

A comparison with the Apocalypse of Weeks indicates the following parallels, sometimes expressed in precisely the same words: the scattering of the people and burning of the temple; the building of an eternal, glorious eschatological temple; the conversion of the gentiles; the removal of all the wicked. Of the gentiles destroying their idols, there is nothing explicit in the Apocalypse of Weeks, although they could be referred to as "the deeds of wickedness." However, in 91:9, in a section that parallels the Apocalypse, we are told that "all the idols of the nations will be given up // and the towers will be burned with fire // and they will remove them from all the earth // and they will be cast into the fiery judgment."

The parallels are sufficiently close in content, sequence, and at times wording to suggest that the two texts reflect common tradition. In addition, Tobit's time references in 14:5 (see also 14:4, "All things will happen in their times"), indicates a fixed chronology and sequence that is compatible with the determinism if Enoch's ten weeks. A more finely-tuned determinism, applied to the lives of particular individuals, is evident in Raphael's assertion that Sarah is the bride "destined" for Tobias "from eternity" (6:18: μεμερισμένη πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος S; ἡτοιμασμένη ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος B).

Against these similarities, there are notable differences between 1 Enoch and Tobit, which should be placed in their respective contexts. Tobit and the Apocalypse of Weeks reflect different assessments of post-exilic Israel and the second temple. The Apocalypse mentions neither the return nor the Zerubbabel's temple. The seventh week is totally perverse until a remnant of Israel is chosen and God gives them the revealed knowledge to be saved and to act as agents of judgment. Subsequent to this, and only then, does Enoch mention a post-exilic temple, which is the glorious eschatological temple. The author of Tobit, on the other hand, acknowledges the fact of the return and the building of Zerubbabel's temple, although the latter is a disappointing replica of the first temple, which will be replaced by the glorious eschatological sanctuary. In addition, by mentioning the return, the author acknowledges the post-Exilic community's status as Israel. Thus it is not necessary to posit a new chosen remnant in that community, whose gift of revealed saving knowledge and an eschatological sword equips them to be God's agents of judgment on their wicked contemporaries.

This element of revealed eschatological wisdom is a significant distinguishing feature between the two texts.[17] In its fictional testamentary context, Tobit's prediction can be read as a revelation, spoken with the divinely given clairvoyance of one about to die.[18]

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[17] On the issue of revealed wisdom and religious error in the Epistle, see George W. E. Nickelsburg, "The Epistle of Enoch and the Qumran Literature," *JJS* 33 (1982) 334–45.

[18] Revealed forecasts of the future are typical in pseudepigraphic testaments. For a

Moreover, this testamentary context parallels the testamentary context of the Apocalypse of Weeks (see 91:1ff).[19] Nonetheless, Tobit does not claim to be transmitting a revelation brought from heaven (contrast 1 Enoch 93:2; cf. 91:1). The source and authority for his prediction lie in the publicly proclaimed words of the prophets of Israel. "I believe the word of God against Nineveh, the things that Nahum spoke . . . and whatever the prophets of Israel spoke, whom God sent. All things will happen, and not one of all these words will fail, and all things will happen in their times" (14:4; see also 14:5, quoted above).[20] Thus the author's voice is not that of a fictional primordial patriarch, nor that of a real leader of an eschatological community of the chosen, who are distinguished by their possession of esoteric, salvific wisdom.

C. Wisdom and Ethical Teaching

In the two previous sections I have argued that the book of Tobit reflects two major concerns in 1 Enoch and that the author of Tobit has introduced these matters through the use of traditions or traditional language that he has in common with the Enochic authors. In this section, I shall reverse the procedure and address a major facet of the book of Tobit and then compare it with its parallels in 1 Enoch.

1. Tobit

Viewed as a literary whole, the book of Tobit can properly be described as a sapiential story (less a simple tale than a more complex novel)—a narrative text which is governed by a pervasive interest in proper human behavior and which embodies this interest not simply in its narrative description, but also in literary forms and specific themes that are at home in such wisdom writings as Proverbs, Job, and Sirach. The episodes that describe Tobit's activity and fate in the Assyrian court (1:10–22) remind one of the tales about persecuted sages in Genesis 37ff., Daniel 1–6, Esther, and the Story of Ahikar (who is, himself a minor figure in the book of Tobit; 1:21–22; 14:10). Tobit's identity as a sage is evident in the traditional proverbial wisdom with which he instructs Tobias (see also Ahikar 2, 8), when he transmits his first testament in chapter 4. Set mainly in parallelistic poetic distichs, this instruction treats a number of topics familiar to the reader of Proverbs and Sirach: the obligation to honor one's parents; the evils of sexual immorality and drunkenness; and, preeminently, the importance of using one's wealth responsibly and for the benefit of others. Integral to these proverbs and often structured into their two-line form is the notion that human actions are subject to divine reward and punishment. Punctuating this specific instruction are two generalizing admonitions that employ the traditional wisdom theme of the two ways of righteousness and wickedness and their respective reward and punishment (4:5–6, 19). In addition to this formal wisdom instruction (which is also put on the lips of Raphael 12:6–10), the author makes his didactic point by means of the events that are narrated. Tobit's actions are the embodiment of right conduct toward others. He buries the dead, acts as a responsible husband and father, and

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discussion of such forecasts, see Anitra Bingham Kolenkow, "The Genre Testament and Forecasts of the future in the Hellenistic Jewish Milieu," *JSJ* 6 (1975) 57–71.

[19] On the testamentary character of this section, see ibid., 61–62.

[20] See also 2:1, 6, where Tobit sees Amos 8:10 fulfilled in his own lifetime and situation.

is generous in the sharing of his wealth. Above all, the plot line demonstrates that God rewards the righteous, even if they suffer for a time.

Both in the narrative itself and in the formal sections of instruction, wisdom is substantially equated with the Mosaic Torah, and right conduct toward God and one's fellows involves the keeping of the Torah. While he lived in the apostate northern kingdom, Tobit worshiped at the Jerusalem sanctuary and paid the proper tithes (1:3–8). When he was exiled in a gentile environment, he avoided forbidden food (1:10–11). When he became ritually unclean through contact with a corpse, he followed the law about ablutions (2:4–9). His command that Tobias marry a woman from his own tribe is based on the examples of the Genesis patriarchs (4:12).

2. 1 Enoch

A concern with human conduct and divine retribution is also central to the Enochic corpus, as is readily evident from its repeated references to the final judgment. Herein, of course, lies an important difference. Taken as whole, 1 Enoch focuses on God's response to human actions rather than on the actions themselves, and this response is mainly reserved for the future, which is pervasively the point of reference for Enoch's references to judgment and his descriptions of the cosmos. In spite of this emphasis on eschatology and the cosmology that undergirds it, one section of the corpus does specifically address and describe in detail the human actions that are subject to God's judgment—the so-called Epistle of Enoch (chaps. 92–105) and its redactional preface (chap. 91).

As is the case in Tobit 4, specific human actions and their recompense are given a theoretical framework in the ethical construct of the two ways. Three segments of two ways teaching alternate mainly with two apocalyptic sections to form the introduction to the Epistle.

Two ways instruction	91:1–4
An apocalypse	91:5–9
Two ways instruction	91:18–19
[Introduction to the Epistle	92:1–5]
Apocalypse of Weeks	93:1–10+91:11–17
[The source of Enoch's revelation	93:11–14]
Two ways instruction	94:1–5

The sections of two-ways material are stereotyped and repetitious, but with variations and turns of phrase that provide additional nuances. Analogies to various of these distichs can be found in the book of Proverbs, especially chapter 4, Sirach 2:6, 12, 15, and in Tobit's testament (4:5–6, 19). Literary connections, however, are probably impossible to prove. 1 Enoch 94:1–5 appears to echo some of the language of Proverbs 4 (cf. 94:1; Prov 4:6; 94:3; Prov 4:14–15). However, 94:3 is also paralleled in Tob 4:5–6, and the concluding admonition in 94:5ab, which looks like a paraphrase of Prov 4:5, is, at one point, more closely paralleled by the concluding admonition in Tob 4:19:

Prov 4:4–5:	Let your heart hold fast my words . . .
	Do not forget the words of my mouth
1 Enoch 94:5:	Hold fast in the thought of your heart
	Do not erase my word from your heart
Tob 4:19:	Remember my commandments;
	And let them not be erased from your heart.

Both 1 Enoch and Tobit have an expression that is paralleled only in Proverbs, and a common turn of phrase that does not occur in Proverbs. All three texts place these admonitions in the context of explicit two-ways phraseology. The simplest explanation is that both 1 Enoch and Tobit employ common traditional two-way material which partly reflects Proverbs, but also has its own nuances.

In 1 Enoch 91:1–94:5, the apocalyptic sections that alternate with the two ways instruction provide the latter with a specific temporal reference for the retribution that is announced for those who will walk in the two ways, viz., the final judgment, which will occur at a specific time. Similarly, 94:2, 5ce indicate an eschatological locus for the revelation of saving wisdom and its rejection by those who walk in evil ways.

Taken as a whole, 91:1–94:5 introduce the rest of the Epistle and are explicated in it. Three literary forms treat the issue of human actions and divine judgment. The Woes collectively provide a detailed description of some of the sins of the author's enemies and warn of the consequences. The exhortations encourage the righteous to await the divine vindication of their righteousness and piety. Several descriptive passages provide a scenario for the coming judgment (see n. 13). The sins that are condemned in the Epistle of Enoch are of two major types. One picks up a central theme in Tobit (wealthy and the wealthy); the other relates to a point of discontinuity already observed (the possession of special, divinely given wisdom).

The major point of overlap between the ethical teaching in Tobit and its counterpart in 1 Enoch 92–105 is their common assertion that the rich have an obligation to the poor and lowly. Their actual treatments of the subjects stand in sharp contrast to one another. Tobit is depicted as a wealthy man, who uses his riches and possessions for the benefit of others (1:16–17) and admonishes his son to do likewise (Tob 4:7–11, 14; see also 12:8–9; 14:10–11). The author of the Epistle portrays the rich and powerful as guilty of sinful excesses, notably the oppression of the lowly righteous.[21] In keeping with their common emphasis on just divine retribution, the two authors posit diametrically opposing fates for the rich. Consonant with his own expressed beliefs (4:6–11), Tobit's generosity is rewarded when his health is restored, and Tobias, who presumably heeds his father's admonitions, lives a long and fruitful life. According to 1 Enoch 95–105, the oppressive rich are set to receive the divine punishment that their sin deserves.

The time or manner of the reward or punishment differentiates the viewpoints of the two authors and is a function of their respective eschatologies. The author of Tobit, playing on the idea of the two ways, states that Tobias's way prospers when he literally makes his way across Mesopotamia to seek his fortune (cf. 4:6, 19: 5:16, 21 [5:17, 22 Grk.] 11:1, 15). Although the idea of "the ways" is basically an ethical construct, Tobias's journey on the road across Mesopotamia is parabolic of the author's belief that one's reward is received during one's lifetime. Tobit's enunciation of this principle in the midst of his disastrous suffering appears to be ironic in context (4:6–11), but it proves to be right when his fortune changes at the end. For the author of Tobit it must be so, because at death one descends permanently to Sheol, "the eternal place" (3:6, 10). The author of the Epistles, on the other hand, admits that it is possible for the righteous not to receive their just deserts in their lifetime but to "descend with grief into Sheol" (102:5). He solves this

[21] For a contrast between 1 Enoch's severe appraisal of the rich and a more optimistic view in Luke that is more consonant with the wisdom tradition in Tobit, see George W. E. Nickelsburg, "Riches, the Rich, and God's Judgment in 1 Enoch 92–105 and the Gospel According to Luke," *NTS* 25 (1979) 324–44.

problem of theodicy, however, by positing a resurrection that will permit the kind of change in fortune that Tobit must experience *before* he dies (103:1–4).[22] For Tobit burial is important because it concludes one's life, and it is appropriate, therefore, that rich people like Tobit and Raguel go out in grand style (14:11–13). In the Epistle, the magnificent funerals of the oppressive rich are deceptive. They are not a final reward for righteousness, but stand in marked contrast to the wretched fate that awaits them in the fires of Sheol, where they will receive just retribution for their sinful lifestyles (103:5–8).

In addition to social injustice, the author of the Epistle condemns his opponents for false teaching and perversion of the Torah. The emphasis is a function of his belief that the righteous chosen of the end-time possess a special revealed wisdom, which is necessary for salvation (see n. 17). Although the Animal Vision and the Apocalypse of Weeks both make reference to the Mosaic Torah, the emphasis in the corpus is on the revealed wisdom that Enoch brought from heaven. It includes the solar calendar, knowledge about the coming judgment, and, most likely, particular interpretations of the Mosaic Torah. This viewpoint distinguishes the Enochic authors from the author of Tobit, for whom there is no such esoteric or special eschatological wisdom that defines a chosen remnant as the true Israel, who alone will be saved.

D. Liturgical Vocabulary

Tobit and 1 Enoch share some common liturgical vocabulary. Tobit has a marked liturgical and, mainly, doxological tone. Tobit and Sarah offer prayers of complaint (3:2–6, 11–15), and all that follows is said to have been triggered by their prayers (3:16–17). When Asmodeus is vanquished, Tobias and Sarah and then Raguel offer prayers of thanksgiving and supplication (8:5–8, 15–17). When he is healed, Tobit blesses God, once briefly (11:14–15) and then at length (chap. 13). The latter hymn is in response to Raphael's command that they praise God and write a book that documents God's might deeds (12:17–22). In 1 Enoch, as in Tobit, prayer can trigger God's saving activity (7:6; 8:3; chaps. 9–11; 97:5–6; 98; 3; 103:15–104:1). Two lengthy prayers are recorded in chapters 9 and 84. Enoch is introduced in 12:3 as "blessing the Lord of majesty, the King of the ages," and after various stages of his journey and after his two dream visions, he praises God (22:14; 25:7; 27:5; 36:4; 81:3, 10; 83:11; 90:40). Although one should not make too much of it, there are close parallels in the high and exalted terminology that these texts use to address God: King of the ages; Lord of righteousness; blessed is your holy name. Related to this is the vocabulary used in Tob 4:16; 12:12, 15 and in 1 Enoch 103:1; 104:1, where, in the context of prayer or an oath, reference is made to the glorious presence of God, the Great One or the Holy One. Both texts appear to know a formal liturgical vocabulary that asserts itself into the presence of a God who is paradoxically addressed in the highest and most exalted terms. It is a view of God that emphasizes the divine righteousness that executes judgment and the majesty and greatness that rules over "all the generations of eternity," which are part of the typical vocabulary of the eschatological passages discussed above.

E. An Attempt to Define Relationships

Although our findings have documented many fundamental and important differences between Tobit and 1 Enoch, we have noted several significant areas of similarity, which

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[22] For a detailed analysis of the reversal of fortunes indicated in 1 Enoch 102:5–104:8, see Nickelsburg, "Apocalyptic Message," 318–23.

is sometimes underscored through the use of (almost) identical wording:

1. Both texts posit the existence of seven holy ones, perhaps "holy watchers," one of them named "Raphael"—God's Healer—who function both as witnesses and intercessors in the heavenly throneroom and as divinely sent agents of salvation or judgment. Tobit may also be combining the biblical idea of "the angel who goes with you" with the picture in 1 Enoch of a journey in the company of an interpreting angel.

2. Although the story of Sarah and Asmodeus doubtless reflects very old and common folkloristic motifs, the confrontation between Asmodeus and Raphael parallels and combines aspects of the primordial and eschatological conflict between supernatural powers in the mythic complex of 1 Enoch 6–11.

3. Tobit's testament in chapter 14 and Enoch's Apocalypse of Weeks posit a common eschatological scenario set in a definite time frame.

4. In dealing with ethical issues, both Tobit and the Epistle of Enoch construe human behavior and divine retribution within the traditional framework of the two ways and focus on the issue of wealth and the wealthy and their interaction with the poor and lowly.

5. Both texts employ some common liturgical vocabulary that indicates similar views of God, whose majestic presence in heaven is accessible through angelic mediation and whose hold on history is sufficiently firm to guarantee the enactment of the respective eschatological visions.

These similarities are significant because the details that document them suggest that they are not easily explicable as the result of independent and coincidental dependence on the Hebrew Scriptures and its idea and vocabulary. They attest either the literary dependence of (parts of) one text on (parts of) the other, a knowledge of oral tradition, or the common dependence of both texts on traditional developments of biblical materials. They could indicate a combination of these.

A choice from among these options requires that one consider the dating of the respective texts. Chapters 1–36 of 1 Enoch can be dated, in various stages between 320 and 200 B.C.E.[23] The Epistle of Enoch and the Apocalypse of Weeks may have been composed as early as the first two decades of the second century B.C.E., but cannot be safely and surely dated prior to this.[24] The book of Tobit certainly antedates the persecution by Antiochus IV and could thus be contemporary with the earliest dating for the Epistle and Apocalypse of Weeks. It may have been written in the early part of the Hellenistic period and have roots in the Persian period.[25]

In light of this dating, it is impossible to prove and unfeasible to posit that Tobit is simply dependent on various parts of the Enochic corpus. Even if the complex of materials discussed in section A above indicates knowledge of material in 1 Enoch 1–36, the formulas about angelic intercession have their verbal parallels in the Epistle, which cannot be shown to antedate the book of Tobit. In addition, the considerations discussed in sections B and C indicate parallels in the Epistle and the Apocalypse of Weeks. It would be a tour de force to argue that the author of Tobit has employed 1 Enoch 1–36, 90–105, stripping the latter, most problematic part of its peculiar eschatology and its emphasis on the eschatological community's possession of special revelation. It seems more likely, therefore, that Tobit and Enoch attest common tradition.

The positing of common tradition raises interesting questions that have an important

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[23] For the date of 1–36, see idem, "Apocalyptic and Myth," 389–91.

[24] On the date of the Epistle, see idem, *Jewish Literature*, 149–50 and p. 158 n. 153.

[25] On the date of Tobit, see ibid., 35.

bearing on our description of the development of Judaism in the Persian and Hellenistic periods.

1. Our study indicates that a text like Tobit—which is, by consensus, a sapiential text—can employ traditional material which also occurs in an apocalyptic collection like 1 Enoch. This is a significant piece of data for those who have argued that the roots of apocalyptic literature are planted, in part, in the soil of the wisdom tradition. In addition, Tobit breaks the stereotype that wisdom literature is uninterested in history and eschatology; the integrally related parallel stories of Tobit and Israel and the inclusion of Tobit's testament and psalm manifest precisely such an interest.

2. Although the Apocalypse of Weeks claims heavenly revelation as the source of its authority, the wording of Tobit's testament implies that speculation about the times of eschatological events could occur in circles that did not posit such a heavenly revelation, but developed such speculations explicitly on the basis of an exegesis of the prophets. In this respect, Daniel 9, with its interpretation of Jeremiah's seventy years, and the Testament of Moses, which is de facto an interpretation of Deuteronomy 28–33, are suggestive analogies to Tobit's testament. Daniel 9 is particularly interesting because it attributes the interpretation to an angel, indeed one of the four and seven listed in 1 Enoch 6–11 and 20–36 respectively.

3. Although Tobit's insight into the prophets is not ascribed to an angelic revelation, such revelation is, in fact, integral to the book of Tobit. The work as a whole is said to have been commissioned by Raphael (12:20), whose presence and activity are described within the framework of an extensive angelophany (chaps. 3–12) that has a multitude of parallels to biblical angelophanies, but also the revelation in Daniel 9 and 10–12. In Tobit, the form is triggered by Tobit's and Sarah's prayers (3:1–15). It then recounts the sending and appearance of the angel (3:16–17; 5:1–8), his false self-identification (5:9–21), his going along the way with Tobias and his beneficent activity (chaps. 6–11), his function as interpreter (6:6–8), his revelation of his identity and his functions in heaven and on earth (12:12–15), and along with the latter his explanation of events in Tobit's life, the typical terrified reaction to the self-revelation (12:16), the reassuring "Fear not" (12:17), the commission to praise God and write a book (12:20), his disappearance (12:21), the partial fulfillment of these commands (12:21; 13:1).

Although it would not be helpful to suggest that the book of Tobit is formally an apocalypse,[26] what the book does claim to know about the activity of the heavenly world and the world's impingement on human life is, in fact, ascribed to an angelic revelation. Raphael is primarily intercessor and helper, but the angel is also a revealer of his own activity and God's. This important role played by revelation, even in the received form of the book of Tobit, raises the question of the place of angelic revelation in the sources and traditions behind Tobit. As we have seen, the angelology, descriptions of the heavenly throneroom, and eschatology in 1 Enoch are all integral and functional parts of that work's apocalyptic, i.e., revelatory character. It is possible that angelic revelation played a role in the common traditions attested in Tobit and 1 Enoch. The presence of an angelic guide and/or interpreter is already attested in Ezekiel 40–48 and Zechariah 1–6.[27] On the

[26] For a literary definition of apocalypse, see John J. Collins, "the Jewish Apocalypse," *Semeia* 14 (1979) 21–59.

[27] On the relationship of 1 Enoch 12–16 especially to Ezekiel 1–2, but also to Ezekiel 40–48, see Nickelsburg, "Enoch, Levi, and Peter," 580–81. On the similarities between Enoch's journeys and Ezekiel 40–48 and to Zechariah 1–6, see Martha Himmelfarb, *Tours of Hell* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1983) 56–58.

other hand, we must consider the possibility that at least some of these traditions (surely the liturgical material and probably the wisdom material) existed in forms that did not claim revelation as a source of authority.

F. Geographical Considerations: Upper Galilee and Mesopotamia

A curious pair of geographical considerations ties Tobit and 1 Enoch together. Both works are associated both to Upper Galilee and Mesopotamia. It is widely recognized that aspects of the Enochic tradition are most closely paralleled by Babylonian materials.[28] However, the mythic events described in chapters 6–11 and 12–16 are played out in Upper Galilee in the region of Dan and Mount Hermon, and the narrative indicates specific accurate knowledge of the region's geography.[29] The collection in its present form is usually thought to be Palestinian, and certainly the Animal Vision indicates specific knowledge of events in early second-century Palestine.

The explicit setting for most of the book of Tobit is the general region from which some of the Enoch traditions are said to originate, viz., Mesopotamia, albeit its northern part, Ecbatana and Nineveh. The book is so thoroughly oriented to the Dispersion and problems that would be encountered by Israelites in the Dispersion, that a Palestinian origin seems unlikely.[30] Nonetheless, the story begins in Upper Galilee, which is said to be the home of Tobit (1:1–6). Perhaps this is casual backdrop, but interestingly, the geographic setting that is the locus of revelation in 1 Enoch is specified as the place of the seductive apostate cult which is a foil to Tobit's Jerusalem-oriented piety.

Milik has argued that the story of Tobit originated in Samaria and was intended to enhance the prestige of the Tobiad family.[31] Subsequently, a Judean redactor provided an orthodox version in which the primary changes pertained to the Jerusalem cult. The initial action was moved to Galilee, presumably to allow the connection with the Assyrian exile. The hypothesis has a number of difficulties, for all of Milik's ingenious explanation of textual problems and geographical uncertainties. The names Tobi and Tobiah, while they can be related to the Tobiad family, can also find their significance in the story itself, which recounts the Lord's goodness to the protagonists. Jerusalem is a central component in both Tobit's psalm and his testament and hardly a bit of retouching. In addition, if the book was written in Samaria, why would the author be so centrally concerned with the problems raised by living in the diaspora? To attribute this material to a Judean reviser also makes even less sense and would radically change the nature of Milik's understanding of the revision of the text. The parallels between Tobit and 1 Enoch suggest that we reconsider the originality of Tobit's references to Galilee, although the very different appraisal of the religious character of the area of Dan requires an explanation.

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[28] See, most recently, James C. VanderKam, *Enoch and the Growth of an Apocalyptic Tradition* (CBSMS 16; Washington, DC, 1984).

[29] Nickelsburg, "Enoch, Levi, and Peter," 582–87.

[30] On the Diaspora provenance of Tobit, see George W. E. Nickelsburg, "Stories of Biblical and Post-Biblical Times," in Michael E. Stone, ed., *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* (CRINT 2:2; Assen/Philadelphia: van Gorcum/Fortress, 1984) 45.

[31] Milik, "La Patrie," 522–30.

The Ethics of Interpretation or What's Left Over After the Elimination of Meaning

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What do biblical scholars do when they interpret the Bible? Ask most scholars and they will tell you that the aim of interpretation is to uncover, elucidate, or explicate the/a meaning of the text.[1] How do they do this? By rigorously and systematically applying some form of interpretive practice or method. Behind each of these practices and methods stands some theory about what meaning is and how it is to be attained. Even when it is recognized that few scholars actually reflect on the theories underlying their practice, the quest for meaning necessarily relies on some type of theoretical account of what it is you are looking for. The assumption that biblical interpretation is involved with determining meaning logically depends on at least one of these theories being right. For even if you hold that there are several meanings to a text, this supposition is still supported by a single theory which must explain what these meanings are and how to get at them.

On this scenario it is not difficult to see that the power of an interpretive theory is a direct function of its ability to answer the question of what the meaning of a text is. Yet, depending on where you do your interpretation, what counts as meaning varies tremendously.[2] It is no secret that what counts as meaning in Sheffield most certainly does not count as meaning in Cambridge. This would not bother some like me, writing in Sheffield, if there were some way to show that Sheffield is right and Cambridge is wrong. As Jeffrey Stout notes, we really have no way of adjudicating between competing conceptions of textual meaning.[3] Without criteria for resolving the question of what the meaning of a text is, we are unable to develop an adequate theory of interpretation.

> If interpretation is a matter of discovering meaning, and is therefore bound to run amuck when informed by mistaken assumptions about what meaning

[1] Lest anyone think I am creating a straw person, I would direct them to look at the way the term meaning is sued in John Barton's recent article, "Reading the Bible as Literature; Two Questions for Biblical Critics," *Literature and Theology* 1 (1987) 135–153. I use Barton as an example because he is one of the most hermeneutically sophisticated and self-reflective biblical scholars in Britain.

[2] See Stanley Fish's various arguments for this point in *Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); also "Anti-Professionalism" *New Lit. Hist.* 17 (1985) 89–117.

[3] See "What is the Meaning of A Text?" *New Lit. Hist.* 14 (1982) 1–12. To those familiar with this essay it will be evident that my debt to Stout here goes well beyond the passages cited.

> is, then literary criticism, religious studies, classics, history [and biblical studies]—in short, all disciplines involving the interpretation of texts—will consist largely in failure to deliver the goods. (Stout, p. 1)

This in itself would not be bothersome if, like the natural sciences, we could say that we were moving forward by systematically removing error. Failure would be tolerable if it were leading to increased probability of success. In the case of developing a theory of textual meaning without a clear conception of what meaning is, we do not even know what "success" would look like.

Given this state of affairs, I would like to propose that we in biblical studies give up discussions of meaning and adopt Stout's position of dissolving disputes about meaning by explicating these disputes in terms of interpretive interests.[4] In the rest of this essay I would like to indicate what biblical studies might look like in this light. I then plan to explore some of the residual issues and consequences of adopting this pragmatic position. Finally, I will raise the question about what sort of interpretive communities would be capable of resolving these issues. My first task, then, will be to elaborate and qualify what Stout's proposal entails for biblical studies.

The reason we cannot agree on what the meaning(s) of a text are, Stout proposes, is that our concerns with textual meaning are confused. The source of this confusion is the term meaning itself.[5] Of course, most of us can use the term meaning in informal conversations with relative ease and clarity. This is because in these informal conversations the contexts in which the term meaning is used are so clearly circumscribed (or capable of circumscription in the course of the conversation) that the term poses no impediment to discussion. The problem arises when we move to formal discussions of meaning as such. Here the term meaning is not so clearly circumscribed. Take, for example, discussions about a theory of meaning.

> What is a theory of meaning a theory of? Evidently, it may be a theory of any number of things. A question of the form, "What is the meaning of x?" retains all of the ambiguity of its central term but none of the grammatical features that . . . would diminish its tendency to confuse. (Stout, p. 3)

Stout's remedy to this confusion is to eliminate it at its source. That is, we should eliminate talk of meanings in favor of other terms that will both suit our interpretive interests and be precise enough to put a stop to futile discussions. To do this, Stout suggests that we employ a form of Quinean explication in regard to the term meaning.[6] That is, "We fix on the particular functions of the unclear expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions."[7] "Good explication . . . tells us how to translate theories from familiar but confusing idioms into idioms better suited to our purposes." (Stout, p. 2).

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[4] Richard Rorty makes a similar proposal in "Texts and Lumps," *New Lit. Hist.* 17 (1985) 1–16. See also Steven Maillous, "Rhetorical Hermeneutics," *Critical Inquiry* 11 (1985) 620–641.

[5] See John Lyons' description of the various meanings of "meaning" in *Semantics* vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 2ff.

[6] See Stout, p. 2ff. Quine's views on explication are laid out in *Word and Object* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) 258ff.

[7] See Quine, p. 260.

When explication is applied to a term like meaning, the result is that instead of answering our questions about meaning, we replace our present question—what is the meaning of this text?—with different questions.[8]

Instead of talk about meanings we would, for example, claim that we are interested in an author's intentions—what he or she intended to do in writing a certain text. This notion of intention would require further explication, but once this is done, it would then be possible to perform all of the tasks necessary to display this intention without ever making recourse to the term meaning. For example, to the best of our abilities, we can describe what Luke's communicative aims were in presenting Jesus in the way he does.[9] The reading this interpretive interest yields can be evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the way the task has been defined and in terms of the way the task is carried out.

On the other hand, we may decide that we are interested in something else. We may, for example, be interested in a text's contextual connections to the material or gender-based means of its production. Having defined this interest closely enough we can then perform the necessary analysis and come out with some sort of answer. There is, however, no need to cloud the issue further by calling the result of this interest meaning, particularly when it is done at the expense of other interpretive interests. The obvious example of such interpretive gerrymandering is E. D. Hirsch's position in *Validity and Interpretation* that only an account of an author's intention can be called meaning and everything else has the status of significance.[10]

A rejection of Hirsch's claims, however, need not entail a rejection of the existence of meaning in some sort of ontological sense (if this is felt to be important). It could at sometime be divinely revealed to NT scholars that textual meaning can only be attained by reading NT texts in the light of the rules laid out in Greco-Roman rhetorical manuals. In this case, we need not change our interpretive practices. We will just have to say that we are interested in things other than textual meaning and continue with what we were doing. Indeed, on this scenario, meaning might be the least interesting and useful thing to pursue.[11]

There may, however, be some who would wish to claim that while no single interpretive interest can lay claim to meaning at the expense of any other interest, the term meaning should be bestowed on that reading which synthesizes all or most of these interests into some sort of macro reading—a reading that looks at a text from all or several possible angles.[12] This aim may also go under a description like full understanding. There is no

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[8] See Mailloux's comment, "The solution to the realist/idealist debate in hermeneutics is not, then, the proposal of still another Theory. The way to answer the realist/idealist question 'Is meaning created by the text or the reader or by both?' is simply not to ask it, to stop doing Theory" (628).

[9] Of course, this does not entail that all of the methods currently used to do this are adequate to the task.

[10] See *Validity and Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). Hirsch revised this position somewhat in subsequent works (cf. "Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted," *Critical Inquiry* 11 [1984] 202–225). For powerful critiques of his revised position see Rorty, "Texts and Lumps," and Lutz Dannenburg and Hans-Harald Müller, "On Justifying the Choice of Interpretive Theories," *J. of Aesthetics and Art. Crit.* 43 (1984) 7–16, with a reply by Hirsch on pp. 89–91.

[11] Stout presents a somewhat similar scenario, p. 4f.

[12] Perhaps the great fictional example of this is Morris Zapp's desire to produce a series

reason, however, to think that substituting a phrase like understanding for meaning will solve any problem.

Further, there are good reasons for thinking that such a synthesis is not generally possible. Most of the interpretive interests we adopt are exclusive of other interests. The reading which one yields is likely to contradict a reading based on another. If this were not the case, we would not have such confusion about the term meaning in the first place. For example, a reading based on Luke 8:19–21 within the context of the gospel as a whole would indicate that Jesus thought of his family members as faithful disciples. One would, at least, have to say that Mary was one of those who listened well (8:18) and should be considered as one of those who heard the word of God and did it (cf. Luke 1:38; 2:19).[13] A reading based on an earlier form of that tradition, Mark 3:28ff., would indicate that Jesus had a negative attitude toward his family, who, for their part, were unsure about Jesus' mental stability. If we are interested in what the earliest tradition thought, the Marcan reading will be important evidence. If we are interested in what Luke thought, then Mark is irrelevant. If we are interested in some phase of this tradition's reception, then both texts along with other data might be relevant, but this would be a third interest altogether and not a synthesis of both into one. This is not to say that scholars must confine themselves to simplistic interests. Our interests can be quite complex and detailed as long as they are precisely formulated. There is, however, no reason to assume that complexity should be a criterion of meaning.

There may indeed be cases when several normally independent interests overlap sufficiently to allow them to be combined into a larger interpretive picture. This, however, is the contingent result of the text under consideration and the particular interests we bring to it. It is not evidence that several interests can be brought together into a unified theory of meaning that will not beg all off the questions that first led us to eliminate talk of meaning. Nor should such coincidences encourage us to argue that interests capable of such syntheses are preferable to those interests which are not.

Eliminating talk about meaning by explicating it in terms of interpretive interests should not lead us to think that we have now resolved all of our interpretive disagreements. Should such a state ever be reached, those of us who make a living by interpreting texts will need to look for other means of support. Rather, the aim of explicating meaning in terms of interpretive interests is to try to make some of our most intractable disagreements about meaning disappear by indicating that they are not really disagreements about the same thing. Our disagreements about what the meaning of a text is have largely been verbal ones.[14] What w once thought to be one topic, is really several topics. The more we seem to differ on any particular topic the more likely it is that we are not discussing the same topic at all. "Identification of a common subject matter for divergent theories requires numerous shared beliefs about the nature of the subject matter. Too much divergence ceases to be divergence altogether: it merely changes the subject" (Stout, pp. 5–6). Once we have recognized this, we can proceed to deal with a much more manageable set of disagreements of a much more substantive nature.

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of volumes covering all of the possible ways of reading Jane Austen's works. See David Lodge, *Changing Places: A Tale of Two Campuses* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979).

[13] It may well be the case that Jesus' positive evaluation of Mary is based on her discipleship and not her maternal role (cf. 11:27–28). Nevertheless, the contrast with the Marcan evaluation of Mary is still quite strong.

[14] See Stout, pp. 5f.

It seems to me that there will be three particular areas where disagreement will remain. The first will be in terms of how we formulate our interpretive interests. Once we forego the use of a term like meaning to characterize our particular interpretive interests we should not assume that all talk of interpretive interests will be equally coherent. For example, I may claim that my interest in reading Philippians is to uncover Paul's intention. This interest itself, however, is potentially as confusing as claiming that I want to uncover the meaning of Philippians.

Do I want to uncover the communicative aims of the person who wrote the epistle? If so, I will need to have a knowledge of the linguistic conventions of the time, the situation that is addressed in the epistle, or, at least, Paul's perception of that situation, and what, if any, mutual knowledge is presupposed between Paul and the Philippians.[15] On this view of intention, the text of Philippians will be the primary piece of evidence.

On the other hand, Paul's intention may also be construed in terms of his motives for writing the epistle.[16] In this case I would need to rely on a picture of the inner workings of Paul's psyche. His conversion experience might be a relevant place to start.[17] Those things which are left unsaid will be as important as what is said.[18] I will need to know something about the history of Paul and the history of his relationship with the Philippians. Having sorted through the evidence, I am then faced with another set of interpretive options. I could try to explain the evidence in terms that would have been recognizable to Paul and the Philippians. On the other hand, I might employ interpretive models from modern social sciences in order to give an explanation of Paul's intentions. In this case, Paul's own description of his intentions need not be taken at face value.

These are just two ways of explicating the notion of intention in regard to a particular Pauline epistle. Clearly, there are other ways of doing this. My aim is not to opt for one over the other. Rather, I simply want to show that once we have eliminated talk of meanings we will still have disagreements about how we formulate our particular interpretive interests. As with the explication of meaning, the more precision we inject into this discussion the more interests we are bound to end up with. We will also be better able to evaluate the results of any particular reading once we are clear about what the reading is actually trying to achieve.

A second level of expected disagreement is in terms of interpretive practice. Given a particular, clearly defined, interest, we may still have disagreements about the readings generated by that interest. Disagreements of this sort will generally be about what is to count as evidence and how we are to read that evidence. Unlike debates about meaning, explication will not be of use to us here. Once we have agreed that we are talking about the same thing, we have reached the point of genuine disagreement. Unfortunately, there is no single method for resolving these disputes. Rather we must rely on rhetorical argumentation, the ability to narrate an account that makes comprehensive sense of the

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[15] These are basically the criteria for successful communication presented in Geoffrey Leech's *Principles of Pragmatics* (London: Longman, 1983).

[16] In making this sort of distinction between motives and intentions I am following Mark Brett's work in this area in his 1988 Sheffield Ph.D. dissertation, "Canon and Hermeneutics."

[17] See, for example, S. Kim, *The Origin of Paul's Gospel* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981). While Kim starts (and reduces) most of Paul's writings to the Damascus road experience, he is not very precise on what his actual interests are.

[18] This seems to be one of Roland Barthes' favorite aphorisms.

recognized evidence which at the same time accounting for the strengths and weaknesses of alternative views.[19]

Without going into too much detail, and at the risk of being simplistic, I will try to give a concrete example of the way such a disagreement might be resolved. That renowned exegete of the last century, J. B. Lightfoot, and I have shared a similar interest in the phrase μορφή θεοῦ in Phil 2:6. This interest could be characterized as the desire to understand how a relatively competent koine Greek-speaking, Philippian Christian of the first century would have read this phrase.[20] (Of course, Lightfoot never would have formulated his interest in this way in his own lifetime. I think, however, that could we resurrect him and educate him in the critical discourse of the twentieth century, he would agree that this is what his interest was. Since we cannot know this one way or another, I simply ask my reader to imagine that this reconstruction is accurate for the purpose of my example.) Given this common interest, it is clear that Lightfoot and I disagree on what the answer to our common questions should be. Lightfoot based his reading of μορφή on the way the term is used in Plato and Aristotle. In these texts the word is linked with such terms as οὐσία and φύσις and describes the "attributes of the Godhead." I, on the other hand, rely on the way the phrase μορφή is used in the NT, LXX, Sib.Or. and especially the way the phrase μορφή θεοῦ is used in *Corpus Hermeticum* 1:12, 14. Here the μορφή of God refers to the visible appearance of God.

By relying on classical uses of μορφή, Lightfoot was simply following the standard philological practice of the day. He did this better than almost anyone else. Nevertheless, by making recourse to the most recent theories of synchronic semantics, I think I can convincingly argue that Lightfoot's philological methods are inadequate to our common task. For a synchronic understanding of μορφή (which is what we are both after) Plato and Aristotle are not relevant pieces of evidence. Provided I have not misrepresented the way μορφή is used in these texts, I can reasonably claim that my dispute with Lightfoot should be resolved in my favor.

To support his reading, a reconstructed Lightfoot (or a devoted follower) would have to show that nineteenth century philological methods are, in fact, superior to those of synchronic semantics for answering this question. Failing that, he could show that my reading of the relevant evidence was faulty and that these texts actually support his original reading of μορφή. Until a Lightfoot supporter can do this, however, our disagreement will remain resolved in my favor.

While this may be the most common type of disagreement, the sort that most exegesis tries to resolve, it may not be the most important disagreement that is left over once we

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[19] These are basically the criteria proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre for resolving epistemological crises in science. "When an epistemological crisis is resolved, it is by the construction of a new narrative which enables the agent to understand *both* how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs and how he or she could have been so drastically misled by them. The narrative in terms of which he or she at first understood and ordered experiences is itself made into the subject of an enlarged narrative" ("Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science," *The Monist* 60 [1977] 455).

[20] See J. B. Lightfoot, *St Paul's Epistle to the Philippians* (photo re-print of 1865 edition; Lynn, MA: Hendrickson, 1981) esp. pp. 127ff. For my reading of this passage see *The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul* JSNTS (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989).

have eliminated meaning. Having recognized that no one interpretive strategy can lay claim to meaning at the expense of other strategies, we are left with the question of which interpretive strategy to adopt in any particular situation. There seem to be at least three possible ways of dealing with this question. Each answer will require or manifest itself in a different sort of interpretive community. Further, each of these answers will raise different ethical issues for their respective communities. What I would like to do in the rest of this essay is to describe what I see these responses to be, what some of the ethical issues are and how these answers might be embodied in various interpretive communities.

Having recognized that the term "meaning" has effectively worked to obscure the plurality of interpretive interests, one could go further and view the maintenance of plurality as a worthy end in and of itself. In fact, those who have argued most strongly against granting any particular interest epistemological privilege have generally supported the view that we should encourage a plurality of interests.[21] As Stout urges, "Let us then celebrate the diversity of interpretations as a sign that our texts are interesting in more ways than one. The only alternative would be to have texts that weren't" (Stout, p. 8).

Given an interpretive task, pluralists can perform it more or less adequately and rationally argue that one performance is better than another performance of the same task. Their only desire is that they be free to pursue any interpretive task that interests them. For pluralists, the only criterion for pursuing an interpretive interest is that it is interesting to sufficient numbers of interpreters to enable a conversation to take place. There will of course be practical limits to this, but they are simply practical.

The pluralist position is most completely embodied in those sorts of interpretive institutions whose primary (or sole) aims are focused on providing a forum in which as many interests as possible can be pursued. Such an institution would provide the occasions and the means for otherwise separate interpreters to validate their interpretive practice in conversation with other like-minded interpreters.

This pluralist community could and should engage in discussion about how well its activities conform to its basic pluralist convictions. Discussions of this nature would focus on questions such as: Is the forum provided by the community as open as is practically possible? Whose interests are recognized as sufficiently interesting to be discussed? Who can contribute to such discussions? Whose discussions get wider exposure through publication? All these questions raise ethical and political issues related to the openness of the forum such a pluralist community provides.[22]

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[21] Stout makes this point on pp. 6ff. Richard Rorty makes similar points in "Texts and Lumps"; see esp. pp. 13ff. Readers of Foucault will want to note here that interests do not simply arise in an organic fashion. They reflect and sustain various configurations of power.

[22] Cornel West directs insightful and sophisticated forms of these general questions to the sort of philosophical and cultural pluralism espoused by Rorty. See "The Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism" in *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, eds. J. Rajchman and C. West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 259–275. For a more direct attack on the coherence of pluralism in literary studies, see Ellen Rooney, "Who's Left Out? A Rose by Any Other Name is Still Red; Or, the Politics of Pluralism," *Critical Inquiry* 12 (1985) 550–563; and Mary Louise Pratt, "Interpretive Strategies and Strategic Interpretations: On Anglo-American Reader-Response Criticism," in *Postmoderism and Politics*, ed. J. Arac (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 26–54.

The one question that the pluralist community could never answer, on other than practical grounds, is whether its members should pursue one interest over another. In fact, the continued existence of a pluralist interpretive community may depend on this question never being asked.[23] To ask such a question would be to betray the fundamental convictions of the pluralist, and whoever asked this question would either have to withdraw it or remove themselves from the community of pluralists before asking it.

I take it that most of the professional institutions to which biblical scholars belong—SBL, SOTS, SNTS, CBA et al.—are examples of such pluralist communities.[24]

In addition to the pluralist, there may be those who, while willing to accept that there is no epistemological difference between interpretive interests, wish to argue that there are reasons of an ethical or political nature for adopting one (or several) interpretive interests at the expense of others. There are actually two separate ways of arguing this point and I will briefly sketch them in turn.[25]

I shall call this first position, for lack of a better name, the social responsibility view. This position begins from the view that no interpretive activity takes place in a vacuum. Few, of course, would dispute this. The social responsibility position, however, goes further. It claims that not only do interpreters play a role in often obscure interpretive communities, but that interpreters or interpretive communities, as interpreters, play some relevant role in society at large. Within this role interpreters or interpretive communities have certain responsibilities to society.[26] Given these responsibilities, it is not hard to imagine that the pursuit of certain interpretive interests could be seen as ethically or politically bad because they would in some way inhibit the interpreter from fulfilling her or his social responsibilities. Hence, they should not be pursued.

As opposed to the pluralist whose only criterion for pursuing an interest is that it is interesting, criteria such as social justice and well-being are invoked as those that should

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[23] In her analysis of Stanley Fish's view of interpretive communities Pratt raises a similar point. "The question of what constrains and constitutes interpretive communities is apparently too uncomfortable to ask. The answer, it would seem, is the shape of the rest of the community's social and material life" ("Interpretive Strategies," 51).

[24] In spite of its name the Catholic Biblical Association has certainly maintained a pluralist stance. See, for example, P. Perkins, "The Theological Implications of New Testament Pluralism," *CBQ* 50 (1988) 5–23, esp. pp. 5, 14. Upon closer examination, it may turn out that these institutions are really fragmented and not pluralist. In spite of this, I think that their aims are basically pluralist, and my comments are based on that assumption.

[25] I should, perhaps, note here that while there are those who advocate positions similar to those I will now sketch, they do not begin from the position that these are issues raised by the elimination of meaning. Indeed, their discourse is as likely to be as infected with this term as anyone's. In spite of this, I will use them as concrete examples because they more than others resemble the positions I am trying to describe.

[26] This is roughly the position argued by Virginia Held in "The Independence of Intellectuals," *J. of Philosophy* 80 (1983) 572–582. This article, coupled with replies by Richard Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism," 583–589, and Alasdair MacIntyre, "Moral Arguments and Social Contexts," 590–591, respectively represent the three basic answers to the questions of what is left over after the elimination of meaning which I will discuss.

guide a community's choice of interpretive interests. Such an interpretive community will have to constantly ask itself how any particular interpretive interest will aid society's quest for justice and well-being and order its practice accordingly.

Recently Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza has presented a form of this social responsibility view in her 1987 SBL presidential address, "The Ethics of Interpretation: Decentering Biblical Scholarship."[27] Schüssler Fiorenza begins by noting that biblical interpretation has started to rely on rhetoric as a central part of its critical practices. Schüssler Fiorenza's view of rhetoric

> rejects the misunderstanding of rhetoric as stylistic ornament, technical skills or linguistic manipulation, and maintains not only "that rhetoric is epistemic but also that epistemology and ontology are themselves rhetorical."[28]

Having noted the rise of rhetoric, Schüssler Fiorenza goes on to note that,

> Since the sociohistorical location of rhetoric is the public of the *polis*, the rhetorical paradigm shift situates biblical scholarship in such a way that its public character and political responsibility become an integral part of our literary readings and historical reconstructions of the biblical world. (Schüssler Fiorenza, p. 102)

Presumably, Schüssler Fiorenza's point is not that it is only the adoption of rhetoric that establishes the social responsibility of biblical studies. The social responsibility of biblical scholarship must depend on their already established role in society. The adoption of rhetoric simply helps them to see that role and its responsibilities in a new light or to see that previous practices may have worked to obscure the social role of biblical scholarship. In other words, I do not take it that her aim is to argue for the social responsibility of biblical scholars from scratch using the "new rhetoric."[29] Rather, hers is a call to recognize a responsibility that has always been there, but subjected to the previously dominant models of interpretation.

Nevertheless, having described the social role of biblical scholarship, Schüssler Fiorenza makes the following prescription for the SBL:

> In short, if the Society were to engage in disciplined reflection on the public dimensions and ethical implications of our scholarly work, it would constitute a responsible scholarly citizenship that could be a significant participant in the global discourse seeking justice and well-being for all. (Schüssler Fiorenza, p. 115)

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[27] *JBL* 107 (1988) 101–115. I am grateful to Professor Schüssler Fiorenza for making this article available to me prior to its publication.

[28] Schüssler Fiorenza, 102. The citation within this citation is from Richard Harvey Brown, *Society as Text* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 85.

[29] The phrase "the new rhetoric" comes from the book *The New Rhetoric*, by C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966). The phrase can be taken as a means of designating a wide variety of critical practices which emphasis "the social aspect of language which is an instrument of communication and influence on others" (*The New Rhetoric*, 513). See also Wilhelm Wuellner, "Where is Rhetorical Criticism Taking Us?" *CBQ* 49 (1987) 448–463.

Here, explicitly, justice and well-being are invoked as the ends to which the SBL should order its interpretive interests if it is to fulfill its social responsibilities. The logical result of this ordering is that the pursuit of some interests, while epistemologically as sound as the pursuit of any other interests, will be seen as ethically or politically irresponsible and not worthy of our attention.[30]

For this viewpoint to be applicable to a pluralist interpretive community such as the SBL, two elements are crucial. First, a case must be made that there is something like a global *polis* to which all the members of the SBL are members by necessity. Without such a *polis* the notion of critical responsibility loses most of its bite. For if a pluralist SBL is just one of the several fragmented institutions interpreters participate in, then their responsibilities become much more circumscribed and fragmented. In short, an interpreter's responsibilities are relative to her or his communal allegiances. This point is made aptly by Richard Rorty. In response to Virginia Held's charge of social irresponsibility directed at intellectuals, who by their very interests, marginalize themselves, Rorty notes,

> One cannot be irresponsible toward a community of which one does not think of oneself as a member. Otherwise runaway slaves and tunnelers under the Berlin Wall would be irresponsible. If such criticism [of social irresponsibility] were to make sense there would have to be a supercommunity one *had* to identify with—humanity as such.[31]

If there is such a supercommunity, then, it is theoretically possible that an interpreter's responsibility to a pluralist community such as the SBL would come into conflict with his or her larger responsibilities to the supercommunity. To act responsibly in such a case the interpreter would have to subject her or his pluralist aims to her or his larger responsibility to this *polis* or supercommunity.

Second, such a supercommunity would have to depend on a Rawlsian view of justice as an ahistorical trans-cultural virtue recognizable by all rational people.[32] This is because the supercommunity's ability to sustain a "global discourse seeking justice and well-being for all" depends on justice being some one thing that we all can recognize. If this turned out not to be the case, global discourse would simply dissolve into intractable arguments about what constitutes justice—arguments which would be much like those arguments associated with meaning. On such a scenario, it would be impossible to argue that one interpretive practice would serve the pursuit of justice any more than alternative interests.

Only with these two elements firmly established could biblical scholars order their interpretive interests in a way that would fulfill their global responsibility to pursue justice. In fact, without a supercommunity, it is not clear that biblical scholars, as interpreters, have any social responsibilities at all. Schüssler Fiorenza's prescriptions, however, simply presuppose that these two elements are firmly established.

It would be churlish of me to criticize a presidential address for not thoroughly examining the adequacies of its presuppositions. Rather, I merely wish to point out that for Schüssler Fiorenza's ethics of interpretation to have any relevance for a pluralist

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[30] "The rhetorical character of biblical interpretations and historical reconstructions, moreover, requires an *ethics of accountability* that stands responsible not only for the choice of theoretical interpretive models but also for the ethical consequences of the biblical text and its meanings" (Schüssler Fiorenza, 113).

[31] Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism," p. 583, responding to Held's argument in the article cited in n. 23.

[32] See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

interpretive institution such as the SBL there must be something like Rorty's supercommunity and Rawls' concept of justice. Of course, these are two things that are not firmly established. Rawls' significant contribution to a theory of justice can hardly be said to have won the day.[33] Further, the article from which Rorty's mention of a supercommunity comes is itself a stinging attack on just these two elements. Finally, very few who have read the works of Jean François Lyotard or Alasdair MacIntyre or assorted others could believe in the sort of global *polis* necessary for Schüssler Fiorenza's position.[34]

The mention of MacIntyre leads me to introduce the final way of addressing the interpretive plurality left over after the elimination of meaning. I shall, for the sake of convenience, call this view the communal or collective position.[35] This position shares with the social responsibility position the view that while no interpretive interest could claim epistemological privilege, there may be ethical reasons for pursuing one interest over another in a particular situation. This position, however, refuses to accept the two elements essential to the social responsibility position outlined above—a global *polis* and an ahistorical, trans-cultural, universally recognizable notion of justice. This refusal is fundamentally rooted in the recognition that the dream of moral philosophy since the Enlightenment—to establish ethical reasoning on ahistorical universal truths of reason to which all rational people would be responsible—is an illusion.[36]

Rather than continue the quest for universal foundations for moral reasoning, the communal view would suggest that the reasons for adopting one interpretive interest over another lie in particular historical communities. These communities would be based on shared convictions about the goods and ends they are to pursue and on "shared dispositions educated in accordance with those beliefs."[37] Such a community will have a provisionally specified *telos* to which its life and practices are directed, to which its members are responsible by virtue of their communal commitments.[38]

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[33] As one might expect, a work as large and significant as *A Theory of Justice* has occasioned a host of critical responses. See, for example, Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) esp. chap. 17.

[34] Jean François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); and MacIntyre, *After Virtue*.

[35] In his criticisms of the work of Robert Bellah et al. in *Habits of the Heart*, Fredric Jameson shows how a term like community can become a pious platitude, "an absent, yet powerful, empty conceptual space," if not given concrete social and historical specification. See "On *Habits of the Heart*," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 86:4 (1987) 546 et al. This is correct. To some degree, I suspect that my own use of "community" is open to similar criticisms. While acknowledging the need for notions community to be given concrete specifications, my aim here is simply to outline the general sort of communal configuration necessary for any community to have the moral resources to answer the question of which interpretive interests to pursue. The issue of whether that community (or collective) should be Marxist, Green, or ecclesial is one that would have to be developed in greater detail than I can go into here.

[36] See MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, esp. chaps. 4, 5, and 6.

[37] MacIntyre, "Moral Arguments and Social Contexts," 591.

[38] See also Jameson's point that "What is wanted, then, is the reinvention, for late-industrial society, of a new form of the utopian project . . ." "On *Habits of the Heart*," 563.

Within a community constituted on these grounds a notion such as justice would no longer be an abstract ahistorical concept. Rather, it would receive specification and embodiment in concrete discussions and practices within the community. Having specified what justice is and how biblical interpretation is relevant to attaining it, such an interpretive community could then order its interpretive interests toward achieving such an end in any particular situation.[39]

For MacIntyre, the paradigm of such a historical community is the Aristotelian *polis*. In MacIntyre's view such communities of coherent moral discourse were evident in various forms down to the Enlightenment, but are now absent from the scene.[40]

A community like this is open to the charge of sectarianism or totalitarianism if one of its ultimate goods is not a critical openness to the various discourses of a pluralist society. In fact, this community may well encourage the existence of a pluralist interpretive community such as the SBL. This is because the interpretive results of a pluralist community could be seen as potential resources which this community could adopt and use to serve its own purposes on its own terms.[41]

(continued)
The pluralist may well respond to this by noting that for a community whose primary end is the maintenance of pluralism, the best practices to pursue are those which enhance the prospects of pluralism. Someone holding the communal position would have to agree. They would, however, simply note that such a pluralist community could never entertain an ethical discussion about which interpretive interests to pursue without betraying their pluralist convictions. One may also raise the question of whether a group of people whose sole connection is their shared practice of biblical interpretation and the shared disposition towards pluralism actually constitute a community in the first place. I am taking this last observation from points made by L. Gregory Jones in "Alasdair MacIntyre on Narrative, Community and the Moral Life," *Modern Theology* 4:1 (1987) 53–69.

[39] The specification of a communal *telos* within which biblical interpretation is a relevant practice is, however, only the first step in the ethical debate regarding the adoption of a specific interpretive interest in a particular situation. This debate will also require a critical account of the particular situation in which the interpretive community finds itself as well as the exercise of practical reasoning. Practical reason will operate to order a community's interpretive interests in accord with its specified ends in a particular situation.

[40] Recently, however, several Christian ethicists have argued that the church might prove to be the modern day manifestation of Aristotle's *polis*. The most obvious case is found in the extensive writings of Stanley Hauerwas. If this is to be the case, the notion of "church," however, will need greater specification. See also MacIntyre's own suggestions in the last chapter of *After Virtue*, entitled "After Virtue: Neitzsche *or* Aristotle, Trotsky *and* Saint Benedict."

[41] In addition, see Cornel West's comment, "Despite the limitations, Rorty's neo-pragmatism can serve as a useful springboard for a more engaged, even subversive, philosophical perspective. This is so primarily because it encourages the cultivation of critical attitudes toward all philosophical traditions" ("The Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism," 270).

I am grateful to Mark Brett, Michael Cartwright, Stanley Hauerwas, Greg Jones and Ken Surin for their numerous insightful comments. I am only sorry that time constraints have not allowed me to deal with all the issues they raised with the attention they deserve.

Briefly then, these are the sorts of responses one might make to the elimination of meaning from the discourse of biblical interpretation. There is obviously much more to be said about the constitution, strengths and weaknesses of these various interpretive communities. The aim of this essay is simply to introduce these communities and sketch some of the ways they might be able to address the ethical issues of interpretation.

Even after a superficial introduction, however, it is clear that what is an ethical issue for one interpretive community will not be an issue for the others. Which ethical issues are left over after the elimination of meaning will depend on a variety of factors, none of which are directly related to theories of interpretation. Rather, such factors will be related to how each community conceives of the world and its role in the world. In theory, the adequacy of any particular community's conception of the world and its role in the world is open to evaluation. This, however, is a larger task for another day.

The Pauline Letters and the Lucan Account of Paul's Missionary Journeys

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Recent studies of Paul's letters and the chronology of his missionary journeys have rightly insisted that one must give priority to the evidence about his apostolic movements in his own letters, especially the uncontested seven letters (1 Thessalonians, Galatians, Philippians, 1–2 Corinthian, Romans, and Philemon).[1] At the same time some of these studies have expressed a negative or at least a somewhat pejorative attitude toward the Lucan account of Paul's apostolic journeying. There is room, however, for another look at the relationship between the evidence of Paul's letters and the Lucan account of his journeys, especially since some of the recent studies eventually admit Lucan data into their consideration of the Pauline evidence. For instance J. Murphy-O'Connor agrees that Paul's appearance before the proconsul L. Junius Gallio in Achaia (Acts 18:12) is the "one link between the Apostle's career and general history that is accepted by all scholars."[2] And yet, that appearance before Gallio is known to us only from the Lucan account. The upshot is that the use of Lucan data for the reconstruction of Pauline chronology is somewhat arbitrary, and the account of the so-called first missionary journey in Acts is often dismissed or regarded with distrust. Clearly, the Lucan data have to be scrutinized critically, but my impression is that more of the Lucan materials could be used than is usual; hence my attempt to reconsider certain aspects of them here.

The Lucan account of Paul's apostolic movements in Acts is structured in three blocks. Modern students of Pauline chronology often cite the comment of John Knox about this threefold division of Pauline missionary journeys: "If you had stopped Paul on the streets of Ephesus and said to him, 'Paul, which of your missionary journeys are you on now?' he would have looked at you blankly without the remotest idea of what was in your mind."[3] True, but the difficulty comes not solely from the structure of the Lucan story

[1] See G. Ogg, *The Chronology of the Life of Paul* (London: Epworth, 1968). A. Suhl, *Paulus und seine Briefe: Ein Beitrag zur paulinischen Chronologie* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1975). R. Jewett, *A Chronology of Paul's Life* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979). J. Murphy-O'Connor, "Pauline Missions before the Jerusalem Conference," *RB* 89 (1982) 71–91; *St. Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology* (Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1983). G. Lüdemann, *Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984). These more recent studies depend in various degrees on earlier ones by D. W. Riddle, *Paul, Man of Conflict: A Modern Biographical Sketch* (Nashville: Cokesbury, 1940) and J. Knox, *Chapters in a Life of Paul* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1950). See also Knox's earlier writings: "Fourteen Years Later: A Note on the Pauline Chronology," *JR* 16 (1936) 341–49; "The Pauline Chronology," *JBL* 58 (1939) 15–39.

[2] *St. Paul's Corinth*, 141.

[3] *Chapters*, 41–42.

in Acts, but much more from the way modern readers have read Acts, since Luke has not distinguished Mission I, II, or III or counted them as we have learned to do.

It is not my intention to work out a complete defense of the Lucan story of Paul's missionary journeys. Rather, I should like to discuss critically three aspects of the problem that the Lucan materials present in the reconstruction of the life of Paul, emphasizing what I consider support from the Lucan story for the evidence that we actually have in Paul's own letters. I acknowledge the priority of the Pauline evidence and recognize that it not only takes precedence over the Lucan data but that the latter have to yield, if and when there is a conflict or hesitation about the relationship. The three aspects are the following: (1) the correlation that exists in the Pauline and Lucan materials; (2) the problem of Mission I (before the so-called Council); and (3) the appearance of Paul before Gallio in Achaia.

I. The Correlation that Exists in the Pauline and Lucan Materials

In 1955 T. H. Campbell wrote an article that, in my opinion, deserves much more attention than it has been accorded. In "Paul's 'Missionary Journeys' as Reflected in His Letters,"[4] Campbell showed that in Paul's uncontested letters there is a sequence of movement from his experience on the road near Damascus to his (projected) arrival in Rome that more or less parallels the detailed movements in the Lucan story of Acts.[5] The principal passages about personal details in the Pauline letters are the following: 1 Thess 2:1–2, 17–18; 3:1–3a, 6; Gal 1:13–23; 2:1–14; 4:13; Phil 3:5–6; 4:15–16; 1 Cor 1:11; 4:17; 5:9; 7:7–8; 15:32; 16:1–10, 12, 17; 2 Cor 1:8, 15–16, 19; 2:1, 9–13; 7:5–6; 9:2–4; 11:7–9, 23–27, 32–33; 12:2–4, 14, 21; 13:1–2, 10; Rom 11:1c; 15:19b, 22–32; 16:1.

In the chart that follows I adapt Campbell's fundamental comparison of items in the Pauline letters with similar items in Acts, making use of added data that have emerged in recent discussions and adding references to some of Paul's collaborators.

Letters	*Acts*
Conversion/Call near Damascus (implied in Gal 1:17c)	Damascus (9:1–22)
To Arabia (Gal 1:17b)	
Return to Damascus (1:17c): 3 years	
Flight from Damascus (2 Cor 11:32–33)	Flight from Damascus (9:23–25)
To Jerusalem (Gal 1:18–20)	To Jerusalem (9:26–29)
To "the regions of Syria and Cilicia" (Gal 1:21–22)	Caesarea and Tarsus (9:30)
	Antioch (11:26a)
	(Jerusalem [11:29–30; 12:25])
	Mission I: Antioch (13:1–4a) Seleucia, Salamis, Cyprus (13:4b–12)

[4] *JBL* 74 (1955) 80–87.

[5] The value of this article has been acknowledged by W. G. Kümmel in his *Introduction to the New Testament* (rev. ed.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1975) 254: ". . . Campbell has proved convincingly that the sequence of Paul's missionary activities that can be inferred from his letters is so remarkably compatible with the information from Acts that we have good grounds for deriving the relative chronology of Paul's activity from a critical combination of the information from Paul's letters with the account in Acts."

Churches evangelized before Macedonia (Philippi) (Phil 4:15)

"Once again during 14 years I went up to Jerusalem (for "Council," Gal 2:1)
Antioch Incident (Gal 2:11–14)

Galatia (1 Cor 16:1) evangelized for the first time (Gal 4:13)

Philippi (1 Thess 2:2 [= Macedonia, 2 Cor 11:9)
Thessalonica (1 Thess 2:2; cf. 3:6; Phil 4:15–16)

Athens (1 Thess 3:1; cf. 2:17–18)
Corinth evangelized (cf. 2 Cor 1:19; 11:7–9)
Timothy arrives in Corinth (1 Thess 3:6), probably accompanied by Silvanus (1 Thess 1:1)

Apollos (in Ephesus) urged by Paul to go to Corinth (1 Cor 16:12)

Northern Galatia, second visit (Gal 4:13)
Ephesus (1 Cor 16:1–8)

Visit of Chloe, Stephanas et al. to Paul in Ephesus (1 Cor 1:11; 16:17) bringing a letter (7:1)
Paul imprisoned (? cf. 1 Cor 15:32; 2 Cor 1:8)
Timothy sent to Corinth (1 Cor 4:17; 16:10)
Paul's second "painful" visit to Corinth (2 Cor 13:2); return to Ephesus

Titus sent to Corinth with letter "written in tears" (2 Cor 2:13)
(Paul's plans to visit Macedonia, Corinth, and Jerusalem/Judea [1 Cor

South Galatian towns (13:13 14:25)

Return to Antioch (14:26–28)
Jerusalem (15:1–12)

Antioch (15:35; Mission II
Syria and Cilicia (15:41)
South Galatia (16:1–5)
Phrygia and North Galatia (16:6)

Mysia and Troas (16:7–10)
Philippi (16:11–40)

Amphipolis, Apollonia, Thessalonica (17:1–9)
Beroea (17:10–14)
Athens (17:15–34)
Corinth for 18 months (18:1–18a)

Silas and Timothy come from Macedonia (18:5)

Paul leaves from Cenchreae (18:18b)
Leaves Priscilla and Aquila at Ephesus (18:19–21)
Apollos dispatched to Achaia by Priscilla and Aquila (18:17)
Paul to Caesarea Maritima (18:22a)
Paul to Jerusalem (18:22b implied)
In Antioch for a certain amount of time (18:22c)
Mission III: North Galatia and Phrygia (18:23)
Ephesus for 3 yrs. or 2 yrs., 3 mos. (19:1–20:1; cf. 20:31)

(Paul's plans to visit Macedonia, Achaia, Jerusalem, Rome [19:21])

16:3–8; cf. 2 Cor 1:15–16])	
Ministry in Troas (2 Cor 2:12)	
To Macedonia (2 Cor 2:13; 7:5; 9:2b–4); arrival of Titus (2 Cor 7:6)	Macedonia (20:1b)
Titus sent on ahead to Corinth (2 Cor 7:16–17), with part of 2 Cor	
Illyricum (Rom 15:19)?	
Achaia (Rom 15:26; 16:1); Paul's third visit to Corinth (2 Cor 13:1)	3 mos. in Greece (Achaia) (20:2–3)
	Paul starts to return to Syria (20:3), but goes via Macedonia and Philippi (20:3b–6a)
	Troas (20:6b–12)
	Miletus (20:15c–38)
	Tyre, Ptolemais, Caesarea (21:7–14)
(Paul plans to visit Jerusalem, Rome, Spain [Rom 15:22–27])	Jerusalem (21:15–23:30)
	Caesarea (23:31–26:32)
	Journey to Rome (27:1–28:14)
	Rome (28:15–31)

The most important differences in the preceding correlation of Pauline and Lucan data are the following: (1) Luke omits all reference to Paul's withdrawal to Arabia after his experience near Damascus (Gal 1:17b); did he know about it? (2) Luke treats Paul's missionary endeavors in three blocks (I: 13:1–14:28; II: 15:36–18:22; III: 18:23–21:16). (3) Whereas Paul himself in 2 Cor 11:32–33 relates his departure from Damascus to the attempt of the ethnarch of King Aretas IV Philopatris to take him captive, Luke ascribes the departure to a plot of "the Jews" to kill him (Acts 9:23). (4) Whereas Paul himself speaks only of having persecuted "the church of God" (Gal 1:13) or the church" (Phil 3:6), Luke portrays Paul "consenting" to the stoning of Stephen (Acts 7:58–8:1), about whom Paul says nothing in his letters, and further pursuing men and women belonging to "the Way" as far as Damascus to bring them to prison (Acts 8:3). But apart from these important differences that do exist, the rest of the correlation of the Pauline and Lucan data is significant. The biggest difficulty in the consideration of it is the Lucan account of Mission I, to which we may now turn.

II. The Problem of Mission I (before the So-called Council)

The end of the Lucan account of Saul's conversion or call in Acts 9 tells of his escape from Damascus (vv 24–25), his coming to Jerusalem (v 26), where his Christian allegiance is made known by Barnabas to Jerusalem Christians, and his eventual departure for Caesarea, whence he was sent off to Tarsus (v 30). In time, Barnabas seeks out Saul to bring him from Tarsus to Antioch, where they abor together "for a whole year" (11:25–26).

Eventually, Luke recounts the story of Saul's first missionary journey (Acts 13:1–14:28). He tells how Barnabas and Saul were set apart for this work on which the Spirit would send them, how they departed from Seleucia, the port of Antioch, and sailed for Cyprus, and how they evangelized the island. Sailing then from Paphos, they crossed to Perga in Pamphylia and passed on first to Anitoch in Pisidia and further to towns of South Galatia,

Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe, which they evangelized with some success. After mistreatment, however, they retraced their steps through Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch to return to Perga and sail from Attalia for Syrian Antioch. So runs the Lucan account of Paul's first missionary journey.

This part of the Lucan story of Paul's post-conversion years, however, seems to have no correspondence in Paul's own letters, and modern interpreters of Acts are sometimes skeptical about its historicity. In fact, Paul never recounts in narrative form his missionary movements, apart from a few verses Galatians 1–2, which actually serve another rhetorical and apologetic purpose.

In these chapters of Galatians, however, Paul tells how he returned to Damascus after his sojourn in Arabia (1:17c). Three years later he went up to Jerusalem for the first time after his conversion or call (1:18), ἱστορῆσαι Κηφᾶν, "to seek information from Cephas" or "to visit Cephas." At the beginning of chapter 2 Paul writes, "Then during (the course of) fourteen years I went up again to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking Titus along with me" (v 1). I regard this visit as the so-called Council visit—the same as that recounted in Acts 15:1–12.

Yet in between the mention of these two visits to Jerusalem (1:18 and 2:1) Paul says explicitly that he went εἰς τὰ κλίματα τῆς Συρίας καὶ τῆς Κιλικίας, "into the regions of Syria and Cilicia" (1:21). Paul insists that he was still personally unknown to the churches of Christ in Judea, which had "only heard that he who once persecuted us was now preaching the faith he had once tried to destroy" (1:23). He further specifies (2:2) that he had been "preaching among the Gentiles." Though it is difficult to state precisely what Paul might have meant by κλίματα (1:21), the word probably refers to "districts" or subdivisions" within the Roman provinces of Syria and Cilicia.[6] There seems to be little doubt that the Lucan notice about Paul's withdrawal to Tarsus (Acts 9:30) can be correlated with "the region of Cilicia" (Gal 1:21). The fact that Mission I begins in Antioch on the Orontes (Acts 13:1–4) can also be correlated with the region of Syria (Gal 1:21). In any case, Paul insists that Christians in Judea had heard that he was "preaching the faith" (Gal 1:23), apparently in those "regions of Syria and Cilicia." The whole year of labor spent by Barnabas and Paul in Antioch is specified as "teaching a large number of people" (Acts 11:26). This may be the Lucan way of referring to what Paul meant by "preaching the faith" (Gal 1:23) to the Gentiles in the region of Syria in the period prior to the "Council."[7]

When Paul wrote to the Philippians, he mentioned "the beginning of the evangelization," in which he had been engaged (ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, 4:15). He recalled that, when he left Macedonia, no church entered into partnership with him in giving and receiving except the Philippian community—and he adds, "even in Thessalonica you sent me help once and again" (4:16). Now "no church" could conceivably mean no other church in Macedonia (no one of which Paul ever mentions). But is it wholly out of question to maintain that Paul was thinking of "no other church" even in "the regions of

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[6] Paul uses τὰ κλίματα τῆς Ἀχαΐας in the same way in 2 Cor 11:10, and BAGD (436) explain it as "the province in its entirety." But in Rom 15:23, when Paul asserts that he has no longer any room (for work) ἐν τοῖς κλίμασι τούτοις, "in these regions," he is referring not to provinces, but to the area of the eastern Mediterranean where he has been evangelizing before he cast his gaze toward Rome and Spain in the west.

[7] For a different interpretation of these verses in Galatians 1 and 2, see M. J. Suggs, "Concerning the Date of Paul's Macedonian Ministry," *NovT* 4 (1960) 60–68, esp. 67.

Syria and Cilicia," where Gal 1:23 suggests that Paul did indeed begin his evangelization. It might even refer to churches in the areas evangelized by Paul in the pre-conciliar mission recounted in Acts 13:1–14:28. Paul must have passed to Philippi from the Province of Asia, where he may also have evangelized areas other than Syria and Cilicia. This last point is speculative, indeed, but the Lucan account of Mission I is not without some support in the sparse details about Paul's "preaching the faith" to Gentiles in the period before the so-called Council. Luke's account has supplied details that Paul has passed over for the sake of his rhetorical apology in Galatians. With this we may pass on to our third point.

III. The Appearance of Paul before Gallio in Achaia

The correlation of the Pauline and Lucan data presented in part I above permit one to work out a relative chronology for Paul's missionary endeavors.[8] His appearance before the proconsul Gallio's tribunal in Achaia (Acts 18:12–17) supplies a date in Mission II which allows one to peg this incident in Paul's life absolutely, even though Paul himself never mentions it in his letters and only Luke records it. Though most interpreters of Paul's life and career acknowledge the validity of this appearance before Gallio, there is still hesitation about the year in which it occurred. For this reason I should like to renew the discussion of it.

Lucius Annaeus Novatus was the son of M. Annaeus Seneca, a Roman *eques* and *rhetor*, and also the elder brother of the philosopher Seneca, the tutor of the emperor Nero. Lucius Junius Gallio was the name the former assumed when he was adopted by a wealthy friend and introduced to political life. Gallio is, however, mentioned as a friend of the emperor Claudius and as the proconsul of Achaia in a Greek inscription, which records the text of a letter sent by the emperor to the people of Delphi about a depopulation problem. Since the text itself is dated in the usual Roman fashion, one can establish by it the time when Gallio was proconsul in Achaia. The inscription had been set up in a temple of Apollo at Delphi, where it was discovered in fragmentary form in 1905 and 1910 by E. Bourguet.[9] The fragments, however, were not fully Published until 1970 by A. Plassart.[10]

The main part of the Greek text of the inscription runs as follows:

1 Τιβέρ[ιος Κλαύδιος Καῖσ]αρ Σ[εβαστ]ὸς Γ[ερμανικός, δημαρχικῆς ἐξου]
2 σίας [τὸ ΙΒ, αὐτοκράτωρ τ]ὸ ΚΖ, π[ατήρ π]ατρί[δος . . . . . χαίρειν].
3 Πάλ[αι μὲν τ]ῆι π[όλει τῇ] τῶν Δελφ[ῶν ἦν ο]ὐ μό[νον εὔνους ἀλλ' ἐπιμελὴς τύ]

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[8] For an attempt to work out the relative chronology, see my forthcoming booklet, *Paul and His Theology: A Brief Sketch* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989).

[9] See E. Bourguet, *De rebus delphicis imperatoriae aetatis capita duo* (Montpellier: C. Coulet & fils, 1905). Cf. A. Brassac, "Une inscription de Delphes et la chronologie de saint Paul," *RB* 10 (1913) 36–53, 207–17.

[10] "Lettre de l'empereur Claude au gouverneur d'Achaïe (en 52)," *Les inscriptions du temple du IV siècle* (Fouilles de Delphes III/4; Paris: Editions de Boccard, 1970) #286. Cf. A. Plassart, "Inscription de Delphes mentionnant le proconsul Gallion," *REG* 80 (1967) 372–78. J. H. Oliver, "The Epistle of Claudius Which Mentions the Proconsul Junius Gallio," *Hesperia* 40 (1970) 239–40. See further J. Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 141–52, 173–76.

4 χης, ἀεὶ δ' ἐτήρη[σα τὴ]ν Θρησκείαν τ]οῦ 'Από[λλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου· ἐπεὶ δὲ]
5 νῦν λέγεται καὶ [πολ]ειτῶν ἔρη[μο]ς εἶναι, ὥ[ς μοι ἄρτι ἀπήγγειλε Λ. 'Ιού]
6 νιος Γαλλίων ὁ φ[ίλος] μου κα[ὶ ἀνθύ]πατος, [Βοθλόμενος τοῦς Δελφοὺς]
7 ἔτι ἔξειν τὸν πρ[ότερον κόσμον ἐντελ]ῆ, ἐ[ντέλλομαι ὑμεῖν καὶ ἐξ ἄλ]
8 λων πόλεων καλ[εῖν εὖ γεγονότας εἰς Δελφοὺς ὡς νέους κατοίκους καὶ]
9 αὐτοῖς ἐπιτρέ[πειν ἐκγόνοις τε τὰ] πρεσ[Βεῖα πάντα ἔχειν τά τῶν Δελ]
10 φῶν ὡς πολε[ίταις ἐπ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ· ε]ἰ μὲν γάρ τι[νες . . . ὡς πολεῖ]
11 ται μετῳκίσ[αντο εἰς τούτους τοὺ]ς τόπους, κρ[. . . . . .]

[1]Tiber[ius Claudius Caes]ar A[ugust]us G[ermanicus, invested with tribunician po]wer [2][for the 12th time, acclaimed imperator for t]he 26th time, F[ather of the Fa]ther[land . . . sends greetings to . . .]. [3]For a l[ong time I have been not onl]y [well disposed toward t]he ci[ty] of Delph[i, but also solicitous for its [4]pros]perity, and I have always pro[tected th]e cul[t of Pythian] Apol[lo. But] [5]now [since] it is said to be desti[tu]te of [citi]zens, as [L. Jun]ius [6]Gallio, my fri[end] an[d procon]sul, [recently reported to me, and being desirous that Delphi] [7]should continue to retain [inta]ct its for[mer rank, I] ord[er you (pl.) to in]vite [well born people also from [8]ot]her cities [to Delphi as new inhabitants and to] [9]all[ow] them [and their children to have all the] privi[leges of Del]phi [10]as being citi[zens on equal and like (basis)]. For i[f] so[me . . . [11]were to trans[fer as citi]zens [to those regions . . .]. . .[11]

From the text of the letter one may deduce that Gallio was proconsul of Achaia during the twelfth regnal year of the emperor Claudius (AD 41–54) and after the twenty-sixth acclamation of him as *imperator.* The emperor was invested with *potestas tribunicia* each year, and that investment marked his regnal years. The emperor's name and the twelfth year of this tribunician authority was in large part restored in this inscription, but the restorations are certain because of other known inscriptions of Claudius.[12] His twelfth regnal year began on 25 January AD 52. The acclamation of him as *imperator* was sporadic, since it usually depended on military victories in which he would have been engaged or indirectly involved. To date an event by such acclamations one has to learn when such and such an acclamation occurred. From other inscriptions one knows that the twenty-second to the twenty-fifth acclamations took place in Claudius' eleventh regnal year (25 January AD 51 to 24 January AD 52) and that the twenty-seventh acclamation occurred in his twelfth regnal year, before 1 August AD 52. Theoretically, then, the twenty-sixth acclamation could have occurred before the winter of AD 51 or in the spring of AD 52. The matter is settled, however, by an inscription that has often been neglected in the recent discussion of Pauline chronology in the light of this Delphi inscription mentioning Gallio. A Greek inscription from Kys in Caria, published in 1887, combines the twenty-sixth acclamation with the twelfth regnal year: δημαρχικῆς ἐξουσίας τὸ δωδέκατον, ὕπατον τὸ πέμπτον, αὐτοκράτορα τὸ εἰκοστὸν καὶ ἕκτον, "with tribunician authority for the twelfth time, consul for the fifth, imperator for the twenty-sixth time."[13]

[11] The rest of the inscription is inconsequential. My translation follows the text as established by J. H. Oliver (see n. 10); square brackets enclose restorations.

[12] For the usual *cursus honorum* in such inscriptions, see M. P. Charlesworth, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Claudius & Nero* (Cambridge: University Press, 1951) 11–14.

[13] See G. Cousin et G. Deschamps, "Emplacement et ruines de la ville de ΚΥΣ en Carie," *BCH* 11 (1887) 305–11, esp. 306–8. One should consult further *CIL* 6. 1256 and

From this it is now clear that the combination of the twelfth regnal year of Claudius with the twenty sixth acclamation of him as *imperator* points to a time between 25 January and 1 August AD 52. Claudius would have written the letter to the people of Delphi sometime in this period, and in it he refers to L. Junius Gallio as his friend and proconsul of Achaia.

Since Achaia was a senatorial province of praetorian rank, it was governed by a proconsul (Greek ἀνθύπατος; cf. Acts 18:12; 13:7; Josephus, *Ant.* 14.10.21 #244). Such a provincial governor was in office for a year and was expected to assume his post by 1 June,[14] and to leave for the province by mid-April at the latest.[15] Claudius's letter mentions that Gallio has reported to him about the conditions he found in Delphi on his arrival. This would seem to mean that Gallio was already in Achaia by late spring or early summer of AD 52 and had written to the emperor Claudius about them.

The problem has always been to decide whether Gallio's proconsular year in Achaia stretched from some time in AD 51–52 or from some time in AD 52–53.[16] Since Seneca, Gallio's younger brother, reports that Gallio developed a fever there and "took ship immediately" (*Ep.* 104.1),[17] it seems that Gallio cut short his proconsular stay in Achaia and hurried back home. This suggests that Gallio arrived in Achaia in the late spring of AD 52, reported on conditions to the emperor Claudius, spent the summer there, and departed from the province not later than the end of October AD 52, before *mare clausum*, when ship-travel on Mediterranean became impossible. It follows then that Paul would have been haled before Gallio in the late spring, summer, or early fall of AD 52.[18]

If one accepts the Lucan testimony that Paul's stay in Corinth toward the end of Mission lasted for eighteen months (Acts 18:11),[19] then Paul would have arrived in Corinth in the early part of the year AD 51.

These, then, are the aspects of the Lucan story of Paul's missionary journeys that merit our reconsideration.

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Frontinus. *De Aquis* 1.13. Cf. E. Groag, *Die römischen Reichsbeamten von Achaia bis auf Diokletian* (Akademie der Wissenschaftern in Wien, Schriften der Balkankommission, Antiquarische Abteilung 9; Vienna/Leipzig: Hölder-Pichle-Tempsky, 1939; repr., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus, 1976) col. 3 #123. A. Brassac, "Une inscription" (n. 9 above) 44.

[14] Dio Cassius, *Rom. Hist.* 57.14.5. LCL 7. 146.

[15] Ibid , 60.11.6; 60.17.3. LCL 7. 394, 408.

[16] Among older writers who use the year 51–52, see A. Deissmann, *Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History* (2d ed.; New York: Doran, 1926) 272. E. Groag, *Die römischen Reichsbeamten*, 32–35. J. Finegan, *Handbook of Biblical Chronology: Principles of Time-Reckoning* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1964) 317–18. These writers have also influenced more recent interpreters.

[17] LCL 3. 190.

[18] There is no real reason to maintain with G. Lüdemann (*Paul*, 163–64) that Claudius' letter was actually sent to Gallio's successor and that Gallio's term of office should be reckoned as falling chronologically "in the years 51/52 C.E." Cf. L. Hennequin, "Delphes (Inscription de)," *DBS* 2. 355–73, esp. 367–68. J. Dupont, "Notes sur les Actes des Apôtres," *RB* 62 (1955) 45–59, esp. 55–56.

[19] This is another item of Lucan data widely accepted by modern interpreters of Paul's missionary journeys: thus J. Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 140; G. Lüdemann, *Paul*, 178 (but fr. 158–59); R. Jewett, *A Chronology*, 58, 91.

Paul in Acts: Aspects of Structure and Characterization

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Mushrooming advances in exegetical methods have fueled debates about comparative value, often as if one approach competes with and mutually excludes another. Granted that the debates help to correct interpretive procedures, if methods have even partial validity, aspects of them will complement each other. That is part of the implication of Meir Sternberg's assertion that biblical study is the intersection of the humanities par excellence.[1]

Previously I have taken a literary approach toward the portrait of Paul in Acts in which I considered the author to be responsible for the entire composition and looked for the sense of the text as a whole. But I always had an eye cocked toward the historical along the continuum from the historical world to the literary world in that I attempted to determine how the Paul of Acts functioned in Luke's setting.[2] Now in this somewhat experimental essay I shift the methods along the continuum away from the author's *Sitz im Leben* in hopes of profiting from the complementarity of methods. First, I utilize structuralism in order to locate Paul in the antitheses of the narrative. Then I turn to modern literary theory in order to study the characterization of Paul. But ultimately I am looking for a synthesis out of the variety of approaches. The question is: Do the methods combine to enrich interpretation?

Aspects of the Structure of Acts

Narrative develops by polarities. Antipodes are evident in narrative programs where transformation takes place when a subject comes into conjunction with a competence or value.[3] Competing programs, which threaten to inhibit or thwart competence and

[1] M. Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) 21. Cf. pp. 14–23. On the interdependence of methods see further W. Booth, *Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); D. Greenwood, *Structuralism and the Biblical Text* (New York: Mouton, 1985) 85; D. Damrosch, *The Narrative Covenant: Transformation of Genre in the Growth of Biblical Literature* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987) 23–30.

[2] R. Brawley, "Paul in Acts: Lucan Apology and Conciliation," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, ed. C. Talbert (New York: Crossroad, 1984) 129–47; idem, *Luke-Acts and the Jews: Conflict, Apology, and Conciliation* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1987) 41–83.

[3] See A. Greimas and J. Courtés, "Program, Narrative," "Acquisition," "Deprivation," "Polemic" in *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1982); H. Boers, "Polarities at the Roots of New Testament Thought: Methodological Considerations," in *Perspectives on the New Testament; Essays in Honor*

performance stages in the narrative schema, stand in opposition to the primary programs. Programs also link together in narrative trajectories that likewise exhibit oppositions.[4]

Although Acts has attracted major attention to its themes,[5] polemic counterparts have captured little interest.[6] This study attempts to demonstrate the significance of the polemical narrative trajectory for understanding the principal one. And it suggests that Acts establishes a consistent pattern so that polarities at the end of Acts are parallel to those at the beginning.

The ending of Luke and the beginning of Acts serve simultaneously as the sanction stage of one narrative trajectory and the need and competence stages of another. The burning hearts of the disciples in Emmaus and the joy of the witnesses of the ascension sanction the performances of opening their eyes and minds to understand the scriptures and to believe that Jesus is the Messiah.

But the ending of Luke creates a new need. The risen Jesus mandates the preaching of repentance and forgiveness of sins. Further, he anticipates empowerment implying its absence at that point.

Acts 1 continues the sanction of the end of Luke. Many proofs during 40 days provide recognition of the success of the performance stage. But Jesus' mandate to the apostles that they are to be witnesses also renews the need. Again, Jesus anticipates empowerment which will overcome an implied lack of power.

Pentecost fulfills the competence, performance, and sanction stages of the mandate. The Spirit comes upon the company of persons and empowers them. Peter interprets the occasion, and 3,000 people believe.

The competence for the apostolic witness, however, does not rest entirely on the coming of the Spirit but also on the reconstitution of the twelve. In Luke 22:30 Jesus promises that the apostles will sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. Thus, the defection of Judas from the twelve demands restoration of the number if the performance is to be successful.

The story of Judas corresponds in the negative both (1) to the reconstitution of the

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of Frank Stagg, ed. C. Talbert (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985) 61–62, 66–69.

[4] P. Miscall (*1 Samuel: A Literary Reading* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986] xx–xxi) critiques structuralism for granting primacy to one pole of oppositions and considering the other irrelevant. Against Miscall, structural analysis helps to confirm the value of the polemical pole. But the investment of a narrative in overcoming a lack does establish one pole as primary.

[5] E.g., E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 49; H. Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961); K. Löning, "Paulinismus in der Apostelgeschichte," in *Paulus in den neutestamentlichen Spätschriften: Zur Paulusrezeption im Neuen Testament,* ed. K. Kertelge (Freiburg: Herder, 1981) 203; R. Pesch, *Die Apostelgeschichte,* 2 vols. (Zurich: Benziger, 1986) 1.29, 2.313.

[6] E.g., K. Rengstorff ("Die Zuwahl des Matthias [Apg.1,15ff.]," *Studia Theologica* 15 [1961] 35–67) does not consider the impact of the demise of Judas on the election of Matthias. In contrast, B. Gaventa ("Toward a Theology of Acts: Reading and Rereading," *Int* 42 [1988] 146–57) does propose a methodological program that takes seriously both the positive and the negative.

twelve and (2) to the formation of a community judged by the apostles.[7] (1) The desertion of Judas decimates the number of those destined to judge Israel, a lack which the narrative attempts to fill. Along the principal axis in the competence phase of the narrative trajectory, a divine appointment establishes Matthias in the place of Judas. Negative programs establish a polemical axis against the principal axis as follows:[8]

Principal Axis	Polemical Axis
? (Matthias ∧ shared experiences of the twelve) (vv 21–22)	? (Judas ∧ shared experiences of of the twelve) (v 17)[9]
God (Matthias ∧ divine necessity [election] (v 26)	God (Judas ∧ divine necessity [removal from office]) (vv 6, 20)
God (Matthias ∧ twelve) (v 26)	God (Judas ∪ twelve) (v 16)
God (Matthias ∧ place [τόπος]) (v 25)	Judas (Judas ∧ place [τόπος]) (v 25)
God (Matthias ∧ κλῆρος) (v 26)	Judas (Judas ∪ κλῆρος) (v 17)

These oppositions in the narrative programs correspond to the respective contours of narrative trajectories in similar oppositon. In the need and competence phases of the narrative trajectories, Matthias is associated with the twelve, Judas turns aside from the twelve and goes his own way.

(2) Concurrently with the unfulfilled need for the twelve to judge Israel,[10] the mandate of Jesus to the apostles to become witnesses remains unrealized. But Pentecost establishes the apostles as witnesses and produces a community under their leadership. Again, the tension between the principal and polemical axes appears as a series of oppositions:

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[7] Although this discussion of Judas reflects my own analysis, I am following extensively L. Panier, "Comprenez pourquoi vous comprenez! Actes 1,15–2,47," *Sémiotique et Bible* 23 (1981) 20–43, and idem, "La mort de Judas: Elements d'analyse sémiotique du recit de la pentecote," *Lumiere et vie* 30 (No. 153/154, 1981) 111–122. Panier and J. Giroud have a series of articles on the narrative structure of Acts in *Sémiotique et Bible* from 1982–85.

[8] I do not list the entire hierarchy of programs but only those with corresponding oppositions. The representation of the programs follows the form S1(S2 ∧ Ov) from the formula NP = F[S1 → (S2 ∧ Ov)]. The narrative program (NP) is a function (F) of transformation which results from one subject (S1) bringing about the conjunction (∧) of another subject (S2) with an object of value (Ov) or disjunction (∪) from an undesirable object. One personage in the narrative may correspond to both S1 and S2 as in the case where a character obtains an object of value for him/herself. See Greimas and Courtés, "Program, Narrative," in *Semiotics and Language.*

[9] "?" represents the subject (S1) which brings about the conjunction (S2 Ov) which is not manifested in the text.

[10] J. Jervell (*Luke and the People of God: A New Look at Luke-Acts* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972] 79) shows that the promise that the twelve will judge Israel is the legacy of Jesus' farewell address.

Principal Axis	Polemical Axis
The conjunction of the nascent Christian community (2:1)	The disjunction of Judas from the twelve (1:25)
God (house ∧ sound) (2:2)	? (habitation ∧ emptiness) (1:20)
God (disciples ∧ Holy Spirit) (2:4)	? (Some in the crowd ∧ mockery) (2:13)
Peter (crowd ∩ explanation) (2:14–36)	Opponents in crowd (crowd ∧ competing explanation) (2:13)
Repenters (repenters ∪ crooked generation) (2:40)	Non-repenters (non-repenters ∧ crooked generation) (2:23, 36, 40)

At the end of the performance phase a narrator's summary describes the relations within the community and the community in relation to the apostles (2:42). This provides sanction for the performance. The twelve judge a community. Significantly, the new believers stem from a crowd of Jews from all the diaspora and from Jerusalem (2:5, 9–11), that is, implicitly, from the twelve tribes.[11]

The architectonic structure also evidences an antithesis between the destiny of Judas and the reconstitution of the twelve. Luke constructs the second half of Acts 1 symmetrically around two citations from the Psalms. Thus, scripture (1) explains the demise of Judas: "Let his habitation become desolate, and let there be no one to live in it" (v 20) and (2) anticipates the reconsitution of the twelve: "His office let another take" (v 20). The account of Judas leads up to the double citation, the election of Matthias follows. The Lucan theme of divine necessity introduces both sections (ἔδει, v 16; δεῖ, v 21). Judas forfeits the κλῆρος (cf. v 17), Matthias receives the κλῆρος (v 26). Thus, the two cases of fulfillment of scripture form a diptych with matching parts in antithesis.

But more is going on than the overt fulfillment of scripture. It is well known that Luke imitates the style of the LXX. This style is prominent in Acts 1. This section begins with a common LXX Phrase, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις . . . followed by an inchoate ἀναστάς (v 15).[12] The fulfillment of scripture and these echoes of the LXX alert the reader that the biblical narrative is contiuing and remind the reader of the story of Israel.[13]

Israel's story, however, continues an even earlier one. Robert Alter's compelling discussion of Genesis 37–39 shows how the account of Joseph and his brothers contains seeds of Israel's later story.[14] The treachery of Joseph's brothers in selling him into slavery

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[11] Cf. R. Zehnle, *Peter's Pentecost Discourse* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971) 122. Jervell (*People of God,* 73, n. 37) citing Bauernfeind, suggests on the contrary that these Jews do not represent diaspora Judaism, but the gentiles!

[12] W. Clarke, "The Use of the Septuagint in Acts," in *The Beginnings of Christianity,* ed. F. Foakes Jackson and K. Lake (London: Macmillan, 1922) 2.66–105; H. Sparks, "The Semitisms of the Acts," *JTS* 1 (1950) 16–28; E. Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller: Studien zur Apostelgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972) 38–70.

[13] Cf. R. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation. Volume 1: The Gospel According to Luke* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 3; J. Drury, "Luke," in *The Literary Guide to the Bible,* ed. R. Alter and F. Kermode (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) 419–20.

[14] R. Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York: Basic Books, 1981) 3–12. My discussion of Genesis 37–39 relies heavily on Alter.

converges with the story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife. But the episode of Judah (hereinafter "Judas" by virture of derivation from the LXX) and Tamar breaks into that story line so that the episodes fall into sharp relief against each other.

The story of Judas and Tamar begins with the notice that Judas separates from his brothers (Gen 38:1). When Judas's son Er dies childless, and when Onan rejects the responsbilities of levirate marriage, and when Judas refuses to provide a mate for Er's widow Tamar, Tamar seduces Judas himself. From this union Tamar gives birth to twins who in the act of birth struggle to dominate each other. The firstborn is named Perez who turns out to be an ancestor of King David.

These narratives foreshadow the future. When the people split into two kingdoms, the tribe of Judah dominates the Southern Kingdom. Thus the separation of Judas from his brothers echoes in the division of the kingdoms.

Reminiscences of these stories reverberate in the story of Judas and the twelve appointed by Jesus to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. The Judas of Acts recalls the prototypical Judas and the twelve sons of Israel. Like the first Judas who sells his brother (Gen 37:27), the second sells Jesus (Luke 22:5; Acts 1:18)). Similarly, the second separates from the twelve apostles as the first separates from the twelve brothers.

The story of Judas and the reconstitution of the twelve also contains seeds of the future. In the remainder of Acts Jews who reject the gospel follow the paradigm of Judas in separating from the apostles who judge Israel. Acts 1:16 presents Judas not as an independent actor but as the leader (ὁδηγός) of the opponents who arrested Jesus. On the day of Pentecost Peter charges that Jesus was delivered up by the hands of lawless ones (2:23). With that the crowd takes on a role shared with Judas. Along the opposite line of development the proclamation of Peter transforms 3,000 in the crowd associated with all the diaspora and Jerusalem, and thus with the twelve tribes of Israel (see above and n. 11) who now stand in solidarity with the twelve (cf. 4:4; 5:14). But the success of the early mission arouses the opposition of the high priestly circle (4:1–22; 5:17–40). Against them Peter identifies the twelve with the God "of our fathers" and portrays the opponents as those who crucified Jesus (5:29–30). The twelve are allied with the God of the patriarchs, the council falls in line with Judas.

In Acts 9 the polemical axis shifts to Paul as an opponent, but then a heavenly light falls upon him taking him out of alignment with Judas and propelling him toward solidarity with the twelve. Then in turn Paul's proclamation repeatedly produces a division among Hellenistic Jews.

Paul's address in Rome produces another division (28:24). Just as the demise of Judas has been neglected as the *polemical* counterpart to the reconstitution of the twelve at the beginning of Acts, so the story of Paul and *believing* Jews has been neglected as the *principal* counterpart to unbelieving Jews at the end of Acts.[15] At this juncture Paul identifies the unbelieving Jews with hardened Israel addressed in Isa 6:9–10. Paul himself identifies with the hope of Israel (28:20; cf. 26:7). Paul and believing Jews align with the twelve tribes judged by the reconstituted twelve apostles. Unbelieving Jews fall in with Judas who, like the prototypical Judas, turns aside from th twelve to go to his own place.

The narrative structure of Acts 28 displays these polarities. Paul's summary of the accusations of the Jews in Jerusalem (28:7–20) establishes a need phase in the narrative

[15] E.g., R. Tannehill ("Israel in Luke-Acts: A Tragic Story," *JBL* 104 [1985] 69–85) argues that Acts ends with the hope of the fulfillment of the promises to Israel pathetically crushed. But he fails to assess adequately belief as well as unbelief in Acts 28.

schema. In face of the need to vindicate himself, Paul communicates his defense to the Jewish leaders. But the sanction stage shows that the defense initially produces a hung jury (vv 21–22). Therefore, the performance falls in abeyance.

Before the narrative ameliorates the need for a defense, a new narrative diverges. The Jewish leaders desire to hear Paul's views. The implicit need is for Paul to communicate to them the kingdom of God. Thus, there is now a double need—the defense of Paul, which has been suspended, and the communication of the kingdom. When some Jews in Rome believe, they sanction the success of Paul's communication of the kingdom.[16]

At that point a secondary diverging narrative branches out. The disbelief and dispute among the Jews establish a need for an explanation. The competence stage is fulfilled by the Holy Spirit's words to their fathers. Paul's citation of those words and his comment that the salvation of God has been sent to gentiles (Acts 28:28) constitute the performance stage.

But the diverging and secondary diverging narratives also converge again with the main narrative. That is, the communication of the kingdom of God to Jewish leaders in Rome and Paul's citation of Isa 6:9–10 merge again with the suspended performance stage of Paul's defense. At the end of Acts Paul is preaching and teaching openly and unhindered (28:30–31). A clue that this sanctions the success of Paul's defense is that the focus shifts dramatically from unbelieving Jews and receptive gentiles back to Paul.[17] Paul's apology is successful in that Jewish leaders in Rome do not oppose him.

Thus, the citation from Isaiah 6 and Paul's comment about receptive gentiles function in part as an apology. In particular they explain empirically why Paul turns to gentiles.[18] As in Luke 9:1–5; 10:8–11, receiving the kingdom of God means receiving its proclaimer.

Therefore, a polemical axis stands over against the principal axis. Paul identifies with the twelve tribes of Israel which the apostles judge. His opponents manifest the fruition of the seeds of the Judas whose separation from the twelve apostles echoes the Judas who turned aside from the twelve brothers.

Schematically, narrative programs stand in antithesis as follows:

Principal Axis	Polemical Axis
Romans (Jerusalem Jews $\wedge$ Paul's release) (v 8)	Jerusalem Jews (Romans $\wedge$ Paul's imprisonment) (v 19)
Jerusalem Jews (Roman Jews $\vee$ accusations) (v 21)	Jerusalem Jews (Romans $\wedge$ accusations) (v 19)

[16] Haenchen (*Acts*, 723), H. Conzelmann (*Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987] 227), Sanders ("The Salvation of the Jews," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, ed. C. Talbert [New York: Crossroad, 1984] 108), and Pesch (*Apostelgeschichte*, 2.309) argue that Acts 28:24 does not actually mean that some Roman Jews believe. That is a direct contradiction of the text as the antithesis between ἐπείθοντο and ἠπίστουν shows.

[17] Haenchen (*Acts*, 722) points out that ἐγώ forms the theme of Paul's speech. J. Dupont, "La conclusion des Actes et son rapport a l'ensemble de l'ouvrage de Luc," in *Les Actes des Apôtres: Traditions, redaction, théologie*, ed. J. Kremer (Gembloux: Duculot, 1979] 372) argues that Acts 28:17ff. turns from Paul to the hope of Israel. But against Dupont vv 30–31 shift squarely back to Paul.

[18] Cf. Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews*, 74–78, 143.

Paul (Some Jewish leaders in Rome ∧ kingdom) (v 24)
Some Jewish leaders in Rome (Some Jewish leaders in Rome ∧ belief) (v 24)

Paul (Other Jewish leaders in Rome ∪ kingdom) (v 24)
Other Jewish leaders in Rome (Other Jewish leaders in Rome ∪ belief) (v 24)

The polarities at the end of Acts correspond to those at the beginning. At the beginning Judas turns aside from his heritage (κλῆρος) with the twelve to go to his own place. But the reconstituted twelve take their leadership over Israel. At the end of Acts Paul claims his heritage with the twelve tribes of Israel. But his Jewish opponents repeat the story of Judas and forfeit their κλῆρος.[19] It is into this polemical structure that Luke fits the characterization of Paul.

Characterization of Paul

Literary criticism inherits from Aristotle a debate about the relationship between character and action. Aristotle advocated the primacy of plot over actor (*Poetics* 7.12–18). But the mutuality of the two has virtually won a consensus in accord with the dictum of Henry James: "What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of character?"[20] Holdovers persist where structuralism reduces characters to actants,[21] and where interpreters of Acts argue that the course of the Gospel from Jerusalem to Rome dominates the personages.[22] Does Paul stand out beyond the demands of the plot?

Although complex, the procedures for building a character boil down to the interplay of information, action, personal traits, and evaluation. Complexity arises in that information may come from the narrator, from the primary character, or from another character; or it may be inferred. Similarly, action may be described by a narrator, reflected by characters, or inferred. Personal traits may be given in direct description by the narrator, claimed by characters for themselves, attributed by characters to others, or inferred.[23]

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[19] In Acts 8:21 Simon forfeits his κλῆρος. W. Foerster (*TDNT* 3.759–60) shows that in the LXX κλῆρος and κληρονομία coincide when they refer to the land of Canaan as a God-given possession. The way Luke uses κλῆρος also suggests its connection with the heritage of Israel.

[20] H. James, "The Art of Fiction," in *Approaches to the Novel: Materials for a Poetics*, ed. R. Scholes (San Francisco: Chandler, 1961) 302. Cf. R. Crane, "The Concept of the Plot," in *Approaches to the Novel*, 165; S. Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) 109–110; W. Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986) 116.

[21] Some structuralists recognize the interplay between the two. Cf. J. Calloud, *Structural Analysis of Narrative* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) 13; R. Barthes, "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative," *New Literary History* 6 (1975) 252. Cf. R. Barthes, *S/Z* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974) 67.

[22] Haenchen, *Acts*, passim; Conzelmann, *Acts*, passim; Gaventa, "Toward a Theology," 152.

[23] Cf. A. Berlin, *Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative* (Sheffield: Almond, 1983) 33–42; Alter, *Art of Biblical Narrative*, 116.

Further, the reliability of the narrator or character cuts across the axes of information, action, personal traits, and evaluation.

Reliability is related to the degree of certainty. According to Robert Alter's hierarchy of the degree of certainty, action alone leaves the reader in the realm of inference, direct speech from characters allows the reader to judge their claims, interior speech leads to relative certainty, and a reliable narrator's explicit statements imply the highest level of certainty.[24] One emendation on Alter's hierarchy, however, is that divine speech takes priority over the narrator.

Theoretically, therefore, in an ideal approach divine speech and the narrator's clear assertions would control weighing of claims and inference from actions. In practice, however, inferences from the action and statements from God, the narrator, and characters are so inextricable as to make discussion in tidy categories unwieldy. Further, character builds up largely through thematization, that is, by repetition and correlation of action, traits, and evaluation.[25] Thus, this discussion attempts to trace lines of relationship among redundancies that correct, redirect, and reinforce one another.

By far the most potent redundancy for Paul's characterization is the triple narration of his conversion. Intrigued with discrepancies among the three versions, some scholars isolate them atomistically and view them as creating patterns of interference.[26] But even if some variant features give the reader pause, the shifts in point of view and context enrich the texture of Paul's character. Beverly Roberts Gaventa has advanced discussion of the three accounts toward an integrated literary view.[27] According to her, Luke adapts each to its context. Thus, first, in a context where the church is moving from a Jewish to a gentile world, Paul is an enemy from the periphery of Judaism who is overthrown (Acts 9); then, in a context where Paul faces accusations, he is a faithful Jew (ch. 22); and, finally, in the continuing context of a personal defense, Paul is faithful and obedient to his call (ch. 26). Nevertheless, Gaventa stops short of an integrated interpretation since she maintains that Luke uses one story in distinct ways. From a holistic perspective, the three accounts correct, develop, and reinforce each other. Thus, if Paul appears to be on the extremities of Judaism in ch. 9, chs. 22 and 26 undermine and amend the impression.

Paul's threefold announcement of turning to the gentiles (13:46; 18:6; 28:28) offers another pregnant case of redundancy. Martin Dibelius long ago took the three references as a cumulative cluster but saw them as referring to a Lucan rejection of the Jews rather than to the ourse of Paul's ministry.[28] David Lewycky has recently made a substantial case that acceptance and rejection of messianism by both Jews and gentiles prior to Paul's announcements preclude Luke's rejection of the Jews.[29] I reiterate my argument, published

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[24] Alter, *Art of Biblical Narrative*, 117.

[25] Barthes, *S/Z*, 92–93; W. Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) 94.

[26] For C. Burchard (*Der dreizehnte Zeuge: Traditions- und kompositionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu Lukas' Darstellung der Frühzeit des Paulus* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970] 118–25) and K. Löning (*Die Saulustradition in der Apostelgeschichte* [Münster: Aschendorf, 1973] 11–18) the discrepancies distinguish tradition from redaction.

[27] B. Gaventa, *From Darkness to Light: Aspects of Conversion in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 52–95.

[28] M. Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* (London: SCM, 1956) 149–50.

[29] D. Lewycky, "Paul's Turning from the Jews to the Gentiles in Luke Acts," (Ph.D. diss.,

elsewhere, that the three references explain pragmatically why Paul turns to gentiles, and, additionally, that the first two announcements establish patterns that undermine the impression of a final rejection of the Jews in 28:28.[30]

Even epithets and direct descriptions may belong to clusters of redundancy and reveal more than the features to which they point immediately. In Acts epithets have four primary functions beyond direct portrayal: prolepsis, analepsis, evaluation, and relation.[31] They anticipate action, recall action, sanction or disapprove personages, and clarify the relationship of the character to others.

As a significant case in point, the divine word to Ananias naming Paul a chosen vessel (9:15) impacts the action of the remainder of Acts. The saying immediately expands into an explicit prolepsis of action forecasting Paul's suffering and ministry.

Moreover, this text links up directly with Paul's two accounts of his conversion. In 22:15 Ananias interprets the event as a divine appointment of Paul as a μάρτυς. In 26:16 the risen Jesus designates him a ὑπηρέτης and a μάρτυς. The latter two cases catch up the action analeptically by recalling Paul's ministry.

In Philippi a παιδίσκη with a spirit of divination identifies Paul and Silas as servants (δοῦλοι) of the most high God (16:17). Her cry proleptically interprets the title to mean that Paul and Silas will proclaim the way of salvation. But it is also relational in that it ties Paul and Silas to the proclaimers (δοῦλοι) of the word in the early Jerusalem community (2:18; 4:29).

The narrator does not apply evaluative epithets directly to Paul but does report negative evaluations by other characters.[32] When Paul exorcizes the evil spirit from the παιδίσκη (16:18), her owners call Paul and Silas "Jews" (pejorative) and accuse them of inciting violations of Roman law. Jews in Thessalonica and Corinth raise similar allegations (17:6–7; 18:13). Against these unreliable characters Paul appears all the more clearly differentiated as law abiding. Their indictments also anticipate accusations in Jerusalem (21:28) where Paul again appeals to his Roman citizenship to demonstrate that he is law abiding (21:39; 22:25, 26, 28, 29). This line of development links up with Paul's explicit claim in 25:8 that he has not offended against Caesar. Thus, Paul's Roman citizenship functions beyond establishing status to evaluate him as law abiding.

In another case, Philosophers in Athens refer to Paul as σπερμολόγος οὗτος (the οὗτος is pejorative). Others call him a preacher of foreign deities (17:18). These characterizations are juxtaposed to Paul's speech in such a way that dramatic irony is at work.[33] Far from being a σπερμολόγος, Paul delivers a coherent speech, and rather than proclaiming a

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(continued)

Marquette University, 1985). I cannot agree with Lewycky that Paul turns to gentiles because Jews refuse him hospitality.

[30] Brawley, *Luke-Acts and the Jews*, 69–78.

[31] On prolepsis and analepsis see G. Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) 33–85. On the indirect function of epithets and their relation to action and evaluation see Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, 331, 342–44, 476. On relational epithets see Alter, *Art of Biblical Narrative*, 126–27.

[32] W. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Irony* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) 63.

[33] Many commentators fail to recognize Tertullus as unreliable and inaccurately assess his characterization of Paul. Recently J. Robinson, "Acts," in *The Literary Guide to the Bible*, ed. R. Alter and F. Kermode (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) 476.

foreign deity, he proclaims the God who is close to the Athenians but unknown (17:22–28).

A similar case occurs in Acts 24:5 where Tertullus labels Paul a pestilent fellow, an agitator, and a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes. Tertullus stands out in relief against the context as a spokesperson for unreliable characters.[34] Further, Paul denies his accusations (vv 10–21). Nevertheless, the epithets catch up the action by recalling Paul's career.

Over against the negative evaluation of others, Paul makes two direct claims that he is innocent (καθαρός, 18:6 [Corinth]; 20:26 [Miletus). In both cases Paul exonerates himself from responsibility for unbelief. The claims, therefore, are evaluative and portray Paul as faithful to his commission. But the first also proleptically anticipates the extension of his mission to gentiles, and the second analeptically recalls his ministry among gentiles and Jews.

Epithets also help to establish relationships. Upon his conversion, Ananias names Paul brother (9:17; cf. 22:13). Synagogue rulers in Pisidian Antioch call Paul and Barnabas brothers (13:15). James refers to Paul as brother in 20:21. Although the term can designate gentiles (15:1, 23), as a relational epithet it always ties Paul to Jews (cf. 14:2; 15:7, 13). It then functions in reverse. Paul identifies with Jews by calling them brothers (13:26, 38; 22:1; 23:6; 28:17). In addition, Paul repeatedly calls himself a Jew (21:39; 22:3), twice claims to be a Pharise (23:6; 26:5), and alludes to "our fathers" (24:4; 26:6) or "my nation" (26:4; 28:19).

Another cumulative device that adds depth to character is shifting the point of view.[35] Paul arrives on the scene from the narrator's perspective. Quickly the narrator opens Paul's interior attitudes by informing the reader that Paul consents to the death of Stephen (8:1). This anticipates action summarized in 8:3 as ravaging the church and in 9:1 as breathing threats and murder against the disciples. But it also anticipates the reversal of action in Paul's conversion. At his conversion, negative characterization shifts to other chracters. Ananias describes Paul as working evil against the saints (9:13). A chorus echoes Ananias's suspicions (v 26). Thus, the variation in point of view adds ambiguity to Paul's character. But the criterion for the reader's judgment is set by yet another point of view—a divine word declares that Paul is God's chosen instrument (v 15).[36]

On two other occasions the narrator opens Paul's interior emotions. The παιδίσκη who identifies Paul and Silas as servants of God annoys Paul (16:18); idols in Athens provoke him (17:16). These cases link up with two related actions. Paul harshly opposes Elymas (13:10), and he reviles the high priest Ananias (23:3). Although these may be examples of righteous indignation, they also give the impression that in spite of his conversion Paul remains fiery and combative.[37]

In a closely related vein, the narrator repeatedly portrays Paul as speaking boldly (e.g.,

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[34] Negative evaluations assist the reader in fixing the character. See W. Iser, *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) 48.

[35] W. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 961) 16–17; Berlin, *Poetics and Interpretation*, 7; W. Harvey, *Character and the Novel* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965) 52–55.

[36] The author molds the reader to judge character by establishing norms. Booth, *Rhetoric of Fiction*, 182–83. Redundancy provides a corrective against errors of communication. Iser, *Act of Reading*, 94.

[37] E.g., 9:22, 29; 3:45; 15:39; 17:2 [iterative], 17; 18:4; 19:9.

9:27, 28; 13:46; 14:3; 19:8; 26:26; 28:31. The narrator's view corresponds to a divine word to Paul in 18:9 urging him not to be afraid to speak. Although this text assures Paul only with respect to Corinth, it echoes in the divine word in 23:11. Thus, divine providence confirms Paul's boldness, and, in turn, Paul's boldness confirms the fulfillment of his divine commission (cf. 26:22).

Shifting the point of view to Paul further verifies his boldness. He tells the Ephesians at Miletus that he did not shrink from testifying (20:20, 27). That ties in thematically with his assertion before Agrippa that he was not disobedient to the divine commission (26:19). Along with that he claims God's promise of deliverance as a part of his commission. In addition, Paul's courageous action in the storm and shipwreck in ch. 27 is interwoven with divine providence to further validate his fidelity to his mission. Thus, Paul's courageous testimony is both evaluative and analeptic. It both warrants and recalls his ministry.

Paul's character takes on additional depth because he acts in a variety of contexts.[38] In Acts Paul is an itinerant, although there are notable periods of stability in Tarsus (9:30; 11:25), Antioch (9:26), Corinth (18:11), and Ephesus (19:8–10). Nevertheless, a reader can hardly avoid the impression that Paul is a vagabond. In fact, in 20:24 Paul summarizes his own career as a δρόμος. But he travels clearly under the guidance of the Spirit.[39]

Part of the context is the relationship between the character and objects or conditions, especially those with metonymic or metaphorical overtones.[40] Three particular objects link Paul to persecution of messianists: the *garments* of those who stone Stephen are laid at his feet (7:58; 22:20); he receives *letters* from the high priest empowering him to arrest Christians (9:1–2; 22:5; cf. 26:10); and he casts a *pebble* (votes) against the saints (26:10). The garments associate Paul with Stephen's opponents. The letters not only identify Paul with the high priest and elders, but also make him their functionary. The pebble is a metaphorical reminder of stoning as the Jewish form of execution. Thus, these objects all align Paul strongly with persecution against the saints.

When Paul changes sides, he shakes out his garments as a sign of the guilt of recalcitrant Corinthian Jews and as an indication of his own innocence (8:6). His garments now differentiate him from unbelieving Jews.

A similar shift occurs in the metonymy of chains. As a metonym for imprisonment, chains represent the radical reversal of Paul's commitments. As a persecutor Paul binds and imprisons men and women of the way (8:3; 9:2; 22:4; 26:10) and ironically forecasts his own destiny. He becomes a part of the way, and so he is bound with chains (2:33) from which he desires to be free (26:29) but which he interprets as a sign of the hope of Israel (28:20). The chains, then, are profound metaphors of the reversal of Paul's commitments.

In addition, blindness, baptism, and food mark Paul's abrupt transformation. Paul's blindness first of all implies punishment for persecuting the way.[41] But it also constitutes part of the christophany as a sign of divine action. Paul's recovery of sight corresponds to the coming of the Holy Spirit, and so the blindness attests a divine encounter. But beyond that, the blindness also has a metaphorical function. The christophany transforms

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[38] Harvey, *Character and the Novel*, 32–33.

[39] 13:2, 4; 16:6–10; 19:2; 20:22; cf. 22:21; 23:11; 27:23–24.

[40] Harvey, *Character and the Novel*, 35–38.

[41] Conzelmann (*Acts*, 72) declares that Paul's blindness is not punishment. But contextually it aligns with the inability of Zechariah to speak (Luke 1:20), the death of Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5:1–10), and the blindness of Elymas (13:11).

Paul from one who perceives reality inauthenically into one who sees authentically (cf. Luke 24:31; Acts 28:27).[42]

Baptism integrates Paul into the community of believers and recalls Jesus' prediction to the apostles that they would be baptized with the Holy Spirit in contrast to John's baptism (1:5). That, in turn, links up with Pentecost (2:1–4). And so Paul's baptism relates him to Jesus, implies the coming of the Holy Spirit (which v 17 anticipates), differentiates him from the followers of John the Baptist (cf. 19:2–7), and serves to legitimate his conversion.

Food likewise has a metaphorical function at Paul's conversion. As a synecdoche for hospitality, it signals his integration into the community (9:19). In the Jerusalem congregation food is a sign of community among believers but also of their relationship with God (2:42, 46). Lines of development extend to Peter's table fellowship with gentiles (11:3), to Paul's involvement in famine relief for Jerusalem (vv 28–30), to the apostolic decree (15:20, 29; cf. 21:25), to the conversion of the Philippian jailer (16:34), and to the restoration of Eutychus (20:11). In addition, Paul acts as host at a meal with eucharistic overtones during a storm at sea (27:33–38). In this last instance, the meal does not bind believers together, but it is a part of the participants' confidence in the promise of God as Paul has related it.

Possessions also function metaphorically as a part of Paul's context.[43] Paul's occupation as a tentmaker (18:3) links up with 20:33–35 to inform the reader retrospectively that Paul has supported himself and has used his labor to aid the weak. Thus, the text characterizes Paul as free from covetousness and as benevolent toward others.

Another subtle connection between possessions and Paul's legitimation emerges when James suggests that Paul purify himself and pay the expenses for four men under a vow (21:23–24). Paul accepts the suggestion as a part of a strategy to disabuse Jewish Christians of their opinion that he teaches Jews of the diaspora to forsake Moses. Thus, Paul's willingness to pay the expenses of the four attests his solidarity with Jewish Christians.

But Paul's habitual relationship with the word characterizes him more definitively than any other relationship to a metonym. When Paul and Barnabas arrive in Salamis, the narrator epitomizes their action as proclaiming the word of God (3:5, iterative imperfect). Thereafter, narrator's summaries repeat the portrayal.[44] The action likewise shows Paul taking up the word in speeches (e.g., 13:6–41; 14:15–17; 17:22–31). In addition, within his speeches he refers to his activity as a ministry of the word 13:26, 46; 15:36). In fact, Paul's ministry of the word is the last impression that the narrator leaves with the reader. Acts ends with what Gerard Genette calls a characterizing ellipsis.[45] In Acts 28:30–31 the relative time for actual narration approaches zero, while the story time has a duration of two years. Paul's characteristic activity for those two years is preaching and teaching. Thus, the action, Paul's claims, and the narrator's information dovetale into characterization of Paul as a proclaimer of the word.

To make a transition to the relationship between the narrator and the character,[46] it

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[42] From blindness to sight is stereotypical conversion language. Gaventa, *From Darkness to Light*, 86–87.

[43] See L. Johnson, *The Literary Function of Possessions in Luke-Acts* (Missoula: Scholars, 1977) 30–36, 217–20.

[44] 13:44, 48, 49; 14:3, 25; 15:35; 16:6, 32; 17:11, 13; 18:5, 11; 19:10, 20; 20:2, 7.

[45] G. Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) 87–109.

[46] Harvey, *Character and the Novel*, 73; Sternberg, *Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, 130.

is not always so. The narrator's claims can conflict with Paul's. The narrator uses the Lycaonians' opinion that Paul and Barnabas are divine to infer that they are heroes. But then in direct speech Paul is self-deprecating: "We also are men of like nature with you" (14:15). In a similar case the narrator records the opinion of the Maltese that Paul is a god (28:6). In contrast, in another direct speech Paul describes himself as serving the Lord in humility (20:19). A discrepancy also occurs in what is attributed to the Spirit by the narrator. The narrator regards Paul's resolve to go to Jerusalem as inspired by the Spirit (19:21) but also says that through the Spirit disciples in Tyre tell Paul not to go to Jerusalem (21:4). Further, Paul's remark before Felix that his accusers share his hope in the resurrection (24:15) stands at variance with the narrator's association of Ananias with the Sadducees who deny the resurrection (23:8, cf. 4:2; Luke 20:27). Although the reader cannot be certain that the narrator recognizes Ananias as a Sadducee, the incident in Acts 23:1–10 contains strong clues that he does. Finally, the narrator's version of Paul's conversion (9:3–7) deviates in several well-known details from Paul's own accounts (22:6–11; 26:12–18).

James Dawsey documents a discrepancy between the voices of the narrator and Jesus in Luke and concludes that the resulting confusion makes Luke paradoxical and ironic.[47] However accurate Dawsey may be with respect to Luke, in Acts the voices of Paul and the narrator do not clash radically. Rather, the dissonance creates a comprehensive patchwork.

For one thing, the famous "we" passages in Acts make the narrator a thick intimate of Paul. For others, the discrepancies in the accounts of Paul's conversion enable the reader to hold together the view that Paul's companions can confirm the incident with the view that the christophany is uniquely Paul's.[48] In a comparable way, 24:15 enables the reader to integrate Paul's identity with Judaism and his conflict with particular Jews. Similarly, the discrepant views on Paul's journey to Jerusalem link up with 20:23 and 21:11, 14 to heighten the danger and Paul's courageous resolve as well as the sense of divine guidance. Likewise, by relating the impression of pagan choruses that Paul is divine, the narrator is able to paint him in heroic proportions while Paul himself remains humble.

Part of the shaping of Paul is the way he repeatedly frustrates the reader's expectations.[49] Since he makes his entrance as a persecutor, the reader is unprepared to discover that he is God's chosen vessel (9:15). He further stretches familiar norms in that a Jewish fanatic will carry the divine name to gentiles as well as Jews. But then he associates only with Jews in Damascus, Jerusalem, and Antioch. By the time of the incident in Pisidian Antioch, the gentiles have fallen out of the picture. In the synagogue in Pisidian Antioch relations surpass cordial, and Paul's message claims the heritage of Israel. Thus, his sudden announcement of a turn to gentiles startles the reader (13:46). But then the surprise reverses; he goes to Jews in Iconium. After Paul's advocacy for uncircumcised gentile believers leads up to the Jerusalem council, Paul astonishingly accommodates to Jews by circumcising Timothy (16:1–3). Then, going to Jews becomes habitual (17:2), so that another brusque announcement of turning to the gentiles catches the reader by surprise (18:6). Yet, interaction with Jews continues. Back in Jerusalem Paul's attempt to purify

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[47] J. Dawsey, *The Lukan Voice: Confusion and Irony in the Gospel of Luke* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986) 73–102, 110, 123–24, 147–56. Against Dawsey see Tannehill, *Narrative Unity*, 7 n. 4.

[48] Conzelmann, *Acts*, 71.

[49] Iser, *The Implied Reader*, 37.

himself and to support four men under a vow demonstrates his fidelity to Judaism. His defense speeches repeatedly declare his solidarity with Judaism. Then, unexpectedly at the end of Acts Paul declares that God's salvation has been sent to the gentiles. Which side is Paul on? In short, when the reader expects Paul to stand firm with the Jews, he announces his mission to gentiles. When the reader anticipates Paul's passing over to the gentiles, he remains ensconced among the Jews.

Toward a Synthesis

Literarily, Paul is an unpredictable, zealous Jew from the heart of Judaism who remains faithful to the hope of Israel by becoming a benevolent messianist. As such he aligns with the twelve tribes of Israel judged by the reconstituted twelve apostles. Within this larger picture, God calls him to a specific divine commission as a servant and witness to gentiles as well as Jews. In fulfilling his commission he becomes an itinerant as the Spirit leads him. But when he carries out his ministry of word and deed, he encounters misunderstanding and opposition. Against resistant Jews, he announces the extension of God's salvation to gentiles. Yet he accommodates for the sake of the Jews and manifests solidarity with Jewish Christians. Against adversaries, he also defends himself as law abiding, obedient to God, faithful to his commission, and true to the heritage of Israel.

Acts individuates Paul distinctly. Admittedly, his heroic proportions and parallels with Jesus and Peter stylize him to a certain extent,[50] nevertheless, Acts differentiates him as a persecutor of Christians, a Pharisee educated under Gamaliel, a tentmaker, and a Roman citizen.[51] He alone is a converted enemy. His divine commission fits into the general mandate of Jesus in Luke 24 but is specifically for him. He faces some typical opponents, but others confront him uniquely (e.g., 21:21, 28; 24:5). Moreover, the individuated Paul transcends the narrative as if he existed independently from Acts.

To cock an eye once again toward the historical, the historical reading and the literary reading run intriguingly close together. Individuation of such an order draws attention to Paul's personal development and speaks against reading him as a symbol of Christianity.[52] Jacob Jervell has recently presented Paul as a symbol of christianity primarily on the basis of the Miletus address. He argues that Paul stands as a symbol of the whole Christian movement in providing the legay for the church.[53] But Paul does not appoint overseers for the church; he assumes them (v 28). Nor does he commit the church to them; he calls them to remember him, and he entrusts them to God (vv 31–32). To be sure, in the Miletus address Paul is concerned with the integrity of the whole counsel

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[50] Paul thus fits N. Frye's category of the typical hero of romance (*Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957] 33). Cf G. Schille, *Das älteste Paulus-Bild: Beobachtungen zur lukanischen und zur deuteropaulinischen Paulus-Darstellung* (Berlin: Evangelische, 1979) 17.

[51] Cf. Jervell, *People of God,* 154, 161–63. On status and profession as marks of individuation see Berlin, *Poetic and Interpretation,* 36.

[52] Against M. Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* (London: SCM, 1956) 149, 160; Haenchen, *Acts,* 328, 691; Löning, *Saulustradition.* G. Schille (*Älteste Paulus-Bild,* 14, 22) views Paul as a representative of the five Antiochenes. They function to legitimate Paul's mission, but never does Paul function as their representative.

[53] J. Jervell, "Paulus in der Apostelgeschichte und die Geschichte des Urchristentums," *NTS* 32 (1986) 382–83.

of God. A close reading of the speech shows, however, that the legacy is nothing other than Paul himself. Paul contends ultimately not for the counsel of God but for himself as the one who boldly declared it 20:20, 27). Rather than making Paul the means by which Christianity passes on its legacy, the Miletus address vindicates him.

But Paul does become paradigmatic as a Jew who becomes a messianist and associates gentiles with the hope of Israel. Gaventa maintains that in Acts Paul is not a paradigmatic model for conversion.[54] The sole converted persecutor, he is transformed by an unequaled christophany and uniquely commissioned. Therefore, in Acts conversion typically occurs as a response to proclamation rather than to something like Paul's dramatic christophany.

On the other hand, in his dialogue with Agrippa, Paul establishes himself as a paradigmatic convert in terms of results if not means. Paul tells the curious king, ". . . I would to God that not only you but also all who hear me this day might become such as I am—except for these chains" (26:29).

Although the validity of the prophets dominates the immediate context, in the larger context Paul has related his transformation, commission, and obedience. Further, the reader has two options. One is to view the scene at a distance assuming that only those originally present onstitute Paul's audience. The other is to identify with the scene as one who (over)hears and, thus, subtly fits into the category of "all' In one case Paul takes on paradigmatic status for the conversion of his audience. In the other, he becomes a paradigm of conversion also for the reader.

But gaps sap the power of the paradigm. Remorse and guilt are left out. Although Paul confesses complicity in the death of Stephen and the persecution of messianists (22:19–20; 26:9–11), he voices no compunctions of conscience. His actions subsequent to his conversion leave no doubt about its reality. But tears of forgiveness (Luke 7:38, 44), blows on the chest (18:13; 23:48), and a heart cut to the quick (Acts 2:37) are conspicuously absent. On the contrary, when the persecution comes back around, it vindicates rather than excoriates Paul. Thus, Paul is a paradigm for switching sides more than for the personal dynamics of conversion.

Here again the literary reading runs close to the historical. Theon of Alexandria describes rhetorical exercises for comparison of characters. He stipulates one particular case in which extreme examples serve to compare the groups they represent (*Progymn.* 9 [1.233, 19–234, 13 Walz]).[55] In th first place, Paul himself is an extreme example representing two groups. Prior to his conversion, he is an extreme example of a Jewish opponent to messianists. Afterward, he exemplifies Jewish Christian messianists who turn to gentiles. Further, Paul stands paradigmatically for Jews who remain faithful to the hope of Israel by becoming messianists, who accept the extension of God's salvation to gentiles, and who align with the twelve tribes of Israel judged by the reconstituted twelve apostles. The contrasting counterpart to this second case fits the paradigm of Judas.

To touch base with the historical one final time, Paul's alignment in the narrative antitheses with the twelve tribes of Israel judged by the reconstituted twelve apostles and his reiterated identity as a faithful Jew are compatible with my previous hypothesis that Luke uses an enhanced portrait of Paul to counter anti-Paulinism against opponents both

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[54] Gaventa, *From Darkness to Light,* 92. For the opinion that Paul is a model for conversion see Schille, *Älteste Paulus-Bild,* 31 and S. Wilson, "The Portrait of Paul in Acts and the Pastorals," SBLSP (1976) 399.

[55] Cited by R. Hock, "Lazarus and Micyllus: Greco-Roman Backgrounds to Luke 16:19–31," *JBL* 106 (1987) 456. The original was unavailable to me.

from within and without the messianic community. Further, the polemical structure at the end of Acts showing the prominence of Paul and believing Jews over against recalcitrant ones is consonant with my contention that Acts does not definitively reject the Jews in favor of the gentiles.[56]

Because Paul manifests little of the ambiguity and confusion of protagonists in modern novels, he falls short of E. M. Forster's purely round character.[57] But part of the problem of using modern literary theory for the study of Acts is that the likes of modern protagonists do not exist in the literature of antiquity.[58] Still, Paul is a complex character about whom we learn far more than is necessary for the plot, and so he better fits Adele Berlin's category of a full-fledged character.[59]

Although Paul manifests little of the internal confusion of round characters in modern literature, he remains ambiguous enough to frustrate formulaic classification.[60] Some aspects of his personage dominate others, but transformations, shifting contexts, and divergent viewpoints see to it that the variety persists. For example, the apostles legitimate Paul (9:27), but the christophany and the vision of Ananias have already legitimated him.[61] Further, the Holy Spirit legitimates Paul through the congregation at Antioch. And after the Jerusalem council Paul is an independent missionary guided by the Spirit. Thus, Paul is and is not subordinate to the apostles.[62] Or Paul bounces back and forth between extending the proclamation of God's salvation to gentiles outside the pale and identifying with Jews and Jewish Christians. Paul is not a faithful Jew or a missionary to the gentiles but something of both.

The indeterminacy of the literary portrait challenges our efforts to reduce Paul to an epitome. Abstractions—whether as persecutor, teacher, prophet, preacher, convert, missionary, faithful Jew, pioneer to gentiles, thaumaturge, servant, witness, accused—either singly or collectively—draw his character to a limited extent only. The Lucan Paul is the synthesis of information, action, traits, and evaluation. Therefore, he eludes analysis, including, of course, this one. The Lucan Paul inhabits a literary world. When he steps out, he is no longer th Lucan Paul but our approximation, more or less accurate. Complexity makes the portrait of Paul in Acts nothing less than a mosaic. But to orient our perspective, the Lucan Paul is but a part of an even larger picture in Luke-Acts and in the biblical story.

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[56] Brawley, "Paul in Acts"; idem, *Luke-Acts and the Jews*, 41–83.

[57] E. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1927) 103–18.

[58] Cf. E. Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

[59] Berlin, *Poetics and Intrpretation*, 23–24. Cf. Harvey, *Character and the Novel*, 88.

[60] See Harvey, *Character and the Novel*, 188.

[61] J. Roloff (*Apostolat-Verkündigung—Kirche: Ursprung, Inhalt und Funktion des kirchlichen Apostelamts nach Paulus, Lukas und den pastoral Briefen* [Gütersloh: Mohn, 1965] 206) notes that what Ananias does he does not as an agent of the church but as an agent of Christ.

[62] A corrective on the thesis of G. Klein (*Die zwölf Apostel: Ursprung und Gehalt einer Idee* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961]) that Paul is subordinated to the apostles to protect against gnostic appropriation of Paul and on the thesis of C. Burchard (*Der dreizehnte Zeuge*) that Paul is not subordinate to the twelve but independently equal.

Literary and Social Dimensions of Luke's Apology for Paul

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Paul is, beyond dispute, the dominant character in the narrative of Acts. And what stands at the center of this characterization is Luke's apology for Paul.[1] Luke's portrayal of Paul achieves its climax in a suspenseful, dramatic narration of Paul on trial. Yet Luke's defense of Paul does not begin with the arrest in Acts 21, for the author's entire account of the career of his hero is governed by a concern to legitimate him. Indeed, few scholars deny the important role played by this apology for Paul within the Acts narrative.[2] Nevertheless, the *interpretation* of this feature of Luke's presentation of Paul—the identification of its precise functions within the narrative and within the social world of Luke's community—remains a matter of dispute.[3]

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[1] Cf. Robert Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1982) 66–90, esp. 66–67, 78–79.

[2] A notable exception is Karl Löning (*Die Saulustradition in der Apostelgeschichte* [NTAbh N.F. 9; Münster: Aschendorff, 1973]), who claims (p. 204) that Paul in Acts, far from being a problematic figure who must be defended, is in fact a figure whose unquestioned authority can shield Luke's own community. Löning discerns in Luke's Paul an answer to the problem of identity now confronting Gentile Christianity. Richard Pervo (*Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre of the Acts of the Apostles* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987]) characterizes Luke's treatment of social status in the case of Paul (and others) as "propagandistic fiction" rather than "apologetic idealizing" (p. 79), branding apologetic interpretation a "convenient refuge," but elsewhere (p. 47) he terms the last third of Acts a "stirring and appealing narrative" apology for Paul and the faith.

[3] To sense something of the broad spectrum of views on this issue, see B. S. Easton (*Early Christianity, the Purpose of Acts and Other Papers* [London: SPCK, 1955] 41–57); A. J. Mattill ("The Purpose of Acts: Schneckenburger Reconsidered," in *Apostolic History and the Gospel*, ed. W. Ward Gasque and Ralph P. Martin [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970] 108–22); Ernst Haenchen (*The Acts of the Apostles* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971 esp. 628–31, 690–94); Jacob Jervell (*Luke and the People of God* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972] 153–207); Löning (*Saulustradition*, 181–201, 204); Volker Stolle (*Der Zeuge als Angeklagter: Untersuchungen zum Paulusbild des Lukas* [BWANT 6/2; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973]); Walter Radl (*Paulus und Jesus im lukanischen Doppelwerk* [Europäische Hochschulschriften 23/49; Bern/Frankfurt: Lang, 1975] esp. 336–45); Maddox (*Purpose*, 66–90); William R. Long ("The Paulusbild in the Trial of Paul in Acts," SBLASP 1983, 87–105); Paul W. Walaskay (*"And so we came to Rome": The Political Perspective of St Luke* [SNTSMS 49; Cambridge: University, 1983] esp. 50–67); Robert L. Brawley ("Paul in Acts: Lucan Apology and Conciliation," *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, ed. Charles H. Talbert [New York: Crossroad, 1984] 129–47); Abraham J. Malherbe (" 'Not In a Corner': Early Christian Apologetic in Acts 26:26,"

Although the once popular "political apologetic" model for reading (Luke-) Acts no longer enjoys the favor it once possessed,[4] it still enters into the assessment of Luke's picture of Paul.[5] Even Walaskay, who exposes the weaknesses in the traditional explanatory model and proceeds to turn it on its head (now Luke appeals on behalf of Empire to his church, rather than the other way around),[6] still reads Luke's defense of Paul in relation to affairs of church and Empire. Increasingly, however, Luke's use of apologetic motifs has come to be read as religious legitimation rather than as political apologetic. To be sure, Haenchen already emphasized the importance of religious legitimation in Acts,[7] but for him it stood in service of political apologetic.[8] In the more recent work by Jervell, Löning, Jürgen Roloff, and Brawley, however, religious legitimation has stepped to the fore, entirely apart from political considerations.[9] Yet the precise goal of that legitimation continues to be described in diverse ways. Does Luke, through his portrait of

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(continued)
Second Century 5 [1985–86] 193–210); Philip Francis Esler (*Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts* [SNTSMS 57; Cambridge: University, 1987] esp. 125–30, 201–19).

[4] E.g., in the studies by Henry Joel Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts* (New York: Macmillan, 1927) 306–16; F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity* (5 vol.; London: Macmillan, 1920–33) 2.177–87; Easton, *Early*, 41–57; cf. Haenchen, *Acts*, 628–31, 690–94; Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960) 138–44; and cf. Martin Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* (London: SCM, 1956) 211–13.

[5] See, e.g., Radl, *Paulus*, 336–45. See Esler's brief critical survey of literature approaching Luke-Acts from the angle of political apologetic (*Community*, 205–11), and the more extensive discussion in Walaskay, *Rome*, 1–37. Cf. the pointed (and now widely quoted) appraisal by C. K. Barrett (*Luke the Historian in Recent Study* [London: Epworth, 1961] 63): "No Roman official would ever have filtered out so much of what to him would be theological and ecclesiastical rubbish in order to reach so tiny a grain of relevant apology." In Barrett's view, Luke addresses his defense of Paul to the church, demonstrating both Paul's anti-gnostic orthodoxy and his solidarity with the Jerusalem church.

[6] See (concerning Paul) Walaskay, *Rome*, 50–67.

[7] As Haenchen sees it, the "burning question" of Luke's day is: "can Christianity be understood in unbroken continuity with Judaism?" (*Acts*, 630).

[8] According to Haenchen, if Luke can successfully locate Christian teaching within Judaism, then the church will be able to lay claim to status as "religio quasi licita": "then there is no fundamental gulf between Judaism and Christianity, the continuity between the two is unbroken, and Christianity can claim to be tolerated like Judaism" (*Acts*, 631).

[9] Jervell, *Luke*, 153–207; Löning, *Saulustradition*, summary of conclusions on 204–10; Roloff, "Die Paulus-Darstellung des Lukas," *EvT* 39 (1979) 510–31, esp. 524–31; Brawley, "Conciliation," 129–47. See also Esler (*Community*, 201–19), who discovers in Luke legitimatory strategies targeted at two quite different groups within his community, Jews (with residual loyalties to the Jewish *ethnos*) and Romans. The presence of Romans within Luke's congregation accounts for the political motifs in the narrative, Esler judges, for "legitimating Christianity to them inevitably involved providing a reassurance that faith in Jesus Christ was not incompatible with allegiance to Rome" (p. 217). In other words, the political thematic serves as a device for religious legitimation. Malherbe, too, interprets Luke's apology for Paul in a non-political sense ("Corner"), suggesting that Luke's portrait of Paul responds to pagan social criticisms of Christianity (pp. 194–95).

Paul, aim to authenticate Paul himself,[10] or Paul and his Gentile mission,[11] or a Gentile church that was heir to Paul's legacy,[12] or Christianity (Gentile Christianity) generally?[13]

In order to approach this elusive question, namely, the function of Luke's apology for Paul within his social world, we must first clearly describe the way it works within Luke's narrative world. The study begins, therefore, by delineating the literary dimensions of the defense of Paul in Acts.

The Apology for Paul within Luke's Narrative

1. Accusations Against Paul

On no fewer than ten occasions, the narrative specifies accusations against Paul (16:20–21; 17:6–7 [indirectly]; 18:13; 19:26–27; 21:21; 21:28; 23:6 [cf. 23:28–29]; 24:5–6; 25:7 [cf. 25:19]; 26:6–7).[14] It may be useful to outline these charges:

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[10] E.g., in Mattill's revival of the hypothesis of Schneckenburger ("Purpose"; cf. also Long, "Trial," 104–05. In Mattill's view, Luke defends Paul to Jewish Christians in Rome for whom Paul is suspect. Jervell, too (*Luke*, 176), detects in Acts a concern to defend Paul against Jewish detractors. Nevertheless, for Jervell Paul is not the only one in need of defense: Luke "writes for Christian readers who are under fire from their Jewish neighbors because of Paul" (p. 177).

[11] E.g., Brawley ("Conciliation," 143), who sees Luke fighting, in defense of Paul and the universalism of his mission, on two fronts, one external (Jewish propaganda) and the other internal ("schismatic anti-Paulinism").

[12] E.g., Roloff, "Darstellung," 524–31; cf. Jervell, who argues that Luke's community must possess a "Jewish-Christian stamp" (pp. 175–76), but who believes Luke to be legitimating not only Paul but also a Christian community hard-pressed because of criticisms levelled at Paul.

[13] E.g., Maddox, who views Luke's Paul as symbolic of Christianity's second generation and as a bridge to the Christianity known to Luke (*Purpose*, 76); Löning (*Saulustradition*, 204–10), for whom the Lukan *Paulusbild* gives legitimacy to Gentile Christianity after the rupture with Judaism (although Löning thinks Paul himself is not a problematic figure for Luke and so needs no defense, serving, rather, as a useful legitimating tool). Cf. also Radl (*Paulus*, 337), who regards Paul on trial in Acts as representative of the entire church; and Malherbe ("Corner").

[14] This datum calls into question Löning's contention that Paul in Acts needs no defense (see n. 2 above). Yet he is right to insist that the setting within the story must not be confused with Luke's own setting (e.g., *Saulustradition*, 216). By defending Paul (within the story), Luke may be accomplishing broader objectives (within his social world). Luke also has the antagonists of Jesus and Stephen enumerate their charges (Luke 23:2, 5, 14; Acts 6:11, 13–14), and Peter, too, comes under attack, (1) from the "Jewish leaders," for teaching in the name of Jesus resurrection from the dead (4:2, 17–18, 25, 27–28, 40), and (2) from the "circumcision party," for his meal fellowship with Gentiles (11:3). This feature of the narrative supports the view that Luke is not legitimating Paul alone. The first complaint lodged against Peter ("they were teaching the people and proclaiming in Jesus the resurrection from the dead," 4:2) defines, in advance, the crux of the apology for Paul (23:6; 24:15, 21; 26:6–8). Moreover, Peter's second arrest is motivated by jealousy (5:17), anticipating a prominent theme of the Pauline mission (see 13:45; 17:5).

16:20–21 *Before the Magistrates of Philippi:*
"These men, being Jews, are agitating [*ektarassousin*] our city, and they are preaching customs not lawful for Romans to accept or to practice."

17:6–7 *Before the Politarchs of Thessalonica* (indirectly aimed at Paul, although Jason and others are the immediate target):
"These people who have disturbed the whole world have come here, too, and Jason has received them. And they all are acting in opposition to Caesar's decrees by claiming that there is another king, Jesus."

18:13 *Before the Proconsul Gallio in Corinth:*
"This man is inducing people to worship God [in a manner] contrary to the Law [= Torah."

19:26–27 *Before the Artisans of Ephesus:*[15]
"This Paul—not only in Ephesus but also in nearly all of Asia—has misled a large number of people by asserting that there are no gods made by hands. And there is danger not only that this trade of ours may come to be discredited, but also that the temple of the great goddess Artemis may count for nothing, and that she may even lose her grandeur—she whom the whole of Asia, and of the world, worship."

21:21 *With James and the Elders at Jerusalem:*
"They have been informed about you that you teach all the Jews who are among the Gentiles apostasy from Moses, saying that they should not circumcise their children or observe [walk in] the customs."

21:28 *Within the Temple at Jerusalem:*
"This is the man who teaches everyone everywhere against the people and the law and this place! And further, he even brought Greeks into the temple and so has profaned this holy place!"

23:6 *Before the Sanhedrin:*[16]
"I am a Pharisee, a son of Pharisees; it is about the hope and resurrection of the dead that I am being examined [*krinomai*]."

24:5–6 *Before the Governor Felix at Caesarea:*
"For we have found this man [to be] pestilent and inciting uprisings [dissensions; *staseis*] among all the Jews throughout the world, and a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes. He even tried to desecrate the temple, but we seized him."[17]

25:7 *Before the Governor Festus at Caesarea:*
"[The Jews from Jerusalem stood around him, bringing many and

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[15] Since the chaos of the later public assembly prevents a formal statement of charges against Gaius and Aristarchus by the Jewish "prosecutor" Alexander (19:33–34; Paul, of course, is not present at the tumultuous proceeding), the notice in vv 26–27 serves as the indictment, a conclusion reinforced by the city clerk's pronouncement in vv 35–40, which answers the accusations brought by Demetrius in vv 26–27.

[16] Curiously (but of course by design), at this inquiry intended to discover the basis for Jewish accusations against Jesus (cf. 22:30), no charges are pressed. Instead, Paul himself seizes the initiative and supplies the true (note *asphales* in 22:30) indictment, nothing other than his affirmation of Israel's hope in resurrection!

[17] This formulation of the case against Paul by the prosecutor Tertullus wins ratification by the rest of "the Jews" present (24:9).

weighty charges which they were unable to prove."[18]

26:6–7 *Before King Agrippa at Caesarea:*[19]
"And now I stand here under judgment [*krinomenos*] on the basis of [my] hope in the promise given by God to our ancestors, to which our twelve tribes hope to attain, when they worship in perseverance night and day. It is for this hope, O King, that I am accused by the Jews."

The sheer weight of this series of accusations, with the accompanying refutation, is most impressive. Clearly this portrait of an embattled Paul, however we interpret it, stands at the center of Luke's purpose in Acts. With whom do these charges originate within the story? It is noteworthy that, with the exception of 16:20–21 (where pagan owners of a female slave retaliate for the loss of her divining powers) and 19:23–41 (where pagan craftsmen perceive Paul's monotheistic teaching as a threat to their livelihood and to their goddess), Jews stand behind these accusations.[20] And when we consider, in addition to explicit grievances against Paul, the numerous plots instigated by Jews throughout Paul's career, both at Jerusalem and in the diaspora (9:23, 29; 13:45, 50; 14:2, 5, 19; 23:12–15[30; 25:2–3; cf. the reminiscence in 20:19 and the prophecy in 21:11), the conclusion is inescapable that Paul's problem is with his fellow Jews. As we will see, Paul's replies to his Jewish detractors confirm that the central issue in the apology is Paul's status as a faithful Jew.[21]

But what specific charges does the reader encounter? In three scenes, the indictment against Paul does carry political overtones. First, the Philippian magistrates hear that Paul and Silas have disrupted the peace of the city and advocated customs not legal for Romans (16:20–21). Second, the politarchs at Thessalonica are informed that Paul's disruptive influence has spread throughout the world, and, worst of all, that by acknowledging Jesus

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[18] Here again Paul, in his brief defense, indicates the nature of these accusations, which are evidently threefold: Paul has done wrong with respect to law, temple, and Caesar (25:8). Acts 25:18–19 provides a second version of the content of the complaints: "When his accusers stood up, they did not offer in his case any charge of evils such as I had supposed, but they had certain areas of debate with him about their own religion, and about one Jesus, who had died but who Paul asserted was alive."

[19] As in 23:6, Paul voices the complaints filed against him, so interpreting the course of the legal proceedings in which he is embroiled. Of course, along with Agrippa others are present, including Bernice and Festus (25:24; 26:30), but Agrippa is the important figure, because he, unlike Roman officials who have earlier listened to Paul's defense, is, in Paul's words, "acquainted with all the customs and issues of debate among the Jews" (26:3). As Robert O'Toole has argued (*Acts 26: The Christological Climax of Paul's Defense* [AnBib 78; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1978] esp. 15–19, 150–55), Agrippa II renders the definitive judgment about Paul (from a human "court," that is; heaven will add its verdict in chs. 27–28) in this climax of Luke's apology for Paul.

[20] See 17:5; 18:12; 21:20–21 (Paul has been maligned among Torah-observant Jewish believers because of his conduct among diaspora Jews); 21:27; 22:30; 23:1–10; 24:1–9; 25:1–3, 7, 15, 24; 26:17, 21.

[21] This is not to dismiss Malherbe's suggestion that portions at least of the apologetic material in Acts reflect pagan social criticisms of Christians ("Corner"). Yet the heart of the apology appears to concern Paul and Israel.

to be king he is guilty of treason against Caesar (17:6–7). Third, Tertullus, for Felix, paints Paul as an incendiary figure among Jews of the empire (24:5–6). These are serious charges! Yet no Roman official, in the end, gives credence to them,[22] indicating that, notwithstanding the gravity of the indictment, it is without foundation.[23] Paul and other Christians associated with him[24] are innocent of any and all crimes in the sphere of Roman law. Paul offers his own clear rebuttal in 25:8: ". . . neither have I done anything wrong in relation to Caesar."

More troublesome, however, are the complaints about Paul's religious disloyalty. In one way or another, all the remaining accusations[25] call into question Paul's standing as a faithful Jew. Paul is alleged to have taught against the Torah (18:13; 21:21, 28; cf. 25:8), against the Jewish people (21:28) and their customs (21:21), and against the temple (21:28; cf 25:8), and to have profaned it (21:28) or attempted to do so (24:6). Therefore, when Paul begins his apology before the temple crowd with the words, "I am a Jew . . .", he reveals the point of Luke's apology as a whole.[26] Yet that observation leaves us with an incongruity. Luke has taken pains to depict Paul as a Torah observing Jew of Pharisaic bent. Given his picture of Paul, the religious charges around which the last fourth of Acts revolves should never have materialized![27] James and Peter, in fact, appear to be less "zealous for the law" (cf. 22:3) than is Paul.[28] As it turns out, Luke is compelled to defend Paul against charges that reflect his career, as we would reconstruct it from his own epistles, much more closely than his own characterization of Paul! It is evident that Luke's

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[22] There is the notice in 17:8, but it is contradicted by the formal action taken in v 9. And while the immediate reaction of the Philippian magistrates (16:22–24) accords with the severity of the charges brought against Paul, the scene closes with these officials apologizing to the prisoner for their mistreatment of him!

[23] Paul does recognize Jesus as "Savior" (13:23), "Christ" (e.g., 17:3, which prompts the allegation of 17:7), and "Lord" (e.g., 20:21, 24; 28:31), and he does proclaim the sovereign rule of God (28:31), but never Jesus as *basileus* (king). In any event, the point of the defense, on this issue, is that Paul and his fellow Christians do not hold their convictions about Jesus (and God) at the expense of loyalty to the Empire.

[24] Cf. 16:19–20; 17:6–7 ("they all . . ."); 24:5 (a dangerous movement of which Paul is the ringleader).

[25] Except those brought by Demetrius (19:26–27), which do not materially advance the defense of Paul. The city clerk pronounces without further ado that the accused are not anti-religion, anti-Artemis (19:37), but naturally the reader—who shares Paul's monotheistic belief—delights to see the mischief produced in relation to a pagan shrine by that belief. The point here is simply that charges levelled at Paul in Acts 19 actually require no defense; rather, they win him plaudits.

[26] See the helpful comments in Long, "Trial," 99–100, 104.

[27] The only exceptions to this pattern of fidelity to Torah are Paul's meal fellowship with Gentiles (16:15, 34; 18:7; see Esler, *Community*, 127–28), and the relatively tame assertion of 13:39 ("everything from which you could not be freed by the law of Moses"). In both matters, Peter, not Paul, is the one about whose fidelity to Torah the narrative raises serious questions (10:1–11:18, esp. 11:1–3; 15:7–11).

[28] Of James and Paul in Acts, Jervell observes, with exaggeration but perceptively nonetheless: "Paul is the law abiding Pharisee, but James stands at the border of orthodoxy" (*Luke*, 188).

narrative portrait of Paul has already been shaped significantly by the concern to authenticate him as a good Jew. The author of Acts has, then, modified the traditions about Paul that he inherited, and for a reason. Not only Paul's apologetic speeches, but also the depiction of Paul's mission activity, defends Paul as a faithful Jew. These are important clues in our quest for the function of the apology for Paul in Luke's social world. But first, we must identify the various legitimating features of Acts that come to the defense of one so frequently—and severely—maligned in the story.

2. To Paul's Defense: Roman Officials and King Agrippa II

Paul[29] is trotted before a succession of Roman officials in Acts (fulfilling the prophecy of Jesus in Luke 21:12–13; Acts 9:15), and their findings build a persuasive cumulative case for Paul's complete innocence of wrongdoing. It is true that in certain instances they do not even pretend to understand the real issues underlying Paul's controversy with his antagonists (openly acknowledged, e.g., in 18:15; 25:18–20). But one thing is unmistakable: Paul has done nothing to deserve either prison or death (18:14–15; 19:37; 23:28–29; 25:25; 26:31; and cf. 28:18). Even the embarrassing fact of Paul's two-year imprisonment at Caesarea (24:27) says nothing about Paul's guilt or innocence; rather, it points to Felix's desire to listen to Paul's message (vv 24–26), to receive a bribe from him (v 26), and, finally, to court the favor of the Jewish people (v 27).[30]

That Paul's innocence, not Roman justice, is the point of the apology is evident from the ambivalent portrayal of Paul's Roman judges. While in one way or another they all attest to his innocence, they themselves do not exemplify the highest values of the Roman order. The Philippian magistrates join a mob action against Paul and Silas (16:22–23), and are later shamed by Paul into apologizing for their unwarranted punishment of Roman citizens (vv 35–39).[31] Moreover, like Felix, Festus is influenced in his handling of Paul's case by a desire to ingratiate himself with the Jewish people (25:9). Just as Pilate had underscored Jesus, innocence at the expense of his own credibility as sponsor of Roman "justice," so too Paul's Roman arbiters now, in Luke's story, defend him in spite of their own failings.[32] If, as seems to me highly probable, Luke knows that Paul's Roman imprisonment ended in his death, then the author has done a remarkable job of writing

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[29] Others stand in for Paul in 17:6–9 and 19:29–41.

[30] As in the case of Paul's imprisonment at Rome, also for two years (!), the privileged treatment given to the prisoner (24:23; 28:30–31) mitigates the embarrassment produced by the facts.

[31] In view of the complaint back in 16:21 ("they are preaching customs not lawful for Romans to accept or to practice"), we now discern that in vv 35–39 Paul's status as *Rōmaios*—moreover, as a "Roman" victimized by an illegal official action!—effectively counters the original accusation. In a related scene, after his arrest in Jerusalem Paul speaks up before the centurion can carry out the illegal order to scourge him (22:22–29). Yet note the tension between vv 29 and 30: ". . . and the tribune also was afraid, for he realized that Paul was a Roman citizen and that he had bound him" (v 29). . . . "But *on the next day* he unbound him . . ." (v 30).

[32] The data expose the implausibility of Walaskay's hypothesis (*Rome*; see the discussion above).

a revisionist history, of narrating Paul's various "trials" to reinforce his innocence.[33] What the final verdict could not supply, Roman officials along the way do emphatically and unambiguously affirm: Paul was innocent. No reader can miss the poignancy, therefore, of Agrippa's final word to Festus (26:32): "This man could have been released had he not appealed to Caesar."

It is no accident that Luke gives the definitive word to Agrippa II. After Paul's eloquent apology in 26:2–23, Festus may think him mad (v 24), but Agrippa knows better. The king has been favored with Paul's most complete and specific defense speech, because he is in a position to understand what Paul is saying (vv 3, 26). King Agrippa knows the issues of dispute between Paul and the Jews, and if he finds no guilt in Paul, then the prisoner must be speaking the truth, despite the repeated plots and acusations of the Jews, when he contends that he stands judged simply for being a faithful Jew, one who believes in the fulfillment of God's promise to Israel (vv 6–7; cf. 28:20). On both political and religious charges, the true, if not the actual, verdict is: "Not guilty!"

3. To Paul's Defense: Peter and James

But if the case for Paul's fidelity to Israel requires further substantiation, Luke does not fail to supply it. Chief witnesses in this aspect of the apology are Peter and James. Although Paul's activity appears in Acts primarily as a mission among diaspora synagogues, with recurring incursions into the Gentile arena,[34] his successful efforts among the Gentiles are clearly problematic within the story. After Paul's first mission journey, the success of which he describes to Christians in Palestine as the "conversion of Gentiles" (15:3–4), he meets stiff opposition, both in Antioch and in Jerusalem, from advocates of circumcision for Gentile converts (15:1–2, 5). And when Paul defends himself after his arrest in the temple, he provokes a violent reaction from his Jewish audience with his final word, recalling Jesus, mandate to him: "Depart; for I will send you far away to the Gentiles" (22:21–22). The point of this first Pauline defense speech, established at the outset (22:3–5), is Paul's genuine Jewishness. This turbulent crowd, however, cannot accept the claim that his move to a Gentile mission (suppressed until v 21) is consistent with his rootedness in the Jewish people. Paul's work among Gentiles is apparently the basis for the accusation that he teaches against "the people" (21:28).[35]

Nevertheless, within the narrative not Paul but Peter bears the brunt of criticism for initiating this problematic turn to Gentiles. By his own admission (10:28), Peter had transgressed Jewish norms regarding conduct with Gentiles, when he entered Cornelius' house. Upon his return to Jerusalem, he encounters objections on just that point (11:2–3). Peter defends his actions by appealing to the direct intervention of God, a defense richly

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[33] Cf. G. W. Trompf, "On Why Luke Declined to Recount the Death of Paul: Acts 27–28 and Beyond," *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, ed. Charles H. Talbert (New York: Crossroad, 1984) 225–39.

[34] No doubt one of the ways in which Luke has narrated Paul's mission to highlight its authentically Jewish character. Paul deflects his message to Gentiles only when his Jewish hearers in a given locale prove intransigent and hostile (13:44–49; 18:5–8; 19:8–10; 28:23–29). In so doing, of course, Paul turns out to be fulfilling scriptural promise (e.g., 13:47).

[35] Significantly, the complaint circulating among Torah observing Jewish Christians does not concern the Gentile mission, but rather the rumor that Paul advocates freedom from circumcision and Jewish customs for Jews living among Gentiles.

elaborated in the narration of this whole episode, with its sequence of visions and its impressive display of the Spirit's presence. Who better than Peter can address the objections lodged against Paul after his own sucessful work among Gentiles in the diaspora? And so at the Jerusalem conference Peter voices Paul's own convictions for him (esp. 15:11, a Pauline echo which may be compared to the briefer one in 20:24), declaring the case already decided on the basis of his earlier experience with Cornelius' household (15:7–11). Meal fellowship with Gentiles and inclusion of Gentiles within the Christian fold are not incompatible with the nature of God's people. Having defended himself, Peter now defends Paul.

James adds his weight to that apology in 15:13–21, and again in 21:17–25. No one can question *James'* faithfulness to Torah, yet after Barnabas and Paul[36] rehearse their effective work among Gentiles ("what signs and wonders God had done among the Gentiles through them," 15:12), James demonstrates that the incorporation of Gentiles into the people of God is true to scriptural promise (vv 15–18), and he proceeds to define the parameters for the Gentile mission that will now ensue with official apostolic sanction (v 22, the fourfold "apostolic decree" (vv 19–20; cf. vv 28–29). What is especially significant about this decree, as it relates to the apology for Paul, is that Luke emphasizes Paul's fidelity to it (16:4), after reinforcing yet again the impression that Paul is a faithful Jew (the circumcision of Timothy in 16:1–3): "As they made their way through the cities [where Paul had already established churches on his first journey, they delivered to them for their observance the decisions made by the apostles and elders in Jerusalem." Luke leaves no doubt: Paul brings his earlier mission churches into full compliance with the apostolic decree, and it will govern his future work as well, as James will remind the reader in 21:25. Far from being a maverick, Paul is in full harmony with James, and with the apostles and elders at Jerusalem.

The irony of James' second defense of Paul is transparent; his attempt to shield the controversial figure from trouble, because of false rumors that he teaches apostasy from Torah, backfires, instead leading directly to his arrest. That ironic development, though, only serves to expose the fundamental irony underlying the entire course of Paul's trials and defense, namely, that Paul comes to be accused—indeed, repeated attempts to orchestrate his death are undertaken—*by Jews, for no other reason than that he is truly faithful to his Jewish heritage* (including the fulfillment of its promise). My point here, however, is simply that James offers unambiguous testimony to Paul's continuing status as faithful Jew, despite all rumors to the contrary: "And so all will know that there is nothing to what they have been told about you, but that you yourself also hold to observing the law" (21:24. Paul's own self-portrait finds in James forceful confirmation: "I am a Jew. . . ."

4. Other Legitimating Features of the Narrative[37]

Luke employs a variety of other devices to legitimate his hero. I can only summarize them briefly here.

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[36] Does Luke's habit of naming Paul *after* Barnabas to this juncture in the story reflect his concern to minimize Paul's role as initiator of mission activity among Gentiles?

[37] Cf. the useful treatment in Brawley ("Conciliation," 134–40) Brawley enumerates six legitimating techniques used by Luke, each having parallels in hellenistic literature: (1) divine approval; (2) access to divine power; (3) high motivation; (4) benefiting others; (5) possessing a high level of culture; (6) adhering to an ancient tradition (p. 135). In what follows, I intend neither to supplant nor to correct, but rather to supplement Brawley's discussion.

a. Paul is authenticated by God

In numerous ways, Luke legitimates Paul by indicating that he enjoys divine favor and sanction. Direct interventions by God/Jesus/Spirit in Paul's life are narrated repeatedly. Only by divine redirection does Paul come to express his zeal for God (22:3) by preaching Jesus, a point accented through repetition (9:3–6; 22:6–10; 26:12–18). Only under divine impulse does Paul launch his mission among Gentiles (22:17–21; 26:16–18; cf. 9:15–16). And through the Spirit (16:6–7), visions (16:9–10, and Spirit-prompted prophecy (21:10–12), God directs Paul's course. Moreover, Paul's performance of miracles, both of judgment (13:8 11) and of healing (14:8–10; 16:16–18; 19:11–12;[38] 20:7–12), points to his divine approval.

Indeed, undergirding Paul's whole mission career stand the twin pillars of divine scripture (programmatically at 13:47) and the divine call/mandate of 9:15–16 (cf. 26:16–18). When Paul takes the gospel to Gentiles, he does so in fulfillment of God's will announced in scripture, and, as he puts it in his address to Agrippa, in obedience to heavenly vision (26:19).[39] Luke emphasizes again and again that God has placed his seal of approval on Paul and his mission among both Jews and Gentiles. The culminating sign of that divine favor occurs while Paul is en route to Rome. As I have already argued, Luke shows that the penultimate legal verdict (that rendered by Agrippa) offers the true assessment of Paul's case, regardless of the actual outcome in Rome. Through his account of high adventure at sea and among barbarians (27:1–28:16), Luke adds to this human verdict God's decisive pronouncement of Paul's innocence.[40] The drama of these chapters twice shifts the reader's impression of Paul from presumed guilt to proven innocence. (1) At first sight, a disastrous shipwreck appears to confirm Paul's guilt, yet the miraculous deliverance of all 276 passengers demonstrates just the reverse. In fact, vv 21–25 depict the rescue of Paul's fellow passengers as something of a divine favor to Paul the prisoner! (2) Likewise, Maltese natives reasonably infer from a viper's attack against Paul that he is guilty of a crime meriting death (vv 3–4): "Though he has escaped from the sea, justice has not allowed him to live." But when he escapes harm, they conclude that he is a god. Luke's reader chuckles, knowing that Paul is no god but *is* the beneficiary of God's vindication. Even as prisoner destined for execution, Paul remains, as he has been from the moment he was first "arrested" by the risen Jesus, fully under divine approval. In legitimating Paul, Luke cannot and need not appeal to any higher court.

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[38] The humorous tale of the seven Jewish exorcists (19:13–16) highlights the divine origin of Paul's miracles: "Jesus I know, and Paul I know; but who are you?" (v 15).

[39] Of course, the location and timing of that visionary mandate are described differently in 22:17–21 and 26:16–18. The discrepancy no doubt stems from Luke's skill in adapting the speech in ch. 22 to its own temple setting.

[40] For detailed discussion of this point, with attention to hellenistic parallels, see G. B. Miles and G. Trompf, "Luke and Antiphon: The Theology of Acts 27–28 in the Light of Pagan Beliefs about Divine Retribution, Pollution, and Shipwreck," *HTR* 69 (1976) 259–67; Brawley, "Conciliation," 135–36; Susan Marie Praeder, "Acts 27:1–28:16: Sea Voyages in Ancient Literature and the Theology of Luke-Acts," *CBQ* 46 (1984) 683–706; cf. Vernon K. Robbins, "By Land and by Sea: The We-Passages and Ancient Sea Voyages," *Perspectives on Luke-Acts*, ed. Charles H. Talbert (Danville: Association of Baptist Professors of Religion, 1978) 215–42.

b. Paul under attack: a study in contrasting motivation

We have already seen Luke's account of the motivation of his protagonist. In one way or another, Paul's motives are reducible to a desire to obey divine direction, even at great personal risk.[41] But what of his opponents? If Paul shows himself to be impelled by noble motives, Luke spares no detail to show just the opposite in his detractors. Apart from the recurring plots to kill Paul (noted above), the viciousness of which is surpassed only by their utter futility, Luke exposes the pernicious motives of those who criticize Paul. Twice jealousy at the success of Paul's preaching leads fellow Jews to oppose him (13:45; 17:5). And twice business profit or self-interest motivates pagan antagonists (16:19; 19:24–27). And the rumors and eventually the accusations that culminate in Paul's arrest at Jerusalem (21:21, 28–29) rest, at best, on ignorance, misinformation, and erroneous supposition, and, at worst, on malicious distortion of the truth. As in so many other respects throughout Luke's apology, so too here in the matter of motivation, Paul emerges from the conflict demonstrably superior to his accusers.

c. Paul the genuine philosopher[42]

We have discovered that several impressive characters in Acts (Roman officials, Agrippa II, James, Peter, God) come to Paul's defense. How effectively does the accused speak on his own behalf? Throughout the narrative, Luke portrays Paul as a persuasive, eloquent orator, indeed as the consummate philosopher.

Paul's defense speeches (22:3–21; 24:10–21; 26:2–23) reflect conventional rhetorical patterns of his day,[43] reinforcing the image already established for Paul earlier in the story as a person of education and culture.[44] Reference to his schooling "at the feet" of the illustrious Gamaliel (22:3) thus serves a dual function, corroborating both his status as devout Jew and his superior intellectual training. Moreover, not only Paul's defense speeches but also his earlier mission proclamation prove him to be a philosopher worthy of respect. (1) He is not a dangerous innovator, but teaches ancient wisdom (cf. 13:16–41; 24:14; 26:5–6, 22–23). (2) His own teaching and the events defining the movement he represents have a verifiable, public character (13:44; 19:9–10; 26:26). (3) He speaks the truth boldly and insistently, despite grave personal risk (e.g., 9:20–22, 27–30; 13:44–47;

[41] See Brawley, "Conciliation," 138.

[42] For more extensive discussion, see Malherbe, "Corner."

[43] For analysis of Paul's defense speeches in Acts in relation to the corresponding hellenistic genre, see Fred Veltman, *The Defense Speeches of Paul in Acts* (Berkeley: Graduate Theological Union Th.D. Dissertation, 1975); Veltman, "The Defense Speeches of Paul in Acts," *Perspectives on Luke-Acts*, ed. Charles H. Talbert (Danville: Association of Baptist Professors of Religion, 1978) 243–56; William R. Long, *The Trial of Paul in the Book of Acts: Historical, Literary, and Theological Considerations* (Brown University Ph D. Dissertation, 1982); Long, "Trial"; Jerome Neyrey, "The Forensic Defense Speech and Paul's Trial Speeches in Acts 22–26: Form and Function," *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, ed. Charles H. Talbert (New York: Crossroad, 1984) 210–24.

[44] Noteworthy are the cultured address at Athens, which is evocative of Plato's Apology of Socrates and also alludes to Stoic wisdom (17:22–31), and Paul's friendship with the "Asiarchs" at Ephesus (19:31). Paul's Roman citizenship strengthens this impression.

14:1–3; 18:5–11; 19:8–10; 20:18–24; 21:10–13).[45] (4) He is unflappable when caught in crisis situations (e.g., 16:25–34; 21:37–22:21; 23:1–10; 27:21–38). (5) He does not sell his teaching for financial gain, not even to support himself (20:33–35; 18:1–3). (6) Above all, he is *persuasive!* The climactic defense speech illustrates the powers of Paul's oratory, as measured by its effects upon his audience (26:30–32).

According to Luke's account, therefore, the very Paul who preaches to Gentiles and provokes the ire of his fellow Jews is a faithful Jew. The same Paul who goes from prison to prison, ultimately—beyond the story—meeting death rather than vindication, is a self-sacrificing, courageous teacher of a venerable tradition that traces its origins to antiquity.

The Apology for Paul in Luke's Social World

We have outlined the literary dimensions of Luke's apology for Paul, probing the ways in which the narrative authenticates its dominant character. Along the way, we have discovered important clues in the much more tenuous search for the social functions of this portrayal of Paul. Before approaching the social dimensions of the apology, a cautionary word is in order. The author's setting is distinct from the setting within his narrative, and the two may not be collapsed into one. It would not be legitimate, for example, to infer, simply on the basis of the recurring Jewish harrassment of Paul in the story, that Luke defends Paul and/or his church from implacable Jewish hostility of similar intensity in his own day. Nevertheless, recognizing that I am now on the thinnest of ice, I hazard a proposal about the social functions of Luke's apology for Paul. I confine myself to two themes of pivotal importance in the narrative, (1) the innocence of Paul, and (2) the Jewishness of Paul.

1. Social Dimensions of Paul's Innocence

Paul's innocence of wrongdoing in the sphere of Roman law we have heard trumpeted by both Roman arbiters and King Agrippa, not to mention by heaven itself. If indeed Luke writes after the demise of his protagonist at Rome, a fact known to his Christian community as well, then such a rehabilitation of Paul, balancing Luke's previous defense of Jesus (e.g., Luke 23:4, 14–15, 22), will be required to restore the credibility of these two most prominent figures from the time of the community's origins as a distinct religious community. Whether questioning of such dubious beginnings arose within Luke's church (as doubt), or more probably from the outside (as skepticism and ridicule), the author carefully shows the truth behind the innuendo—the firm certainty of the teaching already entrusted to his reader (Luke 1:4). As a piece of political apologetic, countering before a Roman audience the "bad press" the church has suffered, Luke's defense of Paul would have only limited utility.[46] And as an apology-in-reverse, commending Rome to the church, Luke's work would be even less successful, narrating as it does so many far from admirable Roman officials. But as a piece of legitimation, aimed at Luke's Christian community to answer all doubts and criticisms prompted by Paul's checkered past (a series

[45] A trait Paul shares, of course, with Jesus, Peter, and Stephen (e.g., Jesus: Luke 13:32–33; 20:1–21:36; 22:67–70; Peter: Acts 4:1–22, 29–31; 5:27–32, 40–42; Stephen: 6:8–7:60).

[46] If for no other reason than that most of Luke-Acts addresses other concerns (cf. Barrett, *Historian*, 63). But more to the point, what Roman official would be satisfied with Luke's failure to report the outcome of Paul's legal proceedings?

of imprisonments culminating in execution), the apology for Paul is a masterpiece! It is possible that Paul illustrates for Luke's readers, who included Romans, that one can proclaim Jesus as Christ and still be loyal to Rome.[47] But much more likely, it seems to me, is the guess that Luke rescues a much maligned Paul for his community. Although his mission activity and message seem to have been disconfirmed by history, Luke rewrites history to reconfirm Paul. To me, the extent of Luke's apology for Paul within Acts necessitates the conclusion that Luke's church (largely Gentile in composition, I believe [cf. 28:28]), carries with it the legacy of Paul. Defending Paul, Luke secures his own church's pedigree.

2. Social Dimensions of Paul's Jewishness

The focal concern of Luke's apology for Paul, however, is his fidelity to Israel. Why does Luke go to such lengths to paint Paul as a good Jew? Mattill's proposal that Luke defends Paul to Jewish Christians at Rome[48] accounts for much of the evidence but proves, on further reflection, to be both more precise than the evidence warrants and too narrowly defined (Acts demonstrates the genuine Jewish roots of the Christian movement as a whole).[49] In view of the dominant role played in the narrative by controversy over Paul's alleged disloyalty to Jewish culture, I consider it likely that Paul had a negative image among Jews (and Jewish Christians?) in Luke's environment. Once again, Luke restores Paul's tarnished image for his Christian readers, demonstrating beyond doubt that Paul, even as a Christian and even as preacher to Gentiles—yes, even as one accused by his own *ethnos*—remained always faithful to Israel and to Israel's God. In fact, he paved the way for Luke's fellow believers to lay claim to Israel's history and promise, beause he dared to believe in the fulfillment of that promise in the resurrection of Jesus, and obeyed the divine summons to take that "light to the Gentiles" (cf. 26:23).

More is at stake in this legitimation of Paul, therefore, than Paul's own standing as a Jew. Luke, the defender of Paul, writes a two-volume work, tracing the progress of God's salvation from Israel, through Jesus and his apostles, to the Gentile world, finally, through Paul himself, conquering even Rome (28:30–31). There were apparent surprises along the way, but for those who like Paul and James knew their scripture, the truth was unavoidable that God was bringing to fruition his ancient promises to Israel. Not Paul alone but the Christian movement for whom he served as an eloquent mouthpiece was rooted in the Jewish people and carried its hopes to final realization. By defending Paul, therefore, Luke undergirds his own believing community, which, despite questions arising from its largely Gentile composition, does assuredly bear Israel's promise laden story. Luke, in his apology for Paul, brings his final chapter of Israel's history to a stirring climax. Not despite, but in large measure because Paul has become Rome's prisoner, the Gentile world is now poised for the message of salvation, which will make its way through the Empire in the time that remains before Jesus' return to vindicate his chosen people.

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[47] Cf. Esler, *Community*, 217–19.

[48] "Purpose."

[49] Mattill's early dating of Acts is also problematic on my reading of the document.

Acts 9:1-29 and Early Church Tradition

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The relation between the accounts of Paul's activities in the book of Acts and those in his own epistles has been the subject of numerous studies.[1] Most of them have concentrated upon the number of visits which Paul made to Jerusalem. They have attempted to match the two visits from the first two chapters in Galatians with the five (or six)[2] visits mentioned in Acts. The mere fact that the controversy continues, however, indicates that the exact relation of these two sources for the Apostle's life is yet to be found.

A more neglected area in comparing Acts and the Pauline epistles is the period of the Apostle's life described in Acts 9:1–29. There is little doubt that the passage reports the same events which the Apostle himself depicted in Gal 1:11–20. Both passages begin with the Apostle's conversion, or rather his calling,[3] along with some description of his

[1] See, for example, Udo Borse, *Der Brief an die Galater* ("Regensburger NT"; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1984) 93–100; Robert Jewett, *A Chronology of Paul's Life* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 63–93; Pierson Parker, "Once More, Acts and Galatians," *JBL* 86 (1967) 175–182; G. Strecker, "Die sogenannte zweite Jerusalemreise des Paulus," *ZNW* 53 (1962) 67–77; J. Cambier, "Le voyage de S. Paul a Jerusalem en Act. 9:26ss. et le schema missionaire theologique de S. Luc," *NTS* 9 (1961/62) 249–257; P. Benoit, "La deuxieme visite de Saint Paul a Jerusalem," *Bib* 40 (1959) 778–792; R. W. Funck, "The Enigma of the Famine Visit," *JBL* 75 (1956) 130–136; J. Dupont, "Notes sur les Actes des Apotres," *RB* 62 (1955) 49–59; T. H. Campbell, "Paul's 'Missionary Journeys' as Reflected in his Letters," *JBL* 74 (1955) 80–87; S. Giet, "Les trois premiers voyages de saint Paul a Jerusalem," *RSR* 41 (1953) 321–347.

[2] Exegetes traditionally find five visits in Acts, but this count is correct only if one ignores the readings from a couple of the earliest MSS of Acts 12:25. According to most translations, Barnabas and Saul returned from Jerusalem. Such a reading fits in well with the fact that the last mention of the two (in Acts 11:30) has them being sent off to Jerusalem, but MSS S and B, along with the majority of later MSS, all read "to Jerusalem." This latter reading implies that Barnabas and Paul had left Jerusalem and were now returning there for still another visit. While p^{74} reads "out of (*ex*) Jerusalem" and the so-called "Western Text" reads "from (*apo*) Jerusalem," the MSS support for the harder reading, namely "to Jerusalem," seems quite strong. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Nestle-Aland 26 has adopted it. This harder reading is also accepted by E. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles*, trans. B. Noble, G. Shinn, et al. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971) 387; and by S. Giet, "Les trois premiers voyages des saint Paul a Jerusalem," *RSR* 41 (1953) 321.

[3] Substituting the word "calling" for "conversion" follows the suggestion of K. Stendahl, *Paul Among the Jews and Gentiles* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) 7–23. So also H. D. Betz, *Galatians* ("Hermeneia"; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 64, 69–70. See Raymond F. Collins, "Paul's Damascus Experience: Reflections on the Lukan Account," *Louvain Studies* 11 (1986) 99–103; H. G. Wood, "The Conversion of St Paul: Its Nature, Antecedents

situation before that event. There is also little disagreement that one should identify the accounts of a visit to Jerusalem, which both sources indicate was Paul's first visit there after his Damascus experience of the Christ.[4] It is therefore tempting to compare these particular passages; yet the very certainty that Acts 9:1–29 and Gal 1:11–20 must depict the same events, not only invites a harmonization, but also raises a problem, namely that contradictions cannot be resolved by arguing that the contradictory passages refer to different events. Still, knowing exactly where contradictions lie can be helpful in defining the issues. Moreover, because Paul was obviously aware of his own movements and because he was unlikely to lie to readers who might be in a position to confirm his truthfulness,[5] where Acts and Galatians disagree, there must be an initial presumption that the error lies with Acts. In interpreting Acts 9:1–29, therefore, since we can determine with reasonable clarity where the passage is in error, it is here that we can examine Acts and the tradition behind it with greater certainty than in a passage in which the correspondence to the Pauline epistles is a matter of dispute.

According to Galatians Paul had been a zealous and learned Jew. We may further conclude that he had attended Jewish schools and that he had progressed to learning the oral tradition of the Jewish *avot,* since he describes the latter part of his education as studying "the tradition of my ancestors."[6] In addition, the future apostle had been a persecutor of the Church. Then he received a divine call to work on the side of those he had formerly persecuted. His call was to preach to gentiles (Gal 1:16; cf. 2:2, 7–9). It was an apostleship of divine grace which he received directly from Christ (Gal 1:1; cf. 1:12).[7] Therefore, instead of conferring with other Christians or visiting the Church

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and Consequences," *NTS* 1 (1954/55) 279: "Paul was converted to Christ rather than to Christianity." The new term makes clearer that Paul did not see himself leaving Judaism for a new religion, but one should perhaps not draw too sharp a distinction between conversion and calling. So William Baird, "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry: Reflections on 2 Cor 12:1–5 and Gal 1:11–17," *JBL* 104 (1985) 656–657. See also Gerhard Lohfink, *The Conversion of St. Paul: Narrative and History in Acts,* trans. B. J. Malina (Herald Scriptural Library; Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1976) 29–30, who points out that according to Acts 9 and 22 Paul received the revelation telling him what to do only with the coming of Ananias. See also Hans Conzelmann, *A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles,* trans. J. Limburg, A. T. Kraabel, and D. H. Juel (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 72–73; G. Klein, *Die zwölf Apostel: Ursprung und Gehalt einer Idee* (FRLANT, n.F. 59:77; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961) 145ff.

[4] This identification has been challenged by Parker, 175–182; H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* ("Krit.=ex. Kom. u. d. NT," VII; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1951) 66–78; and by D. F. Robinson, "A Note on Acts 11:27–30," *JBL* 63 (1944) 169–172, but their views have found few followers.

[5] On this point, see below.

[6] On Jewish education, see J. T. Townsend, "Ancient Education in the Time of the Early Roman Empire," in *The Catacombs and the Colosseum,* ed. S. Benko and J. J. O'Rourke (Valley Forge, PA: Judson, 1971) 139–163; and Townsend's forthcoming article, "Education, NT," in the new *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday); see also F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* ("New Internatl. Gk. Comm."; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 91.

[7] Paul's emphasis on his apostleship can be seen through a comparison of Gal 1:1 with

leaders in Jerusalem, he immediately went off to Arabia,[8] presumably to fulfill his divine commission by preaching to gentiles.[9] He then "returned again (*palin hupestrepsa*) to Damascus"; and since this visit to Damascus is described as a return, the so-called conversion probably took place in or near that city.[10] Then "after three years,"[11] Paul visited Jerusalem for the first time since his Damascus calling; but on this occasion he saw only Peter and none of the other apostles,[12] except for James the Lord's brother.[13] At this point in Galatians Paul even swears before God to his truthfulness[14]and adds two verses later (in v 22) that he was still unknown by sight to the churches of Judea.

2 Cor 11:32–33 adds one detail to the Galatian account. According to these verses Paul at one time had escaped from the ethnarch of the Nabatean King Aretas[15] in a basket through a window in the wall of Damascus. Since the escape from the Arabian king would probably have taken place soon after the Apostle's visit to that country, one can assume

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the passing references to his apostleship in the openings of his other epistles. See B. R. Gaventa, "Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm," *NT* 28 (1986) 309.

[8] Nothing in the context indicates the length of this visit. The "three years" mentioned in v 18 would have at least included any time spent in Damascus after the Arabian mission. See Giet, 338, and Robinson, 170. See also below.

[9] So K. Lake, "The Conversion of Paul and the Events Immediately Following It," *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Part I: *The Acts of the Apostles*, ed. F. J. Foakes Jackson and Lake (hereafter cited as *Beginnings*; London: MacMillan, 1920–33) vol. 5, p. 192; J. Knox, "'Fourteen Years Later': A Note on the Pauline Chronology," *JBL* 16 (1936) 341–349; M.-J. Lagrange, *Saint Paul: Epitre aux Galates* ("Etudes bibl."; Paris: Gabalda, 1950) 16–17; C. S. G. Williams, *A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles* ("Harper's NT Comm."; New York: Harper, 1957) 126; Bruce, 96; Betz, 74. Cf. Giet, 338, 340.

[10] So Bruce, 96.

[11] Whether Paul has reckoned the three years from his return to Damascus, as Giet, 338, maintains, or from his calling to Christ is uncertain. See C. H. Buck, "The Collection for the Saints," *HTR* 43 (1950) 11 n. 4.

[12] These other apostles need not include only the twelve. So Klein, 44–49.

[13] Whether the text of Gal 1:19 implies that James was an Apostle or not depends upon the interpretation of *ei me*. See Lagrange, 18f.; Schlier, 31; J. Munck, "Paul, the Apostles and the Twelve," *ST* 3 (1949) 106.

[14] On the use of the oath in ancient rhetoric, see J. R. Sampley, "'Before God, I do not lie' (Gal. 1:20): Paul's Self Reference in the Light of Roman Legal Praxis," *NTS* 23 (1976/77) 477–482; Betz, 79; B. H. Brinsmead, *Galatians – Dialogical Response to Opponents* ("SBL Dissertation Series" 65; Chico, CA: Scholars, 1982) 97.

[15] Certainly Aretas IV, who reigned from 9 BCE to 40 CE. Even though Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 78:10 affirms that Damascus used to be in the region of Arabia, there is little reason to argue with Jewett, 30–33, and others that Aretas controlled Damascus at the time of the Apostle's escape. In Paul's day the city was under Roman rule. In fact, the very text of Galatians implies that Damascus was separate from Arabia. See Lake, 193f.; Schlier, 29; H. J. Cadbury, *The Book of Acts in History* (New York: Harper, 1955) 19–21; Williams, 126; Haenchen, "The Book of Acts as Source Material for the History of Early Christianity," in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, Essays presented in honor of Paul Schubert, ed. L. E. Keck and J. L. Martin (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966) 268f.; Betz, 74.

with some confidence that 2 Cor 11:32–33 is a detail of Paul's second departure from Damascus assumed in Galatians 1:17–18.[16]

According to Acts 9:1–29[17] the man Saul, later known as Paul, had been a leading Jewish persecutor of Jesus' followers, who were known as "the Way."[18] While this enemy of Christ was journeying to Damascus on a mission of persecution, he experienced a miraculous encounter[19] with the risen one whom he had been persecuting. The passage provides several details of the experience. Among them are assertions that Saul had lost his sight and that he had become a divine instrument to carry the name of the Lord Jesus, not only before the gentiles and kings, but also before the children of Israel (v 15).[20] There is no suggestion, however, that this calling involved apostleship. Immediately after the encounter with Jesus, Saul entered Damascus where for three days he remained blind and fasting. Then, guided by a vision, a certain Ananias visited Saul in Damascus at the house of a certain Judas on the street called Straight. There Ananias restored his sight through the imposition of hands and baptized him. The next "several days" (*hemeras tinas*) Saul

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[16] Cf. Knox, *Chapters in a Life of Paul* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1950) 77 n. 2: "Since Paul leads us to suppose that he did not go back to Damascus after leaving it for Jerusalem 'after three years,' it is safe to say that in II Cor. 11:32–33 he is alluding to that particular departure."

[17] There is an assumption here that the account in Acts 9 may represent the tradition that Luke was using somewhat more accurately than the accounts in Acts 22 or 26. See Collins, 107–108; Conzelmann, 72f.; Charles W. Hendrick, "Paul's Conversion/Call: A Comparative Analysis of the Three Reports in Acts," *JBL* 100 (1981) 415–432; Gerd Luedemann, *Das frühe Christentum nach den Traditionem der Apostelgeschichte: Ein Kommentar* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987) 112–115; Rudolf Pesch, *Die Apostelgeschichte*, 1. Teilband, Apg 1–12 (EKKNT, 5:1; Zurich: Beniziger, 1988) 112–115. One reason for preferring the account in Acts 9 is that the parallel accounts in Acts 22 and 26 occur in speech material, which seem to be free compositions of Luke. Another reason is that there is a greater discrepancy between the two latter accounts than between either of them and the account in Acts 9. Moreover, Pesch finds that the variants in the speech accounts reflect Lucan style. But cf. Chris Ukachukwu Manus, "Conversion Narratives in the Acts: A Study on Lucan Historiography," *Indian Theological Studies* 22 (1985) 184–185, who believes that Acts 9 uses the *Vorlage* of Acts 22. On the speech material in Acts, see Townsend, "The Speeches in Acts," *ATR* 43 (1960) 150–159.

[18] On "the Way" as a designation of Christians, see Conzelmann, 71; J. Pathrapankal, "Christianity as a 'Way' according to the Acts of the Apostles," in *Les Actes des Apotres: Traditions, redaction, theologie*, ed. J. Kremer (BEThL 48; Louvain: University Press, 1979) 533–539; Eero Repo, *Der "Weg" als Selbstbezeichnung des Urchristentums* ("Annales academiae scientiarum fennicae," Sarja B, nide 132:2; Helsinki: Sumomalainen Tiedeakatamia, 1964); S. Vernon McCasland, " 'The Way,' " *JBL* 77 (1958) 222–230.

[19] One should avoid the word "calling" when dealing with the Acts accounts of this event because, according to the version in Acts 22:14–15, Saul's calling to witness Christ came through Ananias and after the initial experience. See Manus, 188–189; Pesch, 308f.

[20] Against this interpretation of v 15, see Lohfink, " 'Meinen Name zu tragen . . .' (Apg 9, 15)," *BZ* 10 (1966) 108–115; idem, *Conversion*, 20, 69–73, who finds the commission to preach only in Acts 26:16–18. Cf. also Sten Lundgren, "Ananias and the Calling in Acts," *ST* 25 (1971) 117–122, according to whom the message that Paul received in Acts 9:15 and 22:14 is substantially the same as what is reported in Acts 26:16–18.

spent with the Damascus disciples and immediately began to preach in the synagogues, presumably to Jews. Jewish reaction was at first surprise and then, when "many days" (*hemerai ikanai*) had passed, violence,—violence which took the form of a plot to kill him. When he learned of the plot, Saul escaped through the city wall in a basket and journeyed to Jerusalem. At Jerusalem the disciples treated their former persecutor as an object of fear until Barnabas gave him an introduction to "the Apostles," presumably to more than two of them.[21] After this introduction Paul spoke openly in the name of the Lord and disputed with the Hellenists[22] until they sought to kill him and so forced him to flee the city. In all this activity Paul played the missionary but was not seen as an apostle.

In both accounts the main outline of the story and certain details are the same.[23] Both agree that Paul had once been a zealous persecutor of Christians, who had been persuaded to join the sect through divine intervention in or near Damascus. The accounts also agree that he was forced to escape Damascus in a basket and that he then visited certain Jerusalem Church leaders. Moreover, both accounts agree in representing Paul as a missionary preacher, although Acts hesitates at representing him as an apostle as well.

In spite of these similarities, however, the two accounts exhibit significant differences. According to Galatians Paul was called to preach to gentiles, but Acts 9 also includes Israel. According to Acts Paul sought the company of other Christians soon after his

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[21] In Acts "the Apostles," when used in reference to the Jerusalem church leaders, regularly designates the twelve. See Pesch, 92–97; Cambier, 255–256; H. Menoud, "Les additions au groupe des douze apotres d'apres le livre des Actes," *RHPR* 37 (1957) 71ff.; Munck, 106. See also F. W. Beare, "The Sequence of Events in Acts 9–15 and the Career of Peter," *JBL* 62 (1943) 296f. Cf. Lake, "The Twelve and the Apostles," *Beginnings,* vol. 5, pp. 52–58. The assumption that according to Acts 9:27 Paul met only Peter and James seems dictated by an assumed agreement with Gal 1:18f. For this view, see E. Jacquier, *Les actes des Apotres* ("Etudes bibl."; Paris: Gabalda, 1926) 299f.; J. B. Lightfoot, *The Epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians* (London: MacMillan, 1896) 85.

[22] The meaning of *Hellenistes* (Acts 9:29; also Acts 6:1; and according to rather strong textual evidence, Acts 11:20) is uncertain. The word is usually thought to designate a Greek-speaking Jew or Jewish Christian. So, for example, H. Windisch, "*Hellen*," *TDNT* vol. 2, pp. 509–510; Haenchen, *Acts,* 260f. n. 3, 266f.; Conzelmann, 61; similarly C. F. D. Moule, "Once More, Who Were the Hellenists?" *ExpTim* 70 (1959) 100–102; E. C. Blackmann, "The Hellenists of Acts 6:1," *ExpTim* 48 (1937) 542f.; Alfons Weiser, *Die Apostelgeschichte,* Kapitel 1–12 ("Ökumenischer Taschenbuchkommentar zum NT," 5:1; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1981) 168–169. Some critics, however, disagree. Among them are Cadbury, "The Hellenists," *Beginnings,* vol. 5, pp. 59–74, who concludes that *Hellenistes* has essentially the same meaning as *Hellen,* and E. Lohmeyer, "Das Abendmahl in der Urgemeinde," *JBL* 56 (1937) 231–238, who follows Cadbury and adds that Acts 6:1ff. refers to a dispute of Jewish and gentile Christians over table fellowship. See also W. Grundmann, "Die Apostel zwischen Jerusalem and Antiochia," *ZNW* 39 (1940) 121–124. Against Cadbury's interpretation, see Haenchen, *Acts,* 260 n. 1, 266f., and Windisch, 509. On the text of Acts 11:20, see B. W. Bacon, "Acts Versus Galatians: The Crux of Apostolic History," *AJT* 11 (1907) 462f.

[23] See Lohfink, *Conversion,* 21–24, for a full description of these details. See also Munck, *The Acts of the Apostles,* revised by W. F. Albright and C. S. Mann ("Anchor Bible," 31; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967) 82, who believes that the similarities outweigh any differences in importance.

Damascus experience, while Galatians denies that he did so.[24] According to Acts Paul's first evangelistic activity was in the Damascus synagogues; Galatians implies that his first preaching was in Arabia. According to Acts Paul fled Damascus to escape Jews; 2 Cor 11:32–33 maintains that he was fleeing the ethnarch of King Aretas.[25] According to Acts the interval between the initial encounter with Jesus and the visit to Jerusalem which followed it was a matter of days,[26]while Galatians affirms it was a matter of years. Acts and the epistles also differ considerably in their descriptions of this visit. In Galatians Paul swears before God that the visit lasted only two weeks and that aside from Peter he saw no other apostle but James the Lord's brother.[27] In fact, Paul claims that the Judean Christians did not even know what he looked like.[28] According to Acts, however, Paul met "the Apostles" and engaged in public preaching and disputing. There also seems disagreement over whether Paul was to be regarded as an apostle. Throughout Acts 9, indeed throughout all of Acts, the author of Luke-Acts seems to be down-playing Paul's apostleship. Apart from passing allusions in Acts 14:4 and 14 to Barnabas and Paul as apostles, Acts never refers to Paul as an apostle but reserves the title for Jerusalem church leaders, presumably the Twelve. In fact, Acts 1:21 laid down one requirement for apostleship that Paul could never have fulfilled, the requirement that an apostle must have been with Jesus throughout his earthly ministry.[29] Thus it is not surprising to find Acts 13:3 describing what appears to be a kind of ordination for Paul before he sets forth on his main missionary work (cf. also Acts 9:15; 22:14–15).[30] In addition

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[24] According to Conzelmann, 71, Acts 9:6 asserts that "in contrast to Gal. 1:12–13 Paul does not learn of the gospel in the vision itself. He is directed to the Church, which is the mediator of this teaching." This distinction seems overdrawn. The vision in Acts 9 certainly included the revelation that Jesus had overcome death and should be confessed as Lord. Such a revelation is indeed the gospel. The rest is commentary.

[25] Cf. Pesch, 311, who suggests that "die Nachstellung durch den Nabataeer-Ethnarchen durch die Juden veranlasst gewesen sein kann"; similarly Haenchen, "The Book of Acts," 268f.

[26] It seems unlikely that the "many days" of Acts 9:23 indicates a period of more than a year, as maintained by A. v. Harnack, *The Acts of the Apostles*, trans. J. R. Wilkinson ("Crown Theol. Lib.," XXVII; "NT Studies," III; New York: Putnam, 1909) 23, 28 n. 1; and Jacquier, 296f.

[27] See above, n. 13.

[28] The assertion that Judea in Gal 1:22 excludes Jerusalem (so Lightfoot, 86; L. Finkelstein, *The Pharisees: The Sociological Background of their Faith* [Philadelphia: JPSA, 1940] 24; cf. Williams, 126f.) is supported by little evidence. See B. W. Bacon, 156; Schlier, 32; cf. E. DeW. Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (ICC; New York: Schribners, 1920) 62ff., 435f.

[29] Lohfink, *Conversion*, 29–30; Haenchen, *Acts*, 113ff.; Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke*, trans. G. Buswell (New York: Harper and Row, 1960) 215ff.; but cf. J. Jervell, "Paulus in der Apostelgeschichte und die Geschichte des Urchristentums," *NTS* 32 (1986) 378–392, who argues that Acts takes the title Apostle from Paul because he is more than an apostle, i.e., a superapostle. See also above, n. 21.

[30] See J. Coppens, "L'imposition des mains dans les Actes des Apotres," in *Les Actes des Apotres*, ed. Kremer, 417–420, who argues that Paul and Barnabas could be called apostles in Acts 14 because they had been ordained as apostles in Acts 13:1–3; but cf. Jervell, 379.

to these contradictions, Acts 9 has two major additions. The first is the imaginative elaboration of Paul's miraculous encounter with Jesus. The second is the story about the restoration of his sight and his baptism by a certain Ananias.

The details of Acts 9:1–29 clearly disagree at many points with the corresponding accounts found in the Pauline epistles, and the two cannot be harmonized.[31] Faced with such disagreements, it is easy, perhaps too easy, to begin with the assumption that the account in Galations must be completely historically accurate. Certainly Paul knew the facts about what he had done; but given the canons of ancient rhetoric, just how much would Paul slant the truth in a *narratio* such as that in Galalatians 1–2? Still, one should not overemphasize Paul's likely use of such rhetorical freedom. A *narratio* had to be plausible, and a statement is most easily plausible when true.[32]

For this study, however, the question of Paul's historical accuracy need not be decisive. What we can learn from Galatians with absolute certainty is what Paul wanted the Galatians to believe about his activity, and from this knowledge it is not too difficult to surmise the views of those whom Paul opposed. Thus, apart from questions of Paul's historical accuracy, we can learn two opposing points of view about Paul in Galatia, that professed by the Apostle himself and that of those whom he opposed. Moreover, as shown by Olaf Linton,[33] the account of Paul's Damascus experience found in Acts seems to agree, not with what the Apostle claimed, but with the version of his actions which he was attempting to refute. In other words, the account in Acts 9:1–29 bears a striking resemblance to the views of Paul's opponents, at least those in Galatia.[34] Therefore, since Acts 9:1–29 agrees with a tradition that is at least as old as the epistle to the Galatians,[35] any explanations of the differences between this section of Acts and the Pauline epistles should begin, not with some purpose by the author of Luke-Acts,[36] but with the origin of the tradition which the author has used.

How did such a tradition about Paul arise? Was it necessarily a deliberate perversion of the Apostle's activity on the part of his enemies? Perhaps not.[37] First of all, we can

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[31] Betz, 63.

[32] Betz, 60. For a questioning of Paul's accuracy apart from rhetorical considerations, see J. T. Sanders, "Paul's Autobiographical Statements in Galatians 1–2," *JBL* 85 (1966) 335–343.

[33] "The Third Aspect: A Neglected Point of View: A Study in Gal. 1–2 and Acts 9 and 15," *ST* 3 (1949) 79–95. Cf. A. Oepke, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater* ("Theol. Handkom. z. NT," IX; Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1937) 27.

[34] See H. Koester, "Gnomai Diaphoroi: The Origin and Nature of Diversification in the History of Early Christianity," *HTR* 58 (1965) 314f.: "No doubt, Luke was a student of Paul's opponents rather than of Paul himself." So also Jewett, 17.

[35] Cf. Linton, who concludes: "It is therefore very probable that the account of Acts derives from older sources, surely not identical with those current in Galatia, but akin to them" (p. 95). Cf. also Strecker, 71. Concerning a possible verbal relation between Acts 9 and Galatians 1, see Linton, 81f.

[36] See Chambier, 249–257.

[37] Paul's opponents in Galatia need not have regarded themselves as his enemies. While disagreeing with some of his claims, they may actually have held him in high esteem. Even if they never regarded him as the equal of the Jerusalem Apostles; they, like the author of Acts, may well have respected Paul as an evangelist. See Linton, 85f., 95; Conzelmann, *Commentary on the Acts*, 73. See also John Hurd, *The Origin of I Corinthians* (New York:

assume that the ultimate source for any story or detail in Acts which finds confirmation in the Pauline epistles is the event itself, or at least what both Paul and his opponents agreed was the event itself. Thus, the tradition in Acts 9:1–29 must contain the following original nucleus about the Apostle's activities upon which both Paul and his opponents agreed:

> Paul, a Jewish persecutor of Christians, had experienced a miraculous change of heart in or near Damascus. Sometime later he had to escape from Damascus in a basket and then visited Jerusalem. He also became a great Christian evangelist.

Since the tradition contains no mention of Paul's Arabian visit, we may assume as a working hypothesis that those who formed the tradition did not know of it.[38]

As a second step we need to ask how those forming the tradition in Acts might have been expected to fill out such a fragmentary account even without an anti-Pauline bias. What would one expect of a man like Paul in his circumstances? He certainly had changed from persecutor to church leader. But would he have done so wholly through a divine revelation and without any Church instruction? Would he not, as the Acts tradition claims, be expected to spend some time with nearby Christians and then without too much delay visit the Jerusalem Church leaders? Moreover, since Paul was known as a great evangelist, one would easily make the correct assumption that he would soon begin preaching. After all, even though he may not have been an apostle of Christ, at least to those like Luke who would limit the title to the twelve, he was so great an evangelist! Now where would one expect a learned Pharisee to preach his new revelation? In the local synagogues, of course,—in the synagogues of Damascus. Then, since the tradition builders apparently knew nothing of an Arabian visit, they might easily assume, as they did, that Paul remained in Damascus until his escape in a basket. Nor would they have had any reason to suppose that he was fleeing an Arabian king. Therefore Acts 9 makes the quite plausible assumption that the Apostle was fleeing Jews, at least partly because it was assumed that Paul's first preaching had been in the Damascus synagogues. As for Paul's apostleship, was it not enough for him to be the great missionary without giving him a title which many would reserve for the twelve?

The Acts tradition is correct in recording that Paul went to Jerusalem after his escape from Damascus, but it was easy to assume in addition that Paul would have visited the Jerusalem apostles soon after encounter with the risen Jesus.[39] After all, those responsible for the tradition in Acts 9 appear to have known of no activity which would have delayed the visit some years. According to Acts, therefore, Paul remained in Damascus only long enough for him to linger there with the disciples "several days" (*hemeras tinas*) and to build up enough animosity to force his flight from the city after "many days (*hemerai ikanai*)."

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Seabury, 1965), who presents Paul's opponents in 1 Corinthians as people led astray by the Apostle's earlier preaching. For a truly hostile approach to Paul, see the Pseudo-Clement, *Homilies* 17:13–19:41.

[38] But cf. Giet, 338ff., according to whom Acts 9 contains a hiatus where one would expect a mention of the Arabian visit. Similarly Jacquier, 296, who thinks that perhaps the author of Luke-Acts did know of this visit.

[39] Cf. B. Orchard, "The Problem of Acts and Galatians," *CBQ* 7 (1945) 378, according to whom one might have expected the Apostle to go to Jerusalem rather than Arabia.

The tradition apparently contained no accurate information concerning Paul's first Jerusalem visit after his Damascus experience, apart from the fact that he did visit there.[40] The tradition builders seem to have used their version of the stay in Damascus as a model for Paul's activity in Jerusalem.[41] Of course, in Jerusalem Paul had no need to gain his sight or to receive baptism; however, as in Damascus, Paul spends his time in meeting Church leaders, in this case the Jerusalem apostles, and in preaching. Also as in Damascus, his preaching resulted in a plot that forced his flight from the city.[42] Moreover, the assumption that this visit took place soon after his miraculous encounter with Jesus leads to the further assumption that the Jerusalem Christians were unaware Paul was no longer persecuting them. Acts 9, therefore, quite understandably depicts them as fearing Paul before Barnabas gave him a suitable introduction.

Of course, the fact that the author of Acts 9:1–29 has relied on an earlier tradition need not imply that he left this tradition untouched.[43] Just as the author of Luke-Acts edited the material which he used from the gospel of Mark,[44]it is likely that he also edited the tradition he used here.[45] One detail which may be a Lucan addition is the naming of Barnabas as the one who introduced Paul to the Jerusalem apostles. Another is the use of the word "Hellenists" to describe those in Jerusalem with whom Paul disputed. A third is the double vision to Ananias and to Paul, a device used in the Cornelius story of Acts 10:1–11:18.[46] Regarding Barnabas, Luke's motive would be the bringing of Paul and Barnabas together as a prelude to their association in the chapters that follow. As for the designation of the Hellenists[47] for the group with whom the Apostle disputed in Jerusalem, the designation may simply indicate that some tradition builder thought that someone like Paul, so closely associated with the Diaspora, would likely seek out those of Greek culture.[48] This detail, however, may also be the product of the author of Luke-

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[40] Cf. Williams, 23; Cambier, 257.

[41] See David Gill, "The Structures of Acts 9," *Bib* 55 (1974) 546–548.

[42] See C. H. Talbert, *Acts* (Knox Preaching Guides; Atlanta: John Knox), 1984) 40f., who also finds a chiastic arrangement in the stories of Paul at Damascus and at Jerusalem.

[43] See Collins, 107–118, who argues for a three-stage history in the development of the account: the traditional story from Damascus, the pre-Lucan story, and Acts 9. But cf. Jervell, "Paul in the Acts of the Apostles," in *Les Actes des Apotres*, ed. Kremer, 297–298, who notes that the difficulty in distinguishing between the author and his traditions is reflected in the contradictory results of recent monographs on the subject.

[44] See F. C. Burkitt, "The Use of Mark in the Gospel According to Luke," *Beginnings*, vol. 2, pp. 106–120.

[45] For a study of this editing, see Luedemann, 121–125. On the special concerns of Luke in relation to Marcionites and Jewish Christianity, see Townsend, "The Date of Luke-Acts," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar*, ed. C. H. Talbert (New York: Crossroad, 1984) 47–62. On the Jewishness of Paul in Acts, cf. Jervell, "Paulus in der Apostelgeschichte und die Geschichte des Urchristentums," 384–386.

[46] Luedemann, 116.

[47] On the meaning of this designation, see above, note 22.

[48] There is reason to doubt the unconfirmed assertions of Acts 9:11; 21:39; 22:3 (cf. 9:30; 11:2) that the Apostle was originally from Tarsus. Robert Kraft of the University of Pennsylvania has maintained orally (as far as I know he has not published it) for many years that Luke may have invented Paul's birth in Tarsus because he misunderstood the

Acts, who, having already recorded that Stephen had found violence while preaching in the Greek synagogues of Jerusalem, thought that a violent reaction to Paul's Jerusalem preaching might well have sprung from the same source and designated this source by what may well be a word of Lucan coinage, namely "Hellenists."[49]

There are two sections in the narrative of Acts 9:1–29 which the Pauline epistles neither confirm nor deny. The first is the story of how Paul, who had been blind since his encounter with Jesus, received his sight through the laying on of hands[50] and was then then baptized. There is, of course, little reason to doubt that the Apostle was indeed baptized.[51] Moreover, the story contains concrete details which are difficult to explain as someone's deduction or bias.[52] The one who baptized Paul was a certain Ananias, who is otherwise unknown. The account even names the street and house where the baptism occurred. If such details involved well-known people and places one might see them as creative elaboration, but these details do not fit such a category. Thus Acts may well preserve a reliable tradition that Paul received his baptism in the house of Judas on the street called Straight in Damascus by a certain Ananias.[53] That the Apostle regained his sight at this time, however, is questionable. According to the tradition, Paul's miraculous experience had left him blind, and he was obviously not blind during his ministry. Perhaps the tradition builders simply felt that a likely time for the Apostle to have regained his sight was at his baptism. Moreover, that Paul regained his sight presupposes that he had lost it in the first place; and as shown below, the latter presupposition is also questionable.[54] The only other detail in this story not accounted for is the vision (*horama*) which guided Ananias to Paul. Tradition required that the two meet to fulfill the divine plan, and Acts commonly makes use of visions in such situations (Acts 10:3, 10–17; 11:5; 16:9–10; 18:9), in particular the double vision as found here. After all, Luke was certainly aware that such visions had been promised for the Messianic age by the prophet Joel (3:1=2:18 in the RSV; cf. Acts 2:17).[55]

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expression, "Saul the Tarsian," which in Aramaic reads, *Sha'ul Tarsaya* (Hebrew: *Sha'ul haTarsi*), and means "Saul the Weaver." Thus it would not have been too difficult to misinterpret "Paul" or "Saul the Tarsian" to mean, "Saul, the man from Tarsus."

[49] See Windisch, 508f.

[50] According to Acts 22:12–16, Paul actually received an ordination at the hands of Ananias. See Lake, "The Conversion of Paul," *Beginnings*, vol. 5, pp. 189f. But this account appears in a speech and represents the interpretation of the author of Luke-Acts. See above, n. 17.

[51] But cf. R. H. Fuller, "Was Paul Baptized?" in *Les Actes des Apotres*, ed. Kremer, 505–508, who argues that the apostolic calling for Paul, Peter, the Twelve, and others was the equivalent of baptism.

[52] See Strecker, 71f.

[53] Against this deduction, see Lake and Cadbury, *Beginnings*, vol. 4, English translation and commentary, 102f., who argue that such details may be found elsewhere in Acts (in particular in 10:6); but apart from 10:6, the details in these other passages tend to be well-known geographical or political facts (e.g., 9:38; 18:12). See also Pesch, 301f., 305; but cf. Lake, "The Conversion of Paul," *Beginnings*, vol. 5, p. 191: "It is quite unnecessary to suppose that the story of Ananias is fiction." Similarly Haenchen, *Acts*, 328.

[54] But cf. Weiser, 228, who regards this healing as very likely.

[55] Although it is unlikely that the story of Paul's baptism is without foundation, its

The second section of Acts 9:1–29 without a parallel account in the Pauline epistles is the detailed elaboration of the Apostle's Damascus experience. In Galatians Paul simply affirms that God revealed his son in (*en*) him.[56] Acts 9, however, adds that the future Apostle saw a heavenly light, before which he fell to the ground blind, while he heard the voice of Jesus, who made himself known to him. Since Luke composed the speeches in Acts,[57] there is little reason to doubt that he would have composed suitable words for Jesus to speak to Paul (in vv 4–6), especially since the parallel accounts in Acts 22:8 and Acts 26:14–15 give somewhat different versions.[58] That Acts 9 reports a light from heaven is hardly surprising since in the ancient world of the early church brilliant lighting was expected with heavenly appearances.[59] Moreover Paul's blindness may have been added merely as a testimony to the intensity of the light.[60] In addition, the setting of the account

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position immediately following the conversion may well be open to question. Luke has a tendency to relate all the pauline stories that take place in a given city on the Apostle's first visit there. Since both Paul's initial encounter with Jesus and his later baptism are connected with Damascus, Luke would have put them together whether they belonged together chronologically or not. See Manus, 185.

[56] The exact meaning of these words in Gal 1:16 is uncertain. Cf. Burton, 49ff.; Lagrange, 14; Schlier, 26f. Note also that in addition to Gal 1:11–17, most exegetes add 1 Cor 9:1 and 15:8; but Betz, 71, affirms the need for caution on this point. Some critics also maintain that 2 Cor 12:2–4 describes the Apostle's miraculous Damascus experience. So Donald W. Riddle, *Paul: Man of Conflict* (Nashville: Cokesbury, 1940) 63; Buck and McD. Greer Taylor, *St. Paul: A Study of the Development of his Thought* (New York: Schribners, 1969) 104, 220–226. Morton S. Enslin, *Reapproaching Paul* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972) 53–55. Betz, 71, suggests a connection between Galatians and 2 Cor 12:2–3 but does not elaborate further. John Knox has shifted his position over the years. He originally accepted the identification in " 'Fourteen Years Later': A Note on the Pauline Chronology," *JR* 16 (1936) 341–349, and in "The Pauline Chronology," *JBL* 58 (1939) 16ff., 22; but by the time he wrote *Chapters in a Life of Paul* in 1950, he regarded his former position as doubtful. So p. 113 n. 1; also 78 n. 3, 121. Against the view that 2 Cor 12:2–4 depicts Paul's Damascus experience, see G. Ogg, "A New Chronology of Saint Paul's Life," *ExpTim* 64 (1952/53) 121f.; William Baird, "Visions, Revelations, and Ministry: Reflections on 2 Cor. 12:1–5 and Gal. 1:11–17," *JBL* 104 (1985) 651–662. Cf. J. D. Tabor, *Things Unutterable: Paul's Ascent to Paradise in its Greco-Roman, Judaic, and Early Christian Contexts* ("Studies in Judaism"; Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986). Although Tabor does not consider the possibility of this epiphany being the Damascus experience, his interpretation of the epiphany could fit such a consideration. See also Betz, 69, who explains Paul's brevity in Galatians as due to the fact that a rhetorical *narratio* called for brevity.

[57] Townsend, "Speeches," 150–159.

[58] See Conzelmann, *Commentary on the Acts*, 71–73, 187, 210f.

[59] Cf. Num 9:15f.; 2 Kgs 2:11f.; 6:17; Ezek 1:13f., 22, 17f.; Luke 2:9; Acts 7:55; Rev 1:16; 21:23; 22:5; etc. Cf. also Conzelmann, *Commentary on the Acts*, 72. See H. Riesenfeld, *Jesus Transfigure: L'arriere-plan de recit evangelique de la Transfiguration de Notre-Seigneur* ("Acta Sem. Neotest. Upsaliensis," XVI; Copenhagen: E. Munksgaard, 1947) 97–114; Conzelmann, ibid., 71.

[60] See Acts 22:11, which is more specific. Cf. 2 Kgs 6:17f.; Ezek 1:28; 2 Cor 3:7ff. See also Haenchen, *Acts*, 323, 626.

in Acts 9 may be partly due to an expanded tradition. The tradition builders were aware that the event took place in the environs of Damascus and that Paul had formerly persecuted the church. Taken together, these facts easily suggest that the Apostle's business in Damascus was the persecution of Christians.[61]

Following the Apostle's initial experience of the risen Jesus, Acts 9 has him spend three days in blindness during which time he abstained from food and drink. Again such expansions are not surprising. The three days need only have been used as a conveniently short period,[62] perhaps suggested by the fact that Jesus spent three days in the darkness of the grave. The fasting served as a suitable indication of the Apostle's repentance[63] and would also have been the normal preparation for the baptism which followed.[64] Of course, that some of the above details represent what actually happened is not impossible, but they can just as easily be seen as a rather commonplace expansion of the simple fact that God revealed his son to Paul, the persecutor, in or near Damascus.

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[61] Various exegetes have pointed out parallels between Paul's experience in Acts 9 and various other ancient stories. Hans Windisch, "Die Christusepiphanie vor Damaskus und ihrer religionsgeschichtlichen Parallelen," *ZNW* 31 (1932) 1–23, sees parallels with the experience of Heliodorus in 2 Macc 3:1. So also Talbert, 39f.; Christoph Burchard, *Die dreizehnte Zeuge: Traditions- und kompositionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu Lukas' Darstellung der Fruehzeit des Paulus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970) 54–105, who in addition cites parallels of the Lucan account with *Joseph and Aseneth*. Charles Hedrick, "Paul's Conversion/Call: A Comparative Analysis of the Three Reports in Acts," *JBL* 100 (1981) 415–432, finds a parallel in the healing and conversion of Ptolemy in the Coptic Acts of Peter. Norman Beck, "The Lukan Writer's Stories about the Call of Paul," *SBL 1983 Seminar Papers*, ed. K. H. Richards (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1983) 215, makes use of 1 Macc 15:15–21 and Dan 10:2–21. Lohfink, "Ein alttestamentliche Darstellung für Gotteserscheinungen in der Damaskusberichten (Apg. 9; 22; 26)," *BZ* 9 (1965) 247–253, and Manus, 173–181, find parallels in the Hebrew Scriptures, while Marvin W. Meyer, "The Light and Voice on the Damascus Road," *Forum* 2 (1986) 27–35, compares Scriptural parallels plus the texts from Nag Hammadi and Ras Shamra. Cf. also Conzelmann, *Commentary on the Acts*, 73. For a form-critical analysis of the account in Acts 9 as a "commissioning account," see Collins, 107–118; W. Vogels, "Les recits de vocation des prophetes," *NRT* 95 (1973) 1–24; Walter Zimmerli, *Ezekiel 1: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, Chapters 1–14*, trans. R. E. Clements ("Hermeneia"; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 100; also Benjamin J. Hubbard, "The Role of Commissioning Accounts in Acts," in *Perspectives on Luke-Acts*, ed. C. H. Talbert (Danville, VA: Association of Baptist Professors of Religion, 1978) 187–198. Against Zimmerli, see O. H. Steck, "Formgeschichtliche Bemerkungen zur Darstellung des Damaskusgeschehens in der Apostelgeschichte," *ZNW* pp. 20–28. Cf. also Manus, 197–181.

[62] See F. Noetscher, "Zur Auferstehung nach drei Tagen," *Bib* 35 (1954) 313: "Dass die Dreizahl in Mythus, Religion und Kult eine grosse rolle spielt, ist längst beobachtet worden." Following this assertion, Noetscher adds a survey of various studies on the number three in Greek and Semitic antiquity.

[63] Haenchen, *Acts*, 323.

[64] See *Didache*, 7:4; Justin Martyr, I *Apol.* 61; Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, 20; Lake and Cadbury, 102.

In summary, Acts 9:1–29 can be understood as a tradition which arose from a simple elaboration of certain bits of accurate information. While some of this elaboration may well stem from the author of Luke-Acts, the similarity of this tradition with what Paul was denying in Galatians 1 suggests that it goes back to those against whom the Apostle was writing. Those who formed the tradition, however, need not have seen themselves as enemies of Paul. This possibility is certainly true for the author of Luke-Acts.[65] As for Paul, his reaction to this tradition as reflected in Galatians suggests that he did not look upon those who misrepresented him so benignly. Even if Paul ever stopped to consider that such people may not really have been his enemies, he would probably have thought, "With friends like these, who needs enemies?"

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[65] So Jervell, "Paulus in der Apostelgeschichte und die Geschichte des Urchristentums," 378–392.

Group Solidarity in the Revelation of John

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The Revelation to John was addressed to Christian congregations in Asia Minor. Its author used it as a vehicle to encourage his audiences to hold firm to the true faith, as he defined the true faith. What was this faith, and why should the congregations have heeded the author's exhortations? The present essay will construct a theory of group solidarity, that is, of self-identification and loyalty, and then use the theory to analyze the text for data relevant to those questions.

A Theory of Group Solidarity

Sociological theories relevant to group solidarity may be placed on a spectrum of perspectives ranging from conflict to functionalist views. The extremes of this spectrum are epitomized by the work of Karl Marx and Friederich Engels (conflict) and that of Talcott Parsons (functionalist). The present essay will develop a mediating and eclectic position.

Marx and Engels described group solidarity as a function of economics and economics as a bitter class conflict. In nineteenth-century European capitalistic systems, those who owned the means of production controlled the value of two types of commodities: products and labor; as a result, they charged the highest price the market would bear for their products and paid the lowest wage possible for labor (Marx, 1906:146–151). This practice created a two-tiered society. On the upper level were the bourgeoisie, that is, the wealthy entrepreneurs and their functionaries who could afford all the luxuries and advantages their society allowed. This select group achieved its prosperity at the expense of the masses of exploited urban workers, the proletariat. The "more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society" (Marx & Engels, 1948:20) differed from the exploitation inherent in previous economic systems only in severity. Every society could be divided into haves and have-nots; capitalism merely "simplified the class antagonisms" (1948:9) and thus polarized the situation further.

The solution proposed for this exploitation was simple, straightforward, and idealistic. When the proletariat had finally absorbed too much abuse the "veiled civil war" would intensify into open revolution. The proletariat would win by virtue of sheer numerical advantage and thus gain control of the entire society. This class would have the status and power previously reserved to the bourgeoisie but would not repeat the mistakes of their predecessors. The newly dominant proletariat would insure justice and a decent standard of living for all by abolishing private property and, ultimately, class distinctions (1948:20–21, 23, 31). In other words, they would forfeit their own domination before other classes would have an opportunity to become fed up with the system and revolt (1948:20).

Marx and Engels wrote the *Communist Manifesto* to move society closer to this stage of open revolution. They asserted that proletarian political activity directed, for example, against imported goods or old patrician classes was simply a product of manipulation of this class by the bourgeoisie who needed their support in the political arena (1948:17).

The only solution to such exploitation was an international union of proletarians for the express purpose of overthrowing the domination of the bourgeoisie. In other words, the most appropriate basis for group solidarity was not national affiliation or religious/philosophical belief but one's own economic advantage.

Parsons, in some ways, was as idealistic as were Marx and Engels. He wrote to and about a relatively prosperous United States between the Depression and Vietnam, and his comfortable chair at Harvard may have closed his eyes to some of the more unpleasant aspects of his culture. As a result, he supported the seemingly desirable status quo and developed a theory of social action which favored the existing patterns of interaction.

Parsons divided his social action system into four component subsystems: social, cultural, personality, and behavioral (1971:6). The social sub-system encompassed a wide variety of attempts by individuals and groups within a society to relate to each other; the cultural subsystem was a collection of shared symbols and myths around which a society might unite; the personality subsystem included the constituent individuals' and groups' psychological compositions; and the behavioral subsystem categorized the society's attempts to interact with its physical environment (1977:4).

Each subsystem functioned primarily by means of one of Parsons' four pattern variables. Integration, the development of harmonious patterns of relationship within a society, was the function of the social system. Pattern-maintenance—the term is self-explanatory—was the major result of the cultural sub-system. Goal attainment, the attempts of individuals and groups within a society to accomplish their objectives, described the way in which the personality system operated. Finally, the behavioral system relied on adaptation, the modification of a group or individual to exist comfortably in an environment which could be modified only to a limited extent (1971:5).

A social group described in accordance with Parsons' theory would be characterized by a stability born of inertia. The group would be thoroughly set in its ways, and minor disturbances would precipitate only minor adjustments in the social action system. Real change could occur only when crises would ricochet through an entire group and make minor adjustments in its social action system ineffective. Thus, group solidarity in a Parsonian society or group was allegiance to an entire system of social action and a natural consequence of existence in that group. Such allegiance was almost invariably a conservative force.

Conflict and functionalist theorists agree that identification with and loyalty to a group are dependent on shared experience. Marx and Engels advocated that the working class unite around their shared experience of economic and political exploitation rather than around any particular values or symbols. Parsons, on the other hand, proposed a unified system of symbols and values, psychological characteristics, individuals' objectives, and social/economic status as an appropriate basis for such solidarity.

The theory to be used in the present analysis recasts the previous theorists' categories of status and value in functionalist terms. Group solidarity is a function, a result, of shared experience, and such experience generally falls into those two categories. The more individualistic categories of objectives and psychological composition are somewhat dependent on the other two. Thus, the basis of group solidarity advocated in the Revelation may be described in terms of status and/or values shared by a large proportion of the group. Conflict, recast as unity against a common enemy or obstacle, may be a significant component of either of these categories.

At this point it is possible to begin a two-part analysis of the basis of group solidarity advocated in the Revelation. The first part is an attempt to determine common elements in the status of the recipient communities and their individual members. The second is

an examination of some values and symbols which the author considered a suitable basis for such solidarity.

The Status of the Recipients of the Revelation

The concept of status measures the variables of lifestyle and its resulting satisfaction or lack thereof. Max Weber proposed two sets of criteria by which this measurement should be accomplished. Class status describes these variables in terms of economic criteria (1947:424), and social status in terms of prestige or respect (1947:428). The two types of status, according to Weber, are related but not in a clear pattern of cause and effect.

The author of the Revelation addressed his work to churches in seven cities of Asia Minor: Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamum, Thyatira, Sardis, Philadelphia, and Laodicea. In other words, he wrote on the assumption that his audiences were thoroughly urban. The exploitation of the countryside by the cities is widely attested; see, for example, Galen, De bon.mal.sucis, 1:1–7. Furthermore, Pergamum (the seat of Roman provincial administration), Ephesus, Thyatira, and Laodicea were quite wealthy. The audiences of the Revelation, by virtue of their urban provenance, were not at the bottom of the economic pyramid.

The author's assumptions regarding his audiences' literacy rates provide further evidence concerning economic status. "Blessed be the reader and those who listen to these prophetic words and obey what is written in it [sic]" (Rev 1:3). The author assumed that his work would be read aloud to his congregations. Apparently, the ability to read was rare but far from non-existent in these churches. There seems to have been no question of whether a literate person could be found to read the Revelation in each group.

Education was the exclusive privilege of the well-to-do during Roman antiquity. Quintilian provided a detailed description of the long and arduous education necessary for the development of competent orators (Inst. Orat., passim). Such a training required adequate financial resources to provide for one's support for well over a decade of intensive study. The extant data about many of the educated persons of this period corroborate the inferences drawn from Quintilian's description. Plato, Aristotle, Alexander, Cicero, Augustus, Marcus Aurelius and others are known to have possessed considerable wealth and leisure. The author of the Revelation could not assume that his audiences would have opportunities to take advantage of such training, but he could expect each to have a few literate, and thus somewhat educated, members. This situation leads to the conclusion that though the audiences were not at the bottom of the economic pyramid, neither were they at its pinnacle.

Adela Collins identified the question of whether or not the consumption of meat offered to idols was permissible as a major issue for the author of the Revelation (1985:210–215; 1986:316–318). The author's congregations apparently contested this issue in as lively a manner as did one of the Pauline churches (1 Corinthians 8–10). The major difference in the situation seems to have been the outcome; the seer of the Revelation held his followers to a more stringent standard than that which Paul advocated for the "strong" among the Corinthians (Rev 2:14– 16, 20, 24–25, cf., 1 Cor 8:7–13, 10:23–11:1).

Gerd Theissen analysed the Corinthian quarrel in detail and concluded that it was basically economic in nature. The wealthy could buy meat regularly; the bulk of the population, however, could afford this luxury only on rare occasions such as a public distribution of meat or a large-scale cultic celebration. (1975:275–279). Thus, the wealthy and influential, by necessity, would need the option of eating meat offered to idols for the sake of their regular social activities. Others, in contrast, could either avoid such

activities or engage in them only on rare occasions and thus consider them aberrations. That the question of eating meat offered to idols was a major issue in the author's communities indicates that these communities probably had some well-to-do members for whom such activity was commonplace; that the author could credibly assume a stringent position regarding the issue indicates that these wealthy members did not dominate the congregations.

The attitude towards wealth reflected in the Revelation is predominantly negative. The church at Laodicea, though rich, was completely lacking in the attributes which characterize a faithful and effective church (3:17). Its counterpart at Smyrna was the opposite (i.e., poor and faithful [2:8–11]). A few chapters later, the rider on the black horse was given authority to destroy much of the supply of subsistence grains but ordered not to harm cash crops such as olives and grapes (6:5–7). This episode could reflect cynicism and fatalism as much as it does affirmation of wealth. Rome, parodied as a prostitute, was dressed in royal garb (17:4, 18:16), filled with luxury items (18:11–13), destroyed (ch. 18, passim), and mourned by those who earned their livelihood by providing for the wants of the wealthy (18:3, 9–19). Finally, the new Jerusalem was wealthier by far than Rome (21:9–22:5). This position regarding wealth suggests that the author of the Revelation assumed that his audiences would appreciate a disparaging attitude towards wealth, perhaps with some cynicism mixed in for good measure, and that they had some hope of gaining wealth.

Tina Pippin suggested that the Revelation was written in a situation of relatively clear-cut class conflict (1987:85ff.). The present examination, in contrast, suggests that the author assumed a more complex situation among his audiences. The fact that they were urban and the lack of reference to any public dole indicate that they were not at the bottom of the economic pyramid. The assumption that most of the Christians had limited education, the author's stringent position regarding meat offered to idols, and the disparaging attitude towards wealth indicate that they were not at the top of the pyramid either. The existence of the quarrel over meat offered to idols and the varied positions of the seven churches on the spectrum of wealth and poverty suggest that there were probably some very wealthy and some very poor Christians in the seer's communities. Whatever the class status of the majority of the author's followers, it is clear that economics did not provide for them the shared experience necessary for the development of group solidarity.

Throughout her recent writings, Collins has investigated the social status of the audiences of the Revelation in terms of these congregations' relationships to Jews, other Christians, and the civil authorities (1985, 1986; passim). She has concluded that the author used differentiation from and vilification of these groups as a basis of group solidarity among his followers (1985:217–218; 1986:318–320). The conflicts reinforced the communities' understandings of themselves as distinct organizations.

Conflict with the Jews is mentioned in two of the shorter letters incorporated into the Revelation. The letter to the church at Smyrna accused the local Jews of blasphemy and called them the "synagogue of Satan," apparently because they instigated legal proceedings by the civil authorities against the Christians (2:9–10). The Jews of Philadelphia, likewise, were called liars and "the synagogue of Satan who call themselves Jews" (3:9). On the other hand, however, the author affirmed his churches' Jewish roots (7:1–8, ch. 12), so he does not seem to have advocated the use of anti-Jewish sentiment as a major component of his communities' self-understandings.

The conflict with Christians regarding meat offered to idols was as limited as that with Jews. This issue apparently caused dissension in only two of the seer's communities: Pergamum (2:14–16) and Thyatira (2:20–25). Those who ate tainted meat in Thyatira and

their leader, "Jezebel," were being given time to repent, but the author expected to remove them from his congregation. Likewise, the Nicolaitans in Pergamum still had some time to change their ways (2:16).

The author's threats to expel his Christian opponents from his churches reflect a method of internal discipline widely practiced in Christian communities of the period. Paul ordered his Corinthian congregation to expel a member who slept with his father's wife (1 Cor 5:1–5), and the author of the first gospel regarded this punishment as a last resort which was acceptable when all lesser measures had failed (Matt 18:15–19). The author of the fourth gospel implied that the Jewish leaders of his period had the option of expelling recalcitrant members from their synagogues after a suitable inquisition (9:13–34), and the later rabbis used this punishment to express their condemnation of serious offenses such as incest, adultery, idolatry, and child sacrifice (m.Ker. 1:1).

Collins overemphasizes the author's quarrels with some Jews and some Christians with whom some of his followers came into contact. This author condemned the two Jewish communities which gave his churches problems, and he carefully built a case for expulsion of the Christians who ate meat offered to idols. (Notice the similarity between the accusations against these Christians and some of the offenses for which the mishnah prescribed similar punishment!) Nevertheless, Collins' conclusion regarding these quarrels is well taken after modification as follows: the author of the Revelation narrated these quarrels to all of his churches in order to reinforce their group solidarity on a non-Jewish and sectarian Christian basis. These quarrels, however, did not represent common experience of sufficient scope to form a basis for group solidarity among members of all seven of the author's churches.

Tension between the seer and the civil authorities is evident throughout the Revelation. The work contains only one reference to an execution already perpetrated, that of Antipas at Pergamum (2:13). The possibility of future executions, however, is depicted vividly and repeatedly (e.g., 2:10, 6:9–11, 11:7, 14:3–5). This attitude accords well with the conclusion of Collins that Domitian instigated no systematic persecution of Christians in Asia Minor (1984:104).

The seer mentioned the expected method of execution: beheading (20:4). This assumption provides some indication of the Christians' status in Asia Minor. Appian recorded Octavian's proscription order with the specification that the killing of the triumvirate's political enemies would be verified by the presentation of their heads (Civil Wars 4:2:7–11), and Suetonius narrated the actual presentation of Brutus' head at Caesar's altar (Aug. 13:2). Josephus related the beheading in summary fashion of a Roman soldier by Cummanus (Ant. 20:117) and that of the Zealot leader Theudas (Ant. 20:98), apparently in contrast to the Romans' usual policy of crucifying Jewish troublemakers. Beheading was a relatively merciful method of execution and was therefore reserved by the Romans for offenders of some status.

The social status which the author of the Revelation assumed that his recipients held is reasonably clear. These communities regarded themselves as non-Jewish, sectarian Christians. How the local Jews and some individual Christians may have regarded these communities may have varied from the standard which the author assumed and advocated as the norm. The members of these communities had highly variable relations with the Jews and with other Christians. Only two seem to have had serious problems with the local Jews, and the same number regarded the existence of Christians with more inclusive tendencies as a major issue. The author expected that his followers would be harassed by the civil authorities but that they would have at least the protection of some sort of judicial procedure and the dignity of beheading. Perhaps this state of affairs suggests that some of the Christians were included in the body of ordinary citizens with some rights

but little voice in government as described in some detail by Collins (1985:189–190), but such a conclusion would be hypothetical.

The social status of the recipients of the Revelation, like their class status, did not provide adequate common ground for the establishment of group solidarity. Relations with Jewish neighbors and more liberal Christians varied among cities, and the civil authorities seem to have provided both a degree of protection and the possibility of intimidation even to the point of execution. The seer assumed that most of his followers considered themselves more or less impoverished, definitely non-Jewish, sectarian, and both intimidated and protected by the provincial and local administrations. Some of his communities, however, had a significant number of members who did not fit that mold. Class and social status did more to divide than to unite the author's followers. Thus, it is necessary to turn to a consideration of the values which the author espoused as an appropriate basis for group solidarity among his followers.

Values Advocated in the Revelation

John Gager described the Revelation as a myth which might give its downtrodden recipients some degree of bliss in the present. He proposed, more specifically, that "the dominant structural feature of the book is not the pattern of sevens but the simpler and more immediate pattern of oscillating oppositions" (1975:54). The Revelation began with the author's exile to Patmos, a scene of oppression and despair (1:9), immediately followed by a vision of the heavenly throne room, a picture of victory and hope (1:12–20). This pattern of alternating episodes of oppression/despair and victory/hope continued until the conclusion of the myth with the establishment of the new heaven, new earth, and new Jerusalem (1975:53).

If one were to apply either an authorial intention or a reader response theory to the Revelation, he/she would most likely assume that the intended audiences were Christian and basically loyal to the author. This situation makes Gager's proposal untenable in its present form. The sets of judgments which he interprets as episodes of oppression/despair are, in reality, exhortations to the Christian audiences to remain hopeful; ch. 13 is the only pericope which gives no evidence of hope. As in other apocalyptic writings, the judgment of this world ushers in the establishment of a new world which will be administered for the benefit of the faithful, so the world's despair is the believers' hope. The basic opposition of the Revelation is not the one proposed by Gager but that of the present world dominated and exploited by Rome to the ideal world dominated and administered by God for the benefit of his people.

In a very real sense, then, the structure of the Revelation may be described as a protracted power struggle between two empires: Rome's and that of God. The Roman Empire, a well-known entity, is parodied throughout the work and made the villain *par excellence*. God's empire, the unknown entity, is described in terms of its known counterpart. This polyphonic technique is used in the description of forensic structures, ruler and empire, and final destiny.

As noted above, the author of the Revelation expected the civil authorities to subject his followers to a thorough inquisition. This author was exiled to Patmos, apparently as a result of a judicial procedure (1:9), and he warned his followers to expect even harsher treatment. The harassment of the church at Smyrna by the city's Jews could lead to imprisonment and trial (2:9–10), and trial for Christians in any of the churches could lead to execution (6:9, 12:10?, 20:4).

Pliny the younger, a governor of Bithynia during the early part of the second century, wrote to his emperor Trajan for approval of the methods he wanted to use in proceedings

against Christians. Trajan's favorable reply suggests that the methods were well-known and used widely by provincial administrators. Since this correspondence took place around 112 C.E. and dealt with a province just north of Asia, it is plausible that Domitian's administrators less than twenty years previously may have used similar methods.

Pliny did not ferret out offenders in any systematic manner. He dealt only with those who were accused before him and gave questionable cases the benefit of the doubt (Epis. 10:96:5–7). Whenever an accused denied that he/she was a Christian, the governor verified the denial by use of the imperial cult as a litmus test:

> . . . I considered that I should dismiss any who denied that they were or ever had been Christians when they had repeated after me a formula of invocation to the gods and had made offerings of wine and incense to your statue (which I had ordered to be brought into court for this purpose along with the images of the gods), and furthermore had reviled the name of Christ: none of which things, I understand, any genuine Christian can be induced to do. (Epis. 10:96:5–6 [1975: 2:287–289])

Forensic use of the imperial cult was combined with recognition of the major Roman deities and explicit denial of Christ. The author of the Revelation recognized the seriousness of the proceedings: "He was allowed to give life to the image of the beast so that the image of the beast might speak and act with the result that such as would not worship the image of the beast would be executed" (Rev 13:15). Even though the consequences of failure to worship Rome (symbolized by its deities and the imperial cult) were extreme, the author considered it necessary for his followers to accept these consequences for the sake of Christian identity as a distinct group; if they worshipped the same entities as non-Christians, they would be no different from the non-Christians.

The author, however, encouraged his audiences with a carrot as well as a stick. The governor's judgment would not be final. After the fifth seal was opened, the victims of Roman judgment asked God to judge their accusers, and he promised to do so (6:9–11). These victims later had special privileges as the 144,000 (14:1–5) and millennial judges (20:4–6). Finally, God himself condemned Rome and her servants for their brutality (18:5, 20:11–15).

The requirements for divine vindication were exactly the opposite of those for Roman acquittal. The Christian forced to choose between Rome and life on the one hand and Christ and possible death on the other had to accept the latter alternative (2:10, 14:1–5, 24:4–6, 11–15). God's verdict would be the opposite of the Roman governor's, and a guilty plea in God's court would bring about even more unpleasant consequences than would one in the governor's.

The author of the Revelation parodied the Roman Empire in two different ways. In ch. 13, he described it as a beast from the sea with ten horns and seven heads (vv 1–2). Most commentators regard the wounded head which was healed (v 3) as a reference to the *Nero redivivus* myth (e.g., Charles, 1920:1:350). Thus, the empire was personified by its seemingly immortal emperor. This creature was Satan's servant (13:4), and the beast from the land (vv 11–17) was the empire/emperor's servant. Perhaps the second beast represented the provincial administration which forced Christians to worship Rome on pain of death.

The empire was parodied as a prostitute in chs. 17–18. She sat on a beast which recalled the beast from the sea of ch. 13 but represented the political symbols of the seven hills and *Nero redivivus* much more clearly (17:7–13). This parody added economic data to the political picture taken from ch. 13. The prostitute was dressed in royal garments (17:4, 18:7, 16) and filled with luxury goods (18:11–15). She obtained this extreme wealth by

exploiting less powerful peoples and scheming with merchants and petty rulers (17:15–18:3).

The status of the ruler of God's empire was as great as that of the emperor of Rome. The initial vision of the throne room (1:12–20) portrayed an unbelievably majestic ruler with several symbols of purity (e.g., several gold items, white hair, feet like refined bronze). The vision of the worship in this room described the ruler's in terms which one might consider exaggerated except in reference to the emperor (Lohmeyer, 1970:17): 24 elders, lightning and thunder, and four living creatures worshipping the ruler (4:2–11).

The wealth of God's empire was extreme as was that of the Roman Empire. The new Jerusalem rested on a foundation of precious stones, had large pearls for gates, and was itself made of gold (21:9–21). This unbelievably large city ruled a new heaven and earth as Rome had ruled the old earth. The difference between the divine and the Roman empires lay in the methods by which they obtained and kept their wealth. Rome used repression and exploitation while the divine empire was God's creation (21:2). The divine empire collected wealth from the kings of the earth but did so in an ethical manner; nothing impure was allowed into the new Jerusalem (21:24–27).

The Lamb personified the divine empire as the emperor did the Roman. The Lamb was described in terms of his counterpart; he had seven horns and seven eyes and had been killed and raised from the dead (5:6). As a result, he was worshipped as was the emperor (5:9–14). After the Roman empire was destroyed, the Lamb, along with the one on the throne, served as the new Jerusalem's temple and its light source (21:22–23).

The divine empire was described as an intensified version of the Roman Empire. It was ruled and personified by a Lamb with features and a history comparable to those of *Nero redivivus*. It was even wealthier than the Roman Empire but obtained its wealth in an ethical and harmless manner. Christians, who expected to be treated as the ultimate outsiders in the Roman Empire, could look forward to being the ultimate insiders in its divine counterpart. Finally, the divine empire destroyed and superseded the Roman Empire.

Conclusion

Group solidarity is defined as identification of oneself with and loyalty to one's group. It is based on a core of shared experiences which generally fall into two categories: status and values. Conflict, that is, unity against a common enemy or obstacle, may be an integral component of either category.

The author of the Revelation wrote in part to advocate a particular basis of group unity among his followers. Geographical proximity was out of the question, as his followers were scattered among churches in seven cities of Asia Minor. Status was not any more useful than geographical location. The Revelation assumed that its listeners could be placed on a variety of locations along the spectra of class and social status.

The author turned to values as a basis for group solidarity. He portrayed the divine empire as an intensified version of and heir apparent to the Roman Empire. The divine empire had its forensic procedures in which the expectations were opposite of those of the Roman courts; one must worship Christ rather than Caesar at the cost of eternal damnation. In addition, the divine empire had greater wealth than the Roman and also its own ruler who had been killed and raised from the dead. The differences between the two empires were minimal.

What basis did the author of the Revelation advocate for support of the divine empire rather than its Roman counterpart? He apparently expected his followers, regardless of their status in the province of Asia, to be treated as enemies by the officials of the empire.

They would probably have this status regardless of the outcomes of any trials. Loyalty to the divine empire served the same purpose for the author of the Revelation as did participation and position christologies for Paul (Theissen, 1983:320, cf., Suetonius, Aug., 40:3). It provided the only hope of social advancement for the author's followers and united them by making them all citizens of a single entity regardless of their *Sitz im Leben* in the present.

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Stories of Reading: Doing Gospel Criticism As/With a "Reader"

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I. Adventures of the "Reader"

From being an observer in the wings or at best a minor participant, the *reader* gradually acceded to the role of protagonist in literary studies through the 1960s and 1970s. By the beginning of the 1980s one could scarcely pick up a literary journal without finding articles and book reviews (if not the entire issue) devoted to the continuing adventures of the "amazing reader in the labyrinth of literature."[1] During this time the amazing reader had many aliases and roles, engaging the text or emerging from it in guises such as the Implied Reader, the Informed Reader, the Narratee, and the Model Reader. The carnival also featured the Reader in the Text and the Flesh-and-Blood Reader, the Competent Reader and the Literent, the Encoded or Inscribed Reader, the Subjective Reader, Superreader, the Newreaders, and the willful Misreader. The carnival has now largely packed up and left, though it has left a new sense of what it means to be a reader—and a critic—in its wake.[2]

[1] Robert Rogers' expression ("Amazing Reader in the Labyrinth of Literature," *Poetics Today* 3 [1982] 31–46).

[2] The following introductions to reader-response criticism are especially insightful: Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982) 64–83; Elizabeth Freund, *The Return of the Reader* (New Accents; London/New York: Methuen, 1987); Steven Mailloux, *Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in the Study of American Fiction* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982) 19–65; Susan R. Suleiman, "Introduction: Varieties of Audience-Oriented Criticism," pp. 3–45 in *The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation*, ed. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Jane P. Tompkins, "An Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism," pp. ix–xxvi in *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). (Tompkins and Mailloux interpret the field from a pramatist standpoint, Culler and Freund from a deconstructionist one.) William Ray, *Literary Meaning: From Phenomenology to Deconstruction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) includes important (and difficult) discussions of different reader-response critics, while Robert C. Holub, *Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction* (New Accents; London/New York: Methuen, 1984) treats *Rezeptionsaesthetik*, the German trajectory of reader-response theory. In addition, there are some notable discussions by New Testament scholars: Robert M. Fowler, "Who Is 'the Reader' in Reader Response Criticism?" *Semeia* 31 (1985) 5–23 (possibly the best starting point for those entirely unfamiliar with the field); Edgar V. McKnight, *The Bible and the Reader: An Introduction to Literary Criticism* (Philadelphia:

It should not be supposed, however, that reader-response criticism is, or ever was, a conceptually unified criticism; rather it is a spectrum of contrasting and conflicting positions. Along the spectrum some have been concerned with how actual readers read, others with the factors (institutional, sociocultural, linguistic) that delimit reading in the first place. Others still have centered on the notion that *the (narrative) text projects an image of its audience, immanent in the text and coextensive with it, as fictional a construct as any of its characters.* For to read any text is necessarily to engage, in and through its rhetoric (however overt or subtle it be), a projection of the reader which that text requires. This projection is proferred as a *role,* one which may be taken on or rejected but which may not be circumvented. To read any literary text, in this view, is always in some sense to read "through" its "reader"-construct, to dialogue with it, and through it with its "author"-construct (the image the author which the text puts forth). Recent literary exegesis of the gospels, attentive to the "strong" roles of reading that these texts enjoin, has found this reader-in-the-text approach especially congenial.[3]

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Fortress Press, 1985); idem, *Postmodern Use of the Bible: The Emergence of Reader-Oriented Criticism* (Decatur, GA: Abingdon Press, forthcoming); Bernard C. Lategan, "Current Issues in the Hermeneutical Debate," *Neotestamentica* 18 (1984) 1–17; Wolfgang Schenk, "Die Rollen der Leser oder der Mythos *des Lesers?*" *Linguistica Biblica* 60 (1988) 61–81. Cf. J. Severino Croatto, *Biblical Hermeneutics: Toward a Theory of Reading as the Production of Meaning,* trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987). Tompkins, *Reader-Response Criticism,* 233–72, remains the best bibliography of the field available, and for a complementary list, with a German as opposed to American bias, see Siegfried J. Schmidt, "Selected Bibliography on Interpretation (1970–1982)," *Poetics* 12 (1983) 277–92.

[3] Recent reader-oriented gospel exegeses, most of which center on the intratextual reader, include Janice Capel Anderson, "Double and Triple Stories, the Implied Reader, and Redundancy in Matthew," *Semeia* 31 (1985) 71–89; idem, "Matthew: Gender and Reading," *Semeia* 28 (1983) 3–27; Jouette M. Bassler, "The Parable of the Loaves," *Journal of Religion* 66 (1986) 157–72; Mary Ann Beavis, "The Trial before the Sanhedrin: Reader Response and Greco-Roman Readers," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 581–96; Fred W. Burnett, "Prolegomena to Reading Matthew's Eschatological Discourse: Redundancy and the Implied Reader in Matthew," *Semeia* 31 (1985) 91–109; R. Alan Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design* (Foundations and Facets; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 203–228; Richard A. Edwards, *Matthew's Story of Jesus* (Stories of Jesus Series; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985); idem, "Uncertain Faith: Matthew's Portrait of the Disciples," pp. 47–61 in *Discipleship in the New Testament,* ed. Fernando F. Segovia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985); Lyle Eslinger, "The Wooing of the Woman at the Well: Jesus, the Reader and Reader Response Criticism" *Literature & Theology 1 (1987) 167–83*; Robert M. Fowler, *"Let the Reader Understand": Reader-Response Criticism and the Gospel of Mark* (Indiana Studies in Biblical Literature; Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, forthcoming); idem, *Loaves and Fishes: The Function of the Feeding Stories in the Gospel of Mark* (SBLDS 54; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981); idem, "Reading Matthew Reading Mark: Observing the First Steps toward Meaning-as-Reference in the Synoptic Gospels," pp. 1–16 in *SBL 1986 Seminar Papers,* ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986); idem, "The Rhetoric of Direction and Indirection in the Gospel of Mark," forthcoming in *Semeia* (see final item); idem, "Thoughts on the History of Reading Mark's Gospel," pp. 120–30 in *Proceedings; Eastern Great Lakes Biblical Society and Midwest Society of Biblical Literature,* vol. 4, ed. Phillip Sigal, 1984; Fred L. Horton, Jr., "Parenthetical

II. The Exegete as a Hero(ine) in a Story of Reading

If we add to the foregoing that the hypothetical recipient of the individual gospel tends also to be conceived as a *virginal reader,* exposed to the text for the first time, then we have a broad working definition of reader-response criticism in the context of gospel studies. Classic biblical exegesis bases itself on the endless refining of multiple readings—readings to which the cumulative impact of a first reading is more or less irrelevant. In a first reading, a verse or passage receives its meaning principally from everything which precedes it. But in exegesis in the mode of redaction criticism, and more especially in the mode of composition criticism, the exegete's overview of the *total* message of the biblical work is the primary control in interpreting any part of it. Thus, the role of reading which

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Pregnancy: The Conception and Birth of Jesus in Matthew 1:18–25," pp. 175–89 in *SBL 1987 Seminar Papers,* ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987); Terence J. Keegan, *Interpreting the Bible: A Popular Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics* (Mahwah, NJ/New York: Paulist Press, 1985) 115–27; Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 120ff.; P. P. A. Kotze, "John and Reader's Response," *Neotestamentica* 19 (1985) 50–63; Bernard C. Lategan and Willem S. Vorster, *Text and Reality: Aspects of Reference in Biblical Texts* (Semeia Studies 14; Atlanta: Scholars Press; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) 67ff.; Norman R. Petersen, "The Reader in the Gospel," *Neotestamentica* 18 (1984) 38–51; idem, "When Is the End Not the End? Reflections on the Ending of Mark's Narrative," *Interpretation* 34 (1980) 151–66; Gary A. Phillips, " 'This Is a Hard Saying. Who Can Be Listener to It?': Creating a Reader in John 6," *Semeia* 26 (1983) 32–56; idem, "History and Text: The Reader in Context in Matthew's Parable Discourse," *Semeia* 31 (1985) 111–38; Susan M. Praeder, "Jesus-Paul, Peter-Paul and Jesus-Peter Parallelisms in Luke-Acts: A History of Reader Response," pp. 23–40 in *SBL 1984 Seminar Papers,* ed. Kent Harold Richards (Chico, CA; Scholars Press, 1984); James L. Resseguie, "Reader-Response Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels," *JAAR* 52 (1984) 307–24; David Rhoads and Donald Michie, *Mark as Story; An Introduction to the Narrative of a Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1982) 137–42; Bernard Brandon Scott. "How to Mismanage a Miracle: Reader-Response Criticism," pp. 439–49 in *SBL 1983 Seminar Papers,* ed. Kent Harold Richards (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983); idem, "A Master's Praise: Luke 16:1–8a," *Biblica* 64 (1983) 173–88; idem, "The King's Accounting: Matthew 18:23–34," *JBL* 104 (1985) 429–42; idem, *The Word of God in Words: Reading and Preaching* (Fortress Resources for Preaching; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) 45–56; Jeffrey L. Staley, *The Print's First Kiss: A Rhetorical Investigation of the Implied Reader in the Fourth Gospel* (SBLDS 82; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988); Augustine Stock, *Call to Discipleship: A Literary Study of Mark's Gospel* (Good New Studies 1; Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1982) 205–208; Robert C. Tannehill, "The Disciples in Mark: The Function of a Narrative Role," *Journal of Religion* 57 (1977) 386–405; Anthony C. Thiselton, "Reader-Response Hermeneutics, Action Models, and the Parables of Jesus," pp. 79–113 in Roger Lundin, Anthony C. Thiselton, and Clarence Walhout, *The Responsibility of Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Exeter, U.K: Paternoster Press, 1985). Finally, see "Reader Response Approaches to Biblical and Secular Texts," ed. Robert Detweiler (*Semeia* 31, 1985), "Reading a Text: Source, Reception, Setting" (*Neotestamentica* 18, 1984), and a forthcoming issue of *Semeia,* ed. Edgar V. McKnight, consisting of selected papers from the SNTS seminar, "The Role of the Reader in the Interpretation of the New Testament."

commentators such as these find written into the gospel text, and which they attempt to reenact, is one which implies supreme familiarity with every detail of the text in advance. Contrast the typical practice of the literary critic when s/he turns his/her attention to the role of reading inscribed, or anticipated, in the gospel text. Upon the usual paraphrase of the story, characteristic of narrative criticism,[4] a second story is superimposed. This is a *story of reading,*[5] in which the interpreter, approaching the evangelist's story as if for the first time, narrates a tale of anticipations and reversals, of puzzles, enigmas, and the struggles to solve them, of beliefs and presuppositions challenged and overthrown. The "reader" is the hero(ine) of this story of reading and functions as a fictional character within it. Her fresh, virginal responses to the text distinguish her from the jaded, voyeuristic critic who records them. Jesus usually plays the supporting role, as the one whose enigmatic words and deeds supply the complicating factors which fuel the plot of the story of reading. Every obscurity in the gospel with which an exegete has ever had to wrestle, every enigma or lacuna, may become a plot-engendering complication in a story of reading. The exegete's workaday attempts to make sense of a difficult text become the subject matter for a script in which a hypothetical reader, fresh to the text and capable of being surprised by it (unlike the jaded critic), is let loose in an adventure of reading. The exegete's workaday frustrations are narrativized and allegorized in this script in the form of suspenseful setbacks and befuddlements encountered by the reader on his/her journey. And the exegete's arrival at a satisfactory solution to the set of problems is allegorized as the happy ending to the story in which the reader finds enlightenment at last.[6] Redaction criticism has no sustained, fleshed-out story of reading of this sort. There is no unfolding, suspenseful, moment-by-moment side to the redaction critic's reading. His/her assumed role vis-a-vis the text is one of intimate familiarity—that of a lifelong spouse as opposed to a virgin bride.

III. But What if the Original "Readers" Were Listening?

But are the recipients which the gospels posit really *readers*? In thus conceiving them do we not run the risk of transferring the psychocultural assumptions of a typographic (i.e., print-centered) culture back into an ancient oral and scribal milieu? New Testament

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[4] See, e.g., Werner H. Kelber, *Mark's Story of Jesus* (Stories of Jesus Series; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979); Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story;* Robert Kysar, *John's Story of Jesus* (Stories of Jesus Series; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984); Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation. Volume One: The Gospel according to Luke* (Foundations and Facets; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).

[5] This expression is a coinage of Jonathan Culler; see Culler, *On Deconstruction,* 64–83, and idem, "Problems in the Theory of Fiction," *Diacritics* 14 (1984) 3–4.

[6] Bassler, "The Parable of the Loaves," is, for me, the paradigmatic example of narrativized reader-response criticism in recent gospel work. Other related examples include Edwards, *Matthew's Story of Jesus;* idem, "Uncertain Faith"; Eslinger, "The Wooing of the Woman"; Fowler, *Loaves and Fishes;* idem, "The Rhetoric of Direction and Indirection"; Keegan, *Interpreting the Bible,* 115–29; Kotze, "John and Reader's Response"; Resseguie, "Reader-Response Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels"; Tannehill, "The Disciples in Mark."

scholars who have seen orality-literacy studies come of age in neighboring fields of the humanities and social sciences[7] fault historical criticism and reader-response criticism alike for such anomalies:

> Contemporary biblical scholarship has consistently assumed that the relationship of the original audience of the biblical literature was a relationship of readers to texts. Discussions about "the reader" and "the text" abound in 20th century historical critical exegesis. While there are often some qualifications of this paradigm with phrases such as "readers or hearers" and "audience," the general assumption is that bibical books such as the Gospel of Mark were read as documents by a single reader who read the document in silence. Thus, literary criticism of biblical texts has uncritically appropriated the paradigms of works such as Wolfgang Iser's *The Implied Reader* with the apparent assumption that a modern and an ancient reader's relationship to the text is the same.[8]

(Many reader-oriented gospel critics take their lead from Iser, as we shall see.) But it would seem that throughout most of ancient history readings were public readings, that even in private, reading was normally done aloud, and that there are no signs of anything that might be construed as silent reading in the biblical tradition.[9] The gospels, therefore, would have been read aloud, either from a manuscript or from memory, preeminently in a public setting. This would hardly raise many eyebrows in the New Testament guild.

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[7] "Since 1960 more than 1,000 books and articles on matters of speech and writing have appeared in fields as diverse as Slavica, Arabic studies, Judaica, Vedic Sanscrit, Old English, French, Spanish and German, a host of African traditions, classics, philosophy, medieval studies, comparative literature, linguistics, folklore studies, and so forth" (Werner H. Kelber, "Biblical Hermeneutics and the Ancient Art of Communication: A Response," *Semeia* 39 [1987] 97).

[8] Thomas E. Boomershine, "Peter's Denial as Polemic or Confession," *Semeia* 39 (1987) 51–52. Cf. Kelber, "The Ancient Art of Communication," 98–99; idem, "Narrative as Interpretation and Interpretation as Narrative: Hermeneutical Reflections on the Gospels," *Semeia* 39 (1987) 124; Walter J. Ong, S.J., *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (New Accents; London/New York: Methuen, 1982), 171.

Kelber's ambitious and controversial *The Oral and Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) led the way in the full-scale appropriation of orality-literacy studies for New Testament work. Cf. Walter J. Ong, S.J., "Gospel, Existence, and Print," *Modern Language Quarterly* 35 (1974) 66–77; idem, "*Maranatha:* Death and Life in the Text of the Book," pp. 230–71 in *Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture* (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1977); idem, *The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History* (2d ed; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) passim; idem, "The Psychodynamics of Oral Memory and Narrative: Some Implications for Biblical Studies" pp. 55–73 in *The Pedagogy of God's Image: Essays on Symbol and the Religious Imagination,* ed. Robert Masson (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982); Lou H. Silberman, ed., "Orality, Aurality and Biblical Narrative" (*Semeia* 39, 1987).

[9] Boomershine, "Peter's Denial," 52–54. Cf. Moses Hadas, *Ancilla to Classical Reading* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

Where the guild has missed out, however, in the view of the orality-literacy specialists, is in failing to realize that the *aural* appropriation of a text (in a public reading, say) fosters a markedly different way of conceptualizing it than the predominantly *visual* appropriation of a private, silent reading. The utter regularity, completedness, and compactness of the modern printed text, its portability and perfect reduplicability, all encourage its conceptualization as object, artifact, and static spatial form.[10] This is yet more true of the biblical text with its numbered chapters and verses. These late-appended numbers achieve their apotheosis in the print culture; enveloping the text-object in a handy reference grid they foster the precision, quantification, and descriptivism of a "scientific" scholarly method. With the synopsis, the concordance, the lexicon and the textual apparatus they become the exegete's indispensible "tools" (a tool being something one uses on an object). A rigorous comparative method like redaction criticism would be inconceivable without an equally rigorous reification of the text. Clearly, in attempting to play out the roles of the audiences envisioned by the evangelists, historical exegetes have failed to give due weight to the fact that these audiences were *listeners* first and foremost. Similarly, current literary exegesis, which tends to conceive of the text in terms of wholeness, the interrelation and integration of parts, well-formedness, etc. (all object-related terms and spatial metaphors), is often the unwitting purveyor of print-derived habits of thought.

At first blush, reader-response critics of the gospels would seem to emerge with more egg on their faces than anyone else. After all, to dub the evangelist's intended listening audience "the reader,"[11] and then produce minute analyses of a "reading" that in all probability never occurred—at least not in the modern, private, silent sense—would seem the ultimate waste of time. But paradoxically the situation may be exactly the reverse. It may well be that the reader-response exegetes do (inadvertent) justice to the oral-aural factor in a way that redaction critics and narrative critics do not. If the gospels were originally designed to be read aloud and in public (i.e., if they are products of a culture with a heavy oral residue), historical exegetes need to find a way to reduce their print-based proclivity to maximally reify texts, to overcome their hypervisual bias, in order to

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[10] Cf. Ong, *Orality and Literacy*, 122, 125–27.

[11] It should be noted that Bassler, for one, would want to deny that her reader-construct is a kind of synecdochic stand-in for the author's *intended* audience. Iser's construct of the implied reader, which she employs, "is not the historically intended reader, nor even an idealized informed reader, who could be expected to penetrate various historical or literary allusions in the text" ("The Parable of the Loaves," 160–61). Instead "Iser seeks to uncover what one could call the natural force of the text, its innate potential for communication, and he is unconcerned with the author's original intention or with the text's actual readers" (ibid., 16). Contrast the following statement which her subsequent analysis elicits: "It is clear that the two feeding miracles have been *deliberately constructed* to highlight the disciples' lack of understanding in preparation for the important unit [Mark 8:22–10:52] that follows. It also seems clear that the effect of these pericopes is to force the reader to share this lack of understanding to some degree. . . ." (ibid., 171, my emphasis). She shies away here and elsewhere from explicitly ascribing the text's effects on the reader to the author's "deliberate construction" (i.e., intentionality), but neither does she explicitly try to distinquish what the author intended from what the text actually effects. Bassler's reader construct thus qualifies by default as a species of the genus "intended reader."

"recover" something of this primitive oral-aural experience. Reader-oriented critics of the gospels inadvertently found a way to do just that when they began to harness the reception theory of Wolfgang Iser.[12] It is with the "reader" (the private, silent variety) that Iser is preoccupied, and not with the hearer, but a reader whose experience of the text is a radically moment-by-moment, *time-bound* one. And the retrospective-prospective side of reading which preoccupies Iser—the so-called "phenomenology of reading"—has clear affinities with the moment-by-moment, syllable-by-syllable experience of *hearing* a text read, an experience which makes all the difference for one's conceptualization of the text, as we said. The literary phenomenologists' pronouncements on *reading* would be most of all true for the experience of *hearing* a text read in an oral or residually oral culture, lacking the concepts or presuppositions which depend upon a printed text: "The 'form' of the text is a belated and recollective construction; it does not exist. Readers do not encounter form. The flow of words, the temporal being of the text, requires from the reader active involvement and interested exploration. Thus *the text is an event*. . . ."[13] Compare the following pronouncement by Werner Kelber: "We treat words primarily as records in need of interpretation, neglecting all too often a rather different hermeneutic, deeply rooted in biblical language that proclaims words as an act inviting participation."[14] In reconceptualizing the gospel text as event rather than object, reader-oriented exegetes have latched onto something crucial. Paradoxically, even as they move away from traditional historical criticism, they take a significant if inadvertent step on behalf of the historical exegesis of the gospels. They show us a time-bound exegetical method that may be more adequate to the primary experience of speaking and hearing that would have formed the original noetic and hermeneutic horizon of the gospels.[15]

IV. How Much Does the "Reader" Know?

But the consecutive, retrospective-prospective approach is not without its problems. Let us look at some examples. In *Loaves and Fishes* Robert Fowler attempts to swim "against

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[12] Recent gospel readings that take their lead in significant ways from Iser include Anderson "Double and Triple Stories"; Bassler, "The Parable of the Loaves"; Edwards, *Matthew's Story of Jesus;* idem, "Uncertain Faith"; Keegan, *Interpreting the Bible,* 115–27; Kotze, "John and Reader's Response"; Petersen, "When Is the End Not the End?"; Resseguie, "Reader-Response Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels"; Scott, "How to Mismanage a Miracle"; idem, "A Master's Praise"; idem, "The King's Accounting"; idem, *The Word of God in Words,* 45–56; Tannehill, "The Disciples in Mark." (Iser's principal works will be listed below.)

[13] Vincent B. Leitch, *Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction* (New York; Columbia University Press, 1983) 79–80, paraphrasing the Heideggerian phenomenology of William V. Spanos, "Breaking the Circle: Hermeneutics as Dis-closure," *Boundary 2* 5 (1977) 421–57; here 445.

[14] *The Oral and the Written Gospel,* xvi.

[15] Despite the advent of the written Gospel, the noetic economy of early Christianity would have remained essentially oral—so Kelber, *The Oral and the Written Gospel,* 17, echoing the widespread view among orality-literacy specialists that manuscript cultures remained hearing-dominant. It took print to finally replace "the lingering hearing-dominance in the world of thought and expression with the sight-dominance which had its beginnings with writing but could not flourish with the support of writing alone" (Ong, *Orality and Literacy,* 121).

the prevailing current of interpretation regarding the relationship of the feeding stories [Mark 6:30–44; 8:1–10] and the Last Supper narrative. It is widely accepted that the feeding stories are to be read in the light of the Last Supper narrative and the familiar Christian practice of the Eucharist."[16] It seems to Fowler, however, that:

> this attitude is shaped more by the intense scholarly interest in the origin of the Christian Eucharist than by a careful, unprejudiced examination of all the meals in Mark. . . . [T]he Last Supper is in fact one of many meals in the gospel. The earlier meals prepare for and lead up to this one last meal, making it crucial not to overlook or minimalize the significance of the these earlier meals. Often the verbal similarities between 6:41, 8:6, and 14:22 are noted and used to justify the discovery of "eucharistic" overtones in the two feeding stories. Regrettably, to argue in this fashion is to stand the gospel on its head. *As the author has structured his work, Jesus' last meal with his disciples in Mark 14 presupposes the earlier feeding stories and not vice versa.* Here we are making a conscious decision to adhere to the internal chronology of the author's story, according to which the last meal is preceded by, and read in the light of, the previous meals in Mark.[17]

And the consequences of this decision? Having already noted how prominent direct conflict between Jesus and the disciples is in the feeding stories and in related material (e.g., 8:13–21), Fowler argues that by the time we arrive at the Passover meal in Mark 14 in a strictly *consecutive* reading:

> the issue foremost in our minds will be the ongoing dinner table conflict between Jesus and the Twelve and not the traditional scholarly questions of the historical origin of the story, the *ipsissima vox* of Jesus, and the variance of traditions in Mark 14:22–25, Luke 22:15–20, and 1 Cor. 11:23–26. These may be legitimate scholarly concerns, but they are not Mark's concerns. When we take care to read the account of the last meal of Jesus and his disciples in light of the previous meals in Mark, we are struck by the recurrence of the dominant theme of discipleship failure in this account. To be sure, we are by now accustomed to portrayals of the disciples' ineptness and misunderstanding at the dinner table, but here [14:18, 20, 27–31] their failure assumes shocking proportions. . . .[18]

Arguing that Mark's presentation of the Last Supper is dominated by the theme of discipleship failure, and that this theme must be given its due weight in the plot, Fowler is skeptical that the Last Supper in Mark is intended to represent "the institution of the Christian eucharist."[19]

Fowler does not claim in *Loaves and Fishes* to be attempting a critical approximation of the pre-print psychodynamics of hearing Mark read in sequence, and perhaps in its entirety, though such a claim might not be altogether amiss. His reading, however, does draw attention to a problem in the consecutive, retrospective-prospective approach. Given the traditional nature of much of the gospel material, and the widespread agreement that

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[16] *Loaves and Fishes*, 138.
[17] Ibid., 134–35, his italics.
[18] Ibid., 135.
[19] Ibid., 147.

the authors of Mark and Luke-Acts, and probably those of John and Matthew, would have envisioned mainly Christian audiences, might the construct of a first-time hearer/reader *unfamiliar* with the unfolding story, upon which the consecutive method depends, not appear to be a somewhat inept one?[20] Reader-oriented gospel critics, by and large, have been slow to face up to this problem. Fowler, confronted head-on with the unmistakably traditional Last Supper material, can hardly evade it. His solution is instructive:

> We share with the advocates of the eucharistic interpretation [of the feeding stories of Mark 6 and 8] their enthusiasm for considering how a reader perceives the feeding stories in Mark, but whereas their "reader" is distinguished by knowledge extrinsic to the text—knowledge of eucharistic traditions—we prefer to examine how a reader operating with the intrinsic knowledge provided by the text itself would read the feeding stories. Far greater authority must be accorded the text itself to inform, control and mold its reader. We prefer to allow the text to educate and guide its own reader, rather than insisting on inventing a hypothetical reader characterized primarily by knowledge and experience external to the text. To see how the text molds its own reader involves seeking out those features of the text that shape the reading experience of *every* perceptive reader, ancient or modern. This approach restores to the text its rightful measure of autonomy. The fundamental datum imposed on us by the text of Mark with regard to the feeding stories and the Last Supper is, we repeat, the priority of the feeding stories over the Last Supper.[21]

The formalist critic in Fowler triumphs over the historical critic in him here. To allow the text "its rightful measure of autonomy" means attending to the unfolding *plot* first and foremost, making that the primary control on interpretation, and giving "extrinsic" factors (e.g., "knowledge of eucharistic traditions") a decidedly secondary place. Jouette Bassler, forced to come to grips with same problem, opts (independently) for a similar solution:

> Only the informed reader has the background to recognize the eucharistic language [in the feeding miracles of Mark 6 and 8], for it has not yet been presented as such in the gospel (see 14:22–23). Only the informed or ideal reader has the information required to penetrate the allegorical details that enhance this interpretation. And only the historical reader would be caught up in the particular set of circumstances that could allow the polemics of the christological debate to be understood.[22]

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[20] Mary Ann Beavis ("The Trial before the Sanhedrin," p. 595) has posed the problem differently. Proper attention to the Greco-Roman context "would tend to invalidate the idea that a Gospel should be interpreted in a 'first reading,' because no first-century lector would have read a Gospel only once before reading it publicly: he or she would have prepared and even memorized the copy." The question that interests me, however, one that Beavis does not address, is whether the gospel lector's *audience* would have had a detailed foreknowlede of the story.

[21] *Loaves and Fishes*, 140–41.

[22] "The Parable of the Loaves," 162.

The *implied* reader, on the other hand, "who embodies all the presuppositions laid down by the text, but only these presuppositions, and who is cognizant of all the information supplied by the text, but only this information and only in the sequence laid down by the text,"[23] will strive to make sense of the feeding miracles by contextualizing them in relation to the developing plot. These remarks, like those of Fowler, bespeak that bias for intrinsic analysis which sets the reader-response critic hand in hand with the narrative critic over against the historical critic, and which makes the latter squirm.[24]

However, these comments of Fowler and Bassler also serve to highlight another paradoxical feature of the time-bound approach. As we have seen, the strict sequential reading may have an unrecognized illustrative value for historical research. This moment-by-moment, cumulative appraisal of the unfolding story may well be the best analogue available to the modern exegete of the psychodynamics of the oral-aural experience which constituted the original noetic horizon in which the gospels were written and received. The paradox is that to be *rigorously* "temporalized" and "aural," and hence most illuminative of the original reception process, the consecutive reading (so it might be argued) should be fully *intrinsic* also; that is, it should bracket the "extrinsic" historical question of what an original listener would have been likely to know *besides* the information consecutively provided by the text. To put it another way, the retrospective-prospective approach is at its best, even from a historian's standpoint, in suggesting what it might have been like to experience a gospel as *heard event* instead of as printed object. And the event-character of a gospel is best approximated when the text is given full leeway to build its reader dynamically in the time-flow of the reading process, the reader's interaction with the characters at any given moment being defined principally in terms of what has gone before in the story, and what s/he anticipates is yet to come. The heuristic potential of the consecutive reading for historical exegesis depends on the extent to which it can successfully simulate this backward-hearkening/forward-hearkening process. Which is not to say that the temporal model *exhausts* the experience of the gospel which the original audience(s) might have had, and which the gospel's author(s) might have envisioned. The

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[23] Ibid., 160.

[24] Lyle Eslinger ("The Wooing of the Woman," 181 n. 16) feels less compelled to cleanly distinguish the intratextual reader of the fourth gospel from the historical reader, and discovers a historical critic who might squirm less than most at his "experiment of following . . . a [first-time] reader through the Gospel":

> If one might allow . . . that the gospel of John was not written with a specifically Christian audience in mind, [the] first time reader would not be such an implausible intended audience. . . . Nevertheless, it is possible for even a jaded Christian reader . . . to follow the logic of such a reading and to receive a similar impress from it. . . . Moreover, Wayne A. Meeks has gone so far as to suggest that even educated readers of the Johannine community might be taken in by the ambiguities, ironies, and other occasions for reader response. *"The reader cannot understand any part of the Fourth Gospel until he understands the whole* [Eslinger's emphasis]. Thus the reader has an experience rather like that of the dialogue partners of Jesus. . . ." Regardless of the reader's background, says Meeks, it is designed to involve the reader in sharing some of the same confusions and misunderstandings as the characters within it. [Citing Wayne A. Meeks, "The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism," *JBL* 91 (1972) 68–69]

other side of this experience would have entailed a competence *brought* to the listening (a knowledge of eucharistic traditions, and much more) and a preacquaintance with the broad lines of the story and its ending, and is no doubt much better accounted for by traditional exegetical methods, in which strict sequentiality plays little part.

Of course, it need not always be a case of either/or. Alan Culpepper has used a *non*consecutive style of audience-oriented criticism in an attempt to clarify the competence assumed of the reader of the fourth gospel. In the final chapter of *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel,* Culpepper revisits the problem of the gospel's intended audience hand in hand with the *narratee*—the narrator's addressee(s), specifically as defined by the text. For Culpepper the vital question is: What does the narratee know or not know? In contrast to the strict consecutive approach, Culpepper's approach is topical and analytic. He analyzes the narratee's knowledge in five areas: persons, places, languages, Judaism, and events, finding that "a remarkably coherent and consistent picture of the intended reader emerges from the narrator's comments," one familiar with all the major characters in the story, with the exception of the Beloved Disciple, but unfamiliar with most of its specific locations. Correspondingly, the readers know Greek but not Hebrew or Aramaic, use the Roman rather than the Jewish system for reckoning the hours of the day, have some familiarity with the Old Testament, but little with the practices of ritual purity, and so on. "In sum, it appears that the intended readers are not Jewish, but their prior knowledge of many parts of the gospel story shows that the intended audience is either Christian or at least is familiar with the gospel story."[25]

But Culpepper's findings are more nuanced than this. Earlier he noted that the discourses uttered by Jesus in the context of Jewish festivals may be grasped in their full significance only by readers who are themselves familiar with the festivals, while the narrator's introductions to the festivals (e.g., 2:13; 6:4; 7:2; 11:55) presume little or no such knowledge. In a fully *intrinsic* analysis of the kind proposed by Gerald Prince, the narratologist from whom Culpepper draws,[26] the narratee would begin to come apart as a coherent construct at this point. But the Johannine narratee does not *quite* disintegrate. After all, it *is* a "group narratee" (cf. 20:31).[27] But is it one group or several? The inconsistency regarding the festivals is the main one encountered by Culpepper, and its significance need not be overstressed. Nevertheless, it illustrates the type of difficulty, occasioned by the complex redactional history of the material, that one might expect to run into in an intrinsic analysis of a *gospel's* audience. And when that happens, it seems to me that one may exercise one of two options: (1) stick with the intrinsic analysis and conclude that the audience-in-the-text is so rife with contradiction as to render the concept inapplicable,[28] or (2) appeal to a source hypothesis to decide which indicators of the

[25] *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel,* 224.

[26] See Gerald Prince, "Introduction to the Study of the Narratee," pp. 7–25 in Tompkins, *Reader-Response Criticism,* and cf. Mary Ann Piwowarcyzk, "The Narratee and the Situation of Enunciation: A Reconsideration of Prince's Theory," *Genre* 9 (1976) 161–77; Gerald Prince, "The Narratee Revisited," *Style* 19 (1985) 299–303.

[27] Prince's term; see his *Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative* (Berlin/New York/Amsterdam: Mouton, 1982) 23–24.

[28] This would be my inclination; see my "Narrative Homiletics: Lucan Rhetoric and the Making of the Reader" (Ph.D. diss., Trinity College, University of Dublin, 1986) 80–90.

audience should count as evidence in the analysis, and which indicators should not. In contrast to Fowler in *Loaves and Fishes,* the historical critic in Culpepper triumphs over the formalist critic in him at the moment of truth, and he opts for the source hypothesis. He deals with the inconsistency regarding the festivals by speculating that "by the time the composition of the Fourth Gospel was completed a broader readership was envisioned than was originally intended. The later readership included gentile Christians who knew little about Judaism."[29]

Culpepper marches to a slightly different drum in this study than to that which generally motivates recent reader-attuned work on the gospels. It is not simply that he is more directly preoccupied with the reader's historical situation.[30] It is rather that relative to most of the other examples listed (see n. 3 above), he is a good deal less preoccupied with the reader's consecutive responses to the plot, i.e., with fashioning a sustained story of reading. In assessing whether reader-response criticism has any relevance for the historical investigation of the gospels (in posing some of the questions a more traditional critic might have posed), it is the more common, consecutive style of reader-exegesis that I have had in mind. And the results? From a historian's standpoint, the temporalized model typical of reader-exegesis must be regarded as an insufficient and distorting one. The tradition-attuned hearers/readers that the gospel texts presuppose surely know more than most of the reader-attuned exegetes give them credit for. If so, the virgin reader is an anachronistic construct for gospel research. But here historical exegesis is placed in a double bind. It risks an even worse sort of anachronism should it fail to assimilate the findings of orality-literacy research, thriving at present in disciplines with far less at stake in the distinctions it poses than ours. That we occupy a different world from that of first-century Christianity is a truism. The orality-literacy factor persuades us that this is not the whole truth: we occupy not just a different world, but a different galaxy also—"the Gutenberg galaxy." It may be that the reading-attuned, consecutive approach, which tends to dissolve spatial form in the time-flow of reading, should be seen as offering at least some corrective to our print-shaped, sight-dominant way of conceiving texts as spatially situated objects to be analyzed and quantified.

V. The "Reader's" Inability to "Feel"

In this paper (preeminently a ground-clearing operation) I shall resolutely avoid easy or arbitrary stopping points, so having detailed the challenge that reader-oriented exegesis has (obliquely) issued to historical exegesis, let us detail some of the formidable challenges that confront the reader-critics in turn. It has been noted, for example, that for the rhetoricians of antiquity and the Renaissance—the precursors of reader-response theory—a literary work is designed to *affect* its readers, to move and sway them. Thus, classical commentaries—one could cite Plato, Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus—"all discuss literature in terms of its effects upon an audience."[31] However, there is a crucial difference in approach between the classical and contemporary critics of response. The experiences which modern audience-oriented critics ascribe to their hypothetical readers are, in contrast to their ancient or Renaissance counterparts, "generally *cognitive* rather than *affective:* not feeling shivers along the spine, weeping in sympathy, or being transported with awe,

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[29] *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel,* 225.

[30] As is Beavis, e.g., in "The Trial before the Sanhedrin," or Tannehill, to a lesser extent, in "The Disciples in Mark."

[31] Jane P. Tompkins, "The Reader in History," in *Reader Response Criticism,* 202.

but having one's expectations proved false, struggling with an irresolvable ambiguity, or questioning the assumptions upon which one had relied."[32] The reader-constructs which reader-response critics of the gospels employ differ from each other in various ways. None of them shivers or weeps, however. Their experience of the text is an ineluctably *cerebral* one. Identification with story participants, potentially the most "affective" sphere of reader involvement, is typically framed in *ethical* or *epistemic* terms. Here are examples of each:

> As the portrait of the [Markan] disciples becomes clearly negative, the tendency to identify is countered by the necessity of negative evaluation. A tension develops between these two attitudes, with the reader caught in the middle.[33]
>
> Not enough information has been supplied in [Mark's] narrative up to this point [8:14–21] to clarify the confusion and the reader is led, at a crucial point in the narrative, to the same internal disposition that the disciples possess in the narrative: misunderstanding and confusion.[34]

Terence Keegan's "reader" is still more cerebral, let loose on an epistemic adventure: "The women of the [Matthean] genealogy [1:3, 5, 6] are precisely the kind of thing that reader-response criticism focuses on, things that strike one as unusual, things that one has to stop and deal with. It is in places like this that the reader is being pulled into the text and foced to think. 'What does this mean? Why is this here? How am I to reconstruct the world where all of this fits together and makes sense?' "[35] Richard Edwards concludes a similar account of the Matthean reader's recollections, anticipations, hesitations and uncertainties, thwarted expectations, considered judgments, filling of narrative gaps—of the *cognitive* side of the reading experience, in short—with the comment that as our understanding of Matthew's story grows, we can anticipate a "growing appreciation of the narrator's intent."[36] But if it is a wholly cognitive role of reading which has been charted, can it be said to have adequately connected with this ancient author's intent?[37]

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[32] Culler, *On Deconstruction*, 39 (my italics), extending Tompkins' argument.

[33] Tannehill, "The Disciples in Mark," 394–95.

[34] Bassler, "The Parable of the Loaves," 165.

[35] *Interpreting the Bible*, 116.

[36] *Matthew's Story of Jesus*, 95.

[37] Dispassionate objectivity and psychological distance are of course the sine qua non of modernist scholarship: hence the emotionally stunted "reader" of reader-oriented exegesis. The rules *are* occasionally bent, however. Jouette Bassler's implied reader is, here and there, more affectively active than most:

> [I]t is with some surprise and consternation that the reader suddenly finds the [Markan] disciples the object of stern criticism in chapters 6 and 8. . . . Now the reader would like to dissociate from the disciples, but the gaps in the text at this point render this impossible. Thus the identification with the disciples initially undertaken quite willingly by the reader, continues—but now unwillingly. . . . By 8:21 the position of the disciples has become quite desperate, but this desperation is shared by the reader. . . . The primary emotion the implied reader experiences at this point is confusion. . . . ("The Parable of the Loaves," 165–66)

These conjectures, which smack strongly of "subjectivism" by ordinary critical standards, shows at what peril the reader-oriented exegete ventures into the realm of affections. "Damned if you do and damned if you don't" neatly sums up the predicament.

VI. The "Reader's" Struggle for Individuality

A second problem concerns the *status* of the "reader" of reader-oriented exegesis. The reader "in" the gospel—the reader strictly as defined by the text—is something which stands in a certain relation to the *actual* audience. But is the actual audience conceived as an ancient one or a contemporary one, primarily? There seem to be at least two answers to this question. Some reader-oriented exegetes seem to suggest that the "reader" defined in and by a gospel is an unchanging property of the text, in which case all flesh-and-blood audiences are equally bracketed. Here are some examples:

> [W]hen I speak about the reader I am not attempting to describe a real person (of the first, third, tenth, or twentieth century) but the person posited *by the text* as the reader.[38]
>
> We prefer to allow the text to educate and guide its own reader, rather than insisting on inventing a hypothetical reader characterized primarily by knowledge and experience external to the text. To see how the text molds its own reader involves seeking out those features of the text that shape the reading experience of *every* perceptive reader, ancient or modern.[39]
>
> Original readers, informed readers, and contemporary readers will bring more to the text than the implied reader and thus will extract more from it. But the perspective of the implied reader allows us to focus on the text as an encounter and thus to uncover its innate potential, whether fully realized or not, for leading *any* reader to the desired response.[40]

But that is only one approach. There is another alternative, one that wants to give the individual contemporary reader a role in addition to the generalized reader-in-the-text. Exemplary of the latter approach is ames Resseguie's "Reader-Response Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels."

Wolfgang Iser's implied reader is a cerebral and ineluctably "modern" construct, as we have seen. What would transpire were such a reader, a child of the novel, let loose to roam freely in a gospel? Resseguie's "Reader-Response Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels," an Iserian reading of selected gospel passages, is, to my knowledge, the most thoroughgoing exegetical appropriation of Iser to date. The general plausibility of these readings is surprising, given that Iser himself has had little time for ancient narrative.[41] Repeated statements to the effect that the reader is encouraged, through the "rhetoric of negation" embodied in Jesus, to sift and reassess the norms of opponents, disciples, and others, and ultimately his/her own norms, seem not at all amiss, given that much of Jesus' activity in relation to fellow characters in the synoptic gospels may plausibly be described in such

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[38] Edwards, *Matthew's Story of Jesus,* 10.

[39] Fowler, *Loaves and Fishes,* 140–41.

[40] Bassler, "The Parable of the Loaves," 172.

[41] Epic and allegory do not provide the indeterminacies or "gaps" which Iser tends to prize in narrative (see Wolfgang Iser, *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974] 28, 103 and cf. Robert Scholes, "Cognition and the Implied Reader," *Diacritics* 5 [1975] 14). Didactic works on the other hand "set an obvious problem for Iser's theory" since they do not privilege the creativity of the reader (Menachem Brinker, "Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser on Textual Indeterminacy," *Poetics Today* 1 [1980] 209).

terms. Custom-built in part for absorbing the dissolution of personal and social norms, Iser's implied reader seems at home in much of the gospel text.

The problem with Resseguie's study lies rather in the status of its reader-construct, which, in full accord with Iser's, differs sharply in theory and in practice. Given Iser's growing popularity among literary critics of the gospels, it is worth commenting on this anomaly in some detail. A salient feature of Iser's reader, as posited theoretically, is that it is neither wholly *actual* nor wholly *ideal*. Whereas an *ideal* reader would be entirely manipulated by a text, as its complete property or reflection, Iser's *implied* reader will bring a cultural and personal history to the text. A reader's dealings with a text, according to Iser, must invariably be colored by his/her "own characteristic selection process. For it is not given by the text itself; it arises from the meeting between the written text and the individual mind of the reader with its own particular history of experience, its own consciousness, its own outlook."[42] Iser's implied reader will in part be a creation of the text, and in part an individual person.

Iser's reception theory is heavily indebted to the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, who was the first to posit a notion of the literary work as a partial or unfinished object whose gaps of indeterminacy (e.g., informational gaps) require completion by an act of consciousness.[43] For Ingarden, however, both true and false realizations of literary works are possible, a "classical" notion which to which Iser is opposed.[44] Iser would affirm a spectrum of acceptable realizations of any given text, for "the potential text is infinitely richer than any of its individual realizations."[45] Though the realization of text as literary work is grounded in immanent textual features, "it is by no means independent of the individual disposition of the reader." His oft-cited analogy follows of two people gazing at the night sky "who may both be looking at the same collection of stars, but one will see the image of a plough, and the other will make out a dipper. . . . The 'stars' in a literary text are fixed; the lines that join them are variable."[47]

I find this aspect of Iser's theory particularly interesting for the way in which it dovetails with the "responsible pluralism of readings" championed by certain theologians and hermeneuticians.[48] Therefore, it is highly instructive to see how it is applied in the practical realm—or not applied. For as a surprisingly number of commentators have observed, Iser grants freedom to his reader in theory only to take it away again in practice. In theory Iser affirms the pertinence of individual reader-response, yet in the readings of specific

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[42] *The Implied Reader,* 284. Cf. Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) 27–38.

[43] Ingarden's principal works are *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and the Theory of Literature,* trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), and *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art,* trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth Olson (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

[44] See Iser, *The Implied Reader,* 14.

[45] Ibid., 280.

[46] Ibid., 274–75.

[47] Ibid., 282.

[48] Notably David Tracy; see *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad; London: SCM Press, 1981). (The expression "a responsible pluralism of readings" is his.)

works in *The Implied Reader* all such individuality is bracketed: "Although Iser wants to present reading as a process which balances text and reader, he always presents the reader in the firm grip of the text."[49] "His concept of the reader is not different from Ingarden's in that both are essentially normative. . . ."[50] Other critics go further, arguing that Iser's reader is even less free than Ingarden's. All Ingarden's reader is asked to do is be faithful to the basic aesthetic and artistic value-structures specific to a given work, whereas Iser's must identify the specific communicative intentions of the work and realize them under its control.[51] Iser's theoretical description of the reading process thus "allows for a great deal more latitude in individual realization than does his actual critical practice,"[52] and the reasons are not hard to fathom. Whereas Iser the phenomenological theorist may safely endorse the individual creativity of the reader, Iser the practical critic must answer to his peers in the literary critical guild, recently and aptly defined as "a cultural institution for presenting *model responses* to literary texts."[53]

Of course the *biblical*-critical guild is, if anything, still more in the business of presenting "model" readings. By and large, reader-oriented critics of the gospels have seized on the generalized "ideal" side of Iser's implied reader—its textually defined, manipulated side—and relegated its individualistic, actual-reader side to the periphery.[54] That is why the opening of Resseguie's "Reader-Response Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels" is unusual. Foregrounded there is the notion that the implied reader is *not* an "ideal" reader, but "an individual who comes to the text" and fills in its gaps in his or her own way.[55] The prospect of an ensuing proliferation of idiosyncratic readings does not bother Resseguie, for "[a]lthough there may be several realizations, even infinite realizations, of a given text, they are always implied and circumscribed by the text."[56] However, whereas the competent reading is *guided* by the text, the implication from the outset is that it will not be *overdetermined* by it. His earliest move in the article is to distinguish his Iser-inspired "dialectical" version of reader-response criticism from other versions, including the one that focuses

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[49] Temma F. Berg, "Psychologies of Reading," in *Tracing Literary Theory*, ed. Joseph Natoli (Urbana, IL/Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987) 259.

[50] Dagmar Barnouw, "Critics in the Act of Reading," *Poetics Today* 1 (1980) 222.

[51] Brinker, "Two Phenomonologies of Reading," 210.

[52] Suleiman, "Audience-Oriented Criticism," 24. Holub, *Reception Theory*, 85ff., and Ray, *Literary Meaning*, 50ff., arrive at similar conclusions.

[53] Robert de Beaugrande, "Surprised by Syncretism: Cognition and Literary Criticism Exemplified by E. D. Hirsch, Stanley Fish, and J. Hillis Miller," *Poetics* 12 (1983) 85.

[54] The implied reader's individualism is either mentioned in passing (e.g., Bassler, "The Parable of the Loaves," 160; Tannehill, "The Disciples in Mark," 395), or not mentioned at all, as is more often the case. Even when mentioned, it seems to have no consequences for the actual reading enacted. Terence Keegan, on the other hand, explicitly lays the individualist feature aside (*Interpreting the Bible*, 110): ". . . the implied reader involves both the role presupposed by the text and the specific realization of that role by a given real reader. In this chapter, however, the main focus will be on indications within the Gospel of Matthew that specify the role to be assumed by the implied reader of that text."

[55] "Reader-Response Criticism," 308.

[56] Ibid., 322. Cf. 308: ". . . the realization of the text is [not] a subjective fabrication of the reader, for the text itself guides the reader in its realization; the written portions place limits on the reader's production of textual meaning."

exclusively on the reader "inscribed or encoded in the text."[57]

Not only does Resseguie follow Iser the theorist, however; he follows Iser the critic also, into deep contradiction. In sharp distinction to his theoretical introduction, Resseguie's actual reading of selected gospel passages is classically normative and "correct." The following examples convey the general tenor. If sympathy for the rich man of Mark 10:17ff., who seeks eternal life, were not encouraged by the strongly positive description of him,

> his failure would not seem tragic, and reader involvement in the narrative would have been kept to a minimum. However, as the narrative stands the rich man's failure in his quest encourages the reader to reconsider a norm that may not have been previously considered a blocking factor for entrance into the kingdom, namely, one's wealth. The reader's involvment with the character encourages him to resolve the tension between a desire for material security and the fact that possessions act as a blocking factor for entrance into the kingdom.[58]

Such is the effect of the positive portrayal of this character. But distance may also

> be reduced between a character and the reader by the type of question or request posed to Jesus. At times a request not only seems reasonable, but it even appears unreasonable to the (implied) reader for Jesus to refuse the request. For example, the request of a potential disciple to bury his father in Luke 9:61, or the request of a potential disciple to say farewell to one's family in Luke 9:62, appears reasonable, and refusal of the requests by Jesus comes as a surprise to the reader, forcing him to find the motives underlying the rejection. Similarly, in the story about the choice of guests at a banquet (Luke 14:12–14), it is natural for a host to invite friends, brothers, relatives, or rich neighbors. It is almost certainly a surprise to the (implied) reader that Jesus summons the host to invite the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind to the banquet. In both examples the element of surprise negates the familiar, causing the reader to reexamine underlying norms that were previously held, but perhaps never before examined.[59]

What sense is there here of an individual reader "who fills in the gaps in his or her own way"? In what sense is Resseguie's implied reader *not* an "ideal" reader? (He defines the ideal reader as one "so manipulated by the text" that s/he "can perfectly interpret [its] meaning."[60]) Throughout we find Resseguie's implied reader being drawn into the gospels' spheres of norms and values in carefully specified ways, being impelled to draw premature conclusion which are then overthrown, being sympathetic or distant from characters as appropriate, examining previously unexamined personal convictions, and so forth. What we miss is any sense that these complex reponses should be regarded as just *one* response-set out of a wide spectrum of potential, equally valid sets. The "several . . . even infinite realizations" of the given text, affirmed in the theoretical sections, swiftly reduce to *the* definitive realization (that which the author might have intended) in actual practice.

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[57] Ibid., 307.
[58] Ibid., 313.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid., 308.

It is hard even to imagine how Resseguie might have remained true to his theoretical tenets while staying within the pale of scholarly respectability. Biblical criticism, like literary criticism, relies on intersubjective reading methods designed to bracket the critic's own "overindividualistic" responses as much as possible, so as to enable critical consensus and principled disagreement. Literary critical projects vigorously affirming the "rights" of "real" readers have run counter to the dominant thrust of American literary studies in a way that has tended to relegate them to the margins. This has been true, for example, of the empirical investigations of the "psychoanalytic" reader-response critics, Norman Holland and David Bleich, into how it is that readers read, and their positive affirmation of the subjectivism of reader-response.[61] For Holland, it is the close analysis of what readers *actually say* about how they read that differentiates reader-response critics like himself and Bleich from others such as Iser who work with "reader"-constructs.[62] But the secret of Iser's success in America has been precisely that of giving the American literary critic—and the biblical critic—"just enough of the reader but not too much."

VII. The Repressed Reader

For biblical studies the moral is plain: criticism is an institution to which "real" readers need not apply. The rather negative remarks on New Testament reader-response criticism with which I shall conclude[64] extend to the (necessary?) poverty of critical reading generally. The "reader" of audience-oriented gospel criticism is a repressed reader. Its parents are mainstream gospel exegesis on the biblical side, and reader-in-the-text formalism on the nonbiblical side. Its sibling, of course, is narrative criticism, which has the same exegetical/formalist ancestry. A reader-oriented approach to the gospels that would seek to ground itself in traditional gospel scholarship—as current literary criticism of the gospels generally would—is, as our discussion showed, severely limited from the outset in the kinds of readings it can propose. Such readings will be stunted versions of regular reading that disallow the "personal" associations that reading invariably sparks, that disallow the affective aspects of reading as opposed to its cognitive aspects, and that can admit the dynamic, retrospective-prospective side of reading only by setting severe limits on the degree of foreknowledge that the reader may bring to the text. And the results? Remarkably "subjective" readings, seemingly, in spite of all this pruning. Hearing how the implied reader of the gospels forms expectations here only to revise them there, is distant from some character at this point and drawn closer at some other, is frustrated, thwarted, discomfited, startled, challenged, puzzled or enlightened, forces me to ask: Why do I experience none of these things when *I* read the text? And does the reader-critic who pulls

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[61] See Norman N. Holland, *The Dynamics of Literary Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); idem, *5 Readers Reading* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975; idem, *The I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); idem, *Poems in Persons: An Introduction to the Psychoanalysis of Literature* (New York: Norton, 1973); David Bleich, *Readings and Feelings: An Introduction to Subjective Criticism* (Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 1975); idem, *Subjective Criticism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[62] Norman N. Holland, "UNITY IDENTITY TEXT SELF," *Proceedings of the Modern Language Society* 90 (1975) 822 n. 8.

[63] Mailloux, *Interpretive Conventions*, 56.

[64] Factious remarks, actually. My own burgeoning approach to exegesis owes much to reader-response criticism.

the "reader's" strings actually experience them either? The general answer to the latter question, one suspects, is No. The "reader" is less an *extension* of the critic (whose jaded responses, after all, would hardly make a good story of reading), than an idealized alter ego. Which is simply to say that the reader-oriented exegete is a *homo institutionis*, just as the more conventional exegete is. Does the traditional gospel critic (the redaction critic, say) not strive to excise incoherent, trivial, oversubjective, or otherwise inappropriate elements from his/her own response in just the same way that the reader-oriented critic does, in order to assume a readerly alter ego that meets the professional requirements of the scholarly guild? On this view, the readings that reader-oriented gospel critics produce are not qualitatively different from those of other critics. One of their valuable features, in fact, other than their ability to present the gospel as dynamic event instead of as static object, is precisely that of making the implicit features of our critical reading explicit by narrativizing our standard moves and reflecting them back to us as in a mirror. Indeed, to my mind the potential of reader-oriented theory for biblical research may not be exegetical so much as metacritical. Reader-oriented theory in literary studies, particularly where it shades over into nonfoundational continental and Anglo-American philosophy, is a Pandora's box into which biblical reader-critics have but begun to peer.[65] Opened more fully it may let loose some unsettling though, I think, timely ways of reconceiving biblical interpretation. But that is another story of reading.[66]

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[65] See, e.g., the articles by A. K. M. Adam and Fred W. Burnett in "Text/History/Exegesis: Biblical Criticism in a Poststructuralist Context" (working title), ed. Gary A. Phillips, *Semeia* (forthcoming issue); McKnight, *The Bible and the Reader*, 83–94; idem, *Postmodern Use of the Bible*; Stephen D. Moore, "Negative Hermeneutics, Insubstantial Texts: Stanley Fish and the Biblical Interpreter," *JAAR* 54 (1986) 707–21; Phillips, "History and Text."

[66] Told in my "Rifts in (a Reading of) the Fourth Gospel, or Does Johannine Irony Still Collapse in a Reading That Draws Attention to Itself?," *Neotestamentica* (issue in press).

Who Were the First Urban Christians? Urbanization in Galilee in the First Century

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Toward the end of the 19th century, Ernest Renan in his book on the life of Jesus portrayed Jesus, his first followers, and their Galilean life as rural, rugged, and itinerant in nature. The first Christians were lacking in cultural sophistication, their lives were free from education, hellenistic influences, and "busy civilization." "Their ignorance was extreme, their intelligence feeble. Not one element of Greek culture had penetrated this first assembly of saints." The happy flock lived off the land and followed the Essenes and Therapeutae in their ascetic life. The rural and bucolic sentiment of life in Galilee had a decisive influence on the destiny of the infant sect.[1]

While this description of the setting of the Jesus movement would seem overstated to almost all present day students of the New Testament, underneath Renan's limpid prose there is a presupposition concerning the social world of early Galilean Christianity that still, despite evidence to the contrary, persists today.[2] That presupposition, more subtly stated, is that Galilee in the first century was comprised of peasant villages, deprived of the social and cultural sophistication of the wider Greco-Roman world, and lacking particularly in the benefits of the city. In order to discover the influence of the city upon the early Jesus movement, one must go north and turn left, to the cities and world of Paul, thereby assuming that no such influence can be found within the borders of Galilee.

Some scholars maintain that early in the history of Christianity the movement made the decision to "*leave the village culture of Palestine behind*" and turn their face toward the Greco-Roman world.[3] It was only at this time in the history of the growth of Christianity that the new movement acquired the sophistication usually associated with the urban centers of the Roman world. This assumption concerning the rural and culturally deprived nature of Galilee surfaces in other ways. Some scholars, for example, assert that Palestine would not have possessed a setting with the educational or linguistic sophistication to produce a gospel.[4] These false assumptions about Galilee have partially blinded us from

[1] E. Renan, *A Life of Jesus* (New York: The Modern Library, 1927) 184–193. Quoted from H. Anderson, *Jesus* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967) 89–90.

[2] See, for example, F. Loftus, "The Anti-Roman Revolts of the Jews and the Galileans," *JQR* 68 (1978) 80–81.

[3] W. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University, 1983) 11. The italics are mine.

[4] See J. Meier in J. Meier and R. Brown, *Antioch and Rome* (New York: Paulist, 1983) 18–19. In contrast to his perspective see J. L. Kinneavy, *Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith: An Inquiry* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1987). Other examples of the effect of this mistaken presupposition in New Testament studies would be for example, the

seeing the world of the first followers of Jesus accurately, and in all its fullness. A closer look at travel and trade patterns through Galilee, numismatic evidence, and above all, the results of recent excavations, reveals a Galilee of the first century in almost every way as sophisticated and developed in hellenistic life and thought, and as much influenced by the *Polis* as their contemporaries in Asia Minor or anywhere else in the Roman Empire. In other words, Galilee of the first century was urbanized and, as a result, possessed the social and cultural influences and opportunities that existed elsewhere in the Roman Empire.

A. Trade and Travel

There are two Galilees, and maintaining the distinction is important. Upper Galilee is self enclosed topographically. Aramaic is more prominent there than in the more clearly bilingual lower Galilee. Upper Galilee's trade network is regional, trading mostly with the area of Tyre and Sidon, and the Golan, as upper Galilee's coin profile reveals. It is more limited than that of lower Galilee. We would not associate urban centers with upper Galilee, but rather villages, or *Tetracomia*, as Josephus describes upper Galilee. We must recognize the "regionalism" within Galilee that E. Meyers has tried to emphasize.[5] The villages of Meiron or Khirbet Shema in upper Galilee are now thought to be larger than many would have suspected. However, urban centers are nevertheless usually associated with lower Galilee in the first century, and rightfully so.

Lower Galilee on the other hand evidences a diversity of trade. Lower Galilee is closely tied with the busy trade of the Mediterranean and the Sea of Galilee, and from there the Decapolis. M. Avi-Yonah's reconstruction of the Roman road system in Palestine highlights how centrally located lower Galilee was in terms of the trade and travel of the entire region.[6] Sepphoris, for example, rests above a major east-west road which ran from Acco in the west to the sea of Galilee, to Tiberias, and eastward to the Decapolis cities and beyond.[7] Lower Galilee was a center for commerce and benefited from extensive trade. A study of the road system in Galilee in this period suggests that Galilee would not only have benefited from its own exporting of balsam, oil, and wine, but would have also been affected by trade which would not necessarily have originated in Galilee itself. Large amounts of goods from the east heading to the Mediterranean would have had to pass through lower Galilee, as well as the other way around. This would have resulted in a certain cosmopolitan flavor to the rather small region, the presence of a variety of influences from the wider Greco-Roman world, and additional toll and tax for the region from this constant flow of goods.[8]

(continued)
translation of certain terms, like *TEKTON*. Why is this rendered "carpenter," and not brick layer or stone cutter? Carpenter better fits the presupposed bucolic ethos of Galilee.

[5] E. Meyers, "Galilean Regionalism as a Factor in Historical Reconstruction," *BASOR* 221 (1976) 93–102. The data from the material culture for the languages of Galilee is discussed there.

[6] M. Avi-Yonah, "The Development of the Roman Road System in Palestine," *IEJ* 1 (1950–51) 54–60.

[7] E. Meyers, "Regionalism," and J. Strange, "Cana," in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary* (Garden City: Doubleday, forthcoming).

[8] The paper by Douglas Edwards in this volume on Urban-Rural relations in first century Galilee discusses more fully the trade patterns in Galilee.

Sites

The population of cities in antiquity is notoriously difficult to establish. However, sometime ago A. Alt determined that more important than the population of a city or region is establishing the apparatus and institutions that such a center might possess. It has been the possession of these institutions and structures, subsequently, which have determined if a place is in fact a city. Is there a city wall? A fortress? A court, a marketplace, and so on?[9] More recently Moses Finley has echoed the insight of Alt by saying that the primary characteristic of a *Polis* is not population or the size of the area, but the political and cultural significance of a certain center. Population is by no means irrelevant, but mere size alone is not a test. Rather, what emerges as crucial is the degree to which these areas appear as political and cultural centers.[10]

Capernaum

Capernaum, for example, has not traditionally been considered a city. There is no evidence as yet for a city wall, court, or any large administrative institution or apparatus such as been found in other urban centers in lower Galilee. It should be noted, however, that Capernaum would have had the apparatus necessary for taxes and tolls, serving as it did as the gateway to Gaulanitis.[11] It is interesting to note that estimates of the population of Capernaum have changed over the last 10 years. The population is now estimated at 12–15,000.[12] There are other features of this large village worth noting and which do reveal something of the level and nature of life in Capernaum. Capernaum reflects city planning, which laid the residential area out in 40–40m blocks. This would have allowed 3–4 homes per block. The excavations from the first-century structure under the later synagogue, and under the basilica across the street, because of some of the materials used for construction, reveal a community which very likely possessed greater financial means that is often associated with Capernaum.[13] It was a fishing village, and W. Wuellner may in fact be right in saying that around the Sea of Galilee fishing was "big business."[14] However, most of the work at Capernaum has focused on either the "House" or the synagogue across the street, so unfortunately we know rather little about life generally in Capernaum. However, these few facts provide a glimpse, albeit a small one, into life in Capernaum.

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[9] A. Alt, "Galilaische Probleme," in *Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte Des Volkes Israel*, Band II, p. 363–435 (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche, 1953). See especially p. 384ff., which discusses "Hellenistische Stadte und Domanen in Galilee."

[10] M. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1973) 124.

[11] See the discussion of Capernaum in J. Strange, "Review Article: The Capernaum and Herodium Publications," *BASOR* 226 (1977) 65–73. And, R. North, "Discoveries at Capernaum," *Biblica* 58 (1977) 424–431. The call of Matthew (cf. Matt 9.9) occurs at a tax office in Capernaum.

[12] E. Meyers, J. Strange, *Archaeology, The Rabbis, and Early Christianity: The Social and Historical Setting of Palestinian Judaism and Christianity* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1981) 58.

[13] See J. Strange, "Review Article: The Capernaum and Herodium Publications."

[14] W. Wuellner, *The Meaning of "Fishers of Men"* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968) 61–62. In addition, Mark adds the interesting note that the fishing business of the sons of Zebedee was prosperous enough to include hired servants (Mark 1:20).

Magdala

Magdala (or Tarichaeae), according to Josephus, contained 40,000 people (J.W.II. 608). This seems unlikely, though it was probably quite large. Magdala was the capital of a toparchy and would have therefore possessed some administrative apparatus and personnel, though not to the extent of a Sepphoris or Tiberias.[15] Magdala was a walled city, boasted a hippodrome or arena, fortifications, and a large aqueduct system (J.W.II.21.3ff).[16] According to Josephus the city had two grain markets and a palace. While 40,000 may be high for the population, the city of Magdala did have some impressive institutions and apparatus which would have established it as an important regional center.

Beth Shean

It is important to remember that the largest Decapolis city, Scythopolis or Beth Shean, rested on the southern border of lower Galilee. This is a significant fact in seeking to reconstruct the cultural/social ethos of Galilee and of the first Christians. The city stood at the junction of important trade routes and always possessed great strategic importance. Extensive excavations have been conducted on Beth Shean, and they are easily accessible.[17] The city had long been a military center and had venerated, most likely, Dionysus. Under Pompey and Gabinius (ca. 55 B.C.E.), there was a large building program. The original excavators thought that the theater (seats 5,000) and the arena were built then. Many now hold to a later date for the theater.[18] There is very elaborate and substantial construction quite visible today at Beth Shean, and it serves as a reminder of the large presence and impact this capital city must have had on its environment and those who lived near it or continually passed by it. Under the Ptolemies, Beth Shean was an important center and was the focus of extensive trade and building. This continued from the Ptolemaic period through the first revolt against Rome. The city of Scythopolis, like Sepphoris and unlike Tiberias, did not rebel and remained loyal to the Romans in 66 C.E.

Tiberias

The precise date of the founding of Tiberias by Antipas is debated. Some believe the date is ca. 23, though Avi-Yonah has made a strong case for 18 C.E. to coincide with Tiberias' 60th birthday.[19] According to Josephus the city had an *Archon*, a Senate of 600, and a *Boule* or Council of 10 (Life 69, 296). Tiberias also sits on a major east/west trade route and would have been difficult to avoid for the person doing much traveling or trading.[20] Tiberias was granted permission to mint its own coins, and within the city was

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[15] A. Jones, "Urbanization in Palestine," *JRS* 21 (1931) 78.

[16] See the discussion in G. Dalman, *Sacred Ways and Sacred Sites*, trans. P. Leventoff (New York: MacMillan, 1934) 126ff.

[17] A. Rowe, *Beth-Shean: Topography and History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1930) 44ff. M. Avi-Yonah, *IEJ* 12 (1962) 123–134, and *IEJ* 13 (1963) 325–326. *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, ed. R. Stillwell (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976) 815ff.

[18] Rowe, ibid.

[19] M. Avi-Yonah, "The Foundation of Tiberias," *IEJ* 1 (1950) 160–169. See also the discussion in H. Hoehner, *Herod Antipas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1972) 93.

[20] See D. Edwards, "Tiberias" in *The New Harpers Bible Dictionary*, ed. P. Achtemeier (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985) 1069–1070.

a stadium, a forum, fortress, and palace.[21] An aqueduct carried water to the city from 15 km. away. The Romans built a temple dedicated to Hygieia at Tiberias.[22] Among the cities of Galilee Tiberias shared top honors with Sepphoris. Each served as the capital and administrative center at different periods. Avi-Yonah estimated the population of Tiberias to be 30–40,000.[23] Again, accuracy is hard to come by, but we can tell that the first century city was six times larger than the Tiberias of the medieval period.[24] The eastern half of lower Galilee belonged to the "territory" of Tiberias.[25]

Sepphoris

Sepphoris was the capital and "ornament" of Galilee from the time of the reorganization of Palestine under Gabinius.[26] Sepphoris was the seat of the Sanhedrin. Like Beth Shean, Sepphoris was always a strategic military site.[27] In Sepphoris there were courts, a fortress, a theater seating 3–4000, a palace, a colonnaded street on top of the acropolis, two city walls, two markets (upper and lower), archives, the royal bank, and the arsenal (Life 9). Sepphoris also minted its own coins. Antipas called Sepphoris *autokratis,* or self-governed, and it was the strongest and largest city of Galilee (J.W. III.511).[28] The territory of the city extended 9 miles SE to Mt. Tabor and 10 miles NW to Akko.[29] Sepphoris possessed a sophisticated water and drainage system. This includes an impressive tunnel hewn through the rock measuring 3.5m wide and 6.5m high.[30] One should make mention also of "under ground Sepphoris."[31] This is a series of underground chambers, some of which are connected and quite elaborate. Some would have been used for storage and then fallen into disuse or transformed for other purposes. In 1986, 25 of these were opened and explored.[32] I would suppose Sepphoris' population to be around 30,000.

There are other sites which would be relevant for a more complete survey of large and/or urban centers in Galilee, including Gabara and Bethsaida where excavations are now beginning. This too looks as though it was much larger than we previously thought. Josephus relates that Philip the Tetrarch raised the village to the status of a city by strengthening the fortifications, adding citizens, and then renaming it after Augustus'

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[21] *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites,* 920. See also Y. Meshorer, *City-Coins of Eretz-Israel and the Decapolis in the Roman Period* (Jerusalem: Israel Museum, 1985) 34.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Avi-Yonah, "Foundation," 164–165.

[24] *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites,* 920.

[25] Josephus, Ant. 18.2.3–36, 38. J.W. 2.9.1–160.

[26] See Ant.15.5.4–91; J.W. 1.8.5–170.

[27] See L. Waterman, *Excavations at Sepphoris* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1937).

[28] Also Ant.18.2.1. See E. Meyers, C. Meyers, and E. Netzer, "Sepphoris: Ornament of All Galilee," *BA* 49 (1986) 155.

[29] J. Strange, "Sepphoris," *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (Garden City; Doubleday, forthcoming).

[30] See L. Waterman, *Excavations at Sepphoris.* This is pictured on plate #22.

[31] E. Meyers, et al., "Ornament," 164.

[32] J. Strange and T. Longstaff, "Sepphoris (Zippori) 1985," *IEJ* 35 (1985) 298.

daughter, Julia.[33] An aqueduct and a city wall have already been found there.[34] Also, as the Sea of Galilee bracketed lower Galilee to the east, so did the region of Ptolemais-Acco on the west. This also was a large city, with a vibrant port which controlled the entire Mediterranean coast by the first century.[35]

This is an unusually large number of urban and larger village centers in lower Galilee, an area roughly 15 miles by 25 miles. As M. Broshi correctly observes, this makes lower Galilee one of the most densely populated regions of the entire Roman Empire.[36] It is not surprising then that both Josephus and the Letter to Aristeas refer to the over-population in Palestine, and Galilee in particular, in their day.[37] This point about the small area which comprises lower Galilee warrants further comment.

The close proximity of these urban areas, and the influences they represent, crowded as they are into this 15–25 mile area, should dramatically affect our understanding and reconstruction of the Jesus movement and its social world. The influences, opportunities, and pressures which these urban centers represent could not have been lost on anyone living in lower Galilee in the first century. There simply is too much travel and trade, and everyone is living too close together for isolation from, or ignorance of, events, developments, influences of any king in Galilee to persist. One is never more than a day's walk from anywhere in lower Galilee, if that. The thought that one could be removed from or unaffected by occurrences and developments, whether political or cultural, in lower Galilee cannot be sustained. One could not live in any village in lower Galilee and escape the effects and ramifications of urbanization. These urban centers represented certain concentrations of Roman power and culture laid over the local traditions. These lower Galilean cities functioned as regional centers of Roman power and culture and would have been unavoidable in this small area in terms of their influence and impact.[38]

Also, the close proximity of people and places within lower Galilee, something too often overlooked, should effect certain reconstructions of the Jesus movement, particularly those which wish to focus on the supposed itinerant nature of the movement. There is

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[33] Ant.18.28. See, D. Urman, *The Golan: A Profile of a Region During the Roman and Byzantine Periods:* BAR International Series 269 (Oxford: BAR, 1985) 120–121.

[34] See J. Strange, "Bethsaida," *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (Garden City: Doubleday, forthcoming). The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Strange for his willingness to share his material and his insights into Galilean history and culture so freely. While he is certainly not responsible for its shortcomings, this essay has profited greatly from his insights.

[35] See M. Avi-Yonah, *Gazetter of Roman Palestine: Monographs for the Institute of Archaeology* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1976) 89. M. Dothan, "Akko: Interim Excavation Report First Season 1973/74," *BASOR* 224 (1976) 1–48. A. Kindler, "Akko: A City of Many Names," *BASOR* 231 (1978) 51–55.

[36] M. Broshi, "The Population of Western Palestine in the Roman-Byzantine Period," *BASOR* 236 (1979) 3.

[37] G. Theissen, *The Sociology of Palestinian Christianity* trans. J. Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978) 40. See Aristeas 113, and Josephus J.W. 3.3.2; Ant.17.11.4; Life 45/230.

[38] M. Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee: A.D. 132–212.* Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld; 1983) 135–154. And A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces,* revised by M. Avi-Yonah (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971) xiii–xiv.

an inherent problem with this reconstruction, namely, that one could easily walk home at the end of the day. Itinerancy would not have been a prerequisite for membership in a popular movement in lower Galilee in the first century.[39]

What are some of the ramifications of all this for Christian origins, and what are the questions which are raised by this view of an essentially urbanized lower Galilee in the first century? What is the import of the presence of these various apparatus and institutions in these cities which we briefly laid out? First, it should be noted that the gospel tradition depicts the activity of the Jesus movement essentially around two areas: the region of Sepphoris, that is, the villages of Nazareth, Cana and Nain, and the area of the Rift Valley on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee, apparently centered around Capernaum. The first followers lived and moved in and around significant urban centers. The Jesus movement would have had its share of urban influence and all that goes with it. Hellenistic culture, education, and influence could not have been foreign to either the Jesus movement or the later gospel writers. Galilee clearly possessed the sorts of settings we assume would be necessary to produce a gospel. There appears to be no good reason to crowd Antioch with evangelists. The Galilean cities of Sepphoris or Tiberias appear as far more plausible places of origin for, say, Matthew's Gospel then Antioch or elsewhere. One need not turn to the diaspora or world of Paul to find the cultural and social influence of the city upon the followers of Jesus. This is an important factor in seeking to recover the ethos of earliest Christianity.

While we have been trying to draw attention to the urban character of much of Galilee, one cannot do away with its village life either. There are villages in Galilee. They seem to be part of a region belonging to a city, but they are nevertheless part of Galilee. This raises one of the most important questions as far as recovering the ethos of Galilean Christianity is concerned. Namely, what is the relationship between urban and rural areas in Galilee? What was, say, the relationship between Nazareth and Sepphoris like? How was that relationship constructed and carried out? What was the tax situation? Was the relationship interdependent? Was it generally characterized by animosity, or all of the above? Did Nazareth enjoy any autonomy, or was life in Nazareth dominated and lived out completely in the shadow of Sepphoris, its buildings and authorities?[40] In light of the archaeological evidence it would be unfounded to assert early Christianity was strictly rural and village oriented. There is plenty of urban imagery in the gospels, and the cities were alive and well during the birth and growth of the Jesus movement. To speak of courts (Matt 5.25), the *agora* (Matt 23.7), and conflict with the religious and civil authorities is to presuppose an urban setting. The city was the seat of authority for those specialists who maintained order and enjoyed civil and political power.

This is an important aspect of recognizing the institutions present within a city. Recognizing these buildings in Tiberias, Magdala, or Sepphoris is not only to draw attention to the architecture and Greco-Roman influence there. These institutions represent the sorts of people who occupied these centers. The presence of courts naturally suggest the presence of judges and all the legal and juridical personnel they would require. Fortresses require soldiers, and theaters or hippodromes other specialists. Naturally an important function for the urban center would be the collection and overseeing revenues, taxes, and tolls. All of these political and civil authorities had of course people who worked for them

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[39] This is the reconstruction advocated by G. Theissen in *The Sociology of Palestinian Christianity.*

[40] This is pursued further in D. Edward's article in this volume on Urban-Rural relations in Galilee.

and perhaps people who in turn worked for them. There were the *retainers* of the authorities who filled these urban institutions and enabled them to function.[41] As Hopkins recognized, these urban centers were power centers which, for the most part, were filled with specialists of various sorts. These specialists needed to be serviced, housed, and supplied.[42] Sometime ago G. Sjoberg noted that a city has a wider range of non-agricultural specialists. This would include particularly the *literati* who possessed most of the skills for these specialties and, perhaps, also the power.[43] The city then represents an unusual concentration of not only culture and sophistication but also one of power. At times this could have been a positive aspect of the city for those living outside the walls, and at other times it could have represented an ominous presence.[44]

One obvious question which emerges of course is, why do these cities not figure more prominently in the gospel tradition? It is not that the early Christians were "ignorant" of the culture or life of the city. Perhaps one need not state the obvious: everyone knew of Sepphoris, Scythopolis, or Tiberias, and therefore they do not warrant mention. They are, in A. Schutz's phrase, "taken for granted."[45] This, however, seems an unsatisfactory answer. While this cannot be developed completely in this essay, we would posit that the absence of these significant and unavoidable urban centers relates to the issue of power which these centers represent and possess. The Jesus movement lived and acted around the cities of Tiberias and Sepphoris but was located more in the villages and towns that were close by, like Nazareth or Capernaum.[46]

A certain level of hostility between the Jesus movement and the retainers of those in power in these villages is depicted in the gospels; however, the movement would not have suffered a direct confrontation with those who enjoyed *de jure* power in these more moderate centers.[47] Power and punishment could not have been exercised as quickly and as decisively in Cana or Capernaum as they could have been in Sepphoris or Tiberias. The employees in Capernaum, or the retainers whom the movement encounters, do not possess the authority to punish or greatly inhibit the activity of the movement.[48] Only

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[41] The term is G. Lenski's and has been applied to the Pharisees in illuminating fashion by A. J. Saldarini in *Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees in Palestinian Society* (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, forthcoming). See also his article in this volume, "The Political and Social Roles of the Pharisees and Scribes in Galilee."

[42] K. Hopkins, "Economic Growth and Towns in Classical Antiquity," in *Towns and Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology,* edited by P. Abrams, E. Wrigley (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1978) 75.

[43] G. Sjoberg, *The Pre-Industrial City* (New York: MacMillan, 1960) 11.

[44] See D. Edwards, "Urban-Rural Relations in First Century Galilee."

[45] A. Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Volume II, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) 121ff.

[46] Cf. Mark 6.1–6//Matt 13.53–58//Luke 4.16.30. Capernaum emerges as the movement's base and center. See, for example, Matt 4.13 and 9.1ff. The concentration in Capernaum has long been recognized. See W. Trilling, *Das Wahre Israel: Studien zur Theologie des Matthäus-Evangelium* (Munich: Koesel-Verlag, 1964) 132.

[47] The retainers are those *literati* in a traditional agrarian society who are employed or form an alliance with those in power. The association of the Pharisees with the Herodians in Mark 3.6 is an example of the sort of alliance the retainer class forms with those in power. They are dependent on the favor of the ruler.

[48] It is likely that these lower level officials would have to report trouble and seek advice on the appropriate response, not possessing the authority to act immediately and on their own.

in these large urban centers with their concentration of political and civil authorities could such a movement meet with immediate trouble and punishment. The absence of Sepphoris or Tiberias in the gospel tradition shouts at the reader who is familiar with the landscape of lower Galilee in the first century. The suggestion being made here is that their absence appears as less of an oversight and more of a strategy.

Finally, one should ask about the meaning of living in the territory or region of a city. The gospel writers themselves are prone to using the phrase, as is Josephus.[49] How did this affect the villages in the so-called region? Was the region formed primarily for tax purposes? One supposes it was. Was there a benefit to begin "in the territory of Tiberias"? One suspects that Josephus has the territory of a city in mind when he cites their populations. So viewed, these figures do not seem nearly so inflated as is often assumed. Again, however, the question about living in the territory of an urban center relates directly to the crucial question of urban-rural relations in Galilee.

It would be very difficult to contend that the cities of Galilee did *not* have an impact on the life and thought of the Jesus movement. The culture of the city did affect the first followers of Jesus. Many of the followers were from these very centers.[50] The urban nature of much of lower Galilee is an important ingredient in assessing the world of early Christianity. The streets and courts of Sepphoris or the life around Tiberias or Magdala were as much a part of the life of the Jesus movement and his followers as was the agrarian imagery of the sower and his seed, the lilies of the field, or the "toing and froing" across the lake. Lower Galilee in the first century was clearly urbanized. The opportunities and influences of the *Polis*, and all the hellenistic culture and developments which are usually associated with it, were a pronounced aspect of life in Galilee of the earliest Christians. The bucolic and sentimental view of life in Galilee, including as well the rural and uncultured followers of Jesus, are portraits which need to be done away with. Life in lower Galilee in the first century was as urbanized and urbane as anywhere else in the empire. In recognizing the urban element in first century Galilee, as well as the villages and village people which surrounded them, we draw closer to a more comprehensive picture of the social world of Galilee and the ethos of the Jesus movement and earliest Christianity.

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[49] See Ant.18.2.3 and J.W. 2.9.1. Also, Matt 4.13; 15.21, 39; Mark 7.31; 8.10.

[50] Cf. John 1.44; Matt 4.13; 9.1.

First Century Urban/Rural Relations in Lower Galilee: Exploring the Archaeological and Literary Evidence

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I. Introduction[1]

The neat distinctions between Palestinian and Hellenistic Christianity[2] still carry overtones of rural as opposed to urban or village as opposed to city environments.[3] The common perception that the nascent Jesus movement developed almost exclusively among farmers, peasants, and "the simple people of rural Galilee" often offers as primary evidence

[1] The paper assumes much of the discussion on the urban character of Lower Galilee that is presented in the article by J. Andrew Overman in this volume.

[2] E.g., Rudolf Bultmann's distinctions between "primitive Palestinian" vs. Hellenistic Christianity in his *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, translated by John Marsh (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) 240f. Martin Hengel has skillfully shown the inadequacy of this distinction in *Judaism and Hellenism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974). See also the excellent work by Sean Freyne, *Galilee From Alexander the Great to Hadrian 323 B.C.E. to 135 C.E.: A Study of Second Temple Judaism* (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier and Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980).

[3] The terms rural, urban, country, village, town, and city are fraught with ambiguity both in today's parlance about the first century period and in the use of such terms by first century writers. A complete discussion of the issues involved is beyond the scope of the present paper. For a general discussion of basic issues see Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), esp. chapter two; George McLean Harper, Jr., "Village Administration in Syria," 105–116; Eric M. Myers and James F. Strange, *Archaeology, The Rabbis, & Early Christianity* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1981) 48–61; Anthony Byatt, "Josephus and Population Numbers in First Century Palestine," *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1973) 51–60; and Martin Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee, A.D. 132–212* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983) 27ff. Goodman rightly notes that rigid classification leads to confusion (ibid., p. 28). Administrative functions, walls, cultural institutions, and public buildings seem to make Tiberias and Sepphoris legitimate *poleis*. Towns and villages are even harder to classify. For convenience we shall consider towns as civic areas (e.g., Capernaum or Tarichaeae) that have some administrative capabilities, significant populations, and some self-governance while villages (e.g., Nazareth) have significantly smaller populations. Urban environments have large centralized populations with varied markets and diverse crafts (primarily cities and towns) whereas rural areas include agricultural areas outside the urban areas proper and small villages.

the use of agricultural metaphors in the sayings material and the lack of a visit to an urban center such as Sepphoris or Tiberias.[4] Two factors suggest that such an analysis needs reevaluation. First, agriculture in the Roman empire was intimately connected with urban environments.[5] Agricultural images in the New Testament, therefore, may neither prove nor disprove a rural provenance. Second, even in the New Testament, early traditions portray images associated with both rural and urban areas. Should one simply interpret the following images as the redactor's literary license: Jesus healing in the cities and marketplaces (Mark 6:56), the use of judicial imagery in sayings material (Matthew 5:25–26/Luke 12:57–59), financial analogies that envision interest bearing accounts (Q = Matthew 25:27/Luke 19:23), or the portrait of an absentee landlord (a city dweller or one connected to an urban environment?) who functions as the parabolic representation of God (Mark 12:1–12 and parallels)?

As an effort to clarify the social and cultural ethos of the Jesus movement, this paper explores the interaction between urban and rural/village areas in Lower Galilee in the first century. More particularly it will address whether this interaction was simply parasitic ("consumer society")[6] or antagonistic,[7] or whether there existed a degree of reciprocity in economic, political, and cultural relations that benefited both urban and rural areas. Finally, it will suggest some implications for interpreting the nascent Jesus movement.

II. Overview of Lower Galilee

Josephus and the rabbinic literature partition Galilee into two distinct geographical regions, Upper and Lower Galilee.[8] The synoptics and the Gospel of John situate Jesus and his followers' primary activity in Lower Galilee and the rift region around the Sea

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[4] Geza Vermes, *Jesus the Jew* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973) 48–49; cf. the similar perspective by the ancient historian G. E. M. de Ste. Croix who concludes that Jesus "lived and preached almost entirely outside the area of Graeco-Roman civilisation proper," *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1981) 427.

[5] Peter Garnsey & Richard Saller show this in some detail in *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture*, 20–43.

[6] M. I. Finley, who takes the term "consumer society" from Max Weber, argues that cities were "centres of consumption" and parasitic when they drew rents and taxes from the country with little returned by way of services or goods (*The Ancient Economy*, 125). Finley, however, rightly notes that the economic relationship between rural and urban areas covered a spectrum that ranged from complete parasitism to full symbiosis, the latter depicting both country and urban area contributing in equal portions to urban production and services (ibid.); see further the useful discussion by Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture*, 49ff.

[7] G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1981) 427; cf. Douglas E. Oakman, *Jesus and the Economic Questions of His Day* (Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986) 5, 12 n. 11.

[8] The Mishnah also has a third area, the Valley or the Sea of Galilee basin. For convenience we shall include it as part of Lower Galilee. See discussion by Sean Freyne, *Galilee: From Alexander the Great to Hadrian 323BCE–135CE. A Study of Second Temple Judaism* (Wilmington, DE & Notre Dame, IN: Michael Glazier & University of Notre Dame Press, 1980) 9ff.

of Galilee.[9] Even so, it is important not to downplay *a priori* the gospel traditions that also send him to the area of the Decapolis (Matthew 8:28/Mark 5:1/Luke 8:26; Mark 7:31), the coast near Tyre and Sidon (Mark 7:24/Matthew 15:21; cf. Mark 3:8), and into Herod Phillip's northern kingdom, the villages of Caesarea Phillipi (Mark 8:27/Matthew 16:13). As we shall see, commercial activity between these areas make such movement plausible.

Eric Myers has noted that the four valleys in Lower Galilee running SW-NE provided excellent trade routes to the sea and thus made Lower Galilee especially susceptible to urban development.[10] According to Magen Broshi, Lower Galilee along with Palestine reached a population density largely unsurpassed until the twentieth century.[11] Indeed, Lower Galilee, Broshi argues, was one of the more densely populated regions of the Roman empire.[12]

Jesus and his earliest followers, therefore, operated in an environment with a strong "urban overlay."[13] Yet Lower Galilee certainly had a significant village network as both

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[9] Without delving into the complex questions of the historical Jesus, I assume this as the primary locus of his ministry. The upper boundary of Lower Galilee, according to the Mishnah, begins at Kefar Hananiah (see Sean Freyne, *Galilee: From Alexander the Great to Hadrian 323BCE–135CE. A Study of Second Temple Judaism* [Wilmington, DE & Notre Dame, IN: Michael Glazier & University of Notre Dame Press, 1980] 9); Josephus places the northern boundary near Bersabe, a village quite close to Kefar Hananiah in the Beth Kerem ("House of the Vine") Valley. The eastern boundary, of course, was the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan rift; on the south of Lower Galilee was the Plain of Esdraelon, with Scythopolis or Beth Shean its most prominent city on the east. Josephus, however, names Xaloth, a village in the plain as the southern border. (See Freyne, op. cit. 9ff. for citations and bibliography.) The west was bounded by the plain of Acco with the maritime city of Ptolemais/Acco its most prominent city. Although not part of Lower Galilee proper, Ptolemai/Acco was called by Josephus "the maritime city of Galilee" suggesting its important economic connection; indeed, the city controlled the entire Mediterranean coast of Galilee in first century (Michael Avi-Yonah, *Gazetteer of Roman Palestine* [Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976] 89).

[10] E. Meyers, "Galilean Regionalism as a Factor in Historical Reconstruction," *BASOR* 221 (1976) 93–102.

[11] Magen Broshi, "The Role of The Temple in the Herodian Economy," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 38.1 (Spring, 1987) 32. Broshi puts the figure in Palestine at about ½ million.

[12] M. Broshi, "The Population of Western Palestine in the Roman-Byzantine Period," *BASOR* 236 (1979) 3; M. Broshi, "The Role of the Temple in the Herodian Econmy," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 38.1 (Spring, 1987) 32; cf. Eric M. Myers, James F. Strange, Dennis E. Groh, "The Meiron Excavation Project: Archeological Survey in Galilee and Golan, 1976," *BASOR* 230 (April, 1978) 18, who note a marked climb in population during the early Roman period in both Upper and Lower Galilee.

[13] The phrase is borrowed from James F. Strange who kindly allowed me to draw on his article "Two Aspects of the Development of Universalism in Christianity: The First to the Fourth Centuries," which was prepared for the New ERA Sociology Conference: "Religion and the Quest for Global Order," and which will appear in the Proceeding of the Conference published by Paragon Press in 1989. This work will be referred to as "Two Aspects . . ." from this point on.

archaeological and literary sources indicate.[14] What relationship existed between the village environment emphasized in the gospel accounts and the urban areas of Lower Galilee in the first century? Do we see clues to the mentalité of first century Galileans with verbal snapshots of children sitting in marketplaces (Matthew 11:16/Luke 7:31); Jesus eating with tax collectors (Matthew 11:19/Luke 7:34); a centurion meeting Jesus in Capernaum (Matthew 8:5–13/Luke 7:1–10); the followers of Jesus instructed to enter city (*polis*) and village (*kome*) (Matthew 10:11, 14; cf. Luke 10:1, 10); the believer who should settle with an accuser before being taken to a magistrate, handed over to an officer and put into prison, and forced to relinquish his last copper (*lepton*) (Luke 12:57–59/Matthew 5:25–26); and the failure of the servant to invest money in the bank to draw interest (Luke 19:23/Matthew 25:27)? These citations taken from Q imply a more complex interaction between urban and rural environments in the areas of trade, administration, and culture than is often assumed. The following discussion delineates that interaction drawing on archaeological and literary evidence.

II. Trade/Commercial Relations

Markets and Commercial Networks

Ramsay MacMullen once remarked that the exchange of goods that occurred within any given fifteen mile radius probably accounted for about "three quarters of the value of exchange throughout" the Roman economy.[15] Ian Hopkins's recent use of central place theory has substantiated MacMullen's observation for Palestine and especially Lower Galilee. Hopkins's approach illuminates, in particular, the interaction between urban areas and villages in Palestine.[16] Hopkins notes that large urban and commercial centers in first century Palestine, such as Scythopolis, incorporated a network of smaller cities (e.g., Sepphoris and Tiberias) within their trading spheres (usually about 25 miles distant). In turn, these smaller urban areas have villages associated with them. If the villages are close to the urban area (e.g., Nazareth to Sepphoris),[17] Hopkins posits, it indicates a trade and

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[14] Josephus mentions that 204 cities and villages existed in Galilee. See discussion with references in Anthony Byatt, "Josephus and Population Numbers in first Century Palestine," *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* (1973) 51–60. The Meiron survey found a large number of village sites that were founded in the late Hellenistic or Early Roman periods; see Eric M. Meyers, James F. Strange, Dennis E. Groh, "The Meiron Excavation Project: Archeological Survey in Galilee and Golan, 1976," *BASOR* 230 (April, 1978) 1–24; see also the discussion by M. Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee, A.D. 132–212* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983) 54ff.

[15] Ramsay MacMullen, "Market-Days in the Roman Empire," *Phoenix* 24.4 (1970) 333; cf. M. I. Finley who talks about peasant markets where peasants and village craftsmen met coming from distances of 5–6 miles to exchange goods; in *The Ancient Economy* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1973) 107.

[16] Ian W. J. Hopkins, "The City Region in Roman Palestine," *Palestinian Exploration Journal* (1980) 19–32; cf. M. Finley who notes that the average distance from a small local market "to the edge of its tributary area" remained at the standard maximum distance to a market preferred wherever means of transport are primitive, namely, four to five miles (*The Ancient Economy*, 127).

[17] Pottery evidence indicates that Nazareth's commercial connections at least pointed north; see discussion below.

commercial relationship. If on the border of the territory, however, it indicates an administrative (i.e. judicial, taxation, banking) relation.

Hopkins' work rightly argues that we rethink the relations that exist between city and village in Lower Galilee. Commercial ties belie the common assumption that cities such as Tiberias or Sepphoris served a parasitic role, simply draining the goods and agricultural produce from the countryside into Herodian or Roman coffers with little offered in return.[18] The small village of Kefer Hananiah provides material evidence for the type of reciprocal economic relations at work. This village located on the border between Upper and Lower Galilee is mentioned in later Jewish sources as a pottery village.[19] The excavator, David Adan-Bayewitz, has skillfully shown through neutron analysis[20] that the distribution pattern of its pottery spreads throughout Lower Galilee and even into the Golan, the latter area often thought to have had little economic dealings with Lower Galilee. Indeed, the Sea of Galilee apparently served as a trade route for the pottery to the Golan.[21] Significantly, the village apparently supplied cooking pottery for much of Galilee, including Sepphoris and the villages around Sepphoris. At least eleven other localities including the Upper Galilean villages of Khirbet Shema and Meiron also had significant amounts of the pottery from this village.[22]

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[18] Martin Goodman, op. cit., 13; see also Peter Garnsey & Richard Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture*, who show the inadequacy of this model in the Roman empire at large. One difficulty with their approach for our purposes is that it offers sweeping generalizations over large historical periods.

[19] David Adan-Bayewitz, "Manufacture and Local Trade in the Galilee of Roman-Byzantine Palestine: A Case Study," (Ph.D at Hebrew University, 1985).

[20] David Adan-Bayewitz, "Kefar Hananya, 1986" *Israel Exploration Journal* 37.2/3 (1987) 178–179; cf. Adan-Bayewitz and I. Perlman, "Local Pottery Provenience Studies: A Role For Clay Analysis," *Archaeometry* 27.2 (1985) 203–217. Adan-Bayewitz has used the technique of neutron analysis to determine the provenance of the pottery found at these various locations. A fuller description of this technique as well as an account of the significance of this distribution of wares and a clear presentation of the considerable quantity spread throughout Galilee will be clarified in Adan-Bayewitz's revised dissertation with Eisenbrauns.

[21] The Galilean bowl from Kefar Hananiah occurs in settlements on the Golan, east of Jordan Valley rift (D. Adan-Bayewitz, "local Pottery Provenience Studies," *Archaeometry* 27.2 [1985] 206). Pottery from the village found on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee was deposited by boatwreck (probably), which indicates one trade route between the village and the Golan area (ibid., 215); further, some of this pottery was found in the same context with home fired Golan pottery (ibid., 217).

[22] The excavators of Capernaum have also found evidence of the pottery at Capernaum, Nazareth, Kfar Kanna (a large village 3–4 miles NE of Nazareth), Tiberias, Magdala, and Tell Anafa in Upper Galilee. See review by James F. Strange, "The Capernaum and Herodium Publications," *BASOR* 226, 72; for Tel Anafa see Sharon C. Herbert, "Tel Anafa 1978: Preliminary Report," *BASOR* 234 (Spring, 1979) esp. 82 n. 7; Eric M. Meyers, James F. Strange, Dennis E. Groh, "The Meiron Excavation Project: Archeological Survey in Galilee and Golan, 1976," *BASOR* 230 (April, 1978) 20; for Nabratein, Capernaum, Magdala, and Khirbet Shema see Eric M. Meyers, James F. Strange, Carol L. Meyers, "Preliminary Report on the 1980 Excavations at en-Nabratein, Israel," *BASOR* 244 (Fall, 1981) 21.

Here is important evidence for a small rural village serving as a center for pottery manufacture marketed throughout the Galilee and Golan to village and city alike, in competition with (or complementary to) home grown products. Adan-Bayewitz rightly argues that there existed "a network of interrelated settlements in first century B.C. to fourth century A.D. Galilee and Golan."[23] This suggests that a reciprocal market relationship between village and city existed even on the boundaries of the cities since Kefer Hananiah lies on the perimeter of several urban areas, including Tiberias and Sepphoris. The village no doubt profited by manufacturing its pottery and selling it in Sepphoris (and elsewhere) in return for various goods and services. It is possible that Sepphoris served as a distribution center to villages within its economic horizon. The pattern may parallel an area in Italy where MacMullen observes "the exchange of goods between the rural population on the one hand, and urban and itinerant merchants on the other hand" occurred at well-planned and consistently held festivals and bazaars.[24] The same case could probably be made for other regional markets such as Tiberias and Tarichaeae.

Villages and certain areas in the countryside also had their markets in which to exchange local goods and crafts.[25] No doubt various service industries such as scribes, money changers, entertainers, healers, and proponents of religious values made the rounds as did travelling merchants to the various market days and bazaars.[26] Later sources, for example, indicate that money changers worked daily in the cities but came once a week to village areas of Lower Galilee.[27] Martin Goodman has made the case that villages of Galilee after 135 CE were largely independent and relied only on city markets to earn coins for Roman taxes, to purchase goods not available (e.g., luxury goods such as gold,

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[23] David Adan-Bayewitz, "Kefar Hananya, 1986," *Israel Exploration Journal* 37.2/3 (1987) 178–179.

[24] MacMullen, "Market-Days in the Roman Empire," *Phoenix* 24.4 (1970) 341. S. Applebaum suggests that some persons obtained their goods from travelling craftsmen who sold their wares (including pottery) from place to place ("Economic Life in Palestine," *The Jewish People in the First Century,* volume Two, edited by S. Safrai and M. Stern, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum [Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976] 680). The sheer volume of pottery from Kefer Hananiah, however, as well as the widespread distribution in both Lower and Upper Galilee and the Golan in both villages and large urban areas alike suggest a complex sophisticated marketing pattern that included both travelling craftsmen, local merchants, and central distribution areas. Indeed, Applebaum acknowledges the importance of marketplaces in the cities (ibid., 687f.). He cites later evidence which indicates that even though peasants brought agricultural produce to market and sold it, middlemen existed "who bought and sold the peasants' produce, also purchasing crafts products and supplying craftsmen with raw materials. Some of these men dealt on a large scale, and worked with agents" (ibid., 688). This fits a pattern developed across the Roman empire in which cities served as

> the seat of social, legal and religious amenities, the centre for the processing of primary products and the productions of craft goods, and the market centre of the sale and distribution of locally produced and imported commodities (Garnsey and Saller, op. cit., 56).

[25] Martin Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee, A.D. 132–212,* 54.

[26] Ibid., 57.

[27] Ibid., 57–59. Here may be the "bankers" with whom the financially inept servant was to invest his master's money (Matthew 25:27/Luke 19:23).

glass, pearls, wood products), and to sell surplus produce and goods like olive oil.[28] Such interchange, however, indicates more than a superficial relation between villages and urban areas. Clearly itinerant merchants as well as persons who provided assorted goods and services (including hawking one's religious or philosophical perspective) created an economic and social web that bound closely spaced villages and the urban areas into a common fabric. Indeed, if one takes MacMullen's fifteen mile distance to market seriously, then nearly every village in Lower Galilee would fall within range of the two major cities, Sepphoris and Tiberias. The pottery from Kefer Hananiah indicates that at least one small village took full advantage of this fact. It should come as no surprise, therefore, when Jesus is portrayed as entering the marketplaces of cities, villages, and country (Mark 6:53–56). It was in those areas that urban and rural persons could gather to carry on economic, social, and religious discourse.

Import and Export Networks

Vigorous international commerce in Lower Galilee occurred as well. One example must suffice to convey the thorough commercial network set up in Palestine. Numerous small ointment bottles have been found throughout Palestine that date from the third century BCE to first century CE. In most cases they are found in household contexts.[29] Apparently, they held precious ointment used for inflammations and eye infections. These items, possibly imported from Lycia (Tarsus?), are found as far south as the city of Jerusalem and as far north as villages like Gush Halav in Upper Galilee. Regional imitations appeared including those made at the Upper Galilean village site of Tel Anafa.[30] The broad sweep of Galilee's import network is indicated by a host of items including Babylonian beer, medium beer, Egyptian barley beer, smoked fish/lentils from Egypt, cheese from Bythynia, mackerel from Spain, wines, asses from Lydia, purple dye from Tyre, jewelry from Egypt (as well as parchment and papyrus).[31]

Galilean exports were less numerous. They included vegetables, grain, olive oil, and such raw materials as Galilean rushes for ropemaking.[32] Balsam may have produced significant revenue.[33] In addition, salted fish was probably a major export from the area of

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[28] Ibid., 60f. For a full discussion of the subject with references see S. Applebaum, "Economic Life in Palestine," in *The Jewish People in the First Century,* volume 2, ed. S. Safrai and M. Stern, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976) esp. 672ff.

[29] Malka Hertz, "Miniature Ointment Vases," *Israel Exploration Journal* 36.1/2 (1986) 50.

[30] Ibid., 51.

[31] *The World History of the Jewish People. The Herodian Period,* volume 7. ed. Michael Ani-Yonah, 180ff.

[32] Examples of other export material from Palestine as a whole include date wine, date honey, perfumes (Pliny, *Natural History* XIII.44; Tacitus, *Histories* V.6), dried figs, fig honey, wine; fine olive oil came from Galilee. See S. Applebaum, "Economic Life in Palestine," in *The Jewish People in the First Century,* volume 2, ed. S. Safrai and M. Stern, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976) for additional discussion.

[33] Strabo notes that balsam was found in the Gennereth plain (*Geography* XVI.2.16 [Loeb]). Balsam was almost exclusively found in Palestine and was no doubt an important source of revenue. Its importance is evident in that Titus' victory arch celebrating his

Magdala/Tarichaeae and provided a source of revenue for the fishing industry in the area around the Sea of Galilee.[34] It should not surprise us that the father of two early followers of Jesus is portrayed as having hired servants to help with this productive enterprise (Mark 1:20).[35]

Economic Reciprocity

Such exports and imports did not simply benefit a few wealthy individuals. Keith Hopkins has rightly criticized the tendency to split the population of the Roman empire into two social and economic strata: a tiny elite and the broad mass of peasants and proletarians who lived near the level of minimum subsistence. This neglects, he argues, the varied, sophisticated market that addressed a large buying public who sought the "best clothes for brides and grooms, or for rich peasants or ordinary clothes for respectable schoolteachers or doctors or for middling landlords."[36] Trade and industry, Hopkins argues, played a major economic role in the Roman empire; agriculture was not the "sole" significant base for the economy.[37] The Roman empire may have been "borne on the backs of its peasants" but peasants received in turn:

> law, protection, peace, rituals, ceremonies and medical advice, even surgery. Towns gave independent peasants and free tenants opportunity to buy extra food and services, necessities and luxuries (tools, pots, clothes, seeds, pastries). Moreover, the towns themselves generated economic activity. Urban artisans had to be serviced, housed; they bought goods.[38]

Thus, villages and rural areas in Lower Galilee had the advantage of markets for their own produce as well as the ability to buy goods not readily available in their own village markets.[39] While ideological tensions may have existed between rural and urban inhabitants,[40] economic reciprocity bound both in an inextricable and oft-times beneficial bond.

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victory over Palestine had balsam trees as part of the booty. See M. Broshi's discussion with bibliography in "The Role of the Temple in the Herodian Economy," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 38.1 (Spring, 1987) 33. S. Freyne discusses balsam in Galilee in his *Galilee From Alexander the Great to Hadrian*, 172–173.

[34] See Martin Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee, A.D. 132–212* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983) 24.

[35] See W. Wuellner, "Fishermen," in *Interpreters Dictionary of the Bible Supplement*, 339 and Freyne, op. cit., 173–174.

[36] K. Hopkins, "Economic Growth and Towns in Classical Antiquity," in *Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology*, edited by Philip Abrams and E. A. Wigley (Cambridge: University Press, 1978) 55.

[37] *Contra* A. Jones, "The Urbanization of Palestine," *Journal of Roman Studies* 21 (1931) 78–85.

[38] K. Hopkins, "Economic Growth and Towns in Classical Antiquity," 75.

[39] Strange, "Two Aspects . . ."

[40] M. Goodman, op. cit., 88–89. Ideological factors and status issues in conjunction with socio-economic concerns must be factored into animosity between rural and urban actants as Gerd Theissen makes clear in *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978). The revolt of 66 CE, for example, surely had its roots

IV. Political and Administrative Interactions

Agriculture and Urbanization as Roman Policy

Reciprocal trade relations between village and urban area fit the political and economic aims of the Roman empire. Galilean society like Roman society in general was essentially pre-industrial. Agriculture, although not the sole econmic base for Lower Galilee or the Roman empire, was nevertheless a major source of income and investment possibilities for those with some means; in addition it served as a means of livelihood (and identity) for a large proportion of the populus.[41] Yet, rural development and urban interchange became essential ingredients for peace and prosperity in the Roman empire.

For Palestine, one can discern the presence of this attitude in the Jewish text, *The Letter of Aristeas,* probably written in the Hellenistic or Early Roman period.[42] The leadership, the writer contends, must pay "continuous attention to husbandry and the care of the land" in order "to ensure good yield as a result for the inhabitants."[43] Further, in order to increase one's profits one must prohibit farmers and the leadership of the city from "engaging in business thus diminishing the treasury, that is to say the profits of farming."[44] Cities and villages in Palestine, the author relates, are "well populated" and designed to give ample produce [including olive trees, corn, vines (wine), honey, fruit trees, dates, numerous flocks and herds].[45] Urban centers with strong productive agricultural areas were crucial to the organized well-functioning political system.

Administration in Lower Galilee

One approach, of course, that the Roman empire used to develop and maintain its

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in the economic sphere. Yet, economic hardships were not confined to peasants in the hinterlands. Josephus mentions 18,000 workers put out of a job when the temple was completed in the mid-60s (Josephus, *Antiquities* XX.219–220). For a discussion see J. Klausner, "The Economy of Judea in the Period of the Second Temple," in *The Herodian Period: The World History of the Jewish People,* volume VII, edited by Michael Avi-Yonah and Zvi Baras (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1975) 191. Even allowing for Josephean exaggeration, a moderate layoff would have contributed to an already volatile social, political, and religious environment. As Applebaum rightly notes, antagonisms "cut across the urban and rural population alike, and the non-agricultural urban craftsmen and petty traders were also a politically radical factor." "Economic Life in Palestine," *The Jewish People in the First Century,* 663). Ideological factors such as nationalism or messianism as well as status questions arising between Roman/Jew, aristocrat/techne, priest/Pharisee, wealthy/poor must all be factored in. This lies beyond the scope of the present paper.

[41] Garnsey & Salley, op. cit., 43f.; cf. Dan Urman's similar observation on the Golan area in *The Golan: A Profile of a Region during the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (BAR International Series 269, 1985) 141ff.; for Galilee see M. Goodman, op. cit., 22ff.

[42] The dates for this letter range from 250 BCE to the first century CE; see discussion by R. J. H. Shutt, "Letter of Aristeas," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha,* volume 2, edited by James H. Charlesworth (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985) 8–9. Quotations are taken from Shutt's translation.

[43] *Letter of Aristeas,* 108–109.

[44] Ibid., 111.

[45] Ibid., 112–113.

political, social and economic stability was the establishment of *poleis.*[46] Moses Finley has rightly called the Graeco-Roman world "a world of cities"[47] and "more urbanised than any other society before the modern era."[48] Isolated homesteads were rare as even the agrarian population generally lived in communities such as hamlets, villages, and towns.[49] In addition, "the city-state, the closely interlocked town-country unit, remained the basic module even after the state component in city-state had lost its strict original meaning."[50] Both Upper and Lower Galilee, however, had villages that elected village councils and assemblies. Local magistrates probably erected public buildings and provided a modicum of civic organization (e.g., tax collection, market days).[51] What political relation existed between such villages and the larger urban areas?

The primary political relation between village and city organizations[52] appears to have been administrative;[53] Sepphoris and Tiberias lobbied for the right to maintain legal

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[46] *The Ancient Economy* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973) 124.

[47] M. I. Finley, "The Ancient City: From Fustel De Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond," in *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece,* edited by B. D. Shaw and R. P. Saller (London, 1981) 2.

[48] Ibid., 20.

[49] Ibid., 2.

[50] Ibid., 20. Archaeological excavation on the outskirts of Jerusalem confirms this tendency for Judea. The excavators note that during the late Hellenistic and Early Roman periods intensive farming occurred on the hillsides among terraces built just for that purpose (Shimon Gibson and Gerson Edelstein, "Investigating Jerusalem's Rural Landscape," *Levant* 17 [1985] 144); in addition, settlement occurred within "nucleated rural villages" with few farms serving as a permanent residence except during the harvest seasons (ibid., 154); cf. Z. Ron, "Agricultural Terraces in the Judean Mountains," *Israel Exploration Journal* 16 (1966) 33–49, 111–122; Eric Meyers, James Strange, and Carol Meyers have shown a similar pattern near Meiron in Upper Galilee, where the large town of Meiron shared a spring th Khirbet Shema only a kilometer away. See Eric Meyers, "Meiron," in *Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land,* ed. Michael Avi-Yonah, Volume III (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1975) 856; for a comprehensive discussion see E. M. Meyers, J. F. Strange, and C. L. Meyers, *Excavations at Ancient Meiron, Upper Galilee* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

[51] Data for the operation of first century villages is quite sparse. Nevertheless, see the excellent discussion by Goodman, op. cit., esp. 120ff; cf. the analysis by G. Harper, "Village Administration in Syria," *Yale Classical Series* 1 (1928) 105–168. It should be noted that much of Harper's evidence draws from the second through fourth centuries and thus must be used with some caution.

[52] To obtain the status of a *polis,* of course, meant civic organizations such as Tiberias consisted of a self governing urban community that had a constitution, a council, magistrates, and a rural area that it controlled (Garnsey & Salley, op. cit., 28). This political or administrative approach, however, was not firmly followed in antiquity; often economic or demographic factors played a role, as did the perspective of the writer discussing a particular civic organization. Strabo, for example, viewed Thebes' constitution as a poor substitute for an area that was underpopulated with decaying buildings, a weak economy and cultural backwardness. Indeed, as far as he was concerned it didn't even rate the title of village. See the discussion and citations in Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture,* 30f.

[53] M. Goodman argues that there was little need on the part of villages to draw on

records,[54] collected taxes,[55] and provided a judicial system.[56] The exact nature of the village's participation remains clouded; it also remains unclear to what extent the *poleis* Tiberias and Sepphoris controlled the areas around them in the first century.[57] Nevertheless, both village and urban organizations in Lower Galilee reflected the empire's goal "to build up a structure of centres of local government that could render practical services to the imperial power."[58] Both helped sustain a peaceful, civilized environment.[59] Indeed Lower Galilee appears to have avoided the typical parasitic relation between village and cities so evident, for example, in Judaea (especially Jerusalem).[60] Villages achieved a more independent status in economic decisions and local administration.[61]

V. Cultural Interaction

A few brief remarks should be made about the cultural interchange between urban and rural areas in Lower Galilee. Martin Goodman shows that second century Galilee was no "semitic enclave surrounded by Hellenism" and he rightly suggests that one must determine the correct "cultural mixture" when discussing the interaction of Greek and semitic influences.[62] Goodman's remarks are no less relevant for the pre-70 period, although first century evidence is more sketchy for Lower Galilee.

As many interpreters have shown, Hellenism permeated much of first century Palestine.[63] Even the geographically isolated villages of Upper Galilee indicate its influ-

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urban areas for security, market facilities, or coinage (op. cit., 131–132). This may be true for the second century but the number of villages and urban areas that had walls and were built strategically on hills or mountainsides (e.g. Jotapata and Gamala) suggest that security was a significant concern.

[54] See discussion by Stuart S. Miller, *Studies in the History and Traditions of Sepphoris* (Leiden: Brill, 1984) esp. 14–45; Goodman, op. cit., 119–154.

[55] Tax collection was a major function of cities (Garnsey/Saller, op. cit., 57; Goodman, op. cit., 131). Goodman overstates the case when he argues that the villages and rural areas did not look to the urban areas to market their goods. As we have shown, ceramic evidence indicates the vital economic connections between urban and rural areas. Cf. the discussion by Freyne, op. cit., 183ff.

[56] Goodman, op. cit., 119ff.

[57] Goodman suggests that they had no major influence in Lower Galilee and that no culture gap existed between the cities and the countryside, op. cit., 130.

[58] Garnsey and Saller, op. cit., 32.

[59] Strabo, for one, did not view city and rural areas as separate but unequal enterprises. Europe, for example, "is diversified with plains and mountains, so that throughout its entire extent the agricultural and civilized element dwell side by side with the war-like element" (quote taken from Garnsey/Saller, op. cit., 32).

[60] Goodman, "The First Jewish Revolt: Social Conflict and the Problem of Debt," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 33 (1982) 417–427.

[61] Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee, A.D. 132–212*, 133.

[62] Ibid., 65–66. Much of the subsequent discussion on the cultural features is indebted to Goodman's work, especially pp. 64–89.

[63] For example, ossuaries of the so-called "Goliath" family, a clan buried in Jericho between the mid-first century BCE to 68 CE, contain a number of Greek (and Aramaic) inscriptions (Rachel Hachlili, "A Jerusalem Family in Jericho," *BASOR* 230 [April, 1978]

ence.[64] In addition, the territory of Scythopolis, a city of the Decapolis that borders Lower Galilee to the south, had a Jewish population significantly influenced by the Greek language.[65] N. Avigad has shown that linguistically at least the inroads of Greek culture

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45–56; Rachel Hachlili, "The Goliath Family in Jericho: Funerary Inscriptions from a First Century A.D. Jewish Monumental Tomb," *BASOR* 235 [Summer, 1979] 31–66). The excavator concludes that the inscriptions indicate the prevalence of Greek in the second Temple period although she overstates her evidence as indicating that "Greek was more common than Aramaic at this time" (Rachel Hachlili, "The Goliath Family in Jericho: Funerary Inscriptions from a First Century A.D. Jewish Monumental Tomb," *BASOR* 235 [Summer, 1979] 62). Hachlili is certainly correct that the large number of inscriptions indicate a family that was "literate, bilingual and prominent" (ibid., 62). This may say more about the education of a certain class (in this case, a family that may have been connected with the priestood and with the royal family) and may as L. Rahman argues present a unique circumstance that doesn't warrant such general conclusions ("Some Remarks on R. Hachlili's and A. Killebrew's 'Jewish Funerary Customs'," *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* [July-December, 1986] 98). Nevertheless, additional evidence clearly shows the inroads that Greek culture had made in the more prominent members of Jewish society. The presence of a Greek abecedary possibly used for magical purposes, leather sandals placed with the dead, and coins found in two skulls also suggest to the excavator that surrounding cultures (in particular Greek culture) may have influenced Jewish burial practices of the Second Temple period (Rachel Hachlili and Ann Killebrew, "Jewish Funerary Customs During the Second Temple Period, in the Light of the Excavation at the Jericho Necropolis," *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* [July-December, 1983] 109–132 and Rachel Hachlili, "A Jewish Funerary Wall-Painting of the First Century A.D.," *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* [July-December, 1985] 112–127; cf. a similar but later example of an abecedary found at Beth-She'arim and published in Moshe Schwabe and Baruch Lifshitz, *Beth She'Arim: The Greek Inscriptions,* volume II [New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974] 46–47).

[64] Two Greek ostraca have been found at the Upper Galilean villages of Meiron and Gischala, perhaps as a result of their trading relation with Tyre. See E. M. Meyers, J. F. Strange, and C. L. Meyers, *Excavations at Ancient Meiron, Upper Galilee* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) and R. Hanson, *Tyrian Influence in Upper Galilee,* Meiron Excavations Project, volume II (Cambridge, MA: ASOR, 1980). This may simply be an anomaly, although Eric Meyers now argues that more Hellenistic influence may have occurred in Upper Galilee than originally thought in "Stratigraphic and Ceramic Observations from the Medieval Strata of Khirbet Shema', Israel: Assessment of the Value of Scientific Analysis," *BASOR* 260 (Fall/November, 1985) 62. Indeed, he concludes elsewhere that it was likely Upper Galilee "was deeply hellenized despite its geographic isolation" in Eric M. Meyers and Carol L. Myers, "Digging the Talmud in Ancient Meiron," *Biblical Archaeology Review* 4.2 (June, 1978) 42.

[65] Four first century Jewish ossuaries from Jews of Scythopolis have been discovered near Jerusalem. The ossuaries had bilingual inscriptions (Hebrew/Greek) (Gideon Fuks, "The Jews of Scythopolis," in *Essays in Honor of Yigael Yadin* edited by Geza Vermes and Jacob Neusner [Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, & Co., 1983] 409; see also n. 14 on the same page). This is particularly interesting when compared to 30 ossuaries of Scythopolitan Jews found in a cemetery north of Scythopolis. These contain only Greek

extended even into the lower strata of society of the first century.[66] Eric Meyers has shown how pervasive Greek was in Lower Galilee in his study of epigraphic remains.[67] Additional evidence comes from the plethora of Greek inscriptions found at Beth-She'arim in Lower Galilee, which date from the second through the fourth centuries. The inscriptions have led at least one commentator to conclude that the Greek language was as common among Jewish communities in Galilee and at the town of Beth-She'arim as it was in Diaspora Judaism of that period. Indeed, a wide range of persons, not just the upper class and not just those limited to coastal areas, was influenced by Greek language and culture.[68] The post-first century dates of most of these inscriptions, of course, indicate that they must be used with caution.

There seems little doubt that much of Lower Galilee displayed a "Hellenized linguistic and artistic vocabulary."[69] Did, however, a significant cultural antagonism exist in lower Galilee between rural areas that were largely conservative, Aramaic speaking enclaves and Hellenistic, urbane, Greek oriented urban areas? The evidence suggests that the answer is "no." Goodman rightly challenges Applebaum's unsupported conclusion that such

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inscriptions, suggesting that the Hebrew inscriptions in Jerusalem were religiously motivated (ibid., 409–410). This is particularly intriguing if, as Avi-Yonah argues, most Jews in Scythopolis were peasants living in the *chora* of the city ("Scythopolis," *Israel Exploration Journal* 122 [1962] 131). Fuks disagrees and contends that most of the Jews lived in the city (op. cit., 410 n. 18.). Their legal status was as "codwellers" with the city people. In either case, Jews living on the border of Lower Galilee and who maintain a connection with Jerusalem indicate the inroads that the Greek language had made.

[66] Avigad discusses unadorned ossuaries found in a small cave which shed signs of extensive use; nine of the eleven ossuaries were inscribed, eight in Greek, one bilingual and one in Hebrew (N. Avigad, "A Depository of Inscribed Ossuaries in the Kidron Valley," *Israel Exploration Journal* 12.1 [1962] 1–12; for a discussion of ossuaries around Jerusalem see James F. Strange, "Late Hellenistic and Herodian Ossuary Tombs at French Hill, Jerusalem," *BASOR* 219 [1975] 39–70). One should also note the personal letter written in Greek which was found among those who participated in the revolt at Masada ("Greek in Palestine and the Diaspora," *The Jewish People in the First Century*, volume two, edited by S. Safrai and M. Stern, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum [Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, Assen, 1976] 1045, 1058). The letter was written to one of the last survivors of the revolt against the Romans and concerned such "an ordinary affair as the supply of vegetables" (ibid., 1058; see also *Israel Exploration Journal* 15 [1965] 110).

[67] "Galilean Regionalism as a Factor in Historical Reconstruction," *BASOR* 221 (1976) esp. 97.

[68] Moshe Schwabe and Baruch Lifshitz, *Beth She'Arim: The Greek Inscriptions*, volume II (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974) 217–222. Such material, of course, must be used judiciously since the bulk of it is dated from the second through fourth centuries. Nevertheless, it indicates clearly the inroads Greek culture had made in an area that gave rise to the Mishnah.

[69] Eric M. Meyers, James F. Strange, Dennis E. Groh, "The Meiron Excavation Project: Archeological Survey in Galilee and Golan, 1976," *BASOR* 230 (April, 1978) 20; cf. Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee*, 88.

cultural antagonism existed.[70] The hostility, Goodman argues, that Tiberias and Sepphoris attracted was as a result of political disputes, not a "cultural split." Indeed, there existed "a cultural continuum from city to country".[71]

Conclusion

In the first century CE, villages and urban areas of Lower Galilee display a degree of reciprocity in economic, administrative, and political relations that merit consideration by New Testament interpreters. Parasitic or antagonistic relations between urban and rural areas, often taken for granted by ancient historians and New Testament interpreters, fail to account for trade networks in which both groups benefit. Stable trade networks as well as the development of productive agricultural areas provided a secure base for peace and prosperity, a goal espoused by the Roman empire and its clients. It appears that villages along with urban areas fostered this goal through the collection of taxes and participation in the legal system. Finally, epigraphic, literary, and archaeological evidence indicates that rural and urban areas in Lower Galilee show a significant amount of Hellenistic influence. The model of Lower Galilee that stresses cultural antagonism between Aramaic-speaking villagers and Greek-speaking urban dwellers may need to be replaced by one that stresses cultural continuity.

For the most part, the canonical gospels place the Jesus movement in village contexts. This paper has indicated, however, that it would be a mistake to assume that the movement operated in cultural, political, or economic isolation from major urban areas. What significance does this have for understanding the nascent Jesus movement? Two brief suggestions will have to suffice. First, traditions in Mark and Q, which situate the movement in market places may indicate that Jesus and the Jesus movement were part of an itinerant stream that travelled from market to market in both village and city. The economic network, therefore, provided a vehicle by which the movement expanded. Second, the judicial images, the financial analogies, and the portrait of an absentee landlord reflect an awareness of the administrative structure that governed rural and urban area alike. The movement was not separate from but part of an economic, political, and cultural network that organized the lives of those in the Roman empire. The admonition from the Lukan Paul so often cited by Luke-Acts' scholars deserves a similar hearing within this context. The activity of the Jesus movement in Lower Galilee "was not done in a corner" (Acts 26:26) even from its inception.

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[70] S. Applebaum "Judaea as a Roman province: The Countryside as a Political and Economic Factor," *ANRW* II.8 (1977) 371; Goodman, op. cit., 89, 231 n. 406.

[71] Goodman, op. cit., 88.

Bandits, Messiahs, and Longshoremen: Popular Unrest in Galilee Around the Time of Jesus

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That our textbooks use Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes/Qumran as the principal comparative material for Jesus and the synoptic gospel tradition is a mark of how removed we have been from the social world of Jesus and his followers. These groups represented a tiny minority at the upper echelons of ancient Jewish society. As the rulers or representatives of the rulers of the society, they were Jesus' opponents. But they surely do not provide appropriate parallels to Jesus and his movement. To reach a more concrete and precise understanding of Jesus we would need to know about life among the common people of ancient Palestine. Until archaeologists make some unexpected discoveries, however, we are dependent on literary sources, and that means, except for the gospel tradition itself, information provided by, and usually about, the elite who could write. About the only time that ordinary people made the pages of literary historical sources was when they caused trouble for the elite. Thus for information on the common people we must focus on figures and movements or incidents that disturbed the tranquility so valued by the rulers.

We have known of movements among the Jewish common people through the histories of Josephus. But in our defensive posture vis-a-vis modern scientific criticism—and choosing to view Jesus in our own image—we have tended in recent generations to ignore embarrassing features of Jesus' ministry such as healing miracles and opposition to the established order and concentrate on Jesus' teachings abstracted from concrete historical context. As we now begin to take more seriously the concrete circumstances of Jesus and his movement, we are left ill-prepared to evaluate our fragmentary data and to formulate the appropriate historical questions. It seems clear that comparisons with figures and movements among the Jewish peasantry bring us closer to the concrete social context of Jesus and his movement. Because our information is so limited and fragmentary, it seems appropriate as well as attractive to utilize figures and movements from anywhere in Jewish Palestine and movements over several generations around the time of Jesus. How might things appear differently, however, were we to focus only on popular movements in Galilee?

Although we have some other data for the social-historical context, we are dependent basically on Josephus for fragments of information on popular phenomena in Galilee. That he was there himself gives us at least a minimal reason for taking his accounts seriously. But he is a hostile witness who despises the popular leaders and movements which he was attempting to control as a representative of the government in Jerusalem. And the principal agenda in his reports is either a glorification of his own role as a great general in a war of monumental import (The Jewish War) or a self-serving defense of his own actions (Life). One recent analysis of Josephus' accounts of events in Galilee has concluded that they are utterly unreliable, but then constructs a highly simplified alternative history based selectively on some of Josephus' statements with no apparently

consistent criteria of selection.[1] A more recent study of Josephus provides a more sophisticated grasp of the historical context in which Josephus must be read and suggests that, with a continually critical and somewhat sceptical eye, we can utilize Josephus'accounts for cautious historical reconstruction of circumstances and events in ancient Galilee.[2]

Further investigations of affairs in Galilee must take into account the work of Freyne. It just one more indication of the stimulation he has provided that some of his generalizations may require qualification. Of some importance for the discussion below, for example, he assumes and asserts but has not demonstrated "Galilean attachment to the temple generally" or "the basic loyalty of Galilean Jews for Jerusalem and its temple." But there would appear to be more reason to conclude that ordinary Galileans would have viewed Jerusalem and the temple somewhat critically as the center from which they were ruled and taxed.

Banditry, Endemic and Epidemic

Much of the discussion of Jesus and contemporaneous Palestinian Jewish history in the last generation worked on the assumption that Jewish Palestine was a hotbed of violent rebellion against Roman rule. The modern scholarly construct of "The Zealots" crystallized the issue for most of that discussion. Closer analysis of our sources for the period, particularly the histories of Josephus, have indicated that although there was indeed widespread revolt in 4 BCE as well as in 66–70 and 132–135 CE, there was very little violent insurrectionary activity anywhere in Jewish Palestine in the interim. There was a good deal of social unrest, including periodic protests over particular abuses and some distinctive types of popular movements. But there is no evidence for any organized and long-standing "nationalist" or "resistance" movement such as that imagined in the Zealot movement. The group actually called the Zealots did not even emerge until the middle of the Jewish revolt of 66–70. An important part of this new view of the diversity within Jewish history of the time is the recognition that *lestai* is not just another term that Josephus used for "The Zealots," but in fact, in most cases, a term for what appears to be "social banditry." If that is the case, then far from being "revolutionary," the *lestai* were simply what Hobsbawm calls a "pre-political" form of social protest against particular local conditions and injustices, and lacked a larger view of the whole society or a critique of the dominant social order.[3] Only when conditions seriously disintegrated in the 60s did this banditry typical of most peasant societies escalate into epidemic proportions and merge with a wider peasant revolt against the high priestly rulers as well as Roman rule.

Freyne has been at pains to argue that Galilee was not full of revolutionary activity against Roman rule.[4] Still working on the assumption that Judea itself was filled with revolutionary ideology, he insists that Galilee, by contrast, was strikingly calm and peaceful. Recognition of the actual pre-political (and non-revolutionary) character of ancient Jewish *lestai* would provide strong support of his contention regarding Galilee,

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[1] S. J. D. Cohen, *Josephus in Galilee and Rome. His Vita and Development as a Historian* (Leiden: Brill, 1979); cf. review by H. R. Moehring, *JJS* 31 (1980) 240–242.

[2] T. Rajak, *Josephus: The Historian and his Society* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984).

[3] E. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels* (New York: Norton, 1965) chap. 2; *Bandits* (rev. ed.; New York: Pantheon, 1981).

[4] The dominant theme that recurs throughout *Galilee From Alexander to Hadrian* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1980).

which is further reinforced by the realization that the whole picture of a nationalist revolutionary movement in Jewish society lacks historical evidence. Freyne, however, appears to have understood the concept of "social banditry" in terms of the old concept of "the Zealots," as if it were a political or even revolutionary phenomenon with a "religious component."[5] Ironically, then, the phenomenon of banditry in Galilee becomes subsumed into his earlier concern to deny that there was revolutionary ideology and activity in Galilee. Freyne's development of a concept of banditry far broader than that in the literature of banditry and his application of it like a social scientific model to Galilean material, however, serves as a stimulus to review critically both concept and procedure.

Studies of banditry such as Hobsbawm's, upon which I depended heavily in previous analyses of ancient Jewish banditry, attempt to make generalizations about typical characteristics of social phenomena that recur across several societies, hence should not be used in a wooden, "cookie cutter" manner. Hobsbawm tends not to make generalizations with "never" or "always" in them. In characterizing social banditry and other forms of "primitive rebellion" he was writing comparative social history, not constructing law-like models of social science. We would be moving far beyond Hobsbawm's stimulating characterizations to think that we can "apply the *criteria* for social banditry" to a given situation (my emphasis). Rather, we can only attempt to reconstruct some aspects of ancient social history where our limited sources allow, utilizing Hobsbawm's comparative material and analysis to formulate appropriate questions.

This means that we must attend to what sort of characteristics the comparative material indicates often pertain to "social banditry" and take note of the significant variations and contingencies. For example, although bandits usually share the religion or values of the people from whom they come, they are not especially religious, and social banditry could hardly be called a "religious phenomenon." Although brigands often enjoy the support of the peasants in their area, nothing in the literature on banditry would suggest that there would ever be a "widescale popular uprising" in reaction to suppression of brigands. Hobsbawm suggested that often (but by no means always) social bandits do get involved in "righting wrongs," as in the case of Eleazar ben Dinai; but it would surely be rare to find bandits "conducting an independent judicial system on behalf of the peasants." (The latter sounds more like a revolutionary regime, and probably occurs only in modern times, although Gottwald and others might see the "judges" of early Israel as an ancient example.) One of Hobsbawm's principal points was that banditry is a prepolitical and "primitive" form of social protest. (One of the things that ordinary social banditry lacks is a sense of "the new order" that one might hope for.) Another principal point is that social banditry sometimes but rarely precedes or escalates into wider peasant rebellion. If there is a situation of wider insurrection, then not only has the situation changed dramatically from that in which social banditry usually arises, but the character and role (and size) of brigand groups has changed. Thus if we want to appreciate the possible impact or role of social banditry in the origins of wider revolts, we cannot juxtapose incidences of ordinary social banditry in a non-insurrectionary situation and those of banditry in the midst of a wider rebellion (and we must be sensitive further to situations of transition and aftermath).

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[5] "Bandits in Galilee: A Contribution to the Study of Social Conditions in First Century Palestine," in *The Social World of Formative Christianity and Judaism. Essays in Tribute of Howard Clark Kee* (ed. J. Neusner, et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988). I do not yet have access to the page numbers of the published article.

In order to achieve some degree of precision with regard to social phenomena it would be prudent to use the concept of "social banditry" somewhat as Hobsbawm does in regard to European phenomena. That limited and relatively precise usage seems to fit most of the cases for which Josephus uses *lestai* with the exclusion of the cases in which he qualifies the term ("another species of banditry") or utilizes it as a political epithet (e.g., for the Zealots proper in Jerusalem when they are no longer operating as brigands). Freyne uses the concept more broadly to include not only rural phenomena but urban as well, e.g., those whom Josephus clearly indicates were "another species" of bandits (i.e., the terrorist group called the Sicarii). He even includes groups for which Josephus never uses the term *lestai,* such as Jesus son of Sapphias and the "faction" of "the sailors and the destitute" in Tiberias (who, along with some Galileans, attacked the royal palace there in 66),[6] and the "young men" (*neaniskoi*) of the village of Dabaritta (who Josephus claims as some of the "guards" posted in the great plain in his more boastful account in the War; Life 126–129; cf. War 2.595–598). It is unclear, however, what the Sicarii in Jerusalem, the *neaniskoi* of Dabaritta or the *aporoi* of Tiberias have in common with those Josephus calls *lestai* in an unqualified sense, other than the carrying out an attack on the rulers' persons or property.

In his lengthy argument that Galilee was not a hotbed of revolutionary activity, Freyne was still operating with the scholarly construct of "the Zealots" as a longstanding and widespread movement. One of the principal supports of that construct was the assumption that Josephus ordinarily used *lestai* in reference to "the Zealots." Freyne is thus understandably at pains to explain away Josephus' reports about the *archilestes* Hezekiah murdered by the young Herod in 47 BCE and the *lestai* dwelling in the caves near Arbela nearly a decade later. His claim that Hezekiah and his band were Hasmonean nobles enables him to conclude that there "was no widespread involvement of the whole population."[7] This suggestion, however, lacks evidence and historical credibility.

First, his conception of a "native" "land-owning" nobility does not fit the historical situation of Galilee under the last of the Hasmoneans as the Romans were taking control in the eastern Mediterranean. Like other principalities in the ancient Near East, the Hasmonean regime in Palestine had high ranking and intermediate officers who commanded the military and/or collected the taxes and/or otherwise administered political-economic affairs. The highest ranking officers in particular enjoyed substantial income from prebendal estates, and they and other officers in charge of tax-collection in regional centers surely came into control of additional agricultural and other revenues, perhaps through the credit-debt mechanism. But that does not constitute being a "large landowner." The basis of their power and wealth was their office in the regime. It seems difficult to imagine what sort of basis they could have had in the countryside to be able to sustain a struggle against Herod for years and decades, as imagined by Freyne.

Second, Josephus, who provides our only sources for these and related events, writes nothing that would suggest that Hezekiah and company were Hasmonean nobles. It would appear, rather, that Freyne's claim is dependent on and an important component of a much oversimplified reconstruction of events in Palestine in the 50s and 40s BCE. Freyne believes that Herod's murder of Hezekiah (in 47?) "caused the Hasmonean

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[6] Josephus does label them "the brigand-band" a year later as they resisted the Roman take-over of Tiberias, War 3.450.

[7] Freyne, *Galilee,* 68, with the claim simply reasserted without further argument or documentation in "Bandits in Galilee."

aristocracy that was prepared to go along with Roman rule to join Antigonus rather than Hyrcanus," and uses as an illustration "the second in command (*hypostrategos*) in Jerusalem," Peitholaus, who "fought against Alexander, Ant 14.84, but for Antigonus, Ant 14.120."[8] The situation and unfolding events in Palestine (focused on the conflict between the Hasmoneans rivals Hyrcanus and Aristobulus), however, compounded by the shifting sides of the Roman civil war, were far more complex than a simple opposition of Hyrcanus, Antipater, and his son Herod siding with Rome *vs* the Hasmonean nobles siding with Antigonus and the Parthians. In fact, according to Josephus, Hasmonean officials had begun to defect nearly a decade before Herod's appointment as governor of Galilee. Peitholaus had deserted not to Antigonus but to his father Aristobulus with 1000 men in 56 BCE, and was killed by Cassius (in 52?) when he was attempting to rally Aristobulus' partisans (War 1.172,180). Moreover, to complicate matters, Caesar himself had sent Aristobulus back to Syria. Evidently the political sides were constantly shifting and, for Hasmonean officers, the outcome was utterly unclear, with much maneuvering for position. In 43 BCE, several years after the elimination of Hezekiah, Malichus, a Hasmonean officer loyal to Hyrcanus, had Antipater poisoned, whereupon Herod avenged his father's death by having Malichus assasinated (War 1.223–230; Ant 14.280–293). And the next year, also in and around Jerusalem, Malichus' brother Helix attacked Herod's brother Phasael (War 1.294–296). Thus there had been power-struggles going on within the Hasmonean regime for some time, apparently unrelated to Herod's elimination of Hezekiah and his brigands in Galilee. Moreover, the return of Antigonus from exile seems unconnected with these struggles within the Hasmonean regime in and around Jerusalem, and connected with the political schemes of petty rulers in Tyre and Chalcis (War 1.297).

The prolonged struggle for control of Palestine between Antigonus and Herod, in connection with which the former obtained the backing of the Parthians and the latter was named "king" of the Jews by the Romans, did not emerge until 40 BCE, long after the elimination of Hezekiah, and even longer after Cassius' defeat of Peitholaus. Josephus says nothing that would suggest that the Galileans who resisted Herod's conquest between 39 and 37 BCE were in some way continuing Peitholaus' struggle. Moreover, he gives no indication that the different points at which Herod fights against resistance to his rule in Galilee involve the same people, let alone that their "leaders, Hezekiah and the others, were aristocrats."[9] Indeed, far from suggesting the "cave-dwelling brigands" were the same as "the garrisons of Antigonus" who had fled Sepphoris, Josephus indicates that these are two different groups by his presentation of these two actions by Herod in immediate sequence in both accounts (War 1.304; Ant 14.413–415), and even gives the impression that the brigands had been active in the area of Arbela for some time. Moreover, "the usual promoters of disturbance in Galilee" mentioned a few paragraphs later appear to be yet a third group and one connected in some way with "the cities," which Herod fined a hundred talents in punishment (War 1.315–316; Ant 14.432–433). There is no reason to locate resistance to Herod among Hasmonean officers and government functionaries. There was apparently resistance to Herod's conquest of his kingdom at all levels of Jewish society, including the peasantry. And the Galileans had had direct experience of his brutal efficiency as their *strategos* since 47, symbolized best perhaps in his rigorous collection of the special levy of taxes by Cassius in 44 (War 1.219–221). After reading about continuing

[8] *Galilee*, 63, 93 n. 20.

[9] Freyne, *Galilee*, 67.

and apparently diverse resistance to Herod one begins to wonder what Josephus had meant earlier by "all Galilee" having gone over to Herod (War 1.291; Ant 14.395). Perhaps he meant those in charge in the district. His reports of a later incident, however, indicate that at least some of the officers or "nobles" (*dynatoi*) in Galilee had become supporters of Herod. Following a victory by Antigonus in Judea, "the Galileans, rebelling against their officers/nobles (*ton para sfisi dynaton*), drowned those who were partisans of Herod in the Lake" (Ant 14.450; War 1.326). So at least some of the former Hasmonean *dynatoi* had prudently cast their lot with Herod—and underestimated the intensity of the people's continuing resistance. There is thus simply no basis in Josephus' accounts of the prolonged struggle for control of Palestine for suggesting that, in the incidents involving Hezekiah and the cave-dwelling brigands, it was some Hasmonean nobles who were spearheading the resistance to Antipas and Herod over several decades. Ironically, to reconstruct Hezekiah and the cave-dwelling brigands as the remnants of Hasmonean nobility injects a special religious-political dimension back into resistance groups in Galilee, whereas to allow the brigands to be brigands would support Freyne's own principal contention about Galilee, that it was not full of religiously motivated revolutionary activity.

Josephus' accounts of Hezekiah appear indeed to be straightforward reports of brigand activity and its suppression.

> Herod, . . . discovering that Ezekias, a brigand-chief, at the head of a large horde, was ravaging the district on the Syrian frontier, he caught him and put him and many of the brigands to death. This welcome achievement was immensely admired by the Syrians. (War 1.204)

As I explained previously, the activities of Hezekiah and his brigands can be easily understood as the product of fifteen years of social disruption and dislocation caused by the Roman conquest and reorganization of Palestine, and the ensuing civil war in Palestine as well as in the Roman empire (including the struggles among Hasmonean factions).[10] As Hobsbawm and others have pointed out, such conditions can produce widespread banditry, as peasants are driven off their land or their livelihood simply destroyed in course of the wars. More particularly in this case, Josephus reports that, after taking control of the country, the Romans confined the Hasmonean regime to its old "Jewish" territory, and restored the Palestinian/Syrian cities to independence (Scythopolis and Gamala are in the list, War 1.166; Ant 14.88). This would almost certainly have meant also that the villages in the surrounding areas would have come under the control of those cities or their rulers, meaning either alien domination or displacement for "Jewish" peasants in such border area villages. This picture is confirmed by the decrees of Julius Caesar (with the Senate) restoring some of this border area to Hyrcanus' (and Antipater's) rule, dated between 48 and 44 BCE, i.e., around the time Hezekiah and his band would have been active. That is, "the kings of Syria and Phoenicia, as allies of the Romans, had been permitted to enjoy the fruits of the places, lands and farms" formerly under Hasmonean control" (Ant 14.190–212, esp. 209). Bandits often operate in frontier areas. But in this case the frontier areas were the location of the most sustained turmoil and dislocation. Hence it is highly credible that displaced people would have formed brigand groups and would be raiding the "Syrian" cities or territories to which they had been subjected.[11] It is then similarly

[10] "Josephus and the Bandits," *JSJ* 10 (1979) 53.

[11] Freyne, "Bandits in Galilee," argues that Hezekiah and company must be displaced

credible that, after Caesar had imposed a new arrangement for the control of Palestine, Antipater and his son as the energetic governor of Galilee, were attempting to assert their control in an area long under uncertain or inefficient government.

The Syrians may have been delighted at Herod's killing of the brigands. But not so at least some people in Galilee. And some of the ruling elite in Jerusalem, increasingly anxious about the concentration of power in the hands of Antipater and his sons, used Herod's murder of Hezekiah's brigands and the resulting popular outcry as an occasion to attempt to clip Herod's wings. "The principal men of the Jews" complained to Hyrcanus that

> Herod had killed Ezekias and many of this men in violation of our Law, which forbids us to slay a man, even an evildoer, unless he has first been condemned by the Synhedrion. . . . And every day in the temple the mothers of the men who had been murdered by Herod kept begging the king and the people to have have Herod brought to judgment. . . . (Ant 14.167–168)

That the mothers of the murdered brigands were appealing to Hyrcanus would appear to be decisive against the hypothesis that the brigands were Hasmonean nobles, for they could hardly have appealed to the rival (enemy) Hasmonean ruler. Rather, that ordinary people would appeal to the king for redress of injustices, even against the abuses of his officers, is a typical occurrence according to Hobsbawm.[12] Moreover, that Herod not only took a substantial body-guard with him to Jerusalem, but "first posted garrisons throughout Galilee" (War 1.210) suggests that Herod had already encountered some sort of serious outcry there. "The leading Jews" in Jerusalem would not have been worried about brigandage on the Syrian frontier and probably not even about the lives of several bandits in the remote border area. But they were anxious to check Herod's rise, and the popular protest in/from Galilee over Herod's murder of the brigands provided the opportunity.

As noted already, the struggles between rival Roman rulers and the turmoil within Palestine continued for the next decade following the suppression of Hezekiah and his band. Given the continuing displacement of people that such turmoil inevitably entailed, it would not be surprising if banditry had been a continuing phenomenon. Thus there is no need in historical reconstruction, as well as no indication in Josephus' reports, to resort to the Hasmonean nobility to explain the substantial numbers of brigands centered around the rough terrain and caves near Arbela. Although Josephus takes great relish in recounting the prolonged campaign and particularly the unusual means necessary for Herod finally to ferret out the "cave-dwelling" brigands, he provides little direct information from which we can speculate any further about their origins or role in Galilee during Herod's conquest of his kingdom. Under the tight control and sharp repression of Herod's

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(continued)
Hasmonean nobility rather than brigands because the raids were against the Syrians, and bandits attempting to "right wrongs" would have attacked the social oppressors within Galilee. But "pre-political" bandits do not yet enjoy a critical assessment of the overall social system and circumstances to which they are subjected and focus on the immediate local circumstances. In this case, the immediate source of their displacement and malaise was subjection to or encroachments by the Syrian cities, midst the general turmoil of the time.

[12] See "Josephus and the Bandits," 46, 54.

regime it would have been difficult for banditry or any other form of protest to emerge. For the reign of Antipas in Galilee we simply have no information.

Just before the outbreak of the revolt in 66, however, banditry was escalating to epidemic proportions in Galilee as well as in Judea. Relatively speaking, the now sizeable and multiplying brigand groups were far more important in Galilee than in Judea (with its diverse types of resistance) as forces in the Jewish revolt. Escalating banditry flowed imperceptibly into, or became the form assumed by, the gradually expanding insurrection in the district. Josephus' reports suggest that the sizeable bands of brigands already in existence constituted one of the two types of resistance to the Romans' initial attempt to "pacify" Galilee. As Sepphoris, the strongest city of Galilee, welcomed the Roman forces, "all the rebels and brigands fled to the mountain in the heart of Galilee" where they temporarily held off a whole Roman legion (War 2.511). Clearly, as Josephus recounts,"the whole of Galilee had not yet revolted from Rome" (Life 28). Ironically, the Romans' "scorched earth" practices expanded the very rebellion they were attempting to suppress by creating thousands of fugitives (e.g., War 2.504–505; 3.60–63), and compounding the numbers of fugitives from Greek and Syrian cities attacks against their Jewish inhabitants and their tributary Jewish villages (War 2.457–480). Many such fugitives would have joined or formed bands of brigands, particularly in northern Galilee and along the border with Ptolemais (Life 77–78, 105). Whether or not we believe Josephus that John of Gischala was himself a brigand, (and recognizing his tendency to exaggerate numbers) it is highly credible that "he mustered a band of four hundred men, for the most part fugitives from the region (*chora*) of Tyre and the villages in that neighborhood" (War 2.587–588; cf. Life 372).

To understand adequately the central importance of the brigands in the "revolt" (or is it simply "anarchy"?) in Galilee, we must take into account the complexity of the situation, between cities (even opposing factions within cities), countryside, brigand groups, etc., and the struggle for dominance between Josephus, John of Gischala, and others. Moreover, it seems more and more likely (to me at least) that Josephus really was playing a moderating role, a double game, of pretending to organize defensively while attempting to control the situation, as he insists in his *Life*. Thus Josephus can argue both that he must pretend to organize resistance "on account of the brigands" and that he was the only one who could protect (the more respectable leaders of) "the Galileans" from the brigands (Life 175, 206). In the anarchic conditions it was perhaps an obvious solution, given that it would have been impossible to disarm and disband the brigands, to "persuade the people to hire them as mercenaries" and then to "bind them by oath not to enter the district (*chora*) unless they were sent for or their pay was in arrear," and to order them not to attack either the Romans or their neighbors (Life 77–78). Some of the grossly exaggerated army that Josephus himself commanded may well have been such "mercenaries" (cf. War 2.583–584). Others such as John of Gischala, of course, could play the same game. Not surprisingly, in the conditions of an anarchic "revolt" it is not always possible to distinguish between the activities of brigands and the raids and guerrilla actions that would be taken by popular rebel forces, such as the plunder of Ptolemy's (wife's) baggage by the *neaniskoi* of Dabaritta (Life 126–127; War 2.595).

Epidemic banditry that flows into rebellion, however, is not necessarily revolutionary. That the sizeable force led by Jesus could sell their services to the pro-Roman city of Sepphoris probably illustrates the "pre-political" perspective that Hobsbawm suggests is typical—i.e., they were almost certainly not "revolutionary" against either the Romans or the dominant city in the area. Of course, Jesus and hus band may rather have been making common cause with Sepphoris against Josephus whom *they* saw as pro-Roman and/or a representative of Jerusalem's unwelcome attempt at domination (and it may be Josephus

who invented the "large sum" in payment in a report that lacks credibility in other regards, Life 104–111).

In at least one instance in upper Galilee the escalating banditry appears not simply to have constituted or flowed into rebellion, but to have stimulated wider peasant revolt. Through Josephus' extremely hostile account of John and the rebellion in Gischala we can discern how the influence of a sizeable band of brigands in the area led peasants of Gischala, previously quiescent, into active rebellion (War 4.84–85). Overall in Galilee one has the impression that the revolt did not become all that widespread among the peasantry. Clearly, however, large numbers of people in the border areas or in the villages devastated by the Romans swelled the ranks of the brigands who provided the principal rebel forces that Josephus was eager to hold in check in the anarchic conditions of 66–67 in Galilee.

Although the brigands constituted substantial elements of the armed forces among the shifting factions in Galilee, those Josephus refers to as "the Galileans" were apparently the potential "revolutionary" elements. "The Galileans" are clearly country people, peasants. They are sharply hostile to the cities, particularly Sepphoris and Tiberias (Life 30, 97–100, 374–385). To believe that this is because of their loyalty to Josephus is to accept that latter's self-serving apology. To assert that they are "militantly nationalist, but not essentially revolutionary"[13] involves either an extremely narrow or a confused picture of what would have constituted revolution in antiquity. Josephus' statements about how he checked the potential attacks by the Galileans also indicate that these peasants in arms were hostile to the cities from which they had been ruled and ready to attack them, particularly when they were loyal to the Romans or Agrippa.

The Popular Kingship of Judas Son of Hezekiah

I have argued that the movement led by Judas son of Hezekiah in 4 BCE was one among several similar movements that assumed a distinctively Jewish form, that of popular kingship. In previous presentations of the results of analysis of Josephus' hostile reports, I have treated Judas' movement together with the two other principal movements in 4 BCE that he views as similar, that led by Athronges in Judea and that led by Simon in Perea. With our focus now more narrowly on Galilee, it may be useful to isolate the reports on Judas and to compare the reports on the other movements in order to "double check" Josephus' treatment of these movements as similar in form.

The descriptions are brief and parallel:[14]

> At Sepphoris in Galilee, Judas, son of Ezekias (the brigand-chief who once overran the country and was suppressed by king Herod), having organized a sizeable force, broke into the royal armories, armed his followers, and attacked the others who vied for power. (War 2.56)
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> There was Judas, son of the brigand-chief Ezekias (who had been a man of great power and who had been captured by Herod only with great difficulty). This Judas, when he had organized at Sepphoris in Galilee a large number of desperate men, raided the palace. Taking all the weapons that were stored there, he armed all of this followers and made off with all the goods that had

[13] Freyne, "The Galileans in the Light of Josephus' Vita," *NTS* 26 (1979–80) 412.

[14] Citing Hanson's translations from *Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs*, 112.

> been seized there. He caused fear in everyone by plundering those he encountered in his craving for power and in his zealous pursuit of royal rank. (Ant 17.271–272)

If these parallel reports about Judas were completely isolated and unique we might suppose that Judas was simply an ambitious regional strongman opportunistically seizing the chaotic situation after the death of Herod to set himself up as king in Sepphoris. Josephus, however, clearly understands Judas and his followers as a phenomenon parallel to at least two other movements. And suddenly, in reports of these disturbances in Galilee, Perea, and Judea respectively, he uses the terminology of kingship. That is, he has already been describing revolt and rebellion in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the wake of Herod's death. Now he focuses on disturbances in which Judas "aspired to royal rank" (*basileious times*) or "attacked the others who vied for power" (*dynasteia*), Simon "assumed the diadem" and "was proclaimed as king" by his followers, and Athronges "aspired to a kingship" and for some time "was called a king" (War 2.56, 57, 61–62; Ant 17.272, 273–274, 278–281). In the Jewish War (2.55), moveover, he even provides a topical introduction: the opportunity induced many "to become king." Just as he has on occasion described some figures as "prophets" and others as "brigands" and yet others as "a special species of brigands," so now he has something more particular in view than just another *stasis* or *apostasis*. Thus from Josephus' procedure as a historian we have some reason to think that these are distinctive figures or movements and that there are are some similarities between them.

The reports about Judas son of Hezekiah, however, are much shorter than the others, hence much less is provided by way of particulars. Thus we must proceed cautiously in using information provided for the other popular kings in extrapolations for a picture of Judas. Josephus mentions that Athronges was a "mere shepherd" and Simon was a royal servant, meaning perhaps a lower level officer or a peasant or sharecropper on one of the royal estates (War 2.57,60; Ant 18.273, 278). Judas is identified only as "the son of Hezekiah the brigand-chief." We have noted above that there is no reason to think that Hezekiah was a Hasmonean noble, hence there is no basis for believing that his son was attempting to revive Hasmonean kingship. Moreover, it seems clear from Josephus' reports here and elsewhere that Judas son of Hezekiah was not the same as Judas of Galilee, who is identified as a *sophistes* and one of the principal leaders of the "fourth philosophy" that agitated against the census in 6 CE when Judea came directly under Roman rule (War 2.118). Thus there is no basis for scholarly speculation about a "messianic dynasty" continuing from Judas of Galilee in 6 CE to Menahem, a leader of the Sicarii in 66. We cannot simply assume from the general parallel with Simon and Athronges that Judas also was a commoner, although that seems most likely. It is possible that, as the son of a famous brigand-chief, Judas was already recognized as a popular leader even before his "ambition for royal rank" in 4 BCE.

In the introductory generalization in the War, Josephus writes that these movements occurred in various places in the countryside, and his accounts of those headed by Simon and Athronges confirm our impression that they were based in the peasantry (War 2.55, 57, 65; Ant 17.273–285). Is Judas' movement an exception? The extremely cursory report in War 2.56 has "in Sepphoris," while the somewhat longer Ant 17.271 indicates more clearly that Judas "gathered together a large number" of men "around Sepphoris," in which he raided the royal palace and then "made off" back into the countryside from which they had come. That the Roman retaliation involved burning the city and enslaving its inhabitants (War 2.68) does not necessarily mean that the Sepphorites themselves were involved in Judas' movement or the attack on the royal palace. But it is at least conceivable

that some of the Sepphorites in 4 BCE, like many of the Jerusalemites, were ready to strike out against Herodian-Roman rule, even though they were directly or indirectly dependent on it economically. It is inherently more likely, however that Judas' movement, like the others, was based in the countryside, as Josephus' framing and one account indicate. In that case, the large number of men that he gathered together may have been "desperate" (Ant 17.271) because of the heavy economic pressures that Herod had placed on the peasantry in order to underwrite his many grandiose building and cultural projects, as well as his elaborate Hellenistic administration, the Galilean center of which was Sepphoris.

We can assume from the general context and the specific targets of their attack that these movements were rebellions against Herodian-Roman rule. Judas and company in particular attacked the royal palace in Sepphoris not simply to obtain arms, but also to take (back) "all the property that has been seizes there" (i.e., by Herodian officials; Ant 17.271). This action is paralle to similar actions by Simon's movement, which burned the royal palace at Jericho and plundered "the things that had been seized there" and attacked other royal and aristocratic residences (Ant 17.274). The scope and importance of these movements are indicated by the size of the military forces that the Romans mobilized to reconquer the countryside and by the brutal punitive measures they took in retaliation, such as the burning of Sepphoris and enslavement of its people (Ant 17.286–295).

Freyne suggested that "in realistic terms Judas son of Hezekiah would have had to represent himself as carrying forward some recognizable tradition of kingship."[15] So long as we think only in terms of recent, established rulers in Palestine, without considering possibilities either in the "little tradition" or in biblical narratives themselves, then the two options would appear to be the Herodian or the Hasmonean (although the latter house was primarily high priestly rather than kingship). Freyne thus argues that since the rebellion of Judas is against Herodian kingship, it must be an attempt to restore the Hasmonean kingship. His argument goes something like this: Judas was in Sepphoris; Sepphoris was a Hasmonean stronghold; therefore. . . . The underlying assumption is that Judas is a surviving member of a Hasmonean "noble" or "landowner" family. That is not impossible, but it is highly unlikely. And the argument is farfetched. As Freyne himself points out, some of the Hasmonean officers went over to the rival Hasmonean side and were killed by the Romans, others were drowned in the Lake in resurgent popular uprising, and Herod had most of those remaining killed when he finally had a firm grip on power in Jerusalem. Moreover, Judas would have to have been skillful indeed to emerge from the tightly repressive Herodian security apparatus that included informers and secret police to have survived, particularly in and around Sepphoris, which was the center of Herodian government in Galilee. Procedurally, however, since we have the movements of Athronges and Simon (and later that of Simon bar Giora and perhaps Simeon bar Kokhba) as well as that of Judas to explain in terms of their similar forms and characteristics, it would be better to treat them together rather than separately with regard to being informed by a "recognizable tradition of kingship." Moreover, even though they have left few if any records, in contrast to the literate elite, common people do generate and sustain cultural traditions. In this case, the Jewish biblical tradition, and probably the popular memory as well, provided yet another and highly recognizable tradition of kingship: that exemplified by Saul, David, Jeroboam, and Jehu, among others. Judas's movement, like those of Athronges and Simon, etc., were probably informed in some way by this biblical

[15] *Galilee*, 215.

tradition of popular kingship, which may have revived among the people precisely because the Hasmonean and/or the Herodian kingship was illegitimate and oppressive (e.g., Ps Sol 17:5–8; many passages in the DSS; and the general opposition to Herod).[16]

To draw any connections between Judas and his movement and Jesus of Nazareth would be purely speculative. But as we become more concrete in our approach to the historical context of Jesus and his followers, it is surely at least interesting that the movement and revolt led by Judas was taking place in the immediate environs of Sepphoris and Nazareth within a few years of Jesus' birth. Here was a mass movement among Galilean peasants from villages around Sepphoris taking common action under the leadership of a popular figure they recognized as king. This occurrence of a concrete movement that took the social form of popular kingship (messianic pretender) here in Galilee as well as in Judea and Perea is all the more significant as we realize that there is little evidence of "messianic expectations" in Palestinian Jewish literature prior to the time of Jesus. The movement, moreover, was brutally suppressed and Sepphoris, the principal administrative city in Galilee, just a few miles from Nazareth, had been sacked and some of its people enslaved by a conquering Roman army that swept through the region, surely leaving vivid memories among the Galilean people in the area.

The Urban Poor in Tiberias

Josephus' accounts of events in Tiberias in 66–67 provide us with at least a fragmentary picture of the behavior of the (Jewish) urban poor in an anarchic time of revolutionary excitment. The principal conflict in the city was between "the respectable men" headed by Julius Capellus who remained loyal to Rome and Agrippa II, on the one hand, and "the most insignificant persons," on the other, who were ready for war (Life 32–35). The conflict thus fell clearly along the main line of political-ecomonic division within the city.[17] "The respectable man," who are elsewhere also clearly the (ten) principal men of the city/people/council (Life 64–65, 69), are the holders of political/economic wealth and power, judging from their names and positions, such as the Roman-sounding Julius Capellus himself, two men named Herod, and Compsus the son of Compsus whose brother Crispus, the former perfect under Agrippa I, was busy "on his estates across the Jordan" (Life 33). The other faction consisted "of sailors and the destitute (*ton aporon*)" (Life 66). Since their leader, Jesus son of Sapphias, is elsewhere identified as the *archon* of the city by Josephus (Life 66, 271), it has been speculated that the office was elective or that he became a "demagogue."

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[16] See further "Popular Messianic Movements," 473–483.

[17] Although polarized thus, however, the situation both in Tiberias and in Galilee as a whole was more complex. Cohen imposes a simplistic scheme of two parties, "war" and "peace," on the particular topics he treats, including Tiberias, removing any motivation for more precise analysis of a given situation. For example, he does not differentiate between the council (*boule*) and the principal men (*Josephus*, 217). But Life 167–168//War 2.638–641 & Life 381, concerning an appeal to Agrippa, do not necessarily mean that the whole council was pro-Roman; in 381 Josephus writes that *hoi protoi ton ek tes boules* had invited the king to take over the city. Actions taken by the principal factions in Tiberias, moreover, must be understood in the historical context that involved not simply Roman imperial rule, but other political-economic-religious-ethnic relationships, such as with Galilean peasants, cities of the Decapolis, the Roman client ruler Agrippa under whose rule they had recently been placed, and the rivalry with Sepphoris.

The terms in which urban life in Palestine are often discussed, as "Greek/Hellenistic" or "Jewish," are vague, even vacuous and indeterminate. In order to take advantage of the fragments of information provided by Josephus, we must move to particular characteristics of Tiberias assessed against what is known generally of ancient urban life in general and Jewish Palestine in particular. Tiberias was founded as his capital by Herod's son, the Tetrarch Antipas. However much traditional Greek "city" terminology may have been utilized in the foundation and/or Josephus' description, Tiberias was a royal administrative city with a predominantly Jewish population.

Judging from the way in which Roman imperial officials addressed their formal correspondence, a Greek *polis* would have consisted of "*archon(ai), boule,* and *demos*,"[18] and influence and actual power gradually came to be held by the *dekaprotoi* within the *demos* or *boule*. Tiberias seems to fit precisely this picture, as Josephus summons *ten Tiberieon boulen kai tous protous tou demou,* and later attends a meeting at which the *archon* Jesus presides (Life 64, 271, 278, 296, 300). However, it would be highly unusual in Roman times for the *archon* to have been so "revolutionary" (see further below); Josephus may reflect the "raised eyebrows" among proper Jews and Greeks alike that the "citizens" of Tiberias were derived from such humble circumstances, some perhaps not even having been "free"; and the confident assertions in scholarly reconstructions that "there was a *boule* or 600" in Tiberias is based on a text in which Josephus has typically exaggerated the numbers (how many boats had he commandeered from the Tarichaeans in order to ship the 2600 Tiberians he supposedly arrested back to Tarichaeae? War 2.641). Thus perhaps we should not lay too much stock simply in the standard terminology used by Josephus. As Tcherikover pointed out in his analysis of Josephus' accounts pertaining to Jerusalem, "Our chief literary source is remarkably unclear and inaccurate when he uses political-legal terminology."[19]

There are a number of other indications that Tiberias was not a typical Hellenistic city, but a royal administrative city with a predominantly Jewish population. A proper Greek city had its own territory, under its own jurisdiction. But Tiberias is described in passing as the center of a toparchy of a Herodian kingdom, hence must not have held jurisdiction over a territory of its own (War 2.252; cf. A. H. M. Junes, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* [2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1971) 276]). A Greek city would have had its own coinage dated according to the era of the city. But coins from Tiberias are Antipas' coins dated by the year of his rule, and it is not until Trajan that it has its own coinage dated by the city's era.[20] Tiberias clearly had a stadium, which served as a gathering place (War 2.618; Life 92, 331). But important political assemblies were apparently held in the *proseuche*, "a huge building, capable of accommodating a large crowd" (Life 277). This appears to be a synagogue or "house of prayer," but appears to have been much larger that the later Galilean synagogues uncovered by archaeologists. The most important building in Tiberias, however, must have been the royal palace, which was lavishly decorated and furnished in a style that observed no scruples about Jewish religious sensitivities (Life 65). Surely under Antipas and perhaps later as well under Agrippa I, the royal court and administration dominated the city's life. The very names mentioned by Josephus indicate

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[18] F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton, 1926) e.g., ##35, 36, 68, 71, 75, 76, 80, 82, etc.

[19] "Was Jerusalem a Polis?" *IEJ* 14 (1964) 63.

[20] See, e.g., Meshorer, *Jewish Coins of the Second Temple Period,* 74–75; Kindler, *The Coins of Tiberias* (1961) #2.

that those who were the wealthy and powerful "leading men" of the city had themselves been, or were descended from, prominent members of Antipas' or Agrippa's administration (Life 32–33). And in his comments about the founding of Tiberias, Josephus explains that one of the two principal types of settlers brought in were government "magistrates" (Ant 18.37).[21]

The picture we receive of Tiberias is thus not that of a typical Greek city, but of a royal administrative city with a predominantly Jewish population and a distinctively Jewish "prayer-house" at which public political discussions were held. The city may have been dominated less by the royal court and administration once it lost its position as capital of Galilee-Perea to Sepphoris in mid-first century, although it was still the center of a toparchy. The language of the royal administration was likely Greek,[22] even though apparently only a small percentage of the inhabitants of the city were "Greek." Josephus gives some indication that at least certain prominent Tiberians resented both their loss of prominence in Galilee to their rival city, Sepphoris, and their recent transfer to the jusrisdiction of Agrippa II. It may or may not be significant that Josephus places the articulation of the jealousy of Sepphoris in the mouth of another (rival) intellectual who had aspirations toward more sophisticated Greek literary culture (Justus of Tiberias, who later became a secretary-historian for Agrippa II). In any case, at the outbreak of the Jewish revolt, the principal men who dominated political-cultural life in Tiberias had their political-economic base in the royal administrative character and function of the city.

Thus it is not surprising that these leading men of the city, with Herodian or Roman names, staunchly resisted the instruction of the Jerusalem government to destroy the royal palace with its animal representations in a style prohibited by the Torah (Life 65). Neither Hasmonean nor Herodian rulers had observed the prohibitions against such representations (e.g., Ant 12.230; 14.34; 19.357), and one would not expect their officers and associates to have been concerned. In this case the royal palace represented the principal heritage of the city whose very foundation had been centered around it.

The faction of the sailors and destitute headed by Jesus, however, required no urging to implement the instruction from Jerusalem, but burned and looted the royal palace in collaboration with certain Galileans, and then killed all the Greek residents of Tiberias as well (Life 66–67).[23] Freyne, who is at pains to insist that there was no revolutionary impulse in Galilee, curiously finds that this was an "obvious act of zealotism" perpetrated by "a pocket of zealotism in Tiberias and its region," and inspired by "Zealot ideals"

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[21] Freyne introduces his "ousted Hasmonean nobles" theory again in this connection. He identifies these "notables or nobles" with both *hoi protoi ton galilaion* in Mark 6:21 and those around Arbela who gave Herod so much trouble (sixty years earlier!); hence they are now being taken into Tiberias so that Antipas can control them.

[22] But had all those settlers brought in from Antipas' Galilean territory learned their Greek as a second language?—leaving open the question of precisely what their "native" language may have been.

[23] Cohen presents an incredible picture of the parties, principal figures, and events in Tiberias, with Josephus as leader of both the destruction of the royal palace and the massacre of the Greeks and "the respectable" elite engaged shoulder to shoulder in pillage with the sailors, paupers, and peasants (*Josephus*, 118). It is unclear why a modern historian should label as "criminals" those who implemented what had been commissioned by the Jerusalem assembly led by the priestly aristocracy.

emanating from Jerusalem.[24] Since it is now being recognized that there was no historical reality behind that modern concept that has confused this and other issues, we must inquire more precisely into Josephus' reports. The Jerusalem government that sent Josephus with the instruction was certainly not the rebel coalition that drove out the Romans in the summer of 66, but the "moderate" and "counter-revolutionary" junta comprised of high priests and leading Pharisees who moved to the fore later that year in an attempt to control the rebellion and reach a negotiated settlement with the Romans—while pretending, insofar as possible, to be making preparations for defense. Whatever the purposes of the *koinon* in Jerusalem, if there was a "halakhic" motivation behind the instruction to destroy the palace, it was located in Jerusalem and not among the "sailors and poor" of Tiberias, who were highly unlikely to have been well-versed in halakhic debates.[25] It is highly questionable to draw conclusions about the motives of the Tiberian poor from the supposed motives of the Jerusalem *koinon* which are themselves utterly unclear, given the lack of evidence.

It is perhaps more justifiable, but still utterly hypothetical, to generalize from other incidents in Galilee. For example, when two of Agrippa's gentile nobles from Trachonitis deserted to Galilee with their horses, arms and money, "the Jews" would have forced them to be circumcized. Judging from Josephus' report, there was some sense among the people that the presence of these uncircumcized nobles was threatening their struggle against the Romans (Life 112–114, 149–154). The incident appears to illustrate a sensitivity among Galilean Jews, undoubtedly intensified by the circumstances, about their own ethnic solidarity as a people against outsiders. They had already come into armed conflict with the Greeks in the cities around the periphery of Galilee. But this case may also express a class conflict, the suspicion in which the people would have held nobles, particularly foreign nobles of the king to whom those around Tarichaeae had recently been subjected. The incident thus indicates a sensitivity among the people about their sense of identity as a people, although it is unclear how it illustrates anything about halakhic rigor. But there is no reason to find any direct connection between "the Jews" who pressed the issue of the gentile nobles' circumcision (apparently at Tarichaeae) and the Tiberian faction of the sailors and poor who fired the royal palace.[26]

There is a more direct link between another incident that happened supposedly in Tarichaeae and the Tiberian poor (on the following see Life 126–135; War 2.595–607). After some young men had ambushed the king's finance officer, Ptolemy, or his wife and brought the plunder to Josephus in Tarichaeae, Josephus secretly consigned the spoil to two "friends" of the king to be returned. Not trusting "their general" (who all but boasts of his utter duplicity and secret agenda), the young men agitated in the villages around Tarichaeae and Tiberias that Josephus was intending to betray the countryside (*chora*, Life 129) to the Romans. At the eventual confrontation in the hippodrome in Tarichaeae, says Josephus, the principal instigator of the angry mob was Jesus son of Sapphias, the *archon* of Tiberias. Supposedly he used the Torah as a rallying symbol, claiming that Josephus was about to betray it. That does not indicate anything about halakhah, but it does suggest that loyalty to the Torah as the embodiment of the independence and traditional

[24] *Galilee*, 234–235, 311–312.

[25] Cf. Freyne, *Galilee*, chap. 8.

[26] Cf. Freyne, *Galilee*, 312: "the same zealot fanatics." Also unclear is precisely what evidence would point to "rigorist sectarian attitudes shared by the people at large."

way of life (not merely "religion") of the people was a central issue in the revolt for Galilean villagers. In this incident, like the one involving the gentile nobles, class conflict is clearly again central. The people suspected, rightly so, as it turned out, that Josephus' real loyalties were to the king, his officer, and ultimately the Roman overlords. The link with the Tiberian party of the poor, of course, is Jesus himself, who was supposedly its leader as well as the *archon*, and we could hypothesize that the Torah, particularly as a symbol and embodiment of the traditional ideals and way of life of the people had come to the fore in the circumstances of the revolt and the excitement of sudden independence of Roman rule.

We have at least some sense of the political-economic circumstances and relations of the destitute class of Tiberias itself. A number of factors indicate that the poor of Tiberias could well have harbored some latent hostilities towards the king and the royal palace as a symbol of their circumstances that may have motivated their attack. Hobsbawm has pointed out that the people of a royal city, most of whom are dependent economically on the business of the court and administration, will usually be loyal to the king as a symbol of their own identity and involvement. But Tiberias had no long-standing heritage as a royal city. It was a new foundation, not even two generations old in 66, and had been the "royal city" proper for only about fifteen years under Antipas and then briefly and in qualified fahion under Agrippa I. Moreover, although the "magistrates" brought to live in the city were apparently already connected with the royal administration, the other settlers apparently had no such link. Indeed, even if we somewhat discount the tone of Josephus' caustic account of the founding, some coercion was involved in bringing some of those subject to the king into the city. Some "were even poor men who were brought in to join the others from any and all places of origin" (Ant 18.37). Thus many of the residents of the city had started poor and remained poor.[27] Since the city was founded on the site of ancient Jewish tombs, furthermore, it was suspect on the basis of Jewish tradition and sensitivities, which may have placed sensitive Jewish settlers in a continuing situation of conflicting loyalities. It stands to reason that these people who were brought in as settlers were also the ones who were required to build the royal palace, with its lavish decorations and ostentatious wealth. While the return of the administrative apparatus of the capital to Sepphoris meant a loss of prestige as well as political-economic standing for the principal families and professional intellectuals or bureaucrats such as Justus, it may well have meant unemployment for some of the already marginal and "destitute." There were clearly multiple bases for possible hostility among the poor directed against the royal palace.

If or insofar as the faction (*stasis*) of the sailors and destitute of Tiberias had a social form, it was defined by the structure and circumstances of the situation. It is highly unlikely that it had any organization, although there may have been other leaders besides Jesus. This "party" of the poor apparently persisted in its rebellious stance through all attempts of Josephus to control the various factions in Galilee and in particular through the several attempts made by "the respectable" principal men of Tiberias itself to induce Agrippa II to take control of the city. When the Romans advanced through Galilee in the summer of 67 subduing the rebellion in systematic fashion, Jesus and his followers made a valiant attempt to resist the inexorable Roman reconquest, while the *protoi*

[27] It is unclear what might have constituted "the opportunities of the hellenistic city environment" of which these poor could have availed themselves in order to achieve "social mobility." See Freyne, *Galilee*, 236.

negotiated submission. In a daring guerrilla attack they managed to capture some horses from Vespasian's forces. But they apparently could not control the city, which was surrendered by the other faction, whereupon they fled to Tarichaeae where they continued their daring resistance (War 3.443–470). One of Josephus' sharp criticisms of Justus may indicate that the "185 fellow-citizens" slain in the internal Tiberian civil strife consisted largely of some of these "sailors and poor." And it would seem likely that many among the "2000 Tiberians found at the siege of Jerusalem" (surelly an exaggerated figure) were former followers of Jesus son of Sapphias who, once resistance at Tiberias and Tarichaeae was futile, fled with other Galileans to Jerusalem to continue the resistance (Life 353–354).

Political and Social Roles of the Pharisees and Scribes in Galilee

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The Pharisees, scribes, and Jesus were all integral parts of Galilean society. Their religious activities were embedded in the political organization of society and had immediate and important political, social, and economic repercussions for all social classes. In order to understand their activities and conflicts with one another, a brief review of society in agrarian empires is needed.

Gerhard Lenski's analysis of numerous agrarian empires, of which the Roman Empire is one, discerns nine significant classes, five grouped as the upper clssses and four as the lower. The upper classes are the ruler (a class in himself), the governing class, retainer class, merchant class, and priestly class. The lower classes are peasants, artisans, an unclean or degraded class, and the expendable class.[1] These are not the only classes one could discern in ancient imperial society, but they are the most significant for the political order which held empires together, and they fit the Hellenistic and Roman empires reasonably well. The Pharisees fit best into the retainer class as a religious group and a political force which interacted with the governing class, often influenced society and sometimes gained power. The scribes, as bureaucrats, educators, and major and minor officials, also fit into the retainer class.

The governing class, retainers, peasants, and artisans are most pertinent for understanding the Pharisees and scribes. The *governing class* was very small, only about 1–2% of the population. It was made up of both hereditary aristocrats and appointed bureaucrats. A strong central ruler, who had good transportation and communication, such as Herod Antipas in Galilee, favored an appointed bureaucracy which was under his direct control and dependent on him for its power. Membership in the governing class included the right of self-aggrandizement through grants from the ruler and "honest graft" in the conduct of office. Offices were often sold and the incumbent was expected to make his fortune from his position. Land ownership, the major form of wealth, was secondary to political power because political power was used to acquire land and wealth, and lack of political power could result in the loss of land and wealth through taxation and confiscation.[2] The Roman governors sent to Syria and Palestine were of this class, as were Herod and his descendants. To some extent the chief priests functioned as part of this class, but they were not as Hellenized nor as accepted in Roman society as Herod and his successors. Jewish society was ruled by the governing class (the chief priests, large landowners, notable elders, and major officials) except when a strong ruler such as Herod had control.

[1] Gerhard E. Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (New York: McGraw, 1966) 214–96.

[2] Lenski, *Power*, 210–11; 229; Richard L. Rohrbaugh, "Methodological Considerations in the Debate over the Social Class Status of Early Christians," *JAAR* 52 (1984) 542.

The *retainer class,* perhaps 5% of the population, served the needs of the ruler and governing class. To some extent they shared in the life of the elite, but not in its direct power. Soldiers, bureaucratic government officials, various kinds of servants, religious leaders, and educators were all necessary for the functioning of society, and as a group they had a great impact on society and culture. However, individual retainers lacked power because any one person could be easily replaced by another. Some retainers could become very powerful and move into the governing class while others could lose their position and fall back into the peasantry. Their offices could become hereditary, but more often they were bureaucratic and so subject to the appointment of the ruler. This group gained most power when the governing class ceased to be effective rulers and left matters in their hands.[3]

Many scribes were members of the retainer class in their capacities as bureaucrats and minor officials. Some lower ranked priests and traditional, local leaders probably fit in here too. Even despised officials, like Levi the tax collector, called by Jesus, fit into this class.[4] Since the Pharisees appear in Josephus as a recognized group which exercises religious, political and possibly educational roles, they seem to fit into the retainer class. Because they have influence with the people and strive for influence and power in Jewish government, they cannot be poor peasants or urban craftsmen who spend all their time producing enough for subsistence. It is likely that the Pharisees were part of the ruling classes as retainers in some way dependent on the rich and powerful who controlled most of society's surplus.

The *peasants* made up the bulk of the population, because most labor had to go into producing food. They were heavily taxed, typically at the rate of 30–70% of the crop, kept firmly under control, and could gain power only when they had military importance or when there was a labor shortage.[5] The *artisan class* was similar to the peasants in lack of power. Artisans, along with the unclean class, were only 3–7% of the population. They were not productive enough to become wealthy, for the most part, and they did not have power unless their skills were so difficult to acquire that they could command high wages and concessions. Their low productivity and dependence on the upper classes meant that they were *not* a middle class, as they are in modern society today. Some members of this group were peasants who had been forced off the land. Jesus was from this class, as was Paul and the fishermen, Peter, Andrew, James, and John. Though far from indigent, they did not have power and influence in society.

The Pharisees and scribes were retainers who flourished in cities and towns. The rich and powerful lived in the city along with the classes and groups dependent on them. Most of the inhabitants of the city were bureaucrats, craftsmen, merchants, servants, religious functionaries, and others directly dependent on the governing class. They did not form a middle class in the modern sense because they lacked power, like the peasants, and were almost totally dependent on the powerful for whom they worked. They were a residual group between the ruling class and the peasants.[6] As a group they lacked internal coherence and were fundamentally an instrument of the powerful.[7] Since the cities

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[3] Lenski, *Power,* 243–48.

[4] Mark 2:13–17; Luke 5:27–32; Matt 9:9–13 (where Levi is Matthew).

[5] Lenski, *Power,* 266–76.

[6] John H. Kautsky, *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1982) chaps. 12, 13 and esp. 323–28.

[7] Kautsky, *Politics,* 333–34.

dominated agrarian society, change and new movements in society tended to originate in the city.[8] Much social conflict was merely the governing class in conflict within itself about who would rule. However, this conflict produced occasional new groups, movements, and ideas.

The Pharisees as Retainers

Because the Pharisees are prominent among Jewish groups mentioned in the New Testament, Biblical scholars tend to inflate their importance. From the viewpoint of the whole culture, and especially that of the ruling classes, the Pharisees were of minor importance. Josephus reflects this larger perspective by mentioning the Pharisees on less than twenty occasions in his many volumes. In the *War* the Pharisees are mentioned four times. Their great influence on Queen Alexandra and consequent political power in the early first century B.C.E. are recounted disapprovingly.[9] Later in that century Herod accused his brother Pheroras' wife of subsidizing the Pharisees against him.[10] After the long, laudatory description of the Essenes, the Pharisees are described briefly with the Sadducees as one of the three traditional Jewish philosophies.[11] Finally, at the beginning of the Great War the most notable Pharisees along with other Jewish leaders tried to prevent the cessation of the sacrifices offered for Rome.[12]

Pharisees as a group or as individuals are mentioned nine times in the *Antiquities*, three of which are parallel to passages in the *War*. Josephus gives a brief description of the Pharisees as he treats the Hasmonean period[13] and a longer one at the beginning of Book 18 (beginning of the first century C.E.), parallel to the description in the *War*. He recounts their conflict with John Hyrcanus which led to loss of influence,[14] their later regaining of influence on Alexandra, and their loss of it again at her death.[15] During the Herodian period, Samias and Pollion, who are Pharisees, appear in several incidents. Samias (or Pollion) defended Herod (in a manner of speaking) at his trial before the Sanhedrin. Herod showed favor to Samias and Pollion when he took Jerusalem and later exempted them from taking an oath of loyalty to him.[16] Near the end of Herod's life the Pharisees formed an alliance with Pheroras' wife and her faction against Herod, an association which led to the execution of a number of Pharisees.[17]

In the *Life* Josephus says that he tried the Pharisaic way of life along with the Essenes, Sadducees, and an ascetic named Bannus; finally he chose the Pharisees.[18] On the eve of the revolt, the leading Pharisees, along with the chief priests and Josephus, appeared as

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[8] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Social Differentiation and Stratification* (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1971) 90–91 and 113–20, stresses the power of the center, that is, the ruling classes, to maintain and change symbols in order to control society.

[9] 1.4.6–5.3 (96–114).

[10] 1.29.2 (567–71).

[11] 2.8.14 (119–66).

[12] 2.17.2–4 (409–17).

[13] 13.5.9 (171–73).

[14] 13.10.5 (288–98).

[15] 13.15.5–16.5 (399–429).

[16] 14.9.3–5; end of Book 14, beginning of Book 15; 15.10.4 (368–72).

[17] 17/2/4–3/3 (32–60).

[18] 1–6 (1).

a leadership group.[19] Simeon ben Gamaliel, a Pharisee, is the prime mover in Jerusalem to have Josephus removed from command in Galilee, and finally the delegation sent to remove Josephus from command had a priest Pharisee and two lay Pharisees along with a young chief priest.[20]

The minor role played by the Pharisees in Josephus is explained by his concentration on the governing class and its political and military fortunes which were so crucial for Jewish society as a whole. Neither the priesthood, the aristocrats, nor the peasants are treated except when they have an impact on the fortunes of the nation as a whole. The Pharisees are mentioned at times of change, crisis, or transition in government because when power shifted they and many other social and political forces in Jewish society became active in the competition for power and influence. When John Hyrcanus shifted his allegiance from the Pharisees to Sadducees, when Alexandra struggled to maintain control after her husband's death, at the beginning and end of Herod's reign, at the transition from Herodian rule to Roman procurators, and in the complex events at the beginning of the war against Rome, the Pharisees are treated by Josephus as part of the political and social competition for power and influence.

The Pharisees functioned as a political interest group which had its own goals for society and constantly engaged in political activity to achieve them, even though they did not always succeed.[21] They were not themselves the leaders of the Jewish community, though prominent leaders of the Pharisees, either by their station in the Pharisaic group or because of family status, were part of the governing class. The Pharisees as a group did not have direct power (except to a limited degree under their royal patron, Alexandra) and were not as a whole members of the governing class. They were a literate, organized group which constantly sought influence with the governing class. As such they fit into Lenski's retainer class, a group of people above the peasants and other lower classes but dependent on the governing class and ruler for their place in society. The members of the retainer class usually fulfilled administrative, bureaucratic, and military functions in society. Josephus does not make clear what functions the Pharisees fulfilled in society, but in each era of Jewish history from the Hasmonean period until the destruction of the Temple they were present and struggling to gain access to power.

The Pharisees' precise goals for society and the laws by which they wished society to live are not described by Josephus, but the traditions which they promoted were popular with the people, especially in the Hasmonean period, according to Josephus.[22] Both their

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[19] 20–23 (5).

[20] 189–98 (38–39).

[21] A political interest group is a voluntary association which seeks to convert its interests into public law or gain control over social behavior, according to E. Pfuhl, *The Deviance Factor* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1980) 122. Modern political interest groups are political parties, pressure groups, special interest groups, and lobbies. Such groups, which compete for power, usually seek to label their opponents deviant. The give and take of political, social, and religious life and the struggles for power among groups can be explained as the attempts of dominant and deviant groups to have society follow their rules. Many of the conflicts among Jewish groups in Palestine and between the Jewish leadership and the early Christian community can be explained in these terms.

[22] Richard A. Horsley, "'Like One of the Prophets of Old': Two Types of Popular Prophets at the Time of Jesus," *CBQ* 47 (1985) 444–45, points out that the lower class

activities in the Hasmonean period and the description of them at the end of Archelaus' reign imply that they were allied with traditional, non-revolutionary Judaism. Whatever influence they achieved, they usually achieved with the help of a powerful patron, and they entered into coalitions with other groups among the upper classes in order to gain influence and move those who had power.

The Pharisees in Galilee

Because Josephus concentrates on events and major figures in Jerusalem he does not write extensively of events in Galilee. Only when treating his Galilean command in his *Life* does he give any details concerning political struggles in Galilee. Even there the only Pharisees who appear are in the delegation sent from Jerusalem to remove him. The gospels are the only sources which place the Pharisees in Galilee. In the Gospel of Mark the Pharisees appear as a potent political and religious force. Since Mark writes just before or after the war against Rome, he is not anachronistically reading the later Pharisees/rabbis back into Jesus' life. His traditions reflect at least the mid-first century and the experience of the early Christian community if not the experience of Jesus.[23] In the early and mid-first century Herod Antipas (4 B.C.E.–39 C.E.) and then Agrippa (41–44) ruled Galilee as client kings of the Roman empire. The chief priests and other Jerusalem authorities had no direct political control there. Galilee itself was not a uniform province, but divided into upper and lower Galilee by topography and tradition. Galilee must not be pictured as a rural hinterland; it had several major cities and towns which served as regional centers for tax collection and security (Sepphoris, Tiberias, Capernaum, Bethsaida, Magdala). Major trade routes passed through lower Galilee. Lower Galilee was only 25 by 15 miles, so that any village was within walking distance of a good sized town. Jesus' home in Nazareth was only four miles from Sephhoris, and the center of his preaching, Capernaum, was a large town in the northeastern corner of lower Galilee.

(continued)
did not always look to the literate class, which formed a tiny middle stratum, for leadership. These literate groups had their own interests to pursue and, if they differed from those of the common people, the people were quite capable of producing their own leaders, such as prophets. This seems to be what happened at the time of the war against Rome. He notes elsewhere that the people would not have looked to the landed gentry for leadership because they were implicated with Herod and other "alien leaders" ("Popular Messianic Movements Around the Time of Jesus," *CBQ* 46 [1984] 484–85).

[23] The historical reliability of the Galilean tradition which derives from Mark and his sources has been attacked. R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (New York: Harpers, 1963) 52–54, argued that many controversy stories originally circulated with unnamed opponents for Jesus, such as the people and their village leaders, and that the tradition tended to insert Pharisees, scribes, etc. Morton Smith, *Jesus the Magician* (New York: Harper, 1978) Appendix A: "The Pharisees in the Gospels," pp. 153–57, esp. 157, argues that the Pharisees are anachronistic in *all* passages. Smith thinks that the original sources had "scribes" in many cases and that Pharisees were added later to fit the experience of the early Christian community. Bultmann is correct that the tradition tends to add Pharisees to many stories and gradually sees them as the adversaries of Jesus par excellence. However, the contention that the early church put the Pharisees in all the Galilean disputes or moved disputes with the Pharisees from a Judean to a Galilean location lacks cogency.

In view of the complex social and political structure of Galilee, Jesus and his opponents in Galilee, the Pharisees, scribes, Herodians, etc., must be seen as part of the larger political struggle for control during the first century. Jesus' opponents are not independent religious authorities, but members of the retainer class, involved in community guidance and leadership. As such they had standing and official roles in the community. They probably functioned as unofficial patrons and brokers for the people and perceived Jesus as a threat to their power and influence.

All the actors in Mark played a minor role in the national drama, especially in Galilee which was far from the center of Jewish political power in Jerusalem. Galilee should not be pictured as cut off from Jerusalem, because both in Josephus and in the gospels, officials come down to Galilee from Jerusalem. However, they do not have direct power, and they must struggle for influence over the people and local leaders in each case. When Jesus began to teach, he challenged and was challenged in turn by the lowest level of the upper classes, the retainers, specifically the Pharisees and scribes. Note that other interactions were with the low level officials, such as synagogue leaders, a centurion, etc. The Pharisees exercised influence on the people and competed with Jesus for control. They entered into political alliances with the Herodians and were associated with the scribes, who had some political control and a presence in Jerusalem as well as Galilee. The roles assigned to the Pharisees in Galilee by Mark do not differ significantly from those assigned them in Jerusalem by Josephus.

A major question unanswered by the sources concerns the daily activities of the Pharisees and the source of their livelihood. The older theory that they were urban artisans is very unlikely because artisans were poor, uneducated, and uninfluential. The more common theory that the Pharisees were a lay scribal movement, a group of religious scholars and intellectuals who displaced the traditional leaders and gained great authority over the community, is likewise very unlikely.[24] This is unproven and very improbable. Though some Pharisees were part of the governing class, most Pharisees were subordinate officials, bureaucrats, judges, and educators. They are best understood as retainers who were literate servants of the governing class, had a program for Jewish society, and had acquired influence with the people and their patrons. The Pharisees must have worked for either the Temple leadership in so far as it was represented in Galilee, Herod Antipas' government, or landowners. The Pharisees' stress on tithing and priestly piety for the laity could have been attractive to the Jerusalem authorities who desired to collect tithes from all Jews in Palestine and who could have met resistance from Jews in Galilee, outside their political control. This kind of activity would continue their role, clearly seen in Josephus, as retainers of the Jerusalem authorities. If the Pharisees in Galilee were representatives of the Jerusalem leadership, it would explain their small numbers in Galilee, their lack of mention in other sources, and their absence in accounts of indigenous Galilean society and leadership. It would also explain their hostility to Jesus and their willingness to form coalitions with the Herodians to oppose him.

It is possible that the officials and retainers of Herod Antipas supported and encouraged the Pharisees and that they served some functions in their government of Galilee. Since the Pharisees were supporters of an ordered Jewish society and of observance of Jewish

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[24] See most recently, Ellis Rivkin, *A Hidden Revolution* (Nashville, Abingdon, 1978) 211–51. This theory, held by many, was popularized in the English speaking world by Jacob Lauterbach, "The Pharisees and Their Teachings," *HUCA* 6 (1929) 69–139, reprinted in *Rabbinic Essays* (New York: Ktav, 1973) 87–162. See esp. 77ff./97ff.

law, their goals would have been harmonious with those of Antipas, who desired to keep his predominantly Jewish kingdom in good order. The Pharisees' emphasis on tithing and practices which promoted Jewish identity could be used to promote loyalty to a Jewish king who kept Galilee peaceful and provided a buffer between the people and the Roman empire.

Finally, the Pharisees could have been supported by the wealthy landowners who found the Pharisaic understanding of Judaism a support for Galilean society. But traditional leaders do not usually share power or form alliances unless there is a need.[25] Since Galilee was relatively peaceful and prosperous until 44 C.E., when the Roman procurators took direct control and relations with the government deteriorated, it is unlikely that the landowners would have allied themselves with the Pharisees as a protest against oppression.

When the opportunity arose, the Pharisees sought power over society, but most of the time they served and were dependent on powerful and wealthy patrons. This means that their organization cannot be viewed as a monastic-like community or withdrawn sect which demands primary and total commitment from every member. It is most likely that Pharisees were active in a number of occupations and roles in society and were bound together by certain beliefs and practices and by endeavors to influence social change.

Scribes

The scribes appear as an organized social group only in the synoptic gospels, where they are associated with both the Pharisees and high priests as opponents of Jesus. Scribes are mentioned in Josephus but not as a coherent social group with a single identity and goal. Scribes are unlike the Pharisees in that they appeared all over the Mediterranean world and the Near East over several millenia, fulfilled many functions, and had varied roles and status over time and in different places. In Jewish society scribes are found working for the king and the Temple. Such scribes may have been drawn from the priests and Levites, as well as from the people. Scribes who held high office were probably drawn from the aristocracy or at least prominent families. Scribes were found in the bureaucracy in great numbers, in villages, and also among groups such as the Pharisees. Scribes had an effect on the preservation of prophecy, wisdom writing, and the Pentateuch, and overlapped circles which had priestly, apocalyptic, and wisdom orientations.

The Gospel of Mark

A brief review of the roles of the Pharisees and scribes in the Gospel of Mark will show how both Pharisees and scribes fit into the retainer class and as such would have been the community leaders most likely to oppose Jesus. Mark mentions the Pharisees alone in five cases, and in all instances they are in conflict with Jesus.[26] The scribes and Pharisees are mentioned together on two occasions when they are in conflict with Jesus (2:16; 7:1,

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[25] Luke portrays the Pharisees as wealthy, established patrons who are failing in their role as protectors of the people and exploiting them, but his view of the Pharisees in Galilean society does not seem to be based on accurate, firsthand knowledge.

[26] 2:18; 2:24; 3:2; 8:11, 15; 10:2. Mark 3:2 says "they" were watching Jesus in the synagogue in order to accuse him. Context both before this story and at the end, where the Pharisees conspire with the Herodians against Jesus, indicate that the Pharisees are meant, at least in the Markan context.

5). The Pharisees are also linked with the Herodians twice (3:6; 12:13) in more political matters. The scribes are mentioned alone on seven occasions.[27] They are linked with the chief priests and elders five times[28] and with just the chief priests an additional four times.[29]

Mark places the Pharisees in Galilee on all occasions except one when the Pharisees and Herodians are sent to Jesus to entrap him in Jerusalem.[30] The Pharisees meet Jesus at Capernaum and other rural towns (3:2, 6; 7:1, 5) and in many, often indeterminate, places (2:18, 24; 8:11; 10:2). In contrast with Josephus, who shows the Pharisees as closely linked with the leadership in Jerusalem, Mark sees them as active only in Galilee. They do not lack alliances and connections with other groups, for they plot with the Herodians (3:6), join the scribes in conflict with Jesus, and have some scribes in their midst (2:16). They even appear in Jerusalem once, but this may be due to the literary arrangement of Mark.[31]

The scribes appear both in Galilee and Jerusalem, but more often in Jerusalem. Comments which Mark makes about the scribes indicate that their teaching and their authority were generally known to the people, so they may have been active in both places. The scribes are found in Jesus' house in Capernaum where he is teaching (2:6), and on another occasion scribes from Jerusalem make charges against him in the same place (3:22). Some scribes from Jerusalem along with the Pharisees challenge Jesus in an indeterminate place (7:1, 5) and the scribes of the Pharisees also challenge Jesus once in his home in Capernaum (2:16). Scribes argue with his disciples after the transfiguration in an indeterminate place (9:14). In addition, the disciples refer to the teachings of the scribes in a Galilean context (1:22; 9:11), and the Galilean people contrast Jesus' authoritative teaching with that of the scribes (1:22), indicating that the teachings of the scribes are well known and well accepted in Galilee. In several cases the scribes either come from Jerusalem (3:22 and 7:1) or are found in the larger towns, such as Capernaum (2:6, 16; 3:22). Later in the narrative the scribes are located in Jerusalem and frequently associated with the priests and elders. They are mentioned with the chief priests and sometimes the elders in two of the passion predictions (8:31 and 10:33) and several times in the Jerusalem narrative.[32] As an educated leadership group, the scribes seem to be associated with large centers, either Jerusalem or major towns.

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[27] Mark 1:22; 3:22; 9:11; 9:14; 12:28, 32; 12:35; 12:38.

[28] 8:31; 11:27; 14:43; 14:53; 15:1.

[29] 10:33; 11:18; 14:1; 15:31. The chief priests, scribes, and elders occur together from chap. 8 on, especially in chaps. 11–15 where, as the Jerusalem authorities, they are concerned with the death of Jesus. For a brief review of these patterns in the gospels, see A. F. J. Klijn, "Scribes, Pharisees, Highpriests and Elders in the New Testament," *NovTest* 3 (1959) 259–67.

[30] The Pharisees are in Galilee in 2:16, 2:18, 2:24, 3:2, 3:6, 7:1 and 5, 8:11, 10:2. They with the Herodians are in Jerusalem only in 12:13. They are described in 7:3 and 8:15 in a Galilean setting.

[31] In chap. 12, just before the arrest of Jesus, Jesus meets a series of his opponents: the Pharisees and Herodians (12:13), the Sadducees (12:18), and a friendly scribe (12:28). He then concludes with an attack on the scribes (12:35–40) and implicitly on the Temple authorities, the priests, when he says that the Temple will be destroyed (13:1–2). It is likely that Mark brought the Pharisees (and possibly the Herodians) into this context to create a complete roster of Jesus' opponents just before the arrest and crucifixion.

[32] 11:18, 27; 14:1, 43, 53; 15:1, 31.

Further information concerning the nature and social position of the Pharisees and scribes can be deduced from the issues which they discuss with Jesus. The Pharisees dispute with him over fasting (2:18), sabbath observance (2:24 and 3:2), and divorce (10:2). The scribes and Pharisees dispute with him over purification of hands (7:1), and the scribes of the Pharisees question his eating with sinners (2:16). The Pharisees also question Jesus' authority by demanding a sign (8:11). In concert with the Herodians the Pharisees try to trap Jesus in a political matter, the question of Roman taxes (12:13), and they enter into a plot with the Herodians against Jesus.

Because the Pharisees in Mark have relationships with other groups in society, enter into political alliance with the Herodians against Jesus (3:6), and with the Herodians put Jesus to the test at the instigation of the Jerusalem leaders (12:13), they act like a well-connected political interest group, of which the scribes of the Pharisees (2:16) may be the Jerusalem representatives. Since their religious views are integral to the way Jews live in Palestine, they sought to control or influence, as much as possible, the political, legal, and social factors which might determine the social practices and views of the community. Thus the Pharisees are the defenders of a certain kind of community, and Jesus challenged the Pharisees' vision of community by attacking their purity regulations concerning washing and food, as well as Sabbath practice. The effect of Jesus' teaching is to widen the community boundaries and loosen the norms for membership in his community. Jesus thus created a new community outside their control and quite naturally provoked their protest and hostility. Jesus and the Pharisees did not argue over theological issues which were of interest to a limited number of Jews, but rather competed for control over the community.

The Pharisees were recognized leaders in the Galilean community, according to Mark. This means that they had high standing in the community and influence, if not power, with the people and other leaders of the community. Jesus, who was from a lower class artisan family, did not have the social standing, honor, and influence to command respect as a teacher, as his return to Nazareth shows (6:2–3). Those who knew him dismissed him as a local carpenter without any community recognition of wisdom or power. His family is an ordinary one and his new claim to teach and to a special standing in the community is rejected out of hand.

The issues raised by the scribes in Mark center around Jesus' teaching authority. In two instances, when the scribes of the Pharisees confront Jesus and when the scribes who came from Jerusalem along with the Pharisees question him, the issues discussed match those raised by the Pharisees. The scribes of the Pharisees criticize Jesus because he eats with tax collectors and sinners (2:16), and the scribes from Jerusalem and the Pharisees question Jesus because his disciples do not ritually wash their hands before eating (7:1, 5). Such issues of table fellowship and ritual purity are typical of the questions raised by the Pharisees above. In the rest of the interaction between Jesus and the scribes, the issues center more around Jesus' authority for his teaching and activity than around sectarian-like rules.

In three encounters with scribes, Jesus' or his disciples' authority is in question, and on one of those occasions a scribe accepts Jesus' teaching authority. In the first of the sequence of five controversy stories the scribes were sitting with a crowd in Jesus' house in Capernaum and questioned (in their hearts) Jesus' authority to forgive the paralytic's sins because only God can forgive sins (2:6). After Jesus' transfiguration, he found the scribes arguing with his disciples because they could not cure a possessed boy (9:14). Though the content of the argument is not spelled out, it probably concerned the disciples' claim to authority and power to do works which are beyond human capability and their failure to perform. Finally, in 12:28 a scribe, who had heard Jesus disputing with

the Sadducees, was impressed with his answer and so asked him a friendly question of his own in order to enter into discussion with him. The scribe and Jesus agreed on the greatest commandment and Jesus said that the scribe was near the kingdom of God (12:28–34). In the first two cases the scribes are not in direct conflict with specific teachings of Jesus, but with his exercise of authority and power. In the last case the scribe is impressed with Jesus' teaching ability and authority and questions him as a disciple would question a master or a teacher his colleague.

In three places Mark's narrative reveals that the people and Jesus' disciples know and recognize the teachings of the scribes. When Jesus first teaches in the synagogue in Capernaum (1:21–28) the people are astonished at his teaching because he "taught them as one who had authority, and not as the scribes" (1:22). The scribes are the point of reference for Jewish religious teaching, and Mark implies that they are the ordinary teachers with whom people are familiar. Jesus, who also teaches, is contrasted with them, especially because of the way he teaches, rather than the content of his teaching. Mark, who has just shown Jesus as commissioned by God at the Jordan, now presents Jesus as exercising that authority in the way he teaches. Later in the Gospel the disciples of Jesus quote the teaching of the scribes about the coming of Elijah (9:11), and Jesus, who accepts the teaching, explains that it has already been fulfilled (9:12–13). Finally, Jesus quotes the teaching of the scribes that the Messiah must be the son of David (12:35) and refutes this contention by Scriptural interpretation, to the delight of the crowd (12:36–37). In these three cases, the teaching of the scribes is well known and assumed to be the "norm" and the beginning point of discussion. Of course, Mark shows Jesus as superior to the scribes, but even his comparison presumes that the scribes are the norm.

Conclusion

The scribes and Pharisees in Galilee are described in Mark as having many interests in common. They both confront Jesus concerning his teaching, and they both object to Jesus' challenge to their traditional leadership. The matters brought up by these two groups reflect slightly different specific concerns. The Pharisees speak of Sabbath and food laws and the scribes argue about teaching authority. This suggests that the scribes are officially recognized and authoritative teachers in the community and the Pharisees are a group with a specific interpretation of certain laws and practices. Both scribes and Pharisees seek influence and resultant control among the people as religious experts and in this quest they compete with Jesus, who is challenging their control and influence within the community.

Neither Passivity nor Violence: Jesus' Third Way

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Jesus' statement about violence in Matthew 5:38–42 has itself been the victim of unusual violence. There are those who reduce the text to a pietistic exhortation to "rather suffer injustice than impose their rights through violence."[1] "His disciples are to be so free of self that they do not even desire human justice."[2] Others believe that Jesus taught nonretaliation because God would imminently wreak vengeance on the wicked,[3] or, coming at revenge by another indirect route, we are to suffer evil and leave it to the civil rulers to see that justice gets done after all.[4] Some see these sayings as encouraging flattery and sycophantism toward those in power: "Politicians, government officials and rich men are always friendly and kind toward those who willingly carry their burdens without complaining"—written without the slightest trace of irony.[5] And a host of writers, from Chrysostom to the present, stress the spiritual benefits to be gained by voluntarily undergoing humiliation and the mortification of the ego.[6]

It is all very well for those of us who are used to receiving justice to surrender it voluntarily, because we are normally treated fairly. A bit of renunciation might even do us good. But to ask the poor and powerless to acquiesce in injustice when that is all they

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[1] Gerhard Lohfink, *Jesus and Community* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 55. Gandhi believed quite the opposite: better to use violence than ever to submit to an unjust law. "Where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence" (cited by Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence* [Princeton: Princeton University, 1958] 28; see also 29, 139).

[2] A. H. McNeile, *The Gospel according to St. Matthew* (London: Macmillan, 1961) 69.

[3] David L. Dungan, "Jesus and Violence," in *Jesus, the Gospels, and the Church. Essays in Honor of W. R. Farmer* (ed. E. P. Sanders; Macon: Mercer University, 1987) 136—Jesus did not advocate nonviolent resistance. " 'Do not resist evil; turn the other cheek' simply means: do not resist—at all." Leave it to the vengeance of God.

[4] See William Tyndale, note 35. Augustine argued that Jesus could not have meant this passage literally, for "He did not in this obey His own precept, for He did not present the other side of His face to him who had smitten Him, but, on the contrary, prevented him who had done the wrong from adding thereto" (John 18:22–23; in *Letter* 138, 12 [NPNF 1:484]; *On Lying* 27 [NPNF 3:470]). Augustine thus found it easy to defend the state's right to kill.

[5] George M. Lamsa, *Gospel Light* (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman, 1936) 40.

[6] Chrysostom, *Homilies on the Epistle to the Romans*, Hom. 12 on Rom 6:19 (NPNF 1st series, 11:426); Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News according to Matthew* (London: SPCK, 1976) 130—"Jesus' concern again is to destroy self-consciousness, here the self-pity of the persecuted." "It is better to surrender everything and go through life naked than to insist on one's legal rights. . . ."

have ever known is itself an act of complicity in injustice. For those who are struggling for a more human world, these readings of the text are themselves laden with political repression and demagoguery. Jesus never said anything of the sort. I will argue that the radicalism of Jesus' message can be recovered by a closer examination of his audience and context, and that his meaning has been correctly grasped by nonviolent activists even apart from a proper exegesis of the text.

1. Matthew's Version of the Saying (Matt 5:38–42)

> 38You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' 39But I say to you, Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; 40and if any one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well; 41and if any one forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. 42Give to him who begs from you, and do not refuse him who would borrow from you. (RSV)

Matthew's form is a jeweled brooch whose centerpiece is 5:39cd–42, four sayings in a fivefold structure in an ABABB pattern.[7] Verse 42 may not belong to the original cluster. In vv 39cd–41, the focus is first on what an oppressor does and then on what the hearers can do back; in 42, the focus shifts to the hearers and what they should do when another would beg or borrow. The more original version of v 42 is probably Gos. Thom. 95–"If you have money do not lend at interest, but give . . . from whom you will not get them (back)." What in Matthew seems to be the bland encouragement of almsgiving and moneylending appears in Thomas in a form as shocking as the injunctions that precede it in Matthew: lend without hope even of interest, lend even to those who cannot pay it back at all. "The follower of Jesus is not merely to lend without interest, but to *give*. If this be so, the very radicalism of the saying might suggest its authenticity."[8] Matthew has not quite succeeded in integrating v 42 into the rest of the saying. I will therefore treat it as a secondary addition of an authentic saying of Jesus as represented by the Thomas version.

2. Luke's Version of the Saying (Luke 6:29–30)

> 29To him who strikes you on the cheek, offer the other also; and from him who takes away your cloak do not withhold your coat as well. 30Give to every one who begs from you; and of him who takes away your goods, do not ask them again.

The Lukan structure is fourfold, but contains only three of the sayings in Matthew. Despite the formal similarities, however, Luke has made a number of alterations, almost all for the worse. He drops Matthew's "right" cheek, apparently not recognizing that "right" specifies the type of blow and thus its seriousness, not as attack or injury, but humiliation. He consequently mistakes the striking as armed robbery,[9] and the response

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[7] For a structural analysis of this saying, see John Dominic Crossan, "Divine Immediacy and Human Immediacy," in a forthcoming volume of *Semeia, The Historical Jesus and the Rejected Gospels*, ed. Charles Hedrick.

[8] R. McL. Wilson, *Studies in the Gospel of Thomas* (London: Mowbray, 1960) 128; cited by Crossan, "Divine Immediacy," 22.

[9] *Tuptō* is used in Homer mostly with weapons of war (LS); in the LXX it usually has

as submission: offer the other cheek to be pummelled. In the same way he regards the taking of the coat as theft; disciples are supposed to offer to the thieves their last remaining covering. In v 30 he preserves Matthew's injunction to give to beggars, but in the second half of the saying returns to the theme of brigandage: if anyone forcibly seizes your goods, do not seek to recover them—as if one could![10] And since he has misinterpreted virtually the whole passage as a response to armed robbery, Luke simply has no use for the saying about how to respond to the enforced carrying of imperial Roman baggage; so he drops it altogether. Luke does get one thing right, however—the sequence of the taking of garments: first the *himation* (outer garment, cloak), then the *chitōna* (coat, shirt).

In the analysis that follows I will treat Matthew's version (5:39cd–42) as substantially original, substituting Gos. Thom. 95 for Matthew's v 42. In what follows I will assume that Jesus is the source of these sayings, but only the plausibility of the interpretation will bear that out.

3. Interpreting the Core Sayings

a. "If any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." Why the *right* cheek? A blow by the right fist in that right-handed world would land on the *left* cheek of the opponent. An open-handed slap would also strike the left cheek. To hit the right cheek with a fist would require using the left hand, but in that society the left hand was used only for unclean tasks. Even to gesture with the left hand at Qumran carried the penalty of ten days penance.[11] The only way one would normally strike the right cheek would be with the back of the hand. We are dealing here with insult, not fisticuffs. The intention is clearly not to injure but to humiliate, to put someone in his or her "place." One normally did not strike a peer thus, and if one did the fine was exorbitant. *M. Baba Qamma* specifies the various fines for striking an equal: for cuffing (slugging), 4 *zuz*; for slapping, 200 *zuz*; but "if [he struck him] with the back of his hand he must pay him 400 *zuz*." But damages for indignity are not paid to bondmen (8:1–7).

A backhand slap was the usual way of admonishing inferiors. Masters backhanded slaves; husbands, wives; parents, children; men, women; Romans, Jews. *We have here a set of unequal relations, in each of which retaliation would be suicidal.* The only normal response would be cowering submission.

A large part of the confusion these sayings have caused arises from the failure to ask who Jesus' audience is. In all three of the examples in Matt 5:39cd–41, Jesus' listeners

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(continued)
the sense "to smite, kill, slaughter," and in the NT 10 out of 13 times it refers to a violent beating.

[10] The *Didache* notes this non-sequitur, and adds as a gloss this quip: " 'If any man will take from thee what is thine, refuse it not'—not even if thou canst" (1.4). The Greek reads, "for thou art not even able." Luke's focus on robbery may indicate that he is applying the saying to the rigors of the life of wandering preachers in the early church, on the order of 2 Cor 11:23–27.

[11] 1 QS 7. But see the strange case of 1 Esdr 4:30! "Right" must not be regarded as an insertion into Matthew's text, whatever other tendencies one may find in the tradition (against Crossan, "Divine Immediacy," 14). Otherwise the type of blow is not specified, and the confusion that Luke exemplifies becomes inevitable. "Right cheek" here is effectively a technical term; it is not merely descriptive of anatomy.

are not those who strike, initiate lawsuits, or impose forced-labor, but their victims ("If any one strikes *you* . . . would sue *you* . . . forces *you* to go one mile . . ."). There are among his hearers people who were subjected to these very indignities, forced to stifle their inner outrage at the dehumanizing treatment meted out to them by the hierarchical system of caste and class, race and gender, age and status, and as a result of imperial occupation.

Why then does he counsel these already humiliated people to turn the other cheek? Because this action robs the oppressor of the power to humiliate. The person who turns the other cheek is saying, in effect, "Try again. Your first blow failed to achieve its intended effect. I deny you the power to humiliate me. I am a human being just like you. Your status (gender, race, age, wealth) does not alter that fact. You cannot demean me."

Such a response would create enormous difficulties for the striker. Purely logistically, how would he now hit the turned other cheek? He cannot backhand it with his right hand.[12] If he hits with a fist, he makes the other his equal, acknowledging him as a peer. But the whole point of the back of the hand is to reinforce the caste system and its institutionalized inequality. Even if the superior orders the person flogged for such "cheeky" behavior (this is certainly no way to *avoid* conflict!), the point has been irrevocably made. He has been forced, against his will, to regard that person as an equal human being. In that world of honor and shaming, he has been rendered impotent to instill shame in an underling.[13] He has been stripped of his power to dehumanize the other.

b. The second example Jesus gives is set in a court of law. Someone is being sued for his outer garment. Who would do that, and under what circumstances? The Hebrew Scriptures provide the clues.

> If you lend money to any of my people with you *who is poor,* you shall not be to him as a creditor, and you shall not exact interest from him. If ever you take your neighbor's garment (*himation*) in pledge, you shall restore it to him before the sun goes down; for that is his only covering, it is his mantle (*himation*) for his body; in what else shall he sleep? And if he cries to me, I will hear, for I am compassionate. (Exod 22:25–27; LXX 22:24–26)
>
> When you make your neighbor a loan of any sort, you shall not go into his house to fetch his pledge. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you make the loan shall bring the pledge out to you. *And if he is a poor man,* you shall not sleep in his pledge; when the sun goes down, you shall restore to him the pledge that he may sleep in his cloak (*himatiō*) and bless you. . . . You shall not . . . take a widow's garment (*himation*) in pledge. (Deut 24:10–13, 17)
>
> They that trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth . . . lay themselves down beside every altar upon garments (*himatia*) taken in pledge. . . . (Amos 2:7–8; see also Ezek 18:5–9)

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[12] The TEV translation, excellent in this passage in other respects, misses when it reads, "let him slap your left cheek too." But this is precisely what he *cannot* do, unless he abandons the backhand altogether.

[13] "Landowners look for respect since what counts to them as well as to their tenants is honor; landowners need the 'status support' that only their tenants can give them" (Bruce J. Malina, "Patron and Client. The Analogy behind Synoptic Theology," paper given at the Westar Institute, St. Paul, MN, October 16, 1987, 2).

Only the poorest of the poor would have nothing but a garment to give as collateral for a loan. Jewish law strictly required its return every evening at sunset.[14]

Matthew and Luke are at odds as to whether it is the outer garment (Luke) or the undergarment (Matthew) that is being taken. But the Jewish practice of giving the outer garment as a pledge (only it would be useful for sleeping in) makes it clear that Luke's order is correct, even though he does not understand the legal setting. According to Liddell-Scott, *himation* is "always an outer garment . . . worn above the *chitōn*," whereas the *chitōn* is a "garment worn next to the skin." Consistent with this usage, the LXX reads *himation* in the passages just cited. S. Safrai and M. Stern describe normal Jewish dress: an outer garment or cloak of wool and an undergarment or tunic of linen.[15] To avoid confusion I will simply refer to the "outer garment" and the "undergarment."

The situation to which Jesus speaks is one with which his hearers would have been all too familiar: the poor debtor has sunk ever deeper into poverty, the debt cannot be repaid, and his creditor has summoned him to court (*krithēnai*) to wring out repayment by legal means.

Indebtedness was the most serious social problem in first century Palestine. Jesus' parables are full of debtors struggling to salvage their lives. Heavy debt was not, however, a natural calamity that had overtaken the incompetent. It was the direct consequence of Roman imperial policy. Emperors had taxed the wealthy so stringently to fund their wars that the rich began seeking non-liquid investments to secure their wealth. Land was best, but it was ancestrally owned and passed down over generations, and no peasant would voluntarily relinquish it. Exorbitant interest, however, could be used to drive landowners ever deeper into debt until they were forced to sell their land. By the time of Jesus we see this process already far advanced: large estates owned by absentee landlords, managed by stewards, and worked by servants, sharecroppers, and day laborers. It is no accident that the first act of the Jewish revolutionaries in 66 C.E. was to burn the Temple treasury, where the record of debts was kept.

It is in this context that Jesus speaks. His hearers are the poor ("if any one would sue *you*"). They share a rankling hatred for a system that subjects them to humiliation by stripping them of their lands, their goods, finally even their outer garments.

Why then does Jesus counsel them to give over their undergarments as well? This would mean stripping off all their clothing and marching out of court stark naked! Put yourself in the debtor's place, and imagine the guffaws this saying must have evoked. There stands

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[14] The rights of the poor debtor are thus protected by Scripture. On the other hand, the creditor is permitted to harrass and shame the debtor by demanding the outer garment each morning. The *Mekilta de R. Ishmael.* on Exod 22:25–27 shows creditors intensifying their demand by taking a night garment by day and a day garment by night. See also *b. Tem.* 6a; *b. Mes.* 31b, 113ab; 114ab; *b. San.* 21a.

[15] *The Jewish People in the First Century* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) I.2. 797–98. But Matthew is not the only evangelist who confuses these terms. Mark, for example, uses *chitōnas* for the high priest's mantle in 14:63 where Matthew (following LXX usage) has *himatia.* In its citation of this passage, *Didache* 1:4 correctly agrees with Matthew against Luke by referring to the "right" cheek, but with Luke against Matthew on the garments: "If any man take thy coat (*himation*), give him thy shirt (*chitōna*) also" (*The Apostolic Fathers* [Loeb; Cambridge: Harvard University, 1959] 310–11). See also *Mek. de R. Ishm.* on Exod. 22:27–"*For that Is His Only Covering.* This refers to the cloak. *It Is the Garment for His Skin.* This refers to the shirt."

the creditor, beet-red with embarrassment, your outer garment in the one hand, your underwear in the other. You have suddenly turned the tables on him. You had no hope of winning the case; the law was entirely in his favor. But you have transcended his attempt to humiliate you. You have risen above shame. At the same time you have registered a stunning protest against a system that spawns such debt. You have said in effect, "You want my robe? Here, take everything! Now you've got all I have except my body. Is that what you'll take next?"

Nakedness was taboo in Judaism, and opprobrium fell not on the naked party, but on the person viewing or causing one's nakedness (Gen 9:20–27).[16] By stripping you have brought the creditor under the same prohibition that led to the curse of Canaan. As you parade into the street, your friends and neighbors, startled, aghast, inquire what happened. You explain. They join your growing procession, which now resembles a victory parade. The entire system by which debtors are oppressed has been publicly unmasked. The creditor is revealed to be not a "respectable" moneylender but a party in the reduction of an entire social class to landlessness and destitution. This unmasking is not simply punitive, however; it offers the creditor a chance to see, perhaps for the first time in his life, what his practices cause, and to repent.

The Powers That Be literally stand on their dignity. Nothing depotentiates them faster than deft lampooning. By refusing to be awed by their power, the powerless are emboldened to seize the initiative, even where structural change is not immediately possible. This message, far from being a counsel to perfection unattainable in this life, is a practical, strategic measure for empowering the oppressed, and it is being lived out all over the world today by powerless people ready to take their history into their own hands.

Jesus provides here a hint of how to take on the entire system in a way that unmasks its essential cruelty and to burlesque its pretensions to justice, law, and order. Here is a poor man who will no longer be treated as a sponge to be squeezed dry by the rich. He accepts the laws as they stand, pushes them to the point of absurdity, and reveals them for what they have become. He strips nude, walks out before his compatriots, and leaves this creditor and the whole economic edifice which he represents, stark naked.

c. Jesus' third example, the one about going the second mile, is drawn from the very enlightened practice of limiting the amount of forced or impressed labor (*angareia*) that Roman soldiers could levy on subject peoples. The term *angareia* is Persian, and became a loan-word in Aramaic, Greek and Latin. Josephus mentions it in reference to the Seleucid ruler, Demetrius, though the absence of the word in his source (1 Macc 10:33) makes it probable that Josephus is reflecting conditions in the first century C.E. instead. In order to enlist Jewish support for his bid to be king, Demetrius promises, among other things, that "the Jews' beasts of burden shall not be requisitioned (*angareuesthai*) for our army" (*Ant.* 13.52). In the Passion Narrative, Simon of Cyrene is "compelled" (*angareuousin*) by the soldiers to carry Jesus' cross (Mark 15:21; Matt 27:32). Such forced service was a constant feature of Palestine from Persian to late Roman times, and whoever was found on the street could be compelled into service.[17] Most cases of impressment

[16] The *Pseudo-Clementine Homily* 15.5 changes the word here for "undergarment" in order to avoid the suggestion that the person becomes naked. For, comments the translator, the person who lost both cloak and tunic would be naked altogether; and "this, the writer may have imagined, Christ would not have commanded" (A. Cleveland Coxe, ANF 8.310).

[17] M. Rostovtzeff, "Angariae," *Klio. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte* 6 (1906) 249–58. In one

involved the need of the postal service for animals and the need of the army for civilians to help carry their packs. The situation in Matthew is clearly the latter. It is not a matter of requisitioning animals but people themselves.

This forced labor was a source of bitter resentment by all Roman subjects. "*Angareia* is like death," complains one source.[18] The sheer frequency, even into the late empire, of reiterated legislation proscribing the misuse of the *angareia* and limiting its legal employment shows how regularly the regulations were violated. An inscription of 49 C.E. from Egypt orders that Roman "soldiers of any degree when passing through the several districts are not to make any requisitions or to employ forced transport (*angareia*) unless they have the prefect's written authority"[19]—a rescript clearly made necessary by soldiers abusing their privileges. Violations of the laws regarding *angareia* were severely punished in order to minimize resentment in the conquered lands.

The Theodosian Code devotes an entire section to *angareia*.[20] Among its ordinances are these:

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Aramaic version of The Book of Tobit, Tobit is unable to go fetch the gold deposited in Rages because "in those days the *angareia* had increased," and therefore "the travelers had disappeared from the streets out of fear" (*The Book of Tobit. A Chaldee Text from a Unique MS in the Bodleian Library* (ed. Ad. Neubauer; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1878), p. 4 lines 7–9 (mistranslated "tribute," p. xxviii). Other early references to *angareia* are found in *Pap. Teb.* I 5, 178ff. and 252ff. (2C B.C.E.). The former commands soldiers and others who are on official business neither to impress (*engareuein*) any of the inhabitants of the province or their beasts of burden for their own personal needs nor to requisition calves, etc. Similarly also *Orientis Graeci Inscr. Selectae* I 665.21 (ed. W. Dittenberger).

[18] *J. B.Mes.* 6.3, cited by Paul Fiebig, "angareuō," *ZNW* 18 (1918) 64–72. For additional Jewish references, see "angaria" in Gustaf Dalman, *Aramäisch-neuhebräisches Handwörterbuch* (2d ed.; Frankfort: J. Kauffmann, 1897–1901) 105; for Greek, "*angareia*" in Liddell-Scott; for Latin, "*angaria, angario*" in *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (Lipsiae: B. G. Teubneri, 1940–46) 2.43. See also August Wunsche, *Neue Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midrasch* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1878) 64–65; L. Goldschmid, "Impôts et droits de douane en Judée sous les Romains," *Rev. d. it. juives* 34 (1897) 207–208; Friedrich Preisigke, "Die ptolemäische Staatspost," *Klio* 7 (1907) 275–77; T. Henckels and H. G. Crocker, *Memorandum of Authorities on the Law of Angary* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919) 25–30; J. Le Clère, *Les mesures coercitives sur les navires de commerce etrangers* (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1949) 19–21, 35–36; A.-H. Schröder, *Das Angarienrecht* (Hamburg: Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, 1965) 15–18.

[19] *Corp. Insc. Gr.* No. 4956, A21, cited by Edwin Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek* (Amsterdam: Philo, [1889] 1970) 37. Hatch suggested that Matt 5:41 should not be translated "whosoever shall compel thee to *go* one mile," but "whosoever shall compel thee to *carry his baggage* one mile," but few versions have followed his sage advice. TEV ably renders it, "If one of the occupation troops forces you to carry his pack one mile."

[20] *The Theodosian Code* (ed. Clyde Pharr; Princeton: Princeton University, 1952) sections 8.5.1, 2, 6, 7, 8.1, 11, 66. See in addition *The Digests of Justinian* (ed. Th. Mommsen; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1985), sections 49.18.4; 50.4.18.21–22 and 29; 50.5.10, 11; and Justinian's *Novella* (Constitutions) 16.9, 10; 17.1, 9, 22 (*The Civil Law* [trans. S. P. Scott; Cincinnati: Central Trust, 1973]).

> If any person while making a journey should consider that he may abstract an ox that is not assigned to the public post but dedicated to the plow, he shall be arrested with due force by the rural police . . . and he shall be haled before the judge [normally the governor] (8.5.1, 315 C.E.).
> By this interdict we forbid that any person should deem that they may request packanimals and supplementary posthorses. But if any person should rashly act so presumptuously, *he shall be punished very severely* (8.5.6, 354 C.E., ital. added).
> When any legion is proceeding to its destination, it shall not hereafter attempt to appropriate more than two posthorses (*angarias*), and only for the sake of any who are sick (8.5.11, 360 C.E.).

Late as these regulations are, they reflect a situation that had changed little since the time of the Persians. Armies had to be moved through countries with dispatch. Some legionnaires bought their own slaves to help carry their 60 pound packs (*not* including weapons!).[21] The majority of the rank and file, however, had to depend on impressed civilians. There are vivid accounts of whole villages emptying themselves to avoid being forced to carry soldiers' baggage, and of richer towns prepared to pay large sums to escape having Roman soldiers billeted in them for winter.[22]

With few exceptions, the commanding general of a legion personally administered justice in serious cases, and all other cases were left to the disciplinary control of his subordinates. Centurions had almost limitless authority in dealing with routine cases of discipline. This accounts for the curious fact that there is very little codified military law, and what we have is late. Roman military historians are agreed, however, that military law changed very little in its essential character throughout the imperial period.[23] No account of the penalties to be meted out to soldiers for forcing a civilian to carry his pack more than the permitted mile survive to us today, but there are at least hints. "If in winter quarters, in camp, *or on the march,* either an officer or a soldier does injury to a civilian, and does not fully repair the same, he shall pay the damage twofold."[24] This is about as

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[21] According to Tacitus, slaves and camp-followers actually outnumbered the soldiers in the army that Vitellius marched to Rome (*Hist.* 2.70). But this was a political concession made by an ambitious and ingratiating general intent on the supreme command; military discipline in his army had collapsed.

[22] Michael Grant, *The Army of the Caesars* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974) xxi–xxx; Fiebig, "angareuō," especially *Lev. r.* Par. 12; *b. Sanh.* 101b; *b. B. Qam.* 38b; *b. Sota* 10a; *b. Ber.* 9b; *b. Yoma* 35b; *b. Ned.* 32a. Vegetius, *De re militari,* gives a graphic picture of the contents of a Roman soldier's pack and the rigors of a forced march (trans. in *Roots of Strategy,* ed. T. R. Phillips [Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publ., 1955] 76–88).

[23] "It was the centurion who formed the backbone of Roman military discipline, and he did so by intensely personal coercion" (C. E. Brand, *Roman Military Law* (Austin: University of Texas, 1968) 81, 42. See also Robert R. Evans, *Soldiers of Rome* (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1986) 74; G. W. Currie, *The Military Discipline of the Romans from the Founding of the Empire to the Close of the Republic* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1928) 10, 12, 161; Abel H. J. Greenridge, "The *Provocatio Militiae* and Provincial Jurisdiction," *Class. Rev.* 10 (1896) 226; Richard E. Smith, *Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army* (Manchester: Manchester University, 1958).

[24] Maurice, *Strategica* 7:3, ital. added; cited by Brand, *Roman Military Laws,* 21. See also 4.10, p. 195.

mild a penalty, however, as one can find. Josephus states what was more nearly the popular impression: Roman military forces "have laws which punish with death not merely desertion of the ranks, but even a slight neglect of duty" (*J.W.* 3.102–8). Between these extremes were deprivation of pay, a ration of barley instead of wheat, reduction in rank, dishonorable discharge, being forced to camp outside the fortifications, or to stand all day before the general's tent holding a clod in one's hands, or to stand barefoot in public places. But by far the most frequent punishment was flogging.[25]

It is in this context of Roman military occupation that Jesus speaks. He does not counsel revolt. One does not "befriend" the soldier, draw him aside and drive a knife into his ribs. Jesus was keenly aware of the futility of armed insurrection against Roman imperial might and minced no words about it, though it must have cost him support from those whose hatred of Rome flamed toward violence.

But why carry his pack a second mile? Is this not to rebound to the opposite extreme: aiding and abetting the enemy?[26] Not at all. The question here, as in the two previous instances, is how the oppressed can recover the initiative, how they can assert their human dignity in a situation that cannot for the time being be changed. The rules are Caesar's, but not how one responds to the rules—that is God's, and Caesar has no power over that.

Imagine then the soldier's surprise when, at the next mile marker, he reluctantly reaches to assume his pack, and you say, "Oh no, let me carry it another mile." Why would you want to do that? What are you up to? Normally he has to coerce your kinsmen to carry his pack, and now you do it cheerfully, and *will not stop!* Is this a provocation? Are you insulting his strength? Being kind? Trying to get him disciplined for seeming to make you go further than you should? Are you planning to file a complaint? Create trouble?

From a situation of servile impressment, you have once more seized the initiative. You have taken back the power of choice. The soldier is thrown off-balance by being deprived of the predictability of your response. He has never dealt with such a problem before. Now you have forced him into making a decision for which nothing in his previous experience has prepared him. If he has enjoyed feeling superior to the vanquished, he will not enjoy it today. Imagine the hilarious situation of a Roman infantryman pleading with a Jew, "Aw, come on, please give me back my pack!" The humor of this scene may escape those who picture it through sanctimonious eyes, but it could scarcely have been lost on Jesus' hearers, who must have been regaled at the prospect of thus discomfitting their oppressors.

Some Christians in the wake of the Jewish War may have found this saying on the second mile too inflammatory and odious to tolerate. Especially in Palestine, now that the Tenth Legion (*Fretensis*) had been stationed in Jerusalem and the whole region had become a commissariat area (*prata legionis*) for the troops,[27] soldiers would have been

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[25] Brand, *Roman Military Laws*, 104–106. In any case military law was always more severe in its punishments than civil. Of the 102 instances where the punishment of a soldier is mentioned, 40 resulted in the death penalty (Currie, *Military Discipline*, 38).

[26] Epictetus provides an example of passive submission to impressment that is the polar opposite of Jesus' advice in Matthew. If a soldier commandeers you for forced service (*angareia*), "do not resist (*antiteine*) nor grumble. If you do, you will get a beating and lose your little donkey [an image for one's body] just the same" (*Disc.* 4.1.79).

[27] Safrai and Stern, *The Jewish People*, I.2. 693–94. In addition, 800 veterans were settled at Emmaus, and a Roman colony was established at Caesarea Maritima (Michael Grant, *The Army of the Caesars*, 213, 326).

constantly levying the remainder of the population for supplies, and for the beasts and people to carry them. And since Luke no longer understood the radicalism of Jesus' advice (as his changes in the other three sayings indicate), he may have opted to suppress so discomfiting a statement.

Jesus is inviting those whose lifelong pattern has been to cringe, bow, and scrape before their masters to liberate themselves from both servile actions and a servile mentality. But he is doing something else as well: he asserts that they can do this *before* the revolution. They do not have to wait until Rome has been defeated, or peasants are landed and slaves freed, or the sabbatical year rules on the remittance of debts are finally honored. They can begin to behave with dignity and recovered humanity *now*, even under the unchanged conditions of the old order. Jesus' sense of divine immediacy has social implications. The reign of God is already breaking into the world, and it comes, not as an imposition from on high, but as the leaven slowly raising the dough (Matt 13:33 par.).

In the conditions of first-century Palestine, a political revolution against the Romans could only be suicidal, as the events of 66–70 proved. Jesus does not propose armed revolution. But he does lay the foundations for a social revolution, as Richard A. Horsley has pointed out. And a social revolution becomes political when it reaches a critical threshold of acceptance, and this in fact did happen to the Roman empire as the Christian church overcame it from below.[28]

Nor were peasants and slaves in a position to transform the economic system by frontal assault. But they could begin to act from an already recovered dignity and freedom, and the ultimate consequences of such acts could only be revolutionary. To that end, Jesus spoke repeatedly of a general remission of debts.[29]

It is entirely appropriate, then, that the saying on debts in Matt 5:42 has been added to this saying-block, though only its Gospel of Thomas form preserves the original intent. Jesus counsels his hearers not just to practice alms and lend money, even to bad-risk debtors, but actually to lend without expecting interest or even the return of the principle. Such radical egalitarian sharing would be necessary to rescue impoverished Palestinian peasants from their plight; one need not contemplate an imminent end of history as a limit on the need for such astonishing generosity. And yet none of this is new; Jesus is merely issuing a prophetic summons to Israel to observe the commandments pertaining to the sabbatical year enshrined in Torah, adapted to a new situation.[30]

Such egalitarian sharing would be necessary in order to restore true communitarian impulses cleansed of narrow calculations of who owes what. For the risky defiance of the Powers That Be that Jesus advocates would inevitably issue in punitive economic sanctions and physical punishment against individuals. They will need economic support; Matthew's "Give to him who *asks* (*aitounti*—not necessarily *begs*) of you" may simply refer to this need for mutual sustenance. Staggering interest rates and taxes work to isolate peasants, who go under one by one. This is a standard function of imperial "divide and rule" strategy.[31] Jesus' solution was neither utopian nor apocalyptic. It was realistic in the

[28] *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987) 318–26.

[29] See Sharon H. Ringe, *Jesus, Liberation, and the Biblical Jubilee* (Overtures to Biblical Theology Series; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

[30] That Jesus proposed such behavior in concrete situations is illustrated by the story of the rich young man (Mark 10:17–22 par.). The same kind of liberating generosity is envisioned in Luke 7:41–42; 10:35; Mark 10:23–31 par. See Douglas E. Oakman, *Jesus and the Economic Questions of His Day* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1986) 166, 215–16.

[31] Horsley, *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence*, 32.

extreme. Nothing less would have been able to halt or reverse the avalanche of defaults through indebtedness than a complete suspension of usury and debt and a rebalancing of economic equality through outright grants, a pattern actually implemented in the earliest community, according to the Book of Acts.[32]

4. The Introductory Setting (Matt 5:38–39ab)

The six antitheses in Matt 5:21–48 are probably Matthean additions, though something in the tradition must have prompted Matthew to develop them.[33] Matthew's introduction of the *lex talionis* in 5:38 is not altogether successful; that law dealt with proportionality in punishment for crimes and serves as the basis of every legal system. In the examples which follow (5:39cd–42), however, Jesus does not nullify, supercede or add to the old law. He is not even attempting to formulate new legislation. His examples *assume* the continuation of existing laws and customs, and in each case represent a surprising new strategy the poor can use to win dignity and recover moral initiative even when the legal system works against them.

Verse 39 is a bit more problematic. The "But I say to you" is echoed in Luke 6:27, and the phrase that follows in Matthew, "Do not *antistēnai* one who is evil," is a perfect summary of the three core sayings that follow. "Evil" (*ponēros*) is a typically Matthean term (26 out of a total of 78 in the NT), yet ten of these have parallels in Q. Luke, however, does not have the word in his version of this passage. So if Matthew added 39ab, he deserves credit for articulating one of the most profound insights in human history. But it has been woefully misinterpreted.

Scholars have focused on *ponēros:* does it refer to an evil person (as in the examples which follow), or to the Evil One as the source of evil, or (since Jesus tended not to regard *people* as such as evil) to the evil *things* people do (hence the KJV's "resist not evil")?[34] Each of these interpretations has something to commend it, and in cases of ambiguity such as this we are probably wise to accept the spectrum of possiblities and live within the ambiguity.

The real problem has gone neglected: how to translate *antistēnai.* Virtually all translators and interpreters have taken it in a general sense: do not *resist.* That meaning of the word is certainly well-attested, but its use in this passage creates insuperable problems. Purely on logical grounds, "resist not" does not fit the militant nonviolent actions Jesus has just been proposing. He has given three examples of resistance to oppression; he cannot then have counseled people not to resist it. Likewise the alternatives are false: one either resists evil, or resists not. No other possibility appears to exist. If Jesus commands us not to resist,

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[32] Acts 2:43–47; 4:32–5:11; 6:1. These reports may be idealized but they are by no means pure fiction. The well-established poverty of the Jerusalem church may have been one of the unintended results of mixing Jesus' hardnosed program of redistribution of wealth with the church's apocalyptic belief in an immediate end of history. Hence the early community *liquidated* capital and lived off the proceeds, rather than sharing in communitarian economic arrangements, and quickly found itself deservedly destitute.

[33] See M. Jack Suggs, "The Antitheses as Redactional Products," in *Jesus Christus in Historie und Theologie. Neutestamentliche Festschrift für Hans Conzelmann zum 60. Geburtstag* (ed. G. Strecker; Tübingen: Mohr, 1975) 441; Crossan, "Divine Immediacy," 11–12.

[34] I tend to prefer the latter; see Paul Gaechter's arguments, *Das Matthäus Evangelium* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1962) 189.

then the only other choice would appear to be supine submission, passivity, complicity in our own oppression, surrender to evil, acquiescence. *And this is precisely the way most Christians have interpreted this saying ever since.* "Turn the other cheek" is taken to enjoin becoming a doormat for Jesus, to be walked on without protest. "Give your undergarment as well" has encouraged people to go limp in the face of injustice and hand over the last thing they own. "Going the second mile" has been turned into a platitude meaning nothing more than "extend yourself." Rather than encouraging the oppressed to stand tall against their oppressors, these revolutionary statements have been transformed into injunctions to collude in one's own despoiling.

The court translators working in the hire of King James, like most of their predecessors, knew that the King would not want people concluding that they had any recourse against his or any other sovereign's tyranny. Therefore the public had to be made to believe that there are two alternatives, and only two: flight or fight. And Jesus is made to command us, according to these king's men, to resist not. Jesus appears to authorize monarchical absolutism. Submission is the will of God. And most modern translators have meekly followed in that path.[35]

What these translators have not noted, however, is that *anthistēmi* is in the first place a military term. It came to be used in a more general way, but literally refers to *armed resistance.*[36] Resistance itself always implies "counteractive aggression," a response to hostilities initiated by someone else. Thus Liddell-Scott defines it as to "*set against* esp. in battle, *withstand*." Eph 6:13 is exemplary of its military usage: "Therefore take the whole

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[35] Coverdale and Cranmer rendered the Vulgate's *resisto* in Matt 5:39b as "resist not euell." The Geneva Bible of 1557 and Tyndale translated "resist not wrong(e)." Tyndale elaborated: Christ taught that no one should avenge himself, but leave that to the civil government. "Christ meddleth not with the temporal regiment." His perspective takes in only the aristocracy: "And thou must ever love thy neighbor in thine heart . . . and yet obey thy ruler and go with the constable or like officer, and break open thy neighbor's door, and if he will not open it in the king's name, thou must lay on, and smite him to the ground" and if you must, kill him. Evil kings cannot be deposed. God has given us no command to put down kings. No matter how bad, they must be endured. The only remedy against evil rulers is to "turn thine eyes to thyself, and thine own sin," and recognize that this is a punishment we deserve to endure (*Expositions and Notes on Sundry Portions of the Holy Scriptures* [Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1849] 58–63).

The sole British exception to this general pattern was the first translator of the Scriptures into English, John Wycliffe (d. 1384), who rendered Matt 5:39b, "ayenstonde not an yuel man." *Ayenstonden,* like *antistēnai,* literally means to "stand against." *The Middle English Dictionary* (ed. H. Kurath and S. M. Kuhn; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1956) I.1.593–4 gives as meaning c) "to fight against, offer resistance, defend oneself," and cites under it Wycliffe's translation of Matt 5:39. The term is frequently used of rebellion and warfare (Wycliffe also uses it of Jannes and Jambres' revolt against Moses, 2 Tim 3:8). Wycliffe's works were burned in 1415.

[36] The Vulgate used *resisto* to translate *antistēnai* in Matt 5:39b, and from the Vulgate the early English translators derived their translation "resist." However, *resisto,* like the English "resist," is often used of military engagements; indeed, as many as half of the 79 appearances of *resisto* in the Vulgate translation of the Hebrew Scriptures, and perhaps 4 out of 14 in the NT where it is used to translate *anthistēmi,* explicitly refer to *violent* opposition.

armor of God, that you may be able to withstand (*antistēnai*, literally, to draw up battle ranks against the enemy) in the evil day, and having done all, to stand" (*stēnai*, literally, to close ranks and continue to fight). The term is used in the LXX primarily for military encounters (44 out of 71 times).[37] Josephus uses *anthistēmi* for violent struggle 15 out of 17 times, Philo 4 out of 10.

Stasis, the noun form of *stēnai*, means "to take a stand," and by extension, a "party formed for seditious purposes; sedition, revolt." Thus Mark 15:7 speaks of an "insurrection" (so also Luke 23:19, 25), Acts 19:40 of a "riot," and Acts 23:10 of a "violent dissention." *Anistemi*, which is virtually interchangeable with *anthistemi*, is used militarily in the LXX 94 times in the sense of "rise up against someone" in revolt or war.[38]

In short, *antistenai* means more in Matt 5:39b than simply to "stand against" or "resist." It means to resist *violently*, to revolt or rebel, to engage in an insurrection. The logic of the text requires such a meaning: On the one hand, do not continue to be supine and complicit in your oppression (flight); but on the other hand, do not react violently to it either (fight). Rather, find a third way, a way that is neither submission nor assault, a way that can secure your human dignity and begin to change the power equation, even now, before the revolution. Turn your cheek, thus indicating to the one who backhands you that his attempts to shame you into servility utterly failed. Strip naked and parade out of court, thus taking the momentum of the law and the whole debt economy and hurling them, jujitsu-like, into a burlesque of legality. Walk a second mile, surprising the occupation troops with a sudden threat to their safety. These are not laws to be slavishly followed, but examples to spark an infinite variety of creative responses in new and changed circumstances. They break the cycle of humiliation with humor and ridicule, exposing the injustice of the system. They recover for the poor a modicum of initiative that forces the oppressor to see them in a new light.

How then did a series of sayings that encouraged subversive assertiveness among the poor get turned into a command to submit to every indecency? The problem surely did

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[37] *Anthistēmi* is used militarily, for example, in Lev 26:37; Deut 7:24; 25:18; Josh 7:13; 23:9; Judg 2:14; 3 Macc 6:19, to cite but a few. The verbal stem *histēmi* ("to stand") is compounded in a wide variety of terms denoting violent warfare, attack, revolt, rebellion, insurrection and revolution: *aphistēmi* (Acts 5:37); *ephistēmi* (Acts 17:5; 6:12); *epanistēmi* (Matt 10:21; Mark 13:12); *katephistēmi* (Acts 18:12); *exanistēmi* (Josh 8:7); *enistēmi* (1 Macc 8:24); *antikathistēmi* (Heb 12:4); and *sunephistēmi* (Acts 16:22).

The following compounds of *histēmi* are sometimes used as technical terms for military formations and strategy: *kathistēmi* (1 Macc 10:32); *apokathistēmi* (2 Macc 15:20); *periistēmi* (2 Macc 14:9); *sunistēmi* (Num 16:3).

[38] See, for example, Gen 4:8; Num 16:2; Josh 24:9; Judg 9:43; 20:5; 1 Sam 25:29; Obad 1; Hab 2:7. *Stasis* is also compounded in myriad ways frequently associated with war, violent uprisings, insurrection, sedition, rebellion and revolution: *stasiōtēs, stasiōdēs* (Jos. *Ant.* 13.403; *J.W.* 1.198); *stasiōteia, stasiarchia; stasiarchos; stasiastichos; stasiasis; stasiastēs; stasiasmos; stasiopoiia; stasiopoios* (Jos., *Life* 134); *stasiopoieō* (Jos. *Ant.* 17.117); *stasiazō* (Jdt 7:15); *akatastasia* (Luke 21:9); *hupostasis* (1 Sam 13:23); *epistasis* (2 Macc 6:3); *epistatēs* (2 Kings 25:19); *protostatēs* (Acts 24:5); *apostatis* (1 Esdr 2:18); *apostasia* (2 Thess 2:3); *apostasis* (Josh 22:22); *apostatēs* (2 Macc 5:8); *apostatikos; apostatein* (1 Macc 11:14); *dichostasia* (Rom 16:17); *sustasiazō* (Jos. *Ant.* 17.285); *sustasiastēs* (Jos. *Ant.* 14:22); *sustasis; prostatēs* (1 Macc 14:47).

not begin with the English translators; Jerome and the early theologians had already fallen under the spell of the "eat humble pie" interpretation.[39] The problem must go back to Matthew himself and his construction of the antitheses. In casting about for an OT verse to serve as a foil to Jesus' sayings on nonviolent direct action, Matthew hit upon the *lex talionis* (Exod 21:22–25; Lev 24:19–20; Deut 19:18–21). Superficially, the law of proportionate revenge fit fine: do not seek revenge (as the old law allowed), but rather return evil with good. But Jesus' sayings envision the rejection of flight (submission, withdrawal, capitulation) and fight (violent retaliation) for a third way which seeks to recover the humanity of both oppressed and oppressor through acts of defiant vulnerability. Matthew's *lex talionis,* on the other hand, introduces a quite different set of contrasts: rejection of massive retaliation (which the *lex talionis* was devised to stop), rejection even of proportionate retaliation (the *lex talionis* itself) and finally—the logic proceeds inexorably toward this conclusion—rejection of retaliation of any kind.[40]

Let me come at that a different way. The logic of Jesus' examples in Matt 5:39cd–42 goes beyond both inaction and overreaction, passivity and murderous counterviolence, to a new response, fired in the crucible of love, that attempts to liberate the oppressed from evil even as it frees the oppressor from sin. Matthew's introduction of the *lex talionis* skews that focus, shifting it to the question of revenge and reparations. *Jesus was not talking about revenge or reparations.* This new focus which Matthew intrudes into the saying-block colors the examples that follow, making them appear to advise seeking no revenge or reparations whatever. As a result, Jesus' militant strategies came to be read as passive acquiescence in oppression, and the radical intent of these sayings was virtually buried for almost two millenia.

I do not think Matthew intended this outcome, or was even aware of it. *It was the unanticipated consequence of his attempt to distance Jesus from Judaism by means of the antitheses.*

If this line of argument is correct, then Matthew may not have added 39b after all. "Do not react violently to evil, do not counter evil in kind, do not let evil dictate the terms of your opposition"—*mē antistēnai tō ponērō* fits Jesus' own logic too perfectly to have been introduced by someone who clearly did not fully grasp it. Perhaps then Jesus used this phrase as a thesis statement to introduce the three examples that follow. For that is what they are—examples. Examples of what? Of a way of being in the world that at last breaks the spiral of violence. A way of fighting evil with all one's power without being transformed into the very evil we fight. A way of not becoming what we hate. Do not counter evil in kind—this insight is the distilled essence, stated with sublime simplicity, of the experience of those Jews who had, in Jesus' very lifetime, so courageously and effectively practiced nonviolent direct action against Rome.[41]

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[39] Jerome follows Luke's error in seeing seizure of the cloak as robbery, and treats turning the cheek as patient submission to injustice and calumny (*Letter 53, To Paulinus* 11; *Letter 84, To Pammachius and Oceanus* 1; *Letter 123, To Ageruchia* 13; *Letter 54, To Furia* 12 [NPNF 6. 102, 176, 235, 106]).

[40] We cannot exclude the possibility that Matthew himself added "resist not evil," and that he intended it to mean just what people have taken it to mean—abandon all desire for justice—since that would fit the logic of his use of the *lex talionis.* I am inclined to believe, however, that it was his misunderstanding of the *antistēnai* phrase that led him to think of the *lex talionis* in the first place.

[41] See Jos. *J.W.* 2.169–174; *Ant.* 18.55–59; *J.W.* 2.230–31; Philo *Leg.* 299–305; and later, Jos. *Ant.* 18.261–284 and Philo *Leg.* 225–229; and Horsley's discussion, *Jesus and*

Jesus, in short, abhors both passivity and violence. He articulates, out of the history of his own peoples' struggles, a way by which evil can be opposed without being mirrored, the oppressor resisted without being emulated, the enemy neutralized without being destroyed. Those who have lived by Jesus' words– Tolstoy, Gandhi, King, Dorothy Day, Caesar Chavez, Adolpho Perez Esquivel–point us to a new way of confronting evil whose potential for personal and social transformation we are only beginning to grasp today.[42]

(continued)
the Spiral of Violence, 90–120. I am utterly baffled by the way Horsley depicts Jews initiating popular nonviolent protests, and then portrays Jesus and Matt 5:38–42 as virtually irrelevant to that setting. He denies that "enemies" referred to outsiders, but rather applied only to fellow-peasants. But we can accurately specify the enemies Jesus has in mind in this passage: "enemies" are masters and overlords who backhand peasants, women, and Jews generally (v 39); "enemies" are landlords who humiliate sharecroppers and the unemployed by seizing their outer garments (v 40); "enemies" are Roman soldiers who compel Jews to carry their baggage (v 41). On p. 303 Horsley contradicts his own argument when he speaks of the destruction of Jerusalem "by its enemies, who, at the time of Jesus, would obviously have been the Romans." He compellingly sketches a society in the birthpangs of discovering nonviolence, and then creates a Jesus, with much questionable argumentation, who is a dreamer no different than Theudas. The argument of this paper fits the socio-political setting that Horsley has so admirably reconstructed far better than his own!

[42] I have attempted to apply Jesus' teaching on the "third way" to the situation in South Africa (*Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa* [Philadelphia: New Society, 1987]), and plan to explore these themes more fully in the third volume of my trilogy on the Powers, *Engaging the Powers* (Philadelphia: Fortress).

Jesus and the Baptist—Two of a Kind?

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In the wake of the "new quest for the historical Jesus" initiated by E. Käsemann and others in the 50s and the gradual unveiling of the Qumran literature, one of the areas that has produced some of the most fruitful discussion on our topic of interest has been the exploration of those pericopes and logia in the Synoptics that deal with Jesus and John the Baptist. This discussion has led to such diverse hypotheses as that a) John and perhaps even Jesus was an Essene; or b) that Jesus was simply a disciple of John's; or c) that Jesus, while initially a follower of the Baptist, came in time to develop his own style and message for ministry to Israel, that significantly differed from John's; or d) that Jesus saw both John's and his own ministry as part of a single final attempt by God to bring his wayward people back into proper relationship with Him in the light of the inbreaking of the Dominion of God which meant judgment or redemption, depending on how one responded to the summons of John and Jesus. Needless to say, how one views these hypotheses and other related ones will significantly effect how one answers the crucial Christological questions we are especially concerned with. If, for instance, Jesus was no more than a disciple of John or a prophet who continued John's ministry, it may in fact be improper to speak either of a Christology of or about Jesus.

Perhaps there is no better place to start our discussion than by interacting with the detailed redaction critical study of the Baptist traditions by W. Wink, for if we are able to separate redactions from sources we will be well on our way to a proper historical perspective on John and Jesus.

It has often been maintained that "The history of John the Baptist has . . . served as the seemingly secure bedrock on which the reconstruction of the history of Jesus could proceed."[1] Nevertheless, it has also often been urged or suspected that a great deal of the Baptist material reflects the polemics of the Christian Church against the Baptist sect in the period 70 A.D. and afterwards. It is the salutary result of Wink's efforts that it can now be safely concluded that what we find that the gospel tradition, far from being polemics against John and his followers, is an attempt to claim John for the Christian cause. Thus as one progresses from the first to the fourth gospel chronologically, one notices that John's words about Jesus become increasingly confessional.

Indeed even as early as Mark's gospel, John is seen as "the beginning of the gospel," the one who sets things in motion and prepares Israel for the coming of God's dominion. Wink pronounced the benediction on the idea that the gospel writers were guilty of ". . . anachronistically projecting back into its origin the later conflict between Christians and John's disciples. . . ."[2] We may even question whether there is any significant evidence

[1] This essay is part of a much larger work that will appear in a slightly different form under the title *The Christology of Jesus.* W. Wink, *John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968) ix.

[2] Wink, *John the Baptist,* 109.

for there being a conflict between the followers of Jesus and John in the later period. In any event, it is extremely unlikely that the early Church, which was increasingly concerned to indicate the uniqueness of its Saviour, would have created out of whole cloth a group of traditions that not only connected Jesus to John, but also gave to John a significant role "in the beginning of the gospel."

Wink argues that it was Jesus' own positive evaluation of the Baptist that accounted for the subsequent appreciation by the Evangelists of his positive role in the gospel events.[3] To this we may add one further reason—they were genuinely concerned to indicate how historically the Jesus movement and the gospel events got started. The Evangelists' unity on the fact that John is or has to do with "the beginning of the gospel" is a result of historical realities which could not be ignored, if the Evangelists were to be fair to their source material.

The results of the redaction critical investigation of Wink also led to the following conclusions: 1) Mark portrays John as Elijah incognito, which parallels the Messianic secret motif; 2) Matthew uses John as an ally of Jesus against the hostile front of opposition Jesus encountered in Judaism; 3) Luke accepts the Markan picture of John as forerunner and adapts it to his conception of *Heilsgeschichte;* 4) the Fourth Evangelist offers his audience a John who is portrayed as the ideal witness to Jesus as God's Christ, His Lamb.[4] If we bear these tendencies in mind it will be easier to detect redaction from source as we investigate the gospel material.

In what historical context should we set the Baptist? Should he be seen as an isolated prophet, a manifestation of the Qumran sect, or another example of a leader of a reform movement in Judaism? On the one hand John appears rather like an OT prophet in both his oracles of doom and his ascetical behavior. On the other, however, his practice of baptizing has no precedent in the OT prophetic literature and on the surface comes nearer to the practices of Qumran and other baptistic type sects (Ebionites, Elkasites, Nasoreans, or an individual like Banus). Very certainly John cannot be seen as simply a reformer of society like the Pharisees, for he calls even the "righteous" and ritually pure to repentance and baptism, even threatening that one's descent from Abraham was no security blanket, protecting one from the coming judgment, nor a guarantee of one's place in God's final dominion.

Furthermore, John has not written off the nation as the "sons of darkness"; he still calls them to repentance. Yet John, unlike Jesus, apparently performed no miraculous deeds or signs. When one looks a little more carefully one also discovers that John's water rite also seems to have a different focus than the practices of Qumran, coming closer to what we know of Jewish proselyte baptism, in its focus and apparent unrepeatability, though that practice is difficult to date to the pre-70 A.D. period of Judaism.[5] Nevertheless, despite the difference from the Qumran practice, J. Becker is still willing to assert "Der Taufer gehort vielmehr mit dem Lehrer der Gerechtigkeit zusammen."[6]

What may we conclude from this all too brief review of possible matrixes for John? First, while John may well have originally been a part of the Qumran community, when we encounter him in the gospel literature he is no longer so, not only because he calls

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[3] Ibid., 111.

[4] Ibid., 110–11.

[5] Cf. G. Bornkamm, *Jesus of Nazareth* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) 47.

[6] J. Becker, *Johannes der Taufer und Jesus von Nazareth* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1972) 105.

the nation to repentance but because he allows both the unclean and the clean, the sinners as well as the righteous, to come into contact with him, and his water rite is not merely a repeatable ritual ablution. Second, Jesus recognized John as a prophetic figure, and there is no good reason to dispute this identification. There is also no reason to see John as the founder of a messianic movement, for neither in the gospels nor in Josephus (Ant. 18.5.2) is there any shred of evidence that John intended to be seen or viewed himself in that light. Nevertheless, he does seem to have felt that the final and decisive judgment of God was about to fall on Israel.

Finally, John should not be seen as a reformer in the manner that the Pharisees or Zealots were reformers. He urges neither a levitical nor a revolutionary program to cure the nation's ills. He was indeed in many ways a unique figure that caused a stir not only among the religious but also in the halls of power in Galilee because he was perceived to be a threat to various sorts of authority figures of his day, a threat to the religious and political status quo. Bearing these things in mind we must now turn to an investigation of the relevant data in Mark, Q, and to some extent John to determine what Jesus' relationship with John was. The narratives and collections of sayings we must give special attention to are the following: 1) Mark 1.1–11, 14, 15; 2) Matt 3/Luke 3.1–22; 3) Matt 11.2–19/Luke 7.18–35. In addition it has been urged by E. Linnemann, among others, that due attention must be given to some of the material in John 3.22–4.3.[7]

1. The Beginning of the Gospel: Mark 1.1–11

That John preached in the chalk wilderness that is adjacent to the Jordan river and baptized in that river few scholars would care to dispute. There is also little reason to doubt Luke's assertion (Luke 3.1) that John appeared during the 15th year of the reign of Tiberias, which dates him somewhere between autumn A.D. 27 and summer of A.D. 29.[8] The wilderness setting does not seem to be something merely created out of the composite citation which introduces the Gospel of Mark (Exod 23.20a, Mal 3.1, M.T., Isa 40.3 almost verbatim from the LXX), not least because all scholars are in agreement that John baptized Jesus in the Jordan. The corollary of this fact however should be noted—John's ministry was likely at the portion of the Jordan adjacent to Judea, not Galilee, though apparently he got as far north as the region of the Jordan just above the northern tip of the Dead Sea. The likelihood of this is increased by two considerations: 1) Mark tells us explicitly that those who were coming to John were from Judea in general and Jerusalem in particular (Mark 1.5); 2) if John had had contact with or formerly been a member of the Qumran sect, this is a region where we might expect to find John. These considerations are of particular importance to our investigation because they mean that if Jesus was indeed baptized by John, it was not in Galilee, and further if it is urged that there was a period when Jesus was with John and perhaps even assisted him or was engaged in a parallel type of activity, this also was not likely in the region of Galilee. In short we must reckon with the likelihood of a Judean period in Jesus' life *prior* to his public Galilean ministry, a conjecture which seems to be substantiated by John 3.22–4.3, if there is any historical substance behind that material (cf. below).

Though it may well be the case that Mark 1.6 is in part drawn from the portrait of Elijah (the leather girdle of 2 Kgs 1.8), the rest of the description is plausible, and as Swete

[7] E. Linnemann, "Jesus und der Taufer," in *Festschrift für Ernst Fuchs*, ed. G. Ebeling et al. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973) 219–36.

[8] Cf. Meyer, *The Aims of Jesus*, 115.

said long ago, John's diet certainly comports with what was available in the Judean wilderness.[9] Certainly if John viewed himself as a prophet it should not be surprising that he dressed and acted in a way that reflected his awareness of the prophetic literature.

In regard to the purpose of John's baptism, there are varied opinions. Josephus suggests that its purpose was for the purification of the body "when the soul had previously been cleansed by righteous conduct." (Ant. 18.5.2). Yet he seems to know of its possible association with the forgiveness of sins because he asserts that this baptism was not to be used to beg off from sins previously committed, unless of course there was that previous cleansing of the soul. Now this suggests a parallel with what Mark asserts: repentance and confession were necessary before or with the act of baptism, in order for the act to be meaningful; the outward act symbolized the inner cleansing. It should be noted that Mark 1.5 also mentions the audible confession of sins, and the previous verse says quite explicitly that this baptism was "for the remission of sins." Recent study suggests that there may not have been proselyte baptism in pre-Christian times, and so John's practice may have been not only new but considered novel.[10]

Whatever the contributions of Mark to this summary, one element is historically very likely: that this baptism was for forgiveness of sins. By the criterion of dissimilarity this motif seems very likely to be authentic, for on the one hand Christians associated forgiveness of sins with Jesus and in particular what he accomplished on the cross and would hardly have invented the idea that Jesus *underwent* a baptism that was for the forgiveness of sins, while Jews associated forgiveness with the activities and sacrifices offered in the temple. What John was offering was something radical and different: an alternative way to forgiveness *apart from the fulfillment of all the legal requirements of the law.*[11] No wonder the Lukan tradition asserts that tax collectors and even (Roman?) soldiers came to John for baptism (Luke 3.12–14). In the case of this tradition, the basic substance of the claim seems to be confirmed by the criterion of multiple attestation, for Matt 21.31–32 asserts similarly that John baptized tax collectors and harlots (cf. Luke 7.29–30). If this was in fact the case, then John no less than Jesus was at odds with both the Temple establishment and the Pharisees on the means of procuring forgiveness, something it was normally thought only God could dispense through the following of the proper legal channels. Could Jesus have gotten his idea about forgiveness of sins from his time with John?

One further element in Mark 1 calls for some comment. Did John in fact proclaim a coming one, whoose baptism with fire he contrasted with his own water baptism? On the surface of things it is possible to deduce that this was a Christian addition to the historical tradition, meant to cast John into Jesus' shadow. Bultmann, for instance, sees vv 7–8 as a later addition to the passage.[12] However, this overlooks the likelihood that Q had its own version of this tradition as well (Matt 3.11/Luke 3.16).[13] Bornkamm puts it this way: "the preaching and baptism of John the Baptist . . . is confirmed by the fact that the Christian message no longer presented the work of the coming judge of the world in terms of a baptism of the Spirit *and fire*, and that a strong tension exists between its

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[9] Cf. H. B. Swete, *The Gospel according to St. Mark* (London: Macmillan, 1898) 4–5.

[10] Cf. D. Smith, "Jewish Proselyte Baptism and the Baptism of John," *Restoration Quarterly* 25 (1982) 13–32; K. Pusey, "Jewish Proselyte Baptism," *ET* 95 (1984) 141–45.

[11] So rightly Linnemann, "Jesus," 228ff.

[12] Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition*, 261.

[13] Cf. I. Havener, *Q–The Sayings of Jesus* (Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1987) 123.

presentation of Christ and the picture of the Messiah as announced by John."[14]

This means that John did not see himself as the definitive revealer of God, but in fact expected a sequel to his ministry. However from these traditions in Mark and Q it is not perfectly clear whether he expected that judge to be Yahweh himself intervening, or some lesser and perhaps human agent of God come to bring judgment on God's people as had happened so often before in Israel's history. If the saying about the sandals is authentic it might suggest a human agent, but it could also be simply a metaphor stressing John's servant status in relationship to the Coming One.[15]

In terms of the Markan outline, Wink argues that the material we have just discussed is seen by Mark as the beginning of the gospel; that is, the good news begins with John and his ministry.[16] Over against this, however, Taylor urges that this overlooks the likelihood that Mark 1.1 should be seen as a title for the whole gospel, and Taylor claims that this suggestion subordinates the importance of the Scripture citation in vv 2–3.[17] However, as both Cranfield and Lane point out, this ignores the fact that vv 1–4 are likely one long introductory sentence which assert that while the good news concerns Jesus Christ, it begins with the wilderness prophet. The good news entailed and was bound up with what, from a Christian viewpoint, amounted to the preparatory role and work of John.[18] We shall have occasion to say more on this subject later when we discuss Jesus' estimation of John and his work. We must now turn to the Q material that indicates something to us of John's message.

2. Vipers and Vituperation—Matthew 3/Luke 3.1–22

As Havener reminds us, "Although John appears or is mentioned only a few times in Q, nonetheless, he is second only to Jesus in importance, and about a tenth of Q is devoted to materials concerning him."[19] Now this is crucial to our investigation because it means that John the Baptist played an important part not only in the pre-gospel traditions from and about Jesus, but that there were likely good and necessary historical reasons why John had to be included in the collections of gospel traditions, even in the logia of Jesus. The anomaly of this must be stressed: in the midst of the Church's collection of Jesus' sayings, there were also included sayings of John!

Following the Q specialist A. Polag's reconstruction of the *Vorlage* behind Matthew 3/Luke3.1–22, we arrive at the following sermon in minature:

> You brood of vipers!
> Who warned you to flee from the wrath to come?
> Bear fruit that befits repentance,

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[14] Bornkamm, *Jesus of Nazareth,* 48 (italics mine).

[15] The possibility of a human agent or Messiah doing the works God himself promised to do was apparently not beyond the bound of conceivability in early Judaism. Cf. J. C. O'Neill, *Messiah: Six Lectures on the Ministry of Jesus* (Cambridge: Cochrane Press, 1980) 3–4.

[16] Wink, *John the Baptist,* 1ff.

[17] V. Taylor, *The Gospel According to St. Mark* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1966) 152.

[18] Cf. C. E. B. Cranfield, *The Gospel According to St. Mark* (Cambridge: University Press, 1963) 34–35; W. Lane, *The Gospel According to Mark* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974) 42–43.

[19] Havener, *Q,* 62.

> And [do] not . . . say to yourselves
> "We have Abraham as our father";
> For I tell you that God is able
> From these stones to raise up children to Abraham.
> Even now the axe is laid to the root of the trees; every tree therefore that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire.
>
> I baptize you [with] water but he who is mightier than I is coming . . .
> He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire.
> His winnowing fork is in his hand, and he will clear his threshing floor and gather his wheat into the granary, but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire.[20]

That John[21] is addressing Israel in this sermon is beyond cavil because of the reference to Abraham, but the further question should be raised as to whether this sermon was addressed as Luke avers to the multitude, or more particularly to some specific group of Jews as Matthew suggests, namely, Pharisees and Sadducees. Marshall contends that the Matthean specification of the narrower audience seems to comport with his redactional tendencies elsewhere (cf. Matt 16.1, 6, 11f.).[22] This overlooks, however, that even elsewhere in Luke (7.29–30) there is a testimony about antipathy between John and the Pharisees, and as J. Fitzmyer points out the address "brood of vipers" seems to suggest some specific group that John was especially exercised about.[23] Indeed the sermon suggests that there was some particular group that John was *surprised* to find coming for baptism in order to flee the wrath to come, whereas this was surely not his reaction to all those who came. After all he likely expected *some* response by some of the Israelites, but not by this particular group.

The answer to the question "Who told you to flee" would be John himself if the addressees for this speech were simply the multitudes who came to hear John at the Jordan. But John seems to think that someone else had told the Pharisees and Sadducees about his message of imminent judgment, and apparently they had come to hear it for themselves.

What are we to make of this speech? Is it an apocalyptic fragment or would it be better to classify it more generally as an eschatological judgment oracle, perhaps not unlike what we find in some of the minor prophets? Becker's careful study has led him, rightly I think, to the conclusion that "Jesus teilt mit dem Taufer dasselbe Verhaltnis zur Apokalyptik. Beide sind keine Apokalyptiker und verwenden apokalyptische Materialien nur im

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[20] A. Polag in Havener, *Q*, 124–25. Portions in brackets are not in both Matthew and Luke, and so it is unclear what was in the *Vorlage*.

[21] It is true that Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, pp. 123, 134, maintained that it is pure chance that this speech, a Christian composition, was put on the lips of John rather than Jesus. Against this is not only the fact that this speech is full of Semitisms, but as Wink, *John*, p. 19 n. 1, points out, it is unlikely that the Church would either have transferred a word of Jesus to John, or created a speech for John that might suggest salvation could be had by repentance, not by repentance plus faith in Jesus.

[22] Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 139, following Creed and Schurmann.

[23] J. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I–IX* (New York: Doubleday, 1981) 467; cf. also Linnemann, "Jesus und die Taufer," 227–28.

begrenztem Umfang."[24] This, however, should not cause us to overlook the fact that though John is using metaphorical speech, quite clearly he expects some act of divine judgment to fall on Israel imminently, unless there was some massive about face in the character of the nation. Yet, though it is wrath that is the primary emphasis, nonetheless John allows that the winnower will gather some wheat. Thus he should not be viewed as purely a prophet of doom.

It is also true that once again John does not specify who this one who will come after him will be. The figure of the winnower gives us no certain clue as to whether John expects a human agent of divine judgment or not. Matt 13.41 for instance specifies angels of the Son of Man being sent out to do the gathering of the evildoers. It is not impossible, as Hill suggests, that John has some Messianic figure in view as the coming one, but more cannot be said with the evidence we have.[25] If the evidence of 1QS 4.20–21 is germaine, there *God* is seen as the agent who will sift humanity, but there the focus is not on separation but the purifying of certain individuals for himself.

David Catchpole in a helpful study has compared this material to the Parables of the Tares and of the Dragnet. He demonstrates striking parallels between the teaching of Jesus in these parables and that of John in the text we are currently investigating. His conclusion is worth quoting in full:

> In the earliest form of the parable of the tares (Matt 13.24b, 26b, 30b) there is documented the overlap and therefore the continuity between the preaching of the historical John and that of the historical Jesus. Both preachers affirmed the imminent and challenging reality of God's future and final kingship implemented in judgment, and both called for an immediate response so that the disaster of belonging to the category of chaff or weeds might be averted and replaced by the security of belonging to the category of the wheat.[26]

As we shall see, there are many striking points of continuity between Jesus and John, which in due course will reveal to us a great deal about Jesus' self-conception.

At this juncture we must turn our scrutiny to the verses which talk about being children of Abraham. D. Allison has rightly pointed us to Isa 51.1–2 as the background for these verses: "Look to the rock from whence you were hewn . . . Look to Abraham your father and Sarah who bore you."[27] Since the the verb translated "to raise up" here likely has the sense of "to cause progeny to come forth," the point of the saying is that God can even give to the rocks the power to bring forth children of Abraham; physical descent is no guarantee of salvation any more, if it ever was. Here, as Allison avers, is as strong an attack on what Sanders calls covenantal nomism as one could wish to find. The children of Israel are being told that repentance and conversion are required of them if they are to avert personal disaster, and this is true even of the pious or religious leaders of the community—Pharisees and perhaps also the Sadducees. It is the content of their character and its fruit, not their physical lineage, which will determine whether they are cut down

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[24] Becker, *Johannes der Taufer*, 105.

[25] Cf. D. Hill, *The Gospel of Matthew* (London: Oliphant, 1972) 95.

[26] D. Catchpole, "John the Baptist, Jesus and the Parable of the Tares," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 31 (1978) 557–70, here 570.

[27] D. C. Allison, "Jesus and the Covenant: A Response to E. P. Sanders," *JSNT* 29 (1987) 57–78, here 59.

at the root or survive the coming judgment. Even D. Daube, a Jewish scholar, has remarked that this passage means "you must acquire him [Abraham] like strangers."[28]

John seems to see, as the Qumranites did, that Israel or at least the leadership of Israel is deeply corrupt and actually requires conversion to avert judgment. It could be argued that John saw his task as the gathering of a remnant to weather the storm of the coming wrath of God. But he had not reckoned on the current leadership of Israel being part of that remnant, hence his response here.

What did John think about this Coming One? Besides the idea that he will bring judgment, which may correspond to the idea that he will baptize with fire, there is in addition the contrast made between John's own baptizing with water and the Coming One baptizing with the Holy Spirit. Various scholars have maintained that this reference to the Holy Spirit can hardly be authentic, but before accepting this view we should ask what John might have meant if he said such a thing, and whether such an utterance could have been made at all in a pre-Christian *Sitz im Leben*.

In the first place the difficulty with seeing the phrase "in/with the Holy Spirit" as purely a Christian addition is that Jesus did not in fact during his ministry or the period leading up to his death baptize anyone with or in the Holy Spirit. To the contrary, Jesus is portrayed as the one who is himself baptized or endowed with the Spirit at the occasion of his water baptism. Yet this utterance near the beginning of the gospel sets up an expectation that we will see Jesus dling what John suggested. In fact, the Synoptic writers do not go on to portray Jesus, even in purely redactional summaries ot remarks, as baptizing anyone or even talking about doing so. In fact, he only seems to speak of his own (coming) baptism (cf. Luke 12.50). In the one saying that does mention Jesus' disciples undergoing a baptism similar to his own, it seems relatively clear that the Holy Spirit was not the subject, and very clear that Jesus is not the bestower, of the baptism in question (Mark 10.38–39). While of course it can be argued that the reference would be to the bestowal at Pentecost, it must be remembered that this reference to the Holy Spirit must make sense within the outline of Mark as well as Matthew, not just in Luke-Acts. All three of the Synoptics refer to this baptism with the Holy Spirit, and it must make sense within the narrative structure of all of them.

Second, the term "Holy Spirit" was known in the OT and other early Jewish literature (cf. Ps 51.11; Isa 63.10f.; Ps. of Sol. 17.42; 1QS 4.20, 8.16; CD 2.12). The coming of the Spirit in the last days was of course also a familiar concept (Joel 2.28–30; Isa 32.15, 44.3; Ezra 18.31; cf. 1QS 4.20–21). Even the contrast between water and Spirit is known (Isa 44.3; Ezra 36.25–27; 1QS 4.21). There were then the ingredients in the OT and the thought world of John for such an utterance to be made. What precisely he meant by it, and in particular whether it is a reference to coming salvation perhaps with purgation (hence the reference to fire?), or simply a coming judgment, is hard to say. One thing does seem rather clear: John is contrasting his baptism to the later Spirit baptism, and the implication seems to be that his will not have the same efficacy or effect as the later one. This must be borne in mind as we turn to our next crucial passage, Matt 11.2–19 and par.

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[28] D. Daube, *Ancient Jewish Law* (Leiden: Brill, 1981) 10. Schillebeeckx, *Jesus*, 134, is even more strident in tone: "The possibility of escape from God's wrath is separated from its connection with the Abrahamic promise to the whole nation and is individualized by a new bond, that is the baptism of John, engagement with a total change, a transformation. . . . Implicit therefore in John's whole movement is an unprecedented disavowal of the Jerusalem Temple cult and propitiatory sacrifices."

3. Doubts and Distinctions: Matt 11.2–19/Luke 7.18–35

A. Queries from Prison: Matt 11.2–6/Luke 7.18–23

The Q material we find in Matthew 11/Luke 7 that deals with Jesus and John should probably be seen as three separate sets of traditions which were gathered together due to similar subject matter. Thus we will focus on the three subsections in turn (Matt 11.2–6 and par.; Matt 11.7–11 and par.; and Matt 11.16–19 and par.). We will also look briefly at the saying about violence and the *basileia* (Matt 11.12–13/Luke 16.16).

The structure of our first subsection is that of a pronouncement story, culminating in Jesus' reply to John's disciples. While Bultmann regards the saying of Jesus which climaxes the story as authentic, he regards the setting as inauthentic.[29] Against this view W. Kümmel has rightly pointed out that: 1) the setting of the story, had it been created by the early church, would surely have placed a different title than the vague "Coming One" on John's lips. There is no real evidence that this was ever a title for Jesus in the early Church; 2) in view of the tendency, documented by Wink and others, for the tradition to stress John's role as a witness to Jesus (cf. John 1), the expression of doubts here by John is surely not the invention of the Christians who passed these traditions on.[30] Marshall makes the further point that Jesus' reply does not directly answer John's question, and indirection is characteristic of Jesus when confronted with questions about his identity.[31] Furthermore,[32] the evidence is very weak for a supposed antagonistic relationship between the disciples of Jesus and John in the latter part of the first century as a significant factor affecting the shape of the Baptist traditions in the gospels. We may then examine this material with some confidence that in its substance it derives from a *Sitz im Leben Jesu.*

The first issue of importance is perhaps to settle whether Matthew or Luke more nearly gives us the original form of this saying. In view of the Lukan additions about the sending of *two* disciples, and the account of Jesus' healings in the presence of the two requisite messengers (witnesses?), apart from the redactional "*ta erga tou Xristou*" in Matt 11.2, the Matthean version basically seems more primitive.

Matthew tells us that John's query comes from the period after he had been incarcerated by Herod. The question relates to John's previous proclamation about a Coming One, whom he seems to have seen as bringing about God's definitive judgment on Israel, though not without rescuing a certain remnant. Fitzmyer has urged[33] that the allusion is to Mal 3.1 in light of Luke 3.15–17, and thus that John likely saw Jesus as Elijah redivivus. If that were the case Jesus here seems to be rejecting such an identification and replacing it with a more Isaianic vision of his role. However, as Fitzmyer himself demonstrates, "the Coming One" could just as well be an allusion to Zech 9.9 (*erchetai,* LXX), and the Qumran literature uses such language to talk about the future Messiah(s) (cf 1QS 9.11, 4QPBless 3).[34] Furthermore, in the Malachi passage it is God who finally comes

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[29] Bultmann, *History,* 22, 115, 135.

[30] Cf. W. G. Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfillment: The Eschatological Message of Jesus* (London: SCM Press, 1957) 110–11.

[31] Marshall, *Luke,* 288.

[32] Wink, *John the Baptist,* 107ff.; Fitzmyer, *Luke I–IX,* 663ff.

[33] Fitzmyer, *Luke I–IX,* 663–64.

[34] Ibid., 666.

and judges after the messenger has come and refined God's people. Yet John seems to have expected his successor "the Coming One" to be a judging figure. Here it would seem is the the clue to explaining John's quandry. Jesus did not seem to be carrying out judgment on the people; to the contrary he seemed to be about the business of healing and helping them. Jesus, then, is here making clear that he did not come to live up to John's expectations, but rather to God's call upon his life. If the emphasis in John's message was coming judgment, the emphasis in Jesus' words and deeds was that the inbreaking of the Dominion of God meant liberation and healing, though if one rejected that liberation, judgment would ensue for that individual.[35]

What then are we to make of Jesus' response? What does it indicate about his self-consciousness? First, it should be noted that Jesus' response consists of six brief parallel clauses and a closing remark which Jeremias has shown has a poetic form in Aramaic.[36] Such use of Aramaic poetry seems to have been characteristic of Jesus. Second, it should be noted that this is a composite citation from Isa 29.18–19; Isa 35.5–6; Isa 61.1; Isa 26.19, with the addition of the allusion to lepers, but perhaps 2 Kings 5 lies in the background of that portion of the saying. This citation suggests that Jesus saw himself as more than a prophet. "He sees in his ministry something which does not merely revive prophecy but 'fulfills' it."[37] Now there is little or no good evidence that in early Judaism Messiah was expected to be a healer; thus, if Jesus did see himself in that role, it would appear that he had his own vision of what being a Messiah would entail. As Fitzmyer points out, Jesus seems to have deliberately left out the references to vengeance in Isa 29.20, 35.5, 61.2 which could have been quoted with the material we have.[38] Jesus instead sees himself as a bringer of eschatological blessing, perhaps one who brings about the conditions so often associated with the final eschatological dominion of God. The final blessing formula is also significant. In light of the way *skandalidzo* is used in the Gospel material (Luke 17.2; Mark 4.17; 6.3; 9.42–47; 14.27, 29) to stumble, or in the passive to take offense, what is likely meant is that how one reacts to Jesus will determine their standing at the eschatological judgment. If they take no offense at him and his deeds they will remain in a state of blessedness.

As Marshall says,[39] the negative form of this blessing is probably conditioned by the fact the John seemed to be having doubts about Jesus, even perhaps losing confidence in him. To this Jesus replies in effect: blessed is the one who does not give up his faith in me. D. Flusser's assessment of this tradition is worth quoting here:

> What is important is that Jesus affirmed in principle the Baptist's question about the eschatological meaning of his activities, but without explicitly declaring he was the coming Messiah. He establishes his claim to the eschatological office by pointing to his preaching of salvation and to his supernatural works of healing. Jesus saw these as an unmistakable sign that the era of salvation had already dawned.[40]

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[35] Reference is to an earlier chapter in a longer study.

[36] J. Jeremias, *New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus* (New York: Scribner, 1971) 20–21.

[37] Didd, "Jesus as Teacher and Prophet," in *Mysterium Christi*, 66.

[38] Fitzmyer, *Luke I–IX*, 667.

[39] Marshall, *Luke*, 292.

[40] D. Flusser, *Jesus* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969) 36.

Quite clearly this story is not told for its own sake for we are not told how John responded to Jesus' answer. It should perhaps also be added that this saying, if it is a response to John's query *from prison*, suggests that Jesus began his ministry *before* John's death, indeed, a fair amount of time before, if the reference to all these different sorts of healings is not mere rhetorical flourish.

B. The Greatest Man Alive: Matt 11.7–11/Luke 7.24–28

According to the Q tradition Matt 11.7–11/Luke 7.24–28, Jesus was by no means stinting in his praise of John. Not only is he called the greatest person ever born, but also he is said to be more than a prophet. It then seems virtually impossible to maintain that Matt 11.9 and 11 and parallel are anything other than the very words of Jesus, for the church surely would never have invented them.

What of the rest of this pericope? It is possible that the Scripture quotation is an editorial addition, and some would argue that Matt 11.11b should also be seen as such. On this view, these verses are added by the Church to put John in his place as Jesus' forerunner.[41] Schweizer, however, who argues against the authenticity of the Scripture quotation, argues in favor of 11.11b, because Jesus could have hardly have praised John so highly without qualifying his remarks in relation to the coming Dominion of God which he is in the process of bringing in. Purely on literary grounds the formulation of 11.11a seems to require 11.11b, for what we seem to have here is antithetical parallelism. It can also be maintained[42] that the argument for the later addition of v 11b rests on the assumption that it must be seen as a derogatory remark aboout John, but this is by no means certain as we shall see.

Several elements in this pericope simply confirm what we have already surmised about John from Mark 1: that he was to be found in the wilderness, and that his raiment was far from that of royalty's. This simply gives independent confirmation from Q to these motifs in the Markan narrative we examined earlier.

Probably the reference to a reed shaking in the wind also relates to John's setting, not his character, since such vegetation did grow around the Jordan.[43] It is also possible there is an allusion to Herod Antipas in 11.8, in which case John is being contrasted with him and this remark was likely made after John was imprisoned. It is thus not impossible that Matt 11.11ff did originally go with what precedes it, though we will not contend for this view. What is of importance to us, however, is that Jesus calls John more than a prophet. What could that possibly augur, not only about John but also about how Jesus viewed himself?

For one thing it appears that Jesus did not view John as just another in the long line of OT prophets, though he was certainly a prophet. He puts John not only in the prophetic category but in a higher one as well. This perhaps suggests that Jesus saw him as the last and great eschatological prophet: the one who prepared God's people for God's final and climactic act of redemptive judgment. In short, he saw him as having a definitive

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[41] Cf. E. Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975) 257–62.

[42] Marshall, *Luke*, 293.

[43] Hill, *Matthew*, 199. Why should Jesus wish to stress John's frailty when he was about to praise him highly anyway? No, the crowds went out to see a great man: John the Baptizer.

role unlike any previous prophet, for John was to have the task of preparing the people for the Coming One and his activity. This at least is what John's own words would suggest, since he did foresee a Coming One, and we may guess that Jesus' estimation was in part based on John's own words. If this assessment is correct, then the Scripture citation of Mal 3.1 and Exod 23.20 are in fact a rather accurate insight into what Jesus thought of John, even if the Scripture was added later by some Christian tradent.

But what then are we to infer Jesus thought of himself and his own role? Surely he did not see himself in any category less than John. The idea that Jesus at least saw himself as a prophet is of course well attested in at least two different layers of the tradition (cf. Luke 13.33–34; Mark 6.4 and par.). If, however, Jesus saw John as the final Great prophet, this surely implies that he saw himself either as 1) the Coming One; 2) or as some sort of messianic figure that went beyond purely prophetic categories, without making the prophetic label entirely inappropriate. Prophet was, as was to prove the case with so many labels applied to Jesus, an accurate title for Jesus as far as it went, but apparently it didn't go far enough in Jesus' estimation.

What then are we to make of Matt 11.11/Luke 7.28? Shortly, we will have time to investigate Matt 11.12–15 and Luke 16.16 fully, but, since they have a bearing on our conclusions here, we must note now in advance that those sayings likely suggest that Jesus saw John as either a transitional figure with one foot in the age of the law and the prophets and one foot in the new age, or the one who intiates the process at the outset of the turn of the eons. In either case, John is not excluded from the inbreaking dominion of God and may in fact be positively included in it. This being the case, it is unlikely that the antithetical statements in Matt 11.11 are meant to contrast John who is outside the kingdom with those who are within it. Rather the comparison is between two ways of evaluating the human condition: 1) those born of women; 2) those in the Dominion of God. Obviously these two categories cannot be mutually exclusive for there must be some of the former category in the Dominion of God.

What then is the point? The point is that even the greatest person in terms of human origins does not have as great a status as even the least of those who has been transformed by and included in God's inbreaking dominion. The latter has an origin or point of beginning that can be said to be of God, thus eclipsing all purely human or physical categories, origins, estimations. As Marshall puts it, ". . . possession of a place in the kingdom is more important than being the greatest of the prophets."[44]

Some have conjectured that *ho mikroteros* should be seen as a comparative not a superlative and thus refer to Jesus himself.[45] Against this, however, is the very structure of the utterance which contrasts those born of women, and the least in the Dominion of God. Were there an intended contrast between John and Jesus here, then *mikroteros* might refer to Jesus being younger, but this seems unlikely on Jesus' lips at this point. The focus is not on Jesus and John, but on those born of women and anyone in the Dominion, even the least participant in it. We are talking here about two realms that in Jesus' mind are of qualitative difference in significance, the one derives from physical generation, the other is a result of God's supernatural intervention in human events and lives. All else pales in light of the possibilities of participating in God's dominion. We must turn now to the text mentioned above that suggests John was in the *basileia.*

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[44] Marshall, *Luke,* 296.

[45] O. Cullmann, *Christology of the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 19??) 24, 32.

C. Attack upon the Realm: Matt 11.12–13/Luke 16.16

Certainly one of the most prolix of all the logia from Q is Matt 11.12–13/Luke 16.16. Yet it is a most important saying on many counts, not least because it appears to give substantial support to M. Borg's contention that ". . . there is much in the gospels that suggests conflict as a context for interpreting the teaching of Jesus. . . ."[46] It appears that our saying is not found in its original context *either* in Matthew *or* Luke, which of course makes it more difficult to discern its meaning.[47] In general, however, E. Bammel's argument that we should see two different sayings in Matt 11.12–13 and Luke 16.16 has rightly met with little acceptance, not least because of the special vocabulary about force in both versions of this saying.[48] In view of a) the difficulty of the saying, and b) its apparent placing of the Baptist and his work alongside or of a piece with Jesus' work, the argument against the authenticity of the saying does not prevail.[49]

In an attempt to get back to the original form of this saying several considerations are crucial: 1) the Matthean form of the saying is more difficult and thus likely to be nearer to the original, at least in 11.12; 2) this view is supported when we note the typical Lukan vocabulary about preaching the *basileia* (cf. 4.43, 8.1) and the *apo tote;*[50] 3) it appears that Matthew, in order to connect the statement about prophets and law with 11.14 which refers to Elijah, has reversed the original order of the saying, which Luke does preserve; 4) Matthew seems to have added the word "prophesied" to 11.13. Thus the original form of this saying is likely to be as Polag has reconstructed it:

> The law and prophets were until John; since then the *basileia* has suffered violence and the violent take it by force.[51]

The vast majority of commetators are in agreement that *BIAZW* should be taken *in malem partem,* a conclusion which is only supported by E. Moore's detailed investigation of both *BIAZW* and *ARIIAZW* in Josephus which, especially in combination, are used ". . . to signify the direct employment of physical violence as a means of coercion, and . . . they carry with them a strong overtone of censure."[52] The question still remains, however, whether we should take *biazetai* as middle or passive. If it is a middle then the

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[46] M. Borg, *Conflict, Holiness, and Politics in the Teaching of Jesus* (New York: Mellen Press, 1984) 24, a thesis which we will explore more thoroughly when we discuss the Pharisees below. In general, I am in agreement with Borg on Jesus' conflict with his context, but I find the attempt to de-eschatologize Jesus unconvincing. Part of the conflict arose precisely because of a difference about eschatology: Jesus thought the *basileia* was breaking in his ministry.

[47] So. J. Schlosser, *Le Regne de Dieu dans les Dits de Jesus* (Paris: Gabalda, 1980) 510, whose in-depth analysis is most helpful with this passage.

[48] Cf. E. Bammel, "Is Luke 16.16–18 of Baptist's Provenience"? *HTR* 51 (1958) 101–6. The fact that John is mentioned in the third person here speaks against Bammel's attempt to see this as a tradition from a Baptist community.

[49] Cf. Schlosser, *Le Regne,* 509ff.; Marshall, *Luke,* 627; Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfillment,* 121–23.

[50] Cf. Fitzmyer, *Luke X–XXIV* (New York: Doubleday, 1985) 1115.

[51] Cf. Schlosser, *Le Regne,* 511ff.; Polag in Havener, *Q,* 143.

[52] E. Moore, "BIAZW, APIIAZW and Cognates in Josephus," *NTS* 21 (1974–74) 519–43; here 540.

sense would be that the *basileia* overpowers by force, presses hard, or even acts with violence, whilst in the passive it would mean that the dominion suffers violence. The Matthean form of this part of the saying surely favors the idea that the dominion is suffering violence, for we are immediately told thereafter that violent men plunder *it*, the dominion itself. This fits in with the usual negative connotation of the main verbs in question.

What then would Jesus be referring to? At least three conjectures are possible, and which one is preferred is in part determined by whether one sees John as being a part of or initiator of God's inbreaking activity/realm or not. The meaning could be that both John (at the hands of Herod Antipas) and Jesus (perhaps at the hands of the crowds, cf. John 6.14–15) had suffered from those who were not adverse to use violence to achieve their aims. In the case of John, that meant silencing him; in the case of Jesus, attempting to force his hand and make him a political ruler, which he did not want to be.[53]

Another possibility is that this is a comment about the revolutionaries of John's and Jesus' era who were attempting to force the dominion of God into being, by, among other things, acts of violence against the Romans. This is not at all impossible to believe on Jesus' lips, especially in view of some of his own comments about violence (cf. Luke 22.49–51; Matt 26.52). Another view would be that Jesus is referring to the sinners and outcasts who were taking the dominion by storm, so to speak, ever since the possibility of right standing with God had first been offered through baptism by John and then later by Jesus' preaching of the good news. The only difficulty with this last view is that it makes various negative verbs and a noun that usually has a negative sense serve a positive purpose: describing an activity Jesus wholly condoned. Thus on the whole the second view seems the most probable. In any event certain important conclusions can be drawn from this saying, whoever the violent ones were.

First, it is quite clear that Jesus sees the dominion as a present reality which can be acted upon.[54] Second, it appears certain that Jesus sees John as *either* a transitional figure with one foot in the old era of law and prophets and one foot in the new eon, introduced by his preaching and baptizing,[55] or possibly as being just the first in the new era. The preposition *mechri* or for that matter *heos avti* is certainly susceptible to such an interpretation. In either case this would explain why Jesus would interpret the experience of John and his own experience together, here and elsewhere. Third, this saying likely attests to the rather volatile atmosphere in which John and Jesus preached and worked. In such a setting it was imperative to be careful what one said and how one said it if one did not wish to be co-opted by violent men for their own more political causes. Fourth, this saying surely attests to the fact that Jesus did not see his work as simply a continuation of the agendas of the previous age; the day of the law and prophets had had its day and was ceasing to be (or if John was already dead, had ceased to be). The inbreaking of the ominion meant a new state of affairs for God's people, indeed an eschatological state of affairs. Fifth, it is hardly possible here to take *basileia* to mean what Chilton wants it to mean (God in his activity), for Jesus was not likely saying that God was under attack or suffering violence! Here is another saying which shows that the *basileia* must be seen not merely as a reign but also as a realm.

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[53] For a detailed attempt to put forward this view, cf. P. W. Barnett, "The Jewish Eschatological Prophets" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1977; Ann Arbor Microfilms, 1978) 145–210.

[54] Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfillment*, 122–24.

[55] So Fitzmyer, *Luke X–XXIV*, 1117–18.

D. Contrasting Styles of Ministry: Matt 11.16–19/Luke 7.31–35

That Jesus perceived John as a man of God with divine authority is not only clear from what we have discussed thus far but also from such texts as Mark 11.27–33 and par. which likely contains an authentic utterance of Jesus.[56] There are then various texts which one can appeal to which suggest that Jesus was willing to parallel his own work and divine authority with John's. These same texts also suggest that Jesus saw himself as one having divine authority and a divine commission. However, none of the texts which suggest parallels or even the indebtedness of Jesus to John should cause us to overlook those texts which suggest that Jesus distinguished himself and his work from John in various regards. One such text is the Q material of Matt 11.16–19/Luke 7.31–35.

Even those who are most stringent about their sifting of the gospel tradition are in agreement that the substance of this material, which is a wisdom saying in the form of a modified similitude, should be accepted as coming from a *Sitz im Leben Jesu.*[57] The only real difficulty comes in dealing with the saying of or about Wisdom at the end of the pericope, and a few have objected to the use of Son of Man terminology in Matt 11.19/Luke 7.34. On the latter score it may be that an original "I" has been replaced with the Son of Man terminology.[58] But if *bar enasha* was used by Jesus chiefly as a circumlocution when he was referring to his own present ministry, there is no good reason for doubting its originality here.[59] In regard to the wisdom saying, scholars are rather evenly divided on its original form. Almost certainly Luke has added *panton* at 7.35, but it could also be urged that Matthew may have altered the original to speak of Wisdom's deeds in light of Matt 11.2.[60] Hill, however, is probably right that the evidence of the Peshitta, which supports the reading "deeds," should be given due weight in which case Matthew's form of the saying is more original.[61]

In this saying we have a comment on "this generation," a phrase frequently used pejoratively in the gospels to mean this "wicked or faithless generation" (cf. Luke 11.29–32 and par.; Luke 11.50f. and par.; Luke 17.25; Mark 8.12, 38 *passim*). The OT background to this phrase should not be overlooked (cf. Deut 32.5, 20; Judg 2.10; Ps 78.8; 95.10; Jer 7.29) where it is also used to criticize the immorality and/or faithlessness of Israel. The phrase in its present context suggests a basic rejection of Jesus by the majority of his potential audience in Israel, and thus likely this saying derives from late in the ministry when it was evident that the vast majority were to reject the good news Jesus offered, just as apparently most had also rejected John's ministry.

Though it is possible to interpret the similitude otherwise, most probably we should recognize the standard Jewish introduction of a parabolic saying, so that the comparison is between the whole situation described in the saying and the behavior or case of "this generation." This would mean then that the comparison is not suggesting that "this generation" is like the children first mentioned in the similitude, but rather like the playmates

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[56] Cf. Taylor, *Mark,* 468–69; C. E. B. Cranfield, *The Gospel According to St. Mark* (Cambridge: University Press, 1972) 362.

[57] Cf. Perrin, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom,* 41; Breech, *The Silence of Jesus,* 9–10.

[58] A. J. B. Higgins, *Jesus and the Son of Man* (London: 1964) 121–23.

[59] Reference is to another chapter in a longer study.

[60] Cf. Schweizer, *Matthew,* 264–65.

[61] Hill, *Matthew,* 202.

who respond to the children calling them to play.[62] Thus, most probably we are to see the children who are inviting the others to play first at wedding then at funeral as Jesus and John. Both Jesus and John performed for them, but they would neither dance nor mourn, refusing to be drawn into the events Jesus and John were heralding.

It is perhaps pressing the comparison too far to correlate the dancing with Jesus and the mourning with John. Nonetheless, in Matt 11.18 and par., we hear of John's ascetical behavior, neither eating nor drinking (which Luke has expanded); and in v 19 of Jesus' full participation in the fellowship of breaking bread and drinking wine, even with sinners and toll collectors. Neither extreme of behavior pleased "this generation": they labeled John a fanatic or a mad man (he has a demon) and Jesus a immoral and a libertine (not only a glutton and a sot, but a friend of those who should be shunned, sinners and traitors). Now of course this is to a degree a caricature. John did eat and drink some things, and we have no evidence that Jesus was famous for over-indulgence. Nevertheless, it does rather aptly indicate that there was a definite perceived difference in the way John and Jesus went about ministry, a perceived difference that in fact reflected a degree of reality. In effect though, Jesus is saying it did not matter which extreme of behavior was suggested, or what reaction to life was encouraged, for nothing pleased this faithless audience. They would not play either John's or Jesus' game.

For our purposes what is striking about this similitude is that while Jesus groups himself together with John as a *performer* before Israel (notice the "we"), nonetheless he definitely distinguishes their behavior. This strongly suggests that they had different visions about how to go about their ministries: how to call Israel to account in view of the inbreaking dominion, and in the case of Jesus' proclamation, the present intervention of God for redemptive judgment. This means that Jesus was not and was not perceived to be simply one who carried the efforts of John a step further in the same direction, or adopted the same *modus operandi*. Jesus preached good news of the dominion's arrival, John baptized and warned of coming judgment and the need for preparation. The difference between these two men then was not just that Jesus ministered *after* John, and thus saw the inbreaking of what John only looked forward to in his lifetime, since he was prematurely dispatched by Herod Antipas (cf. Mark 6.14–29; Josephus Ant. 18.5.2, 1.116–119). What besides time caused this difference between Jesus and John? Perhaps we find a clue in Matt 11.19b, which reads "but Wisdom is justified by her works."

That "works" is the original reading here is likely not only for the reason already mentioned, but also in view of the reference to children in the similitude. It is much more probable that "works" would be changed to "children" to make the saying (which probably was not originally an independent logion) fit neatly with what precedes than vice versa. The meaning of the saying would be that despite the rejection by the general public, which has been the subject of discussion up to this point, nonetheless Wisdom will be vindicated or proved right by her deeds.

At this juncture we must bear in mind that in early Judaism there was a significant and developed tradition about wisdom as "a quasi-personal hypostasis in heaven, a divine agent expressing the mind of God, who preaches to men and longs to dwell among them but is rejected by them"[63] (cf Job 1, 28; Proverbs 1, 8; Sirach 1, 24; 11QPs-a 18; Bar 3f.; 1 Enoch 42; 4 Ezra 5; 2 Baruch 48; Wisdom, *passim*). Proverbs 8 is especially relevant, for in that text Wisdom calls, indeed "cries out," in the public places urging the people

[62] Cf. Jeremias, *Parables of Jesus*, 101.

[63] Marshall, *Luke*, 303.

to listen. The parallel to the setting of our similitude is striking enough to suggest that Jesus had this text in mind when he spoke.

Now let us suppose for a minute that Jesus did see himself as God's *Shaliah,*[64] someone endowed with divine authority and power, the very authority and power of the sender. That *Shaliah* must also be endowed with a divine commission and instructions. He must have a certain knowledge from and of the sender, indeed, wisdom to carry out the sender's instructions and purposes. He must know the mind of the sender in various important regards. The profile just mentioned in the last two sentences admirably describes the portrait of Wisdom we find in Proverbs 8 and elsewhere in the Wisdom literature. Is it then inconceivable that Jesus saw himself as divine Wisdom incarnate? Breech, no conservative, argues about the verse in question: "The appended saying interprets Jesus as the heavenly Wisdom who comes down to earth and calls men in the market place but they do not heed (Proverbs 8)."[65] It is of course possible to argue as M. J. Suggs has done that this Wisdom theme is a part of the first evangelist's redactional work of a Christological nature.[66] There are several things which must count against this conclusion. First, as M. D. Johnson has rightly noted, this does not blend in well with the other Christological redaction of the first evangelist, or even with his overall Christological presentation which involves both source and redactional material.[67] Second, however, this overlooks the fact that it is Luke, not Matthew, that attributes the Q saying found in Matt 23.37–9/Luke 13.34 to Wisdom directly. Had Matthew had a Wisdom focus in his redactional work we would have expected to see the evidence of it here, when in fact we find it in Luke, *not Matthew,* at this juncture. Thus it seems that the conjecture of seeing the wisdom motif in the text at hand as going back to Jesus has more to commend it than the view of Suggs. This conjecture would have to find support in other texts as well, because one text is too tenuous a basis to draw a firm conclusion about such an important matter. Yet in our treatment of Jesus' sayings we have already found hints in this direction.[68]

Furthermore, the following facts would be nicely explained if Jesus did see himself as God's Wisdom in the flesh: 1) it would explain a saying like Matt 12.42/Luke 11.31 which may well be authentic.[69] Solomon had wisdom, Jesus was greater by being the manifestation of Wisdom in the flesh; 2) it would also explain why Jesus' preferred mode of speech is the parable or similitude, which is one characteristic form or genre of wisdom literature; 3) it may explain why he felt free to vary not only from conventional wisdom, but also from Torah in the manner he did ("but I say to you"); 4) it may explain his felt-closeness to the Father (Abba), as well as his apparent belief that he had special knowledge of the Father that only he knew and could reveal.[70] 5) it would explain a saying like "Foxes

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[64] Reference is to another chapter in a longer study.

[65] Breech, *The Silence of Jesus,* 25.

[66] Cf. M. J. Suggs, *Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Matthew's Gospel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[67] Cf. M. D. Johnson, "Reflections on a Wisdom Approach to Matthew's Christology," *CBQ* 36 (1974) 44–64.

[68] The discussion of our text by C. E. Carlston in relation to other wisdom material in the gospels confirms the wisdom character of this material. Cf. his arficle, "Wisdom and Eschatology," in *Logia,* 101–19, here 102–3.

[69] Cf. my *Women in the Ministry of Jesus,* 44–45 and notes.

[70] This depends on the authenticity of sayings such as the so-called Johannine thunderbolt (Matt 11.27), which it should be noted is set in the midst of several obvious wisdom sayings in 11.25 and 11.28ff.

have holes . . ." (Matt 8.20/Luke 9.58), which is much like 1 Enoch 42.2 and Eccl 24.6–22 in which Wisdom has no dwelling place; 6) It might explain how as early as 10–15 years after Jesus' death the Church was apparently already singing Christ hymns like we find in Philemon 2 and elsewhere that likely manifested a belief in the pre-existence of the Son; 7) It would of course also explain why Jesus did distinguish himself from John in various crucial ways.

Leaving aside this last line of thought, whatever one may think of Matt 11.19b, it must be recognized from the rest of this pericope that Jesus did see himself as taking on a task like that of Wisdom in Proverbs 8, and distinguishing himself in his *modus operandi* for ministry from John. This can only reflect the fact that Jesus viewed himself in a different light and perhaps in a different category than he viewed John, who it will be remembered he said was more than a prophet. It may perhaps be asked why then Jesus did not call himself Wisdom more directly or more often than in this one saying (Matt 11.19b). The most logical explanation is that he normally used the Son of Man terminology in place of Wisdom because he was a male, and Wisdom is of course in Proverbs 8 and elsewhere a female persona.

As we conclude this essay we will turn briefly to some more controversial material from John 3–4, to see if Linnemann is right that this may shed some light on the historical Jesus.

4. Jesus the Judean Baptizer? John 3.22–4.3

E. Linnemann's challenging study on Jesus and John led her to the following conclusions on the basis of the historical substance behind John 3.22–4.3: 1) During the lifetime of John, Jesus, surrounded by a circle of disciples, worked as a baptizer, or at least if 4.2 is a historical note, allowed and encouraged his disciples to do so;[71] 2) Jesus had during this time drawn greater crowds as a baptizer than John; 3) Jesus had stayed for a long time with John beyond the Jordan in Perea, allowing himself not only to be baptized by John, but he was a disciple of John; 4) the later side by side baptizing of two groups became a problem; 5) Jesus abandoned his baptizing when he heard that the Pharisees had learned Jesus was having more success than John, for it was not his intention to weaken or compromise John's position in the eyes of his opponents (i.e., the Pharisees); 6) Jesus had learned from John of this new way of right standing with God through repentance and baptism apart from detailed fulfillment of the Law's requirements; 7) This led Jesus to the conclusion that the event of the repentance of sinners and tax collectors was the sign of the final inbreaking of God's mighty dominion. It was also, coupled with John's imprisonment, what prompted Jesus to take up a ministry of preaching the inbreaking Dominion in his native region of Galilee.[72]

What are we to make of these suggestions? In the first place as Schnackenburg points out,[73] 3.22–23 do not indicate Jesus was in the circle of the Baptist or baptized with or under his tutelage. What is suggested is a parallel practice in the same general region, during the same general time period. Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Jesus

[71] Various scholars have seen 3.22 as being contradicted by 4.2. Cf. R. E. Brown, *The Gospel According to John I–XII* (New York: Doubleday, 1966) 164.

[72] Cf. Linnemann, "Jesus und die Taufer," 226–33.

[73] R. Schnackenburg, *The Gospel According to St. John: Volume One* (London: Burns and Oates, 1968; trans. K. Smyth) 410–11.

endorsed John's work, for certainly his being baptized by John implies at least that he thought John's baptism was valid and valuable. Most definitely Mark 11.27–33 and par. indicates that Jesus saw John's baptism as having the divine imprimatur. This suggests that Jesus may have gotten the idea for a brief baptizing ministry from John, for he saw how effective John was in calling people to repentance and preparation for the coming divine activity.

Second, it is quite plausible that Jesus, out of his respect for John, would have ceased his own parallel ministry so as not to compromise John's work. Perhaps he saw his own efforts as an attempt to further or supplement not supplant John's efforts. Perhaps it was when it became apparent that John would minister no more, due to imprisonment, that Jesus had to carefully evaluate or reevaluate the call of God on his life, and see if God was urging him to go a step further than the Baptist had, perhaps with a somewhat different emphasis, though he too would call the nation to decision in light of the inbreaking divine activity and he too would welcome the least, last and the lost who responded to his call. There would also be a different *modus operandi:* Jesus would go directly to the people, preaching, healing, fellowshiping with them rather than waiting for them to come to him.

In regard to the sixth and seventh points mentioned above, they are both believable, though they cannot be proved beyond a shadow of a doubt. Perhaps Jesus did gain some insight into the new work God was calling him to by observing the method and message of John. Nevertheless, when he began his Galilean ministry he no longer saw his work as simply an extension or supplement of John's, if indeed he had done so before then. Due allowance must be made for both the similarities and the differences between Jesus' and John's ministries, for they tell us that Jesus did not simply see himself as another prophet like John, though John was the closest and nearest point of comparison on the contemporary Judean scene. Thus, for example, while Jesus saw both John and himself as prophetic figures, nonetheless he saw John as more than just another prophet, and himself as more and other than John.

5. Conclusions: Jesus' Self-Concept In Light of his Relationship with John

The rich corpus of material in the gospels which deals with Jesus and John has led us to various important conclusions. Outstanding amongst these are the fact that Jesus saw himself as not merely announcing but bringing about the eschatological blessings promised in Isaianic prophecies. Unlike John, Jesus apparently did not expect a Coming One after him, a successor. He himself was bringing in and bringing about the final eschatological message and work of God for his people Israel. This in part explains both the strident and urgent tone to much of what Jesus said. Salvation for Israel hinged on how it responded to Jesus' call, and before that on John's.

Another key insight seems to be that Jesus either saw himself as divine Wisdom in the flesh, or at least as carrying out the tasks and roles that the Wisdom literature portrays Wisdom as doing. This, when coupled with Jesus' understanding of himself as the *Shaliah of God,* may go a long way toward explaining Jesus' exalted sense of authority, power, and mission and may explain why he felt free to say and do a lot of the striking things he said and did which did not match up with common expectations about either a prophet or a Messiah.

Of those born of woman, Jesus said John was the greatest, and thus it is hardly surprising that John is the one figure in the gospel tradition that Jesus seems to constantly compare and contrast himself to both in his words and deeds. While Jesus could have

compared himself *primarily* with various of his other contemporaries (Herod Antipas, Caesar, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the priests and Levites, the revolutionaries) or *primarily* with prophetic or kingly figures in Israel's past (David, Solomon, Moses, Jonah), he chooses to mention such figures only in passing, or at least not nearly with the frequency that he mentions John. Though we cannot be sure about the chronological placement of many of Jesus' sayings about John, nonetheless it appears that from early on to near the very end of Jesus ministry (cf. Mark 11.27–33 and par.) Jesus was constantly comparing and contrasting himself to John. He was the main human touchstone for Jesus, the one figure which helped him sort out his own sense of identity and mission.

What this of course implies is that Jesus did indeed manifest a normal progressive historical consciousness. While early on, if the material in John 3.22–4.3 has any historical substance, it appears that Jesus saw himself as acting in parallel to and perhaps even as a supplement to John's ministry, when John was imprisoned or perhaps even shortly before then when John appeared to be in some danger, Jesus reevaluated what God's call was on his life, and this in turn led to his all too short ministry in Galilee. The seeds of that "something greater than John" consciousness may have in fact already been planted as early as Jesus' baptism by John, which seems to have coincided with some sort of charismatic experience or vision that Jesus had about being God's unique Son. In due course Jesus may also have come to see himself as "the Coming One" John spoke of, though clearly he saw his task and message as placing more emphasis on the good news about God's inbreaking activity than on the bad news of judgment which John stressed when he spoke of "the Coming One." Certainly the eschatological consciousness of both men, their understanding of the crucial and decisive time that was dawning for Israel, is very similar in nature and orientation. Jesus seems to have seen John as a transitional figure, the last of the old style of prophets, or better said, the decisive eschatological prophet of God, but also one who has one foot in and introduces the new eon. Of both John and Jesus was it said the dominion suffers violence.

In any event, it is quite clear that Jesus' self concept can not properly be evaluated without giving detailed attention to the material in the gospels which speaks of Jesus' relationship to John. Who Jesus thought he was is to a significant extent revealed by whom he compared and contrasted himself with, and no one gets more frequent mention by Jesus on that score than the Baptizer, the voice crying in the wilderness.Thus in many ways the Baptist material is some of the most crucial for revealing who Jesus thought he was.

Transumptive Narration and the Structure of Wisdom 1-5

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"Transumptive narration" is the process of incorporating several different stories into a new, comprehensive narrative pattern. This paper[1] will argue that such a process is at work in Wisdom 1–5, and that these chapters weave around the righteous man the narratives of the Suffering Servant and the Greco-Roman philosopher. The former has long been a known factor in Wisdom,[2] so this brief discussion will stress the latter.

The righteous man first comes into view when the ungodly express their desire to attack him. Wis 2:12 virtually quotes Isa 3:10 LXX which, unlike the MT, introduces a sudden and unexplained note of violence against a righteous one (*dikaios*). But why would Pseudo-Solomon pick out a sequence so fragmentary and lacking in context that one can hardly make sense of it? The rapidity and apparent unreasonableness with which the ungodly move from hedonism to a willingness to kill the righteous man is very puzzling and is hardly made less so by the utilization of Isa 3:10 LXX. Indeed, the mere move to a willingness to oppress people (2:6–9) is odd. It is easy to see why the ungodly should want to enjoy what time they have, but why should they want to harm others? Oppressing people is not dictated by a devotion to seeking pleasure. If such people got in the way of one's pleasure, it would be reasonable to rid oneself of them, but 2:10 seems to indicate that the ungodly are going to make a point of oppression. How would that further pleasure seeking? Similarly, the motivation offered for the ungodly's murder of the righteous man appears wholly inadequate. To proper hedonists, 2:12–16 would be an argument for simply ignoring the righteous man and getting on with having a good time. Wis 2:12b says that the righteous man "opposes" the actions of the ungodly, but 2:12a indicates that such opposition amounts to no more than what is "inconvenient." Wis 2:12c–2:16 shows that the conflict between the ungodly and the righteous man is really one of words and ideas. Why do the former react so violently to someone they might more appropriately consider a jabbering, innocuous fool? Finally, 2:17–20 sounds extremely strange, for there the ungodly put themselves in a no-win situation. Either they will prove the righteous man to be wrong, in which case they will have gained nothing more than if they had ignored him, or they will prove him to be right, with disastrous consequences to themselves.

If, in keeping with our emphasis on Wisdom's transumption of Hebraic and Greek stories, we turn to the latter, we find that a possible solution emerges. By the first century

[1] My thanks to Robert J. Miller of Midway College and Ron Cameron of Wesleyan University, who read drafts of this paper.

[2] M. J. Suggs, "Wisdom of Solomon 2:10–5: A Homily Based on the Fourth Servant Song," *JBL* 76 (1957) 26–33. Cf. also G. W. E. Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism* (HTS 26; Cambridge, MA: Harvard; London: Oxford, 1972).

C.E., the pursuit of superficial pleasure was sometimes associated with villainous behavior. In polemicizing against the Epicureans, Epictetus accuses them of teaching "how righteousness is nothing, how reverence is folly, how a father is nothing, how a son is nothing.[3] Later, he says that their teachings could give legitimacy to adulterers, embezzlers, or those who neglect parents.[4] Pseudo-Solomon may well be employing such readiness to believe in the wickedness of hedonists in order to make the transition from 2:9 to 2:10 more plausible. As for the murder of the righteous man, in Greek and Hellenistic culture, there are many stories about men who follow a godly lifestyle and criticize those who follow a superficial, ungodly lifestyle. These men are philosophers, and their criticism provokes scorn and even violence.

Already in Plato's *Apology,* Socrates says that he must urge others "not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much. . . ."[5] Epictetus paraphrases Socrates' admonitions, in accordance with the Athenian's status by this time as the philosopher *par excellence.*[6] This paraphrase serves as a prelude to a discussion, the point of which is that one should not focus on mere appearances: ". . . *you* are not flesh, nor hair, but moral purpose; if you get that beautiful, then *you* will be beautiful."[7]

At another point, Epictetus again uses the figure of Socrates, this time to show how easily a philosopher can be killed at the hands of those who care only about externals. Here, it is not Epicureans who are the villains, but those archetypal opponents of the philosopher, Anytus and Meletus:

> Why, do you think that if Socrates had wished to maintain his external possessions he would have come forward and said, "Anytus and Meletus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me?" Was he so foolish as not to see that this course does not lead to that goal, but elsewhere?[8]

The "elsewhere" is death, and it comes so readily that Epictetus must caution against being as bold as Socrates unless one desires to meet the same fate:

> If you, for your part, are preparing a peroration of that sort, why do you mount the platform at all, why answer the summons? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will come . . .[9]

Here, Epictetus seems to be of the opinion that telling people to lead a lifestyle of care for the soul can get one killed.

Epictetus also recommends that Plato's advice to philosophers be taken seriously:

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[3] Epictetus, *The Discourses* (trans. W. A. Oldfather; LCL; London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1967) 2.20.25. That Epictetus is treating the Epicureans unfairly here is not really significant for our argument.

[4] Epictetus 2.20.35. Cf. also 3.7.15–16.

[5] Plato, *Apology* 30A–B.

[6] Epictetus 3.1.19–23. For the frequency with which Epictetus mentions Socrates, simply see the indices to the Loeb edition.

[7] Epictetus 3.1.40.

[8] Epictetus 2.2.15–16.

[9] Epictetus 2.2.19–20.

> Will you not, as Plato says, study not merely to die, but even to be tortured on the rack, and to go into exile, and to be severely flogged . . . ?[10]

It is highly suggestive that Epictetus imagines God as asking the philosopher, "In your school what did you call exile and imprisonment and bonds and death and disrepute?"[11] Each of these items implies persecution; the inclusion of death shows how far such persecution could go.

Epictetus was not alone in his feeling that philosophers could readily evoke hostility. Cicero asserts that philosophy has given men incalculable good,

> And yet philosophy is so far from being praised in the way its service to the life of man has deserved, that most men ignore it and many even abuse it.[12]

To Seneca, those whom the philosopher serves are feverishly volatile:

> What physician gets angry with a lunatic? Who takes in ill part the abuse of a man stricken with fever and yet denied cold water? The wise man's feeling towards all men is that of the physician towards his patients: he does not scorn to touch their privy parts if they need treatment, or to view the body's refuse and discharges, or to endure violent words from those who rage in delirium.[13]

More succinctly, Seneca maintains that a philosopher need not do anything offensive. "The mere name of philosophy, however quietly pursued, is an object of sufficient scorn. . . ."[14]

Finally, we may note Dio Chrysostom, who states that, for all their dedication, philosophers "gain neither wealth nor power . . . but rather hatred, abuse, and reviling. . . ."[15]

It seems, then, that Pseudo-Solomon has employed a familiar *topos* from Greco-Roman philosophy—that of hostility against the philosopher—and sharpened it to include the actual taking of life.[16] This employment allows Pseudo-Solomon to move laconically but (he must have felt) persuasively from a conflict over essentially philosophical issues to the

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[10] Epictetus 4.1.172.

[11] Epictetus 1.30.2.

[12] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* (trans. J. E. King; LCL; London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam's, 1927) 5.2.5–6. Although Cicero here speaks of "philosophy" rather than of philosophers, he does refer to the latter several sentences further on.

[13] Seneca, "De Constantia," *Moral Essays* (trans. J. W. Basore; LCL; 3 vols.; London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam's 1928–35) vol. 1, 13.1–2.

[14] Seneca, *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales* (trans. R. M. Gummere; LCL; 3 vols.; London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam's 1917–25) vol. 1, 5.2.

[15] Dio Chrysostom, *Dio Chrysostom* (trans. J. W. Cohoon and H. L. Crosby; LCL; 5 vols.; London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard; New York: Putnam's; 1932–51) vol. 3, 32.19.

[16] Thanks are due to Robert J. Miller of Midway College for help with this point. It should be added here that Epictetus, too, appears to have engaged in this kind of sharpening. That he did so with the proverbial figure of Socrates suggests that the persecution and *killing* of the philosopher could have been a more common notion than our data indicate.

act of homicide. The *topos* allows Isa 3:10 LXX—puzzling even in its original context—to be used sensibly. Pseudo-Solomon has thus written a story about a pious Jew which appropriates Greco-Roman narrative patterns. This appropriation is suitable for an author living in two cultures. A Hellene, a Jew, and, more to the point, a Hellenistic Jew, could all look at this story and find it meaningful. It resonates biculturally.

Further connections between the righteous man and the philosopher are not difficult to locate. In Wis 2:12a, the ungodly complain that the righteous man reproaches them for "sins against the law" or *nomos*. In the philosophical tradition, one could compare this to the *Crito* (50Aff.), as well as to passages from Epictetus (cf., e.g., 2.16.28, 4.3.10, *Encheiridion* 50). As for the complaint in 2:12b that the righteous man accuses the ungodly of sins against their *paideia*, the philosophical tradition would have an embarrassment of rich comparisons.[17] Let a few citations from Epictetus suffice here: 1.2.6, 2.1.21–23, 4.5.7.

Philosophical parallels can also be found for the suggestion that there is a father-son relationship between God and the righteous man (compare Wis 2:13, 16 and Epictetus 1.9.6), that the latter is a burdensome nuisance (compare Wis 2:14 and Diogenes Laertius 6:24), that his lifestyle is strange (compare Wis 2:15 and Epictetus 4.8.5–12), that he is forbearing (compare Wis 2:19 and Plutarch, *Moralia* 90E), that he has been tested by God (compare Wis 3:5 and Seneca, *Prov.* 1.6), and even that he will receive an exaltation after death (cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.29.71; Seneca, *Tran.* 16.4).

What the above indicates is that Pseudo-Solomon, finding himself in a situation beset by competing cultures and their stories, has taken several of those stories and wrestled them into his own, new construction. In the first chapters of Wisdom, a momentous figure from Hellenistic culture, the philosopher, is intertwined with an equally momentous figure from Hebraic culture, the Suffering Servant. Wisdom 1–5, by transuming several different narratives, becomes a syncretistic story for a syncretistic age.[18]

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[17] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (trans. G. Highet; 3 vols.; New York: Oxford, 1934–44).

[18] For an attempt to trace the figure of the Greco-Roman philosopher through Paul's understanding of Jesus' death, cf. the author's *The Noble Death* (JSNTS; Sheffield: JSOT, 1988).

Narrative Christology in Early Jewish Christianity

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This paper will describe the christological reflections of early Jewish Christians contained in three NT narratives. They are the narratives of the Baptism, the Temptations, and the Transfiguration. Further, this paper is heavily dependent upon my recent book *Narrative Theology in Early Jewish Christianity*, to be published by Westminster/John Knox Press in the summer of 1989.

Introduction

An explanation of the words of the title provides a concise introduction to this paper. For example, different authors have used the words "Jewish Christianity" in a variety of ways. Thus, Jewish Christianity could describe most members of the earliest church. Also, the words "Jewish Christianity" have been used to describe the Ebionites who flourished in the second and third centuries of our era. However, we are following R. Longenecker in using the words "ideologically." Consequently, the words "Jewish Christianity" are being used "with reference to early Christians whose conceptual frame of reference and whose expressions were rooted in Semitic thought generally and Judaism in particular."[1] Accordingly, these early Jewish Christians expressed their new faith in Jesus in a way that grew out of their Jewish background.

The word "early" has been added to the words "Jewish Christianity" to designate a first-century community which existed between the resurrection of Jesus and the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. While Jewish Christianity continued to exist after this date, we are confining our attention to this early period because the literary data on which this study is based was formulated within this period. Thus, this time span and the theological motifs expressed through these narratives establish a *fixed point of reference* for the study of Jewish Christianity. Heretofore, inquiries into Jewish Christianity have been largely confined to the Ebionites. Unfortunately the sources which tell of the Ebionites are late and hard to date since they have been edited and interpolated in the process of transmission. In contrast, the three narratives cited above are found within the NT and are datable several years before 70 C.E.

Further, there is an emerging scholarly consensus that the three narratives cited in this paper were first formulated by early Jewish Christians. The story of the Baptism illustrates our point. After a thorough examination of just one motif in the story, L. Keck writes the following:

> Specifically, we have . . . anchored the story in the earliest milieu in which traditions of Jesus emerged—Palestinian, Aramaic-using Christianity.[2]

[1] R. Longenecker, *The Christology of Early Jewish Christianity*, Studies in Biblical Theology, 2d series, 17 (London: SCM Press, 1970) 3.

[2] L. Keck, "The Spirit and the Dove," *NTS* 17 (1970) 67.

Also, the three narratives are found in chronologically early strata of the NT. Thus, the narratives of the Baptism and of the Transfiguration are found initially in Mark. Moreover, Mark used a pre-Markan account as his source for the Transfiguration and, possibly, for his story of the Baptism. While it is difficult to date pre-Markan accounts, they must pre-date Mark by several years. The source of Matthew's version of the Temptation is Q, which is usually dated about 50 C.E.

The term "Narrative" in the title needs considerable clarification. "Narrative," as it is used in this paper, must be distinguished from a new approach to biblical study called "Narrative criticism." Narrative criticism seeks to examine a whole Gospel, such as Mark, as a continuous story. The continuous story is then viewed from the perspective of plot, character development. conflict, etc. However, this approach does not work well with the individual narratives which constitute the literary deposits of early Jewish Christianity.

Nevertheless, since early Jewish Christians sometimes communicated their theological reflections in the form of narrative or story, it is important to reflect upon the nature of the stories they have left us.

Perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of the narratives, through which they expressed their faith in Jesus, is typology. Thus, their narratives about Jesus also recalled other stories found in their Bible. For example, the story of the Temptation is integrally related to three stories about the wilderness wanderings of the people of Israel under Moses. Three times Jesus quotes from Deuteronomy to counter the temptations the Devil puts before him. These three quotations recall the stories of the giving of the manna, of putting God to the test at Massa, and of going after other gods. Accordingly, persons and events from the Hebrew Bible are viewed as "types" or foreshadowings of similar persons or events in the NT narrative.

Since typology is an ancient method of biblical interpretation, it should not be surprising that other first century Jewish exegetical traditions and elements of the first century world-view should lie in the background of these narratives. Accordingly, the modern interpreter must learn to work *through* the story and state the meaning *in terms of the story.* Of course, this is not easy because it means entering into the world of the story. In addition to the difficulty of entering into the world of the first century story, another difficulty must be faced. The modern interpreter is tempted to extract the meaning from the story, state that meaning in propositional form, and then discard the story. However, as in the case of the parables, the "meaning" cannot live apart from the story because the story always conveys more "meaning" than the modern interpreter can reduce to propositional statements.

In view of the difficulties involved in entering into the world of the story, it is almost inevitable that questions of methodology should arise.

Methodological Questions

The modern interpreter of these narratives must deal with at least two kinds of methodological questions. The first involves the proper method for entering the world of the story and thereby exploring its meaning. The second involves the issue of dating certain Jewish exegetical traditions which the stories presuppose.

Entering the world of a narrative and exploring its meaning involve matters of form. Is it prose or poetry? Is it a scientific report or a novel? Certainly, words are used differently in each case.

Matters of form have been central to NT criticism. Moreover, form critics have had much success in classifying the "forms" found in the Gospels. Every beginning NT student knows something about the form of a pronouncement story, a miracle story, or a parable.

However, in attempting to classify the form of these early Jewish Christian narratives, form critics have failed to come to any consensus. In fact, they have come to widely different conclusions. Consequently these stories are said to convey widely different meanings. Hence, another method for exploring the meaning of these stories is clearly needed.

The method of analysis proposed by B. Gerhardsson seems to provide the help for entering the world of the story that the form critics have not provided. Gerhardsson describes his approach as "a method of genetic analysis of one particular type of gospel tradition."[3] By "one particular type of gospel tradition" he means stories like the Temptation narrative that can be traced to Jewish Christianity. By "method of genetic analysis" he means examining these stories in terms of three constituent elements of which they were composed. Unlike some form critics, he is not trying to make abstract "forms" fit specific stories so much as he is examining elements found within the stories themselves.

In the following paragraphs we will briefly describe Gerhardsson's method of analysis before employing it in the next section of the paper in order to enter the world of the Temptation narrative. The first of three constituent elements present within the narrative consists of words from the Hebrew Bible. In this case the words are found in Deut 8:3; 6:16; and 6:13. They allude to the three stories mentioned above.

The second constituent element is a broad category best described as Jewish tradition. In our analysis Jewish tradition consists mostly of exegetical traditions which interpreted the word "wilderness" and the exegetical tradition associated with Deut 1:1. Exegetical traditions are customary ways of interpreting words and passages of Scripture which enable the reader to understand those words and passages in a certain way. Thus, the word "wilderness" became associated with a certain geographical era and with temptations initiated by the devil. Also, first-century Jews believed that the wilderness was associated with the coming drama of salvation.

Finally, the third element deals with the Jewish/Christian use of the Bible and Jewish tradition to explain and defend their faith. The story of the Temptation of Jesus offers an example of the way structure and biblical passages betray the conceptual frame of reference of the people who formulated the story. They formulated the story so that each temptation of Jesus has a parallel in a temptation which Israel failed during their wilderness wanderings.

After entering the world of the story, it is still necessary to address two crucial questions to each of the narratives under consideration. First, what is the main thrust or meaning of this narrative? Second, what does this narrative tell us about the Christology of the Jewish Christians who first formulated it?

In the latter part of the paper the results will be brought together to determine what the combined witness of three narratives reveals about the Christological reflections of early Jewish Christianity.

The other methodological issue concerns dating the exegetical traditions and other aspects of Jewish tradition found within the three narratives of this study. In the case of the exegetical traditions found within the Temptation narrative, dating is no real problem since these same exegetical traditions are found within the Dead Sea Scrolls. Since the community of the scrolls flourished at approximately the same time that the Temptation

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[3] B. Gerhardsson, *The Testing of God's Son: An Analysis of an Early Christian Midrash* (Lund: Gleerup, 1966) 12. In the description of Gerhardsson's method, I have used his categories, but twice used my own terminology. For example, I have used the term "Jewish tradition" because it is a term in current usage.

narrative was written, these exegetical traditions could have been known by Jewish Christians.

After the foregoing discussion concerning introductory matters, it is now time to turn to the narrative of the Temptation of Jesus.

The Temptation of Jesus

Before analysis of this narrative can take place, two preliminary critical issues demand attention. The first concerns which narrative should be investigated since the NT contains not just one, but three narratives of the Temptation, found in Matt 4:1–11, Mark 1:12–13, and Luke 4:1–13. The second critical issue concerns the finding of form critics.

Fortunately, most critics agree that the Matthean and Lukan accounts were based on the common source Q. They also agree that Matthew's version more nearly reflects the Q source than does the Lukan. However, it is difficult to know whether the brief Markan account is a variant version of the Q story or reflects a different tradition altogether. However, since the enigmatic Markan version poses so many questions, interpreters are not sure precisely what the version is saying other than the fact that Jesus was tempted by the devil. Consequently, this paper will interpret Matthew's account and will not complicate matters by making comparisons between the three Synoptic accounts.

The other critical issue concerns the form of the story. Bultmann assigned the narrative "to the sphere of the Palestinian tradition" and described its form as "a controversy dialogue on the Jewish model."[4] In his recent commentary on Luke, J. Fitzmyer classifies the Lukan version as a "story about Jesus, part of the narrative tradition," while a recent interpreter of Matthew classifies it as a midrash.[5] This wide divergence of opinion regarding the form of the story illustrates the necessity of entering into the world of the story through the constituent elements of the story itself.

A logical place to begin is the three citations from Deuteronomy, since these citations constitute an important formal element within the narrative. Deut 8:3b is cited in Matt 4:4; Deut 6:16 in Matt 4:7; and Deut 6:13 in Matt 4:10. What function do these three citations perform in the narrative? Obviously, they are the means Jesus uses to foil the temptations. However, they expose the devil's testing not only because of the meaning within the words themselves, but also because the words refer to the contexts from which they were taken. Thereby, Jesus indicates that he will not succumb to the same tests that the wilderness generation failed!

What evidence is there that these citations refer to the contexts from which they were taken? First, there is the Jewish exegetical practice of the time: sometimes such citations referred to the surrounding passage. Second, and more cogent, is the fact that the narrative itself points to the context of Deut 8:3b. The "setting" of the narrative in Matt 4:1–2 quotes several key words from the context of Deut 8:3b. Thus, the Greek words for "was led," "the wilderness," "tempted," and "forty" are all found in the Septuagint of Deut 8:2. Note how these words reappear in the setting: "Then Jesus *was led* up by the Spirit into *the wilderness* to be *tempted* by the Devil. And he fasted *forty*. . . ."

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[4] R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963) 256f.

[5] J. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke* (I-IX), The Anchor Bible, Vol. 28 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981) 508. M. Goulder, *Midrash and Lection in Matthew* (London: SPCK, 1974) classifies the narrative as a midrash, (245). So also Gerhardsson, op. cit.

Since the formulators of the narrative quoted key words from Deut 8:3b, one may assume that they also felt the purpose of God's testing Israel applied equally to the tests put before Jesus. Thus, Deut 8:2 states that "the Lord your God has led you these forty years in the wilderness . . . testing you to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments, or not."

In terms of the broad context mentioned above, most commentators point out that the forty days of Jesus' temptations recall the forty years of Israel's testing.

Further, in terms of the broad context of these three citations from Deuteronomy, another verse must be cited: namely, Deut 1:1: "These are the words that Moses spoke to all Israel beyond the Jordan in the wilderness, in the Arabah over against Suph, between Paran and Tophel, Laban, Hazeroth and Dizahab." According to a well-known Jewish exegetical tradition, Deut 1:1 and thereby the rest of Deuteronomy were interpreted as words of rebuke or chastisement that Moses addressed to Israel because they failed the tests that God put before them. The first few lines of *Sifrei Deuteronomy*, a kind of exegetical commentary on the Book of Deuteronomy, make this clear.

> (1:1) "These are the words that Moses spoke. . . . What does the verse mean? . . . (This verse) teaches that they were words of rebuke. . . ."[6]

While Deut 1:1 does not appear as a citation in the narrative, it should be included in the discussion for it sets the stage, so to speak, for the whole discussion. This exegetical tradition provided a lens through which the formulators of the narrative saw the passages with which they worked and by which they formulated the story as they did.

In mentioning this exegetical tradition we have alrady begun to investigate the Jewish tradition behind the narrative. This exegetical tradition will be examined in depth in the following section after other aspects of the Jewish tradition found in the Dead Sea Scrolls have been explored.

The Jewish Tradition: The Dead Sea Scrolls

The Dead Sea Scrolls provide a helpful summary of the Jewish tradition that lies behind the Temptation narrative. Conveniently, much of the relevant tradition clusters around the concept "wilderness" which occupies a central place in the thought of the Scrolls. Thus, according to a crucial text found in The Community Rule, the sect went into the "wilderness" to prepare for God's coming act of delivarance.

> And when these exist as a community (13) in Israel, according to this programme they shall be separated from among the settlement of the men of iniquity to go into the desert (wilderness), to prepare the the way of Him, (14) as it is written,
>
> In the wilderness prepare the way . . . in the Arabah they shall make straight a highway for our God (Is. 40:3),
>
> (15) This means study of the Law (which) he commanded by the hand of Moses. . . .[7]

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[6] *Sifrei Deuteronomy*, ed. L. Finkelstein (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1969) 1, lines 1–3. The translation is my own.

[7] The Community Rule 8:13–15. Translated by A. Leaney, *The Rule of Qumran and Its Meaning* (London: SCM Press, 1966) 209.

From the above passage it is apparent that the concept "wilderness" carries with it several elements of tradition which must be separated for purposes of analysis.

Perhaps the foremost element of tradition associated with the term "wilderness" is geographical. It dscribes the geographical area in which the community was located. In summarizing his discussion of the geographical area designated by the term "wilderness." R. Funk finds that the NT Temptation narratives reflect the usage of time and particularly the usage of the Dead Sea Scrolls.

> To sum up, nominal *eremos* (the wilderness) in the NT is usually localized as the wilderness of Sinai or the wilderness of Judea (not just Judah), the latter including the lower Jordan valley and possibly the eastern slopes of the valley. There is precedent for this usage in the LXX and Qumran literature. . . ."[8]

Thus, the location of the Temptations in the NT follows the Jewish tradition of the time according to the Dead Sea Scrolls.

Another element of tradition that the term "wilderness" conveys is eschatological. Accordingly, the sect believed that they were living at the end of this evil age and at the beginning of God's new age of deliverance.

Further, the term "wilderness" is associated with testing. Preparing the way of God in the wilderness meant studying and keeping the Law as perfectly as they could. However, while they were attempting to obey the law perfectly, Belial, the ruler of this present evil age, was testing them. (See The Community Rule 1:16–18 and 3:21–25.)

Since the community is located in the wilderness the wilderness is a primary area of Belial's activity. In addition, however, the association of the demonic with "wilderness" is a general idea of the time.

The elements of tradition associated with "wilderness" that have been listed above are presupposed in the Temptation story.

The Jewish Tradition: An Exegetical Tradition

In the discussion (above) concerning the citations from Deuteronomy, Deut 1:1 was included and the exegetical tradition associated with it was mentioned. Here, however, since scholars have never before associated this exegetical tradition with the Temptations and since it answers questions concerning the narrative, considerable attention will be given to it.

Our discussion will begin with *Sifrei Deuteronomy* for two reasons. First, this exegetical midrash makes an explicit identification between the exegetical tradition of rebuke and Deut 1:1. Second, of the numerous rabbinic works that cite this tradition, *Sifrei Deuteronomy* seems to stand closest in time to the NT.

This midrash associates every place-name in Deut 1:1 with a rebuke that Moses gave to the wilderness generation in that place. Several place-names receive the following formulaic treatment. The place is mentioned and then the formula, "teaches that he

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[8] R. Funk, "The Wilderness," *JBL* 78 (1959) 214. If Funk is correct, the second and third temptations were also located in the wilderness. Funk seeks to determine "whether this . . . phrase was localized in proximity to the Holy Land and the holy mountain, Zion" (206). Hence the Temple borders the wilderness. The "high mountain" echoes Moses' ascent to Nebo, located among "the eastern slopes of the valley" where the Lord "showed him all the" land (Deut 34:1).

(Moses) rebuked them concerning whatever they did," is cited. Next, the place-name is repeated. Thus, " 'in the wilderness' (the place-name) teaches that he rebuked them concerning whatever they did (formula) 'in the wilderness' (place-name repeated)." With reference to 'in the wilderness' a specific sin is mentioned by citing the story which describes that sin. Israel's complaint preceding the giving of the manna is mentioned: "Would that we had died by the hand of the Lord in the land of Egypt, when we sat by the fleshpots and ate bread to the full. . . ." (Exod 16:3) Later. the incident of the golden calf is cited as Israel's worst sin and is identified with the place-name "Dizahab." Thus, *Sifrei Deuteronomy* gives an extensive exposition of this exegetical tradition.

For our purposes the most important treatment of the tradition is found in the four targums: Neophyti 1, The Fragmentary Targum, Pseudo-Jonathan, and Onkelos. The targums provide important links with Jewish works written before the Gospels, and two of the targums reflect a tradition in which only three sins of Israel are mentioned.

Neophyti 1 and The Fragmentary Targum agree in listing three sins as the cause of God's anger, and both agree in naming these as the sending out of the spies from Paran, the grumbling associated with the manna, and the making of the golden calf.

Also, the targums provide important links with the Book of Jubilees and the Damascus Document from the Dead Sea Scrolls. The link with Jubilees is the mention of the fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in Neophyti 1 and the Fragmentary Targum: God was so angry he would have destroyed the wilderness generation except for his promise to the fathers. Pseudo-Jonathan mentions the merit of the "righteous fathers" while Onkelos alone is silent. The mention of the spies from Paran in all the targums except Onkelos is a link with the Damascus Document.

Thus, the targums explain the rebuke tradition as well as translate Deut 1:1. They also emphasize the emotional factor by focusing on God's anger.

Space makes it impossible to cite every reference to the rebuke tradition in rabbinic works. Suffice it here to say that Midrash Rabbah to Deuteronomy treats the tradition with great homiletical skill and also mentions three places where Israel provoked God. Further, the rebuke tradition is juxtaposed to the tradition of ten trials in the wilderness associated with Num 14:22 in *The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan.* There, each of the seven place-names in Deut 1:1 is identified with a sin in the wilderness, and three additional place-names from Deut 9:22 are added. This talmudic work again emphasizes the importance of using words from Deuteronomy to express the rebuke tradition.[9] At this point an important methodological issue must be raised. If the exegetical tradition in question cannot be traced back to NT times, it is difficult to prove that the tradition lies behind the Temptation narrative. On the other hand, if the tradition was known in the literature of or before the NT period, the interpreter is virtually assured that the tradition in question could have been known by NT writers.

Fortunately, there is evidence that the tradition was known both in the Damascus Document and in the Book of Jubilees. In the Damascus Document, column three, we read this concerning the wilderness generation.

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[9] *The Midrash Rabbah: Deuteronomy,* Vol. VII, trans. by J. Rabinowitz (London: Soncino, 1977) 2f. See also Exodus Rabbah 51:8 where this sentence occurs: "Hence did Moses rebuke them with 'and Laban, and Hazeroth, and Di-zahab' " (Deut 1:1). Here three place-names from the same verse are quoted. This strengthens the impression that a tradition focused on three sins. See *The Midrash Rabbah: Exodus,* Vol. III, trans. by S. Lehrman (London: Soncino, 1939) 571. See J. Goldin, *The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan,* Vol. X, Yale Judaica Series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) 136–37, chap. 34.

> And at Kadesh He said to them, "Go up and possess the land" (Deut 9:23). But they chose their own will and did not heed the voice of their Maker, the commands of their Teacher, but murmured in their tents: and the anger of God was kindled against their congregation."[10]

Three points virtually assure us that the author of the above knew the tradition associated with Deut 1:1. The first striking point is a citation from Deuteronomy. Second, the story to which Deut 9:23 alludes concerns the sending out of the spies from the "wilderness of Paran" (Numbers 13:3 and 26). Paran is one of the place-names in Deut 1:1. Also, the story of the sending out of the spies is one of the causes of God's anger in Targum Neofyti 1 and in The Fragmentary Targum and in other passages associated with the rebuke tradition. Third, like the targums, the passage stresses God's anger.

In the introduction to the Book of Jubilees, God speaks these words to Moses before the people have entered the promised land.

> And you, write for yourself all of these words which I shall cause you to know today, for I know their rebelliousness and their stubbornness before I cause them to enter the land which I swore to their fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. . . .[11]

There are two significant points of contact with the rebuke tradition. The mention of the fathers recalls this same feature in Targum Neofyti 1 and in The Fragmentary Targum. Perhaps of greater significance is the fact that the words of the rebuke are a composite of quotations from Deut 31:27, Deut 30:20, Deut 31:20, and possibly Exod 33:1.

Thus, the Damascus Document and the Book of Jubilees indicate that the rebuke tradition was known before the NT was written.

In addition, indirect evidence that the Temptation narrative presupposes the rebuke tradition is found in the way this tradition answers the questions of modern interpreters. For example, R. Bultmann wonders "why these three events were told as three temptations of the Son of God. . . ."[12] Others ask why only words from Deuteronomy are quoted by the Son of God. Why, for example, in the saying associated with the second temptation didn't Jesus quote from the primary account of the story in Exod 17:2c: "Why do you put the Lord to the proof?"

Note how the rebuke tradition answers these questions. In the rabbinic litrature the words from Deuteronomy are primary, and the original accounts of the incidents in Exodus and Numbers are cited only to illustrate and give specificity to the words from Deuteronomy. Further, only words from Deuteronomy were regarded as rebukes for Israel's failures. In answering Bultmann's query the literature suggests there was a tendency (or a tradition) to narrow the rebukes to three. Further, the tradition suggests why the

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[10] G. Vermes, *The Dead Sea Scrolls in English*, 2d ed. (Great Britain: Watson and Viney, 1984) 99.

[11] Jubilees 1:7, *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, Vol. 2, ed. J. Charlesworth (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985) 52. Also in Pseudo-Philo 12:4 there is a rebuke upon the wilderness generation although no words from Deuteronomy seem to be associated with it. See Pseudo-Philo, op. cit., 320. For additional support in Josephus and other premishnaic personages, see B. Malina, *The Palestinian Manna Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 1968) 72–74 and esp. n. 2, p. 72.

[12] Bultmann, op. cit., 256.

first and third "events were told." The tradition suggests that an act of idolatry involving the calf was the climax of Israel's failures. Also, the grumbling preceding the giving of the manna is frequently cited as a cause of God's anger. From other sources, of course, scholars know that the story of the manna was popular in contemporary literature. What other factors within the rebuke tradition or besides the rebuke tradition influenced the formulators of the narrative is not clear. Still, the rebuke tradition gives answers where previously there was guess-work.

The Work of Early Jewish Christians

Heretofore, we have examined the three citations from Deuteronomy and their contexts. We have explored the Jewish tradition found in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the rebuke tradition associated with Deut 1:1. Now it is time to outiine the work of Jewish Christians who fashioned these raw materials into a remarkable narrative which interpreted their faith in Jesus in terms of their Jewish heritage.

Let us begin by noting the basic parallelism drawn between the temptations faced by Jesus and those temptations to which Israel succumbed. Israel is hungry and murmurs: "You have brought us out into this wilderness to kill this whole assembly with hunger" (Exod 16:3b). Jesus is hungry and trusts God to satisfy his needs: " 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God' " (Matt 4:4). At Massah, Israel showed lack of faith by challenging God to perform a miracle for them: ". . . they put the Lord to the proof (test) by saying 'Is the Lord among us or not?' " (Exod 17:7). The devil tempts Jesus to repeat Israel's lack of faith. "If you are the Son of God," "tempt" God to prove it by a miracle. The citation from Deut 6:16 exposes the devil's strategy. Jesus again reveals what was in his heart. Again, his relationship to God has been tested.

In the third episode the parallel between the temptation of Israel and that of Jesus is clear. According to the rebuke tradition, idolatry is the climax of Israel faithlessness. So here in the climactic temptation the devil invites Jesus to worship him and thereby obtain "all the kingdoms of the world" (Matt 4:8). Jesus quotes a passage that lays bare the situation. Again, Jesus' relationship to God is tested, and the test disciplines him to reveal a heart faithful and obedient to God.

The parallelism between the faithfulness of Jesus and the unfaithfulness of the Mosaic generation is striking. Indeed, the parallelism reveals the remarkable unity of the passage. The setting flows as naturally into the first temptation as the first into the latter two. The narrative reveals remarkably subtle artistic and theological abilities. Further, by means of this parallelism Jewish Christians formulated a clear affirmation of their understanding of Jesus' status as Son of God. Sonship is understood in terms of faithful obedience to God's will. Where the first son was disobedient, this son was obedient. Faithfulness in temptation reveals the contents of the heart. Thus, the parallelism makes a theological affirmation of unmistakable clarity. Working with three citations and standing within the Jewish tradition, Jewish Christians formulated a story which exemplified a cardinal virtue of their heritage: obedience. Here, sonship is demonstrated by obedience.

Conclusions

What did the passage mean to those who first heard it? Two primary conclusions present themselves from the foregoing study. The first concerns the parallelism between Jesus and the wilderness generation, and the second concerns the meaning of the key term "Son of God." Both need further amplification.

As the parallelism indicates, Jesus relived the temptations of his ancestors: his faithfulness is contrasted with their unfaithfulness. Also, the rebuke tradition casts that parallelism in a certain light. The narrative is not a summary of the wilderness experience: only the negative aspects of the sojourn are emphasized. Perhaps the hearers also remembered God's anger associated with the rebuke tradition. At any rate, Israel's failures serve to emphasize the obedience of the son.

However, while the sonship of Jesus is the focus of the testing and thereby the point of the story,[13] interpreters do not agree concerning the prcise meaning the term "Son of God" conveys. Is it a title for the Messiah? Or does the term, once used to designate God's covenant people as God's son, thereby point to some non-messianic relationship? While the story itself does not define the term, it suggests the latter interpretation, since no traditional messianic conduct or titles, such as "Christ" or "Messiah," is found.

Further precision in defining "Son of God" is found by placing the Temptation narrative in context with the Baptismal narrative which immediately precedes it. Along with others, Alan Richardson argues that the two narratives must be viewed together on the basis of their parallel relationship with the wilderness generation: "As Israel of old, the 'son' whom God called out of Egypt, was baptized in the Red Sea and tempted in Wilderness, . . ."[14] so also Jesus is baptized in the Jordan and tempted in the wilderness. In view of this connection the meaning of the terms "beloved son" in the one story casts light on the title "Son of God" in the other. In the next section we shall see that the phrase "my beloved Son" does not mean a messiah, but indicates a unique relationship (defined by the word "beloved") to God. By obedience and faithfulness under duress that unique relationship is demonstrated.

If the two primary conclusions presented above constitute the main thrust of the narrative, what does the narrative tell us about the theology of the early Jewish Christians who formulated it?[15] As we pointed out, this remarkably subtle narrative reveals several clear theological affirmations.

First of all, the narrative reveals that Jewish Christians were interested in Christology. Moreover, they believed and worked with the exegetical traditions of the time to interpret their faith in Jesus in terms of their Jewish heritage. In addition, they were familiar with typology, and typology also was used in the service of Christology.

Second, they believed in a view of history whereby the Mosaic age in some ways would foreshadow, or parallel, the coming time of God's final deliverance for His people. (Of course, this view of history is implicit in their typological exegesis.) This same view of history is mirrored in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in much of the NT. Accordingly, the Temptation narrative implies that Jesus is bringing to a completion and a fulfillment the history of Israel. Jesus is obedient and faithful where Israel of old was not.

Further, they believed that in some sense they were living in the time of salvation. The obedience and faithfulness of Jesus has broken the power of the devil. He is the one who has bound the "the strong man" (Mark 3:27 and parallels) and has begun to plunder his house. Thus, the narrative of the Temptation heralds the time of deliverance.

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[13] Gerhardsson, op. cit., 20. Gerhardsson writes: ". . . that which is put to the test is precisely Jesus' *sonship;* the term *Son of God* is the *key term* in the narrative.

[14] A. Richardson, *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament* (London: SCM, 1958) 150.

[15] J. Dupont argues that the narrative originated in a Jewish Christian milieu. J. Dupont, "L'Arrierefond Biblique du Recit des tentations de Jesus," *NTS,* Vol. 3, No. 4 (1957) 299.

In the preceding section we have applied Gerhardsson's method of analysis to the narrative of the Temptation. Thereby, we entered the world of the story in order to determine its meaning as well as the theology of the early Jewish Christians who formulated it.

The Baptism and the Transfiguration

In this section space does not permit us to treat the stories of the Baptism and the Transfiguration as fully as the preceding narrative. Rather, we shall simply state the results of our analysis and thereby supplement what we have learned about the theology of Jewish Christians from the previous Temptation narrative. We shall find that both stories focus on Christology and add specificity to what has been learned about the title: Son of God.

Let us now turn to the Baptism of Jesus. Here the form of the story indicates that the focus of the narrative is directed to the words of the heavenly voice: "Thou art my beloved Son; with thee I am well pleased."[16]

According to most commentators the words of the heavenly voice are thought to be a composite quotation: the first half being assigned to Ps 2:7 and the latter half to Isa 42:1. Since God addresses the king of Israel in Ps 2:7 as "my son," the use of the words "my son" in the Baptismal narrative is thought to convey messiahship to the recipient. However, four points weigh heavily against this interpretation. First, the word "beloved" is not found in the Septuagintal text of Psalm 2, and the date of the targum which might supply the term is uncertain. Second, the phrase "beloved son" does describe Isaac three times in Gen 22:2, 12, 16 in the Septuagint. Third, the term "beloved" seems to be an inappropriate designation for the messiah. Fourth, the Greek text of Mark 1:9–11 contains several significant words in common with Genesis 22, as if the one story were quoting from the other. Actually, the cumulative effect of these four points weighs heavily in favor of the view that Genesis 22 is the source of the phrase "beloved Son."

Again, most commentators assign the second half of the sentence spoken by the heavenly voice ("with thee I am well pleased") to Isa 42:1. Again, difficulties immediately arise. First, various interpreters derive these words from a number of sources other than Isa 42:1. Second, the word for "well pleased" is not found in the LXX of Isa 42:1! Accordingly, the argument for Markan dependence on Isa 42:1 is weaker than most interpreters suppose. Indeed, a surprisingly strong argument can be made that the Jewish tradition associated with Genesis 22 is the source of the second half of the sentence as well. Perhaps the clearest evidence is found in the retelling of Genesis 22 in the Book of Jubilees 17:16: "Behold, Abraham loves Isaac, his son. And he is more pleased with him than everything."[17]

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[16] We have followed the analysis of F. Lentzen-Deis, *Die Taufe Jesu nach den Synoptikern* (Frankfort-Am-Main: Knecht, 1970) esp. chs. 4 and 5, pp. 97–248. The form "vision," found in the OT, is further developed in the targums so that the form focuses on the content of the words from heaven. The Markan story corresponds exactly to the formal elements of the "*Deute-Vision*"; Lentzen-Deis assigns a Palestinian *Hintergrund* to the form since it is found in the targums. Thus, he agrees largely with L. Keck concerning the background of this narrative.

[17] *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, Vol. 2, ed. J. Charlesworth (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985) 90. The *Ge'ez* that is translated as "pleased" is possibly a translation of *eudokeo*. See A. Dillmann, *Lexicon* (Lipsiae: 1865). Column 800 cites Sir. 37:28 for this verb representing *eudokeo*. Jubilees is a Palestinian book written about 100 years before Christ.

Accordingly, if our research is correct, the immediate background of the Baptismal narrative is both Genesis 22 and the Jewish exegetical traditions associated with Genesis 22 at the time the story of the Baptism was formulated. Consequently, the story was told in such a way that a Jew of the time would recall features of the story of the Binding of Isaac. A Jew of the time would also recall that Isaac was a kind of anticipatory sacrifice that validated all the subsequent sacrifices offered on the temple mount.

The parallelism or typology with Isaac enabled Jewish Christians to express their faith in a category with which they were familiar. As Isaac was the unique/beloved son of Abraham, so Jesus is the unique/beloved Son of God. By means of this typology, Jesus' relationship to God was expressed without reference to any messianic role. Also by this typology, the significance of his death as a sacrifice for sin could be explained.

Now let us turn to the narrative of the Transfiguration. Like the Baptismal narrative, this narrative, too, takes the form of a vision. Here, however, the vision portrays a scene from the coming end of the age, and consequently, should be classified as an apocalyptic vision.[18]

In this vision, too, the reader's attention is drawn to the climax of the story in the words of a voice from the cloud: "This is my beloved Son; listen to him" (Mark 9:7b). Redaction critics dispute whether these words were added by Mark from the Baptismal narrative or whether Mark inserted the voice into the Baptismal story from the Transfiguration![19] A third possibility is that the title was in current use among Jewish Christians when the narratives were formulated. Regardless of the origins of the words, our task is discovering the meaning of the words for Jewish Christians.

Since most interpreters of the Transfiguration point to the same words in the Baptismal story, a brief review of our analysis of the latter story is in order. There, the words are quoted from Genesis 22. Accordingly, the words "beloved Son" refer to the Abraham/Isaac story: they do not refer to the king and, hence, should not be understood messianically.[20]

Additional light may be shed on the words by the context in which they are found. In the Baptismal scene the context of "beloved Son" reflects the sacrificial thrust of the Binding of Isaac. In the Transfiguration scene the context is eschatological and apocalyptic. Here the context points to the eschatological authority of the "Son." Also, since the "Son" is being distinguished (as we shall see) from the eschatological prophet-like-Moses, the context seems to be emphasizing the unique relationship that is associated with the words rather than the sacrificial aspects.

Possibly, for Jewish Christians, the words "beloved Son" carried recollections of the expressions Jesus himself used in describing his relationship to God. For example, G.

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[18] H. Kee, "The Transfiguration in Mark," *Understanding the Sacred Text,* ed. J. Reumann (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1972) 149f. So also, M. Sabb, "La redaction du recit de la Transfiguration," *La Venue du Messie,* Recherches Bibliques, 6 (Louvain: 1962) 67–70.

[19] B. Chilton, "The Transfiguration: Dominical Assurance and Apostolic Vision," *NTS* 27 (1980–81) 119. G. Sellin argues that the words properly belong in the Transfiguration and Mark inserted them into the Baptism. G. Sellin, "Das Leben des Gottessohnes," *Kairos: Zeitschrift fur Religionswissenschaft und Theologie,* Neuefolge 25 (1983) 242.

[20] J. Fitzmyer also rejects the equation of son with Messiah in both the Markan and Lukan versions of the Transfiguration: "Here the Synoptic tradition has made use of a title that is pre-Pauline and has connotations other than messiah." See Fitzmyer, op. cit., 793.

Vermes, who sees Jesus as one of the charismatic, holy men of Galilee, summarizes what meaning the term *son of God* would convey to early Jewish Christians.

> If the reasoning followed in these pages is correct, the earliest use of *son of God* in relation to Jesus derives from his activities as a miracle-worker and exorcist, and from his own consciousness of an immediate and intimate contact with the heavenly Father.[21]

If Jewish Christians did not recollect and transmit such remembrances of Jesus in the period after the crucifixion, who else did it?

Having defined the significance of the term "Son" for Jewish Christians, we must turn to the problem involved in the juxtaposition of the words "beloved Son" with the admonition "listen to him." The words "listen to him" are associated with the prophet-like-Moses of Deut 18:15. While the prophet-like-Moses was to speak God's "words" to the people, in this vision the beloved Son has become "God's spokesman for the end time."[22] Thereby, the function of the eschatological prophet-like-Moses has been shifted to the Son and only the words "listen to him" are left to remind the reader of the Moses-like prophet.

Finally the precise meaning of this apocalyptic vision for Jewish Christians needs clarification. Of the numerous views concerning the meaning of this story, two seem to do most justice to the words of the passage. The traditional view sees in the Transfiguration a foreshadowing of the second coming of Jesus. A modern view articulated by H. Kee (see n. 22) interprets the Transfiguration to be a proleptic scene from the coming end of the page in which Jesus is "God's spokesman for the end time."

The words of the passage do not support the traditional view so much as the modern view. In passages like Mark 8:38, words and phrases like "Son of Man," "with the holy angels," and "comes in the glory" are associated with the second coming. They are absent here. The glistening white garments do not ncessarily indicate a second coming. They are a stock item in works that picture the end of the age as Revelation 7:13–14 shows. Rather, the climax of the story is found in the words from heaven, and these words support Kee's interpretation.

Let us summarize our findings concerning the title "beloved Son/Son of God." In the narrative of the Baptism, the words point to an Isaac/Jesus typology for they are the same words by which another voice from heaven asked Abraham to sacrifice his beloved son in Genesis 22. In the narrative of the Temptation the key words "Son of God" are also colored by the words "beloved Son" in the preceding narrative. Here, Jesus demonstrates his sonship by faithful obedience.

In the narrative of the Transfiguration the words "beloved Son" again recall the Isaac/Jesus typology. However, the words are packaged in so thoroughgoing an eschatological and apocalyptic fashion that the context must be taken into account. Here, the unique relationship between Father and Son is interpreted by the role assigned to the Son as "spokesman for the end time." In this role, Peter, James, and John, and the wider audience of Jewish Christians are admonished to "listen to him."

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[21] G. Vermes, *Jesus the Jew* (New York: Macmillan, 1973) 211. Also see J. Dunn, *Christology in the Making* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980) 26–28. Dunn speaks of Jesus' *abba* prayer and his sense of "eschatological uniqueness in his relationship with God," as conveyed through such passages as Mark 12:6 and Luke 22:29f.

[22] H. Kee, *Community of the New Age* (London: SCM Press, 1977) 123.

While it is hazardous to build too much upon these three narratives, a number of observations can be made. Our earlier observation about Jewish Christian interest in Christology is confirmed. Not only were they interested in Christology, but also the title "beloved Son/Son of God" was important in their theology. Further, the above research confirms the suggestion of M. Hengel that the title "Son of God" was the contribution of Jewish Christianity to the church.[23]

Second, the view of history whereby the salvation under Moses would in some ways foreshadow the greater salvation for God's people is both confirmed and augmented. As they formulated the story, the Jewish Christians saw the "type" for the mount of Transfiguration in Mount Sinai. Only here, not one, but several stories involving Mount Sinai constituted the "type." Again, these Moses/Sinai stories were understood in the light of contemporary exegetical traditions.

However, the prominence of the Sinai/Wilderness motif in Jewish Christianity must be augmented by the inclusion of other "types" such as the Isaac/Jesus typology. The richness of their Christological thinking was not confined to a single "type" or category. Again, our research confirms an observation by M. Hengel: their understanding of Jesus was not confined to "one 'episode in salvation history' among others."[24]

Third, the narrative of the Transfiguration further confirms the eschatological and apocalyptic orientation of early Jewish Christians. Here, the eschatological tension is heightened in that the very end itself is depicted.

Beyond the Evidence

Our research focused on narratives whose dominant Christology is expressed by the terms "Son of God/beloved Son." Other narratives remain to be analyzed. What about the title "Messiah?" This Son of God Christology stands in contrast to the Messiah-King Christology investigated by D. Juel.[25] Why did the narratives focus on one kind of Christology and the material investigated by D. Juel focus on another? Is the one earlier than the other? Are we talking about the same Jewish Christians or two different groups? Further research in this area is needed.

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[23] M. Hengel, *The Son of God* (London: SCM Press, 1976) 7–10. See esp. ch. 6. If Geza Vermes and others are correct, the title "son" originated with Jesus himself. See Vermes, *Jesus the Jew* (New York: Macmillian, 1973) ch. 8, esp. 209ff.

[24] M. Hengel, op. cit., 90.

[25] D. Juel, *Messianic Exegesis: Christological Interpretation of the Old Testament in Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988).

Wrath and Persuasion: The *Iliad* and Its Context

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In the last twenty-five years, Homerists have emerged from a sort of self-imposed seclusion. For a time, the imposing spectre of oral-formulaic composition had frightened off almost all who would seek unique meaning in Homer's phrases and plots. Homer's medium became his message; the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the earliest *Enkyklopedia Hellenike.* Today those who favor Homer the artist have become much bolder. A few have even attained a sort of Homeric *kleos.* Among scholars of the *Iliad* the names of Hermann Frankel, James Redfield, and Jasper Griffin resound far and wide and will probably do so for at least a few years more. Unlike the "formulists," these scholars and others see the Homeric poems as meaningful and unique wholes. But when such scholars search for the unique meanings of the poems, they still concentrate on the structures of Homer's world (and the ways Homer's characters transcend these structures), not the dynamic flow of events in Homer's narratives.

Historians tend to fight other battles, but only recently have they, too, occupied battle lines that have not been dictated by the oral landscape. The alleged conservatism of Homer's formulaic store set off a stampede "In Search of the Trojan War" that has not yet altogether subsided—a Mycenaean world glutted with boar-tusked helmets, figure-eight shields, and silver-studded swords. Leveler heads, such as Moses Finley, argued that "The World of Odysseus" was historical but post-Mycenaean. Those more sober still remained skeptical: Anthony Snodgrass forged weapons from cultural anthropology and classical archaeology to argue convincingly that Homer's world was a fiction, but in doing so he transformed Homer into a poetic genius who floated supremely above history. The problem is neither Homer the historian nor Homer the divine creator plays convincingly as Homer the human poet. As a result, a third, more convincing "Homer" has recently emerged, Homer the poet of his times. Oliver Taplan writes, "The very fact that [Homer's poems] came into existence says a lot about the concerns and the sensibilities of Homer's audience." But what exactly does it say? Put this way, the question of history can no longer be divorced from the question of interpretation.

Several writers have looked for Homer's original significance in his poetic world or his poetic techniques: the self-indulgent life-style of his *aristoi* or the geometric ordering of his verses. But cannot Homer's story have contributed something to his impact on his contemporaries? After all, many have noted that Homer's uniqueness among Greek epic lies in the unity, economy, and power of his narratives. In this essay, I want to explore this possibility with respect to the *Iliad.* First I will address the question of interpretation, then raise the question of history. I am especially interested in one facet of Homer's significance, the religious facet. Virtually everyone who looks at the Homeric world concludes that Homer's gods are superfluous literary fabrications. This conclusion is, however, at odds with the attitudes of the archaic and classical Greeks themselves. A reading of the *Iliad*'s story in its context suggests the opposite. However much Homer's gods may "overdetermine" events, however playful they may be, these gods are real and

necessary, and perhaps just the sort of gods that the Greeks needed in the eighth century BCE—and later.

Grief, Wrath, and Persuasion

As I read the *Iliad,* the story is not so much a tragedy of nature versus culture (Redfield) or a confrontation with the aporias of death (Griffin) but an epic of life in "society." At the center stands a theme that Homer clearly announces and that most scholars today quickly dismiss, "the wrath of Achilles." I concede that this theme is an antique, if not entirely antiquated. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a reading of the *Iliad*'s narrative ought to begin where Homer begins, and I doubt that we are done with Achilles's wrath quite yet.

A couple standard objections make it seem that Homer's opening prayer—"Sing, goddess, the wrath of Achilles"—goes unfulfilled. The first is philological. *Menis,* it is said, is a noun which, along with its verbal cognates, denotes a particular kind of anger felt only by Achilles and the gods. Unfortunately for Homer, the last time this kind of anger appears—in fact, the last time the noun *menis* appears—is when Achilles renounces his wrath at Agamemnon in Book Nineteen, just when tension really starts to build.

Philological arguments are impressive by their very learnedness, but I find this argument less convincing than I once did. First, *menis* is not a workhorse in Homer's vocabulary. After the first word, it appears only three times in the entire poem, once in Book Nine and twice in Book Nineteen. Statistically, we should not expect it again until somewhere around Book Twenty-Nine, in the middle of "Iliad II." Second, Homer does not appear to be as aware of verbal nuances as his commentators. He uses other terms, such as *cholos,* to describe Achilles' emotional state without any discernible indications of subtle differences, even when Achilles is allegedly renouncing his *menis* in Book Nineteen (cp. 1.217, 19.15). Third, *menis* is the very first word of the poem, obviously an intentionally forceful position. But given the conventions of Homer's meter, *menis* is the only word for wrath that can occupy this position. If Homer had used another noun, such as *cholos,* he would have sung a weaker opening. In fact, the later Greeks themselves did not seem to feel the sense and force that is attributed to *menis* today. When the *Iliad* was loosely integrated into the Homeric cycle, the redactors gave it a new beginning: "Tell me now, O Muses who dwell on Olympus, how *menis* and *cholos* came upon" Achilles and Apollo.

A second objection to reading the *Iliad* as a poem about Achilles' wrath is based not on the poem's vocabulary but on its content, and this objection appears to be more weighty. *Menis* or not, Achilles' wrath does not seem to be the subject of the poem we have before us. After Achilles becomes enraged in Book One, he drops out of sight. The poet treats us to what Frankel perspicuously identified as a synopsis of the war at Troy. Achilles pops into view around Book Nine, but only long enough to dispatch Patroklos to his death. Once Patroklos is killed, Achilles reappears on center stage, but he *renounces* the anger that the poem is supposed to be about, is reconciled with the Achaians, and fights valiantly to a very dramatic climax. Either the momentum of the story carries Homer on to a grand finale that is unannounced and out of place, or Homer sings a single, unified poem but stumbles over the first few lines, unable to articulate his grand theme.

This objection is forceful. The reader who finds the plot of the *Iliad* compelling as a whole cannot simply take Achilles' wrath at Agamemnon as its subject. We must plumb deeper to discern Homer's meaning when in effect he claims, "I sing the wrath of Achilles."

To discern this meaning, I believe it is necessary to stop looking at "wrath" in isolation and reinsert it into the system of interactions to which, in Homer's mind, it clearly belongs. The premium of the *Iliad* clearly articulates half, but only half, of this system:

wrath produces sufferings, in this case, countless sufferings for the Achaians and death for mighty heroes. The other half of the system appears, for example, in one of Homer's memorable similes: ". . . like a strong-bearded lion whose whelps a stag-hunter has seized from out of the thick wood; and the lion, when it returns, grieves (*achnutai*) and traverses many vales, scenting out the tracks of the man, if somewhere he might find him. For especially sharp anger (*cholos*) seizes him" (18.318–322). Wrath not only produces sufferings; it also results from suffering. Gregory Nagy puts the two halves together, but with French overtones that reify evil more than I find appropriate in the *Iliad:* "The word *akhos* [distress, anguish] signals *le transfer du mal:* the *akhos* of Akhilleus leads to the *menis* of Akhilleus leads to the *akhos* of the Akhaians." In brief, Homer's theme is the cyclical interaction of grief and wrath centered upon Achilles, "the best of the Achaians," but naturally the way Homer elaborates this theme is much more complex than the quote from Nagy seems to imply.

The cyclical interaction of grief and wrath seems to have been something of a typical theme in early Greek epic. Generalized, it appears on the famous shield of Achilles in *Iliad* Eighteen. Even more pointedly, Homer recounted another instance of this theme at length in the embassy to Achilles in Book Nine. There Phoinix warned Achilles to relent, lest he suffer the fate of Meleagros—Meleagros, who, affronted by his mother, retired from battle in anger and sulked, resisting every attempt at persuasion except that of his wife, Cleopatra; when Cleopatra finally did persuade her husband, he returned to battle and fought valiantly, but he had lost the rewards that would otherwise have been his.

Just as the cycle of grief and wrath and grief underlies the architecture of the story of Meleagros, so it underlies the architecture of the *Iliad.* But the ways the *Iliad* differs from the Meleagros-tale are instructive. For one thing, Homer shows more psychological insight than Phoinix. An enraged hero does not seek his own betterment (as the moral of Phoinix's story implies); he seeks revenge. For him, the cycle of grief and wrath must end where it began, not with the hero but with the person who affronted him. The result is a poem constructed of two successive cycles that take grief and wrath to their ultimate expressions.

The first cycle begins with an escalating spiral: the wrath of Chryses and Apollo leads to the wrath of Agamemnon, which leads in turn to the wrath of Achilles. Achilles contemplates drawing his sword and running Agamemnon through, but Athena restrains him. So begins the theme of the enraged and sulking hero who, unwilling to take action which would destroy society completely, must be content with inflicting suffering by refusing to act. Homer's treatment of the situation is masterful and bold. Phoinix dwells on the sulking Meleagros and the attempts to persuade him. Homer has Achilles return to his ships—and ignores him. Instead, he patiently and persistently shows what is at stake in the sufferings that Achilles' anger inflicts: the whole Trojan campaign. The Achaian hopes rise with Diomedes' *aristeia* (his demonstration of prowess in Books Five and Six), only to be crushed by a Trojan onslaught that brings the Achaians to the brink of despair.

At this point, Achilles reappears, but only because his appearance is mandated by what is of more interest to Homer than Achilles himself, the consequences of Achilles' wrath. Desperate, the Achaians attempt to close the cycle of grief and wrath by means that placate even the gods (cp. 9.499ff). Their failure leaves both themselves and Achilles in impossible positions. The Achaians are brought from the brink of despair to the brink of annihilation. Under the cover of night, Diomedes and Odysseus manage a successful raid, but Homer simply uses this passage (usually athetized) to add to the pathos of the next day's events. The Trojans breach the walls, overcome every hero but the steadfast Ajax (Achilles' anti-type), and set fire to the ships. At the same time, Achilles finds that a strategy of nonaction involves him in contradictions that inevitably cause the cycle of

grief and wrath to snap another turn. Despite his intentions, Achilles cannot be both inside and outside the camp. Faced with the entreaties of Patroklos, he is caught between action and nonaction, wrath and friendship. The contradiction is embodied in the fateful, implausible instructions Achilles gives Patroklos as he tries to be both places at once: fight while you are being beaten; when you start to win, stop. Patroklos is an inevitable if unintended casualty of Achilles' great rage.

The first cycle of grief and anger is never really resolved; it is simply replaced. Achilles does make up with Agamemnon, but only because, after he has rolled in the dust in anguish for his lost comrade, a new "anger (*cholos*) came harder upon him, and his eyes glittered terribly under his lids, like sunflare. He was glad, holding in his hands the shining gifts of Hephaistos" (19.15–18). Wrath at an ally gives way to wrath at an enemy. The anger of nonaction becomes the rage of action. The story of Achilles' wrath now becomes the story of Achilles' deeds. Achilles refuses to eat; only with difficulty does he allow others to do so. Beside himself with rage, Achilles lashes out even at the gods. He kills Hektor, but he would prefer to eat his flesh raw. In his rage, he entirely forgets to bury Patroklos, until reminded of his duty by Patroklos' own ghost. Finally, he drags Hektor's corpse about Patroklos' pyre for twelve days running. Homer has described rage pushed to its absolute limit. There are no *algea*, no sufferings, that, once inflicted, will dispel Achilles' wrath. Within the limits of human society, the situation has become utterly impossible—until a force outside society, a compelling force, intervenes.

There are marked differences between this story and the tale of Meleagros. First, the setting. Meleagros refuses to fight for a settled community over which his family has control. The communal model echoes the extended family of the *oikos*, the household writ large. Achilles sulks among a group of male warriors bound together on a foreign shore not by kin nor by *oikos* structures but simply by the force of their common enterprise. Second, in the tale of Meleagros, Cleopatra saves the city by persuading her husband to fight. In the *Iliad*, Achilles' closest companion, Patroklos (whose name inverts the two elements of Cleopatra's name), only compounds the misery. On the banks of Troy, companionship counts for something, but the situation is devoid of the familial structures that made for order at home. Finally, Meleagros is the champion of his city, but so are Agamemnon, Diomedes, Ajax, Odysseus, and the rest of the heroes we meet on the Ilian shore. Achilles is unique, and it is his uniqueness that makes his rage truly remarkable. He is the best of the best, "the best of all the Achaians," and he embodies the strength that the Achaian camp needs to survive. But for Homer, the very quality that gives Achilles the capacity for tremendous good also gives him the capacity for tremendous rage: the great *thumos* that Phoinix pleads with Achilles to tame. The paradox is nothing less than the paradox of Homeric society itself. The hero on whom survival depends is, when enraged, its greatest threat, and no human, social force can constrain him.

There is, then, another dimension to Homer's theme. The need for persuasion plays a continuous counterpart to the cyclical interaction of grief and wrath, for to yield to persuasion is to relent from anger. Anger is the force of disruption and war, persuasion the force of harmony and order. In the active voice, *peitho*, "to persuade," *effects* order and harmony; in the middle voice it *reflects* it, as when Achilles bids Patroklos to welcome his guests, and Patroklos "is persuaded" to do so.

That Achilles' wrath excludes persuasion is clearly marked. The phrase "*ou me peiseis*"—"you will not persuade me!"—appears so frequently on Achilles' lips that the reader is tempted simply to skip it. The dying Hektor breathes out: "I know you well as I look upon you, I know that I could not persuade you, since in your breast is indeed a *thumos* of iron" (22.356–357). But there is an extra sharp edge to Achilles' implacability. Homer's

world sets a limit to legitimate anger, a limit given in the paradigm of the gods and heroes of old, who, when angered, were and are placated with gifts and persuaded with words (9.497–526). Achilles violates this limit, and this is a point that Homer does not want us to miss. He places the divine paradigm at the beginning of the entire poem. When Apollo is enraged at the offense to Chryses his priest, Kalchas the seer suggests that the Achaians propitiate the god, for "thus we might persuade him" (1.100). Unlike Achilles, the god relents.

Yet as the poem proceeds, two forms of persuasion enjoy some measure of success. One of these is the persuasion of Achilles' companion, Patroklos. The day after the visit of Agamemnon's emissaries, Achilles sends Patroklos to Nestor on the pretext of wanting to learn the identity of a wounded warrior. Nestor seizes the opportunity and asks Patroklos to intercede with Achilles. "With a god's help," he says, "you might move him. For the persuasion of a companion is a strong thing" (11.792–793 = 15.403–404). We already know that Patroklos will achieve only limited success, for when he first answered Achilles' summons, Homer commented, "this was the beginning of his misfortune" (11.604). And before Patroklos has breathed a word of entreaty to Achilles, we have overheard Zeus tell Hera all that will happen (15.60–71). In effect, Patroklos only persuades Achilles to condemn him to death. With this death, Homer has transformed what had typically been an instrument of hope—the persuasion of an *hetairos* (cp. Cleopatra)—into a vehicle of disaster. Against the contradictions of Achilles' rage even the most potent human instrument of social order is useless.

With Patroklos dead, there is but one recourse left, the persuasion of the gods. When anger first arises in Achilles' breast, Athena descends from Olympus. "I have come to calm your fury, if you will obey," she says—that is, "if you will be persuaded" (1.207). Achilles is at once a model of placability: "It is necessary to observe your words, goddess, even though I am enraged (*kecholomenon*) in my *thumos*. For thus it is better. The gods hearken especially to the person who 'obeys' (*epipeithetai*) them" (1.216–218). Appearances notwithstanding, Achilles is at pains to follow the specific instructions of the gods throughout the poem, and in the end, it is the gods who overcome Achilles' rage. Thetis appears to her son and informs him of Zeus' plan. Remarkably, Homer gives us not even a hint that Achilles hesitates: "So be it. [Priam] can bring the ransom and take off the body, if the Olympian himself so urgently bids it" (24.139–140).

But Achilles' rage has gone very far, and the quelling of this rage requires the violation of several conventions. Priam's liaison with Achilles must take place by cover of night. It defies common sense and normal cooperation: "*ou me peiseis*"—"you will not persuade me"—Priam tells Hekabe, and Hermes tells Priam (24.219, 433). Mortal enemies share the most intimate sign of communality, a meal, and then sleep under the same roof. Like all conventions, these conventions must be broken by a specialist. Priam is escorted by Hermes, the same god who escorts souls to that other most untamable being, Hades.

When at the end of Book Nine Odysseus had told the assembled Achaians that Achilles was implacable, Homer noted the response: "Thus he spoke, and they all remained silent, marveling at his speech, for he spoke very powerfully" (9.694–695). When the aged Priam stands at Achilles' door, we are again in the presence of the profound. "[Priam] stood close beside him and caught the knees of Achilles in his arms, and kissed the hands that were dangerous and manslaughtering and had killed so many of his sons. . . . [And] Achilles wondered as he looked upon Priam, a godlike man, and the rest of them wondered also, and looked at each other" (24.477–480, 483–484). In the ensuing encounter, Achilles struggles to control himself. Priam's miseries inevitably remind Achilles of Achilles' own sufferings, and his anger threatens to erupt (24.568–586). But in the end, as Achilles

himself is aware, the will of the gods prevails. Achilles' wrath and the sufferings that it wrought are finally extinguished with the last flickers of Hektor's pyre.

The Poet and His Audience

To formulate a good answer to "the question of history," "What does the *Iliad* say about the concerns and sensibilities of Homer's audience?" I would like to know more than we do. To begin with, I would like to know when Homer lived, where he lived, what the circumstances were under which he sang his songs, and in detail who his audience was and what their world was like.

Our answers to these questions are sadly limited. There are clear hints in the *Iliad* that its author conceived of the world from an Ionian perspective. There is a general consensus among scholars that Homer lived in the mid to late eighth century B.C.E., although the evidence is far from conclusive. We know a little about other bards—the rhapsodes who later recited Homeric poetry, and Hesiod who won first prize in a competition on Euboea—but for Homer and his Ionic associates, G. L. Huxley is depressingly sober and depressingly correct: "There is little evidence for the circumstances in which the Asiatic Greek poets were accustomed to recite their epics." As for Homer's audience, new discoveries and ever more sophisticated analytical techniques promise increasing elucidation from archaeology, but what I want to know remains dismally obscure. About Asia Minor in what was likely to have been Homer's time, J. M. Cook writes, "[Archaeology] cannot relieve our ignorance of the constitutional history of these early settlements." On the best known location in all of Greece, Snodgrass has observed, "We still do not know enough of Attica in the second half of the eighth century to speak with any confidence about the likely intellectual and spiritual concerns of its artists." Clearly, there is much more potential for detail in other subjects that are every bit as interesting, such as the German cabarets of the golden '20s or the circle of Maecenas in Augustan Rome.

If Homer did live in eighth century Ionia, it seems that he lived in the wrong place at a very exciting time. By the eighth century, Ionia was one of Greece's cultural backwaters. It was, ironically, isolated from the oriental influences that had sparked off bursts of cultural activity in other parts of the Greek world. But Ionia did have a proud past. Precisely when and why and how Greeks had come to settle on the Western coast of Asia Minor is unknown, but come they did, beginning somewhere around the eleventh century B.C.E. They seem to have brought with them the roots from which a flourishing tradition of oral poetry would grow.

It is difficult, of course, to know the precise place of oral poetry in Ionic life. All that we have are tantalizing hors d'oeuvres that do nothing to sate our hunger for the main course. Homer's references to phyla and phratries as military and kinship units seem to echo the phyla and phratries of Ionia. Features of Ionian settlements seem reflected in similar characteristics in Ionian epic. Homer's audiences would probably have included the leading men on the Asia Minor coast, men with such suggestive names as Agamemnon and Hektor and patronyms such as Neleid (allegedly from Pylian stock come east *via* Athens). It is tempting to speculate that the epic tradition somehow postulated an ideal that the Ionians tried to emulate.

Ionia could also boast of another major achievement, although given the recent discoveries at Lefkandi on Euboea it must now share its bragging rights. Early on, Ionia developed large, settled communities. We do not know how the settlements were patterned. Toward the end of the eighth century some communities were gathered about an elevated citadel (what Homer would call a *ptolis*) with an open area (for assembly?) flanked by a temple-altar complex and what is presumably the hut of the leading man. Fortifica-

tion walls were not unknown—Smyrna and Emporio-on-Chios had them—but they seem to have been rare. The sparsity of fortifications should not be taken, however, to imply a sparsity of strife. Inter-Ionian struggles were not entirely quelled when later the twelve leading Ionian cities banded together to form a league, centered about a common sanctuary.

By the eighth century, though, the real excitement in Greece was back by the mainland, at places like Euboea, Corinth, and Athens. Some alleged developments of the time are debatable: a shift from pastoral nomadism to sedentary agriculture, an immense population growth that quadrupled the size of Athens in the last half of the century, or, alternatively, the rise of a populist movement at Athens in mid-century that was suppressed as the seventh century began. Others are more certain, and they make for an impressive list: the opening up of serious trade to the east and to the west, followed within a generation by serious colonization, especially in the fertile plains of Magna Graeca; the introduction of writing; the development of an orientalizing style in art; and the systematization of mythology upon oriental lines. These developments alone would be enough to swell any generation with pride, but they were accompanied by three others that, for my purposes, at least, were even more momentous.

First, it was in the eighth century that the *polis* emerged. Dark Age settlements had generally been small; the dominant institution was the *oikos*, the household of the leading man together with his retainers. In the eighth century, whether by the coalescence of *oikoi* ("synoikism") or some other means, a new community emerged that was characterized by a body of "citizens" (variously restricted) who deliberated on a communal goals. At the same time, the religion of the Greeks developed very significant forms: the pan-Hellenic sanctuaries of Olympia, Delphi, Delos, and Dodona first became active; hero-cults at Mycenaean tombs were disseminated widely; and there appeared temples around which the emerging *poleis* coalesced. Last but certainly not least, an intense interest in oral epic seems to have swept the Greek world in the mid to late eighth century from the east to as far west as Pithecousai off the coast of modern Naples. It is difficult to assess Homer's place in this movement. On one count only about 10% of the heroic scenes on vases from the period are from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey;* other parts of the Homeric cycle seem to have been more popular with painters. But in any case, by the time genuine history begins a century or so later, Homer has clearly emerged from the pack.

These, then, are the two historical contexts against which we must read the *Iliad:* the Ionia in which the epic tradition developed and in which the poem was composed, and the pan-Hellenic environment in which the poem became disseminated.

Those who find meaning in the poem's structures inevitably see the epic as a device of legitimation. Different critics describe Homer's world differently, of course, but throughout all the variations the world of which Homer sings remains the world of his heroes, the *aristoi* or leading class; all other members of society are inconsequential. It is a quick jump to assume that Homeric epic provided the ideal for the leading class, whether that class was actually leading or, as Ian Morris has recently suggested for late eighth century Athens, in (temporary) retreat. The *aristoi,* this view suggests, liked to think of themselves as Mycenaean heroes, and there seems to be evidence that they did. Not only does "narrative" heroic art make its first appearance in the Greek world at this time (cp. other traits cited earlier); even today funerals are often clear signs of social pretension, and some eighth-century funerals seem to have emulated Homeric practice.

It is worth pointing out that most people like to admire and emulate heroes, even heroes whose social position bears no relation to the social world of the admirers. But with that *caveat,* Homeric poetry as social legitimation satisfies quite easily the requirements of historians who want to read the poems against the larger structures of eighth century

Greece. Presumably, however, this function would not have been peculiar to Homer, for Homer's *aristoi* were probably not much different from the *aristoi* in the rest of the (Ionic) epic tradition. Not the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* but the existence of an epic tradition itself would have helped legitimate the position and prestige of the upper crust. Here, then, "Homer" is a sort of synecdoche: as the most renowned practitioner of oral epic, he stands for the whole tradition.

But in that case we have not quite answered the historical question with which I began. In and of itself, the notion of legitimation does not explain why an audience in eighth-century B.C.E. Greece would have the interest or the patience to listen to a poem such as the *Iliad*, nor why Homer would compose it. For in the *Iliad*, Homer does not simply sing of heroes whom we can admire and emulate. Something more subtle is going on. Admirable and emulatable figures are certainly there. Like Superman, both the Achaian and the Trojan heroes perform tasks impossible for mortals of today. But Homer only uses these heroes as a background. In the foreground he idealizes something quite different: the internal. social forces that threatened to destroy the heroes and their world. Achilles represents the force of disintegration at its most extreme: individual rage and obstinacy raised to its upper limits. As a result, Achilles is not a hero whom we admire and emulate. In fact, Homer builds an audience into the poem to help evoke from us the appropriate response. Confronted with Achilles' rage and implacability, even the great heroes of old sat in stunned amazement.

In the end, however, the stunned amazement of the Achaians is eclipsed by the profound peace and silence that accompany the quelling of Achilles' great rage in *Iliad* Twenty-Four. A reader of today, whether religious or not, inevitably sees psychological forces at work in Achilles' relenting, but it is clear that Homer—and Achilles—see the matter quite differently. In the poem, Achilles relents only because forces outside himself and his world intervene. These forces are not the "bright, lucid, rational" gods that every now and then one still reads were Homer's contribution to Greek religion. Nor are they the gods with which Walter Otto could indulge his romantic sentiments. These are human gods—for some, gods too human to be divine. But these gods had to be human. They stand to Homer's *aristoi* in the position the *aristoi* were supposed to stand to the rest of society. Their *bie* and *time* and *arete* were supreme, and as a result their will was unavoidable, even for an enraged hero of the calibre of Achilles.

Read as a narrative, rather than as exemplifying epic structures, the *Iliad* does not make much sense as legitimating the position of the leading class. Instead, it makes sense as powerfully articulating what to some ninth to eighth century Greeks, at least, was the ultimate threat to human, social existence, and then providing a religious, social fiction to mystify that threat and thereby overcome it. I think we can see the poem doing just this in at least two contexts.

First, many have noted that Homer's perspective is the (imagined) perspective of an Ionian colonist. His Ionia is deliberately archaizing, and the Achaians camped on Troy's shore are closely analogous to the first Greeks to come east to Asia Minor. Could it have been that the experience of colonization and the precocious development of larger settlements disrupted the normal structures of authority and legitimation and forced the colonizers to develop, to some extent, a community of "equals" forced, like the Achaian warriors, to depend upon the power of persuasion for their survival? If so, the precedent of later Ionian history—and Greek history generally—suggests that such a community could only have come into existence under the patronage of the gods.

Second, the same move from patriarchal authority to "communal" consensus would have characterized the development of the *polis* in the eighth century B.C.E., whatever the precise process. And with the rise of temples religion—the activity of such familiar

Homeric gods of the *polis* as Zeus and Athena and Apollo—seems to have been the essential fiction that made the process possible.

Perhaps the *Iliad*'s profound hold on the Greek imagination derives from the fact that, until Alexander's conquests, Greek communities were always communities of persuasion, threatened by the same force of fragmentation that Achilles embodied, and united by the common fiction that the gods were socially supreme. But it is also possible to speculate, at least, on the *Iliad*'s impact when it was first being sung. Oswyn Murray suggests that we imagine epic bards reciting their poems in smoke-filled *megara* such as those whose foundations have been discovered on the citadels of Zagora and Emporio. If he is correct, the awe that the *Iliad* evoked should have been very powerful indeed. The disputes whose threat became real in Achilles took place just outside the door, while the gods dwelled—and exercised their persuasive power—less than a hundred yards from where the bard and his audience sat.

Epidaurian Miracle Cures

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Asklepios was essentially a god of hope. For the healthy, he provided a locus for prayer that good health would continue. For the sick or troubled, he offered comfort and the possibility of aid when other methods had failed. The sanctuary of Asklepios at Epidauros was one of the great centers of pilgrimage for people in severe difficulty, particularly in matters of health. What many of these pilgrims, or suppliants, expected from the god and experienced at the sanctuary is preserved for us in a series of remarkable inscriptions.

The tales survive on large stelai, roughly 5'7" high by 2½ feet wide, inscribed in the second half of the fourth century B.C.E. Two of the stelai are reasonably complete and contain 20 and 23 tales respectively; fragments of a further two bring the total up to approximately 70 tales. Pausanias mentions six of these stelai in the second century C.E., and says that in earlier times there were more.[1] One of the stelai bears a heading declaring that what follows are the cures, *Iamata,* of Apollo and Asklepios.

The Iamata deal with a wide variety of illnesses and accidents, which range from the catastrophic to the mundane. In most cases, the names and home districts of the people are recorded, and we can see from this that patients came to Epidauros from the furthest reaches of Greek civilization. Parents came with, and sometimes on behalf of children; patients came with every degree of illness, some walking on canes, others carried on litters; apparently healthy men and women came in hopes of fertility, conception or successful childbirth. People sought out Asklepios' help to find missing persons and objects; to go on sailing trips; and to enter into commercial ventures.

Most commonly, the tales deal with the practice of "incubation." Patients slept within the sacred enclosure in a special building called the *Abaton.* During the night, they hoped for a dream sent by the god, or a visitation by the god himself. Within the dream, the god would cure the patient, and the next morning, he or she would leave the Abaton healthy. Very often, the tales' narration leaves unclear what occurs in the dream and what is really happening. This is perhaps in some cases deliberate.

Expectation was heightened by ritual; faith was reinforced by miraculous tales, circulating informally by mouth and in written form on many votives, and formally on these impressive, monumental stelai.

A patient might be greeted by the following:

Tale B 3: "Aristagora of Troezen. Since she had a worm in her belly, she slept in the sanctuary of Asklepios in Troezen and she saw a dream. It seemed to her that the sons of the god, while he was not there but was in Epidauros, cut off her head, but they couldn't put it back again so they sent someone to the Asklepieion where he was, so that he would return. Meanwhile the day comes too soon and the priest clearly sees the head removed from the body. During the following night Aristagora saw a vision. It seemed to her that the god had returned from Epidauros and put her head back on her neck,

[1] Pausanias, *Guide to Greece,* II.27.3 (Edel. T. 384).

and after that cut open her belly, took out the worm and sewed it together again, and after that she became healthy."

For anyone doubting the tales or the power of the god, the corpus provided a warning:

Tale A 11: "Aischines, when the suppliants were already sleeping, went up a tree to peek over into the Abaton. Then he fell out of the tree and impaled his eyes on some fencing. In a dreadful state, having been blinded, he earnestly prayed to the god, slept here, and became sound.

Tale B 16: "Kaphisias. This man laughed at the treatments of Asklepios. "The god is lying saying he cures the lame," he said, "because if he has the power, why hasn't he cured Hephaistos?" Kaphisias suffered punishment for this outrage, for while he was riding his bull-headed horse, it trampled him and wounded him in the foot so that he was in an even worse condition than before. Later, after he had earnestly prayed to the god, he became healthy." [heavily restored text]

There is a tremendous variety in the reported afflictions, but the most common are blindness and the conception and birth of children. Both of these problems could be handled in any number of ways:

Tale A 1: "Kleo was pregnant for five years. After the fifth year of pregnancy, she came as a suppliant to the god and slept in the Abaton. As soon as she had left it and was outside the sacred area, she gave birth to a son who, as soon as he was born, washed himself at the fountain and walked about with his mother. Because of these things the fortunate woman inscribed upon an offering: "The wonder is not the size of the plaque, but the act of the god: Kleo bore a burden in her stomach for five years, until she slept here, and he made her healthy."

Tale B 19: "Agameda from Keos. This woman, sleeping here concerning children, saw a dream. It seemed to her that in her sleep a snake lay down upon her stomach. And from this five children were born to her."

Tale A 9: "A man came as a suppliant to the god because he was so blind in one eye that, while he still had the eyelids of that eye, there was nothing within them and they were completely empty. Some of the people in the sanctuary were laughing at his simple-mindedness in thinking that he could be made to see, having absolutely nothing, not even the beginnings of an eye, but only the socket. Then in his sleep, a vision appeared to him. It seemed that the god boiled some drug, and then drew apart his eyelids and poured it in. When day came he left with two eyes."

Asklepios dealt with problems both in amazing and down-to-earth ways. A modern doctor might be in sympathy with the following prescription:

Tale B 9: "Agestratos, headache. This man was afflicted with sleeplessness on account of the distress in his head. When he came into the Abaton, he fell asleep and saw a dream. It seemed to him the god had cured the pain in his head and then stood him up straight, naked, and taught him the [stance] from the [wrestling competition]. When day came he left healthy and not a long time after won the [wrestling match] at Nemea."

Though many of the conditions in the Iamata are subject to spontaneous remission, causing some modern commentators to view both cure and illness as hysterical in origin, Asklepios could help in areas we still only dream of today:

Tale A 19: "Heraieos of Mytilene. This man had no hair on his head, but plenty on his chin. Ashamed because the other men laughed at him, he slept here. The god anointed his head with a drug and made it have hair."

Asklepios also dealt with many problems unconnected with illness:

Tale B 4: "Under a rock, a boy Aristokritos of Halieis. He had dived and swum away into the sea and then remaining under water he came upon a dry place completely surrounded by rocks, and he couldn't find any way out. Later his father, when he couldn't

find anything searching, slept here before Asklepios in the Abaton concerning his son and saw a dream. It seemed that the god led him to a certain place and there showed him where his son was. When he left the Abaton and quarried the stone he found his son on the seventh day."

Sometimes healing occured in unexpected ways, though the patients (and authorities) knew that Asklepios was the source and dedicated votives accordingly:

Tale B 6: "A dog cured a boy from Aegina. He had a growth on his neck. When he had come to the god, a dog from the sanctuary licked his neck one day, and made him healthy."

Tale A 16: "Nicanor, lame. One day when he was sitting down, some boy grabbed his crutch and ran away. Getting up, he ran after the boy and from this he became healthy."

Tale B 23: "A man from Kios, gout. One day, the man was walking over to a goose, which bit him in the feet and by making them bleed, made him healthy."

The Iamata inscriptions can provide important evidence of the religious hopes and speculations of ordinary people in the later Classical and Hellenistic periods. To use them responsibly, however, their sources and the history of their compilation must be determined as far as possible.

At the time the stelai were inscribed, the sanctuary was in the process of being expanded and monumentalized. As a part of this program, individual votive inscriptions were selected and combined, resulting in the corpus format on the surviving stelai. This process is indicated by the internal evidence of the Iamata, and by the heading of an analogous collection, slightly later in date, from an Asklepios shrine in Lebena, Crete.[2]

In most cases, an inscribed votive plaque original is the most likely source. A prime example of this is tale A 1, which preserves the text of Kleo's original dedication. This dedication is in a simple verse form, two hexameters and a pentameter, a strong indication of "professional" composition and construction of the votive by an artisan. In addition to this, it is possible that oral tales associated with prominent votives were also transferred to stone. Kleo is again a good example, since the narrative portion of her tale contains elements not present in the dedication, most notably the boy getting up and walking about immediately after birth. This element may reflect oral amplification of her original inscription. The interplay between inscribed and oral material is one of the most significant factors affecting the final forms of many of the tales. Other elements may derive from the preferences and abilities of the artisans who actually created most people's votives. Some tales, possibly that of Aristagora, who temporarily "lost her head" at Troizen, may derive from other Asklepios sites, or even from ancient historians.

Close examination of the collection reveals stylistic and thematic patterns, indicating sub-groups of tales. Some groups are organized according to subject, while other groupings cover a variety of afflictions but share style and certain motifs. The following group of three tales from Stele A is a very clear example of this:

Tale A 12: "Euhippos had a spear head in his jaw for six years. While he was sleeping here, the god drew the spearhead out and gave it to him in his hands. When day came, he left healthy, having the spearhead in his hands.

Tale A 13: "A man from Torone, leeches. When he was sleeping, he saw a dream. It seemed to him that the god ripped open his chest with a knife, took out the leeches and gave them to him in his hands, and sewed his breast together. When day came he left

[2] *Inscriptiones Creticae* I xvii 8 (159).

having the animals in his hands, and had become healthy. He had drunk them down, after being tricked by his stepmother who had thrown them into a potion which he drank.

Tale A 14: "A man had a stone in his penis. He saw a dream. It seemed that he was having sex with a beautiful boy and as he had an orgasm in his sleep, he ejected the stone and picking it up he left with it in his hands."

The repeated mention of carrying the foreign body in the hands emphasizes the relationship of these three tales. However, the motif is not consistently applied. In the first two tales, it is very natural and stresses the hand to hand contact between the god and the patient, a bridge between dream (the surgical vision) and concrete reality. These two tales also share many stylistic features which connect them. However, the third tale is very different, both stylistically and in the type of illness and cure. The presence of the motif of hands in this tale must be explained in terms of the history of the collection and arrangement of the corpus.

There are several other very noticeable sub-groups. Tales 1–10 on Stele A form a somewhat looser cluster of this kind; not only are they related linguistically, but the arrangement and editing seems to reflect a particular message about the god, portraying his great power and kindliness, and providing warning and correction to irreverent people. Tales 1–5 on Stele B deal with Asklepios' ability to act at a distance, extending his sphere of influence. However, it should be noted that very often in larger thematic sub-groups of this kind, the individual tales can be dissimilar linguistically and stylistically.

Based on these conditions I suggest the following model for the compilation of this text. First, the sources themselves are various, including A) text votives, and B) oral tales inspired by pictorial votives or other objects around the sanctuary. Second, collection was made three times; in the early fifth century, the mid-fifth, and the mid-fourth centuries B.C.E., joining tales into successively larger groups. These collections probably reflect growth spurts of the sanctuary, and each of these smaller collections may reflect the aims and world view of the sanctuary authorities at a particular time, as with tales 1–10 in Stele A.

With each collection, the opportunity arose for a certain amount of editing, occasionally even a full-scale recasting. As part of this, elements and details could "spread" from story to story, emphasizing the relationships between tales. This spread of motifs may have occurred in any one of a number of ways. In tales A 12–14 above, the block which stresses "hands," the original votives may have all been very simple gifts, but attached to a pictorial representation of hands; the narrative tales survive then grow up to explain the words and picture. Or, one narrative plaque may have been joined over time by smaller votives without narrative; their hanging together may have led to an attempt to explain the connection by repetition of motifs. Another possibility is that a particular artisan carried a "stock" of pictorial votives showing hands or terra-cotta sculptures of hands (a very prominent feature in the Asklepieion at Corinth), and that the artisan would introduce or emphasize the detail of hands within the narrative he composed for the giver to reflect this; if later a simple plaque votive were displayed near votive hands, the element might easily spread.

The possibility of separating the tales into stylistic groups and establishing a relative chronology within the corpus will make these tales an even more useful source for personal and sanctuary religion in the late Classical and Hellenistic ages. Preliminary study reveals a change in emphasis within the groups over time, showing development in the sanctuary's propaganda aims and also in the people's expectations and images of the god. Asklepios remains a god of hope, but change is apparent in the kinds of things people dared to hope for, even from him. However, though the element of cinematic wonder may be less in later tales, there is no reduction of the miracle of health restored to people

who had been given up as "hopeless cases." Tale after tale, from earliest to latest times, concludes with a simple statement which speaks volumes to people in distress: ". . . When day came, he walked out healthy."

Bibliography

The most helpful work on Asklepios in English is Ludwig and Emma Edelstein's *Asclepius: A Collection and Interpretation of the Testimonies* (Hopkins: Baltimore, 1945). Volume I is a collection of references to Asklepios from ancient authors and inscriptions, organized under subject headings and cross-referenced. Volume II is an exposition and interpretation of these testimonies, describing the worship of Asklepios and the practice of temple medicine.

The best full-scale commentary on the Iamata is Rudolph Herzogs's *Die Wunderheilungen von Epidauros* (*Philologus* suppl. vol. xxii.3, Leipzig, 1931). Herzog provides exhaustive references, particularly to medical authors, as well as restorations of very fragmentary tales.

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Plato and the Primal Being

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"Honesty, in a philosopher, means he will deceive himself first."
—William Gass

The Indo-European (IE) myth of the creation of the world out of the parts of a primordial being constituted, according to Bruce Lincoln, a pervasive ideology in the ancient world. Persuading people of the divinely ordained rightness of their place in the social order, this mythological ideology fostered false consciousness.

Building on Lincoln's work, I shall argue that Plato's views on psychology, political theory, and ethics, when placed in their mythological context, can be read as rationalizations of an elite ideology already embodied in and supported by an ancient religious mythological tradition. Plato's tripartite view of *psychē* (rational, spirited, appetitive) is tied intimately to his theory of the cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice) and his vision of the ideal society (philosopher-kings, warriors, commoners). His theory of justice hinges on the notion that *dikaiosynē* derives from the rule of reason and consists in the proper functioning of the parts of the *psychē*. Paralleling the individual, justice on the social level derives from the rule of philosopher-kings and consists in the proper functioning of the classes of society. Both psychological and political subordination result. Just as the passions ought to be dominated by reason, so the commoners ought to be dominated by their leaders.

The Primal Being

Lincoln demonstrates that there are many variants of the IE creation myth which tell of a primordial being (often the first man or first king, sometimes a god, giant, or domestic animal) who is killed (usually by sacrifice, murder, or in battle) and dismembered (2). Out of the pieces of the victim's body the universe in both its cosmic and social dimensions is made. For example, in the famous "Song of *Purusa*" (*Rg Veda* 10.90), the moon, sun, and wind are created from the mind, eye, and breath of a primal "man" while the priests, warriors, and commoners come from his mouth, arms, and thighs.

These myths establish, according to Lincoln, homologies that constitute alloforms (5). They do not claim that x is *like* y, but that x is *made out of* y. Priests and the mouth of *Purusa* are consubstantial. They are alternative forms. Hence, when the priest speaks, so too does the Primal Being.

The power of this mythic vision stems from the fact that it establishes complex organic connections among the elements of the macrocosm, mesocosm, and microcosm. Food production, nutrition, medical practices, social order, class characteristics and responsibilities, even cures for baldness and the proper disposal of hair cuttings were legtimated and regulated by this mythology.[1]

[1] I do not have the space to summarize the massive amount of documentation and careful analysis Lincoln provides. See in particular chapters 3–5 for the evidence which

Lincoln is particularly interested in what such myths have to say about the nature of society, who propagated them, and who benefited from their propagation. These myths picture society as hierarchical. The king (usually selected from the warrior class and ritually consecrated by the priests) not only stands at the top of the social pyramid, but also embodies society. If he prospers, society prospers. If he fails, society fails. The priestly class was a leisure class freed from manual labor. It was materially supported by the king, warriors, and lower classes in exchange for nonmaterial services such as recitation of prayers, performance of rituals, and working of magical cures. The priests propagated the myths and elaborated their details to account for vast areas of social life and practice. According to the myths *they* told, they were made out of the head of the Primal Being. The warriors rank below the priests and provide military and police power. They derive from the upper torso, reflecting homologic ideas associating both strength and courage with the breast and heart. At the bottom of the heap stand the commoners—farmers, traders, craftsmen—who provide for the material well being of those above. They are alloforms of the Primal Being's thighs or legs. Just as the legs support the body, so the commoners support the social order.

It takes no great intelligence to realize that those who primarily benefitted from the propagation of IE creation myths were the kings, priests, and warriors. These myths provided an ideological base which justified a coercive apparatus that often resulted in the repression of the lower class. Lincoln remarks that such myths constitute a "screen that strategically veils, mystifies, or distorts important aspects of real social process . . . [creating] false consciousness in many members of society, persuading them of the *rightness* of their lot in life, whatever that may be, and of the total social order" (164).

Plato

Plato, like Empedokles before him, had met the Primal Being.[2] There can be little doubt that some aspects of the IE myth of the creation of the universe out of the body of a Primal Being influenced Plato's thinking. In *Timaios* (30) Plato protrays the demiurge as endowing the cosmos with soul and intelligence because he desired all things to be good and realized that nothing was fairer than an intellegent creature with a soul. Hence the world was framed as "one visible living being (*zōon*) comprehending within itself all other living beings of a kindred nature" (*Tim.* 30D). Like Empedokles, Plato makes the shape of this "*zōon*" spherical and explicitly denies that it has any organs (such as eyes and mouth) or any limbs.[3]

This explicit denial that the *zōon* has any sense organs or limbs makes it sound very unlike a primordial person. Yet Plato refers to this primordial living being as a "blessed god" and speaks of the creation of the universe as both a *division* of this living being and

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(continued)
shows how even the most mundane activities found their justification in this mythic system. The persistent power of this micro-/macrocosmic connection on the European imagination is demonstrated by the Renaissance use of the human body as the image of the world (Barkan: 1975) and the abiding interest in the "hypothesis of magic" which is "based on the idea of *continuity* between man and the world" (Couliano: 23).

[2] For Lincoln's analysis of the relationship between Empedokles' cosmology and the creation out of the Primal Being see pp. 36ff. Lincoln also offers an illuminating comparison with the *Aitareya Upanisad.*

[3] Compare Empedokles' Fragment B29 with Plato's *Timaios* 34.

a *mixing* of the elements according to Pythagorean formulas (*Tim.* 35). The human soul is made out of the same elements as the universal soul (*Tim.* 41) and, even the human body partially replicates the shape of the universe. Our heads are spherical, like the universe, "being the most divine part of us and the lord of all that is in us" (*Tim.* 44D). The other parts of the body (the limbs) are "to be servants" and provide locomotion. The primordial living being (universe) does not need limbs or sense organs because it moves only in a circle. But humans must travel about and it would be a bit awkward to do so if we were shaped like spheres and without sense organs. So, as Plato humously puts it, we got limbs and senses "in order that [we] might not tumble about among the high and deep places of the earth" (*Tim.* 44E).

Empedokles begins his cosmology with the spherical One in which Love dominates. Strife then "curdles" limbs (Fr. 30) which become dismembered as we pass from the One to the Many via the activity of Strife. In contrast, Plato's vision of creation utilizes the image of a craftsman copying an intelligible pattern into a "receptacle." The spherical, primordial living being of Empedokles is not Plato's starting point. It is the result of a prior activity. Division of this living being eventually takes place, but the prior action is one of crafting and copying. Empedokles' cosmology is much closer to the IE myth than is Plato's story. Yet remnants of the IE creation myth remain embedded in Plato's account.

When we turn to the *Republic* (Books 3 and 4), which was written prior to the *Timaios*, the influence of the IE myth on Plato emerges in a striking fashion. Here a homology of soul and society is clearly established and, when combined with ideas about the body found in the *Timaios* (69B–70), a fourfold homology emerges.

Table I. Homology of body, soul, and society (Plato)[4]

Bodily part	*Portion of soul*	*Qualities of class*	*Social class*
Head	Rational (*logistikon*)	Deliberative (*bouleutikon*)	Philosopher-Kings
Upper torso	Spirited (*thymoeides*)	Defensive (*epikouretikon*)	Warriors
Lower torso	Appetitive (*epithymētikon*)	Commercial (*khrēmatistikon*)	Commoners

If we compare Plato to a version of the IE myth found in the *Laws of Manu* (i. 87–93), we note that Manu's story recounts how the social classes were created from the body of the first man. Plato's account tells how the essential characteristics of the social classes were placed *into* the body of the first man.[5] Plato also replaces the priestly class, as one

[4] Adopted from Table 13 in Lincoln (154). Plato uses different terminology in different places to describe the classes and their characteristics. The philosopher-kings (*philosophoi*) are drawn fron a class of guardians (*phylakes*) who are the elder warriors. The "auxlaries" (*boēthoi*) are the younger warrriors. Plato often refers to the class I have termed "commoners" as "farmers and artisans" (*georgoi kai demiourgoi*).

[5] Plato also tells another sogiogonic myth which says the three classes were born from the earth and thus are "brothers" (*Rep.* 414D–415A). They differ with respect to mineral content since gold was mixed into the substance of the higher class, silver into the defenders, and iron plus bronze into the lowest.

might expect of a philosopher, with the philosopher-kings. Plato argues that the "just man" is the one fit to rule because he combines the "three separate parts, each in their proper place" (Rep. 434DE, 435B, 441DE). As Lincoln notes, "It is no accident that in many IE creation accounts, the first-man figure (to whom Plato's "just man" corresponds) was specified as the first king" (156).

It is difficult to determine to what extent Plato's homologies reflect alloformic thinking on his part. One can take all of this talk metaphorically and analogically. Most philosophers have done just that since such thinking is more appropriate to the rational philosopher than the "crude" alloformic thinking of the mythopoeic mind. However, if these are metaphors and analogies, they exert a powerful influence because they lead Plato to conclude that various social classes have "essential" characteristics. In his little essay on "self-mastery" in the *Republic* (431A–D), he comments, ". . . you will find a host of motley appetites, pleasures, and pains, primarily among children, women, domestic slaves, the masses, and the common people (*en tois pollois te kai phaulois*) . . . But the simple and moderate [appetites], you will find only in a few (*en oligois*), and these are the best by nature and education."

In addition, Plato's theory of education is elitist. "Liberal" education is reserved for the upper classes. Although talented commoners might be afford such education, generally Plato believes the commoners need no philosophical education because their life consists in the exercise of practical skills (Windelband: 127). Plato offers philosophy as the appropriate replacement for the poetry and myths of the priests. Hence "philosophy [becomes] the great moral teacher of the upper class" (Wood: 138).

If religious mythology erects a "sacred canopy" (to borrow an image from Peter Berger), which creates false consciousness by divinely chartering and legtimating one possible social order as necessary, then Plato's philosophical "mythology" erects a "rational canopy" which creates false consciousness by philosophically chartering and legitimating one possible social order as necessary. God wants the priests to rule, reason wants the philosophers.

Perhaps "necessary" is too strong a term when it comes to Plato. After all, he does put forth many of his ideas, especially in the *Timaios*, as only "probable." To some extent this qualification results from Plato's rationalistic epistemology. According to his theory of knowledge, the best we can hope for when doing "physics" and dealing with empirical entities is "true opinion." Nevertheless Plato does present his views on the nature of the soul and on ethics with more confidence and, while he expresses some hesitation about his political views, the *polis* he describes is set forth as an "ideal."[6]

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[6] Copleston (209) says it is difficult to know how "literally" one is to take the association of the parts of the soul with areas of the body. Randall is quite certain we should read Plato more as a dramatist and a poet than as a philosopher, especially when it comes to his political views. Plato, in his seventh letter, expresses the hope that his ideas would be taken seriously, if not always literally. He writes ". . . the correct philosophy . . . enables us to discern in all cases what is just for communities and for individuals. Accordingly, the human race will not be free of evils until either those who rightly and truly follow philosophy acquire political supremacy, or the class who have power in the *polis* be led by some dispensation of Heaven to become real philosophers" (*Ep.*, 7, 326B). Also see Vidal-Naquet's discussion (202) and Socrates' remark (*Tim.* 26E) that this is a "true account" (*alēthinon logon*) "not merely an imaginative fiction" (*mē plasthenta mython*).

Plato's theory of the cardinal virtues reflects the homological pattern of the IE creation account. The virtue appropriate to the rational part of the soul and, by homologic extension, the ruling class, is wisdom (*sophia*). The virtue appropriate to the spirited part and, by homologic extension, the warrior class, is courage (*andria*). One would expect, given the homologic pattern we have been tracing, Plato would associate temperance (*sophrosynē*) with the appetitive soul and the commoners. Windelband, following this obvious homological extension, interprets Plato in this way, noting such further hierarchical homologies (in ascending order) as plant, animal, humans, among the organic beings and southern countries, northern countries, and the Greeks among different peoples (125). However, in the *Republic* (431A) Plato remarks that temperance is the "rule of the better part over the worse" and explicitly denies that it can be associated exclusively with the ruled. Rather temperance "extends to the whole" (432A), constituting a "harmony" which can be defined as the "agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule, both in states and individuals" (432B).

Although the first two cardinal virtues (wisdom and courage) do not break the homological pattern, the third virtue, temperance, does. This break occurs because Plato realizes that temperance involves self-mastery. Given his theory, this implies that one part of the soul (and society) must rule (master), the other parts. Therefore, the practice of temperance requires that all three levels co-operate in this rule.

Plato describes justice, the fourth cardinal virtue, in two ways. Viewed as a psychological virtue, it consists of each part of the soul "doing its own" (*Rep.* 442A). Viewed as a social virtue, justice consists in everyone in the *polis* performing their proper function and attending to their "own business" without interfering with anyone else's (433A). Since the practice of temperance amounts to the subordination of the spirited and the appetitive parts of the soul to the rational and, by homologic extension, the subordination of the lower classes to the upper classes; justice, on both the microcosmic and mesocosmic level, involves the acceptance of this subordination. So each part of the soul and each social class does what it is supposed to do, no questions asked. Just as psychological injustice consists in antagonistic conflict among the parts of the soul (*Phaedrus* 246A–B), so political injustice consists in a meddling and restless spirit which results in one class interferring in the business of another (Copleston: 229; *Rep.* 433A–B).

Philosophers have been puzzled by Plato's theory of justice. For example Vlastos ponders long and hard over Plato's description of justice as both a psychological and social virtue involving "doing one's own" because justice is usually understood as a social virtue involving "getting one's due" (1971A:76). After a complex textual analysis, he claims to solve several puzzles in Plato's views, not the least of which is the fact that Plato's definitions "present no discernible link with ordinary usage" (1971A:70).

Vlastos' careful textual analysis needs to be supplemented by a historical and social analysis. Plato is transforming the notion of justice which the Athenian democracy had been increasingly understanding as *isonomia*, "equality before the law" (Winspear: 210). Thus, the traditional notion of "to each man his due" Plato transforms into " 'to each man his proper function and no other,' because this accords better with his hierarchical conception of the social division of labour" (Wood: 142).

The *Republic* begins with the question, "What is justice?" Socrates determines that the quest for the answer to this question must be rational. This "rational" inquiry, however, under the influence of the homologic patterns of the IE myth, results in both a theory of virtue which amounts to subordinationism on both a microcosmic and mesocosmic level and a theory of justice which, in effect, tells each social class to mind its own business and accept its lot as right. Furthermore the creation myth of the *Timaios* provides a powerful macrocosmic support. For a commoner to question her lot in life amounts to a threat,

not just to the social and moral order, but to the very structure of the divinely crafted and rationally ordered universe.

Conclusion

The rational merits of Plato's arguments have been debated by generations of scholars (Thorson: 1963; Vlastos: 1971B). However, when his ideas are placed in their mythological context, they appear in a very different light. IE myths of the creation of the cosmos out of a Primal Being and their use to justify an ontological connection among macro-, meso-, and microcosm clearly informs and supports Plato's ideas. In this light, his arguments appear to be not merely conservative, but also rationalizations of an ideology previously claimed by the priests to be divinely ordained.

What may have prompted such philosophical rationalizations? Part of the answer lies in the social and political history of Athens. Plato comes from the old aristocratic class. Democracy had undermined its power and influence. This "mob rule," as Plato calls Athenian democracy, appears to him as a social, political, moral, and intellectual disaster. Therefore, he attempts to provide philosophical justifications for an older hierarchical view of society which previously had been supported by a mythological tradition and priestly dominated institutions.

Another part of the answer lies in the weakening of traditional Olympian religion as a social force, and the conflict of philosophers with the priests and poets whose authority they had been undermining from at least the time of Xenophanes' attack on anthropomorphism. The authority of *logos* was replacing the authority of *mythos,* but the psychological, ethical, and social ideas of Plato that this new authority supported were still deeply rooted in an ancient mythological tradition. Marcel Detienne has written, "Plato's work marks the time when philosophy, while censoring tales of the ancients as scandlous fictions, sets about telling its own *myths* . . ." (82). The propagation of these new philosophical tales no longer supports a priestly class, but now supports an emerging intellectual elite and secures for them the material support for nonmaterial services previously enjoyed by the priests. However, as the above analysis has demonstrated, these "new" tales of Plato were not so very new in content. What is new, and what makes them all the more dangerous, is the claim that these views are "rational." Supposedly the "truth" has now replaced "fiction," and who among us dare quarrel with the "truth"? To do so would be unnatural, immoral, irrational, and socially destructive.

Postscript

Philosophers, historians, classicists, and philologists have poured over the ancient Greek classics which stand at the foundation of Western culture. They have gleaned bits of wisdom, created ingenious interpretations, and mined the depths of etymology. Recently interests have shifted to questions about the social roots and ideological bias of the ancients. I am convinced, along with others (Wood: 1978; Winspear: 1974), that to fully understand the classics they must be closely and carefully related to their social contexts. When this is done, facile distinctions between mythology and philosophy begin to blur and important questions about the social and religious foundations of the Western philosophical enterprise emerge. Issues long since thought settled must be reopened and new issues too long ignored addressed. I offer this reading of Plato as one small part of this much larger task.

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The Rhetoric of Memory in the Stories of Saul and David: A Prospective Study

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In analyzing biblical texts rhetorically, scholars have paid much attention to the elements of style, disposition, and invention following the classic divisions of rhetoric. Comparatively little attention, however, has been paid to memory as a part of the rhetorical process. The primary reason for this is the perception that memory is little more than a device with which to dazzle the audience. In fact, if rhetoric is the art of persuasion, memory is an indispensable part of the persuasion process, and its use in the biblical text is neither coincidental nor haphazard.

The presentation of memories in the scriptural passage occurs in three contexts: 1)The narrator alludes to certain events through key words and phrases; 2) a character remembers directly a particular event, whether in the recent or distant past; and 3) a speaker calls on the audience to remember a particular event. In all three cases, the memory functions as a key to understanding the present actions in the plot. In effect, it provides the hearer/reader with a coherent symbol system for interpreting the world: a world view. The rhetoric of memory is a rhetoric which allows the audience access to a particular world view and enables the narrator or writer to persuade the audience to his or her mind-set. The narrator speaks from his or her memory to the memory of the audience, attempting to engage the audience on common ground.

The subject of this study is the use of memory as it is given to the characters in the stories of Saul and David. I am particularly interested in the concrete memories of the distant and recent past and the role they play in furthering the plot development and in convincing the audience of the respective places of Saul and David in Israel's history.

An Introduction to Memory in 1 and 2 Samuel

James Wharton, following Pfeiffer and speaking of the Succession Narrative (2 Sam 9–20 and 1 Kgs 1–2), understands the author to have "created history as an art, as a recital of past events dominated by a great idea . . . we are certainly no longer bound to regard these stories as history in the sense of unbiased reporting of events."[1] What Wharton alludes to in suggesting that history might be something other than unbiased reporting is memory, the way in which the world and the individual intersect and come to make sense of each other. There is, in a sense, ***no*** unbiased reporting of events; there are only events interpreted through the world-view of the individual. The world-view finds its expression in memory. Wharton continues:

> (Our narrative) requires a time when the pre-Davidic traditions of Israel were still sufficiently dominant to preclude and artificially glorified version of how

[1] James Wharton. "A Plausible Tale: Story and Theology in II Samuel 9–20, I Kgs 1–2" *Int* 5 (1981) 341–42.

> the kingdom survived all threats and was passed on to Solomon. But it also requires a time when the theological excitement about this new turn in Israel's story with God made it urgent to recall and recount just how it came about.[2]

The urgency to recall these events applies not only to the Succession Narrative, but also to any place where the recollection of those events helped make sense of the present world. In placing memories in the mouths of the characters, the narrator of 1 and 2 Samuel made sure the audience was carried along in the process, either agreeing or disagreeing with the character's actions, but arriving, in the end, at the same conclusion, that the divine will had been done.

With regard to each other, 1 and 2 Samuel have an interesting relationship in regard to their memories. 1 Samuel 1–15 deals almost exclusively with memories of the distant past while the rest of 1 Samuel contains no memories at all. 2 Samuel contains memories, most of which would be described as recent past, usually those events which happened or were supposed to have happened in 1 Samuel or, at the farthest point, in the time of Judges. The scholar will recognize immediately the significance of the break. It is precisely the point at which Saul's kingdom makes way for David's. This, in itself, raises an interesting question: Why do the characters of Saul's story remember only the distant past while those inhabiting David's tale seem obsessed with particular memories of the previous kingdom? To arrive at an answer, one needs to review the memories of both books.

1 Sam 1–15: Memories of Action and Reaction

2:27–28, 30	And there came a man of God to Eli and said to him, "thus says the LORD, 'I revealed myself to the house of your father when they were in Egypt subject to the house of Pharaoh. And I chose his out of all the tribes of Israel to be my priest, to go up to my altar, to burn incense, to wear an ephod before me: and I gave to the house of your father all my offerings by fire from the people of Israel! . . . therefore the LORD, the God of Israel declares: "I promised that your house and the house of your father should go in and out before me forever . . ."
4:8	Woe to us! Who can deliver us from the power of these mighty Gods? These are the Gods who smote the Egyptians with every sort of plague in the wilderness . . ."
6:6	Why should you harden your hearts as the Egyptians and Pharoah hardened their hearts? After he had made sport of them, did not they let them go and they departed?
8:7–8	And the LORD said to Samuel: "Hearken to the voice of the people in all that they say to you: for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me from being king over them. According to all the deeds which they have done, from the day I delivered you from the hands of the Egyptians and from the hands of all the kingdoms that were oppressing you.
12:6–12	And Samuel said to the people: "The LORD (is witness) who appointed Moses and Aaron and brought your fathers up out of the land of Egypt. Now therefore, stand still that I may plead with you before the LORD concerning all the saving deeds of the LORD which he performed for you

[2] Ibid., 300.

and your fathers. When Jacob went into Egypt (and the Egyptians oppressed them) then your fathers cried to the LORD and the LORD sent Moses and Aaron, who brought forth your fathers out of Egypt and made them dwell in this place; but they forgot the LORD their God; and he sold them into the hand of Sisera, commander of the army (of Jabin, king) of Hazor, and into the hands of the Philistines, and into the hand of the king of Moab: and they fought against them. And they cried to the LORD and said, 'We have sinned, because we have forsaken the LORD, and have served the Ba'als and the Ashtaroth; but now deliver us out of the hands of our enemies and we will serve thee.' And the LORD sent Jerubba'al and Barak, and Jephthah, and Samuel and delivered you out of the hand of your enemies on every side: and you dwelt in safety . . . and when you saw that Nahash, the king of the Ammonites came against you, you said to me, 'No, but a king shall reign over us,' when the LORD your God was king.

15:2 Thus says the LORD of hosts, 'I will punish what Amalek did to Israel in opposing them on the way when they came up out of Egypt.

At first glance, these seven memories have little in common with one another save that they are of past events. Closer examination of their contexts, however, reveals a significant trait. Every memory is followed by an anecdote revealing that the character(s) in question pay little or no attention to the memory and do not allow it to inform their action. The man of God reminds Eli that God has chosen his father's house. Later the reader (and Eli) are made aware that Eli betrayed that memory in "honouring your sons above God by fattening yourselves upon the choicest parts of every offering of my people Israel (2:29)." The punishment is death for the sons. The Philistines remember the God who plagued Egypt, but decide to fight anyway and are themselves stricken by a plague from the LORD (4:9, 6:4). Furthermore, the Philistine priests remind them that Pharaoh hardened his heart, but in the end let the people of Israel go. The Philistines seem to let Israel pass, but after the ark is returned we read immediately of another attack. The Philistines had been exhorted not to harden their hearts: it appears they forgot the lesson in their eagerness to overwhelm the Israelites.

The next two memories deal with the same subject from different perspectives. God's memory of Israel in 8:7–8 reminds them of their own "hard-heartedness" in forsaking the LORD. Of course, the memory fails to move the people. They insist on forsaking God once again and ask for a king. The memory of God's deliverance in 10:17–18 is followed by an outright rejection of God as sovereign protector, because the people repeat their request for a king.

Samuel's farewell speech in 12:6–12 contains a number of memories centering on the LORD's action in delivering the people from their enemies and their subsequent disobedience and punishment. The anecdotes which follow the speech operate on two levels. The people still ask for a king/deliverer, though they recognize the error of it. Samuel tells them, in essence, that they can make up for the problem if they will but fear the LORD (12:14ff.). This is immediately followed by a story of Saul who tries to deliver himself from the Philistines rather than wait for Samuel. Saul has forgotten or failed to heed the memory of the LORD as deliverer. His punishment is much harsher than that of the people. His kingdom is not to endure, but another man would be appointed "Prince over Israel" (13:5–15). The last memory furthers the idea of the one before. The LORD, through Samuel, reminds Saul of Amalek and God's promise to blot out the remembrance of Amalek (Ex 17:14). Saul again does not allow the memory to guide his action, but

keeps some of the Amalekite property. For this the punishment is cast in more severe terms than simply letting his kingdom die as before. Here, God has "torn the kingdom of Israel from you this day and has given it to a neighbor who is better than you" (15:28). Though Saul repents of his action God does not. God regrets only that "he had made Saul king over Israel" (15:35).

What is the effect, then, of these memories? The answer is simply this: one of complete discontinuity with the past. It is as though Saul's entire story formed a disjunction with what went before and what will come afterwards. It is not, and this is important, a good or bad disjunction. Both pro-monarchical and anti-monarchical tendencies may find their place in it, and commentators have correctly detected evidence of both. But neither affect the overarching feeling that Saul and his kingdom are somehow misfits in the flow of time. The memories given to the characters in Saul's story did not influence their action in the present. It is as though they remembered or were reminded of details and events which were not their own and had not been part of their history. In this context, the last line of chapter 15 is entirely appropriate: "The LORD repented that he had made Saul king over Israel." The statement, following so closely on one which says "The Glory of Israel will not lie or repent for he is not a man that he should repent" (15:29), suggests that the narrator believed God had "changed his mind" about Saul. Therefore, it becomes necessary to "re-remember" this disjointed segment of history in a way which smooths the gap in time and which integrates the story back into the whole of Israel's history. It is precisely this that happens in 1 Sam 16:1–2 Sam 2:35 through the use of some well placed memories.

1 Sam 16:1–2 Sam 2:35: Memories of Healing and Integrating

It is interesting to note that no direct memories are put forth by characters in the rest of 1 Samuel. The narrative is taken up with the rise of David and the death of Saul—so caught up in the present that there is no time to assimilate and draw metaphors for the action. When the memories resume, they are dramatically different. The characters remember recent past events, understanding their importance as a guide for present action. They not only engage the past, they work with it, gaining insight toward appropriate actions in given situations. What strikes the reader immediately, however, is the content of the memories, so inconsistent with the actual events they recall. Memories of things which happened in 1 Samuel appear here in such altered forms that they are hardly recognizable. Other memories select only very specific references to 1 Samuel and the rest of scripture. The two "old memories" refer to God's choice of Israel as a people and point to the present situation. The overview is as follows:

2 Sam

1:4–10 recalls the death of Saul, but in a different manner. Here the Amalekite slew Saul, instead of Saul committing suicide. Here Saul was leaning on his spear, but was not yet dead. The message is not completely contradictory. Saul did ask some one to slay him.

3:8–11 Abner recalls the promise which "The LORD has sworn to David, to transfer the kingdom from the house of Saul and set up the throne of David over Israel and over Judah from Dan to Beersheba.

3:17–18 And Abner conferred with the elders of Israel saying, "For some time past you have been seeking David as king over you. Now then bring it about; for the LORD has promised David saying, 'By the hand of my servant David, I will save my people Israel from the hand of the Philistines, and from the hand of all their enemies.' "

5:1–2	Then all the tribes of Israel came to David at Hebron and said, "Behold, we are your bone and flesh. In times past when Saul was king over us, it was you that led out and brought in Israel; and the LORD said to you, 'You shall be shepherd of my people Israel, and you shall be prince over Israel.'
6:21	And David said to Michal, "It was before the LORD, who chose me above your father, and above all his house, to appoint me as prince over Israel, the people of the LORD—and I will make merry before the LORD.
7:5–9	"Go and tell my servant David, 'Thus says the LORD: Would you build me a house to dwell in? I have not dwelt in a house since the day I brought up the people of Israel from Egypt to this day, but I have been moving about in a tent for my dwelling. In all places where I have moved with all the people of Israel, did I speak a word with any of the tribes (judges) of Israel, whom I commanded to shepherd my people Israel, saying, "Why have you not built me a house of cedar?" ' Now therefore, thus . . . says the LORD of hosts: 'I took you from the pasture, from following the sheep, that you should be prince over my people Israel; And I have been with you wherever you went, and have cut off all your enemies from before you; and I will make for you a great name, like the name of the great ones of the earth.'
7:10b–11	. . . and violent men shall afflict them no more, as formerly, from the time that I appointed judges over my people Israel.
7:15	My steadfast love shall not depart from him, as I took it from Saul whom I put away from before you.
7:23–24	What one nation on earth is like thy people Israel, whom God went to redeem to be his people, making himself a name, and doing for you great and terrible things, by driving out before his people a nation and its gods. And thou didst establish for thyself thy people Israel to be thy people forever; and thou, O LORD, didst become their God.
11:19–21	And (Joab) instructed the messenger, "When you have finished telling all the news about the fighting to the king, if the king's anger rises, and if he says to you, 'Why did you go so near the city to fight? Who killed Abimelech, the son of Jerubbesheth? Did not a woman cast an upper millstone upon him from the wall, so that he died at Thebez? Why did you go so near the wall?' Then you shall say, 'Your servant, Uriah the Hittite, is dead also.'
12:7–8	Nathan said to David, "You are the man. Thus says the LORD the God of Israel, 'I anointed you king over Israel, and I delivered you out of the hand of Saul; and I gave you your master's house, and your master's wives into your bosom, and gave you the house of Israel and of Judah; and if this were too little, I would add to you much more. . . .
19:9	And all the people were at strife throughout all the tribes of Israel, saying, "The king delivered us from the hand of our enemies, and saved us from the hand of the Philistines; and now he has fled out of the land from Absalom.
21:1	(There was a famine) . . . and David sought the face of the LORD, and the LORD said, "There is blood guilt on Saul and on his house, because he put the Gibeonites to death . . ."

The Amalekites, who were the reason for Saul's punishment in 1 Samuel 15, come back to haunt him even after his death. In a recollection distinctly different from what the audience was told at the end of 1 Samuel, a young Amalekite brags to David of his role in killing Saul. David honors Saul's memory by having the young man killed. The memory was a false one and failed to persuade David that glory was due. However, it caused David to pay homage to Saul in the beginning of a book in which he will soon come to realize his own greatness over the former king.

Shortly thereafter, Abner makes two statements regarding a promise which God made to David: "The LORD has sworn to David to transfer the kingdom from the house of Saul and set up the throne of David over Israel and over Judah from Dan to Beersheba" (3:8). In 1 Samuel that promise was made to Saul through Samuel. Saul is told: "Your kingdom will be given to a neighbor who is better than you" (15:28). In 28:17, the same promise is concretized: "Your kingdom will be given to your neighbor, David." At no point in 1 Samuel does God speak directly to David. The memory in 2 Samuel recalls exactly that, thus bypassing Samuel and Saul and reforming a past which harmonizes more closely with the present. The memories also predict a greater future for David than that given to Saul. David is to reign over Israel and Judah from Dan to Beersheba; Saul is never given the promise of total kingship in this same way. Further, while both Saul and David are connected with saving the people from the Philistines, David's promise is greater: ". . . and from the hand of all their enemies" (3:18).

In the memory of 5:1–2, the tribes proclaim David king and also remember God's direct word to David. Not only shall he be prince over Israel, but "shepherd of my people" as well. This is the first time the word *shepherd* is used in the sense of leading the people. Thus the memory of the LORD's promise to David is reconciled or made congruent with the memory of David as a shepherd. How could God choose anyone else?

2 Sam 6:21 provides a striking example of one character's acceptance of a memory put forth by another. This memory functions as a climax to a series of self-disclosures which David makes as he grows in awareness of his given role. Prior to 6:21, David understands first that "Judah has anointed me king over them" (2:7) and, in a third person report, that the "LORD has established him king over Israel" (5:11–12). However, his perception of his kingship appears late in the action of the plot, and there is no insight into the relationship between Saul's decline and David's rise. When Michal accuses him of shamelessness, David responds with a sudden burst of awareness: "It was before the LORD who chose me above your father and above all his house. . . ." In the beginning of 2 Samuel, David had been very careful to honor the memory of Saul; here, he does not even speak his name. It is a picture of David that is disturbing and utterly human. It is a moment in which David takes for himself the memory of God's choice and how both the event and the memory have shaped the present world. This is, of course, something the reader and other characters have known for some time. To David, it is a revelation. The speaking of the memory brings David into full knowledge of his kingly role.

It is God who remembers in 7:5–9, 10b–11, 15, and 12:7. In the first example, God firmly takes command of the memory that it was the LORD who made David king and destroyed the enemies. In doing so, God legitimates David in the line of tribes (judges) commanded to "shepherd my people Israel." Moreover, God appears to allow the memories to dictate present and future actions, showing the congruity of David's kingship in opposition to Saul's incongruity: ". . . And violent men shall afflict them no more as formerly, from the time I appointed judges over my people Israel . . . My steadfast love shall not depart from him, as I took it from Saul whom I put away before you" (7:10b–11, 15).

David's prayer in 7:23–24 recalls Israel's heritage as a chosen people and goes on to place himself squarely in line with it (7:25ff.). There is no memory of Saul in this, only the memory of God who has promised David "I will build thee a house." In keeping with the memory, David asks for God's blessing and the fulfillment of the promise.

Joab's recollection of Abimelech poses a number of interesting questions. He clearly believed that David would remember the "man who would be king" of the Judges story. Joab must have been reminded of the incident as well. But of what effect is the placing of the memory before the audience now? The question David could ask might just as easily have been rendered: "Why were you so close to the wall?" Garsiel points out a number of similarities between Saul and Abimelech which may provide some clues but are not entirely satisfactory in this narrow context.[3] It may be that Joab thought David would try to cover up his order by shifting the blame for Uriah's death onto Joab with a reminder of a lesson every school child would know. McCarter chooses to reorganize the text so that David actually recalls the event to the servant when he speaks to him.[4] His case is compelling, but the given context provides more narrative interest, particularly since David never gets a chance to speak the words. The memory of Abimelech's death must have deeply affectd Joab since he knew that going near the wall meant certain death for Uriah. It is also interesting to note that just as Abimelech dies for shedding innocent blood (Jg 9:56), so Joab would die as well for shedding blood without cause—that of Abner and Amasa (1 Kgs 2:31ff.). Though both Saul and David are found guilty of killing without cause (2 Sam 12:9ff.; 21:1), neither is condemned to die for it. Thus the memory of Abimelech may be a foreshadowing of the action to come concerning Joab.

Chapter 12 relates Nathan's rebuke of David for the Bathsheba affair. McCarter points out the striking similarity between this and Samuel's rebuke of Saul in 1 Sam 15:17ff.[5] The similarity does not extend, however, to each king's reaction. Saul protests Samuel's accusation and makes a case for his innocence. David immediately responds that he has sinned and makes no other comment. Afterwards, though he fasts for the life of his child, he accepts the child's death as something which could not have been prevented. In this context, Nathan's recounting of the memory of God does much to reshape the memory of Saul so that David appears to be the appropriate king. First, the admission that "I anointed you . . ." makes God concretely responsible for David's kingship narratively prior to Saul's pursuit of him. This is very different than telling a prophet to anoint the one chosen; it places David in a position of importance over those who are anointed by proxy. Second, God recalls giving David "your master's house and your master's wives into your bosom." No record exists of this event, but the effect of the memory is to eliminate Saul from the picture decisively; to give to David what should have been his from the beginning. The memory does not deny Saul's existence, it places him in an entirely different context. Saul is no longer king, but equivalent to an enemy out of whose hand David must be delivered (see also 22:1). As king, Saul was a mistake or misfit. By incorporating God's memory into the text here, the narrator works hard to find the place where Saul does fit into Israel's history. He tries to make sense of the fact that God repented that he had made Saul king.

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[3] Moshe Garsiel. *The First Book of Samuel: A Literary Study of Comparative Structures, Analogies, and Parallels* (Ramat-Gan, Israel: Revivim, 1985) passim.

[4] P. Kyle McCarter. *II Samuel* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1984) 282.

[5] Ibid., 300.

The last two memories are best described as those which influence specific future action. The people recall that David delivered them out of the hand of the Philistines. His present behavior seems incongruent with this memory. David hears this word and returns (19:11ff.) The last memory concerns the reason for the famine. There is bloodguilt on Saul's house for which David must atone. He does so by giving over seven of Saul's sons to the Gibeonites, thereby eliminating many possible successors to the throne.

Thus, in all the memories which the characters of David's story recount, there is congruence between past and present, between what one is reminded of or remembers and what one does. This is not the case in Saul's story. The rhetoric of memory there is a rhetoric of dissimilarity with the past. Its subtle effect makes the reader aware that this part of Israel's history was an uncertain time when leadership was unclear and very real dangers threatened on every side. In forcing the issue of kingship, the people made a mistake, rather than trust in God. God changed his mind as well, repenting of his choice of Saul for king. The story of David and the memories put forth within it presents a picture of Israel once again trying to use the memory of God's actions as a guide to behavior. When Saul is remembered, it is as far less important than David and, indeed, as an enemy of David and Israel. It is this memory, not how he is actually presented in 1 Samuel, that will continue to influence Israel as it moves on in history.

The use of memory in 1 and 2 Sam is not unique and, upon some consideration, not surprising. There can be no better way of changing or incorporating the past than to remember it through one's own perspective. The perspective of the author of Samuel becomes clearer after looking at the specific memories and helps clarify the tension between pro-monarchical and anti-monarchical factions. Whether one is for or against the monarchy, Saul's story disrupts Israel's history and its characters fail to take that history into account. By contrast, David's reign remains firmly within the grasp of memory as the one which the LORD God anointed to carry on the tradition.

Egypt as an "Iron Furnace": A Metaphor of Transformation—A Writer's Perspective

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Reference is made to Egypt as an "iron furnace" in three biblical passages: Deut 4:20; 1 Kgs 8:51; and Jer 11:4. In each instance, Israel's sacred story and God's role in the sacred story are recounted. The reference in Deuteronomy occurs in the conclusion of Moses' first address. Moses refers to God's bringing the people out of the iron furnace as the basis of his appeal for faithful obedience to the covenant. In 1 Kings, the reference is included in Solomon's concluding prayer at the dedication of the Jerusalem Temple. Solomon links Israel as God's heritage with God's bringing the people out of the midst of the iron furnace. An appeal to the people to uphold the covenant is also made here. In the Jeremiah passage, God directs Jeremiah to proclaim the words of the covenant to the people of Judah, the words that were commanded after God brought the people out of the iron furnace of Egypt.

Deutero-Isaiah also uses the image of a furnace (48:10). Isaiah contrasts the "former things" with the "new things" that Israel has not yet heard. God has refined Israel and tried its people in the "furnace of affliction." The "furnace" is not specifically identified, but certainly refers to the exile in Babylonia. In light of Deutero-Isaiah's emphasis on a New Exodus, the ambiguity allows for the identification of the Babylonian exile with the "exile" in Egypt.

That these passages all link the furnace metaphor directly to claims about God's saving activity and to the relationship between God and people is clear. However, the significance and meaning of the metaphor are not stated directly. Two important questions are left unanswered: First, why is the metaphor of an "iron furnace" used to encapsulate and express the relationships among God, people, and Egypt in the literary traditions; and second, why does Egypt play such a significant role in these traditions?

The traditional interpretation is that the metaphor conveys the meaning of oppression imposed on the people during their sojourn in Egypt. But the meaning has much more depth and breadth than this interpretation allows. Oppression is but one facet of the *transformative* quality of the Egypt/Exodus traditions. It is this process of *transforming* that is conveyed most powerfully in the metaphor.

The iron furnace metaphor is a type defined by anthropologists as an "elaborating symbol" or "root metaphor" (Ortner, 1979; cf. Turner, 1967:29–31; Fernandez, 1966:61–62). It differs from other types of metaphors in its capacity to order experience. As such, it is essentially analytical. It serves as a source of categories for conceptualizing the ordering of the world, as a means of orienting oneself in the world, and as a way of understanding the relationships of parts in a whole. The interrelationship among the parts of the root metaphor help to conceptualize the interrelationship among the parts of the referent, that is, what is being referred to. In the case of the metaphor considered in this paper, Egypt as iron furnace serves as a means of conceptualizing the development of Israel as a religious people.

In order for the root metaphor to convey meaning, the members of a society must recognize from their experience of the world that many relationships in their human and social experiences can be expressed by the symbol. Although there is no literal connection between the symbol and its referent, i.e., no "natural" link, it is nevertheless possible to identify a formal congruence of logical structure between them. The congruence is determined by factors specific to the communities in which the symbol operates (Firth, 1973:70–71).

The processual structure of rites of passage as defined by Victor Turner (e.g., 1969) serves as an appropriate analogy for revealing the structural relationships underlying the iron furnace metaphor and its referents. A similar approach has been used by Sir Edmund Leach in interpreting biblical texts. According to Leach (1983:100):

> if we consistently think of text in relation to ritual and *vice versa* instead of keeping the two modes of metaphorical expression in mutual isolation, then matters which might otherwise seem obscure may come into sharper or even quite different focus.

The analogy serves both as an analytical framework and as a heuristic device for sorting out the relationships among the domains of technology, history, and narrative traditions that are encapsulated in the iron furnace metaphor and for identifying the nature of transformation represented in each. It also offers a means for clarifying why it is that the technological process of ironworking serves as a mechanism for communicating and illuminating a crucial turning point in Israel's narrative tradition.

Rites of passage mediate transitions in space, social status, social position, or age. There are three phases in the processual structure of these rites: separation, marginality, and aggregation. In a social setting, separation consists of the symbolic detachment of an individual or group from an earlier fixed point in the social structure or from a particular set of social conditions (a "state"). It is a kind of symbolic "death" in preparation for the ritual transformation. The marginal or liminal state marks the entrance into a cultural realm that has few of the attributes of the past or forthcoming phase, a move from structure to anti-structure. The participants in the ritual are "betwixt and between" and their characteristics are ambiguous (see Turner, 1979). It is during this phase that reorientation and transformation are undergone. The final phase is reincorporation into the normal structure of society in a transformed state. This symbolic rebirth represents a change in status.

Implied in the iron furnace metaphor is an awareness of the transformation that the iron ore undergoes when it is introduced into the furnace.[1] A processual structure similar to that in rites of passage can be identified for the complex and mysterious technological process of iron production. This process corresponds in structure as follows: In the preliminal phase, the iron ore is a relatively soft metal inferior to bronze. When the ore is introduced into the furnace, it is separated from its previous state and moves into the liminal or marginal phase during which it is transformed by the fire with the assistance of the smith. As it undergoes the transformation, it possesses neither its previous attributes nor those it will ultimately acquire. It is "betwixt and between." It is during this crucial phase that it is "reoriented" through carburization[2] and forging and is prepared to move

[1] On the development and processes of ironworking in the ancient Near East, see, e.g., Wertime and Muhly, 1980.

[2] Carburization is the crucial technological process whereby the iron ore, heated in

into a higher state as a strong metal superior to that which entered into the process. Once quenched, it is "reborn." It takes on a new set of characteristics that allow for its use in the form of tools and weapons. In this state iron is recognized for its significant social and economic contributions to maintaining life in the community. In the form of tools it contributes to providing both food and shelter. In the form of weapons it contributes to providing food (hunting) and to protecting the community from internal and external disturbances (e.g., warfare).

Archaeological information illuminates this process of transforming in other spheres.[3] Reflected in the metephor is the coincidence of sociopolitical and technological developments during the transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age. The end of the Late Bronze Age is characterized by a series of cultural and social upheavals that resulted in the decline of empires, disruption of trade, and population movements and migrations (see, e.g., Dever, 1977).

The Early Iron Age stands between the decline of the Late Bronze Age cultures and the development or "birth" of a new nation, Israel. It is a period of transition culturally, socially, and technologically (see, e.g., Gottwald, 1979). By the end of this transitional period, iron begins to surpass bronze as the preferred metal for manufacturing utilitarian objects (Waldbaum, 1978). This technological shift corresponds roughly to the rise of the Israelite state—the emergence of Israel as a cohesive people. The Early Iron Age, then, is a time of rebuilding, a time of cultural an economic reorientation, a time of transformation that is directly linked to the introduction of iron.

II

Further insight into the transformative meaning underlying the iron furnace metaphor used in Deut 4:20, 1 Kgs 8:51, and Jer 11:4 is gained by looking at other references in the Bible. Many of the iron metaphors in the Hebrew Bible refer to technological, military, or political superiority, strength, power, oppression, etc., meanings that are present in the Egypt as iron furnace metaphor as well. But in addition to its superiority and strength, the ancient Israelites were aware of the transformative quality of the ironsmith's work. This quality is evident in the Isaiah passage referred to earlier, as it is in Ezek 22:17–22, where it is made explicit: God will gather the house of Israel in Jerusalem as the smith gathers metals into a furnace to smelt them. The image of the smelting process is used here as a means of communicating to the people that they are in need of purification by means of the fire of the Divine wrath. Ezekiel draws an analogy between the coming judgment and a smelting furnace in which slag (the impurity) is removed (cf. Mal 3:1–4).

The most forceful testimony to the meaning of the iron furnace metaphor, however, is present in the structure of the pentateuchal narratives about the development of God's relationship with Israel. It is clear that by the time of the Pentateuch's final editing the

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(continued)
contact with charcoal, absorbs the carbon that is necessary for transforming it from a soft metal to one of superior strength.

[3] The contributions of archaeology are not fully developed in this paper. The relevant archaeological information is presented in McNutt, 1983 and in my doctoral dissertation (in progress) entitled "Ironworking and Its Symbolic Representation in Ancient Israel's Sacred History"; cf. Waldbaum, 1978.

biblical storytellers recognized a transitional period in Israel's religious development during which Israel is transformed from the disparate peoples reflected in the ancestral stories in Genesis to Israel as a national religious entity united under the guidance of Yahweh.

The structure underlying these narratives reveals diachronic and spatial literary relationships that are in themselves symbolic and contribute to the potency of the Egypt as iron furnace metaphor. As Edmund Leach argues, these relationships have symbolic significance whether or not they happen to correspond to reality as normally understood (1987:581). The narrative structure is illuminated by applying the phases in the processual structure of rites of passage. Israel's "previous state" as a scattered people living in the geographical region of Canaan, with a promise yet to be fulfilled, is represented in the ancestral stories. Joseph's entrance into Egypt and the subsequent descent of his family represent a break from the past way of life and an entrance into the iron furnace Egypt in preparation for the fulfillment of the promise. In Egypt and the wilderness Israel experiences the topsy turvy realm that is so characteristic of the "betwixt and between" (cf. Leach, 1987). The entrance into Egypt symbolizes a separation from Israel's previous state culturally, socially, spatially, and temporally. Cultural and social autonomy is lost to slavery and oppression, the land promised left behind, temporal reality between the times of Joseph and Moses passed over with a mere reference to the number of years passed in Egypt (Exod 12:40).

In this light, the process of reaggregation—the fulfillment of the promise, the forging of the people into the religious entity "Israel"—begins with the pivotal event in Israel's sacred story, the exodus from Egypt. It is at this point that the God Yahweh liberates the people from their bondage in the iron furnace, from the liminal "betwixt and between" in which their status as an autonomous people is suspended and ambiguous. The motif of rebirth is clear from the creation imagery used in Exodus 15 (see Anderson, 1984). But this is only the first step toward the ultimate goal of achieving a new status as a people possessing a land of their own. Once they pass out of the furnace, symbolized by the crossing, or quenching, at the Reed Sea, they must be forged into a people with a common identity, sharing in further trials to cement their solidarity. The final steps toward transformation are made in the wilderness. In the Hebrew Bible, wilderness symbolizes liminality or marginality *par excellence*. The wilderness is a place of chaos, of hunger and thirst, of demons, etc. But it is also a place of Divine revelation. In the wilderness Elijah experiences the "small voice" that is God's (1 Kgs 19:12), Moses encounters the Divine, and the Israelites experience both the threats of death and the hope for new life. The wilderness is the "Other World" in which everything happens in reverse—heavenly bread falls from the sky, water emerges from a rock, etc. (Leach, 1987:587). "Entering or leaving the Wilderness symbolizes a metaphysical movement from the here and now to the timelessness of the Other or vice versa" (Leach, 1987:586). Following the forging in the wilderness, both through the gift of the covenant law and through shared experience, the Israelites take the final step of reaggregation. Under the leadership of Joshua the people pass over the Jordan River into the Promised Land. They are quenched and "reborn." They enter into the same land left behind by Joseph and his family, but they move back into this geographical realm as a transformed people, as "Israel." It is the same land, yet not the same land. Before, it was a land in which Abraham and his kin travelled and dwelt as sojourners. Now it is a land possessed, a land given as an inheritance by the graciousness of God.

III

There are many rich symbols woven into this sacred tale of transformation: water as a symbol of rebirth, the wilderness as liminality, the image of the furnace as womb,

Pharaoh and the plagues as representatives of chaos, etc. But there is one important symbol whose meaning is not fully apparent unless viewed in relation to the iron furnace metaphor. This symbol, encapsulated in the roles of the Midianites and Moses, is the metalsmith as mediator. It is the Midianites and Moses as Midianite that mediate the transitions in the narrative and the processual structure underlying it. In proposing this argument, I accept the assertion that the Midianites and the Kenites are closely related groups.

The Kenites are portrayed in biblical tradition as staunch supporters of both Israel and Yahwism (e.g., Judg 5:24–27; cf. 4:17–22; 1 Sam 15:6; 30:29). Some interpreters have gone so far as to assert that the Kenites were responsible for introducing Yahwism to the ancient Near East (e.g., Rowley, 1950:149–63). But it is generally agreed that they are depicted as a group of nomadic or semi-nomadic metalsmiths. The eponymous ancestor of this group is Cain, the Israelite culture hero and ancestor of Tubal-Cain, the first "forger of all instruments of bronze and iron" (Gen 4:22).

Moses' father-in-law is the key to the identification of the Kenites with the Midianites. In the Exodus stories he is called a Midianite, but in other passages a Kenite (Judg 1:16; 4:11). In 1 Sam 15:6, the Kenites are remembered as having shown loyalty to Israel during the Exodus, a role attributed to the Midianites in the pentateuchal narratives. Whatever the explanation for this inconsistency might be (see, e.g., Parke-Taylor, 1975:23), it is clear that biblical tradition regarded the father-in-law of Moses as a Kenite. If, in fact, tradition associated the Midianites with the Kenites, who are in turn associated with metalsmiths, then the role of the Midianites in Israel's sacred tale takes on added significance.

The structural role of the Midianites is clarified by social analogies used as a heuristic tool for sorting out the structural relationships. In African societies, the smith's role as mediator in the transformation of iron serves as a cognitive or analytical model, as a metaphor, for mediating relationships (McNutt, n.d.).[4] In African mythology, the First Smith or iron god (always a male) is often the culture hero. He serves as a facilitator of the formation of order out of chaos. As both a descendant of the gods and as the first human ancestor, he mediates between the heavenly and earthly realms and transmits to humans crucial knowledge about social organization, agriculture, animal domestication, technology, etc. It is he who is able to maintain a balance between the divine and human spheres and who can resolve internal and external controversies.

In the social and political spheres, the roles of the African smith are also related to his mediating function in his craft. By virtue of the ritual functions he serves in the technological "rite of passage," he is well-suited to serve in a similar capacity in social rituals. Thus his role is central in many initiation rites and he occasionally attains the office of priest. For the same reason, he is recognized as a mediator in settling legal disputes and as upholder of social justice. All of these functions and offices are related to his role as craftsman in facilitating the "death" and "rebirth" of the material he transforms in the smelting and forging processes.

The typical social separation of African smiths and their families from the rest of society is also related to their craft. It is the role of artisan that sets the smith apart. Artisans are often considered to be socially and structurally inferior or "marginal" in society (cf. Turner,

[4] For general surveys of the symbolic roles of iron and the ironsmith in African societies, see, e.g., Forbes, 1971:54–104; Eliade, 1978:79–96; McNutt, n.d. On metaphors associated with iron technology, see also Fernandez, 1966, 1982.

1969:96; 1985:231–33). Marginal peoples tend to play major roles in myths and popular tales as representatives or expressions of universal human values. They also tend to function *socially* as arbiters in disputes, as representatives of what Victor Turner calls "communitas," as a kind of check on the normative system of bounded, structured, particularistic groups. The socially marginal position traditionally associated with the smith, then, is closely related to his social function as mediator, a role that he also plays in his craft.

The role of the Midianites/Kenites in the narrative structure of Israel's sacred history is clarified if viewed from this perspective. The Kenites are presented as a socially marginal group. Although they are fiercely devoted to Israel and to Yahwism, they are never fully incorporated into Israelite society. Cain, the culture hero and eponymous ancestor of the Kenites, is a marginal and ambivalent figure. He is a murderer, yet marked by God in order that none should kill him. As the ancestor of both city-dwellers and tent-dwellers, he is socially marginal. Cain's mark is a "stigma" that identifies him as a person not quite human, an anti-social mediator who is neither human nor divine (Aycock, 1983). He represents the margins of oppositions—purity/pollution, life/death, limitation/creativity, this world/the other world, etc.

In the pentateuchal narratives, the Midianites are also mediators. Geographically, they are a marginal people in the Israelite world. They dwell on the margin between the Promised Land and the iron furnace Egypt. It is the Midianite traders in Genesis 37 who are ultimately responsible for mediating the symbolic "death" of Jacob's family by transporting Joseph to Egypt, into the betwixt and between where Israel's transformation as a people is to take place. The Midianite role in mediating the subsequent rebirth of the people is made even more explicit. It is the Midianites who give Moses refuge when he flees from Egypt. It is in the geographical boundary between Egypt and the Promised Land—Midian—where God reveals the Divine name to Moses and assigns him his mission (Exodus 3). Moses becomes the mediator of Divine liberation while in Midian. He becomes a Midianite himself by marrying into a Midianite family (Exod 2:21). Because of his marginal status, he is ultimately denied the opportunity of participating fully in the society to which he has helped give birth. He is not allowed to enter the Promised Land (Deuteronomy 34).

Jethro (in Exod 2:18 "Reuel" and in Num 10:29 and Judg 4:11 "Hobab"), Moses' father-in-law and priest of Midian, plays an essential role in the narrative structure. He is responsible for accepting Moses into Midianite society. Following the exodus, mediated by Moses, the marginal Israelite/ Midianite, Jethro offers a sacrifice to God and presides over a sacred meal attended by Aaron (Exod 18:10–12). He advises Moses in matters of governing the people and mediating disputes (Exod 18:13–27). And in Num 10:29–32, Moses requests that Hobab serve as Israel's guide through the wilderness, as their eyes, because it is he who knows how to survive in this marginal realm. Just as the Midianites had been responsible for facilitating the symbolic death represented in the descent of Joseph into Egypt, so a Midianite is given responsibility for guiding Israel through the final step in the process of rebirth—the passage through the liminality of wilderness toward the goal of the Promised Land.

The mediating roles of the Midianites in facilitating the transformation of Israel in the narrative are very similar to those of the smith in African society. Jethro is a priest-smith who mediates between the realms of the Divine and the human, he mediates in the human realm as legal councilor, and, most importantly, he facilitates the completion of Israel's rite of passage into a new "state" as a nation. He has a hand in assisting Yahweh, the Divine Smith, in "forging" Israel into a united people.

IV

In summary, the metaphor of Israel as an iron furnace serves as a root metaphor for ordering Israel's religious development, as a source of categories for conceptualizing the interrelationship of the events that led to the birth of a nation out of the iron furnace of Egypt. Encapsulated in the metaphor is an awareness of the structural congruence among the domains of iron technology, history, and narrative, and the transformations that are represented in each. Implied in the metaphor is the mystery of the Divine Smith's transforming power and the mystery and transforming power of the covenant relationship that forged Israel into a people united. Condensed in this powerful symbol is the *meaning* of Israel's relationship to God:

> . . . as information is decreased, meaningfulness is increased; for similarities, substantive or structural, between that which we seek to understand and that which we already "know," are made explicit. Metaphors are constructed. The application of a rule, principle, or classificatory device to a wide range of phenomena . . . invests the world with meaning, for everything is not only itself, but also an icon of other things (Rappaport, 1979:156).

Table

ritual/metaphor	previous "state" ("death")	transition/ transformative period	transformed "state" ("rebirth")
iron-working	soft metal/ore	furnace (smelting/forging)	strong/superior metal
historical periods	Late Bronze Age 1600-1200 B.C.E	Early Iron Age 1200-922 B.C.E.	Iron Age 922-586 B.C.E.
narrative perspective of "history"	Ancestral period Genesis	Egypt/Wilderness Exodus-Deut	Israel in the Promised Land Joshua-Kings

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Hezekiah in the Books of Chronicles

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The Chronicler's portrayal of Hezekiah in 2 Chr 29–32 comes at a crucial juncture in his overall presentation of the history of the monarchy in Judah. This is indicated, in part, by the extent to which he diverges from his *Vorlage*, 2 Kings 18–20. Nearly all commentators draw attention to the fact that whereas the DtrH and Isaiah devote the bulk of their accounts to such political matters as Sennacherib's invasion, Hezekiah's illness, and the Babylonian intrigue to elicit Hezekiah's support against Assyria (2 Kings 18:9–20:19 // Isa 36:1–39:8), relegating Hezekiah's reform measures to a single verse (2 Kings 18:4), the Chronicler apportions three chapters to the reform (2 Chr 29–31) and treats the more political concerns that exercised his predecessors in an abbreviated and theologically motivated fashion (2 Chronicles 32).[1]

With regard to these more political concerns the Chronicler's tendency to idealize pious kings by the omission of material deemed to be inconsistent with their characterization is particularly evident.[2] The omission of 2 Kings 18:14–16, the deuteronomistic first stage of the invasion which reports Hezekiah's capitulation and attempt to appease Sennacherib with tribute payments, as well as the drastic abridgement of 2 Kings 18:17–37 // Isa 36:2–22, Sennacherib's demand for capitulation through his messenger, and 2 Kings 19:1–34 // Isa 37:1–35, Hezekiah's appeal, provide the clearest examples of this perspective.[3]

Less clear are the reasons for the Chronicler's presentation of Hezekiah's illness and recovery (2 Chr 32:24–31 // 2 Kings 20:1–19).[4] By adding a note stating, "God left him to himself, in order to try him and to know all that was in his heart," (v 31b) the Chronicler has positively reinterpreted his *Vorlage* to present a blemish on the character of Hezekiah as a beauty mark.

As one might expect from this brief sketch, the secondary literature concerned with these chapters (especially chapter 32), their parallels and the thorny historical and theological problems which grow out of their interrelationship is immense,[5] certainly too

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[1] Recent discussions may be found in H. G. M. Williamson, *1 and 2 Chronicles* (NCB; London: Marshall, Morgan, and Scott, 1982) 350–88; S. McKenzie, *The Chronicler's Use of the Deuteronomistic History* (HSM 33; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985) 159–168; R. Dillard, *2 Chronicles* (WBC 15; Waco: Word Books, 1987) 226–61.

[2] W. F. Lemke, in his unpublished Harvard dissertation, has convincingly shown that the way the Chronicler usually idealizes pious kings is to omit derogatory material, *Synoptic Studies in the Chronicler's History* (Harvard: 1964) 245.

[3] See Dillard, 255–56.

[4] For helpful suggestions regarding the significance of Babylon for the Chronicler's interpretation, see P. Akroyd, "The Chronicler as Exegete," *JSOT* 2 (1977) 2–32.

[5] Dillard provides a helpful introductory bibliography (p. 226) "concentrating on more recent materials that provide summaries of the current state of the argument and entree into the larger bibliography devoted to the subject" (p. 227).

vast to be covered within this limited space. Thus, this paper will confine itself to one significant aspect of the Chronicler's distinctive account: his presentation of Hezekiah as a second David and/or a second Solomon.

The vigorous debate as to whether the Chronicler seeks to depict Hezekiah as a second David or a second Solomon continues without consensus as proposed Davidic and Solomonic allusions in Hezekiah proliferate at an alarming rate. While many of the comparisons between these kings are valid, there appears to be no means by which these claims may be judged. A modest start in this direction might be made with the proposal of two criteria:

1. That the alleged comparison be unique to the Chronicler.
2. That the alleged comparison be applied to David and Hezekiah or Solomon and Hezekiah alone.

Justification for the first criterion arises from contemporary scholarship's reluctance to utilize material already present in the Chronicler's *Vorlage* in the construction of a chronistic theological perspective without extensive critical examination.[6] The same may be said for those elements of "pro-priestly revision"[7] that appear in 1 Chronicles 15–16, 23–27. It will become evident in the course of this paper that this criterion is of relatively little importance for this investigation. Such is not the case, however, for the second criterion. Here, much confusion exists, with the result that characteristic expressions applied to many of the Chronicler's favorites are adduced in support of the contention that Hezekiah is being presented as either a second David or a second Solomon rather than simply one of the pious, Davidic kings the Chronicler holds up to his people.

We turn now to an examination of the major attempts to see Hezekiah as either a second David or a second Solomon in light of these criteria.

Hezekiah as a Second David

The major attempt to see Hezekiah as a second David is that of R. Mosis.[8] This is a corollary to his suggestion that the Chronicler has adopted the reigns of Saul, David, and Solomon as paradigms of three possible situations in which Israel might be found: Apostasy (Saul), Faithfulness (David), or Future Blessing (Solomon) (p. 165). Since this final realization must remain future-oriented, Hezekiah must be patterned on either Saul or David. Thus, Mosis calls Hezekiah, "einen zweiten David" (p. 189) based on the following evidence:

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[6] T. Willi's insistence on the importance of the parallel passages and consequent detailed analysis of the Chronicler's "exegetical" techniques serves only as a corrective to wholesale neglect of the *Vorlage*, *Die Chronik als Auslesung* (FRLANT 10; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972).

[7] The term is Williamson's who uses it to denote the redactor(s) responsible for the minor expansions of 1 Chronicles 15–16 and the more extensive additions to 23–27 to correct the Chronicler's presentation on the basis of the twenty-four priestly courses then current in Jerusalem. On the whole question see Williamson, "The Origins of the Twenty-Four Priestly Courses: a Study of 1 Chronicles xxiii-xxvii," *SVT* 30 (1979) 251–68.

[8] *Untersuchungen zur Theologie des chronistischen Geschichtswerkes* (Freiburg: Herder, 1973).

1. 2 Chr 29:2 claims Hezekiah "did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, according to all that David his father had done."

2. After claiming the post-exilic restoration of the cult in Ezra 1–6 is Davidic, Mosis displays the parallels between this restoration and Hezekiah's cleansing of the temple and Passover (2 Chr 29:3–31:1).

3. 2 Chr 32:1–23, the deliverance from Sennacherib, parallels 1 Chronicles 14 in that both describe a victory resulting from seeking Yahweh or the Ark. Furthermore, Hezekiah's military preparations in this chapter more closely parallel David than Solomon "the man of peace."

Mosis has been challenged by H. G. M. Williamson.[9] *Vorlage* considerations considerably weaken the force of 2 Chr 29:2, which simply reproduces the deuteronomistic judgment of 2 Kings 18:3, itself a stereotyped formula. 2 Chr 32:1–23 has been carefully reworked to omit Hezekiah's initial capitulation (2 Kings 18:14–16) and the taking of Judah's fortified cities (2 Kings 18:13 // Isa 36:1) obvious *Vorlage* alterations that tell against Mosis. In addition, the Chronicler records that victory was due to Yahweh's intervention, not Hezekiah's military activities (2 Chr 2:22 no par). We might also point to the omission of 2 Kings 18:7b–8, "he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and would not serve him. He smote the Philistines as far as Gaza and its territory from watchtower to fortified city," as evidence of the Chronicler's intention to portray Hezekiah as a "man of peace," especially since the Chronicler records Solomon "went to Hamath-zobah, and prevailed against it" (2 Chr 8:3 no par). The parallel with Ezra 1–6, of course, depends upon the prior assumption of common authorship.

Williamson's critique is convincing. However, it by no means exhausts the possible allusions to David that have been suggested. In a detailed article discussing the Chronicler's thematic structure, B. Halpern[10] collects a number of motifs that may be construed as effecting parallels, though, it must be said, this is not Halpern's purpose in presenting these parallels and he himself is convinced of the Chronicler's intention to portray Hezekiah as a second Solomon (p. 51). Of these, the motif of prosperity, often marked with the formula "wealth and honor," is the most pervasive.

1. 1 Chr 18:2–11 presents a series of reports depicting David's exacting of tribute. These may be paired with the notice that "many brought gifts to the Lord to Jerusalem and precious things to Hezekiah king of Judah," (2 Chr 32:23a no par), though the exacting of tribute is not quite the same thing as receiving gifts.

2. 1 Chr 22:3–4, 5b, 14–16; 28:1, 14–18; 29:2–5, 6–8, 12, 21, all dealing with David's transfer of kingship to Solomon, repeat the motif of wealth and parallel similar statements of Hezekiah's wealth in 2 Chr 30:24ff.; 31:4–12 (both without parallel in Kings).

3. David's regnal summary contains the notice that David "died at a good old age, full of days, riches and honor," (1 Chr 29:28) which is picked up in the summary of Hezekiah's reign (2 Chr 32:27–30 no par) and 2 Chr 32:23b (no par) "he was exalted in the sight of all nations from that time onward." 1 Chr 14:1, 2, 17 might be cited as a closer parallel.

While all these references to Hezekiah's prosperity are without *Vorlage*, and so may be construed to arise from the Chronicler's intent to portray Hezekiah as a wealthy, honored

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[9] *Israel in the Books of Chronicles* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 124–25.

[10] "Sacred History and Ideology: Chronicles' Thematic Structure—Indications of an Earlier Source," *The Creation of Sacred Literature, Composition and Redaction of the Biblical Text* (ed. R. Friedman; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) 35–54.

king in the Davidic tradition, the Chronicler has also utilized this motif to enhance the positive portrayal of other pious Judean kings, most notably Solomon (2 Chr 1:12, 14–17; 2:6–9; 3:4–7, 14; 4:7–8, 18, 19–22; 5:1; 8:17–18; 9:9–28), but also Asa (14:12–15 no par); Jehoshaphat (17:5, 9, 11; 20:25 no par); Uzziah (26:6–15 no par) and Jotham (27:3–5 no par).

A similar situation obtains with the motif of victory in war as the result of the king's seeking Yahweh. David's victory in 1 Chr 14:14ff. is paralleled in Hezekiah (2 Chr 32:1–23) but also in Asa (14:6, 10–14 no par); Jehoshaphat (20:1–30 no par); Amaziah (25:7–10, 11–13 no par); Uzziah (26:5–6 no par) and Jotham (27:5–6 no par).

The presence of these motifs in conjunction with other Davidic kings lessens their significance for our purposes. This is not the case with Halpern's isolation of the motif of Yahweh saving the king. 2 Chr 32:22 reports Yahweh saving Hezekiah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem and recalls the same notice with regard to David, who was also saved wherever he went (1 Chr 18:6, 13 // 2 Sam 8:6, 14) (p. 41). The only other relevant occurrence, 1 Chr 11:14, is textually suspect precisely at the word "save," though it, too, relates to David.

R. Dillard has suggested other Davidic parallels for Hezekiah[11] as follows in increasing order of probability:

1. 2 Chr 32:6, Hezekiah's appointment of military officers "mirrors the earlier work of David (1 Chr 23–27)" (p. 257). David's activity, however, is limited to chapter 27, which is to be regarded as secondary.[12]

2. 2 Chr 32:21 which mentions the destroying angel "recalls events after David's census (2 Sam 24 // 1 Chr 21)" (p. 258). The differences between these two accounts makes the parallel somewhat improbable, even if it satisfies the requirements of our criteria.

3. 2 Chr 31:11–14, dealing with Hezekiah's provision for storerooms in the temple under the auspices of the Levites, Dillard pairs with David's similar activities in 1 Chr 9:26; 23:28; 26:22 and 28:12 (p. 251). As only Hezekiah and David are connected in this way and in the absence of *Vorlage* difficulties, we may accept this judgment in the case of 9:26; 26:22 and 28:12. 23:28, however, as part of the pro-priestly revision, must be left out of consideration.

4. In 2 Chr 30:12 the expression "the people acted with one accord (*lb 'bd*)," one of the Chronicler's ways of emphasizing the "undivided loyalty of the people toward pious kings," finds an exact match only in 1 Chr 12:38 (heb. p. 245).

5. 2 Chr 32:5b, "and he strenthened the Millo in the City of David," is the most interesting in this regard since Dillard claims this activity "likens Hezekiah once again to David and Solomon (1 Chr 11:8; 1 Kgs 11:27)," (p. 257). While the Davidic reference is secure, the reference to Solomon is only found in Kings, the Chronicler having omitted it from his presentation.[13] We must agree with Coggins, "Here as

[11] *2 Chronicles.*

[12] *2 Chronicles,* 174.

[13] See P. Weltan, *Geschichte und Geschichtsdarstellung in den Chronikbüchern* (WMANT 42; Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1973) 71, "Millo begegnet erstaunlicherweise in der Chronik, abgesehen von unserer Stelle, nur 1 Chr 11,8 im Zusammenhang mit der Eroberung der Stadt durch David. Ganz fehlt Millo in der Salomoüberlieferung, wo der Ausdruck 1Kön 9,15.24; 11,27 noch begegnet, was vom Chronisten völlig übergangen wird."

elsewhere it appears as if a deliberate comparison is being made between Hezekiah and David."[14]

Further examples of the Chronicler's intention to depict Hezekiah as a second David which are not paralleled in his *Vorlage* and which apply only to these two kings are found in Hezekiah's Royal Speeches (2 Chr 30:6–9; 32:7–8).[15]

1. 2 Chr 30:6 refers to "the God of Abraham, Isaac and *Israel*," recalling the same appelation in 1 Chr 29:18. The only other instances in the Hebrew Bible are found on the lips of Moses (Exod 32:13) and Elijah (1 Kings 18:36). The tenor of this speech, which seeks to gather all Israel and particularly those "brothers" from the North, for cultic reform, echoes David's similar concern at the start of his reign (1 Chr 13:1–4).
2. 2 Chr 32:7, "Be strong and courageous, do not fear or be dismayed," in Hezekiah's second speech, is exactly parallel to David's words of encouragement to Solomon (1 Chr 22:13), except that David's imperatives are in the singular while Hezekiah's are in the plural due to their respective audiences. Furthermore, both pairs of imperatives are repeated in 1 Chr 28:20 where David again encourages his son, separated only by "and do" which refers to the building of the temple and is not relevant to Hezekiah's audience. 2 Chr 20:15, 17, Jehoshaphat's salvation oracle, because it too makes use of the second pair of imperatives, might be cited in refutation of this evidence. It is the combination of the two sets of imperatives that is most important, however, and this combination occurs only in the Davidic and Hezekian references.

We may conclude from this investigation that the Chonicler is concerned to depict Hezekiah as a second David in ways that other pious Judean kings are not.

Hezekiah as a Second Solomon

The major attempt to see Hezekiah as a second Solomon is that of H. G. M. Williamson.[16] This is a corollary of his suggestion that "in Hezekiah's recapitulation of Solomon's achievements it is as though the Chronicler is taking us back prior to the point of division where the one Israel is united around a single temple under the authority of the Davidic king."[17] Of the evidence he presents in favor of his position, six items are especially cogent:

1. 2 Chr 30:26, "So there was great joy in Jerusalem, for since the time of Solomon the son of David king of Israel there had been nothing like this in Jerusalem," is as Wiiliamson says, "certainly the most obvious link between Hezekiah and Solomon and it is one which could not be said of any of the intervening kings."[18]
2. 2 Chr 30:23, in which the whole assembly decides to keep the feast for an additional

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[14] *The First and Second Books of the Chronicles* (CBC; London: Cambridge University Press, 1976) 281.

[15] On the significance of the Royal Speeches for the structure and theology of the books of Chronicles see my *When Kings Speak: Royal Speech and Royal Prayer in Chronicles* (SBLDS 93; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987).

[16] *IBC*, 119–25; *1 and 2 Chron*, 350–88.

[17] *1 and 2 Chron*, 351.

[18] *1 and 2 Chron*, 371; *IBC*, 120–21; cf. Dillard, 228–29.

seven days, strongly recalls the prolongation of the feast at the dedication of the temple in 2 Chr 7:8, 9.[19]

3. 2 Chr 30:6–19 employs four verbs of repentance that figured prominently in 2 Chr 7:14, Yahweh's answer to Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the temple: "repent, return" (vv 6, 8, 9); "humble oneself" (v 11); "pray" (v 18; cf. 30:20, 24); and a synonym for "seek" (v 19).[20] In addition, in 7:14 Yahweh promises that if his people "who are called by my name humble themselves, and pray and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways, then I will *hear* from heaven, and will forgive their sin and *heal* their land," terminology that is picked up in 2 Chr 30:20, "And the Lord heard Hezekiah and healed the people." While some of these verbs are employed in the descriptions of subsequent kings,[21] which is only to be expected given the paradigmatic nature of both the prayer and the divine response for the Chronicler's presentation, *all* of these references coalesce only in Hezekiah.

4. 2 Chr 30:9 contains an echo of 1 Kings 8:50, the second half of which was omitted in the Chronicler's parallel account of Solomon's prayer at the temple dedication only to appear, here, in the mouth of Hezekiah, the second Solomon.[22]

5. Hezekiah's immediate concern for the temple is emphasized at the time of his accession (2 Chr 29:3) as was Solomon's (2 Chr 1).

6. In the same way, at the end of their work on the temple (8:16; 29:35b) both kings receive similar summaries of their accomplishments.[23]

Williamson's other arguments for seeing Hezekiah as a second Solomon are less convincing:

1. It is difficult to see how David's words of enouragement to Solomon (1 Chr 19:18; 22:13; 28:10, 20) when repeated by Hezekiah (2 Chr 32:7) make Hezekiah a second Solomon.[24]

2. Similarly, while it is true that the mention of "Beersheba to Dan" (2 Chr 30:5) means that now, under Hezekiah, "the land is regarded as having returned to its full Solomonic extent,"[25] the land attained that extent in the time of *David* as 1 Chr 21:2 makes clear, and is never so described in the Solomonic materials, even if it is strongly implied.

3. A third application of material to Solomon that has also been seen as Davidic concerns 2 Chr 31:2–3 where Hezekiah restores the divisions of the priests and Levites (v 2) as well as the prescribed offerings (v 3) after the fashion of Solomon in 2 Chr

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[19] *1 and 2 Chron*, 371; cf. Dillard, 229.

[20] *1 and 2 Chron*, 367–70.

[21] Surprisingly, the reign of Manasseh is portrayed in this way (2 Chr 33:12–13). I am indebted to H. G. M. Williamson for bringing this to my attention in personal conversation. His reading of an earlier draft of this paper and subsequent discussion are also much appreciated.

[22] Quoting personal conversation with S. Japhet, *IBC*, 124 n. 4.

[23] *1 and 2 Chron*, 351; cf. Dillard, 228.

[24] *1 and 2 Chron*, 382. Williamson's point, that Joshua's later use of the phrase to encourage the people (Josh 10:25) strengthens the Moses-Joshua / David-Solomon typology, remains unchallenged.

[25] *1 and 2 Chron*, 366; *IBC*, 123.

8:12–15.[26] P. Ackroyd, for one, has argued that this "echoes the activities of David, particularly in 1 Chron. 23–26."[27] Unfortunately, the whole matter is complicated by the differing views these scholars hold on the presence of redaction in 1 Chronicles 23–27. On Williamson's view, which we have basically adopted in this paper, the Davidic material is secondary and thus does not preclude the parallel.

4. With a slight alteration of the MT in accordance with the LXX 2 Chr 32:22b reads, "and he gave them *rest* on every side," (RSV), thereby including Hezekiah among those pious kings who received this special blessing for their faithfulness. While it is true that this concept is especially concerned with Solomon,[28] as Williamson notes, both Asa (14:1, 5–7; 15:5 no par) and Jehoshaphat (20:30 no par) were also beneficiaries.[29]

5. Similarly, Hezekiah's exaltation "in the sight of all nations," (32:23) while it does recall Solomon (9:23–24) is also a part of the Chronicler's distinctive portrait of David (1 Chr 14:17 no par); Jehoshaphat (2 Chr 17:10–11; 20:29 no par); and Uzziah (26:8 no par).[30]

6. The same may be said regarding the application of the motif of "wealth and fame" (32:27–29) to Hezekiah."[31] As our previous analysis has indicated, this important concept is regularly applied to the Chronicler's favorites.

Along these same lines, however, R. Dillard has discovered another possible allusion to Solomon in the Hezekian materials in the detail of the reference to "shields" at 2 Chr 32:27, the section describing Hezekiah's wealth. Though some recent translations (NAB, JB, NJB) have emended the text at this point, along the lines of the proposal in BHS, to "jewels/gems," Dillard appropriately remarks, "Shields were kept in treasuries; this emendation would be at the expense of the author's effort to parallel Hezekiah with Solomon (9:16; 12:9)" (p. 254).

Halpern repeats many of Williamson's observations and adds one of his own, "The notion of the priests' self-sanctification occurs only in the accounts of Solomon's and Hezekiah's reigns (2 Chr 5:11; 29:15, 34) (p. 50). This is correct, as the Davidic reference in 1 Chr 15:14 which would make this applicable to David, Solomon and Hezekiah, not Solomon and Hezekiah alone, is part of the "pro-priestly" expansion related to 1 Chronicles 23–27.

As in the case of the Davidic parallels we may conclude on the basis of this investigation that the Chronicler was also concerned to depict Hezekiah as a second Solomon in ways that other pious Judean kings are not.

Hezekiah as a Second David and a Second Solomon

The previous two sections have endeavored to examine the major attempts to depict Hezekiah as either a second David or a second Solomon. On the basis of the two criteria developed at the start of this paper, genuine chronistic material and application of the comparison with David or Solomon to Hezekiah alone, it appears that neither position can be exclusively sustained. This suggests that a mediating position in which Hezekiah

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[26] *1 and 2 Chron*, 373; *IBC*, 122.

[27] *I and II Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah* (TBC; London: SCM Press, 1973) 187.

[28] See R. Braun, "Solomon the Chosen Temple Builder: The Significance of I Chronicles 22, 28, and 29 for the Theology of Chronicles," *JBL* 95 (1976) 581–90.

[29] *1 and 2 Chron*, 385.

[30] Ibid.

[31] *1 and 2 Chron*, 386–87; *IBC*, 122.

is seen as both a second David and a second Solomon would more fully account for the evidence. In his recent commentary, R. Dillard has collected a number of indications that this is precisely the case. It remains for us to investigate those parallels and determine which are free of *Vorlage* dependence and which apply the comparison with David *and* Solomon to Hezekiah alone.

1. 2 Chr 31:3, which records Hezekiah's provision for the regular offerings, echoes those of David (1 Chr 16:37–40) and Solomon (2 Chr 2:4; 8:12–13) (p. 249).

2. 2 Chr 31:3, "Just as David and Solomon provided from their own wealth for the temple (1 Chr 29:1–5; 2 Chr 9:10–11), so also Hezekiah provides from his property" (p. 249). The force of this argument is somewhat weakened by the occurrence of this same motif in the reign of Josiah (2 Chr 35:7–9). The fact that Josiah comes after Hezekiah adds an interesting wrinkle to the discussion in that this later appearance would not prevent the allusion from depicting Hezekiah as a second David and Solomon.

3. 2 Chr 31:8, which speaks of Hezekiah blessing the people, recalls the blessing administered by David (1 Chr 16:2; cf. v 43) (p. 250). The parallel with Solomon (2 Chr 6:3) may be questioned on the grounds that "blessed" (*brk*) may function here with the meaning "greeted," (cf. NAB) though that seems to me to be overly scrupulous. As these references are not applied to other kings (with the exception of 31:3) and since they are not present in the Chronicler's *Vorlage* we may retain them as evidence for the Chronicler's patterning of Hezekiah upon both David and Solomon.

4. A more qualified assessment is required in the matter of the appointment of the priests and Levites (2 Chr 29:11–14; 31:2, 11–20). While both David (1 Chr 15:3–24; 23–26) and Solomon (2 Chr 8:14–15) are involved in this activity (p. 229), and no other kings are so described, the Davidic references are found in sections regarded as secondary and the Chronicler has been careful to present Jehoiada, the priest, in this way as well (2 Chronicles 23).

5. 2 Chr 29:31–33, in which the people respond to Hezekiah's appeal with offerings and contributions for the temple, "mirrors events at the time of David, Solomon, and Moses (Exod 36:6–7; 1 Chr 29:6–9; 2 Chr 7:7; cf. 31:5–10)" (p. 237). This characteristic motif also occurs in Joash's reign (2 Chr 24:8–14) and appears to be different from the *Vorlage* of 2 Kings 12:9–16.[32]

6. A similar judgment may be rendered with regard to the motif of "success" (2 Chr 31:21; 32:30). In addition to the important occurrences of this term in the reigns of David (1 Chr 22:11, 13; 29:23) and Solomon (2 Chr 7:11), Asa's reign is also characterized in this way at 14:6 (heb. no par).

A final theme supportive of this position actually arises out of an observation made by Williamson,[33] when he notices that the Chronicler is fond of adding a note concerning the assembling of all the people for major occasions. This is especially true with regard to David (1 Chr 11:3, 4; 23:1; 28:1), Solomon (2 Chr 1:2; 5:2) and Hezekiah (30:1ff.).

Thus, while not every alleged comparison can be accepted without reservation, the evidence suggests that there is sufficient warrant for claiming the Chronicler is concerned to present Hezekiah as both a second David and a second Solomon.

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[32] *1 and 2 Chron*, 318; *contra* Rudolph.

[33] *1 and 2 Chron*, 113, 366.

Conclusions

If, as the evidence presented above would seem to indicate, the Chronicler has endeavored to portray Hezekiah as both a second David and a second Solomon, the question arises as to why he has done so. Two suggestions may be made by way of conclusion.

First, while this analysis has challenged Williamson's contention that the Chronicler sought to portray Hezekiah as a second Solomon, his major point, the restoration of the situation prevailing under Solomon, i.e., the reunification of North and South under Hezekiah,[34] is strongly supported. If the reigns of David and Solomon are seen to be one, the parallels adduced between Hezekiah and Solomon are strengthened by the addition of those between Hezekiah and David, not weakened. Furthermore, once we have rigorously applied our initial criteria to make the case that it is the combined reign of David and Solomon that the Chronicler seeks to reproduce in his portrayal of Hezekiah, many of the alleged parallels that were dispensed with can be cited as secondary evidence for the Chronicler's overall intention to provide a solution to the problem of the divided monarchy.

Further support for this interpretation is to be found in Halpern's interesting observation that there is a decided break in the narrative of Chronicles following the reign of Hezekiah: "From Manasseh onward, the whole rest/prosperity/salvation complex disappears," (p. 41); "Hezekiah is the last king of whom it is said that Yhwh was with him, saved him, rescued him, gave him any sort of rest, brought foreigners to pay tribute to him, and so forth" (p. 49). In addition to the cessation of these common motifs, even such previously regular features as burial and accession formulae undergo observable change following the reign of Hezekiah. In the accession formulae the name of the queen mother disappears after Hezekiah as does the stipulation of interment "in the city of David" in the burial notices (p. 48). All of which leads Halpern to say, "there is an inclusio formed there between Hezekiah and the 'United Monarchy' " (p. 50).

Second, the question becomes: but are the reigns of David and Solomon best understood as a unity? Recent years have witnessed a growing consensus that they are. Otto Plöger was among the first to propose that David's preparation for and Solomon's construction of the temple formed "einen zusammenhängenden Akt."[35] This proposal was substantiated in a series of works which denied the separation of the David History and the Solomon History into two distinct periods and argued that both kings are treated comparably: (i) both are selected by divine choice (1 Chr 17:11; 22:7–10); (ii) both ascend to the throne with the full support of "all Israel" (11:1–3; 29:22b–25a); (iii) both were equally devoted to the temple cult.[36] Williamson's summary may be taken as illustrative of the current situation which sees the Chronicler as concerned "to present the reign of David and Solomon as a single, unified event within the divine economy for the life of the nation, in which the complementary nature of the two kings' functions plays an

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[34] See Williamson, *IBC*, 119–31; idem, *1 and 2 Chron*, 25–26; 350–51; Throntveit, 110–13.

[35] "Reden und Gebete in deuteronomistischen und chronistischen Geschichtswerk," *Aus der Spätzeit des Alten Testaments* (Göttingen; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971) 56.

[36] R. L. Braun, "Solomonic Apologetic in Chronicles," *JBL* 92 (197) 503–16; idem, "Chosen Temple Builder"; Williamson, "The Accession of Solomon in the Books of Chronicles," *VT* 26 (1976) 351–61.

important role . . ."[37] But if the crucial point with regard to the interpretaion of these two kings is the complementary nature of their function within a single, unified event, and if the Chronicler is in fact interested in presenting Hezekiah as a return to that golden age of the United Monarchy, his presentation of Hezekiah as a second David *and* a second Solomon is precisely what we should expect.

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[37] Eschatology in Chronicles," *TynBul* 28 (1977) 140.

How Mithra Won the West

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There are three main types of hypotheses concerning the relation between the Iranian god Mithra and the Roman god Mithras:

1. The Roman mystery cult of Mithras was based on Mazdaism, or Zoroastrianism, after it had undergone some unorthodox changes. This was Franz Cumont's view, set forth in 1899.[1] Today this view is generally rejected, partly because of the evidence and partly because of Cumont's faulty method. Assuming, without hard evidence, that Roman Mithraism was a form of Mazdaism, he proceeded to explain the features of the Roman cult in terms of Mazdaism. But this was circular reasoning, as R. L. Gordon and David Ulansey have observed. Gordon expressed it thus: "Cumont simply assumed at every critical point that the Magian evidence was relevant, and proceeded to argue as though this were an established fact and not merely a working hypothesis."[2] Actually, many of the Roman features were not in Mazdaism.

2. Reacting against Cumont, a few scholars went to the other extreme and asserted that Mithraism originated in the West, with the addition of a few Eastern features to enhance its appeal. Michael Speidel and Stig Wikander have presented this hypothesis, and Speidel suggested that Roman Mithraism was derived from the worship of the bull-god Orion.[3] In 1975 Gordon accepted the hypothesis of Western origin when he said, "We ought to start with the hypothesis that Roman or Western Mithraism is an independent religion."[4] But in 1978 he changed to the view that the mystery cult of Mithras began in Anatolia and resulted from "the transformation of an Anatolian secret cult into an elaborate and learned mystery cult incorporating current views of the nature of the cosmos."[5] He suggests that Zoroastrian features came from Zoroastrian pseudepigrapha.

The hypothesis of Roman origins seems weak. Orientalizing Roman religion was not a Roman practice. Mystery religions came to Rome from Greece and the Near East. The Romans adopted mystery religions; they did not manufacture them. If the worship of Mithras in a mystery cult was a deliberate Roman creation, why is it such a hodgepodge instead of being more systematic? Why do some features seem extraneous and hardly fit

[1] Franz Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, II (Brussels, 1899).

[2] R. L. Gordon, "Franz Cumont and the doctrines of Mithraism," in J. R. Hinnells, ed., *Mithraic Studies*, I, 221. See David Ulansey, "Mithraic Studies: A Paradigm Shift?," *RSR* 13 (1987) 104–10. For a very comprehensive survey of Mithraic scholarship, see Roger Beck, "Mithraism since Franz Cumont," in *ANRW* II/17/4, 2002–2115.

[3] Michael Speidel, *Mithras–Orion* (Leiden, 1980); Stig Wikander, *Études sur les mystères de Mithras* (Lund, 1951).

[4] In *Mith. Stud.*, "Second plenary discussion," II, 352.

[5] R. L. Gordon, "The Date and Significance of *CIMRM* 593," *J. of Mithraic Studies*, II, 163.

with other features? And why is it not more consistent? For example, why is Mithras sometimes separate from Sol, the Sun, and sometimes identical with him, and sometimes with the Great Bear in the heavens? The mysteries of Mithras have the characteristics of a religion that grew over a long period of time in a variety of localities and cultures. Furthermore, if the Persian features are only incidental additions, why did several late Roman writers regard Mithraism as Persian? Why was one of the seven grades of initiation labeled "Persian"?

3. Roman Mithraism was derived directly from a Greek/oriental mystery religion formed in Anatolia in the late Hellenistic period. It migrated to the West in the first or early in the second century A.D. and developed a Roman form of the cult. Although it varied greatly from Mazdaism, it still had a few Iranian features. This is essentially the view of John Hinnells[6] and the majority of Mithraic scholars.

Let us examine evidence for hypothesis number 3. After a brief look at the Iranian background, let us ask, How much do the Roman Mithras and the Persian Mithra have in common?

The pre-Zoroastrian religion in ancient Iran was a polytheistic nature religion. The main deities were the three Ahuras, or "lords": Mazda, Vouruna, and Mithra. The expression, "the Ahura," referred to Vouruna, not to Ahura Mazda, states Mary Boyce.[7] Mithra severely punished men who lied and broke covenants. Fire was an agent of Mithra, and it appears that when Iranians made covenants, they swore by Mithra in the presence of fire, either on the hearth or the sun in the sky.[8]

In mid-sixth century B.C. Zarathustra, or Zoroaster, reformed the old religion. He discarded Mithra and Vouruna and worshiped Ahura Mazda, "Wise Lord," as the Supreme God.

Cyrus, a contemporary of Zoroaster, rebelled against the Medes in 550 B.C. He and his successors established and maintained the Persian empire for 220 years. The Persian kings made Zoroastrianism the state religion. Nevertheless, even in Zoroaster's lifetime, the worship of Mithra and nature continued to be practiced by some conservative priests. After Zoroaster's death Magi, or priests, introduced Mithra worship into Zoroastrianism, and *Yasht* 10 in the Avesta has preserved some of the beliefs about Mithra as he was worshiped in the Persian empire.[9]

Mithra has certain traits in *Yasht* 10 which are similar to some in Roman Mithraism—similar enough to have influenced the latter or perhaps even served as foundations on which to build certain features of the mysteries of Mithra. In *Yasht* 10 he is definitely a god of war who gives victory and prosperity to the followers of Truth (verses 7–11, 28–34) and destroys their enemies (71–72). In the Roman mysteries Mithra gives victory to his followers; in a marble relief from Ephesus, now in the *Kunsthistorisches Museum* in Vienna, Mithra, in a Phrygian cap, fights beside Roman soldiers, helping them slay their enemies. In the Avesta Mithra is "victorious" (141), and in the Roman mysteries Mithras was "invincible." In *Yasht* 10 Ahura Mazda appoints Mithra to be the protector and overseer of the whole physical world (103). That notion may be a forerunner of the more developed idea in the *Mithras Liturgy*, where Mithras is the constellation Great Bear "which moves and turns heaven [i.e., the heavens] around"; the latter is similar to the

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[6] John R. Hinnells in *Mith. Stud.*, I, "Introduction," and II, 303–4.

[7] Mary Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism*, I, *The Early Period* (Leiden, 1975) 23, 48.

[8] Ibid., 28–29.

[9] R. C. Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism* (London, 1961), 98–120.

cosmology in the fresco in the ceiling of the Mithraeum on the island of Ponza, where the Great Bear, Mithras, is at the polar center of the heavens.[10] In *Yasht* 10 the followers of Truth worship the stars, moon, and sun (145); in Roman Mithraism Mithras' followers worship them too. In *Yasht* 10 Mithra is associated with the sun, but not identical with it. He is the sun's "brightness," or light, which precedes it at dawn and accompanies it across the sky in his own chariot drawn by four white horses which are immortal (13, 67, 125). The Magi saw the sun's light on the mountain peaks before they saw the sun. Believing that the earth is flat, they naturally throught that light must be separate from the sun, for at dawn and at sunset they saw light when they did not see the sun. They did not realize that the phenomenon is caused by the curvature of the earth. And since they saw light through the day, they assumed that Mithra, light, must accompany the sun in its journey. If they had realized that the earth is round, that knowledge would have fouled up their theology! The Roman iconography which portrays Mithra and the Sun as separate individuals about to drive off in a chariot seems to me to be strong evidence of Mazdean influence. The proper time for prayer to Mithra is at sunrise, "when the sun comes over the high mountain" (118). He is the giver of life, including that of herds and children (65); is there a connection between that belief and the tauroctony?

The Magi migrated and spread Mazdaism throughout the Persian empire; this Mazdaism was a combination of Zoroaster's teaching and the old Aryan nature religion with its acceptance of Mithra as a divinity. The Magi had close contact with Babylonian priests and their astrology. Perhaps it helped to prepare the way, but as we will observe later, the order of the planets is different.

Early in the Persian period Mithra became virtually equal with Ahura Mazda. Several passages in *Yasht* 10 maintain a close relationship between Mithra and Ahura Mazda, and the prestige of each deity is preserved. Ahura Mazda seems superior in that he appointed Mithra to be the protector and overseer of the cosmos (102–3) and he established the ritual by which Mithra is to be worshiped (119–22). But Mithra seems superior in that Ahura Mazda worships him in heaven, the house of Song (123–4).

Mithra became so popular in the Persian empire that he seems to have surpassed Ahura Mazda. Among the theophoric names in the Aramaic inscriptions from the "treasury" at Persepolis in the time of Darius I (early 5th century), five names are composed with Mithra's name and only three with Ahura Mazda. Mithra's popularity among the Elamites is demonstrated in the Mithraic names in the Elamite tablets from the fortifications at Persepolis. Darius I states in his Behistun inscription that the Elamites were rebellious and did not worship Ahura Mazda. They evidently preferred Mithra. Xenophon in his *Anabasis* reports that Cyrus II (400 B.C.) "swore by Mithra." Quintus Curtius states that at Gaugamela Darius III called upon the Sun and Mithra and the Eternal Fire to give him victory.[11] We note that Ahura Mazda is not named. Mithra clearly was popular with Persian kings. Richard Frye doubts that there was a separate cult of Mithra, but thinks that "there may have been a special fraternity, possibly in the army, devoted especially to Mithra."[12]

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[10] *The "Mithras Liturgy,"* Marvin W. Meyer, ed. & tr. (Missoula, MT, 1976) lines 695–704; see Roger Beck, "Interpreting the Ponza Zodiac," *J. of Mithraic Studies*, I:1–19; 2:87–147.

[11] Quintus Curtius iv. 13(49) 12.

[12] Richard N. Frye, "Mithra in Iranian History," in *Mith. Stud.*, I, 64.

We turn now to the Hellenistic period. At this time Mithra was a prominent deity in Parthia, Armenia, and eastern Anatolia. He was even worshiped as far north as the Crimea. In the ostraka from Nisa in Parthia "theophoric names with Mithra are more in evidence than those of other deities," states Frye.[13] Annually a satrap of Armenia sent 20,000 foals to the Mithraic festival, the *Mithrakana,* according to Strabo, who also says that all the Persian cults existed in Media and Armenia.[14] The kings of Pontus, who ruled from the close of the fourth century until 63 B.C., were of Iranian descent. Mithra was evidently their favorite god, judging from their consistent policy of taking to themselves the name Mithradates. Antiochus I, son of Mithradates VI, ruled Commangene (just north of Syria) from 70–35 B.C. He, too, took the name of Mithradates and made Mithra the special protector of his kingdom. In two bas reliefs in the colossal tomb he built for himself at Nimrud Dagh, he is portrayed as making a sacred contract with the god by the handshake of right hands. Ahura Mazda did not immediately disappear from Mithraism, however, for at the same site Antiochus erected giant statues of both Mithra and Ahura Mazda. But after that, Mithra worship became a separate religion, a separation made inevitable, it seems to me, by Mithra's role as a god of war.

Like many other religions, Mithraism came into close contact with Greek religion and culture in the Hellenistic period. The last two Mithradatic kings, Mithradates V and VI, were especially eager to adopt Greek culture and mix it with their Iranian heritage. Mithradates VI even copied Alexander in appearance.[15] Antiochus I of Commagene also followed a hellenizing policy, and in an inscription at Nimrud Dagh he identifies Mithra with three Greek gods: Apollo, Helios, and Hermes. Antiochus' tomb "shows a blend of Iranian and Greek elements in both art and religious ideas."[16] The Mithraism of Antiochus is not yet a mystery religion, but only a hellenized Zoroastrianism. Ahura Mazda is honored as Zeus, and in a relief depicting Mithra and Antiochus, Mithra holds in his left hand the *baresman,* the bundle of twigs the Magi used in Zoroastrian ritual.

If Mithraism became a mystery religion before it became a Roman religion, the change to a mystery cult must have occurred as a result of contact with Greek religion and culture. If that happened, we would expect to find evidence in Roman Mithraism of Hellenic influence. And the evidence is there.

1. How did the god's name change from Mithra among the Persians to Mithras among the Romans? Some Greek inscriptions have been found in which the name is *Mithrēs,* ending in *eta sigma.* An example is the Sagarios inscription cut into the rock near Farasha in Cappadocia.[17] The Greek form must have been the source of the Roman form; that is the only reasonable explanation of the s at the end of the name. The Persian "Mithra" became the Greek "*Mithrēs*" that became the Roman "Mithras." Thus the Romans' source was a Hellenistic form of Mithraism, not a pure Persian form.

2. The order of the planets in Roman Mithraism is further evidence of Greek influence. Although in the Persian period some Magi must have been exposed to Babylonian astronomy and astrology, in the Hellenistic period Mithraism evidently became acquainted with Greek thought on these subjects, which was quite advanced. In the fourth

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[13] Frye, ibid., 65.

[14] Strabo, *Geography* xi. 530.

[15] *Oxford Classical Dictionary,* 2d ed. (Oxford, 1970) 696.

[16] Ibid., 72.

[17] *CIMRM,* I, no. 19. See also Al. N. Oikonomides, *Mithraic Art* (Chicago, 1975) 83; *TMMM,* II, no. 67.

century Eudoxos of Cnidos had written a description of the constellations, and he had made astronomical speculations. In the third century Aratus used that description in his popular poem *Phaenomena*. Gordon has observed that the order of the planets in Roman Mithraism is quite unlike any known from Babylonia, but is similar to that in Greek.[18] The Mithraic order, on which the grades of initiation were based, is Saturn, Sun, Moon, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury. This order is like the order of sidereal rotation, the usual order in Greek horoscopes, except that in the latter Saturn is placed third instead of first.

3. The sixth grade of membership in Roman Mithraism was called *Heliodromus*. The term is clearly a compound of two Greek words, *helio*, "sun," and *dromeus*, "runner," and thus is further evidence of Greek influence. The old Avestan idea of Mithra as the light which travels across the sky with the sun appears to be the ultimate source. Gordon is probably correct when he states:

> The evidence of the Aventine Mithraeum (Santa Prisca) and the Mithraeum of Felicissimus is that the associaton between grades and the planets was very important. In my view, admission to a grade signified, among other things, that one's soul had now reached that rank in the planetary hierarchy. The name *Heliodromus* might then be a literal statement of religious fact: the grade-holder was spiritually in the sun's orbit.[19]

The general hellenization of Mithraism apparently preceded the formation of the Mithraic mystery religion. The hellenization was an essential stage which prepared the way. Another essential step was the discarding of Ahura Mazda, a step which enabled Mithras to become the "Greatest God" in the *Mithras Liturgy*.[20]

The wide variety of features in the mysteries of Mithra indicate that the cult was not a revision of Persian religion, but an eclectic creation from many sources. When did this happen? Judging from the evidence of its contacts with Greek culture, the first century B.C. is probable as the beginning, with continuing development in the next century. Plutarch reports that the Cilician pirates in southern Anatolia, whom Pompey conquered in 67 B.C., "sacrificed strange rites on Olympos [a mountain nearby]; they perform (*eteloun*) secret initiation rites (*aporrētos telētas*) of which those of Mithra have been preserved until now, having been made known first by them" (*Pompey* 24). This evidence deserves to be taken seriously, for Plutarch used Posidonius as a source, and Posidonius had two meetings with Pompey.[21]

Where did Mithraism become a mystery religion? Surely in a place or places in close contact with a Greek mystery religion. Possibly it was the courts of the hellenizing kings of Pontus, Mithradates V or VI, although this seems questionable in light of the fact that the latter's son, Antiochus I of Commagene, worshiped Mithra outside the framework of a mystery cult. The earliest representation of Mithra slaying the bull is on the five Kertsch terracotta tablets found near the modern town of Kerch in the Crimea; they date from 50 B.C.–A.D. 50. At least one—and perhaps all—was found in a grave, not a Mithraeum. Greek influence was possible in the Crimea, for Greek colonists had settled there before the Mithradatic kings of Pontus ruled the region. After Pompey put an end to the rule of Mithradates VI, the Crimea became part of a Roman protectorate. Two

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[18] Gordon, "Franz Cumont and the Doctrines of Mithraism," in *Mith. Stud.*, I, 230.

[19] Gordon in "First plenary discussion" in *Mith. Stud.*, I, 131–2.

[20] *Mithras Liturgy*, line 643.

[21] Robert Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus* (Leiden, 1975) 5.

of the tablets are described and pictured in Vermaseren's *Corpus*.[22] Cumont concluded that the tablets were casts from molds made in Asia Minor; if he was correct, then this iconography may have come from Pontus, or even from the Cilician pirates. A crucial question—for which I do not have the answer—is: Does the tauroctony prove the existence of the mystery religion?

The Cilician pirates, through Plutarch's account, provide the only concrete evidence of the beginnings of the mystery cult. And mystery cult it probably was, for the Greek verb and noun (*teleō* and *telete*) that Plutarch employs were the customary terms for initiation into mystery cults, and he further describes the rites as "secret" (*aporrētos*). At first glance, it seems improbable that these pirates would either create or develop a mystery religion, but these were not ordinary, ignorant pirates. They had developed a virtual nation in southern Anatolia and were closely associated with the Mithradatic kings of Pontus.

How did Mithra win the West? Pompey resettled the pirates in other parts of Anatolia and in Greece, but Plutarch does not say he settled them in Italy. Thus it is not probable that they spread the religion directly to the Romans at that time. The Parthian Tiradates journeyed to Rome to be crowned ceremonially as king of Armenia in A.D. 66; he then initiated Nero into the mysteries of Mithra. History does not record that Nero took the trouble to pass it on.

Two other routes seem more probable. One is through the army. C. M. Daniels has made an excellent study of the subject.[23] The earliest known iconographic evidence of Roman Mithraism is a marble altar which C. Sacidius Barbarus, a centurion of legion XV Apollinaris, dedicated in Latin to "Mitrhe." It was found at Bad Deutch Altenburg, near Carnuntum, on the banks of the Danube in eastern Austria.[24] It is now in the *Kunsthistorisches Museum* in Vienna. The term "Barbarus" attached to Sacidius' name indicates that he came from an uncultured land, and the misspelling of *Mithrae* suggests that the inscriber was not familiar with Mithras' name. Daniels traces the history of that particular legion. After defeating Tiridates, it helped to end the Jewish revolt in Palestine, then returned to Carnuntum where it remained A.D. 71–86 and again in 105–114. According to Tacitus,[25] its commander, Corbulo, before his death in 66, recruited new troops in Galatia and Cappadocia. The "barbarian" Sacidius may well have been among them. If so, the date of the altar is in the period 71–86. Thus Mithraism may have been introduced into the Roman army at that time by soldiers from the Anatolian provinces of Galatia and Cappadocia, which were close to Pontus, Armenia, Commagene, and Cilicia. We should not be surprised that Mithra became popular among Roman soldiers, for he had been popular with kings and soldiers for the same reason: he was a warrior god. As lord of a mystery religion, however, he provided another benefit: if any of his soldiers died in battle, they were rewarded with blessed immortality among the stars.

Mithra was also popular in the Roman world outside of the military. This is evident from the prevalence of house Mithraea which were not connected with army camps. Chapels built inside houses, often by remodeling a room, or built as attachments to a house, tend to be earlier than the Mithraea unrelated to houses. A considerable number of house Mithraea, built in the second century, existed in Ostia and Rome. This fact suggests that traders, as well as soldiers, enabled Mithra to conquer the West.

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[22] *CIMRM*, I, nos. 11 and 12, figs. 2 and 3.

[23] C. M. Daniels, "The role of the Roman army in the spread and practice of Mithraism," in *Mith. Stud.*, II, 249–74.

[24] *CIMRM*, I, no. 1718.

[25] Tacitus, *Histories* iii. 24.

Crucified with Christ: A Synthesis of 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and Galatians

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Let us pretend that Paul's writings had vanished from history, that his letters, never canonized as Christian Scripture, had been forgotten by posterity. Now let us pretend that some chance discovery unearths in a cave a collection of perfectly preserved manuscripts consisting only of 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philippians, Philemon, and Galatians. Our assignment: write a synthetic account of the the theology of these five letters.

I. Aims and Methods of Theological Synthesis

Before attempting the exotic stunt promised by the subtitle of this paper, I offer a rough account of my working assumptions, along with an *apologia* to readers who may, with fair cause, doubt the value or intelligibility of the ambitious project being undertaken by the Pauline Theology Group. The announced aims of the group are: (A) *descriptive:* to sketch the "theology" of each Pauline letter considered individually, and (B) *synthetic:* to construct a composite account of Pauline theology by "synthesizing" the results of the individual sketches. Difficult problems of method beset both phases of the project.

A. The Descriptive Task

What are we looking for when we seek to describe the "theology" of a Pauline letter? What is the difference between Paul's "symbolic universe" and his "theology"? And how are both of these to be distinguished from the particular statements that Paul actually happens to make in his surviving correspondence?[1]

My working assumptions are these: Paul shares a "symbolic world"—a communally shared imaginative environment—with other early Christians, including the readers of his letters. The dominant images of this symbolic world are located in early Christian tradition (kerygmatic and liturgical) and in Israel's Scripture.[2] Paul's particular statements,

[1] These different objects of inquiry correspond to J. Paul Sampley's distinctions between Paul's "thought world," his "thought," and his "communication of them." These terms were employed by Sampley in "Overcoming Traditional Models by Synthesizing the Theology of Individual Letters," (unpublished paper circulated to members of Pauline Theology Consultation, 1986) 2, and then highlighted by Norman Petersen in "On the Method of Recasting Pauline Theology: A Response to J. Paul Sampley" (1986) 3. [Henceforth in these notes, unpublished papers presented to the Pauline Theology Consultation/Group will be cited by title and date only.]

[2] This assertion of the centrality of Scripture in Paul's symbolic world is perhaps

which are contingent pastoral responses to specific historical situations, are to be read as "performances" of a "competence" supplied by this larger communal symbol system.[3] When we seek the "theology" of the letters, however, we are concerned neither with the performance as such nor with the competence as such, but with the ideational *mediating structures* that characterize Paul's critical selection, organization, and interpretation of the elements of the communal symbolic universe. We are focusing neither on *langue* nor on *parole*, but on the *grammar* (or syntax?) of Paul's utterances: the characteristic patterns of critical reflection that appear when he appropriates the symbolic universe in responding to specific pastoral situations.

To employ an optical metaphor rather than a linguistic one, we are seeking to trace the contours of the hermeneutical lens through which Paul projects the images of the community's symbolic world onto the screen of the community's life. The contingent arguments of the letters should be read as Paul's attempt to persuade his readers to interpret the practical consequences of foundational assumptions (axioms) that they putatively share with him in light of his convictions—i.e., in light of his own particular theological construal of those assumptions. All this can be represented crudely in diagrammatic form.



Such categories are difficult to employ with precision, because we know Paul's symbolic world primarily through its contingent expression in the letters, and the distinction between that symbolic world and Paul's own theological thought can be discerned only inferentially. The importance of these categories, however, may be illustrated by observing how they clarify certain differences between some of the papers that have been written for our project.

Consider, for example, the pairing of papers on Galatians offered by J. D. G. Dunn and Beverly Gaventa. Dunn recounts the specific argument of the letter, focusing on the issue that Paul addresses ("covenantal nomism") and concentrating his interpretive labors on explicating the language that Paul employs in his response to this issue (e.g., "works of the Law"). Gaventa, on the other hand, inquires more broadly after the "theology of the letter," by which she means the fundamental conceptual structure out of which Paul responds in addressing the "presenting problem" in Galatia. Thus, because they are asking different questions of the text, the two papers give us divergent accounts of the theology of Galatians, even though they are not far apart on most of the key exegetical issues.[4]

(continued)
debatable. I have sought to make the case for this view in my forthcoming book, *Intertextual Echo in Paul's Letters* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989).

[3] Here I have recourse to the "linguistic model" suggested by Petersen, "Method of Recasting," 6.

[4] See J. D. G. Dunn, "The Theology of Galatians," (1988) and Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians," (1988). An analogous difference characterized the 1986 papers of Edgar Krentz, "Through a Prism: The Theology of 2 Thessalonians" (1986) and Robert Jewett, "The Theology of Second Thessalonians as a Pauline Letter," (1986).

(Neither paper probes the difference between Paul's theology and his symbolic world; but see my remarks on N. T. Wright's paper, below.)

Gaventa's approach, rather than identifying Paul's "convictional logic" with his "argumentative logic," requires us to give a nuanced account of the relation between them.[5] The drawback in this approach is that it forces us to read "between the lines,"[6] rather than on the surface of the text, to find the theology of the Pauline letter; thus, it is difficult to establish precise methodological controls on proposals about the shape of this theology (for example, Gaventa's proposal that Galatians turns upon a fundamental antithesis between *kosmos* and Christ/new creation). This drawback, however, is more than outweighed by the benefits of Gaventa's approach, for it does justice to J. C. Beker's insight that Paul is a "hermeneutic theologian,"[7] rather than a systematic one; proposals about the theology of a Pauline letter must reckon with the fact that Paul's statements and exhortations are always in fact *interpretations* of a body of traditions or beliefs, spoken as "a word on target" (Beker) for a particular situation.

If the explicitly articulated statements of Paul's individual letters are manifestations of "the underlying structure of his belief-system,"[8] why begin by isolating the "theology" of a single letter, considered apart from the rest of the Pauline corpus? The procedure is purely heuristic: it may allow us to recognize important data that would elude us if we began with the whole collection of letters.[9]

B. The Synthetic Task

Even if we grant the possibility of describing the theology of individual letters, the difficulties of synthesis remain daunting. The more clearly historical scholarship has limned the historical contingency of the letters as pastoral communications, the more difficult it has seemed to give a satisfying account of the unity of Paul's thought. The older synthetic accounts of "Pauline theology"[10] failed to do justice to the particularity and diversity of the letters. On the other hand, more recent efforts at synthesis that take the contingency of the letters seriously into account have been hard pressed to find grounds for asserting their theological coherence. (I have in mind here not only aggressively deconstructive analyses such as Räisänen's but also, e.g., Beker's frank puzzlement over how to fit Galatians into his constructive proposal that apocalyptic is the ground of coherence in Pauline theology.) Under such circumstances, it is tempting to dismiss the synthetic task as misguided and doomed, an exercise in artificial harmonization.[11]

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[5] These are Daniel Patte's terms, brought into our discussion by Wilhelm Wuellner, "How Paul Does Theology and How We Do Pauline Theology," (1987) 3.

[6] During our 1986 discussion, Jouette Bassler characterized Jewett's approach to the theology of 2 Thessalonians in this way.

[7] J. Christiaan Beker, "The Faithfulness of God and the Priority of Israel in Paul's Letter to the Romans," *HTR* 79 (1986) 10.

[8] N. T. Wright, "Towards a Synthesis of Pauline Theology," (1987) 5.

[9] In my comments below, I shall try to point out some of the ways that this heuristic procedure has already paid off in the course of our project.

[10] Such as R. Bultmann's sketch of Pauline theology in *Theology of the New Testament* (New York: Scribner, 1951–55) or D. E. H. Whiteley, *The Theology of St. Paul* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966.

[11] See Heikki Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (WUNT 29; Tübingen: Mohr, 1983); cf. the Response by Wright, "Towards a Synthesis," 3–18.

Still, with few exceptions, readers of the Pauline corpus continue to register tantalizing impressions of ideational coherence. Are such impressions the projections of our own irrepressible lust for order, which so captivates us that, as Frank Kermode remarks, it requires "a more strenuous effort to believe that a [text] lacks coherence than to believe that somehow, if we could only find out, it doesn't"?[12] Or is there in fact a coherent theological vision out of which Paul's pastoral responses issue? The synthetic phase of our project seeks to test the impression of coherence by proposing synthetic construals of Pauline theology based upon artificially limited—but incrementally increasing—bodies of textual data.

Such synthetic proposals are necessarily constructive in character: they entail an act of imagination on the part of the interpreter. This observation has several important consequences. (1) Our synthetic proposals should not be confused with neutral accounts of Paul's thought; they must be honestly acknowledged as our own attempts to make sense of Paul's writings by rearticulating their message in a form different from the form that Paul himself employed.[13] (2) The validity of such proposals can be tested only through the execution of concrete attempts to perform the synthetic task. There is no fixed method that can be consistently applied; rather, we are hoping that some members of our group will be able to generate imaginative accounts of Pauline theology that have the power to elicit consent from this community of putatively competent readers. In other words, we are working by trial and error. (3) The primary criterion that must be employed in assessing these synthetic proposals is the test of "satisfaction": does the proposed synthesis in fact illuminate the texts in such a way that most of us can say, "Yes, that is a good reading of the texts"? A "good reading" is presumably one that accounts for the content of the letters in such a way that it enables us to recognize and understand elements of these texts that might previously have remained opaque.

Because of the design of our project, the writer of a synthesis paper must pass judgment —either explicitly or implicitly—on the adequacy of the attempts at synthesis offered in previous years. Is the synthesizer going to build upon, modify, or scrap the results of last year's papers? Is the new synthesizer going to follow the same methodological procedures suggested by previous writers? Or—recognizing that we are working by trial and error—is the synthesizer going to decide that the previous efforts were unsuccessful experiments from which we may nonetheless have learned a great deal? In that respect, I find last year's initial synthesis papers by John Reumann and N. T. Wright to be enormously helpful—especially when taken together—even though I want to suggest a way of approaching the task that differs from both of them in important respects. My own synthetic proposal will come into the clearest focus if I state briefly my (appreciative) critiques of Reumann and Wright.[14]

Reumann's procedure is to tally the statements in 1 Thessalonians and Philippians under the headings of preestablished dogmatic loci and then to compile and compare the results

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[12] Frank Kermode, *The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1979) 53.

[13] As rightly noted by Robert Jewett, "A Methodological Proposal Emerging out of the Beker-Sampley Session," (1986).

[14] Only someone who has actually tried to write this sort of synthetic paper can appreciate the massive difficulty of the task, and therefore the considerable accomplishment represented by the work of Reumann and Wright.

of the two separate tallyings.[15] The value of Reumann's method is that it attempts to treat the individual letters separately and then to reflect on what picture emerges when they are combined. The use of a common systematic framework for classifying the theological statements found in the two different letters facilitates comparison, as the same questions are put to each letter: what does Paul say about God, about Jesus Christ, about the Holy Spirit, about anthropology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and so forth?[16]

The great difficulty with this method is that it superimposes an analytical grid upon the letters rather than allowing the categories to emerge inductively from a reading of the texts. The structure and order of presentation are given by the church's confessional/dogmatic tradition. One telltale sign of this fact is the frequency with which Reumann comments on the *absence* of this or that idea: "There is nothing said about a divine role in creation or in Israel's history. . . . Raw material for a *Gottesbild* of Father, Son, and Spirit is present, but not in a demonstrably triadic way . . . Anthropology is only casually brought in. . . ."[17] and so forth. It is as though Reumann already knows what the puzzle is supposed to look like, because he already has a picture on the cover of the box, and he is merely taking inventory to see which pieces of the puzzle are already in hand. This method, I would argue, defeats the purpose of our project.

Furthermore, Reumann's survey of the theological statements found in 1 Thessalonians and Philippians gives us little sense of the shaping and emphasis of Paul's thought. He has inventoried the component parts, but he has not explained how they are integrated. How are these theological ideas connected to one another? Which of the motifs that Reumann lists are central and which are peripheral? What is assumed and what is argued? What gives coherence to Paul's theological thoughts? Reumann's paper explicitly disavows the attempt to address such matters: he has given us a parts list rather than a portrait.[18]

Tom Wright's paper, on the other hand, represents a conception of the synthetic task that is diametrically opposed to that of Reumann: "It is not enough . . . merely to consider the specific topics treated by Paul at this or that point in his letters. It is also important to ask questions about the underlying *structure* of his belief-system."[19] Wright posits an account of the themes that he takes to be crucial to this underlying belief-system: Paul's theology centers on "monotheism and election," as redefined by means of christology.[20] Then Wright seeks to demonstrate how his explanatory metamodel accounts for and unites the apparently disparate strands of Paul's thought, as they had been identified in earlier analyses of the individual letters.

The strength of Wright's method lies in its comprehensive explanatory potential: in contrast to Reumann's more modest inventory, Wright's proposal is aggressively systematic

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[15] John Reumann, "The Theologies of 1 Thessalonians and Philippians: Contents, Comparison, and Composite," *SBL 1987 Seminar Papers*, 521–36.

[16] Methodologically, Reumann's method is a cousin of Whiteley's, with one important difference: Reumann is attempting to treat the "theologies" of individual letters separately before working towards synthesis.

[17] Reumann, "Theologies," 533–34.

[18] "I have deliberately at this stage . . . not gone into approaches to Paul that massively treat a theme as 'center' (e.g., apocalyptic). Nor have I at this stage sought to make comments on the coherence/contingency issue. . . . At this stage it is work enough to try to be somewhat descriptive." Ibid, 532.

[19] Wright, "Towards a Synthesis," 5 (emphasis mine).

[20] Ibid, 38 et passim.

and integrative. He plunges between the lines of Paul's letters and offers us an account of how the explicit level of argumentation is related to the deeper convictions out of which Paul operates. (In terms of my distinctions above, one might characterize Wright as arguing that Paul appropriates the symbolic world of *Judaism* by filtering the ideas of monotheism and election through his christological convictions so as to make them pertinent to his Gentile Christian communities.)

The difficulty with Wright's procedure lies in its somewhat daring disregard for the explicit level and limits of Paul's argumentation. For example, it might be true, as Wright thinks, that the parousia expectation of 1 Thessalonians 4 ought to be understood as Paul's reinterpretation of "the covenantal hope of Israel," but how would we ever know that from reading 1 Thessalonians? I am inclined to think that many of Wright's proposals are methodologically premature as an analysis of the theology of 1–2 Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon. The criticism can be put two ways. (1) Wright could have written much the same paper no matter which letters he had been asked to consider. (2) Wright is implicitly reading the letters on which he concentrates through the hermeneutical lens of Romans.[21] Thus, while it seems to me that Wright's proposals are not only provocative but also in large measure correct accounts of the roots of Paul's thought, I think that a more inductive approach is necessary at this stage of our project.[22]

My objection, then, to both of these two very different attempts at synthesis is that neither is sufficiently inductive. Wright (like Gaventa) is more concerned about the presuppositions and structure of Paul's thought, whereas Reumann (like Dunn) works closer to the textual surface, but both of them import explanatory frameworks that would be very difficult to derive from the texts themselves. It will become evident that I find Wright's proposal the more promising one for our synthetic project, but it needs to be chastened and cross-checked by Reumann's scrupulous attention to the actual statements of the texts.

I would urge that we seek to let these five texts dictate the lines of emphasis and the shape of our construal, just as though these were the only letters in the Pauline corpus.[23] In other words, we are seeking to sketch what "Pauline theology" would look like if Romans and the Corinthian correspondence did not exist—or if the guild of critical scholars suddenly decreed these longer letters to be deutero-Pauline! (I once had a student who actually wrote a paper contending that Romans was a deutero-Pauline letter because it so flagrantly contradicts the "true" Pauline theology of Galatians.)

The results of such a procedure will of course be skewed because of the limitations of the sample. However, as Leander Keck is fond of reminding us, the seven-letter corpus may be an equally skewed partial sample. If my procedure is successful, it will by no

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[21] My hunch is that the second way of stating the objection is close to the truth; see Wright's remarks (pp. 17–18) about the "hermeneutical spiral."

[22] I also think, by the way, that Wright should do another synthesis at the end of our project: i.e., a "theology of Paul as a whole that will allow him to use Romans explicitly as the interpretive key to the Pauline corpus.

[23] I have not made any attempt here to grapple with the problem of the authorship of 2 Thessalonians. My assignment for the project was to treat it, for purposes of our experiment, as a Pauline letter, and I have done so here. Interestingly, while my own predisposition was to assume its pseudonymity, I found it fitting into my proposed synthesis rather effortlessly. I have no settled conviction on the issue, however, and I would ask readers of this essay not to read it as if it were a defense of the "authenticity" of the letter.

means reveal a comprehensive groundplan of Paul's theology. Instead, it will describe only that portion of the foundation uncovered by our excavations in the five letters under consideration. Major themes may remain buried. My goal will be to give a sketch that captures the contours, concerns, and movement of Paul's thought *as it appears in these letters*. The heuristic value of such a sketch will, I hope, become evident as we proceed.

II. Pauline Theology: Shape and Emphases

A. The Narrative Framework

Scattered throughout Paul's letters are allusions to a foundational *story* about what God has done to bring salvation to his elect people. Several contributors to our project have drawn attention to the presence in Paul's letters of this implicit "narrative which constitutes the identity of the Christian community."[24] I would like to propose that the ground of coherence in Paul's thought is to be found not in a system of theological propositions (e.g., "justification by faith" or a "theology of the Law") but in this kerygmatic story of God's action through Jesus Christ, "who gave himself for our sins in order to deliver us from the present evil age, according to the will of our God and Father" (Gal 1:4).

Nowhere within the letters does Paul narrate this foundational story in detail, but he constantly cites it allusively as a warrant for the claims and arguments that he makes. (For especially clear examples, see 1 Thess 1:9–10; 4:13–18; 5:9–10; Phil 2:1–13; Gal 3:13–14; 4:3–7; 5:1.) It is possible, therefore, to piece together an outline of the story's key elements.

(1) God long ago revealed, in his promise to Abraham, his intention to bless "all nations" (Gal 3:6–9). This intention was a result of God's love (1 Thess 1:4, 2 Thess 2:13, 16), which expresses itself in God's election and calling of a people for salvation (1 Thess 2:12, 5:9, 5:23–24; 2 Thess 2:13–14).

(2) God sent forth his son Jesus Christ in order to liberate people who were in bondage and to make them "sons" of God (Gal 4:1–7; 5:1). This sending of Jesus was God's way of fulfilling the promise made to Abraham (Gal 3:14, cf. 4:28). (Within our present corpus, the "sending" motif appears explicitly only in Galatians, but in all the letters, it is pervasively presupposed that Jesus is the instrument of God's will, the one through whom God's redemptive purpose is executed.)

(3) Jesus achieved God's purpose through his death on a cross (Gal 3:1, 13). This death was simultaneously an act of obedience to God (Phil 2:8, Gal 1:4) and of love for those whom he died to save (Gal 2:20). That is why Paul interprets Jesus' death as an act of "faithfulness" (*pistis*): Jesus' obedience to God brings about the fulfillment of God's promise to humanity (Gal 3:22, cf. 2:20).[25] For reasons that Paul does not entirely explain, Jesus'

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[24] Stanley Stowers, "Response to 'The Theology of Philemon' by Mary Ann Getty," (1987) 5. Cf. Wright, "Towards a Synthesis," 12–13; Gaventa, "Singularity," 10. This is a thesis that is obviously congenial to my own earlier work on "narrative substructure" in Pauline theology (*The Faith of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Narrative Substructure of Gal 3:1–4:11* [SBLDS 56; Chico: Scholars, 1983]). Readers of that book will recognize that I have tried to come at the issues in a fresh way in the present essay, without recourse to the methods used in the book to identify narrative structure.

[25] I am pleased to note that Gaventa ("Singularity," 16) joins the ranks of those who are persuaded by this interpretation of *pistis Iesou Christou*. Dunn ("Theology," 20) remains unconverted.

death has multifaceted consequences: to it can be ascribed deliverance from the wrath of God (1 Thess 1:10) and from "the present evil age" (Gal 1:4), and redemption from "the curse of the Law" (Gal 3:10). Positively speaking, Jesus' death seems to be the means through which the community has received the gift of the Spirit (Gal 3:14), and "life" with Jesus (1 Thess 5:10, Gal 2:20), with its blessings of freedom (Gal 5:1) and righteousness (Phil 1:11, 3:9 [?], Gal 2:21). Paul's frequent formulaic references to "the *charis* of our Lord Jesus Christ" (e.g., 2 Thess 3:18, Phil 4:23, Phlm 25, Gal 6:18) appear to be based in this interpretation of Jesus' death as an act of love that has vicarious salvific benefits for others.

(4) Jesus was also raised from the dead (1 Thess 1:10, 4:14, Gal 1:1, Phil 3:10, 21 [cf. 2:9?]). By contrast to Paul's great emphasis on Jesus' death, these letters make relatively little explicit theological use of this element of the story. In the one clear instance where Jesus' resurrection is employed as a theological warrant (1 Thess 4:14), it functions as a proleptic sign that points to the general resurrection of the dead (see #6, below).

(5) Jesus' death/resurrection puts an end to the world as it was and adumbrates the "new creation" (Gal 6:14–15, cf. 2:20). However, one of the story's most crucial features is its interpretation of the present time as a temporal anomaly, an in-between time in which the community "awaits the hope of righteousness" (Gal 5:5). During this interval, the believing community suffers (1 Thess 2:2, 2:14–16, 3:3–4; 2 Thess 1:4–5; Phil 1:27–30; Gal 4:29, 5:11, 6:12). At the same time, however, the present is a time in which the Holy Spirit is given to the community as a sign of their adoption into God's family (Gal 3:14, 4:6), and the word of God goes forth in power through the preaching of the gospel (1 Thess 1:5, 2 Thess 3:1, etc.).

(6) The community's hope is fixed on an event which still lies in the future of the story: the *parousia* of the Lord Jesus, when he will come from heaven to claim his people and transform them into his likeness, pronouncing judgment on the world. At this time, the dead will be raised. (1 Thess 1:10, 2:19, 3:13, 4:13–18, 5:23–24; 2 Thess 1:6–10; Phil 3:11, 20–21, 4:5). Galatians makes few explicit references to this last act of the story, but—if it be read through the lens of the Macedonian correspondence—apparent allusions to the events of parousia and judgment may be found in 1:4, 1:8–9 [?], 5:5, 5:10, 5:21, 6:4–5, 6:7–10, 6:15.

Within this narrative structure, Paul understands the vocation and temporal location of his communities. As he confronts pastoral problems in his churches, he responds to them by thinking through the situation in light of the story, plotting the community's place within the unfolding narrative. For example, he finds the Galatians' desire to be under Law upsetting because it seems (to him) to represent a retrogression to an earlier phase of the story, and therefore a *de facto* denial of the efficacy of Jesus' death (Gal 2:21, 4:8–11).[26] Or, to cite another clear instance, he answers the Thessalonians' concerns about believers who have died by assuring them that when Jesus returns "the dead in Christ will rise first" and be together with those who are left alive (1 Thess 4:13–18). Rather than consoling them with philosophical arguments about death or explaining that the souls of the departed have gone to be with God, he unfolds a narrative of future events in which he believes he and his readers will participate.

Several preliminary "grammatical" remarks may be made about Paul's use of this foundational story. First of all, it is striking that the narrative—as I have outlined it here—is primarily about God's action through Jesus Christ. The story has subplots that detail the

[26] Cf. Hays, *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 223–35.

responses of Paul himself (e.g., Phil 3:4–14, Gal 1:13–24) or of the people to whom he preached (e.g., 1 Thess 1:3–10, Gal 4:12–20), but these subplots derive their sense and significance from their participation in the larger narrative in which Jesus Christ is the protagonist.[27]

Second, Paul's references to the story focus to a remarkable extent on two key moments: the death of Jesus and "the day of the Lord." The particular pathos of Paul's theology results from the suspension of the community's present experience between these poles. Jesus' death has somehow transmuted the human condition in such a way that Paul can say that the world has been crucified through his cross (Gal 6:14). From a whole series of passages, particularly in Galatians, it is evident that Paul thinks of the cross as the pivotal point of what Amos Wilder called "the world-story." On the other hand, however, the final climax and resolution of that story is still to come in the *parousia*.

The Thessalonian correspondence places great emphasis on the future element of Paul's apocalyptic narrative framework ("not yet"), whereas Galatians concentrates heavily on the transformation of present experience as a result of Christ's death ("already"). Happily for our purposes, Philippians combines these emphases and shows that they are logically related in Paul's thought-world through a *narrative* sequence (see especially Philippians 3). Thus, the apparent theological discrepancy between Galatians and 1–2 Thessalonians in relation to eschatology may be understood as an effect of the interplay between contingent factors and coherent structure: Paul addresses different problems by appealing to different parts of one and the same foundational narrative. (This suggestion could be worked out in much more detail if the scope of this essay permitted.)

B. Israel, Gentiles, Election

In Galatians a major issue surfaces concerning the interpretation of *election* (element #1 in the above plot summary): can uncircumcised Gentiles participate fully in the community of those who experience the blessing of the God of Israel? Circumstances in Thessalonica had not required Paul to address this problem, but the challenge of the Jewish-Christian "teachers" at Galatia compelled him to articulate a theological rationale for his non-Law-observant mission to Gentiles.[28]

In 1 Thessalonians, Paul appears to assume without argument that his Gentile Christian converts at Thessalonica have become participants in the covenant community of Israel. (Here I support Wright's controversial proposal.) Because the matter is not yet a point of controversy for Paul, he does not formulate the claim thetically, but his language assumes this position at several points. Not only does he remark that his readers have "turned to God from idols, to serve a living and true God" (1 Thess 1:9; surely the God of Abraham?), but—even more tellingly—he exhorts them to take wives "in holiness and honor, not in the passion of lust like the Gentiles (*ta ethnē!*) who do not know God" (1 Thess 4:4–5); the warrant for this exhortation is given in v 7 ("For God has not called us for uncleanness, but in holiness"). It is often noted that in these passages Paul has

[27] See Part D, below, for further discussion of the response of the community.

[28] As this way of formulating the matter suggests, I accept the outlines of J. Louis Martyn's reconstruction of the historical situation ("A Law-Observant Mission to Gentiles: The Background of Galatians," *SJT* 38 [1985] 307–24). Whether Paul had previously worked out his own position on this problem is not particularly important for our purposes.

appropriated the language of Hellenistic Jewish apologetics and missionary preaching, but the extraordinary implications of these texts for his ecclesiology are rarely noted. Paul writes as if this Gentile Christian community is "Gentile" no longer; though they remain uncircumcised, he has transferred to them the communal ascriptions appropriate to Israel. Whether his comment in 1 Thess 4:5 is completely artless or whether it is a conscious and clever metaphorical deformation of Jewish linguistic convention, Paul is addressing his readers as non-Gentiles.

We may connect these passages directly to Phil 3:3: "*We* are the circumcision, who worship God in Spirit and boast in Jesus Christ and do not trust in the flesh." Although the claim occurs in the midst of a rhetorically heated passage, there is ample reason to think that Paul means what he says: it is believers in Jesus Christ who have legitimate claim to Israel's destiny and prerogatives.[29] *Peritomē* functions here as a non-literal honorific term meaning "covenant people," and it has been appropriated to describe Christian believers, whether they are physically circumcised or not. To make an issue out of physical circumcision is to put confidence in the flesh, rather than in Christ. Thus, the letters that we have considered earlier in our project contain significant intimations of the position that Paul is forced to argue explicitly in Galatians:[30] Gentiles participate in the promised blessing *ek pisteōs Iēsou Christou*, not through circumcision or Torah-obedience.

When we turn to Galatians with these issues in view, the cogency of Dunn's interpretation is evident. I think we should grant without hesitation his argument that the letter is not concerned primarily to establish a doctrine of justification by faith as opposed to justification through human achievement; rather, it is concerned primarily to argue that God's promise to Abraham always had the Gentiles in view and that God's covenant was never intended only for the Jewish people (Gal 3:6–9).[31] The existence of Gentile Christian communities where the Spirit is palpably and powerfully present (3:2–5) is evidence that these Gentile believers are "children of promise" like Isaac, children of the free woman rather than children born *kata sarka* to the slave woman, who represents "the present Jerusalem . . . in slavery with her children" (4:21–31). That is why Paul can refer provocatively to the church as "the Israel of God" (6:16). In this eschatological Israel, embracing both Jews and Gentiles, neither circumcision nor uncircumcision matters (5:6, 6:15), because where the promise is fulfilled, the old distinctions have been abolished in the "new creation," the new life in which those who are "in Christ" already participate (2:20, 3:26–29).

In other words, Paul does not interpret the foundational story as a simple linear *Heilsgeschichte* from Abraham to the present moment. Rather, for Paul, Christ's death has introduced a surprising discontinuity in Israel's story, simultaneously necessitating and enabling a new reading of Scripture that discloses its witness to the Gospel. Christians have become Isaac, Jews have become Ishmael! Paul's revisionary re-reading of Scripture—worked out in some hermeneutically jarring ways in Gal 3:6–29 and 4:21–31—fractures

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[29] Correctly, Wright ("Towards a Synthesis," 31): "[T]he church is regarded in these letters as the covenant community, which in several quite different but complementary ways is regarded by Paul as heir to the titles, prerogatives, and role in God's plan that had been taken by Israel (or, the righteous within Israel) in standard Jewish thought."

[30] I assume, of course, that Philippians was actually written later than Galatians; the chronological order implied by my sentence is the order of our investivation, not of the development of Paul's thought.

[31] See Part C below, however, for further response to Dunn.

traditional Jewish models for discerning the coherence of Scripture's message.[32] At the same time, however, he insists that God's act in Jesus Christ illuminates a previously uncomprehended narrative unity in Scripture.[33] It turns out, according to Paul, that Scripture from the first was always "about" God's intention to bless the Gentiles through Christ.

If we read Galatians as a response to this range of concerns, it becomes evident that the letter's references to "sonship" and "adoption," to "righteousness," and to God's "calling" all should be understood as aspects of Paul's response to the issue of participation in the covenant promises. The Gentile Galatians, who once were "enslaved under the *stoicheia tou kosmou*" (4:3) have been set free and brought into the family of God's own people. At the same time, Paul also argues in this letter that the Law is among the *stoicheia*, and that Jews as much as Gentiles must be adopted through Christ into God's family. That, of course, is an explosive claim, but it is a necessary inference from the narrative framework in which Paul reasons, for "if righteousness were through Law, then Christ died gratuitously" (2:21; cf. 3:21).

This last quotation shows how apt is Wright's interpretation (based on Phil 3:9) of *dikaiosynē* as "covenant membership" or "covenant status."[34] (Parenthetically, it may be noted that these five letters offer virtually no support for Kasemann's interpretation of *dikaiosynē theou* as God's salvation-creating power—unless Gal 5:5 should be so construed; virtually all the references to God's own righteousness appear in Romans.) *Dikaiosynē* is the status conferred upon Abraham as a result of God's gracious promise. This status is likewise conferred upon others whom God calls through Christ, not through the Law, which has no power to give life (3:21) and no authority to supersede or limit the covenant promise to Abraham and Christ his "seed" (3:15–18). It is not just coincidental that the righteousness/justification language is absent from 1–2 Thessalonians and Philemon; this terminology appears only in the letters where the question of covenant membership for Gentile Christians is a disputed matter.

One of the motifs that does surface with surprising frequency in this five-letter corpus is the theme of God's *calling*. (See, e.g., 1 Thess 2:12, 4:7, 5:24; 2 Thess 1:11, 2:13–14; Phil 3:14; Gal 1:6, 1:15, 5:8, 5:13). The references speak variously of being called into God's kingdom or to holiness or for freedom; *ho kalōn hymas* becomes in several of the passages an epithet for God. In every case the image presupposes that God summons a people that were previously ignorant of or estranged from him into relationship with himself. The background of this imagery, I would suggest, is to be found in Deutero-Isaiah, where there are repeated references to God's calling of the Servant/Israel (e.g. Isa 41:9, 42:6, 43:1, 49:1, 51:2 [re: Abraham!], 54:6). If one hears such echoes in Paul's use of *kalein*, the close association of the "calling" imagery with the idea of Israel as a covenant people becomes the more evident. Just as God called the Servant/Israel by gathering them from the corners of the earth so that they might be "a covenant to the people, a light to the nations," so God now calls the "Israel of God" (=the church) for a similar reason, so that the gospel might be proclaimed.[35]

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[32] Of course, there is ample precedent in Israel's prophetic tradition for the sort of reversal that Paul works here on the conventions of confident piety.

[33] This claim is developed more fully in Hays, *Intertextual Echo*.

[34] Wright, "Towards a Synthesis," 27.

[35] It is important to note that Paul never speaks of the church as the "new Israel," as though the old one had been supplanted. Rather, believers in Jesus simply *are* Israel. They

C. The Messiah and the People of God

The above reflections lead on to the formulation of an obvious and crucial question: *how* is the calling of Israel (which Paul dramatically reinterprets in these letters to include Gentile Christians) related to the narrative framework that we have described above, which focuses on the action of Jesus, especially his death on the cross? Precisely at this point Christian theology usually falls mute, despite the obvious importance of the issue. As Gerhard Ebeling noted (speaking of the Reformers' theology), it is very difficult to discern any "strict inner connexion" between christology and the doctrine of justification by faith.[36] This traditional difficulty is illustrated by Dunn's paper on the theology of Galatians, which virtually ignores christology. If, as Dunn rightly summarizes Paul's position, "the initial expression of God's covenant promise was in terms of promise and faith and always had the Gentiles in view from the first,"[37] then why was the death of Jesus necessary? Abraham's faith was certainly not directed towards the crucified Christ. If Abraham was justified by believing God, why can't the Gentiles do the same, without necessity for the Son of God to die on a cross?[38]

The essays of Gaventa and Wright have articulated two important ways of responding to these questions, both of which must be reckoned with in order to account for the connection between Paul's narrative framework (=his christology) and his reinterpretation of "Israel" (=his doctrine of justification).

Gaventa, following a line of interpretation pioneered by J. Louis Martyn,[39] contends that "the central theological claim" of Galatians is "that the gospel proclaims Jesus Christ crucified as the inauguration of a new creation."[40] Jesus' death terminates the old age and ushers in a new one, in such a way that the very structure of reality is transformed. The old age, to which the Law belongs, perishes in the *apokalypsis* of the cross. Thus, believers living in the eschatological twilight zone at the turn of the ages are called upon to recognize and embody the new creation in which the old barriers between Jew and Gentile are dissolved (note especially Gal 3:26–29, 5:14–16).

Wright's paper cautiously advances a proposal that he has developed more boldly elsewhere. Paul has "retained the sense of 'Messiah' for *Christos*," and "the Messiah represents his people, God's Israel" in such a way that his destiny contains and determines theirs: "they are 'in' him such that what is true of him is true of them."[41] That is why Paul can write *Christō synestaurōmai* (Gal 2:19). That is why the promise originally made only to Abraham and his singular *sperma* (=Christ, Gal 3:16) is now made available to others: "If you are Christ's then you are Abraham's *sperma*, heirs according to promise" (3:29). That is why the blessing of Abraham comes upon the Gentiles *in* Christ Jesus

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(continued)
are the true remnant that stands in continuity with the past Israel, rather than in contradiction to that Israel. Nonetheless, Paul certainly leaves himself open in Galatians to a supersessionist interpretation.

[36] Gerhard Ebeling, *Word and Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963) 203.

[37] Dunn, "Theology," 1.

[38] Gal 1:4 affirms that Jesus Christ "gave himself for our sins," but Paul, in the letters of our restricted "canon," does not develop a sacrificial atonement theory.

[39] J. Louis Martyn, "Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul's Letter to the Galatians," *NTS* 31 (1985) 410–24.

[40] Gaventa, "Singularity," 18.

[41] Wright, "Towards a Synthesis," 32.

(3:14). That is why the faith and obedience of Jesus are both life-giving and life-shaping for God's people (Gal 2:20–21, 3:21–22). That is why the self-emptying, death, and exaltation of Christ Jesus in the Philippians hymn (Phil 2:6–11) is a saving event rather than a bizarre cosmic spectacle. That is why Paul expects Christians ultimately to be raised up along with Jesus and to share his glory (1 Thess 4:14, 2 Thess 2:14, Phil 3:20–21).

It is not critical for our present purposes to assess Wright's claim about the history-of-religions background of this way of thinking, i.e., that it is a development of OT and intertestamental Jewish ideas about the Messiah.[42] The point that matters here is that Paul does in fact think about the fate of God's people as bound up in the fate of Jesus. The logic of salvation is a logic of *participation* in the destiny of Jesus, the divinely sent protagonist of the gospel story.[43] For that reason, there is a vital organic connection between christology and ecclesiology (Israelology?) in Paul's thought. The life of God's elect is prefigured and carried by the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.

That this life entails neither a sectarian escape from reality nor a private inner spiritual experience is guaranteed when Wright's insights about the participation of Israel in the fate of the Messiah are coupled with Gaventa's apocalyptic interpretation of the cross. The gospel of Jesus Christ offers a proclamation about the transformation of creation through Jesus' death and a call to all who hear to participate in the freedom of the children of God.[44]

It will occur to some readers that this account of Pauline theology is relentlessly "mythological." Such ideas as the destruction of the old age through the death of Jesus or the "mystical" participation of the people of God in the fate of God's Son are not readily intelligible outside the universe of discourse in which they appear in Paul's letters. Can such images be demythologized in such a way that their content is successfully carried over into a universe of discourse more hospitable to modern scientific/historical sensibilities? I tend to think not. Fortunately, my assignment is theological synthesis, not hermeneutical transfer! The one task that does remain for us, however, is to show how Paul employs these ideas and images in describing and prescribing the response of the community of faith to the action of God narrated in the gospel.

D. The Community's Cruciform Role in the Drama

Much of Paul's explicit argumentation is concerned with the Christian community's *response* to God's action in Christ. Because the story of God's saving purpose is not yet finished, the community has a role to play in its outworking in the present time. One of Paul's most characteristic theological emphases is his steadfast insistence on the *cruciform* character of that role. The community called to live "in Christ" will necessarily live in a way that corresponds to the pattern of faith/obedience defined by Christ's death on the cross.

For the most part, Paul regards this cruciform existence in the present time not as an

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[42] Wright apparently stands on this question close to the position of Albert Schweitzer, *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*. At the 1987 meeting, Leander Keck, in his summarizing remarks at the end of the discussion of Wright's paper, noted his surprise that no one had challenged Wright's virtual equation of *Christos* with the people of God.

[43] Cf. Hays, *Faith of Jesus Christ*, 248–54.

[44] Of course, this call to freedom sets up difficult issues for a community in a social world where slavery was a normal institution. See my remarks on Philemon in Part III.A.3, below.

ideal to be pursued but as a fact of experience. "I have been crucified with Christ" (Gal 2:20): among the many things that Paul means by this extraordinary claim is that he is a participant in Christ's suffering. He tells the Thessalonians that they have become "imitators of us and of the Lord, for you received the word in much affliction with joy of the Holy Spirit" (1 Thess 1:6). These sufferings are also said to correspond to the experience of the "churches of God in Christ Jesus which are in Judea," whose sufferings in turn mirror the death inflicted on "the Lord Jesus and the prophets" by their own countrymen (1 Thess 2:14–15; cf. the allusions to persecution in Gal 4:29, 5:11, 6:12).[45] Similarly, he encourages the Philippians by saying, "It has been granted to you that for the sake of Christ you should not only believe in him but also suffer for his sake, engaged in the same conflict which you saw and now hear to be mine" (Phil 1:29–30). As this citation suggests, suffering in the likeness of Jesus and for his sake is seen not as a misfortune but as a privilege; Paul can regard this conformity to Jesus' death as a consummation to be wished by the faithful (e.g., 2 Thess 1:4–5). He describes his own hope in terms of conformity to the emptying-death-resurrection paradigm of Christ's career[46] (Phil 2:5–11): "that I may know him and the power of his resurrection, and may share his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, that if possible I may attain the resurrection from the dead" (Phil 3:10–11).

Just as clearly, Paul regards this hope not as a private goal but as a normative paradigm for Christian believers. He explicitly urges them to *imitate* him in contrast to others who are "enemies of the cross of Christ" (Phil 3:17–18). He agonizes over the Galatians, whom he entreats to "become as I am," because he hopes to see "Christ formed in [them]" (Gal 4:12, 19). I have argued elsewhere—and therefore will not repeat the arguments here—that, when he exhorts the Galatians to "Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ" (Gal 6:2), he is urging them to assume the same posture of self-sacrificial giving for the sake of others that he urges upon the Philippians by appealing to the story-warrant of Christ, who took the form of a slave and humbled himself by becoming obedient unto death on a cross (Phil 2:1–13; cf. Gal 5:13b: "Through love become slaves of one another"). *Nomos Christou* is a way of describing this pattern of renouncing one's own privileges and interests for the sake of others.[47]

One consequence of our heuristic experiment of working with a Pauline corpus consisting of 1–2 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and Galatians is that we are led to read Galatians in a way that highlights these themes of imitation, union with Christ, and participation in his sufferings. Issues concerning the Law and justification are present in Galatians, to be sure, but they appear to belong to the contingent level of argumentation rather than to the theological hermeneutic out of which Paul responds to the questions at hand. Gal 2:20–21, with its emphasis on union with Christ's grace-giving death, looks more and more like the hermeneutical center of the letter.

How does this union occur? Unfortunately for us, the matter is not as clear as we might wish. The warrant for the claim of union with Christ's death and participation in his life

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[45] Note the emphasis that Karl Paul Donfried ("The Theology of 1 Thessalonians as a Reflection of Its Purpose," [1986]) places on persecution as the background of 1 Thess and on the role of Jesus as "the prototype of the martyr" (p. 9).

[46] Noted by Wright, summing up a widely-held interpretation ("Towards a Synthesis," 31–32).

[47] Richard B. Hays, "Christology and Ethics in Galatians: The Law of Christ," *CBQ* 49 (1987) 268–90.

is apparently given in Gal 3:27: "For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ." Playing out our letters-found-in-a-cave fantasy, we might ask, what does it mean to be "baptized into Christ"? Is this a reference to some cultic ceremony? A metaphorical way of talking about the believer's imaginative identification ("through faith," 3:26) with the fate of the hero of the community's foundational story? Since our corpus contains no other references to baptism, the matter remains mysterious. (But perhaps we can hope for the discovery of additional evidence. . . .)

It is clear, in any case, that union with Christ has definite ethical implications for Paul. The metaphor of being crucified with Christ is given an explicit ethical turn in Gal 5:24: "Those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires" (cf. Gal 6:14). Furthermore, To "put on Christ" is to assume something of the character and vocation of the "Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me" (Gal 2:20). That is what Paul means by insisting that that "it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me." And that is why the exemplary character qualities of the triadic *pistis-agapē-hypomonē* formula (1 Thess 1:3; cf. 2 Thess 1:3–4, Phlm 5) mirror attributes that are ascribed elsewhere in these letters to Christ (or to God). For example, *pistis* in 1 Thess 5:24, 2 Thess 3:3 ("*Pistos* is the Lord [Jesus?] who will strengthen you and guard you from the Evil One."), Phil 3:9, Gal 2:20, 3:22;[48] *agapē* in 1 Thess 1:4, 2 Thess 2:13, 2:16, 3:5, Gal 2:20; *hypomonē* in 2 Thess 3:5. The character of the community of faith is to be a reflection of the character of God, as revealed in the cross of Christ.

For that reason, the community itself has a witness-bearing function in the world (1 Thess 1:8). The community's unity in faith and suffering love stands as a witness to the hostile world of God's judgment and salvation (Phil 1:27–30), of hope for the new creation (Gal 5:5–6, 3:28). As "children of promise" the eschatological community reflects the free Jerusalem above (Gal 4:26–28). Therefore they must live as "children of God without blemish in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, among whom [they] shine as lights in the world" (Phil 2:14–15). They can be designated simply as "the saints" because they are a (covenant) community called to be devoted to the service of God. That is one of the reasons why they must practice community discipline (2 Thess 3:6–15, Gal 6:1–5) and cultivate practices that build the community up in love (1 Thess 4:9–12, 5:12–28; Phlm 4–7; Phil 2:1–4; Gal 5:13–15).

In fact, one way of summarizing the role given to the eschatological community is to say that the community, by living a life "worthy of the gospel of Christ" (Phil 1:27)—i.e., a life that faithfully corresponds to his obedience and self-sacrificial love—becomes the embodiment of the new creation at the turn of the ages. Because the parousia of the Lord Jesus is still a future event, the community in the present time knows "the fellowship (*koinōnia*) of his sufferings" (Phil 3:10). But that *koinōnia* is already a sign of grace in the world, because of its correspondence to the cross.[49]

Paul's passionate rejection of the Law-gospel of the Galatian teachers must be understood in this frame of reference. The problem with the Law-gospel is not (just?) that

[48] I am well aware that the exegesis of these last three citations as references to Jesus' faithfulness is open to debate; nonetheless, I stand by the interpretation given here.

[49] The role of the community here is not only as vehicle of the message: the community's life actually has a hermeneutical function. For various reflections on this issue, see J. Christiaan Beker, "The Coherence-Contingency Theme as Interpretive Model," (1986) 10–12, and the important programmatic essay by Wayne Meeks, "A Hermeneutics of Social Embodiment," *HTR* 79 (1986).

it promotes works-righteousness; the problem is that, by redividing the world between Jew and Gentile, it reinstantiates the distinction that Christ's death had broken down (Gal 3:28) and brings division in the eschatological community (5:15–21). The Law-gospel turns back the cosmic clock and effectually denies the presence of the new age in the commmunity that should receive its identity solely from the story of the cross.

III. Conclusion: "Straining Forward to What Lies Ahead"

At the conclusion of this attempt at synthesis, it strikes me that there are several loose ends. I will, for the sake of discussion, identify six of them. Of these, it seems to me that three are Paul's own loose ends: important unresolved theological problems that threaten the internal coherence of his thought. The other three loose ends are problems that we must cope with somehow in order to carry on our our attempts at constructive synthesis.

A. Paul's Unfinished Agenda

The positions staked out by Paul in our five letters, taken together, pose a series of theological dilemmas that are not adequately addressed, let alone resolved, in the texts before us. Space forbids discussion of these issues, but I list some of them here as matters that may demand consideration in our future discussions.

1. Why then the Law of Moses?

No reader with a sympathetic understanding of Judaism can come away from Galatians without feeling that Paul has dodged the essential theological issues concerning the Law as divine revelation. In answer to his own question, "Why then the Law?" Paul makes a number of interesting proposals: the Law was given to restrain sin[50] until the promised *sperma* should come; the Law was never intended to give life (3:21); the Law was our *paidagōgos eis Christon*. These statements hang together reasonably well with the contention that the Law is not contrary to the promises of God (3:21). But how can Paul also say that being under the Law is a state of slavery, equivalent to being in bondage to the *stoicheia* (4:1–11)? How can he brush aside circumcision—which was given to Abraham as a sign of the covenant promise—as being of no importance while simultaneously appealing to the Abraham story as a key support for his Law-free gospel? Does he really mean to suggest in Gal 3:19 that the Law was not given by God? (I do not think that is what he means, but he comes dangerously close to saying it; this is the Paul that Marcion knew and loved.) Paul owes his Jewish-Christian critics a better solution than he has produced here in Galatians.

2. Judgment and mercy

How can the gracious God who sent Jesus Christ to die for us—including Gentile sinners—also inflict "vengeance on those who do not know God and upon those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus" (2 Thess 1:8)? The problem is emphasized by the inclusion of 2 Thessalonians within the data base, but the theological issue also arises from the other letters, which are not reticent about pronouncing God's wrath and destruction on unbelievers (e.g., 1 Thess 1:10, 2:16, 4:8; Phil 1:28, 3:18–19; Gal 1:6–10, 4:30, 5:4,

[50] Here I stand in agreement with Dunn's exegesis ("Theology," p. 15 n. 13).

5:10–12, 5:21, 6:7–8). The problem is hardly unique to Paul, but it is sharpened by the intensity of his proclamation of the grace of Jesus Christ.

3. Slavery and freedom

The letter to Philemon, by urging Philemon to receive Onesimus back "no longer as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother . . . both in the flesh and in the Lord" (Phlm 16), suggests that Paul's language in Galatians about liberation from bondage through Christ has a literal application.[51] The symbolic world of the gospel impinges upon and reshapes social relations: this is a necessary corollary of Paul's view that the Christian community is the place where the new creation breaks through into human experience. When slavery is given an unremittingly negative valence, as it is in Galatians (especially 4:1–11, 4:21–5:1), it is hard to avoid the inference that the institution of slavery has no place among Christians. On the other hand, the very same letter can also urge Christians to "become slaves of one another" (5:13). In Philippians Paul describes himself and Timothy as "slaves of Christ Jesus" (1:1), while at the same time holding up Jesus who "emptied himself, taking the form of a slave" (2:7) as paradigmatic for the community of faith. Obviously Paul uses the slavery metaphor in different ways, but the uses would seem to work against one another, particularly at the level of discerning the practical social implications of the the gospel story.[52]

B. Making Paul's Theology Make Sense to Us

Finally, though this essay does not presume to address questions about how we, as belated readers rifling through someone else's mail, can appropriate Paul's message, I cannot help noting three issues that confront us at every turn when we try to synthesize an account of Paul's thought that makes sense to us.

1. Apocalyptic eschatology

No surprise here. If the coherence of Paul's gospel is integrally bound up with the imminent *parousia* expectation, does that render his whole thought-world problematical for readers who have seen history go on as before?

2. Vicarious inclusion in corporate salvation

My whole discussion of the participation of the people of God in the destiny of Christ raises this issue. Can such conceptualities be grasped as intelligible by those of us who live on this side of Luther, Jefferson, and Bultmann? Or, alternatively, does Paul's theology implicitly pronounce anathema on all forms of Christian piety that make our relation to God contingent upon individual subjective response?

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[51] My interpretation of Philemon at this point is indebted to Norman R. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

[52] For a nuanced discussion of the way in which social realities condition the ranges of meaning that Paul's original readers might have assigned to this metaphor, see Dale B. Martin, "Slave of Christ, Slave of All: Paul's Metaphor of Slavery in 1 Corinthians 9," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1988).

3. Allusion and echo

To what extent does comprehension of Paul's letters depend upon our ability to discern the nuances of his manifold allusions to Scripture and to early Christian traditions? The more I have worked with Paul, the more convinced I have become of the accuracy of Beker's characterization of Paul as a "hermeneutic theologian." But if he is a hermeneutic theologian, we must seek to comprehend his writings as intertextual performances that presuppose and depend upon their relation to a body of precursor "texts," many of which are irretrievably lost to us. The effect of this loss is not only a muffling of the rhetorical force of the performance but also a semantic leakage. In order to begin recovering some of what has been lost, I would propose that the best place to focus our efforts is on Paul's use of Scripture, for there we at least have access to the texts to which he alludes. Galatians, with its long exegetical arguments, raises the issue far more directly than the other letters examined previously in our project, but even the Macedonian correspondence is full of Scriptural allusions (a few illustrations: Phil 1:19/Job 13:16, Phil 2:10–11/Isa 45:23, 1 Thess 3:9/Ps 115:3 LXX, 1 Thess 3:13/Zech 14:5 (?), 1 Thess 5:8/Isa 59:17). If the specific task of "Pauline theology" is to study the hermeneutical transformations that Paul performs in appropriating elements of his symbolic universe for the situation of his readers, what better place to start than with careful analysis of Pauline *allusions* to Scripture? That is, of course, a major project for another time, but I would urge future contributors to our corporate project to pay careful attention to Paul's interpretations of Scripture as a key to understanding his theology.[53]

[53] What we need are studies that will attend not just to exegetical techniques and backgrounds, but also to the meaning-effects produced by Paul's allusions and intertextual juxtapositions.

The Costs of Proselytism and Conversion

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Arthur Darby Nock showed that conversion was a distinctly specialized and rare religious experience in the Ancient World.[1] Most religious rites of the time helped maintain the political order because they were civic ceremonies. Participation involved "adherence," a low level of involvement, as an act of civic piety. But prophetic religions such as Judaism and Christianity stimulated conversion, raising commitment far above simple adherence. Conversion necessarily involved a radical change of lifestyle, often to a socially stigmatized group. Professor Nock showed that the strong personal commitment of conversion was characteristic of Judaism, some of the philosophical sects, mystery religions, and pre-eminently Christianity. He maintained that conversion uniquely suited Christianity to gain in popularity while conquering opposition. Furthermore, highly personal piety, an effect of the conversion experience, was characteristic of Christianity and a small number of other cohesive religions in the Roman Empire. Thus, conversion provided the dynamic for a true religious revolution in the late Roman Empire and a startling innovation in religious patterns. According to Nock, the phenomenon of conversion was remarkably important for understanding the popularity and attractiveness of Christianity even before Paul. Christian communities organized all their resources for the dissemination of the gospel, quickly spreading throughout the Roman world.

Nock recognized and emphasized an extremely important dynamic in the spread of early Christianity. Time has not disproven his insight, rather deepened and broadened it. On the other hand, in the later empire, Nock may have overstressed internal factors, distorting the importance of the Christian emperors' patronage in the success of Christianity.[2] Also, Nock's understanding of conversion was stereotypic, for he followed William James in limiting the experience of conversion to a radical emotional experience or a quick turning to a new way of life, implying a complete reorientation in attitude, thought and practice. In this respect, Nock's understanding of conversion was also traditionally Christian, strongly influenced by Luke's description of Paul. Furthermore, Nock probably underestimated the level of commitment which adherence to a civic form

[1] A. D. Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933).

[2] See Ramsey MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire A.D. 100–400* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); also his *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) 94–137, for issues of conversion in paganism, dynamic religions, and the death of paganism. See now Robin Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians: Religion and the Religious Life from the Second to the Fourth Century A.D. When the Gods of Olympus Lost Their Dominion and Christianity, with the Conversion of Constantine, Triumphed in the Mediterranean World* (New York: Knopf, 1986). For a good summary of the social structure of pagan society, see David Balch and John E. Stambaugh, *The New Testament in its Social Environment* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986).

could generate among the local pagan aristocrats, who vied with each other for social prominence through public benefaction, a process in which Judaism and later Christianity sometimes participated in late Hellenism, when a church or synagogue achieved regional importance. Obviously, both internal and external factors are important to the history of any group.

The relationship between conversion, high personal commitment, and group cohesion is crucial for understanding the spread and success of early Christianity. Nevertheless, a great many questions were left unanswered by Nock's intuition: Why did conversion become important in Judaism and Christianity? How did conversion continue to play an important role in Christianity in the second and succeeding generations of family membership? Nock saw conversion as a continuous process, typical of the way in which all Christians entered their movement, but this cannot be entirely true. Only in the first generation of Christianity in a family did all enter by conversion. Thereafter, the progeny of the converts was socialized into Christianity. The child needs no conversion for social mores, values and institutions present themselves as self-evidently true in a family which provides instruction into its religious rites. Primary socialization of the child, the process by which self-evidently true assertions about the world become internalized and recognized as objective reality, may therefore be an important analogy to the way in which conversion works in developing commitment. Thus, we must also factor in the most ascetic and monastic varieties of Christianity, Christian communities which eschewed family life, who continued to have a strong influence on the progress of the movement.[3] In radically ascetic Christianity, conversion would continue to be the primary experience of "entrance" into the religion.

More recent studies have pointed out that the highest degree of commitment is only evident when sudden conversions are followed by and supplemented by thorough education to the values of the group. Since all communities establish what Peter Berger has called a "plausibility structure," a state in which beliefs seem self-evident and need no proof, a more exact analysis of the relationship of commitment to conversion is necessary.[4] Viewed from the perspective of social commitment, conversion resembles a new and conscious choice to socialize to a particular group—a resocialization, if you will.[5] The convert builds up a new structure of reality, corresponding to the structure of the group he joins. The values of the new group helps form the convert's new reality, a reality learned from the group as the convert learns about it.

1. Conversion and the Strength of Religious Commitment

In the religious life of most communities, the commitment of converts is legendary.[6]

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[3] See D. MacDonald, *The Legend and the Apostle* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983) and Elizabeth Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad, 1983).

[4] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1967) 15; Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays On Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

[5] See Harold Remus, "Sociology of Knowledge and the Study of Early Christianity," *SR* 11:1 (1982) 47f.

[6] There is no need to document this in detail. But it happens that a recent survey by the American Jewish Committee in New York has demonstrated it again. Egon Mayer

Scholars have also noted the relationship between strong religious commitment and conversion. Perhaps best known of these studies is *Commitment and Community.* In it, Rosabeth Kanter records her interest in the psychology of commitment while investigating the factors influencing the survival of apocalyptic communities.[7] After studying nine successful communities and many unsuccessful ones, she defined commitment not in individual terms but in terms that serve the community: the group of necessary internal controls which support the group. Personal commitment and those conversion experiences in which a new social world is learned become two aspects of the same dynamic of socialization in sects, apocalyptic, or utopian communities. Whenever a group is made up almost entirely of converts, its cohesiveness will tend to be much greater than a group whose membership is filled by casual affiliation or with no decisive action rejecting other choices. But chronologically, conversion most often precedes commitment, so that the phenomenon of commitment includes more aspects than merely conversion.

Kanter observed that the highest degree of cohesiveness is found in groups that present new moral communities, such as where members come to share property or other resources and form a single household. Since this is a common feature of Jewish and Christian sectarianism, the relevance to first century Judaism and Christianity should have been noted before. As expected, one characteristic of sects that are highly dependent on conversion for membership is that they also tend to be highly cohesive, stressing the differences between themselves and the outside world.

In analyzing the history of these groups Kanter observed three principal types of commitment and the processes which enhance them. Although hers is not the only possible scheme and possibly not the most satisfactory one from the point of view of general theory because of her necessarily personal evaluations of her data, it is especially relevant to the study of early Christianity and other apocalyptic forms of Judaism, since her observations were made on the basis of modern examples of such groups. She divided commitment into three aspects—affective commitment, instrumental commitment, and moral commitment.[8] Though Kanter does not discuss the issue, her typology allows for a neat distinction between the two types of conversions which were isolated by psychologists: Sudden conversions would necessarily begin with a sudden high degree of affective commitment, while gradual conversions work explicitly to develop high dimensions of moral and instrumental commitment as well. Kanter characterized instrumental commitment as a commitment to the *organization and its rules,* affective commitment as commitment to its *members,* and moral commitment as commitment to the *ideas of the group, as spelled out by its leaders.* This results in three major aspects of commitment in a particular group: retention of members, group cohesiveness, and social control. Since these are observations based upon evaluations and interpretations of her narrative data and not based on quantified data, they cannot be treated as strict definitions of every society's

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and Amy Avgar interviewed partners of 309 intermarried couples. About a third of the couples identified contained a partner who had converted to Judaism. The overwhelming majority of partners converted to Judaism were women. They reported that the children of these couples are raised as Jews and the spouses were highly identified with the synagogue and the Jewish community. *The New York Times,* June 22, 1987, section B, p. 9.

[7] *Commitment and Community* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 64.

[8] Ibid, 61–74.

mechanism of commitment, but they are important descriptive tools in helping to analyse why conversion helps galvanize community and ensure success.

Since the time of Nock, scholars of antiquity have lost confidence in using the term *conversion* as a culturally universal concept. Conversions may be fast or slow, determined cultically or by ecstatic experience, and vary on dozens of other variables. Each culture defines what it means by conversion and tends to enforce that definition to the exclusion of many others. In a complex society differing concepts of conversion may compete for dominance. Furthermore pure types are rarely found. Although radical conversions relate to the affective side of group commitment, they may also have ramifications on the other two scales as well. Gradual conversions typically address all three aspects of group commitment as part of the training process. This explains why many successful groups encourage gradual rather than sudden conversions. But some radical conversions can also be important for the development of commitment, since the emotions elicited by the sudden conversion are normally interpreted as a religious consciousness by the religious group. Radical conversions exemplify the ecstasy or bliss sought within the movement and give dramatic urgency to the claims of the group. But, for the stability of the membership, it is important to balance the emotional contribution of radical converts with the more even enthusiasm of gradual converts, who appropriate the rules and roles of the group more thoroughly and so add stability.

Even in conventional religious groups, affective commitment has a disproportionate effect in cohesion. G. Lenski has noted that communal involvement and close affective interpersonal relationships with members was a most important variable for the cohesion of a religious organization or institution.[9] This would also account for the high level of commitment among participants in a religious movement even when they do not seek or attain high office. But while the moral factors may be primary in terms of personal goals and meanings in a religion, the affective commitments are chronologically prior in most believers' experience.

One result of such analyses in the modern world has been the observation that the most rapid church growth tends to be among the most conservative and demanding denominations. A liberalizing movement from sect to denomination is the general rule for most religious groups in American religious institutional life. Even so liberal churches and sects often do not attract or retain members as fast or as surely as do conservative ones, which rely on conversion, strict moral standards, high investments of time and money to develop higher degrees of commitment. Thus, people join conservative churches, while others tend to disaffiliate from the liberal ones, ceasing to have affiliations with any church.[10]

More recently, several psychologists have investigated the relationship between conversion and commitment by examining the language of converts. Snow and Machalek[11] proposed that the surest way to identify the phenomenon of conversion would be to look for changes in the subject's "universe of discourse." Studying the Nichen Shoshu Buddhist movement, they suggested that converts may be identified by four "rhetorical indicators": 1. Adopting a master attribution scheme; 2. biographical reconstruction; 3. suspending

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[9] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, rev. ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963).

[10] Dean Kelley, *Why Conservative Churches are Growing* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

[11] "The Convert as a Social Type," *Sociological Theory*, ed. R. Collins (San Francisco: Jossey-Boss, 1983) 259–289; and "The Psychology of Conversion," *Annual Review of Sociology* 10 (1984) 167–190.

analogical reason; and 4. embracing a master role. Subsequent research has shown that these four rhetorical indicators are important for locating religious commitment. Only one of them—biographical reconstruction, where the subject actively reinterprets past experiences or self-conceptions from the vantage point of the present in such a way as to change the meaning of the past for the subject—is a clear indicator of religious conversion.[12]

2. Conversion and Community in Hellenistic Judaism

There have been many, many studies of proselytism and conversion in Judaism. A strong scholarly argument rages over whether or to what extent Jews proselytized.[13] Few

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[12] Clifford L. Staples and Armand L. Mauss, "Conversion or Commitment? A Reassessment of the Snow and Machalek Approach to the Study of Conversion," *JSSR* 26 (1987) 133–147. Staples and Mauss were specifically trying to see if the criteria deduced by Snow and Machalek from an Eastern sect would hold true for a sect of born-again Christians. The answer was positive, but as they say, only one of the criteria is specific to conversion.

[13] J. Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind,* 264–5; S. Aalen, *Die Begriffe 'Licht' und 'Finsternis' im Alten Testament, im Spätjudentum und im Rabbinismus* (Oslo: 1959); H. J. Schoeps, *The Jewish Christian Argument,* trans. D. E. Green (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963) 12; David Eichhorn, *Conversion to Judaism: A History and Analysis* (New York: Ktav, 1965); B. J. Bamberger, *Proselytism in the Talmudic Period* (New York: Ktav, 1968) 24; James Parkes, *The Conflict Between Church and Synagogue* (New York: Atheneum, 1969) 23; William G. Braude, *Jewish Proselytizing in the First Five Centuries of the Common Era* (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1940); R. R. de Ridder, *The Dispersion of the People of God: The Covenantal Basis of Matthew 28:18–20 against the Background of Jewish, Pre-Christian Proselytizing and Diaspora, and the Apostleship of Jesus Christ* (Kampen, the Netherlands: J. H. Kok Co., 1971); J. N. Sevenster, *The Roots of Pagan Anti-Semitism in the Ancient World* (Leiden: Brill, 1975) 202–3; S. B. Hoenig, "Conversion During the Talmudic Period," in *Conversion to Judaism,* ed. D. M. Eichhorn, *Conversion to Judaism: A History and Analysis* (New York: Ktav, 1965) 210; J. C. Meagher, "As the Twig was Bent: Anti-semitism in the Greco-Roman and the Earliest Christian Times," in A. Davies, *Anti-semitism and the Foundations of Christianity* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979); Schuyler Brown "The Matthean Community and the Gentile Mission," *NovT* 22 (1980) 193–221; John Peterson, *Missionary Motives in the Old Testament and Their Gradual Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); A. S. Goldstein, "Conversion to Judaism in Bible Times," *Conversion to Judaism: A History of Analysis* (New York: Ktav, 1965); Derwacter, *Preparing the Way for Paul: The Proselyte Movement in Later Judaism* (New York: Macmillan, 1930); M. H. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974) 131–53; G. Alon, *Jews, Judaism, and the Classical World,* trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1977); R. Mary Smallwood, *Jews;* M. Simon, *Verus Israel: Études sur les relations entre chrétiens et juifs dans l'Empire roman* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1948); J. Leon, *The Jews of Ancient Rome* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1960) 75–126; Recently Shaye Cohen has been writing a series of detailed articles on conversion and intermarriage in antiquity, which I assume will be collected into a fine book. On the whole, they reach the conclusion that the definition of conversion would depend on the various authorities asked, which is in line with my contention that different groups had different interests and definitions of conversion. Nevertheless, realizing the local character of the issues, I feel a certain number of

scholars emphasize adequately that different Jews and different Jewish sects reached different opinions about proselytism and defined conversion differently. As we shall see, attitudes ranged from a total denial of a mission to the gentiles to an extreme interest in it. Opinions must have been widely varied, but can be summarized by underlining several idealized approaches. Furthermore, not every scholar has bothered to define the social and psychological background against which Jewish conversion must be evaluated: conversion was a rare but not unprecedented experience in antiquity.

Christianity was not the only proselytizing sect within Judaism. Much of its proselytizing style was rooted in Judaism, though Christianity and Paul in particular transformed the Jewish heritage in moving beyond the Jewish milieu into the wider world. Other Jews sects, like the Essenes, a monastic group which left us the writings of the Dead Sea Scrolls, depended on converts to fill its ranks. This group, with its enormous interest in purity rules and the responsibilities of priesthood, qualifies as a very highly cohesive, communitarian movement. Without doubt it was the most cohesive sectarian group in Greco-Roman Judea, even when Christianity is included. But unlike Christianity it was totally uninterested in a gentile mission.

The perception that strong personal decisions lead to highly cohesive groups can be profitably applied to sectarian life in Judaism. And one general rule, which differs significantly from the Christian stereotype, can be promulgated at the beginning: gradual conversion was the typical and expected pattern for virtually every sectarian group in Judaism, though sudden and emotional conversion may have occured occasionally. Admittedly we know very little about the many messianic movements which left no documents behind, and even the community which John the Baptist formed cannot be adequately defined; its social and psychological life is virtually unavailable to us. But Greco-Roman Judea valued learning of special meanings of difficult texts. In fact, in providing instruction in the truths of the sect, each of the sects set up the closest thing to an educational institution in Jewish society.

This phenomenon is best illustrated by Josephus' autobiographical statements. In his *Vita* 7–12, Josephus reports, rather immodestly, that he was a wonder child. As the child of a priestly family, his fame quickly became known to the priests in Jerusalem, who would come to listen to his childhood lectures. At the age of 16, however, he opted for a "formal" education (9–12):[14]

> At about the age of sixteen, I determined to gain personal experience of the several sects into which our nation is divided. These, as I have frequently mentioned, are three in number—the first that of the Pharisees, the second that of the Sadducees, and the third that of the Essenes. I thought that, after a thorough investigation, I should be in a position to select the best. So I submitted myself to hard training and laborious exercises and passed through the three courses. Not content, however with the experience thus gained, on hearing of one named Bannus, who dwelt in the wilderness, wearing only

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generalizations can be framed, provided it is always possible to refine in the presence of complex and very varied facts.

[14] Josephus, *The Life*, trans. H. St. J. Thackeray, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926) 5–7. The translation must be used with great care. See below.

> such clothing as trees provided, feeding on such things as grew of themselves, and using frequent ablutions of cold water, by day and night, for purity's sake, I became his devoted disciple. With him I lived for three years and, having accomplished my purpose, returned to the city. Being now in my nineteenth year I began to govern my life by the rules of the Pharisees, a sect having points of resemblance to that which the Greeks call the Stoic school.

Josephus' claim to be a *Wunderkind* and a religious quester may be a conceit, for it certainly is part of his attempt to recommend himself as a knowledgeable historian of the Jewish people. In fact, the motif of spiritual quest was itself a literary convention, functioning throughout the Roman world to establish an author's credentials as a religious commentator.[15] Josephus' religious sentiments were more impressed with Bannus, not with the other sects. From Bannus Josephus learned to practice a regimen similar to the Essenes and John the Baptist. Of special interest is Josephus' report that Bannus practiced a simple life with frequent ritual immersions for purity's sake. If anything in Josephus' life should be considered a conversion experience, this is it, since he states that he became his devoted disciple (ζηλωτης εγενομην αυτου). He does not leave Bannus until his (religious) inclinations are satisfied (επιθυμιαν τελεωσας).

His decision to join the Pharisees, on the other hand, is hardly more than a matter of convenience. This perception is at odds with much Josephus scholarship, which sees Josephus as a Pharisee. But they read too much into Josephus' description of his decision to investigate their philosophy. Although many English translations have rendered ηρξαμην πολιτευεσθαι as "I began to conduct myself," or some other phrase which may reflect religious conversion, it is more likely that the true translation is something more like: "I began to study civil law, for which purpose I entered the society of the Pharisees."[16] Josephus, then, never actually became a convert to the Pharisees; he relied on them for his legal education and to gain credence for his public career.

This clarifies Josephus' many pro-Sadducean statements and his continuing enmity with the Pharisaic leadership during the war. When he states in *Antiquities* 18:15 that the Pharisees are extremely influential among the townfolk, and that all public rituals are carried out according to their precepts, we may get an inkling of his motivation for seeking out their education. Since Josephus is most likely a Sadducee by birth, he must do as Josephus himself says all Sadducees do: "For whenever they assume some office, though they submit unwillingly and perforce, yet submit they do to the formulas of the Pharisees, since otherwise the masses would not tolerate them" (*Antiquities* 18:17). The Pharisees were one of the most powerful groups in Judea and not just a sect when Josephus wrote. He was not a great sympathizer with their cause, but he was a practical man and understood the necessity of being guided by them. This also sheds important light on his later defection to the Roman side during the War. Josephus was a pragmatic man throughout his life.

Pragmatic though he was, Josephus was no *convert* to the Pharisees. But he does illustrate the range of religious decisions possible for a Jew in the first century. Josephus may be talking about a conversion experience when he became Bannus' disciple. However,

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[15] See Justin *Dial.* beg. Dio Chrysostom and St. Augustin. See Heydahl, *Philosophie und Christentum*, 1966.

[16] See Alan Mason, "Was Josephus a Pharisee? A Re-Examination of life 10–12," CSBS Conference, Hamilton, June 1987 and Dissertation Wyckliff College of the University of Toronto, 1987.

he also evidences the converse phenomenon, what Nock called *adherence* and many social psychologists call *alternation,* in his education by the Pharisees. We can see that a Jew's association with one of the Jewish sectarian positions—let us say either Essenism or Pharisaism—might have involved a radical change of some aspects of his existence. But at the same time, it might not be a radical change in every respect. Alternatively, one might go to some religious figures or movements for educational purposes, without anticipating a conversion experience.

Had Josephus actually joined the Essenes as well as lauding them, he would have had to become a convert, although conversion to this group was normally envisioned as a gradual process of internalizing group norms. Essene membership came only by conversion. Even an orphan would have had to go through the same lengthy initiation as any other convert. Virtually no member of this group could be called merely an adherent because all members adopted a radically different life-style.[17]

The ideology of the Qumran group fostered conversion decisions. The single most obvious characteristic of the Essenes or Dead Sea Scroll sectarians was their dualism. Strongly apocalyptic, the community divided the world into a battle between the children of darkness and the children of light. But this is not to be confused with a philosophical impetus toward dualism—they believed in a single deity. The distinction, rather, has as much to do with sociology as theology. Their dualism was parallel to their division of the world into sons of light and sons of darkness which served to separate members of the group from everyone else. From another perspective the dualism was parallel to the strong distinction between pre- and post-decision cognitive dissonance in their community. It functioned to keep the new member away from any contradictory information. It is interesting how thoroughly this distinction affects their thinking, for they virtually identify themselves with the community of the saved at the end of time. There is thus a perfect symmetry between their personal decision states in joining their community and their views of the ultimate purpose of history.

In this respect the Qumranites are quite close to the flying saucer group which Festinger studied in his classic work *When Prophecy Fails*[18] or many of the new religions today, who set up monastic or ascetic or retreat communities based on the notion that they alone will survive. Even though ecstasy appeared to be part of their rites, the Qumran group did not describe conversion in ecstatic or emotional terms, stressing the stages and rigors of the life of purity instead. They prescribed ritual immersion for purity as did the Pharisees. But it had a mark that was unequivocally Essene. Ritual immersion made the Dead Sea Scroll community pure enough to fight with the angels at the end of time. Hence, the member could be saved at the final battle. The practice helps fill in the gaps between rabbinic views of community and Christian ones, just as it helps fill in the missing steps between Jewish ritual immersion and Christian baptism. Because of the Dead Sea Scrolls we can now investigate their internal organization and see that they would score very high on all the scales Kanter develops for commitment.

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[17] See Lawrence Schiffman, *Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Courts, Testimony and the Penal Code* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983) 155–74.

[18] Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riechen, and Stanley Schacter, *When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World* (New York: 1956). See my *Rebecca's Children* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) 191–92 for more information.

This model of conversion, exemplified by sectarian Judaism, produces highly committed members. The sect defines what it means by conversion, in this case defining it by means of ritual requirements.

3. Conversion among Diaspora Jewish Groups

Within the small area of Judea and the slightly larger area of the land of Israel, which included Samaria and the Galilee, we have evidence of a large number of Hellenized Jews. These Jews produced the majority of the material evidence coming down to us from the first centuries. It is their culture whose ruins we find scattered over Israel and the mediterranean land masses. Josephus mentions the "representations of animals" which Herod Antipas put in houses in Tiberias (*Life* 65). Although the galilean synagogues with their beautiful mosaics—containing zodiacs, the seasons, and depictions of Helios—date from the third century and later, they show the extent of Jewish acculturation to Hellenism, the willing interplay of Jewish and pagan beliefs, one supposes, as long as some major tenet of Jewish belief was not flagrantly violated. In the Jewish Diaspora, acculturation can only have been all the more evident.[19] Philo, the spokesman for Hellenistic Judaism, evinces a great degree of universalism. He discusses the wisdom of the Greeks as one standard of truth in the world. Of course, he takes pains to show that everything good in Greek thought is paralleled in Jewish thought and that Judaism contains moral and philosophical truths only hinted at by the Greeks. He never explicitly mentions an active Jewish mission to convert gentiles.[20] However, he sometimes appears to believe that geniltes can attain salvation, as gentiles without conversion, just as Jews attain to the philosophical mind. He certainly does not actively promote a mission to gentiles, as he was a sensible diaspora Jew and is sensitive to gentile fears. Though he mentions with pride that some gentiles have sought fit to convert to Judaism, and goes out of his way to exhort Jews to accept them, he even seems to believe that there are some gentiles who have the advantages of a moral and philosophical life without conversion to Judaism (*Special Laws* 1.52, 1.308–309, *Virtues* 103–4).[21]

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[19] See the splendid discussion of Dieter Georgi in *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief: Studien zur Religiösen Propaganda in der Spätantike* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964), which has now been translated into English as *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982). His work on missionary activity is a wonderful window into the world of proselytism in late antiquity. The new epilogue brings the book up to date bibliographically and records the author's evolving opinions on these important issues.

[20] Peder Borgen, "Debates on Circumcision in Paul and Philo," *Philo, John and Paul: New Perspectives on Judaism and Early Christianity* (Atlanta Georgia: Scholars Press, 1987) 233–255; also *Paul Preaches Circumcision and Pleases Men And Other Essays on Christian Origins* (Trondheim: Tapir, 1983). Borgen portrays Philo correctly as demanding literal circumcision, as well as an "ethical" circumcision. He maintains that Paul was misunderstood by his followers to have advocated literal circumcision when he merely used the same figure of speech of "ethical" circumcision which Philo did.

[21] See Abraham Malherbe, *The Social Aspects of Early Christianity,* 2d ed. enlarged (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 51–2. Ellen Birnbaum is currently working on a dissertation at Columbia, which will try to unpack Philo's ambivalent and conflicting perspectives on the issue.

This is a minor topic, however, compared to the *apologia* which Philo and Josephus mount for proving the truth of Judaism in *Against Flaccus* and *Against Apion* respectively. Indeed scholarship has been needlessly detained trying to distinguish between the two different motives: missionary literature or apologetic. There is no doubt that apologetics were the primary motivation, whereas missionary literature was more characteristic of less acculturated Jews. It is, of course, possible that basically apologetic literature was used for missionary purposes as well as their more obvious value for gentile education. Even the justly famous *Joseph and Aseneth* seems more suited for the education and training of previously identified proselytes than for the missionizing of gentiles.

In the apologetic literature several arguments crop up again and again. Among the proofs of Judaism's truth are both its ancient history and its success in gaining converts, which was also noted by several prominent and hostile classical writers. Horace states that the Jews may compel a person to be one of the throng (*cogemus in hanc concedere turbam*, Satires 1.4.139–43). Tacitus, the Roman historian, says of proselytes to Judaism: "The earliest lesson they receive is to despise the gods, to disown their country, and to regard their parents, children, and brothers as of little account" (*Histories* 5.5).[22]

Such statements testify to the success which Judaism had in proselytism. But they also show the social threat which Judaism and Christianity presented to Greco-Roman society. A. Malherbe suggests quite cogently that both Philo's and Josephus' use of the so-called *Haustafel*, the idealized ethical portrait of a household which is so common in pagan ethical treatises, was partly an attempt to counter polemics and fears that Judaism was anti-social or would undermine pagan society.[23] This is logical because Jewish right in diaspora were dependent on the good will of the rulers. It was not wise to antagonize them. Historical records enumerate the consequences of Jewish conscious and unconscious threats against the peace or well-being of the Empire. For instance, the Jews were expelled several times from the city of Rome, at least one under praetor Peregrinus, explicitly on the charge of proselytizing.[24]

The perception is even more important after the birth of Christianity, since both Jewish and pagan society shared exactly this distrust of Christianity. Jesus' message, according to the New Testament, did contain advice to leave parents and families. Needless to say, later Christianity found the same and greater need to apologize for possible family disruption as did Judaism, as the *Haustafel* in 1 Peter shows.

In the first century B.C.E. the Maccabees were also known to have conquered the Idumeans and to have forced circumcision upon them. These two may be considered

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[22] Ptolemy the Historian, from Josephus Ant. 13.257, 318. Horace refers to the Jews' desire for non-Jews to join their group: *in hanc concedere turbam*. Also Seneca, *De Superstitione*. See Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, 2 vols. (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences, 1974, 1980) 127, 146, 147, 365. See also Valerius Maximus, *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* 1.3.3; Horace *Sermones* 1.4.142–143; Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 6.11 and *Epistolae Morales* 108.22; Martial, *Epigrammata* 7.30.5–8, 35.3–4, 82.5–6, 9.94.1–8; Petronius, *Satyricon* 68.8; Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* 67.14.1–3. See also Mary Smallwood, *Jews*, 379 and n. 82. See also Shaye J. D. Cohen, "Conversion to Judaism in Historical Perspective: From Biblical Israel to Postbiblical Judaism," *CJ* Summer 1983, n. 15. and Henry Green, *The Economic and Social Origins of Gnosticism*, SBL Dissertation Series 77 (Atlanta GA: Scholars Press, 1985) 89f.

[23] Philo *Hypothetica*, see Eusebius *Praeparatio* 8.6–7 355c–361b; Josephus *Against Apion* 2.190.

[24] See E. Mary Smallwood, *Jews*, 128–42, 174–180, 202–245.

converts, but it is clear that the exceptional nature of the circumstances and the duress involved excludes them from consideration in our psychological portrait. According to Valerius Maximus, the Jews were expelled from Rome in 139 B.C.E. because of their attempts to "transmit their holy rites to the Romans" (*qui Romanis tradere sacra sua conati erant*). Very likely this was the same reason for their expulsion under Tiberius in the first century, for according to Dio Cassius they were expelled because "they were converting many of the natives to their customs." After the rise of Christianity then, Jews continued to proselytize, and their proselytism gained them both friends and enemies. One may question whether Jews actively sought out proselytes in an aggressive way or whether they just developed out of philosophical interest or the attractiveness of Jewish services and lifestyles. But the undeniable truth appears to be that they did come, in sufficient numbers to cause anxiety in the pagan world.

Jewish proselytism was therefore both real and controversial. Jews gained proselytes but did not overwhelm the pagan world because because its message was for a sophisticated minority. Becoming a Jew was never merely a decision to join another religious club. Judaism was exclusive, it decried the other religious associations, and therefore was sometimes seen as intolerant. Joining Judaism was primarily a decision to join another *ethnos*, which was not self-evidently possible to everyone, never taken lightly, and often viewed with some suspicion.[25]

That there were differing standards for the acceptance of converts to Judaism, perhaps attributable to the different orientations of the various sects, is evident not only from the rabbinic discussion but from a few precious reports from Josephus. Josephus claims that the Jews of Antioch "were constantly attracting to their religious ceremonies multitudes of Greeks, and these they had in some measure incorporated into themselves" (*Jewish War* 7.3.3.[45]). On the other hand, some Jews preferred that potential converts remain "God-fearers" or semi-proselytes because such in-between stages provoked fewer backlash incidents than did disrupting pagan families by converting wives, children or husbands. Still, problems of family disruption only underline that most conversions took place on a person to person level, spreading through organizations and families one member at a time. Such patterns are well known today, such as in Mormon preaching, and is bound to be a significant piece of evidence for the process by which Christianity spread as well.

Just as Jews received converts from pagan society, many Jews, even those who wished to retain their Jewish identity, acculturated to pagan society. As in the modern period, the Jew's predicament as "marginal man" could be solved by leaving Judaism entirely, by downplaying the value of Judaism, or by reforming Judaism to make it more acceptable in gentile eyes.[26] Obviously, some assimilated completely, losing their Jewish identity and

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[25] See B. J. Bamberger, *Proselytism in the Talmudic Period;* Salo Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York: JPS, 1952) v. 1, 174f; M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism,* v. 1, 307; S. Zeitlin, *The Rise and Fall of the Judean State,* v. 3, 326; S. Applebaum, "The Social and Economic Status of the Jews in the Diaspora," in S. Safrai and M. Stern eds., *The Jewish People in the First Century* (Philadelphia: 1976) v. 2, 622f.; J. R. Rosenbloom, *Conversion to Judaism* (Cincinnati: 1978); J. Z. Smith, "Fences and Neighbors: Some Contours of Early Judaism," *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) 1–19; H. A. Green, "Jewish Identification and Assimilation: Continuities and Discontinuities in Roman Egypt," *SBL 1985 Seminar Papers,* ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta, GA, Scholars Press, 1985) 505–513.

[26] Everett V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man* (New York: Scribners, 1937). In the latter

often gaining citizenship in the Greek *polis*.[27] But, just as in the modern world, so in the ancient one there were many accommodations short of apostasy. While Philo believed that the special laws of Judaism had to be practiced literally, he also informs his reader that some intellectual Jews did not practice them. Although they studied Torah, they understood the laws only as allegories illustrating moral principles, not seeing fit to observe them in their personal lives. This implies that a Jewish education was received by most of the community, though different Jews may have stressed different values. Philo does not agree with these "extreme allegorizers," but his criticism stops far short of real hostility. He is satisfied with satirizing them as persons who try to "live as souls without bodies, as though they were living by themselves in a wilderness" (On the Migration of Abraham 89). Philo appears to mean by this that the customs of Judaism are designed to be practiced, where they enforce moral standards within society. Philo essentially describes the "extreme allegorizers" as philosophers, misguided for having forgotten that universal values must be envisioned through particular material circumstances.[28]

The leniency of Philo's reproach of the "extreme allegorizers" can be seen in comparison with apostates, for whom Philo has less kind words: "being incontinent, . . . [they] have sold their freedom for luxurious food . . . and beauty of body, thus ministering to the pleasures of the belly and the organs below it" (*Virtues* 34, 182). This discussion is reminiscent of 3 Maccabees where the apostates are called: "those who for their belly's sake had transgressed the divine command" (7:11). The apostates are not virtuous but merely indulging themselves in degradation. They make no attempt to live up to the virtues of Judaism, desiring complete assimilation, while the "extreme allegorizers" continued to consider themselves Jews and maintain the moral laws of Judaism, though they neglected the special customs.

On the other hand, we may briefly note the ferocity of hatred directed against gentiles by some of the apocalyptic literature. Jubilees continuously stresses the strict separation of Jews from the gentiles, who are their inferiors in morality (Jubilees 15:31). Indeed they are demonically related to the evil powers. The Qumran texts outlining the war of the sons of light on the sons of darkness depict the gentiles in similar villainy. 4 Ezra too condemns all the gentiles, after the destruction of the temple (4 Ezra 6:55–57).

These are hardly discussions of Jewish identity or conversion. But they show the range of choices available to Jews of the time. Conclusions about such modern ideas as assimilation and conversion can be teased out of the context, because across the myriad of differences separating the modern world from the Greco-Roman world, some of the social conflicts are quite similar.

Shaye Cohen among others has suggested that Jewish identity in this period resembles citizenship in that it was usually determined by birth and was not easily obtained otherwise. Indeed, the Greek term *Ioudaios* (Ιουδαιος) and the Latin *Iudaeus*, like the Hebrew *Yehudi* (יהודי), basically meant "Judean," thus retained more geographical and national connotations than is true of the word "Jew" in modern languages. So a Jew could only

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case, secularized Jews themselves might be tempted to convert to other groups.

[27] See 1 Macc 1:11–15, 3 Macc 2:31 and 7:10; also Philo *Vita Mosis* 1.130 and *De Virt.* 182.

[28] See John J. Collins, "A Symbol of Otherness: Circumcision and Salvation in the First Century," Brown Conference August 1984 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986) 163–186, esp. 171–72.

become a citizen of another place through naturalization. Though citizenship in Greek cities was zealously guarded, yet it was sometimes bestowed upon foreigners on the basis of habitation, property ownership, even religious rite, and primarily through local benefactions. But the metaphor of citizenship is incomplete and sometimes misleading.

Jews aspired to and obtained citizenship on an individual basis in Alexandria, though as a result of the civil conflict between the Jews and the Greeks in that city the best the community could receive was *isopoliteia*, separate-but-(not so)-equal rights to citizenship.[29] In fact, the legal issues surrounding Jewish rights were more closely associated with their status as a *collegium licitum* or even possibly a *religio licita*.[30]

But the fact is that no one single principle can encompass the number of social strategies available to Jews in this period when the issue of proselytism and conversion is raised. Some Jews were satisfied with social gains, content to develop independently and without gentile interference. But other Jews were not content unless they actively sought out new members of the religion. Still other Jews, like Philo, probably came from families which had been part of the citizenry for generations and anxious not to create incidents that might provoke gentile intolerance. Paul too is apparently a citizen of the Empire. But citizenship was often bestowed on the basis of religious preference, rather than the other way around, which meant that it was never easy for Jews to become citizens of other areas. Although one could own property in Athens without being a citizen, one way to become a citizen of Athens was to seek initiation into the Eleusian mysteries, which no religious Jew could do.[31] The result is that Jewish identity in parts of the Diaspora was somewhat like foreign nationality, as it is today, though it is hardly identical with the ancient understanding of citizenship. On the other hand, Jewish identity in the ancient world could often be subject to the same stresses as it is even in the modern secular American Jewish community, which has its many examples of apostasied to both established religion and the new religious cults. And it was certainly aware of the social lesson that visibility added to vulnerability.

It was not accidental that we have few explicit discussions of conversion in Hellenistic Jewish literature: Jewish adjustment to Hellenistic life often made explicit proselytizing uncomfortable and dysfunctional. While we do not have many specific discussions of conversion from other Hellenistic Jewish authors, John J. Collins has shown that there was among Hellenistic Jews a very liberal attitude toward gentile interest in Judaism.[32] A body of apologetic or "propaganda" literature was designed to inform gentiles of the value of Jewish life. The Sibylline Oracles praise the Jews as a race of most righteous men (3.219). Specific features proving Jewish moral superiority are enumerated: the practice of social justice (218–264) and the avoidance of idolatry and homosexuality (573–600). In a number of passages the sibyl speaks directly to the Greeks: "To what purpose do you

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[29] Aryeh Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt: The Struggle for Equal Rights* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1985).

[30] George la Piana, "Foreign Groups in Rome During the First Centuries of the Empire," *HTR* 20 (1927) 183–403; Pauly-Wissova, "*collegium*," 4, columns 380–480; Smallwood, *Jews*, 133f; Sevenster, 148–58; W. Ruppel, "Politeuma," *Philologus* 82 (1927) 268–312, 433–54.

[31] Plutarch, *Theseus* 33.2, G. E. Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, n.d.) 77. My thanks to Holland Hendrix for this idea and reference.

[32] John J. Collins, see above, n. 62.

give vain *gifts to the dead*[33] and sacrifice to idols? Who put error in your heart that you should abandon the fact of the great God and do these things" (547–549)? Within the Sibylline Oracles, salvation is sought in this world. Jews and Greeks alike may attain a peaceful life free from war and subjugation. Hence, salvation can be attained by Greeks if they abandon idolatry and offer sacrifice at the temple of the great God in Jerusalem (624–634).

Likewise in the *Letter of Aristeas*, there is no direct appeal for conversion, but there is certainly an apologetic or propagandistic attempt to portray the merits of Judaism. The letter purports to be written by one Greek and sent to another, but scholars usually see a Jewish hand behind it. The God of the Jews is described as "the overseer and creator of all things, whom they worship, is He whom all men worship, and we too your Majesty, though we address him differently, as Zeus and Dis; by these names men of old not unsuitably signified that He through whom all creatures receive life and come into being is the guide and lord of all" (*Letter of Aristeas* 16). Judaism is presented as a non-violent, non-aggressive philosophy and most especially not an exclusive or closed fraternity. Rather Judaism is a gift to all humanity, since God's providence is universal. It is not suggested that God will show special consideration for the Jews simply by virtue of their being Jews. Nor is there any hint of proselytism. The Jews follow their own rites, which attain a desirable religious end, but the same end can be attained by noral and god-fearing Greeks, though the rites be different.[34] Some of the most acculturated Jewish writers apparently soft-pedaled conversion when it was viewed as threatening by the gentile community, arguing that monotheism and virtue would be rewarded wherever they were found. These Jews asked gentiles to worship the one true God, which entailed a rejection of idolatry or as it was often expressed, worship for the dead, and avoidance of sin, with emphasis on adultery and homosexuality as the two characteristic gentile sins.

Of course, in spite of Jewish sensitivities to the charge of breaking up gentile families, some Jews welcomed converts. A brief mention of conversion occurs at the end of the book of Judith, which is probably to be dated to the Hellenistic period. After Judith has killed Holofernes, the Ammonite general is so impressed with the saving acts of the Israelite God that he becomes a believer, even accepting circumcision, and was incorporated "in the house of Israel forever." No doubt this is meant to illustrate the highest possible form of pagan admiration for Judaism.

There is an account of gentile conversion to Judaism in Hellenistic writing, the romance of *Joseph and Asenath*, which is set during Joseph's sojourn in Egypt but is meant to be the model of proselytism in the Hellenistic world. Since Asenath is a woman, the issue of circumcision does not arise. On the other hand, the ritual which is mentioned is completely puzzling. Joseph is described as eating the blessed bread of life, drinking the cup of immortality, and anointing himself with the blessed oil of incorruption. When Asenath converts, after she throws her idols away, she attains to these rites, which are apparently symbolic of Jewish life in general, rather than representative of a specific conversion ritual.[35]The puzzling objects of Asenath's rites are known to be symbolic of Judaism in a general way. For instance, the rabbinic document Shabbat 17b forbids gentile wine, bread, and oil: "the bread and oil of the heathen on account of their wine, and their wine

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[33] Italics mine. See Mishnah Avodah Zarah 2:3.

[34] Moses Hadas, *Aristeas to Philocrates* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951) 62.

[35] *Joseph and Asenath* may have some Jewish-Christian influence as the bread is marked with a sign that looks like the cross.

on account of their daughters, and their daughters on account of idolatry." Thus the symbols can be used conversely to illustrate Asenath's entrance into the community. The context in *Joseph and Asenath* is apposite to the rabbis' warning, implying that the rules of commensality were broadly understood in the Judaism of this period as safeguards against the idolatry of gentiles. We also learn that Joseph does not eat with the Egyptians, even though he is ruler of all Egypt (7:1; 20:9). Asenath is described as "dead" before her conversion, which represents her journey into life. In this document, immortality is the benefit she receives for converting.

Thus, the choices available to Hellenistic Jews were manifold, implying many different kinds of adaptations to the Jewish-Hellenistic cultural exchange, allowing for a variety of different opinions toward conversion in the Jewish community. Philo and the Hellenistic writers give evidence of the liberal end of the spectrum of commitment to Judaism: some self-identified Hellenistic Jews were still committed to Judaism, but the sources of their commitment must have been entirely different from the Essenes, who produced such a sectarian, inward-looking, and highly cohesive society, separate even from the majority of Jews. To the contrary, the Hellenistic Jewish community could have been involved in many transactional relationships with the larger Hellenistic world while maintaining many transactional relationships with Jews as well. They often needed both sets of relationships to pursue their livelihood. Though the upper levels of Hellenistic Jewish society may have felt deprived of the full rights of citizenship that many non-Greek or Roman gentile Hellenists had attained, most Jews felt at some ease in Hellenistic society and trade, accepting the restrictions on their lives as givens and seeking to remove as many non-essential boundaries as they could justify. They sometimes endeavored to remove a cause of suspicion between themselves and their gentile neighbors by saying that all moral people could enjoy God's blessing by righteousness. It is likely that many did not seek to convert their gentile neighbors, for this would have risked a gentile backlash. But it is just as likely that some Jews sought out gentiles for conversion.

Of course, one cannot call Hellenistic Jews a very unified group, much less a social grouping. But this is precisely the point. Group commitment was built in quite different circumstances. It is quite probable that these Hellenistic Jews, with a variety of differing accommodations to Hellenism, were the majority of Jews of that time. Yet they could not have felt the social cohesion which the Essenes developed. Furthermore, modern studies show that "liberal" positions do not grow as quickly as "conservative" ones, since some liberal members can be assumed to fall away, giving up any religious identification while more conservative positions are able, if they desire, to attract new highly committed members, even when there is a generalized, gradual movement toward more "liberal" positions. This can be summed up by noting that the Essenes were a highly cohesive group, while the Hellenistic Jews were not a unified group at all.

4. The God-fearers or Semi-proselytes to Judaism

God-fearer is the term used to refer to those gentiles with varying degrees of commitment to Judaism, all of whom have been attracted to the synagogue but who are unwilling as yet to become full proselytes. Acts uses the terms *sebomenos,* literally a worshiper [sometimes *theosebes* and variants suggesting a worshiper of God most high], or *phoboumenos,* literally a *fearer* of God. "Fearing God" is merely the normal Hebrew idiom for describing worshipping Him. The term *god-fearer* is used most obviously in Acts 10, where Cornelius is described as one and is also a donor to the synagogue. But the term is not a Lukan invention, for Josephus uses it as well (*Antiquities* 14.110) to describe gentiles,

and so does Julia Severa, a co-sponsor of the synagogue building in Acmonia.[36]

A. T. Kraabel has proposed that the presence of these people in the synagogues where Paul preaches are Luke's invention, introduced for the purpose of showing "how Christianity had become a gentile religion legitimately and without losing its Old Testament roots."[37] Kraabel's skepticism was based on his contention that we lack any firm archaeological or inscriptional evidence for *God-fearer* in any synagogue site, though he himself describes the synagogue at Sardis as designed to allow ample view of passersby of the interior services in progress, so as to be a showplace of Jewish ritual for the gentile world.[38] But the evidence is less one-sided than Kraabel suggests, since the term does exist in a few inscriptions, where its meaning is moot, as it may refer to a Jew or a gentile.

The literary evidence seems to me to contradict Kraabel's methodological reserve. Many of the pagan writers attest to the attractiveness of Jewish ways of life, reporting that gentiles were interested in some Jewish ceremony but did not convert. Plutarch speaks of a freedman named Caecilius "who was accused of Jewish practices (ἐνοχοω τω ιουδαιζειν, *Life of Cicero* 7:6). Seneca may be referring to Judaism when he became a vegetarian in his youth (*Letters* 108:22). Dio Cassius says that in 41 Claudius forbade the Jews in Rome to hold meetings because they had increased so greatly in numbers (60.6.6). He also says that many who were drifting into Jewish ways (τα των 'Ιουδαιων εθη) were condemned for atheism (67.14.1–3). Suetonius suggests that the persecution of Domitian was against "those who followed the Jewish way of life (*vitam*) without formally professing Judaism" (Suetonius, Domitian 12:2). The precise behavior among potential converts to Judaism which occasioned these attacke is probably not consistent. But the fear and derision of the gentile observers is obvious enough.

To my mind, the two new recently published inscriptions from Aprodisias in Caria settles the problem of the existence of God-fearers.[39] Besides identifying Jewish donors,

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[36] J. B. Frey, *Corpus Inscriptionum Ioudaicarum* (Rome: 1936) 766. The literature on this group is large. But see L. Feldman, "Jewish 'Sympathizers' in Classical Literature and Inscriptions," *TAPA* 81 (1950) 200; and H. J. Leon, *The Jews of Ancient Rome*, 247, 251. See especially Kirsopp Lake, "Proselytes and God-Fearers," *The Beginnings of Christianity, Part I: The Acts of the Apostles*, ed. F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966) vol. 5, Additional Notes to the Commentary, 74–95. The arguments are clearly reviewed and critiqued in greater detail by John Gager, "Jews, Gentiles and Synagogues in the Book of Acts," *Festschrift for Krister Stendahl*, forthcoming, which he has been kind enough to let me see.

[37] A. T. Kraabel, "The Disappearance of the 'God-Fearers,'" *Numen* 28 (1981) 113–126; see also "The Roman Diaspora: Six Questionable Assumptions," *JJS* 33 (1982) 445–464. Shaye Cohen, "Crossing the Boundary," 1987 SBL Conference in Boston equally expresses reservations: "A modern scholar does not say anything substantive by calling someone in antiquity a judaizer or a God-fearer. These terms are vague and require explication." As will be clear, I think Cohen and Kraabel are exaggerating our lack of knowledge. It is one thing to say that the term requires explication. It is quite another to say that it says nothing substantive.

[38] Kraabel, "Sardis from Prehistoric to Roman Times," *Results of the Archeological Exploration of Sardis 1958–1975* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) 184, quoted from Gager.

[39] See Gager, above, n. 62, who cites his indebtedness to Joyce Reynolds and Robert

with a mixture of Jewish, biblical and Hellenistic names, the texts identify a whole group of people as *theosebeis* who have exclusively Greek names, some with occupations likely to be gentiles, like city councillors. Within the list there is a sprinkling of people with biblical names who are described as proselytes. Clearly, "God-fearer" is a title with a special technical meaning, distinct from Jews and proselytes. Furthermore, the inscriptions tend to support the contention that some gentiles were fellow-travelers with Judaism, supporting the synagogue but who had, for one reason or another, not sought to convert. Thus, while Luke certainly construed the presence of God-fearers in the synagogues of the Hellenistic world as consonant with his own theology, God-fearers certainly existed, and possibly in large numbers. These people formed a large reservoir of gentiles interested in Judaism for whom Christianity would have had a natural appeal. They were not an easily definable group; rather any number of different kinds of commitment can be imagined. But that is precisely the point of calling them God-fearers, all the way from casual interest to complete commitment.Though one can imagine a number of purely political reasons why a gentile would want to support a prominent local synagogue, among the God-fearers Philo would certainly have numbered some gentiles who could achieve the status and privileges God had promised to the Jews. After all, benefaction was one of the accepted routes leading to adhesion with the group. Possibly some God-fearers were content with adhesion because they were unable to consider conversion. These people were surely held in high respect by the community, since their gifts were accepted and recorded for posterity. We shall see that the rabbis held similar but not identical concepts of righteous gentiles.

But God-fearer might equally mean someone with higher degrees of commitment to Judaism. And, of course, the God-fearer could eventually become a full convert. This impressed Juvenal (14.96–106), who wrote a satire on the increasing Judaization of those who were first impressed by the rite of the sabbath:[40]

> Some who have had a father who reveres the Sabbath, worship nothing but the clouds, and the divinity of the heavens, and see no difference between eating swine's flesh, from which their father abstained, and that of man; and in time they take to circumcision. Having been wont to flout the laws of Rome, they learn and practice and revere the Jewish law, and all that Moses committed to his secret tome, forbidding to point the way to any not worshipping the same rites, and conducting none but the circumcised to the desired fountain. For all which the father was to blame, who gave up every seventh day to idleness, keeping it apart from all the concerns of life.

Juvenal's writing points out how gentiles came to Judaism, through the progressive learning process of the God-fearers, culminating in the progressive acceptance of Jewish ceremonial law. But it also points out the dangers of backlash inherent in Jewish proselytism and illuminates why other Jews were willing to consider God-fearers the equal of Jews in righteousness. That is the point; God-fearers were probably asked to make their

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Tannenbaum, the editors of the Aprodisias Synagogue Inscriptions and to G. W. Bowersock, for his public lecture discussing the inscriptions. Joyce Reynolds and Robert Tannenbaum have now published their research, *Jews and God-fearers at Aphrodisias: Greek Inscriptions with Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[40] Quoted from Georgi, *Opponents*, 97.

commitments slowly and with great care, for fear of gentile backlash. Some of the Jewish community must have been content with gentile God-fearing because it reduced the potential threat to the Jewish community. It neutralized the criticism that Jews were trying to convert gentiles. Instead, it described a world in which righteous gentiles looked to Jews for instruction and were their moral, if not their cultic, equals. But, at the same time, others in the Jewish community surely saw a providential progression in gentile interest in Judaism, just as the pagan community did, though they evaluated its divine sanction differently.

5. Conversion among the Pharisees and Rabbis

We cannot be sure that the rabbinic reports about conversion reflect pharisaic practice of the first century. Rabbinic rules grew out of first century practice, but without outside corroboration, we cannot be sure how or exactly when any particular custom developed.

Some scholars have maintained that the Pharisees only converted Jews to their special sect and were unconcerned with gentiles. To do so, they have ignored an enormous body of material about gentile conversions in later rabbinic writing. The rabbis clearly know of both kinds of convert. While Akiba may have been a famous rabbi who came to Pharisaism only in his middle years, the rabbis also tell many stories of gentiles seeking admission to Judaism. And they developed special vocabularies for both types of converts. So the hypothesis of sole Jewish conversion seems to me to be wildly off the mark.

With regard to commitment, both Pharisaism and early Jewish Christianity would have fallen into intermediary positions between Hellenistic Jews and the Essenes, the two extremes of commitment, since both accepted converts, viewed themselves as a sect, but lived in the community rather than in monastic orders. It is probable from the description in the New Testament that Pharisees did not attain or need the same social cohesion which early Christianity evidenced. Pharisees did not live communally, for instance, though they surely lived very close to each other. Conversion into the Pharisaic order of the first century seems to have been a significant new level of cohesiveness, but limited to accepting rules of the *baburoth*—taking on the purity regulations at table, giving heave offerings and being meticulous in observing the tithing regulations. The result of these regulations, as Jacob Neusner has pointed out so often, was to create a self-contained community defined by its ability to marry within its ranks, eat at its own houses and touch only its own implements. At first, the Pharisaic order would have been sectarian in nature; most of those who entered the order would have already been socialized to Judaism.[41] The later rabbis, reflecting on their traditions, idealized the legal situation in the first century and certainly held out high standards of entrance:

> The rabbis say: "If a proselyte takes it upon himself to obey all the words of the Torah except one single commandment, he is not to be received.
>
> Sifra, Kedoshim 8

This rule may apply both to gentile and Jewish converts to Pharisaism. The rabbis never say anything here which implies that proselytism was limited to Jews. Gentile conversion to Pharisaic Judaism certainly existed and would have been more serious a case of resocialization.

In today's society, conversion to Judaism is almost entirely embarked upon by people who want to marry a Jewish spouse. We have evidence of the same motivation in the

[41] Jacob Neusner, *From Politics to Piety* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973).

ancient world (*Joseph and Asenath*) but no comparative statistics about the other motivations. Religious questing certainly should account for some conversion in the ancient world as today.

Of course, intermarriage in the ancient world would have been less common than in culturally plural, polydox North America. In modern cases, the decision to convert is often merely a strategy to gain acceptance in the intended mate's family. Though it is certainly possible to convert to Judaism without developing the other scales of commitment, converts today evince higher levels of commitment to Judaism than non-converted fellow-travelers of Jewish spouses, even when they convert in non-halakhic ceremonies or describe their conversion as a convenience to assuage the sensibilities of the parents. The decision to abandon one's family and follow a new life's regimen, even when it is the regimen of a spouse, is often a latent strategy of separation from a painful home environment, yet it also raises the level of cognitive dissonance and is thus translatable, under the proper circumstances, into higher commitment to the new group, provided some of the other scales of sommitment can be brought into play. The few Jewish congregations made up largely of converts, such as are occasionally found in New York, tend to stress bonds and emotional enthusiasm in services but are nevertheless low in traditional practice and in general community commitment.[42] In the Hellenistic world, where religion was almost universally respected, one cannot expect many low commitment conversions. Most gentiles who converted to Judaism, and any converting to Pharisaic Judaism, would have had to reconstrue a whole world scheme.

When we study gentile conversion to Judaism, we have to confront the problem that most of our information comes from the rabbinic evidence whose date and disinterestedness is moot. The evidence of Christianity, if it could be used effectively, would push back our knowledge to the first century. But that would mean accepting that Christian proselytism is evidence that some first century Jews were interested in proselytizing gentiles. I believe that such a conclusion has at least some limited validity. But that merely begs the question of the extent of Jewish mission.

The later, rabbinic evidence reproduces what we assume must have been the case in the first century. Here is the range of opinion, as idealized by later talmudic tradition:

> A foreigner came to Shammai, saying, "Make a proselyte of me, on the condition that you teach me the whole of the Torah while I stand on one foot." Shammai drove him off with a measuring stick he had in his hand. Thereupon he repaired to Hillel with the same proposition.
> Hillel received him as a proselyte and taught him: "What you do not like to have done to you, do not do to your fellow. This is the whole of the Torah; the rest is explanation of it. Go learn it." (b Shabbat 31a)

Here the convert is most likely to be a gentile. This is one of three examples given at this place in Talmud of the difference between Hillel and Shammai, two early rabbis who lived just prior to Jesus, on the issue of conversion but there is no way to be sure that the stories contain any historical value for the first century. The gentiles in the three examples are meant primarily to help display a difference between the schools of Shammai and Hillel, which flourished later. They may also represent different positions in the group of potential proselytes. That is to say, the three stories in the rabbinic anthology emphasize the more lenient approach of Hillel, the dominant rabbinic sage, on the issue

[42] See above, n. 12.

of conversion over the strict position of Shammai, who does not appear very interested in making converts. The three gentiles may even represent varieties of opinions among converts to Judaism: those who convert to non-Pharisaic Judaism (no oral law and only of the laws of the Bible), those who convert out of ambition (to become the High Priest), and finally the one quoted above, who converts for the moral principles, and to whom is given the famous answer of Hillel: "What you do not like to have done to you, do not do to your fellow," but, and this is the important part for the rabbis, immediately told to go out and study.

The problem with the rabbinic evidence lies not only in what it means but also in the date it became the standard practice within Judaism.[43]

Like the Essenes, the rabbis favored the slow, highly indoctrinated convert over the rapid emotionally involved one. What became rabbinic doctrine may have only been a formalization of earlier general practice within the Jewish community or it may have been the explicit beliefs of the first century Pharisees. One effect of Hillel's answer is to encourage the convert to enter the stages of training to become socialized as a Jew. Now we see why gradual conversions are emphasized. Gentile conversions to Judaism were decisions to leave one kind of cultural milieu and enter another, moving from one socialization to another. They therefore demanded long training. So whether or not an emotional crisis was passed, the rabbis emphasized the process of education. Nor can we ignore that the rabbis here must mean study in whatever rabbinic schools of study then existed. The famous stories of Rabbi Akiba, who decided to become a rabbi late in his life, do not emphasize the suddenness of his decision so much as the stringent training he undertook so late in life. In later tradition, the cultic requirements of conversion were three, as the statement attributed to R. Judah the Prince (fl. 200 c.e.) makes clear:

> Rabbi says: Just as Israel did not enter the covenant except through three things—through circumcision, through immersion, and through the acceptance of a sacrifice—so it is the same with proselytes.
>
> Sifre Num. 108

The import of the story is to establish the rabbinic model for the acceptance of proselytes: the Sinai theophany. To the three ritual obligations one must add the fourth most important obligation to know and practive the Torah of Israel, as interpreted and taught by the rabbis. It must be admitted that conversion *per se* was not much of an issue in pre-exilic times, hence neither the ritual nor the educational requirements of Hellenistic conversion are based in biblical law, rather they are derived from it in non self-evident ways. When the rabbis said Torah, they meant the written and the oral law, but other kinds of Jews may have practiced a less exacting Judaism. For purposes of this metaphor,

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[43] For fuller discussion of Jewish rules of conversion, see Lawrence Schiffmann "At the Crossroads: Tannaitic Perspectives on the Jewish-Christian Schism," *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition*, Vol. II, Aspects of Judaism in the Hellenistic World, ed. E. P. Sanders with A. I. Baumgarten and Alan Mendelson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981) 122–156. Professor Schiffman has expanded these thoughts into a book: *Who Was a Jew: Rabbinic and Halakbic Perspectives on the Jewish-Christian Schism* (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1985) where the rabbinic rules are fully spelled out in convenient form but no serious questions about their historical validity for the first century have been asked. See also Shaye J. D. Cohen, "Conversion to Judaism in Historical Perspective: From Biblical Israel to Postbiblical Judaism," *CJ* Summer 1983.

all Israel is assumed to have been circumcised, been baptised, and made sacrifices before Sinai. By the end of the second century, the ideal of the rabbis was to insure that proselytes kept every single aspect of Torah (t. Dem 2:5, e.g.) but there is no telling how close actual practice came to this ideal, nor when the rabbinic ruling became normative for the entire world community of Jews. Yet this statement does not contradict the practice of Hillel in first century B.C.E. Judea.

That Pharisaic Jews sought to make converts is evidenced outside of Jewish literature. Matt 23:15 reports that the Pharisees were zealous to make converts. The most famous of Josephus' accounts, the conversion of the royal house of Adiabene in *Antiquities* 20.2.3–4 [34–48]), illustrates how important was the Pharisaic opinion in matters of conversion. It also gives us a sense of how the differing views of conversion might work in real cases. A Jewish merchant named Ananias (Hebrew: Hananiah) visited the royal house of Adiabene and taughted the king's wives to worship the Jewish God.[44] His efforts to convert began with the women and were carried on on a person-to-person basis. Through the Harem, he won over the crown prince, Izates, but his mother Queen Helena had already been won over by another Jew.

The issue of circumcision becomes problematic in this conversion account, since Izates is a male who needs circumcision to convert and, in fact, he wishes to be circumcised. But his mother disagrees, feeling that his subjects would reject him as king if he practiced Judaism openly. Interestingly, Ananias takes the part of Queen Helena, not recommending circumcision under the circumstances. His words are very important. Josephus portrays him as recommending that Izates remain a God-fearer, since "he could worship the divine (το θειον σεβειν) even without circumcision, if he had fully decided to be devoted to the ancestral customs of the Jews, for this was more important than circumcision." These words are Josephus' not Ananias', but they do articulate a rational and defensible position within Judaism, and one which is compatible with rabbinic Halakhah. Indeed, it shows us how the problem of conversion was actually handled, outside of the prescriptive, legal requirements discussed by the rabbis. Professor Malherbe and other scholars' suspicion is confirmed: many Jews simply preferred that a God-fearer bypass formal conversion when a complex social situation was involved, relying on the universalism that God loves all moral people. In this case, Izates is perfectly ready to accept circumcision but his mother prevents him, for reasons of state. Whether or not Josephus agreed with the practice, his narration implies that becoming a God-fearer was the functional equivalent of becoming Jewish. More importantly, it saved the sensitive Hellenistic Jewish community from the ire of the convert's relatives, or in this case, the irate subjects of the convert.

Such a tolerant position can hardly have arisen from one of the Jewish sects. Rather it is another example of acculturated, culturally plural, universalism characteristic of the diaspora. But this is not the end of the story. Later, Eleazar, a more pious Jew from Galilee, arrives and requires Izates to undergo circumcision, although the rite is performed by his physician, not by a *mohel*, the ritual circumcizer, if the occupation existed yet.

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[44] For a recent treatment of the topic see Lawrence H. Schiffman, "The Conversion of the Royal House of Adiabene in Josephus and Rabbinic Sources," *Josephus, Judaism, and Christianity*, ed. Louis H. Feldman and Gohei Hata (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987) 293–312. Professor Schiffman concentrates on very different issues than are important here.

The story gives is a clear hint at what Josephus' opinion was: all things being equal, being Jewish is better than God-fearing. And the story ends happily; the populace accepts Izates as king, whereupon he and Helena become famous as benefactors of Jerusalem, donating generously toward the improvement of the city, and again showing the importance of benefaction in establishing a new identity. This incident suggests not only that there were differenced in definition of conversion throughout the Jewish community but that for acculturated Jews being a God-fearer was virtually the equivalent of being a Jew, especially since non-Jewish peoples could react hostilely to attempts at formal conversion. It also shows that while some Jews were content with making God-fearers, sensitive to the hostility that was generated by attempts at formal conversion, others risked themselves and possibly the welfare of the Jewish community to promote conversion.

Although Eleazar comes from Galilee, he has some characteristics of the Pharisees since, like them and the rabbis after them, he was characteristically strict in the performance of ritual, whenever any possible doubt could be satisfied by punctiliousness (and probably characteristically lenient in the performance of punishment, where any doubt was satisfied by mercy.

Many people have, without sufficient evidence, assumed that the story of Izates evidences Josephus' own personal opinions about the necessity of circumcision for conversion. But Josephus is not the Pharisee many people assume he is. He is, at best, an ex-pharisee like Paul. But unlike Paul I do not think he ever was a committed member of the Pharisaic order. And Josephus' personal opinion about circumcision, at least at the time of his writing (when he was a Roman courtier of sorts) is far less positive than has been imagined:

> About this time, there came to me from the region of Trachonitis two nobles, subjects of the king, bringing their horses, arms and money which they had smuggled out of their country. The Jews would have compelled them to be circumcised as a condition of residence among them. I, however, would not allow any compulsion to be put upon them, declaring that everyone should worship God in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience (κατα την ἑαυτου προαιρεσιν τον θεον ευσεβειν) and not under constraint, and that these men, having fled to us for refuge, ought not be made to regret that they had done so. Having brought over the people to my way of thinking, I liberally supplied our guests with all things necessary to their customary manner of life. (Vita 113)

Josephus is trying to take credit for preventing a forcible conversion, not trying to make a convert himself; he is certainly trying to ingratiate himself to his new Roman overlords by claiming to share Roman opinions about circumcision; he may be trying to claim authorship for a practice which was probably already widespread in Israel; but he still uses the vocabulary of God-fearing to describe the religious practice of the refugees and justifies his claims by citing the universalism of God-fearing. Forced conversions, which were an abuse of power under the Maccabean kings, appear to have survived into Roman times, especially during the revolt when Jews were trying to assert their ancestral rights. How widespread the practice was remains unclear. But forced conversions are a product of Jewish military domination, which is rare in this period. Were it not an aberration of the revolt, Josephus would not mention it as a single incident of such great import.

These incidents in Josephus demonstrate that there were significant differences in entrance requirements and the perceived necessity of conversion throughout Judaism, but it does not show that rabbis or Pharisees accepted converts without circumcision. On the contrary, it implies that for some Jews, being a God-fearer was virtually the equivalent

of being Jewish, therefore obviating the need of conversion. It also implies that while some Jews were content with making God-fearers, sensitive to the hostility that was generated by attempts at formal conversion, others risked themselves, and possibly the welfare of the Jewish community, to promote conversion, because that was the most important step. They simply represent two different philosophies on the issue. Occasionally, when a party of conversion-minded Jews came to power, as for instance the Maccabees, forced conversions occured. So there is an enormous spectrum of opinion in the Jewish community.

Eleazar in the story of Izates may represent the Pharisaic position. Although nothing in the story establishes the historicity of any first century rabbinic practice, Josephus provides strong hints that the rabbinic practice of allowing conversion only with the observance of all the law was already known in the first century. Otherwise, the story would have ended with Izates' adoption of semi-proselytism. The really committed convert, as was Izates, wanted to express even stronger religious commitments which was laudable, given the happy outcome, even among those who did not feel conversion to be universally required. Though explicit rabbinic practice cannot be demonstrated from this report, we must assume something like it to make sense of Josephus' story.

Later rabbinic traditions illustrate how careful and sensitive the rabbis were to the issue of the intent and motivation of a convert. It does not have to be a first century tradition to illustrate the issue we have clarified in the story of Izates' conversion. Strong conversion decisions, which include circumcision, help to make more committed converts:

> Our rabbis taught: A proselyte who comes to convert at this time, we say to him: Why did you decide to convert? Do you not know that Israel at this time is afflicted, oppressed, downtrodden, and rejected, and that tribulations are visited upon them? If he says, "I am aware, but I am unworthy," we accept him immediately, and we make known to him a few of the lighter commandments and a few of the weightier commandments, and we make known to him the penalty for transgression of gleaning the forgotten sheaves, the corner, and the poor man's tithe (i.e. rules of charity, protecting the poor). And we make known to him the punishment for violating the commandments. . . . And just as we make known to him the punishment for violating the commandments, so we also make known to him their reward. . . . We are not too lengthy with him nor are we too detailed. If he accepts this, we circumcise him immediately. . . . Once he has recovered, we immerse him immediately. And two scholars stand over him and make known to him some of the lighter and some of the weightier commandments. If he immersed validly, he is like an Israelite in all matters. (In the case of a woman, position her in the water up to her neck, and two scholars stand outside and make known to her some of the lighter and some of the weightier commandments . . .)
>
> b. Yeb. 47a–b

This incident represents itself as the practice of the tannaitic rabbinic community before the third century, while the document and the reference to the fallen condition of Israel suggests a date later than the first war against Rome, which ended in the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E. But it does underline the same motivations which seemed obvious in Josephus' story of Izates' conversion.

In setting high standards for conversion, the rabbis intended not to discourage conversions but to make committed converts. Yet, if one looks at conversion within the broad context of the whole Jewish community, which the convert entered when he or she finished training, is one justified in calling first to fourth century Judaism a high-conversion

community? The answer is certainly less positive than in dealing with the Qumran community, a sect within first century Judaism which was solely filled by conversion. Many Jews were born into Judaism without passing any conscious decisions. There were also some very Hellenized Jews who might almost be called adherents in Nock's terms. Finally, there were a variety of different possibilities available for a loose and incompletely defined group called God-fearers, who might be fellow-travellers or attend synagogue but had not taken decisive steps to become Jews.

In measuring conversion among the Jewish community at large, if such measurements were possible, we would have to be satisfied with some expression of a mean or average, saying that pockets of conversion experiences were correlated with high group coherence in various Jewish subcommunities. But the special laws of Judaism functioned more strongly than conversion to develop group cohesion. Nock's generalization might still be maintained but only in a carefully nuanced way. Within sectarian and apocalyptic Judaism conversion was an important aspect of Jewish cohesion. In other parts of the community, the special laws functioned in to keep community commitment high.

As we have seen, many varieties of both Judaism and Christianity proselytized, each using a method that was uniquely suited to itself—ranging from monastic social organization like the Dead Sea Scroll community to the Pharisees with their *haburah* fellowship communities to loose affiliations based on social class and sacral function in the wider Hellenistic world. Within Christianity as well, different varieties of community sprang up. The earliest Christian community apparently contained representatives of both the most exclusive and the most open attitudes of the Judaism of the day. Indeed, the Christian record is good evidence that these attitudes existed in Judaism and should not be treated as unique examples of a Christian revolution in Jewish sensibilities.

Thus, we have a spectrum of approaches to the issue of the gentiles and their place in God's plan. On the one hand, there were Jews who insisted that all who wished to be part of God's coming kingdom should sincerely repent and join Judaism fully. This seems to be characteristic of sectarian Judaism and probably characterized many branches of the early Christian movement. These Jews were interested in creating the most committed kinds of followers in insisting strictly on conversion.

Then there were Jews who, for whatever reasons, did not insist that gentiles convert to Judaism but that they eschew the sinful aspects of pagan society. This might be considered righteous in its own right or part of a longer and more temperate process of conversion to Judaism. But, in any event, it tried to defuse the gentile claim that Jews were disrupting pagan society. Paul's mission is an example of the possible mixture in that he wished to raise. He essentially combined the two forms by saying that God-fearing plus faith in Christ was the equivalent of a full conversion without the adoption of the special laws of Judaism. This in itself was no innovation, for apparently other Jews advocated that the gentiles need only live moral lives. The problem that Paul stimulated among Jews and Jewish Christians was not one of universalism so much as the recommendation that the distinctions between Jews and gentiles be removed entirely. This, first of all, shocked Paul's fellow Christians.

Commitment in the ancient world was formed in the same way it is formed in the modern world. There was an instrumental aspect, where a person develops willingness to carry out requirements of the group. These instrumentalities may start out as symbolic or ritual actions in which commitment is cemented and developed but end in moral or evaluative dimensions where a person continues to uphold the beliefs of the group outside of the ritual context. Behind this is, in Kanter's words, a cost/benefit ratio in which the individual invests his psychological energy into the group. This seems to be the strategy of rabbinic conversion where the ritual qualifications yield both a highly cohesive group

and a strong commitment to continue acceptable moral behavior. The special laws and the other rituals, rather than many conversion experiences, would have been the basic tool for enforcing the commitment.

The standard practice of the rabbis in trying to dissuade proselytes once they had signalled their desires, had nothing to do with being opposed to proselytes in general. Rather rabbinic dissuasion was for the purposes of selecting highly motivated converts, while discouraging others who might become immoral or lax and hence give the Judaism a bad name. Furthermore, we know from the New Testament among other places that the Pharisees were particularly zealous in trying to make converts, in spite of the danger of inadvertently admitting a Roman informer (See Matt 23:15). We may suspect that the rabbis did not normally face the same kinds of pressures and threats of reprisal which Hellenistic Jews sometimes did. All of rabbinic discussion about policy was accompanied by the most rigid instruction, change of lifestyle, circumcision for men, immersion and sacrifice for all, followed by a strict regiment of purity and dietary prohibitions forever. The dangers of undergoing circumcision as an adult, given the state of medical knowledge, is reason enough to believe that conversion to Judaism was itself a high dissonance producing situation (j. Yeb. 16a). But we also know that converts often faced social rejection from their previous friends and relations, an attitude which necessarily was fostered by the decision for a new faith.

6. Metamorphosis

If *conversion* is used in the modern sense, then Paul qualifies as a convert, though his vocabulary for describing the conversion experience is surprising in several respects. As in many modern cases, Paul did not convert from one religion to another; rather he converted from one variety of Judaism to another. Without going into detail or the unique aspects of Paul's experience, Paul helps exemplify the dynamics of conversion in the ancient world. As in the modern world, so in the ancient one, the degree of resocialization depends on the distance the convert must go between the old and new communities and the strength of the new commitment. Conversion can take place within a single religion, where less resocialization needs to take place. This is important for judging the differences between the kind of conversion that Paul underwent and that of his mostly gentile followers, who had a somewhat different experience from a social perspective. Paul went from a highly committed Pharisee to a highly committed member of an apocalyptic form of Judaism. Those pagans who followed him converted from paganism to a new religion whose relationship to Judaism shortly became a vexing issue.

Christianity was not yet defined as different from Judaism. It was a new sect within the Jewish community and it should be specially important to Jewish scholars because of its newness alone. It is the only sect in all first century Judaism—including Sadduceeism, Phariseeism, and Essenism—whose origins are well known. It thus gives Jewish historians data about the birth of first century sects which they cannot get anywhere else.

Paul sometimes uses a term which suggests that he underwent a conversion. In modern life, anyone using this term would naturally be called a convert but the connotations of Paul's language have been almost entirely missed. That word is *metamorphosis*—the *transformation* from one state to another. In Rom 12:2 for instance, Paul says: "Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed (μεταμορφουσθε) by the renewal of your mind." The relationship between metamorphosis and conversion in Paul's life is made clear by some of his other uses of the term.

In Philippians 3:7–11, Paul states:

> But whatever gain I had, I counted as loss because of the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord. For his sake, I have suffered the loss of all things, and count them as refuse, in order that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own, based on law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God that depends on faith; that I may know him and the power of his resurrection, and may share his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, that if possible I may attain the resurrection from the dead.

Here, the contrast between his former life and present one implies a contrast between law and faith, and the attainment of resurrection from the dead, becoming like Christ in his death (συμμορφιζομενος του θανατου αυτου). The language Paul uses is not merely that of analogy or imitation; it is that of transformation (*metamorphosis*) from one state of being to another, in which he has become the same substance as Christ through his death (*symmorphosis*). It is the same word which we still use to describe a caterpillar's change into a butterfly after its seeming death in its chrysalis. It is also the term which the ancient world could use to describe the seeming decay of a seed underground before it begins new growth. And Paul means to imply that faith in Christ brings about a change of equal miraculousness and magnitude. That change has already started, though the process of becoming like Jesus begins with suffering, as his had. The process is an apocalyptic one, ending in the final consummation.

> Brethren, join in imitating me, and mark those who so live as you have an example in us. . . . But our commonwealth is in heaven, and from it we await a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body, by the power which enables him even to subject all things to himself. (Philippians 3:17–21)

This process of transformation will end in a glorious new body, spiritual rather than material, which corresponds with the body which Christ has already revealed to him.

In 1 Cor 15:37–42 Paul uses the metaphor of a planted and growing seed to describe resurrection, possibly even interpreting Jesus' parables of growth in a new way: "What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. And what you sow is not the body which is to be, but a bare kernel, perhaps of wheat or of some other grain. But God gives it a body as he has chosen. . . . So it is with the resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable." In 1 Cor 15:51 Paul explicitly says that the dead shall be changed (αλλαγησομεθα), putting on a new body as if it were new clothes (ενδυσθαι), words normally associated with baptism but clearly associated with spiritual transformation as well.

As we have just seen, the same term, transformation can be used to describe Paul's own conversion, where he is transformed and reformed into the body of Christ (Phil 3:11). This is one type of important vocabulary Paul can use to describe his conversion, linking it with an identification with Christ and later the final judgment. Paul's conversion is a radical change in his life and the source of his sense that he has been saved. So Paul is consciously using his own experience to express the power of the Holy Spirit and to exemplify a new attitude towards the keeping of law. This experience is the beginning of a process of redemption which will envelop the whole world apocalyptically.

I would suggest briefly here then that Paul should be seen as an example of the phenomenon of conversion in first century Jewish sectarian life. What is particularly interesting about Paul's terminology is that he evinces the high commitment state of the radical conversion sectarian communities, but he also recommends that no gentile needs

a conversion in the technical Jewish sense of the word, in terms of law. This recommendation is characteristic of a particular diaspora Jewish strategy. But Paul changes the definition of what a conversion is. He does not see ritual status as important for this process. Thus, Paul is something of an anomaly. He evinces high commitment and conversion language. But he does not recommend gentile ritual conversion to Judaism. This is understandable given his personal journey from pharisaism to gentile Christianity. There is no way to tell whether Paul's formula was a unique solution to the problem. All we know is that it was not a particularly popular one in his day, but that it was the formula destined to attract the most gentiles to the teachings of the Hebrew Bible and of Christ.

But Paul's writing does underline the more typical Jewish approach before him. There seems to be a diaspora Jewish sensitivity to the whole issue of metamorphosis. Unlike Paul, the Septuagint does not use terms associated with *metamorphosis* to any special advantage.[45] Philo uses *metamorphosis* three times: describing (1) Emperor Gaius's insane attempt to become Apollo (Gaium 95), (2) Moses' transformation to a prophet by means of divine inspiration (Mos. 1.57), and (3) the virtue of piety, which is transformed by the slightest alteration (Spec. leg. 4.147). There may be an explicitly satirical use of the concept of metamorphosis in Philo's description of Caligula. Speaking about Moses, Philo brings together the notions of prophecy and religious transformation, which we see in Luke's biography of Paul, and to a lesser extent in Paul's writing itself. For the greatest religious leaders, Philo is apparently able to use the language of transformation freely, without the satirical bite in his description of Caligula's attempt to become divine. Philo believes Moses to have been a unique figure, even a divine figure in many ways, and the perfection of earthly paradigms for prophet, priest and king. Otherwise, Philo does not use *metamorphosis*. Rather, he stresses the patient progress (προκοπτειν) by which humanity is made perfect (τελειος). This usage reflects the popular stoic conception of Philo's day.[46]

Although Philo values the process by which humanity perfects itself and so shares in divinity and moral excellence, the terminology of metamorphosis plays no role in his description of the process. Instead, the chief terms he employs have to do with a person's patiently making progress. Most people do not see God directly, but through a mirror (fuga 213). The concept of perfection might easily refer to any philosophically-minded human being, according to his or her abilities. Gentiles as well as Jews are capable of the journey, though Israel, whose name means he who sees God, is specially gifted in the search because of its possession of the biblical text and moral catechism. Clearly, if conversion is a part of Philo's scheme, it is the kind of conversion characteristic of long training. But he never speaks of a missionary purpose to Judaism. It may be that he was sensitive to the issue of Jewish mission and tried to dispell pagan fears.

7. Gentile Circumcision and the Noahide Commandments

After Paul's conversion and commission to preach the crucified Christ to the gentiles, his conclusion in Galatians was that circumcision was not important to salvation, for the

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[45] See John Koenig, *The Motif of Transformation in the Pauline Epistles: A History of Religions/Exegetical Study* (New York: Union Theological Seminary, 1970) 73–85, on which this discussion depends. See also Beverly Gaventa, *From Darkness to Light: Aspects of Conversion in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986).

[46] G. Stählin, "Fortschritt und Wachtum," *Festgabe, Joseph Lortz*, vol. 2, *Glaube und Geschichte*, ed. E. Iserloh and P. Manns (Baden-Baden: Bruno Grim, 1957) 18.

law was no longer a vehicle of salvation. Waiving circumcision for gentile salvation was not in itself a startling conclusion, since many Jews—some Pharisaic as well as Hellenistic Jews—did not insist on conversion to Judaism as a precondition for gentile salvation. As we have already seen, there were a variety of opinions in the Jewish community concerning the wisdom of seeking the conversion of gentiles together with the rituals necessary to ensure their salvation. Jewish Christians, because they were primarily Jews, must have included a similar spectrum of opinion.

From a legal perspective Paul may not have startled the Jewish Christian community so much by saying circumcision was unnecessary for gentile salvation *per se*, as claiming that the saved Jews and gentiles could form a single new community and freely interact.[47] The issue was not how the gentiles could be saved but how to eat with them and marry them. For Paul, Pharisaism had set down the previous rules: Birth inside the people of Israel was a special honor, like priesthood. Unlike the priesthood, membership in the people of Israel was available through conversion to any who desired it. But it was not necessary for a person to become Jewish to be righteous and thus have a place in the world to come, as indeed it was not necessary to be a priest to be righteous. Instead special laws were a special responsibility attendant on any Jew for the privilege of being part of Israel. But purity rules prevented the observant Jews from intimate contact with the impure. Several Christians, reacting from their previous understandings of purity in Judaism, were afraid to allow Jews and gentiles to form a single community, even in Christianity, because such actions would violate the purity laws. Indeed, they were right. Pharisaism prevented such interaction.

The way in which the fate of the gentiles is discussed in later rabbinic Judaism is through the doctrine of the "Noahide Commandments." This rabbinic doctrine is derived from a midrash on the flood narrative in which God makes a covenant with all humanity not to destroy it. God seals the covenant with the sign of the rainbow, just as He thereafter seals the special Jewish covenants with Abraham and Moses with circumcision. Circumcision is a special sign which indicates membership in Israel. But the sign of the rainbow is available to all humanity to symbolize God's promise of safety.

The rabbis assumed that the covenant with Noah also contained several revealed commandments defining just and humane behavior. Essentially this imaginative exegesis of the flood narrative extends the benefits and some of the responsibilities of Torah to all the peoples of the world.[48] The Noahide Commandments (See b. Sanhedrin 56b, for instance) function like a "natural law" of righteousness, which any just person can be expected to know by observation and reason. In more Christian theological language, it is available by God's grace to all humanity.

In rabbinic midrash, the ordinancies of the Noahide Commandments include monotheism, avoidance of murder, organizing courts and promulgating justice, avoiding incest, theft, blasphemy, as well as avoiding eating the flesh of living creatures and, sometimes, recognition that YHWH, the God of Israel, is the one true God. All of these ideas can be derived from the passages describing God's covenant with Noah, but they must be read together with the rules for sojourners, principally in Leviticus 17–26. The reasons for this analogy are not entirely clear but appear to be closely associated with the

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[47] Paula Fredriksen, in her new book, *From Jesus to Christ: The Origins of the New Testament Images of Jesus* (New Haven: Yale, forthcoming), agrees with me on this issue.

[48] Heikki Raeisaenen's subtle discussion of the gentiles under the law in *Paul and the Law*, 16–28, would improve had he taken this doctrine seriously.

origination of the legal mechanism, situating their genesis at a time when rules were needed for the legal status of resident aliens. The Noahide Commandments may then be quite an ancient legal tradition.

Of course, the minute we mention rabbinic doctrine in the first century we raise the issue of anachronism. Although rabbinic doctrine, enumerating from six to ten "Noahide Commandments" depending on the version, cannot be traced earlier than the third century in rabbinic literature, other versions of the Noahide Commandments can found in the Book of Jubilees 7:20–21, which is pre-Christian:[49]

> And in the twenty-eighth jubilee Noah began to command his grandsons with ordinances and commandments and all of the judgments which he knew. And he bore witness to his sons so that they might do justice and cover the shame of their flesh and bless the one who created them and honor father and mother, and each one love his neighbor and preserve themselves from fornication and pollution and from all injustice.

The particular ordinances thought to be universally humane by Jubilees are establishing justice, eschewing incest, honoring parents, loving neighbors, and prohibiting adultery, promiscuity, and *pollution* from injustice.[50] In Jubilees, this short lawcode forms the basis of the judgment against the giants, which brings on the flood and sets the scene for the myths contained in the book of Enoch.

It would be unwise, however, to assume that Jubilees is promulgating such ideas in order to find a basis for humane universalism. Quite the contrary, Jubilees has a strictly dualistic view of the world, both on the divine and human level, in consonance with the ideas of Qumran sectarians, in whose library it figured prominently. Israel is identified as a good kingdom. God selected them as special and above all other peoples (2:21) to be marked by circumcision (15:11). They alone can participate in the sabbath and the other God ordained festivals. The other nations are condemned, and God has placed spirits in authority over them to lead them astray.

Jubilees forcefully says that there is no salvation without circumcision on the eighth day (15:26–27). That virtually means that conversion of the gentiles is impossible. Even a charitable reading supposes that only the children of converts can enter the community:

> And anyone who is born whose own flesh is not circumcised on the eighth day is not from the sons of the covenant which the Lord made for Abraham, since (he is) from the children of destruction. And there is therefore no sign upon him so that he might belong to the Lord because (he is destined) to be destroyed and annihilated from the earth and to be uprooted from the earth because he has broken the covenant of the Lord our God. Because the nature

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[49] See David Novak, *The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: An Historical and Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws* (Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1983) 3–35. Novak dates the laws to Maccabean times albeit with no textual support, because it seems to him to be appropriate to the time of forced conversions. Then he discounts the witness of Jubilees. Neither hypothesis convinces me. But Novack's main emphasis is on the later discussion of these rules in talmudic and post-talmudic times, which is more convincing.

[50] Notice that like Paul and other apocalyptic groups especially, but in line with Judaism generally, pollution can be used as a metaphor for unrighteousness.

> of all of the angels of the presence and all of the angels of sanctification he sanctified Israel so that they might be with him and with his holy angels.[51]

The obvious reason for the inclusion of the Noahide Commandments at this place is to provide Jubilees with a legal warrant for condemning the gentiles. This is entirely appropriate to a sectarian position, where all the gentiles and but a saving remnant of Israel are scheduled for divine destruction. We know from this evidence that there were sects within Judaism which did not subscribe to any liberal ideas about the capabilities of gentiles; even the relatively liberal rabbis in later times added a few more commandments than we find in Jubilees and deleted the explicit pollution requirement (whose essence may have been subsumed under incest). The rabbis also clarified that when a child is not circumcised, his future reward is not automatically imperiled. Such a lack is, in the opinion of the later rabbis at least, a sin of his father (*Shulhan Arukh*, "Yoreh Dea" 260.1). So for later rabbinic tradition, it was not even necessary to be circumcised on the eighth day to be Jewish, part of Israel, or deserving of the world to come.

The early date and apocalyptic setting of the Noahide Commandments seems clear from the Jubilees reference. But law, like reason, is a two-edged sword. It condemns the guilty and also upholds the innocent. The converse to the Jubilees vision, that some gentiles are capable of righteousness, also can be found in Judaism in communities that were not so sectarian or apocalyptic. It is certainly found in rabbinic Judaism, even though the estimate of the number of righteous gentiles was usually fairly low. Rabbinic estimation of gentiles was at least partly formed by the experience of two disastrous wars against Rome and by a general estimation of the level of gentile morality. We have seen the same issues surface in Hellenistic Jewish literature where it functioned to missionize gentiles to give up their immoral ways and become God-fearers. It follows then that many Jews would have considered God-fearers to be righteous gentiles.

Strangely enough, Luke again helps demonstrate that a positive use for the Noahide Commandments was known in first century Judaism. Acts 15:20, 15:29, and 21:25 describe an Apostolic Decree defining a minimum of practice for the new gentile Christians. The specific decrees are derived from an exegesis of Leviticus 17–18[52] under the influence of the Noah story. In the Christian version, the new Christian "God-fearers" (*sebomenoi* or *phoboumenoi*), as such gentiles had been called in Judaism, had to abstain from meat sacrificed to idols (ειδωλοθυτων), from the flesh of animals not ritually slaughtered (αἵματος), from animals which had been ensnared and killed (πνικτων), and from forbidden marriages, incest, and unchastity (πορνειας). The early Christians more closely approximate the ordinances of Jubilees than did the third century rabbis.[53] It is possible that the reason the Christian version of the rules is stricter than the other Jewish versions is that a large section of the church was allowed to remain uncircumcised, thus bringing possible sources of pollution much closer to the table.

Each version of these minimum moral laws not only articulates the responsibilities of the gentiles in God's plan but also reflects the historical situation and values of the particular Jewish sect promulgating it. The Christian text is the most positive, even more positive than the rabbinic one. But that seems entirely due to the Christian necessity to face this issue more squarely than any other Jewish group. The Christian group had a larger percentage of gentile converts than the other groups. The rabbinic version dates

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[51] So translates O. S. Wintermute in *Charlesworth* 2, p. 87.

[52] See, for example, H. Waitz, "Das Problem des sog. Aposteldecrets," *ZKG* (1936) 227.

[53] See John Hurd, *Origin*, 250–253, for the basic bibliography.

from a time when the righteousness of gentiles, even in non-sectarian circles, was a bit more controversial, and during a time when to proselytize to Judaism could be a capital offense in Roman law. The rabbis also mention several times that bad proselytes informed against the Jews. One can imagine a backsliding convert informing the authorities that he had been proselytized against his will and against the Roman law, just as today's deprogrammed counterconverts turn against their former communities. So it was wise to be careful.

Yet, the rabbis, just as the Christians and unlike the apocalypticists, used the Noahide Commandments for a positive purpose—namely, to include the righteous among the gentiles within the world to come.[54] The concept of "Noahide Commandments" is more antique and more widespread in Judaism than can be proved from the midrash, as the New Testament once again shows us.

The reports in Acts actually give a clearer exegetical sense of how these rules were derived. Though they were pinned to the Noahide covenant, so that they could apply to all humanity, they were more directly derived from the biblical rules incumbent upon "the stranger in your gates."[55] Resident aliens were obliged to abstain from offering sacrifices to strange gods (Lev 17:7–9), from eating blood in any form (Lev 17:10ff), from incest (Lev 18:6–26), from work on the Sabbath (Exod 20:10f), and from eating leavened bread during the Passover (Exod 12:18f).[56] Note that the Christian version deliberately parallels the Noahide commandments: it does not merely leave out the special Jewish laws, otherwise it would not have specified that blood could not be eaten. The Christian form of the rules is based, like the Jewish ones, on actual experience of accommodation between Jews and gentiles living together, within a Jewish state or a disapora community. Thus, the Christian form of the rules mentions only those issues which are likely to be a source of controversy between the Jewish and gentile Christians living together. The formulation of the the Noahide commandments in the rabbinic literature arises the same way but reflects a later time, when the real problem for Jews was how to live in gentile communities, not the other way around. Both the Christian and the rabbinic version may be based on an earlier text which comes from Maccabean civil procedure, but that is undemonstrable.

But this issue had already surfaced in the lives of sectarian Jews, as Jubilees had made clear. So too in the first century, Jewish Sibylline Oracles specified those rules incumbent upon righteous gentiles:

> Happy will be those of mankind of earth
> who will love the great God, blessing him
> before drinking and eating, putting their trust in piety.
> They will reject all temples when they see them,
> altars too, useless foundations of dumb stones
> (and stone statues and handmade images)
> defiled with blood of animate creatures, and sacrifices
> of four-footed animals. They will look to the great glory of the
> one God and commit no wicked murder, no deal in
> dishonest gain, which are most horrible things.

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[54] See *Rebecca's Children*, 165–171 for a fuller discussion.

[55] Here the work of David Novack, mentioned in n. 62, is right on the mark.

[56] See Steven Wilson, *The Gentiles and the Gentile Mission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). My interpretation softens Wilson's arguments a bit.

> Neither have they disgraceful desire for another's spouse
> or for hateful and repulsive abuse of a male.
> Other men will never imitate their way
> or piety or customs, because they desire shamelessness.
> On the contrary, they deride them with mockery and laughter.
> Infantile in their foolishness, they will falsely attribute to
> those what wicked and evil deeds they themselves commit.
>
> Sybilline Oracles 4:24–39

Here again murder, theft, and other specifics are mentioned as primary prohibitions for all humanity to observe. In the Apostolic Decree such issues were taken for granted because they were obviously eschewed by all Christians. In the Apostolic version, only ceremonial laws of Judaism were the significant questions.[57] The appearance of idolatry was important too, so Acts 15:20 mentions it, as does Paul in 1 Corinthians 8, 10, and again in Romans. These passages will need to be discussed in great detail in chapter 7.

Pseudo-Phocylides also mentions the general principles of Jewish ethics without mentioning the ceremonial Torah. One of the witnesses of this poem reports that it ended with the exhortation that: "purifications are for the purity of the soul, not of the body" (11.228–230, *Charlesworth* 2, p. 582). Aristeas likewise says: "Honoring God is done not with gifts or sacrifices but with purity of soul."[58] These sentiments come from the prophets, who rebuked the misuse of the cult. But they are used in Hellenistic Judaism to argue against the necessity of temple worship, both for Jews in diaspora and gentiles. It is also part of a proselyte literature designed to convince pagans of the inherent morality of Judaism and bring them to (but apparently no closer than) the status of God-fearers, in the first instance. If they later chose to join Judaism, that was their own decision.

The rabbis also use the writings of the prophets to demonstrate that God desires acts of lovingkindness and a contrite heart (*Avot deRabbi Nathan* 6).

More important for understanding Paul's opinions about gentile practice, the rabbinic version of the Noahide Rules does not contain any of the positive special laws of Judaism, such as *Kasbrut* or circumcision. Nor does the Apostolic Decree. It merely exhorts the gentile not to eat the blood of the animal. Paul apparently did not insist on any Jewish customs in his gentile mission. Indeed, he says that he himself adopted the rules of gentile Godfearers in his mission to them (Gal 4:12, 1 Cor 9:21).

As the Sibylline Oracles and the other Hellenistic literature show us, the most obvious social locations for the promotion of God-fearing and conversion must be Diaspora Judaism, where avoiding any prospective threats from gentile neighbors mitigated Jewish enthusiasm for conversion. The pharisees, being largely a Palestinian phenomenon, had no such scruples. But the rabbis also promulgated Noahide Commandments for the same social strategy. Many simply assumed that becoming Jewish was not the only way to gain God's love. For the believing Jew, cultic and ceremonial laws reflected moral principles. Hellenistic Jewish writers chose to emphasize the moral principles, not the ceremonial laws, in discussions with gentiles. For many varieties of Judaism, a gentile was not excluded from the rewards of the righteous because of the accident of birth.

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[57] See the helpful article of Kirsopp Lake, "The Apostolic Council of Jerusalem," and "Paul's controversies," *The Beginnings of Christianity: The Acts of the Apostles*, vol. 5, Additional Notes, 195–211, 212–223.

[58] Raeissaenen *Law*, 36, 38.

Likewise, Paul does not say that all law is worthless, only that its meaning has changed. Paul's missionary writings occasionally assume that gentiles are under the law.The Noahide laws help us understand what he meant. As Raeissaenen has shown, Paul's use of the first person plural in Gal 3:23–29 implies that the gentile hearers are equally with the Jews under the sway of the law.[59] The law is a custodian or prison guard and a tutor both to him and the Galatians, who are addressed directly in the second person: "for you are all children of God through faith" (Gal 3:26). In this respect he includes himself as well, since he has equally undergone a radical conversion: "so that we might be justified by faith"(Gal 3:24). In a way, he himself has retreated halakhically from pharisaic observance to the level observance demanded of God-fearers, more or less, though he certainly considers himself still to be Jewish.

Again in 4:5–6 Paul repeats the pattern of preaching: God sent his son to redeem those under the law, who receive the status of children. Because you are children, we have received the Spirit. However, this is not a double concept of law, sometimes referring to Torah, other times to a more general, moral law. For every Jew moral law and Torah were coterminous, and Torah was conceived as a transcendent natural law, as well as a set of ordinances. Paul knows that because of the Noahide commandments (if it is not anachronistic to call them that in the first century), Torah is the moral guide for gentiles as well as Jews.[60]

There is one other place where Paul seems to assume that gentiles, as well as Jews, can get the rewards of Torah, even though they do not observe the ceremonial laws:

> All who have sinned without the law will also perish without the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged by the law. For it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the law who will be justified. When Gentiles who have not the law do by nature (φυσει) what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus. (Rom 2:12–16)

To be sure, Paul condemns what he considers to be Jewish misapplication of law. To do so, he appropriates an argument from the Jewish side, to condemn Jews by their own standards. Paul states that all sinners are judged by the law, while all righteous are upheld by it. This judgment is equivalent to natural law (φυσει). He also says explicitly that this doctrine is what Jews teach (2:21).[61] Right at this place, in characterizing a Jewish position to defeat it, Paul ironically gives us clear evidence for the importance of the Noahide commandments in Judaism. This is one more place where reading Paul's letters helps us date and understand the evolution of rabbinic thought. Already in the first century

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[59] Raeissaenen *Law*, 20.

[60] *Pace* Raeissaenen *Law*, 21. He and some Christian exegetes are misled by this statement into thinking that gentiles are subject to the Torah but can never adequately practice it (see *Law*, 26). This is an uncharitable reading of rabbinic (and other Jewish) literature.

[61] Of course, why Paul should here maintain that justification is by works rather than faith, even to condemn his opponents, is a longer story. See chapter 8 at the beginning for more on this passage. To understand this passage one has to give up the theological principle that Paul taught an end to righteousness based on works.

Pharisaic thought could both debate and admit that righteousness among gentiles was equivalent to righteousness among Jews, as was to become normative among the rabbis later. It is possible that Paul did not like that idea during his most zealous Pharisee stage, but it seems likely that it was already part, if a debated part, of Pharisaic teaching in the first century.

8. Proselytism After the War Against Rome

After the war against Rome 68 to 70 C. E., Jews and Judaism went through a period of disfavor. Henceforth the tax owed to the Temple was extracted for Rome. The Emperor Domitian instituted a system of informers to ferret out anyone who converted to Judaism.[62] His successor, Nerva, seems to have abolished the system of denunciation. Later, Hadrian outlawed circumcision as a kind of castration, and possibly Jewish proselytism totally. Whether he did so before or after the second Jewish revolt against Rome is of great significance in weighing the causes for that unfortunate conflict. But the date of the edict has less significance to the history of proselytism; its effect was uniformly to oppress the practice of Judaism, consequently stopping proselytism as well. Afterwards, under Antoninus Pius and thereafter, the penalties for circumcision were rescinded for Jews and presumably for Jews alone. Thus, while Jews could circumcise Jewish children again, circumcising gentile proselytes still remained dangerous. No one knows precisely whether this was the force of Antoninus Pius' rules or whether they were enforced thereafter. Becoming a "God-fearer" and indeed becoming a Christian rather than a convert to Judaism must have gained in attraction after the two revolts against Rome. We should not dismiss the effect of these second and third century facts as relevant to Christian missionary movements. Being Jewish might be just as attractive to a motivated gentile. But the choices were narrower and the decision more dangerous.

Yet it would be unfair merely to say that Judaism stopped proselytizing. Apparently, the Romans often felt that prosecuting Jews was not worth their while; perhaps the rule against proselytism was entirely rescinded for a time. As the Christian church gained in power, however, it had quite a different view of these laws and strengthened them. Yet, Jewish proselytism and indeed Jewish Christianity probably remained a force in the Roman world after the canonization of the New Testament. It was from this group of semi-proselytes that many of Christianity's converts came, for they were an anomalous group, alienated from their gentile past yet not fully Jews or fully accepted as such by the rabbinic definition, and under some suspicion. To take the final step into Judaism was a dangerous operation surgically and often politically most inexpedient. Such people were attracted to the message of Paul during the first century. In later centuries the attraction must have increased, even as the attraction of Judaism waned.

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[62] Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, "The Legal Condition of the Jews in the Roman Empire," *ANRW*, ed. Hildegard Temporini and Wolfgang Haase, II, 13, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980) 665–762.

The Influence of the Roman Family and Social Structures on Early Christianity in Rome

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This paper is intended as a contribution to a social history of early Christianity in the city of Rome. It arises out of a larger study of 1 Clement and the Shepherd of Hermas in the context of early Christianity at Rome.[1] It will look at how the beliefs and concerns of two distinct congregations in Rome during the late first and early second centuries were affected by Roman ideology and social conventions. It will attempt to prove that the congregation behind 1 Clement, which represents a social elite among the Christian house churches of Rome, reidentified the nature of the Church and relations within it in conformity with Roman thinking to a greater degree than did the Christians behind the Shepherd of Hermas, who enjoyed a lower social status in Rome. This suggests that early Roman Christians identified with the ideology and social conventions of the larger society in direct proportion to their positive social status.

Most studies that consider influences on the authors of 1 Clement and the Shepherd of Hermas focus on how they may have been influenced consciously or unconsciously by earlier literary works. Rarely have scholars considered the impact of the Roman social context in which the authors and their families and friends lived out their lives. This is a significant omission, since the concerns of early Christians in Rome were certainly related to the challenges arising from their social situations, and the formulations of their beliefs were at least in part a response to those concerns. Another important omission in earlier studies of 1 Clement and the Shepherd is an extended comparison of the two works, despite the fact that most scholars of 1 Clement and the Shepherd make at least the first part of the Shepherd contemporaneous with 1 Clement. This paper is in part an attempt to address both of these omissions.

After presenting basic assumptions about the date and nature of 1 Clement and the Shepherd, this study will show that the Roman goal of civil harmony became for Clement a model for congregational order, and his positive estimation of Roman citizenship led him to explain membership in the Christian congregation as a kind of citizenship. By contrast, Hermas saw a clear distinction between the goals of the state and those of Christianity, and rejected identification with its structure. Then this essay will demonstrate that Clement's strong belief in the need for civil harmony in the Church led him to define relations in the family on the model of the Roman family *(familia)* and the authority of

[1] James S. Jeffers, "Social Foundations of Early Christianity at Rome: The Congregations Behind 1 Clement and the Shepherd of Hermas," diss., University of California, Irvine, 1988. The Greek texts of 1 Clement and the Shepherd used in the present essay are those of Kirsopp Lake, trans., *The Apostolic Fathers*, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold (London, 1912, 1913). The translations are Lake's with some modifications. Lake's numbering system for the Shepherd is used, and the three parts are abbreviated as follows: Visions (Vis.), Mandates (Mand.), and Similitudes (Sim.).

its head (*patria potestas*). Like Clement, Hermas borrows from the Roman concept of the ideal family, but unlike Clement he does not apply it in a systematic way. Finally, this study will show that Clement takes the Roman concept of patronage, which grew out of the Roman idea of the family, as a model for relationships between Christians. Although Hermas shows familiarity with the Roman notion of patronage, he turns the Roman model on its head when he applies it to the Church.

Basic to this study is the assumption that early Roman Christianity was not unified organizationally or ideologically. It had been influenced by Paul, and probably by Peter. It also was heavily influenced by the large Jewish comunity in Rome. Most of its early members were Jews, but within a generation gentiles probably came to predominate. The city of Rome under the empire is the last place one would expect to find a monolithic church: it was home to persons of many cultures and religions, some who came unwillingly as slaves and others who freely sought out its economic opportunities. Thus, one may find that different segments of the Christian community in Rome adapted to the Roman social environment in different ways and to different degrees.

Another assumption of this study is that 1 Clement and the Shepherd arose out of essentially contemporaneous Christian congregations in Rome. It agrees with the majority of scholars, who date the composition of 1 Clement to ca. 93–97.[2] This letter was written by Clement, who probably was an imperial freedman and the leader of a house church in Rome. His house church probably was composed largely of imperial freedmen and slaves meeting as a household or funerary association. A number of strands of evidence suggests Clement's imperial freedman status. For example, Clement sent two imperial freedmen, Claudius Ephebus and Valerius Vito, as his special representatives to Corinth (65.1). His letter, though clearly not written by an aristocrat, demonstrates a correct understanding of the Roman elite. As one might expect in the work of a former slave leading a congregation of slaves and former slaves, 1 Clement uses "master" (*despotēs*) more frequently than does any other early Christian text.[3] The traditional site of Clement's house church, under the present-day Basilica of San Clemente, includes a first century warehouse and private dwelling that belonged to the Flavian imperial household and may have belonged to Flavia Domitilla, a Roman aristocrat sympathetic to Christianity. These conclusions are developed elsewhere at length.[4] Since imperial freedmen were one of the few groups who could usually expect upward social mobility,[5] and since early Christianity included few or no true aristocrats, Clement and his associates probably formed a social elite among the Christians in Rome.

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[2] For example, John Fuellenbach, *Ecclesiastical Office and the Primacy of Rome* (Washington, DC, 1980) 1–3; Donald A. Hagner, *The Use of the Old and New Testaments in Clement of Rome* (Leiden, 1973) 1; Charles T. Crutwell, *A Literary History of Early Christianity*, 2 vols. (New York, 1971) 1; Paul Mikat, *Die Bedeutung der Begriffe Stasis und Aponoia für das Verständnis des 1 Clemensbriefes* (Cologne, 1969) 11–12; A. Stuiber, "Clemens Romanus I," *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum*, ed. Th. Klauser (Stuttgart, 1957) 3: 191; and Adolf von Harnack, *Der erste Klemensbrief* (Berlin, 1909) 91–92.

[3] Graydon F. Snyder, *The Shepherd of Hermas*, The Apostolic Fathers: 6, ed. Robert M. Grant (Camden, NJ, 1968) 38.

[4] See Jeffers, 96–103, 126–139, 270–311.

[5] See P. R. C. Weaver, *"Familia Caesaris": A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedmen and Slaves* (Cambridge, 1972); idem, "Social Mobility in the Early Roman Empire: the Evidence of the Imperial Freedmen and Slaves," *Past and Present* 37 (1967) 3–20.

Clement wrote his letter to rebuke the church in Corinth for replacing its duly appointed leaders with a new group of leaders. Clement's intense concern for order and stability and his certainty about the dire consequences of their absence suggest that his group in Rome had to contend with disorder. It is unlikely that he would write a letter similar in length to the Gospel of Mark in order to address a problem in which he had no personal interest.

This paper agrees with scholars who date the Shepherd of Hermas between the 90s and 135.[6] The first part, Visions 1–4, almost certainly was composed around the time of 1 Clement by Hermas. The later parts, the Mandates and the Similitudes, may have been composed by the same author or by one of his followers. This study accepts for the most part Hermas' self-identifications in the Visions. He was a former slave who clearly lacked the education, wealth, and opportunities of the average imperial freedman. He held no official office in the congregations at Rome but depicts himself as commanded by God to rebuke the existing office holders in Rome. This opposition is an example of the kind of internal strife which 1 Clement condemns in Corinth, and which Clement himself had to deal with in Rome. The idea that a congregation formed around Hermas is unique to this study but is supported by a number of factors. Hermas' concern for ministry in the context of the local congregation (e.g., Mandate 11) indicates that he would not have pursued a solitary lifestyle but would have been part of a house church. The Shepherd's wide popularity in Rome and elsewhere from at least the late second century suggests that a following might have formed around Hermas in his own day. Also, the charismatic nature of his claims to authority suggests a personality that could have attracted followers. Since his message called upon Christians to turn away from compromise with the larger society's standards, he would have expected Christians to forsake their current lifestyles and identify with his message. The latter part of the Shepherd suggests that the leaders in Rome did not reform to his satisfaction. Thus, those Christians who reformed according to Hermas' standards would have to leave the established congregations and form new ones. Whether or not these new groups had any organic connection with Hermas is less important than the fact that they would have supported his opposition to what he considered the world-compromising ways of the office holders in Rome. For the sake of simplicity, such persons or groups will be called by this study "the congregation behind the Shepherd" or "Hermas' congregation."

Civil Harmony and Congregational Order

The history of the ancient Greek city-states is rife with civil war (*stasis*), but concord (*homonoia*) was the ideal for most Greeks. Plato defined *stasis* as internal and domestic hostility and fighting among those united by nature. In this way, a city is divided against itself.[7] Starr comments that the Greek city-state, prior to Roman intervention, had suffered as much from internal dissension as from external war.[8] Rome itself had endured long periods of civil war prior to the establishment of the principate under Augustus.

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[6] J. Reiling, *Hermas and Christian Prophecy* (Leiden, 1973) 24; Martin Dibelius, *Der Hirt des Hermas* (Tübingen, 1923) 453; Robert Joly, "Judaïsme, Christianisme et Hellènisme dans le Pasteur d'Hermas," *La Nouvelle Clio* 5 (1953) 394–406; Jean Daniélou, *The Theology of Jewish Christianity*, trans. John A. Baker (Chicago, 1964) 39.

[7] Plato, *Republic* 5.470.

[8] Chester Starr, *Civilization and the Caesars* (New York, 1965) 105.

But imperial power significantly reduced *stasis* throughout the Mediterranean world in the first century, and contemporaries readily attributed the Roman peace (*pax Romana*) to the power of the emperor. Strabo writes that in the past Italy had been torn by faction, but "never have the Romans and their allies thrived in such peace and plenty as that which was afforded them by Augustus Caesar from the time he assumed the absolute authority. . . ."[9] This was the great advantage of Roman rule, as recognized by pro-Romans such as Nicolaus of Damascus, advisor to King Herod of Judaea.[10]

The *pax Romana* was one of the more effective non-coercive policy tools of the state. Most people in the interior provinces, and especially those in Rome, had no fear of foreign attack. During the time of Clement and Hermas, the Mediterranean Sea was free of pirates, allowing a more continuous flow of trade. The far-flung Roman highway system, made possible by the virtual absence of rebellion within the empire and maintained at great expense, allowed for uninterrupted travel and commerce as never before in history.

The official status in this empire which Roman citizenship signified was esteemed highly in the first century. Those who possessed it were entitled to special protection by the Roman government from the accusations of non-citizens and from the more extreme forms of punishment. They were held in honor above non-citizens, even if they were of slave origin. Some, like the centurion in Acts 22:28, had paid large sums of money to obtain their Roman citizenship. Imperial slaves received citizenship upon manumission, and many non-Roman soldiers were granted citizenship when they retired. The word *politeuomai* in antiquity originally had the meaning "to be or live as a citizen," "to act as a citizen (by taking part in political life)," or "to share in state government, to rule the state." The more diluted sense of "conduct" is first found in the *Maccabees*, where it is used only in this sense. Paul uses *politeuomai* to mean "conduct" in Philippians 1:27.[11]

Clement admired the order and stability of Roman society. The basic imperative of the Christian congregation's authority structure for Clement is not personal ability or oral character in its leaders, but the need to preserve concord (*homonoia*) by eliminating internal dissension (*stasis*). Church membership, like Roman citizenship, implies for Clement a specific set of responsibilities toward the group and acknowledgment of one's place in the group. Hermas, on the other hand, does not find the state an appropriate model for the church and is willing to act in ways that might be interpreted as *stasis* to bring about able and moral leadership.

According to Clement, the proper role of Christians is to support the *pax Romana*, not to contest or upset it. Clement demonstrates a knowledge of and respect for the *pax Romana* in the way he contrasts the terms for peace and for its absence. His term for peace (*eirēnē*), used 24 times, is often linked to the word for concord or harmony (*homonoia*), used 14 times. His primary term for the absence of peace is dissension or sedition (*stasis*), used 16 times. To *stasis* are linked strife (*eris*), used eight times, schism (*schisma*), used five times, and danger (*kindunos*), used three times in this context.

The interaction of these terms with one another is a key to the theme of 1 Clement.[12]

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[9] Strabo, *Geography* 6.4.2.

[10] Emilio Gabbe, "The Historians and Augustus," *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects*, ed. Fergus Millar and Erich Segal (Oxford, 1984) 61–63.

[11] Hermann Strathmann, "*polis, ktl.*," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. G. Friedrich, trans. G. W. Bromiley, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids, 1968) 6: 516–35.

[12] Paul Mikat, *Die Bedeutung der Begriffe Stasis und Aponoia für das Verständnis des 1. Clemensbriefes* (Cologne, 1969) 28–40.

Just as Rome remains in peace because all obey the emperor, the Christian community will remain in peace when all obey God, the Master, and remain in subjection to the congregation's leaders. This peace and stability does not arise out of a belief shared by the rulers and the ruled in specific principles of authority, such as those found in Paul's writings. Rather, it is posed from above. God sent Jesus Christ, who appointed the apostles (42.1–5). The apostles in turn appointed leaders in every city, including the deposed office holders in Corinth, and in order to avoid strife (*eris*) instructed them to appoint their own successors (44.1–2). Clement seeks to restore peace to the Corinthian church by restoring its former and rightful leaders. They had been ousted by the congregation, and a new group installed (1.1). Clement does not consider the possibility that the existing leadership might have needed correction or replacement. Rather, he mirrors the attitude of the Roman ruling elite, which held that the most grievous error in society was treason: challenging the existing leadership. In the same way, the most grievous error in 1 Clement is for the average Christian to rebel against the authority of his appointed leaders. According to Clement, this expulsion of the Corinthian leaders is a case of sedition (*stasis*) and has disrupted the stability of the congregation. Peace and harmony for Clement must be imposed by the leaders of the Christian churches.

In a number of passages, Clement presents in clear opposition the Corinthians' present internal dissension and the secular Roman ideal of peace and concord. Love, which may have been the Christian equivalent of Roman consensus, "allows no schism, love makes no sedition, love does all things in concord" (49.5). Prior to the ouster of the old presbyters, "a profound and rich peace was given to all . . ." (2.2); they enjoyed "righteousness and peace" (3.4); and all "dissension and all schism was abominable" to them (2.6). But the change in leadership meant the end of peace. He writes to address

> the abominable and unholy dissension, alien and foreign to the elect of God, which a few rash and self-willed persons have made blaze up to such a frenzy (*aponoia*) that your name, venerable and famous, and worthy as it is of all men's love, has been much slandered (1.1).

This *stasis* is held responsible for causing the Christians in Corinth to lose faith in God and to stop obeying his comands (3.4).

The new leaders at Corinth apparently ruled with the active support of the congregation. Despite this, and the fact that Clement seems to have had no direct knowledge of these leaders, he calls them "men who rush into strife and dissension" (14.2). They are the "leaders of dissension and disagreement" rather than "those who live in love and fear" and so put their own goals above the "common hope . . . our tradition of noble and righteous harmony (*homonoia*)" (51.1–2). Despite the fact that Clement calls this common hope "our tradition," it is his congregation's version of the *pax Romana*. Clement exhorts the new leaders at Corinth to leave the community so that it will have peace (54.2). In chapter 55, he refers to examples "from the heathen" of "any kings and rulers" who have sacrificed themselves or gone into voluntary exile in order to end dissension. Thus, the Hellenistic ideal of political concord, which had become a political reality in the cities of the Roman empire, provides the standard for conduct in Clement's congregation.

Clement clearly considers very dangerous any instance of conflict within the Christian community. This sentiment cannot be accounted for simply by the teachings of Christianity which he had received, although they undoubtedly played a part. Clement is aware of the Apostle Paul's teachings about the unity of the body of believers and the impropriety of dissension. He believes that God, as master of the Christian, is due as much obedience as the emperor receives from his subjects.

The author of 1 Clement and the members of his house church probably were mainly imperial slaves or freedmen. The latter had received Roman citizenship when they were freed. It is not surprising, therefore, that Clement builds upon the Roman notion of peace imposed from above by depicting the members of the Church as citizens. Clement says that the Corinthians were adorned by their "virtuous and honorable" citizenship (*politeia:* 2.8). Like the *Maccabees* and Paul, Clement uses *politeuomai* in the broader sense of "to conduct," but the fact that he uses the word repeatedly (seven times) suggests that his positive estimation of Roman citizenship made him consider the term a fitting expression of conduct within the community.[13]

Proper citizenship in 1 Clement is always linked with acceptance of the notion of peace and stability imposed from above, while improper conduct as a citizen is linked with dissension and strife. Clement says that the peace of the Christian community is upset by dissension and schism because Christians pursue their own selfish desires and do not conduct their citizenship in a civil manner (3.4). Those who "live without regret as citizens of God" (*tauta hoi politeuomenoi tēn ametamelēton politeian tou theou*) would rather leave the community than be the cause of strife (54.4). The Christian martyrs conducted themselves (*politeuomai*) in an exemplary fashion (6.1), because they were willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the Christian community. Similarly, those who conduct themselves in "fear and love" of God are willing to suffer torture (51.2). Christians who perform good and virtuous deeds in harmony (*homonoia*) are acting as citizens worthy of God (21.1). Clement uses this term of Christian office holders in the sense of one who governs a state when he says that strife and dissension have resulted because the Corinthian presbyters were removed despite their blameless governing (*politeuomenous ek tēs amemptōs,* 44.6).[14]

In contrast to Clement, Hermas presents a clear distinction between the goals of Christianity and the goals of the state. He never uses the term *stasis,* and he uses *homonoia* only twice. He also never uses the term for acting like a citizen (*politeuomai*). Far from providing Christianity with a model of organization, the state for Hermas is by nature diametrically opposed to Christianity. Unlike Clement, who calls the leaders of the state "our rulers and governors upon the earth" (60.4), Hermas, in what looks like a proto-Augustinian notion of the City of God, contrasts God as Lord of the heavenly city with the Roman emperor as the "Lord of this city":

> He said to me, "You know that you, as the servants of God, are living in a strange country, for your city is far from this city. If then you know your city, in which you are going to dwell, why do you here prepare lands and costly establishments and buildings and vain dwellings. . . . For the Lord of this city will say: 'I do not wish you to dwell in my city, but go out from this city, because you do not use my law' " (Sim. 1.1–3).

Thus, in its only reference to secular government, the Shepherd advocates hostility toward the world's systems, not imitation of them.

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[13] Maccabees: 2 Macc 6:1, 11:25; 3 Macc 3:4; 4 Macc 2:8, 23; Paul (*politeuomai* and cognates): Phil 1:27; 3:20; Eph 2:12; 2:19. Strathmann, 6: 517–18. Strathmann asserts concerning *politeuomai* in the Post-Apostolic Fathers that "in the main it simply means 'to walk.' "

[14] See Walter Bauer, "*politeuomai,*" *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature,* ed. and trans. William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich (Chicago, 1957) 693.

Although the Shepherd does not borrow from Roman ideology as does 1 Clement, it does attempt to promote peace within the congregations, since division, for its author, is caused by sin. Harmony for Hermas is not to be imposed by office holders but is encouraged by the virtuous and dedicated examples which leaders should set for the community. Hermas contrasts the current leaders in the congregations of Rome with the Christian leaders in apostolic times. The earlier leaders "always agreed among themselves, and had peace (*eirēnē*) among themselves, and listened to one another . . ." (Vis. 3.5.1). But he compares the current leaders to the Pharisees who "take the chief seats" and he warns them not to poison their followers. Their hearts are hardened and they disagree with each other, and so they need to admonish one another and "be at peace" among themselves (Vis. 3.9.7–10). Hermas sees no conflict between his desire for peace in the Christian churches and his intention to confront their leaders and attempt to convince them to "reform their ways" in accord with his vision (Vis. 2.2.6). The author of 1 Clement gives no hint in his letter that he would approve of such conduct by a non-office holder. In fact, this may explain why Clement felt compelled to address the situation in Corinth: since no legitimate Corinthian office holder remained in leadership to confront the dissension, a legitimate office holder from a sister church had to do so.

The Shepherd represents those on the underside of Roman society who have found only grief from relationships with the state, whereas 1 Clement represents those who value their relationship with the state and see no essential conflict between its forms and their faith. These latter Christians, who enjoyed greater social status and economic stability, found it easier to imitate the conventions of pagan society.

The Roman Familia and the Christian Haustafel

For the Roman aristocracy in the early imperial period, the household provided the basic structure of the state. The health of the household was considered essential to the stability of the state. In ancient Roman law, the only person in the *familia* with full political rights was the *paterfamilias*, the male head of the Roman household. He held nearly unlimited power (*patria potestas*) over his wife and children, as well as over his clients, slaves, and other legal dependents.[15] For example, he could have an unwanted newborn infant abandoned, sell his son into slavery, and even have his wife or children executed.[16] Other laws also served to protect and maintain the position of the *pater*.

These laws were changed dramatically as time went by, so that by the period of the early empire, the *patria potestas* had lost most of its legal power. Nevertheless, the *pater* still had considerable influence over his adult sons. A son (*filiusfamilias*), even though a Roman citizen and despite his age and rank, could own nothing while his *paterfamilias* lived.[17] Only heads of households among the aristocracy benefited from the laws enforcing the *patria potestas*. The households of the class below the aristocracy, the *populus urbanus*, apparently were not always organized in this way. This was particularly true of slaves and of foreign residents of Rome, who lacked Roman citizenship, since their marriages were

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[15] Eva Cantarella, *Pandora's Daughters*, trans. Maureen B. Fant (Baltimore, 1987) 113–14. See also John Crook, *Law and Life of Rome* (Ithaca, NY, 1967) chapter 4, "Family and Succession."

[16] Pierre Grimal, *The Civilization of Rome*, trans. W. S. Maguinness (New York, 1963) 119.

[17] David Daube, *Roman Law* (Edinburgh, 1969) 75–76.

not recognized by Roman law.[18] Codes of behavior written by Romans usually were addressed to the *paterfamilias* only. Women, children, and slaves normally were addressed in the third person.[19] Adherence to the *patria potestas* became for the aristocracy in the imperial period a symbol of traditionalism, an ideology.

Family life and relations in the New Testament are codified in *Haustafeln* (codes of household ethics). These codes typically focus on three levels of submission and obligation: wives to husbands, slaves to masters, and children to parents.[20] In the New Testament, these codes in general do not define relationships between members of a house church, but relationships between members of individual households. New Testament *Haustafeln* are found in Col 3:18–4:1, Eph 5:21–6:9, 1 Pet 2:13–21, 3:1–7, 1 Tim 2:1–6:2, and Tit 2:1–10.

Christian household codes may have originated in Stoicism or in the ethical teachings of Plato and Aristotle. Stambaugh and Balch believe that household codes in the New Testament may have been an attempt to impose on Christian family life a more patriarchal order, patterned on the Greco-Roman household.[21]

Although the concept of the Christian family in both 1 Clement and the Shepherd is affected by the the Roman notion of the household (*familia*), 1 Clement is affected to a greater extent. First Clement and the Shepherd both contain *Haustafeln* (1 Clem. 1.3, 21.6–8; Shepherd, Mand. 8.10). The two *Haustafeln* in 1 Clement are similar in content and parallel in structure. In 1.3, he tells the Corinthian Christians:

> For you did all things without respect of persons, and walked in the laws of God, obedient to your rulers, and paying all proper honor to the older among you. On the young, too, you enjoined temperate and seemly thoughts, and to the women you gave instruction that they should do all things with a blameless and seemly and pure conscience, yielding a dutiful affection to their husbands. And you taught them to remain in the rule of obedience and to manage their households with seemliness, in all circumspection.

In 21.6–8, he returns to this theme:

> . . . let us respect those who rule us, let us honor the aged, let us instruct youths in the fear of God, let us lead our wives to that which is good. Let them exhibit the lovely habit of purity, let them show forth the innocent will of meekness, let them make the gentleness of their tongue manifest by their silence, let them not give their affection by factious preference, but in holiness to all equally who fear God. Let our small children share in the instruction which is in Christ, let them learn. . . .

These passages represent the earliest codes of household ethics, addressed to the general membership of a church, in which only the *paterfamilias* is addressed directly. This differs

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[18] John E. Stambaugh and David L. Balch, *The New Testament in Its Social Environment*, Library of Early Christianity: 2 (Philadelphia, 1986) 123.

[19] Stambaugh and Balch 124.

[20] David E. Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia, 1987) 196. See also David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1981) and D. Lührmann, "Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und antike Oekonomie," *New Testament Studies* 27 (1980) 83–97.

[21] Stambaugh and Balch 55.

from the codes in Col 3:18–4:1, Eph 5:21–6:9, and 1 Pet 2:13–21, 3:1–7, which are also written to a general audience, address wives, husbands, children, fathers, slaves, and masters in the first person.[22] Although the codes in 1 Tim 2:1–6:2 and Tit 2:1–10 address all categories of household members in the third person, this is because they are addressed to a specific individual charged with supervising the behavior of Christians. The difference between the New Testament and 1 Clement indicates a subtle shift in the thinking of the group behind 1 Clement: it holds responsible the male head of the household, the *paterfamilias*, for the spiritual welfare of his entire household. Also unlike the New Testament codes, Clement does not present the proper behavior of husbands and fathers toward the family beyond their responsibility to govern its conduct. For example, husbands according to Paul are to love their wives as much as they love themselves and not be harsh with them (Eph 5:33, Col 3:19). Fathers are to not exasperate or embitter their children (Eph 6:4, Col 3:21). Masters (which in Roman society would refer to the *paterfamilias*) are to treat their slaves justly, not showing favoritism, not threatening them, and providing for their needs (Eph 6:9, Col 4:1).

Unlike the New Testament codes of household conduct mentioned above, Clement devotes a disproportionate amount of space to the duties of wives. He is concerned solely with regulating their behavior. This greater emphasis on wives may be a reflection of the fact that the declining power of the *paterfamilias* in Rome had been accompanied by a rise in the power and independence of women in the aristocracy, much to the chagrin of their husbands.[23] Clement, because of his respect for the belief system of aristocrats, may have shared their frustration over this loss of power. In addition, the women in Clement's congregation may have imitated the more independent behavior of their mistresses.

Clement's instructions for children in 21.6–8 also differ from the New Testament codes of household ethics. Whereas in the New Testament codes the focus is on obedience and respect to parents and elders, in 1 Clement the focus is on instruction in the basics of the Christian faith. While it is true that the education of children is often considered basic to obedience, the shift in emphasis from the received Christian (largely Pauline) tradition is sigificant. This focus on education could reflect an increased concern among second generation Christians that the received faith be transmitted to the new generation. But it also may reflect in part the high value placed on education among the Roman aristocracy.

The great omissions in Clement's codes of household ethics, when compared to those in the New Testament, are instructions to slaves and masters. Clement's audience, like his congregation, undoubtedly included slaves. It is unlikely that his congregation included Christian slave owners, however. In order to avoid laws that proscribed the organization of unrecognized religions, it could not organize as a religious association. It probably had to organize formally as either a household association or a funerary association composed primarily of slaves and clients of the Roman aristocracy. The presence of an aristocrat would have been considered inappropriate. Apparently, in the absence of Christian masters, Clement saw no reason to address the relations between slaves and masters. Whether or not the Corinthian congregation included slaveowners, it appears that Clement's concerns in this area were shaped more by his own experiences than by his knowledge of the situation in Corinth.

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[22] Fathers and children are not mentioned in the 1 Peter passages.

[23] Cantarella 135–59. She records a number of complaints along this line by classical authors.

An example of how the Roman concept of the *patria potestas* affected Clement's concept of the church can be found in his reference to the Old Testament story of Rahab. In recounting the episode, he closely follows the Septuagint version of Joshua 2. In it, Rahab pleads with the Israelite spies to spare her and her father, mother, brothers and sisters (Josh. 2:13). But Clement has her ask them to spare "me and my father's household (*oikos*)" (12.5). This slight change suggests that Clement understood and accepted as appropriate the Roman aristocratic form of family organization, in which the *familia* belonged to its *paterfamilias*.

The importance of the *paterfamilias* for Clement is also apparent in his application of the concept to officers in the church. Clement and his congregation probably thought of the church officer as the *paterfamilias* of a congregation household (*familias*). Like the *paterfamilias* of a Roman family, concern for the leader's personal behavior is overshadowed by a concern to spell out his authority over and responsibility for the members of his congregation. In chapter 44, Clement calls unjust the removal from office of men who were appointed by the apostles and their successors, and who have served blamelessly for many years (44.2–3; cf. 42.1–5). Although he characterizes them as "blameless" (*amemptōs*) three times in chapter 44, the lack of details about the current situation in Corinth suggests that the author supported the ousted leaders more on principle than from a thorough knowledge of the situation. Clement neither refutes specific charges against the ousted leaders nor describes how leaders might be removed. For Clement, once a presbyter is appointed he is untouchable (like a *paterfamilias*). All others must respect his position, be content in their own places, and not seek to aspire to positions to which they have not been appointed (41.1).

Clement appears to have combined New Testament principles with the Roman upper-class ideal of the *paterfamilias* who exerts ultimate power and authority over his household. Such a model lends itself well to the main point of Clement's letter: that order and harmony must be imposed in the community if dire consequences are to be avoided.

Hermas accepts the Roman concept of the *patria potestas*, but in a more general and less complete sense than does Clement. The closest that Hermas comes to a code of household ethics is in Mandate 8.10:

> Next hear the things which follow: To minister to widows, to look after orphans and the destitute, to redeem from distress the servants of God, to be hospitable, for in hospitality may be found the practice of good, to resist none, to be gentle, to be poorer than all men, to reverence the aged, to practice justice, to preserve brotherhood, to submit to insult, to be brave, to bear no malice, to comfort those who are oppressed in spirit, not to cast aside those who are offended in the faith, but to convert them and give them courage, to reprove sinners, not to oppress poor debtors, and whatever is like to these things.

Carolyn Osiek believes that the material in this verse comes from traditional lists of virtues, church order material and codes of household ethics, and the traditional theology of the "pious poor."[24] The only obvious link to the codes in the New Testament and 1 Clement is the command to "reverence the aged." Osiek takes this verse to imply that the Christian community is "by extension one household," since the form of a *Haustafel*

[24] Carolyn Osiek, *Rich and Poor in the Shepherd of Hermas* (Washington, DC, 1983) 61.

is extended to include various duties among members of the congregation.[25]

But Hermas does speak at length of his own family. Hermas is the head (*kephalē*) of his household (Sim. 7.2). This is different from Paul, who only refers to the husband as the head of the wife (Eph 5:23). The change is subtle, but significant. The *paterfamilias* was the head of the entire household.

Unlike the New Testament and 1 Clement, the Shepherd depicts the head of a household, Hermas, as having direct responsibility for the sinfulness of his family:

> But it is not for this that God is angry with you, but in order that you should convert your family, which has sinned against the Lord, and against you, their parents. But you are indulgent, and do not correct your family, but have allowed them to become corrupt. For this reason the Lord is angry with you, but he will heal all the past evils in your family, for because of their sins and wickedness you have been corrupted by the things of daily life. . . . do not cease, then, correcting your children, for I know that if they repent with all their heart, they will be inscribed in the books of life with the saints (Vis. 1.3.1, 2).

If he obeys Gods commands and corrects them in piety, they will be saved (cf. Sim. 5.3.9). If he neglects Gods commands, no one in his household will be saved (Mand. 12.3.6). This includes his wife, whose sins according to Hermas stemmed from her inability to control her tongue (Vis. 2.2.3, 2.3.1).

These passages seem to give Hermas the absolute power of a spiritual *paterfamilias*, but in reality that power is limited. Hermas is in a sense held hostage by the behavior of his family. If they sin, his life on earth as well as his eternal destiny will be affected. The threat he issues, that their sins would bring down condemnation on the entire family, is a powerful weapon. But this does not look like the kind of weapon a *paterfamilias* of the aristocracy would have used.

Similitude 7 relates that the "shepherd of punishment" (an angel) has been sent to afflict Hermas and his family. Hermas is told that he is being punished so harshly because of the great sins of his family. He protests that he should not be punished, "even if they have done such things." The shepherd explains that his family "cannot be punished in any other way, than if you, the head (*kephalē*) of the household (*oikos*), be afflicted. For when you are afflicted, they also will necessarily be afflicted, but while you prosper, they cannot suffer any affliction" (Sim. 7.3). This passage must refer to affliction caused by economic deprivation. The health or happiness of Hermas family members could be removed on an individual basis; but if they are to suffer material loss, the one who feeds and shelters them must also suffer material setbacks. This emphasis on economic suffering suggests the low social status of Hermas.

Hermas, like those in the lower classes of Roman society, was affected by the aristocracy's concept of the *patria potestas*. The power of the Christian *paterfamilias* over the family's spiritual health is made quite strong in the passage just mentioned, and to this degree the Shepherd adheres to the Roman aristocratic model. But, for Hermas, this power is mitigated by the ability of his family to disobey him and thus cause his own ruin, both materially and spiritually. In addition, references to Hermas' past leniency with his household suggest that he may not have based his prior relationships with it on the *paterfamilias* model.

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[25] Osiek.

Unlike Clement, Hermas never attmpts to apply the Roman model of the family in a systematic way. Also unlike Clement, Hermas does not expand the model to include the place of leaders over the congregation. If he does see his congregation as a household, as Osiek believes, it is not based on the Roman elite's concept of the household.[26] The notion of the faily in 1 Clement clearly has been influenced by Roman ideology, and that to a greater degree than the notion of the family in the Shepherd.

Roman Patronage and Obligations Between Christians

The *familia* of a Roman aristocrat consisted not only of his wife, descendants, and slaves, but also of his clients. During the Republic, and particularly after the plebs won the right to elect their own magistrates, patricians developed ties of responsibility and duty with their social inferiors, commonly referred to today as the patron-client relationship. The plebs became *clientela* of the *patroni.* They owed them deference and specific responsibilities such as joining their retinue during public appearances.[27] Seneca observed that this reciprocal exchange, which he called *beneficia,* was a custom "which more than any other binds together human society."[28]

Like the Roman concept of the *familia,* patronage remained an iportant social basis of the aristocracy in the early empire period. This is true despite the fact that patronage under the empire had lost its earlier political significance.[29] Public attendance on one's patron was required, and often consumed the better part of a patron's morning hours if not the entire day. Clients provided an aristocrat with a retinue that accompanied him around the city or ornamented his receiving room, and thus announced the aristocrats social importance. For his day's attendance, the patron was rewarded with a small basket (the *sportula*). It generally contained food and small presents. Trajan restricted its value to six and one-quarter sesterces per day: a small remuneration if one had to attend errands of his patron for the better part of the day.[30]

Sometimes a client was invited to a patron's banquet table simply to demonstrate the patron's wealth, not out of genuine friendship. In such cases the client could expect to be the butt of jokes and to receive food and wine far inferior to that of honored guests, as Juvenal laments.[31] Slaves, after receiving their freedom, usually became his clients. In the first century the free citizen owed only moral obligations to his patron, but the freedman owed him legal obligations as well.[32] Augustus used the patron-client relationship in establishing the imperial bureaucracy. As a result, members of the *familia Caesaris,* imperial slaves and freedmen, were recognized as special representatives of imperial authority, and came to exert at times greater influence than many aristocratic members of the ruling elite.[33]

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[26] Osiek 61–62.

[27] Juvenal, *Satires* 1.46, 7.142. See also Ludwig Friedländer, *Roman Life and Manners Under the Early Empire,* trans. L. A. Magnus, 4 vols. (New York, 1913) 2: 195–202.

[28] Seneca, *De Ben.* 1.4.2: De beneficius dicendum est et ordinanda res, quae maxime humanam societatem adligat. Cf. Richard P. Saller, *Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire* (Cambridge, 1982) 119 n. 1.

[29] Karl Christ, *The Romans,* trans. Christopher Hole (Berkeley, 1984) 97; H. G. Pflaum, *Abrégé des Procurateurs Equestres* (Paris, 1972) 195.

[30] Friedländer 197.

[31] Juvenal, *Satires* 5. See Friedländer 199.

[32] P. A. Brunt, *Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic* (New York, 1971) 48.

[33] Weaver, *"Familia Caesaris,"* 5–6, chapter 22.

Clement and Hermas show a familiarity with the patron-client relationship, and build their concept of relations within the Christian community in part on this model. First Clement, in its use of the patron-client model, demonstrates that its author had come to accept social distinctions among Christians as a basis for ordering their interrelationships. That is, through the influence of Roman ideology, Clement came to accept hierarchy based on social status as natural to Christianity. The Shepherd, on the other hand, accepts the need for interdependency, but does not base the value of a Christian on his social identity.

Clement says, "The great (*megalos*) cannot exist without the small (*mikros*), nor the small without the great; there is a certain mixture among all, and in this lies the advantage" (37.4). Thus, Clement emphasizes the importance of order and stability to the proper functioning of society and the mutually beneficial nature of the patron-client relationship at its best.

He also says:

> Let the strong care for the weak and let the weak reverence the strong. Let the rich man give help to the poor and let the poor give thanks to God, that he gave him one to supply his needs (38.2).

Like a Roman patron, the strong (*ischuros*) and rich (*plousios*) Christian has a responsibility to lend aid to the weak (*asthenēs*) and poor (*ptōchos*) Christian. The juxtaposition of strong/weak and rich/poor implies that both appositions include an economic aspect. In other words, the "strong" Christian is identified with the economically "rich" Christian. As will be shown below, this is an equation which Hermas rejected. The weak Christian should show "reverence" (*eutrepestha*) for the strong Christian. Grant and Graham assert that Clement's commands to the strong are the same as those in Romans 15:1–2, but add that enjoining the weak to respect the strong was Clement's "own idea of order."[34] It is likely that Clement's idea was modeled on the Roman patron-client relationship. Since *eutrepestha* is the same word Clement uses for reverence for God, it clearly implies more than superficial respect. His statement accurately reflects the state of affairs in Rome: if the poor were dependent on the patronage of the elite, the elite were just as dependent on the clientage of the slaves and clients who staffed their palaces, managed their businesses, and guarded their persons.

Clement appears to accept social distinctions among Christians as a basis for ordering relationships within the community, on the model of Roman patronage. He makes one significant change: unlike Roman aristocrats, rich Christians are not to use their retinue of needy clients for ostentatious display. Rather, they are to care for those that are in need (38.2).

Hermas also asserts that rich and poor Christians benefit one another. But he alters the Roman model further, so that the poor man shows gratitude not to his patron but to God. In Similitude 2, the relationship between the elm and the vine in viticulture is presented as applying "to the servants of God, to the poor and the rich":

> The rich man has much wealth, but he is poor with regard to the Lord, being busied about his riches. . . . But when the rich man rests upon the poor, and gives him what he needs, he believes that what he does to the poor man can find a reward with God, because the poor is rich in intercession and

[34] Grant and Graham 2:23.

> confession. . . . The rich man, therefore, helps the poor in all things without doubting. But the poor man, being helped by the rich, makes intercession to God, giving thanks for him who gave to him. The rich man is still zealous for the poor man, that he should lack nothing in his life, for he knows that the intercession of the poor is acceptable and rich toward the Lord. Therefore the two work together to complete the work, for the poor works in the intercession in which he is rich . . . this he pays to the Lord who helps him. And the rich man likewise provides the poor, without hesitating, with the wealth which he received from the Lord . . . and has fulfilled his ministry rightly (Sim. 2.4–7).

In this passage, the rich man is made responsible to see that the material needs of the poor are met. Hermas adds to this that a Christian cannot have both wealth and a strong relationship with God. This departs from Clement, who equates "strong" with "rich" in 38.2, and from Roman ideology, which equated wealth with strength, honor, and effectiveness. According to Hermas, the rich man's low spirituality can be mitigated only by providing for the material needs of the poor, as the elm provides support for the vine. He implies that by nature the rich man, like the elm, cannot produce fruit (Sim. 2.3, 5). But when he supports the poor man, who like the vine naturally produces fruit, he increases the fruitfulness of the poor man. In so doing, the rich man produes fruit as well.

The poor Christian in this passage has no responsibility toward his rich benefactor except to pray to God on his behalf. He is not charged to show either deference or gratitude, as he is in 1 Clement. Rather, he shows gratitude to God for providing assistance through the rich man. An additional responsibility of the poor toward God is mentioned in Mandate 2.5: the one who receives material support must be in true "distress" (*thlibō*). Apparently, Hermas held the rich Christian responsible only to help poor Christians who cannot provide their own basic sustenance.

Hermas thus turns the patron-client relationship on its head. Unlike Roman patronage, which has as its ultimate purpose the building of the patron's prestige, the purpose of mutual support for Hermas is to sustain the true spiritual warriors of Christianity: the "pious poor." This idea in Hermas is affected more by Jewish and Christian traditions than by Roman society.[35] Clement, while also rejecting the ultimate purpose of Roman patronage, accepts the basic Roman assumption that great and small can assist one another and, in theory, equally contribute to the community. The key influence of Roman ideology on 1 Clement in this section is its hierarchical nature. Unlike the Shepherd, where rich and poor support one another, and where the poor are more spiritual, 1 Clement reflects Roman ideology when it implies that those with power and wealth have more to offer the congregation in every way than do their poor and powerless brothers.

Conclusion

Clement and his congregation found in Roman ideology a useful way to bring order and stability to a group of house churches composed of a wide variety of ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. In the same way that the Romans had imposed order on many different nations, order among the Roman congregations and in their constituent families could not be expected to arise naturally, but must be imposed from above. Like good

[35] Regarding the theology of the "pious poor," see Osiek 16–38.

citizens, the laity needed to recognize that peace would come through their orderly obedience to their office holders. Like obedient members of a *familia*, they needed to realize that peace would result from accepting the direction of their *paterfamilias*, whether the head of a household or an office holder. Finally, like good clients, they needed to show proper deference to their social superiors, who were their leaders.

The Shepherd represents a more egalitarian and less hierarchical approach to achieving peace and harmony. Hermas is more concerned to encourage Christian leaders to earn the respect of followers by their morally upright lives and good deeds than he is to command followers to show respect. Congregational leaders are not portrayed in the forms of the *paterfamilias* or the patron. Unlike Clement, "wealthy" Christians for Hermas, far from being superior to poor Christians, are spiritually inferior.

A number of trends in later Roman Catholic theology suggest that Clement's ideology won out over Hermas'. This may have happened because Clement's approach was a more practical solution to achieving unity at Rome. It also may have resulted because the majority of Christians in Rome, whose social status probably would have been closer to Hermas' than to Clement's, regarded their social superiors in the Church as their spiritual superiors as well.

Arcana Mundi: Prophecy and Divination in the *Vita Mosis* of Philo of Alexandria

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Introduction

For the ancients humanity shared with few others the privilege of citizenship in two worlds. It enjoyed in daily alteration two distinct kinds of experience—the *hypar* and the *onar*—each of which has its own logic and its own limitations.[1] We are told that waking and sleeping encompassed prophecy and divination and that each offered the prophet and the diviner the opportunity, however fugitive, to encounter their dead, their demons, their gods.

Yet faced by the many accounts of prophecy and divination in ancient Mediterranean culture the historian of late antiquity may say with Lucian "that pair of tyrants, Hope and Fear," account for so widespread a belief in these *arcana mundi*. This permits the historian to relieve the strain placed on his credulity by vastly inflating the credulity of his subjects.

Although prophecy and divination provide much amusement to the satirist it is of little help to the historian to be content with Lucian's judgment. We have to seize the precise and individual characteristics of an age. We have to explain why ancient Mediterranean men and women chased oracles in the ways they did and what kinds of prophets and mantics satisfied them. We have to take the pulse of an ancient heart to uncover the rhythm of ancient values.

Nonetheless when we take the pulse of this heart to grasp its rhythm, to understand the oracles, prophets and diviners sent to the men and women of the Mediterranean basin by their gods we cannot help but think—if we could only remove the patina that encrusts and inhibits our understanding of ancient prophecy and divination, then we could grasp why Apollo gave prophetic powers to Cassandra to win her love, apprehend why Zeus and Athena endowed Tiresias with the gift of prophecy to compensate for the curse that made him blind,[2] and finally, perhaps, even comprehend why the Primal God picked Moses to declare by inspiration what cannot be apprehended by reason.[3]

Therefore the topic of this study is Hellenistic prophecy and divination. The focus of this work is Philonic prophecy and divination. Finally, this paper limits its topic and focus

[1] On the *onar* and *hypar* in Greek and Hellenistic literature, see Dodds [1951] 102–134. For the *onar* in Greco-Roman literature and Philo, cf. Berchman [1987] 403–428.

[2] *Agam.*, 1203ff.

[3] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.187.

to the *hypar* not the *onar*. To deal with both phenomena would exceed the limits of our study.[4]

Following Philo's example we bring only so much material as seems necessary to establish our topic and thesis. Our main examples are taken from the *Vita Mosis*. Related materials from the *corpus Philonicum* are utilized when appropriate.

The thesis of this work is that Philo's views of prophecy and divination rely, at least in part, on Greek and Hellenistic configurations. This paper attempts to offer evidence that Philo's prophetic and divinatory theories are indebted, in part, to Middle Stoic and Middle Platonic interpretations of prophecy and divination.[5] That Philo composed the *Vita Mosis* to demonstrate the *logos* character of Jewish prophecy and divination.[6]

Such an agenda requires a brief summary of the character and development of prophecy and divination in the eastern Mediterranean world before Philo.[7]

I. Prophecy and Divination Before Philo

1. Definition of Terms

Settling on a precise definition of prophecy and divination is not easy. How they were interpreted in antiquity has a long history, and in the complex cultural melange of the ancient Mediterranean world one should not expect to find a single attitude toward, or interpretation of prophecy and divination. Each text from the Archaic through the Hellenistic age has a specific context. Together they yield an extended range of subtle definitions and interpretations.

Although it is simply not possible to speak of a general ancient attitude towards prophecy and divination without differentiating between epochs, locales, and each text's social and cultural environment, it is possible to offer a taxonomy, to construct a kind of linguistic map of the meanings and functions of prophecy and divination in the Greek and Hellenistic worlds.[8]

The Greek word for prophecy or divination is *manteia*. The prophet or prophetess is a *mantis*. An important feature of both words is their association with powers that stand outside of the normal range of human capacities. This appears the case because the Greeks connected these words with two others: *mainomai*—to be mad; and *mania*—madness.[9] Sometimes the word *ekstasis* is used to describe this state. It means a stepping out of

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[4] A preliminary examination of onaric prophecy in Philo has been provided by Berchman [1987] 414–428.

[5] This is an established thesis. cf. Wolfson [1946] 2.3–72. For recent appraisals see Winston [1985] 53ff.; Berchman [1987] 403–428. For the allegorical techniques of Philo on prophecy and divination, cf. Mack [1974/5] 71–112.

[6] Goodenough [1986] 33 notes that the *Vita Mosis* is an apologia written to characterize Mosis as the ideal sage of the Stoics, the divine man of the Pythagoreans, and the savior of the mysteries.

[7] This paper will not attempt to offer new interpretations of the vast array of documents from this period. It restricts itself to a critical examination of representative modern interpretations of these literatures.

[8] See J. Z. Smith [1978] esp. ch. 13.

[9] See Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244c; Eur., *Bac.*, 299. cf. Curtius, Meillet, Boisacq, Hofmann, s.v. *mania, mantis, mainomai.*

oneself and refers to a form of possession, presumably a type of divine or demonic possession.[10]

If we may assume this, then *propheteia* is a type of *manteia;* the prophet a kind of *mantis.* Each type of prophet and each kind of prophecy yields a map of a culture's understanding of the meanings and functions of the prophet and of prophecy.

While possessed the mantic receives an oracular vision—a *chresmatismos.*[11] The meaning of this noun is clear from the verb *chrematizo*—to give a revelation.[12] The oracular vision can occur while the mantic is asleep. In this case it is an onar, a dream vision. The *onar-chresmos* is a vision sent directly to the dreamer. It is not characterized by a conversational moment.[13] The oracular vision can also occur while the prophet is awake. The *hypar-chresmos* generally involves divine possession.

The oracle takes two forms. The mantic may merely be the passive mouthpiece for the oracle. In this case the oracle is cast in monologue form, usually in the form of gnomic sayings. The mantic also may be an active medium for the oracle. In this case the oracle is cast in dialogue form, usually in the form of questions and answers.[14]

When the oracle is received, and the gift of prophecy and divination is acquired, the prophet and prophetess step outside their normal selves and become divinely possessed. They speak for someone else. This other is usually a god or demon. Through the prophets a god speaks and reveals his plans.[15]

In rare cases, such as at Delphi, priests were called *prophetai* because they interpreted the obscure utterances of the mantis Pythia who was directly inspired by Apollo.[16] Priests put her message into verse for those who consulted the oracle. These prophets were not directly in touch with the god. Indeed, one step removed, they interpreted divine oracles, much like the dream interpreter decoded god-sent dreams, from the mouth of the possessed prophet.[17]

Through the *onar-chresmos:* 1) the god sends his thoughts with symbolism. This type of oracle always requires interpretation; 2) the god sends this type of vision to a lower god, a demon; a prophet, or a priest; 3) humans who receive such visions possess suprahuman powers and are called a prophet [*prophetes*], wise man [*sophos, spoudaos*], or a divine man [*theios aner*].

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[10] Euripides makes Teiresias claim that Dionysius is the god of ecstatic prophecy, cf. *Bac.,* 298ff.

[11] The Neopythagoreans were especially interested in this type of onaric oracle, cf. Iambl. *Vit. Pythag.,* 65.114; cf. Artem. *Onric.,* 1.2.

[12] On the *chresmatismos* see Luck [1985] 238–239.

[13] See Dodds [1951] 102–134 for the *onar* in Greek materials. See Berchman [1987] 414–428 for the *onar* in Philo.

[14] On these types of prophecy in general see Dodds [1951] 64–134. In Philo see Wolfson [1946] 2.22–54 and Winston [1985] 53–54.

[15] Plato tells us that all *prophetai* are not directly in touch with the gods and says that *prophetes* should be reserved for priestly interpreters who translated the utterances of the ecstatic diviner [*mantis*]. Cf. *Tim.,* 72a.

[16] This is clear from Aristotle, ap. Sext. Emp., *Adv. dogm.,* 3.20=fr. 10 Rose; *Probl.,* 30,954a 34ff.; also see Cicero, *De div.,* 1.18, 64, 70, 113; Plut., *Def. orac.,* 431eff.

[17] Plato calls them *theomanteis* and *chresmodoi,* cf. *Apol.,* 22c; *Meno,* 99c. Or *manteis theoi* and *chresmodoi,* cf. *Ion,* 534c.

In general, however, prophets [*prophetai*] were responsible for proclaiming the clear sayings of the gods. Prophets put the divine message into verse for those who wished the adivice of the gods. these prophets are in direct contact with the gods. They immediately relay divine oracles from the gods to humanity.

Through the *hypar-chresmos:* 1) The god sends his thoughts without symbolism. This type of oracle never requires interpretation; 2) The god only sends this type of vision to some respected or important person, perhaps a priest, a prophet, maybe a demon or a lower god; and 3) humans who receive such visions possess suprahuman powers and are called a prophet [*prophetes*], a wise man [*sophos, spoudaios*] or a divine man [*theios aner*].[18]

The evidence suggests that onaric and hyparic oracles are received by similar figures in the Greco-Roman world. For our purpose it is important to examine the prophet more closely.

2. Prophetes: Mania and Psyche

a. The Epic and Tragic Literatures

Ecstatic prophecy was practiced from an early date in the eastern Mediterranean.[19] It is found in association with Apollo, in western Asia and on mainland Greece.[20] His oracles at Claros near Colophon and at Branchidae outside Miletus existed before the colonization of Ionia.[21] At both sites ecstatic prophecy seems to have been practiced.[22] Moreover, at Patara in Lycia we know that his prophetess was locked in the temple at night for a nocturnal union with the god. She was thought to be his medium and bride as Cassandra should have been.[23]

The words which the Greeks used to describe the diviner are varied and inconsistent. An ancient name and interpretation for one who divines is *entheos,* within is a god, who speaks from the person in a strange voice or in an unintelligible way.[24] A god may seize or carry a person in its power, *katechei,* and the individual is possessed.[25] Stepping out, *ekstasis,* is frequently used. This means an abandoning of normal ways and good sense. Hence understanding [*nous*] is no longer in the individual.[26] Since these terms cannot be reconciled or distinguished from each other, the most common term employed by the ancients to describe these varied states is *mania,* frenzy or madness.

Significantly, the Greek word for god, *theos,* is related to the art of the diviner. A sign interpreted by the seer is a *thesphaton,* the diviner is a *theopropos,* and what is done is a *theiazein* or *entheazein.*[27] In the *Iliad,* Kalchus is the son of Thestor. In the *Odyssey,* the diviner with second sight is Theoklymenos. Consequently, the tribe which guards the Oracle of the Dead at Epirus is called the *thesprotoi.*

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[18] For a recent assessment of these types see Gallagher [1982] esp. ch. 1–2.

[19] See Burkert [1985] 109–118. Also Gressmann, *AOTBAT.,* 1.225ff.; Goetze, *KF,* 1.219; and Fraser, *AAO,* 72–82.

[20] See Burkert [1985] 109118. Also Dodds [1951] 69ff.

[21] *Claros,* Paus. 7.3.1; *Branchidae,* Paus., 7.2.4.

[22] Cf. Farnell [1927] 4.403ff. cf. 224.

[23] Herodt., 1.182.

[24] Eur. *Bacc.,* 300.

[25] Ibid., 1124. Cf. *katechesthai.*

[26] Plato, *Ion,* 534b.

[27] Thucy., 8.1; Herodt., 1.62.

Prophecy [*prophetai*] was embraced within a comprehensive notion of divination [*mantike*] by the Greeks. The ancients subdivided divination acording to the method of apprehension. They distinguished technical or ominal from natural or intuitive divination.[28] In its many forms divination becomes the sensible evidence of the gods, its authenticity is guaranteed by its divine patrons.[29]

It is natural divination to which dreams and ecstatic states belong. Apollo has the patronage of trance mediumship, Asclepius that of the veridical dream, while Hecate and Corybantes are held responsible for disorderly divination.

For example, at most of his oracles Apollo relied on enthusiasm [*enthusiasmos*]. The Pythia becomes *entheos*. The god enters into her and uses her vocal organs as it they were his own.[30] Thus enthusiasm and ecstasy is a blessing sent by Apollo that leads to divination.[31]

Other prophets like Cassandra and Bakis, who were not confined to official oracles, also prophesize in a state of possession.[32] Theoclymenus, for example, has similar symbolic visions as Cassandra,[33] and the Argive prophetess of Apollo is reported to have similar spontaneous, ecstatic visions.[34]

In the Dionysus cult telestic ecstasy plays a prominent role with the god dispensing enthusiasm and ecstasy to his followers.[35] Wild frenzy may appear as a catastrophe sent by terrible Hera but it is, despite its hallucinatory effects, in fact, a divine state.[36]

The joys of Dionysius Lusios, the liberator, enables one to stop being oneself, thereby setting oneself free. The aim of his cult was a liberating ecstasis. As the Scythians in Herodotus state: "Dionysius leads people on to behave madly."[37]

With the incorporation of the Apollinian and Dionysian cults in the civic religions by the sixth and fifth centuries, these characteristics were overlaid by others. Ecstatic and telestic prophecy have passed under the control of religious orthodoxy. Two brothers, the sons of Zeus, govern the spheres of divine possession. Dionysius and Apollo rule over initiation and divination while Zeus stands as Father of both. Dionysius offers freedom, Apollo security.

Neither Dionysius or Apollo are linked to pathological prophecy. Other powers are associated with ecstatic and telestic prophecy in their pathological contexts. From Euripides[38] and Hippocrates[39] we see that Hecate, Cybele, Pan, Poseidon, Apollo Nomios, and Ares are associated with these aspects of ecstatic and telestic prophecy.[40]

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[28] *Iliad*, 1.172.

[29] Ibid., 1.87. According to Homer Apollo is the god of the diviners.

[30] Plato, *Leg.*, 672b.

[31] See Dodds [1951] 72ff.

[32] *Agam.*, 1266ff.; 1269ff. Cf. Cicero, *De div.*, 1.67.

[33] *Ody.*, 20.35ff.

[34] This type of prophecy continues unabated into the Roman period, cf. Plut. *Pyrrh.*, 31. Also see Aesch. *Eum.*, 378ff.; Hdt., 7.140.3 for earlier examples of this type of prophecy.

[35] See Burkert [1985] 109–118.

[36] *H. Hymn.*, 7.34ff.

[37] Thuc., 2.61.2; Menander, fr. 149; Hipp., 141ff.

[38] *Morb. sacr.*, 1.6.360.13ff.

[39] *Medea*, 1172.

[40] The cult functions appear to be cathartic and apotropaic. Cf. Dio. Chrys., *Or.*, 4.90.

Moreover, these figures are not only associated with deities that cause mental illness. They also become the divine patrons of mental health for they could cure what they caused once their anger was appeased.[41]

Indeed, by the fifth century cults to Hecate developed a special treatment for the symptoms of ecstatic and telestic mental illness. The Corybantes were Hecate's attendants and they healed such afflictions.[42] We know from Plato and Aristides that the Corybantes professed to cure anxiety [*deimata*] arising from their morbid mental condition.[43] Asclepius was often the practitioner of the cure if all else failed.[44]

This implies that Apollo takes part in cures for mental disorders arising from prophecy.[45] Consequently, ecstatic and telestic prophecy and divination were detached from merely a religious context and applied to the field of psychiatry and physiology.[46] Hippocratic physicians become part of an ancient equation that also explains prophecy and divination.[47] They became interpreters of the manifold effects of divine possession.

A typical diviner is Homer's Kalchas "who knew things past, present, and to come."[48] Like all great diviners Kalchas practices an art "granted him by Apollo." Later the Pythia became his official spokeswoman. So pervasive was need to legitimize prophecy that genealogical connections were created between legendary diviners like Mopsos as grandson of Teiresias, and historical seers would trace themselves back to a Melampus so that in Olympia there were a line of diviners called the *Iamidai.*[49] The gift is handed down from generation to generation.

Nonetheless, prophecy could not be fully confined to official oracles. The sober ecstasy that griped Aristeas stood outside cult control. Seized by Phoibos he was transported to northern lands from whence he returned with tales of the wondrous Hyperboreans.[50] We are also told that the spirit of Hermotimos from Klazomenai went traveling and brought back information about distant places and information about the future.[51] This spontaneous divine madness possessed many wandering charismatic miracle men between the seventh sixth centuries. In trance they flew to the spirit world and back again.

However, by the fifth century this unregulated divination and prophecy is discredited. Diviners and prophets are organized in the interest of the Olympians. Apollo takes over the patronage of trance mediumship and his son Asclepius the veridical dream, while powers like Hecate and the Corybantes are held responsible for the disorderly manifestations of divination and prophecy. Apolline prophecy is associated with knowledge, the Dionysian with liberation, and the Hecatean with healing through Apollo's son Asclepius. Prophecy and divination is under the control of the Olympian gods.

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[41] Pind., *Pyth.*, 3.137ff.; cf. Diodorus, 3.58.2; Pausanius, 9.25.3.

[42] Plato, *Laws*, 790e; Aristides, *De musica*, 3.25, p. 93 Jahn.

[43] Ar. *Vesp.*, 118ff.; 122ff.

[44] For example, Theophrastsus describes a musical cure for this pathology, cf. fr. 88 Wimmer=Aristoxenus, fr. 6. Also see, Aristoxenus, fr. 117.

[45] For treatment of insanity see, Censorinus, *De die natali*, 12; Caelius Aurelianus, *De morbis chronicis*, 1.5.

[46] On this see, Heiberg, *Geistes krankheiten in klass. Altertum.*

[47] *Iliad*, 1.70.

[48] Pindar, *Ol.*, 6.

[49] Hdt., 4.13–15.

[50] Apollon., *Hist. Mir.*, 3.

[51] Hesiod, fr. 37.14ff.

Nonetheless, the diviner [*mantis*] and prophet [*prophetes*] were often viewed as ambiguous, sometimes even dangerous. Possession, seizure, stepping out, frenzy could be a pathological state,[52] a cthonic possession by the Mother of the Gods,[53] or a beatific trance from Apollo which enduced song and dance.[54]

A few, like the author of the fifth-century treatise *de morbo sacro,* go so far as to deny any sickness is more divine than any other, holding that all disease is divine as part of the divine order whose causes may be discovered by reason.[55]

In most cases it is assumed the diviner speaks in an abnormal non-pathological state which requires someone to formulate and translate the divine utterances. This figure is commonly the prophet [*prophetes*].[56] Consequently, with Plato and the Stoa the art of prophetic interpretation becomes a rational technique. Here the transition to philosophical or scientific methodology is made almost imperceptibly.

Consequently, by the dawn of the classical age Greek intellectuals begin to classify divine madness into specific types. Heraclitus makes Apollo and Zeus its patron, with the Apolline Pythia and the Sibyl its mouthpieces or Zeus' priestess at Dodona its medium.[57] Then Plato and Chrysippus offer a prophetic typology and a scientific art of prophetic interpretation.[58]

b. The Philosophical Literatures

Only Democritus,[59] Aristotle,[60] and Hippocrates[61] are skeptical about the legitimacy of prophecy and divination. They are either psychological or physiological in origin, signaling either a human psycho-pathology or physio-telepathy but rarely a divine blessing. We shall have the opportunity to discuss this naturalizaton of the supernatural momentarily.

It is a short step from investing prophecy with divine legitimacy to imbuing the prophet-diviner and the art of divination with philosophical significance. For Plato madness is our greatest blessing (*Phaedrus,* 244a). It is given as a divine gift (*Phaedrus,* 265a). For Chrysippus it is the power to perceive the linking of all causes and the ability to grasp everything which will be (*SVF* 2.945). The configurations of Plato and Chrysippus endure for centuries.[62]

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[52] Hippocr. *Morb. Sacr.,* 1.42 (6.362, ed. Littre).

[53] *Hymn. Apoll.,* 156–164; cf. Herodt., 8.135. where Mys hears his mother tongue in the *thespizein* of the *promantis* in the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios.

[54] Hippoc., *Morb. sacr.,* 18; *Prog.,* c.1, 2.112.5, cf. *aer. aq. loc.* 22.

[55] Although the source is late there is a prophet alongside the Pythia in Delphi. Cf. Plut. *De def. orac.,* 438b; and one beside the *thespiodos* in Klaros. cf. *OGI* 530.

[56] Herac., fr. 92d. The context of the fragment in Plutarch makes it likely the god in question is Apollo.

[57] For Plato see the *Phaedrus,* 244ae; 245a; 249d; 262d. For Chrysippus *ap.* Cicero, *De div.,* 2.63.1.30.

[58] For Democritus see, Plutarch, *Q. conv.,* 8.10.2, 734f.=*D-K* 68 A 77.

[59] For Aristotle see *Eth. Eud.,* 8.2.23, 1248a38ff.; *De div. p. somn.,* 464a32. Also see Cicero, *De div.,* 1.72. Plutarch, *Plac. phil.,* 5.1.

[60] For the Hippocratic tradition see, e.g., *Morb. sacr.,* 18; 20; *Prog.,* 1.

[61] See Pfeffer [1972] 10–112.

[62] See Dodds [1951] 64–101; Pfeffer [1972] 10–39.

Plato's interpretation of prophecy and divination is complex.[63] He extolls four types of mantic prophecy. Yet he also depricates divination and manticism. His positions rest on the view of the supranatural origin of prophecy and the psychic and physiological basis of divination.

Plato defines four types of divine madness. He distinguishes the prophetic madness whose patron god is Apollo from the telestic madness whose patron god is Dionysius. To this he adds poetic madness inspired by the Muses and erotic madness inspired by Aphrodite and Eros.[64]

The first is the frenzy [*mania*] of the diviner which produces the art of divination [*mantike*].[65] The second is the madness of the priest which releases one from disease and other ills.[66] The third frenzy is the source of the songs of poets and the laws of statesman.[67] The fourth madness is the recollection of the ideas that cannot be perceived by the senses.[68]

That the diviner creates good omens and induces success is assumed. It is also assumed there is a tortuous and complicated path to understanding prophecy which is discovered by means of signs. Hence, each type of prophetic frenzy stands before a diviner who wields the art of divination. For Plato the prophet becomes synonomous with diviner and the art of divination. Furthermore the prophet as diviner can be a poet, a priest, a statesman, or a philosopher.[69]

Prophecy and divination yield a wide range of knowledge. Given the source of prophetic knowledge Plato is not hesitant to suggest their capacity to yield a recollection of intelligibles.[70] Prophecy possesses a degree of epistemic validity. It is not the mere production of the ego. Ecstatic possession [*katokochē*] is a decidedly valuable mode of intellection which yields divine knowledge.[71]

The details of Plato's theory deserve fuller attention. Nonetheless it is clear that for Plato each god and demon has its own *ergon*,[72] that they give commands and gifts,[73] and that principal among them is manic prophecy.

Among the media for the dissemination of divine goods is divine madness in all its varieties. The gods are our masters who give to their servants goods for the improvement of their souls. These goods provide information relevant to the making of good moral judgments if interpreted properly.[74]

This is only the case, however, if the rational part of the soul is active in prophecy and divination. If the irrational parts of the soul are active then prophecy and divination yield falsehoods.[75] Thus each activity encompasses a wide range of psychic and truth

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[63] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 265b; cf. 244ae.
[64] Ibid., 244b.
[65] Ibid., 244d–e.
[66] Ibid., 245a. cf. *Meno*, 99d.
[67] *Phaedrus*, 249dff.
[68] Ibid., 262d.
[69] Ibid., 249d.
[70] Ibid., 244b; 265a.
[71] *Phaedrus*, 247a.
[72] *Apol.*, 33c; 41d; cf. *Phaedrus*, 229e. For Socrates, cf. Xen., *Mem.*, 1.3.2.
[73] Plato appears to accept this Socratic perspective. Xen., *Mem.*, 1.4.15–19; 1.4.18–19.
[74] *Rep.*, 571ff.
[75] *Crito*, 44b; *Phaedo*, 60e; cf. Calcidius, *In Tim.*, 256.

conditional possibilities—from intelligible and sensible knowledge to opinion and belief.

Plato, thus, is cautious and ambiguous about prophecy and divination. It is the deceitful soul who values more the knowledge derived from prophecy and divination than knowledge derived from philosophy.[76] The rational soul [*nous*] is never active in prophecy. Reason [*logismos*] is the mental faculty which judges [*krinein*] prophetic visions [*phantasma*].

Rationally analyzed prophecy reveals an image of the truth. Unanalyzed prophecy yields falsehoods for prophets are not of sound mind.[78] Indeed it is the liver which is the organ of divination and Plato suggests that divination may have a physiological and pathological basis.[79] This leads Plato to say prophecy and divination must be rationally managed for:

> God gave unto man's foolishness [*aphrosune*]
> the gift of divination [*mantiken*].
> (*Tim.*, 71e)

Aristotle's view of prophecy and divination is more negative than Plato's.[80] He views onaric and hyparic activity as demonic and irrational. He sees a pathological origin for both prophecy and divination. This judgment leads him to deny their divine character and the epistemic validity of prophetic visions and mantic prognostications.

In his youth Aristotle followed Plato in attributing both to an innate capacity of the soul itself either in sleep or when the soul is about to abandon the body at death.[81] Later is his essay *De div. p. somn.* he no longer speaks of the soul's innate power of divination and he rejects the notion of god-sent dreams.[82]

Melancholics are mentioned again but they are no longer seen as especially gifted but merely as exceptionally talkative types who prompt all types of visions that on occasion become true.[83] Dreams are natural and nature is not divine. Thus, dreams are called demonic.[84]

Aristotle also rejects ominal divination[85] and ascribes the intuitive variety of divination not to divine intervention but to an innate capacity of the human mind.[86] A kind of melancholic temperment enables certain individuals to perceive intuitively and irrationally both the future and the present. The cause of this is an excess of black bile in the prophet or diviner's system and this leads to the conclusion that prophecy and divination are signs of emotional instability.[87]

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[76] *Apol.*, 22b–c; *Ion*, 534e; *Meno*, 99c. For Socrates, cf. Xen., *Mem.*, 1.1.2; 1.1.6–10; 1.4.16.

[78] *Tim.*, 71a–72b; cf. *Rep.* 364b; *Laws*, 772d; 871c.

[79] *Tim.*, 72bd.

[80] See Dodds' analysis of Aristotle [1973] 163; 176; 180–185.

[81] See fr. 10 Rose=12a Ross. Premonitions of the sick are discussed in an earlier dialogue Eudemus, cf. fr. 37 Rose.

[82] *De div. p. somn.*, 464a20; cf. Cicero, *De div.*, 2.126.129.

[83] Ibid., 463b 15–22.

[84] Cf. *De div. p. somn.*, 463b 12ff.

[85] His *Per. Phil.* is lost but this judgment is preserved by Cicero, *De div.*, 1.72 and Plutarch, *Plac. phil.*, 5.1.

[86] *Eth. Eud.*, 8.2.23, 1248a 38ff.; *De div. p. somn.*, 464a 32.

[87] *Eth. Eud.*, 1248a 29b. Plato had already associated divination with the irrational soul, cf. *Tim.*, 71de.

Prophecy and divination represent the illusions of the sane and the hallucinations of the insane. With this judgment Aristotle removes prophecy and divination from any serious philosophical consideration. Prophets, diviners, and mantics are mere exploiters and charlatans.

In summary, Aristotle traces prophecy and divination to an irrational source which is superior to mind and deliberation. He traces this to a disease which gives rise to melancholy. Their epistemic veracity is individual, and hence minimal, for prophecy and divination express in symbolic form a variety of morbid physiological and psychological states. Thus, they have no intellective or predictive value. They merely possess a clinical value.

The consequences of Aristotle's assessment are significant. Prophecy and divination are moved from the divine sphere to the demonic and assessed within the context of psychological and physiological pathology.

c. The Empirical and Medical Literatures

This approach to prophecy and divination begins with Democritus. His treatise *On Images* is lost[88] but an outline of the doctrine is preserved by Plutarch.[89] We are told that prophecy and divination are explained by the penetration through the pores of the body of images which are emitted by objects. These are the thoughts, characters, and emotions of individuals. Their impact communicates to recipients the opinions, thoughts, and impulses of their senders.

There are also degrees of distortion which images suffer in transit from individual to individual. These depend on climatic, atomic, and emotional factors.[90] Consequently, Democritus argues for a natural interpretation of prophecy and divination. Their epistemic veracity is minimal. They merely yield the disturbed mental world of the prophet or diviner.

This is a theory of telepathy.[91] It is quite distinct from contemporary attempts to explain prophecy and divination.[92] The theory argues that such images are a disturbance of body and mind. These images only carry representations of the mental activities of those who produced them. They do not yield knowledge of the divine.[93]

This reflects an emerging natural interpretation of mania. Empedocles and his school distinguished madness arising *ex purgamento animae* from frenzy due to bodily ailments.[94]

With Thucydides we encounter one who entirely belongs to this natural school of thought. He explains the plague at Athens as a natural disorder. He sets down its nature and explains its symptoms in order to prevent its recurrence.[95] This approach suggests that Thucydides was familiar with the principles of Greek medicine.

This approach to illness is also evident in Herodotus. He offers explanations of the

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[88] Cf. *D-K*, 68 B 10.

[89] Cf. *Q. conv.*, 8.10.2, 734f.=*D-K* 68 A 77.

[90] See Delatte [1934] 46ff.; and Dodds [1973] 160ff.

[91] See Sext, Empir., *Adv. Math.*, 9.19=*D-K* 68 B 166.

[92] This is clear from Aetius, 4.10.4=*D-K* 68 A 116.

[93] According to Antisthenes, Democritus undertook an experimental study of images, cf. Diog. Laert., 9.38.

[94] See Caelius Aurelianus, *De morbis chronicis*, 1.5=*D-K* 31 A 98. Cf. Delatte [1921] 21ff.

[95] Thucy., 2.48; cf. 2.47.

madness of Cleomenes and Cambyses from a natural perspective. Clearly, madness yields symptoms that can be studied within a clinical context.

We learn that the madness of Cleomenes was explained from natural causes by the Spartans. They thought it due to drunkeness.[96] The Argives, however, thought Cleomenes went mad because he induced the Pythoress to pronounce against Demaratus.[97] The Athenians differed from all others saying that it was because he cut down the sacred grove of the goddess. Herodotus thinks his madness and death was due to wronging Demaratus.[98]

The ethnographer explains Cambyses' madness as congenital epilepsy.[99] For most people this calls for a supernatural form of healing for epilepsy was thought to be the sacred disease *par excellence.*[100] Consequently, the cures prescribed by Herodotus for epilepsy were a mixture of the natural and supernatural. He advocated abstinence from foods which rendered the patient impure, the avoidance of clothing that carries evil and the binding of the patient's hands.

The Hippocratic *Prognostikon* states certain diseases such as epilepsy have something divine about them.[101] Its symptoms were thought to be a form of possession.[102] However, it is up to the physician to uncover its natural causes. The medical practitioner attempts to define the cause [*aitia*] of illness through empirical observation and to suggest a prognosis [*prognostikon*] for its cure.[103]

All natural objects are composed of the four elements and are characterized by the qualities hot, cold, dry, and moist.[104] This approach leads to a set of conclusions about the nature of epilepsy and its cure.[105]

Physical characteristics are hereditary and from this general law he advises that epileptic fathers and mothers should refrain from producing children due to the unhealthy nature of their seed. To demonstrate this he describes the natural causes of epilepsy in great detail. He develops the anatomical preconditions for the disease by describing the system of blood vessels. Finally, he explains the details of epilepsy through the various disturbances in the circulation of the *pneuma* in the blood.[106]

In phlegmatic people too much humidity causes too much phlegm in the brain. This excess of phlegm flows down [*katarrei*] into the veins and inhibits the flow of *pneuma.* This explains symptoms of paralysis, seizure, weakening of the senses, and loss of consciousness. Practical medicine, then, in the case of the prophetic disease epilepsy, is the application of a dry medicine to reverse a wet disease. The goal is to restore the patient's natural state.

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[96] Hdt., 6.84; cf. 6.75.3.

[97] Ibid., 6.75.

[98] Ibid., 6.85.

[99] Ibid., 3.33; cf. Xen., *Mem.*, 3.12.6.

[100] On epilepsy, see Temkin [1945] 15ff.; 84ff.; 138ff.; Oesterreich [1930] 18; 22; 179–183; and Weinreich's study Menekrates, Zeus, und Salmoneus, *TBAW,* 18.

[101] *Prog.*, c. 1, 2.112.5 (Littre).

[102] Aretaeus, *De causis et signis acutorum morborum,* 1ff. (Kuehn).

[103] Hipp., *Morb. sacr.*, 18=6.394.9ff. (Littre).

[104] *ap.* Galen, 13.763–764. (Kuehn).

[105] Hipp., *De mun.*, 14.

[106] Hipp., *Morb. sacr.*, 20; cf. 12. ehn.

This, however, is relatively advanced thinking. Nonetheless, it is important for this study because the medical literature provides a natural typology and explanation of prophecy and divination.

Hippocrates devotes a whole section of his treatise *Peri Diaites* to a discussion of precognitive dreams.[107] For the Hippocratic physician dreams are merely wish-fulfillments which are symbolic forms of morbid physiological states having no predictive value save for the physician. They are examples of physical disease or mental crisis. They are but clinical symptoms of mental and physiological illness.[108]

Thus for the physicians prophecy and divination yield signs that reveal the health or illness of the patient. Once these images are decoded the medical practitioner gains a picture of the patients hygenic and urpoietic systems.[109] Then diagnoses and prognoses are offered to counter the pathology.

d. The Asclepian Epidaurus

Assessing prophecy and divination in their prognostic and diagnostic contexts leads to an expansion of the clinical approach to these arcana mundi. The physicians greatly influenced analyses associated with the cults of Asclepius, Isis, and Serapis.[110]

It is a short step from the *Prognostikon* of Hippocrates to the Temple records of the Asclepian Epidaurus.[111] One old physician, who had been granted an apotheosis, had cult centers across throughout the Mediterranean basin. This was Asclepius. It was his temple at Epidaurus with its records that allow entrance into the world of Asclepian prophecy and divination.

The healing cults of the Mediterranean world were many and varied, their approaches to prophecy and divination determined by regional cultic contexts. Nonetheless certain gods were recognized not only as healers but as prophets. They were associated with the cthonic deities and their progeny.[112]

Prophecy and divination permeated the *Asklepia* and the theories of the philosophers and physicians were known there. Alexander Polyhistor claims that "the whole air is full of souls, who are worshipped as the demons and heroes and it is these who send mankind dreams and omens."[113]

Although it was principally the dream oracle [*onar-chresmos*] the Asclepian priests focused upon another type of oracle merits our attention. This is the waking oracle [*hypar-chresmos*]. For telepathic prophecy and divination were also associated with it.[114]

Maximus of Tyre experienced a waking vision of Asclepius.[115] It is likely that many

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[107] Text and translation in Littre, *Oeuvres d'Hippocrate*, vi.640–643. For the date see Jaeger, *Paideia*, 3.33f.

[108] For example, see Epidem., 1.10=2.670 (Littre); *Hum.*, 4 (v 480); *Hebd.*, 45 (9.460). *Morb.*, 2.72 (7.110); *Int.*, 48 (7.286).

[109] Hipp., *Peri Enyp.*, 4.421ff.; 4.428ff.

[110] See Weinreich [1908] and Dodds [1951] 64ff.

[111] See Herzog [1931] and Edelstein-Edelstein [1965] for the testimonies from Epidaurus.

[112] See Dodds [1951] 110–116; 127–130.

[113] Alex. Pol. *apud* Diog. Laert. 8.32=*D-K* 58 B 1a.

[114] For this aspect of Asclepian divination see Meier [1962] 314–318.

[115] Diog. Laert., 9.7.

of the god's more detailed prescriptions were received by patients in a waking state of mind. We also are told of cures performed by temple dogs who lick the affected part of the waking patient.[116] Thus the *hypar chresmos* was a recognized medium of divine epiphany. Its features are worth examining in some detail.

Aristides tells us of his waking encounter with the god:

> It was like seeming to touch him . . . a kind of awareness that he was there in person; one was between sleeping and waking, one wanted to open one's eyes and was anxious should he withdraw too soon; one listened and heard things, sometimes as in a dream, sometimes as in waking life; one's hair stood on end; one cried and felt happy; one's heart swelled but not with vainglory. What human being could put that experience into words? But anyone who has been through it will share my knowledge and recognize the state of mind.
>
> (*Orat.*, 48.31ff.=test. 417)

Several features of this vision are worth noting. The oracle is received while the patient is awake. The media of the oracle are voice and sight. Although the vision is received in a semi-conscious state it is grasped by the rational mind. Fourth, the oracle has a divine origin. Thus the reception of voices and visions are not signs of mental or somatic illness but divine possession. Therefore the oracle may be used for diagnostic, prognostic, and divinatory ends.

Indeed cure from ailment signifies rebirth.[117] The god appears and commences to give a set of prescriptions to follow. If followed the patient is cured. Once cured the patient becomes a *religiosus* or even a *fanum* and joins other *katochē* in the *katochi*.[118]

Thus visual and auditory signs from the god are considerd legitimate forms of possession. Indeed the healing cults of the Mediterranean world continue to promote a culture's positive assessment of prophecy and divination. Moreover a rational defense of the *arcana mundi* is offered, thereby countering the valuations placed on the prophet and the diviner by philosophers and physicians.

This perspective on prophecy and divination becomes part of viewpoints common to Stoicism and later Platonism.[119] Both school traditions not only defend prophecy and divination but place the prophet and diviner among the wise men and divine men who founded their schools. Often the deity appears and reveals to the diviner the course of future events and prescribes appropriate action for the prophet to follow.[120] We shall have the opportunity to discuss these developments momentarily. But first we must briefly examine the oneirocritical traditions.

e. Oneirocritica

It is even a shorter step from the Temple records of the Asclepian Epidaurus to the *Oneirocrtica* of Artemidorus.[121] His approach to dream oracles suggests a variety of

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[116] Edelstein-Edelstein [1965] 17; 20; 26.

[117] At least according to the Suida, s.v. *domninos*.

[118] See Singer [1922] on how the healing god uses the powers of the universe to heal and give prognoses.

[119] See Plut. *Gen. soc.*, esp. 6; 12; 20–22. We shall have the opportunity to discuss Plutarch momentarily.

[120] This is a favorite *leit-motif* of Philo's concerning Moses, cf. *Vit. Mos.*, 1.72ff.

[121] Cf. Pack [1963]; eng. tr. White [1975].

philosophical influences.[122] His writing is important for our purposes for he employs terminology also utilized by Philo Judaeus.[123]

It is not possible to give in any detail a complete analysis of the contents of the *Oneirocritica*.[124] Nonetheless, the following points are worthy of notice.

Artemidorus classifies dream prophecies under five headings. The first three are considered prophetic and true dreams, the last three non-prophetic and false dreams.[125] These are the:

> enigmatic dream: the *oneiros*
> prophetic vision: the *horama*
> oracular dream: the *chresmatismos*

and the:

> nightmare: the *enypnion*
> apparition: the *phantasma*

The oracular vision [*horama*] and the prophetic vision [*chresmatismos*] are valuable for this study. While they are analyzed by Artemidorus as onaric oracles, Philo takes such oracles to be onaric and hyparic.[126] Moreover, he employs the technical terminology of onaric prophecy in a new, hyparic context.[127]

In the case of the hyparic *horama* and *chresmatismos* the god appears directly without intermediaries and symbols. Usually deity manifests himself vocally and converses with the prophet directly. Consequently, there is no need for interpretation of prophecy.[128]

Finally there are six elements found in all oracles. These are nature, law, custom professional skill, art, and name. To grasp the full meaning of an oracle it is necessary to know about the prophet's life and situation, his character, and the land he comes from. Such data is central for the the art of oracle exegesis. For oracles are mediated through the prophet or mantic. Therefore the meaning and outcome of an oracle depends on information about their character.

3. Prophetes: Mania, Psyche, and Cosmos

a. Stoicism

With Stoicism, the association between prophecy, divination, and medicine continues. The Stoics defend the legitimacy of prophecy and divination. They base their defense on medical and philosophical grounds.[129]

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[122] See White [1975] 1–11.; cf. Pack [1963].

[123] See Berchman [1987] 412–428.

[124] For a detailed analysis see Blum [1936] 23ff.; 83–89.

[125] *Onic.*, 1.2.

[126] On Philo's onaric interpretation of these oracles, see Berchman [1987] 414–428.

[127] See Part II of this study.

[128] According to Artemidorus this *chresmos* is straightfoward or theorematic, not enigmatic or allegorical, cf. *Onic.*, 4.1, 35.

[129] Like Alexander Polyhistor, Posidonius thought demons and heroes sent oracles to mankind, cf. See Cicero, *De div.*, 1.64.

According to Chrysippus prophecy is a form of divination.[130] From Posidonius we learn there are two types of divination: natural and artificial.[131] He grounds natural and artificial in physiological theory and employs prognostic methods to uncover their hidden meanings.[132]

For example, the Stoics argued that ominal divination had an empirical basis. Certain causal sequences had been observed in the past that points to their re-occurence in the future. Intuitive divination was another matter. But since the Stoics believed themselves to live in a finite universe the nexus of present conditions on which the future was thought to depend was also finite.[133] Therefore, even the content of intuitive divination was thought knowable in its totality by the gods and this knowledge was passed to humanity through special prophetic agents.

These a priori conclusions were supported by collections of cases.[134] Cicero tells us they consisted of anecdotes from famous men. The poverty of such collections permits us to move on to the theoretical basis of Stoic prophetic theory.

Prophecy and divination yield divine knowledge and the prophet-diviner grasps the meaning of the divine Logos who orders and governs the world.[135] This is possible, the Stoics argue, because of the relationship of the soul to God.[136] Some souls are capable of cognisizing the universal Pneuma dispersed throughout the world and if their precognitions are interpreted correctly then the most important issues of things divine and human can be uncovered.[137]

Since the course of all events is determined by providence they argued that precognition was possible and that it must occur. Consequently:

> Prior events are causes of those following them, and in this manner all things are bound together with one another, and thus nothing happens in the world such that something else is not entirely a consequence of it and attached to it as a cause . . . From everything that happens something else follows depending on it by necessity as a cause.
>
> (*SVF* 2.945)

Therefore:

> If there could be any man who perceived the linking of all causes nothing would ever deceive him. For whoever grasps the causes of future events must grasp everything that will be . . . The passage of time is like the unwinding of a rope, bringing about nothing new.
>
> (*SVF* 2.944)

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[130] See Cicero, *De div.*, 2.63; 1.30.

[131] Ibid., 1.11; 2.26.

[132] Ibid., 1.12, 24, 112.

[133] Only if there were an infinity of worlds would divination be impossible, cf. Plut. *Def. orac.*, 24.423c.

[134] Those compiled by Chrysippus are lost. However, Cicero utilizes many of these cases in book 1 of the *De divinatione.*

[135] Ibid., 1.57; 1.20.

[136] Ibid., 1.30, 65; 2.10.

[137] Ibid., 1.57; 1.29.

All future events are theoretically predictable and divination is appealed to as evidence for the validity of the causal nexus. For every event must have a cause since the pneuma-logos is the intelligent director of everything.[138]

For Posidonius the validity and truth character of prophecy rests on the assumption of the community of divine and human reason.[139] This common reason in God and man results in a physically mediated telepathy between human souls, demonic souls, and the divine soul.[140] The thinking of these beings set up vibrations in the air which enable prophets and diviners to receive and apprehend their thoughts:[141]

> . . . as the minds of gods have community of feeling without eyes, ears, or tongue . . . so human minds when set free by sleep or in detached states of excited derangement, perceive things which minds involved with the body cannot see.
>
> (Cicero, *De div.*, 1.29)

Such a supposition permits the Stoics to generalize a theory of prophecy and divination on the basis of *sympatheia* which, when combined with the notion of pneuma, leads to a physical explanation of the possibility of prophecy and divination.

There is much more to Posidonius' cosmology than can be dealt with here. Nonetheless, his pneumatology points toward basic cosmological assumptions. Cicero links the two when he describes Posidonius' efforts to establish divination:

> He supposes that there are signs in nature of future events.
>
> (Cic., *De div.*, 1.129)

Indeed Cicero tells us that:

> the Stoic Boethus and our own Posidonius have studied the causes of prognostications; and if the causes of these things were not discovered yet the facts themselves could be observed and noted.
>
> (Cic., *De div.*, 2.47)

The predictability of events and cosmic sympathy complement each other. Posidonius argues such pneumatic vibrations impinge on us continually because of cosmic sympathy.[142] The proper recording and observation of causes yields data about the workings of divine providence.[143]

Such linkage suggests an attempt to counter Democritean, Aristotelian, and Hippocratean arguments against prophecy and divination. Such reflections were generalized in Middle Stoic and Middle Platonic doctrine to argue for their efficacy.[144]

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[138] *SVF*, 2.945; cf. 2.959; 2.967.

[139] Cicero, *De div.*, 1.64.

[140] Plut., *Gen. soc.*, 20.589b. Reinhardt [1926] 401 attributes this theory to Posidonius.

[141] For example, the influence of the magnet upon iron was used by Plato to illustrate the communication of poetic madness. cf. *Ion*, 533dff. See Dodds [1973] 164ff.

[142] Cicero argues that Posidonius' position is a basis for a plausible argument for the efficacy of divination, cf. *De div.*, 1.86.

[143] Not all Middle Stoics maintained this view, cf. Panaetius, fr. 68; 70–71; 73.

[144] On the similarities between Middle Stoic and Middle Platonic views of *sympatheia* and *pneuma*, see Reinhardt [1926] 248–253.

Posidonius, at least, regarded human affairs as subject to to causation and based his theory of causation on a theory of the regulation of the universe dependant on three sources: God, Fate, and Nature.[145] Nature provides signs that can be interpreted through artificial divination. Consequently, physically mediated telepathy between souls of the air and the seer are valid because such signs are caused by divine reason.[146]

The Apamean employs the results of his geographical and biological researches to demonstrate that all parts of the cosmos are linked together by natural affinity [*sympatheia*].[147] This makes possible, for example, for astrological configurations to be informative for deciphering fate and the shape of an animal's liver to have a bearing on the outcome of a battle.

The assumption is that all things are linked causally. Sometimes this link is explicit and obvious. Other times it is implicit and hidden. In the second case, which often encompasses prophetic material, the diviner uncovers the hidden causes under the surface of events.[149] All things occur in accordance with fate and since fate is the causal link running through and connecting all events prophecy and divination are sources for understanding such events.[150]

Since prophecies are a source of predetermined events a careful study of them furnishes a knowledge of the future. This type of knowledge comes from a careful study of the causal elements within and between prophecies. Indeed, the divinatory character of prophecy is demonstrated from their signs according to the rules [*theoremata, praecepta*] of propositional logic.[151]

An example of this is as follows:

> . . . if it were not the case that all things are encompassed by fate, then the prophecies of the diviners would not be true; but the prophecies of the diviners are true (this premise is supressed but assumed); therefore all things are encompassed by fate.
>
> (*SVF* 2.939)

This *modus tollens* argument form according to the second undemonstrated argument permits Chrysippus to define divination as:

> The power of knowing, understanding, and explaining the signs, which are presaged by gods for men.
>
> (*SVF* 2.1189)

Fate is the *ratio essendi* of divination. This is what makes it a science [*techne*]. Thus the prophecies of fate are always fulfilled. Logic is the *ratio cognoscendi* of divination. Thus prognostications are demonstrable. Indeed the existence of fate guarantees that prophecy and divination are effacious. Moreover the predictions of prophecy and divination are scientific because prophetic signs reveal connections within in nature based upon the designs of divine providence [*pronoia*].

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[145] See Cicero, *De div.*, 1.25 and 1.64.
[146] Ibid., 1.129.
[147] Ibid., 2.33–35.
[149] See Edelstein-Kidd [1972] frr. 111; 112.
[150] Cf. *SVF* 2.973.
[151] Ibid., 2.939, 1191.

This understanding of prophecy and divination functioned to offer proof of the existence of the gods and the government of all things in nature according to providence. Since the human soul is divine it possesses the capacity of receiving and interpreting the providental signs given to it by the gods. Prophecy and divination reveal natural laws and their causal connections.

b. Platonists

Later Platonists largely accepted Stoic theories of prophecy and divination. This implies an acceptance of Stoic pneumatic and providental theories as well.[152] Two examples of the extent to which this was the case must suffice to illustrate this connection. Our subjects are Antiochus of Ascalon and Plutarch of Chaeroneia.

The Middle Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon believed in artificial and natural divination because it was the result of the working of the divine *logos* in the world.[153]

Antiochus like Posidonius, as far as we can gather, regarded human affairs as subject to an ineluctable chain of causation. Consequently, he based his theory of divination upon this theory of the regularity of the cosmos.[154]

He maintained that artificial and natural divination are the working of the divine logos in the world. Divination comes in dreams or arises from certain parts of the earth [sic. Delphi] to be grasped by privileged individuals such as sibyls. It is even possible for men by careful study to learn and understand the mantic signs.[155] Thus all philosophers save Xenophanes and Epicurus believed in divination.[156]

Antiochus has forgotten Plato's objections against manticism He remembers only Plato's blessings upon divine madness. He follows Chrysippus who identifies prophecy with divination thereby rendering nugatory Plato's distinction.

Later Platonism's acceptance of the legitimacy and efficacy of prophecy and divination is also attested by Plutarch who wrote four essays dealing with the subject. For Plutarch's views of prophecy and divination we turn to his psychology and demonology. It is here that he rationalizes our *arcana mundi.*

He assumed the efficacy of natural and artificial divination.[157] His faith in both rests on the premise that only a few individuals receive direct divine revelations. Communication from the gods for the many is received through signs.[158] The agents of divination are largely demons who mediate between gods and men.[159] They are in charge of oracles because they supervise the *krasis* of the exhalations of the earth cause prophecy[160] and guide souls which possess mantic powers.[161]

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[152] See Cicero, *De fato,* 5.2; 7.13.

[153] This thesis is convincingly argued by Dillon [1977] s.v. *pneuma, pronoia, manteia.*

[154] The details of Cicero's *De div.* 1.12ff.; 1.110ff. apply to Antiochus and all later Middle Platonists, cf. Dillon [1977] 89ff. For Antiochus the best work remains, Luck [1953].

[155] Following Cicero, *De fin.,* 4.36; cf. *Top.,* 63–64; *Nat. Deo.,* 1.16.

[156] Cicero, *De div.,* 1.12, 110; 1.5.

[157] *Gen. soc.,* 6; *De pyth. orac.,* 398ab.

[158] *Gen. soc.,* 21–22.

[159] *De def. orac.,* 416cff.

[160] Ibid., 432cd.

[161] *Gen. soc.,* 20.593dff; cf. 591dff.

Plutarch held that the human soul had a natural faculty of divination which could be used at favorable times when the somatic state of the soul was not unfavorable.[162] The extent of Plutarch's faith in prophecy and divination is clear from his assumption that a cloud in the sky is a sign of impending storm.[163] His argument extends even to sneezes. They may give a clue to divine intentions to the truly prophetic soul.[164]

His premise is that prophecy and divination are caused by images from demonic and divine bodies which enter the body effecting the soul of the prophet.[165] Consequently, a god or demon is the underlying or directing cause of an oracle.[166] This is clear from Plurarch's discussion of the *daimonion* of Socrates where he asserts that demons in the act of thinking set up vibrations in the air which enable noetic souls to apprehend their thoughts.[167]

Demons, then, serve as a link between gods and men and are in charge of the administration of oracles. Although it is not possible to describe Plutarch's demonology fully in this study there are aspects of his theory that warrant mention because of its link to prophecy and divination.[168]

He postulates a personal or guardian demon, the most famous being the voice which guided Socrates.[169] For Plutarch the gods personally take over the guidance of a favored few like Socrates. This demon is a *nous* that directs thoughts and actions through voice medium.[170] When Socrates hears the demon we are told that his perception of the voice is the apprehension of a thought [*logou noesis*].[171] Indeed, the demon's *logoi* are transmitted through the air as a form of telepathic communication.[172] When Socrates received them he experiences a waking oracle [*hypar-chresmos*].

Such reflections were generalized by Plutarch from Middle Stoic and Middle Platonic doctrines of cosmic, demonic, and psychic sympathy. Only for the Neoplatonist does this linkage become wholly non-physical.[173]

Plutarch says the higher powers pick the best men for special guidance. They guide these mean by proclamations and signs [*logo dia sumbolon*].[174] Now proclamations and signs are the basis of natural divination. Plutarch informs us that the *daimonion* of Socrates sends signs to the master's intellect through a voice medium. Thus through the demon's

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[162] *De def. orac.*, 40.

[163] *Gen. soc.*, 12.

[164] Ibid., 12.

[165] *De def. orac.*, 44.

[166] Ibid., 48.

[167] *Gen. soc.*, 20.589b. Reinhardt connects Plutarch with Posidonius on this point, see [1927] 464ff.; [1927] 288f.

[168] For a discussion of Plutarch's demonology, see Jones [1916] 27ff.; Soury [1942]; Dillon [1977] 216–221.

[169] *Gen. soc.*, 20.591dff.

[170] Ibid., cf. 20.593dff.

[171] Ibid., 20.588c.

[172] Heinze [1892] 102ff. traces this notion back to Posidonius. Also see Jones [1916] 30ff.

[173] For example, see Plot., *Enn.*, 4.4.32; 4.3.18; 4.9.3.

[174] *Gen. soc.*, 24. cf. Theanor's speech.

phone, echo, kledon, ptarmos, and *opsis* divine oracles are sent to the subject.[175] Socrates, in turn, apprehends the voice and interprets the oracle through his rational faculties.

Thus demons initiate mantic inspiration and impress upon the human mind knowledge of the future.[176] Plutarch argues that since demons have the power of knowing the future it is natural that that souls touced by a demon have the same power.[177] This is a rational power for demon and human and deserves closer attention.

This mantic faculty is dimmed by the influence of the body but becomes active through dreams, in initiations into the mysteries because in these states the body is in a favorable state for divination. Significantly, when in this state the rational soul is released from myopic contemplation. She apprehends the future through the exercise of intellect. This condition Plutarch calls *enthousiasmos.*[178] The mantic is the wise man or woman who makes use of this ecstatic reasoning faculty to divine the future.[179]

In summary, Antiochus and Plutarch offer a rationalist interpretation and defense of prophecy and divination. Their origins are divine, demonic, their functions pneumatic and rational—judgments that contain deep meaning if correctly interpreted.

Prophecy and divination are necessary for psychological relocation and epistemological illumination. Moreover the fact that prophecy and divination are demonstrable rational activities legitimates their role as proper philosophical arts. They have become divine sciences.

The Democritean, Aristotelian, and Hippocratean traditions had dispossessed prophecy and divination of their divine pedigree, allotting to each a demonic and anthropological one. In the Asclepia, the Porch, and the Academy prophecy and divination are a chief means of access to the divine center. The prophet and diviner are suprahuman agents who legislate, propitiate, and prognosticate on behalf of the gods for humanity. These configurations crystallize in the *Vita Mosis* of Philo. Hence it is to this work we now turn.

II. Philo of Alexandria: The *Vita Mosis*

1. Prophetes: Mania, Psyche and Cosmos

The *Vita Mosis* may justifiably be regarded as part of the prophetic and divinatory literature of the Hellenistic age. Although it would be highly desirable to make a detailed analysis of prophecy and divination in all his writings this is not possible in the limited scope of this study. For our purposes it must suffice that a representative sample of the evidence be presented on our topic. The results gained will permit us to draw some general conclusions on Philo's purpose in writing the *Vita Mosis* and the relation it has to Hellenistic theories of prophecy and divination.

Philo exegetes the various types of prophecy and divination recorded in the Pentateuch according to several of the classifications and interpretations found in the traditions discussed above.

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[175] Following Bock [1898] 24–25; cf. 29–33.
[176] *Gen. soc.*, 20.431b.
[177] *Def orac.*, 39ff.
[178] Ibid., 432cd.
[179] Ibid. 432d.

a. Prophetic Theory

According to Philo the organ of prophecy is the *pneuma*. It is the *psyche psyches* with the purest and most divine *ousia*.[180] The soul receives pneumatic messages through its faculties of intellection, hearing, and sight. For a rational soul is fully capable of apprehending divine sights, sounds, and ideas.[181] Through the rational part of the soul the prophet apprehends the divine ideas and achieves a kind of union with the divine intellect. For Philo maintains that the prophet possesses a purified intellect, full of clearness and distinctness.

Philo's linkage of prophetic *mania* with the activities of the *psyche-nous* and the divine *logos* represents an acceptance of certain Stoic and Platonic ontological, ideational, and psychological assumptions.[182] This link requires some discussion for it explains, at least partially, Philo's understanding of the character and function of prophecy and divination.[183]

In prophecy according to Philo there is a union of the rational soul with the divine intellect.[184] Through prophecy the soul has a conscious perception of divine wisdom represented through the divine word.[185] Consequently, in prophecy the mind moves in unison with the mind of the universe.

The coupling of the rational soul and the divine intellect is an acceptance of the notion that the mind rationally moves out of itself in prophecy, that the sights and sounds it receives from deity are efficacious and capable of yielding knowledge and foreknowledge of divine things.[186]

Both are graspable because through oracles divine ideas are transmitted to the human intellect.[187] The rational soul has a conscious perception of divine wisdom represented in images an words and upon grasping these the human mind moves in unison with the mind of the universe.[188] The crucial step lies in the identification of the detachable self with the divine mind upon reception of an oracle.[189] When the soul hears the divine voice she acquires a transcendent, rational self.[190] This aquisition is an apprehension of the

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[180] See *Vit. Mos.*, 1.277; cf. *Fug.*, 33.

[181] For studies on Philo's theory of hyparic prophecy, see Wolfson [1946] 2.3–54; Winston [1985] 53ff.; [1986] ch. 5.

[182] For the Stoics see Posidonius, *ap.* Cicero, *De div.*, 1.29. cf. 1.57. For the Platonists see Plutarch, *Def. orac.*, 40; 44; *Gen soc.*, 20; cf. *Mor.*, 588e.

[183] For the history of these developments see Pfeffer [1976] 43–112.

[184] See Wolfson [1946] 2.11–22.

[185] The *Vita Mosis* pullulates with such imagery, cf., e.g., 2.188–191; cf. *Gig.*, 19; 28; *Spec.* 49.

[186] This is abundantly clear in Philo's description of the tabernacle, cf. *Vit. Mos.*, 2.74–76.

[187] Once this occurs the human mind becomes "a prophetic spirit" [*prophetikon pneuma*]; cf. *Vit. Mos.*, 2.277, or a "divine and prophetic spirit" [*to theion kai prophetikon pneuma*]; cf. *Fug.*, 188.

[188] Philo self-consciously links prophecy with the rational part of the soul. Throughout the *Vita Mosis* the word *nous* and its cognates are employed to characterize prophetic activity.

[189] Cf., e.g., *Gig.*, 22; *Spec.*, 49; *Virt.*, 219.

[190] Philo's prophetic epistemology has close associations with his theory of ideas; see Dillon [1977] 155–162; Berchman [1984] 170–176; cf. Berchman [1987] 423–426.

divine ideas. Prophecy is part of the soul's arsenal of rational activities.

Moses receives oracles. Pneumatically possessed the prophet has the capacity to interpret sacred utterances:

> For it was in accordance with his nature that the pronouncements in which the special laws were summed up should be given by him in his own person, but the particular laws by the mouth of the most perfect of the prophets whom . . . having filled him with the divine spirit choose him to be the interpreter of his sacred utterances [*bon epikrinias aristinden kai anaplesas entheou pneumatos hermenea ton chresmodoumenon eileto*].
>
> (*Dec.*, 175)

This coupling of prophecy with *pneuma* is an explicit rejection of earlier Platonic, Aristotelian, and medical views of prophecy and divination. The crucial step lay in the identification of the detachable self with the divine mind. Prophetic and mantic ecstacy claims the authority of the God's *logos*.

This step involves Philo's acceptance of later Platonic and Stoic interpretations of prophetic and mantic theory. Prophetic knowledge becomes a vision of divine truth. This paradigm shift involves transformations in Platonic ideational and epistemological theory and a corresponding elevation of the epistemic value of sense perception. Prophetic hearing and seeing are important components of Philonic epistemology for prophecy yields lucid perceptions of the divine ideas.

The technical aspects of this transformation lay beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, they can be seen in the range of types and variety of functions Philo ascribes to prophecy and divination.

b. Prophetic Classification

According to Philo there are three types of prophecy. These are ecstatic, rational, and prognostic prophecy.[191] He also sketches three prophetic functions in the *Vita Mosis*. These are the legislative, the priestly, and the prognostic.[192]

Philo's ecstatic, rational, and prognostic prophecy encompass Plato's four types of prophetic frenzy.[193]

Again, Plato's four types of prophetic madness are:

1. Prophetic madness associated with Apollo
2. Telestic madness associated with Dionysius
3. Poetic madness inspired by the Muses
4. Erotic madness inspired by Aphrodite and Eros

According to Plato the first is the ecstasy of the diviner which produces the art of divination.[194] The second is the frenzy of the priest which through prayers, purifications, and sacred rites protects his people.[195] The third is the madness of the muses which is the

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[191] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.188–191.

[192] Ibid., 2.5; cf. *Praem.*, 9.56.

[193] This has been noted by Wolfson [1946] 2.11–24.

[194] *Phaedrus*, 244b.

[195] Ibid., 244de; cf. *Statesman*, 290c. As early as Chrysippus this frenzy is also associated with divination, cf. Cic. *De div.*, 2.63, 130.

source of the laws of statesmen and kings.[196] The fourth is the ecstasy of the philosopher which is the recollection of the ideas imperceptible to the senses.[197] Philo also links these types of prophetic frenzy with the lawgiver, the priest, and the philosopher.[198]

The legislative, priestly, and prognostic functions of prophecy are well established by the time of Philo.[199] Hellenistic tradition makes Apollo, Dionysius, the Muses, Aphrodite or Eros the patrons of each.[200] Philo, not surprisingly, makes his deity the patron of all these prophetic functions.[201]

David Winston has provided us with a concise typological survey of prophecy and makes a number of important observations concerning its function.[202] First, he points out that for Philo rational and prognostic prophecy is not mediated through ecstatic possession but through the divine voice. Second, he uses this fact to distinguish two types of prophecy—the ecstatic and hermeneutical—and two kinds of prophet—the non-rational ecstatic prophet and the rational legislative, priestly, and prognostic prophet. Third, he notes that ecstatic prophecy is employed by Philo to explain the prophet's ability to predict the future while hermeneutical prophecy is used to explain the prophet's capacity to grasp the fundamental principles of reality. Fourth, he links Philo's typology and theory of prophetic functions with Middle Platonic ones.

Winston also points out that "whereas in the state of ecstatic possession the prophet's sovereign mind is entirely preempted by the Divine Spirit, so that he becomes a passive medium, hermeneutical prophecy does not render its recipient passive . . . that far from being preempted, the inspired mind . . . is extraordinarily quickened and sharpened."[203]

c. Types of Prophecy

Philo introduces three types of prophecy in the *Vita Mosis*. They are:

a. ecstatic prophecy
b. didactic prophecy
c. prognostic prophecy

Philo distinguishes ecstatic prophecy from didactic and prognostic prophecy. Ecstatic prophecy is non-rational, perhaps supra-rational. Didactic and prognostic prophecy are rational.[204] This division of prophecy into two types Winston calls the Philonic distinction between ecstatic and the hermeneutical prophecy.[205]

Philo identifies ecstatic prophecy with ecstacy [*ekstasis-tardemah*]. This is the departing

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196 *Phaedrus*, 245a; Meno, 99d.

197 Ibid.,, 249d.

198 On this association see Pfeffer [1976] 10–39.

199 Ibid., 43–112.

200 See Dodds [1951] 65– 101.

201 See Wolfson [1946] 2.16–22. However, Wolfson goes too far in his attempt to show a radical distinction between Plato and Philo on prophecy and between Philo on Hellenistic views of prophecy in general.

202 Winston [1985] 53–54.

203 Ibid., 54.

204 *Vit. Mos.*, 2.188–191.

205 Winston, 53–54.

and going out of the understanding [*logismou-dianoias*] from the prophet. For when the mind [*nous*] is divinely possessed [*enthousiazei*] it becomes filled with god:

> . . . it is no longer within itself, for it receives the divine spirit [*to theion pneuma*] to dwell within it . . . it fell upon (Abram), for it does not come upon one gently and softly but makes a sudden attack . . . "a great dark fear fell upon him," for all these are ecstasies of the mind, since he who is in fear is not within itself. And darkness is an impediment to sight; and the greater the fear is, so much duller does (the mind) become in seeing and understanding. These things, moreover, are not ineptly spoken of but as evidence of the clear knowledge of prophecy, by which oracles and laws are legislated by God [*chresmoi kai nomoi hupo tou theou nomothetountai*].
>
> (*Quest. in Gen.*, 3.9)

These oracles [*chresmoi*] are signs [*deigmata*]. Philo states:

> The first kind are absolutely and entirely signs [*deigmata*] of the divine excellences, graciousness and beneficience, by which he [sic. God] incites all men to noble conduct. for which he opens up the road which leads to happiness.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.189)

Ecstatic prophecy is regarded by Philo as the highest type of prophecy.[206] However, he leaves it out of his analysis of prophecy because it is not rational prophecy. Moreover, ecstatic prophecy, like dream prophecy, requires interpretation. And interpretation and prophecy are not the same thing [*kai allos legetai hosanei di'hermeneos. Hermeneia de kai propheteia diapherousi: Vit. Mos.*, 2.191]. Consequently Philo decides to leave its analysis to another treatise.[207]

Philo associates didactic and prognostic prophecy. For:

> In the second kind we find combination and partnership: the prophet asks questions of God about matters on which he has been seeking knowledge, and God replies and instructs him. The third kind are assigned to the lawgiver himself: God has given to him of his own power of foreknowledge and by this he will reveal future events.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.190–191)

Didactic and prognostic prophecy are highly valued by Philo. He includes them in analysis because they are characterized by their rationality.[208] Since they are of this type, they do not require interpretation.

Didactic prophecy is a type of rational possession. It takes on two forms. A monologue in which case the prophet is a passive medium for divine instruction. Deity merely speaks

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[206] Which suggests that for Philo this type of oracle is onaric, cf. Berchman [1987] 403–428.

[207] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.191. Presumably, Philo would have discussed this type of prophecy, which in the strict sense is not prophecy, in connection with the ectasy of dream prophecy, *De somn.*, 1.159. The subject in both contexts is Abraham.

[208] These enthusiastic states are quite distinct from the state of divine possession outlined by Philo in *Q. in Gen.*, 3.9.

through the prophet. A dialogue in which case the prophet is an active participant in divine instruction. God speaks with the prophet. In both cases the goal of prophecy is instruction [*didaskontos: Vit. Mos.*, 2.190].

Prognostic prophecy is also a type of rational possession. Like didactic prophecy it can be either in monologue or dialogue form. God gives to the prophet, as a passive or active medium, his foreknowledge [*prognostikes*]. Then the prophet reveals the meaning future events [*e thespiei ta mellonta: Vit. Mos.*, 2.190–191].

d. Hyparic Prophecy

Winston's distinction between ecstatic and hermeneutical prophecy permits us to focus upon Philo's view of hyparic prophecy with increased clarity.

The waking vision [*hypar*] is associated with both ecstatic and hermeneutical prophecy. In ecstatic prophecy the waking oracle [*hypar-chresmos*] is symbolic and requires interpretation. In hermeneutical prophecy the waking oracle [*hypar-chresmos*] is straightfoward and requires no interpretation.

Not surprisingly, Philo calls didactic and prognostic prophecy:

a. straight foward prophecies—*chresmoi*

and:

b. waking prophecies—*hypar-chresmoi*

When Philo defines prophecy as waking and straightfoward [*hypar-chresmos*] he means that these prophecies do not require interpretation [*Vit. Mos.*, 2.191].

Although didactic and prognostic prophecy are characterized by enthusiasm it is an enthusiasm wherein the mind is awake and engaged in noetic activity. In this type of enthusiasm mind and reason remains within the soul.[209]

For Philo the divine mind makes rational contact with the the human in hermeneutical prophecy alone. Speech and sight function as the link between *logos* and *psyche*. This can be seen in the range of functions Philo ascribes to the Mosaic *hypar*.

e. Phonic and Visual Oracles

Phonic and visual oracles are straightfoward prophecies which require no interpretation. For Philo the Pentateuch abounds with these types of oracles. He employs Hellenistic theoretical norms and incorporates them into his own analysis of the biblical text. The following examples must suffice to illustrate phonic and visual oracles in Philo.

There are phonic oracles [*chresmoi*] that take conversational form. Philo says:

> There are four cases upon which the divine voice laid down the law in the form of question and answer and which therefore have a mixed character; for on the one hand the prophet asks a question under divine possession [*enthousia*], and on the other hand the Father, in giving the word of revelation, answers him and talks with him as a partner [*ho pater thespizei logou kai apokriseos metadidous*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.192)

[209] See Wolfson [1946] 2.22–54 for Philo's view of types and functions of prophecy.

Thus hyparic prophecies are clear and distinct oracles [*chresmoi*] linked with:

> . . . the divine voice [that] laid down the law in the form of question and answer . . . [*dia peuseos kai apokriseos chresmois nomothetethentes, mikten echontes dunamin: Vit. Mos.*, 2.192].

Phonic and visual oracles are proclaimed by Moses and by angels. Sometimes Moses and other prophets receive oracles through angelic intermediaries.[210] Angels, like demons, are intermediaries between deity and humanity.[211] Consequently, they are the carriers of phonic and visual oracles to the Pentateuchal prophets.[212]

Philo makes reference to an angel who appeared to Moses at the burning bush [Exod 3:2ff.]. Through the angel a speech is given. It is ascribed to God. The angel is merely a passive agent for divine communication.[213]

> There was a bramble bush . . . which, without anyone's setting it alight, suddenly took fire . . . In the midst of the flame was the form of the fairest beauty, unlike any visible object, an object supremely divine in appearance, refulgent with a light brighter than the light of fire [*kata ten mesen de phlogoa morphe tis en perikallestate, ton horaton empheres oudeni, theoeidestaton agalma, phos augoeidesteron tou puros apastraptousa*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.66)

For our purposes it is important to note that Philo employs several chresmatic *topoi* in his description of the oracle of the burning bush. The oracle is a waking [*hypar-chresmos*] and a visual prophecy [*horatos-chresmos*]. It is delivered through one of the rational [*logike*], unbodied souls [*psychon asomaton*] which serve as intermediaries between divinity and humanity.[214]

Moreover:

> It might be supposed that this was the image of him that is [*eikona tou ontos einai*], but let us call it an angel or herald, since, with a silence that spoke more clearly than speech, it employed as it were the miracle of sight to reveal future events [*kaleistho de aggelos, hoti schedon ta mellonta genesesthai dieggelle tranotera phones besuchia dia tes megalourgetheises opseos*] . . . the angel was a symbol of God's providence [*pronoias tes ek theou*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.66–67)

This sight-prophecy reminds one of the hyparic oracles from Asclepian Epidaurus. It is sent through an intermediary. Once received the subject experiences the personal presence of the god. Finally, the oracle contains detailed prescriptions which if followed guarantee the protection of divine providence for the subject and his people.[215]

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[210] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.188.

[211] An angel in an address to Balaam says the following words:

> I shall direct your speech, prophesying [*thespizon*] through your tongue all that shall happen, though you yourself understand nothing of it. (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.274)

[212] *Vit. Abr.*, 113; 115.

[213] *Conf.*, 176.

[214] *Vit. Mos.*, 1.63ff; cf. *Fug.*, 141; *Mut.*, 134.

[215] In *Vit. Mos.*, 1.68ff., Philo narrates the history of the Jews. Their history is largely

Finally there are oracles that are both phonic and visual. The Decalogue [sic. *chresmous*], for example, was delivered by God to Moses:

> by a voice which, strange paradox, was visible and aroused the eyes rather than the ears of the bystanders [*diaphones – to paradoxotaton – horates*].
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.213)

This phonic-auditory oracle [*chresmos*] is an invisible sound. Since this oracle is incorporeal and rational it is received and understood by the rational part of the soul [*psyche logike*].

For Philo the faculties of sound and sight are the link between god-sent oracles and the rational soul. Moreover, the hyparic oracle offers pneumatic instructions and pronoaic presentiments from a God knows, directs and guides all things.

3. The Evidence

Although it would be highly desirable to make a detailed analysis of each aspect of Philo's theory of prophecy this is not possible given the limited scope of our study. Again it must suffice that a representative sample of evidence be presented. Our headings are legislative, priestly, and prophetic prophecy.

Hopefully, the results gained will permit us to draw some general conclusions concerning Philo's purpose in writing the *Vita Mosis*. Moreover, the results gained will allow us to view similarities and differences between Philonic and Hellenistic theories of the prophet, prophecy and divination.

a. Moses: Legislator, Priest, and Prophet

For Philo Moses is amone the heaven-born of the species. He is among the divine men who have risen above the sphere of sense-perception and dwell in the intelligible world.[216] As such he is the legislator, king, priest, and prophet who regulates the present and divines the future.[217]

Moses possesses the power to perceive incorporeal things beyond the realm of sense perception. Possessed by the inspiration [*enthousia*] of the divine logos[218] he has the unmixed knowledge [*akretos episteme*] of the fully rational soul.[219] Thus Philo employs the term *katapneustheis* to describe Mosis.[220]

The divine spirit dwells for extended periods of time in him.[221] Moses, therefore,

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(continued)
interpreted within the context of divine prescriptions. These prescriptions are presented as oracles mediated through the Patriarchs. Generally, these oracles are hyparic, phonic, and dialogical in nature; cf., e.g., *Vit. Mos.*, 1.71–84.

[216] *Gig.*, 60; For the distinction between earth-born, heaven-born, and god-born men, cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 10.619cd.

[217] *Vit Mos.*, 2.35; 188.

[218] *Spec.*, 8; 49.

[219] *Gig.*, 22.

[220] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.35; 189–191.

[221] *Gig.*, 47–49.

possesses the capacity to prophesize continually. This characteristic separates Moses from all other Pentateuchal prophets.[222] Consequently, the prophet represents the:

> . . . all harmonious . . . union of these four faculties, for intertwined and clinging to each other, they move in rythmic accord . . . and thus imiitate the virgin graces whom an immutable law of nature forbids to be separated. And of them it may justifiably be said, what is often said of the virtues, that to have one is to have all.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.7)

Moses' nature does not link him with the passions and deceptions of sense-perception. Rather it couples him to divine reason and knowledge. Philo self-consciously places Moses in a *logos*, not a *pathos* context. His character does not signify one who is insane or melancholic but one who is enlightened and pneumatic. Moses represents the working of the divine logos in the world.

It is not Democritus', Aristotle's, Hippocrates', or even Plato's view of the manticism that dominates Philo's in interpretation of prophecy. For them the *chresmos* is an affliction of the *psyche* and *soma*. Its visions lead to *phantasmata*.

Philo's theory reflects those of Chrysippus, Posidonius, Antiochus, and then later, Plutarch. For them the *chresmos* is a divine blessing that leads the *psyche* to *episteme*, to the *theoi logoi*. For Cicero says the Stoics taught of souls who have a special relationship to God. They know the the divine pneuma and are capable of divination.[223] Plutarch describes the soul of Socrates as fully rational. When Socrates hears the voice of his daimonion he apprehends it as thought [*logou noesis*].[224] Philo employs these terms to describe Moses.[225] Moreover these are the characteristics that link Moses with the Stoic sage [*spoudaios*], the Platonic wise man [*sophos*], and the Pythagorean divine man [*theios aner*].[226]

Moses knows divine words and visions. He receives them through oracular messages. Indeed with the soul's eye he perceives the immaterial forms [*asomatous ideas*]; the very place of reason [*to prosagoreuomeno logeio*]; the divine ideas whose place are in the Logos.[227] Thus when Moses apprehends oracles [*chresmoi*] he knows a divine conceptual universe.

For Philo oracles reveal a direct vision of intelligible reality. They are not the mere phantasmata of the soul's innermost, hallucinatory life. It is the role of Moses to inform his audience of this fact. Indeed, Philo tells us:

> . . . Moses necessarily obtained prophecy also, in order that through the providence [*pronoia*] of God he might discover what by reasoning [*logismo*] he could not grasp. For prophecy finds its way to what the mind [*nous*] fails to reach.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.6)

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[222] Ibid., 47.

[223] See Cicero, *De div.*, 1.20, 29–30, 57, 65; 2.10.

[224] See Plut. *Gen soc.*, 20.593dff; 20.588cff.

[225] *Gig.*, 22; cf. *Immut.*, 3.

[226] On the *spoudaios*, see Stob. *Ecl.*, 2.114=*SVF* 3.605. On the *sophos* see Cicero, *De div.*, 2.63, 129. On the *theios aner* see Iambl. *Vit. Pythag.*, 65.114.

[227] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.74, 113.

This tells us much about the soul who receives oracles. It is the charitic soul who discharges to his community admonition and guidance. The divine character of the chresmos bestows on the soul who hears and visions it a divine character. This, at least partially, explains Philo's profound interest in prophecy and divination. They are a chief means of access to the divine center. The one who unlocks the door to the divine is someone like Moses who chief skill is that of legislator, king, priest, and prophet.

b. Character and Medical Topics

Character topics pullulate through the *Vita Mosis*. Philo employs them to establish the legitimacy of Moses in his roles as legislator, king, priest, and prophet. Such information as the prophet's identity, occupation, birth, health, age, and land of origin assist Philo in his exegesis of the character of Mosaic prophecy and divination.[228] Indeed the significance and outcome of Pentateucal prophecy often hinges on the prophet's character.

Moses is a character of the noetic type.[229] His personal habits reflects a soul wedded to reason and to the pursuit of the good. His occupations and associations reflect the wholesome nature of his psychic makeup. Consequently the oracles he receives are symbols of his divine character.[230]

Philo illustrates this through a sketch of the topics he used to portray the prophet in the first book of the *Vita Mosis*.

> The former treatise dealt with the birth and nature of Moses; also with his education and career as a ruler, in which capacity his conduct was not merely blameless but highly praiseworthy; also with the works he performed in Egypt and during the journeys both at the Red Sea and in the wilderness—works which no words can adequately describe. . . .
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.1)

On the basis of his background Philo says it is:

> . . . not without good reason, that states can only make progress in well-being if either kings are philosophers or philosophers are kings. But Moses will be found to have displayed, combined in his single person, not only these two faculties—the kingly and the philosophical—but also three others . . . law-giving . . . the high priest's office . . . and . . . prophecy. For Moses, through God's providence [*pronoia*], became king, and law-giver, and high-priest, and prophet; and in each function he won the highest place.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.2–3)

As a man of reason and not the senses, he is able to grasp, unlike Pharoah, the:

> I am, who is . . . [*ego eimi ho on*]
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.75)

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[228] This is clear from his analysis of Moses, cf. *Vit. Mos.*, 2.2–7 where he describes the Mosis as king, lawgiver, priest, and prophet.

[229] Others include Abraham by teaching, Isaac by nature, and Jacob by practice, cf. *Vit. Mos.*, 1.76.

[230] For a recent study on divine men and the function of aretalogies in the Greco-Roman world, see Gallagher [1982].

so that:

> . . . they may learn the difference between what is and what is not . . . to whom alone all existence belongs [*hina mathontes diaphoran ontos te kai me ontos prosanadidachthosin . . . ho mono prosesti to einai*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.75)

In summary, Philo employs character topics to demonstrate Moses' heavenly, indeed, noetic pedigree. They assist Philo in legitimizing the role Moses plays as legislator, king, priest, and prophet for his people. Indeed on the basis of his character and activity God elevates Moses at the close of his life to highest rank among men.

> . . . the Father . . . resolved his two-fold nature of soul and body into a single unity, transforming his whole being into mind . . . [*hypo tou patros, hos auton duada onta, soma kai psychen, eis monados anestoicheious physin holon di'holon . . . eis noun*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.288)

For Philo this divine act underscores the legitimacy of Moses as legislator, king, priest, and prophet.

Use of medical topics are found wanting in the *Vita Mosis*.[231] The likely reason is that medical topics were often used to demonstrate the pathological nature of prophecy and divination. Oracles yield insights into the patient's hygenic and urpoietic systems and thereby reveal the health of the prophet and mantic. Consequently, their use would not support one *leit-motif* of the *Vita Mosis* which is a defense of prophecy and divination.

Philo self-consciously defends the legitimacy and efficacy of prophecy and divination.

There are some who do not accept the posssibility let alone the truth-veracity of divination. Philo characterizes them as:

> . . . fools whom reason has not disciplined . . .
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.95)

Thus he rejects Democritean, Aristotelian, and, perhaps, Hippocratean assessments of the nature and value of the prophetic and divinatory arts.

Philo's *apologia* is self-conscious and wide-ranging. When he describes Pharoah and the activities of his diviners their activity is not characterized as pathological. Even the Egyptian *magoi* perform wonders and receive oracles.[232]

> But all the wizards and magicians [*sophistai . . . kai magoi*] who were present said: "Why are you terrified We too are practiced in such matters, and we use our skill [*techne*] to produce similar results."
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.92)

And when Moses performs his skills the results are so extraordinary they:

> . . . refuted the skepticism in every ill-disposed person's soul, and they now regarded these events not as the works of human cunning or artifices fabricated

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[231] This is a sharp contrast from the *De somn.*, cf. Berchman [1987] 414–428.

[232] Cf., e.g., *Vit. Mos.*, 1.88–94.

> to deceive, but as brought about by some diviner power [*dunamin theioteran*] to which every feat is easy.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.94)

The clear evidence of the facts even forced the skeptics to admit to veracity of divination. This was accomplished by Moses:

> . . . through proofs of signs [*semeion*] and wonders [*teraton*] which are clearer than oracles [*chresmon*] . . .
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 1.95)

Curiously, Philo does not distinguish between the hyparic powers of Moses and those of the sophists, augurers, and soothsayers of Egypt. He merely makes the point that Moses' powers are superior to these sophists-magicians, not that prophetic and divinatory powers are illegitimate.

Indeed none of the prophets of the Pentateuch are magicians [*goetes*] who cast spells and charms that bewitch [*goeteusai*] their audience—Moses least of all.[233] Clearly Egyptian magic is inferior to Jewish magic. For it is performed by agents of a lesser god.

The activities of Moses and the Egyptian magi are neither the hallucinations of the sick or even the illusions of the sane. Rather they are rational activities undertaken by agent of the intelligible god and even the agents of the sensible gods. Thus rather than a sign of prophecy and divination are divinely sanctioned and thus legitimate.

For Philo the heroes of the Pentateuch practice prophecy and divination. Prophets and diviners exhibit skills which signify their place and taxon. As mediators between the divine and human realms figures like Moses stand at the divine center of things for their communities. They are the chief means of access to the divine center.

Indeed the demonstration that Moses possesses such this knowledge and activity signifies his special place and taxon among the wonder workers of the Hellenistic world. This *propbetes* is above the *magos*, and certainly is no *sophistos* or *goes*.[234]

c. Legislative Propbecy

As lawgiver Moses is king, priest, and prophet.[235] His legislative frenzy resembles the mania associated with the Muses for this is the prophecy of statesmen and kings.[236] Philo

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[233] On the term *goes*, cf. Plato, *Sym.*, 202e where magic is granted a measure of efficacy as a function of the demon eros. However, in Hellenistic times the term is generaly derogatory. For example, in first century C.E. Jewish texts; cf., e.g., Josephus, *Ant.*, 20.92; 167; 188; *Bellum*, 2.261ff. For the larger Hellenistic context of this term, see Bidez-Cumont [1938] 1.144ff.; Momigliano [1972] 63ff.

[234] Philo never refers to these hyparic wonder-workers as *goetes*. Rather they are called *magoi*. In the *De Somn.*, 1.219–220, however, Philo sharply distinguishes between Jewish and Egyptian prophecy. Perhaps the distinctions drawn are between the character of their onaric prophecies. In the case of divination, both Jews and Egyptians share a common legitimacy. For the distinction between the terms *goes* and *magos* see M. Smith [1978] s.v. *goes* and *magos*.

[235] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.2. cf. Wolfson [1947] 2.16 where he notes the association between Philo and Plato, cf. *Rep.*, 5.473d.

[236] *Phaedrus*, 245a; *Meno* 99ad.

does not distinguish Moses the king, lawgiver, and priest from Moses the prophet. All these pneumatic activities are sanctioned by God. He assumes each activity is an aspect of the other.[237]

For Philo legislative prophecy is associated with: 1) the ideal king [2.1–11]; 2) the permanence of the laws of Moses [2.12–16; 3) the respect paid to Moses by other nations [2.17–24]; 4) an account of the making of the LXX [2.25–44]; and 5) the accounts of the greatness of the historical and legislative elements of Torah [2.45–65].

Two examples from legislative prophecy must suffice to illustrate its nature and the character of its legislators.

Legislative prophets appeared even before Moses. Among them was Noah. The wisdom of divine legislation emerges in his command to Noah to build the Ark.

Thus in this case when Philo describes the significance of legislative prophecy he introduces the Stoic themes of providence and the cosmic cycle.[238]

In his providental wisdom before the flood deity legislates through an oracular voice [*bas hupbegounto boi chresmoi: Vit. Mos.*, 2.60] the preservation of all creatures. After the cataclysm those humans choosen become models for the regeneration of mankind.

Deity's legislation of the collection of specimens was such:

> . . . that it was in minature of earth in its entirety, comprising the races of living creatures, of which the world had carried before innumerable specimens, and perhaps would carry them again . . .

His human specimens:

> these are the guardians and prizes of the good, by which not only they themselves and their families won safety and escaped the greatest dangers . . . but also became leaders of the regeneration, inaugurators of a second cycle, spared as embers to rekindle mankind, that highest form of life . . . born to be the likeness of God's power and image of his nature, the visible of the invisible, the created of the eternal.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.62, 65)

Here Philo folds the Stoic cosmic cycle into the Pentateuchal account of the flood. This is done to propose that the Nomos legislated through Noah is a model for the preservation of mankind.[239]

For Philo, however, among legislative prophets Moses reigns *par excellence*. This is because he exhibits:

> . . . love of humanity, of justice, of goodness, and hatred of evil . . . it is no small thing if it is given to anyone even one of these . . . to grasp them all together . . . to this Moses alone appears to have attained.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.9–10)

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[237] For the inter-relationship of these functions in the *Vit. Mos.*, cf. 2.16, 35, 50, 76, 187; 188–191; 275. Cf. *Praem.*, 9.56.

[238] On *cataclysmi* in Stoic thought see, Censorinus, *De de Nat.*, 18.11=fr. 19 Ross=fr. 8 Walzer. cf. Seneca, *Nat. quaest.*, 3.29.1; Plutarch, *De E ap. Delphos*, 389c. Also see Hahm [1977] 186; Lapidge [1978] 181; Mansfeld [1979] 146–147; Berchman [1988] 27ff. Philo was well aware of the Stoic theory of the cosmic cycle, cf. *De aet. mun.*, 76–77.

[239] Ibid. *De aet. mun.*, 76–77; cf. *Vit. Mos.*, 2.62–65.

Thus:

> . . . Moses himself was the best of all lawgivers [*nomotheton aristos*] . . . his laws are most excellent and truly come from God . . . his laws, firm, unshaken, immovable, stamped, as it were with the seals of nature herself . . . will remain for all future ages as though immortal, so long as the sun and moon and whole heaven and universe exist.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.12–15)

Because of his character and the power of his legislation Moses stands as one linked to divine reason and knowledge. Philo places this legislator fully in a *logos* context. We know Philo assumes prophecy to be a rational phenomenon. Thus he refers to prophecy as the legislative condition of the mind [*peri ton kata ten nomothetiken hexin: Vit. Mos.*, 2.8].

Thus Moses:

> . . . possessed by the spirit . . . entered on his work as a prophet, since he held it fitting to always hold himself in readiness to receive oracular messages [*prophēteuein kai theophoreisthai, prosekon hegoumenos etoimon emparechein aei tois chresmois heauton*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.69)

Through use of terms such as *theophoresthai* and *chresmois* Philo signals that Moses is the divinely possessed prophet of God who discharges to his community legislative prophecy. The contents of this prophecy are filled in by Philo when he describes Moses as priest and prognosticator.

d. Priestly Prophecy

Philo uses this sketch of legislative prophecy and the legislative prophet as an entrance into the meaning and function of priestly legislation and prophecy. Here again Moses is his primary subject.

The priestly prophecies include a description of: 1) the tabernacle [2.66–108; 136–140]; 2) the priest's vesture with its symbolism [2.109–135]; 3) the appointment of the priests and the levites [2.141–158]; 4) the part played by the Levites in the punishing of the golden calf [2.159–173; and 5) the priests and the blossoming of Aaron's rod [2.174–186].

In the Greco-Roman world prophets and mantics were associated with sacntuaries. Those sanctuaries where divination was regularly practiced were called oracles [*manteia* or *chresteria*]. These oracles dealt with political, priestly, and prognostic issues.[240]

Philo's theory of sanctuary and priestly prophecy is strikingly similar. Mosis is associated with a sanctuary. His duty was to build and furnish a Temple.[241] His oracles focus on political, priestly, and prognostic issues.[242] He revealed and legislated a Nomos. He even divines for he possesses the power of foreknowledge to reveal future events.[243]

When Philo describes the priestly functions of Moses, the prophet actually practices the telestic *mania* whose patron for the Greeks was Dionysius.[244]

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[240] See Myer [1904].

[241] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.74–76.

[242] Ibid., 2.2–7; cf. *Praem.*, 9.53–56.

[243] Ibid., 2.188–190.

[244] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 244a–245a.

> . . . the chief priest . . . fortified with perfect rites and perfect knowledge of the service of God [*epi teleiois hierois kai episteme teleia tes tou theou*] . . . may ask that he and those whom he rules may recieve prevention of evil and participation in good from the gracious being who assents to prayers.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.5)

Telestically sacred rites and divine services function to protect the people and avert them from evil:

> . . . he should also have the office of chief priesthood to enable him armed with prophetic knowledge [*prophbeteuon epistemonikos*] to worship the self-existent, and offer up thanksgivings for his subjects when they do well and prayers and supplications for propriation when they do amiss.
>
> (*Praem.*, 56)

As Philo's prophetic terminology reveals [sic. *prophbeteuon epistemonikos*] Moses is a priest who receives and issues oracles that are a knowledge of things unknown to the senses. For these are oracles vouchsafed to him by God [*kata ta chresthenta logia bereto: Vit. Mos.*, 2.176].

For in grasping these *logia* Moses acquires access to a noetic world. In a vision in which he comes to know the priest's vestiture Moses grasps this place of reason [*to prosagoreuomeno logeio*], this reasoned oracle [*logeion ton kriseon*].[246]

When Philo pictures this aspect of priestly prophecy it suggests the prophetic *mania* whose patrons are Aphrodite and Eros.[247]

One example from the *Vita Mosis* suffices to illustrate this aspect of priestly prophecy.

i. The Sanctuary [Exod 26:18]

As Philo's vocabulary suggests the prophetic priest has a direct vision of the sanctuary as its exists in the intelligible world of the ideas.

> He saw with the soul's eye the immaterial ideas of the material objects [*apoteleisthai somaton asomatos ideas te psyche theoron*] made, and these ideas had to be reproduced in copies from the senses . . . and from patterns conceived in the mind [*ap'archetupou graphes kai noeton paradeigmation aistheta mimemata aprekonisthenai*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.74)

So the shape of the model was stamped on the mind of the prophet . . . [a] moulded prototype, produced by immaterial and invisible forms [*aveu hules aoratois eidesi*]; and then the resulting work was built in accordance with that shape by the artist impressing stampings upon the material substances required in each case.

(*Vit. Mos.*, 2.76)

Philo's association of prophecy and intellection is not without significance. The Alexandrian divides knowledge into two types, sense perception [*aistbesis*] and intellection [*noesis*].[248] Priestly prophecy is clearly associated with knowledge of the divine ideas.

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[246] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.112–113.

[247] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 244a–245a.

[248] On Philo's epistemology see Dillon [1977] 155–162; Berchman [1984] 170–176.

Consequently, priestly knowledge is among the highest types of knowledge of Philo.

> . . . priests and prophets . . . having wholly risen above the sphere of sense perception . . . have been translated into the world of the intelligibles and dwell there registered as freemen of the commonwealth of ideas which are imperishable and incorporeal.
>
> (*Gig.*, 13.61)

Consequently, the priest and prophet:

> through the providence [*pronoia*] of God . . . discover what by reasoning [*logismo*] he could not grasp.[249]
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.6)

They grasp intelligible knowledge through "the oracles and laws given by God [*chresmoi kai nomoi hupo tou theou nomothetountai*]."[250] Such oracles and laws are known only through the power of intellection.

For Philo intelligible knowledge includes much more than the priest's perception of the world of the ideas revealed through the sanctuary oracles. It also encompasses the prophet's knowledge of future events revealed through the prognostic oracles.

e. Prognostic Prophecy

Prognostic prophecy is divinatory in character. In the case of Moses it is a noetic power:

> . . . of foreknowledge [*prognostikes dunameos*] and by this he will reveal future events [*e thespiei ta mellonta*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.190)

This means the prophet has the power to know things beyond sense perception. Because of his power, character, and knowledge Moses is able to reveal future events.[251] Consequently, when Philo describes this type of prophecy it resembles the Platonic *mania* of the diviner associated with Apollo as well as the *mania* linked to Aphrodite and Eros.[252]

The prognostic prophecies are included within accounts: 1) of the destruction of the Egyptians [2.246–257]; 2) on manna [2.258–269]; 3) of the slaughter of the idolaters [270–274]; and 4) of the destruction of Korah and his followers [2.275–287].

There are seven prognostic oracles: 1) at the Red Sea Moses predicts the destruction of the Egyptians [2.250–252]; 2) in the desert Moses tells the people not to leave any manna until morning [2.258–259]; 3) he correctly divines that the seventh day of the falling of the manna is the Sabbath [2.263–265]; 4) he predicts there will be no manna on the sabbath [2.268]; 5) Moses predicts what will happen to Korah and his followers [2. 2.280]; 6) Moses predicts what will happen to each tribe [2.288] and 7) Moses predicts his death [2.291].[253]

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[249] By *logismos* Philo means the discursive reasoning that arises from sense-perception, cf. *Praem.*, 5.28.

[250] *Q. in Gen.*, 3.9.

[251] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.190.

[252] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 244b; 249d.

[253] On the significance of the number seven in Philo's thought see Moehring [1978]

The prognostic oracles spoken by Moses take two forms.
As a dialogue they are:

> . . . cases upon which the divine voice laid down the law in the form of question and answer . . . for . . . the prophet asks a question under divine possession [*enthousia*] . . . and the Father in giving the word of revelation, answers him and talks with him a with a partner.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.192)

As a monologue they are:

> . . . assigned to the lawgiver (sic. Moses) himself: God has given to him of his own power means by which he is able to reveal future events.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.188)

Generally, however, prognostic prophecy is not in the form of a dialogue. It is cast in monologue form.

Not only does Philo employ oracular terms in his analysis of Pentateuchal prognostic prophecy. He also uses many Stoic and Platonic notions in his interpretation of predictive prophecy. He finds them useful for exegesis.

Two examples suffice to illustrate Philo's use of oracular terminology and philosophical topics.

i. The Destruction of the Egyptians [Exod 14:13–14].

> . . . the prophet, seeing the whole nation entangled in the meshes of panic . . . was taken out of himself by divine possession and uttered these inspired words [*ouket'on en beauto theophoreitai kai thespizei tade*].
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*, 2.250)

This hermeneutical oracle well illustrates Philo's prophetic vocabulary. The hyparic oracle [*hypar-chresmos*] is transmitted by sight [*boratos-chresmos*]. In prophecy Moses is taken out of himself by rational possession [*theophorazein*]. In this state he is a seer [*thesphaton*] who pronounces inspired words which reveal without symbolism what should be done by his people.[254]

ii. The Manna Prophecy [Exod 16:23].

> Not long after Moses delivered a second inspired pronouncement [*epitheiasas apophtheggetai logion*] concerning the sacred seventh day. That day has held the place of honor in nature, note merely from the time when the world was framed, but even before the heaven and all that sense perceives came into

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(continued)
191–228. That Philo picks seven prognostic prophecies in the *Vita Mosis* demands further investigation.

[254] This is the type of oracle called the *chresmatismos* or *admonitio* by Macrobius and Chalcidius. cf. Mac. *in Somn. Scip.* 1.3.2; Chalc. *In Tim.*, 256. Waszink [1941] 65ff. argues Chalcidius' classification combines Platonic with Jewish ideas. The assumption is he derived it from Numenius via Porphyry.

> being. Yet men knew it not, perhaps by reason of the constant and repeated destructions by fire and water the later generations did not receive from the former the memory of the order and sequence of events in the series of years. This hidden truth Moses, under inspiration [*epitheiasas*], revealed in an announcement [*logio*] to which a manifest sign gave testimony [*dia semeiou tinos enargous*].
>
> . . . Moses when he heard of this and also actually saw it [*eph'ois aggellomenois hama kai horomenois kataplageis*] was awestruck and, guided by what not so much surmise as God-sent inspiration [*theophoretheis*], made announcement [*epespise*] of the sabbath . . . I need hardly say conjectures of this kind are closely akin to prophecies. For the mind [*nous*] could not have made so straight an aim if there was not also the divine spirit [*theion pneuma*] guiding it to the truth itself.
>
> (*Vit. Mos.*,2.263–265)

Again this prophecy is cast as a waking oracle [*hypar-chresmos*]; a kind of waking vision [*horama*].[255] The media of the oracle are voice and sight [*hama kai horomenois*]. In prophecy Moses is rationally possessed [*epitheiasas-theophoretheis*]. Once possessed he announces [*esepise*] the word [*logiou*] and sign [*semeiou*] of God.

There is much here worth discussion. The Alexandrian refers to the oracle as a manifest rational sign [*semeiou enargous*]. He understands these signs as manifest which means they are explicit and obvious. Thus when Philo says such signs are manifest he understands them to be commemorative signs.[256] A commermorative sign refers anything which serves to reveal a natural event observed in conjunction with it.[257] Consequently, nature provides signs that, through the art of divination, are employed to predict the future.

He frames the oracle within the context of the cosmic *cataclysmi* common to Stoic thought.[258] In this example Philo assumes a theory of causation based upon the regulation of natural events by divine providence. Thus he has Moses interpret the meaning of the sign from observing the causal progression and connection among natural events using his knowledge of the cosmic cycle as a guide to the truth. The prophet's ability to divine this hidden truth enables him to interpret the meaning of the sabbath.

Since prophecies are a source of predetermined events a careful study of them furnishes a knowledge of the future. Prognostic knowledge arises from study of the causal nexus between signs. Indeed the divinatory character of signs can demonstrated logically.

Philo demonstrates the divinatory character of the manna oracle according to the rules [*theoremata*] of propositional logic [*Vit. Mos.*, 2.264–267]. He employs the second *modens*

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[255] The waking vision is a classification of dream mentioned by Artemidorus and Macrobius, cf. *Onic.*, 1.2; in *Somn. Scip.*, 1.3.2. Philo, however, casts the vision in a hyparic not an onaric context.

[256] For the meaning of the *semeion* in Stoic thought see Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.*, 8.11, 80; Seneca, *Ep.* 117.3. A sign indicates a thought, a *lekton* –"that which is meant." Cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.*, 8.80. This sign signifies a thought which can be apprehended by the mind, cf. Galen, *In Log.*, 7.22ff.

[257] See Cicero, *De div.*, 1.11, 12, 24, 112; 2.26.

[258] On the cosmic cycle in Stoic thought, cf. Censorinus, *De de nat.*, 18.11=fr. 19 Ross=fr. 8 Walzer; Seneca, *Nat. quaest.*, 3.29.1; Plutarch, *De E ap. Delphos*, 389c. For Philo see *De aet. mun.*, 76–77.

tollens argument form to demonstrate the efficacy of Moses' interpretation of the sign [*semeion*] of the shower of food and later its doubling.

Logic is the *ratio cognoscendi* of divination. Providence is the *ratio essendi* of divination. For God is the dispensator of prognostic oracles. Divination, then, is the working out of the plans of the divine *logos* in cosmic and natural history. Consequently, divination is a science for Philo.

These prognostic oracles also serve to underscore Philo's belief that Moses receives direct divine revelations. That he is capable of interpreting divine oracles through the analysis of signs and that this ability illustrates he is the favored prophet of God.

Moses has an intellect [*nous*] that directs his thoughts and actions. His mind is intimately connected with the pneumatic intellect that governs all things. Thus when Moses hears or sees the thoughts of God he directly apprehends and understands them. Indeed it appears that the divine *logoi* are transmitted telepathically to Moses for when he receives them he experiences a waking oracle [*hypar-chresmos*].

Philo's imagery is instructive. Deity is a personal guardian for Moses who takes over the guidance of his most favored prophet. During his life deity directs the intellect of Moses through voice and sight mediums. At his death God combines the body and soul of Moses into a single intellect so he can leave to each tribe a prophecy of their future.[259]

Philo's portrayal of Moses parallels Plutarch's portrait of Socrates.[260] Each has a guardian. God and demon personally take over the guidance of the favored one by directing their thoughts and actions. In perceiving a vision or through hearing a voice Moses and Socrates apprehend divine thoughts. From apprehension they divine the future.

Moses' means of access to the divine is through his excellence of soul and mind. His chief skill is prophecy for through prophecy he exhibits knowledge of a people's name, place, and taxon. The description and interpretation of such taxonomic knowledge is Philo's purpose in writing the *Vita Mosis.*

Conclusion

This partial yet, it is hoped, representative survey of hyparic prophecy and divination has concentrated on trying to demonstrate the theoretical connections Philo shares in common with Hellenistic theories of prophecy and divination.

Firm conclusions about the function of prophecy and divination within the whole pattern of Philonic exegesis can be drawn only when all the evidence has been collected and analyzed. Nonetheless it is possible, even now, to make a few preliminary observations about Philo's understanding of the nature and function of hyparic prophecy:

1. Philo attempts to establish a connection between the text of the Pentateuch and the designs of divine providence. He attempts to show a linkage between the providence of God and the historical and institutional world of Judaism. In many instances the biblical text provides Philo with all the data required by him, but in many others, the link between Pentateuch and the Alexandrian's prophetic and divinatory interpretations goes much wider afield.

2. Philo employs Stoic and Platonic prophetic and divinatory *topoi* throughout the *Vita Mosis.* They form an integral part of his exegetical approach. He knows the logical and pneumatic bases of prophetic interpretation. He is aware of theories of prophecy and divination within the philosophical and cultic contextes of his time. This is clear from

[259] *Vit. Mos.*, 2.288.

[260] Following Winston [1985] 54.

Philo's extensive use of the technical terminology common to these traditions. He applies these *topoi* and *nomen* to a Pentateuchal context.

3. Philo's coupling of prophecy and divination with intellection signals an explicit rejection of the association in the epic and tragic literatures of prophecy with irrationality. It also represents a refutation of the association by natural scientists and physicians of prophecy and divination with psychic and somatic pathology.

4. Philo uses prophecy and divination to make three main points:

a. The divine origin and noetic character of prophecy and divination. This permits Philo to argue for the *logos* character of Jewish prophecy and divination.

b. Jewish prophecy and divination are linked to a series of philosophical postulates that illustrate their ontological, epistemological, psychological, and ethical significance.

c. He argues for the superiority of Jewish prophecy and divination over Greek and barbarian varieties. That Jewish prophecy and divination is not esoteric in character can be shown through the Pentateuch. For Philo this is reasonably and demonstrably so.

Hellenistic prophetic and divinatory theory, then, are valuable tools for Philo's intentions. Its use permits Philo to lift the Pentateuch out of the *arcana mundi* to which it was consigned.

To this extent the *Vita Mosis* stands as an important and independent work within the *corpus Philonicum*. Moreover it links Philo with traditions of Hellenistic prophecy and divination that stretch from the Archaic Greek through the Roman eras. Indeed—to view Philo's *Vita Mosis* from this perspective is to connect it with its proper contextual world—that of the relation of prophecy and divination to *pronoia* and *paideusis* of the gods. If Philo has taught us anything it is that these issues deserve more careful study.

Prophets and Prophecy in Josephus

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1. Introduction

Despite the fact that more than half of his *magnum opus*, the *Jewish Antiquities*, is an interpretive paraphrase of the Bible and thus has much to say about the activities of the prophets and despite the fact that Josephus himself claimed to have powers of prediction, an examination of the exhaustive bibliographies of Josephus[1] that have been compiled shows that no systematic study of prophets and prophecy in Josephus has thus far been attempted. The first attempt to deal with the subject, that by Fascher,[2] surveys superficially the pseudoprophets of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the war against the Romans. It is surprising that in his sweeping survey of prophecy and prophets in the Judaism of the Hellenistic-Roman period, Rudolf Meyer[3] almost totally ignores Josephus' treatment of the Biblical prophets. Blenkinsopp[4] concentrates on Josephus' self-understanding as a prophet and on the relationship of prophecy and priesthood. Delling[5] has a useful survey but does not address the questions of the relations between prophecy and history and between prophecy and the priesthood, nor the relations between Josephus' views and those of the pagan Greeks and the rabbis concerning prophecy. The most recent study, by van Unnik,[6] is largely a summary of the references to prophecy but is hardly analytical.

The present study proposes to address itself to the following questions in particular:

a. How important are the Biblical prophets to Josephus, and how much knowledge did he have the prophetic books?

b. What is the nature and purpose of prophecy, according to Josephus?

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[1] Heinz Schreckenberg, *Bibliographie zu Flavius Josephus* (Leiden: Brill, 1968); Heinz Schreckenberg, *Bibliographie zu Flavius Josephus: Supplementband mit Gesamtregister* (Leiden: Brill, 1979); Louis H. Feldman, *Josephus and Modern Scholarship* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984); Louis H. Feldman, *Josephus: A Supplementary Bibliography* (New York: Garland, 1986).

[2] Erich Fascher, *Prophétes* (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1927) 161–164.

[3] S.v. "*prophétes*," in Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, eds., *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, vol. 6 (English trans.: Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964) 812–828.

[4] Joseph Blenkinsopp, "Prophecy and Priesthood In Josephus," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 25 (1974) 239–262.

[5] Gerhard Delling, "Die biblische Prophetie bei Josephus," in Otto Belz et al., *Josephus-Studien: Untersuchungen zu Josephus, dem antiken Judentum und dem Neuen Testament. Otto Michel zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974) 109–121.

[6] Willem C. van Unnik, "Die Prophetie bei Josephus," in his *Flavius Josephus als historischer Schriftsteller* (Heidelberg, 1978) 41–54.

c. To what degree does Josephus see a relationship between prophecy and his profession as historian?

d. How does Josephus explain the apparent discrepancy between the view that prophecy had ceased with the destruction of the First Temple and the fact that it apparently continued up to his own day?

e. To what degree do Josephus' views show the influence of Hellenization, and to what degree do they correlate with the rabbinic view?

f. To what degree is there a correlation between Josephus the priest and Josephus the prophet?

2. The Importance of the Biblical Prophets to Josephus

One would expect Josephus to have a considerable knowledge of the prophets for at least eight reasons: 1) Josephus presents himself, probably, to be sure, with some measure of exaggeration, as extremely knowledgeable in Jewish law, so much so that the chief priests and the leading men of Jerusalem would constantly consult him from the time when he was a lad of merely fourteen years of age. One assumes that if he was so well versed in Jewish law he must also have known well the prophetic and wisdom books of the Bible which are so often quoted and expounded in the Talmud and in the rabbinic midrashim. 2) In his apologetic work *Against Apion*, where Josephus had to be particularly careful lest he be accused of misrepresenting his case, Josephus (1.37), in defending the accuracy of the Biblical narrative, declares that only the prophets had the privilege of recording the history of the Jewish people, and that the accuracy and consistency of their records are guaranteed by the fact that they were divinely inspired. He could hardly have made such a claim as to the reliability of the prophets if he had not studied them. 3) As a pious Jew, Josephus, we are justified in assuming, must have gone to the synagogue regularly where he would have heard the *haftarah*, which comes from the prophetic books, chanted each week after the reading of the portion of the Pentateuch. That the *haftarah* was, indeed, regularly included in the Sabbath service at the time of Josephus seems clear from the passage in Acts (13:15) which states that "after the reading of the Law and the prophets" Paul was invite to deliver an exhortation. 4) Moreover, Josephus in his youth (*Vita* 10) spent considerable time with the Essenes, as we may gather from his detailed account in the *Jewish War* (2.119–161), who from their early years were particularly well versed in the prophetic books (*War* 2.159) and who, indeed, had a special gift for prophecy themselves. If the Essenes are related to or even identical with the Dead Sea Sect, which cultivated a special interest in apocalyptic and prophetic books, this interest in prophecy would be reinforced. 5) Furthermore, the Pharisees, whose ranks Josephus eventually joined (*Life* 12) after experimenting with the three sects of Jews, were said to have a special gift of foreknowledge (*prógnosin*, *A* 17.43), as we can see from the predictions of Pollio the Pharisee (*A* 17.4) and his disciple Samaias (*A* 14.174–175). 6) In addition, he apparently looked upon himself as a latter-day Jeremiah,[7] as we can see from the explicit reference to Jeremiah in his speech to the Jews (*War* 5.391–392); and he clearly saw and emphasized the parallel between the first destruction of the Temple so vehemently warned against by the prophets and the destruction of the second Temple against which he, in turn, had warned his fellow countrymen. 7) Finally we recall that

[7] On Josephus' identification with Jeremiah see David Daube, "Typology in Josephus," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 31 (1980) 18–36.

he himself regarded himself as having a special gift for prophecy, like his Biblical namesake, Joseph, as he showed in predicting (*War* 3.400–402) that Vespasian would become emperor. 8) The prophets were to gain popularity in the following century even among pagan philosophers, if we may judge from Numenius of Apamea, the Pythagorean, who, according to Origen (*Contra Celsum* 4.51), quoted not only Moses but also the prophets in many passages in his writings.

At first sight we are tempted in join Blenkinsopp[8] in expressing surprise that Josephus dedicates so little space to the canonical prophets. The reason for this, one suspects, is that Josephus is writing a history, whereas the chief burden of the prophets is ethical exhortation. Indeed, it is clear that Josephus knows the prophetic books, as we can see from the fact that he paraphrases the book of Jeremiah in a number of instances (for example, *Antiquities* 10.84 is clearly based on Jer 46:2), and from the fact that he says (*Antiquities* 11.96) that the prophets Haggai and Zechariah encouraged the Jews—a detail that he could have acquired only from the Biblical books bearing their names. To be sure, where there are parallel accounts in historical books and in a prophet he prefers the historical account, as we perceive, for example, in the fact that he draws upon 2 Kgs 20:5 for his statement (*Antiquities* 10.27) that King Hezekiah would be cured within three days, whereas Isa 38:5 says nothing about the three days. But this is hardly an indication of a diminished interest in and regard for the prophets. A point that has not been noted hitherto is that Josephus frequently repeats (though from a stylistic point of view such repetition may even appear awkward) the identification of a prophetic figure as a prophet where the Biblical text in the Hebrew and in the Septuagint, both of which he knew well, does not. I have noted the following instances where Josephus mentions the word "prophet" or the verb "prophesied" where it is missing in the Bible: Moses, 1 time;[9] Phinehas, 1;[10] Joshua, 2;[11] Samson, 1;[12] Samuel, 44;[13] Abiathar, 1;[14] Nathan, 9;[15] Gad,

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[8] Blenkinsopp (above, n. 4) 243.

[9] *Antiquities* (hereafter abbreviated *A*) 2.327 vs. Exod 14:13.

[10] *A* 5.159 vs. Judg 20:27–28.

[11] *A* 4.165 vs. Num 27:18–23; *A* 5.20 vs. Josh 4:3.

[12] *A* 5.285 vs. Judg 13:24.

[13] *A* 5.340 vs. 1 Sam 2:26; *A* 5.341 vs. 1 Sam 1:1ff.; *A* 5.347 vs. 1 Sam 2:21; *A* 5.351 vs. 1 Sam 3:19; *A* 6.19 vs. 1 Sam 7:2; *A* 6.31 vs. 1 Sam 7:15; *A* 6.34 vs. 1 Sam 8:3; *A* 6.35 vs. 1 Sam 8:5; *A* 6.47 vs. 1 Sam 9:6; *A* 6.48 vs. 1 Sam 9:7 (to be sure identified in these last two instances in the Bible as a "man of G-d"); *A* 6.52 (*bis*) vs. 1 Sam 9:22 and 9:25; *A* 6.54 vs. 1 Sam 10:1; *A* 6.58 vs. 1 Sam 10:14; *A* 6.64 vs. 1 Sam 10:22; *A* 6.66 (*bis*) vs. 1 Sam 10:24–25; *A* 6.77 vs. 1 Sam 11:7; *A* 6.83 vs. 1 Sam 11:14; *A* 6.86 vs. 1 Sam 12:1; *A* 6.92 (*bis*) vs. 1 Sam 12:18–19; *A* 6.100 vs. 1 Sam 13:8; *A* 6.101 (*bis*) vs. 1 Sam 13:8; *A* 6.136 vs. 1 Sam 15:7; *A* 6.141 vs. 1 Sam 15:10–11; *A* 6.143 vs. 1 Sam 15:10–11; *A* 6.144 vs. 1 Sam 15:31; *A* 6.145 vs. 1 Sam 15:31; *A* 6.147 vs. 1 Sam 15:22; *A* 6.151 (*bis*) vs. 1 Sam 15:24–25; *A* 6.153 vs. 1 Sam 15:26; *A* 6.156 vs. 1 Sam 15:35; *A* 6.162 vs. 1 Sam 16:10; *A* 6.220 vs. 1 Sam 19:18; *A* 6.221 vs. 1 Sam 19:18; *A* 6.221 vs. 1 Sam 19:19; *A* 6.292 vs. 1 Sam 25:1; *A* 6.336 vs. 1 Sam 28:18–19; *A* 6.344 vs. no parallel; *A* 7.27 vs. 2 Sam 3:17; *A* 7.53 vs. 2 Sam 5.2 and 1 Chron 11:2.

[14] *A* 6.359 vs. 1 Sam 30:7.

[15] *A* 7.94 vs. 2 Sam 7:17 and 1 Chron 17:15; *A* 7.147 vs. 2 Sam 12:1; *A* 7.158 vs. 2 Sam 12:25; *A* 7.214 vs. 2 Sam 16.22; *A* 7.348 vs. 1 Kgs 1:11; *A* 7.349 vs. 1 Kgs 1:14; *A* 7.350 vs. 1 Kgs 1:17; *A* 7.353 vs. 1 Kgs 1:28; *A* 7.371 vs. 1 Chron 28:3.

3;[16] David, 2;[17] Ahijah, 4;[18] Shemaiah, 2;[19] Jadon, 6;[20] Azariah, 1;[21]Jehu, 2;[22] Elijah, 16;[23] Elisha, 26;[24] Jahaziel, 1;[25] Jonah, 4;[26] Nahum, 2;[27] Isaiah, 7;[28] Jeremiah, 12;[29] Ezekiel, 1;[30] Daniel, 3;[31] instances where no specific name is mentioned, 32.[32] This comes

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[16] *A* 7.322 vs. 2 Sam 24:14 and 1 Chron 21.13; *A* 7.324 vs. 2 Sam 24:15 and 1 Chron 21:14; *A* 7.329 vs. 2 Sam 24:18.

[17] *A* 8.109–110 vs. 1 Kgs 8:14–21; *A* 10.267–269 vs. no specific Biblical passage.

[18] *A* 8.206 vs. 1 Kgs 11:29; *A* 8.209 vs. 1 Kgs 11:40; *A* 8.218 vs. 1 Kgs 12:6ff.; *A* 8.266 vs. 1 Kgs 14:2.

[19] *A* 8.223 vs. 1 Kgs 12:22 and 2 Chron 11:2 (here called "the man of G-d"); *A* 8.257 vs. 2 Chron 12:7.

[20] *A* 8.234 vs. 1 Kgs 13:7; *A* 8.236 vs. 1 Kgs 13:11 ("man of G-d"); *A* 8.241 vs. 1 Kgs 13:24; *A* 8.243 vs. 1 Kgs 13:29 ("man of G-d"); *A* 8.243 vs. 1 Kgs 13:33; *A* 8.244 vs. 1 Kgs 13:33.

[21] *A* 8.295 vs. 2 Chron 15:1.

[22] *A* 8.299 vs. 1 Kgs 16:1; *A* 8.302 vs. 1 Kgs 16:1ff.

[23] *A* 8.319 vs. 1 Kgs 17:1; *A* 8.323 vs. 1 Kgs 17:15; *A* 8.325 vs. 1 Kgs 17:17; *A* 8.325 vs. 1 Kgs 17:18 ("man of G-d"); *A* 8.327 vs. 1 Kgs 17:18; *A* 8.327 vs. 1 Kgs 17:24 ("man of G-d"); *A* 8.329 vs. 1 Kgs 18:7; *A* 8.331 vs. 1 Kgs 18:7; *A* 8.337 vs. 1 Kgs 18:21; *A* 8.346 vs. 1 Kgs 18:46; *A* 8.354 vs. 1 Kgs 19:21; *A* 8.360 vs. 1 Kgs 21:17; *A* 8.362 (*bis*) vs. 1 Kgs 21:27–29; *A* 8.417 vs. 1 Kgs 22.38; *A* 9.20 vs. 2 Kgs 1:3.

[24] *A* 9.37 vs. 2 Kgs 3:20; *A* 9.48 vs. 2 Kgs 4:3; *A* 9.49 vs. 2 Kgs 4:7 ("man of G-d"); *A* 9.55 vs. 2 Kgs 6:17; *A* 9.56 vs. 2 Kgs 6:18; *A* 9.57 vs. 2 Kgs 6:19; *A* 9.58 vs. 2 Kgs 6:21; *A* 9.59 vs. 2 Kgs 6:23; *A* 9.60 vs. 2 Kgs 6:24; *A* 9.67 vs. 2 Kgs 6:31; *A* 9.68 vs. 2 Kgs 6:32; *A* 9.70 vs. 2 Kgs 6:33; *A* 9.72 vs. 2 Kgs 7:2; *A* 9.73 (*bis*) vs. 2 Kgs 7:2; *A* 9.86 vs. 2 Kgs 7:20; *A* 9.88 vs. 2 Kgs 8:7; *A* 9.90 vs. 2 Kgs 8:10; *A* 9.103 vs. 2 Chron 21:18; *A* 9.120 vs. 2 Kgs 9:25; *A* 9.175 vs. 2 Kgs 13:7–8; *A* 9.178 vs. 2 Kgs 13:14; *A* 9.179 vs. 2 Kgs 13:14; *A* 9.182 vs. 2 Kgs 13:20; *A* 9.183 vs. 2 Kgs 13:20; *A* 9.185 vs. 2 Kgs 13:25.

[25] *A* 9.11 vs. 2 Chron 20:18.

[26] *A* 9.208 vs. Jonah 1:1; *A* 9.211 vs. Jonah 1:7; *A* 9.211 vs. Jonah 1.9; *A* 9.212 vs. Jonah 1:15.

[27] *A* 9.239 vs. Nahum 1:1; *A* 9.242 vs. Nahum 1:1ff.

[28] *A* 9.276 vs. 2 Kings 19; *A* 10.13 vs. 2 Kgs 19:5; *A* 10:16 vs. 2 Kgs 19:20; *A* 10.28 vs. 2 Kgs 20:4; *A* 10.29 vs. 2 Kgs 20:9; *A* 10.32 vs. 2 Kgs 20:16; *A* 10.35 vs. no particular passage.

[29] *A* 10.78 vs. 2 Chron 35:25; *A* 10.117 vs. Jer 38:1; *A* 10.119 vs. Jer 38:4; *A* 10.120 vs. Jer 38:5; *A* 10.122 vs. Jer 38:7; *A* 10.128 vs. Jer 38:17; *A* 10.130 vs. Jer 38:27; *A* 10.156 vs. Jer 40:1; *A* 10.157 vs. Jer 40:6; *A* 10.178 vs. Jer 43:1; *A* 10.180 vs. Jer 42:7; *A* 11.1 vs. Ezra 1:1.

[30] *A* 10.98 vs. 2 Kings 24 and 2 Chronicles 36.

[31] *A* 10.246 vs. Dan 5:29; *A* 10.249 vs. Dan 5:29; *A* 10.269 vs. no particular passage.

[32] *A* 4.218 vs. Deut 17:9; *A* 4.320 vs. Deut 33:1; *A* 5.120 vs. Judg 1:1; *A* 6.38 vs. 1 Sam 8:7–9; *A* 6.115 vs. 1 Sam 14:18; *A* 6.166 vs. 1 Sam 16:13; *A* 6.254 vs. 1 Sam 22:9–10; *A* 6.261 vs. 1 Sam 22:16ff.; *A* 6.262, 268 vs. 1 Sam 22:9–23; *A* 6.271 vs. 1 Sam 23:2; *A* 6.327 vs. 1 Sam 28:3; *A* 7.7 vs. 2 Sam 2:1; *A* 7.72–73 vs. 2 Sam 5:19; *A* 7.76 vs. 2 Sam 5:23; *A* 7.294 vs. 2 Sam 21:1; *A* 7.296 vs. 2 Sam 21:1; *A* 7.321 vs. 2 Sam 24:10 and 1 Chron 21:7; *A* 7.334 vs. 2 Sam 24:25 and 1 Chron 21:26; *A* 8.199

to a significant total of 183 instances where Josephus has deliberately introduced the word "prophet" where it is not to be found in the original text. The contrast is particularly striking in the case of Samuel, who is referred to as a prophet in the Biblical text only once (1 Sam 3:20) in contrast to the 44 occurrences in Josephus.[33]

In what we may term editorializing on the part of Josephus, he declares (*A* 8.418), commenting on the fate of King Ahab, which had been predicted by two prophets, that we should realize that nothing is more beneficial (*sumphoróteron*, "suitable," "useful," "profitable") than "prophecy and the foreknowledge [*prognóseos*, a term especially well known from the Hippocratic school of medicine with respect to forecast of the result of disease] which it gives, for in this way G-d enables us to know what to guard against."

The significance of prophecy for Josephus may be deduced from the fact that when he summarizes the virtues of the greatest of all leaders, Moses, he makes a special point of emphasizing his ability in persuading the masses, his command of his passions, his ability as a general, and, finally—last but not least—his status as a prophet, where, Josephus says (*A* 4.329), he had none to equal him.

The importance of prophets for Josephus may be seen in the fact that in several instances he modifies the Biblical narrative by having a prophet as a spokesman for G-d rather than have G-d Himself address a person. Thus we are told (*A* 7.72) that before engaging in battle with the Philistines King David, who permitted himself to do nothing without "prophecy" (*propheteías*) and a command from G-d, consulted the high priest in order to get a prediction of the outcome of the forthcoming battle, and that when the high priest forecast a decisive victory David entered into battle. Similarly, when a famine was raging in the land, David supplicated G-d to reveal the cause of the calamity; and here, too, it is prophets, and not, as in the Bible, G-d Himself, who explain that G-d wished to see the Gabaonites avenged who had been wickedly killed by Saul. If Josephus had adhered to the Biblical version this would hardly have added to David's glory, whereas the statement that David never did anything without prophecy certainly does enhance his reputation, especially in the eyes of his Greek and Roman readers, who would think of the many instances in both Greek and Roman history where generals consulted oracles before engaging in battle. Likewise, in Josephus (*A* 8.197) it is a prophet, rather than G-d Himself, who warns King Solomon that his unlawful acts will be punished if he does not reform. Here again, Josephus avoids a head-on theological collision between G-d and man and prefers, as his sophisticated readers undoubtedly did, to have a prophet as a middleman.

The importance of prophecy for Josephus may further be seen in other modifications

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(continued)

vs. 1 Kgs 11:14; *A* 8.243 vs. 1 Kgs 13:33; *A* 8.244 vs. 1 Kgs 13:33; *A* 8.296 vs. 2 Chron 15:2ff.; *A* 8.334 vs. 1 Kgs 18:13; *A* 8.354 vs. 1 Kgs 19:19; *A* 8.382 vs. 1 Kgs 20:28; *A* 8.402 vs. 1 Kgs 22:7; *A* 8.417 vs. 1 Kgs 22:38; *A* 9.119 vs. 2 Kgs 9:25; *A* 9.250 vs. 2 Chron 28:13; *A* 10.67 vs. 1 Kgs 13:1ff.; *A* 11.3–4 (Ezra 1:2–4); *A* 10.60–61 vs. 2 Kgs 22:15–20 and 2 Chron 34:23–28.

[33] If we ask why, on the contrary, Josephus (*A* 1.208) omits the Biblical statement (Gen 20:7) which speaks of Abraham as a prophet, and likewise why he omits (*A* 2.293ff.) the Biblical statement (Exod 7:1) which speaks of Aaron as a prophet, we may suggest that both of these passages occur before the relevation at Sinai, and that Josephus wished, in general, to reserve the term "prophet" for those through whom G-d speaks after this revelation.

of the Biblical narrative. Thus when G-d charges Samuel to elect a king He berates the Jews for adopting a course ungrateful not merely toward G-d, as the Biblical text (1 Sam 8:7–9) would have it, but also toward Samuel's status as a prophet (*A* 6.38). Likewise, in his eulogy of the prophet Elisha (*A* 9.179), Josephus declares, in a extra-Biblical addition to 2 Kgs 13:14, that it was because of the prophet Elisha, as King Joash declared, that the Israelites had never had to use arms against their foes but that through his prophecies alone they had been able to overcome the enemy without a battle. Again, in another supplement to the Bible, Josephus (*A* 9.265, 9.281, 10.60–61) on three occasions stresses that the Jews were driven into exile not merely because they had violated the laws of the Torah but also because they had disregarded the warnings of their prophets. Undoubtedly Josephus stresses these warnings of the prophets because of the parallel with the warnings which he himself had vainly given the Jewish people and which, when disregarded, had led once again to the destruction of the Temple. Indeed, he specifically adds (*A* 10.38) to the Biblical account the statement that King Manasseh did not even spare the prophets, whom he slaughtered daily, whereas Scripture (2 Kgs 21:16) says merely that he shed very much innocent blood. Finally, what persuades King Cyrus of Persia (*A* 11.3–4), in a comment that has no parallel in the Bible (Ezra 1:2–4), that G-d is the One whom the Israelite nation worships is that He foretold Cyrus' name through the prophets and that He likewise predicted that Cyrus would rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem.

One major reason why Josephus ascribes so much importance to prophecy may be seen from his summary statement about Daniel (*A* 10.280), where he refutes the Epicurean position that G-d is not providential. His refutation of this position is that if this were true "we should not have seen all these things happen in accordance with his prophecy." We may ask, then, why Josephus omits so many prophecies. He himself gives the answer (*A* 9.242), namely in order not to seem tiresome (*okhlerós*, "troublesome," "irksome") to his readers, just as he tells us (*A* 2.176) that he was inclined to omit the names of those members of Jacob's family who descended to Egypt because of their difficulty but that he finally decided to give the names in order to refute those who claimed that the Jews were of Egyptian rather than of Mesopotamian origin. He apparently realized that a string of miraculous stories could well lead to the kind of ridicule which we find in such writers as Lucian. That this was, indeed, his fear may be deduced from the fact that when Josephus comes to the achievements of Daniel, he declares (*A* 10.266) that one may especially wonder at hearing, "namely that all things happened to him as to one of the greatest prophets."

3. The Nature of Prophecy

Prophecy, according to Josephus, is an art (*A* 8.334). The prophet in Josephus has three major functions, corresponding to present, past, and future: as contemporary mediator between G-d and man he declares the utterances of G-d, he interprets the past and creates the Scripture that records this past, and he predicts the future. The prophet himself, says Josephus (*A* 8.243), in an extra-Biblical comment (cf. 1 Kgs 13:33), must be divine (*theîon*) and excellent (*áriston*) not only in his speech but also in his very person (*A* 8.244). Because of his gifts he is the man who has reached the highest level of happiness (*eudaimonías*), as we can see from Josephus' addition (*A* 6.56) to the Biblical account (1 Sam 10:6, 10:11) of Saul's prophesying. The prophet is actually possessed by G-d in a way that transcends his reason (*A* 6.223) and is thus able to perform wondrous (*thaumastá*) and incredible

(*parádoxa*) deeds (*A* 9.182).[34] Josephus adds amazingly little to the Biblical account about the prophets as moralizers,[35] but this is presumably because his audience preferred to have his history stress political and military rather than ethical issues. If, as van Unnik[36] remarks, Josephus is not interested in the prophets as persons or in their writings it is for the same reason that the books of Samuel and Kings do not focus on the prophets, namely because their chief interest is in the political leaders of Israel and their wars.

The prophet, as conceived by Josephus, is one with whom the Deity converses (*A* 8.327). In the case of Moses,the greatest of all prophets, Josephus (*A* 4.329), in an editorializing comment, remarks that in all of his utterances one seemed to hear the speech of G-d Himself. As prophet he gives commands in accordance with the will of G-d. Thus, for example, in an extra-Biblical remark (cf. Judg 1:1), Phineas (*A* 5.120) "prophesies" (*prophēteúei*) that is, announces, that it is the will of G-d that the tribe of Judah be given the command against the Canaanites. He is the mediator, the middleman, the interpreter of G-d's words, as we see, for example, in the incident (*A* 7.294) where there is a dreadful famine during which, according to the Biblical text (2 Sam 21:1), King David seeks "the face of the L-rd," whereas, according to Josephus, it is the prophets who act as intermediaries in presenting G-d's word that the Gabaonites are to be avenged. A similar role for the prophets as interpreters of G-d may be seen in Josephus' statement (*A* 7.321) that it is the prophets who inform David that G-d is angry with him, whereas there is no such statement in Scripture (2 Sam 24:10 and 1 Chron 21:7). Again, whereas the Bible (2 Kgs 9:25) notes that Jehu reminded his aide Bidkar of the oracle which G-d had uttered against Joram, in Josephus (*A* 9.119) it is the Elijah's prophecy of which Jehu reminds Bidkar.

Another major role of the prophet, which apparently, according to Josephus, continued until his own day, was that of prediction of the future. Thus Josephus (*A* 2.194) reports that Jacob, before his death, foretold to his sons by way of prophecy (*katà prophēteían*) how each of their descendants would find a place in Canaan. The Bible (Gen 49:1) speaks only of the prediction and says nothing about prophecy; for Josephus such a prediction is *ipso facto* a prophecy. So far as this aspect of prophecy is concerned, its characteristic is that its predictions come true, as we can see, for example, from Josephus' extra-Biblical

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[34] It is noteworthy that in the much-disputed *Testimonium Flavianum* (*A* 18.63–64) Josephus says the same two things about Jesus that he declares here were able to be performed by the prophet Elisha through his prophetic power, namely that he did deeds contrary to all expectation (*paradóxon*) (*A* 18.63) and that he did marvelous (*thaumásia*) (*A* 18.64) things. Josephus says specifically that the prophets had prophesied these things about him; and the parallel with Elisha would seem to equate Jesus with the prophets, though, as we have noted, Josephus indicates (*Against Apion* 1.40) that prophecy, in the classical sense at least, had ceased with the destruction of the first Temple. This would seem to add still another argument against the authenticity of the *Testimonium Flavianum*. As to John the Baptist, Johannes Lindblom, *Geschichte und Offenbarungen: Vorstellungen von göttlichen Weisungen und übernatürlichen Erscheinungen im ältesten Christentum* (Lund, 1968) 168–172, attempts to find signficance in the fact that Josephus (*A* 18.116–119) avoids the term *prophétes* in speaking of John the Baptist; but, as we have noted, he does use the word of John Hyrcanus, and he could have used it with regard to John the Baptist in the same sense, namely one who is able to predict the future.

[35] One exception is *A* 9.350 vs. 2 Chron 28:13.

[36] Van Unnik (above, n. 6) 50.

(cf. 1 Sam 3:19) addition (*A* 5.351), that all that Samuel prophesied was seen to come true.[37]

4. The Prophet as Historian

One basic reason for Josephus' great interest in the prophets is that he regards them as his predecessors as historians of the past. Indeed, in the proem to his *Jewish War* (1.18) Josephus declares that he will begin his work at the point where "the historians of these events [i.e. the Biblical history] and our prophets conclude, "though he actually begins the work in about the year 171 B.C.E. According to Josephus (*Against Apion* 1.37) it is because the prophets alone are responsible for the Holy Scriptures that there is no discrepancy in what is written, their accuracy being due to the fact that their knowledge of ancient history was due to the inspiration which they received from G-d. This interest must have been heightened by the fact that the historical books of the Bible subsequent to the Pentateuch are reckoned by Josephus (as they were by the rabbis) as prophetic books, even though the role of the prophets in several of them, notably Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, is surely less important than that of the political leaders. Indeed, Josephus goes on to remark (*Against Apion* 1.41) that the reason why the historical works from the time of Artaxerxes in the mid-fifth century B.C.E. to his own time are less reliable is because they did not have the prophets to attend to them. That, indeed, Josephus believed that prophecy, in the sense of composition of Biblical books, had ended with the return from Babylonian captivity may be seen from the fact that in his close paraphrase of 1 Maccabees, he says (*A* 13.5) that the calamity that befell the Jews at the hands of Bacchides was greater than any that they experienced since their return from Babylon, where 1 Macc 9:27 has "since the time that a prophet was not seen among them."[38] We may add that while it is true, as we shall see, that Josephus, like the

[37] Similar instances where the word "prophecy" refers to prediction may be found in the following passages: *A* 6.57; *A* 6.136 (where the corresponding Biblical passage, 1 Sam 15:7, omits mention of "in accordance with G-d's prediction"); *A* 6.261 (where there is no mention of prophecy in the Biblical source, 1 Sam 22:16ff.); *A* 6.36 (where the Bible, 1 Sam 28:18–19, says nothing about prophecy); *A* 8.109–110 (where the corresponding Biblical passage, 1 Kgs 8:14–21, has no mention of prophecy); *A* 8.218 vs. no mention of prophecy in 1 Kgs 12:6ff.; *A* 8.234, where Josephus equates "foreknowledge" (*prógnosin*) with prophecy, as one can see from the reference to the prophet that follows immediately; *A* 8.402, which refers to "what is going to happen," where the Bible (1 Kgs 22:7) specifically speaks of a prophet; *A* 9.86 vs. no mention of prophecy in 2 Kgs 7:20; *A* 9.175 vs. no mention of prophecy in 2 Kgs 13:7–8; *A* 9.185 vs. no mention of prophecy in 2 Kgs 13:35; *A* 9.276 vs. 2 Kings 19; *A* 10.67 vs. 1 Kgs 13:1ff.

[38] Van Unnik (above, n. 6) 48, n. 23, has missed this point when he cites this passage and remarks that Josephus does not here reproduce the statement of 1 Maccabees about the end of prophecy. In substituting the phrase "since their return from Babylon" for "since the time that a prophet was not seen among them" Josephus is equating the end of prophecy with the period of return from Babylonian captivity. Van Unnik's attempt (ibid.), however, to find significance in the fact that Josephus has omitted the statement (1 Macc 14:41) that the Jews were pleased that Simon should be their high priest "forever, until there should arise a faithful prophet," as if Josephus disagreed that a prophet could yet arise, is not well founded, since Josephus' paraphrase of 1 Maccabees ends at *Antiquities* 13.214 with 1 Macc 13:42.

Talmudic rabbis, regarded the sages as the true successors to the prophets, there were two prophetic functions which the sages could not and did not claim, namely the inspiration to write books of Scripture and the authority to record history.

That it is not possible, after the reign of Artaxerxes, to have prophets in the sense of people who are able to *compose* Holy Scripture may be seen from the way in which Josephus deals with the seventy (or seventy-two) translators of the Torah into Greek. Philo (*De Vita Mosis* 2.7.37) speaks of the translators "as if they were divinely inspired (*katháper enthousiôntes*) and describes their work by the term "prophesied" (*proephéteuon*). Josephus (*A* 12.103ff.), on the other hand, carefully avoids saying that they prophesied since this would put them in the same category as the prophets who composed Biblical Books. Instead, he says (*A* 12.104) that they set out to work as ambitiously and painstakingly as possible. The fact that he adds (*A* 12.106) that they washed their hands in the sea and thus purified themselves each day does not indicate that they expected divine inspiration any more than a present-day Torah scribe does who immerses himself in a *mikvah* each time before writing the divine name. Finally, the fact (*A* 12.108) that after the completion of the translation the people requested that it should remain as it was and not be altered is an indication not of the prophetic status of the translators but of Josephus' view (*Against Apion* 1.42) that one should not alter Scripture in the slightest, whence his own enigmatic promise (*A* 1.17), in view of his modifications of Scripture, that he will neither add nor subtract anything to the Scriptural text.

That a prophet is concerned with recording the past may be seen from the fact that Moses (*A* 4.320), at the close of his life "prophesies" to each of the tribes the things that are past (*genomena*),[39] whereupon the multitude, recalling these events, bursts into tears. When Josephus does include the deeds of the prophets in his *Antiquities* he does so because, as he says (*A* 9.208) in justifying his inclusion of the story of Jonah, he has promised to give an exact account of Jewish history. This kinship of the prophet and the historian may be seen in the fact that Josephus (*A* 1.240) refers to the historian Cleodemus-Malchus as "the prophet."[40]

We may conjecture that Josephus saw a kinship between the prophet and the historian not only in that both deal with the past but also in that both seek to predict the future. One is reminded of the famous passage (1.22.4) in Thucydides, one of Josephus' favorites[41] that "whoever wishes to have a clear view of the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all human probability, happen again in the same or a similar way" will find his history useful. Thus the historian functions both as recorder of the past and as predicter of the future. If, in his pericope about Daniel, Josephus (*A* 10.210) declares that he has not thought it proper to relate the meaning of the stone because "I am expected to write of what is past and done and not of what is to be," this is merely a good excuse because he does not wish to offend his patrons, the Romans, to whose overthrow the passage actually refers, since the stone was said in Josephus' day to be a symbol of the Messiah, who would perform this.

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[39] I here adopt the reading of the manuscripts, which is clearly the *lectio difficilior*, rather than that of the Latin (*futura*), which would have Moses prophesying future events.

[40] See D. E. Aune, "The Use of Prophetes in Josephus," *JBL* 101 (1982) 419–421. Another suggestion is that the name "Malchus" refers to Cleodemus as a *malakh*, i.e., a messenger, which is another name for a prophet. See Carl R. Holladay, *Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors*, vol. 1: *Historians* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983) 257, nn. 9, 10.

[41] See Henry St. John Thackeray, *Josephus the Man and the Historian* (New York: Jewish Institute of Religion, 1929) 110–114.

Josephus (*Against Apion* 1.40) declares that prophecy ended in the reign of Artaxerxes (presumably an indication that Josephus, like the Rabbis (*Seder Olam Rabbah* 21), regarded Esther, who lived in the reign of Artaxerxes, whom Josephus identifies as the Biblical Ahasuerus, as a prophetess—the last to compose a Biblical book under prophetic inspiration.[42] And yet, he asserts (*War* 1.68–69, *A* 13.299–300) that the three greatest privileges of which John Hyrcanus was accounted by G-d to be worthy included the gift of prophecy. But, as we have noted, there is a major difference between the Biblical prophets and those who came later in that only the former were capable of producing inspired writings for the canon of the Bible.[43] Moreover, while it is true that Josephus still uses the word "prophecy," he is careful to point out Hyrcanus has the ability to foresee (*prógnosin*) and foretell (*prolégein*) the future, as shown by the fact that he foretold what would happen to his two elder sons; he lacked, we may note, the ability to understand the past and to interpret the present. Similarly, we hear in the Talmudic corpus that it is possible to know things beyond sense perception, as we see from Hillel's statement (Tosefta, *Pesahim* 4.2) that people would know how to act on a certain occasion by the Holy Spirit or from the fact that Rabban Gamaliel (Tosefta, *Pesahim* 1 [2].27) was able, through the Holy Spirit, to guess the name of a certain Gentile.[44] That Josephus regarded these latter-day prophets as being incapable of interpreting the past and present may be seen from his omission (*A* 12.318) of the detail (1 Macc 4:46) that the stones of the desecrated altar were put away "on the temple-hill in a fitting place until a prophet should come and give a decison about this."

5. The Prophet as Predicter

That the word "prophesy" may be used by Josephus in the general sense of "declare" or "predict" may be seen from the statement (*A* 9.145) of the high priest Jehoiada that G-d foretold (*prophēteúsanta*) that the house of Joash should rule for all time to come. The corresponding Biblical passages (2 Kgs 11:4 and 2 Chron 23:3) make no mention of G-d's prophecy. In any case, G-d is not a prophet, and the word must mean merely "declared" or "predicted." Likewise, when Josephus (*Against Apion* 2.286) speaks of the Jews' trust in Moses' "prophetic" utterances concerning G-d he cannot be referring to "prophecies" concerning G-d, but rather to statements or declarations.

Similarly, Josephus claims for himself not the powers of a prophet in the classical sense and, indeed, never refers to himself as a *prophétes*, but rather the ability to interpret dreams and to foretell the future, as, indeed, we find also for personalities in the New Testament.[45] Hence, though, because of his prophecy with regard to Vespasian, he seems to be subjective when he speaks of prophecy in general, the fact is that he is really objective since his prophecy is merely a prediction.

For Josephus, perhaps because he modelled himself upon his Biblical namesake Joseph, dreams play an important role in the prediction of the future. On several occasions (*Life* 208–212, *War* 3.351–354) he mentions his own dreams and says about himself that he was an interpreter of dreams and skilled in divining the meaning of the ambiguous

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[42] That prophecy has ceased is known not only to Josephus but also to the rabbis (*Yoma* 9b) and to Julian (*Contra Galilaeos* 198 B–C).

[43] So Harry A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1947) 52–53.

[44] Cited by Wolfson (above, n. 43) 53.

[45] See, e.g., Matt 1:20, 2:12–13; Acts 9:10, 10:3, etc.

utterances of G-d. It is perhaps significant of his inclination not to downgrade dreams that in his relatively close paraphrase of the Bible Josephus (*A* 3.300) omits the passage (Num 12:6–8) in which G-d tells Aaron and Miriam that He will speak to other prophets in dreams but that he will speak to Moses mouth to mouth. It is surely significant that when he paraphrases (*A* 7.147) the passage (2 Sam 12:1) in which G-d appears to Nathan in which He communicates his displeasure with King David for the affair with Bathsheba, he not merely adds the identification of Nathan as a prophet but also that G-d appeared to him in a dream. Likewise, Josephus (*A* 8.125) adds to the Biblical account (1 Kgs 9:2) that it was in a dream that G-d appeared to King Solomon to reassure him that He would abide in the newly built Temple forever provided that the Jews acted righteously. Josephus apparently realizes that some of his readers will be skeptical about the inclusion of dreams in his history, and so when he recounts the dreams of Archelaus and of Glaphyra (*A* 17.345–346, 351–352) he explains that he has included them in his history for two reasons, namely because they concern royal persons and because they provide instances for the confirmation of the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and of the providential concern of G-d for the affairs of men. He then adds, as he so often does when he mentions miracles, the expression of courtesy to his readers, that anyone to whom such things seem incredible is free to have his own opinion. In this positive view of dreams he is in accord with the generally held pagan view[46] and in contrast to Ben Sira (34:1–5) that dreams lift up fools and are vain and to the Talmudic rabbis, some of whom placed credence in them (*Berakhoth* 55–56; Jerusalem Talmud, *Maaser Sheni* 4.8; *Nedarim* 8), while others held the view that dreams are neither advantageous nor disadvantageous (Jerusalem Talmud, *Maaser Sheni* 4.8) and that there is no dream without some nonsense (Berakhoth 55a).

A key to prophecy in this sense is that it comes true. Thus Josephus (*A* 8.417) stresses, more than does the Bible (1 Kgs 22:38) the acknowledgement of the *truth* of Elijah's prophecy. In an extra-Biblical editorial (*A* 8.418) Josephus proceeds to add that inasmuch as the prophecies spoken by Elijah and Micaiah came true, we ought to acknowledge the greatness of G-d and should not think that statements that flatter us are more worthy of belief than the truth, "but should acknowledge that nothing is more beneficial [*sumphoróteron*, 'suitable,' 'useful,' 'profitable'] than prophecy and the foreknowledge [*prognóseos*] which it gives." The quality of Isaiah which Josephus singles out (*A* 10.35) in a kind of editorial about him is that he was marvelously possessed of truth and was confident of never having spoken what was false. This quality of truthful prophecy, adds Josephus, is to be found not only in Isaiah but also in the twelve other prophets as well. Indeed, the key to this aspect of prophecy is found in Josephus' editorializing (*A* 10.269) about Daniel, namely that he made plain the accuracy and faithfulness to truth (*aparállakton*, literally "indistinguishableness" [i.e. from truth]) of his prophecies.

Hence, there is no possibility that a true prophet will be contradicted by another true prophet. Thus Zedekiah, one of the false prophets, is attempting to undermine the authority of the prophets, declares (*A* 8.408), in an extra-Biblical detail, that Micaiah is lying, inasmuch as he apparently contradicts another prophet, Elijah, in stating that within three days King Ahab would meet his death. Similarly, in an addition to the Biblical text, Josephus (*A* 10.106–107) says that King Zedekiah disbelieved the prophecies of Jeremiah and Ezekiel inasmuch as they apparently contradicted one another, the first stating the

[46] Cf., e.g., Herodotus 7.16, 8.54; Suetonius, *Julius* 81.3, *Augustus* 93.4; Plutarch, *Caesar* 63; Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 4.

the king would be taken captive by the Babylonians, and the latter declaring that he would he would not see Babylon; nevertheless, as Josephus (*A* 10.141) remarks, both prophecies came true—the *sine qua non* of prophecy—since Zedekiah was blinded and thus taken to Babylon.

Josephus was particularly concerned with prophecy because of the role played by what he termed false prophets, who claimed divine inspiration (*War* 2.259), in forming the background of the revolution against Rome. Thus we hear (*A* 20.97) of a certain Theudas, who, approximately in the years 44 to 46, asserting that he was a prophet (*prophétes*), led a large number of followers to the Jordan River, which, he claimed, would part at his command. If Josephus is correct in describing him as a prophet and not merely, as in Acts (5.36), as a "somebody," this would indicate that this aspect of prophecy, namely prediction by divination, had not ceased. Another such figure in the following decade, during the procuratorship of Felix (52–60), is the Egyptian who declared (*A* 20.169) that he was a prophet (*prophétes*) and led masses of people to the Mount of Olives, who claimed that at his word the walls of the Jerusalem would fall down thus providing them with an entrance into the city.[47] Finally, the Zealots, he says (*War* 4.386), scoffed at the oracles of the (true) prophets (*toùs tôn prophetôn chresmoús*), notably a prediction that the city would would be captured and the Temple burnt when there would be civil war (*stásis*), the dreadful consequences of which are particularly stressed by Josephus' model, Thucydides (3.80–82). In particular, according to Josephus (*War* 6.285–286) six thousand refugees in the Temple owed their destruction to a false prophet (*pseudoprophétes*) who claimed to have a divine command that the people go up to the Temple court in order to be delivered. Indeed, says Josephus (*War* 6.286);, numerous prophets (*prophêtai*) were suborned by the revolutionaries to delude the people by bidding them to await help from G-d. These false prophets, political or Messianic in nature, from Josephus' point of view, may still be termed "prophets" because they predict the future through divination, but their prophecies will not turn out to be true. If, as a matter of fact, the Pharisaic scholars were distinguished by their foresight (*prometheís*), that is, their ability to predict the future, and if, as the Talmud would have it, the scholars are the real successors of the prophets, it is the *sopboi,* that is, the *sopherim* who interpreted the ambiguous oracle (*War* 6.312) found in the Scriptures (presumably in Daniel) to the effect that someone from Judaea would become the ruler of the world who were directly responsible for inciting the Jews to undertake war against the Romans. Indeed, as Blenkinsopp[48] remarks, Judas the Galilean is called a *sophistés,* which implies the exegetical skills associated, as we have seen, with the prophets. Hence, we may be able to understand better Josephus' puzzling remark (*A* 18.23) that the Fourth Philosophy, the sect of revolutionaries, agreed with the Pharisees in all respects except that they were convinced that G-d alone was their leader and master.

6. Josephus' Relation to the Pagan and Talmudic Views of Prophecy

In rewriting the Biblical narrative, as I[49] have noted, Josephus presents his history as a biography of great men. In emphasizing the importance of prophecy Josephus is

[47] Here also, as in the case of Theudas, the version in Acts (21.38) does not mention that he claimed to be a prophet.

[48] Blenkinsopp (above, n. 4) 260.

[49] Louis H. Feldman, "Josephus' Portrait of Saul," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 53 (1982) 45–99.

appealing not so much to his Jewish readers, who, as we have seen, tended to downgrade the significance of prophets and to emphasize the importance of the sages who were regarded as their successors, as to his pagan readers, who expected the great leaders of history to be associated with significant prophecies.[50] Hence, in emphasizing the prophecies associated with his Biblical heroes Josephus could expect a favorable response from his readers.

Josephus is addressing the *Antiquities* to a pagan audience, as we can see from the fact that he justifies writing the work by noting (*A* 1.10) the precedent of the Septuagint, which likewise was directed to Gentiles; and there are many passages in his paraphrase of the Bible where he Hellenizes the narrative.[51] In particular, we may note Josephus' extra-Biblical portrait of a prophet in his description of Samson, of whom he says that it was plain from the frugality of his diet (*toû perì tèn díaitan sophrosúnes*) and his loosely flowing locks that he was to be a prophet (*prophēteúson*). None of this is to be found in the Biblical source (Judg 13:24); in fact, there is no mention there, or for that matter in rabbinic literature, that Samson is a prophet. But this portrait corresponds rather closely to that of the pagan philosopher and holy man, Apollonius of Tyana (*ap.* Philostratus 1.8), who is said to have partaken only of dried fruits and vegetables and to have let his hair grow long.

Josephus' use of the term *entheos* ("inspired," literally having the god within one) with regard to prophets would be familiar to his pagan audience, especially since this is the time-honored term used with reference to the Pythian priestess of Apollo at Delphi,[52] who was thought to have been entered into by the god; hence, when she speaks, she speaks in the first person, as if it were Apollo himself. Similarly, when Saul prophesies (*A* 6.56) he is divinely inspired (*entheos*)(the term is not found in the Septuagint version of Josephus' source, 1 Sam 10:6). Likewise, Elijah (*A* 8.346) is divinely inspired (*entheos*), whereas the term in not found in the Septuagint of the corresponding passage (1 Kgs 18:46). Finally, Josephus describes himself (*War* 3.353) as divinely inspired when at Jotapata he reads the meaning of the prophecies in the Sacred Scriptures.

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[50] See Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: University Press, 1933) 240.

[51] See Louis H. Feldman, "Abraham the Greek Philosopher in Josephus," *TAPA* 99 (1968) 143–166; "Hellenizations in Josephus' Account of Man's Decline," in Jacob Neusner, ed., *Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough* (*Studies in the History of Religions* 14: Leiden: Brill, 1968) 336–353; "Hellenizations in Josephus' Version of Esther," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 143–170; "Josephus as an Apologist to the Greco-Roman World: His Portrait of Solomon," in Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, ed., *Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1976) 69–98; "Josephus' Portrait of Saul," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 53 (1982) 45–99; "Abraham the General in Josephus," in Frederick E. Greenspahn et al., eds., *Nourished with Peace: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism in Memory of Samuel Sandmel* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984) 43–49; "Josephus as a Biblical Interpreter: the 'Aqedah," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 75 (1985) 212–252; and "Josephus' Portrait of Deborah," in A. Caquot et al., eds., *Hellenica et Judaica: Hommage a Valentin Nikiprowetzky* (Leuven-Paris: Editions Peeters, 1986) 115–128.

[52] See E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California, 1951) 70–71 and 87, n. 41.

Even in his portrait of Jeremiah Josephus adds a touch which his pagan readers would have appreciated, inasmuch as he declares (*A* 10.90) that the people and their rulers accused Jeremiah of having as prophet used divination (*oionizoménou*, which involves taking omens from the flight and cries of birds, so familiar to the pagans). Josephus source at this point, Jer 26:7ff., does not mention the accusation of divination at all; and the introduction of this accusation of divination, expressly forbidden in the Torah (Lev 19:26), which actually, in the Septuagint, uses the same verb (*oionieústhe*) as the one which Josephus employs here, undoubtedly heightens the drama of the situation.

Josephus' version (*War* 4.459–464) of how the prophet Elisha converted a noxious into a salubrious spring is a clear case of Hellenization. The Biblical passage (2 Kgs 2:19–22) states merely that the men of the city of Jericho told Elisha that the water was bad and that the land was unfruitful, whereupon Elisha took a new bowl, put some salt into it, threw the salt into the water, and declared, in the name of G-d, that from that time forth the water would be wholesome and that neither death nor miscarriage would come from it. Josephus' scenario describes Elisha as a guest of the people of Jericho who had been treated by them with extreme hospitality. He then requites their kindness by conferring a boon upon them. He dramatizes the scene by having Elisha raise his right hand to heaven, pour propitiary libations upon the ground, beseech the earth "to mollify the stream and to open sweeter channels, and heaven to temper its waters with more genial airs and to grant to the inhabitants alike an abundance of fruits, a succession of children, and an unfailing supply of water conducive to their production, so long as they remained a righteous people." The whole scene is very reminiscent of such Greek mythological stories as that of Philemon and Baucis, the poor and pious old couple who entertained Zeus and Hermes in their cottage and who, in return, since the gods had not been received kindly by anyone else during their visit upon the earth, were saved from the flood, saw their cottage become the gods' temple, and served as priest and priestess of the shrine there. An even closer parallel is to be found in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, where we find the story of how Demeter, during her search for her abducted daughter Persephone, received hospitality from King Celeus of Eleusis, his wife Metaneira, and their daughters, who were drawing water from a well. In return, Demeter nourishes Celeus' son Demophoon and even attempts to give him immortality. Still another parallel is the story of Phytalus the planter who entertained Demeter during her wanderings and who, in return, received a fig tree as a gift.

Again, in emphasizing (*A* 4.388) that there was a saying of inspired men (*andrôn entheon*) that the city of Jerusalem would be captured and the Temple burnt when there would be sedition among the people Josephus was presenting a conditional oracle of the sort that was common among Greek oracles[53] but almost non-existent among Jewish prophecies. In the meantime, this gave Josephus an opportunity to stress the destructive nature of *stasis* ("sedition"), which plays such a crucial role in Thucydides' account (notably 3.80–82) of the decline of Greek political morality.

Moreover, his pagan readers would have especially appreciated and sympathized with Josephus' comment (*War* 4.386) that the Zealots, whom he so strongly berates, scoffed at the oracles (*chresmoús*, the word normally used for oracles, such as those of Delphi) of the prophets (*prophetôn*) as impostors' tales. But Josephus is careful to stress a major difference between the pagan oracles, notably those of the most famous oracle at Delphi,

[53] See David E. Aune, *Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) 142.

and those of the Jews, namely that the former were notorious for their ambiguity whereas the latter were noteworthy for their clarity and truth. Thus, as we have noted, true prophets cannot, by definition, contradict each other, though at first sight the prophecies of Jeremiah and Ezekiel (*A* 10.142) appeared to do so. Like the oracles of Delphi the oracles in the Jewish Scriptures may sometimes be ambiguous (*amphibolos*) (*War* 6.312) and, like those of Delphi, if misinterpreted, may lead to disaster, as did the oracle, as interpreted by the Zealots, declaring that someone from Judaea would become a ruler of the world. In contrast, Josephus says of himself (*War* 3.352) that he was skilled in divining the meaning of ambiguous (*amphibolous*) prophecies (*propheteías*) in the Holy Scriptures.

One would have expected Josephus to distinguish carefully, in his terminology, between pagan and Jewish prophets and even between the classical prophets and those latter-day prognosticators such as himself. To be sure, he never applies the word *prophétes* to Balaam or, for that matter, to himself. But he elaborates greatly on Balaam's enthusiastic prophecies, as we can see when we compare his account (*A* 4.119ff.) to the single verse in the Bible (Num 23:12). Yet, just as he is not consistent and precise in his terminoloy of slavery,[54] so here, though he avoids the term for Balaam, he does use the term for an Egyptian prophet (*Against Apion* 1.312), for Cleodemus-Malchus the historian (*A* 1.240) and the prophets of Baal opposed by Elijah (*A* 8.339).[55] Moreover, to show Moses' broad-mindedness he notes (*A* 4.157–158), in recording Balaam's prophecies, that not only did Moses do him the high honor of recording them but he ascribed them to Balaam when he might have appropriated and taken credit for them himself, inasmuch as there would have been no witness to correct him. This last statement shows that the prophecies of Balaam were of such a high order that they were deserving of the greatest of all prophets, Moses himself.

On the other hand, Josephus is well aware of rabbinic traditions with regard to prophets and prophecy. Thus, whereas his Biblical source (1 Kgs 11:11) states that the L-rd warned Solomon about his unlawful acts, Josephus (*A* 8.197) records that it was a prophet sent by G-d who addressed him. The rabbinic tradition[56] agrees with Josephus in mentioning that it was a prophet, identified as Ahijah, who was G-d's spokesman on this occasion. Similarly, Josephus (*A* 8.389), like the rabbis,[57] supplies the name, Micaiah, of the prophet who warned the Israelite that he would be killed by a lion.

In contrast to Josephus, however, the rabbis downgraded the importance of the prophets, perhaps in response to Christianity, which stressed the prophets,[58] particularly because

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[54] See John G. Gibbs and Louis H. Feldman, "Josephus' Vocabulary for Slavery," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 76 (1985–86) 281–310.

[55] With the exceptions here noted, Josephus maintains the distinction, found in pagan sources, between the *prophétes*, which is the title of a mortal speaking in the name of a god who is attached to an established oracular shrine, and the *mantis*, who is the unattached seer, a term which he applies, for example, to himself (*War* 4.625), as he does to contemporary Jewish seers, such as Judah the Essene (*War* 1.80, *A* 13.313). See Joseph E. Fontenrose, "Prophetes," *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. by N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970) 887. Here, too, we may note, Josephus is not precise in his terminology, since he uses the term *manteion* of the oracle at Delphi (*Against Apion* 2.162), where the reading, to be sure, is doubtful.

[56] See the note on this passage in the Loeb Library edition.

[57] See the Loeb Library edition of Josephus on this passage.

[58] See, e.g., Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*, chapter 7, who notes that in Christianity the

of the alleged predictions of Jesus as the Messiah and which declared that the Jews had failed to understand the words of the prophets. Thus, whereas, as we have noted, Josephus, on no fewer than forty-four occasions, adds the epithet "prophet" to the name of Samuel, the third-century Palestinian Rabbi Levi, almost surely here as elsewhere reflecting an earlier opinion, declares that Samuel was reprimanded by G-d for his self-pride. The fourth-century Palestinian Rabbi Hunia (Huna) (*Ecclesiastes Rabbah* 1.34) goes so far as to declare that it was only Israel's sin that made it necessary to give them more books than the Pentateuch. On the other hand, one of the rabbis (the fourth-century Babylonian Amemar) explicitly states (*Baba Bathra* 12a) that the sages were superior to the prophets, presumably because the prophet must wait for a divine communication whereas the sage may, on his own initiative, seek to explain the Law. Moreover, as we see in the famous case of Josephus' contemporary Rabbi Eliezer (*Baba Metzia* 59b), miracles and even a voice from Heaven do not count in the scale against human reasoning. According to the third-century Palestinian Aha bar Hanina (*Exodus Rabbah* 10.1), G-d says to the prophets, "Do you think that I have no messengers if you do not accept to be my messengers? In this case, I will execute my message "by a snake, by a serpent, by a frog." According to his contemporary, the Palestinian Abba bar Kahana, all the forty-eight prophets and seven prophetesses in Israel were unsuccessful in leading back the Jews to the right path, whereas the evil decree of Ahasuerus did so. In fact, the rabbis explain (*Midrash Psalms* 90.4) that even the words of Moses himself, the greatest of the prophets, have no place in the Pentateuch when they are spoken by him as a prophet; and this will explain the exclusion from the Pentateuch of the eleven psalms attributed to Moses. Moreover, there is skepticism toward prophets in rabbinic literature, so that we hear (*Sifra* 27.34) that a prophet may no longer make any innovations. Indeed, the third-century Rabbi Johanan goes so far in his downgrading of prophecy that he declares that since the Temple's destruction prophecy has been taken from prophets and given to fools and children (*Baba Bathra* 12b).

7. The Prophet and the Priest

It is often said that in the Biblical period the priests and prophets were fundamentally opposed to one another. Yet, in his summary of the Mosaic code (*A* 4.200), the very first topic in Josephus is G-d's choice, through prophecy (*dià propheteías*) of Jerusalem as the holy city and the site of the Temple. In a very significant passage, the Bible (Deut 17:9) declares that difficult cases are to be brought before a high court consisting of the priests and the judge "who is in office in those days," but Josephus (*A* 4.218) states that the cases are to be brought before the high priest and the prophet and the council of elders." Moreover, it is to the priests, in a manner reminiscent of Rome's Sibylline Books, that the book containing the prophecy of future events has been consigned (*A* 4.303–304). It is Phineas the high priest who acts as G-d's prophetic interpreter (*propheteúsantos*) in Josephus (*A* 5.159), whereas the Biblical passage (Judg 20:27–28) has no mention of prophesying. Furthermore, in Josephus (*A* 6.115) Saul orders the high priest to don his high priestly robes and to prophesy, whereas there is no mention of prophesying in 1 Sam

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center of gravity has moved from the Law to the Prophets. See Nahum N. Glatzer, "A Study of the Talmudic-Midrashic Interpretation of Prophecy," *Review of Religion* 10 (1945–46) 115–137; reprinted in his *Essays in Jewish Thought* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1978) 15–35.

14:18. Again, it is through the prophecy of the high priest Abimelech that David learns what is to be, whereas in the Bible David inquires directly of the L-rd. Likewise, it is the high priest Eli through whom G-d prophesies (*prophéteusen*) concerning his posterity, a passage omitted in the Biblical text (1 Sam 22:16ff.). Furthermore, in Josephus (*A* 6.262 and 268) Nob is the city not only of priests (1 Sam 22:9–23) but also of prophets. Again, in the Bible (1 Sam 28:6) before going to battle against the Philistines, Saul inquires of the L-rd, Who does not answer him either by dreams, or by the Urim, or by prophets; Josephus (*A* 6.328) evidently conflates the three, since he states merely that Saul asked G-d through the prophets. Furthermore, it is the high priest Abiathar whom David approaches (*A* 6.359) to prophesy (*propheteúsei*) before going to battle against the Amalekites, whereas the Bible (1 Sam 30:7) does not mention prophecy here. Before going to battle King David consults the high priest for a prophecy (*A* 7.72–73, 76), whereas in the Bible (2 Sam 5:19, 23) he consults G-d directly.

The cessation of prophecy is connected with the destruction of the first Temple, at which time the Urim and Tummim of the high priests likewise ceased to function.[59] Indeed, the Talmud (*Yoma* 73b) declares that no priest is inquired of by the Urim and Tummim who does not speak through the Holy Spirit, that is, through prophecy. In particular, Josephus (*A* 13.282–283) notes the prophetic gift of the high priest John Hyrcanus in being able to declare that his sons had just defeated Antiochus. At the beginning of the war against the Romans it was in the Temple (*War* 6.299–300) that a voice was heard declaring that the Presence of G-d was departing. Indeed, Tacitus (*Histories* 5.13.2) states that the majority of the Jews believed that their ancient priestly writings contained a prophecy that a ruler from Judaea would possess the world. Moreover, the gift for prophecy possessed by the Essenes may well be connected with their acknowledged priestly character. Finally, Josephus himself specifically connects his priestly status and his gift for prophecy when he says of himself (*War* 3.352–353) that being "a priest himself and of priestly descent he was not ignorant of he prophecies in the sacred books."

8. Summary

As we have noted elsewhere,[60] Josephus is not particularly interested in theologizing in his *Antiquities*, presumably because, despite the fact that he states (*A* 1.14) that the main lesson to be derived from a perusal of his history is that G-d rewards those who obey His laws and punishes those who do not, his chief aim was in writing a history as such and because he intended to discuss elsewhere such theological matters as the reasons for the commandments generally (*A* 1.25).[61] When it came to prophecy, however, Josephus' point is that the prophets are the recorders of Jewish history of the Biblical period and

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[59] Josephus (*A* 3.218), to be sure, says that the Urim and Tummim ceased two hundred years before the composition of his *Antiquities*, that is, presumably after the reign of John Hyrcanus, who is presented as having attained the summit both of the priesthood and of prophecy (*War* 1.68–69, *A* 13.299–300).

[60] See Louis H. Feldman, "Use, Authority, and Exegesis of Mikra in the Writings of Josephus," in M. J. Mulder, ed., *Mikra: Reading, Translation, and Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity* (*Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum*, section 2, vol. 1 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1988) 457–521, especially 506–509.

[61] See also *A* 1.192, 3.94, 3.143, 4.198, 20.268.

guarantors of the validity of this account and, indeed, are the predecessors of later historians such as Josephus himself. Inasmuch as prophets play an important role in Greek and Latin literature from the time of Homer himself, he felt that emphasizing the role of prophets, calling them by name as such even in many places where the Bible does not, and Hellenizing their portrait would make them readily intelligible to his pagan readers.

Moreover, the emphasis on prophecy is, in effect, autobiographical, since Josephus viewed himself as being a latter-day Jeremiah, giving advice in the second Temple period similar to that given by his predecessor at the time of the destruction of the first Temple. Though he never refers to himself as a prophet as such, he claimed for himself that aspect of prophecy pertaining to prediction of the future. Finally, his emphasis on the relationship between priest and prophet is largely due to the fact that Josephus is the priest who claimed for himself the gift of prophecy.

Two Types of Mosaic Prophecy According to Philo

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Introduction

After discussing in his *Life of Moses* the superiority of the latter as king, legislator, and High Priest, Philo proceeds to describe his prophetic excellence. Before doing so, however, he attempts to explain the restricted limits within which his description will be confined (*Mos.* 2.187). In his discussion of Moses as legislator, Philo had depicted the legislative condition of mind reflected in his ordinances (2.8–11) and had offered proofs for his superiority (2.12–14). He had also praised the excellence of Moses' exordium to the Law, i.e., the historical part of Scripture (*historikon meros*), consisting of an account of creation and biographies of individuals that delineate the punishment of the impious and the honoring of the just (2.46–47). Since he had not, however, described the laws themselves, the reader might have been led to expect such an account in his description of Moses as prophet. Philo therefore offers an explanation of why this is not to be the case. Though fully aware that all things written in the sacred books are oracles delivered through Moses, he will confine himself to those more especially his, that is, the predictive prophecies spoken by Moses himself, when inspired and possessed and transported out of himself (*epitheiasantos kai ex hautou kataschethentos*),[1] in addition to the revelation which comes through question and answer.[2] The special laws, on the other hand, spoken by God in

[1] For the eight instances of this type of prophecy that are cited by Philo, see H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge, MA, 1948) 2.34–35. Heschel cites parallel rabbinic sources for many of these cases and suggests that Philo was probably influenced by Palestinian homilists who may have preached in Alexandria, though the latter regarded these utterances as a product of Moses's own reasoning rather than being due to the inspiration of the holy spirit. See A. J. Heschel, *Theology of Ancient Judaism* (London, 1965) 2.161–65, 220–23 (Hebrew). It may well be, however, that we ought to translate *ex hautou kataschethentos* as "of himself possessed," i.e., possessed of his own accord, in which case Moses would enjoy the unique privilege of inducing the ecstatic state at will, unlike other ecstatic prophets to whom such ecstasy apparently comes "by an involuntary principle" (*QG* 4.125; cf. *Som.* 2.1: *ex beautēs hē psychē kinoumenē*). The same seems to be true of Philo's second category of prophetic dreams in which the human mind, moving along with the Mind of the Universe, appears of itself, i.e., of its own accord, to be possessed and God-inspired (*ex beautou katechesthai kai theophoreisthai dokei*) and thus receives foreknowledge of the future in the form of transparent symbols (*Som.* 1.2).

[2] Philo explains it as follows: "The prophet asks a question under divine possession, and the Father renders the oracle, giving him a share of speech and answer" (*Mos.* 2.192).

his own person (*ek prōsopou tou theou*)[3] with His prophet for interpreter (*di' hermēneōs tou theiou propbētou*), will not be dealt with here but will be deferred to a later occasion (*hyper-tbeteon*), since they are too great for human praise, and even the entire cosmos could not do them justice. What Philo seems to be saying is that they are too grand and complex to be dealt with as an aside to an encomium of Moses and must be analyzed in a separate treatise dedicated solely to that topic (cf. *Op.* 4). Besides, adds Philo, "they are delivered as if through an interpreter (*bosanei di' hermēneōs*), and interpretation and prophecy are not the same thing" (2.191). Philo's meaning is that the special laws are delivered by Moses not as an "ecstatic" prophet but rather as a "hermeneutical" prophet, a distinction soon to be explained. Although there is some uncertainty as to what Philo means by the laws "spoken by God himself with his prophet for interpreter," the simplest explanation appears to be that he is referring to the special laws and is not here including the Decalogue as such which he explicitly tells us elsewhere was "not delivered through a spokesman or interpreter" (*aneu propbētou kai hermēneōs. Spec.* 3.7; cf. *Praem.* 2; *Decal.* 19).[4] Since his only wish at this point is to explain why he will here confine himself to Moses' predictive prophecies and the laws given in the form of question and answer, he simply refers to most of the rest of the laws without adding the further distinction that needs to be drawn between the special laws and the Decalogue. However, inasmuch as the special laws according to Philo only spell out the ten summary principles of the Decalogue, the latter is at least included implicitly.

Two Types of Prophecy

Philo's description of the first and third categories of divine oracles delivered by Moses yields two types of prophecy, ecstatic and hermeneutical (or *noetic*),[5] the one being

[3] Justin Martyr employs the same expression (*apo prosōpou*) for the Spirit's speaking in various characters (*Apol.* 1.37.1; 1.38.1; *Dial.* 25.1; 42.2). See Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr* (repr. Amsterdam, 1968) 179.

[4] According to A. Myre, "Les caractéristiques de la loi mosaique selon Philon d'Alexandrie," *Science et Esprit* 27 (1975) 35–69, (also Bréhier 187 and Goodenough 193 n. 70) Philo is here referring to the Decalogue which though spoken by God himself was transmitted to us in writing by Moses acting as a scribal and prophetic interpreter. The third category of revelation referred to by Philo includes, according to Myre, the entire Pentateuch, with the exception of the four cases of the second category and the Decalogue, which belongs to the first category. I see no warrant for this in Philo's writings. For a detailed discussion, see Wolfson, *Philo,* 2.22–59; Émile Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1950) 179–205; E. R. Goodenough, *By Light Light* (repr. Amsterdam, 1969) 192–96; and Wayne Meeks, *The Prophet-King* (Leiden, 1967) 125–31. According to Wolfson, *Philo,* 43, what we have in scripture of the first category of prophecies "is only that which has been transmitted to us in understandable language through Moses in his capacity as interpreter; it does not represent the original 'voice' spoken by God 'in His own person,' and heard by Moses in his capacity as a prophet. The latter are 'too great to be lauded by human lips,' that is, they are inexpressible in human language."

[5] Although Philo makes a clear distinction between *hermēneia* and *prophēteia* in *Mos.* 2.191, elsewhere he employs these terms synonymously (*Spec.* 4.49; *Mos.* 1.277; *Her.* 259) and he frequently juxtaposes the two terms (*Deus* 138; *Legat.* 99; *Mut.* 125). See

mediated through possession, the other through the prophet's noetic response to the divine voice, which is seen by Philo as a figure for rational soul. As for the second category of oracles, inasmuch as there is no clear indication in Philo's text that the *enthousiasmos* of Moses when he is posing his questions to the deity involves the kind of possession that displaces his own mind, it would seem that both question and answer in the four cases cited by Philo are exemplifications of noetic prophecy,[6] in which, as we shall soon see, the prophet's mind is not only not preempted but actually appears to seize the initiative. Although Philo has very likely deliberately refrained from drawing out the full implications of the two distinctively different modes of Mosaic prophecy referred to by him, his idiosyncratic bifurcation of the prophetic personality is of fundamental significance for a proper understanding of his concept of divine revelation. Philo's momentary restriction of the use of the term "prophecy" to the predictive model of inspiration conveniently enables him to focus the reader's gaze almost exclusively on ecstatic prophecy and thus allows him to deal with the noetic type with almost casual unconcern. We are driven to a distant but singular passage in *Decal.* 32–35 if we wish to seek out his understanding of the latter form of prophecy. Philo's descriptions of ecstatic possession are rhetorically elaborated in a series of passages in which it is emphatically asserted that in that state the prophet's sovereign mind is entirely preempted by the Divine Spirit, so that he becomes a passive "medium" for the Deity's message, a conductor, as it were, for a higher source of energy:

> For no pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own; he is an interpreter prompted by Another in all his utterances, when knowing not what he does (*en agnoiq*) he is filled with inspiration, as the reason withdraws and surrenders the citadel to a new visitor and tenant, the Divine Spirit which plays upon the vocal organism and dictates words which clearly express its prophetic message. (*Spec.* 4.49, trans. Colson)[7]

At *Her.* 264, with reference to the ecstasy which fell about sunset on Abraham (Gen 15:12), we are told that the divine and human illuminations cannot function simultaneously:

> For when the light of God shines, the human light sets; when the divine light sets, the human dawns and rises. This is what regularly befalls the fellowship of the prophets. The mind is evicted (*exoikizetai*) at the arrival of the divine Spirit, but when that departs the mind returns to its tenancy (*eisoikizetai*).

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Goodenough, *Light,* 193 n. 70. To avoid ambiguity, I shall henceforth refer to this type of prophecy as noetic rather than as hermeneutical.

[6] Contra Wolfson, *Philo,* 2.33, who regards the second category as a combination of prophecy through the divine spirit (what I have designated ecstatic prophecy) and prophecy by the divine voice.

[7] Cf. *Spec.* 1.65; *QG* 3.9; 4.196; *Mos.* 2.188. For the image of God playing on man as upon an instrument, cf. *Her.* 259; *Mut.* 139; Plut. *Def. Or.* 436F; *The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth* (J. M. Robinson, ed., *The Nag Hammadi Library* [NY, 1977] 296); Athenagoras, *Legat.* 7; *A Plea for the Christians,* chap. 9; Pseudo-Justin, *Cohort. ad Graecos* 8; Epiphan. *Haer.* 48.4 and 11; Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions in Islam* (Chapel Hill, 1975) 126.

> Mortal and immortal may not share the same home. And therefore the setting of reason and the darkness which surrounds it produce ecstasy and inspired frenzy (*ekstasin kai theophorēton manian*). (trans. Colson)[8]

At *Mos.* 1.274 it is an angel rather than the Divine Spirit that similarly possesses the mind of Balaam and employs him as a passive and in this case, unwilling instrument:

> I shall prompt the needful words without your mind's consent, (*aneu tēs sēs dianoias*) and direct your organs of speech as justice and convenience require. I shall guide the reins of speech, and, though you understand it not (*ou syientos*), employ your tongue for each prophetic utterance. (trans. Colson)[9]

A closer look at ecstatic prophecy in the ancient Greek tradition is now essential if we are properly to gauge the precise form of this prophetic mode which Philo has attributed to Moses. It goes without saying that the biblical picture of Mosaic prophecy is generally non-ecstatic (the one exception is recorded in Numbers 11), and that Philo's ascription of a series of eight instances of ecstatic prophecies to the great lawgiver must be seen as deriving from the Hellenic side of his training. Philo was undoubtedly aware of two diverse conceptions of ecstatic prophecy in Greek thought, the one radical, the other considerably milder. The nature of the Pythia's ecstasy at Delphi, the best known example of this mantic form, is unfortunately enveloped in controversy. The usual description of it derives from a source as late as the following passage from Lucan (first century CE):

> At last Apollo mastered the breast of the Delphian priestess; as fully as ever in the past, he forced his way into her body, driving out her former thoughts, and bidding her human nature to come forth and leave her heart at his disposal. Frantic she careers about the cave, with her neck under possession; the fillets and garlands of Apollo, dislodged by her bristling hair, she whirls with tossing head through the void spaces of the temple; she scatters the tripods that impede her random course; she boils over with fierce fire, while enduring the wrath of Phoebus. (*B.C.* 5.165–74, trans. Duff; cf. Lucian, *Jup. Trag.* 30)[10]

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[8] At *Her.* 249–56, Philo provides a fourfold classification of *ekstasis* strikingly similar to that in *Gen.R.* 17.21 (Theodor-Albeck 156). See Carl Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria* (repr. Amsterdam, 1970) 155; H. C. Puech, "Mormotos," *Rev. d. Etud. Gr.* (1933) 311–33.

[9] Cf. *Tanḥuma*, Buber, *Balak* 16: "The Lord curved Balaam's mouth and bridled it, as a man drives a nail into a board."

[10] According to Philo, ecstatic inspiration also causes bodily changes in the prophet. See *Mos.* 2.272; *Virt.* 217; *Ebr.* 146–47; cf. Plut. *Def. Or.* 432D. It is of interest to note that it was Origen's opinion that *ekstasis* and *mania* do not belong to biblical prophecy (*Hom. Ez.* 6.2; *Cels.* 7.3). He is severely critical of the pagan oracular practices because of their ecstatic character. Communication between God and man should involve a heightening of the intellectual capacity, not its diminution (*Princ.* 3.3.4). He has especially sharp words for the Pythian oracle: "If the Delphic Apollo were a god, as the Greeks imagine, ought he not rather to have chosen as his prophet some wise man. . . . If, however, he even preferred the female, perhaps because he was unable to prophesy through a man or because his sole source of delight was in the private parts of women [cf. *Cels.* 7.3: "it is related that while the prophetess is sitting at the mouth of the Castalian cave she receives a spirit through her womb"], ought he not to have chose a virgin rather

Here we have a clear example of psychic invasion, and a portrayal of the Pythia as the god's medium. As Fontenrose has stated, however, "Lucan is not only describing an unhistorical consultation, but he also had no knowledge of Delphi. . . . It is Aeneas' visit to the Sibyl of Cumae in *Aeneid* 6.9–158 that lies behind Lucan's account of Appius' visit to Delphi, as Amandry and others have pointed out."[11] In his own portrayal of ecstatic prophecy, however, Philo was very likely following in the footsteps of his favorite philosopher, Plato, who does indeed speak of the Pythia's madness, connecting *mantike* with *manike* (*Phaedr.* 244A–245C), and who, in *Tim.* 71E, says that no one achieves true divination in his right mind (*ennous*). Elsewhere he indicates that the poets, like the prophets, say many fine things, but know none of the things they say (*Apol.* 22C; *Meno* 99C), and that "God takes away the mind of these men and uses them as his ministers just as he does soothsayers and godly seers, in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who utter these words of great price, when they are out of their wits, but it is God himself who speaks and addresses us through them" (*Ion* 534C, trans. Lamb).

A milder form of ecstatic prophecy is advanced by Plutarch in *Def. Or.* 431B–438. After explicitly rejecting the notion that "the god himself after the manner of 'belly-talkers' (*engastrimythio*) enters into the bodies of his prophets and prompts their utterances, employing their mouths and voices as instruments" (414E), he attempts to explain prophetic oracles by means of the following theory put into the mouth of Lamprias. The soul is inherently prophetic (since it is in reality nothing but an embodied demon), though its mantic element is an imaginative faculty (*phantastikē dynamis*), irrational and indeterminate in itself, like a blank writing tablet, but receptive of impressions. When a prophetic breath or current, emanating from the earth or streams, enters the body it creates in the soul an unusual temperament (*krasis*), which heats it up and opens up certain passages through which impressions of the future are transmitted (cf. Arist. *Prob.* 954a). In this heated condition, the soul succeeds in relaxing the reasoning element and prevents it from diverting and extinguishing the inspiration (432F).[12] In *Pyth. Or.* 397BC, he develops the idea that the god does not himself compose the oracular verses, "but that he supplies the origin of the incitement (*archē kinēseōs*), and then the prophetic priestesses are moved each

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than a married woman to prophesy his will?" (*Cels.* 7.5). The Jewish prophets, says Origen, "through the touch of the Holy Spirit upon their soul possessed clear mental vision and became more radiant in their soul, and even in body" (*Cels.* 7.4). See Gunnar Af Hällstrom, *Charismatic Succession* (Helsinki, 1985). Augustine's view of prophecy is likewise noetic, for he singles out "intellectual sight" as the essential constituent of prophecy. "Augustine did not feel any need to have a special theory to account for God's activity in inspiring the prophet. This could be explained in the same terms as God's activity in anybody's mind, . . . as one of the many modes of his intellectual presence, that is to say of illumination, in the mind" (R. A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine* [Cambridge, 1970] 194–95).

[11] Joseph Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley, 1978) 210. See also W. D. Smith, "So-called Possession in Pre-Christian Greece," *TAPA* 96 (1965) 403–26; David E. Aune, *Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Grand Rapids, 1983) 32–34.

[12] To the objection that this theory renders the gods otiose, the answer is given that the earth which generates the exhalation, and the sun which endows the earth with all its power of tempering (*kraseōs*) are gods for us (*Def. Or.* 436F).

in accordance with her natural faculties. . . . As a matter of fact, the voice is not that of a god, nor the utterance of it, nor the diction, nor the meter, but all these are the woman's; he puts into her mind only the visions" (*tas phantasias,* trans. Babbitt).

Clearly, Plutarch's theory of ecstatic prophecy envisages no displacement or dissociation of the human mind, though it does provide for its tranquilization. Nor is his theory without antecedents, for we learn from Cicero (*Div.* 1.113) that the frenzied soul (*furibunda mens*) spurns the body, takes wing, and flies abroad, inflamed and aroused by various kinds of influences, such as groves and forests, rivers and seas, and subterranean vapors. In all these cases it sees the things it foretells in its prophecies, as Cassandra did. Now a close examination of Philo's description of predictive prophecy will, I believe, reveal that, while he has adopted the more radical form of Greek ecstatic prophecy as his model with regard to he prophecies of Abraham and Balaam (*Her.* 264–66; *Mos.* 1.274–91), this is not the case with the predictive prophecies of Moses. Here there is no explicit reference to the displacement of the prophet's mind, to his ignorance of his own prophetic words, or to the fact that God prompts the words that he speaks. Moreover, in two instances we are told that under the divine inspiration, Moses sees certain visions.[13] In one case, he has a vision (*phastasian lambanō*) of the Egyptians dead, in the other, he "sees the earth opened and vast chasms yawning wide, great bands of kinsfolk (i.e., Qorah and his ilk) perishing and living men descending into Hades" (*Mos.* 2.252, 281).[14] Philo does indeed say that the divinely possessed Moses "was no longer in himself" (*ouket' ōn en heautō*: *Mos.* 2.250), and this expression is sometimes used of one whose mind is displaced (Plato, *Ion* 534B, *QG* 3.9; cf. *Her.* 264), but it is also used of the state of philosophic frenzy, and may simply indicate that the mind is completely absorbed in the Deity (e.g., *Her.* 70). In short, to adopt Aune's terminology, the ecstatic predictive prophecies of Moses may best be characterized as products of "vision trance" rather than "possession trance."[15]

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[13] It is true that in one of his oracles, Balaam too says, "I see the people rising up as a lion's cub, and exulting as a lion" (*Mos.* 1.284), but in this case, he apparently does not really see such a vision, but is simply uttering the words that God had placed in his mouth against his will.

[14] For similar instances of a prophet narrating a vision at the same time it is being revealed to him, compare the speech of Theoklymenos in *Od.* 20.351–57, in which the *mantis* tells the assembled suitors what he sees. In Cassandra's speeches in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (1072–1330), the prophetess sees visions past and future. The impression one gets from Aeschylus' depiction of her is that of one greatly agitated, but still retaining a considerable measure of self-control. "She remains aware of her surroundings and describes with clarity the appalling phantoms which loom and fade before her" (Aeschylus, *Agamemnon,* ed. J. D. Denniston and D. Page [Oxford, 1957] 166). In Lycophron's *Alexandra* (86, 216, 251, 254) she similarly sees visions and hears voices. Cf. also Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii* 8.26, and Pseudo-Philo, *LAB* 28.6–10, where Cenez, in a prophetic speech, sees visions and hears sounds and voices, though on his return to his senses he is ignorant of all that he had spoken or seen (cf. *LAB* 62.2, and Aristides, *Or.* 2.43). See Aune, *Prophecy* 147–52.

[15] Aune's terminology follows with some modifications that used by Erika Bourgignon in her book *Possession* (San Francisco, 1976). See Aune, *Prophecy,* 19, 33, 348 n. 8. "Vision trance," according to Aune, "is a state in which audio and/or visual experiences imperceptible to others are perceived by the intermediary, while 'possession trance' is a state in

If the interpretation offered above is correct, it would readily fit the pattern of uniqueness which frames Philo's portrait of Moses, for it is now evident that not only is Moses' legislative prophecy unique, but even his predictive prophecy, a gift he otherwise shares with Noah and the Patriarchs (*Her.* 260–61), is likewise unique in character, since it is not, as with the latter, a product of psychic invasion and displacement.[16]

In sharp contrast to ecstatic prophecy, divine voice or noetic prophecy does not render its recipient passive. Although no separate account is given by Philo of this mode of Mosaic prophecy, we may discern its nature from his description of the giving of the decalogue, which must serve us as the paradigm for prophecy through the divine voice.[17] God, we are there told, is not as a man needing mouth, tongue, and windpipe (cf. *Deus* 83; *Mig.* 47–52; *Sac.* 78). Rather He created a rational soul full of clearness and distinctness which shaped the air around it into a flaming fire, sounding forth an articulate voice. This miraculous voice was activated by the power of God which created in the souls of all another kinds of hearing far superior to that of the physical organ. "The latter is but a sluggish sense, inactive until aroused by the impact of the air, but the hearing of the mind possessed by God (*entheou dianoias*) makes the first advance and goes out to meet the conveyed meanings (*phthanei proypantōsa tois legomenois*) with the swiftest speed" (*Decal.* 35).[18] It is clear from this description that the inspired mind that perceives this special rational soul created by God, far from being preempted or rendered passive, is rather extraordinarily quickened and sharpened.

It is important to note that what began in this passage as a description of a corporeal phenomenon, air shaped into a flaming fire, sounding forth an articulate voice, is suddenly and abruptly allegorized by Philo into one that is incorporeal, a mind-to-mind communication rather than the perception of a sense organ. The very fact, however, that he resorts

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which an alien spirit is regarded as having invaded the personality of the intermediary. When oracles are presented as the direct speech of the inspiring oracular divinity, the psycho-physiological state of possession trance is presupposed." Aune also points out that despite the obvious etymological derivation of *entheos* and *enthysiasmos*, it is not completely clear that the Greeks, when using such terms, always meant that a god invaded or took possession of a human personality (i.e., possession trance). Cf. *Midrash Tehillim* 194a (Psalm 90): "R. Eleazar taught in the name of R. Jose b. Zimra: none of the prophets, as they uttered their prophecies knew that they were prophesying, except Moses and Isaiah who did know" (trans. Braude).

[16] For Philo's depiction of Moses as a super-sage, see my article, "The Sage in Philo's Philosophy," *Da'at* 11 (1983) 9–18 (Hebrew).

[17] See Wolfson, *Philo*, 2.37.

[18] The phrase "with the swiftest speed" is in this context equivalent to "with the sharpest keenness." The key words here, however, are *phthanei proypantōsa*, which clearly imply that the human intellect is not in this case simply a receptacle passively receiving the divinely conveyed meanings but is actively involved in the prophetic experience. Its keen anticipation of the divine words seems to indicate that it somehow takes the initiative in assimilating them. I therefore cannot accept the view of Bréhier that we are dealing here with an interior hearing in which the human spirit is entirely passive (*Idées Philosophiques* 187). For the sluggishness of the senses, cf. Cicero, *Acad. Post.* 1.31; *Sac.* 78–79, 82; *Abr.* 127.

to a rather intricate description of the miraculous divine voice in purely physical terms, which is then only diverted to the intelligible level by a last minute maneuver, is a clear indication that he was attempting to preserve the literal meaning of the biblical text to the best of his ability. Had he wished to, he could have allowed the rational soul to employ a physical voice transmitted through the air, since later even a philosopher like Plotinus, in whose writings demons, as in Philo, play only a secondary role, could envision them as using a voice (4.3.18.22). The fact that he did not do so is therefore significant, and demonstrates how important it was for him to transfer this miraculous event to the intelligible realm. We shall presently come to appreciate the full implications of this exegetical turn.

For the notion of a mind-to-mind communication in order to explain the divine voice at Sinai, Philo was undoubtedly indebted to the Middle Platonic tradition. The Platonists had been exercised by the need to explain the nature of Socrates' famous *daemonion* or sign, and one of the interpretations recorded by Plutarch is very similar to that adopted by Philo to explain the Divine utterance at Sinai:

> It occurred to us [Simmias went on to say] as we examined the question in private among ourselves, to surmise that Socrates' sign was perhaps no vision, but rather the perception of a voice or else the mental apprehension of language that reached him in some strange way. . . . Socrates had an understanding which, being pure and free from passion, and commingling with the body but little, for necessary ends, was so sensitive and delicate as to respond at once to what reached him. What reached him, one would conjecture, was not spoken language, but the unuttered words of a daemon, making voiceless contact with his intelligence by their sense alone. For speech is like a blow (*plegē gar hē phonē proseoike*) whereas the intelligence of the higher power guides the gifted soul, which requires no blows, by the touch of its thought; and the soul on its part yields to the slackening and tightening of its movements by the higher intelligence. . . . If the body is moved with so little trouble by a notion that enters the understanding without the help of spoken language, it cannot be hard, I think, to believe that the understanding may be guided by a high understanding and a diviner soul, that lays hold of it from without by a touch, which is the way in which it is the nature of thought to impinge on thought, just as light produces a reflection. For in very truth our recognition of one another's thoughts through the medium of the spoken word is like groping in the dark; whereas the thoughts of daemons are luminous and shed their light on the daemonic man. . . . For just as the sound of sappers' blows is detected by bronze shields, which reecho it as it rises from the depths of the earth and strikes them, whereas through everything else it slips unnoticed; so the messages of daemons pass through all other men, but find an echo in those only whose character is untroubled and soul unruffled, the very men in fact we call holy and daemonic. (Plutarch, *On the Sign of Socrates*, 588Dff., trans. De Lacy and Einarson)[19]

[19] Cf. Calcidius' Latin commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, chap. 255, ed. Waszink: "Now the voice that Socrates heard was not, I think, of the sort that is made when air is struck [cf. *SVF* 1.74; *Deus* 83; Albinus, *Did.* Chap. 19.1]; rather it revealed to his soul, which was by reason of his great purity, unpolluted and therefore more perceptive, the presence and society of his familiar deity, since only the pure may meet and mingle with the pure"

It is essential to note that Philo invokes the notion of ecstatic possession only to explain the ability of the prophet to predict the future, a talent clearly requiring the exclusive services of the divine pneuma, since no finite mind could enjoy such a power (cf. *Mos.* 2.6, 187; *Her.* 261). Moses' promulgation of the special laws, however, communicated to him by the divine voice (*Mos.* 2.188), is understood to involve the active participation of the prophet's mind. The same is true of the "ten Words" or "Heads" which summarize the entire Law and which required the quickened perception of the entire Israelite nation.[20] In the light of the general thrust of Philo's philosophic thought, it is very likely that he understands "noetic" prophecy to refer to the activation of man's higher mind or his intuitive intellect, by means of which he grasps the fundamental principles of universal being viewed as a unified whole. Wolfson has noted the fact that Philo does not resort to the Platonic doctrine of the recollection of ideas in order to account for the mind's knowledge of the intelligible realities, but his assertion that the latter was based upon prophetic revelation taken in its literal sense is unconvincing.[21] Philo did not need the Platonic doctrine of *anamnēsis*, since for him the human mind was an inseparable fragment of the Divine Logos, and all that it required in order to attain to the intelligible Forms was the initial stimulus of sense-perception which formed a kind of gateway into them (*Somn.* 1.187–8).[22] Presumably the formation of sensible images and the ideas

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(cited by De Lacy and Einarson in *Plutarch's Moralia*, LCL 7.451 n. b); also *ibidem*, chap. 138, where Calcidius observes that in addressing the inferior gods, the Demiurge in Plato's *Timaeus* did not need to employ vocal sound, a mode of communication required by humans because their souls are enveloped by the body (for this notion, cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 12.25ff.; Proclus, *In Crat.* 11.27ff.; Gregory of Nyssa, *In Eunom.* 2.391); Cicero, *Div.* 1.129; Plotinus 4.3.18.13–23; Proclus, *In Crat.* 35.24; Julian, *Orat.* 8.249C. See Willy Theiler, *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin, 1966) 302–12; J. H. Waszink, "La Théorie du Langage des Dieux et les Démons dans Calcidius," in *Epektasis, Mélanges Patristiques offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou*, ed. Jacques Fontaine and C. Kannengiesser (Beauchesne, 1972) 237–44. The connection between the theory expressed in Plut. *Gen. Soc.* 588Dff. and Philo was already noted by Guy Soury, *La Démonologie de Plutarque* (Paris, 1942) 128.

[20] The only difference between the transmission of the Decalogue and the special laws is that the former were communicated directly to the people without the intermediation of Moses acting as *hermēneus*. Philo's statement at *QG* 3.9 that the oracles and laws are legislated by God through [ecstatic] prophecy seems puzzling at first sight. So, too, his statement in *QG* 4.196 that the prophet becomes an instrument, while God is the artist, whose Logos skillfully strikes a harmony through which legislation is made known. It would thus appear that ecstatic prophecy is not only the source of predictive oracles but also of legislation. From *QG* 4.90, however, it is evident that Philo at times uses the term "legislation" in connection with predictive oracles, for there he notes that Abraham is a prophet who "legislates oracularly concerning things that are to come. For law is an invention of nature, not of man."

[21] Wolfson, *Philo*, 2.8. There are only three references to recollection in Philo's writings (*Mut.* 100; *Praem.* 9; *Mos.* 1.21), and none of them is used in the Platonic sense of the term.

[22] Plotinus similarly dispenses with the Platonic *anamnēsis*, since in his view the human mind has direct access to the illumination of *Nous* which is always available to it. Albinus,

derived from them activated the mind's dormant access to the world of incorporeal Forms (cf. *Her.* 111). The unified vision of the world of intelligible Forms thus constitutes an inherent characteristic of the human mind, though for most men much effort is ordinarily required to actualize it. When it does occur, however, man achieves direct knowledge of the Divine. Philo therefore undoubtedly understood the prophetic revelation through which Moses attained to his understanding of the law, as an intuitive grasp of the higher divine realities, the fundamental principles of being and the natural laws which constitute its structure.[23]

To support our analysis of Philo's theory of noetic prophecy we turn now to several key passages from *The Migration of Abraham.* At *Mig.* 80, Philo notes that thoughts are nothing else than God's words or speech, "for without the prompter (*tou hypoboleōs*) speech will give forth no utterance, and mind is the prompter of speech, as God is of mind." Moreover, interpreting the verse Exod 4:10 ("from the time thou has begun to speak to thy servant"), he speaks of God's flashing into Moses the light of truth by means of the undying words of absolute Knowledge and Wisdom (*Mig.* 76). Earlier in the same treatise, he writes that

> the fairest things in nature are objects of sight rather than of possession. For how is it possible to become possessed of things whose allotted place is nearer to the Divine? Yet to see them is within the bounds of possibility, though not for all. It is exclusively for the purest and most keen-eyed class. . . . For this reason, whereas the voice of mortal beings is judged by hearing, the sacred oracles intimate that the words of God are seen as light is seen; for we are told that "all the people saw the Voice. . ." (Exod 20:18) for what was happening was not an impact on air made by the organs of mouth and tongue, but virtue shining with intense brilliance, wholly resembling a fountain of reason." (*Mig.* 46–47, trans. Colson)

The divine illumination of Moses' mind is thus mediated through a vision of the eternal Forms. Finally, Philo is careful to note that it is by virtue of his merit (*aristindēn*) that Moses was selected by God to be filled with the divine spirit and to be interpreter of his sacred utterances (*Decal.* 175; cf. *Spec.* 4.192, cited below).

The passages referred to above lead us back to a characteristic trait of Philo's mystical vision, its inherently bipolar perspective, which consistently allows two alternative modes of describing human intellectual activity. From the divine perspective, the higher workings of the human mind, when it has assimilated itself to the Logos, may aptly be ascribed to the divine power which is its true source and it may be said that God is prompting them from within, though from the human perspective, they may reasonably be assigned to the individual human mind that appears to be producing them. Philo's loose terminological usage, and the rapidly shifting focus of his literary expression, often result in a

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on the other hand, insisted that general concepts could not be formed from a accumulation of sense-data alone, and that only *anamnēsis* could make this possible (*Did.* chap. 25). Nevertheless, he too allows for the direct apprehension of intelligibles (*ta noeta*) through a type of logos termed *epistēmonikos.* See John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) 291–92.

[23] The Stoics had similarly assimilated the wise man to the priest and prophet (D.L. 7.119; *SVF* 3.605; Cicero, *Div.* 2.129). Cf. Bréhier, *Idées Philosophiques* 239.

disconcerting disarray of seemingly contradictory statements and inconcinnities. Add to this his conservative religious bent, which makes him exceedingly reluctant to render explicit such conceptions as he considers too philosophical for the uninitiated reader, and it becomes immediately evident that our interpretation of his theory of Mosaic prophecy is insusceptible of the kind of demonstration we should like to achieve. There exist nevertheless a number of strong indications that I believe lend a considerable degree of plausibility to our reading of his partially veiled intent. According to Philo "the true priest is necessarily a prophet, advanced to the service of the truly Existent by virtue rather than by birth, and to the prophet nothing is unknown since he has within him a spiritual sun and unclouded rays to give him a full and clear apprehension (*katalēpsin*) of things unseen by sense but apprehended by the understanding" (*Spec.* 4.192, trans. Colson). That this description of prophecy cannot apply to the ecstatic prophet goes without saying, since the latter "has no power of apprehension when he speaks but serves as the channel for the insistent words of Another's prompting" (*Spec.* 1.65, trans. Colson; cf. 4.49). More significant, however, is the insistence here that the prophet is illuminated by an internal sun for the clear apprehension of intelligible truth. Especially revealing is Philo's description of Moses as one "who had attained the very summit of philosophy and had been taught through oracles the greater and most essential truths of nature, thus virtually identifying philosophical mastery with divine instruction."[24] Moreover, in describing Moses' education, Philo writes that "his happy natural gifts anticipated" (*phthanōn*) the instruction of his tutors, "for the naturally endowed soul goes forward in advance (*proapantōsa*) to meet its instruction, and derives more profit from itself than from its teachers" (*Mos.* 1.2–22). Note the use of the two verbs *phthanō* and *proapantaō*, that are identical with those used to describe the Israelites' perception of the ten commandments (*phthanei proypantōsa*), indicate that in both cases it is the innate human capacity that is the decisive factor in the attainment of the knowledge involved.

In Philo's mystical thought, true prophetic power is rooted in the special intellectual capacities that God has graciously bestowed on his chosen ones, and of the latter Moses stands out as a unique exemplar of unsurpassed excellence. The fact that at Sinai it was the entire Israelite people that had attained an unmediated intellectual vision of the ten Words[25] should not surprise us, for in Philo's allegorical code Israel is nothing but a symbol of "the man who sees God," the initiate into the highest divine mysteries.[26] Philo's

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[24] In *Mos.* 1.48, Philo says that Moses was always unravelling (*anelittōn*) philosophical notions, readily distinguishing (*diaginōskōn*) them in his mind, and committing them to memory. "He brought his personal conduct into conformity with these ideas because the one mark he set before him was nature's right reason, the sole source and fountain of virtues."

[25] The Bible designates them not as the ten Commandments or Laws but as the ten Words, and so they are commonly called in rabbinic literature (*'aseret hadibrot*). *Dibrot* is the plural form of *dibber*, which means prophetic revelation (cf. Jer. 5:13).

[26] Philo is unaware of the rabbinic distinction between the first two commandments, spoken directly by God, and the rest of them, in which the divine name appears in the third person (*b. Horayot* 8a; *Makkot* 24a; *Song R.* 1.13; cf. Maim. *Guide* 2.33). Maimonides holds that the view of R. Yehoshua b. Levi is correct, that the Israelites heard only the first two commandments from God ("from the kisses, but not all the kisses"). Moreover, they were not equal to Moses even in regard to the first two commandments, for he heard them as articulate speech, whereas they heard them as sound alone.

insistence on the infallibility of prophetic inspiration, in contrast to the ordinary processes of reason, must therefore be seen as a reflection of his conviction that the former is a product of the intuitive reason of one whose mind has a virtual lock on the ultimate divine truths by virtue of a congenital divine endowment.[27] His conservatism, however, has naturally led him to preserve much of the scriptural idiom of divine interventionism in preference to the integrationist approach of the philosopher,[28] though this ought not deflect the astute reader from a correct assessment of his true intentions.

Although Philo emphatically insists that the Law is not to be considered as an invention of the human mind,[29] his meaning is clearly that the laws of the Torah constitute natural laws and are therefore divine and not a result of arbitrary human devising. When man's intuitive intellect is at work and he formulates laws in accordance with the fundamental principles of being, it is the divine Logos whose power is thus made manifest.[30] In his attempt to establish the absolute authority of the Mosaic Torah, Philo takes great pains to maintain the utter superiority of Moses in his fourfold capacity as king, priest, legislator and prophet. The consummate quality of his legislative prowess is attested by the immutable character of his laws throughout the ages and the universal acclaim which they have

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[27] Referring to the "Isaac" kind, Philo asserts that the self-taught nature is new and higher than our reasoning, arising by no human design, but by a God-inspired ecstasy. That which is taught requires time, but what comes by nature is rapid and in a sense timeless. Every beginning and end is automatic, since it is not our doing but that of nature (*Fug.* 166–72).

[28] For a fine discussion of the distinction between the interventionist understanding of preordained miracles over against the integrationist view in medieval and early modern Jewish thought, see Alexander Altmann, *Essays in Jewish Intellectual History* (Hanover, NH, 1981) 142–53.

[29] See *QE.* 2.43; *Decal.* 15; *Mos.* 2.187; *QG* 4.90; *Spec.* 2.13.

[30] Philo's attitude to the Torah is similar to that of the later Kabbalists. Scholem has pointed out that according to R. Ezra b. Shelomo, an older contemporary of Nahmanides, the Torah constitutes the one great name of God, i.e., "it expresses His transcendent Being, or at least that part or aspect of His Being which can be revealed through creation" (*Commentary on the Talmudic Aggadoth,* Fol. 34a). It goes without saying, says Scholem, that such an assertion does not refer to the document written in ink on a scroll, but to the preexistent Torah. For the Kabbalists, the aggadic notion that the Torah was created two thousand years before the world's creation, refers in reality to the process by which the divine *sefiroth* emanated from God's hidden essence. The Torah is thus not something separate from God's essence, but rather represents the secret life of God. This *Torah kedumah,* or primordial Torah, is sometimes identified with God's Wisdom, the second emanation which sprang from the hidden "nothingness" (G. Scholem, *On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism* (NY, 1965) 39. A somewhat similar conception of Wisdom or Logos as the archetypal Torah can be found in the Wisdom of Solomon (See my Anchor Bible commentary on that work, 42–43). Philo's concept of the Torah as being in accord with the natural law similarly envisions it as the embodiment or expression of God's Wisdom or Logos. It is precisely in view of this notion that Philo conceives of Moses not as a legislator who issues arbitrary commands, a procedure savoring of tyranny and despotism, but rather as one who suggests and admonishes and prefers to exhort rather than enforce (*Mos.* 2.50–51; cf. *LA* 3.80).

received. Indeed, the Torah is the only law-code to have been favored by such unchallenged approbation from Greeks and barbarians alike (*Mos.* 2.14, 17–20). Philo's unrestrained idealization of Moses is clearly designed to grant his legislative effort an authority of unlimited scope and thereby secure its sacrosanct character. But what he has so generously bestowed with one hand, he subtly nuances and modifies with the other. Nothing in the Torah, according to Philo, is to be taken literally whenever its literal acceptance would compel one to admit anything base or unworthy of its dignity (*Det.* 13), and he consequently proceeds with the greatest alacrity to extract from Scripture its hidden allegorical meaning. Although he preserves the literal observance of the Law by depicting the relationship of the outward observances to their inner meanings as one of body to soul,[31] and insisting that just as we take thought for the body because it is the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the letter of the laws (*Mig.* 93), his exegetical mode infuses the Torah with a radically new philosophical significance which, despite his many protestations, clearly overshadows its literal shell. Philo's inner mind in this matter is almost embarrassingly revealed by two asides made in the course of his discussion. If we keep the outward observance, he says, "we shall obtain an understanding of those things of which these are the symbols, and in addition we shall escape the censure and accusations of the multitude." Like Moses Mendelssohn in a much later age, he was keenly aware that his effectiveness as a teacher of new and higher spiritual truths would be largely neutralized if he tampered with the observance of the Law. His second aside is even more revealing. Referring to those who treat the literal sense of the Law with easy-going neglect, he says:

> As it is, as if living alone by themselves in a wilderness, or as if they had become discarnate souls, knowing neither city nor village nor household nor any company of humans at all, transcending what is approved by the crowd, they track the absolute truth in its naked self. These men are taught by sacred Scripture to be concerned with public opinion, and to abolish no part of the customs ordained by inspired men, greater than those of our own day (*Mig.* 90).

Since in Philo's writings the *alētheia gymnē* represents man's highest epistemic ideal, it is quite obvious that his concern here is not at all philosophical, but only existential and communal.

Ecstatic and Noetic Prophecy and Mystic Vision

A final word must be added with regard to Philo's view of the relationship between ecstatic prophecy and mystic vision, and between the latter and noetic prophecy. Although many of the characteristic terms employed by Philo for ecstatic prophecy recur in his descriptions of philosophical/mystical vision, a sharp distinction must be drawn between these two spiritual states, for while the former represents a psychic invasion, the latter refers to a psychic ascent. Both are nevertheless characterized by an inspired frenzy like that of Corybants and Bacchants, a going out of one's self, forgetfulness of self, sudden seizure, and bodily transformation.[32] In spite of these similarities, it is the source

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[31] Cf. Origen, *Princ.* 4.2.4: "For just as man consists of body, soul and spirit, so in the same way does the scripture" (trans. Butterworth).

[32] *LA* 3.43; *Her.* 69–70; *Op.* 70–71; *Ebr.* 146; *Cont.* 12; *QG* 4.4; *Plant.* 147; *Som.*

of the initiative which primarily differentiates the ecstatic from the mystic. In the former, the initiative lies with the deity, whereas in the latter it is in the hands of man.[33] Moreover, in ecstasy the frenzy is the essential element mediating the prophecy, whereas in mystic vision it is only an accompaniment of the culmination of the noetic ascent. The question now remaining before us, is whether there is any significant difference between the mystic vision and the noetic form of prophecy exemplified by Moses in his legislative capacity. Inasmuch as there is no reference to a state of frenzy in our paradigm for noetic prophecy, it is very likely that the prophetic state is characterized by total calm and serenity. Commenting on the verse, "But you stand here with me" (Deut 5:31), Philo says that this oracle indicates that God gives the man of virtue a share in his own nature, which is repose (*ēremia*). Similarly, citing Moses's words, "And I stood between the Lord and you" (Deut 5:5), he notes that this verse indicates that the "Mind of the Sage, released from storms and wars, with calm still weather and profound peace around it (*nēnemō̧ de galēnȩ̄ kai batheia eirēnȩ̄*), is superior to men, but less than God" (*Som.* 2.228; cf. *Fug.* 174; *Deus* 10–12). It would seem, then, that once again, true to his delineation of the Mosaic paradigm as entirely unique, Philo has placed his noetic prophecy at the apogee of the human ascension to God and has granted it superiority even over the mystic vision of all other members of the philosophical elite. The Mosaic summit of spirituality is thus marked by a state of absolutely serene joy, inferior only to that of the deity himself.

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2.232. For the Corybantic imagery in Plato and Philo, see I. M. Linforth, "The Corybantic Rites in Plato," *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 13 (1946) 121–62.

[33] E. R. Dodds has pointed out that "the *ekstasis* which Philo ascribes to the Hebrew prophets has sometimes been confused with mystical union, quite wrongly, as is clear from Philo's account of such *ekstasis*. . . . It is the supernatural spirit which descends into a human body, not the man who raises himself or is raised above the body. So far as I know, the earliest application of the word to mystical experience in the strict sense is in Plotinus 6.9.11.22" (*Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* [Cambridge, 1965] 71–72). Once again, however, we must bear in mind that in Philo's mystical thought, as in most others, our ordinary perception of human initiative is itself only a product of our restricted human perspective, for in reality all mortal striving is but the obverse side of divine effective action. "I call Thee," sang Hallaj, "no, Thou callest me unto Thee!" (*Diwan*, qasida no. 1, verse 2). "Some said to Rabi'a: I have committed many sins, if I turn in repentance towards God, will he turn in mercy toward me? 'Nay,' she replied, 'but if He shall turn toward thee, thou wilt turn towards Him' " (See Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions* 81, 165–66; R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam* [London, 1963] 31, 13; D. Winston, *Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria* [Cincinnati, 1985] 43–44, 46, 50–52).

A Proposed Reconstruction of Q 10:23-24

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Q 10:23	
1/	1=A
[ ][2]	2=B
( )[3] μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ	
ο( )[3]ἱ βλέπο[( )ντες ἃ βλέπετε][3]	3=B
(...)[4]	4=D
\1→ 10:24	

Matt 13:16	Luke 10:23
1/	1/
[ ]2	[Καὶ στραφεὶς πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς κατ' ἰδίαν εἶπεν][2]
(ὑμῶν δὲ)[3] μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ	( )[3]μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ
ὅ(τ)[3]ι βλέπο(υσιν)[3],	ο( )[3]ἱ βλέπο[ντες ἃ βλέπετε][3]
(καὶ τὰ ὦτα ὑμῶν ὅτι ἀκούουσιν)[4].	( )[4]

Q 10:23[1]: Position of the pericope in Q.
Luke=Q: After Q 10:22; before Q 11:2.

Pro: **Müller** 1908, 29–30: In a list of "Textfolge von Q" Q 10:23–24 is placed here. **Streeter** 1924, 274: ". . . the coincidence in order [between Mt and Lk] is interrupted by the occurrence in Luke of two verses (Lk x. 23–24) which Matthew postpones to a later context." **Easton** 1926, 168: "Mt's position for these verses is obviously artificial and they may very easily have stood here in Q. . . ." **Schmid** 1930, 297–98: "Dass Lk den ursprünglichen, historischen Platz des Spruches bietet, ergibt sich schon daraus, dass dieses Wort erst im Zusammenhang mit dem Jubelruf seine wahre tiefe Bedeutung gewinnt."/ "Dass Lk es nicht von dort herausgenommen haben kann, beweist neben seinem Fehlen bei Mk und dem oben Gesagten eine feine sprachliche Differenz zwischen Mt und Lk." **Hirsch** 1941, 99: "Danach ist Luk 10_{21-24} Wiedergabe der ursprünglichen Komposition von Q in zwei Teilen, die durch den neuen Einsatz 23 heute deutlich voneinander abgehoben sind." **Marshall** 1978, 431: "The blessing on the disciples has been inserted by Matthew into a Marcan context, and hence Luke may preserve the original setting in Q." **Schmithals** 1980, 125: "Der Vergleich mit Mat. 11,25–27; 13,16f. und mit dem Kontext dieser Stellen zeigt, dass Lukas die vorliegenden Logien im wesentlichen unverändert aus der Spruchquelle Q übernommen und ihnen auch die Stellung in Q (im Anschluss an 10,2–16) belassen hat." **Schweizer** 1982, ET 182: "The sayings were probably already placed here in Q." **Schneider** 1984, 243: "Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass erst Matthäus die Einladung an die Bedrängten (Mt 11, 28–30) an die dritte Stelle setzte (Schmid: Mt und Lk, 289; gegen Norden) und dass in Q (wie bei Lk) unmittelbar der Makarismus der Jünger folgte. Lukas hätte den einladenden 'Heilandsruf' kaum unterdrückt, wenn er ihm in Q (an dieser Stelle) begegnet wäre." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 865: "Luke *may* have preserved the original order of these sayings in 'Q' and possibly Matthew has

moved the beatitude to another context, but it is really impossible to say. I prefer to think they were not originally joined in 'Q.'" **Kloppenborg** 1987, 73: "In these cases [like Q10:23–24], we know the Matthaean setting to be secondary. But there is no corresponding reason to suspect the Lucan setting as specially contrived, and for this reason it is preferable to assume that Luke reproduced the original order of Q." Reconstructions: **Kloppenborg, Polag.**

Con: **Knox** 1957, 56: "The 'makarism' of Luke x. 23 would provide an excellent conclusion to the whole episode of the sending and return of the disciples. No doubt it was originally an independent saying, but the original compiler regarded it as a suitable conclusion to the whole." **Dupont** 1969, 185: "La troisième pièce de Luc [10:21, 10:22, 10:23–24] se retrouve ailleurs chez Matthieu (13, 16–17); on peut donc penser qu'elle n'est pas necessairement liée aux deux premières et qu'elle a eu une existence indépendante dans la tradition." **Lührmann** 1969, 61: "Schwieriger ist die Frage nach dem Kontext dieses Doppelworts in Q. Bei Lk schliesst sich an 10, 21f ein aus Q stammender, von Mt (13, 16f) in den Zusammenhang des Gleichniskapitels eingebauter Makarismus an (Lk 10, 23f). Da er bei Mt also in einem aus Mk übernommenen Zusammenhang steht, kann das nicht sein ursprünglicher Kontext sein. Mt andererseits setzt in 11, 28–30 den Jubelruf mit einer Aufforderung fort, die keine Parallele in Mk oder Lk hat. Wenn nicht der Makarismus Lk 10, 23f/Mt 13, 16f in Q auf den Jubelruf folgte, könnte Mt 11, 28–30 dort gestanden haben, und Lk hätte diese Verse durch den Makarismus ersetzt. Es bleibt schliesslich die Möglichkeit, und von der haben wir auszugehen, dass weder Lk 10, 23f/Mt 13, 16f noch Mt 11, 28–30 in Q auf den Jubelruf folgte, dass sich also über die Fortsetzung nichts mehr ausmachen lässt." **Hoffmann** 1972, 105: "Da im Sinn der lukanischen Konzeption die Augenzeugenschaft entscheidende Voraussetzung für die spätere apostolische Predigt ist, wie Apg 4, 20 aber auch 1, 21f und 10, 39 zeigen, könnte Lukas selbst die Seligpreisung redaktionell bearbeitet und hier eingefügt haben." **Vassiliadis** 1978, 72: Q10:23–24 is to be placed, with a lesser degree of probability ( ), after Lk x (19–20) and before Lk xi (2–4), 9–26. **Zeller** 1984, 41: ". . . deren Ort in Q ohnehin nicht mit Sicherheit ermittelt werden kann;" Reconstructions: **Schenk** *Matt* = *Q*: After Q 11:26 (Matt 12:45); before Q 13:18 (Matt 13:31).

Pro: **B. Weiss** 1876: "Dass die hier eingeflochtenen Sprüche Luc. 10, 23. 24 ihre ursprüngliche Stelle haben, sahen wir bereits zu Mtth. 11, 27. Dort werden die (bereits an Jesum glaubenden) Jünger selig gepriesen, weil sie in ihm den sehen, in welchem die höchste Offenbarung des Vaters gegeben ist (v. 22), hier wird die Seligpreisung auf ihre Empfänglichkeit bezogen, nicht auf das, was sie sehen, sondern darauf, dass sie sehen, und darum auch die Ohren, die dabei vor Allem im Betracht kommen, hinzugefügt. . . ."

Con: **Hawkins** 1899, 162: ". . . Matthew altered their places [Q 10:23–24], mainly with the purpose of combining them into collections of sayings. . . ." **Wernle** 1899, 67: "An den Jubelruf schliesst Mt den Heilandsruf, Lc die seligen Augenzeugen, den Mt mit vielleicht besserem Text in die Gleichnisrede eingeschaltet hatte (13, 16f.)" **Müller** 1908, 33: ". . . Mt J_1 [selig sind eure Augen . . .] in das Gleichniskapitel c. 13 zu dem Jesajawort (Mk 4_{12} = Mt 13_{14-15}) setzen will, . . ." **Streeter** 1924, 275: "If, however, we consider (1) Matthew's proved habit of piling up discourses compacted from Mark, Q and M; (2) the fact that sayings like 'Blessed are your eyes' Mt xiii. 16–17, concerning Offences, Mt xviii. 7–being embedded in extracts from Mark–cannot possibly be in their original context as they occur in Matthew, the presumption is plainly in favour of the view that *Luke's order is the more original.*" **Easton** 1926, 168: "Mt's position for these verses is obviously artificial. . . ." **Schmid** 1930, 298: "Mt hat es wegen seiner inhaltlichen Verwandschaft mit den Worten über den Zweck der Parabeln und speziell mit dem von Mt allein daran angeschlossenen Schriftzitat über die Verblendung des jüdischen Volkes (ad

vocem Βλέπειν καὶ ἀκούειν) im Parabelabschnitt eingefügt." **Manson** 1937, 372: "Mt has taken this saying and inserted it in a new context, where the understanding of parables is under discussion. This has involved small changes in Mt 13^{16}, which completely alter the sense." "The alterations made by Mt bring the saying into closer agreement with the text from Is. $6^{9f.}$ quoted in Mt $13^{14f.}$" **Hirsch** 1941, 99: "Und diese Seligpreisung der Jünger ist zweifellos aus Q und steht Matth $13_{16.17}$. zweifellos von Matth selbst dort eingefügt in einem Markuszuhammenhang, in den sie nicht gehört." **Hirsch** 1941, 285: "Matth hat den Stoff aus Q selbständig etwas erweitert (23b.24) und den Schluss in Q durch eine neue Bildung ersetzt (28–30). Das aus Q hier Fortgefallene ist von ihm an andrer Stelle (Matth $13_{16.17}$) in einem Markuszusammenhang untergebracht." **Dupont** 1969, 185: "La troisième pièce de Luc [10:21, 10:22, 10:23–24] se retrouve ailleurs chez Matthieu (13, 16–17); on peut donc penser qu'elle n'est pas necessairement liée aux deux premières et qu'elle a eu une existence indépendante dans la tradition." **Lührmann** 1969, 61: "Schwieriger ist die Frage nach dem Kontext dieses Doppelworts in Q. Bei Lk schliesst sich an 10, 21f ein aus Q stammender, von Mt (13, 16f) in den Zusammenhang des Gleichniskapitels eingebauter Makarismus an (Lk 10, 23f). Da er bei Mt also in einem aus Mk übernommenen Zusammenhang steht, kann das nicht sein ursprünglicher Kontext sein. Mt andererseits setzt in 11, 28–30 den Jubelruf mit einer Aufforderung fort, die keine Parallele in Mk oder Lk hat. Wenn nicht der Makarismus Lk 10, 23f/Mt 13, 16f in Q auf den Jubelruf folgte, könnte Mt 11, 28–30 dort gestanden haben, und Lk hätte diese Verse durch den Makarismus ersetzt. Es bleibt schliesslich die Möglichkeit, and von der haben wir auszugehen, dass weder Lk 10, 23f/Mt 13, 16f noch Mt 11, 28–30 in Q auf den Jubelruf folgte, dass sich also über die Fortsetzung nichts mehr ausmachen lässt." **Hoffmann** 1972, 105: "Die Stellung dieses Logions bei Matthäus innerhalb der Gleichnisrede (Mt 13, 16f) ist zwar sekundär, . . ." **Miyoshi** 1974, 132: "Matthäus setzt den Makarismus in die Parabellehre ein und schafft dadurch einen literarischen Zusammenhang mit dem vorangehenden negativen Satz über οἱ ὄχλοι v. 13. . . ." **Marshall** 1978, 431: "The blessing on the disciples has been inserted by Matthew into a Marcan context, . . ." **Schweizer** 1973, ET 300: "The saying derives from the source used in Luke 10:23–24. In that context Matthew has replaced it with 11:28–30; he needs it here because the distinction between the disciples and the unbelieving crowd is crucial to him. . . ." **Schenk** 1981, 60: "Matthäus allerdings wandelte den Spruch in die subjektive Richtung einer 'bedingten Seligpreisung' ab und stellte sie in einem anderen Zusammenhang." **Gundry** 1982, 257: "For a renewed and contrastive portrayal of true disciples as those who understand, Matthew now interpolates a pair of sayings that occur in Luke 10:23–24 right after the 'Johannine thunderbolt' (cf. Matt 11:25–27)." **Zeller** 1984, 41: ". . . deren Ort in Q ohnehin nicht mit Sicherheit ermittelt werden kann;" **Dupont** 1985, 884: ". . . Matthieu a emprunté à un autre contexte (cfr *Lc.*, x, 23–24). . . ." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 865: "Luke *may* have preserved the original order of these sayings in 'Q' and possibly Matthew has moved the beatitude to another context, but it is really impossible to say. I prefer to think they were not originally joined in 'Q.'"

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: A, after 10:22, before 11:2.

1. There is good reason for seeing Matthew responsible for locating the saying in his Markan context: (a) its fits his view of the parables as understandable and the disciples as understanding, providing the requisite contrast with the crowds (he changes *all* the Markan instances of disciples' misunderstanding!); (b) it makes *ad vocem* contact with the Isaiah quote introduced by Matthew into the Markan context, and *expands* it in correspondence with the Isaiah quote.

2. There are no strong reasons for seeing Luke as responsible for its Lucan context. Against Hoffmann above it should be observed that Luke is interested in having the

ἀπόστολοι as eyewitnesses, but does not use μαθητής in this connection, as νήπιοι and ἀποκαλύπτω are likewise not part of Luke's terminology to express the eyewitness qualification of apostles.

3. Although 23a seems to be Lucan editing (see below), in the Gospel he regularly inserts στραφεῖς+a verb of speaking into his sources (7:9, 44, 9:55, 14:25, 23:28, always with reference to Jesus.

4. When viewed apart from Lucan contextual framework and Lucan theology, the saying forms an unproblematic unit with Q 10:21–22, which may thus be taken with some probability as its original context in Q.

Q 10:23[2]: Luke's introductory phrase.

Luke=Q [Καὶ στραφεὶς πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς κατ' ἰδίαν εἶπεν][2]

Pro: **Loisy** 1907, I, 912: "Il est possible aussi que la formule de transition marque le passage d'une source à une autre, ou à un autre endroit de la mème source:" **Manson** 1937, 372: "Lk's introductory words would seem to belong to Q. They can scarcely be editorial, seeing that almost the same formula is used to introduce the immediately preceding verse." **Hirsch** 1941, 99: "Ob dieser neue Einsatz—in dem naturlich mit D κατ' ἰδίαν zu streichen ist—von Luk stammt oder schon in Q sich fand, ist Nebenfrage." **Marshall** 1978, 438: "Although it [the introductory formula] is lacking in Mt (where, however, the context does not require it), and its language is partly Lucan (στραφείς, 7:9; *et al.*), it is based on Q, since the phrase κατ' ἰδίαν (9:10 par. Mk 6:31) is not Lucan (cf. Schulz, 419)." **Jeremias** 1980, 189: "10, 23f. Trad στραφεὶς πρός; στραφείς→7,9 Trad; +πρός τινα→7, 44 Trad." **Jeremias** 1980, 155: "Alle 7 Belege [of στραφείς] finden sich im Nicht-Markusstoff (Lk 7, 9.44; 9, 55; 10:23; 14,25; 22, 61; 23, 28)." **Jeremias** 1980, 171: ". . . πρός τινα im NT nur im lukanischen Sondergut: Lk 7, 44; 10, 23; 23, 28." **Schweizer** 1982, ET 183: "The transition to vs. 23 is un-Lukan, and so was probably already present in his sources (cf. 22:61)." **Wegner** 1985, 211: "Die Tatsache, dass Lk στραφείς nicht in der Apg verwendet und auch niemals als Einfügung in seinen Mk-Stoff benutzt, deutet darauf hin, dass der Gebrauch des Verbs in dieser Partizipialform vor-lk ist."

Con: **Hawkins** 1899, 22: στραφείς is characteristic of Luke's gospel. **Harnack** 1907, ET, 25: "Here St. Luke begins with a stylistic correction and with a pedantic simplification of the thought." **Loisy** 1907, I, 912[1]: "Cf. *supr.* p. 908, n. 2. Le κατ' ἰδίαν (qui manque dans D. Ss. Sc. mss. lat. pourrait être un écho indirect de Mt 28–30, passage omis par Luc, mais d'où l'on pouvait inférer que l'ensemble du discours ne s'addressait pas aux disciples (B. Weiss, E. 350)." **Müller** 1908, 51: 10:23a comes from Luke. **Bussmann** 1926, 66: V 23a was not in Q. **Hirsch** 1941, 99: "Ob dieser neue Einsatz—in dem naturlich mit D κατ' ἰδίαν zu streichen ist—von Luk stammt oder schon in Q sich fand, ist Nebenfrage." **Hirsch** 1941, 99: "Aus der Gepflogenheit des Lukas würde die Erweiterung eines kurzen καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς durch eine genaue Bestimmung der Adresse durchaus nicht herausfallen." **Schürmann** 1968, 233[30]: "Ein στραφείς von Jesus auszusagen, ist charakteristisch lukanisch: vgl. Lk 7, 44 und 23, 28 S; 10, 23 (22 v.l.) Sv diff Mt, c. Dat. noch 7, 9 diff Mt, objektlos noch 9, 55; 14, 25 Sv diff Mt; 22, 61 diff Mk; sonst diff Mt nur noch Mt 9, 22 und 16, 23 diff Mk (beidemal aber ἐπιστραφείς); Jo 1, 38." **Hoffmann** 1972, 105: "Lukas gibt dem Logion im Vers 23 eine eigene Einleitung und streicht die Erwähnung des Hörens, die Mt 13, 16f erhalten ist." **Schulz** 1972a, 419: "Eine kurze apophthegmatische Einleitung, wie sie in allerdings überarbeiteter Gestalt bei Lk vorliegt, wird in Q ursprünglich sein; das Vokabelmaterial ist allerdings zum Teil lk geprägt.[105]" **Schulz** 1972a, 419[105]: "Das Partizip στραφείς mit Jesus als Subjekt ist Lk eigentümlich; er verwendet das Verb στρέφειν (Ev 6mal; keine sicher trad Belege) immer

in partizipaler Form; μαθητής Ev ca 16mal trad; ca 17mal red; Apg 28mal; das Wort ist in Q-Rahmenbemerkungen nirgends belegt (vgl dsAr 404(f) A 6). Auch κατ' ἰδίαν wird von Lk stammen, weil 'das nunmehr Folgende sich auf die Urapostel speciell bezieht' (HOLTZMANN Lc 360)—κατ' ἰδίαν sonst allerdings nur noch Ev 1mal trad; Apg 1mal." **Dupont** 1973, 725: "L'intervention rédactionnelle de l'évangéliste se manifeste clairement dans la notice d'introduction de Lc 14, 25, dans celle de 10, 23 (diff. Mt 13, 16), dans la retouche apportée en 9, 7 (diff. Mt 8, 10)." "Le complément introduit par πρός se rattache à στραφείς plutot que à εἶπεν, en Lc 23, 28 comme en 10, 23, mais contrairement à 14, 25;" **Miyoshi** 1974, 133: "Der Einleitungsvers ist eindeutig redaktionell: καὶ στραφείς und πρὸς . . . εἶπεν, vgl,. Lk 9, 55 und Lk 9, 57, 59. . . . Die Wendung κατ' ἰδίαν schreibt Lukas nur noch in Lk 9, 10b (eine Wiedergabe der Mk-Tradition): . . ." "Mit Absicht hat Lukas deshalb diese Wendung in Lk 10, 23 eingefügt, damit der Offenbarungscharakter von 21–22 betont wird." **Polag** 1979, 88: Q10:23a is printed in Appendix II—"Sententiae verba Jesu inducentes, quae non certe ad Q pertinent." **Schneider** 1984, 245: "Die Einleitung stammt vom Evangelisten, der damit den Makarismus ganz eindeutig an die Jünger Jesu gerichtet sein lässt." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 867: "In vv. 23–24 he has fashioned the introductory participial cl., making the beatitude refer expressly to the disciples (Matt 13:16 is less clear)." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 874: "Luke uses the aor. pass. ptc. *strapheis* in an intrans. sense with *pros* and the acc., as in 7:44; 23:28." **Kloppenborg** 1988, 81: Q10:23a is enclosed in his [ ] as not from Q. Reconstructions: **Luz, Schenk, Zeller.**

Matt=Q: [ ][2]

Con: **Polag** 1979, 15: "It can reasonably be assumed that the redactor of Mt dropped the introductory words because they were inappropriate to his version." **Gundry** 1982, 257: "Since Jesus is already speaking to his disciples here (see v 10), the transitional 'and turning to the disciples, he said privately' (so the tradition as represented by Luke) drops out."

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: B, [ ]

These words are from Luke, perhaps as his expansion of a Q *Vorlage,* since στραφεῖς . . . εἶπεν is entirely Luke's style—he regularly inserts στραφεῖς+a verb of speaking into his sources (7:9, 44, 9:55, 14:25, 23:28), always with reference to Jesus. Μαθητής is rare in Q (only 6:40, 7:18 elsewhere, never in an introductory comment referring to Jesus' disciples. Κατ' ἰδίαν, if in Luke's text at all (cf. v.l.'s), is his borrowing of a Markan phrase, elsewhere in the Gospel only in 9:10b.

Q 10:23[3]: Luke's "the eyes that see what you see" or Matthew's "your eyes because they see."

Luke=Q: ( )[3] μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ο( )[3]ἱ βλέπο[ντες ἃ βλέπετε][3]

Pro: **Bussmann** 1926, 66. **Vögtle** 1971, 240. **Schulz** 1972 a, 419: "Der Lk-Fassung ist der Vorzug zu geben." **Miyoshi** 1974, 132: "Das Verb in der zweiten Person bei Lk ist deshalb ursprünglicher; denn auch in v. 24 ist das Verb βλέπετε in der zweiten Person gebraucht, sowohl bei Lk wie auch bei Mt v. 17." **Marshall** 1978, 438: "Although Luke might be suspected of generalising here, it is more probable that the first half of the saying is parallel to the second, and that Matthew has altered the form of the saying to fit his context in which there is a contrast between those who do not understand and the disciples." **Schweizer** 1982, ET, 183: "He does not say 'your eyes,' probably thinking also of later 'disciples'. . . ." Reconstructions: **Luz, Polag, Schenk, Zeller.**

Con: **Cadbury** 1920, 191: "...Luke rarely if ever adds an unemphatic personal pronoun, and those which he finds in his source (possibly due to the prominence of these pronouns

in Semitic idiom) he omits." Examples in the genitive include: Lk 22,11; 10,23; 11,13; 12,22 (twice). Only the first example is not in a Q passage. Reconstructions:
Matt=Q: (ὑμῶν δὲ)³ μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὅ(τ)³ι βλέπο(υσιν)³

Pro: **Loisy** 1907, I, 912: "On peut, d'après Matthieu, conjecturer que le commencement de l'apostrophe se lisait dans la source: 'Bienheureux les yeux qui voient ce que vous voyez, et les oreilles qui entendent ce que vous entendez!' "

Con: **Loisy** 1907, I, 748: "Pour adapter ce passage à sa propre idée, le rédacteur, au lieu de dire avec Luc: 'Heureux les yeux qui voient ce que vous voyez!' écrit: 'Mais heureux vos yeux parce qu'ils voient!' ce qui relève les disciples par rapport aux Juifs, qui ne peuvent pas voir." **Easton** 1926, 168: "Mt's 'your' is due to his context (W[eiss]), as is his 'because they see' (W[eiss], L[oi]s[y])." **Schmid** 1930, 298: "Wenn aber Mt im nächsten Vers (17) mit Lk schreibt ἃ βλέπετε καὶ . . . ἃ ἀκούετε, so ist klar, dass das ὅτι im vorangehenden Satz Anpassung an den Zusammenhang der Parabelrede ist. Auch das bei Lk felhende ὑμῶν δέ (Mt V 16) dient demselben Zweck." **Dupont** 1958, 277³: "Indication du motif dans une proposition introduite par ὅτι: Mat., 13, 16; 16:17;. . . ." **Dupont** 1958, 278¹: "Matthieu enchaîne alors en introduisant le macarisme de yeux qui voient (Luc le rapporte dans un contexte tout différent);" **Lührmann** 1969, 61¹: "ὑμῶν δὲ (Mt 13, 16a) ist bewusste Antithese zu 13, 13–15; Mt 13, 16b ist Erweiterung nach 13, 17 und dem Jesajazitat;" **Schulz** 1972a, 419: "Der Lk-Fassung ist der Vorzug zu geben. Dass zeigt zum einen der Wechsel von ὅτι (Mt V 16) zu ἃ (Mt V 17)[107] and zum anderen, dass die Mt-Fassung nur aus dem Kontext verständlich ist." **Schulz** 1972a, 419[107]: Richtig STRECKER Weg 197; SCHMID Mt und Lk 298; ὅτι bei Mt in V 16 ist als Angleichung an Mt V 13 leicht zu begreifen (STRECKER Weg 197 A 2; anders CONZELMANN Mitte 96 A 3)." **Schulz** 1972a, 420: "Mt kontrastiert das Sehen und Hören der Jünger dem Nichtsehen und Nichthören der Welt. Darum führt er das vorangestellte betonte ὑμῶν ein und ändert das ursprüngliche οἱ βλέποντες ἃ βλέπετε in ὅτι βλέπουσιν." **Schweizer** 1973, 300: ". . . contrary to verse 17 and Luke 10:23, Matthew contrasts not seeing with seeing in the absolute sense rather than with seeing particular things." **Miyoshi** 1974, 132: "Um diesen Gegensatz [οἱ μαθηται and οἱ ὄχλοι] hervorzuheben fügt er dem Makarismus ὑμῶν δέ bei." **Miyoshi** 1974, 132: Das Verb βλέπουσιν in der dritten Person bei Mt ist eine Annäherung an v. 13." **Marshall**, 1978, 438: "Although Luke might be suspected of generalising here, it is more probable that the first half of the saying is parallel to the second, and that Matthew has altered the form of the saying to fit his context in which there is a contrast between those who do not understand and the disciples." **Gundry** 1982, 257–58: ". . . Matthew inserts both δέ and, in first position, ὑμῶν to emphasize the contrast between false disciples and true. His changing the description of the disciples' eyes as those 'that see the things which you see' to a reason for the blessedness of their eyes ('because they see') antithetically parallels v 13b in its distinctively Matthean for ('because seeing they do not see')/ and again accentuates human responsibility. The deliberate changing of οἱ βλέποντες to ὅτι βλέπουσιν does away with the need to see different translations of the Aramaic ךָ, though the ambiguity of the Aramaic may have provided a convenience for the change." **Dupont** 1985, 256: "Mais Matthieu a retouché le v. 16; les disciples y sont déclarés heureux, non plus en raison de ce qu'ils voient et entendent, mais parce qu'ils ont des yeux qui voient et des oreilles qui entendent." **Dupont** 1985, 885³⁷: "Le changement de sens ne se limite donc pas à l'introduction de l'idée de causalité, résultant de l'adjonction d'un double ὅτι; il tient en même temps au fait que les verbes 'voir' et 'etendre' perdent leur signification propre et sont pris dans un sens purement métaphorique." Reconstructions: **Polag.**

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: B, ( )³ μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ο( )³ἱ βλέπο[( )ντες ἃ βλέπετε]³

The Lucan form represents Q, because of the parallelism preserved in it, and because Matthew seems to have adjusted the wording to his context (cf. Schulz, Schmidt, Lührmann, and Miyoshi above). In particular, the construction with ὅτι is Matthean, corresponding to the redactional ὅτι of 13:13 that is quite important to Matthew's rewriting of Mark here.

Q 10:23[4] : Matthew's statement about ears.
Luke=Q: ( )[4]

Pro: **Harnack** 1907, ET 25: "The 'hearing' was already wanting in St. Luke's parallel to verse 16;"

Con: **Müller** 1908, 12: "Lk 10_{23} [selig die Augen . . .] kürzt Mt 13_{16b} wegen Lk 10_{24b} das bleibt; 'was ihr sehet' in v. 23 ist aus 24 ergänzt." **Cadbury** 1920, 85, 88: ". . . Luke's Greek instinct would lead him to avoid distinctly Semitic parallelisms."/ "In several cases one of two parallel or antithetical clauses is absent from Luke, . . ." Cadbury notes here Matthew 5,54; 10,24; 7,17; 13,16; 6,13;, 19; 7,13; 10,37. Only Matt 10:24 is not from Q. **Dupont** 1958, 2781: "Le verset suivant [Lk 10:24//Mt 23:17], dans les deux textes, parle de 'croire' et 'd'entendre'; on peut soupçonner Luc d'avoir supprimé les oreilles pour éviter des répétitions." **Miyoshi** 1974, 132: "Aber es ist auch möglich, dass Lukas diesen Teil gestrichen hat. Darauf weist der letzte Halbsatz v. 24b hin, wo die Rede vom Hören ἀκοῦσαι ἃ ἀκούετε dem in Mt vorliegenden Teil entspricht, wie die Rede vom Sehen in v. 24a ἰδεῖν ἃ ὑμεῖς βλέπετε dem Thema des Auges im Makarismus parallel steht." **Miyoshi** 1974, 132–33: "Für die luk Weglassung des 'Ohr' kann ein zweifacher Grund vermutet werden: erstens, der Gegensatz des Sehens ἃ βλέπετε ist die Offenbarung der Sohnschaft Jesu v. 21–22, die sich zuerst durch die sichtbare Niederlage der Dämonen v. 17–18 vorbereitet hat. Lukas neigt dazu, die Offenbarung als Vision zu veranschaulichen, z.B. in der Taufe Jesu, Lk 3, 22: . . ." "Zweitens, die Rede von 'Ohren' der Jünger zum Hören passt nicht gut für die luk Perikope, die als Abschlusswort zur Rückkehr der Boten dient." **Marshall** 1978, 438: ". . . Matthew includes a phrase about hearing which corresponds to a similar phrase in the second part of the saying; here it is likely that Luke has abbreviated the saying, thereby losing the original parallelism of eyes and ears. . . ."

Matt=Q: (καὶ τὰ ὦτα ὑμῶν ὅτι ἀκούουσιν)[4].

Pro: **Loisy** 1907, I, 748 3: "V. 16. ὑμῶν δέ μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὅτι βλέπουσιν. Rien ne correspond dans Luc à ce qui suit: καὶ τὰ ὦτα ὅτι ἀκούουσιν, mais cette addition vient de la source et se trouve garantie en quelque façon par Luc, x, 24, où il est question de voir et d'entendre, comme dans Matthieu." **F. Schnider** 1973, 177: "Fraglich ist, ob Lukas in Lk 10, 23 den Parallelismus um das Hören gekürzt hat, oder ob Matthäus in Mt 13, 16 erweitert hat. Im zweiten Teil des Wortes ist der Parallelismus von Sehen und Hören bei Matthäus und Lukas belegt, was eher für seine Ursprünglichkeit spricht."

Con: **Easton** 1926, 168: "As regards the last clause of Mt v. 16 H[arnac]k argues that Lk thought the prophets *did* hear, W[eiss] that Mt added the clause to fit his context." **Schulz** 1972a, 420: "Wahrscheinlich hat Mt auch das Hören der Ohren hinzugefügt. Dass es in der 'lukanischen Tradition verlorenging,' weil es von den üblichen eschatologischen Vorstellungen charakteristisch abweicht, ist kaum zutreffend. Mt dürfte durch V 17 einerseits, aber auch durch das vorangehende Jesaja-Zitat zu dieser Ergänzung veranlasst worden sein." **Schweizer** 1973, 300: ". . . in the very first sentence he [Mt] mentions ears and hearing, since he is concerned with understanding the parables of Jesus. Originally, no doubt, the emphasis was on seeing the glory of the eschaton." **Miyoshi** 1974, 132: "Mt wendet den Makarismus auch auf die 'Ohren' an: τὰ ὦτα ὑμῶν ὅτι ἀκούσιν. Ob Matthäus es in die Q eingesetzt hat, oder ob Lukas es aus der Q gestrichen hat, ist

schwierig zu entscheiden. Falls Mt es redaktionell eingeschoben hat, kann als Grund dafür vermutet werden, dass im Zitat aus Is 6, 9 in Mt 13, 15 'die Ohren' zweimal mit den 'Augen' parallel gesetzt werden und davon der Vers 16 beeinflusst worden ist." **Gundry** 1982, 258: "To make the beatitude into a couplet of synonymously parallel lines, Matthew adds 'and your ears, because they hear.' The addition also continues the antithetic parallel with v 13, prepares for the distinctive command to hear the parable of the sower (v 18), and doubles the beatitude on true disciples." **Schneider** 1984, 245: "Mt 13, 16 spricht (wegen des Zusammenhangs des Gleichniskapitels) sekundär auch vom Hören." "Wiederum hebt Lukas auf das *Was* des Erlebens ab, während Mt 13, 16 (Q) die *Tatsache* des Sehens und Hörens betont." Reconstructions: **Luz, Polag, Schenk, Zeller.**

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: D,(. . .)[4]

This one is a toss-up, but I give a slight preference to Luke as representing Q because of Matthew's tendency to accommodate this Q text to the preceding Isaiah quote (see above), even though this means that Matthew created the parallelism—something that Gundry regards as quite likely.

Q 10:24

[[(ἀμήν)]][1] /λέγω \ [1] γὰρ / \ [1] ὑμῖν ὅτι	1=C
πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ [( ) βασιλεῖς][2]	2=A
[[(ἐπθύμ)]][3]ησαν ἰδεῖν	3=C
ἃ [ὑμεῖς][4] βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδαν	4=B
καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἃ ἀκούετε καὶ οὐκ ἤκουσαν	
\10:23[1]	

Matt 13:17	Luke 10:24
(ἀμὴν)[1] / \ [1] γὰρ /λέγω \[1] ὑμῖν ὅτι ( )	[1] /λέγω \ [1] γὰρ / \ [1] ὑμῖν ὅτι
πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ (δίκαιοι)[2]	πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ [βασιλεῖς][2]
(ἐπεθύμ)[3]ησαν ἰδεῖν	[ἠθέλ][3]ησαν ἰδεῖν
ἃ [ ][4] βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδαν,	ἃ [ὑμεῖς][4] βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδαν,
καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἃ ἀκούετε καὶ οὐκ ἤκουσαν.	καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἃ ἀκούετε καὶ οὐκ ἤκουσαν.

Q 10:24[1] : Luke's "for I say to you" or Matthew's "for truly I say to you."

Luke=Q: ( )[1] /λέγω \[1] γὰρ / \ [1] ὑμῖν ὅτι

Pro: **Vögtle** 1971, 240: ἀμήν was not in the original wording of Q. **Jeremias** 1980, 125–26: "Mit anderen Worten: Lukas behandelte ἀμήν äusserst schonend: er hat es im Markusstoff keinmal ersatzlos gestrichen. Wenn wir uns dem Nicht-Markusstoff des dritten Evangeliums zuwenden, so bietet sich ein anderes Bild dar. Zwar findet sich auch hier dreimal ἀμήν (4, 24; /12, 37; 23, 43), im übrigen jedoch wird a) ἀμήν auf verschiedene Weise übersetze (mit ἐπ' ἀληθείας 4, 25; ναί 7, 26Q; 11, 51Q; 12, 5; ἀληθῶς 12, 44Q; γάρ 22, 16.18 vgl. Mk 14, 25; δέ 13, 35 $\mathfrak{p}^{75}$ B A D) oder ersatzlos fortgelassen (7, 9Q 28Q; 10,12Q.24Q; 12, 59Q; 15, 7Q; 22, 34 vgl. Mk 14, 30) bzw. b) die ganze Wendung ἀμήν λέγω ὑμῖν ersetz . . . oder ganz weggelassen. . . . Diese starke Tendenz, ἀμήν zu meiden, entspricht nicht der lukanischen Technik, wie wir sie soeben aus seiner Markusbearbeitung kennen lernten, und ist daher der Tradition anzulasten." Reconstructions: **Luz, Polag, Zeller.**

Con: **Cadbury** 1920, 157: "With regard to ἀμήν Luke's practice varies, but he seems often to change or omit it." "it is omitted in: Lk 7,9, 28; 10,12, 24; 12,59; 13,25; 15,7; 22,18, 21, 34." **Easton** 1926, 168: "Lk has omitted ἀμήν, . . ." **Miyoshi** 1974, 133: "Es

besteht aber die Möglichkeit, dass Lukas die Wendung mit ἀμήν vermieden hat, weil es Belege gibt, wo Lukas ἀμήν auch aus der Mk-Tradition getilgt hat." **Marshall** 1978, 438–39: "Luke has omitted the introductory ἀμήν (diff. Mt) as usual (4:24 . . .)." **Gundry** 1982, 258: "In the introduction to the next saying, either Matthew adds ἀμήν or Luke omits it. . . ."

Matt=Q: (ἀμὴν)[1] / \ [1] γὰρ /λέγω \ [1] ὑμῖν ὅτι

Pro: **Harnack** 1907, ET 26: "ἀμήν may possibly belong to the source, but may also have been inserted by St. Matthew." **Hasler** 1969, 66: "Die mit γὰρ erweiterte A-Formel bei Mt empfanden Sinaiticus, altlat. und ägypt. HSS mit Recht als überfüllt und liessen es fallen. Mt 5, 18; 10, 23 und 17, 20 aber zeigen dieselbe Besonderheit. Dabei wird Amen übernommen: 5, 18 und 17, 20 aus Mk; 10, 23 aus S. So besteht auch für Mt 13, 17 die Möglichkeit der Übernahme der A-Formel aus Q. Sie wird zur Gewissheit, wenn die Verwandtschaft zu den beiden Q-Doppellogien Lk 12, 37 und Mt 24, 46f/Lk 12, 43f beachtet wird. Beides sind Makarismen, die mit dem nachfolgenden, formelverbundenen Logion ebenfalls ein Doppelwort bilden. In Lk 12, 44 übersetzt der Evangelist Amen mit ἀληθῶς. Dadurch bestätigt sich die A-Formel im Q-Wort." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 875: "In the Matthean counterpart (13:17) the original reading of 'Q' is retained, *amen gar lego hymin*—one of the instances in which Luke has omitted *amen*." **Wegner** 1985, 214: "(e) hat Mt es [ἀμήν] in QMt: 5, 18. 26; 8, 10; 10, 15; 11, 11; 13, 17; 17, 20; 18, 13; 23, 36 und 24, 47." **Wegner** 1985, 215: "Betrachtet man jedoch das Vorkommen von ἀμήν im Q-Stoff, so ist es recht auffällig, dass alle Belege ausschliesslich in den Mt-Parallelen vorkommen, wobei die entsprechenden Lk-Stellen es entweder gar nicht bringen, oder aber dafür ein ναί bzw. ἀληθῶς haben.[24] Angesichts dieses Q-befundes wird man kaum Mt eine sek Hinzufügung des ἀμήν an allen Q-Belegen zuschreiben durfen, es sei denn, eine zurückhaltende red Tätigkeit gegenüber den ἀμήν-Worten des Mk hätte sich seltsamerweise gegenüber Q ins Uferlose gesteigert. Da jedoch für eine derartige Annahme jegliche näheren Indizien fehlen, wird man sich wohl begnügen müssen, bei allen solchen QMt Belegen, bei denen Lk an den entsprechenden Stellen für das mt ἀμήν keinen Ersatz bringt, beide Möglichkeiten, die der Trad und der Red, jeweils offen zu halten. Für die Beurteilung des ἀμήν auSt bedeutet dies, dass bzgl. seines trad oder red Charakters eine sichere Entscheidung nicht mehr möglich ist." **Wegner** 1985, 215[24]: "Ersatzlos steht mt ἀμήν bei folgenden Lk-Parallelen: Lk 7, 9.28; 10, 12. 24; 12, 59; 15, 7; 16, 17 und 17, 6. . . ." Reconstructions: **Schenk.**

Con: **Harnack** 1907, ET 26: "ἀμήν may possibly belong to the source, but may also have been inserted by St. Matthew." **Kingsbury** 1969, 42: Mt places "the particle ἀμήν ('truly') at the head of v. 17, the purpose of which is to underline the messianic authority of this saying of Jesus." **Lührmann** 1969, 611: "ἀμήν (13, 171) geht wie häufig auf Mt zurück;" **Schulz** 1972a, 420: Das ἀμήν in Mt V 17 könnte möglicherweise vom Evangelisten stammen." **Miyoshi** 1974, 133: "Es besteht aber die Möglichkeit, dass Lukas die Wendung mit ἀμήν vermieden hat, weil es Belege gibt, wo Lukas ἀμήν auch aus der Mk-Tradition getilgt hat." **Gundry** 1982, 79: ". . . a favorite clause of Matthew, 'For truly I say to you' . . ." It occurs thirty-one times in the first gospel, but only thirteen in Mark and six in Luke. Nine further times Luke omits the Semitic ἀμήν, or makes a substitution for it, and takes over the rest." "only he [Matthew] ever uses the conjunction γάρ with the other words in it (see also 10:23; 13:17; 17:20)." **Gundry** 1982, 258: "In the introduction to the next saying, either Matthew adds ἀμήν or Luke omits it. . . ."

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: C, [[(ἀμήν)]][1] /λέγω \ [1] γὰρ / \ [1] ὑμῖν ὅτι

Because of Matthew's demonstrable tendency to add ἀμήν to his sources and Luke's to omit it, this one cannot be decided with great probability. Since Luke's tendency is the

stronger, however, this gives the greater probability to Matthew's having preserved Q here, especially when taken with Hasler's argument re. Q 12:37, 44.

Q 10:24[2] : Choice of nouns.
Luke=Q: πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ [βασιλεῖς][2]

Pro: **Harnack** 1907, ET 26: Καὶ βασιλεῖς, in spite of its doubtful textual authority, must be regarded as belonging to the Lukan text; for its later addition cannot be easily explained, while it is explicable that it should have dropped out of the text. If, however, it stood in St. Luke, it stood also in Q. . . . **Loisy** 1907, I, 912: "L'expression plus générale et plus exacte de Mattheiu pourrait être secondaire par rapport à l'autre, qui n'associe aux prophetes que les rois pieux, David, Ézéchias, Josias." **Bussmann** 1926, 66: βασιλεῖς is original. **Schmid** 1930, 298–99: "Mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit verdienen die βασιλεῖς bei Lk den Vorzug vor den δίκαιοι bei Mt."/ ". . . und dass auch Lk diesen Ausdruck durchaus nicht immer vermeidet. Als blosse redaktionelle Verbesserung des Evangelisten sind die βασιλεῖς nicht recht verständlich. Im ganzen ist, wie Moffatt bemerkt, die Position der Könige stärker als die der Gerechten. Moffatt weist zur Erklärung auf den 'Preis der Väter' (Sir 44ff) hin, wo neben den grossen Propheten auch die frommen Könige der Vorzeit genannt werden, und schliesst mit Recht, 'What lies behind this beatitude is an appreciation of Israel's nobler past, not a census of the good and the false, either among kings ar [sic] among prophets' (a. a. O. 28)." **Vögtle** 1971, 240: βασιλεῖς is original. **Fitzmyer** 1985, 867: ". . . Luke has probably retained the original formulation of 'Q' in the phrase 'prophets and kings,' whereas Matthew has changed it to 'prophets and righteous ones' (13:17; cf. Matt 10:41 ['M']; 23:29)." **Kloppenborg** 1987, 198: "The thanksgiving [of 10:21] also draws a social demarcation: revealed to the νήπιοι but hidden from the σοφοί. The beatitude may in fact also contain a hint of this demarcation: the somewhat puzzling use of βασιλεῖς[120] may be clarified on the supposition that Q here evokes the notion that the bearers of the eschatological message (e.g., John in 7:24–26) as well as its recipients (10:21; 12:27) are precisely not the wise and wealthy. Revelation instead comes to the simple and poor!" **Kloppenborg** 1987, 198[120]: Matthew's δίκαιοι is almost certainly redactional and Luke here is original."
Reconstructions: **Luz, Polag, Schenk, Zeller.**

Con: **B. Weiss** 1876, 342: "Bem., wie Luc. nur statt der δίκαιοι, die er auch Mtth. 10, 41 entfernte, die Könige als die Grössten des A. Bundes neben den Propheten nennt, . . ." Knox 1957, 56[1]: "At x.24 Creed (*ad loc.*) regards Luke's 'kings' as more forcible (and therefore more original?) than Matthew's 'righteous men' (xiii.17). But there is no clear reason why Matthew should have changed it. On the other hand kings are the proper recipients of Hellenistic revelations, their souls being nearer to the divine than those of ordinary mortals. Cf. P. M. G. xiii, 227. Also Manilius 1, 41 . . . and *Corp. Herm.: Exc. Stob.* xxiv; . . . Moreover, not many of the kings of Israel and Judah would have 'desired to see these things'; David, Solomon in his better period, Hezekiah and Josiah are about the only possible candidates. But there were many righteous men looking for the Consolation of Israel. It seems that here Luke has changed his source to conform to the Hellenistic convention." **Miyoshi** 1974, 133: "Aber es gibt auch Grund zu fragen, ob nicht Lukas statt der Gerechten die Könige redaktionell eingesetzt habe, denn, sollte Lukas den offenbarten Sohn in v. 23 als den königlichen Messias verstanden haben—und es scheint so zu sein—, könnte die Anreihung von Propheten und Königen gerade dazu dienen, die messianische Hoffnung der Propheten und der davidischen Könige zum Ausdruck zu bringen, zumal die messianische Hoffnung Davids in Apg 2, 26 durch ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ausgesprochen wird. Ferner interessiert sich nur Lukas für die Beschreibung der falschen Hoffnung des Herodes, Jesus zu sehen, Lk 9, 9b und 23, 8."

Matt=Q: πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ (δίκαιοι)[2]

Pro: **Schmid** 1930, 299: "H. Wendt (Lehre Jesu I 93), B. Weiss (Quellen des Lk 68) und Lagrange (Mt 261) die Mt-Version für primär halten, und zwar deshalb, weil Lk 'die Gerechten' neben den Propheten auch 11:47 (=Mk 23:29) weglässt und den Vers Mt 10:41, wo auch die Propheten und Gerechten neben einander stehen, nicht aufgenommen hat. Auch waren die Könige nicht wie die Gerechten und Propheten auf Grund ihres Titels für die Erwartung des messianischen Reiches qualifiziert gewesen. Lk denke etwa an die Psalmen neben den Propheten (vgl. 24:44) und an den König David als ihren Verfasser." **Hirsch** 1941, 99: "Was den Wortlaut von Luk 10_{21-24} anlangt, so wird man 'Könige' für einen Ersatz von 'Gerechte'=Fromme halten." **Käsemann** 1965, ET 91–92: "The prophets only bring into the clear light of day the determining force of the whole community—the Spirit of prophecy himself who governs this community and therefore guides it by means of the instruments he considers appropriate." / "The early date of the conception is equally revealed by the fact that Luke substitutes in 10.24 the combination 'prophets and kings' for the original 'prophets and righteous men,' thus clearly losing the real sense of the latter."

Con: **Harnack** 1907, ET 26: ". . . the δίκαιοι of St. Matthew is a correction due to this evangelist, who has a special liking for δικαιοσύνη." **Easton** 1926, 168: ". . . for 'kings' Mt has substituted the generalizing 'righteous' (H[arnac]k, L[oi]s[y])." **Manson** 1937, 372: " 'Prophets and kings' (Lk) is preferable to 'Prophets and righteous men' (Mt). The latter collocation is characteristic of Mt. Cf. Mt. 10^{41} (M), 23^{29}." **Schmid** 1930, 299: "Mann kann aber dem entgegenhalten, dass auf der anderen Seite Mt eine ausgesprochene Vorliebe für δίκαιος hat (17 x) und es 13:43 als Ersatz für συνιέντες (Dn 12:3) einfügt, . . ." **Dupont** 1969, 301: "il ajoute aux prophetes les 'justes' [23:29] comme il le fait en 10, 41 et en 13, 17;" **Kingsbury** 1969, 147^{75}: "Matthew's reference to 'righteous men' in place of 'kings' (Lk 10,24) is probably a mark of his editorial activity, for only in his Gospel are 'prophets' and 'righteous men' mentioned in conjunction with one another (cf. 23.29; 10.41)." "Then, too, the term δίκαιος occurs 17 times in Matthew, but only twice in Mark and 11 times in Luke. On the other hand, E. Käsemann [Käsemann 1965] . . . and Bonnard (*Matthieu*, p. 196) hold that it was not Matthew but Luke who has emended the logion we find in 13.17, because Luke no longer understood its Palestinian colour." **Lührmann** 1969, 611: ". . . die Zusammenstellung προφῆται καὶ δίκαιοι findet sich nur bei Mt (Mt 10, 41; 23, 29. 35)." **Schulz** 1972a, 420: Red sind auch die δίκαιοι, da dieser Begriff allgemeiner als βασιλεῖς bei Lk ist und zudem δίκαιος ein mt Vorzugswort ist.[113]" **Schulz** 1972a, 420^{113}: Ca 10mal trad; ca 6mal red; dagegen Mk 2mal; Lk 11mal; für die Ursprünglichkeit der βασιλεῖς treten auch ein: HARNACK Sprüche 22; BUSSMANN Studien II 66; HAUCK Lk 144; SCHMID Mt und Lk 298; STRECKER Weg 197 A 3; vorsichtig: KLOSTERMANN Mt 120; vgl auch Mt 23, 29, wo Mt ebenfalls gegen Q δίκαιοι neben προφῆται schreibt." **F. Schneider** 1973, 177: "Ebenso hat Matthäus βασιλεῖς durch δίκαιοι ersetzt (vgl. Mt 10, 41; 23, 29. 35)." **Schweizer** 1973, 300: "Typically Matthean . . . is the reference to the 'righteous' (Luke 10:24 reads 'kings'). There is no mention of the patriarchs or of Moses, because they mark the beginning of God's history, while prophets and righteous men look ahead to its continuation." **Miyoshi** 1974, 133: "Nach πολλοὶ προφῆται schreibt Lukas βασιλεῖς, im Unterschied zu δίκαιοι bei Mt. Man kann schwer entscheiden, welche Fassung ursprünglicher ist. Zwar ist 'δίκαιοι' matthäisch, denn Mt setzt 'δίκαιοι' mit Propheten parallel, vgl. Mt 10, 41; 23, 29 was erlaubt, die δίκαιοι der matth Redaktion zuzuschreiben." **Marshall** 1978, 439: "Matthew has δικαίοι, which suggests 'those who live by the word of the Lord which the prophets proclaim' (J. A. Ziesler, *The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul*, Cambridge, 1972, 139). But this appears to be a Matthaean simplification (cf. Mt 10:41; 23:29; Manson, *Sayings*, 80)."

Gundry 1982, 258: "Alongside the 'many prophets' Matthew puts 'righteous [men]' instead of Luke's 'kings.' Luke does not show favoritism toward his word, but words with the stem δικ- belong to Matthew's special diction (18–19, 10–9). See the comments on 10:41–42 for the pairing of prophets and righteous men in Matthew and for righteous men as teachers of righteousness, not just those who live righteously." **Schweizer** 1982, ET 183: "Kings are mentioned together with the prophets (Isa. 52:15; 60:3; Matthew: 'righteous')—those in whom God's acts become visible though they received only preliminary revelation." **Fitzmyer** 1985, 867: "Luke has probably retained the original formulation of 'Q' in the phrase 'prophets and kings,' whereas Matthew has changed it to 'prophets and righteous ones' (13:17; cf. Matt 10:41 ['M']; 23:29."

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: A, [βασιλεῖς]²

Matthew is redactional and Luke's βασιλεῖς preserves Q. Matthew frequently uses the pair προφῆται καὶ δίκαιοι, a phrase he apparently created. There is no reason to see βασιλεῖς as a redactional addition of Luke. Further, the contrast with kings continues the social demarcation of Q 10:21–22 (Kloppenborg).

Q 10:24 ³: Choice of verbs.

Luke=Q: [ἠθέλ]³ησαν ἰδεῖν

Pro: **Schmid** 1930, 298³: "Moulton (Exp s. 7 VII 414) hält (gegen Harnack 22) auch ἠθέλησαν bei Lk für ursprünglich gegenüber ἐπεθύμησαν, weil es das schwächere Verbum ist. Ebenso Bussmann II 66."

Reconstructions: **Zeller.**

Con: **B. Weiss** 1876, 342: Luke "... das ἐπεθύμησαν in das einfachere ἠθέλησαν verwandelt)." **Harnack** 1907, ET 26: 'Ηθέλησαν for ἐπεθύμησαν is an obvious stylistic improvement (ἐπιθυμεῖν occurs only once elsewhere in St. Matthew)." **Easton** 1926, 168: "ἠθέλησαν is perhaps better Greek than ἐπεθῡμησαν (H[arnac]k), ..." **Schürmann** 1968, 116: "Da muss es aber auffallen, dass Lukas hier [in 17:22] das ἐπιθυμεῖν stehenlässt, welcher er 10, 24 diff Mt 13, 17 durch θέλειν ersetzt, so dass von Lk 17, 22 her die Mt-Fassung Mt 13, 17 als ursprünglich erwiesen werden kann." **Schürmann** 1968, 222: "30. ἐπιθυμεῖν c. inf. schreibt neben 15, 16; 16, 21; 22, 15 S wohl auch Q' vgl. Mt 13, 17 diff Lk (wohl ursprünglich) und Lk 17, 22 in einem Sondervers diff Mt, der auch der Q-Vorlage zuzurechnen sein wird." **Schulz** 1972a, 420: "Lk dürfte das relativ seltene Verb ἐπιθυμεῖν (so Mt) durch das geläufigere Qelein ersetzt haben.[114]" **Schulz** 1972a, 420[114]: So auch HARNACK Sprüche 22; anders BUSSMANN Studien II 66; Θέλειν bei Lk: Ev ca 26mal trad; ca 1mal red; Apg 14mal." **Dupont** 1973, 48³: "... Luc avait évité ce verbe [ἐπιθυμέω] en 10, 24; il ne veut en user qu'à bon escient." Reconstructions: **Zeller.**

Matt=Q: (ἐπεθύμ)³ησαν ἰδεῖν

Pro: **Bussmann** 1929, 66. **Dupont** 1973, 48³: "Le verbe ἐπιθυμέω est employé 2 fois par Mt (5, 28; 13, 17), ... On admet généralement que Mt 13, 17 a emprunté le verbe à sa source;" Reconstructions: **Luz, Polag, Schenk.**

Con: **Marshall,** 1978, 439: "For θέλω, Matthew has ἐπιθυμέω with no apparent difference in meaning." **Gundry** 1982, 258: "... Matthew exchanges 'they wanted' (ἠθέλησαν) for 'they desired very much' (ἐπεθύμησαν), which in 5:28 has already occurred distinctively in conjunction with seeing. The greater strengh of Matthew's verb enchances the actuality of the disciples' seeing and hearing."

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: C, [[(ἐπεθύμ)]]³ησαν ἰδεῖν

I have no new arguments to add to the ones above, which seem almost evenly balanced to me. **Schürmann's** argument with reference to 17:22 gives a slight edge to ἐπεθύμησαν.

Q 10:24[4]: Luke's pronoun.

Luke=Q: ἃ [ὑμεῖς][4] βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδαν

Pro: **Easton** 1926, 168: ". . . the insertion of the subject pronoun would have been contrary to Lk's usual custom (W[eiss]; noting that the pronoun was impossible in Mt's context)." **Schulz** 1972a, 420: "Das bei Mt fehlende ὑμεῖς, das Lk in V 24a bietet, ist ursprünglich, da Lk sonst gerne das Personalpronomen weglässt, nicht aber hinsufügt.[115]" **Schulz** 1972a, 420[115]: "Vgl Lk 6,27.36; 7,27; 11,20; 12,7; mit Auslassung durch Mt rechnet auch SCHMID Mt und Lk 298 u. A 3." Reconstructions: **Polag, Zeller.**

Con: **Harnack** 1907, ET 25–26: "The emphatic ὑμεῖς is strange in St. Luke, seeing that this evangelist elsewhere is accustomed rather to omit the pleonastic personal pronouns of Q; but in this passage he had omitted the ὑμῶν at the beginning, and the ὑμεῖς is /not pleonastic where he places it." **Cadbury** 1920, 192: "Examples of the apparent insertion of personal pronouns by Luke are the following:" Lk 5,20, 23; 9,50; 10,24; 12,29; 20,3, 41; 22:11. In the case of Lk 10:24, ". . . Luke has omitted a pronoun elsewhere in the sentence . . ., so that the inserted pronouns are here compensations . . . for the omitted words." **Miyoshi** 1974, 133: "Die gleichen Gründe veranlassten Lukas zur Betonung des 'Sehens' durch Einschub eines Personalpronomens ὑμεῖς in v. 24a: ἰδεῖν ἃ ὑμεῖς βλέπετε."

Matt=Q: ἃ [ ][4] βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδαν

Pro: **Schmid** 1930, 298: "Dagegen wird man neben ἃ βλέπετε auch das bei Mt fehlende ὑμεῖς in Lk V 24 für ursprünglich halten dürfen, weil Lk das Personalpronomen sonst gerne weglässt, nicht aber hinzufügt."

Reconstructions: **Zeller.**

Con: **Gundry** 1982, 258: "Matthew reserves ὑμεῖς (so Luke with βλέπετε) for the unique command to hear in the next verse. The omission results in a closer parallel with the following line, where the pronoun does not occur."

Evaluation: MEB 24 v 88: B, [ὑμεῖς][4]

Since Luke rarely inserts emphatic pronouns in his sources, and since Matthew's construction does not allow him to use it, ὑμεῖς was probably in Q.

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The Cross and Discipleship in Q

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To understand discipleship in Q we must come to grips with an important sayings cluster (Q 14:26–27) which contains Q's only reference to the cross. In Matthew the cluster consists of three sayings—two parallel sayings on family relationships (Matt 10:37) and the cross saying (Matt 10:38). Luke has only two sayings—a single long sentence on family relationships (Luke 14:26) followed by the cross saying (Luke 14:27). We find parallels to the sayings in Mark 8:34b and *Gos. Thom.* 55, 101; and, in addition, Matthew and Luke both redact Mark 8:34b (Matt 16:24; Luke 9:23). I will first reconstruct the Q text of the sayings. Then I will briefly compare the Q text with the parallels from Mark and the *Gospel of Thomas* in order to sketch the tradition history of the sayings. Finally I will interpret the Q sayings.

I. The Reconstruction

Matthew and Luke set the sayings on family relationships and the cross in very different contexts. Since these contexts influence the evangelists' redaction of the sayings, we need to take them into account in reconstructing the Q text. Matthew places the sayings in the middle of a small collection of Q sayings (Matt 10:34–39) that falls near the end of the Mission Discourse (Matt 9:36–11:1):

Divisions within Households	Matt 10:34–36	Luke 12:51–53
Relatives and the Cross	Matt 10:37–38	Luke 14:26–27
Finding and Losing Life	Matt 10:39	Luke 17:33

Matthew joins the sayings on Relatives and the Cross asyndetically to the preceding sayings on Divisions within Households. By placing the sayings in the Mission Discourse Matthew has Jesus address them to the disciples (Matt 9:37; 10:5–6). Luke on the other hand has a very different audience in mind. He places the sayings in a section on the Conditions of Discipleship (Luke 14:25–33) which he sets in the Travel Narrative (Luke 9:51–19:44).[1] Luke provides the section with an introduction in v 25: Συνεπορεύοντο δὲ αὐτῷ ὄχλοι πολλοί, καὶ στραφεὶς εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς. This verse is redactional. The expression συμπορεύομαί τινι occurs three times in Luke (7:11; 14:25; 24:15) and nowhere else in the NT.[2] The verb reflects Luke's fondness for πορεύομαι and compounds with συν-.[3]

[1] The exact limits of the Travel Narrative are disputed. The best treatment is A. Denaux, "Het lucaanse reisverhaal (Lc. 9,51–19,44)," *Collationes brugenses et gandavenses* 14 (1968) 214–242; 15 (1969) 464–501; esp. pp. 465–475.

[2] The only other place (Mark 10:1) where the verb occurs uses a different construction. See J. Jeremias, *Die Sprache des Lukasevangeliums* (MeyerK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980) 157.

[3] Statistics on πορεύομαι: Matthew 29; Mark 3; Luke 51; Acts 37. See F. Neirynck

Luke uses the plural ὄχλοι frequently in the Gospel and in Acts.[4] The participle στραφείς is also redactional. Luke uses it seven times whereas it appears only three times in Matthew and nowhere in Mark.[5] The expression εἰπεῖν πρός τινα occurs seventy-two times in Luke and twenty-five times in Acts.[6] So this introductory verse is completely redactional. It sets the stage for the following sayings and designates the crowds as the audience.[7] We can now examine the sayings themselves.

	3 Matt 10:37–38		Luke 14:26–27
		26	εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρός με καὶ οὐ μισεῖ τὸν πατέρα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἔτι τε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ, οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής.
37	ὁ φιλῶν πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπὲρ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἔστιν μου ἄξιος, καὶ ὁ φιλῶν υἱὸν ἢ θυγατέρα ὑπὲρ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἔστιν μου ἄξιος·		
38	καὶ ὃς οὐ λαμβάνει τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ ὀπίσω μου, οὐκ ἔστιν μου ἄξιος.	27	ὅστις οὐ βαστάζει τὸν σταυρὸν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἔρχεται ὀπίσω μου, οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής.

We must first decide whether the original sayings cluster contained two sentences as in Luke or three sentences as in Matthew. We can answer this question fairly easily by examining the main clauses of the sentences. Although Matthew and Luke have different main clauses, each repeats the main clause of the first sentence. Matthew has οὐκ ἔστιν μου ἄξιος in all three sentences, and Luke has οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής in both of his sayings. However, Luke has a third οὐ δύναται εἶναι μου μαθητής in the final saying of the pericope on the Conditions of Discipleship: "Thus, therefore, everyone who does not take leave of all his possessions, cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:33). Like Luke's introductory verse (Luke 14:25), this concluding verse is completely redactional. The

(continued)
and F. Van Segbroeck, *New Testament Vocabulary* (BETL 65; Louvain: Leuven University/ Peeters, 1984) 162. According to Jeremias Luke-Acts contains 40% of the verb compounds with συν- in the NT. See J. Jeremias, *Sprache*, 86–88.

[4] Luke 3:7, 10; 4:42; 5:3, 15; 7:24; 8:42, 45; 9:11, 18; 11:14, 29; 12:54; 14:25; 23:4, 48; Acts 8:6; 13:45; 14:11, 13, 18, 19; 17:13. It also occurs with πολλοί in Luke 5:15. Ὄχλος is redactional in Luke 4:42 (compare Mark 1:37); 5:15 (compare Mark 1:45); 5:29 (compare Mark 2:15); 6:19 (compare Mark 3:10); 9:11 (compare Mark 6:33); 9:18 (compare Mark 8:27). See M. Devisch, *De geschiedenis van de Quelle-hypothese: 1. Van J. G. Eichhorn tot B. H. Streeter; 2. De recente exegese* (2 vols.; Louvain: Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1975) 2. 507.

[5] Luke 7:9, 44; 9:55; 10:23; 14:25; 22:61; 23:28. See J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae: Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem* (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1909) 22, 46.

[6] F. Neirynck and F. Van Segbroeck, "Le texte des Actes des Apôtres et les charactéristiques stylistiques lucaniennes," *ETL* 61 (1985) 304–339, esp. p. 321. See also H. J. Cadbury, *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1920) 202–203.

[7] Compare the setting for Luke's redaction of Mark's cross saying: "But he said to all . . ." (Luke 9:23).

vocabulary betrays Luke's hand. First, the disciple must renounce "all his possessions (πᾶσιν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρχουσιν)." Luke uses both the verb ὑπάρχω and the expression τὰ ὑπάρχοντα so frequently that they form part of his characteristic vocabulary.[8] The pronoun ἑαυτοῦ[9] and the adjective "all"[10] also show Luke's hand. The verb ἀποτάσσομαι appears four times in Luke-Acts and only twice more in the NT.[11] The opening words of the sentence οὕτως οὖν πᾶς ἐξ ὑμῶν ὃς οὐκ are all familiar Lucan expressions,[12] and Luke borrowed the main clause from the Q cluster. Once we see that Luke 14:33 is redactional, we gain a clearer focus on the structure of the Q sayings cluster. Q originally had three sayings as in Matthew. Luke combined the first two sayings in his v 26, thus omitting one of the three main clauses, but he compensated for the omission by constructing a concluding saying that uses the same main clause (Luke 14:33).[13]

When we compare the two sentences in Matt 10:37 with the single sentence in Luke 14:26, we find substantial differences. Matthew begins both sentences with participles whereas Luke begins his single sentence with a long conditional clause. In Matthew Jesus talks about loving relatives more than him, in Luke about hating relatives. Matthew has four objects ("father," "mother," "son," "daughter"). Luke begins his sentence with an expression that has no parallel in Matthew: "If anyone comes to me." He then follows Matthew by mentioning "father" and "mother," but he continues with "wife and children and brothers and sisters, and even his own life." There are differences in detail. Luke has "his" with "father," and the two writers use different connectives between the objects (Matthew: ἤ; Luke: καί). And, of course, the main clauses are completely different. Despite these extensive differences we can reconstruct the original Q text if we pay close attention to Matthew's and Luke's redaction. We also need to explore the connections between the variants. Not all of them are independent. Sometimes a decision on one variant helps resolve other variants.

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[8] Statistics on ὑπάρχω: Matthew 3; Mark 0; Luke 15; Acts 25. Statistics on ὑπάρχοντα: Matthew 3; Mark 0; Luke 8; Acts 1. See J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, 23.

[9] Luke uses ἑαυτοῦ frequently (Matthew 32; Mark 24; Luke 57; Acts 21). He substitutes ἑαυτοῦ for αὐτοῦ in 13:19 (compare Matt 13:31); 13:34 (compare Matt 23:37); and 19:36 (compare Mark 11:8). See J. Schmid, *Matthäus und Lukas: Eine Untersuchung des Verhältnisses ihrer Evangelien* (Biblische Studien 23/2–4; Freiburg im B.: Herder, 1930) 277 n. 3; R. Laufen, *Die Doppelüberlieferungen der Logienquelle und des Markusevangeliums* (BBB 54; Königstein/Bonn: Hanstein, 1980) 303.

[10] Luke insists on total detachment. Compare Luke 5:11, 28; 18:22; 21:4; Acts 2:44. See J. Dupont, "Renoncer à tous ses biens (Luc 14,33)," *NRT* 93 (1971) 561–582, esp. p. 568.

[11] Luke 9:61; 14:33; Acts 18:18, 21 (compare Mark 6:46; 2 Cor 2:13). See F. Neirynck and F. Van Segbroeck, "Le texte des Actes des Apôtres et les charactéristiques stylistiques lucaniennes," 318.

[12] Statistics on οὕτως: Matthew 32; Mark 10; Luke 21; Acts 27. Statistics on οὖν: Matthew 56; Mark 5; Luke 33; Acts 61. For πᾶς ἐξ ὑμῶν compare the Lucan expressions τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν (Luke 11:5, 11; 14:28; 15:4; 17:7); ἄνδρες ἐξ ὑμῶν (Acts 6:3); τινες ἐξ ἡμῶν (Luke 24:22; Acts 15:24); εἷς ἐξ αὐτῶν (Luke 12:6; 15:4; Acts 11:28); εἴ τις ἐξ αὐτῶν (Luke 22:50); τις ἐξ αὐτῶν (Luke 11:15; 22:23; Acts 11:20; 15:2; 17:4); ἄνδρες ἐξ αὐτῶν (Acts 15:22; 23:21); δύο ἐξ αὐτῶν (Luke 24:13); πολλοὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν (Acts 17:12). On πᾶς ὅς compare Luke 12:8, 10, 48; Acts 2:21; and on ὃς οὐκ compare Luke 9:50. See J. Dupont, "Renoncer à tous ses biens," 569.

[13] J. Dupont, "Renoncer à tous ses biens," 569.

We begin with the variant that has the largest ripple effect—the choice between Luke's "does not hate" and Matthew's "loves more than me." Luke clearly preserves the original Q expression which reflects a Semitic background.[14] Matthew softens a harsh saying, switching from a negative to a positive term and referring explicitly to Jesus (ὑπὲρ ἐμέ). Both the softening and the reference to Jesus betray Matthew's expression as secondary.[15]

Matthew's desire to soften the saying crops up again in the main clause. Luke's "cannot be my disciple" is absolute. Luke excludes those who do not hate their relatives from the circle of Jesus' disciples. Matthew does not exclude. Instead he says that those who love their relatives more than Jesus are not worthy of Jesus. Some further considerations confirm this conclusion. Matthew placed the sayings in his Mission Discourse which is addressed to those who are already disciples, so Q's "cannot be my disciple" would not fit this context. Although the hearers are already disciples, they must show themselves "worthy" of Jesus.[16] Furthermore, Matthew uses ἄξιος redactionally in 10:11 and twice in 10:13 (compare also Matt 22:8).[17] Luke, though, is the only gospel writer to use the cognate verb ἀξιόω (Luke 7:7; Acts 15:38; 28:22) and its compound καταξιόω (Luke 20:35; Acts 5:41), and he uses the adjective ἄξιος redactionally in Acts 13:25 (compare Q 3:16). So Matthew uses ἄξιος redactionally, and Luke had no reason to avoid it. We conclude that Luke preserves the Q wording of the main clause.

When we turn to the objects in the dependent clause, we find just the opposite case. Matthew is very close to Q, and Luke has changed the objects to bring them into line with a similar list in Luke 18:29–30 (compare Mark 10:29–30). We can see this most clearly in the case of "wife." Luke introduced "wife" into his Marcan source in 18:29 (compare Mark 10:29), so he probably added it to Q in 14:26. In redacting Mark's Eschatological Discourse Luke shows the same tendency to extend the list of those the Christian is in conflict with, adding "relatives" and "friends" to Mark's "brother" and "parents" (compare Luke 21:16 with Mark 13:12). In this way Luke accentuates the separation of the disciples from their own.[18] Luke 18:29–30 and the Marcan parallel (Mark 10:29–30) also provided the source for the objects τέκνα, ἀδελφούς, and ἀδελφάς. For ἔτι τὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ Luke drew on two other passages in his gospel, Luke 9:24 (compare Mark 8:35) and Luke 17:33 (compare Matt 10:39).[19] So Q originally contained four objects—"father," "mother," "son," "daughter"—spread over two sentences as in Matthew.

So far we have seen that Luke's "does not hate" and his main clause reflect Q. Matthew on the other hand preserves the Q objects. We turn now to more difficult problems, the

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[14] For the background of this "hate" see Gen 29:31–33; Deut 21:15–17; Ps 139:21–22; 1QS 1:10; 9:21; Josephus, *J. W.* 2.8.7 §139. See K. Stendahl, "Hate, Non-Retaliation, and Love: 1QS x, 17–20 and Rom. 12:10–21," *HTR* 55 (1962) 343–355; J. A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel according to Luke* (2 vols.; AB 28 & 28A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981, 1985) 2.1063.

[15] R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (New York/Evanston: Harper & Row, 1963) 160.

[16] A. H. McNeile, *The Gospel according to St. Matthew* (London: Macmillan, 1915) 148; S. Schulz, *Q: Die Spruchquelle der Evangelisten* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972) 447; R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 303–304.

[17] R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 303–304.

[18] J. Dupont, "Renoncer à tous ses biens," 564.

[19] The phrase contains some Lucan stylistic characteristics like τε and ἑαυτοῦ. Luke uses τε 9 times in the Gospel and 151 times in Acts. On ἑαυτοῦ see n. 9 above.

form of the sentences, the connectives between the objects, the use or omission of the article with the objects, the pronoun "his" with "father," and the connective between the sentences.

Dupont claims that Luke's εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρός με goes back to Q and that Matthew omitted it because it did not fit in the Mission Discourse where he placed the sayings.[20] Polag also includes the clause in his reconstruction.[21] But Schulz points out that Luke introduced a similar expression (ἐρχόμενος πρός με) in another Q passage (Luke 6:47; compare Matt 7:24).[22] Luke also has in mind the conditional form of Mark's cross saying (Mark 8:34) which he redacts in 9:23 (εἴ τις θέλει ὀπίσω μου ἔρχεσθαι). The conditional clause fits the context Luke created for the saying. The crowds make up Jesus' audience in Luke (Luke 14:25); and, since the crowds are not disciples, Luke begins with the conditional, "If anyone comes to me . . .," that is, to become my disciple. He then goes on to list the demands the disciple must fulfill. But if Luke's conditional is not original, what about Matthew's participles?

It is tempting to accept Matthew's participial construction and reconstruct the beginning of the sentences with ὁ μὴ μισῶν. We need to be cautious, though, and examine Matthew's redaction before accepting his construction. Matthew likes substantival participles. One of his characteristic expressions, τὸ ῥηθέν, uses the construction;[23] and it appears in passages where we suspect Matthean redaction. For example, we find the construction three times in the first three antitheses (Matt 5:22, 28, 32). Although the divorce saying (Matt 5:32) comes from Q (compare Luke 16:18), the first two substantival participles (Matt 5:22, 28) are probably redactional. Coming closer to home, Matthew uses the construction lavishly in the immediate context of the passage we are reconstructing. He imposes a stylistic unity on the end of the Mission Discourse by stringing together eight substantival participles:

ὁ φιλῶν πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπὲρ ἐμέ . . . (Matt 10:37a)
ὁ φιλῶν υἱὸν ἢ θυγατέρα ὑπὲρ ἐμέ . . . (Matt 10:37b)
ὁ εὑρὼν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ . . . (Matt 10:39a)
ὁ ἀπολέσας τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ . . . (Matt 10:39b)
ὁ δεχόμενος ὑμᾶς . . . (Matt 10:40a)
ὁ ἐμὲ δεχόμενος . . . (Matt 10:40b)
ὁ δεχόμενος προφήτην εἰς ὄνομα προφήτου . . . (Matt 10:41a)
ὁ δεχόμενος δίκαιον εἰς ὄνομα δικαίου . . . (Matt 10:41b)

The two participles in v 41 are almost certainly redactional. Those in v 40 come from Q (compare Luke 10:16), but Matthew probably introduced the two in v 39. Both the Lucan form of this Q saying (Luke 17:33) and the Marcan overlap (Mark 8:35) have relative clauses instead of participles. Since four of the last six participles come from Matthew, he probably introduced the participles in v 37. But if neither Luke's conditional clause nor Matthew's participles come from Q, where do we go to find the original Q

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[20] J. Dupont, "Renoncer à tous ses biens," 563.

[21] A. Polag, *Fragmenta Q: Textheft zur Logienquelle* (2d ed.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1982) 70.

[22] S. Schulz, *Q*, 447.

[23] Matt 1:22; 2:15, 17, 23; 4:14; 8:17; 12:17; 13:35; 21:4; 22:31; 24:15; 27:9. Compare ὁ ῥηθείς (Matt 3:3). See J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, 7, 33.

construction? We saw above that Luke drops one of Q's three main clauses, but he compensates for the omission by constructing a concluding verse (Luke 14:33) that uses the clause. Luke 14:33 probably also preserves the original Q sentence structure. If we look past the expressions that connect this verse to the preceding parables (οὕτως οὖν πᾶς ἐξ ὑμῶν), we can see the original Q sentence structure shining through: ὅς + οὐ(κ) + present indicative + object with article and possessive pronoun.[24] If we reconstruct the first two Q sentences with relative clauses, this would bring them in line with the cross saying which begins with a relative clause. Although we must beware of introducing too much regularity into Q reconstructions, the strong end repetition of the three sayings invites us to explore the possibility that initial repetition balanced the end repetition. We can also make sense of Matthew's redaction. He switches from Q's relative clauses to begin his string of substantival participles that hold the end of the Mission Discourse together. He makes a similar redactional move from a relative clause to a participle in 10:4 (compare Mark 3:19) and in 13:9 (compare Mark 4:9), and we've seen that he probably replaces two more relative clauses with participles in 10:39 (compare Luke 17:33 and Mark 8:35). So the first two Q sentences began with ὃς οὐ μισεῖ.

We can now quickly resolve the remaining variants. Besides switching from a negative to a positive expression and changing the relative clauses to participles, Matthew also streamlines the sentences. He drops the article with the objects and omits the pronoun "his" after "father." Luke's ἑαυτοῦ replaces an original αὐτοῦ,[25] and the articles in Luke come from Q. The original Q expression τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ corresponds to the object of the cross saying τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ (Matt 10:38). Q probably also had an αὐτοῦ after υἱόν in the second sentence. Matthew changed the connectives between the objects from καί to ἤ. The particle ἤ is Matthean;[26] and it doesn't fit the Q verb "hate," for it would then be sufficient to hate either father or mother. Finally, Matthew's "and" joining the two sentences is redactional. The first sentence does not begin with a connective, and we will see that the cross saying does not have a connective. The three sentences followed one another asyndetically in Q.

Matthew and Luke agree more closely in the cross saying, so the Q reconstruction presents fewer difficulties. Since we have already seen that Luke preserves the Q main clause, we need only investigate the relative clause. Matthew's initial "and" is redactional. Luke in general avoids asyndeton, so the lack of connection in his text reflects Q. Jeremias collected and summarized the relevant data. First, Luke systematically eliminates Marcan asyndeta. Asyndeton occurs forty times in texts Luke takes over from Mark, and Luke supplies a connective thirty-six times. The four exceptions are allowed to stand for emphasis.[27] When Luke introduces asyndeton either into Marcan material or in Acts, he always does it for emphasis.[28] Because Luke tends to avoid asyndeton, the relative frequency of

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[24] In Luke 14:33 the object is in the dative because of the compound verb.

[25] See n. 9 above.

[26] Statistics: Matthew 68; Mark 33; Luke 45; Acts 35. See J. Lambrecht, *Marcus Interpretator: Stijl en boodschap in Mc. 3,20–4,34* (Brugge/Utrecht: Desclée de Brouwer, 1969) 27 n. 22.

[27] Mark 1:41//Luke 5:13; Mark 2:9//Luke 5:23; Mark 2:17// Luke 5:32; Mark 12:9b//Luke 20:16.

[28] Luke 21:13, 19, 23; Acts 3:25, 26; 7:44, 52; 8:21; 10:3b, 37; 20:29, 33, 34, 35; 25:10b; 26:8.

asyndeton in the non-Marcan material (55 times) must come from Luke's sources. Furthermore, Matthew frequently agrees with Luke in not having a connective in sayings material.[29] So Q joined the cross saying to the sayings on family relationships without any conjunction.

Luke substituted ὅστις for Q's ὅς to highlight the saying's generalizing character. Matthew uses the form ὅστις very frequently, so he would not have changed it if he had read it in Q.[30] Matthew's λαμβάνει, rather than Luke's βαστάζει, is the first Q verb in the relative clause. The phrase λαμβάνειν τὸν σταυρόν appears only here in the NT and does not occur in profane Greek; the usual expression is βαστάζειν τὸν σταυρόν,[31] Luke apparently grecized the Q expression which Matthew preserved.[32] Furthermore, Matthew introduced βαστάζειν into the Q account of John's Preaching (Matt 3:11).[33] If he used it redactionally, he would not likely change it if it lay before him in a Q text. In the relative clause Luke once more substituted ἑαυτοῦ for αὐτοῦ.[34] Matthew's ἀκολουθεῖ ὀπίσω μου is a Septuagintism (compare 3 Kgdms 19:20; Isa 45:14; Ezek 29:16; Hos 2:7). The redundant expression offended Luke's sense of style, so he grecized with ἔρχεται ὀπίσω μου. Matthew undoubtedly preserves the Q expression. We can confirm this by comparing Matthew's and Luke's redaction of the Marcan overlap (Mark 8:34). Unfortunately, there is a textual problem in Mark's text. There are two main readings:

1) ὀπίσω μου ἀκολουθεῖν P^{45} C* D W Θ 0214 f^{1} *pm*
2) ὀπίσω μου ἐλθεῖν ℵ A B C^{2} K L Γ f^{13} 33 892 1241 *al*

N-A[25] accepts Reading 2, but N-A[26] switches to Reading 1. Reading 1 is clearly the more difficult reading, and it explains Reading 2. Scribes were reluctant to copy a redundant expression, and they grecized by altering the infinitive. If we accept Reading 1 with N-A[26], then Matthew's and Luke's redaction of Mark 8:34 confirms our Q reconstruction. Both

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[29] See, for example, Matt 12:35//Luke 6:45; Matt 11:27//Luke 10:22; Matt 12:30//Luke 11:23; Matt 12:41//Luke 11:32; Matt 6:22//Luke 11:34; Matt 10:34//Luke 12:51; Matt 6:24//Luke 16:13; Matt 10:39//Luke 17:33. See J. Jeremias, *Sprache*, 60–61; J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, 137–138; H. J. Cadbury, *Style*, 147–148.

[30] See Matt 2:6; 5:39, 41; 7:24 *bis*, 26; 10:32, 33; 12:50; 13:12 *bis*, 52; 18:4; 19:29; 20:1; 21:33; 22:2; 23:12 *bis*. Matthew introduces it redactionally into Mark in 12:50 (compare Mark 3:35), 19:29 (compare Mark 10:29), 21:33 (compare Mark 12:1), and twice in 13:12 (compare Mark 4:25). In the NT there is no distinction between ὅς and ὅστις except in cases like the present where the pronoun ὅστις occurs without an antecedent in the sense of "whoever." See H. J. Cadbury, "The Relative Pronouns in Acts and Elsewhere," *JBL* 42 (1923) 150–157, esp. p. 152; V. Spottorno, "The Relative Pronoun in the New Testament," *NTS* 28 (1982) 132–141.

[31] Compare John 19:17. See E. Dinkler, "Jesu Wort vom Kreuztragen," *Neutestamentlichen Studien für Rudolf Bultmann zu seinem siebsigsten Geburtstag am 20. August 1954* (BZNW 21; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1954) 110–129, esp. p. 112 n. 6.

[32] Luke uses βαστάζω relatively frequently, five times in the Gospel and four times in Acts. See R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 303.

[33] See H. Fleddermann, "John and the Coming One (Matt 3:11–12//Luke 3:16–17)," *Society of Biblical Literature 1984 Seminar Papers* (ed. H. K. Richards; SBLSPS 23; Chico: Scholars Press, 1984) 377–384, esp. p. 379.

[34] See n. 9 above.

Matthew and Luke eliminate the redundant ἀκολουθεῖν in editing Mark (Matt 16:24; Luke 9:23).[35]

We can now draw these discussions to a close by printing the reconstructed Greek text:

Q 14:26–27

26 ὅς οὐ μισεῖ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα
οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής·
ὅς οὐ μισεῖ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα
οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής·
27 ὅς οὐ λαμβάνει τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ
καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ ὀπίσω μου
οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής.

II. Tradition History and Interpretation

Before presenting an interpretation of the Q sayings, I will discuss briefly the tradition history of the sayings. Mark has a form of the cross saying (Mark 8:34b) which both Matthew and Luke take over (Matt 16:24; Luke 9:23), and the *Gospel of Thomas* has two sayings that parallel the Q cluster (*Gos. Thom. 55*, 101). First the Marcan overlap:

Q 14:27	Mark 8:34b
	εἴ τις θέλει ὀπίσω μου ἀκολουθεῖν,
	ἀπαρνησάσθω ἑαυτὸν
ὅς οὐ λαμβάνει	καὶ ἀράτω
τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ	τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ
καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ ὀπίσω μου	καὶ ἀκολουθείτω μοι.
οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής.	

The Q saying consists of a relative clause which contains two conditions of discipleship, taking up the cross and following Jesus, followed by a main clause. Both the relative clause and the main clause are negative. Mark's saying has a conditional clause followed by three imperatives, all positive. Pesch and Laufen maintain that Mark's form is primary,[36] but three considerations show that the Q saying is original. First, the Marcan saying repeats the concept of following. It appears both in the conditional clause ("If anyone wishes to follow me") and as the final imperative ("and follow me"). This repetition is a sign of redactional reworking. The Q saying is simpler and more straightforward. Second, Mark's "let him deny himself" appears to be an interpretative addition. It spells out in a spiritualizing way what the Q saying implies but does not state. Third, the negative Q statement is uncompromising; Mark's positive imperatives are milder. Although the imperatives do not water down the absolute demands of the saying, the positive formulation tries to engage the reader and win assent, whereas the negative form of the Q saying makes no concession

[35] Although Laufen is aware that Matthew's expression is a Septuagintism, he nonetheless prefers Luke's expression. See R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 303.

[36] R. Pesch, *Das Markusevangelium* (HTKNT 2; Freiburg/Basel/Vienna: Herder, 1976, 1977) 2.61; R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 304–308.

to human weakness. It is easier to imagine a stern, uncompromising negative statement being turned into an imperative than to imagine the opposite development. So the Marcan form of the saying is secondary to the Q form.[37]

Two sayings in the *Gospel of Thomas* parallel the Q sayings cluster. In *Gos. Thom. 55* we read, "Jesus said, 'Whoever does not hate father and mother cannot be a disciple to me, and whoever does not hate brothers and sisters, and bear the cross as I do, will not be worthy of me.' "[38] The saying echoes Luke in the expressions "does not hate," "brothers and sisters," and "cannot be a disciple to me." It reflects Matthew in the phrase "will not be worthy of me." Since "worthy" is a Matthean redactional addition to the Q text, its presence in *Gos. Thom. 55* shows that the saying depends on Matthew's gospel. Since "brothers and sisters" is a Lucan redactional addition to the Q sayings, *Gos. Thom. 55* also depends on Luke's gospel. Another parallel occurs in *Gos. Thom.* 101: "[Jesus said] Whoever does not hate [father] and mother as I do cannot be my [disciple], and whoever does [not] love [father and] mother as I do cannot be my]disciple]. For my mother [. . .], but my true [mother] gave me life." The first part of the saying closely approximates the first part of *Gos. Thom. 55*, and like *Gos. Thom. 55* it echoes Luke in the expressions "does not hate" and "cannot be my disciple." But "love" in the saying reflects Matthew. Since Matthew's "love" is a redactional alteration of Q, *Gos. Thom.* 101 also depends on Matthew's gospel.

The Marcan saying and the two *Gospel of Thomas* sayings deserve fuller treatment, but such an investigation would carry us beyond the limits of the present study which centers on the Q sayings. We can, though, now sketch the tradition history of the sayings. The tradition history begins with the Q cluster. This is Phase 1. The Q cluster is the earliest recoverable form of the sayings. There is no evidence that the sayings ever existed independently of one another. On the contrary, extensive repetition welds the sayings so closely together that they form an original unity. Mark 8:34b represents Phase 2 in the development of the sayings. It attempts to tone down the radical Q cross saying by switching to a positive formulation. In Phase 3 Matthew and Luke took up and redacted both the Q cluster (Matt 10:37–38; Luke 14:26–27) and Mark's cross saying (Matt 16:24; Luke 9:23). The *Gospel of Thomas* forms Phase 4. *Gos. Thom. 55*, 101 depend on the redactional work of the later evangelists.

We turn now to the interpretation. The sayings cluster consists of three sayings on the conditions of discipleship strongly linked to each other by repetition:

Q 14:26–27

26 Whoever does not hate his father and mother cannot be my disciple;
whoever does not hate his son and daughter cannot be my disciple;
27 whoever does not take up his cross and follow after me cannot be my disciple.

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[37] See further J. Lambrecht, "Q-Influence on Mark 8,34–9,1," in *Logia: Les paroles de Jésus–The Sayings of Jesus: Mémorial Joseph Coppens* (ed. J. Delobel; BETL 59; Louvain: Peeters/Leuven University, 1982) 277–304, esp. pp. 278–282.

[38] The English translations of the *Gospel of Thomas* sayings are by Marvin W. Meyer in John S. Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical Notes, and Concordance* (Foundations & Facets Reference Series; Sonoma: Polebridge, 1988).

We notice immediately the threefold end repetition (οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής). End repetition, technically called epiphora or epistrophe, occurs often in biblical and Hellenistic rhetoric.[39] The sentences also have strong initial repetition. All three sentences begin with ὃς οὐ . . . τὸν . . . αὐτοῦ καὶ . . . , and the first two have an even more extensive pattern: ὃς οὐ μισεῖ τὸν . . . αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν . . . Initial repetition, technically called anaphora or epanaphora, is also common in biblical and Hellenistic writings.[40] The combination of initial and end repetition, called symploche, is rare.[41] By exploiting both kinds of repetition the author of the cluster crafted a rhetorical gem.

The author also carefully arranged the sayings. The first two belong together, and the cluster climaxes in the cross saying. The first two, however, do not just lead up to the cross saying. They bring to an end a series of Q statements that deal with the disciples' relationships with their families. In the second half of the Demands of Discipleship (Q 9:57–60) a disciple asks leave to bury his dead father. Jesus responds by telling the disciple to follow him and leave the dead to bury the dead. In the ancient world men and women had the solemn obligation to bury the dead. This obligation plays a central role in works as diverse as the Book of Tobit and Sophocles' *Antigone*. By instructing a disciple to abandon a dead father, Jesus shows that discipleship must override every human obligation, even the most sacred, and every human bond, even the closest. The Enigma of Jesus' Mission (Q 12:51–53) picks up this theme and introduces an element of hostility. Now Jesus' coming divides families into hostile camps. The sayings in Q 14:26 carry this hostility to an extreme. To belong to Jesus means the disciple must hate parents and children. Small wonder that Matthew could not stomach this! He radically altered the sayings by removing the offensive "hate."

Scholars have lavished considerable attention on the cross saying, but most interpretations wrench the saying out of its context in Q and probe it for its meaning in Jesus' ministry.[42] Erich Dinkler and Martin Hengel are typical. Dinkler claims that the saying refers to a cultic signing with a *tau* or X which he traces back to Ezek 9:4–6. The sign distinguishes the believer from the apostate.[43] Hengel believes that the synoptic cross

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[39] 1 Cor 7:12–13; 9:19–22; 12:4–6; 2 Cor 11:22, 27; Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.29.10; 2.19.24; 3.22.105; 4.1.102, 9.9. See R. N. Soulen, *Handbook of Biblical Criticism* (2d ed.; Atlanta: John Knox, 1981) 62; N. Turner, *Handbook for Biblical Studies* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982) 68.

[40] Psalms 13; 29; 1 Cor 3:9; 10:21, 23; 2 Cor 7:2, 4; Gal 3:28; 4:4–5; 5:26; Phil 2:1; 3:6; 4:12; Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.4.14, 5.7. For Q examples see Q 6:20–23; 7:33–34; 11:39b–44, 46–52. See R. N. Soulen, *Handbook of Biblical Criticism,* 18; N. Turner, *Handbook for Biblical Studies,* 42.

[41] Psalm 67; Mic 5:9, 12. See R. N. Soulen, *Handbook of Biblical Criticism,* 186; W. G. E. Watson, *Classical Hebrew Poetry: A Guide to its Techniques* (JSNTSup 26; Sheffield: JSOT, 1984) 277.

[42] For summaries of interpretations see D. R. Fletcher, "Condemned to Die: The Logion on Cross-Bearing: What Does It Mean?," *Int* 18 (1964) 156–164; J. G. Griffiths, "The Disciple's Cross," *NTS* 16 (1969–1970) 358–364; R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen,* 308–314; J. S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections* (Studies in Antiquity and Christianity; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 231–232.

[43] E. Dinkler, "Jesu Wort vom Kreuztragen," 110–129.

sayings were originally Zealot formulas that Jesus took up.[44] Neither interpretation is plausible. Laufen points out against Dinkler that nothing in the tradition indicates cultic practices were important to Jesus,[45] and John Kloppenborg notes that Hengel can't point to a single Zealot saying to support his interpretation.[46] The interpretations of Dinkler and Hengel dramatize the difficulties that come from ripping a saying from its primary literary context and trying to interpret it. The cross saying fits smoothly in series of Q passages that link Jesus' life and death with the disciple's life and death. In the Demands of Discipleship (Q 9:57–60) the disciple is to have no home because Jesus has no home. Like Jesus the disciple faces opposition, persecution, and the threat of death (Q 6:22–23, 27–28, 29–30; 10:10–12; 11:47–51; 12:4, 11–12; 13:34–35). Q doesn't just describe the disciple's existence and Jesus' existence in identical terms. The author formulates the general principle: "The disciple is not above the teacher . . . it is sufficient for the disciple that he become like his teacher" (Q 6:40). This likeness extends to the cross.

The section on Discipleship and the Cross (Q 14:26–27) forms the climax of Q's teaching on discipleship. The disciple must break radically with this world, even to the point of hating parents and children. This radical break serves a radical clinging to Jesus, even to the point of embracing his death on the cross.

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[44] M. Hengel, *Die Zeloten* (Leiden: Brill, 1961) 265–266.

[45] R. Laufen, *Doppelüberlieferungen*, 310–312.

[46] J. S. Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 231.

Q Bibliography: 1981-1988

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Introduction

This is a tentative, working bibliography (now over 240 items) which is being produced in conjunction with the Society of Biblical Literature's Seminar on Q. The intention is to update this constantly, printing an annual report each summer. This edition has about 60 more items than the last bibliography published in the *SBL 1986 Seminar Papers.*

The starting date of 1981 has been determined by the coverage of F. Neirynck and F. Van Segbroeck, "Q Bibliography," *Logia/Les paroles de Jésus –The Sayings of Jesus: Mémorial Joseph Coppens* (ed. J. Delobel; BETL 59; Leuven: Peeters/Leuven: University Press, 1982) 561–86. This bibliography covers items through 1980 with a few from 1981 and 1982. These 1981 and 1982 entries are repeated here.

Items on Q published 1980 and earlier but not included in the Neirynck-Van Segbroeck bibliography are included here. These are indicated by the *siglum* +[26 such items].

Hopefully, a ten year bibliography for 1981–1990 can be published in 1991. Perhaps this project will be expanded to include the data prior to 1981, thus producing a "complete" bibliography of Q through 1990.

Beginning with the "Elenchus Bibliographicus" in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis* 59 (1983) F. Neirynck has included a section entitled "Quelle." Virtually all of the items included in this section (except for a very few which do not focus on Q) are also included here (sometimes with corrections). This edition of the Q Bibliography includes data from *ETbL* 59 (1983)–62 (1986). Further, *NTA* has been utilized through 32:1.

This Q Bibliography includes items (books and reviews; articles; dissertations) which focus particularly on Q. Items which discuss gospel and synoptic studies generally are not included even though Q may be discussed (specific chapters on Q within books are included, if identified). Items on specific pericopes which come from/constitute Q material are not included unless the title indicates that the focus of the study is explicitly Q-related. Items which deal with sayings traditions in Nag Hammadi texts are listed only in my Nag Hammadi bibliographies unless they are related specifically to Q studies.

I am aware of several items on Q not included here; I have not yet been able to locate and check them personally. They should appear in the 1989 bibliography.

I have received help from James Robinson and John Kloppenborg, which is much appreciated. Other help is invited; additions and corrections should be sent to me.

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[For reviews of books published earlier than 1981, the author, brief title and publication date of the book are indicated in square brackets before the reviews are listed.]

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Matthew: Sermon and Story

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Die Zweideutigkeit des Geistes scheint ein Problem jeder charismatischen Bewegung vor allem in der zweiten und in späteren Generationen zu sein. Das macht die konkrete Bestimmung unserer Falschpropheten schwierig. Entsprechend vielfältig ist die Palette der Vorschläge: Zeloten, Pharisäer, Essener, strenge Judenchristen, Pauliner. Am meisten Zustimmung findet heute der Vorschlag von G. Barth, in den Falschpropheten hellenistische Antinomisten zu sehen. Der text gibt keine genaueren Informationen. U. Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus*. I. Teilband. EKK (Zurich: Benziger Verlag und Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1985) 402–403.

"To read is to play the role of a reader and to interpret is to posit an experience of reading." J. Culler, *On Deconstruction* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1982) 67.

Introduction

This essay is an exercise in reader-response criticism. It has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that the Sermon on the Mount plays an integral role in the Gospel as narrative—to show several inseparable connections between sermon and story.[1] The second is to raise the question of what criteria our group—our interpretive community—uses to measure the adequacy of various readings of the Gospel and the set of values and interests those criteria embody.[2]

Many interpreters have drawn attention to connections between the Sermon on the Mount (SM) and the rest of the Gospel. The use of key words and themes has been traced. Some have pointed out that the Sermon (5–7) and the miracle chapters (8–9) are

[1] In an essay discussed last year Edgar Krentz noted that narrative analysis must take the lengthy Matthean discourses seriously ("Community and Character" in *SBL 1987 Seminar Papers* [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987] 567 and n. 17). He praised Dick Edwards (*Matthew's Story of Jesus* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985]) for doing so and criticised (unfairly, I think) Jack D. Kingsbury (*Matthew as Story* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986]) for not doing so. The fact that narrative criticism of the gospels arose primarily in conjunction with Mark perhaps explains why the role of discourses has not been emphasized more frequently.

[2] After all, as Robert Scholes ("Deconstruction and Communication," *Critical Inquiry* 14 [1988] 294) points out, even Derrida holds that there are "protocols of reading." Many of the concerns I have are illuminated by Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza's SBL presidential address, "The Ethics of Interpretation: De-centering Biblical Scholarship," *JBL* 107 (1988) 3–17, Werner Kelber's presentation at last year's annual meeting, "Gospel Narrative and Critical Theory," and Rudolf Bultmann's classic, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?" in *Existence and Faith* (New York: World, 1961) 287–296.

the meat in the sandwich formed by two summary passages concerning Jesus' teaching, preaching and healing (4:23–25=9:35).[3] They offer a scenic depiction of the activities described in the summaries. Other interpreters have noted the similarities between the warnings against unspecified hypocrities in 6:1–18 and the condemnations of the scribes and Pharisees in Chapter 23.[4] I will show how two passages, 5:31–32 and 7:15–20, contribute to the development of character and plot as the Gospel unfolds. I will focus on the part these passages play in the temporal process of reading the narrative. Thus, my essay involves in a certain sense a re-telling of the Gospel.[5] It also follows the convention of treating the Gospel as a coherent whole.[6]

In order to facilitate discussion, I will limit my use of literary jargon. I will bracket the complex issues of defining plot and character, simply assuming standard English dictionary conceptions.[7] However, given the concerns and content of this essay, the question, "Who is the 'reader' "? must be answered. Recent theoretical discussion has multiplied "readers" beyond number.[8] Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan has noted that the list yields two extremes:

> At one extreme the concept is of a real reader, whether a specific individual or the collective readership of a period. At the other, it is a theoretical construct implied or encoded in the text, representing the integration of data and the interpretive process 'invited' by the text.[9]

When I speak of the reader I want to allude to both extremes because I want to hold in tension the role the text plays and the role real readers play in creating meaning as individuals and as possessors of shared conventions and codes. I wish to privilege neither text nor reader.[10] It is for this reason that I am partial to Wolfgang Iser's definition of

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[3] H. J. Held, "Matthew as Interpreter of the Miracle Stories," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963) 249f. J. D. Kingsbury, "The 'Miracle Chapters' of Matthew 8–9," *CBQ* 40 (1978) 566ff. William G. Thompson, "Reflections on the Composition of Matthew 8:1–9:34," *CBQ* 33 (1971) 366ff.

[4] For example, W. D. Davies, *The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1966) 291–292, who asks us to compare 7:15–21 with 23:2–3; 7:1ff. and 23:4, 5:14–16 and 23:16; 6:16–18 and 23:25–28; 5:12 and 23:34–36.

[5] This procedure should be familiar from Edwards, especially pp. 9–10.

[6] For a discussion of this convention, see Stephen D. Moore, "Are the Gospels Unified Narratives," *SBL 1987 Seminar Papers*, 443–458 and the response by Mary Ann Tolbert (Private Circulation).

[7] As in M. H. Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms*, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1981).

[8] For helpful surveys of reader-response criticism see Jane P. Tompkins, "An Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism," in *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1980) ix–xxvi; and Robert M. Fowler, "Who is the Reader in Reader Response Criticism?" *Semeia* 31 (1985) 5–26.

[9] *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics* (London and New York: Methuen, 1983) 119. For Rimmon-Kenan the implied reader is an intratextual concept, an it, not a he or she.

[10] Feminist criticism helps to illumine many hermeneutic issues. If one simply thinks of a woman reading a patriarchal text—of the double movement of identifying with and resisting—one can see both the power of the text and the power of the reader and a third power—literary, social and political codes and conventions. See Judith Fetterly, *The Resisting Reader* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978); Annette Kolodny, "A Map

the implied reader as a concept which "incorporated both the prestructuring of the potential meaning by the text, and the reader's actualization of this potential through the reading process."[11] His definition focuses on the interplay between internal structures and the standing point outside. It leaves room for the roles of text, reader, and context (including interpretive communities) in reading.[12]

Finally, although strong verbal repetition links both passages to other portions of the Gospel, I am not concerned here so much with saying something about repetition, *per se*, as with saying something about the reading process and interpretation. My treatment of the passages assumes the important functions of verbal repetition as it engages the memory, reduces noise in the communication channel, creates expectations, increases predictability, persuades and reduces alternative interpretations. It also assumes the importance of variation (including the creation of contrasts and the creation of uncertainty requiring decision) and narrative context (including the building of associations and drawing of similarities and contrasts) in conjunction with repetition.[13]

5:31–32

In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus offers an authoritative legal interpretation to the disciples and crowds forbidding divorce except on the grounds of unchastity. Later, as Jesus

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for Reading: On Gender and the Interpretation of Literary Texts," *NLH* 11 (1980) 451–67; *Gender and Reading*, ed. E. A. Flynn and P. P. Schweickart (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986); J. Culler, *On Deconstruction* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) 43–64; Wayne C. Booth, "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the Challenge of Feminist Criticism," *Critical Inquiry* 9 (1982) 45–76; and in gospel criticism, Jane Schaberg, *The Illegitimacy of Jesus* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987) 14–19 and my "Matthew: Gender and Reading," *Semeia* 28 (1983) 3–27.

[11] *The Implied Reader* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974; German orig. 1972) xii.

[12] Some will consider me retrograde and overly text-oriented for choosing Iser. Also, distinctions could be multiplied. For example, we could also distinguish the narratee and/or the encoded reader/narratee—all as intratextual functions. See Kingsbury, *Story*, 36–38, relying on Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1978) and Norman R. Petersen, "The Reader in the Gospel," *Neotestamentica* 18 (1984) 39–43, influenced by Peter J. Rabinowitz's distinction between actual audience, authorial audience (the intratextual hypothetical audience the author has in mind when he or she writes), narrative audience (the intratextual narratee who naively accepts the narrator's tale), and the ideal narrative audience ("Truth in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences," *Critical Inquiry* 4 (1977) 121–41 and " 'What's Hecuba to Us?': The Audience's Experience of Literary Borrowing," in *The Reader in the Text*, ed. S. Rubin Suleiman and I. Crosman (Princeton: Princeton University, 1980) 241–263. In Matthew, since the narratee is not highly characterized, the distinction between the narratee and implied reader is blurred.

[13] For a discussion of verbal repetition in Matthew, see J. Capel Anderson, "Double and Triple Stories, the Implied Reader and Redundancy in Matthew," *Semeia* 31 (1985) 71–90; and Fred W. Burnett, "Prolegomenon to Reading Matthew's Eschatological Discourse: Redundancy and the Education of the Reader in Matthew," *Semeia* 31 (1985) 91–110 and my dissertation "Over and Over and Over Again: Studies in Matthean Repetition," University of Chicago, March 1985.

enters Judea on his way to Jerusalem and the passion, the Jewish leaders question him about divorce. The questioning occurs in the context of a series of controversies (19:3–9; 21:15–16, 23–46; 22:1–45) and passion predictions (20:17–19, 28) that leads up to the harsh condemnations of the Jewish leaders in chapter 23. Jesus' authoritative interpretation in the Sermon on the Mount prepares the reader to view the Jewish leaders and their actions in a negative light in the later context. This contributes to the building tensions between Jesus and the Jewish leaders which lead to the passion. Below I will trace the reading process involved in more detail.

The implied reader finds 5:31–32 in a series of antitheses which contrast Jesus' stricter interpretation of the law with what was said by the men of old.[14] The effect of the antitheses is to establish Jesus as the authoritative interpreter of the law. In 5:31–32 he recalls the requirement of a bill of divorce, an allusion to Deut 24:1–4.[15] In contrast, he forbids divorce, except on the grounds of unchastity (πορνείας). This authoritative teaching sets the stage for what is to come in 19:3–9.

The implied reader comes to 19:3–9 fresh from the community discourse and a summary passage indicating Jesus' entry into Judea beyond the Jordan. The reader knows the significance of this geographical shift from 16:21; 17:9–13 and 17:22–23. Jesus is moving closer to Jerusalem and the passion. The Pharisees approach Jesus, tempting him with a legal question about the grounds for divorce. The implied reader already knows from 5:31–32 that there is only one proper ground for divorce. The reader has knowledge superior to that of the temptors. Jesus cites Gen 1:27 and 2:24 as evidence that God does not will divorce. Here the reader is given new information—the basis for Jesus' injunction in 5:31–32. The Jewish leaders refer to Moses' command to give a bill of divorce and to dismiss, i.e., what was said (5:31=19:7), what has already been rejected. Jesus responds that Moses allowed this because of their hardness of heart, "but from the beginning it was not so." What the Pharisees view as God's will was only a concession to hardheartedness. Jesus then repeats the authoritative interpretation of 5:32 with slight variation (15:32=19:9; 12 words in common).[16] Jesus confirms his earlier teaching in a new context. In the process the implied reader judges the Jewish leaders negatively.

The negative characterization of the Jewish leaders is accomplished not only by the implied reader's prior knowledge of Jesus' authoritative interpretation of the law, but also by (1) the narrator's characterization of them as "tempting him" (πειράζοντες αὐτόν), and (2) by the arrangement of subsequent episodes and passion predictions. *Approaching* and *tempting* Jesus echoes 16:1 where the narrator says Pharisees and Sadduccees *approached* Jesus *tempting* him by asking for a sign.[17] It anticipates 22:18 and 22:35. In 22:18 Jesus calls the Pharisees and Herodians hypocrites, echoing 6:2, 5, 16 and 15:7 and anticipating 23:13, 15, 23, 25, 27. He asks why they *tempt* him. They have tried to ensnare him with another legal question, tribute to Caesar. In 22:35, a Pharisee tempts Jesus with yet

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[14] See G. Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, 93ff.

[15] See Alan H. McNeile, *The Gospel According to St. Matthew* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980; reprint MacMillan, 1915) 66; and W. C. Allen, *St. Matthew*, 3d ed. ICC (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1977) 51–52; and Robert Guelich, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Waco: Word Books, 1982) 198–199.

[16] The variations seem associated with making the connection to 19:10–12.

[17] Tempting being something the Jewish leaders had not done in the initial sign of Jonah episode (12:38–42–16:1–4).

another legal question, the greatest commandment. The Jewish leaders are not only false interpreters of the law, they are aligned with the devil, the "*tempting one*" (4:3). As the narrative continues after 19:3–9 the reader learns that the question about divorce is simply one in a series of incidents in which the Jewish leaders seek to tempt and entrap Jesus. Along with the passion predictions and the Bethany-Temple scenes, these scenes are part of a pattern that prepares the reader for Jesus' condemnations of the Jewish leaders in chapter 23 and for the passion in Jerusalem.

Previous scholars have noted the verbal similarities between 5:31–32 and 19:3–9. The existence of two similar passages has provoked interpretation. However, most scholars have simply explained away their existence by assigning them to different sources. Thus, they have missed their role in the characterization and plot and the important effects their existence has on the reader as the Gospel unfolds through time.[18] They have not seen the important link between sermon and story, or rather that the sermon is an inseparable part of the story.

Matt 7:15–20

In the latter portions of the Sermon on the Mount Jesus warns the disciples and crowds, and thus the implied reader, against false prophets who are wolves in sheeps' clothing. These false prophets are to be known by their evil fruits. This non-specific warning echoes the words of John the Baptist in 3:7–10 which warn the scribes and Pharisees that they must produce fruit and not count on their Abrahamic ancestry to save them from the coming wrath. It, along with 3:7–10, prepares the implied reader for Jesus' outright condemnations of the Jewish leaders as those who produce evil fruit or no fruit at all in 12:33–37 and in chapter 21. Like 6:1–18, 7:15–20 warns about characters indirectly in order to prepare the reader to take a certain view of them and to prepare for the subsequent role they play in the plot. These passages plant suspicions that are reinforced by narrative events and by verbal repetition when very similar words are specifically applied later in the narrative. The reader has the sense, "Aha, I suspected as much. I knew it all along." This is at least one reading of the role that the actual reader is invited to play.[19]

However, many real readers have actualized the "reconstruction–inviting structures"[20] of the text rather differently. The identity of the false prophets particularly is an interpretive crux. The existence of readings of the false prophets as diverse as Hellenistic antinomian charismatics, Pharisees, Jewish-Christians, Essenes, gnostics, Zealots, Paulinists, etc. indicates both something about the role of the reader in the text and the actual readers outside the text.[21] After examining the interpretations of a number of

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[18] The exceptions are Edwards (69) who notes that "Jesus affirms what had been said earlier about the reasons for divorce" (5:31) and Daniel Patte (*The Gospel According to Matthew: A Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987] 266), who notes about 19:9: "Jesus' concluding statement is thematic . . . and thus expresses the preceding points in terms of the knowledge of readers who should recall the saying in 5:32."

[19] This is, in fact, the reading I gave in "Over and Over and Over Again," 132–137.

[20] Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, 119.

[21] For bibliographies and summaries of various readings of the passages see Robert Guelich, 390–403; David Hill, "False Prophets and Charismatics: Structure and Interpretation in Matthew 7:15–23," *Biblica* 57 (1976) 327–348; and Ulrich Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus*. 1. Teilband, Mt. 1–7. EKK (Zurich: Benziger Verlag and

modern scholars, certain points of departure in the text can be recognized.[22] These include the following:

1. The term προσέχετε (7:15; 6:1; 10:17; 16:6, 11, 12)
2. The term false prophets (7:15; 24:11; 24:24)
3. The wolf in sheep's clothing motif and the terms wolf (7:15 and 10:16) and sheep (7:15; 9:36; 10:6; 10:16; 12:11, 12; 15:24; 18:12; 25:32–33)
4. Prospective and retrospective associations with producing fruit (3:7–10=7:15–20=12:33–37 and chapter 21)
5. Whether one reads the inclusio of 7:16–20 as enclosing a comment on 7:15 or as a parenthesis after which the discussion of false prophets continues in vv 21–23. (Does 7:21 introduce a new topic?)
6. How one relates this particular passage to other passages not specified above.
7. What one takes to be the verbal and social codes and general knowledge presupposed by the text.

The implied reader must form various hypotheses in response to these points. He or she may form several hypotheses over time, the first not being quite effaced by the last.[23] The fact that almost all of the points mentioned involve references forward and backward over the course of the Gospel indicates the importance of the temporal ordering of reading (or hearing). Thus, in interpreting 7:15–20 and its role in the Gospel as a whole, it is important to ask what information the reader has been given prior to reading the passage? What expectations, what kind of "set" has been created? How has the reader been trained to read the passage? Then we must ask whether the reader's provisional interpretation is confirmed or confounded as the narrative continues.

Prior to the SM Jesus is introduced in the birth story as Messiah, Son of David, Son of Abraham, savior of his people, Emmanuel-God with us, King of the Jews, and Shepherd of God's people Israel. He is established as the central character. He is

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Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1985) 400–411. I have only recently received Günther Baumbach's *Das Verständnis des Bösen in den synoptischen Evangelien* (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1963). I will read the relevant portions prior to our discussion.

[22] Stanley E. Fish, ("Interpreting the Variorum," in *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, 164–184) first taught me to look to interpretative cruxes as indications of the reading experience. The points of departure I have noted are indications of where the text elicits a reader's activity. As points uncovered by looking at scholarly practice, they could be considered evidence of Michael Riffaterre's superreader ("Describing Poetic Structures: Two Approaches to Baudilaire's 'Les Chats,'" in *Reader-Response Criticism*, 37–38). Menakhem Perry ("Literary Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates its Meanings," *Poetics Today*, Vol. 1:1–2 (1979) 35–64 and 311–361) also analyzes various scholarly responses. In his case they are to Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily." He also emphasizes the character of the reading experience along what he calls the text-continuum.

[23] Real readers base their readings on one or more of these points of departure. Often they give more weight to some points than others in constructing their interpretations.

established as a reliable character aligned with the values of the implied author. The story of Herod and the Magii foreshadows indirectly the conflict with the Jewish leaders and the expansion of mission to the Gentiles later in the Gospel. Immediately following the birth story, John the Baptist is introduced as a reliable character. He confronts the Pharisees and Sadduccees. He calls them a brood of vipers. He warns them to bear good fruit and about the coming eschatological Judge. The description of the Judge forms the introduction to Jesus as an adult. Jesus is baptised and blessed by the reliable supernatural voice as God's son. Following the baptism, there is the temptation of Jesus as God's son. After John is delivered up, Jesus departs to Galilee of the Gentiles. Jesus, then, begins his ministry with the exact proclamation that John earlier made (3:2=4:17). He calls four disciples (4:18–22). A summary passage describes Jesus' teaching, preaching and healing activities and the crowds which surround him as a result. This sets the stage for the SM delivered to the disciples and crowds.

The beginning of the SM establishes Jesus as the authoritative interpreter of the law, calls for a righteousness to exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees, warns against hypocrisy, teaches where one's proper loyalty belongs, etc. 7:15–20 comes toward the end of the sermon. It belongs to a series of exhortations preceeding the parable of the two builders. The first word, προσέχετε, echoes the warning in 6:1 not to be like the hypocrites. However, the most striking echo of previous material is the parallel between John's warning to the Pharisees and Sadducees to bear good fruit in 3:7–10 and Jesus' warning about the false prophets. There is extensive verbal repetition to engage the reader's memory (3:10b=7:19, eleven words in common). Since John has been established as a reliable character and since he and Jesus preach the same message, verbal repetition here leads the implied reader to suspect, at least provisionally, that the false prophets are the Jewish leaders. There have been no prior references to false prophets, wolves or sheep—except to Jesus as one who will shepherd my [God's] people Israel" (2:6). There have been no "bad guys" introduced save for Herod, the devil-temptor, the potentially bad Pharisees and Sadducees and the unspecified hypocrites in 6:1–18.

If 7:20 forms the end of the passage and 7:21 introduces a new topic, then the reader must simply continue reading passages subsequent to the SM to see of the hypothesis is correct. However, if the reader views 7:16 and 7:20 as a parenthesis, then the hypothesis must be enlarged or modified by vv 21–23. The reader learns that what counts is doing the will of the Father. Simply calling Jesus "Lord" or even *prophesying* (supplying a possible link to the pseudo-*prophets* of 7:15), exorcising or doing mighty works in Jesus' name is not sufficient. People who call Jesus "Lord" but who do not do the will of the Father work lawlessness (ἀνομίαν). Perhaps, then, the Jewish leaders will call Jesus "Lord," but will not do the will of the Father, but lawlessness. Perhaps the false prophets are not the Jewish leaders but, like them, need to produce fruit, do the will of the Father, rather than lawlessness. Perhaps the Jewish leaders are a subgroup of a larger group that could be labelled false prophets.

The SM ends with the parable of the two builders emphasizing hearing and doing Jesus' words found in the sermon. The narrator notes the crowds' (to whom the Sermon was addressed along with the disciples) reaction of astonishment: "For he was teaching them as one having authority, and not as their *scribes*" (7:29). This brief indication along with the rest of the Gospel through chapter 21 confirms the implied reader's initial hypothesis that the false prophets are the Jewish leaders, a group that produce evil fruit or no fruit at all.

In chapters 8 and 9 Jesus' miraculous healings and exorcisms demonstrate his power from God to the implied reader. They also provoke various reactions from different character groups that will be developed as the narrative continues. The implied reader

begins to judge characters by their contrasting reactions to Jesus. In 9:1–7 the first confrontation between Jesus and the Jewish leaders occurs. Some of the scribes inwardly accuse Jesus of blasphemy. Jesus reads their thoughts, knowing that they think πoθνρά in their hearts (bearing καρπoὺς πονηρους). The conflict gradually builds in 9:10–13 and 9:32–34. In 9:35 the summary passage which forms an inclusio around chapters 5–9 appears. In 9:36–10:42 Jesus exhibits concern for the crowds and sends the twelve on a mission with a lengthy charge. The narrator reports that Jesus viewed the crowds as "*sheep* without a shepherd" (9:36). Jesus commissions the twelve to go to "the lost *sheep* of the house of Israel" (10:6=15:24). In 10:16–18 he sends the disciples forth as *sheep* in the midst of wolves, the only other reference to wolves in the Gospel. The sheep metaphor indicates to the implied reader at this point members or potential members of God's flock. So far it has only been used to refer to the Jewish crowds and disciples. The wolves are "men" of whom the disciples are to beware (προσέχετε, 10:17=6:1=7:15=16:6, 11, 12).[24] They will deliver the disciples to councils, scourge them in *their* synagogues and bring them before leaders and kings for Jesus' sake for a testimony to *them* and to the Gentiles. The wolves are not explicitly identified as the Jewish leaders, but the reader perceives a very thin veil. If *they* called the housemaster Beelzebul, how much more the members of his house (10:25=9:34=12:24).

As in the SM there are general references in the Missionary Discourse which are developed and attached explicitly to the Jewish leaders later in the Gospel. The words of 10:17, 23 are applied to them in 23:34, 36.[25] Verse 25 alludes to the Jewish leaders' earlier claim that Jesus exorcises by the power of the ruler of demons (9:34). It foreshadows 12:24, when they will say that he exorcizes by Beelzebul, the ruler of demons.

In chapters 11 and 12 Jesus' conflict with the Jewish leaders blossoms. In 12:9–15 Jesus compares the man with the withered hand to a *sheep* who should be pulled out of a ditch on the Sabbath. Again Jesus cares for members of the flock. The Jewish leaders use the man's predicament to accuse Jesus—of violating the law (12:10). Following the healing, the Jewish leaders begin the process that leads to Jesus' death—they "take counsel" to destroy him (12:14).[26] This is followed by the exorcism (mentioned above) after which the Jewish leaders declare that Jesus exorcises by the power of Beelzebul (9:32–34=10:25 =12:22–24). Jesus responds with a lengthy condemnation in which he applies the same words that John had used to warn the Jewish leaders in 3:7–10 and Jesus had used against the unspecified false prophets in sheep's clothing in 7:15–20. In the first instance the Jewish leaders were warned that they needed to repent and could not rely on being children of Abraham. In the second the crowds and disciples were warned of false prophets who looked like members of God's flock[27] but were wolves who produced evil fruit. Here the Jewish leaders are specifically condemned as those bad trees producing bad fruit, as evil men who must who put forth out of their evil treasure. The Jewish leaders have blasphemed against the Holy Spirit, a sin that cannot be forgiven. As the Gospel unfolds the Jewish leaders are increasingly portrayed as evil and incapable of the

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[24] Matthew always uses προσέχετε to warn against the Jewish leaders, explicitly in 16:6, 11, 12 and implicitly in 6:1,; 7:15; 10:17. See Guelich, 390.

[25] A complicating factor is the verbal parallels between 10:17–22 and 24:9–14.

[26] The words συμβούλιον ἔλαβον play an important role in the Jewish leaders' plot against Jesus (12:14=22:15=27:1=28:12, see also 26:3–4).

[27] Or who were dressed in prophetic garb. See Guelich, 392 and McNeile, 95.

repentance for which John called. The fruit imagery and their reactions to Jesus in the first twelve chapters reinforce the characterization of the Jewish leaders as bad trees producing evil fruit. The reader gradually sees them in a worse and worse light, more and more opposed to Jesus.

A great deal more might be said about passages which confirm the proposed initial reading of 7:15–20 as the texts proceeds. I will only discuss two more,. The first is chapter 21. There the reader finds the final references to the Jewish leaders as those who produce evil fruit or no fruit at all.[28] In chapter 21 Jesus triumphantly enters Jerusalem, cleanses the temple and heals the blind and lame there. The chief priests and scribes are incensed at the marvels he has done and the cries of the children, "Hosanna to the Son of David" (21:15). After they confront him, he leaves the city for Bethany. On his return the fruit imagery becomes concrete. He curses a barren fig tree which withers instantly. Re-entering the temple he again confronts the Jewish leaders. The chief priests and elders of the people question the source of his authority. He responds with a question concerning the authority of John. They dare not answer because they fear the crowd, who "have John as a prophet" (21:26). Jesus proceeds to tell them two parables, the parable of the Two Sons (21:28–32) and the parable of the Wicket Tenants (21:33–41). He concludes by saying, "Therefore, I tell you, that the kingdom of God will be taken from you and will be given to a nation producing the fruits of it" (21:43). Although the phrase is very short, the reader hears the echoes of 3:7–10; 7:15–20; and 12:33–34 where the Jewish leaders and the production (ποιέω) of fruit are linked. Like the fig tree, the Jewish leaders are barren. They do not do the will of the Father (21:31=12:50, five words in common). They have not responded properly to Jesus. They do not render the fruits of God's vineyard to God. They will be judged and wither as the cursed fig tree. The chief priests and Pharisees know that Jesus tells the two parables concerning them and seek to seize him. However, they fear the crowds who have Jesus, like John, as a prophet (21:46=21:26, five words in common). The Jewish leaders are portrayed as the enemies of John and Jesus, who both warn the reader that the character of the leaders can be known by their fruits.

A final passage that both confirms and raises questions about the reader's hypothesis that 7:15–20 is to be read as a distinct unit and refers to the Jewish leaders is 23:25–28. Jesus labels the scribes and Pharisees as hypocrites (=6:1–18 where the hypocrites are not specifically identified) who are outwardly beautiful and righteous but within (ἔσωθεν δέ) are full of robbery, intemperence, hypocrisy and lawlessness (ἀνομίας). This accords well with the description of the false prophets of 7:15–20 as sheep without and wolves within (ἔσωθεν δέ). However, the term lawlessness provides a retrospective connection with 7:23 and 13:41 as well as a prospective connection with 24:12. These passages all speak of lawlessness in an eschatological context. In 13:36ff., Jesus explains to the disciples the parable of the tares. The ones doing lawlessness are tares who will be burnt in the fiery furnace. In chapter 24, again addressing the disciples—in response to the disciples showing him the temple—Jesus offers the eschatological discourse.[29] In 24:12 Jesus says that "because of the increase of lawlessness, the love of the many will grow cold." This reference to lawlessness comes in close contiguity with the only other Matthean references outside of 7:15 to false prophets, 24:11, 24. False prophets *will* arise to lead many astray before the end (24:11). The end will not occur until the kingdom has been preached to all

[28] This section on chapter 21 comes essentially from my "Over and Over and Over Again," 136–137.

[29] Cp. Burnett, 98–101.

nations. False Christs and false prophets *will* arise showing great signs and wonders so as to lead astray, if possible, even the elect (24:24).

If the false prophets of 7:15; 24:11 and 24:24 are construed as part of the same group, then the reader may retrospectively abandon the original hypothesis that the false prophets were the Jewish leaders and include 7:21–23 as part of the warning beginning with 7:15. The false prophets who produce lawlessness are people who call Jesus "Lord," who produce mighty works and prophesy in his name. The elect must be wary of them and identify them by their fruits. *Or,* the reader, given 12:22–37; 3:7–10; 23:25–28; etc., may read the references to false prophets in 24:11, 24 as Jewish leaders who may lead the disciples and the "many" astray.[30] The possible fly in the soup for this reading is the references to ἀνομία in 7:23=24:11. *Or,* the reader may decide that the false prophets in 24:11, 24 are not related to those in 7:15. *Or,* the reader given all the alternative hypotheses constituted reading processually—7:15–20 read as a single unit, 7:15–23 as one unit, and reading both prospectively and retrospectively in the light of all the other passages mentioned above—may see all those who do not do the will of the Father, who are workers of lawlessness, who bear evil fruit, who will lead astray—all those present and future—as false prophets and enemies whether they claim to be members of God's flock, as members of the character group the Jewish leaders or as those who claim allegiance to Jesus.[31]

What do we make of the reading process as I have constructed it? Do we choose between alternative final hypotheses or interpretations achieved after the whole text has been actualized? Do we concentrate on the experience of reading and the effect of various hypotheses formulated as the reader reads, each one not quite faced by the previous one? How do we decide? What are our criteria? What is at stake? Certainly the very least that can be said, given my reconstruction and the various scholarly interpretations, is that in the course of reading the Gospel the identity of the false prophets is very much in question.

Conclusion—Open Questions

All sorts of implications and questions could be drawn from my analysis. I will discuss some in four areas of interest to our group: literary, historical, sociological and hermeneutic.

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[30] The immediate context of 24:11 may suggest, but does not require, that the false prophets arise from among the disciples—the "you." Jesus expands his comments beyond the twelve with his references to the "many" and the "elect." There is no immediate context surrounding 24:24 which determines the origin of the false prophets and false Christs.

[31] This *both/and* suggestion is different from Guelich's both/and alternative: "Rather than *either* a Jewish *or* a Christian group . . ., the *false prophets* represented *both* elements as vigorous Jewish Christians who sought to implement the strict adherence to the Mosaic Law (Käsemann, "Beginnings," 86–87) and may have sought to impede the Gentile mission of Matthew's church as well (*Sermon,* 393)." It differs in that it does not go outside the story world to posit a "real" group represented and in emphasizing the reading experience along the text continuum. It also differs from from Paul S. Minear's ("False Prophecy and Hyprocrisy in the Gospel of Matthew" in *Neues Testament und Kirche für Rudolf Schnackenburg,* ed. Joachim Gnilka [Freiburg: Herder, 1974] 76–93) suggestion that 7:15–23 (read as about Christian false prophets) and passages about hyprocrisy (including chapter 23 directed in the narrative to the scribes and Pharisees) are both warnings to prophet-leaders in Matthew's community.

Literary Implications and Questions

Along with the work of other literary critics, my analysis makes a case that the sermons in Matthew are an integral part of the Gospel as narrative—and of the experience of reading it. They are not simply plunked-down repositories of teaching in the midst of an independent story. My analysis indicates how elements of the SM lead the reader to view characters and events in a certain light. It points to the effect of the arrangement of elements along the text continuum. In traditional categories, it shows how certain elements contribute to the development of character and plot.[32]

Historical Implications and Questions

For those whose interest is primarily historical, a rhetorical literary approach can be helpful. With regard to 7:15–20, my analysis reveals the reading process that led Barth, for example, to label the false prophets Hellenistic antinomians or Hill to label them the Pharisees across the street.[33] From my "points of departure," one can see how each actualized the text's potentialities. One can also see that they jump to their hypothetical historical contexts at least one step too quickly. They do not take seriously the entire reading process. Also, like many other historical critics, they treat the Gospel too much like an allegory to which a reconstructed historical context provides the key.

Characters and character groups are not merely ciphers for individual or groups in the evangelist's historical context or that of the historical Jesus. Too often interpreters assume, for example, that the disciples directly represent the members (or leaders) of Matthew's church. Since the Matthean implied reader judges *all* the characters—referred to and depicted—from the perspective of the implied author, the reader does not simply identify with one group or another. This suggests that historians would do well to ask what the reading experience might reveal about the authorial audience, the audience the actual author posited when composing. What prior knowledge is presumed on the part of the audience? Where are they located in space and time? What moves seem designed to educate them? The work of Norman Petersen on Mark, Alan Culpepper on John, and Jack Kingsbury on Matthew has pursued this angle of inquiry.[34] In reconstructing an authorial audience, we would still not have a description of the original audience. However, we would at least have an interpretation of the actual author's view of them.

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[32] An important side comment I would like to make is that I am not sure we have gotten all the gold out of the mine of a formalist approach to the gospels yet. After the fragmentation of previous years, there is still much to be learned by analyzing the gospels as wholes apart from historical or other objectives. Traditional narrative categories still can teach us a lot.

[33] Even using traditional methods Barth's argument could be questioned because he does not explain 23:25–28.

[34] See Petersen, "The Reader in the Gospel," Culpepper, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 203–224 and Kingsbury, *Story*, 120–133. Many interpreters find direct commentary from narrator to narratee especially helpful in reconstructing an authorial audience. There are problems, however. How are implied reader, narratee, and authorial audience defined, distinguished (if they are distinguished) and related to one another?

Given this angle of inquiry, my analysis raises the question of why the actual author might have created the reading experience described. Why is the reader given knowledge superior to that of the Jewish leaders? Why are they not pictured as members of the audience for the SM? Why are they progressively tarred? Why, in the case of 7:15–20, create certain hypotheses and cause their reconsideration, if not effacement? In asking such questions, we must keep in mind (1) that the answers might simply have to do with narrative logic and (2) that the resultant picture is an interpretation. As Gospel critics we reconstruct an historical context out of the Gospel and limited additional data and proceed to use that context to interpret the Gospel.

A final suggestion for historical critics stimulated by my analysis and that of other rhetorical literary approaches is that the study of the reception history of Matthew is worth pursuing. Commentaries, manuscript versions and quotations from the Gospel would provide a record of some of the earliest responses. This would help to describe the role of the implied reader and be interesting in its own right. It also *might* bring us closer to reconstructing the kind of responses the Gospel elicited from the original audience.

Sociological Implications and Questions

Turning to the area of sociological criticism, I can only invite contributions from members of the group. My essay does not directly address problems of code and convention, either of a literary nature or of the kind the new sorts of sociological criticism explore.

Hermeneutic Implications and Questions

Finally, in the area of hermeneutics, my analysis raises all sorts of questions about how the text, individual interpreters and interpretive communities interact to produce certain readings and rule out others. If the Gospel has numerous "points of departure" along a text continuum, then complex questions are also raised about the nature of a text and the way we "know" texts.

A reader-response analysis such as mine takes seriously language as power. I presuppose, and believe that you share my presupposition, that Matthew speaks powerfully in different ways to individuals, religious communities, and Western culture. What are the presuppositions and conventions of our interpretive community? What are the criteria our group uses to evaluate readings of this powerful text, this text which is both story and sermon?

I see text, reader and community(s) as partners in interpretation. Personal experience, theological commitments, training and social position shape my view. I reject the notion that any one of the partners ought to overpower the others not least because of my allegiance to the Reformed tradition which values the text as the Word of God, the illumination of the Holy Spirit upon the individual conscience, and the witness and corrective of the Church. My training as a member of our guild, my position as a teacher at a state university and my experience as a woman who encounters friendly and unfriendly forces at work in text, interpretive communities, and myself also play a role.

I look forward to a fruitful discussion in Chicago.

The Gospel of Matthew: Hypocrisy as Self-Deception

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At the outset I should like briefly to define and describe the human phenomenon of self-deception. What does it mean to say that a person deceives himself/herself? Self-deception is the state of actually holding a belief about or an image of oneself, or a vision of one's situation in reality, while at the same time knowing in another part of oneself that the belief, image, or vision is not true. In self-deception the person is at the same time both the victimizer who lies and the victim who is lied to. The self-deceiver lies to himself and knows that he is lying; therefore he knows the truth. But simultaneously he believes the lie he is telling himself and, therefore, does not know the truth. The self-deceiver both believes her own lie and also knows that she is lying.

Self-deception is the human phenomenon in which a person imposes a cover story which he or she *really* believes yet only *half*-believes in order to conceal the real story of what is going on in his or her life. As such, self-deception is an instance of the violation of human wholeness, the correspondence of the self with the self. I should like now to pursue this subject matter as it comes to expression in the Gospel of Matthew by looking at several key texts in the larger context of the Gospel.

The Tree and Its Fruits: A Problematical Relationship (Matt 7:15-20)

This section begins with an exhortation to beware of false prophets (7:15). The command is followed by a section framed (7:16a, 20) by the claim that you will know them by their fruits. The material inside this frame (7:16b–19) explains why or how you know them by their fruits: because tree (heart) and fruit (act) correspond; it is not possible to get bad fruit from a good tree or vice versa. The "they" who are known by their fruits are in part the false prophets, but the generality of the comments here as well as in the parallel section in 12:33–37 makes it clear that Matthew is talking about human beings universally.

Now who are the false prophets in Matthew's situation? I will argue that the sheep's clothing image suggests the view that they are Jews or Jewish Christians who practice an ethic of external obedience. But the fact that they confess Jesus as Lord (Kyrios) and appeal to their prophesying and miracle-working (7:21–22) may indicate that they are enthusiasts and antinomians.[1] Briefly put, enthusiasts are people who put more store in having the Spirit than in belonging to the historical order with its moral responsibilities. Perhaps the historical author was faced with a theological battle on two fronts: he was in conflict with both legalists and antinomians. But for the implied author—the author as he is shaped

[1] See Ernst Käsemann, "The Beginnings of Christian Theology," *New Testament Questions of Today*, trans. W. J. Montague (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969) 83–84.

by the writing of the text and who thus becomes the unifying principle of the text—the situation is somewhat different. The pressure of the text fuses external obedience to the law (5:20; 7:15) with opposition to God's will (7:21, 23) so that there results within Matthew's narrative world, as distinguished from his historical situation, only one opponent: people who are antinomian in that they only obey the requirements of the law externally.[2]

Now we can state the exegetical problem: since people—in principle—are known by their fruits and since the false prophets present the fruits of sheep, how does the author know that inwardly they are wolves? Matthew has said that one can read a person's heart (tree) from his or her fruit. But can one? Does that accord with other things which he says?

Matthew affirms that fruit reveals the true nature of the tree because tree and fruit correspond (7:16–20; 12:34–35). It is impossible for them not to correspond, impossible for a tree to produce contrary to its nature (7:18; 12:35). The outside manifests the inside because the inside determines the quality of the outside (23:26).

But does Matthew really mean that, or in what sense can he mean it since in at least three places he indicates that the outside can falsify, conceal, or misrepresent the inside? (1) In our present text (7:15) people who are really wolves appear as sheep. (2) In 12:33 Matthew puts the reader under the imperative to create correspondence between tree and fruit, which implies that the accord does not exist. (3) The Pharisees are said to be clean, whitewashed, and apparently righteous on the outside, but within they are unclean and wicked (23:25, 27–28). Thus under the conditions of actual historical existence there is conflict rather than correspondence between the inside and outside of a person.

What are we to make of this tension in the Gospel of Matthew? It appears that at the level of textual articulation the Gospel simply contradicts itself. Fruit reveals the true nature of the tree, and it does not. We could relieve the contradiction by saying that the *correspondence* between inner (good tree) and outer (good fruit) belongs to the ontological level of reality, to unfallen creation or what is true for human beings in principle or latently. The *contradiction* between heart (bad) and action (good), on the other hand, belongs to the ontic level, to what is actually true for fallen human existence. But then we would have to ask ourselves what the hermeneutical status of the ontological/ontic distinction is. What is the locus of the distinction? Where does it come from? One option is to argue that while the implied author—the text's principle of unity—contradicts himself, the historical author presupposed the distinction. (Generally when I use the name Matthew to refer to a person rather than to the text, I mean the implied author, not the historical author.) But how would we know that? He may have, but we are not sure. So perhaps we should understand the text as an incomplete set of clues which has to be turned into a work by the pre-understanding of the reader.[3] Thus the interpreter completes the work by taking Matthew's contradiction into his own horizon, into his synthesis

[2] For the view that Matthew was opposing both Pharisees and antinomians see Gerhard Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law," in *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, trans. P. Scott, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963) 74–76, 85. The view that Matthew had only one opponent which was both legalistic and antinomian is held by Robert H. Gundry, *Matthew* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 6, 132–133. Gundry, however, does not distinguish the historical situation from the narrative world nor does he use literary categories to explain the opponents as they appear in the text.

[3] See Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) 21–25, 27, 38, 47–48, 74, 92, 141.

of the text and his own pre-understanding. That is, the interpreter in ***his*** work shows that Matthew's claim that tree and fruit correspond and his claim that they are in conflict do not really contradict each other because they belong to two different categoric situations, the ontological and the ontic.

We should note here in brief summary that the correspondence of fruit and tree belongs to the ontological or latent level while the contradiction belongs to the ontic or actual situation of unbelief. It should also be pointed out that for Matthew the correspondence is recreated or actualized in the believing disciple. Understanding the gospel changes the heart and produces ethical fruit (13:14–15, 23). This is the new actual situation.

We have seen that we can relieve Matthew's contradiction by bringing in the ontological/ontic distinction. But we still have the problem: how does Matthew know under the conditions of fallen human existence that there is in fact a wolf underneath the sheep's clothing? How does he know that people are not what they appear to be? In believers there is correspondence between inside and outside, and in unbelievers there is contradiction—our *provisional* conclusion about Matthew's position. But Matthew also states that human beings are not capable of telling which is which, are not able to distinguish weeds from wheat (13:29). Only God can read the heart (6:4, 6, 18). So how does Matthew know that there is a wolf in there, that there is in fact a contradiction between inner and outer, that the righteousness of the false prophet is not real (5:20; 23:28)?

Matthew would have to have an *external* criterion in order to be able to test real righteousness, and in fact he does. The law as reinterpreted by Jesus provides him with a general ethical principle if not precise rules. One's acts are evaluated by the law. The Pharisees are condemned as hypocrites who are not really righteous because they pay attention to the minutiae of the law (tithing) but not really to the weighty matters of justice, mercy, and faith. Thus for Matthew an act is defined not only by its relationship to the heart (7:16–18; 12:34–35) but also by its conformity to the higher principles of an empirical code.

It seems that with Matthew the law applies in distinguishing cultic behavior (tithing) or petty morality from high morality (justice and mercy). Matthew also suggests that it applies in distinguishing high from higher morality. Loving the neighbor is high morality (5:43), but loving the enemy is weightier (5:44). Thus the principle—love your enemy—can be used to determine whether the scope of your caring action is sufficiently broad. Law can decide whether your action is weighty and whether its scope is as inclusive as it should be.

In the unfallen creation, then, or in the eschatologically renewed creation, heart and act would completely correspond. But even disciples who have believed and seen the truth and who have had their hearts renewed are still characterized by little faith. The kingdom of heaven has both come and not come; the heart is both renewed and not renewed. The disciples even in the presence of the resurrected and exalted Son of God both worshipped and doubted (28:17). If the heart of the believer is divided, her acts would have an ambiguous relationship to the heart. They may be better than the (unredeemed) heart (7:11) and worse than the (redeemed) heart. Thus under the conditons of fallen existence even the believer's situation is ambiguous. The ambiguity may be seen by contrasting 7:11 with 12:34–35. A person who is evil may *do* better than he *is* (7:11); an evil person *cannot* do good (12:34–35). In order to do the will of God under such conditions two things are needed: (1) the enablement of a disposition to love, which results in continual renewal coming from the inside, the heart qualifying the act (23:26) and thus achieving wholeness; (2) the (reinterpreted) law as a norm for righteousness, which is necessary as long as redemption is not complete.

Thus the law is a criterion for righteousness if we are defining the proper quality of *behavior:* it distinguishes the weighty from the superficial. But Matthew also suggests a distinction between weighty behavior and real righteousness. Real righteousness is the comprehensive wholeness of a *heart* directed by love *and acts* of caring (5:27, 43–48; 12:34–40; 25:31–46). How does one tell that the weighty behavior is not real righteousness, that those who appear to be sheep are really wolves?

We must first determine what the clothes of the sheep would actually be in the context of Matthew's Gospel. The evangelist distinguishes heart from act (5:21–22, 27–28), tree from fruit (7:17–18), inside from outside (23:25–28), and inside from clothes (7:15). Thus clothes must mean external acts. But what kind of acts? These wolves perform the behavior of sheep, so who are the sheep in Matthew? Sheep in the Gospel may be a negative image—Israel in its lostness and in need of redemption (9:36; 10:6; 15:24). And it may also be a positive image—those who feed the hungry and visit the prisoners (25:33–36). In Matthew 7:15 sheep is positive because it is contrasted with ravenous wolves. Thus the sheep in 7:15 are connected with those in 25:33ff., and their clothes then stand for acts of caring. These wolves in sheep's clothing feed the hungry, clothe the naked, visit the sick and imprisoned (25:35–36). This is weighty morality. But it is said to be in contradiction with their inner disposition (wolfishness). This contradiction makes them like the Pharisees who are clean within but unclean without (23:25–28). The reference to the Pharisees here makes a connection with Matt 5:20 which also tells us about the righteousness of the Pharisees. It is not sufficient to enable one to enter the kingdom. But what is its content? That is indicated by the antitheses which follow (5:21–48), these statements of opposition between what the law requires and what Jesus requires. The context shows that the Pharisees do not do what Jesus demands, but they do fulfill the requirements of the law. Since 5:20 contrasts the righteousness of disciples with the righteousness of Pharisees, in the contrasts which follow in 5:21–48—contrasts between what the law requires and what Jesus requires—it may be assumed that the Pharisees obey the law while Jesus' disciples obey his reinterpretation of it. Therefore, the Pharisees are people who do not commit murder or adultery, who do not divorce without the proper document, who tell the truth under oath, who seek justice rather than unlimited vengeance, and who love their neighbors. This is the behavior of the wolves in sheep's clothing, along with their feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, etc. But Matthew tells us that this righteousness does not meet the demands of Jesus to love from the heart (5:22–23, 28) and that it has only the outward appearance of righteousness (23:28). Beneath this apparent righteousness is the rapaciousness of wolves (7:15), the term for rapacious being cognate in Greek with the greed which Matthew attributes to the Pharisees in 23:25.

Matthew urges his readers to be on their guard against these false prophets (7:15). The righteousness of the latter is not real, for it does not correspond to the heart, the inner disposition (7:15b; 23:27–28). These people live in violation of the wholeness which constitutes well being. But how does Matthew know that the false prophets' hearts are evil, since it is also his position that acts can either disclose or conceal the heart and only God really knows what is on the inside (6:4, 6, 18)? The truth is that he cannot know. His theological analysis of the human condition makes it impossible for him to know whether acts really reveal or conceal the heart. He urges the reader to discern the falsity of the false prophets, but since that is in the final analysis impossible, the imperative is turned back on the reader. Beware of the false prophet in you. Are you the ravenous wolf hiding in sheep's clothing, who appears to be righteous but within is full of rebellion? Only about yourself—and not perfectly then—can you discern whether the act was for God's glory and in order to be his child or was for the sake of human praise.

Hypocrisy as Self-Deception (6:1-18)

We have seen that for Matthew the structure of human being in principle—and then again in faith—is the correspondence of self with self or wholeness. But the actual situation is that heart and act have fallen apart. The depth of this self-division is seen more specifically in Matthew's understanding of hypocrisy. The conditon of the lost person is that he or she has become blind to the alienation of act from heart or character,and the external act is taken to fulfill the will of God. This is what Matthew means by hypocrisy: self-deception. Or so I will argue.

There is a general agreement that the Greek word *hypocrite* basically meant actor, and already in the Classical and Hellenistic periods it had received the extended negative meaning "pretender." In the Septuagint it also had a negative connotation as it does in the Synoptic Gospels.[4] The word could mean either a pretender or one who is self-deceived, and some take it to mean a conscious deceiver or pretender in Matthew.[5] Robert Guelich, on the other hand, denies that any notion of pretense, intention to deceive, or conscious lack of integrity attaches to the term in Matthew's usage. The hypocrite in Matthew believe that he or she is righteous before God and other human beings on the ground of obedience to the law and fails to realize that he or she is really alienated from God. The belief that acceptance by human beings guarantees acceptance by God is based on the view that both God and human beings uphold the law as the expression of God's will.[6]

I think that Guelich is right that Matthew's hypocrite is self-deceived rather than a pretender, but I will argue that Matthew does hold such a person responsible and culpable in part. If the hypocrite is not consciously and cynically pretending, he or she is still responsible for being unconscious of the dichotomy between self-image and reality. The hypocrite may not intend to deceive, but he/she does lack integrity, correspondence between inner and outer, and is responsible for the lack because he/she has concealed the true nature of the inner person from herself/himself.

Matthew may suggest that there are two related strands of self-deception in the hypocrisy which he describes. In the first one, the hypocrite wants to be right with God or rewarded by God. This intention is indicated by the assertion that it is the *divine* reward which has been lost (6:1b) or the kingdom of *heaven* which has not been entered (23:13). The reason for the failure is the false belief that external acts of piety or morality performed to be seen by others will gain one a reward with God (6:2b, 5b, 16b). One is deceived about the appropriate means toward the end of divine reward.

In the other strand the proper end or goal of life has itself been eclipsed. The goal has become human approval. In the discussion of hypocrisy in 6:1–18 Matthew uses dramatic images that appeal to the senses of sight and hearing to portray behavior as public evidence—sounding the trumpet, praying on the street corners, disfiguring the face. In 6:2, 5, 16; 23:5–7 he uses grammatical constructions which explicitly express that the *purpose* of the behavior is to get glorification and praise from humans. It is not that the

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[4] See A. Wilckens, "Hypocritēs," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, trans. G. Bromiley, abridged in one volume (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Crescent: Paternoster Press, 1985) 1235–1236.

[5] See Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew*, trans. D. Green (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975) 143; Francis W. Beare, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981) 165; Robert H. Gundry, *Matthew* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 102.

[6] Robert A. Guelich, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Waco: Word Books, 1982) 278–279.

hypocrites want human praise as a means to or assurance of divine reward but rather as a substitute for it. So enticed have they become by the security of public acceptance that they have lost sight of the divine. This confusion about the proper goal of life is a secondary self-deception in Matthew, while the primary one is the false belief that external behavior will gain reward from God. And these two strands have been interwoven with each other.

The hypocrites really believe that they are in the right: have we not confessed Jesus as Lord and worked miracles (7:21–22)? When did we fail to care for the Son of Man (25:41–44)? They do not realize that the human approval is all that they are going to get (6:5). They have been paid in full and are alien to the divine reward (6:1b). Hypocrisy is *not* pretending consciously to be more righteous than one is but *really* believing *erroneously* that one is righteous, that one has met the divine requirements. This point may not be altogether clear in 6:1–18, but it is made so in other places. The hypocrite actually does not see the flaw in himself (7:1–3). Chapter 23 says repeatedly that he is blind to his self-division. He is blind to the fact that the only thing which meets the divine requirement is the correspondence between inner and outer cleanness.

The hypocrite as blind and self-deceived will not spell out her true condition to herself: that external morality, however weighty, is not enough; that the inside is rebellious, ravenous, unclean. The dynamic generating this failure to avow is that the hypocrite wants to be right with God (6:1b) and to have life and also to have this on one's own terms—to have life by taking the broad, easy way (7:13–14). In order to believe that she can have life by taking the easy way, she must convince herself of the lie that the latter is enough.

Hypocrisy, as a failure to see the truth, is for Matthew the same thing as the fattened heart (13:14–15), for the function of the heart, the seat of understanding, can be referred to as seeing (13:13–16). In Matthew, then, hypocrisy is a term for the human condition and not just a word for a few especially vicious people. Apart from revelation it is inescapable (11:25; 13:11–15), and yet people are responsible for it and culpable. The many imperatives in the Gospel, including the imperative to see the truth (7:5), show that people are capable of action and insight and are guilty if they have not acted and understood. There has been ample manifestation of God's kingdom, but Israel has refused to respond (11:20–24), has shut its eyes (13:15c). The blindness of hypocrisy in Matthew 23 is condemned in a very accusatory way.

In terms of cover story and real story the hypocrite uses the positive cover story that he is righteous because he is praised by humans (6:2; 23:28) to conceal the negative real story that he is alienated from God (6:1b) and corrupt within (23:25–28). What she fails to spell out to herself is the very reality of depth, the inside, the heart, in its corruption. In concealing the *uncleanness* within, she conceals the very dimension of the *heart* or the *within*—from which can come either love and forgiveness or anger, hatred, lust, etc. (5:22, 28; 12:34–35; 15:18–20; 18:35). The hypocrite is blind to his own depth because he does not want to give his whole heart. It is two sides of the same reality that the hypocrite conceals both the radicalness of the divine requirement and the depth of his own heart on which that demand lays claim.

The Overcoming of Self-Deception

Self-deception is cured by the gospel (24:14) or word (13:19) of the kingdom which gives understanding and insight, which is to say that the gospel reforms the fattened or uncomprehending heart. This transformation then produces ethical fruit (13:23). So ethical action is given with the revelation that recreates the heart. It is a part of the redemptive event, God's action in human beings. Revelation produces new understanding (13:11,

16–17), a new ethical disposition, a new tree (7:17a, 18a) or treasure (12:35a) from which come good acts (7:17a) or words (12:35). For Matthew an act cannot be good unless it manifests a heart, tree, or treasure which is also good (7:17–18; 12:33–35). Both character and action are given by God's grace as power to transform. (But recall the earlier point, in tension with this one, that acts are also evaluated by the reinterpreted law.)

And both character or ethical disposition and action or fruit are placed under the imperative. Both of them are a moral obligation to be achieved by human beings, as well as a gift of grace, although carrying out the demand is enabled by grace. Let me begin with the character or disposition side of the imperative. Matthew puts the reader under the command to cleanse the inside of the cup in order that (*hina*) the outside might be clean (23:26). That really entails bringing the inner self again to consciousness since it has been lost sight of through self-deception. The hypocrite or self-deceived one whom Matthew repeatedly addresses is not a member of a small, especially vicious part of humanity. This is rather Matthew's term for human beings apart from grace, the blind who have not been given to see. Matthew can also apply it to disciples (7:5, as a part of the Sermon on the Mount, is addressed to disciples) inasmuch as they are sometimes guilty of little faith (6:30; 8:26; 14:31; 16:8) and they doubt while they worship (28:17). Hypocrite is not just a term for those who believe that tithing and keeping the sabbath earn the divine reward. It also includes those who do not kill or commit adultery, who tell the truth under oath and love their neighbors, who care for the sick and hungry. Outwardly they appear to be righteous but inwardly they are full of rebellion (23:27–28). They are blind to the inner reality so that it must be restored to consciousness. But how do you become aware of your inner being, your heart, and the ethical demands placed upon it, and the necessity of bringing it into accord with outer action? How do you come to see what you do not and cannot see because you do not know that it is there? And you do not know that it is there because you have intentionally concealed it (7:13–14; 11:20–24; 13:15c), and the concealment has become a fate (11:25; 13:13–15b). How can the ethical address to the inside be heard when the inside does not know that it exists? How do you deal with an inside that you do not know you have?

As we have seen, for Matthew the heart is restored to understanding (13:11a) and insight (13:16–17) from beyond itself, by the word of the kingdom and the cross (4:17; 13:19; 16:21; 20:28–34). You must be shown what you cannot see, your own lost dimension of depth. This brings the inner dimension back to consciousness (13:16–17, 23). Thus the person can grasp his or her inside, can cleanse it (23:26) by installing in it the disposition to the weightier matters of the law—justice, mercy, and faith (23:23). This disposition or inside will generate action or an outside which will be clean or righteous because it will correspond to the inside (23:26). The inside qualifies the outside.

But Matthew can also begin at the other end of the dialectic, with action and the imperative to act. He is saying in effect: cleanse the outside in order that the inside might be clean. A new kind of action will reshape the heart, so start with action. Take the log out of your eye, hypocrite, and then you will see (7:5). *Do* the thing which the will of God requires, and the heart and understanding (seeing) will be redirected.

In summary let us observe that grace as power and ethical action are united in an insoluble paradox: (1) The word of the kingdom gives new understanding which generates new character and action as part of the saving event; ethical fruit is in fact given by God, achieved by him/her in human beings (13:11, 16, 23; 7:16–18). (2) This actuality given as part of the recreation of wholeness is lost if it is not achieved by the person through his or her own effort (5:20; 6:14–15; 7:21–27; 16:27; 18:35; 22:1–15). God's act enables the response, but the response must also be one's own.

The Representation of Wholeness in the Failure to Achieve It: The Parable of the Unforgiving Servant (18:23-25)

This parable expresses in concentrated narrative form the theological and ethical point of view which we have seen more broadly set forth as that of the Gospel: well-being resides in the wholeness of the self, in the correspondence between inner and outer, between possibility and actuality.

The story has a three-part plot composed of a crisis resolved, a response to the resolution, and a consequence. The crisis for this servant of the king, probably a high level tax farmer, is that he owes the king a debt so large as to be improbable to the point of impossibility. He owes ten thousand talents while the annual revenue of Herod the Great was only nine hundred. But the debt is gratuitiously cancelled, which turns a closed and hopeless future into an open one. The extravagance of the forgiven debt alerts us to the fact that we are dealing with a metaphor of the kingdom of heaven and not simply with a realistic story. This official of the king responds to his unexpected and undeserved blessing by throwing a fellow official into jail for not being able to pay back a small debt immediately.

The consequence is that the king turned the first official over to the jailers in whose prison he would languish until he paid back the debt—forever. There is also an element of the extraordinary here. The king's final withdrawal of his initial forgiveness would be for that Middle Eastern audience the introduction of chaos. The order of the world has been destroyed, for a king does not retract forgiveness once given.[7] If the word of the king cannot be counted on, what can be? In talking with the first servant, the king told him that it was *necessary* for him to have been merciful as mercy had been shown to him. Two questions present themselves to us. (1) What was the nature or ground of the necessity imposed on the servant? (2) What is the theological import of the chaos introduced into the ending of the story—the withdrawal of forgiveness?

Why was it necessary for the servant to be merciful?

David Little in his study of Matthew's ethics suggests that for Matthew it was necessary because in the evangelist's view the law of reciprocity is an intrinsic validating principle: insofar as possible there should be an equivalence between others' treatment of one and one's treatment of others.[8] But we could respond that in the context of the parable the king's statement could mean that it was necessary to be merciful in order to stay out of jail. There *is* in the parable a failure of reciprocity, but in Matthew reciprocity as a justifying principle for ethical norms rests on a deeper justification. And the movement toward prison with its final cutting off of freedom and the future simply externalizes the inner existential transaction in the plot of the parable. The king's act of forgiveness as power for a new kind of action was not actualized by the servant. It should have been. The necessity for the servant's mercy was based on the implications of the story's development, as we shall see in the next paragraph.

The overall movement of the story does not put the emphasis on the *demand* for merciful behavior but on the *enablement* of it by the king's forgiveness as power for a new kind of life. Note that the cancellation of the debt is, in theological terms, both grace

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[7] See Bernard Brandon Scott, "The King's Accounting: Matthew 18:23–34," *JBL* 104:3 (1985) 439–440.

[8] See David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, *Comparative Religious Ethics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978) 104, 179, 190, 194, 196.

as forgiveness and grace as power or enablement. Forgiveness gives power or possibility. The necessity for *mercy* is grounded on the parabolic *narrative* structure of human existence as intersected by the kingdom of heaven. The superabundance of grace—the cancellation of an impossible debt—opens up a possibility of such power that it must be actualized. Mercy is necessary because the new possibility propels itself with such force. Yet the ending of the story shows that mercy is also *demanded.* It is also a human responsibility, and the ironic tragedy of human existence is that it can thwart the necessary thrust of God's grace as power. And it should be pointed out that while the parable itself puts the emphasis on grace, the interpretive conclusion which Matthew adds to it (18:35) shifts the stress to demand. Matthew makes it a matter of strict reciprocity, equal retaliation: if you do not forgive your brother from your heart, God will put you in jail forever. The necessity for the merciful behavior, then, is grounded in the powerful effect of salvation history—and in the need to escape punishment.

But if we view the parable in the context of 7:16–20—the text on tree and fruit—the necessity for merciful behavior resides also in the structure of human existence as created. Grapes are not gathered from thorn bushes. A sound tree produces good fruit; in fact, it is not possible for it to produce bad fruit. There is then in human existence as such an impulse toward wholeness, toward the correspondence between interior heart and external act. The flaw in the human conditon is that this wholeness has been lost, and we exist in contradiction between inside and outside—the wolf in sheep's clothing. The word of the gospel is the event that restores the heart which can produce corresponding good acts (13:16–17, 23; 20:28–34). Thus what was latently and in principle the case with human beings as created is now actually the case for the believing disciple. Salvation realizes what God had always intended for human beings as created. There is then actually in the *renewed* human being the same impetus toward wholeness which is latently present in human being *as such.* In our parable the king's cancellation of the debt is the equivalent of creating a new heart, a new possibility, in the servant. The necessity for his acting mercifully is then grounded in the pressure which comes from the thrust of human existence as such—now recreated—toward wholeness.

I can now deal very quickly with the second question which I raised above. The theological import of the social chaos introduced by the king's withdrawal of forgiveness in the story is that God's forgiveness is not effective unless internalized as a disposition toward other human beings. In the beginning the possibility of freedom for the future is given, and in the end it is taken away. In between it was not actualized by the servant. Therefore, the possibility offered by God himself/herself remains an unfulfilled possibility unless it is enacted by the person. The New Testament narrative understanding of existence in faith does not permit us to think of any moment or situation as existing as it is in itself, defined and self-contained, disengaged from the story process. Each moment—like the cancellation of the servant's debt—can become one thing or another, but it cannot simply remain what it is. If one freezes the moment rather than letting it open out into something new, it becomes a prison—as the unforgiving servant discovered.

Kings of Israel: A Question of Crime and Punishment

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The strains placed upon Israelite society by the creation of the monarchy are perhaps most evident in the legal situation of the king in relation to that of ordinary citizens. Where previously each member of the covenantal group was required (according to the Sinai ideal) to obey the law and to be subject to the rule of law, there is no instance in the text in which the king is brought before a court or charged with a crime by any person other than a representative (prophet, man of God, wise woman) of Yahweh. This extraordinary circumstance would have been the result of the evolution from a locally tribal or community-based society, administered by elders, to one which was more complex, urban and nationally-oriented, and ruled by a hierarchical group of political elites. It also forms the basis in the biblical narrative for a literary reaffirmation by the Deuteronomic and Prophetic editors of the system of divine justice which is designed to demonstrate that the kings were ultimately subject to the jurisdiction of Israelite law.

From the beginning, it seems, there was vocal opposition to the establishment of the monarchy. The anti-monarchic perspective begins with 1 Samuel 8 in which the prophet/judge Samuel warns the people that the monarchy will have the power to demand labor service of their young men and women and take a tenth of their produce to support the crown's activities. He goes on to catalogue abuses of power among the to-be-created power elite in which the king distrubutes favors to his military officers and political allies. Although this material was written after the monarchy was actually established,[1] it very likely reflects the arguments used by Samuel and others (using the model of tyranny and abuse exemplified in the policies of other Near Eastern rulers[2]) against this political step. The anti-monarchical voice[3] sums up its admonition to the people by saying:

> You will cry out because of your king, whom you have chosen for yourselves;
> but the Lord will not answer you in that day. (1 Sam 8:18)[4]

[1] See T. Ishida, *The Royal Dynasties in Ancient Israel* (BZAW 142; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1977) 40–41, for the various suggestions made on the development of the "manner of the kingdom" described here.

[2] I. Mendelsohn, "Samuel's Denunciation of Kingship in the Light of Akkadian Documents from Ugarit," *BASOR* 143 (1956) 17–22. See also J. W. Flanagan, "Chiefs in Israel," *JSOT* 20 (1981) 47–73.

[3] L. Delekat, "Tendenz und Theologie der David-Salomo-Erzahlung," in F. Maass, ed. *Das Ferne und Nahe Wort: Festschrift Leonhard Rost* (Berlin: Topelmann, 1967) 31, contends that the editor/author of the entire court history was anti-monarchical. Countering this view is that of L. M. Eslinger, *Kingship of God in Crisis* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985) 260, who argues against an anti-monarchical viewpoint by the narrator.

[4] Compare Hos 8:4 and 13:10 on the futility of reliance on kings in times of crisis.

In order to reiterate his message, Samuel calls on Yahweh for a miracle which will demonstrate to the people the evil they have done by demanding a king other than Yahweh (1 Sam 12:12–25). Their rebellion ends with a plea of repentance (12:19) and the instruction that the people and their king must "fear . . . serve . . . and hearken" to Yahweh's voice and law. Thus, once the deed has been accomplished, it can only be ended at Yahweh's pleasure, and in the mean time there is no special position granted to the monarch which places him above the law.

To further reinforce this attitude that the king is subject to the law of Yahweh, the Succession Narrative contains a pattern which shows that Yahweh will not allow the king free rein to violate the law with impunity. Although the punishment may not always be exactly the same for the king as it is for an ordinary citizen, it is just as certain and potentially more devastating since it involves the succession to the throne. That, in fact, is the major point to be made here. The king represents more than just his person; he also represents the future of the nation and more especially his own dynasty. When he is punished, it always involves a condemnation of his successors as well.

Coming from a slightly different approach, K. W. Whitelam[5] uses the cases of the David-Bathsheba affair and the execution of Naboth to demonstrate that the king was in fact above the law. He goes on to say that "the only restraint upon the king's conduct appears to have been appeal to divine justice."[6] I basically agree with this position, but I believe that for the biblical writers it is more than a representation of the political realities of the time.

My supposition is based in part on the work of Anthony F. Campbell,[7] who in critiquing the patterning of the Deuteronomic language and form in the work of Walter Dietrich[8] and of Moshe Weinfeld,[9] argues for the existence of a "Prophetic Record" as the basis of much of the narratives' edited form. Campbell notes that some of what Dietrich and Weinfeld attribute to DtrP has pre-dtr origins and several, so-called characteristic dtr phrases (as listed in Weinfeld's appendix, pp. 320–65) are "not tied in any way to dtr themes and theology."[10]

I have isolated six examples of a literary framework which has been imposed upon the Succession Narrative (perhaps by the Prophetic editors), using some pre-dtr phrases as well as some which later can be associated with the dtr editor. It is designed to show that the kings of Israel and Judah were ultimately subject to the law. The examples I wish to discuss here are: Nathan's parable and indictment of David (2 Sam 12:1–14); God's judgment of

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(continued)
See also M. Weinfeld, *Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972) 281, which cites Ps 33:13–17 and its caution to kings not to rely upon military might alone.

[5] K. W. Whitelam, *The Just King, Monarchical Judicial Authority in Ancient Israel* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1979) 170–184.

[6] Ibid., 180.

[7] A. F. Campbell, *Of Prophets and Kings, A Late Ninth-Century Document* (CBQMS 17; Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association, 1986).

[8] W. Dietrich, *Prophetie und Geschichte* (FRLANT 108; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972).

[9] M. Weinfeld, *Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972).

[10] A. F. Campbell, *Of Prophets and Kings*, 25 n. 9.

Solomon's apostasy (1 Kgs 11:11–12) and Ahijah's symbolic rending of his garment (1 Kgs 11:30); Ahijah's condemnation of Jeroboam's house (1 Kgs 14:7–14); Elijah's cursing of Ahab's house (1 Kgs 21:21–29); and Huldah's assessment of the sin of the people and of Josiah (2 Kgs 22:19). These are all portrayed as divinely initiated judgments. There is no direct appeal to Yahweh for justice. Instead, God directs his representatives to take action which will bring the monarch and his dynasty to recognize their guilt.

Each of the above narratives contains the following common elements:

(1) Setting and narration of the criminal activity of the king
(2) Prophet or divine voice confronts king with his crime(s)
(3) King repents or is partially absolved by other factors
(4) Punishment is decreed, but is imposed on the next generation.

In addition, some of these elements are also found in the portion of the Saul cycle which deals with his conflicts with Samuel over their responsibilities as leaders of the people (1 Sam 13–15).

Campbell has also isolated a series of characteristic statements in his study of prophetic speed within these same narratives. Our lists do overlap to a certain extent. However, his aim is to demonstrate how these speech forms are not characteristic of dtr (contra Dietrich and Weinfeld), while my assertions are designed to show another intent on the part of the prophetic editors. One example of this should suffice. All three of the above scholars point to the action of "tearing away the kingdom from the present incumbent" (Campbell, pp. 24–25; Weinfeld, p. 355, #10; Dietrich, p. 86). While Dietrich and Weinfeld argue for this as one of several phrases which can be attributed to dtr vocabulary, Campbell states that despite its use in dtr contexts (1 Kgs 11:11, 13 and 2 Kgs 17:21) that does not prove its dtr origin, only dtr usage.

I accept Campbell's arguments, but again state that my purpose is to show a post-dtr revision of the narratives, whose aim is to reestablish the dictum that all Israelites are subject to Yahweh's judgment. Thus I would assert that the commonalities between these narratives are simply augmented by the recurrent statement (in all but David's case) that God has, or will, cut (*krt*) or rend (*qr'*) the kingdom from the king and/or his descendants: 1 Sam 15:28, Saul; 1 Kgs 11:11, 30, Solomon; 1 Kgs 14:14, Jeroboam; 1 Kgs 21:21, Ahab. The omission in David's case may be due to the special covenantal relationship established with him and his dynasty. It is probably also reflective of the tradition of absolving founders of being "merely human."[11] T. Ishida suggests the covenant also reflects the emergence of the independent character of the Davidic monarchy from its tribal and Saulide roots.[12]

The idea of rending is also somewhat changed in the Josiah narrative. Here it is the king who rends his clothes rather than a prophet (2 Kgs 22:19), but it does not prevent God from invoking his punishment on the kingdom. The action simply displays the penitence of the king for the actions of his predecessors and himself in not obeying the law, either consciously or unconsciously. His action here might best be compared to Ahab's humbling of himself (rending his clothes and wearing sackcloth) in 1 Kgs 21:27.

With these qualifications in mind, I will now examine each of the narratives mentioned above. Particular aspects of the literay framework will be further explained and the pattern more fully drawn.

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[11] Compare the legends that have developed about George Washington and Lenin.

[12] T. Ishida, *Royal Dynasties*, 80–99. Note also the use of this covenant in 1 Kgs 11:11–12 as the basis of Solomon's reprieve.

Samuel and Saul

As the first of the Israelite kings, Saul was a precedent setter. His management of the kingdom and the military established patterns which were either followed or avoided by future rulers. Thus the three episodes in 1 Sam 13–15 depicting his deteriorating relations with Samuel set a tone for future indictments of the kings by prophets.

There are two separate rejections of Saul as king in this narrative. In the first instance, Saul performs a sacrifice. He is brought to task for this usurpation of power by Samuel (compare Jeroboam and the "man of God" in 1 Kgs 13:1–10). This may be a reflection of a historical event, but more importantly it placed the monarchs on notice that there were two powers in the state, represented eventually by palace and temple. As M. Buss[13] notes, the rejection is not an immediate one. Saul will continue to rule for many years. However, he has been put on notice of the raising up of a rival ("the Lord has sought out a man after his own heart"–13:14), something that apparently tormented him (16:14–15).

The second rejection, while again not an immediate prelude to Saul's death, was even more devastating since it humbled him before his army in a moment of supreme triumph. Saul had been ordered to "utterly destroy" (*hrm*) the Amalekites. The war was a success, but Saul, like Achan in Josiah 7, had "stolen" from that which had been "devoted" to God. He spared Agag the Amalekite king and the best of their herds, supposedly for a grand sacrifice to be held in his capital (15:15), but more likely as loot from the battle to be divided among his soldiers (see Judg 5:30). Samuel, at God's instruction, confronts the king, first rhetorically toying with him: "What then is this bleating of sheep in my ears and the lowing of the oxen which I hear?" (v 14), and then pronounces God's judgment with the irrefutable oracular logic: "to obey is better than sacrifice" (v 22).[14]

Words are not enough here. Samuel uses the symbolism associated with Saul's desperation, remarking that just as Saul had torn the prophet's robe seeking another judgment, Yahweh would rend the kingdom from him and give it "to a neighbor of yours" (15:27–28). The only shred of dignity left to Saul in this situation is Samuel's willingness to put on a good "public face" and allow the king to save face before the elders and his military commanders by worshipping Yahweh in recognition of their military victory (v 30).[15] Saul's reign would continue, but it would always be under the cloud of a prophecied premature demise.

As a sort of inclusio to this scene, Samuel's statement of rejection is reiterated in one final, post-mortem confrontation between these two men in 1 Samuel 28. Saul has had the witch of Endor summon up the ghost of Samuel and his shade repeats the prophecy saying "The Lord has torn the kingdom out of your hand, and given it to your neighbor, David" (v 17). The use of David's name (a secret in the first instance) finalizes the transition to a new dynasty. All that remains is for Saul to fight his last battle, see his immediate heirs killed, and recognize the inability to escape Yahweh's justice.

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[13] M. Buss, "The Social Psychology of Prophecy," in J. A. Emerton, ed., *Prophecy: Essays Presented to Georg Fohrer on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (BZAW 150; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980) 8 n. 25.

[14] Compare Hos 6:6; Jer 7:21–24; and Ps 50:5–15 for continuing use of this theme.

[15] See D. M. Gunn, *The Fate of Saul, An Interpretation of a Biblical Story* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980) 70–72, which describes the pathos of this scene.

David and Nathan

In the episode involving David's adulterous affair with Bathsheba (2 Samuel 11–12), there is a more developed form of the motif demonstrating that the king is not above the law. The crime is described in great detail, including his frenzied attempts to get Uriah the Hittite to have relations with his wife. When David's desperation leads him not only to steal another man's wife, but also arrange his death, the scene is set for the second phase of the motif—the appearance of the prophet Nathan.

Nathan's parable (12:1–7), examined in detail in recent studies by S. Lasinell and A. Malamat, like Samuel's sarcastic joking in 1 Sam 15:14, first sets up the king for his ultimate personal fall. The audience already realizes (see 11:27) that David is caught in a legal web created by Nathan's "melodramatic" tale.[16] Just as he condemns the wealthy man in the parable for stealing the sole, precious possession of the poor man, David (having been drawn into the emotion evoking story) is eventually forced to recognize his guilt in stealing Bathsheba from Uriah.[17]

To this point David appears to be unaware of any personal wrongdoing and can judge another man's crimes without discerning his own. However, the king is also faced with the fact that some punishment is necessary in order to expiate his sin (12:8–15). Nathan speaks a curse which subsequently explains the future difficulties which David will have with his heirs (12:10–11). Then the prophet, following the pattern of the literary framework, sets aside the punishment due to David, and places it upon the child of his infidelity (12:13–14).

David's attempt to save the child's life (12:15b–23) through acts of repentence and fasting proved futile and thus added to the recognition that once judgment has been passed it must be carried out without mercy. Although the king had not received the usual sentence for adultery, death (Deut 22:22; Lev 20:10) or exile (Lev 18:20, 29), or even the punishment he himself had decreed (12:5–6), justice was done. He did not escape, and the curse (12:11–12) laid on his family "troubled" the remainder of his reign.[18]

It might also be asked why Bathsheba is not mentioned as an accomplice in the crime. She had also committed adultery. However, the onus of guilt is placed only on David A. Phillips' discussion[19] of the changes in the adultery statutes during the Deuteronomic

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[16] See C. Macholz, "Die Stellung des Königs in der israelitischen Gerichsverfassung," *ZAW* 84 (1972) 165–66, and G. B. Caird, *The Language and Imagery of the Bible* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980) 105, for acceptance of this narrative as a realistic judicial situation in which the prophet posits an actual case based on legal precedent. S. Lasine, "Melodrama as Parable: The Story of the Poor Man's Ewe-Lamb and the Unmasking of David's Topsy-Turvy Emotions," *HAR* 8 (1984) 107, sees David's acceptance of the "reality" of the story as evidence of "the extent of his detachment from the real world in which he had acted so unjustly."

[17] U. Simon, "The Poor Man's Ewe-Lamb: An Example of a Juridical Parable," *Biblica* 48 (1967) 221. Lasine, "Melodrama," 110–111, notes that the lesson comes after the king traps himself and is shaken, at least for the moment, out of his "obliviousness to reality."

[18] J. Rosenberg, *King and Kin, Political Allegory in the Hebrew Bible* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) 39–40, discusses the political context of this parable. See also G. W. Ramsey, "Speech-Forms in Hebrew Law and Prophetic Oracles," *JBL* 96 (1977) 52.

[19] A. Phillips, "Another Look at Adultery," *JSOT* 20 (1981) 14–16. The question also arises about whether Bathsheba was even culpable for the crime since it was David who

reform provides one explanation. He notes that before the 7th century only the male was liable for this crime as a separate legal entity, the woman still functioning legally as an extension of her husband or father. One additional factor might be that the king is the focus of this narrative and it would weaken the impact of the narrative and of the motif to also bring Bathsheba into the picture. In any case, she, like David, suffered with the death of their child (12:18–24).

Solomon and Ahijah

The pattern of crime and punishment continues in Solomon's reign. Despite the traditional portrayal of this king as a wise man, a good administrator, internationalist, and builder, the Deuteronomist centers in on his apostasy in allowing the worship of the gods of his many wives (1 Kgs 11:4–8). This failing, while understandable in a political sense, was unforgivable to the priestly community of Yahweh. It also provided an opening for the Shilonite priesthood to regain some of the power and influence they had lost with the ouster of Abiathar (1 Kgs 2:26–27).[20] Ultimately, it also served as the explanation for the division of the kingdoms in Rehoboam's time—and it is this event that suggests once again our literary framework.

(1) The king had sinned through his worship of other gods.
(2) Initially, Yahweh spoke directly to Solomon, confronting him with his crimes (11:11–13).
(3) As punishment for this violation of the covenant, the kingdom will be rent (*eqra'*) from him and given to his "servant" (compare 1 Sam 15:28).
(4) However, "for the sake of David your father I will not do it in your days, but I will tear it out of the hand of your son" (11:12).

The later appearance of the Ephraimite prophet Ahijah to Jeroboam, a rising, Ephraimite member of Solomon's bureaucracy, fits very well into the list of Solomon's political enemies. Just as Hadad of Edom (11:14–22) and Rezon of Damascus (11:23–25) were raised by Yahweh, according to the Deuteronomist, as foreign adversaries to Solomon's kingdom, Jeroboam, Solomon's former servant, will become an internal threat to his rule.[21] His position is legitimized through the traditional pattern of a prophet designating him as Yahweh's chosen instrument (compare 1 Sam 10:1 and 16:1–13).[22]

J. Holder makes a good point that there is not much attempt to personalize Jeroboam in this narrative. The most that can be said for him is that he was "industrious," but this does not outweigh in the mind of the Deuteronomist the reputation he earns later as the

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(continued)
sent for her. It would have been difficult saying no to a king (see the result for Vashti in Esther 1:12–22).

[20] R. R. Wilson, *Prophecy and Society in Ancient Israel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) 185.

[21] R. L. Cohn, "Literary Technique in the Jeroboam Narrative," *ZAW* 97 (1985) 26, notes this pattern of adversaries and that it is broken with the reference to the "servant." He describes this as an echo of the earlier prophecy (1 Kgs 14:11) that Solomon's kingdom would be given to his servant.

[22] R. R. Wilson, *Prophecy and Society*, 186.

penultimate evil king.[23] The dramatic act of tearing his robe and giving Jeroboam 10 pieces (1 Kgs 11:30–31) was Ahijah's way to tie his pronouncement to earlier political events. It could easily be compared to the division of the Levite's concubine into 12 pieces (Judg 19:29) or to Saul's division of his team of oxen into pieces (1 Sam 11:7). Both of these actions signalled a stirring up of the tribes to take action against an enemy. However, the most likely comparison Ahijah wished to make was with 1 Sam 15:27–28 where Saul inadvertently tore Samuel's robe and the prophet used this to symbolize the tearing of the kingdom away from Saul and his family.[24]

Jeroboam and Ahijah

Once the separation of the kingdoms had taken place, Jeroboam found himself faced with the political necessity of differentiating his new kingdom from the one to the south. He thus chose the policy which would give him greatest control over the affairs, political and religious, of his people and bring them into more harmonious relations with their neighbors. The establishment of cult centers at Dan and Bethel are not a rejection of Yahweh as much as they are an assertion of political and religious independence from the Zadokite priesthood of Solomon's temple and the Davidic monarchy in Jerusalem.[25]

In the process of gaining their independence, however, Jeroboam revived some old syncretistic beliefs (golden calves, Exod 32:4, parallels golden calves in 1 Kgs 12:28 as well as the worship of Baal in the Canaanite nature cult)[26] and fostered popularly based places of worship, the high places (12:31a), which further removed the people's minds from Jerusalem. Also, his appointment of non-Levitical priests to officiate in the new cultic sites (12:31b; 13:33) dashed the ambitions of the Shilonite priesthood, which Ahijah had represented when he designated Jeroboam as king.

This failure of fortunes could explain why Ahijah is at Shiloh when he is consulted by Jeroboam's wife instead of at Bethel or Dan.[27] It also sets the stage for the rejection of Jeroboam as king, and again it should be noted that this is not a signal for an immediate end to his reign. Ahijah's curse, which is a parallel to the curse of Elijah on Ahab's family (1 Kgs 21:20–24) and thus may be formulaic, contains the elements we have seen before: recitation of sin, judgment based on a violation of God's trust/covenant with the king, pronouncement of punishment, and the immediate implementation of that punishment on a royal child (1 Kgs 14:7–19; compare 2 Sam 12:7–14).

One element that is missing in the pattern, however, is the cry for forgiveness by the king. Jeroboam is never depicted as being remorseful (not even in the intrusive prophetic legend in 1 Kgs 13:1–10 in which his arm is withered). He recognizes the power of Yahweh's representatives (13:6 and 14:3), but is not willing to recognize them or Yahweh as the sole sources of power in Israel. In their disgust with "Jeroboam's sin," the Deuteronomists found no need for further dialogue between the king and prophet (especially if it would weaken their portrayal of this model of evil). Jeroboam had chosen

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[23] J. Holder, "The Presuppositions, Accusations, and Threats of 1 Kings 14:1–18," *JBL* 107 (1988) 27–38.

[24] J. Gray, *I & II Kings* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970) 295. See also R. L. Cohn, "Literary Techniques," 27, for the "sound play" between the robe (*salma*) which Ahijah tears and the kingdom of Solomon (*Šĕlomo*), which is torn from the king.

[25] T. Ishida, *Royal Dynasties*, 147.

[26] J. Gray, *I & II Kings*, 315.

[27] R. R. Wilson, *Prophecy and Society*, 186.

to introduce rivals to Yahweh and he is said to have continued this practice throughout his reign despite warnings from representatives of God (13:33).

Jeroboam had been an agent of Yahweh's will and had refused to remain a part of the changes his kingship were created to engineer. As R. L. Cohn has noted in his study of this narrative,[28] "God's agent can become God's victim if he does not remain true to his calling."[29] The political initiative of Yahweh that includes Jeroboam's rise to power is now to be swept away totally by another agent of change, Baasha (15:27–30). Neither man, however, is given any special attributes or basis for the foundation of a long lasting dynasty.[30] Their actions simply form the basis of a new destructive political pattern in the northern kingdom, succession by assassination.

Ahab and Elijah

Perhaps the best example of the motif demonstrating "the king is not above the law" is found in the Ahab narrative. Each of the steps in the motif are clearly present, with no need for explanations of omission or literary sidesteps. This is due to the Deuteronomic reworking of the original story (contained in 1 Kgs 21:1–19a).[31] In 21:19b–29 is found a continuation/theological conclusion of the story[32] which has been appended to the narrative and which consciously completes our literary framework.

Following the stages of the framework (step 1), Ahab's crime is one of benefiting from the illegal actions of his Phoenician wife Jezebel. He had attempted to purchase or barter for a vineyard owned by Naboth. Upon being refused, the king had no legal recourse to obtain the land.[33] It was only through the false charges laid against Naboth at Jezebel's command[34] and his precipitate execution by stoning (2 Kgs 9:26 adds his sons to the execution), that Ahab was able, as the ultimate heir to property within the kingdom, to claim ownership of land belonging to a "traitor."[35]

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[28] R. L. Cohn, "Literary Techniques," 33, describes this with regard to the story of the "man of God," which separates the two portions on Jeroboam's sins.

[29] This might be compared to the vineyard metaphor in Isa 5:1–6.

[30] J. Holder, "Presuppositions," 34, takes this further by saying that the story contains an editorial presupposition: "There is only one legitimate representation of Yahweh's power and presence, viz., the ark in Jerusalem." Jeroboam's acts have thus managed to "provoke Yahweh to anger" by casting "Yahweh behind his back."

[31] H. Schmoldt, "Elijas Botschaft an Ahab: Uberlegungen zum Werdegang von 1 Kon 21," *BN* 26 (1985) 39–52, identifies vv 1–16 as the original Naboth incident and posits a pre-dtr core for the threats of the prophet found in vv 17–19a, 21, 24. for additional discussion of dtr and pre-dtr breakdown of these verses, see A. F. Campbell, *Of Prophets and Kings*, 96–99.

[32] J. M. Miller, "The Fall of the House of Ahab," *VT* 17 (1967) 312. A. Rofe, "The Vineyard of Naboth: the Origin and Message of the Story," *VT* 38 (1988) 101–102, points to a post-exilic origin ofr the final form of the story.

[33] F. I. Anderson, "The Socio-Juridical Background of the Naboth Incident," *JBL* 85 (1966) 48. Compare the land transaction in Jer 32:6–15.

[34] J. Gray, *I & II Kings*, 435 and 441, discuss the synthesis of Israelite and Canaanite concepts of monarchic privilege brought about through this marriage alliance.

[35] J. Weingreen, *From Bible to Mishna: The Continuity of Tradition* (London: Manchester University Press, 1976) 88. See also K. W. Whitelam, *The Just King*, 175–176.

As the king steps off the boundaries of his new property, he is confronted (step 2 of the motif) by the prophet Elijah. Here once again the idea of "cutting" (21:21, *wĕbikbrati*) is used in connection with the punishment of the miscreant monarch. Elijah then curses Ahab and his family, comparing their fate to that of Jeroboam (14:10–11), and consigning them to the same fate of being left unburied, their bodies mutilated and consumed by dogs and birds (21:22–24).[36]

Step 3 in the framework is found in Ahab's abject repentance for his sins: "he rent (*wĕyiqra'*) his clothes, and put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted and lay in sackcloth, and went about dejectedly" (21:27). These traditional acts of mourning "cover" the blood guilt for Naboth,[37] and could be compared to the actions which David ordered Joab to perform in mourning for Abner in 2 Sam 3:31. They also form the the basis for step 4 of the framework. In a rhetorical question reminiscent of Job 1:8, Yahweh asks the prophet if he has "seen how Ahab has humbled himself" (21:29a). Such action is sufficient to delay the decreed punishment, leaving the evil to come "in his son's days" (21:29b).[38]

Josiah and Huldah

The final example of this literary framework to be discussed involves the finding of the "Book of the Law" by Josiah's advisers and its validation by the prophetess Huldah.[39] In this particular instance, however, the likelihood is that the motif we have been discussing was known to the prophetess. Her failure to accurately forecast Josiah's future suggests that she used the motif to strengthen, through traditional wisdom, her political prediction prior to actual events.[40]

Josiah reigned at the end of the Assyrian hegemony over the Near East.[41] With their approaching demise at the hands of the Chaldeans, there were new political opportunities, which Josiah made full use of in his expansion into Samaria (2 Kgs 23:15–20). To further speed his political expansion and a revival of nationalism, Josiah, in a clearly anti-Assyrian mode, cleansed the temple in Jerusalem and instituted a religious reform (compare Hezekiah's reform for similar reasons in 2 Kgs 18:3–6).[42]

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[36] See O. Margalith, "The KĔLABIM of Ahab," *VT* 34 (1984) 228–231, for discussion of this curse and comparisons with the Cybele-Dionysus cult.

[37] See also A. Rofe, "The Vineyard of Naboth," 95, who suggest the humbling is "the contribution of a later author who hastened to correct the prophecy in order to harmonize it with following events."

[38] E.T. Mullen, Jr., "The Royal Dynastic Grant to Jehu and the Structure of the Books of Kings," *JBL* 107/2 (1988) 194, suggests that "Dtr was able to explain the duration of the house [of Omri] by virtue of the pietistic response of Ahab to the prophetic condemnation delievered by Elijah." Yahweh then "postpones the punishment until the days of Ahab's offspring . . . until the time of Jehoram (2 Kgs 9:22–37)."

[39] Ibid., 726, discusses why Huldah was consulted rather than Jeremiah or Zephaniah.

[40] A. Brenner, *The Israelite Woman, Social Role and Literary Type in Biblical Narrative* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985) 60.

[41] See M. Cogan, *Imperialism and Religion: Assyria, Judah and Israel in the Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.C.E.* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1974), for discussion of the political situation.

[42] See J. M. Miller and J. H. Hayes, *A History of Ancient Israel and Judah* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986) 397–401, for a full treatment of the stages of Josiah's reform.

Once the "Book of the Law"[43] was read to the king, the stages of the motif begin. Although Josiah is described as one who "did what was right in the eyes of the Lord" (2 Kgs 22:2), he realized upon hearing the stipulations of the law that he and the people were in clear violation of this covenant (step 1). Variation on our pattern then occurs in step 2 when the king takes the initiative to consult the prophetess to authenticate the book. In every previous case it has been the divine representative or God who has taken the initiative to approach the king. This variation again argues for the artificial usage of the framework by Huldah in her pronouncement.

Huldah 's prophetic speech in 2 Kgs 22:15–20 contains steps 3 and 4. She describes the punishment due the people for their sins, but takes note of how Josiah has humbled himself before Yahweh: "you have rent (*wĕtiqra'*) your clothes and wept before me" (22:19). Thus the judgment is delayed (step 4) until after Josiah's reign. Clearly, Huldah was speaking before the debacle at Megiddo[44] in which Josiah was killed in battle (23:29). Her words encourage the king to move ahead with his political expansion and religious reform, but they also demonstrate the use of well known prophetic motifs for political purposes.

Conclusion

It has been shown in this study that a literary framework has been imposed on or used in portions of the Succession Narrative. The most likely source of this motif is the "Prophetic Record" as formulated by the prophetic editors in the period after 500 B.C.E. Its purpose springs from the need to demonstrate that the kings were not free to operate above the law. They were subject to divine justice and the size of their kingdoms and the longevity of their dynasties depended upon their adherence to the same covenant that was imposed on all of the people. Certainly, some kings of Israel and Judah did consider themselves above the law and acted accordingly. It became one of the tasks of the prophetic editors to show that current and future difficulties arose from this royal attitude.

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[43] See M. Weinfeld, "Deuteronomy—the Present State of the Inquiry," *JBL* 86 (1967) 249–262, for discussion of the relationship between the "Book of the Law" and the current book of Deuteronomy.

[44] See A. Malamat, "Josiah's Bid for Armageddon, the Background of the Judean-Egyptian Encounter in 609 B.C.," *JANES* 5 (1973) 271.

Mission in Matthew: The Second Discourse as Narrative

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In his thought-provoking structural commentary on Matthew's faith, Daniel Patte writes concerning the Second Discourse (10:5b–42)

> If this section was narrative in character—if it was organized according to the unfolding of a plot—it would be concluded by the description of the disciples carrying out their mission and coming back to Jesus with a report on the outcome of what they did. But nowhere in the Gospel do we find any mention that the disciples actually went on mission and came back to Jesus. Thus, from the outset it appears that this section is *not* narrative in character.[1]

This paper suggests otherwise. It attempts to show that what holds together the blocks of mostly traditional Jesus sayings in Matthew's Second Discourse is not merely themes, as Patte argues, but in fact a story that not only fits into the gospel's larger narrative structure but forms an essential part of it. I want to show how this story emerges from the evangelist's careful combination of traditional Jesus sayings and sayings which I suspect are Matthean creations.[2]

This approach to Matthew's Second Discourse rests on the claim of structuralist theory that:

> each narrative has two parts: a story (*histoire*), the content or chain of events (actions, happenings), plus what may be called the existents (characters, items of setting); and a discourse (*discours*), that is, the expression, the means by which the content is communicated. In simple terms, the story is the *what* in a narrative that is depicted, discourse the *how*.[3]

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[1] Daniel Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (Fortress Press: 1987) 138.

[2] These include most especially the difficult sayings of 10:5b on the particularist mission to Israel and 10:23b on not having gone through all the towns of Israel before the Son of man comes. The historical critical approach to these sayings has generally treated these sayings as independent of their Matthean context. See, e.g., Donald A. Hagner, "The *Sitz im Leben* of the Gospel of Matthew," Consultation on Matthew, SBL Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, 1985.

For a redactional critical study of the Second Discourse using the two-source theory as a working hypothesis, see my dissertation, "Mission and Discipleship in Matthew: A Redaction-Critical Study of Mt 10:34" (University Microfilms International: Ann Arbor, MI, 1979).

[3] Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse; Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Cornell University Press: 1978) 19.

This basic distinction between story and discourse allows for seeing narrative structure as expressed through either performance or text, e.g., ballet, a comic strip, tapestry, or an epic poem. The author of Matthew's gospel, I want to argue, has expertly used traditional units of Jesus-sayings as *discourse* in order to tell a *story* which does indeed unfold in the course of the Second Discourse.

How the narrator craftily prepares the reader for the story within the discourse will be the subject of Part I of this study. This will be followed in Part II by a proposed outline of the "plot" of the story and an analysis using Barthes' identification of "kernels" and "satellites." Finally, Part III will consider how the story within the Second Discourse fits into the narrative framework of the gospel as a whole, giving further impetus I hope to approaching this neglected discourse in a fresh and insightful way.[4]

I. The Narrative Frame of Matt 9:35–11:1

Frans Neirynck has shown that in the only truly original order of Matthew (4:23–11:1), the evangelist was inspired by the traditional scheme of presenting Jesus' teaching (5–7) and work (8–9) which are then continued by his disciples (10).[5] But the miracle story immediately preceding the Second Discourse, namely, the cure of the dumb demoniac in 9:32–34, prepares the reader in a special way for what is to come. This briefly-told tale offers the alert reader an exquisite image: an encounter with Jesus enabling *a dumb man to speak*. The interaction between Jesus and the cured man now empowered to speak immediately draws two opposing responses. One is reassuringly affirmative: "the *crowds* marveled, saying, 'Never was anything like this seen in Israel' "(v 33). The other is fearsomely ominous: "But the *Pharisees* said, 'He casts out demons by the prince of demons.' "[6]

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[4] The Second Discourse as a whole has received little attention: see, G. Baumbach, "Die Mission im Matthäus-Evangelium," *TLZ* 92 (1967) 889–93; S. Brown, "The Two-Fold Representation of the Mission in Matthew's Gospel," *ST* 31 (1977) 21–32; S. Brown, "The Mission to Israel in Matthew's Central Section (Mt 9.35–11.1)," *ZNW* 69 (1977) 73–90; S. Brown, "The Matthean Community and the Gentile Mission," *NovT* 22 (1980) 193–221; L. Cerfaux, *Discours de Mission* (Paris: 1956); L. Cerfaux, "La Mission de Galilée dans la tradition synoptique," *Recueil L. Cerfaux*, 1 (Gembloux: 1954) 425–69; L. Cerfaux, "La mission apostolique des Douze et sa portée eschatologique," *Mélanges E. Tisserant* (Rome: 1964) 43–66; L. Deiss, "Le Discours apostolique ou le Discours de Mission. Mt 10," *Spir* 12 (1961) 281–91; 16 (1963) 245–56: F. C. Grant, "The Mission of the Disciples, Mt 9:35–11:1 and Parallels," *JBL* 35 (1916) 293–314; J. Grassi, "The Last Testament-Succession Literary Background of Matthew 9:35–11:1 and Its Significance," *BTB* 7 (1977) 172–76; R. E. Morosco, "Redaction Criticism and the Evangelical: Matthew 10 A Test Case," *JETS* 22 (1979) 323–331; J. Radermakers, "La Mission, engagement radical. Une lecture de Mt 10," *NRT* 93 (1971) 1072–85.

[5] R. Neirynck, "La rédaction matthéenne et la structure du Premier Évangile," *De Jésus aux Évangiles* (Gembloux: 1969) 41–73.

[6] According to H. J. Held ("Matthew as Interpreter of the Miracle Stories," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew* [Philadelphia: 1963] 247), this last pericope within the collection of miracle stories of Matthew 8–9 serves to underscore "how people behave in the presence of the miraculous activity of Jesus." The doublet in Matt 12:22–24 involves a blind and deaf demoniac whose cure by Jesus touches off the Beelzebul controversy with the blind-guide Pharisees.

In this healing important issues of the mission discourse are already present in miniature: mission to Israel and healing, rejection by the Pharisees and defamation. Thus the threatening response of the Pharisees accusing Jesus of demonic power in 9:34 provides an important clue to the narrative that will unfold in the discourse ahead, but it is not the only one.

Also valuable for grasping and appreciating the message of the mission discourse is Jesus' actual cure of the dumb demoniac, giving power to the man to speak. For in the discourse that follows references to speech frequently occur: those sent out are to proclaim the Kingdom, when dragged into court are not to be anxious about how to speak or what to say, for one will be given in that hour what to say for the Spirit will speak through them, they are to utter in the light and proclaim from the housetops, and acknowledge publicly affiliation with Jesus. But one reference to speech within the discourse threatens the validity of all the rest.[7] This is the story about to be told which will include a poignant reversal of the miracle story.

II. The Story Within the Discourse

One way to approach the story within the Second Discourse is by way of plot. In a classic article, Roland Barthes identifies two main classes of units—functions and indices—as the smallest meaningful segments of narrative discourse. Within each of these, Barthes distinguishes two subclasses. Some functions "constitute real hinge points of the narrative (or a fragment of the narrative); others merely 'fill in' the narrative space separating the hinge functions."[8] The former Barthes calls *noyau*, translated by Chatman as "kernels," and the latter *catalyse*, translated as "satellites."[9]

Kernels are cardinal functions presenting alternatives which bear directly on the subsequent development of the story. They represent risky moments within the story, when the story is opened up to taking different directions. Satellites function within narratives as fillers, circumstances or consequences following from the kernel. What and how satellites fill in between kernels is of interest since so much must be left out. Both logic and temporality come into play in reading narratives.

Does the Second Discourse present a plot in which some actions or events can be identified as "kernels" and others as consequential units? Is there an unfolding, a cause-effect chain of events? The outline on the next page suggests there is.

A full discussion of this proposed outline of the plot within the Second Discourse cannot be undertaken here but let us consider more closely at least the three kernels identified above.

a. Matt 10:5–6 as the first "kernel"

For my analysis of the story within the Second Discourse, Matt 10:5a is vital. It states clearly: "These twelve Jesus sent out, charging them" [*Toutous tous dōdeka apesteilen ho Iēsous parangeilas autois*]. This verse Patte studiously avoids commenting on, arguing rather that "nowhere in the Gospel do we find any mention that the disciples actually went on

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[7] The text which introduces this negative use of speech is peculiar to Matthew, namely, 10:25b on Jesus being "called" Beelzebul; see below.

[8] R. Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," reprinted in *A Barthes Reader* (ed. Susan Sontag; New York: 1982) 265.

[9] See Chatman, *Story and Discourse*, 53–56.

mission. . . ." But I suggest that the reader is justified in assuming that if Jesus sent them out, they went. (The text, after all, doesn't say that *they didn't go!*)

KERNEL: Initiation; Jesus sends out the 12 to Israel (10:5–6)
satellites:
  circumstances:
    what to do: preach and heal
    how to travel: no money or food
    where to go: villages and homes
  consequences:
    inhospitality
    persecution
    deliverance
    endurance required

KERNEL: Turning point: Moving On (v 23); New Persecution (v 25)
satellites:
  circumstances:
    what to do: fear not, continue mission
    why do it: motivating maxims
  consequences:
    verbal abuse internalized
    mission comes to a standstill
    turning inward to family/self
    hard sayings

KERNEL: Closure: Open-ended promises (v 40–42)

The idea that the disciples did go is given narrative support in several ways within the gospel. First, the saying of Jesus in 9:38 emphasizes the urgency of the ripe harvest and the lack of workers. This surely calls for the disciples being sent out immediately instead of waiting until some later date—as if this were merely a dress rehearsal. Second, the naming of the twelve disciples as "apostles" in the opening verses of the chapter leads naturally to their being sent out, as the narrative states. Third, the discourse ends with the formula "And when Jesus had finished instructing his twelve disciples, he went on from there to teach and preach in their cities" (11:1) with no mention of the disciples. Not until chapter 12 are the disciples mentioned again while chapter 11 has Jesus upbraid the cities of Israel for rejection—at the very time one can imagine the disciples as on their mission. In fact, the entire chapter 11 reads nicely as filling in the picture of disciples on a failed mission to Israel: the initial confusion of John the Baptist concerning Jesus; Jesus' words praising the Baptist, but also claiming that the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he; the upbraiding of the Israelite towns; and the gentle ministry of Jesus contrasted with those whose teachings burden and oppress. Finally, when the disciples do reappear in the narrative, they are described as *hungry,*[10] a possible link with the Markan tradition which reads:

[10] The explanatory note that "the disciples were hungry" is peculiar to Matthew; cp. Mark 2:23.

> When the apostles returned to Jesus, and told him all that they had done and taught. And he said to them, "Come away by yourselves to a lonely place, and rest a while." For many were coming and going, *and they had no leisure to eat.* (Mark 6:30)

As Patte rightly notes, there is no mention of the disciples' departure and return in Matthew's story (as in Mark 6:12–13, 30 and Luke 9:6, 10; 10:17–20). But this omission allows the narrator in Matthew to avoid any hint of the mission being a success, as reported within the synoptic tradition by Mark and Luke. Rather as the Matthean Jesus sends out his disciples the picture that emerges is clearly one of failure: this mission will meet first with rejection in the form of inhospitality (10:11–14), then active persecution (vv 16–23), and finally defamation (vv 24–25). In fact, as the first half of the discourse unfolds, it becomes impossible to imagine this mission as succeeding!

The overwhelming character of the opening verses of the mission discourse is negative. The charge itself is laden with prohibitions: "Among the Gentiles go not, and into towns of Samaritans enter not." Nine more negatives tumble forth within eleven verses: no gold, no silver, no copper, no bag, no sandals, no staff, not worthy, not received nor listened to. This is a narrative set-up. All the cues in the text suggest that reaction to this mission, pointedly identified as exclusively to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel," will be negative. Jesus' gives concluding advice: leave that house or town (v 14); rejection will end in condemnation (v 15).[11]

The next block of Jesus-sayings[12] details persecutions incited by Jews: "for they will deliver you up to councils, and flog you in their synagogues," "dragged before governors and kings" having to defend yourself, and suffering family betrayals, "you will be hated by all." This unit of persecution-texts ends with similar counsel: flee (v 23). Both words of advice: "shake off the dust from your feet as you leave" and "flee to the next town" underscore the overwhelmingly negative response expected from the exclusive mission to Israel and *the need to move on.*[13]

This advice actually inaugurates the next kernel, the turning point, and sets the stage for the second half of the discourse. Even more, this advice anticipates the final commission "to all nations" in Matthew's gospel finale.

To summarize: the first kernel is a burst of energy—Jesus sends out the apostles. The circumstances list pitfalls to be avoided. The mission charge is circumscribed with care, but the consequence is still failure. The narrative moves from personal affronts to synagogue beatings to trials in the civil court. The energy of the mission meets resistance at every turn, giving way finally to the apocalyptic woes of treachery even within families and universal hatred which precede the coming of the Son of man.

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[11] Negatives punctuate both the Markan and Q traditions of the mission charges but Matthew out-negatives them both; positive responses to the mission are suppressed; cp. Luke 10:8–9.

[12] See Mark 13:9–13 where this block of sayings appears in roughly the same form but in the context of the apocalyptic discourse.

[13] Again, this emphasis on *moving on* appears to be Matthean; cp. Mark 6:11 and Luke 9:5–6 and 10:10–12.

b. Matt 10:23–25: Second "Kernel"

The second kernel of the story-plot within the Second Discourse appears in vv 23–25. The exclusive mission to Israel will end before it is completed; there will not be enough time before the Son of man comes. ***But Jewish persecution will continue in the form of maligning.*** Again a saying unique to Matthew carries the weight of the story. The saying ("A disciple is not above his teacher . . . ") has a Lukan parallel (21:18–19), but the Matthean version adds a pointed reference to defamation:

> If they have called the master of the house Beelzebul, how much more those of his household (10:25b).

Note that in this text Jesus is "called" [*epekalesan*] Beelzebul, specifying maligning as the ongoing form of Jewish persecution of disciples. The sayings following this "kernel" within the plot fill in the consequences of this maligning. Within the first half of the discourse the disciples actively carry out the mission and then become the victims of violent persecution. Even in the passive roles of being beaten or dragged into court, disciples are able to give external witness, as vv 18–20 testify. But verbal violence strikes within. It is easily internalized, going deep into the self, creating fear and self-doubt. It is meant to have a paralyzing effect.

Whereas the first half of the discourse is filled with activity, the second half brings the mission to a standstill. Repeated mission imperatives—to utter, speak out, not fear but acknowledge publicly—suggest their opposites: a failure to proclaim what they hear in secret or to proclaim it from the housetops or to acknowledge openly their discipleship to Jesus. The first half of the discourse focuses on the failure of Israel, the second on a failure of discipleship.

The source of the disciples' malaise and consequent withdrawal from apostleship can be traced back to vv 23–25. It is here that the mood of the discourse changes drastically. Earlier one can envision courageous and obedient missioners, empowered by Jesus and bolstered by the Spirit, carrying out the mission charge. But the imperatives immediately following vv 23–25 suggest not that disciples *are* boldly proclaiming the message of the kingdom from housetops but that they need to be charged again, encouraged anew, and prodded on by threats. In a poignant reversal of the miracle story in which Jesus empowered a dumb man to speak, Jewish slander has silenced the disciples. *Defamation has made the missioners dumb!*

This disabling of the disciples by verbal abuse rallies the rest of the discourse.[14] To a list of motivating maxims, Jesus adds the arresting assertion that he did not come to bring peace but a sword. The sword undercuts both patriarchal authority (a man is separated from his father, a daughter from her mother . . .) and any claims of the primacy of familial bonds (whoever loves father or mother more than me . . .). Family concerns and self interests have taken the place of the mission within disciples' lives. In reaction to a failed mission to Israel and Jewish discreditation, they have understandably turned inward. Loss of a mission perspective has put their own discipleship to Jesus at risk. Fittingly, the hard sayings about carrying one's cross and losing one's life bring to a climax these strong

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[14] It is the connection between being verbally abused and its effect upon mission that is special here. E.g., Luke 6:28 counters a preceding woe of being well-spoken of with: "Bless those who curse, pray for those who abuse you" but there is no connection made with mission, as there is in Matthew.

rebukes against a timorous, self-serving discipleship.

To summarize: resistance to the mission in the first half of the narrative discourse is described in terms of *externals:* inhospitality, floggings, court trials, family betrayals. In the second half of the discourse, resistance changes to *internals* because the outward accusations have become internalized. The satellites following this second kernel are filled with advice for the preacher suddenly silent from self-doubt. Don't be afraid, don't worry over what is hidden or not known. The negative limits which focused the missionary charge in the first half are also present in the second half, but with an important difference. As noted, the negatives in the first half are about limiting focus in the fact of external factors: dressing style, location, destination. In this new piece of the narrative discourse, after the turning point, the direction is from inside out, encouraging the flickering flame with new imperatives. Endurance in the first part means persevering against the various forms of outside resistance. Endurance in the second half means overcoming the inner fears and doubts that can silence any witness to Christ.

c. Matt 10:40–42: The Third Kernel

How this story will end is an open question. The last three sayings of Jesus conclude the discourse on a positive note: those who carry on the mission and thereby evoke even the slightest response of compassion will bring eternal reward [*mistbos*] to themselves and to those who receive them.[15] As a number of commentators have recognized, though they are divided on their interpretation, these verses evoke Jesus' final parable on the Last Judgment, where giving a cup of cold water merits entrance into the Kingdom.[16] Placed here in the narrative, these sayings hint at what will be fully disclosed only in the parable: that mercy for those in need will be the universal measure of judgment.

The crowds who people the narrative immediately preceding the sending of the twelve are depicted completely in terms of need: "When he saw the crowds, he had compassion for them, because they were harassed and helpless, like sheep without a shepherd." Jesus sends his disciples in direct response to the needs of the crowds. At the same time Jesus sends out his own disciples with directives that leave them exposed, vulnerable, defenseless. They are to go without provisions, without money, extra clothing, sandals, or staff. They are to be at the mercy of those to whom they proclaim the kingdom. Thus both those who are sent and those who receive them share a common ground, human need. They begin on a basis of mutuality. And at the End, they will be measured by the same rule: compassion for those in need.

To summarize: the third kernel within the narrative discourse is a pointer to Final Judgment, giving the concerns around mission their full eschatological weight. What is ultimately at issue within the discourse therefore is the universal significance of Jesus and what this requires of those who follow him.

Part III: The Mission Story within the Gospel

Matthew's story of Jesus begins with a genealogy as preface to his birth and ends with a resurrection appearance to his eleven disciples on a mountain in Galilee. Set within this time frame, the storyline of the Second Discourse is that Jesus indeed sent out his twelve

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[15] In Matthew, *mistbos*, like the Father, is secret and heavenly (cf. Matt 5:46; 6:2, 5, 16).

[16] See, e.g., J. R. Michaels, "Apostolic Hardship and Righteous Gentiles. A Study of Matthew 25.31–46," *JBL* 84 (1965) 27–37 and L. Cope, "Matthew xxv:31–46—The Sheep and Goats Reinterpreted," *NovT* 11 (1969) 32–44.

disciples to Israel but they were rejected as he was. The verse sealing this fateful choice comes later in Matthew's story when the people answer Pilate eager to release Jesus: "His blood be on us and on our children!" Storywise, this rejection ends the mission to Israel.

Regarding the disciples' exclusive mission to Israel, only the first ten or so verses of the discourse can be imagined as happening during the time of Jesus' own ministry. They were sent to preach and heal, with specifics on how to enter new territory, and they were rejected. Acknowledgement of that rejection comes in Jesus' conclusion: "it shall be more tolerable on the day of judgment for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah." As noted earlier, Jesus' chastisement of the towns of Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum in the following chapter occurs precisely when the disciples are on their mission.

But the persecution texts of 10:16–23 receive no narrative support in the rest of Matthew's gospel. Nothing suggests that the disciples were dragged into synagogues during Jesus' ministry or chased from town to town. These same predictions, however, reappear in Jesus' castigation of the scribes and Pharisees immediately before he departs from the temple and predicts its destruction:

> Therefore I am sending you prophets and wise men and teachers. Some of them you will kill and crucify; others you will flog in your synagogues and pursue from town to town (23:34).

Here the time between prediction and fulfillment collapses into one historical moment. Though realized only *after* Jesus' death, these persecutions of disciples derive their meaning and purpose from the rejection Jesus already suffered in life and especially in death. The apocalyptic signs accompanying Jesus' death and the Epiphany/Appearance on the mountain in Galilee suggest a proleptic coming of the Son of man ending the mission to Israel, as predicted at the time of the first sending (10:23).

From the start the advice Jesus gave for response to rejection was to leave (v 14) and flee (v 23). In other words, embedded in the text along with rejection is the idea to move on. This prepares for the final commissioning as well as for what follows in the second half of the discourse. This chain of events fits the gospel narrative by clearing the way for the Risen Jesus' Final Commissioning of the eleven disciples[17] to go to all the nations.

The second half of the story, of a mission stalemated by discreditation, fits Matthew's gospel in a different way, although it too prepares for the final scene of commissioning. It pulls together and focuses upon related concerns expressed throughout the gospel. Most often these concerns are directly addressed by Jesus to the disciples (and the reader), as in this passage early in the Sermon of the Mount:

> You are the salt of the earth; but if salt has lost its taste, how shall its saltness be restored? It is no longer good for anything except to be thrown out and trodden under foot by men. You are the light of the world. A city set on a hill cannot be hid. Nor do men light a lamp and put it under a bushel, but on a stand, and it gives light to all the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven. (5:13–16)

This text anticipates beautifully the situation described in the second half of the mission discourse, of disciples who have been charged to proclaim the good news but who have

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[17] Judas' faithless death changes the number 12, symbolic of Israel, to 11. These eleven receive a new commission.

become dumb. They are exactly like salt losing its savor and like lighted lamps put under bushel baskets. Even more revealing is the fact that this passage follows immediately the beatitude addressed directly to the disciples: "Blessed are you when men *revile* you and *persecute* you and *utter all kinds of evil against you falsely* on my account." This is the very connection the story in the Second Discourse makes between verbal abuse and its effect upon discipleship.

Other texts focus on the issue of maligning as well. Matthew's retelling of the controversy of disciples plucking corn on the Sabbath has Jesus address the accusing Pharisees: "And if you had known what this means, "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice," *you would not have condemned the guiltless.*"[18] And again, in the controversy of the washing of the hands, Jesus challenges the Pharisees and scribes on what truly defiles: "For out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, *false witness, slander. These are what defile* a person. . . ."[19] Following the account of the Beelzebul controversy the Matthean Jesus accosts the scribes and Pharisees: "You brood of vipers! how can you *speak good,* when you are evil?" (12:33–37).

Perhaps most telling of all is the story unique to Matthew's gospel of how the guards at the tomb were paid off to say Jesus' body was stolen by his disciples. "So they took the money and did as they were directed; and this story has been spread among the Jews *to this day.*" This last incident stands between the rest of the gospel and the Risen Lord's Final Commissioning, giving a vivid example of the malicious verbal assaults and false testimony being perpetrated among Jews against Christian claims.

In sum, the first part of the story within the Second Discourse fits into the narrative framework of Matthew's story by detailing an exclusive mission to Israel that was soundly rejected and ended, thus preparing for the Final Commission on the end of the gospel. The second part of that story prepares for the Final Commissioning by focusing upon the essential need of discipleship to carry out a mission in spite of Jewish rejection and defamation.

Conclusion

On first reading, the Second Discourse seems didactic, even dull and unimaginative. But this study argues, based on the structuralist distinction between *story* and *discourse,* that a dramatic story of mission life unfolds within the Second Discourse by means of a careful arrangement of traditional Jesus-sayings and sayings of Jesus at key moments which are peculiar to Matthew, viz., the exclusive mission to Israel in 10:5–6 and the end of that mission but continuing Jewish persecution in the form of maligning in 10:23–25. These two texts function as the "kernels" or major moments within the story while the remaining Jesus-sayings function as "satellites" by filling in the circumstances and consequences. The first half of the discourse captures the story of a mission courageously carried out exclusively to Israel but rejected as predicted. But the second half tells of apathy replacing commitment, of a mission shut down by rejection and defamation, thereby posing a serious threat to discipleship itself. Both parts of this mission story, I have argued, fit into the larger narrative of Matthew's gospel. Thus I have attempted to show there is actually a plot or chain of events that unfolds within the discourse as part of a story that not only breathes life into these traditional teachings but quickens the gospel as a whole.

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[18] *Oikodespotēs* is clearly Matthean and *oikiakos* appears only here and in Matt 10:36 within biblical literature; cp. Luke 11:13 and 12:28.

[19] Matthew concludes the list with these two forms of evil speech as compared to the Markan parallel which ends more conventionally with "pride" and "foolishness."

Matthew and the Law

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Some explanation is required as to why anyone would agree to treat yet once again a subject that "makes jugglers of us all."[1] The seeming contradictions in Matthew do provide a challenge for those who like brain-teasers. How should one understand the relation of the statements on the continuing validity of the law in 5:17–20 with the antitheses and other sections of Matthew where the law seems to be challenged or set aside (as 15:11)? How should one understand the contradiction between the warning in 16:11–12 to avoid the teaching of the Pharisees and Sadducees and the instruction in 23:3 to do what the Pharisees say but not what they do? However, the problem alone is not sufficient reason to treat the subject again, for virtually every position possible has been proposed in the abundant material on Matthew.

I would suggest that there are three reasons that justify once again treating this subject. One is the importance of Matthew's statements on law for any society and particularly for the Christian community. Despite our agreements about the necessity of law, most of us have negative feelings about law, including any idea of the law of God. Our statements reveal a necessity to show that the law is inferior and that the law is set aside. Matthew, however, did not share our feelings. He had a revolutionary understanding of the intention of the law which he thought would guide his readers in the will of God. While this is reasonably well-known, our biases against the law need to be addressed once again.

The second and third reasons for tackling this subject are intertwined. They are the need for sound and relevant methods and the need to hear Matthew. Just as many of us tend to have a bias against the law, there seems to be a bias against Matthew. Because of our theological preferences or our critical conclusions, we rarely actually hear Matthew. We read Matthew reading Mark and changing Q. Should we not be suspicious when Luke's version is nearly always given preference, even though we know of Luke's penchant for streamlining?[2] Does redactional activity always disclose the origin of the material or can it also show shaping of the material? We have only to read Donald Hagner's *The Jewish Reclamation of Jesus* to realize that Jewish scholars find most acceptable in Matthew the very items with which Christians have the most difficulty and that the very items Christians see as solutions to the problem Jewish scholars see as mistranslations

[1] Jack Suggs, *Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Matthew's Gospel* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970) 112.

[2] Note, for example, that Matthew is often viewed as adding ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ in 5:18 (cf. Luke 16:17). See Heinz Schürmann, "'Wer daher eines dieser geringsten Gebote auflöst . . .': Wo fand Matthäus das Logion Mt 5,19?" *BZ* 4 (1960) 241; and Robert A. Guelich, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1982) 144. Jan Lambrecht, *The Sermon on the Mount* (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1985) 85, suggested that Luke may have dropped the iota because this letter is not particularly small in the Greek alphabet.

of Semitic originals or later insertions.[3] We interpret Matthew in light of what he should have said if he were Paul.[4] Ought we not allow Matthew to be Matthew?

I am concerned also that our theories about Gospel origins prevent us from reading each of the Gospels in its own right. I am not prepared to argue against the two source hypothesis, nor am I willing to accept it or any other solution as the template for understanding the Gospels. The tendency of New Testament scholarship to create theories on the basis of hypotheses must cause some concern about methodological controls and the viability of our common enterprise.

None of us would want to read Matthew without being aware of the parallel accounts, but if we are to understand Matthew's view of the law, we ought to focus our attention on a "vertical" reading of Matthew.[5] We should also remind ourselves that we are dealing with *popular* literature, not a technical theological piece. If so, we possibly can avoid hyper-exegesis and inquire after the *function* of the various sayings in the overall document.

The Issues Requiring Treatment

The eight occurrences of νόμος in Matthew[6] seem deceptively simple in comparison with the complexity of the questions about the law that are present in nearly every portion of the book. Before discussing the subject at hand, there is value in isolating the issues so that a comprehensive view of the problems is before us. An adequate treatment of Matthew and the law involves the following:

1) An understanding of the view(s) of the law in Judaism and the diversity of its applications. In particular, did Judaism expect a new torah with the coming of the Messiah?[7]

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[3] Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984, esp. 87–132 and 282.

[4] Note, for example, Roger Mohrlang's preference for Paul' s thought on the law in his *Matthew and Paul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 127–129. It should also be added that in many cases Matthew is being read from the perspective of a misunderstood Paul. See my comments relating to Paul and the law in "Justification by Grace—to the Doers: an Analysis of the Place of Romans 2 in the Theology of Paul," *NTS* 32 (1986) 72–93; and in "Spheres of Influence: A Possible Solution to the Problem of Paul and the Law," *JSNT* 32 (1988) 93–113.

[5] The distinction between a "vertical" reading of Matthew which focuses only on Matthew's tendencies and theology as opposed to a horizontal reading which compares his account to Mark and Luke is derived from William G. Thompson, *Matthew's Advice to a Divided Community* (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970) 6.

[6] 5:17, 18; 7:12; 11:13; 12:5; 22:36, 40; 23:23. The reading of τὸν νόμον at 15:6 deserves more attention than it usually receives.

[7] W. D. Davies is the person who has focused most on the question of whether Judaism thought the Messiah would bring a new torah. See his *Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come* (Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1952) and his *The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) 109–190. Despite the admitted lack of support for a theory of a messianic torah, Davies still used the language. See *Torah*, 86–90 and *Setting*, 184–190. Some people at Qumran may have viewed the Temple Scroll as torah. See Yigael Yadin, *The Temple Scroll* (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1983) I, 390–392. But this is quite different from the supposed new law brought by the Messiah. Against this idea see especially Peter Schäfer, "Die Torah der messianischen Zeit," *ZNW* 65 (1974) 27–42. I do not think Matthew should be interpreted as a new torah.

2) The question whether it is permissible to treat Matthew in light of what is known about other discussions of law in the New Testament. If Matthew was written in Syria, may we assume the author knew of the debates about the law in Antioch years earlier?[8] For many, 5:17–20 reflects debates between factions in the Church,[9] and for some Paul is the target of these sayings.[10]

3) A determination of what one may conclude from silence. Are we to conclude that circumcision is still practiced in Matthew's community or that it has been abandoned?[11]

4) A determination of the character of Matthew's community. Had there been a split with the synagogue or not?[12] Were there opponents (charismatics or antinomians) in the community?[13] In particular, should 7:15 and 7:22–23 be read as referring to the same group?[14] Less attention will be given to a description of the Matthean community in this paper. The time and circumstances of the break with the synagogue are not as clear as

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[8] See Ernst Käsemann, "The Beginnings of Christian Theology," *New Testament Questions of Today* (London: SCM Press, 1969) 86–89; Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Matthew*, trans. David E. Green (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975) 105–106; and Ulrich Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus (Mt 1–7)* (Zurich: Benziger Verlag, 1985) 238–239.

[9] E.g., Gerhard Barth, "Matthew's Understanding of the Law," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, Günther Bornkamm, Gerhard Barth, and Heinz Joachim Held (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963) 64–65; and Francis Wright Beare, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981) 141.

[10] E.g., Hans Dieter Betz, "The Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:3–12): Observations on Their Literary Form and Theological Significance," *Essays on the Sermon on the Mount*, trans. L. L. Welborn (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) 20.

[11] Mohrlang, 44–45, assumed that circumcision is still being practiced by the Matthean community. John P. Meier, *Law and History in Matthew's Gospel: A Redactional Study of Matthew 5:17–48* (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1976) 61 and 64, thought that the community had dispensed with circumcision.

[12] Günther Bornkamm, "End-Expectation and Church in Matthew," *Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew*, 22, thought that the community had not yet broken with Judaism, but later changed his mind in "The Authority to 'Bind' and 'Loose' in the Church in Matthew's Gospel, *The Interpretation of Matthew*, ed. Graham Stanton (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 88. See the discussion in Meier, 9–13, who thought the community had already separated.

[13] Käsemann, 83f., argued Spirit enthusiasts were opposed. Numerous others suggest Matthew argues against antinomians; e.g., Lambrecht, 90; and Eduardo Arens, *The* ΗΛΘΟΝ-Sayings in the Synoptic Tradition (Freiberg: Universitätsverlag, 1976) 94. However, James E. Davison, "*Anomia* and the Question of an Antinomian Polemic in Matthew," *JBL* 104 (1985) 617–635, effectively demonstrates that ἀνομία is a general word for sin and has no special connotation of antinomianism. From this he concluded there is only one front against which Matthew argues. That front is moral laxity, whether evidenced by charismatics or Pharisees.

[14] See the discussion in David Hill, "False Prophets and Charismatics: Structure and Interpretation in Matthew 7,15–23," *Biblica* 57 (1976) 327–348, who argued that two different groups are intended in 7:15 and 7:22–23.

some have argued.[15] Certainly W. D. Davies' attempt to see the Sermon on the Mount as a Christian counterpart to the rabbinic restructuring of Judaism at Jamnia is not convincing.[16] In addition, the more that one takes a literary critical approach to Matthew and includes a discussion of the implied reader, the more "fog factor" there is potentially between us and the Matthean community. The implied reader and the actual reader are not necessarily the same.[17] Are we even certain that the Gospel was written for the author's community rather than, for example, as a catechetical tool for a larger group?

5) An interpretation of the exegetical mine field in 5:17–20. Why does Matthew have "the law or the prophets"? What does πληρῶσαι mean? What is the relation of the four sayings in this section? Does 5:19 interpret 5:18 or 5:17? What is the relation and meaning of the two ἕως clauses in 5:18? Does 5:18d refer to the death and resurrection of Jesus?[18] Are the least commands a reference to *Jesus'* commands?[19] Does 5:19 mean there is ranking in the Kingdom or does it refer to exclusion from and entrance into the Kingdom? Do all four of these sayings present a unified thought or are parts of them intended to counter other parts?[20]

6) Does Matthew present Jesus as abrogating the law? In many ways this is the most important question, but unfortunately a variety of answers is given. Arguments have been presented that none or as many as four of the antitheses abrogate the law.[21] In addition people have found possible violations of the law in 8:22;[22]12:1–8; 15:1–20; and 19:3–9.

7) How antithetical are the antitheses? Is δέ in this construction to be understood as a strong adversative? We usually interpret the antitheses as if ἀλλά were used. J. Levison, however, argued that they are not antithetical at all.[23] In addition, if they are oppositional

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[15] See Reuven Kimelman, "Birkat Ha-Minim and the Lack of Evidence for an Anti-Christian Jewish Prayer in Late Antiquity," *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition*, Vol. II, ed. E. P. Sanders with A. I. Baumgarten and Alan Mendelson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981) 226–244; and Steven T. Katz, "Issues in the Separation of Judaism and Christianity after 70 C.E.: A Reconsideration," *JBL* 103 (1984) 43–76.

[16] Davies, *Setting*, 256–315.

[17] Daniel Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 13. If the gospels are not suitable for discovering the historical Jesus, they are hardly any better suited for discovering the early church. I am indebted to my former colleague John Phelan for pointing this out forcefully.

[18] E.g., Meier, 63–64; Guelich, 168, saw 5:18d as pointing to Jesus' entire ministry.

[19] Robert Banks, *Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 222–223; Schweizer, 108; Betz, "The Hermeneutical Principles of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:17–20)," *Essays on the Sermon on the Mount*, 48.

[20] Guelich, 168; Meier, 60–64; Arens, 92.

[21] The following views are representative: Suggs, 113, viewed the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth antitheses as abrogating the law; Schweizer, 110, viewed the third, fifth, and sixth as abrogations; Meier, 159, viewed the third, fourth, and fifth as abrogations; and Brice Martin, "Matthew on Christ and the Law," *TS* 44 (1983) 54–70, argued that none of the antitheses is an abrogation.

[22] This is the position of E. P. Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) 252–255 and 267. See the discussion of this text in Martin Hengel, *The Charismatic Leader and his Followers*, trans. James Greig (New York: Crossroad, 1981) 3–15.

[23] Jack Levison, "A Better Righteousness: The Character and Purpose of Matthew 5:21–48," *Studia Biblica et Theologica* 12 (1982) 171–194.

in character, what is being opposed—the written torah or the rabbinic tradition?

8) What is the role of Hos 6:6 in Matthew and especially how absolutely did he understand the words "not sacrifice"? Was the cultic law no longer valid for him?

9) What is the role of the love command in Matthew?

10) How should we understand 23:2–3 and other statements such as 23:23 and 24:20 that suggest a concern for detailed observance of the law?

11) What kind of author/editor/theologian was Matthew? Was the person who crafted this document careful and artistic or somewhat sloppy and inconsistent? Did he have a consistent approach to the subject of the law?

Obviously it is not possible to deal with all these issues here, but hopefully enough can be treated to chart a course for understanding Matthew.

Options for Understanding Matthew with Reference to the Law

Before dealing with the texts, a summary of the attempts to explain Matthew's attitude to the law will be helpful. The following are the most popular ways by which people have explained the phenomena in Matthew:

1) To conclude that Matthew thought the Old Testament law was no longer valid after the coming of Jesus. Statements stressing the validity of the law are traditions that Matthew has retained, but qualified by his own views. The Old Testament law was either set aside because Jesus as Messiah brought a new torah[24] or because he fulfilled the law through his death and resurrection.[25]

2) To conclude that Jesus thought the Old Testament law was no longer valid, but that Matthew rejudaized or "retorahized" the message of Jesus.[26] A rejudaizing tendency could be combined with other explanations.

3) To argue that the law was partially valid for Matthew. Relatively few people currently would say Matthew distinguished the moral law from the ceremonial and civil laws. But many would argue that he presents Jesus as radicalizing or intensifying the torah so that some laws are set aside.[27]

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[24] R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, "Attitudes to the Law in Matthew's Gospel: A Discussion of Matthew 5:18," *BibRes* 17 (1972) 31–32; Richard S. McConnell, *Law and Prophecy in Matthew's Gospel* (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt Kommissionsverlag, 1969) 51f. and 93–95; and Terence L. Donaldson, *Jesus on the Mountain* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985) 112–117.

[25] Meier, 63–64; Hamerton-Kelly, 21 and 28–32; cf. Guelich, 168; and Schweizer, 108.

[26] See Hans Hübner, *Das Gesetz in der synoptischen Tradition* 2d ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973) esp. 237f. Hübner argued for a "retorahizing" instead of a rejudaizing. His book is an assessment of E. Stauffer's argument (in *Die Botschaft Jesu damals und heute*, Bern, 1959) that Jesus argued against the torah and that his message was requmranized and rejudaized. G. D. Kilpatrick, *The Origins of the Gospel According to St. Matthew* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946) 101f., argued similarly. Cf. T. W. Manson, *The Sayings of Jesus* (London: SCM Press, 1949) 135, and the views of Davies, *The Setting*, 256–315 and 400, and Beare, 31, that Matthew has rabbinized the message of Jesus.

[27] Barth, 102; McConnell, 50; and Mohrlang, 12.

4) To view the law as completely valid as far as Matthew presents Jesus' teaching of it.[28]
5) To view the law as interpreted by a specific hermeneutical key so as to reveal the divine intention of the law.[29]

It is within the framework of the last option that I suggest we explain Matthew.

Towards a Solution

There are three studies relevant to Matthew and the law that have been particularly helpful in constructing a paradigm for interpretation. They are the works of Alexander Sand,[30] Marcus Borg,[31] and Daniel Patte.[32] Others have made similar points, but usually not with the same force. While all Matthew's statements on the law may not cohere easily, what he really believed about the law is clear. In his mind a proper understanding of the law is a prophetic reading of the law in which the love command and the call for mercy demonstrate the true requirements of the law. As M. Borg has argued, Jesus substituted the mercy code for the holiness code.[33] A defense of this statement is more easily made in Matthew than anywhere.

That Matthew wanted his readers to understand the law prophetically is not a new suggestion.[34] We would do well, however, to notice how he presents his discussions of law. Four of the eight occurrences of νόμος are in the expression ὁ νόμος ἢ/καὶ οἱ προφῆται (5:17; 7:12; 11:13 in reverse order; and 22:40). Two more are in the contexts where ὁ νόμος ἢ/καὶ οἱ προφῆται occurs (5:18 and 22:36). One is in a context where Hos 6:6 is quoted to validate Jesus' comments (12:5), and the last is an allusion to Mic 6:8 (23:23). Also when the issue of eating with unwashed hands (15:1f.) becomes a debate about the command of God, a word from the prophets (Isa 29:13) provides commentary on the hypocrisy of evading responsibility for one's parents. Even the regulation of temple activities is determined by words from the prophets (Isa 56:7 and Jer 7:11 at Matt 21:13). In addition, the point is underscored in 23:29–36 that the Pharisaic application of the law is not in keeping with the prophetic view and is therefore wrong. The Pharisees, who think they are law abiding, are actually lawless (23:28) because they do not understand what the law is really about.

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[28] Among others, Martin; A. E. Harvey, *Jesus and the Constraints of History* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982) 53–54. Bornkamm, "End-Expectation," 24; and Allen Verhey, *The Great Reversal* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984) 83, argued that Matthew retained even the oral law.

[29] Birger Gerhardsson, "The Hermeneutic Program in Matthew 22:37–40," *Jews, Greeks, Christians*, ed. R. Hamerton-Kelly and R. Scroggs (Leiden: Brill, 1976) 134 and 140f.; Eduard Schweizer, "Observance of the Law and Charismatic Activity in Matthew," *NTS* 16 (1970) 216; and James D. G. Dunn, *The Living Word* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 53, among others.

[30] Alexander Sand, *Das Gesetz und die Propheten* (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1974).

[31] Marcus J. Borg, *Conflict, Holiness and Politics in the Teaching of Jesus* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984).

[32] Patte, *The Gospel of Matthew*, see n. 17.

[33] Borg, 123 and 128.

[34] Sand, 59, 125, 193, 208, 221. Meier, 86, viewed the prophets as the canon within the canon, but he did not see a prophetic reading as the explanation of the problem.

Clearly Matthew does not want his readers to conceive of the law as an entity in itself. One should not think merely of the law, but of the law and the prophets. Scholars have often felt that ἢ τοὺς προφήτας in 5:17 was out of place,[35] but it was not for Matthew. Already, even though the rest of 5:17–20 focuses only on questions of the law, Matthew wanted his reader to think of the law *and the prophets.* The *inclusio* with 7:12 only underscores the point. The title of this paper is, therefore, a misnomer. To discuss only Matthew's understanding of the law is to misunderstand him. For him the law cannot be understood apart from the prophets. Jesus himself is presented as a prophet who gives the authoritative interpretation of the law.[36] A closer analysis of 5:17–20 appears below.

That the love commands encompass for Matthew the intention of the law and the prophets is obvious. In 22:34–40 the great commandment is identified as the requirement to love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, and mind (Deut 6:5), but a second command is said to be like this one—the commandment to love one's neighbor as oneself (Lev 19:18). Familiarity with this text ought not prevent us from noting that love of fellow humans is put on the same level as love for God. The important point, of course, is 22:40 where all the law and the prophets are said to "hang" (κρέμαται) on these two commands. It is not so much that all the others may be deduced from these two as that these two determine how all the others are to be understood and applied.[37]

Similarly, the "golden rule" is said to encompass the law and the prophets (7:12). Surely the "golden rule" is to be understood as synonymous with the love command in Lev 19:18.[38]

The focus that Matthew places on the love command can be seen in other ways as well. The arrangement of the antitheses suggests that the love command in 5:43–47 is both the climax of the section and the principle underlying all the antitheses.[39] (Note the *inclusio* between 5:20 and 5:47 with περισσεύση and περισσὸν.) In 19:19, unlike the parallel accounts in Mark and Luke, the love command is listed along with some of the "social" commands from the Decalogue as the commands that should be kept to enter eternal life. In Matthew's mind the love command is the prism through which the others are to be understood and the command that shows clearly that the rich young man had not kept the commandments. It is no accident that τέλειος in Matthew occurs only here

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[35] C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels* (London: Macmillan, 1927) II, 47; Hübner, 33. Banks, 206, suggested that the insertion is the result of an unconscious association of ideas. Lambrecht, 83, correctly argued that "the law or the prophets" hardly differs from "the law and the prophets."

[36] Sand, 138f.; Harvey, 57. Note that Matthew presents Jesus as the climax of the prophetic tradition: e.g., 21:11; 21:33–46; 23:34–39.

[37] McConnell, 13; Barth, 77–78. Schweizer, *Good News,* 425, suggested that these two commands were the only ones that need to be obeyed. This can hardly be what Matthew intended.

[38] Note that Didache 1.2 connects the love command and the golden rule. The whole section appears to have been influenced by Matthew. Meier's attempt (42 n. 4) to disparage the golden rule is misguided.

[39] Cf. Patte, 82, who viewed the last antithesis as the logical conclusion of the others, and McConnell, 49–54. On the love command, see Victor Paul Furnish, *The Love Command in the New Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972) esp. 74–84; and John Piper, *'Love Your Enemies'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

and at 5:48, both in close proximity to the love command.[40] In 19:21 the rich young man is not given a higher level "counsel of perfection," but a commentary to understand the intention of the commands and the nature of discipleship.[41]

We ought not overlook as well that, while the love command is not explicitly mentioned in 25:31–46, the verdict at end judgment is based on whether one practiced love.[42] The passage 24:12 is also important, for here ἀνομία and ἀγάπη are viewed as opposites.

Parallel to the emphasis on the love command is the focus in Matthew on mercy. I would not see this focus as something different from the love command, but merely another way to express it.[43] Mercy is clearly an important theme for Matthew, not only because of his double use of Hos 6:6 as the basis for showing the intention of the law (9:13 and 12:7), but also because of the importance of the theme for him generally. In 23:23 justice, mercy, and faithfulness are identified as the weightier matters of the law. Δικαιοσύνη and ἐλεημοσύνη seem to be equated in 6:1–2. In 5:7 the merciful are promised mercy and in 18:33 the point of the Parable of the Unforgiving Servant is that the mercy of God *requires* (ἔδει) that people show mercy to each other.

While Hos 6:6 is paradigmatic for Matthew, it is not clear how strongly he understood the words "not sacrifice." M. Borg argued that no objection to the cult is presupposed in Matthew's use of this text.[44] Texts like 5:23–24 and 17:24–27 seem to assume acceptance of the temple and its worship. A. E. Harvey is not far wrong in saying that Jesus (and for our purposes Matthew) had little interest in the cult[45]even with the account of the cleansing of the temple. At least, we can conclude with E. P. Sanders that Jesus (and Matthew) did not consider the temple inviolate.[46] There is one greater than the temple who has appeared (12:6), so if the temple cult has any validity, it is not because the temple

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[40] On τέλειος see P. J. Du Plessis, ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ: *The Idea of Perfection in the New Testament* (Kampen: Uitgave J. H. Kok, [1959]); Barth, 97–103; and E. Yarnold, "Τέλειος in St. Matthew's Gospel," *Studia Evangelica* 4, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1968) 269–273. Beare, 163, pointed out that what is meant in this context is the completeness of love. There is little difference between 5:48 and the parallel in Luke 6:36. Certainly, there is no doctrine of perfectionism here. The verse merely means that God's people take their character from their God. The person who is τέλειος lacks nothing, but expresses unswerving devotion to God. Relationship with God is assumed, but the attempt by Guelich, 234–237, to downplay the "moral" element and the radical call to obedience are unjustified.

[41] *Contra* Lamar Cope, *Matthew, A Scribe Trained for the Kingdom of Heaven* (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1976) 116. That 19:21 is not a counsel of perfection is obvious if one compares the call to discipleship here with the call to discipleship in 16:24. I cannot accept that Jesus' recitation of the commands in this context is possibly simply a "set-up" as suggested by Douglas J. Moo, "Jesus and the Authority of the Mosaic Law," *JSNT* 20 (1984) 13.

[42] Depending, of course, on how one interprets 25:40. Some interpret this verse of the reception of missionaries and thereby lessen the focus on love. See e.g., J. Ramsey Michaels, "Apostolic Hardships and Righteous Gentiles: a Study of Matthew 25:31–46," *JBL* 84 (1965) 27–37.

[43] Cf. Sand, 208.

[44] Borg, 362 n. 168.

[45] Harvey, 64.

[46] Sanders, 251.

is valid in and of itself, but only insofar as the temple practice is subsumed under the teaching of Jesus, or more explicitly, under the demands for both mercy and love.[47] However, I do not think we can exclude the possibility that for Matthew the words "not sacrifice" provide an implicit rejection of the cult. It is surprising that he did not make more of these words, especially if his Gospel was penned after 70 A.D.

To say that Jesus substituted the mercy code for the holiness code may be too strong, but at least in Matthew, Jesus *disregarded* the holiness code in favor of the mercy code. Whereas the holiness code focuses on separation and caused the Pharisees constantly to fear contamination, the mercy code is inclusive, even to the extent of loving one's enemies, and assumes that true holiness, not uncleanness, is contagious.[48] One has only to read Matthew 8–9 in which Matthew underscores that Jesus willingly touched a leper, a hemorrhaging woman, and a girl believed to be dead and was willing to enter the house of a Gentile. His same lack of concern for cleanliness regulations is obvious in 15:1–20. At least we must conclude that the concern of much of the Old Testament law with cultic cleanliness regulations was viewed as peripheral by Jesus in Matthew. That concern is unimportant in light of the demand for love and mercy that is the key to understanding the law and the prophets.

The real issue, as several people have pointed out, is how one reads the scriptures. The issue is not one's relation to torah, but how one interprets all the scriptures. There can be little doubt that in Judaism the torah was given greater importance than the prophets and the writings.[49] The Samaritans and Sadducees accepted only the torah, and the other groups took their identity from torah much more than from any other portion of scripture. In Matthew, however, Jesus will not allow reading only torah or sections of torah. One must read all the law and the prophets. With this is the recognition that not all of the law (and the prophets) is of one piece. The law is not a uniform codex.[50] There are parts of it that are more important. (E.g., Deut 24:1 is a concession, but Gen 2:24 points to the divine intention.) What one must seek in reading the scriptures is the pure unconditioned will of God. As J. Suggs pointed out, "What we confront in Matthew is law opposed to law."[51] In Matthew, Jesus provides a hermeneutic for reading the scriptures. Everything is to be understood in light of the requirements of love and mercy. To the question "What is the law"? the answer is "The love command and the demand for mercy." To the question "When is the law not law"? the answer is "When it is only law and not in keeping with the tenor of all the law and the prophets." The wry humor in 12:12 (cf.

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[47] Cf. Sand, 44; and Cope, 67–70. Tikva Frymer-Kensky, "Jesus and the Law," *Jesus in History and Myth*, ed. R. Joseph Hoffmann and Gerald A. Larue (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986) 131, commented that חסד is a dangerous principle of law since it cannot be legislated!

[48] Borg, 123–138; cf. Sand, 210.

[49] The point was made at least as early as J. A. Bengel that the prophets were valued less than the torah. (*Gnomon*, trans. Andrew Robert Fausset [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1877] I, 168.) See also Beare, 139; Bennett Harvie Branscomb, *Jesus and the Law of Moses* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1930) 27–30; Sand, 180; and Meier, 71–72. Note Midr Ps 90.4; Yad IV.3; Ros Has IV.6; Meg. IV.1–5; bMeg 14a; pMeg 70d.

[50] Barth, 78; Sand, 40, 193 and 207; Mohrlang, 21.

[51] Suggs, 107–108.

10:31) that decides in favor of doing good on the sabbath is merely an extension of this hermeneutic of love and mercy.[52]

Matthew 5:17–20

The legitimacy of reading Matthew in this way depends to some degree on showing how specific texts can be interpreted on the basis of finding a "hermeneutical" center to Matthew's understanding of the law. Matthew 5:17–20 is both the most important text and the most difficult to deal with. On the other hand, possibly the text is not as difficult as we have made it.[53] Many of the problems seem to be caused by the difficulties modern interpreters have with the law, especially in relation to what they know from Paul. Why else would people conclude that texts like 5:20 and 48 are to drive the reader to despair?[54] Why else would someone conclude that 5:20 is not about the law but about Christian righteousness?[55] Why would T. W. Manson suggest that 5:18 was originally bitter irony which meant, "It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for the scribes to give up the smallest bit of that tradition by which they make the law of none effect."[56] Why would J. P. Meier conclude that with law Matthew had to grapple with resistant building blocks?[57] Why would K. Berger seek to avoid a reference to the torah with the expression "the law and the prophets"?[58] And why would 5:17–20 be interpreted partly with reference to Jesus' words so that F. D. Bruner would suggest 5:17 honors both the Old Testament and the New Testament, 5:18 honors especially the Old Testament, and 5:19 honors especially the New Testament.[59] Granted that there are difficult issues in this text, *we* have made the problems worse. Matthew did not see or intend any difficulty.

Often the solution to this text is found in tradition historical approaches that argue Matthew brought together sayings with which he did not fully agree or that he used one saying to contradict another. The position typical of these approaches is that 5:17–20 reflects debates between the conservative Jewish Christian community and a freer, probably Hellenistic, community. Sayings such as those in vv 18 and 19 preserve, at least partly, the argument of the conservative group. 5:18d and 20 are viewed as Matthew's drastic alteration or negation of these conservative ideas and are the only parts that express what Matthew really thinks. In these reconstructions Matthew ends up holding a "Pauline" position which is the opposite of what he seems to be saying. R. Guelich's view is illustrative. In his view, 5:17–19 was a misunderstanding and distortion of Jesus' ministry. Matthew added "or the prophets" in 5:17 and "until all things come to pass" in

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[52] With reference to a hermeneutical approach to the law in Matthew, see (in addition to the works listed in n. 29) Patte, 74, 167–168, and 315; Borg, 71 and 161; and Sand, 188, 193, and 216. Bengel, I, 227, had already suggested that Hos 6:6 was an axiom of interpretation.

[53] Cf. Phillip Sigal, *The Halakah of Jesus of Nazareth According to the Gospel of Matthew* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986) 19–23.

[54] Which Beare, 152, rightly rejected.

[55] Lambrecht, 89.

[56] Manson, 135.

[57] Meier, 23.

[58] Klaus Berger, *Die Gesetzesauslegung Jesu: Teil I: Markus und Parallelen* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1972) 208 and 219.

[59] Frederick Dale Bruner, *The Christbook: A Historical/Theological Commentary: Matthew 1–12* (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987) 168.

5:18 to point to Jesus' teaching and ministry. Surprisingly, Matthew included 5:19, but countered it by 5:20 and the antitheses so that the question of keeping the legal demands of the law becomes moot, since a righteousness that comes from keeping the law is inadequate for entering the Kingdom.[60]

Almost certainly there were debates about the law which, indeed, made the subject important to Matthew, but I doubt very much whether 5:17–20 reflects the arguments of those debates. Furthermore, one must ask what Matthew thought he was doing on such an approach. Can we believe that Matthew thought his reader would know that he really meant the opposite of the words he was writing? I would suggest that any approach that is beyond the capabilities of some poor Syrian Christian is one that cannot be correct.

The placement of these verses in Matthew's overall construction must be given due attention. Clearly Matthew has hurried through the necessary elements in the story of Jesus to get to this point. Note what a brief and rapid summary of Jesus' early ministry is given in 4:12–25. In Matthew's mind the most important part of the ministry of Jesus is his teaching on the proper understanding of God's law. Here W. D. Davies is correct: ". . . the penetrating demands of Jesus . . . were part of 'the bright light of the Gospel', that is, they were revelatory."[61] As I understand Matthew, the demands of Jesus are not something different from the law, but an explanation of what the law and prophets really are. Matthew placed the Sermon on the Mount early in his Gospel because he believed the call to such holy living would be a revealing invitation to the Kingdom. Therefore, because of its location, we must assume that 5:17–20 was of unquestioned importance for Matthew.[62] He thought he was providing a foundation from which to understand the rest of Jesus' teaching and its relation to the Hebrew scriptures.

The work of Daniel Patte is especially important here. He pointed out that authors use "oppositions," of which we have three in 5:17–19, as the primary mode of expression of their intentions.[63] Such oppositions remove ambiguity and express the main points of the text. " 'Explicit oppositions,' . . . *can be viewed as a direct expression of the author's convictions.*"[64] Usually the oppositions are conveyed with "old knowledge" (imagery and symbols that make sense for the audience).[65]

If this is true, both because of the placement and because of the form, Matthew did not record material with which he was in disagreement. Rather, these verses express what he really believed. Regardless of the origin of these sayings,[66] for Matthew they provide a coherent statement about Jesus' interpretation of the law.

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[60] Guelich, 134–174. See also Meier, 40f. and esp. 64, where Meier suggested that prior to his death and resurrection Jesus confined himself to the land and people of Israel and remained faithful to the law. After the death and resurrection, the new heavens and the new earth have come, and the binding force of the Mosaic law has passed. Hamerton-Kelly, 20f., found three distinct views of the law in Matthew. For this kind of approach, see also Arens, 91–116; Luz, 227–244; McConnell, 6–41 (who on p. 34 suggested that 5:18–19 were included because of a missionary motive); and Banks, 203–226.

[61] Davies, *The Setting*, 437.

[62] Luz, 230–231.

[63] Patte, 6–11

[64] Ibid., 7. (Italics his.)

[65] Ibid., 10.

[66] Wolfgang Trilling, *Das wahre Israel* (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1964) 167f.; and Suggs, 116, are representative of those who would see 5:17–20 as composed of four unrelated logia.

Instead of providing a detailed account of how the exegetical issues in these verses have been treated, I will only suggest how I think these sayings should be understood. In 5:17 there are only two items that require comment: "the law and the prophets" and πληρῶσαι. The expression "the law and the prophets" is intended to point to the Hebrew scriptures as a whole.[67] The intention with this statement is to place the rest of the scriptures on a par with the law and as the means to a proper understanding of the law.[68] The term πληρῶσαι has created frequent debates and is somewhat surprising. One would have expected στῆσαι or something similar (cf. Romans 3:31). I do not think that Matthew used πληρῶσαι because of his emphasis on the predictive function of the scriptures.[69] This section prepares one to understand Jesus' *teaching*, not his actions, and Matthew does not have another of his formula citations until 8:17. There is no thought of fulfilling and therefore transcending, as Banks suggested.[70] Exactly which translation is preferable is difficult to decide, but the thought of Matthew is clear enough. His intention is to say that Jesus did not come to set aside or nullify the scriptures; rather his purpose was to affirm them and bring them to reality.[71] Possibly the word "accomplish" is a suitable translation and would also serve well in the similar construction at 3:15. Matthew's point is that Jesus came so that people would live according to the scriptures.

There is a parallel to this use of πληρῶσαι τὸν νόμον in Rom 8:4; 13:8; and Gal 5:14. Surprisingly, in the last two texts the fulfillment of the law is also seen in the love command. We do not need to suggest as J. P. Meier did that the pre-Matthean form read ποιεῖν or some similar word,[72] for the parallels in Paul and the context of Matthew verify a meaning for πληρῶσαι that focuses on doing, obeying, or fulfilling in speech and action.[73] In other words, 5:17 expresses that Jesus' purpose was not to destroy the scriptures, but to bring them to actuality in people's lives.

With 5:18 the questions are the meaning of the ἕως clauses and the reference of one iota and one "hook." The latter are merely metaphorical for the least important commands. Whether the first ἕως clause means "never"[74] or "at the end of the age"[75] is almost irrelevant from the standpoint of Matthew's readers. Even if 24:35 intends a higher valuation of Jesus' words than what is said about the law, the readers do not know that yet. What they do know is that as long as their lives continue on this earth the law has validity. The second ἕως clause is more difficult, but surely the reference is not to the death and

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[67] Jack Dean Kingsbury, *Matthew as Story* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 66; Georg Strecker, *Die Bergpredigt* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984) 56.

[68] Sand, 180.

[69] *Contra* Meier, 80.

[70] Banks, 210. Nor does πληρῶσαι contain an element of discontinuity.

[71] Barth, 68–69; Strecker, 57; Arens, 105–106; see Henrik Ljungman, *Das Gesetz Erfüllen* (Lund: Gleerup, 1954) esp. 53f.

[72] Meier, 85; on p. 80 he had rejected the meaning "doing" for πληρῶσαι, but then had to reconstruct the text to bring back this meaning. He had noted that Paul used πληρῶσαι with reference to law, but he rejected any relevance of this for Matthew (75–76).

[73] Suggs, 117; Patte, 72; Sand, 185–186; cf. Gustaf Dalman, *Jesus–Jeshua*, trans. Paul P. Levertoff (London: SPCK, 1929) 56, who said that πληροῦσθαι is akin to τελεῖσθαι, "to be accomplished."

[74] Strecker, 58; Arens, 92.

[75] Patte, 71; Meier, 61.

resurrection or to all the ministry of Jesus.[76] The two clauses may be tautologous,[77] or as many suggest, the second possibly should be interpreted "ethically" to mean "until all the law demands is accomplished" (i.e., until the will of God is fully realized).[78] In either case the reader knows that the law has not and will not be set aside, at least until God's purposes for this earth are accomplished.

5:19 is not a literary fossil[79] or an undigested morsel.[80] This saying functions as further confirmation of the points made in 5:17–18. The primary question here is the intention of the expression "one of the least of these commands." The attempt to interpret this as a reference to Jesus' teaching is unfounded.[81] Certainly Matthew's readers could not be expected to understand this. Nor is there a reference to Paul[82] or to the ceremonial laws.[83] The reference is to the same items as intended in 5:18 with one iota and one "hook." The intention is to underscore the importance of proper teaching about and obedience to the law. There is also a question whether this text teaches only a lesser place in the kingdom for those who teach and obey inappropriately or whether such language is metaphorical for exclusion.[84] I would suggest that the saying is metaphorical, but that it portrays what is valued by God or is displeasing to him (similar to the reward language of chapter 6).

The meaning of 5:20 for Matthew is clear. A righteousness is required that goes beyond what the scribes and Pharisees thought was satisfactory. Δικαιοσύνη is to be understood of ethical behavior rather than a gift from God.[85] The greater righteousness is both quantitative and qualitative.[86] The antitheses demonstrate what this greater righteousness entails, and 5:48 is essentially a restatement of 5:20.[87]

No stretch of the imagination is required to accept that Matthew intended 5:17 and 20, but could he have intended 5:18–19? The question is not whether he intended these verses, but how "legalistically" he intended them. The difficulty emerges when we treat these or any other sayings atomistically, but Matthew placed them together in a unit and within a larger work. He has already warned the reader that absolute statements such as the one in 5:18 are not to be read legalistically, but within the framework of the whole of scripture (and/or Jesus' sayings). In 4:4 an absolute statement from scripture is given: "A person will not live from bread alone, but from *every* word proceeding from the mouth

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[76] Hamerton-Kelly, 30f., attempted to verify the death-resurrection as the end of the law by recourse to 28:11.

[77] Hübner, 19. A. M. Honeyman, "Matthew V.18 and the Validity of the Law," *NTS* 1 (1954) 141–142, argued that the second clause stated positively what the first stated negatively.

[78] Sand, 38; Luz, 237.

[79] As Lambrecht suggested, 88.

[80] As Meier suggested, 104.

[81] See n. 19.

[82] see n. 10.

[83] Strecker, 60.

[84] Schweizer, *Good News*, 105.

[85] See Benno Przybylski, *Righteousness in Matthew and his World of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) 84.

[86] Przbylski, 85; Strecker, 64.

[87] Sanders, 260–262, is wrong to see in 5:17 a strict legalism and in 5:20 a call for Jesus' followers to be more righteousness than the Pharisees *by the same standard.* (Italics his.)

of God." So in 4:6 the devil takes a word from God as the basis of the second temptation, but that word is set aside by another that is more important. One may not merely plug in individual texts. Matthew does not intend for absolute statements to be interpreted legalistically. They have a function, but they must be placed within the framework of the whole of scripture (or the teaching of Jesus) to determine the will of God.[88] 5:18–19 has the function of underscoring the permanency of scripture and the value that God places on proper teaching and obedience.

In effect, 5:18 and 19 both are hyperbole. Some have argued against the suggestion of hyperbole,[89]but here and elsewhere in Matthew, including 23:2–3, there are several examples. R. H. Stein has underscored the use of hyperbole in the teaching of Jesus and provided criteria for recognizing it. Among the criteria relevant to our discussion are logical impossibilities (such as fulfilling iotas and hooks) and conflicts with other sayings. Commissive language which seeks to cause things to happen tends toward hyperbole more.[90] That is exactly what is happening in Matthew. Strong statements are made to persuade the reader that scripture is of permanent validity and is to be practiced as the will of God. This is popular literature, not a technical, theological writing, and we should expect to find forms like hyperbole.

Did Jesus Abrogate the Law?

The question is not "Did Jesus break the oral law"? for certainly he did. The question is "Did he break the written law"? To answer this, we will have to look at individual texts, but the question presupposes some unfounded assumptions. The question assumes that the law is a monolithic entity in which all of its statements point in one direction, but that is not the case. There are numerous statements that pull against each other just like the tension between Ps 91:11–12 and Deut 6:16 in Matt 4:6–7. One of the most obvious areas where there are diverse statements is the question of divorce. Not only do we find the concession of Deut 24:1 over against Gen 2:24, but we find that in certain texts divorce is mandated to protect the wife (Exod 21:11 and Deut 21:14), whereas other texts prohibit divorce to protect the wife (Deut 22:19 and 29). Both texts have the same goal, but they propose opposite actions. Examples like this could be multiplied easily. How does one harmonize the command not to seek peace or good relations with Ammonites and Moabites in Deut 23:6 with the demand to love the alien in the same book (10:16–19)? The Hebrew scriptures are not monolithic. What Jesus does in Matthew is show one how to read the scriptures and discern the will of God.

Another assumption behind this question is that no other Jew abrogated the law. Is it an abrogation of the law that the death penalty is not carried out in Judaism for breaking the sabbath (Exod 31:15)? Is it an abrogation of the law that financial penalties were substituted for literal obedience to the *lex talionis*?[91] Is it an abrogation of the law that Yohanan ben Zakkai abolished the trial of the suspected adultress and presided over the

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[88] Cf. Patte, 73–74.

[89] E.g., Meier, 44 n. 15.

[90] Robert H. Stein, *Difficult Sayings in the Gospels: Jesus Use of Overstatement and Hyperbole* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985) 36f., 89. He listed 5:17–18, 33–37, 39–41, 42, 48, and 23:3 all as hyperbole. To classify texts as hyperbole is not to say that they may be ignored. It merely means the texts are not absolute.

[91] See the discussions in David Daube, *The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism* (London: Athlone Press, 1956) 255–259; and Branscomb, 31–32.

dissolution of the sacrificial system?[92] Certainly there were statements about the law in Judaism that were as absolute as Matt 5:18,[93] and E. P. Sanders is at least partly right in saying that there is no precedent in Judaism for making distinctions within the law.[94] No one argued for keeping only the moral law. However, that there was discussion about "light" and "heavy" commands shows that there were valuations made among the different commands, even if the assumption was that all commands would be kept.[95]

It seems to me that there are still unanswered questions about what Jews in Jesus' day really believed about the law. It is one thing to quote general and absolute statements, but it is another thing to note what really is practiced. The law was believed totally, but it was also assumed that the meaning of the law is ambiguous and must be debated.[96] Rabbinic majority opinions were given, but dissenting opinions suggesting entirely different practices were dutifully recorded.[97] Sometimes one passage of scripture is quoted as justification for not obeying another passage.[98] In fact, P. Sigal argued that abrogation of specific precepts of the written torah was not unusual in Jesus' milieu.[99] This kind of activity to justify not doing a written precept seems to be what is going on with oaths (5:33–37) and with "gifts" to avoid caring for parents (15:4–9). The point in Matthew in these instances is that regardless of what one does scripturally or exegetically to justify his or her action, the word and will of God has been nullified. S. Westerholm's comment that the learned of Israel understood the law as containing statutes whereas Jesus did not may be appropriate.[100]

In other words, one could claim to believe the law totally, but not do what it says. That was true for people who sought ways to avoid the intention of the law. It was also true for crisis times such as with the Maccabeans in regard to sabbath observance during war and for the Qumranites who would not participate in the temple worship. Some of the issues with regard to Jesus' observance of the law may similarly be because of the crisis nature of his ministry.[101] More importantly, the question is "What is the law"? Jesus in Matthew provides insight into the intention of the scriptures and presses people to an obedience that goes to the core of their being.

Even with this in mind, we still must ask whether Jesus' teaching sets aside the law. The answer to that question depends on the treatment of several texts and also on how atomistically and legalistically one wishes to treat the Hebrew scriptures. Granted Matthew's understanding that Jesus taught the true intent of the scriptures, I would say that

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[92] See the discussion in Frymer-Kensky, 130. Cf. Num. Rab. 19.8.

[93] Exod. Rab. 6.1; Lev. Rab. 19.2; Cant. Rab. 5.11.3; cf. Bar 4.1; Wis 18:4; 4 Ezra 9.37.

[94] Sanders, 248.

[95] Aboth II.1; IV.2; Midr Ps. 9.3; Deut. Rab. 6.2; Sifre Deut. 48, 79, 82.

[96] Ḥag I.8; Pesiq. R. 21; Midr Ps 12.4. Note the "hidden things" of the law in 1QS 5.11. How seriously should we understand the rabbinic statements that the oral law is more important than the written so that even God gives heed to the elders (Sanh. XI.1; Pesiq. R. 3.1–2.)? So much attention is given to the written and oral law that not even miracles or a *Bath Kol* can set it aside (bBM 59a).

[97] E.g., Sanh. X.3; XI.1; Gen. Rab. 7.2.

[98] See the discussions in Sigal, 48–51, 68; Harvey, 60–61; and Sanders, 248–249.

[99] Sigal, 23.

[100] Stephen Westerholm, *Jesus and Scribal Authority* (Lund: Gleerup, 1978) 59–60, 112–113.

[101] Harvey, 60–65; Manson, 189.

he did not think Jesus violated or abrogated the law, but that presupposes an analysis of the texts in question. Only brief comments are possible in this paper.

The Antitheses

The antitheses are clearly intended to provide an explanation of the greater righteousness that is demanded in 5:20. The point in every case is to go beyond a surface level to the intention of the will of God in expressing the law. What is required is an integrity of being that is characterized by love, mercy, and truth.

The two important questions in approaching the antitheses are whether there is strong opposition or continuation between the two halves of the statements and, if there is opposition, whether it is the word of God or scribal tradition that is being opposed.

The attempt to see in the antitheses a contrast between the word of God and the word of Jesus[102]is unfounded and very difficult to reconcile with 5:17–20. The arguments from several people that the antitheses are not strong oppositions must be given serious consideration.[103] At the same time, it is not satisfactory to say that the opposition is merely to the scribal interpretation.[104] It seems to me that δέ in each of the antitheses will have to be analyzed in its own right.[105] In the first two antitheses δέ seems to show continuation. The intention in both is to show how far reaching is the concern of the commands. There is no contrast with either God's word or scribal interpretation. There is only an extension of the command to show what kind of integrity is demanded. With the third, fifth, and sixth antitheses there seems to be a mild adversative tone. One could argue, as J. Levison did, that the scripture is not a point of contrast, but a basis for teaching.[106] Still, the content of the second half shows that the concern of the will of God is not in the first half, but in the concerns for love, mercy, and truth. With the fourth antithesis, the opposition seems even stronger, and at least formally there is a setting aside of texts like Deut 6:13. But it seems clear that we are dealing with scribal interpretation and the abuse of oaths, as is evidenced by 23:16–22.[107] If the function of oaths was to verify truth

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[102] As Dalman, 73; Jack Dean Kingsbury, "The Place, Structure, and Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount Within Matthew," *Interp* 41 (1987) 139; Meier, 133.

[103] Daube, 55–62; Levison, 173–176; and Sanders, 260, who said the antitheses "affirm the law, but press beyond it." Matthew would probably have said they affirm the law and press to its center.

[104] As Harvey, 55; and Sand, 19.

[105] Many have noticed that not all the antitheses are alike; e.g., Meier, 125–161; Suggs, 113.

[106] Levison, 174.

[107] See the discussions in David E. Garland, *The Intention of Matthew 23* (Leiden: Brill, 1979) 132–136; Westerholm, 104–113; Guelich, 211–219. Meier, 156, rejected any use of 23:16–22, but the parallels are too strong and seem intentional. Material later in the Gospel cannot be ignored in interpreting the Sermon on the Mount unless one thinks that the Sermon on the Mount was transmitted intact and integrated by Matthew as H. D. Betz, "The Sermon," 18, and William R. Farmer, "The Sermon on the Mount: A Form-Critical and Redactional Analysis of Matt 5:1–7:29," *SBL 1986 Seminar Papers*, 56. 23:16–22 must be used in interpreting 5:33–37 just as 19:3–9 must be used in interpreting 5:31–32. Matthew treated themes briefly in 5–7 and expanded on those subjects later in the document. For a critique of Betz' position, see Charles E. Carlston, "Betz on the Sermon of the Mount—A Critique," *CBQ* 50 (1988) 47–57.

and casuistry led to the avoidance of truth, then Jesus did not abrogate the law by limiting people to the simple truth.

If one does justice to the *function* of the various biblical statements and to possible abuses in the Jewish culture that may have occasioned the sayings, there is no necessary abrogation of the law in any of the antitheses. The antithesis dealing with divorce is not an abrogation, for Deut 24:1 is not a legitimation of divorce, but the prohibition of a divorced woman from returning to her first husband after being "defiled" by a second. Furthermore, an absolute prohibition of divorce seems to be expressed in CD 4.21–5.2 and 11Q Temple Scroll 57.17–19 (if the regulations for the King were a model for the whole community as J. Fitzmyer has argued).[108] If this is so, Jesus' comments would not be perceived as a violation of the law. Rather, as the discussion in 19:3–9 shows, his concern is for the divine intention in marriage.

The fifth antithesis is an abrogation of the law *if* one ignores the function of the *lex talionis* in its context. But the moment that one admits that the purpose of the *lex talionis* was to limit revenge and to make sure that wrong doing was not ignored (Deut 19:19–21), then the statement of Jesus is not a violation of that function. Without playing with words, however, one can say that Jesus' teaching is a redirection. It asks that disciples of the Kingdom no longer stand on their rights; the concern is not for personal legal satisfaction. Instead, through hyperbole people are asked to implement the mercy code. Jesus' concerns are different from those of the *lex talionis*, but an absolute understanding of Jesus' statements is not possible either.

Similarly the sixth antithesis, the climax of this section, is a redirection. As elsewhere, Jesus will not allow limits to be set on one's responsibility. Integrity in the Kingdom requires that the love command control all relationships, including relationships with enemies. There is a different orientation from much of the Old Testament, but the origin of this teaching is the Old Testament itself. The issue again is how the scriptures are to be understood and what in them is to be emphasized.

Other Possible Abrogations of the Law

Matt 8:22 is not an abrogation of an Old Testament law, although it would have been seen as an abrogation of the oral tradition.[109] Nor would Matthew have concluded that Jesus was violating what the scriptures taught about the sabbath. When I started this paper, I intended to argue that Jesus violated the written law at only one point—the food laws in 15:11. Clearly if this statement is understood in an absolute sense, the legislations about unclean foods are set aside. However, I think now that this is to read Mark 7:19 into Matthew. In Matthew the issue is the tradition of the elders concerning ceremonial washings. Jesus contrasted their tradition with the word of God. He told the people that eating with unclean hands does not defile, but that breaking God's law does. (Note that the sins that defile in v 19 are mostly violations of the decalogue.) It would be hazardous to conclude from this text that Jesus taught against and violated kosher food laws, particularly since this was still a difficult issue in the early church.[110] Mark drew the

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[108] Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "The Matthean Divorce Texts and Some New Palestinian Evidence," *TS* 37 (1976) 213–221; Sigal, 112–114; and Yadin, *The Temple Scroll*, I, 353–357.

[109] *Contra* Sanders, 252–255. See Harvey, 60. This passage does show that following Jesus supersedes any other religious duty.

[110] Barth, 89–90; Branscomb, 180; Sanders, 266.

conclusion that all foods were clean, but Matthew did not. It is fair to say that Jesus disregards uncleanness issues in Matthew, but how Matthew or his community dealt with the issue of kosher food (or circumcision) is not known. From the evidence we have, Matthew did not think that Jesus abrogated the law.

What of the "Legalistic Elements"?

There are still some texts in Matthew that suggest that Matthew not only did not abrogate the law, but that he was legalistic in observance of the law. 23:2–3, 23, and 24:20 all express attitudes that are surprising.

I have already indicated that 23:2–3 is hyperbole and must not be taken out of its context.[111] The tension set up by these verses is intentional.[112] The validity of the task of the scribes and Pharisees is affirmed, but their practices are rejected as hypocrisy. The qualification of these strong statements in the following verses would have prevented any misunderstanding on the part of Matthew's readers.

The call for focus on the weightier matters of the law in 23:23 is well in keeping with Matthew's whole approach to the law, but the call not to leave aside tithing of spices is unexpected. Jesus did not argue against tithing, and surely the intention here is to provide an emphatic way of saying that less important items ought not be neglected. The law is concerned primarily with issues of justice, mercy, and faithfulness, but it addresses many other parts of life too that ought not be neglected. This statement must be kept within the tenor of all of Matthew's teaching on the law. It is impossible to accept that the intention was to foster practice that would divert attention away from the "weightier elements." This is not a call to legalism.[113]

Matt 24:20 is difficult to treat since it is so cryptic. Possibly Matthew assumes his readers keep the sabbath strictly.[114] However, this is less likely since emergency situations allowed for breaking the sabbath, and it would make Matthew's view stricter than the rabbinic view. It may be as A. Schlatter and E. Hirsch argued that Christians would be "as conspicuous as spotted dogs" fleeing in the middle of a Jewish conflict.[115] However, a more plausible solution is that the difficulty of flight on the sabbath is related to the fact that shops and gates would be closed.[116] In any case, it is difficult to believe that the attitude reflected in 12:1–14 is altered by this text.

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[111] Stein, 38–39; Patte, 321, only says that it is not literal; Beare, 448, that it is a foil; and Garland, 54–55, (following Banks, 176) that it is a rhetorical preparation, a strategem. Christine Heubült, "Mt 5:17–20: Ein Beitrag zur Theologie des Evangelisten Matthäus," *ZNW* 71 (1980) 147–148, suggested that 23:3 does not refer to teaching, but means that the community should comply with what the Pharisees say because of the emergency situation. The emergency is that the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat, and the Christian community is powerless. This is unlikely.

[112] Patte, 321.

[113] See the discussion in McConnell, 84; and Patte, 325–326. Westerholm, 59, assigned a minor place to tithing, but the text seems instead to assign a minor role to tithing minor things.

[114] Patte, 539.

[115] Quoted in Barth, 92.

[116] Banks, 102.

Conclusions

Matthew's view of the law is that it is unquestionably enduring in validity. He does not present a legalistic view of the law, but nor does he leave the suggestion that Christians may be lax in their obedience to the law. Judgement is still an important theme for Matthew, and the law is to be lived.

The law, however, for Matthew was not a monolithic entity. It was diverse with various laws pointing in different directions. In Matthew's presentation of Jesus' teaching those diverse laws are organized by and subsumed under the love commands and the mercy code. Whereas his contemporaries had organized the law under ideas of holiness and ritual purity, Jesus reorganized it in keeping with God's love. The law is not to be treated as the focus of the canon. Rather, one must read the law and the prophets and interpret all the scriptures in accordance with the love commands, the "golden" rule, and God's desire for mercy instead of sacrifice. As a variation on the statement "People are more important than things," Matthew would say "People are more important than religion." How he worked out the "cultic" questions that were debated in the early church is unknown. Such questions are virtually ignored. The "weightier" matters of the law—justice, mercy, and faithfulness—are the items that Matthew is concerned about and expects to be lived. These core concerns of the law direct all else and produce the integrity that is the goal of the proclamation of the Kingdom.

This is not to suggest that living the law is some type of works righteousness. Even to say this is to insert Paul's thought into Matthew. There is no thought that one obeys the law by mere human effort. Nor is there a belief that the law is the center of relation to God. Whereas that was true with Judaism, for Matthew and his readers the center of their relation with God is Jesus.[117] They do not gather around the torah; they gather in the name of Jesus. There they experience the presence of God and live in accordance with his will.

One further item should be mentioned. The discussion of law in Matthew suggests that Matthew's view of scripture needs to be given more serious attention. Usually Matthew is viewed as having used his scriptures as a prophecy book. Those elements are present, but Matthew seems to have a much more nuanced view of scripture and its interpretation. A reconsideration of that view would be beneficial not only for understanding Matthew, but also for current discussions about scripture.

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[117] See Bornkamm, "The Authority," 91; and J. M. Gibbs, "The Son of God as the Torah Incarnate in Matthew," *Studia Evangelica* vol. IV, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1968) 38–46.

The Exegesis of God: Jesus' Signs in John 1-11

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It is a surprising fact that only R. Smith in recent years has offered an Old Testament paradigm for the Johannine signs as a group.[1] After a brief look at his suggestion, I would like to offer another which seems to me convincing. I will explore some of the advantages of this new suggestion and conclude by enumerating some of the unanswered questions, the avenues of investigation, which this suggestion opens up for the future.

1. Introduction

Robert Smith says that we are meant to read the signs as an act of God akin to that in the Exodus miracles. His correlation of the Exodus miracles and John's signs is as follows:

YHWH's/Moses' signs in Exodus	Jesus' Signs in John
-water turned to blood (7:14–24)	-water turned to wine (2:1–11)
-onslaught of frogs (7:25–8:15)	
-onslaught of gnats (8:16–19)	
-onslaught of flies (8:2–32)	
-plague on animals (9:1–7)	-healing of official's son (4:46–54)
-disease of boils (9:8–12)	-healing of paralytic (5:2–9)
-hail and thunderstorm (9:13–35)	-stilling of the storm (6:16–21)
-onslaught of locusts (10:1–20)	-feeding of the multitude (6:1–15)
-darkness upon the land (10:21–29)	-healing of the blind man (9:1–41)
-death of the first born (11:1–12; 11:32)	-raising of Lazarus (11:1–44) and death/resurrection of Jesus

Even the briefest glance at Smith's table will show that the general plausibility of many of the suggested connections breaks down with two in particular: the plague on animals (Exod 9:1–7) and the healing of the official's son (John 4:46–54); as well as the disease of boils (Exod 9:8–12) and the healing of the paralytic (John 5:1–9).

The "fit," in other words, is not sufficiently precise. Rather, I would suggest that the answer to the question "why these particular signs?" lies in another direction.

[1] Robert Smith "Exodus Typology in the Fourth Gospel," *JBL* 81 (1962) 329–42. A variation of his thesis is presented by D. Clark "Signs in Wisdom and John," *CBQ* 45 (1983) 201–209. Those who have suggested a pattern to the arrangement of the signs include C. Welch, *Parable Miracle Sign* (London: Berean, 1978) 204; and M. Girard, "La composition structurelle des sept 'signes' dans le quatrieme evangile" *Stud Rel/Sci Rel* 9 (3, 1980) 315–24.

2. Psalmic "Backbone" in John

Besides the fact that the Fourth Gospel displays a predilection for the Psalms when quoting the OT, there are several places in John which are influenced by a particular Psalm, even when no Psalm is explicitly quoted.[2] For example, R. Brown notes the influence of Psalm 107 on the diction of the sea-epiphany in John 6:16–21. And J. Beutler's recent monograph on John 14 develops a thesis that its themes are partly influenced by Psalms 41 and 42 (LXX). These are two of several suggestions made along these lines in recent years.[3] In that same tradition, I offer a new suggestion concerning how the minor signs work together. It is a thesis which, from the beginning, has never failed to impress me both with its simplicity and beauty. Those twin characteristics have also convinced me that it is true.[4]

It will be remembered at this point that Schnackenburg admits the possibility that the tradition of the "green grass" of John 6:10 may be informed by Ps 23:2, the Psalm of the Shepherd. And Merx long ago suggested that the setting of the healing of the paralytic in chap. 5, by what he calls the Sheep Pool, points in a quiet but unmistakable way to Jesus as Shepherd.

So there is already some sensitivity to the fact that Jesus' "I am the good shepherd" (John 10) is reinforced by the leitmotif of Jesus as Shepherd in the minor signs, and specifically along the lines of Psalm 23.

It is appropriate therefore, to do a close reading of that Psalm with an ear and eye to the ways in which these signs may be in dialogue with it.

The LORD is my shepherd, I shall not want;
[2]he makes me lie down in green pastures.
He leads me beside still waters;[a]
[3]he restores my soul.[b]
He leads me in paths of righteousness[c] for his name's sake.
[4]Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death,[d]
I fear no evil; for you are with me;

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[2] C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel According to St. John*, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978) 27–30, lists 20 passages in John having varying degrees of affinity with the language of an OT text. Of these 20, the Psalms play a prominent role in 11. The next most frequently used text would be Isaiah.

[3] R. Brown, *The Gospel According to John*, AB 29 A,B (New York: Doubleday, 1966, 1970) 1.255. J. Beutler, *Habt keine Angst: Die erste johanneische Abschiedsrede (Joh 14)* (Stuttgart: Gm b h, 1984). See too the response to Beutler's earlier article by E. Freed, "Psalm 42/43 in John's Gospel," *NTS* 29 (1983) 62–73. Further examples include G. Reim, "Jesus as God in the Fourth Gospel: The Old Testament Background," *NTS* 30 (1, 1984) 158–60 [on Ps. 45]; G. Bampfylde, "More light on John XII 34," *JSNT* 17 (1983) 87–89 [on Ps. 61]; and A. T. Hanson, *The Living Utterances of God: The New Testament Exegesis of the Old* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983) 127 [on Ps 131].

[4] I have been involved with this thesis since the mid 1970's. I presented it to the Upper Seminar in the study of Religion at Harvard University in Sept. 1980 and gave it in schematic form to the Catholic Biblical Ass'n Conference in San Francisco, August 1985. See *CBQ* 47 (4, 1985) 684.

your rod and your staff, they comfort me.
5You prepare a table before me in the
presence of my enemies;
You anoint my head with oil, my cup overflows.
6Surely goodness[e] and mercy[f] shall follow me
all the days of my life;
and I shall dwell in the house of the LORD
for ever.[g]

a Heb *the waters of rest*
b Or *life*
c Or *right paths*
d Or *the valley of deep darkness*
e Or *only*
f Or *kindness*
g Or *as long as I live*

Ps 23:1a The Lord is my shepherd; I lack [*hystereomai*] nothing.

This exact language is present in the explicit notice of the Evangelist concerning the problem at the Cana wedding, the first sign: i.e., they lack [*hysterēsantos*] wine (John 2:3). It is a problem solved by Jesus' action. This connection between the Psalm and John is verbal; others are thematic [reflecting similar ideas].

In that latter regard, it is interesting that Ps 23:5b reads *to potērion sou methuskon hōs Kratiston.* The literal translation of the Greek is something like "Your drinking cup is the best." It is not at all difficult to hear the echo of this idea in the comment made about the wine Jesus gives after the other wine has been drunk: "Everyone first serves the good wine and when [the guests] are through drinking, the inferior; but you have kept the good wine until now."

The surprises, however, do not stop here either. For the Hebrew of this verse reads *Ksy rwyh,* literally "my cup is saturation." The RSV translates "my cup overflows" and this, of course, is the English text of the Psalm verse which is most commonly used today. What is noteworthy for our purposes is the way this motif is thematically echoed in the explicitly mentioned fact the "there were six stone jars, (each) holding two of three measures, 20 or 30 gallons" (2:6). The huge amount of liquid transformed into wine accurately reflects the Hebrew "my cup overflows."

Ps 23:4a reads "even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death . . .[5]

We recall that Jesus' words, "your son lives," restores to health a boy who is described as *ēmellen apothnēskein,* "about to die."

We should also note in this regard that the Johannine narrative has a peculiar geographical characteristic vis-a-vis its near-analogues in the Synoptic gospels; i.e., because of the fact that the boy lies in Capernaum in the Jordan River Valley, John stresses not once but three times the plea for Jesus to "come down." The motif of the terminally ill child being in a valley perfectly coheres with this aspect of Psalm 23.

[5] W. J. Michel, "SLMWT, 'Deep Darkness' or 'Shadow of Death,' " *Journal of the Chicago Society of Biblical Research* 29 (1984) 5–20, argues that the Masoretic vocalization "Shadow of Death" is correct.

Ps 23:2b reads "by still waters he leads me," *epi hydatos anapauseōs exethrepsen me.* The site of this activity of the Lord, the still waters, are again explicitly reflected in the pool of chap. 5. The man's complaint to Jesus that "when (*botan*) the water moves, I have no one to put me in" intimates that at the time of their conversation, the waters are still. Indeed, one of the points of the narrative is to show that Jesus' word is effective quite independently of any "disturbance of the waters."

As in the case of the first sign, moreover, this sign has clear connections to the Masoretic text of the pertinent verse. The Hebrew of the verse uses *nabal,* "lead," and provides a strong analogue to the story of a paralytic's healing.

Ps 23:2a reads "he makes me lie down in green pastures." We have already noted that when John's text says "Get the people to recline; Now there was much grass in that place," Schnackenburg hears Jesus' activity as the Shepherd of the Psalm.

And of course, when the feeding itself occurs, we cannot but hear echoes of "you spread a table before me" (Ps 23:5).

The table moreover is spread "in the presence of my enemies," just as the ensuing dialogue of Jesus on the Bread of Life is delivered in the presence of the challenging Jews (6:41, 52).

Ps 23:4b reads "I fear no evil, for you are with me." We recall that, in John 6:16–21 Jesus speaks these words of comfort in the storm: "Do not be afraid; it is I" (6:20). It should further be remembered that Jesus does not calm a storm in John. Rather, he does just what this Psalm says "the Lord" does, he calms the fear of evil by his presence.

Ps 23:3a reads "he restores my life" (*tēn psychēn mou epestrepsen*). We recall the return of Lazarus to life with his sisters (John 11). The state to which Lazarus is called is not glory, but a restored natural life. It acts as a sign of the life which Jesus is, but does not correspond to Jesus' eventual glorified state. Lazarus' return to life precisely mirrors this verse of Psalm 23.

Now the attentive reader will realize that six of the seven minor signs have been shown to correspond in rather direct ways with various portions of Psalm 23. The only minor sign remaining is the healing of the man born blind in John 9, and it is to that remaining issue that we now turn.

Students of the Psalter consistently remark on the close relationship between and identical beginnings of Psalms 23 and 27. In fact only these two Psalms in the Septuagint begin with *kurios* and a self-referent: The Lord is my [*me*] shepherd; The Lord is my [*mou*] light and my salvation. Both Psalms function as a description of the activity of "the Lord" who acts on behalf of "me."

It is then plausible to suspect that the Evangelist may have set up a dialogue with Psalm 27 in the same way that he set one up with Psalm 23. Let us consider the points of similarity.

A Psalm of David

The LORD is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The LORD is the stronghold of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?

[2]When evildoers assail me, uttering slanders against me, my adversaries and foes, they shall stumble and fall.

[3]Though a host encamp against me, my heart shall not fear; though war arise against me, yet I will be confident.

[4]One thing have I asked of the LORD, that will I seek after; that I may dwell in the house of the LORD all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the LORD, and to inquire in his temple.

[5]For he will hide me in his shelter in the day of trouble; he will conceal me under the cover of his tent, he will set me high upon a rock.
[6]And now my head shall be lifted up above my enemies round about me; and I will offer in his tent sacrifices with shouts of joy; I will sing and make melody to the LORD.
[7]Hear, O LORD, when I cry aloud, be gracious to me and answer me! [8]You have said, "Seek my face." My heart says to you, "Your face, LORD, do I seek." [9]Hide not your face from me.
Turn not your servant away in anger, you who have been my help. Cast me not off, forsake me not, O GOD of my salvation: [10]For my father and my mother have forsaken me, but the LORD will take me up.
[11]Teach me you way, O LORD; and lead me on a level path because of my enemies.
[12]Give me not up to the will of my adversaries; for false witnesses have risen against me, and they breathe out violence.
[13]I believe that I shall see the goodness of the LORD in the land of the living!
[14]Wait for the LORD; be strong, and let your heart take courage; yea, wait for the LORD!

d Or refuge
e Heb to eat up my flesh

Perhaps most striking is the relation between the verses "For my father and mother have forsaken me, but the Lord will take me up" (Ps 27:10) and the drama of John 9:18–23 in which the parents of the healed man, for fear of being put out of the synagogue, respond to the interrogation of the Pharisees with "he is old enough; ask him yourself." After the ensuing interrogation, Jesus seeks out the man.

This verse of the Psalm is not, unlike many of the other verses to be surveyed, a commonplace. No real parallels exist. And it is to be noted that the desertion by his parents may be seen, in the scheme of John 9, as the central scene of the drama:

A	1–7	confrontation between Jesus and the disciples
B	8–12	blind man and neighbors
C	13–17	pharisees and blind man
D	18–23	pharisees and blind man's parents
C′	24–34	pharisees and blind man
B′	35–38	blind man and Jesus
A′	39–41	Jesus and pharisees

Furthermore, in John 9:5, Jesus identifies himself as light, "I am the light of the world," and in 9:38 he is addressed as "Lord" and worshiped. In view of what we have just seen about the theme of parental desertion in both Psalm 27 and John 9, it is hard not to hear the echo of Ps 27:1 "The Lord is my light and my salvation," when we read John 9:5, 38. I suggest that many of the specific details of John 9 have in part been crafted along the lines of Psalm 27 in order to make a statement about the identity of the one at work in opening the eyes of the blind.

Without overindulging in the extremities to which such a study can go, that "parallelomania" in which exact correlations between every verse of both texts are sought out and "found," one can nonetheless engage in a fruitful reading of the texts side by side. One can see in broad terms how the events of John 9 interpret the rest of the Psalm.

The psalmist's first conclusion drawn from his conviction about the Lord is "whom then should I fear?" (Ps 27:1b). The healed man in John 9 is anything but fearful in his relations

with his interrogators. John 9:27, 30–33 particularly reveal his temerity under questioning: ("Do you too want to become his disciples?").

"Hide not your face from me" (Ps 27:7–9): While the Psalmist, in a threatening situation, prays to be answered by the Lord, the blind man, cast out of the synagogue, is sought out by Jesus when he hears of the expulsion.

"My adversaries breathe out violence" (Ps 27:16): Note the animosity in the pharisees' questions before casting the man out of the synagogue (esp. John 9:28, 34–"Are you trying to teach us? You, a sinner from birth?").

"I believe I shall see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living" (Ps 27:13) has no verbatim equivalent in John 9. But, given what one has already seen of the relation between the two texts, it can be read as demonstrating a hope of the psalmist which has become reality for the man cured of his blindness by Jesus.

When charted, the minor signs show the following affinities with Psalms 23 and 27:

John's Signs	Psalms 23/27
1. Cana: the lack of wine is reversed; (John 2:3)	nothing is lacking for me; (Ps 23:1)
large amount of liquid turned into excellent wine (John 2:6, 10)	my cup is the best/overflows (Ps 23:5b)
2. healing of the child in the Jordan river valley who was "about to die" (John 4:47, 49, 51)	even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death (Ps 23:4a)
3. healing of the paralytic at the still pool (5:7, 9)	he leads me beside still waters (Ps 23:2b)
4. feeding the crowd in the the grass (6:10, 11)	he makes me lie down in green pastures; you spread a table before me (Ps 23:2a, 5a)
5. appearance in the sea storm and words of assurance to the fearful disciples "It is I; do not be afraid." (6:20)	I fear no evil, for you are with me (Ps 23:4b)
6. giving sight to the blind man and seeking him out following his brave responses under questioning and desertion by his parents (9)	The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom should I fear? (Ps 27:1) Even though my father and mother have forsaken me, the Lord will will take me up (Ps 27:10). See above for further details.
7. return of Lazarus to life	he restores my life (Ps 23:3a)

3. How Did the Evangelist Proceed?

John's Editing of Synoptic-like Material to Produce his Signs

The first thing one notes about John's signs vis-a-vis the Synoptics is that many of his signs have near-parallels there. But a closer inspection of the situation shows John's program in their regard to be unique in the canon.

1 Cana 2:1–11		
	no parallel	
2 Cana 4:43–54		Luke 7:1–10 Matt 8:5–13
	Luke shares the detail of the ailing being at the point of death	
3 paralytic, 5:1–9		Mark 2:1–12 Luke 5:17–26
	John's healing of the paralytic near water is singular	
4 the feeding 6:1–15		Mark 6:32–44 Matt 14:13–21 Luke 9:10b-17 Mark 8:1–10 Matt 15:32–39
	Mark 6, with John, details the green grass	
5 Words in storm 6:16–21		Mark 6:45–52 Matt 14:22–33
	Mark and Matt, with John include "It is I; have no fear."	
6 blind man 9		Mark 10:46–52 Matt 20:29–34 Luke 18:35–43 Mark 8:22–26
	One Synoptic vs. shows the crowd rebuking the blind. The conflict is not as developed or as specifically reflective of Psalm 27 as is John's sign.	
7. Lazarus 11:1–44		Mark 5:21–43 Luke 8:40–56 Matt 9:18–26 or Luke 7:11–17?
	"he restores my life" is reflected in all accounts.	

We see that John's first sign, reflecting Psalm 23's "my cup is the best/overflows" has no equivalent in the Synoptics. Others of the remaining signs, while having near-parallels in the Synoptics, nevertheless differentiate themselves from the Synoptic accounts by details which link them to some aspect of Psalms 23/27. This is especially true of chap. 4's "come down," of chap. 5's "still waters," and the blind man's "desertion by parents" in chap. 9. The remaining signs share some aspect with their Synoptic parallels which can reasonably be seen as reflective of some aspect of these two Psalms.

It should be noted, moreover, that every one of the Synoptics includes acts by Jesus which cannot all reasonably be understood within this two-Psalm schema. The Synoptic miracles also include exorcisms, healings of the deaf and dumb, hemorrhages and leprosy. In contrast, all of John's signs may be seen as reflective of some portion of these two Psalms.

The evidence suggests then that John alone in the canon intends all of Jesus' related miracles to be seen as signs of the activity of the Lord of Psalms 23/27.

What process are we envisioning for the Evangelist? Although there must be an area of grey in the picture, I suggest that the following portrait offers a discernible and plausible outline: The Psalm 23 motif was already available to him in the traditional feeding story's "green grass." As his attention turned to that Psalm, he noticed the affinity of its verse 4 "I fear no evil, for you are with me" with the pericope accompanying the feeding, Jesus' action on the sea.

He seizes on a plan to present only miracles of Jesus which reflect parts of Psalm 23. That works for all but one miracle. He has, however, been sensitized to Psalm 27 by the similar beginnings of Psalms 23 and 27, as well as by the fact that the "I AM" predication of the sea scene occurs at night, implying that Jesus' self-revelation is light. He then partly forms the blind man pericope along the lines of Psalm 27.

4. Advantages of this Psalms thesis

Congruence of the "Minor" Signs with The *Sign of the Fourth Gospel*

In the last section we noted that the coherence of John's signs with the portrait of the Lord in Psalms 23/27, as well as the absence from the fourth gospel of miracle stories not easily related to those Psalms, builds a defensible case that Psalms 23 and 27 form the substructure on which John's signs are erected.

In what follows, I wish to point out the basic coherence of John's signs group with the last and greatest sign of the fourth gospel, that of Jesus' being "lifted up" in the cross/exaltation. It will be remembered that John 3:14 states

> For just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert
> so the Son of Man must be lifted up.

The majority of commentators see that this alludes to the story of the bronze serpent on the pole (*sēmeion*) of Num 21:9, and that this verse thereby qualifies the cross/exaltation as a sign, indeed *the* sign of John's gospel. The majority of commentators also note two aspects of this chief sign which cohere with the presentation of the minor signs in chaps. 1–11.

First, there is the authoritative manner in which Jesus meets the cross/exaltation that coheres with the same manner in the other signs.

He takes charge of his being "lifted up"—he is the first to step forward in the garden at his arrest to ask "Whom do you seek?" It is he who questions Pilate "Do you say this

on your own?" (18:34) and reminds the procurator of his merely derivative power (19:11). He carries his own cross unaided and utters at the last what can easily be heard as a cry of accomplishment "It is finished" (19:30). It is not untrue to say that Jesus "performs" the sign of his being lifted up.

So too he takes the initiative in many of the signs in John 1–11 (chaps. 5, 6, 9). And when others make a request of him in chaps. 2 and 4, he puts himself at some distance from the request. Even in chap. 11, he follows the time schedule which is unexpected, not immediatedly rushing to the bedside of the ailing Lazarus.

Second, the glory of the greatest sign portrayed in chaps. 20 and 21 is explicitly discussed in the 1st and last signs in chaps. 1–11 (2:11; 11:40).

This much is nothing new. But once we consider the role of Psalms 23/27 in the formation of the "minor" signs, we are introduced to a wholly new dimension of how all John's signs founction as a group.

We remember that the failure of the minor signs to win universal faith is explained in 12:38 as a misunderstanding of "the Lord." And indeed, our analysis of the "minor signs" has suggested that one of their statements as a group is to portray Jesus acting as "the Lord" of those two Psalms. In other words, the works which Jesus performs in the minor signs give him the right to bear a divine name, i.e., the Lord. In that regard, these Psalms-signs provide the material basis on which the complaint of 12:38 is built: the activity of the Lord.

But even more important, the minor signs function exactly as does the chief sign of the gospel, in that the chief sign also confers on Jesus the right to bear a divine name:

> John 8:28 When you have lifted up the Son of Man, then you will know that "I AM."[6]
>
> The signs of John 1–11 collectively give Jesus the right to bear the name "Lord."
>
> The sign of his being lifted up gives him the right to bear the name "I AM."
>
> There is, in short, a simple congruence between the signs of the Book of Signs and *the* Sign of the Book of Glory: they confer Jesus' title to a divine name.

5. The Minor Signs and Current Research on G John at large

In this section, I wish to indicate the points of convergence between the thesis that Psalms 23/27 form the backbone of the minor signs in John 1–11 and other relevant research on the fourth Gospel in recent years. In doing so, I am continuing to assume the validity of the thesis as a working hypothesis and will simply be pointing out ways in which the content and method of this program of the Evangelist are congruent with other dynamics of the Gospel as uncovered in recent research. I wish to focus on three major areas which can very crudely be divided into the categories of what, who and how.

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[6] For the relation between *kurios* and the tetragrammaton, see J. Fitzmyer, "The Semitic Background of the New Testament *kurios* Title," *A Wandering Aramaean. Aramaic Essays* (Missoula: Scholars, 1979) 114–24.

I. What: The Revelation of the Name, and Jesus as Exegete

I.1 The Revelation of the Name

One of the most basic assertions to make about the signs in John 1–11 is that they collectively show Jesus revealing a divine name, "Lord," since he acts out the script of the Lord who is "my shepherd, my light and my salvation." In this regard, they are congruent with the revelation which occurs at the sea catch in chap. 21 (which some regard as itself a sign). The revelation is "it is the Lord" (21:7). Some recent studies have focused in one way or another on the revelation of the name which occurs at several other points in the Gospel.

A. The Revelation of the Name by God's Agent

G. W. Buchanan is only one of the recent commentators who point out that the Father and Jesus are depicted along the lines of the sender-agent relationship in antiquity, a relationship predicated in part on the agent's use of *the name:* The one sent "had the power of attorney to act for, in the name of, the one who did the sending."[7]

B. Jesus as Temple

B. Childs is only one of many recent commentators to note that G John presents Jesus as the New Temple (2:21).[8] The point is well taken because of the fact that the Deuteronomist asserts that the Lord places his Name in the Temple, and the concomitant fact that Jesus makes God's presence available by revealing his name (John 17:6).

C. Logos and Memra

In a development of his Oxford thesis under G. Vermes, R. Hayward maintains that the Johannine logos has as one of its background influences a targumic phrase which exegetes the divine name.[9] The phrase, mymr', is a kind of theological shorthand for the divine name. And Hayward asserts that "nothing stands in the way of the conclusion" that one of the background ideas to the Logos doctrine is the Memra.[10]

D. The Acclamation of Jesus as "Lord" (20:28) in relation to chaps. 8 and 10

J. Neyrey has recently suggested that the acclamation of Jesus as "Lord" in 20:28 is based largely on material in John 8 and 10.[11] For our purposes, this is noteworthy because we have asserted that the minor signs lay Jesus' claim to act as the Lord who is both "light" and "shepherd." These designations, of course, occur in chaps. 8 and 10 [8:12, I am the light of the world; 10:11, I am the good shepherd]. While I would see the minor signs as the chief evidence for Jesus' claim to the title "Lord," it is also true that I see Jesus' self-predications in chaps. 8 and 10 as congruent with the evidence of the minor signs. It is a pleasant surprise for me to see that independent research on how Jesus lays claim to that title also turns to chaps. 8 and 10 for substantiating evidence.

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[7] "Apostolic Christology," *SBL Seminar Papers 1986* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1986) 172–82, esp. p. 179.

[8] B. Childs, *The New Testament as Canon* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984).

[9] R. Hayward, *Divine Name and Presence: The Memra* (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, 1981).

[10] Hayward, *Divine Name,* 134–36.

[11] J. Neyrey, " 'My Lord and my God': The Divinity of Jesus in John's Gospel." In K. Richards, ed., *1986 SBL Seminar Papers* (Atlanta: Scholars 1986) 152–71.

I.2 Jesus as Exegete

John 1:18—No one has ever seen God; the only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, that one has made him known.

It has long been seen that this verse builds on the basis of the privileged position of the eternal Word / Son in order to assert Jesus' unique ability to present / describe / exegete [*exēgēsato*] the Father. At the simplest level, we can assert that our thesis about the signs collectively revealing the activity of the Father is congruent with the assertion of 1:18.

It has also long been seen that at 1:18, the Evangelist may be thinking of a text like Sirach 43:31. That entire latter section of Sirach 43 is worth considering here in order to undergird our assertion that when Jesus exegetes the Father, it is done at least in part through his works:

[27]Though we speak much we cannot reach the end, and the sum of our words is: "He is the all."
[28]Where shall we find strength to praise him? For he is greater than all his works.
[29]Terrible is the Lord and very great, and marvelous is his power.
[30]When you praise the Lord, exalt him as much as you can; for he will surpass even that/
When you exalt him, put forth all your strength, and do not grow weary, for you cannot praise him enough.
[31]Who has seen him and can describe him? [*ekdiēgēsetai*] Or who can extol him as he is?
[32]Many things greater than these lie hidden, for we have seen but few of his works.
[33]For the Lord has made all things, and to the godly he has granted wisdom.

According to Sirach, the ability to "describe him" (*exēgeomai*) at all can be done because "we have seen his works," few in number though they be. According to John, Jesus presents the Father to the world through his works, which include his signs. As Barrett says . . . "in the Bible, and not least in John, revelation is as much through action as through speech."[12] And those signs do so, as we can now say, in a very specific way, by presenting the Lord of Psalms 23 and 27.

II. Who—John The Prophet

P. Minear makes a case for understanding the fourth Evangelist as fulfilling the function of "prophet."[13] He delineates the following characteristics as constitutive of that function:

- a prophet is made intensely aware of the powerful presence of the risen Lord;
- is charged to tell God's people what has been seen and heard from that Lord;
- serves the people as a leader in their worship;
- instructs them in the commands and the way of the Lord;
- relays to the community the traditions received from Jesus, both before and after his death;

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[12] Barrett, *John*, 170.

[13] P. Minear, *John The Martyr's Gospel* (New York: Pilgrim, 1984) 7, 8. This prophetic identity is also stressed by G. L. Renner, *The Life-World of the Johannine Community: An Investigation of the Social Dynamics which Resulted in the Composition of the Fourth Gospel* (Ann Arbor, 1982).

• screens the memories of the Messiah through various passages of scripture and vice versa;
• helps Christians understand their own situations in the light of their participation in the stories of Jesus' death and glorification.

For our own purposes, the hypothetical function of the Evangelist as leader of worship is pertinent, since in that activity the Psalms would play a significant role. The gospel displays a predilection for the Psalms among its citations and, as we have already suggested, the 23rd and 27th Psalms form the backbone of the minor signs.

Moreover, Minear portrays the prophet as one who sees the exalted Lord and reports the content of that vision. In this regard, Minear reflects the work of Aune who stresses that the Lord's future coming is made present in "direct visionary experience within the context of worship."[14] Aune is thinking here of a "prophetic *visio Christi* within the setting of worship. . . . The eucharist undoubtedly forms the central moment of this setting . . . in which the exalted Jesus, now present in Parousia splendor, pronounces both blessing and woe, salvation and judgment, through prophetic cultic personnel."[15]

Aune would attribute a saying like 14:23 "We will come to him and make our home with him" as an example of a prophet's reported vision.[16] Because the signs collectively report that Jesus acts as the Lord, it is worth considering whether and to what degree they represent an exercise of the community's prophetic function.

III. How—Irony as Revelation—John's Literal and Intended Levels

G. O'Day has made one of the most ambitious attempts in recent years to put the irony of the 4th Gospel into a theological perspective.[17] Her work has direct bearing on our thesis about the minor signs in John.

She rehearses the list of those points in John where the literal meaning also conveys another higher meaning as well: e.g., the verb *hypsoo*, "to lift up," referring both to the crucifixion and to the exaltation of Jesus.[18] She notes that a "dualism" such as the twin declarations that Jesus did not come to judge (3:17) and that all judgment has been given to him (5:22) are a related category of such "double meanings," in that the one category of judgment has two simultaneously operative meanings as defined by John.[19]

She notes the related research of others: Martyn who says that John 9 is both an episode in the ministry of the historical Jesus and at the same time an episode in the life of the Johannine community.[20] She refers to R. Bultmann who says that, for John, the glory, while not the same as flesh, becomes available only in and through the flesh (*doxa* through *sarx*).[21] She points out the seminal work of G. MacRae whose description of the Gospel's *modus operandi* focuses on the challenge offered there to see in a human being the Logos of God.[22]

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[14] David Aune, *The Cultic Setting of Realized Eschatology in Early Christianity* (Leiden: Brill, 1972) 134.
[15] Ibid., 129.
[16] Ibid., 131.
[17] G. O'Day, *Revelation in the Fourth Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986).
[18] Ibid., 8.
[19] Ibid., 8, 9.
[20] Ibid., 8.
[21] Ibid., 6.
[22] Ibid.

This two-in-one dynamic in G John has some similarities to descriptions of rhetorical irony in antiquity. For example, Anaximenes defines irony as "saying something while pretending not to say it, or calling things by the opposite of their real names."[23] Quintilian defines irony as "the term which is applied to words which mean something other than they express"[24] and allows for a kind of figurative irony in which "the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent rather than confessed."[25] This latter definition of irony is related to his notion of a figure, i.e., "the term employed when we give our language a conformation other than the obvious and ordinary."[26] Quintilian understands that such figurative irony can characterize the whole manner of a person, like the Socrates of the dialogues.[27] Cicero's notion of irony also explicitly extends beyond the individual line or phrase to describe the entire content and tone of a speech and cites the example of Plato's dialogues, where "the whole tenor of your speech shows what you think differing continuously from what you say."[28]

O'Day admits that literary critics in antiquity do not discuss the term irony in relation to narrative. And she is content merely to juxtapose the two-in-one dynamic in the narrative of John with ancient examples of rhetorical irony.[29] She succeeds in showing that they function similarly. I don't think it necessary however to abandon consideration of G John as an actual example of rhetorical irony in antiquity; i.e., let us take seriously the fact that this text opens with a declaration that its fundamental dynamic is a Word spoken in the world. That declaration opens up the possibility of understanding God as *rhetor* in G John, to whom the dynamics of ironic speech are available, and exercised in narrative.

When God is so understood in the Gospel, it is further noteworthy that the ensuing revelation of the minor signs does not solely follow Bultmann's model of purely existential revelation, but has an ideational content as well, i.e., that Jesus' works are the Lord's.[30] Whatever extential revelation is evoked in an individual's situation [to use Bultmann's terms] by each sign in the Gospel, the signs as a unit also convey a content as well about the relation of Jesus' works to the Lord's.

The attempt to appreciate that ideational content in the case of the minor signs should be sensitive to the ironic mode of revelation in the fourth Gospel so stressed by O'Day. She leads the reader through John 4 and points out those several places where the reader becomes aware that two different levels of dialogue are occurring at the same time, e.g., though Jesus is really thirsty on one level, his request for a drink is made of a character who is thirsty on another level.[31] The same process whereby one bit of dialogue reveals two different statements to the reader is exemplified in Jesus' answer to her statement about the expected Messiah (v 25).[32] By His *ego eimi* in v 26, asserts by O'Day, he is not just fulfilling the woman's messianic expectations, but by echoing the divine self-predication (in Isa 52:6), he transcends her expectations.

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[23] Ibid., 14; Rhetoric to Alexander 1434[a], 17f.
[24] O'Day, 16; Institutio 6.2.15–16.
[25] O'Day, 17; Institutio 9.2.45–47.
[26] O'Day, 16; Institutio 9.1.4.
[27] O'Day, 17; Institutio 9.2.45–47.
[28] O'Day, 15; De Oratore 2.67.269.
[29] O'Day, 19.
[30] Ibid., 40.
[31] Ibid., 60.
[32] Ibid., 73.

The important point to stress here for O'Day, and with which I agree, is that the intended or higher level in no way obliterates the dynamics of the literal or lower level. They work together simultaneously. Also worth restressing with O'Day is that this revelatory process, so integral to the revelation offered by the fourth Gospel, occurs in the narrative mode. John does not simply let the Christological assertions of the Prologue suffice as "gospel."[33]

So too, for our purposes, we are reminded both that (1) the dynamics of the individual signs are not obliterated by their collective revelation of the Name and (2) such revelation occurs through the signs narratives.

6. Relation of the Psalms–Signs to Recent Work on the Parables of the New Testament

Signs as Parables

It is noteworthy that the shepherd / light complex which forms the primary background of the seven minor signs is among the most heavily represented motifs of the seven "I AM" sayings [8:12, 9:5, 10:7, 10:11]. At the very least, this fact should open one to further investigation of the relationship between the signs and the "I AM" sayings.

In this regard, one might recall the fact that Schnackenburg refers to the "I AM" sayings as "parabolic" because they seem to be John's explicitly Jesus-centered replacement for the presentation of Jesus' parables known in the Synoptics.[34] That is noteworthy because Riga has already pointed out that the Synoptic parables and John's signs both perform the function of forcing their addressees to a decision, and often dividing them.[35] That is, not only are the I AM saying "parabolic," but the minor signs are "parabolic" as well.

Furthermore, I believe that we can go beyond Riga's observation that the signs function similarly to the Synoptic parables. We can say that, in a very real way, the signs *are* part of the parables of John's gospel. When we observe that John uses the same Isaiah 6 citation in 12:40 to explain the failure of the signs as is used by the Synoptics to explain the failure of the parables, we are faced with the possibility that John is thinking of his signs as parables.

This notion is not without implicit supporting evidence in the text of the Synoptics. The Isaiah verse which they cite begins with a reference to their "seeing but not perceiving," i.e., there is a visual component in the explanation of the parables in the Synoptics. We are perhaps too accustomed to thinking of the parables primarily as stories which are spoken and heard. But that emphasis is only part of the emphasis of the Isaiah quote cited by the Synoptics. "Seeing," the citation insists, is as much a part of one's reaction to the parables as "hearing." Indeed, at least one Synoptic researcher discusses Jesus (and his career as a whole) as the parable of God.[36] What I am suggesting is that John, whose Word not only speaks but is also light, took seriously the visual component of the early Christian tradition about parables, and understood Jesus' signs as part of the parabolic ministry of the Word made flesh.

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[33] Ibid., 91.

[34] Schnackenburg, "Jesus the Shepherd and Related Parables," *John*, 2.275f.

[35] P. Riga, "Signs of Glory: The Use of Semeion in John's Gospel," *Int* 17 (1963) 402–410, esp. 407.

[36] J. R. Donahue, "Jesus as the Parable of God in the Gospel of Mark," *Int* 32 (1978) 369–86.

Once the signs have been classified as parables, the door is open to consider the signs under some of the identifying rubrics of the Synoptic parables.

The first of these lies in the oft-repeated statement that the Synoptic parables lend themselves to multiple interpretations.[37] That is an accurate description of the minor signs in John. They lend themselves to a variety of interpretive matrices, both individually and as a group.

Second, the oft-repeated notion of Jeremias and others that the Synoptic parables reveal the inbreaking of God's reign through the person of Jesus is also worthy of consideration in the context of understanding the signs. Indeed the collective function of the minor signs in revealing the works of the Lord of Psalms 23/27 supports the notion that John is in essential agreement with the Synoptic version of what parables do.

Conclusion

We have seen that appreciation of Psalms 23 and 27 as the "backbone" of the Fourth Gospel's signs provides a closer fit than was the case with the previously suggested Exodus background. This Psalmic background is also consistent with other ideational emphases of the gospel [e.g., that Jesus exegetes the Father and reveals the Name], with the exercise of the prophetic charism in the community, and with the ironic mode of the Evangelist's operation. However, the thesis has left certain unanswered questions which point the way for future research. Some of these unexplored questions include the following:

—to what mode of OT usage is this most akin? From what milieu primarily?

—since we are discussing narrative support for assertions about Jesus made in dialogue (I am light, shepherd), are there convincing parallels for the procedure, especially for so large a block of narrative?

—at precisely which point or points did the Evangelist bring these Psalms to bear on the Synoptic-like narratives? How precise can we be in this regard?

—to what school of ironic expression is this process most akin, or more pointedly, which of the purposes of irony is the Evangelist fulfilling? Should we be thinking along the lines of Quintilian, for example, who posits as one of the functions of special language, the giving of pleasure to the one who detects the author's program? (Inst. or. 9.2.78)

—can we legitimately make the seeming crossover between the genres of miracle and story implied by considering the signs as part of John's presentation of Jesus' parables?

Working out answers to these and other questions will be a vexing task to some degree. One is reminded of Mark 10:29, 30 which insists that the blessings of the kingdom come inextricably interwoven with a liberal dose of unpleasant realities. May those difficulties not taint the pleasure one derives from having a basically simple answer to the simple question "Why *these* Signs?": The Lord is my shepherd, my light and salvation.

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[37] M. A. Tolbert, *Perspectives on The Parables: An Approach to Multiple Interpretations* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979); applied more or less systematically by P. Perkins, *Hearing the Parables of Jesus* (New York: Paulist, 1981). See too J. D. Crossan, "Parables," *Harper's Bible Dictionary* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985) 747–49, esp. 749.

The Rebellion of Korah, Numbers 16-18: A Study in Tradition History

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I admit to much misgiving in writing this paper. The chapters in question are complex, the inferences speculative, and the results tentative. My sole purpose is to stimulate further discussion. I am also presuming that the seminar participants will consult my previous work so that I need only refer to its conclusions.

I begin with my conclusion that Numbers 16–18 is a cohesive unit. The prescriptions for the responsibilities of the priests and the Levites (18:1–7) and their respective emoluments (18:8–32) are the antidote to the people's panic (17:27–28) in the wake of the plague that befalls them (17:6–15) following their support of the rebellion of their chieftains, purportedly under the leadership of Korah (16:2–4, 16–27*, 35). Thus, the description of the job profiles of the priests and Levites (18:1–7) is no mere repetition of an earlier version (3:5–10). It now specifies that, henceforth, the priestly and Levitic guards (*mišmeret*) will take full responsibility (*nāśā' 'āwōn*, 18:1, 23) for any encroachments (*qārab*) against the sanctuary.[1]

Whereas chap. 18, in my opinion, is the product of a single hand, the opposite holds true for chap. 16. The seams of chap. 16 are plainly visible and, in spots, the stitching is inordinately poor; all critics agree that we confront a composite.

I have analyzed chap. 16 elsewhere[2] so I need not repeat the details. My dissection is best summarized by the following structural outlines, to which I shall append two minor modifications.

I. Penultimate Recension

Introduction: Korah, Dathan and Abiram, chieftains versus Moses and Aaron, vv 1–4 (earlier version).

A. Dathan and Abiram versus Moses, vv 12–15.

B. Korah and chieftains versus Aaron, 16–18 (*'ădātĕkā* means chieftains).

C. Korah and *'ēdâ* versus Moses and Aaron, vv 19–22.

1. At the Tabernacle, v 19.
2. God threatens *'ēdâ*, vv 22–21.
3. Moses and Aaron intercede, v 22.

C'. *'ēdâ* spared at the Tabernacle, vv 23–24, 26a, 27a (*miškan YHWH**).

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[1] See J. Milgrom, *Studies in Levitical Terminology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970) 16–22.

[2] J. Milgrom, "Korah's Rebellion: A Study in Redaction," *De la Tôrah au Messie (Mélanges H. Cazelles)*, ed. J. Doré, etc. (Paris, Desclée, 1981) 135–46.

B'. Korah and the chieftains incinerated at the Tabernacle, v 35.
A'. Dathan and Abiram swallowed, vv 25, 26 (*'ēdâ*), 27b–34 (Korah, *lāhem**).

II. Ultimate Recension (MT)

Introduction: Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, chieftains versus Moses and Aaron, vv 1–4. [Korah and Levites versus Aaron, vv 5–7, 8–11 (*'ădātēkā* means Levites)].
A. Dathan and Abiram versus Moses, vv 12–15.
B. Korah and chieftains versus Aaron, vv 16–18.
C. Korah and *'ēdâ* versus Moses and Aaron, vv 19–22.
C'. *'ēdâ* spared at dwellings of Korah and Dathan and Abiram, vv 23–27a.
1. God orders removal of *'ēdâ*, vv 23–24.
2. Moses removes *'ēdâ*, vv 25–27a.
A'+ B' (part). Korah and Dathan and Abiram swallowed, vv 27b–34.
B' (part). chieftains incinerated, v 35.

The penultimate recension envisages three discrete rebellions (I ABC). However, in view of the patent alliance of the community (*ēdâ*) with the chieftains (17:6), it may well be that the two rebellions should be regarded as a single uprising.

The omission of Korah from the punishment of the chieftains in the MT (v 35) can be attributed to the subsequent shift of his death from the Tabernacle to the company of Dathan and Abiram (v 32). However, since it is likely that the chieftains, as well as Dathan and Abiram, may "have originally been dissociated from Korah,"[3] v 35 may have been preserved unchanged: only the chieftains, but not Korah, were incinerated by the divine fire.[4] This leaves only the mutinous Levites under the leadership of Korah (the ultimate recension)—a most natural alliance since Korah himself was a Levite chieftain (Exod 6:21; Num 26:58). The association of Korah with the chieftains, then, would be the work of the penultimate redactor (I B).

Since, heretofore, I have not analyzed chap. 17, some comments on its composition are in order. Vv 1–5 continue 16:35. These verses would then be part of the penultimate recension except for the glosses *'ăšer lō' mizzera' 'ahărōn* and *wĕlō'-yihyeh kĕqōraḥ wĕka-'ădātô* (in v 5), as the contribution of the ultimate recension which pits Korah and the Levites against Aaron. Vv 6–15 (minus 14b) are in place since they depict the community's rebellion following the death of its chieftains. The test of the rods (vv 16–24) also continues the penultimate recension since once again the antagonists are Aaron and the chieftains. Thus all of chapter 17 (minus the two above-mentioned glosses) can be attributed to the penultimate recension which deals chiefly with the uprising of the chieftains.

Two major problems remain to be solved. The first is that the chieftains "contend with Aaron, not with Moses, and we have no historical record of any struggle for the

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[3] Ibid., 138.

[4] There is no need to propose *wĕ'ēš yāṣĕ'â* > *wattēṣē'* *'ēš*, as I originally surmised (ibid., 140), in view of Paran's convincing demonstration of P's "closing deviation," its literary technique of closing a pericope by altering its word order and verb tenses; cf. M. Paran "The Literary Features of the Priestly Code" (Hebrew University dissertation, 1983) 124–57 (Hebrew).

priesthood outside of Levitic circles."[5] In response, I had adduced evidence that according to the veritably old biblical narratives, lay leaders could act as cultic officiants. Thus the conflict of the chieftains was not with Aaron (or the Aaronides), "between the chieftains and the Levites."[6] Support for this hypothesis can be found in the tradition recounted by Josephus (Ant. 4:63–66) and adopted—clearly independently—by Ibn Ezra and Ramban (*ad loc.*) that Aaron and the chieftains act only as representatives of their tribes and that the contest of the rods mirrors the rivalry stirred up among the tribes by the election of Levi as the official clergy (cf. Num 3:11–13).[7] Indeed, Rabbi Judah ben Samuel He-hasid, a younger contemporary of Ibn Ezra, even ventures the opinion (radical for his time) that the divine selection of the Levites by means of the rods actually preceded and motivated the rebellion of the chieftains.[8]

This supposition, that the Levites are the target of the chieftains' uprising, also suffices to resolve the second problem: how to account for the status of the Levites as presented in chap. 18; they share custody of the Tabernacle with the priests and as a reward for their mortal risks, they are awarded an annual tithe from the produce and livestock (cf. Lev 27:30–33) of each Israelite. Indeed, now it becomes possible to explain why the chieftains undergo two tests: at the sanctuary (16:16–18, 35) and with the rods (17:16–25). The first vindicates Aaron: presumably, only his incense offering is accepted (16:16b; cf. 17:12). The second, the test of the rods, vindicates the Levites. Henceforth, no layman, even a chieftain, may serve in the sanctuary: "The stranger (i.e., layman) who encroaches shall be put to death" (1:51; 3:38; cf. 3:10; 18:7).

A final comment on the historical settings of the rebellions. With J. Liver,[9] I continue to maintain that the mutiny of Dathan and Abiram reflects the struggle of the Reubenites to regain their erstwhile dominance among the tribes. I am less certain about the provenance of the chieftains' rebellion. I have tentatively suggested that it may be connected with Jereboam's appointment of important laymen as priests (*qĕṣôt bā'ām*, 1 Kgs 12:31 [=chieftains?]).

However, I have changed my mind regarding the dating of the ultimate recension which adds a fourth (or third) rebellion, that of Korah and the Levites against Aaron. "The beginning of the First Temple period when the Temple hierarchy was still in the process of formation"[10] remains a possibility, particularly if the Chronicler can be believed that many northern Levites flocked to Jerusalem when Jeroboam replaced them with laymen (2 Chron 1:13–17). However, the same Levitic migration can be postulated on firmer historical ground when Northern Israel was vanquished by the Assyrians. Another, equally plausible cause if the abolition of the local altars by Josiah and the consequent unemployment of their (Levitic) priests. Indeed, I must now concede that a Korah could

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[5] J. Milgrom, "Korah's Rebellion," 142 n. 2.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibn Ezra's supposition (on 16:1 and 16:3) that the chieftains were all first-born, attractive as it may be, cannot be substantiated.

[8] *Torah Exegesis of Rabbi Judah He-hasid*, ed. I. S. Lange (Jerusalem, 1975) *ad loc.*; cf. G. Brin, "An Investigation of R. Judah He-hasid's Comments on The Torah," *Sinai* 88 (1981) 5–6 (Hebrew); Eng. trans. and abridgment by J. Chipman, *Immanuel* 12 (1981) 25.

[9] "Korah, Dathan and Abiram," *Scripta Hierosolymitana* 8 (1961) 189–217, esp. 203–7.

[10] J. Milgrom,'Korah's Rebellion,' 143 n. 2.

have marshalled the provincial Levites against the entrenched Aaronide establishment in Jerusalem at any time during the history of the First Temple.[11]

I would therefore tentatively submit that the uprising of the chieftains against the Levites and its consequences form the main bloc of Numbers 16–18 which were affixed to the account of Dathan and Abiram in the penultimate recension (16:1*, 12–15, 25–34*). Subsequently, the Levitic uprising against the Aaronides was interpolated into the ultimate recension (16:5–7, 8–11) and Korah made the instigation of all the rebellions.

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[11] However, the period of the Second Temple is precluded since the Korahites were then powerless; cf. S. E. Loewenstamm, *Encyclopaedia Biblica* 7 (1977) s.v. *Qōraḥ*, 257–58 (Hebrew).

The Story of Korah's Rebellion: Key to the Formation of the Pentateuch

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I

The key to unlocking the Pentateuch has yet to be found. After more than two hundred years of testing now this key, now that, scholars find themselves with more keys than ever before, but none which gives entré to every nook and cranny of this maze-like book – a book which, though seemingly composite, does not acknowledge itself as such. Even when segmented into composite elements by the application of literary, formal, or other criteria, it is silent as to how and when these composite elements came into existence, who composed them and for what reason. However sharply the tools of analysis have been honed, scholars are still at sixes and sevens when it comes to understanding the process by which the Pentateuch came to be what it is: a book attributed to a single author, Moses, who was believed to have penned virtually every word of it before his death in the wilderness.

This silence is loudly echoed by the silence of the historical, prophetical, and hagiographical books of the Bible. The book of Kings may tell us of the discovery in the Temple of a book allegedly written by Moses, but it does not explicitly tell us the length and breadth of it. And though we are assured that it had been lost for a very long time – from the days of the Judges no less – its original content was presumed to have remained intact.

So too, though we read in Nehemiah that Ezra read from the Torah of Moses, we are not told how much he read, or how it came to be that Ezra had become privy to a copy of the Torah of Moses which had been out of circulation from the time of Joshua, and hence could not have been in its entirety the book which had been found in the Temple in Josiah's day. Insofar then as the process of Pentateuchal formation is concerned, neither the Pentateuch nor the non-Pentateuchal books of the Bible have proved to be helpful.

The extant literature of the ancient Near East is no less unhelpful. However much it illuminates the background of Israel's history and literature, it is opaque when it comes to the process of Pentateuchal formation. And for good reason. There is no ancient Near Eastern equivalent of so multi-layered a composite of millennial history, multi-faceted story-telling, and wide-ranging legislation designed for societies both simple and complex. Being the anomaly that it is, the Pentateuchal process is not explicable by an appeal to ancient Near Eastern analogies which do not exist.

Since scholars have been unable to find in the Pentateuch or in the other books of the Bible, or in the literature of the ancient Near East any explicit confirmation of the hypotheses they have conjured up, it would seem to follow that only some as yet untried method may offer an implicit confirmation so persuasive that it borders on the explicit. It is just such an untried method that I wish to test out in this paper. For I shall argue that if one takes the story of the rebellion of Korah as one's starting point, and follows through on the paths that it logically compels us to follow throughout the rest of the Pentateuch, the historical and prophetical books of the Bible, the Hagiographa, and to

an extra-canonical book, the Wisdom of Ben Sira, one will discover along the way the historical process by which the Pentateuch came to be the unity of composites that it is.

II

If a wanderer, without any awareness of more than two hundred years of Pentateuchal criticism, had stumbled by chance on a copy of the Pentateuch and had opened it to the story of Korah's rebellion, it would be clear to such a one that this could hardly be a story pure and simple, but rather an account of a violent struggle for absolute power dramatically enhanced by the exceptionally harsh punishments meted out to the rebels by a God beside himself with anger. That this story reached beyond mere literary or theological concern would be evident from the fact that Aaron's son Eleazar was commanded to take the brazen firepans of the rebels and beat them out for a covering of the altar ". . . to be a memorial unto the children of Israel, to the end that no common man that is not of the seed of Aaron draw near to burn incense before the Lord, that he fare not as Korah and his company as the Lord spoke unto him by the hand of Moses" (Num 17:4–5).

It is made even more evident from the fact that 32 verses (18:1–32) of hard-hitting legislation follows fast in the wake of the story, legislation drawing a barrier of permanent separation between Aaron and his sons the priests, and the rest of the tribe of Levi, the ministrants, removable only on pain of death: "Only they [the Levites] shall not come nigh unto the holy furniture and unto the altar, that they die not, neither they, nor ye" (18:3).

The story's implicit purpose would have spoken out to the untutored wanderer loud and clear: any challenge on the part of the Levites or the people at large to the priestly monopoly of Aaron and his sons would be put down as forcefully in the future as it had been put down in the past.

III

Turning from the story of Korah's rebellion and trekking through the rest of the Pentateuch from Exodus through Deuteronomy, the untutored wanderer would very soon realize that he or she had entered a maze with no way out. Impressed by Yahweh's crushing of Korah's revolt and his crowning of Aaron and his sons with the priesthood, the wanderer would not have been surprised at the thousands of passages in Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers that long before the revolt had endowed Aaron and his sons with the priesthood in perpetuity; assigned to them the role of sole expiators of the sins of the people; designed for them garments of beauty; built for them a splendid Tabernacle; and gave them charge of distinguishing between the holy and the profane, the clean and unclean. Nor would the wanderer have been surprised that the breaking of the rebellion was followed up with further underpinnings of the absolute authority of Aaron, his rightful heir to the high priesthood, Eleazar, and to the sons of Aaron at large.

What would puzzle the wanderer, however, would be the way in which the Aaronide path enters into and out of paths which are not Aaronide at all. One of these paths would show the markings of an absolute power lodged in a prophet-like leader, Moses, who was neither a priest himself nor an endower of a priestly class, nor the architect of an elaborate cultic establishment. This the untutored wanderer would discern clearly in the vignette of Moses's relationship to the Tent of Meeting and the cloud of God's presence as drawn in Exodus 33:7–11.

> Now Moses used to take the tent and pitch it outside the camp, far off from the camp; and he called it the tent of meeting. And every one who sought the Lord would go out to the tent of meeting, which was outside the camp.

> Whenever Moses went out to the tent, all the people rose up, and every man stood at his tent door, and looked after Moses, until he had gone into the tent. When Moses entered the tent, the pillar of cloud would descend and stand at the door of the tent, and the Lord would speak with Moses. And when all the people saw the pillar of cloud standing at the door of the tent, all the people would rise up and worship, every man at his tent door. Thus the Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend. When Moses turned again into the camp, his servant Joshua the son of Nun, a young man, did not depart from the tent.

Here is a simple tent of meeting, and not an elaborate tabernacle; here Yahweh comes down in a cloud to speak with Moses face to face and not to savor the incense of sweet-smelling sacrifices; here Joshua is tending the tent and learning to be a prophet like Moses, and not a priest like Aaron. Here in a word, is prophetic, not Aaronide absolutism. There are thus two roads leading away from each other, and not merging.

As if this were not maze-like enough, a third road opens up to our untutored wanderer as soon as he or she starts reading Deuteronomy. This road, by contrast to the other two, has the markings of a system of authority which is neither Aaronide or prophetic. Aaron takes center stage in Deuteronomy only when he kindles Yahweh's burning anger by building the golden calf. Otherwise, with the exception of the mention of his death, Aaron is conspicuously absent from Moses' farewell address. What the wanderer finds instead is a priestly class made up of that very tribe of Levi whose claims to altar rights had been so deeply buried in sheol with Korah and his company. Here in Deuteronomy, this class is endowed by Yahweh and Moses with altar rights in perpetuity, and with authority over the Law for all time:

> And of Levi he said, "Thy Thumim and Thy Urim be with Thy holy one . . .
> for they have observed Thy word, and keep Thy covenant.
> They shall teach Jacob Thine ordinances,
> and Israel Thy law.
> They shall put incense before Thee,
> and whole burnt offerings upon Thine altar.
> Bless, Lord, his substance
> and accept the work of his hands.
> Smite through the loins of them
> that rise up against him.
> and of them that hate him,
> that they rise up not again.
> (Deut 33:8a, 9b–12)

Realizing that these three roads cannot logically merge with each other, the untutored wanderer would have little alternative but to separate each of them from the others and mark them off one by one with clear signs indicating the authority system which had built them. Whether not these roads at some time or other had actually led into one another is one which cannot be answered so long as one is confined to the Pentateuchal maze. Whether it can be answered by trekking through the historical, prophetical, and Hagiographic books of the Bible, and the Wisdom of Ben Sira, can be determined only after our untutored wanderer has ventured forth.

IV

Trekking one's way through the historical and prophetic books of the Bible is quite a different experience than that of trekking through the Pentateuch. Joshua, to be sure, is somewhat reminiscent of the Pentateuchal maze with its mutually exclusive authority systems, and Judges proves to be no straight path either, but they are not nearly as puzzling and bewildering as the Pentateuch itself, if only because no weighty legislation is heaped up along the way. As for the books of Samuel and Kings, they offer a relatively straight path which leads from prophetic absolutism to power-sharing, and from a pastoral agricultural and urban pre-monarchical society and embryonic cultic system to a more complex monarchical society with a priestly class, an elaborate cultic system, and a class of prophets split between "guild prophets" on the one hand and "free lance" prophets on the other.

The record as set down in Samuel and Kings would in outline be clear to our untutored wanderer. Samuel is pictured as a prophet with absolute power who crowns and uncrowns kings. Nathan is a prophet who holds kings to account and pressures David into designating Solomon as his successor. Ahijah the Shilonite gives Yahweh's sanction to Jeroboam's revolt against Solomon's heir Rehoboam. Elijah condemns Omri and Ahab in Yahweh's name, while Elisha spurs Jehu to revolt and take the crown for himself.

Throughout Samuel, Kings, and the prophetic books attributed to Amos, Micah, Hosea, and Isaiah, the wanderer would discover that prophetic absolutism was the order of the day whether it was manifest as with Moses and Joshua through an apprenticeship system or, as with Amos, a claim that Yahweh had spoken directly to one who was neither prophet or the son of a prophet. The issue was not whether the voice of Yahweh was absolute, but whether the claim to have heard that voice was to be trusted. The "free lance" prophets never hesitated to denounce sacrifices and excoriate priests, kings, and "guild" prophets.

Indeed the untutored wanderer would have seen that until the reign of Josiah, the prophets had been able to ward off any challenge to their special relationship with Yahweh. Unlike the priestly class of Solomon's Temple and the Davidic kings, prophetic absolutism reached back to Moses the prophet of the Exodus and the wilderness wanderings. Not so the Solomonic priesthood or the Davidic kings whose legitimacy dangled precariously on prophetic whim. Whereas the prophets were protected by wilderness covenant rights, priest and kings had no such right to which they could appeal.

In Josiah's day, however, a bid to gain this right was made when the high priest, the king, and a guild prophetess proclaimed that a book which had been lost since the days when the Judges judged was indeed the handiwork of Moses. Although the book is not explicitly stated to have been Deuteronomy, Deuteronomy is the only book of Moses which legitimized a Levitical priesthood, gave sanction to monarchy, and set limits to prophetic absolutism. It would therefore seem highly plausible to our untutored wanderer that the lost book must have been Deuteronomy, for otherwise it would be difficult to explain that those who are the beneficiaries of the tripartite power-sharing stipulations of Deuteronomy—priest, king, and "guild" prophet as against "free lance" prophets—the very ones who find and authenticate this newly-found book.

Priest, king, and "guild" prophet had seemingly joined in a coalition to establish the legitimacy of a post-wilderness priestly class, and a post-wilderness monarchy on wilderness covenantal grounds. If successful, the free-lance prophets would once and for all be silenced. Yahweh very much wanted sacrifices. So much so in fact that he had chosen the tribe of Levi to serve as an hereditary priestly class, to have the Urim and the Thumim in their charge, to teach Jacob Yahweh's ordinances and Israel Yahweh's law, to

burn incense before Yahweh, and to offer whole burnt offerings upon his altar and to be assured of Yahweh's vengeance on their adversaries and those who hated them (cf. Deut 33:8–10). Henceforth any prophet who did not accept as binding the immutable laws alleged to have been given by Moses on Horeb, or the institutions which Yahweh had allegedly established in the wilderness, might be put to death as a false prophet, as was urged in the case of Jeremiah and successfully against the prophet Uriah.

Here at long last was to be found the second of the three roads within the Pentateuchal maze, but it was evident that it was built not as a road to link up with prophetic absolutism but rather as a road built to bring it to a dead end. It did not take our untutored wanderer much further trekking before discovering that the builders of the tripartite power sharing road had failed to achieve their hoped-for goal. First, in chapters 40–48 in the book of Ezekiel, a prophet, solely on the basis of prophetic authority, stripped the Levites of their priestly prerogatives and turned them over to the son of Zadok, transmuted the king into a prince, and promulgated legislation that is not to be found in Deuteronomy. So little regard did this prophet have for the authenticity of Deuteronomy that he makes no mention of Moses, no mention of Horeb, and no mention of Moses' farewell address or his deathbed blessing to Levi. But neither does he make mention of the Aaronides, or Sinai, or, most striking of all, the rebellion of Korah, the burial of the Levitical claims in sheol, and the line of demarcation between the Aaronide priests and the Levite ministrants which presumably had been drawn by Moses centuries ago in the wilderness. However much this Ezekiel may have been an exemplar of prophetic absolutism and however much he may have been aware of the fact that the Levites were practicing as priests as Deuteronomy prescribed, he knows nothing as yet of the story of Korah's rebellion and the establishment of Aaronide absolutism.

And, as our untutored wanderer would discover as he or she read through the last of the prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi were as unaware of the Aaronides as Ezekiel.

In the face of a silence so eloquent, what choice would the wanderer have but conclude that, as late as Malachi's final words admonishing Israel to adhere to the Torah which Moses had given in Deuteronomy, the longest, widest, and most heavily trafficked road in the Pentateuch had yet to be built. Not until the books of Chronicles, Ezra, and the Ezraic sections of Nehemiah are opened and read do the Aaronides, who are nowhere found in Samuel, Kings, or in any of the prophetic books, make their first appearance.

V

The third road of the Pentateuchal maze thus opens up only after the Pentateuch has been finalized, promulgated and accepted by the people at large as God's immutable revelation at some unknown point in time between 445 B.C. at the earliest and 397 B.C. at the latest. Chronicles, Ezra, and the Ezraic parts of Nehemiah, having been written after this momentous event, bear clear witness to the fact that the Aaronide road, though recently built, was believed to stretch all the way from the wilderness age to the Persian conquest. Although well-read in Kings the author of Chronicles does not hesitate to superimpose Aaronide absolutism over the non-Aaronide priesthood and cultus to which the writers of Kings attest. Indeed the Chronicler goes so far as virtually to delete the history of the Northern kingdom of Israel from the history of Yahweh's people and goes to great pains from the start to finish to differentiate between the Aaronide priests on the one hand and the Levite non-priests on the other, as is evident from the following citations:

> The Levites were appointed for all the service of the tabernacle of the house of God, but Aaron and his sons offered upon the altar of burnt offering and upon the altar of incense, for all the work of the most holy place, and to make atonement for Israel according to all that Moses the servant of God had commanded. And these are the sons of Aaron: Eleazar his son, Phineas his son . . . Zadok his son. (1 Chron 6:35–38)
>
> And Abijah stood up upon mount Zemaraim and said: "Hear me, O Jeroboam and all Israel. . . . Have ye not driven out the priests of the Lord, the sons of Aaron, and the Levites and have made you priests after the manner of the people of other lands? . . . But as for us, the Lord is our God, and we have not forsaken him; and we have priests ministering unto the Lord, the sons of Aaron, and the Levites in their work. . . . (2 Chron 13:4, 9, 10)

The third road of Aaronide absolutism, once built and opened up, succeeded, whereas the second road of power sharing in Deuteronomy had failed. The Aaronide road became the only road which the people of Israel were to travel from the day that the Pentateuch was promulgated until the Hasmonean revolt. For it is simply a matter of record that never again are the Levites to be found serving as priests; Davidic kings are never again found sitting on the throne; and the voices of the prophets are never again given ear in the land. By contrast the Aaronides, unknown even to the last of the prophets, alone served as priests in the Temple until its destruction in 70, and continued to enjoy an honorific separation from the Levites until the present day.

VI

How did this singular achievement take place? How did a class which came to wield such absolute power emerge as it were ex-nihilo?

Unfortunately our sources are such that no definitive answers can be given. But however true this may be, answers of a sort may be elicited from the structure of the finalized Pentateuch; from the efforts of Ezekiel to strip the Levites of their priestly rights and to transfer them to a single family; from the disintegrating state of the restored community as reported by Nehemiah; and by the story of Korah's rebellion.

A close look at the structure of the finalized Pentateuch reveals that from Exodus through Deuteronomy, the claims of the Aaronides swamp the claims for prophetic absolutism as pictured in Exod 33:7–11 and the claims for tripartite power-sharing as set forth in Deuteronomy.

So too we can infer from the fact that these claims were preserved in the Pentateuch, and not blotted out that the prophetic absolutist corpus and tripartite power-sharing corpus must have had the seal of Mosaic wilderness authenticity so indelibly impressed on the people that to touch them in any way would endanger rather than enhance the Aaronide bid for absolute power. What could not be achieved by eradication might very well be achieved by quantitative reiteration.

Ezekiel's testimony to the corruptness of the Levites, a corruption attested to even by Malachi, who insisted that Yahweh would not break his covenant with Levi, and his efforts to end it by separating out a single family, the sons of Zadok, from the other Levitical families, foreshadow the Aaronide solution which was to have Yahweh and Moses strip the Levites of their priestly rights and establish Aaronide absolutism in the wilderness rather than entrusting this task to a prophet.

The corruption of the Levites as attested to by Ezekiel and Malachi, coupled with Nehemiah's eyewitness report on the sad and deteriorating state of the restored community,

must have prompted a group of distinguished priestly families to seek a radical solution by banding together as the sons of Aaron in a bid for absolute power. In order to justify this usurpation, they added to the prophetic Mosaic corpus and to Deuteronomy a newly crafted Aaronide corpus, and compressed all three elements into a single work, the Pentateuch.

Fortunately for this bold and daring enterprise, the Persian emperor had a vital stake in its success. What he needed was a strong and loyal priesthood which enjoyed the willing support of the people and which had no royal ambitions as did the Davidides or oracular pretensions as did the prophets.

And finally the story of Korah's rebellion with its violent leit motif and with its literal burying alive of Levitical claims would seem to echo the actual overthrow of the Levites by the newly constituted Aaronides on the eve of, or in the wake of, the promulgation of the Pentateuch.

The story of Korah's rebellion so viewed turns out to be the powerful device that Aaronides could fashion to justify a rebellion against an existing priestly class whose altar rights had been promised to them in perpetuity in Moses' deathbed blessing. The Aaronides were thus able to take advantage of all the rebellion motifs that had already been recorded to tell the story of the most heinous rebellion of them all, one that outraged God more than any of the others, even that of the golden calf.

After 90 verses packed with violence, threat, symbolism, and death-dealing law, it was scarcely likely that the people of Israel would ever forget the story of Korah and its message. And, as it turned out, they never did.

VII

Now that the last of the authority systems, the Aaronide, has been found, only one further question remains. Did the Aaronide claims remain simply claims, or were they implemented? For this answer the untutored wanderer must turn to Ecclesiasticus.

The wisdom of Ben Sira is the work of an author who not only acknowledges that he had written the book but also leaves us in no doubt that he lived during the High Priesthood of Simon the son of Onias. Although a book preeminently devoted to Wisdom, it is also a book which describes the class structure of his day and sings the praises of all the famous men to whom the Lord apportioned great glory from Adam through Nehemiah. And in the singing of his praises, Ben Sira lavishes his highest and longest and sweetest notes not on Moses but on Aaron. For though Moses may be praised for giving God's revelation, Aaron is seen to be the revelation!

So, too, out of all that he might have drawn upon from Exodus through Deuteronomy to share with his readers, Ben Sira, with the exception of the revelation on Sinai itself, limits himself to those sections of these books which deal with Aaron's person, his sacred garments, his expiatory functions, his priestly revenues, and his overarching authority.

And out of all the episodes he might have chosen detailing challenges to the authority of God and to Moses, he chose one and one only: the story of Korah's rebellion which is conjured up as a warning to those who might be deluded into thinking that Aaron's absolute authority was a mere claim and not a firm structural reality.

The bond between Aaron's singular role and Korah's fate is as tight in Ben Sira as it is in Numbers 16–18 as the following verses make manifest:

> Moses ordained him [Aaron] and anointed him with holy oil: it was an everlasting covenant for him and for his descendants all the days of heaven, to minister to the Lord and serve as priest and bless his people in his name. He

> chose him [Aaron] out of all the living to offer sacrifice to the Lord, incense and a pleasing odor as a memorial for to make atonement for the people in his commandments he [God] gave him [Aaron] authority in statues, and judgments, to teach Jacob the testimonies and to enlighten Israel with his law. Outsiders conspired against him and envied him in the wilderness. Nathan and Abiram and their men and the company of Korah, in wrath and anger. The Lord saw it and was not pleased, and in the wrath of his anger they were destroyed; he wrought wonders against them in flaming fire. (45:15–19)

And lest anyone still harbor doubts as to the reality of Aaronide absolutism in Ben Sira's day, one has only to turn to chapter 50 and see through Ben Sira's eyes the Aaronide High Priest of that day surrounded by a garland of his Aaronide brethren carrying out with all the pomp, circumstance, and reverence as enjoined by the Pentateuch the Temple service on the Day of Atonement.

VIII

By allowing the story of Korah's rebellion and the establishment of the Aaronide absolutism that was legislated in its wake to lead our untutored wanderer first to the Aaronide system of authority in the Pentateuch itself, then to the non-existence of this authority in the other books of the Bible, then to its appearance for the first time in Chronicles, Ezra, and the Ezraic parts of Nehemiah, and finally to its efflorescence in the Wisdom of Ben Sira, we discover that it holds the key that can unlock for us the process by which the Pentateuch came to be the book it is.

The Woes in Q (and Matthew and Luke): Deciphering the Rhetoric of Criticism

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I. Introduction

Interpreting the rhetoric of criticism is difficult. In the case of the woes in Q, this applies both to the woes themselves and to what scholars have written about them (perhaps especially to the latter). For the point of a critique is not inevitably or even especially the same thing as its exemplary matter. The critic often argues one thing by describing another. Again, I refer both to the woes in Q and to their interpreters.

For example, when in 11:39–41[1] there is talk about cleansing the outside vs. inside of a cup, is the significant issue under discussion proper cleanliness viz. hygiene? rules about cleanliness viz. purity? the rules of a particular Jewish group (i.e. the Pharisees) on cleanliness viz. how one ought to interpret the Torah regarding purity? Or is the choice of this specific issue (namely, cleansing the outside of a cup) made for the sake of some other broader characterization well-depicted by but not identical with the concrete example?

One should at least be careful not to fixate on a single aspect of the woe and assume for whatever reasons that this feature is key to its interpretation when, in fact, it may be no more than a standard component of the social reality which was the woe's original context. In this case, the phenomenon's typicality would account for its elective use in the woe, at the same time that this fact makes clear that as such, the phenomenon is not itself the woe's precise point.

Interpretation of the woe would then need to decide what exactly its objective is, namely, whether the act of interpretation sought to describe the woe's precise point or, as a different enterprise, wanted to use the woe in some way as an example of another broader description (e.g., systems of purity and disputes about them as a social facet of early Christianity). Neither of the two kinds of interpretation is per se more valuable or interesting than the other; it is simply important to remember that both operate under the same name but ought not to be confused.

Much of the history of interpretation of the woes in Q is of the second type. Most interpreters have read them in the service of larger agenda. The woes in Q have provided a useful opportunity for scholars to reconfirm certain basic (now subliminal?) assumptions about the origins of early Christianity, such as the importance of a (radicalized) understanding of Torah for early Christianity's emergence;[2] its eventual separation from Judaism

[1] As is now conventional, throughout the paper reference is made to passages in Q using the numeration of their location in Luke.

[2] In his as yet unpublished paper, "Law and Salvation in Q," John S. Kloppenborg demonstrates that at best, this kind of concern pertains to the latest redactional (tertiary) stratum of Q; for a critique of previous scholarship in this regard, see esp. pp. 1–3.

after a period of increasingly intense sibling rivalry; persecution at the hands of unrepented Jews as the cost of now being the new "true" Israel;[3] the urgency and seriousness of all disputes about religion during this period due to the impending apocalypse of judgment and salvation proclaimed by Jesus and accepted by his followers, etc. Read within the framework of this historical myth, the woes in Q appear as oracular denunciations of an incalcitrant, devious, and ostentatious self-righteousness called Pharisaism (however much we know that it ought not to be so called, at least not with the traditional value judgments attached to the name). The imprecation, woe to you, becomes a proleptic verdict of damnation, although ostensibly uttered so that the demand might yet change their ways (becoming early Christians).

I would be willing to admit that I overstate the case somewhat in the interest of a livelier conversation if I did not think that hidden beneath scholarship's often thick prose and reasoning are frequently matters of clear social consequence. Indeed, most invidious in this regard are precisely the various stock phrases, standard characterizations, and leaps of logic that go without saying or justification. For it is these which form the terrain over which we later wage our scholarly and other battles. Such disputes are sometimes laughable for their triteness and inconsequence. On other occasions, however, the ideological substructure of the arguments can be alarming, if not catastrophic, in its implications. One has only to think of the role which Biblical interpretation played in the rise and maintenance of Nazi Germany.[4]

II. The Woes in Q

What is the precise point of the woes in Q? Is it just the fact that the Pharisees do not know how to get a cup completely clean, i.e., both inside and out (11:39) that is at issue? that they have somehow overlooked an important element (namely, justice) in their otherwise highly refined piety (11:43)? that they show reverence for the prophets by building them monumental tombs (11:47)? that they do not use or share more liberally the privilege they have of access to a certain experience (11:52)? In other words, is it because they do not do perfectly the things they were supposed to do that they are chastized? Or is it possible that the problem is precisely what they were supposed to do?

In the latter case, the issue then would not be what Matthew later slanders, namely, a lack of moral integrity on the part of the Pharisees, that they were somehow hypocrites and religious shysters. At stake is rather the very notion of moral integrity itself so virtuously represented by them. The Pharisees are made the direct object of the woes in Q because, better or more zealously than anyone else in their contemporary setting, the Pharisees maintained their people's covenanted, that is, conventional way of life.[5] And precisely this normative ethos is under debate.

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[3] Cf. Jacob Neusner, "'Israel': Judaism and its Social Metaphors," *JAAR* 55 (1987) 331–61, in which Neusner shows how volatile the notion of Israel was and remained within Judaism itself.

[4] See, e.g., Robert P. Ericksen, *Theologians Under Hitler: Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, and Emanuel Hirsch* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).

[5] On the other hand, it is not because they somehow viz. self-evidently represented "Israel" that the Pharisees are made the object of Q's woes. The Pharisees in Palestine during the first century C.E. were simply one of a number of groups vying for a specific social identity and wider recognition. As a party, they likely constituted no more than six thousand (6,000) persons: see Str.-Bill. 4.335, where reference is made to Josephus, Ant. 17.2–4.

The woes in Q put in question basic practices of ancient Palestine's religio-cultural system as epitomized by the Pharisees. The system itself was thereby prodded. Nothing is denounced as such. But by poking at the system's self-evidence viz. self-righteousness, by pocking its armor and chipping away at its veneer of perfection or completeness, the social conglomerate of tradition and invention was rendered more dubitable and, thus, more manageable, that is, inhabitable.

As far as I can tell, the woes in Q do not criticize the Pharisees' way of doing things for the sake of advancing an alternative arrangement. In this regard, we may want to castigate their perpetrators for being merely critics with nothing different to suggest. On the other hand, by recognizing the simply critical stance of the woes in Q, our interpretation of them is permitted to avoid pitting in some absolute way the persons whom these woes represent over against the Pharisees, which would continue the imagination of early Christianity as soon opposed to early Judaism (along with every other form of Greco-Roman religion) and, then, the starker antagonism of Christian versus Jew. A simply critical stance toward one's local society does not eschew participation in it. The woes in Q do not signal a total rejection or full denunciation of the Pharisees. They register instead merely a depreciation of them.

The Pharisees are not everything that they have been cracked up to be. Once this is seen and affirmed, it would then be possible to live with them. The bubble of the Pharisees' desire for full obedience and faithfulness is burst, creating thereby cohabitable space for persons less inclined to conform to their spiritual grandeur.

An individual look at the various woes in Q will confirm these general remarks. In each case, I have used comparable sayings whenever possible to catch the point. As said in the beginning, the rhetoric of criticism can be difficult to understand directly. When the woes in Q are explicated only in and of themselves, one too often misses what is being said, that is, one finds only what one already knew (or thought) to be at stake. Thus, I have taken special advantage of similar statements by Greco-Roman Cynics regarding their cultural and religious contemporaries, hoping by their heuristic orientation to gain perhaps a new perspective.

The woes are presented in English translation in fragmentary form. Thus, we read (an approximation to) the minimal text of Q. It includes every literal agreement between Matthew and Luke plus conceptual agreements or those things which both Matthew and Luke say differently, but in synonymous terms (=the material printed between angle brackets < >). Obviously, a complete Greek text of the woes would be preferable, but the critical edition is not yet finished. At the same time, it is striking how much one can discern without a fluid syntax. And by remaining content with "only" a minimal text, we avoid the otherwise seemingly inevitable tendency to drift in the interpretative direction of Matthew or Luke, whose text we just adopt to give ourselves the sensation of a whole saying.

11:39–41

. . . you . . .
Pharisees . . .
the outside of the cup and <the> . . .
you clean . . .
but inside . . .
full of rapacity and . .

. . . <the> inside . . .
clean . . .

The first woe in Q plays explicitly with a dichotomy between inside and outside and implicitly with one between the dictates of a system of purity and being virtuous. The point seems to be that however complete one's treatment of external matters may be, without a corresponding internal reality the preceding effort is void of value.

There is a certain burlesque exaggeration to the rhetorical figure used here in Q (later taken up literally and elaborated pedantically by Matthew) insofar as it implies that the Pharisees would meticulously cleanse the outside of a cup, only to leave the inside still soiled and stained. The physical ridiculousness of such a thing makes clear how, at another level, the assumption of ethical integrity solely on the basis of perfectly performing a customary rite is equally laughable.[6]

Parallels[7]

(1a) Seeing someone perform religious purification, he said, "Unhappy men, don't you know that you can no more get rid of errors of conduct by sprinklings than you can of mistakes in grammar?" (DL 6.42)[8]

(1b) But I do not mean by this that we ought to be shameless before all men and to do what we ought not, but all that we refrain from and all that we do let us not do or refrain from, merely because it seems to the multitude somehow honorable or base, but because it is forbidden by reason and the god within us, that is, the mind (Julian 6, 196D)

(2a) He was gathering figs, and was told by the keeper that not long before a man had hanged himself on that very fig tree. "Then," said he, "I will now purge it" (DL 6.61).

(2b) Someone having reproached him for going into dirty places, his reply was that the sun too visits cesspools without being defiled (DL 6.63).

(2c) Being reproached with drinking in a tavern, "Well," said he, "I also get my hair cut in a barber's shop" (DL 6.66).

(2d) And he saw no impropriety either in stealing anything from a temple or in eating the flesh of any animal, nor even anything impious in touching human flesh, this, he said being clear from the custom of some foreign nations (DL 6.73).

(3) Then said the Savior to him [a Pharisaic chief priest], "Woe unto you blind that see not! You have bathed yourself in water that is poured out, in which dogs and swine lie night and day and you have washed yourself and have chafed your outer skin, which prostitutes also and flute-girls anoint, bathe, chafe, and rouge, in order to arouse desire in men, but within they are full of scorpions and of [bad]ness [of every kind]. But I and [my disciples], of whom you say that we have not im[mersed] ourselves, [have been im]mersed in the liv[ing . . .] water which comes down from [. . . B]ut woe unto them that . . .(POxy 840.2).[9]

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[6] Cf. Kloppenborg, "Law and Salvation in Q," 6: "While Q 11:39–41 acknowledges the Pharisaic distinction regarding cups, it immediately diverts the discussion onto an ethical plane and treats vessels as metaphors."

[7] I have consulted a number of works while collecting parallels to the woes in Q whose use I here acknowledge with appreciation, notably, F. Gerald Downing, "Quite Like Q" (unpublished paper); Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical Notes & Concordance* (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge, 1987).

[8] All translations of parallel material are those of the Loeb series unless otherwise indicated. The abbreviation "DL" stands for the *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius.

[9] The translation is that of Kloppenborg (*Q Parallels* ad loc.).

(4) Jesus said, "Why are you washing the outside of the cup? Don't you think that the one who made the inside is the very same one who made the outside?" (*Gos. Thom.* 89).[10]
(5) Purifications are for the purity of the soul, not of the body (ps-Phocylides 228).[11]

Commentary

To comment on parallels runs the same risk as explaining a joke: one may talk for some time and add nothing. On the other hand, the attribution of parallels seems often rather like a snowball fight, in which loosely formed projectiles are hurled at a fleeting object with no obvious desire to hit it; the fun is in the throwing. I hope to steer a course between these two extremes.

(1) The two sayings listed under this number, although distinctive in many ways, agree (and therefore are especially noteworthy) that the typical signs of (ancient) morality do not constitute true virtue. Thus, Julian (1b) makes the source of true virtue "the god within us, that is, the mind," thereby hypostasizing the critical reasoning typical of Cynics. This practice is then embodied by Diogenes (1a) exposing the non-sequitur of contemporary ritual purification.

Unlike Julian, however, Diogenes does not reify his critique. His remarks do not posit by way of response another (interior) version of what is criticized; they remain instead at the level of efficacy vs. inefficacy, that is, they do not transcend the phenomenon.

In this light, the talk in 11:41 about cleaning the inside of the cup is simply a (positive) restatement of the (negative) discrepancy noted before; it is not an argument for true virtue's inner location. Indeed, a cup has no "within" in the sense of Julian's "god within us." The inside vs. outside of a cup is rather comparable to the relationship between act and consequence invoked by Diogenes, whereby the one thing leads inevitably into the other.[12] Thus, if one's intent is to purify a cup/one's behavior, but one's purification is limited, i.e., does not extend beyond the most visible features of the vessel/one's comportment, the result is as predictable as the attempt is ludicrous.

Just like Diogenes (1a) the critique in 11:39–41 does not argue for true virtue as the interiorization of (the "real meaning" of) traditional religious rules and regulations nor, as

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[10] Here and elsewhere in the paper, the translation of sayings from the *Gos. Thom.* is that of Bentley Layton, *The Gnostic Scriptures* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987) 380–99.

[11] I am indebted for this parallel to Kloppenborg, "Law and Salvation in Q," 7. The translation is that of F. W. van der Horst in James H. Charlesworth, ed., *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (2 vols.; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985) 2.582.

[12] According to Kloppenborg ("Law and Salvation in Q," 6): "Q 11:39–41 indeed betrays knowledge of the Pharisaic view that in matters of purity, vessels are divided into inner and outer parts (later a third part, the handle, was introduced). Neusner has convincingly demonstrated that the Q saying can only be directed at the Shammaite opinion (which was dominant before 70 C.E.) that the inside and outside of cups function autonomously and that either or both may be clean or unclean." This perspective does not oppose my point of view; if anything, it acts as supplementary support for it. In Kloppenborg's terms, 11:39–41 states that one cannot talk about distinct zones of purity (vs. Shammai) as though the outside of a vessel could be clean while the inside was not or vice versa. I simply go one step further and suggest that 11:39–41 speaks in stronger terms, namely, that it makes no sense even to talk about the inner vs. outer parts of vessels regarding purity (thus opposing the Pharisaic view in general).

Julian would have it, as an inward principle. Both Diogenes and 11;39–41 argue instead for true virtue as the limit of its cultural presentation, seen most clearly in the local morality's self-contradictions.

(2) The four sayings under this number are often cited as examples of Cynic "shamelessness." It would be more accurate to describe them as critiques of ancient notions of purity vs. impurity. (Of course, in an honor-shame culture like that of the ancient Mediterranean world, unrepentantly to call estalished moral conventions into question meant, because one did not honor them, that one would therefore be characterized in terms of shame, i.e., as shameless). The point is essentially that what was typically thought of as impure hardly is. By extension, the same applies to what was theoretically pure and/or how to make it so viz. purification. The first saying (2a) plays precisely with this theme. Notably, it does not resolve the issue beyond posing it in the form of a conundrum. One should not miss the very clever wit with which this is done. The business at hand, though profoundly penetrating, is not deadly serious.

The other three sayings in this set rattle the foundations of prevalent notions of purity by contrasting certain acts generally considered impure with examples to the contrary. The point is to make the ruling assumptions less than self-evident without, however, erecting another system in their place. Thus, in the second saying (2b) nature viz. the sun proves that it is possible to occupy a soiled environment without being (morally) stained. Obviously, the argument as such ultimately cannot be sustained. Human beings including Diogenes lack the material make-up of light which permits it to be both visibly present and untouched. Rhetorically, however, the saying does not operate at this level. It plays rather with the rigidity of a taboo, pinching its absoluteness by demonstrating one case in which the imputed rationale does not hold (in this case, that one should not enter into "dirty" places because one cannot avoid impurity there). The saying is effective, that is, it scores its point because it makes one stop and think at least for a second about the moral prescript's (lack of) self-evidence.

In the next saying (2c) the moral system is questioned that allows certain bodily needs (e.g., a haircut) to be taken care of in their respective locales without the slightest prospect of reproach while the satisfaction of other needs (e.g., cutting one's thirst) suffers a more rigorous and often negative evaluation. The question is why the fulfillment of one need is more or less immoral than the other. Why should Diogenes not recover bodily fluids in a tavern, it being one place to do so, if one renews other bodily features (in this case, appearance) wherever that is possible (viz. in a barber shop)? Again, a host of mitigating factors means that the argument as such will not sustain itself. But the saying is successful is raising the inquiry, "Well, why not?!" And that is the point.

Notably, the metaphor this time or point of comparison is not (an element of) nature but (another part of) society itself. The Cynic's critique of conventional morality is not simply the pitting of natural ways against cultural mores, which would finally be one moral system versus another. It is rather precisely the very notion of a moral system (represented by the conventions of pure vs. impure) that is under suspicion. That is why not only nature but society itself furnishes opposing evidence.

The last saying (2d) is most interesting for its referral to "the custom of some foreign nations." What is pure vs. impure is not constant from one culture to the next. Thus, the norms of one's own group must have no claim on perfect righteousness. The Cynics integrated the ethnological discoveries of the Greco-Roman world into their social vision. To demonstrate this relativity of values, Diogenes is said to have violated the previously presumed sanctity of temples, the dietary customs of his people, even the prohibition of "touching" human flesh. Any pretense of moral absoluteness is self-deception.

The sense in these sayings of virtue's insufficient representation by prevailing moral practice is shared by 11:39–41. Diogenes' wit, however, is not here as apparent. The description of the cup's "inside" as "full of rapacity" seems less playful that Diogenes' talk of "purging" the hanging tree by picking its fruit, his reference to the sun dipping undefiled into cesspools, the defense of tavern-hopping via the barber shop. By comparison, there is an edge to 11:39–41 suggestive of a certain choler. Where this comes from is unclear.

On the other hand, there is again no reason to think that the suggestion in 11:41 to "clean the inside" of the cup is laden with greater meaning than Diogenes' retort, "I will now purge it." Both responses equally imply that the previously indicated assumptions about purity lack validity.

(3) The saying in POxy 840.2 is interesting for the following reason. On the one hand, it presents a much more aggressive polemic than either 11:39–41 or the cited sayings of Diogenes evince. At the same time, it shares with these sayings a similar perception of the strong incongruity between a desire for moral purity and circumstantial reality (which "you blind . . . see not"). Thus, the water used for bathing viz. cleansing proves not to be clean itself. Calling it "water that is poured out" is exactly like the suggestion in 11:39–41 that someone would wash the outside but not the inside of a cup. Physically ridiculous, the rhetorical exaggeration makes clear the basic contradiction in play, namely, that purification is sought with less than pure means.

Likewise, the motions or gestures of purification are in themselves not notably efficacious. Not only assiduous holiness accounts for bodily ablutions and a certain self-laceration. For on the surface, prostitutes and flute-girls do exactly what the religious zealot does, although "within they are full of scorpions and of badness of every kind," meaning the aforenamed women by reputation and, by implication just as easily, the latter devotee.

There follows then in POxy 840.2 a different debate about the nature of true baptism, completely unrelated to 11:39–41.

(4) The saying in *Gos. Thom.* 89 looks very much like Luke 11:40, although there are certain differences. In each saying, by making the critique reside in the failure to realize that one and the same person viz. God is responsible for both inside and out, the plane of discourse ceases to be that of the human agent and his or her self-deception vis-a-vis virtue; the question becomes instead one of theological vision. How can one think in terms of pure vs. impure, sacred vs. profane, etc., if one agrees that there is only one God who created everything? It is not necessary to explore here all aspects and implications of this shift of focus; it is important simply to see clearly that such a shift has occurred.

Both in *Gos. Thom.* 89 and Luke 11:40, at stake is an alternative imagination of reality, which basically rejects as such the system of purity. Thus, the question is asked point-blank in *Gos. Thom.* 89, "Why are you washing the outside of the cup?" which is precisely the part most likely to be in contact with contamination. The point is then not to do a thorough job (=Matt 23:26) but, rather, Why do it at all?

In Luke (11:41) a program of ethicized righteousness is advocated, symbolized by giving "what is inside" as alms. Thus, it is supposed, any and all concerns about purity will be taken care of ("and behold everything will be clean for you"). The dismantling of the pure/impure mentality is less frontal in Luke 11:40f. than in *Gos. Thom.* 89, but the objective is identical.

Summary

In view in 11:39–41 is the basic incongruity between the Pharisees' aspirations to complete holiness via a thoroughgoing system of purity and the reality that true virtue

is not thereby achieved, given enduring imperfections in their character. In this, the saying in Q compares to a number of similar Cynic observations and denunciations. At the same time, 11:39–41 seems somewhat less mischievous or playful than many of the same Cynic statements for reasons here unknown. Talk about "the inside . . . clean" in 11:41 does not mean that true virtue has an inner location but, rather, belongs to the logic of the saying as the simple inversion of the preceding.[13]

11:42

. . . woe to you . . .
Pharisees
because you tithe mint
and . . .
and . . .
and <neglect> . . .
justice
and . . .[14]

This second woe in Q makes essentially the same point as the first, but instead of using the pursuit of purity as its foil, it uses piety's perfection viz. imperfection as exemplary.[15] The Pharisees' attempt to actualize their traditions of faith to the utmost degree, that is, in terms of the most daily and common details is called long on effort but short on principle. The forest has been lost amidst the trees.[16] Somehow, certain fundamental (legal) values no longer possess their rightful predominance or directive profile by virtue of overwhelming specification viz. trivialization.

Parallels

(1a) He was moved to anger that men should sacrifice to the gods to ensure health and in the midst of the sacrifice should feast to the detriment of health (DL 6.28).

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[13] Cf. Downing, "Quite Like Q" 12: 11:39–41 is "phrased in terms of the Stoic and Cynic contrast between inner reality and 'mere' externals."

[14] 11:42c (viz. d, i.e., the final sentence, "but these things it was necessary to do and not <neglect> those") is generally recognized as a secondary interpolation, i.e., due to the (tertiary) redaction of Q and thus not part of the original woe: see Kloppenborg, "Law and Salvation in Q" 9–11, esp. p. 9 n. 36 for other literature; see furthermore, Paul Hoffman, *Studien zur Theologie der Logienquelle* (3d ed.; Muenster: Aschendorff, 1982) 59 n. 34; 170 n. 50; *idem*, review of S. Schulz, *Q: Spruchquelle der Evangelisten*, *BZ* nf 19 (1975) 114 (where the addition is said to reflect "eine Rejudaisierungstendenz").

[15] Like the first woe, this one also, according to Kloppenborg ("Law and Salvation in Q" 10) "engages in rhetorical exaggeration and caricature. That it accurately reflects current tithing practice is most unlikely. Even a cursory glance at the Mishnaic discussions of tithing is sufficient to indicate that there was no unanimity in regard to the liability of any of the items of 11:42a." At the same time, 11:42 does not oppose tithing per se; thus, registered is not the opinion of the *'ammei ha'aretz* who apparently repudiated the practice as such: see Str.-Bill. 4.335.

[16] Rabbinical literature itself refers to this kind of behavior as the mark of a "stupid piety": see Str.-Bill. 4.336–37.

(1b) He would rebuke men in general with regard to their prayers, declaring that they asked for those things which seemed to them to be good, not for such as are truly good (DL 6.42).

(1c) Certain parents were sacrificing to the gods, that a son might be born to them. "But," said he, "do you not sacrifice to ensure what manner of man he shall turn out to be?" (DL 6.63).

(2) Once he saw the officials of a temple leading away someone who had stolen a bowl belonging to the treasurers, and said, "The great thieves are leading away the little thief" (DL 6.45).

(3a) One day he saw a woman kneeling before the gods in an ungraceful attitude, and, wishing to free her of superstition, according to Zoilus of Perga, he came forward and said, "Are you not afraid, my good woman, that a god may be standing behind you?—for all things are full of his presence—and you may be put to shame?" (DL 6.37).

(3b) When someone expressed astonishment at the votive offerings in Samothrace, his comment was, "There would have been far more, if those who were not saved had set up offerings" (DL 6.59).

(4) Law is a good thing, but it is not superior to philosophy. For the former compels a man not to do wrong, but the latter teaches him not to do wrong. To the degree that doing something under compulsion is worse than doing it willingly, to that degree law is worse than philosophy. For this reason do philosophy and do not take part in government. For it is better to know the means by which men are taught to do right than to know the means by which they are compelled not to do wrong (ps-Crates 5).[17]

Commentary

(1) The three sayings by Diogenes listed under this number argue against the equation of religious practice with self-interest and mere performance instead of in the service of certain fundamental values. Thus, prayer is criticized (1b) when it represents not the desire for what is truly good but, rather, simply another means of satisfying personal wants (="those things which seemed to them to be good"). Sacrifice (another form of prayer) is chastised (1c) which is performed only for the existence of a child and not for its well-being ("to ensure what manner of man he shall turn out to be"). The kind of attitude here denounced could lead to blatant contradictions. Thus, Diogenes condemns (1a) sacrificing to the gods for health simply as an excuse to make oneself sick, that is, for doing the very common thing of making sacrifice the pretext for a party, at which one overindulged and paid the price (="feast to the detriment of health").

It is the lack of an intentional horizon beyond the religious act itself or the specific wish which prompted it that calls forth Diogenes' repeated critique, just as in 11:42 the similar reduction or restriction of religion to relentless tithing (although perceived by its proponents as their faith's extension and elaboration throughout daily life) results in a neglect of justice and other such things (cf., e.g., "the truly good," the "manner of man," "health").

(2) The saying of Diogenes here in view compares with other sayings as well in Q (cf., e.g., 6:41–42). In the context of 11:42, it is the perspective marked by great vs. little that is pertinent. The temple officials are quite insistent regarding the legalities associated with the theft of an insignificant vessel from their treasury, but (thus Diogenes' characterization

[17] The translation is that of Ronald F. Hock in Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles* (Missoula, MT: Scholars, 1977) ad loc.

of them as "great thieves" implies) are thoroughly oblivious, if not devoted, to the ways in which they themselves rob others blind.

In 11:42, there is no suggestion that the Pharisees actively prevent justice; their neglect could be simply a lamentable preoccupation with other less important matters. But the reduced culpability in this case only underscores the basic problem. Both the Pharisees and the temple officials denounced by Diogenes remain opaque to issues beyond the purview of a certain pettiness. Masters of the minor, both are incognizant of or duplicitous in what they avoid considering, namely, the graver matters of justice and the indictments of their own behavior. Both 11:42 and Diogenes (in the cited saying) work this gap, marking it as one of (ir)responsible omission.

(3) The sayings of this set mock certain pious postures or gestures; not so much, however, for their minor importance in comparison with higher causes but, rather, for their internal nonsense. They compare, nonetheless, with 11:42 and the sayings identified above by number one (1a,b,c) in their attention to religion's always less than perfect realization. Thus, a woman's contrite act of repentance or fervent supplication (3a="kneeling before the gods") is mitigated by bodily awkwardness, making whatever the intention of her soul may be into physically "an ungraceful attitude." Likewise, the number of prayers answered for lives saved as symbolized by the votive offerings in Samothrace (3b) is a less impressive figure when one thinks how many prayers for a similar salvation have gone unanswered, given all those who have died.

The motive for Diogenes' critique is said in the first saying (3a) to be his "wishing to free her of superstition." The topic of superstition enjoyed a wide discussion in the ancient Greco-Roman world and was the context for many disputes about diverse (religious) practices. For reasons of space, however, I cannot here elaborate the issue beyond observing that (NT) scholars have heretofore not typically understood tithing (namely, in 11:42) as an act of superstition. But perhaps we should. If we would, this characteristic feature of Pharisaic piety is then criticized in 11:42 essentially for its uselessness, which is revealed by what it leaves unconsidered, namely, justice. The ethical angle from which the judgment is made is also typical of the wider cultural polemic against superstition.

(4) Comparison of the saying cited here with 11:42 suggests for the second woe in Q an opposition between positive and negative motivation (for want of a better term). The rules and regulations for tithing correspond to what ps-Crates calls "law," although tithing does not seem exactly to compel one not to do wrong. But, in fact, it is part of a system of piety that is fundamentally defensive viz. preventative, designed as it is to erect "a hedge around Torah." Torah as such is not, of course, understood in negative terms. But the piety which guards it and guarantees that it will not be violated can be called negative in the sense that the orientation is centripetal, seeking only to assure that nothing is done to alter what has been surrounded by the protective barrier. In contrast, the search for justice would be rather more centrifugal, directed towards the creation of a different social situation constituted by changes in current customs and structures; it could thus be called positive.

Let us be clear that the contrast just described has nothing to do with the contrasts drawn historically viz. theologically between Judaism and Christianity, the OT vs. NT, "law" vs. "gospel," etc. Reflected in 11:42 is instead a similar contrast to that made by ps-Crates between law and philosphy; as such, it represents a purely intra-cultural debate among contemporaries. It has to do with options for ethical orientation within the same society; in the case of 11:42, in Hellenistic Palestine under Roman rule. The point of the woe would be, then, that it is better to develop mechanisms by which society and its

citizens deal more justly with each other (="are taught to do right") than to codify further an inherited order which merely minimizes wrong.[18]

Summary

In 11:42, preoccupation with the minutiae of a religious system (viz. Pharisaic piety) is faulted for its failure to advance (what ought to be) the faith's ultimate aims or fundamental values. A certain near- or shortsightedness is in view which does not take into account issues greater than this narrow range of vision. The woe's critique compares to criticisms made by Cynics and others in the contemporary Greco-Roman world of superstition. In a sense, an opposition is drawn between negative and positive motivation, the latter being seen as the preferable mode for activity.

11:44[19]

Woe to you . . .
because you <are like tombs> . . .
and . . .
persons . . .

With the third woe in Q, we encounter an explicit or direct characterization of the Pharisees (vs. previous profiles by analysis of behavior). As opposed to using certain of their specific practices as the issue under discussion, a metaphor is here made to which

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[18] Cf. Kloppenborg, "Law and Salvation in Q," 9: "Neither Q's criticism of the Pharisees nor its counterproposal is obviously nomocentric."

[19] I have not considered Luke 11:43 par. as part of the woes in Q for the following reasons: (1) The principal arguments for including it in Q are abstract or, if granted, without further substance. These arguments are (a) 11:43 is a "doublet" in Luke, the similar saying in Mark 12:38=Matt 23:5b–7a being paralleled later in Luke 20:46; (b) there are two minor agreements between 11:43 and Matt 23:5b–7a vs. Mark 12:38, namely, (i) both in 11:43 and in Matt 23:6, the Pharisees "love" what follows (although 11:43 uses the verb ἀγαπάω while Matt 23:6 has φιλέω, in Luke 20:46 the same verb φιλέω occurs unparalleled in Mark 12:38); (ii) both 11:43 and Matt 23:6–7a agree in putting "first seat(s) in the synagogues" before "greetings in the marketplaces" vs. the opposite order in Mark 12:38=Luke 20:46. Even if one were to accept these arguments (namely, the fact of doublets in Luke and the minor agreement in wording that is φιλέω) as evidence for the original presence of 11;43 in Q, there is not a single word (beyond "love") to give the saying content which can be shown not to be dependent on Mark 12:38. Thus, the result is: (a) the theoretical possibility that 11:43 belongs in Q at the same time that (b) it is a practical impossibility to argue for it having any specific viz. distinctive language.

(2) The minor agreements between 11:43 and Matt 23:6–7a are complemented viz. nullified by an equal number of minor disagreements, namely, (a) 11:43 refers to the "first seat" in the singular in the synagogues while Matt 23:6 speaks of the same in the plural; (b) between the verb for love in Matt 23:6 and "first seats in the synagogues," reference is made to "first place in the feasts" (vs. its position at the end of Mark 12:38) while in 11:43 the verb for love is followed immediately by "first seat in the synagogues."

the Pharisees are held to correspond. Why this metaphor, whence it comes, what its precise point is, are questions still to be answered.[20]

11:46

. . . buy . . .
<load> . . .
persons . . .
burdens hard to bear . . .
. . . selves . . .
own finger
do not <touch>

The fourth "woe" in terms of style of argument belongs between the first two and the third, for it seems to presuppose a specific practice of the Pharisees but refers to it with a metaphor (namely, the carrying of cargo) which cannot be taken literally. Again, the contrast is between official posture (in this case, let us say, the Pharisees as legislators) and its human, all too human, lack of realization (in this case continuing the previous suggestion, the Pharisees' inability or unwillingness to help achieve fulfillment of the laws they make). It is not clear that the contrast here is any more self-conscious a dichotomy than in other woes.

Parallels

(1) And he would wonder that the grammarians should investigate the ills of Odysseus, while they were ignorant of their own. Or that the musicians should tune the strings of the lyre, while leaving the dispositions of their own souls discordant; that the mathematicians should gaze at the sun and the moon, but overlook matters close at hand; that the orators should make a fuss about justice in their speeches, but never practice it; or that the avaricious should cry out against money, while inordinately fond of it (DL 6.27–28).

(2) No good ruler ruins his subjects nor does a good shepherd harm his sheep. But your whole land is empty of subjects and poorly managed by your officials . . . it would be better for you to be sparing of the people over whom you would have authority . . . (ps-Anacharsis 7; to Tereus, the cruel despot of Thrace).[21]

Commentary

(1) Of the saying cited with this number, the part most pertinent to 11:46 concerns the orators, who "make a fuss about justice in their speeches, but never practise it." The point is clear; they say one thing and do another. Expectations are raised and made of persons

[20] Kloppenborg ("Law and Salvation in Q," 7) effectively equates "the accusation that the Pharisees are 'unmarked graves'" with "corpse-uncleanness . . . employed as a metaphor for moral failing." He then continues: "Clearly, this woe takes for granted that Pharisees are concerned with purity. Otherwise it would have no rhetorical effect. The idea of purity remains important for Q, but it is redefined in exclusively ethical terms. It is even doubtful, in view of Q 9:59–60, that the traditional taboos associated with a corpse are given any importance. While Q knows of, and plays on, Pharisaic ideas of purity, there is no indication that it accepts them as valid."

[21] The translation is that of Anne M. McGuire in Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles*, ad loc.

without ever involving those who raise and make them. Likewise in 11:46, the Pharisees are said to demand what they do not fulfill or to whose fulfillment they do not contribute.

The question which follows is why. On its own, 11:46 could suggest as the reason for this double standard any number of motives ranging from sadism to social class structures, all of which would probably yield more hermeneutical fruit if pursued than the quizzical wit of Diogenes, who simply portrays with his probing characterizations human folly and its self-deceptions. There is a proclivity on the part of given individuals to seek and solve problems everywhere but where they themselves are concerned. The same goes for responsibility and productivity. Likewise in 11:46, the Pharisees are said to do just this kind of thing, creating "burdens" which they think should be borne, but then not by them. However irritating and oppressive the contrast may be, it is difficult to make it more profound than that.

(2) The second saying listed here suggests that the problem of the use and abuse of authority is an additional feature of the critique in 11:46. In a sense, the folly described there can now be specified, namely, that the indiscriminate exercise of power works against itself; instead of demonstrating the extent of its strength, it rather results in diminished effectiveness or a lesser area of influence. Thus, Tereus, the despot of Thrace, by his poor habits of rule is left with little over which to reign. The Pharisees run the same risk to the extent that their proliferation of laws and strenuous demands (="burdens hard to bear") lacks the balance and likely compassion which would be meted, if they too were accountable for the same. It would be better for the Pharisees to be sparing of the people over whom they have authority or at least share with them the difficulties caused by their interpretations, if only thereby to avoid the likely possibility that they will soon be masters of a realm empty of subjects, marked only by the officiousness of its management.[22]

Summary

At issue in 11:46 is the Pharisees' particular version of human folly whereby speech and action viz. demand and fulfillment do not coincide. The consequence of this sort of thing when one is or wishes to be the leader of a group are finally undercutting (of oneself).

11.47–48

Woe to you . . .
because you build the <tombs> of the prophets . . .
<y>our fathers <killed them> . . .

you are witnesses . . .
and <participate in the deeds>
of your fathers . . .
because . . .
the . . .
you . . .

[22] In saying this, I am not by any stretch of the imagination constructing a covert *vaticinium ex eventu.* The fate here described hardly accounts for the subsequent history of Judaism. All I have done is try to express how apparently the practice of leadership by the Pharisees looked to one or some of their contemporary critics in the first century C.E.

This is the fifth woe in Q. The dichotomy posed is that of the reverential remembrance of former national figures (i.e., the prophets) by the descendants of those who killed them. The incongruity compares, for example, to that of the American people now honoring Martin Luther King, when only a generation ago he was denounced by the same group as an insurrectionist, instrument of communism, etc. The point is to expose how contemporary esteem masks a history of rejection, how the golden praise of present-day memorials is founded on the slippery clay of past disdain, how current civic pride makes heroes out of ancient enemies, but not necessarily to set the record straight. What appears to be giving honor is really just covering tracks.

Materially, 11:47–48 recalls the just previous reference to tombs in 11:44 (the third woe). It is interesting that there would be repeated mention of this kind of thing in such short compass. What the repetition means, of course, is a different question. Is it perhaps just another indication of the importance of burial in the ancient world? Burial was an event which, because of its pervasive practice and high estimation, allowed one by invoking it to comment on a host of issues; to refer to tombs is simply one way to indicate this topic. Quickly successive talk of the same, hwoever striking, represents no more than reduplicated use of a standard trope.

Parallels

(1a) Hence, it is said, arose a quarrel among his disciples as to who should bury him: nay, they even came to blows; but, when their fathers and men of influence arrived, under their direction he was buried beside the gate leading to the Isthmus. Over his grave they set up a pillar and a dog in Parian marble upon it. Subsequently his fellow-citizens honored him with bronze statues, on which these verses were inscribed: "Time makes even bronze grow old; but thy glory, Diogenes, all eternity will never destroy. Since thou alone didst point out to mortals the lesson of self-sufficingness and the easiest path of life . . ."

But some say that when dying he left instructions that they should throw him out unburied, that every wild beast might feed on him, or thrust him into a ditch and sprinkle a little dust over him. But according to others his instructions were that they should throw him into the Ilissus, in order that he might be useful to his brethren (DL 6.78–79).

(1b) He had commanded us beforehand that no care was to be bestowed on the body since it was worthless and no longer useful after the soul had left it. Nevertheless, as far as was possible, we disregarded the misfortune and misunderstood his words, and to the degree that we could we adorned him after we had washed him and put on his garments, and when we had buried him in a fitting manner, we went away (ps-Socratics 14: Aeschines to Xenophon).[23]

(2) . . . as Stilpon says, neglecting the living because of the dead is the mark of a man who does not reason correctly (Teles 59H).[24]

Commentary

(1) The post-mortem volte-face of society vis-a-vis Diogenes indicated in the materials listed under this number is the point of comparison with 11:47–48. When Diogenes was alive, like the prophets his social ranking or esteem was not notably high, if only by virtue

[23] The translation is that of Stanley Stowers in Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles*, ad loc.

[24] The translation is that of Edward O'Neil, ed. and trans., *Teles [The Cynic Teacher]* (Missoula, MT: Scholars, 1977) ad loc.

of the things he himself said to ensure marginalization. Upon his death, however, and according to ps-Aeschines (1b) against his own wishes, Diogenes was elevated to honored status (by the manner of his burial). If we can believe the tradition preserved by Diogenes Laertius (1a), a tomb was built for him in Corinth "beside the gate leading to the Isthmus," that is, in a very public place. Although previously accustomed to doing everything in full view of all, the similar location of his body after death engendered quite an opposite evaluation. Thus, one who while living was quite uncontrolled by local norms and thus presented a challenge and affront to their legitimacy was finally overcome and domesticated in death. It is this covert kind of cultural self-justification that also 11:47–48 wants to expose.

Both in the sayings related to Diogenes' death (1a, b) and in 11:47–48, at issue is principally the building of tombs. The critical question is why they are erected. In both the case of Diogenes and that of the prophets, it is a social act which serves the interests of the builders, that is, far from its ostensible purpose to recognize and recall the enduring worth of the person thus enshrined, entombment rather enshrouds or restricts (by materially fixating it) their memory or the form of their continuing presence. Thus, their remembrance in this way proves really to be a means of forgetting.

Interestingly, in both of the cited discussions of Diogenes' burial this fact is admitted more or less explicitly. Thus, in the one account (1a) after giving all the details of the struggle and decision how properly to inter him, it is then mentioned that when dying, Diogenes himself had rather different ideas. These ideas, moreover, were thoroughly consistent with his prior approach to life, which those who bury him thus contradict by their preoccupation and care. Likewise, ps-Aeschines (1b) says that "as far as was possible, we disregarded the misfortune and misunderstood his words."

In 11:47–48, the same thing happens, only here not on the lips of the "participants" themselves but, rather, via someone else (viz. whoever is responsible for the saying in Q). In other words, the contradiction is not confessed but charged. Perhaps for this reason, the perceived contrast between present and past history is also somewhat more fiercely drawn.

In 11:47–48, those who remember the prophets by building their tombs are said to forget the heritage of murder that caused their death. This heritage is not per se the point of the saying, which as said rather concerns the ambivalence of building tombs. Nonetheless, it is clear that in the present case, this ambiguity includes a history of some violence. And forgotten violence is generally repeated. Thus, recalling what the memorials do not mention is not merely reveling in contradiction. It has as well an edge of anxiety or warning to it that such things not be done again, at least not because of ignorance and self-deception. Thus, it is said that "you are witnesses and participate in the deeds of your fathers."

It is not clear, however, that the statement, "you . . . participate in the deeds of your fathers," means that precisely the same thing is still going on, only now at the hands of the children. Just as easily the meaning is that the descendants of this group, precisely because they inherit the gains and goods of their ancestors, also must recognize their participation in or abiding responsibility for all ill methods by which these things were achieved.

A comparable example would be the modern Vietnam Veterans' Memorial. Its construction and reverence implies, among other things, an affirmation of the politico-economic system (cum representatives) which sent the persons named by the memorial to their unnecessary death. Those who continue to enjoy and maintain this ("American") way of life "participate in the deeds of your fathers." Meant is not that another generation is fighting again in southeast Asia. Rather, the point is that the American people as such

continue to be guilty of the former conflict by virtue of the same continuing domestic-foreign policies. And, like those in 11:47–48 who build the tombs of the prophets, they are not released from this legacy by erecting a monument.

(2) The saying marked by this number in itself needs no explanation. It does suggest, however, an additional dimension to the critique of building tombs viz. burial in 11:47–48, namely, that there is a way in which this kind of practice, especially if it is a form of piety, neglects the living. The (Pharisees') interest in honoring the prophets may reveal a reciprocal disinterest in contemporary persons (with their attendant needs and desires). In this, the same kind of behavior which earlier killed the prophets is effectively repeated, insofar as a disregard of the immediate context means minimally not heeding and often thereby opposing current efforts at reform and social change (assuming that the historical activity of the prophets was essentially that).

Summary

The issue under criticism in 11:47–48 is the (Pharisees') building of tombs, specifically, for the prophets, presumably to honor them. The problem with this kind of remembrance is what it forgets, namely, in 11:47–48 the antecedent habits of opposition and murder which led to the prophets' demise (in the case of Diogenes, it is his socially marginal existence while alive versus the later exaltation of his corpse). Those who build such tombs participate in this tradition of repression insofar as they do not denounce but, rather, affirm and carry on the social order inherited from their (killing) ancestors. One of the other problems with this sort of concern for the dead is its likely concomitant neglect of the living.

11:52

Woe to you . . .
because . . . <you> . . . lock . . .
the . . .
<you do> not <go> in
<and> those going in
you <prevent> . . .

In the final (sixth) woe, a similar point is scored to the one made in the fourth, namely, while the Pharisees command a certain social position, they do not use it in accordance with its function and possibilities but, rather, simply hold the privilege. Of all the woes, this one, if any, implies a certain self-consciousness to the Pharisees' imperfection. At the same time, however, the basic theme throughout the woes of appearance (having power) vs. reality (doing nothing constructive with it) continues.

Parallels

(1) Jesus said, "Woe unto the Pharisees, for what they resemble is a dog sleeping in the manger of some cattle, for it neither eats nor let(s) the cattle feed" (*Gos. Thom.* 102).

(2) The Athenians urged him to become initiated, and told him that in the other world those who have been initiated enjoy a special privilege. "It would be ludicrous," quoth he, "if Agesilaus and Epaminondas are to dwell in the mire, while certain folk of no account will live in the Isles of the Blest because they have been initiated" (DL 6.39).

(3) Jesus said, "The Pharisees and the Scribes have taken the keys to acquaintance and

hidden them. They have neither entered nor let those who want to enter enter. You then be as shrewd as snakes and as innocent as doves" (*Gos. Thom.* 39).

Commentary

(1) The comparison of 11:52 with *Gos. Thom.* 102 leaves the Pharisees looking rather churlish. In view, on the other hand, is nothing more significant than that. For whatever (unspecified) reasons, the Pharisees, like the dog in the manger, are in a certain position of power, being able to control access to something desirable. But neither of the two does anything with this power except hold it and, perhaps it is implied, flaunt it. In any case, both are accused of basically silly behavior. Human viz. canine folly is again at fault.

(2) The saying by Diogenes listed under this number addresses the notion of privileged access to a given (religious) experience. Diogenes suggests that this experience must be of dubious value if persons otherwise of high repute and character are denied the opportunity to enjoy it, simply because they have not fulfilled certain customary prerequisites. Better stated, it is the prerequisites which make no sense if only by their omission and for no other reason, the best of persons fail to receive what other "certain folk of no account" obtain merely for these few acts. There is, thus, no defensible virtue in the fact that one has (not) availed oneself of such a thing: in the case of Diogenes, being initiated; in 11:52, that which the Pharisees "lock" up, thereby preventing access.

The issue can be stated even more forcefully. Beyond being an immature thing to do, the very idea of locking persons out is impossible, if thereby something truly important is supposedly denied. For to think that a certain group could control the participation of others in life's viz. death's more significant experiences is simply ludicrous (thus Diogenes). If, nonetheless, the Pharisees proceed on this premise, they obviously then "do not go in," i.e., experience those things themselves, even as they attempt to keep this pleasure from those who, in fact, are "going in."

The specific point of 11:52 concerns the act of locking, just as the saying by Diogenes centers on the practice of initiation. The problem with both activities is their evident uselessness, especially given the fact that, as Diogenes suggests, if what is thus guarded is of value, no one can impede "those going in" from finally enjoying it.

(3) The comparison in this case between 11:52 and *Gos. Thom.* 39 is contrastive. In *Gos. Thom.* 39, the Pharisees (and scribes) are said to have hidden the keys to acquaintance. The problem is, thus, where to find them. In 11:52, there is no question about location. The issue is entrance viz. the effort to keep persons out.

Summary

Once again, in 11:52 human folly is in view. Like the dog in the manger in *Gos. Thom.* 102, the Pharisees display a certain power or privilege without, however, doing anything with it. The irony is like that which Diogenes identifies vis-a-vis initiation, namely, if what is "locked" by the Pharisees truly matters, they cannot finally deny anyone access to it. Thus, if they do succeed in this, the experience is hardly worth the effort.

Some Preliminary Conclusions

All the woes in Q in one way or another turn about the axis of appearance vs. reality. Moreover, appearance is typically synonymous with the pretense of virtue, while reality is always rather less exalted. The constant tweaking of this contrast characterized also Greco-Roman Cynics, who never ceased to bring their rhetorical inventiveness and sardonic sense of humor to bear upon the gap. Both the woes in Q and the Cynics play

for space in which the norms of their conventional society are relaxed and relativity reigns. At least, there is a sense that the current social order is not supreme. This is never expressed, however, as far as I can tell, in more positive or constructive terms. The critique is thus not tied to utopian desires. It may also be that the sheer press of established ways was such that, practically speaking, all one could want was to unsettle them a bit.

It has proven extremely helpful and instructive to read the woes in Q in the light of other parallel or similar sayings, if only because certain habitual categories of description cease thereby to have immediate or self-evident relevance. Thus, an opportunity is presented really to reconsider how we read such texts. In the particular case of the woes, moreover, their solemnity or weightiness is diminished a bit, once it is seen with the aid of Greco-Roman Cynicism's comparable traditions that this kind of criticism is not inevitable the mark of great social upheaval.

III. Forsaking Criticism to Assume Judgment

The woes in Q became part of a polemical trajectory through early Christianity and western culture which, in its entirety, cannot here be followed. But it is instructive and pertinent quickly to review the scythe-like initial increments; these in many ways determined what follows. I begin with the redaction of Q, which most notably inserts 11:49–51 amidst the other woes.[25] What happens when the so-called "Sophia oracle" is added? Does it "up the ante" or "douse the fire"? Does continuity or discontinuity, elaboration or deployment, describe its basic relation with the other sayings? Why is 11:49–51 of all the woes the one which has most received the attention of scholars (judging by what bibliographies report)?

I then consider briefly use of the woes from Q in Matthew (23) and in Luke (11:37–54). At that point, some concluding observations can be made.

A. Q 11:49–51

Therefore <Sophia says> . . .[26]
I . . . send . . .
prophets and . . .
and . . .
from them . . .
kill and . . .
persecute . . .
<so that responsibility for> . . .
blood . . . all . . .
poured out . . .
from . . . blood of Abel . . .
to . . . blood of Zacharias
<put to death>

[25] Thus, what I have heretofore called the woes in Q would be more accurately referred to as the woes in Q's formative stratum. The redaction of Q (excluding for the moment talk of a tertiary layer) would then create the document, Q, per se.

[26] There appears to be a general consensus that 11:49–51 was originally in Q a saying of Sophia: see Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 143 n. 181 and the literature cited there.

between . . . the altar . . .
and the <temple>
<truly> I say to you
<responsibility of>
this generation.

The saying in 11:49–51 is now regularly thought to belong to the redaction of Q, i.e., it represents a secondary elaboration of the original catena of woes for reasons which, most recently, John S. Kloppenborg indicates.

> Whereas 11:47–48 (like the rest of the woes) is directed against the Pharisees or scribes, 11:49–51 broadens this criticism to "this generation," i.e., to those who reject Wisdom's messengers (cf. 7:31–35; 11:29–32). Moreover, in the midst of woes attributed to Jesus it is unexpected to find a saying of Sophia speaking, apparently from her standpoint at the beginning of history (ἀποστελῶ). Finally, the character of the Sophia saying differs from that of the woes; whereas the woes offer reproaches, the Sophia oracle is a threat of retribution on this generation. Thus it appears that a saying of Sophia has been joined to a series of woes through catchwords and thematic associations to form a judgment oracle against "this generation."[27]

Kloppenborg's argument is thoroughly literary, as indeed it should be,[28] for he intends simply to demonstrate the many ways in which 11:49–51 does not rhetorically fit into its present context and, therefore, why it was unlikely part of the woes' formative stratum. I have nothing more to add in this regard to his convincing work.

Needed, however, is further reflection on the social matrix or consequences of the literary changes Kloppenborg describes. Kloppenborg himself has broached the subject, but does not pursue it.

> The latest insertion was 11:49–51, which broke up the original connection of 11:47–48 with 11:52, and which broadened the polemic from groups within Judaism to "this generation" itself. From the perspective of the latest editing of the Q woes, Israel is guilty of rejecting God's envoys, and her leaders actively attempt to thwart the unfolding of the kingdom. The editing of the Q woes has transformed them from intramural disputes into full-blown oracles and threats of judgment.[29]

Kloppenborg suggests a process whereby originally contained remarks ("intramural disputes") have been intensified into pronouncements of out-right condemnation. I agree. But what is the mechanism of this transformation? I suggest that it is mythification, which means that the mundane realm of daily life and local society ceases to be the focus of comment as the plane of discussion is broadened or elevated (?) to that of sweeping generalizations and transcendental personages. Thus, in 11:49–51 we hear not only of "this generation" in place of the Pharisees, but also of all the blood wrongly spilt from

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[27] See Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 144.

[28] See Kloppenborg, "Tradition and Redaction in the Synoptic Sayings Source," *CBQ* 46 (1984) 34–62, for a convincing demonstration why only literary criteria should pertain to a discussion of Q's stratigraphy.

[29] See Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 147.

Adam to a certain Zacharias, i.e., every act of unprovoked assault from primordial time through known history.[30] In place of the other woes' unidentified speaker(s) (in Q, there is no evidence that Jesus is responsible for them) in 11:49, Sophia declaims. And she, instead of commenting on observable behavior or visible cultural contradictions, purports to announce the sempiternal succession of her emissaries, whose rejection would constitute a theo-drama of divine appeal and profane rebuff.[31]

The action is, thus, no longer on the surface. One needs more than a certain candor and sense of humor to read the social situation. In 11:49–51, oracular insight is suddenly required; a mini-myth must be produced to clarify what is really happening.

This process of mythification is not limited to 11:49–51 but also forms part of Q's redaction elsewhere. In 7:35, Sophia is again explicitly invoked in a verse that would rationalize the profoundly contradictory histories of John and the son of man (mentioned in 7:33–34). The figure of the son of man in both 7:34 and a series of other sayings also belongs consistently (with only one exception, 9:57–58) to Q's redaction. In 3:16, there is talk of "the stronger one who is coming" as, in 7:19, of "he who is coming" (cf., further, 13:35). Thus, in contradistinction to Q's formative stratum, a host of quasi-mythological personae appear together one stage later on the scene.[32] Why?

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[30] Cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985) 946: Abel and Zecharias are respectively the first and last persons murdered in the first and last books of the Hebrew canon or Old Testament.

[31] A parallel of sorts to 11:49–51 exists in the literature of Cynicism, see ps-Diogenes 20: "I heard that you are grieved that the Athenian youths, drunk with wine, laid blows on me, and that you suffer great distress that wisdom should be treated wtih drunken violence. But be well aware that although Diogenes' body was beaten by the drunkards, his virtue was not dishonored, since it is in its nature not to be adorned or shamed by evil men. Diogenes certainly was not insulted, but the Athenian public, some of whom resolved to show contempt for virtue, suffered terribly. Really, through the foolishness of one person foolish men throughout the populace come to ruin, since they plan improper actions and wage war when they should be at peace. But had they checked their madness from the start, they would not have come to this" (the translation is that of Benjamin Fiore, S.J., in Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles*, ad loc.).

Interestingly, however, beyond the similar reference to wisdom as somehow the originary cause of it all (although in ps-Diogenes 20, the identification between wisdom and the misfortune of Diogenes is made by someone else and, furthermore, implicitly pooh-poohed) the response of Diogenes to Melesippus (the fictitious recipient of the letter) never leaves the plane of local history, unlike 11:49–51. Thus, in ps-Diogenes 20 the actors are simply "the Athenian youths," the cause of the assault "drunk[enness] with wine," the ultimate problem the social one whether Diogenes' group-status or virtue has thereby been dishonored ("insulted"). In place of the polemic in 11:50–51 against "this generation," ps-Diogenes 20 speaks only of "the Athenian public." The moral drawn is not one of impending judgement (vs. 11:51) but, rather, merely a reflection on the way certain individual(s') actions can implicate the whole society. Thus, however inviting the parallel may be at first glance, it is finally not worth pursuing.

[32] For the secondary character of 7:35 plus the son-of-man sayings in Q, see most recently Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 172–73 (=6:22–23); 111 (=7:33–34, 35); 190–91 (=9:57–58); 130, 134 (=11:30); 211–13 (=12:8–9, 10); 149 (=12:40); 160, 163 (=17.24); 160–61, 164 (=17.26–30). Discussion of the significance of these sayings' "additive"

Regarding the woes in Q, the modulation via 11:49–51 into a more mythical key seems a medium for escalating or further polarizing social debate. By means of this kind of rhetoric, evident conflict is made more serious viz. more serious conflict is reflected. Myth's abstracted characteriziations purport to discern behind or beyond what is patently obvious something of greater significance.

In this regard, 11:49–51 runs in quite the opposite direction of what we have seen to be the line of Q's original woes. Versus their insistence that despite appearances, reality is really not so lofty, profound, indeed sacred, 11:49–51 suggests that the history of (Israel's) social violence is even more fraught with meaning than the facts alone would suggest. According to 11:49–51, ancient Israel's habit (shared with virtually every other known culture) of killing off critics of the established order (what else sociologically were the classical prophets?) is, in fact, an affront to and attack on God (in the form of Sophia and her messengers). The murder of a few half-clad, barking types like Jeremiah and John becomes, thus, not just an act of lamentable intolerance but an event of cosmic proportions, for which fitting retribution is promised.

What is hereby achieved? More adequate voice is perhaps given to feelings of frustrated patience and a sense of innocence on the part of persons who have taken some blows. At the same time, however, it hardly needs to be pointed out that the same rhetorical escalation does not solve in any way the basic problem. In fact, it only contributes further to a deteriorating relationship. Creating the conditions for an ultimate divorce may be its implicit purpose.

B. Matt 23:1–39

In Matthew (23) the woes from Q are made to serve a full-scale attack. As part of the chapter itself, they aid in its character assassination of the scribes and Pharisees. The same chapter, however, is also part of a larger context, namely, Matthew 21–25 where, it appears, the evangelist has quite deliberately constructed a series of final "controversies" in which, rather like the shoot-out at high-noon at the end of every B western, Jesus faces off with all his rivals. The metaphor is not pure fancy or anachronism, for Matthew gives this concluding section of his gospel a very particular backdrop, namely, the temple, whereby more than just a place to occur is granted; the setting is indicative of the power play at work.

(continued)
appearance begins with Heinz Schuermann, "Beobachtungen zum Menschensohn-Titel in der Redequelle," in R. Pesch and R. Schnackenburg, eds., *Jesus und der Menschensohn* (FS A. Voegtle; Freiburg: Herder & Herder, 1975) 124–47. The discussion is continued by Adela Yarbo Collins, "The Son of Man Sayings in the Sayings Source" (paper presented to the joint session of the Q and Early Christian Apocalypticism Seminars at the 1986 annual meeting of the SBL, Atlanta, GA).

All these persons include 9:57–58 in the conversation (as Kloppenborg evinces) and either explicitly or implicitly shy away from exclusively identifying the son-of-man sayings in Q with its redactional stratum. My different point of view in this regard is defended in a forthcoming article, "The Son-of-Man Sayings in Q," to be published in *Semeia*.

For ascription of 3:16 to the redaction of Q, see Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 102–7, 166–70.

In Matt 21:23a, Jesus enters the temple to be met immediately by "the chief priests and elders of the people." Without further ado strife follows upon strife. In 21:23b–27, the question is raised and avoided by whose power Jesus does what he does. Two subsequent parables (21:28–32; 33–41) insist on making the rebuttal stick. The first charges the accusers with less faith than that of the tax-collectors and whores. The second implies these same persons' willful participation in a history of murder and unlawful plunder, for which their imminent disinheritance is due (those who will give "the lord of the vineyard" his fruits in their season are for Matthew presumably early Christians versus early Jews). In 21:42–44, the latter parable is further explicated and rationalized (v 43: the kingdom of God will be given to a people who produce this kingdom's fruits). Not surprisingly, then, the chief priests and Pharisees (now named specifically as the elders of the people: cf. v 23) understand in 21:45 that "them there's fightin' words" and accordingly wish to respond in kind (21:46).

In Matt 22:1–14, a third parable (like the preceding one) elaborates how the original group of chosen people (the figure of guests here used instead of farmers) has been replaced by another one (with certain ancillary arguments carried on simultaneously). In 22:15–22, the Pharisees (now without the chief priests) try to set a second theological trap ("Is it lawful to pay taxes to Caesar or not?"), only to be foiled once more (cf. 21:23b–27). In 22:23–33, the Sadducees (appearing from nowhere viz. Mark) lose a stuffy scholastic debate over the resurrection. In 22:34–40, the Pharisees (coming to the rescue, having heard the Sadducees had failed) try another academic tact ("Which is the most important commandment of the law?") but alas, to no avail!

In Matt 22:41–46, Jesus then strikes back with his own bit of christological trivia. By v 46, all opponents have been silenced. Far from being the end of it all, however, this counterattack serves as a springboard for the fierce polemics of the subsequent chapter. In 23:1–3, it is made clear that in what follows, the scribes and Pharisees are to be thoroughly scathed. And, indeed, they are soundly whipped, the woes from Q being steadily deployed to this end. Matthew 23 is consumed with the offensive.

In Matt 24:1 just as he is leaving the temple, Jesus is then immediately taken up with apocalyptic prophecy (i.e., Matthew's use of Mark 13 amplified by a number of unparalleled eschatological parables plus similar material from elsewhere in Q). The ranting continues uninterrupted for the next two chapters. In Matthew 24–25, the temple thus remains the backdrop; no other change of scenery is ever mentioned. From 21:23 to 25:46, therefore, we are debating over sacred space; the scribes and Pharisees are villified on their home turf. The woes from Q, if only by virtue of this new setting, are now in the midst of a territorial dispute.

It is striking to observe how Matthew both reflects and simultaneously twists the argument of the woes in Q. In place of the contrast between appearance and reality, in Matt 23:3 we are told that the opposition is rather between what the scribes and Pharisees say and do; i.e., they do not practice what they preach.[33] Their speech is authoritative, but their action is not. The issue of authority is the new element. Those who currently sit on "the chair of Moses" (23:2) do not merit the honor which this social position would demand. The rest of the chapter wants to prove the point.

Thus, the woes in Matthew 23 are especially *ad hominem;* they center on issues of the person. Debated are the qualifications necessary to assume viz. continue holding Moses' chair. For this reason, the personal defamation "hypocrites" is found only in Matthew

[33] Cf. above, 11:46.

along with a number of other derogatory names. For this reason, only in Matthew (23:8–12) is there an extended discussion of the (non-) use of social titles. For this reason, only in Matthew (23:13–22) is leadership as such of primary importance (in vv 16–22, the credibility of the opposition's legal judgments is notably questioned; cf., further, v 23: "and [you] have neglected the weightier matters of the law"). By 23:24, the level of discourse has sunk to that of insult: "You blind guides, straining out a gnat and swallowing a camel!" At this point, then, the other woes from Q plus 13:34–35 can simply be appended, interspersed with additional invective.

The woes from Q in Matthew 23 have lost all sense of humor and playfulness. They now form part of charges laid against Israel's religious leaders for moral corruption (so clearly perceptible through the glass walls of Matthew's house). The electoral battle (namely, who will finally be the chosen people: Matthew's group or that of the scribes and Pharisees) looks to be a dirty one with lots of mud-slinging and name-calling. Things can only deteriorate.

C. Luke 11:37–54

In contrast with Matthew 23, use of the woes from Q by Luke (11:37–54) is notably reserved. This is not to say, however, that Luke is therefore innocent in his transmission of them. Instead, there is a way in which Luke's polite distance from the tussle makes the woes in question into just another self-evident feature of the life of Jesus, one of the many things contributing to the conspiracy that ultimately led to his demise. The result is, then, by virtue of the larger context and argument of the gospel that the Pharisees (and lawyers) come off looking rather like bad sports who could not accept honest criticism. Certainly more gentile than Matthew's brawling presentation, the effect of Luke's is nonetheless similar and perhaps, because less pronounced, rather more invidious.

Luke (11:37–38) has Jesus utter the woes from Q at a Pharisee's dinner party to which Jesus has just been invited. Jesus does not wash his hands before he eats, whereat the Pharisee's understandable surprise sets everything off. By prefacing the woes in this way, Luke may seem to be trying to lessen their antagonistic profile; the woes are not public declamations made in the street for all to hear but, rather, off-the-record remarks made in the private quarters of a friend's dining room. They begin, in any case, as the explanation of an unexpected idiosyncracy on Jesus' part.

The subsequent woes, however, (from Q) are too forceful to make the preceding account believable. Instead, Luke's introduction creates a scene in which Jesus proves himself an ingrate, using his own volition of common custom as an opportunity to rail at his host and the group this person represents. In return for the Pharisee's gracious gesture of hospitality, Jesus, having forged a predictable pretext to be questioned, virtually explodes with heretofore repressed agression, piling one thing on top of another, not allowing any defense or response to be made to the accumulating accusations. All the lawyer in 11:45 has to do is observe that Jesus is also attacking them when he says these things about the Pharisees and Jesus launches immediately into a second attack, this time against the lawyers. We are not with Luke 11:37ff. in the presence of someone who embodies political or social grace.

For Luke (11:53–54) the point of it all appears to be the chance to see yet another historical reason why there arose opposition against Jesus in Israel.[34] The scribes and

[34] See Fitzmyer, *Luke X-XXIV*, 944: the incident of the woes "helps to trace the growing hostility to Jesus' ministry that punctuates the Lukan account."

Pharisees must accept Jesus' denunciations (he leaves immediately after making them) but do so in a passive-aggressive way; instead of answering him back (although Jesus viz. Luke hardly gives them a chance to reply) they deal with their decidedly upset feelings by bad-mouthing Jesus to others and surreptitiously looking for a way to get even. One might wonder if they did not have every reason to respond this way. But because the final remarks by Luke make the scribes and Pharisees less than the most magnanimous persons (which one would surely need to be to hear and not react in some way to what Jesus has just said) we are left thinking that Jesus must be right after all and they simply could not handle it.

It is the naturalness or apparent self-evidence (sometimes called his faithful use of sources) with which Luke presents the woes from Q that makes of them something other than what they were. In the framework given them by Luke, there no longer exists any sense of interaction or exchange of opinion. The Pharisee (in 11:37–38) and lawyer (in 11:45) are straight men for Jesus' indictments, so that at the end (11:53–54) Jesus, done speaking, simply leaves; questions and/or comments are not entertained. The scribes and Pharisees can only plot against him. It is as though any further dialogue were considered useless. And that, of course, guarantees that the preceding woes will now be thought of as final judgments instead of the penetrating and slightly mischievous probes they constitute in Q.

IV. Conclusion

I have tried in this paper to describe the woes in Q and then the initial increments of their fateful trajectory in Q's redaction, Matthew (23) and Luke (11:37–54). Throughout whether explicitly or implicitly the ambivalence or "slipperiness" of criticism has been my concern. I also admit to an incidental interest in what the woes in Q might "actually" have "meant" to their "initial" audience.

It has been demonstrated that the woes in Q are fundamentally about the contrast between appearance and reality, which in the case of the Pharisees means a certain opposition to or debunking of their zeal for perfect righteousness and purity. The critique also includes a sense of the human folly hereby manifested, at the same time that a certain rigor or seriousness is clear. The local scene is not transcended. Debated are given features of daily life in Hellenistic Palestine under Roman rule which apparently the Pharisees embody par excellence. Criticism is motivated by the desire not to bear unflinching the burden of these mores when they are self-deceptive.

The woes in Q were subsequently taken up into a process I have called mythification, whereby the contrast now becomes one of social groups with their representative (transcendental) personages. What was previously the self-blindness of human folly and untempered religious zeal is thus made into an example of willful deceit and unprovoked aggression. This escalation and reification of criticism into full-fledged antagonism is lastly evident in the eventual history of the woes' interpretation, which takes them (in Q, Matthew, and/or Luke) as support for a presupposed imagination of early Christian origins, in which effectively Christianity is set apart and distinguished from all contemporary thought and life. The rhetoric of criticism, both as social critique and as textual commentary, in this way comes to serve the interests of Christian self-justification and self-aggrandizement. These interests have then historically included more than the mere villification of those who do not belong to this group.

The trajectory of the woes in Q grants only a glimpse into the process of mythification, even as it simultaneously demands a more exhaustive investigation of the matter, which

obviously is not possible here. Nonetheless, on the basis of this paper certain observations regarding mythification can be made.

It is notable, for example, in my opinion how the woes in Q pass from their unnamed speaker(s) in the document's formative stratum via an oracle of Sophia at the redactional level onto the lips of Jesus in Matthew and Luke. The sayings become thereby increasingly less significant for what they say and more for who says them. That is to say, in Q the woes stand (or fall) on their own; if they fail to make their point, they are meaningless. By contrast, in Matthew and Luke the main thing is that Jesus (representing Christians) takes on the Pharisees (and scribes and lawyers, etc. representing Jews). If everything said is not notably cogent or compelling, the opposition is still effectively portrayed. Thus, it becomes more and more difficult to evaluate precisely the issues under debate, because they (namely, the woes in Q) increasingly serve merely as grist for a mill preset to grind. To the extent that interpretation (of the woes) takes it heuristic clues or, less consciously, simply allows itself passively to be seduced by the later constructions of the gospels, the richer exchange of opinion and examination at their origins is lost.

In the discussion of 11:49–51, it was noted that the process of mythification evident there also forms part of Q's redaction elsewhere. It would be interesting to see to what extent the comments made here about the "Sophia oracle" are strongly corroborated throughout the document's second stratum. Insofar as the indicated perspective can be generalized, it would seem then that a marked shift in the constitution or orientation of the persons represented by Q has occurred. In place of a set of dispersed social critics, the formation of a particular group of disenfranchised persons is now in view which, like any other new group, is primarily preoccupied with problems of its own authorization, identity, and conservation.

In a different context, I have already outlined the kind of persons or social grouping which I believe Q originally represents.[35] I would understand the paper's interpretation of the woes to be consistent with this earlier work. In the beginning, Q attests a loosely constituted movement manifesting great similarities in thought and life-style or ethos and ethical rationalization to Greco-Roman Cynics. Both sets of persons are examples of contemporary popular philosophers.

Evident in both cases, namely, the formative stratum of Q and Cynicism, is a tensive participation in local society, whereby cultural norms and ruling assumptions are continually called into question without, however, an alternative order being instituted. (This is precisely what we have seen at work in the woes!) Behavior and speech criticize conventional mores, but remain part of (dependent upon, if you will) the same system of social organization. It is a marginal existence, subject to a variety of contrary characterizations (the persons who lead it can be called, e.g., parasitic leeches, "a bunch of bums," romantic idealists believing in a pristine state of nature viz. rule of God, etc.) but not without certain social function, namely, to mark the borders or limitations of the criticized culture. Notably, to reiterate something already said, this role of definition is played out within the group. It is an act intrinsic to its society, not set up over against it. The persons who perform it thus belong to the order they lampoon and castigate and therefore, in a liminal way, still represent it.

What apparently has begun, on the other hand, with the redaction of Q to be continued in Matthew and Luke is the construction of a new order, precisely set up first

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[35] See Leif E. Vaage, "Q: The Ethos and Ethics of an Itinerant Intelligence" (Ph.D. Diss., The Claremont Graduate School, 1987) esp. 386–91.

(in Q's redaction) over against the yet dominant culture and eventually in its stead (already signaled ideologically in Matthew). Thus, Sophia (11:49) and a cohort of other such quasi-mythological figures emerge in the second stratum of Q to provide a certain transcendental authorization for the new group's existence, granting it hereby a sacred canopy of sorts under which its first fledgling moments are sanctioned and secured. The group identifies itself at the same time in terms which explicate its differentiated (and thus threatened) being; in 11:49–50, the model of the prophets and (other divine messengers), especially given their concomitant history of inflicted bloodshed, grants the needed self-understanding. Finally, the (reciprocal) threat of coming retribution (11:51) provides a mechanism of self-conservation at a time when the group has few, if any, other means whereby to defend itself. Soon, of course, the same threats can serve as pretexts for realizing retribution and reprisal, not to speak of revenge and repression.

The Kingdom That Didn't Come: A Social History of the Q Tradents

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Introduction

My assignment is to sketch the social history of the tradents of Q. There are two overarching scholarly issues that must be kept in mind. One is the question of how to understand the relation between itinerancy and group formation. This question actually comes to impasse when the language of "radically" itinerant preachers is used in the same discourse with the language of the "community" of Q. Both languages are currently in use. The second issue is a difference of scholarly opinion on how to interpret the Q sayings in relation to the activity of its tradents. There are several ways in which this issue has been phrased: preaching/teaching; public/private; apocalyptic/wisdom; prophetic pronouncement/rhetorical persuasion; ecstatic performance/social rationalization; and so forth. If the two issues are combined, as they must be in any attempt to imagine the people who transmitted these sayings, the options multiply. Thus there is a broad range of opinion about how to understand Q in the context of its social history.

This paper takes a position with regard to both issues and offers a rather fulsome sketch of the social history that results. The point of departure is given with two recent developments in Q studies. The first has to do with the literary history of Q. Especially important in this regard is the work of John Kloppenborg. In his major study, *The Formation of Q*, Kloppenborg was able to isolate and describe three layers in the compositional history of Q before it was employed independently by Matthew and Luke.[1] These layers are now being referred to as Q1, Q2, and Q3. Since these layers divide along thematic as well as formal lines, and since a definite sequence is given from "sapiential instruction" in Q1 to the "announcement of judgment" in Q2, the beginnings of a social history are also clearly in evidence.

The second development is less well known, except perhaps by hearsay. It is the accumulation of evidence that suggests a strongly popular Cynic flavor to the earliest layers of the Jesus traditions. Probing the Cynic parallels to the aphorisms and chreiai of Jesus in both Q and Mark helps define more precisely the nature of the "sapiential instruction" characteristic for Q1. Studies in Cynic wisdom have also opened windows to the cultural climate in Galilee during the first century, the cultural climate within which the tradents of Q have to be placed. A Cynic Jesus does appear to fit the Hellenistic cast to Galilean culture much better than the apocalyptic Jesus.[2]

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[1] John S. Kloppenborg, *The Formation of Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom Collections* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).

[2] On Cynic parallels to the early Jesus traditions, see F. Gerald Downing, "Cynics and Christians," *New Testament Studies* 30 (1984) 584–93; F. Gerald Downing, "Quite Like Q: A Genre for 'Q': The 'Lives' of Cynic Philosophers," *Biblica* 69/2 (1988) 196–225; John S. Kloppenborg, "Blessing and Marginality: The Persecution Beatitude in Q, Thomas &

These two developments are mutually supportive. On the basis of literary studies an earliest layer of Q material has been identified for which an earliest stage of social history is quite plausible. This possibility of a correlation between text and social history at one level of Q makes it possible to proceed with the project as a whole. If a second correlation can be worked out for Q2, and the shift from Q1 to Q2 can be clarified by changes in the social situations reflected in each layer, a thesis might be possible that accounts for the literary history in terms of a social history of the Q tradents.

The challenge for the social historian of early Christianity is that social history must be reconstructed from the literary products of that history. Because literary activity is only one of many activities that must be determined, texts are inadequate data. Thus the move from texts to times is quite complex, requiring several controls simultaneously as plausible social profiles are constructed for testing. One requirement is that the textual material make sense in the context of the social situation educed from the text. A second is that the resulting social world make sense in the context of its larger cultural frame. A third is that the shifts from one situation to another in a tradition held to be continuous can also be explained. In this case, the reasonableness of a certain sequence is very important, as is the determination of the logic that must have guided the new configurations of social and ideological advantage.

The first probe into the social history of the Q tradents, then, would be to work out the social situation reflected in each layer of Q material in terms of the language used in each case to address those situations. If the correlations make sense, and if the shifts from layer to layer correspond to understandable junctures in a plausible social history, a thesis might be supported.

This paper will focus upon the relation of Q1 to Q2 in order to develop a thesis about the Q tradents at the earlier stages of this sayings tradition. A first set of comparisons between the two layers of Q material will concentrate on conceptual, stylistic, and rhetorical features (Section I). A second set of comparisons will then attempt to isolate evidence for the respective social situations assumed or addressed in each layer of material and trace the shift that occurred from Q1 to Q2 both at the literary level and at the level of social experience (Section II). In the course of this investigation a reconstruction of the social history of the Q tradents will come into view.

In his *Q Parallels*, Kloppenborg enumerates units of sayings material with the siglum S (S1, S2, . . .). This system will be used in order to facilitate reference to the text. I have followed Kloppenborg's assignment of Q material to the three layers he identified in *The Formation of Q*, taking into consideration his subsequent reflections on this matter in an unpublished paper for the Jesus Seminar entitled "Formative and Redactional Layers in Q."[3] The assigment of units of material to the three layers frustrates fine distinctions that could be made within units of mixed material, but for the purpose of this essay whole units can be assigned to one or another of the layers. Only in two obvious instances have

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Early Christianity," *Foundations and Facets Forum* 2/3 (1986) 49–53; Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 324–25; Burton L. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988) 67–74. On the cultural climate in Galilee being Hellenistic see Mack, *Myth of Innocence*, 32–35, 52 n. 19, 65–66.

[3] John S. Kloppenborg, *Q Parallels: Synopsis, Critical Notes and Concordance* (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press, 1988); John S. Kloppenborg, "Formative and Redactional Layers in Q," Unpublished Paper for the Jesus Seminar, Sonoma, California, March 1988.

distinctions been made within units. In other cases a question mark (in parenthesis) has been used to indicate mixed material or questionable assignment. I have made only slight adjustments to Kloppenborg's assignments.[4] Thus Q1 material consists of S1, S7, S8 (minus 6:22–26), S9, S10, S11, S12, S13, S14, S21, S22 (minus 10:12), S27, S28, S35 (?), S36 (?), S40, S41, S42, S48, S49, S54, S56, S57, and S60. All else can be assigned to Q2 with the exception of S6 (The Temptations of Jesus) which belongs to Q3. In terms of units, Q1 material constitutes approximately one-third of the collection.

It is important to note that, especially in his discussion of Q1 material, Kloppenborg frequently notes earlier and later material brought to a given compositional unit. I shall argue that some Q2 material also is composite, reflecting several stages of social and compositional history. Thus the layers are best understood as identifiable moments in a compositional history that was actually in process over a longer period of time. The division in three layers is nevertheless justified on both formal and thematic grounds as will become clear.

I. A Comparison of the Literary Profiles (Q1 and Q2)

A. Formal and Material Characteristics

A good place to begin this study is with Kloppenborg's summary to *The Formation of Q*.[5] He notes that Q1 has a high preponderance of imperatives plus supporting aphorisms formed into clusters by motive clauses, while Q2 is characterized formally by polemical chreiai, judgment pronouncements, and woes. One might add that the motive clauses in Q1 tend to be analogies (*parabolai*) drawn from nature or behavior reminiscent of the everyday, whereas the parables (*parabolai*) in Q2 include a number of apocalyptic scenarios.

Almost every block of material in Q1 contains at least one aphorism, or a programmatic

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[4] I have made adjustments to Kloppenborg's assignment of material in seven instances: In S8, Kloppenborg assigns only Q6:23c to Q2. I understand Q6:22–26 as a reflection of Q2 themes, including synagogue problems, eschatological promise, and the destiny of the prophets. I take S24 as Q2 (K: Q1), because Jesus' authority is enhanced by the notion of "being sent," otherwise absent in Q1. K assigns S35, S36, and S39 to Q1. I see these as belonging together in a unit (S35–39) that offers instruction to the community for the occasion of "trial" before the rulers of the synagogue, a circumstance imaginable only for the post-Q1 social history. I assign S48 to Q1 (K: Q2) only because I want to cite the curious saying about "agreeing with one's accuser" as a support for Q1 discourse. Kloppenborg is right about the unit as a whole fitting best in Q2. Kloppenborg assigns Q13:24 ("Strive to enter," S50) to Q1, but the notion of "entering" by "striving" fits best in Q2 where the kingdom came to be imagined as an eschatological domain. It might be noted also, that Kloppenborg has expressed uncertainty about all but one unit in the "miscellaneous sayings" (S58–64). I have assigned all but S60 to Q2 because they can easily be taken as a set of instructions to the post-Q1 community. Note the themes of repentance, keeping the law, loyalty, scandals, forgiveness of a brother, and hope for the impossible.

[5] Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 317–328.

saying that could easily be taken aphoristically. To catch the flavor of this substratum it will be helpful to list the following (paraphrased a bit to encourage a fresh look):

Blessed the poor; theirs is the kingdom. (S8)
The measure you give will be the measure you get. (S10)
Can a blind man lead a blind man? (S11)
No good tree bears bad fruit. (S13)
Foxes have holes, humans have none. (S21)
The harvest is plentiful, the laborers few. (S22)
Nothing is hidden that will not be made known. (S35)
Life is more than food and clothing. (S41)
Where your treasure, there your heart. (S42)
Everyone who exalts himself will be humbled. (S54)
Whoever seeks to gain his life will lose it. (S56)
If salt is saltless, what's it good for? (S57)
No one can serve two masters. (S60)

These sayings are not particularly clever, but the observations they make are keen and their stance toward life in general is, while not hostile, incisive and critical. They are, in fact, mildly subversive. That much comes through without knowing anything about the reasons why anyone would want to cultivate such sayings. To discover the reasons we need some additional clues about the ethos from within which such sayings made their point. Before going on to look for those clues, however, the comparative point needs to be scored. Sayings of this kind are not characteristic for Q2. There are only a very few instances in Q2 where a programmatic saying is phrased as pungently as in Q1, the clearest examples being the saying about the last and the first in S51, and the saying about the lamp and the bushelbasket in S33. In every case of aphoristic language in Q2 the possibility of commentary upon human behavior in general is erased by dislocation from the worlds of social convention and by application either to the apocalyptic reversals that threaten all aspects of the status quo, or to the realm of true enlightenment.

A somewhat clearer picture of the Q1 ethos can be gained by close attention to the imperatives that predominate. Since there are so many of them, some blocks of material consisting mainly of parenesis, a selection must be made that can stand for the bulk of the material and illustrate its basic thrust. The following examples were selected on the basis of two considerations. One was to choose sayings with aphoristic qualities in keeping with the overall tone of the material in Q1. The other consideration was to look for sayings that might be considered core sayings within a cluster. The following list is the result (cheating a bit as usual in order to make the point):

Rejoice when reviled. (S8)
Love your enemies. (S9)
Bless those who curse you. (S9)
To him who strikes you on the cheek, offer the other also. (S9)
Judge not, that you be not judged. (S10)
Leave the dead to bury the dead. (S21)
Carry no purse; salute no one on the road; first say "Peace;" eat what is set before you. (S22)
Ask, and you will receive. (S28)
Fear not, your worth is more than many sparrows. (S36)
Do not be anxious about your life. (S41)

Sell your possessions and give them away. (S42)
Settle with your accuser on the way. (S48)

With imperatives such as these before us, an ethos begins to come into view. It is still not yet clear why anyone would want to cultivate such a collection of odd exhortations. But as a collection they do hang together in the recommendation of a certain stance toward the world. This stance resists conventional wisdom in most cases, only to employ rather banal advice in other cases as if, however, it were a matter of some import. An example of the later case would be the advice to settle quickly with one's accuser. Why such common wisdom should be cast as rule or exhortation is strange unless it was spoken within an ethos where common wisdom was mostly eschewed. Taken together, then, the imperatives have the same flavor as the aphorisms above and add to the sense of some investment in the odd view of the world they have in common.

There is little in Q2 that can compare with this sense of exhortation. Instead, there are two overriding forms of address in Q2 that mark the contrast with Q1. One is a rhetoric of persuasion (not exhortation) aimed at clarifying the identity of some group for which Jesus was the founder figure. There is very little evidence in Q1 for this kind of concern. The other is a rather sharp rhetoric of castigation aimed at some who refused to join the Jesus people in their cause. It is this feature of Q2 that bears comparison with the imperatives in Q1, for the castigations are made as direct address, include woes, and are given parabolic support in a way formally similar to the parenetic clusters in Q1. If one compares the parenetic tone of Q1 with the judgmental tenor of Q2, however, the contrast between the two layers of material becomes quite shrill. A huge shift in social circumstance is reflected in the change of rhetoric and in the different attitudes toward the world each layer assumes.

Were there leisure to pursue other aspects of the formal and material characteristics of Q1 and Q2, the contrast would only be strengthened. Comparisons could be made of the use of blessing formulae, woe formulae, analogy selection, type of rhetoric, logic of argumentation, use of chreiai, dialogue and controversy, implied audience, direct and indirect address, and so forth. In every case the result would be the same. Q1 is bent on recommending a certain critical stance over against a rather recognizable world. Q2 is obsessed with thoughts of divine reward and punishment meted out on the basis of loyalty and obedience to a founder figure Jesus.

This difference is nowhere more clear than in the formulations of reciprocity in Q1 and Q2. In both layers of the Q tradition formulations occur of the tit for tat variety. In Q1 there is frequently an uncomfortable rub somewhere in the mechanism of exchange. Either the tat is uncomfortable as a consideration even though the tit is attractive ("Love your enemies; you will be sons of God"), or the comforting tat is ruined when the unattractive tit is considered ("Whoever seeks to save his life will lose it"). It is this feature of the Q material that has given rise to its description as dialectical, paradoxical and inversionary. It is important to see that the impression of paradox is illusory, because where the exchange is inversionary it never takes place at the same level of logic in the same system of reference, but always in the space between one situation of reference and another. In Q1 the orders of reference are the conventional world of human affairs and the ethos of Q as, for instance, in the following sayings:

Blessed the poor; theirs is the kingdom. (S8)
Love your enemies; you will be sons of God. (S9)
Sell your possessions; put treasure in heaven. (S42)

If, in Q1, the exchange is not inversionary, but reciprocal, the wisdom tends to be prosaic and the orders of reference unclear. Examples would be the following:

Judge not, that you not be judged. (S10)
The measure you give will be the measure you get. (S10)

In Q2, on the other hand, the relation of deed to consequence is thoroughly reciprocal, and the orders of reference clearly distinquished. One distinction is between the orders of the faithful and the unfaithful. Another is between the situation in the present and the situation at the eschaton. Examples are as follows:

He who hears you, hears me; he who rejects me, rejects him who sent me. (S24)
He who is not with me is against me, and he who does not gather with me scatters. (S29)
Blessed are those who hear the word of God and keep it. (S31)
Everyone who acknowledges me before men, the Son of man will acknowledge before the angels. (S37)
He who denies me before men will be denied before the angels. (S37)

The distinction between Q1 and Q2 is obvious. In Q1 risky behavior is at stake; in Q2 it is the acceptance or rejection of Jesus and his words that is at issue. The words of Jesus have become a standard for inclusion/exclusion in some imagined realm with an eschatological eventuality.

B. Concepts and Views of the World

One way to mark the shift in conceptuality between Q1 and Q2 is to note the lack of apocalyptic idiom in Q1 and its overbearing presence in Q2. The corollary would seem to be that Q1 assumed a wisdom view of the world. This application of the traditional scholarly distinction between wisdom and apocalyptic is not exactly wrong, but it is inadequate. Kloppenborg correctly emphasizes that the wisdom characteristic for the "sapiential" Q1 is not the customary epigramatic formulation of conventional morals, but an invitation to countercultural behavior.[6] This is an extremely important observation. Q1 is "sapiential" with respect to the apocalyptic Q2, but not with respect to traditional forms of conventional wisdom. Q1 actually takes conventional wisdom as its point of departure for critical assessment of social conventions and suggests another pattern of behavior. It "argues" for this by subverting the normal logics and/or applications of conventional bits of wisdom, and thus creates the impression of enigma even though the aphorisms used to do this are not particularly striking. It may be questioned whether the acceptance of an alternative conceptual system was even thought necessary.

The scholarly response to this question has usually been to point to the terminology of the kingdom of God as evidence for a clear conceptual frame. This move is partially justified, for the language of the kingdom is certainly in evidence as the term of reference for the novel ethos under recommendation. It is also the case, however, that reference to the kingdom of God is the only way in which the tradents of Q1 expressed their commonly shared ethos. This means that the question of their worldview hangs on the significance of this terminology in reference to their recommended pattern of behavior. That relation has seldom been acknowledged, much less worked through. The need for

[6] Ibid., 318–21.

a conceptual frame of reference has seemed so self-evident that scholars have latched onto the terminology of the kingdom automatically. The problem arises when it is seen that the worldview scholars have assumed for the language of the kingdom (the apocalyptic) does not fit its application in Q1.

The kingdom of God is mentioned in S8, 21, 22, 27, 41 and 49. These are the sayings:

> Blessed the poor; theirs is the kingdom of God. (S8)
> Leave the dead to bury their own dead; but you, go and announce the reign of God. (S21)
> No one who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God. (S21)
> Whenever you enter a town and they receive you, eat what is set before you; take care of the sick there and say to them, "The reign of God has come near to you." (S22)
> When you pray, say, "Father, let your name be kept pure, let your reign take place, give us each day our daily bread." (S27)
> Do not seek what you are to eat and what you are to drink, nor be worried. For all the nations of the world seek these things; but your Father knows that you need them. Instead, seek his reign over you, and these things will be added to you. (S41)
> What is the reign of God like? . . . It is like a grain of mustard seed. . . . It is like leaven that a woman hid in three measures of meal. (S49)

None of these references fits an apocalyptic view of the world. None of them even assumes an apocalyptic view of the world as a larger frame of reference in order to enhance the significance of a novel notion of the reign of God. None is making the claim that the reference intended is so stupendous it must be thought of in "eschatological" terms. Only in the parables does the reign of God even become the subject for consideration, and there it is compared to the natural phenomena of seeds and leaven. In all other instances, mention of the reign of God is almost offhanded, ancillary to the making of other points. The other points all have to do with human circumstances that seem to be at stake. All instances of the term are actually rather straightforward references to the ethos of a certain pattern of behavior. Since this ethos is countercultural, reference to it can take a number of forms. It can be announced, desired, affirmed, claimed, and signalled in a given human exchange. The link between the notion of the reign of God and the pattern of countercultural practices in view is very, very strong.

A full discussion of the pattern of behavior recommended in Q1 is not possible here, given the scope of this paper. A partial profile would nevertheless be helpful. A list of items for inclusion in such a profile would include: voluntary poverty (S41, 42), nonretaliation (S9), "lending" without expectation of return (S9), severance of family ties (S21, 56), etiquette for begging (?:S22, 28), etiquette for the road (S22), etiquette for receptions and rejections (S9, 22), prayers for sustenance (S27, 28), and singlemindedness in pursuit of the kingdom of God (S41, 42, 56, 57, 60). Kloppenborg called this an "ethic of radical discipleship" and made the following observation about it:

> Q presents an ethic of radical discipleship which reverses many of the conventions which allow a society to operate, such as principles of retaliation, the orderly borrowing and lending of capital, appropriate treatment of the dead, responsible self-provision, self-defense and honor of parents.[7]

[7] Ibid., 318.

Since there is no indication in Q1 that the kingdom of God refers to an apocalyptic reversal of divine and worldly powers, the term must have something to do with a sense of order that could ground such behavior elsewhere than in the legal and cultural conventions of contemporary society. In a recent study I have argued that the closest analogy for this combination of countercultural behavior and the language of ruling is found in the Greek traditions of popular philosophy, most notably among the Cynics. Many scholars have in fact noted the strong similarity between the pattern of behavior in Q and the popular Cynic ethic. What has not been taken into account is that the Cynics also talked about representing a divine order that was different than the conventions of society. The match between the Cynics and the Q people is not exact, however, mainly because the Cynics could be quite comfortable with the natural order (*physis*) as the arena of the divine in contrast to social convention (*nomos*), whereas the Q tradents were obviously concerned specifically to theologize their non-societal ethos. Thus the terminology of the reign*of God* is a bit distinctive (though not unique, given is occurrence as well in Jewish wisdom literature of the period),[8] and may be a clue to the broadly Jewish cultural climate within which these Jesus people lived. As a concept in Q1, in any case, the reign of God is better understood when embellished by other references to God as Father than if derived from an apocalyptic worldview.[9]

Note the theology of Q1:

> Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return;
> And your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most
> High; For he is kind to the ungrateful and the selfish. (S9)
> Be merciful even as your Father is merciful. (S10)
> Father . . . give us . . . forgive us . . . lead us. (S27)
> If you know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more
> will the heavenly Father give good things to those who ask him.
> (S28)
> If God so clothes the grass . . . how much more will he clothe you. . . .
> Your Father knows that you need . . . (S41)
> You cannot serve God and mammon. (S60)

This theology is much more reminiscent of Jewish wisdom thinking than Jewish apocalyptic thought. Jewish wisdom was, moreover, fully capable of accommodating Hellenistic popular philosophy, and was, in fact, very much interested in doing so. There is little evidence in Q1 of interest in developing a conceptual grasp of a world ordered by divine wisdom, for the focus of concern was clearly upon the existential situation of the individual. This is not markedly different from the attitude of popular Cynicism, however, for in that case also there was little interest in working out a systematic philosophical theology of nature to support the notion of life "according to nature" (*kata phusin*). It was enough, apparently, both for Cynics and for the Q1 people, to imagine God as the guarantor of the better way to live that each had espied as an alternative to

[8] The term "kingdom of God" occurs in Hellenistic Jewish wisdom literature: Wisdom of Solomon 10:10; Sentences of Sextus 311; Philo, *De specialibus legibus* 4.164.

[9] On the derivation of the notion and terminology of the kingdom of God from Hellenistic Jewish wisdom literature, see Burton L. Mack, "The Kingdom Sayings in Mark," *Foundations and Facets Forum* 3/1 (1987) 11–18.

a society held to have gone wrong. For the Q1 people, the name of that alternative order was the reign of God. For such a reign to be realized there was no need to imagine a dramatic apocalyptic moment. As Kloppenborg put it, even though he still used the apocalyptic contrast to make the point, "[T]he radical ethic of Q[1] is associated with . . . the presence of the kingdom."[10]

In Q2, by contrast, the world view is clearly apocalyptic and the language of the reign of God has been apocalypticized. This was achieved essentially by means of three major conceptual developments, each of which can be seen to undergird the message of judgment that is characteristic for Q2. The first is an appeal to the history of Israel as prototypical paradigm for Jewish rejection of prophetic calls to repentance. The second is a new role imagined for Jesus as the rejected prophet and proclaimer of the new order. And the third is the expressly apocalyptic imagination of a final judgment upon those who reject the Jesus program. Taken together, these three conceptual developments define the emergence of an historical imagination among the tradents of Q.

The effort to link up the Jesus movement with the epic history of Israel was largely an exegetical labor. In Q1 there is very little appeal to epic traditions and no expressly exegetical activity. Those instances where appeal is made can be understood as the use of popular lore in support of an ethical elaboration, as for instance the mention of Solomon's glory in S41, or the possibility of an allusion to Elijah in the discipleship saying in S21. In Q2, however, concern for epic precedence is explicit and pervasive. There is reference to Abraham and his children (S3), Israel (S15, 62), the Patriarchs and the prophets (S51), the law and the prophets as an epoch (S18), prophets and kings as summation of an epoch (S26), the reviews of Israel's history from the perspective of personified wisdom (S34, 52), and the summary motif of the killing of the prophets (S8, 34). Precedent examples of "preaching" (received by foreigners!) are recalled in the cases of Jonah (S32) and the queen of the South (S32). Examples of judgment (understood to have fallen on those who did not "hear") are given with the stories of Noah (S66), Sodom (S22, v 12), and Lot (S66). Predictions found in the writings of Malachi and Isaiah are cited as fulfilled in the activities of John (S17) and Jesus (S16). And exegetical finesse is indicated in the elaborate parable of the Great Supper (S55).

The strategy is clear. Israel's history is marked as negative precedence for the Jesus movement. It unfolds as a story of unfulfilled promise, distinguished by a prophetic strain that was consistently rejected. The logic is that the rejection of the Jesus movement is no more than one should have expected. The link between the epic history and the beginnings of the Jesus movement is worked out most clearly in the preaching of John and the sayings of Jesus about John. (John is the messenger predicted by Malachi; Jesus is the one who comes afterward.) As if on target, the John-Jesus material also is the place where the "message" to the present generation is recast as a call to repentance buttressed by the apocalyptic threat. (John warns the "brood of vipers" about the wrath to come; Jesus will "baptize" with the fire that takes care of the "chaff.") It should come as no surprise that this way of rationalizing the rejection of the Jesus movement required a new imagination of the reign of God.

In Q2 there is much more interest in the sayings that call down judgment upon those who rejected the movement than in reimagining the reign of God. Thus it is that controversy chreiai, woes, prophetic warnings, and threats and parables of apocalyptic judgment predominate. One easily looses track of the notion of the kingdom of God. One

[10] Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 320.

has the impression that the apocalyptic projection was required mainly in order to make the threat of judgment stick, not in order to imagine a future for a movement that was now defined in other ways, but worried about its place in the larger scheme of social institutions. This may be a very important clue, both to the function of the apocalyptic language in Q2 and to the state of social formation reflected in it. Nevertheless, there are references to the reign of God in Q2, and they show that the move toward an epic-apocalyptic view of the world had effected the way in which the kingdom was conceived. Here are the references:

> The law and the prophets were until John; since then the good news of the kingdom of God is preached, and everyone enters it violently. (S18, 61)
>
> Among those born of women none is greater than John; yet he who is least in the kingdom of God is greater than he. (S17)
>
> There you will weep and gnash your teeth, when you see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets in the kingdom of God and you yourselves thrust out. (S51)
>
> As my Father appointed a kingdom for me, so do I appoint for you that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. (S68)

This list of references is a very weak foundation for the view that the notion of the kingdom of God was essentially apocalyptic. The Q1 use of the term has to be assumed in order to understand its import in Q2. In Q2, the notion of the kingdom of God is not primary. It was the requisition of an epic-apocalyptic frame of reference that was fundamental, which then called for a reconception of the kingdom. This historical frame served to define the place of the Q tradents with respect to other groups and thus also to redefine and relocate the kingdom ideal. The kingdom was now expressed as a domain to be entered, and its full manifestation would take place only at the eschaton. But the apocalyptic moment was imagined mainly to support the threat of judgment upon the Q detractors, not to clarify the nature of the Q group as an apocalyptic sect. This is clear, not only from the frequent use of the apocalyptic idiom of judgment without mention of the kingdom of God, but also from the way in which the apocalyptic idiom was used to put the Q people in the picture. With the exception of the last kingdom saying (S68), it was not the appearance of the blessed reign of God as a kingdom that exercised the Q2 imagination, but the appearance of the Son of man as judge. The Q tradents put themselves in the apocalyptic picture mainly by making a point about the judge. That point was rather simple: his standard of judgment would be the words of Jesus.

C. Audience, Authorship, and Authority

The question of authority has been one of the biggest bug-a-boos in Q studies. Because all of the sayings are attributed to Jesus, and because Jesus is characterized as an imperious authority whose words will determine the eschatological decision about inclusion and exclusion from the kingdom, scholars have tried to imagine what it was about Jesus that might account for his powerful influence. A favorite theory has been to link the mention of the spirit in Q to the kerygma of the death and resurrection of Jesus and describe the tradents as ecstatic prophets who dared to speak in Jesus' name by means of the power

of his spirit.[11] Another theory has been to regard the generative core of the sayings as somehow related to an original utterance of Jesus, a meaning that continued to provide the tradents with a sense of Jesus' continued "oral presence."[12] Both of these views are scholarly theological constructions. Neither is helpful as a description of how the Q people understood what they were doing. There is no indication of a kerygmatic interpretation of Jesus' death in Q, nor is there evidence that the tradents understood either Jesus or themselves to be speaking oracles. Kloppenborg's negative conclusions with regard to these questions is forthright and compelling. They should mark the end of all such attempts to mystify the authority of Jesus's sayings in Q.[13]

The authority of Jesus in Q at all levels is related to the authority of his words. The importance of Jesus' words in Q is related to the significance of the instruction they offer. The instruction they offer is directly related to behavior, practice, and social relations that were important for the social experiments in process. Since the social experiment was a movement that started in the presence of Jesus, the attribution of instructional sayings to Jesus should not be thought mysterious. Kloppenborg has adequately documented a number of ways in which "schools" of thought, "disciples" of a teacher, or the attribution of maxims and chreiai to a pivotal sage or founder figure regularly produced just such collections of sayings. Kloppenborg's demonstration should mark the end of bewilderment about attribution.[14]

One should imagine a rather long process of the cultivation of the sayings of Jesus. Using only the shift in discourse from Q1 to Q2 as an index, one can see that both the content and the audience of Jesus' instructions changed in keeping with the social experience of the Q tradents. Authorship is therefore essentially ambiguous, for the instruction is clearly addressed to audiences later than the time of Jesus, even though the sayings are attributed to him. This was not at all an unusual occurrence in the Hellenistic period. It means that the Q tradents borrowed Jesus' authority via fictive authorship in the interest of addressing their own contemporary circumstances. Of course they did this in the context of a living tradition of rehearsal and reimagination. Reimagination would have taken place by increments that linked up with the state of "memory" at any given juncture. If the shift between Q1 and Q2 is seen as only one rather obviously identifiable moment in an otherwise prolonged process, it would be possible to imagine many lesser dramatic shifts in the content of Jesus' instruction along the way. There is no reason to think that any novel instruction was not felt to be appropriately attributed to Jesus, given the accumulated teachings and characterization of Jesus familiar at the time.

It is, however, also the case that the authority of Jesus was enhanced by recharacterization appropriate to the recasting of his instructions. These recharacterizations reveal the sense of seriousness Q tradents invested in their movement. The rather unusual attribution of singular, and then divine, authority to Jesus does set this collection of sayings apart from the general run of school traditions with which Kloppenborg compared it. One

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[11] See M. Eugene Boring, *Sayings of the Risen Jesus*, SNTSMS 46. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1982).

[12] See Werner H. Kelber, *The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983).

[13] Kloppenborg, *Formation*, 322.

[14] Ibid., 263–328.

reason for this unusual attribution of authority is surely related to the use of the sayings as a standard for recognition. "Keeping" Jesus' words may have been the only standard these people had for recognizing a true follower of the Jesus movement. Thus Q1 tradents found the language of loyalty to Jesus a convenient way to express committment to the "keeping" of his words as a mark of belonging to the movement. In Q1, at any rate, it is this language that is used to express Jesus' authority as the founder of the movement. One should note that this is the only express enhancement of Jesus' authority in Q1, and that it is directly related to hearing and keeping his words. It was achieved imaginatively merely by having Jesus refer to himself as the speaker of his own words in the office of a teacher who called disciples. The references are:

> Why do you call me "master, master" and not do what I tell you? (S14)
> Everyone who comes to me and hears my words and does them, I will show you what he is like . . . (S14)
> Follow me. (In the context of three discipleship sayings: S21)
> I send you out as lambs in the midst of wolves. (S22)
> If anyone comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple. Whoever does not bear his own cross and come after me, cannot be my disciple. (S56)

It might be important to emphasize that these are the only sayings in which Jesus refers to himself in Q1, and that each addresses the theme of discipleship.

In Q2, on the other hand, the authority of Jesus is remarkably advanced. Jesus not only knows that his sayings will be the standard by which the Son of man judges (S38), he refers as well to the rejection of his own "mighty deeds" as cause for judgment (S23, 29), he knows what the wisdom of God thinks of him (S20, 34), accepts John's question about Jesus being "the coming one" (S16, cf. S46), speaks of the Son of man in enigmatic self-reference (S20, 32 and elsewhere), and accepts the designation Son of God (S6, 25). In two instances Jesus even refers clearly to his own eschatological role (S52, 68).

It must be clear that this mythic enhancement of the figure of Jesus is the result of relating his role to the epic-apocalyptic view of history. It should also be clear that the epic-apocalyptic view of history was worked out in order to support the message and threat of judgment characteristic for Q2. That the message of judgment required such an elaborate frame of epic-apocalyptic history in order to make good on its threat indicates a problem of some magnitude in the social history of the Q people. Since the woes and the sayings of judgment are directed toward those who have rejected the Jesus movement, the nature of that problem is given. A program thought to be constructive was experienced as ineffective. In response to those whose rejection hindered the progress of the program, the mode of "instruction" switched to the mode of defense, reproach, and threat of judgment.

It is extremely important to notice that, with the shift in the tenor of the message, there is also a change in the audience addressed. In Q1 the instruction is addressed to those who are or would be followers of Jesus. The programmatic aphorisms are for those who already share the critical attitude toward society characteristic of the Jesus movement. The imperatives partially express an exhortative "You can do it," and partially a move toward codification of rules for the new movement. The self-designations that occur are all rather informal tags with both descriptive and metaphorical nuance: "the poor" (S8), "sons of the Most High" (S9), "followers" (S21, 56), "son of peace" (S22), and "brothers" (S12, 63). References to others who may be encountered in the world at large are vague: "those who reproach, revile, or accuse" (S8, 9, 48), "enemies" (S9), the "blind" (S11), "hypocrite" (S12)

a nonreceptive "town" (S22), the "nations" (S41), and "brothers" (S12, 63). This lack of need for greater precision in identification, together with the overwhelming sense of leisurely, elaborated instruction in behavior, point to a new movement in the process of thinking through what it should be about.

In Q2 quite another social circumstance is reflected. The mode of address is still direct speech, but the content of the speech betrays the authenticity of the speech situation. At most, one might imagine a former phase in which a bit of charge and countercharge took place with certain kinds of detractors whose rejection of the Q people was felt to be particularly embarrassing. In their present state, however, the woes and judgment sayings are highly elaborate formulations that reflect upon the reasons for a rejection that has already taken place. It is not easy to imagine those addressed bothering to listen any longer. To put sayings such as these in the mouth of Jesus means that a turn was taken toward a myth of origin. One finds corroboration for this change in the function of the sayings collection in the introduction of narrative material that also occurs in Q2. This material contains not only elaborated chreiai in which Jesus is imagined cleverly to have won the argument for the Q side (such as the Beelzebul pericope, S29), but the very important accommodation of the John tradition (S3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 20). Q2 can only have functioned for the Q people as a kind of overhearing of Jesus' pronouncements upon some particular people or groups who had not joined the Jesus movement. The effect would have been a rationalization for the failure of the Jesus movement, and a vindication of the rightness of its cause despite the failure.

The change in audience is important for another reason as well. With the shift from Q1 to Q2 a narrowing of focus upon Q's social world is in evidence. This is directly inverse to the broadening of epic-apocalyptic horizons at the level of mythic rationale. In Q1 all of society is in view; in Q2 certain specific groups have caught the attention of the Q people. These groups, moreover, are important to the Q people in relation to the question of the legitimacy of their own program. This program now appears also to have experienced a specific socialization. If we were able to be more precise about the groups assumed by Q2, as well as about the difference between the Q1 people and the Q2 group, the social history for the Q tradents would begin to come into view.

II. A Reconstruction of Social Behavior and Formation

The predominant mode of exhortation in Q1 is to individuals and, judging from the aphorisms and programmatic sayings reviewed above, the behavior recommended is strikingly similar to popular Cynic ethic. The question is how this material can be used to imagine the beginnings of a Jesus movement. Did the followers of Jesus consist primarily of people who actually lived in keeping with such an ethic? And if so, how did they understand the significance of what they were about?

Since Theissen it has been customary to talk about the Q people as itinerant preachers, that is early Christian prophets.[15] There has been less clarity about the content of their message, and especially about the relation of the sayings of instruction to that message.

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[15] See Gerd Theissen, "Wanderradikalismus: Literatur soziologische Aspekte der Überlieferung von Worten Jesu im Urchristentum," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 70 (1973) 245–71; *Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity*, eng. trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978).

It appears to be assumed by many scholars that the itinerant preachers proclaimed the "eschatological" appearance of the "kingdom of God," and that to accept their message meant taking up a radical life-style similar to that of the itinerants. So understood, the Q movement was focused on replicating itinerant preachers, and the sayings in Q served both as a summary of their preaching as well as an outline of their ethic of behavior. Whether the proclaimers themselves and those they addressed were poor, marginalized folk who found the message of the kingdom particularly appropriate to their circumstance, or whether the call was to voluntary poverty and itinerancy as a way of life in protest against societal ills and in affirmation of kingdom ideals has been a matter of debate. Either way, however, the society under critique and judgment to which the message of the kingdom was addressed has normally been understood as "Palestinian Judaism." This has made it possible to interpret the "eschatological message" as a call either to repentance and reformation, or as a call to some degree of revolutionary activity.

Serious problems with this reconstruction arise as soon as it is seen that Q reflects a complex and changing social history. The reconstruction is possible only if all of Q is read at the same literary level and projected back upon the earliest phase of the Jesus movement. The instructions in Q1 must be combined with the apocalyptic "message" of Q2, for instance, and the itinerancy motifs of Q1 must be taken as the norm for all Q tradents, even those who produced the fictive preachments in Q2. Given the marked differences between Q1 and Q2, as well as the signs of compositional history that each layer contains, Theissen's proposal cannot be right and a revision of Q's social history is therefore required.

A. The Social World of Q1

The view that the Q tradents were itinerant preachers is based primarily on (1) the "mission speech" in Q1 (S22) supported by a few sayings that associate the activity of announcing the kingdom of God with discipleship (S21), (2) the overall impression in Q1 that public performance is in view, and (3) the overall impression in Q2 of a "mission" in its time of "harvest."

If the material in Q2 must be set aside, so must the notion of preaching missions to an intransigent world. Q1 does not offer instruction in the preaching of repentance and/or preparation for an apocalyptic judgment. The language of the kingdom in Q1 functions to name the significance of the life-style called for by the instructions. To live according to these instructions was understood as a manifestation of the kingdom, and specific moments of behavior could be announced as kingdom activity. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to understand all of the instruction in Q1 as evidence for a radical itinerancy, as if public performance and announcement filled the horizon of activity and concern. It would also be wrong to assume that all instructions for the road were motivated by a missionary purpose, as if making converts was the primary goal of all public kingdom activity.

Most of the instructions that assume public encounter can be described as survival tactics. They are not much different than one might expect for a movement whose public stance and style was similar to a Cynic sense of presence in the midst of a foolishly structured society. Cynics, it should be emphasized, did not engage society with the expectation of changing it, nor did they aim to convert everyone they met. They anticipated reproach and schooled themselves in accepting it, thus making their "announcement" of the alternative order to which they belonged. But they also sought ways to escape the embarrassment of being caught in a position of being beholden or subservient to any personal or institutional superior. To escape entrapment by means of a strategy that could

simultaneously make a positive statement for the alternative order was a highly prized skill. Consider the following from this point of view:

Rejoice when reviled. (S8)
Bless those who curse you. (S9)
Turn the other cheek; do not withold your cloak; go the second mile. (S9)
Judge not, that you not be judged. (S10)
How to tell the good from the bad. (S13)
You must say no to family expectations. (S21, 56)
Watch out for the wolves; carry no purse; salute no one on the road. (S22)
Agree with your accuser quickly. (S48)

It now needs to be emphasized that this kind of instruction might apply to persons engaged in a variety of life circumstances that may have been experienced in the Jesus movement. One need not assume that the only valid kingdom was a radical homelessness and itinerancy. Most of the sayings cited above would work quite well as instructions for circumstances in which Jesus people in several social roles regularly or occasionally found themselves. This becomes even clearer when one adds to the above list a second set of instuctions that continues to exhibit a slightly daring attitude toward social conventions, but could easily be applied to life situations of persons that were not itinerant:

Blessed the poor, hungry, and those that mourn. (S8)
Love your enemies. (S9)
Be merciful. (S10)
The measure you give will be the measure you get. (S10)
The speck and the log. (S12)
Give us each day our daily bread. (S27)
Lead us not into temptation. (S27)
Ask, and it will be given you. (S28)
Do not be anxious about your life. (S41)
Sell your possessions and give alms. (S42)
No one can serve two masters. (S60)

A consideration even more serious for the itinerancy thesis with its assumption of individual prophets is that there are a number of instructions that could easily apply to inner-movement relationships. Some of these are much more concerned with relations among the Jesus people than with an individual's encounter with the world at large. Consider the following from this point of view:

Forgive, and you will be forgiven. (S10)
Give, and it will be given to you. (S10)
Why do you see the speck that is in your brother's eye? (S12)
Forgive us our sins as we forgive our debtors. (S27)
If you then know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask him. (S28)
Everyone who exalts himself will be humbled. (S54)
If salt has lost its taste . . . (S57)

And notice the Q2 saying as well:

If your brother repents, forgive him. (S63)

The most telling evidence for a complex social configuration, however, is that Q1 contains instructions relative to the same themes from two different perspectives. Some of these themes were traditional with the Cynics, such as those that revolve around the question of begging. That Q1 includes advice on asking as well as on giving to those who beg (S9) means that persons other than impoverished itinerants are clearly in the picture.

The "mission speech" (S22) is particularly interesting from this point of view. Though written as if addressed to itinerants, its concern is with the behavior of a "laborer" upon "reception" in the house of a "son of peace" in another city. If it were not for the fiction of Jesus saying "Behold, I send you out as lambs in the midst of wolves," the main body of instruction could easily be read as written from the perspective of house groups interested in a network of cordial relations with other house groups. The injunction to "Pray the Lord of the harvest to send out laborers" is curious in the context of an imagined commissioning of the laborers by Jesus, but it would not be strange as an imagined address to house groups in the Jesus movement. Thus there are two "commissions" interwoven in the mission speech, one addressed to the group which should pray for laborers to be sent out, the other addressed to those who are being sent out. Both injunctions are put in the mouth of Jesus, but the social reality must have been that the group itself did the "sending out."

The "mission speech" pivots on a single issue. It is the question of appropriate behavior in the event of being "received" or "not received" when entering a house or a town. Reception is signified by an exchange of the sign of peace. Behavior is spelled out in terms of conventional rules of hospitality: Eat what they provide; don't offend the host by accepting another's hospitality; care for the sick while there and announce the kingdom to them. Note that the instructions for the road are extremely cautious: that is *not* the place to be announcing the kingdom with initiative. And "at the house," it is only where the welcome has not been worn out that one should stay.

A confusion is introduced when the focus of attention changes from house to town. The issue remains the same, how to acknowledge reception or rejection. But at the house, reception is acknowledged by accepting hospitality and rejection is acknowledged only by noting the "return" of one's greeting of peace. There is no castigation. At the town, however, reception is still acknowledged by accepting the hospitality (surely still of some *house,* for the sign of acceptance is that one should eat what is offered), whereas rejection is acknowledged by wiping off the dust from one's feet. (It does not say that one is then to go on to the next town. That notion is first documented in Mark.) It thus appears that, at some point in the experience of the Jesus people, towns came to be classified in terms of their receptivity to the movement, but that the receptivity of a town was judged on the basis of whether it contained a house of hospitality or not. This means that the "missionary" activity reflected in these instructions could well have been undertaken in the normal course of travel within expanding networks of friends, acquaintances, and trading partners as the Jesus movement spread. The heightened concern about meals is certainly suspicious, given the evidence for the importance of meals for social formation in other early Jesus movements. The combination of Cynic-like instructions "for the road" with conventional hospitality etiquette "at the house" is also suggestive of a complex social formation in process. Apparently radical itinerancy was not the only way, or not the way at all, in which the reign of God was talked about, practiced and announced by the tradents of Q1.

B. The Social World of Q2

There is very little instructional material in Q2 directly addressed to its tradents, and none that continues the Cynic themes of itinerancy and "mission." There is also little direct reflection of the social formation of the tradents. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Jesus people had become quite aware of themselves as a movement bounded by a society that did not accept them as expected.

It is now the case, for instance, that certain cities could be named as particularly intransigent (S23, cf. S22, v 12) and that contemporary society could be described as "this evil generation" (S20, 32, cf. S3). In context, reference to the evil generation appears to have mainly Jews in mind. This is very different from the picture of society reflected in Q1. There is, in Q2, a preoccupation with the notion of Israel in general, and especially with its failures (mentioned above in section I), and a specifically pointed polemic against the Pharisees in particular (S34, 35, v 1). This material names those who had not responded positively to the Jesus movement, and it suggests that certain expectations had not been fulfilled. A social boundary had been erected between those who belonged to the Jesus movement, who now conceived of the kingdom as a domain to be "entered," and detractors who were now considered to be outsiders and rightfully "excluded" from the kingdom. This social juncture is clearly reflected in the language of "division" in John's preaching (S3, 4), the Beelzebul pericope (S29), the sayings about Jesus' coming to bring division (S46), and the apocalyptic parables (S44, 45, 50, 51, 55, 66, and 67). It would be most helpful therefore to understand more about the circumstances that occasioned this view of the world.

The clue of major significance is the saying about the synagogue and its rulers in S39, supported by the mention of being "excluded" in the fourth beatitude (S8, v 22), as well as by the issues underlying the woes against the Pharisees and lawyers in S34. Pharisees and synagogues do not automatically go together, it is true, but in this case seem to describe aspects of a common Jewish response to the Jesus people that was experienced as critical. Though not "in charge" of "the" synagogue (a diaspora institution based on local leadership), Pharisees may already have made their influence felt in northern Palestine before the Jewish war as representatives of a Judaic piety and code of tradition that many Jews were in the process of acknowledging as definitional. The issues at stake in the Q2 woes against the Pharisees and lawyers include the questions of washings, alms, tithing, the burial and honor of the dead, status in the synagogue, and the power to interpret conventional codes. The important question is why the Jesus people would have become particularly concerned about issues such as these.

There is no evidence for conflict with Pharisaic ethics and synagogal rulers from the early phases of the Q movement, and it is not easy to imagine why those free spirits, acting out a novel notion of the reign of God with all of Galilean society in view, would have taken on the Pharisees as prime targets, nor why the Pharisees would have been particularly threatened by them. If the Jesus movement had formed house groups, however, and members of these house groups were or had been closely associated with the synagogue, a situation of conflict could well have become critical. How such a social formation with laison to the synagogue came about is difficult to imagine if one defines the Jesus movement solely in terms of homeless, wandering followers of Jesus' call to radical discipleship. But perhaps there were other ways of hearing the call to live against the social conventions.

Some Jesus people at least thought so. The elaboration of Cynic-like imperatives into ethical parenesis defines the purpose of several blocks of material in Q1. This is true of S9 (On Retaliation), S10 (On Judging), S11 (Blind Guides), S12 (On Hypocrisy), S13

(Good and Evil Men), S14 (Parable of the Builders), S27, 28 (On Prayer), S40 (Foolish Possessions), S41 (On Anxiety), and S42 (Heavenly Treasure). These elaborations are clearly the product of careful thought about the application of crisp calls to be different. They also reveal literary activity and skill, and thus reflect a developing ethos that suggests group formation and concerns. As such they support the thesis that house groups had formed. A certain air of ethical piety would not be out of place if one imagined some of these groups on the fringes of a synagogue.

Much of the material in Q2 could then be explained as the result of a tensive relationship between Jesus people and Jews in the context of the synagogue. The appeal to the scriptures and the working out of an epic-apocalyptic frame of history would make sense in just such a context. The issues with the Pharisees and lawyers were precisely about attitudes and codes that the Jesus people would have found very difficult to accept. And the authority of Jesus would no doubt have become a major issue in any attempt to sustain relations.

To emphasize the authority of Jesus as the founder of the Jesus movement is in fact a matter of great concern in Q2. How one stood in relation to Jesus' authority is emphasized above all other considerations of difference with those who refused to accept the Jesus movement and what it represented. It was no longer just a matter of response to his words, or to the kingdom ideal, but to Jesus himself that determined entrance into the kingdom:

> Blessed is he who takes no offense at me. (S16)
> Wisdom is justified by all her children. (S20)
> He who rejects me, rejects him who sent me. (S24)
> All things have been delivered to me by my father. (S25)
> If it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you. (S29)
> Something greater than Solomon is here. (S32)
> Something greater than Jonah is here. (S32)
> Everyone who acknowledges me before men, the Son of man also will acknowledge before the angels of God; But he who denies me before men will be denied before the angels of God. (S37)
> Do you think that I have come to give peace on earth? No, I tell you, but rather division. (S46)

This heightened attribution of authority to Jesus functioned mainly to support the threat of judgment upon those who rejected the Jesus movement. But it also allowed for the thought that those who belonged to the Jesus movement were privileged with a knowledge others did not have. There are some indications that such a notion of special election and endowment was being explored:

> He who is least in the kingdom of God is greater than [John]. (S17)
> No one knows who the Son is except the Father; or who the Father is except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him. (S25)
> Blessed are the eyes which see what you see. (S26)
> When your eye is sound, your whole body is also full of light. (S33)
> As the Father appointed a kingdom for me, so do I appoint for you. (S68)

Thus the rhetoric of Q2 is best understood as the result of a social formation in the process of defining its borders over against a Jewish competition. Such a situation of competition should not be projected upon the time of Jesus and the earliest phases of the Jesus movement. It would have developed gradually in the course of small group formations in houses that "received" the teachings of "Jesus" and then developed a discourse along its lines. While working out the style and ethics of an attractive alternative to living with discretion in the midst of a very big social world, a social world where Roman, Hellenistic, Syrian, and Jewish interests intersected in a largely arbitrary, superficial, and unfriendly hegemony, novel combinations of the kingdom vision could easily have been struck with age-old Jewish ethical ideals. Some Jesus people, at any rate, must have found it possible to talk about the kingdom in ways that did not violate their Jewish (or northern Israelite) sense of heritage. But meeting together as Jesus people, and talking about the kingdom on synagogue occasions would have created vigorous dispute.

The pain of social formation is also obvious. As loyalties developed within the Jesus groups in the context of working out relations with family, friends, and neighbors who did not wish to cut ties with the synagogue, the rhetorics of committment, division, and judgment evolved. Since Kloppenborg rightly emphasized the "announcement of judgment" in Q2, I have discussed this layer mainly in terms of the prophetic announcement of apocalyptic judgment addressed to those outside the community who had refused the kingdom message. It needs now to be noticed that Q2 also contains instructions to the community that reflect upon this situation.

Once the apocalyptic imagination had been entertained in order to buttress the threat of judgment upon frustrating synagogue authorities, Q2 people were caught in their own apocalyptic juices. The threat of judgment in the future came back upon their own situation of self-definition and had to be addressed. Judgment was judgment. If the standard was to be the words of Jesus, how could Jesus people be exempted? One can easily read the embellishment of the "blessings" in S8 from this point of view, as one can the collection of "miscellaneous sayings" in S58–64. Once it is seen that Q2 contains material that addresses the community in the light of the announcements of judgment that are directed to detractors, an interesting thesis is possible for the block of material in S35–39. This block actually forms a unit of instruction for Jesus people who are called upon to give an account of their loyalty to the Jesus movement before the leaders of the synagogue. The major issue is clear. To deny Jesus will have disastrous consequences at the eschaton. The problem is compounded, however, in this present situation of "trial." It is that the very topic of apocalyptic judgment may come up. What can one say about one's "announcement of apocalyptic judgment" upon these leaders who presently sit in the seat of judgment themselves?

The resilience of the Jesus people must have lain in the strength of their social formation. It is impossible to imagine Q as the product of two or more generations of prophetic activity on the part of individual proclaimers with fire in their eyes. The passionate energy that emanates from the sayings in Q is much better understood as a manifestation of a social spirit charged with the warmth of inner-group tensions in the process of working out an ethic to assure continued practice. But of course, no matter how attractive the novel social experiment was, competition with the Pharisees had to prove fatal. Pharisees had status, institutions, traditions, rationalized ethic, and skill in argumentation on their side. So when it came to the countdown, it was the Jesus people who were left to make their way in the world with only the holy spirit, their founder and his authority, and a few appeals to Israel's epic to sustain them. Their response was to craft a large epic-apocalyptic frame for their history and count their detractors out.

C. The Social Role of the Q Tradents

The remarkable differences between Q1 and Q2 have been used to isolate two moments in the literary and social history of a single movement, and to mark the shifts in discourse and social formation that are thereby disclosed. The problem of imagining that shift at the level of social experience has been touched upon, and a hypothetical reconstruction of the social history offered that moves more gradually from one situation to another. What has not been adequately addressed in this reconstruction is the question of continuity in discourse. How, indeed, was the move made from an essentially aphoristic social critique to a highly mythological language of origination in the interest of social placement? A certain retention of aphoristic style is certainly noticeable in the enigmatic rejoinder characteristic for the later material. And the earlier penchant for sayings of reciprocal inversion was not entirely given up in Q2, though the formula of exchange was reapplied with the introduction of a different audience and a larger frame of historical reference. And yet, the change in rhetoric and world view is so great, one wonders how and why anything at all from the earlier phases is still contained in the final product.

A return to the text is called for now, with the added perspective of social concerns. The transmission of the sayings in Q was not achieved by wandering preachers in need either of a handbook of instructions or of a synopsis of themes for proclamation. It was the product of community scribes skilled in social rationalization. Q bears the marks of thinking, working out problems of application, research, elaboration, and novel imagination. Fictional audiences are the rule both for Q1 and Q2, and mythic imagination was involved in the many moments when Jesus as the founder figure was recast as originator of first this, then that mode of social discourse. It is the process of reshaping traditional material in the course of working out applications appropriate to new social circumstances that must now be investigated. Something of this rethinking process is still traceable in the compositional history of Q.

One such development has already been mentioned. It is the way in which the blocks of material in Q1 elaborate earlier, essentially aphoristic material in the direction of programmatic community ethic. S8 moves from "Blessed the poor" to a triparte characterization of the Jesus people, and finally to a blessing on those who suffer exclusion from some other group. S9 contains the Cynic-like injunction to "bless those who curse," but develops an elaborate explication of what it means to "love your enemies," replete with an announcement of social reward. S10 theologizes and ethicizes the notion of "Judge not, lest you be judged." S11 appears to take the Cynic-like observation about the blind leading the blind as an opportunity for introducing a thoughtful warning about how a disciple should regard his teacher. S12 hovers on the social border between a charge against hypocrites with logs in their eyes to a demand that a brother take his out before criticizing. S13 turns the observation about trees and their fruit into a moralism about matching what you say with what you really think. S14 illustrates the import of a sharp reposte ("Why call me master and not do what I tell you?") with a parable about building a house that can last! If the core of the prayer in S27 is the request for daily bread, it has been embedded in a thoroughly theologized social piety. In S28 the beggar's delight ("Ask, and it will be given you") has been transformed into a comforting community maxim. In S40 a Cynic-like put-down ("Man, who made me a judge or divider over you?") leads to a moralistic parable about the horrible fate of a rich man who could not "divide" his goods. And S41 presents a marvelous elaboration of the saying about not being anxious in order to enjoin the seeking of the kingdom. In brief, Q1 reveals a thoughtful process of accommodating earlier tradition in the interest of working out an appropriate ethic for a group in the process of social formation. In the course of this accommodation, an earlier Cynic-

like thrust to the discourse was transformed into maxim-like morals. If this essay allowed us more leisure, it would be possible to analyze the patterns of elaboration used to compose these units. They are extremely clever employments of rhetorical logic that aim at the retention of earlier material even while transforming their significance through novel applications. Thoughtful scribal activity cannot be denied.

It is now possible to suggest that the compositional history from Q1 material to Q2 can be traced in a similar way. A few of the units assigned to Q1 actually contain material better assigned to the Q2 stage. This is certainly true of the beatitudes (S8), verse 12 of the mission speech (S22), and perhaps all of S48 and S56. This means that material indicative of Q1 thinking continued to be reshaped internally in the process of transmission. There are, on the other hand, units of material in Q2 that work with the Cynic style of aphoristic response reminiscent of sayings characteristic for Q1, but which have the form of chreiai that elaborate the response in the interest of themes more appropriate to the later stage of rationalizing social separation. This would be true for the unit on John and Jesus (S16–20), the Beelzebul Accusation (S29–30), and the saying on True Blessedness (S31).

In some cases, it appears that aphoristic material appropriate for Q1 level discourse has been upgraded in terms of Q2 concerns, in much the same way as Q1 units elaborated earlier aphorisms. Examples would be the following: In S33 the aphoristic saying about the lamp under a bushel has been elaborated into a (dense and infelicitous) warning about true enlightenment. S35 starts with a proverb about the impossibility of keeping secrets and applies it to the frightening circumstance of having confessions made in private proclaimed in public. S36 applies the happy saying about not being afraid ("You are of more value than many sparrows") to the dismal distinction about whom to fear and not to fear among those who can kill you.

Other units in Q2 offer additional and different elaborations of themes already embedded in Q1 material. This is obvious in the case of S39 where the saying about not being anxious (Q1, S41) is applied to the circumstance of deposition before the synagogue rulers. It might also be true for the application of the metaphor about the tree and its fruits (Q1, S13) to the preaching of John (Q2, S3). Thus the lines of distinction between Q1 and Q2 are ragged, indicative of a continuous process in which selection, reshaping, and additional composition was the rule. The Q1 layer is nevertheless still identifiable, due mainly to the happy circumstance that a number of elaboration units, similarly formed during an imporant phase of social formation in the movement's history, were found worthy of retention by later scribes.

Supposing that the later scribes treated their traditional material (Q1) in the same way as the Q1 scribes had elaborated their traditional material (Cynic-like sayings), the question is whether the process from Q1 to Q2 can be further clarified. It is already clear that the process was partly one of a rather radical resignification of Q1 material. But it was not solely such a process, for many of the blocks were left in place as still valid for the instruction of the community. So the question about the reworking of earlier material needs to be approached some other way. Both compositional and conceptual relations between the two distinctly different types of discourse need to be considered.

Three observations can be made about this process. The first is that Q2 material firmly brackets Q1 material with a fairly obvious design. The second is that there is evidence for the use of wisdom mythology to form a conceptual bridge from the earlier teachings of Jesus addressed to the community to the later pronouncements of judgment upon the evil generation. The third is that the material about John and Jesus functions as a myth of origin to explain how both kinds of "teachings" can be attributed to the same founder figure. Each deserves a brief clarification.

Q1 material is clustered largely in four major blocks, distributed with some purpose throughout the first two-thirds of Q, then broken up and interspersed with prophetic and apocalyptic material in the last third of Q. If one imagines Q1 as a document, it could have begun with an incipit ("The Words of Jesus," S1 in the place of the present S7) and the Inaugural Sermon (S8–14), and ended with the saying about "ears to hear" in S57. This material was taken up in the Q2 edition as instruction that was still valid for the community in spite of the fact that the community found itself surrounded by a world under threat of apocalyptic judgment. Thus the bracketing of community instructions by apocalyptic material reflects the community's social circumstance. The Q2 material begins with the apocalyptic preaching of John (S3–4), and (if Kloppenborg is right about Luke 22:29–30 belonging to Q) ends with the promise of sitting on thrones in the eschatological kingdom judging the twelve tribes of Israel (S68). The overall design can be shown by means of a roughly summary outline. Note that I have distinquished Q2 material in terms of address to outsiders (main alignment) and address to the community (slight indentation). Though I am uncomfortable with Kloppenborg's headings, especially with the language of "mission," I have retained them in the interest of easy reference:

Q2 *Q1*

The Preaching of John (S3–4)

Jesus' Inaugural Sermon (S7–14)

Jesus' Answer to John's Inquiry (S16–20)

On Being a Disciple of Jesus (S21, 22)

Woes on Those who Reject the Mission (S22, v 12, S23)
  The Authority of the Missionaries (S24)
  Blessings on Those who Accept the Mission (S25, 26)

Confidence in the Father's Care (S27, 28)

Controversies with this Generation (S29, 30)
  Blessing on Those who Hear the Word of God (S31)
Judgment on this Generation (S32)
  True Enlightenment (S33)
Woes against the Pharisees (S34)

  Warning: All Secrets will be Revealed (S35)
  Assurance and Warning: Don't Fear/Whom to Fear (S36)
  Warning: Only Those who Confess Jesus will be Saved (S37, 38)
  Assurance: The Holy Spirit will Assist (S39)

The Community's Ethic (S40–42)

Sayings on the Coming Judgment (S44–48)

Parables on the Growth of the Kingdom (S49)

Sayings on the Two Ways (S50–57)
  (Interspersed with Discipleship Sayings, some of
  which could be from Q1, e.g. S54, S56, S57)

Miscellaneous Instructions to the Community (S58–64)
(Few of which appear to be from Q1)

The Eschatological Discourse (S65–68)

This outline shows that the Q1 material was carefully integrated into the new set of instructions. The several shifts from Q1 to Q2 material set a pattern that is followed even in the arrangement of Q2 material (indicated by the slight indentation in column 1 of items that serve as supportive instruction to the community in the context of the apocalyptic message of judgment). The shifts can be described in terms of a change of audience addressed (insiders/outsiders), a change of tone (blessing/woe), a change of message (helpful instruction/warning), as well as a change of content (ethics for now/eschatological judgment then). This means that the retention of Q1 material was not accidental, or the product of concern to save and transmit precious memory traditions. Q1 material was critical for the bifocal discourse required by the circumstance in which the Jesus people found themselves as a community in formation.

The emergence of a bifocal discourse did create a serious conceptual problem. It was the problem modern scholars refer to as the difference between wisdom and apocalyptic views of the world. There is some indication that the scribes involved in the construction of Q2 were aware of this problem and troubled by it. They solved the problem by recasting the characterization of Jesus as an envoy of mythological wisdom, on the one hand, and by recasting the mythological function of wisdom to include the sending of apocalyptic prophets, on the other. In this process, it does not appear that the reimagination of Jesus as an envoy of wisdom was particularly difficult. It was the revision of the wisdom myth and the problem of combining wisdom instruction with apocalyptic discourse that required ingenuity. If this is so, it means that these scribes were fully aware of the "sapiential" nature of Q1, and that Jesus had been regarded by them first and foremost as a teacher of wisdom.

The myth of wisdom is assumed, not projected, and the identification of Jesus as wisdom's envoy is not made a matter of explicit instruction. The new mythology comes to expression in a very few brief strokes. In S20 the conclusion to the unit on John and Jesus is that "wisdom is justified by all her children." The point is that both John, who in the course of the unit is characterized both as an ascetic (Cynic?) and as a prophetic messenger, and Jesus, who in the course of the unit is characterized both as a libertine (Cynic?) and as "the one to come," should be understood as wisdom's children. This unit of material (S16–20) is cleverly constructed and very important for the Q2 program. We must return to the question of John and Jesus in a moment. For now, note that the unit addresses the problem of how to imagine the accommodation of two sets of discourse (sapiential and prophetic), each with its own problematic differentiations. Under the category of the sapiential there is both a Cynic type of wisdom as well as conceptual knowledge about the good news of the kingdom. Under the category of the prophetic there is both a Cynic type of behavior and a fully rationalized eschatological message. The category of accommodation for all four is "wisdom" and the conceptual solution is achieved by allusion to the myth of "wisdom's children."

The same concern to associate wisdom with the preaching of repentance underlies the question about whether a "sign" will be given to "this generation" in S32. At first it appears that no sign will be given. This may be an earlier chreia that was elaborated by appending two exceptions. One is the sign of Jonah (preaching of repentance); the other is the wisdom of Solomon. In both cases the point is that "something greater" is now present for this generation. The greater thing is, of course, Jesus, whose instructions combine both wisdom teachings and pronouncements of apocalyptic judgment.

In S34 Jesus cites the "wisdom of God" who said, "I will send them prophets and apostles, some of whom they will kill and persecute." This is an important text, for it combines two previously independent themes from Jewish literature of the time, that of wisdom's envoys, and that of the killing of the prophets. Since the theme of the killing of the prophets was a homiletical topos on Israel's rejection of the prophets' message, S34 elaborates on the seriousness of rejecting the message of Jesus (and John?) as "wisdom's children."

In addition to these sayings where wisdom is expressly mentioned, there are also several sayings units that draw upon the idiom of wisdom mythology without making the reference explicit. In S52 there is the lament over Jerusalem from the perspective of epic history. This can be understood as a use of the wisdom myth to support the contention of judgment basic to the preaching discourse. In S25, S33, and S35, on the other hand, the motif of wisdom hidden and revealed is used to assure the followers of Jesus that their knowledge of the meaning of "all these things" sets them apart from those whose house is left desolate. Note that this use of the wisdom myth has the tendency to valorize inner-community knowledge of its identity in esoteric terms.

We can now return to the most interesting feature of all. It is the way in which the figure of John the Baptist is used to set the stage for the combination of wisdom and apocalyptic in the teachings of Jesus. In S3 the preaching of John introduces the theme of eschatological judgment ("the wrath to come"), picks up on the old metaphor about trees and their fruits (the bad trees will be cut down and burned), and warns that being children of Abraham will not be a sufficient defense. Given what we now know about the history of Q, this introduction is sharply intentional. In S4, then, John announces Jesus as the mightier and more worthy one to come, and explains that Jesus will baptize both with the holy spirit and with fire.

What the baptism with fire means is explained. It refers to the burning of the chaff left over after the wheat has been harvested. What the baptism with the holy spirit means is not as explicit, although the wind that separates the chaff from the wheat clearly works in favor of the wheat. One can follow the theme of the holy spirit through Q2 (another distinguishing feature when compared with Q1), and note its use in relation to the (divisive) "announcement" of the kingdom both by Jesus and by Jesus' followers. Apparently the Q community had found a powerful metaphor to fill the gap created by the eschatological dislocation of the kingdom of God. The metaphor was most probably taken from wisdom mythology. It served to bridge several horrendous absentions created by the new social and conceptual situation: Jesus, the kingdom, Israel, society, and God were all in the process of withdrawing to far-flung horizons. Only the spirit of the community manifest in its speech could now be identified as a sign of linkage with the grand program.

So Jesus will be an even more powerful speaker than John. It is not yet clear what the nature of his speech will be. The suspicion is that he will continue John's call to repentance. But when Jesus is introduced, it is the inaugural sermon that is given. This is Q1 material and it shows that Jesus has a group other than the children of Abraham in view. His instructions to this group take on a certain "eschatological" seriousness, both because of John's preaching, and because of the theme of conflict that courses through them. But it is not yet necessary to project an apocalyptic frame.

The question about Jesus' relation to John and his preaching is left for adjudication in the next major block of material (S16–20), but even there it is not clear that Jesus will be an apocalyptic preacher. The burden of the unit is to show that John was right about Jesus as the coming one, and that Jesus realized who John was. Why this narrative material was thought necessary is an important question. Two rather obvious considerations

immediately come to mind. One is that the very idea of a relation between John and Jesus must have been a novelty. The other is that, once entertained, a second problem immediately surfaced. It was the problem of understanding how John, cast as an apocalyptic prophet, and Jesus, known to be a wisdom teacher, could possibly be involved in the same kingdom program. The unit addresses both of these concerns by "justifying" both John and Jesus, but without clearly answering the question of how Jesus' message will relate to John's.

The unit does introduce the language of the kingdom of God in a very suggestive way. In S17 there is the saying about the "least in the kingdom of God" being greater than John. In S18 the saying is that "The law and the prophets were until John; since then the good news of the kingdom of God is preached, and everyone enters it violently." The reader familiar with the earlier Q1 material on the reign of God may well get a funny feeling at this point. The reign of God is no longer to be thought of as a natural alternative to contemporary society, a way of life available to anyone who dares. Now it is to be thought of as appearing as a possibility only after the history of the law and the prophets came to their end with John, and then only by means of preaching, and then only to be entered with violence.

So John drops from sight while Jesus turns to instruct his followers in the preaching of the kingdom (S21–24). And now it becomes clear that not everyone will accept the message. With that established, the rest of the Q2 program can unfold. Announcing the kingdom must contain both instruction in its ethic and warning about the judgment because of the division between those who accept it and those who reject it. The twists and turns accelerate with sharper and sharper corners to negotiate until finally and with clarity the horrible truth comes home. The message is really about belonging to the Jesus people and accepting Jesus' authority. The ethic of the Jesus people, while it determines how the final judgment will fall concerning entrance or exclusion, is no longer a description of life in the kingdom of God. The ethic of the community defines, instead, a time of testing in anticipation and hope of eschatological inclusion: "Everyone enters it violently; Strive to enter by the narrow door; *There* you will see . . . the kingdom of God" (S18, 50, 51).

Summary

The social history proposed for the tradents of Q has been worked out in correlation with Q's compositional history. The point of departure was Kloppenborg's isolation of three layers of literary composition in Q, distinguished on the basis of thematic, form-critical, and genre-critical criteria. His argument for the sequence from Q1 to Q2 on literary critical grounds was accepted, that namely Q2 material accommodated Q1 material and not the other way around. To Kloppenborg's separation of Q1, Q2, and Q3, I have suggested the possibility of isolating aphoristic material in Q1 that points back to an even earlier stage in the history of discourse. The isolation of this material has not been demonstrated by exegetical probes, but the type of material that appears to be programmatic for these units has been indicated, and the method by which a demonstration might proceed has been suggested: Since the units of material in Q1 are composed according to known rhetorical principles of elaboration, the logic of a unit can be analyzed in order to determine primary themes from supporting arguments. By isolating core material in most Q1 units of composition, therefore, an earliest layer of material can be discerned. Because this material can be typed and compared with similar discourse in other popular movements of the time, a supporting argument for an earlier layer/stage of the Q movement can be given.

The study has focused nonetheless mainly upon the layers identified as Q1 and Q2. Emphasis has been placed upon the tenor, rhetoric, reflection of social world, and worldview at each level of material. Some control has been suggested by reference to social and cultural conditions in Galilee during the first century. Comparing the two layers of tradition, notable differences were identified that call for explanation. Part of the explanation, it has been suggested, must come from an understanding of changes in the social history of the tradents.

In order to move from text to social context, emphasis has been placed on the reflection of the social world available in the texts, as well as attitudes toward that social world that are revealed in the tenor and rhetoric of the texts. A hermeneutics of suspicion has prevailed in keeping with current theory on the function of mythic imagination for social construction and practice. Especially in the case of the social formation of a new religious movement or society, a high rhetorical coefficient is to be expected, as well as highly imaginative projections.

Five stages in the social history of the tradents of Q can be identified, although only two of them (Q1 and Q2) produced resilient sedimentary layers in the tradition. The last stage (Q3) gets lost in the process of Q's assimilation by the people who produced the synoptic gospels, but the direction toward fuller mythic development is nevertheless clear already in Q (the temptation story). The earliest stage (pre Q1) is also barely discernible as a literary residue, but it is quite distinct as a type of discourse. Then, because of the great difference between Q1 and Q2 in both circumstance and rhetoric, a period of activity is needed in order to account for the change. A brief description of each stage can serve as a summary and conclusion to the study.

1. The earliest recoverable stage of the Q movement must be reconstructed from the set of aphorisms and aphoristic imperatives that were selected for reworking by Q1 tradents. There is no guarantee that this selection represents a full profile of the type of discourse characteristic for that stage. It must be taken seriously, however, simply because, at the Q1 stage, this material had to serve as an adequate encapsulation of the living tradition that was in process of resignification. We know that this must be the case from studies of the way in which social and cultural change takes place.

Several inferences of social significance can be drawn from this aphoristic material. Behaviorial performance was in the center of attention, and the arena of significance for this performance was public. The public sphere does not appear to have been subjected to a systemic social analysis, however, as if its ills had been traced to this or that particular cause. The social world of context was under critical observation, to be sure, for the behavior recommended was purposefully non-conventional, mildly disruptive, and implicitly countercultural. But there is no indication that the purpose of this behavior was to challenge the social system in order to change it. The way society was ordered and the ways people acted in society at large were simply accepted, in the sense of "What more can one expect?" Rather, the imperatives recommended behavior that individuals could perform when encountering other individuals within the context of the expectations common to social practice.

Even the moments of individual encounter do not appear to have been thought of as part of a mission to convert those encountered. The focus is primarily subjective, that is upon the action and attitude of the individual who ventures forth to "follow Jesus." There is, however, in some distinction from the similar stance of the popular Cynic, a noticeable ethos of concern that accompanies this set of behavioral recommendations. They reveal a heightened interest in exploring encounter as a moment of human exchange (rather than just display). The aphorisms tend toward inversionary constructions, and assume implicitly what might be called an egalitarian view of social roles and rankings. This means that

the Jesus movement may well have been found attractive as an association of individuals. One should not underestimate the attractiveness of an association of like-minded individuals consciously exploring a life style unbeholden to the social conventions of the time. What the aphoristic imperatives offer is neither a call to convert the world, nor an invitation to romantic religious experience. They recommend a stance toward life in the world that could easily become the basis for an alternative ethos and ethic among those ready to listen and dare. The language of the reign of God captures precisely the ambiguities involved: individual/group; behavior/ethos; practice/conceptual order. Thus, while the aphoristic imperatives picture the individual alone before the challenge of risky living without expectation that the world will change, the parables of the reign of God (S49) assume an association of such people that will spread throughout the world by natural process.

This reconstruction is not only plausible, explicable, and reasonable, it takes its place very nicely as a bridge between what might be imagined for the historical Jesus and what eventually surfaces in Q1 (and elsewhere in the Jesus traditions). Note that there need not be any "authentic" remnants from the "sayings of Jesus" among these aphorisms. It is enough to see that the style of speech and the stance toward the world can easily be imagined as an activity from which the Q movement could have originated. The high incidence of imperatives argues against taking this set of aphorisms as fully representative for discourse at the beginning. The preference for imperatives suggests, instead, that group formation had advanced, and that the first order of business was to agree on what, then, the identifying modes of behavior should be. One can easily imagine a small gathering of neighbors, Jesus people, and guests in, say, a house of hospitality in Gadara, comparing notes on encounters and codes: "What, he said what?" "Yes, he said it, I have it from NN at Sepphoris." Group formation on this model is a much more reasonable reconstruction of origins than the notion of a preaching mission that called for the repentance of Israel in the face of impending judgment. I find no evidence of "wandering charismatic preachers" in the earlier material of Q.

2. The stage of social formation reflected in Q1 has been worked out in some detail. The literary clues from Q1 are the selection of aphoristic imperatives at the core of elaboration units and the transformation of these imperatives into maxims with moral and ethical significance. A shift in arena is also discernible, from the earlier emphasis upon public encounter toward a great deal of interest in inner-group relations. Judging from the "mission speech" in S22, one has to imagine a network of small groups meeting in houses. The notion of "mission" or better, using the terminology of Q1, of "laboring in the harvest" appears to be very closely related to personal traffic among houses of hospitality in such a network. If the social circumstance for the emergence of the notion is given its due, one can imagine that the give and take of social formation with its obvious consequence of producing non-joiners as well as joiners was the experience that triggered a new sense of investment in the reign of God as a movement, and of purpose in its representation among others. Note that the language is not conversionist, but coded as the "reception" or "rejection" of the "laborer." The only "message" the laborer had was the announcement of the availability of the reign of God.

As for itinerancy, there is no indication that the laborers are a special class of wandering prophets. The notion of homelessness is taken from the immediately preceding set of sayings on "discipleship." These sayings are fundamentally and intentionally hyperbolic. If the analogy with the foxes and birds were pressed, even a Cynic would have no trouble finding a "home" for the night. So the import must be that committment to the Jesus movement takes priority over even such basic ties to conventional social arrangements as those constitutive for the family. Such an articulation is fully in keeping with the Cynic

cast to the earlier discourse, but its exaggerated expression reveals an additional awareness. This awareness must be that of very serious issues of human relationship that would have been stretched to the point of breaking in the formation of new Jesus groups. Apparently, these groups had drawn some conclusions about why some refused to join, and what it took to "enter" the Jesus association.

3. A third stage of social history must be reconstructed for the period between Q1 and Q2. Q2 reflects this stage as past, for the language of judgment shows that those who had refused to join the Jesus movement were considered excluded from the kingdom of God. Since those who were now under wrath were the Pharisees and leaders of the synagogue, the social history of stage three is given. As the house groups spread, those who associated with the Jesus movement must have found it particularly difficult to retain relations with friends and relatives who belonged to the local synagogue. Synagogues were an urban diaspora institution, so it is not surprising to find woes upon certain cities in Q2 together with the woes upon the Pharisees and the lawyers. Conflict and competition during this period served to heighten the sense of social identity for the Jesus associations and solidify community codes, even while borders were erected that eventually cut them off from the rest of the world.

4. The stage of social formation reflected in Q2 is not yet that of an apocalyptic enclave, for the language of apocalyptic serves mainly to support the threat of judgment upon detractors. This response to the failure of the movement to remain in conversation with the synagogue was, nonetheless, the occasion for a very sobering shift in elan. Though it was a tryst mainly with the synagogue that invited an apocalyptic imagination and reshaped the discourse of the Jesus movement, the result was that an overarching epic-apocalyptic horizon now dominated its worldview. There are signs of appeal to esoteric knowledge, to the divine authority of Jesus, to the appearance of Jesus as the decisive moment for Israel's history, and to Q as a myth of origin for the embattled community.

5. Q3 reveals an even more advanced stage of mythmaking. Jesus' appearance is now cast as a cosmic battle between the Son of God who knows how to interpret the "word of God" and the forces of evil that appear in Satan's temptation. Q at this level can be compared quite easily with the Gospel of Mark, each presenting a different myth of origin for Jesus movements at the same stage of rationalization. Mark draws upon the kerygmatic traditions of the Hellenistic communities to place the testing of God's Son at the end of the story. Q puts the testing at the beginning and shows no sign of interest in (or knowledge of?) the kerygmatic traditions.

A certain tone to the apocalyptic speeches in Q can now be clarified. They are not scripts appropriate to public proclamation either in Jesus' time or in the time when the scribes of the Q community penned them. Jesus is not portrayed realistically as a preacher, either of the "good news of the kingdom of God" (S18), or of a call to repentance in preparation for the judgment. He is portrayed, instead, only as the one who speaks with authority, and what he says is put forth as pronouncement for the instruction of the Q community. The Q community must learn how to think about Israel, the law and the prophets, the purposes of the wisdom of God, the meaning of John the Baptist and the great transition that took place with the appearance of Jesus. They must pay attention to the instructions he gave to his followers, the woes pronounced upon their detractors, and the very serious consequences of denying Jesus' authority, the one whose kingdom will appear at the eschaton when the final judgments fall. The Q community will learn this by overhearing. They will overhear Jesus addressing them indirectly by means of an historical fiction. Q is not a handbook for rehearsal. It is a myth of origin. It is a myth of origin created because the kingdom did not come.

The Social Setting of the Q Mission: Three Dissertations

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Introduction

The following three dissertations on the Q mission appeared independently of each other in 1987: (1) my own dissertation, "The Social Setting of the Mission Charge in Q," The Claremont Graduate School; (2) Risto Uro, "Sheep among the Wolves: A Study on the Mission Instructions of Q," University of Helsinki; (3) Leif Eric Vaage, "Q: The Ethos and Ethics of an Itinerant Intelligence," The Claremont Graduate School. In this article I will summarize and briefly evaluate these dissertations.

All three dissertations attempt first to reconstruct the text of the mission instructions. Vaage, more so than the other two, prefers to stay with a minimal Q rather than conjecture about texts that are attested only by one or the other of the gospels. All three agree that at least two or possibly three strata can be detected in Q. The focus of all three studies is social description rather than literary and theological analysis. Whereas Uro and I take a look at the social setting of the various strata of Q material and the social dynamics whereby changes have occurred, Vaage's interest lies primarily in the formative stage of Q.

I. The Social Setting of the Mission Charge in Q (Tashjian)

In my dissertation I have chosen the mission charge, or rather the larger complex of Q 9:57–60; 10:2–16, 21–24, because it is particularly useful in doing social description and analysis of Q. As a literary genre it is, unlike the rest of Q, an address which gives instructions to the messengers rather than a message to be proclaimed by them. What sets of circumstances have led to preservation of this discourse and what does it reveal about those who are addressed by it? A literary analysis of the mission charge indicates that after the initial composition further redactional additions were made. These stages of composition and redaction reflect historical and social adaptations among those for whom the Q document was significant.

The mission instructions in Q as they stand now are addressed to a group of missioners who understand themselves as prophets. This is indicated by a number of statements in the mission charge as well as the document as a whole. In the beatitudes at the beginning of the Q sermon, they are pronounced blessed when they are persecuted because they share in the destiny of the prophets of old (Q 6:22–23). John the Baptist, who is quite prominent in Q, is identified by Jesus as a prophet and more than a prophet (7:26). There is some degree of optimism that the message they proclaim will be heeded: "The harvest is plentiful, but the laborers are few; pray therefore the Lord of the harvest to send out laborers into his harvest" (Q 10:2). Many prophets of old desired to see and hear what the messengers of Jesus were seeing and hearing but did not (10:24). Prophets have been repeatedly sent by the Wisdom of God, but their destiny has always been persecution and death up to the very present; but now their blood will be avenged on this generation

(11:47–51). The present time is the decisive, crucial period of judgment, but it is positively connected with the previous history of law and the prophets (16:16).

Although these features of the Q document seem to indicate that the Q messengers identified themselves with Israel's prophetic and Deuteronomistic tradition, there are other considerations which complicate critical efforts to determine the Q messengers' self-understanding and the accompanying question of the intended literary genre of the Q collection. Alongside the prophetic references mentioned above are clear allusions to sapiential language and tradition. For example, after the denunciation of the present generation for its refusal to accept either John the Baptist or the Son of man, the pericope ends with a saying which contains an explicit allusion to wisdom: "Yet wisdom is justified by [all] her children/deeds" (Q 7:35).

In Q 11:31 the wisdom of Solomon is explicitly mentioned and the point made that the queen of the South came "from the ends of the earth" to hear it. Yet as praiseworthy as the wisdom of Solomon was, "something greater than Solomon is here."

The question which remains unclear at this point is whether the Q messengers understood themselves in terms of prophetic tradition, sapiential tradition, or an assimilation of both. A related question is whether their self-understanding shifted from one category to another as time went on. If such a shift did take place, one may assume that the Q document itself shifted from one literary genre to another or became a mixture of two genres.

It is not difficult to see that in Q there are both prophetic and wisdom strands. There is, however, no scholarly consensus as to whether one of these is earlier than the other, and if so, which of the two is earlier. The debate revolves around two foci: the literary genre of the compositional stage of Q, and the literary genre of the final form of Q. One should also add the sociological dimension and ask whether the Q messengers themselves experienced a change in their self-perception as charismatic prophets or teachers of wisdom. However, since religious traditions in Palestine had a tendency to be intermixed, any such change would be more of a subtle shift in emphasis or perspective than an outright, dramatic revolution.

The self-understanding of the Q messengers has indeed undergone a change. This can be documented by the literary history of the document itself. It is reasonably clear that a number of what may properly be called prophetic discourses fit rather poorly in their present context and therefore show evidence of being interpolated at a later stage than the initial composition of Q. One such example is the fourth beatitude in the Q sermon, particularly 6:23 which is not a beatitude but an imperative to rejoice because "your reward is great in heaven." While the first three beatitudes are sapiential in form and content, the fourth beatitude is prophetic and Deuteronomistic. Similarly in the mission charge, the woes on Galilean cities (Q 10:13–15), which are prophetic in form, seem out of place in a discourse addressed to messengers. Likewise, confessing or denying Jesus before men (Q 12:8–9) has to do with prophetic utterance in an unsympathetic setting and is secondarily connected with with Q 12:6–7 which is a sapiential exhortation against anxiety with the reminder that God cares even for sparrows and has the hairs of one's head numbered. The literary history of Q seems to indicate that certain prophetic elements have entered the Q collection at some point after the compositional stage. On the other hand, the literary genre of Q in its final form is sapiential rather than prophetic. Hence, one must posit three stages of literary and social development for Q. In its earliest stage, which would be the compositional stage, Q would best be described as sapiential. At a subsequent stage, prophetic elements are incorporated. In the final redaction, the cycle is completed in that Q is edited from a wisdom perspective. Sociologically this would indicate that the Q messengers took on a prophetic stance after an initial stage of wisdom

outlook and self-identification. Furthermore, it seems probable that a third stage developed as well in which the prophetic spirit and outlook gave way to Christian scribalism with a return to a more sapiential understanding of reality.

Ethical radicalism characterizes the Q messengers at the earliest stage as is clearly apparent in a number of sayings in the mission charge and elsewhere. In Q 9:58 a prospective follower of Jesus is told that the Son of man has nowhere to lay his head, implying that a follower is to lead a life of renunciation of a fixed home. The anti-family ethos of Q can be seen in the reply of Jesus to the second would-be follower's request to go first and bury his father: "Follow me, and leave the dead to bury their own dead" (9:60). To be a follower of Jesus means taking up one's cross and if need be severing relations even with one's own family members (14:26–27; 12:51–53). In the mission instructions the injunction to take no silver, no purse, no bag, no sandals, no staff (10:4) is to be understood as having its social setting in situations of life that are extreme, to say the least. Wealth and possessions are criticized in Q 12:22–32. Rather than be anxious about food and clothing, one is to seek the kingdom of God. Enemies are to be loved, retaliation is to be set aside, self-defense is to be renounced, and absolute generosity is to be practiced (Q 6:27–30). The very kinds of things that are thought to be essential for social stability, a sense of security, and continuity of community life seem to be rejected.

Theissen has rightly argued that the content of a sayings tradition is an accurate reflection of the ethos and life style of the transmitters of those sayings. For Q this would mean that itinerancy in the document implies itinerancy among the transmitters. Itinerant bearers of the sayings tradition are responsible for the preservation of sayings whose content is itinerant radicalism. One must conclude then that in Q there is sufficient evidence of charismatic itinerancy prior to the development of a self-conscious community. Boring's observation that the Q document implies a settled community may also be correct only if it is taken as a reflection of the final redactional stage of Q.

The history of the Q community begins then with a group of itinerant messengers of Jesus. There is initially no Q community distinct from Palestinian Judaism in general. The social setting of the mission charge itself assumes a prior history of itinerant preaching with some measure of optimism that the message will find receptive audiences. The mission instructions in Q 10:5–9 leave the possibility open that the messengers will be able to find sons of peace in receptive homes. Reception in towns is also a distinct possibility, where food and drink may be provided, and an opportunity may be afforded for healing and preaching. It is significant that in these instructions there is no indication at all that the messengers are to seek groups or communities that are already aligned with the Jesus movement. The possibility of being rejected in towns is left open (10:10).

At this stage of the history of Q we encounter wandering preachers who view themselves as messengers of Jesus (10:3). Apparently they travel the length and breadth of Palestine performing healing miracles and proclaiming the the kingdom of God (10:9, 11). They see their task as preaching what Jesus had preached, or more precisely, they see themselves as the medium through which Jesus continues to speak: "He who hears you hears me" (10:16a). It is a message of ethical and social radicalism, such as the pronouncement of blessing on those who are poor, hungry, and weeping (6:20b–21), the injunction to love one's enemies (6:27–36), and the call to utter trust in the providence of God for food and raiment (12:22–32). The messengers are to acknowledge Jesus publicly and without fear (12:11–12). There is a great deal of emphasis on speaking, hearing and doing the words of Jesus (6:47–49).

While the mission charge contains elements which point to a relatively early period when success of the mission is viewed with some optimism, there are other indications that the preaching of the Q messengers did not elicit an overwhelming response. This is

intimated in the mission charge itself by the puzzling statement that the messengers are being sent as sheep in the midst of wolves (10:3). Its position here is rather curious, but it would be understandable if it is seen as having its *Sitz im Leben* at a somewhat later stage when the Q missioners begin to face opposition and rejection rather than the earliest period of itinerant preaching.

In the mission discourse the possibility is entertained that in some towns the messengers may well face rejection, in which case they are to shake off the dust from their feet (10:10–11).

The intrusive nature of the woes on the Galilean towns of Chorazin, Bethsaida and Capernaum (10:13–15) has already been noted. Their position here in the mission charge is understandable, however, as a reflection of the social and historical fact of the messengers' experience of opposition and rejection. They serve as a rhetorical device whereby some understanding is brought to the experience of persecution and provide justification for the message and self-understanding of the Q messengers; so also with the threat that it will be more tolerable for Sodom and for Tyre and Sidon on that day.

The woes on the Pharisees indicate that the Q messengers were engaged in polemic against them (11:39, 42–44, 46–52). In 11:49 particularly is there a reference to persecution and killing. Other intimations of possible opposition is the fourth beatitude (6:22–23), whose secondary inclusion in Q has often been noted. Jerusalem is lamented because it kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to her (13:34–35).

In the face of such opposition, the Q messengers are offered encouragement and consolation. They are to rejoice for their reward is great in heaven and they share the destiny of the prophets of the past (6:23). They need not fear those who can do no more than kill the body (12:4). According to 12:11–12, which is difficult to reconstruct, they need not be anxious as to how to answer when they are brought to court, because divine assistance will be provided.

Along with the Q messengers and their opponents, we must also assume that there were scattered groups of sympathizers in towns and villages who responded favorably to the preaching of the Q messengers. These groups were probably never very large, as indicated by the fact that there is a strong pronouncement of judgment on Galilean cities in analogy to Sodom (10:12–15). Furthermore, it is uncertain as to how profoundly the sympathizers identified with the ethical demands of the itinerant messengers.

Most of the discourses in Q are understandable as addresses to sympathizers who are settled in their villages and towns and are much less radical in their life style than the itinerant messengers. Such a social setting would provide repeated opportunities for most of the sayings of Jesus to be continually told: the Q sermon as a whole (6:22–49); instruction on prayer (11:2–4, 9–13); admonition against anxiety (12:2–7); trust in the providence of God for food and raiment (12:22–34); watchful readiness for the day of the Son of man (12:39–40; 17:23–24, 26–27, 30); faithful or unfaithful steward (12:42–46); parables of the mustard seed and leaven (13:18–21); admonition to enter by the narrow door and warning against the possibility of being left out (13:24–29); the demand to give up family loyalties and to take up one's cross in response to the call of Jesus (14:26–27); instruction on offenses, forgiveness and faith (17:1, 3b–4, 6); and parable of the pounds (19:12–26). The social setting in which these discourses are repeatedly told is more conceivable as that of instruction to those who have already aligned themselves in some way with the Jesus movement, however imperfectly, than that of missionary preaching whereby adherents are enlisted for the first time.

These small groups of sympathizers most probably continue to worship in the synagogues with no consciousness or intent of deviation from Judaism. The evidence for this is not direct but must be obtained by a process of inference. In Q there is no criticism

of the Mosaic law, which held a central place in synagogue worship. The law will never become void (16:17). Q makes no sharp contrast between the law and Jesus as is evident in the Matthean formulation, "You have heard . . . but I say" (Matt 5:21, 27, 31, 38, 43). Matthew clearly understands Jesus as superior to the Mosaic law and as the one in whom the law has its ultimate fulfillment (Matt 5:17–18). However, even in Q there is already the awareness that whereas the law and the prophets were until John, the present age, understood in relationship to Jesus, is the critical moment in history when the kingdom of God suffers violence, and men of violence take it by force (16:16). The Pharisees, who were increasingly associated with the synagogue, are criticized that they are excessively scrupulous with the cultic minutiae of the law but neglect justice and the love of God (11:42). On the other hand, in the temptation story (4:1–13), which is recognized as a later redactional layer in Q, Jesus appeals to the authority of the Torah in his confrontation with the devil. It appears that in Q there is an attempt to come to terms with the paradox of the authority of the word of Jesus in relationship to the authority of the Torah. Q finds the word of Jesus supremely authoritative. The significance of the Torah, on the other hand, is understood in its intensified, ethical meaning in keeping with the prophetic tradition of ancient Israel as represented in Isa 1:12, 17; Hosea 6:6; Amos 5:21–24; and Micah 6:6–8.

Although the Q messengers and their sympathizers identified with the Israelite past, the Torah, the prophetic and wisdom tradition, it is puzzling that they should face opposition and rejection in Palestinian circles. A number of questions come to mind. Was first-century Palestinian Judaism intolerant of messianic movements or new interpretations of the Torah? Was the opposition to Q religious, social or political? Did opposition come from the rank and file of society or from its leaders?

Hengel argues quite correctly that the political and religious history of Judaism from the time of the Maccabees was such that "any fundamental theological criticism of the cult and the law could no longer develop freely within Judaism."

As the Q messengers went about Palestine, in certain towns they may have found no sympathizers or may have even been forbidden to enter their borders (10:10–11). In other towns where there may have been sympathizers, it is quite likely that pressure was brought to bear on sympathizers to refrain from associating with these charismatics. Now it was becoming increasingly necessary for sympathizers to choose between the synagogue and the wandering prophets. They were probably given to know that they could not be faithful members of the synagogue and upstanding citizens and continue their association with the Q messengers. Intimations of such social ostracism can be clearly detected in the beatitude of 6:22 where there is mention of being reviled and maligned, and in 12:11 where one is faced with the prospect of interrogation in a public hearing.

The sympathizers apparently belonged to economically destitute and politically powerless classes, as intimated in the first three beatitudes (6:20b–21). The admonition against anxiety over food and raiment (12:22–31) would be appreciated by people who are habitually asking, What shall we eat? What shall we wear? The reply of Jesus to John the Baptist, echoing Isa 35:5 and 61:1, lists people living on the margins of society, such as the blind, the lame, the lepers, the deaf, the poor (7:22). In the witness of Jesus concerning John (7:25), there is the implication that those attired in soft clothing are found in royal palaces, not in the circles of John, Jesus, or Q.

Since the sympathizers belonged to the lower socio-economic classes, it would not be too difficult to conjecture that they found the message of the Q messengers appealing. The message of hope in Q, such as the beatitudes, could easily appeal to people who were socially deprived.

One can reasonably conjecture that the next stage in the social history of the Q community was a sect-type assembly of sympathizers who were now not merely sympathizers but ardent followers. Cleavage between the synagogue and "the Q sect" begins to widen to the point of mutual polemic, persecution, public trials and even the possibility of death (6:22–23; 10:3, 10–16; 11:47–52; 12:4, 11; 13:34–35; 14:26–27).

Now the Q community becomes a social world in itself. For its members, there is no other significant society. No other social ties, not even family relationships, can take precedence over social relationships within the community. One must "hate" members of one's own family to become a member of the Q community (14:26). The kingdom of God takes precedence over burying one's own father (9:59–60). Members of one's household may turn against one who becomes an active participant in the Q community (12:51–53).

Religious exclusivism is apparent in the jubilation and beatitude at the end of the mission charge. According to Q 10:21, "these things," which are presumably the contents of the Q sayings, are hidden from "the wise and understanding," namely those who oppose the Q message, and are revealed to "babes," that is, members of the Q community. "No one knows who the Son is except the Father, or who the Father is except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (10:22). Such revelation of the Father has been given to the Q community: "Blessed are the eyes which see what you see! For I tell you that prophets and kings desired to see what you see, and did not see it, and to hear what you hear, and did not hear it" (10:23b–24). He who rejects the Q message rejects God himself (10:16); such a rejection is an unforgivable blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (12:10). Entry into the kingdom is through the narrow door (13:24), presumed to be the Q community. The least in the kingdom of God, namely the Q community, is greater even than John the Baptist (7:28).

The sectarian values of the Q community demand total commitment. One must not fear to acknowledge Jesus publicly, even if it means martyrdom (12:4, 8–9). In sectarian mentality, the social world outside the immediate circle of the community no longer holds any viable attraction worth cultivating. The leaders of society are blind leading the blind (6:39–40). This generation, like children playing in the streets, is hard to please; neither the ascetic Baptist nor the sociable Son of man is acceptable to this generation (7:31–35). Woe is pronounced on Galilean cities for their refusal to repent (10:13–15). The Pharisees are denounced for their hypocrisy, self-righteousness, and even murderous intentions (11:39b–44, 46–52). Even Jerusalem itself is despairingly abandoned (13:34–35). The original guests who had been invited to the great supper forfeit their privileges by refusing to come while the outcasts from the city streets and lanes are ushered into the messianic banquet (14:16–24). People will come from east and west and sit at table with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, presumably a reference to the gentile mission, while "you/the sons of the kingdom," that is, Israel, will be thrust out (13:28). Jesus promises members of the Q community that they will eat and drink at his table in his kingdom and sit on thrones to judge the twelve tribes of Israel (22:28–30). The attitude of the Q community toward Israelite society is not that of placation, reconciliation, or amiability but of controversy, polemic, and polarization. For the Q community religious commitment takes precedence over, and indeed becomes a substitute for, national or ethnic loyalties. God has rejected Israel, and now there is nothing but judgment left for her. It would be reasonable to conclude that at this stage in its history Q was moving in a sectarian direction.

Yet one must still ask how it is that in this social setting of sectarian orientation the words of the mission charge remain in force. If there is nothing but judgment and despair left for Israel, why the continued interest in the words of this commission? The answer lies in the fact that the Q collection as a whole and the mission charge in particular define

the self-understanding of the Q messengers and create a world that is meaningful in spite of the harsh realities around them. Poverty, hunger, precarious existence, opposition, and rejection, which the Q community is experiencing, become bearable when seen in the light of the authoritative words of Jesus in the commission. The mission charge creates and continues to reinforce the Q community's world of meaning.

II. Sheep among the Wolves (Uro)

In many ways Uro's dissertation is similar to mine and therefore I will only point out some of its distinctive features. To begin with, Uro detects four compositional stages in the mission instructions: (a) kernel (10:4, 5–7b); (b) early mission code (10:4–11a); (c) mission speech (10:3–16); (d) final Q section (9:57–11:13).

The kernel of the mission speech is a consistent whole which has to do with the messengers' wandering life, their equipment and behavior on the road and in houses. The conjunction of "house instructions" and "town instructions" is a secondary composition belonging to the next stage. The early mission code, which is supposedly the common pattern behind the mission charges in Mark and Q, is distinguished from the kernel in that it includes public behavior (10:8–11a). This seems to me to be a questionable criterion in that it assumes that the instructions in 10:4–7b have to do with private behavior. The mission speech (10:3–16) is characterized by an increasingly pessimistic tone, with the theme of judgment as the leading motif. The thematic section, 9:57 to 11:13, was composed by the final redactor using the mission speech of 10:3–16.

Uro argues that in the earliest stages of Q, the "mission code" was shaped by a group of wandering missionaries who were the activists of the Christian movement in Palestine. Their radical life style, while in some ways paralleling Cynic practices, does not derive from direct confrontation with Cynicism but has its setting in the Jesus movement itself. Their mission was characterized by charismatic prophecy and eschatological consciousness.

The "mission speech" (10:3–16) depicts the situation of second generation Christian missionaries with a more gloomy outlook than the early charismatics. These preachers have experienced increasing conflict with the larger Jewish community. Israel's impenitence is pondered in such sayings as woes on Galilean towns (10:13–15), references to "this generation" (11:31–32), and gentile receptiveness (7:1–10). Although Uro considers 10:3–16 a coherently composed unit from a later perspective than the earlier mission code, he does not assume this to be a part of a general redaction of the whole document. Q is now in an intermediate stage of growing hostility and polemic against Judaism, but not separation and independence.

The "final redaction" of Q, which according to Uro was a major literary endeavor encompassing the whole document and undertaken in an ecclesiastical setting, is largely responsible for such statements in the mission charge as the bountiful harvest (10:2) and the thanksgiving and blessedness (10:21–24). The audience of 10:2 is no longer wandering charismatics but a Christian congregation which sends out church missionaries much like what is depicted in Acts 13:1–3. At this stage Q not only accepts but also encourages mission among gentiles, as seen in the "east and west" saying (13:28) and the parable of the great supper (14:15–24). Jerusalem is forsaken (13:34–35); God's secret revelation is given to "babes" (10:21).

The Q document in its final redaction cannot be attributed to wandering charismatics. Their antisocial message does not represent the later compositional stages of Q; their role is not that of literary activity but oral performance. Therefore behind the present form of the mission charge stand Christian groups in a sedentary rather than itinerant setting.

III. Q: The Ethos and Ethics of an Itinerant Intelligence (Vaage)

Vaage is interested primarily in the persons attested by the formative stratum of Q. Thus sayings which belong to the redaction of Q are excluded from consideration.

Vaage finds much of Q scholarship disappointing. His review of scholarship reveals three types of thought about the persons whom Q represents. He rejects the first two types of thought which characterize Q either in congregational terms or as a group. He finds a promising possibility in a third option which opens the way for viewing Q in analogy to the traditions of Greco-Roman Cynicism. He starts with Theissen, Schottroff, Stegemann, Kuhn, and Kloppenborg, but moves beyond them to make a strong case for Cynicism as the most appropriate tradition by which to understand the persons whom Q represents.

After a painstaking reconstruction of the so-called mission instructions (10:2–16), Vaage finds 10:3–6, 9–11, 16 to belong to the formative stratum of Q and makes these sayings the focus of his dissertation. It is these sayings which provide the closest parallels to Cynicism.

To demonstrate that such parallelism does indeed exist, for each of the above verses he adduces statements from Cynic writings which contain similar vocabulary or thought. Thus the reported statement of Crates that "Those who live with flatterers [are] . . . as defenceless as calves in the midst of wolves" is given as being analogous to Q 10:3, "I send you as sheep among wolves." Vaage argues that this is a cogent analogy in spite of the fact that the correspondence is not exact. Calves and sheep are analogous by virtue of their shared opposition to wolves. Sheep/calves and wolves represent ethical figures that are mutually antagonistic. The point of Q 10:3 is ethical integrity. The persons whom Q represents are warned of situations which will threaten their moral endurance. Vaage realizes of course that the verb ἀποστέλλω (10:3) does not occur in the statement from Crates, but this does not destroy the parallelism because the verb need not be taken in the traditional sense of missionary sending.

The prohibitions in 10:4 against a wallet, footwear, staff, and greeting have their parallels in Cynicism in the fact that these represent a way of life that is not normal in the Greco-Roman world.

The instructions in 10:5–6 describe how to find hospitality and how to handle inhospitality. In short, the point is how to beg. In this respect, both Q and Cynicism represent a way of life that is dependent on the hospitality of other persons. "Both learned that inhospitality and rejection are best endured and forgotten."

In Q 10:9 the instruction is given to heal and to announce the arrival of the kingdom of God. As in Cyncism so also in Q there is a close relationship between healing and the kingdom of God. The Cynics represented a way of life which was healthy and therapeutic not only for themselves but also for others who recognized the virtue of such life style by offering hospitality to them. "The Cynic lives 'under father Zeus,' whose presence means that other kings and kingdoms lose their threat and power." The same can be said for the kingdom of God in Q.

Although the specific gesture of removing dust from the feet (10:10–11) is not strictly paralleled by Greco-Roman Cynicism, the Cynics did perform similar acts of protest against cities in response to conflict, abuse and inhospitality.

The issue in 10:16 is self-justification or rationalization of the Q way of life. Hospitality is also involved here because other persons must either recognize or reject such a way of life. Vaage takes Matthew's wording to be representative of Q here, thus using the verb δέχομαι which would be more suitable for a discourse on begging than Luke's ἀκούω.

Although Vaage recognizes differences between Cynicism and Q, the correspondences are such that the persons whom Q represents cannot be viewed as historically unique. The Cynics' sense of happiness is rooted in a way of life characterized by self-sufficiency, forthrightness and shamelessness. These virtues are not features of a theoretical ethical system as much as a purely practical way of life characterized by a naive imitation of the natural environment, a certain harshness of speech, scurrilous as well as symbolical acts, biting anger and trenchant humor, calculated to express nonconformity to the values and mores of contemporary culture. Like Greco-Roman Cynicism, Q critiques the prevailing culture by offering an alternate way of life. Q represents persons who were more like Cynics than like anyone else.

Vaage offers two test cases for his thesis by discussing the exhortation in Q to love one's enemies (6:27–36) and a group of sayings on the kingdom of God. He demonstrates the usefulness of comparison between Q and Greco-Roman Cynicism.

Concluding Remarks

In these three dissertations the primary focus is on social and historical description of the persons represented by Q. Two different analyses are undertaken. Uro and I attempt to chart the social history of Q as that is visible at the various stages of its literary development. Vaage on the other hand attempts a description of the persons represented by the formative stratum of Q.

That there are similarities between Q and Greco-Roman Cynicism cannot be doubted. However, two questions would merit further exploration. First, if the final redactional stage of the mission instructions in Q as well as the perspectives of Matthew and Luke are more appropriately to be viewed as missionary enterprise rather than begging in the manner of Greco-Roman Cynicism, what were the social and historical dynamics which precipitated such a transformation? It seems to me that one would have to take seriously several social settings commensurate with the various strata of Q. Second, if Q is primarily a Palestinian or even more specifically a Galilean phenomenon, it may be useful to explore Greco-Roman Cynicism, and therefore Q, in the social and political environment of Palestine and/or Galilee.